



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Political Science
Master Program (with Thesis)

**THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN LEADERSHIP TRAITS OF
POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS AND PARTY ISSUE POSITIONS:
THE CASE OF TURKEY 2002-2015**

Ali Abdelfattah

Master Program (with Thesis)

Ankara, 2017

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

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The jury finds that Ali Abdelfattah has on the date of 13.02.2017 successfully passed the defense examination and approves his Master Thesis titled, "The Association between Leadership Traits of Political Party Leaders and Party Issue Positions: The Case of Turkey 2002-2015".



Doç. Dr. Banu Cingöz-Ulu (Jury President)



Doç. Dr. Elif Erişen (Supervisor)



Prof. Dr. Ali Çağlar



Doç. Dr. Özlem Dirilen Gümüş



Doç. Dr. M. Murat Erdoğan

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☐ **Serbest Seçenek/Yazarın Seçimi**

13 /02/2017



Ali Abdelfattah

ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Doç. Dr. Elif Erişen danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.



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ÖZET

Abdelfattah, Ali. *Liderlik Özellikleri İle Konu Bağlımlı¹ Parti Pozisyonu Arasındaki İlişki: Türkiye Örneği 2002-2015*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2017.

Siyasi partiler literatürü, geleneksel olarak liderliğin parti pozisyonu üzerine tesirinden daha çok parti imajı, parti kimliği ve parti ideolojisinin seçmen tercihlerine etkisi konularına ilgi göstermiştir. Bu çalışma, parti liderlerinin parti içindeki etkisini gösterme ve liderin özellikleriyle konu bağliımlı parti pozisyonları arasındaki doğrudan ilişkiyi araştırmak suretiyle literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, araştırmaların çoğu uzak mesafe liderlik özellikleri analizi kullanılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir ve çoğu çalışma liderin kişiliğinin dış politikaya ve uluslararası alana nasıl etki ettiğini incelemektedir. Genel olarak iç politika üzerine, özellikle siyasi parti organizasyonları çerçevesinde devlet altı siyaset düzeyinde araştırma eksikliği mevcuttur. Bu araştırma parti lideri kişilik özellikleri ile konu bağliımlı parti pozisyonları arasındaki ilişkiyi sorgulamaktadır. Araştırma şu üç soruyu ileri sürer: parti liderinin kişilik özellikleri ile konu bağliımlı parti pozisyonu arasında bir ilişki var mıdır? Eğer varsa bu ilişkinin gücü ve istikameti yönü ne şekildedir? Buna ilaveten bazı kişilik özellikleri özel olarak belirli durumlarla ilişkili midir? Bu çalışmada liderlik tarzını ölçmek için liderlik özellikleri analizi, konu bağliımlı parti pozisyonunu ölçmek için MARPOR (Manifesto Research on Political Representation) Manifesto Analizi Veri Seti kullanılmaktadır. Bu araştırmada söz konusu ilişkiler 2002 sonrası dönem Türkiye örneğinde test edilmektedir. Çalışma 2002'den 2015'e kadar Türkiye parlamentosunda temsil edilen dört siyasi partiye odaklanır. Bu dönemde Türkiye'de beş parlamento seçimi gerçekleşmiş ve araştırma konusu partileri altı farklı lider yönetmiştir. Araştırma, liderlik karakter özellikleri ile konu bağliımlı parti pozisyonları arasında güçlü bir ilişki kurmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Politik Liderlik, Lider Özellikler, Parti Konu Pozisyonu, Türkiye

1 The original meaning of that concept in English is "Party Issue Positions".

ABSTRACT

Abdelfattah, Ali. *The Association between Leadership Traits of Political Party Leaders and Party Issue Positions: The Case of Turkey 2002-2015*, Master Thesis, Ankara, 2017.

The literature of political parties has traditionally given more attention to party image, party identification, and the impact of the party's ideology on voter choice, rather than the effect of the leadership on party positions. This research fills that gap in the literature by showing the intra-party impact of party leaders, and by exploring the direct association between leaders' traits and party issue positions. In addition, most research was conducted using an At-a-distance Leadership Trait Analysis, and most studies investigate how the leader's personality impacts foreign policy, and the international domain. There is a lack of research on domestic politics, and more precisely on sub-state level politics within political party organizations. This study investigates the association between party leadership traits and party positions on issues. The research posits three questions: Is there any association between a party leader's personality traits and party positions on issues? If so, what is the strength and direction of this association? In addition, do some traits specifically correlate with specific positions? The study uses Leadership Traits Analysis to measure leadership style, and MARPOR (Manifesto Research on Political Representation) datasets of Manifesto Analysis to measure party issue positions. The research tests these associations in the case of Turkey post-2002 era. It focuses on four political parties which were represented in the Turkish parliament from 2002 to 2015. In this period, Turkey underwent five parliamentary elections, and the parties under investigation here had six leaders. The study illustrates a strong association between leadership traits and party positions on issues.

Key Words

Political Leadership, leadership Traits, Party issue Positions, Turkey

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ABBREVIATIONS

Leadership Trait Analysis	(LTA)
Believes Can Control Events	(BACE)
Conceptual Complexity	(CC)
Distrust of Others	(DIS)
In-Group Bias	(IGB)
Need for Power	(PWR)
Self-Confidence	(SC)
Task/People Focus	(TASK)
Justice and Development Party	(AKP)
Nationalist Movement Party	(MHP)
Peoples' Democratic Party	(HDP)
Republican People's Party	(CHP)
Comparative Manifesto Project	(CMP)
Manifesto Research on Political Representation	(MARPOR)
Manifestos Research Group	(MRG)
Party Manifesto Data	(PMD)
Middle East and North Africa	(MENA)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study investigates the association between the leadership traits of political party leaders and party positions on issues. As the literature review below explains, some previous researches have recorded a correlation between the party elite and party issue positions (Karol, 2009). The correlation between leaders' traits and party issue positions may not have been addressed adequately, however, as the literature has given more attention to party image, party identification, and the impact of party ideology on vote choice, rather than the effect of the leadership on party positions. This thesis fills the gap in the literature, showing the impact of party leaders inside the party by exploring the direct association between leaders' traits and party issue positions. In addition, most previous research which has been conducted using at-a-distance leadership trait analysis investigates the impact of leader personality on foreign policy and the state's action in the international domain. But on the other hand, there is an apparent lack of research on domestic politics, more precisely on sub-state levels within political party organizations.

The thesis posits three main questions which have not been investigated clearly in the literature; is there any association between party leaders' personality traits and party positions on issues? If so, what is the strength and direction of this association? In addition, do some traits specifically correlate with specific positions?

1.1 PARTY LEADERSHIP

1.1.1 Why Study Party Leadership?

The study of leadership is one of the most ambiguous fields in social science (Hart & Rhodes, 2014), which could explain why the Handbook of Political Leadership (2014) opens with title; "*Puzzles of Political Leadership*". The reason for that ambiguity is the broad disagreement among scholars about the definition of a leader, or leadership (Elgie, 1995), as well as differences over the approach of study, disciplines, leadership typologies, and the leader's impact on political life (Hart & Rhodes, 2014). The importance of leadership and a leader's impact on political life has long attracted the attention of philosophers, starting with Plato and Aristotle, as seen in their efforts to

define the ideal “Ruler” and how he/she should rule or govern. This line of inquiry continued through Machiavelli in his famous “The Prince”, and later the social contract philosophers in their efforts to put limits to absolute use of power (Gerring, Onel, Morrison, & Keefer, 2014; Keohane, 2014). But, the most significant step in studying leadership and leaders came after the disaster of the Second World War; a conflict thought to be primarily caused by ambitious leaders (Hart & Rhodes 2014). The question raised then was how to avoid this disaster caused by putting the fate of nation/nations in the hands of only one person. Over the last two decades, research has focused on the increasing role of leaders in political life. It is argued that leaders of a party fill a major place in Western democracies; leaders’ personalities play a pivotal role in achieving party success (Katz & Mair, 1994; Leduc, 2001; Marsh, 1993), and the world has witnessed the phenomenon of “electoral face of presidentialization” (Mughan, 2000; Poguntke & Webb, 2005). The leader’s role in changes or blocking changes is undeniable, according to another research (Ahlquist & Levi, 2011).

Poguntke and Webb (2005) in their book “The Presidentialization of Politics”, present a new argument, that democratic regimes become more “presidentialized”, and politics becomes more personalized over time. The hypothesis concerns the practice and the exercise of power, despite constitutional and organizational constraints, and in spite of regime type. They explain their concept of “presidentialization” by describing three key features of presidential regimes, and the “logic of presidentialism” itself, to distinguish it from other types. The three features are; leadership power resources, leadership autonomy, and personalization of the electoral process. The increase of these features is considered as an indicator of presidentialization. The research argues that three political areas where the phenomenon of presidentialization could be observed, and a leader’s influence increases are seen, are; within the government, the so-called “executive face”, inside the party, “the party face”, and within elections, “the electoral face”.

The research explains the “party face” as the growing power of a leader within the party, vis-à-vis organizational constraints, dominant coalitions, and the “shift in intra-party power to the benefit of the leader” (p. 26). In addition, the leader seeks to communicate directly with party members, overstepping sub-leaders in the party. This shift of party

mechanisms leads to a concentration of power, and a more leader-based party, rather than an organization-based party (Poguntke & Webb 2005).

Regarding the importance of leaders in general, studies about party leadership became a popular topic only recently (Lobo, 2014) in academia. The reasons behind the negligence of party leadership as a topic stem from the democratic traditions and arrangements, built on a bottom-up culture, plus the separation of power, and institutionalization. These concepts are in contrast with the will of one leader, the top-down structural hierarchy of an organization, and the concentration of authority. However, after the decline of the mass party era and the emergence of different types of parties such as catch-all and electoralist parties, the role of leaders within the party has increased significantly. In other words, the shift in party types was actually a shift from the focus on party members to the focus on party leaders (Lobo, 2014; Ruscio, 2008). In addition, the increasing role of media in political communication led to more concentration on the leader/candidate, rather than the program and ideology, and the importance of media highlighted the value of image over content. (Farrell, 2006; Garzia, 2011; LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, 1996; Lobo, 2014; Mughan, 2000; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Despite disagreements amongst scholars, there is a significant number of studies which focus on the importance of party leaders and candidates within the party and on voter behavior. This research varies from comparative to case study models.

Studies focusing on a leader's impact on voter behavior and electoral success received broader interest amongst scholars. Studies such as Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt (2011), in their important research, assert the influence of leaders and argue that leaders matter, but not in all cases and circumstances. The hypothesis of the study has been tested in nine Western democracies, namely: Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States, where it encompasses 68 elections, and 42 different parties and leaders. The main investigation of the study is to explore the leaders' effects on voters in different contexts, such as party systems, countries, changes over time, and organizational constraints. Bean and Mughan (1989), in their comparative study of two countries, Australia and Britain, investigate a party leader's personality and its impact on the voter during the 1983 British, and 1987 Australian parliamentary elections. The research concludes that, despite the important role of leaders on voters'

choices, the different profiles of party leaders did not make a significant difference; instead, the voters' perception about a leader's effectiveness was important in their voting decision. Posing the question; "Do leaders affect the outcomes of elections?", Bittner (2011) conducted a study that covered 35 elections in seven countries; Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, and USA from 1968 to 2004. This research measures the impact of a leader's personality traits on voters' choices, and whether the electorates vote for party label and party platform, or party leaders. The research stresses the leaders' impact on voter preference. This impact differs from one leader to another and upon the size of the party to which that the leader belongs. Another study measures the candidate's impact on voters. Brettschneider and Anderson (2006) conducted a study on German national elections from 1961 to 2005. The study argues that candidates play an important role only for voters who do not identify with a specific party. In order to explore British voter determinants, (Rusk, Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2006) in their in-depth study about the British electorate, base their findings on public opinion and voting surveys, from 1964 to 2001. The study shed the light on three approaches; sociological approach which emphasize the social context to explain electorate behavior. Second, individual rationality approach, this approach constructed on the rational choice theory. Third, the valence approach, by connecting party issues with positive values widely acceptable to the voters, and affecting their voting behavior. In summary, the study argues that the valence approach best explains British voter behavior, with an increasing role of party leaders. Another study investigates the party leader role in both media coverage and its impact on election results in Britain. Mughan (2000) observes the increasing importance of party leaders in British politics, started from the mid-1980s, to the date the study conducted, and claims that "British general elections have presidentialized" (p.128).

The second type of study approach concerns the party organizational change, or the internal distribution of power, and leadership selection. The literature discusses the role of party leader within the party, according to official party rules and regulations, or unofficially, by its influence and resulting factions. It lends more importance to party leaders and party elites, rather than party institution and members (Lobo, 2014). This approach also discusses the problem of decision-making, and who makes the important decisions within the party. The argument put forth by Michels and his Oligarchic law

(Michels, 1962) states that all organizations are controlled by a small number of elites, regardless of how much these organizations claim their degree of intra-democracy. Following this, Michels and Panebianco (1988) added to and developed other ideas in the field of organizational approach. In contrast with Michels, Panebianco claims that the clique which rules the party is not an oligarchy, instead they are dominant coalitions of leaders who control the party's strategic mechanisms. In addition, he argues that the party's degree of institutionalization correlates inversely with the degree of cohesiveness of this dominant coalition of leaders.

Studies refer to the increasing concentration of power in the leaders' hands, which is linked to the change of party types in last decades, and to the emergence of new party models. These new models became closer to the state and relatively more dependent upon it, which in contrast decreases the importance of their membership (Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966). Carty (2004), in his efforts to set out a model of party change, highlights the decline of the role of membership and the increasing influence of individuals who enjoy decision-making power in modern party organizations. In addition, party leaders have increased their autonomy and power, and political parties have become "more leader-driven".

Literature on the organizational approach also includes topics such as the leadership selection mechanism. Studies on the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in the UK (Alderman, 1999; Alderman & Carter, 1993) were conducted to explain the relationship between the party leadership election mechanism within the party, and the party's defeat in national elections. Another study was conducted on the leadership selection method in five countries, namely: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and UK. That study observed a relationship between the defeat in national elections and the party's decision to broaden the base of the electorate within the party (Cross & Blais, 2012). Moreover, several studies contributed to the question of who selects a party leader, and the impact of that group on intra-party democracy. Matthews (2015) in his study of five parties in Northern Ireland, collected data from interviews with elite members and party documents. The study claims a correlation between party organizational heterogeneity and intra-democratization. Denham and O'Hara (2007), in their study on a party leader's legitimacy and its relation with leaders' selection method, apply their methods to Cameron's

mandate in the UK's Conservative Party, and showed not only the selection method, but also the right to withdraw support of the leader, could weaken a leader's power within party.

1.1.2 Approaches to Analyzing Political Leadership

The topic of political leadership has seen a wide range of approaches of study across different disciplines. Here, I discuss the most widely used approaches and methods of analyzing political leadership in political science. These methods are multi-disciplinary, involving both political science and psychology.

1.1.2.1 Institutional Analysis

The main idea of this approach is that leader's behavior is shaped by their position and institutional (formal and informal) arrangements. Both their position and the party organization itself constrain the leader's behavior by the logic of calculation, according to rational choice theorists, or by appropriateness, according to sociologists. In this approach, institutional arrangements are more important than the actors themselves (Helms, 2014). Therefore, the institutional approach focuses on leadership as an *office of leadership*, seeing the leader as a position, not an individual. The study of leadership concerns several types of leadership across several institutional levels. Its main concern is executive and legislative leadership at the state level, and how political regimes could shape and determine the output of the political process (Lijphart, 1992). However, the institutional approach concerns party leadership (Lobo, 2014), and also political movement leadership (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). The criticism of this approach is that it gives less importance to a leader's characteristics and their ability to have a significant impact on political output. This approach also may not be the appropriate choice for countries with weak institutional arrangements and it may be more fruitful to look at institutional and individual approaches as complementary to understanding political phenomena. While the individual approach focuses on a leader's psychology, the leader does not act in a vacuum; instead, he/she is surrounded by formal and informal constraints, and has interactions with other individual and organizational actors who have different interests. Conversely, neglecting the leader's individual effect on political output, and institution's behavior, could lead to insufficient analytical results.

1.1.2.2 Contextual Analysis

Contextual analysis focuses on the position held by the actor, but it also focuses on the interaction between the actor's characteristics within the position, an approach that lends more importance to the political environment and circumstances surrounding the actor and the position at any given point in time. For example, how the oil shock in the 1970s and the collapse of the Berlin Wall effected political leaders in those countries at that time (Hart, 2014).

Although the impact of political context on a leader's behavior is observed here, this approach has a great degree of ambiguity in terms of measuring its context. The ambiguity comes from the complication of the context itself. For example, in order to analyze the contextual effect, questions are raised about its definition, i.e.; Is it within the international or domestic environment? Is the context under examination contemporary, or should its historical roots be analyzed, too? Also, the meaning of the context itself is debatable. In addition to analyzing the context and determining its nature, the question is; Do all leaders perceive the same context in the same way? Another analytical problem is the type of the context. All context types, macro or micro, may not have the same impact on a leader's behavior. In other words, "the context actually is as the analyst says it is" (Hart, 2014, p. 220). Furthermore, the impact of context on leaders is only half of the picture when it comes to explaining the political reality, and the role of leadership style needs to be addressed.

1.1.2.3 Decision-Making Analysis

This approach focuses on the output of the political process, and decision makers' choice; whether decision makers are individuals, groups, or a coalition. This approach contains several models of analyses, among them, the famous "Rational Choice Model". This approach is widely used in foreign policy analysis (Brule, Mintz, & DeRouen, 2014), but because the subject matter of the thesis is domestic politics, this approach is not discussed further here.

1.1.2.4 At-a-Distance Analysis

At-a-distance analysis claims that the targets' personalities can be analyzed from the content of their public verbal declarations. In normal situations, the subject under investigation comes to the clinic and responds to structured interviews conducted by a specialist, or the subject visits the laboratory and is investigated through psychological experiments. Unfortunately, this traditional method is not applicable to political leaders who lead very public lives. Instead, at-a-distance technique tries to answer these questions by examining a leader's public statements. (Schafer, 2014). Its theory and methodological techniques help researchers analyze several different qualities of political leaders. The method is used to analyze five main qualities: First, leaders' traits (Herman, 1999) and under that category, the seven individual leadership related traits are analyzed. These traits are: Control of events, Need for Power, Conceptual Complexity, Self-Confidence, Task/person focus, Distrust of Others, and In-Group Bias. The method uses the spontaneous statements of the subject to assess each trait's score. The combined result of these seven traits then points to one of eight personality styles. The second major category of inquiry is the operational code of a leader's beliefs (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003), which focuses on personal beliefs. This method asks ten questions to assess personality belief systems. These questions are separated into two groups; philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The philosophical beliefs come from the leader's view on the nature of the political environment and other actors, and his role within this environment. On the other hand, instrumental beliefs deal with the leader himself, his actions in the political sphere, and his "views on goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics for the self in the political universe" (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 35). Thirdly, the political motivation question (Smith, 1992) assesses a political leader's motives, using both the spontaneous and prepared verbal material of the subject. This technique seeks to determine one of three motives that each leader should possess. The first one is need for achievement; which means that the leader is motivated to seek the position by a desire to accomplish and achieve something good or unique. Second, affiliation; the leader seeks close relations with others, and friendly relationships with persons generally. Third, need for power; leaders are concerned with their impact on others, upon nations, persons, or groups. Each motive category has a group of key words and is scored, and each motive has its reflection on leader's behavior (Winter, 2003). Fourth, a leader's integrative

complexity is considered to be a recognizable cognitive style used to assess problem solving, decision-making, information and its dissemination (Suedfeld, 2003). The technique investigates the thought structure of the subject and is not concerned with the material content. In addition “integrative complexity has two components; differentiation and integration. Differentiation refers to the perception of different dimensions when considering an issue. Integration refers to the recognition of cognitive connections among differentiated dimensions or perspectives” (Suedfeld, 2004). Unlike other methods, this technique uses all kind of materials produced from the subject, such as books, articles, fiction, letters, speeches and speech transcripts, video and audio tapes, and interviews. Fifth, the verbal behavior method is used to assess a leader’s personality profile (Weintraub, 1989). This method was formulated by (Weintraub, 1981, 1986, 1989) based on analyzing a speaker’s language syntax and verbal style, and it focuses on how the speaker formulates sentences and uses specific grammatical structures. According to Weintraub (2003), the method is based on three hypotheses; (1) Patterns of thinking and behaving are reflected in styles of speaking, (2) Under stress, a speaker's choice of grammatical structures will mirror characteristic coping mechanisms, (3) Personality traits are revealed by grammatical structures having a slow rate of change (p. 139). The analysis uses a sample of at least ten minutes of spontaneous free speech, and each response must contain atleast thirty words. The technique lays out twelve categories of verbal styles, and each category has its grammatical indicators. After determining the category, the researcher linking these categories with sixteen traits should be able to determine the speaker’s personality.

1.1.2.5 Political Personality Profiling

This approach is based on the psychological analysis of a leader’s personality by profiling that personality under several elements. It assumes that every element could affect a leader’s behavior. These elements are set out under five main categories including the context of his/her nation's history, plus the leader’s personality, world view, leadership style, and outlook. After collecting data about the subject based on the elements in the profile, and after filling in this information in the categories, the analyst tries to match the resulting “profile” to one of the three dominant personality types in political leaders’ characteristics, which are as follows; narcissistic personality, the obsessive-compulsive

personality, and the paranoid personality. Each type has its own features, leadership style, weaknesses, and implications for decision making. This type of analysis is more appropriate for case studies (Post, 2014).

1.1.2.6 Social Constructionist Approach

This approach concerns how the followers perceive the leadership and the interaction between leaders and followers. What determines the success of a leader is how the followers perceive the leader (Grint, 2014). This approach avoids the idea of “Fact” and “Truth”, because it is always relative to the social group and their view (Cunliffe, 2008). Also, the method stands against the idea that cold numbers could reflect the reality. In contrast, people’s perception of events and their explanations are what really matters for their perception of reality (Grint, 2014). This qualitative approach uses narratives as the analysis technique (Grint, 2014).

In addition to the approaches discussed above, there are a few more analysis techniques used to study leadership. Rhetorical analysis is a qualitative method that analyzes leaders’ scripts as a fundamental tool of communication and a source of influence with followers (Uhr, 2014). Biographical analysis is an approach that sees the leader’s story in an interpretive way. This technique combines a leader’s personal and professional life, as well as the environment that leader interacts with, in order to explain leader’s life and actions. (Walter, 2014). Observational analysis is based on the observation of leadership mechanisms and actors in leadership positions from an insider perspective (Gains, 2014).

After presenting the most important approaches in the study of political leadership, this research will use At-a-distance leadership traits analysis for several reasons. Firstly, the approach presents a valid method to assess political leadership personality, one based on a quantitative technique which allows the study to make a consistent comparison among several leaders’ personalities. This advantage is not available to that degree of efficiency in other methods. Secondly, the technique uses automated coding of the text, based on a software program. The program has proved its efficiency, allowing the study to avoid the disadvantages of manual coding with its extensive use of time and labour, and its high degree of human bias. Thirdly, the technique uses the spontaneous statements of the subject, such as interviews and media conferences, which are mostly available for public

review. Therefore, the researcher does not have to conduct an interview with the subject, which can be extremely difficult in some cases, nor is there a need to collect highly classified or archived data not normally available to the public. Fourthly, the method concerns a leader's personality assessment, which is the central topic that the study investigates. Lastly, among the five sub-methods which investigate the five different qualities of leader's personality, all sub-methods use an At-a-distance automated technique, and the study chooses the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) by Hermann (1999) for distinct reasons; compared to the other five methods, LTA includes in its analysis both the leader's motivations in the trait of "affiliation", plus the leader's political beliefs under three trait categories of; "Distrust", "Control of events", and "Conceptual Complexity". LTA does not analyze leader's traits in a vacuum, instead it holistically analyzes these interactions with the political environment.

1.1.3 Leadership Traits Analysis Literature

In addition to Hermann's research on LTA from the 1970s and beyond (1974, 1977, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004), several studies using LTA have been conducted. The literature focused only on research conducted after 2002, to assure that those studies used the modern automated coding analysis by Profiler Plus (Young, 2001), which has been proven in its accuracy and efficiency (Schafer & Walker, 2006).

Previous research using Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), and the at-a-distance method of assessing leader's personality, varies between using (LTA) in association with an operational code analysis of leader's beliefs (Besaw, 2014; Brummer, 2016; Dyson, 2016; Galliano, 2002; Kelley & Vasquez, 2014) for a multi-dimensional assessment, on the other hand, some of them analyze leadership (LTA) as a whole with its seven traits (Brummer, 2016; Charles & Maras, 2015; Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, & Ozkececi-Taner, 2015; Elena Lazarevska & Sholl, 2005; Kesgin, 2013; Shannon & Keller, 2007), whereas others select specific traits to measure their correlation with other variables. Some papers measure only four traits; Self-Confidence, Need for Power, Distrust, Group affiliation, and their correlation with violence and lethality (Besaw, 2014). Another measures; Control of events, Self-Confidence, Conceptual Complexity, and Openness to information associated with crisis sense-making (Van Esch & Swinkels, 2015), whereas,

a third study measures Distrust, Self-Confidence, Conceptual Complexity, the Need for Power and its impact on the degree of violence and lethality in civil wars (Kelley & Vasquez, 2014). Other papers use two traits; Believes can Control Events and Conceptual Complexity (Dyson, 2006, 2009) to examine their effects on foreign policy. As an example, some research has discussed personality's effect on Donald Rumsfeld and Tony Blair in their decisions to pursue an invasion of Iraq, and the topics of Distrust, the Need for Power and its correlation with using force (militarized interstate disputes) in foreign policy have been examined (Shannon & Keller, 2007). Other research measured the Believes can Control Events trait and its impact on using force in foreign policy by examining US presidents from 1953 to 2000 (Keller & Foster, 2012), including the categories of In-group affiliation, Distrust and its impact on foreign policy behavior (Kesgin, 2012). Still another paper investigates the constraints of challenge/respect (which consists of two traits; Believes can Control Events and Need for Power) and its impact on making the decision to go to war with the Alliance (Dyson, 2007).

Dyson (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2016) presented a prominent work using the LTA technique on political leaders. The first study investigates the correlation between a prime minister's personality, and decision-making. The study applies the question to Tony Blair's decision to participate in the second Iraq War and it suggests that Blair's high score in both Believes can Control Events and Need for Power, and low score in Conceptual Complexity, played an essential role in his decision to go to war (Dyson, 2006).

In a similar study, Dyson (2007) investigates the same question of personality's effect on decision-making in foreign policy. However, that study investigates why Britain decided not to go to into the Vietnam conflict alongside the U.S, while it decided to join the Iraqi War in later years. By assessing the personality traits of both Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and Tony Blair, and mainly their scores toward constraints, the study highlighted how Wilson's traits showed his respect of constraints (public opinion and opposition) and how that affected his decision-making, as evidenced by his refusal to participate in the conflict in Vietnam. In contrast, Tony Blair's scores showed that he is a constraint challenger (Dyson, 2007).

Continuing his investigation into the correlation between a leader's personality traits and decision-making, another study (Dyson, 2009) shows how Rumsfeld's (former U.S. Minister of Defense during the second Iraqi War) high scores of Distrust drove him to go to war in the first place. However, his low score in Control of Events, and high score in Conceptual Complexity traits affected his capability of managing the messy situation later on in Iraq (Dyson, 2009).

From another perspective, Dyson (2016) explored leadership style, and its interaction, in the case of Gordon Brown and his Chancellor, Alistair Darling, and its negative reflection on managing economic policy during the financial crisis of 2007/2008.

Another important paper by Foster and Keller (2014), investigates leadership traits (essentially Conceptual Complexity and Distrust) and its effect on the decision-making process. The study tests its hypothesis on the presidents of United States from 1953 to 2000, and their tendency to use power. The study indicates a negative correlation between Conceptual Complexity and using force, especially if associated with a high score for the Distrust trait.

Violence/lethality and its correlation with the Distrust trait were a topic of investigation in two papers. The first paper investigates whether or not a terrorist leader's personality has influence on the violence/lethality degree of that group. After analyzing eleven groups from different cultures and with different political goals, the paper suggests a strong correlation between Distrust trait and tendency to use violence (Besaw, 2014). The second paper investigates state leaders' personality traits and their influence in violence/lethality in post-World War II civil wars. The study also indicates a significant positive correlation between Distrust trait and violence/lethality (Kelley & Vasquez, 2014).

Several studies have been conducted concerning leader's personality and its influence on crisis management. The first investigated thirteen state leaders in the European Union, and their behavior during the euro crisis. The study indicates that leaders with high scores in Self-Confidence tend to behave in a self-oriented way, instead of sharing responsibility with others. And leaders with high scores in Conceptual Complexity found it difficult to face the crisis and define the situation accurately (Van Esch & Swinkels, 2015).

This method of LTA is also used to examine the economic domain, and sub-state levels of leaders. Namely, a study analyzes Central Bank leaders and their reaction to the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998 (Thies, 2004). The study focuses on two dimensions: firstly, the degree of independence of the Central Bank as an institution apart from the state, and the effect of this independence during the crisis. Secondly, it covers the central bankers' traits and their influence on how they dealt with the situation. The study indicates a significant positive correlation between the independence of the institution from the state, and leaders with high scores in Conceptual Complexity were found to be more successful in managing the financial crisis and its effect on their countries.

Leadership Trait Analysis has also been used to assess Turkish political leaders. Baris Kesgin is one of the pioneers in the in-depth analysis of Turkish political leaders, using the At-a-distance content analysis technique. In his study of post-Cold War Turkish prime ministers, using LTA and operational code analysis, Kesgin rebuts the dominant secular/religious classification of Turkish leaders to explain their political behavior. Instead, the study suggests that leaders' personality style was the major variable (Kesgin, 2013).

Another contribution by the same researcher focuses on Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, Kesgin (2012) and it suggests that both of the following traits; high In-Group Bias and high Distrust scores, had a vital impact on her decisions in the realm of foreign policy.

There are three additional important papers using LTA in the Turkish domain. The first paper (Görener & Ucal, 2011) analyzes Erdogan's leadership and its impact in foreign policy and government outputs. The study covers Erdogan's leadership style from 2004 to 2009 and measure the change in Erdogan's scores in each trait and its impact on policy. The second paper (Cuhadar, et al., 2015) investigates how Turkish leaders react differently toward structural constraints, with a comparison between two prime ministers; Ozal towards the first Iraqi war 1991, and Erdogan towards the second Iraqi war 2003. Each leader's reaction was tested under two occasions. For Ozal, it was the "closing of the oil pipeline" and "allowing the US-led forces deployment in Turkey", and for Erdogan was the "deployment of the US troops in Turkey for a Northern front" and "opening Turkish air space". The research suggests that self-confidence and Conceptual

Complexity were the main variables between other traits that may play the major difference between two leaders' reactions. A third paper was conducted by the same team of researchers (Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, & Ozkececi-Taner, 2016). In this paper they investigate if the percentage of change in the leader's behavior is affected by changes to his position/role and if that differs from one leader to another, depending on leader's personality traits. In other words they measure leader's adaptation to the new position based on leader's traits, *and* if leader's traits themselves change with the changing role. They applied the hypothesis to three leaders; Ozal and Demirel during their premiership and presidency, and Abdullah Gul during his premiership and presidency, in addition to his tenure as a minister of foreign affairs. The research claims that the leader's traits score change across roles, but it varies from leader to another and from trait to another, as well.

1.1.4 Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)

Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is a technique used to assess leadership style. LTA is based on Margaret Hermann's works from 1970s onwards (1974, 1977, 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004).

Hermann defines leadership style as:

The ways in which leaders relate to those around them, whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions (Hermann, 1999).

The main argument of Hermann's method lies within the interaction dimension in a leader's personality. In other words, the method is not concerned only with the leader's traits in a static state or vacuum; instead, it measures the leader's traits in their dynamic interaction with the environment and other actors. It assesses leadership style by asking three questions, and each of those three questions are answered by measuring seven personality traits. Those seven traits, in turn, are measured through a content analysis of the leader's spontaneous verbal responses.

Different features of the leadership styles and their link with political behavior have been explored in several previous works by Hermann (1980a, 1984a, 1995); Hermann and Hermann (1989); Hermann and Preston (1994); Kaarbo and Hermann (1998); and

Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann (1989). LTA assumes that by answering three essential questions, subjects' leadership styles could be determined. These three questions orbit around the leader's view on the concepts of constraints, incoming information, and motivations. According to Hermann (2002, p. 6) the questions are:

- (a) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment – do they respect or challenge such constraints?
- (b) How open are leaders to incoming information – do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response?
- (c) What are the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions – are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves, or by the relationships that can be formed with salient constituents?

The related seven leadership traits are:


- (1) The belief that one can influence or control what happens.
- (2) The need for power and influence.
- (3) Conceptual Complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment).
- (4) Self-Confidence.
- (5) The tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something, versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities.
- (6) An individual's general distrust or suspiciousness of others.
- (7) The intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias.

By measuring the first two traits, the initial question about leader's image of constraints in the political environment can be answered. This reflects the leader's view about his/her ability to control political events. The third and fourth traits deal with the way the leader processes new information and they answer the question of to what extent are leaders

open to incoming information. The last three traits examine the leaders' motives in their political position, and the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions.

The following table is a model of Hermann's technique of leadership traits analysis:

Figure 1. The Processes from Traits to Decision²



(Hermann, M. G. (1999). Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis. Retrieved from www.socialscience.net/Docs/LTA.pdf)

1.1.4.1 Which materials are content analyzed by LTA?

Hermann (1999) set a number of conditions for the material to be analyzed. It should conform to the following rules:

- **Spontaneity:** Materials must be taken from spontaneous conversations of the subject to minimize (not to avoid completely) the degree of preparation and to avoid speech writers. Although sometimes the leader reviews the questions with the interviewer, when the interview starts, the leader's responses become spontaneous. Also, Hermann (2002) recommends the classification of the degree of spontaneity in the material, ranging from planned interviews, press conference, to coming face to face with the press suddenly at unexpected time (Hermann, 1999).

² This figure summarizes how decisions are made based on Hermann (2002).

- **Minimum volume of the material:** Hermann (2002) argues that the minimum material needed is 50 responses, and each response must not be less than 100 words from different occasions to be able to assess the leader's seven traits.

Variety: Variety of topics, occasions, audience, and the interview type are very important to provide a degree of accuracy for the leader's traits under assessment.

1.1.4.2 How content analysis is done in LTA?

Each trait is indicated by words and phrases in the text. The frequency of these words and phrases about a trait used by the subject shows the degree of the salience of this leadership trait.

After collecting the materials and coding all the words and phrases, the level of the salience of each leadership trait is calculated. The percentages found at the content coding stage need to be converted to values or characteristics. Tables number 2, 3, and 4 show the different values leaders get in constraints, incoming information, and motives based on different degrees of their corresponding traits. And table number 4 summarizes the resulting leadership styles.

Table 1 Subject's Behavior to Constraints

Need for Power	Belief Can Control Events	
	Low	High
Low	Respect constraints; work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important.	Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence.
High	Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion--behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where can pull strings but are less accountable for result.	Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

Source: (Hermann, M. G. (1999). *Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis*. Retrieved from www.socialscience.net/Docs/LTA.pdf)

Table 2 Openness to Information

Scores on Conceptual Complexity & Self- Confidence	Openness to Contextual Information
Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence	<i>Open</i>
Self-Confidence > Conceptual Complexity	<i>Closed</i>
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence Both High	<i>Open</i>
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence Both Low	<i>Closed</i>

Source: (Hermann, M. G. (1999). Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis. Retrieved from www.socialscience.net/Docs/LTA.pdf)

Table 3 Motivation toward World

In-group Bias	Distrust of Others	
	Low	High
Low	World is not a threatening place; conflicts are perceived as context-specific and are reacted to on a case-by-case basis; leaders recognize that their country, like many others, has to deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and call for flexibility of response; moreover, there are certain international arenas where cooperation with others is both possible and feasible. <i>(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships.)</i>	World is perceived as conflict-prone, but because other countries are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility in response is possible; leaders, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests. <i>(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant)</i>
High	While the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, leaders view that it is bounded by a specified set of international norms; even so, adversaries are perceived as inherently threatening and confrontation is viewed to be ongoing as leaders work to limit the threat and enhance their countries' capabilities and relative status. <i>(Focus is on dealing with threats and solving problems even though some situations may appear to offer opportunities.)</i>	International politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as "evil" and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior. <i>(Focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems.)</i>

Source: (Hermann, M. G. (1999). Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis. Retrieved from www.socialscience.net/Docs/LTA.pdf)

Table 4 Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Challenges Constraints	Closed to Information	<i>Expansionistic</i> (Focus is on expanding one's power and influence)	<i>Evangelistic</i> (Focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause)
Challenges Constraints	Open to Information	<i>Incremental</i> (Focus is on maintaining one's maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both)	<i>Charismatic</i> (Focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act)
Respects Constraints	Closed to Information	<i>Directive</i> (Focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's own views while still working within the norms and rules of one's position)	<i>Consultative</i> (Focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a particular situation)
Respects Constraints	Open to Information	<i>Reactive</i> (Focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow)	<i>Accommodative</i> (Focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus , empowering others and sharing accountability in the process)

Source: (Hermann, M. G. (1999). *Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis*. Retrieved from www.socialscience.net/Docs/LTA.pdf)

Lastly, after calculating the percentage of each trait, the results should be compared with a norming group of leaders. This norming group is based on a broad analysis of a number of leaders from different cultures, holding different positions. The first version of the norming group contains 87 leaders on the top of the state's regime, from 46 countries, and 121 leaders occupying different positions as ministers, opposition parties' leaders, MPs, and social movement leaders. Those 122 leaders have been collected from 48 countries, and the sample is taken from between the years 1945 to 1999, and from different regions around the world. Table 5 shows the mean of each trait of the norming group, and its standard deviation. When the subject recorded a score of any of the traits higher /lower than one standard deviation above the mean, it means that the subject is high/low in this trait, otherwise s/he is considered moderate in that trait.

Table 5 Potential Comparison Groups

Personality Trait	87 Heads of State	122 Political Leaders
Belief Can Control Events	Mean = 0.44 Low < 0.30 High > 0.58	Mean = 0.45 Low < 0.33 High > 0.57
Need for Power	Mean = 0.50 Low < 0.37 High > 0.62	Mean = 0.50 Low < 0.38 High > 0.62
Self-Confidence	Mean = 0.62 Low < 0.44 High > 0.81	Mean = 0.57 Low < 0.34 High > 0.80
Conceptual Complexity	Mean = 0.44 Low < 0.32 High > 0.56	Mean = 0.45 Low < 0.32 High > 0.58
Task Focus	Mean = 0.59 Low < 0.46 High > 0.71	Mean = 0.62 Low < 0.48 High > 0.76
In-group Bias	Mean = 0.42 Low < 0.32 High > 0.53	Mean = 0.43 Low < 0.34 High > 0.53
Distrust of Others	Mean = 0.41 Low < 0.25 High > 0.56	Mean = 0.38 Low < 0.20 High > 0.56

Source: (Hermann, M. G. (1999). *Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis*. Retrieved from www.socialscience.net/Docs/LTA.pdf)

The following norming group developed later, and increased the sample number from 209 to 284 leaders. In addition, it was divided into sub-groups based on region, and table 6 presents the latest version of the norming group of leadership trait analysis scored by the means and standard deviations:

Table 6 Norming group

Region	Control over Events	Need for Power	Conceptual Complexity	Self-Confidence	Task Orientation	Distrust of Others	In-Group Bias
World Leaders (N=284)	Mn=.35 SD=.05	Mn=.26 SD=.05	Mn=.59 SD=.06	Mn=.36 SD=.10	Mn=.63 SD=.07	Mn=.13 SD=.06	Mn=.15 SD=.05
Western Europe (N=53)	Mn=.33 SD=.07	Mn=.26 SD=.05	Mn=.57 SD=.06	Mn=.32 SD=.13	Mn=.64 SD=.09	Mn=.09 SD=.06	Mn=.17 SD=.05
Eastern Europe (N=78)	Mn=.34 SD=.05	Mn=.24 SD=.05	Mn=.59 SD=.05	Mn=.39 SD=.10	Mn=.68 SD=.07	Mn=.10 SD=.05	Mn=.14 SD=.06
Middle East & Northern Africa (N=46)	Mn=.33 SD=.06	Mn=.27 SD=.06	Mn=.56 SD=.08	Mn=.31 SD=.13	Mn=.58 SD=.06	Mn=.16 SD=.07	Mn=.15 SD=.06
Pacific Rim (N=79)	Mn=.34 SD=.06	Mn=.27 SD=.06	Mn=.59 SD=.08	Mn=.32 SD=.12	Mn=.62 SD=.08	Mn=.14 SD=.08	Mn=.16 SD=.05
Anglo-America (N=15)	Mn=.36 SD=.04	Mn=.24 SD=.04	Mn=.60 SD=.05	Mn=.45 SD=.08	Mn=.62 SD=.06	Mn=.12 SD=.03	Mn=.13 SD=.03
Latin America (N=13)	Mn=.37 SD=.03	Mn=.25 SD=.02	Mn=.60 SD=.05	Mn=.34 SD=.05	Mn=.65 SD=.06	Mn=.19 SD=.06	Mn=.15 SD=.03

Source: (Hermann, M. G. (2012). LTA Norming Groups. Retrieved from www.socialscienceautomation.com)

1.2 PARTY POSITIONS ON ISSUES

The literature on party positions investigates mainly the political stance of parties, and specifically party position changes on issues. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of “party issue” first. Sartori (2005), in his analysis of voter behavior and distinguishing voter types, such as the issue-insensitive voter, defines a party issue as “a bounded set of problems that can be isolated and is indeed perceived in isolation – not only in its distinctiveness but because of its distinctiveness.” (Sartori, 2005, p. 292). On the other hand, Karol (2009) defines a party issue as a “distinct area of public policy characterized by ongoing controversy” (Karol, 2009). This thesis makes use of Karol’s definition of a party issue because her definition is based on a concern for the basic long-term orientation of the party toward specific policy areas, and does not refer to tactical

opportunistic decisions in response to temporary situations. Party position literature has two main approaches to studying change: *the realignment theory* and *the issue evolution perspective* (Karol, 2009).

Realignment theory emerged in the literature in the 1950s and 1960s (Key 1955, 1959; Pomper, 1967; Schnattschneider, 1960), but the real formulation of the theory took place by the 1970s (Burnham, 1970; Campbell, 1966; Sundquist, 1983). The theory assumes that political stability is interrupted regularly by short periods of instability. The longer period of stable political life is called a “political system”. This period is characterized by a clear agenda for each party, stable and clear voting behavior and preferences, and clear issue positions for each party. Phases of instability inevitably come along and change this equilibrium. The interrupting phase of instability is associated with the emergence of a new issue, one which was not addressed earlier in the political agendas of the parties. This instability forces the coalescing elements of the old equilibrium to change their positions and agendas, which leads to a new form of equilibrium with new party alignments. Long-term stability with short-term episodes of instability is called an “electoral cycle” (Burnham, 1970).

The theory has received a lot of criticism from scholars for several reasons. Firstly, the regularity of this cycle and how long it lasts couldn’t stand up to empirical scrutiny (Beck, 1974; Ladd, 1990; Mayhew, 2004; Silbey, 1991; Ware, 2006). Some scholars criticized it because the interruptions were exceptional events in the history, such as the Great Depression and the US Civil War (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Silbey, 1991).

The second approach, issue evolution, emerged in reaction to realignment theory. Scholars using the issue evolution approach argue that realignment theory starts with the polarization of the masses on a specific issue, but the polarization may be a result and not a cause of the phenomenon under investigation. It may, in fact, be only the tip of the iceberg (Carmines & Stimson, 1986). The main idea of the theory is to explore the dynamics and the processes of issue evolution, from the first time the issue was mentioned by a politician, through to the emergence of a new party system and new party positions. Therefore, the source of the issue comes from party elites in the form of a “cue”, and then it affects the masses and changes their party identification. Over time, these issues become

the pillars, or the axes of a new party system. Every party defines its position in the political sphere based on those issues (Carmines & Stimson, 1986).

This perspective is based on two main ideas: The first idea is the top-down change of issues and the resultant change in party positions. The machine starts its work with a signal from the party elite, or a group of party elites, and then snowballs downward to the masses. The second idea is “elite replacement”, which means that party leaders do not change their stance toward the same issue, but changes to the elite behavior come about primarily through their replacement inside the party elite (Karol, 2009). This perspective also received some criticism. Later research showed the bottom-up direction of issue influence between the elite and the masses. In addition, other researchers observed changes in the elite’s behavior, and in their stance toward the issues, without elite replacement (Lee, 2002; Karol, 2009; Spitzer, 2015).

In addition to the two theories mentioned above, Harmel and Janda (1994) present a different theory of party change. The starting point of their theory is their criticism of the inevitability of issue evolution, or evolutionary changes in parties, in general. The study argues that party change does not just arise by itself without a reason, and such change is not inevitable according to evolution theory. The theory disagrees with the focus on only external effect as a cause of party change (both gradual and abrupt change). The study emphasizes, instead, the importance of internal factors, when the party leaders decide to change organizationally, or make changes on issues. These changes occur only when a good reason (external) exists, and with a will to change among party leaders, according to Harmel and Janda (1994). Therefore, the theory first seeks the reasons for change and then it focuses on three types of change, namely the change of strategies, organizational characteristics, and issue positions. It proposes three reasons that cause these changes; change of leadership, change of the dominant faction, and/ or external (environmental) stimulus for change (Harmel & Janda, 1994). They used two sources of data, first, longitudinal comparative data, collecting annual data from the official documents of parties, in addition to judgmental data collected by the researchers covered 19 parties in four countries from 1950 to 1990 under four indicators. All data collection method, and indicators explanations presented in Janda’s study “Political parties: A cross-national survey” (Janda, 1980).

This thesis refers to the two elements of the theory, the issue position change and the change of leadership factor. One of the main assumptions in the theory is that “most (though not all) party changes result from decisions made by party operatives, which include internal as well as external causal influences (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 262). The major changes mostly come from inside the party itself, with or without an external impulse, and the change of party leadership is one of the underlying causes of internal change (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Harmel and Janda’s (1994) theory pays more attention to the organizational changes in parties, rather than party position change on issues. However, it sheds light on party change in general, and it gives us a different perspective on how political parties change.

This thesis makes use of the issue evolution approach to understand party change. It focuses on the assumption of the theory of party elite replacement or behavior change, and investigates its effect on the change of party positions across issues. It defines party elite replacement or behavior as party leadership change and the resulting changes in leadership traits are, in part inspired by the integrated theory of party change. Moreover, acknowledgment of the possibility of a two-way relationship in the theory between party leaders/elites and issue positions in the masses is reflected in how this thesis investigates the relationship between leadership traits and party positions.

As a result, the thesis investigates the association between party leadership traits and issue positions of the party, and not a specific causal relationship. The expectation of leadership traits affecting party positions is a theoretical one.

1.2.1 Measuring Party Position and Party Position Change

The literature on party position change has a variety of party position measures. Each technique’s relative advantage depends on the research question. Some researchers used party manifesto content analysis (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2004; Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Janda, Harmel, Edens, & Goff, 1995; Laver & Garry, 2000; Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003; Litton, 2015; Schumacher, 2015), while others used legislatures voting behavior based on roll call data (Karol, 2009; Lee & Schutte, 2015). Still other researchers used the content analysis technique on Party leaders’ statements (Karol, 2009), legislative speeches (Laver, et al., 2003), and the party’s official website

and media (Gibson & Ward, 2000; Litton, 2015). Survey techniques including expert-based surveys (Gabel & Huber, 2000), citizen-based surveys (Gabel & Huber, 2000; Johns, 2012), plus internet and mail surveys were also used. Every data collection method has its advantages and disadvantages, as the study will explain later. That's why some of those researchers combined more than one technique (Gabel & Huber, 2000; Johns, 2012; Karol, 2009; Laver, et al., 2003; Litton, 2015) depending on their models.

1.2.2 Why Manifesto Analysis?

Among the several techniques in the literature, this thesis uses the manifesto project data on party manifestos for several reasons. Firstly, manifestos summarize where the party *wants* to stand on political issues, and not what the party has already chosen with their legislative voting behavior. That neutralizes confounding factors that affect the association under investigation, such as the legislative members' personal choices, interests and faction affiliation within the party, and their responsibility to voters in addition to their responsibility to leaders of the party. Moreover, legislative group behavior of voting is not determined solely by party internal factors, such as leadership decisions and MPs self-interests, but also by the interaction with external factors such as; types of coalitions, negotiations, and agreements with/ against other parties in the parliament. Secondly, unlike issue enforcement in reality, and its high effect on electorates and party supporters with their internal and external cost-benefit calculations, manifestos are only a promise of action – something that may lead to less complicated calculations in drafting the program, and therefore more association with leaders' preferences. In other words, party manifestos reflect more the internal variables, such as leadership style change and elite behavior. Thirdly, both expert-based and citizen-based surveys measure party image rather than party position. The technique measures how voters and experts perceive the party, not how the party leaders perceive the “self”, or the image that party leaders want to export to others. Survey technique could be more effectively used in the case of party image and party ideology research (Gabel & Huber, 2000; Johns, 2012). Fourthly, thanks to Manifestos Research Group (MRG) project (Merz, Regel, & Lewandowski, 2016; Volkens, et al., 2011), it is possible to conduct a computer based content analysis of party manifestos. This technique has proven its

reliability and validity in several studies, as mentioned above. Moreover, the project helps to minimize subjectivity in the content coding of the manifestos.

In order to avoid any confusion in the study, it should be noted that the Manifesto project is mentioned in the research under several names or abbreviations such as: Comparative Manifesto Project CMP, Party Manifesto Data PMD, Manifesto Research on Political Representation MARPOR, manifesto data project, and Manifestos Research Group MRG.

According to MARPOR project (Volkens, et al., 2015) that:

Up to now, a total of 273 articles published between 2000 and the first semester of 2015 in eight high-impact journals (American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Electoral Studies, The Journal of Politics, and Party Politics)... (p. 217)

This number increased to 289 articles by May 2016 (Manifesto project database, 2016). The data was collected, content analyzed and coded in terms of topics, policy dimensions, extraction methods, countries, party types and families, times, and actors, extent of critique, validation, and reliability testing (Volkens, et al., 2015, p. 219), and both coding handbook and statistics, and full list of publications are available online (Manifesto project database, 2016).

In the forthcoming pages, the papers most relevant to the study that used Manifesto project data will be reviewed.

The first paper investigates how party leaders change party issues in order to appeal to core party voters before the election (Green, 2011). By conducting interviews with conservative party leaders in Britain from 1997 to 2005, and by using the Manifesto data project to determine changes on issues, the paper shows that “Conservative issue strategies between 1997 and 2005 were chosen on grounds of spatial proximity and public perceptions of issue ownership” (Green, 2011, p. 735). The research suggests studying longstanding party stances on issues to understand overall party electoral strategies.

Leaders’ authority over party members has been investigated in a study about the effect of bicameralism on political parties (VanDusky-Allen & Heller, 2013). The main argument is that party leaders lose part of their authority over party members, mainly

MPs. In order to test this argument and the strength of leaders' authority over the party, the study compares party positions based on formal manifestos, and party positions based on legislative behavior. If the correspondence between the two measures is close, it infers a greater level of authority of party leaders over party members, and the inverse is also true. The paper uses Manifesto project data to identify party position on the right-left scale.

Based on comparative manifesto project data (CMP), Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) present a model of measuring left-right party position. The study finds that, despite the broad source of data for party position location, the data showed implausible results on left-right scale, under the argument that left and right definition differs from country to another. The study suggests a new mathematical calculation of CMP data, in order to be able to measure party position in uni-dimensional left-right scale. The study tested its new technique on four Western countries; Germany, Italy, Sweden, and UK. Those countries each have different types of party systems. Finally, the study indicates that the new technique is accurate to measure the scale of left-right position, and comparing the results with external data (expert surveys and elite surveys), shows its validity (Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006).

This paper investigates the validity of CMP data for measuring left-right party position across nations and across timelines. After comparing the results with external data, namely: two surveys based on country experts, and two surveys based on citizens' position on the left-right dimension to measure voter willingness, the study asserts the validity and accuracy of the data, but in the context of defining the theoretical definition of left and right across countries, and the specific type of categories selected from CMP data which were aggregated to calculate the left-right scale (Gabel & Huber, 2000).

Using CMP data, Pelizzo (2003) demonstrates that Manifesto project data is not a valid method to measure party's left-right position. Instead, the data is better suited to measuring party change direction, not party position. The source of this claim is that the results of the Italian party system were distorted. After verifying that the Italian party system is not exceptional, and verifying existing flows in both data collection and methodology, the study indicates that CMP analysis is a better method to explain party

change direction to remain competitive. This criticism is based mainly on the assumption that party position is determined by voters' perception, and voters' subjective views. Therefore, the study recommends more attention to the subjective framework in the analysis (Pelizzo, 2003).

Adams and his colleagues (2004) study the changes in party ideology, and whether the results of last election, or public opinion's change, could influence ideology change. In exploring this question for eight West European countries, the study measures ideology change using the Manifesto data project. On the other hand, in order to measure public opinion change, the study used "voters' left-right self-placements" survey. The results indicate a significant response of ideology change toward only a clear and high degree of public opinion shift on issues, and no evidence was found for the effect of the previous election's results (Adams, et al., 2004).

In contrast, another study based on CMP data of eight parties in three different countries, namely: Germany, Britain, and USA, in the national election from 1950s to 1980s, Janda and his colleagues (1995) indicated that poor performance in the election has a significant effect on party position willingness (party manifesto) in the next election (Janda, et al., 1995).

The correlation between opinion leaders and party representation was a topic of study conducted by Adams and Ezrow (2009). The paper demonstrates strong response from the party elites to opinion leaders. The study measures opinion leaders' preferences based on both Eurobarometer surveys data and CMP to assess party issue positions. The content of the study was from 1973 to 2002, and it applied to mainstream parties in twelve western European countries. The study indicates a significant correlation and a high degree of response from the party elites to opinion leaders. This correlation was found across countries and across time (Adams & Ezrow, 2009).

Ceron (2012), in his investigation of party faction influence on party issue position, indicates a link between party faction preferences and party positions. The study conducted on Italian parties from 1946 to 2010, measured factions' preferences by analyzing the content of motions in the party congresses occurred in that time, and used CMP data to measure party positions (Ceron, 2012).

Another study discusses the topic of gendered politics, and measures how party performance could correlate with party leadership gender. The study investigates 71 parties in 11 parliamentary regimes, between 1965 and 2013 (O'Brien, 2015). The results indicate different levels of access and experience in party leadership between genders, and these differences are shaped by party performance. Amongst several techniques used to determine party performance, the study used manifesto project data to measure the change on issues, and to test the hypothesis that female leaders emerge in left-leaning parties.

Another interesting study investigates women's effect on party position. By measuring party position change of 142 political parties in 24 different democratic countries from 1990 to 2003, Kittilson (2010) conducted research into the role of women in party issue preferences. Party position change was measured by CMP data, and women's effect measured by women's number in both party's parliamentary delegation, and party leadership committee. The study demonstrates a correlation between women representation in mentioned organs with social justice issue, and gender quota policies (Kittilson, 2010).

Laver and Garry (2000) present a computer-coding technique to analyze party manifesto as a measure of policy position, instead of using hand-coding. The paper shows the importance of official party texts (party manifesto), and the debate about their validity to reflect party positions, or the image that the party wants to export. The paper also presents the previous techniques of analyzing manifestos by testing its method on the British and Irish party manifestos issued during the 1992 and 1997 in general elections. In order to measure the validity of the new technique, the research used both methods (hand-coding and computer-coding) and compared the findings. The results were encouraging and close to each other, which infers a high degree of validity (Laver & Garry, 2000). Another paper written by the same team, in addition to Kenneth Benoit (Laver, et al., 2003), conducted the same investigation, but they presented two vital additions. Firstly, they extracted their technique to include non-English-language texts by analyzing German parties' texts in addition to the British and Irish parties. Secondly, they didn't just analyze party manifestos, but they also included legislative speeches. The final results assure the accuracy and validity of the technique.

In summary, the previous literature shows the variety of papers which count on CMP data in their analysis. The papers investigated party position change with voter preference as an independent variable (Green, 2011), and used this as an indicator of leaders' authority over party members (VanDusky-Allen & Heller, 2013). Other studies discuss CMP data's validity as a measure of left-right dimension (Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Pelizzo, 2003), with last election's effect (Adams, et al., 2004; Janda, et al., 1995) and public opinion (Adams, et al., 2004) as a dependent variable, and both opinion leaders (Adams, & Ezrow, 2009) and intra-party faction's (Ceron, 2012) influence on party position change, gender effect (Kittilson, 2010), and lastly, computer-coding and hand-coding differences (Laver & Garry 2000). This wide variety of questioning sheds light on the validity and accuracy of the data as a source of analysis.

1.2.3 Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR)

The Manifesto Project uses parties' election manifestos in order to study parties' policy preferences. MARPOR is an extension of the Manifesto Research Group, and the Comparative Manifestos Project CMP. The dataset covers more than 1000 parties, in 50 countries all over the world. The project collected data starting from the Post-World War II period till today, and the project updates its data every six months.

The project defines seven domains of party policy positions. Each domain has a number of categories related to it, and each of the total 56 categories has an operational definition. The number and label of categories is designed to fit all parties under investigation, therefore it is not required that each manifesto has to cover all categories. The first domain concerns the party's outlook on the international level. The domain varies from the use of military, to international integration and peace. The second domain concerns issues related to freedom and democracy standards. The third domain deals with how the party sees the political system of its own country, including centralization and corruption. The fourth concerns the realm of the economy, and the party preferences about economy and the type of economic system. The fifth domain includes all issues related to quality of life and welfare, such as education and environmental protection, and equality. The sixth domain concerns the fabric of society and includes issues such as multiculturalism and national way of life. The seventh and final domain concerns social groups, and it mentions

groups based on their type of profession, such as workers and farmers. (All categories and operational definitions appended.)

MARPOR follows the steps below to score political party positions using their manifestos: First, it chooses coders from the country under investigation. Those coders should have received training and worked in fields related to political science and election, and should be familiar with these topics. Secondly, to ensure the unification of coding standards across countries, those coders receive a special coding training that ends with coding tests for heightened reliability. Thirdly, the coding process contains two steps: unitizing and coding. Unitizing means transforming the text to units, in order to code and quantify it later. Each unit should contain one message from the manifesto, called “quasi-sentences”, because sometimes one normal sentence contains more than one message. After dividing the text to “quasi-sentences” or messages, each message is classified under one of 56 categories designated by the project experts. These categories are grouped under the 7 domains as given in Appendix A and B (Coding handbook, 2014). Having reviewed different strands of the literature on the main variables of the thesis’ research question, primarily party leadership and party positions. Under each domain the 56 categories distributed and measured scored, and the correlation has been tested between those categories and domain from and with leaders’ seven traits.

This thesis posits the hypotheses below on leadership traits and party positions as operationalized by MARPOR. The study concerns in those three traits specifically because there was confirmation in previous studies of their effect on a leader’s behavior surrounding key issues (Besaw, 2014; Kelley & Vasquez, 2014; Kesgin, 2012; Shannon & Keller, 2007; Smith, 2014).

In addition, according to a review of available literature, there are no previous studies showing a link between leaders’ traits and party position on issues to test the correlation. Moreover, most previous studies have focused on leaders’ traits and their impact on foreign policy decisions in the international domain. In this study, the three particular traits were chosen because they were the most correlated and influenced traits in the previous studies. Furthermore, the selected issues have been chosen as they were the closest to other variables in the previous studies, with a degree of speculation. Therefore,

a limitation in this study is expected, and it could lead to non-correlational results as well, especially since the study sets out to explore whether or not an association between leader's traits and party position on issues is, in fact, evident. The mismatch between leader's trait and manifesto may be a problem with the study's internal validity, because the manifesto is not a product of party leader. Having acknowledged this limitation, I'm interested in the question of what type of parties are associated with leadership trait.

According to Hermann (2002), leaders with high scores in both Distrust of Others and In-Group Bias traits, tend to take risks and pursue aggressive behavior, and perceive the world of politics as an environment of hostility. In addition, several studies using LTA claim a positive correlation between Distrust and violence/lethality both domestically, (Kelley & Vasquez, 2014) as well as in the international realm (Besaw, 2014), as seen with willingness to violate international norms (Shannon & Keller, 2007), and tendency to militarize a dispute (Kesgin, 2012; Smith, 2014). In contrast, leaders with a low score of both Distrust and in-group bias, tend to be flexible and cooperative with others. Furthermore, in-group bias average refers to the degree of nationalism, in which I expect that leaders with high score might take more protective policies in politics and economy.

1.3 HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1a: Distrust of Others correlates positively with anti-imperialism.

Hypothesis 1b: Distrust of Others correlates positively with the tendency to control the economy by the state.

Hypothesis 1c: Distrust of Others correlates positively with nationalizing the industry.

Hypothesis 1d: Distrust of Others correlates positively with the tendency of centralizing and narrowing the circle of decision making.

Hypothesis 1e: Distrust of Others correlates positively with the tendency to use military.

Hypothesis 1f: Distrust of Others correlates negatively with European integration.

Hypothesis 2a: In-Group Bias correlates positively with anti-imperialism.

Hypothesis 2b: In-Group Bias correlates positively with tendency to control the economy by the state.

Hypothesis 2c: In-Group Bias correlates positively with nationalizing the industry.

Hypothesis 2d: In-Group Bias correlates positively with tendency of centralizing and narrowing the circle of decision making.

Hypothesis 2e: In-Group Bias correlates positively with tendency to use military.

Hypothesis 2f: In-Group Bias correlates negatively with European integration.

These hypotheses are based on Hermann's analysis (2002) that leaders with higher scores in Conceptual Complexity than in Self-Confidence tend to show more tolerance, listen to others and be open, and often build collegial decision structures to allow free access to information and decision. In contrast, leaders with higher scores in Self-confidence than in Conceptual Complexity tend to be ideologues, and be "more likely to organize the decision-making process in a hierarchical manner in order to maintain control over the nature of the decision" (Hermann, 2002, p. 18).

Hypothesis 3a: Openness to contextual information (conceptual complexity > self-confidence) correlates positively with freedom and democracy.

Hypothesis 3b: Openness to contextual information (conceptual complexity > self-confidence) correlates positively with decentralization of decision-making.

Hypothesis 3c: Openness to contextual information (conceptual complexity > self-confidence) correlates positively with a tendency to Free-Market Economy.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 DATA AND METHODS

This thesis uses Leadership Traits Analysis to measure leadership style, and a content analysis of party leaders' spontaneous speeches to measure their traits. Party issue positions are measured by the content analysis of party manifestos based on MARPOR datasets, which already include computed scores for the political parties considered in this thesis.

The study tests the hypotheses above using the Turkish case. It focuses on four political parties represented in the parliament, Justice and Development Party (AKP) Republican People's Party (CHP) Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). The study domain covers the years 2002 to 2015. In this period, Turkey has undergone five parliamentary elections; 2002, 2007, 2011, the June 2015, and the November 2015 elections. Parties under investigation have included six leaders as Table 7 shows³:

Table 7 Leaders under Assessment from 2002 till 2015

	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
PARTY/ LEADERS	Erdoğan	Deniz Baykal	Devlet Bahçeli	Selahattin Demirtaş
2002 to 2015	2002-2014	2002-2010	2002-2015	2014-2015
	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu		
	2014-2015	2010-2015		

³ The study excluded Figen Yüksekdağ the co-leader of the Peoples' Democratic Party because she held the position on June 2014 with no enough rhetorical materials to analyze, and Abdullah Gül tenure because its shortness with no changes on party positions in that time.

2.1.1 Leadership Traits Analysis Data

2.1.1.1 Data Description

The collected data covers six leaders' spontaneous statements from 2001 to 2016. The study used several research datasets and websites to collect data, and the next section provide the source list and the search method for each source:

LexisNexis and Factiva news search engine: provides a full text database of news and political information, with a primary source newspaper articles. Access to this database is not open to the public, unless the person has a membership, or a public library provides this service⁴.

International channels and newspapers: present transcripts, such as: CNN, BBC, Der Spiegel, Washington Post, The New York Times, Aljazeera English, and EuroNews, Wall Street Journal, with special focus on specific talk shows to provide transcripts such as Amanbur and Charlie Rose.

Local news's archive: Anadolu News, Cihan Haber, Daily Sabah News, Hürriyet Daily News, and Today's Zaman.

In addition to previous search types, I used Google search engine to cover wider results.

2.1.1.2 Keywords and Search Methods

The search method depends on the website or search engine. For LexisNexis and Factiva, first advanced research section in the website have been chosen, then set the domain of search by day, moth, year, then choose news types, language, and region. After that, and for a wide ranging search, one would write only the surname of the person, such as: Erdogan, or Baykal. To confirm, under the same settings of time and language, one could change the keywords several times, for example; Erdogan/ Erdoğan/ Prime minster Erdogan/ Recep Tayyip Erdogan/ leader Erdogan/ Turkish prime minister/ Turkish premier/ premier Erdogan.

⁴ In this study, the access provided by Bilkent university's library.

The search inside specific websites is based on two methods. First is the website search engine results, but sometimes that search engine does not offer an advanced search, or the owners have renewed the contents, or do not keep old archives. That leads to the second method that uses the Google engine search on the same specific website. For example, if I want to search for Demirtas's materials on Hürriyet Daily News website between the years 2012 to 2016, therefore I type into a Google search: site:

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com> Demirtas 2012...2016.

A general search on Google was also conducted. For example, for Bahceli, one could write "Bahceli interview", "Bahceli transcript", or "Bahceli media conference", in addition to the year of search for narrowing the results.

The type of audience and the topic of statements varied to cover all statements found for those leaders. For example, some interviews were conducted in foreign countries, while others were in Turkish. Some interviews were conducted with Turkish media, while others were with international media. In addition, the statements were split between televised interviews (most of time live, and sometimes recorded), and interviews with newspapers (national and international).

Furthermore, collected materials were not only taken from interviews, but were sometimes based on a statement to the press after a political meeting, or international visit, or in the airport before and after the travel, or at a media conference. The only "must condition" is for the verbal material to be spontaneous. In addition, all collected statements were made when the leader was actively occupying his position of party leadership.

Although the study was committed to the minimum average of utterances (50 responses, each response must not less than 100 words, from different occasions), the number of analyzed statements and words varied from one leader to another. Whereas the materials for Erdogan and Davutoglu are extensive, material for leaders like Bahceli was rare.

Moreover, two factors impeded the process of data collection, and the number of collected statements and words for each leader. First, because the study uses an automated method of analysis, and relies on a program called "Profiler Plus", this program was only able to

code texts in the English language. Therefore, all collected materials must be in English, which narrowed the range of available materials. Secondly, international media conducting interviews, and providing transcripts in English are selective and not exclusive, and normally shed more light on leaders in the government than leaders in the opposition. In addition, media are also selective in terms of the topics they choose to cover and translate. That could explain the gap between number of words for Erdogan and Davutoglu, and other party leaders.

Lastly, regarding the argument that the texts lose its meaning and could affect the results of leader's traits, or the texts could reflect the translator's personality and not the leader's personality, previous works by Hermann (1987) confirmed that this argument has been tested, and that the translated materials do reflect leader's personality as much as the original materials.

2.1.1.3 Data Aggregation

Each speech/interview was normally used as a unit of analysis, but the data must be aggregated if the leader's statement is less than the minimum number of words (50 responses, and each response must be no less than 100 words) required to be able to process the coding and conduct the research, or if the research demands an annual or monthly aggregation to serve the research question and the investigation (Schafer & Walker 2006).

In this study the data were aggregated for each five years (electoral cycle), to explore the association between leaders' traits and party positions. Therefore, aggregation intervals will be in that form: 2002 to 2007, 2007 to 2011, and 2011 to 2015. This aggregation has two exceptions; first, when the leader hands his position down to another leader, such as Baykal with Kilicdaroglu in 2010. In such a case, the aggregation ending and beginning points must change. And if the collected materials are not enough to be aggregated in five years, such as the Baykal and Bahceli's materials, the study was forced to aggregate all available materials into one unit. Table 8 indicates the number of materials and words for each leader:

Table 8 Number of Collected Documents and Words for Each Leader

Erdogan		Davutoglu		Baykal		Kilicdaroglu		Bahceli		Demirtas	
Docs	Words	Docs	Words	Docs	Words	Docs	Words	Docs	Words	Docs	Words
53	51378	56	48903	14	5420	65	15684	13	7100	42	24034

In addition to previously collected data, the study integrated scores conducted on Erdogan before 2003. Cuhadar and her colleagues (2015) in their comparison between Ozal's and Erdogan's behavior toward first and second Iraqi war, collected 33 documents containing 9317 words of Erdogan's spontaneous statements, covering the period between 28 August 2001, to 9 March 2003 (Cuhadar et al., 2015, p. 17). The data collection and analysis procedures in that study are similar to here, except they collected statements related only to foreign affairs issues which do not affect the leader's scores, especially after comparing their results about Erdogan, with the results in this study to see if there is a big difference, or a huge gap, but it was almost close, and statistically acceptable.

2.1.1.4 "Profiler Plus" Automated Coding Program

In order to content code the speeches, the study uses a software program called "Profiler Plus" Version 5.8.4. This program was developed in part by Michael D. Young (Young, 2001). The program provides three different methodological techniques to choose from; operational code analysis (beliefs), leadership trait analysis, and motives analysis. The program package is free to download from (www.socialscienceautomation.com). The package's name is "Syracuse supported package for academics".

2.1.1.4.1 Data Preparation

The following steps show the data processing practice from collection to final output.

1. Collecting data from the sources mentioned previously, under the condition of spontaneity, by saving it in "txt" files, with a reference to date, and type of statement, then naming the file by year-month-day of the statement for an easier indexing later.

2. Removing any words belonging to someone other than the leader under investigation, such as any press questions or editorial remarks.

2.1.1.4.2 Data Coding

After following the downloading and installing instructions, these steps should followed:

1. Modify the “Profiler Plus” program settings to LTA (Explained in the manual downloaded with the program).
2. Follow the procedures of using the program by adding the texts prepared earlier to the program to start coding. The texts could be analyzed individually or aggregated, based on the type of analysis required.
3. The program presents the results in a Microsoft access file. The data could be analyzed or used directly, or it could be used as input to SPSS, and then processed for statistical analysis. .

2.1.2 Party Positions Data

2.1.2.1 Data Description

The study uses Manifesto Project (CMP), to determine parties’ positions. The project’s website (<https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>) provides data for all parties, in all investigated parties, from 1945 till now, in one file, and the data is updated regularly.

2.1.2.2 Data Description and Preparation

First, the data should be downloaded (using .xlsx, a type of Excel file recommended here for easier preparation before analysis), from the website. The Excel spreadsheet contains data from 56 countries, in 173 columns, and 4122 rows. The rows contain the list of countries and their parties, and columns contain data such as country code, country name, party code, party name, party abbreviation in its original language, and then information about the election such as election date, participation, number of total seats, and number of seats for each party. There are 56 columns for categories of party policy positions under investigation. The columns from per101 to per703_2 contain coding results of the subcategories used to calculate the main categories. For example, category number per103 of “Anti-Imperialism: Positive” splits to per103.1 “State Centered Anti-

Imperialism”, and per103.2 “Foreign Financial Influence”, and the score of the main category is the sum of those two subcategories. The spreadsheet ends with a group of five columns plus one, namely: rile, planeco, markeco, welfare, intpeace + datasetversion. These six abbreviations are the names of the columns containing data about right-left position, planned economy, market economy, welfare, and international peace, and the version of the dataset, respectively; each calculated using different methods. The last column refers to the data year, (2016b) in the case of this study, and the (b) refers to the second half of the year, because the data is updated twice each year.

In order to use the database, all irrelevant data must be deleted. There are three types of irrelevant data. First, is the data of party positions of countries other than Turkey. Second, party positions data about Turkey before 2002 are not applicable in this case. Third, the needed columns are only the 56 categories, in addition to party abbreviation column, and election date column. Hence, the remaining columns were deleted.

The next step is to add seven columns containing the manifesto’s seven domains. Each domain is simply an aggregation of the results of the domain’s categories. These columns do not exist in the original data, however, they are added for two reasons; first, they show which domains are important to the party than others, and secondly, the correlation between leader’s traits and the domain in general.

After doing the previous steps, the table should contain 17 rows including 4 party labels in 5 elections, and 65 columns: 56 categories + 7 domains + Party abbreviation + election date. Please see Appendix 1 for the 7 domains and their respective categories.

2.1.3 Integrating Traits’ Results with Party Position Data

After preparing each data group separately, the next step is to integrate both data groups in one data sheet. As in the LTA data preparation method mentioned previously, the output of “ProfilerPlus” program comes in the form of a Microsoft Access file. The first step is to open the file and select “Central Tendency” table, which contains leaders’ traits results.

	Clipboard	Font	Alignment	Number	Signs			
N23								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	Filename	BACE	PWR	CC	SC	TASK	DIS	IGB
2	doc003ub.txt	0.272727273	0	0.577777778	0.153846154	0.347826087	0.1875	0
3	Doc006ub.txt	0.5	0.5	0.634146341	0	0.489361702	0.333333333	0
4	G:\google drive\the dessirtation\all leaders all v	0.446594982	0.26994302	0.613586098	0.244972578	0.666297731	0.214285714	0.101815312
5	G:\google drive\the dessirtation\all leaders all v	0.434823091	0.259704251	0.622768743	0.237762238	0.674264706	0.20754717	0.094810379
6	G:\google drive\the dessirtation\all leaders all v	0.474860335	0.30726257	0.60880829	0.32	0.670454545	0.253521127	0.125
7	G:\google drive\the dessirtation\all leaders all v	0.374631268	0.275362319	0.666043031	0.365714286	0.638381201	0.210526316	0.131355932
8	G:\google drive\the dessirtation\all leaders all v	0.409756098	0.233333333	0.654178674	0.253164557	0.632398754	0.13559322	0.097142857
9	I:\all leaders all words\Bahceli all.txt	0.395061728	0.165644172	0.613636364	0.282051282	0.725752508	0.168316832	0.022727273
10	I:\all leaders all words\Baykal all.txt	0.415841584	0.334951456	0.64	0.240506329	0.653153153	0.130136986	0.114583333
11	I:\all leaders all words\davutoglu all.txt	0.432310469	0.26344086	0.620287602	0.242152466	0.671942446	0.206290472	0.099029126
12	I:\all leaders all words\Demirtas all.txt	0.389396709	0.261648746	0.664565826	0.329411765	0.636199095	0.185783522	0.118357488
13	I:\all leaders all words\Erdogan all edit.txt	0.401342975	0.239524056	0.607922645	0.415567282	0.623824451	0.156562292	0.095400341
14	I:\all leaders all words\Erdogan all extra.txt	0.406976744	0.240174672	0.602399064	0.397575758	0.62116041	0.161736941	0.097402597
15	I:\all leaders all words\Erdogan all.txt	0.401135777	0.239400207	0.610457921	0.415567282	0.627258647	0.155497723	0.095292116
16	I:\all leaders all words\erdogan years\2005-2007	0.38225256	0.251273345	0.606903164	0.542600897	0.638078902	0.152688172	0.114754098
17	I:\all leaders all words\erdogan years\2009-2011	0.410997204	0.238273921	0.611985472	0.411609499	0.608066184	0.152263374	0.081735621
18	I:\all leaders all words\erdogan years\2012-2014	0.432098765	0.229064039	0.573997234	0.228699552	0.626746507	0.189873418	0.116883117
19	I:\all leaders all words\kilicdaroglu all.txt	0.338501292	0.204081633	0.601029601	0.27972028	0.662847791	0.165354331	0.107033639
20								
21								

Figure 2. Traits Results

As figure 2 shows, the first column contains a list of analyzed files by its folder's extension. In addition, the first two rows have uncommon names, therefore, the file names first must be rewritten in short, and the name must refer to its contents. Secondly, the first two rows are a default with the program, and they do not belong with the analyzed data as. Therefore, the first two rows must be deleted. The next seven columns are labeled by the abbreviations of the seven traits under investigation: Control Events (BACE), Need for Power (PWR), Conceptual Complexity (CC), Self-Confidence (SC), Task/people focus (TASK), Distrust (DIS), In-Group Affiliation (IGB).

After preparing the traits table, both party position results and leaders' traits results have to be matched in one table. In other words, this previous figure will be added to party position sheet, and the columns should appear side by side in a way that each row of election must match the party leader's results at that time, as shown in figure 3:

	A	B	C	D	BL	BM	BN	BO	BP	BQ	BR	BS	BT	BU	BV	B'
1	partyabbre	date	per101	per102	per706	Domain7	Filename	BACE	PWR	CC	SC	TASK	DIS	IGB		
2	AKP	200211	0.0144	0	0.02088	0.11304	Erdogan 1st election	0.37	0.31	0.58	0.36	0.73	0.11	0.1		
3	AKP	200707	0.02832	0.00033	0.03532	0.1183	Erdogan 2st election	0.382253	0.251273	0.606903	0.542601	0.638079	0.152688	0.114754		
4	AKP	201106	0.00703	0.00094	0.02882	0.09067	Erdogan 3st election	0.410997	0.238274	0.611985	0.411609	0.608066	0.152263	0.081736		
5	AKP	201506	0.0034	0	0.00194	0.0704	Davutoglu 1st election	0.434823	0.259704	0.622769	0.237762	0.674265	0.207547	0.09481		
6	AKP	201511	0.00328	0	0.00234	0.06958	Davutoglu 2st election	0.47486	0.307263	0.608808	0.32	0.670455	0.253521	0.125		
7	CHP	200211	0.00475	0	0.0285	0.12827	Baykal 1st election	0.415842	0.334951	0.64	0.240506	0.653153	0.130137	0.114583		
8	CHP	200707	0.00186	0.00559	0.02422	0.15465	Baykal 2st election	0.415842	0.334951	0.64	0.240506	0.653153	0.130137	0.114583		
9	CHP	201106	0.02294	0.00249	0.04688	0.11571	Kilicdaroglu 1st election	0.338501	0.204082	0.60103	0.27972	0.662848	0.165354	0.107034		
10	CHP	201506	0.00968	0	0	0.04452	Kilicdaroglu 2st election	0.338501	0.204082	0.60103	0.27972	0.662848	0.165354	0.107034		
11	CHP	201511	0.00909	0	0	0.05164	Kilicdaroglu 3st election	0.338501	0.204082	0.60103	0.27972	0.662848	0.165354	0.107034		
12	MHP	200707	0.01932	0.0006	0.02114	0.08938	Bahceli 1st election	0.395062	0.165644	0.613636	0.282051	0.725753	0.168317	0.022727		
13	MHP	201106	0.00376	0	0.02734	0.10184	Bahceli 2st election	0.395062	0.165644	0.613636	0.282051	0.725753	0.168317	0.022727		
14	MHP	201506	0.00592	0.00079	0.00197	0.08047	Bahceli 3st election	0.395062	0.165644	0.613636	0.282051	0.725753	0.168317	0.022727		
15	MHP	201511	0.00624	0.00073	0.00184	0.07746	Bahceli 4st election	0.395062	0.165644	0.613636	0.282051	0.725753	0.168317	0.022727		
16	HDP	201506	0.00344	0	0.00172	0.13918	Demirtas 1st election	0.374631	0.275362	0.666043	0.365714	0.638381	0.210526	0.131356		
17	HDP	201511	0.00281	0	0.0014	0.10814	Demirtas 2st election	0.409756	0.233333	0.654179	0.253165	0.632399	0.135593	0.097143		
18																
19																
20																
36																

Figure 3. Results of Both Party Position and Leaders' Traits

By combining both results together as shown in Figure 3, the analysis faces a problem that party leaders who have been involved in several elections must have traits scores for each of those elections. In this study, all leaders under investigation led their parties in more than one election, as table 9 shows:

Table 9 Leaders and elections⁵

Leader	Participated Election	Number
Erdogan	2002, 2007, 2011	3
Davutoglu	2015-6, 2015-11	2
Baykal	2002, 2007	2
Kilicdaroglu	2011, 2015-6, 2015-11	3
Bahceli ⁶	2007, 2011, 2015-6, 2015-11	4
Demirtas	2015-6, 2015-11	2

⁵ Leaders' order followed here and for the whole study, ordered first by party, and the most represented party in the parliament comes first. Second, by leader's tenure within the party.

⁶ Although Bahceli led his party during 2002 election too, but he excluded because his party didn't succeed to win any seat in the parliament, and Manifesto Project data covers only parties that had seats.

In order to analyze leaders' traits restricted by election cycle, the available data must be 5,000 words or more in each period, a condition which is only met for three leaders, namely: Erdogan, Davutoglu, and Demirtas. Other leaders' data is not enough to proceed with an accurate analysis of their personality traits in each election cycle. To overcome this problem, the study assumed that those leaders' traits did not change across time, and that's what table 10 represents. It shows, for example, that all four scores for Bahceli are the same.

Table 10 Manifesto scores of Parties in Election Cycles and Leaders' Traits after Excluding Unavailable Data

Election Cycle	2002		2007			2011			2015-6				2015-11			
MARPOR Categories	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
Domain 1: External Relations	5.976	6.057	8.93	9.564	6.521	9.233	9.832	7.655	5.244	7.898	6.825	2.578	5.295	8.508	6.827	3.37
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	1.440	0.475	2.832	0.186	1.932	0.703	2.295	0.376	0.340	0.968	0.592	0.344	0.328	0.909	0.624	0.281
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.559	0.060	0.094	0.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.073	0.000
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.288	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.117	0.200	0.547	0.024	0.155	0.473	0.344	0.023	0.292	0.441	0.281
Military: Positive	0.360	0.238	1.633	1.491	1.993	2.062	0.250	1.640	0.437	1.471	2.051	0.172	0.469	1.591	2.313	0.140
Military: Negative	0.072	0.000	0.067	0.062	0.000	0.047	0.250	0.034	0.024	0.387	0.000	0.344	0.047	0.325	0.000	0.281
Peace: Positive	0.864	1.781	1.033	4.596	1.087	2.249	2.844	3.418	0.413	0.968	0.789	0.687	0.398	1.169	0.734	1.545
Internationalism: Positive	1.872	0.475	1.966	0.621	0.604	3.351	2.295	1.367	3.520	3.020	2.525	0.515	3.561	3.248	2.349	0.562
European/LA Integration: Positive	1.080	3.088	1.366	0.807	0.000	0.469	1.248	0.068	0.486	0.929	0.079	0.172	0.469	0.974	0.073	0.140
Internationalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.186	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.994	0.845	0.141	0.20	0.205	0.000	0.000	0.237	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.220	0.140
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	5.832	3.919	3.332	2.111	2.295	4.756	9.381	6.015	10.076	14.363	11.165	22.164	9.958	15.752	11.197	27.668
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	2.520	1.544	1.500	1.304	1.208	1.476	4.790	2.461	2.161	3.949	2.604	8.419	2.132	3.670	2.460	8.848
Democracy	3.024	2.019	1.599	0.745	0.966	2.413	3.992	2.597	6.191	9.601	8.087	12.027	6.162	11.075	8.223	17.416
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.047	0.000	0.581	0.000	0.542	0.237	0.000	0.000	0.585	0.294	0.000
Constitutionalism: Negative	0.288	0.356	0.233	0.000	0.121	0.820	0.599	0.376	1.724	0.271	0.237	1.718	1.664	0.422	0.220	1.404
Domain 3: Political System	12.672	9.383	6.732	9.689	9.842	4.546	8.034	8.169	4.953	5.845	5.759	4.467	5.107	6.333	6.13	6.742
Decentralization: Positive	2.664	0.000	0.700	0.683	0.060	0.258	0.150	0.034	1.262	1.432	0.513	3.608	1.218	1.202	0.477	5.478
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.486	0.039	0.907	0.000	0.562	0.032	0.918	0.000
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	3.528	2.494	3.166	2.795	3.865	2.554	4.940	2.837	1.190	1.084	0.907	0.000	1.336	0.909	0.954	0.000
Political Corruption: Negative	4.680	4.751	1.100	5.280	5.072	0.445	2.944	3.794	0.801	2.400	2.682	0.687	0.773	1.981	2.643	0.843

Election Cycle	2002		2007			2011			2015-6				2015-11			
MARPOR Categories	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
Political Authority: Positive	1.800	2.138	1.733	0.807	0.845	1.289	0.000	1.504	1.214	0.890	0.750	0.172	1.218	2.209	1.138	0.421
Domain 4: Economy	39.382	38.717	32.123	27.95	34.3	36.97	24.851	35.918	42.899	30.313	37.947	11.168	42.316	28.809	37.225	8.564
Free-Market Economy: Positive	11.447	4.988	6.465	2.112	4.408	2.085	0.250	2.666	0.850	0.232	0.552	0.000	0.820	0.487	0.551	0.000
Incentives: Positive	5.472	7.126	6.731	7.205	5.495	3.069	3.443	3.554	4.904	3.562	5.049	0.687	5.459	3.183	4.809	0.421
Market Regulation: Positive	0.216	0.950	0.633	0.683	0.725	0.398	0.649	0.649	0.874	1.703	2.012	3.436	0.867	1.819	1.946	2.949
Economic Planning: Positive	11.951	5.344	1.100	1.677	5.012	3.327	0.349	8.202	6.579	4.259	5.957	1.203	6.795	4.255	5.653	0.983
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.062	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.232	0.000	0.172	0.000	0.195	0.000	0.140
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.118	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.110	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.825	0.929	0.552	0.172	0.797	0.974	0.587	0.140
Economic Goals	1.008	5.582	5.965	1.801	3.442	5.037	0.948	0.171	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.144	0.238	0.000	0.248	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.194	0.394	0.172	0.023	0.260	0.367	0.140
Economic Growth	3.312	8.907	2.932	4.286	5.737	8.341	9.930	8.988	7.405	4.104	4.931	0.344	6.912	3.767	5.066	0.281
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	3.168	4.988	7.398	7.702	8.696	14.292	6.936	10.082	15.416	12.389	11.637	1.718	14.738	11.010	11.307	1.404
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.000	0.200	0.068	0.364	0.348	0.631	0.515	0.375	0.260	0.661	0.281
Nationalization: Positive	0.000	0.238	0.000	0.497	0.181	0.000	0.150	0.308	0.316	0.232	0.118	0.172	0.305	0.195	0.147	0.281
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	1.440	0.000	0.033	1.180	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.856	0.813	5.720	0.172	4.733	1.202	5.764	0.140
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.405	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.404
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	1.224	0.356	0.766	0.435	0.604	0.398	1.996	1.230	0.510	1.316	0.276	0.000	0.492	1.202	0.257	0.000
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	11.736	19.477	21.26	17.577	15.218	23.735	29.091	16.952	20.514	16.608	29.654	35.396	20.619	27.51	16.447	31.883
Environmental Protection: Positive	0.360	1.900	2.333	2.236	1.812	2.718	2.345	2.187	2.549	2.170	2.942	3.265	2.413	2.696	2.056	3.511
Culture: Positive	0.144	3.088	4.132	2.298	2.174	5.131	3.992	2.256	3.787	2.367	4.297	3.780	3.866	3.378	2.203	2.669
Equality: Positive	1.584	1.425	0.900	0.932	0.906	0.797	3.792	0.923	3.763	2.288	6.852	12.199	3.655	6.398	2.093	12.219
Welfare state Expansion	4.536	6.651	8.597	5.776	5.133	10.450	12.275	6.733	5.705	6.312	9.214	12.887	5.858	8.867	6.791	10.815
Welfare state Limitation	0.288	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	4.680	6.413	5.298	6.335	5.193	4.639	6.687	4.853	4.710	3.471	6.349	3.265	4.827	6.171	3.304	2.669
Education Limitation	0.144	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	12.168	5.819	10.229	12.298	16.97	9.981	5.539	11.586	9.079	13.648	6.775	8.419	9.561	7.275	14.428	8.426
National Way of Life: Positive	0.504	1.069	2.399	1.988	8.031	1.382	0.100	4.751	3.059	6.233	1.936	0.000	3.187	1.494	6.498	0.000
National Way of Life: Negative	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.172	0.000	0.065	0.000	0.140
Traditional Morality: Positive	1.656	0.356	1.799	0.062	2.114	1.148	0.000	1.196	1.529	0.710	0.348	0.000	1.664	0.292	0.698	0.000
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.144	1.425	0.233	3.354	0.242	0.000	0.449	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Law and order	5.904	2.375	4.065	5.217	6.341	5.389	2.695	5.263	2.112	3.550	0.852	1.203	2.273	1.234	3.928	0.983
Civic Mindedness: Positive	3.816	0.475	1.633	1.615	0.242	1.828	1.347	0.376	1.821	2.051	2.594	2.405	1.828	2.956	2.239	3.230
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.072	0.119	0.100	0.062	0.000	0.234	0.948	0.000	0.558	0.276	1.045	4.639	0.609	1.234	0.257	4.073
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.828	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.808	0.000

Election Cycle	2002		2007			2011			2015-6				2015-11			
MARPOR Categories	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
Domain 7: Social Groups	11.304	12.827	11.83	15.465	8.938	9.067	11.578	10.184	7.04	4.452	8.047	13.918	6.958	5.164	7.746	10.814
Labor Groups: Positive	2.520	3.207	3.499	3.106	1.027	1.757	2.745	1.948	2.840	3.368	3.471	10.997	2.741	3.053	3.414	8.427
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	4.968	6.057	3.499	9.068	5.254	2.413	3.044	5.024	3.982	1.084	4.379	2.749	3.960	2.111	4.148	2.247
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000
Minority Groups: Positive	1.656	0.713	1.300	0.807	0.543	2.015	0.998	0.478	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	2.088	2.850	3.532	2.422	2.114	2.882	4.691	2.734	0.194	0.000	0.197	0.172	0.234	0.000	0.184	0.140
LEADERS' TRAITS SCORES																
	Erdogan	Baykal	Erdogan	Baykal	Bahceli	Erdogan	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas
Believes can Control Events	0.37	0.416	0.382	0.416	0.395	0.411	0.339	0.395	0.435	0.339	0.395	0.375	0.475	0.339	0.395	0.410
Need for Power	0.31	0.335	0.251	0.335	0.166	0.238	0.204	0.166	0.260	0.204	0.166	0.275	0.307	0.204	0.166	0.233
Self-Confidence	0.58	0.640	0.607	0.640	0.614	0.612	0.601	0.614	0.623	0.601	0.614	0.666	0.609	0.601	0.614	0.654
Conceptual Complexity	0.36	0.241	0.543	0.241	0.282	0.412	0.280	0.282	0.238	0.280	0.282	0.366	0.320	0.280	0.282	0.253
Task Focus	0.73	0.653	0.638	0.653	0.726	0.608	0.663	0.726	0.674	0.663	0.726	0.638	0.670	0.663	0.726	0.632
Distrust of Others	0.11	0.130	0.153	0.130	0.168	0.152	0.165	0.168	0.208	0.165	0.168	0.211	0.254	0.165	0.168	0.136
In-Group Bias	0.1	0.115	0.115	0.115	0.023	0.082	0.107	0.023	0.095	0.107	0.023	0.131	0.125	0.107	0.023	0.097

By integrating both data groups into one table, now the data are ready to be analyzed statistically. The table shows the seven traits' scores of each leader under investigation, and their 56 categories' party positions scores. Some of categories resulted a (0) number, this number refers that analyzed manifesto didn't mentioned this category.

In chapter 3 below I first focus on leaders' traits and compare Turkish political party leaders' to one another and to norming group scores. Afterwards, I test my hypotheses and investigate the association between MARPOR scores and leadership traits.

CHAPTER 3

3.1 LEADERS' TRAITS IN COMPARISON

In this section the study will present “ProfilerPlus” program results of leaders’ scores. Moreover, the research raises several questions about the results, such as what scores tell about each leader and in comparison to other leaders. How do Turkish leaders’ traits score in comparison to Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) leaders, world leaders, and Western European leaders? Is there any change across time in leaders’ traits?

Table 11 contains scores for leaders as a total, and periodical scores based on election cycle, and the norming group cores for MENA, world, and European leaders.

Table 11 Leaders’ Scores of LTA

Leaders/ Traits	Believes can Control Events	Need for Power	Conceptual Complexity	Self- Confidence	Task Focus	Distrust of Others	In-Group Bias
Erdogan All	0.407	0.240	0.602	0.398	0.621	0.162	0.097
Erdogan 2002 Election	0.370	0.310	0.580	0.360	0.730	0.110	0.100
Erdogan 2007 Election	0.382	0.251	0.607	0.543	0.638	0.153	0.115
Erdogan 2011 Election	0.411	0.238	0.612	0.412	0.608	0.152	0.082
Erdogan 2012-2014	0.432	0.229	0.574	0.229	0.627	0.190	0.117
Davutoglu All	0.432	0.263	0.620	0.242	0.672	0.206	0.099
Davutoglu 1st Election	0.435	0.260	0.623	0.238	0.674	0.208	0.095
Davutoglu 2nd Election	0.475	0.307	0.609	0.320	0.670	0.254	0.125
Baykal	0.416	0.335	0.640	0.241	0.653	0.130	0.115
Kilicdaroglu	0.339	0.204	0.601	0.280	0.663	0.165	0.107
Bahceli	0.395	0.166	0.614	0.282	0.726	0.168	0.023
Demirtas All	0.389	0.262	0.665	0.329	0.636	0.186	0.118
Demirtas 1st Election	0.375	0.275	0.666	0.366	0.638	0.211	0.131
Demirtas 2nd Election	0.410	0.233	0.654	0.253	0.632	0.136	0.097
World Mean (N=284)	0.35	0.26	0.59	0.36	0.63	0.13	0.15
Standard Deviation	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.1	0.07	0.06	0.05
MENA Region (N=46)	0.33	0.27	0.56	0.31	0.58	0.16	0.15
Standard Deviation	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.13	0.06	0.07	0.06
Western Europe (N=53)	0.33	0.26	0.57	0.32	0.64	0.09	0.17
Standard Deviation	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.06	0.05

Leaders/ Traits	Believes can Control Events	Need for Power	Conceptual Complexity	Self- Confidence	Task Focus	Distrust of Others	In-Group Bias
Eastern Europe (N=78)	0.34	0.24	0.59	0.39	0.68	0.1	0.14
Standard Deviation	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.1	0.07	0.05	0.06

3.1.1 Turkish Leaders and World Average

Figure 4 shows Turkish leaders' scores compared with world leaders' scores:




Figure 4. Leaders' Scores Compared to World Average⁷

The traits' abbreviations in figure 4 refer to; Believes can Control Events (BACE), need for power (PWR), conceptual complexity (CC), Self-Confidence (SC), Task/people focus (TASK), Distrust of Others (DIS), in-group bias (IGB). In addition, the bars in the chart are ordered as the leaders' legend ordered below.

The chart (figure 4) shows that for Believes can Control Events, Erdogan, Davutoglu, and Baykal score higher than the world average. In "Need for Power" only Baykal's score is higher than the average, whereas Kilicdaroglu and Bahceli are lower. In "Conceptual Complexity" all leaders are average, except Demirtas, who is higher. In "Self-

⁷ The 7th bar represents the world mean, and the cap on it represents the standard deviation.

Confidence” while Davutoglu and Baykal are lower than the mean, the other leaders are average. In Task focus, only Bahceli is higher than the mean, while others are average. In “Distrust” only Davutoglu has a higher degree, while the rest of leaders are average. The last trait is In-Group Bias where all leaders are almost average, except Bahceli who is significantly low.

3.1.2 Turkish Leaders and MENA Region Average

Figure 5 shows Turkish leaders’ scores compared with MENA region leaders’ scores:




Figure 5. Leaders’ Scores Compared to MENA Average⁸

The traits’ abbreviations in the chart refer to; Believes can Control Events (BACE), need for power (PWR), Conceptual Complexity (CC), Self-Confidence (SC), Task/people focus (TASK), Distrust of Others (DIS), In-Group Bias (IGB). In addition, the bars in the chart ordered as the leaders’ legend ordered below.

In the chart (figure 5), Turkish leaders’ comparison with MENA leaders’ average is close to their comparison with world mean in almost all traits. Leaders like Erdogan, Davutoglu, and Baykal remain higher than average of MENA, and this time Bahceli joined them with a high score. Kilicdaroglu remains moderate, and Demirtas leans

⁸ The 7th bar represents the MENA mean, and the cap on it represents the standard deviation.

towards high. In “Need for Power” Erdogan leans low, Davutoglu and Demirtas are moderate, and Baykal stands alone as the only leader higher than MENA average, then come both Kilicdaroglu and Bahceli with a low score. In Conceptual Complexity, all leaders’ averages are same except Baykal’s score, which changed from leaning towards high, to higher than the average. In Self-Confidence, both Kilicdaroglu, Bahceli, and Demirtas are moderate, whereas Erdogan leans toward high, and Davutoglu and Baykal lean low. In Task Focus Trait, the change difference is obvious in that all leaders’ averages changed. Davutoglu, Baykal, Kilicdaroglu, and Bahceli all became higher than the average, and both Erdogan and Demirtas became leaning towards high. In Distrust trait, Turkish leaders were closer to the average than world average. All Erdogan, Kilicdaroglu, and Bahceli results are moderate, and Davutoglu and Demirtas lean high, while only Baykal leans low. In In-group Bias, Turkish leaders came closer to the average, while all leaders lean low, except Bahceli who is still lower than the average. In summary, Turkish leaders’ scores are closer to MENA average than world average in Self-Confidence trait, Distrust trait, and In-Group Bias trait. However, in other traits Turkish leaders are closer to world average than MENA average.

3.1.3 Turkish Leaders and Western European Average

Figure 6 shows Turkish leaders' scores compared with Western European leaders' scores:




Figure 6. Leaders' Scores Compared to Western European Average⁹

The traits' abbreviations in the chart refer to; Believes can Control Events (BACE), need for power (PWR), Conceptual Complexity (CC), Self-Confidence (SC), Task/people focus (TASK), Distrust of Others (DIS), In-Group Bias (IGB). In addition, the bars in the chart ordered as the leaders' legend ordered below.

In comparison with Western European average, Turkish leaders' belief that they can control events makes Erdogan, Bahceli, and Demirtas lean high. Davutoglu and Baykal remain high, and Kilicdaroglu stands alone as moderate. In Need for Power trait, Kilicdaroglu and Bahceli are lower than the average, and Baykal is higher, whereas Erdogan leans low. Davutoglu and Demirtas's scores remain moderate compared to the Western Europe average. In Conceptual Complexity, Erdogan, Davutoglu, Kilicdaroglu, and Bahceli lean high, but Baykal and Demirtas remain higher than the average. In Self-Confidence, leaders like Davutoglu, Baykal, Kilicdaroglu, and Bahceli lean low, whereas Erdogan leans high, and Demirtas is moderate. Unlike the MENA average, Turkish

⁹ The 7th bar represents the Western European mean, and the cap on it represents the standard deviation.

leaders in Task Focus trait here are closer to the mean. Leaders like Erdogan, Baykal, Kilicdaroglu, and Demirtas are moderate, whereas Davutoglu and Bahceli lean high. In Distrust, all leaders are high, except Baykal who leans high. In-group Bias average shows all leaders are lower than the average. In summary, Turkish leaders' scores are closer to Western European average than world average in only Task focus trait, whereas other traits are closer to World and MENA average.

3.2 LEADERS PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT ACCORDING TO TRAITS SCORES

Before analyzing each leader's scores individually to understand what the scores mean, the general picture of the chart shows that in the first trait (Believes can Control Events) Kilicdaroglu's score was the closest to the mean, but the most varied score from other leaders. In the second trait (Need for Power), it appears that Baykal's score is different from other scores as it is the highest, in contrast to Kilicdaroglu, whose score comes in as the lowest among other leaders, significantly. The third trait (Conceptual Complexity) shows a low variation between leaders with the exception of Demirtas's score. The third trait (Self-Confidence) shows a general low trend among leaders with a difference in Erdogan's score, which is significantly high. The variation in the fourth trait (Task Focus) is low, but the exception this time is Bahceli's score, who has a high average. Distrust average of Turkish leaders is high in general, only Baykal leans low. In-Group Bias average shows close variation in leaders' scores, but Bahceli remains the exception, with a strictly low score.

The Leaders' personality assessment is based on leaders' behavior toward A) constraints B) processing information C) and motives. Below I discuss how leader's behavior toward those three elements shapes his leadership style.

3.2.1 Constraints

Erdogan's scores show no higher variation than other Turkish leaders, except his score in Self-Confidence, which is significantly higher than other leaders. In comparison with world, MENA, and West European means, Erdogan's score in Believes can Control Events is higher than the norming group means. In the trait of need for power, Erdogan's score is moderate, but leans low in all means. In Conceptual Complexity, Erdogan's score

is moderate, but leans high compared to MENA and West European Mean. Although he has the highest scores among Turkish leaders in Self-Confidence, Erdogan remains moderate, but leans high, compared to world, MENA, and West European means. Erdogan's score in Task Focus compared to the same means also moderate, but leans higher than MENA leaders' mean. In Distrust of Others, Erdogan is typical and represents the MENA leaders' mean, but compared to the world mean he is moderate, although he leans high, and compared with the West European mean, he is significantly higher. The opposite appears for In-Group bias, where Erdogan's score is significantly low in both world mean and almost touches the minimum average of MENA leaders' mean (0.097402597 from .09). According to the previous scores, Erdogan is different than world leaders in 71% (five traits from total seven), and different than MENA leaders and Western Europe leaders in 86% (six traits from total seven).

Erdogan's high scores in Believes can Control Events, and low scores in Need for Power refers to a person who tends to challenge constraints, but in order to do so, he prefers confrontations and a direct way of using his authority. This type of leader is not good at manipulating others and using indirect ways of influence. In addition, he is not good at playing the role of the man behind the throne who controls the situation. These types of leaders, although they are acting out their power visibly, are not as skillful as leaders who are high in both traits.

Leaders with high scores in Believes can Control Events like Erdogan have a tendency toward hegemony in decision making. They prefer to check on decision processes, and to assure that orders are carried out accurately. He prefers surprise visits to the work place and does not tend to delegate authority. In addition, he does not wait for suggestions or ideas; instead, he prefers to initiate policies and plans, awaiting the support from others to achieve it. Normally this type of leader does not like compromises, they decide how they would like to see things done and insist on it.

Erdogan, with his low score in Need for Power means that he likes to empower his followers and sacrifice for them. The sense of team work and spirit of the group is also high, and he tends to build a trustful relationship between him and followers.

Compared with other Turkish leaders under investigation, Davutoglu's scores in Believes can Control Events and Distrust are the highest. His score in Self-Confidence is relatively the lowest (with Baykal). For the other traits, Davutoglu's scores are almost moderate with no significant difference. Compared with world, MENA, and European leaders, Davutoglu scores in Believes can Control Events higher than all means significantly. In Need for Power he is almost typically moderate in all means. In Conceptual Complexity, despite the fact that he is moderate compared to other Turkish leaders, he leans high compared to all means. Davutoglu's Self-Confidence is quite low, but compared to MENA and European leaders, leans low only. His Task Focus scores leans high compared to all means, it is high in Distrust among world and European leaders, and it leans high among MENA leaders. Davutoglu's In-Group Bias score is almost low compared to all means, especially among European leaders. According to Davutoglu's scores, he is different from all world, MENA, and European leaders' means in 86% (six traits from a total of seven).

Although Davutoglu falls in the same category of Erdogan as a constraints challenger, his higher score in Believes can Control Events (the highest among other leaders under investigation) and also a higher score in Need for Power makes his style differs from Erdogan. Therefore, Davutoglu is not skillful in manipulating others, and he uses a direct approach, but to a lesser degree than Erdogan, which means he could use maneuvering and Machiavellian behavior sometimes, although that approach does not suit him. He is also acts on his authority visibly.

His high score in Believes can Control Events shows a higher control of decision processes, and checking on things to be done. He also prefers face to face negotiations or meetings with other leaders to be able to determine others' intentions, otherwise he will miscalculate the situation. In addition, he does not waiting for others to present policies and plans, instead he tends to initiate, to take the lead in policy making and creating a vision of how things should be done, and he tends generally to take charge.

Davutoglu's score in Need for Power almost represents the norming group. In addition to having Erdogan's style, Davutoglu is more contextual in that trait, which means he changes his style between manipulative and direct use of power, and between

Machiavellian methods and team work by empowering his followers, all depending upon the context.

Baykal's scores compared to other leaders are quite interesting. Baykal has the highest score strictly in Need for Power trait. His scores in Believes Can Control Events, Conceptual Complexity, and In-Group Bias are considered high among other Turkish leaders. Baykal's score in Distrust is the lowest among others, and he has a low score in Self-Confidence too. Baykal's scores in the rest of traits show a moderate average among them. Compared to world, MENA, and European leaders' means, Baykal's scores in both Believes can Control Events and Need for Power are higher than all means significantly. His Conceptual Complexity average leans high among both world and MENA leaders, and significantly high among European leaders. His Self-Confidence leans low among MENA and European leaders, and lower than the world average significantly. Baykal is a task-focused leader, higher than MENA leaders, and he leans high among world and European leaders. Although he has the highest average in Distrust among Turkish party leaders, his average is considered moderate compared to world, MENA, and European average. Baykal's score in In-Group Bias leans low among world and MENA leaders, and low according to the European average.

In summary, Baykal's scores show him different than world leaders in 71% (five from total seven traits), different than MENA leaders in 100% (all seven traits' average), and different than European average in 86% (six from total seven traits).

Deniz Baykal's scores in both Believes can Control Events and Need for Power is significantly high among all means. These scores propose a constraints challenger leader with a skill in both direct and indirect methods to get the things done. They normally know what should be done, and do what is necessary to achieve it, in both direct use of power, and manipulating others, and they do well. In addition to his tendency to verify that things are done, he is imitative, preferring face to face meeting with other leaders, and shows a lack of delegating authority. He is skillful in manipulating others, and always wants to appear as a winner. He is also Machiavellian and has a keen sense of choosing the appropriate tactic in every situation. Such leaders consider followers and people as instrument to their goals, with no regard for them generally. Such leaders also succeed in

the beginning in achieving their goals and influencing others, but “you cannot fool all the people all the time”, so followers and those in their surrounding circle feel that these kinds of leaders do not represent their needs and hopes, instead they are seen to have used people in order to achieve their personal vision.

Among Turkish party leaders investigated, Kilicdaroglu’s score in Believes can Control Events is the lowest, and he has a low score in Need for Power, too. Moreover, in the rest of other traits he is near moderate. Comparing Kilicdaroglu’s scores with world, MENA, and European leaders, his score in Believes can Control Events is moderate in all means, and he has low average of Need for Power compared to all means. His average in Conceptual Complexity score was moderate against world leaders and leans high compared to both MENA, and European leaders. Kilicdaroglu’s Self-Confidence leans low in both world and European average, and moderate in MENA average. In his Task Focus score, he is moderate in world and European average, and high according to MENA average. Kilicdaroglu’s Distrust differs from one mean to another. According to world average he leans high, and moderate among MENA leaders, and high compared to European leaders. In-Group Bias average for Kilicdaroglu shows he leans low in both world average and MENA average, and low in European average.

In summary, Kilicdaroglu’s traits’ average makes him different than world and MENA leaders in 57% (four trait from total seven), and in 71% (five traits from total seven) compared to the European average.

Kilicdaroglu’s moderate score in Believes can Control Events and low score in Need for Power gives the expectation that he respects constraints in general, but under some situations he could change to challenge constraints. This type of leader is always seeking compromise and consensus. Leaders with those scores don’t take the initiative, instead they wait to react according to other players. This type is more also more contextual in his behavior above anything else, and that is determined based on his other traits, too.

Bahceli’s average in both Need for Power and In-Group Bias is the lowest among all other leaders under investigation; especially In-Group Bias shows a wide gap between him and other leaders. His scores in Believes can Control Events, Conceptual Complexity, and Distrust are moderate, and he has the highest scores as a task-focused

leader among all other Turkish leaders. In comparison with world, MENA, and European leaders, he leans high in Believes can Control Events according to world and European average, and high according to MENA average. His scores in Need for Power are low compared to all averages. And his Conceptual Complexity leans high in comparison to the MENA and European average, and moderate next to the world average. Bahceli's Self-Confidence leans low compared to both world and European averages, and comes in at moderate in comparison with MENA leaders. He is high in Task Focus score among world and MENA leaders, and leans high among European leaders. In Distrust, Bahceli's averages are varied. In comparison to the world average he leans high, to MENA average he is moderate, and to the European average he is high. Compared to all averages, Bahceli's score in In-Group Bias is strictly low.

In summary, Bahceli's average is different than world average in 86% (six from total seven traits) and from the MENA average in 71% (five from total seven traits), while he is different than the European average in 100% (all seven traits).

In his behavior toward constraints, Bahceli is the closest type to Erdogan in his high average in Believes Control Events and low in Need for Power. Therefore, he prefers to challenge constraints, but with a direct way of using power. He is not good at manipulating others and does not prefer Machiavellian methods and controlling the game from behind the throne. Confrontation and face to face meeting with other leaders are also his favorites. His low average in Need for Power also makes him empowering of his followers, and he believes in teamwork. He does not manipulate others in order to achieve his goals; instead, he is considered the agent that represents the group's values and needs.

Compared to Turkish party leaders, Demirtas has a moderate average in Believes can Control Events, Need for Power, and Distrust, while he has the highest scores in Conceptual Complexity and In-Group Bias. Demirtas's average in both Self-Confidence and Task Focus is considered high, compared to others. In comparison with world, MENA, and European leaders, his scores in Believes can Control Events lean high across all averages, and moderate in Need for Power, also in all averages. His Conceptual Complexity average again is high compared to all means, and Self-Confidence is moderate against all means.. His Task Focus average is moderate in world and European

average, and leans high compared to MENA leaders' average. His Distrust leans high in both world and MENA average, and high compared to the European average. His In-group average leans low in both world and MENA means, and low among European leaders' mean.

In summary, his average is different than world and European leaders in 57% (four from total seven), and in 71% (five from total seven) from MENA leaders.

Demirtas' scores for the first two traits is similar to Davutoglu's, but his Believes can Control Events remains lower (here he leans high, between moderate and high), and moderate in Need for Power. Such averages tend to show challenge for constraints to some degree. He may change these constraints when they threaten his position, or obstruct his fundamental role of leadership. He prefers face to face negotiations or meetings with other leaders to be able to determine others' intentions, otherwise he will miscalculate the situation. In addition, he does not waiting for others to present policies and plans, instead he tends to initiate, to take the lead in policy making and creating a vision of how things should be done, and he tends generally to take charge. He is also more contextual in that trait, which means he changes his style between manipulative and direct use of power, and between Machiavellian methods and team work by empowering his followers, all depending upon the context.

3.2.2 Incoming Information

All six leaders' scores in Conceptual Complexity are higher than Self-Confidence scores (which means all of them are open to contextual information). The assessment is built not only on that, but on a ranking for each leader based on the gap between two scores (Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence), insofar as a leader's Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence means that the leader is more open to contextual information.

Therefore, the study will show here, in general, the features of 'open to contextual information' leaders, then it will discuss the Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence scores of each leader individually, with the leader's rank in degree of openness.

Leaders who have a Conceptual Complexity score that is higher than Self-Confidence are considered open to external information. They are seeking always more information to be able to make their decisions. Leaders of that type are open and responsive to the suggestions, opinions and needs of others (followers or crews). As much as they are open to information, they do evaluate each situations case by case, and take time to collect the data. In addition, they prefer to reorganize the decision making structure to get the best out of it, and to have the maximum opinions and feedback from its members. Most leaders with a high average of openness to information are more pragmatic.

Although Erdogan is considered open to contextual information, his scores present him as the least open among other party leaders (ranked at number six) in responsive and open to information. What is remarkable in Erdogan's scores is his highest score in Self-Confidence with a huge gap between him and the other leaders under investigation. Leaders with a high average in Self-Confidence are mostly satisfied and proud of what they have done. They don't search for more information to evaluate the situation and their previous mistakes. Leaders with high average of Self-Confidence are less contextual, and always filter the incoming information to match their view about the world and the self.

Davutoglu's score in Conceptual Complexity is not that far from Erdogan's score, but it is higher. What is remarkable here is his Self-Confidence average which is the lowest among others including Baykal. This low score in Self-Confidence and higher score in Conceptual Complexity makes him number two in the list of most open to information leaders. Leaders with low average in Self-Confidence like Davutoglu seek outmore information about the self, others, and the situation. They appear more contextual, and they change their behavior according to the situation and position. Those leaders mostly prefer to be agents or representatives to their parties, movements or group.

Baykal's scores in Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence bring him on the top of the list as the leader most open to contextual information. Like Davutoglu, his score in Self-Confidence is remarkable, as it is the lowest among other leaders, but it remains higher than Davutoglu in Conceptual Complexity. Therefore, like Davutoglu, his low score in Self-Confidence suggests he is always seeking more information, and he adapts

his behavior according to the situation, not his own desire. His behavior looks inconsistent with the others.

Kilicdaroglu's scores places him at number five in the list, just above Erdogan. His average is affected by his low score in Conceptual Complexity more than Self-Confidence (which is also not high). Leaders with low scores in Conceptual Complexity are less pragmatic, and they see the environment and the world as less multi-dimensional. They are more stereotyped in perceiving incoming information about the situation. Their orientation about politics and the world is more simple and structured. For such leaders, it is easy to make the appropriate decision, because the world is classified and typed, as is their information process system.

Bahceli comes in at number four out of a total of six in the list. His scores are much closer to Kilicdaroglu's, however he is higher in both Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence, which suggests he is more pragmatic and leans toward the moderate. The world is less structured in his view, however he generally doesn't seek out more information.

Demirtas comes in at number three in the list, with his perceiving contextual information average standing at moderate. However, his score in Conceptual Complexity is the highest, and his Self-Confidence is also relatively high. These scores suggest he perceives the world as more complicated and multi-dimensional, more than in a black and white, good and evil view. Such leaders seek out more opinions about the situation to give them better perspectives. They generally involve more actors in decision making and take more time to make those decisions. However, his high Self-Confidence score means the incoming information is filtered to suit his view about the world and the self.

3.2.3 Motives

Leaders' political motives are split to two main categories. First, the leaders' motive to seek their position in the first place. Do they seek their position for an idea, purpose, or to solve a problem? Or, do they seek the position for more power and influence, or for furthering relationships? These motives are measured by the Task Focus trait. The second category is a leader's motive to maintain his position, and his behavior toward others,

which are measured by Distrust of Others, and In-Group Bias traits. The three traits; Task Focus, Distrust of Others, and In-Group Bias together are used to determine a leader's general political motives.

3.2.3.1 Seeking the Position "Task Focus"

Compared to world, MENA, and Western European means, Erdogan's score is moderate in all cases. However, among leaders under investigation in this study, Erdogan's score remains the lowest among leaders considered moderate in the task focus continuum; a concept that refers to a charismatic personality that could switch between two functions easily, depending on the situation and what is appropriate in that context. Those types of leaders tend to focus on solving the problem and achieving the goals, but without forgetting the morale inside the group he leads, and the need to build good relationships.

Davutoglu's score in Task Focus comes in as the second in the list as a highest score. And compared to World, MENA, and European means, he is either high or he leans high. This average shows Davutoglu as a task-focused leader. This leader seeks his position motivated by a cause, ideology, or a problem, rather for relationship reasons, like seeking support from others or social acceptance. These type of leaders always see their leadership as a mission that must accomplished, and they consider their tenure as a series of problems that must be solved. They don't give attention to people and their needs, as much as giving they give attention to achieving goals. In fact, they consider people as instruments to achieve the goal. In-group morale, popularity inside the group or in the eyes of the constituents is not their concern. They believe that you will never be able to satisfy everyone, but once the achievements are seen by others, their methods will be understood.

Baykal's average in Task Focus falls into the "moderate" category, but his score is still obviously higher than Erdogan's. This average means that leaders like Baykal have found the balance between focusing on the task and achieving goals, and they keep motivating the group and the team around them to keep morale at a good level. He is also situational, which means he can switch between focusing on the task and focusing on relationships and the spirit inside the group, depending on the context, and what the situation needs more.

Although Kilicdaroglu's average is moderate, his score comes the third after Bahceli and Davutoglu as a task focused leader. This score depicts him as a balanced leader that can focus on both tasks and the spirit of the group and its relationship, but he leans relatively higher in focusing on tasks, compared to his predecessors, Baykal, Erdogan, and Demirtas.

Among all Turkish party leaders, Bahceli stands as the highest as a task focused leader. Bahceli's score is higher than the world and MENA averages, and leans high (almost touching the standard deviation cap) according to the Western European average. This score means that Bahceli only concerns himself with goals and plans, rather than people and team. The team and the people are just instruments to achieve the goals. Those leaders sacrifice everything for the sake of thier goals.

Demirtas comes in second after Erdogan as the lowest among others in Task Focus trait. Demirtas average is moderate, however his score indicates that he has a charismatic tendency since he can balance bothtasks and relationships.

3.2.3.2 Toward the World "Distrust of Others and In-Group Bias"

Distrust of Others: All leaders under assessment have low averages of Distrust, except Baykal who is moderate. Distrusted leaders generally explain others' motives as a threat, or in a suspicious perspective, especially people who have competed with them for their positions. They explain any move or action as a conspiracy, and their attention is always wrong and dangerous. Those leaders prefer to work by themselves to assure that the work will be achieved without sabotage. The first condition of their surrounding social circle and advisors is to be loyal, rather than qualified. These leaders are too sensitive to critique, and take criticisms personally. On the other hand, leaders who are moderates like Baykal, still have a degree of distrust, but it is tempered by past experience. Those leaders lean situational in Distrust of Others, rather a general perspective of political sphere.

In-Group Bias: All six leaders under assessment have a low average in In-Group Bias, with a special note regarding Bahceli whose score is the lowest by a wide margin. Leaders with a low degree of In-Group Bias are still patriots and work for the sake of their own groups, however they are less hostile and they perceive the world of politics as more

colored and fluid, instead of in a black and white view. In addition, they recognize others' positions according to the situation, therefore the "we-them" recognition changes contextually. In that context, all six leaders differ in the degree of their overall low average of In-Group Bias.

3.2.4 Categorizing Leaders' Personality

As explained in chapter one, according to Table 4, each leader falls into a specific category of personality style based on leader's traits scores. Three dimensions must be measured to categorize the personality: Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motives. Table 12 shows each leader's assessment and his category, followed by a definition of each.

Table 12 Turkish Leaders' Style According to Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Challenges Constraints	Closed to Information		
Challenges Constraints	Open to Information	Ahmet Davutoglu Devlet Bahceli	Recep Tayyip Erdogan Deniz Baykal Selahattin Demirtas
Respects Constraints	Closed to Information		
Respects Constraints	Open to Information	Kemal Kilicdaroglu	

Ahmet Davutoglu and Devlet Bahceli

Incremental: Focus is on maintaining one's maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both. Those incremental leaders are constraints challengers, open to incoming information, and problem focused. However, the only different between both leaders is the degree of need for power. While Davutoglu is moderate in that trait, Bahceli is low. This difference makes Bahceli more directive in practicing his position than Davutoglu.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Deniz Baykal, and Selahattin Demirtas

Charismatic: Focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act. Charismatic leaders are constraints challengers, open to incoming information, but they are relationship focused instead of tasks. Three leaders fall in this category, but each of them is different in some aspects. For instance Deniz Baykal's score in Need for Power is the highest among all other leaders, what makes him skillful in manipulating others, and always wants to appear as a winner. He is also Machiavellian and has a keen sense of choosing the appropriate tactic in every situation. On the other hand, Erdogan's low score in the same trait is low, which means he likes to empower his followers and sacrifice for them. The sense of team work and spirit of the group is also high, and he tends to build a trustful relationship between him and followers. Demirtas's moderate score in the same trait, makes him falls in the area between both leaders, which means he is more contextual in that trait, which means he changes his style between manipulative and direct use of power, and between Machiavellian methods and team work by empowering his followers, all depending upon the context.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu

Reactive: Focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow. This type of leader is always seeking compromise and consensus. Leaders with those scores don't take the initiative, instead they wait to react according to other players. This type is more also more contextual in his behavior above anything else.

CHAPTER 4

4.1 POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM IN TURKEY

The Turkish political system is considered a parliamentary regime based on the separation of powers. According to the 1982 constitution, the executive power carried is by both the president and the Council of Ministers. Legislative power is carried by parliament, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which consists of 550 seats elected in a multi-party system each five years (Turkish Constitution, 1982). To form the government, one party must have the absolute majority of seats in the House, otherwise winning parties must form a coalition government. Although Turkey adopted a parliamentary system, the 1982 constitution gives the president broad authority, but traditionally this authority increased and decreased depending on the president's personality, and his political views. This critical role of the institution of the presidency was aggravated after constitutional changes were made to make the president directly elected by the people, instead of by members of parliament. Criticism of the system was especially noticable when the first election of 2014 brought to the position a professional politician in the form of Erdogan. These changes gave the presidency more influence in decision making at the expense of the prime ministerial position. In addition, the Turkish political experience is characterized by the role played by the military, directly or indirectly, and how it influences political decisions, or reorganizes the political sphere. This role is directly related to the overall success of the political elite to manage political and economic matters, and provide a state of stability in the country.

Parliamentary elections in the Turkish republic have almost 70 years of history behind them, beginning with the first multi-party election held in 1946 (Karpat, 2012). As mentioned, the Turkish parliament consists of 550 seats. Those seats are distributed across all provinces in Turkey, and each province is represented in the election based on its population. Turkey is divided to 85 districts, and political parties compete based on a party-list proportional representation system. Independent candidates can also run for election alongside standard party candidates. In addition, the election law stipulates a minimum threshold 10% of the nationwide vote in order for a party to enter parliament. But if the party has won a majority in some districts, yet couldn't overcome the threshold, those votes are divided between the other winning parties in the same district. Elections

in Turkey are done underjudicial supervision of the so-called Supreme Election Council, or “YSK”. In the period between 2002 and 2015, Turkey witnessed five parliamentary elections; specifically, 2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015, and November 2015. In the 2002 election, only two parties were able to pass the threshold of 10% and those were the AKP by 34% and 365 seats, and CHP by 19.4% and 177 seats. In addition, 1% of independents won 8 seats out of the total of 550 seats. Later, in the 2007 election, three parties were able to enter the parliament; the AKP by 46.7% and 341 seats, CHP by 20.8% and 112 seats, and MHP by 14.3% and 71 seats. In addition, 5.2% of independents won 26 seats of total 550. In the 2011 election, the same three parties were reelected and that gave the AKP 49.8% and 327 seats, the CHP 25.9% and 135 seats, and the MHP 13% and 53 seats. In addition 6.6% independents won 35 seats of total 550. Then, the June 2015 election came along to change the situation so that, in addition to the previous three parties, a fourth party managed to pass the threshold. The results were divided so that the AKP won 40.8% of votes and 258 seats, CHP won 24.9% of votes and 132 seats, MHP won 16.2% of votes and 80 seats, and HDP won 13.1% of votes and 80 seats. These results, for the first time in 13 years, changed the game, in that the AKP lost the absolute majority of seats which meant they had to form a coalition. After several rounds of negotiations, and because of political polarization, political parties failed to form a coalition. That led to an election in November 2015 which resulted in an absolute majority again by the AKP. This time, the results were AKP 49.5% and 317 seats, CHP 25.3% and 134 seats, MHP 11.9% and 40 seats, and HDP 10.7% and 59 seats out of the total 550 (YSK, 2017).

4.2 TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR PARTY POSITIONS BASED ON MARPOR

Table 10 contains 7 domains and 56 categories and it is coded as explained in chapter one. For example, the second row is called “Foreign Special Relationships: Positive” and in front of it we find the scores belonging to each party in every election. The first number under the column “2002” “AKP” is “0.014”, which refers to the percentage of comments mentioning favorable relationship with a specific country, from all categories and messages in the text. In the “2002” “CHP” results, the number has changed to 0.005 which means that CHP mentioned a favorable relationship with a specific country in the same election less than the AKP. Again, by comparing the same category “Foreign Special

Relationships: Positive” over time in the same party, the score in the 2002 election was 0.014, and in 2007 that score increased to 0.028, meaning that the importance of that category increased over time in the same party. The technique was applied to all 56 categories and the sum of each column (without calculating 7 domains scores) should be “1”. The third row, called “Foreign Special Relationships: Negative” for example is the same as the previous one, but it refers to the percentage of comments mentioning a negative relationship with a specific country. Finally, these 56 categories are grouped under 7 different domains. The percentages in each domain are the sum of the categories’ scores, and show the importance of each domain to the party. For example, the fourth domain “Economy” shows significant high scores compared to other domains. It means that economic issues are the most important issues in the party’s vision.

4.3 LEADERS’ TRAITS AND PARTY POSITIONS¹⁰

4.3.1 Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Erdogan’s scores from 2002 to 2011 have witnessed a remarkable change in several traits. His Believes can Control Events trait score increased gradually, while in contrast, his Need for Power gradually decreased. His Conceptual Complexity is almost stable across time with a marginal increase. His Self-Confidence scores is the most changeable trait, whereas his scores increased dramatically from 2002 to 2007, and his average falls down again by the end of 2011. Erdogan’s scores in Task Focus trait decreased, which means at the time he gave more attention to relationships and morale inside the group, instead of achieving goals and missions. Erdogan’s Distrust of Others trait increased across time, especially in the first years of his tenure. In contrast, his In-Group Bias score first increased, then decreased significantly after 2007. Erdogan’s scores here are statistically compatible with two previous studies conducted to assess his leadership traits analysis. The first study by Kesgin (2013) who investigates all post-cold war Turkish prime ministers, and among them Erdogan’s scores comes in with no large difference, and they do not affect the leader’s general assessment. The marginal difference seen here may have occurred because the collected statements of the leader were only statements related to foreign policy topics. The second study by Cuhadar and her colleagues (2015) covered

¹⁰ Leaders’ order followed here and in the whole study ordered first by party, and the most represented party in the parliament comes first. Second, by leader’s tenure within the party.

only the period from 28 August, 2001 to 9 March, 2003 of Erdogan's tenure. These results were also compared (actually these scores are used here, as mentioned before) with the results here, and no statistically significant difference has been found.

AKP positions' scores over the same range of time (2002 to 2011) also show a remarkable change. In the "external relations" and "welfare and quality of life" domains, the average increased gradually over time. In contrast, "political system", "fabric of society", and "social group" domains witnessed a gradual decrease. Finally, "freedom and democracy", and "economy" domains show a decrease and then an increase of the average over the last years of his tenure (for more illustration see Figure 7).

Table 13 Erdogan's Traits Scores, and AKP Positions' Scores in The Same Period

Erdogan	2002	2007	2011
Believes can Control Events	0.37	0.382	0.411
Need for Power	0.31	0.251	0.238
Conceptual Complexity	0.58	0.607	0.612
Self-Confidence	0.36	0.543	0.412
Task Focus	0.73	0.638	0.608
Distrust of Others	0.11	0.153	0.152
In-Group Bias	0.1	0.115	0.082
Domain 1: External Relations	5.976	8.93	9.233
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	1.440	2.832	0.703
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.000	0.033	0.094
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.288	0.000	0.117
Military: Positive	0.360	1.633	2.062
Military: Negative	0.072	0.067	0.047
Peace: Positive	0.864	1.033	2.249
Internationalism: Positive	1.872	1.966	3.351
European/LA Integration: Positive	1.080	1.366	0.469
Internationalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.141
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	5.832	3.332	4.756
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	2.520	1.500	1.476
Democracy	3.024	1.599	2.413
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.047
Constitutionalism: Negative	0.288	0.233	0.820
Domain 3: Political System	12.672	6.732	4.546
Decentralization: Positive	2.664	0.700	0.258
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.033	0.000
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	3.528	3.166	2.554
Political Corruption: Negative	4.680	1.100	0.445
Political Authority: Positive	1.800	1.733	1.289
Domain 4: Economy	39.382	32.123	36.97
Free-Market Economy: Positive	11.447	6.465	2.085
Incentives: Positive	5.472	6.731	3.069
Market Regulation: Positive	0.216	0.633	0.398

Erdogan	2002	2007	2011
Economic Planning: Positive	11.951	1.100	3.327
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.100	0.023
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000
Economic Goals	1.008	5.965	5.037
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.144	0.000	0.000
Economic Growth	3.312	2.932	8.341
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	3.168	7.398	14.292
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000
Nationalization: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	1.440	0.033	0.000
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	1.224	0.766	0.398
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	11.736	21.26	23.735
Environmental Protection: Positive	0.360	2.333	2.718
Culture: Positive	0.144	4.132	5.131
Equality: Positive	1.584	0.900	0.797
Welfare state Expansion	4.536	8.597	10.450
Welfare state Limitation	0.288	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	4.680	5.298	4.639
Education Limitation	0.144	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	12.168	10.229	9.981
National Way of Life: Positive	0.504	2.399	1.382
National Way of Life: Negative	0.072	0.000	0.000
Traditional Morality: Positive	1.656	1.799	1.148
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.144	0.233	0.000
Law and order	5.904	4.065	5.389
Civic Mindedness: Positive	3.816	1.633	1.828
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.072	0.100	0.234
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000
Domain 7: Social Groups	11.304	11.83	9.067
Labor Groups: Positive	2.520	3.499	1.757
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	4.968	3.499	2.413
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.072	0.000	0.000
Minority Groups: Positive	1.656	1.300	2.015
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	2.088	3.532	2.882

4.3.2 Ahmet Davutoglu

Although the time span examined for 2015 is just 5 months, Davutoglu's traits scores show some change, too. His Believes can Control Events, Need for Power, Self-Confidence, Distrust of Others, and In-Group Bias scores increased, especially for Self-Confidence and Distrust of Others. Both conceptual complexity and Task Focus traits

remain stable in that period of time. AKP positions' scores were almost stable between 2015-6 and 2015-11 elections (see Figure 7).

Table 14 Ahmet Davutoglu's Traits Scores, and AKP Positions' Scores in The Same Period

Davutoglu	2015-6	2015-11
Believes Can Control Events	0.435	0.475
Need for Power	0.260	0.307
Conceptual Complexity	0.623	0.609
Self-Confidence	0.238	0.320
Task Focus	0.674	0.670
Distrust of Others	0.208	0.254
In-Group Bias	0.095	0.125
Domain 1: External Relations	5.244	5.295
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	0.340	0.328
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.000	0.000
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.024	0.023
Military: Positive	0.437	0.469
Military: Negative	0.024	0.047
Peace: Positive	0.413	0.398
Internationalism: Positive	3.520	3.561
European/LA Integration: Positive	0.486	0.469
Internationalism: Negative	0	0
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.000	0.000
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	10.076	9.958
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	2.161	2.132
Democracy	6.191	6.162
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.000
Constitutionalism: Negative	1.724	1.664
Domain 3: Political System	4.953	5.107
Decentralization: Positive	1.262	1.218
Centralization: Positive	0.486	0.562
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	1.190	1.336
Political Corruption: Negative	0.801	0.773
Political Authority: Positive	1.214	1.218
Domain 4: Economy	42.899	42.316
Free-Market Economy: Positive	0.850	0.820
Incentives: Positive	4.904	5.459
Market Regulation: Positive	0.874	0.867
Economic Planning: Positive	6.579	6.795
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.825	0.797
Economic Goals	0.000	0.000
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.000	0.023
Economic Growth	7.405	6.912
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	15.416	14.738
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.364	0.375
Nationalization: Positive	0.316	0.305
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	4.856	4.733
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	0.510	0.492
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	20.514	20.619

Davutoglu	2015-6	2015-11
Environmental Protection: Positive	2.549	2.413
Culture: Positive	3.787	3.866
Equality: Positive	3.763	3.655
Welfare state Expansion	5.705	5.858
Welfare state Limitation	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	4.710	4.827
Education Limitation	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	9.079	9.561
National Way of Life: Positive	3.059	3.187
National Way of Life: Negative	0.000	0.000
Traditional Morality: Positive	1.529	1.664
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.000	0.000
Law and order	2.112	2.273
Civic Mindedness: Positive	1.821	1.828
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.558	0.609
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000
Domain 7: Social Groups	7.04	6.958
Labor Groups: Positive	2.840	2.741
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	3.982	3.960
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.024	0.023
Minority Groups: Positive	0.000	0.000
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	0.194	0.234

4.3.3 Deniz Baykal

Unfortunately, because of the lack of analyzed statements for Baykal that might cover all his years of tenure, Baykal's scores were aggregated, and his traits were analyzed in detail in chapter 3. CHP positions under his tenure witnessed a big change in most domains. While "external relations", "fabric of society", and "social groups" domains show a significant increase, domains like "freedom and democracy", "economy", and "welfare and quality of life" show a significant decrease too, and the political system domain was almost stable with no remarkable change (for more illustration see Figure 8).

Table 15 Deniz Baykal's Traits Scores, and CHP Positions' Scores in The Same Period

Baykal	2002	2007
Believes can Control Events	0.416	
Need for Power	0.335	
Conceptual Complexity	0.640	
Self-Confidence	0.241	
Task Focus	0.653	
Distrust of Others	0.130	
In-Group Bias	0.115	
Domain 1: External Relations	6.057	9.564
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	0.475	0.186

Baykal	2002	2007
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.000	0.559
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.000	0.062
Military: Positive	0.238	1.491
Military: Negative	0.000	0.062
Peace: Positive	1.781	4.596
Internationalism: Positive	0.475	0.621
European/LA Integration: Positive	3.088	0.807
Internationalism: Negative	0.000	0.186
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.000	0.994
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	3.919	2.111
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	1.544	1.304
Democracy	2.019	0.745
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.062
Constitutionalism: Negative	0.356	0.000
Domain 3: Political System	9.383	9.689
Decentralization: Positive	0.000	0.683
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.124
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	2.494	2.795
Political Corruption: Negative	4.751	5.280
Political Authority: Positive	2.138	0.807
Domain 4: Economy	38.717	27.957
Free-Market Economy: Positive	4.988	2.112
Incentives: Positive	7.126	7.205
Market Regulation: Positive	0.950	0.683
Economic Planning: Positive	5.344	1.677
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.062
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.000	0.000
Economic Goals	5.582	1.801
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.238	0.248
Economic Growth	8.907	4.286
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	4.988	7.702
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.000	0.062
Nationalization: Positive	0.238	0.497
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	0.000	1.180
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	0.356	0.435
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	19.477	17.577
Environmental Protection: Positive	1.900	2.236
Culture: Positive	3.088	2.298
Equality: Positive	1.425	0.932
Welfare state Expansion	6.651	5.776
Welfare state Limitation	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	6.413	6.335
Education Limitation	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	5.819	12.298
National Way of Life: Positive	1.069	1.988
National Way of Life: Negative	0.000	0.000
Traditional Morality: Positive	0.356	0.062
Traditional Morality: Negative	1.425	3.354
Law and order	2.375	5.217

Baykal	2002	2007
Civic Mindedness: Positive	0.475	1.615
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.119	0.062
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000
Domain 7: Social Groups	12.82	15.46
	7	5
Labor Groups: Positive	3.207	3.106
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	6.057	9.068
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.000	0.062
Minority Groups: Positive	0.713	0.807
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	2.850	2.422

4.3.4 Kemal Kilicdaroglu

Kilicdaroglu's traits scores were also aggregated from 2010 to the end of 2015. However, CHP positions' scores show a significant change in that time, especially between the 2011 and 2015 elections. While "external relations", "political system", and "social groups" domains show a decrease in score averages, domains like "freedom and democracy", "economy", and "fabric of society" scores show an average increase, and "welfare and quality of life" increases in the first election cycle, then decreases again significantly.

Table 16 Kemal Kilicdaroglu's Traits Scores, and CHP Positions' Scores in The Same Period

Kilicdaroglu	2011	2015-6	2015-11
Believes can Control Events		0.339	
Need for Power		0.204	
Conceptual Complexity		0.601	
Self-Confidence		0.280	
Task Focus		0.663	
Distrust of Others		0.165	
In-Group Bias		0.107	
Domain 1: External Relations	9.832	7.898	8.508
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	2.295	0.968	0.909
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.250	0.000	0.000
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.200	0.155	0.292
Military: Positive	0.250	1.471	1.591
Military: Negative	0.250	0.387	0.325
Peace: Positive	2.844	0.968	1.169
Internationalism: Positive	2.295	3.020	3.248
European/LA Integration: Positive	1.248	0.929	0.974
Internationalism: Negative	0.000	0	0
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.20	0.000	0.000
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	9.381	14.363	15.752
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	4.790	3.949	3.670
Democracy	3.992	9.601	11.075
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.542	0.585
Constitutionalism: Negative	0.599	0.271	0.422

Kilicdaroglu	2011	2015-6	2015-11
Domain 3: Political System	8.034	5.845	6.333
Decentralization: Positive	0.150	1.432	1.202
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.039	0.032
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	4.940	1.084	0.909
Political Corruption: Negative	2.944	2.400	1.981
Political Authority: Positive	0.000	0.890	2.209
Domain 4: Economy	24.851	30.313	28.809
Free-Market Economy: Positive	0.250	0.232	0.487
Incentives: Positive	3.443	3.562	3.183
Market Regulation: Positive	0.649	1.703	1.819
Economic Planning: Positive	0.349	4.259	4.255
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.232	0.195
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.000	0.929	0.974
Economic Goals	0.948	0.000	0.000
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.000	0.194	0.260
Economic Growth	9.930	4.104	3.767
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	6.936	12.389	11.010
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.200	0.348	0.260
Nationalization: Positive	0.150	0.232	0.195
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	0.000	0.813	1.202
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	1.996	1.316	1.202
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	29.091	16.608	27.51
Environmental Protection: Positive	2.345	2.170	2.696
Culture: Positive	3.992	2.367	3.378
Equality: Positive	3.792	2.288	6.398
Welfare state Expansion	12.275	6.312	8.867
Welfare state Limitation	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	6.687	3.471	6.171
Education Limitation	0.000	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	5.539	13.648	7.275
National Way of Life: Positive	0.100	6.233	1.494
National Way of Life: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.065
Traditional Morality: Positive	0.000	0.710	0.292
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.449	0.000	0.000
Law and order	2.695	3.550	1.234
Civic Mindedness: Positive	1.347	2.051	2.956
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.948	0.276	1.234
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.828	0.000
Domain 7: Social Groups	11.578	4.452	5.164
Labor Groups: Positive	2.745	3.368	3.053
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	3.044	1.084	2.111
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.100	0.000	0.000
Minority Groups: Positive	0.998	0.000	0.000
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	4.691	0.000	0.000

4.3.5 Devlet Bahçeli

Similar to Baykal and Kılıcdaroğlu, Bahçeli's traits scores were aggregated to cover all years of his tenure. However, MHP positions under Bahçeli's tenure were stable in most domains, except "freedom and democracy" which increased over time, and "political system" which decreased gradually. The "fabric of society" domain increased dramatically in 2011, then increased again in 2015 elections (see Figure 9).

Table 17 Devlet Bahçeli's Traits Scores, and MHP Positions' Scores in The Same Period

Bahçeli	2007	2011	2015-6	2015-11
Believes can Control Events	0.395			
Need for Power	0.166			
Conceptual Complexity	0.614			
Self-Confidence	0.282			
Task Focus	0.726			
Distrust of Others	0.168			
In-Group Bias	0.023			
Domain 1: External Relations	6.521	7.655	6.825	6.827
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	1.932	0.376	0.592	0.624
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.060	0.000	0.079	0.073
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.000	0.547	0.473	0.441
Military: Positive	1.993	1.640	2.051	2.313
Military: Negative	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.000
Peace: Positive	1.087	3.418	0.789	0.734
Internationalism: Positive	0.604	1.367	2.525	2.349
European/LA Integration: Positive	0.000	0.068	0.079	0.073
Internationalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0	0
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.845	0.205	0.237	0.220
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	2.295	6.015	11.165	11.197
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	1.208	2.461	2.604	2.460
Democracy	0.966	2.597	8.087	8.223
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.581	0.237	0.294
Constitutionalism: Negative	0.121	0.376	0.237	0.220
Domain 3: Political System	9.842	8.169	5.759	6.13
Decentralization: Positive	0.060	0.034	0.513	0.477
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.907	0.918
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	3.865	2.837	0.907	0.954
Political Corruption: Negative	5.072	3.794	2.682	2.643
Political Authority: Positive	0.845	1.504	0.750	1.138
Domain 4: Economy	34.3	35.918	37.947	37.225
Free-Market Economy: Positive	4.408	2.666	0.552	0.551
Incentives: Positive	5.495	3.554	5.049	4.809
Market Regulation: Positive	0.725	0.649	2.012	1.946
Economic Planning: Positive	5.012	8.202	5.957	5.653
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.118	0.110
Protectionism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.552	0.587
Economic Goals	3.442	0.171	0.000	0.000
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.394	0.367
Economic Growth	5.737	8.988	4.931	5.066

Bahceli	2007	2011	2015-6	2015-11
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	8.696	10.082	11.637	11.307
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.000	0.068	0.631	0.661
Nationalization: Positive	0.181	0.308	0.118	0.147
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	0.000	0.000	5.720	5.764
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	0.604	1.230	0.276	0.257
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	15.218	16.952	29.654	16.447
Environmental Protection: Positive	1.812	2.187	2.942	2.056
Culture: Positive	2.174	2.256	4.297	2.203
Equality: Positive	0.906	0.923	6.852	2.093
Welfare state Expansion	5.133	6.733	9.214	6.791
Welfare state Limitation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	5.193	4.853	6.349	3.304
Education Limitation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	16.97	11.586	6.775	14.428
National Way of Life: Positive	8.031	4.751	1.936	6.498
National Way of Life: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Traditional Morality: Positive	2.114	1.196	0.348	0.698
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.242	0.000	0.000	0.000
Law and order	6.341	5.263	0.852	3.928
Civic Mindedness: Positive	0.242	0.376	2.594	2.239
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.000	0.000	1.045	0.257
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.808
Domain 7: Social Groups	8.938	10.184	8.047	7.746
Labor Groups: Positive	1.027	1.948	3.471	3.414
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	5.254	5.024	4.379	4.148
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Minority Groups: Positive	0.543	0.478	0.000	0.000
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	2.114	2.734	0.197	0.184

4.3.6 Selahattin Demirtas

Demirtas's traits scores are measured in the period between 2012 and 2015. However his scores between the 2015-6 and 2015-11 elections are different. His averages in Need for Power, Self-Confidence, Distrust, and In-Group Bias traits decreased significantly, and his scores in Conceptual Complexity and Task Focus remain stable across time. In contrast, his Believes can Control Events increased between the two elections.

HDP positions also changed in the same period of time. Scores in domains like "external relations", "freedom and democracy", and "political system" increased, and scores in the domains of "economy", "welfare and quality of life", and "social groups" decreased, but "fabric of society" domain score remained stable (see Figure 10).

Table 18 Demirtas's Traits Scores, and HDP Positions' Scores in The Same Period

Demirtas	2015-6	2015-11
Believes can Control Events	0.375	0.410
Need for Power	0.275	0.233
Conceptual Complexity	0.666	0.654
Self-Confidence	0.366	0.253
Task Focus	0.638	0.632
Distrust of Others	0.211	0.136
In-Group Bias	0.131	0.097
Domain 1: External Relations	2.578	3.37
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	0.344	0.281
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.000	0.000
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.344	0.281
Military: Positive	0.172	0.140
Military: Negative	0.344	0.281
Peace: Positive	0.687	1.545
Internationalism: Positive	0.515	0.562
European/LA Integration: Positive	0.172	0.140
Internationalism: Negative	0	0
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.000	0.140
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	22.164	27.668
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	8.419	8.848
Democracy	12.027	17.416
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.000
Constitutionalism: Negative	1.718	1.404
Domain 3: Political System	4.467	6.742
Decentralization: Positive	3.608	5.478
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.000
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	0.000	0.000
Political Corruption: Negative	0.687	0.843
Political Authority: Positive	0.172	0.421
Domain 4: Economy	11.168	8.564
Free-Market Economy: Positive	0.000	0.000
Incentives: Positive	0.687	0.421
Market Regulation: Positive	3.436	2.949
Economic Planning: Positive	1.203	0.983
Corporatism: Positive	0.172	0.140
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.172	0.140
Economic Goals	0.000	0.000
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.172	0.140
Economic Growth	0.344	0.281
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	1.718	1.404
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.515	0.281
Nationalization: Positive	0.172	0.281
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	0.172	0.140
Marxist Analysis: Positive	2.405	1.404
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	0.000	0.000
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	35.396	31.883
Environmental Protection: Positive	3.265	3.511
Culture: Positive	3.780	2.669
Equality: Positive	12.199	12.219
Welfare state Expansion	12.887	10.815
Welfare state Limitation	0.000	0.000

Demirtas	2015-6	2015-11
Education Expansion	3.265	2.669
Education Limitation	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	8.419	8.426
National Way of Life: Positive	0.000	0.000
National Way of Life: Negative	0.172	0.140
Traditional Morality: Positive	0.000	0.000
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.000	0.000
Law and order	1.203	0.983
Civic Mindedness: Positive	2.405	3.230
Multiculturalism: Positive	4.639	4.073
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000
Domain 7: Social Groups	13.918	10.814
Labor Groups: Positive	10.997	8.427
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	2.749	2.247
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.000	0.000
Minority Groups: Positive	0.000	0.000
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	0.172	0.140

4.3.7 All Leaders over Time

Table 19 here represents the scores of all leaders under assessment, with all categories' scores across all elections under investigation:

Table 19 Leaders' Traits Scores Compared with Party Positions

Election Cycle	2002		2007			2011			2015-6				2015-11			
Categories	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
	Erdogan	Baykal	Erdogan	Baykal	Bahceli	Erdogan	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas
Believes can Control Events	0.37	0.416	0.382	0.416	0.395	0.411	0.339	0.395	0.435	0.339	0.395	0.375	0.475	0.339	0.395	0.410
Need for Power	0.31	0.335	0.251	0.335	0.166	0.238	0.204	0.166	0.260	0.204	0.166	0.275	0.307	0.204	0.166	0.233
Conceptual Complexity	0.58	0.640	0.607	0.640	0.614	0.612	0.601	0.614	0.623	0.601	0.614	0.666	0.609	0.601	0.614	0.654
Self-Confidence	0.36	0.241	0.543	0.241	0.282	0.412	0.280	0.282	0.238	0.280	0.282	0.366	0.320	0.280	0.282	0.253
Task Focus	0.73	0.653	0.638	0.653	0.726	0.608	0.663	0.726	0.674	0.663	0.726	0.638	0.670	0.663	0.726	0.632
Distrust of Others	0.11	0.130	0.153	0.130	0.168	0.152	0.165	0.168	0.208	0.165	0.168	0.211	0.254	0.165	0.168	0.136
In-Group Bias	0.1	0.115	0.115	0.115	0.023	0.082	0.107	0.023	0.095	0.107	0.023	0.131	0.125	0.107	0.023	0.097
Domain 1: External Relations	5.976	6.057	8.93	9.564	6.521	9.233	9.832	7.655	5.244	7.898	6.825	2.578	5.295	8.508	6.827	3.37
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	1.440	0.475	2.832	0.186	1.932	0.703	2.295	0.376	0.340	0.968	0.592	0.344	0.328	0.909	0.624	0.281
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.559	0.060	0.094	0.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.079	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.073	0.000
Anti-Imperialism: Positive	0.288	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.117	0.200	0.547	0.024	0.155	0.473	0.344	0.023	0.292	0.441	0.281
Military: Positive	0.360	0.238	1.633	1.491	1.993	2.062	0.250	1.640	0.437	1.471	2.051	0.172	0.469	1.591	2.313	0.140
Military: Negative	0.072	0.000	0.067	0.062	0.000	0.047	0.250	0.034	0.024	0.387	0.000	0.344	0.047	0.325	0.000	0.281
Peace: Positive	0.864	1.781	1.033	4.596	1.087	2.249	2.844	3.418	0.413	0.968	0.789	0.687	0.398	1.169	0.734	1.545
Internationalism: Positive	1.872	0.475	1.966	0.621	0.604	3.351	2.295	1.367	3.520	3.020	2.525	0.515	3.561	3.248	2.349	0.562
European/LA Integration: Positive	1.080	3.088	1.366	0.807	0.000	0.469	1.248	0.068	0.486	0.929	0.079	0.172	0.469	0.974	0.073	0.140
Internationalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.186	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Election Cycle	2002		2007			2011			2015-6				2015-11			
Categories	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
	Erdogan	Baykal	Erdogan	Baykal	Bahceli	Erdogan	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas
European/LA Integration: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.994	0.845	0.141	0.20	0.205	0.000	0.000	0.237	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.220	0.140
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	5.832	3.919	3.332	2.111	2.295	4.756	9.381	6.015	10.076	14.363	11.165	22.164	9.958	15.752	11.197	27.668
Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	2.520	1.544	1.500	1.304	1.208	1.476	4.790	2.461	2.161	3.949	2.604	8.419	2.132	3.670	2.460	8.848
Democracy	3.024	2.019	1.599	0.745	0.966	2.413	3.992	2.597	6.191	9.601	8.087	12.027	6.162	11.075	8.223	17.416
Constitutionalism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.047	0.000	0.581	0.000	0.542	0.237	0.000	0.000	0.585	0.294	0.000
Constitutionalism: Negative	0.288	0.356	0.233	0.000	0.121	0.820	0.599	0.376	1.724	0.271	0.237	1.718	1.664	0.422	0.220	1.404
Domain 3: Political System	12.672	9.383	6.732	9.689	9.842	4.546	8.034	8.169	4.953	5.845	5.759	4.467	5.107	6.333	6.13	6.742
Decentralization: Positive	2.664	0.000	0.700	0.683	0.060	0.258	0.150	0.034	1.262	1.432	0.513	3.608	1.218	1.202	0.477	5.478
Centralization: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.486	0.039	0.907	0.000	0.562	0.032	0.918	0.000
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	3.528	2.494	3.166	2.795	3.865	2.554	4.940	2.837	1.190	1.084	0.907	0.000	1.336	0.909	0.954	0.000
Political Corruption: Negative	4.680	4.751	1.100	5.280	5.072	0.445	2.944	3.794	0.801	2.400	2.682	0.687	0.773	1.981	2.643	0.843
Political Authority: Positive	1.800	2.138	1.733	0.807	0.845	1.289	0.000	1.504	1.214	0.890	0.750	0.172	1.218	2.209	1.138	0.421
Domain 4: Economy	39.382	38.717	32.123	27.95	34.3	36.97	24.851	35.918	42.899	30.313	37.947	11.168	42.316	28.809	37.225	8.564
Free-Market Economy: Positive	11.447	4.988	6.465	2.112	4.408	2.085	0.250	2.666	0.850	0.232	0.552	0.000	0.820	0.487	0.551	0.000
Incentives: Positive	5.472	7.126	6.731	7.205	5.495	3.069	3.443	3.554	4.904	3.562	5.049	0.687	5.459	3.183	4.809	0.421
Market Regulation: Positive	0.216	0.950	0.633	0.683	0.725	0.398	0.649	0.649	0.874	1.703	2.012	3.436	0.867	1.819	1.946	2.949
Economic Planning: Positive	11.951	5.344	1.100	1.677	5.012	3.327	0.349	8.202	6.579	4.259	5.957	1.203	6.795	4.255	5.653	0.983
Corporatism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.062	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.232	0.000	0.172	0.000	0.195	0.000	0.140
Protectionism: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.118	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.110	0.000
Protectionism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.825	0.929	0.552	0.172	0.797	0.974	0.587	0.140
Economic Goals	1.008	5.582	5.965	1.801	3.442	5.037	0.948	0.171	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	0.144	0.238	0.000	0.248	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.194	0.394	0.172	0.023	0.260	0.367	0.140
Economic Growth	3.312	8.907	2.932	4.286	5.737	8.341	9.930	8.988	7.405	4.104	4.931	0.344	6.912	3.767	5.066	0.281
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	3.168	4.988	7.398	7.702	8.696	14.292	6.936	10.082	15.416	12.389	11.637	1.718	14.738	11.010	11.307	1.404
Controlled Economy: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.000	0.200	0.068	0.364	0.348	0.631	0.515	0.375	0.260	0.661	0.281
Nationalization: Positive	0.000	0.238	0.000	0.497	0.181	0.000	0.150	0.308	0.316	0.232	0.118	0.172	0.305	0.195	0.147	0.281
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	1.440	0.000	0.033	1.180	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.856	0.813	5.720	0.172	4.733	1.202	5.764	0.140
Marxist Analysis: Positive	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.405	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.404
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	1.224	0.356	0.766	0.435	0.604	0.398	1.996	1.230	0.510	1.316	0.276	0.000	0.492	1.202	0.257	0.000
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life	11.736	19.477	21.26	17.577	15.218	23.735	29.091	16.952	20.514	16.608	29.654	35.396	20.619	27.51	16.447	31.883
Environmental Protection: Positive	0.360	1.900	2.333	2.236	1.812	2.718	2.345	2.187	2.549	2.170	2.942	3.265	2.413	2.696	2.056	3.511
Culture: Positive	0.144	3.088	4.132	2.298	2.174	5.131	3.992	2.256	3.787	2.367	4.297	3.780	3.866	3.378	2.203	2.669
Equality: Positive	1.584	1.425	0.900	0.932	0.906	0.797	3.792	0.923	3.763	2.288	6.852	12.199	3.655	6.398	2.093	12.219

Election Cycle	2002		2007			2011			2015-6				2015-11			
Categories	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP
	Erdogan	Baykal	Erdogan	Baykal	Bahceli	Erdogan	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas	Davutoglu	Kilicdaroglu	Bahceli	Demirtas
Welfare state Expansion	4.536	6.651	8.597	5.776	5.133	10.450	12.275	6.733	5.705	6.312	9.214	12.887	5.858	8.867	6.791	10.815
Welfare state Limitation	0.288	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education Expansion	4.680	6.413	5.298	6.335	5.193	4.639	6.687	4.853	4.710	3.471	6.349	3.265	4.827	6.171	3.304	2.669
Education Limitation	0.144	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Domain 6: Fabric of Society	12.168	5.819	10.229	12.298	16.97	9.981	5.539	11.586	9.079	13.648	6.775	8.419	9.561	7.275	14.428	8.426
National Way of Life: Positive	0.504	1.069	2.399	1.988	8.031	1.382	0.100	4.751	3.059	6.233	1.936	0.000	3.187	1.494	6.498	0.000
National Way of Life: Negative	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.172	0.000	0.065	0.000	0.140
Traditional Morality: Positive	1.656	0.356	1.799	0.062	2.114	1.148	0.000	1.196	1.529	0.710	0.348	0.000	1.664	0.292	0.698	0.000
Traditional Morality: Negative	0.144	1.425	0.233	3.354	0.242	0.000	0.449	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Law and order	5.904	2.375	4.065	5.217	6.341	5.389	2.695	5.263	2.112	3.550	0.852	1.203	2.273	1.234	3.928	0.983
Civic Mindedness: Positive	3.816	0.475	1.633	1.615	0.242	1.828	1.347	0.376	1.821	2.051	2.594	2.405	1.828	2.956	2.239	3.230
Multiculturalism: Positive	0.072	0.119	0.100	0.062	0.000	0.234	0.948	0.000	0.558	0.276	1.045	4.639	0.609	1.234	0.257	4.073
Multiculturalism: Negative	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.828	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.808	0.000
Domain 7: Social Groups	11.304	12.827	11.83	15.465	8.938	9.067	11.578	10.184	7.04	4.452	8.047	13.918	6.958	5.164	7.746	10.814
Labor Groups: Positive	2.520	3.207	3.499	3.106	1.027	1.757	2.745	1.948	2.840	3.368	3.471	10.997	2.741	3.053	3.414	8.427
Labor Groups: Negative	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agriculture and Farmers	4.968	6.057	3.499	9.068	5.254	2.413	3.044	5.024	3.982	1.084	4.379	2.749	3.960	2.111	4.148	2.247
Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive	0.072	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.000	0.000
Minority Groups: Positive	1.656	0.713	1.300	0.807	0.543	2.015	0.998	0.478	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive	2.088	2.850	3.532	2.422	2.114	2.882	4.691	2.734	0.194	0.000	0.197	0.172	0.234	0.000	0.184	0.140

Before conducting the statistical correlation process, the first observation on the data is that not all domains have the same importance across parties. The data in table 19 shows that the domain of “economy” occupies the highest degree of importance in all parties except HDP, which gives the “welfare and quality of life” domain the highest concern. Then, “welfare and quality of life” domain comes in as the second in importance for the AKP, CHP, and MHP, but for HDP, the second domain in importance is “freedom and democracy”.

Secondly, the scores on party positions show an obvious change in domains across time, but especially under different leaders. For example, the next chart (Figure 7) shows how

the categories (aggregated in domains) change across time for the AKP, especially the differing averages from 2002, 2007, and 2011 under Erdogan, and then for 2015-6 and 2015-11 under Davutoglu:




Figure 7. AKP Positions Across time

It's obvious that the last two bars (representing the elections under Davutoglu) in the first, second, fourth, fifth, and seventh domains are significantly different from other bars. However, the third and sixth domains didn't show a clear change between the two leaders, and it could be that both leaders agreed on the same values represented in the domains, or unlike "economy" and "welfare and quality of life" domains, "political system" and "fabric of society" domains have less weight among party leaders.

The same observation applies to the CHP. The next chart (figure 8) shows party position change across time, and the gap between the scores under Baykal's 2002 and 2007 elections, and Kilicdaroglu's 2011, 2015-6, and 2015-11 elections.




Figure 8. CHP Positions Across time

The results show the difference between the two leaders' average in almost all domains, but also show another interesting observation; that party positions in 2011 under Kilicdaroglu leadership, and party positions in 2015-6 and 2015-11 under the same leader, changed dramatically. The explanation of that change could be that Kilicdaroglu occupied his position in 22 Mays 2010 in an unexpected change of leadership, and almost one year before the general election, so that was a short time in which to choose his advisors and maintain his influence on the party position.

The results for MHP also confirm this observation, but in the MHP case, all elections occurred under the same leader, with no major change.




Figure 9. MHP Positions Across time

However, the second, and the third domain show significant changes, and these changes could be influenced by the political context and challenges at that time.

HDP participated in two elections in the same year (2015) under the same leader, Demirtas. The results don't show a dramatic change in party position between the two elections, but they do show differences in the weight of domains, compared with other parties.




Figure 10. HDP Positions Across time

4.4 HYPOTHESES TESTS AND THE RESULTS

This study assumed several correlational hypotheses between political party leaders' traits, and party position categories. Having described the scores of parties and the traits of their leaders in electoral and manifesto cycles above, this chapter investigates the relationship between party leaders' traits and their party positions. The following tables represent those hypotheses and whether this correlation and its direction exists, or not, according to the results.

Hypothesis 1a: Distrust of Others correlates positively with anti-imperialism.

Leader Names	Distrust of Others trait score	Anti-Imperialism
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.162	0.135
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.206	0.0235
Deniz Baykal	0.130	0.031
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.165	0.215666667
Devlet Bahceli	0.168	0.36525
Selahattin Demirtas	0.186	0.3125
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation .124 Sig. (2-tailed) .816	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 1b: Distrust of Others correlates positively with the tendency to control the economy by the state.

Leader Names	Distrust of Others trait score	Controlled Economy
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.162	0
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.206	0.3695
Deniz Baykal	0.130	0.031
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.165	0.269333333
Devlet Bahceli	0.168	0.34
Selahattin Demirtas	0.186	0.398
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation .770 Sig. (2-tailed) .074	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 1c: Distrust of Others correlates positively with nationalizing industry.

Leader Names	Distrust of Others trait score	Nationalization
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.162	0
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.206	0.3105
Deniz Baykal	0.130	0.3675
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.165	0.192333333
Devlet Bahceli	0.168	0.1885
Selahattin Demirtas	0.186	0.2265
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.031 Sig. (2-tailed) .953	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 1d: Distrust of Others correlates positively with the tendency of centralizing and narrowing the circle of decision making.

Leader Names	Distrust of Others trait score	Centralization
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.162	0.011
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.206	0.524
Deniz Baykal	0.130	0.062
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.165	0.023666667
Devlet Bahceli	0.168	0.45625
Selahattin Demirtas	0.186	0
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.025 Sig. (2-tailed) .963	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 1e: Distrust of Others correlates positively with the tendency to use military.

Leader Names	Distrust of Others trait score	Military: Positive
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.162	1.351666667
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.206	0.453
Deniz Baykal	0.130	0.8645
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.165	1.104
Devlet Bahceli	0.168	1.99925
Selahattin Demirtas	0.186	0.156
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.392 Sig. (2-tailed) .442	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 1f: Distrust of Others correlates negatively with European integration.

Leader Names	distrust of Others trait score	European Integration
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.162	0.971666667
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.206	0.4775
Deniz Baykal	0.130	1.9475
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.165	1.050333333
Devlet Bahceli	0.168	0.055
Selahattin Demirtas	0.186	0.156
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.769 Sig. (2-tailed) .074	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 2a: In-Group Bias correlates positively with anti-imperialism.

Leader Names	In-Group Bias	Anti-Imperialism
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.097	0.135
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.099	0.0235
Deniz Baykal	0.115	0.031
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.107	0.215666667
Devlet Bahceli	0.023	0.36525
Selahattin Demirtas	0.118	0.3125
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.534 Sig. (2-tailed) .276	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 2b: In-Group Bias correlates positively with tendency to control the economy by the state.

Leader Names	In-Group Bias	Controlled Economy
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.097	0
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.099	0.3695
Deniz Baykal	0.115	0.031
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.107	0.269333333
Devlet Bahceli	0.023	0.34
Selahattin Demirtas	0.118	0.398
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.237 Sig. (2-tailed) .650	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 2c: In-Group Bias correlates positively with nationalizing industry.

Leader Names	In-Group Bias	Nationalization
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.097	0
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.099	0.3105
Deniz Baykal	0.115	0.3675
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.107	0.192333333
Devlet Bahceli	0.023	0.1885
Selahattin Demirtas	0.118	0.2265
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation .212 Sig. (2-tailed) .687	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 2d: In-Group Bias correlates positively with tendency of centralizing and narrowing the circle of decision making.

Leader Names	In-Group Bias	Centralization
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.097	0.011
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.099	0.524
Deniz Baykal	0.115	0.062
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.107	0.023666667
Devlet Bahceli	0.023	0.45625
Selahattin Demirtas	0.118	0
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.636 Sig. (2-tailed) .174	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 2e: In-Group Bias correlates positively with tendency to use military.

Leader Names	In-Group Bias	Military
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.097	1.351666667
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.099	0.453
Deniz Baykal	0.115	0.8645
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.107	1.104
Devlet Bahceli	0.023	1.99925
Selahattin Demirtas	0.118	0.156
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	Negative Correlation

Hypothesis 2f: In-Group Bias correlates negatively with European integration.

Leader Names	In-Group Bias	European Integration
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.097	0.971666667
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.099	0.4775
Deniz Baykal	0.115	1.9475
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.107	1.050333333
Devlet Bahceli	0.023	0.055
Selahattin Demirtas	0.118	0.156
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 3a: Openness to contextual information (Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence) correlates positively with freedom and democracy.

Leader Names	Openness to contextual information	Freedom and Democracy
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.204823306	4.64
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.378135136	10.017
Deniz Baykal	0.399493671	3.015
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.321309321	13.16533333
Devlet Bahceli	0.331585082	7.668
Selahattin Demirtas	0.335154062	24.916
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 3b: Openness to contextual information (Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence) correlates positively with decentralization of decision-making.

Leader Names	Openness to contextual information	Decentralization
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.204823306	1.207333333
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.378135136	1.24
Deniz Baykal	0.399493671	0.3415
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.321309321	0.928
Devlet Bahceli	0.331585082	0.271
Selahattin Demirtas	0.335154062	4.543
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.072 Sig. (2-tailed) .893	No Significant Correlation

Hypothesis 3c: Openness to contextual information (Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence) correlates positively with a tendency to Free-Market Economy.

Leader Names	Openness to contextual information	Free-Market Economy
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0.204823306	6.665666667
Ahmet Davutoglu	0.378135136	0.835
Deniz Baykal	0.399493671	3.55
Kemal Kilicdaroglu	0.321309321	0.323
Devlet Bahceli	0.331585082	2.04425
Selahattin Demirtas	0.335154062	0
Correlation Coefficient	Pearson Correlation -.614 Sig. (2-tailed) .195	No Significant Correlation

Table 20 Hypothesis table

Trait	Category/Domain	Assumed Correlation	The Results
Distrust	anti-imperialism	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	control the economy	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	nationalizing the industry	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	centralizing and narrowing the circle of decision making	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	use military	Positive correlation	No significant correlation

Trait	Category/Domain	Assumed Correlation	The Results
	European integration	Negative correlation	No significant correlation
In-Group Bias	anti-imperialism	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	control the economy	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	nationalizing the industry	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	centralizing and narrowing the circle of decision making	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	use of military	Positive correlation	Negative correlation
	European integration	Negative correlation	No significant correlation
Openness to Contextual Information	freedom and democracy	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	decentralization of decision making	Positive correlation	No significant correlation
	Free-Market Economy	Positive correlation	No significant correlation

As table 20 shows, only one of the hypotheses were supported with significant correlations.

CONCLUSION

The study sets out to investigate the association between party leaders' personality traits and party position on issues. In order to measure leaders' personality traits, the study used an At-a-distance leadership traits analysis technique (LTA). This quantitative technique measures 7 traits of leaders that influence their behavior and their views in the political sphere. These traits are: Believes can Control Events, Need for Power, Conceptual Complexity, Self-Confidence, Task/People Focus, Distrust of Others, and In-Group Bias. In order to measure party position on issues quantitatively, the study used Manifesto project dataset (MARPOR). This dataset offers a quantitative content analysis of political party manifesto based on 56 categories, viewed under 7 primary domains, which offers the opportunity to proceed with comparative studies among those parties included in the dataset.

The research started by collecting the data of leaders' statements from 2002 to 2015. Due to the data being in the English language, its collection became much harder, especially for the leaders of oppositional parties, because most international newspapers and media news don't give the same attention to leaders of the opposition as much as they do to high ranking officials like presidents and ministers. After collecting the data and preparing it for analysis, then seeing the results, I started to work on MARPOR dataset, which was less difficult compared to working with LTA data. Thanks to MARPOR, I was offered the data in a way that any researcher could use it easily. All I had to do is to prepare it in a form to be compatible with LTA data, and then I was able to integrate both datasets to proceed with the correlation.

The study contains four chapters. The first chapter offers an introduction to the study, and sheds light on the research methods used in both the political leaders analysis and party positions analysis on issues, in addition to a review of the literature in both fields of study, then it ends with positing the research questions and hypotheses. The second chapter presents the research method that used in this study and data collection, preparation, and description in details, before conducting the analysis. The third chapter focuses on the six leaders' personality assessments, based on their traits scores. In order to have an accurate assessment, leaders' scores are compared with world leaders' average, MENA average, Western European average, and finally leaders' scores are compared with each other. The

chapter ends by assessing each leader's personality style depending on their position towards responsiveness to constraints, openness to contextual information, and leaders' motivations. The fourth and last chapter focuses on the correlation between two variables by combining both datasets and proceeds to the correlation analysis. The analysis is conducted on three levels: First, at the leader's level to see if any observation can be made regarding the leaders' traits scores and their party position scores during their tenure. Secondly, at the party level; this involves observing the change in leadership and party position. Thirdly, placing all parties and leaders together, which is done by measuring the association between leaders' traits and party positions. Then the chapter ends by testing the hypotheses and showing the correlational results between two variables.

The research posits three questions: Is there any association between a party leader's personality traits and party positions on issues? If so, what is the strength and direction of this association? In addition, do some traits specifically correlate with specific positions? The study assumed positive and negative correlations between three variables, namely Distrust, In-Group Bias, and Openness to Contextual Information, over a group of different categories and domains. After conducting the correlation test, among all assumed hypotheses, none of hypotheses were confirmed.

The study concerns in those three traits specifically because there was confirmation in previous studies of their effect on a leader's behavior surrounding key issues (Besaw, 2014; Kelley & Vasquez, 2014; Kesgin, 2012; Shannon & Keller, 2007; Smith, 2014). However, my expectations about those traits and specific categories and domains were wrong.

On the other hand, the study showed how party positions on issues were affected by a change in party leadership, and from one party to another. In addition, the study showed how each party may have different concerns toward 7 domains, and not all parties give the same importance to the various key issues.

This study has significance for several reasons. First, most previous research which has been conducted using At-a-distance leadership trait analysis investigates the impact of leader personality on foreign policy, and the state's action in the international domain, but there is an apparent lack of research on domestic politics, more precisely on sub-state

levels within political party organizations. Secondly, most research gives more importance to official leaders, or sometimes political and economic international organizations' leaders, and less concern to leaders of the opposition. Thirdly, the study opens a discussion about the role of the individual versus the role of institution in shaping and influencing an organization's behavior.

Furthermore, the study sets several recommendations for future studies. First, because the number of statements in English for non-native English speaking countries is always an obstruction for researchers, it would be useful if a similar program to "ProfilerPlus" could process foreign languages, such as the Turkish language which would have been helpful in this case. Secondly, despite previous studies on Turkish leaders being available, and in addition to this study, I would recommend more research to investigate a wider range of Turkish leaders from different sectors in the state in order to create a national average of leadership traits for a better overall assessment. Thirdly, I recommend comparing the results here with qualitative studies on the same leaders for a wider and deeper knowledge base. Fourthly, it would be more useful if the same four parties' positions on issues were investigated under two additional variables; the institutional or organizational variable and its effect, plus the variable of significant political events. For examples of the latter variable, military intervention, a new constitution, or important regional events may have profound implications on domestic politics, and it should be observed whether political parties change their positions in response to those significant political events, to which degree, and in which direction.

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APPENDIX 1

MARPOR¹¹

Domain 1: External Relations		411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
101	Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life
102	Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	501 Environmental Protection: Positive
103	Anti-Imperialism: Positive	502 Culture: Positive
103.1	<i>State Centred Anti-Imperialism</i>	503 Equality: Positive
103.2	<i>Foreign Financial Influence</i>	504 Welfare state Expansion
104	Military: Positive	505 Welfare state Limitation
105	Military: Negative	506 Education Expansion
106	Peace: Positive	507 Education Limitation
107	Internationalism: Positive	
108	European/LA Integration: Positive	Domain 6: Fabric of Society
109	Internationalism: Negative	601 National Way of Life: Positive
110	European/LA Integration: Negative	601.1 General
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy		601.2 Immigration: Negative
201	Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	602 National Way of Life: Negative
201.1	<i>Freedom</i>	602.1 General
201.2	<i>Human Rights</i>	602.2 Immigration: Positive
202	Democracy	603 Traditional Morality: Positive
202.1	<i>General: Positive</i>	604 Traditional Morality: Negative
202.2	<i>General: Negative</i>	605 Law and order
202.3	<i>Representative Democracy: Positive</i>	605.1 Law and Order: Positive
202.4	<i>Direct Democracy: Positive</i>	605.2 Law and Order: Negative
203	Constitutionalism: Positive	606 Civic Mindedness: Positive
204	Constitutionalism: Negative	606.1 General
Domain 3: Political System		606.2 Bottom-Up Activism
301	Decentralisation: Positive	607 Multiculturalism: Positive
302	Centralisation: Positive	607.1 General
303	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	607.2 Immigrant Integration: Diversity
304	Political Corruption: Negative	607.3 Indigenous rights: Positive
305	Political Authority: Positive	608 Multiculturalism: Negative
305.1	<i>Political Authority: Party Competence</i>	608.1 General
305.2	<i>Political Authority: Personal Competence</i>	608.2 Immigrant Integration: Assimilation
305.3	<i>Political Authority: Strong government</i>	608.3 Indigenous rights: Negative
305.4	<i>Pre-Democratic Elites: Positive</i>	
305.5	<i>Pre-Democratic Elites: Negative</i>	Domain 7: Social Groups
305.6	<i>Rehabilitation and Compensation</i>	701 Labour Groups: Positive
Domain 4: Economy		702 Labour Groups: Negative
401	Free-Market Economy: Positive	703 Agriculture and Farmers
402	Incentives: Positive	703.1 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive
403	Market Regulation: Positive	703.2 Agriculture and Farmers: Negative
404	Economic Planning: Positive	704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive
405	Corporatism: Positive	705 Minority Groups: Positive
406	Protectionism: Positive	706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive
407	Protectionism: Negative	
408	Economic Goals	
409	Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	
410	Economic Growth	000 No meaningful category applies

Source: (Werner, A., Lacewell, O., & Volken, A. (2014). Manifesto coding instructions. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB))

¹¹ This table was taken directly from Manifesto coding handbook: Werner, A., Lacewell, O., & Volken, A. (2014). Manifesto coding instructions. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

APPENDIX 2

Categories' Operational definition (Coding handbook, 2014, p. 16-26)¹²:

NOTE: Every negative category includes all references of the positive category but negative. For instance, 'Military: Negative' is the reversal of all 'Military: Positive' statements.

DOMAIN 1: External Relations

101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive

Favourable mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such countries.

102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative

Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship.

These special relationships should be predetermined on a case by case basis. Refer to the supervisor for detailed information and attach a list of special relations to the coding protocol.

[103 Anti-Imperialism, comprised of:]

103.1 State Centred Anti-Imperialism

Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states. May also include:

- Negative references to controlling other countries as if they were part of an empire;
- Favourable references to greater self-government and independence for colonies;
- Favourable mentions of de-colonisation.

103.2 Foreign Financial Influence

Negative references and statements against international financial organisations or states using monetary means to assert strong influence over the manifesto or other states. May include:

- Statements against the World Bank, IMF etc.;
- Statements against the Washington Consensus;
- Statements against foreign debt circumscribing state actions.

104 Military: Positive

The importance of external security and defence. May include statements concerning:

- The need to maintain or increase military expenditure;
- The need to secure adequate manpower in the military;
- The need to modernise armed forces and improve military strength;
- The need for rearmament and self-defence;

¹² This table was taken directly from Manifesto coding handbook: Werner, A., Lacewell, O., & Volken, A. (2014). Manifesto coding instructions. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

- The need to keep military treaty obligations.

105 Military: Negative

Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts. References to the 'evils of war'. May include references to:

- Decreasing military expenditures;
- Disarmament;
- Reduced or abolished conscription.

106 Peace

Any declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises -- absent reference to the military. May include:

- Peace as a general goal;
- Desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries;
- Ending wars in order to establish peace.

107 Internationalism: Positive

Need for international co-operation, including co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101. May also include references to the:

- Need for aid to developing countries;
- Need for world planning of resources;
- Support for global governance;
- Need for international courts;
- Support for UN or other international organisations.

108 European Community/Union or Latin America Integration: Positive

Favourable mentions of European Community/Union in general. May include the:

- Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);
- Desirability of expanding the European Community/Union;
- Desirability of increasing the ECs/EUs competences;
- Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament.

In Latin American countries: Favourable mentions of integration within Latin America, e.g. CELAC, MERCOSUR, UNASUR. May include the:

- Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);
- Desirability of expanding or deepening the integration;

109 Internationalism: Negative

Negative references to international co-operation. Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country's foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.

110 European Community/Union or Latin America Integration: Negative

Negative references to the European Community/Union. May include:

- Opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities;
- Opposition to the net-contribution of the manifesto country to the EU budget.

In Latin American countries: Negative references to integration within Latin America, e.g. CELAC, MERCOSUR, UNASUR. May include the:

- Opposition to the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);
- Opposition to expanding or deepening the integration.

DOMAIN 2: Freedom and Democracy [201

Freedom and Human Rights, comprised of:]

201.1 Freedom

Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom in the manifesto and other countries. May include mentions of:

- Freedom from state coercion in the political and economic spheres;
- Freedom from bureaucratic control;
- The idea of individualism.

201.2 Human Rights

Favourable mentions of importance of human and civil rights in the manifesto and other countries, including the right to freedom of speech, press, assembly etc.; supportive refugee policies.

[202 Democracy, comprised of:]

202.1 General: Positive

Favourable mentions of democracy as the "only game in town". General support for the manifesto country's democracy. May also include:

- Democracy as method or goal in national, international or other organisations (e.g. labour unions, political parties etc.);
- The need for the involvement of all citizens in political decision-making;
- Support for parts of democratic regimes (rule of law, division of powers, independence of courts etc.).

202.2 General: Negative

Statements against the idea of democracy, in general or in the manifesto country. Calls for reducing or withholding democratic rights from all or certain groups of people. Calls for the introduction or maintaining of a non-democratic regime, e.g. monarchy or rule of the military.

202.3 Representative Democracy: Positive

Favourable mentions of the system of representative democracy, in particular in contrast to direct democracy. This includes the protection of representative institutions and actors against direct democratic elements.

202.4 Direct Democracy: Positive

Favourable mentions of the system of direct democracy, in particular in contrast to representative democracy. This includes the call for the introduction and/or extension of referenda, participatory budgets and other forms of direct democracy.

203 Constitutionalism: Positive

Support for maintaining the status quo of the constitution. Support for specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution. The use of constitutionalism as an argument for any policy.

204 Constitutionalism: Negative

Opposition to the entirety or specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution. Calls for constitutional amendments or changes. May include calls to abolish or rewrite the current

constitution.

DOMAIN 3: Political

System 301

Decentralisation: Positive

Support for federalism or decentralisation of political and/or economic power. May include:

- Favourable mentions of the territorial subsidiary principle;
- More autonomy for any sub-national level in policy making and/or economics, including municipalities;
- Support for the continuation and importance of local and regional customs and symbols and/or deference to local expertise;
- Favourable mentions of special consideration for sub-national areas.

302 Centralisation: Positive

General opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels. Support for unitary government and for more centralisation in political and administrative procedures.

303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency

Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more efficient. May include:

- Restructuring the civil service;
- Cutting down on the civil service;
- Improving bureaucratic procedures.

Note: Specific policy positions overrule this category! If there is no specific policy position, however, this category applies.

304 Political Corruption

Need to eliminate political corruption and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic power. Need to abolish clientelist structures and practices.

[305 Political Authority, comprised of:]

305.1 Political Authority: Party Competence

References to the manifesto party's competence to govern and/or other party's lack of such competence.

305.2 Political Authority: Personal Competence

Reference to the presidential candidate's or party leader's personal competence to govern and/or other candidate's or leader's lack of such competence.

305.3 Political Authority: Strong government

Favourable mentions of the desirability of a strong and/or stable government in general.

305.4 Pre-Democratic Elites: Positive

Co-operation with pre-democratic authorities in the transition period; amnesty for former, non-Democratic elites; and 'let sleeping dogs lie' in dealing with the nomenclature of the former, non-Democratic regime.

305.5 Pre-Democratic Elites: Negative

Against pre-democratic elite's involvement in democratic government; weeding out the collaborators of former, non-Democratic regime from governmental service; for truth commissions and other institutions illuminating recent history.

305.6 Rehabilitation and Compensation

References to civic rehabilitation of politically persecuted people in the authoritarian era; references to juridical compensation concerning authoritarian expropriations; moral compensation.

Note: Specific policy positions overrule all subcategories of 305! If there is no specific policy position, however, these subcategories may apply.

305.4, 305.5 and 305.6 should only be used for transitional, former authoritarian regimes.

DOMAIN 4: Economy

401 Free Market Economy

Favourable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model. May include favourable references to:

- Laissez-faire economy;
- Superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems;
- Private property rights;
- Personal enterprise and initiative;
- Need for unhampered individual enterprises.

402 Incentives: Positive

Favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies (assistance to businesses rather than consumers). May include:

- Financial and other incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks etc.;
- Wage and tax policies to induce enterprise;
- Encouragement to start enterprises.

403 Market Regulation

Support for policies designed to create a fair and open economic market. May include:

- Calls for increased consumer protection;
- Increasing economic competition by preventing monopolies and other actions disrupting the functioning of the market;
- Defence of small businesses against disruptive powers of big businesses;
- Social market economy.

404 Economic Planning

Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government. May be:

- Policy plans, strategies, policy patterns etc.;
- Of a consultative or indicative nature.

405 Corporatism/ Mixed Economy

Favourable mentions of cooperation of government, employers, and trade unions simultaneously. The collaboration of employers and employee organisations in overall economic planning supervised by the state.

406 Protectionism: Positive

Favourable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets (by the

manifesto or other countries). Measures may include:

- Tariffs;
- Quota restrictions;
- Export subsidies.

407 Protectionism: Negative

Support for the concept of free trade and open markets. Call for abolishing all means of market protection (in the manifesto or any other country).

408 Economic Goals

Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in relation to any other category. General economic statements that fail to include any specific goal.

Note: Specific policy positions overrule this category! If there is no specific policy position, however, this category applies.

409 Keynesian Demand Management

Favourable mentions of demand side oriented economic policies (assistance to consumers rather than businesses). Particularly includes increase private demand through

- Increasing public demand;
- Increasing social expenditures.

May also include:

- Stabilisation in the face of depression;
- Government stimulus plans in the face of economic crises.

410 Economic Growth: Positive

The paradigm of economic growth. Includes:

- General need to encourage or facilitate greater production;
- Need for the government to take measures to aid economic growth.

411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive

Importance of modernisation of industry and updated methods of transport and communication.

May include:

- Importance of science and technological developments in industry;
- Need for training and research within the economy (This does not imply education in general, see category 506);
- Calls for public spending on infrastructure such as roads and bridges;
- Support for public spending on technological infrastructure (e.g.: broadband internet).

412 Controlled Economy

Support for direct government control of economy. May include, for instance:

- Control over prices;
- Introduction of minimum wages.

413 Nationalisation

Favourable mentions of government ownership of industries, either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised industries in state hand or nationalising currently private industries.. May also include favourable mentions of government ownership of land.

414 Economic Orthodoxy

Need for economically healthy government policy making. May include calls for:

- Reduction of budget deficits;

- Retrenchment in crisis;
- Thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship;
- Support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system;
- Support for strong currency.

415 Marxist Analysis: Positive

Positive references to Marxist-Leninist ideology and specific use of Marxist-Leninist terminology by the manifesto party (typically but not necessary by communist parties).

Note: If unsure about what constitutes Marxist-Leninist ideology in general or terminology in a particular language, please research.

[416 Anti-Growth Economy and Sustainability, comprised of:]

416.1 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive

Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics. Rejection of the idea that growth is good.

416.2 Sustainability: Positive

Call for sustainable economic development. Opposition to growth that causes environmental or societal harm.

DOMAIN 5: Welfare and Quality of Life

501 Environmental Protection

General policies in favour of protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other "green" policies. For instance:

- General preservation of natural resources;
- Preservation of countryside, forests, etc.;
- Protection of national parks;
- Animal rights.

May include a great variance of policies that have the unified goal of environmental protection.

502 Culture: Positive

Need for state funding of cultural and leisure facilities including arts and sport. May include:

- The need to fund museums, art galleries, libraries etc.;
- The need to encourage cultural mass media and worthwhile leisure activities, such as public sport clubs.

503 Equality: Positive

Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people. This may include:

- Special protection for underprivileged social groups;
- Removal of class barriers;
- Need for fair distribution of resources;
- The end of discrimination (e.g. racial or sexual discrimination).

504 Welfare State Expansion

Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of:

- Health care;
- Elder care and pensions;
- Child care;
- Social housing.

Note: This category excludes education.

505 Welfare State Limitation

Limiting state expenditures on social services or social security. Favourable mentions of the social subsidiary principle (i.e. private care before state care);

506 Education Expansion

Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels.

Note: This excludes technical training, which is coded under 411.

507 Education Limitation

Limiting state expenditure on education. May include:

- The introduction or expansion of study fees at all educational levels;
- Increasing the number of private schools.

DOMAIN 6: Fabric of Society

[601 National Way of Life: Positive, comprised of:]

601.1 General

Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals. May include:

- Support for established national ideas;
- General appeals to pride of citizenship;
- Appeals to patriotism;
- Appeals to nationalism;
- Suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion.

601.2 Immigration: Negative

Statement advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants. Might include statements regarding,

- Immigration being a threat to national character of the manifesto country,
- 'the boat is full' argument;
- The introduction of migration quotas, including restricting immigration from specific countries or regions etc.

Only concerned with the possibility of new immigrants. For negative statements regarding immigrants already in the manifesto country, please see 608.1.

[602 National Way of Life: Negative, comprised of:]

602.1 General

Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history. May include:

- Opposition to patriotism;
- Opposition to nationalism;
- Opposition to the existing national state, national pride, and national ideas.

602.2 Immigration: Positive

Statements favouring new immigrants; against restrictions and quotas; rejection of the 'boat is full' argument. Includes allowing new immigrants for the benefit of the manifesto country's economy. Only concerned with the possibility of new immigrants. For positive statements regarding

immigrants already in the manifesto country, please see 607.1.

603 Traditional Morality: Positive

Favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values. May include:

- Prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour;
- Maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value;
- Support for the role of religious institutions in state and society.

604 Traditional Morality: Negative

Opposition to traditional and/or religious moral values. May include:

- Support for divorce, abortion etc.;
- General support for modern family composition;
- Calls for the separation of church and state.

[605 Law and Order, comprised of:]

605.1 Law and Order General: Positive

Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country's law code. May include:

- Increasing support and resources for the police;
- Tougher attitudes in courts;
- Importance of internal security.

605.2 Law and Order General: Negative

Favourable mentions of less law enforcement or rejection of plans for stronger law enforcement. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country's law code. May include:

- Less resources for police;
- Reducing penalties;
- Calls for abolishing the death penalty;
- Decriminalisation of drugs, prostitution etc.

[606 Civic Mindedness: Positive, comprised of:]

606.1 General

General appeals for national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as united. Calls for solidarity with and help for fellow people, familiar and unfamiliar. May include:

- Favourable mention of the civil society and volunteering;
- Decrying anti-social attitudes in times of crisis;
- Appeal for public spiritedness;
- Support for the public interest.

606.2 Bottom-Up Activism

Appeals to grassroots movements of social change; banding all sections of society together to overcome common adversity and hardship; appeals to the people as a united actor.

[607 Multiculturalism: Positive, comprised of:]

607.1 General

Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country

including special educational provisions.

607.2 Immigrant Integration: Diversity

Statements favouring the idea that immigrants keep their cultural traits; voluntary integration; state providing opportunities to integrate.

Only concerned with immigrants already in the manifesto country. For positive statements regarding the possibility of new immigrants, please see 602.2

607.3 Indigenous rights: Positive

Calls for the protection of indigenous people, strengthening their rights, may include:

- Protection of their lands;
- Introduction of special provisions in the democratic or bureaucratic process;
- Compensation for past grief.

[608 Multiculturalism: Negative, comprised of:]

608.1 General

The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.

608.2 Immigrant Integration: Assimilation

Calls for immigrants that are in the country to adopt the manifesto country's culture and fully assimilate. Reinforce integration.

Only concerned with immigrants already in the manifesto country. For negative statements regarding the possibility of new immigrants, please see 601.2

608.3 Indigenous rights: Negative

Rejection of idea of special protection for indigenous people.

DOMAIN 7: Social Groups

Note: Specific policy positions overrule this domain (except 703)! If there is no specific policy position, however, these categories apply.

701 Labour Groups: Positive

Favourable references to all labour groups, the working class, and unemployed workers in general. Support for trade unions and calls for the good treatment of all employees, including:

- More jobs;
- Fair wages;
- Good working conditions;
- Pension provisions etc.

702 Labour Groups: Negative

Negative references to labour groups and trade unions. May focus specifically on the danger of unions 'abusing power'.

[703 Agriculture and Farmers, comprised of:]

703.1 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive

Specific policies in favour of agriculture and farmers. Includes all types of agriculture and farming practises. Only statements that have agriculture as the key goal should be included in this category.

703.2 Agriculture and Farmers: Negative

Rejection of policies favouring agriculture and farmers. May include:

- Cap or abolish subsidies;
- Reject special welfare provisions for farmers.

704 Middle Class and Professional Groups

General favourable references to the middle class. Specifically, statements may include references to:

- Professional groups, (e.g.: doctors or lawyers);
- White collar groups, (e.g.: bankers or office employees),
- Service sector groups (e.g.: IT industry employees);
- Old and/or new middle class.

Note: This is not an economical category but refers to the social group(s).

705 Underprivileged Minority Groups

Very general favourable references to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms (e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, immigrants, indigenous). Only includes favourable statements that cannot be classified in other categories (e.g. 503, 504, 604, 607 etc.)

706 Non-economic Demographic Groups

General favourable mentions of demographically defined special interest groups of all kinds. They may include:

- Women;
- University students;
- Old, young, or middle aged people.

Might include references to assistance to these groups, but only if these do not fall under other categories (e.g. 503 or 504).

000 No meaningful category applies

Statements not covered by other categories; sentences devoid of any meaning.

Source: (Werner, A., Lacewell, O., & Volkens, A. (2014). Manifesto coding instructions. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB))

APPENDIX 3



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KURUL İZİN MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 09/03/2017

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: **Liderlik Özellikleri İle Konu Bağlımlı Parti Pozisyonu Arasındaki İlişki: Türkiye Örneği 2002-2015.**

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kuruldan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.


 Tarih ve İmza 09.03.2017

Adı Soyadı: Ali Abdelfattah
Öğrenci No: N12126617
Anabilim Dalı: Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Programı: Siyaset Bilimi-Tezli Yüksek Lisans
Statüsü: ☒ Y.Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Dr.

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI



Doç. Dr. Elif Erişen

Detaylı Bilgi: <http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr>
 Telefon: 0-312-2976860 Faks: 0-3122992147 E-posta: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr

APPENDIX 4



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS/DOKTORA TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 09/03/2017

Tez Başlığı / Konusu: **Liderlik Özellikleri İle Konu Bağlımlı Parti Pozisyonu Arasındaki İlişki: Türkiye Örneği 2002-2015.**

Yukarıda başlığı/konusu gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 118 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 09/03/2017 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezin benzerlik oranı % 7 'tür.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1- Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç,
- 2- Kaynakça hariç
- 3- Alıntılar hariç/dâhil
- 4- 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

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Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

Tarih ve İmza

Adı Soyadı: Ali Abdelfattah

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Programı: Siyaset Bilimi-Tezli Yüksek Lisans

Statüsü: ☒ Y.Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Dr.**DANIŞMAN ONAYI**

UYGUNDUR.

Doç. Dr. Elif Erişen