

OTTOMAN HOME FRONT MOBILIZATION AND
PROPAGANDA DURING THE BALKAN WARS OF
1912-1913

A Master's Thesis

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December 2016

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Bilkent University 2016

To my father



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DURING THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912-1913

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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ANKARA

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.



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
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ABSTRACT

OTTOMAN HOME FRONT MOBILIZATION AND PROPAGANDA DURING THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912-1913

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This thesis is an analysis of the Ottoman wartime propaganda for the home front during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 based on the activities of the National Defense League and Ottoman/Turkish periodicals. In particular, I discuss the speeches of the Women's Committee of the National Defense League; belles-lettres published in periodicals; and lastly, reports on the war crimes of the Balkan allies in *Tanin*. The Ottoman Army had many deficiencies during the wars and power politics of the Great Powers were not favoring the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the intermittent support of Britain to the Ottoman Empire had ended, which added to its isolation. Under such conditions, the Ottomans employed propaganda on a large scale to ensure the participation of every individual in the war effort. The Ottoman propagandists employed modern propaganda techniques effectively. They manipulated established values while attempting to spread new ideas that they wanted society to assimilate. In line with this, nationalist ideas, and patriotic and religious discourse are prominent in the texts under analysis.

Keywords: Ottoman Wartime Propaganda, Mobilization, Home Front, the Balkan Wars, Nationalism.



ÖZET

1912-1913 BALKAN SAVAŞLARINDA OSMANLI SİVİL CEPHESİ VE PROPAGANDA

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Bu tez, Balkan Savaşları (1912-1913) sırasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun sivil cepheye yönelik yaptığı propagandanın Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti'nin aktiviteleri ve Osmanlıca süreli yayınlar üzerinden bir analizidir. Özellikle, Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti'nin Kadınlar Komisyonu'nun konuşmalarını; basında yayımlanan edebi eserleri; ve son olarak *Tanin* gazetesinde Balkan müttefiklerinin savaş suçları hakkındaki raporlarını tartışıyorum. Savaş sırasında Osmanlı Ordusu'nun birçok eksiği vardı, ve Büyük Güçler'in kuvvet politikası Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan yana değildi. Dahası, İngiltere'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na olan kesintili desteği son bulmuştu ve bu, Osmanlı'nın yalnızlığını artırmıştı. Bu koşullar altında, Osmanlılar her bireyin savaş çabasına katılımını sağlamak için geniş çapta propaganda faaliyeti yürüttüler. Osmanlı propagandacıları modern propaganda tekniklerini etkili bir biçimde kullandılar. Yerleşik değerleri manipüle ederken toplumun özümsemesini istedikleri yeni fikirleri yaymaya çalıştılar. Bu doğrultuda, analiz edilen metinlerde, milliyetçi fikirler ile vatanperver ve dini bir söylem öne çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Savaş Propagandası, Mobilizasyon, Sivil Cephe,
Balkan Savaşları, Milliyetçilik



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BEO	Bab-1 Ali Evrak Odası
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
DH. SYS.	Dahiliye Siyasi



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Subject

This thesis is about the Ottoman wartime propaganda for the home front mobilization during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The political elites and intellectuals asked the Ottoman public to participate in the war effort in any way possible, but primarily called people for donating to civil society organizations; volunteering for fighting or other works related to the army; volunteering for the works of the civil society organizations; sewing clothes for fighting soldiers. For these purposes, the Ottomans employed some of the modern propaganda techniques effectively through the modern means of communication by manipulating existing values while aiming at indoctrinating the common public with new ideas.

I apply propaganda analysis considering the purpose of the propaganda activities, the intended audience, the propagandist, the media utilized, propaganda techniques employed, desired response, time, effectiveness, and context. As my sources are texts, my subject is the language in addition to the content. In this regard, I mainly

focus on the discourse. I do not enter the area of semiotics, but I also discuss rhetorical tropes and figures of speech when available and already ask some other relevant questions in semiotic analysis within the propaganda analysis. The rhetorical tropes, figures of speech, and discourse in the texts are useful to understand some ideas and values of the propagandist or the intended audience. Besides, they help to see how the propagandist aimed at increasing the effect on the public.

This study shows that the texts under study reveal the reflections of the dominant intellectual ideas and policies of the period. Namely, they are secular-Ottomanism, Islamic-Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism. The Ottoman nationalists argued the Turkish nation to be the dominant nation of the Empire, but most of the time advocated the idea that all Ottomans were equal. How far the Ottoman elites and intellectuals assimilated the nationalist ideas is another issue. Regarding the texts under analysis and my topic, I evaluate them within the realm of politics and propaganda.

In line with this, I can say that they attempted to arouse national awareness among the Ottoman citizens of the Empire, which can be regarded within the realm of patriotism. Also, they attempted to awaken nationalist sentiments of the Turks, which can be discussed within the concept of nationalism. Meanwhile, some of the propagandists conveyed their messages with a discourse in line with the Ottomanist or Islamic-Ottomanist ideas to enable the contribution of each Ottoman citizen to the war effort. The idea of Ottomanism as an umbrella term for all nations of the state was visible in addressing of the writers of the texts to “the Ottomans.” Also, it was possible to see the nationalist and patriotic ideas in words and concepts such as fatherland, nation, “loyalty to the fatherland”, “the Turk,” “the honor of

Turkishness.” In addition, the established values of society that they referred to could be gathered under the terms of honor, dignity, and Islam. I should also mention that the propagandists associated these existing values with new ideas that they wanted the public to assimilate.

I apply propaganda analysis also for other reasons. Most of the historiography about the Ottoman wartime propaganda focuses on its atrocity propaganda. I think, showing the Ottoman atrocity propaganda during the Balkan wars is important. The atrocity propaganda, in a sense, became popular with the World War I. Some academics argue that the British propaganda during the WWI was the first modern government propaganda. Not only the Britain but also other warring parties employed atrocity propaganda during the WWI. Especially the propaganda activities of the Allied Forces were very effective; thus, the WWI gave incentive to propaganda studies. In this sense, the WWI is a benchmark in the development of modern propaganda.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 can also be regarded as a benchmark in the systematic employment of the atrocity propaganda through modern communication means in regards to the experience of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, I talk about the Ottoman atrocity propaganda in my study. However, I believe, it is helpful to apply a propaganda analysis to the Ottoman sources during the Balkan wars, which will contribute to the understanding of some questions related to the context by providing new perceptions. Also, it will show other propaganda techniques that the Ottomans employed, thus, giving an idea of the Ottoman experience with “propaganda.” Such an analysis may provide insight into the intended and unintended outcomes of the propaganda activities in the Ottoman society.

1.2. Sources

The Ottomans used many available means of communication (or propaganda) to maximize the energies for the Ottoman cause in their first total war. They attempted to influence the public opinion by royal processions, greeting cards, leaflets, sermons, books, periodicals, plays, and speeches. Within the scope of this study, I focus on the periodicals and the speeches among these means of communication. More specifically, I analyze the speeches that the female elites and intellectuals made in the conferences of the National Defense League, besides including some of the calls of the League published in the press; poems, short stories, and plays published in the Ottoman (Turkish) newspapers and journals; lastly, the reports of the war crimes of the Balkan states as they appeared in *Tanin* throughout the wars.

I discuss various poems, short stories, and plays published in different periodicals such as *İkdam* (The Labouring Strenuously), *Tanin* (The Echo), *Sabah* (The Morning), *Donanma* (The Navy), *Halka Doğru* (Towards the Populace), *Sebilü'r-Reşat* (The Path of Irshad),¹ *Tasvir-i Efkar* (The Illustration of Opinions), and *Büyük Duygu* (The Great Yearning). Haluk Harun Duman's study, *Balkanlara Veda* (Farewell to the Balkans) includes a list of the poems, short stories, and plays published in regular periodicals in Istanbul between 1912 and 1914.² My study mostly benefit from his list to locate the issue in which the belles-lettres appeared.

For the texts of the speeches, my source is *Balkan Harbi'nde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları* by Şefika Kurnaz.³ The book is composed of an introduction of the

¹ *Irshad* is a religious term meaning "to show the right path."

² Haluk Harun Duman, *Balkanlar'a Veda* (İstanbul: DUYAP, 2005).

³ Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: M.E.B., 1993).

writer and the transcribed speeches of the female political elites and intellectuals in the conferences that the National Defense League (Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti) organized. The primary source of the book is *Darülfünun Konferans Salonunda Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* (The Meetings of Our Ladies in the Conference Hall of Darülfünun) published by *Tanin* in 1329.⁴ I should also mention Nazım H. Polat's *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*⁵ as my source for the information about the League such as the date of its establishment, the committees, and their activities.

Before finishing this section, I need to clarify two issues regarding my sources: first, why I focus on the activities of the National Defense League among the civil society organizations working for the war effort; second, why I discuss war crimes based on merely *Tanin*. Starting with the League, I focus on its activities because of the availability of the sources of propaganda, and diverse membership structure as well as its official objectives.

The National Defense League was established soon after the coup d'état of the CUP in 1913 to mobilize the home front "to save the fatherland." The League sought for the support of each Ottoman citizen and achieved the collaboration of the press in general. Also, some of the men of letters that wrote literary pieces were members of the League. Besides, some of the women who made speeches in its conferences were also members of other civil society organizations such as Halide Edip (Adivar) and Nezihe Muhlis. In conclusion, I focus on the activities of the National Defense

⁴ *Darülfünun* is the Ottoman University and the term means "house of science." For further information, see Tokay Gedikoğlu, "Turkey," in *International Higher Education: an encyclopedia* 2012, ed. Philip G. Altbach, Vol. 1 (Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2012), 579-589.

⁵ Nazım H. Polat, *Müdaafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991).

League because it achieved the collaboration of many elites and intellectuals of the period from different political and ideological views.

Secondly, I limit my research about the reports of the war crimes to one publication, specifically, *Tanin* to demonstrate that *Tanin* systematically manipulated them for propaganda purposes. To show this, I start my review of the newspaper just before the wars and finish a couple of months after the Treaty of Adrianople when the Balkan wars officially ended for the Ottoman Empire. My motivation to select *Tanin* is the fact that it was the semi-official newspaper of the CUP, and the CUP might be the greatest beneficiary of the atrocity propaganda in case the members could be effective in influencing the Ottoman and European public opinion throughout the wars.

In addition to the contributing to the home front mobilization for an ongoing war, the CUP could benefit from the atrocity propaganda and needed it for other several reasons. For example, the CUP favored entering the war before the beginning of the wars and criticized the government of Kamil Pasha because of the performance of the Ottoman Army. Then, the CUP blamed the government for the intention of ceding the city of Adrianople to Bulgaria; came into power with a coup d'état on 23 January and resumed fighting. When the Second Balkan War started, the government entered the war to take back the city of Adrianople. After retaking the city, the CUP appealed to the Great Powers by enumerating Bulgarian atrocities for an "official" approval for keeping the city within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

1.3. Literature Review

One of the recent studies about the Ottoman propaganda during the Balkan wars is a master thesis titled “Depiction of the Enemy: Ottoman Propaganda Books in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.”⁶ This study shows how the Ottomans depicted enemy by focusing on the following books published during the Balkan wars: *Alam-i İslam: Bulgar Vahşetleri* (Sorrrows of Islam: Bulgarian Cruelties), edited and published in 1912, *Alam-i İslam: Rumeli Mezalimi ve Bulgar Vahşetleri* (Sorrrows of Islam: Atrocities in Rumelia and Bulgarian Cruelties), edited and published in 1913, and *Kırmızı Siyah Kitab; 1328 Fecayii* (The Red Black Book, the Disasters of 1328), edited and published in 1913. Calling them as propaganda books, Cengiz Yolcu argues they primarily aimed at influencing the Muslim/Turkish public opinion and shows how they propagated the idea of the atrocious enemy, especially Bulgarians, by examining their contents under the concepts of “revenge, barbarity and violence, cross vs. crescent.” Yolcu shows the sources of these publications and their affiliation with the Ottoman state. In this regard, he argues that there was no state-led and organized propaganda practices except for the limited support of the Porte by comparison with the propaganda practices of the European countries during the WWI.

Yolcu’s study is useful for my thesis concerning showing the wide range of publications employed for propaganda, and the atrocity propaganda, in particular. However, I do not agree to some of his points in his thesis. Firstly, though it is possible to argue that there was no state-led propaganda, which possibly affected the

⁶ Cengiz Yolcu, “Depiction of the Enemy: Ottoman Propaganda Books in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913” (M.A., Boğaziçi University, 2014).

Ottoman propaganda negatively, an analysis of other propaganda means can demonstrate a different picture. The *Irshad* and the Women's committees of the National Defense League, for example, had propaganda programs. The League also achieved the collaboration of people with different political views and intellectual ideas. Some of them were either directly writing or were influential in the press. Thus, at least for the period of the Second Balkan War, there was an organized propaganda activity for the mobilization of the public.

Secondly, I do not agree with his argument that the intended audience excluded the local non-Muslims as the fight proceeded because secular Ottomanism was not a practical idea. To strengthen his argument, he proposes that the writers of the books under analysis were addressing to "the Ottomans" for support, but they started to regard non-Muslims as traitors by the course of the wars.⁷ Even if this might be the case for those books, the National Defense League called for the help of each Ottoman citizen in 1913. In addition, such a generalization as "non-Muslims" ignores the existence of Jewish people in the Ottoman Empire, and there are examples that Jewish people collaborated with the National Defense League in propaganda activities.

Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, in his article, "Atrocity Propaganda and the Nationalization of the Masses in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars (1912-13)," discusses the Ottoman atrocity propaganda and mentions the books above besides other means of communication such as periodicals, leaflets and pamphlets within the print media

⁷ Yolcu, "Depiction of the Enemy," 126.

through which the Ottoman state and political elites employed atrocity propaganda.⁸ His argument is that nationalist elites and the Ottoman state employed atrocity propaganda “to mobilize and nationalize domestic populations,” and especially the pamphlets published during and after the wars contributed to the “nationalization” of the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire.⁹ His argument of nationalizing the masses can be regarded within the discussions of the Islamic-Ottomanism that the Porte adopted as the primary policy after the Balkan wars, but with a difference: there is a distinction between adopting Islamic-Ottomanism as an opportunist policy and creation of this identity among the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, he argues that the adoption of this identity by the common people was also a major target. Thus, I think, his suggestion that the atrocity propaganda contributed to the building of this identity requires much more research.

I should also mention my objection to his argument or generalization that the atrocity propaganda “was used in the stigmatization of non-Muslims.”¹⁰ This approach, as I mentioned above in regards with Yolcu’s thesis, ignores the contribution of the Jewish *millet* within the non-Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire.

As a last commentary about Çetinkaya’s article, or about the difference of my thesis from his study, in terms of the employment of the atrocity propaganda to mobilize the public for the war, I need to mention that I show how the propagandist called for the help of the public for supporting the war effort and try to evaluate the efficiency of the propaganda efforts. I also analyze the texts to show other propaganda

⁸ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, “Atrocity Propaganda and the Nationalization of the Masses in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars (1912-13),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46, no. 4 (2014): 759-778, doi: 10.1017/S0020743814001056.

⁹ Çetinkaya, “Atrocity Propaganda,” 763, 764, 774.

¹⁰ Çetinkaya, “Atrocity Propaganda,” 774.

techniques employed besides the atrocity propaganda for the same purpose of mobilizing the home front during the Balkan wars.

Another study about the Ottoman atrocity propaganda is Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu's article titled as "*Balkan Savaşları'nda Osmanlı Propagandası: Neşr-i Vesaik Cemiyeti*" (Ottoman Propaganda in the Balkan Wars: The Association for Publishing Documents).¹¹ Kerimoğlu explores the activities of the Association for Publishing Documents (*Neşr-i Vesaik Cemiyeti*). He argues that the Association aimed at influencing the public opinion at home towards mobilization for the war effort and the public opinion abroad to receive support from the Great Powers for national causes by publishing documents of the Balkan atrocities. The Association drew attention to the atrocities against Muslim populations of the Balkans during the wars and appealed to European governments not to remain silent.¹² For the mobilization of the home front, on the other hand, the association asked people to support the war effort in various ways in their publications and the press.

Kerimoğlu argues that the propaganda activities of the Association both for abroad and home were not as effective as expected. The reasons that he proposes for this result on the home front are low literacy rate; insufficiency in the infrastructure such as communication and transportation; and lastly, the fact that the Ottoman state was a multiethnic empire, not a nation state; thus, the Muslim/Turkish populations of the Ottoman Empire lacked the national consciousness and did not respond the calls for "the fatherland" and "the nation." I cannot evaluate the degree of the effectiveness of the Ottoman wartime propaganda for home, nor can I evaluate the effectiveness of

¹¹ Hasan Taner Kerimoğlu, "Balkan Savaşları'nda Osmanlı Propagandası: Neşr-i Vesaik Cemiyeti," *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* XXIX, no. 2 (2014): 539-561.

¹² Kerimoğlu, "Balkan Savaşları'nda Osmanlı Propagandası," 543.

each propaganda work separately, but I propose as one of the main arguments of this thesis that the Ottoman propaganda for home was effective considerably.

As for Kerimoğlu's argument that Muslim/Turkish people did not understand the nationalist notions like fatherland, I abstain myself from claiming that this discourse did not create a response among the Muslim/Turkish populations of the Ottoman Empire, but I think this is highly possible among the common people. I regard them within the ideas that the nationalist elites wanted to indoctrinate besides manipulating the already existing values by avoiding the clash of the identities.

Stefo Benlisoy's article "*Karamanlıca Aktis gazetesini örneğinde Balkan Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Rum basınında mezalim propagandası*" (Atrocity Propaganda in the Ottoman Greek newspaper *Karamanlıca Aktis* during the Balkan Wars) also discusses the atrocity propaganda during the Balkan wars in the Ottoman Greek newspaper *Aktis*, which targeted Turkish speaking Anatolian Orthodox people.¹³ According to Benlisoy, the purpose of this propaganda was to weaken the reactions to the Greeks of the Empire who were accused of collaborating with the Balkan states in the reports as well as to the Greek army whose atrocity news took place in the Ottoman media putting an emphasis on the Bulgarian atrocities. Possibly, the newspaper used atrocity claims for its political goals rather than aiming at maximizing energies in the Empire for the war effort.

Lastly, I should mention Eyal Ginio in regards with his study on the Ottoman propaganda during the Balkan wars. In his article, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream," Eyal

¹³ Stefo Benlisoy, "Karamanlıca Aktis gazetesini örneğinde Balkan Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Rum basınında mezalim propagandası," *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 17 (Winter 2014): 1-25.

Genio explores the Ottoman propaganda and symbols employed for this purpose by aiming at depicting the Balkan wars from the perspective of its outcomes on the collective identity of the Empire's populations. He argues that one set of symbols targeted local and European audience while the other addressed specifically to the Muslims including those beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

The official discourse of the Ottoman Empire was that it was a fight for a noble "national" cause, but not a religious one. Ottoman authorities emphasized dynasty's former sultans and used terms signifying Ottoman identity. Sultan referred to the glory of Ottomans' ancestors. Genio argues that the declaration of the king of Bulgaria of a new crusade gave the opportunity to the Ottomans and Muslims to employ propaganda through the symbols of Islam. Muslim press presented the wars as "Christian aggression" against the whole Muslim world and mobilized to contribute to the war effort of the Ottoman state. However, the Ottoman propaganda was not influential on all ethnicities of the empire. During the Balkan wars, Muslim solidarity was proven to be an Ottoman success, and secular Ottomanism did not work to mobilize the Ottomans as one nation.¹⁴

This thesis also shows that the Ottoman elites and intellectuals attempted to mobilize Muslims with reference to Islamic symbols, but they argued that it was a fight for national causes. The contribution of Muslims abroad proved Muslim solidarity, but I do not discuss this issue in this study because it needs further research and analysis to show that it was specifically the Ottoman wartime propaganda activities that led to

¹⁴ Eyal Genio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream," *War in History* 12, no.2 (2005): 156–177, doi: 10.1191/0968344505wh316oa.

such mobilization. In addition, this study focuses on the propaganda activities aimed at the home front.

1.4. Thesis Structure

Including the introduction and conclusion, this thesis is composed of five chapters. In the second chapter, I discuss propaganda in theory and mention some propaganda practices before the 20th century relevant to the topic, and finally focus on the type of the Ottoman propaganda. In the first section of the chapter, I provide definitions of propaganda. Then I discuss some topics related to propaganda such as its relation to lie, reason, and emotion in addition to its difference from persuasion as these are the issues that scholars widely discuss regarding the properties and/or employment of propaganda. Along with these discussions, even the definition of propaganda among academics and its interpretation by an individual or group of individuals in a society varies. Thus, defining propaganda and clarifying these issues are important.

The second section of the second chapter illustrates certain propaganda examples in political history and then in the late 19th century Ottoman Empire. Especially the employment of propaganda in the last quarter of the 19th century Ottoman Empire will contribute to an understanding of the context of the propaganda, which is at the core of this study. I should also mention that I choose certain examples of propaganda in history to demonstrate the development of propaganda. What I mean by the “development” of propaganda may be a change in the scope of its employment, its extension to a larger audience, and faster, the sophistication of the techniques and means of propaganda.

After a historical and theoretical background for the notion of propaganda, I explain certain events before the Balkan wars to raise my argument in historical context in the third chapter. They are mainly as follows: the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78; national and territorial claims of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, the course of the Balkan wars with an emphasis on the Ottoman defeat; lastly, the situation of the Ottoman army on the eve of the wars as well as its performance during the wars.

The fourth chapter is the main chapter of the thesis, where I discuss the propaganda activities of the Ottoman political elites for the home front mobilization. This chapter is composed of four major sections. The first section is about the National Defense League and an analysis of its propaganda activities. The second section is composed of an analysis of belles-lettres such as poems, short stories, and plays published in the Ottoman (Turkish) press during the wars. Then, I discuss the reports of the war crimes of the Balkan states as appeared in *Tanin*. Finally, I try to evaluate the effectiveness of the Ottoman propaganda activities.

CHAPTER II

PROPAGANDA

2.1. Propaganda in Theory

Propaganda has usually been perceived as something negative because some people think that it contains lies. Indeed, for some, it is almost all about lies. Commenting on modern propaganda, Chomsky says that “it involves so many lies that it has the remotest relation to reality.”¹⁵ For some other scholars, propaganda may include lies, but I should say that lies do not define propaganda. I will give a detailed definition of propaganda and demonstrate its relation to lies, emotions, and reason besides its difference from persuasion.

Leonard W. Doob defines propaganda as “a systematic attempt by an interested individual (or individuals) to control the attitudes of groups of individuals through the use of suggestion, and consequently, to control their actions.”¹⁶ However, it does

¹⁵ Noam Chomsky, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), 37.

¹⁶ J.A.C. Brown, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing* (England: Penguin Books, 1975), 19.

not always aim at controlling people's behaviors or actions, and this definition may be limited in demonstrating all characteristics of propaganda. Jowett & O'Donnell's definition may give more insight into propaganda. They define propaganda as "a deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist."¹⁷

So propaganda is a deliberate attempt of propagating an idea systematically to influence perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors for an intended end. The following terms can also be included in the definition: lies, truth, half-truth, facts, censorship, persuasion, a biased objective, a hidden purpose or intention, appeal to emotions, appeal to reason, and manipulation.

For Walter Lippmann, it is very natural that propaganda involves some form of censorship because otherwise conducting propaganda would not be possible. For him, a set between the propagandee and "the event" is fundamental.¹⁸ Jowett & O'Donnell argue that the propagandist aims at disseminating information with a biased objective for the best interest of the propagandist while using informative communication that is neutral, so he tends to control the flow of information.¹⁹

On its relation to truth, Jacques Ellul argues propaganda is composed of the realm of facts where truth exists and the realm of intentions and interpretations where "necessary falsehood pays off." He says propaganda may include some facts that are difficult to be proven while sometimes the propagandist intentionally makes it hard

¹⁷ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (USA: Sage Publications, 1994), 6.

¹⁸ Leonard W. Doob, "Public Opinion and Propaganda," in *Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic*, ed. Jeremy Hawthorn (London: Edwards Arnold Ltd., 1987), 8.

¹⁹ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 41.

for people to understand by being silent on or hiding certain facts. When the intentions of the propagandist are involved, people may not be able to find any proof for evaluating the accuracy of the information. Ellul gives the example of Hitler's speeches. Accordingly, Hitler always spoke out his wish for peace and had never mentioned his will for fighting before the war started. Then he gave an excuse for the armament, namely the encirclement.²⁰

As for the question of how different propaganda is from persuasion, Jowett & O'Donnell have an explanation. Victoria O'Donnell & June Kable defines persuasion as such:

“a complex, continuing, interactive process in which a sender and a receiver are linked by symbols, verbal and nonverbal, through which the persuader attempts to influence the persuadee to adopt a change in a given attitude or behavior because the persuadee has had perceptions enlarged or changed.”²¹

Based on this definition, Jowett & O'Donnell explains that persuasion is “interactive,” so both parties satisfy their needs. It is “transactive,” so both sides are active in an attempt to fulfill needs. They conclude that persuasion is more mutually satisfactory than propaganda. In such a process, any change that the persuadee will adopt in his attitudes or behaviors is a voluntary change. However, they argue, when a persuader has a secret agenda to alter the attitudes of an audience, his action falls into the category of propaganda.²²

Lastly, Ellul asks the question if propaganda is rational or irrational to come up with the conclusion that it is both “rational and irrational.” It is irrational in the sense that

²⁰ Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 52-61.

²¹ Victoria O'Donnell and June Kable, *Persuasion: An Interactive-Dependency Approach* (New York: Random House, 1982), 9.

²² Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 27-35.

it addresses to feelings while on the other hand there is some truth in propaganda; indeed, it may mainly sometimes include facts, statistics, and so on. When this is the case, what the propagandist is doing is that he exposes the individual to an excessive data that diminish his/her capacity of personal judgment and critical thinking. Captured in a web of facts in an article, what s/he is left with is only an impression. Then s/he acts irrationally based on an emotional feeling. It is irrational because s/he does not remember, think over and analyze the statistics or other factual information in such a piece of propaganda unless he is a specialist in the relevant area.²³

2.2. Propaganda in History

The usage of the term propaganda to mean the propagation of an “idea” appeared in the late 16th century when Pope Gregory XIII established a commission with the name *de propaganda fide*, which was supposed to spread the Catholic faith. Pope Gregory XV, in 1622, further regularized this practice by establishing *The Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (The Sacred Congregation for Propagating the Faith).²⁴ On the other hand, scholars say propaganda is probably as old as the humanity itself, and even it is possible to see the use of modern propaganda techniques in earliest civilizations. On the antiquity of propaganda, Harold D. Laswell comments that “much classical Greek and Roman literature is the more or less accidental residue of propaganda.”²⁵

²³ Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, 84-87.

²⁴ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 2.

²⁵ Harold D. Lasswell, “Propaganda,” in *Propaganda*, ed. Robert Jackall (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 13-14.

In that case, it is possible to talk about different propaganda techniques employed through the ages, and numerous examples of propaganda exist even before the age of modern propaganda. I demonstrate only particular examples within the context of this study and in line with the elements based on which propaganda has developed. Namely, they are the increase in the need for the use of it together with the growth of civilizations as well as the formation of nation states; increasing sophistication in communication means; and growing understanding of the psychology of propaganda.²⁶

Among ancient civilizations, the Greeks employed propaganda both in civil life and warfare. Propaganda in the civil life in ancient Greece was visible in monuments, temples, and edifices that symbolized the state power other than the utilization of myths for political purposes.²⁷ As a specific example of the use of propaganda in ancient Greece, in particular through symbols, some policies of the Alexander the Great, the King of Macedonia (336-323 B.C.), can be cited. One notable event in this regard was his marriage to one of the daughters of Darius, after defeating the Persians and proclaiming himself as the King of Persia. Also, his arranging the marriages of his eighty officers with Persian women from the nobility in line with his policy to unite two cultures, or in a broader view, to strengthen his empire was symbolic propaganda. Lastly, his wearing the royal Persian clothes can also be regarded as a reflection of the same policy,²⁸ which all served as propaganda towards the Persian people.

²⁶ Jowett & Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 48.

²⁷ For the role of myths in politics see Martin Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Lund: Gleerup, 1951).

²⁸ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 55.

In warfare the Greeks also employed propaganda. One notable example was the employment of a modern propaganda technique, disinformation, by the Greek naval commander Themistocles to induce Xerxes, the King of Persia, to attack the Greek fleet at Salamis in 480 B.C.E. Themistocles arranged the propaganda of disinformation when Xerxes succeeded to conquer several places including Athens. He made sure that certain messages would reach to Xerxes through “seemingly” Xerxes’ reliable source. The disinformation was that some units of the Greek Army at Salamis would leave. Acting upon this information, Xerxes deployed some of his fleet there. Themistocles sent another disinformation and induced Xerxes to engage in a naval battle at Salamis with the combined forces of the allied Greek city-states in conditions favorable to the Greek navy.²⁹

2.2.1. Propaganda and Religion

Different agents have usually manipulated religion throughout the history with varying degrees based on existing conditions of a particular period. As mentioned above, even the usage of the term “to propagate,” which originally means “to sow,” to mean to propagate “an idea” started with the Catholic Church in the 16th century. Then, the congregation was established with a mission to spread the Catholic belief primarily in the New World and also to prevent the spread of Protestantism threatening the political, religious and economic power of the Catholic Church.

A more specific example of the usage of faith in propaganda, which is also an example of atrocity propaganda, was the speech of Pope Urban II for the first Crusade in 1095. The Pope made a public speech on a platform specially constructed

²⁹ Jowett & O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 53-54.

for this occasion. He called people to protect Christianity and save Christians from the atrocities of the Muslims while the underlying reason for the Pope's plea was Byzantine Emperor's asking for military assistance against the rising power of the Seljuk Turks; thus he spoke as such:

It is the imminent peril threatening you and all faithful which has brought us hither. From the confines of Jerusalem and from the city of Constantinople a horrible tale has gone forth... an accursed race, a race utterly alienated from God... has invaded the lands of those Christians and has depopulated them by the sword, pillage, and fire... They (Turks) perforate their navels, and dragging forth the extremity of the intestines, bind it to a stake; then with flogging they lead the victim around until the viscera having gushed forth the victim falls prostrate upon the ground.³⁰

While explaining so-called atrocities against Christians to arouse an emotional response, he did not neglect to offer material gains for the Crusaders as another motivation, as was apparent in the way how he promoted the land that they would go. Namely, it was "floweth with milk and honey... like another paradise of delights."³¹

Calling people to wage war in the name of God is not unique to Christianity, nor limited to this example. Some similarities can be drawn between the Pope's propaganda and the propaganda during the Balkan wars. The Pope employed atrocity propaganda to galvanize feelings for crusading. Likewise, the warring sides in the Balkan wars (1912-1913) applied the same kind of propaganda with very similar representations, some aspects of which this thesis analyzes. Second, the call of the Pope draws a similarity to that of Ferdinand of Bulgaria in that he also proclaimed war in the name of Christianity. Other Balkan states as well reflected it as a fight between the Cross and the Crescent. The Ottoman Sultan, on the other hand, referred

³⁰ Anne Freemantle, *The Age of Faith* (New York: Time-Life Books, 1965), 54, quoted in Jowett & O'Donnell, 66.

³¹ Anne Freemantle, *The Age of Faith* (New York: Time-Life Books, 1965), 54, quoted in Jowett & O'Donnell, 55.

only to the glory and courage of the ancestors of the Ottomans in his speeches.³² In the Ottoman/Turkish media, however, it is possible to see references to the idea that it was a religious war while some writers specifically emphasized that the war was not a religious one, but a fight for the fatherland.

2.2.2. *Ancien Regimes* vs. Nationalism in Propaganda Wars

The development of the printing press in the 18th and 19th centuries contributed to the development of propaganda. As a result of the advancements in the printing press, the messages could reach a larger audience through various media in a shorter time. And the rise of nationalism in the 19th century combined with a relatively improved situation of the press gave incentive to extensive utilization of propaganda. The *ancien regimes* employed propaganda to cope with nationalist and/or separatist movements while the nationalists tried to propagate to their liberal ideas. Both parties sought for widespread support for legitimization.

The French and American revolutionaries benefited a great deal from the press to disseminate their ideas and could obtain general support. Among the American colonies, especially Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* was very influential in molding the public opinion for independence. Newspapers as well were influential during the Revolutionary war. The number of the newspapers in the colonies raised to 70 during the war from 30, though most could not survive by the end of the war.³³

³² Eyal Ginio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream," *War in History* 12, no.2 (2005): 156–177, doi: 10.1191/0968344505wh316oa.

³³ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 80.

One powerful piece of press propaganda for revolutionary ideology was “Boston Massacre” in 1770. The incident arose when British soldiers, having quartered in Boston for more than a year, started to fire on the crowd that had thrown snowballs, sticks and oyster shells to them. As a result, 4 of rioters died, and 11 were injured, and this incident was called as “Boston Massacre.” Furthermore, an engraving by Paul Revere depicting the Massacre became a powerful piece of propaganda for national causes. The famous engraving included a sign “Butcher’s Hall” above the British Customhouse.³⁴

A propaganda similar to that of Boston Massacre was the Storming of Bastille for the French Revolution in 1789. A group of revolutionists destructed the prison representing the power of the monarchy and the incident was promoted as the “Storming of Bastille” in the press, but the wording of the propagandists did not reflect the whole truth. Even three years after the revolution, the building was not completely ruined.³⁵ The British newspapers also reported the incident with a biased approach. The number of the Parisians involving in the storming of the edifice changed significantly from one newspaper to another, apparently, based on the attitude of the newspaper towards the revolt. As a further example, a clear difference in the attitudes was visible between the *Bath Chronicle* and *the World*. The *Bath Chronicle* referred to the prison as an “instrument of tyranny” while the latter was critical of the “violent actions” of the revolvers.³⁶ It is possible to associate this

³⁴ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 82-83.

³⁵ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 88.

³⁶ Norbert Schürer, “The Storming of the Bastille in English Newspapers,” *Eighteenth-Century Life* 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 75. doi:10.1215/00982601-29-1-50.

approach of *the World* to the French Revolution with its affiliation with the British government because some academics consider it as a “ministerial” publication.³⁷

Napoleon’s military campaigns and propaganda helped the spread of revolutionary and nationalist ideas. The *ancien regimes* had to cope with the spread of nationalism. Propaganda thus served for the *ancien regimes*, too. The Ottoman Empire was one of the *ancien regimes* that were challenged by nationalist and separatist movements like Habsburgs in the 19th century. In the face of this and other challenges from within and outside, the Ottoman Sultan adopted new social and political policies for modernization and imperial legitimacy. I will briefly show the employment of propaganda for these purposes during the Hamidian era (1876-1909) by focusing on symbolic propaganda and the use of war literature, in particular, epic.

Abdulhamid II and the ruling elites underlined the legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty together with its religious and spiritual characteristic of ghaza. In addition, the fact that the regime tried to adapt itself to the changing conditions of the period, as is demonstrated in Can E. Çekiç’s study, was visible, for example, in the practices of the renovating of some mosques and tombs of the members of the founding dynasty. Some of them were Ertuğrul Mosque in Istanbul, the Sheikh Edebali Mosque in Bilecik, the Tomb of Ertuğrul Gazi in Söğüt, the Tomb of Gazi Süleyman Paşa in Bolayır, the Tomb of Gazi Mihal in Edirne, the Tomb of Hayme Ana (Ertuğrul's mother) in Söğüt.³⁸ The place of the Ertuğrul Mosque, which was next to Yıldız Palace, further reinforces the idea of imperial legitimacy. Thus, the motifs around the

³⁷ Jeremy Black, *The English Press in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 185.

³⁸ Can Eyüp Çekiç, “Hamidian Epic: War Literature in the Late 19th Century Ottoman Empire,” (PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2016), 36.

foundation of the Ottoman state aimed at reinforcing the idea of loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan by increasing the visibility of the imperial references in society.

Public ceremonies, iconography, decorations, coat of arms also manifested the same idea in a similar fashion. Also, Selim Deringil draws attention to the convergence of the "new and old" in these symbols of power.³⁹ An interesting demonstration of this was that the military band accompanying the *sürre* procession played western anthems.⁴⁰ So manifestation of the transformation of the Empire towards modernization conjoined with the idea of the imperial loyalty.

War literature was one of the principal tools for propaganda purposes. Epic within the war literature reemerged and revived in the 19th century. New stories dealing with the military victories of the ruling dynasty as well as with the victorious past were composed with the dominant themes such as “the virtues of obedience, discipline, pietism, frugality, morality, and courage.”⁴¹ The revival of epic was not specific to the Ottoman Empire, but it was to the changing conditions of the period; thus, epic was widely used in Europe by different political and intellectual agents.

In regards with the Ottoman experience, epic of the Hamidian era drew its source mainly from the Crimean War in 1856, the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-78, and the Greco-Turkish War of 1897. The Plevna defense in the Russo-Turkish war and the victory in the latter were the most recent subjects of the epics. When discussing the relationship of the political power to the epic, Can E. Çekiç demonstrates that the Hamidian regime benefited from epics to reinforce the

³⁹ See Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999).

⁴⁰ Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 25-26.

⁴¹ Çekiç, “Hamidian Epic,” 286.

idea of loyalty to the Sultan. Arguing this within the context of the changing conditions of the 19th century, some of which I briefly mentioned earlier, Can E. Çekiç shows the Ottoman experience with modernization and nationalism by focusing on the role of epic. In this regard, epic served for another element in the manifestation of the social/political policies and intellectual ideas of the Hamidian era, at the core of which laid the issue of integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁴²

2.3. Defining the Type of the Ottoman Wartime Propaganda

Academics categorize propaganda as black, white or gray depending on to what extent it reveals or conceals its real source; as fast or slow based on the type of the media that the propagandist employs. In addition to these classifications, Ellul distinguishes between the propaganda of agitation and integration. I will try to define the kind of the Ottoman propaganda based on these categorizations.

Covert/black propaganda hides its source, identity, and aim so that the public is unaware that someone will influence them while in overt/white propaganda the source, objectives, and intentions are made public. White propaganda “tends to be accurate” and attempts to create reliability in the audience while black propaganda has a false source and includes “lies, deceptions, and fabrications.” Lastly, in gray propaganda, the source might and might not be known and the accuracy of the information it is disseminating is unknown.⁴³

⁴² See Çekiç, “Hamidian Epic.”

⁴³ Jowett & O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*

Defining the type of propaganda based on its source is helpful to identify propaganda and understand other questions in a propaganda analysis such as the objectives and the intended audience. Regarding the context of this study, such an analysis can be applied to the reports on war crimes. However, given the difficulty of evaluating the reliability of the evidence on this subject I limit myself to mention the source as it appeared in the press when necessary for my argument. Thus, I discuss the categorization of propaganda based on its origin in this section to explain why I omit this element usually included in a propaganda analysis.

It is hard to locate each information or reports on atrocity against Muslims that appeared in the Ottoman/Turkish press or expressed by intellectuals in their speeches in a category based on the source of propaganda. Such news in the press generally included the information of the source. They were mainly collected from the following sources: Muslim people arriving in Istanbul from the Balkans; the Ottoman army; war correspondents of the newspaper; foreign war correspondents; and finally Ottoman civil associations. Furthermore, the Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also evidenced atrocities against Muslim/Turkish populations of the Balkans.

On the other hand, the same report evidenced atrocities by Turks/Muslims, too. The members of the commission investigating war scenes were from Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States,⁴⁴ which might imply the commission's intent to draw up an unbiased report. Though it may seem less biased

⁴⁴ See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914).

than the reports of the warring sides, which is very natural, still this report as well is questionable in its reliability and objectivity.

As for the type of the media through which the propagandist disseminates information, there are two kinds, namely fast and slow media, categorized based on “the immediacy of the effect desired.” Fast media include television, radio, newspapers, speeches, moving pictures, e-mail and the internet, which are the communication forms that can affect public opinion nearly in a heartbeat. Slow media, on the other hand, include communication tools, such as “educational exchanges and activities, cultural exhibits and books,” through which the propagandist attempts to indoctrinate an idea in the long run.⁴⁵ Based on this categorization, this thesis focuses on, in particular, newspapers and speeches. Obviously, a wartime propaganda can be more effective via fast media on account of the fact that the propagandist seeks an immediate response from the intended audience that will contribute to the war effort and war causes.

Lastly, another form of propaganda, which is the propaganda of agitation, describes the type of the propaganda in analysis. Based on Ellul’s definition, the propaganda of agitation attempts to maximize energies and acquire substantial sacrifices by throwing the individual into enthusiasm and adventure towards the extraordinary aims that appear to him as totally within reach. He argues propaganda of agitation is usually the opposition's propaganda, but a government may also employ this kind of propaganda, for example, when it seeks to prompt energies for the mobilization of a nation for war. Its subversive character normally directed to an established order now targets the enemy. Stating that this kind of propaganda is the easiest to make, Ellul

⁴⁵ Kenneth Osgood, “Propaganda,” *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, 2002, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/propaganda.aspx>.

suggests that the propagandist needs only to address to the simplest and most violent feelings for an effective propaganda of agitation.⁴⁶ The Ottomans called people for mobilization during the Balkan wars mostly by appealing to the emotions such as fear, hatred, and anxiety besides appealing to positive emotions so that the audience would be motivated, excited and anxious enough to take action and sacrifice anything for “the fatherland, nation, and religion.”



⁴⁶ Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, 71-3.

CHAPTER III

THE BALKAN WARS (1912-1913) AND THEIR ORIGINS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PROPAGANDA

3.1. The Origins of the Balkan Wars

Though the immediate cause of the Balkan wars can be found in the national objectives of the Balkan states and traced back to the settlement at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 that put a limitation to the national aspirations of each of them, background to the conflicts of 1912-13 and preceding instability in the region involves many factors. These factors include the effect of nationalism in the Balkan Peninsula after the French Revolution in 1789; emergence of a bourgeoisie class in the Balkans in the mid 18th century; Ottoman misgovernment in the region related to internal and external challenges that the Ottoman state faced starting from the 18th century.

In addition, the rivalry between Russia and Austria in the region that increased in the 19th century as a result of Russia's Pan-Slavist policy in line with its larger national goal of reaching the Mediterranean Sea, and Austria's wish to secure its Hungarian

border against a potential threat as well as its increasing economic and political concerns in the Balkans after its weakening influence in the Central Europe and Italian Peninsula especially following its defeat against Prussia in 1866 added to the instability in the Balkans. Lastly, the ambitions of unified Italy (1870) in the Balkans that mainly revolved around the objective to dominate the Adriatic Sea and Britain, France, and Germany's involvement in the regional events out of their economic and political interests in the Ottoman Empire can be argued among the factors affecting instability in the Balkans.

Depending on the standpoint of the writer, this background can be elaborated, and different starting points are possible, but obviously all of these factors contributed at some point and to some extent to the instability in the Balkans throughout the 19th century up until the Balkan wars. Historians usually trace the origins of the Balkan wars to the Congress of Berlin (1878).⁴⁷ Within the context of this thesis, I can start from the Eastern Crisis of 1875-78. It is useful to discuss the path leading to the Congress of Berlin and then talk about the Congress to portray the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the international arena of the world politics, which will give a better understanding of why the Ottomans tried hard to create a public opinion abroad for the favor of the Ottoman Empire and sought for the support of the Great Powers during the wars. The same political situation of the Ottoman Empire might also be one of the causes leading the political elites and intellectuals to convey a propaganda campaign targeted the Ottomans. The place of the Ottoman Empire in the international arena of the world politics had gone worse when it came to the period that this study focuses on because the Ottoman Empire was more isolated at

⁴⁷ See Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London & New York: Routledge, 2000).

the time. Britain stopped its traditional policy of intermittent support for the Ottoman Empire with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.

3.1.1. The Eastern Crisis (1875-1878)

The Eastern Crisis of 1875-78 describes a set of events related to the instability in the Balkan lands of the Ottoman Empire between 1875 and 1878 as a part of the Eastern Question. It started with an uprising among Christian peasants in Herzegovina in 1875 and spread to Bosnia and then to Bulgarian places. There are some theories on the origins of the revolts in Herzegovina and Bosnia, but discussions are not finalized among historians.⁴⁸ Based on the British reports, it was related to the misgovernment of the Ottoman officials and not an uprising for independence. On the causes of the uprising in Herzegovina, Consul Holmes, the British agent in Bosnia, reported as such:

The discontent which undoubtedly exists against most of the Turkish landowners, and against the Zaptiehs and tax-farmers has been the excuse rather than the cause of the revolt, which was assuredly arranged by Servian agitators and accomplished by force.⁴⁹

Holmes's report about the revolt in Bosnia neither showed a demand of the people for independence from the Ottoman Empire. They wanted to remain as the Ottoman subjects but asked for a just governance and equality in law with Muslims.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ For different explanations on the causes of the revolts see James Peter Phillips, "The Eastern Crisis, 1875- 878, in British and Russian Press and Society" (PhD diss., University of Nottingham, 2012), 67-68.

⁴⁹ George Douglas Campbell, *The Eastern Question: From the Treaty Of Paris 1836 to the Treaty of Berlin 1878 and to the Second Afgan War*, vol. 1 of *The Eastern Question: From the Treaty of Paris 1836 to the Treaty Of Berlin 1878 And to the Second Afgan War* (London: Strahan, 1879), 15.

⁵⁰ Campbell, *The Eastern Question*, 29.

However, Bulgarian insurrection in May 1876 involved the aspirations of Bulgarian revolutionary committees. It was an organized insurgency with the motto of “Liberty or Death” as brandished on the flag prepared for the movement.⁵¹

The Ottomans utilized Bashi-Bazouks in addition to the regular troops to suppress the insurgents, at which they were successful, but some reports emphasized their brutal actions. For example, acting consul Freeman at Bosna-Serai stated that “Bashi-Bazouks were terrorizing the people.”⁵² Vice consul Dupuis from Adrianople told about the insurgents and suppression attributing atrocities and outrages to both sides in the contest in May. His report to Henry Elliot mentioned “horrible cruelties to the small Turkish guard...hacked to pieces by Bulgarians” in the village of Bellova.⁵³ In June, Elliot reported that the insurrection in Bulgaria was suppressed, “although, he regretted to say, with cruelty, and, in some places, with brutality.”⁵⁴

The way that the Ottoman irregular troops suppressed the insurgents attracted much attention in particular in the British media. Their publications regarding the issue and Gladstone’s pamphlet of “Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East” published on September 6, 1876, created a public opinion against the Ottoman Empire. An atrocity campaign across Britain was conducted in the second half of 1876. People

⁵¹ Januarius Aloysius MacGahan, *The Turkish Atrocities in Bulgaria* (London: Bradbury Agnew & Co., 1876), 38-39; David Harris, *Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), 23.

⁵² M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1966), 213.

⁵³ Brendan William Larkin, “The Times and the Bulgarian Massacres” (B.A., Wesleyan University, 2009), 67.

⁵⁴ Campbell, *The Eastern Question*, 217.

held meetings and made speeches demanding the British government's active involvement in the Bulgarian events.⁵⁵

The British government did not favor a direct intervention, but Russia seemed to intervene especially after the reports of the atrocities against Bulgarians, but Russia took action only after the defeat of Serbia (that had got involved in the fighting in June 1876). The Ottomans had suppressed the insurgents, and were about to defeat Serbians, but Russia gave an ultimatum to the Porte to accept an armistice with Serbia for not more than a month. Thus Serbia and the Ottoman Empire made an armistice on October 31. Six Great Powers agreed on a Conference at Constantinople on the basis of peace. The representatives of these Great Powers held meetings in the Preliminary Conference at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople in December. After they concluded their proposals regarding the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers invited the Porte for the Full Conference.

The Porte refused the proposals arguing that the demands of the Great Powers were inconsistent with the independence of the Ottoman state. The Porte rejected the modified proposals that still retained the condition of the International Commission and governors with independent tenure, too, at the Conference on January 15, 1877. Thus, the Conference dissolved, but negotiations continued until the Powers signed a Protocol on March 31. The Porte protested the Protocol again because it was inconsistent with the independence of the Ottoman state and the sovereignty of the Sultan. The Ottoman Empire was not a party to the Protocol because the agreement between Britain and Russia was that the Ottoman Empire would not be asked to sign

⁵⁵ Phillips, "The Eastern Crisis," 113.

it. However, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 1877, with the pretext that the Ottoman Empire did not accept the Protocol.

The Ottoman Empire fought a two-front war against Russia and its allies, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, in the Balkans and Caucasus during the Russo-Turkish War. When Russia invaded San Stefano, the Britain interfered and thus Russia accepted the Ottoman offer of peace. Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano that imposed very harsh terms on the Ottomans: the Ottoman Empire was to grant independence to Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, autonomy to Bosnia, and a large autonomous Bulgaria extending from the Black Sea to the Albanian Mountains, and from the Danube to Aegean was to be created under Russian protection.

Other Great Powers objected to this treaty and thus replaced it with the Treaty of Berlin that sanctioned full independence of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia; created the principality of Bulgaria, the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, and returned Macedonia to the direct rule of the Ottoman Sultan, instead of a large Bulgaria. The Treaty also deprived Montenegro from its territorial gains in Herzegovina, the Sandjak of Novi Pazar and Albania and gave the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Pazar to Austria.

The Treaty of Berlin did not bring peace to the Balkans. Herbert Gibbons's following words show one of the reasons for this:

From the beginning of the Congress to the end, there was never a single thought of serving the interests of the people whose destinies they were presuming to decide. They compromised with each other 'to preserve the peace

of Europe.’ This formula has always been interpreted in diplomacy as the getting of all you can for your country without having to fight for it.⁵⁶

So the aspirations of the Balkan states continued. The fact that the Treaty of Berlin replaced the Treaty of San Steafano and thus returned Macedonia from Bulgaria to the direct control of the Ottoman Sultan frustrated Bulgaria. Indeed, the treaty put a limitation to the national aspirations of the other Balkan states as well, thus “after 1878 all the Balkan countries strove to overcome the Berlin settlement and realize national unity.”⁵⁷

The attitude of Britain to the Porte differed from that of Russia throughout the Eastern Crisis. The British government prioritized the suppression of the insurrections while Russia tried to interfere and impose reforms on the Ottoman Empire. However, Britain did not take part on the side of the Ottoman Empire when the war broke out, neither did she go to war with Russia. Some argue that the public agitation in Britain affected the British policy in this way. And especially Gladstone and liberal media discussed not interfering on the side of the Ottoman Empire was the right decision because “the Ottomans, due to their inability to reform, were no longer worthy of guaranteed British support.”⁵⁸

To what extent the reaction of the British public contributed to shaping the policy of the British government concerning the Eastern Question is questionable. However, depending on the diplomatic correspondences (especially between Britain and Russia, and between Britain and the Ottoman Empire), the British Cabinet

⁵⁶ Herbert Adams Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (1911-1914) (New York: Century Co., 1914), 162.

⁵⁷ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 3.

⁵⁸ Larkin, “The Times and the Bulgarian Massacres,” 116.

encouraged the suppression of the insurgents and advised the Porte to deal with the issue as a local disturbance, thus not to appeal to other Powers regarding the revolts. Russia, on the other hand, sought the support of Britain to interfere in the events and impose reforms on the Ottoman government.⁵⁹

The British documents show that the British government tried to prevent the outbreak of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and warned the Ottoman Empire about the possible danger of such a war. Britain made it clear to the Porte that it would not intervene in case of war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. However, based on the statement of Mithad Pasha, the Porte expected that Britain would have to interfere sooner or later because the European, and in particular, British interests were so attached to the conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Pasha said “this profound belief, added to the reasons we have mentioned, was one of the principal factors of our contest with Russia.”⁶⁰

The British government also showed its disapproval of Russia’s entering war with the Ottoman Empire and made it clear that Russia “separated” itself from the Concert of Europe because it was acting without discussing the issue with its allies. The following excerpt from the despatch of the British government to the British ambassador in Petersburg dated May 1, 1877, explained the issue in following terms:

It is impossible to foresee the consequences of such an act. Her Majesty’s Government would willingly have refrained from making any observations in regard to it; but, as Prince Gortchakow seems to assume, in a Declaration addressed to all the Governments of Europe, that Russia is acting in the interest of Great Britain and that of the other Powers, they feel bound to state, in a

⁵⁹ For further information regarding the correspondences see Campbell, *The Eastern Question*.

⁶⁰ Campbell, *The Eastern Question*, 331-32.

manner equally formal and public, that the decision of the Russian Government is not one which can have their concurrence or approval.⁶¹

The hope or expectation of Mithad Pasha was not realized by the British government. And the Russo-Turkish war demonstrates the last example of the British policy of “favoring or protecting” the Ottoman Empire against Russian expansion as well as Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire that would threaten British economic interests in the Empire, and most importantly the lanes to India. Also, this policy was a part of a larger idea of maintaining the survival of the Ottoman Empire as a buffer zone in line with the system of the balance of powers. Russia’s interference and later on direct intervention, on the other hand, illustrate its intrigue in the Balkans in line with the Pan-Slavist policy as a part of a greater national cause of reaching to the Mediterranean Sea.

3.1.2. The National and Territorial Aspirations of the Balkan States

The Treaty of Berlin was an obstacle in front of the national goals of the Balkan states, as I mentioned above. All of the four Balkan nations that declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1912 had laid claims on the Ottoman lands in the Balkans; thus, they engaged in propaganda activities in those territories, and in particular, in Macedonia. As a result, the following period witnessed the dissolution of the Berlin settlement.

Bulgarian aspirations focused on Thrace; Greek on the Aegean Islands; Montenegrin on northern Albania; Serb on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Montenegro and Serbia also laid claim in Novi Pazar where population included Albanians, Serbs, and Slavic-

⁶¹ Campbell, *The Eastern Question*, 425.

speaking Muslims, and Kosovo, where Serbs, Turks, Gypsies, Vlachs, Albanians, and others populated. The interests of all, however, overlapped in Macedonia that comprised the vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir, and Salonika. Each argued why Macedonia should be within their borders: "Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely Hellenic. Had it not always been Greek before the Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip of Macedon to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire? The Servians, on the other hand, invoked the memory of the Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, who, in the fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman conquest, was crowned "King of Romania" at Serres... The Bulgarians invoked the memory of their medieval domination of Macedonia and Thrace."⁶² Thus, Serbia's Nacertanije and Montenegro's national aspirations included expanding at the expense of Austria besides the Ottoman Empire.

The realization of these claims was difficult because of several reasons. The Balkans were mixed ethnically, linguistically, and religiously. People of different faiths and ethnicities were living side by side. Machiel Kiel says that they were celebrating each others' festivities. Halil Berktaý states that public places such as baths often brought them together.⁶³ Mark Mazower also comments on this coexistence as such:

We should be cautious not to idealize the realities of life in the Ottoman Empire, but a polity of different groups of different faiths coexisted by the standards of 20th and early 21st centuries remarkably with little strife between them.⁶⁴

⁶² Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe* (1911-1914), 169.

⁶³ *The Silent Balkans*, directed by Andreas Apostolidis (Europe & Balkans: Anemon Production, 2012), DVD.

⁶⁴ *The Silent Balkans*, DVD.

Macedonia, specifically, was highly mixed. The claims based on the romantic nationalism of these Balkan states was problematic in that it was tough to determine a local's belonging to a particular ethnicity in Macedonia where people from different ethnicities were mixed, and moreover, national awareness was lacking in most. Mark Mazower puts it as such: "Many of them when asked are you Bulgarian or Greek, it was a meaningless question for most, but by 1914 it would matter because their life or death would critically depend on it."⁶⁵ Another issue was that their criteria for defining one's nationality differed from each other. Accordingly, anyone displaying Slavic cultural traits was Serb; Bulgarians regarded those who physiologically and linguistically similar to those in Bulgaria to be Bulgarian; to the Greeks, any person under the authority of the Greek Patriarchate was Greek.⁶⁶ Thus, population statistics based on ethnicity differed.⁶⁷

With these claims, they worked to create national identities and win over the people in Macedonia through churches, schools, and with guns. Serbs established the Society of Saint Sava in 1886; Greeks *Ethniki Hetairia* (National Society) in 1894; Bulgarians Supreme Committee (or External Organization) in 1895. Macedonians also formed a group, IMRO (International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), with the motto of "Macedonia for Macedonians" in 1893, and this group preferred autonomy under the Ottoman rule rather than Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ *The Silent Balkans*, DVD.

⁶⁶ Julian Brooks, "The Education Race for Macedonia," *The Journal of Modern Hellenism* 31 (2015). <http://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/article/view/30>.

⁶⁷ See appendix, 1.

⁶⁸ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 5.

The ecclesiastic rivalry predominantly was between the Greeks and Bulgarians. Before the establishment of Bulgarian Exarchate, all Orthodox Christians were under the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Ottomans considered them all as one *millet*. The Sultan's firman allowing for the establishment of the Exarchate in 1870 retained the Ecumenical Patriarchate's jurisdiction over all Orthodox Christians. Serbia lagged behind Bulgaria and Greece in this race because it did not have an ecclesiastical organization in Macedonia. Anderson, however, argues that Serbia gained an advantage through its alliance with Austria in 1881 because Austria promised to support Serbia's territorial gains in Macedonia on the condition that Serbia did not claim Novi Pazar.⁶⁹

Other than churches, the Balkan states sought to insert influence through education. They opened schools in Macedonia. In the educational race, Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks were highly active though other Balkan nations such as Romanians and Albanians sought ways to spread their influence in Macedonia. Also, Macedonians involved in this propaganda race in a similar fashion.⁷⁰ Lastly, the conflicts among these rivalry groups sometimes resulted in armed conflicts through guerilla forces. For example, a revolt that broke out in Macedonia in 1903 resulted in violent conflicts and they lasted from 1904 to 1908.

Ottomans were not isolated in this propaganda war. They also employed propaganda to win over the Muslim populations of the Balkans. The Ottoman Empire was even in preparation of establishing a "propaganda commission that would reinforce Islamic sentiments and ties" in Shkodra, and around Ipek and Yakova in August

⁶⁹ Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, 269.

⁷⁰ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 5.

1912.⁷¹ Meanwhile, the Ottomans were trying to prevent the Catholic priests who were employing “propaganda” in the Balkans.⁷² According to one such document, a notification regarding the propaganda activities of the bishop substituting the Greek metropolitan in *Gevgeli* was sent to the Greek Patriarchate. The bishop was encouraging the Greeks to arm, and the notification asked that he shall leave such acts.⁷³

3.1.2.1. Disintegration in the Ottoman Balkans

Balkan wars broke out in the autumn of 1912 when formerly Ottoman subjects then independent Balkan states, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Except for Bulgaria, all of them obtained independence in the 19th century. Serbia and Greece gained autonomy under the Treaty of Adrianople ending the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29. One year later, Greece became independent while Serbia was recognized as an autonomous principality. Moldavia and Wallachia obtained autonomy under the Treaty of Paris signed at the end of the Crimean War (1853-1856). Later on, these two principalities united and composed the Principality of Romania (1859-1861). Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro obtained *de jure* independence in 1878 with the Congress of Berlin.

Bulgaria was the first to break the Berlin settlement by annexing Eastern Rumelia in 1885. Serbia, backed by Austria, fought against Bulgaria because of its annexation of

⁷¹ BOA. DH.SYS., 78/19, 28 February 1912.

⁷² BOA. BEO., 4041/303034, 19 May 1912; BOA. BEO., 4076/305639, 24 August 1912; BOA. BEO., 4110/308250, 7 November 1912.

⁷³ BOA, BEO., 3981/ 298511, 4 January 1911.

Eastern Rumelia. Bulgarians defeated Serbia, and indeed Austrian intervention prevented Bulgaria from advancing further and invading Serbia. Then, Greeks fought against the Ottomans for union with Crete in 1897. The Ottomans were the winning side, but the Great Powers interfered and granted Crete autonomy while preventing its union with Greece.

Then the Second Constitutional Era starting in 1908 witnessed worsened instability in the Balkans and more territorial losses on the part of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Aksakal's words well describe the period in this sense: "If the empire's territorial integrity was fragile under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, it shattered under the new constitutional government that came to power in July 1908."⁷⁴ The CUP coup in 1908 gave Austria the opportunity to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria to proclaim independence by benefitting from the internal conflicts and instability.⁷⁵ Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bulgaria unilaterally declared its independence. Worried by the annexation of Bosnia, Serbia sought for an alliance; and was able to obtain one with Montenegro, but it did not last. New Greek government brought back the issue of Crete, but it remained unsolved. In 1909, another endeavor for an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria took place. Serbia leaned towards a union with Bulgaria to attract all Catholic or Orthodox Serbs, Croats, and Slovans in "neighboring Monarchy" besides its motivation to realize its

⁷⁴ Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 58.

⁷⁵ For the political rivalry in the Second Constitutional Era see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006); Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987); Aykut Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, trans. Selda Somuncuoğlu (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2016).

goals in Macedonia.⁷⁶ However, two countries could not overcome their rivalries.

Thus this agreement did not survive, either.

In 1911, Albanians demanded autonomy with unified Shkodra, Janina, Kosovo, and Monastir. The same year Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 started in Tripoli. The defeats of the Ottoman army in the Italo-Turkish war, according to Anderson, paved the way for the Balkan League of 1912 and provoked the Balkan wars because the Balkan states could evaluate the Ottoman military strength.⁷⁷ In March 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia signed a treaty through the mediation of Russia. They agreed on the partitioning of Macedonia. Accordingly, Serbia would take northern Macedonia while Bulgaria would get most of the rest of it. And Nicholas II would settle the disputed zones. Later on, Greece and Montenegro as well joined the agreements.

The Balkan states could delay their conflicts with each other and agree to direct their energies to the common enemy. The preparations of their nation with this idea started in 1911 as exemplified in the Greek and Bulgarian press between 1911 and 1912. At the beginning, the Greek and Bulgarian press portrayed each other as allies and emphasized common history and traits such as the common enemy and faith. This discourse transformed into a negative one in June 1913. Otherization in the form of accusations, humiliation, attributing brutality, and stereotyping started to dominate the writings in the press. "Political myths" served for the purpose of creating an ally and then turning the same ally into an enemy.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 10.

⁷⁷ Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, 291.

⁷⁸ Maria Kotzabassi, "Propaganda and Political Myths: The Press on the Greek-Bulgarian Relations during the Balkan Wars," in *The Centenary of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913): Contested Stances* 2014, ed. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş, Vol. 2 of *The Centenary of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913): Contested Stances*. (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 745-758.

3.2. The War

The Ottomans fought on four fronts during the First Balkan War. Mainly they fought against Greek forces in Southern Albania; Bulgarians in Thrace; Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians in Macedonia; and against Serbians and Montenegrins in Kosovo as well as Northern Albania. The Ottoman Army Forces composed of regular troops, reserve units (redif),⁷⁹ volunteers, and the Tribal Light Cavalry Regiments during the wars. Ottoman General Staff formed the 1st (Eastern) Army under the command of Abdullah Pasha in Thrace and the 2nd (Western) Army under the command of Ali Rıza Pasha in Kosovo, Salonika, Monastir, Shkodra, and Janina.

In the Thracian theater, the Ottoman troops sustained heavy defeats at Kırkkilise and Lüleburgaz-Pınarhisar. The Ottomans retreated to Çatalca line, and only there they could prevent further advance of the Bulgarians. Bulgarians also besieged the city of Adrianople while its secondary forces captured the Eastern Macedonia. The Greek Navy, on the other hand, defeated the Ottomans at Dardanelles, occupied the Aegean Islands, and blocked the arrival of the Ottoman reinforcements from Anatolia and other parts of the Empire to the Balkan Peninsula. The dominance of the Greek Navy in the Aegean prevented the arrival of support and supplies from Anatolia to the Ottoman Armies in the Eastern and Western theatres. Greek Navy gained an advantage in particular through the armored cruiser Georgios Averof.

The combats in the Western Theatre, either, was not bright for the Ottomans. Serbs, outnumbering the Vardar Army under the command of Zeki Pasha, defeated the

⁷⁹ *Müstahfiz* units are incorporated in Redif system during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, thus they do not constitute a different category in the Balkan Wars. For further information on the Ottoman military organizations see Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara & Denver & Oxford: ABC-CLIO/Greenwood, 2009), PDF e-book.

Ottomans at Kumanovo and advanced further. They captured Uskub, Monastir, and Kosovo while the Greeks entered Salonika and besieged Janina in southern Albania. As the Vardar Army retreated without defending Uskub, the Serbian Army entered the city quickly. Salonika fell, as well, without any resistance of the Ottoman forces. Montenegro, on the other hand, surrounded Shkodra with the help of the reinforcement from the Serbian Army.

Some historians harshly criticize Hasan Tahsin Pasha because of his decision to surrender Salonika to the Greeks without any resistance. The Greek fleet that cut off the city was preventing any reinforcement to the Ottoman Army by the sea, but Hall argues that the Ottomans could resist on the east bank of the Vardar River, and exploit Bulgarian and Greek rivalry through negotiations to win time. To him, “Hasan Tahsin Pasha was not up to his responsibilities.”⁸⁰ On the other hand, people of Salonika did not want to see the destruction of the city. Greek and Bulgarian troops were around 50 kilometers away from the city.⁸¹ Şükrü Hanioglu says that people of Salonika feared of a simultaneous attack of the Greeks and Bulgarians, or Bulgarian invasion before the Greeks. They thought Bulgarians would make a greater massacre in the city. Especially Jewish traders who dominated the commerce in the city did not want any fighting in Salonika.⁸² Thus, the Administrative Council of Salonika signed a protocol demanding the prevention of the spread of the war to the city. Moreover, when Hasan Tahsin Pasha asked some divisions about their situation, all except one replied that they would not be able to fight.

⁸⁰ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 62-63.

⁸¹ *Rumeliye Elveda*, directed by Reyhan Yıldız (Turkey: KanalD Home Video, 2012), DVD.

⁸² *Rumeliye Elveda*, DVD.

Hasan Pasha's another decision at the battle of Yanitsa (Yenice) is also criticized within the context of its contribution to the defeat of the Ottoman Army at Yanitsa, thus opening the way for Salonika for the Greek Army. He ordered the reinforced Drama Redif Division to join his troops very late, and it was unable to arrive in time to change the course of the battle on behalf of the Ottomans. For Erickson, however, it is questionable if the result could be different, but if Hasan Pasha had any mistake at the battle of Yanitsa, he thinks, this belated decision might be the only one.⁸³

By December, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territories in the Balkans. On December 3, The Ottoman Empire signed an armistice with the Balkan states except Greece that wanted to take Janina. Thus, fighting in Janina continued during the truce. Moreover, fighting did not stop in Shkodra, either, though Montenegro signed the armistice. The representatives of the warring countries of the First Balkan War and the Great Powers met in London for the settlement of peace. The Balkan allies demanded the Ottomans to cede all European territories west of Çatalca line. The Ottomans refused to concede Thrace and the Aegean Islands, which Bulgaria and Greece did not accept. On January 6, the talks were suspended.

On 23 January, the CUP took over the government with the pretext that the government would cede the city of Adrianople and resumed fighting mainly to save the city, but Adrianople and also Janina fell in March. Shkodra also fell to Montenegro in April. The Treaty of London signed on 30 May formally ended the First Balkan War leaving all territories west of a line drawn from the Aegean port of Enos to the Black Sea port of Midia to the Balkan allies, except Albania. Albania

⁸³ Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: the Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 220-223.

whose borders defined by the Great Powers became independent. Among the warring Balkan countries, only Serbia achieved its objectives, but it had to give up some of its gains in northern Albania upon the Great Powers' pressure.

The Great Powers left the divisions of the mentioned territories to the Balkan states themselves, but the Balkan countries could not resolve their old disputes mainly on Macedonia, so the Second Balkan War started on June 29-30, 1913. Bulgaria fought against Romania and the Ottoman Empire in addition to its former allies. Romania attacked to gain Dobrudzha, and Ottomans to recapture Adrianople. On July 21, Ottomans, under the leadership of Enver Pasha, retook Adrianople, but the peace treaty with Bulgaria was signed only in September. Based on the Treaty of Constantinople (September 29, 1913) the Ottoman Empire kept Kırklareli, Didymoteicho, and Adrianople.⁸⁴

3.3. Deficiencies in the Ottoman Army

The Ottoman Army on the eve of the First Balkan War had deficiencies in spite of the reforms in the army especially after the coup of 1908. Indeed, it is possible to argue that some of these reforms sometimes worked for the disadvantage of the Ottoman Army during the wars, because the newly reorganized Ottoman Army was at war too soon to fully implement those reforms.⁸⁵ An estimate is that implementing

⁸⁴ For territorial changes see appendix, 2.

⁸⁵ For the reorganization of the Ottoman Army after 1908 see Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*. For a military history of the Ottoman Empire (1792-1918) see Gültekin Yıldız, ed., *Dünya Savaş Tarihi, Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi; Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetleri, 1792-1918* (Istanbul: Timaş, 2013).

the reforms would take approximately ten years.⁸⁶ Likewise, depending on the report of the Staff of the War Department (Erkan-ı Harbiyye Dairesi) dated September 29, 1912, the Ottoman Army did not seem to wage a war especially against all of the Balkan states simultaneously. Firstly, the Army had shortages of weapons and other equipments and it would require it to have a time period of at least five years to overcome these deficiencies. Moreover, it was possible within this period of time only if the Ottoman state was free from internal and external troubles. Secondly, the soldiers were tired because they had been called to arms for a couple of years. In conclusion, the Staff of the War Department told the government to consider these facts.⁸⁷

There were many factors contributing to the defeat of the Ottoman Army decisively in addition to these. Various contemporary historians argue different factors as the primary reason for this defeat. Some observants of the wars and soldiers in the field during the wars also evaluated the Ottoman Army from various angles in their memoirs. An attempt to determine the primary cause of the defeat is not necessary within the context of this study, but demonstrating the deficiencies discussed or factors that contributed to the Ottoman defeat at different levels provides a thorough understanding of the propaganda works of the Ottomans during the Balkan wars. The positive performance of the Ottoman Army was not absent, but this section focuses on the deficiencies because they affected the Ottoman propaganda efforts and some propaganda elements especially in the media. And also, one of the intended

⁸⁶ Great Britain. Foreign Office. *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914: The Balkan Wars*, ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold William Vazeille Temperley, Vol. 9 of *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967), 246.

⁸⁷ Turkey. Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı. *Balkan Harbi 1912-1913: Harbin Sebepleri, Askeri Hazırlıklar ve Osmanlı Devletinin Harbe Girişi*, Vol. 1 of *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1970), 272, Appendix 11.

audiences of the Ottoman propaganda was the Ottoman soldiers and potential volunteers for the Ottoman Army.

Firstly, the Ottomans could not mobilize as many men as the Ottoman mobilization plan on the eve of the war envisaged. Depending on this plan, 478,848 men would be mobilized for the Eastern Army and another 333,815 men for the Western Army, but the Eastern Army had 115,000 men (October 21, 1912) and 175,000 men were in the Western front (October 19, 1912) at the beginning of the war. The Balkan states, on the other hand, seem to have been more effective in mobilization of their forces when compared to the Ottoman state in terms of the proportion of mobilized manpower to the populations of the warring countries. According to the numbers that Richard Hall gives, Bulgarians mobilized a total number of 599,878 men (including men serving in capacities other than fighting) out of 1,914,160 total male population during the First Balkan War;⁸⁸ Greeks raised its peace-time army from 25,000 to 110,000 men; Montenegro's wartime army had 35.600 men and Serbia's, 230,000.⁸⁹

Another calculation of the forces of the Balkan League was as such: Bulgaria had 200.000 men in the Eastern Theatre and another 33.000 in the Western Theatre; Serbia, 130.000; Greece, 80.000; Montenegro 31.000.⁹⁰ Based on the information that Erickson gives Bulgarians fielded 459,810 men in their army, and Montenegrins, 44.500. Obviously it is difficult to determine the exact numbers, but considering the numbers even roughly, the Ottoman army had the advantage of manpower on paper

⁸⁸ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 24.

⁸⁹ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 16-17.

⁹⁰ Kemal Soyupak and Hüseyin Kabasakal, "The Turkish Army in the First Balkan War," in *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, eds. Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) 159.

against its enemies separately, but in practice, the Ottomans fought against a number of men sometimes close to theirs and at some battles against forces overwhelmingly high in number.

The Ottoman government passed new laws regarding conscription to benefit from larger portions of the population in the army in 1909. New legislation limited the certain previous exemptions (of non-Muslims and Muslims) based on the regulation of 1886. As a result, the Ottomans could recruit more non-Muslims than before during the Balkan wars. On the other hand, existing exemptions still reduced the manpower for the mobilization. Another obstacle in front of an effective mobilization was that some corps were scattered in the remote lands of the Empire. For example, because of the insurrections in Yemen in 1911, thirty percent of the total regular and reserve units were dispatched to Yemen.⁹¹ Abdullah Pasha, the commander of the Eastern Army, also mentions this situation in his memoirs:

The most important troops of these armies (the First and the Second Armies) were scattered because of the combats of Yemen, Albania, and Italy, thus it was not possible to benefit from these in the following war.⁹²

Secondly, especially reserve units in the Ottoman army were weak in some respects. Hamit Ercan, a young non-commissioned officer, who was to teach new methods of warfare to the reserve units around Izmir during the Italo-Turkish War, informs about certain deficiencies of them such as their overly familiar demeanors and inability to comprehend the close order and weapon drills.⁹³ Mahmut Muhtar Pasha serving as

⁹¹ *Balkan Harbi 1912-1913: Harbin Sebepleri*, 131.

⁹² Abdullah Kölemen, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu Kumandanı Abdullah Paşa'nın Balkan Harbi Hatıratı*, eds. Tahsin Yıldırım and İbrahim Öztürkçü (İstanbul: DBY, 2012), 79.

⁹³ Hamit Ercan, *Bir Osmanlı Askerinin Anıları: Balkan Savaşı'ndan Kurtuluş'a*, eds. Levent Alp and Ahmet Mehmetefendioğlu and Ozan Arslan (İzmir: Şenocak, 2010), 30-36.

the commander of the 3rd corps in the Eastern Army complains about reserves the most, while talking about runaway soldiers and dispersion during the retreat.⁹⁴ Even unqualified or poorly qualified army officers were not absent in these units.⁹⁵

Abdullah Pasha was also one of the commanders that emphasized the weakness of reserves:

As we believed that our reserves did not possess any value in terms of warfare during our command in 1911 of the Western Army concentrated against Montenegrins and the Western Army of Anatolia stationed around Izmir because of the Italo-Turkish War, if we held any hope, this rested in the regular corps.⁹⁶

Mehmet Beşikçi, on the other hand, underlines another factor causing this situation of reserves. Explaining the organization of the reserve units, and their functions before and during the Balkan wars, Beşikçi argues that it was not the fault of those soldiers that they could not meet the expectations of the Ottoman army organization. He suggests that regular troops that were to be the backbone of the fighting mechanism lacked in numbers because the Ottoman military could not mobilize enough of the potential manpower for these troops, and “partly to compensate for this deficiency,” the Ottoman army organization expected reserve units to function as efficient combatant forces while these units’ organization was not suitable for this.

He asserts that these soldiers were reacting in some way as such to the negative conditions imposed on them and corroborates his argument referring to the studies of sociology and military history that suggest soldiers of an age of compulsory military service in the modern era, may demonstrate an active reaction by running away in

⁹⁴ Mahmut Muhtar Pasha, *Balkan Harbi: Üçüncü Kolordu'nun ve İkinci Doğu Ordusu'nun Muharebeleri*, ed. Engin M. Ziyattin (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1979), 124.

⁹⁵ Rahmi Apak, *Yetmişlik Bir Subayın Hatıraları* (Ankara: TTK, 1988), 91.

⁹⁶ Kölemen, *1328 Balkan Harbi'nde Şark Ordusu*, 96.

cases when the state does not meet their certain basic expectations and also when their belief in the righteousness of the war is not continuously refreshed.⁹⁷

Historians also evaluate the effects of the military changes of the Second Constitutional Era to the outcome of the Balkan wars. One of the significant changes in this regard was about the regiments in the army. The Supreme Military Council passed some laws, such as the Law for Age Limitation of June 1909 and the Law for the Purge of Military Ranks of August 1909, which retired many regiments adding more to the already discharged regiments in 1908. Erickson says these laws aimed at creating a professional officer corps by eliminating patronage system, improving the qualifications of remaining regiments, and retiring some others, though “political priorities and loyalties”⁹⁸ had their share in these purges. He says many regiments were illiterate and did not have a formal military education, and most resisted modernization. Reorganization of the Ottoman army between 1910 and 1911, on the other hand, introduced school-trained officers in most of the important positions in the army.⁹⁹ Şükrü Hanioglu argues that massive retirement of regiments resulted in the lack of “expert staff” that had the experience of fighting and knew the field.¹⁰⁰

Historians also criticize some operational decisions of the Ottoman army during the First Balkan War. For example, Hall argues that Abdullah Pasha’s offensive against Bulgarians in Thrace on 21 October, before reinforcements could arrive from Anatolia, was disadvantageous for the Ottomans, because many of his troops,

⁹⁷ Mehmet Beşikçi, “Balkan Harbi’nde Osmanlı Seferberliği ve Redif Teşkilatının İflası” *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no. 110 (Spring 2012): 27-43.

⁹⁸ Erickson & Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, 221.

⁹⁹ Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 23-24.

¹⁰⁰ *Rumeliye Elveda*, DVD.

especially the reserve units, were ill-equipped and ill-trained. According to Hall, Nazım Pasha, the Ottoman minister of war, ordering this offensive abandoned the existing war plan that envisaged a defensive strategy.¹⁰¹ Erickson, on the other hand, objects to the idea that the Ottomans left their defensive strategy by arguing as such: “In actuality, the Ottoman General Staff held to the preconceived strategic concept of seizing the operational initiative within the larger framework of the strategic defensive.” Then he adds that Pertev Pasha (the chief of operations) ordered both Western and Eastern Armies to start attacking before Christian armies concentrated.¹⁰² At the end, however, Ottoman offensive encirclement operations at Kırkkilise and then Lüleburgaz-Pınarhisar, and at Kumonovo and then Monastir in the Western Theatre deprived the Ottoman troops from “their greatest inherent advantage.”¹⁰³

Poor morale and lack of discipline, common in the Ottoman army, also affected the course of the wars. Suat Zeyrek refers to Uskub divisions in Kumonova battle that ran away during the night by leaving their artillery behind even before seeing Serbian troops, as an indication of lack of discipline and weak authority.¹⁰⁴ Also, some commissioned officers left their troops for a long time, thus causing disorderly movement of the companies that were left with no commissioned officer to lead

¹⁰¹ Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 24-25.

¹⁰² Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 83-84.

¹⁰³ Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 331, 181.

¹⁰⁴ Fevzi Çakmak, *Batı Rumeli'yi Nasıl kaybettik?: Garbi Rumeli'nin Suret-i Ziyai ve Balkan Harbi'nde Garb Cephesi*, ed. A. Tetik (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2011), 153.

them.¹⁰⁵ In addition, there were army officers who did not have any motivation for fighting. They asked: “What are we fighting for?”¹⁰⁶

As a result, Ottoman Army during the Balkan wars lost disastrously, which caused the Empire huge territorial losses. The Ottoman elites and intellectuals tried to win the war on the home front. The deficiencies in the Ottoman Army during the Balkan wars affected propaganda activities. These deficiencies and heavy defeats increased mobilization and propaganda efforts besides shaping the subjects of some propaganda writings.

¹⁰⁵ Mehmet Niyazi, *Şark Ordusu'nda Aziz Paşa Fırkası* (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1331), 49.

¹⁰⁶ Georges Remond, *Mağluplarla Beraber: Bir Fransız Gazetecinin Balkan Harbi İzlenimleri*, ed. Muammer Sarıkaya (Istanbul: Profil, 2007), 127.

CHAPTER IV

HOME FRONT MOBILIZATION

4.1. The National Defense League

The National Defense League was established soon after the coup de'tat of the CUP in 1913. On 31 January, the CUP declared that a "National Defense League" would be established with the objective of saving the fatherland in danger and called people to the meeting that would be held the same day in Dar'ül Fünun conference hall. The CUP asked the help of "each Ottoman" citizen by calling them to put aside personal aspirations and emotions, and cooperate to save the fatherland.¹⁰⁷ Some approached this call of unity and solidarity with caution. In other words, they questioned if the League sincerely aimed at working for the goal mentioned above free from partisanship, but generally, the League achieved to obtain the collaboration of people from different political views, which is evident in the support of the periodicals and the profile of the membership. According to Nazım Polat, the Ottoman/Turkish press

¹⁰⁷ "Beyanname," *İkdam*, 18 Kanunisanı 1328 /31 January 1913 in Nazım H Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991), 23-24.

including the newspapers known for their opposition to the CUP, such as *İkdam*, welcomed the establishment of the League and supported its activities especially at the beginning.¹⁰⁸ Polat says the commissions of the League was dominated by the Unionists but included opponents such as Diran Kelekyan, Nureddin Bey, Ahmed Ferit Tek, and Ahmed Cevdet (Oran).¹⁰⁹

Though the League declared its neutrality, some historians regard it as a paramilitary organization of the Unionist government. Sina Akşin claims that the CUP established the National Defense League to force the opposition to collaborate with them.¹¹⁰ Eyal Ginio says that the CUP had already started to mobilize civilians through economic boycott campaigns, public demonstrations and fund-raising in the face of international challenges that the Ottoman Empire confronted after the coup of 1908, thus, he argues, the associations working for these purposes were often linked to the CUP.¹¹¹

The CUP created new associations besides supporting already existing ones after it took the decision to include all associations into its structure in the Congress of 1913.¹¹² Thus, the strong connection after the coup of 1913 between the CUP and

¹⁰⁸ See Nazım H Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*.

¹⁰⁹ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Meşrutiyet Hatıraları," *Fikir Hareketleri Mecmuası* 8, no. 196 (Temmuz 1937): 214 in Nazım H. Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991), 31.

¹¹⁰ See Sina Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat Terakki* (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1980), 145-147; Erdal Aydoğan, "Paramiliter Bir Kuruluş Olan Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Bazı Çalışmaları," *Atatürk Dergisi* 3, no. 3 (2003): 68.
<http://188.125.166.138/~tfww/paramiliter-bir-kurulus-olan-mudafaa-i-milliyet-cemiyetinin-kurulusu-ve-i-dunya-savasinda-bazi-calismalari/>.

¹¹¹ Eyal Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat* (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 116-118.

¹¹² See Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler: İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın; Bir Partinin Tarihi*, Vol. 3 of *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000) 337. For the relationship between the CUP and the Ottoman Red Crescent see Hüsnü Ada, "The First Ottoman Civil Society Organization in the Service of the Ottoman State: The Case of the Ottoman Red Crescent" (M.A., Sabancı University, 2004), 28; Mesut Çapa, "Kızılay (Hilal-i Ahmer) Cemiyeti

civil society organizations is natural but it should be kept in mind that the CUP was the government henceforth. In other words, this connection firstly shows the government support for these associations. Then, it does not mean all members were Unionists or pro-CUP as demonstrated in the membership structure of the National Defense League.

In the first meeting of the League, the committees of Aid, *Irshad*,¹¹³ Hospitals, Principles and the Committee for the Volunteer Regiments were founded. And the League was organized in provinces besides the center to be able to reach people as many as possible. The head Şerif Ali Haydar Bey sent telegrams to the mayors of provinces and districts to inform about the society and asked for the opening of provincial branches.¹¹⁴

One of the very effective committees of the League in terms of mobilizing people was the Committee for the Volunteer Regiments that called for volunteers for military helping facilities through the media and utilized the influential people of their regions. The volunteers were trained in arsenal battalion before being dispatched to the units in the front. They either fought or worked for the war effort in other facilities such as road and bridge construction, sanitary affairs, and shipment.¹¹⁵

(1914-1925)” (Ph.D diss. Ankara Üniversitesi, 1989), 12. For the Navy League see Mehmet Beşikçi, “The Organized Mobilization of Popular Sentiments: The Ottoman Navy League, 1909-1919” (M.A., Boğaziçi University, 1999); Selahittin Özçelik, *Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: TTK, 2000).

¹¹³ “*Irshad*” means “the act of showing the true path” in a religious context.

¹¹⁴ Erol Akcan, “Balkan ve Birinci Dünya Haribi Yıllarında Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti,” *Tarihin Peşinde*, no. 13 (2015): 165. http://www.tarihinpesinde.com/dergimiz/sayi13/M13_07.

¹¹⁵ Aydoğan, “Paramiliter Bir Kuruluş Olan Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti’nin Kuruluşu,” 71.

The Committee of Principles was also sending declarations to the press to call people for donations from time to time.¹¹⁶

Also, the Committee of *Irshad* aimed at reaching people through speeches and sermons. The Committee, whose secretary general was Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), mainly composed of the men of letters and the cloth. According to the primary principles of the Committee, the members would organize religious and national speeches in which they would motivate people, and ask the public for whatever sacrifice was required in the face of the “the great danger that the state was in;” the speeches and sermons would totally be free from partisanship. Atrocities of the Balkan nations would be told to people with the goal of achieving national unity and getting the lost lands back; the reasons of the “disasters” would be analyzed from the point of “morality and economy, not political.” The Committee would explain that even the disasters could bring about benefits for determined nations.¹¹⁷

In line with these missions and objectives, the first declaration of the Committee emphasized that their call was to everybody and “to the each corner of ‘the Ottoman homeland.’”¹¹⁸ This idea of Ottoman solidarity was exemplified in the Committee’s collaboration with Jewish *millet* of the Ottoman Empire. The Committee held a meeting with the notables of the Jewish *millet* in Hasköy Mirahi Synagogue on March 5, 1913. One of the members explained how the Ottomans protected the Jews in history, and Jewish Rolevi Efendi spoke about the Spanish oppression of the Jews

¹¹⁶ Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, 2.

¹¹⁷ “Vazife-i İrşad Nasıl Yapılacak...,” *İkdam*, 30 January 1328/12 February 1913, 3 in Nazım H. Polat *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1991) 60-61; Aydoğan, “Paramiliter Bir Kuruluş Olan Müdafaa-i Milliyet Cemiyeti’nin Kuruluşu,” 73.

¹¹⁸ “Umum Vatandaşlara!” *İkdam*, 26 January 1328/8 February 1913, 4.

in the past and told that Turks “received them with open arms.” Then he asked Jews not to speak any language other than Turkish.¹¹⁹

4.1.1. The Meetings of the Women’s Committee

The Women’s Committee of the National Defense League was established with the initiation of four female students of the Darülfünun in Petersburg. These Turkish girls were Gülsüm Kemalova, Rukiye Yunusova, Meryem Yakubova and Meryem Pataşova. They suggested that a Women’s Committee be established with the missions of collecting donations in Istanbul after dividing the city into regions for this purpose; organizing conferences; creating divisions of women that would go to the fronts to serve for the war efforts. And the last suggestion above also mentioned “if necessary, women should sacrifice their life.” Lastly, they suggested that the Sultan Mehmed Reşad go to the front to lead the Ottoman Army, as Halide Edip argued.¹²⁰

The Committee organized two conferences in the Darülfünun conference hall on February, 8 and 15. The speakers included the Ottoman elites such as Cevdet Pasha’s daughter and novelist Fatma Aliye; Macar Osman Pasha’s daughter and author Nigar Binti Osman; Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s daughter Fehime Nüzhet; Köse Raif Pasha’s

¹¹⁹ “Musevi Vatandaşlarımızın Tezahürat-ı Vatanperveranesinden,” *İkdam*, 20 February 1328/5 March 1913 in Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, 61. The official language of the Ottoman Empire was Turkish since 1876, but in the Second Constitutional Era, according to Erol Ülker this was emphasized more. And he argues that this and some other policies of the state in this period are wrongly interpreted as the assimilation policies of the state while they should be regarded within the policies of centralization and decentralization. See Erol Ülker, “Contextualising ‘Turkification’: nation-building in the late Ottoman Empire, 1908-18” *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005).

¹²⁰ Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, 73-74.

daughter İhsan Raif. Other intellectuals and activists that spoke in the conferences included Halide Edip (Adivar), Naciye Hanım, Gülsüm Kemalova, some students (Mebruke, Zehra and Firdevs) from the high school for females and (Muzafer, Huriye Baha, Nezihe Muhlis) from Anadolu Hisarı İttihat ve Terakki Kız Mektebi.¹²¹

4.1.1.1. Awakening Patriotic and Nationalist Sentiments

The female speakers of the National Defense League called their audience to work for “the fatherland, nation, and religion” by addressing to patriotic, religious, and sometimes nationalist sentiments. Thus, they addressed to “the Ottomans,” “Turks,” and “Muslims.” Depending on which sentiments a speaker addressed to, the major intended audience changed. The speakers emphasized the necessity and urgency for taking action for saving of the fatherland, nation, and religion that was in danger. Thus patriotism was the common theme. Namely, they all appealed to patriotic feelings, but only some appealed to nationalist sentiments, or indeed, tried to “awaken” nationalist sentiments in the audience.

For nationalist sentiments, the speeches of Halide Edip, Firdevs, Fehime Nüzhet and Nezihe Muhlis can stand as examples. Firdevs told how Turkish women helped the soldiers with their physical power in the past and asked “Ladies, where is this blood? Where is that life, that Turkish blood?”¹²² Halide Edip called for the awakening of “Turkishness” in the minds and hearts of the audience. She described “the Ottoman Turks” as “a nation that does not know how to be proud of its nation, does not love its nation, in the last rank in awakening with its national sentiments.” She argued if

¹²¹ Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 9-13.

¹²² Firdevs, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 37.

people realized that “Turkishness is the thing we want that would live,” nobody could defeat or kill them.¹²³ Fehime Nüzhet also talked about the necessity of the “awakening” for the future of the state. She invited the audience to talk with people “in whose soul the pride, national affection and grandness of Turkishness has died” and “try to indoctrinate him/her with the ‘identity’ of his grandiose ancestors.”¹²⁴ Nezihe Muhlis also referred to the high qualities of “Turkishness” as such: “

We Turks shall either live a magnificent life in the pride of liberty that is worthy of our race, or shall prefer the dignified death to a derogated life... Turks has never lost the characteristics of spiritual and racial that has been bestowed upon.¹²⁵

For patriotic feelings some examples can be given from the speeches of Nakiye and Fatma Aliye. Nakiye told the responsibility of the citizens and called for action in the following words:

The future, liberation, and salvation of the nation is in the hands of the nation again, namely in our hands...each individual of the nation saves fortune only for the time of sacrifice. No matter how little it is, again, it doesn't belong to the individual but to the whole Ottomanism.¹²⁶

Fatma Aliye said “our nation” comprehended the necessity to work in collaboration “in the national defense.” Thus, she addressed to each Ottoman citizen to save the Ottoman nation.¹²⁷ Gülsüm Kemalova called women to work for “the fatherland and religion” and associated patriotic terms with established values such as honor, dignity, and faith as such:

¹²³ Halide Edip, *Kadınlarımızın İhtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 41-45.

¹²⁴ Fehime Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İhtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 76.

¹²⁵ Nezihe Muhlis, *Kadınlarımızın İhtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 66-67.

¹²⁶ Nakiye, *Kadınlarımızın İhtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 32.

¹²⁷ Fatma Aliye, *Kadınlarımızın İhtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 23-25.

We have no doubts that all of your hearts are full of national and religious patriotism and you all are ready to sacrifice anything you can so that the national dignity can be saved.... (Our men) take dying for the fatherland and nation as honor...Let's make (our enemies) see that Turkish women are nothing less than men when it comes to the issue of the fatherland, dignity.¹²⁸

She used the propaganda technique, glittering generalities such as patriotism, dignity, and honor. These terms have positive connotations, but their meaning was vague and differed depending on the context. Kemalova associated dignity and honor with patriotic ideas. Accordingly, she argued that dying for the fatherland was honorable, and the fatherland was the dignity of a nation.

Fatma Aliye's speech emphasized religion more to arouse patriotic feelings. She referred to the Quran to call for Muslim solidarity. Firstly, she discussed the assaults of the Balkan states in the name of religion and "civilized" West that ignored the massacres of Muslims in the Balkans. She quoted a Quranic verse mentioning the necessity of Muslim solidarity and invited women to work for the fatherland by reminding their roles as citizens of the country. Then, she argued that their works and sacrifices for the fatherland, religion, and nation would enhance their afterlife other than the worldly life.¹²⁹

4.1.1.2. Appeal to Fear and Bandwagon

While asking for sacrifices, the speakers emphasized that "the fatherland was in danger" and the situation of the Ottoman state was associated with "disaster," but it was possible to pull through by serious work. Speakers' appealed to existing anxiety

¹²⁸ Glsm Kemalova, *Kadınlarımızın İtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 26-27.

¹²⁹ Fatma Aliye, *Kadınlarımızın İtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 23-25.

and aimed at increasing the cause and then asked for sacrifices. This, worked as a motivational force. They also gave examples of support from Muslims and Turks abroad to motivate the Ottoman women and showed that they were not alone besides reminding them to do their share as everybody else was doing his/her share.

Kemalova talked about “the danger” by benefiting from the rhetorical device, epistrophe as such: “Today the fatherland is in danger. The sacred center of Caliphate of three hundred million Muslims is in danger.”¹³⁰ The repetition of the term “danger” at the end of the sentences made her speech more powerful because the words have cadence. This approach also made the sentences more memorable. It is also possible to argue that the stressed idea was that the country was in danger because the repeated word was “danger.” Nakiye also used the same device in the same topic: “Ladies! Today, more than any other time, the religion is in danger, the fatherland is in danger.”¹³¹ Depending on the fact that the women’s speeches often associated the existing situation of the Ottoman Empire to doomsday and disaster, the epistrophe might have aimed at evoking anxiety, fear, or awareness so that people would take action.

The following paragraph from Fehime Nüzhet’s speech may stand as another example of the same discourse that I mentioned above:

Ladies!

These days are (like) the doomsday. It will be understood if our nation that has attained a long and glorious life time of six hundred thirty years has the right to live henceforth or not. What is the love for the fatherland? What is the sacrifice for the homeland? What is the difference between being slaves to our former

¹³⁰ Kemalova, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 26-27.

¹³¹ Nakiye, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 32.

subjects and being independent and sovereign? It will be known in these days if (our nation)¹³² have comprehended these or not.¹³³

These were rhetorical questions; thus, Fehime Nüzdeh did not expect for an answer.

The paragraph suggested that the survival of the Ottoman state and the freedom of the Ottomans depended on the comprehension of the situation of the Ottoman state, patriotism, and sacrifice. So if one loved his/her motherland, s/he should sacrifice because otherwise s/he would be enserfed. The metaphor “doomsday” standing for “these days” increased the association between the two situations; thus, the speaker emphasized the urgency of awakening.

Then she continued with the following questions:

Shall we wait without doing nothing while the grandiose building of the fatherland is crackling and about to collapse? Shall we save our money to pay for the pleasures of Bulgarian soldiers? ...shall we, too, prepare to set out soon? No, thousand times no.¹³⁴

As another way of encouraging the Ottoman women for sacrificing, the women showed how the Muslims and Turks all around the world suffered seeing this disaster and that they supported the Ottoman Empire materially and morally. Thus, the speakers used the propaganda technique, bandwagon whose main idea was that “everybody is doing so you should do it as well.” For example, Fehime Nüzhet stated that the whole world of Muslims and Turks was in agony. The eyes of people from China, Iran, Africa, India, Java, Turkistan, and Afghanistan “want to close forever not to see a flipped crescent...” Then she asked “What about us?” and answered that

¹³² The subject of the sentence is ambiguous. A possible translation might be “a regular/orderly commission that has millions of individuals, men and women.” Depending on the rest of the speech it might be the Ottoman nation or may also include the Muslims all around the world.

¹³³ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 29.

¹³⁴ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 31

they were suffering as well and talked about the necessity of supporting the Ottoman soldiers materially and morally.¹³⁵

Kemalova also used the same propaganda technique of bandwagon. She stated that her purpose was to inform about the fact that “their millions of northern sisters” were sharing their agony and gave a dramatic example regarding this sorrow. Accordingly, a woman from Petersburg committed suicide out of her sorrow during the Italo-Turkish War (1911-12) the previous year. Then she came to the point of asking for sacrifices. She told the Ottoman women that their northern sisters were expecting “benevolence, determination, steadiness, and action” from them.¹³⁶ She also included an example of a “sacrifice” from “their northern sisters” in her speech to show they were doing their share and it was time the Ottoman women started sacrificing. She encouraged the Ottoman women to take action by showing “their northern sisters” were also actively supporting the Ottoman cause.

4.1.1.3. “Give, for the fatherland, for the religion, for dear soldiers!”¹³⁷

As for the issue of how the Ottoman women could work for the war effort, the speakers argued they could contribute to the war effort through donations; sewing necessary things for the Ottoman soldiers; working in the Ottoman Red Crescent; going to the fronts to motivate the soldiers and work there; spreading the word to

¹³⁵ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 30-31.

¹³⁶ Kemalova, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 26-28.

¹³⁷ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 79.

other people; sending “indifferent” men to the fronts; and praying for the victory of the Ottoman Army.

Kemalova encouraged women to donate their jewelry for the National Defense League and to go to the fronts. For the latter, she showed *Hız. Aişe* and other Muslim women as role models who accompanied their men going for fighting to motivate the soldiers and also serve for them. Thus, she invited Muslim women to act in the same manner. Secondly, she argued that they could help through donations. She said that “as you know, a person can live without jewelry but cannot live without dignity... the conscience of none of us would accept wearing those jewelry and silk and walk around, while the fatherland is in such a danger.” So they were supposed to “sacrifice for the fatherland, nation, and dignity.”¹³⁸ Another speaker, a student in the high school for females, called women to help by sewing and donating. Also they could send “the indifferent” men spending time in cafes, home, and saloons for “the defense of the fatherland.”¹³⁹

As I mentioned above, one of the ways how the Ottoman women could contribute to the war effort was to go to the fronts to motivate soldiers and work there. Women came up with an idea in the meeting, which also showed that they were aware of the fact that soldiers needed motivation. Thus, they decided to send a telegram to the Ottoman army to motivate the soldiers for fighting:

Soldier Brothers!

Our religion, homeland, and honor (*namus*) are in danger. If you destroy the enemy and save these, you will earn the consent of Allah, save the heritage of our ancestors, august sultans, and the honor of your daughters, and receive the prayers of your mothers. This time Muslim women can meet only an army that

¹³⁸ Kemalova, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 27.

¹³⁹ Zehra, *Kadınlarımızın İctimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 36.

destroyed the enemy and rescued the honor of Muslimness and Turkishness. If you escape from the enemy, you will bring the abasement of the world on Muslims and Turkism. If you escape from the enemy, you will not be able to come back before trampling down all of the Muslim women who have been prepared to die for their land, religion, and honor.

May Allah help you!¹⁴⁰

Nakiye also showed how the Ottoman women could help by referring to history.

Firstly, she emphasized the urgency of taking an action for “dear mother”¹⁴¹ that was waiting for help by asking rhetorical questions:

Shall we respond by shutting our ears to this cry/clamor of our mother? Shall we sleep until the enemy holds our ears and shake? ...Shall we leave our money for the enemy so that they can turn our mosques into taverns? Shall we save our diamonds for adorning their ‘madams’ and churches? Or shall we wear them while shivering in front of the bayonets of the enemy the slayer? What are we waiting for? Our sisters who live thanks to this soil, this nation! It is high time we worked through patriotism.¹⁴²

Then, Nakiye explained how Swedish people contributed their country’s war effort.

Accordingly, they came up with a project called “the Sacrifice Week” to meet the

Swedish government’s need for a ship. Each person would spend money only on

their basic needs out of their weekly budget and spare the rest as donations. They did

so, and the government could buy a ship better than they envisaged. After giving this

example for the sacrifice of the people of the Swedish nation, she asked for donations

and called those who did not have money to apply such project as “the Sacrifice

Week.” And those who could not do either should help the Red Crescent in their

works for the war effort. Lastly, the old who could not do any of these could pray

until God shall give victory.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ *Tanin*, 9 February 1328/22 February 1913.

¹⁴¹ “Mother” stands for the fatherland.

¹⁴² Nakiye, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 32-33.

¹⁴³ Nakiye, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 33-34.

4.2. The Balkan Wars in Belles-Lettres

Literature can become an effective means of propaganda, and it was so, for the Ottomans during the Balkan wars. The Ottoman litterateurs attempted to galvanize the home front for the war effort and bolster the morale of the army by producing and publishing works in the genres of poetry, short stories, and theater. Haluk Harun Duman mentions around 280 poems dealing with the Balkan wars in the newspapers and journals regularly published in Istanbul;¹⁴⁴ 25 short stories published in *İkdam*, *Tanin*, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, *Halka Doğru*, *Donanma*, and *Türk Yurdu*;¹⁴⁵ 5 published plays¹⁴⁶ between 1912 and 1914.

The litterateurs benefited from the propaganda techniques such as glittering generalities, atrocity propaganda and appeals to emotions. They used vague and “glittering” terms such as honor, dignity and glory and associated them with the things for which they asked for sacrifices, which was similar to the women’s speeches that I argued in the previous section. As for the reflections of the ideas of Ottomanism and Turkish nationalism, these ideas sometimes coexisted in one writing, and at other times only one of them was emphasized.

Nationalist ideas were generally conveyed in addressing to the audience. Some writings addressed to the Turks specifically and drew its topic from the Turkish

¹⁴⁴ Duman, *Balkanlar’a Veda*, 103.

¹⁴⁵ Duman, *Balkanlar’a Veda*, 237.

¹⁴⁶ Cengiz Yolcu states that there exists no evidence if the plays, *Gayz* (Wrath) and *Edirne Müdafaası* yahud *Şükrü Paşa* (Defense of Edirne or *Şükrü Pasha*) together with *Türk Kanı* (The Turkish Blood), *İrkımızın Namusu* (The Honor of our Folk), and *Güzel Rumeli* (Pleasant Rumelia) were staged or not. See Cengiz Yolcu, “Depiction of the Enemy: Ottoman Propaganda Books In the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913” (M.A., Boğaziçi University, 2014).

history. For example, a poem titled “Orphan Fatherland” expressing sadness about the situation in which the country was, posed a rhetorical question regarding “the Turks”: “What a sight is it? Oh God, what happened to the Turk?”¹⁴⁷ Ali Canip Yöntem and Enis Behiç Koryürek pointed out “the Turkish” rule over the Balkans. Yöntem, asked the floods to devastate the west and the east “as long as they do not submit to the Turk” after mentioning atrocities of the enemy.¹⁴⁸ Another poem called “Turks” for fighting stating that “the fatherland is our mother, our honor.”¹⁴⁹ The metaphor in the sentence above implies the sacredness of the fatherland. It is possible to read it in two ways: the fatherland is our mother who is our honor, or it is our mother and our honor. The concept of honor in the meaning of “*namus*” in Turkish is usually associated with the woman in patriarchal societies, but how a society or an individual at a particular time perceives it differs. Thus in this sentence honor might stand for the fatherland or the mother. In either case, all three terms can be argued within the context of the things for which the propagandist wanted people to sacrifice. They were so valuable, and now in danger of an attack; thus, it was high time that they took action.

Patriotism, on the other hand, can be regarded as the main theme in all of the writings because the purpose was to obtain sacrifices during the wars. There was a lack of motivation among the soldiers and a lack of interest in the fighting among the civilians during the Balkan wars. Thus, it was necessary to arouse patriotism for the fatherland and also it was useful to appeal to religious sentiments for this purpose.

¹⁴⁷ Müfit Necdet “Öksüz Yurdum,” *Büyük Duygu*, 23 May 1329/ 5 June 1913.

¹⁴⁸ Ali Canip Yöntem, “Kaval,” *Halka Doğru*, 13 June 1329/26 June 1913.

¹⁴⁹ Özdemir, “Türklere,” *Hikmet*, 11 October 1328/26 October 1912, quoted in Duman, *Balkanlar’a Veda*, 114.

Ziya Gökalp can be given as a prominent example within this regard. Ziya Gökalp, in his lullaby, told the son whose father died for his fatherland that the enemy would fear if he grew up. He called the father as “martyr” implying the sanctity of the fatherland. Secondly, he asked him to take the crescent back to the mosques on top of which there was cross anymore.¹⁵⁰ In his another poem while calling for fighting he mentioned “the fatherland, nation, flag, and religion” were in danger.¹⁵¹

4.2.1. Atrocity vs. Revenge

Defamation and demonization of the enemy are the concepts that can be discussed within atrocity propaganda. The purpose of atrocity propaganda is to arouse hatred against the enemy by depicting the enemy through its atrocities exaggerated or fabricated. Atrocity propaganda was the common characteristic of the speeches, belles-lettres, and the reports that I analyze. It was mostly employed through the news, but some literary writings employed this propaganda technique as well.

Mehmet Akif affronted the warring Balkan states by calling Montenegrins as bandits; Serbians as donkeys; Bulgarians as snakes; Greeks as dogs.¹⁵² Ali Ekrem described the Balkan allies as the enemies of the religion and honor/chastity. Then he called them “vile” and associated their troops with “mad dogs.”¹⁵³ Cihangir Sabiha said the

¹⁵⁰ Ziya Gökalp, “Şehid Haremi,” *Halka Doğru*, 9 May 1329/22 May 1913.

¹⁵¹ Ziya Gökalp, “Yurdumuza Koşalım,” *Büyük Duygu*, 20 June 1329/3 July 1913

¹⁵² M. Akif “Yarası Olmayan Gocunmasın,” *Sebilürreşad* 29 November 1328/ 12 December 1912. For a similar stereotyping in an Albanian propaganda picture see appendix, 3.

¹⁵³ Ali Ekrem, “Orduya Hitap,” *Tanin*, 3 January 1329/16 February 1913.

Adrianople “had been surrendered to rabid dogs, monsters, and wolves not to an enemy” in his story titled “I Shall Not Deliver the Civilization to Ferocity” that was published on July 31, 1913, after the Ottoman troops retook the Adrianople.

“Ferocity” in the title stands for the enemy while civilization stands for the Ottomans. The main idea of the story is that the civilized Ottomans saved the city when they retook it from the atrocious enemy. When the commander of the enemy entered in the city, he said that “Go, to drink Turkish blood,” and the story ended with the following statement: “I shall not deliver the civilization to ferocity” in the personification of the swords, bayonets, cannons. This statement is meaningful and reflects one of the common arguments among the political elites that the West was not civilized because they were indifferent to the agony of Muslims/Turks being massacred in the Balkans.¹⁵⁴

Timur Melik’s poem titled “The Prayer of the Turk” also described the enemy in a derogatory manner as such:

Here the enemy is laying on the ground breathing for life
Wishes to have the son of Turks (Türkoğlu) relent
The place, where its dirty carrion lays, is filling with crimson blood
Wishes to die in a flash
Oh Almighty God do not let my enemy wander in my homeland
Do not let the Turk, this servant of yours be oppressed by his enemy.¹⁵⁵

Calling a human corpse as carrion is already pejorative, but what the poet refers to as “dirty carrion” is not even a dead body; it is “the enemy” laying on the ground in the throes of death.

¹⁵⁴ Cihangir Sabiha, “Medeniyeti Vahşete Esir Etmem,” *Rûbab*, 18 July 1329/31 July 1913, in Nesime Ceyhan, *Balkan Savaşı Hikayeleri* (Istanbul: Selis Kitaplar, 2007), 147.

¹⁵⁵ Timur Melik, “The Prayer of the Turk,” *Teşrih*, 22 October 1328/4 November 1912, quoted in Duman, *Balkanlar’a Veda*, 133.

One poet addressed to “the soldiers of Islam” warning them against a huge cross walking on them associating it with the atrocities, so the implication is that it was a war between the cross and the crescent because the people of the cross were oppressing Muslims. Accordingly, they “emboweled thousands of women and killed many orphans and they were athirst for attacking right and chastity.”¹⁵⁶

The use of the word “right” (*hak*) needs further explanation. In a religious context, it connotes justice, righteousness, truth and Islam in addition to its usage to cover all kinds of rights of a person. Thus, it is possible to think that the poet states their attack to “right” to refer to their attack to Islam/the truth as well as to the lives, properties, freedom, chastity, honor of the Muslim population of Balkans thus oppressing them. In this sense, an attack to Islam/the truth means assaulting every value God set; raping the rights of people was directly associated with attacking Islam itself.

Most of the time demonstration of the enemy’s atrocities went hand in hand with sacred values. The following excerpt from a poem drew attention to atrocities through sacred values or vice versa:

Mother earth has turned scarlet out of blood
As has been butchered the Turkish woman, Turkish girl!
Have attacked monstrously to your quick (the vital spot)
Heaps of thieves of chastity and honor!

Cross has been hung on mihrabs, adhans
Has been silenced, bells tolling with loud thumps
Minbars of mosques has been demolished
Has been trampled by boats, Qurans!..¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Ali Ekrem, “Orduya Hitap.”

¹⁵⁷ Tahirü’l-Mevlevi, “Kulağına Küpe Olsun Unutma,” 14 August 1913, *Publication of Rumeli Muhacirin-i İslamiye Cemiyeti*, quoted in Hayriye Süleymanoğlu Yenisoy, “1912-1913 Balkan Savaşlarının Edebiyata Yansıması,” 94. bys.trakya.edu.tr/file/download/70139778/.

Again the concept of honor (*namus*) reflects a wider meaning than chastity. It may still be associated with woman, but even in that case, the poet does not directly and exclusively mean raping by “thieves of honor” as he used the word chastity along with the honor. So it might be any attack on a woman, and more specifically their “butchering Turkish women/girls.” Secondly, the poet used some symbols of Islam such as mosque, adhan, and the Quran to describe the enemy’s hostility and disrespect towards Islam.

Denigration was also directed to runaway soldiers because fighting was not a sacrifice but an obligation. Women were asked for “sacrifice” in the speeches as well as in some belles-lettres because there was no obligation, but men were either conscripted, so obliged to fight, or called to join as volunteers. The women and men were all expected to contribute to the war effort in any way possible, but when they did not, the perception in the texts regarding men was pejorative. In women’s speeches, on the other hand, it is possible to see only a mild criticism in such a situation.

Just as fighting was glorious, running away from the army was inglorious. Runaway soldiers became “the other” within. Esat Rıza cursed a runaway soldier whom he called “despicable” wishing him to die and go under the earth so that nobody would see him because he dishonored the believers, damaged “the honor of Turkishness” and also his glory. He ran away from “heaven and martyrdom.”¹⁵⁸ Abdülhak Hamit said whoever surrendered the enemy whose purpose was to destroy the fatherland was the most inferior traitor of the fatherland.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Esat Rıza, “Sükuttan Sonra,” *Büyük Duygu*, 23 May 1329/5 July 1913.

¹⁵⁹ Abdülhak Hamit, “Terane-i Harp,” *Sabah*, 10 October 1328/23 October 1912.

Aka Gündüz also dealt with the same theme in one of his short stories. An old man curious about his son combatting in the front found out about a lieutenant who ran away causing other privates to panic and to return in a body, thus a victory that could be won vanishes at a stroke. The soldier explaining the event was talking about the battalion that the old man's son was in, and also, his son answered to the description of the runaway lieutenant, so the old man thinking that this "traitor" was his son became miserable.¹⁶⁰

Revenge theme as an answer to the atrocities and belligerence of the enemy besides as a motivational force to continue fighting was one of the common themes. Some of the writings with the revenge theme specifically called men for fighting to retake the city of Adrianople. And this was explicit in some and implicit in some others, but still obvious depending on the date of the publication.

A poem with the signature of "a muhajir" personified Maritza mentioning its sadness upon the loss of Selimiye Mosque (or the fall of Edirne in broad terms) and disrespect of Bulgarians to it. The poet assured the crying river that the flame of vengeance was in their heart and the Turkish army was coming.¹⁶¹ Mehmet Ali Tevfik, in his poem, expressed his will to take revenge of a Muslim girl named Safiye who was raped in Çatalca.¹⁶² This also showed the influence of atrocity propaganda on some of the propagandists themselves. The intellectuals exposed to propaganda first themselves attempted to influence others.

¹⁶⁰ Aka Gündüz, "Piç," *Tanin*, 1 February 1328/14 February 1913.

¹⁶¹ "Sultan Selim," *Halka Doğru*, 25 April 1329/8 May 1913.

¹⁶² Mehmet Ali Tevfik, "Hemşirenin Hitabı," *Tanin*, 8 February 1328/ 21 February 1913.

Nezihe Muhlis' story titled as *Lullaby of Battle (Cenk Ninnisi)* mentioned an old woman whose son joined the Balkan wars. She went to a notable of the village in the hope of getting war news and found out that her son sent a letter. Mehmet who was taken to hospital because of his wounds bade farewell to both by saying he took the revenge of his father who died in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and willed his son to follow in his footsteps.¹⁶³

Another story called the *Last Will (Vasiyet)* had the same theme of revenge, but this time the old woman asked his son to take revenge by reminding her son of the previous Bulgarian atrocities against Turks, and she even willed him to instill the desire for revenge in future generations.¹⁶⁴ Another story dealing with the same theme told about an old woman who was happy that her son joined the army and was fighting against the enemy. She was not sad much when she heard about her son's death because of two reasons: first, he took his father's revenge who died in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78; second, he died as a martyr.¹⁶⁵

4.2.2. Symbols of Glory

Glory was presented as another theme to motivate soldiers and encourage men to go for fighting. The writings promoted the idea that fighting was glorious. Sometimes, they emphasized the warrior heritage of the Ottoman/Turkish nation. Some poems glorified certain individuals in the army for their success, heroism, and bravery

¹⁶³ Nezihe Muhlis, "Cenk Ninnisi," September 1912.

¹⁶⁴ Ercüment Ekrem, "Vasiyet," *Senin*, 22 October 1328/4 November 1912.

¹⁶⁵ M. Tahir, "Şehit Anası," *Büyük Duygu*, 9 May 1329/22 May 1913.

besides attributing similar characteristics to the soldiers as a whole to fire them up. Some other writings referred to the glorious past and great conquerors to encourage soldiers for fighting. And any “success” of the Ottomans during the wars became a reference point for the most recent glories.

Üsküdarlı Talat used the image of the glorious past in his poem. He referred to the period of Murad I who conquered significant territories in the Balkans. He asked the soldiers to destroy the enemy and achieve a victory like the one in the Battle of Kosovo. Thus, they would beatify the soul of Murad I.¹⁶⁶ Ercüment Ekrem mentioned that their “ancestors marched Vienna,” and called soldiers to march so that their “sacred flag would reach to its previous border.”¹⁶⁷ Süleyman Nazif reminded the memory of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and expressed his longing for Plevna as well as his wish for reunion with it. By referring Plevna, he said “we fell apart thirty years ago, oh glorious battlefield we have come again.”¹⁶⁸ As I mentioned earlier, the Plevna defense was one of the prominent topics of epic in the Hamidian era. The memory Plevna was evoked again during the Balkan wars, but this time with a different objective, namely, the hope of “reunion.”

Ziya Gökalp also mentioned some great conquerors of the Turkish history in one of his poems. It seemed to him that such conquerors remained in the past:

Is what I see Atilla or İlhan?..
Tell me, where are Turkish spirits?
Where is Turan, where is Karakurum?
Did Muscovys fill Türkistan?..¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Üsküdarlı Talat, “Avaza-i Harp,” *Sabah*, 11 October 1328/24 October 1912.

¹⁶⁷ Ercüment Ekrem, “Harp Şarkısı,” *Tanin*, 16 October 1328/29 October 1912.

¹⁶⁸ Süleyman Nazif, “Cenk Türküsü,” *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 16 October 1328/29 October 1912.

¹⁶⁹ Ziya Gökalp, “Türk Kartalı,” *Büyük Duygu*, 2 March 1329/15 March 1913.

Muallim Hicri was another writer who referred to glorious conquerors of the Ottoman history. He attributed the Ottoman soldiers a warrior heritage and associated this heritage with Turkish/Ottoman conquerors:

Go! Says to you: Your biological father, Oğuz,
Go! Says to you: Atilla and Yavuz,
You at the back, they are the guide on the front!
Is the march thus towards Edirne?¹⁷⁰

The most recent subjects in terms of the concept of glory were drawn from the enduring besieged cities and their commanders, and the cruiser Hamidiye. Filorinalı Nazım wrote a poem for the defenders of Janina while Salime Servet Seyfi dealt with those who combatted in Çatalca.¹⁷¹ A short story titled *Escapade of Megali-idea* glorified the success of the Ottoman cruiser Hamidiye. The story dedicated to Rauf Bey who commands the cruiser mentions the insanity of Polifovos, the commander of the Greek cruiser, Megali-idea. Accordingly, Greece sent an army officer to the cruiser for checking the accuracy of the news that Polifovos became insane all of a sudden in his cabin. The army officer found a notebook that turned out to be the diary of colonel Polifovos including his memories one week prior to his insanity. He started reading the diary and understood that the colonel became insane out of exhaustion and anxiety that consecutive attacks of Hamidiye caused. Worried after knowing about this, the new commander of the cruiser decided to take the cruiser to the Port of Piraeus with an excuse.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Muallim Hicri, “Edirneye mi?” *Tanin*, 23 July 1329/5 August 1913.

¹⁷¹ Filorinalı Nazım, “Yanya Müdafilerine” *Alemdar*, 6 February 1328/19 February 1913; S. Servet Seyfi, “Gidip Gelmeyenler,” *Donanma*, December/January 1912.

¹⁷² Ercüment Ekrem, “Megali-ideanın Sergüzeşti: Kahraman Rauf Bey,” *Tanin*, 22 January 1328/4 February 1913.

During the Balkan wars, the Ottoman cruiser Hamidiye destroyed a Greek cruiser and the gunpowder storage on the island of Syros, which was appreciated a lot and told as a great success in the news besides its maneuvers to escape the Greek Navy. Because of the the heavy defeats of the Ottoman Army during the wars, such relatively small successes were exaggerated.

Also, Adrianople, one of the besieged cities, became a prominent symbol of the wars. Spotting of Edirne seems to be associated with the possibility of retaking it when the dates of the writings are considered, and attributing Adrianople special importance after retaking is also out of the fact that it is the only land that the Ottoman army could save apart from its historical and strategical position.

A poem titled as “Vengeance” published in May referred to the history of Adrianople with a dramatic expression. After mentioning Bulgarian atrocities in the city and the agony of people exposed, it continued as such:

Sultan Murad is beating his chest in heaven for this situation,
Lala Şahin is tearing his heart out because of his agony,
Mimar Sinan is weeping inwardly...
Endured for 5.5 months and saved his/her honor,
Defeated the oceans of Bulgarians soundly,
Surrendered, but with her/his head held high...¹⁷³

Another poem with the same title above celebrated the retaking of Edirne in July. It emphasized the importance of the city as the only Ottoman land left in Rumelia with the following lines: “The name of the Turks that had been dominating Rumelia since 600 years was going to be erased, the last light of the crescent in Europe was going to go off...”¹⁷⁴ “The crescent” in the poem can be a metonymy for the Ottoman

¹⁷³ “Öç,” *Halka Doğru*, 25 April 1329/8 May 1913.

¹⁷⁴ “Öç,” *Halka Doğru*, 19 July 1329/1 August 1913.

Empire or Islam. The metonymy here may have aimed at giving both meanings, thus appealing to the Muslims all around the world.

Muallim Hicri also glorified Adrianople and attributed great importance to the city. He called Adrianople as “Turkish Ka’bah” in his poem published on 22 July 1913 when the Ottomans retook the city.¹⁷⁵ Thus, he attributed sanctity to the city to explain how crucial the city was for “the Turks.” When the Ottomans retook the city, it did not mean that they could keep it as the Ottoman territory until the war officially ended and the Great Powers approved that the city would be given back to the Ottomans. And the war with Bulgaria officially ended in September. Thus it is possible to see the propaganda writings whose subject was Adrianople in the periodicals by the Treaty of Constantinople (September 29, 1913) that settled peace between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria was signed.

4.2.3. Patriotism of Women

Some texts called women to contribute to the war effort. Hacı Emine emphasized that “men were killing by dying, thereby receiving glory.” Then she called women to sew clothes for ghazis.¹⁷⁶ Nezihe Muhlis also called women to mobilize for the war effort through a meaningful metaphor. She compared fatherland/motherland, whose Turkish equivalent is not already a metaphor, to a mother. She called “the daughters of the motherland” to relieve her wounds as their most honorable debt to the motherland.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Muallim Hicri, “Edirneye mi?” *Tanin*, 23 July 1329/5 August 1913.

¹⁷⁶ Emine Ümmü Vicedani Hacı Emine, “Muhadderat-ı Harp,” *İkdam*, 20 October 1328/2 November 1912.

A play named *The Honor of our Race*¹⁷⁸ also mentioned Turkish women's help for the war effort. The play explained the sacrifice and enthusiasm of Turkish women to help the fatherland through several characters. The story evolved mainly around three characters: Cazibe (appeal) and Necat (salvation), who were volunteering to collect donations door-to-door, and Mefkure (goal) who decided to work for the war efforts upon being impressed by these women. The writer also showed three ways through which women could help the war effort via these three characters: donating, helping wounded soldiers and boycotting European goods.

Cazibe explained how his brother encouraged her to help the motherland and appealed to the patriotic sentiments of Turkish women as such:

Oh women, the half of the thirty million Ottomans
Show the enemies who a Turkish woman is.
Will it be too much if you relieve the wounds of the private
Who was shot in the heart?
Whoever does not relieve the wounds of an Ottoman soldier
Falls into enemy hands, know this and wake up...¹⁷⁹

The writer touched upon the subject of boycotting, too, through the character of Necat. Necat, a lady of the high society of Izmir, surprised other women seeing her in her mother's jilbab, so she explained that she preferred this jilbab over the fabrics arriving in the country from "the shameless Europe desiring to usurp her life after her wealth." She stated that Turkish girls were throwing away all the fabrics coming from Europe because even "its softest silk pricked the body like a toxic thorn."¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Nezihe Muhlis, "Yurdumuzun Kızlarına," *Donanma*, October 1912.

¹⁷⁸ Mehmed Sırrı "Milli Piyes," *Tanin*, 18 March 1329/31 March 1913.

¹⁷⁹ Sırrı, "Milli Piyes."

¹⁸⁰ Sırrı, "Milli Piyes."

The boycotting the western goods and shopping from local Muslim/Turkish tradespeople was a topic in the women's speeches as well. In the speeches, they also explained how the Ottoman women could contribute to the economy of the country and why it was necessary. The mobilizing women around such an idea was in line with the CUP's economic policies of creating Turkish/Muslim bourgeoisie. And the economic role of the Ottoman women was emphasized generally within the context of creating a better future more than contributing to the war effort.

Lastly, Mefkure symbolized the target group or rather the successful result of the propaganda aimed at the intended audience. She was upset before listening to the speeches of these women because her husband raged at her for she donated her jewellery to help the war effort. As she witnessed the enthusiasm and sacrifice of these women to help the fatherland, she became sure of what to do; leaving her husband whom she called as "Bulgarian" because as a man running from fighting the enemy he could not be a "Turk" and working to help the war effort.¹⁸¹ The writer otherized the Ottoman citizens who did not fit in the expected act like in the case of runaway soldiers.

4.3. *Tanin* and Atrocity Propaganda

There were more than two hundred reports on the war crimes of the Balkan allies published in *Tanin* during the Balkan wars. The war crimes that these statements contained were rape, sexual abuse, forced conversion, massacre, plundering, beating, insult and similar humiliations of Muslim/Turkish populations. *Tanin* manipulated

¹⁸¹ Sırrı, "Milli Piyas."

such war crimes for propaganda purposes. The prominent indicator of this was the fact that such news appeared very often only until Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire started negotiations in September. After that time, the bombardment of atrocity news stopped. The periodical, henceforth, focused more on reforms of the state.

These reports represented the enemy as brutal, barbaric, evil, menacing, and so on. Besides the propaganda value of these crimes, the language used while presenting these news contributed to the demonization of the enemy.¹⁸² The reports were gathered through the following ways as it was stated in the periodical: from Muslim people arriving in Istanbul from the Balkans; as official military reports; from the war correspondents of the newspaper; foreign correspondents; from Ottoman civil associations collecting data on the atrocity. Based on the scrutinization of these statements, official reports included information with less interpretation while many stories reported by citizens or “co-religionists” in the Balkans included emotional appeals by delivering the information in a passionate manner.

¹⁸² For some reports and writings regarding the war crimes of the Balkan states in *Tanin* see “Bulgar Vahşeti,” 14 October 1328/27 October 1912; “Bulgar Vahşeti,” 15 October 1328/28 October 1912; “Bulgar Vahşeti,” 16 October 1328/ 29 October 1912; “Bulgar Mezalimi,” 20 October 1328/2 November 1912; “Bulgar Vahşeti,” 21 October 1328/3 November 1912; “Midilli’de Yunan Mezalimi,” 18 January 1328/31 January 1913; Mehmet Ali Tevfik, “Rumeli Mezalimi: 100 Bin,” 20 January 1328/2 February 1913; “Bulgaristan’da İslamlar,” 20 January 1328/2 February 1913; “Mezalim ve Avrupa Matbuaatı,” 20 January 1328/2 February 1913; “Dedeagaç Mezalimi,” 21 January 1328/3 February 1913; Mehmet Ali Tevfik, “Rumeli Mezalimi,” 20 January 1329/2 February 1913; “Rumeli Mezalimi,” reported by the editor-in-chief of *Le Matin*, Mösyö Senekan Lozan, 25 January 1328/7 February 1913; “Gömülcene Mezalimi,” 17 July 1329/30 July 1913; “Bulgar Vahşetlerinden: Resmi Haberler,” 17 July 1329/30 July 1913; “Bulgar Vahşetlerinden,” 18 July 1329/31 July 1913; Bulgar Mezalimi: Mezalime Dair Vesikalar,” 20 July 1329/2 August 1913; “Bulgar Mezalimi: Bulgaristan’daki Useramızın Hali,” 21 July 1329/3 August 1913; “Bulgar Mezalimi: Resmi Haberler,” 22 July 1329/4 August 1913; “Mezalim Listeleri,” 2 August 1329/15 August 1913; “Dedeagaç: Vahşilerin Avdeti Karşısında,” 8 August 1329/21 August 1913; “Edirne Meselesi: Bulgar Vahşetleri,” 10 August 1329/23 August 1913; “Bulgarlar, Müslümanları Nasıl Hristiyan Yaptılar?,” 13 August 1329/26 August 1913; “Kanlı Salib,” 19 August 1329/1 September 1913; “Bulgar Canavarlıkları,” 21 August 1329/3 September 1913.

One report titled as “Bulgarian Ferocity” was an example of the latter. It informed about a case of sexual violence in a village of Bulgaria where five to ten Muslim households existed. It was claimed that a Bulgarian lieutenant sent some soldiers to bring all young Muslim girls in the village to the military quarters upon which the soldiers broke into Muslim households and started beating family members to force them to give all of the young Muslim girls. The girls wanting to end this violence came out of where they had been hiding, and the soldiers took these girls aged between twelve and eighteen to the military headquarters where Bulgarian army officers attacked, abused, and raped them “all night long.” The girls were treated in the same manner by the patrol officers who were charged with taking them to their homes.¹⁸³

The reporter compared the soldiers to rabid savages or wild animals to describe their manner while holding and tying the girls’ hands and he stated that they took them as if they were transporting animals. Also, he highlighted “the innocence and purity” of the girls while calling the Bulgarians as “monsters.”¹⁸⁴

“Bulgarian Ferocity: Harrowing Stories” composed of stories of assimilation with a similar tone. Accordingly, Muslims who could not withstand hunger had to accept wearing kalpak leaving aside their fez in Plovdiv and imamah in other villages around. And Bulgarians “belittled” Muslim men by forcing them to do “the jobs that normally animals were doing;” in another case Bulgarians “who could not calm their wild (or atrocious) desires” with a crime, started another.¹⁸⁵ In another case of forced

¹⁸³ *Tanin*, 8 October 1328/21 October 1912.

¹⁸⁴ *Tanin*, 8 October 1328/21 October 1912.

¹⁸⁵ *Tanin*, 9 October 1328/22 October 1912.

conversion, it was reported that Serbs fastened a halter around the head of a Muslim named Veysel Ağa, walked him in the city “like an animal,” then beat him and finally took him to a church telling him to convert to Christianity and threatened him with death. The reporter called these Serbs as “barbarians who did not have a share from humanity.”¹⁸⁶

Another report of an Ottoman war correspondent was a bit romanticized within a context of a story telling. It was a letter titled “The Woe of Tunca” by an Ottoman correspondent. He personified the river which aimed at intensifying the influence of the story on the audience. After telling about the natural beauty of the region, he depicted the situation after Bulgarians entered there:

Tunca bade farewell to all kinds of tittering for long, vowed not to carry a tiny little joy in its heart which had been crying for the things that it had been seen for several months... Bulgarians who waged war not only to Turks but also to all humanist feelings were throwing newly wimble chest, newly frozen corpse, newly weathered head, newly gouged eye in each minute into her lap fluttering with heartthrob!¹⁸⁷

Accordingly, Bulgarians killed some people with the pretext that they were violating the public order of the city. At least 50-60 thousand Muslims were stuffed in a small island within this pretext. He heard stories from the people going into and coming out of that island. Accordingly, they were in very harsh conditions under rain and cold finding no place to hide other than tree hollow and branches. Many people were stuffed in a small area and struggling with dysentery.

¹⁸⁶ Tanin, 11 October 1328/ 24 October 1912.

¹⁸⁷ Muhiddin, “Tuncanın Derdleri: Sarayıçı Faciası” *Tanin*, 18 July 1329/31 July 1913.

He finished the report romantically. When he returned to the city, as if he heard a complaining voice in the forest: “You came from Istanbul, didn't you? Welcome... but, as you see, do not escape again!”¹⁸⁸

One of the news specified as an official report seems less subjective in terms of the language used, but it is epitomic in describing a scene or case of a crime starkly. It was a telegram from the Department of the Supreme Military Command to the Office of the Grand Viziership with the date July 16, 1329. It reported about the results of an inquiry as follows:

In the shore of the river of Erde in Karaağaç, with the guidance of a person among the subjects of Italy, another massacre place was discovered. It was understood from the inquiry by the left wing leadership that a post was blood-soaked and there were a lot of human hair on it, and that many people had been butchered like sheep depending on the fact that blood clots were still there although it rained a lot, and around the village of Mer'as Bulgarians massacred many from captives whom they brought with themselves while leaving Edirne by bullets and bayonet, and even killed some of them violently as gouging their eyes and stripping the skin of their faces.¹⁸⁹

Another report, in the same manner, was about the findings of an exploration that the Ottoman army made in a town after the Bulgarians left. Based on the inquiry, twenty Muslim corpses were tied one another and executed by shooting, and three bodies of Muslim women were “massacred” by cutting their breasts and ears. It was also reported that Bulgarians raped Muslim women and then set fire to the town before leaving.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Muhiddin, “Tuncanın Dardleri.”

¹⁸⁹ *Tanin*, 18 July 1329/31 July 1913.

¹⁹⁰ *Tanin*, 17 July 1329/30 July 1913.

4.4. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Ottoman Propaganda

Based on the speeches and belles-lettres, one of the goal of the Ottoman/Turkish propagandists was to enable the contribution of the Ottomans to the war efforts primarily through donations, volunteering for the army, and volunteering for any other possible works. It is not possible to know the response of the audience in depth within the scope of this thesis, but it is possible to have an idea if the propagandists received the desired response.

The effects of the propaganda activities could be seen in the efforts of the National Defense League. In the first meeting of the Women's Committee that about four thousand women attended, nine of the boxes of the National Defense League and three of the Red Crescent were filled with aids.¹⁹¹ In the second meeting, many jewelry, gold, and money were donated besides aids in kind at the end of the speeches.¹⁹² The speakers galvanized patriotic sentiments of their audience as evidenced from the donations given at the end of their speeches. Fehime Nüzhet expressed this excitement as such:

...one of our sisters rushed forward and gave her ring, earrings, bracelet, watch, cordon (in short) whatever she had as gold and diamond. Then a competition for sacrifice started... One patriotic sister of yours took off her eyeglasses, which is a necessity, not a luxury, and gave... a woman was about to pass out because of excitements... a young girl was crying her heart out because of her sadness.¹⁹³

She also explained an incident from the first meeting as a model of patriotism and sacrifice. Accordingly, one of the women within the audience heard Nüzhet calling

¹⁹¹ Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları*, 47.

¹⁹² Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları*, 80.

¹⁹³ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 77.

for the help the fatherland approached her holding one *mecidiye* in her hands. She said that she would keep one *kuruş* that was enough to go to her destination and asked Nüzhet to take the rest.¹⁹⁴

In the same speech, Fehime Nüzhet referred to the Ottoman soldiers that were feeling cold while asking for aids. She said:

I am saying that the soldiers are feeling cold. Is not your body shivering under your cardigans and fur upon hearing this? You will return to your rooms with stoves and hug your soft quilts after you leave here. They do not have a warm room. Their quilts are generally wet military cloaks. For those who cannot find it, the cold darkness of the night serves as a quilt. Oh, do not you shiver? Give, for God's sake, for the prophet's sake, give!¹⁹⁵

It is meaningful that one of the women in the audience donated the fur on her for the National Defense League before leaving. This might show the effect of Nüzhet's speech above in particular. On the other hand, it is obvious again based on Nüzhet's speech that the speakers could not obtain as much sacrifice as they expected at the end of the first meeting. Nüzhet stated that riches of society did not donate enough while the poor helped the most for the fatherland.¹⁹⁶

Secondly, the League achieved conscripting many volunteers. The Committee for the Volunteer Regiments benefited from influential people for this purpose such as chieftains in eastern provinces and some notables.¹⁹⁷ In addition, the Committee of *Irshad*, as Nazım Polat states, contributed to the mission of the Committee for the Volunteer Regiments. For example, the müfti of Trabzon called for conscription in

¹⁹⁴ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 77.

¹⁹⁵ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 79.

¹⁹⁶ Nüzhet, *Kadınlarımızın İçtimaları* in Şefika Kurnaz, *Balkan Harbinde*, 78.

¹⁹⁷ Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, 56.

his declaration that was sent to the press. Polat states that thousands of people volunteered for the army from a wide range of ages in a short time. Old people like Cemil Pasha at age 80 volunteered for the army besides children like a twelve-year-old boy.¹⁹⁸

The Office of Shaykh al-Islam also supported the cause of the National Defense League by sending a circular to vilayets and sanjaks on February 2, 1913. The circular demanded that people be explained in a proper way that it was a religious duty on each Muslim to help those working together for the Ottoman nation and the Muslim populations. Also, it demanded from ulema and “good” people to continue chanting influential prayers. Four days later, the Office of Shaykh al-Islam also declared that it was not religiously permissible to waste time in coffeehouses while Muslims were oppressed in Rumelia.¹⁹⁹ This kind of declarations must have brought about a positive effect at least on “religious” people.

It is also possible to see the donations of women affected by other propaganda activities. According to the news in *Tanin*, women donated money and jewelry when “their sensations were upsurged” on the occasion of a *mewlid*.²⁰⁰ In another *mewlid* gathering, the “patriotic” women of Trabzon made cash donations as well as donating their jewelry for the National Defense League.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, 56-58.

¹⁹⁹ Polat, *Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, 39-40.

²⁰⁰ *Tanin*, 1 February 1328/14 February 1913.

²⁰¹ *Tanin*, 18 February 1328/3 March 1913.

Mewlids and similar gatherings during the wars were also used as occasions of propaganda activities. The propagandists benefited from them to obtain sacrifices for “the fatherland” by appealing to the religious sentiments of people. In other words, they appealed to religious sentiments to arouse patriotism.



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The political isolation of the Porte in the international arena of world politics and deficiencies in the Ottoman Army and heavy defeats furthered the need for propaganda to mobilize the Ottomans for the war effort during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13; thus, the Ottomans attempted to maximize energies and obtain considerable amount of sacrifice by employing modern propaganda techniques such as bandwagon, glittering generalities, ad populum, selective truth, and atrocity propaganda. They also made use of rhetorical tropes and figures of speech to increase the effect of the message conveyed.

The primary theme in the writings and speeches was that the fatherland, nation, honor, dignity, religion was in danger. Thus, they called people to contribute to the war efforts in any way possible. The female speakers of the National Defense League encouraged women to donate; sew clothes or any other necessary thing for soldiers; volunteer for the works of the Ottoman Red Crescent; motivate men who “waste time” in cafes to go for fighting; go to the fronts to motivate soldiers and serve for them; spread the word. The belles-lettres aiming at female audience asked for

sacrifices in similar ways. Most of the belles-lettres, on the other hand, aimed at encouraging men to go for fighting and also to motivate fighting soldiers.

For these purposes, the Ottoman propagandists aimed at increasing the existing anxiety and fear of losing whatever they attributed a great value so that people would take action. They also aimed at arousing hatred against the enemy. Atrocity propaganda specifically served for this purpose. It was used in the speeches of women, belles-lettres, and in *Tanin* as reports of the war crimes of the Balkan states. Also, some writings referred to runaway soldiers through a pejorative discourse to discourage soldiers from this and thus they were otherized. This approach was in line with the national purpose of the Ottoman state during the Balkan wars.

To motivate for sacrifices, female speakers referred to the history to find examples of patriotism and sacrifice. *Hız. Aişe*, for instance, might be a role model for going to the fronts to motivate and serve for soldiers. The Swedish people might stand as an example for patriotism. These were some of the examples other than references to the Ottoman/Turkish history. The belles-lettres, on the other hand, referred to the glorious Ottoman/Turkish past through great conquerors and glorious victories because the primary purpose in such writings was to motivate soldiers and encourage men to go for fighting.

The Ottoman propagandists also tried to indoctrinate the audience with nationalist ideas. They appealed to nationalist sentiments other than patriotic and religious feelings of people. Before appealing to the patriotic and nationalist sentiments, sometimes it was necessary to arouse these feelings first of all. The ideas of dying for the “fatherland” and “the grandness of Turkishness” were new to the public; thus, the Ottoman/Turkish propagandists associated these ideas with established values such

as Islam, Caliphate, honor, and dignity. In this way, they attempted to arouse patriotism in the citizens of the Ottoman nation, and “national” awareness in the Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

Most of the propaganda activities of the Ottomans during the Balkan wars were initiated by political elites and intellectuals of the period. Based on three seemingly separate sources of propaganda activities that were analyzed in this study, an agreement in the discourse of the propagandists was seen, and this discourse was in parallel with the propaganda program of the Committee of *Irshad* of the National Defense League. It should be remembered that the National Defense League achieved the collaboration of influential people from different political and intellectual views. Some of those people were also the producers of some of the belles-lettres. Nezihe Muhlis, Aka Gündüz, and Mehmet Akif who worked for the National Defense League were some of the writers that published literary works in the press. In addition, *Tanin* was the semi-official newspaper of the CUP, which established the National Defense League. In conclusion, there was an organized propaganda campaign at least in the second half of the Balkan wars.

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APPENDIX

<i>BULGARIAN STATISTICS</i> (Mr. Kantchev, 1900)	
Turks	499,204
Bulgarians	1,181,336
Greeks	228,702
Albanians	128,711
Wallachians	80,767
Jews	67,840
Gypsies	54,557
Servians	700
Miscellaneous	16,407
Total	2,258,224
<i>GREEK STATISTICS</i> (Mr. Delyani, 1904) (Kosovo vilayet omitted)	
Turks	634,017
Bulgarians	332,162
Greeks	652,795
Albanians	
Wallachians	25,101
Jews	53,147
Gypsies	8,911
Servians	
Miscellaneous	18,685
Total.....	1,724,818
<i>SERVIAN STATISTICS</i> (Mr. Gopcevic, 1889) ¹	
Turks	231,400
Bulgarians	57,600
Greeks	201,140
Albanians	165,620
Wallachians	69,665
Jews	64,645
Gypsies	28,730
Servians	2,048,320
Miscellaneous	3,500
Total	2,870,620

1. Statistics of populations in Macedonia based on ethnicity by rival states
(Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914), 28, 30.

TERRITORIAL MODIFICATIONS

IN THE BALKANS

1. CONFERENCE OF LONDON

2. TREATY OF BUKAREST



2. Boundaries in the Balkans after the Conference of London and the Treaty of Bukarest (Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914).

ÇPORRUNI PREJ MEJE! EGERSIRA GJAKPIRESE!!



3. Albania defending Shkodra against Montenegro (the monkey), and Janina, against Greece (the tiger) while Serbia (the snake) is attacking from another side (Source: *Dielli* (The Sun) (February 13, 1913), in Valery Koley and Christina Kouloiri, eds., *Teaching Modern Southeast European History: The Balkan Wars* (Salonika: CDRSEE, 2009), 47.



4. Greek victims who were fished out of the Maritza River in Karaağaç (BOA, FTG. 1516. 29/10).