

T.C.
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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) BİLİM DALI

**MODERNIZATION AND HEGEMONY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
CASES OF ENGLAND, USA AND CHINA**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

BEYHAN ÇAĞRI TUZCUOĞLU

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

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ÖZ

MODERNLEŞME VE HEGEMONYA: İNGİLTERE, AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ VE ÇİN ÖRNEKLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

TUZCUOĞLU, BEYHAN ÇAĞRI

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

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Bu tezde modernleşme ve hegemonya arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Devletlerin modernleşme ve hegemonya kurma süreçlerinin birbirine bağlı olduğunu düşündüğümüzden çalışmamızda bütüncül bir bakış açısı kullanılmış ve bu iki süreç iç içe geçmiş süreçler olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, İngiltere, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Çin'in modernleşme ve hegemonya kurma süreçlerini inceleyerek bu üç devletin farklı modernleşme yollarının onların hegemonya kurma süreçlerine ve hegemonyalarını kurduktan sonra dünya-sistemini yeniden organize etme çabalarına etkilerini analiz etmektir. İnceleme, Dünya-Sistemleri Analizi ve çeşitli modernleşme kuramlarının teorik çerçevesi birlikte kullanılarak yapılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Modernleşme, Modern Devlet, İlerlemeci Tarih, Sosyal Değişim, Çoklu Modernlikler, Dünya-Sistemleri Analizi, Merkez, Çevre, Kapitalist Dünya-Ekonomisi, Eşitsiz Gelişme, Hegemonya

ABSTRACT

MODERNIZATION AND HEGEMONY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES OF ENGLAND, USA AND CHINA

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In this thesis, the relationship between hegemony and modernization was examined. Since I think that modernization processes of states and their hegemony-building processes are interconnected, a holistic approach was used and these two processes were examined as combined processes in my work. The aim of this work was to analyze different modernization paths of England, the USA and China and effects of these different modernization processes on their hegemony-building processes and their efforts of reorganizing the world-system after establishing their hegemony by examining the relation of modernization and hegemony-building processes of these three states. Examination was handled by using the theoretical framework of World-Systems Analysis and various modernization theories together.

Keywords: Modernization, Modern State, Progressive History, Social Change, Multiple Modernities, World-Systems Analysis, Core, Periphery, Capitalist World-Economy, Unequal Development, Hegemony

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1. INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, my aim is examining the modernization and hegemony-building processes of England, the USA and China comparatively. Since I think that modernization processes are highly effective on states' hegemonic periods, I will examine these processes together. Furthermore, I think internal processes of states and systemic processes of the modern world-system, which is a capitalist world-economy, are interconnected, and that is why I will not examine the modernization processes and hegemony-building processes of these three states together but separately, I will examine them as combined processes. Immanuel Wallerstein, prominent theorist of *World-Systems Analysis* argues:

The transition from feudalism to capitalism involved first of all (first logically and first temporarily) creation of a world-economy. That is to say, a social division of labor was brought into being through the transformation of long-distance trade from a trade in "luxuries" to a trade in "essentials" or "bulk goods", which tied together processes that were widely dispersed into long commodity chains...Such commodity chains were already there in the sixteenth century and predated anything that could meaningfully be called "national economies." These chains in turn could only be secured by the construction of an interstate system coordinate with the boundaries of the real social division of labor, the capitalist world-economy. As the capitalist world-economy expanded from its original European base to include the entire globe, so did the boundaries of the interstate system. The sovereign states were institutions that were then created within this (expanding) interstates system.¹

As Wallerstein argues, construction of modern states and the modern interstate system is an interwoven process with the construction and expansion of the modern world-system, which is a capitalist world-economy. This intertwinement makes it impossible to understand particular systemic processes of the world-system and internal processes of modern states separately. I also claim that every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system after establishing its hegemony in accordance with its set of values, institutions and interests and since these are highly determined by modernization of this hegemonic power, it is crucial to analyze modernization and hegemony as combined

¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of the Nineteenth Century Paradigms*, (Philadelphia: Temple University press, 2001), 73-74.

processes. As I will explain, the position of a state in the world-system and its struggle for being a hegemonic power are also very effective on its modernization process. For all these reasons I brought forward, I will examine the modernization and hegemonic processes with a holistic approach.

As mentioned above, I think the processes of modernization and hegemony cannot be understood by examining them separately. Therefore, I have a critical perspective to modernist scholars who try to analyze modernization processes by examining the internal dynamics of states. But aim of my thesis is not criticizing this approach; that is why, I will not deal with these modernist scholars' thoughts separately and in details; I will just criticize their common methodological approach to distinguish my methodological perspective on this subject.² I will use several scholars' theories, which reject the concept of linear progressive history and examine the different paths of modernization, and theoretical framework of *World-Systems Analysis* together for my comparative analysis.

After the introduction, in the second chapter, I will explain my methodological approach. I will discuss why I insist that modernization and hegemony-building processes should be examined as integrated processes. Then, I will elaborate my holistic and interdisciplinary approach. I will also explain the reasons for choice of my cases and sort my basic parameters for my comparative analysis. After that, I will explain the basic features of the modernization process and the foundation of the modern state. Discussing all theories on modernization and the modern state is beyond the scope of this thesis; thereby, I will discuss the theories which are directly related to my aim. I will especially focus on Karl Marx's and Max Weber's theories on these subjects with a critical perspective. I will discuss the effects of industrialization on the foundation of the modern state. Then, I will emphasize the increasing role of state with the modernization process. After briefly explaining the Enlightenment paradigm, I will focus on the concept of progressive history. I will discuss the concept of progressive history with a critical perspective and show how this concept was used for

² For examples of this kind of modernist approach see: Emile Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society*, (New York: Free Press, 2014); Talcott Parsons, *The Evolution of Societies*, (New Jersey: Printice Hall, 1977); Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

legitimization of colonialist and imperialist efforts. And lastly, I will discuss why I should reject the concept of linear progressive history and monistic understanding of modernization and I will explain how I use Eisenstadt's theory of *Multiple Modernities* and comparative historical sociological approach of Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol for examining the different paths of modernizations. Besides the works of Eisenstadt, Moore and Skocpol, of course I will benefit from works of several other scholars for discussing modernization processes.

In the third chapter, I will explain the theoretical framework of *World-Systems Analysis*. First, I will elaborate on the historical origins of *World-Systems Analysis* by focusing on scientific debates which prepared the scene for emergence of *World-Systems Analysis*. Then, I will explain the main concepts of *World-Systems Analysis* like "world-system", "world-empire", "world-economy", "*longue durée*" and "core-periphery". After that, I will elaborate the different perspectives on the concept of hegemony.

In the fourth chapter, I will examine England's modernization process and the rise and decline of its hegemony. After explaining the basic features of England's modernization, I will examine how the internal dynamics of England and systemic processes are integrated. Then, I will emphasize the crucial role of England's colonization efforts for foundation and institutionalization of the modern world-system. After examining England's hegemony-building process, I will discuss how England reorganized the world-system after establishing its hegemony. And finally, I will elaborate the reasons of decline of England's hegemony.

The fifth chapter will focus on the modernization of the USA and rise and decline of its hegemony. I will elaborate on the distinctive features of American modernization and how it achieved to take over the hegemonic position from England. After that, I will discuss how the USA reorganized the world-system after establishing its hegemony. Lastly, I will explain the challenges against the US hegemony and elaborate the reasons for decline of its hegemony.

In the sixth chapter I will examine China's modernization and its potential for being the next hegemonic power of the world-system. I will compare the China's modernization with England's and the USA's modernization and discuss the differences. Then, I will explain the rise of East Asia region and discuss the possibility of its becoming the new most developed core zone of the world-system. After that, I will explain why I think it is impossible to maintain its hegemony for the USA and elaborate the reasons for my prediction that China will be the next hegemonic power of the world-system. And finally, I will briefly discuss how China could reorganize the world-system if it achieved to establish its hegemony.



CHAPTER TWO: THE MODERN STATE, PROGRESS AND DIFFERENT MODERNITIES

2.1. A Methodological Debate: Unit of Analysis

2.1.1. A Holistic and Unidisciplinary Approach

There is no constant method which is valid for every case; your research subject specifies your methodology. In that case, what kind of methodology should we use for examining the relation between modernization and hegemony? I suggest a holistic and unidisciplinary methodological approach for this subject. Unidisciplinary approach means rejecting “*the traditional boundaries of the social sciences*” and analyzing “*materials that had once been considered the exclusive concern of historians or economists or political scientists or sociologists, and to analyze them within a single analytical frame.*”³ My subject, modernization and hegemony, encompass political, economic, social and cultural spheres; thereby, it cannot be studied in isolated framework of one discipline. Since the processes of all these spheres are integrated, my research requires a unidisciplinary approach. By a holistic approach, I mean neither the world-system nor the state can be a proper unit of analysis. Since I think modernization processes and hegemonic cycles are interconnected, I will try to analyze them together. Modernization process includes great transformations and “*these transformations, shaped in each society by the combined impact of their respective historical traditions and the different ways in which they became incorporated into the new modern world system*”⁴ cannot be explained by just analyzing the internal dynamics of these societies. According to this study, it is methodologically appropriate to examine the internal dynamics of states and the structural dynamics of the world-system as combined processes for a possible analysis of the link between modernization and hegemony.

Every research subject should be contextualized properly; that is to say, it would be contextually insufficient to focus only on the internal dynamics of a particular state for understanding its modernization process. External factors and systemic

³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 19.

⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, *Daedalus*, Vol 129, No 1, (Winter 2000): 15.

processes have great influence on states' modernization processes. For example, I will see how existence or lack of external threat became very influential on the modernization of the USA. I will also examine how England's competition with Spain for being the hegemonic power of the world-system was one of the triggering factors of its industrialization efforts and how this rapid industrialization determines the path of its modernization. As Skocpol points out:

If a structural perspective means a focus on relationships, this must include transnational relations as well as relations among differently situated groups within given countries. Transnational relations have contributed to the emergence of all social-revolutionary crises and have invariably helped to shape revolutionary struggles and outcomes. All modern social revolutions, in fact, must be seen as closely related in their causes and accomplishments to the internationally uneven spread of capitalist economic development and nation-state formation on a world scale. Unfortunately, existing theories of revolution have not explicitly taken this perspective. To be sure, they have suggested that revolutions are related to "modernization"- but this has entailed an almost exclusive focus on socioeconomic tendencies and conflicts within national societies, taken one by one in isolation.⁵

None of the states have a complete autonomy; they all act in the framework of the world-system. There are two different types of world-system: world-empires and world-economies.⁶ The modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy. The structures and institutions of this capitalist world-economy has a great impact on states' class struggles, mode of productions and any other internal relations. States and the world-system are interacting units, hence, processes like modernization and hegemony should be examined with a holistic methodological approach.

In my study I argue that, both negligence and over emphasis of external effects could cause misinterpretations. While modernization theorists focus on internal dynamics and overlook the impact of systemic processes on internal ones, sometimes world-systems analysts may overrate the importance of the world-system as a unit of analysis and neglect the distinctive dynamics of individual states and effects of these dynamics to the world-system. As W. E. Moore points out:

⁵ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19.

⁶ I will elaborate the concept of world-system in Chapter 3.

Two generalizations appear justified with reference to adaptation to "external" events or influences. Both are of a long-term and largely unidirectional or cumulative character. With reference to "natural" influences, accumulated knowledge of methods of prediction and control, together with an increased independence of social systems from the non-human environment, serves more and more to cushion (but not to eliminate) the impact of shifts and crises. With reference to inter-system contacts, on the other hand, the multiplication of agencies of communication serves to reduce the isolation and thus the autonomy of societies, to increase the proportion and rate of changes from external sources, and thereby to increase "cultural" interdependence and even homogeneity.⁷

According to our above mentioned argument, the modernization processes and hegemonic cycles are interconnected. A particular state's position, relations and struggle in the world-system shall be very effective on its modernization process. There are different paths of modernization. Distinctive features of a states' modernizations shall also be very effective on their position and actions in the world-system, in our case, on the way how they establish their hegemony. I also claim that, after establishing its hegemony, every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system according to its own values, interests and institutions. Since its definition of interests and construction of values and institutions are highly determined by some internal processes, especially modernization process, it is necessary to examine the modernization of hegemonic powers to understand how they reorganize the world-system. Consequently, according to my methodological approach, it is impossible to define systemic processes as "external" and domestic processes as "internal" and make a strict separation of them in this subject. Because of the all reasons I brought forward, from my standpoint, it is crucial to use a holistic approach for examining process of modernization and hegemony and their relational essence.

2.2. Choice and Examination of Cases

The reason for my focus on England, the USA and China is due to the fact that the first two were hegemonic powers of the world-system, and China is the best candidate for being the next hegemonic power. By picking these countries as cases my aim is examining the modernization processes of these three states as a combined

⁷ W. E. Moore, "Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change", in *Readings in Social Evolution and Development*, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970), 127-128.

process with their hegemony-building processes as well as understanding the relation between these two processes. Since I claim that these three states have different modernization paths, respectively, I also claim that they have different hegemony-building processes. Because of these differences, it is hard to find common parameters for a comparative analysis. Yet, I will focus on some structures and processes to examine the differences of their modernizations and hegemony-building processes comparatively.

The First parameter is the existence or lack of feudal system and its effects on their modernization processes. Even though unravelling of feudal structures is generally accepted as an indicator for modernization, it cannot be generalized. Indeed, for my first case, England, unravelling of feudal structures accelerated the modernization process. Here I will discuss the effects of peasants' dispose of feudal restrictions, penetration of market relations to the rural areas and change of the source of wealth on England's modernization. Since a feudal system has never been in America, unravelling of feudal system cannot be used as an indicator for modernization of the USA. For emphasizing and understanding the differences between modernization of England and the USA, I will discuss the effects of lack of feudal heritage on American modernization. Even though there has been a short period similar to feudalism after the collapse of the empire, the feudal system has never been a deep-seated system in China. The feudal system, with its hierarchies, mode of production and political structure, was quite different from system of Chinese empire. I will examine the structure of empire; especially state bureaucracy and mode of production and their distinctive effects on the modernization of China.

As a second parameter I will use class structures and class struggles for my comparative analysis. In England, the peasant class was totally annihilated by the enclosure movements in the modernization process. This enclosure movement was conducted by the alliance of landed aristocrats and the bourgeoisie. In fact, beyond alliance, these two classes were intertwined in England. This intertwinement, and the annihilation of peasantry became very determinative on England's modernization and I will discuss their significant effects. Since there was no feudal system in America, there was not a peasantry in classical terms. Hence, I will use the parameter of class in the form of a clash of interest between Northern industrial bourgeoisie and Southern

plantation owners and effect of this clash on American modernization. I will also make a critical analysis of the general claim that slavery is an obstacle for capitalism; and I will show how important was the production of Southern slave states for American development and examine the real position of slavery in this capitalist system. The position of peasantry and its ties with the empire is crucial for understanding China's modernization. I will examine the change of class structures which caused several peasant rebellions and led to a peasant revolution in China.

My third parameter is the ways of capital accumulation. For a comprehensive industrialization, a certain extent of capital accumulation is required. Primitive capital accumulation by dispossession is very common in the early stages of capitalism and industrialization. In England, significant capital accumulation was actualized by enclosure movement and this created propertyless peasant masses. In America, colonialists seized the lands of the natives and plundered the wealth of the continent; I can see the primitive capital accumulation by dispossession in a different way in America. But in China, primitive capital accumulation by dispossession never happened. As I will explain in the relevant chapter, at the beginning of the 20th century, overwhelming majority of the lands in China were private property of peasants. After the Communist Revolution in 1949, with comprehensive land reforms, peasants' control over the lands was increased. Thereby, China actualized a capital accumulation and started its industrialization process without primitive accumulation by dispossession and without abolishing the peasantry. I will discuss the significant effects of this way of capital accumulation on China's modernization process.

My fourth parameter is colonization efforts and imperialist policies. Colonization and imperialism were very effective on both modernization processes and the structure of the world-system. England's rapid industrialization and its need for raw materials triggered its efforts of colonization. As we will see, England's colonization efforts played a crucial role both for spread of modernity and foundation of the modern world-system. Legacy of England's colonial rule in America was also very effective on American modernization. The USA also colonized a lot of region in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century including Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Philippines and several others. During its hegemony, imperialist policies of the USA had a great impact on both rise and decline of its hegemony. Imperial China has never

conducted colonial policies. Some Chinese merchants tried to establish some kind of network in South Asia, but it was not a state-backed policy and never institutionalized as a colonial rule. Since China did not follow colonialist policies, European and American colonialists could penetrate South and East Asia more easily and this had important effects on the structure of the world-system. As I will explain later, interventions of colonialists in this region and China affected China's modernization substantially. England colonized some regions of China and some modern institutions and modern production techniques moved to China by this way. These external threats of colonialists directed the elites of China for modernization; especially military modernization for withstanding the military superiority of colonialists. Rising nationalism in China by the effect of these external interventions also played an important role in its modernization process. Thereby, I will examine these three states both as subjects and objects of these colonialist-imperialist policies and analyze the effects of these policies on their modernization processes and structure of the world-system.

2.3. Modernization and the Modern State

In this chapter, I will examine the modernization process and emergence of modern states. First I will explain the Marx's and Weber's thoughts on modernity and modernization with a critical perspective.

As a historical materialist, Marx thinks that history is a linear progress. Way of this progress is determined by relations of production and class struggle. Simply, in every stage of progress, when relations of production changes and old system become unsustainable, a new emerging class abolishes the system and builds a new one in which this emerging class becomes the ruling class. The state is an instrument for class domination. Marx and Engels argue:

In the case of the nations which grew out of the Middle Ages, tribal property evolved through various stages — feudal landed property, corporative movable property, capital invested in manufacture—to modern capital, determined by large-scale industry and universal competition, i.e., pure private property, which has cast off all semblance of a communal institution and has shut out the state from any influence on the development of property. To this modern private property corresponds the modern state, which, purchased gradually by

the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of government securities on the stock exchange.⁸

Modern capitalist system was built by the bourgeoisie who abolished the feudal system; therefore, the modern capitalist state is an apparatus of bourgeoisie's dominance. Marx and Engels claim that "*the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie*".⁹ Poulantzas criticizes this narrow understanding of the modern state and emphasized that state has a "*relative autonomy*".¹⁰ This means that the modern state is not simply an apparatus of the bourgeoisie, modern capitalist state certainly tries to protect their interests but its function cannot be reduced to this. The structure of modern state is relatively autonomous, its features and policies are not just determined by economic interests of bourgeoisie. Modern state has advanced means and institutions which provide capacity to organize daily life more efficiently than any of its successors. The prominent sociologist Anthony Giddens who is known for his theory of structuration and his holistic view of modern societies reminds us that contrary to agrarian states or empires, the dominant class does not directly rule in the modern capitalist system, being an industrial bourgeoisie and a civil servant of state does not necessarily interpenetrate.¹¹ Politicians and professionalized bureaucracy rule in the modern state, but since modern state is dependent on capitalist production, its relative autonomy is restricted by the economic power of the bourgeoisie. Defining the state just as an apparatus for the class dominance causes an underemphasis of the significance of the modern state in the modernization process and underestimation of its capacity of regulating social life in the modern era. Function of state has increased day by day since the modernization process has begun. The American sociologist and historian Charles Tilly, who wrote on the relationship between politics and society argues:

⁸ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *German Ideology*, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), 98-99.

⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, Vol-I, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 15.

¹⁰ Nicos Poulantzas, *Siyasal İktidar ve Toplumsal Sınıflar*, (Ankara: Epos Yayınları, 2003), 298.

¹¹ Anthony Giddens, *Sosyoloji: Kısa Fakat Eleştirel Bir Giriş*, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2005), 73-74.

European states began to monitor industrial conflict and working conditions, install and regulate national systems of education, organize aid to the poor and disabled, build and maintain communication lines, impose tariffs- for the benefit of home industries, and the thousand other activities Europeans now take for granted as attributes of state power. The state's sphere expanded far beyond its military core, and its citizens began to make claims on it for a very wide range of protection, adjudication, production, and distribution. As national legislatures extended their own ranges well beyond the approval of taxation, they became the targets of claims from all well-organized groups whose interests the state did or could affect. Direct rule and mass national politics grew up together, and reinforced each other mightily.¹²

As we see in Tilly's argument above, the modernization process is a process of concentration of power in states' hands. By the advanced transportation and communication means, which are result of Industrial Revolution, and by a specialized bureaucracy, modern state gained the capacity to intervene in every sphere of social life.

Here I will make use of Max Weber's work on the legitimacy and modern state, which constitutes one of the most influential arguments regarding the state and authority; Weber gives us a very useful framework in which he discusses the tripartite classification of authority as ideal types: traditional authority, rational-legal authority and charismatic authority.¹³ Indicators of rational-legal authority are industrialization, concentration of state power and increase of state's penetration to social life, spread of the mass education, increase in use of communication and transportation means like railroads, telegraph and telephone, foundation of a tax system and specialized bureaucracy, rationalization of social and political system. Oktay argues that rational-legal authority belongs to industrial societies.¹⁴ And Poulantzas mentions that characteristics of Weber's concept of rational-legal authority are formative elements of capitalist state model.¹⁵ I agree with both of the scholars and add that rational-legal authority is also a crucial element of the "modern state". The main features of a modern state are "*a centralized and bureaucratically organized administrative and legal order run by an administrative staff, binding authority over what occurs within its area of*

¹² Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 115.

¹³ Max Weber, *Ekonomi ve Toplum*, Cilt- I, (İstanbul: Yarı Yayınları, 2012), 334-374.

¹⁴ Cemil Oktay, *Siyaset Bilimi İncelemeleri: Meşruyet-Sınıflandırma-Kültür-Modernleşme*, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2005), 49.

¹⁵ Poulantzas, 168.

jurisdiction, a territorial basis, and a monopoly of the use of force”¹⁶ Weber especially emphasizes the importance of “monopoly of the use of force and bureaucracy” for modern state. According to him, the distinctive feature of a modern political system is not just the construction of a specialized bureaucracy in a state, but the very “bureaucratization of life” in the modern times. Modern life is a bureaucratically regulated life with strict rules and institutions. In this respect, Weber’s argument will be the basic ground on which I would base my discussion on modernization.

We see an overemphasis on economic sphere in Marx’s theories; economic structures and relations of production are the main determinative factors in historical processes. But Weber does not give priority to economic sphere, he also focus on politics, culture, and religion. Contrary to Marx, he does not put the class in the center of his analysis; according to him class is just one of several types of groups which can emerge in a society; besides class as an economic group, there are also political and cultural groups which Weber called the “*status groups*”.¹⁷ Everything in the society is not determined by the economic relations, social structures are more complicated than that. Cultural tendencies, political choices, moral values and religious beliefs can be very effective on social structures. Therefore, the modern state cannot be understood as just a product of economic relations, and its function is beyond being just an apparatus of the bourgeoisie.

The modern state did not emerge incidentally or “naturally” in the course of time; it was constructed. Bureaucracy, taxation and warfare are crucial elements for the construction of the modern state and they are strongly connected to each other. A new taxation system was very important for building the modern state. As Poggi says: “*The state’s increasingly vast and expensive operations are financed from a distinctively public store of wealth, one that is replenished by levying taxes impersonally on the citizens’ incomes and expenditure-not by extorting donations from them, selling them offices or shares of the proceeds of state’s military or colonial ventures, or drawing on*

¹⁶ Graeme Gill, *Nature and the Development of the Modern State*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2-3.

¹⁷ Şerif Mardin, *Siyasal ve Sosyal Bilimler*, Bütün Eserleri-7, Makaleler-2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 123.

their private wealth.”¹⁸ Contrary to tributary pre-modern state, modern state has a more complex system for getting the surplus from its subjects and this taxation system requires a professional and well-educated bureaucracy. By this more complex taxation system, modern state could collect taxes more efficiently and this provided the capacity to finance expenses of great infrastructure investments, big projects necessary for modernization and raising a central army.

Industrialization played a crucial role in the foundation of modern state. Social mobility was highly limited in non-modern societies, but with industrialization, strict social roles become useless. Breuilly says that in industrial society people cannot have constant “*unique jobs and positions*”, they should gain qualities to “*move between the roles of industrial society*”.¹⁹ In the feudal era generally people were living in separated small regions under the control of a lord, central authority was weak, every lord had his own rules and laws in his region and generally people spoke different languages in every region. This heterogeneous structure was not suitable for capitalism and its industry. Modern capitalist system needs a national market, homogeneous tax system, common language and standard education and legal system. Only a different kind of state, which we call modern nation-state today, could satisfy these requirements. Improved transportation and communication means provided by the Industrial Revolution were used to build a national market which is essential for capitalism and the modern state. The state’s capacity of control over its subjects was also increased by these improved means; state’s authority was enhanced and centralized, modern state with monopoly of use of force could be built only with Industrial Revolution.

Mass education had a very important function in the state-building process; modern values were extended to public by schools. If you are creating a new form of state, in our case the modern territorial nation-state, you need to create new institutions, new values, new laws and most importantly new type of humans. And standard mass education system was the best tool for creating these people who are suitable for this new system. They gain skills which they need to adopt the modern industrial society in

¹⁸ Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1978), 97.

¹⁹ J. Breuilly, “Introduction”, in Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 24.

the schools and they also learn how to become a good citizen. As Althusser emphasizes the importance of school as an ideological apparatus of state, he mentions that state takes the children at such an age that they are open to influence the most, years they are stick between family and school, and shapes them as proper citizens.²⁰ Like most of the great transformation process, this modernization process is also highly exclusive. While creating a certain type of human, the modern state system excludes the others. People are indoctrinated with modern values through schools, families and national armies and if they do not accept these values, do not follow the majority they can be easily isolated from the society. As mentioned before in discussing the Weber's definition, state has the "*monopoly of use of force*" in its territory, at least legally. In state-building processes, states (especially modern states) try to establish a monopoly in cultural and intellectual area too. As a higher level of organization, state tries to unite people through its set of values, and functions as a homogenizing actor. As Bourdieu says: "*The state, as I see it, must be conceived as a producer of principles of classification, that is, of structuring structures that are applicable to all the things of the world, and in particular to social things.*"²¹ As we will see, the new cultural and intellectual frame created by states in the modernization processes became very effective on the way of their establishment of hegemonies and reorganization of the world-system.

2.4. The Myth of Enlightenment: Progressive History

Enlightenment is a paradigm which emerged in Europe in the 18th century. Enlightenment thinkers questioned the religious authorities and claimed that if people can be freed from religious restrictions they could reach the truth by their own reason. Even though there were important differences between them, according to majority of the Enlightenment thinkers, we should reject the religious knowledge and demystify the universe by rational thinking. By being freed from all kinds of pressure, especially political and religious, people could reveal their real capacities. According to Kant "*Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.*"²² But the Enlightenment paradigm, as an ideological framework for a social engineering project,

²⁰ Louis Althusser, *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları*, (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2003), 76.

²¹ Pierre Bourdieu, *On The State: Lectures at the Collège de France*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 165.

²² Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" , *Berlin Monthly*, (1784): 1.

includes so many authoritarian aspects. Homogenizing the persons through the concept of an “ideal human”, which is defined by humanism of Enlightenment, was important part of this authoritarian aspect. Adorno and Horkheimer critically argue:

Each human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different from all others, so that it could all the more surely be made the same. But because that self never quite fitted the mold, enlightenment throughout the liberalistic period has always sympathized with social coercion. The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual and in the scorn poured on the type of society which could make people into individuals... Any attempt to break the compulsion of nature by breaking nature only succumbs more deeply to that compulsion. That has been the trajectory of European civilization. Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment, stands in the same relationship to its objects as fate, whose concept it eradicates: as liquidation. Under the leveling rule of abstraction, which makes everything in nature repeatable, and of industry, for which abstraction prepared the way, the liberated finally themselves become the “herd” (*Trupp*), which Hegel identified as the outcome of enlightenment.²³

Uniting masses through an “ideal human” means disidentification. This “ideal human” of Enlightenment is rational and open to change, but he is also European, white, and Christian. In the frame of this ideology, the European man is superior to people in the other regions and creates a superior civilization. When the Enlightenment ideology tries to homogenize European people, it also offers this ideal as an example to non-Europeans with an authoritarian view. As we will see, the concept of progressive history is based on this acceptance of superiority of the European man.

Enlightenment paradigm depends on the concept of progressive history. According to this kind of understanding of history; there is a linear path of progress which every society has to follow for being developed or civilized. Progress is taken as a necessary and inevitable process. Since European states were the most developed states, others should follow their steps to reach the same level of development. This kind of understanding of history contains several misconceptions. First of all, as Giddens mentions, history cannot be apprehended as “*social change*”.²⁴ There were as much stability and continuity as change in the history. Second, historical evidences

²³ Theodor W. Adorno and Marx Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2002), 9.

²⁴ Anthony Giddens, *Ulus Devlet ve Şiddet*, (İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, 2008), 48-50.

show us that it is impossible to claim there is a universal path of progress, different societies have different dynamics and as I will elaborate in the chapters of our three cases, they followed different paths of development.

The Enlightenment includes an Orientalist understanding of Europe against others; *“idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures”*.²⁵ As mentioned before, according to the Enlightenment paradigm, other states should follow the European states’ path of development to reach the same level. This aspect of Enlightenment became a legitimization point for colonization and imperial expansionisms of European states. Other states should reach the same development level with Europeans states, because progress is “good” and “necessary”; but their internal dynamics prevent this kind of development, people in these countries are not civilized and they do not have the capacity to adopt themselves to modernity. Since these underdeveloped countries are unable to conduct their development process, European states, as the most developed states, have responsibility to interfere. David Harvey says: *“The belief ‘in linear progress, absolute truths and rational planning of ideal social orders’ under standardized conditions of knowledge and production was particularly strong... The ‘modernization’ of European economies proceeded apace, while the all thrust of international politics and trade was justified as bringing a benevolent and progressive ‘modernization process’ to backward Third World”*.²⁶ As we see, European states tried to legitimize their imperial efforts by covering them as missions to bringing “modernity”, “civilization” or “development” to other states and concept of progressive history of Enlightenment served them as an ideological instrument for this legitimization.

²⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 7.

²⁶ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 35.

According to Peter Sugar term of “development” is more appropriate than “progress” to explain change; because every change in the history is a development and term of development is more neutral than progress.²⁷ But the term “development” is not more innocent than the term “progress”. They were both used to establish the superiority of the European world, convince the non-European people to this superiority and legitimizing the imperial policies. Between 16th and 20th century, Western European countries really had a rapid economic development; theories for explaining the reasons for this development show us another example of concept of progressive history. Before the emergence of the modern world-system, Europe was not the center of the world economy. Contrary to the constructed discourse, which is a result of the Western dominance in the modern era, Europe was an economically backward region of the world. Samir Amin, prominent theorist of contemporary dependency theory who had important influence on *World-Systems Analysis* scholars, says:

The European culture that conquered the world fashioned itself in the course of a history that unfolded in two distinct time periods. Up until the Renaissance, Europe belonged to a regional tributary system that included Europeans and Arabs, Christians and Muslims. But the greater part of Europe at that time was located at the periphery of this regional system, whose center was situated around the eastern end of the Mediterranean basin. This Mediterranean system prefigures to some extent the subsequent capitalist world system. From the Renaissance on, the capitalist world system shifts its center toward the shores of the Atlantic, while the Mediterranean region becomes, in turn, the periphery. The new European culture reconstructs itself around a myth that creates an opposition between an alleged European geographical continuity and the world to the south of the Mediterranean, which forms the new center/periphery boundary. The whole of Eurocentrism lies in this mythic construct.²⁸

The aim of this retrospective eurocentric construct was proving the uniqueness and superiority of Europe and it was part of concept of progressive history. In this discourse, Europe, as a unique entity, has always been the center of “civilization”, roots of all technological and scientific development lies there. When Europe was seen as the cradle of “change”, the other regions, especially the East, symbolizes the “stability”. Significant economic development of European countries was result of unique features of European societies and individuals. Europeans are more rational, competitive and

²⁷ Peter F. Sugar, “Economic and Political Modernization: Turkey”, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed., Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 146.

²⁸ Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), 103.

individualistic; and they are also more open to change. In my opinion, none of these claims have scientific values. European dominance after the 16th century was result of historical processes and it has nothing to do with these factors. This dominance was established through emergence of capitalism. And capitalism did not emerge in Europe because Europeans were more rational or civilized, or European states were more powerful. In fact, European states were relatively weak and in my opinion, this was one of the main reasons for the emergence of capitalism in Europe. Empires like China or India had strong state structure and bureaucracy and they could prevent emergence of capitalist relations and stopped the birth of a strong independent bourgeois class. All European monarchies tried to resist this process but their weakness and loose feudal structure of Europe created suitable conditions for the emergence of capitalism. As an underdeveloped region of the world, with the emergence of capitalism and the industrialization, Europe had a rapid economic and military development. By their industrialized military power, European states colonized other regions of the world, and “Western dominance” was established through this colonization.

Rejecting the concept of progressive history does not mean denying big changes in history. Exaggerating the continuities between pre-modern and modern times and ignoring the significance of the great changes of modernization process would be another inaccurate approach. Focusing on durability of some traditions could cause a misconception about change and place of tradition in modern times. Giddens says:

To sanction a practice because it is traditional will not do; tradition can be justified, but only in the light of knowledge which is not itself authenticated by tradition. Combined with the inertia of habit, this means that, even in the most modernised of modern societies, tradition continues to play a role. But this role is generally much less significant than is supposed by authors who focus attention upon the integration of tradition and modernity in the contemporary world. For justified tradition is tradition in sham clothing and receives its identity only from the reflexivity of the modern.²⁹

As Giddens emphasizes, tradition gained a different function in the modern world and role of tradition is not significant enough to overshadow the importance of great transformations. Therefore, I do not claim that modernization was not a great change,

²⁹ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 38.

even there were continuities, modernization process certainly includes great political, economic and cultural transformations. I have four basic assertions: 1) History does not consist of mere change 2) Every change is not progress 3) There is no universal linear path of progress 4) There are no certain stages or teleological end which humanity will eventually reach; neither progress nor its types are inevitable.

As we see, the concept of progressive history based on misconceptions, explaining history as a linear and inevitable progress, is not a scientific approach. We can observe progressive processes in history but it does not mean that they are inevitable and they will occur in the same way in every part of the world. Even though I accept progressive processes can be found in history, I also think that defining “modernization” or “transition to capitalism” as a progress is an ideological choice and it is very problematic from my standpoint. Questioning that these processes are progress for whom and these progressive processes were achieved at what cost shall be very reasonable. Wallerstein argues:

One of the problems in analyzing progress is the one-sidedness of all measures proposed. It is said that scientific and technological progress is unquestionable and breathtaking, which is surely true, especially insofar as most technical knowledge is cumulative. But we never seriously discuss how much knowledge we have lost in the world-wide sweep of the ideology of universalism. Or if we do, we categorize such lost knowledge as mere (?) wisdom. Yet, at the simple technical levels of agricultural productivity and biological wholeness, we have been discovering of late that methods of human action discarded a century or two ago (a process enforced by enlightened elites upon backward masses) often need to be revived because they turn out to be more, not less, efficacious. More importantly, we are discovering at the very ‘frontiers’ of advanced science the tentative reinsertion of premisses triumphantly discarded a century, or five centuries, ago.³⁰

As Wallerstein discussed, one-sided perspectives cannot explain all consequences of “progress”. In my opinion, costs like loss of knowledge, dispossession, environmental destruction, or alienation cannot be ignored. When these kinds of macro processes occur, generally while some people’s conditions are improving, we see that others’ conditions are devolving. It is for sure that some people got benefitted from modernization and transition to capitalism, but for example for the victims of enclosure

³⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism*, (London: Verso, 1996), 98-99.

movement in England, modernization or capitalism did not symbolize progress. Even though further elaboration of this subject is beyond the scope of this thesis; I will just note that, in my opinion, people who benefitted from these processes are a minority.³¹

As explained before, Marx shares the Enlightenment concept of linear-progressive history. Actually, even though they have some critiques to the Enlightenment, both Weber and Marx believed the uniqueness and superiority of Western societies' structures, see modern capitalism as a progress and stuck to the concept of progressive history; therefore, both of them conceptualize their theories in the Eurocentric paradigm of Enlightenment. I will approach their ideas with a critical perspective, but I will not totally reject them; I thought some of their ideas still have an explanatory power and I will make use some of them in the chapters I analyze my cases.

2.5. Different Modernizations, Different Modernities

There are common features of states' modernization processes; and structure of modern states shares some common elements, for this reason, concepts of "modernization" or "modern" are not useless; in my opinion, we can use them for describing the common features of a large spectrum of phenomena. After the Second World War, some modernist scholars, highly influenced by Enlightenment's concept of progressive history, claimed that modernization is a universal phenomenon and developing countries should take their modernization processes as models and follow the same path.³² But as indicated above, it is impossible to claim that there is one linear path of progress or modernization. Thereby, we should reject this monistic and uniform approach and properly analyze the differentiations in modernization processes. My aim is examining the relation between modernization processes of three states and their hegemonies in the world-system. In my opinion, these states' modernization paths and their way of establishing their hegemonies are highly interconnected. I also claim that

³¹ For further information on this subject see: Zygmunt Bauman, *Does the Richness of the Few Benefit Us All?*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Fikret Başkaya, *Çığrımdan Çıkılmış Bir Dünya: Sosyal Sefaletin, Ekolojik Felaketin, Etik Yozlaşmanın Kökeni*, (Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı: Ankara, 2004)

³² For an example of these modernization theorists see: Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, (New York: Free Press, 1964.)

after establishing its hegemony, every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system according to its interests, set of values and institutions and since these are highly determined by this state's modernization process, it is crucial to analyze different modernization paths of these states for aim of my thesis.

There are several theories which challenge the concept of progressive history and Enlightenment's monistic approach of development. The first one I use in my thesis is Eisenstadt's *Multiple Modernities*. Theory of *Multiple Modernities* "is a multi-dimensional theoretical description of structural evolution".³³ According to this theory, even though modernization process began first in Western Europe, modernization does not mean Westernization. There are plenty of different paths of modernizations, although we can find some common features they are not enough to conceptualize a general model for modernization. Eisenstadt says:

The actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of this Western program of modernity. While a general trend toward structural differentiation developed across a wide range of institutions in most of these societies-in family life, economic and political structures, urbanization, modern education, mass communication, and individualistic orientations-the ways in which these arenas were defined and organized varied greatly, in different periods of their development, giving rise to multiple institutional and ideological patterns.³⁴

Eisenstadt's critics to the monistic and uniform explanation of modernization provide us with a suitable ground for a more sufficient analysis of modernization processes. By examining the different political, economic and cultural dynamics of societies, we can understand the states' different social structures, institutions and ideological tendencies which emerged in the different modernization processes.

The second approach I will use in my thesis is historical sociology. This approach uses the historical and sociological data to compare different modernization types. Especially I will use Theda Skocpol's and Barrington Moore's comparative works to examine varied historical paths of different types of modernizations. In his book, *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship*, Moore's aim was explaining the

³³ Gerhard Preyer, "Introduction: Paradigm of Multiple Modernities", *ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research*, Volume 24 (2007): 10.

³⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities", 1-2.

“historical development of three alternative paths to modern-liberal democracy, fascism and communism” comparatively.³⁵ His student Skocpol tried to do the same kind of work by examining the modernization process of Russia, France and China in her book, *States and Social Revolutions*. A holistic approach which I suggest to examine modernization and hegemony always requires a historical perspective; I claim that there are different modernization paths and these different modernization paths create different hegemonies and we cannot challenge the concept of progressive history without historical analysis. Skocpol says:

Historical sociological studies highlight the *particular* and *varying* features of specific kinds of social structure and patterns of change. Along with temporal processes and contexts, social and cultural differences are intrinsically of interest to historically oriented sociologists. For them, the world’s past is not seen as a unified developmental story or as a set of standardized sequences. Instead, it is understood that groups or organizations have chosen, or stumbled into, varying paths in the past. Earlier ‘choices’, in turn, both limit and open up alternative possibilities for further change, leading toward no predetermined end.³⁶

This historical perspective gives us the opportunity of tracing the roots of different modernizations in history. As mentioned before, examining the internal dynamics of single states is not enough for a sufficient analysis. In my opinion, development of states and development of the world-system should be examined together. That is why, I will use this historical perspective combined with theoretical framework of *World-Systems Analysis* to analyze these historical processes in a proper context.

³⁵ Edward Friedman and James Scott, foreword to *Diktatörlüğün ve Demokrasinin Toplumsal Kökenleri: Çağdaş Dünyanın Yaratılmasında Soylunun ve Köylünün Rolü*, by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2012), 10.

³⁶ Theda Skocpol, “Sociology’s Historical Imagination” in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, ed., Theda Skocpol, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1-2.

CHAPTER THREE: WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

3.1. Historical Origins of World-Systems Analysis

World-systems analysis emerged in the 1970s. It was a new perspective on social reality; its methodological and epistemological challenges caused a shift in the social sciences and changed the paradigm. According to Wallerstein four debates during the period 1945-70 prepared the proper conditions for the emergence of world-systems analysis: The first one is “*The concept of core-periphery developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the subsequent elaboration of dependency theory*”, the second one is the “*utility of Marx’s concept of the Asiatic mode of production, a debate that took place among communist scholars*”, the third one is “*the discussions among historians of western Europe about the transition from feudalism to capitalism*” and the last one is the “*debate about total history and the triumph of the Annales school of historiography*”³⁷

The concept of core-periphery was suggested by Raúl Prebisch and his Young Turks at the ECLA in the 1950s. They rejected the David Ricardo’s theory of “comparative advantage” and claimed that some economically more developed countries (core) have certain advantages *vis-à-vis* less developed countries (periphery) in international trade. These core countries set the rules of international trade and this trade results in flow of surplus from the periphery to the core. This “unequal exchange” creates “unequal development”. Consequently, international trade cannot be a win-win game and underdevelopment of some countries is the result of development of others.

Another important debate is about Marx’s concept of the the Asiatic mode of production. Marx was trying to classify the “*stages of economic structures through which humanity evolved.*”³⁸ His classification was based on linear progression and it was difficult to find a proper place for large bureaucratic empires like China or India in his classification. Therefore, he suggested this concept to explain the economic structures of these empires. In the 1930s Stalin rejected this concept, and because of his

³⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

power this concept lost its popularity in debates among communist scholars. After Stalin died in 1953 the debate on the Asiatic mode of production reemerged. Marx accepted the Enlightenment theory of progress and with this debate some communist scholars started to question this theory and its inevitable stages of development. Their critique of Marx cracked the rigid conceptual inheritances of orthodox Marxism.

The third debate which provided a base for emergence of *World-Systems Analysis* was about transition from feudalism to capitalism. An English Marxist economic historian Maurice Dobb wrote a book, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, in 1946. The debate was started after Paul Sweezy, an American Marxist economist, published an article that criticized the arguments of Dobb about transition from feudalism to capitalism. Sweezy focuses on external factors, particularly “*trade flows*” to explain this transition, Dobb focuses on internal factors and he accused Sweezy with ignoring the crucial role of changes in the “*structure of production and class relations*”.³⁹ This debate was important in two ways. Like the debate about the Asiatic mode of production this debate also caused the questioning of inevitable stages of development and progression concept of orthodox Marxism. Another importance is that this debate was actually about the unit of analysis which was very important in methodological framework of *World-Systems Analysis*.

The fourth important debate was about historiography. In the beginning of the 20th century French historiography was highly idiographic and empiricist; French historians were focusing on just political history. It was also the general trend all over the world. The *Annales* School emerged in the 1920s; leaders of the school were Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch. Members of this school had some serious critiques of traditional historiography. They advocated that historiography should be “total”; it should examine all economic, social and political underpinnings of historical development.⁴⁰ Idiographic disciplines defend uniqueness of social phenomena but *Annales* scholars advocated that long-term generalizations are possible in the social sciences. The influence of the *Annales* School remained limited until 1945. After the Second World War under the leadership of Fernand Braudel the influence of the

³⁹ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 15.

Annales School spread all over the world. Braudel criticized the “event-dominated” historiography and suggested the *longue durée*.⁴¹ According to Braudel we should focus on “structural time (or long lasting, but not eternal, basic structures that underlay historical systems) and the cyclical processes within the structures.”⁴²

All these four debates and their contributions had significant influence on the *World-Systems Analysis* scholars. Prebisch’s core-periphery concept was improved by *World-Systems Analysis* scholars and became important element of *World-Systems Analysis*. *World-Systems Analysis* scholars were influenced by Marxist theory but they did not take it as a dogma. So they really benefited from critiques against orthodox Marxism, especially critiques on inevitable development and Enlightenment theory of progress. For examining the social developments properly a researcher should choose his unit of analysis first, if he chose wrong his analysis would be insufficient. According to *World-Systems Analysis* scholars traditional social scientists focused on wrong unit in their analysis; and therefore, their analysis does not have sufficient explanatory power to examine social developments. Issue of unit of analysis is crucial for *World-Systems Analysis* scholars and debates on this issue made important contributions to them.

3.2. Main Concepts and Arguments of World-Systems Analysis

The theoretical framework of *World-Systems Analysis* is based on three main components: 1) a multidisciplinary approach, 2) the *longue durée* and 3) world-systems rather than states as unit of analysis. All three of these components include hard critiques of traditional perspectives in social sciences.

Before the nineteenth century knowledge was seen as a unitary field. In the nineteenth century philosophy and social sciences separated and social sciences divided into disciplines.⁴³ Scholars of all disciplines built exclusive areas for their disciplines and put strict borders with others. According to *World-Systems Analysis* scholars social reality is a complex phenomenon and it is impossible to examine it separately. That is

⁴¹ Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: The *Longue Durée*” Review, Vol XXXII, no. 2 (2009): 174.

⁴² Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 15.

⁴³ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science”, *Political Geography*, Vol 17, Issue 1 (January 1998): 75.

why they examine the political, economic, social and cultural spheres in a single framework. Since *World-Systems Analysis* scholars do not recognize the borders of disciplines, *World-Systems Analysis* is not multidisciplinary, it is unidisciplinary.

The concept of *longue durée*, which was suggested by Fernand Braudel, is another important component of theoretical framework of *World-Systems Analysis*. As mentioned before, Braudel criticized the idiographic historiography, which focuses on uniqueness of social phenomena. He insisted that “*the mass of small details that comprise the bulk of traditional history, which is almost always political history, is only part of reality, indeed only a small part.*”⁴⁴ If we use structural time in my analysis, focus on long-term trends and cyclical processes, we are able to make proper generalizations. These generalizations are not eternal truths but they can explain the structures and the systems which have long lifetime. According to Braudel just explaining particular events in the past cannot be the aim of history, we should study *longue durée* because my aim must be also explaining the present.⁴⁵

World-Systems Analysis scholars use the world-system as unit of analysis. According to them national states (or any other actors) are surrounded and restricted by the structures and the rules of the world-system; that is why examining one state cannot give us enough information to explain big picture.⁴⁶ For understanding the long-term trends and reaching some generalizations, we should take the world-system as a unit of analysis.

Other important concepts of *World-Systems Analysis* are “core-periphery”, “world-system”, “world-empire” and “world-economy”. There are two different kinds of historical systems: minisystems and world-systems. A world-system is a “*multicultural territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange of*

⁴⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, “Time and Duration: The Unexcluded Middle.” *Thesis Eleven*, Vol 54 (1998): 82.

⁴⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, “Braudel on the *Longue Durée*: Problems of Conceptual Translation,” *Review*, Vol XXXII, No: 2 (2009): 168.

⁴⁶ Stephen K. Sanderson, “World-Systems Analysis after Thirty Years: Should It Rest in Peace?” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 46, No: 3 (2005): 180.

basic goods and raw materials is necessary for everyday life of its inhabitants.”⁴⁷ There are two different world-systems: world-empires and world-economies.

The modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy and it emerged in the sixteenth century in Western Europe. Wallerstein defines world-economy as a “*large geographic zone within which there is a division of labor and hence significant internal exchange of basic or essential goods as well as flows of capital and labor.*”⁴⁸ There is not a unitary political structure in world-economies; there are lots of political units which interact in an interstate system. World-economies are culturally and politically heterogeneous; division of labor holds the system together. The main logic of capitalist world-economy is ceaseless accumulation of capital.

There is, however, another perspective about world-system and its modernity. Contrary to Wallerstein, Frank and Gills claim that modern world-system did not emerged in the sixteen century, it is at least 5.000 years old.⁴⁹ According to them ceaseless accumulation of capital is not a unique feature of modern capitalist world-system, we can observe it in different ages of history. So it is impossible to talk about a new and different modern world-system, there is only one world system which exists for thousands of years. Wallerstein’s concept of world-systems do not mean systems which encompass the whole world, world-systems are in a world of their own; multiple world-systems can exist in the world at the same time. Frank and Gills’s world system is a world-wide system; that is why they use the term of world system, without a hyphen, to emphasize that there is only one world system. Frank also claims that this world system emerged in Asia, not in Europe, and he accuses Wallerstein for being a Eurocentric.⁵⁰ Even if we accept that Frank has some important points which need consideration about Eurocentric perspective of *World-Systems Analysis*, I think extending the existence of world-system back to 5.000 thousand years ago does not fit with the historical facts. Certainly there are historical continuities and roots of the modern world-system can be found in the previous systems, but in my opinion modern

⁴⁷ Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes, “World-Systems Analysis,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 21, (1995): 389.

⁴⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 23.

⁴⁹ Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, ed., *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, (London: Routledge, 1993), 3-4.

⁵⁰ Andre Gunder Frank, *Yeniden Doğu: Asya Çağında Küresel Ekonomi*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2010), 31.

capitalist world-economy is a new and different world-system which has its own characteristics.

The concepts of core-periphery are also important ones that *World-Systems Analysis* scholars took from Prebisch and improved. There are developed core zones, underdeveloped peripheral zones and there are semi-periphery zones which share the features of both. Even when *World-Systems Analysis* scholars sometimes talk about “core countries” or “peripheral countries” we should keep in mind that core-periphery is a relational concept; they actually mean core-like production processes and peripheral production processes and the zones which they are concentrated. Core-periphery is “*the degree of the profitability of the production processes and since profitability is directly related to the degree of monopolization, what we essentially mean by core-like production processes is those that are controlled by quasi-monopolies.*”⁵¹ Peripheral production processes are relatively competitive and peripheral products have a weak position vis-à-vis core products in international trade. This unequal exchange causes a constant flow of surplus-value from peripheral zones to core zones. This axial division of labor and unequal exchange are inherent features of capitalist world-economy. Hopkins emphasizes that peripheral “*does not mean marginal in the sense of dispensable.*”⁵² Core and peripheral zones complete each other and they are both essential for capitalist development.

3.3. Hegemony

Even if each state is accepted as equals in international law there is a hierarchy among states in the modern world-system. And these states compete with each other to gain more power and climb to higher ranks in this hierarchy in the interstate system. There are two different ways to establish dominance. The first one is “*transforming the world-economy to a world-empire*” and the second one is obtaining hegemony.⁵³ In world-empires there is a single political unit in the whole world-system. This means that this strong political authority can destroy the suitable conditions for endless

⁵¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 28.

⁵² Terence Hopkins, “The Study of the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Introductory Considerations.” In *World Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*, ed. Terrence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 25.

⁵³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 57.

accumulation of capital. Since endless accumulation of capital is the main logic of the capitalist world-economy, capitalist world-system cannot survive under control of one unitary political structure, there has to be multiple political units. But capitalist world-system also has inherent features that create conditions for emergence of hegemonic powers that dominate the system. Chase-Dunn states:

It should be emphasized hegemony in the core of the capitalist world-system is not a matter of relative military power. First Spain and then France were more powerful than other single states in terms of state revenues or the ability to mount military expeditions. Hegemony is rather a matter of the combination of coercive power and economic competitive advantage. It is ability to produce goods or render services cheaply, in combination with a degree of military power which enables the capitalists of a hegemonic core state to realize greater profits in the world market.⁵⁴

As Chase-Dunn emphasizes, hegemony is different from military dominance; therefore, it should be supported by economic power. But hegemony is also not just about the economic and military power. Wilkinson says that “*Hegemony is clearly a political or politico-military relationship, not an economic nor a cultural one, though wealth and culture may be resources that enable hegemony.*”⁵⁵ In my opinion this is an inadequate definition of hegemony, for establishing and sustaining the hegemony, a state requires also cultural instruments. There are lots of states, cultures and languages in world-economies. But all actors in the interstate system are linked together with a common geoculture. Wallerstein defines geoculture as “*values that are very widely shared throughout the world-system, both explicitly and latently*”.⁵⁶ This geoculture is dominated by the hegemonic power of the system. Hegemonic states determine the cultural trends, their language becomes the common language for trade and intellectual activities, their standards become global standards. Hegemony cannot be based on just coercion; it should be supported by cultural means. Arrighi says that hegemony: “*is something more and different from dominance pure and simple. It is the power associated with dominance expanded by the exercise of intellectual and moral*

⁵⁴ Christopher Chase-Dunn, “Core-Periphery Relations: The Effects of Core Competition,” *In Social Changes in the Capitalist World Economy*, ed. B. Hockey Kaplan, (California: Sage, 1978), 160.

⁵⁵ David Wilkinson, “Hégemonia: Hegemony, Classical and Modern”, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Volume XIV, no.2. (2008): 138.

⁵⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System-4: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 277.

leadership.”⁵⁷ Other actors (at least lots of them) should voluntarily follow the leadership of the hegemonic states. For gaining (and maybe building) this consent, hegemonic powers have to have powerful cultural means.

According to Amin hegemony is a phenomenon which is “*multidimensional, relative and always under threat*.”⁵⁸ It is multidimensional because it has economic, military, cultural and ideological aspects. A state has to reach an optimal combination of all aspects of power to establish hegemony. It is relative because it is a relational concept like core-periphery. Hegemony is not just about the capacity of hegemonic power, it is about the power relations between hegemonic state and other actors. Hegemony is always under threat because the essential features of modern capitalist world-economy disallow permanent hegemony. There is an uphill competition between states in the modern interstates system.

We can see rises and declines of several hegemonic powers in the history of capitalism; it is a cyclical process of capitalist world-system which repeats in every 100-150 years.⁵⁹ Three powers obtained hegemony in the world-system: The Netherlands (the United Provinces) in the mid-seventeenth century, the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century and the USA in the mid-twentieth century. The rise and fall of hegemonic powers are different from rise and fall of empires. Empires gain power by conquering adjacent states and exploiting them by means of plunder, taxation or tribute. Hegemonic states rise by controlling and dominating the international trade, “*especially the oceanic trade which linked cores with peripheries*.”⁶⁰ It is hard for hegemonic powers to maintain their dominance. According to Chase-Dunn there are three main reasons for declining of a hegemonic power. Hegemonic powers make high profits with their leading core industries. This strengthens their hegemony but it also causes higher wages in these hegemonic states, and profits decrease. Capitalists relocate their production processes to zones where wages are lower and opposition is weaker. Foreign investment is profitable but risky business; their investments can be expropriated by the

⁵⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and Origins of Our Time*, (London: Verso, 1994), 27-28.

⁵⁸ Samir Amin, *Liberal Virüs: Sürekli Savaş ve Dünyanın Amerikanlaştırılması*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2016), 104.

⁵⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Bildiğimiz Dünyanın Sonu*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık, 2012), 45.

⁶⁰ Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes, “World-Systems Analysis”, 411.

states where they invest.⁶¹ Relocation of production processes also causes unemployment in the hegemonic state and unemployment causes stagnation because of the lack of effective demand. The second factor is turnover time of fixed capital. The third factor is high costs of being hegemonic power. Hegemonic powers have responsibility to maintain order in the world-system and it causes huge military expenditures. When hegemonic core state is investing in military area some of the core states get opportunity to invest in industry, they develop their production techniques and reach higher levels of production capacity. As a result hegemonic power loses its economic superiority.

I will examine the rise and decline of two hegemonic powers, Britain and the USA; analyze the rise of China and discuss its possible hegemony. I will use the theoretical framework of *World-Systems Analysis* for analyzing these shifts of hegemony. External and internal processes cannot be separated, that is why I will also analyze the modernization processes of these three countries. Every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system after establishing its hegemony. So after examining their modernization processes to analyze how they became hegemonic powers I will also try to understand how their ways of modernization affected their reorganization of the world-system.

⁶¹ Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Core-Periphery Relations: The Effects of Core Competition," 162.

CHAPTER FOUR: MODERNIZATION AND HEGEMONY OF ENGLAND

4.1. The Modernization of England

In this chapter I will examine the modernization process of England and its effects on England's hegemony. I will analyze the specific class relations which was determinative on England's modernization. My first aim is to understand how peasantry was annihilated in England and how it influenced the capital accumulation and England's modernization. Another point I will focus on is the conditions that created the suitable ground for alliance of landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Total annihilation of peasantry and this alliance played a crucial role in the model of England's modernization, which is generally defined as "democratic" or "liberal". Because of these specific class relations, England had a relatively gradual and stable modernization process and this provided a convenient ground for a rapid development and England could establish its hegemony thanks to this development. I will also examine how the position of England in the world-system and its competition with other states triggered its industrialization and modernization processes and see why I suggest analyzing internal and systemic processes together. Another aim of this chapter is to understand how England constituted a new geoculture according to liberal values. Liberal concepts of "progress" and "development" became main elements of the geoculture of the world-system during the English hegemony and this change contributed to the spread of modernity. These two concepts were also crucial for legitimization of colonization and I will discuss the importance of colonization for foundation of the modern world-system under the leadership of England. Finally, I will examine, as the spreader of liberal state model, how England reorganized the world-system as a more state-centric system.

Since I claim that a state's way of establishing its hegemony is highly under influence of its modernization process, we should look at the England's modernization process and its rise in the world-system together. Modernization is a very complex phenomenon; it is impossible to elaborate all the details of England's modernization here, so I will point out some important historical events and processes which are

related to my hypotheses. Even though there are some deprecators it is usually accepted that England was the first modernized state. And even though liberals of our age do not accept, England's democratic transition to modern society includes much violence and pressure.

After the Wars of the Roses ended in 1485 the House of Tudor came to power and they ruled England until 1603. Since powerful aristocratic houses fought with each other to take the throne in these long wars their power was diminished after the wars. And during their reign, the Tudors tried to reinforce central authority and diminish the power of seniors and aristocrats even more. They imposed some strict restriction on senior's right of raising their own army; they established an executive jurisdiction and large bureaucracy and ended the war among aristocrats.⁶² The Tudors found a weakened feudal structure when they came to power and they tried to abolish it with their administrative and legal practices.

From the beginning of the 15th century agriculture was commercialized in England; landed aristocrats started to see their lands just as a source of money. Marx says: "*Rent has so completely divorced the landed proprietor from the soil, from nature, that he has no need even to know his estates, as is to be seen in England.*"⁶³ Political and economic structure of the feudal system is based on agricultural production and agricultural division of labor. Commercialization and capitalization of agriculture changed the relation between landed aristocrats and serfs (or farmers) and weakened the structure of the feudal system in England. The enclosure movement was the greatest strike for the feudal system. It started in the 15th century and continued until the 19th century under different forms. First, landowners seized the common lands which were being used by their tenant farmers as rangelands. It became harder for farmers to raise animals, and they became poorer. This was followed by a second type of enclosure; landowners enclosed all of their lands for raising sheep. Wool stapling became more profitable than agriculture and increasing number of lords started to prefer using their lands for raising sheep rather than agriculture. Since job of raising sheep requires much

⁶² Berrington Moore, *Diktatörlüğün ve Demokrasinin Toplumsal Kökenleri: Çağdaş Dünyanın Yaratılmasında Soylunun ve Köylünün Rolü*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2011), 33.

⁶³ Karl Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1955), 73.

fewer men than agriculture, lords dismissed most of their tenant farmers and serfs, and great number of people lost their means of living and had to leave their homes because of enclosure.⁶⁴ Masses were freed from feudal restrictions and bondage; since they lacked any land or capital they had to sell their labour capacity for living or they had to be beggars or bandits.⁶⁵ After feudal ties were unwound, dealing with these stray masses became a serious problem for all European countries. Banditry increased in Europe and these peasants who did not have any income for living revolted in a lot of countries. Significant peasant rebellions emerged all over the Europe and generally they were quashed very harshly. As a first industrialized state England had an advantage about dealing with these masses, “*the rapid rise of manufactures, particularly in England, absorbed them gradually.*”⁶⁶ When the industrial revolution occurred, these people who lacked land and capital became workers of industrial production centers. Many of these people went to the cities and growth of the new cities provided market for commercial agriculture. By employing these stray masses in new industries and adopting those to city life England could avoid serious peasant rebellions and had a more stable modernization process.

Commercialization of agriculture destroyed the loyalty of landowner aristocracy to the throne and they opposed the Stuarts’ effort of establishing an absolute monarchy.⁶⁷ Now landowner aristocracy was sharing similar interests with the bourgeoisie of growing cities. This alliance between landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie played a crucial role in the modernization process of England. Beyond alliance, these two classes were intertwined; old aristocrats were becoming new bourgeois and rising bourgeois was buying lands and titles. In a lot of Western European countries majority of aristocrats could not adopt themselves to the new conditions of capitalism, they fought besides the royalists in the modernization processes and were abolished by the bourgeoisie. But as Teschke mentions, in England

⁶⁴ Leo Huberman, *Feodal Toplumdan Yirminci Yüzyıla*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 121.

⁶⁵ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 507.

⁶⁶ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *German Ideology*, 77.

⁶⁷ Moore, 488.

“the transformation of a militarized feudal class into a demilitarized class of capitalist landlords provided the social basis for the new constitutional monarchy”.⁶⁸

This alliance continued to gain power in the parliament. Star Chamber, a kind of supreme court, which was in fact used by kings for their arbitrary actions, was abolished by Long Parliament in 1641. It was also one of the last tools for kings to prevent the enclosure movement. Peasantry was substantially annihilated by the enclosure movement which was conducted by this alliance. As mentioned before, by abolishment of the peasantry, England could protect itself from serious peasant rebellions which destabilized a lot of European states. It is accepted that by its sectarian and reactionist attitude in modernization processes peasantry could be an obstacle for democratic transition, so abolishment of peasantry also gave chance to England for more democratic and peaceful modernization.⁶⁹ It is partially true but I should note that enclosure and abolishment of peasantry cause of a lot of blood and pain too. Enclosure was a legal and extended violence, and England could achieved democratic transition to capitalist system, and completed its modernization processes through this violence and pressure.

Tension between the parliament and the throne reached its peak in the reign of Charles I (1625-1649). He was trying to strengthen the central authority and hold all the reins of power himself. However, he approved the Petition of Rights in 1628 and committed that he would not levy tax without approval of parliament, he closed the parliament soon after.⁷⁰ This sparked off conflicts in the society which culminated in the English Civil War. Royalists were defeated in 1648, and Charles I was beheaded as a traitor and a dictator in 1649. Even the troops which were fighting against royalists were consisted of lower classes; this war against the crown was led by alliance of landed aristocrats and bourgeoisie; they were the true victors who benefited from this Civil War. Cromwell ruled England as a dictator until his death in 1658 and royalists returned to power in 1660 by accession of Charles II to the throne. But these developments could not stop the rise of the bourgeoisie and demands of reforms. In 1679 Habeas Corpus Act

⁶⁸ Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*, (London: Verso, 2003), 252

⁶⁹ Moore, 59.

⁷⁰ Toktamış Ateş, *Siyasi Tarih*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 70.

was accepted, this act secured the individual rights and freedoms of people; prohibited the arbitrary arrests and opened all of the administrative actions to judicial control. With the acceptance of Bill of Rights in 1689, power of kings was substantially restricted and the parliament gained a superior position over throne. With all these developments a democratic regime was established in England.

Even though the rights of individuals were under legal guarantee and the power of monarch restricted, I have to mention that this democratic regime was quite different from contemporary democracies; certain groups were excluded from political area. Women and dispossessed men could not have political rights for a long time. The reason for this can be found in the classical liberalism which had serious influence on the modernization process of England. According to classical liberalism humans are good and rational and they have the capacity to take their own decisions. But humans without education and property are dependent on other people and they do not have this capacity. Therefore, these irrational and dependent people who lacked the capacity to understand what is really good for themselves could not use political rights, as it could destabilize the system. When liberal individualism emphasizes the importance of “person” or “human”, it also defines its features and excludes the ones who do not have these features. This liberal understanding also served as an ideological background for legitimization of England’s (and other Western countries’) colonization efforts. According to this perspective, since progress is necessary and inevitable and Western countries (England in our case) symbolize the model of modern and developed countries, other countries have to follow their path to reach the same development level. But people of these countries are uneducated and irrational; they cannot understand this on their own. Since these countries and their people do not have the capacity to accomplish this development on their own, it is the duty of developed and modern countries to bring them “civilization”. This liberal perspective of spreading the modernization was an important tool of colonialism and later, I will explain why the England’s colonialization efforts were crucial for foundation of the modern world-system. Here we can use Ratzel’s concept of *Lebensraum*. *Lebensraum* is “the geographical surface area required to support a living species at its current population

size and mode of existence”.⁷¹ According to Ratzel’s conceptualization, a state needs continuous expansion to live. Ratzel claims that high civilizations absorb low civilizations with expansion, so it is not just a territorial expansion; it is also spread of state’s values and institutions. Even though this concept is generally used related to Germany; it can be generalized to other states in a way, especially European states at that time and the USA later. English imperialism and German imperialism had different characteristics of territorial growth; but I claim that the concept of Lebensraum has an explanatory power for imperialism of all modern states. Ratzel says: “*The territory of a state is no definite area fixed for all time-for a state is a living organism, and therefore cannot be contained within rigid limits-being dependent for its form and greatness on its inhabitants, in whose movements, outwardly exhibited especially in territorial growth or contraction, it participates*”.⁷² Apart from his nationalist and essentialist thoughts, Ratzel has an important point about the state, particularly about the modern capitalist state: The structure of this kind of state includes expansionist characteristics. As mentioned before, there are two different world-systems: world-empires and world-economies, and the modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy. Expansion of the modern state is embedded in the expansion of the modern world-system. Wallerstein says:

The history of the modern world-system has been in large part a history of the expansion of the European states and people into the rest of the world. This has been an essential part of the construction of a capitalist world-economy. The expansion has involved, in most regions of the world, military conquest, economic exploitation and massive injustices. Those who have led and profited most from this expansion have presented it to themselves and the world as justified on the grounds of the greater good that such expansion has had for the world’s populations. The usual argument is that the expansion has spread something variously called civilization, economic growth and development and/or progress. All of these words have been interpreted as expressions of universal values, encrusted in what is often called natural law. Therefore, it has been asserted that this expansion was not merely beneficial to humankind but also historically inevitable.⁷³

⁷¹ Woodruff D. Smith, “Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum”, *German Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1980): 53.

⁷² Friedrich Ratzel, “The Territorial Growth of States”, in *Human Geography: An Essential Anthology*, ed. John Agnew, David N. Livingstone and Alisdair Rogers, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 526.

⁷³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*, (New York: New Press, 2006), 1.

As we see, even though they have different characteristics, all imperial expansionisms of Western states comprise exploitation and conquest; and they were all legitimized by the idea of progress, development or civilization. Even England's modernization, generally defined as "liberal" and "democratic", includes so much pressure, blood and exploitation. And England's process of establishing its hegemony, which was a type of capitalist expansionism highly under influence of its capitalist modernization, can be understood as a refined version of Lebensraum. Another noteworthy point which we deduce from this example is that the modernization, colonization and the emergence of the modern world-system are interconnected processes. That is why, I insist on a holistic approach. Modernization processes of states and systemic processes of the modern world-system can be understood only by examining them together as reciprocal and sometimes even combined processes.

Industrialization and modernization accompany each other. The English built the first modernized state and they also led the process of the Industrial Revolution. There were many reasons why the Industrial Revolution occurred in England first; main ones are demographic growth, agrarian revolution, existence of capital and increasing demand.⁷⁴ Industrial capitalism requires capital, raw materials and labor. England obtained capital and raw materials mostly by colonization, England (and of course other colonialist states) plundered the wealth and resources of a lot of regions. Besides enclosure, enslaving the people of colonies also provided labor to England's industries.

Means which were provided by industrialization were crucial for building a modern state. After the industrial revolution, means of transportation and communication were developed significantly. This gave chance to England to construct a national market, reach every corner of the country by its bureaucracy, execute a national legal system and strengthen the central authority. According to Wallerstein, depression of late medieval age and competition with Spain encouraged England for its effort of industrialization.⁷⁵ This shows us how a state's position and struggle in the

⁷⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern Dünya Sistemi-3: Kapitalist Dünya Ekonomisinin Büyük Yayılımının İkinci Evresi 1730-1840*, (İstanbul: Yarı Yayınları, 2015), 16.

⁷⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern Dünya Sistemi-1: Kapitalist Tarım ve 16. Yüzyılda Avrupa Dünya-Ekonomisinin Kökenleri*, (İstanbul: Yarı Yayınları, 2015), 232.

world-system can affect its vital internal processes like modernization and industrialization.

Warfare plays a crucial role in the foundation of the modern state. The central bank was established in 1694 for financing the war with France which had started in 1688; England's wars in the continent pushed it to build a big and permanent army, establish an operative bureaucracy, and since the state need more taxes in war time, House of Commons which had right to regulate taxes, gained power against the kings and the council of ministers.⁷⁶ National armies also played a role as a school in modernization processes. Most of the men learnt national languages and the rules of modern society in armies; they were also instilled patriotic values. Discipline and punctuality of modern industrialized society were institutionalized by national armies.

As indicated above, by the abolishment of peasantry a great number of people had to go to the cities. High urbanization is an important indicator for modernization. Increase of urban population created a significant cultural and social transformation in England. Villagers became workers and they had more disciplined, organized and punctual life. City life also encouraged a more individualistic style of living. These cities were based upon different economic structures; trade and industrial production were main pillars of their economy. These new capitalist economic relations destroyed the traditional subsistence economy which was based on barter trade. Growing economy of cities encompassed all of England and market dominance was established in the economy.

Even though there were strong efforts of dynasties for centralization, England never had a period of real absolute monarchy.⁷⁷ Specific conditions which elaborated above created common interests for landed aristocrats and the bourgeoisie and their alliance against the throne prevented the absolute concentration of power in the hands of monarchs. Since England's political and institutional structure was relatively more flexible, revolutionary process in England did not create a hard rupture from the ancient

⁷⁶ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*, 157.

⁷⁷ Poulantzas, 197.

regime.⁷⁸ Aristocratic and bourgeois values continued to live together. This gradual and relatively stable modernization process of England paved the way for a rapid development and gave chance to England for competing to become the hegemonic power of the world-system.

4.2. The Rise and the Decline of England's Hegemony

England was the second hegemonic power in the modern world-system. England constructed the global market from bottom to top under its hegemony. There were militarily more powerful countries from England in that period but since hegemony is different than manu militari world-empires they could not achieve to be the hegemonic power of the world-system.

Shifts of hegemony occur after great wars. Wallerstein calls these wars “*Thirty Years War*”; according to him the first Thirty Years War was between 1618 and 1648 and the United Provinces emerged as hegemonic power after this war, the second was the Napoleonic Wars between 1792 and 1815 and the England (United Kingdom) emerged as the hegemonic power after these wars and the last one was two World Wars between 1914 and 1945 and the USA emerged as hegemonic power after these wars.⁷⁹ These wars also represent the competition among core states for being the hegemonic power of the world-system, only the core states which have certain features and advantages emerged victorious from these wars and after being the hegemonic power all hegemonic powers reorganized the world order in favor of their interests. Since their definition of interests, their values and their institutions, which determines the way of this reorganizing, strictly related with their modernization process, I claim that these important changes in the structure of world-system made by hegemonic powers could not be completely understood without analyzing their modernization processes.

England's disposal of economic tutelage of the United Provinces was a turning point for its economic growth and its process of being the next hegemonic power of the world-system. After the abrogation of Hanseatic concession in 1598, the English

⁷⁸ Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Modernleşme: Başkaldırı ve Değişim*, (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2007), 80.

⁷⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern Dünya Sistemi-2: Avrupa Dünya-Ekonomisinin Pekiştirilmesi ve Merkantilizm 1600-1750*, (İstanbul: Yarı Yayınları, 2015), 27.

bourgeoisie took control of England's internal and external trade and England could be able to conduct more independent economic policies.⁸⁰ Only after that England could join the competition among the core states as a significant power and accomplished the development which made it the hegemonic power of the world-system.

By the significant developments in transportation and communication a global market was constructed in the 1870s. The telegraph system and railways integrated the markets all over the world and provide a real-time information for all actors. By the effect of this improved means the world-economy had a great expansion. Between 1840 and 1870 “*the volume of seaborne merchandise between major European states more than quadrupled, while the value of the exchanges between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, Latin America, India and Australasia increased about sixfold.*”⁸¹ This global market was constructed under the leadership of England. England needed this global market to sell its industrial products, it was a large empire with all its colonies and made large amount of infrastructure investments in different regions of the world. The modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy; this system emerged in Europe first and other regions of the world were enclosed by this capitalist world-economy by two means: the world-scale trade network substantially created by England and colonization.

England had certain advantages in the world-system. First of all it was the first industrialized country. Its new production methods and capacity provide economic superiority against other states. Its geographical position also provide important advantages to it. Since it is an island, England could relatively isolate itself from conflicts in continental Europe and pass through some destructive periods with minimal harm. Geographical position is a crucial element for establishing hegemony. Chase-Dunn states that:

Concentration of productive advantage is partly due to locational advantages which interact with the level of technology and organization appropriate to the scale of the world economy during a particular era. Centrality in the world economy is facilitated by geographical centrality, especially when transport costs are high. Reflecting on the hegemony of the United Provinces, the United

⁸⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern Dünya Sistemi-1: Kapitalist Tarım ve 16. Yüzyılda Avrupa Dünya-Ekonomisinin Kökenleri*, 374.

⁸¹ Giovanni Arrighi, “The Global Market”, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol V (Summer 1999): 219.

Kingdom and the United States suggests that there is a rough correspondence between the size of the home market and the scale of the world-economy.⁸²

England's industrialized production and strong navy provided the privilege of controlling and dominating the long-distance trade. It also colonized a lot of places from different regions by its strong military naval power and able to protect its interest in these colonies. These colonies provided raw materials, taxes and human resources to England. By taxing the people in its colonies England could be able to close its budget deficit; it also formed troops from colonies and used them in a lot of military campaigns. These colonies were also new markets for industrialized production of England. Since there were several squeezes and depressions in the European economy in this period, these new markets were essential for England to continue its economic growth.

England's colonization process, which was backed by its industrial power, was also very crucial for the foundation of the new world-system. Hobsbawm says:

India was systematically deindustrialized and became in turn a market for Lancashire cottons: in 1820 the subcontinent took only 11 million yards; but by 1840 it already took 145 million yards. This was not merely a gratifying extension of Lancashire's markets. It was a major landmark in world history. For since the dawn of time Europe had always imported more from the East than she had sold there; because there was little the Orient requires from the West in return for spices, silks, calicoes, jewels, etc., which it sent there. The cotton shirtings of the Industrial Revolution for the first time reversed this relationship, which had been hitherto kept in balance by a mixture of bullion exports and robbery.⁸³

Before the emergence of the modern capitalist world-system, the center of the world-economy was in Asia. The Eastern world was superior to the West in technology and economy; Asian states had the greatest trading volume in the world. Besides silk, spices, etc., manufactured products of China and India were imported to Europe, and since Europe could not produce anything valuable to sell, there was a huge foreign trade surplus in favor of Asia. That is to say, Europe was economically dependent on Asia. Asian states tried to conduct protectionist policies to avoid destructive effects of import of industrial products on their economy. England could not overcome these trade

⁸² Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Core-Periphery Relations: The Effects of Core Competition", 161.

⁸³ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 35

restrictions by political and diplomatic means and used its military supremacy to force these states to dispose of quotas and tariffs. Once defeated by England, these states became open markets for England's industrial products. By abolishing their traditional manufacture system and economically colonizing them, England integrated them into capitalist world-economy and ended the supremacy of Asia (other colonies of England were integrated into the capitalist world-economy by this way too). Western dominance was substantially the result of industrialized England's colonization efforts.

Arrighi emphasizes that for understanding the reasons for the rise and decline of the British hegemony we have to understand the three factors that British hegemony was based on. These three factors are "*British mastery of the European balance of power, British leadership in the liberalization of trade in the Western world and the British leadership in empire-building in the non-Western world.*"⁸⁴ Several times a state tried to establish a world-empire in Europe. England led the coalition against these states and they could be defeated only by England's intervention. After these wars, England reconstructed the order and England's role as European balance of power enhanced its hegemony. Since England was the first industrialized state and it had the economic supremacy, liberalization of international trade was suitable to its interests. England established an empire with its colonies all over the world and they did not just provide resources; they were also military bases to enlarge this empire.

After the war between 1775 and 1783 England lost its colonies in America. With the Treaty of Paris, the USA emerged as an independent country and England had to recognize its sovereignty. It seemed like an important loss for England but as Wallerstein rightfully points out it turned out that it was actually a gain for England; England got rid of high administrative costs of colonies and continued its high margin and profitable trade with its former colonies.⁸⁵ In the short term, England benefited from this historical event, but in the long term, independence of the USA weakened England's hegemony.

⁸⁴ Arrighi, "The Global Market", 219.

⁸⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern Dünya Sistemi-3: Kapitalist Dünya Ekonomisinin Büyük Yayılımının İkinci Evresi 1730-1840*, 109.

After England other countries started their industrialization process too and started to seek colonies. Especially, industrialization of Germany changed the balance in Europe. After Germany established its national unity, it started a rapid industrialization process. An armament race was started between these two powers and they competed for the control of the colonies. As Arrighi states *“after 1902, the race in armored steamships with Germany forced Britain to reconcentrate its navy in North Sea home waters, seriously undermining Britain’s capacity to police its world-encompassing empire.”*⁸⁶ This arms race and competition on colonies led the states into the First World War, and it accelerated the decline of British hegemony.

During the First World War, the USA was selling arms and loaning great amount of money to England and France. Allied powers were close to exhaustion and after Russia withdrew from war, their position got even worse. Germany was trying to transform the capitalist world-economy to a world-empire, if Germany would defeat the allied powers it would have the full control of Europe. This united Europe under the control of powerful Germany would be a threat for American interests. Thereby, the USA got involved in the war and changed the balance in favor of its debtors. This was a very important historical point; the USA was taking over the role of mastery of the European balance of power from England.

As mentioned before, all hegemonic powers reorganized the world-system after becoming the hegemonic power of the world-system, and understanding their modernization processes are crucial for an analysis of this reorganizing. In feudal Europe agriculture was generally a subsistence activity; when feudalism collapsed as a system in Europe agriculture started to commercialize. Landed gentry in England adopted these new conditions better than their equals in continental Europe, old landowners and aristocrats became great merchants and bourgeois; this determined the path of England’s modernization. England was the first country where a bourgeois revolution emerged but due to this adaptation and absolute annihilation of peasantry in early phase, the transition was relatively softer than in continental countries, for example France. England achieved to establish a liberal state model and its reorganizing

⁸⁶ Arrighi, “The Global Market”, 227.

of the world order was determined by this model. After emerging as victorious from the competition with France for being the hegemonic power in 1815, England started to spread the liberal values and institutions. Wallerstein points out that even though they were rivals, after 1815 England and France made an alliance to institutionalize the “liberal state model” in core regions of the world-system.⁸⁷ Since liberal theory defends minimizing the government interventionism in social life, many liberal scholars claim that liberalism reduced the role of the state. Actually, liberal reforms made the state more flexible and strengthened it. When he is discussing that reformism of liberalism is “state-enhancing”, Wallerstein says: “*Conservatism and socialism appeal beyond the state to a “society” which finds its expression in other institutions. Liberalism, precisely it is individualistic and contractual, finds the ultimate resolution of conflicts in state decisions, state alone being presumed to have no interests of its own but to be the vector of the majority compromise and consensus.*”⁸⁸ When England was encouraging this liberal modern state model under its hegemony, it was also spreading a more powerful state model, establishing a new interstate system and reorganizing the world-system as a more state centric system.

As mentioned before, liberalism also postulates that progress is necessary and inevitable. Irene Collins defines liberalism as “*a belief that progress, leading to final perfection, could be achieved by means of free institutions*”.⁸⁹ Against the stability and fear for change of ancient regimes new modern regimes centered upon progress. Progress and development became the main aims of the states in the modern world-system under England’s hegemony.

Industrial capitalism is another important part of the modern-world system. Marx says: “*The industrial bourgeoisie can rule only where modern industry shapes all property relations to suit itself, and industry can win this power only where it has conquered the world market, for national bounds are inadequate for its development.*”⁹⁰ England was the first place where industry shaped these relations and industrial

⁸⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, , *The Modern World-System-4: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914*, 21.

⁸⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing the World-System*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), 10.

⁸⁹ Irene Collins, *Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (London: Historical Association, 1957), 4.

⁹⁰ Karl Marx, “Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850” In Karl Marx, *Selected Works, Vol I*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 19.

bourgeoisie became the dominant class. But the nature of this system requires expansion of its mode of production and institutions. As Marx properly states, industrial capitalism cannot survive in just one state, it is a global system. England became a model for other states with its successful industrialization. New techniques of industrial production were spread to the world from England and by building and controlling the world market; England led the expansion of this industrial capitalist system in the world.

When reorganizing the world-system England used a lot of means but industrialization and liberalism were the most crucial ones. The industrialization process led by England was a great transformation and changed the structure of the world-system entirely. Traditional modes of production and their political structures swept by this transformation and a new world-system, a capitalist world-economy, emerged. Every world-system needs a geoculture and as mentioned before, this geoculture is substantially determined by the hegemonic power of the system. Liberalism grew into the mainstream ideology of the modern world-system and became the most crucial component of the geoculture during the period of England's hegemony. Under the leadership of England, international trade was more liberalized and as explained above, structures of the modern world-system were reshaped according to liberal values and institutions.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE MODERNIZATION AND THE HEGEMONY OF THE USA

5.1. The Modernization of the USA

Western European countries had different ways of modernization; one cannot claim that the modernizations of England, France or Germany are identical. But they shared certain common features; they all have legacy of feudalism, even though its effect could change everywhere it was an important common ground which had a great impact on their modernization processes. Modernization of the USA had some common features with Western European countries too but it also had significantly different characteristics from them. The most crucial one is that there has not been a feudal system in America and the USA did not have to deal with this feudal legacy in its modernization process. It means that there has not been an aristocracy and a peasantry in classical terms in the USA. Lack of these two social classes and certain repressive mechanisms of feudalism became very determinative on the modernization of the USA and substantially distinguished it from European examples. Eisenstadt points out:

The first radical transformation of the premises of cultural and political order took place with the expansion of modernity in the Americas. There, distinctive modernities, reflecting novel patterns of institutional life, with new self-conceptions and new forms of collective consciousness, emerged. To say this is to emphasize that practically from the beginning of modernity's expansion multiple modernities developed, all within what may be defined as the Western civilizational framework...The crystallization of distinct patterns of modernity in the Americas took place...through a confrontational discourse with Europe-especially with England and France.⁹¹

As Eisenstadt argues, beyond talking about universal path of modernization, we cannot even find historical data for defining a “Western type of modernization” as a narrower concept. Each Western European state has different features of modernization and the USA also had its distinctive path. In Europe, unravelling of feudal structures can be used as an indicator of modernization, but in America, it cannot be taken as an indicator. As we will see in the next chapter, in the case of China, there was a system of empire which was quite different from the feudal system; therefore, unravelling of

⁹¹ S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, 13.

feudal structures cannot be used as an indicator for China either. Taxation, warfare and bureaucracy were important elements for foundation of the modern state. Warfare played somehow an important role in most of the modernization processes, but in American experience it was indubitably the driving force of modernization. As I will explain, the USA had a highly militarized modernization; the state-building process in America was substantially based on warfare. Foundation of a modern taxation system and emergence of a modern bureaucracy occurred through warfare in America.

Under the British rule, people in colonies had important representative democracy experience which could be considered as ahead of their time. Blacks and women did not have right to vote and a man had to have certain amount of property to vote, but there was still more democratic system than in European countries. In the period of colonial rule, between fifty and eighty per cent of American adult white males had right to vote, in Britain that was only fifteen per cent in the same period.⁹² Geopolitical positions of states have direct impacts on their modernization processes. America was explored and colonized by Europeans by the end of the 15th century. With their superior military technology, Europeans slaughtered the natives of the continent and seized their lands. Since there were great empty lands in America, a majority of the American white males had opportunity to have their own lands which provided them with the right to vote.

England wanted to levy new taxes on its colonies in America for reimbursing its expenses of wars in Europe. These new taxes caused protests among people in the colonies and this process resulted in the American War of Independence (1775-1783) against England. The Thirteen Colonies decided to cut all their ties from Great Britain and declared independence in 1776.⁹³ They established the Thirteen United States of America which can be seen as the earliest form of the United States of America. In 1783, the USA gained its independence from England by the Treaty of Paris.

As mentioned before, warfare is very important for foundation of the modern state. In the time of war colonies started to establish a national finance system. The

⁹² Alan Farmer, *Britain and the American Colonies, 1740-1789*, (London: Hodder Education, 2008), 8.

⁹³ Daniel Marston, *American Revolution, 1774-1783*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 37.

Congress started to act like a government and in 1775 June Congress “*raised an army and declared the colonies collectively responsible for what was spent defending their common cause*”.⁹⁴ Hence, first efforts of establishing a taxation system occurred through warfare. This collective responsibility for financing the war also forced states to build specialized bureaucracy to regulate this process.

There is a tendency to call American War of Independence as a revolution.⁹⁵ But in my opinion, this war was neither revolution nor an anti-imperialist war. As Moore befittingly states, this war for being independent from England was just about conflict of interests between traders in America and traders in England; and it did not cause any revolutionary changes in American society.⁹⁶ There were not any improvements of rights, reforms led up to expansion of political participation or a serious change of class structure after this war, for that reason, in my opinion, defining this process as a revolution is a misconceptualization. As Arrighi says: “*It was the spatial product of the century-long process of territorial seizure and occupation through which the United States had ‘internalized’ imperialism from the very beginning of its history*”.⁹⁷ All the efforts of securing the internal unity and establishing the USA was a process of imperial expansion. Consequently, Americans were not against colonialism as a general phenomenon; they were just troubled with English colonialism on themselves, and they opposed it. Therefore, in my opinion, it is impossible to define this kind of war as anti-imperialist or anti-colonialist.

At the beginning of the 19th century a national market was constructed by the federal government in America. Means of transportation and communication were significantly improved, and this provided a suitable ground for industrial production and long distance trade in the country. There had been only sixty-nine post offices and about two thousand miles of post roads in 1788, but by 1815 there were over three thousand

⁹⁴ Robert A. Becker, “Currency, Taxation and Finance, 1775-1787” in *A Companion to the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 388.

⁹⁵ Look at Jeff Wallenfeldt, *The American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812*, (New York: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010); John Ferling, *Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Robert J. Allison, *The American Revolution: A Concise History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁹⁶ Moore, 153.

⁹⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony Unravelling II”, *New Left Review* 33, (May/June 2005): 20-21.

post offices and post roads were built all over the Union.⁹⁸ Since America had not been united politically and economically yet and the economic structure was variable according to areas, this market revolution had different effects on different regions. As Lacy K. Ford notes:

In many parts of the North, and in scattered enclaves elsewhere, the market revolution brought with it industrialization, understood as a process of capital-intensive factory production, and the rise of a class of largely propertyless wage laborers. In other areas, the market revolution meant simply the expansion and intensification of commercial agriculture and trade, and in the lower South, the market revolution represented the westward expansion of plantation agriculture and the extension of staple agriculture into upland regions previously dominated by subsistence production.⁹⁹

Even though this market revolution occurred differently in different regions of America, we can say that it accelerated the foundation of the national market.

In 1861 a Civil War started in America. Seven Southern slave states declared independence from the US and established the Confederate States of America. The Confederacy was claiming some territories from the North and the West; and war started when they attacked a US fortress, Fort Sumter. Western states made an alliance with Northern states in the Civil War. This war between the industrial Northern states, which were called the Union, and the slave states of South ended in 1865 by defeat of the South.

As mentioned before, there was not a feudal system in America; therefore, there was not an aristocracy and peasantry or clashes between them. As Moore mentions, in America, there was a different kind of “*marriage of iron and rye - to glance once more at the German combination of industry and Junkers - but with Western family farmers, not landed aristocrats, and hence with diametrically opposite political consequences.*”¹⁰⁰ Alliance of Northern industrial bourgeoisie and Western farmers defeated the slave states of the South in the Civil War. A reactionary coalition between Northern industrial bourgeoisie and landed elites of the South did not emerge before the

⁹⁸ Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 478.

⁹⁹ Lacy K. Ford, ed., *A Companion to the Civil War and the Reconstruction*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 3.

¹⁰⁰ Moore, 173.

Civil War. An important reason for this lack of alliance supports my claim that one should analyze the modernization processes of states and the systemic processes of the world-system together. External threats could play a unifying role in countries, in Japanese and German modernizations, these threats made it easier and necessary to establish this kind of coalitions. But the USA had a different position in the world-system, it did not have a serious external enemy, and for elites of the North and South, it was not crucial to make such an alliance. This lack of external threat and its impact on American modernization again shows us how effective systemic position and relations of a state could be on its modernization process. That is why, I insist that a holistic perspective which focuses on internal and systemic relations of states as combined research objects is required for proper analysis of modernization and hegemony.

The Civil War paved the way for the development of industrial capitalism. The West joined the Union after the Civil War and a great internal market was established in the USA. The industries of the North were backed by the agricultural production of the West and the South. The state executed very high tariffs after the Civil War to protect its industries. Even though developed countries usually suggest to the underdeveloped countries to lower their tariffs and support the liberalization of international trade, they all execute high tariffs and conduct protectionist economic policies in the beginning of their industrialization processes. Under the protection of the state and with a great internal market, American industry achieved an unprecedented development. Its great industry provided economic and military superiority to the USA and the USA could be able to establish its hegemony by its industrial and military power.

Slavery is an important category for American modernization. Generally it is accepted that slavery does not belong to a modern system and it is an obstacle for industrialization and capitalism. There is no convincing historical evidence for this argument; on the contrary, we can easily find evidences that slavery played a crucial role for American industrialization. Between 1815 and 1860, the cotton industry was the most important industry for the industrialization and the economic growth of America; England was the biggest buyer of cotton and it was buying 80% of the cotton from

Southern slave states between 1840 and 1865.¹⁰¹ As historical facts show us, plantations of Southern states, where slave labour was used, were driving forces of industrial development of America, not an obstacle for it. As Marx states:

Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that gave the colonies their value; it is the colonies that created world trade, and it is world trade that is the precondition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance.

Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe North America off the map of the world, and you will have anarchy — the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations.¹⁰²

As Marx argues, slave labor played a crucial role both in the industrialization of many states and in creation of world trade. Although slavery was prohibited by law after the Civil War, it continued to live under different names and forms. Contrary to the claims of the defenders of progressive history, history does not follow a linear path; historical processes could be reversed and gains of lower classes could be taken from them. After the Civil War, Northern and Southern elites tried to take back the new rights of blacks, migrants and organized labour, and as Tilly mentions, they became quite successful in the South. Besides blacks even many dispossessed white lost their rights.¹⁰³ By Black Codes (1865-1866) and Jim Crow Laws after that, racial discrimination in public life was legalized and institutionalized in America. Political and civil rights of black people (and dispossessed whites) were restricted; blacks were excluded from state offices, specific schools and public places.

Individual rights were guaranteed in the U.S. constitution, and right of private property was the most important of them. It was accepted as inviolable, the right of property was seen as a sacred right. This also means that propertied class is the only segment of society which is really under legal protection. This over-emphasis on private

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 157.

¹⁰² Karl Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty* by M. Proudhon, 49-50.

¹⁰³ Charles Tilly, *Demokrasi*, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2014), 168.

property was the reflection of structure of political system in the USA. Karl Polanyi states:

A hundred years later not commercial but industrial property was to be protected, and not against the Crown but against the people. Only by misconception could seventeenth-century meanings be applied to nineteenth-century situations. The separation of powers, which Montesquieu (1748) had meanwhile invented, was now used to separate the people from power over their own economic life. The American Constitution, shaped in a farmer-craftsman's environment by a leadership forewarned by the English industrial scene, isolated the economic sphere entirely from the jurisdiction of the Constitution, put private property thereby under the highest conceivable protection, and created the only legally grounded market society in the world. In spite of universal suffrage, American voters were powerless against owners.¹⁰⁴

Even though political rights were legally expanded and the rate of political participation increased by years in the USA, as Polanyi argues, propertyless masses did not have a real political power. Eisenstadt is right when saying that the modernization process of America was conducted by a small oligarchic group.¹⁰⁵ This small propertied oligarchic group organized the political regime for their interests and did everything in their power to prevent extension of political and civil rights to the masses.

In many European experiences of modernization radical movements were very effective. There were some obstacles for emergence of radical tendencies in America. Since there was not a peasantry in classical terms, we cannot see serious peasant rebellions in American history. There were plenty of vacant lands in America and people were not under feudal restrictions; it was easier to get a property for farmers and workers. This prevented the emergence of radicalism of dispossessed masses which turned Europe upside-down. This also strengthened the individualist and competitive tendencies and created suitable ground for capitalism. Only radical movement which the American state had to handle was the black movement. In the 18th and 19th centuries several slave rebellions occurred in America. Legal racial discrimination was not repealed until the second half of the 20th century and although legal equality was

¹⁰⁴ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 233-234.

¹⁰⁵ S.N. Eisenstadt, *Modernleşme: Başkaldırı ve Değişim*, 80.

accepted, de facto discrimination could not be abolished; therefore, organized radical black movement continued to live in the USA.

The American Civil War is generally accepted as the first example of modern and industrialized war because of effective usage of “*railroads, the telegraph, ironclad ships and observation balloons.*”¹⁰⁶ This war was also demonstration of advanced American military industry. American industrialization (especially military industrialization) was the moving force of American modernization, with the industrialization there has been a need for modern state and society. The North’s victory was based on its industrial superiority against the South. This aspect of American modernization is generally unheeded, although most scholars emphasize the liberal values and democratic structures of American modernization. In fact, American modernization is highly militarized. First, the War of Independence, then Civil War and then two World Wars; American society went through nearly constant military mobilization for more than one and a half century. This highly militarized path of modernization had serious impacts on American hegemony. As mentioned before, hegemony is a combination of military and economic power. Even though Spain was militarily more powerful than England, England became the hegemonic power of the world-system. In cases of previous hegemonic powers their economic superiority outweighed their military power, but in the case of the USA, its military superiority was the dominating factor of its hegemony. There has never been militarily more powerful country than the USA during its hegemony. Shifts of hegemony occur after great wars, when hegemony of previous hegemonic powers unravelling their military power was declining too and with the destruction of great wars they lost their hegemonies. But in the case of the USA, although it lost its economic superiority and its hegemony is certainly declining, military power is intensifying in its hand. Even though the USA is going through a significant deindustrialization process, by the impact of its highly militarized modernization, it is still the greatest producer of arms in the world. With its tremendous nuclear capacity, American military power is still unmatched, and it is even growing day by day. Therefore, because of this intensification of military power, for the USA, it seems unlikely to lose its hegemony by the same way as previous hegemonic

¹⁰⁶ Donald A. Ritchie, *American History: Modern Era Since 1865*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 190.

powers. As we see, this highly militarized modernization path of the USA was very determinative on the structure of its hegemony and it will be also very determinative on how the next shift of hegemony will occur in the world-system.

5.2. The Rise of American Hegemony

The USA established its hegemony after the Second World War but it had already become an important power which constrained the hegemonic power of Britain even before First World War. The USA had a very rapid economic and military development. Arrighi says: “By the 1850s the US had become a leader in the production of machines for the mass production of small arms. In 1910, the United States already controlled 31 percent of the world’s official gold reserves.”¹⁰⁷ After the Civil War in the period of 1860-65 the USA established its unity and its development gained a serious momentum.

Even though the USA achieved a significant economic growth, England was still maintaining its dominance in “*international capital market*” before the First World War; in 1914 England had the 44 per cent of “*overseas investment*” alone, while the USA, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland and the rest were sharing 56 per cent and England had mercantile marines 12 per cent larger than total mercantile marines of European countries in the same year.¹⁰⁸ In my opinion, despite its rapid development, it would be quite harder for the USA to take over the hegemonic position from England if the destruction of the two World Wars did not change the balance in the world-system.

As mentioned before, the USA took over the role of mastery of European balance of power from England during the First World War. A united and powerful Europe would be a threat for the USA, so it joined the war by side of allied powers to prevent Germany’s effort of transforming European world-economy to a world-empire. Before the First World War, England led the coalitions against the states which tried to control all Europe, but now Germany was defeated only by interference of the USA. In

¹⁰⁷ Arrighi, “The Global Market”, 228-229.

¹⁰⁸ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 51.

the Second World War, the USA played the same role with a more powerful position this time. This role of mastery of European balance of power was very important for being the leader of Western countries and it reinforced the hegemonic position of the USA.

England and the USA had strong economic ties; England's economy and the British-centered global market were damaged after the First World War and this had seriously bad effects on the American economy. Especially after the Great Depression in 1929, American economy fell into a crisis. Between 1933 and 1938 the Roosevelt Administration implemented the New Deal, which included important economic and social reforms. The USA managed to overcome its economic difficulties by these reforms and obtained a strong position in world politics before the Second World War.

The First World War was the end of the period called *belle époque* or the Edwardian era (1871-1914). England was still an important power in the world-system but it lost its hegemony after the war. Hegemonic powers could maintain their position as a financial center long after they lost their hegemony. As Arrighi states: "*In the 1920s the United States already accounted for over 40 percent of world production but had not developed into the natural center for intermediation in international economic exchanges that London had been.*"¹⁰⁹ England was able to keep some of its power after the First World War but the Second World War was a total disaster, most of the European countries were ruined. Actually, the USA was the only superpower which had not got a serious destruction on its production capacity.

After the Second World War the USA and the USSR divided the world into spheres of influence in Yalta. Stalin and Roosevelt agreed that east of the Elbe River would be the sphere of influence of the USSR and west of it would be the sphere of influence of the USA. This agreement had some secret clauses. The first one is that the USSR would not have any aid from the USA for its reconstruction. According to Wallerstein cost of the reconstruction of the USSR would be very high and even if the USSR were reconstructed, it did not have a potential to become a suitable market for the

¹⁰⁹ Arrighi, "The Global Market", 232.

USA.¹¹⁰ So this clause was beneficial for the USA. The second secret clause was more ideological. The USA and the USSR agreed not to be in a military confrontation but they also agreed that they would use an aggressive discourse against each other. We know that they continuously accused each other until the collapse of the Soviet Union. They declared each other as the main threat to the world and increased the tension all the time. Like Wallerstein, a lot of other scholars incisively claimed that the Cold War was based on this secret clause and actually it was an invention and I agree with that. This invention of the Cold War provided certain benefits to the two superpowers. By using the fear of the US, the USSR had a protective role for its satellite states. All opposition in the USSR was also crushed by accusing their leaders for being agents of the USA. The USA established a strong anti-communist propaganda and accelerated the fear of communism. The USA was the only military power which could match the USSR, and its propaganda had been successful; a lot of states, especially European states were convinced that there was a threat of Soviet invasion. As mentioned before, a hegemonic state needs the consent of other states. By this propaganda the USA constructed the idea that European countries and other countries of the “Free World” needed the protection of the USA against the USSR. In my opinion, by this fear and acceptance of its leadership, the USA reinforced its hegemonic position. As mentioned before, American modernization was based on capitalist development and over-emphasis on private property; thereby, communism was seen as a threat to the founding principles of the USA. From my point of view, every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system according to its values and institutions. Both because of internal dynamics of the USA and power relations in the world-system, anti-communism became an important part of ideological framework which the USA wanted to dominate the geoculture of the world-system.

The USA needed to reconstruct the global market to establish its hegemony. The rest of the world did not have the capacity to make great production; therefore, there was no serious competition. There was not also enough buying power in the market because of the destruction of the Second World War, the USA had to create sufficient effective demand to reconstruct the global market. After the global market

¹¹⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Liberalizmden Sonra*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık, 1998), 173.

collapsed, the system which was organized by England was collapsing too and the USA had to build new institutions and reorganize the world-system to establish its hegemony. As Arrighi and Silver state:

Increasing systemic disorganization curtails the collective power of the system's dominant groups. And the greater the curtailment, the more widely and deeply felt the demand for system-level governance. Nevertheless, this demand can be satisfied and a new hegemony can emerge only if increasing systemic disorganization is accompanied by the emergence of a new complex of governmental and business agencies endowed with greater system-level organizational capabilities than those of the preceding hegemonic complex. The breakdown of any given hegemonic order is ultimately due to the fact that the increase in the volume and dynamic density of the system outgrows the organizational capabilities of the particular hegemonic complex that had created the conditions of the systemic expansion. Ultimately, therefore, the ensuing self-reinforcing disorder can be overcome, and the conditions of a new systemic expansion can be created, only if a new complex emerges that is endowed with greater systemic capabilities than the old hegemonic complex.¹¹¹

That is to say, a potential hegemonic power could establish its hegemony only by forming a new and more complex institutional structures and reorganizing the world-system. Therefore, the USA had to reconstruct the global market, establish new institutions and develop new systemic agencies to restore the order and establish its hegemony. In 1945 the USA provided aid to Europe and other regions of the world by UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) and CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere).¹¹² The Truman administration encouraged the European countries for establishing a union and abolishing the trade barriers among themselves. This would be helpful for reconstruction of Europe and the USA promised to give more aids. In 1947 George Marshall, Secretary of State, declared the Marshall Plan. According to this plan the USA provided significant economic aid to sixteen countries. This plan and other aids were important steps for reconstruction of the global market. But as Arrighi emphasizes: *“European integration and world economic expansion required a far more comprehensive recycling of world liquidity that involved in the Marshall Plan and other aid programs. This more comprehensive recycling eventually materialized through the most massive rearmament effort the world had ever*

¹¹¹ Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, *Chaos and the Governance in the Modern World System*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 33-34.

¹¹² Wallerstein, *Liberalizmden Sonra* , 172.

seen in times of peace".¹¹³ The USA used the fear of Soviet invasion to convince these countries for armament effort and provided great military aids to the countries which belong to the Western camp. The USA also sold great amount of arms to these countries and this trade provided the expansion which world-economy needed.

The USA also established important institutions to build its hegemony. One of the most important of these institutions was Bretton Woods. By Bretton Woods Agreements a new monetary system was established. This new monetary system was based on the dollar. Also two other important institutions were established by these agreements: The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions served as the main means of American economic supremacy. Another important institution was the United Nations. The charter of the United Nations was guided by the American constitution. The United Nations was designed to serve the interests of the victors of the Second World War. The USA, the USSR, UK, France and China became permanent members of the Security Council, where all important decisions are taken. All these five states have right of veto. As the hegemonic power of the world-system, the USA has been the most influential state in the UN. Consequently, the USA reshaped the financial structures by the Bretton Woods Agreements and restored the political order by United Nation in the world-system.

As mentioned before, every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system according to its interests and set of values after establishing its hegemony and these interests and set of values are highly influenced by modernization processes of these hegemonic powers. But there is not a one-sided relation between hegemonic power and the world-system; as hegemonic power affects the world-system, world-system affects the hegemonic power too, it is a reciprocal process. The reorganizing capacity of the hegemonic power is restricted by the specific structures of the world-system and power of other states. After the Second World War, the USA wanted to reorganize the international trade in the world-system in a more liberalized way. Liberal economy, right of private property and free trade were the basic principles which were defended by executives of the American development in the modernization process. Also, since

¹¹³ Arrighi, "The Global Market", 235.

the USA had an economic supremacy, complete free trade was for the benefit of the USA. But after the Second World War, the European countries were devastated and their economies collapsed, it was impossible for them to compete with unmatched production capacity of the USA in conditions of free trade. They had to protect their fragile economies. Therefore, *“The United States eventually moved toward a compromise settlement. Rather than a simple system of free trade, the industrial countries would establish a managed order organized around a set of multilateral organizations and a “social bargain” that sought to balance openness with domestic welfare and stability.”*¹¹⁴ Even hegemonic powers do not have the power of dictating everything they want to the other actors in the interstate system of the modern world-system.

5.3. Challenges to the American Hegemony

After the Second World War, the USA established its hegemony. 1945-73 was a period of great expansion in the world-economy; it was the period in which American hegemony was strongest. But the USA faced several challenges in this period which accelerated its decline. The Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War and 1968 world revolution were the most important challenges in this period. After this period, American hegemony started to decline in the 1970s and faced two other important challenges in its period of decline: Iranian Islamic Revolution and September 11. Since every challenge had important damage on American hegemony and affected the way of its decline, I will analyze the relation between these challenges and decline of the American hegemony.

Cuba had been seen as its backyard by the USA for a long time. General Batista, who was backed by the USA, was ruling the state as a dictator. There were important oppositions to General Batista in Cuba. The USA was supporting Batista against armed revolutionary groups but it did not manage to ensure him keeping his position. In 1959, Batista was overthrown by Fidel Castro and his armed guerillas. Socialist revolution in a very close country to the USA was perceived as a big threat.

¹¹⁴ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 185.

After the revolution, Cuba started to develop good relations with the Soviet Union and revolutionary government of Cuba expropriated the properties of a lot of American companies. The USA decided to give an answer to this challenge and organized the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The US government armed Cuban exiles and sent them to Cuba to overthrow the socialist regime. The result was a disaster; by the support of local civilians, Cuban army had a certain victory. After that the USA tried to organize several plots, it tried to assassinate the leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro, tens of times but it failed. Cuba was a very small country and it had very limited economic power compared to the USA. Losing its backyard was bad enough, worst was that the USA could not accomplish to change the regime in such a small country. It damaged the prestige of the USA and gave courage to its opponents. They thought that even such a small country, which was also very close the USA, could challenge its hegemony, they could too.

1968 world revolution was a strong blow to the American hegemony. People were unhappy about the status quo and serious upheavals emerged all over the world. According to Wallerstein spark of these upheavals was opposition of the people who were excluded from well-organized world order of American hegemony.¹¹⁵ Revolutionaries of 1968 did not just oppose the American hegemony; they also claimed that there was a sham fight between the USA and the USSR. They rebelled against the world order which was shaped by these two superpowers. Direct political results of this revolution could not last long. But intellectual results were very important. This revolution challenged the liberal values and changed the geoculture of the world-system which was created by American hegemony. The USA lost its dominance in intellectual area.

The Vietnam War was another important challenge to the American hegemony. The end of the Vietnam War was generally accepted as starting point of the decline of American hegemony. There was a war between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The first one was supported by the Soviet Union and China, and the second one was supported by the USA and its allies. In the 1960s, when the war was continuing, the US administration decided to directly join the war to prevent the invasion of South Vietnam

¹¹⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Amerikan Gücünün Gerileyişi*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık, 2004), 50.

by communist North Vietnam. The US administration feared that if North Vietnam won the war, this communist regime could affect the other states in the region and could cause changes of regimes. The US troops were sent to Vietnam and fought against forces of North Vietnam. After more than ten years of war, the USA lost and had to withdraw its troops from Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Unfair military intervention of the USA and its massacres by using chemical weapons enhanced the opposition against its hegemony; people started to protest the USA all over the world. These protests were also one of the starting points of 1968 world revolution. The Vietnam War damaged the global consent that leadership of the USA was beneficial for all. The costs of the war were also tremendous for the USA. It lost almost sixty thousand soldiers, and the war consumed a great amount of financial resources of the USA. This was different from failure in Cuba; in Cuba the USA just armed the exiles, gave them financial support and organized some plots against the socialist regime. But in Vietnam, the USA, the strongest military power of the world, was directly involved in the war and despite its high technology and superior air forces it could not defeat the North Vietnam. This was a great success for the anti-American bloc and this failure damaged the national pride of the USA. With several other reasons, high financial costs of this war to the USA caused the loss of its economic supremacy in the 1970s.

Another important challenge was the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In 1979 the Shah of Iran was overthrown and a new Islamic Republic was established under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini. The Shah was following a pro-American foreign policy, contrary to his predecessor; Khomeini wanted to follow an independent foreign policy. He described the USA as the “Great Satan” and the Soviet Union as the “Lesser Satan.” He conceptualized his foreign policy as “*Neither East Nor West*”.¹¹⁶ After this revolution, the USA lost an important ally. But beyond this, according to Wallerstein, Khomeini’s Iran gave more damage to American hegemony even more than Cuba, 1968 revolution or any other opposition. Wallerstein emphasizes that Chinese Communist Party, revolutionaries of Cuba or Nasserists were all struggling against the common world-system but despite their differences, they all share the Enlightenment values and

¹¹⁶ Ray Takeyh, *Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20.

therefore, they were all part of the system.¹¹⁷ But Khomeini was rejecting all these values, speaking through another view of world; that's why he managed to insult the USA and damaged its hegemony that much. The hostage crisis between Iran and the USA was an important strike to the prestige of the USA. After the revolution, students invaded the US embassy and took sixty three people as hostage in the fourth of November 1979. Students demanded the extradition of the Shah to Iran. The USA organized a rescue operation with a helicopter but it failed. Invaders took these people as hostage for four hundred forty four days. Daring to take hostage of the diplomats of a hegemonic power was an insult and if this hegemonic power could not manage to rescue them for this long, it would be serious loss of prestige.

5.4. The Decline of the American Hegemony

All these challenges caused serious damages to American hegemony. There were also other challenges, decolonization of the Third World and their industrialization efforts had serious impact on American hegemony too. Some radical movements did not directly fight against the USA but examples like Algeria challenged the system which was shaped by American hegemony. Besides all these challenges, two important structural changes were fatal strikes to the American hegemony: Collapse of the bipolar system and over-financialization of the world economy. Over-financialization caused the loss of superiority and control in global market for the USA and collapse of bipolar system meant the disappearance of the greatest threat which the USA used to construct the consent of other states for its hegemony. As I will elaborate, since the USA lost its economic superiority and consent of other states, it started to depend on coercive power more than ever. Loss of economic superiority and leadership role depend on consent means that the USA does not have a hegemonic position anymore; the USA now have what Ranajit Guha called "*dominance without hegemony*".¹¹⁸

The 1950s and 1960s was a great expansion period of the world-economy like in the 1850s and 1860s. Arrighi emphasizes that these two periods had two important characteristic in common: "*First they were both periods of reconstruction of the global*

¹¹⁷ Wallerstein, *Liberalizmden Sonra*, 180.

¹¹⁸ Ranajit Guha, *Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997)

market by the world's most powerful state. And second, they both ended in a crisis of overaccumulation followed by a worldwide financial expansion."¹¹⁹ Besides this overaccumulation, prices of primary inputs increased. First prices of labor increased by the pressure of syndical movements and the general increase of wealth in the 1960s and 1970s. These developments were followed by the oil shock. Between 1970 and 1973 oil prices increased twofold and in 1974 they increased threefold. This extreme increase in the price of inputs caused a serious decrease in the rates of profitability. With this decrease of profitability the expansion period ended and the world-economy entered a Kondratieff-B phase in the 1970s. Capitalists tried to overcome this profitability squeeze by *"diverting a growing proportion of their incoming cash flows from production and trade in commodities to hoarding, lending, borrowing and speculating in financial markets."*¹²⁰ Financialization of the world economy weakened the control of nation states on economy. Capitalists transferred their money to offshore banks which were beyond control of the states. Increased speculation and uncontrolled flow of liquidity made national economies more fragile and unstable.

The gold-dollar standard, which was established at Bretton Woods, was not sustainable for the USA anymore because of all these complications in the world economy. The gold-dollar standard collapsed between 1968 and 1973 and the USA lost much of its control on global supply of money. But as Arrighi emphasizes there was no alternative to the dollar as the *"principal international reserve currency and medium of exchange, the abandonment of the gold-dollar exchange standard resulted in the establishment of a pure dollar standard."*¹²¹ Since the USA did not need to control its balance of payments deficits anymore this provided freedom to the US government for expanding the global supply of money between 1973 and 1978. But the USA could not benefit from this seigniorage privileges for long time. Since most of the liquidity created by the US authorities could not be used in new trade and production facilities, it did not solve the economic problems of the USA and accelerated the financialization of the world economy. As Arrighi mentions *"most of it turned into petrodollars and Eurodollars, which reproduced themselves many times over through the mechanisms of*

¹¹⁹ Arrighi, "The Global Market", 236.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 237.

¹²¹ Ibid., 239.

*private interbank money creation and promptly reemerged in the global market as competitors of the dollars issued by the US government.”*¹²²

When Jimmy Carter became president things were not going so well for the USA. Economic troubles and ideological challenges weakened the position of the USA in the world-system. Carter gave his famous speech in which he accepted the limits of the US power in the public. According to Wallerstein he developed a “soft attitude” in the foreign policy and it functioned well until Khomeini challenged it.¹²³ Regardless of the “soft attitude” the USA was still the Great Satan for the Khomeini. With his soft attitude, Carter was planning to develop better relations with other states and reduce the opposition against the USA which was rising all over the world. Khomeini was seeing it as a trap and his uncompromising position destroyed these plans. Carter’s soft attitude could not able to solve hostage crisis with Iran for a long time and the USA lost prestige. After Carter, Ronald Reagan became the president and his election campaign was based on the rejection of this soft attitude. He used an aggressive discourse, promised that he would be harsh on the enemies and restore the power of the USA. Reagan borrowed great amount of money, especially from Japan, and started a “*military Keynesianism*” to overcome high unemployment inside the country and stop the decline of the USA in the world-system.¹²⁴ As a result of this, the USA became the most indebted country in the world. In 1981 “*federal budget deficit stood at 74 billion dollar and the total national debt at 1 trillion dollar. By 1991 the budget deficit had quadrupled to more than 300 billion dollar a year and the national debt had quadrupled to nearly 4 trillion dollar.*”¹²⁵ This debts made American economy very fragile and decreased its capacity to dominate world politics.

Reagan kept his promise of abandoning the soft attitude and became harsh on enemies. He accelerated the armament effort of the USA and moved the armament race to another level. The Cold War was based on balance of terror between the USA and USSR. These two superpowers had great nuclear weapons which could cause a big destruction and it is certain that even if one of them hit first, retaliation of the other

¹²² Ibid., 239.

¹²³ Wallerstein, *Liberalizmden Sonra*, 25.

¹²⁴ Wallerstein, *Amerikan Gücünün Gerileyişi*, 54.

¹²⁵ Arrighi, “The Global Market”, 241.

would cause intolerable destruction too. Because of the situation of this mutually assured destruction, neither of them could risk taking the first step. If the gap between their nuclear capacities increased, this balance of terror would collapse. Therefore, both of them had to respond to the rival's moves, they had to keep up with the new researches and inventions of their rivals to reach the same level. Reagan started the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was also known as Star Wars Project. This comprehensive military project included new kind of nuclear defense system which would change the balance between these superpowers. The USSR did not have the economic resources to afford the same kind of researches and this new nuclear armament race resulted with bankruptcy of the USSR. This was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR.

The USA and its supporters tried to show the collapse of the USSR as their victory. In the short term, the collapse of their most powerful enemy could be seen as a victory but in the long term collapse of the USSR had destructive effects on hegemonic position of the USA. Western Europe and Japan were increasing their economic power since the 1970s and at the end of the 1980s they had the capacity to compete with the USA. The USA was legitimizing its hegemonic position by the threat of communism. In Western discourse, the USSR was defined as the biggest enemy of the Western Bloc, and the USA was the only military power which could stop its expansionist intentions. When the USSR collapsed, this threat disappeared. Western European countries, Japan and other allies did not need the military protection and political leadership of the USA anymore. The USA established its hegemony by using the conditions of the bipolar system. Since the USA lost its economic superiority, it was impossible to maintain its hegemonic position after the collapse of the bipolar system.

According to Wallerstein, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a result of the collapse of the bipolar system. Saddam had this plan for a long time but he chose 1990 and it was not a coincidence. After the USSR collapsed, the principles of Yalta, which defined the spheres of influence of superpowers and balance between them, were meaningless. In the Cold War period there was a fear that any minor clash could cause a nuclear war. Therefore, the USSR and the USA were very prudent and they stepped in

almost all the clashes in the world and tried to restore the order. But after the USSR collapsed, Russia had neither that power nor responsibility to intervene in this kind of clashes. Saddam knew that there was no more the USSR to constrain him. The USA had two options; it would try to stop Iraq or would not intervene; and Saddam thought he would benefit both of this options. If the USA would not intervene he would win a victory and get rid of his big debts to Kuwait. If the USA would try to stop him, he was counting on his long term gains. The USA decided to answer this challenge and at the end of the Gulf War forces of Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait. But according to Wallerstein, even though it was a victory it damaged the hegemonic position of the USA and showed the decline of it to everyone. First of all, it became clear that the USA did not have the economic capacity to afford this kind of war alone anymore; costs of the war were defrayed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Germany and Japan.¹²⁶ Secondly, Saddam could not dare to do this kind of action when the balance between the USSR and the USA was strong and stable. This action showed that states were not bound by constraints of the bipolar system anymore. Saddam challenged the hegemony of the USA without facing great destructive consequences and this encouraged other challenges.

After attacks of September 11, the Bush administration declared “War Against Terrorism” in 2001. These attacks gave opportunity to the USA for creating a new threat and convince the other states that they still need the military protection of the USA. Strong military forces were the only superiority of the USA. Since they could not restore the American power by economic means, the neo-conservative administration planned to restore it by using coercive power. New enemies of the world were global terrorists and rogue states which supported them. The USA organized a special operation to Afghanistan and after that invaded Iraq under the project of War Against Terrorism. The main aims of the Bush administration were legitimizing the leadership of the USA by using this global terrorism threat and taking control of petroleum reserves in the region. As Arrighi emphasizes, the USA overthrew Saddam in a short time but it was not a victory; this invasion and its consequences damaged the American

¹²⁶ Wallerstein, *Amerikan Gücünün Gerileyişi*, 56.

hegemony even more than Vietnam did.¹²⁷ The USA was very prudent after the failure in Vietnam, it tried to avoid direct military confrontation because of the consequences of this defeat. It used proxy forces in Nicaragua, Kampuchea and Angola; it supported Iraq against Iran for not wanting to face a destructive defeat like in Vietnam. After the USA invaded Iraq, a strong resistance started against the USA. These resisters were not well-armed like Vietnamese guerillas, they were not experienced in guerilla warfare, they did not have the support of two superpowers (China and USSR) like Vietnamese did and there were no suitable geography for guerilla warfare in Iraq. And the USA reorganized its military forces after the failure in Vietnam, advanced its technology of weapons and professionalized its army. Thereby, as Arrighi notes the gap between the military capacity of the army of the USA and Iraqis resisters was far bigger than the gap between the army of the USA and the Vietnamese resisters; nonetheless the USA could not gain a certain victory against these resisters and reestablish the order in Iraq.¹²⁸ Because of this gap, consequences of this adventure damaged the hegemony of the USA more than the defeat in Vietnam. The military intervention of the USA in Vietnam damaged its position as the leader of the free world and protector of liberation. Opposition against the USA increased all over the world and resistance in Vietnam became an inspiration for the revolutionaries of 1968. After the invasion of Iraq, the USA faced a wave of opposition again, people protested this invasion all over the world. It almost became impossible to maintain the consent for its hegemony; on the contrary, the USA became the most hated country for most of the people. The plan of strengthening its economy by gaining control of petroleum did not work as well; costs of the war were tremendous. Except the Second World War, costs of the War Against Terrorism were greater than all wars and military operations of the USA.¹²⁹ The Vietnam War started the decline process of American hegemony and Iraq War was the fatal hit. After the September 11, even though the USA had an opportunity to construct the consent for its leadership and restore its hegemony, in my opinion, the way it used this opportunity accelerated the decline of its hegemony and deepened the transformation process of its “hegemony” to a pure “dominance”. The USA could not

¹²⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith Pekin’de*, (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2009), 186.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 192.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 205.

create a proper ideological framework for its War Against Terrorism and could not convince the majority of the states and the international community. Since the USA concentrate on military area on this process and could not construct an ideological framework for legitimizing its military interventions, it could not restore its hegemony. On the contrary, the USA became more dependent on its military dominance and reduced the consent for its leadership even more by these policies after September 11.

England lost its hegemony after two big wars, even though it was victorious in both wars it lost in the economic arena. On the other hand, the decline of the USA has been faster, despite the fact that it did not join this kind of big destructive wars, because the USA did not have a territorial empire like England did. As mentioned before, the ways of colonialist and imperialist policies are very effective on modernization processes and hegemonic periods of the states. After the Second World War, a decolonization process occurred in the world and the USA supported this process to break the influence of England and France over their colonies. The new structure of the world-system was also not suitable for old colonial policies and direct territorial dominances. Therefore, the USA used new imperialist policies, substantially based on economic policies, to reinforce its hegemony. Even though having colonies have some costs, it has also certain advantages but the USA could not use these advantages. The USA did not have the chance to directly use the resources of its colonies. England could balance its current accounts deficit by taxing its colonies; especially incomes from India were crucial for maintaining its hegemony. England could also use troops from colonies for countless military confrontations. As noted before, a hegemonic power has to use more military power when its hegemony is declining, and as we see this assertion is valid for the USA more than any other hegemonic powers. But since the USA did not have the chance to use these kinds of colonial troops, cost of these military confrontations is higher. Consequently, it was harder to maintain its hegemony for the USA since it had to compete with rising powers and overcome the crises without these resources; and lack of these kinds of advantages shortened its period of hegemony.

There were several factors which caused the decline of American hegemony; but especially two important structural changes, which emerged in the world-system

after the 1970s, made the decline of the American hegemony inevitable. The first one was this collapse of the bipolar system. As mentioned before, the balance between the USSR and the USA was the main factor for maintaining the order in the world-system. After the USSR collapsed, it was the responsibility of the USA now, and the USA had no economic or political power to maintain the order. The USA had to use military power to maintain the order and protect its interests several times after this collapse, and these military actions consumed its resources and made its economy even worse. As we know, hegemony is different from dominance of world empires which depend on conquest and tribute; it should be based on minimal use of coercive power and generally if a hegemonic power has to use so much coercive power it is a proof of its decline. The collapse of the bipolar system also caused the loss of the consent for American leadership. Consent of other states is crucial for hegemonic states. Since the “main threat” for the Western bloc disappeared they did not need the military protection of the USA anymore. The USA lost its economic superiority before the collapse of the bipolar system, its only legitimization point for its hegemony was its military protection. Western Europe and Japan, which had the economic capacity to compete with the USA and did not need its military protection, were not willing to follow its leadership anymore. The second factor was financialization of the world economy. As mentioned before, in 1970s capitalists faced a crisis of overaccumulation which decreased the profitability and they tried to overcome this profitability problem by transferring their money to offshore banks, speculating, lending and hoarding. The USA reconstructed the global market after the Second World War, and during this reconstruction it established lots of institutions to reinforce its hegemony. But all the institutions and the structures created by the USA were shaped according to a world economy which was based on production and trade. Financialization of the world economy was a great structural change and means of the USA were not suitable to maintain its hegemony after this transformation. As Arrighi mentions: *“In the 1980s, the total value of financial assets increased two and a half times faster than the aggregate GDP of all rich countries; and the volume of trading in currencies, bonds and equities five times faster. It was in this context that the notion of globalization as a new condition in which even the most*

powerful of the states had no alternative but obey the dictates of global market forces gained currency.”¹³⁰ After this financialization process it was impossible to control the market anymore. As the hegemonic power of the world-system, the USA had the advantage of defining the rules of the game but now the global market forces started to constrain that power. Their rules and interests became the priorities, and loss of this advantage damaged the hegemonic position of the USA. Another solution found by capitalists to overcome the crisis of overaccumulation and the profitability problem was relocation of the production processes. Since profits decreased, capitalists of the USA and other core countries moved their production facilities to the zones where wages were lower. These relocation processes caused deindustrialization of the core zones. Except some high-tech and military production, the USA became deindustrialized. Both England and the USA had the greatest production capacity by the time they had reached the peak of their hegemonic power. Since the USA lost its production capacity, it lost its chance to resist financialization of the world economy and dictates of the global markets by its production capacity. This relocation processes resulted in concentration of the productive facilities in East Asia and it accelerated the rise of East Asia in the world-system. Starting with the 1970s, East Asian countries had an unprecedented development and competed with the USA and other Western countries. In the next chapter I will examine the rise of East Asia and possibility of Chinese hegemony.

¹³⁰ Giovanni Arrighi, “The Global Market”, 241.

CHAPTER SIX: THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA AND ITS POSSIBLE HEGEMONY

6.1. The Modernization of China

China's political and social structure was significantly different from European feudalism. Peasants in China were not under feudal obligations like European serfs, and there were no seigneurs who had control over taxes and held juridical power. China was a bureaucratic empire with a strong public administration which allowed it to collect taxes and regulate the social life without depending on local lords. Same as in Europe, land was the main source of wealth but contrary to Europe great farms were not common in China. There were no powerful lords ruling the large lands, lands were generally distributed as small parts, and fiefs were granted to people for their services to empire and they could rent it to farmers. As Weber's analysis on China suggests it constitutes a unique example with respect to the state and capital accumulation. In his own words: "*through political accumulation of property, there had developed a stratum of land magnates who leased lots. This (albeit unstable) patriciate bore neither a feudal nor a bourgeois stamp, but speculated in opportunities for the purely political exploitation of office.*"¹³¹ Thereby, the main way of having land and wealth was being a civil servant of empire. In England, there was a strong feudal structure. There were great aristocratic houses which had been ruling their regions for centuries; even though they had ties with the monarchy, they had their own armies and financial sources. Monarch of the feudal regime was just a *primus inter pares*. Strong aristocratic houses could balance the power of monarchy in England, but in China there was no house or group to challenge the state's authority. As mentioned, elites of the regime were civil servants of the empire and all their power and wealth came from and depended on the state. Imperial China had its unique examination system for choosing civil servants. For being a civil servant you had to pass these specific exams, which were substantially based on Confucianism, and get an academic title. In theory, these exams were open to everyone; there were examples of people from lower classes passing these exams. But

¹³¹ Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, (Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), 86.

there was not a mass education system in Imperial China and since passing these exams required a proper education and a lot of free time, which lower classes generally could not afford, these examples were very rare. Therefore, civil services had been held by upper classes and we can say that there was not a remarkable vertical mobility in Imperial China. Although the Chinese Empire had a complex bureaucratic structure, Chinese bureaucracy was not a modern type of bureaucracy, it was a patrimonial one and its realm of authority was limited.¹³²

China was an agrarian society and its basic unit was clan. Peasants did not have common lands; that is why they generally did not work together, they were atomized and isolated. Actually relations of production in China forced them to compete with each other, because of this; there was no solidarity between them. There were thousands of local markets where peasants sold their goods and got some services. Landlords did not join the agrarian affairs; they took their share in kind; their ties with land and the peasants were loose. Technology was simple, and there was abundance of labor; landlords did not have a motivation to modernize and commercialize the agriculture.

China was the main center of international trade in the middle ages. Contrary to divided structure of feudal Europe, China was a well-organized and highly urbanized empire. During the rules of the Song dynasty (960-1279) there were a two great cities which had a population over 5 million. In 13th century urbanization rate was %6-7.5; but it decreased to %4 in the beginning of 20th century.¹³³ Loose structure of feudal Europe provided a suitable ground for the emergence of capitalist relations, and the bourgeoisie constructed new economic structures in the new rising cities. High urbanization is accepted as an indicator for modernization and development of capitalism and even Chinese empire had very high urbanization rate during pre-modern times; old cities had different kind of organization and, as Giddens emphasizes, capitalist relations emerged in the new cities which were built by deterritorialized peasants, craftsman and merchants, not in the old ones.¹³⁴ Imperial China levied high taxes on trade for taking the real profit or made specific trade of goods a state monopoly and directly controlled

¹³² Max Weber, *Ekonomi ve Toplum*, Cilt II (İstanbul: Yarı Yayınları, 2012), 411-413.

¹³³ Andre Gunder Frank, *Yeniden Doğu: Asya Çağında Küresel Ekonomi*, 245.

¹³⁴ Anthony Giddens, *Tarihsel Materyalizmin Çağdaş Eleştirisi*, (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2000), 77.

trade. Besides other reasons, this relatively strong structure of empire prevented the growth of an independent merchant class and the emergence of capitalist relations in China.

When European countries were seeking colonies all over the world, Chinese empire did not make any efforts for colonization. Even long-distance navigations and building of ships which could be used for this kind of navigations were banned by Chinese empire in the mid-15th century and this made easier for Western countries to enter East Asia successfully in the first period of their sea expansionism.¹³⁵ Besides distant countries, Chinese empire did not have any effort to colonize the states in its own region either. Some Chinese merchants invested in Southeast Asia and established some kind of network but since colonization was not an official policy of the empire they did not have the support of the state. Kenneth Pomeranz says:

What may have been more important are the ways in which the licensed monopolies, tax farming, and other features of a Braudelian “capitalism” linked to revenue-hungry, privilege granting competitive states were essential to the unique economic effects of Europe’s New World intrusion. We can see some of this by comparing the effects of Europe’s New World empires to those of Chinese merchants who established themselves in Southeast Asia without state backing. Most of Southeast Asia, like the post-contact New World, was sparsely populated and capable of supplying vast quantities of land-intensive resources that were in demand “back home.” Chinese went there in significant numbers, but Southeast Asia never became for coastal China what the New World was for Western Europe.¹³⁶

Without the political and military protection of the Chinese state, Chinese merchants could not institutionalize their economic relations with this region and were removed from there by European colonialists easily. As explained before, modernization and industrialization of European countries, especially England in our case, were highly dependent on colonization; when European states were plundering the wealth of colonies, transporting their raw materials to their own countries and using people of colonies as soldiers in their armies and labor for their industries, Imperial China did not have this kind of resources.

¹³⁵ Anthony Giddens, *Ulus Devlet ve Şiddet*, 146.

¹³⁶ Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 200.

China had an agricultural economy and this economy was being regulated by its strong public administration. For a long time, Imperial China maintained order and had a relatively stable economy. But in the 19th century overpopulation, drought and famine started to cause serious problems in this agricultural economy. Overpopulation had not created a problem until the 19th century but China had no more lands to open agriculture anymore in the 19th century. Since internal dynamics were not ready for an industrialization process, industrialization was not an option for diminishing the adverse impacts of overpopulation. Between 1600 and 1800, population of China doubled and increased to 350 million, but bureaucracy of empire was not ready to respond to this kind of increase.¹³⁷ Collecting taxes and providing security became harder. In default of chance of providing new lands or industrializing its economy, China could not overcome this overpopulation problem. Constant increase of population caused an impoverishment; especially peasants' life conditions were significantly deteriorated. Because of these problems, social and economic structures of China started to crack. Several serious peasant rebellions emerged and a lot of peasants became bandits.

In addition to these internal problems China faced some external imperialist threats which weakened the state and deepened the problems of peasants. Imperial China banned importation but industrialized states were trying to enter China's great market. China was selling luxury goods like tea to the Western states and claiming that Chinese empire was an autarchic state and these countries had nothing they needed. In fact, Western states had really a hard time to find something to sell to China and this was causing a great foreign trade surplus in favor of China. England started to sell opium to China and created a considerable demand. Even though it was banned by the Qing dynasty, England continued to sell opium to China and accused China of violating the right of free trade when Qing dynasty accused them of violating the rules of China and importing hazardous substances to their country.¹³⁸ This conflict caused the First Opium War (1839-1842) and China faced a devastating defeat. After the war, with Treaty of Nanking, England colonized Hong Kong, established autonomous rule in several ports and gained important trade concessions. The USA, France and Japan

¹³⁷ Rana Mitter, *Modern Çin*, (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2012), 32.

¹³⁸ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *21. Yüzyılda Çin: Çin Hakkında Bilmek İstedığınız Her Şey*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015), 54-55.

gained the same kind of concessions in a few years. This war was an important rupture; it destroyed the traditional perception of the Chinese that they were more developed than European countries. It also opened the Chinese market to these industrialized countries and made China vulnerable to their imperialist political interventions. As mentioned before, European and American imperialism was also very crucial for the spread of modernity. Eisenstadt argues:

The variability of modernities was accomplished above all through military and economic imperialism and colonialism, affected through superior economic, military, and communication technologies. Modernity first moved beyond the West into different Asian societies-Japan, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia-to the Middle Eastern countries, coming finally to Africa. By the end of the twentieth century, it encompassed nearly the entire world, the first true wave of globalization.¹³⁹

These imperialist expansions were important in four ways: First, some modern values and modern production techniques were spread to the world by result of these expansions. Second, states like China, which became subject of this imperial interventions motivated to modernize state structures, mode of production and military forces to resist these kinds of interventions. Third, this colonization efforts and imperialist interventions integrated the other regions to the capitalist world-economy. And fourth, these colonization efforts and imperialist interventions fundamentally changed the structure of the world-system; Western dominance in the world-system was established through these expansionisms based on imperialists' industrialized capacity of warfare.

These imperialist interventions had really destructive effects on China's economy. After they got trade concessions, these imperialist countries started to import a lot of industrialized goods to China and this destroyed the handicraft industries which were an important source of income for Chinese peasants. Western countries were also trying to fuel the existing unrest of peasants and cut their ties with the local culture by missionary activities. Combination of these external and internal conditions caused several peasant rebellions: White Lotus Rebellion (1795-1804), Taiping Rebellion (1854-1864), Nien Rebellion (1853-1868) and Muslims' separatist rebellions in 1850-

¹³⁹ S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities", 14.

1870.¹⁴⁰ Especially the Taiping rebellion was under the influence of missionary propaganda. This rebellion also had some pre-socialist elements; rebels demanded a land reform, gender equality and abolishment of power of *gentry*. Since landless and indebted peasants were marginalized, land reform was generally common demand of these rebellions.

Central army could not manage to quash these rebellions; they could be stopped only by the self-defense troops which were led by local *gentry*. This weakened the central authority and started a decentralization process. Local *gentry* got more control over taxes and started to raise its own armies. Since central authority lost its full control over taxes it could not manage to find enough resources for important infrastructure investments which was essential for modernization and industrialization.

Japan defeated China in 1895 and invaded the several regions in China. Japanese invasion and intervention of Western imperialist states caused a nationalist movement in China. Nairn claims that nationalism is a result of “uneven development” of capitalism.¹⁴¹ Elites in the peripheral countries want to complete development process of their own countries by following the path of developed core countries but they do not want external intervention of these imperial core states. According to Nairn “*constructing a militant community with self-conscious of its identity*” is the only way for it.¹⁴² Nairn’s theory cannot explain nationalism in core countries but he has a point about the emergence of nationalism in peripheral countries and its relation with modernization and development process. Besides some internal dynamics, imperial interventions teared down the relatively stable structure of the Chinese empire. These imperial interventions and the reactional nationalism against those interventions played a crucial role for mobilizing the people during the modernization process of China.

Especially after the defeat by Japan, Chinese rulers understood that they cannot maintain the power of state without doing any changes. Between 1901 and 1911 Chinese rulers put into practice several reforms. They abolished the Confucian

¹⁴⁰ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 75.

¹⁴¹ Tom Nairn, “The Maladies of Development”, in J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (edited by), *Nationalism*, (Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press, 1994), 72.

¹⁴² Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 90.

examination system, prepared a national budget system, opened new modern schools to grow executive elites and established specialized ministries. In 1908, Chinese rulers decided to establish a chamber of deputies from the members of the *gentry*. Local councils were established in 1908, it was decided that provincial assemblies would be established in 1909 and a national assembly would be established in 1910 for preparing the country to establishment of a legislative assembly and parliamentary system which was envisaged to be implemented in 1917. The majority of the chamber of deputies consisted of the *gentry* and merchants; in a short time this chamber became an important place for demand of political and social reforms. There were a lot of supporters of liberal constitutionalism in the chamber, they thought restoration of the state power would be only possible by significant reforms; especially decentralization of the empire was their first priority. Even though it was decided that a parliament would be established in 1917, deputies demanded an immediate transition to parliamentary system in 1910. This increased the tension between the local *gentry* and the central authority. The rulers of the Qing dynasty rejected these demands and deputies returned to their own provinces. Short after from this crisis, rulers of the Empire decided to expropriate railway construction projects. Local elites had investments in these projects and this act would cause an important financial loss for them. The Empire faced mass protests led by *gentry* after this crisis. People refused to pay taxes, shops and schools were closed. The Empire tried to quash this rebellion by force, killed protestors and arrested a lot of members of *gentry*. But protests were growing and after some units of army joined the rebellion, imperial troops faced terrible defeats and several provinces declared their independence. Under the leadership of *gentry*, merchants, civil servants and military elites, this rebellion resulted in collapse of empire. This fragile alliance of the dominant classes tried to build a new political system, they declared a republic but they did not have the power to unite the country and restore the order by establishing a new system. After the collapse of empire, China entered into a long chaotic period (1911-1927) during which local warlords seized power.

During this period of power vacuum, two different organized movements started to gain power: Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party and Communist Party of China. Both of these movements were backed by the Soviet Union in the beginning.

In 1924, these two parties established an alliance for fighting against warlords and for a “democratic revolution”. They gathered the National Revolutionary Army and started the Northern Expedition for uniting China. After a long period of internal conflict and chaos, warlords were defeated and Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, seized power and took control of most of China in 1927. After seizing power, Chiang Kai-Shek eliminated the communist leaders by violence and alliance was broken up. Kuomintang started to follow a new path, cut all ties with the Soviet Union, used a more nationalist ideology and accepted military and economic aids from Western states. Kuomintang tried to quash all mass movements which were mobilized in the period of war against warlords and established an authoritarian regime, mostly dependent on its monopoly of violence. Chiang Kai-Shek was very influential on army and even though Kuomintang was the result of a loose coalition of merchants, gentry and bureaucrats, the main instrument of his rule was coercive power of army. Kuomintang could not establish a strong rule, especially after the Japanese invasion it had to withdraw from most of the rural areas and concentrate its power in coastal cities. Because of lack of power, Kuomintang gave up collecting taxes from local rulers between 1928 and 1936.¹⁴³ That is why, the Nationalist Government had to depend on excise duties and international trade tariffs. These high taxes on excise and high tariffs on international trade had a restrictive impact on economies of cities and slowed down the growth of industry. Since Kuomintang was conducting measures which limit the growth of industries, using most of its resources for fight against communists and remnants of warlords and could not collect taxes efficiently, it could not manage to start a comprehensive modernization process during its rule.

Communists were trying to mobilize the industrial proletariat of the cities for a revolution, but since China was not an industrialized country, the proletariat was not a large and powerful class. Until 1949 total production of modern industry was never more than 3.5 per cent of national income, and industrial workers stayed less than 1 per cent of total labor force.¹⁴⁴ Kuomintang was very powerful in the cities; that is why, efforts of mobilizing the industrial proletariat failed dramatically. With the withdrawal

¹⁴³ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, 249-250.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 247.

of Kuomintang from rural areas a historical opportunity emerged for communists. They started to become successful organizing the people when they abandoned the policy of focusing on the proletariat and developed close relations with the peasants. Since peasants' economic position was getting worse and they were suffering under the rule of warlords for a long time, dissatisfaction among them were increasing day by day and it was easier to organize them for communists. Forces of Kuomintang withdrew from rural areas and communist guerillas were the only organized forces which could protect peasants from Japanese invaders, their victories against invaders gained prestige for them in the eyes of peasants. There was a tradition of peasant rebellions in China for centuries; therefore, peasants had experience for political mobilization. These suitable conditions provided a rapid growth for communists, by bringing the peasants into fold; the Communist Party of China became the greatest organized power in China.

After the 1949 Revolution communists seized power. The Communist Party reinforced the central authority and reorganized the state. As mentioned before, the bureaucracy is an essential element of a modern state. In 1948, under the rule of Kuomintang, there were two millions civil servants in China, in 1952 under the rule of the Communist Party it was three million three hundred and ten thousands, and it reached eight millions in 1958.¹⁴⁵ The Communist Party built a greater state apparatus than Kuomintang or Empire could ever achieve to build. This party state with a large-scale bureaucracy managed to collect taxes more efficiently and regulate social life more comprehensively.

Peasants generally hold their own lands in China; at the end of the first quarter of 20th century, only 7 per cent of land belonged to the state in China, rest of the land became private property.¹⁴⁶ After the collapse of the empire, warlords seized the lands of peasants. After the war with Japan, communists made radical land reforms in 1946. They expropriated all the lands of warlords and rich landowners, and redistributed the lands to the people, including the young and women, equally in the regions they held. After the 1949 Revolution, they spread these land reforms to other regions of the country. Power and control of the landlords over peasants were substantially abolished.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 263.

¹⁴⁶ Moore, 240-241.

Generally, primitive accumulation by dispossession was accepted as inherent phase of industrialization and development. But China followed a different path; contrary to general acceptance these reforms provided rapid and decentralized capital accumulation without taking the lands of peasants from them in China.¹⁴⁷ This genuine type of capital accumulation was the key for China's development.

Until 1960, People's Republic of China largely followed the same policies with the Soviet Union and focused on industrialization efforts. But after 1960, a radical rupture happened in these policies, China abandoned the policy of industrialization at the cost of agriculture. A great campaign was started to support and improve the agriculture. The Communist state raised well-educated experts and sent them to rural regions to modernize agricultural techniques. A great autonomy was given to the locals; a decentralized and collectivized agriculture had a great success. With the support of the state, a significant agricultural growth was achieved. As mentioned before, the industry was still very weak in the first half of the 20th century; that is why, concentrating on industry by sacrificing agriculture was not a suitable policy for the new regime and it did not work. Communist state did not give up investing on industrialization but paid particular attention to agriculture and after changing this policy and investing in agriculture, China achieved an important development. China's significant development starting from the 1990s is the result of this policy of balanced growth. In the 1980s *"ideological extremism of Maoist development had been replaced by pragmatic growth in traditional entrepreneurship coexisted with a neo-authoritarian state that guides development"*.¹⁴⁸ China truly changed its political and economic direction in the last decade but its development was not result of this change, as I will show, China had prepared the dynamics of this development before this change.

6.2. The Rise of East Asia and China in the World-System

As mentioned before, even though we use the term "core countries" sometimes, there are actually core, semi-peripheral and peripheral "zones" in the world-system. That is why we need to elaborate on the rise of East Asia to understand the rise

¹⁴⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith Pekin 'de*, 365-366.

¹⁴⁸ Gilbert Rozman, "The Rise of the State in China and Japan", in *The Rise and the Decline of the Nation-State*, ed., Michael Mann, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 175.

of China in the world-system because there are signs that East Asia will be the most developed core zone of the world-system soon, and the leader of this core zone will be the next hegemonic state.

The capitalist world-economy emerged in Western Europe in the sixteenth century and since then it expanded to the whole world. All other regions of the world were integrated into capitalist economy one by one. New technologies which were developed after the Industrial Revolution made this expansion possible. By this expansion, the Western world established its dominance over other regions of the world. According to Wallerstein, East Asia was the region which became integrated into the system last but it was the first region that started the process of ending the dominance of the West.¹⁴⁹ First Japan defeated Russia and showed that these Western expansions were not irrecoverable; then revolution in China in 1911 started the process of reconstruction of the most ancient kingdom in the world. East Asia was returning to the arena of world politics.

After this period the world saw two World Wars, and destructive consequences emerged all over the world. East Asian countries got their share too and probably Japan faced the most destructive consequences. After two atomic bombs Japan was ruined, it lost its production capacity; its citizens had to deal with diseases caused by bombs, but in the 1970s Japan started to gain more economic power. It was followed by other East Asian countries and in a short time they became capable of competing with the Western countries. In the 1970s, the world-economy was in a Kondratieff-B phase, with considerable stagnation. But Kondratieff –B phases do not mean that all regions and countries would be in stagnation; some specific regions could benefit from these stagnation periods. East Asia started its rise in the Kondratieff-B phase of the world-economy; it used the circumstances right and accomplished a tremendous development when other regions were dealing with stagnation and deflation. As mentioned before, in Kondratieff-B phases profits decrease, and capitalist try to overcome this problem by decreasing their costs. The main way of decreasing the cost is the relocation of production processes. Capitalists move their production facilities to the regions where

¹⁴⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Bildiğimiz Dünyanın Sonu*, 51.

wages are lower. We could observe these relocation processes all the time but they become widespread in Kondratieff-B phases. Because of these relocations, production processes were moving to the East Asia from the Western countries and this caused a significant enrichment and development in the East Asia. As Arrighi mentions “*the eight percent plus average annual income growth set by several (East) Asian economies since the late 1960s is unique in the 130 years of recorded economic history*”.¹⁵⁰ Capitalists could move their production facilities to several regions and actually they did, but they generally concentrate in one region because it is more profitable. It means that only one region benefits from these relocation processes considerably. Countries like Brazil or South Africa had similar economic positions to these East Asian countries before the rise of East Asia. Then, why did they not benefit these relocation processes as much as East Asian countries? According to Wallerstein, it was about geography of the Cold War, East Asia was front line in the Cold War and the others were not.¹⁵¹ That’s why, they got more economic and military aids for their reconstruction after the Second World War, especially South Korea, Taiwan and Japan were supported by the USA. But the rise of the East Asia cannot be explained just with external support, it was also connected to some internal features of the region which will be explained below.

Japanese were able to reconstruct their country rapidly after the Second World War. They did not just survive after this disaster, they also reindustrialized their country and starting from the 1970s their development made them one of the economic superpowers of the world. Development of Japan brought an economic mobility to the region and extended the regional market. Aids of the USA and the trade with Japan helped the development of other regional countries. East Asian and South Asian countries were entering a development process one by one. First Four Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) achieved an important development, and then they were followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, China and Vietnam. Some of these peripheral and semi-peripheral countries gained the economic power which provided them opportunity to compete with core countries in some production areas. Generally, core countries relocate the old leading industries to the peripheral countries.

¹⁵⁰ Arrighi, “Global Market”, 245.

¹⁵¹ Wallerstein, *Bildiğimiz Dünyanın Sonu*, 47.

They keep having new leading production processes which were relatively monopolized and more profitable. In the beginning, East Asia was the region where these old leading industries were moved. But in a short time, some capitalist organizations which produce new leading industries started to invest in this region. Some of these countries had know-how and resources to produce these new leading products even by themselves. That is to say, East Asia was not a peripheral zone where just producing peripheral products anymore; East Asian countries could produce some high-tech products and compete with core countries now. East Asia was not just competing with other regions in production, it also gained important share in global finance. Arrighi notes: “*The Japanese share of the total assets of Fortune’s top fifty banks in the world increased from 18 percent in 1970 to 27 percent in 1980, to 48 percent in 1990. As for foreign exchange reserves, the East Asian share of the top ten central banks’ holdings increased from 10 percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 1994.*”¹⁵² This dominance on global finance is very important. As mentioned before, since the 1970s there has been a process of overfinancialization of the world economy. This process weakened the power of states and constrained even the most powerful countries’ act of freedom in economic area. Since the USA did not have the economic power to resist the impositions of the financial markets, overfinancialization process damaged its hegemonic position. The increasing dominance of East Asian countries on global finance made them stronger vis-à-vis speculators. As Arrighi mentions “*East Asian states, or at least some of them, have all the money they need to keep at bay the kind of pressure that is driving states all over the world-the USA included-to yield to the dictates of increasingly mobile and volatile capital.*”¹⁵³

The USA could not afford the costs of being a hegemonic power and it was deep in debt. Its current account deficit is increasing every year and East Asian countries have become main financers of this deficit. They bought great amount of US treasury stocks and accumulated their foreign exchange reserves as dollar. In 2006, Japan had the biggest US treasury stocks, 339 billion dollar; China was the second (300 billion dollar) and its US treasury stocks were bigger than total stocks of Britain,

¹⁵² Arrighi, “Global Market”, 246.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 246.

Germany and Canada.¹⁵⁴ Japan and China also gave loan to the USA about 2.5 trillion dollar and to the EU about 1 trillion dollar.¹⁵⁵ These developments increased the dependency of the USA and other Western countries on East Asian countries. Wallerstein predicts that there will be a strong struggle between East Asia and EU for being the most powerful core zone of the world-system and East Asia will be the victorious.¹⁵⁶ I agree that, all these data show us that the Western countries lost their competitive capacity *vis-à-vis* East Asia and it is highly possible that East Asia will be the most powerful core zone and center of the production and finance in the near future. It was thought Japan would be the leader of the rise of East Asia in the 1990s but it was very hard to establish hegemony for Japan for the reasons I will explain later. China, with its significant development and other features I will explain, is the best candidate both for being the leader of the East Asia and being the next hegemonic power of the world-system.

6.3. The Possible Chinese Hegemony

Before the Industrial Revolution China was a great power and had an important place in international trade. As mentioned before, capitalism, which emerged in Western Europe first, was expanded to the other regions of the world by means of the Industrial Revolution and this expansion changed economic, political and social structures of the countries in these regions substantially. In 1820, China's share in the world GDP was 32.4%, when Europe's share was 26.6, Russia's 4.8%, Japan's 3% and USA's 1.8%; in 1890 China's share fell into 13.2% but Europe's share increased to 40.3%, USA's increased to 13.8; in 1952 China's share bottomed out with 5.2% and USA's share increased to 23.4% when Europe's share fell into 29.7%.¹⁵⁷

After this decline, China regained its power, achieved a significant development and became the second biggest economy in the world. During 1978-2008 period, China had 9.5% average growth rate per year, this rate was even greater than growth rate of Europe during the Industrial Revolution, China's economy developed

¹⁵⁴ Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith Pekin'de*, 200.

¹⁵⁵ Mustafa Peköz, *Küresel Güçlerin Çatışma Merkezi Asya ve Yükselen Çin*. (İstanbul: Pales Yayınları, 2014), 19.

¹⁵⁶ Wallerstein, *Bildiğimiz Dünyanın Sonu*, 57.

¹⁵⁷ Atilla Sandıklı, "China: Future's Superpower" in *China New Superpower?: Dimensions of Power, Energy and Security*, ed. Atilla Sandıklı (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2011) 41-42.

twentyfold and it managed to get 700 million citizens above the poverty line.¹⁵⁸ How did China accomplish this unprecedented growth? In my opinion, it is impossible to explain this process with China's abandonment of Maoist heritage. General Western view for this development is that after China accepted market rules and integrated with the Western world its large population, and low-cost labor provided a great advantage to it. By following the same path with Western world, China industrialized rapidly and rose to the higher rankings in the hierarchy of the world-system. Arrighi rejected the assertion that China's development could be explained by its acceptance of neoliberal values and claimed that we have to examine China's internal features and its "non-Western" way of development to understand its progress.¹⁵⁹ It is certain that China had a significant change of direction politically and economically in recent times, but Arrighi seems to be correct arguing that China's development is not a result of its acceptance of neo-liberal values. In my opinion, China's development cannot be explained with the choices in last decade, we should understand the long-term processes and policies that occurred in China since the Communist Revolution to examine its unprecedented development.

As mentioned before, generally primitive capital accumulation by dispossession was accepted as an inherent phase of capitalist development. There were important land reforms in China in the 1940s, which abolished the power of landlords, and by these reforms China achieved a rapid and decentralized capital accumulation without taking the lands of peasants from them. This distinctive way of capital accumulation was very important to understand the development of China. Before the 1949 Revolution, coastal regions where the proletariat was concentrated were under strong dominance of Kuomintang. Because of this, the Chinese Communist Party had to organize in far and poor regions and depend on the peasantry. After the revolution, China followed the same path with the Soviet Union and focus on industrialization, but in the 1960s the Chinese Communist Party gave up trying to abolish the peasantry for modernization of the country like Stalin did; on the contrary, Chinese modernization

¹⁵⁸ Ersin Dedekoca, *Ekonomi-Politik Pencereden ABD-Çin İlişkileri: Eski Dünyaya Yeni Düzen*. (Ankara: Barış Platin, 2000), 47-48.

¹⁵⁹ Arrighi, *Adam Smith Pekin'de*, 355.

was based on education and economic development of the peasantry. China continued to execute reforms for improving the agriculture and developing the peasantry.

With its new balanced growth policy, China had a rapid economic development after the 1970s. Between 1979 and 2005, “*China’s GDP increased from less than \$150 billion to \$1.65 trillion; its foreign trade climbed from \$20.6 billion to \$1.15 trillion; per capita income rose from \$190 to more than \$1200*”.¹⁶⁰ As we see about land reforms, this development of China was not about rejection of Maoist heritage; actually it rises on the reforms and policies of revolutionary governments. Another important policy for understanding the remarkable development of China was education reform. China benefited from relocation of world-scale production processes in the 1970s but the low-cost of labor was not the main reason for China’s being the center of this relocation, there were several zones where wages were low but in China labor was not just low-cost, it was also high skilled. With the education reforms, China had a great number of high skilled workers, well-educated engineers, technicians and scientists. As a result of these educational campaigns, today, China is one of the leaders on scientific researches and has know-how to compete with Western countries. In 2003, the USA spent fivefold of China’s expenditures to research and development activities but it did not have even twofold researchers than China, and China’s expenditures of research and development increased 17% in last ten years, it was just about %4-5 in the USA, EU and Japan.¹⁶¹ These high skilled and well-educated personnel cost lower than Western ones. Costs of the Chinese workers are 5% of the American workers and costs of the engineers and managers of the factories cost 35% of American equivalents. Much fewer managers and supervisors are used in Chinese production system; it is about fifteen managers for every fifteen thousand workers. This self-managements system reduces the costs and improves the productivity. China had an unprecedented development by this advanced production system; it enjoyed “*a trade surplus of US\$34 billion in 2004, and of US\$102 billion the next year...In the three decades since economic reform, China’s gross domestic product increased from 1 to over 5 per cent of the world total.*

¹⁶⁰ Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell, “Introduction” in *China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, (New York and London: An East Gate Book, 2007), xiv.

¹⁶¹ Arrighi, *Adam Smith Pekin’de*, 368.

*In 2007 it contributed to more than 10 per cent of the growth in the world economy”.*¹⁶²

As we can understand from these statistics, by its great investments in education and know-how, China improved its production capacity, became an important actor in the world economy and strengthened its position in the world-system.

Since the USA lost its economic superiority it was harder to maintain its hegemony. Production capacity of the USA decreased substantially and the USA has been deindustrialized. The USA was the production center of the world when its rise in the world-system began and during the heyday of its hegemony, but now the USA's economy became a consumption economy and this increased its dependency on other countries. Between 2005 and 2011, the USA's export to China was 499.1 billion dollar and its import from China was 2.44 trillion dollar.¹⁶³ It shows us that the USA was not the production center of the world anymore and its import dependent economy made impossible to narrow its great foreign trade deficit. The USA did not just lose its competitive capacity *vis-à-vis* China in labor-intensive manufacturing, China also surpassed the USA in advanced technological and knowledge intensive productions and in my opinion, it was the fatal blow to the USA's economic superiority.

China was excluded from global trade by the Cold War policies of the USA. But the USA needed an ally against the USSR and sought to establish good relations with China. President Nixon visited China in 1972 and normalization of relations between these two countries began. This gave an opportunity to China for being active in global trade again and the USA became an important market for Chinese production. First, it was seen as a win-win situation, the USA had an ally against the USSR, benefited from cheap products of China and China found market for its production. But in a short time, China's competitive capacity increased and it was seen as a threat by the USA. Great debts of the USA to the East Asian countries did not cause a big problem for the USA but with the rise of the China it became more troubled. Because other East Asian countries accepted the leadership of the USA but China had a different ideological background and it did not have the consent for the American hegemony.

¹⁶² Chi-Kwan Mark, *China and the World Since 1945: An International History*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 124.

¹⁶³ Peköz, 305.

The USA's loans to China increased China's capacity of influence over the US policies and damaged the hegemonic position of the USA. In fact, the rise of China was more dangerous than the rise of Japan for the USA. As mentioned before, hegemony is a combination of economic and military power, it is impossible to become a hegemonic power without an effective coercive power to back up your economic activities. Japan had a significant development but despite its economic superiority, it did not have the military power for protecting its economic interests. Because of its weak military position, Japan could not resist several economic dictates of the USA. The USA is still the greatest military power of the world and China's military power is inferior *vis-à-vis* the USA but China is different from Japan in this area. It increases its military expenditures every year, it has a large army, and most important it has nuclear weapons, which increases its deterrence. China has also been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since 1971; it means China has a right of veto in this council where lots of important decisions are taken. Japan does not have this kind of capacity of influence in world politics; thereby, it could not back its economic power with political and military power. Japan was competing with the Western capitalist organizations but China was not just competing with them, it also provided them with a large market. When Japanese companies were taking control of the global markets, Western capitalists were forcing the USA to execute economic sanctions to Japan. But now these Western capitalist organizations have great investments in China and in my opinion, if the USA tries to erect customs barrier to China they would oppose it to protect their interests. If we remember the power of these big transnational organizations and their influence on policies of even the most powerful states, we can understand that this is a big advantage for China.

As mentioned before, the main element of constructing the consent for American hegemony was its military protection against the Soviet threat, and after the USSR collapsed, the USA started to lose this consent. The USA used the fear of Soviet threat successfully in Cold War; and in East Asia it used a similar fear by using the threat of communist China. East Asian countries did not have the military capacity to resist China and they were convinced that the USA was the only power which can protect them from China's expansionist ambitions. After the Cold War ended, this

perception of threat weakened too, China proved that it intended to follow a peaceful development path and regional countries (except Taiwan) starting to establish better relations with China. Trade of China with regional countries increased considerably and China hold the leading role of the region. China also established strategic relations with important countries from other regions too. In November 2004 “*the formal Agreement on Trade in Goods between ASEAN and China was signed; it envisaged establishment of a free trade area by 2010 for six ASEAN members and by 2015 for the four newest ASEAN members*”.¹⁶⁴ China also led the process of establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This organization includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; India and Pakistan will become the full members of the organization in 2016. Members of the organization agreed to cooperate in economic and military area, Russia and Kazakhstan are important oil producing countries and their membership makes the economic cooperation of these countries very strategic. Since China significantly improved its production capacity, its need for energy increased evenly and this cooperation is crucial for its need. Members of this organization also have a plan to establish a free trade zone among them. China’s relation with India is another important strategic issue. Because of their large population and rich resources a partnership between these two countries can create a significant effect on world politics. China established very good economic relations with India, Iran (another important oil producing country) and African countries. China’s volume of trade with India was 300 million dollars in 1994, it increased to 20 billion dollars in 2005; China concluded a petroleum treaty with Iran in 2004 and in 2000 China relinquished from its 1.2 billion dollars credits from African countries and the trade between China and the African countries increased fourfold in next five years.¹⁶⁵ Good relations of China with Africa continued to improve. By 2013 China had more than 15 per cent of direct investment in Africa.¹⁶⁶ China also lent large amount of money to a lot of countries and it did not lay down hard conditions in return like the USA did, it helped infrastructure investments of poor countries and made some projects for them with low-

¹⁶⁴ David Greenaway, Chris Milner and Shujie Yao, ed., *China and the World Economy*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 24.

¹⁶⁵ Arrighi, *Adam Smith Pekin’de*, 215.

¹⁶⁶ Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, *By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest Changing the World?*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 72.

cost. China gained the sympathy of a lot of countries with these kinds of activities. When the USA started to lose the consent for its hegemony with the collapse of the bipolar system and its aggressive foreign policies, China started to construct the consent for its hegemony by its peaceful development.

As mentioned before, financialization of global markets diminish the power of nation states' control of economic processes and made their economies more fragile. Since China had an advanced production capacity, it became more immune to dictates of global markets. Even though it is claimed that liberalization of Chinese economy is the reason for its rapid growth, on the contrary, it is planned economy and protectionist policies are the reason of this growth. Hung says: "*The government's control over portfolio flows shielded its economy from the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis, when many of its neighbouring economies were buffeted by the large swings of foreign capital flows. Some analysts also argue that China's ability to sustain its currency-peg regime since 1994, which was underpinned by its tight controls of portfolio flows, played an important role in maintaining China's price stability and uninterrupted economic growth*".¹⁶⁷ When other rapid developing Asian countries' economies were shaken by the crisis, government's control on economy provided a strong position to China for avoiding the destabilizing effects of global markets and overcome the crisis with minimum harm. China continued to sustain its economic growth and even became "*the first major economy to escape growth recession during the 2008–09 global financial crisis.*"¹⁶⁸

The USA has significant cultural power but with rising opposition even this power started to decline. Hollywood movies, American best-sellers and TV serials still have considerable influence on people but alternatives are occurring. Cultural and intellectual discourse of the USA depends on emphasis of freedom. Especially after September 11, the priority of the USA became security, and the image of the USA as the country of freedoms has been damaged. Getting visa from the USA became harder

¹⁶⁷ Juann H. Hung, "China's Approach to Capital Flows Since 1978: A Brief Overview", in *China and Asia: Economic and Financial Interactions*, ed. Yin-Wong Cheung and Kar-Yiu Wong (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 44-45.

¹⁶⁸ Yiping Huang, "Will China Become an Engine of Growth for the Region?" in *APEC and the Rise of China*, ed. Lok Sang Ho and John Wong, (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2011), 68.

and people started to prefer other countries for their touristic vacations or education. With its educational reforms, China's level of education system became competitive with the USA and other Western countries and the students who cannot get visa or afford to study in the USA go to China for their education. China started a considerable cultural integration process by offering qualified and low-cost educational activities to all people around the world. China funded Confucius Institutes, where they teach Chinese language and culture, in a lot of countries from different regions, like Kenya, South Korea, Uzbekistan and Australia.¹⁶⁹ Thereby, even the USA's cultural influence is still superior, in my opinion, by its well-planned cultural policies China will be able to establish a sufficient cultural influence for constructing consent for its hegemony.

The USA's most powerful instrument is its military power. Its industrial production mostly geared to manufacturing military equipment, weapons, ammunitions and missiles. With its destructive nuclear weapons, advanced technological arms and bases all over the world, the USA holds a military power which no other actor could override. China increased its military expenditures and has been trying to establish military cooperation with other countries but its military capacity is still not enough to challenge the USA. In 2005 China's military expenditures on national defense was 30.5 billion dollars, it was 7% of the US defense budget and "*the US military expenditure per capita was sixty times that of China's.*"¹⁷⁰ The USA still can be very dominant in the world-system by its unmatched military capacity, but in my opinion, since it is losing its economic superiority, it will be harder to invest in military area and the USA will not be able to sustain its military superiority in the long-term. This will end the hegemonic period of the USA definitively.

In the light of these developments, we can say that American hegemony came to an end, And also it is highly possible that Western dominance will end soon too. The rise of East Asia under the leadership of China will continue and change the balance in world politics. Unequal development is an inherent feature of the capitalist world-

¹⁶⁹ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 68

¹⁷⁰ Çağdaş Üngör, "Countering US Hegemony: A Viable Option for China? Dynamics of the Sino-U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold War Era" In *China New Superpower?: Dimensions of Power, Energy and Security*, ed. Atilla Sandıklı (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2011), 135.

economy; even development of all regions is impossible. Western Europe and North America could accomplish their significant development at the cost of underdevelopment of the rest of the world. The rise of East Asia caused the decrease of power of Western European countries and the USA; with the deindustrialization of some of these countries, it is possible that we can see the peripheralization of these zones in the long-term. It is impossible to make certain predictions what kind of changes will occur in the world-system after China establishes its hegemony¹⁷¹. But in my opinion, China's first priority will be overcoming the overfinancialization crisis in the world-economy. With its genuine state capitalism model, China could resist this crisis so far, and in my opinion, China will try to spread this state model and reorganize the world-system in a more production-based structure to overcome this crisis.

¹⁷¹ For this discussion, see: Paul S. Ciccantell and Stephen K. Bunker, "The Economic Ascent of China and The Potential For Restructuring the Capitalist World-Economy", *Journal of World-Systems Research*. Vol 10, No: 3, (Fall 2004); Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Durlugian and Craig Calhoun, *Kapitalizmin Geleceği Var mı?*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2014).

7. CONCLUSION

This thesis, attempted to examine the reciprocal relations between modernization and hegemony-building processes. As explained above, the emergence of the modern states and the foundation of the modern world-system are highly related. That is why, systemic processes of the modern world-system and the internal dynamics of the states are interconnected. In my opinion, this assertion is especially valid for modernization and the hegemony-building processes. As I elaborated in my thesis, I claim that states' modernization and hegemony-building processes have significant effects on each other. Modern states emerged as a part of interstate system of the capitalist world-economy; construction of the modern state and the modern world-system have been integrated from the very beginning. States might have their own dynamics and the world-system might have different dynamics, but these dynamics are in a constant interaction. No unit has an absolute autonomy in my subject; therefore, in my opinion, making an artificial isolated "internal" and "external" separation could cause misconceptions in researches. Therefore, I used a holistic approach and examined the modernization and hegemony-building processes of my cases together as combined processes.

Social phenomena are very complex issues. Especially major processes like modernization and hegemony comprise a lot of aspects; economic, political and cultural dynamics should be considered to understand these kinds of processes. Since social reality is inseparable, I preferred to examine the all aspects of modernization and hegemony in a single framework. I borrowed this unidisciplinary methodological approach from *World-Systems Analysis*. I reject the traditional boundaries of social sciences, that is why, I did not concentrate on particular sphere and tried to examine all aspects of my subject in a single framework.

In this research, with a critical perspective, I set aside the concept of linear progressive history and elaborated the distinctive features of the modernization processes of England, the USA and China. Besides many others, I especially focused on the existence or lack of feudal legacy, class structures and class struggles, ways of capital accumulation and colonization efforts of these three states as my parameters and

examined and compared the effects of these four parameters on their modernization processes.

I tried to show in my research that it is impossible to claim that there is one model of modernization; historical data show us that modernization process of states diversify extensively. Beyond accepting one linear path of modernization, data of my research indicates that it is impossible to conceptualize even narrower definitions; stereotypes like “Western type of modernization” do not have any explanatory power. A great variety of modernization can be observed in the history and since I claim that modernization and hegemony-building processes are interconnected, these different modernization paths create different hegemony-building processes.

Every shift of hegemony creates a structural change in the world-system. That is why I tried to elaborate the details of rise and declines in the hegemonies of our selected cases. The different ways of establishing and losing their hegemonies gave us important data about significant structural changes in the world-system.

As indicated above, in this thesis, I tried to understand the distinctive paths of modernization of England, the USA and China; and I tried to analyze the effects of their distinctive paths to their hegemonic processes. I also tried to understand effects of the position and the relations of these states in the world-system to their modernization processes. Since I claim that every hegemonic power reorganizes the world-system according to its own values, interests and institutions, I also tried to analyze the effects of England’s and the USA’s modernization processes to this reorganizing. The changes which these hegemonic powers made during these reorganizing periods substantially changed the structure of the modern world-system. These changes also affected the way of rise and decline of these hegemonic powers. Of course hegemonic states cannot reorganize the world-system the way they exactly want. Even though hegemonic states are the dominant power of the world-system, they had to act in the interstate system of the capitalist world-economy. Their reorganizing capacity is restricted by the specific structures of the world-system and power of other states. Since hegemonic powers are different than *manu militari* empires, they cannot just depend on coercive power. Hegemonic powers need the consent of other states for their leadership (at least consent

of some of the states). If a hegemonic state tries to establish dominance by just depending on its coercive power and tries to reorganize the world-system just according to its own interests, it loses the consent of other states that its leadership is beneficial for all of them. None of the hegemonic powers could gain the consent of all states, but if a hegemonic power loses the consent of all states for its leadership, it cannot maintain its hegemonic position for a long time. That is why, for understanding their reorganizing periods, I tried to examine the position of England and the USA in the world-system and analyze their relations with other states, oppositions to their hegemony and compromises which they had to give. Since China did not establish its hegemony yet, I elaborated its rise in the world-system, examined the policies and means which it uses for establishing its hegemony, discussed the possibility of its hegemony and made some brief predictions about how China might reorganize the world-system if it would achieve to establish its hegemony.

World-Systems Analysis gave us a satisfactory theoretical ground for analyzing the systemic processes and structural changes in the world-system. Wallerstein's and other *World-Systems Analysis* scholars' theories certainly represent a paradigm shift. Focusing systemic dynamics rather than the internal dynamics of states and examining the long-term cycles of the capitalist world-economy was an important rupture and this new approach really contributed to the scientific knowledge for understanding the contemporary world. My research substantially based on the theoretical framework of the *World-Systems Analysis*. But for the reasons I elaborated, I think neither world-system nor states can be a proper unit of analysis. That is why, I examined the internal processes of states and systemic processes together with a more holistic methodological approach. *World-Systems Analysis* is generally criticized for overemphasizing the importance of the world-system and neglecting the distinctive internal dynamics of the states.¹⁷² By using theoretical framework of the *World-Systems Analysis* together with several modernization theories and examining the internal dynamics of the states and systemic dynamics of the world-system together, I tried to show how *World-Systems*

¹⁷² For this discussion see: Stephen K. Sanderson, "World-Systems Analysis after Thirty Years: Should It Rest in Peace?", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 46, No: 3 (2005).

Analysis can be used for a more holistic analysis. I hope my modest effort can be at least a minor contribution to these discussions.



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