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PHD DISSERTATION

Ayşe Gül İÇİN



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**THREADS OF PARTISANSHIP: UNRAVELLING
COLLECTIVE NOSTALGIA IN TÜRKİYE THROUGH
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS**

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Ankara, 2024

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Ankara, 2024

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis, prepared by Ayşe Gül İÇİN and titled “Threads of Partisanship: Unravelling Collective Nostalgia in Türkiye Through Social Representations,” is accepted by a unanimous vote as a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.

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I certify that this thesis fulfills the requirements to be deemed a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work, that I have not had any unethical behaviour infringing patent rights and copyright at any stages from the planning to writing of the thesis, that I have obtained all the information in this thesis within academic and ethical rules, and that I have cited all the information and comments used in this thesis. Date (04.12.2024)

Signature

Ayşe Gül İÇİN



DEDICATION

To my family

&

To my precious niece, Ecrin

&

And to everyone who participated in this study

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ABSTRACT

Threads of Partisanship: Unravelling Collective Nostalgia in Türkiye Through Social Representations

This dissertation explored the phenomenon of collective nostalgia, a nostalgic dream that depends on individuals thinking of themselves as members of certain groups, in the increasingly polarising context of Türkiye. It aimed to investigate how past, present, future, and collective nostalgia are socially represented in the context of partisan identities in Türkiye. Based on a qualitative methodology using semi-structured interviews, the study involved in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 75 individuals supporting various political parties in Türkiye, conducted between April 2022 and April 2024. The data were evaluated through content analysis using the MAXQDA. Participants expressed various types of nostalgia, including Ottoman Nostalgia, Early Republic Nostalgia, 70s-80s' Political Activism Nostalgia, 90s Nostalgia, Gezi Park Nostalgia, and Nostalgia for the Founding Years of the AK Party. The main finding of the research indicates that collective nostalgia, along with representations of the past, present, and future, is directly related to political identities, with supporters of political parties ascribing meanings to historical events and periods that align with their party identities. This highlights the political aspect of collective memory and nostalgia and contributes to a better understanding of the increasing political polarisation in Türkiye. The findings are discussed in the context of partisan schemas and perceived relative deprivation on economic, values-based, and political arenas. This dissertation is expected to provide the basis for a more complete understanding of collective nostalgia and its relationship with intergroup polarisation in Türkiye. Thus, it is expected to help researchers to (1) better understand the impact of social change on different political groups, (2) better analyse the expectations and reactions of groups in times of socioeconomic and political change, (3) analyse more comprehensively the possible effects of variations in the content of collective nostalgia on intergroup relations.

Keywords: Partisanship, collective nostalgia, social representations, social identity, collective memory

ÖZET

Partizanlığın Dinamikleri: Türkiye’de Kolektif Nostaljiyi Sosyal Temsiller Aracılığıyla Çözümlemek

Bu tez, Türkiye’de giderek artan kutuplaşma bağlamında, bireylerin sosyal gruplara aidiyetleri temelinde hissettikleri, o grubun geçmişinin özelliklerinden kaynaklanan geçmişe yönelik özlem duygusu olan kolektif nostalji olgusunu incelemiştir. Çalışma, Türkiye’de partizan kimlikler bağlamında geçmişin, günümüzün, geleceğin ve kolektif nostaljinin sosyal temsillerini araştırmayı amaçlamıştır. Niteliksel bir metodoloji temelinde yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmelere dayanan araştırmada Nisan 2022 ve Nisan 2024 arasında Türkiye’de çeşitli partileri destekleyen 75 kişi ile derinlemesine yüz yüze görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Veriler, MAXQDA programı kullanılarak içerik analizi yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir. Katılımcıların, kolektif nostalji temsillerinin incelenmesi sonucunda, desteklenen siyasi partinin önemli bir değişken olarak ortaya çıktığı görülmüştür. Osmanlı Nostaljisi, Erken Cumhuriyet Nostaljisi, 70-80’ler Politik Aktivizm Nostaljisi, 90’lar Nostaljisi, Gezi Parkı Nostaljisi, AK Parti’nin Kuruluş Yılları Nostaljisi gibi farklı nostalji çeşitleri katılımcılar tarafından ifade edilmiştir. Araştırmanın temel bulgusu, kolektif nostaljinin, geçmişin, günümüzün ve geleceğin temsillerinin siyasi kimliklerle doğrudan ilişkili olduğunu ve siyasi parti destekçilerinin tarihsel olaylara ve dönemlere parti kimliklerine uygun anlamlar yüklediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu durum, kolektif hafızanın ve nostaljinin siyasal yönünü belirginleştirirken, Türkiye’deki artan politik kutuplaşmanın daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkı sağlamaktadır. Bulgular partizan şemalar, ekonomik ve politik alanlar ile değerler alanında algılanan göreceli yoksunluk bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Bu tezin, Türkiye’de kolektif nostalji ve gruplar arası kutuplaşma ilişkisini daha kapsamlı bir şekilde anlamak için bir temel sağlaması beklenmektedir. Böylece, bu çalışmanın araştırmacılara (1) toplumsal değişimin farklı siyasi gruplar üzerindeki etkisini daha iyi anlama; (2) sosyo-ekonomik ve politik değişim zamanlarında grupların beklenti ve tepkilerini daha iyi analiz etme; (3) kolektif nostaljinin içeriğindeki farklılıkların gruplar arası ilişkiler üzerindeki olası etkilerini daha kapsamlı analiz etme konusunda yardımcı olması beklenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Partizanlık, kolektif nostalji, sosyal temsiller, sosyal kimlik, kolektif hafıza

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ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CHP	: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
HDP	: Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People's Democratic Party)
MHP	: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
SAADET	: Saadet Partisi (The Felicity Party)
TDK	: Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Society)
TIP	: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers Party of Türkiye)
TKP	: Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Communist Party of Türkiye)
YRP	: Yeniden Refah Partisi (The New Welfare Party)
YSK	: Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (Supreme Election Council)
ZP	: Zafer Partisi (The Victory Party)

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INTRODUCTION

*“The past is a foreign country:
they do things differently there”
(L.P. Hartley, 1953)*

Nostalgia is a phenomenon that has begun to attract the attention of various social sciences, such as sociology, political science, and psychology, in recent years. Nostalgia was first defined as the diagnosis of individuals who had a pathological mood due to the longing for space and homeland (Hofer, 1688). It was, therefore, conceived as a psychological anomaly and limited by a craving for the personal past. Over time, along with modernity, it has become a phenomenon that includes the longing and desire for the past because of the reaction to the irreversibility of time. Today, nostalgia is not just a uniform concept that reflects the longing of older people for their youth. It can also include a yearning for the future as well as the past; it is socially and discursively constructed based on the contexts; thus, it is a 'cultural' phenomenon with multiple meanings (Boym, 2009).

The current literature focuses almost entirely on personal (individual) nostalgia, that is, longing for personal history. Nostalgia is generally triggered by disturbing affect (Sedikides et al., 2015a) as well as scents (Reid et al., 2015) and music or lyrics (Stephan et al., 2015). Individual nostalgia consists of loving, self-relevant, and social memories often expressed in positive traits (e.g., happy, warm) and sometimes in negative characteristics (e.g., longing, sadness). In addition, nostalgia studies focused on its psychological functioning, showing that nostalgia increases empathy (Zhou et al., 2012), strengthens social connectedness (Wildschut et al., 2006), and buffers existential threats (Juhl et al., 2010).

Collective nostalgia (group-based nostalgia), a concept that has become the focus of researchers in recent years, refers to the emotional experience in which an idealised longing for the past is shared within a group (Wildschut et al., 2014). This type of nostalgia enables individuals to develop a commitment to the past based not only on their personal memories but also on the group's shared history, values, and identity elements (Boym, 2009).

Especially in times of political and social change, collective nostalgia can act as a powerful tool to reinforce group identity and bolster the group's self-perception. At the same time, it brings together positive representations of the past with criticism of the present and expectations for the future.

Collective nostalgia is not a phenomenon specific to a particular country or community but is also a global phenomenon. In different nations of the world, longing for the past is a common emotion that shapes and transforms social and political dynamics. For example, according to The Economist (2018), there is a global collective nostalgia boom today, and the main examples of this are the campaigns carried out during Donald Trump's presidential election in the USA in 2016 and the Brexit elections in the UK. Trump's 2016 campaign slogan, *Make America Great Again*, emphasises dissatisfaction with America's current state and longing for the once-enjoyed golden age. Similarly, during the 2016 referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, the slogan *Now Let's Make Britain Great Again*, expressing longing for the powerful days of empire, was adopted by those supporting Brexit¹. A study conducted in 2016, six months before the referendum, found that 44 per cent of British people were proud of Britain's colonial history, and 43 per cent thought the empire was a good thing, indicating an increasing tendency to romanticise the UK's imperial and colonial past (El-Enany, 2020). In addition to these examples, China's desire to return to its golden age, the elections won by populist politicians in Mexico and Italy with calls for the restoration of national sovereignty, Bolsonaro's bringing the far-right to the presidency in Brazil, and right-wing governments in Hungary and Poland working for the restoration of traditional values are also indicators of this explosion (The Economist, 2018). In the case of Türkiye, in the 22 years following the Justice and Development Party's coming to power with the 2002 election victory, we witnessed a return of both political and public interest to the Ottoman past and the rise of attempts to reconnect with the Ottoman past, both in conquest rallies and in various popular culture elements (Karakaya 2020; Özyürek, 2006). While these initiatives manifest themselves by re-glorifying the symbols and values of the Ottoman period, Istanbul stands out as a nostalgic symbol in this context as the home that has been longed for and desired to return to for a century (Tokdoğan, 2018).

These examples indicate that feeling nostalgic is not something that people do by remembering their own subjective or personal past, but it is also a highly collective

¹ The 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union.

phenomenon that affects larger groups, even entire populations and nations at times. Longing for a return to a significant historical period mobilises emotions by celebrating past glories or honouring legends and figures/heroes important to their local/national communities (Boym, 2009). “As such a collective force, nostalgia has a transformative capacity to change societies and the life experiences contained within them” (Jacobsen, 2022, p. 3). Indeed, studies show the significant effects of collective nostalgia in various intergroup contexts by making group boundaries more distinct, fostering an exclusionary sense of identity and, as a result, causing adverse intergroup relations (e.g., Smeekes et al., 2015). Political science has also investigated the concept to examine populist attitudes (e.g., Elçi, 2021). For example, in the Turkish context, Elçi (2021) found a significant positive relationship between collective nostalgia and populist attitudes. However, the dynamics between group-based nostalgia and political polarisation have not yet been sufficiently explored, especially from a qualitative perspective. Hence, in this dissertation, I examine how partisan identity shapes collective nostalgia in the profoundly polarised context of Türkiye and how these nostalgia narratives function in the political context. As a social psychologist, I am interested in the social and political consequences of the psychology of partisan identity and the functions that collective nostalgia plays within the political polarisation in Türkiye. Specifically, I investigate how collective nostalgia, and the social representations of the past, present and future differ according to partisan affiliations and how these narratives might influence intergroup polarisation.

Throughout my academic journey, I have always been interested in understanding the social and emotional foundations of intergroup relations. It would be helpful to explain how my own personal tendencies and family history shaped this study, for the reader of this dissertation to understand the background of my research better. I have always had a tendency towards nostalgia ever since I can remember, both as a child and an adult. For me, nostalgia, like its literal meaning, has been a bittersweet emotion that makes me feel both sadness and peace simultaneously. This emotion often came with a melancholic longing for 'lost time'—for a place I no longer had, for a bygone era, for childhood, for family members who were no longer with me. Especially in times of emotional difficulty, looking at old family photos, reminiscing about beautiful and happy childhood memories, or re-watching old television series had a soothing effect on me. For me, nostalgia has always stood out as an individual means of coping and as an emotion that has always held an important place in our extended family story. Growing up, my parents' political stories and pride-filled

memories of the past, rooted in their politically active youth in Türkiye in the 1970s, held a significant place in our lives. These narratives, filled with collective nostalgia, often glorified ideological or party affiliation, revealing a strong sense of group identity. My family's memories frequently emphasised struggle and resistance. However, they also expressed the distance from the groups with different ideological views. In time, investigating precisely the longing for the past and how it intersects with social identities became an academic curiosity for me. At the same time, observing how nostalgic narratives regarding social relations and values of the past differ among different party supporters in public discussions and on social media sparked my interest further. This variation is unsurprising within Türkiye's increasingly polarised political climate. Türkiye's context is multi-dimensional, with a socio-political and historical background marked by political, economic, and social upheavals, coup processes, democratic backslides, economic crises, and deep social polarisations. Collective nostalgia seems widespread, but it rarely manifests independently of party identity. My in-depth interview findings reveal that supporters of all political parties in Türkiye long for different aspects of the past. This diverges from international literature, which generally associates nostalgia with conservatism and right-wing ideologies, suggesting a longing for traditional values. Instead, in Türkiye, nostalgia is uniquely experienced across the entire political spectrum. Particularly, opposition supporters experience nostalgia not only due to economic deprivation but also as a response to perceived deficits in democratic and social rights. This indicates that nostalgia is a yearning for the past and a reaction to current social and political inequalities.

The concept of collective nostalgia provided me with a valuable framework to understand intergroup relations and the dynamics of increasing polarisation in the society in which I live. Questions like “What aspects of the past do different party supporters long for?”, “What are the diverging and converging aspects of their dissatisfaction with the present?” and “How do their ideal society descriptions for the future vary?” are central to this study, which explores the phenomenon of collective nostalgia to address these inquiries. This dissertation essentially studies collective memory and social representations, built around core concepts like social identity, collective nostalgia and partisanship. French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (2022) argues that memory is socially rather than individually constructed. Consequently, individual and collective memory are interconnected, continuously reconstructed and transformed with shifting social contexts. According to Halbwachs (2022), memory is linked to groups—society—and, therefore, to

the social. This means that memory is shaped according to the social framework of the groups to which individuals feel attached. Furthermore, the group-dependency of social memory associates it with identity. Thus, memory constructions are diverse, partial, and conflictual, making it impossible to speak of a single memory construction on any given issue.

Collective memory provides a social understanding of the past shaped by group identity perspectives, infused with emotions. Nostalgia, as one of these emotions, reflects social representations of the past as well as the present dissatisfactions and plays an essential role in the formation of group identity. In this context, this doctoral dissertation used a qualitative approach to explore the collective memory of Türkiye's societal past as well as present, and future representations within the framework of partisanship. Using a qualitative design with face-to-face in-depth interviews allowed me to examine how individual experiences and narratives are contextualised within broader social and historical frameworks in an in-depth manner.

I present the conceptual background of my study in the following section. First, I discuss the historical evolution of nostalgia and explore its functions. Next, I delve into the phenomenon of collective nostalgia in detail and refer to studies conducted in this field. I, then, address the relationship of collective nostalgia with relative deprivation theory, ideology, and partisan identities. In the subsequent section, I discuss how collective nostalgia, social representations and collective memory are interconnected concepts, followed by nostalgia studies in Türkiye and the scope of the current study. In the next part, I discuss the research method in detail and provide information about the participants, followed by results and a general discussion to conclude.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Evolution of Nostalgia: From a Disease to a Cultural Phenomenon

Nostalgia is a complex, bittersweet, identity-based, and existential emotion often defined as an emotional longing for the past (Sedikides et al., 2015b; Wildschut & Sedikides, 2021). The concept was first introduced to medical literature in 1688 by Swiss medical student Johannes Hofer (1934) in his thesis on the field of medicine. At that time, nostalgia was considered a disease that emerged because of the homesickness of soldiers who had left their homes and had both physiological and psychological effects. The word's etymology comes from the Greek 'nostos', meaning to return home, and 'algos', meaning a painful situation; thus, an aching longing to return home emphasises the melancholic undertone of the term (Boym, 2009). Nostalgia, as defined by Hofer (1934), was a disease that included serious physical (e.g., fever, brain inflammation, etc.) and psychological symptoms (e.g., visual and auditory hallucinations), which could progress from simple physical discomfort to catatonia and death, was treated with medicinal herbs, hot hypnotic emulsions and opium at that time. While returning home generally alleviated the symptoms of nostalgic Swiss soldiers, it has been noted that different measures were taken to prevent nostalgia from becoming an epidemic such as soldiers being prohibited from singing their local tunes not to be affected by nostalgia (Boym, 2009).

In the late 20th century, scholars in the psychodynamic tradition, who viewed nostalgia as a form of melancholia or depression, emphasised “the importance of the pre-oedipal mother in the emotional development of nostalgia” (Kleiner, 1977, p. 17), while nostalgia is viewed as “a regressive manifestation closely associated with loss, grief, incomplete mourning, and depression” (Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1980, p. 110). In his study on contemporary nostalgia in 1979, sociologist Fred Davis found that college students in the United States associated words such as warmth, old times, and longing with nostalgia rather than homesickness. This finding contributed to the *conceptual separation of nostalgia* from homesickness. Thus, nostalgia, initially considered equivalent to homesickness in Hofer's (1934) study, has become more related to *time* rather than *space*.

Nostalgia, which became a popular term in the first half of the 20th century and became an object in cultural theory, has the following dictionary definitions today: “a feeling

of longing for past beauties and this feeling becoming dominant; past affection, current affairs”² (Turkish Language Association [TDK], n.d.); “a feeling of pleasure and also slight sadness when you think about things that happened in the past” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.) and “a bittersweet longing for things, persons, or situations of the past” (American Heritage Dictionary, n.d.). These definitions emphasise the longing, bittersweetness, positivity and melancholy found in nostalgia. On the one hand, nostalgia is a feel-good emotion; when we feel nostalgic, we become happy because we remember something good, meaningful, and fulfilling from the past. However, nostalgia has another dimension than just feeling good: the feeling of pain and distress that comes from realising that it is not possible to bring back something that no longer exists (Davis, 1979). This is why nostalgia is a bittersweet emotion; sadness accompanies happiness in nostalgia. The past is no longer here; therefore, one must live with the loss and deprivation that the past (i.e., childhood, youth, prehistory, etc.) is irretrievably lost.

Psychological research has shown that nostalgia is associated with memories, the past and various emotions, while also documenting the functionality of this emotion (Wildschut et al., 2006; Hepper et al., 2012). In their study examining the nostalgia experiences of individuals living in the United States and the United Kingdom through content analysis, Wildschut and colleagues (2006) showed that the object of nostalgia is mostly close relationships, that nostalgic narratives depict disappointment and loss as well as positive emotional expression, and that they sometimes even touch on topics such as injury, separation, and the death of a loved one. Similarly, Hepper and colleagues (2012) found in their examination of the understanding of nostalgia among individuals living in the United States and the United Kingdom that laypeople viewed nostalgia as a predominantly positive, social, and retrospective emotion. Taken together, the findings of these two studies overlap with the formal dictionary definitions I have provided above.

Studies in psychology have also demonstrated various functions of nostalgia. First, nostalgia contributes to psychological well-being and produces positive effects at the individual level. Findings by Batcho (2007) suggest that nostalgia may enhance psychological well-being by facilitating a sense of connection with others and strengthening one’s sense of community. Second, nostalgia may strengthen self-esteem by increasing self-

² Turkish: Geçmişte kalan güzelliklere olan özlem duygusu ve bu duygunun baskın bir duruma gelmesi; geçmişseverlik, gündedün (TDK, t.y.)

positivity (Vess et al., 2010), as well as supporting other positive characteristics such as optimism (Cheung et al., 2013), inspiration (Stephan et al., 2015), and creativity (Van Tilburg et al., 2015). Third, nostalgia strengthens social connectedness, a sense of belonging, acceptance, and social support (Juhl & Biskas, 2023). Fourth, nostalgia enables the individual to perceive the passage of time as meaningful and to develop a sense of continuity between the past self and the present self (Routledge et al., 2008; Sedikides et al., 2016). This makes it easier for people to cope with existential threats. Overall, it can be said that nostalgia has a distinct regulatory and motivational function.

While the psychological functions of nostalgia are important at the individual level, nostalgia has recently emerged as an important concept in the context of social identity - that is, as collective nostalgia. Collective nostalgia, can be defined as a feeling of longing that individuals feel for their membership in a particular group, stemming from the characteristics of that group's past (Wildschut et al., 2014). This concept contributes to the sense of social belonging and identity by strengthening the bond that individuals establish not only with their own past but also with the shared past of a group or society. At this point, it is necessary to examine in more detail how collective nostalgia, which is also the main subject of this dissertation, shapes group identity and intergroup context by focusing on its functions. Therefore, next section explores the phenomenon of collective nostalgia, how it differs from personal nostalgia, its relationship with social identity theory, intergroup emotions theory as well as its functions at the intragroup and intergroup contexts.

1.2. Conceptual Understanding of Collective Nostalgia and its Functions

Although some scholars have divided nostalgia into two vectors, *individual-group* or *direct-indirect* (e.g., Havlena & Holak, 1992), most studies are based on the individual nostalgia perspective, while research on collective nostalgia has yet to be widely considered. Personal (individual) nostalgia is related to one's own life experiences and is a state of longing for one's unique, individual past, past relationships, memories, people, and events; that is, the content of the nostalgic experience is one's autobiographical memories. This type of nostalgia is generated from a personally experienced and remembered past (Havlena & Holak, 1992; Stern, 1992). Collective nostalgia, on the other hand, refers to shared emotional experiences based on the collective memories of a group (Davis, 1979). Collective nostalgia creates a shared emotional experience among individuals by incorporating elements such as group identity, belonging, and historical context more strongly and can be experienced

directly or indirectly. Direct experience refers to events in an individual's life. In contrast, indirect experience can arise from stories told by friends or family members, historical narratives, books, movies, or information in the media (Holak et al., 2008).

Collective nostalgia studies (i.e., Cheung et al., 2017; Smeekes et al., 2015; Wildschut et al., 2014), which have gained importance in the last 10 years, are based on the *intergroup emotions theory* (Mackie et al., 2000), which suggests that people can experience emotions based on their social identities. When individuals identify with a group, events or objects associated with that group begin to take an emotional meaning for them. Thus, group-based emotions include a variety of positive and negative feelings that arise as a function of group membership, such as group-based shame and guilt (Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). In this context, collective nostalgia refers to people's tendency to be nostalgic for the memories of objects, periods, or events in the collective past (Wildschut et al., 2014). Unlike personal nostalgia, people can feel nostalgic for a past they have not personally experienced (e.g., a 30-year-old individual living in Türkiye feeling nostalgic for the Early Republican period). Velikonja (2009) argues that this second-hand nostalgia can be as powerful and compelling as primary nostalgia through the positive information of collective memories.

At this point, it is of great importance to touch upon *social identity theory* to understand the relationship between collective nostalgia and social identity. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985) suggests that people derive part of their identity from their social groups. Social identities are formed when individuals create ingroup and outgroup categories based on similarities and differences (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The basic assumption of the theory is that individuals strive to create and maintain a positive self-image; in this process, social identity is shaped by group membership and reinforced by prejudices during social comparisons between groups. According to Tajfel and Turner (1985), social categorisation causes individuals to view their in-group as superior and define it positively, while attributing negative meanings to out-groups. Emphasising the differences between groups strengthens the perception of these differences and paves the way for the formation of in-group hierarchies. The internalisation of these hierarchies often leads to intolerance of outgroup members and their rights. When individuals internalise social identities, they *become to embrace the group's successes and failures personally*. Maintaining *positive group distinctiveness* is an active process that explains the dynamic

nature of social identity, especially when a group's position or status is threatened (Mackie et al., 2000). In this context, *collective nostalgia* may stand out as an emotion that distinguishes group members from out-groups and reinforces the sense of continuity that is important for group identity (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Thus, collective nostalgia may reinforce common experiences among group members based on shared social identity, while also highlighting *the group's unique identity*.

Research shows that collective nostalgia can be distinguished from personal nostalgia, regulates one's attitudes and behaviours towards one's own group, creates stronger effects on people with high in-group identification, and is socially shared within a group (Smeekes, 2015; Smeekes et al., 2015). In times of crisis or instability, collective nostalgia emphasises a common social identity through shared or remembered history (Boym, 2009; Davis, 1979). The history of groups is a source of comfort for group members because shared memories (norms, values, traditions) provide group members a positive historical narrative. Collective memories also establish an implicit link between current and future group members and those of the past (Liu et al., 1999). In this way, they remind us that groups remain stable despite the passage of time and events affecting the group. This sense of shared social identity reveals common experiences and helps group members understand the importance of values and symbols that contribute to their cohesion. Collective nostalgia calms group members by strengthening the individual's sense of connection with the groups and their past through longing (Wildschut et al., 2014). In other words, it helps members psychologically recover from the past by reestablishing collective continuity and motivates group members to support collective action to reconstruct the present. In fact, Wildschut et al. (2014), in their study conducted with an experimental design, showed that British students' intentions to support their ingroup's publicity campaign increased when they were reminded of a shared past. Likewise, Irish undergraduates who experienced nostalgia about a collective event (instead of engaging in autobiographical recollection of a collective event) spent more of their money to punish a transgression inflicted upon an ingroup member (Wildschut et al., 2014, Study 3).

Collective nostalgia, which has positive effects in the intragroup context, may have the opposite effects in the intergroup context. While nostalgia for the group's past experiences can reveal what constitutes group members' unique identity, it can also highlight how different they are from outgroups. For example, Wohl and colleagues (2019) showed

that White Americans who feel nostalgia for America's past are more prejudiced against Muslims and are positively associated with support for extreme actions against Muslims in the United States, including demolishing mosques, banning the use of headscarves in government buildings, preventing Muslims from practising their faith in public spaces, etc. These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Smeekes and colleagues (2015), who found that national nostalgia for the Dutch past predicts opposition to fundamental rights (e.g., celebrating religious holidays in private or public) for Muslim immigrants. Cheung and colleagues (2017) showed that collective nostalgia triggers negative emotions such as anger and contempt toward an outgroup in case of a perceived threat to the ingroup. Their studies conducted particularly during the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong showed when Hong Kongers perceive threats to China's values, they become nostalgic for their past social structures, and this nostalgia increases anger toward the outgroup and intentions to take collective action. The basic insight underlying these studies is based on relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002), which is the perceived discrepancy between the position of the groups to which a person belongs (also known as the ingroup) and the position that the group members think they should have. Therefore, next section discusses this relationship between collective nostalgia and relative deprivation through the studies conducted in this area.

1.2.1. Collective Nostalgia and Relative Deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation suggests that, despite the objective position of the individuals or groups, subjective comparisons and interpretations determine the awareness and responses to perceived inequality (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002). Individuals compare themselves; their status or groups and these subjective comparisons lead to evaluations that enable them to realize they may be in a disadvantage position to the reference group. Basically, people feel deprived of a certain dimension; this deprivation is not due to an absolute deficiency of the individuals but rather the result of comparison with the situation of another person or group (Stouffer et al., 1949). Runciman (1966) makes a differentiation between two concepts of relative deprivation that are individual-based (egoistic) deprivation and group-based (fraternal) deprivation. Individual-based deprivation involves individuals recognizing their disadvantages through interpersonal comparisons, whereas group-based deprivation is rooted in an individual's perception of themselves as a member of a disadvantaged group. The emotional dimension of group-based deprivation is significantly related to the intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000). According to

this theory, group members can experience group-based emotions (e.g., anger, guilt) in a specific intergroup context connected to their group identity, even if they are not personally affected by the events (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).

The impact of relative deprivation on group-based emotions becomes even more pronounced when viewed through *temporal comparisons*, particularly in relation to the past, as highlighted by the concepts of retrospective evaluations and collective nostalgia. In other words, individuals can also make group-based comparisons regarding their groups' past and present situation. Wildschut and colleagues (2014) propose that collective nostalgia is triggered when group members positively recall an idealized version of the past or feel dissatisfaction with their current circumstances. Cheung and colleagues (2017) found that nostalgia is linked to the perception of an unsatisfactory present, and nostalgic feelings intensify when individuals in the ingroup view the current situation as worse than the past. Similarly, Zhang and colleagues (2022) showed that relative deprivation has significant positive predictive effects on collective nostalgia through social and environmental alienation.

In line with this theoretical framework, Gest and colleagues (2018) analysed the effects of perceived relative deprivation in social, economic and political spheres on support for the radical right parties (RRP) in their study conducted in the United Kingdom and the United States. The study showed that a sense of collective nostalgia fuelled by relative deprivation significantly increased radical right support among white participants. In more recent studies on the relationship between relative deprivation theory and collective nostalgia, Rogenhofer and colleagues (2023) showed that the concept of resentment, which they define as a social experience consisting of feelings of ontological insecurity, group relative deprivation, and powerlessness, is predictive of collective nostalgia, using the 2019 Belgian National Election Study. They have noted that populist radical right parties (PRRP) in Western societies present an idealised version of the past as a positive reference while describing the present as a *declining* and *endangered* society. These discourses use nostalgia to create alarm that society is on a bad path today and reinforce the longing for the national past along with the current social discontent. Thus, they set social boundaries by pitting people with local and historical roots, referred to as “old-timers,” against other groups, referred to as “newcomers” (Smeekes et al., 2021). Similarly, Versteengen (2024) found that group-based nostalgia strengthens the link between relative deprivation and radical right

support. Their analysis of representative panel data from the Netherlands showed that individuals' nostalgia for society being better in the past increased radical right support. Additionally, individuals who experience intense collective nostalgia were more likely to feel dissatisfaction with the current government and, in turn, turn to the radical right. In this context, the theory of relative deprivation argues that individuals evaluate the present in a negative framework by remembering the past as a rosy picture, and this encourages them to resolve their dissatisfaction with current social conditions with parties that offer promises of returning to the past (Versteegen, 2024). In summary, these studies suggest that a sense of relative deprivation, reinforced by an idealised longing for the past, can trigger individuals or groups to turn to the radical right by increasing their dissatisfaction with today's social conditions. Individuals motivated by a sense of relative deprivation attempt to alleviate this dissatisfaction by choosing parties that promise a return to a positive past.

These studies have generally addressed the collective nostalgia experience as a one-way phenomenon and have limitations because they have not focused sufficiently on the specific past content that individuals feel nostalgic about. While studies such as Wildschut and colleagues (2014) focused solely on "feeling nostalgic," Smeeke (2015) used more global questions of nostalgia for Dutch society (e.g., 'I miss the way society was'). Similarly, Versteegen (2024) measured collective nostalgia using the two statements, "I miss the way society was" and "I miss the way people were". As a result, despite finding a high level of interest in the past among conservatives, they were unable to identify a left-leaning or inclusive type of nostalgia. However, there are important findings on the content of collective nostalgia and how different conceptualizations of the past can shape support for right-wing populist discourse. Three studies by Lammers and Baldwin (2020) show that collective nostalgia can both increase and decrease support for right-wing populist hostile rhetoric, depending on how the past is conceptualised. Their study shows that nostalgia for a past characterised as politically incorrect is associated with increased support for right-wing populism, while, in contrast, nostalgia for the greater kindness of the past is associated with decreased support for right-wing populism.

Similarly, Wohl and colleagues (2020) have examined how the content of collective nostalgia differs regarding the recovery of the in-group past and its effects on intergroup relations. The basic assumption of their study was that group members can experience collective nostalgia by focusing on different aspects of the past. Based on social identity

theory, they emphasise that ingroup needs and desires shape nostalgic memories of the group, and these memories trigger group-specific action tendencies. In particular, the content of collective nostalgia can be aligned with the current social goals of the group, depending on which aspects of a past that groups want to recover. They have shown that in different socio-political contexts, such as the United States and Poland, those who feel nostalgic for more open or homogeneous societies develop different attitudes towards immigrants and out-groups. Nostalgia focused on openness was associated with reduced anti-immigrant sentiment, while nostalgia focused on homogeneity was associated with higher anti-immigrant sentiment. In this context, the longing felt in collective nostalgia is not only for the past but also for a version of the past that has been reinterpreted according to present needs. Indeed, other studies in the literature also show that how the content of collective nostalgia is shaped by partisanship and ideology, which brings us to the next section (Hibbing et al., 2017; Stefaniak et al., 2021).

1.2.2. Collective Nostalgia, Ideology and Partisanship

Partisanship is defined as people's constant support for the political parties they support, regardless of circumstances, and a permanent emotional orientation towards political parties like the orientations they develop with social ingroups (Blais et al., 2001). As such, partisanship is one of the internalised identities important to oneself (Huddy et al., 2015). Increasing levels of emotional political polarisation worldwide (Garrett & Bankert, 2020) show that partisanship no longer merely reflects political preferences but has also become an important social identity. Polarisation studies, which draw attention to the positive relationship between political ideology and partisanship, show that the possibility of polarisation increases as individuals' partisanship levels increase (Gentzkow, 2016). Research highlights the power of partisan identity by showing that it can create an ingroup/outgroup divide as strong as ethnic identity, creating social distance and strong negative feelings toward rival partisans, and that simply identifying with a political party can be enough to negatively evaluate other parties or their supporters (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Westwood et al., 2017).

A study by Hibbing et al. (2017) shows that partisans in America are polarised in their evaluations of both the past and the present, and this differentiation affects their current political attitudes. Moreover, the findings reveal that Democrat and Republican party supporters, who correspond to right and left ideological identities, feel nostalgic for different

periods of American history. Müller and Proksch (2024) aimed to introduce, compare and validate measures of nostalgia in partisan discourse. The research was conducted on a fully translated dataset of election manifestos published in twenty-four parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 2018. The authors analysed nostalgia content using text classification tools developed over the last two decades for sentence-level measurement. The study's findings show that nationalist, radical right and Christian democratic parties have the highest levels of nostalgic discourse. While nostalgia varies across Europe, parties in Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe display the highest levels of nostalgic discourse. The results show that nostalgia is critical in party competition and varies systematically in partisan communication.

Stefaniak and colleagues (2021) examined the impact of ideological leanings on collective nostalgia. Their study, conducted in three different sociopolitical contexts (i.e., the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom), showed that conservatives were nostalgic for a homogeneous society, while liberals were nostalgic for a more open society. Their findings suggest that collective nostalgia was experienced with similar intensity for right- and left-leaning groups but was diametrically opposed in content. This study therefore challenges the assumption in the literature that nostalgia is only expressed by right-leaning groups and demonstrates how partisan identities can play a central role in determining the content of nostalgia.

In summary, existing findings on collective nostalgia and intergroup relations suggest that shared memories of the past contribute to collective memory when transformed into comprehensive narratives. However, this process can have both unifying and divisive effects. While nostalgia provides various gains at the individual and relational levels, it can emerge as a phenomenon that can have both unifying and divisive consequences at the societal level. Research also shows that collective nostalgia is not only a right-wing phenomenon; it can emerge in various ways among different ideologies and identities. For example, Stefaniak and colleagues' (2021) study found that both conservatives and liberals experience nostalgia, but the content they focus on differs. Their findings illustrate how collective nostalgia, shaped by current socio-political contexts, reflects not only a longing for the past but also for a version of the past that has been reinterpreted according to present needs. This reinterpretation is consistent with *the concept of social representations*, which are shared understandings and beliefs that groups construct to make sense of the world.

According to Moscovici's theory of social representations (1984), these representations are important for understanding how groups develop attitudes, construct identities, and navigate intergroup relations. Social representations provide cognitive and communicative frameworks through which past experiences (e.g., those linked to nostalgia) are understood and used to define group membership. In this context, representations of the past play an important role in shaping and maintaining social identity within groups. For example, Liu and Hilton (2005) argue that social representations of the past are highly diverse and can contribute differently to the ingroup's past that members seek to recapture. Therefore, in the next section, I will first introduce the theory of social representations, and then discuss the relationship between social representations, collective memory, and collective nostalgia, as well as how these concepts are interconnected.

1.3. Social Representations Theory

Social representations are concepts, expressions and explanations used by individuals or groups to express their ideas about objects, events, people, or other things that exist in their social environment and make sense of the social world surrounding them (Moscovici, 1984). According to Moscovici (1976), these concepts, ideas and explanations have two primary functions: (1) to establish an order that will enable people to direct and dominate their material and social worlds and (2) to enable communication by providing members of social groups with a code that will enable them to name and classify their own history as well as the history of their group. Social representations emerge in daily talk and are produced, modified, spread and objectified during interpersonal interactions. In this way, they not only make communication possible but also contribute to societies creating their own symbolic realities by influencing decision-making processes at personal and social levels. Especially in traditional and homogeneous societies, social representations constitute the symbolic reality of society because societies not only experience reality but also reproduce it (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Markova, 2003).

Shared concepts and memories can be used to draw boundaries between an in-group and an out-group. Thus, social representations of the past tell us which figures, events, or themes of the past have greater significance (e.g., Liu et al., 2012; Torsti, 2012). As previous studies examining representations of the past have shown, there are controversial social representations among different subgroups and minorities in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005). In their research on historical representations of national identity and intergroup relations in

the Dutch context, Smeekes and Verkuyten (2014) argued that the past is essential not only for the sense of personal identity but also for the sense of identity derived from memberships in social groups. In this sense, past representations provide an important area for understanding intergroup relations because each group's past is unique from its own perspective.

Drawing on this perspective, Smeekes (2022) argues that individuals understand what defines their group—such as shared ideologies and norms—which in turn shapes group members' behaviours. Social Representations Theory, which focuses on social knowledge, emphasizes the need to consider the historical, cultural, and macro-social conditions of a society when analysing social phenomena. In this framework, the role of history in shaping representations becomes critical. Social representations of the past are pivotal in creating, sustaining, and transforming social identities. Narrative representations of key events in a group's history play a central role in defining and positioning these identities (Liu & Hilton, 2005).

Moreover, representations of the past significantly influence the quality of intergroup relations and the perception and legitimation of social systems. They also provide a framework for understanding and evaluating the differences between ingroups and outgroups. For instance, Sibley and colleagues (2008) examined historical narratives that justify social inequality and demonstrated how such narratives produce discourses that maintain inequality, which are crucial for understanding intergroup conflict. In this context, social representations emerge as strategic tools that reinforce group identity and reproduce social hierarchies. This perspective aligns with Rofel's (1999) argument that nostalgia is not merely an emotion or a moment of commemoration but a representational strategy. Just as social representations can reinforce group identity and sustain social hierarchies, nostalgia can serve as a tool for individuals and groups to legitimize themselves and advance their policies. By selectively invoking the past, nostalgia creates a shared sense of identity while also shaping perceptions of social and political realities.

1.3.1. Collective Memory, Social Representations and Collective Nostalgia

Collective memory, a concept associated with representations of the past, refers to a form of social knowledge that can be transmitted across generations, maintaining certain constants over time. At the same time, collective memory has a dynamic side because it reflects the current needs and future desires of the group that shares it (Halbwachs, 1980.)

According to Halbwachs, group memory exists separately from individual memory and memories of the past are strongly linked to group membership. Every group, whether family or nation, has its own collective memories. In general, Halbwachs (1994) has emphasized the role of society as a context in which memories are created, recognized, and localized. These memories are not tied to individual group members: a member may leave the group, but the narrative of the shared past remains in the minds of other members.

Social representations and collective memory are essential tools for understanding how individuals and groups construct their identities, often through the social-psychological processes that shape their perceptions of historical events (Pennebaker et al., 2006). Jodelet (2003) and Halbwachs (1994) emphasize that the content of collective memory is linked to group membership. Candau (1998) suggested that there is a dialectical relationship between these two concepts, with social identity defining collective memory and collective memory shaping social identity.

The reconstruction of history through collective memory involves the selective remembering and forgetting of certain events (Madoglou et al., 2010). This process can be used as a tool to confirm in-group identities and clarify boundaries against out-groups (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Collective memory is shaped by the way socialized knowledge of specific historical events is remembered similarly by different individuals or groups (Coman et al., 2009). This information, which begins with individual information processing processes and turns into collective thought forms, is transmitted over time through both daily experiences and other communication and socialization processes through the representations outlined above.

Concepts of a shared past are communicated through different forms of collective remembering, such as family photographs, national myths, and cultural or national celebrations (Connerton, 1989). Although historical documents present the past as fixed, memories and their interpretations can evolve over time. The key aspect of Halbwachs' (1992) theory recognizes that collective memories are dependent on the context of remembering. Collective remembering always involves a set of narratives that can respond to both present and future needs (Halbwachs, 1992). In other words, concepts of the past and their significance for the present are constantly negotiated at different levels of the social environment (Pennebaker et al., 2006). How a group remembers its past is a valuable tool

for determining the group's current values and norms, and this provides information about the group's status (Liu & Hilton, 2005).

Collective memory is reconstructed narratively, selectively fitting the past to current needs, where historical events may be represented as desired rather than as they actually occurred (Halbwachs, 1994; Liu & László, 2007). In this context, collective nostalgia refers to a strong emotion that associates individuals or societies with a representation of their past (Laurens, 2002) and arises due to collective memory processes that accumulate all its distinctive features (Halbwachs, 1994; Madoglou, 2010; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997). Nostalgia, as part of collective memory, reflects how the past is represented in the present through social representations (Roussiau & Renard, 2003; Viaud, 2003). These representations are shaped by values, norms, dominant ideas, educational models, institutions, and group affiliations.

Collective memory is shaped by both past experiences and future orientations, with scholars like Ahonen (2005) and Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) highlighting how collective memory fosters group continuity by referencing both history and future aspirations. According to Davis (1979), nostalgia is one of the tools we use to construct, maintain, and reconstruct our identities, or in other words, one of the psychological lenses we can use to reflect our past, present, and future. Nostalgia justifies contemporary actions by relying on the past (Gaston & Hilhorst, 2018), with group history sometimes being remembered in a way that aligns with the needs of its members rather than how it occurred. Social representations of the past include shared beliefs, symbols, or cultural narratives within a group (Moscovici, 1988) and are a useful tool in the process of identity construction; this process allows people to understand who they are, where they come from, and where they need to go (Liu & Hilton, 2005). There may be differences in remembering the past because, from this perspective, the past is socially constructed. Members of a group acquire their common history through social representations. Thus, although memory includes personal aspects that present it as an individual entity, remembering occurs within the collective context and through collective memory (Halbwachs, 1980). In parallel, researchers (e.g. Stefaniak et al., 2021; Wohl et al., 2020) suggest that the content of collective nostalgia can vary as much as past representations and that these contents play an important role in determining which actions group members will support to achieve in-group continuity. In summary, the content of collective nostalgia is of great importance, and addressing groups'

experiences of collective nostalgia can help researchers understand why and how their expectations and reactions differ in times of socioeconomic and political change.

1.4. Current Study: The Purpose and Scope of the Study

Nostalgia has rarely been a research topic for researchers in Türkiye. Limited research on nostalgia in the country examines the concept particularly as a tool of populism (Elçi, 2021; Karakaya, 2020) and focuses on two types of nostalgic reverie, namely, Ottoman nostalgia and Kemalist nostalgia. The reason for separating nostalgia in this way is due to the polarisation and tensions between ‘secular’ identity and ‘Islamist-conservative’ identity that has been going on historically in the country. Ottoman nostalgia is characterized by a reaction to modernization efforts to cut ties with the Ottoman legacy of creating a secular state (Özyürek, 2006). On the other hand, Kemalist nostalgia emerges as a reaction to the rise of political Islam and refers to the glorification of the period of Atatürk as a golden age. It means longing for the childhood of a robust and independent nation as well as its secularist modernization politics (Özyürek, 2006). From a sociological approach, Karakaya’s (2020) research focuses on Turkish Conquest Rallies by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AK Party], as a case study to examine the characteristics of kind of populist nostalgia that is described as Ottoman Nostalgia and discusses the political power of nostalgia by focusing on the political use of the past. Elçi (2021) showed a significantly positive relationship between collective nostalgia and populist attitudes. The results of their study showed that Ottoman nostalgia increased populist attitudes, while there was a weak correlation between Kemalist nostalgia and populist attitudes. In another study conducted with an experimental design, the concept of national nostalgia in the context of Turkish nationalism was focused on and the mediating role of the level of identification in the relationship between social comparisons and national nostalgia was examined. Accordingly, participants with low identification with national identity glorified their past more when they compared with weaker nations; while participants with high levels of identification reacted defensively when compared with stronger nations and their level of national nostalgia of the Turks increased (Alper & Tasman, 2019).

Akarsu (2017) who focused on the relationship between different forms of national identity and the perceived importance of historical events in Türkiye found that ideological orientations as well national identity forms were decisive in how individuals construct the past. Similarly, a study on intergroup forgiveness among Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian

groups in Türkiye showed that which party a person votes for, rather than ethnic identity, is more relevant to whether a person is willing to forgive an outgroup member (İslambay, 2019). In other words, in Türkiye's political context, political identities may be more relevant than national identities (Karakaş, 2014).

The noticeable rise of polarisation based on partisanship in Türkiye was my starting point for this research. Research shows that polarisation and partisanship levels are quite high in Türkiye, and the desire to live together is low (Bilgi-MIGRATION & GMF, 2020; Leabens & Öztürk, 2021), and finally that the degree of closeness of party support to other party leaders does not exceed 5% for any leader (Turkey Corporate Social Responsibility, 2016). A recent study also reveals partisanship and polarisation are tightly connected and the rate of partisanship in the country is 74% (Leabens & Öztürk, 2021). This research shows that partisan identities, including the ruling party and opposing party supporters, hold the perception that other parties may threaten their well-being and that such anxieties are widespread on both sides of the political divide in the country. The study of dimensions of polarisation in Türkiye (Bilgi-MIGRATION and GMF, 2020) shows that political polarisation is not only valid for supporters of a single party but is observed among supporters of all parties. For each party supporter, there is a group that is seen as *the other*. For example, for AK Party supporters, the Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, [CHP]) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (Turkish: Halkların Demokratik Partisi, [HDP]) supporters; For CHP supporters, AK Party and HDP supporters; For HDP supporters, AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, [MHP]) supporters; For İYİ Party supporters, AK Party and HDP supporters, and for MHP supporters, HDP and CHP supporters represent the furthest groups. According to the findings of the study, 75% of the participants do not want their children to marry the children of the supporters of the party they feel the furthest; 72% do not want to do business with the supporters of the party they feel the furthest; 67% do not want their children to play with the children of the supporters of the party they feel the furthest and 61% do not want to be neighbours with the party supporters of the party they feel the furthest. As a result, it is seen that party supporters do not differ only in the context of the conservative-secular distinction. Additionally, voters in Türkiye do not always define their political identities around the conservatism-secularism distinction (Bakiner, 2018). Relatedly, although it is understandable that researchers classify nostalgia with a dual conceptualization in Türkiye because of the conservative-secular identity polarisation in the country, it is not enough to

examine nostalgia only in terms of the Ottoman-Kemalist distinction. Such a classification is limited in presenting the different meanings of nostalgia and does not provide sufficient information about its social psychological functions.

As I have already mentioned in the literature section, nostalgia can be analysed as a possible determinant of polarisation between groups and political attitudes in the context of partisanship. Similarly, research on social representations of the past shows that individuals tend to remember the past in the same direction as their social identities (Liu et al., 1999). Relatedly, current study suggests that collective nostalgia, which has emerged as an important emotion in the intergroup context in recent years, would be useful to study in the context of partisanship, as group-based nostalgia is also a key element of group identity in the face of outgroup threats, motivating group members to separate from outgroups (Smeeke & Verkuyten, 2015). Based on this, we can expect that in societies with high political polarisation, people's representations of the past and the way they feel nostalgic can be directly related to their partisan political identities. Thus, in Türkiye's increasingly polarised environment, the main purpose of the study is to deeply examine nostalgia as a group-based emotion in the context of partisanship and to investigate the ways in which past, present, future, and collective nostalgia are socially represented by different party supporters. Examining the narratives of supporters of various parties is of great importance in understanding how the past, present, and future are constructed at the political level. In line with this main purpose, the objectives of the study are (1) to examine how collective nostalgia is represented in the context of partisanship and (2) to explore multiple meanings that may contribute to differences in the evaluation of the past, present, and future drawing on the perspective of social representations theory. My research questions are as follows:

RQ1) Does the content of collective nostalgia vary depending on the party people support? If yes, how does it change?

RQ2) Do representations of the past vary depending on the party people support? If yes, how do they change?

RQ3) Do today's representations vary depending on the party people support? If yes, how do they change?

RQ4) Do representations about the future vary depending on the party people support? If yes, how do they change?

2. METHODS

2.1. Research Design

In this study, as the primary purpose, I aimed to explore the concept of collective nostalgia in Türkiye. Considering the scarcity of research on collective nostalgia and social representations of the past, present, and the future in Türkiye and the complexity of the related issues, I preferred to use a basic qualitative research design based on an interpretive and constructivist paradigm. Qualitative research aims to understand how individuals construct reality in interaction with their social world, and to analyse in depth the meanings they attribute to these phenomena (Merriam, 2008). Since qualitative methods usually involve developing hypotheses after the data are collected, we can consider them as hypothesis-generating research rather than hypothesis-testing research (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003).

According to Moscovici (1984), studying social representations requires understanding the processes by which individuals learn about events in daily life by talking and construct reality with new information. Since social representations are structures constructed in social discourses and language, especially in times of crisis, qualitative methods and techniques such as interviews in natural contexts are suitable for understanding these representations. Thus, I used semi-structured interviews to gather data. The interview method is frequently preferred in qualitative research due to its powerful features, such as providing the opportunity to obtain information about what we cannot see and make alternative explanations about what we see (Glesne, 2013). In-depth individual interviews are a flexible method that provides space for participants to explore and express their ideas and experiences on their own terms (Farr, 1993) and are frequently used because they provide the opportunity for exploratory studies that the nature of social representation studies require. This method, consisting of flexible questions, helps to expand the topic with different questions throughout the conversation, reveal diversity and reach new ideas about the subject (Merriam, 2013).

2.2. Participant Selection

I have determined participants by criterion sampling, a sub-type of the purposive sampling method (Patton, 2015). In selecting participants, I aimed to reach the broadest possible representation by interviewing party supporters who represent different political

views in Türkiye. In this context, I interviewed supporters of both the mainstream parties such as AK Party, CHP, HDP MHP, and the IYI Party (Turkish: İYİ Parti), which have groups in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, and the parties that represent distinct ideological traditions such as the Workers' Party of Türkiye (Turkish: Türkiye İşçi Partisi, [TIP]), the Communist Party of Türkiye (Turkish: Türkiye Komünist Partisi, [TKP]), the Felicity Party (Turkish: Saadet Partisi, [SAADET]), The New Welfare Party (Turkish: Yeniden Refah Partisi, [YRP]), and the Victory Party (Turkish: Zafer Partisi [ZP]). My aim in selecting participants from different parties was to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of collective nostalgia in Türkiye by representing a broad political and ideological spectrum. In this way, I aimed to provide a more comprehensive analysis of how different party identities shape collective nostalgia experiences. In this context, I interviewed 75 people, i.e., 13 AK Party supporters, 13 CHP supporters, 13 HDP supporters, 13 IYI Party supporters, 12 MHP supporters, 4 TIP supporters, 3 TKP supporters, 2 ZP supporters, 1 SAADET supporter and 1 YRP supporter. The main reason why the AK party, CHP, HDP, İyi Party, and MHP supporters constitute the majority is that they are the parties with the highest voter representation rate according to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) based on the 2018 General Election results (AK Party 42.5%, CHP 22.64%, HDP 11.70%, MHP 11.10%, IYI Party 9.96%).

During the proposal and ethics committee approval process of my dissertation, I stated that one of the groups I planned to interview was HDP supporters. However, after receiving ethics committee approval and starting interviews, HDP, which was at risk of being closed due to legal processes, announced that it had decided to participate in the 14 May 2023 Presidential Elections under the name of the Green Left Party (Turkish: Yeşil Sol Parti) (Cumhuriyet, 2023). In the following process, at the party congress held in October 2023, it was decided that the new name of the Green Left Party would be the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (Turkish: Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi), and its abbreviation would be HEDEP (BBC News Türkçe, 2023). However, the Supreme Court of Appeals rejected this decision due to the similarity of the abbreviation HEDEP to the abbreviation HADEP, which was closed in 1991, with the possibility of confusion. Following this decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, HEDEP decided to change the abbreviation and took the name Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (Turkish: Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, [DEM]) in December 2023 (BBC News Turkish, 2023). At this point, the reason why I did not make any changes to my sample group is based on a basic principle

underlying the definition of partisanship. Since partisanship is about emotional attachment to a party or political figures and political tendencies in this context and includes a sense of belonging of individuals or groups to that party, and the political affiliation of individuals in the group is compatible with the project goals, no changes were made to the sample group. Accordingly, I used the name HDP when contacting the participants and in the reporting to ensure consistency.

2.3. Data Collection Procedure

After receiving approval from the Ethics Committee of Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University (Appendix A), I reached the participants using the snowball method. The reason for choosing this method is that the snowball method is a method that helps identify or reach participants who are difficult to reach (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). In this context, I conducted in-depth interviews with 75 people in various cities, including Aksaray, Ankara, Balıkesir, Giresun, İstanbul, Muğla, Ordu, Van, and Kars, between April 2022 and April 2024. Materials included Informed Consent (Appendix B), a Personal Information Form (Appendix C), and the Semi-structured Interview Guide (Appendix D).

I structured my interview questions around three main themes. These themes helped me guide the conversation in the desired direction and maintain a natural flow. *The first theme* is structured around *three sub-topics*. The first and second sub-topics address individual perspectives on nostalgia and collective nostalgia, while the third sub-topic focuses on the social representations of the past. In this context, I began by asking participants the question, “Could you please define nostalgia in your own words?”. Following this, I asked them to identify the periods in their personal past that evoke feelings of nostalgia and to describe these periods in detail. Subsequently, I inquired about the periods in our societal history that they associate with nostalgia and asked them to characterise these periods and their features. The questions under this sub-topic encompass the social, political, and economic characteristics, values, prominent events, and figures of the periods they long for. In the third sub-topic, I asked participants to reflect on societal history and identify the periods they found challenging to live through, as well as describe these periods in their own terms. *The second theme* focuses on participants' representations of the present. Within this framework, I asked them to identify the key differences they observe when comparing the past and the present. Specifically, I asked them to evaluate changes in human relationships, values, political structures, and economic conditions. Additionally, I requested them to

indicate what they consider to be the most significant issue concerning the present day. *The third and final theme* aims to understand participants' projections for the future. In this context, I asked them to describe the society they long for and to share their thoughts on how such a society could be achieved. The purpose of these questions is to map general aspects or key issues of nostalgia as experienced by participants, to encourage participants to share their ideas and to be able to discuss nostalgia holistically in the past-present-future time perspective.

At the beginning of the interviews, I provided detailed information to the participants about my research. I conducted the interviews according to the semi-structured interview guide and recorded the interviews with a voice recorder after obtaining consent from the participants, who were informed about the confidentiality of the interviews, to have their data recorded. I coded each participant in the study according to the party they supported, by giving them a sequential number as AK Party 1, AK Party 2, AK Party 3, CHP 1, CHP 2, CHP 3, etc. The longest interview lasted approximately 76 minutes, while the shortest interview lasted 11 minutes. A total of 2128 minutes recorded time, with the average duration for an interview of 28.40 minutes.

Table 2.1 shows the demographic characteristics of the participants. A total of 75 participants took part in this study. More than half of the participants identified as man (n=45, 60%, Table 3.1) and the remaining participants identified as woman (n=30, 40%, Table 1). Self-reported ethnic identities³ included Alevi, Arabic, Caucasian, Circassian, Kurdish, Tatar, Turkish, Yoruk, Zaza. Occupations of participants included academician, architect, civil servant, driver, economist, farmer, engineer, lawyer, sales consultant, teacher, worker and private sector workers such as communication, insurance, commerce, textile. The age distribution of the participants is as it follows: highest number of (sixteen) participants between 42-49 years, 15 participants between 34-41, 12 participants between 26-33, 10 participants between 58-65, 9 participants between 50-57, 9 participants between 66-above and 4 participants between 18-25. An examination of participants' educational levels revealed that 2.7% (n=2) were primary school graduates, 2.7% (n=2) were middle school graduates, 29.3% (n=22) were high school graduates, 4% (n=3) were university students, 37.3% (n=28) were university graduates, and 13.3% (n=10) held doctoral degrees.

³ Questions about ethnic identity were posed to participants in an open-ended format, and the responses were shaped based on the participants' own definitions.

Income distribution was divided into five groups to indicate the socioeconomic status of the participants: low, lower-middle, middle, upper-middle, and upper-income groups. Accordingly, 17.3% (n=13) were in the lower income group, 24% (n=18) were in the lower-middle income group, 46.7% (n=35) were in the middle-income group, and 10.7% (n=8) were in the upper-middle income group. Detailed demographic information of the participants can be seen in Appendix E.

Table 2.1. Demographic characteristics of participants

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Man	45	60
	Woman	30	40
Age Group	18-25	4	5,3
	26-33	12	16
	34-41	15	20
	42-49	16	21,3
	50-57	9	12
	58-65	10	13,3
	66-above	9	12
Education	Primary School	2	2,7
	Secondary School	2	2,7
	High School	22	29,3
	University Student	3	4
	University Graduate	28	37,3
	Master's Student	4	5,3
	Master's Graduate	2	2,7
	Doctoral Student	2	2,7
	Doctoral Graduate	10	13,3
Income	0-17.000	5	6,7
	17.001-34.000	22	29,3
	34.000-51.000	25	33,3
	51.001-68.000	9	12
	68.001-85.000	5	6,7
	85.0001-above	9	12
Income Group	Low	13	17,3
	Lower middle	18	24
	Middle	35	46,7
	Upper middle	8	10,7
	Upper	1	1,3
Ethnicity	Alevi	7	9,3
	Arabic	1	1,3
	Avshar Turkish Tribe	1	1,3
	Caucasian	1	1,3
	Circassian	2	2,7
	Kurdish	11	14,7
	Tatar	3	4
	Turkish	45	60
	Yoruk	1	1,3
	Zaza	1	1,3
	Unwilling to specify	2	2,7

2.4. Data Analysis Procedure

I transcribed the recorded information by trying to be faithful to the language and accent characteristics of the interviewees and used MAXQDA Professional Data Analysis Software for Qualitative & Mixed Methods, a computer-aided qualitative data analysis program, in the analysis. I have analysed the entire data set collected in the study with content analysis, a type of qualitative data analysis. Content analysis, as with qualitative methods, involves subjective interpretation of the content of data, and these interpretations arise from the systematic classification of data into codes, patterns, and themes (Breakwell, 2013). Essentially, the analyst works with a large body of data and breaks it down into smaller categories that represent the content of the data (Jaspal, 2020).

To analyse the qualitative data, I employed a content analysis approach, in which I combined both deductive and inductive strategies. Predefined main categories—such as personal/collective nostalgia, social representations of the past, present-day representations (economic, value-based, political, social relationships), and future projections—were developed based on the study's theoretical framework and research objectives. These categories provided a structured framework for organizing the data. Within these categories, the coding process was inductive, allowing for the emergence of sub-themes based on participants' responses. Coding involves separating the data into sections, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and making sense of them. Thus, I began by reading the interview transcripts, identifying repetitive themes, phrases, and paragraphs, and noting potential codes. For example, under the category of "present-day representations," political differences were further analysed to reveal sub-themes such as *oppressive policies and authoritarianism*, *insecurity and polarisation*, *increased freedom*, reflecting the nuanced perspectives of different political party supporters. This hybrid approach ensured both alignment with the research focus and flexibility to capture patterns in the data.

During the coding process, I marked the same code multiple times on the same participant, but I made my comparisons on a document-by-document basis. That is, I focused on how many participants stated that code; the same participant stating the same code multiple times did not affect my comparisons. Thus, when reporting the findings, I indicated that the relevant comparison was document-based using the term '*document-based*'. Code-based comparisons, which represent the frequencies of relevant codes across all documents, were also specified as '*code-based*' in the names of tables or figures.

2.5. Reflexivity

This research serves not only as an academic investigation, but also as a journey of discovery of the society I live in. This reflexivity shows how my identity and experiences are intertwined with each stage of the research. I have tried to develop a constant awareness to remain neutral and objective while confronting my own emotions and past.

During the process of preparing this research and collecting data, two important and deeply affecting events occurred in my life; my father's Alzheimer's disease progressed, and I lost my grandmother. I realized that witnessing my father gradually lose his memory was an important factor in my interest in the subject of collective memory and nostalgia. This experience showed me not only how valuable the past is, but also the deep meaning that memory carries for a community and an individual. While experiencing this, I tried to continue this study in an objective and analytical framework as possible. My father's struggle with Alzheimer's disease clearly revealed to me the fragility and power of both individual and collective memory. As his disease progressed, the way he remembered political events of the 1970s and 1980s in Türkiye also changed. On some days, his memories of past actions and friends were very vivid; on other days, these memories seemed to be completely erased or confused. Alzheimer's worked like a selective filter in my father's memory, emphasizing certain political memories while overshadowing others. This provided me with a striking example of how collective memory can be selective within the framework of partisanship.

During the data collection process, the loss of my grandmother, who had a very important place in my life, caused me to continue my work with a deeper nostalgia and emotionality. Focusing on the participants' childhood memories during the interviews reflected my search to relive the past I had lost. These interviews allowed me to re-interpret the connection I had established with the past and to see how this connection was reflected in the research process. Similarly, some participants became very emotional when expressing their intense longing for past experiences. In such times I always reminded them that we could take a break or end the interview. Although I was initially worried that this would create emotional pressure on my participants, after the interviews, almost all participants stated that the interviews had some therapeutic and relaxing effect and were interesting for them, which relieved my concerns. The interest of the participants in my study

increased my motivation. Their curiosity about this topic revealed that the research addressed a relevant social need.

Audio recording of the interviews made initially some participants feel uneasy. It was critical for me to establish a trusting relationship with the participants and to allow them to express themselves freely. While some of the participants expressed these concerns, I took care to alleviate their discomfort and create a safe space, always reminding them that they had the right not to continue the study if they felt uneasy. I also reminded them of the confidentiality of the study at such times. This process increased my awareness of the sensitivity with which political research should be conducted in a country where political polarisation and oppression are high, like Türkiye.

Conducting this study between April 2022 and May 2024 coincided with a context in which Türkiye experienced a presidential election (14 May 2023, Phase 1 and 14 June 2023, Phase 2), a general election (14 May 2023), and a local election (31 March 2024); therefore, politics was at the centre of social life. I believe that this context affected the study in several ways. First, since the participants' level of contact with politics was high, their level of identification with the parties they supported and their collective nostalgia experiences for the past may have been shaped under more intense and current influences. In addition, in this period, when the political atmosphere encompassed daily life more, the participants' perceptions of the past, present, and future may have become more pronounced. This situation provided the opportunity to penetrate the subject of the study more deeply and provided details on how the participants made sense of the past with their partisan identities and how these meanings affected their current political attitudes.

3. RESULTS

I present the findings obtained from the analyses in three main sections in accordance with the semi-structured interview guide. In the first section, I focus on participants' definitions of nostalgia, their nostalgic memories related to their personal past, and their collective nostalgia representations, which are the periods in the societal past for which they feel the most nostalgic. In addition, I address participants' social representations of the most difficult periods and distressing events throughout the societal history.

The second section includes comparative evaluations of the present and the past in terms of economic and political conditions as well as social relations and societal values. In this section, I also examine in detail the issues participants consider as Türkiye's most important problems.

In the third and final section, I present participants' descriptions of the society they long for and their expectations for the future. In this section, I focus on participants' understanding of the ideal society and their hopes and expectations for achieving this society in the future. This structure ensures that I provide a systematic and in-depth analysis of this study, allowing for a comprehensive understanding of participants' perceptions of the past, present, and future.

4.1. Nostalgia, Personal and Collective Nostalgia

4.1.1. Definition of Nostalgia

In this section, I present the participants' definitions of nostalgia. In the literature, nostalgia is primarily defined as a longing for the past and is often associated with positive emotions such as happiness, intimacy and warmth as well as sometimes with negative emotions like melancholy and sadness. It consists of affectionate, personal and social memories (Seidikes et al., 2015). Similarly, in my study, participants' definitions of nostalgia frequently reflect a longing for happy and beautiful times in the past, especially from their childhood and early youth years.




Figure 3.1. The document-based frequency of the categories in the definition of nostalgia

As seen in Figure 3.1, I grouped the codes related to participants' definitions of nostalgia under five distinct categories. These categories are as follows: longing for the past, elements of the past, emotional experiences, past-future synthesis and remembering the past. Figure 3.1 shows the document-based frequency of these categories within the definitions of nostalgia indicating how many participants mentioned each category. Accordingly, the theme of longing for the past was the category expressed by the most participants ($n = 59$). The codes under the category of elements of the past include popular cultural elements of past eras, music genres, fashion items, objects more commonly used in earlier times (such as stoves, radios, notebook covers, etc.) and games played in the past (see Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2. Thematic map for participants' definitions of nostalgia along with the sub-codes

As Figure 3.2 shows, longing for happy and beautiful memories from childhood along with a general longing for the past emerged as the two most frequently expressed themes by participants. Games played in the streets during childhood, the absence of safety concerns, happy moments spent with family and childhood itself are frequently mentioned aspects of the past. For some participants, nostalgia represents a longing for the sociocultural values of the past such as neighbourhood culture, neighbourly relations and a sense of sharing. The category of emotional experiences reveals that some participants defined nostalgia as an emotion associated with happiness, sadness/melancholy, security and peace. The past-future synthesis category encompasses definitions by participants who described nostalgia as a concept functioning as a bridge between the past and the future. Table 3.1 shows sample quotes related to participants' definitions of nostalgia. The information in parentheses indicates the participant's code, gender and age. For example, “IYI Party 1” means the first participant from IYI Party supporters.

Table 3.1. Sample quotes related to participants' definitions of nostalgia

THEME	SUB-THEME	SAMPLE QUOTES
Longing for the Past (n=59)	General longing for the past (n=24)	Nostalji deyince benim aklıma gelen insanların geçmişte yaşadıkları, yaptıkları, gördükleri ya da kullandıkları şeyleri özlemeleri (IYI Parti 12, erkek, 40).
	Longing for beautiful/happy moments from the past (n=23)	Nostalji derken benim aklıma geçmişteki yaşanan güzellikler geliyor. Yani geçmiş geliyor nostalji derken. Yani arkadaşlarımla geçirdiğim zaman, çocukluk derim yaşadığım. Yani nostalji derken o geliyor bana (CHP 2, kadın, 45)
	Longing for sociocultural values of the past (n=10)	Bana göre nostalji... Nasıl anlatayım? Yani bu komşuluk, arkadaşlık, bizim çocukluğumuzdaki o arkadaşlık yok, mahalle, kültürü, işte o şeyi yok. Bizim çocukluğumuzda kapılar hep açıktı (AK Parti 13, erkek, 49).
	Longing for the simplicity of the past (n=2)	Tabii ki nostalji özlem duyduğumuz, önceden çok rahat yapılıp da şimdi yapılamayan şeyler daha rahat daha doğal hareketlere derdik (MHP 9, erkek 40).
		When I think of nostalgia, what comes to mind are the things that people experienced, did, saw, or used in the past, which they long for (IYI Party 12, man, 40).
		When I think of nostalgia, for me, it brings up the beautiful moments from the past. So, when I say nostalgia, the past comes to mind. The time I spent with my friends, my childhood days. That's what comes to me when I think of nostalgia (CHP 2, woman, 45).
		In my opinion, nostalgia... How can I explain it? I mean, that sense of neighbourhood, friendship—the kind of friendships we had in our childhood are no longer here, the neighbourhood culture is gone, that essence is missing. Back in our childhood, the doors were always open (AK Party 13, man, 49).
		Of course, nostalgia is about the things we long for, things that were once easily done but can no longer be done so freely, things we used to describe as more relaxed and natural actions (MHP 9, man, 40).

Table 3.1 (continued)

Elements of the Past (n=19)	Objects, music, fashion, cultural elements (n=19)	Nostalji bence Coşkun Sabah'tır. Evet. Coşkun Sabah. Nostalji duyduğum zaman aklıma Coşkun Sabah geliyor. Elindeki ud değil mi o çaldığı? O geliyor (AK Parti 6, erkek, 48). Ee nostaljinin tanımı, ee siyah beyaz televizyon efendime söyleyeyim. Herkesin takım elbise giydiği, tüm kadınların elbise giydiği bir zaman (MHP 11, erkek, 30).	I think nostalgia is Coşkun Sabah. Yes, Coşkun Sabah. When I feel nostalgic, he comes to mind. Isn't he the one who plays the oud? That's whom I think of." (AK Party 6, man, 48). Well, the definition of nostalgia for me is black-and-white television, I mean. A time when everyone wore suits, and all the women wore dresses." (MHP 11, man, 30)
Remembering the Past n=9)	Commeration of the past (n=5)	Yani nostalji aslında geçmişle ilgili bir şey gibi geliyor bana geçmişe öykünme, onu anma gibi çağrışımlar yapıyor (HDP 1, kadın, 33)	So, nostalgia seems like something related to the past to me, it evokes associations such as emulating the past and commemorating it (HDP 1, female, 33)
	Romantic perception of the past (n=2)	Nostalji benim için biraz daha böyle geçmişe romantik bir bakış, geçmişe romantik bir algılayış şekli gibi geliyor basit şekilde tanımlamak gerekirse (İYİ Parti 7, erkek, 26).	Nostalgia, for me, feels like a more romantic perspective on the past, a way of perceiving the past romantically, if I had to define it simply." (IYI Party 7, man, 26).
	Desire to recall/return to old times (n=2)	Nostalji tabii ki geçmişe belirli bir özlem çerçevesinde geçmiş günlerin anılması ve o ana tekrar geri dönme isteği gibi yorumlanabilir (TİP 4, erkek, 61).	Nostalgia can certainly be interpreted as the remembrance of past days within a framework of longing for the past and a desire to return to those moments (TIP 4, man, 61).
Emotional Experiences (n=6)	Melancholy/sadness (n=4)	Keder, melankoli, hüznün ve bir eksiklik duygusu, hiç tamamlanmayan, geçmeyen bir eksiklik duygusu (HDP 9, kadın, 26).	Grief, melancholy, sadness, and a sense of deficiency—a feeling of an incomplete, unending deficiency." (HDP 9, woman, 26).
	Feelings of safety/serenity (n=1)	Nostalji benim için çocukluk anılarımda çok keyifli dönemler geçirdiğim için, kalabalık bir ailede büyüdüğümüzden ama biraz da sosyal demokrat bir ailede büyüdüğümüzden, birliğin, beraberliğin ve paylaşımın daha fazla olduğu ve daha keyifli, daha huzurlu hissettiğim ve anı olarak baktığım zamanda geçmişe şey hissediyorum yaşadığım yerde güvenle yaşayabildiğimi hissediyorum (CHP 12, kadın, 52)	For me, nostalgia is tied to the enjoyable periods I experienced in my childhood. Growing up in a large family, and in a somewhat social-democratic family, I feel a sense of unity, togetherness, and sharing more. I remember those times as more pleasant and peaceful. I recall feeling safe in the place where I lived (CHP 12, woman, 52).
	Happiness (n=1)	Nostalji deyince geçmişte mutlu olduğum zamanlar daha çok belki. (İYİ Parti 12, erkek, 40)	When I say nostalgia, I think of the times when I was happier in the past (IYI Party 12, man, 40).
Past-Future Synthesis (n=2)	Past-Future Synthesis (n=2)	Nostalji, eee yani işte geçmişle geleceğin senteziyle oluşturulmuş anılar diyelim, yani böyle bir şey (HDP 12, erkek, 42).	Nostalgia, well, let's say its memories formed by the synthesis of the past and the future, something like that (HDP 12, man, 42).

4.1.2. Personal Nostalgia

The periods in which participants experienced nostalgic feelings related to their personal past predominantly coincide with their childhood and school years. Other periods include their working life and early youth and university years that also encompass politically active times and the early years of marriage (see Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3. Thematic map for participants' expressions regarding personal nostalgia

The elements that make early youth nostalgic include the sense of freedom, friendships formed at university, the university environment providing opportunities to explore different cultures, cultural activities carried out during that time and lastly the development of political awareness and identity. The elements that make working years nostalgic include having an active life and work friends.




Figure 3.4. Thematic map for the sub-codes of childhood-school years

Figure 3.4 includes the document-based frequency of themes related to participants' childhood and school years. Regarding childhood, themes such as playing games in the streets, being with family, neighbourhood culture and solidarity, feeling happy and safe, more sincere human relationships and the enthusiastic celebration of national and religious holidays emerge. These themes are common across supporters of all political parties.

Some participants express their longing for the times when they could play comfortably on the street and had no security problems. Participants describe childhood as a 'freer and more comfortable' time, referring to an environment where issues that would trouble families such as harassment did not exist. In this setting, children could spend time in the streets without worrying expresses a longing for a safe environment. This nostalgia for the security and social bonds of childhood also highlights the notion that today's children are deprived of the experience of growing up in a natural and safe environment, presenting the past as an ideal time.

Quote 1 (CHP 5, woman, 50)

Bizlerin sokakta arkadaşlarımızla, mahalle kültürüyle büyüdüğümüz, bütün oyunlarımızı birbirimizden öğrendiğimiz, akşamın 8lerine kadar dışarlarda korkusuzca kendi mahallemizde arkadaşlarımızla oynayarak geçirdiğimiz bir çocukluğumuz vardı.

We had a childhood that we grew up with our friends on the street, with the neighbourhood culture, we learned all our games from each other, and we spent our childhood playing with our friends in our own neighbourhood without fear until 8 pm.

Quote 2 (HDP 1, woman, 50)

Sokakta oynayabildiğimiz, daha özgür ve rahat olduğumuz, taciz gibi ailelerimizi rahatsız edecek durumların olmadığı bir ortamımız vardı - zaten yoktu böyle şeyler. Komşu teyzemiz amcamız o anlamda vardı, şimdiki çocukların sahip olmadığı ortamlar.

We had an environment where we could play on the street, where we were freer and more comfortable, where there were no situations that could disturb our families such as harassment- there weren't such things anyway - we had our neighbours next door whom we called aunt and uncle, environments that current children do not have.

Some participants' nostalgic childhood memories emphasize the special significance of the time spent with family. The common theme highlighted by these participants is the value and longing for time spent with family members. Moments shared with siblings, parents or extended family members (such as grandparents) represent a childhood experience where family bonds were stronger, and these bonds now emerge as a cherished and longed element. Participants associate these times with feelings of peace, security and happiness. For one participant, childhood nostalgia is evoked by memories of the stove, the scent of fruits, and eating meals on the floor table (Quote 3). Another participant reminisces about

moments when her grandfather listened to traditional folk songs, expressing a desire to return to those times (Quote 4). One participant, who lost his father and brother, emphasizes that family togetherness is no longer possible, with this loss making the past feel more nostalgic and precious (Quote 5). Another participant, reflecting on growing up within a larger family structure beyond the nuclear family, reveals a longing for a more community-oriented way of life (Quote 6).

Quote 3 (AK Party 12, woman, 36)

Hangi anılar nostaljik geliyor... Ee ben çok çocuklu bir ailede büyüdüm. Yani çok çocuklu dediğim 4 kardeşlik biz. En büyükleri bendim. Yani o aile şeyi, huzuru.... Benim annem çocuklarıyla çok vakit geçiren bir bayandı. O yer sofralarımız, onlarla işte... Annemle o çay - çay alışkanlığımız annemden gelir mesela bizim- o dönemleri... O soba, o meyva kokuları. Yani çocukluğumda onlar.

What memories feel nostalgic... Well, I grew up in a big family. I mean, by big, I mean we were four siblings. I was the oldest. That sense of family, the peace... My mother was a woman who spent a lot of time with her children. Those meals on the floor, and, you know... Our tea habit, that comes from my mother—for example, those times... That stove, the scent of fruit. Those are my childhood memories

Quote 4 (HDP 9, woman, 26)

Eee böyle fantazm olarak geri döndüğüm zaman, evet. Çünkü bana böyle bir dediğim gibi anne rahminin korunduğu bir alan açıyor. Geçmişte kendimi huzurlu hissettiğim anlara dönüyorum. Mesela dedem dengeç türküleri dinlerdi, radyoda dinlerdi. Dedemle dalga geçtiğim bir an vardı ama mesela bu ana gidiyorum.

When I fantasize about going back, yes. Because, as I said, it creates a space for me that feels as safe as a mother's womb. I return to moments in the past when I felt peaceful. For example, my grandfather used to listen to folk songs, he listened to them on the radio. There was a moment when I teased him, and I find myself going back to that moment.

Quote 5 (CHP 1, woman, 48)

70'li yılların sonu 80'li yılların ilk yarısı gibi o dönemler ya da ortası gibi. Çünkü ben babamı 1987'de kaybettim, babamdan bir süre sonra abimi kaybettim. Sonra işte bizler büyüdük, evlendik ayrıldık evden. Şimdi hiç kardeş, anne-baba tamamen bir arada olamıyoruz. Belki de o eksiklik yüzünden orayı çok fazla özlüyorum, açıkçası nostalji deyince aklıma hep oralar geliyor.

The late 70s or the early to mid-80s, around that time. Because I lost my father in 1987, and then a while after that, I lost my brother. Then we grew up, got married, and moved out of the house. Now, none of us—siblings, parents—can be together anymore. Maybe it's because of that absence that I miss those times so much. Honestly, when I think of nostalgia, that's what comes to mind.

Quote 6 (İYİ Party 7, man, 26)

Aile ilişkilerimiz, hani mesela babaannem bizimle o dönemlerde daha çok. Daha sonra hani diğer amcalarıma vesaire gitmeye başladı hani ama daha böyle çekirdek aile gibi değil büyük bir aile gibiydik. İşte abim, ben şehir dışına çıkmamıştık, bir aradaydık.

Our family relationships, you know, for example, my grandmother was with us more during those times. Later, she started staying with my uncles and such, but back then we were more like a big family rather than just a nuclear one. My brother and I hadn't left the city yet, we were all together.

Particularly, today's features that distance people from each other and virtualize relationships are criticized while 'togetherness, sharing and happiness' in the narratives of the childhood are emphasized. As Quote 7 and Quote 8 indicate, the neighbourhood culture and sincere relationships, which no longer exist in today's societal structure according to the participants, emerge as important elements of nostalgia for childhood.

Quote 7 (AK Party 5, man, 33)

Şimdi gibi bir apartman kültürü yoktu, zaten ben müstakil evlerin yoğunlukta olduğu bir mahallede büyüdüm. Herkes birbirini tanırdı. Komşuluk ilişkileri mesela annem evde olmazdı bir komşunun evine gidip oturabilirdik, çocuklarıyla gayet samimi oturabilirdik. Sanırım buna daha çok özlüyorum.

There was no apartment culture like today, I grew up in a neighbourhood where there were mostly detached houses. Everyone knew each other. Neighbourly relations, for example, my mother would not be at home, we could go to a neighbour's house and sit down, we could sit down very closely with their children. I think I miss that more.

Quote 8 (TKP 2, man, 60)

Çocukluğumda kişisel olarak da kendi içinde barışık, aile ile barışık ve mahalle ile barışık gibi ortam, bir mahalle kültürü olduğu için. O anlamdaki toplumsal dayanışmanın ve iletişimin çok daha yüksek olduğu, daha az nüfuslu, daha ferah yaşamının getirdiği bir hoşnut olma durumu.

Because when I was a child, I was personally at peace with myself, at peace with my family and at peace with my neighbourhood, there was an environment, a neighbourhood culture. In that sense, it was a state of contentment brought about by living in a less populated and more spacious environment, where social solidarity and communication were much higher.

Overall, the descriptions of childhood memories indicate that time spent with family, growing up in a safe environment with friends and trust in neighbours are strongly associated with nostalgic longings. While losses and separations over time deepen longing for the past, family memories and neighbourhood relations along with the search for peace and security seem to contribute to the idealization of the past.

4.1.3. Collective Nostalgia

Figure 3.5 shows the thematic map of collective nostalgia representations among party supporters. Accordingly, the most frequently mentioned nostalgia themes are *70s and 80s Political Activism Nostalgia*, *90s Nostalgia*, *Early Republic Nostalgia*, *Ottoman Nostalgia* and *Nostalgia for the founding and rising years of AK Party*. Other nostalgia themes mentioned include *Gezi Park Nostalgia*, *Nostalgia for the 2010 Peace Process*, *Holistic Past Nostalgia* and *Nostalgia for Pre-Islamic Turkish history*, but these were expressed by fewer participants.




Figure 3.5. Thematic map for the types of collective nostalgia among participants

Supporters of AK Party primarily express nostalgia for the Ottoman era, while nostalgia for the Early Republican period is more frequently mentioned by IYI Party and CHP supporters. Nostalgia for political activism in the 70s and 80s is *predominantly* articulated by supporters of leftist parties such as HDP, TKP, and TIP. In contrast, nostalgia for the 90s is expressed by a variety of groups, including AK Party, CHP, MHP, IYI Party, SAADET and YRP (see Table 3.2). These findings show that “party identity” emerged as a significant variable. Additionally, while some participants expressed longing for the periods they had lived through, others reported nostalgia for periods they had never experienced. Thus, the age-based distribution of collective nostalgia representations can be seen in Appendix F.

Table 3.2. Collective nostalgia representations by party supporters

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	IYI Party	MHP	SAADET	TIP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
COLLECTIVE NOSTALGIA											
NOSTALGIA OF PRE-ISLAMIC TURKISH HISTORY										1	1
NO PERIOD		1								1	2
HOLISTIC PAST NOSTALGIA				1	1						2
OTTOMAN NOSTALGIA	4		1	2							7
EARLY REPUBLIC NOSTALGIA	1	4		4	2						11
70s AND 80s POLITICAL ACTIVISM NOSTALGIA		3	9	5	1		4	3			25
90s NOSTALGIA	4	5		2	6	1			1		19
NOSTALGIA FOR AK PARTY'S FOUNDING AND RISING YEARS	4				2						6
2010 PEACE PROCESS			2								2
GEZİ PARK NOSTALGIA		1	1								2
SUM	13	14	13	14	12	1	4	3	1	2	77

Nostalgia for the founding and rising years of AK Party is voiced by AK Party and some MHP supporters, while nostalgia for the 2010 Peace Process and Gezi Park is articulated by participants who support HDP. Holistic Past Nostalgia is expressed by participants supporting MHP and IYI Party, while nostalgia for pre-Islamic Turkish history is voiced by a participant from the Zafer Party. The analysis of participants' representations of collective nostalgia within the context of the political groups they feel close to reveals that supported party emerges as an important variable (see Table 3.2).

70-80's Political Activism Nostalgia

The 70s and 80s Political Activism Nostalgia observed primarily among participants from the left ideological spectrum, such as HDP, TKP, TIP, and some IYI Party and CHP supporters, emerges as a collective longing for the period when participants' political identities began to form or when they actively engaged in politics. However, nostalgia for this period is also seen in the narratives of younger participants who have never experienced this period. Key elements that make this period nostalgic for participants include the strength of struggle, political organizations, and sense of belonging and solidarity relations (see Figure 3.6).




Figure 3.6. Thematic map for the themes-subthemes of 70s-80s Political Activism Nostalgia

For supporters of mostly HDP, TKP, TIP, the most frequently mentioned and nostalgically remembered aspect of this period is the narrative of comradeship, along with a strong sense of belonging and solidarity. Participants who remember this period with nostalgia mostly emphasize the values of that period such as solidarity and comradeship, sincere, reliable and honest human relations. Unity based on political struggle, struggle for values and political solidarity narrative emerge as elements that reinforce the nostalgia felt for this period. For example, an HDP supporter (Quote 9) expresses his longing for the 70s and emphasizes the sincere human relations, social solidarity and sense of trust of that period. The participant emphasizes that in the civil society organizations of the 70s, whether in the village, neighbourhood or metropolis, people established friendly relations and approached problems sincerely. While this nostalgia reflects a period when people were sensitive to social problems and could act together, he also brings criticism against today's divided and conflicting structure. A TKP supporter (Quote 10) emphasizes that in the past, people supported each other in both good and bad times and that the culture of solidarity was very strong. This period is idealized by the participant as a time when social unity and solidarity were most important, when people supported each other under all circumstances. Another TKP supporter's nostalgia (Quote 11) emphasizes a strong solidarity and collectivism based on a communist understanding of morality. His nostalgia expresses longing for a period in the past when mutual solidarity and social responsibility were based on ideological foundations, while emphasizing the importance of the moral understanding of that period. In particular, the joint use of material means (giving a portion of the salary to solidarity) is a practical reflection of this moral understanding. The emotional and ideological unity of that period creates a much more pronounced nostalgia when compared to the more dominant material interests in today's capitalist world.

Quote 9 (HDP 5, man, 65)

Ama gerçekten ben özlüyorum samimiyet vardı, her sivil toplum örgütü içerisinde bi dostane bi ilişki vardı, köyde yaşıyosan köyde, metropolde yaşıyosan metropolde yaşadığın mahallede var olan bir sorunu eğer halkı, yoksulu etkiliyosa, zarar veriyorsa bu suyundan tut elektriğinden yolundan, ya da ne bileyim ekonomik maddi manevi o siyasal anlayışla hep bir araya geldi. Ya bu yoksul halkın şu sorunu var hep birlikte dostane şekilde el atarlardı, sorunları çözmeye başlarlardı. Ve insanlar da güven duruyordu

But I really miss sincerity, there was a friendly relationship within every civil society organization, if a problem exists in the neighbourhood you live in in the metropolis or in the village and if it affects the people and the poor, it harms them, from water to electricity, roads, or I don't know, economically, materially, spiritually, they always came together with that political understanding. These poor people have a problem, they would all lend a hand in a friendly way, they would start solving the problems. And people had trust.

Quote 10 (TKP 3, woman, 66)

Dayanışmamız çok güçlüydü. O zaman iyi ve kötü günlerimizde mücadele, dayanışmamızda her türlü dayanışmayı görüyorduk. Şu anda öyle değil. Şu anda herhangi bir eylem olduğunda birlikte görüşüyoruz. Diğer aradaki yaşantımızda birbirimizin işte acı tatlı güzel olaylarında uzaktayız yani.

Our solidarity was very strong. At that time, we saw all kinds of solidarity in our struggle and solidarity in our good and bad days. It is not like that now. Right now, we meet when there is any action. In our other lives, we are far away from each other in the bittersweet and beautiful events.

Quote 11 (TKP 1, man, 73)

Çok farklı, çok farklıydı yani o tarif edilemez şeydi. O bir şeye dayanıyordu, ahlak anlayışına. Çünkü bizim komünist ahlak anlayışında o vardı. Yani yanandan gayri her şey ortaktır. O nedenle o günkü koşullar özlenecek ve imrenilecek koşullardı çünkü kadro yetiştiriyorsun sen, örnek oluyosun. Her şeyinle örnek olmak zorundasın. Ben cebimde aldığım maaşın yarısını dayanışmaya gönderirdim çünkü tutuklu olan arkadaşlarım vardı. Onların çocuklarının okul masrafı var, ev kirası var, vesaire var. Dolayısıyla o dayanışma ile biz ayakta kalabilen arkadaşlar kalmıştık.

It was very different, very different, that was something indescribable. It was based on something, the morality. Because that was in our communist morality. In other words, everything is common except for the burning. Therefore, the conditions of that day were conditions to be missed and envied because you are training a cadre, you are setting an example. You have to be an example with everything you have. I used to send half of my salary to solidarity because I had friends who were arrested. Their children had school expenses, house rent, etc. Therefore, we were the friends who can survive with that solidarity.

The 1970s stand out for the strength of left-wing organization across various spheres for majority of HDP, TKP, TIP and CHP supporters. This organization encompassed revolutionary and democratic movements in universities, the anti-fascist struggle, worker class unionization and labour movements. For example, an HDP supporter (Quote 12) describes the 1970s leftist movement as a period when workers' rights, solidarity, and freedom of expression were lived with enthusiasm and bravery. Another HDP supporter (Quote 13) emphasizes that worker strikes, and labour movements were carried out with strong solidarity in an atmosphere of collective trust. Quote 14 reflects on how the youth movements of the 1970s produced young people with more intellectual depth and political power than today's intellectuals, helping shape Türkiye's direction. A TKP supporter (Quote 15) also highlights the power of social solidarity through village cooperatives, while pointing out the negative impacts of the September 12 coup on these movements.

Quote 12 (HDP 9, woman, 26)

1970'ler ve o dönemlerin sol hareketi, sol hareketteki ruhu, insanların emek, dayanışma, işçi hakları kavramını böyle daha coşkulu ve daha cesur yaşadığı dönemler ve kendini daha özgür ifade ettiği dönemler.

The 1970s and the leftist movement of that era represent a time when the spirit of the left was alive, and people embraced concepts like labour, solidarity, and workers' rights with greater enthusiasm and courage. It was a period when individuals felt freer to express themselves.

Quote 13 (HDP 5, man, 65)

İşçi hareketleri vardı. İşçi direnişleri vardı. Ee, son sınıfta 12 Eylül geldikten sonra ben okulu bıraktım. İstanbul'a geldim, gurbette çalışmaya başladım. Çalıştığımız fabrikada işte o kendine siyasiyim diyen, solum diyen bi sürü değerler, o işin hakları için, işçinin emeğinin karşılığını alabilmeler için gerçek anlamda çok bedel ödediler. Örneğin 1 mayıslar olurdu ta bu Alibeyköy Baraj yolunda şeyler vardı, demir çelik fabrikaları vardı. Ufak tefek atölyeler vardı, teneke tuğla yapılan yerler falan vardı. O çalışan, emekçi, yoksul halkın sokağa dökülmesi bir ucu ta Taksim'de olurdu bir ucu Alibeyköy içinde olurdu. O kadar korkunç bir kitle vardı, korkunç bir güven vardı

There were worker movements. There were worker resistances. Well, I left school after the September 12th coup in my final year. I came to Istanbul and started working in exile. In the factory where we worked, there were many people who claimed to be political, who identified as leftist, and they paid a real price for the rights of workers and for workers to receive the fruits of their labour. For example, there would be May Day celebrations; there were events on the Alibeyköy Baraj Road, and there were steel factories. There were small workshops, places where tin bricks were made. The pouring out of the working, impoverished people onto the streets would extend from Taksim all the way to Alibeyköy. There was such a huge crowd, there was such a tremendous sense of security.

Quote 14 (HDP 8, man, 35)

Hani gençlik hareketlerini biliyorum, o dönem üniversitelerdeki gençlik hareketlerinin politik olarak çok güçlü olduğunu, Türkiye'ye yön verebilecek şekilde de güçlü olduğunu, siyasi aktörleri zorlayacak bir duruş sergilediklerini biliyorum. Ve o dönemin gençlik hareketinin de şu anki gençlik hareketinin yani hatta o dönemki gençlerin 20-21 yaşındaki gençlerin şu an 35-40 yaşlarındaki entelektüel dediğimiz kesimlerden daha birikimli, daha da donanımlı olduğunu düşünüyorum ben.

I know about the youth movements; I know that the youth movements in universities during that period were politically very strong and had the power to influence Türkiye. They had a stance that could challenge political actors. I believe that the youth movements of that time, and even the young people who were 20-21 years old back then, were more knowledgeable and equipped than the intellectuals we refer to today who are now around 35-40 years old.

Quote 15 (TKP 1, man, 73)

Ve çünkü köy kooperları da etkilemişti. Köylülerin %80'i örgütlüydü. Köy kooperları kanalı dolayısıyla bizim görevlerini köy kooptan köylüler dayanışma içinde bulunuyorlardı. Çünkü onlar da bizim mücadelenin başarıya ulaşması onların da lehine olacağını görüyorlardı. Bu toplumsal dayanışma giderek ivme kazandı, kabardı ve 12 Eylül'ün önünü kestiler.

And because the village cooperatives had an impact as well. 80% of the villagers were organized. Through the village cooperatives, the villagers would come together in solidarity, as they also saw that the success of our struggle would be in their favour. This social solidarity gained momentum and grew, but they were halted by the events of September 12th.

Participants nostalgically evaluate the pre-1980 period, emphasizing it as a time when democratic thought was strengthened, and youth was conscious and organized. For instance, a CHP supporter (Quote 16) describes the 1970s as a golden age in terms of the development of democratic thought and youth awareness, expressing sadness over the gradual loss of values that began afterward. An HDP supporter (Quote 17) states that the youth of that period was more cultured and conscious, noting that the political consciousness and struggle for democracy in universities carry nostalgic value compared to the lack of organization and struggle today. A TKP supporter (Quote 18) mentions that the struggle

continued even after September 12, referring to it as a legacy of democratic and anti-fascist struggle; according to him, this legacy influenced the mobilization of subsequent generations, contributing to the resurgence of student movements towards the end of the 1980s.

Quote 16 (CHP 10, woman, 66)

Benim gençliğim zaten o yıllarda başladığı için ben onu 80'e kadar diyeyim. Yani şu on yıl o kadar güzeldi ki, altın çağıydı. Belki de düşüncelerin veya diyeyim ki sana hani demokratik düşüncenin gelişmesinde, altın çağıydı belki de. 80'den sonra artık elimizden yavaş yavaş alındı.

Since my youth began in those years, I would say until 1980. That decade was so beautiful; it was a golden age. Perhaps it was the golden age in the development of thoughts, or let's say, democratic thought. After 1980, it was slowly taken away from us.

Quote 17 (HDP 8, man, 35)

O dönemin aslında nelerin nostaljik yaptığını biraz o dönemin gençliğinin daha kültürlü, daha bilinçli, daha birikimli, daha çok araştıran, daha duyarlı olduklarını ve herhangi bir teknolojik alet olmadan birbirleriyle olan bağlarının daha güçlü olduğunu düşünüyorum. O gençlerin özellikle üniversitelerdeki politik bilinci, demokrasi anlamındaki mücadeleleri de bence o dönemi çok nostaljik kılan bir durum çünkü bugün öyle bir örgütlenmeden ve mücadeleden çok uzak noktadayız.

What makes that period nostalgic, in my opinion, is that the youth of that time were more cultured, more conscious, more knowledgeable, more inquisitive, and more sensitive. Their connections with one another were stronger without any technological devices. The political awareness of those young people, especially in universities, and their struggles for democracy are also factors that make that period very nostalgic because today we are far removed from such organization and struggle.

Quote 18 (TKP 2, man, 60)

... Hareketin kendisi gururlandırıcı bir şey. Bütün eksikliğine, zaafına ve bütün yanlışlarına rağmen. Şimdi benim dönemle ilgili kıvanç duyduğum ya da gurur duyduğum iki kulvar vardır. Biri demokratik üniversite mücadelesi, hemen arkasında anti faşist mücadele. Bu iki kulvardaki mücadele ve burada yapılan fedakarlıklar olmasa belki bir sürü şey çok daha başka sonuçlara yol açacaktı. Antifaşist mücadele olarak oluşturduğumuz miras 12 Eylül sonrasını da şekillendirdi. Mesela şöyle bir peşin ön yargı var: '12 Eylül geldi, her şey bitti, herkes yenildi, dağıldı ve tükendi'. Böyle bir şey yok çünkü 12 Eylül sonrasında da mücadele devam ediyor ve bu mücadele 1987 sonrasındaki kuşağı doğrudan etkiliyor. 87 sonrasındaki hareketliliğin altyapısında doğrudan bu miras var.

Of course, there were challenges, and we were swept along, but the movement itself is something to be proud of, despite all its shortcomings, weaknesses, and mistakes. There are two areas related to my period that I take pride in: one is the democratic university struggle, and the other is the anti-fascist struggle. Without the sacrifices made in these two areas, many things would have led to very different outcomes. The legacy we created through the anti-fascist struggle also shaped the post-September 12 period. There is a preconceived notion that "September 12 came, everything ended, everyone was defeated, scattered, and exhausted." But that's not true; the struggle continued after September 12, and this struggle directly influenced the generation that emerged after 1987. The foundation of the activism after 1987 is directly rooted in this legacy.

In the narratives of supporters of MHP and IYI Party, the patriotic feelings of Turkish nationalists and their struggles in this regard are emphasized. Patriotism and self-sacrifice emerge as fundamental values for nationalism, with particular emphasis on the notion that

Turkish nationalists played a ‘protective’ rather than a destructive role in the chaotic environment of September 12 era. An IYI Party supporter (Quote 19) describes Turkish nationalists as conservative village children, stating that they have gained the ability to fight by battling both nature and hardships. Meanwhile, a MHP supporter (Quote 20) argues that Turkish nationalism is an essential force that resists foreign ideologies and protects the country's independence, asserting that Türkiye has maintained its freedom thanks to this struggle.

Quote 19 (IYI Party 1, man, 70)

Türk milliyetçilerinin vatan savunması dışında yaptıkları bir şey yoktu, yıkma derdi yoktu. Yıkılan vatani düzeltme içindelerdi tam tersi, yıkacaklara karşı canlarını mesane siper ediyorlardı. Bir menfaat karşılıkları yoktu. Zaten şunu da söyleyeyim Türk milliyetçileri o dönemde -şimdi de öyle gerçi- genelde muhafazakar köy çocuklarıydı. Bu muhafazakar köy çocukları köylerde tabiatla, efendim vahşi doğayla, vahşi hayvanlarla mücadele ederek gelmişledi, savaşmayı bilen kişilerdi.

Turkish nationalists did nothing but defend the homeland; they had no desire to destroy. On the contrary, they were focused on repairing the nation that had been torn apart, putting their lives on the line against those who would destroy it. There were no selfish interests involved. I should also mention that Turkish nationalists at that time—just like now—were generally conservative village children. These conservative village children came from rural areas and had learned to fight by battling nature, wild animals, and the harsh conditions of their environment.

Quote 20 (MHP 4, man, 62)

Bu noktada yeni yeni açıklamalar o dönemin itirafnamelerini okuyunca Türkiye'nin nasıl bir uçurumun kenarına geldiğini, Türk milliyetçilerini ve ülkücü gençliğin bir direnç noktası olarak bu tür yabancı ideolojinin karşısında göğsünü siper ettiğini, hiçbir şey düşünmeden binlerce gencin şüheda mertebesine eriştiğini, bu, bu bugünkü Türk varlığından eğer söz ediyorsak ve rahatça bu röportajları yapabiliyor, özgür isek 3 dünya ülkelerinin uydusu gibi değilsek bir Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, bir Suriye, bir Irak, bir Suudi Arabistan gibi değilsek zaten İslam ülkelerinin tamamı aşağı yukarı aynı durumdadır bu onlar sayesinde. Tek ülke Türkiye vardır, yarı buçuk ülke de İran vardır.

At this point, when I read the confessions from that era, I realize how close Türkiye came to the edge of an abyss. I see Turkish nationalists and the youth of the idealist movement as a point of resistance against foreign ideologies, standing firm with great courage. Thousands of young people reached the status of martyrs without hesitation. If we are talking about today's Turkish existence and if we can conduct these interviews freely, without being satellites of third-world countries like the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia—countries that are all pretty much in the same situation—it is thanks to them. There is only one country, Türkiye, and a halfly, Iran.

HDP supporters' nostalgia for this period also reflects their longing for the development of the Kurdish movement's peaceful struggle. The emphasis on the importance of peaceful resistance against armed struggle at that time is seen as one of the main reasons for the participants' nostalgia. Participants also state that the marginalization, oppression and violence they individually experienced or witnessed in their childhood transformed into a sense of struggle and rebellion. In this context, the 1970s-80s are idealized by the participants as a symbol of the ideal of peaceful struggle.

Quote 21 (HDP 4, woman, 38)

O dönemin çocuğu değilim, hiç görmedim. Ama azıcık okuyup bilgilerimizden, kaynaklara ya da kitaplarımıza baktığımız zaman tarihsel anlamda 80'de daha dürüst, daha kansız, eylemler daha şiddetsiz, sadece gerçekten siyasi ideolojisini ya ben varım diyen, buna rağmen bunu söyleyip de müebbet hapis yiyen. Siyasi, ee nasıl söyleyeyim... Kan dökülmeyen tarih. O yüzden bana Kürt oluşumlarının, kanlı eylemlerin olmadığı dönemler daha yakın geliyor. Çünkü insanlar siyasi düşüncelerini sözleriyle dile getirirdiler. Eylem yaptıkları tek şey bildiri dağıtmaktı.

I'm not a child of that era; I've never seen it. But when I read a little and look at our sources or books, historically speaking, I find that the period before 1980 was more honest, less bloody, with actions that were more peaceful. People really expressed their political ideologies without resorting to violence, even if it meant facing life imprisonment for their beliefs... It was a history without bloodshed. That's why the periods without violent actions by Kurdish organizations feel closer to me. People articulated their political thoughts through words. The only action they took was distributing pamphlets.

Quote 22 (HDP 9, woman, 26)

Bunu böyle böyle ele aldığın zaman işte Deniz Gezmiş'lerin ya da işte Kürt siyasi liderlerin de işte işkence ve zulüm gördüğü dönemler ve o dönemlerin bu dönemlerdeki duygunun şarkılara da yansıdığı bir dönemler. İşte Grup Yorum, Koma Azad vesaire böyle bir ortam hayal ediyorum yani. İnsanların seçim yapmak zorunda kaldığı ve özellikle Kürt ve Kürt gibi azınlık olan, minoritede olan halklar için daha zorlu bir dönem. Ama aynı zamanda da direnişçi ve o cesur hareketlerine de çok hayran olduğum bir dönem.

When you consider this in this way, here are the periods when Deniz Gezmiş and Kurdish political leaders were tortured and oppressed, and the feelings of those periods were reflected in the songs. I imagine an environment like Grup Yorum, Koma Azad, etc. It is a more difficult period when people have to make choices, especially for Kurds and minorities like Kurds. But it is also a period of resistance, and I admire their courageous actions very much.

Another important element of nostalgia for the 1970s and 1980s is the participants' determination in their belief in political struggle, which they express as 'commitment to the political struggle.' For example, one participant mentions that he lived in fear of death and capture every day during the September 12 period, but despite the torture he would face if captured, he was able to endure these difficulties.

Quote 23 (HDP 10, man, 73)

12 Eylül'ü daha sıcak yaşadım. Her gün ölüm korkusu, her gün yakalanma korkusu, yakalandığında yıllarca göreceğin işkenceler çabası çabası. Ne kadar içeride kalacağın belli değil. Bu tedirginlikle yaşamak, bu tedirginlik duygusu. Bu tedirginlikle yaşamak, bu tedirginlikle evlenmişsen, bir ailen olmuşsa aileni bu kaotik ortamdan koruyup kollamak, sadece kendini koruyup kollamak da değil... Bunlar tabii sıkıntılı bir süreç ama bütün bunlara rağmen belki güzel yanı o. Öylesine inanmışız ki davamıza bütün bu acıları göğüsleyebiliyoruz. Ben insanın hayatta göğüsleyemeyeceği şey şu diyorum, öngöremediği olumsuzluklar. Öngördüklerine karşı bir şekilde insan kendini ne kadar katı olursa olsun koşullar, ne kadar acımasız olursa

I experienced the events of September 12 more intensely. Every day was filled with the fear of death, the fear of capture, and the effort to endure the torture you would face for years if caught. It's uncertain how long you will be imprisoned. Living with this anxiety, this feeling of unease—if you've married that anxiety, if you have a family, protecting them from this chaotic environment is not just about protecting yourself. Of course, these are challenging processes, but perhaps the beautiful part is that we are so committed to our cause that we can endure all this pain. I believe that what a person cannot endure in life are the negative outcomes they cannot foresee. When it comes to what they can foresee, no matter how rigid a person is or

olsun kendini hazırladığında oradan şu veya bu şekilde sağlam çıkabiliyor.

how ruthless the conditions are, when they prepare themselves for it, they can emerge from it in one way or another.

Despite all the issues and political pressures of the 1970s and 1980s, feelings of happiness, hope, and pride are distinctly prominent in the participants' collective memory of this period. While anger is expressed in response to the oppression and persecution, participants were able to maintain faith and hope for the future due to the organized structure of the period. Additionally, there are participants who express feelings of regret specific to this period. Regret is associated with the polarised social structure for the sake of ideals and the right-left conflict. This contradictory emotional perspective reveals that the era left a profound mark on both individual and collective levels and nurtured a complex feeling of nostalgia.

Quote 24 (TIP 4, man, 61)

Tabii ki öfke de duyuyoruz, kızgınlık duyuyoruz. Bunun da nedeni şu. Eee... Bu yapılan baskı ve zulme rağmen bunların gözümüzün önünde cereyan etmesi ve bunlara şahit olmak bile insanı ürküten bir şey. Yani bu hiç hoş bir şey değil. İnsan psikolojisini bile zaman zaman zora sokan şeyler. Ama buna karşı tek şeyimiz var, hala bizi ayakta tutan tek bir şey var. Yani mücadele azmi ve bir şeylerin değişeceğine olan inancımız yani.

... Yani o dönemde devrimin çabuk bir şekilde gelişeceği, olacağı ve daha güzel günlere hızlı bir şekilde ulaşılacağı düşüncesi vardı ve bu bizim tabii ki yaşama ve mücadele motivasyonumuzu arttıran bir perspektifti. Bu yıllarda mücadele azminden hiçbir şey kaybetmedik. Yani mesela başımıza gelen olumsuz hadiseler bile bizi yıldıramadı. Hapse düşmek, işkence görmek, ne bileyim uzun süre hapiste yatmak gibi şeyler bile bizi yolumuzdan döndüremedi. Çünkü o umut canlıydı ve nasıl olsa bu iş olacak, bir devrim söz konusu. O yüzden bu tür acılara tabii ki katlanmakta hiçbir sıkıntı yok falan diye düşünüyorduk yani.

Of course, we feel anger and frustration as well. The reason for this is that witnessing such oppression and persecution unfold right before our eyes is frightening. It's not a pleasant experience at all; it can even challenge human psychology at times. But we have one thing in response to this: there is still one thing that keeps us going—our determination to fight and our belief that things will change. ...During that period, there was a belief that the revolution would develop quickly and that we would reach better days swiftly. This perspective, of course, increased our motivation to live and to fight. We lost nothing in terms of our determination to struggle during those years. Even the negative events that happened to us didn't discourage us. Things like being imprisoned, facing torture, or spending a long time in jail couldn't turn us away from our path. Because that hope was alive; we believed that this would happen, that a revolution was at hand. So, we thought there was no problem in enduring such pains.

Quote 25 (CHP 3, woman, 50)

Benim çocukluk anılarımda en ama en can evimden vuran, çok etkileyen, hala daha çok etkisinde olduğum bahsederken Nazım Hikmet'in kız çocuğu şiiri. İGD'nin, İlerici Gençler Derneği gecesinde ben sahnede 9 yaşındayken bu şiiri okumuştum ve bu şiiri bana teyzem ezberletmişti ve benim hayatımda öğrendiğim ilk şiirdi. ...Ben de bir kız çocuğuydum, bunların hepsini birleştirdiğim zaman çok önemli değerler çıkıyor ortaya. Acı

In my childhood memories, the one that hits me the hardest, that has greatly affected me and still influences me is Nazım Hikmet's poem about a little girl. I recited this poem on stage at the IGD, Progressive Youth Association event when I was 9 years old, and my aunt had taught me to memorize it. ...I was a little girl too, and when I bring all these together, very important values emerge. Despite the painful aspects, it was a period

yanları da olsa mutlu anılardan ve özleminden oluşan bir dönem, gururlandıran bir dönem. Sonsuz bir gurur, bahsederken bile tüylerim diken diken oldu.

filled with happy memories and longing—a period that brings pride. I feel endless pride, and even talking about it gives me goosebumps.

Quote 26 (IYI Party 3, man, 66)

Ülke çok daha güzel kalkınmış, çok da hızlı kalkınmış olurdu ama işte bizim o idealimizi efendim o mücadele azmimizi ayrı kutuplara bölünerek birbirimizle uğraştık durduk. Uğraşınca da kötü oldu.

The country would have developed much more beautifully and quickly, but we ended up dividing our ideals and determination to fight into separate poles and focusing on fighting each other. As a result, it turned out badly.

90's Nostalgia

Nostalgia for the 1990s is expressed differently among supporters of the AK Party, CHP, and MHP (see Figure 3.7). For example, AK Party supporters view this period as one where religious elements and practices were prominent (Quote 27), while MHP supporters see it as a time when nationalism and ‘the doctrine of the Nine Lights’⁴ were accurately represented (Quote 28). In contrast, CHP supporters remember this period as one that represented a peaceful, secure, and harmonious society before AK Party came to power (Quote 29).

Quote 27 (AK Party 6, man, 48)

Hani biz o ortamda yetiştiğimiz için, bir de gençlik vakfı, bir de cami, okul, iş arasında olduğumuz için o dönemde daha çok onlar beni etkiliyordu. Mesela Hac sohbetleri mesela hoşuma gidiyordu. Eşimle birlikte gittiğimiz sohbetler oluyordu. Ben 98'de evlendim. O dönemde bir onları özleyorum. Mesela grup toplantılarımız oluyordu. İl içinde, il dışında, Eskişehir’de, Adana’da, Antep gibi böyle iller arası toplantılar oluyordu. Onlar hoşuma gidiyordu. Seviyordum. Bir birbirlerine güven vardı. Şimdi o ortam var mı? Yok. Ne bir AK Parti iktidarı tarafının yaptığı toplantılar var, ne Erbakan tarafının yaptığı toplantılar var. Bayağı onlar da azaldı gitti. Ben o şeyleri özleyorum yani.

Since we grew up in that environment, and because we were involved with youth foundations, mosques, schools, and work during that time, those things influenced me more. For example, I enjoyed the Hajj conversations. There were discussions that I attended with my spouse. I got married in '98, and I miss those times. We used to have group meetings, both within and outside the province, in cities like Eskişehir, Adana, and Gaziantep. I liked them; I enjoyed them. There was a sense of trust among each other. Is that environment still there now? No. There are neither meetings held by the AK Party nor those organized by the Erbakan side. They have significantly decreased. I miss those things.

⁴ It is the set of ideological principles that form the basis of the program of the Nationalist Movement Party, consisting of the principles of Nationalism, Idealism, Moralism, Communalism, Scientificism, Peasantism, Developmentalism, Industrialism and Technicalism. For detailed information see (Türkeş, 1967).

Quote 28 (MHP 10, man, 43)

O nostaljik dönemde, yani özlem duyduğumuz dönemde bir hiyerarşik yapı vardı ama katı bir yapı vardı. Mesela kuralların dışına çıkılmazdı. Şimdiki dönemde, aradaki farkı söyleyeyim, biraz esneklik payı var o zaman yoktu. Kural kuraldı işleyiş işleyisti. Lider, doktrin ve teşkilat üçlümüz vardır. Biz bunların dışına çıkmazdık yaşım küçük olmasına rağmen daha biz o zamanlar bunları hatmetmiş insanlardık ki ezberletilirdi yani bunlar bize. Bunlar 9 ışık doktrin yani bizim ideolojimizin alt sekmeleri.

In that nostalgic period, the one we long for, there was a hierarchical structure, but it was a rigid structure. For example, rules were not to be broken. In the current period, let me point out the difference: there is a bit of flexibility now, which didn't exist back then. A rule was a rule, and a process was a process. We had a trio of leader, doctrine, and organization. We did not deviate from these; even though I was young at the time, we were people who had already memorized these concepts. These were the 'Nine Lights' doctrine, which are the subcategories of our ideology.

Quote 29 (CHP 5, woman, 57)

Mesela ben, işte şuralarda bomba patlamış, buralarda kadınları öldürmüşler, şurada şu şiddet olayı olmuş, burada çocuk istismarı olmuş. Bunların hiçbirine tanıklık etmedim günümüze kadar. Çok huzurluyduk, çok rahattık, okullarımıza yalnız gider gelirdik. Eee, nasıl söyliyim, çevremizde güvenilir insan doluydu. Herkes birbirini tanırdı o dönemde. Çok güzeldi. Ben size şunu söyleyebilirim. 1998'e kadar son derece huzurlu bir Türk ulusu vardı. Ulus adına söyleyebilirim bunu.

For example, I haven't witnessed any bomb explosions, killings of women there, incidents of violence, or child abuse until today. We were very peaceful and comfortable; we used to go to our schools alone. How should I say it? There were trustworthy people all around us. Everyone knew each other during that period. It was very beautiful. I can tell you this: up until 1998, there was an extremely peaceful Turkish nation. I can say this on behalf of the nation.




Figure 3.7. Thematic map for the codes-subcodes of 90s Nostalgia

Other elements that make the 90s nostalgic for participants include the societal unity and the dominance of social equality in the social structure. For example, a MHP participant (Quote 30) emphasizes that the social fabric of the period was more integrative and encouraged unity. People living in the same neighbourhood, regardless of their economic and social status, paved the way for the sharing of common cultural experiences. In this context, the fact that the child of a teacher, the child of someone working for minimum wage, and the child of a civil servant could grow up in the same social environment represents a period when social class distinctions were less pronounced. The fact that the period was described as a time when "there were not many neighbourhoods of ideas or political neighbourhoods" shows that the political polarisation of the period was less, and that people could live together even if they had different views.

Quote 30 (MHP 2, man, 37)

90'lı yıllarda insanlar çok böyle ayrılmış durumda değildi bence, yakın ekonomik aileler ve aile kültürü vardı. Mesela öğretmen çocuğu da asgari ücretle çalışanın çocuğu da memurun çocuğu da baktığımız zaman üst düzey bloklar bile olabilir aslında baktığımızda hep aynı mahallede oynayan çocuklardı. Aynı kıyafetleri giyen, aynı yiyecekleri yiyen. O dönemlerde belki bugünkü gibi az önce gerçek mahalleden bahsettim ama işte fikir mahallelerinin, siyasi mahallelerin çok olmadığı dönem olarak görüyorum ben. 80 darbesinden sonra bir insanlarda kaynaşma olan bir süreç olarak görüyorum genel olarak böyle. Mesela bakıldığında her siyasi görüşten insanın bir arada olabildiği de, böyle çok aile içinde veya farklı meclislerde insanların fikirlerini söyleyebilmekte rahat hissettiği bir dönem.

I don't think people were very divided in the 1990s; there were close economic families and family cultures. For example, the teacher's child, the child of someone earning minimum wage, and the civil servant's child were all children who played in the same neighbourhood, even if they belonged to higher social strata. They wore the same clothes and ate the same food. During that time, perhaps not as much as today, as I mentioned earlier regarding real neighbourhoods, I see it as a period when there were not many ideological or political neighbourhoods. I generally perceive it as a process of cohesion among people after the 1980 coup. For instance, it was a time when people from every political view could be together, and individuals felt comfortable expressing their opinions within families or in different assemblies.

Another element that makes the 1990s nostalgic is the political figures of the era. Despite sharp ideological boundaries, the culture of discussion (political civility) among well-educated figures, framed by rules of respect, is a theme frequently expressed. The depiction of political figures in caricatures and the narrative of freedom of expression are emphasized as a situation that does not exist in the current context. For instance, a CHP supporter (Quote 31) talks about the political freedom in the 90s where critiques of politics could even be reflected in caricatures. In contrast, the participant notes that this freedom is now restricted. Drawing from her journalism experience, she expresses a longing for a time when restrictions and prohibitions were less prevalent. Another participant (Quote 32) views

the discussions among political figures in the 90s as friendly rivalries and balanced debates, emphasizing that this has been lost since the 2000s. She emphasizes that in the 90s were civilized and that the brawls and incidents of violence in the parliament were not as widespread as they are today. This presents a perception of the political culture of the past as more civilized and open to debate.

Quote 31 (CHP 6, woman, 48)

Yani mesela bu da çok nostaljik ve keyif veren bir şey çünkü dünyada da hani siyasete dair, ee, eleştirel yaklaşımların hep karikatürlere bile yansiyabilir özgürlükte olduğu, ee, düzeni özmek söz konusu aslında şimdi de günümüzde. Çünkü insanlar özgür olarak düşündüklerini ifade edemedikleri için, bundan korkar hale geldiler. Hep satır aralarında gizleyerek, özgürlüklerinden ödün vererek kendi aralarında sadece düşüncelerini paylaşabiliyorlar ama eskiden bu söylediğim siyasi isimler ne biliyim Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz tam benim çocukluğumun siyasi figürleri bunlar. Turgut Özal keza. Ve tabii ki kimi benim sempati duyduğum kimi duymadığım, sadece isimleri sayıyorum şu an. Her birinin açıkçası karikatürlere yansıdığı, onların siyasi tatlı çekişmelerinin olduğu, ee, ve düzeyli bi şekilde siyasi atışmaların gerçekleştiği dönemler. Dolayısıyla hep hep o zaman benim için çok daha nostaljik, çok daha keyifli.

I mean, this is also very nostalgic and enjoyable because, in the world, there used to be a freedom where critical approaches to politics could even be reflected in caricatures, which makes us long for that order even today. People have become afraid to express what they think freely, so they hide their thoughts between the lines, compromising their freedoms and only sharing their ideas among themselves. But back then, the political figures I mentioned, like Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz, were significant figures from my childhood. Turgut Özal too. Of course, I have my sympathies for some and not for others; I'm just naming names right now. Each of them was reflected in caricatures, there were sweet political rivalries, and political exchanges occurred in a civilized manner during those times. Therefore, it all feels much more nostalgic and enjoyable for me.

Quote 32 (CHP 5, woman, 57)

Politik olarak bütün siyasetçiler birbirleriyle tatlı atışmalar içindeydi. Birbirine hakaret boyutunda şiddet içeren, ben meclisteki kavgalara hiç tanık olmamıştım, 2000, yani AKP dönemine kadar ben mecliste yumruklu saldırı, kavga, hiç böyle şeyler görmedim. Güzel bir yaşantı vardı ülkemizde.

Politically, all the politicians were engaged in friendly exchanges. I had never witnessed any violent attacks or insults; I had never seen fistfights or brawls in the parliament until the 2000s, meaning until the AK Party era. There was a beautiful experience in our country

Early Republic Nostalgia

The Early Republic Era nostalgia, mostly expressed by CHP and IYI Party supporters, and some MHP supporters, is characterized by advances in law and democracy, the establishment of village institutes, efforts toward education, a modernist worldview, nation-state building, the spirit of the national struggle and Atatürk's leadership. In line with the founding philosophy of the Republic, the granting of voting rights to women and the efforts towards modernization to create a strong and independent state are mentioned as proud achievements of this era (see Figure 3.8).




Figure 3.8. Thematic map for the sub-themes of Early Republic Nostalgia

The Early Republic nostalgia is particularly shaped by admiration and praise for economic development, industrialization and the founding philosophy of the Republic. The participants' positive sentiments towards this period stem from the core principles, achievements and projects that played a key role in the development of modern Türkiye. The steps taken towards becoming a nation-state after a hard-fought war and the emphasis on economic and social progress are frequently highlighted. For instance, a CHP supporter (Quote 33) expresses nostalgia for the economic investments made during the early years of the Republic, emphasizing initiatives such as sugar factories, cotton mills, and aircraft factories as significant steps in the country's development. The retrospective longing for past economic policies in comparison to today's situation is also notable. An IYI Party supporter (Quote 34) associates the early Republic period with successes in economic, military, political and educational spheres. Especially the development and reforms carried out under Atatürk's leadership appear to be the main source of nostalgia for this participant. The participant expresses that the system established by Atatürk was built on strong foundations but that this spirit and determination could not be sustained after him. Alongside the longing

for past successes, there is also a narrative of disappointment regarding the inability to maintain these achievements in the present.

Quote 33 (CHP 1, man, 48)

Türkiye'nin gerçekten halkını zenginleştirmeye dönük, halkına kazandırmaya dönük yatırımları vardı. Mesela fabrikaların kurulması, şeker fabrikaları, işte bizim pamuk fabrikalarımız, uçak fabrikalarımız vardı. Uçak ithal etmiş bir ülkeden bahsediyoruz zamanında. Hatta araba fabrikaları falan kurmaya çalışmışız olmamış. Ama hani bu ve benzeri olaylar ülkenin iktisadi anlamda kalkınması için övünülecek, hatta geriye dönüp özenilecek olaylar yani.

Türkiye really had investments aimed at enriching its people, making gains for its citizens. For example, the establishment of factories—sugar factories, our cotton factories, we even had aircraft factories. We're talking about a country that once imported airplanes. In fact, we even tried to establish car factories, but it didn't happen. However, these kinds of efforts and similar events are worth praising and even looking back at with admiration as achievements for the country's economic development.

Quote 34 (IYI Party 3, man, 66)

Fakat şeyi şu, yani tüm şu geçmiş şeye baktığımızda en iyi dönem, en güzel dönem, bütün sıkıntılara rağmen, bütün ne bileyim yani zorluklara rağmen, Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan çıktığı, o Atatürk'ün en azından o 10 yıl ülkeyi gerçekten iktisadi, ekonomik olarak, siyaset olarak, askeri olarak ve onun cumhuriyeti kuruluş felsefesi, çok büyük bir felsefeymiş. Ve o gün gerçekten o 10 yıllık, 15 yıllık süreçte bu ülkenin ekonomisini de eğitiminde, siyasetinde de, sağlığında da öyle güzel adımlar atılmış ki, öyle güzel temeller kurulmuş ki yani o devam ettirilebilse, o ruh devam ettirilebilse, o azim, o çalışma devam ettirilebilseydi Atatürk'ten sonra da. Veya çoğu sohbetlerde biz onu da duyuyoruz, Atatürk bir 10 yıl daha yaşasaydı bu ülkede çoğu şey çok daha güzel olacaktı..

However, looking at all this past, the best period, the most beautiful period, despite all the difficulties and challenges, is the time when Türkiye emerged from the War of Independence. Atatürk's leadership during at least the first 10 years truly transformed the country economically, politically, and militarily. The foundational philosophy behind the establishment of the Republic was significant. During that 10- to 15-year period, remarkable steps were taken in the country's economy, education, and health sectors. Beautiful foundations were laid; if only that spirit could have been maintained that determination and effort could have continued after Atatürk. In many discussions, we hear that if Atatürk had lived for another 10 years, many things would have been much better in this country.

Early Republic Nostalgia emphasizes the strength of the national struggle during this period and the existence of a national identity built under challenging conditions. This nostalgia is characterized by a meaningful perception of social consciousness and identity formation shaped by the collective solidarity and spirit of resistance of the nation during the establishment of the Republic. In this sense, the Republic Era is idealized as a time when national unity and togetherness expanded, and the foundations of the modern Turkish state were laid. Participants who support CHP express their nostalgia for this period, which is shaped by collective struggle, solidarity, and pride in a time of very limited material resources (Quote 35 and Quote 36). This sense of togetherness appears to create a strong feeling of longing among the participants. An IYI Party (Quote 37) supporter highlights the

success achieved despite material impossibilities, pointing out that the confidence felt in the aftermath of war's hardships and challenges has created an atmosphere of hope.

Quote 35 (CHP 11, woman, 37)

En çok özlem duyduğum dönem Cumhuriyet Dönemi. Atatürk'ün olduğu döneme çok özlem duyuyorum. Ona duyduğum özlemin sebebi de insanların gerçekten maddi olarak hiçbir şeyleri olmamasına rağmen milli mücadelede hep birlikte, bir arada çaba sarf ederek bizi bugün rahat rahat topraklarımızda yaşama imkanı sunduğu için o döneme çok özlem duyuyorum ve çok gururlanıyorum.

The period I miss the most is the Republic Period. I miss the period when Atatürk was there a lot. The reason I miss him is because although people really had nothing materially, they made an effort together in the national struggle and gave us the opportunity to live comfortably in our lands today, I miss that period a lot and I am very proud.

Quote 36 (CHP 12, woman, 52)

Cumhuriyetin kurulduğu yıllarda yaşamayı çok isterdim. Atamızın önderliğinde, insanlarımızın, askerlerimizin herkesin milli mücadele ruhu içinde seferber oluşu, Kurtuluş Savaşını kazanmamız... Yoktan bir ülke var etmemiz hep beraber. Savaş sonrası bütün zorluğuna, yokluklara rağmen güven çok umutlu hissettiren, çok duygulandıran, şu an bile üzerine konuşuyorken tüylerimi diken diken eden bir dönem.

I would have loved to have lived in the years when the Republic was founded. Under the leadership of our Atatürk, the mobilization of our people, our soldiers, in the spirit of national struggle, our winning the War of Independence... All together, we created a country from nothing. Despite all the difficulties and deprivations after the war, it was a period that made me feel very hopeful, very moving, and even now when I talk about it, it gives me goosebumps.

Quote 37 (IYI Party 3, man, 66)

Yani o fakir fukara halkı öyle bir seferberliğe şey yapıyorlar ki. Yani herkes şunu yapıyorlar mesela yollarını imece usulü karayollarını, demiryollarını çalıştırarak yapıyorlar. Yani köylü çalışıyor, insanı çalışıyor, yani herkes çalışarak emek, imece usulüyle oturup yapıyorlar. Yani çok farklı o kadar fakir fukaralığın efendim yetişmiş nüfusun az olduğu yani, eee, çünkü nüfusun çoğu ya çocuk ya yaşlı ya da kadın. Böyle bir ortamda bile yani gerçekten ülkede ciddi adımlar atıp belli bi hedefe varmışlar. Bu başlı başına bi hadise ve biz inanın yani işte 80 yıldır 90 yıldır o birikimin şeyini kullanarak geldik.

I mean, they are mobilizing the poor and needy people in such a way. I mean, everyone is doing this, for example, they are building roads, highways, and railways by working together. I mean, the villagers are working, the people are working, I mean, everyone is working, working, working together, sitting down and doing it. I mean, it is very different, the poor and the educated population is low, because most of the population is either children, the elderly or women. Even in such an environment, I mean, they have really taken serious steps in the country and reached a certain goal. This is an event in itself and believe me, we have come here using that accumulation for 80 or 90 years.

Ottoman Nostalgia

Ottoman Nostalgia, mostly expressed by AK Party supporters, is characterized by three important elements: the Ottoman Empire's political and military successes, its social order and social structure and the decline period characterized by alienation from culture (see Figure 3.9). According to the participants, the reason why groups with different ethnic and religious identities were able to live in prosperity and peace without being oppressed is that because the Ottoman Empire created a state tradition that allowed differences to coexist.

Multiculturalism, characterized by a policy of inclusiveness and tolerance, is seen by the participants as an element that made the Ottoman Empire strong and that the participants are proud of.

Quote 38 (AK Party 4, man, 43)

Bence Osmanlı devletinin farklı toplulukların, farklı dinlerin ve etnik kökenden kişilerin hoşgörü politikası içinde yaşaması gurur duyulan bir olay. Sonraki zamanlarda hep bir baskının, yıldırma, asimile etme politikalarının olduğunu görüyoruz. Burada ise büyük, güçlü bir imparatorluk olduğunun da bir göstergesi.

I think it is a proud thing that the Ottoman state lived with a policy of tolerance towards different communities, different religions and ethnic backgrounds. In later times, we see that there was always a policy of oppression, intimidation and assimilation. Here, it is also an indication that it was a large and powerful empire.

Quote 39 (AK Party 3, man, 40)

Tamamen hiçbir ırkı, hiçbir dini, hiçbir mezhebi gözetmeden, tamamen adalet üzeri olmak istedikleri için ve bunu dünyaya kanıtladıkları için. Yani örneğin bir Hristiyan'ın memleketinde yaşarken onun dinine müdahale etmeden, bir Musevi'nin dinine müdahale etmeden, herhangi bir dini unsur olursa olsun hiç müdahale etmeden bunu başardıkları için tabii ki o dönemi her zaman söylerim. Çünkü bu kesinlikle benim için buradan, bu perspektiften bakıyorum.

Because they wanted to be completely above justice, without considering any race, any religion, any sect, and because they proved this to the world. For example, while living in a Christian's country, without interfering with his religion, without interfering with a Jew's religion, without interfering with any religious element, of course I always mention that period because they achieved this. Because this is definitely from here for me, I look from this perspective.




Figure 3.9. Thematic map for the sub-themes of Ottoman Nostalgia

One of the main reasons participants view the Ottoman period as the golden age of the societal past is the narrative of being a powerful, independent and respected empire that triumphed over the West. Participants greatly admire the Ottoman military, political, and cultural successes, stating that these achievements have been passed down as a legacy to modern-day Türkiye. For instance, an AK Party supporter (Quote 40) highlights key moments such as Alparslan's victory at the Battle of Manzikert and the conquest of Istanbul, emphasizing the significance of these victories for both the Islamic world and Turkish history. He states that especially during aid activities he had in Yemen, they were referred to as the 'grandchildren of Fatih', suggesting that the Ottoman legacy is still felt today and influences contemporary perceptions of power. Another participant views the conquest of Istanbul as a major victory for Muslims (Quote 41), while an IYI Party supporter (Quote 42) similarly expresses admiration for the prestige and strength of the Ottoman Empire when they ruled large territories.

Quote 40 (AK Party 10, man, 49)

Hani bildiğimiz, en başta Alparslan'ın Malazgirt Savaşı'yla birlikte Anadolu'nun kapılarını açması. İkinci olarak İstanbul'un fethedilmesi. Bir çağın açılıp bir çağın kapatılması. Yardım faaliyetleriyle uğraşıyorum. Yemen'e yardım götürmüştük. Oradaki insanlar bizi "Fatih'in torunları hoş geldiniz" diyerek karşıladılar. Yani biz işte Fatih'in torunlarıyız. İşte Yavuz'la birlikte eee Mısır seferi, ardından halifeliğin Osmanlı'ya geçmesi. Yani o güç çok büyük bir güç.

As we know, first, Alparslan opened the doors of Anatolia with the Battle of Manzikert. Secondly, the conquest of Istanbul. The opening of an era and the closing of another. I am involved in aid activities. We had brought aid to Yemen. The people there welcomed us saying, "Welcome, grandchildren of Fatih." I mean, we are the grandchildren of Fatih. The Egyptian campaign with Yavuz, and then the transfer of the caliphate to the Ottomans. In other words, that power is a very great power.

Quote 41 (AK Party 4, man, 43)

Bence İstanbul'un fethi, Batı'yı yenilgiye uğrattığımız en önemli olaylardan biri. Müslümanlar sürekli bir mücadele içinde olmuşlar. Dünyada Hristiyanlık ve Müslümanlık adına fetihler yapılırken, bizler bu olay ile tarihe adımızı yazdırmışız. İşte Bizans'ın yenilmesi, İstanbul'un Osmanlı'nın başkenti olması.

I think the conquest of Istanbul is one of the most important events in which we defeated the West. Muslims have been in a constant struggle. While conquests were made in the name of Christianity and Islam in the world, we have written our name in history with this event. Here is the defeat of Byzantium and the capital of Istanbul of the Ottoman Empire.

Quote 42 (IYI Party 9, man, 29)

Dünyanın Türkiye'yi tanıdığı bir zaman var. Osmanlı'yı tanıdığı bir... Osmanlı'dan çekindiği, korktuğu... Bu benim için bir erkek olduğum için belki bilmiyorum ama hani ciddi anlamda saygı duyulan ya da dikkat edilen hani o sonuç olarak Osmanlı'ya karşı herkes bir başkaldırma söz konusu değildi o zaman. Yani kıtaların çoğu bizde olduğu için, böyle bir güçle sahip olduğumuz için.

There was a time when the world knew Türkiye. When it knew the Ottomans... When it was afraid of the Ottomans... Maybe it's because I'm a man, I don't know, but there was no question of a rebellion against the Ottomans, because of that, because we had most of the continents, because we had such power.

Some participants evaluate this period with a nostalgia that emphasizes the powerful and justice role of the Ottoman Empire on the world stage. Their narratives depict the empire as not only possessing strong warriors but also as a civilization that led the world in justice and moral superiority. This perspective reveals the perception that the Ottoman period led the world not only with military victories or territorial domination, but with a greater spiritual and moral mission. One AK Party supporter (Quote 43) highlights the advancement of Muslim civilization through scientific and cultural contributions at a time when Europe lagged, stressing the Ottoman's mission of "i'la-yı kelimetullah" (the exaltation of God's name) and its continuous political activity to ensure justice and fairness. Another participant explains Ottoman dominance not merely as a show of power but as the ability to intervene against injustice and wrongdoing. This participant idealizes the Ottoman Empire as a provider of universal justice (Quote 44).

Quote 43 (AK Party 10, man, 49)

Çevremizdeki duruma baktığımız zaman o dönemde yani Avrupa sefalet içerisindeydi zaten. Yani hani şu anki Avrupa gibi Avrupa söz konusu değildi. Zaten yine tarihi okuduğunuzda, baktığınızda ne aldılarsa Müslümanların eserlerinden almışlar. Yani Endülüs'ü yaka yaka bitirdiler. Üç beş tane kitap kaldı diyor onların alimleri, bilginleri. O üç beş tane kitapla biz şu anki Avrupa'yı kurduk diyorlar.... Yani benim yine gördüğüm, bildiğim kadarıyla politik olarak biz Osmanlı olarak yerimizde durmamışız. Yani sadece kabımıza çekilmemişiz, i'la yı kelimetullah denen bir kavram var ya bizde Allah'ın ismini hâkim kılmak, adaleti sağlamak.

When we look at the situation around us, at that time, Europe was already in misery. In other words, there was no Europe like today. Anyway, when you read history, when you look at it, whatever they took, they took from the works of Muslims. In other words, they finished Andalusia by the neck. Their scholars and intellectuals say there are only three or five books left. They say that with those three or five books, we established today's Europe... In other words, as far as I see and know, we did not stand still politically as the Ottomans. In other words, we did not just withdraw into ourselves, there is a concept called i'la yi kelimetullah, we make the name of Allah dominant, provide justice.

Quote 44 (AK Party 3, man, 40)

Bu dönemler yani, tamamen yani dünyaya hâkim olmak. Hâkim olmaktan kastım yani işte ben güçlüyüm, ben hâkim oldum, efendi benim anlamında değil. Nerede bir haksızlık, nerede bir adaletsizlik varsa ona müdahale edebilme gücünden dolayı tabii ki o dönemi tercih ederim.

These periods, that is, completely dominating the world. What I mean by dominating is not in the sense of I am powerful, I have become dominant, I am the master. I prefer that period of course because of the power to intervene wherever there is injustice, wherever there is injustice.

The participants' nostalgic narratives include not only the periods when the Ottoman Empire held a strong position and led the West, but also the decline and disintegration that followed a period of cultural deterioration. They express a sense of disconnection from cultural and historical roots with the modernization process of Türkiye and the founding of the Republic, which they criticize. The participants argue that a deterioration began because

of the negative influence of foreign powers on Ottoman's domestic culture. While the foundation of the Republic is seen as a restructuring after this "deterioration", there is also a lament over the loss of certain aspects of the past during this process. In their view, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of the Republic are interpreted not as a positive transformation but as a kind of forced evolution. Participants believe that the legacy inherited from the Ottoman Empire was not adequately preserved during Türkiye's modernization, leading to a current identity confusion. The founding of the Republic is perceived by participants as a partial rejection of the Ottoman cultural heritage, which evokes a sense of melancholy about the past.

Quote 45 (AK Party 2, man, 40)

Orada biraz da kendi iç kültüründen dışarı çıkıp dışarıdaki olumsuz durumların örnek alınması ve de içimize gelen olumsuz dış güçlerle beraber tabii ki orada bir bozulma bence başlıyor zaten. Eee, sonrasında parçalanan saltanatla beraber zaten bir evrim geçiriyor Kurtuluş Savaşıyla. Benim için öyle nitelendirebilirim.

There, I think a deterioration begins there, of course, with the negative external forces coming into us and stepping out of its own internal culture and taking the negative external situations as an example. Well, it already goes through an evolution with the sultanate falling apart after the War of Independence. I can describe it that way for me.

Quote 46 (AK Party 10, man, 49)

Bir dönem çünkü Cumhuriyetin başlangıcıyla birlikte bizim köklerimiz kesilmiş. Yani ben arşivcilik mezunuyum. Osmanlı arşivlerine yönelik yetiştirdiler bizi. Kaçımız bizim geçmişimizi okuyabiliyor? İşte bir Japon dedesini, ninesini, ne bileyim üç kuşak öncesiyle alakalı her türlü bilgiyi, birikimimi alabiliyor, okuyabiliyor, paylaşabiliyor veya bir Çinli veya bir Hindistanlı ama bir Türk olarak yani biz iki kuşak önceki Atamızı dedemizi bilmiyoruz. Onlar ortaya ne oydular, ne gibi değerleri vardı, nelere sahiptiler? Ve hani büyüyebilmemiz için, yetişebilmemiz için, gelişebilmemiz için de bu şu anki bu karışıklığımızın, bu bulanıklığımızın hani bir şey olamamış olmamızın da, nereli olduğumuzun belli olmaması, şeyi aslında bence bu. İşte bir o bağı yakalayabilirsek... Bir film var izlemiştinizdir siz de son Samuray diye. Neydi o? Rus oynamıştı mesela. O filmde onların bizim Osmanlı'nın yıkılışı, Cumhuriyetin kuruluşu gibi bir zamanları var, dönemleri var aynı dönem hemen hemen. Ama onlar o kültürü devam ettiriyorlar, bozmuyorlar. Ama biz bütün her şeyi sıfırlıyoruz. Tekrardan hayata tutunmaya başlıyoruz.

Because our roots were cut off with the beginning of the Republic. I mean, I graduated from Archiving. They trained us towards the Ottoman archives. How many of us can read about our past? A Japanese grandfather, grandmother, I don't know, can read and share all kinds of information and knowledge related to three generations ago, or a Chinese or an Indian, but as a Turk, we don't know our Ancestor or grandfather two generations ago. What did they create, what kind of values did they have, what did they have? And for us to be able to grow, to catch up, to develop, this confusion, this blurriness of ours right now, the fact that we haven't become anything, it's not clear where we're from, I think this is the reason. If only we could catch that connection... You must have watched a movie called The Last Samurai. What was it? For example, a Russian played a role. In that movie, they have a time, a period like the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the foundation of the Republic, almost the same period. But they continue that culture, they don't spoil it. But we reset everything. We start to hold on to life again.

Nostalgia for AK Party's Founding and Rising Years

The period from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, mostly expressed by AK Party and some MHP supporters, reflects a longing for the years of the AK Party's rise to power (see Figure 3.10). This nostalgia is characterized as a time of social transformation due to the AK Party's liberal-focused policies, and it is also described as a period that provided opportunities to empower women in social life.

Quote 47 (AK Party 1, woman, 45)

Eskiden kadınların siyasette veya bir toplumda bulunmasıyla işte 2000, benim bulunduğum sürede ya bu hani biraz daha AK Parti ile beraber ben değiştiğini düşünüyorum. Açıkçası yani evet, burda kadına bir kapı aralandı.

I think that with the presence of women in politics or in society in the past, during my time there, I think it has changed a little bit with the AK Party. Frankly, yes, a door has been opened for women here.




Figure 3.10. Thematic map for the codes-subcodes of Nostalgia for AK Party's Founding and Rising Years

It is noted that the national consciousness was on the rise in society, along with an increase in tolerance among people. Investments made in the economic field painted a picture of a society with a high standard of living, while motivation and hope for the future were expressed as being high.

Quote 48 (AK Party 12, woman, 36)

Daha güçlü bir Türkiye olma yolunda adımlar atılması bence, özellikle az önce bahsettiğim Ecevit dönemi ekonomik krizinden sonra. İnsanlara güven ve umut edecek bir şeyler vermesi, kadınları toplumsal hayata daha çok katmaları. Uzun süre de istikrarlı politika izlediler.

I think steps were taken towards becoming a stronger Türkiye, especially after the economic crisis of the Ecevit era that I mentioned earlier. Giving people confidence and something to hope for and integrating women into social life more. They followed a stable policy for a long time.

Quote 49 (MHP 5, man, 24)

Şu aklıma geliyor spor konusunda milli takım o zamanlar yani güzel işler yapıyordu, yani izlemekten zevk uyuyordu. Yani eee bir milli şuur vardı, herkes o milli şuurla oraya odaklanıp izliyordu. Yani başarı veya başarısızlıkta yine herkes gurur duyuyordu.

This comes to my mind, in terms of sports, the national team was doing great things at that time, I mean it was a pleasure to watch. I mean, there was a national consciousness, everyone was focusing on that national consciousness and watching. In other words, everyone was proud of success or failure.

Holistic Past Nostalgia

Holistic Past Nostalgia reflects the participants' multifaceted and rich understanding of Turkish history, while also establishing a strong bond with the ideology of nationalism. This nostalgia offers a perspective that evaluates the cultural and social heritage of different historical periods together. The participants' nostalgia for the most powerful period of the Ottoman Empire, the early years of the Republic, and the deep-rooted history of Anatolia brings with it a multidimensional historical narrative. The participants glorify the power and civilization of the Turkish nation by emphasizing past achievements, cultural richness, and social unity. Anatolia symbolizes the multidimensionality and historical depth of Turkish identity as an area where different civilizations coexist (see Figure 3.11).




Figure 3.11. Thematic map for the sub-themes of Holistic Past Nostalgia

A MHP supporter (Quote 50) traces Turkish history back thousands of years, emphasizing the importance of Anatolia's historical heritage, such as Göbeklitepe. He argues that Western countries, especially Europeans, are trying to claim this region's history and distort the deep-rooted past of the Turks. Additionally, he highlights the significant achievements of the Turks in science, art, and other fields from the 10th to the 14th centuries, referring to this period as a "Turkish Renaissance". Similarly, an IYI Party supporter (Quote 51) expresses nostalgia for both the modernization and development initiatives under Atatürk's leadership and the pinnacle of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Fatih Sultan Mehmet. In the participant's view, the literary, artistic, scientific, and administrative successes of the Fatih era represent a time when the nation reached the peak of civilization.

Quote 50 (MHP 4, man, 62)

Siz en son 1071'de buraya gelmişsiniz. Yeni farklı teoriler olduğu için en son diyorum bunu. Atatürk'ün de imzasıyla en az 7000 yıldan beri Türk beşiğidir diyor, Türk'ü tanımlarken. Elbette çok uzak görüşlü bir yapı ortaya koyuyor. Şimdi bu size bir misyon yüklüyor yani şey de hatta çok enteresan buna başkaları sahip çıkmaya çalıştığı için bunu söylüyorum. Avrupalılar kendi köklerini ararken birilerine Hititlere bağlıyorlardı. Şimdi Göbeklitepe'ye bağlamak istiyorlar çünkü onların ormanlarda, bataklıklarda yetişen bir kültürel ürünleridir onlar öyle bir köklü bir tarihleri de yok Avrupalıların. ... Yani Türk toplumu, Türk tarihine baktığınız zaman çok keskin bir aradan gireyim zaman dilimine. 10. yüzyıldan itibaren tıpta, bilimde, teknolojiye, matematikte, astronomide, sanatta ve müzikte muhteşem başarılar imza atmış bir kültürel varlık ortaya koyuyo ve 14. yüzyıla kadar dünya klasizmi yaratabilecek bir varlığı aynı zamanda Asya'da, Horasan'da, Kuzey Afrika'da, ta Endülüs'e kadar uzanan bir coğrafyada bir Türk rönesansı yaratabilecek bir düzeydeydi. Elbette bir nostaljik olarak o başarılı olduğu dönemi insan yaşamak isterdi.

You last came here in 1071. I say last because there are new and different theories. When defining the Turk, it is said that it has been the cradle of Turks for at least 7000 years, with the signature of Atatürk. Of course, he presents a very far-sighted structure. Now, this gives you a mission, in other words, it is very interesting, I say this because others are trying to claim it. When Europeans were looking for their own roots, they were connecting them to the Hittites. Now they want to connect them to Göbeklitepe because they are a cultural product that grows in forests and swamps, and Europeans do not have such a deep-rooted history. ...So when you look at Turkish history, let me take a very sharp break and go back to the time period. Starting from the 10th century, it has created a cultural entity that has made great achievements in medicine, science, technology, mathematics, astronomy, art and music, and until the 14th century, it was at a level that could create a world classicism and at the same time create a Turkish renaissance in Asia, Khorasan, North Africa, and a geography that extends all the way to Andalusia. Of course, as a nostalgic, one would want to experience that period when it was successful.

Quote 51 (IYI Party 12, man, 40)

Atatürk dönemiyle ilgili şey... Bir dünyada gelişme var, bir modernleşme var, sanayi teknoloji var. Ama eğitim var. Özellikle savaş teknolojileri çok ilerlemiş falan. Silahlar var. Büyük küresel güçler var, emperyalist devletler var. ...Hastalık yaygın, açlık yaygın, yani çok fazla teçhizat yok, çok zor bir dönem. Ona rağmen bir savaş veriliyor. Ama asıl önemli

Regarding Atatürk's era, there was global progress, modernization, and advancements in industry and technology, especially in warfare. There were powerful global forces and imperialist states. ...Disease was rampant, hunger was widespread, there was a severe lack of equipment, and it was a difficult time. Despite all this, a war was

olan o savaştan sonra, o yetişmiş insan gücü az, eğitim kurumları zayıf, ekonomik şartlar kötü. Buna rağmen çok kısa süre içerisinde büyük bir okuma-yazma seferberliği, sanayi ve teknoloji hamlesi ve modern, demokratik, laik bir hukuk devleti inşa etmeleri çok önemli. Bunu şuradan anlayabiliyoruz. Afganistan, Pakistan, İran, Ortadoğu ülkeleriyle benzer özelliklerdeyken, yüz yüzyıl önce bugün çok daha iyi bir yere gelmiş olmak. O yüzden o dönemin şeyi, mesela nostalji deyince aklıma şey gelir mesela. 1920ler çok kötü bir şart altında, çok kötü şartlar altında ülke ama çok güzel giyinen mesela bir Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, çok güzel takım elbiseleri, sakal tıraşı, saç, onun o duruşu, o sigara içişi falan bana çok nostaljik gelir. Anıtkabir'e gittiğimde de çok etkilenirim. Her dönemin bence nostaljisi var. Ama mesela Fatih dönemi ise artık göçebe bir toplumun yerleştiği, bir devletleştiği, belli kurumları inşa ettiği ve dünyaya büyük bir güç olarak kendini gösterdiği bir dönem. Fatih'in en önemli tarafı devlet yönetim sisteminde bu Enderun sistemini getirmesi ve bu sistemi daha çok Balkanlardan topladığı gençlerle yapıp, mesela Pargalı bir balıkçının oğlunu Avustralya Macar İmparatorluğu'na denk bir makama gelebilmesi. Aynı dönem şiirde, edebiyatta, denizcilikte, mimaride falan müthiş gelişmeler, yani Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni arası olan dönem. Bizim her açıdan zirveye vardığımız bir dönem. O dönemi çok nostaljik buluyorum, çok şey buluyorum yani, etkileyici buluyorum. İşte ilk kahvehaneler falan, şeyler, mesela Sahnı Seman Medreselerin kurulması, yine Süleymaniye Medresesinin kurulması, o anlamda bilimde, teknolojiye, sanatta, savaşta her açıdan belki de milletimizin medeniyet açısından zirveye geldiği bir dönem. O anlamda onu çok beğeniyorum.

fought. But the most important part is what happened after the war: there was a shortage of educated people, weak educational institutions, and poor economic conditions. Despite all this, in a very short time, a massive literacy campaign was launched, there were industrial and technological advancements, and a modern, democratic, secular rule of law was established. We can understand the significance of this when we consider that while Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries shared similar characteristics a century ago, today Türkiye has advanced much further. That's why, when I think of nostalgia, the 1920s come to mind. The country was in a very bad state, but Mustafa Kemal Atatürk always appeared well-dressed, with his suits, shaved face, and well-groomed hair. His stance and the way he smoked a cigarette feel very nostalgic to me. I am deeply moved when I visit Anıtkabir. Every era has its nostalgia. For example, the period of Fatih the Conqueror was when a once-nomadic society settled, established a state, and demonstrated its power to the world. Fatih's most significant contribution was bringing the Enderun system to state governance, educating young people, mostly gathered from the Balkans. For instance, the son of a fisherman, Pargalı, could rise to a position equivalent to the Austrian Hungarian Empire. The same period also saw tremendous developments in poetry, literature, maritime exploration, and architecture. The era from Fatih to Yavuz Sultan Selim and Suleiman the Magnificent is when we reached our peak in every respect. It's an era I find highly nostalgic and deeply impressive. The founding of the first coffeehouses, the establishment of the Sahn-ı Seman Madrasah, and later the Süleymaniye Madrasah were significant advancements. In every field—science, technology, art, and warfare—this was perhaps the peak of our nation's civilization. That's why I admire that period so much.

Nostalgia for 2010 Peace Process

For the two HDP supporters, the period in history that evokes a sense of nostalgia is the Peace Process, also known as the Kurdish Opening, in 2010 (see Figure 3.12). The nostalgic elements of this period include discussions aimed at ending armed conflict, increased solidarity and sincerity, greater freedom in practicing their culture, a reduction in

political pressure, and the presence of democratic debates regarding their recognition in the political arena.




Figure 3.12. Thematic map for the codes-subcodes of Nostalgia for 2010 Peace Process

Quote 52 (HDP 8, man, 35)

Daha yaşanılır, daha rahat olmasının bir diğer sebebi ise hani kıyasladığımız zaman 80'ler 90'lar 2000'li yıllara kadarki Türkiye'de var olan şeylerle 2000'den 2010 yılına kadarki olan süreçlerin de farklı olduğunu düşünüyorum siyasi olarak, özellikle düşünce özgürlüğü bazında ve siyasal olaylar bazında. İnsanlara biraz daha rahat siyaset yapabilme alanı açıldığını düşünüyorum.

Another reason why it was more liveable and comfortable, in my opinion, is that when we compare the conditions in Türkiye from the 1980s and 1990s up until the 2000s with the period from 2000 to 2010, there is a noticeable difference, especially in terms of freedom of thought and political events. I believe that during this time, there was more space for people to engage in politics more freely.

Quote 53 (HDP 11, woman, 32)

15 yıl önce benim bulunduğum şehirde benim kültürüme dair izler, işte dil olsun ya da giyim olarak her açıdan aslında daha iyi ve daha aittim oraya. Ama şu anda baktığımda ne dil olarak ne kültürel olarak hiçbir şekilde kendime ait bir şey bulamıyorum orada. O yüzden 15 yıl öncesini çok özleyorum. O dönemde bize ait, kendi kültürüne ait izler falan vardı ya, kendi dilini çok rahat, her ne kadar şey olmasa bile, resmiyet olmasa bile rahat konuşabildiğin bir süreçti. O dönemi özleyorum. Kendime ait bir yer vardı orada, kendime ait bir toplum vardı orada. Hastaneye gittiğimde oradaki insanın konuşmasından şimdi buradan anlıyordum, evet tamam ya da okula gittiğimde yanımdaki arkadaşımın bana yakın olduğunu görüyordum. Hem kültürel hem de dilsel olarak. Ama şu anda çok farklı bir şey görüyorum orada. Çok daha

Fifteen years ago, in the city where I lived, there were traces of my culture—whether in language or clothing, in every sense I felt more connected and more like I belonged there. But now, when I look at it, I can't find anything that feels like mine, neither in language nor in culture. That's why I miss how it was 15 years ago. At that time, there were traces of our own culture, and you could speak your own language comfortably, even though it wasn't official or formal. I miss that period. I had a place there that felt like mine, a community that felt like mine. When I went to the hospital, I could tell from the way people spoke that they were from there, or when I went to school, I could see that the friend next to me was close to me both culturally and linguistically. But now, I see something very different there. It's a much

karmakarışık bir kültür ve kendi özünden yitirilmiş bir toplum görüyorum orada. O yüzden 15 yıl öncesinde bunları özledim yani

more chaotic culture, and I see a society that has lost its essence. That's why I miss the way things were 15 years ago.

Gezi Park Nostalgia

The nostalgia felt by two participants—supporters of HDP and CHP—centres around the Gezi protests, which hold deep meaning for them, particularly in terms of social transformation and solidarity (see Figure 3.13). The themes that emerge in their narratives are the representation of an alternative society, solidarity, hope and rebellion based on common demands.




Figure 3.13. Thematic map for the codes-subcodes of Gezi Park Nostalgia

The CHP supporter (Quote 54) describes Gezi Park as a "social transformation" and views it as a point of rebellion against despair. The protests are seen as more than just demonstrations; they represent a powerful resistance capable of changing the collective mindset on both individual and societal levels. The HDP supporter (Quote 55), similarly, defines Gezi as a symbol of solidarity and a life created outside of social hierarchies. She idealizes Gezi Park as a space where marginalized and isolated individuals built a life beyond all selfishness. The experience at Gezi is portrayed as one of unity, stripped of the identities and social statuses imposed by the system. For this participant, the mutual support, sharing, and assistance among the people represent a peak moment of social solidarity. Both participants idealize these experiences and reflect on them with nostalgia, contrasting them with their current disappointment in today's social and political conditions.

Quote 54 (CHP 6, woman, 48)

Gezi yani benim için çok büyük bi şey, büyük bi dönüşüm yani toplumsal dönüşüm. Orda bi ayaklanma, bi itiraz, bi isyan var ve hani ihtiyacımız olan bi şey olduğunu düşünüyorum zaten. Tüm bu umutsuzluğa isyandır herhalde Gezi. O da benim için çok keskin bi değişim noktası tarihte herhalde. ... Biraz daha kendim yalnız hissetmediğim, hala aynı tarafta olduğum, büyük bir kesimin yanında olduğunu hissetmek insana güçlü hissettiriyor ve umutlu hissettiriyor. Eee, tabii ki umudu hiç kaybetmiyoruz ama maalesef bu ayaklanmanın işte ya da benzer yüksek seslerin çok da fazla bizi bi yere götürmedi ya da götürmeyeceği endişesine düşmeye başladım yani ben de.

Gezi is a huge thing for me, a major transformation, a societal transformation. There's an uprising, a protest, a rebellion there, and I already think it was something we needed. Gezi is probably a rebellion against all this hopelessness. It's a very sharp turning point in history for me, I think. ... Feeling that I'm not alone, that I'm still on the same side, and that I'm standing alongside a large group of people makes me feel strong and hopeful. Of course, we never lose hope, but unfortunately, I've started to worry that this uprising or similar loud voices haven't really gotten us anywhere or might not lead us to where we want to go.

Quote 55 (HDP 1, woman, 33)

Şöyle başka bir hayat... Yani aslında sistemin bütün bu ötekileştirdiği, eleştirdiği, yalnızlaştırdığı, bireycileştirdiği, bütün dayanışma ilişkilerinden uzak kalan insanlar olarak dediğim gibi biz orada başka bir hayat kurduk. Bütün o hiyerarşik ilişkilerin dışında, bütün bencilliğin dışında, herkesin her şeyini paylaştığın, en ufak bir hareketlilikte insanların birbirinin yardımına koştuğu, uzman bir doktorun sade bir vatandaş olduğu ama aynı zamanda vatandaşın başına bir şey geldiğinde onun gerçekten uzman doktor olduğunun açığa çıktığı... Bütün kimliklerimizin, profesyonel hayatımızın, mesleklerimizin, işte maddi durumumuzun, nereden geldiğimizin, nerede oturduğumuzun, her şeyimizin ötesinde orada gerçekten bütün kimliklerimizden arınmıştık. O çok birleştiriciydi bence.

Here's another life... I mean, as people who were all marginalized, criticized, isolated, made individualistic, and distanced from all forms of solidarity by the system, we created a different kind of life there. Outside of all those hierarchical relationships, outside of all the selfishness, it was a place where everyone shared everything, where at the slightest movement, people rushed to help each other. A specialist doctor was just an ordinary citizen, but at the same time, when something happened to a fellow citizen, it became clear that they were indeed a specialist doctor. We stripped away all our identities, our professional lives, our jobs, our financial status, where we came from, where we lived—everything. And that was really unifying, in my opinion.

Nostalgia for Pre-Islamic Turkish History

Figure 3.14 shows the thematic map of Nostalgia for Pre-Islamic Turkish History. The nostalgia for pre-Islamic Turkish history and culture emphasizes the importance of the army and the value of Turkish identity and history while idealizing the Gokturk period as the golden age of societal history. The Zafer party supporter who longs for this period also criticizes the Arabization of society today and expresses his dissatisfaction with the fact that Islamic values have taken precedence over Turkish identity as Quote 56 indicated.




Figure 3.14. Thematic map for the sub-themes of Nostalgia for Pre-Islamic Turkish History

Quote 56 (Zafer Party 1, man, 31)

İslamiyet öncesi Göktürkler Dönemi gerçekten güçlü bir ordu, bir ordu-millet. Türklük tanımının yapıldığı, Türk olmanın ayrıcalık olduğu, diğer tüm milletlerden üstün olduğumuz bir dönemdi. Yani zihnimizde de öyle düşündüğümüz bir dönemdi. Tabii toplumsal yapı, örf ve adetler, töremiz bunlar önemliydi. Ama şimdi İslamiyet’le beraber Arap ahlakını aldığı için toplumun çoğu, bize uygun olmayan rahatsızlık verici bir hal aldı.

The Gokturk Period before Islam was a really strong army, an army-nation. It was a period when Turkishness was defined, when being Turkish was a privilege, when we were superior to all other nations. In other words, it was a period when we thought so in our minds. Of course, social structure, customs and traditions, our traditions were important. But now, since they have adopted Arab morality with Islam, most of the society has become disturbing and unsuitable for us.

Collective Nostalgia Figures

The representations of nostalgic figures by participants have been examined under three main categories: Political and Military Figures, Religious and Spiritual Figures, and Popular-Cultural Figures. The code distribution of collective nostalgia figures according to the density of participant expressions is shown in Figure 3.15. Among the visible codes, those with larger font sizes are mentioned more frequently, while those written in smaller font sizes represent figures mentioned less frequently. When looking at the code cloud shown in Figure 3.15, it is seen that the most frequently mentioned figures are Alparslan Türkeş, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Necmettin Erbakan, Bülent Ecevit.

Table 3.3 (continued)

Bülent Ecevit	5	1	2	1	2						11
Alparslan Türkeş			5	7							12
Devlet Bahçeli			1	3							4
Deniz Gezmiş		3				1	1				5
Mahir Çayan		4					1				5
Hüseyin İnönü		1					1				2
İbrahim Kaypakkaya		2					1				3
Bülent Uluer							1				1
Süleyman Demirel	1		1	1							3
Erdal İnönü	2										2
Behice Boran						1	1				2
Kemal Türkler						1	1				2
Rıza Kuas							1				1
Fevzi Çakmak			1								1
İsmet İnönü			1								1
Tansu Çiller	1				1						2
Hüseyin Nihal Atsız					1						1
Leyla Zana		2									2
Mesut Yılmaz	1										1
POPULAR AND CULTURAL FIGURES											
Nazım Hikmet						1					1
Reha İsvan							1				1
Ruhi Su							1				1
Çarşı			1								1
Mimar Sinan	1										1
Musa Anter		2									2
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek					1						1
Ziya Gökalp			1	1							2
Yahya Kemal				1							1
Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi			1	1							2
Halide Edip Adıvar				1							1
Bir Demet Tiyatro		1									1
Grup Yorum		1									1
Mazlum Doğan		2									2
Ahmet Kaya		2									2
RELIGIOUS AND MORAL FIGURES											
Pir Sultan Abdal					1						1
Hacı Bektaş Veli					1						1
Hacı Bayram Veli					1						1
Dadaloğlu					1						1
Yunus Emre	1				1						2
Mevlâna	1				1						2
Ebu Eyyub el Ensari	1										1
SUM	18	11	22	20	42	3	6	11	3	3	139
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

Among AKP supporters, the most frequently mentioned figures include Kanuni Sultan Süleyman (Suleiman the Magnificent), Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Necmettin Erbakan, and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu. CHP supporters highlight figures such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Bülent Ecevit, and Erdal İnönü. HDP supporters mention leftist and revolutionary figures like Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan, as well as popular and cultural figures such as Ahmet Kaya, Musa Anter, Mazlum Doğan, and Grup Yorum, alongside figures associated with the Kurdish movement like Leyla Zana. For IYI Party and MHP supporters, the most nostalgic figure is Alparslan Türkeş. Additionally, political figures like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, Devlet Bahçeli, and Necmettin Erbakan, as well as cultural figures such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Ziya Gökalp, Galip Erdem, Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi, Yahya Kemal, and Halide Edip Adıvar also hold significant importance. TIP and TKP mention leftist and revolutionary figures like Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan as well as the important figures of the revolutionary socialist and labour movement in Türkiye such as Bülent Uluer, Rıza Kuas, Behice Boran, Kemal Türkler and lastly popular and cultural figures such as Nazım Hikmet and Ruhi Su. YRP supporter mentioned Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the National Vision movement and Adnan Kahveci and Turgut Özal as figures representing the conservative political understanding. Supporters of Zafer Party have mentioned figures such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Timur and Alparslan, whose historical achievements stand out and who symbolize the turning points of Turkish history.

4.2. Social Representations of the Past from the Perspective of Partisan Identities

When I asked participants during the interviews about the most difficult and sorrowful periods in societal history, their responses indicated that collective memory is shaped by the distinctions between their own identities and the us versus others. Participants generally answered questions about the past with a focus on recent history, predominantly discussing events that occurred during their own lived experiences.

4.2.1. Hard Periods to Live in the Societal History

Figure 3.16 shows the distribution of difficult and sorrowful periods in societal history. According to this chart, the September 12 period and the last 24 years are defined by most participants as the most sorrowful and dark times. There is a strong consensus on

defining the present day as the most challenging period in societal history due to the economic and political practices of the ruling party. Following these periods, the 1990s, the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, and the February 28 postmodern coup are noted.




Figure 3.16. The document-based frequency of the themes in hard periods

Table 3.4 shows the distribution and frequency of hard periods to live according to party supporters. The periodical coding and sub-coding themes are detailed in Appendix F. The darkness of the colour in the table represents the frequency of the code. Darker-coloured codes indicate those that were most frequently mentioned by participants. Accordingly, the most difficult periods in societal history for AK Party supporters, are, in order: the founding of the Republic (n=2), September 12, 1980 coup, February 28 postmodern coup (n=2), July 15 coup attempt (n=2), terrorist incidents in the 1990s (n=2), the March 12, 1960 coup (n=1), 2001 economic crisis (n=1), and Gezi Park protests (n=1).

Table 3.4. Document-based representations of hard periods to live by party supporters

	AK PARTY	CHP	HDP	İYİ PARTİ	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZAFER	SUM
HARD PERIODS TO LIVE											
1912-1922: Balkan Wars and the War of Independence				1						1	2
The Last Period of the Ottoman Empire			1								1
The Mongol Period			1								1
2001 Economic Crisis	1										1
The 1990s	2		5	2	1		1				11
RECENT PAST: 2000 - Present		8	5	3	3	1	3	2		1	26
March 12, 1960 Military Coup	1	1				1					4
September 12, 1980 Military Coup	2	4	5	6	3	1	1	2	1		25
Establishment of the Republic	2										2
Gezi Parkı Protests	1					1					2
February 28 Postmodern Coup	2				1	1					4

Table 3.4 (continued)

July 15, 2016 Coup Attempt	2		2	1	3						8
SUM	12	13	15	15	10	4	3	3	1	2	78
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

For some AK Party supporters, the reforms in the early years of the Republic, along with Türkiye's modernization process, are perceived as a departure from identity and cultural values. It is thought that the reforms brought by the Republic created a major break with the past. The expression "break" includes the belief that historical continuity has been interrupted and that this situation harms the moral and cultural fabric of society (Quote 57). For another participant, the February 28 process is defined as a blow to free thought (Quote 58).

Quote 57 (AK Party 10, man, 49)

Yani benim gördüğüm kadarıyla, ee ben hani manevi boyutu, İslami boyutu olan bir kişi de olarak yani Cumhuriyeti bu anlamda çok şey görmüyorum. Yani karanlık bir dönem olarak maalesef görüyorum. Çünkü az önce konuştuğumuz düşüncede olan büyüklerimizi... Ya ne demek yani benim atam da dedem de sarık takıyordu, şapka takıyordu. O insanlar sarık takıyor, şapka takıyor diyerek sen ne yapıyorsun? Yok ediyorsun, ortadan kaldırıyorsun. ...İşte harf devrimi yapıyorsun. Geçmişinle, senin seni sen yapan tüm değerlerle bağını kesiyorsun, yok ediyorsun. Yani bunların hepsi böyle sıkıntılı olan şeyler olarak görüyorum. O dönemi karanlık bir dönem, karanlık bir çağ olarak görüyorum.

As far as I can see, as someone who values spirituality and the Islamic dimension, I unfortunately view the Republic as a dark period. Because, as we just discussed, elders who shared similar views... What does it mean? My grandfather and great-grandfather wore a turban, and now they wear a hat. So, what are you doing when you say that people wearing turbans and hats are to be condemned? You are erasing them, wiping them out. ...Then you introduce the alphabet reform. You sever all ties with your past, with the values that make you who you are. I see all these as problematic. I view that era as a dark period, a dark age.

Quote 58 (AK Party 4, man, 43)

28 Şubat süreci de ülkede belli bir kesimin zulme ve baskıya uğradığı, laiklik adına özgürlüklerin kısıtlandığı bir dönem olmuş.

The 28th of February period was also a time when a certain segment of the population faced oppression and pressure, a period where freedoms were restricted in the name of secularism.

Among the critical historical periods frequently mentioned by CHP, HDP, TIP, and TKP supporters are *the September 12, 1980 coup* and *Recent past: 2000 to the present* (see Table 3.4). The September 12 period, characterized by military intervention and the loss of democracy, is regarded as one of the most significant and negative events that shaped Türkiye, particularly due to its long-term impact on shaping future generations and hindering political organization. Factors that made the period "dark" include the left-right conflict leading to polarisation, poor economic conditions and limited resources, the harsh conditions in prisons, torture, unsolved murders, repression of Kurds and socialists, lack of fair trials,

discrimination, restrictions, and the pervasive culture of fear. An HDP supporter (Quote 59) describes the constant feeling of fear and anxiety brought on by the September 12 period. The participant expresses the psychologically exhausting effect of living with this anxiety and trying to protect loved ones. Another HDP supporter (Quote 60) expresses how brutal the coup period was, emphasizing the mass violence and human rights violations experienced in metropolitan areas and rural areas. The participant expresses the trauma experienced by the groups that were oppressed, despised and insulted during that period, and states that the losses and traumas caused by this process should not be forgotten. Another HDP supporter (Quote 61) describes the impact of the military coup on their families and the pain they experienced in a very personal way. Witnessing traumatic events such as their relatives being thrown into acid pits makes the participant feel the emotional burden and deep anger about this period. A TKP supporter (Quote 62) states that murders were committed every day and valuable people were killed, there was no security of life, and concrete divisions such as the roads separating between rightists and leftists were dominant in society. In general, the participants argue that the traces left by the September 12 coup should be left in the memory of society. Participants emphasize that recognizing and accurately documenting what happened is critical for society to confront its traumas.

Quote 59 (HDP 10, man, 73)

12 Eylül'ü daha sıcak yaşadım. Her gün ölüm korkusu, her gün yakalanma korkusu, yakalandığında yıllarca göreceğin işkenceler çabası cabası. Ne kadar içeride kalacağın belli değil. Bu tedirginlikle yaşamak, bu tedirginlik duygusu. Bu tedirginlikle yaşamak, bu tedirginlikle evlenmişsen, bir ailen olmuşsa aileni bu kaotik ortamdan koruyup kollamak, sadece kendini koruyup kollamak da değil.

I experienced September 12 more warmly. Every day there is the fear of death, the fear of being caught, the torture you will endure for years when you are caught. You don't know how long you will be inside. Living with this anxiety, this feeling of anxiety. Living with this anxiety, if you got married with this anxiety, if you have a family, protecting and looking after your family from this chaotic environment is not just protecting and looking after yourself.

Quote 60 (HDP 5, man, 65)

En karanlık, en kötü, en acı süreç 12 Eylül 80 darbesiydi. Bu askeri darbe öyle korkunç bir şeydi ki yani, ee, metropollerde o kenar mahallede, gecekondu mahalleleri, doğu'da köylerde geçiyo yani doğunun hepsini katletmişler. Bu anlamda ezilmeyen, horlanmayan, hakaret edilmeyen bir tek yer gösteremezsiniz. Şimdi o süreç çok kötüydü, o süreç hiç suç aslında bu bahsettiğim insanlar da suçlu falan değil bu tam bağımsız Türkiye diyen gerçek anlamda vatansever insanlardı bunlar. Ama ne hikmetse işte işlerine gelmedi sözüm ona onlar kendilerince vatan haini dediler. Bir sürü genci katlettiler, bir sürü sakat kaldı, bir sürü köylü, bir sürü yaşlı, bir sürü

The darkest, worst, most painful period was the September 12, 1980 coup. This military coup was such a terrible thing, I mean, it took place in the metropolises, in the slums, in the shantytowns, in the villages in the east, I mean they massacred the entire east. In this sense, you cannot show a single place that was not oppressed, humiliated, insulted. Now, that period was very bad, in fact, the people I mentioned were not criminals or anything, they were truly patriotic people who said this is a fully independent Türkiye. But for some reason, it did not suit them, they called them traitors in their own way. They massacred a lot of young people, a lot of

kadın kız, bir sürü hakarettten geçti, bir sürü eziyetten geçti. En kötüsü de işte oydu.

people became disabled, a lot of villagers, a lot of elderly people, a lot of women and girls, they went through a lot of insults, they went through a lot of torture. That was the worst of it.

Quote 61 (HDP 7, woman, 38)

80 darbesini ben babamdan bilirim. Bir de Ahmet Türk'ün bir belgeseli var. Ben hiçbir zaman o belgeseli 10 dakikadan fazla izleyemedim. Henüz bitiremedim, bitiremiyorum. Yani sekizinci dakikası banyoya koşuyorum. Yani benim bile dayanamadığım şeyi insanoğluna yaşattığı... Ben tarih boyunca ve gerçekten İslamiyet'e inananım. Mağşer gününde 80 darbesini ve 80'leri yaşatanların asla cenneti görmemesi gerektiğine inanıyorum. Büyük bir karanlık geçmişti. insanların asit kuyularına ki benim bunlar içinde akrabalarım bile var. Şırnak'ta, Cizre'de asit kuyularına atılan akrabalarım var, Kürt bölgesinden helikopterlerle havaya atılanlar var biliyorum ki ben... Askeri darbeye evi yakılmış.

I know about the 1980 coup from my father. There is also a documentary by Ahmet Türk. I have never been able to watch more than 10 minutes of that documentary. I still haven't finished it, I can't finish it. I mean, I run to the bathroom in the eighth minute. I mean, what he made humanity go through that I couldn't even stand... I am a true believer in history and Islam. I believe that those who made the 1980 coup and the 1980s go through on the Day of Judgment should never see heaven. A great darkness had passed. People were thrown into pits of acid, and even my relatives are among them. I have relatives who were thrown into pits of acid in Şırnak and Cizre, there are those who were thrown into the air by helicopters from the Kurdish region, I know that I... Their houses were burned down in the military coup.

Quote 62 (TKP 3, woman, 66)

12 Eylül çok karanlık, her gün on beş, yirmi, belki otuz cinayetin işlendiği dönemler. Çok değerli insanlar basında bilim adamı, adalette büyükelçiliklerde çok değerli insanlar öldürüldü, toplu katliamlar oldu, kahveler tarandı falan yani can güvenliği yoktu o zaman. Çok karanlıktı yani. Yürüyeceğin yollar bile bölünmüştü, isimleri vardı sağcılar, ülkücülerin yolu, ülkücülerin, solcuların falan. Gece bölümde okuyordum mesela, öğretmenimle gidip geliyordum. Daha sonra gündüz bölümüne geçtim. Çok ciddi karanlıktı.

September 12th was a very dark time, when fifteen, twenty, maybe thirty murders were committed every day. Very valuable people were killed, scientists in the press, very valuable people in the embassies in the justice system, there were mass killings, coffee shops were raided, etc., there was no security of life at that time. It was very dark. Even the roads you would walk on were divided, they had names, the right wing, the nationalist, the left wing. For example, I was studying in the night department, I was going back and forth with my teacher. Later, I transferred to the day department. It was very dark.

For HDP supporters, another challenging period in social history is the 1990s, marked by traumatic experiences on both individual and collective levels. Participants listed the factors that made these years difficult for them as follows: unsolved murders/disappearances, heavy restrictions on the Kurdish language, the closure of political parties and newspapers, the normalization of violence, and the 'fear of the uniform,' which reflects the sense of distrust and pressure felt towards security forces. An HDP supporter (Quote 63) expresses the fear he felt when he encountered uniformed soldiers during his childhood in the 1990s. Similarly, other participant from HDP supporters' (Quote 64 and Quote 65) states that in their childhood memories of the 1990s, they constantly encountered death, disappearances, and people being sent to prison. They later realize how painful it was

for them to have such events "normalized" around themselves. In general, the participants reflect on their childhood experiences related to the political violence and trauma they experienced in Southeastern Türkiye during the 1990s. Each of them conveys from their own perspectives how deeply this period left its mark on individual and collective memory.

Quote 63 (HDP 8, man, 35)

90'larda biz çocukluğumuzda genellikle üniformalı gördüğümüz zaman her zaman korkardık acaba niçin geldiler, yine kimi götürcekler ya da yine kim kimi şikâyet etti tarzında böyle bir korku ya da kasetleri saklama, silahları saklama insanlar arasında böyle bir şey vardı. Biz çocukken büyüklerimiz konuştuğu zaman biz de hep bundan etkilenirdik, hatta koşardık haber verirdik asker geldi şu geldi falan diye. Üniforma forma korkusu vardı 90larda.

In the 90s, when we were kids, we were always scared when we saw people in uniform, we wondered why they came, who they were going to take away again, or who complained about whom, or there was this fear among people of hiding tapes, hiding weapons. When we were kids, when our elders talked, we were always affected by it, we would even run to tell them that the soldiers had come, that they had come, etc. There was a fear of uniforms in the 90s.

Quote 64 (HDP 11, woman, 32)

90'lı yıllarda çocuk olduğum dönem. Yani böyle o 2-3 yaşında olduğum dönemde bile çevremde gördüğüm, sürekli birilerinin işte cezaevinde olması, birilerinin kaybolmuş olması, birilerinin ölmüş olması, hep bu haberler. Ve çok normal karşılanıyordu artık böyle çevremizde. O normal karşılanmanın ne kadar acı olduğunu sonradan fark ettim. Ya o dönem evet bence kötü ya. Hatırlamak istemediğim, keşke hiç olmasaydı dediğim dönem yani.

the 90s when I was a child. I mean, even when I was 2-3 years old, I saw people around me constantly being in prison, people missing, people dying, all this news. And it was considered very normal in our environment. I realized later how painful it was to be considered normal. Yes, that period was bad in my opinion. It's a period I don't want to remember, a period I wish had never happened.

Quote 65 (HDP 6, woman, 35)

Ee, ben 93'te başladım okula. O zamanlar sürekli çatışma vardı yani akşamları başlardı çatışma sabaha kadar sürerdi ve aydınlatma yasaktı sokaklarda. Sokaklar kapkaranlıktı. Çünkü işte dışarıda dolaşan PKK'lılar görünmesin diye. Benim en şahit olduğum çarpıcı olay o dönem, şahit olduğum en çarpıcı olay şuydu. Okula gittiğimizde bi kalabalık görürdük evimizin önünde. Biz imamın öldürüldüğünü gördük. Ben o cesedi gördüm yani ilkokuldaydım ya, o cesedi gördüm. Çok da tarif etmek istemiyorum nasıl olduğunu ama birçok şey aklımdan çıkmıştır ama onu ben hayatım boyunca unutamıyorum. Yani orda, bi ölünün bile görülmemesi gereken bi yaşta ben karşımda yere uzanmış, kanları daha sıcak olan bir ceset gördüm. İnsanlar etrafındaydı böyle hepimiz birbirimize şakalar yapıyoduk, çocuklar böyle etrafında dolanıyoduk.

Well, I started school in 93. At that time, there was constant conflict, I mean, the conflict would start in the evenings and continue until the morning, and lighting was forbidden on the streets. The streets were pitch black. Because so that the PKK members walking outside would not be seen. The most striking event that I witnessed at that time, the most striking event that I witnessed was this. When we went to school, we would see a crowd in front of our house. We saw the imam being killed. I saw that body, I mean, I was in primary school, I saw that body. I don't want to describe it very much, but many things have slipped my mind, but I can't forget it for the rest of my life. I mean, at an age when even a dead body shouldn't be seen, I saw a body lying on the ground in front of me, its blood was warmer. People were around it, we were all playing pranks on each other, kids were hanging around it like that.

In the narratives of the IYI Party and MHP supporters, the September 12 period emerges as a period characterized by the climate of chaos and anarchy created in society by the right-left conflict and political division under the influence of imperialist powers, and the struggle of Turkish nationalists in this environment of conflict. The statements of the participants emphasize the idea that Türkiye is manipulated by external forces and that these external interventions hinder the country's development process. They argue that Türkiye's domestic and foreign policies are shaped by Western countries (USA, Europe, England) and, at times, actors such as Russia and China, and that this situation hinders Türkiye's development. These views, as a reflection of the nationalist discourses in Türkiye, are nourished by the idea that external forces harm the country's internal dynamics. The belief that external forces hinder Türkiye's potential finds an explanation through historical traumas and political fractures.

Quote 66 (IYI Party 1, man, 70)

Bu yetiştirilme daha doğrusu kaba kuvvet, yaralama olaylarını o dönemlerde iki el yönetiyor diye düşünüyordum. Daha sonra tek olduğunu gördüm. Bir tarafta Rusya bir tarafta Amerika düşünüyordum, daha sonra çoğunluğun Amerika olduğu kanaatına vardım. Amerika kalkınmış ülke istemiyor, çökertmek istiyor. Büyüme yolunda olan ülkelerin bir şekilde büyümesini yavaşlatarak, yıkarak, iktidarı değiştirerek bunu yapıyor.

I thought that this upbringing, or rather brute force, the incidents of injury were managed by two hands at that time. Later I saw that it was only one. I was thinking of Russia and America on one side, then I concluded that the majority was America. America does not want a developed country; it wants to destroy it. It does this by slowing down the growth of countries on the path of growth, destroying them, and changing the government.

Quote 67 (MHP 10, man, 43)

Yani aslında bunlar tamamen o dönemin çok parlak geleceği olan insanların kırma politikasıydı Avrupa'nın. Başta Amerika'sı, İngiltere'si bunlar tabii konseyde olarak Rusya'da olabilir. Bunlar bazen ne kadar da düşman gözükseler aslında her zaman için bizim karşımızda olan veyahut da kendi aralarında düşman gözükp de aslında her akşam aynı masada yemek yiyen ülkeler. Yani bunlar ülkenin o güzel kesimini, o verimli, o çok zeki, o parlak öğrencilerini yani cumhuriyetin düşünsenize ilk meyveleri onlar. Çok önemli, yani o o kesimi kırmışlar.

In fact, these were entirely a policy of breaking the people of that period who had a very bright future in Europe. First, America, England, of course, they could be in the council and Russia. Although these sometimes seem like enemies, they are countries that are always against us or seem like enemies among themselves but actually eat at the same table every night. In other words, these are the first fruits of the republic, think about that beautiful part of the country, those productive, very intelligent, bright students. Very important, they broke that part.

Quote 68 (MHP 4, man, 62)

O dönemdeki Türkiye koşulları uçurumun eşiğine gelmiş bir ülke özellikle farklı ideolojilerin böl-parçala-yut şeklindeki planların uygulandığı, uygulanmaya çalışıldığı ülkelerden birisiydi. Dünya iki kutupluydu ve şimdiki dünya ülkelerinin büyük bir bölümü eşitlik, demokrasi işte, işte özgürlük bağlamında sosyalist ve komünist hareket de

The conditions of Türkiye at that time were on the brink of a precipice, especially one of the countries where plans of different ideologies were implemented and tried to be implemented in the form of divide-smash-swallow. The world was bipolar, and a large part of the world's current countries were in the context of equality, democracy, freedom,

dünyanın birçok yerinde yaygındı. Bunların önemli bir bölümü yani Rus ideolojisinin Akdeniz ve sıcak iklimlere inme şeklindeki yaklaşım biçimi Türkiye'de ciddi yatırımlarla bir kesim oluşturulmasına ve ideoloji destek bulmasına bağlıydı. Bu noktada emperyalist güçlerin çok ciddi yatırımlar yaptığı biliniyor. Aslında olayın öteki tarafında belki de bu sol ve sosyalist örgütlerin arkasında SIA'nın olduğu da KGB ile birlikte Türkiye'nin güçlenmesini istemeyen emperyalist güçlerin çünkü şeyi değişmez bu Amerika, Rusya, Fransa, Almanya hiç fark etmez hepsinin Türkiye'ye karşı haspane tavırları tarihten beri var olan bir şeydir.

and socialist and communist movements were also widespread in many parts of the world. A significant part of these, namely the Russian ideology's approach of descending to the Mediterranean and warm climates, depended on the creation of a segment in Türkiye with serious investments and finding ideological support. It is known that imperialist powers made very serious investments at this point. In fact, on the other side of the matter, perhaps the SIA was behind these leftist and socialist organizations, and the imperialist powers that did not want Türkiye to become stronger, together with the KGB, because this does not change, America, Russia, France, Germany, it does not matter, all of them have a friendly attitude towards Türkiye, something that has existed since history.

For the supporters of MHP and IYI Party, the increasing threat of terrorism, economic crisis and mafia formation, the restriction of basic freedoms with February 28 are shown as factors that made the 90s difficult, while the 2016 coup attempt, the power struggle and FETÖ's military and media structure, the inability to dissolve FETÖ cadres and the anti-democratic attempts of the army are stated as difficult processes to go through.

Quote 69 (MHP 1, man, 38)

28 Şubat bence özgür düşünce adı altında insanların özgür düşüncelerinin kısıtlandığı bir dönem. Yani sırf bir siyasi partinin, sırf dini yaşama şekillerinden dolayı kısıtlama getirilen bir dönem diye düşünüyorum ben. Ve o yüzden gerçekten bence ülkede demokrasi tarihinde yapılmış en büyük hamle. Olumsuz anlamda söylüyorum bunu.

I think February 28th is a period when people's free thoughts were restricted under the name of free thought. In other words, I think it was a period when restrictions were imposed solely on a political party, solely on the way they practiced their religion. And that's why I really think it's the biggest move in the history of democracy in this country. I'm saying this in a negative way.

Quote 70 (IYI Party 3, man, 66)

Tabii 90'lı yılların işte en çok faili meçhul cinayetleri, PKK terör hadisesi, 28 Şubat'ı, Öcalan'ın gelmesi, yakalanıp getirilmesi, siyasi koalisyonlar. Bi de kriz de 94'te, bi de kriz de yaşadık ekonomik olarak. Yani bunlar hep bu ülkeyi sıkıntı içine sokan şeylerdi maalesef.

Of course, the unsolved murders of the 90s, the PKK terror incident, February 28, the arrival of Öcalan, his capture and rendition, political coalitions. We also experienced a crisis in 1994, and an economic crisis. These were all things that unfortunately put this country in trouble.

The period from the 2000s to the present has been defined as the most difficult period to live, stated by majority of CHP and some TKP, TIP, HDP, IYI Party, MHP supporters, has been coded as the 'Recent Past' (see Table 3.5). It is striking that some of the participants who described the September 12, 1980, coup as a negative period, defined today as a worse period than that period. The last 24 years, in which problems such as the youth's anxiety

about the future and desire to leave the country, the increasing difference between the lower and upper classes, marginalization and political pressures, the decrease in sincerity and the increase in distrust among people, and the lack of necessary punishments for crimes have been experienced, are defined by the participants as a period of ‘complete collapse’. The participants, who stated that this collapse is not limited to a single area, emphasize the collapse of education, the collapse of the economy, the collapse of the legal system and the collapse of the moral structure characterized by Western imitation. The party supporters’ representations of this period and document-based frequency values can be seen in Table 3.5. Accordingly, ‘change of social classes and financial difficulties’ appears as a common concern in the narratives of the six groups (CHP, HDP, İYİ Party, MHP, TIP, TKP) that describe this period under the category of hard periods to live in the societal history.

Table 3.5. Document-based frequency of the representations of the Recent past: 2000-present

	AK PARTY	CHP	HDP	İYİ PARTY	MHP	SAADET	TIP	TKP	YRP	ZAFER	SUM
RECENT PAST: 2000 - Present	8	3	3	2	1	2	2			1	22
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE											
Quality of the Education System	1										1
RELIGION AND POLITICS											
Religion Being Used for Political Purposes			1								1
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS											
Concern for the Future	1										1
Financial Struggles and Change in Social Classes	3	2	2	1		1	1				10
LAW AND MERITOCRACY											
Distrust in Justice								1			1
Deterrence of Punishments	2										2
Human Rights Violations		1									1
Societal Injustice and Discrimination	2	2						1			5
Unqualified Governance	2		1							1	4
POLITICAL PRESSURES											
Increased National/Militaristic Rhetoric	1										1
Labelling and Polarisation	1	1	1	1							4
Political Violence and Targeting		1									1
Political Corruption	1		1	1							3
Political Pressure/Autocracy	3	1	1	1				1			7
Pacification of Society and Lack of Organization	1	1	1					2			5
Peace Process and Privileges					1						1
SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY VALUES											
Punishment of Patriots										1	1

Table 3.5 (continued)

Loneliness-Individualism									1	1
Social Corruption	2	2				1	2			7
Hegemonic System		1								1
Decreased Value of Human Life	1		1							2
Social Apathy		1								1
SECURITY AND VIOLENCE										
Anxiety and Fear									1	1
Increasing Terror Threat					2					2
Discrediting the Military and Pacifying the Armed Forces	1			1						2
Irregular Migration and Border Security	1								1	2
Growing Insecurity and Violence	1									1
SUM	32	16	12	10	2	8	7	0	4	91
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

Among the factors that make the recent past difficult for HDP supporters are social injustice and discrimination, political violence and targeting, discrimination, human rights violations; while for CHP supporters, these factors include problems such as financial struggles, the lack of deterrent punishments, political pressures, incompetent management, discrediting the military, and the pacification of the Turkish Armed Forces. For IYI Party supporters, incompetent management, political instrumentalization of religion, privileges granted to Kurds during the resolution process, political corruption, and political pressures stand out; while for MHP supporters, labelling and discrimination, increasing terrorist threat, discrediting the military, political corruption, and political pressures stand out. While for Zafer Party supporters, the reasons that make the recent past difficult are irregular migration and border security problems and incompetent governance, for Saadet Party supporters, it is social corruption. Lastly, the increasing difference between the lower and upper classes, injustice, discrimination, political oppression, the pacification of society and political disorganization are emphasized by TIP and TKP supporters.

Table 3.6 shows the distribution of distressing events in the societal past according to party supporters. When I asked the participants about the events that were distressing or sad for them, in addition to the difficult periods in the social past, their answers exhibited a selective sensitivity shaped by their ideological identities. The PKK operations in the 1990s, the 1997 Postmodern Coup (February 28), the unsolved murders in the 1990s, the 2010 Opening Policy and the 2016 coup attempt are the events brought up by MHP, IYI Party and AK Party supporters. The September 12, 1980, Military Coup stands out as an event brought up jointly by CHP, HDP, TIP, TKP and IYI Party supporters. In addition, events such as the

Sivas Massacre, the Train Station and Reyhanlı Bombings are among the important events of recent history brought up by CHP, HDP, TIP and TKP supporters.

Table 3.6. The distribution of distressing events in societal history according to party supporters

AK PARTY	Terrorist Incidents in the 80s The Economic Crisis in the 90s (Tansu Çiller Period) Unsolved Murders in the 90s The February 28 Postmodern Coup The Gezi Park Protests The July 15, 2016, Coup Attempt The February 6, 2022, Earthquake
CHP	Death of Deniz Gezmiş and friends, Mahir Çayan Maraş Incidents September 12, 1980, Military Coup Death Fasts in the 90s July 2, 1993, Sivas Massacre Ergenekon and Balyoz Cases October 10, 2015, Ankara Train Station Attack February 6, 2023, Earthquake Forest Fires and Floods, Mining Accidents Increasing Incidents of Violence Against Children and Women
HDP	Sinking of the Boat of the Communist Party Founders (Mustafa Suphi) Death of Deniz Gezmiş, Mahir Çayan 1975 Lice Earthquake Maraş Incidents September 12, 1980, Military Coup July 2, 1993, Sivas Massacre Unsolved Murders in the 90s Suruç Massacre Roboski Massacre October 10, 2015, Ankara Train Station Attack 2013 Reyhanlı Bomb Attacks Taybet İnan's Body Left on the Street in Cizre (2016)
İYİ PARTY	September 12, 1980, Military Coup PKK Incidents in the 90s February 28 Postmodern Coup Economic Crisis in the 90s (Tansu Çiller Period) Unsolved Murders in the 90s 2010 Resolution Process July 15, 2016, Coup Attempt Government-Cemaat Partnership

Table 3.6 (continued)

MHP	Death of Atatürk Closing or Privatizing the Values of the Republic Poisoning of Turgut Özal Postmodern Coup of February 28 Economic Crisis in the 90s (Tansu Çiller Period) Earthquake of August 17, 1999 Death of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu Arrival of Syrians in the Country 2010 Kurdish Opening Mining Accidents
SAADET	Postmodern Coup of February 28 Drowning of Migrants Gezi Incidents February 2016 Ankara Attack War in Palestine
TIP	May 1, 1977 (Bloody May Day) Maraş Incidents in the 1970s July 2, 1993. Sivas Massacre Political Arrests (Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtaş, Can Atalay) Fires and Floods July 8, 2018, Çorlu Train Accident Mining Accidents
TKP	July 2, 1993. Sivas Massacre Gezi Park Casualties Assassinations (Kemal Türkler, Uğur Mumcu, Abdi İpekçi, Hrant Dink) August 17, 1999, Earthquake July 8, 2018, Çorlu Train Accident February 6, 2023, Earthquake
YRP	Headscarf ban Unsolved murders in 1990s
ZP	1912 Balkan War Wars

4.3. Social Representations of Present

In this section, I first focus on the participants' comparisons between the past and the present. Following that, I address the topics of Türkiye's most significant problems according to participants.

4.3.1. Past-Present Comparison

In this section, I examine the participants' evaluations of the differences between present and the past. I address these representations under five main categories: Social Relations and Societal Dynamics, Political Situation and Differences, Economic Situation and Differences, Social Norms and Values, and Improvements compared to the past.

Social Relations and Societal Dynamics

The narratives of participants comparing the present with the past in terms of human relationships highlight the following themes: increasing polarisation between people, growing social distance, loneliness and alienation, loss of trust, the decline of neighbourhood culture and weakening of neighbourly relations, the virtualization of relationships, reduced safety and the decrease in love and respect between individuals. Table 3.7 shows that supporters of all political parties experience these changes in social life and human relationships similarly negatively and share common representations.

Table 3.7. Document-based representations of social relations and societal dynamics by party supporters

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
SOCIAL RELATIONS AND DYNAMICS											
Positive Differences											
Increased Tolerance and Empathy	1	1		2							4
Negative Differences											
Social Disintegration and Value Erosion											
Interest-Based Relationship				1						1	2
Strive for Superiority and Hierarchy			1	1							2
Depersonalization		1	3	1					1		6
Rural to Urban Migration and Social Structure										1	1
Deterioration											
Intolerance, Insecurity and Loneliness											
Virtualized Relationships	2	1	2	1							6
Intolerance Towards Differences				1	1						2
Decreased Love and Respect	1	3	3							1	8
Increased Distrust	2	1	5	4	2		1		1	1	17
Loss of Neighbourhood Culture/weakening of Neighbourly Relations	4	2	1	5	2	1	2	1			18
Social Distance, Alienation and Loneliness	3	3	3	5	5			1	1	1	22
Insecure Environment and Increased Violence		2	1	4	1						8
SUM	13	14	19	25	11	1	3	2	3	5	96

Compared to the past, the most frequently emphasized differences in today's human relationships include increasing social distance, loneliness, and alienation. Participants' narratives reflect a shift from a society where everyone trusted each other and could entrust their children to neighbours to one where no one trusts each other and people are afraid of one another. In these accounts, there is a critique of modernity, with the development of technology and digitalization being seen as factors that negatively impact human relationships. Additionally, the system itself is highlighted as playing a role in alienating individuals. For example, An AK Party supporter (Quote 71) idealizes her university years through small but heartfelt moments like sharing a simit, while viewing today's youth as being trapped in the digital world and distant from social interactions. An HDP supporter, while idealizing the pre-technological times, expresses longing not for a more developed society but for a time when people were more connected and built sincere relationships (Quote 72). A CHP supporter (Quote 73) highlights that modern life has brought about individualism and loneliness. MHP and IYI Party supporters (Quote 74 and Quote 75), while acknowledging the convenience of technology, also point out that social relationships have become less sincere, filtered, and artificial. They emphasize that the digital world has contributed to the fragmentation and alienation of family and kinship ties.

Quote 71 (AK Party 8, woman, 36)

Yani ben üniversitede bir arkadaşımı, simiti ortak bölüp yiyebilen bir dönemdi. Şimdi gençlerimiz böyle dijital çağda bilgisayarın başında telefonlarını, kafalarını kaldırmayan, hani biz böyle şarkılar söyleyen, üniversitenin kampüsünde böyle birbirimize sarılmış ya da bir kıyafeti paylaştığımız dönemlerdi. E şimdiki nesil sadece ortak oyun alanlarında hani birbirleriyle sadece diyalog kuruyorlar, ortak bir medya platformu oluyor sadece orada samimiyet var.

It was a time at university when I could share a simit with a friend. Now, our youth are stuck in this digital age, glued to their computers and phones, never lifting their heads. Back then, we were singing songs together, hugging each other on campus, or sharing clothes. But today's generation only interacts in shared gaming spaces, their dialogue limited to those environments, with genuine connection only happening on media platforms

Quote 72 (HDP 6, man, 35)

Teknolojinin olmadığı bir zamanın ben özlemimi çekiyorum. Daha iç içe, herkesin birbirini tanıdığı. Mesela bizim bi kere otobüs yolculuğu yaparken yanımdaki adam kimlerden olduğumu sordu. Ben de dedim ki işte şu ailedenim, tanıyo musun dedim. Ya sen ne diyosun dedi ya. Biz dedi eskiden birbirimizin evinde, filan kişinin evinde kaç tane civciv var, onları bile biliyoduk, diyordu. İşte ben o zamanı özliyorum. İnsanların

I'm nostalgic for a time when there was no technology. A time when people were more connected, and everyone knew each other. For instance, once during a bus journey, the man sitting next to me asked about my family. I told him who I was and asked if he knew them. He said, "What are you talking about? Back in the day, we even knew how many chicks people had in their homes." That's the time I miss. I miss the days when we didn't have to ask each other where we were.

birbirlerine nerdesin diye sormadığı zamanları ben özliyorum.

Quote 73 (CHP 11, woman, 37)

Yani şu anda mesela biz toplum olarak üst katımızda yaşayan komşumuzu bile bilmiyoruz. Daha yalnızlaşıp, daha kendi çekirdek ailemize odaklı yaşıyoruz. Ama o dönemde insanların daha sıcak ve daha bir arada olduğunu düşünüyorum.

I mean, for example, nowadays as a society, we don't even know the neighbour living above us. We've become more isolated, more focused on our own nuclear families. But back then, I think people were warmer and more connected

Quote 74 (IYI Party 8, woman, 31)

Yani bu teknolojinin getirdiği yenilikler bize çoğu alanda kolaylık sağlarken sosyal hayatımızda da birazcık daha böyle nasıl diyeyim yapaylığa götürdü bizi sanki. O samimiyetten, sıcak ilişkilerden hani biraz uzaklaştık. Birbirimizi sadece sosyal medyadan takip etmeye başladık.

I mean, while the innovations brought by technology have made things easier for us in many areas, in our social lives it has somewhat led us to, how should I put it, artificiality. We've drifted a bit from those sincere, warm relationships. We've started following each other only on social media.

Quote 75 (MHP 5, man, 24)

İnsanlar artık birbirlerine yabancı, akrabalar hatta aynı evin içindeler ama birbirlerine yabancılar dediğim gibi aile yapılanması, akraba ilişkileri parçalandı, bölündü. Akrabalar arası artık gidip gelme, misafirlik yok. Aile içinde herkes kendi köşesine oturmuş, kendi sosyal medyasında, dijital dünyasında. Oraya hapsolmuş olmuş bir şekilde.

People are now strangers to each other; even relatives, even those living in the same house, are strangers to each other. As I said, the family structure and relationships with relatives have broken down and fragmented. There's no more visiting between relatives, no more being guests in each other's homes. Within the family, everyone sits in their own corner, immersed in their own social media, their own digital world. In a way, they've become trapped there.

Participants emphasize that neighbourhood culture and neighbourly relations were stronger and more pronounced in the past compared to the present. In this context, neighbourhoods are depicted as places where social values were preserved and transmitted. The loss of neighbourhood culture is associated with individualization and selfishness, which are seen as elements that hinder the preservation and transmission of social values. At the same time, the consciousness of taking care of one's neighbourhood and the culture of living together without regard for ethnic or religious differences are also idealized. For instance, a MHP supporter (Quote 76) talks about a culture in which everyone could mix freely in the neighbourhoods and even discipline their neighbour's children. He believes that individuals were responsible for protecting each other's values in the past and that this solidarity has been lost in the present. An IYI Party supporter (Quote 77) longs for a way of life based on mutual aid and collective lifestyles. A Saadet Party (Quote 78) supporter explains that security in neighbourhoods was maintained by neighbours and local youth,

theft incidents were rare, and there was a strong consciousness of taking care of the neighbourhood in the past.

Quote 76 (MHP 2, man, 37)

Bugünle kıyasladığımızda eskiden mahala kültürümüz vardır. İşte mahalledeki teyzeler, amcalar komşusunun çocuğuyla da ilgilenir, onun hatasını yanlışını görse de kulağını çeker. Böyle bir hakkı vardır. Baktığımız zaman orada herkeste bir değerini koruma durumu vardı.

When we compare today with the past, we had a neighbourhood culture. The aunts and uncles in the neighbourhood would take an interest in their neighbour's children and would even scold them if they saw any mistakes. They had that right. Looking back, there was a sense of responsibility among everyone to protect each other's values.

Quote 77 (IYI Party 1, man, 70)

Şimdi bizde eskiden kapılar kapanmazdı, kapılara çentik dediğimiz hayvanların girmemesi için bir çubuk takılırdı. İnsanlar ihtiyaçlarını sormadan gider birbirinin evinden alırdı, daha sonra söylerlerdi. Kimse niye girdin, niye aldın demezdi. Ödünççülük vardı, yokluk ödünççülüğü de getirmişti. Eskiden çocukluğumda efendim bardakla zeytinyağı ödünççülüğü yapılırdı, bardakla şeker ödünççülüğü yapılırdı. Herkes birbirine bu konuda muhtaç olduğu için bir bardak şeker istemek ya da bir bardak zeytinyağı istemek yadırganmazdı veya bir ufak şişe gaz yağı istemek yadırganmazdı.

In the past, our doors were never closed; we would use a stick called a "çentik" to prevent animals from entering. People would take what they needed from each other's homes without asking, and later, they would mention it. No one would ask, "Why did you go in? Why did you take it?" There was a culture of borrowing, brought about by scarcity. In my childhood, we used to borrow olive oil by the glass or sugar by the glass. Since everyone was in need, it wasn't unusual to ask for a glass of sugar or a glass of olive oil, or even a small bottle of kerosene.

Quote 78 (SAADET 1, man, 39)

Yani eskiden vardı herhalde onlar biz hayal meyal hatırlıyorum ben böyle. İnsanlar böyle daha mahallesine sahip çıkardı. İşte gençleri nöbet tutardı dışarıdan gelen olmasın falan diye. Hırsızlık olayları az olurdu. Koruma içgüdüğü çok fazla olurdu mesela. Onları biraz daha böyle şey, özlem duyuyorum yani.

In the past, people took more ownership of their neighbourhoods, or at least that's what I vaguely remember. They would keep watch over the young ones, ensuring that no outsiders came around. Theft was less common back then, and there was a strong instinct to protect one another. I find myself longing for that sense of community and solidarity

Another theme related to the categories mentioned above is the concerns raised predominantly by woman participants regarding the increasing violence against women and children, as well as the declining sense of security in society. Participants emphasize that children can no longer play freely in the streets, and that authorities have been ineffective in addressing cases of femicide and child abuse, resulting in a deterioration of the societal sense of security.

Quote 79 (CHP 11, woman, 37)

Kendi dönemimde hatırladığım, yani çocukluğumda hatırladığım dönemle kıyasla, biz sokakta gayet rahat arkadaşlarımızla oyunlar oynarken şu anda var olan günümüzde çocuklarımızı sokağa salmaya bırakın hani

In comparison to the period I remember from my childhood, we used to play outside freely with our friends, whereas today, we try to protect our children by limiting their freedoms and not letting them play outside at

gerçekten özgürlüklerini kısıtlayarak koruma altına almaya çalışıyoruz. Çünkü dediğim gibi yani bunun en önemli sebebi şu anda mesela günümüze kıyasla bizden çok daha geri dönemde yaşayan göçmenlerin ülkeye sokulduğu için güven duygumuzu kaybetmiş olmamız etkiliyor.

Quote 80 (HDP 1, woman, 33)

Kadınların mesela bu kadar çok her yerde tacize ve şiddete uğradığı dönem olmamıştı. Defalarca kez bunu yaşıyor ve tanık oluyoruz ve bu aslında uzun vadede hepimizin hayatında sanki kalıcı hale gelebilecek şeylermiş gibi geliyor bana.

all. The main reason for this, as I mentioned, is the influx of immigrants living in the country today, which has affected our sense of security and made us lose trust.

There has never been a time when women have been subjected to so much harassment and violence everywhere. We experience and witness this many times, and it seems to me that these are things that could become permanent in all of our lives in the long run.

Quote 81 (CHP 5, woman, 57)

Şunu da söyleyim güvenlikte çok büyük bir zafiyet görüyorum. Kadın cinayetlerindeki başıboşluk, etkisiz davranışlar, duyarsızlık, had safhada. Sanki katili ödüllendirircesine davranılıyor. Çocuk istismarları özellikle de bunların devlet ve kamu kurumlarında yapılıyor olması çok can yakıcı.

I must say that I see a significant weakness in security. The lawlessness surrounding femicides, the ineffectiveness, and the insensitivity towards these issues are at an all-time high. It feels as if the perpetrators are being rewarded for their actions. The fact that child abuse, especially when it occurs within state and public institutions, is particularly heartbreaking.

Political Differences between Past and Present

In the current political system, frequently emphasized factors by party supporters include discrimination and interest relations, the othering policies of those in power, the incompetence, unreliability, and lack of qualifications of contemporary political figures, the polarisation of political dynamics, political pressures and violence, media bias, one-man rule, and authoritarianism. Table 3.8 shows the frequency of these themes according to party supporters.

Table 3.8. Document-based representations of party supporters regarding political differences between past and present

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
POLITICAL SITUATION AND DIFFERENCES											
DISCRIMINATION AND INTEREST RELATIONS											
Interest Relations and Political Practices											
political and legal double standards		2									2
power, kinship relations and privileges		1									1

Table 3.8 (continued)

lack of merit	1	1	1				1	4
interest-based politics and ideological clarity	1	1	2	5	4	1	1	15
Discrimination and Labeling								
democracy and minorities			1					1
devaluation policy			0					1
divisive Politics		4	5	1	2		1	13
POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES								
Partisanship and Polarization								
increased partisanship and polarization	1	1	1	2	1		1	7
decreased Polarization				1				1
Ideological Movements and Societal Dynamics								
weakening class solidarity			1				1	1
weakening nationalism				1				1
rise of political Islam		1		1				1
determinant role of the oppressed and minorities			2				1	3
development of Kurdish movement			1					1
socialist movement's effort to reconnect with society							1	1
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CHANGING PRACTICES								
Increased Freedom		2			1			3
Increased Neoliberalism				1				1
Oppressive Policies and Authoritarianism								
biased media		1	1	1				3
political pressures and violence		6	7	5			1	2
one-man regime		3	3	1			1	8
Distrust in Political System								
weakening of ties with the society	1						1	2
debate culture and political incivility			1	2	1		1	1
distrust in politics	1						1	1
Stable Policies and Powerful Türkiye		2			5			7
POLITICAL FIGURES								
Incompetent Figures				1				1
Untrustworthy Figures				1				1
Unqualified Figures				3				3
EARLY POLICIES OF AK PARTY								
Liberal/Freedom-Oriented Structure	1							1
Trust and Hope	1							1
Changing Role of Women in Politics	1							1
Decreasing Conflicts			1					1
Decreased Pressure			1	1				2
Peace Process			1					1

Table 3.8 (continued)

SUM	1	1	32	28	13	1	5	9	1	4	12
	1	9									3
N _{Documents}	1	1	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75
	3	3									

The most frequently emphasized theme in participants' narratives is 'Oppressive Policies and Authoritarianism,' which includes political pressures and violence, censorship and popular culture, and the one-man regime. Narratives in this theme were only expressed by CHP, HDP, TKP, TIP, and IYI Party supporters. Participants stated that today's political conditions are harsher compared to the past, and that people feel more under political pressure. Particularly, the fear that social media posts could lead to police raids reveals the intensity of oppression and people's sense of insecurity. In these narratives, it is emphasized that the current government follows policies that are even more regressive than those of the 12 September military coup, and this situation is described with the analogy of a 'reign of fear' where freedoms are taken away from individuals. Lastly, it is noted that the concept of democracy has been eroded, the public's voice is being stifled, and protests and objections are suppressed by police intervention. For instance, a CHP supporter (Quote 82) describes the current government as oppressive and as one that disrupts societal values, emphasizing that this creates pessimism and hopelessness in society. Another CHP supporter (Quote 83) specifically notes that freedom of thought has disappeared, and that people are living in a time where they are afraid to express their opinions. An HDP supporter (Quote 84) highlights how even the simplest acts of seeking rights are labelled as acts of terrorism and are punished by the government, while another HDP supporter (Quote 85) points out that the current government has even taken back the rights granted during the 12 September era, and that pressures on those who resist have increased. A TKP supporter (Quote 86) criticizes the current government for its disregard for the constitution and systemic order. He expresses that constitutional rights could be defended in the past, but today those rights have been eliminated.

Quote 82 (CHP 3, woman, 50)

Yani ben Türk toplumuyum ve ben bizim ülkemizin hiç bu kadar baskı altında ve kendi değerleriyle ve kendi fikirleriyle dağıtmaya çalışan bir iktidarda dönem geçirdiğimizi hatırlamıyorum. ... Bu dönem kadar baskı altına, boyunduruk altına sokulmaya çalışılmadık. Bu çok çok ciddi bir psikolojik baskı, mutsuzluk ve ülke için ve kendi hayatlarımız ile ilgili umutsuzluk yaratıyor demek anlamı çıkıyor bundan. Çok karamsar

I am Turkish, and I do not recall our country ever being under such oppression and governed by a regime that tries to dismantle its own values and ideas. ... We've never been subjected to this level of pressure and subjugation before. This creates a very serious psychological pressure, a sense of unhappiness, and hopelessness about the country and our own lives. It feels like a very bleak period. It makes you feel deeply

hissettiren bir dönem bu dönem sana kendini. Çok ciddi bir karamsarlık hem de acaba yarın neye uyanacağız, nasıl bir baskı ile uğraşmak zorunda kalacağız durumu hâkim.

Quote 83 (CHP 6, woman, 45)

Yani özgürlüklerin elimizden alındığı, düşünce özgürlüklerinin de artık hiçbir anlamının kalmadığı, insanların fikrini söylemekten korktuğu, çekindiği, ee, korku imparatorluğua dönüşmüş olmak şu anki durum. Eskiden her ne kadar ülkenin ekonomik, ee, zemininde yine problemler olsa da en azından mutluyduk ve umutluyduk. Şu anda da bunu tam tersi durumdayız.

pessimistic, constantly wondering what kind of pressure we'll wake up to tomorrow, and what we will have to deal with.

The situation now is that our freedoms have been taken away, freedom of thought has lost all its meaning, and people are afraid and hesitant to express their opinions. It's become a reign of fear. In the past, even though there were still economic problems in the country, at least we were happy and hopeful. But right now, we're in the complete opposite situation.

Quote 84 (HDP 1, woman, 33)

En ufak bir hak arama mücadelesinin, en ufak bir sokağı kullanma mücadelesinin kendisinin bir terör eylemi olarak adlandırılması. Yani hani polisin size karşı olan tutumunun kendisine bir tepki gösterdiğinizde bunun polise mukavvet oluyor olması... En ufak bir Erdoğan'a hakaret soruşturması altında iktidara eleştirmeye çalışmanın bile bir suç sayılıp cezaevine konulması kişilerin. Bunun gibi gerçekten çok fazla örnek verebilirim. Umudu diri tutmaya çalıştığımız ama daha da kötüye gittiğini gördüğümüz bir süreç yaşıyoruz aslında.

The smallest fight for rights, the smallest effort to use the streets is labeled as a terrorist act. I mean, when you show any reaction to the police's attitude toward you, it's considered resistance against the police... Even the smallest attempt to criticize Erdoğan is seen as an offense, and people are jailed for it. I could give so many more examples like this. We're living through a process where we're trying to keep hope alive, but we can see things are getting worse.

Quote 85 (HDP 10, man, 73)

Şunu da söyliyim güvenlikte çok büyük bir zaf Burada ifademi çok düzgün seçmeliyim, buna inanıyorum. Çünkü mevcut iktidar az önce üzerine konuştuğumuz 12 Eylül'ün dahi gördüğü hakları hak olarak görmekten çok uzaklar ve onları da tek tek 12 Eylül'ün dahi elimizden alamadığı birçok hakkı aldıkları kesin. Ama 12 Eylül'de eğer mücadelenin içindeydysen, eğer mücadelenin göbeğinde, yani kenardan izleyen birisi değildysen, 12 Eylül'de artık bir araya gelmenin, üç kişinin bir araya gelmesinin bile imkansızlaştığı bir dönemdi. Yani ben hiçbir zaman darbe dönemleri demokratiktir diyemem. Ama buradan hareketle de, buradan hareketle de bu adamların genel anlamdaki 12 Eylül'den bile geriye götürdüklerini de görmemezlik yapamam.

Let me also say this, there is a huge gap in security. I need to choose my words very carefully here; I truly believe that. Because the current government is far from seeing the rights we discussed earlier, even the ones acknowledged during the September 12 military coup. It is certain that they have taken away many rights, even those that the coup couldn't strip from us. But during September 12, if you were part of the struggle, if you were in the middle of the fight—not just watching from the sidelines—it was a time when even gathering three people together became impossible. I can never say that coup periods were democratic, but at the same time, I can't ignore the fact that these people have taken things even further back than September 12.

Quote 86 (TKP 1, man, 73)

Sistemsizlik var çünkü anayasa yok ortada. Yani bir defa 80'de hiç olmazsa anayasa vardı. Diyoduk ki şu anayasa, yargılandığım bile hakime diyordum ki şu yasaya göre bizi yargılayamazsınız çünkü sen bizi 274-275 sendikalar yasasına göre yargılıyorsun, O

There's a lack of system because there is no constitution in place. At least in the '80s, there was a constitution. We used to say, 'This is the constitution.' Even when being prosecuted, I could tell the judge, 'You can't judge us under this law because you're using

anayasal bizim hakkımızdı ama şimdi onu söyleyemiyosun. Çünkü bilmediğin suçtan yargılanırsın. Dolayısıyla toplumsal şeyden de bugünkü baktığımızda duyarsızlık... O gün biz, o günkü koşullarda sinemacılar mitinge katılıyolardı, yürüyüş yapıyolardı, meslek grupları yürüyüş yapıyolardı. Bugün bakabiliyo muyuz? En ufak hakaretinde polis şiddeti ile karşı karşıya kalınıyor.

the 274-275 trade unions law, and that was our constitutional right.' But now, you can't say that because you can be judged for crimes you don't even know. So, when we look at society today, there's a sense of indifference. Back then, under those conditions, filmmakers joined rallies, they marched, professional groups would march. Can we see that today? People face police violence for the slightest criticism.

Another frequently mentioned theme in this category is the criticisms directed at the 'one-man regime,' characterized by allegiance to a single authority and the weakening of democracy. For example, a CHP supporter (Quote 87) states that there is no democratic environment today and that political decisions are made by a single person. An IYI Party supporter (Quote 88) complains about a societal structure moving toward conformity and servitude. By comparing it to the Ottoman period, he believes that today's leaders are associated with religious motifs, which he sees as an unhealthy approach to governance. A TIP supporter (Quote 89) accuses the AK Party government of having a monarchy-like administration, arguing that the country is governed by a small group while the working people suffer.

Quote 87 (CHP 8, man, 70)

Politik olarak karşılaştırma yapmak çok zor. Bugünkü politika politika değil zaten. Şimdi hele içinde yaşadığımız şu an zaten ne bileyim demokratik bir ortam değil. Yani tek kişinin iki dudağı arasında olan bir yaşam tarzımız var. Yani o ne derse o oluyor. Zam verirse alıyoruz, vermezse almıyoruz gidi falan bir şey. Eskiden birtakım şeyler daha kurallıydı. Ha çok iyi değildi belki ama birtakım şeyler daha kurallıydı. Yani bunlar ortada kalktı. Daha "ben sizin babanızım ben ne dersem o olur" hesabına döndü. Yani daha ciddiyetsiz oldu sanki.

Making political comparisons is very difficult. Today's politics isn't even politics anymore. Especially the current situation we're living in, I don't even know, it's not a democratic environment. We live in a system where everything is decided by a single person. Whatever they say goes. If they decide to raise salaries, we get it; if not, we don't. Things used to be more regulated in the past. Maybe it wasn't perfect, but there were certain rules in place. Now, those rules are gone. It's turned into a 'I'm your father, and what I say goes' kind of situation. It feels more unserious, somehow.

Quote 88 (IYI Party 10, man, 63)

İnsanlar? İnsanlar da tek tip olmaya başladı. La ilahe illallah ne demektir? Allah birdir, ondan başka Allah yoktur değil mi? O aynı zamanda nedir, öbür türlü düşündüğün zaman, kula kulluk edilmez demektir. İşte buradaki bu nüansı kaç kişi anlayabilir? Lütfen yanlış anlaşılmasın. Ben bunu anlıyorum anlamında değil. Bir çözümleme yapıyorum burada. La ilahe illallah dediğin zaman Kelime-i Tevhid ne demektir? Allah'tan başka ilah yoktur. O aynı zamanda ne demektir tersine çevirdiğin zaman kula kulluk edilmez demektir. Ama

People? People have started to become more uniform. What does 'La ilahe illallah' mean? It means 'There is no god but Allah,' right? But what does it also mean, if you think about it differently? It means that no one should be subservient to others. But how many people can understand this nuance? Please, don't get me wrong. I'm not saying I fully understand this. I'm just analyzing it here. When you say 'La ilahe illallah,' what does the declaration of faith (Kelime-i Tevhid) mean? It means there is no deity but Allah. But what does it also

şimdi ne var? Osmanlı'nın bir düsturu vardır: Baş Başa Bağlı Baş Allah'a Bağlı. Neden? Padişahı uhrevi bir kavram o öyle değildir... Yöneticiler siyasi bir motif olmanın dışına çıkmış, dini bir motif haline gelmiştir ve peygamber ve Allah arasında oluşan kimlikler atfedilmeye başlamıştır ülkede. Düşünebiliyor musunuz? İşte diyor o değil ben peygamberim.

mean when you reverse it? It means that people should not be servants to other people. But what do we have now? There's an Ottoman motto: 'The head is connected to the head, the head is connected to Allah.' Why? Because the sultan was given a divine connotation, but that's not how it is... Leaders have ceased to be just political figures and have become religious symbols. They are now being associated with identities formed between the prophet and God. Can you imagine? Someone is saying, 'It's not him, it's me; I am the prophet.

Quote 89 (TKP 3, woman, 66)

Sistemsizlik var çünkü anayasa yok ortada. Şu anda AKP iktidarı tipik bir monarşi ile ülkeyi idare ettirmektedir. Bu tür bir hazırlık var. AKP Genel Başkanı Cumhurbaşkanı sıfatındaki ve yanındaki bir grup, onların ülkeyi yönettiği ve diğer %98 oranındaki emekçi halk kitlesinin inim inim inlediğini görüyoruz.

There is a lack of system because there is no constitution in place. Currently, the AKP government is running the country with a typical monarchy. This kind of setup is in place. We see that the President, who also holds the title of AKP Chairman, along with a small group, is running the country, while the remaining 98% of the working class is suffering terribly

Another frequently mentioned theme in this category is the change in the way politics is conducted and the increasing dominance of interest-based politics today. According to supporters of the IYI Party, MHP, Saadet Party, and some CHP and HDP supporters, politics has become a tool for enrichment. This situation has become more pronounced through political corruption, and the permeability between the ideological positions of parties has increased. It is emphasized that loyalty to party ideology has diminished, and parties often support situations that do not align with their ideologies in line with their own interests. For example, an IYI Party supporter (Quote 90) criticizes today's politics for lacking long-term goals, with leaders making day-to-day decisions and lacking a clear philosophy. He believes that in the past, both the ruling party and the opposition had clear goals and ideologies, but this clarity has been lost today. Another IYI Party supporter (Quote 91) emphasizes that, especially after 2000, politics in Türkiye has become a tool for personal enrichment, with nepotism and favouritism becoming widespread. Another participant (Quote 92) highlights that politics in the past carried more moral responsibility and respect for public resources. However, today, he notes an increase in bribery and corruption in politics and argue that unqualified appointments have caused significant harm to the country.

Quote 90 (IYI Party 9, man, 29)

Hani bir eskinin siyasi, işte örnek veriyorum, genel başkanı olsun bir partinin araştırıyorum. Belli bir felsefe, belli bir amaçlar doğrultusunda hareket ederken şu andaki

You know, in the past, political leaders—let's say the chairman of a party, for example—used to act according to a certain philosophy and goals. But now, it's all about short-term

günübirlik amaçlar. Yani bugünün mantığı ve yarının mantığı ya da bugünün ile yarının mantığı kesinlikle birbirini tutmuyor. Kesinlikle. Hani günübirlik değişimler. Hani ülkeyi belli bir noktaya taşıma niyetli değil de ülkeyi her gün işte bir sağdaki merdivenden çıkalım, bir soldaki merdivenden çıkalım. Hani bir ora bir ora idare edelim gibisinden. Hani şu anda hani idare edelim, kendi çıkarlarımıza bakalım, ondan gerisini nasıl olsa sonraki gelen düşünsün, şu olsun, bu olsun. Şimdilik bir idare edelim, şöyle yapalım falan. Eskiden öyle değilmiş yani sonuç olarak. Yani herkes bir yere gelmeye çalışmış. Yani bir muhalefet olsun, iktidar olsun, hepsinin bir böyle felsefesi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Eskiden daha netmiş. Yani şu anda net değil. Kesinlikle net değil.

Quote 91 (IYI Party 4, man, 65)

Ya Türkiye tabii her şeye, her şarta rağmen yine de büyüyor ama politik yolsuzluklar ve siyasetçilerin ve devletin gücünü kullanarak zenginleştirme dediğimiz usulün hala Türkiye'de çok önemli boyutlarda olduğu ve politikacının politikayı zenginleşme aracı olarak kullandığı, geçmişte de bu kadar olmasa da olmasına rağmen özellikle 2000 sonrası Türkiye'de çok ciddi bir şekilde politika kişisel zenginleşmenin aracı haline ve nepotizm dediğimiz eş, akraba, dost kayırmacılığı ve devlet kadrolarındaki hak etmeyenlerin hak etmediği yerlere gelebilecek şekilde, ihtisasa ve kaliteye hiç dikkat edilmeden, en kalitesizin en tepede başka bir işgal etmesi ve o alanda çok daha kaliteli insanlar olmasına rağmen bir kenarda kalması gibi Türkiye'de insan kaynağının çok ciddi derecede yıpratıldığı bir süreç olarak yaşıyoruz.

Quote 92 (IYI Party 3, man, 66)

Seçilen insan ben buraya seçildim madem seçildim bunun bütün hakkını ben kullanırım yani işte eskinin tabiri "Beyt'ül mala saygı bile duymadılar." Yani milletin emanet ettiği kasaya, makama, mevkiye kendi babasının malıymış gibi, kendi şeyiymiş gibi kullanmaya kalktı. Bu, bu ülkeye gerçekten maliyeti çok ağır oldu. Hala da ağır oluyor. Hala da ağır oluyor. Yani bu son zamanlarda biraz rüşveti, yolsuzluğu efendim yani ayyuka çıktığı dönemler oldu ve bu son zamanlarda artık bir de işin liyakat yani ehline verilmiyor makamlar, mevkiler. En büyük sıkıntılar bunlar oldu.

objectives. Today's mentality and tomorrow's mentality, or the logic of today and tomorrow, absolutely don't align with each other. There are constant day-to-day changes. It's no longer about moving the country to a certain point, but rather, let's just take one step up the right staircase today, then the left one tomorrow, as if managing from one place to another. The current mentality is 'let's just manage for now, look after our own interests, and let the next group deal with the rest.' In the past, it wasn't like that, as far as I can tell. Everyone tried to move things forward. Whether it was the opposition or the ruling party, I believe they all had a philosophy. Things were more clear-cut back then. Today, it's not clear at all, definitely not.

Of course, despite everything and all the conditions, Türkiye is still growing. However, political corruption and the practice of using political and state power as a means of personal enrichment are still very significant in Türkiye. Although it wasn't as prevalent in the past, especially after 2000, politics has seriously become a tool for personal enrichment. Nepotism, the favouritism shown towards spouses, relatives, and friends, has become widespread, and people who are not qualified are being placed in positions they don't deserve. Expertise and quality are no longer considered, with the least qualified individuals occupying the highest positions. Despite there being much more qualified people, they are sidelined. This has been a period in which Türkiye's human resources have been severely depleted.

The elected person thinks, 'Now that I'm elected, I will use all the privileges that come with it.' As the old saying goes, 'They didn't even respect the public treasury (Beyt'ül mal).' They treated the public funds, positions, and authorities entrusted to them as if they were their own personal property. This has had a very heavy cost on the country, and it continues to be costly. In recent times, there have been periods where bribery and corruption have reached their peak, and now, on top of that, there's the issue of meritocracy—positions and ranks are not given to those who are qualified. These are the biggest problems we've faced.

Other frequently mentioned theme in the 'Segregation and Interest-based Relations' category is the labelling and segregation policies implemented by those in power. In this context, it is observed that mostly CHP and HDP supporters share similar representations and experiences. It is emphasized that the policies of dividing people based on ethnicity, religion, political views, and gender by the government and the system have increased polarisation in society and led to a rise in human rights violations. These policies are noted to play a significant role in reducing trust among people. It is frequently stated that, in the past, people showed more respect for different political views, whereas today, individuals are more subject to being labelled based on their political opinions.

Quote 93 (CHP 12, woman, 52)

Geçmişe baktığımızda şimdi de hiçbir görüşleri, hiçbir yaklaşımları gerçekten ülke yararına, halkın toplumun yararına birleştirici ve bütünleştirici olarak bakan bir etkileri olduğuna inanmıyorum. Tam tersine çok fazla ayrıştıran, bölüştüren ve insanları birbirine düşman eden bir iktidar olduğuna inanıyorum. Şimdi partinin adının hiçbir önemi yok, görüşün önemi var. Dikte edilmeye, empoze edilmeye çalışılan düşünce yanlış burada. Hepimiz etten kemikteniz ve hakikaten bu mavi gökyüzü altında yaşıyoruz. Bizim ülkemiz, bizim toplumumuz yıllarca Ermenisi, Kürdü herkes bir arada yaşadı ama bu dönemde yaşadığımız kadar bölüştürölüp ayrıştırılmadık. Bu dönem kadar birbirimize düşürülmeye çalışılmadık hiç.

When we look at the past, I don't believe that any of their views or approaches genuinely aimed to unite and integrate the country and society for the public's benefit. On the contrary, I think it is a government that divides and pits people against each other. The party's name doesn't matter; it's the ideology that does. The wrong here is the thought being imposed and dictated. We're all made of flesh and bone, and we all live under this same blue sky. Our country, our society, for years, Armenians, Kurds—everyone lived together. But we were never divided and separated as much as we are during this period. We've never been pitted against each other as much as we have in this era.

Quote 94 (HDP 10, man, 73)

İşte onun için bu birbiriyle çatıştırılan toplum dinamikleri, toplum dinamikleri, çatışmacı kültüre malzeme yapılan toplum dinamikleri hala sermaye tarafından o anlamda kullanılmak isteniyor. Çünkü hiçbir ülkede yoktur ki sistemin kaymağını yiyen yüzde 5'i taş çatlasın yüzde 10'u geçmez. Aslında yüzde 90 sistemin mağdurdur. Mağdurlar bu kadar çok olmasına rağmen neden azınlık olan kesim tarafından yönetiliyor? İşte bunun için yönetiliyor. Böl-yönete malzeme yapılıyor. Mağdurlar birbiriyle çarpıştırılıyor. Alevi-Sünni, Türk-Kürt. Eee genç-yaşlı, kadın-erkek. Eee yani bunların hepsi sosyal, kültürel ayrılıklar dahi çok ciddi bir ayrılıkmış gibi konsensüs içinde yaşayabilecek ayrılıklar, yani kültürel farklılıklar bizde çatışmaya kadar boyut kazanıyor.

That's why the societal dynamics that are being pitted against each other are still being used as tools for a conflict-driven culture by capital. In no country does the system's elite, who benefit from it, exceed more than 5-10% at most. The reality is, 90% are victims of the system. Despite there being so many victims, why are they ruled by this minority? This is exactly why. They are being used as tools for the divide-and-rule strategy. Victims are being made to clash with each other—Alevi vs. Sunni, Turk vs. Kurd, young vs. old, man vs. woman. All of these, even cultural differences, which should be manageable differences to live together with, are being exaggerated into conflicts.

In contrast to narratives criticizing today's political system in many aspects when compared to the past, it is observed that for MHP and AK Party participants, an image of Türkiye is emerging—one that has strengthened on the international stage, is capable of independent action, and has solidified its position as a regional leader. The participants highlighted that Türkiye, particularly in the defence industry and foreign policy, has achieved significant successes, marking an important transformation from past to present. Through strategic moves and technological advancements, Türkiye has strengthened its position on the global stage. MHP supporters expressed that, although critical events like the July 15 coup attempt shook Türkiye, the nation unified afterward, further solidifying the country's stability. They emphasized that, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, Türkiye is ready for the 'Century of Türkiye,' taking determined steps in this direction. In this context, we can say that the perception of Türkiye as a self-sufficient and strong state in both political and military spheres is prominent for the participants.

Quote 95 (AK Party 8, woman, 36)

Biz aslında güçlü bir devletiz. Çünkü dış güçler de bizi zaten onun için kabullenemiyor. Biz artık böyle kıyıda köşede kalmış bir ülke değiliz. Biz her şeyimizle donanımlı, mükemmel... Tabii ki olur. Bazı eksiklikler vardır, sıkıntılar vardır. Olacak, bu olmayacak diye bir şey yok. Ama şu an ben her şeyin elimizin altında olduğunu düşünüyorum. Pahalı olsa da dahil. Yani her şeye ulaşabiliyoruz. Geçmişe göre her şeyimiz şükürler olsun ya var.

We are a strong state. Because foreign powers cannot accept us for that very reason. We are no longer a country left on the sidelines. We are equipped in every way, excellent... Of course, there are some shortcomings, some difficulties. That will happen; it's not that they won't. But right now, I believe everything is at our fingertips. Even if it's expensive. I mean, we can reach everything. Compared to the past, thank God, we have everything.

Quote 96 (MHP 11, man, 30)

Politik olarak tabii, ee doğru kelimeyi bulmaya çalışıyorum, şeyin adı neydi ya... İstikrarlı, çok istikrarlı bir politikamız var. Tabii yani bu 15 Temmuz ufak bir sarsılma diyebiliriz belki buna ama ondan sonra tabii tüm vatan millet olarak, toplum olarak birleştiğimizi düşünüyorum. Eee o yüzden, hani katlanarak perçinlenerek bu istikrarın devam ettiğini düşünüyorum. Tabii Türkiye yüzyılına, politik olarak Türkiye'nin hazır olduğunu önderlerimiz sayesinde Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve Bahçeli, milliyetçi hareket partisi lideri Bahçeli olarak hazır olduğumuzu da düşünüyorum yani.

Politically, I'm trying to find the right word, what was it called... We have a very stable policy. Of course, we can say that July 15 was a slight jolt, but after that, I believe that as a nation, as a society, we united. So, I think this stability continues to be reinforced. Of course, I believe Türkiye is ready for the 'Century of Türkiye' thanks to our leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party.

Quote 97 (MHP 9, man, 40)

Yani şöyle Türkiye olarak bakarsak bugünkü politik koşullar en üst düzeyde şu an. Gerek saraylar gerek kullanılan araçlar, ürettiğimiz silahlar, tanklar, uçaklar, iha'lar, siha'lar... Baktığımızda eskiden kendi tüfeğimizi dahi yapamıyor durumdaydık. Belki de yapıyorduk engelleniyorduk. Biliyorsunuz uçağımız Hürkuş zamanında vardı, bir şekilde düşürüldü. Arabamız üretildi, benzin konmadığı için durdu ve yapılamadı baktığımızda. Hani bunlar diyebilirim.

Quote 98 (MHP 4, man, 62)

Biz evet gelişmelere açık bi toplumumuz. Bugün çok enteresan belki yapay zekayı da direkt kullanarak İHA ve SİHA'larla teknoloji iyi başarılar elde ediyor. Biraz daha gelişeceğini tahmin ediyorum bunun. Afrika'da varsınız, Akdeniz'de varsınız, Ege'de bilmem ne şeye Yunanistan'a önümüze atıyorlar sıkça. Çok önemli fazlar, çok muhatap almaya değmez ama uçak yapıyorsunuz, ee, 30 yıl işgal edilen Karabağ toprakları geri alınıyor. Suriye'de varsınız, Irak'ta varsınız, emperyalistlerle karşıda, yeni bir Haçlı Seferi ile karşı karşıyasın şimdi Türkçesi bu. Yani Suriye ve Irak'ta biz hem Sovyetler yani hem Rusya ile hem Amerika ile hem Fransa ile hem diğer Almanya hiç alakası olmasına rağmen tüm batılı Haçlı sefer Haçlı güçlerine karşı orda mücadele ediyoruz ve orada varız.

When we look at it as Türkiye, today's political conditions are at the highest level. Whether it's the palaces or the tools we use, the weapons we produce, tanks, planes, drones, and armed drones... In the past, we couldn't even make our own rifles. Perhaps we were trying to produce them but were blocked. You know we had our plane, Hürkuş, which was somehow brought down. Our car was produced, but it couldn't continue because there was no fuel. These are the things I can mention.

We are indeed a society open to developments. Today, it's quite interesting that we are achieving good results in technology using artificial intelligence directly with drones and armed drones. I expect this to develop further. You are present in Africa, you are in the Mediterranean, and they frequently throw Greece in front of us regarding the Aegean Sea. These are very important phases; they aren't worth engaging with, but you are making planes, and the territories of Karabakh, which were occupied for 30 years, are being reclaimed. You are present in Syria, you are in Iraq, facing imperialists; you are now confronted with a new Crusade. In Turkish, this is what it means. In Syria and Iraq, we are fighting against all the Western Crusader powers, including the Soviets, the Russians, the Americans, the French, and even Germany, with whom we have no connection, and we are there.

In this section, I have also analysed how the changes in the political structure and system were interpreted based on ideology. The table in Appendix H analyses how right-wing and left-wing ideological groups perceive the political order in Türkiye and what issues they emphasize in terms of contemporary political system, and ideological dynamics. Left-wing individuals drew intense attention to political pressures, media bias, divisive policies and authoritarian practices. At the same time, they criticized increasing partisanship and polarisation, the weakening of class solidarity and interest relations. On the other hand, right-wing participants emphasized Türkiye's strong policies and stability and drew attention to positive developments such as the increase in freedoms and the role of women in politics. In common, both groups accept the negative effects of interest-based relations on the political order. These differences between the right and left show that ideological perspectives are decisive in the perception of politics.

Economic Differences between the Past and Present

The narratives of participants comparing the past and present from an economic perspective and in terms of living standards show that all party supporters share common representations. Accordingly, the most frequently mentioned theme is economic problems and uncertainties. Other themes are ranked as criticisms of the current economic system and policies, the negative effects of economic conditions on human relationships, and improvements in economic recovery and rising levels of welfare (Table 3.9). Criticisms of the Economic System and Policies include issues related to production, investments made through borrowing, increasing taxes, inconsistencies in economic policies, and a self-interested economic system. The effects of economic conditions on society include the increasing income inequality, economic anxieties arising from increased migration, and the negative impacts of the economy on human relationships.

Table 3.9. Document-based hierarchical coding table regarding economic differences between the past and present

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZAFER	SUM
ECONOMIC SITUATION, LIVING STANDARDS AND DIFFERENCES											
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL EFFECTS											
Economic Problems and Uncertainties											
impact of economic conditions on human relations	1	1					1				3
income inequality		2	2	1			1				6
economic anxieties and migration		1									1
economic crisis and poverty	5	7	4	3	5		1	1			26
increased unemployment		2			1		1				4
Economic Recovery and Prosperity											
increased prosperity	2				1						3
increased economic conditions	2			1	2				1		6
ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND POLICIES											
Interest-Based Economic System											
changing policies and inconsistency	1										1
investment made through debt	2										2
interest-based policies						1		1			2
Labor Exploitation							2				2
Production Problems		1	1	1	1						4

Table 3.9 (continued)

Increasing Taxes	1					1				2	
TECHNOLOGY AND HEALTH RELATION											
Psychological Disorders										1	1
Physical Health Issues										1	1
SUM	1	1	7	6	1	1	7	2	1	2	6
	3	5			0						4
NDocuments	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	3	1	2	7
	3	3	3	3	2						5

In the comparison of the past and present, the most frequently and commonly expressed problem by participants is economic issues and the uncertainties created by these challenges. Participants' statements emphasize problems such as rising unemployment, increasing inflation, and decreasing purchasing power, as well as the depreciation of the Turkish lira, pointing out that the economic crisis is deepening and that the struggle to make ends meet is becoming widespread. In this context, it is noted that even when compared to past periods of scarcity, the current economic standards have deteriorated further. For example, participants emphasize the high prices observed in markets and rents, stating that purchasing power has become strained, people can no longer shop as comfortably as before, and living standards have declined (Quote 99). They highlight that individuals are struggling to meet their basic needs and that there are no longer opportunities for vacations or going out to have fun (Quote 100). Another participant notes that despite the poverty line being very high, the minimum wage remains low, and even as a civil servant, it has become difficult to make ends meet (Quote 101). Similarly, a TKP supporter emphasizes that in recent years, the struggle to make a living has reached serious dimensions and inflation has rapidly increased. She states that income levels are inadequate to meet people's needs, particularly highlighting the sharp rise in rent prices (Quote 102).

Quote 99 (AK Party 10, man, 49)

Ama şu an markete gittiğimizde inanılmaz afaki, uçuk fiyatlar. Kiralarda uçuk fiyatlar, yakıtta da uçuk uçuk. Yani gerçekçi olalım. Hani böyle çok şuan bir siyasi yapıda olmam, objektif yorum yapamayacağım anlamına gelmez. Yani şu an insanların alım gücü inanılmaz zorlaştı. Yani eskiden daha rahat alışveriş yaparken şu son dönem insanlar ekonomik olarak çok büyük bir sıkıntı yaşıyor bu gerçek. Yaşam standartları düştü, düşmeye başladı. Evet bir dönem çok iyiydi insanlar ev alıyordu, araba alıyordu, işte iş hayatında daha aktifti ama şuan yaşam standartlarımız biraz zorlanıyor.

But right now, when we go to the market, the prices are incredibly outrageous. Rents are exorbitant, and fuel prices are also sky-high. I mean, let's be realistic. Just because I'm not currently in a political structure doesn't mean I can't make objective comments. People's purchasing power has become extremely difficult. In the past, people could shop more comfortably, but in recent times, they are facing significant economic difficulties—this is a fact. Living standards have dropped; they are starting to decline. Yes, there was a time when things were very good people were buying homes, buying cars, and being more

active in their work lives. But now our living standards are a bit strained.

Quote 100 (CHP 4, man, 42)

Ekonomi kötü, insanların alım gücü düşük. Ya orta direk diye bir şey kalmadı. Düşünsene bir insan tatil yapabilmek için 500 tane takla atıyo ya. Yani tatil bir insanın bir haftalık tatili devletin yani normalde devletin karşılaması gerekiyo hani. Her vatandaşına bir tatil veremiyosa bu devlet, bu kadar vergiyi alıyosa neye yarar yani. İnsanlar tatile gidemiyolar, insanlar dışarı çıkıp gönüllerince eğlenemiyolar. İnsanlar istediklerini artık alamıyorlar yani. Markete giriyorsun, önceden işte canın istedi reyonda bir şey görürdün alırdın, koyardın yani. Şimdi bakıyosun, diyosun ki yok bunu almayayım sadece temel ihtiyaçlar, o temel ihtiyaçların da en ucuzunu. Ve minimuma indirerek alıyosun.

The economy is bad, and people's purchasing power is low. There's no longer a middle class. Just think about it—one has to jump through hoops just to be able to take a vacation. Normally, the state should cover a week's holiday for its citizens. If the state can't provide a vacation for every citizen while collecting this much tax, then what's the point? People can't go on vacation; they can't go out and enjoy themselves freely. People can no longer buy what they want. You walk into a market, and whereas before, if you saw something you liked on the shelf, you would buy it. Now you find yourself saying, "No, I won't buy this; I'll just get the basics," and you're buying the cheapest of those essentials, minimizing everything.

Quote 101 (HDP 12, man, 46)

Herkes evine ekmek götürme derdinde, ikincil bir gayesi yok bile çoğu insanın geçim sıkıntısından. Yoksulluk sınırı 50-60 binlerde, asgari ücret 17 bin lira. Ben devlet memuruyum da geçinmekte zorlanıyorum. Ne denir ki bu şartlara.

Everyone is just trying to put bread on the table; most people don't even have a secondary goal because of their struggle to make ends meet. The poverty line is around 50-60 thousand, while the minimum wage is 17 thousand lira. I'm a civil servant, and I'm still struggling to get by. What can one say about these conditions?

Quote 102 (TKP 3, woman, 66)

Şu anda çok ciddi bir, özellikle son iki üç yıldır, hatta belki de bu 2024'te üç dört aydır, yani iki üç aydır ciddi bir geçim sıkıntısı var. Enflasyon çok korkunç arttı. Gelir düzeyi insanların kesinlikle geçimlerini sağlamıyor. Asgari geçim indirimi örneğin 30 bin lirayken insanlar 10 bin lira alıyorlar, o da yeni 10 bin lira alıyorlar iki aydır. Daha önce 7 bin lira alıyorlardı. Ev kiralari şiddetli arttı. Enflasyon önlenemediği için her alanda bu pahalılık artıyor, önlenemiyor. Önleyeceğini de düşünmüyorum.

Right now, especially in the last two or three years, and perhaps even in the past three or four months of 2024, there is a serious struggle to make ends meet. Inflation has increased tremendously. The income level definitely does not cover people's living expenses. For example, while the minimum subsistence allowance is 30 thousand lira, people are only receiving 10 thousand lira, and that's a new 10 thousand lira they've received for the past two months. Previously, they were getting 7 thousand lira. Rent prices have sharply increased. Since inflation cannot be controlled, the cost of living is rising in every area, and I don't think it will be controlled.

On the other hand, different assessments regarding the country's economic conditions are also present in the participants' statements. In this context, some supporters of the AK Party, MHP, and YRP explicitly emphasize the improvement in the country's economic conditions, the diversity of products, and the increase in the level of welfare. An AK Party supporter (Quote 103) note that compared to the past, living conditions are not that bad, and

that the living conditions of different groups (civil servants, middle class, wealthy) have changed. She expresses that the middle class has gained significantly in the last two years and that the lower class is in a better situation compared to the past. A supporter of the MHP (Quote 104) claims that the economic situation is not bad, asserting that those who work well and improve themselves achieve financial success. However, he argues that the desire to work has decreased, leading to a preference for desk jobs, which they believe is one of the main reasons for unemployment. Other participants state that people generally have everything they need, such as homes and cars, and therefore, complaining is unjust (Quotes 105 and 106).

Quote 103 (AK Party 9, woman, 58)

Geçmişten çok çok yüksek ki. Yani bugünü kıyaslayamayız. Geçmişte şu vardı. Memur kesimi ayırıydı, orta kesim ayırıydı, zengin kesimi ayırıydı. Evet, şimdi de var zenginlerimiz ama eee orta kesim bayağı bir, şu son iki sene önceye kadar baya bir yere geldiler. Evet, çok alt kesim var. Onlar da eskiye rağmen çok çok iyiler. Dediğim gibi ben ev ziyaretlerine gidiyorum. Yani ben görüyorum insanların yaşantılarını. He var, şöyle var... Ya biraz akli dengesinde kendini idame ettiremeyen insanlarda sıkıntı var aslında. Yoksa ki yaşam şartları o kadar kötü değil.

It's much higher than the past. I mean, we can't compare it to today. In the past, there was a distinct division: the civil servant class was separate, the middle class was separate, and the wealthy class was separate. Yes, we still have wealthy people today, but the middle class has made significant progress, especially compared to two years ago. Yes, there is a very low-income group, but they are also in a much better position than before. As I said, I go on home visits. I see people's lifestyles. Yes, there are some people who are struggling to maintain their mental stability, but otherwise, living conditions are not that bad.

Quote 104 (MHP 9, man, 40)

Vallahi şöyle söyleyebilirim onu da...Ekonomik olarak çok kötü değiliz açıkçası. İşini gerçekten yapan, meslek sahibi olan, kendini geliştiren insanlar mutlaka hem iş sahibi oluyorlar hem de gelir elde ediyorlar ekonomik olarak. Eskiden işi çoktu, para yoktu. Şimdi para var ama iş yapan insanlar azaldı ve herkes rahat, kolay, masa başında genelde işler tercih ettiği için işsizliğin temel problemlerinden birinin bu olduğuna inanıyorum ben. Umarım özellikle meslek liselerini- ben de meslek lisesi çıkışlıyım kendim adamlar da yetiştiriyordum, işçiler de yetiştiriyorum- özellikle meslek liselerine biraz da ağırlık verilirse ülkenin temel kalkınması daha iyi olabilir ekonomik olarak.

Honestly, I can say this... Economically, we are not that bad. People who genuinely do their jobs, have professions, and develop themselves certainly manage to own businesses and earn income. In the past, there was a lot of work but no money. Now there is money, but the number of people doing work has decreased, and since everyone prefers easy, desk jobs, I believe this is one of the main problems of unemployment. I hope that if more emphasis is placed on vocational schools—I'm a graduate of a vocational school myself, and I was also training workers—especially vocational schools can significantly contribute to the country's economic development.

Quote 105 (AK Party 13, man, 49)

İyi olan, yaşam tarzı iyi geçmişe göre. Ne kadar ağlasak da istediğimiz her şey var. Evimiz var, arabamız var. Yaşantın üst seviye. Kimse diyemez ki ben şunu aldım, alamıyorum. Piyasaya bak ağlayanların yüzde doksanı her şeyi var. Ben on liralık borçtan korkan insanım, adamlar milyonluk borca giriyor. Demek ki

Life is good; the lifestyle is better compared to the past. No matter how much we complain, we have everything we want. We have homes, we have cars. Our lifestyle is at a high level. No one can say, "I bought this, but I can't afford it." If you look at the market, ninety percent of those who complain have

güveniyorsun bir şeylere, devlete, yarına, işine gücüne gidebiliyorsun.

everything. I'm someone who fears a ten-lira debt, while others are going into millions of lira in debt. This means you trust something—whether it's the state, tomorrow, or your job.

Quote 106 (AK Party 11, woman, 33)

Belki şöyle bizim insanlarımız bolluktan sıkıldı. Bolluktan gerçekten bolluk çok. Çok bolluk var. Yani artık şöyle bir şey. Ben öyle düşünüyorum. Tabi ki para yok, para yok diyorlar ya, ben ona inanmıyorum. Fakir yok artık. Akıl fakiri var, fakir yok. Çünkü şöyle bir şey... Gördüğümüz gibi gençler böyle dışarıda bir kahvenin şeyi olmuş dünyanın parası. Oldu yani. O eski insanlar evde oturuyor, çocuklar yiyor onu. Dışarıda zaten açlık yok. Yok daha yani kesinlikle yok.

Maybe our people are just tired of abundance. There is really a lot of abundance. I think this way: Of course, they say there's no money, but I don't believe that. There are no poor people anymore; there are people lacking wisdom, but not poor people. Because, as you can see, young people are spending a fortune on coffee outside. Those old folks are sitting at home, while the kids are enjoying that. There is no hunger outside; absolutely none.

The table in Appendix I analyses how right-wing and left-wing ideological groups evaluate the economic situation in Türkiye and their views on issues such as economic problems, income inequality, and economic policies. Both the right-wing and the left-wing supporters agree that economic crises and uncertainties affect Türkiye's economic system. Unemployment, income inequality, labour exploitation, and increasing taxes have been highlighted as problems mostly mentioned by left-wing individuals. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that right-wing individuals state that economic recovery and welfare have increased compared to the past. In conclusion, while both the right and the left accept that economic crises and income inequality are important problems of the current order, the left-wing individuals evaluate the economic order more critically, while the right-wing individuals focus on increasing economic welfare. At the same time, while right-wing individuals acknowledge current economic challenges, they often attribute them to external factors such as foreign powers, global crises, or post-COCID-19 challenges.

Differences in Social Norms and Values Between the Past and Present

The participant expressions comparing the social structure and values of the past and present have been grouped into eight categories (Table 3.10). According to frequency, these categories are Religion and Social Practices, Family and Society, Criticism of Individualization and Modernity, Criticism of the New Generation, Criticism of Capitalism and Materialism, Issues Regarding the Transmission of Social Morality and Values, Criticism of Changing Social Norms Based on Gender, Concerns About the Loss of Republican Values.

Table 3.10. Document-based coding table regarding social norms and values

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
SOCIAL STRUCTURE, NORMS AND VALUES											
REPUBLIC VALUES											
Increase in Opposition to Atatürk					1						1
Loss of Republic Values		1	1	1							3
TRANSMISSION OF SOCIETAL MORALITY AND VALUES											
Changes in Moral Norms	1								1		2
Alienation from Cultural Heritage	1										1
Normalization of Crimes and Moral Decline		1	2				1				4
Lack of Control	1										1
Degeneration and Europeanization					1						1
Transmission of Moral Values to Youth	1										1
CRITICISM OF NEW GENERATION											
Irresponsibility	1			1		1					3
Extreme Freedom	1			1							2
Imitation	1										1
Decreased Respect for Elders	2	1		1	2				1		7
Weakening of Authority						1					1
GENDER AND SOCIAL ROLES											
Clothing and Changing Image of Women	2			1	1			1			5
Gender and Deterioration of Family Order					1						1
Women's Social and Economic Empowerment	1			1							2
Transformation of Gender	1										1
INDIVIDUALISM AND MODERNITY											
Consumer Culture and Materialism	2		1	4	2						9
Material Scarcity and Happiness	1		1								2
Mechanization				1							1
Technology and Exploitation			1	1							2
Individualism, Selfishness and Isolation		2	2	3	2		1			1	11
Modernity					1						1
Openness to Change					1						1
RELIGION AND SOCIAL PRACTICES											
Narrow Mildness		1									1
Arabization					1						1
Moral Decay	5				3	1			1		10
Weakening of Religious and National Values	3				1	1					5
Exploitation of Religion			2	1	1						4
Social/Religious Pressures and Conservatism		2		2			1				5
Culture of Obey		1									1

Table 3.10 (continued)

FAMILY AND SOCIETY											
Differentiation of Values	1										1
Deterioration of Family Values and Traditional Family Structure	7	2		2	2	1			1	1	16
Authoritarian Parenting Style		1									1
SUM	32	12	10	20	20	5	3	1	4	2	109
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

When examining the participant statements comparing the past and present in terms of social values and norms, it is notable that the loss of traditional values is most frequently expressed by supporters of right-wing parties such as the AK Party, MHP, Saadet, and YRP (see Table 3.10). Among these traditional values, concerns and criticisms include the loss of family and child-rearing values, distancing from essence, detachment from national and religious values, excessive liberalization, changing norms based on gender, criticism of the image of women, and moral decay. Overall, the participants' views reflect criticisms regarding how values, moral norms, and social structures in Türkiye have changed over time. The loss of traditional values, the weakening of religious and national values, and the perception of moral collapse within society stand out in their statements. Participants share their concerns about the degradation of religious values and morality, noting that young people have lost their sense of respect and shame, and that the understanding of modernization, which brings excessive liberalization and individualization, is misunderstood. In general, participants express that the commitment to traditional values has diminished while questioning the effects of modernization and technological advancements on individuals and society. They emphasize that society is losing its essence, and that the importance of historical, religious, and cultural heritage is being overlooked. In the modern age, the superficial perception of religious beliefs and the lack of integration into daily life are highlighted. They point out that the moral values of society are eroding through scandals on television and content shared on social media. It is believed that there used to be a common culture and set of values, but now this has fragmented. There is a prevailing view that modernization weakens individuals' moral values. Participants think that the young people who move freely in the streets are, in fact, living in a kind of captivity rather than experiencing true freedom.

Quote 107 (AK Party 2, man, 40)

Temel farklılıklar özümüzü maalesef kaybetmiş durumdayız. Özümüzle beraber tarihi geçmişimizi, eee, din ve kültürel geçmişimizi de çoğu noktada es geçiyoruz yine.

Unfortunately, we have lost our essence along with our fundamental differences. In many respects, we overlook our historical background, as well as our religious and cultural heritage.

Quote 108 (AK Party 6, man, 48)

Böyle içi boşaltılmış bir din neredeyse, içi boşaltılmış. Şimdi benim elimde Facebook var, her türlü afedersiniz açık seçik resimler de gelebiliyor. Açık seçik resimler de gelebiliyor. Ama hem ona hem namaza. Olmaması lazım böyle.

It's almost a religion that has been emptied of its essence. Now I have Facebook, where all kinds of explicit images can come through. Explicit images can come through. But there shouldn't be both that and prayer.

Quote 109 (MHP 12, man, 62)

Toplumda değer diye bir şey kalmadı ki. Hani yok öyle bir şey yok. Hani aç televizyonu, şu anda hani bu karısını aldatmış, internete girmiş, bilmem ne olmuş, bütün şeyi bozuluyor. Onların da yapmak istediği o mahsus yapıyorlar. Televizyonda bir tane şey, ne izleyebiliyorsun açtığın zaman akşamları? Eskiden bir tek kanal vardı, hiç olmazsa herkes aynı şeyi izliyordu. Şimdi çocuklarına yine internet veremiyorsun. Giriyorum bir saat şu siteleri kapatayım, onu kapatayım. Yok yani. Toplumsal bir değer kalmıyor. Yanlış anlama da kadınlar erkeklerden daha beter oldu. Eskiden tam tersi oldu yani.

There are no values left in society. I mean, there is nothing like that. You turn on the TV, and right now, someone has cheated on their wife, gone online, or whatever, and everything is falling apart. They do this on purpose. What can you even watch on TV when you turn it on in the evenings? There used to be just one channel, at least everyone was watching the same thing. Now you can't even give your children the internet. I go online for an hour, trying to block these sites, that sites. There's nothing left. Don't get me wrong, women have become worse than men. It used to be the opposite.

Quote 110 (IYI Party 1, man, 70)

Utanma duygusu da kalmamış. Bu modernleşme değil bana göre. Şimdi çocukların sokakta el ele tutuşması, öpüşmesi, birbirine sarılması bu sevgi göstergesi değil. Benim anladığım muhafazakarlık, milliyetçilik şeyinde bu yok, insan şeyinde de yok. Bazı şeylerin bir gizliliği olması gerekir. Bu modernlik de değil, bunun adı özgürlük de değil, bunun adı insanlık da değil. Bazıları işte insan hakları, özgürlük gibi savunmalar içerisine giriyorlar ama özgürlük alanı değil bu. Tam tersi bana göre esaretteler, bu esarete olmanın dışı vurumu özgürlük dedikleri. Yani okullara gidiyorsun işte serbestlik adı altında öğrenci öğrenciye benzemiyor. Modern dediğin her değişiklik, her yanlışlık modernlik değil ne öğretmenleri öğretmen olarak tanıyabiliyorsun, ne öğrenciyi. Giyim kuşam sınıfa da yansımış derse de yansımış.

There is no sense of shame left. This is not modernization in my opinion. Now, children holding hands, kissing, hugging each other on the street is not a sign of love. What I understand is not in conservatism, nationalism, or in humanity. Some things need to have a secret. This is not modernity, this is not called freedom, this is not called humanity. Some people defend themselves with human rights, freedom, but this is not an area of freedom. On the contrary, in my opinion, they are in captivity, this is the manifestation of being in captivity, what they call freedom. In other words, you go to schools and the students do not look like students under the name of freedom. Every change, every mistake you call modern is not modernity, you cannot recognize a teacher as a teacher, nor a student. The way you dress is reflected in the classroom; it is reflected in the lesson.

The changing norms based on gender and criticisms of women's clothing style are emphasized by the supporters of the AK Party, MHP, YRP and IYI Party. The changing role

of women is associated with the deterioration of the traditional family structure and the weakening of child rearing values.

Quote 111 (AK Party 8, woman, 36)

Şu da var. Şimdi güçlü bir kadın icat edelim derken ailedeki kadının rolünü de unuttuk. İşte eşine de değer veren, çocuklarına değer veren bir anne konumu da çıktı. Hep böyle işte başarılı, erkil bir kadın, erkeksi bir kadın yaratırken bizim aileyi, toplumu aile yapan, toplumu toplum yapan aileyi de dağıtmaya başladık.

There is also this. While trying to invent a strong woman, we forgot the role of women in the family. Here is the position of a mother who values her husband and children. While creating a successful, masculine woman, a masculine woman, we started to dismantle our family, the family that makes society a family, and the society that makes society a society.

Quote 112 (AK Party 4, man, 43)

Sosyal ilişki açısından zaten biz kim olduğumuzu biliyoruz, toplumun diğer kalanı farklı imajların peşinde koşuyor. Özellikle kadın hakları dedikleri aslında kadını aşağılayan, ona yakışmayan davranışlar. Bir de çocuklarımıza kötü örnek olan cinsiyet değiştirenler, bunlar sağlıklı değil. Özgürlük adı altında aşırı bir esnekleşme, değerlerimizden vazgeçme, ahlaksızlaşma hali mevcut gittikçe artan şekilde.

In terms of social relations, we already know who we are, the rest of society is chasing different images. Especially what they call women's rights are actually behaviors that belittle women and do not suit them. And those who change their genders are bad examples for our children, these are not healthy. There is an increasing tendency to become too flexible, to abandon our values, and to become immoral under the name of freedom.

Quote 113 (AK Party 6, man, 48)

Değişiklik çok. Önceden biz tesettür dediğimizde, tepeden turnağa idi, ama şimdi kot pantolon üzerinde başörtülü bir bayan, başörtülü ama bütün vücut hatları belli. Böyle içi boşaltılmış bir din neredeyse, içi boşaltılmış. Şimdi benim elimde Facebook var, her türlü afedersiniz açık seçik resimler de gelebiliyor. Açık seçik resimler de gelebiliyor. Ama hem ona hem namaza. Olmaması lazım böyle.

There are many changes. When we used to say hijab, it was from head to toe, but now it is a woman with a headscarf on jeans, she is wearing a headscarf, but all her body lines are visible. It is almost an empty religion, it is empty. Now I have Facebook, I can send all kinds of, excuse me, explicit pictures. Explicit pictures can come. But both for her and for prayer. It shouldn't be like this.

Quote 114 (MHP 11, man, 30)

Yani mesela şöyle. Mesela aile kavramını yıktıklarını düşünüyorum. Yok tövbe haşa erkek erkeğe, kadın kadına... Yani böyle şeylere biz karşıyız. Aile birliğini bozan şeyler bunlar efendime söyleyeyim. Hani onlar öyle olduğu zaman, az önce de konuştuğumuz gibi anasını atasını saymıyor. Bir de üstüne yani tövbe estagfurullah böyle şeyler olunca tüm aile düzenimiz- toplumun en küçük yapı taşı ailedir – parçalanıyor.

For example, like this. For example, I think they have destroyed the concept of family. No, God forbid, a man against a man, a woman against a woman... I mean, we are against such things. Let me tell you, these are the things that destroy the unity of the family. When they are like that, as we talked about earlier, they do not respect their mothers and fathers. On top of that, when such things happen, God forbid, our entire family order – the smallest building block of society is the family – is falling apart.

The views of AK Party, IYI Party, and MHP supporters emphasize the dissatisfaction created by the increasing materialism and consumer culture in modern society. Participants indicate that people are inclined to constantly seek more and consume more, which

negatively affects societal values. It is noted that in the past, people were less ambitious about acquiring goods, the differences between the rich and the poor were smaller, and this was an important determinant of social harmony. However, today, this frenzy of consumption and desire for material possessions is said to make people more unhappy and selfish. Participants stress that society's excessive focus on material values weakens individuals' spiritual fulfilment and social bonds.

Quote 115 (AK Party 10, man, 49)

Herkes işte hani ben özgürüm denen bir dayatma var. Tabii bu şeyi biraz belki materyalist veya kapitalizmle alakalı olabilir. Devamlı harcamayı teşvik eden bir durum var. Yapı var, bak onda o var, bunda bu var. Sende niye yok? Senin de olsun, sen de al, o da yetmez sana, bu da yetmez sana diyerek böyle insanların maalesef devamlı tüketime yöneltildiği, düşünüp sorgulayacakları durumu nasıl örtmeye çalışan sıkıntılı bir şey var, durum var.

For example, like this. For example, I think they have destroyed the concept of family. No, God forbid, a man against a man, a woman against a woman... I mean, we are against such things. Let me tell you, these are the things that destroy the unity of the family. When they are like that, as we talked about earlier, they do not respect their mothers and fathers. On top of that, when such things happen, God forbid, our entire family order – the smallest building block of society is the family – is falling apart.

Quote 116 (IYI Party 5)

Biraz daha açgözlüyüz. Daha tüketici olduk, Daha o da olsun, o da olsun, o da olsun modunda devam ediyoruz. Yani eskiden bakkala gidiyodun bir ekmek alıyodun şimdi ekmek almak için markete gidip iki tane poşetle çıkıyosun. İhtiyacın olmayan şeyleri de alıp çıkıyosun aslında. O yüzden bir açlık oldu insanlarda. Her şeye karşı açlık bu ekonomik olarak, ihtiyaç olarak, duygu olarak. Duygu açlığı çok fazla. Onun dışında yani hani cinsel ihtiyaca varana kadar çok büyük açlıkların olduğunu düşünüyorum.

We've become a bit greedier. We've become more consumer-driven, constantly wanting more and more. In the past, you'd go to the grocery store to buy a loaf of bread, but now you go to the supermarket and come out with two bags. You end up buying things you don't even need. That's why there's this hunger in people now—for everything. It's a hunger not just economically or in terms of needs, but emotionally as well. There's a huge emotional hunger. Beyond that, I think there's even a significant hunger when it comes to things like sexual needs.

Other codes in this category include themes such as the desensitization of individuals, the decrease in respect and value shown to elderly individuals, the normalization of crimes due to the lack of necessary penalties, the shift of values towards a religious axis, the increase in religious pressures, and the sale of Republican values and lands. Participants criticize the influence of religious and conservative values on society in Türkiye expressing concerns that this influence hinders modernization, individual freedoms, and scientific progress. The centralization of religion in social structures is seen as a threat to the principle of secularism, and it is believed to limit personal freedoms and critical thinking. For example, a TIP supporter (Quote 117) emphasizes the increasing impact of social pressure (Turkish: "mahalle baskısı") and religious education, criticizing the growing visibility of religious

figures in public life and the use of religion as a tool of oppression. A CHP supporter (Quote 118) argues that Türkiye is undergoing a process of conservatizing, with societal values becoming more insular and shaped by xenophobia. This is viewed as a departure from modernization toward a more closed societal structure. Another CHP supporter (Quote 119) criticizes the centralization of religion in both social and governmental levels, claiming that a religion-centred governance approach is dominating the country, in violation of secularism. An HDP supporter (Quote 120) also criticizes the backward influence of Islamic groups (such as foundations and religious lodges) on society, arguing that compared to Europe's advancements in science and technology, limiting children to religious education threatens Türkiye's future.

Quote 117 (TIP 2, woman, 63)

Geçmişe dayalı... Ya mahalle baskısı çok arttı bir kere. Ondan sonra Araplaştırmaya çalışıyorlar, dini figürler çok ortaya çıktı. Yani çocuklara din eğitimi altında işte şey de neler öğretiliyo bilmiyoruz. Biz çocuğumuzu şeye göndermedik mesela Kur'an kursuna filan hani öğrenmesine gerek yok diye düşündük. Ama okulda bunları öğretiyorlar. Bilmek zorunda hissettiriyorlar yani. Yani bileceksin not verecek çünkü. O da sıkılıyo, bunalıyo. Yani bu şeyler ön plana çıktı. Yani mahalle baskısı, dini baskılar...

Based on the past... Well, neighbourhood pressure has increased a lot, for one. Then, they are trying to Arabize us, religious figures have become much more prominent. I mean, we don't even know what's being taught to children under the guise of religious education. For example, we didn't send our child to a Quran course because we thought it wasn't necessary for them to learn. But they're teaching these things in school. They make you feel like you have to know it because they give you grades for it. And the child gets bored, feels overwhelmed. So, these things have come to the forefront—neighbourhood pressure, religious pressures...

Quote 118 (CHP 13, man, 45)

Yani toplumsal değerler anlamında, dediğim gibi ülkenin daha fazla açılma, modernleşme, Avrupalılaşma sürecine girdiği bir zamandı. Ama geçtiğimiz son dönem ülkenin iyice muhafazakarlaştığı, iyice içine kapandığı, iyice zenofobisinin arttığı bir dönem olarak ben tanımlayabilirim. Aradaki farklardan biri bu. İkinci olarak tekrar dediğim gibi yani dış politika ülkenin iç atmosferini de fazlasıyla şekillendiriyordu. Ama son dönemde mesela ülkenin daha yakınlaştığı kutuba baktığımız zaman daha çok otokrat ve diktatör ülkelerle...

In terms of societal values, as I mentioned, it was a time when the country was becoming more open, modernizing, and Europeanizing. But I can describe the recent period as one where the country has become increasingly conservative, more inward-looking, and with rising xenophobia. This is one of the differences. Secondly, as I said before, foreign policy significantly shaped the country's internal atmosphere. However, in the recent period, when we look at the pole the country has aligned with, it's mostly autocratic and dictatorial countries...

Quote 119 (CHP 9, man, 32)

Toplumsal değerlerin merkezine dini oturttuklarını düşünüyorum ki yaşıyoruz da hepimiz bu toplumda yaşıyoruz. Laiklik ilkesine tamamen aykırı bir yönetim şekli bu taşradan merkeze kadar, bunun üzerine kurulu düzen zaten. Dini koyduğunuzda akıl devre dışı kalır. Bu benim şahsi düşüncemdir. İnanıp inanmamam da herkesin olduğu gibi benim de

I believe they have placed religion at the center of societal values, and we are all living in this society, experiencing it firsthand. This form of governance is completely contrary to the principle of secularism, from rural areas to the center, and the entire system is built on this. When you place religion at the center, reason is sidelined. This is my opinion.

şahsi tercihimdir ama dini hayatınızın merkezine koyduğunda ve yönetim şekli olarak benimsediğinizde akıl, düşünce ve sorgulama yetisini kenara bırakmanız gerekiyor.

Whether I believe or not is, as with everyone, my personal choice. But when you make religion the center of your life and adopt it as a system of governance, you must set aside the ability to reason, think, and question.

Quote 120 (HDP 5, man, 65)

Temel olarak gördüğüm şey şimdi toplumu kendine müslümanım diyen muhafazakâr herkes kendine göre bi vakıf kendine göre bi dergâh kurmuş. 110 tane dergâh var, vakıf var. Ve bunlar şey herkes bir şekilde bürünmüş herkes İslamiyette farklı bir dil anlatarak kendine bir cemaat oluşturmuş. Toplumu geriye götürmek, bunların topluma bir şey falan getirdikleri yok. Ya şimdi bak Avrupa'ya bakıyoruz yani dünya geliyor, teknolojiyle, bilimiyle yani süreç o kadar güzel ki, dünya o kadar gelişmiş ki ya herkes kendini geliştirirken, uzayda hayat keşfetmeye çalışırken bizim ufak 7 yaşındaki 8 yaşındaki çocuklarımızı vakıflara teslim ediyoruz ve beyinleri donduruyoruz ya bu çocukların geleceğini bırak çocukların geleceğini memleketin geleceğini de tehlikeye atıyoruz.

Basically, what I see now is that society has been shaped by conservative individuals who call themselves Muslim, with everyone creating their own foundation or religious lodge. There are 110 different lodges, foundations, and everyone has taken on a different form, creating their own community by interpreting Islam in a different language. These groups are not contributing anything positive to society; in fact, they are taking it backward. Now, look at Europe, look at how the world is progressing with technology and science—the process is so beautiful, the world has advanced so much. While everyone else is developing themselves, trying to discover life in space, we are handing over our seven- or eight-year-old children to these foundations, freezing their minds. This not only jeopardizes the future of these children but also the future of the country.

The table in Appendix J shows how right-wing and left-wing ideological groups interpret social structure, norms and values. As I mentioned above, the data reveal ideological differences and similarities through various themes such as individualization, modernization, moral norms, religion and family. Left-wing participants emphasized the loss of republican values, the negative effects of modernization such as individualization, selfishness and isolation, and the increasing religious pressures and conservatism in the social order. On the other hand, right-wing participants emphasized the themes of moral decay, the lack of responsibility of the new generation and excessive freedom, while the deterioration of family values and traditional structures appeared to be an important area of concern. At the same time, they criticized the weakening of religious and national values to a great extent. These findings show that ideological groups focus on different themes in their concerns about social values.

Improvements Compared to the Past

When I asked participants about aspects of modern life, they considered to be improvements compared to the past, their responses formed this category. Primarily, the views of AK Party, MHP, and Zafer Party supporters are highlighted in this section, focusing

on topics like technological advancements, improvements in the healthcare sector, successes in disaster management, and social aid programs (see Table 3.11). Participants emphasize Türkiye's strong position in the field of UAVs and drones (IHA and SIHA), the increase in global interaction, and significant progress in transportation and urban development.

Table 3.11. Document-based hierarchical coding table regarding improvements compared to the past

	AK PARTY	CHP	HDP	İY PARTİ	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZAFER	SUM
IMPROVEMENTS COMPARED TO THE PAST											
Transportation and Urbanization											
Advances in Urbanization and Municipal Services					1						1
Developments in Transportation	1			1	1						3
Health and Quality of Life											
Advancements in the Health Sector	3				2						5
Success in Disaster Management and Social Benefits	3										3
Identity Based Improvements											
Importance of Identity Claims							1				1
Technological and Communication Developments											
Ease of Communication	1							1			2
Increased Life Standards		2		1				1		1	5
Power of social media					1						1
Increased Interaction with the World					1						1
Easy Access to Information		1			2	1					4
SUM	8	3	0	2	8	1	1	2	0	1	26
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

Participants emphasize the positive changes in Türkiye and the impact of state-provided social services on society. Their views generally focus on the progress of society, the improvement of living standards, and the successes of state social policies. For instance, an AK Party supporter (Quote 121) highlights the development of infrastructure across the country. The increase in transportation options, improvements in hospitals, and the overall rise in living standards are seen as reflections of the services provided by the state. She also emphasizes the state support provided for elderly and disabled individuals and finds the state's care assistance and health services for the elderly to be significant in terms of social change. A MHP supporter (Quote 122) stresses the significant role of major cities (Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara) in Türkiye's development. He believes that urban planning and municipal

efforts have expanded the country's vision on the international stage. An AK Party supporter (Quote 123) points out the support and assistance provided by the state following past natural disasters (earthquakes, floods), indicating that the state's post-disaster aid and reconstruction efforts highlight the importance of social solidarity and state assurance.

Quote 121 (AK Party 9, woman, 58)

Mesela yollarımız var belki herkesin söylediği ama ben il dışına çıkınca Rabbime şükürler olsun. Daha 2 hafta önce İstanbul'daydım. O deniz altı metrosuna bindim. Yani ulaşım, yollar, hastanelerimiz her şey... Rabbimize şükürler olsun ki Cumhurbaşkanımız yaşlılarımıza bakım parası veriyor. Ben hastalara da ziyaret ediyorum aynı zamanda ve 15 günden 15 güne evde sağlık gidiyor, onlarla ilgileniyor. Yatakları, üstleri... Ben hastanın bakımının üstünden anlarım. Pırıl pırıl, tertemiz. Niye? Biliyor ki devlet tarafından takip ediliyor ve para alıyor ondan. Eskiden yaşlıları kim eve koyardı ki? İstemezlerdi, hor görürlerdi. İşte engelli çocuğu olan saklardı ama bugün alıyor, ortama çıkartıyor. Niye? Onunla gurur duyuyor. Niye? Devletimiz onu destekliyor çünkü.

For example, we have roads, maybe everyone says, but when I go out of town, thank God. I was in Istanbul just 2 weeks ago. I took that submarine metro. So, transportation, roads, our hospitals, everything... Thank God, our President gives money for the care of our elderly. I also visit the patients, and he goes to home health for 15 days, takes care of them. Their beds, their clothes... I know a lot about patient care. They are sparkling, spotless. Why? He knows that they are being monitored by the state and he gets money from them. Who would put the elderly in homes in the past? They didn't want them; they looked down on them. If someone had a disabled child, they would hide them, but today they take them and take them out. Why? He is proud of them. Why? Because our state supports him.

Quote 122 (MHP 5, man, 24)

Günümüzde de dünya gücü olabilecek potansiyelde bir ülkemiz var, daha da gelişiyor. İşte baktığımızda büyük şehirlerimiz İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara gibi büyük şehirlerimiz ön plana çıkıyor. Yani şehir yapılanması, belediyeçilik çalışmaları bu alanlardaki yani ön plana çıkararak ülkemizin dünyaya karşı vizyonunu genişletiyor metropol şehirler. Çünkü ülkemizin tamamen şey değil yani aslında olumsuz değil değişim olumlu olan şeyler de var.

Today, we have a country with the potential to become a world power, and it is developing even more. When we look at it, our big cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara come to the fore. In other words, city structuring, municipality works in these areas, namely by bringing them to the fore, broaden our country's vision against the world, metropolitan cities. Because our country is not completely something, in fact, it is not negative, there are also positive things that change.

Quote 123 (AK Party 9, woman, 58)

Eee, o dönemi anlatırsak tabii ki, eee 65'lerde deprem sel olmuştu. Kısaca onu söyleyeyim o zaman. Depremzedelere toplanan dış ülkelerden gelen paralar memur parası olarak, maaşı olarak bu ülkede geri döndü. Böyle zamanlar geçirdik biz. Sel olurdu, sel çok olurdu eskiden. Sel olurdu köy köy, il il vatandaşlar ellerinde bir heybeleri, toplarlardı kapı kapı. Çünkü ben bunu çocukluğumdan da hatırlıyorum işte. "Depremzede geldi" derdi babaannem, annem. İşte sel felaketinden o heybesine ne veriyorsa kuru ekmek yiyecek. Bakın biz on bir tane ilimiz yok oldu ve ben Adıyaman'a gittim. Adıyaman merkez olma şartıyla dört tane

Well, if we talk about that period, of course, there was an earthquake and flood in the 65s. Let me tell you briefly then. The money collected for the earthquake victims from foreign countries returned to this country as civil servants' salaries and salaries. We went through such times. There would be floods, there used to be a lot of floods. There would be floods, village by village, province by province, citizens would collect their bags with their bags, door to door. Because I remember this from my childhood. My grandmother and mother would say, "The earthquake victim has come." Whatever he puts in that bag from the flood disaster, he

köylere gittik. Çadır kentlere, çok ihtiyaç, böyle çok batıl olan yerlere gidelim dedik. İnanın oraya belediyelerimiz çöp arabasını bile bizim arkamızdan yollamıştı. Köye köy çöp arabasını temiz olsun diye. Çok şükür Mevla'ya nereden nereye geldik. Yani bu gözle görülüyor

will eat dry bread. Look, eleven of our provinces were destroyed and I went to Adıyaman. We went to four villages on the condition that Adıyaman would be the centre. We said let's go to tent cities, places where there is a lot of need and such superstition. Believe me, our municipalities even sent garbage trucks there after us. So that the garbage trucks would be clean. Thank God, we have come a long way. In other words, it can be seen with this eye.

I have also analysed which developments right and left ideological groups view positively by comparing the present with the past (see Appendix K). The results show that left-wing individuals focus on the developments in technology and communication while right-wing individuals emphasize developments in health and quality of life, improvements in transportation and urbanization, developments in the defence industry, and improvements in technology and communication.

4.3.2. The Most Important Problem of Türkiye

In this section, I aimed to understand what issue most bothers the participants in the current context and analyse whether they differ from one another in this regard. An important reason for this is that one of the areas where political polarisation manifests itself is the formation of views on the issues and topics discussed in the country according to political party affiliations. Therefore, the discussions/issues tend to change not according to the positive or negative aspects of the topics but generally based on which party leadership supports or opposes them. The prioritization of the responses given by the participants indicates that party identity is critically important for the same issues. Participants generally discussed multiple problems rather than a single issue. The analyses show that problems related to the Justice and Legal System, Political and Governance System, Economy, and Education System are frequently mentioned (see Figure 3.17).




Figure 3.17. The document-based distribution of Türkiye's most important problem

Table 3.12 shows the distribution of Türkiye's most important problems according to party supporters. Issues related to the Justice and Legal System, which represents the 21% of the codes, are mostly expressed by CHP, HDP, IYI Party and MHP supporters. These issues include increasing inequality and exploitation, misuse of public resources, party-based discrimination and privileges, refugee policies and injustices, incompetence, and legal violations in the penal system. Problems related to Democracy, Politics, and the Administrative System (i.e., 21% of the codes) are primarily voiced by supporters of CHP, HDP, TKP, and TIP, with concerns about the potential loss of secularism, loss of democracy, political pressures, and a confrontational mindset being significant issues. Economic problems (i.e., 17% of the codes) such as economic crisis, unemployment, production issues, and income inequality are common concerns among all party supporters, with CHP supporters expressing these concerns most frequently. Issues regarding the quality and accessibility of education (i.e., 14% of the codes) are raised by supporters of all parties, while some MHP and IYI Party supporters criticize the education system for being disconnected from national values. Social and Cultural Issues (i.e., 11% of the codes) are expressed by AK Party, MHP, Saadet, ZP and YRP supporters as the degeneration of moral values alongside the imitation of Western culture and the loss of fundamental traditional values. For CHP supporters, there are concerns about the shift of values towards religious axes. Security and Terrorism issues (i.e., 7% of the codes) are articulated by MHP, AK Party, and IYI Party supporters as internal and external enemies, national conflicts, and the presence of

terrorist organizations like FETÖ/PKK, while for CHP and HDP supporters, violence against women is a prominent issue. Additionally, Zafer Party, MHP, and İYİ Party supporters have expressed concerns about potential demographic changes resulting from the government's uncontrolled immigration policies (i.e., 5% of the codes). Lastly, environmental concerns (i.e., 3% of the codes) are expressed by HDP supporters.

Table 3.12. The document-based hierarchical coding table regarding Türkiye's most important problem

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF TÜRKİYE											
Concerns About Uncontrolled Migration and Demographic Changes		1		2	1					3	7
Environmental Problems		2	2					1			5
Social and Cultural Problems	6		2	2	3	1			1	1	16
Justice Related Problems	3	13	6	4	4						30
Security and Terror Problems	1	1	1	3	3		1				10
Democracy, Politics and Governance System	2	9	9	3	1		3	3			30
Problems With the Education System	2	6	2	4	6						20
Economic Problems and Inequality	2	11	1	3	3		3	2			25
SUM	16	43	23	21	21	1	7	6	1	4	143
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

The analysis of Türkiye's most important problem based on ideology reveals differences between ideological priorities and concerns around various themes such as migration, environment, justice, education, and economy (see Appendix L). Left-wing individuals predominantly state that the most important problem in Türkiye is related to democracy and the governance system. At the same time, environmental problems were emphasized only by left-wing individuals. Right-wing individuals frequently emphasized social and cultural problems and prioritized the education system and population dynamics such as migration. Economic problems and concerns about justice were expressed jointly by both groups.

4.4. Future Projections

4.4.1. Descriptions of the Ideal Society

In this section, I aimed to understand what kind of society the participants long to live in and their expectations for the future in this regard. Figure 3.18 shows the frequency of codes used regarding the desired society. Accordingly, the following descriptions respectively stand out: a society based on a strong sense of social unity and togetherness, a society based on human rights, an economically developed society, a society that has an effective legal system, a society prevailing social justice and equality, a society with widespread social assistance, society with historical/political ideologies (communist, socialist, nationalist, etc.), a society with an advanced education system, a society with the ecological awareness, a secular society, a traditional society.




Figure 3.18. The document-based thematic map for the Ideal Society

Table 3.13 shows the document-based frequency of the themes regarding ideal society descriptions of party supporters. Although participants have differing views on the past and present, they share common expectations and concerns regarding the ideal society.

Table 3.13. Document-based frequency of Ideal Society by party supporters

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TİP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
IDEAL SOCIETY											
DEVELOPMENT OF ECOLOGICAL AWARENESS	1	3	2	1							7
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS			3								3
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS		3	1	2	1	1	1	1		1	11

Table 3.13 (continued)

DEVELOPED EDUCATION SYSTEM	1	1	1	3	2					1	9
SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND SOLIDARITY	6	6	3	8	4	1	2	1	1	1	33
A SOCIETY BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS	2	4	6	8	4		2	2		1	29
TRADITIONAL SOCIETY	6			1	1					1	9
SECULAR SOCIETY			1	2				1		1	5
SOCIAL SERVICES AND SUPPORTS		3	1	2		1				1	8
FUNCTIONING LEGAL SYSTEM	3	2	2	5	2	1	1	1		1	18
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND EQUALITY	2	2	4	2	1		2	1			14
HIGH STANDARDS OF LIVING	1	5	2	5	5			1			19
SUM											
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

Social cohesion and solidarity are a category commonly and frequently mentioned by all party supporters. Participants expressed their longing for a society where social unity and togetherness are increased, peaceful and loving relationships are prioritized, partisanship and prejudice are diminished, and solidarity and sincerity thrive in a secure environment. For example, a Zafer party supporter (Quote 124) expresses his desire for a society where everyone can live as they wish, where no one judges anyone else. A YRP supporter (Quote 125) wants people and labour to be respected and to be able to walk in peace on the streets. A TKP supporter (Quote 126) wishes for Türkiye to live in peace with its neighbours and the world, and for a society where minority rights are protected. A supporter of the Saadet party (Quote 127) longs for a society where there are sincere, warm relationships like in the old days, where people can talk to each other. An IYI party supporter (Quote 128) longs for a society where people can live together, free from harsh judgments and prejudices, and accept their differences. Similarly, a CHP supporter (Quote 129) believes in the importance of uniting society by reviving past values and acting together regardless of political views.

Quote 124 (Zafer 2, man, 36)

Yani işte bir partiye oy verenler başka partiye oy verenleri hainlikle suçluyor. Yani toplumsal barışı, toplumsal huzuru da kaybettiğimizi de düşünüyorum bu noktada. Bunların olmadığı, daha böyle herkesin yani insanların istediği gibi yaşayabildiği, hiç kimsenin kimseyi yadırgamadığı, herkes istediği gibi yaşasın. Doğal olanı, insancıl olanı da o zaten.

In other words, those who vote for one party accuse those who vote for another party of treason. In other words, I think we have lost social peace and tranquility at this point. A world where these things do not exist, where everyone, that is, people can live as they wish, where no one finds anyone strange, where everyone can live as they wish. That is what is natural and humane anyway.

Quote 125 (YRP 1, woman, 51)

Birinin bir diğerine saygı göstermesini istiyorum. Emeğe saygı duyulmasını istiyorum. Yani dışarı çıktığımda huzurla yürümek istiyorum açık söyleyeyim. Kimsenin

I want one to respect the other. I want labor to be respected. In other words, when I go out, I want to walk in peace, to be frank. No one has respect for anyone else, everyone can

kimseye saygısı yok, herkes çok rahat çöpünü yere atabiliyor. Çalışana bir saygı yok, emeğe emek harcayana bir saygı yok.

throw their garbage on the ground very easily. There is no respect for the worker, no respect for those who put in effort.

Quote 126 (TKP 3, woman, 66)

Savaşa karşıyım yani savaşa çok, çok korkunç bütçe ayrılıyor. Ülkemizin komşularla barış içinde yaşamasını istiyorum. Dünya ile barış içinde yaşamasını istiyorum. Türkiye biraz dışlanıyor da, Avrupa Birliği'ne girmiyoruz yıllardır. Çünkü tutarlı bir politika izlemiyor Türkiye. Orta Doğu'da olmak için, lider olmak istediği için Avrupa ona güvenmiyor. Ben bütün komşularla barış içinde yaşayan, savaşa karşı olan, ırkçı olmayan, Kürtlere karşı da ikinci vatandaş muamelesi yapmayan, Kürtlerin demokratik haklarını veren, bütün yaşayan azınlıkların da haklarını koruyan, laik bir ülke istiyorum.

I am against war, in other words, a very, very terrible budget is allocated for war. I want our country to live in peace with its neighbors. I want it to live in peace with the world. Türkiye is being marginalized a little bit, but we have not been entering the European Union for years. Because Türkiye does not follow a consistent policy. Europe does not trust it because it wants to be in the Middle East, to be a leader. I want a secular country that lives in peace with all neighbors, is against war, is not racist, does not treat Kurds as second citizens, grants democratic rights to Kurds, and protects the rights of all living minorities.

Quote 127 (Saadet 1, man, 39)

İnsanların birbiriyle sohbet edip öyle hani eski filmlerde görüyoruz bazen mesela böyle işte kahvehaneler böyle Osmanlı zamanı gösteriyo ve çok güzel sohbetler. Televizyon yok, bir şey yok, o tarz. Ondan sonra daha samimi ilişkiler, daha sıcak ilişkiler.

People chatting with each other like that, you see in old movies sometimes, for example, coffeehouses show the Ottoman period and have very nice conversations. No television, nothing, that kind of thing. After that, more intimate relationships, warmer relationships.

Quote 128 (IYI party 7, man, 26)

Aslında çok böyle kutuplaşmış bir yerde de yaşıyoruz hani ben ne kadar insanlarla oturup konuşabildiğimi düşünsen de artık insanlar çok keskin, ön yargılı ifadelerle sahip. Cümle içinde geçirdiğiniz bir basit kalıptan sizi damgalayıp sizinle görüşmek istemiyorlar. Ben bunun böyle olmamasını istiyorum aslında. Yani geleceğin Türkiye'sinde, ne diyeyim hani anayasal bir vatandaşlık zemininde bulduğumuz "işte bu ülkenin vatandaşlarına Türk denir", etnik kökenlerimiz de farklı olabilir vesaire işte. Dinlerimiz, mezheplerimiz farklı olabilir. İdeolojik olarak nerede durduğumuzda bağımsız olarak aynı masada aynı şeyleri konuşabilme ve bir şeyler üzerinden ulaşabilmeliyiz. Bu çatışma ve gerginlik ortamını başka türlü gidebileceğimizi düşünmüyorum hani.

In fact, we live in a very polarised place, no matter how much you think you can sit down and talk to people, people now have very sharp, prejudiced expressions. They don't want to meet with you because of a simple phrase you use in a sentence, and they stigmatize you. I actually want this not to be the case. In the Türkiye of the future, what can I say, where we meet on a constitutional citizenship ground, "the citizens of this country are called Turks", our ethnic origins may be different, etc. Our religions, sects may be different. We should be able to talk about the same things at the same table and reach out through something, regardless of where we stand ideologically. I don't think we can get out of this environment of conflict and tension any other way.

Quote 129 (CHP 12, woman, 52)

İyi bir kültürümüz var. İyi bir toplumuz tekrar söyleyeceğim. Ama temele bir dönmemiz lazım. Eskiye bir dönüp bir bakmamız lazım. Oradan onu alıp nereye getirebiliriz? Birleşerek, bütünleşerek ne yapabiliriz? Hep birlikte bakmamız lazım. Gençler, yaşlılar diye ayırarak değil, siyasi parti görüşüne olarak değil, hepimiz bütünleşerek ve birleşerek. Ben

We have a good culture. We are a good society; I will say it again. But we need to go back to the basics. We need to look back at the past. Where can we take it from there and bring it? What can we do by uniting and integrating? We need to look together. Not by separating the young and the old, not by political party views, but by all of us

güzel şeyler hayal ediyorum. Yine bütünleşebileceğimizi düşünüyorum. Yine birleşebileceğimizi düşünüyorum.

integrating and uniting. I dream of beautiful things. I think we can integrate again. I think we can unite again.

The second most frequently mentioned depiction is the Society Based on Human Rights. In this context, the participants generally emphasize the longing for human rights, democracy, freedoms and a just social order. Each of them opposes the injustices and marginalization in the social structure from their own perspective and longs for a society where there is no alienation and where people are valued is emphasized. For example, a TKP supporter (Quote 130) longs for a society where differences are not questioned, and all kinds of rights (human, legal, sexual orientation, etc.) are guaranteed. A TIP supporter (Quote 131) desires a democracy where human dignity is valued, like in Norway and Sweden. Similarly, a CHP supporter (Quote 132) also express a longing for a "Scandinavian Society," characterized by a democratic, enlightened, and people-oriented social structure. An HDP supporter (Quote 133) longs for a society where cultural differences are freely and comfortably expressed, and where diverse colours and cultures are preserved.

Quote 130 (TKP 2, man, 60)

Ben mesela kimsenin farklılıklarından dolayı sorgulanmadığı, herkesin insani, hukuki, hayvani haklarının, cinsel yönelimler dahil hepsinin güvence altına alındığı bir hukuksal yapı ile sosyal bir ortam istiyorum.

For example, I want a social environment and a legal structure where no one is questioned for their differences, and where all human, legal, animal rights, including sexual orientations, are guaranteed.

Quote 131 (TIP 2, woman, 63)

Yani insana değer verilen, insana insan olduğunu hissettiren, insanca yaşayabileceğim bir düzen istiyorum. Daha çok hangisi mesela demokrasilerde bile bu kadar hani nasıl diyeyim Norveç'teki demokrasi gibi İsveç, Norveç'teki gibi öyle bir demokrasi istiyorum. Öyle şeydeki gibi falan değil İngiltere'deki, Fransa'daki, yok Almanya'daki gibi istemiyorum. Onlar bile bize göre çok çok ilerideler de ben İsveç, Norveç gibi insana değer verilen bi demokrasi istiyorum.

I want a system where people are valued, where you can feel your humanity, and where I can live a humane life. If I had to choose, I want a democracy like in Norway or Sweden, where people are truly valued. Not like in England, France, or Germany—though even they are far ahead of us—but I want a democracy like in Sweden or Norway, where people are genuinely valued.

Quote 132 (CHP, woman, 45)

Aydın, özgürlükçü bir toplum tabii ki yani. Herkesin sesini çıkarabildiği, kimsenin kimseyi yargılamadığı, kimsenin kimsenin hakkına girmedeği, özgürlüklerin elinden alınmadığı, insanların, ee, kazandıklarının arasında uçurumların olmadığı, Yani ekonomik adaletsizliğin olmadığı, ee, bir toplum hayalim var tabii ki. Daha çok, ee, sanırım bi İskandinav ülkesinde yaşamak isterdim ya da buranın bi İskandinav ülkesi aydınlığında olmasını

An enlightened, liberal society, of course. I have a dream of a society where everyone can speak up, where no one judges anyone else, where no one infringes on anyone else's rights, where freedoms are not taken away, where there are no gaps between what people, er, earn, in other words, where there is no economic injustice, er, of course. I think I would rather live in a Scandinavian country, or I would like this place to be as enlightened

isterdim. Ee, eşitsizliklerin daha az olduğu, işte gelir gider dengesinden tut özgürlüklerin çok yüksek olduğu, güvenliğin çok yüksek olduğu, ne biliyim doğa, doğayı, doğaya daha sıkı sıkı sahip çıkıldığı, doğanın korunduğu, ee, el değmemesi gereken bütün ne biliyim tarihi anıtlardır, değerlerdir, bunların gözümüz gibi bakıldığı, ee, insanın insan gibi, hayvanın hayvan gibi, doğanın olduğu gibi bırakılma hakkının olduğu bi toplum, daha doğrusu ülkede yaşamak isterdim.

Quote 133 (HDP 11, woman, 32)

Herkesin çok rahat bir şekilde düşüncelerini ifade edebildiği, herkesin eee rahat yaşayabildiği, özgürce yaşayabildiği, kendi rengini, kendi kültürünü, o varlığını koruyabildiği bir toplum olmasını çok isterdim.

as a Scandinavian country. Eh, where there is less inequality, where freedoms are very high, starting from the balance of income and expenditure, where security is very high, where I don't know nature, nature, nature is protected more strictly, where I don't know all the historical monuments, values that should not be touched, where these are looked after like our eyes, er, where people have the right to be left as humans, animals as animals, nature as it is, I would like to live in a society, or rather a country.

I would love to have a society where everyone can express their thoughts very easily, where everyone can live comfortably, freely, and preserve their own color, their own culture, and their existence.

The longing for an economically developed society with high levels of prosperity and living standards has mostly been expressed by supporters of CHP, MHP, and IYI Party. They desire an economic system where everyone can meet their basic needs, there are no economic worries, and people do not face financial struggles in their daily lives.

Quote 134 (CHP 3, woman, 50)

Tabii ki ben öncelikle gerçekten herkesin çok basit bir cümle belki ama karnı doysun istiyorum gerçekten. Karnı doysun, akşam kafasını yastığa koyduğu zaman, sabah uyandığında cebimde ne kadar param kaldı, bu kadarını elektriğe bu kadarını kiraya bu kadarını bilmem neye ödemek zorundayım diye endişe duymamalı.

Of course, first and foremost, I really want everyone, and this may sound like a simple sentence, to have enough to eat. I want them to have a full stomach and, when they lay their head on the pillow at night and wake up in the morning, not to worry about how much money they have left, or how much they have to pay for electricity, rent, or other expenses.

The longing for a society with an effective legal system is expressed by supporters of all parties, particularly emphasizing a developed judiciary and legal system, as well as fair, reliable, and meritocratic governance. For example, an AK Party supporter (Quote 135) emphasizes that ensuring justice in society is vital. He expresses a desire for a system that will secure people's rights, not from a romantic perspective, but with a concrete understanding of justice. An IYI Party supporter (Quote 136) argues that individuals should be able to express themselves freely and claim their rights, stressing the need to utilize legal avenues. A MHP supporter (Quote 137) emphasizes that justice should not only provide equality among individuals but also legally protect everyone's rights. They highlight the importance of ensuring justice regardless of religious, ethnic, or political views and express a desire for equality among individuals.

Quote 135 (AK Party 5, man, 33)

Ben bu konuda çok fazla romantizm yapmayacağım. Yok işte insanlar çiçek olsun, böcek olsun, kelebek olsun, birbirlerini sevsinler bu gibi şeyler benim için çok önemli değil. Ama adalet hakikaten önemli. Adalet toplumun temelidir diye boşuna dememişler. Adalet sistemimizin düzelmiş olmasını ben temenni ediyorum, çok önemsiyorum.

I won't romanticize too much about this. No, whether people are flowers, insects, butterflies, love each other, these kinds of things are not very important to me. But justice is important. They didn't say justice is the foundation of society for nothing. I hope our justice system will improve; I care about it very much.

Quote 136 (IYI Party 7, man, 26)

Özlemimi duyduğum bir toplum aslında herkesin kendisini rahatlıkla ifade edebildiği ve haklarını aslında elde edebildiği, talep edebildiği bunu da yaparken hukuku kullandığı, işte gayet meşru yolları kullandığı bir düzen. Onun dışında herhangi bir böyle ideolojik saplantım falan olduğunu düşünmüyorum artık yani. Herkes bir şekilde, yasal bir şekilde hakkını talep etsin.

The society I long for is actually a system where everyone can express themselves easily and actually obtain and demand their rights and use the law and very legitimate means to do so. Other than that, I don't think I have any ideological obsession or anything like that anymore. Everyone should demand their rights in some way, legally.

Quote 137 (MHP 1, man, 38)

Ya özlemimi duyduğum tarif aslında dediğim gibi adalet duygusu. Ben bunu hayatımda benden bağımsız bir insanın da aynı şeyi yaptığında aynı etkiyi aldığını gördüğüm günlerin gelmesi... İçimde en büyük özlem budur. Yani siyasetten dinden, dilden, ırktan bağımsız bir şekilde, birey bazında düşündüğünde aynı hatayı yapan insanın cezalandırılmasının da eşit olması mükafatlandırılmasının da eşit olması noktasında benim için en büyük geleceğe dair en büyük özlemim bu olur. Yani gelecekte en büyük beklentim budur diye düşünüyorum.

Well, the description I miss is actually, as I said, a sense of justice. I see that in my life, when a person independent of me does the same thing, they get the same effect... This is the biggest longing inside me. In other words, when you think about it on an individual basis, independent of politics, religion, language, race, the fact that people who make the same mistake are punished equally and rewarded equally, this is my biggest longing for the future. In other words, I think this is my biggest expectation from the future.

The traditional social structure is primarily expressed by supporters of the AK Party, highlighting a longing for a society where customs and traditions, moral values, and the traditional family structure are preserved, religious values are properly taught and passed on to future generations, and a belief-based community is fostered.

Quote 138 (AK Party 8, woman, 36)

Aile yapısının çekirdek yapıyı bozmadan, sosyal hayatta güçlü olan kadınlar, aktif olan gençler, sosyal medyadan işte belli platformlara takılmadan giden gençler hayal ediyorum.

I envision a family structure that remains intact, with strong women in social life, active youth, and young people who engage with certain platforms on social media without being overly consumed by it.

Quote 139 (AK Party 12, woman, 36)

İşte az önce dedim ya. Bayanlarımız da erkeklerimiz de vizyon sahibi insanlar olsunlar. Gözle de konuşmayla da ne bileyim diksiyonla da bütün ortamlara hitap edebilecek insanlar olsunlar. Bunun başörtü ile ya da şey değil vizyon, vizyonerlik çok farklı bir şey. Ama kafa olarak azıcık muhafazakar olsunlar, ahlak öncelikleri ahlak olsun. Eee, ahlak olursa her şey olur. Ben şeye çok inanırım. Vizyoner vizyon çünkü her şey, o vizyon parayla dahi alınamayacak bir şey. Vizyon. Yarı muhafazakar yarı da. Şöyle söyleyeyim Yarı vizyoner, yarı muhafazakar ama tamamı ile vizyoner olsunlar.

I just mentioned it earlier. I want our women and men to be visionary individuals. They should be able to communicate and connect with others through both their gaze and their speech, regardless of the environment. This is not about headscarves; vision is something entirely different. They can be a bit conservative in their mindset, with moral priorities centered around ethics. If there is ethics, everything else will follow. I strongly believe in vision because it is something that cannot be bought with money. So, I envision them as half conservative and half visionary, but completely visionary overall.

Participants also express a longing for a society where the education system has developed, ecological awareness has increased, and social assistance and support have strengthened a people-oriented understanding of the state. Additionally, although less frequently, descriptions such as secular Türkiye, Atatürk's Türkiye, a society like the Gezi movement, Independent Kurdistan, Socialist State, Nationalist/Patriotic Society and Classless-Boundless-Non-Exploitative Society are also encountered. In these descriptions, the influence of the participants' party identity and the ideologies participants support become more pronounced. For example, a supporter of the Saadet Party (Quote 140) longs for the past coffeehouse culture and sincere relationships. For him, the ideal society represents an environment where social ties are strengthened, like the Ottoman period. A supporter of the Zafer Party (Quote 141) expresses a desire for a country that aims for progress in science and technology to strengthen Turkish consciousness and ensure the survival of the Turkish nation. This emphasizes the importance of a strong national identity and solidarity. A supporter of the İYİ Party (Quote 142), aware of the legacy left by Atatürk, emphasizes the need to take care of Türkiye and the feeling of nationalism. A supporter of the TKP (Quote 143) expresses that he has a Marxist worldview and argues that socialism is a socially grounded order based on science, stating that democracy holds an important place in this context. A TIP supporter (Quote 144) recalls that during the Soviet Union era, people could live without the worry of hunger, wishing for a similar society to be possible today. An HDP supporter (Quote 145) who experienced the Gezi movement states that this experience is very special for her and longs for the environment of equality and social solidarity during that process, wanting this way of life to spread throughout society. Another HDP supporter (Quote 146) harbours a longing for an independent, democratic Kurdistan to ensure the recognition of their identity and the protection of their cultural rights.

Quote 140 (Saadet 1, man, 38)

İnsanların birbiriyle sohbet edip öyle hani eski filmlerde görüyoruz bazen mesela böyle işte kahvehaneler böyle Osmanlı zamanı gösteriyo ve çok güzel sohbetler. Televizyon yok, bir şey yok, o tarz. Ondan sonra daha samimi ilişkiler, daha sıcak ilişkiler. en meraklıyım biraz öyle tarihi böyle dizileri izlemeye. Muhteşem Yüzyıl'ı bile izlemiştir yani şeyde. İşte Diriliş Ertuğrul, Kuruluş Osmanlı, işte Alpaslan falan filan. Ordaki şeyleri görünce çok hoşuma gidiyordu mesela. Hep derim “Keşke ben de o dönemde yaşasaydım. Keşke ben de orda olsaydım.” falan filan diye. Karşıdan belki böyle güzel geliyo. Mesela işte Muhteşem Yüzyıl özellikle Osmanlı şeylerinde o kahvehaneler var böyle küçük işte nargile içiyolar, oturuyorlar. Çok güzel hikayeler anlatılıyor. Mesela o çok hoşuma gidiyordu.

People chatting with each other like that, you see in old movies sometimes, for example, coffeehouses, they show the Ottoman period and they have very nice conversations. There is no television, nothing, that kind of thing. After that, more intimate relationships, warmer relationships. I am most curious about watching historical series like that. I have even watched Magnificent Century, that is. There is Diriliş Ertuğrul, Kuruluş Osmanlı, there is Alpaslan, etc. When I saw the things there, I really liked them. I always say “I wish I had lived in that period. I wish I had been there.” etc. Maybe it seems nice like that from the front. For example, especially in Magnificent Century, there are those coffeehouses, they are small, they smoke hookah, they sit. Very nice stories are told. For example, I really liked that.

Quote 141 (Zafer 1, man, 36)

Özlemini kurduğum toplum şöyle: Öncelikle Türklük bilincinin yerleştiği, kendi neslimiz için, gelecek nesiller için, Türk milletinin yaşaması için, güçlenmesi için, tüm dünyayla mücadele edecek şekilde, bilimde ve teknolojiye en ileriye hedefleyerek yaşadığımız bir ülke görmek istiyorum.

The society I long for is as follows: First of all, I want to see a country where the consciousness of Turkishness is established, where we live by aiming for the most advanced in science and technology, in a way that will compete with the whole world for our own generation, for future generations, for the survival and strengthening of the Turkish nation.

Quote 142 (IYI Party 8, woman, 31)

Bir şeyleri tükettiğimiz değil de artık sürdürdüğümüz, onlara böyle dört elle sahip çıktığımız... Gerçekten bize Atatürk'ün bıraktığı bir Türkiye'nin farkında olduğumuz... Yani bu toprakların gerçekten şehit kaniyle sulandığının ve bizim buradan başka şansımızın, bu vatandan başka vatanımızın olmadığını bildiğimiz... Şu an çok böyle ilerlemiyoruz çünkü. Herkes ‘gidebilirim’, ‘orada yaşarım, burada yaşarım’ kafasında. Ama biz oralara gittiğimizde buralara başkaları gelecek o zaman ve biz bunu da kabullenemeyeceğiz aslında. Çünkü ya hepimizin kanında var o yani o Türk milliyeti, bu toprağın bizim olduğu, bu vatanın bizim olduğu, burada atalarımızın olduğu, mezarlarının olduğu...

We are not consuming things but now we can sustain them, we embrace them with both hands... We are truly aware of a Türkiye that Atatürk left us... In other words, we know that these lands are truly watered with the blood of martyrs and that we have no other chance, no other homeland than this... Because we are not progressing like this right now. Everyone is thinking ‘I can go’, ‘I can live there, I can live here’. But when we go there, others will come here then and we will not be able to accept that either. Because we all have that in our blood, that Turkish nationality, that this land is ours, this homeland is ours, our ancestors are here, their graves are here...

Quote 143 (TKP 2, man, 73)

Ben Marksist bir dünya görüşüne sahibim. Marksist bir dünya görüşü aynı zamanda bir şeydir, bilimdir. Dogma değildir. Dolayısıyla o bilime dayanan toplumsal düzeni sosyalizmdir. Sosyalizme giden yolda demokrasi kuralları uygun olan her toplum üzerinde yaşamam özlemim de odur zaten . Yakın ve yakın, uzun

I have a Marxist worldview. A Marxist worldview is also something, it is science. It is not dogma. Therefore, the social order based on that science is socialism. My longing to live in every society that has democratic rules on the way to socialism is that. These are near and immediate, long-

planlı hedefler bunlar. E bizimle farklı düşünen unsurları onların yöntemi ile değil bizim yöntemimizle onları da insan etmeye çalışır.

Quote 144 (TIP 4, man, 61)

Esas olarak tabii ki özlemini duyduğumuz şey bir sosyalist dünya. Biz onu gördük. Yani Sovyetler Birliği'nin varlığı döneminde insanların karın doyurma derdinin olmadığı bir dünyanın var olabileceğini gördük. Bugün de aynı şeyin olmasını istiyoruz. Yani insanların karın doyurma derdinden başka şeylerle uğraşabileceği bir toplum olmalı.

Quote 145 (HDP 1, woman, 33)

Gerçekten Gezi gibi ülkenin nasıl yönetildiğinden bağımsız, eksikliği, noksanı, hatası, eleştirilecek yanları illaki olur. Her rejimde olur, bence her rejim aslında kendi muhaliflerini de kendi yaratır. Ama o Gezi'de deneyimlediğim hayatım kendisi çok özel, çok özlediğim, çok istediğim bir hayatmış. Yaşadıktan sonra onu anladım. Keşke dedim toplumun bütünü böyle yaşasa, biz hayatımızı sonuna kadar böyle biçimde, bu ilişkilene biçimiyle yaşasak dedim. Çalışmak zorunda olmadığımız ama aynı zamanda çalışanlarla çalışmayanların birbirleriyle de eşit olduğu bir hayat. Bence çok mikro düzeyde, ileride kuracağımız hayatın mikro düzeyde bir örneği gibiydi, minyatürü gibiydi diyebilirim belki de. Sanki orada bir düşün vardı.

Quote 146 (HDP 7, man, 74)

Bağımsız, demokratik bir Kürdistan'dır benim gönlümde yatan. Günlük yaşamımızda da bizim hep Kürtlükle oturuyoruz, Kürtlükle kalkıyoruz. Mesela burada toplantı yapıyoruz, hep Kürt sorununu tartışıyoruz. İnan hep rüyalarım da odur. Mesele bizim tanınmamızdır. Biz inkâr edilmişiz bugüne kadar. Bu inkâr politikası ortadan kalktıktan sonra illa ben sınır çekmekten yana değilim ama benim diyelim kendi bayrağım olsun, kendi özel ulusal marşım olsun, kendi anadilimle yazayım okuyayım.

planned goals. And it tries to make the elements that think differently from us human, not with their methods but with our methods.

Essentially, of course, what we long for is a socialist world. We have seen it. In other words, during the existence of the Soviet Union, we saw that a world could exist where people did not have to worry about making ends meet. We want the same thing to happen today. In other words, there should be a society where people can do things other than making ends meet.

It really is like Gezi, regardless of how the country is governed, there are always shortcomings, deficiencies, mistakes, aspects to be criticized. It happens in every regime, I think every regime actually creates its own opponents. But the life I experienced in Gezi was very special, a life I missed very much, a life I wanted very much. I understood it after I lived it. I said, I wish the whole society lived like this, we lived our lives in this way, with this form of relationship until the end. A life where we don't have to work, but at the same time, those who work and those who don't work are equal to each other. I think it was like a micro-example of the life we will build in the future, maybe I can say it was like a miniature. It was like there was a dream there.

An independent, democratic Kurdistan is what lies in my heart. In our daily lives, we always sit down with Kurdishness, we always wake up with Kurdishness. For example, we hold meetings here, we always discuss the Kurdish issue. Believe me, that is always my dream. The issue is our recognition. We have been denied until today. After this policy of denial is eliminated, I am not necessarily in favor of drawing borders, but let's say I have my own flag, my own special national anthem, I can write and read in my own native language.

4.4.2. How to Achieve the Ideal Society

In addition to the participants' descriptions of the society they longed for, I also wanted to learn their views and expectations about reaching this ideal society. For the majority of CHP (n=7) and some MHP (n=3), AK Party (n=2), İyi Party (n=2), HDP (n=1), TIP (n=1), Zafer (n=1), YRP (n=1), Saadet (n=1) supporters, expressed a sense of

pessimism, believing that the ideal society is unrealistic to reach. The analysis results reveal that this disbelief is based on different reasons for each participant group. For example, YRP supporter sees societal moral decline as a fundamental reason, while Zafer Party supporter believe that the influence of political Islam cannot be overcome. MHP supporters fear the increasing negative effects of demographic changes, while CHP supporters think factors such as a divisive mentality, declining education quality, lack of political organization, and the misuse of religion in state affairs hinder the achievement of an ideal society. HDP supporter emphasizes the divisive mentality, and TIP supporter expresses disbelief in a change of government. AK Party supporters state that the former unity and solidarity cannot be restored, and that the new generation is already lost. Finally, Saadet Party supporter display a deep distrust of politics, claiming that change is impossible regardless of which political view comes to power.

Table 3.14. The document-based hierarchal coding table containing participants' views on how to achieve the ideal society

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	İYİ Party	MHP	SAADET	TIP	TKP	YYP	ZAFER	SUM
HOW TO REACH THE IDEAL SOCIETY											
EDUCATION AND AWARENESS											
Development of the Education System											
Equal Opportunities in Education		1									1
Quality Education			2	2	1						5
Contemporary Education Institutions		1						1			2
Education of Human Values			1								1
Education in Families and Social Structures					1						1
Education of Tradition Values		2									2
A Core-Based Education System				2	1					1	3
Research and Conscious Society											
New Generations	1	2	1	1							5
Mindset Change			1								1
Importance of Science and Technology				1	1						2
Researching Society		1									1
Individual and Psychological Development			1	1							2

Table 3.14 (continued)

SOCIAL AND SOCIETAL CHANGES											
Through Solidarity, Organizing and Struggle	1	4	2				1	2			10
Art and Collective Solidarity		1									1
Women's Development and Empowerment		2					1				2
Societal Awareness											
Fulfilling Individual Responsibilities	2				1						3
Ecological Crisis Awareness			1					1			2
Development of Moral Values	2			1	1						4
LEFT/SOCIALIST IDEOLOGIES AND THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCES											
Left/Socialist Ideologies								2	1		3
New Global Discourse and Organisation									1		1
Union of System Victims			1					1	1		3
NATIONAL AND CULTURAL VALUES											
With the Success of Nation-States	1										1
With Youths Who Preserve Turkish Consciousness/Traditions				1	1						2
Alperen Philosophy					1						1
Power of Turks					1						1
With Youth Who Protect Republic Values		3									3
DEMOCRATIC AND CRITICAL APPROACHES											
System Criticism and Change											
Confronting Past Mistakes											
Conflicts within Capital			1								1
Collapse of Man-dominated Culture			1								1
Collapse of the System			1								1
Critique of Past Left Movements			1					1			2
Democracy and Culture of Debate											
Culture of Inclusion and Compromise			1	2							3
Establishing Multi-Cultural Structure			1								1
GOVERNANCE POLICIES AND LEADERSHIP											
Security and Defence Policies				1							1
New Constitutional Order			1								1
From Local to Central Governance			1								1
Meritocracy and Quality Politicians				1				1			2
Leadership				1	1						2
With AK Party and the President's Policies	1										1
With a New Political Structure		1									1
Presidential System					2						2
Change of Power		1									1
ISLAMIC VALUES											
	1			1							2
IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH											
	2	7	1	2	3	1	1		1	1	19
SUM	11	17	23	18	14	1	7	7	1	1	100

Table 3.14 shows that the participants' ways of reaching this goal are compatible with their party ideologies despite the existence of a common dream of a society. I interpret this situation as indicating the difficulty of finding common ground for the participants, since everyone prefers different paths, even if they have a common goal. According to AK Party supporters, reaching the ideal society seems possible through the education of traditional values, moral development, internalization of Islamic values, strengthening the concept of the nation-state, fulfilling individual responsibilities, and the policies of the AK Party and the President.

Quote 147 (AK Party 4, man, 43)

İnanıyorum. Hükümetimiz ve Cumhurbaşkanımız sayesinde AK Parti'nin yarattığı politikalara sahip çıkacak bir yönetim var olacaktır illaki.

I believe. Thanks to our government and our President, there will be an administration that will uphold the policies created by the AK Party.

Quote 148 (AK Party 3, man, 40)

Şöyle inanıyorum, demin dediğim gibi eğer dünyadaki küresel döngüde ulus devletler samimi anlamda kazanırlarsa buna inanıyorum, bunun olacağını hissediyorum. Eğer kazanamazlarsa, yine küresel bir döngü devam edecekse, yani tamamen emperyalizmin kapitalizmin olduğu bir döngü - tabii ki emperyalizm ve kapitalizmin forma değiştirerek, kılık değiştirerek geldiği değil tamamen soyutlandığı bir döngü kazanırsa - evet buna inanıyorum.

I believe, as I mentioned earlier, that if nation-states truly succeed in the global cycle, I feel this will happen. If they don't succeed and a global cycle continues—one dominated entirely by imperialism and capitalism—if such a cycle prevails, where imperialism and capitalism aren't just changing forms or disguises but are completely isolated, yes, I believe in this.

Quote 149 (AK Party 12, woman, 36)

Eğer değerlerimizi kaybetmesek, özümüzü biraz daha dönersek, gençlik daha çok gençlik. Bizim yaşlarımız o kadar değil de bu gençleri de biz yetiştiriyoruz sonuçta. Eğer gençliğe biz özümüzü geriye dönüp işte yaşantımızı, örf ve adetlerimizi biraz daha öğretebilir isek inşallah olur diye umut ediyorum.

If we don't lose our values, if we return a bit more to our essence, especially with the younger generation—maybe not as much for people our age, but we are the ones raising these youth after all. If we can teach them more about our essence, our way of life, our customs and traditions, I hope it will happen.

According to CHP supporters, achieving the ideal society seems possible through preserving secularism and the values of the Republic, building modern educational institutions, raising conscious, research-oriented, and science-focused new generations, ensuring equal opportunities in education, confronting past mistakes, and through a change of government.

Quote 150 (CHP 12, woman, 52)

Bizim çok güzel bir Türk bayrağımız var. Biz Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün çocukları ve evlatlarıyız. Onu her zaman hem söylediklerine, hem yolundayız, hem izindeyiz. Öğretmenlerimize, özellikle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün izinden giden öğretmenler olmasını ve bu yolda öğrenciler yetiştirmesini istiyorum. Ben Türkiye'ye inanıyorum. Güzel şeyler olacak inşallah.

We have a beautiful Turkish flag. We are the children and grandchildren of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. We always follow his words, we are on his path, and we follow his footsteps. I especially want our teachers to be teachers who follow Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's footsteps and raise students on this path. I believe in Türkiye. Good things will happen, God willing.

Quote 151 (CHP 11, woman, 37)

Tek umudum gelecekte tabii ki bizim geçmişimizi, değerlerimizi, cumhuriyeti çocuklarımıza anlatarak onların ne bileyim böyle eğitimin bu kadar kötü olmasına rağmen kendimiz kitap okutarak, onlara gerçekten bilinçli ve doğru bilgileri anlatarak gelecekteki, yani bizim yetiştirdiğimiz çocukların değiştirilmesine dair bir umudum var.

My only hope is that in the future, of course, we will be able to change the children we raise, by telling them about our past, our values, and the republic, by making them read books, even though their education is so bad, and by giving them conscious and correct information.

According to HDP supporters, achieving the ideal society seems possible through the dismantling of patriarchal power structures, critiquing past leftist movements, education on human values, dismantling the culture of conflict and building a culture of reconciliation and democracy, fostering art and collective solidarity, establishing a multicultural structure, implementing a local-to-central governance system, and advancing the women's empowerment.

Quote 152 (HDP 1, woman, 33)

Ya şöyle şimdi her ne kadar sosyalist olsam da tek bir hayat tabii ki tanımlayamıyorum ben. Yani devrim olacak ve devrimden sonra bütün ilişkiler değişecek, değiştiğinde de kadınlar da özgürleşecek gibi söylemin kendisini hiç gerçekçi bulmuyorum. Zaten bununla ilgili deneyimler de var ve böyle olmadığını görüyoruz. Dolayısıyla ikisinden bağımsız ilerleyen bir süreç. Devrimden sonra da bence kadın mücadelesi büyümeye ve sürmeye devam edecek. Çünkü erkekliği zaten iktidar üretiyor, karşısında bir karşı iktidar deneyimini de yaratıyor. O yüzden aslında bu mücadele bence çok uzun soluklu bir mücadele ve hemen bitmeyecek bir mücadele olduğunu düşünüyorum. O yüzden kadın devrimi diye bilinçli olarak söyledim çünkü.

Well, although I consider myself a socialist, I can't define a single life path. I don't find the notion that a revolution will happen, and after the revolution, all relationships will change, and women will become liberated, to be realistic at all. There are already experiences that show it doesn't work that way. So, it's a process that evolves independently of the two. I think the women's struggle will continue to grow even after the revolution because masculinity is produced by power, and it also creates a counter-power experience. Therefore, I believe this struggle is a long-term one and won't end immediately. That's why I consciously referred to it as a women's revolution.

Quote 153 (HDP 10, man, 73)

Sistem mağdurlarının, sistem karşıtı olması gerekliliği ortaya çıkıyor. O mağdurlara Alevi, Sünni'nin davasıyla dertlenmezsen, eee ya şunu diyeyim daha çok uzatmayayım. 1 Mayıs'a

It becomes clear that the victims of the system must be against the system. If you do not worry about the Alevi and Sunni cases for those victims, well, let me just say this

katılan kitle Nevruz'a katılamıyorsa, 8 Mart'a katılamıyorsa yani 8 Mart'a katılan kitle 1 Mayıs'a, Nevruz'a katılmıyorsa, hatta onur yürüyüşüne katılmıyorsa, herkes kendi derdini kendi gücüyle savunmaya kalkıyorsa bu böl-yönet politikasının sür git devamından başka bir şey olamaz. Aslında biz şimdi bu alanlara, emek mücadelesi verenler hangi alana akıyorsa, hangi meydana akıyorsa ekoloji mücadelesi verenler de aynı alana, aynı meydana akmalı. Onur mücadelesi verenler de aynı kadın hakları mücadelesi verenler de. Yani bu zaman, bu sefer bir güç oluruz. Alevisi, Sünnisi, kadını, erkeği, emekçisi, eee ekolojisti eee hepsi aynı meydana akmalı.

without further. If the group that participates in May Day can't participate in Newroz, and if they can't participate in March 8, or if the group that participates in March 8 doesn't attend May Day or Newroz, or even the pride march, if everyone tries to defend their own issue with their own power, this can only lead to the continuation of the divide-and-rule policy. Wherever those fighting for labor rights flow, the ones fighting for ecological rights should also flow into the same space. The ones fighting for pride and those fighting for women's rights should also do so. This way, we can become a force. Alevi, Sunni, women, men, labourers, ecologists—all should gather in the same space.

Quote 154 (HDP 11, woman, 32)

Tek umudum gelecekte tabii ki bizim Sistemsel olarak yani sistemde bir şeyleri değiştirerek yani en temele aslında insani değerleri yerleştirerek. En temeli yani o ilkokul, hatta okul öncesi bazında ailelere özellikle yani insani değer, insan olmak ne demek? İnsana nasıl yaklaşmak gerek? İşte insan hakkı nedir? Aslında bunu kavramış bireyler yetiştirerek ulaşabiliriz. Yani bence her şey temelden başlar. O da zihniyet.

My only hope for the future is, of course, to change things systematically within the system—essentially by establishing human values at the very core. The foundation is to focus on families, especially at the preschool and elementary school levels. What does it mean to be human? How should we approach people? What are human rights? We can achieve this by raising individuals who understand these concepts. I believe everything starts from the foundation, and that foundation is mentality.

According to the supporters of the IYI Party, reaching the ideal society seems possible through the development of education, the establishment of an education system based on core values, nurturing young people who are aware of their Turkish identity and uphold traditions, having competent and qualified administrators, and building a culture of democracy.

Quote 155 (IYI Party 4, man, 65)

Siyasi iktidarın dediğim gibi aşağı yukarı 500-600 kişilik, en az 1000 kişilik bir buna yürekten inanmış kaliteli kadroların iş başına gelmesiyle mümkün. Bir kadro hareketiyle az önce söylediğim kendi menfaatlerini ve ülke siyasetini zenginleşme aracı görmeden, ülke kaynaklarının doğru bir şekilde, iyi değerlendirilebilir bir siyasi kadroyla bunu sağlanması çok kolay. Çünkü baştakiler ve tepedekiler düzgün davranırsa bu davranış modeli dalga dalga toplumun alt kesimlerine yayılır ve Türkiye büyüdükçe biraz önce söylediğim bütün problemler ortadan kalkar.

My only hope for the future is, of course, to change things systematically within the system—essentially by establishing human values at the very core. The foundation is to focus on families, especially at the preschool and elementary school levels. What does it mean to be human? How should we approach people? What are human rights? We can achieve this by raising individuals who understand these concepts. I believe everything starts from the foundation, and that foundation is mentality.

Quote 156 (IYI Party 1, man, 70)

Şimdi Türkiye'nin bir meselesi öze dönmesi gereken bir eğitim sistemi. Önce kendine dönecek, kendi olacak başkası değil. Yani 'Avrupa şunu yapıyor, kalkınmış. Amerika bunu yapıyor, kalkınmış' diyerek olmaz. Onun kültürü o yapıya uygundur kalkınmıştır. Bana sorarsan dünyada kapitalizmi ile kalkınan ülkeler var, komünizm ile kalkınan ülkeler var. Efendim karma ekonomi ile var da para değer bakımından en diplerde olan ülkeyiz. Biz buna mı layığız, yok mu bizim kapasitemiz. Birincisi insan gerçek usulde yetiştirilmiyor, bir başka yerler gösterilerek anlatılıyor. Sizin tezlerinizde de öyledir. Önce Batıda nasıldır bu, ondan sonra buraya gelirsiniz. Bizde nasıldır, Batı nasıl almıştır demezsiniz. Öyle bir kompleks de var. Onun için Türkiye'de eğitim sistemi bize dönük, bizim olan, bizim değerlerle beraber sıfırdan ele alınmalıdır, yeniden dizayn edilmeli. Ayı yeniden keşfetmenin bir anlamı yok.

Now, Türkiye needs an education system that returns to its roots. It must first turn to itself and be itself, not someone else. Simply saying, "Europe does this, and it has developed," or "America does that, and it has developed," won't work. Their culture is suited to their structure, and that's why they have developed. In my opinion, there are countries that have developed through capitalism, countries that have developed through communism, and others that have developed through mixed economies. However, we are one of the countries with the lowest monetary value. Do we deserve this? Don't we have the capacity? First and foremost, people are not being raised properly; instead, they are being taught by showing how it is done in other places. In your theses, you also mention how it is in the West before addressing our context. You don't consider how things are here or how the West has achieved its development. There is also a complex about it. Therefore, Türkiye's education system should be focused on us, our values, and should be redesigned from scratch. There's no point in rediscovering the moon.

According to MHP supporters, reaching the ideal society seems possible through the development of education, education in families and social structures, the construction of a value-based education system, moral development, the philosophy of Alperen, the strength of the Turk, and the implementation of a presidential system.

Quote 157 (MHP 10, man, 43)

Size has, size özgü sizin örf, adet, gelenek ve tarihsel bütünlüğünüzle beraber bir şeyler olmalı bunun içinde. Müfredat dediğim o. Biz tamamen karman çorman kimin ne olduğu neyin ne olduğu tarihte çoğu şeyde de yanlışlıklar var. Daha daha öze ve doğruya yönelik bir eğitim sistemimiz olmalı aslında bakın doğruya yönelik.

You should have a curriculum that reflects your unique customs, traditions, and historical integrity. What I mean by curriculum is that we currently have a confusing system where it's unclear who is who and what is what, often filled with inaccuracies in history. We need an education system that is more focused on essence and truth, one that emphasizes accuracy and relevance.

Quote 158 (MHP 5, man, 24)

Bana göre buna ulaşmanın yolu dediğim gibi ahlak önemli. Ahlakı yapıda insanların değişmesi gerekiyor, yani birbirlerini saygı duymayı en basitinden birbirini küçümsememeyi. Herkes insan, yani kimsenin kimseye bir üstünlüğü yok. Yani mevkileri ile veya nasıl desem dünyevi zenginlikleriyle

In my opinion, the way to achieve this is through moral values. People need to change their moral framework, meaning they must learn to respect each other and not look down on one another. Everyone is human, and no one should consider themselves superior to others based on their position or worldly

kimsenin kimseye üstünlük kurmaması gerekir. Bu da ahlaki olarak birtakım belki değerleri özümsemek ile mümkündür.

Quote 159 (MHP 9, man, 40)

İnanıyorum ya inanıyorum. Çünkü şöyle söyleyeyim dünyada tek bir Türk kana kadar umudum bitmez, tek bir Türk kalsa dahi umudum tekrar yeşerir. Çünkü biz demir dağlardan, oralardan tekrar ülke kurmuş, savaşlar yapıp tekrar dünyaya hükmetmiş insanlarız. Hani geriye dönüp baktığınızda her zaman bir Türk vardır. Dedğim gibi tek Türk kalana kadar umudumu kaybetmem.

Quote 160 (MHP 6, man, 40)

Bu toplumsal yapının bozuk olduğu ya da olayların olduğu yerlerde ilgili kurumlar aileye de eğitim verebilir çocuklarla birlikte. Okul toplumsal hayatın merkezi olmalı. Sadece günün belirli saatlerinde ders verilen yerler değil, mesai saatinden sonra da toplumsal yaşantının devam ettiği yerler olmalı. Camiler de aynı şekilde, sadece günün belli saatlerinde namaz kılınan yerler değil mahallede toplumsal hayatın kalbi olmalı. Çocukların ve ailelerin birlikte eğitim aldığı yerler olmalı.

wealth. This can be accomplished by internalizing certain moral values.

My only hope for the future is, of course, to change things systematically within the system—essentially by establishing human values at the very core. The foundation is to focus on families, especially at the preschool and elementary school levels. What does it mean to be human? How should we approach people? What are human rights? We can achieve this by raising individuals who understand these concepts. I believe everything starts from the foundation, and that foundation is mentality.

My only hope for the future is, of course, to change things systematically within the system—essentially by establishing human values at the very core. The foundation is to focus on families, especially at the preschool and elementary school levels. What does it mean to be human? How should we approach people? What are human rights? We can achieve this by raising individuals who understand these concepts. I believe everything starts from the foundation, and that foundation is mentality.

According to TIP and TKP supporters, achieving the ideal society involves critiquing past leftist movements, promoting solidarity and political organization, embracing a socialist governance approach, global-level organization, uniting the victims of the system, having competent and qualified political leaders, women's empowerment, building modern educational institutions, and increasing social awareness along for the problems such as ecological crisis awareness.

Quote 161 (TIP 4, man, 61)

İnanıyorum tabii ki. Sınıf mücadelesiyle bunun başka bir yolu yok. Sınıf mücadelesini sürdürerek ulaşabiliriz. Bu sadece bulunduğumuz yerde değil. Şimdi sadece emekliler olarak değil, gençler olarak, kadınlar olarak da. Mesela sen üniversitede işte atıyorum bir başkası dershanesinde mesela bir başkası işyerinde. Yani direnerek, mücadele ederek ne yapacak, sürdürecektir bunu. Örgütlenerek ki toplumun en büyük problemi aslında örgütsüzlük. Şimdi şöyle bir tuhaflık var. Örgütlü kesimler birden fazla örgüte üye. Üç dört tane örgütümüz var ama örgütsüz gezenler hiçbir örgüte üye değiller. Bu

I believe, of course. There is no other way to achieve this than through class struggle. We can reach this not only from where we are now. Not just as retirees but also as young people, women, etc. For example, you might be in your university, and someone else might be at a different workplace. By resisting and fighting, what will happen is that it will continue. Organizing is crucial because the biggest problem in society is disorganization. Now, there's a strange situation. Organized groups have multiple memberships; they belong to three or four organizations. However, those who are disorganized are not

örgütlülüğün genişlemesi gerekiyor. Yani bunu geliştirecek adımlar atmak gerekiyor. Bunun üzerine bir örgütlü toplum ortaya çıkarsa dayanışmanın ve kardeşliğin daha fazla öne çıkacağı bir toplum düzenine doğru adım atmış oluruz.

Quote 162 (TKP 3, woman, 66)

Mücadeleyle, mücadele olmadan asla olmaz. Kesinlikle insanların bunu fark etmesi lazım. Sadece oy kullanarak bu olmaz. İnsanlar 5 yılda bir yapılan seçimlerle bunun olacağını sanıyor. Örgütlenmek zorundalar. Her hareket yani sol hareket olarak demiyorum, insanlar sağ harekette de örgütlenmelidir. Birkaç kişinin eline bırakıyorlar. Sağlam bir örgütlenme olsa insanlar belki bu kadar kutuplaşmayacaklar. Belli eller hareketi örgütleyiyor, yanlış yola gönderiyorlar. Solun kesinlikle örgütlenmesi lazım. Gençlik hareketinin örgütlenmesi lazım. Her şekilde, çevre hareketlerinin de örgütlenmesi lazım. Çok fazla çevre cinayetleri işleniyor. Ekolojik olarak ağaç katliamları, maden aramalar, altın aramalar. İşte yakında gördük. 9 kişinin hala cesedi bulunamadı altın aramada. Çevre hareketleri güçlü ama ne yazık ki iktidar hepsini bastırıyor. Ama varsa da tek çaremiz örgütlenmek, buna inanmak. Umutsuzluğa yer yok.

Quote 163 (TKP 2, man, 60)

Şimdi sosyalizm veya işte sosyalist ekonomi, onun da mesela birçok sıkıntıları olduğu için dünyada sosyalist hareketler böyle dağılmalar yaşıyorlar. Onların da ciddi şekilde sorgulanarak yapılabilir şeylerin yapılması, yeni bir sosyalizm anlayışı lazım. Mücadele sosyalist hareketin devrimci hareketin şöyle olması lazım, artık dünya çapında bir örgütlülük vizyonu ile bakacaksınız. Çünkü kapitalizm sana dünya çapında saldırıyor, perde yıkıldı duvar yıkıldı. Kapitalizm kendi içinde en büyük tehlike olarak gördüğü şeye odaklanmıştı, orada enerjisini ve dikkatini harcamaktan kurtuldu ve şimdi rahatladı. Önünde bir engel yok. Doğaya, insane, her şey saldırıyor şu an ve bu saldırı sınır tanımayan, ülke tanımayan bir saldırı. Global yani. O zaman sen de buna tek tek kendi ülkende bağımsız ve onun dışındakileri görmeden organize edilmiş hareketlerle karşı koyamazsın. Belki okyanus ötesi bir merkez olacak ve bu merkezi orada koruyacaksınız.

members of any organization. This organization needs to expand. Steps must be taken to develop this. If an organized society emerges, we will move towards a social order where solidarity and brotherhood are emphasized more.

Struggle is essential; it absolutely cannot happen without it. People need to realize this. It won't be achieved just by voting. Many believe that change can occur through elections held every five years. They must organize. Not only leftist movements, but people in right-wing movements also need to organize. They leave everything in the hands of a few individuals. If there were strong organizations, perhaps there would be less polarisation among people. Certain groups are organizing movements and steering them in the wrong direction. The left must definitely organize. The youth movement needs to organize as well. In every way, environmental movements must organize too. Many environmental crimes are being committed, including tree massacres and mining explorations. We recently saw that nine bodies are still missing from a gold mining incident. Environmental movements are strong, but unfortunately, the government suppresses them all. Our only option is to organize and believe in it. There is no room for hopelessness.

Now, socialism or socialist economies also face many challenges, which is why socialist movements around the world have experienced fragmentation. We need a new understanding of socialism that is seriously examined and that addresses what can be done. The revolutionary movement of socialism should adopt a vision of global organization because capitalism is attacking you on a worldwide scale. The barriers have been torn down, and capitalism has focused on what it sees as its biggest threat, freeing its energy and attention, and now it feels unencumbered. It is currently attacking nature, humanity—everything—and this assault knows no borders or countries; it is global. Therefore, you cannot respond to this with isolated movements in your own country without recognizing the broader context. Perhaps there will be an oceanic center that will support and protect these movements.

According to the supporters of the Zafer Party, reaching the ideal society requires the establishment of a structure that encompasses education, national consciousness, moral values, and historical awareness.

Quote 164 (Zafer 1, man, 31)

Öyle bir ülkeye ilk önce Türk töresini, Türk tarihini doğru öğreterek, Siyasal İslamcıların yazdığı tarih kitaplarından değil de İslamiyet Öncesi Türk döneminin objektif bir biçimde incelendiği, Türklerin cihan hakimiyeti ülküsünün gençlere yerleştirildiği, haram ve kamu malının çalınmasının falan bunların çok kötü şeyler olduğunun anlatıldığı, böyle insanların ayıplandığı bir eğitim verirse ülke düzelir.

In such a country, if we first teach the Turkish tradition and Turkish history correctly—based not on the history books written by political Islamists, but on an objective examination of the pre-Islamic Turkish period, instilling in the youth the ideal of Turkish global dominance, and emphasizing that actions like theft of public goods and immoral behavior are very bad things, with a system that condemns such behavior—then the country will improve.



4. DISCUSSION

In this dissertation, I tried to understand the differences in perceiving and remembering the past, evaluating the present and positioning the future in Türkiye, and the phenomenon of collective nostalgia from the perspective of various party supporters. The starting point for this study was to better understand the increasing polarisation trend in Türkiye in recent years and the decreasing desire to live together among supporters of different parties. In societies where polarisation increases, differences regarding past representations of the country can be expected to emerge. What is seen as *the good old days* for some citizens may be *dark times* for others (Hibbing et al., 2017). In this sense, the phenomenon of collective nostalgia offered me a very productive and valid ground. Through the space provided by nostalgia, I had the opportunity to understand party supporters' views on the present, their longing for the past, and their expectations for the future within the contexts of periods, values, events, and figures that are significant to them. If I use the findings of this thesis as a map, what I observe is that participants are spread across different positions according to the parties they support and the ideological values they adopt. This situation indicates that shared values and the culture of coexistence are gradually weakening.

This research includes participants who reflect not only student groups but also the general population of society. This participant profile, representing different age groups, gender and a broad political spectrum, ensures that the study's findings are valid for a wider segment. Although not entirely balanced, the study achieved a relatively equitable distribution of participants in terms of gender. Thus, my study, which is not limited to a specific social group or age limit, has allowed me to analyse social trends, experiences, and perceptions more comprehensively based on the general population. This increases the power of the study and allows the results to be evaluated in a more meaningful framework for the whole society.

As one of the methodological strengths of this study, I ensured that the questions in the data collection process were neither leading nor restrictive. For example, I asked questions about nostalgia or the past without emphasising a specific period, leaving it entirely to the participants' perception and interpretation. Instead of specifying a particular period, I asked open-ended questions such as "When you think about our general societal past, is there a period that you feel nostalgic about?" or "In your opinion, which period in our societal past do you find difficult to live in?". Through this flexible approach, I obtained

solid and in-depth data, allowing participants to share their unique interpretations freely. For example, my findings showed that both *the glorious* and *are not defined as fixed periods* but as fluid constructs that change according to the individual's ideological and partisan identity. This exploratory finding provides a perspective on how historical understanding is shaped by socio-political references. In this study's framework, the concepts individuals use to either glorify or critique the past, in line with their group affiliation, become an expression of social identity. This, in turn, reveals how the diverse historical narratives of the past are being re-constructed within Türkiye's political context.

In the following stages of the discussion, I will first examine participants' representations of collective nostalgia and the past within the context of partisan identities and schemas. Subsequently, I will address their evaluations of the present through the framework of studies on relative deprivation in the literature. Then, I will discuss the party identity-based differences in their expectations for the future projections. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the results in terms of democratic processes and make recommendations for policymakers.

4.1. Collective Nostalgia Based on Partisanship

The first research question (RQ1) in my thesis was to explore whether the phenomenon of collective nostalgia varies among party supporters. Collective nostalgia has been studied mainly in the context of national nostalgia and prejudice against immigrants in the social psychology literature (e.g., Smeekes, 2015). It has also been examined in local literature through a binary conceptualisation of Kemalist nostalgia and Ottoman nostalgia (Elçi, 2021; Karakaya, 2020; Özyürek, 2006). The analyses I obtained from my study show that nostalgia is not limited to these two types and that there are various forms of nostalgia. For instance, *Ottoman nostalgia* and *the longing for the early years of the AKP* are more commonly expressed by AKP supporters, while *early Republican nostalgia* is more frequently expressed by CHP and IYI Party supporters. The supporters of HDP, TKP and TIP predominantly express *Nostalgia for the 70s-80s political activism*. In comparison, *90s nostalgia* is represented by multiple groups, including CHP, MHP, IYI Party, AKP, Saadet, and YRP. The depictions of these collective nostalgia representations show that each period has a dominant element that makes it nostalgic. Accordingly, Ottoman nostalgia can be characterised by the '*powerful empire narrative*', while early Republican nostalgia can be associated with '*Atatürk's founding philosophy and the construction of the modern nation-*

state.’ The central theme of the 70s-80s political activism nostalgia revolves around ‘*solidarity and political organisations*’, while the theme that defines 90s nostalgia is ‘*serenity, unity and homogenisation*.’ The nostalgia for the founding years of the AK Party can be characterised by ‘*social transformation, prosperity, rise, motivation, and hope*’. Other types of nostalgia can be classified as Gezi Park Nostalgia (characterised by *elements of alternative society and solidarity*), 2010 Solution Process Nostalgia (characterised by *democratic gains and political recognition*), Holistic Past Nostalgia (characterised by *possessing geography of civilisations, rich historical narrative, cultural wealth/superiority, and strong personalities throughout history*), and Nostalgia for Pre-Islamic Turkish History (characterised by *the importance of the army and the value of Turkish identity and history*), but participants less frequently express these. All these results point to the significance of the dominant features of the respective periods for each identity, such as *tolerance policy, the strong empire narrative, Atatürk’s principles and Republican values, longing for a just and equal world, peaceful struggle, and political recognition*. Thus, nostalgia intersects with social identities.

Consistent with the literature, participants express nostalgia for periods they did not individually experience (Velikonja, 2009). For example, some participants idealise the Early Republican Period, the Ottoman Era, and the 1970s as a golden age, even though they did not experience these times. These findings also present various perspectives on the perception of the golden age of the past. For a conservative AK Party supporter, the glorious past points to the Ottoman period, while for individuals who embrace a leftist ideology, this concept refers to the founding years of the Republic or the youth movements of the 1970s. Similarly, the collective nostalgia figures meaningful to party supporters have been shaped in accordance with their ideologies and the party’s principles and traditions. For instance, figures such as Kanuni Sultan Süleyman and Fatih Sultan Mehmet, predominantly mentioned by AK Party supporters, stand as representatives of the party’s ties to the Ottoman legacy, while figures like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Necmettin Erbakan, and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu align with the party’s national view and nationalist-conservative line. Figures mentioned by CHP supporters, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Bülent Ecevit, and Erdal İnönü, can be seen as reflections of the party’s republican, secular, and social democratic ideology. Figures like Deniz Gezmiş, Mahir Çayan, and Leyla Zana reflect the HDP’s connections to socialist and Kurdish movements. Figures such as Alparslan Türkeş, Ebufulzel Elçibey, Hüseyin Nihal Atsız, and Galip Erdem, mentioned by MHP and IYI Party

supporters, emerge as key figures of nationalist and pan-Turkist ideologies. Figures cited by TKP and TIP supporters, such as Bülent Uluer, Behice Boran, Kemal Türkler, and Rıza Kaus, are associated with socialist, labour movements, and revolutionary leftist ideologies in Turkey during the 1970s.

The narratives where meanings attached to the same event or period vary based on party identity are also commonly observed. For example, the 1970s are identified as a nostalgic period by majority of the the IYI Party, HDP, TKP, TIP and some CHP supporters. However, for IYI Party supporters, this era is characterised by the patriotism and strength of Turkish nationalists and their actions, whereas for HDP, TKP and TIP supporters, it is defined by the power of working-class and anti-fascist youth organisations and solidarity relations. Similarly, the 1990s symbolise a religion-based nostalgia for some AK party supporters, while for most CHP supporters, 90s represent a longing for the peaceful and modernist societal structure before AKP's rise. For some MHP supporters, this period corresponds to an era where nationalism was more accurately represented and marked by homogenisation. In contrast, IYI Party, CHP, and MHP supporters define the 1990s as a time of fewer societal divisions and greater peace compared to the present, while for HDP supporters, it stands out as a period marked by marginalisation, political oppression, and intense censorship. These findings support Stewart's (1993) views that nostalgia is always ideological and suggest that examining the political dimension of memory is functional. The results also indicate that collective nostalgia, as a group-based emotion, can be analysed as a potential element of polarisation.

Davis (1979) defines nostalgia as a profound sense of longing and distress that arises from the knowledge that something no longer exists, such as a lost empire. In this context, the theme of a "lost empire that no longer exists" stands out in the nostalgia of AK Party supporters for the Ottoman era. There is a parallel and connection between the nostalgia for the Ottoman period and the longing for the early years of AK Party's establishment and rise. The early 2000s, much like the Ottoman Empire, were seen as a period of rising liberal and tolerant policies, prosperity, and stability. This perception fuelled nostalgia for the Ottoman past and the early years of AK Party among its supporters. Thus, the nostalgia for these two periods—Osmanlı and the AK Party's early years—intersects, representing times of hope, unity, and perceived strength.

The Early Republican nostalgia is characterised by a secular state structure and modernisation efforts, reflecting CHP supporters' longing for the Republic's founding philosophy, Atatürk's principles and reforms, and modernisation. Similarly, CHP supporters' nostalgia for the 1990s—the pre-AK Party era—can be seen as a protective response to preserve republican values. With the rise of the AK Party, attempts to reconnect with the Ottoman past and the trend of glorifying symbols and values from the Ottoman era may have led to CHP supporters' perception that the Republic's foundational values were being undermined. In this context, both forms of nostalgia (Early Republican Nostalgia and 90's Nostalgia as representing pre-AK Party Era) seem to be shaped by concerns that the gains of modernity and the secular Republic are under threat.

Boym's (2009) definition of nostalgia as “a longing for a home that no longer exists or may never have existed” provides a valuable framework for understanding the nostalgic representations of HDP supporters. Their collective nostalgia is primarily associated with three distinct periods: the Peace Process, the Gezi Park protests, and the 1970s. The 1970s served as a source of nostalgia due to strong political organisations, youth movements, and the development of the peaceful struggle approach within the Kurdish movement. Similarly, the Peace Process can be seen as a period symbolising hope for peace, equality, and political recognition. Gezi Park, on the other hand, represents an alternative societal structure. A longing for peaceful struggle, democratic rights, and an alternative social order interconnects these three forms of nostalgia. For some participants, the longing for the Peace Process may reflect a yearning for an unfulfilled ideal, symbolising incompleteness.

Among the forms of nostalgia most frequently expressed by MHP supporters are the ‘Holistic Nostalgia of the Past’, where nationalist ideology is combined with deep-rooted historical and civilizational values, and the nostalgia of the 1990s, when relations with the Turkic republics developed. When the MHP's ideology of national identity, unity and national pride is considered, ‘Holistic Nostalgia’ represents a broad and deep-rooted civilizational heritage, while the 1990s symbolize the strengthening of ties with the Turkic world, the concretization of the nationalist vision and the MHP's perspective that prioritizes national values in foreign policy. These two forms of nostalgia form a harmonious whole with the MHP's ideological framework focused on national identity and integration with the Turkic world.

The periods IYI Party supporters feel nostalgic are especially the early Republican period and the 1970s. These periods are directly related to the party's ideological identity. This nostalgia reflects a longing for the founding principles of the Republic on the one hand, and a past shaped by the influence of nationalist discourses in the 1970s on the other. Longing for the 1970s symbolizes the pure and determined defence of nationalist ideology of that period in the context of today's structure.

The nostalgia expressed by TIP and TKP supporters is primarily associated with the 1970s and 1980s, which were marked by intense youth and workers' movements, union activities, strong political organization, revolutionary democratic struggle and anti-fascist resistance. Narratives of comradeship, solidarity and the strengthening of the socialist movement characterize this period. Considering the ideological stance of TKP and TIP, this nostalgia reflects a longing for a past based on the principles of social equality, workers' struggles and class solidarity. Party supporters see this period as the period when socialist values were most strongly experienced, collective consciousness reached its peak and revolutionary spirit was most intense. Therefore, this nostalgia overlaps with the ideological history of the parties and represents their search for a just society along with their criticism of the capitalist system.

Another research question of the study (RQ2) was whether representations of the past change or remain the same within the context of party identity. In line with the work of Hibbings et al. (2017), which shows that polarisation leads to different evaluations of past and present periods, the findings of this study provide strong examples of the political dimension of memory and recollection. The criticised past and societal events that participants find distressing are categorised in a way that reflects a selective sensitivity shaped by their party identities. In this context, participants' collective memory highlights emotional reactions to historical events that align with their ideological affiliations. For instance, for some AK Party supporters, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and reforms in the early Republic period symbolise a break from culture and point to the dark side of the past. Meanwhile, for supporters of the CHP, HDP, TKP, and TIP, hard periods to live corresponds to the recent period under AK Party rule. The 1990s, seen by many as years of unity, homogenisation, and modernisation, are considered by many Kurdish-origin HDP supporters to be one of the most challenging periods in social history. On one side, the 1990s represent modernisation, peace, and stability; on the other, it is marked by repression,

conflict, and chaos. This suggests that critical representations of the past are not only based on party identity but also along ethnic lines.

4.2. Relative Deprivation and Partisan Evaluations of the Present

Examining representations of the present shows that, in terms of social relationships, the representations of all party supporters converge. For example, the feeling of loneliness and alienation in social relationships brought about by modernity and digitalisation is a shared and widespread experience among all participants. This situation can be expressed collectively, regardless of political or partisan identities. Commonalities in the theme of personal nostalgia as well as societal relations of the present, regardless of party affiliation, highlight participants' shared longing for a safer and more stable structure. Participants described the past not only as a space for longing for childhood, but also as a period marked by greater social security, solidarity, and meaning. This finding aligns with theories suggesting that nostalgia, particularly during times of uncertainty (such as economic or social crises), triggers a tendency to seek solace in a familiar and secure past (Boym, 2001; Davis, 1979). The fact that party supporters experience nostalgia because of isolation and individualization points to the impact of modernity, the consumer society perspective that has developed with globalization, and the impact of digitalization on the weakening of social ties. In my study, the fact that participants describe the past as a time when there were stronger social ties supports the link between loneliness and nostalgia. We can also consider the impact of neoliberal policies on nostalgia in a broader and universal context. The increasing longing for the past, especially in the context of worsening economic conditions, can be interpreted as a reflection of the impact of neoliberalism on individuals.

Contrary to common themes in social relationships, concerns about pressures in the political context and the loss of democratic rights are more commonly expressed by opposition and left-wing party supporters. Additionally, while most participants express economic concerns, there are also economic evaluations where the impact of partisan identities can be observed. While opposition supporters are critical of the current economic situation, ruling party supporters tend to make more positive assessments of the economy, comparing it to the past (e.g., the economy being much more developed compared to the past, greater abundance and access to resources for AK Party supporters, etc.). These results align with Çakır's (2018) study, which found that high polarisation and partisanship in Türkiye are related to more biased perceptions of short-term factors such as democratic

satisfaction and economic evaluations. Their findings suggest that the way democracy works in Türkiye is not merely about winning or losing elections but is also influenced by one's party identity. Their results also show that opposition identifiers tend to evaluate the economy negatively, while the ruling party's supporters have more positive evaluations of the economy.

The narratives of participants comparing the present and the past in economic and political terms suggest that there may be a relationship between collective nostalgia and the perception of political and economic deprivation. Specifically, the relative deprivation felt by opposition supporters regarding the loss of democratic rights in the present, compared to the past, might have fuelled nostalgia for the founding years of the Republic (when democratic rights began to take shape) or 1970s, a time marked by strong political organisation, youth movements, and activism. These narratives point to a context where rights in the past are perceived to have been stronger in comparison to the current political conditions. For example, CHP, HDP, TIP and TKP emphasize the loss of democratic rights in the present. At the same time, they express their discomfort with the shift of social values towards religion and increasing religious pressures. The sense of relative deprivation of these groups is shaped by the perception of 'limitation of freedoms and authoritarianism' with the belief that the past was 'freer' and 'more democratic'. On the other hand, concerns about the erosion of moral values and the weakening of traditional family values are more common among supporters of right-wing parties. These participants, driven by a sense of deprivation based on the loss of values, long for periods such as the Ottoman era when traditional social structures were dominant, and there was no rupture with culture, or the early 2000s when national consciousness was perceived to be higher. Overall, while opposition supporters express their nostalgia in terms of the loss of democratic and political rights in the present, conservative groups emphasise concerns about the loss of moral values. These different approaches point to how evaluations of the present can be shaped by individuals' relative perceptions of deprivation, through different perspectives of the past. This is also in line with the work of Stefaniak and colleagues (2021) who found that both conservatives and liberals experience collective nostalgia, but the content of these nostalgias are markedly different.

In their study conducted in the United Kingdom and the United States, Gest and colleagues (2018) demonstrated that collective nostalgia, fuelled by perceived relative deprivation in the economic and political spheres, significantly increases support for the

radical right. Similarly, Versteegen (2024) found that collective nostalgia strengthens the link between relative deprivation and support for the radical right. Their analysis of representative panel data from the Netherlands showed that individuals' nostalgia for society being better in the past increased radical right support. However, it is important to note that these findings are context-dependent and should be evaluated within the socio-political processes specific to each country. For instance, in the past century, the United States and other Western societies underwent a liberal transformation (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2021); therefore, the observation that such nostalgic sentiments tend to increase support for the radical right may be meaningful in the Western context. However, in countries like Türkiye, which has undergone a different cultural and political transformation in recent years, becoming a more conservative and less secular society (Özbudun, 2007; Yavuz, 2020), similar findings may not be expected. Indeed, Lammers and Uğurlar's (2024) recent comparative study of Türkiye and the United States on societal discontent, nostalgia, and ideology presents findings that contrast with the existing literature. Their study shows that American conservatives are more likely to experience pessimism than liberals, while Turkish liberals experience more societal pessimism and nostalgia than conservatives. The authors discuss these findings within the socio-political and historical context of Western, American, and Turkish societies. Western conservatives are said to be more prone to feelings of cultural pessimism, believing that society is heading in the wrong direction (Jost et al., 2003; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018), and thus conservatives and others on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to feel nostalgia than liberals or those on the left (Lammers & Baldwin, 2018; Smeekes et al., 2023). However, Lammers and Uğurlar (2024) specifically argue that due to different socio-historical trajectories, the associations people make with the past may vary significantly across societies, and political groups in various countries with similar ideological positions may develop radically different perspectives on the past and future. While Western conservatives may feel increasingly pessimistic in a more liberal environment, this sentiment may be dominant among the liberal side of the political spectrum in Türkiye. In a similar vein, the exploratory findings of my study suggest this relationship. It would not be incorrect to state that opposition supporters intensely express societal pessimism and collective nostalgia. This collective nostalgia is specifically fuelled by their feelings of economic and political deprivation, especially when compared to the past.

This finding does not mean that supporters of right-wing parties do not experience nostalgia. As I mentioned in the introduction of this section, the representations of supporters of the right-wing parties towards the present are dominantly shaped by concerns such as moral corruption and loss of values; this may indicate a value-based perception of relative deprivation. At this point, it is noteworthy why individuals who adopt conservative values frequently express concerns such as moral degeneration and loss of values, despite Türkiye undergoing a conservative transformation. This situation can be explained by the perception inherent in conservatism that the social order is under constant threat and that idealized values of the past cannot be sufficiently protected today (Kirk, 2001). Even if conservatives see that society is generally converging towards their own ideological lines, they may believe that this transformation has not occurred ‘deeply’ or ‘fully’. In addition, dynamics such as modernization and globalization may lead to cultural changes that may overshadow the general tendency of society to become more conservative (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Therefore, it is possible for conservatives to strongly experience value-based nostalgia by making a comparison between the past and the current social order. Indeed, Leabens and Öztürk (2020) shows that partisan identities in Türkiye, including the ruling party and opposing party supporters, hold the perception that other parties may threaten their well-being and that such anxieties are widespread on both sides of the political divide in the country.

In conclusion, my findings point to the importance of considering the relationship between collective nostalgia, relative deprivation and party identity. These findings demonstrate how individuals' evaluations of social, economic, and political changes are intertwined with the nostalgia they feel for the past and their sense of relative deprivation.

4.3. Party Identities and the Ideal Society: Commonalities and Differences

Participants' definitions of their ideal society reflect their common expectations of social unity and solidarity. Most participants emphasize social harmony and solidarity, regardless of partisan identity. This apparent commonality reflects a yearning for peaceful and loving relationships in an environment where polarisation is increasing, and prejudices are deepening. Participants yearn for an egalitarian society, especially in the face of injustice and marginalization. This can be seen as a response to the perceived inadequacies and pressures on individuals' rights and freedoms in Türkiye's current social and political conditions. Similarly, the demand for a society with an effective legal system is common

among supporters of all political parties. This can be interpreted as a response to the lack of rule of law and widespread injustices.

The longing for the traditional social structure expressed especially by the AK Party supporters, can be understood in a context where they see social change and religious values as under threat. This reflects concerns about the preservation of conservative values and the sustainability of the traditional structure of society. This feeds the participants' nostalgia for past moral values and traditional family structures. Additionally, a typical pattern serves as a thread in some narratives: the longing for an unfinished dream in the past reflected in the future. Examples such as a society where nationalism is accurately represented, a socialist country, Atatürk's Türkiye, or a society like Gezi indicate this situation. For instance, for a CHP supporter emphasising secular identity, the ideal society is strictly aligned with the Republic's founding principles and is secular. A participant who takes pride in the anti-fascist and revolutionary struggles of the 1970s has a future societal vision based on the desire to revive an incomplete socialist utopia. In some narratives, the Gezi resistance symbolises the desired future of society. This experience, which was real in the past, is expressed with the hope that it may be possible again, even though it seems utopian today.

Although there are common elements in participants' depictions of the ideal society, the paths to this society diverge, and these pathways align with the party identity, ideologies, and values supported. Supporters of the AKP, MHP, IYI Party and the Zafer Party emphasize traditional, national and religious values to preserve and strengthen the social order to reach their ideal society. Moral development, preservation of the traditional family structure, strengthening of the national identity and nation-state understanding are prominent in this segment. Education is seen as important for these parties to preserve values and pass them on to future generations. In addition, elements such as an authoritarian management approach, emphasis on strong leadership and support for the presidential system stand out as distinct elements of the right-wing ideology. CHP supporters emphasize the importance of secularism and Republican values and the construction of modern educational institutions in achieving the ideal society. For supporters of HDP, TKP and TIP, reaching the ideal society is possible through criticism of past left movements, the overthrow of patriarchy, empowerment of women, development of solidarity and organization, while they also emphasize similar sensitivities on topics such as ecological crisis awareness, multiculturalism and local-to-central management.

Overall, participants' depictions of ideal societies reflect the effects of social change and political polarization. This suggests that, even with a common goal, it is difficult to find a shared ground. This shows how the social structure and political environment in Türkiye is going through a difficult process in terms of collective values and social harmony.

4.4. Implications for Democratic Communication and Policymaking

This dissertation also has noteworthy implications in terms of democratic systems and communication processes. The way individuals and groups interpret historical and current events through their values and ideological perspectives may be a significant feature of pluralistic societies (Dahl, 1989). This diversity can be seen as a reflection of democratic principles, particularly freedom of thought and speech. However, when these representations become tools of polarisation, they can weaken mutual understanding, replacing dialogue. The results of my study indicate that collective nostalgia can become exclusionary when shaped by partisan identities. This has potential to lead different groups to view their historical narratives as the only valid ones, creating “us vs. them” dynamic. For example, those who idealize the Ottoman past may see CHP supporters as disconnected from Türkiye’s “true” identity, while those advocating for Early Republic nostalgia may perceive religious conservatives as a threat to modernity, as indicated by the results of this study. These sharp divisions can weaken the democratic process.

When collective memory is filtered through partisan nostalgia, it can limit individuals’ ability to empathise with alternative viewpoints. This highlights the necessity of a democratic culture that embraces pluralism and encourages critical engagement with history. Based on this, I would like to offer some recommendations to policymakers. Policymakers can encourage narratives that encompass diverse historical perspectives in the education system. Methods and content integrated into the education system, such as democracy education (Wadham et al., 2024), peace education (Harris & Synott, 2002), and perspective-taking (Todd & Galinsky, 2014), can be important tools in dealing with societal divisions in a healthy way and reconciling differences in collective memory. Perspective taking is defined as the process by which a person understands the feelings, thoughts, and motivations of others (Todd & Galinsky, 2014). Social perspective taking refers to both interpersonal relationships, that is, students understanding each other in school or in the classroom, and at a more academic level, understanding different perspectives in historical, cultural, and political contexts (Gehlbach et al., 2012). This process contributes to

strengthening social relationships, reducing prejudices, creating empathy, and establishing positive relationships with people with different beliefs (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Gehlbach et al., 2015; Vescio et al., 2003). Sandalh (2020) suggests using the perspective taking method to ensure that students evaluate their perspectives on political or social issues from different perspectives, rather than reducing them to a single perspective. In education, teaching students to understand different perspectives in social relationships and providing them with perspective taking methods can enable them to develop a more open-minded and critical mindset, especially considering cultural and ideological differences. With such an education and culture of dialogue, individuals can discuss history not only within the boundaries of their ideological frameworks, but also in a broader context of mutual understanding. Integrating democratic values and perspective-taking into the education system can make individuals more tolerant of the experiences of different groups in the long run. Especially in polarised societies, perspective-taking methods can enable different groups to empathize with each other's experiences and feelings.

My findings also suggest that party supporters are unified in their dissatisfaction with contemporary social relations. Shared dissatisfaction with the isolation, distance, and individualization of social relations can provide a starting point for encouraging the rebuilding of social trust. In this context, policymakers can also emphasize shared values and visions in their political discourses to build social cohesion and trust.

4.5. Limitations

This study provides deep insights into how collective nostalgia and ideological identities intersect with the Turkish context, offering a valuable contribution to understanding the country's socio-political structure. However, it is not without limitations. First, a limitation of the study is that it fails to address the ideological contradictions between the depictions of ideal society and the ways to achieve these depictions from a broader perspective. The research findings reveal that while the participants share common representations of an ideal society, significant ideological differences emerge regarding the ways to achieve this society. For example, although the participants agree that an ideal society should be more egalitarian, united and free, the approaches they propose to achieve this society often ignore opposing groups. This finding demonstrates how the polarisation dynamics in society are reflected in the solutions proposed by the participants. In this context, it is arguable that the phrasing of the question may have deepened this gap. For

example, I asked the participants, “How do you think this society you long for can be achieved?” This question may have encouraged the participants to propose solutions based on their own ideological perspectives. Alternatively, reframing the question as “How can we achieve the society you long for in a way that includes others?”, “How can we build a common future?” could have provided a different context. This approach could have encouraged participants to think not only from their own ideological perspectives but also in terms of seeking social consensus. In this context, this limitation presents an important opportunity for future research. Designing questions that are more inclusive and encourage dialogue could help focus on both shared goals and solutions to make those goals more achievable. For example, asking participants, “Is it possible for opposing views to come together to find a common pathway to ideal society? What would you suggest?” could yield a more inclusive analysis with the potential to overcome ideological barriers. In conclusion, this limitation provides an opportunity to explore the divergence between ideal society visions and pathways to achieving the. A methodological framework encouraging broader dialogue among participants could offer a more comprehensive understanding of how to build a shared societal future.

Secondly, despite including participants with a wide range of political views, the relative underrepresentation of certain smaller but significant groups (such as Zafer Party, YRP, SAADET) could limit the development of a more homogeneous understanding across the entire political spectrum. Considering that individuals from these parties may have unique nostalgic representations of Türkiye’s societal past and sensitivities toward different periods, this gap points to the need for further exploration of these groups’ nostalgic perceptions.

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recent social psychological research has highlighted the connection between collective memories and group identity in the process of recalling and evaluating the past (e.g., Hirst & Manier, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Paez & Liu, 2001). This connection is significant for the present study as it provides insights into how social identity impacts collective memory representations. Previous studies have shown that the patterns of remembering collective memories differ across groups (e.g., Griffin, 2004; Schuman et al., 2003). Similarly, the results of this study indicate that party identity, as a social identity, functions as a strong identity in participants' processes of remembering and longing for the past, evaluating the present, and constructing their ideal future worlds. Both the way historical events and figures are remembered, and evaluations of the present are shaped by the ideological lines of the parties. This suggests that nostalgia is not only a longing for the past but can also function as social representations that shape social groups' shared understandings of the past and as a tool for strengthening current political stances and identities. Partisan identities act as a schema that facilitates and filters individuals' perspectives on political and social events, allowing them to evaluate and interpret events from a particular perspective (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002). The alignment of participants' collective perceptions of the past with ideological differences may function to deepen societal polarisation by shaping evaluations of both the past and present in divergent directions.

Collective nostalgia has been studied mainly in the context of national nostalgia and prejudice against immigrants in the social psychology literature (e.g., Smeeke, 2015). In the local literature, nostalgia is discussed with a dual conceptualization: Kemalist Nostalgia and Ottoman nostalgia (Elçi, 2021; Karakaya, 2020; Özyürek, 2006). These findings do not provide information about how nostalgia is experienced by diverse segments in the country and its social psychological functions. In this sense, it is expected that this dissertation fills an important gap in the national literature.

Lammers and Baldwin (2020) suggest that future research should explore the idea that nostalgia is not a characteristic of any side of the political spectrum but rather can be used to justify beliefs across both sides of the political divide. According to them, right-wing nostalgia may serve to legitimize certain right-wing values and beliefs (such as hierarchy, meritocracy, and capitalism), while left-wing nostalgia could justify specific left-wing

values and beliefs (such as egalitarianism and socialism). In this sense, nostalgia can function as a general impulse that leads people to long for the past, regardless of the actual historical truth, and its effects on people's thoughts may vary depending on which aspects of the past are highlighted. Like the authors' views, although I cannot present a relational finding, my results suggest that nostalgia is experienced by both sides of the political spectrum, with its content differing significantly.

My analysis suggests that individuals strengthen their identities and ideological stances through their nostalgia and collective memories of the past. The way right-wing and left-wing political groups associate terms like *glorious history* or *lost values* with different historical periods deepens the sense of historical belonging between groups, possibly creating a divide in their understanding of meaning and values. Such divisions, particularly in a society like Türkiye that is politically and culturally diverse, lead different groups to define themselves based on shared memories and historical identities. This can limit interaction and dialogue between groups, making communication more challenging and potentially exacerbating polarisation. Current study contributes to understanding how collective perceptions of the past and their relationship with party identities reflect on the social structure, highlighting the need for efforts to develop a more inclusive collective memory and foster dialogue in the future.

The research serves as a foundational starting point for future studies. Considering Türkiye's changing political dynamics and these influence individuals' perception of the past, an empiric examination of the relation between collective nostalgia and ideological identity could provide a comprehensive contribution to the literature on political polarisation and memory studies. Future studies could focus on which ideological groups experience more intense nostalgic feelings or how this intensity affects the social context, such as whether groups with stronger nostalgic feelings respond more strongly to current changes or whether this feeling contributes significantly to contemporary political polarisation. Future studies could also consider generational differences in the experience of collective nostalgia within a broader framework.

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7. APPENDICES

Appendix A - Ethics Committee Approval

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ (AYBÜ)
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER ETİK KURULU
PROJE ONAY BELGESİ

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Psikoloji bölümü öğrencilerinden Ayşe Gül İçin'in, Türkiye'de Politik Kutuplaşma Bağlamında Grup Temelli Nostalji adlı araştırması değerlendirilmiştir. (Bu kısım başvuru sahibi tarafından doldurulmalıdır)

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmuştur.

Proje etik açısından geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmamıştır.

AYBÜ SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER ETİK KURULU KARARI
(Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır)

Araştırma kodu (Yıl – Araştırma sıra no)	2022 - 794
Başvuru formunun Etik Kurula ulaştığı tarih	30.03.2022
Etik Kurul Karar toplantı tarihi ve karar no	05.04.2022 - 07
Yer	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Esenboğa Külliyesi
Katılımcılar	Formda imzası bulunan üyelerimiz toplantıya katılmıştır.

KURUL BAŞKANI VE ÜYELER:

Prof. Dr. Hakkı ODABAŞ	Başkan
Doç. Dr. Musa ÖZTÜRK	Üye
Doç. Dr. Ömer ASLAN	Üye
Doç. Dr. Özge GÖKBULUT ÖZDEMİR	Üye
Doç. Dr. Ali POLAT	Üye
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Kenan ÖZÇELİK	Üye
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Recep YORULMAZ	Üye
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Semih CEYHAN	Üye
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Keziban Büşra KAYNAK EKİCİ	Üye
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Gülay YAZICI	Üye
Öğr. Gör. Dr. İrem Şengül SEFEROĞLU	Üye

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Appendix B - Informed Consent

Sizi Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü öğrencisi Ayşe Gül İçin tarafından doktora tez çalışması kapsamında Doç. Dr. Gülden Sayılan danışmanlığında yürütülen Türkiye’de geçmişin temsilleri ve kolektif nostalji konulu araştırmaya davet ediyoruz. Bu araştırmaya katılıp katılmama kararını vermeden önce, araştırmanın neden ve nasıl yapılacağını bilmeniz gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle bu formun okunup anlaşılması büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Bu çalışma kapsamında Türkiye’de farklı kesimlerin toplumsal geçmişe yönelik algılarının ve grup temelli bir duygu olan kolektif nostalji deneyimlerinin anlaşılması hedeflenmektedir. Görüşmenin ilk kısmında sizlere toplumsal geçmişe ve nostaljiye yönelik sorular sorulacaktır. İkinci kısımda ülkenin mevcut durumu ve üçüncü kısımda gelecek beklentileriniz üzerine konuşacağız. Gerçekleştirilecek görüşmelerin etkili ve sistematik analiz edilmesi adına görüşme boyunca ses kaydı alınacaktır.

Farklı kesimlerin mevcut sosyoekonomik ve politik değişimleri nasıl deneyimlediğini anlamak, Türkiye’de bir arada yaşama kültürüne ilişkin tartışma ve politikaların daha doğru ve gerçekçi bir zemine oturmasına yardımcı olabilir. Bu çerçevede yaklaşık 45-60 dakika ayırarak mevcut çalışmaya katılımınız biz araştırmacılar için çok değerli bir katkı olacaktır.

Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmanın hiçbir aşamasında sizden kimlik bilgisi istenmeyecektir. Vermiş olduğunuz bilgiler gizli tutulacak ve yalnızca bilimsel amaçlar doğrultusunda kullanılacaktır. Çalışmada katılımcılarda psikolojik ya da fizyolojik hasara yol açabilecek herhangi bir uygulama yer almamaktadır. Ancak çalışmanın herhangi bir aşamasında rahatsızlık duyduğunuz takdirde hiçbir gerekçe göstermeden çalışmayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Çalışmayla ilgili ayrıntılı bilgi almak isterseniz Ayşe Gül İçin ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Gösterdiğiniz ilgi, ayırdığınız zaman ve katılımınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz.

Appendix C - Personal Information Form

1. Cinsiyetiniz:

☐Erkek ☐Kadın ☐Belirtmek İstemiyorum ☐Diğer _____

2. Yaşınız: _____

3. Doğum yeriniz: _____

4. Hayatınızın büyük bölümünü hangi bölgede geçirdiniz?

☐Akdeniz Bölgesi

☐Doğu Anadolu Bölgesi

☐Ege Bölgesi

☐Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi

☐İç Anadolu Bölgesi

☐Karadeniz Bölgesi

☐Marmara Bölgesi

5. Yaşamınızın büyük bölümünü geçirdiğiniz yer:

☐Büyükşehir

☐İl

☐İlçe

☐Köy

☐Belde

6. Şu anki eğitim durumunuzu en iyi yansıtan seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

☐Okuma yazma biliyor

☐Lise mezunu

☐Yüksek lisans öğrencisi

☐İlkokul mezunu

☐Üniversite öğrencisi

☐Yüksek lisans mezunu

☐Ortaokul mezunu

☐Üniversite mezunu

☐Doktora öğrencisi

☐Doktora mezunu

7. Hangi etnik kökene mensupsunuz?

Lütfen belirtiniz. _____

☐Belirtmek istemiyorum.

8. Medeni haliniz:

☐Bekar

☐Evli

☐Boşanmış

☐Belirtmek istemiyorum

9. Çalışma durumunuzu en iyi belirten seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

☐Çalışıyorum

☐Öğrenciyim,

☐Öğrenciyim, aynı

☐Çalışmıyorum, iş arıyorum

çalışıyorum

zamanda çalışıyorum

☐Çalışmıyorum, iş aramıyorum

☐Öğrenciyim,

☐emekliyim

çalışmıyorum

10. Mesleğiniz nedir? _____

11. (Çalışmıyorsa) Kaç aydır düzenli bir işte çalışmıyorsunuz? _____

12. Toplumun geneline kıyasla kendinizi hangi gelir grubuna ait görüyorsunuz?

☐Alt ☐Alt-Orta ☐Orta ☐Orta-Üst ☐Üst

13. Ortalama olarak hanenize giren aylık gelir ne kadardır?

☐0-17000
☐17001-34000
☐34001-51000
☐51001-68000
☐68001-85000
☐85001 ve üzeri

14. Herhangi bir dine inanıyor musunuz?

☐Evet ☐Hayır ☐Belirtmek istemiyorum

15. (Evet ise) Hangi dine inanıyorsunuz?

Lütfen belirtiniz. _____

☐Belirtmek istemiyorum.

16. Kendinizi ne derece dindar olarak tanımlarsınız?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç										Oldukça fazla

17. Kendinizi ne ölçüde muhafazakâr olarak tanımlarsınız?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç										Oldukça fazla

18. Lütfen politik olarak durduğunuz yeri aşağıda belirtilen aralık bir sayıyı işaretleyerek belirtiniz.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Sol					Merkez					Sağ

19. Lütfen politik olarak yakın durduğunuz siyasi partiyi belirtiniz.

☐AK Parti
☐CHP
☐MHP
☐HDP
☐İYİ Parti
☐DEVA
☐GP
☐TKP
☐TİP
☐Diğer

20. Lütfen aşağıdaki politik görüşlerin her birinin sizin görüşünüzü ne ölçüde yansıttığını belirtiniz.

(-5=hiç yansıtmıyor, 0= emin değilim, +5=oldukça fazla yansıtıyor)

	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	Fikrim Yok
Anarşizm												
Atatürkçülük												
Ekolojizm												
Faşizm												
Feminizm												
Komunizm												
Kürt Siyasi Hareketi												
Liberalizm												
Liberteryeniz m												
Marksizm												
Millî Görüş												
Milliyetçi Muhafazakârl ık												
Muhafazakâr Demokratlık												
Muhafazakârl ık												
Radikal İslam												
Sosyal Demokrasi												
Sosyalizm												
Türkçülük												
Ulusalcılık												
Ülkücülük												

Appendix D - Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Tema	Alt-temalar	Sorular/alt temalar
1. Toplumsal Geçmişe ve Nostaljiye Dair Perspektifler	1a. Nostalji, Kişisel ve Kolektif Nostalji	Nostaljiyi nasıl tanımladığınızı öğrenmek istiyorum. Kendi cümlelerinizle nostaljinin tanımını yapar mısınız? Kişisel geçmişinizi düşündüğünüzde hangi dönemler nostaljik hissettiriyor size kendinizi? Toplumsal geçmişimizi düşündüğünüz zaman özlem duyduğunuz bir dönem var mı? Bu dönemi nasıl tarif edersiniz? Toplumda kendinizi yakın hissettiğiniz politik gruba düşündüğünüz zaman, hangi dönemle ilgili nostalji hissinin yaşıyorsunuz? Bu döneme ait hangi anılar geliyor aklınıza?
	1b. Yüceltilen Geçmiş Temsilleri	Toplumsal geçmişimizi düşündüğünüzde, size göre en güzel, en yaşanılabilir dönemler hangi zamanlardı? Nasıl tarif edersiniz bu dönemi? (Ek: Yüceltme/İhtişam?) Bu dönemde; Yaşam standartları nasıldı? İnsanlar arasındaki ilişkileri nasıldı? Siyasi durum açısından nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz bu dönemi? Sizin için bahsetmiş olduğunuz bu dönemi yaşanılır kılan özellikler neler? Olaylar – mutlu eden, gururlandıran olaylar var mı? Figürler – figürler kimler? Değerler / Gelenekler– bu dönemin değerleri ile ilgili ne dersiniz?
	1c. Eleştirel Geçmiş Temsilleri	Toplumsal geçmişimizi düşündüğünüzde üzücü, yaşaması zor dönemler olarak hangi dönemler geliyor aklınıza? Bu dönemde: Yaşam standartları nasıldı? İnsanlar arasındaki ilişkiler nasıldı? Siyasi durum açısından nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz bu yılları? Bu dönemi sizin için zor kılan şeyler neler? Olaylar? Figürler – figürler kimler? Değerler / Gelenekler– bu dönemin değerleri ile ilgili ne dersiniz? Bahsetmiş olduğunuz bu geçmiş size başka nasıl hissettiriyor kendinizi?
2. Günümüze dair temsiller	2a. Geçmiş-Günümüz Karşılaştırması	Geçmiş günümüzle kıyasladığınızda ne gibi farklılıklar görüyorsunuz? (Ek: Sosyal, ekonomik, politik farklılıklar?) Daha iyi olan şeyler neler? Daha kötü olan şeyler neler? Genel olarak toplumsal değerlerimiz üzerine düşündüğünüzde nasıl bir değişim görüyorsunuz?
	2b. Türkiye'nin en önemli problemi	Size göre Türkiye'nin günümüzde en önemli problemi veya sizi en endişelendiren sorunu ne?
	2c. Gruplarası Kutuplaşma: uzak/yakın hissedilen gruplar	Türkiye'de yakın hissettiğiniz grupları düşündüğünüzde nerede duruyor bu gruplar sizin hayatında? Nasıl hissediyorsunuz bu gruplarla ilgili?

		Türkiye’de uzak hissettiğiniz grupları düşündüğünüzde nerede duruyor bu gruplar sizin hayatında? Nasıl hissediyorsunuz bu gruplarla ilgili?
3. Gelecek Yansımaları	3a. İdeal Toplum Tasvirleri	Uzak ve yakın olduğunuz grupları düşündüğünüzde nasıl bir Türkiye hayal ediyorsunuz? Özlemini duyduğunuz toplumu tarif eder misiniz?
	3b. İdeal Topluma Ulaşma Yolları	Sizce özlem duyduğunuz bu topluma nasıl ulaşabiliriz/ulaşabilir miyiz?



Appendix E - Socio-Demographic Information of Participants

Supported Party	Interview Time	Age	Gender	Place of Birth	Education	Ethnicity	Job Status	Occupation
AK Party 1	27.21	40	Woman	Giresun	University	Turkish	Unemployed	Housewife
AK Party 2	15.00	40	Man	İstanbul	University	Unwilling to specify	Full Time	Textile
AK Party 3	20.00	43	Man	İstanbul	Primary school	Unwilling to specify	Full time	Textile
AK Party 4	12.00	33	Man	Trabzon	High school	Turkish	Full time	Trade sector
AK Party 5	43.08	48	Man	Konya	University	Turkish	Full time	Lawyer
AK Party 6	21.50	49	Man	Aksaray	High school	Turkish	Full time	Civil servant
AK Party 7	21.02	36	Woman	Aksaray	High school	Turkish	Full time	Civil servant
AK Party 8	25.28	58	Woman	Ordu	University	Turkish	Full time	Accountant
AK Party 9	22.00	49	Woman	Ordu	High school	Turkish	Unemployed	Housewife
AK Party 10	35.31	33	Man	Germany	University	Turkish	Full time	Public relations specialist
AK Party 11	18.47	36	Woman	Ordu	High school	Turkish	Unemployed	Housewife
AK Party 12	23.07	40	Woman	Ordu	High school	Turkish	Unemployed	Child development graduate
AK Parti 13	30.32	49	Man	Aksaray	High school	Kurdish	Full time	Civil servant
CHP 1	33.48	48	Man	Erzurum	High school	Zaza	Full time	Trade sector
CHP 2	18.15	46	Woman	Samsun	University	Alevi	Part time	Farmer
CHP 3	12.03	50	Woman	Balıkesir	High school	Turkish	Retired	Secretary to the General Manager
CHP 4	39.21	42	Man	Sivas	High school	Alevi	Full time	Accountant
CHP 5	24.00	55	Woman	Mardin	High school	Arabic	Retired	Insurance specialist

CHP 6	25.45	45	Woman	Kırklareli	University	Turkish	Full time	Corporate Communicat ios Specialist
CHP 7	11.15	64	Woman	Balıkesir	University	Turkish	Retired	Retired
CHP 8	20.15	73	Man	Kırklareli	University	Turkish	Retired	Banker
CHP 9	31.27	32	Man	Ankara	University	Turkish	Full time	Sales consultant
CHP 10	19.46	66	Woman	Manisa	University	Circassian	Retired	Nurse
CHP 11	32.06	37	Man	Bursa	High school	Turkish	Unemploy ed	Housewife
CHP 12	25.41	52	Woman	Balıkesir	High school	Turkish	Retired	Private sector
CHP 13	12.03	45	Man	Konya	PhD Graduate	Caucasian	Full time	Academician
HDP 1	36.21	33	Woman	İstanbul	University	Alevi	Unemploy ed	Architect
HDP 2	41.31	50	Woman	Tokat	High school	Alevi	Part time	Private sector
HDP 3	45.00	68	Woman	Ankara	PhD Graduate	Yoruk	Retired	Biologist
HDP 4	41.06	38	Woman	Diyarbakır	University	Kurdish	Unemploy ed	Emergency and Disaster Management
HDP 5	35.24	63	Man	Tunceli	High school	Kurdish	Full time	Driver
HDP 6	30.00	36	Man	Şırnak	University	Kurdish	Full time	Teacher
HDP 7	23.35	74	Man	Van	High school	Kurdish	Retired	Worker
HDP 8	22.47	35	Man	Kars	Üniversite	Kurdish	Full time	Teacher
HDP 9	27.42	25	Woman	Bingöl	Master's student	Kurdish	Part time	Psychologic al Consellor
HDP 10	72.19	73	Man	Giresun	High school	Turkish	Retired	Retired
HDP 11	30.17	32	Woman	Batman	University	Kurdish	Full time	Special education teacher
HDP 12	16.00	46	Man	Van	University	Kurdish	Full time	Teacher
HDP 13	26.00	55	Woman	Ardahan	High school	Alevi	Retired	Private sector

IYI Party 1	76.13	71	Man	Giresun	University	Turkish	Retired	Teacher
IYI Party 2	12.20	54	Man	Giresun	Ortaokul mezunu	Turkish	Full time	Hazelnut producer
IYI Party 3	45.48	66	Man	Aksaray	University	Tatar	Retired	Construction engineer
IYI Party 4	13.00	65	Man	Adana	Master's Graduate	Turkish	Retired	Military personel
IYI Party 5	30.20	43	Woman	Konya	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician
IYI Party 6	24.00	38	Woman	Aksaray	PhD Graduate	Tatar	Çalışıyoru m	Academician
IYI Party 7	22.59	31	Woman	Kayseri	Yüksek lisans öğrencisi	Turkish	Çalışıyoru m	Academician
IYI Party 8	33.53	25	Man	İzmir	Yüksek lisans öğrencisi	Turkish	Öğrenciyi m	Student
IYI Party 9	36.59	30	Man	Aksaray	University	Turkish	Çalışıyoru m	Public relations speacialist
IYI Party 10	23.25	63	Man	Aksaray	University	Turkish	Retired	Retired
IYI Party 11	34.50	55	Man	Balıkesi r	University	Circassian	Retired	Doctor
IYI Party 12	32.31	42	Man	Kahram anmaraş	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician
IYI Party 13	26.52	20	Woman	İstanbul	University student	Turkish	Part time	Student
MHP 1	30.00	37	Man	Balıkesi r	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician
MHP 2	52.38	37	Man	Konya	PhD student	Avshar Turkish Tribe	Full time	Teacher
MHP 3	22.00	61	Man	Trabzon	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician
MHP 4	45.39	29	Man	Adana	Master's student	Turkish	Full time	Electrical engineer
MHP 5	20.40	24	Man	Ordu	University student	Turkish	Student	Student
MHP 6	19.00	40	Man	Konya	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician
MHP 7	26.35	27	Man	Sivas	PhD student	Turkish	Full time	Academician

MHP 8	15.11	33	Woman	Kahramanmaraş	High school	Turkish	Unemployed	Housewife
MHP 9	21.38	39	Man	Balıkesir	University	Turkish	Full time	Mechanical technician
MHP 10	55.00	43	Man	Balıkesir	University student	Turkish	Full time	Manager
MHP 11	20.18	37	Man	Aksaray	University	Tatar	Full time	Architect
MHP 12	20.11	63	Man	Balıkesir	High school	Turkish	Retired	Retired
Saadet Party 1	35.35	39	Man	Bandırma	University	Turkish	Full time	Electrical Technician
TIP 1	13.00	57	Woman	Ankara	University	Alevi	Retired	Teacher
TIP 2	30.00	63	Woman	Kastamonu	University	Turkish	Retired	Civil servant
TIP 3	14.21	49	Man	Gaziantep	University	Alevi	Full time	Vet
TIP 4	41.11	61	Man	Ankara	University	Kurdish	Retired	Economist
TKP 1	33.33	60	Man	Sivas	Master's graduate	Kurdish	Full time	Journalist
TKP 2	70.00	73	Man	Ardahan	Primary school	Turkish	Retired	Farmer
TKP 3	31.02	66	Woman	Balıkesir	University	Turkish	Retired	Teacher
YRP 1	12.00	51	Woman	Tokat	High school	Turkish	Unemployed	Housewife
Zafer Party 1	20.22	31	Man	Yozgat	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician
Zafer Party 2	18.23	34	Man	Adana	PhD Graduate	Turkish	Full time	Academician

Appendix F - The Distribution of Collective Nostalgia Themes Across Age Groups

Age Groups	18-25	26-33	34-41	42-49	50-57	58-65	66-above	SUM
COLLECTIVE NOSTALGIA								
NOSTALGIA OF PRE-ISLAMIC TURKISH HISTORY	1							1
NO PERIOD			1			1		2
HOLISTIC PAST NOSTALGIA			1			1		2
OTTOMAN NOSTALGIA	1	1	3	2				7
EARLY REPUBLIC NOSTALGIA		4	3	1	2		1	11
70s AND 80s POLITICAL ACTIVISM NOSTALGIA	1	2	2	2	4	5	9	25
90s NOSTALGIA		3	5	7	3	1		19
NOSTALGIA FOR AK PARTY'S FOUNDING AND RISING YEARS	1	3		2				6
2010 PEACE PROCESS		1	1					2
GEZİ PARK NOSTALGIA		1		1				2
SUM	4	15	16	15	9	8	10	77
N_{Documents}	4	12	15	16	9	10	9	75

Appendix G - Code Book for Hard Periods to Live in the Societal History

	AK Party	CHP	HDP	IYI Party	MHP	SAADET	TIP	TKP	YRP	ZP	SUM
HARD PERIODS TO LIVE											
1912-1922: Balkan Wars and the War of Independence					1					1	2
Ottoman Governance Policies										1	1
Difficulty in Accessing Food and Basic Needs										1	1
The Hardships of War										1	1
The Last Period of the Ottoman Empire				1							1
The Mongol Period				1							1
Chaos and Security Issues				1							1
Lack of State Authority				1							1
2001 Economic Crisis	1										1
The 1990s	2		5	2	1		1				11
Traumatic Experiences											
Sivas Massacre							1				1
Being Subjected to Discrimination			1								1
Life Threats and Fear			2				1				3
Feeling Under Pressure			1				1				2
Distrust in Security Forces			2								2
Violence and Chaos											
Insecurity				1							1
Terrorism and Unsolved Murders	1		2	2	1		1				7
Formation of mafias					1						1
Normalisation of Violence, Conflict, and Losses			3	1			1				5
Oppression and Restriction											
Bans on the Kurdish Language			1								1
Closure of Newspapers and Political Parties			1								1
April 5, 1994 Decisions and Economic Crisis	1										1
RECENT PAST: 2000 - Present		8	3	3	2	1	2	2		1	22
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE											
Quality of the Education System		1									1
RELIGION AND POLITICS											
Religion Being Used for Political Purposes				1							1
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS											
Concern for the Future		1									1
Financial Struggles and Change in Social Classes		3	2	2	1		1				9
LAW AND MERITOCRACY											
Distrust in Justice								1			1
Deterrence of Punishments		2									2
Human Rights Violations			1								1
Societal Injustice and Discrimination		2	2					1			5

Unqualified Governance		2		1						1	4
POLITICAL PRESSURES											
Increased National/Militaristic Rhetoric		1									1
Labelling and Polarisation		1	1	1	1						4
Political Violence and Targeting			1								1
Political Corruption		1		1	1						3
Political Pressure/Autocracy		3	1	1	1			1			7
Pacification of Society and Lack of Organization		1	1	1				2			5
Peace Process and Privileges					1						1
SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY VALUES											
Punishment of Patriots										1	1
Loneliness-Individualism							1				1
Social Corruption		2	2			1	2				7
Hegemonic System			1								1
Admiration of the West							1				1
Decreased Value of Human Life		1		1							2
Social Apathy			1								1
SECURITY AND VIOLENCE											
Anxiety and Fear							1				1
Increasing Terror Threat					2						2
Discrediting the Military and Pacifying the Armed Forces		1			1						2
Irregular Migration and Border Security		1								1	2
Growing Insecurity and Violence		1									1
March 12, 1960 Military Coup		1		1							2
Human Rights Violations											
Oppression by Soldiers						1					1
Restriction of Freedom of Faith						1					1
Dismissals		1									1
Discrimination		1									1
Poor Prison Conditions	1										1
Death Penalty	1			1							2
September 12, 1980 Military Coup	2	4	5	6	2	1		1	1		22
CULTURE OF FEAR											
Impact on All Aspects of Life			1								1
Culture of Fear		1	3					1	1		6
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES											
Oppression on Kurds and Socialists											
Discrimination		1	1								2
Poor Prison Conditions							1				1
Tortures/unsolved murders		1	2	1	1		1	1			7
Weakening of Union and Cooperative Movements								1			1
Othering			1								1
Violence and Oppression											5
Lack of Fair Trials		1			1		1	1			4
POLITICAL DIVISION											

Segregation									1		1
Socialist Left Isolated								1			1
Right-Left Conflict		2		5	2	1		1			11
Struggles of Turkish Nationalists				1	2						3
IMPERIAL POWER AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS											
Manipulation				1							1
Power Struggle				1							1
Foreign Powers		1		1	2						4
Anarchy and Chaos					1						1
SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS											
Changes in Agriculture and Rural Areas								1			1
Limited Resources and Poverty	1	1	1	2	1						6
Beginning of Privatizations								1			1
Establishment of the Republic	2										2
Loss of Historical Knowledge/Archives Sold	1										1
Spiritual and Cultural Disconnection	1										1
Alphabet Reform and Disconnect from the Past	1										1
Fragmentation of Lands	1										1
Destruction of the Caliphate	1										
Gezi Park Protests	1					1					2
Public Damage						1					1
Attempt to Overthrow the Government	1										1
February 28 Postmodern Coup	2				1	1					4
Intervention in Judiciary and Educational Institution						1					1
Military Power Demonstration						1					1
Restriction of Freedoms	2				1	1					4
July 15, 2016 Coup Attempt	2		2	1	3						8
Fear and Uncertainty	1		1		1						3
National Security Concern					1						1
Increasing Distrust Among People					1						1
Loss of Lives	2			1							3
Distrust in Government and Political Manipulation				1							1
Unjust Governance	1										1
FETÖ's Structure					1						1
Power War				1							1
Anti-democratic Military	1										1
SUM	30	47	54	46	35	12	17	18	3	8	270
N_{Documents}	13	13	13	13	12	1	4	3	1	2	75

Appendix H - Distribution of Political Differences According to Ideology

	Left-wing	right-wing	SUM
POLITICAL SITUATION AND DIFFERENCES			
DISCRIMINATION AND INTEREST RELATIONS			
Interest Relations and Political Practices			
political and legal double standards	2		2
power, kinship relations and privileges	1		1
lack of merit	2	2	4
interest-based politics and ideological clarity	4	11	15
Discrimination and Labelling			0
democracy and minorities	1		1
devaluation policy		1	1
divisive Politics	10	3	13
POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES			
Partisanship and Polarization			
increased partisanship and polarization	3	4	7
decreased Polarization		1	1
Ideological Movements and Societal Dynamics			
weakening class solidarity	3		3
weakening nationalism		1	1
rise of political Islam	1	2	3
determinant role of the oppressed and minorities	3		3
development of Kurdish movement	1		1
socialist movement's effort to reconnect with society	1		1
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CHANGING PRACTICES			
Increased Freedom		3	3
Increased Neoliberalism	1		1
Oppressive Policies and Authoritarianism			
biased media	2	1	3
political pressures and violence	16	5	21
one-man regime	7	1	8
Insecurity and Polarization			
weakening of ties with the society	1	1	2
debate culture and political incivility	2	4	6
distrust in politics	1	2	3
Stable Policies and Powerful Türkiye		7	7
POLITICAL FIGURES			
Incompetent Figures		1	1

Untrustworthy Figures		1	1
Unqualified Figures		3	3
EARLY POLICIES OF AK PARTY			
Liberal/Freedom-Oriented Structure		1	1
Trust and Hope		1	1
Changing Role of Women in Politics		1	1
Decreasing Conflicts	1		1
Decreased Pressure	1	1	2
Peace Process	1		1
SUM	66	58	124
NDocuments	33	42	75



Appendix I - Distribution of Economic Differences According to Ideology

	Ideology = left-wing	Ideology = right-wing	SUM
ECONOMIC SITUATION, LIVING STANDARDS AND DIFFERENCES			
Economic Problems and Uncertainties			
Impact of Economic Conditions on Human Relations	2	1	3
Income Inequality	5	1	6
Economic Anxieties and Migration	1		1
Economic Crisis and Poverty	13	13	26
Increased Unemployment	3	1	4
Economic Recovery and Prosperity			0
Increased Prosperity		3	3
Increased Economic Conditions		6	6
Economic System and Policies			
Interest-Based Economic System	1	3	4
Labor Exploitation	2		2
Production Problems	2	2	4
Increasing Taxes	2		2
SUM	30	27	57
N _{Documents}	33	42	75

Appendix J - Distribution of Value Differences According to Ideology

	Ideology = left-wing	Ideology = right-wing	SUM
SOCIAL STRUCTURE, NORMS AND VALUES			
REPUBLIC VALUES	2	2	4
Increase in Opposition to Atatürk		1	1
Loss of Republic Values	2	1	3
TRANSMISSION OF MORALITY	4	6	10
Changes in Moral Norms		2	2
Alienation from Cultural Heritage		1	1
Normalization of Crimes and Moral Decline	4		4
Lack of Control		1	1
Degeneration and Europeanization		1	1
Transmission of Moral Values to Youth		1	1
CRITICISM OF NEW GENERATION	1	13	14
Irresponsibility		3	3
Extreme Freedom		2	2
Imitation		1	1
Decreased Respect for Elders	1	6	7
Weakening of Authority		1	1
GENDER AND SOCIAL ROLES	1	8	9
Clothing and Changing Image of Women	1	4	5
Gender and Deterioration of Family Order		1	1
Women's Social and Economic Empowerment		2	2
Transformation of Gender		1	1
INDIVIDUALISM AND MODERNITY	8	19	27
Consumer Culture and Materialism	1	8	9
Material Scarcity and Happiness	1	1	2
Mechanization		1	1
Technology and Exploitation	1	1	2
Individualism, Selfishness and Isolation	5	6	11
Modernity		1	1
Openness to Change		1	1
RELIGION AND SOCIAL PRACTICES	7	20	27
Narrow Mindness	1		1
Arabization		1	1
Moral Decay		10	10
Weakening of Religious and National Values		5	5
Exploitation of Religion	2	2	4
Social/Religious Pressures and Conservatism	3	2	5
Culture of Obey	1		1
FAMILY AND SOCIETY	3	13	16

Differentiation of Values		1	1
Deterioration of Family Values and Traditional Family Structure	2	12	14
Authoritarian Parenting Style	1		1
SUM	26	81	107
N_{Documents}	33	42	75



Appendix K - Distribution of Improvements Compared to the Past According to Ideology

	Ideology = left-wing	Ideology = right-wing	SUM
IMPROVEMENT COMPARED TO THE PAST			
Health and Quality of Life		4	4
Technological and Communication Developments	4	7	11
Transportation and Urbanization		4	4
Technology and Health Relations		1	1
Identity Based Improvements	1		1
SUM	5	16	21
N_{Documents}	33	42	75

Appendix L - Distribution of Türkiye's most Important Problem According to Ideology

	Ideology = left-wing	Ideology = right-wing	SUM
THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF TURKIYE			
CONCERNS ABOUT UNCONTROLLED MIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES	1	5	6
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS	5		5
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS	4	11	15
JUSTICE RELATED PROBLEMS	7	7	14
SECURITY AND TERROR PROBLEMS	3	5	8
DEMOCRACY, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEM	16	6	22
PROBLEMS WITH THE EDUCATION SYSTEM	6	9	15
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND INEQUALITY	11	9	20
SUM	53	52	105
N_{Documents}	33	42	75