TWO DIFFERENT WORLDS BUT THE SAME POPULISM: COMPARISON OF HUGO CHÁVEZ AND RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN

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JANUARY, 2017

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BY

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
JANUARY, 2017

Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

In political science literature, there is a lively debate on how to identify and define populism. Yet, there are limited numbers of scholarly works on the relationship between leadership and populism in juxtaposition with democracy. This study aims to analyze how political leaders rise as the populists and how populist leadership transforms political structures. Following a theoretical debate on definitions of populism with a particular focus on populism as a political strategy, the analysis of the socio-economic and political policy preferences of two different and ideologically contrasting populist leaders, Hugo Chávez and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, demonstrates that once the leaders attain power through the populist strategy, consecutive electoral successes thanks to populism bestows them with the opportunity of personalizing and consolidating their power. Building on their power enables them to restructure the political system along with their political vision which is at times in contradiction with traits of liberal democracy such as contestation, opposition and pluralism. As the analysis of these two cases shows, populism can emerge in very different contexts since the two countries differ in their institutions, democratic legacy, demographics, history and economy. The analysis also reveals the necessary but insufficient conditions of populism shared by the two countries such as the breakdown of the traditional party system, high social inequality, and peculiar traits of political culture, with an emphasis on support for a strong executive and a democratic system.

Key Words: Populism, leadership, socioeconomic policies, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hugo Chávez

ÖZET

Siyaset Bilimi literatüründe popülizmin ne şekilde tanımlanması gerektiğine dair canlı bir tartışmanın varlığına rağmen, popülizm ve liderlik arasındaki ilişkiyi demokrasi bağlamında inceleyen sınırlı sayıda akademik çalışma vardır. Bu çalışma, siyasi liderlerin popülist liderler olarak siyasi arenada nasıl yükseldikleri ve siyasal sistemi ne şekilde dönüştürdüklerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Popülizm tanımını tartışan teorilerin incelenmesi ve popülizmin bir siyasi strateji olarak tanımlanmasının ardından birbirlerine ideolojik olarak zıt olan iki farklı liderin, Hugo Chávez ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın, sosyoekonomik ve politik alanlardaki siyasalarının incelenmesi göstermektedir ki bu iki lider popülist bir strateji izleyerek iktidara gelmiş ve, popülizm sayesinde birbiri ardına gelen seçim başarıları elde etmek suretiyle, siyasi güçlerini sağlamlaştırmayı ve kişiselleştirmeyi başarmışlardır. Kazandıkları siyasi güç sayesinde siyasal sistemi kendi siyasi görüşleri çerçevesinde yeniden şekillendirmeye çalışmışlar, bu görüşleri kimi zaman liberal demokrasinin tartışma, muhalefet ve çoğulculuk ilkeleriyle ters düşmüştür. İki ülkenin; kurumları, demokrasi geçmişi, nüfus yapısı, tarihi ve ekonomileriyle farklı olmalarından ötürü, popülizmin bu iki vaka çerçevesinde tahlili, çok farklı şartlarda ortaya çıkabildiğini göstermektedir. Bu analiz her iki ülkede de popülizmin ortaya çıkması için gerekli ancak yeterli olmayan koşulları ortaya koymuştur. Bu koşullar geleneksel parti sisteminin bozulması, yüksek sosyal eşitsizlik ve siyasi kültürün bu ülkelere has özellikleri olan güçlü bir yürütme erkine ve demokratik sisteme olan kuvvetli destektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülizm, Liderlik, Sosyoekonomik Politikalar, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hugo Chávez

To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cliché to say but having a PhD degree is a long journey and a daunting task to do but it made me proud to see how far I have come. Even though it is a bit masochistic to enjoy how you suffer from taking classes, writing papers and as the level boss this dissertation, I have grown personally and academically a lot and it was all worth it. With this study, I have proven that I have had thick skin, as one of my professors advised once, and rose from my ashes like phoenix.

This study would be impossible without help of my dear supervisor Asst. Prof. Ebru İlter Akarçay who not only guided me through the process but also encouraged me to pursue my dreams and invest in myself by taking Spanish courses and specializing on Latin America. I also express my gratitude to Prof. Necla Geyikdağı and Assoc. Prof Şakir Dinçşahin for their contribution and feedback as my Committee Members. I also would like to thank Selin Türkeş and Aslı Postacı for their support and encouragement at Yeditepe University, which made me feel like at home. I am indebted to Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Prof. Sabri Sayarı for introducing me to Political Science and Comparative Politics. I also thank Asst. Prof. Emre Hatipoğlu for inspiring my teaching style and giving me moral support throughout my years at Sabancı University.

Thank you all from the bottom of my heart my dear friends and future colleagues: Özge Arı, Bengü Aydın Dikmen, Tuğçe Özer O'Neil, Gizem Korg, Gülgün Kurtay, Hakan Erdagöz, Orçun Selçuk, Deniz Kutluay, Sinem Şahiner, Pınar Barış Şahin, Esra Rüzgar Ateşkan, Envare Savcı, Funda Sarıcı, Gönenç Gümüş Akar and Asst. Prof. Gül Pınar Erkem Gülboy and her dear spouse Prof. Burak Samih Gülboy.

Lastly, I am grateful to my family, my father İbrahim Karana, my mother Arife Karana, my little sister Tuğçe Karana, my sister Seçil Varal and her spouse Mehmet Varal, my little cats Miniş and Kara Böcük, and my love and husband Kadir Şenol for their unconditional love and support.

This study was financially supported by TUBITAK with the 2211 scholarship program.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	*Acción Democrática*	Democratic Action Party
AKP	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	*Anavatan Partisi*	Motherland Party
AP	*Adalet Partisi*	Justice Party
CHP	*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*	Republican People's Party
COPEI	C*omité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente*	Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee
CTV	*Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela*	Venezuelan Confederation of Workers
DP	*Demokrat Parti*	Democrat Party
DYP	*Doğru Yol Partisi*	True Path Party
FEDECAMARAS	*Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela*	Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce
FP	*Fazilet Partisi*	Virtue Party
IMF	The International Monetary Fund	
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization	
MAS	*Movimiento a1 Socialismo*	Movement for Socialism
MBR-200	*Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200*	The Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200
MDSD	The Most Different Systems Design	
MSSD	The Most Similar Systems Design	
MSP	*Milli Selamet Partisi*	National Salvation Party
MVR	*Movimiento Quinta Republica*	The Fifth Republic Movement
PDVSA	Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A.	Petroleum of Venezuela
PKK	*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PSUV	*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*	Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela
RP	*Refah Partisi*	Welfare Party
TOKİ	*Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı*	Turkey's Mass Housing Administration
URD	*Unión Republicana Democrática*	Democratic Republican Union

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Theme and Research Questions

At first glance Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hugo Chávez may seem to be two leaders that are difficult to relate to each other. Because they were leaders of two very different countries located in different spheres of the world and far away from each other and they had completely opposite ideologies, it is hard to find a common denominator between two. However, when two leaders are examined in the context of populism and consolidation of democracy in two different settings, some interesting facts unfold. Therefore, this study aims to analyze how populism has helped two leaders in consolidating power and the relationship between populism and consolidation or decay of democracy within the framework of these two leaderships.

In comparative politics, scholars compare countries and systems by using different analytical tools and methods. Comparing the most different and most similar systems are the methods scholars usually resort to. Although a larger number of studies recently display an effort, there is a considerable lack of studies comparing Turkey with Latin American countries. Considering similarities, this negligence comes as a surprise. Leadership is also a burgeoning topic in current literature as scholars analyze leaders with different aspects and theoretical approaches. Moreover, although populism is not a new subject matter as scholars produced literary work regarding populism in Latin America especially in 1970s and 1980s, populism made a comeback in 2000s with its new forms by triggering new debates.

Besides filling the void in the literature regarding the comparison of Turkey and a Latin American country, Venezuela, this study will contribute to literature by its emphasis on populism. In addition, comparing two different political systems and analyzing two different leaders in conjunction with populism might attract the attention of scholars who are interested in populism and consolidation/decay of democracy. As a unique study combining issues of populism, leadership and consolidation of democracy with the most different systems design method; this dissertation intends to be a successful scholarly work.

This study is going to aim detecting the similarities in the rise of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, who was the President of Venezuela between 1998 and 2013, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the Prime Minister between 2002 and 2014, and currently became the 12th President of Turkey. Turkey and Venezuela constitute most different systems because their geography, history, socio-economic structure (apart from being developing countries), ideologies are completely different. Especially, Venezuela has a legacy of colonial rule, while Turkey had never been colonized. These differences give perfect opportunity to search for the common denominator of these two cases by controlling for alternative explanations.

1.2. Theoretical Debate and Concept Clarification

The dissertation consists of three main sections. The first part presents theoretical debate and concept clarification. The main concept of the dissertation is populism. It is the main pillar of the study because it is the main cause of the rise and consolidation of two leaders' power. There are many definitions of populism.

According to Roberts (2007), populism is related to political mobilization. Therefore, Roberts defines populism on the basis of mass mobilization by stating that it is "the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or 'the people'" (Cameron 2009, p. 336, Roberts 2007, p. 5). This definition centralizes the link between the leader and its constituency and emphasizes the political content in populism. This definition lacks ideological position as it only concentrates on mobilization; thus, it can be linked to both neoliberalism, which targets the redesigning of the state in favor of a pro-market orientation and industrialization, and leftism, which asserts redistributive policies (Cameron 2009, p. 336, Roberts 2007, pp. 5-6).

Instead of mobilization, Cas Mudde focuses on ideology component of populism when defining populism. Mudde (2004) defines populism is an ideology which depicts society as composed of two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'. Populism as ideology portrays politics as the expression of the 'general will of the people' (Mudde 2004, pp. 543, 562). Although populism is an ideology, it is 'thin-centered ideology' because it has a delimited core and other political concepts are attached to the core. Since it lacks well-defined premises of other ideologies, it can be interlinked with other ideologies (Mudde 2004, p. 544). For Mudde, the main component of populism is its Manichean worldview which argues that there is a clash between elitism and pluralism in a society because while the elites support the idea of politics reflecting the views of the moral elite, pluralism acknowledges fundamentally different views and wishes of different groups in the society (Mudde 2004, pp. 543-544). Consequently, according to Mudde what defines populism is its discourse, which create a normative dichotomy as 'the elite'

versus ‘the people’, rather than behavior or attitudes as other approaches to populism argue. Mudde also rejects definitions of populism based on distinct type of organization like charismatic leadership or communication style, which eliminates intermediaries between the leader and its constituency. Although these are also features of populism, the defining character of populism is the Manichean outlook according to Mudde (2004, pp. 544-545).

Like Mudde, Kirk Hawkins also values populist discourse. Before asserting his type of understanding, Hawkins presents four prominent definitions of populism used in the social sciences today. These definitions are structural, economic, political-institutional, and discursive (Hawkins 2009, p.1042). The structural approach towards populism highlights social origins of populism, which are created by specific conditions of certain development stage. So to speak, scholars who defend this approach are developmentalists who establish link between development strategies, especially import substitution industrialization (ISI), and emergence of populism as populist regimes interlinked cross-class coalitions and popular mobilization to their development strategies. Similar to structural approach, economic approach accentuates the relationship between economic policies and populism as populist regimes attempt to appeal the poor through their shortsighted economic policies (Hawkins 2009, p. 1042). The third approach, political-institutional, stresses the link between political strategies and institutional aspects of populism. Supported by Kenneth Roberts and Kurt Weyland, this approach portrays populism as the basic struggle over control of government to dominate politics,and core values of the community. In this struggle, institutions and material benefits play an important role because if trust for existing institutions of representative democracy is low and a

charismatic leader can offer material benefits in exchange of support from large numbers of voters, populism emerges. As a result, scholars who support this approach purport that populism is caused by institutional and political conditions rather than structural or economic ones.

According to Hawkins, these three approaches are widespread in the study of populism in the developing world, particularly Latin America; yet, what must be defining character of populism is its new democratic discourse along with presence of a charismatic mode of linkage between voters and populist leaders. What differentiates populism is its emphasis on a new type of democracy expressing the will of the people rather than interests of the elite (Hawkins 2003, p. 1138). This new type of democratic understanding is supplemented by a "Manichaean discourse" of populist leaders that associates "Good" with a unified will of the people and "Evil" with the elite, which have secret self-serving plans (Hawkins 2009, p.1042). Manichean discourse provides legitimate basis for populist leaders because this dualistic vision divides the society along with two different world visions of good and evil, which is represented by populist leader and corrupt elite subsequently. In this dualistic vision, the will of people delegated to the populist leader because individual citizens cannot rule themselves but their will can be unified as theorized by Jean Jacques Rousseau. As a result, the government is embodiment of general will. The populist leader speaks as a true representative of this general will with God given peculiarities. At this point, it is necessary to remember what Guillermo O'Donnell identified the common problem of Latin American regimes, delegative democracy. In this type of democracies, the president surpasses the horizontal accountability and fosters vertical one because the president represents the general will (O'Donnell 1994,

pp. 61-62, Ellner 2001, p. 6). Thus, O'Donnell assumes delegative democracies as a form of democracy which is less liberal but more democratic than representative democracy, since the president represents the general will, its governing cannot be constrained apart from existing political structure enforcing checks and balances, and constitutionally limited time in the office (O'Donnell 1994, pp. 59-60). Within the framework of delegative democracy, the president resorts to the Manichaean discourse, as Hawkins discussed, to strengthen his/her electoral basis.

The legitimacy of this new type of direct or radical democracy replacing the old representative one depends on the 'charismatic mode of linkage' between the voters and the leader. Populist leaders have a claim on representing the general will because they have direct relations with the voters. Moreover, they have right to rule because they have exceptional abilities, even God given blessing, which constitute the charisma of the leader. Max Weber offers theoretical explanation of this charismatic mode of linkage, which emerges under exceptional conditions of economic and political crises (Hawkins 2003, pp. 1138-1139). The populist leader builds his/her charisma by offering solutions to society's deepest problems through radical change which would be achieved by extraordinary, quasi-divine character and skills of the leader (Weber 1946, p. 245). Therefore, presidential candidates give weight to personalistic features in their presidential campaigns instead of clarifying the content of their program and stages of radical changes. The leader is so glorified that the opposition is accused to be corrupt and illegitimate as refuses to acknowledge, and any means (up to the most extreme, violence) can be legitimately employed against the opposition because the leader embodies the popular will and the opposition disregards this fact (Hawkins 2003, p. 1140).

This charismatic mode of linkage also justifies the personalization of politics because since there is direct relationship between the leader and voters, this relationship should be unmediated by parties or other institutions. Institutionalized party systems handicap the rise of populist leaders because party loyalties are high and parties possess an identity that is independent of and more significant than that of its leader or founder (Hawkins 2003, p. 1139). Therefore, the emergence of populist leaders requires inchoate party systems in which volatility is high and party loyalties are low. When inchoate party systems encounter political or economic crises, voters easily switch their alliances and support populist leaders. However, inchoate party systems are necessary but not sufficient conditions for populist leaders to reach voters as Hawkins argued. Populist leaders appeal to voters through democratic discourse that stresses the existence of a popular will and the idea of 'the people versus the elite' as discussed above. Consequently, both inchoate party systems and new democratic discourse are necessary conditions of populism.

Instead of focusing on only one attribute like democratic discourse or mass mobilization, Steven Levitsky and James Loxton (2013) define populism on the ground of three characteristics. These three characteristics are mobilization of mass support via anti-establishment appeals, positioning themselves in opposition to the entire elite; rise of populist leaders as outsiders coming from outside the national party system bypassing parties and other forms of institutional mediation by representing the general will of people (Levitsky & Loxton 2013, p. 110). Among these characteristics, Levitsky and Loxton argue that anti-establishment appeal is common to all populisms but its combinations with other characteristics produce diminished subtypes of populism, which are maverick populism whose leaders are

political insiders abandoning established parties and make personalistic and anti-establishment appeals; and movement populism whose leaders are anti-establishment outsiders emerging from social movements and maintaining grassroots rather than personalistic linkages (Levitsky & Loxton 2013, p. 110). Besides defining populism and identifying its types, Levitsky and Loxton claim that populism leads weak democracies to transform into competitive authoritarianisms. However, even though their argument is plausible, the focus of this study is not questioning the effect of populism on regime types in general -even if populism in Turkey and Venezuela led to democratic decay eventually- and reach general conclusions about regime type and populism relations, but rather searching for how populism helps leaders to consolidate their power.

Lastly, Kurt Weyland (2001) proposes different and more practical definition of populism by capturing the core the concept. According to Weyland, populism is best defined as a political strategy because leaders resort to populism to sustain their rule (Weyland 2001, p. 18). As a political strategy, populism covers all acts of the leader; hence, covers almost all features pointed by other scholars mentioned above like mass mobilization, discourse or ideology. For Weyland, populism is a way of attaining power. Populist leaders use different instruments effectively to stay in power. These instruments are elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and most recently opinion polls (Weyland 2001, p. 12). By using these tools, populist leaders mobilize and demonstrate their distinctive power capability. Populism enables leaders to capture the support of large portion of the population even though the support is mostly sporadic. Populism allows the personalization of power by the leaders since not a group or organization but the leader stays in power as an individual (Weyland 2001,

p. 18). Populist chief executives need constant broad mass support to consolidate their political leverage and overpower their opponents' institutional bases (Weyland 2001, p. 12). Nevertheless, according to Weyland, despite achieving this broad mass support, populism does not survive for long and after populist leaders capture power, they jettison their populism. Especially, right-wing populist leaders can maintain their support for shorter period than left-wing because they gather populist support for solving short-term economic crises and once they solve problems, their support base dissolves (Weyland 2013, p. 27, Weyland 2003a, p. 1099). Despite practicality and comprehensiveness of Weyland's definition, Steve Ellner criticizes Weyland and others who conceive populism as a predominately 'political strategy' by discarding socio-economic factors (Ellner 2003, p. 158). Nonetheless, Weyland's definition constitutes the basis of populism understanding in this dissertation even if with small changes.

Along with discussing different definitions and approaches towards populism, I present the changes in the perception and the implementation of the idea of populism among the scholars supporting either the classical approach or neo-populism. The metamorphosis of populism as a concept resulted in divisions among scholars who support classical and neo variants. Scholarly writing bases the populism to the formation Latin American democracies in 1930s and 1940s (Ellner 2003, p. 139). At that period, populism emerged as a major force by incorporating organized workers into politics through ISI policies. Scholars called this first wave of populisms as the classical type. Yet, with the effect of globalization in 1980s and 1990s, a very different socioeconomic environment developed and the presidents of Latin America applied different strategies to attain power along with these changes. Some presidents

embraced neoliberalism. While classical populism has been located to the left of the political spectrum, some presidents employed neoliberal reforms by diverging from economic populism of the classical variant (Weyland 2001, pp. 4, 6-7). As a result, these strategies, including neoliberal policies, created a new form of populism and scholars named this new variant populism as neo-populism (Ellner 2003, p. 139). Neo-populism preserved some features of classical populism but deviated from it in some aspects. Unlike classical populism, neo-populist leaders no longer depend on the support of organized workers; on the contrary, as neoliberal policies trimmed the power of workers, neo-populist leaders intensified their efforts to gather support from unorganized masses.

Although classical populism seems to be inconsistent with neoliberalism, neo-populism is compatible because they share an 'anti-status quo orientation', an 'anti-elite discourse', and a challenging and transforming stance towards the political structure (Weyland 2003a, p. 1098). Since elites hinder neoliberal reforms and this transformation requires state backing against the opposition of elites, neo-populism and neoliberalism coincide at these points. In addition, neo-populist leaders can use market reforms to justify their desire for power (Weyland 2003a, p. 1098). Apart from neoliberal reforms, the most significant feature of neo-populism is that neo-populist leaders have appealed to marginalized groups who were hurt by or deficient of benefits provided by state interventionist policies and disregarded by traditional parties (Ellner 2003, p.150).

Although scholars date populism back to 1930s and 1940s, earliest examples of populism can be found in the Roman Empire when Gaius Julius Caesar (100 BC- 44 BC) claimed power through populism. After many military triumphs during the civil

war in the Roman Republic starting in 49 B.C., on February 14, 44 B.C., the Senate voted to grant power of lifelong dictatorship to Caesar (Crompton 2003, p. 98). Caesar captured the chance of transforming the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire thanks to his charisma achieved through his speeches, military victories and public charities like feasts (Kamm 2006, pp. 130-132). The support of masses for Caesar threatened the elite and eventually led the group of 60 men who stroke Caesar down. If hadn't been killed, Caesar would have established one-man rule by surpassing the Senate due to his popular backing. What made him populist was that he was considering making reforms and increasing power of plebs by restraining patricians. Moreover, the main source of his power was support of middle and lower classes. Thereupon, he was one of the earliest populists.

One important aspect of populism is its affinity with democracy. Therefore, this section of the theoretical basis of dissertation touches upon the new democracy understanding of populists. Especially, Hugo Chávez claimed that he was asserting new form of democracy, which gives unprivileged classes a chance to rule rather than being dominated by the corrupt elite. Scholars call this new form as radical democracy because instead of representation, it fosters participatory democracy, as it was the case in Venezuela (De Venanzi 2010, pp. 58-59, Hidalgo 2009, p. 86). Both leaders dramatized democracy and put emphasis on the rule of people in their discourse. However, what they understood from democracy and how they articulated the concept is analyzed in the first section following the analysis of democratic values.

Another issue concerning the theoretical basis of the study of populism is to discover the link between charismatic authority referred to Max Weber and the emergence of populist leaders. As a matter of fact, charismatic leaders arise when there are extraordinary conditions like economic or political crises, which result in emergence of charismatic authority as anticipated by Weber. Scholars also questioned the relationship between leadership and economic performance and found out that people tend to support charismatic leaders under conditions of economic crisis. As Erdoğan and Chávez were democratically elected, the conditions of economic crisis and discrediting of traditional parties facilitated their rise to power. Their consequent electoral victories thanks to populist policies led to an increase in their transformative tendencies along with the consolidation of power.

1.3. Determinants of Populism and Cases

After clarifying the definition of populism and analyzing theoretical debates, the second part of the study deals with the background conditions of populism to appear. I justify my case selection with focused comparison of Turkey and Venezuela through the Most Different Systems Design which enables the identification of similar conditions in two countries facilitating the emergence of populism. The reason why I chose Hugo Chávez is that scholars regard him as the utmost case of populism in Latin America. Even without a detailed analysis, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is observed, similar attitudes can be encountered. However, to what extent these similarities can be accounted for in reference to populism is the main research question of this study. As a result, this dissertation compares and contrasts the political visions and policy references of Hugo Chávez and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

As well as being a daily life practice, comparison is central to political science discipline. Comparison in political science has four main functions (Landman 2008, p. 4). The first function is describing the context in order to understand the conditions peculiar to the political system. The second is classification to organize empirical evidence. The third function is hypothesis-testing enabling the elimination of rival explanations in order to establish a causal relationship and build more general theories. The last one is prediction built on the identified certain antecedent factors and conditions (Landman 2008, p. 4). Comparative research can perform one or more of these functions.

Political scientists conduct comparative research either by using qualitative or quantitative data. Each of these types of data requires specific research methods and techniques for the collection of the data and the analysis. In addition to differences in methods and techniques, quantitative and qualitative research differ in objectives and conclusions they derive from the data. Using simple and advanced statistical methods, quantitative research analyzes the relationships among numeric variables in order to reveal causal relationship between dependent and independent variables. To obtain meaningful statistical results, quantitative research is applied in Large-N research design. Qualitative research contrastingly uses small number of cases in order to delve into details of the unit of analysis. Even though establishing causal relationship is common to both, some qualitative research designs focus more on identifying and understanding the attributes, characteristics, and traits of the objects of inquiry (Landman 2008, p. 20). Nevertheless, there are also qualitative studies just aiming description rather than causation.

Arendt Lijphart (1971, p. 683) identifies three main fundamental strategies of research, which are experimental, statistical and comparative methods. According to Lijphart, the comparative method is almost equal to the statistical method except the number of cases. The main difference between the two is that the comparative method is applied when the number of cases is too small for the statistical method.

Even if comparative analysis of few countries offers more detailed and comprehensive analysis, due to small number of cases, the comparative method suffers from the problem of many variables, small number of cases (Lijphart 1971, p. 685). Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994, p. 119) argue that this problem is common in qualitative case studies even though it is not inherently peculiar to qualitative research design. They identify the problem as "more inferences than observations" caused by ill-defined research design. To solve the problem King, Keohane and Verba recommend either refocusing the study on the effects of particular explanatory variables or adding a new set of observations measured at different level of analysis (King et al. 1994, p. 120). Similarly, Lijphart suggests three ways of overcoming the problem which are increasing the number of cases as much as possible, reducing the "property-space" of the analysis and focusing the comparative analysis on "comparable" cases (Lijphart 1971, pp. 686-687). Among these solutions, while the first two attempt to overcome the problem by changing the number of cases, the last one is directed towards handling the problem of many variables through keeping many variables constant by using comparable cases.

Focused comparisons date back to John Stuart Mill's logic of inquiry and formulation. Mill propounded "method of difference" and the "method of concomitant variations"

for careful selection of countries in order to limit the variables by keeping constant as many as possible (Lijphart 1971, p. 687). Even though Mill's logic of inquiry initially had the purpose of applying it in experimental inquiry, his logic also became applied to comparative case study research (Mills et al. 2010, p. 555). Both methods target identifying the variables causing the phenomenon to occur. However, while the method of agreement focuses on context variables that are not necessary for the phenomenon to occur, the method of difference examines the variables that are necessary. Therefore, the method of agreement is a method of comparing instances of the same phenomenon in different circumstances. The method of agreement aims to reveal what is common in different circumstances because the common variable is probably the cause of the phenomenon's occurrence (Mills et al. 2010, p. 555). The method of difference contrarily is applied in order to seek the absence of a social phenomenon even in similar circumstances.

Studies using the focused comparison are generally case-oriented because by using the country as the unit of analysis scholars aim to reveal similarities and differences among countries instead of examining the analytical relationships between variables (Landman 2008, p. 28). Having the root in Mill's logic of inquiry, some studies apply the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), which scrutinizes different outcomes across similar countries and the others use the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), which analyzes similar outcomes across different countries.

MDSD enables the elimination of unnecessary context variables that are irrelevant to the observed political outcome. Even if with Mill's logic of inquiry MDSD encourages the search for a single sufficient circumstance or explanatory variable,

adding more explanatory factors is possible as well. However, once the number of sufficient explanatory factors increases, the generalizability of the conclusions decreases since there would be lesser cases fulfilling these required sufficient common characteristics (Mills et al. 2010, p. 572). Therefore, conclusions derived through MDSD with small-N cases can only contribute to mid-range theories not the ground ones. Moreover, in addition to the inherent problem of too many variables and not enough observations/countries due to limited number of cases analyzed, MDSD might suffer from the problem of selection bias since the countries are chosen according to values on the dependent variable (Landman 2008, p. 76).

Even though comparison through MDSD has some problems, there are always many trade-offs associated with different goals and methods of comparison, and each method has its own peculiar flaws. The lure of MDSD is its applicability to theory building. Through elimination of potential causes, MDSD helps building theory even if it is weak for theory confirmation (Mills et. al 2010, pp. 571-572). By identifying necessary and sufficient conditions, focused comparison of cases through MDSD can contribute to theory building rather than theory testing, which targets the elimination of rival explanations.

Comparing cases of Turkey and Venezuela fits the MDSD and is conducive to theory building on populism. Even though MDSD aims revealing the sufficient factor or at least minimizing the number of explanatory factors, comparison of Turkey and Venezuela yields an opportunity to seek for the necessary conditions of populism to appear even if it fails to identify one sufficient factor. In the process of exploring the key factors behind populism, this study combines different techniques within the

framework of MDSD. These techniques are such as macro-historical and institutional comparative analysis, time series analyses of the World Values Survey data, descriptive statistics from the World Bank and indicators of Reporters Without Borders supplementing these analyses.

As mentioned, two cases fit the MDSD, which provides advantages when two cases are compared. Different social, economic and political contexts of two cases enable us to discover genuine factors creating suitable environment for populism to surface. An analysis of geography, history, economy, values, beliefs and ideologies reveals that two countries share similar conditions such as breakdown of traditional party system, high level of inequality and distinct characteristics of political culture which are strong support for democracy and a strong leader. Moreover, when the biographies of two leaders are analyzed, surprising similarities are unveiled. Their background is important in the explanation of their political vision, discourse and charismatic leadership. Both of them are outsiders but they also benefited from their experience in political movements in the past. They presented themselves as "common men" because they were not members of the elite. Although they have different backgrounds, with Chávez being a military officer, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first a football player and then the mayor of Istanbul, they both claimed that they stayed away from corrupt politics as outsiders and they rose to power as common men. Moreover, when they appeared in political arena similar conditions facilitated their rise. These conditions were the economic crises and the fall from grace of traditional parties, accompanied by their charisma. As traditional parties were held responsible for current economic crises, both leaders could appeal to electorate by accusing those parties.

One concern for the comparison of Erdoğan and Chávez might be difference in constitutional regimes as Venezuela has presidential system while Turkey has parliamentary tradition since its establishment. Presidential system may facilitate the personalization of politics because presidential elections are held separately and presidential candidates can establish direct links with the electorate, while in parliamentary systems political parties prevail (Linz 1990, pp. 61-62). Moreover, in presidential systems, the president as the head of executive has more constitutional power compared to prime minister. Constitutional power enables the president to extend his/her control and overcome constraints, as the constitutional change of Venezuela in 2009 eliminating term limits might be one example. Prime ministers are responsible to both the party and the parliament. Therefore, prime ministers can be more constrained. However, checks and balances thanks to separation of powers in presidential system designed to constrain the president; thus, compared to presidents, power of prime ministers is not checked. Moreover, compared to presidents, prime ministers might consolidate party discipline and increase their influence on politics easily. Consequently, although constitutional regimes are different in Venezuela and Turkey, both leaders could surpass constraints and achieve personalization of politics regardless of the political structure. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, thanks to his charisma and lack of institutionalization of party system, gradually could dominate the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*- AKP) and personalize Turkish politics by setting aside party politics. Although Hugo Chávez consulted party members during the initial years of his leadership, he could also consolidate his personal power by suppressing the Movement of the Fifth Republic (*Movimiento*

Quinta Republica- MVR). As a consequence, two leaders share similar positions in Turkish and Venezuelan politics.

1.4. Policy Analysis: Socioeconomic Policies and Policy Preferences in Political Domain

The last section of dissertation focuses on the relationship between populism and socio-economic policies and policy preferences in the political domain. The main argument of the dissertation is propounded in this chapter. Hence, this chapter aims to demonstrate how both leaders consolidate their power through populism. Although both leaders have different settings and opposite ideological stances as Chávez championed statism while Erdoğan fostered neoliberalism, they sustained their support by their populist policies. Their populism was financed through capital inflows. While Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party attracted capital inflows thanks to chairing a one-party government as it enabled Turkey to stabilize political and economic structure, Hugo Chávez and his party benefited from rise of oil prices due to international context as Venezuela is one of the prominent oil exporting countries. Owing to capital inflows, they could finance their populist policies. Along with the analysis of their socio-economic policies, the economic policy analysis is supplemented by economic figures from both countries.

Thanks to revenue generated by oil exports or overseas investments, both leaders initiated social programs, mainly health care and education programs, which increased their lower-class support and contributed to their charisma as poor-friendly leaders. Both leaders underlined that they were serving “the people” instead of

protecting interests of “corrupt elite”. This “serving to people” discourse legitimized harassing the opposition; because along with this discourse, being the embodiment of national led the leaders and their partisan followers to think that they had every right to suppress the opposition as long as they sustained the support of people. The victims of this harassment became the media, judges and prominent businessmen. To demonstrate how the opposition was hurt by punitive practices of two leaders, this section also scrutinizes reports of independent watchdog organizations for these countries.

Some policy preferences of leaders in political realm facilitated the transformation of society along with political worldview of these leaders. The discourse used by these leaders amplified already existing polarization and certain values (such as support for strong leader) held by people of Venezuela and Turkey. As mentioned above, both leaders utilized discourses and narrative capabilities to build their personal charisma. Both leaders referred to rhetoric of national will, corrupt elite, and many other issues to boost their charisma and centralize their power. Using a distinct discourse becomes useless unless values of people comply with it. As the examination of the political values held by Venezuelans and Turks via Latin American Barometer and World Values Survey proved that the people of both countries support strong executives and are receptive to rule by a strong leader, this part of the dissertation analyzes corresponding policy choices of the leaders in political arena.

To further analyze policy preferences of two leaders in the political domain, the last section of the final chapter delves into restructuring of democratic institutions. Institutional changes in the legislative and judicial branches are analyzed

subsequently. Relations with journalists and the media are scrutinized also.

1.5. Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes my main points and findings and emphasizes the main argument of this study, which is, however different they are, the leaders utilized populism as a political strategy to consolidate their power and spread their political view across the society. In this chapter, I explain the place of this study in the literature and the promises this study holds for future analysis. This study has the potential to open up new space for further research because the findings may shed light on the experiences of other populist regimes. Especially, the comparison of Turkish case with a right-wing populist regime in Latin America might produce interesting results.

2. THEORETICAL DEBATE and CONCEPT CLARIFICATION

As famous as cave allegory, scholars use elephant allegory to illustrate how some concepts are misunderstood or assumed composing of individual parts rather than as a whole. As the elephant allegory goes, scholars like blind men attempt to understand or describe an elephant by touching its parts and illustrate the elephant as its trunk, foot or tail. Defining populism as a concept is similar to elephant metaphor but with a twist. Although men in the allegory are blind and they do not have a clue that there is an elephant, when it comes to populism scholars are all aware that populism is more than its components; yet, they still propound its parts for reductionism and applicability concerns. Before asserting which definition of populism constitutes the basis of this dissertation, I am going to explain various approaches and conceptions of populism along with its historical development.

2.1. How to define populism: Variants and Theoretical Approaches

The difficulty of defining populism emanates from the fact that it is related to another corrupted concept: democracy. As populism emerges when there is a demand for expansion of electoral basis or crisis of democratic representation, populism is associated with democracy. Before further discussing the relationship between democracy and populism, first I am analyzing how scholars define populism.

Approaches toward how to define populism are eclectic because scholars describe populism through looking at different theoretical glasses such as modernization and communication theories. Scholars supporting modernization theory and

developmentalist approach define populism on the ground of structural and economic factors. They basically argue that socio-economic factors led to emergence of populism. Developmentalist scholars suggest that the main cause of the emergence first wave of Latin American populism was the state-led model of capitalist development known as import substitution industrialization (ISI) along with coalitions supporting the charismatic leaders (Weyland 1999, p. 379, Weyland 2001, p. 5, Knight 1998, p. 237, Jansen 2011, p. 79, de la Torre 1992, pp. 388-389, Motta 2011, p. 29). The Great Depression; due to failure of markets to deal with the crisis, led to questioning of capitalist development and paved the way of new interventionist state in the economy. To save the market and the workers at the same time, the state had to intervene into the economy through Keynesian policies. Besides extending material benefits to organized working and lower class constituencies Keynesian policies helped charismatic leaders maintain their support to stay in power. Consequently, starting with late 1920s and 1930s, especially in 1940s and 1950s, the first wave of populism in Latin America took place.

The first wave of populism in Latin America juxtaposed with some attributes such as distributive economic policies, economic nationalism, charismatic leader, a political alliance forged by different segments of the society especially by incorporating the urban working class through expanding the rights of workers and electoral basis, and an anti-status quo ideology (Cammack 2000, p. 151, Arditi 2003 pp. 17-18, Spanakos 2008, p. 525, de la Torre 1992, p. 389). The reason that populism is characterized by these attributes is there was a political and economic crisis during the first wave and amalgamation of these factors paved the way of populism. Since established political institutions lost their capacity to control or guide popular political mobilization,

political system changed from oligarchic rule to representative democracy (Roberts 2002, p. 7, Cammack 2000, p. 156, Weyland 2001, p. 5, Knight 1998, p. 240). Moreover, transition from agro-export-based economies to and ISI resulted in demand for more economic and political rights for workers; hence, these processes followed each other and contributed to the rise of populist leaders. Rapid urbanization and industrialization led to increasing movement towards cities and created a new mobilized mass (Roberts 2002, p. 7, Weyland 2001, p. 5, de la Torre 1992, p. 392). Charismatic leaders exploited the conditions of economic and political crises and turn them into the chance of maintaining their rule by mobilizing this urbanized segment of society. By appealing to new electorate through distributive promises, they mobilized this urban working class and they challenged the established order, the hegemony of landed rural elites, without threatening the democratic system but adjusting the rules of the game by incorporating the working and lower classes. Apart from organized labor, most of the support came from national industrialists, created via transition from agriculture-based economy to industrialization, who promoted indigenous development and industrialization with concurrent protection of national industry due to collapse of the foreign markets (Spanakos 2008, p. 523).

Like the first wave, second wave also appeared during period of crises by validating the argument of Kenneth Roberts who theorized that populist waves occur during periods of institutional crisis, decay, or transition. Deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions and degeneration of political architecture built during the era of state-led import substitution industrialization by the first generation of populist leaders created economic and political crisis. Especially the 1982 debt crisis and progressive rise of prices in the 1980's crippled statist and nationalist development models because Latin

American states could not follow the ISI policies, which generated extreme state borrowing to cover government spending and distributive economic policies. Following the collapse of the ISI economic model due to crises the way for neoliberal reforms opened and integration to global markets initiated (Roberts 2002, p. 8). The market reforms in line with as the Washington Consensus imposed by international lenders eroded the mass-based party bases and labor organizations of the ISI era, turning them into unorganized mass constituencies. Reforms included reduction in the regulation of markets, increasing privatization, cutting government budget for controlling inflation, and transfer of public services to private or nongovernmental agencies (Spanakos 2008, p. 524). Therefore, working and lower classes lost social benefits promoted during the ISI period and suffered due to neoliberal economic program.

As the support base of first wave populists disbanded by the market reforms of 1980s and 1990s, structuralist and developmentalist scholars were mistaken by assuming that populism in Latin America fade out and it was a product of a particular developmental stage (Spanakos 2008, p. 524, Jansen 2011, p. 80). Although some elements of the classical populism such as organized labor, intense social mobilization disappeared due to market reforms, populism in Latin America made a come back in late 1980s and 1990s but with a different face. Development of media and communication strategies, especially the use of television to reach the constituency, decreased the role political parties by bestowing opportunity for outsiders and populist figures to appeal directly to the electorate (Mudde 2004, pp. 553-554, Kriesi 2014, pp. 365-367). In addition, market reforms by cutting down wages, minimizing public sector employment, and emasculating workers' legal

protections reduced the political leverage of the labor unions by crippling the working class power; hence, charismatic leaders no longer could rally the working class for their support but appeal to growing informal sector through communicating directly with them through media appearances (Roberts 1995, p. 90, Weyland 2003a, p. 1100, Kriesi 2014, p. 365).

Similar to the first wave of populism, the second wave of populism coincided with political and economic crises. Public discontent with the social negligence of the neoliberal model offered politicians from both left and right ideological spectrum a chance to obtain the support of electorate through criticizing this model and applying clientelistic policies or social programs. Consequently, while the early populists were associated with left-wing ideology with redistributive economic strategies, rallying for the rights of labor, and economic nationalism, this new type of populism included right-wing ideology and neoliberal economic policies yet with social programs. While the first wave of populism in Latin America is called as “classic populism”, the recent wave is named as “neopopulism”.

The common denominator between two variants is that “the will of people” is symbolized within the presence of a charismatic leader who claims saving the nation along with defending the rights of “the people” against the corrupt elite (Arditi 2003, p. 18, Spanakos 2008, p. 525, di Piramo 2009, p. 190). However, although the charismatic leader stays intact with a quasi-messianic figure bypassing formal mechanisms of representation whenever it suits her/his interest, his/her support base changed. While the unions and the army organized mass demonstrations in support of the charismatic leader and his/her party during the classical populism period in Latin

America, in current period of neopopulism, leaders supported by unorganized masses who are mobilized during election terms but stayed silent most of the time so that identified as “silent majority” (Mudde 2004, pp. 557-558, Canovan 1999, p. 5, Pasquino 2005, p. 16).

Another striking difference between two variants of populism is that nationalism and economic protectionism of classical populism is jettisoned. Although new generation of leaders kept some elements of the classical populist syndrome like the political strategies to reach and maintain personal power of the leader applied during the classical populism period, they pursued neoliberal policies that contrasted with the programs of classical populists and sought to eliminate the socioeconomic legacies of classical populism (Weyland 2001, p. 7). While economic policies of classical populists aimed at building and protecting national economy via subsidies and price controls, import substitution and the protection of local industry; neoliberal policies enacted by neopopulists targeted opening the economy to attract foreign direct investment and integrate into global economy (Arditi 2003, p. 18, Roberts 1995, pp. 89-90). Populist leaders could follow neoliberal policies, despite lingering high levels of inequality and occasionally erupting social unrest, through social programs and successful media strategies.

Although neopopulist leaders lack organized support like classical populists due to neoliberal policies minimized popular mobilization, they achieved establishing cross cutting coalitions among various segments of society. The other difference is that while charismatic leaders built strongly established parties having close ties with the society, neopopulist leaders no longer need party as brokerage with the society thanks

to development of media which enabled leaders to establish direct links with the electorate. The last difference is that in classical populism the state either surrenders to pressure of organized class or sectorial groups or charismatic leaders inflate societal demands for their own political gain; however, neoliberalism favors the competitive logic and discipline of the marketplace with technocratic decision making (Roberts 1995, p.90). Consequently, there is inherent contradiction with neoliberalism and the populism of first wave thus classical populism is different from neopopulism, which is fused with neoliberalism.

Despite these differences, leaders of both populisms resort to clientelistic networks created by the distribution of government resources to make partisans supporters better off and punish opponents as well as the use of public spending by disregarding criteria of fiscal or monetary responsibility although neopopulists considered budget constraints more compared to classical counterparts (Arditi 2003 p. 18). Moreover, since the Asian crisis of 1997, populist leaders with both left and right ideologies criticized neoliberal reforms and opposed neoliberalism because they could not solve endemic problems of Latin American countries, high levels of inequality, low economic growth, and low-quality democracy. Despite failure of these reforms and perpetuating maladies, democratic breakdown is not prevalent in Latin America right now. One of the reasons of populist governments to continue playing the democratic game instead of resorting to anti-democratic strategies is that since the end of the Cold War the great powers cut their support for armed leftist revolution and armed rightist resistance in the region; hence, democracy became the dominant form of government, yet its quality has been a matter of question (Spanakos 2008, p. 525).

Populism in Latin America during 1940s and 1950s is not the only example of classical populism. The Russian "*narodnichestvo*" of the nineteenth century, by which an egalitarian struggle on behalf of Russian peasants initiated, small farmer movements in the U.S.A during the 1930s and the U.S. People's Party of the late nineteenth century also constitute other examples of the first wave of populism (Arditi 2003, p. 17, Mudde 2004, pp. 548, 550, Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 322, Plattner 2010, p. 87). However, Latin American populism exemplified by Argentina under Juan Domingo Perón and Brazil under Getúlio Dornelles Vargas and many more who advocated statist and nationalistic economic policies and created mass-based party or labor organizations to encapsulate their followers, became more salient compared to populisms in other geographies; hence, classical populism is identified with Latin America (Roberts 2002, p. 5). Neopopulism, conversely, debated over various geographies; yet, this discussion over geographic approaches toward populism will be analyzed in detail later.

Like developmentalist approach, some other approaches have also structural elements in them; yet, instead of modernization or industrial development, they focus on either construction of the social structure or conflict among social stratifications. For instance, Paul Cammack offers an analysis of Latin American populism within the perspective of Marxist tradition by the populism with resistance to neoliberal capitalism (Arditi 2003 p. 17). As another structuralist, Ernosto Laclau sought to reveal discursive constructions, which constituted the basis of hegemony of dominant classes, through neo-Gramscian approach. Laclau analyzed populism within the framework of his neo-Gramscian approach by underlining that populism is a dimension of the popular-democratic imaginary whose class-nature varies in

accordance with contending discursive constructions (Arditi 2003, p. 17). His arguments will be analyzed in detail within the framework of discursive approach towards populism.

So far I attempted to explain the historical variants of populism, which emerged out theoretical frameworks scholars applied while analyzing populism. Before presenting the definitions of populism, it is important to revisit classification of principal perspectives on populism in the Latin American literature by Kenneth Roberts (1995). According to Roberts, there are four prevailing perspectives on populism in the Latin American literature, which are 'historical/sociological perspective', 'economic perspective', 'ideological perspective' and 'political perspective' (Roberts 1995, pp. 84-85). While the historical/sociological perspective offers a detailed account of emergence of first wave of populism in Latin America with an emphasis on the multiclass sociopolitical coalitions that typically appear during the early stages of industrialization, the economic perspective explains populism as fiscal indiscipline and a set of expansionist or redistributive policies applied to respond to mass consumption without considering fiscal constraints; hence, it supports ahistorical account of populism. In addition, Roberts (2002) criticizes this perspective within the confines of neopopulism as scholars identified new wave of populism, spread across Latin America in the 1980's and early 1990's along with the economic crisis and neoliberal reforms, on the ground of narrow economic terms. As Roberts put it, scholars associated populism with expansive fiscal policies and redistributive measures to promote popular consumption and support at the expense of macroeconomic stability. Since populism results in fiscal deficits, foreign exchange bottlenecks, and acute inflation, neoliberal reforms were regarded as the remedy for

such economic maladies (Roberts 2002, pp. 3-4). However, Roberts opposes this reductionism, which equates populism with economic measures in the analysis of both classical and neo populism.

The ideological perspective by emphasizing the conflict between “the people” and “the elite” focuses on the analysis of the ideological discourse. Lastly, the political perspective highlights the centrality of top-down mobilization by personalist leaders who passes or subordinates institutional forms of political mediation. What political perspective puts emphasis on is that populism results in deinstitutionalization of political authority due to the direct, paternalistic relationship between personalist leaders and their heterogeneous mass of followers.

Kenneth Roberts criticizes these perspectives on the ground that they are irreconcilable and meanings of populism generated by these perspectives are inconsistent (Roberts 1995, p. 88). Due to these troubles of these perspectives, Roberts questions the utility of them for social science inquiry and asserts his perspective on populism with core elements of the concept. These elements are

1. a personalistic and paternalistic, though not necessarily charismatic, pattern of political leadership

2. a heterogeneous, multiclass political coalition concentrated in subaltern sectors of society

3. a top-down process of political mobilization that either bypasses institutionalized forms of mediation or subordinates them to more direct linkages between the leader and the masses

4. an amorphous or eclectic ideology, characterized by a discourse that exalts subaltern sectors or is antielitist and/or antiestablishment

5. an economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create a material foundation for popular sector support (Roberts 1995, p. 87, Roberts 2002, pp. 1, 3, Di Piramo 2009, p. 185).

Roberts captures the core of populism by identifying the core elements of "classical" populism and he is right when he acknowledges it would be misleading to focus on one element but providing an amalgamation of some factors, which produce populism. However, Roberts also falls the trap of scholars who follow the perspectives he criticized, he regards populism composed of irreconcilable elements and he puts too much emphasis on political mobilization which is almost missing in some cases during the neopopulist period. Therefore, he acknowledges that there are two subtypes of populism, one of which is characterized by statist development strategies and the construction of mass organizations linked to the state with mass mobilization, whereas the second adheres to market logic and more pluralistic or individualized forms of representation with limited political mobilization to the electoral arena or to public gatherings (Roberts 2002, p. 5). Nevertheless, his definition of populism as mobilization of lower classes by a personalist leader, when the institutions of representation fail to express the interests of them and popular masses crave for political inclusion, excludes other elements of populism by reflecting them as unnecessary (Roberts 2002, pp. 2-4). As a result, his core elements of populism and his definition with emphasis on political mobilization mirror the classical populism more than neopopulism.

2.2 What populism is.. and is not: How Scholars Define Populism

In the light of theoretical and historical approaches, and perspectives presented above, in this section I aim to provide a detailed account of definitions of populism suggested and supported by scholars in the literature. In the current literature on Latin American populism, there are five main definitions of populism. These definitions are populism as ideology, logic/discourse, mobilization/movement, strategy and style. Each type of definition is formulated on the basis of different theoretical approach that I tried to present. Among these definitions, while populism as ideology, logic and discourse have basis on social and communication theories such as Gramscian approach of Laclau and discursive analysis of Cas Mudde or Kirk Hawkins that I am going to analyze in detail in this section, populism as style gets its inspiration from theories of performativity. Populism as strategy is more eclectic compared to other definitions but its emphasis on leadership and structural conditions at the same time mixes developmentalist approach with leadership theories.

2.2.1 Populism as ideology

Populism as ideology is the conceptualization of Cas Mudde. He defines populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, pp. 543, 562, Mudde 2010, p. 1175, Mudde 2014, p. 218, Mudde 2007, p. 23, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, pp. 149-150, Lucardie 2009, p. 319, Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, p. 1273, Bos et al., 2011, p. 187, Kriesi 2014, p. 362, Rovira Kaltwasser 2011, pp. 194-195, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 409). This

definition of populism has been so prevalent in the European literature that is it the dominant conceptualization of populism by political scientists in Europe (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 383). Mudde's definition can be misinterpreted at the first glimpse because he uses "ideology" to define populism. However, Mudde argues that populism is a 'thin-centered ideology' as it has a delimited core with political concepts attached to it (Mudde 2004, 544). Since it is a thin-centered ideology, populism can be easily intertwined with wide range of ideologies from left and right such as communism, nationalism, socialism and ecologism (Mudde 2004, p. 544).

For Mudde what constitutes the core of populism is the Manichean discourse of the populists, which divides the people into two opposite groups the corrupt elite and the pure people (Mudde 2004, p. 544). Consequently, according to Mudde, populism is composed of 'thin-centered ideology' with the 'Manichean discourse'. Because Mudde defines populism on the ground of ideology and discourse, he opposes definition of populism as a distinct type of organization such as charismatic leadership because he regards charismatic leadership and direct communication between the leader and 'the people' as features that facilitate populism rather than defining it (Mudde 2004, pp. 544-545).

In the populist discourse who constitute the people is often vague because delimiting the people would cost electoral support. Therefore, generally what is often clearer is who and what populists are against such as political parties, which fail to represent the interest of the people as they create artificial divisions within the homogeneous people besides breaking the ties between the leader and supporters, and put their own interests above those of the people (Mudde 2004, p. 546). However, these anti-party

sentiments do not mean that they promote the abolition of the democratic system. Rather, populists support reforming the existing system instead of a revolutionary movement and they claim that unlike the established parties, they are true representatives of the people. Once they obtain electoral support, they claim that they would speak for "the people" and make their voice heard.

Cas Mudde argues that since the early 1990s populism has become a regular feature of politics in western democracies and populist radical right parties have become one of the most successful party family although their systemic effect has been limited (Mudde 2004, p. 551, Mudde 2014, pp. 217, 222-223, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, p. 155). Although populism as a thin-centered ideology can be juxtaposed with right and left ideology, Mudde argues that populism is mainly associated with the radical right; yet, this claim is valid only for Europe although he does not mention (Mudde 2004, p. 549). Mudde's examples of populist parties include Jörg Haider's FPÖ, Jean-Marie Le Pen's FN, or Pauline Hanson's One Nation which are radical right parties and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Pim Fortuyn's LPF are the non-radical but populist right parties. In addition, the French former businessman Bernard Tapie, who had a scandal ridden political career in both the mainstream Socialist Party and the outsider Radical Party are the examples of left-wing populist parties (Mudde 2004, p. 549). The common denominator among these diverse parties is that they share a core ideology that includes a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007, p. 22, Mudde 2014, p. 218, Zaslove 2009, pp. 310, 312, Roodujin 2014, pp. 80-82).

According to Mudde, the rightwing of these Western European parties constitute a new party family called as the populist radical right. The minimalist definition of this new party family involves nationalism as most of European right-wing parties refer to the nation and strive for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit to achieve a monocultural state (Mudde 2007, p. 16). However, defining these parties on the basis of nationalism fails to be explanatory because nationalism is too broad term and it will not be able to make a distinction between "moderate" nationalists, notably so-called liberal nationalists, and the "radical" nationalists (Mudde 2007, p. 17). Therefore, instead of defining this party family on the basis of nationalism, Mudde offers nativism as one of the core ideologies of populist radical right parties. Nativism is more convenient substitute for nationalism, anti-immigrant or racist because it includes all these concepts without degrading to them; hence nativism can include racist and anti-immigration arguments but also it may not. In addition, nativism captures both xenophobia and opposition to immigration without reducing the parties to mere single-issue parties, such as the term anti-immigrant does (Mudde 2007, p. 19, Zaslove 2009, p. 312, Plattner 2010, p. 88). The last advantage of the term is that it enables exclusion of liberal nationalism because it promotes the idea that state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group which constitute the nation and non-native groups should be send away or blocked to enter as they are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state (Mudde 2007, p. 22, Roodujin 2014, p. 82, Mudde 2010, p. 1173). Consequently, nativism contains and combines nationalism and xenophobia; hence, it is key component of populist radical right party family as Mudde suggests (Roodujin 2014, p. 82).

Another core feature of populist radical right family is authoritarianism which is defined as "a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority" along with the operationalization of "The Authoritarian Personality" of Theodor Adorno and his collaborators (Mudde 2007, p. 22). Thusly, authoritarianism is described as the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely and the order will be achieved through discipline, law and order-based policies (Mudde 2007, p. 23, Mudde 2014, p. 218, Rooduijn 2014, p. 82, Mudde 2010, p. 1174). Authoritarianism is another necessary component of populist radical right parties because they believe that unity that is supported by nativism can only be achieved through strict authority; thus, nativism and authoritarianism complete each other.

The third component of this party family is populism defined as a thin ideology that portrays society to be essentially divided between two antagonistic and homogeneous groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and supports the idea that politics should be guided by the general will of the people instead of self-interest of the corrupt elite. Populism is the feature that separates populist right wing parties from other radical right parties, yet Mudde acknowledges that there are also nonpopulist radical right parties and movements. Consequently, while populist radical right is located in broader spectrum of radical right, since not all populist radical rightists are nationalists, not all nationalists are populist radical rightists, populist radical right constitutes a special form of radical right with its combination of nationalism with xenophobia (Mudde 2007, pp. 26, 30-31, Roodujin 2014, pp. 80-82). Although

Mudde stresses the populism component of populist radical right parties, he underlines that the ultimate core feature of the ideology of this party family is nativism, not populism. As a consequence, Mudde names this party family as populist radical right not radical right populism. By centralizing the nativism, this term helps to exclude liberal nationalist movements as well as elitist nationalists. Moreover, combining nativism with populism enables demarcating populist radical right from extreme right including fascism and National Socialism and its various 'neo'-forms. Even though they both oppose liberal democracy, the extreme right is antidemocratic whereas the radical right is democratic as it supports the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people (Lucardie 2009, p. 319, Bos et al., 2011, p. 189, van Kessel 2014, p. 108). However, as Lucardie (2009) asserts the commitment of populist radical right to democracy is also questionable even if populist radical right parties claim supporting it.

To summarize, according to Cas Mudde populist radical parties form a new party family in European party system. Even though there are other non-populist or even elitist radical right movements and parties, they are not as prevalent as the populist radical right, which is a special form of the broader radical right with combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. In addition, Mudde argues that since there is populist Zeitgeist, it is no surprise to see the populist radical right as the temporary dominant form of the radical right, as a radical right reflection of the contemporary (Mudde 2004). However, when his current study (Mudde 2014) searches for the impact of populist radical right parties on national party systems in Western Europe, the findings demonstrate that these parties have a limited effect on the party system of

Western Europe as they have hardly changed the systemic interactions between the relevant political parties within most countries (Mudde 2014, pp. 222-223).

To test Cas Mudde's arguments on populist discourse along with leadership, Linda Bos, Wouter van der Brug and Claes de Vreese (2011) conduct a research on leaders of Netherlands and attempt to analyze the relationship between the media and right-wing populist leaders. They believe that populist leaders have to be extraordinary in their behavior, style, or in their messages and appear authoritative by displaying their knowledge on issues addressed in order to be popular in the media (Bos et al., 2011, p. 183). The results of their analysis show that there is a significant positive interaction effect between populist style and the dummy right-wing populist leader. This populist style includes anti-elitist rhetoric, which promotes dramatizing, using simple and strong language, and emphasizing strong or charismatic leadership (Bos et al., 2011, p. 198). They find out that through this populist style, populist leaders acquire a positive image among the voters who perceive them as more effective especially when they appear to be more authoritative by displaying their knowledge on the topics discussed (Bos et al., 2011, p. 197). An intriguing finding is that when mainstream party leaders engage in populist manners, they are perceived negatively while the right-wing populist leaders are not punished for it (Bos et al., 2011, p. 197). Although Bos, Brug & Vreese provide an interesting research by combining political style or rhetoric with leadership, their approach toward populism is closer to Kurt Weyland's definition rather than Mudde's as they focus more on leadership rather than the discourse.

The main weakness of Mudde's definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology is that ideology is catchall term losing its clarity especially when mixed with other ideologies (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 383). This lack of clarity endangers conceptual validity and utility. According to Moffit and Tormey (2014), since there is no 'populist movement' or Populist International like other ideologies such as ecologism or feminism has, and there is hardly anyone identifies himself as 'populist', populism is not an ideology on these terms. Moreover, unlike other ideologies, populism lacks a clear common historical or genealogical referent beyond the People's Party of the 1890s (or perhaps the *Narodnichestvo* of 1870s Russia) (Mofitt & Tormey 2014, pp. 383-384).

My critique regarding Mudde's new party family is its formulation. Mudde argues that this party family is defined by the combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nevertheless, it is not clear what changes if we omit populism from this formulation. Mudde even admits that the core ideology of this formulation is nativism and what weight populism carries is obscure. Further, the mixture of nativism and populism might mislead us about whom the populists referring to when they talk about "their people". Populists are purposely ambiguous about "the people"; yet, when they are nativists at the same time, they probably refer to their ethnic group rather than whole people. Realizing this Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) make a distinction between inclusive and exclusive populisms. While studies on Latin America highlight its inclusive characters, studies on European populism focus on its exclusive nature (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, pp. 147-148).

2.2.2. Populism as political logic/discourse

The second definition of populism identifies populism as a political logic. The vanguard of this definition is Ernesto Laclau whose conceptualization of populism as a political logic has made the biggest impact especially in the area of political and social theory in European comparative politics (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 384). According to Laclau, when defining populism by restricting populism to one of its historical variants or suggesting a general definition, which will always be too narrow, is misleading (Laclau 2005, p. 17). Especially the second attempt will be self-defeating exercise since listing a series of quite disparate movements under the label 'populism' will not say anything about what the meaning of that label would be, as Laclau argues. Moreover, Laclau opposes two pejorative propositions regarding populism, which are populism is vague and indeterminate in the audience to which it addresses itself, in its discourse, and in its political postulates; and populism is mere rhetoric (Laclau 2005, p. 67). For Laclau, vagueness and indeterminacy are not shortcomings of a discourse about social reality, rather it reflects social reality as such. Further, rhetoric is not epiphenomenal because no conceptual structure finds its internal cohesion without appealing to rhetorical devices. In light of these arguments, Laclau underlines that populism is related to the ontological constitution of the political as such (Laclau 2005, p. 67, Sutherland 2012, p. 330).

Discourse also takes a special place in Laclau's definition of populism. First thing to note about discourse is that Laclau clarifies what he means by discourse. Discourse is not merely restricted to the areas of speech and writing, but any complex of elements in which relations play the constitutive role (Laclau 2005, p. 68). In addition, this

understanding of discourse purports that elements do not pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted through it. This claim of Laclau's is crucial in identification of "the people". Since populism characterized by antagonistic division of society as scholars mostly agreed, the construction of "the people" should be highlighted. For Laclau, "the people" is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents (Laclau 2005, p. 73). Construction of the people signified by the plebs presenting itself as the totality of the populous. The construction of the people is not an automatic emergence of the people, instead, it s a result of a complex construction process which can, among other possibilities, fail to achieve its aim (Laclau 2005, p. 200). This process necessitates the discursive construction of a global identity out of the equivalence of a plurality of social demands through articulation of an antagonistic political frontier and popular identity (Laclau 2005, pp. 83, 110). Formation of the people also involves discursive practices as the people does not exist previously but constructed through discourse. Thus, this construction process is not fixed constellation but articulation of a series of discursive resources, which can be put to very different uses also (Laclau 2005, p. 176).

In sum, for Laclau, populism is not a type of movement, which is identifiable with either a special social base or a particular ideological orientation, but a political logic (Laclau 2005, p. 117). This political logic expressed through different types of discourses. For instance, while there is a dominant statist discourse of citizens' rights in Latin American populisms, in Eastern Europe an ethnic populism trying to enhance the particularism of the national values of specific communities while excluding other ethnic minorities dominates the political agenda (Laclau 2005, p. 193). In conclusion,

according to Laclau, populism is a political logic signified through discourse (Sutherland 2012, p. 331).

The main critique towards Laclau is that discursive approach often rather than illuminating or analyzing the subject matter, servers to verify and prove the correctness and universal applicability of the Laclauian framework it utilizes (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 385). Moreover, Laclau argue that populism becomes synonymous with politics since populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian space. Moffitt & Tormey (2014) warn us that this argument results in the problems of slippage of concepts, the issue of empirical counter-examples and methodological applicability (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 384). Due to these problems, rather than as a primary framework to analyze populism, the discursive approach to populism should be utilized as a methodological supplement helping to explore populism (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 386).

Apart from Laclau, Kirk Hawkins also defines populism as a discourse. Unlike other scholars, Hawkins attempts to measure populist discourse through content analysis of 40 leaders. Before going in detail of analysis, Hawkins discusses four principal definitions of populism in the social science literature. These definitions are structural, economic, political-institutional, and discursive. The first approach defines populism along with certain stages of development by underlining its social basis and relationship with industrialization in countries located at the periphery of the world economy (Hawkins 2009, p. 1042). Besides, in addition to socio-economic conditions, this approach analyzes cross-class coalitions and popular mobilization to support import-substituting industrialization (ISI) during the first wave of populism in Latin

America. Like structuralist approach, economic approach also studies Latin American populism yet focuses on the policy outputs including the basic struggle over control of government, policy, and core values of the community but with special attention paid to shortsighted economic policies that appeal to the poor (Hawkins 2009, p. 1042). The third approach, political approach concentrates on the relationship between populism and institutions. It seeks for the effect of institutionalization on populism such as low esteem for existing institutions of representative democracy or the presence of a charismatic leader. The last definition or approach of populism is the discursive one that Hawkins supports. According to this approach, populism is a Manichaean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite, and accordingly politics is a cosmic struggle between good and evil (Hawkins 2009, pp. 1042-1044). The general will of the people is represented by the populists who defend the rights of the people against the corrupt elite. Within this framework, populists resort to the Manichean discourse to claim representing the general will; hence, their discourse should be analyzed. Most studies apply a qualitative content analysis to search discursive practices; however, Hawkins tries to measure populist discourse at the elite level using a form of content analysis from educational psychology known as holistic grading, which is applied to a study of more than 200 speeches from 40 chief executives (Hawkins 2009, p. 1048).

After analyzing quasi-randomly selected four speeches of these 40 leaders from campaign, ribbon-cutting, international, and famous speeches, the findings demonstrate that Chávez indeed has a very populist discourse and populist discourse is a fairly rare phenomenon on the contrary of expectations (Hawkins 2009, p. 1051, 1054-1055). Although the attempt of Hawkins to quantify populist discourse a brave

move, reducing populism to discourse of antagonism between the people and elite for theoretical parsimony produces errors as Hawkins had to explain why George W. Bush came out to be one of the leaders having high level of populist discourse in the speeches (Hawkins 2009, p. 1058). Even though Hawkins admits that Bush cannot be considered populist but antagonistic, this mistake should warn us all against parsimony when populism analyzed. As a consequence, populism should be analyzed as consisted of compounding factors instead of one main component.

Similar to Hawkins' analysis, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) conduct a quantitative analysis on the political party broadcasts of the six Belgian parties. They conduct a discourse analysis on these parties because they define populism as a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, pp. 322-324, Rodriguez Braun 2012, p. 24). According to Jagers and Walgrave, the core of the populism is the appeal of the political actors to the people and their anti-elitism (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, pp. 323-324). In this line, they analyze their data by assessing the exclusivity-index, whether parties are excluding specific population; the anti-establishment-index, whether parties are against politics, the state and the media; and the people-index, whether the parties are referring to the people. Results of the analyses demonstrate that three defining aspects of populism, referring the people, attacking the establishment and excluding the groups are associated in the Belgian context in 1999–2001 (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 335). Among the six parties, Vlaams Blok's discourse most fundamentally differs from the others parties' communication because it scores high on all three indexes by referring the people and identifying with the public at large, having exclusive and fervently anti-establishment attitude and adversely from other parties exclusion of specific groups (Jagers &

Walgrave 2007, p. 333). However, Jagers and Walgrave remind us that Vlaams Blok is extremely nationalist party with the aim of breaking up Belgian state and setting up a separate Flemish state; hence their extreme nationalism explains its populism (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p. 336). This fact leads questioning of whom Vlaams Blok is referring to when it mentions "the people" because referring to ethnic group results in equating nationalism with populism. Therefore, any party's anti-establishment or exclusivist attitude towards groups or institutions just because their ethnic group or interests of this group is not represented is a product of nationalism rather than its populism.

Another study that uses quantitative measurement of populism belongs to Matthijs Rooduijn and Teun Pauwels. They select their cases from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy as they believe that there are different kinds of allegedly populist parties such as the *Partij voor de Vrijheid*, the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* and the *Socialistische Partij* in the Netherlands; the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party in the UK; the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* in Germany; and *Forza Italia* and the *Lega Nord* in Italy (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, p. 1273). They analyze manifestos of these parties by the help of trained coders with the method of classical content analysis. In order to reveal their populist nature, coders were instructed to look at every possible reference to the people. In addition to the reference to people, anti-elitism in the manifestos computed and finally the percentage of populist paragraphs in every election manifesto was obtained. However, the authors realized that measuring people-centrism by paying attention to the references to the people is almost impossible because not every mention of the words 'our' or 'we' does not mean making a reference to the people; rather, they are

generally referring to the political party instead of the people (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, p. 1275). Therefore, instead of references to the people, they focus on anti-elitism.

After validating populist parties are populist and mainstream parties are not by their measurement, the classical content analysis turns to be more successful than the computerized analysis in generating better estimation of their true degree of populism; yet both methods have enough validity to measure populism as they argue (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, pp. 1277-1279). Although Rooduijn and Pauwels admit that their measurement does not cover the whole concept as the measurement of people-centrism is missing, they claim that the effect of this negligence towards people-centrism is limited and anti-elitism alone is a pretty good indicator of populism by itself since it has both face validation and concurrent validation (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, p. 1278). Obviously, jettisoning half of the concept is problematic. Another problem is that whose ideas, the leader or the party as total, the manifestos reflect is undetermined. As Stijn van Kessel stressed while parties occasionally apply populist discourse, party leaders can constantly use populist rhetoric; hence, populism the party as a whole shows little populist characteristics when formal party documentation or the discourse of other party members are analyzed (van Kessel 2014, p. 107). For instance, while Silvio Berlusconi was himself a populist figure, the *Forza Italia* was not as much populist as its leader, van Kessel argues (van Kessel 2014, p. 106). Therefore, populism as a discourse leads problems when scholars aim analyzing populism through parsimony by degrading populism to one or more components.

The third definition of populism is defining populism as strategy or organization. Kurt Weyland as the protagonist of this approach defines populism as a political strategy consisted of three main characteristics which are a personal leader who appeals to a heterogeneous mass of followers feeling excluded and available for mobilization; a direct and quasi-personal relationship between the leader and his/her constituency which bypasses established intermediary organizations, especially parties; and lastly, a new or revived an old populist party which becomes a personal vehicle with a low level of institutionalization (Weyland 1999, p. 381, Weyland 2001, pp. 13-14, Weyland 2003a, pp. 1097, 1102, Rovira Kaltwasser 2011, p. 193). When defining populism, Weyland highlights political aspect of populism rather than economic basis because emergence of populism under different socioeconomic structures and economic models questions the validity of socioeconomic factors. Nevertheless, defining populism as a strategy does not leave out socioeconomic factors, on the contrary, it is flexible enough to analyze populism with different socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, defining populism as a strategy enables the concept to travel through history by explaining both the classical and neo variants of populism and different geographies including the Latin America and Europe (Weyland 2001, p. 18).

Structural and economist approaches associate populism with certain stage of development and economic policies along with organized support from workers. However, populism cannot be defined on the basis of a specific stage of social mobilization or delayed dependent development because it appeared both in 1930s and 1980s thusly under different development levels with different social constituencies such as organized workers and unorganized mass supporters subsequently (Weyland 2001, pp. 8-9). Accordingly, defining populism on the ground

of economic policies fails similarly because it categorizes diverse leaders such as the classical populist Juan Perón, neopopulist Alan García, conservative José Sarney, and Marxist Salvador Allende under the same label (Weyland 2001, p. 11). However, a political definition like strategy achieves explaining how and why populism emerges.

2.2.3. Populism as strategy

Populism as a strategy focuses on how populist leaders attain and exercise political power (Weyland 2001, p. 12). Instead of economic policies related to distribution of socioeconomic benefits, it centralizes patterns of political rule because by using economic and social policy as an instrument for capturing the power, leaders shape the politics. Similarly, anti-elite rhetoric along with division of society into two antagonistic camps and ideological juxtapositions help leaders to consolidate their power (Weyland 2001, p. 11). Therefore, economic policies or ideological commitments are the tactics within the general strategy of leaders and populism is thoroughly political and best defined in political terms.

Besides classical populism, populism as a strategy can explain the unexpected affinity between neoliberalism and neopopulism. Neoliberalism and neopopulism have compatible interests such as support for centralization of power for market reforms to be successful, attack on the elite with special interests, rejecting intermediary associations and opposition to state interventionism. Neopopulist leaders support massive privatization efforts of neoliberal experts along with tax reforms because privatization through sale of public enterprises and increased fiscal extraction provide revenues, which can be used for financing discretionary spending and anti-poverty

measures through social programs to garner support (Weyland 1999, pp. 392-393). Moreover, neoliberal expertise formulate neoliberal reforms which cripple the power of intermediary associations such as bureaucrats or workers' unions which seek to limit the personal power of the leader (Weyland 1999, pp. 388-389). Further, neoliberals support strong executive, weakening rival institutions such as parliament and blocking checks and balances, because backing of the president is necessary for structural adjustment to be accomplished while neopopulist presidents foster their own personal leadership (Weyland 1999, pp. 382, 387-388, 391-392, Weyland 2003a, p. 1107). As a consequence, while neopopulist leaders concentrate their power to enhance their personal leadership, neoliberals support strong executive for their own agenda also; hence, neopopulists and neoliberal experts form an alliance in many countries. However, according to Weyland this alliance is not likely to endure long because although neopopulists and neoliberal experts have compatible interests to some extent, especially when the two allies initiate market reforms, the personalistic whims and political machinations of populist leaders as well as reluctance of populist leaders to keep up with market rules create tensions (Weyland 1999, pp. 382-383, 398). In addition, neoliberal experts prioritize budget austerity and attracting foreign direct investment; yet for neopopulist leaders enhancing personal power takes precedence over these neoliberal aims. Another source of tension between neoliberalism and neopopulism is that while neopopulists favor the unity of the people by calling for an end to factional conflicts and ideological rifts, neoliberals side with the new elites while undermining popular support for neopopulist leaders although both opposed the old elite during the first phase of their alliance (Weyland 2003a, pp. 1108, 1111). Consequently, the alliance between neoliberals and neopopulists does not last long.

Populism has emerged under different contexts but there has been a crucial permissive cause that is weak intermediary organizations, especially inchoate parties (Weyland 1999, pp. 384, 386). Strong parties block populist mavericks to take over parties; yet, when parties are inchoate populist leaders easily capture the party as they face few organizational obstacles. Moreover, party weakness caused by constant infighting, frequent party switching, and cumbersome policymaking, discredits established politicians and facilitates the rise of populist challengers. In addition, populist challengers can rise through either establishing new parties and attracting voters who lack loyalties to existing parties along with high electoral volatility, or capturing the power in an old established party. Consequently, party weakness, indicated by organizational fluidity and high electoral volatility, breeds populist challengers. Nevertheless, party weakness and electoral volatility do not guarantee the emergence of populist leaders but they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the rise of populist leaders (Weyland 1999, p. 385).

Apart from institutional factors, deep economic crises also can contribute to the rise of populist leaders because these crises discredit existing parties and leaders by opening the way of populist leaders. Besides, crises give charismatic populist leaders the opportunity to prove their extraordinary capacities to save the nation (Weyland 1999, p. 394). Economic crises also justify neoliberal programs, which cannot be adopted under unexceptional periods, as the people give unconditional support to these programs to save the nation. Likewise, these crises destabilize party systems by weakening party structures, which in turn further promotes the emergence of neoliberal populism. As a result all these economic and institutional factors bring forth neoliberal populism (Weyland 1999, pp. 395, 397).

Unlike the organized support during classical period, neopopulist leaders seek and find stronger mass support among unorganized sectors as neoliberal policies disbanded organized sectors (Weyland 1999, p. 388). Further, on the contrary of constant support of leaders in classic populism period, support for neopopulist leaders is sporadic and tenuous as neopopulist leaders mobilize unorganized sectors especially during election periods. However, this lack of mobilization is compensated by the direct quasi-personal relationship between the undifferentiated mass and the leader established via television (Weyland 1999, p. 382, Weyland 2001, pp. 13, 15-16). In addition to television appearances, the leader aims to boost his/her popular identification by depicting himself/herself as the common man who arose within the community by his/her charisma (Weyland 2001, p. 14).

Due to unstable support of undifferentiated mass, populist leaders need to routinize their charisma and solidify their mass by creating limited party organization or resorting to clientelism because depending only on charisma for obtaining mass support is not sustainable. As television and modern media have decreased the need for high level of institution, populist leaders promote low level of institutionalization, which would allow sustaining high level of support but would not restrict the personal rule of the populist leader (Weyland 2001, p. 16). Specifically, neopopulist leaders like Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Fernando Collor in Brazil pursued anti-organizational tactics by refusing to transform their own electoral vehicles into organized parties for not to be restricted by the party vehicle because their unmediated and direct relationship with the electorate sustained their popularity (Weyland 2001, p. 15). Moreover, when neopopulist leaders faced consolidated party systems, instead of anti-organizational stance, they favored taking over established but weakly

institutionalized parties and subordinating the party under their dominance. Within the institutional framework, when two waves of populism compared, it is revealed that neopopulism is less institutionalized than classical populism.

According to Weyland (2001), neopopulism is mobilizational, transformatory, and redemptive than classical populism. Especially, neopopulism is more representative and compatible with liberal democracy because neopopulist leaders appeal to the whole citizenry rather than some sectors of the society, and ascertaining the will of the people through votes and poll responses (Weyland 2001, p. 16). Classical populism was inclusive because classical populism coincided with democratization and the incorporation of previously excluded sectors of the population into political and social life, especially the working class, but not all the populist leaders were politically democratic (Weyland 2003a, pp. 1102-1103).

Neopopulism is not as inclusive as the classical populism and even depicted as exclusionary. While classical populists broadened the public sphere, neopopulist leaders limited the public sphere due to privatization, depoliticization and demobilization (Weyland 2003a, p. 1103). Although the classical populism and neopopulism seem different, they have similarities such as top-down mobilization of the excluded sectors, plebiscitarian acclamation, and the cult of leader. Therefore, claiming that classical populism is more democratic than neopopulism is fallacious owing to depiction of classical populism by leftist critics in positive way (Weyland 2003a, pp. 1003, 1112). Despite questions regarding reliability of opinion polls, they help neopopulist leaders to be more accountable and responsive than classical populism; hence, neopopulism is more representative and compatible with liberal democracy than the classical populism (Weyland 2003a, pp. 1005-1006). However,

the extent of this compatibility and the relationship between the populism and democracy pose a puzzle, which I am going to examine later.

When populism is defined as a strategy, too much emphasis is put on the leader because populism is composed of various elements like economic policy, discourse and institutions. Nevertheless, the main factor binding these elements is the charismatic leader who creates and controls these components of populism. The leader is central for populism because the leader seeks or exercises government power based on support from large numbers of followers who are mobilized by the charismatic leader also. The charisma of the leader persuades the unorganized masses that the leader has distinctive power capability to solve grave problems of the country and rescue the people from crises, threats and enemies (Weyland 2001, p. 14).

Elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and opinion polls are the crucial instruments by which the leader demonstrates and proves his/her power and charisma (Weyland 2001, p. 12, Weyland 2003a, p. 1102). These demonstrations of power also help the leader to suppress his/her opposition by claiming that he/she is the embodiment of the national will. As the hero of the nation, in the name of the whole nation, the leader combats against the privileged groups and their special interests, and transforms the corrupt established institutions by aligning them along with the common good of the people. However, underneath of all these actions, the thrust for power and a political strategy lie (Weyland 2003a, p. 1102). The leader constitutes the core of populism because without the leader cult, populism cannot emerge. Moreover, not a group or organization but one charismatic rules under the populism; hence, this fact also proves that the leader is the main component of the populism.

2.2.4. Populism as political style

The last main definition of populism in the literature is populism as a style. This definition centralizes the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 387). These performances produce various types of political styles including populist, technocratic, authoritarian and post-representative styles, all of which have their own specific performative repertoires affecting political relations. These styles utilized by Hugo Chávez, Angela Merkel, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Subcomandante Marcos subsequently (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 387). Among these styles the populist one which attracts the most attention of scholars as Moffitt and Tormey argue. The main reason behind this scholarly attention is 24-hour news cycle has turned politicians into pseudo-celebrities as almost every act of politicians has become newsworthy and their projected images have become increasingly crucial for political survival (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 387). At this point, the centrality of performance in politics has become even more important especially when the populist leaders occupy the political agenda.

When defining populism as a political style, Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey follow Alan Knight who was the first scholar describing populism as a political style. Knight described populism as a "loose style 'characteristically involving a proclaimed rapport with "the people", a "them-and-us" mentality, and (often, though not necessarily) a period of crisis and mobilization'" (Knight 1998, p. 223). However, Moffitt and Tormey focused on performance aspect of this political style rather than institutionalization perspective of Knight. They emphasize that performance within a political style is not merely a one-sided relationship in which only the politician is active by performing for a passive audience; instead, it is a mutual relationship in

which the performance can actually change or create the audience's subjectivity, and by as response, this change the context and efficacy of the performance (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 389, Weyland 2001, p. 12). To exemplify this idea, Moffitt and Tormey discuss the relationship between the populists and the people. When populists claim to speak in the name of 'the people', they create 'the people' like a homogenous actual being and they claim that they have a direct and unmediated contact with this being. As a result, this act of populist should be analyzed as a performative action, which is a part of political style.

Defining populism as a political style differs from other definitions such as discourse and ideology because while these definitions focus on structural arrangements and rhetoric/discourse to analyze populism, political style is concerned with performative aspect of populism (Weyland 2001, p. 12). Even though discursive approach acknowledges performative aspect of populism, it regards political style as a subordinate to the discourse. Moreover, Moffitt and Tormey confront Mudde's argument that populists regard the elite actually as corrupt and they oppose the elite constantly. Instead of populist opposition to the elite, they argue that oppositions of populists are context-specific since populists sometimes oppose institutions or groups such as asylum seekers or immigrant workers. Although populists are not part of the elite definitely, the main drive of populists' opposition to these actors is their desire for appealing the people with their performative actions, not opposing the elite (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 391). The critique by populists can target different groups and take different names such as 'the elite', 'the establishment', 'the state' or 'the system' in populist discourse but main emphasis of the populists becomes the accusation of populists towards these groups as responsible of crisis, breakdown,

corruption or dysfunctionality. The source of friction between the representatives and the people can be problems related to immigration, economic difficulties, perceived injustice, military threat, social change or other issues and populist promise that they can find cure for these maladies. Therefore, their appeal to the people centers not opposition to the elite but the crises they create. This appeal can be juxtaposed with both left-wing and right-wing leaders and movements; hence, populism as a political style can be molded with all ideologies of political spectrum.

Populism as a political style is almost as promising as populism as strategy. However, although Moffitt and Tormey strongly defend populism as political style, Weyland criticizes that many leaders, who occasionally adopt a populist style especially during the election campaigns, are classified as populists; hence, this categorization is too wide lacking clear delimitation of case (Weyland 2001, p. 12). Moffitt and Tormey also criticize Weyland by arguing that defining populism by centering the leadership is problematic since similar modes of organization or strategy appear across the political spectrum in many different articulations such as social movements, including religious or millenarian movements, they have charismatic leaders but they are not actually populists (Hawkins, 2010, p. 168, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, p. 154). Another critique is that there is no relationship between the low institutionalization or organization and populism as parties in Europe such as Le Pen's Front National or Wilder's *Partij voor de Vrijheid* with tight party discipline and organization demonstrates (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 386). Further, Moffitt and Tormey stress that defining populism as a strategy neglects the classic referent in discussions of populism, the people (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, p. 386). Lastly, Mudde & Kaltwasser remind that while the original US Populists lack a charismatic leader, well-established

parties (such as populist radical right parties in Europe) have high level of institutionalization unlike Weyland's expectations (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 154).

The problem of the first critique is that political style also appears across the political spectrum but Moffitt and Tormey underline that among all of political styles populism constitute the unique one with scholarly attention. Apart from what other styles are not clear, their argument suffers the same problem they criticize: lack of delimitation. Although charismatic leaders may be common to other political or religious organizations, so does the political style as each political or religious organization has political attitude and perfomative action. Consequently, although charismatic leadership occupies an important place in Weyland's definition of populism, it is not the sole component; rather, political strategy applied by the leader is the main ingredient as it binds organizational and ideational aspects of populism. Secondly, lack of institutionalization in Latin American countries when European parties are highly institutionalized and leadership differences between populisms of Latin American countries and the US might be signs of geographical differences of populisms as Mudde & Kaltwasser (2013) acknowledged rather than shortcomings of Weyland's argument. Lastly, focusing on strategy and leadership does not mean excluding the appeal to the people; on the contrary, it illuminates the relationship between the leader and the people because without the leader people cannot be mobilized. Therefore, populism as political strategy is general enough to combine various factors, but also delimited enough as political strategy of the leaders can be studied to analyze populism with clearer point of view than political style.

2.2.5. Populism as political movement/mobilization

So far I tried to outline four main definitions of populism in the literature: populism– as ideology, logic/discourse, strategy/organization and style. The last definition of populism yet with limited appeal and usage is populism as political movement/mobilization. Robert S. Jansen (2011) defines populism as a mode of political practice, political mobilization. According to Jansen political-institutional approaches towards populism and especially neopopulism variant during the 1990s provided insights regarding populism by identifying populism as a symptom of weak democratic incorporation since individuals follow populist leaders even if they are not firmly incorporated into political life through strong and stable political parties (Jansen 2011, p. 81). Although Jansen acknowledges that the most important contribution of these studies was the decoupling of populist politics from economic policies, they neglected social factors behind this mobilization.

Although Jansen centralizes mobilization, he refuses defining populism as a movement or regime type, instead suggests populism as a flexible way of animating political support. In this line, Jansen regards populist mobilization as a political project which is "a concerted and sustained set of political activities—a package of mobilizational and discursive practices—that maintains a degree of enduring coherence, both in terms of its rhetorical underpinnings and its ongoing enactment" (Jansen 2011, p. 82). In addition, a project of populist mobilization is not a temporary and short-term act; rather, it is a sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary

people as Jansen states (Jansen 2011, p. 82). As a consequence, populist project combines popular mobilization and populist rhetoric and by this way, this project becomes a political means for generating support for challengers or incumbents with different social political and economic agendas (Jansen 2011, pp. 77, 82-83, 85).

Besides populist project, Jansen delves into the analysis of populist rhetoric. He identifies that populist rhetoric is an anti-elite and nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people (Jansen 2011, p. 83). By using a populist rhetoric, leaders create the natural social unity and inherent virtuousness of the people constituted by the ordinary people including workers, the urban poor, the landed and landless peasantry, indigenous populations, professionals, the middle class, and even certain segments of the elite giving support to the leaders (Jansen 2011, p. 84). To unite such diverse segments of society, leaders downplay differences and emphasize similarities and they attempt to forge a solidary among the people through populist rhetoric. Besides promoting the solidarity, populist rhetoric used by populist leaders provokes the people against the elite who disproportionate and unjustified control over conditions affecting the rights, well-being, and progress of the people thanks to elite power and privileges (Jansen 2011, p. 84). According to Jensen, populist leaders like Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales have generated populist mobilization by mobilizing marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while promoting an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people (Jansen 2011, p. 75). Although Jansen successfully explains the process of populist mobilization, he neglects that by the development of social media, internet and other medium types, mobilization has turned to be more sporadic and temporary;

hence, rather than mobilization, we should focus on who mobilizes the ordinary people.

Torcuato S. di Tella (1997) defines populism as a political movement, which is based on a mobilized but not yet autonomously organized popular sector controlled and mobilized by a charismatic leader who has a direct link with the masses (di Tella 1997a, p. 196). When defining populism, di Tella disregards the ideology and focus more on mobilization because while ideology can change but mobilization stays intact (di Tella 1997b, p. 51). According to di Tella, populism is a product of socio-economic conditions such as urbanization, education, internal migration, and striking contrast between developed and backward regions (di Tella 1997b, pp. 52-53). Therefore, different mixes of these conditions breed different types of populisms. Especially the attitude of the elite is crucial because anti-status quo drive of the elite usually result in populism as di Tella suggests.

With different socio-economic conditions, populism differs in Europe and the Third World. While articulation of ethnicity and religion pushed European voters towards the Right, this blending created reaction against the dominant European powers, especially in the Middle East by pushing the voters to the Left. Correspondingly, while populism is associated with the Right in Europe, it was associated with the Left and anti-imperialism in the Third World (di Tella 1997a, p. 193). The Third World can be compared within subgroups because the Latin American cases also differ from Middle Eastern, Asian or African regimes. While the masses in Latin American regimes are more urban and unionized, along with live and vibrant civil society, the masses in other Third World regions are more multi-class based. As a consequence,

Latin American masses cannot be easily incorporated into multi-class integrative parties differently from other regions (di Tella 1997a, pp. 194-195).

For di Tella, apart from socio-economic conditions, anti-status quo attitude of dominant group with the influence of populist leader is decisive for populism to appear. While there is a mobilization in Europe perceived as populist, di Tella opposes identification of these movements as populist. Although mobilized groups in Europe appeal to the native working class, and they share the similar strategy of antagonizing the liberal bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, their mobilization is not associated with populism. While populists oppose to the upper classes, the elite mainly, these groups target underprivileged groups, especially non-native groups such as immigrants, asylum seekers. Consequently, di Tella belives that mobilized groups in Europe are nearer to fascism and they should be branded as 'radical nationalists' or 'radical Right' rather than populists (di Tella 1997a, p. 190).

Since populist mobilization is generated by social conditions such as urbanization, immigration and education which contributed to concentration of power in the elite while further excluding the periphery from the politics; when these social conditions changes towards a more urban, educated and secular pattern, populism may disappear (di Tella 1997a, p. 196). For di Tella, when populism vanishes social democracy can emerge in Latin America thanks to its left leaning status.

2.3. Economic Populism

Scholars defining populism on the basis of economic policies concentrate their efforts on the analysis of economic populism. By economic populism scholars refer to economic policies by which populist governments attempt to gather political support thanks to generation of economic growth as a result of these policies. According to Kaufman and Stallings (1991), populism involves a set of economic policies planned for achieving specific political goals such as mobilizing support of organized labor and lower-middle-class groups; attaining the support of domestic business; and, limiting the political effect of the rural oligarchy, foreign enterprises, and large-scale domestic industrial elites (Kaufman & Stallings 1991, pp. 15-16). Within the framework of this definition of populism, Kaufman and Stallings identify economic policies designed for obtaining these political goals. These policies consisted of budget deficits to increase domestic demand; nominal wage increases along with price controls to generate income redistribution; and, exchange-rate control or appreciation in order to decrease inflation and to raise wages and profits in nontraded-goods sectors (Kaufman & Stallings 1991, pp. 15-18). Consequently, through applying policies of budget deficits, nominal wage increases, and controls, governments produced growth and redistribution which in turn generated political support for these governments enabling them to stay in power and appealing to the disparate elements of the coalitions simultaneously (Kaufman & Stallings 1991, p. 18).

In addition to defining populism on the basis of economic policies, Kaufman and Stallings analyze the conditions breeding economic populism. According to their analysis, the main factor behind the emergence of economic populism was the import

substitution industrialization, ISI, which provided intellectual justification for economic policies pursued by governments that led to populism (Kaufman & Stallings 1991, p. 21). ISI created cycles of populism by favoring the protection of domestic markets which necessitated higher government spending for large wage increases and high tariffs to protect the new industries in domestic market. Moreover, protection of domestic markets produced national industries pressuring government for protectionism, and these new industries employed the urban middle classes and blue-collar workers who demanded redistribution through mobilization projected by unions. Consequently, ISI and populism supported each other.

According to Kaufman and Stallings, the cycle of populism came to an end because of the debt crisis of the 1980s. The economic crisis caused by the draining of loans that enabled governments to cover their trade and budget deficits, forced governments to give up their populist policies (Kaufman & Stallings 1991, p. 31). In addition to cut of funds for populist governments, the change in the intellectual current and political discourse within Latin America from supporting the ISI to favoring greater fiscal restraint, trade liberalization, and privatization also helped breaking the populist cycle as Kaufman and Stallings argued (Kaufman & Stallings 1991, pp. 15, 31-32).

Like Kaufman and Stallings, Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards also argue that Latin America was captured by the cycles of populism due to the use of expansive fiscal and credit policies and overvalued currency in order to attain and accelerate growth and redistribute income (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991, p. 7). Dornbusch and Edwards also define populism in economic terms. They suggest that economic populism is an approach to economics that emphasizes growth and income

redistribution without considering the risks of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints, and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive nonmarket policies (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991, p. 9). Moreover, they identify four stages of economic populism by which populist policymakers transform the economy. This transformation process starts with populist policy makers' initiatives to implement ambitious economic programs aimed at redistributing income, generating employment, and accelerating growth but ending with intervention of other political or economic actors and at extreme violent overthrow of the government due to dreadful failure of economic populism (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991, pp. 9-12, Knight 1998, p. 241). According to Dornbusch and Edwards this failure of economic populism appeared frequently in Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Nicaragua.

On the contrary of arguments supported by Kaufman and Stallings and Dornbusch and Edwards, Luiz Bresser Pereira and Fernando Dall'Acqua claim that the main reason behind inability of many Latin American governments to make sound fiscal policy choices was not macroeconomic populism, as they argued; instead, this failure was caused by the developmentalist policies implemented by Latin American governments during 1970s (Bresser Pereira & Dall'Acqua 1991, pp. 29-30). Bresser Pereira and Dall'Acqua acknowledge that populist macroeconomic models ignored the fact that budgetary deficits can be helpful for sustaining growth and can work as a cyclical stabilization device in a short-term period, and populist policy makers used public deficits as a central policy in achieving rapid economic growth and income distribution goals (Bresser Pereira & Dall'Acqua 1991, pp. 31-32). Due to this delusion, populist policy makers also neglected inflationary pressures and external

constraints that their fiscal policy creates. However, although fiscal policy of populist policy makers created some problems, the main reason behind failure of these policies was developmentalist policies of Latin American authoritarian regimes in the 1970s, which fostered rapid capital accumulation at the expense of large budget deficits due to substantial expansion in government expenditure (Bresser Pereira & Dall'Acqua 1991, p. 34). To cover these large budget deficits and sustain public investment during developmentalist cycle, authoritarian governments increased foreign borrowing; hence, following populist governments had to live with this infamous legacy of this period. As a consequence, Bresser Pereira and Dall'Acqua claim that populist governments were not responsible of fiscal crisis in Latin America during late 1980s and 1990s; but rather, economic policy making of populist governments was simultaneously limited by debt constraints arising from past foreign borrowing and from social pressures with high levels of inequality owing to former developmentalist policies (Bresser Pereira & Dall'Acqua 1991, p. 36).

Although analysis provided by Robert Kaufman, Barbara Stallings, Rudiger Dornbusch, Sebastian Edwards, and opposite arguments of Luiz Bresser Pereira and Fernando Dall'Acqua shed light to certain economic conditions of populism that played a crucial role in emergence of populism in Latin American countries, the comeback of populism with different shades and ideological orientations refuted their arguments and demonstrated inaccuracy of equating populism with distributive and irresponsible economic policies within the framework of ISI. Moreover, as Knight (1998) rightfully observes, economic populism is not confined to populist governments and some characteristics of it can be part of any economic model of other governments as well (Knight 1998, p. 242). Henceforth, in populism literature,

most scholars have agreed that populism does not correlate to a specific economic policy or project (Di Piramo 2009, p. 185).

Differently from other accounts equating populism with economic policies, Anton Derks (2006) searches the economic policies of right-wing populists and try to reveal how right-wing populists appeal to voters with left-leaning political ideology in Europe with the case of Flanders (Belgium). Derks highlights that there is an unexpected overlap between radical right-wing populist critique of the welfare state and appealing egalitarianism, and request of left-leaning voters for equality, which is not necessarily demanding redistribution (Derks 2006, pp. 177, 179). Voters are susceptible for the appeal of right-wing populism because they believe that welfare state does not provide social justice and equality; instead, it makes the reallocation process more complex and less transparent besides being an instrument in the hand of the corrupt elite (Derks 2006, pp. 180-181, 196). Moreover, welfare state stipulates reallocation of resources including the immigrants who pose an economic threat for the real inhabitants, as they are competitors on the labor market besides being profiteers of the social security system (Derks 2006, p. 181). The analysis of attitudes and social backgrounds of people supporting right-wing populism show that while egalitarian drives caused by socioeconomic conditions of the respondents, their critical attitude towards the welfare state resulted from their ideological orientations (Derks 2006, p. 194). Therefore, both left-leaning voters and right-wing populists oppose the welfare state's inclusive and universalistic criteria of reallocation; and instead, they support reallocation based on direct and transparent reciprocity, and limited access for the cultural in-group (Derks 2006, p. 197).

Derks' research successfully shows that even right-wing populism can appeal to left-leaning voters thanks to its references of equality and critique towards existing economic structure. However, his analysis is limited to European populism; hence, the measurement should be replicated in other regions to increase the validity of the findings.

2.4. Populism and Democracy

Scholars' perspectives on democracy determine how they evaluate the relationship between populism and democracy. While scholars centralizing the liberal approach towards democracy tend to regard populism as pathology of or defect within the representative democracy; scholars supporting the notion of radical democracy appraise populism by treating it as a corrective force for representative democracy, which lacks political representation of the silent majority (Kaltwasser 2011, p. 185). These two different interpretations of the relationship between populism and democracy are also outcome of three distinct approaches; liberal, radical and minimalist approaches. According to scholars with liberal approach, populism abuses the widespread frustration and discontent due to failure of political parties and representative institutions to make democracy work (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 405, Mudde 2004, p. 541). Moreover, they see populism as a democratic pathology or syndrome because populists oppose intermediary and representative institutions as they disrupt the will of people. In addition, although the voters select their representatives, representative democracy does not guarantee that elected representatives realize the wishes of the electorate; hence, populists criticize representative democracy due to this ambiguity in the democratic system (Kaltwasser

2011, pp. 188-189). Furthermore, according to liberal approach, populism disregards horizontal accountability by obstructing checks and balances, which is designed to prevent tyranny of the majority or minority (Knopff 1998, pp. 683-689).

On the contrary to liberal approach, radical approach assumes populism as the main component of democracy rather than as a pathology or syndrome (Kaltwasser 2011, p. 189). According to scholars supporting this approach, through populism, the people as a political being is constructed by political articulation of different demands and formation of collective identity opposing the elite or the establishment. Thusly, for these scholars, by filling the gap between the governed and governors, populism incarnates the normative ideal of a radical democratic project instead of challenging the democratic system within (Kaltwasser 2011, pp. 191, 194).

Lastly, scholars with minimalist approach towards populism aim to reveal core aspects of populism rather than analyzing the effects of populism on democracy from a normative perspective like other approaches (Kaltwasser 2011, p. 185). Definitions of these scholars target reaching the lowest common denominator, which would enable cross-regional research on populism by comparing the effect of populism on different democratic regimes (Kaltwasser 2011, pp. 185, 196). Therefore, the minimal approach aspires developing a clear definition of populism, such as populism as a political strategy suggested by Weyland or an ideology advanced by Mudde, to facilitate the analysis of the relationship populism and democracy (Kaltwasser 2011, p. 195).

Paul Taggart is one of the scholars of liberal approach. Taggart (2004) defines populism as a feature of representative politics because according to Taggart populism emerges out of democratic deficit in the functioning of representative democracy (Taggart 2004, p. 269). Consequently, populism appears when political representation fails and populists challenge the system. For Taggart, there are five main characteristic features or common themes of populism that explain the populist phenomena. The first of these characteristics is hostility of populism towards representative politics (Taggart 2004, p. 273). Since representative politics fail most of the time, for populists what matter for democracy to work is not seeking more representative government but better government that they would provide when they are elected. The failure of representative politics leads to a sense of extreme crisis and populists benefit from the conditions created by crises. Thusly, populism accompanies periods of crises and change rather than stable politics, and crises are the second common theme to populism.

Crises can be product of a sense of moral decay but it always turns into a critique of politics and into the sense that traditional parties or political actors cannot deal with the unusual conditions of crisis (Taggart 2004, p. 275). Populists believe that periods of crises threaten the integrity of the community, which Taggart calls as "the heartland", and the third common theme of populism. The heartland connotes a territory of the imagination by which populists construct the 'people' inhabit in that territory as the object of their politics (Taggart 2004, p. 274, Bos et al., 2011, p. 187, Abts & Rummens 2007, pp. 418-419, Mudde 2004, p. 546). Accordingly, Taggart argues that without heartland the concept of the people will be meaningless because it is the heartland that turns the people into a meaningful community instead of just

habitants of a territory. The utility of depicting idealized unity of the community in the heartland is that it helps populists to portray the people and their support as monolithic and free from the internal conflict (Taggart 2004, p. 274).

Along with referring to heartland, the success of populists can be explained through the lack of core values of populists, which enables them to juxtapose themselves with very different ideological positions from the left to the right (Taggart 2004, p. 274). Being compatible with various ideologies from the left and right, although populism in Europe has been associated by radical right and in Latin America with radical left generally, indicates highly chameleonic character of populism (Rooduijn 2014, p. 87, Taggart 2004, pp. 274-275). The last theme introduced by Taggart focuses around the self-limiting quality of populism. Populism as a movement has limited capacity to mobilize people because mobilization of people depends on the sense of crises and the target of populists is mainly overcoming the crises. Consequently, when populist movements become institutionalized they lose their appeal for the people because their source of attraction is their unusualness and reluctance for ordinary politics (Taggart 2004, p. 276). Moreover, by exalting a charismatic leader who transcends bureaucratic and political limits, populists reject more bureaucratized, regularized and constrained forms of leadership and politics. To conclude, Taggart argues that as the common themes of populism, the lack of core values, self-limitation and chameleonic features partially explain why populism is so episodic and why studying populism is difficult (Taggart 2004, p. 276).

To summarize, Taggart regards populism as a defect of representative politics since populists by claiming popular sovereignty challenge the institutions of representation

(Taggart 2004, p. 278). The contribution of Taggart is that he unleashes populism from juxtaposition with nationalism by introducing the concept of heartland, which explains the appeal of populists towards nationalist feelings of the supporters without necessarily tying it to the nationalism. Although populists provoke nationalist feelings, especially in Europe, their understanding of nationalism is not related to ethnic groups most of the time, they promote the protection of the heartland which can signify protection of the country from external and internal enemies, and preserving the political unity. Therefore, definitions of populism on the ground of nationalism suffer from the failure of generalizability. In addition, Taggart, by focusing on the relationship between populism and representative politics reveals that populism breeds from the defects of representative politics.

Margaret Canovan is another significant scholar who analyzes the relationship between democracy and populism, especially from theoretical perspective. Canovan attracts attention to specific understanding of democracy propelled by the populists. Due to unmet social needs and heightened economic insecurities of the majority, populists have a critical stance towards representative democracy as it fails to represent their opinion and allows systematical exclusion of the majority from politics by mainstream parties and media controlled by the elite (Canovan 1999, p. 2, Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 42, di Piramo 2009, p. 193). Disappointed by the representative democracy, populists offer their version of democracy, which favors ‘direct democracy’ applied through direct political decision making via referendum and popular initiative (Canovan 2004 p. 242, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 408, Pasquino 2005, p. 31).

Similar to Taggart's ideas, Canovan underlines that populism is a shadow cast by democracy itself; hence, it originates within the democratic system itself. Populist movements capture the power through their appeal to the people within the democratic system without challenging the system. Moreover, this pro-democratic attitude of populist movements constitutes a striking contrast with new social movements, which are anti-systemic and challenging power structures. Although populist movements involve some kind of revolt against the established power structure like new social movements, identifying populist movements with anti-system mobilization and attack on the established parties are not enough because populism challenges not only established power-holders but also elite values diffused by the media and academia, unlike new social movements (Canovan 1999, pp. 3-4, Arditi 2004, p. 136). Moreover, according to Canovan, what separates populist movements from other movements is that through appealing the people and speaking in the name of the people, populist create and enforce their own values and legitimacy. For speaking in the name of the people, populists treat the people as a unified body, which must be protected against the parties and factions that divide it (Canovan 1999, p. 5, Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 41). This protection cannot be realized unless a charismatic leader represents the democratic sovereignty of the people and personifies the interests of the nation.

Canovan stresses the importance of the charismatic leader because he/she is the one materializing the appeal to the people and mobilizing the common or ordinary people against the privileged, highly educated, cosmopolitan elite (Canovan 1999, p. 5). Populist leaders are the one speaking for the 'silent majority', whose interests, ideas and opinions systematically ignored by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians and strident

minorities as Canavan states (Canovan 2004, p. 242, Pasquino 2005, p. 16). When referring to the people, through simplicity and directness in their discourse by using colorful and undiplomatic language, charismatic leaders generate support from the electorate by exploiting the ordinary people's disgust of politicians and bureaucracy (Arditi 2004, p. 136, Kriesi 2014, p. 363, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 407). Like Taggart, Canovan also underlines that charismatic leader breaks the rule of regularized and bureaucratized form of leadership and politics because emotional attachment to the leader, direct and personal tie between the leader and followers, enable rejection of intermediary institutional structures (Canovan 1999, p. 6, Canovan 2004, p. 242, Kriesi 2014, p. 363).

The claim of populists to speak in the name of the people is legitimized by the democratic system itself because populists come to power through democratic elections. This claim also has basis in theoretical dualism of democracy. According to Canovan, democracy has two faces which are a 'redemptive' and a 'pragmatic' face (Canovan 1999, pp. 2, 9, Mudde 2010, p. 1175, Kaltwasser 2011, p. 192, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 406). This dualism caused by two fundamentally different sets of principles that democracy contains: liberalist and populist/democratic. While liberalism encourages protection of individual rights, universal principles and the rule of law through constitutionalism, in populist/democratic strand the sovereign will of the people, which is understood as unqualified majority rule and typically expressed through referenda, prevails (Canovan 2004, p. 244). Due to incompatibility between these two strands, modern liberal democracies always have tensions and populism turn to be a threat for liberal democracy with its populist/democratic but illiberal

perspective (Canovan 1999, pp. 7, 13, Canovan 2004, p. 244, Arditi 2004, p. 137, di Piramo 2009, p. 194, Abts & Rummens 2007, pp. 406, 409).

For Canovan, redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy reflect through two different styles which she barrows from the work of Michael Oakeshott. These styles are called as 'the politics of faith' and 'the politics of scepticism', or as Canovan refers redemptive and pragmatic styles of politics (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 411). While for the politics of faith, politics become a matter of achieving perfection or salvation in this world, whether it is religious or secular; for the politics of scepticism, there should be lower expectations regarding what a government can achieve because the rule of law constrains the politics and governments (Canovan 1999, p. 8, Arditi 2004, p. 137). Moreover, whereas the politics of faith entails mobilization of popular enthusiasm behind reaching salvation and promotes increase of power to accomplish this mission, the politics of scepticism, by contrast, is suspicious both of power and of enthusiasm by favoring limitation of governmental power by keeping order and reducing occasions for conflict (Canovan 1999, p. 10). Consequently, while the former supports unconstrained power, for the latter, the politics of faith undermines itself through its totalitarian aspirations since there is strong anti-institutional impulse in redemptive democracy (Canovan 1999, p. 9). Nevertheless, pragmatic democracy has also its own problems because pragmatism can lead to corruption if the redemptive impulse is missing; hence, democracy should involve balanced degree of redemptive democracy and pragmatism to work as Canovan contends (Arditi 2004, p. 138). Otherwise, populism exploits the tension between redemptive and pragmatic aspects of democracy and when there is a gap between promise and performance in

democracy (Canovan 1999, pp. 11-13, Canovan 2004, p. 244, Arditi 2004, pp. 137-138, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 411, Plattner 2010, p. 84).

To elaborate the importance of the leader in populist movement, Canovan (1999) establishes an analogy between the church and populism. Since the church is an institution where religious charisma is routinized, in populism charisma of the leader is routinized. Moreover, like the charismatic preachers who claim that they have unmediated access to the voices of God, thus they have divine authority; the populist leaders declare that they represent the will of the people; hence, they have right to personalize the power. However, since the church is not a democratic institution, politics also loses its democratic inspirations when the leader of a populist movement quests for direct personal representation over elaborate mediating institutions and aims to have a degree of personal power that is hard to reconcile with democratic aspirations (Canovan 1999, p. 14, Arditi 2004, p. 137). Accordingly, Arditi (2004) highlights that direct relationship between the leader and the common man increases the centrality of the leader and gives him/her so much power that almost turns them into something akin to infallible sovereign. Therefore, excessive empowerment of the leader results in the loss of democratic political participation (Arditi 2004, p. 143).

To capture the power, populist leaders benefit from the paradox in democratic project. Democracy supposed to bring the mass of the people into politics but concerning the institutional design of democracy, it is almost impossible (Canovan 2004, p. 245, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 409). Further, articulating the mass into politics is even more difficult because institutional arrangements are too complex for most people; thus, most of the time ideology helps the population to involve in and grasp the

politics by simplifying the world of public affairs. In addition, disappointment of the people with the politics, since the sovereignty of the people fails to realize, helps populist leaders' claim that they will return the power that the elite stole from the people (Canovan 2004, pp. 245, 247-248). Additionally, populists get help from the ambiguity in the term 'the people' because it means an exclusive group of privileged citizens as well as those excluded from that elite, the 'common people' (Canovan 2004, pp. 248-250). Populists refer to the people both as individuals and a collective body; therefore, they can mobilize the people as separate individuals to form and express the collective will, and they can represent this will by speaking in the name of this collective body.

Canovan offers significant insights regarding the relationship between democracy and populism by emphasizing how populists claim legitimacy by speaking in the name of the people whose interests, ideas and worldview have been excluded from the political arena. Benjamin Arditi (2004) analyzes Canovan's arguments especially regarding populism being a shadow of democracy. By questioning whether the populist shadow is a fault, an accident, a recurrence or a fixture of modern democracy, Arditi suggests that Canovan's shadow metaphor can be understood as an indicator of a democratic glitch but this understanding is a product of interpreting democracy from the liberal perspective towards democracy (Arditi 2004, p. 140). Arditi opposes liberal approach towards populism because for him, populism is not shadow of democracy but a spectre because populism both accompanies and haunts democracy (Arditi 2004, pp. 140-141). According to Arditi, populism can be either a dimension of representation or a mode of participation but it can also transform into democracy's nemesis (Arditi 2004, p. 143).

Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens (2007) further develop the two-strand model presented by Canovan by switching to a model of three logics. Similar to Canovan they argue that populism is a dangerous threat to democracy (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 407). Moreover, Abts and Rummens share the idea that constitutional democracy has two irreconcilable faces but they call them as constitutional and democratic pillars instead of redemptive and pragmatic aspects (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 407). While constitutional pillar privileges the rule of law which would enable the protection of the citizens against the state's or other citizens' arbitrary exercise of power through checks and balances in the system of representation; the democratic pillar defends unlimited supreme authority which would be embedded in the direct rule of the people (Plattner 2010, p. 84). Contemporary constitutional democracies establish a delicate balance between these two pillars by providing constitutional guarantees for individual rights and concomitant democratic rule by the people or their representative (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 410, Plattner 2010, p. 87). However, populists diagnose the democratic deficit in the constitutional regimes because there is discrepancy between two pillars as representative democracy reduces participation to voting in elections or political party membership but the elites control the politics by turning themselves into privileged political agents (Motta 2011, p. 35). Apart from the elected elites and bureaucrats, the majority is excluded from active politics. As a result, the elite tilts the power towards constitutional pillar thusly there is need for a pure form of democracy, which would give power back to the people (Kriesi 2014, p. 363).

The main problem of populist claim for restoration of the democratic pillar of constitutional democracy is that populists perceive the citizens as a homogeneous

political body with a singular popular will, the volonté générale, as German philosopher Carl Schmitt theorized (Abts & Rummens 2007, pp. 414-415). This so-called unity imposed on the citizens by populists and even necessitates sacrifice of individual rights in the name of collective identity because individual identity is equated with collective identity by blurring the public-private division (Pasquino 2005, p. 13, Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 41). Abts and Rummens argue that what populists are missing is the original logic of the empty place of power, which is the third logic along with constitutional and democratic logic. The logic of the empty place of power means that in a democratic regime the representatives keep the power for a limited time period and political stage is open to all kinds of political plurality and diversity (di Piramo 2009, p. 196).

For populists, the locus of power is occupied and closed by a substantial image which depicts the people as a homogeneous body selecting a leader who can speak directly on behalf of the collective body of citizens as an embodiment of national will (Abts & Rummens 2007, pp. 414, 417, de la Torre 1997, pp. 12, 15, Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 41, di Piramo 2009, pp. 179-180, 194, Kriesi 2014, p. 363, de la Torre 2007, p, 394, Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 41). However, this populist logic of identity kills the essence of democracy, representation of diversity and plurality. In addition, since the leader symbolizes self expression of the national will, no constitutional constraints can be replaced on democratically elected leader by any other state institutions or the rule of law (Mudde 2004, p. 561, de la Torre 1997, pp. 12, 17, Rodriguez Braun 2012, pp. 23-24, Pasquino 2005, p. 13, Plattner 2010, p. 88). In order to boost their personal predominance and attain political hegemony through direct relationship with the followers, populist leaders weaken constitutional checks and balances, dismiss

intermediary institutions, especially civil society, and subordinate independent agencies such as the media to their will (Weyland 2013, p. 21, di Piramo 2009, pp. 179-180, Kriesi 2014, p. 362). Therefore, by supporting the idea of 'government by the people, for the people', populism rejects main constitutive elements of democracy, which are the rule of law, the division of power or respect for the rights of minorities as they confine the people's sovereignty; hence populism constitutes a threat to the democratic system (Rodriguez Braun 2012, p. 24, Jagers & Walgrave 2007, pp. 337-338, Weyland 2013, pp. 20, 31).

Populists consider democratic elections as a way of approving the idea that the national will is delegated to the leader; hence, no political opposition or obstacle to this unanimous grip of power is allowed and any political opponent is perceived not as adversary in a fair and equal competition but an enemy which should be removed from the political domain and even society itself (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 419, Weyland 2013, p. 21, de la Torre 2007, p. 385). Efforts of delegitimizing and marginalizing all opponents turn populist regime into authoritarian and despotic because the elimination of opposition conducted by violence and repression towards the opponents and any divergent view or dissent threatening the homogeneity of people (Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 421, de la Torre 1997, p. 17, Piramo 2009, pp. 195, 197, Piramo 2009, p. 195). In addition, when suppressing the opponents, populists claim that they are struggling for moral values; hence they legitimize demonization and elimination of rivals without any compromise through a discourse, which declares war against the rivals for defending moral values (de la Torre 1997, pp. 14, 16-17). Consequently, populism blends moralism, personalism, and authoritarianism, which run counter to liberal democratic institutions.

The ability of leader claiming the embodiment of national will is not peculiar to everyone. The leader has to be someone special in order to be appealing to the people. The leader rises as a common man coming from the same background of common people and having the same values (Mudde 2004, pp. 558, 560). Understanding the problems of common people, the leader has capability to solve these problems; hence ordinary people has faith in the leader and willing the follow the leader even he/she disregards democratic constraints as long as the leader institutes a responsive government to the needs and wishes. Being an outsider can help the leader to persuade voters that he/she is not corrupted as the other political actors but not all populist leaders are true outsiders, especially populist leaders in Europe had political career and connections with the economic and political elites (Kriesi 2014, pp. 363, 372). What matter for the success of any candidate claiming to be the leader, is that he/she has to be connected to the elites, but not part of them because elite values are alien to them and policies implemented by the elite do not reflect their own wishes and concerns and the elites even abuse power and status they hold (Mudde 2004, p. 560, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 418). Moreover, populists can combine anti-establishment stance with anti-intellectual attitude because intellectuals serve for the vested interests of the corrupt elite; yet, populists also create their own intellectuals legitimizing their rule (Knight 1998, p. 230).

The relationship between the populist leader and followers can be described by Max Weber's famous distinction of charismatic authority because there are important similarities as Mudde (2004) underlined. For Weber there are three types of political legitimacy, which are traditional, rational-legal and charismatic (Mudde 2004, p. 556). While in traditional authority political legitimacy and obedience sustained

through customary rules and procedures, in rational-legal authority these are obtained through explicitly formulated constitutional rules and principles. Differently from these two, charismatic authority does not take its political legitimacy from custom or constitution but from the leader (Weber 1946, p. 52). According to Weber, the source of the charismatic leader's power does not emanate from codes and statues as this is the case with legal authority, or the authority does not deduce from traditional custom or feudal vows of faith as traditional authority stipulates (Weber 1978, p. 229). Instead, the leader with charismatic authority attains his/her power by proclaiming his/her strengths, miracles and oracle like a hero or prophet. Therefore, the charismatic leader is not followed just being an ordinary politician but as a divine charismatic master. The subjects have to recognize personal mission of the charismatic leader and they have to show faithful devotion to sacred mission of the leader, which is the realization of divine or national will (di Piramo 2009, p. 188). For the glorification of the leader and accomplishment of the mission, charismatic domination rejects all kinds of constraints and all ties to any external order; thus, for Weber, charismatic authority is revolutionary and similar to religion. As Wouter van der Brug and Anthony Mughan (2007) put it "the charismatic leader 'is obeyed not by virtue of a custom or a law, but by virtue of the faith he inspires" (van der Brug & Mughan 2007, p. 31).

Although consolidated constitutional democracies achieved the institutionalization of legal-rational authority, populist leaders with their charismatic authority attempt to challenge representative democracies with their direct relationship with the followers, which is established through media and constitutional referenda apart from election campaigns. Due to this direct and personal relationship, populist leaders reject

institutional intermediation and do not need to promote participation; and, the voters want the politicians to implement their policies without bothering them (Mudde 2004, pp. 557-558, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 417, Pasquino 2005, pp. 16, 31-32). Since populists perceive representative democracy as an inadequate system failing to represent the majority, they attempt to replace representative democracy with radical democracy, which favors institutional devices that give power directly to the people, such as initiatives, referendums, recalls, term limits and electronic town halls (Knopff 1998, p. 703, Weyland 2013, p. 23). However, although these devices are designed for empowering the people, populists favor majoritarian understanding of democracy instead of a vision of democracy wedded to liberalism or to constitutionalism (Plattner 2010, p. 88). Moreover, populists reject democratic deliberation and moderation, and block the chance of the opposition winning any election. Consequently, by the discourse of they are returning the power to the people or speaking in the name of the people to defeat the tyranny of the elite, populists abuse the power and turn their own ruling into a tyranny of elite (Knopff 1998, p. 693).

To summarize, all scholars mentioned above regard populism as a defect of representative politics and a threat to liberal democracy. Some scholars such as Hanspeter Kriesi, Carlos de la Torre, Panizza and Miorelli, along with criticizing populism on the basis of its illiberal attitudes, argue that populism might be corrective force for representative democracy instead of undermining the democratic regime. Representative democracy has led to the alienation of voters by development of social media and new communication channels, which distracted the voters from their partisan ideologies and loyalties; but simultaneous pressure of the economic crisis, the erosion of the established parties' representation function made the electorate more

open to populist challengers (Kriesi 2014, pp. 369-370). Populist challengers may lead parties to correct their mistakes and this process might trigger restructuration and realignment of the party system as Kriesi contends.

Carlos de la Torre (2007) opposes the view of populism as a negation or the essence of democracy, which extremely exalts or despises populism. Instead, attracts attention to uneasy and ambiguous relationship between liberal democracy and populism. On the one hand by mobilizing the previously excluded, populism incorporates common people into the political community; hence, it has been an important democratizing force (de la Torre 2007, pp. 384, 394). On the other hand, through Manichean discourse, populists tried to achieve authoritarian appropriation of the people's will by imposing their versions of popular authenticity, which closes door to plurality and diversity of interests (de la Torre 2007, pp. 385, 389, 394, di Piramo 2009, p. 195). Populism can be democratic despite its Manichean discourse and authoritarian elements. By criticizing the modernity project, which excludes the poor from political arena; giving voice to popular grievances against the status quo; promising social regeneration, political integrity and egalitarian justice; and mobilizing those previously excluded, populism can contribute to the renewal and enlargement of democracy (Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 45, di Piramo 2009, p. 189).

Nevertheless, since populists not always respect the norms and institutions of liberal democracy as liberal norms and procedures can hinder the expression of the authentic and homogenous will of the people, populism offers weak citizenship rights; yet, strong appeal of leaders leads to mobilization and incorporation of the people (de la Torre 2007, p. 394, Piramo 2009, p. 187). Consequently, although populism and

democracy have compatible normative grounds since both seeking to enact the sovereign rule of the people, they have uneasy and ambiguous relationship due to their divergence on how to conceive of the holders of sovereignty, the elite or majority, and how to organize political representation, direct democracy or representative democracy (Panizza & Miorelli 2009, pp. 39-41).

To conclude, scholarly works on the relationship between populism and democracy demonstrate that there is an ambivalent relationship between the two. Nevertheless, the dominant premise is that populism is a threat to liberal democracy. Within this theoretical framework, in order to identify necessary conditions of populism to appear and understand how populism impairs democracy, the next section scrutinizes the cases of Turkey and Venezuela.

2.5. Concluding Remarks for Theoretical Debate

From this literature review on populism, we can conclude that populism can be described best as a political strategy offered by Weyland because this definition incorporates almost all components of populism mentioned by other scholars such as appeal to people, mobilization by a charismatic leader, the Manichean discourse and so forth. Moreover, the leader is key factor in generation of populism because it is the leader who mobilizes the people by appealing to their grievances and animosities towards the elite and the political system. Besides, it is the leader who legitimizes the Manichean discourse in the eyes of the people. Therefore, it is the leader who realizes the populist project, which transforms the political system. With this theoretical

perspective, we can hypothesize that the two leaders, Erdoğan and Chávez resorted to the same strategy in generating electoral support although they were in two different contexts and with two opposite ideologies.

3. DETERMINANTS of POPULISM and CASES

3.1. Two Cases: Turkey and Venezuela

(Against the closure case in 2008) "Everyone can see the squares, people are on the squares. This is democracy, this is the Republic, this is republican, the nation will decide." In Siirt, Erdoğan said, "Know this well: the step taken yesterday (i.e. on Friday) was not taken against the AKP. It was taken against the national will."[1]

(Over electoral success in 2014) "The message our precious people gave is very clear. The people gave a clear message to Turkey and to the world: What did they say? They said "We are here." They said, "The Turkish people are impassable." "We are the owners of this country. The people will not bow and Turkey is invincible."[2]

""I am not myself, I am the people," "This is not about Hugo Chávez, this is about a people," he said. "We the Bolivarians, we the revolutionaries, we are not afraid of any threats by any oligarch no matter how rich or powerful"" (Zúquete 2008, p. 100).

At first glance, comparing Turkey and Venezuela might seem to be pointless attempt or a further stretch in comparative politics. Even though they seem to be unrelated, under a close scrutiny, uncanny resemblance reveals. However, the scope of this resemblance requires a scholarly work to highlight the conditions common to two countries. What are the peculiar conditions that paved the way to both leaders' rise to power? To what extent these commonalities explain recent political transformations

[1] http://bianet.org/biamag/crisis/105662-akp-s-defense-against-closure-is-hypocritical
[2] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/full-text-turkish-pm-erdogans-post-election-balcony-speech.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64341&NewsCatID=338

in two countries? What is the role of the leaders in these transformations? Before delving into the analysis addressing these questions, first two countries should be compared and contrasted with a view to history, political institutions, economies, and ideologies and values in order to reveal commonalities and differences.

3.2. Historical Background of Venezuela and Turkey

Located in South America, Venezuela is a country known by beauty queens, controversial leader Hugo Chávez and political instability. Venezuela gained its independence from Spain in 1820. Before being an independent country, for almost two centuries, Venezuela was ruled by Spanish rulers running *haciendas* and plantations called as "*Crillos*" or "*Creoles*" -Spaniards who were born in Latin America but have the European descent during colonial times. Spanish control was established after Christopher Columbus, was who was the first European explorer, discovered the continent in 1498 (Crooker 2006, pp. 10-11, 31). Venezuela was a valuable colony for the Spanish Empire not for its products or taxes, but due to strategic location between the Caribbean Sea and Brazil which was a Portuguese colony at that time, turned Venezuela into a buffer zone against Portuguese expansion into the Caribbean. Therefore, although it was costly to rule Venezuela because the Spanish Empire was spending more money on Venezuela than obtaining taxes, Spain perpetuated its dominance for strategic purposes (Crooker 2006, p. 37). Spanish dominance came to a halt when the French Emperor Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808 and appointed his brother to run Spain. The Spanish colonies' bid for the independence began because a French ruler could not claim authority over them.

Consequently, Venezuelan revolutionaries overthrew Spanish control and declared independence in 1811 under the leadership of Simón Bolívar (Crooker 2006, p. 39).

Simón Bolívar is a crucial historical and political figure who played an important role in the liberation of Spanish colonies in South America. Despite being a member of a rich *crillo* family and military commander in the Spanish imperial army, Simón Bolívar became the leader and hero who fought for the colonies to gain independence from Spain (Crooker 2006, pp. 10-11, 40). Under the leadership of Bolívar, the Republic of Gran Colombia covering the lands of current-day Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador was established and Bolivar served as president of this country until his death at the young age because of tuberculosis in 1830. Following his death, with the strengthening of separatist movements and the emergence of *caudillos* (military strongmen) intended to break Gran Colombia into regionally divided countries, Bolívar's dream to unite all of Spanish America into a single country ended and Venezuela became a republic in its own right in 1830 (Crooker 2006, pp. 40-41). Bolívar left behind his dream of unifying Latin America under a single cause as a legacy and Hugo Chávez was the one who ignited by the spirit of Bolívar and attempted to realize this promise.

Although Venezuela gained its independence, political conflict did not fade away and there was no swift transition into democracy. The country tumbled into political crisis and military dictators totally controlled the government and dominated the political arena until the 20th century. After 1935, dictators began to share control with the legislature (Crooker 2006, p. 41). Transition to democracy was achieved through the overthrow of the last dictator of Venezuela, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez by the

military in 1958. Since then until 1998, Venezuela became a pacted democracy in which two dominant parties shared power through successive elections.

Differently from Venezuela Turkey has never experienced colonialism. Turkish Republic emerged out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was established in the beginning of fourteenth century by one of the minor tribes under the leadership of Osman (1284-1324) who was a founder of the dynasty that gave the state his name (Pavlovic 2004, p. 47). Although the Ottoman Empire ruled for over six hundred centuries, with the effect of nationalism spreading through the French Revolution, the empire began to dissolve through secession of Serbia, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria in the 19th and 20th centuries. To preserve territorial integrity by regaining lost lands, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers and entered the First World War. However, defeat in the war resulted in complete disintegration with the seizure of its lands by the Allies, Britain and France, following the signature of Armistice of Mudros in 1918 and then Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. Rather than occupation of the Allies, it was the Greek invasion triggered organized resistance for the cause of independence and foundation of new state because the Greeks were former subjects of the Empire; hence their claim to the Asia Minor was a huge blow for the Turkish people.

Similar to Simón Bolívar, Mustafa Kemal emerged as the leader of the independence movement. Following the success of resistance against the occupying forces, particularly the Greeks, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 and independence of the Turkish state was recognized. The Turkish Grand National Assembly declared Turkish state as the “Republic” in 29 October 1923 and the process of modernization

through reforms was initiated. Mustafa Kemal, who was given the name of "Atatürk" (Father of Turks), played central role in this modernization and secularization process. However, among reforms such as democratic elections, giving women the right to vote, and taking steps toward the secularization of society with the separation of religion and state, the last one set the stage for future political conflict (Pavlovic 2004, pp. 51-52).

While Venezuela transformed into a democracy when the military overthrew last dictator Jimenez in 1958, Turkey experienced its first coup d'état in May 27, 1960 succeeded by a short-term military rule. Ironically, despite being a product of military regime, the 1961 constitution expanded civil liberties and introduced large number of autonomous administrative agencies and a bicameral Constituent Assembly in order to balance the executive power, and eventually reach a pluralistic and democratic society (Özbudun & Gençkaya 2009, pp. 14, 16).[3] However, although the military aimed to balance executive power and reinforce civil society via autonomous agencies, the constitution also sealed the place of the military in politics.[4]

[3] The constitutional transformation of Turkey dates back to the Ottoman Empire when constitutional reforms were taken to limit the power of the Sultan. The first constitutional document limiting the absolute power of the Sultan was the Deed of Alliance (Sened-i İttifak) signed in 1808 between the representatives of local notables (âyan) and the Palace. This document arranged the relationship between the notables and the central government by affirming their loyalty to the central government in return of granting privileges. The second document was the Edict of Tanzimat of 1839 followed by the Edict of Islahat in 1856. These documents secured certain basic human rights for the subjects of the Empire by unilateral declaration and recognition of the Sultan. However, since these rights were only morally binding upon the Sultan and there was no effective legal mechanism for the protection of these rights, these legal documents failed to limit the autocratic and absolutist power of the Sultan and introduce constitutional regime. Nevertheless, they contributed to constitutional transformation and paved the way of the first Ottoman Constitution, which promulgated in 1876 (Özbudun & Gençkaya 2009, p. 7). For detailed account of changes the 1961 Constitution brought see Kalaycıoğlu 2005, pp. 93-95.

[4] To prevent another intervention, the military officers formed the Armed Forces Union, which monitored both the politics and the constitution-making process. The most crucial institutional change that the constitution brought was bicameral parliament which constituted by the lower chamber (the National Assembly) with 450 deputies elected every four years by a system of proportional representation, and the Senate consisted of 150 members elected for six years by a majority vote but one-third has to retire every two years. Military officers who were the members of National Unity Council established after the military intervention became life-time senators. Moreover, the National

Unlike delimited but continuous democratic regime of Venezuela, the 1960 coup was the first but not the last one in Turkey. The military intervened into politics through the memorandum of 12 March 1971. This intervention forced the government to resign but did not dissolve the parliament and the military did not assume power directly. However, an above-party technocratic government was formed. Two constitutional amendments in 1971 and 1973 curtailed civil liberties and strengthened the executive power by reversing the provisions of the 1961 constitution. These amendments were harbingers of upcoming coup, which took place at 12 September 1980.

The 1980 coup not only suspended civil rights temporarily but also permanently changed the rules of the game through a new constitution. The 1982 constitution weakened checks and balances by overpowering the executive especially the president as the military desired to perpetuate its tutelage over politics by veteran military officers becoming the presidents.[5] The political structure created by the constitution resulted in unprecedented consequences for Turkish politics. Despite the ban on former political parties and the creation of military-sponsored new parties, the 1983 elections concluded with the victory of the newly established Motherland Party, Turgut Özal becoming the prime minister. This victory opened up a new chapter in Turkish politics for especially the right-wing political parties and movement.

Security Council was established and the military high command had a say in the government policies (Ahmad 2003, pp. 122-123).

[5] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2005) argues that the 1982 constitution created a new design of political regime that he calls the "Turkish Third Republic". In this new regime, while the parliament turned the parliament submissive to the executive, the executive especially the President was granted enormous authority in all matters political, legal, economic, and so on despite being devoid of any political and legal responsibility for his or her actions, except for treason. Consequently, the constitution created a hybrid regime with a combination of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes which Kalaycıoğlu calls "semi-parliamentary" (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 128).

Political transformation in Venezuela gained momentum in 1940s when three political parties, *Acción Democrática*- Democratic Action Party (AD) which is a social democratic party at the center left, Christian Democratic Party C*omité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee) (COPEI) which is a conservative democratic party at the center right, and Democratic Republican Union *Unión Republicana Democrática* (URD) were formed and the first two dominated political arena during the 1970s and 1980s by receiving more than 90 percent of the popular vote in presidential elections (Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 65). However, the last dictator of Venezuela, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, outlawed these parties to centralize his power. This ban on parties lasted until 1958 when the Venezuelan military overthrew Jimenez and he had to flee to the United States (Crooker 2006, p. 60). In the past, after the coup the military leaders usually used to reach an agreement over a new dictator; yet, this time they allowed civilians to take the power. After becoming legal again, three parties signed a pact to seal the transition to democratic regime. This pact is called as the Pact of *Punto Fijo* because party leaders signed the pact in a residence of a former Venezuelan president called as "*Punto Fijo*" (Crooker 2006, p. 60, Wilpert 2005, p. 11). Rómulo Betancourt was one of the main actors who made this pact possible. Following the pact, Betancourt was elected as the president.

Punto Fijo pact enabled three parties to share power among themselves by appointing their members to presidential cabinets and government ministries. While the pact enabled the transition into a democratic regime, it prevented any other party's incorporation into politics by curbing the representation thus creating a limited

democratic system. This limited democratic system of Venezuela lasted from 1959 to 1998 when Hugo Chávez challenged the rules of the game and then managed to change them. The *Punto Fijo* system deemed to fail because of dominant parties' negligence for growing discontent of the majority whose interests were not represented by those parties. Especially during the 1990s increasing poverty along with political resentment of those politically and economically excluded resulted in political tension. In fact, the basis of this pacted democracy was economic because oil revenue was also shared among the parties (Wilpert 2005, p. 11).

Despite being an uninterrupted democracy compared to other Latin American countries and praised for it, Venezuelan democracy had to recover from crises. The first crisis was a guerilla war during the 1960s, which put Venezuelan democracy in jeopardy by right-wing military officers and left-wing guerrillas (Crooker 2006, pp. 41, 61). Guerilla warfare was nothing similar to separatist insurrection that Turkey has experienced since 1980s but attempted to overthrow the government to establish a socialist government.[6] The guerilla uprising resulted in the complete and enduring marginalization of the socialist left as well as disappearance of the left from electoral competition until Hugo Chávez's electoral victory in 1998 (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 10). In Turkey also the left discredited in late 1970s due to violent clash among various factions and the right-wing extremists, which offered the military rule the opportunity of stepping in and crushing both in 1980.[7] Although the right-wing

[6] Kurdish problem attracts very scholarly attention and in Turkish politics. There is vast literature on this subject analyzing the causes, historical evolution, effects and possibility of solution. For details see Ahmad 2003, Kirisci & Winrow 1997, Barkey & Fuller 2000, and Lundgren 2007.

[7] The military rule justified suppressing both left-wing and right-wing associations by the claim of establishing law and order and preventing sectarian, ideological, and ethnic violence ravaging the country (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 125)

nationalist made a comeback thanks to right-wing disposition among the electorate and escalation of fight against the terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (PKK), the left lost its electoral power completely.

Apart from military struggle, Venezuela was challenged economically due to fluctuations in oil prices especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Sharply declining oil prices in late 1980s caused the second crisis of Venezuelan history. Thanks to his successful redistribution and social policies during the first term, Carlos Andrés Pérez was reelected as the president. However, due to declining oil revenues, high level of government waste and corruption, the country found itself in a huge foreign debt. In consequence, Pérez had to embrace neoliberalism in its radical form as a shock treatment and kneel down before the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by initiating an austerity program, which stipulated rising prices for commodities and services (Ellner 1989, p. 105, Ellner 1996, p. 89, Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 65). Austerity measures like increasing taxes, increasing prices on public transportation and cutting social spending created extreme resentment among already poor majority who struggled in their daily lives already (Crooker 2006, p. 62, Levin 2007, pp. 68-69).

On 27 February 1989, resentment of the majority due to doubling of gasoline and public transportation costs triggered a riot that began in the periphery of the major cities, called as neighborhoods "*Barrios*", and then spread throughout the country.[8] Besides increased economic burden on the majority, Venezuelans felt betrayed

[8] Once people discovered that the bus fares had doubled in the morning of February 27, 1989, the riots began in the streets of Guerenas, a town located in 30 kilometers east of Caracas, and then spread to Caracas and nearby towns. Unexpectedly, the protests rapidly escalated into a full-scale riot. Another unseen consequence of the riot turned into uprising against sharp economic discrepancies. When the young people began to pour down the mountains from Caracas's huge barrio into the wealthy city center, smashing store windows, looting from them, and then burning the stores, the rich felt threatened. The riots were the worst in Venezuela's history (Levin 2007, pp. 64-65).

because many people had voted Pérez by the expectation that he would raise salaries, lower inflation, and increase public spending on social services that he accomplished during his first term (1974-1979) (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 16, Ellner 1996, p. 89, Roberts 2003, p. 49). Betraying the majority's expectations, Pérez chose to initiate neoliberal economic program by flaring already resented and frustrated public because of economic crisis, corruption and scandals involving Pérez and ministers (Ellner 1993-1994 p. 3).

To suppress the riot, president Pérez gave the order to the military for restoring order and recovering goods that had been looted to use weapons if necessary and in a week more than 200 protesters were killed while the foreign press estimated the number of casualties more than a thousand (Ellner 1989, p. 105, Ellner 1993-1994 p. 3, Levin 2007, p. 64).[9] The riot has been named as "*El Caracazo*" and has turned into a symbol of Venezuelan's insurgency.

Resentful of the mass killing conducted due to Pérez's order and the cut in their salaries, some young and mid-level officers of the military under the leadership of Chávez attempted to overthrow Pérez in February 1992 (Crooker 2006, p. 63, Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 16, Ellner 1993-1994 p. 3). However, due to lack of support from the people, this attempt failed. Despite this failure, by a couple of minutes-long speech on television, Chávez achieved to capture the attention of the people (Levin 2007, pp. 72-73).

[9] Even though the exact number of the casualties is not certain, as the government paid out money to 1000 families of whose members had been killed, the official number given by the government is probably unrealistic (Levin 2007, p. 66).

Although Pérez survived even the second coup attempt in November 1992, in 1993 he was removed through impeachment due to allegedly stealing or misusing millions of dollars in public funds (Crooker 2006, p. 63, Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 16, Ellner 1993-1994 p. 3, Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 66, Levin 2007, p. 74). His removal did not end the political problems because although the population remained faithful to democracy, trust in political institutions dropped to very low levels; economic problems remained throughout in 1990s despite the president Rafael Caldera's efforts to fix after his electoral victory in 1993 elections. There was no systematic challenge towards *Punto Fijo* system until 1998 when Chávez achieved his first but not last victory in the elections.

3.3. Evolution of Political Systems and Institutions

Democratic history of Venezuela starts with the 1946 election for Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 1). However, the formation of modern Venezuelan party system dates back to end of the Juan Vicente Gómez's dictatorship with his death in 1935. Turkey's democratization also coincides with the beginning of Venezuela's democratic history since the first multiparty elections in republican Turkey were held in 1946. Although these first elections were not completely free and fair, the elections in 1950 resulted in peaceful and democratic handover of the government by ensuring transition to multi-party democracy and the beginning of the democratic history of Turkish Republic (Sayarı 2002, p. 1).

Venezuelan traditional historical accounts on twenty-seven-year dictatorship of Gómez (1908-1935) have described his rule as one of the most ruthless dictatorships of Latin America (Ellner 1995, p. 95). Being isolated from the society as well as estranged from even his own family, it is expected of him that Gómez ruled country ruthlessly from his ranch home in Maracay with small clique composed of his supporters. Although some historians of Venezuela praise him for his economic success even during the 1930s under the harsh economic conditions created by the Great Depression, human rights abuses, especially torture, marked his era. Moreover, some accused Gomez for betraying the interests of nation and his initial supporters, the elite, by turning the country into dependent economy through selling out the oil of Venezuela to international oil companies (Ellner 1995, pp. 95, 98). Nevertheless, even if the well being of nation deteriorated under the lengthy rule of Gomez, he can be regarded as the founding father of modern Venezuela since he established a centralized state that has been altered in form but preserved its substance over the years (Ellner 1995, pp. 96, 98).

Following the death of Gómez, Eleazar López Contreras (1936-1941) and Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945) ruled the country until the military coup of 1945 (Ellner 1995, p. 100). Compared to Gómez and Lopez era, the presidency of Medina Angarita promoted social and political harmony to the extent that Medina legalized two prominent parties, the AD and later the PCV-the Communist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Comunista de Venezuela)* (Ellner 1995, p. 103). Political tolerance amplified after the fall of Medina Angarita in October 1945 up until to the overthrow of President Rómulo Gallegos by a military coup in 1948. During this

period, the first attempt to establish a democratic system was taken through first universal and direct elections in Venezuelan history (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 5).

While the Republican People's Party-*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) ruled the country from 1923 to 1946 through a one-party regime, the Democrat Party-*Demokrat Parti* (DP) emerged as the main contender after splitting from the CHP in 1946. These two parties throughout the 1940s and 1950s constituted the main actors of two-party system in Turkey and they dominated the electoral arena by collectively receiving more than 90 percent of the total votes and controlling 98 percent of the parliamentary seats until the 1960s (Sayarı 2002, pp. 10-11).

Simultaneously, two major parties dominated the political arena in 1940s and led the process of democratization in Venezuela. *Acción Democrática*- Democratic Action Party (AD) established in 1941, achieved the control of politics in Venezuela and turned the party system in Venezuela into predominant party system between 1945 and 1948 (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 5). The other biggest party was COPEI- C*omité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee) which has been Christian Democratic Party of Venezuela. While during 1940s, the COPEI had strong links with the conservative sectors of society especially with the Catholic Church, later in 1970s; its discourse has changed along with centralizing effect of two-party system with the AD (Molina & Pérez 1998, pp. 5, 7).

These two biggest parties of Venezuela, AD and COPEI, played an important role in the democratization of Venezuela and democratic consolidation after 1958. Like

Turkey had two-party system from 1946 to 1961, AD and COPEI became the main actors of two-party system in Venezuela from 1958 to 1993. However, while there was no power-alteration between the CHP and the DP since the DP had electoral victories in the elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957, and the CHP could not takeover the power; the AD and the COPEI shared power by constant power alteration. Therefore, due to the absence of turnover in government in Turkey, the party system of Turkey located at the borders between a two-party and a predominant party system whereas Venezuela had clear-cut two-party system (Sayarı 2002, p. 12). Moreover, whereas Venezuela had a stable party system along with a tranquil society, Turkish party system lacked the stability with growing conflict between two parties along with polarization of the society (Sayarı 2002, p. 12).

After taking part in the coup d'état in 1945 and following the elections in 1952 Marcos Evangelista Pérez Jiménez became the president of the country. The Pérez rule (1948-1958) reminded the era of Gómez with harsh treatment towards dissidents, economic progress, favoring foreign interests and inhumane behavior (Ellner 1995, p. 104). Despite intensive political pressure and ban on the parties, there was increasing interest in politics due to need for political change accompanying social change accelerated by migration from rural to urban starting with 1940s. To meet the changing political and social needs of the society, the leading parties had to go underground and unite on the common objective of reestablishing democracy by setting aside their ideological differences (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 7).

By overthrowing the last dictator Pérez in 1958, Venezuela turned into democracy once for all. As I mentioned before, leading parties of Venezuela AD, COPEI and

URD, which was not powerful party as much as the first two, came together in order to establish a democratic order which will not be spoiled by another military intervention. The political arrangement named as the Pact of *Punto Fijo* and opened the way of power sharing between the AD and the COPEI (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 9).

The period starting with 1958 until late 1980s witnessed changes in ideological positions of leading parties. While both the AD and COPEI moved towards the center of political spectrum, the left was discredited due to unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government with guerrilla warfare during the 1960s (Molina & Pérez 1998, pp. 9-10). Although political arena had pluralism, it was limited as the power of extreme left and extreme right was curbed. While moving towards the center the AD relaxed relations with the labor and abandoned redistributive policies, the COPEI distanced itself from its more conservative supporters. The political system got more and more exclusive due to power sharing between the AD and the COPEI, and exclusion of the left from the political arena. This limited democratic system of Venezuela closed the way of political incorporation and representation of economically disadvantaged citizens whose significant part supported the leftist ideology and demanded redistribution. Moreover, the system hampered any formation of credible opposition, which is the most crucial and necessary element of a democratic system (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 10).

Two major parties, the AD and the COPEI, consolidated their partisan loyalties through building clientelist networks by sharing the oil revenue especially during the oil boom in 1970s (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 10). Thanks to high price of oil, two

parties were able to achieve electoral success and Venezuela had two-party system. José E. Molina and Carmen Pérez (1998) identify the party system in this period starting with 1973 elections until 1988 as attenuated bipartyism. The system is characterized by the electoral dominance of two major parties, AD and COPEI and Movement for Socialism *Movimiento a1 Socialismo* (MAS), which separated from the Communist Party in 1971, as the third but insignificant power in the left (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 11, Ellner 1993-1994, p. 2, Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 65).

Nevertheless, since the survival of the system depended on the oil revenue, fluctuations of oil price affected the government's social and economic policies. For instance, after 1973 OPEC decision to increase oil price, the increased oil revenues enabled the Carlos Andres Pérez administration to provide gains such as social programs for the various sectors of the society and salary increases for the workers. However, these benefits did not interpolate redistributive policies but just helped government in mitigating social conflict (Ellner 1989, pp. 117-118). Especially the AD had established close relations with labor leadership since 1960s and oil boom helped sustaining these close relationship during 1970s and 1980s until late 1980s when oil prices and gains of workers started to decrease. Limited resources broke the deal and trade union leaders chose to change their strategy and demand redistributive policies (Ellner 1989, pp. 118-119).

Once oil price declined after 1986, oil revenues declined as well. Combined with high level of corruption and inefficiency in solving daily life problems of the masses, cut of social spending due to declined oil revenues created high level of frustration and dissent. To express their discontent with governmental policies, the majority of voter

chose to abstain to vote in general elections (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 13). During 1970s until 1983, voters resorted to vote of punishment by voting for the opposition to punish the government which led to power alteration between the AD and the COPEI as well as the consolidation of two-party system. Therefore, while electoral participation was high at that time, once absenteeism replaced the vote of punishment, electoral participation declined significantly (Ellner 1993-1994, p. 7). Since citizens chose to protest the government through peaceful means and within the confines of democratic regime, democratic regime was not at stake; yet, high level of absenteeism led questioning of quality of democracy in Venezuela.[10]

Because even strikes were not common in Venezuelan history and strikes of oil workers in 1936 and 1950, the steel workers in 1971, and the textile workers in 1980 failed miserably, the *Caracazo* event, I mentioned before, was unforeseen. Formerly, making deal with especially the AD government, Venezuelan Confederation of Workers-CTV (*Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela*) leaders forestalled any mobilization of workers through either confrontation such as threatening or coopting like calling symbolic strikes which paralyzed production for a short time (Ellner 1989, pp. 92, 107-109). Therefore, in Venezuela even though social harmony was missing, social tranquility was present until late 1980s when social disrupt erupted suddenly.

Neoliberal policies conducted by Pérez government exaggerated the effects of economic crisis triggered by low oil prices. In addition, political scandals involving

[10] The high level of absenteeism in regional and local elections posed problems for the quality of democracy. For instance, political participation dropped such a low level beginning with the 1989 elections that the militantly leftist party Causa R won the governorship in the industrial state of Bolívar by around 55 percent abstention. Higher rate of abstention in regional and local elections than in balloting for president and the national congress had already been a problem in Venezuela but during the 1990s it became alarming for the quality of democracy (Dietz & Myers 2007, pp. 65-66).

the president and several ministers, led to impeachment of Carlos Andres Pérez in 1993, fostered political crisis. While trust in political institutions dropped significantly, crisis of governability emerged (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 16). Widespread discontent and inequality, harsh living conditions, and increasing disillusionment forced the major parties to reevaluate their policies and search for panacea for the burgeoning problems of the country.

To cope with the economic and political crisis, to prevent further disillusionment of the electorate, and to restore their lost credibility three major parties -AD, COPEI and MAS- undertook political reforms. These reforms involved party reforms, decentralization and revitalization of civil society especially endorsement of neighborhood associations, which proliferated throughout the country during the 1980s (Ellner 1993-1994, pp. 3, 6, 12). Moreover, to foster democratization further three basic reforms were conducted. These reforms were shortening of municipal and congressional terms, direct election of governors and nominal elections which offered the option of selecting individual candidates rather than a party slate as a whole to the voter (Ellner 1993-1994, pp. 4, 10). All these reforms reinforced decentralization and as a side effect however, decentralization further contributed to disillusionment of the citizens, especially neighborhood associations incited anti-party attitudes among the electorate (Ellner 1993-1994, p. 7). Nonetheless, decentralization also contributed to democratization because by increasing the responsibilities and capability to make decisions of popular regional leaders, it hindered the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the system of presidentialism besides leading politicians for paying more attention to local and regional demands (Ellner 1995, pp. 114-115, Ellner 1993-1994, p. 21).

Along with decentralization reforms, the parties realized that promoting internal democratization by holding party primaries and decentralization of their organizations are necessary. For instance; while after the *Caracazo* event the AD and the COPEI intended to hold party primaries but failed to realize due to fear of facing further factionalism, the MAS held primary elections at both national and state levels in 1990 (Ellner 1993-1994, pp. 12-13, Ellner 1996 p. 87, Ellner 1996, p. 101). However, the AD failed to adjust to decentralization in state level and party level because since foundation, it favored the model of a highly centralized, interventionist state which would lead the country towards modernization (Ellner 1993-1994, p. 16).

Apart from factionalism and internal democratization, the neighborhood associations also challenged the major parties. Since they proliferated throughout the country in 1980s, neighborhood associations encouraged citizens to actively participate in politics bypassing the parties. Neighborhood associations first formed in barrios to combat against the negative effects of accelerated urbanization after the overthrow of Jimenez in 1958 but when the Municipal Law- *Ley Organica de Regimen Municipal* passed in 1978 separated national and municipal elections, the law bolstered their formation further (Ellner 1993-1994, p. 5, 22). Before this law, Venezuelans only voted once in every 5 years to cast only 2 votes, one is for the president and the other for a party slate encompassing the houses of Congress (Senate and Chamber of Deputies), the state legislature, and the municipal council (Ellner 1993-1994, p.5). Consequently, the separation of voting complicated the system at the same time opening the system to independents and local groups for political influence. During late 1980s, neighborhood associations besides lobbying for improvements helped

channeling public frustration and resentment caused by the decline in public services due to economic crisis and uncontrolled urban growth. Consequently, they played an important role in familiarizing the citizens with the concept of active and direct political participation.

Although decentralization contributed to democratization by restraining and balancing the power of the parties and the president, it opened the way of personalization of politics and further dealignment of partisanship thanks to direct election of mayors and governors beginning from 1989 by the law of decentralization- *Ley Organica de Descentralizacion*, and running of candidates as independents (Ellner 1993-1994, pp. 17, 22, 32, Molina & Pérez 1998, pp. 17-18). The interests of governors and the major parties started to clash. By challenging the "*partidocracia*" or "*partyarchy*" sustained by the two major parties for about 20 years, decentralization resulted in change in the party system from bipartyism to limited multipartyism[11] (Molina & Pérez 1998, pp. 14-15). The direct election of governors and mayor also contributed to strengthening of small parties like the MAS along with proportional representation (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 18).

Another unanticipated effect of decentralization was uneven geographical and sectoral progress after the control of services such as education, health, tourism, orphanages, ports, airports, bridges and highways granted to the initiative of the individual states (Ellner 1993-1994, pp. 17, 21). Decentralization and political reforms did not offer panacea for pressing problems of the country rather became disappointments. After

[11] The electoral system in Venezuela changed in 1992 again. For the election of two-thirds of the council members for each municipality, single-member voting districts were created while the remaining third would be allocated on the basis of the citywide vote obtained by each party (Ellner 1993-1994, p. 11).

his election in 1993, Caldera as a political leader with pragmatist approach attempted to put the brakes on decentralization, which might lead to administrative chaos, and other economic reforms by resorting to state interventionism to control the intensification of inequalities (Ellner 1996, pp. 91, 100, 106, Dietz & Myers 2007, pp. 67, 71).

In addition to problems created by political reforms and decentralization, antisystem political forces such as Fatherland for All- *Patria para Todos* (PPT) and the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 *Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200* (MBR-200) established by Chávez and constituted another challenge for Venezuela (Molina & Pérez 1998, p. 15). To consolidate democracy, Venezuela have changed party systems from two-party system into multiparty system in 1990s; however, applying electoral reform in extreme forms such as winner-take-all in single-member electoral districts did not solve political problems by incorporating anti-system parties, local groups and independents but increased the rate of abstention (Ellner 1996, p. 106). Consequently, before Chávez, Venezuelan party system with discredited two major parties and declining voter participation was in an existential crisis. Due to the breakdown of political system, political arena was susceptible for political change.

After the 1960 coup, in the 1961 elections Turkey switch from plurality to a proportional representation system and with new right-wing parties competing for the DP's heritage resulted in fragmentation in the party system (Sayarı 2002, pp. 12-13). Among several parties established after the DP, Justice Party-*Adalet Partisi* (AP) became very successful in late 1960s. Due to proportional representation system

many more parties ranging from extreme right and extreme left were established in the 1960s and 1970s. These parties included The Marxist Turkish Workers Party-Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP), the extreme right-wing Nationalist Action Party-*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP), the explicitly Islamist National Order Party-*Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP) and its successor, National Salvation Party-*Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP) (Sayarı 2002, pp. 13-14).

The 1970s Turkey faced increasing ideological polarization between the political left and the right and escalating conflict. Fragile coalitions failed to solve deepening political and economic problems of the country. Instead of compromising, the two major parties the CHP and the AP chose to stir up political violence and flare the crisis of selecting the president, which turned to be pretext of the military to intervene in 12 September 1980. After banning all pre-1980 parties, the military attempted to establish a new party system following the 1983 elections, which would bring political stability through a two-party system consisted of two moderate, centrist parties by excluding the extremist radical leftist, ultranationalist, and Islamist parties (Sayarı 2002, p. 15). However the military rule did not anticipate that the Motherland Party-*Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP) would obtain great success in the elections by capturing 45.1 percent of the votes and 52 percent of the parliamentary seats. This electoral victory of the ANAP perpetuated in 1987 and the founder of the party Turgut Özal became the 8th President of Turkey in 1989 until his sudden death in 1993.

Pre-1980 parties made a comeback with different names such as the AP becoming the True Path Party-*Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP), the Islamist MSP to the Welfare Party-

Refah Partisi (RP), and the far-right MHP first changing its name to the National Work Party (MÇP) and than reassuming its original name, Nationalist Movement/Action Party-*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP) (Sayarı 2002, p. 16). Moreover, the split of the CHP into three by creating two new parties, the Democratic Left Party-Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party-*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* (SHP) complicated the political picture more by nourishing fragmentation.

Turkey during 1990s witnessed strengthening of right-wing parties with the intensification of the fight against the PKK, turning down by the European Union for full membership and increasing conservatism in the society.[12] The political crisis escalated between Turkey and Greece over the disputed status of some rocks in the Aegean, Armenian demand for Turkish territory, and increasing attacks of the PKK from neighbor countries mounted already existing patriotism, ethnic nationalism, chauvinism, and xenophobia (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, pp. 150, 156).

Insurmountable problems during mid-1990s were the fight between two main contenders of the right-wing movement, ANAP and DYP, over the leadership; increasing power of the Islamic movement, which threatened secularism, and the divulging of corruption through a traffic accident, which revealed the secret deal between politicians, mafia and bureaucrats and led to public indignation and protest (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 156-157). Among these grave problems the anti-secular acts of the RP in 1997 disturbed the military most and resulted in imposition of 18-point

[12] For a detailed analysis of increasing during the 1990s see Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu (2009) "The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey".
To understand the dynamics of Turkey-European Union relations during the 1990s, see detailed accounts of Turkey-European Union relations starting with 1960s by the works of Meltem Müftüler Baç who is one of the prominent experts on Turkey-EU relations.

resolution on RP-DYP government at the National Security Council's February 28, 1997 meeting [13] (Çarkoğlu 2004, p. 112). The military's intervention in politics without using hard power led scholars to name the incident as a "Soft Coup" or "Post-Modern Coup". Consequently, the Constitutional Court closed the RP besides imposing a political ban on the leader of the party, Necmettin Erbakan (Çarkoğlu 2004, p. 113).

In the 1990s, despite both left and Islamist movements repressed by the state, it was the Islamists who appealed to the people through democracy discourse thanks to increasing conservatism of Turkish society.[14] Even though the majority of Turkish society suffered economically with unequal distribution and decreasing social security, accordingly might have been receptive of statist policies of the left, the leftist movement failed to gather support due to increasing factions and the identification of the left with political violence since the emergence of the PKK as the left-wing Kurdish separatist organization. Moreover, the 10 per cent threshold imposed by the 1982 constitution hampered both the representation of the Kurds and the left in the parliament and failed to deliver the intended two-party system stability by the military.[15] This high level threshold for the representation decreased the quality of democracy in Turkey besides excluding Kurdish representation in the parliament and

[13] For a detailed analysis of the acts of the RP at that period see Narlı (1999) "The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey".

[14] In fact, leftist movements and Islamist movements were not repressed equally during the 1990s. In the 1980s, the military promoted religiosity as a cement for Turkish society to restore national order lost in late 1970s due to political violence involving extreme right and left (Savran 2015, p. 60). This strategy of the military coincided with Green Belt doctrine of the Carter administration in the United States, which intended to balance the power of the USSR in the Persian Gulf through enforcing pro-American religious states in the region. This policy also stipulated enforcement of fundamentalist movements, which backfired later in 2000, especially in Afghanistan.

[15] Although military rule attempted to introduce two-party system to provide political stability by excluding extremists and further suppressing anti-system forces, due to proportional representation, multi party system stayed intact. Moreover, the 10 per cent threshold introduced by the 1982 Constitution produced anticipated consequences such as overestimation of the right-wing parties' votes besides hampering the representation huge portion of the electorate since their votes allocated to the parties that could pass the threshold.

obstructing reconciliation with the Kurdish separatist movement to prevent further escalation of the violence.

Despite differences in their geographies, economies, histories and the evolution of democratic regimes, Turkey and Venezuela had party system collapse during the 1990s. Henry A. Dietz and David J. Myers (2007) identify party system collapse as the "disappearance of an entire party system by democratic means" (Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 59). While this party system collapse witnessed in highly institutionalized two-party system of Venezuela, it was observed in inchoate multi-party system of Turkey as well (Roberts 2003, p. 40). The main reason behind this common party system collapse was the discredit of major parties due to their failure to solve pressing economic and social problems by compromising. In this line, Dietz & Myers (2007) explain the party system collapse by three factors whose interaction brings about party system collapse. These factors are the "appearance of a crisis that shakes the foundations of the political regime and that the dominant political class is unable to manage", "a weakening of party system institutionalization", and the "appearance of an attractive antiparty-system personality"(Dietz & Myers 2007, p. 61).

According to Dietz & Myers (2007), when these three factors lead to party system collapse, large numbers of voters punish the system-sustaining parties by abandoning their support in a short period; due to the loss of the electoral power, the weakened system-sustaining parties cannot recapture the power to protect intrasystemic relationships that structured in party system previously; and new political parties, especially under the leadership of anti-system actors, emerge and they change interparty competition. Neither Venezuela nor Turkey experienced total elimination

of previously governing parties but both countries witnessed the discrediting of dominant parties and their loss of electoral power. Therefore, I choose to call drastic changes in party systems of Turkey and Venezuela as breakdown rather than collapse.

Starting with the 1990s, Turkey experienced daunting economic crises in 1994, 1999 and 2001. As these economic crises coincided with the coalition governments, Turkish people have identified coalition governments with failure of solving economic, political and social problems. The last economic crisis before the AKP government, in 2001, both discredited coalition forces and resulted in their expelling from the parliament. Right-wing DYP and ANAP were erased from the electoral arena, MHP- far right-wing party- was left outside the parliament and failed to recover its electoral power. Their exclusion from the parliament both facilitated the AKP's electoral victory by opening the way of AKP to attain right-wing voters and concluded the process of party system breakdown in Turkey.

Consequently, when Turkish electorate punished the coalition forces by eliminating them from the parliament and casting votes for the newly established party the AKP in the 2002 elections, similarly, Venezuelan electorate chose to punish traditionally governing parties- COPEI and AD- by banishing them from the government and supporting anti-party and anti-systemic leader, Hugo Chávez in the 1998 presidential elections. Those two leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hugo Chávez, promised to bring changes for the ordinary lives of citizens besides changing the system installed by the traditional parties involving systemic exclusion, prolonged economic and political crises, and socio-economic problems.

3.4. The Economics & Demographics

Throughout colonial history, the economy of Venezuela was weak. The independence wars damaged Venezuelan economy further and Venezuela became even poorer. However, with the discovery of oil and natural gas, Venezuela gained huge amounts of money from oil exports especially during the oil boom from 1950 to 1980. Becoming one of the leading oil-producing countries in the twenty- first century, Venezuela was referred to as "Saudi Venezuela" after Saudi Arabia (Crooker 2006, p. 71). Still, the economy of Venezuela heavily relied on mining and oil industry, which accounted for 28 per cent of the country's gross domestic product and petroleum produced by the government-run Petróleos de Venezuela (Venezuelan Petroleum) provided about 50 percent of the government's revenue (Crooker 2006, p. 71).

Majority of 29 million Venezuelans, 93.5 per cent, lives in the cities with increasing level of urbanization, 1.7% annual rate of change.[16] The reason behind this high level of city inhabitance is intense migration of poor people from rural areas to city peripheries in search for jobs. Not only Venezuelans move from rural to urban, Venezuela also receives poor people from neighboring countries such as Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. A large number of immigrant people live under poor conditions especially in heights of the capital, Caracas. In the barrios people lack basic public services such as schools, medical facilities, housing electricity and even sewers (Crooker 2006, p. 44). Therefore, the majority of the population expects their daily basic needs to be fulfilled by the government at least.

[16] http://www.indexmundi.com/venezuela/demographics_profile.html

Like Turkey, high portion of Venezuela's population consisted of the young. Venezuelan's youth population of 0-25 age constitutes 46.47 % of the population while Turkey has 41.7 % youth population (Pavlovic 2004, p. 61). Although young population is utilized as an advantage for economic growth in Turkey, despite higher ratio of youth population, the same is not valid for Venezuela due to taxation problem. Since the portion of middle-income population, who pays the tax, is very small in Venezuela, young population creates a burden on economy rather than an advantage (Crooker 2006, p. 44). Social spending heavily depends on revenues generated through export of oil; hence, combined with the scarcity of taxation, the lack of economic diversification troubles the Venezuelan economy and creates hardships for the poor majority.

Both countries have skewed economic distribution and high level of unequal distribution. GINI coefficient was 39.0 in Venezuela in 2011 and in Turkey it was 40.2 in 2010.[17] Imbalances of income further exaggerate social tension and deepen polarization in both countries. Combined with political discontent, high level of inequality might lead to social explosion by massive protests. In Venezuela after increasing the costs of public services had caused massive protests during the weak starting with 29 February 1989 called as *El Caracazo*. Massive street protests again have taken place especially during the Maduro government due to shortage of basic commodities as the record drop in the oil prices put Venezuelan economy on the brink.[18] In Turkey, the biggest political protests taken place in 2013 when chain of events triggered by excessive use of power of police forces against small group of

[17] According to World Bank data, Turkey's GINI coefficient was 40.0 in 2011 and 40.2 in 2012.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html
[18] Gallas, D 2015 'Venezuela: Economy on the brink?', viewed 18 January 2016
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34983467

environmentalists who came together to save Gezi Park in central Istanbul by opposing government's decision to build a shopping center in place of Gezi Park. While protests began with environmental concerns, as a reaction to extravagant use of power by the police and insistence of the government on building the shopping center, both its content and discourse changed towards critique over all governmental policies, especially the neoliberal economic policies, and protests spread all over the country. However, mass protests are not frequent in Turkey as much as Venezuela.

Fight against poverty and generating humanitarian development are the most crucial economic challenges ahead both countries. Surprisingly Turkey and Venezuela have very close ranks in human development as United Nations human development index shows.[19] In the current index of human development adjusted for inequality, Turkey ranks 72nd while Venezuela ranks 71st. In 2013 by preserving its place Turkey ranked 69th while Venezuela ranked 67th by declining one rank. Therefore, two countries have similar development levels in the areas of schooling, life expectancy and incomes. Moreover, a close examination of humanitarian development of two countries starting from 1990 also demonstrates a similar pattern of improvement especially during 2000s, despite huge difference in the level of development between two countries in 1990.[20]

While Turkey is ethnically diversified, majority of Venezuelans is racially mixed with a European, Indian, and African ancestry. Most of Venezuelans still identifies themselves as *criollos*, Spaniards who were born in Latin America but have the European descent during colonial times. Along with *criollos*, Venezuelans also use

[19] http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/IHDI
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI
[20] http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends

the racial terms *mestizo* and *mulatto*. While *mestizo* signifies a person of Indian and Spanish ancestry, a *mulatto* is a person of black and white descent (Crooker 2006, pp. 45-46). Hugo Chávez accentuated his mestizo identity and promoted political incorporation of mestizo community. Turkish population is consisted of Turks around 70-75 %, Kurds 18 %, and other minorities 7-12 %[21] (Pavlovic 2004, p. 56). Even though Venezuelan mestizo population faces discrimination and exclusion from politics, this problem does not evolve into social conflict. However, in Turkey Kurdish separatist movement evolved throughout 1980s and up to now has resulted in over 40,000 casualties (Pavlovic 2004, p. 76).

Two countries are not the same but similar in having clientelist and corporatist linkages to social constituencies. Venezuela had stronger clientelist and corporatist linkages than Turkey thanks to its well-established two-party system and expansion of public sector through revenues generated by the oil export. Two major parties in Venezuela, the AD and the COPEI, by distributing public sector jobs and political or economic favors in exchange for political support, both built clientelist networks and achieved electoral success which consolidated two-parties system from 1958 to 1993 (Roberts 2003, p. 46). Not just ordinary citizens, private sector also became dependent on rent-seeking ties to public officials in Venezuela (Roberts 2003, p. 47). However, the dependency of private sector on the state is not unique to Venezuela because since Turkey is a highly centralized patrimonial state, it intensively controlled the private sector from the beginning. The process of private enterprise's development was strictly controlled, regulated and nurtured by the state starting with

[21] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html

the 1950s (Öniş 1992, p. 7, Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 174).[22] By favoring the groups and supporting them over the others, each Turkish government created its own wealthy class to sustain its authority.

The working class became loyal supporters of the Venezuelan parties because corporatist linkages forged between the dominant parties and national labor and *campesino* (peasant) confederations through resources obtained from the oil (Roberts 2003, pp. 47-48). Especially, the AD established strong ties with the labor movement after defeating the Communist Party for leadership of the labor movement. The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), which covered over 80 percent of labor unions, was also dominated by the AD. However, rather than consolidating democracy or improving its quality, since the relationship among these actors depended on public resources and material gains, they impaired the creation of genuine democracy in Venezuela. Moreover, partisan loyalties contingent on material gains also undermined class identities and ideological attachments (Roberts 2003, p. 48). The AD and COPEI also changed along with these dependent relations by transforming into pragmatic, multiclass, catchall parties and weakening ideological appeal. This juxtaposition of the major parties curbed the capacity of parties to represent distinct social groups and proposing policy alternatives for solving daunting problems of the country (Roberts 2003, p. 48). In the end, prolonged economic

[22] Kalaycıoğlu (2005) explains the hegemonic position of the Turkish state in the economy by the state tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Kalaycığlu (2005, p. 175) states, "In part, this tradition is inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The essence of the tradition consists of a marked statist orientation (étatism), which stresses community over its members, uniformity rather than diversity, an understanding of law that stresses collective reason instead of the will of membership. The state is paramount mechanism of control, and traditionally the awe of the state is such that no group dares to challenge its control or even hegemony over the society. Coexistence or conformity with the "Papa State" has been much more beneficial than to challenge it. The image of the state as an "omnipotent hegemon," controlling every social process and suffocating any freedom of social, economic, or cultural action, yet possessing vast resources to deliver an infinite amount of largesse (ihsan) to who it deems as loyal and supportive has popular acceptance." Consequently, the Turkish state has been dominant in all areas including the economy thanks to the Ottoman heritage.

hardship and changes in the labor market during the 1980s weakened the bonds among the major parties, the labor and associations with waning partisanship among the electorate (Roberts 2003, pp. 48, 53).[23]

Although the labor movement was incorporated into political decision making in Venezuela, even if the number of interest associations increased during the 1960-1979, autonomous labor and business associations were not incorporated into the policy-making process in Turkey, as it was the case in Venezuela (Öniş 1992, p. 8). Consequently, while the associations and the parties cooperated in Venezuela, in Turkey political parties have dominated the political arena by suppressing both the associations and the labor. However, with the reform package of 24 January 1980, Turkish economy transformed from ISI economy to market-oriented economy by deregulating key relative prices, devaluating the exchange rate, removing price controls on state economic enterprises, and reducing subsidies on fertilizers and petroleum products (Öniş 1992, p. 9). The military intervention in 1980 facilitated the adjustment process as well as suppressing the labor through eliminating the right to strike and restricting the scope of union activity in the 1982 constitution (Öniş 1992, p. 10). Consequently, the labor has been excluded from political decision since ever then.

While the AD and the COPEI was discredited by their cumulative economic mismanagement which further aggravated the effects of the economic crisis during

[23] Roberts (2003) charges the ISI policies both for the structuring the relationship between the parties and associations, and the erosion of these relationships following the demise of ISI during the 1980s. As a result of global debt crisis and plunging oil prices led to severe fiscal and balance of payments problems in Venezuela, the structural bases of political representation gradually eradicated (Roberts 2003, pp. 48-50). While new grassroots protest movements emerged especially among the urban poor, both the labor unions and the parties failed to channel or appease their discontent. Concomitant decrease in the GNP and escalating poverty during the late 1980s and the 1990s necessitated economic structure change.

the 1990s, the final blow to Turkish economy hit the country in 2001. Turkish economy was already in bad shape due to high level of current account deficit and already experienced economic crisis of 1994, but the minor political crisis initiated by a quarrel between the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer turned into a final blow for the economy in 2001 (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, pp. 179, 181).[24] Even though the coalition government attempted to solve economic problems by the help of the IMF austerity problem, by the deterioration of the prime minister's health, the other coalition partners called for the early elections in 2002. What they did not anticipate was they were unable to win any seats in the parliament and the AKP achieved electoral success with the 35 per cent of votes. Ironically, the AKP perpetuated the economic policies of the previous coalition government and became successful with the political stability of single-party government.

To conclude, the structures of two countries are almost completely different. While the Venezuelan economy is heavily dependent on the oil revenues, the Turkish economy is more diversified. Although both countries had ISI policy as a way of economic development until 1980s and switch to neoliberal economic policy in the 1980s, the effects of the ISI were different in two countries due to differences in party systems. Venezuela, being a stable two-party system, had an alliance of the two major parties, associations and the labor while Turkey had a multi-party system and excluded associations. What was common to them was prolonged economic and political crises and failure of traditional parties to come up with the solutions for the socio-economic problems and escalating poverty with high level of inequality. As a

[24] The financial crisis struck mostly the banking sector. 21 out of 89 banks in Turkey collapsed following the crisis in February 2001. The crisis resulted in disappearance of approximately $40 billion USD from the accounts of more than 20 banks and financial institutions, which brought the country to the brink of economic bankruptcy (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, pp. 179, 181).

consequence, while Venezuelan electorate chose to support a charismatic leader who offered displacing the *partidocracia* with a more equal and new Venezuelan republic, the Turkish electorate preferred to grant party government to the AKP under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with the hope of political and economic stability.

3.5. Values, Beliefs and Ideologies

To fully understand and analyze a country's democratic system, two-tiered approach is necessary. First, by looking on the demand side- the attitudes of the voters towards democracy- their values and expectations should be analyzed. Then, looking at the supply side, the approach of both leaders and their parties towards the democracy should be highlighted.

3.5.1. Demand Side: How the electorate in two countries perceives democracy

A close examination of the World Values Survey time-series data related to democratic values shows there is a strong democratic impulse in two countries. Firstly, when compared with other countries randomly chosen to ensure geographical variation in terms of support for democratic regime, despite severe economic and political crises support for democratic regime almost stays intact in Turkey. When the 78.9 per cent of the Turkish respondents support the idea of "democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government" in the wave 3 (1995-1998), there is 78.7 per cent support in wave 4 (2000-2003). Apart from Sweden, Venezuelan respondents not only have the highest democratic impulse but also when the support declines from 89 per cent to 85.5 per cent in Sweden, support for

democracy increases in Venezuela from 83.6 per cent in the wave 3 to 91 per cent in wave 4.

Table 1: World Values Survey Wave 3

World Values Survey Wave 3: 1995-1998
Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Strongly agree	35,2	45,8	13,9	26,3	65,6	42,1	46,8	46,7
Agree	40,2	41,7	53,6	48,4	23,4	36,8	39,6	36,9
Disagree	9,9	6,1	5,5	9,7	5,2	6,2	7,4	9,2
Strongly disagree	1,9	1,2	0,7	2,1	0,8	1,1	1,1	4,1
NA	0,3	0	0	0	0	1,6	0	0
DK	12,5	5,2	26,3	13,5	5,1	12,2	5,2	3,2
(N)	**12,042**	**1,079**	**1,054**	**1,211**	**1,009**	**1,907**	**1,542**	**1,2**

Table 4: World Values Survey Wave 4

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

World Values Survey Wave 4: 2000-2003
Democracy may have problems but is better than any other form

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Agree strongly	38,6	42,9	12	28,5	49,6	37,8	40,1	68,4
Agree	43,2	42,3	53,6	55,2	42,9	40,9	44,8	22,6
Disagree	7,2	6,1	4,9	8,6	5	8,5	10,5	4,5
Strongly disagree	1,7	2,1	0,9	1,7	0,7	1,8	1,7	2,8
No answer	0,1	0	0	0	0	0,2	0	0
Don´t know	9,2	6,6	28,6	6	1,8	10,9	2,9	1,7
(N)	**10,958**	**1,28**	**1,362**	**1,501**	**1,014**	**3,401**	**1,2**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

In addition to support for democratic regime, the electorate in two countries

Table 3: World Values Survey Wave 3

World Values Survey Wave 3: 1995-1998
Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Strongly agree	13	7,8	2,5	7,2	9,9	11,1	4,7	36,2
Agree	41,3	52,4	28,5	40	50,5	44,6	34,8	39,6
Disagree	29	25,4	32,7	35,3	23	25,4	46	14,9
Strongly disagree	5,9	5,3	6,7	4,8	14	4,8	8,2	6,1
NA	0,2	0	0	0	0	1,4	0	0
DK	10,5	9,1	29,6	12,7	2,6	12,7	6,3	3,2
(N)	**12,042**	**1,079**	**1,054**	**1,211**	**1,009**	**1,907**	**1,542**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

increasingly opposes the idea that “democracies are indecisive and have too much

squabbling". Especially in Venezuela, there is a significant decline in the number of respondents agreeing with the idea. Therefore, the electorate in two countries do not bother with how democracy work and do not regard democracies as incompetent

Table 4: World Values Survey Wave 4

World Values Survey Wave 4: 2000-2003
Democracies are indecisive

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Agree strongly	9,1	10,3	2,1	8,3	5	11,4	4	19
Agree	39,3	49,9	30	45,4	41	39,3	33,8	35,2
Disagree	33,9	24,8	36,4	33,6	42,8	31,1	51,5	24
Strongly disagree	7,8	5,4	5,5	5,6	7,3	6,6	7,2	19,9
No answer	0,1	0	0	0	0	0,2	0	0
Don´t know	9,8	9,5	26	7,1	3,9	11,4	3,5	1,8
(N)	**10,958**	**1,28**	**1,362**	**1,501**	**1,014**	**3,401**	**1,2**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp systems.

The respondents not only find democratic regime less conflictual as data shows, the majority of the respondents in both countries are content with having a democratic political system. The data covers only two waves for Venezuela, which indicates very high rate of increase, from 84.6 per cent to 92.1, in support for "having a democratic political system". The number of Turkish respondents favoring the democratic system, on the other hand, has very slightly increased from 81 per cent to 83.1 per cent. It is surprising that the support for democratic political system stays at the same rate, 83.2, in wave 5 and wave 6 despite changing number of respondents of "very good" and "fairly good".

Table 6: World Values Survey Wave 3

World Values Survey Wave 3: 1995-1998
Having a democratic political system

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Very good	38,9	49,9	37,9	39,6	61,1	40,9	50,9	48
Fairly good	39,5	40	41	42,9	31,7	40,1	34,2	36,6
Fairly bad	8,9	4,9	6,4	4,4	3,9	7,8	6,4	7,2
Very bad	3,5	2	1,9	3,4	0,3	2,1	2,6	5,6
NA	3,9	0	0	0	0	1,2	0	0
DK	5,3	3,2	12,9	9,7	3,1	7,9	6	2,7
(N)	**12,042**	**1,079**	**1,054**	**1,211**	**1,009**	**1,907**	**1,542**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 13: World Values Survey Wave 4

World Values Survey Wave 4: 2000-2003
Having a democratic political system

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Very good	48,6	40,6	36	49,3	69,8	43,9	50,5	63,9
Fairly good	37,5	44,2	43,9	39,6	25,4	39,2	35,3	28,2
Bad	5,2	5,9	5,9	5,4	2,6	5,3	6,4	4,2
Very bad	2	2,9	1,2	1,2	0	2	4,1	2,2
No answer	0	0	0	0	0	0,1	0	0
Don´t know	6,7	6,4	13	4,5	2,2	9,6	3,7	1,4
(N)	**10,958**	**1,28**	**1,362**	**1,501**	**1,014**	**3,401**	**1,2**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 7: World Values Survey Wave 5

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2008
Having a democratic political system

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States
Very good	48	45,8	31,2	43,4	75,8	52,3	43,2
Fairly good	36,6	41,4	46,6	39,3	21,6	30,9	38,7
Fairly Bad	5,9	3	8,1	6,7	1,7	4,4	10,2
Very bad	2,2	1,5	2	3,3	0,4	1,8	3,5
Missing; MX: Neither good nor bad; Not asked by the interviewer	0,4	0	0	0	0	0	2,4
No answer	4,1	1,4	12	7,2	0,5	0,7	2
Don´t know	2,8	7	0	0	0	9,9	0
(N)	**7,196**	**1,002**	**1,096**	**1,5**	**1,003**	**1,346**	**1,249**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 9: World Values Survey Wave 6

World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2013
Political system: Having a democratic political system

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States
Very good	43	53,5	28,2	40,4	69,3	48,1	37,8
Fairly good	38,6	31,7	43,8	47,3	23,8	35,1	41,9
Fairly bad	7,4	5,5	8,1	3,9	2,8	6,9	12,2
Very bad	2,5	2,2	2	1,1	1,1	2,1	4,9
No answer	1,5	2,3	0	2,2	0,3	1,4	3,2
Don´t know	7	4,8	17,9	5	2,6	6,4	0
(N)	**9,726**	**1,03**	**2,443**	**1,21**	**1,206**	**1,605**	**2,232**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 16: World Values Survey Wave 3

World Values Survey Wave 3: 1995-1998
Political system: Having the army rule

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Very good	4	3,1	0,5	5,1	0,5	7,3	1,5	10,5
Fairly good	10,7	8,8	1,7	10,7	3,2	22,7	4,9	14,1
Fairly bad	29,2	25,8	11,7	25,3	23,7	40,4	16,3	31,9
Very bad	47,1	54,8	72,5	46,4	70,4	22	74,4	37,8
NA	3	0	0	0	0	1,3	0	0
DK	5,9	7,5	13,7	12,6	2,3	6,2	2,9	5,8
(N)	**12,042**	**1,079**	**1,054**	**1,211**	**1,009**	**1,907**	**1,542**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Contrastingly to the previous findings, both countries similarly have high rate of support for having the army rule compared to other countries. Support for having the army rule among the Turkish respondents is 30 per cent in wave 3 (1995-1998) and 24.6 per cent in Venezuela. Although the rate of Turkish respondents supporting the army rule drops to 27.5, and very slightly increases in wave 5 to 27.7 per cent and then becomes 27.1 per cent in wave 6 and Venezuelan support also decreases from 24.6 to 21.7 in wave 4; the support for army rule in both countries is still very high compared to other countries. Therefore, this data gives clues about problematic nature of democratic support in both countries. The legacy of military rules might have damaged democracy understanding of two countries by increasing the need and respect for the state authority due to remnants of the patrimonial state tradition, even if it contradicts with democratic impulse.

Table 25: World Values Survey Wave 4

World Values Survey Wave 4: 2000-2003
Having the army rule

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Very good	5	4	0,6	5,1	0,4	8,3	2,1	7,8
Fairly good	11,4	11,5	1	8,5	6,1	19,2	6,5	13,9
Bad	29,4	25,3	9,5	39,8	29,2	32,8	31,7	31,4
Very bad	46,9	47,9	77,8	39,4	60,7	30,7	58,1	43
No answer	0,1	0	0	0	0	0,2	0	0
Don´t know	7,3	11,2	11,1	7,2	3,6	8,7	1,6	3,8
(N)	**10,958**	**1,28**	**1,362**	**1,501**	**1,014**	**3,401**	**1,2**	**1,2**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 19: World Values Survey Wave 5

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2008
Having the army rule

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States
Very good	4,1	2,6	0,2	9,1	0,6	8,1	1,4
Fairly good	11,9	8,1	2	19,5	4,1	19,6	12,4
Fairly Bad	25,6	25,9	12	25,3	25,3	31,8	31,2
Very bad	49,6	53,1	75,5	38,3	69,1	22,6	50,9
Missing; MX: Neither good nor bad; Not asked by the interviewer	0,4	0	0	0	0	0	2,4
No answer	4,1	1,5	10,3	7,8	0,9	1,2	1,7
Don´t know	4,4	8,9	0	0	0	16,6	0
(N)	**7,196**	**1,002**	**1,096**	**1,5**	**1,003**	**1,346**	**1,249**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 22: World Values Survey Wave 6

World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2013
Political system: Having the army rule

	TOTAL	Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States
Very good	2,7	1,9	0,4	3,7	0,7	8,3	2,3
Fairly good	11,5	8	1,8	21,5	8,1	18,8	14,7
Fairly bad	26,1	22,7	12,3	41,8	31,2	26,4	31,5
Very bad	50,6	58,2	69,3	22,5	56,3	36,9	48,6
DE,SE:Inapplicable ; RU:Inappropriate response; Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No answer	1,7	3,2	0	2,8	0,4	1,9	2,9
Don´t know	7,3	6,1	16,2	7,8	3,3	7,6	0
(N)	**9,726**	**1,03**	**2,443**	**1,21**	**1,206**	**1,605**	**2,232**

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 28: World Values Survey Wave 3

World Values Survey Wave 3: 1995-1999
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections

	TOTAL	Country						
		Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Very good	7,7	5,9	6,4	10,2	5,8	8,8	3,1	14
Fairly good	20,8	20,8	20	19,3	19,9	27	20,6	14
Fairly bad	28	29,6	24,7	21,1	26,5	31,1	23,9	38,5
Very bad	33,7	34,8	30,4	34,3	45,2	21	47,3	28
NA	0,3	0	0	0	0	1,2	0	0
DK	**9,5**	**9**	**18,6**	**15,2**	**2,6**	**10,9**	**5,2**	**5,5**
(N)	9,002	1,079	1,054	1,211	1,009	1,907	1,542	1,2

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Prior to the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hugo Chávez by stepping up as charismatic leaders, respondents of two countries are highly susceptible to a leader who bypasses the parliament and contradicts democratic parameters such as elections. When the electorate is compared, Turkish respondents in wave 3 have the highest support for a strong leader surpassing democratic limits with the ratio of 35.8 per cent. Venezuelan respondents also have very high ratio of support, 28 per cent, becoming the third highest support ratio after Peru.

Table 31: World Values Survey Wave 4

World Values Survey Wave 4: 2000-2004
Having a strong leader

	TOTAL	Country/Region						
		Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	Venezuela
Very good	15,4	7,9	6,2	15,5	4,1	26,7	8,4	17,9
Fairly good	26,8	28,1	18,1	19,4	16,8	38,2	20,7	27,3
Bad	25,7	25,6	25,6	36,9	27,4	15,3	37,4	28,6
Very bad	22,9	24,9	36,8	18,7	48,6	8,6	31,9	20,4
No answer	0,1	0	0	0	0	0,2	0	0
Don´t know	9,1	13,5	13,3	9,5	3,2	11	1,7	5,8
(N)	10,958	1,28	1,362	1,501	1,014	3,401	1,2	1,2

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

More remarkably, in wave 4, while in almost every country- except Sweden- there is an increase in support for a strong leader, the support of Turkish respondents almost doubles by becoming the highest increase. Similarly, the ratio of Venezuelan

respondents supporting the strong leader becomes the second highest with ratio of 45.2. As a consequence, the data confirms my hypothesis that both countries were receptive to strong leaders. Although this finding might look like being in contradiction with the democratic impulse in both countries, actually it successfully explains why the electorate chose to support these leaders when they acted within the democratic parameters without centralizing inclinations at the beginning of their rule and why they did not oppose when they were overpowering the legislative and the judiciary once they consolidated their power.

Although data is missing for Venezuela, Turkish electorate's support for the strong leader continues in wave 5 and wave 6 around 49 per cent. The data also demonstrates that the political culture of Turkey looks similar to Latin American countries. The cultural map presented by Inglehart and Welzel's study [25] also confirms this resemblance by placing Turkey next to Chile, very close to Brazil, Argentina and Peru with high level of traditional values and balance of self-expression and survival values.

Table 34: World Values Survey Wave 5

World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009
Having a strong leader

	TOTAL	Country/Region						
		Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	
Very good	9,6	5,3	4,2	14,2	3,7	19,4	6,6	
Fairly good	23,8	26,8	16,9	26,9	14,1	29,6	25	
Fairly Bad	26,8	26,4	30,4	29,5	27,1	17,1	30,7	
Very bad	28,4	20,1	35,3	17,5	53,8	17,1	33,9	
Missing; MX:Neither good nor bad; Not asked by the interviewer	0,4	0	0	0	0	0	2,4	
No answer	5,3	1,8	13,2	11,9	1,3	0,7	1,5	
Don´t know	5,7	19,6	0	0	0	16	0	
(N)	7,196	1,002	1,096	1,5	1,003	1,346	1,249	

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

[25] For details see Welzel-Inglehart's cultural map http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp

Table 35: World Values Survey Wave 6

World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014
Political system: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections

	TOTAL	Country Code						
		Argentina	Japan	Peru	Sweden	Turkey	United States	
Very good	9,4	14,5	7	9,8	5,5	17,2	6,1	
Fairly good	28,6	30,1	22	44,4	20,8	32,6	28	
Bad	24,2	22,8	23,7	27,7	26,6	18,9	26,2	
Very bad	26,7	21,4	28,3	7,8	42,6	15,6	37,2	
DE,SE:Inapplicable ; RU:Inappropriate response; BH: Missing	0	0	0	0	0,1	0	0	
No answer	1,5	2,6	0	2,1	0,3	1,9	2,5	
Don´t know	9,5	8,5	19	8,1	4,2	13,9	0	
(N)	9,726	1,03	2,443	1,21	1,206	1,605	2,232	

Note. Data compiled from World Values Survey http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp



***Figure 1*: Welzel-Inglehart Cultural Map**
www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp

3.5.2. Supply Side: How the leaders perceive democracy

Turkish society has been traditional and patrimonial since the Ottoman era. With the establishment of Turkish Republic and the secularization of the state, there has been a conflict between the secularist and Islamist forces.[26] After transition to multi-party elections in 1946, the secularist elite has had the fears of Islamic reactionary opposition arising again from the periphery as the Sheikh Said Rebellion had demonstrated in 1925 (Çarkoğlu 2004, p. 114). The military as the guardian of the secularism, had been one of the dominant actors of the conflict between the secularist and Islamists. The religious movements strengthening during the 1980s and 1990s had challenged both the secularist character of the state and democratic parameters.

Although during the 1990s with the increasing migration conservatism has increased, not majority of Turkish citizens supported Sharia rule replacing the secular state. Çarkoğlu (2004) finds out that the majority of Turkish people, 68 per cent of total respondents, do not favor the establishment of a Sharia-based religious state in Turkey, while 53 per cent of the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*-SP) voters, whose voters also constituted the AKP voters later, supported the religious state (Çarkoğlu 2004, p. 118).[27] Despite low support for the Sharia, the majority has conservative

[26] Şimşek (2013) regards conservatism as a peripheral and oppositional current against the westernization, secularization and modernization projects of the political center. According to Şimşek, this conservative movement was devoid of class identity since there was no strong aristocratic tradition in Turkey. Therefore, conservatism was an ideological inclination represented by different classes in the periphery, namely the Anatolian local notables and various sectors of the rural population. However, with the intensification of migration during the 1980s, demographic changes along with moving of conservative rural to urban opened the way of conservatism capturing the center (Şimşek 2013, p. 436).

[27] Çarkoğlu (2004) conducts a detailed research on the support for Sharia rule among the Turkish electorate. Çarkoğlu reports that support for the Sharia was not high among the electorate in the 1970s and 1980s as well (Çarkoğlu 2004, p. 119). He reveals that there is a troubled understanding of Sharia among the electorate. There is overwhelming support for the secular republican civil code whereas there is also strong claim that religious people are being oppressed in Turkey and the majority is

values especially regarding the women's role in social life and there is implicit concern for the religious services and practices among the electorate. As Şimşek (2013) identifies, conservative people yearn for the diffusion of traditional way of life involving "more religious education, greater control over women's sexuality and dress code, regulations improving the protection of the family in public places such as restaurants, coffee houses, beaches and hotels through segregation from single men, wearing headscarves in public institutions, and regulation of work hours and places for unrestricted religious practices" (Şimşek 2013, p. 436). In this line, there is a considerable number of respondents complained about state policies imposing secularism and disregarding problems and identity of religious people. [28] Consequently, while the electorate opposed the role of religion in state affairs, it was susceptible for a conservative party supporting conservative policies disseminating conservative values and fostering traditional way of life but not undemocratic regime.

To meet the demands of the society for a secular state with respect for conservative values, the AKP had to revitalize its position by reconsidering previous experiences of religious parties, which were closed down once they confronted secularism. In addition, due to these experiences, the AKP had to prove its democratic credentials to the secularist elite, involving the military, the civilian bureaucracy, Kemalist intellectuals, non-governmental organizations, and important portion of the media, which was almost certain that the AKP had a hidden agenda (Şimşek 2013, pp. 431-

concerned about religious freedoms. Moreover, even the majority of electorate supporting the Sharia, opposes religion as a guide in state affairs (Çarkoğlu 2004, pp. 118-127).

[28] Regarding the freedom of religion, Çarkoğlu (2004) underscores that people do not complain about oppression related to religious practices directly because only 31 per cent declares that people are not free to practice religion. However, when they are asked whether there is oppression toward the religious people, 42 per cent of the people states that there is oppression (Çarkoğlu 2004, pp. 127-128).

432).[29] Besides eliminating the suspicions of the secularist elite towards its Islamic roots, the AKP needed a common theme appealing available diverse voters of the right consisting Islamist, center-right, ultra-nationalist and even center-left in order to achieve electoral success when the traditional parties were already discredited[30] (Özbudun 2006, p.554). As a consequence, the AKP came up with a new political concept for Turkish politics "conservative democracy" and presented itself as "conservative democrat" by rejecting the identity of "Muslim-democrat" (Çağliyan İçener 2009, p. 597).

Conservative democracy bestowed the AKP with various benefits. First, the term fulfilled the demands of society that I mentioned, conservatism and democracy. By fusing these two, the AKP was able to distance itself from previous Islamic parties, which were perceived as anti-regime, reactionary forces (Çağliyan İçener 2009, pp. 606-608). Moreover, besides meshing up with Turkish conservatism, this ideological depiction allowed the AKP to tie up former Islamist, center-right, ultra-nationalist and even center-left voters under the roof of AKP as a party of the center (Şimşek 2013, p. 431). The ambiguity of the term due to lack of clarity about which element prevails for the AKP also facilitated AKP's reach for the masses. Furthermore, not for only the domestic politics, this political brand was also evoking a positive image for foreign relations, most notably with the EU and the USA (Şimşek 2013, p. 432).

[29] According to the secularist elite, the AKP has had a hidden agenda of establishing an Islamic state, through using democracy as a means to reach that aim (Çağliyan- İçener 2009, p. 603, Taşkin 2013, p. 295). This act of hiding real intention in hostile environments until the aim is actualized called as takiye, meaning Islamic dissimulation to hide one's real intentions (Şimşek 2013, p. 431).

[30] Additionally, the AKP wished to distance itself from the highly negative political legacy of the previous decade. This legacy includes the anti-systemic discourse and confrontational attitudes of the former Islamist parties that accelerated the secularist mobilization while disappointing many Muslims who supported them, and the bad performance record of center-right parties in coalition governments. Thusly, the AKP searched for a new political brand, which would avoid distasteful and infamous legacies and would not be corrupt or tainted (Şimşek 2013, p. 432).

The extent of harmony between the elements of the concept was a matter of concern since the synthesis composed of two contradictory components of regional and universal, traditional and modern, change and continuity dichotomies (Çağliyan- İçener 2009, p. 606). Although the AKP wished to dispel criticism over ambiguity through drawing an analogy between Christian-democratic parties in the West and theirs, this was a stretch in attempt. Even though there are similarities in matters of religious education and limited government in economic arena, there are grave differences their historical backgrounds, class affiliations and state visions (Şimşek 2013, pp. 434-435).[31] Contrary to Western counterparts, the AKP turned into a revolutionary party rather than conservative one thanks to political reforms restructuring the political system in favor of marginal and traditional groups at the expense of the secularist block in particular and the official establishment in general (Şimşek 2013, p. 438). As a consequence, the AKP gradually turned into be anti-systemic party by losing its conservative character in a sense in the Western counterparts.

From the beginning of its foundation, the AKP emerged out a peripheral and oppositional movement criticizing the political system being undemocratic due to restrictions on freedoms and liberties, especially on the Islamic symbols and activities, military's tutelage on politics and dominance of secularist elite in politics. After the AKP's coming to power, six harmonization packages were designed to comply with the EU membership requirements and to keep the promise of democratization in the anti-democratic structure of the state institutions. However, once it achieved successive electoral victories, the AKP tilted the balance of power

[31] For a detailed account of differences in their historical backgrounds, class affiliations and state visions see Şimşek 2013, pp. 434-436.

towards conservatism in this synthesis and gradually dropped its democratic emphasis of their new identity and focused on conservatism.[32]

For the AKP, conservatism entails the preservation of the traditional values through the protection of the family, the maintaining of social order and justice, and the enforcement of morality by creating a religious community (Çağliyan İçener (2009) pp. 598-599). Both family and religion function as the basis of social order as well as cohesive and unifying forces in the society. Without highlighting Islamist drive not to disturb the secularist elite, the AKP accentuated conservatism in justifying the policies forging conservative society such as controversial attempt to criminalize adultery, restricting the sale of alcohol in some public places, giving equal status to religious schools with secular schools in terms of recruitment for universities and state cadres, and lifting the ban on headscarf and other Islamic symbols and activities (Şimşek 2013, pp. 438-439, Çağliyan İçener 2009, pp. 603, 608). However, unlike the Western counterparts, the AKP overlooked individual liberties, which are equally crucial for Christian democrats. Disdain for individualism, interference in the private sphere by the claim of government's moral obligation to society, gradual Islamization of social life through social policies of the AKP have been interpreted as the signs of

[32] In the first years of the AKP rule, the AKP's understanding of conservatism was different from what it transformed into following the electoral victories. In his speech at the first general congress of the AKP on 12 October 2003, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described the AKP's democratic conservatism as "a means of bridging the gap between the state and society, to unite the center with the periphery". In addition, in his speech he emphasized that the AKP opposes social and political engineering imposing certain principles to create a homogeneous society; hence, through conservative democracy the AKP fosters natural and evolutionary political transformation rather than revolutionary and coercive (Özbudun 2006, p. 549). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued that the AKP would pursue politics based on compromise and reconciliation in place of a politics based on conflict. It is ironic that once consolidated the power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and deputies of the AKP changed their attitudes and abandoned their belief in gradual, and natural societal transformation; instead, they became committed to creating a conservative and religious society.

a reversion to Islamism (Çağliyan İçener 2009, pp. 603, 608).[33] These acts triggered the fear of regime change and created public antagonism, which led to Gezi protests in 2013.

Similar to conservative democracy posited by the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the leader of the party, Hugo Chávez also suggested his own version of democracy, "participatory democracy", to challenge and change the representative democracy. Although the AKP invented the concept by synthesizing two components, even if they are contradictory at some point, the concept Hugo Chávez advanced was not new. Hugo Chávez reintroduced already existing concept in Latin American leftist platforms over the past few decades and has become a current issue with the rise of left-wing governments, to Venezuelan politics (Hawkins 2010, pp. 32-33). Chávez's approach towards democracy diverged from the Leninist approaches, which opposed democratic institutions by claiming that they are nominal institutions used by the bourgeoisie as impediments to revolutionary goals. Instead of rejecting democratic institutions, Chávez promoted the idea of redesigning the traditional representative institutions in line with demands of the masses for democratic participation in decision-making. Hawkins (2010) defines the participatory democracy as "the use of mass participation in political decision making to complement or (in the most radical versions) replace the traditional institutions of elections and lobbying associated with representative democracy" (Hawkins 2010, p. 32).

[33] During the 1980s and 1990s the Islamist movements, from which the AKP emerged, and conservative intellectuals opposed liberal values and materialism and overemphasized that liberalism favors because these values could endanger faith individualism. Eventually the AKP had to revert back to its origins to preserve its core electorate (Taşkin 2013, pp. 301-302). Another difficulty of the AKP in reconciling with liberal democracy is majoritarian tendency that conservative democracy of the AKP entails. Conservative democrats' reduction of democracy to the exercise of the will of moral majority results in the imposition of enforced communitarian morality on the society by disregarding plurality in the society as well as repudiating individuality (Taşkin 2013, pp. 302-303).

By encouraging political participation, Chávez aimed to integrate new civil society organizations into traditional forms of corporatist policymaking and cultivate more radical forms of consensual decision making in political parties through the implementation of direct primaries (Hawkins 2010, p. 33). Along with former decentralization efforts involving the direct election of local officials, a dramatic transfer of central government revenues to states and municipalities, and the tentative implementation of internal party primaries for presidential candidates, new civil society organizations had emerged such as neighborhood associations; yet, Chávez government intended to take a step further by making a new constitution which would authenticate "Bolivarian Revolution" that Chávez was determined to realize.[34]

During the presidential campaign Chávez promised a new constitution that would replace the 1961 Constitution and would incorporate formerly excluded masses, especially the poor, the indigenous, Venezuelans of African descent, and women who were alienated from politics by the *Punto Fijo* system, into decision-making through democratic participation and redistribution programs (Wilpert 2005, p. 23, Levin 2007, pp. 81, 83). Following his electoral success and coming into power, Chávez's first initiative was forming a constituent assembly to write a new constitution in 1999. This new constitution besides changing the name of the state from the Republic of

[34] Bolivarian Revolution is the socialist transformation of the state that Chávez desired to achieve. Chávez named this transformation process after his Andean independence hero Simon Bolivar since he aimed to follow his legacy in this transformation of both Venezuela and Latin America. Bolivarian Revolution was envisioned of rendering progressive, redistributive, and participatory democratic regime (Wilpert 2005, p. 7). The 1999 constitution was cornerstone in the realization of Bolivarian Revolution as a political project. The constitution brought fundamental political and institutional changes. First, the constitution established a legislature with only one chamber, the National Assembly by changing two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, established by the 1961 Constitution (Molina 2002, p. 226, Levin 2007, p. 84). Second, the constitution reregulated terms of the National Assembly and the president. While the National Assembly has a five-year term, the president serves for a six-year term (Levin 2007, p. 84). Although elections were held for both branches simultaneously in 2000, they will not be held simultaneously again until 2030. The National Assembly consists of 165 seats. Politically, the constitution identified participatory democracy a fundamental principle of governance and citizenship stipulated in article 62 (Hawkins 2010, p. 35).

Venezuela to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, granted Venezuelan citizens the opportunity of more active political participation through referenda, local popular assemblies, local public planning councils and support for more lively civil society in these collective bodies (Wilpert 2005, pp. 21, 23, Ellner 2001, p. 10, Levin 2007, p. 84). Specifically, the article 62 assures the right of democratic participation by declaring "All citizens have the right to participate freely in public matters" and that "the participation of the people in the creation, execution, and control of public affairs is the required means to achieve the protagonism [*protagonismo*] that guarantees their complete development, both as individuals and as a collective" (Hawkins 2010, p. 35).

Not only with the constitution, but also with the Bolivarian Circles, the Communal Councils (*Consejos Comunales*) and the missions, Chávez government encouraged many Venezuelans to participate in democratic matters more than they ever have participated before. These initiatives promoted direct popular participation especially at the local level. However, similar to problematic nature of conservative democracy, participatory democracy of Chávez was also problematic due to contradictory status of representative bodies and local participatory bodies. Moreover, while the Chávez government promoted democratic participation at the local level, concomitantly for the sake of Bolivarian Revolution, he recentralized government functions around his charismatic personality through bypassing the legislative and suppressing the judiciary and thereby crippling the representative democracy.[35] Therefore, while fostering democratic participation, he undermined Venezuelan democracy.

[35] Chávez's rule not only weakened the legislative and judicial branches of government at the state level but also curtailed the autonomy of public entities such as the Central Bank and the state oil company (Ellner 2001, p. 7). Moreover, Chávez while awarding his supporters blocked the membership of government commissions and financial support of the secondary associations unallied

Even though Chávez promised political change by replacing the nation's neo-corporatist political system with a new political system involving direct popular participation in decision-making at the local level, political transformation derailed from the aim of democratization. The president's antidemocratic measures in the direction of a powerful executive whose authority would be largely unchecked by other state institutions, endangered participatory democratic vision of social justice (Ellner 2001, p. 7). Moreover, with increasing dependence of civil society associations on the government support and activists' increasing partisanship which, intensified already existing polarization in the country, led the questioning of democratic credentials of the Bolivarian Revolution.

In conclusion, criticizing the deficiencies of the representative democracy, both leaders and their close circles proposed their own versions of democracy, conservative and participatory. Even though they claim that their versions are superior thanks to reincorporation of the excluded masses into politics and overseeing their well-being in the political system, the political transformation led by their democratic visions did not bring the envisioned democratic achievements.

3.6. Biographies of two leaders: Who were/are they?

In appearance of populism the leaders play crucial role because while previously discussed determinants of populism- high socioeconomic inequality, support for strong executive and democracy, and the discredit of ruling parties- stay intact, the leaders with their charismatic authority transform the political structures through

with the government (Hawkins 2010, p. 35). As a consequence, *Chavismo* is associated with executive-based authoritarianism instead of democratic rule.

populist policies. Therefore, it is essential to analyze personal experiences and backgrounds of the leaders. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hugo Chávez are usually attributed to have charisma but in order to understand the sources of their charisma, their lives should be traced: how they lived, evolved and achieved. Surprisingly, there are many similarities in life experiences of two leaders. First, they were born into poor families and experienced daily struggles of ordinary citizens. These early life experiences both helped them to understand real-life problems of the majority and appeal them as one of the "commoners".

First coincidence, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Hugo Chávez were born in the same year, 1954. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born on 26 February and Chávez born on 28 July. Their families were poor and living in the periphery. Erdoğan's father was fisherman and mother was housewife while Chávez's parents were elementary school teachers. During their childhood, both worked for contributing their economically struggling families. Erdoğan sold bagels and water to cover education expenses and Chávez helped to make and sell the coconut buns and papaya cakes his grandmother baked. Both families were religious but while Erdoğan followed the teachings of his family, Chávez chose to be inspired by his guerilla grand grandfather, Pedro Pérez Pérez (Gott 2007, p. 37). Moreover, while Chávez was proud, impulsive, quickly tempered and rose against his family sometimes from the early on, Erdoğan treated his father always with respect and did not challenge or question his authority.[36] Nevertheless, from his father and his neighborhood-Kasımpaşa in İstanbul-, Erdoğan

[36] Judith Levin (2007, p. 54) explains character of Chávez with a small anecdote of his life. Levin says, "*Chávez was still a skinny guy with big feet. People who knew him then say he wasn't handsome and he had trouble getting girlfriends. When one girl rebuffed him and hurt his feelings, he took a rotting donkey's head that he had found by the side of the road and deposited it on her doorstep. (It is the sort of story that appeals to people who are interested in Hugo Chávez's character: he seems, throughout his life, to be proud, impulsive, and—at times—quick tempered.)*"

inherited his tough and authoritative attitude, which facilitated his being embraced by the masses as one of them.

Other similarity is their interest in sports. Starting with his childhood, Erdoğan had dreamed of becoming a football player (Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, p. 19). Chávez was also interested in sports but baseball, and as well dreamed of one day being a major league pitcher in the United States like his hero baseball player (Levin 2007, pp. 51, 53). Erdoğan took one step ahead in realizing his childhood dream by playing the football professionally until he had to choose the politics over football. Chávez decided to attend the Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences in Caracas when he was 17 years old because he was advised that the academy would allow him to pursue a career in major league baseball through the academy (Judith Levin 2007, p. 54). Moreover, since his childhood, his parents encouraged his brother and him to become educated to get out of poverty that they were in (Levin 2007, p. 47).

While Chávez chose to the military as his profession, during his education in the religious vocational school (*İmam Hatip Lisesi*), Erdoğan started to be interested in politics and became the youth branch head of religious movement.[37] Proceeding in his politics career, Erdoğan ran for the parliament membership for the first time in 1986. But his first political victory was in the municipal elections in 1992 when he was

[37] Following the 28 February process, in 1997, the Higher Educational Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu-YÖK) adopted a new rule to prevent the vocational schools to enroll in any science or social science undergraduate program of the Turkish universities by a cut in their university exam scores when they attempt to choose other department apart from theology (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 171). This obstacle in reach for higher education, besides the problem of turban, contributed to the rise of religious movement to challenge the secularist elite in Turkey, which excludes the religious groups both education and politics. Erdoğan expressed his animosity towards this exclusion by stating that they suffered enough to get over obstacles towards the graduates of religious vocational schools (Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, p. 27). Eventually, the AKP government made necessary arrangements in the rules of the Council of Higher Education to allow the graduates of religious vocational school to choose other departments in universities.

elected as İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor. In this electoral victory, his changed political strategy played very important role. Learning from the past mistakes of Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)- the National Salvation Party-the predecessor of the Refah Partisi (RP)-Welfare Party, which was closed down after the military intervention in 1980- Erdoğan and his party the RP changed the MSP's strategy of sustaining limited political base, and strived for expanding the electoral base by focusing on changing social and political needs of the society during late 1980s and 1990s especially with the emergence of new political movements including the religious movement. Erdoğan fostered a new inclusive political strategy appealing to various groups of the society including non-conservative ones. Along with this new strategy, the RP attempted to attain a new political identity highlighting nationalist and conservative aspect rather than religiosity (Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, pp. 58, 62). Moreover, the RP made social justice as focal point and social cooperation through helping the poor in the periphery.[38]

During his education in the Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences, Chávez studied political science, history and developed special interest in Marxism-Leninism and his boyhood heroes of Simón Bolívar and Ezequiel Zamora (Levin 2007, pp. 37, 55, Gott 2007, pp. 37, 103). These studies laid the foundation of his political project "Bolivarianism" which projected a unified and pro-poor Latin America.[39] Despite his

[38] In late 1980s and 1990s, with increasing migration, the primary problem of the people living in the outskirts of the big cities was housing. During the local election campaigns, the media accused Erdoğan of building shanty houses. This accusation backfired by contributing the success of Erdoğan since the masses identified themselves with Erdoğan who had same problems and was sharing the same fate with them; hence he was one of them (Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, p. 68).

[39] Ezequiel Zamora (1817-1860) was one of the heroes of Hugo Chávez. He inspired Chávez as he helped the very poor people of the Venezuelan countryside and desired reallocation of a certain amount of land around each town to be available for common use, like the "commons" of old English or American towns in order to ensure that the poor would be better off. Zamora defended the slogans of "Land and free men," "general elections," and "Hatred toward the oligarchy." Hugo Chávez admired Zamora's goals and considered them as complimentary to Bolívar's goals. He dreamed to accomplish

interest in politics, Chávez did not plan to take part in politics in near future. However, when he was sent to Cumaná to stop a rebellion in 1976, his thoughts changed dramatically after discovering the treatment of the guerilla fighters (Levin 2007, p. 58). Political and economic crises in late 1980s further contributed to the awakening and politicization of Chávez. Once military intelligence agencies became aware of Chávez's political movement within the army, to prevent the movement to grow further, authorities transferred him in 1986 away from the military academy (Levin 2007, p. 63). However, the *Caracazo* event became the last bitter event in politicization of Chávez.

After being sent away to Maturin with some other officers due to accusation of plotting a coup or even an assassination of the president and other government officials, Chávez graduated from Simón Bolívar University in Caracas (Levin 2007, p. 70). Yet this time, he started to plan an actual coup against the President Pérez once he learned that he would be resent to exile to a small village near Colombian border. His attempt to overthrow the President Pérez on February 14, 1992 failed due to communication and coordination problems among the troops. However, after his surrender Chávez was able to make a small, uncensored speech, which made an unanticipated impact among the people as Chávez both took the responsibility of the military uprising by himself and gave people hope for a better future by saying "*Por Ahora*" (for the moment) (Gott 2007, pp. 77-78, Levin 2007, p. 72). Even though Chávez was sentenced for a long time and he stayed in prison only for two years thanks to President Caldera's pardon, he already had turned into a hero because even Caldera was blamed Pérez rather than coup attempt (Levin 2007, pp. 73-74).

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their goals and initiated some projects to realize land reform that Zamora struggled to achieve (Gott 2007, pp. 120-123, Levin 2007, pp. 37-38).

Consequently, this failed coup attempt and imprisonment contributed to Chávez charisma instead of destroying it.

Like Chávez, Erdoğan was sentenced as well, not for coup attempt but for reading a poem. Following the 28 February process, the RP was closed down but Erdoğan dared to continue challenging the secularist state policy by insisting on reading the poem that calls for a religious struggle in rallies.[40] In the end he was sentenced one-year jail by the accusation of inciting the people towards hatred or hostility along with race, ethnicity or sectarian division under the article 312/2 of Turkish Penal Code (Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, pp. 81, 83-86, Eligür 2010, p. 242). Similar to Chávez, this sentence enhanced Erdoğan's charisma and reinforced his hand in becoming the leader.

After the closure of the RP, the religious movement had established a new party, the Virtue Party- *Fazilet Partisi* (FP). There was already a hidden fracture in the RP between two opposing groups, the reformists and traditionalists (Gürel 2015, p. 34). The reformists aspired turning the party into a mass party by appealing different segments of the society besides Erdoğan replacing Erbakan as the leader. Traditionalists contrarily aimed to preserve the Islamic basis of the party as well as following Erbakan and his successor Recai Kutan as the leader.[41] This polarization persisted in the FP. However, the FP could not achieve expected success in the 1999

[40] The poem he read belonged to Ziya Gökalp who was one of the prominent thinkers of the late the Ottoman Empire period and his ideas were influential during the foundation of Turkish Republic. The poem Erdoğan quoted was written to protest against foreign occupation of the Ottoman lands in the aftermath of World War I. The poet called the Muslims to fight for protecting their land by stating that they had nothing but their faith, yet their mosques would be turned into army barracks of the army of the faithful. The Public Prosecutor's Office claimed that this poem was calling for people to rise up against the Republic and charged Erdoğan with seditious activity (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 163).

[41] The reformist wing attempted to change the leadership at the FP's First Convention on May 14, 2000. Since Erdoğan was banned from politics, Abdullah Gül became reformists' candidate for the party leadership but they lost the party leadership to the leader of the traditionalist wing, Recai Kutan, by 521 votes to 631 (Eligür 2010, pp. 242-243, Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 164, Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, pp. 103, 106).

National Assembly elections by receiving about 15 percent of the national vote. Moreover, in 2000 the Public Prosecutor opened a case in the Constitutional Court for the closure of the FP by the claim that the FP turned into the foci of Islamic extremism and conducted anti-secular propaganda and activities which challenge the republican foundations of the political system of Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 163, Şimşek 2013, p. 431). The close of the FP in 2001 gave the reformists long hoped for the opportunity of establishing their own new party, the Justice and Development Party- (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*- AKP or AK Party) on August 14, 2001.

Meanwhile, after his pardon by the President Caldera and release from prison, Chávez reorganized his ground movement, the MBR-200, into a party called the Fifth Republic Movement (*Movimiento Quinta Republica*-the MVR).[42] In his new political path, Chávez established good relations with Cuba by visiting Fidel Castro in September 1994 following his invitation. This visit was the harbinger of future close relations and cooperation between Chávez and Cuba.

In his presidential campaign for the 1998 presidential elections, Chávez utilized different tactics in order to appeal the electorate. For instance, even though he had resigned from the military after leaving prison, he wore his military uniform to emphasize his military background (Levin 2007, p. 80). Besides, to draw attention to his revolutionary character he wore a revolutionary's red beret. In addition, to influence conservative voters sometimes he dressed in a conservative shirt and tie. Whatever he wears the main message that Chávez gave to the electorate was he was one of the ordinary citizens of Venezuela with his mixed-race origins and poor

[42] The party was called the "fifth" movement because since the declaration of independence in 1811, Venezuela had had four republics (Levin 2007, p. 77).

background, someone who looks like them and speaks like them, who shares their concerns (Levin 2007, p. 79). Chávez consolidated this image with his strong oratory. Rhetorical skills contributed charisma of Chávez.

Besides his personal features, the failure of the AD and COPEI also facilitated Chávez's success in the 1998 elections. One of his main opponents was former Miss Universe Irene Sáez from the AD and the COPEI's decision to support Sáez disturbed the electorate by giving the impression that two major parties are not so different from each other and they will not offer political change (Levin 2007, p. 80). President Hugo Chávez took office on February 2, 1999 and his political success did not make everybody happy, especially some middle and upper class Venezuelans felt threatened and thought that their privileges were at stake.[43] Therefore, the war began between Chávez and his opponents, which escalated to the extent that the opponents attempted overthrowing Chávez in 2002.

Like Chávez, the success of Erdoğan and the AKP was unexpected.[44] The AKP achieved to obtain 34 per cent of the national vote and 66 per cent of the seats of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, thanks to the 10 percent national threshold that eliminated all other political parties except the CHP (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 164). The

[43] The upper middle class disgusted by the fact that a man from the lower class dominated politics and imposed his vision on them, which is almost the opposite of what they have. Levin (2007) explains their discomfort with Chávez by stating "They find him really embarrassing— folksy, corny, undignified. They say of him, "The peon [landless peasant] has taken over the farm" (El péon ha tornado la finca). Some middle- and upper-class Venezuelans call him ese mono—"that monkey" (Levin 2007, p. 88). However when they detest him because of his origins the others love him for those same reasons, says Levin. Chávez's response towards his contempt is another contempt as he calls his opponents "rancid oligarchs and squealing pigs" (Levin 2007, p. 89).

[44] Özbudun (2006) underlines that a number of factors contributed to the success the AKP during the election campaign for the 2002 elections. First learning from the experience of the RP, the AKP successfully blended campaign techniques of face-to-face personal contacts with modern methods such as using the help of professional public relations. Moreover, Özbudun stresses that since election campaigns in Turkey have centered around the personality and personal characteristics of the party leader in recent years, Erdoğan's powerful charismatic personality and 'man of the people' image contributed substantially to the party's electoral success (Özbudun 2006, p. 552).

main factor behind this success was the political strategy pursued by the AKP. While maintaining the social networks established during the RP government and preserving social justice and cooperation emphasis with limited Islamist tone, the AKP chose to pursue the EU membership in order to consolidate its legitimacy. Compared to RP and FP's attitude towards the EU, which depicted the EU as a "Christian Club" that contrasts with Islamic character of the country, the AKP's search for membership was surprising. However, concerning the AKP's claim of conservative democracy, for drawing a new political image, which is at peace with modernity, tolerant to diversity, and pragmatic, yet conservative in outlook; seeking the EU membership was necessary to make this image persuasive for the diverse segments of the Turkish society (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, p. 166).[45]

Erdoğan's role in the formulation of the political strategy of the AKP was crucial. First, Erdoğan, thanks to his popularity and political network he attained during his tenure Mayor of Istanbul, easily centralized his power in the party. Even though he could not become the prime minister at the beginning due to his political ban and Abdullah Gül became the prime minister for five months, following the lift of his ban and his election, he swiftly became both the leader of the party and the prime minister. Since then Erdoğan has diverse powers including determination of all the influential posts within his party, the list of deputies that will run in the next elections, names of the mayors and even the name of next president (Taşkin 2013, p. 300). The political system in Turkey, which facilitated centralization of the party leaders' powers, helped Erdoğan further in his consolidation of de jure and de facto power. Erdoğan has dominated the AKP to the extent that AKP groups in the National

[45] Çakır and Çalmuk (2001) call this new identity as "globalist conservative" as the AKP supports liberalism and fosters integration with global economy and preserve its conservative character at the same time.

Assembly became the most silenced and disciplined party groups since the 1950s (Taşkin 2013, p. 300).

In line with the claim of conservative democracy, Erdoğan changed his attitude towards democracy. Once he claimed that democracy was a means to reach political ends by depicting democracy as a tramway in reach for political aims from which someone got off easily, Erdoğan began praising democracy as an end itself (Çakır & Çalmuk 2001, p. 263). Concerning support for democracy and strong leader among the Turkish electorate, this drastic change of the political strategy is very reasonable and not surprising.

4. POLICY ANALYSIS: SOCIOECONOMIC POLICIES AND POLICY PREFERENCES IN POLITICAL DOMAIN

4.1 Economic Transformation and Socio-economic Policies

Populism is a political strategy to attain political power. Through populism, leaders come to power and realize political transformation in line with their worldview and political vision. Socio-economic policies and specific policy preferences in the political domain are the tools of this populist strategy to transform the society and political structure.

Similarities in economic and political conditions in Turkey and Venezuela have facilitated Hugo Chávez and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's claim to power, consolidating their central position in political arena once they came to power. As discussed in previous chapters, high level of inequality along with devastating effects of neoliberal policies, the breakdown of traditional party system and high level of support for democratic system yet with a strong leaders-who is not bothered with rule of law or horizontal accountability- constituted the background conditions for populism to appear. Before discussing the political policy preferences of two leaders for transforming the society and political structure, first I am going to analyze socio-economic context, especially devastating effects of neoliberal policies and high level of inequality, which navigated socio-economic policies of the leaders and helped them garner political support for policy preferences in political realm. Then, I am going to trace the political transformation process in two countries through political

policy preferences of the leaders, which aimed to build a new political system along with their ideological inclinations and political vision.

4.1.1. Socio-Economic Context

To understand the motives behind socio-economic policies of two leaders, an analysis of recent socio-economic background of two countries is necessary. Following the 1973 OPEC crisis, like most of the countries, Turkey and Venezuela suffered the consequences even if due to different reasons. Sustaining economic development based on Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) became costlier for the governments during 1980s because this economic development strategy postulated self-sufficiency of a country by reducing dependence and raising tariffs to protect national industry. Moreover, this economic strategy necessitated a strong state, which would organize the state along with the premises of the economic development strategy.

While the ISI promoted state intervention in economy, it also gave the government the opportunity of building their electoral bases, especially among the labor, through wage increases, price controls and the protection of national industry. Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings (1991) argue that the ISI was the main factor behind the cycler reappearance of populist regimes in Latin America.[46] Kaufman and Stallings define populist governments as the governments applying economic policies to garner electoral support through distribution and expansion of domestic demand

[46] Even though Kaufman and Stallings tied the cycles of populism to the developmentalist model of economic development, reappearance of populism in neoliberal era falsified their contention.

(Kaufman & Stallings 1991, p. 15).[47] In line with their approach towards populism, according to them the ISI fostered a set of economic policies facilitating populist governments' chance of collaborating with organized labor and lower-middle-class groups to consolidate power by distributing employment in public sector and ISI industries. In addition, since domestic demand was controlled by the redistribution of resources, the government could surpass inflation and obtain electoral support from diverse segments of society including national bourgeoisie and poor majority. Yet, the ISI led governments to finance increasing budget deficit, due huge public spending to sustain ISI development model, through foreign borrowing in 1970s (Pereira & Dall'acqua 1991, pp. 34-35). While Kaufman and Stallings keep distributive populist regimes as the responsible of fiscal imbalances, Luiz Bresser Pereira and Fernando Dall'acqua (1991) oppose explaining fiscal imbalances of Latin America on the ground of economic populism.[48]

The collaboration between diverse sectors of society and the populist government came to a halt when the oil crisis further exacerbated huge budget deficits of populist governments. Facing increasing fiscal burden due to expansion of state expenditure to fulfill the demands of social movements strengthened throughout national-development model, the populist governments had to find new financial sources. However, foreign borrowing was no longer available since international finance for borrowing depleted. Latin American governments were using international borrowing as a corrective force for suppressing social pressures for economic redistribution due

[47] One of the populist governments according to Kaufman and Stallings (1991, p. 24) was the first term of Carlos Andres Pérez during 1974 and 1978. This term Pérez was known for his distributive policies involving huge public spending. His reputation of this term also played an important role for his reelection.

[48] For Pereira and Dall'acqua populist governments public deficits were not used a cyclical stabilization device as Kaufman and Stallings claimed, rather public deficits were used as a central policy in achieving rapid economic growth and income distribution (Pereira & Dall'acqua 1991, p. 32).

to high social inequality in the society (Pereira & Dall'acqua 1991 p. 36). When the sources of lending dried out in 1982 following the Mexican crisis of August 1982, Latin American countries lost their major source of financing their public overspending. In addition to enormous foreign debt, devoid of resources to distribute and support national industry especially sectors exporting, populist governments tumbled into fiscal crises.

Large budget deficits and foreign debt forced Latin American countries to kneel down before to IMF and accept their terms for further borrowing. Even though Kaufman and Stallings (1991 pp. 31- 32) argue that there was a shift in the intellectual and political discourse within Latin America itself in favor of greater fiscal restraint, trade liberalization, and privatization, the missing point was the intellectual shift was a product of new phase of liberalism in the world formulated and emanated by the IMF and the World Bank (Taylor 2010, pp. 41, 45). New neoliberal model of economic development was a response to failure of the ISI model since the general concord was state-interventionist policies advocated by the left and promoted by the ISI failed miserably. Debt crisis of early 1980s further consolidated the need for change and replace the ISI model (Flores- Macías 2010, p. 413).

The Washington Consensus generated a new understanding of economy and the nation state compatible with the international economy. In this reformulation of economy and the state, the state was granted the role of arbiter between the market and the society. According to Marcus Taylor (2010), neoliberalism redefined the parameters of politics as well as state-society relations. Through neoliberal reforms starting in late 1970s, a new political project was set in motion. This political project

targeted transforming the state through neoliberal reforms along with the premises of globalization and global economic competition. The state was granted the duty of enforcing new technologies of power and discipline across socio-economic life, and realigning identities, perceptions and expectations along with global competitiveness (Taylor 2010, p. 43). In the long run, competitiveness would help for fighting against poverty and for reaching an inclusive society. In this fashion, neoliberalism was presented as a national development project, which would provide socio-economic development and poverty alleviation.

Even though neoliberalism was presented as impartial technocratic prescription for deep-rooted socio-economic problems, both its political nature and unanticipated effects were obscure. Imposed doctrine of competitiveness neglected further distortion of economic well being of majority and escalating social struggles. In addition, along with neoliberal restructuring, while the state withdrew from economic arena to open the space for the functioning of private enterprise, through disenchantment of political groups and declining political interest and participation, the state was emancipated from political pressures. Therefore, neoliberalism formulated a weak but coercive state.[49] This restructured state took the charge of assuring the functioning of the market and building necessary institutional bodies to endorse the neutrality and rationality of the market (Taylor 2010, p. 46). To sustain the political system, both the state and the society have to be depoliticized. Neoliberal reforms undermined collective social action organizations by curbing power of civic associations and labor unions. However, the depoliticization process did not fade the

[49] Taylor (2010) argues that the main target of neoliberal restructuring was to create a strong state which would discipline both society and its own institutional bodies in the name of common good in order to adhere to the process and outcomes of social relations realigned with the market mentality (Taylor 2010, pp. 46-47).

socio-economic problems but only swept them under the carpet until a populist government turned the frustration into political action.

In late 1980s when the neoliberal paradigm was spreading, neoliberal policies conducted by Turgut Özal and Andres Pérez governments led to further deterioration of living conditions of poor majority by obsessing about economic development through private initiative but disregarding redistribution and further amplifying inequality. Lack of social security, problems of housing and diminishing wages created public frustration and anger. Especially the *Caracazo* event marked the beginning of popular mobilizations against the socio-economic consequences of neoliberal economic policies in Venezuela (Rénique 2009, p. 1, Gibbs 2006, pp. 269-270). This reaction towards neoliberalism spread throughout Latin America as the populations of other Latin American countries suffered the consequences of neoliberal reforms as well.

In 1990s, a second generation of neoliberal reforms attempted to give neoliberalism a human face (Taylor 2010, p. 48). However, instead of alleviating socio-economic problems and lingering social tensions, these reforms produced unanticipated outcomes. Through fostering privatization neoliberal restructuring led to greater discrepancy between skilled and unskilled work. Contrary to expectations, neoliberal policies in two countries created a huge number of people who work in informal economy with the shrinking of public sector, which provided employment for the great portion of the society during the 1970s (Taylor 2010, p. 48). By leaving these masses deficient of social and job security with low wages, neoliberal policies victimized those of non-privileged poor people. Structural adjustment for tighter fiscal

control applied as a shock treatment caused bewilderment and trauma for the general population since it was unexpected of Pérez who was reelected thanks to his generous public spending in the first term (Ellner 2002a, p. 88, Ellner 2002b, pp. 83-85). Sharp decrease in social programs further exacerbated sense of resentment along with mounting socio-economic inequality and impoverishment during the 1990s. Especially in Latin America, cuts in social programs set the stage for a new degree of polarization and impoverishment. The number of people living under poverty line rose to significant levels with lingering inflation and unemployment problems.

Another consequence of neoliberal policies was decreasing political participation and interest, which led to political party decline and political disenchantment. Before neoliberal reforms, parties in Venezuela, especially the AD, had strong ties with organized labor, peasant leagues, and the student movements. Even though Venezuelan democracy was far from perfect, the political parties could ease the social conflict through collaborating with these collective bodies especially in presidential elections. However, the astronomical growth of the informal economy and microbusinesses promoted by neoliberal reforms handicapped the ability of these groups to organize into unions or autonomous organizations of civil society and influence the government (Ellner 2002b, pp. 88, 91). Therefore, neoliberal reforms inadvertently or intentionally weakened and fragmented civil society, which had contingent relationship with the state (Ellner 2002b, p. 80). Consequently, even though neoliberalism is juxtaposed with liberal democracy, it adversely affected already imperfect democracy of Venezuela.

By diminishing the size of the central government and limiting government's role in the economy, neoliberal restructuring envisioned replacing the state's function in economy by the civil society and private initiative. However, accompanying political decentralization to neoliberal reforms in Venezuela, which led to the decentralization of services such as health, port facilities, the police force, the highway system, public transportation, airports and other sectors, the changes in political and economic structure did not produce the intended outcomes (Ellner 2002b, pp. 89-90). Instead, the fusion of political decentralization and neoliberalism created a huge institutional vacuum, which left the majority of Venezuelan citizens devoid of basic infrastructure and economic needs. Neither crippled state, nor rudimentary civil society and private initiative did fulfill the wishes of the Venezuelan citizens.

Similar to Venezuela, historically Turkey has had weak civil society and rudimentary private initiative. Following the Ottoman heritage, Turkish Republic has had centralist tradition for political and economic governance from the capital Ankara. Lacking private initiative, since the Young Turk era, governments in Turkey supported the emergence and growth of a nationalist industrial bourgeoisie (Pamuk 2010, p. 29). Even though the protection of the domestic market and industrialization by heavy use of a restrictive trade regime, investments by state economic enterprises and subsidized credit, throughout the ISI period the private sector was gradually empowered by the state, the failure of the ISI necessitated the change in the strategy for strengthening the private sector and promoting economic growth.[50]

[50] Following the coup in 1960, the military regime established the State Planning Organization (SPO) and with the support of a broad coalition including the Republican People's Party with its etatist heritage, the bureaucracy, large industrialists and even the international agencies, most notably the OECD under the supervision of the SPO transition to ISI development strategy initiated (Pamuk 2010, p. 26). Along with the ISI strategy, during the 1960s and 1970s the state protected the domestic market through heavy use of a restrictive trade regime and generated industrialization by conducting

Even though the ISI policies became successful to some extent, especially in the early stages, following the OPEC crisis in 1973 within couple of years with outstanding external debt stock, which mounted from 9 percent to 24 percent of GDP, and skyrocketing inflation which reached to 90 percent in 1979, Turkish economy were at the brink of collapsing (Pamuk 2010, p. 27). Coupled with the failure of the ISI policies and economic crisis, political instability further pushed for economic and political change. The 1980 coup consolidated economic transformation initiated by January 1980 decisions, which stipulated the radical opening of the economy to the forces of globalization with export oriented economic growth strategy replacing the nationalist-development strategy of the ISI.

Following the 1980 coup the 1982 constitution severely limited the right of collective action and political participation. Especially the power of trade unions was severely limited by the strict membership conditions for trade unions, restricting strikes and banning the political involvement of trade unions (Aybars & Tsarouhas 2010, p. 753). In addition, market and export oriented development strategy prescribed the deregulation and elasticity of the labor market and an extensive privatization process (Aybars & Tsarouhas 2010, p. 755). These prescriptions resulted in a sharp decline in formal employment along with rise in informal employment especially subduing disadvantaged groups, including women, young people, people with disabilities and

investments by the state economic enterprises and subsidizing credit as key tools for achieving ISI objectives. The SPO's role was crucial for private sector decisions as private sector investment projects had to search for SPO's approval in order to benefit from subsidized credit, tax exemptions, import privileges and access to scarce foreign exchange (Pamuk 2010, p. 26). The ISI model of the 1960s differed from the 1930s' development model because during the 1930s the private sector was weak; hence, industrialization was led by the state enterprises and the state took over the control many sectors of the economy. However, by the 1960s model development strategies, the private sector began to prevail even though strong state economic enterprises stayed intact. Thusly, new ISI period combined the old and the new ISI systems. The 1960s witnessed the emergence of big family holding companies, large conglomerates which included numerous manufacturing and distribution companies as well as banks and other services firms (Pamuk 2010, p. 26).

the unskilled who have searched for the informal jobs to avoid high rate of unemployment.

Besides unemployment problem, Turkey during 1990s and early 2000s had to cope with series of economic crises triggered by internal and external fluctuations, which resulted in macro-economic instability, large public deficits and persistently high inflation (Aybars & Tsarouhas 2010, p. 753). Due to these problems, Turkey witnessed three grave economic crises in 1994, 2000, and 2001 (Savran 2015, p.71). These crises forced Turkey to accept the terms of the IMF by standby agreements and the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank. Deals with the IMF and the World Bank imposed austerity measures to sustain budgetary discipline, which led to cuts in social welfare especially in the areas of health and pension systems. These measures further intensified economic marginalization of the masses in Turkey.

The neoliberal restructuring formulated by the IMF and World Bank entailed economic change based on regulatory reforms through institutionalization and regulation. However, since coalition governments ruled the country throughout the 1990s due to 10% electoral threshold the political arena was turbulent.[51] Apart from creating democratic deficit and representation problems, the electoral threshold compelled political parties to form coalition governments even though they are ideologically opposites; hence, during the 1990s there were eleven short-lived governments and seven of them were coalitions (Çetin 2010, p. 40). These coalition governments were very far away from bringing the necessary economic regulation and institutionalization to complete neoliberal transformation. Instead of creating a

[51] The electoral threshold of Turkey is the highest in the World and the rate is % in Liechtenstein, 5% in Germany, New Zealand, Romania, and Czech Republic, 4% in Spain, Bulgaria, and Sweden, 3% in Argentina and Greece, 2% in Denmark, 1.5% in Israel, and 0.67% in Netherlands (Çetin 2010, p. 39).

dynamic economy based on fair competition and free market, neoliberal reforms accompanied with political instability created rent-seeking actors especially among the military, bureaucracy, and the market[52] (Çetin 2010, pp. 34-35, 38, 49). Even though the AKP government brought bold changes imposing regulation and control, this rent-seeking behavior perpetuated and even accelerated during as the AKP controlled the state completely unlike coalition partners, which had to share the rent.[53]

During the 1990s, privatization and regulation were the main strategies of economic development (Çetin 2010, p. 34). Especially the privatization of state monopolies and introduction of competition in network industries necessitated labor elasticity which further deteriorated unemployment problem since people lost job security along with decreasing welfare benefits. Moreover, neoliberal reforms crippled bargaining power and political leverage of the organized labor in Turkey.

Changing terms of the labor market and boost of confidence of the exporters following the new economic strategy favoring a more open economy and export-led growth resulted in emergence of new centers of industries in Anatolia starting in late 1980s and during the 1990s (Pamuk 2010, p. 29). The rising new elite both challenged the place of leading industrialists of the Istanbul region and supported the religious movement financially. Symbiotic relationship between the RP and this new

[52] One of the main causes of the economic crisis of 2001 was conflicting view of the coalition parties on the economy because there was a vital contradiction in their approach towards the economy: while they intended to implement market-based institutions and regulations, they had no intention to let go their rent resources at the same time (Çetin 2010, p. 40). Since the banking system played an important role in rent distribution due to ineffective regulatory framework, crisis in the banking sector spread over other sectors as well and resulted in the losses of public banks and budget deficits.

[53] Since franchise contracts for the public utilities were subject to public law, Turkey could not attract foreign investment. However, the constitutional amendment in 1999 protected investors by allowing the franchise contracts to apply international arbitration and privatizations, as a result, privatization revenues in the post-2000 term have increased (Çetin 2010, pp. 44-45).

conservative and pro-neoliberal elite persisted through the emergence and rise of the AKP as well.

4.1.2. The Pink Tide

Reaction towards neoliberal restructuring was not unique to Venezuela or Turkey. Socio-economic transformation and problems were similar in Latin American countries. Accordingly, Latin America witnessed the rise of left-wing movements in late 1990s. Supported by indigenous movements, the left-wing parties were able to channel frustration of the electorate into electoral victories. The rise of the leftist governments in Latin America has been called as "Pink Tide". Even though the rise of left was unexpected considering collective disenchantment with decreasing political participation due to neoliberal reforms, left-wing movements have benefited from the circumstances that neoliberalism created. Besides, the left learning from the past mistakes and experiences refined its strategy to capture the power. The political transformation in Latin America has been named as the Pink Tide in order to highlight the moderate and hybrid nature of the new left-wing governments since the left jettisoned the obsession of communist revolution; instead has focused on internal restructuring, social recovery, and ideological adjustment to the political and economical challenges and necessities of a new era (Moraña 2008, p. 32).

For explaining the rise of the left in Latin America, scholars have proposed two main arguments.[54] While the first argument explains this rise on the grounds of socio-economic policies of previous governments, which disappointed social, economic,

[54] Blanco Blanco & Grier (2013 p. 69) find that natural resource abundance has played a significant role in the rise of the left.

and political expectations of the electorate, the second focuses on the political learning of the left which led to moderation and alleviated the fears of the electorate (Blanco & Grier 2013, p. 68). To reveal the political learning of the left and its reflection on the politics of the left, Mabel Moraña (2008) highlights political change from the 1970s and 1980s to the 1990s. The stark contrast is the left has preferred institutional and electoral means to reach power by abandoning the armed struggles. Avoiding violence has facilitated the legitimation of the left as a qualified political player. Political moderation diffused economic arena as well. The left deserted its antagonistic attitude towards the market economy instead supported the idea of coexistence of the market economy with strong state initiative. Moreover, even though the state was granted a central role in social transformation and economy, the left no longer opposed all of transnational corporations and foreign investment; on the contrary, it promoted the idea of promotion and protection of foreign investment along with the revitalization of the principle of national sovereignty to protect national interest (Moraña 2008, p. 32). Consequently, the left has evolved into a moderate political contender for power, which did not scare away the voters; rather, turned into a center of attraction for the electorate with the promise of holding the panacea for the daunting socio-economic problems.

Thanks to change in political strategy, the leftist presidential candidates have swept the electoral arena and came to power in Venezuela (1998), Chile (2000), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), Peru (2006), Nicaragua (2006), and Paraguay (2008) (Flores-Macías 2010, p. 413). While in Latin America during the 1990s right-wing presidents constituted 64 percent of the

total number of presidents, with the rise of these left-wing governments, in 2005–2008, this ratio has fallen to 33 percent (Blanco & Grier 2013 p. 68).

Even though the leftist governments of Latin America share some main tenets of the leftist ideology, they differ along with their ideological characteristics and the specific social constituencies mobilized and incorporated by their left-wing political movements in their countries (Moraña 2008, p. 32). These differences led scholars to differentiate among these left-wing governments by classifying two types of left as the "responsible left" or "moderate left" and "demagogic left" or "radical left". Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Verónica Michelle Bachelet of Chile, Tabaré Ramón Vázquez Rosas of Uruguay and Néstor Carlos Kirchner of Argentina were identified as the "good" left as they did not oppose market-led growth but supported market reform to fulfill social demands and they had respect for liberal democratic institutions without distorting the division of powers and the rule of law (Spronk 2008, p. 174).[55] Since the left-wing governments of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa respectively, through mobilizing their electoral base they have challenged the economic policies disseminated by the Washington consensus, they were branded as the "bad" left.[56]

The main drive behind the differentiation of "good" and "bad" left was two opposite economic policies of the left-wing governments. While the so-called bad left, by

[55] Even though they applied statist economic policies gradually, the governments of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007-2015) in Argentina have been considered a bridge case between these two groups (Flores-Macías 2010, p. 415).

[56] Weyland (2009) explains the ability of the radical left to challenge neoliberalism by the traditional rentier economy of those countries in which radical left rose. While the moderate left embraced the fundamental constraints emanating from global capitalism and domestic neoliberalism and sought change inside these constraints; the radical left pursued a different path by rejecting the market model with a strong nationalist skepticism about globalization, fierce repudiation of the established political class, and a questioning of pluralist, representative democracy (Weyland 2009, p. 148).

rejecting the economic orthodoxy increased the state intervention in the economy through the nationalizations of strategic industries such as natural resources and telecommunications, the implementation of land reforms, and asserting price and exchange controls; the so-called good left has perpetuated economic orthodoxy by maintaining remarkable fiscal austerity, leaving prices to the market, and fighting poverty through limited social programs. Consequently, the administrations of Chávez, Morales and Correa, instead of reforming the neoliberal structure, have decidedly reversed several orthodox measures implemented by pro-market governments of the previous two decades and opted for redistribution rather than selectively addressing social inequality through targeted social spending like the other camp has carried out (Flores- Macías 2010, pp. 414-415).

It is ironic that Chávez was not considered radical at the beginning but gradually asserted a socialist agenda by moving towards the left especially after 2005.

4.1.3. Neoliberal Transformation in Turkey and Venezuela

Even if they do not share the same geography, devastating effects of neoliberalism explain the need for change in two structurally different but in terms of socio-economic necessities, dissimilar societies of Turkey and Venezuela. Mounting impoverishment and socio-economic inequality turned the deprived electorate susceptible to populist appeals of nontraditional politicians. As the outsiders of the political system who were not the responsible for neoliberal devastation, two leaders channeled anger towards traditional parties for not resisting neoliberalism into an

opportunity for persuading the electorate that they would ease the pain of neoliberal policy outcomes.

Considering ideological leaning of the AKP towards neoliberalism, the promise of recovery from devastating outcomes of neoliberal reform could seem as an oxymoron. However, similar to the left-wing political movement and Chávez, the AKP and Erdoğan utilized social justice discourse, which was generated by the religious movement and the former RP government, as previously mentioned.[57] Moreover, through social network and religious solidarity established by the movement and the RP, the AKP promised the ease the pain of two recent economic crises and austerity measures of the previous coalition government without enforcing redistribution. Even though Erdoğan's and Chávez's understanding of social justice differed along with their ideological inclinations as Chávez prevailed redistribution to reach a socialist political system while Erdoğan envisioned religious solidarity without diverging from neoliberal economic policy, the shared commonality was both leader appealed to the need for social justice in their societies within the confines of their ideological orientations.

Differences are marked in terms of historical background as Venezuela experienced colonialism, which created strictly delimited class relations and economic and political marginalization along with cleavages in Venezuela. On the contrary, Turkish society has had vague class relations due to Ottoman heritage since the Ottoman

[57] The religious movement filled the political vacuum created by the elimination of the left-wing as the only political actor representing anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. Therefore, the religious movement started to use leftist anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist slogans in their political discourse. Moreover, in order to appeal to the masses and establish hegemony over the informal and educated sections of the proletariat, they argued that only way to bring social injustice and recover from the existing economic problems is complete Islamization of the society and the state (Gürel 2015, pp. 20, 32).

Empire forged a political system only composed of the subjects and the sultan by restraining cleavages in the society. Therefore, Turkish society has not been as economically and politically polarized as Venezuelan society. However, even though the economic marginalization of the religious movement was not so dramatic, political emasculation of religious movement in Turkey strengthened anti-establishment cause of the movement and paved the way of prospective polarization.

Anti-establishment attitudes of religious and leftist movements differ, so the leaders as well. While Erdoğan preferred sporadically to mobilize the masses especially during the campaigning periods and in the opening ceremonies of state facilities just to consolidate the support for the government's neoliberal economic policies with a small touch of social justice for correcting former mistakes of neoliberalism, Chávez targeted a structural change in politics by introducing popular organizations to challenge neoliberal ideology and restructuring of the state.

Completely opposite ideologies held by the leaders explain the contrasting path taken by the leaders in terms of mobilization and handling the public discontent towards the neoliberalism. Reflection of the leftist ideology revealed its protest culture towards the neoliberalism during the *Caracazo* event. Since then, left-wing movement has focused on more direct forms of protests in Venezuela. Eventually, Chávez formulated a direct participatory democratic system in which the people would be mobilized and directly participate to challenge neoliberalism. Yet in Turkey, the right-wing religious movement envisaged more subtle forms of protest to challenge the dominance of secular ruling elite. Religious network was subsidized by Anatolian conservative businessmen, which gradually strengthened economically thanks to

neoliberal transformation of Turkey during the late 1980s and 1990s. Anatolian conservative businessmen called as Anatolian tigers have contributed to the rise of religious movement by financing the religious networks and challenging the dominance of secular elite in İstanbul over the Turkish economy.[58] Even though the religious movement did not confront neoliberalism as the left-wing movement of Venezuela did, both movements had the same ambition: challenging the established interests and the elite ruling the country.

High level of inequality in two countries strengthened the hands of populist governments in two ways. First, huge portion of the society living below the poverty level increased the demand for social policies targeting poverty alleviation. Second, wealthy segments of the society were subordinated to populist governments. Either collaboration and cooption or suppression, the governments domesticated the economic elite. Both governments also created their own wealthy class in line with their ideological stances.

Despite privatizations, state still remained as a powerful player in the Turkish economy. Thanks to strong state presence in the economy, governments were able to selectively privatize state enterprises to generate income without losing control (Çetin 2010, p. 41). Moreover, privatizations were the main pillars of rent-seeking policy

[58] Thanks to neoliberal restructuring in Turkish economy during late 1980s and 1990s Islamist bourgeoisie steadily gained power. The rising capitalists of Anatolia have been called as "Anatolian tigers" because of an analogy between the East Asian tigers and Anatolian businessmen (Gürel 2015, p. 33) Besides, Anatolian businessmen increased political power when Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, MÜSİAD) was founded in 1990. MÜSİAD as the representative of the Islamist bourgeoisie has the purpose of balancing Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, (Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD), which maintains the secular bourgeoisie. Even though MÜSİAD has been much weaker compared to TÜSİAD, with the AKP government, it gained significant power. The MÜSİAD perpetuated its support for the RP to the AKP as well (Savran 2015, p. 62).

since there is a bargain between the government and political interest groups in privatization decisions to share the rent. The AKP government benefited from the strong presence of the state in the market and the acceleration of rent-seeking neoliberal transformation throughout the 2000s.

As the Venezuelan economy severely depends on the price of oil, Chávez formulated pro-oil policies intended to support high prices, institutional and legal reforms and reasserting political control over the state-run company Petróleos de Venezuela S. A. (PDVSA) by ending the industry's traditional autonomy (Hidalgo 2007, p. 1). Change in the status of the PDVSA began in 2001 when Chávez administration reached the decision of increasing the share of the PDVSA in all the country's oil fields by decreasing private oil companies' share through extracting more taxes from multinational companies (Mazzuca 2013, p. 118). However, when the PDVSA's directors and managers refused to comply with Chávez's goal of cutting production to increase the price and participating more in social programs, a battle between two was triggered. The clash reached its nadir when PDVSA workers and managers participated in the economic strike that took place between December 2002 and January 2003. The strike concluded with dismissal of more than 15,000 workers and the restructuring of the state-run company along with the government domination (Hidalgo 2007, p. 10).

Besides gaining the control of the PDVSA, the drastic changes in international arena in 2000s, especially with the Iraq War in 2003, surging prices for oil, minerals, and agricultural commodities gave Chávez the chance of taking bold steps to generate

more income for the country and redistribution.[59] Because extracting tax capacity of Venezuela has been very low and main source of revenue comes from abroad through the sales of oil, revenue generated from the oil produced by the state-run company, the PDVSA, was crucial.[60]

Chávez turned increased state control over oil rents into an opportunity for redistribution and incorporating the informal sector into his coalition through so-called Bolivarian Missions (Mazzuca 2013, p. 118). The Bolivarian Missions were created between 2003 and 2004 and have been financed by the PDVSA. The missions consisted of four main programs in the areas of education, health and food. Misión Robinson and Misión Ribas were created to promote literacy and basic education, Misión Barrio Adentro to provide health services, and Misión Mercal to provide subsidized food (Mazzuca 2013, p. 118, Penfold-Becerra 2007, p. 64).

In addition to sustaining Chávez's electoral power through financing the missions, skyrocketing oil prices gave Chávez the chance of initiating the project of his political

[59] Thanks to abundant oil revenue, Chávez's administration expanded state intervention in the economy through regulations, fees and price controls. State intervention in the economy thanks to oil revenue and significant increase of government spending led to greater public and private investment, a faster expansion of production in the non-oil sector and a recovery of purchasing which in return resulted in 13 straight quarters of growth with rates of around 10% until 2006 (Hidalgo 2007 p. 10). However, the fixation of fiscal policy and monetary policy to oil revenue even though contributed the accomplishments of radical leftism in boom times, dependency on oil subjugated the economy to the fluctuations of the price of oil. Moreover, drastic increases in public spending have fueled inflation, which curtailed the social payoffs of new policy programs. While economic hardships were coupled with the political confrontation and the striking institutional weakness of the state, which was stoked by ideological purges, populist politicization, and unaccountable personalism, economic growth and employment were seriously diminished (Weyland 2009, p. 158). Consequently, Chávez administration failed to replace neoliberal economic model with a new, viable, and diversified model of economy in Venezuela. As a result, currently Venezuela is struggling with inflation and shortages of basic commodities.

[60] Venezuela has been a petro-state. Hidalgo (2007) defines petro states as a particular kind of state whose main source of revenue comes from abroad through sales of oil, which represent at least 40% of total exports and 10% of GDP. Even though oil provides a high monopolistic income, dependency on a resource that is expendable, capital-intensive, strategic, and vulnerable to external variables results in an institutional structure non-adaptable to the bust periods (Hidalgo 2007, pp. 1-2).

vision: 21st century socialism. Since early days of his political career, Chávez's main target was transforming the political and economic system through the Bolivarian Revolution, which would build a new kind of socialism that would challenge the status of traditional parties and elites and would improve living conditions for the poor. The Bolivarian Revolution was a piecemeal political project and the presidential election of 2006 concluded the transition phase by sealing the Chávez's central role in the politics (Hidalgo 2007, p. 7).

Domestic economic success reflected in foreign policy formulations of the leaders. Both leaders strived for bold foreign policy initiatives with the ambition of regional leadership.

4.1.4. Regional Leadership Aspirations

Socialist vision of Chávez was not limited to domestic politics. Rather, Chávez sought the ways of spreading his vision into the region by reviving the dream of his long-time national hero, Simón Bolívar who attempted to unite the region under the confederation of Andean Republics but failed (Rénique 2009, p. 9). Chávez used his country's abundant reserves of oil and gas as leverage against to the US influence on the region and form alliances to that seek to counter US power (Hidalgo 2007, p. 11). Chávez's aspiration of being a regional leader and spreading socialist vision to the region along with the leftist revival in the region resulted in regional cooperation and institutional initiatives. With the initiative of Venezuela in 2006 Cuba, Bolivia and Venezuela established the *Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos de las Américas*

(ALBA).[61] The main drive behind the creation of the ALBA was the economic and political strengthening and integration of the region. Differently from other international initiatives for international cooperation such as the US-sponsored free trade agreements, ALBA was generated to alleviate poverty and social inequalities through regionally shared vision of social welfare, fair trade, and mutual economic assistance (Rénique 2009, p. 11, Griffiths 2010, p. 612). Under the framework of ALBA, regional cooperation spread over other areas such as the energy initiative of Petroamérica, the *Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas* (UNASUR), which was created in 2008, the project of a South American common market, Telesur, a public television company sponsored by seven Latin American countries and the Bank of the South as an alternative to the World Bank and IMF with seven member states (Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia and most recently Paraguay) (Rénique 2009, pp. 10-11, Griffiths 2010, p. 612, Muhr 2010, p. 43).

In addition to challenging neoliberalism through spread of socialist vision across the region, ALBA and other initiatives have signified Chávez's efforts toward regional integration under the banner of socialism and his aspiration of being a regional leader. To secure his regional influence, Chávez sought ways of counterbalancing not only the US's economic influence in the region, which the US is pushing through the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, but also political influence as well (Hidalgo 2007, p. 11, De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 421). Therefore, Chávez took every chance of

[61] ALBA dates back to 2000 when Cuba and Venezuela signed the Integral Cooperation Agreement. This agreement was followed by the ALBA Integration Agreement in 2004 and in 2005 the Implementation Accord. While Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007), Dominica (2008), Honduras (2008), Ecuador (2009), St Vincent and The Grenadines (2009) and Antigua and Barbuda (2009) joined to the initiative as full members, Paraguay and Grenada have been observers. In 2006, Bolivian President Morales' proposal of Peoples' Trade Agreements (PTAs) concluded the process of ALBA. These PTAs prioritized fair trade over the US promoted bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (Muhr 2010, p. 40).

confronting the presidents of the US, especially George W. Bush whom he represented as a grave threat for his socialist vision.

Similarly to Chávez, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and also his government benefited from the changing terms of international markets in 2000s. First, when the AKP won the majority of the parliament by 34 per cent of the votes and established a single-party government, Turkish economy rose as an emerging market with economic environment where investor confidence and foreign direct investment were rising. In addition, the Iraq War in 2003 both increased strategic importance of both the Middle East region and Turkey, which evolved into a crucial regional player and model country in the region with its geostrategic location and democratic regime with mildly Islamist government. Moreover, steady improvements in productivity by domestic economic actors supported by accelerated short-term capital inflows sparked an extraordinary period of economic growth consolidating Turkey's economic power.

Economic development and increasing strategic importance encouraged Erdoğan's claim of being the regional leader. Besides, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was chief advisor of Erdoğan from 2003 to 2009 and then in 2009 he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs until 2014, endorsed Erdoğan's claim by introducing the concept of strategic depth as a factor that should characterize Turkish foreign policy. Within the framework of this concept and formulation of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has had geopolitical strategic depth thanks to strong historical and cultural connections to neighboring countries; hence, he advocated the need to develop an activist foreign policy, aiming to engage all countries in these regions (Kirişci, 2009, p. 36). As a central country, to pursue an activist foreign policy in order to achieve strategic aims,

Turkey should have asserted its soft power on and developed a "zero problem policy" with neighboring countries. One of the main tenets of this foreign policy formulation was making the pursuit of economic interest the main element of their country's diplomacy (Kirişci 2009, p.42). Therefore, Turkish foreign policy was retuned on the basis of extending economic relations and consolidating political influence (or soft power) of Turkey on the region through trading.[62]

Both leaders were aware that regional leadership of Turkey and Venezuela depended on strong economy to spread economic influence over the regions and attain political dominance in domestic politics. Both leaders had an unprecedented level of control over the politics; hence, they shared the same intention of extending their political hegemony over economics as well. In Venezuela since state expanded its control over the economy and the president maximized their control over the state, Chávez became more and more central in economic policymaking (Mazzuca 2013, p. 113). Concentration of political power in Turkey also allowed Erdoğan progressively to have more control over economic policy.

Both leaders reoriented their economic policies to the benefit of the poor and consequently achieved economic and electoral successes. The economic performance of the countries under two leaders thanks to favorable international market conditions and commodity prices until 2008 contributed to the success of social policies, which facilitated the imposition of leaders' domination in the political arena.

[62] By introducing Rosecrance's idea of the "trading state" to the Turkish politics, Kemal Kirişci (2009) analyzes how Turkish foreign policy was reformulated along with the premises of zero-problem policy with the neighbors. According to Kirişci, the AKP government designed zero-problem policy with an economic elaboration and emphasis on finding new export markets and expanding the terms of trade produced significant results by increasing Turkey's foreign trade with neighborhood countries more than six-fold.

Following this brief discussion of foreign policy, the next section delves into socioeconomic policies of the leaders.

4.2. Social Policies

Social inequality and polarization was nothing new for Venezuela and Turkey under the leadership of Chávez and Erdoğan. Yet, neoliberal transformation in both countries during the 1980s and 1990s created winners and losers from the economic liberalization process.[63] While the winners were the secular ruling elite and businessmen in Turkey, in Venezuela they were mainly business interests and other privileged groups breed from the oil revenue. Losers of the neoliberal transformation were the poor of two countries, historically been disadvantaged and generally unorganized (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 816). Systematically excluded indigenous people and residents of informal settlements of favelas and barrios in Venezuela and poor conservative majority living in the countryside and shantytowns in Turkey had to bear the consequences of neoliberal austerity justified by the economic development illusion.[64]

[63] Terry Gibbs (2006) opposes the claim of Venezuela became more polarized under Chávez by the media or mainstream analysts. He claims politics in Venezuela since Chávez is no more polarized than it was under neoliberalism but the media and analysts are intended to present Venezuela as so because the poor became the benefactors of policy making. Gibbs attracts attention to chronic problem of wealth distribution in Venezuela. According to Gibbs those who have trouble with the redistribution agenda of Chávez and associate the policies with redistribution as authoritarian, especially the privileged elite controlling Venezuela's oil wealth for decades, should accept the fact that redistribution is the bitter medicine that the rich must swallow in order to reach a more just and humane society as the poor have been asked to swallow the bitter medicine of neoliberal austerity for over two decades in the vain hope that some of the wealth would eventually be distributed to the poor (Gibbs 2006, p. 268).

[64] Gibbs (2006) reminds the neoliberal belief technocrats used to side-step questions of inequity and justify the dominance of elites in decision-making. For neoliberal thinking, economic growth alone will lead to development and the alleviation of poverty eventually (Gibbs 2006, p. 268).

Raised in barrios, Chávez was aware of the living conditions and daily struggles of people in barrios. Thus, to address the inequality problem he initiated an all-out assault on neoliberal doctrine and its authoritarian elements by bringing into question elite dominance over the economy (Gibbs 2006, p. 269). Rather than reforming the neoliberal structure, Chávez lit the fire of revolution and projected the Bolivarian Revolution. Chávez introduced a program of wealth redistribution, and the gradual expansion of a full suite of public services in the areas of transportation, healthcare and doctors, housing, education, and telecommunications (Griffiths 2010, p. 611). To transform the Venezuelan state into a socialist state, Chávez administration developed alternative redistributive mechanisms to strengthen Venezuelan welfare state through social missions (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 818).

The social missions were designed as social programs to address urgent social needs by increasing community participation in state-sponsored public organizations. Since the state bureaucracy created obstacles for the fulfillment of social needs, the missions were established as parallel structures either completely outside the scope of government ministries or in collaboration with them in order to get around certain bureaucratic obstacles (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 818). As they have been under the government supervision, and even directly linked to the president, the intention of developing a genuine civil society through promoting civil social actions were questioned. Moreover, political mobilization in severely polarized society entails the risk of partisanship rather than forming an independent vivid civil society. Nevertheless, Chávez's redistributive agenda, whether it led to vibrant civil society or not, prioritized forging a social democratic alternative to neoliberalism.

Even though social missions first were created in 2003, the explicit socialist turn taken in 2004 and 2005 gave them a boost in the way of creating a Bolivarian socialist alternative. Their success facilitated Chávez's reelection in December 2006 by campaigning on a platform to develop a model of twenty-first-century Bolivarian socialism (Griffiths 2010, p. 611). 21st century Bolivarian socialism called for the expansion of state involvement in the economy and, rather than the abolishment of the market economy, offered a mixed capitalist economy.[65] Thus, at the beginning, the project was mild in terms of future objectives. However, successive electoral success along with increasing oil wealth gave Chávez encouragement to introduce more radical policy initiatives by the socialist turn in 2004-2005. The bold moves of Chávez included renationalization of key industries like telecommunications and electricity, the promotion of popular participatory democracy in the workplace and in public governance through the creation of local communal councils, communes, and models of cooperative and co-management in businesses (Griffiths 2010, p. 611). With the government's public commitment to the application of popular participation, the missions turned into motors for social change by addressing full range of social, economic and educational needs. Successfully implemented, by October 2008 the number of social missions targeting health care, popular culture and music, energy efficiency, the promotion of local communal councils, and a full range of adult education programs reached 30 (Griffiths 2010, p. 613, Muhr 2010, p. 51).

[65] Because he was realist, instead of toppling the capitalist economy, Chávez firmly opposed to savage neo-liberalism but accepted the presence of market forces alongside the public sector as well as private enterprise, respecting the rules of the game. In consequence, Chávez turned Venezuelan economy into mixed economy under the motto of 'as much state as necessary, and as much market as possible where the invisible hand of the market joins up with the visible hand of the state' (De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 420).

The AKP under Erdoğan's leadership also introduced social policies to address the living conditions of the poor. Yet, compared to Chávez's revolutionary initiatives, they have been limited in their scope and impact. Taking the ideological differences into consideration, differences in handling the problem of inequality and poverty is a natural outcome. Chávez envisioned a revolutionary participatory democracy and institutionalized dissatisfaction with neoliberalism in Venezuela by a counter-project from the constitution down to the every day practices of average citizens (Gibbs 2006, p. 269). In Turkey, even though the poor majority suffered the consequences of neoliberal transformation, the majority of the population due to right-wing inclination and increasing conservatism did not oppose the neoliberal policies of the AKP. However, had the AKP had pursued neoliberal policies without generating social policies, it would face formidable hurdles in achieving electoral majority. Therefore, social policies played an important role in electoral success of the AKP. Persistently using the discourse of "serving the people"[66], Erdoğan enhanced the impact and success of social policies, which in return granted him political dominance.

Even if different in their formulation and structure, both leaders pursued social policies for the empowerment of the poor. To show how they formulated their social policies in the areas of education, health and housing and infrastructure, next section presents the analysis and comparison of these social policies.

[66] http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/32879/president-erdogan-shares-iftar-dinner-with-citizens-at-the-presidential-complex.html

4.2.1. Education Policies

Following the neoliberal transformation and decentralization, due to cutbacks of funds and privatizations of the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal approach towards public education resulted in the exclusion of large sectors of the population (Duffy 2015, p. 656). Under the framework of neoliberal agenda for education, public expenditure on education was reduced, subsidies and supports for non-government providers of education were provided and private education, in which is formulated as user-pays or private contributions to costs, was promoted. This model of education based on the idea of human capital theory, which constructs public educational expenditure as an investment with a measurable economic 'rate of return'; hence, the model was justified by the claim of introducing or increasing private competition within former state monopolies in order to improve the quality of these services and expand access to and enrolment in education (Griffiths 2010, p. 609). Moreover, the neoliberal education model was consonant with the terms of the World Bank and IMF programs which obliged Latin American states to reduce government spending, to increase budget surpluses and savings in addition to imposing export-led economic growth as a universal model for all states. The main problem of this neoliberal education model was its negligence for persistent and growing social, economic and educational inequalities linked to the application of market principles to social life (Griffiths 2010, p. 610). Therefore, unprecedented consequence of neoliberal model was that many poor families could not afford to send their children to school and thousands were excluded from the system in Venezuela (Gibbs 2006, p. 273). Even though not much severely in Venezuela, similar consequences of neoliberal restructuring created losers craving for government support for education in Turkey as well.

Chávez's government presented full-fledged education programs or in other words education missions to tackle with the root problem of access to education. These initiatives were designed to offer an alternative vision and approach to the neoliberal model in accordance with broad Bolivarian socialist transformation. The Bolivarian Constitution in 1999 and Organic Law of Education in 2009 redefined the right of education with a democratic commitment to provide substantially deeper and broader conception of 'Education for All' that includes children and adults, driven by a constitutionally enshrined understanding of education as a human right in and of itself (Griffiths 2010, pp. 611, 618, Duffy 2015, pp. 657-658). Therefore, new approach to education opposed commodification of education and determined to provide education for all citizens, especially access a university system to over half a million high school graduates who were unable to access university education, which had become increasingly exclusive (Gibbs 2006, p. 273).

Since he came to power, Chávez supported access to free universal, public education at all levels and for all sectors of society, thus he introduced education missions in 2003 (Duffy 2015, pp. 656-657, Ellner 2011, p. 429). The first of education missions was the Mission Robinson literacy campaign, launched in July 2003. Mission Ribas was the second mission projecting increase in high school literacy and Mission Sucre later that year was designed for equivalency undergraduate education. Thanks to Mission Robinson, about 1.3 million people became literate by reducing 90% of Venezuela's illiteracy rate and as a consequence UNESCO declared Venezuela as free of illiteracy in 2005 (Gonzalez 2014, p. 104, Duffy 2015, p. 657, Gibbs 2006, p. 274). Like Mission Robinson, Mission Ribas and Sucre also became successful. By 2008,

571,917 students were studying in Mission Sucre, with enabling 30,000 graduates between 2003 and 2008. By 2009, over 600,000 students had graduated from the Ribas Mission (Ellner 2011, p. 432). Education missions significantly increased enrolment in higher education in general by raising the number from 700,000 in 1998 to over 2 million in 2008 (Duffy 2015, p. 657). With 193% increase since 1999, since 83% of eligible citizens enrolled in higher education, Venezuela had the world's 5th highest rate of university enrolment.

Instead of replacing them, the missions were found as parallel structures to existing educational institutions in order to set existing educational institutions aside since neoliberal opposition forces and neoliberal logic dominated them. In addition to increasing literacy, the main target of the missions was raising awareness for the participatory democracy, which was also a pedagogical project to cultivate the exercise of protagonist participation[67] (Duffy 2015, p. 650). Besides taking active part in the formulation and delivery of social policy, the formerly excluded and marginalized groups were expected to have a say in the execution of education policy as well. Therefore, not only by access to higher education that they were devoid of, new education policy had the intention of democratizing the education system by moving beyond state-financed compensatory welfare schemes.

In contrast to Chávez's pioneering efforts for the education system in Venezuela, Erdoğan and the AKP government provided limited benefits to the poor but increased opportunity structures for the access to education. Starting from 2003-2004, the

[67] To diffuse the idea of participatory democracy and democratic education, students were given the chance of co-construct the curriculum. Moreover, practical classes lead students to conduct community projects in which students take active part in their communities (Duffy 2015, pp. 659-660, Griffiths 2010, p. 617).

Ministry of Education has distributed elementary school textbooks to all students free of charge (The Ministry of Family and Social Policies (MFSP) Annual Report of 2011, pp. 123, 125, Annual Report of 2015, pp. 124, 126). Moreover, to support children of poor families, the government has provided school supplies, clothing, meals and grants. Even though these aids were limited acts in terms of poverty alleviation, they helped poor families whose children cannot continue their education as the families could not pay for school supplies and cover educational expenses (Buğra & Keyder 2005, p. 36). Similarly, student loans and scholarships for higher education have risen from 240 TL to 400. In addition, in 2012 the government abolished the tuition fee for public universities, which also facilitated the access to higher education. Besides scholarships for higher education, the AKP government has accomplished constructing 101 dormitory projects out of 178 by 2015 (MFSP Annual Report of 2015, p. 127).

While the Chávez government in 1999 initiated the project of converting primary and secondary schools into 'Bolivarian Schools', which would improve pre-school and basic education with a longer school day that includes cultural activities and sport, nutrition including breakfast, lunch and an afternoon snack, with 8-year compulsory primary education that was initiated in Turkey in 1997, the AKP government also provided lunch to poor students besides transportation to schools (Gibbs 2006, p. 274).[68] However, in 2012, the AKP government in order to increase demand for religious vocational schools changed the compulsory education system from 8-year

[68] To increase enrollment rate in the primary education two governments followed similar steps in their efforts to support excluded sections society for schooling. They have provided meals for school students, scholarships, and improved public transport to get students to and from school (Griffiths 2010, p. 613). In Venezuela mostly the poor and the nation's Indigenous peoples have benefited from the government support. Both governments significantly increased government expenditure on the education.

compulsory education to 12-year compulsory education with three separate graduates known as 4+4+4.

Despite education policies of two leaders were beneficial for the poor majority, both new education system suffered the same problem: vulnerability to indoctrination and politicization. To develop their particular vision of the ideal society or instill ideology into the citizens regimes use education; hence there is no such thing as a neutral educational process (Duffy 2015 pp. 651, 654). However, both governments intensively endeavored imposing their values- socialist and conservative or religious- to the people. While the Chávez government officially declared the political role of public schooling in socialist transformation of the country, the AKP government and Erdoğan constantly expressed their intention to create a pious youth or generation.[69] Similar to Erdoğan's statement, following Chávez's reelection in 2006, Education Minister, Adán Chávez, stated 'the transformation of the education system is inextricably linked to the construction of socialism for the twenty-first century' in 2007 (Griffiths 2010, p. 615).

Deliberate actions of two governments targeting further politicization of education caused reactions and accusations. Ideological education imposed on all students in the education missions through compulsory weekly classes in socio-political studies led to accusations of Cuba-style government indoctrination to enforce hegemony even though the government claimed having the intention of counter-balancing the hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism and promoting critical revolutionary education

[69] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dindar-genclik-yetistirecegiz-19825231
Up until recently, Erdoğan continuously emphasizes his intention of creating conservative society and youth.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-muslim-family-should-engage-in-birth-control-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=99840&NewsCatID=338

to foster participatory democracy and democratic socialism (Duffy 2015, p. 662, Griffiths 2010, pp. 611, 615-616).[70] For instilling conservative and religious values in new generations the AKP government has deliberately pursued the strategy of converting public high schools into religious vocational schools, which would raise a pious generation.[71] However, AKP's efforts for a conservative society ignite the discontent of the secular bloc aroused by the gradual eradication of secular values and imposition of religious/conservative values on the society.

4.2.2. Health Policies

Access to healthcare services in two countries became more troublesome following the neoliberal restructuring. Therefore, both leaders and their governments to fulfill the needs of poor majority addressed the problem of healthcare by transforming the terms of health services. Due to socialist ideology, Chávez took the issue beyond the delivery of services and redefined healthcare as an arena for active citizenship and framed healthcare in the constitution as both a right and a responsibility within the framework of the Bolivarian Revolution (Gibbs 2006, p. 271). In the opposite manner, with a leaning towards neoliberalism, Erdoğan's government favored limited but effective social support for the poor in healthcare arena.

The neoliberal reforms conducted during the 1990s both by Pérez and Caldera governments led to decentralization of healthcare. Along with fiscal reduction,

[70] Steve Ellner (2011) stresses that political content of the social programs endangers basic principles of liberal democracy by violating the separation of powers and the divorce between the public and private spheres (Ellner 2011, pp. 431-432). Even though Maura Duffy opposes Ellner's claim by presenting new education model as counterbalancing the hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism and highlights its critical credentials, politicization of education incited further polarization of Venezuelan society (Griffiths 2010, p. 617).

[71] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/imam-hatibe-ilgi-11-yilda-7-kat-artti-27706500

regional authorities poorly financed and managed health services (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 817). Due to neoliberal restructuring and marketization of health, the poor were disproportionately negatively affected. Consequently by the late 1990s class-based health disparities were enormous and by 1997, 73% of total health expenditure in Venezuela was private and the poor majority could not afford healthcare expenses.[72] Therefore, Chávez administration prioritized providing healthcare to those who have been previously excluded, which includes most of the 70% of the country's population living in poverty (Gibbs 2006, pp. 271-272). Once the urgent needs of the most marginalized sectors of the population, including the ones who never had healthcare in their lives, were met, the government would attempt to develop an integrated, accessible and sustainable system for the whole country. Similar to education, former understanding of the health designating health as a commodity to be exchanged in the market was challenged by Chávez government redefined healthcare as a fundamental right to be provided by the state (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 818, Gibbs 2006, p. 271).

To enable access to healthcare, Chávez government introduced the health mission *Barrio Adentro* (Into the Barrios). This mission was launched in April 2003 with 58 physicians, but in 2005 more than 20 000 Cuban doctors, dentists, health workers and physical trainers were working in the program (Gibbs 2006, p. 272, Gonzalez 2014, p. 117). Health services of Cuban doctors were essential for the mission work because Venezuelan doctors, who were indisputably members of the upper-middle class and

[72] Poor majority of Venezuela usually reside in neighborhoods (*Barrios*). These neighborhoods have historically been deficient of basic services of the state. Moreover, people living in the neighborhoods have suffered from problems with health services and with general infrastructure as most of the health facilities are placed in these barrios that have been chronically disadvantaged and overcrowded (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 827).

worked for the most part in the private sector, and the Venezuelan Medical Federation refused to take place in the mission (Gonzalez 2014, p. 103, Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 829). Therefore, Chávez government resorted to Cuban help for filling the gap Venezuelan doctors created. The Cuban doctors have provided health services especially to the poorest sections of the society, those residing in the barrios (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 829).

Apart from raising the budget for health, envisioning improvements in access to and utilization of health services, and achieving improvements in health indicators, *Barrio Adentro* mission fostered active community participation in provision of healthcare. While local families hosted Cuban doctors by providing accommodation, food and other medical staff; besides, a converted section of a family dwelling functioned as small clinics (Gibbs 2006, p. 272). Moreover, people of barrios directly work in Health committees, which serve as organizational mechanisms in primary health care delivery and management. Health committees are formed by 10 barrio residents chosen in an assembly of citizens and work with a popular health post (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 818, Gibbs 2006, p. 272).

Barrio Adentro mission became so successful that within its first 18 months, the health care was serviced to 17 million Venezuelans including those who received medical care for the first time in their lives. In addition, by 2006, the number of health committees registered reached a total of 8,519 (Mahmood et al. 2012, p. 818). Thanks to success of the mission, Chávez was praised by the director of the Pan American Health Organization for his leadership and achievements in health. The mission

besides enabling access to clinics supported the poor to purchase drugs at an 85% discount in government subsidized pharmacies (Gibbs 2006, p. 272).

Even though among the social missions, the health mission *Barrio Adentro* has been the most visible in terms of its achievements and its visibility gave advantage to Chávez in the 2004 presidential recall referendum, it still faced some challenges. Poor infrastructure and a negative attitude of Venezuelan doctors who do not accept the level of expertise of the Cubans as comparable to themselves created problems (Mahmood et al. 2012, pp. 818, 825-827, 830). Mirroring the social polarization, the mission induced intense opposition to the program among Chávez opponents. Nevertheless, despite problems and challenges, *Barrio Adentro* mission helped Chávez government to obtain electoral support in order to further push forward for socialist agenda.

Like Chávez government, health reforms yielded confidence boost and electoral support to the AKP. Just after the AKP came to power, it launched the Health Transformation Program known as Health Transition Project (HTP) in 2003 (Varol & Saka 2008, p. 29, Yılmaz 2013, pp. 56, 65, Hazama 2015, p. 37). The main target of this transformation was helping the poor for access to health care besides improving the quality of health services and reducing the inequalities in access to health care and utilization of health services (Varol & Saka 2008, p. 29). To reform healthcare, the government took serious steps and addressed the main problems of health services in Turkey such as access inequality, administrative inefficiency and low-quality care (Hazama 2015, p. 37). Similar to Chávez's efforts for decommodification of health care services and making access to health care services a citizenship right, the AKP

has formulated a new understanding of health similar to what Chávez asserted (Yılmaz 2013, p. 58).[73]

Governments in 1990s took some measures to increase the number of citizens accessing the healthcare especially by introducing the green card, which has been social assistance scheme offering free inpatient health care services for the very poor (Yılmaz 2013, pp. 60-61, 63). The main drive behind the distribution of the green card was complementing the three public insurance schemes which provided by the Social Insurance Institution (*Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, SSK*) for formal workers, the Retirement Fund for Civil Servants (*Emekli Sandığı, ES*) and the Pension Fund for the Self Employed (*Esnaf, Sanatkarlar ve Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sigortalar Kurumu*, BAĞKUR) (Yılmaz 2013, p. 60). These institutions were combining retirement pensions with health insurance extracted from employees and employers along with occupational status lines, without contribution of the government. However, due to high level of informal employment, Turkey's health care system failed to provide universal coverage; thus, the governments resorted to green card to balance the system by increasing the expenditure on the green card scheme which reached one-fourth of public expenditure on health care services in 2000 (Yılmaz 2013, p. 61). Nevertheless, the green card neither incorporated healthcare outsiders to the system nor did it solve the problem of discrepancy between publicly insured citizens and green card beneficiaries; it rather, placed the poor citizens at the bottom end of the stratified health system in Turkey (Yılmaz 2013, p. 63).[74]

[73] Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 37) defines decommodification as "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation".

[74] Even though public expenditure on green card increased significantly, before the AKP's introduction of health reform the World Bank reported that over one-third of citizens were not covered by any health insurance scheme, including the green card (Yılmaz 2013, p. 63).

To unify health schemes and establish a universal health insurance fund, in 2008, the AKP government replaced different reimbursement mechanisms of social security institutions by the General Health Insurance Scheme to ensure equity of access to services (Varol & Saka 2008, p. 30, Yılmaz 2013, p. 66, Hazama 2015, p. 37). Besides making primary health care services free of charge for the people even without a social security scheme, this new health system incorporated individuals below the age of eighteen to the health insurance scheme free of charge and since Turkey has considerable young population and the problem of child poverty, this provision was a bold step in terms of public access to healthcare (Varol & Saka 2008, p. 30).

Another advantage of the new system for the Turkish citizens was the integration of private hospitals into the public health insurance scheme, which facilitated citizens' access to the majority of private hospitals by paying an additional contributory payment for health care services and medication (Yılmaz 2013, pp. 66, 69, 71, Varol & Saka 2008, p. 30). In addition to private hospitals, patients were granted the right to obtain medicines from all private pharmacies instead of the limited number of specified pharmacies that had provided this service in the past (Varol & Saka 2008, p. 30). Moreover, in 2005, the coverage of the green card was extended to cover all health care expenditure of the poorest segments of the society. As a consequence, the reforms expanded the access of the lower income group to public health services significantly which in return contributed to electoral success of the AKP since the general public was content about the short term impact of the health reform (Yılmaz 2013, p. 67, Hazama 2015, p. 48).

Contrary to short term benefits, in the long term the reform led to unanticipated consequences for the poor majority due to neoliberal approach of the government towards the health issue. First, gradually the government has raised the contributory payments, which led to total revenue collected from them to triple between 2009 and 2010 with increasing the burden on the poor majority (Yılmaz 2013, p. 70).[75] Another problem the reform created was diverging the inequality from occupational basis to income rather than abolishing occupational status-based and income inequalities (Yılmaz, 2013, pp. 55-77, Hazama 2015, p. 37). Income differences in access to healthcare created an income-based differentiation among citizens in reaching hospitals. Since low-income citizens cannot afford additional payment in order to access private hospitals, the reform led to segregation of hospitals, as public hospitals for the poor and private hospitals for the middle and high-income citizens, and different quality of service for different income groups. Overall, new system has strengthened the stratification of access to health services and in the long run, benefited the middle and high-income citizens more even if in the beginning it favored the poor majority. Nevertheless, still health service satisfaction of the lower-income group is very high compared to pre-AKP period.

4.2.3. Housing, Food and other Services

The most vital area that brought the AKP electoral success is construction. Constructing bridges, highways, hospitals, and airports entitled the AKP government to instill the idea of the AKP fulfills its duties by serving the people unlike previous

[75] With rising contributory payments and additional payments of which the AKP government has failed to regulate and penalize, the state's subsidy of private hospital services served for the benefit of middle and high-income citizens rather than low-income citizens who cannot afford these services, thus the state spends more on health care services for the middle and high-income in comparison to low-income citizens (Yılmaz 2013, pp. 71-72).

governments, which got elected but failed to distribute prosperity. Achievements in the construction granted fame and electoral support for the AKP. Among the construction sites, the most visible and directly beneficial for the poor was housing.

To provide housing for the poor and middle income who cannot afford a home due to existing market conditions, Turkey's Mass Housing Administration (*Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı*- TOKİ) was established by the ANAP (the Motherland Party) in 1980s (Işıkkaya 2016, p. 316). Under the AKP government both the funds, field of activity and authority of TOKİ expanded. Since 2004, with reconfiguration of laws to increase TOKİ's powers, the gate was opened for TOKİ to get involved in the housing sector. Accordingly, thanks to increasing duties and authority, TOKİ was directly involved in the construction of social housing by providing between five and ten percent of all of housing in Turkey (Marschall et. al 2015, p. 3).

With expansion of authority and range of activities, TOKİ under the AKP government provided credits for 600,000 dwelling units between 2003 and 2014 in 81 provinces, 675 counties and 1,480 building sites; whereas, before the AKP from 1984 to 2002 TOKİ had provided credits for 940,000 dwelling units under the credits extended for cooperative housing (Isikkaya 2016, p. 322). Among these dwellings, 346,992 of them were constructed as social housing, 190,786 of them were for low and middle-income households -especially the urban poor- and 40,731 dwellings are produced in the transformation of squatter housing in Turkey (Isikkaya 2016, p. 322). These dwellings helped the poor- who cannot afford a house- to purchase the house through monthly payments like a tenant paying the rent.

Besides providing housing for the people, an increase in range of activities, especially the collaboration between local governments and TOKİ for large-scale infrastructural projects, allowed the AKP government to allocate resources through distributive politics under clientelism by providing jobs, contracts, and other selective incentives (Marschall et. al 2015, p. 3). Investment contracts play a key role in the patronage networks and private companies that sympathize with the governing party usually compete and are awarded the contracts as leaked phone conversations between conglomerate bosses demonstrated.[76] Therefore, TOKİ and the construction sector not only optimized the popularity of the AKP among the low-income and middle-income citizens, but also empowered the clientelist networks of the AKP.[77]

One paradox of the AKP's housing policy is urban transformation policy fostered in big cities of Turkey. Even though urban transformation project was at first initiated and justified by the discourse of rebuilding risky houses for protection against any possible earthquake, and upgrading the built environment and improving the living conditions of the poor, it diverged from its original target and turned into a rent project. Moreover, the project has led to the redevelopment of squatter settlements on the outskirts of the city and the enforced gentrification of its inner-city slums (Karaman 2013, p. 716). Consequently, even if the poor benefited from urban transformation in the short term, in the long term the project is expected to bring

[76] An economist, Mert Yıldız (2014) in his blog, Econoscale, manifests the centrality of Erdoğan in both Turkish economy and construction sector. For Yıldız, even though Erdoğan does not own any companies, still he strictly is involved in the Turkish economy. By taking construction decisions such as what to build or where to build including social housing, malls, the largest mosque in Turkey, the largest airport in the world, the largest hospital in the world, Erdoğan desires that his vision drives the economy. Moreover, Erdoğan also has a say on investment contracts as a selected number of private companies having organic ties with Erdoğan compete for and acquire the contracts. In addition, Erdoğan's obsession with economic growth and disdain for structural reforms has increased the importance of the construction sector, which has been the generator of growth. https://econoscale.wordpress.com/2014/03/09/erdoganomics-and-life-after-akp/

[77] Marschall et. al (2015) assert that TOKİ housing has significantly contributed to the AKP 's electoral success, which has had significant impact on the durability of the AKP as well.

devastation, due to problems of overpopulation, intense traffic, and destruction of green zones and water resources, to all and mostly to the poor majority.[78]

Chávez government also launched projects for construction especially in barrios with urgent needs. Chávez, with his strong ties with the military, incorporated the armed forces' men power and logistics to realize his first major social program, Plan Bolívar 2000, which was conducted in 1999-2001 (Lander & Navarrete 2007, p. 16, De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 420, Penfold-Becerra 2007, p. 70). This plan was a civil-military emergency program to repair and build roads, schools, clinics and hospitals in order to improve public infrastructure in the barrios. Moreover, the program targeted distributing food to remote areas of the country. Even though this program to some extent became successful with a significant social and political impact in the low-income sectors, due to problems of improvisation, lack of institutionalization and transparency, the program was accused of corruption (Lander & Navarrete 2007, pp.16-17). Therefore, the government introduced the mission of MERCAL (*Mercado de Alimentos*) in 2003 in order to continue distributing food. Mission MERCAL with its 15,000 retail outlets was designed to break the oligopoly control of the food industry and sustain the supply of quality, with the provision of low priced goods to low-income sectors across the nation (Lander & Navarrete 2007, p. 24, Ellner 2011, p. 432, Ellner 2010, p. 88). To sell state-subsidized products with around 30 to 40 per cent discounts, MERCAL has opened grocery stores and supermarkets in lower-class neighborhoods (Ellner 2011, p. 432).

[78] In Istanbul, in last two years 705 residences and 72 shopping centers have been constructed or their project has been launched. If the construction is officially allowed in the northern part of the city, the only green zone left, this will add 7.5 million people to Istanbul's population. Considering the tremendous rent potential and Erdoğan's obsession with construction and economic development, it is more likely that northern part of the city will be opened to construction.
http://t24.com.tr/haber/iki-yilda-705-rezidans-72-avm-iste-istanbulun-insaat-haritasi,342626

Along with the socialist vision and endogenous development desire of Chávez, the government fostered the creation of agricultural cooperatives. Agricultural cooperatives were strengthened by the land reform, which was legislated in 2001 and initiated in 2002. For Chávez, land reform was a compulsory action to take, as Venezuela was one of the countries with most unequal land distribution.[79] Following Chávez's electoral victory in 2006, land reform accelerated in response to the political opposition's increasingly militant stance against the government (Enríquez 2013, p. 620, De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 420). Especially, following Chávez's declaration of initiating the socialist project in 2005, the expropriations of private land began to gain in prominence over the use of public land for resettling families (Enríquez 2013, p. 620).[80] Even though with increasing oil revenue Chávez government pay full compensation to former owners stipulated by 2001 Land Law, still complications occurred as some peasants and landowners were killed during land seizure (De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 421).

Even though the original intention was the prevention of shortages and scarcities through encouraging self-sufficiency, bringing idle land into food production, fostering food production by state-managed farms and cooperatives, and distributing the productions at cheap rates in retail outlets of MERCAL, suppressing the prices at low rates to make them available to the poor resulted in unforeseen consequences and even the opposite of what was desired (De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 420).

[79] Venezuela's Gini Index for land was .88 in 1997 and 5% of the population owned 80% of private land (Enríquez 2013, p. 617, De Zoysa & Newman 2008, p. 420).

[80] The Land Law enabled the government to recover land from private sector and bestow to the landless and land-poor for food production. To resettle the families from squatters to recovered and expropriated lands to utilize for food production, Chávez government aimed at distributing the expropriated land; as a result, the government confiscated 5.5 million hectares of land from private owners between 2001 and 2010 (Enríquez 2013, pp. 621-622).

Prioritization of the interests of the poor over the others by introducing state subsidies and price controls created 'disloyal competition' with regard to private commercial interests (Ellner 2011, p. 432). Coupled with decreasing price of the oil, the state failed to alleviate significantly the ongoing shortages of basic commodities by subsidizing and controlling because when prices were set below production costs, sellers failed to keep the shelves stocked and even though official prices were low, the products were not accessible (Naím & Toro 2016).[81] As a consequence, all of Chávez government's efforts to suppress the prices for the sake of the poor backfired.[82]

4.3. Concluding Remarks for Socio-economic Policies

Social policies benefited the poor in the short term by improving living conditions. The achievements of social policies were associated with two leaders and generated a firm basis of public support and contributed to the electoral success of the leaders by opening the way of their dominance in the political arena. However, in the long term, even though the reasons differed in two countries, they disappointed the poor majority due to internal contradictions, problems and constraints. While Chávez's missions suffered from lack of organization and mismanagement due to improvised nature of them just to fulfill the urgent needs of the poor, the predominance of neoliberal inclination of the AKP occasionally contradicted with the interests of the poor by clouding the benefits provided by social policies.[83] Moreover, both prioritized

[81] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/venezuela-is-falling-apart/481755/

[82] Chronic shortages, a poor investment climate, and low productive capacity failing to keep pace with increasing demand paved the way for inflation, which reached 22.5 percent in 2007 and 30.9 percent in 2008 (Ellner 2010, p. 88).

[83] Mike Gonzalez (2014) contends that the missions were flagship programs but they were born out of urgent necessities rather than meticulously planned projects or parts of social welfare strategy. In addition, even though some missions worked well at the beginning like Barrio Adentro, due to

quantity over quality in the achievements of the social policies. Even if the social policies brought public support in the short term, nepotism and clientelist networks curtailed the benefits for the poor. Nevertheless, with media support for the both leaders, the political support of the poor majority persisted strong until the global economic crisis unfolded in 2007-2008 and 2014 and hit developing countries really hard and hampered both government's abilities to sustain social policies benefiting the poor majority.

4.4. Populism and Policy Preferences in Political Domain: Political Transformation and Democratic Decay

Following the electoral successes thanks to growing oil revenues financing social missions in Venezuela and social policies of Erdoğan and AKP touching upon crucial needs of poor majority, the leaders pursued policies in political realm aimed at transforming society along with their political worldview. The discourse used by these leaders amplified already existing polarization and democratic support along with certain values such as support for strong leader held by people of Venezuela and Turkey. Both leaders utilized discourses and narrative capabilities to build their personal charisma and solidify their electoral basis. Therefore, in this section, I am going to analyze how the leaders centralized power and dominated politics through policies of polarization, instilling new political vision in the country, institutional changes in democratic institutions in order to distort checks and balances and

mismanagement and corruption gradually their achievements have vanished. The problem of organization -as the missions were created as parallel to existing state institutions and they were not coordinating but rather competing-, lack of monitoring of the activities and objectives were the main factors dooming the missions to the failure (Gonzalez 2014, pp. 104-105).

centralize their political power, and harassment of the opposition, especially the media.

4.4.1. Rewards of Social Policies: Economic Voting

Neoliberal reforms applied in Venezuela and Turkey during late 1980s and 1990s were designed with the high hopes in greater economic stability, growth and gradual elimination of social inequalities thanks to first two. However, erosion of social welfare led poor majority of two countries to be susceptible to social policies. Aware of socio-economic necessities of the poor majority, as they were both one of them in the past, Chávez and Erdoğan formulated social policies addressing their economic deficiencies. Achievements of social policies gave both leaders boost of confidence for realization of their vision and the chance of consolidating their power along with subsequent electoral successes.

Impoverished by neoliberal restructuring, underprivileged sectors of the population, specifically workers in the informal economy, were the main targets of social policies of two leaders (Ellner 2011, p. 421). Through social missions Chávez incorporated these excluded and underprivileged groups into the political, economic and cultural life and gave them have say in decision-making, especially in the local arena (Ellner 2011, p. 421). Raising political awareness among the excluded groups of *Punto Fijo* Pact through participatory democracy, Chávez mobilized these groups and obtained their electoral support. Even though Chávez drew significant support from the poor who are economically and politically excluded especially in 1998 elections, the poor was not the only group supporting Chávez in subsequent elections (Lupu 2010, pp. 9,

26). Various socioeconomic groups, primarily the poor and the middle class, supported Chávez in later elections.[84] Socially heterogeneous and multiclass character of Chávez's support base is one of the main reasons why he was called as populist (Weyland 2003b, p. 836).

Even though multiclass base of Chávez included some wealthy sectors, the very rich opposed him disproportionately and governed the opposition front challenging Chávez government several times. Socialist vision of Chávez incited further polarization followed by violent protests and suppressions (Griffiths 2010, p. 617). Nevertheless, Chávez continued acquiring support from diverse sections of the society.

Similar to Chávez, the AKP has been supported by a broad coalition of the poor, the middle classes, and some wealthy sectors.[85] AKP's first electoral achievement was a product of moderation in rhetoric towards democracy and attitudes towards secularism, and strong bid of the AKP for Turkey's EU membership (Çagaptay 2002, pp. 44-47, Çarkoğlu 2002, pp. 30-31, Öniş 2012, p. 139).[86] Thanks to move towards

[84] Noam Lupu (2010) explains the appeal of Chávez's policies to various socio-economic groups. For Lupu, Chávez constituted his multiclass base by maintaining a nationalist, antioligarchic rhetoric, redistribution and a certain amount of clientelism for the lower classes while he appealed middle-class voters by pursuing some broader redistributive and statist developmental policies, including nationalizations of utilities, benefiting these sectors (Lupu 2010, p. 26).

[85] Scholars analyze the electoral base of the AKP within the perspective of center-periphery of Edward Shils introduced to Turkish politics by Şerif Mardin (1973). Mardin basically argues that Turkish politics inherited the political structure of center-periphery from the Ottoman Empire. This dichotomy persisted in economic and cultural spheres as well. Polarization along with secularist bureaucracy ruling the country and conservative periphery challenging the dominance of the secularist elite endured through Turkish Republic. This polarization played an important part in electoral power of the AKP as Erdoğan and his party built their appeal on conservative right-wing electorate on this historical polarization. Once they came to power, they further bolstered polarization to secure the support of the conservative periphery to challenge the dominance of secularist elite.

[86] Even though religiously conservative constituency of the AKP was skeptical towards the EU membership, the AKP was committed to EU membership aspiration (Çarkoğlu 2002, pp. 31, 39-40). The AKP's strong bid for EU membership was motivated by two factors. First, the AKP aimed mitigating fears of religious extremism of secularist elite and electorate by seeking EU candidacy,

center, the AKP was able to attract a diverse array of voters including Islamists, rural nationalists and moderate urban voters (Başlevent et al. 2005, p. 547, Çagaptay 2002, pp. 42-43). Moreover, failure of center-right and left parties to generate economic development during 1990s by inefficient management and corruption charges, and economic meltdown in February 2001 following the political quarrel between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit frustrated the middle classes (Çagaptay 2002, pp. 42-43). Economic conditions impelled voters to search for a new alternative government, which would pursue their economic interests.

Voting on the basis of economic performance evaluations led scholars to search for the economic factors affecting electorate's voting preferences. According to economic voting theory, there are two main approaches for economic voting, the retrospective and prospective pocketbook/sociotropic (Başlevent et al. 2005, pp. 548-549, Lewis- Beck & Stegmaier 2008, p. 303). While retrospective pocketbook voting signifies voting based on individuals' assessments of their personal (household) economic situations in the recent past, retrospective sociotropic voting refers to casting ballot along with assessment of incumbent government's performance for the national economy (Başlevent et al. 2005, p. 549, Çarkoğlu 2008, p. 325). Therefore, in both variants of retrospective voting, the decisions of electorate are determined by the evaluations of economic performance rather than economic policy proposals and promises. Prospective voting, on the contrary, is casting ballot on the basis of future economic prospects and promises rather than the assessments of the past performance. In this fashion, prospective pocketbook involves individual economic expectations

which would strengthen Turkey's democracy (Çagaptay 2002, pp. 46-47). Second, the EU-Turkey cooperation in economic front was crucial for the AKP to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding Turkish economy's direction and potential for the future (Çarkoğlu 2002, pp. 39-40, Çagaptay 2002, p. 47).

whereas prospective sociotropic voting depends on the national prospects (Başlevent et al. 2005, p. 549).

Economic considerations were decisive in 2002 elections of Turkey as voters were adversely affected by disastrous economic performance of the incumbent parties and punished them with retrospective pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations (Başlevent et al. 2005, 560). In addition to ideological considerations with right-wing/conservative replacement, prospective pocketbook and sociotropic assessments contributed to electoral success of the AKP.[87] The AKP as a new party differed from corrupted right-wing parties of the 1990s and offered just order and social justice. Therefore, the AKP projected a better economic performance and more convenient candidate for the sake of national economy.

While the parties in the incumbent coalition government during the 2001 crisis associated with the crisis, the AKP was a newly established party with a clean slate. Accordingly, by paying the price of their mismanagement of the economy, three members of the coalition government were left out of the parliament granting the AKP a comfortable majority in the parliament after 2002. Another advantage the AKP enjoyed just after assuming power was the economic reform program implemented in 2001 by the coalition government under the leadership of Kemal Derviş. The reform program fostered fiscal and monetary discipline coupled with strong regulatory measures aimed toward the banking and the financial system (Öniş 2012, p. 139). The

[87] As Ali Çarkoğlu (2002) identifies in the November 2002 elections, the AKP received the votes of religious, young, shantytown dwellers who do not support EU membership (Çarkoğlu 2002, p. 39, Başlevent et al. 2005, 560). The bid for EU membership thusly was not for the electorate but for the secular opposition skeptical about religious background of the AKP, especially due to challenging acts of its predecessor, the RP, towards secularism and democratic regime.

AKP capitalized on stronger economic structure consolidated by the reform program without bearing the cost.

Economic voting was confirmed in the 1998 elections as well. Kurt Weyland (2003) by running a statistical analysis of pre-election survey verifies that people's subjective economic assessments did indeed have an important impact on the 1998 election (Weyland 2003b, p. 825). Similar to Turkish voters punishing the incumbent parties for their economic performance and opting for the AKP as promising alternative, Venezuelan voters supported Chávez by negative retrospective evaluations and optimistic prospective expectations (Weyland 2003b, p. 825). Discontent with economic conjunctures motivated the electorate search for better alternatives for the future. Along with the disappointment by traditional parties' failure to find cures for the lingering economic problems, with hopes for future improvements in the economy and their daily lives, Venezuelan voters supported Chávez at the polls (Weyland 2003b, pp. 831-832, 836). Therefore, economic assessments, especially sociotropic prospective evaluations, remarkably explain the first electoral success of Chávez (Lewis- Beck & Stegmaier 2008, p. 311).[88]

Similar to the 2002 elections of Turkey, economic considerations played an important role in voter preferences of the 2007 general elections. As Ali Çarkoğlu (2008) analyzes the determinants of voting in the elections, both retrospective and prospective sociotropic evaluations occupied central place in voter decisions along

[88] Even though Weyland offers an analysis based on the economic voting, essentially he opposes the causal mechanism proposed by the economic voting literature claiming that people's prospective assessments, which reflect the objective probabilities of future developments, drive their electoral choice. Instead, Weyland argues that psychological drives, particularly strong loss-aversion, as people deliberately avoided the idea of further deterioration and hold on to the belief of salvation by a charismatic leader who would take bold measures to overcome the crisis, led Venezuelan voters to support Chávez. Therefore, since the people are motivated by subjective and unrealistic drives rather than objective assessment of future probabilities, Weyland opposes assumption of economic voting literature and proposes a more complex causal argument combining economic and psychological motives (Weyland 2003b, pp. 826, 838-839, 844).

with ideological and ethnic aspects. Concerning the sociotropic assessments, the AKP constituency differs from other parties with their positive and optimistic economic evaluations for the state of economy. While deteriorating future evaluations of the economy raise the likelihood of support for the opposition, ameliorating assessments increase the support for the incumbent AKP (Çarkoğlu 2008, p. 335). Rather than retrospective and prospective pocketbook voting, sociotropic concerns prevail in economic voting because voters typically hold the government responsible for economic well being of the nation instead of their personal finances (Lewis- Beck & Stegmaier 2008, p. 303). Therefore, it is not surprising that Çarkoğlu detects prospective pocketbook evaluations are insignificant in differentiating all party constituencies.

From their election up until 2008 financial crisis, both Chávez and Erdoğan governments enjoyed favorable consequences of economic boom. Their rise intersected with concurrent economic conditions facilitating the success of their economic projections. As a major oil producer, skyrocketing oil prices starting with 2004 led the Venezuelan economy grew by over 18 percent in 2004, about 10 percent in 2005 and 2006, 8.2 percent in 2007, and 4.8 percent in 2008 (Pérez 2013, pp. 66-67). Even though Turkish economy did not directly benefited from changing terms of international economy, as Venezuela did due to rising commodity prices, indirectly Turkish economy benefited from favorable global liquidity environment (Öniş 2012, p. 139).[89] Until 2008, exceptionally favorable conditions such as record capital and trade flows, low interest rates, and strong demand for emerging market assets

[89] Domestic factors also contributed to the AKP's economic success, especially low inflation, which rendered the growth environment more robust and sustainable besides the AKP to appeal to middle and lower income groups. During the 1980s and 1990s, those income groups mostly suffered from high and chronic inflation; thus, combined with high growth rate, low inflation boosted the AKP's electoral fortunes (Öniş 2012, p. 140).

financed Turkish economic boom as Turkey attracted large inflows of short-term and long-term foreign capital, along with domestic demand-driven growth (Aytaç & Öniş 2014, p. 53). Thanks to both domestic and international environment, the AKP achieved substantial economic success by reducing the rate of poverty from 27 percent in 2002 to 18 percent in 2009 and concomitantly improving the GDP per capita, which dramatically increased from $3492 in 2002 to $10,067 in 2010 (Öniş 2012, p. 140). In addition, under the AKP government, Turkish economy grew around 6 percent in 2002, 5 in 2003, 9 in 2004, 8 in 2005, 6.8 in 2006, 4.6 in 2007 according to the World Bank data.

High growth trajectory in both countries enabled Chávez and Erdoğan governments to increase social spending in the areas of health, education and housing. Thanks to increasing oil wealth, Chávez implemented social programs addressing the needs of the poorest sections, as well as the middle class, and promoting political participation while the AKP's social initiatives were limited in scope and selective but effective. Both governments used a variety of formal and informal redistributive mechanisms along with improving the provision of public services, both at the level of the local and national governments, to raise the living standards of the middle and poorer segments of society which translated into electoral support for them (Öniş 2012, pp. 137, 141, Zúquete 2008, 93).[90]

Apart from contributing to their electoral success, social policies and economic performance distorted the perception of national economy by the supporters of two leaders. Even though 2008 financial crisis hit two countries hard, both leaders easily

[90] For Ziya Öniş (2012), redistributive politics of the AKP through formal and informal mechanisms to enlarge and sustain its electoral base differentiate the party from other neoliberal parties conducting social policies.

manipulated their constituency to persuade them the national economy is doing well.[91] Their supporters were already inclined to believe in what they have been told because of indoctrination by partisan media and education besides politicization through social missions or religious networks. Accordingly, individuals participated in social missions in Venezuela expressed greater support for the president besides stronger belief in the national economy doing well (Pérez 2013, pp. 68, 75). Pérez (2013) finds strong connection between support for the president and positive evaluations of the national economy. Pérez asserts that individuals evaluating the national economic conditions as "very good" approve of the president's job by nearly 50 points higher than individuals who believe the economy is doing very poorly. Moreover, Pérez finds out that the poorest Venezuelans approve of the president's performance by nearly 15 points higher than the wealthiest citizens (Pérez 2013, p. 69).

Even though through social policies both leaders touched the lives of the majority and obtained the support of non-partisan electorate, dependence on oil revenue of Venezuela and favorable economic conditions of Turkey put achievements in jeopardy.[92] With declining oil prices, Chávez's Bolivarian revolution has been challenged by rising crime, daunting economic deterioration, and especially erosion of purchasing power due to skyrocketing inflation (Pérez 2013, p. 76). Global

[91] Due to financial crisis and declining oil prices starting in 2008, the Venezuelan economy has faced catastrophe. The Venezuelan economy began to slow in 2008 and turned negative in 2009 until 2011. Moreover, accompanying high levels of inflation eroded purchasing power (Pérez 2013, p. 67). Turkish economy also began to struggle. Turkish economy grew only 0.65 percent while it contracted around 5 percent in 2009. Even though growth rate raised around 9 percent in 2010 and 2011, adverse effects of financial crisis have still subverted Turkish economy recently.

[92] Weyland (2003b, p. 828) claims that Chávez did not bring any improvement and material benefits to the large mass of the population. His contention, even though it was valid at that time, undeniably was mistaken because Chávez introduced some 25 missions offering a wide array of services in the fields of education, health, nutrition, the environment, sports, culture, and housing, besides targeted programs for indigenous rights and services for street children, adolescents, and mothers at risk starting in 2003 (Pérez 2013, p. 69).

financial crisis of 2008 was a litmus test for the AKP and Erdoğan as well. Taking into consideration the surpassing economic pragmatism of the AKP electorate over ideological predispositions, the slight victory of Erdoğan with 51. 95 percent of the votes in the first direct presidential election and the electoral decline of the AKP in June 2015 elections were not surprising. Likewise, Chávez confronted drastic declines in his popularity. However, both leaders were able to hold on to their power and preserve their hegemony over politics thanks to their populist appeal.

4.5. Sources of Populist Appeal

Essential sources of Erdoğan and Chávez's populist appeal have been their charismatic authority, use of populist discourse and their formulation and exercising mechanisms of direct democracy in accord with radical and conservative democracy to solidify the partisanship of their electorate.

4.5.1. Charisma and Authority

The term charisma in political theory builds upon Max Weber's notion barrowed from the bible. By clarifying from religious connotations, Weber introduced charisma to the political domain and to the study of power and leadership (Zúquete 2008, p. 95). Nevertheless, charisma as a political term combines leadership skills with supernatural or superhuman powers, either the leader believed to have or attributed by the followers (Merolla & Zechmeister 2011, p. 31). Moreover, politics are not totally divorced from religion. Populist movements have quasi-religious dimension and

populist leaders resort to religious discourse to further boost their charisma and reinforce their leadership. Therefore, in the study of populist appeal, charisma explains a lot why and how populist leaders rise.

In the eyes of their electorate and party members, the leader has exceptional abilities, even God given blessing, which make them deserving for leadership. They do not have ordinary powers accessible to everybody; rather, they have peculiar qualifications to be elected as the leader. These exceptional abilities and qualifications justify the rule of the leader because by extraordinary, quasi-divine character and skills the leader offers solutions to society's deepest problems through radical change (Weber 1958, p. 245). Consequently, for Weber, charismatic mode of linkage between the leader and the electorate emerges under exceptional conditions of economic and political crises (Hawkins 2003, pp. 1138-1139, Merolla & Zechmeister 2011, pp. 31-32). This charismatic mode of linkage also justifies the personalization of politics because since there is direct relationship between the leader and voters, this relationship should be unmediated by parties or other institutions. Therefore, presidential candidates give weight to personalistic features in their presidential campaigns instead of clarifying the content of their program and stages of radical changes. In parliamentary systems parties also campaign by emphasizing the personality of the leader.

As anticipated by Weber, both Erdoğan and Chávez arose when there were extraordinary conditions, economic and political crises, granting them charismatic authority to challenge the established political structure and forge new political structure by instilling their ideology in the society. Their charisma emanated from

glorification and victimization at the same time. They were glorified as a success story of a common man since their popular image of being “someone who is just like us” disseminated over and over by the media (Zúquete 2008, p. 100). Both leaders as commoners of their barrios arose as a common man and thusly experienced the daily struggles of common men. Besides, social programs, mainly health care and education programs increased their lower class support and contributed to their charisma as poor-friendly leaders. Coming from the ordinary people, both leaders underlined that they were serving “the people” instead of protecting interests of corrupt elite.

The origins of the leaders mirrored in their discourse when they address to the constituency. Both identified themselves with the excluded, the downtrodden, and the poor; and with their life stories they claimed that they had genuine understanding of and empathy with the struggle and the hardships that the common citizens must endure to survive (Zúquete 2008, p. 99). Their origin also echoed in their rhetorical style. Apart from being good orator, both leaders were plainspoken, direct and when they counter their enemies they were relentless and crude. Moreover, when they address their electorate they use “serving to the people” discourse to gather their sympathy and to accuse the opposition for self-serving.

Serving to the people discourse is convincing for their electorate because they suffered from the same problems of the excluded and because they defended the interests of the people they faced opposition. Both leaders claimed to be sacrificing themselves for their cause and paying the price of their struggle for the well being of

their people by imprisonment.[93] Their imprisonment gave them a valid justification for playing the victimization card for their electorate besides facilitating their rise as the leader in leftist and religious movements since it boosted their charisma and respect for their authority. Victimization rendered concomitant glorification because they were sanctified for their faith and sacrifice for their mission.

Glorification and sacralization of the leader goes hand in hand with the development of the perception and representation of his leadership as a "missionary" one. As Zúquete (2008) argues populist politics contains missionary characteristics. Zúquete defines missionary politics as "a characteristic form of political religion that has at its center a charismatic leader who leads a chosen people gathered into a moral community struggling against all-powerful and conspiratorial enemies, and engaged in a mission toward redemption and salvation." Therefore, by fusing populism with religious connotations, the populist leader attains a mythic figure with a redemptive mission (Zúquete 2008, p. 91). Politics goes beyond of ordinary politics and turn into no holds barred war to achieve new society.

In this mission of creating new society along with ideological lines, the leader identifies with the people and claims to be the embodiment of national will. Because the leader is a missionizing figure, he will defend the interests of the people against the corrupt opposition and will save the nation. Serving to the people discourse reinforces the leader's claim of being the embodiment of national will. Attacks on the

[93] José Pedro Zúquete (2008, p. 98) depicts Chávez as someone who Chávez as an exemplary figure, a moral archetype. Chávez presents an image of someone who has always lived for his ideal, continually struggling for his cause, and who has made great sacrifices to defend his homeland. Chávez in his portrayal transcends being an ordinary politician and turn into father of the country and self-sacrificing son of Venezuela for the sake and well-being of his country. Consequently, Chávez's discourse of sacrifice for the country is imbued with a model of patriotism, which also promotes his leadership.

leader become attacks on the people (Zúquete 2008, p. 100). The leader is equated with the people thusly the opposition is corrupt and illegitimate, and any means (including violence) can be legitimately employed against them because the leader embodies the popular will and the opposition disregards this fact (Hawkins 2003, p. 1140). The leader and his camp inclined to think that they had every right to suppress the opposition and legitimacy to harass the opposition as long as they sustained the electoral support of the people. The victims of this harassment became the media, judges and prominent businessmen.

Another tactic shared by these populist leaders was defying and mitigating the critiques by depicting and accusing the opposition as "enemies of the people". This discourse concomitantly renders them a cloak of protection from critics for the policy failures of the government as well as delineating the populist camp.[94] When there is a policy failure, corruption charges or any act against the interest of the people, both leaders blame the enemies of the people. Moreover, both leaders accuse the opposition by treason because they represent the national interest and the opposition does not comply. By identifying any opposition with treason or enmity, they deny the opposition's right to exist, which is indispensible for liberal democracy.

In the process of creating new society both leaders constantly referred to the creation of new Venezuela and Turkey. New Turkey and Venezuela entailed both rupture with

[94] Charisma of Erdoğan and Chávez explains how two leaders were able to avoid the blame for negative impact of global financial crisis triggered in 2008 but their successors not. Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (2011, pp. 32, 43) reveal that individuals holding greater perceptions of charisma are less likely to blame the leader for policy failures, at least in the short term. Moreover, even though the crisis grant enormous power to the leader due to his charisma, failure to deliver benefits gradually erodes power and charisma of the leader (Merolla & Zechmeister 2011, p. 33). As individuals hold on to charisma of the leader by abstaining from performance evaluations, it takes time to blame the leader for the poor performance. Therefore, they conclude that charisma provides a shield against accusations of poor leadership for a short time period and the charismatic leader's fall from grace becomes slower compared to the decline of a "normal" president.

the existing political system and also selected references to the past. While Chávez inspired by Simon Bolívar and his redemption ambition, Erdoğan glorified the Ottoman era (Sanoja 2009, p. 399, Sylvia & Danopoulos 2003, p. 71).[95] To associate rebuilding the countries with the past and to reinforce the connection with the mythic past, both leaders chose to name construction projects and programs after historical figures (Zúquete 2008, pp. 108-109). For instance, Erdoğan and the AKP named the third bridge in Istanbul as Yavuz Sultan Selim who was the ninth Sultan of the Ottoman Empire and Osman Gazi, who was the founder of the Ottoman Dynasty, bridge located at the Gulf of Izmit. In similar fashion, Chávez gave names of historical figures such as Zamora to land reform, Robinson (pseudonym of Venezuelan philosopher Simón Rodríguez) to literacy mission, and Ribas (José Félix Ribas) to education mission (Zúquete 2008, p. 108). Moreover, anniversaries with historical references were reloaded with ideological connotations and significance. While Erdoğan frequently pointed at 2023, the 100th anniversary of Turkish Republic, as the AKP's aim to remain in power and revised the date to 2071 (1000th anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert which opened the way of Anatolia's Turkification), Chávez has proclaimed his intention to remain in power until 2021, the 200th anniversary of Carabobo which was the battle that Simon Bolívar's decisive victory led to the independence of Venezuela (Zúquete 2008, p. 108). Thereby, both leaders established a link between the past and present to sustain their charismatic authority and legitimize their political transformation.

[95] Inspiration of Chávez by Simón Bolívar was not new. Bolivarianism was the political thought of the military movement MBR-200 in 1990s before Chávez's election as the president. Bolivarianism was constructed on the ideas of three precursors who were Simón Bolívar, Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodriguez (Sanoja 2009, p. 401). Among these three founding fathers of Bolivarianism, Bolívar had a special place he inspired Chávez with his leadership skills. By establishing an analogy between the process of Venezuela's foundation and new Venezuela with Bolivarianism, Chávez underlined that the historical struggle of the excluded against the elite initiated by Bolívar continues in new Venezuela (Sanoja 2009, p. 404, Zúquete 2008, pp. 91, 101).

4.5.2. Populist Discourse

Achievement of political transformation depended on the active participation of the people. To secure the endurance of the new political system, both leaders mobilized their supporters. Even though mobilization of Erdoğan's supporters was sporadic compared to Chávez's political initiatives, which targeted systemic empowerment of the people, the two leaders employed a similar discursive theme to appeal and mobilize the people. This discursive theme consisted of different components such as religiosity, active involvement in political transformation, assumed unity and antagonism towards dissidents and the opposition through Manichean discourse.

Coming out of a religious movement, it is completely natural for Erdoğan to use a religious discourse to address his electorate. What is surprising and showing the chameleonic character of populist leaders is religious statements and connotations of Chávez despite being an atheist himself. Considering high religiosity in Venezuela, religious discourse of Chávez was a strategic move to appeal to the masses. Chávez by reinterpreting the mission of Christ as a battle against injustices drew an analogy between his cause and the mission of Christ (Zúquete 2008, pp. 109-110).[96] By reclaiming the re-enactment of Christ's own combat against the powerful on behalf of the poor, the Chávez government was inspired by "Christ's Mission" when naming social missions which targeted "zero misery" and "zero poverty" while achieving equality and liberty in the land of Venezuela (Zúquete 2008, p. 110).

[96] Chávez's inspiration of Christ reflected in his addressing to highly religious population. Moreover, Fernandes (2007, pp. 112-113) argues that campaign posters of Chávez, especially featuring portraits, reminded of evangelical pictures of Christ and his promise of new life after the evils of the past had religious connotations.

The main source of populist leaders' legitimacy is use of 'general will' represented by the leader. Populist leaders claim to be speaking for and with the people as the embodiment of national will (di Piramo 2009, p. 179, Canovan 1999, p. 4). To legitimize their acts undermining liberal democracy, they both reinterpret 'general will' and transform the people into a 'mythic being' by attributing special qualities (Zúquete 2008, p. 109). Using the discourse of 'empowering the people' both leaders expanded their personal influence over the politics and attempted to instill their ideological vision in the society. Since the majority voted for them repeatedly they claim that being the embodiment of national will granted them some kind of immunity towards institutional constraints and checks and balances of democratic system.

Even though both leaders were supported by a multiclass coalition, and mostly unorganized mass, they assumed a false unity and homogeneity among their supporters. This presumed unity is a necessary element of new society ideal of the leaders; hence they needed to enforce false consciousness on their electorate. Through reinventing the people as the political unity both leaders pursued ways of challenging the establishment. Their anti-establishment discourse targeted mobilization of the people against the elite controlling the regime. In addition, the people had to be unanimous as the active agents of political change to achieve clear break with the past. To represent and personify sovereignty of the people, populists treat the people as a unified body, which must be protected against the parties and factions that divide it (Canovan 1999, p. 5, Panizza & Miorelli 2009, p. 41).

To appeal to the masses and solidify their electoral basis both leaders sought ways of establishing emotional attachment. Conditions of economic and political crises facilitated their reach to the people emotionally since they were in fragile position and inclined to trust an emergent promising leader. Having the charisma in Weberian sense bestowed them the right to exercise power above discredited institutions and speak for the people (di Piramo 2009, p. 187). Addressing religious, patriotic and conservative or emancipative values, the leaders aimed to trigger emotional attachment and establish special emotional connection between the electorate and their leadership. Symbolically the leader presented himself as one of the founding fathers since they were both inspired by or competed with the old ones and they attempted to found new Turkey and Venezuela (Zúquete 2008, pp. 98, 113). [97]

Direct communication through radio programmes, television appearances and public speeches strengthened the bondage between the leader and their audience. Two leaders benefited from remarkable usage of communication channels to boost their charisma and convey ideological messages. Through media channel, concomitant mythification of the people and their leadership affirmed and substantiated the centrality of the leader and their political ideal came closer to be realized.

Emotional attachment plays a crucial role in repolitization of the society along with ideological inclinations of the leaders. By tickling chauvinist emotions, charismatic leaders rally people behind their holy cause. As Canovan (1999, p. 6) underlines populist politics have a revivalist flavor and emotional ingredient, which translate ordinary politics into extraordinary politics. In this extraordinary atmosphere and

[97] Orçun Selçuk (2016, p. 6) underlines that following the third consecutive victory of the AKP in 2011 and being the country's first popularly elected president in 2014 gave Erdoğan the confidence of attributing himself being the founding father of the 'New Turkey,' with the initiation of new era of founding the 'New Turkey'.

crisis, the charismatic leader is depicted as a paternal figure solving the grave problems of the country and a symbolic projection of the national ideal (di Piramo 2009, p. 188). As the father of the country, charismatic leader changes politics into campaign to save the country from daunting problems or to bring about a great renewal, which would eventually realize ideological ideal.

Going beyond the ordinary politics, charismatic leader further flares sentimental value of the cause. To mobilize people and gather their support for the political change, the charismatic leader exaggerates already existing emotional element in all political discourses (de la Torre 2000, p. 4). This exaggeration is maintained by the rhetoric of dichotomous worldview. This Manichean worldview defines the politics on the ground of two opposite camps, good and evil. Accordingly, politics become moral and ethical struggle between good and evil. Definition of politics as moral struggle gives the leader upper hand and dismisses any criticism towards ideological ideal or acts of the leader. Moreover, since politics is an ethical struggle and a battleground, there is no room for agreement or compromise but fight against the evil (Mudde 2004, p 544, de la Torre 2000, p. 4, di Piramo 2009, p. 189). Consequently, politics translates into no-holds-barred war with two antagonistic groups of friends and foes, which deepens already existing polarization in the country.

With Manichean worldview what is peculiar to populist discourse is there is always one target to blame. As populist leaders divide the people dichotomously, the people versus the enemy, he defines the foe vaguely and flexibly in order to provide room for maneuver to successfully adapt himself to changing socio-political agendas (di Piramo 2009, p. 189). Even though Chávez and Erdoğan used different terminology in

their identification of the adversary due to ideological contrast as Chávez constantly referred to 'oligarchy' and Erdoğan repeatedly preferred vague term 'them' meaning 'the others', their discourse was similar in identification of politics as the struggle between good and evil. Moreover, even though their ideological inclinations totally contrast their discourse contains the opposite rhetoric. While Erdoğan criticized the bureaucracy on the class base by calling 'bureaucratic oligarchy' and 'interest rate lobby' to stress the elitist character of adversaries (especially the armed forces and the secular wing of the bourgeoisie) and denounce them, Chávez used religious discourse when confronting his opponents (Savran 2015, pp. 70-71).[98]

Both leaders frequently accused foreign actors for wrongdoings and problems in their countries. Even though Erdoğan's opposition to the U.S. has not been consistent and rather sporadic depending on the rising anti-Americanism in the public, Chávez constantly criticized and attempted to challenge the US imperialism. For Chávez, the US imperialism symbolized the root of evil and the opposite of what Chávez have dreamed about. Therefore, in Manichean world of Chávez, the U.S. epitomized the evil. Moreover, while the mythification of the people went hand in hand with demonization of the U.S., rampant patriotism against the US imperialism, which backed the populist discourse of Chávez by strengthening his dominant position. Chávez rose as the charismatic leader who was a devoted himself for the holy cause of realizing Bolivarian Revolution in home and then spreading it to Latin America to save the region from the U.S-led globalization (Zúquete 2008, pp. 98, 113-114). In

[98] In the past, surprisingly Erdoğan ironically referred to 'oligarchy' to criticize established interests in bureaucracy even if it belongs to the leftist jargon for dismantling class-based society. His use of leftist jargon also demonstrates chameleonic character of populist leaders as they can easily barrow from even the opposite ideology to enhance political reputation.
http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/37393/burokratik-oligarsi-ulkelerin-felaketidir.html

this holy war, the evil was represented by the inside enemies, which were in complete opposite with pure patriots of homeland, and the U.S.

The evil or enemy in Erdoğan's discourse has changed along with the conjuncture from internal to external ones. Nevertheless, Chávez's attitude towards George W. Bush by calling him "donkey"[99], and Erdoğan's criticism of Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos meeting of World Economic Forum in 2009[100] contributed to their reputation since they confronted their enemies in public. Due to confrontation with Israel over Palestine, Turkish-Israeli relations reached their nadir in 2010 when Israeli military forces intervened into a flotilla heading for helping Gaza. Criticizing Israel on the basis of religious solidarity with Palestinians was not only a product of religious bond based on ideological inclination of Erdoğan but also a part of strategic move of Erdoğan to achieve his long-term ambition of Middle Eastern leadership. Similarly, criticizing the U.S. in public boosted Chávez's charisma in Latin America and maintained his ambition of Latin American leadership, even though Venezuela continued trading with the U.S.

4.5.3. Polarization

Social inequality and polarization was new neither for Venezuela nor for Turkey. Yet, neoliberal transformation in both countries during the 1980s and 1990s created winners and losers from the economic liberalization process. While winners were the secular ruling elite and businessmen in Turkey, winners in Venezuela were mainly

[99] Not only "donkey", Chávez called George W. Bush as "genocidist" and an "alcoholic" as well (Spakanos 2008, p. 521).
[100] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html?_r=0

business interests and other privileged groups controlling the oil revenue. Losers of the neoliberal transformation were the poor of two countries, historically been disadvantaged and generally unorganized (Mahmood et al. 2012, pp. 816, 828). Systematically excluded indigenous people and residents of informal settlements of favelas and barrios in Venezuela and poor conservative majority living in the countryside and shantytowns in Turkey had to bear the consequences of neoliberal austerity justified by the economic development illusion. Thence, those economically and politically marginalized groups were craving for a political change.

Both leaders gradually translated socio-economic inequality and polarization in the society into political polarization. In this political transformation both Erdoğan and Chávez adopted similar populist discourse in order to polarize the society alongside their ideological inclinations. Social polarization in Venezuela has more of an economic basis with a left-right division whereas in Turkey economic differences molded with contrasting worldviews of secularism and religiosity/conservatism (Savran 2015, p. 70). Nevertheless, in both cases, even if their magnitude differs, both economic and political factors enabled political polarization in two countries.

Populist rhetoric of the leaders exaggerated political polarization by defining politics as the moral and ethical struggle between two opposing groups either el pueblo and the oligarchy or secularist elite and conservative majority (de la Torre 2000, p. 4, (de la Torre 2013, p. 40). In addition to aggravating antagonism to sustain existing socio-economic polarization, Manichean worldview of the leaders stirred political tension up. Even though both leaders captured power by moderating their discourse and moving towards the political center, they gradually shifted towards the extreme left

and right. Accompanied by polarizing discourse, this shift further provoked political antagonism. Nevertheless, the leaders needed polarization to solidify partisanship of their followers and secure their charismatic authority. Besides, polarization fueled their power as one of the driving force behind the mobilization of supporters as active generators of new political system.

Polarizing discourse used by the leaders forced the citizens to choose sides. The citizens either had to support their cause or bear the consequences. Supporters were awarded with clientelist benefits such as jobs, grants, contracts and other material interests, while dissidents confronted intimidation, harassment, jailing and penalties. The punishment of the dissidents was legitimized on the basis of labeling and charging those of opposing the ideal of the leader as the elite, internal traitors and allies of foreign powers counteracting against the will and benefit of the people. Moreover, the leaders justified punitive measures they take to harass and intimidate the dissidents by the embodiment of the national will discourse by claiming those measures were necessary to defend democracy and the people (di Piramo 2009, p. 195).

Translating the society into two opposing camps led to winner-take-all politics in both countries in which there was no room for opposition and criticizing the will of the people, so the leader as the embodiment of the national will. To alleviate accusations of anti-democratic measures both leaders resorted to the rhetoric of threat and fear as well as conspiracy. Through portraying the country as besieged, threatened, and surrounded by powerful and conspiratorial forces, they diffused the sense of fear, which would solidify unity by preventing internal divisions (Zúquete 2008, p. 104). In

addition, both leaders made use of nationalist connotations to arouse the sense of threat. Nationalism also became shelter for the leader as the dissidents were accused of being enemies of the homeland and compradors. Therefore, nationalism also reinforced the claim of the leader being the embodiment of national will, as he is the father and savior of the nation.

Even though both leaders promised empowering the marginalized people to restore genuine democratic system, polarization led to unprecedented democratic decay.[101] By denouncing and demonizing the opposition and refusing any compromise, both leaders curtailed the plurality of liberal democracy. The leaders distorted contestation by "either one of us or against us" mentality and led the way for no-holds-barred-war in two countries. Solidifying the partisanship of electoral bases through polarization, electoral victories bolstered their confidence in transforming the political structure through introducing institutional changes asserting their domination on the politics, instilling their worldview in the society and thereby challenging the old political establishment.

4.5.4. Direct Democracy and Political Participation

Democratic deficit in representative democracy due to failure of representing large sections of the population or detachment of substantial portions of the population from dominant ideological discourse opens the way for populist leaders (di Piramo 2009, p. 193). Acknowledging the disappointment of the electorate by the representative democracy, populists offer their version of democracy. To change the

[101] Democratic decay refers to gradual and slow erosion of liberal traits of democracy in a country with the curtailing of political rights, civil liberties and rule of law, accompanied by undermining of political institutions. Differently from drastic and violent ways of overthrowing a democratic regime, such as a military takeover, democratic decay is more incremental version of democratic reversion which may gradually lead to a hybrid regime between liberal democracy and dictatorship (Schedler 1998, p. 97).

existing political system they come up with new and claimed to be more democratic system which favors mechanisms of 'direct democracy' such as referenda and popular initiatives (Canovan 2004 p. 242, Abts & Rummens 2007, p. 408, Pasquino 2005, p. 31).

As Canovan (1999) accentuates populism originates within the democratic system. Populists capture power by the promise of generating more democratic system by incorporating the marginalized citizens to the system. The use popular approval through direct democracy mechanisms even holds the promise of democratizing the representative democracy by involving direct participation of the citizens in political decision-making, the populist leaders use it as a stamp of approval for their own political vision. Once the trust of the people was renewed and strengthened in every electoral process for Chávez and Erdoğan, the new democratic system experienced two severe problems, which were diminishing pluralism due to contrasting character of their political vision with liberal democracy and the centrality of the leader.

4.5.5. Envisioning New Political Project: New Turkey and New Venezuela

When disclosing their new political projects for their countries, Chávez and Erdoğan constantly underlined empowering the people. Even though Erdoğan's political vision for new Turkey was more vague and involved less systematic change compared to Chávez, both leaders criticized the old political system, spoke of founding a new political system in which the people ruled and introduced institutional changes for the sake of people's rule.

Chávez envisioned a new political system, which would not reform the existing political system but would bring groundbreaking change, a revolution. Inspired by Simon Bolivar, Chávez named his vision as Bolivarian Revolution (Sylvia & Danopoulos 2003, p. 71). The Bolivarian Revolution targeted generating social change, which would eventually revitalize 'Twenty-First Century Socialism' in Venezuela. The Bolivarian Revolution formulated the components bringing the social transformation as the Simon Bolivar National Plan, the Social Missions and other new mechanisms fostering protagonist participation (Duffy 2015, p. 650). In addition creating a socialist alternative to neoliberalism through more equal economic distribution rather than social reforms to improve living conditions of the poor, the government aimed at promoting people's direct participation in social, political, economic and cultural affairs as protagonists as well (Duffy 2015, p. 651, Wilpert 2005, p. 7).

Political vision embraced by Chávez is called as "radical" or "participatory democracy". Participatory democracy questioned the confines of representative democracy and searched for the deepening of democracy through the development of dual forms of participatory and representative systems (Duffy 2015, p. 653). Formulated on the basis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ideas on democracy, radical democracy prioritizes the majority rule, mass mobilization and the political participation of popular sectors in political organizations which would enable political learning and empowerment of the formerly excluded (Ellner 2010, pp. 80-81).

To materialize the radical democracy vision of Chávez, the 1999 Constitution called for active participation of the citizens in political matters (Azzellini 2010, p. 16).

Especially article 62 validates the right of participation by the mandate of "all citizens have the right to participate in public affairs" (de la Torre 2013, p. 31). In this line, in 2000 Chávez initiated the process of participatory democracy by supporting the formation of Bolivarian Circles (*Círculos Bolivarianos*). Even if the Bolivarian Circles reached approximately 2.2 million members in their heyday, they became short-lived because members abandoned them in order to participate in state-sponsored social programs and electoral organizations (de la Torre 2013, p. 31, Ellner 2010, p. 82, Hawkins & Hansen 2006, pp. 103, 107, 124).

Even though at the beginning the Bolivarian Revolution lacked clear ideology and leading groups or a party, it evolved and radicalized throughout time. Especially after 2005, when Chávez declared building the Twenty-First Century Socialism replacing capitalist system in Venezuela, it evolved into a socialist revolution by transcending anti-neoliberal movement and increasingly radicalized (Azzellini 2010, pp. 8-9, de la Torre 2013, p. 31, Griffiths 2010, p. 607). Chávez's formulation of 21st Century Socialism differed from orthodox Marxist models by replacing the leading role of the proletariat with unorganized mass of the 'unemployed, the poor, and the excluded' (de la Torre 2013, p. 31). However, it shared Marx's idea of creating autonomous self-government and a communal state with directly accountable and changeable delegates to provide direct participation in the affairs of the state (Duffy 2015, p. 653). This communal state idea led to creation of Communal Councils starting in 2005, which were legalized by the National Assembly with the law of Communal Councils in 2006 (Gott 2008, p. 481, Azzellini 2010, p. 24). Bounded together these autonomous self-organized local Communal Councils would constitute an association, which lead to a commune that in turn would form socialist cities in the process of

socialist transformation of the state (de la Torre 2013, p. 31, Azzellini 2010, p. 10). Therefore, along with other mechanisms such as referendums, constitutional guarantee of recalling elected officials and popular consultations; these bodies were key components of the exercise of direct democracy by the common people.

The attempt of direct rule of the people through the Communal Councils was promising for realization of the rule of people; however, eventually it fell short of fulfilling this promise. Juxtaposition of representative and participatory systems resulted in some anomalies. In addition to clash of authority among representative and participatory organizations, conflicts arose between the state and its popular base due to Chávez's charismatic authority over participatory mechanisms (Azzellini 2010, pp. 21, 24). Moreover, the Communal Councils were supposed to be free from dominance of the Chávez government; yet, the Ministry for Popular Participation and Social Development was established to oversee their funding and operation, which hindered the autonomy of civil society and decentralization initiative (Gott 2008, p. 481, Azzellini 2010, p. 24, de la Torre 2013, pp. 32-33, Ellner 2001, p. 19). Both leaders supported civil society organizations when they abide by or do not confront with their ideological ideal; but they curtailed their autonomy, which is one of the essential traits of liberal democracy.[102]

[102] Kirk Hawkins & David Hansen (2006) conducted research over the Bolivarian Circles in order to reveal true nature of their members. Even though the members were activists with high level of respect for democracy, Hawkins and Hansen (2006, pp. 118-119) noted that the Bolivarian Circles served as clientelist brokers by providing benefits in return of support for Chávez and charismatic mode of linkage between Chávez and the Circles limited their autonomy besides hampering institutionalization. Besides the Bolivarian Circles, the creation of Bolivarian universities attracted Chavista students, which left the student movement solely under the control of anti-Chávez students. Due to opposition domination and frequent student demonstrations, the Chávez government refused to listen student demands (Hawkins 2015, p. 10). As a consequence, even though Chávez mobilized formerly excluded majority with participatory democracy understanding, both civil society and universities lacked autonomy and depended on the charismatic authority of the leader.

Problem of contradiction among participatory mechanisms and the central government manifested itself in the creation of the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*- PSUV) as a mass party as well. The PSUV replaced its predecessor the Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República-MVR) in 2009. By promoting mass mobilization the PSUV achieved having 5.7 million members and becoming the biggest and the highest vote-getting party in Venezuela (Ellner 2010, p. 81). However, due to clash of politics of self-management with centralization, bureaucratization, and hierarchical organization, it failed to produce political and organizational plurality (Azzellini 2010, pp. 26-28). In addition, the PSUV failed to transcend being an electoral party and becoming a forum for critical debate with collective leadership and internal democracy, and stayed under the shadow of Chávez (Ellner 2010, p. 84, Azzellini 2010, p. 28). From early on, Chávez employed antiparty rhetoric by denouncing vertical organization structures including political parties and labor organizations because they were associated with old establishment (Ellner 2001, pp. 5-6, Ellner 2002b, p. 89). His antiparty position and despise for vertical political structures signaled his attitudes towards representative political institutions later as opposed to horizontal checks and balances and attempted to replace representative institutions by participatory mechanisms.[103]

In addition to Chávez's antiparty and anti-vertical structures position and disdain for representative political institutions, his charismatic authority contributed to new political system lag behind institutionalization. Chávez's overstepping as missionizing

[103] Due to difference of political structure, Erdoğan was not antiparty like Chávez. Because presidential system allows neglecting parties' weight in presidential elections; yet, in parliamentary system, prime ministers are bounded by their parties, Erdoğan even though has had strong hand in the party since the foundation, gradually asserted his control and eventually suppressed the AKP and dominated politics personally.

figure and the claim of being a founding father thanks to reestablishing the political system consolidated his charisma and secured his role as maximum leader of the government (Zúquete 2008, p. 98, Ellner 2010, p. 84, Ellner 2001, p. 7). Moreover, Chávez's direct link and constant dialogue with the electorate through media appearances strengthened and concomitantly legitimized his charismatic authority (Zúquete 2008, p. 114). The centrality and cult of Chávez contradicted the empowerment of the people since along with control over the finance of participatory mechanisms, Chávez's charismatic authority not only curtailed the autonomy of the civil society organizations but also prevented the institutionalization of the participatory organizations due to cripple of collective leadership or blocking of competition for leadership (Ellner 2010, p. 84, Griffiths 2010, p. 617).[104]

Eventually, participatory mechanisms suffered from the problems of low level of institutionalization, lack of internal debate and the centrality and cult of Chávez, which curtailed the autonomy of these organizations and prevented collective leadership (Ellner 2010, pp. 80, 82-84, de la Torre 2013, p. 33, Hawkins & Hansen 2006, 119, Ellner 2011, p. 423). Lack of institutionalization obstructed transparency and opened the way of corruption and misuse of public funds through clientelist networks which contributed to crumble of the economy (Ellner 2010, p. 91, Hawkins & Hansen 2006, p. 104).

Due to differences in both political systems and ideological inclinations, Chávez and Erdoğan differed in their approach towards the rule of people. While Chávez searched

[104] According to Ellner (2010, p. 84) Chávez's rule confirmed Max Weber's contention that charismatic leadership generates legitimacy; yet, it forestalls the emergence of legal structures. In addition, for Ellner, Chávez's leadership discouraged healthy rivalry and internal debate within the PSUV and restrained the capacity of the party to connect social movements and state institutions.

for the systemic empowerment of the people, the AKP government under the leadership of Erdoğan preferred resorting to referenda especially when they confronted with resistance towards the political project that they were determined to achieve. Nevertheless, both governments favored direct democracy over the representative one by exalting the rule of the people, which is actually constituted by their supporters and encoded as the sacred majority deserving to rule.

Both leaders praised direct democracy mechanisms, especially referenda, over representative ones because they were in harmony with the majoritarian understanding of democracy held by the leaders. The leaders utilized mechanisms of direct democracy to surpass the opposition because representative politics built on the precept of plurality and prescribed political deliberation while direct democracy favored the majority, which belonged to the populist leader's camp. Even though referendums are supposed to be more democratic since they involve direct participation of the people in decision-making, they turned into tools of the leaders for legitimizing their political projects, which were selectively disrespecting the rules of the liberal democracy such as the separation of powers, pluralism, and accountability (de la Torre 2013, p. 41). Consequently, even though the political visions of the leaders included democratic features like empowering the people through referenda or participatory organizations; combined with polarization and the misuse of referendums for instilling their ideal and bypassing the opposition, they neglected and disrespected plurality principle of liberal democracy.

4.6. Institutional Changes to Secure the Pivotal Role of the Leader

Along with their political vision, for the leaders it was essential to overthrow existing obstacles to achieve the rule of the people. Since the old establishment was the main hurdle to overcome, both leaders presented institutional changes challenging the old political system as democratic moves necessary for the people's rule. However, since the leaders were the embodiment of the national will, the measures taken for empowering people also meant centralization of the leader in politics. Partisan media helped leaders to convey democracy discourse by hiding side effects of these institutional changes, which were personalization of power and diminishing plurality. Regardless of the institutional structure of two countries, by introducing institutional changes both leaders concentrated the power in their hands by distorting checks and balances.

By the claim of representing the will of the systematically excluded against arrogant, privileged, highly educated, and cosmopolitan elites, corrupt politicians and strident minorities, both leaders were able to appeal to the people and mobilize them for political change (Canovan 1999, p. 5, Canovan 2004, p. 242, Pasquino 2005, p. 16). Depending on the disgust of the ordinary people towards politicians and bureaucracy, both leaders translated this revulsion into electoral success, which bestowed them the chance of generating political transformation.

Until 2014 elections, the AKP and Erdoğan were able to win every general election in 2002, 2007 and 2011, by increasing their share of the vote on each occasion. Similarly, Chávez won the presidential elections in 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2012 (and a

recall referendum in 2004 and after failing in 2007, he was able to win the referendum over unlimited reelection in 2009). While growing oil revenues and social missions played an important role in Chávez's electoral success, the AKP and Erdoğan benefited from economic growth trajectory, which enabled social policies. Besides, political cadres of both leaders controlled all reins of state power facilitating their electoral success thanks to the use and abuse state resources for electoral campaigns (Hidalgo 2007, p. 7). In addition to harvesting the benefits of participatory organizations' support in the electoral campaigns, domination of the National Electoral Council by Chávez supporters (*Chavistas*) made electoral success easier to achieve. Moreover, former disgrace of opposition parties and erroneous strategies of the opposition such as electoral boycott in Venezuela, and refusing finding common ground to unite and act in unity to balance the leaders and their movements in both countries, opened the way of two leaders' triumph.

Consecutive electoral successes boosted their confidence in reshaping democratic institutions and gave them opportunity to eliminate their rivals and concentrate power. While Chávez chose to reshape the regime by writing a new constitution along with his political vision as soon as he was elected, Erdoğan and the AKP have gradually acquired the devices of political domination.

In addition to promoting political participation, new constitution of Venezuela brought drastic institutional changes enacted by the Constituent Assembly overwhelming dominated by pro-Chávez members. Even though the new constitution reflected democratic vision of Chávez by enabling different types of referenda, making possible the removal of elected officials, and fostering the participation of

civil society in the nomination of judges at all levels, the National Electoral Council, the national controller, and the newly created ombudsman; it also opened the way of personalization of power by Chávez (Ellner 2001, p. 18). The new constitution granted enormous power to Chávez by extending the presidential term from five to six years besides granting the president the power to enact laws and to hold any kind of referendum without support from the legislature (Corrales & Penfold 2007, p. 101). As the Senate was eliminated, the unicameral legislative became easier target to subjugate and checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches distorted (Corrales & Penfold 2011, p. 19). Besides the legislative, the executive asserted its control over the body that governs electoral affairs (the National Electoral Council-CNE), the high court, the attorney-general, the comptroller-general, and the military (Corrales & Penfold 2007, pp. 101-102). Moreover, the president was granted the complete discretion over military promotions without legislative approval and with his military background Chávez established close ties with the military.

Erdoğan and the AKP faced the first and the most serious confrontation and resistance to their envisioned political transformation when Abdullah Gül was nominated for the presidency. Because his wife's headscarf, the secularist elite and the military reacted by organizing rallies and declaring 'e-memorandum' following the first round.[105] However, harsh critique of the military backfired as Erdoğan campaigned for 2007 elections by portraying the opposition as the elite blocking 'the will of the people' and achieved obtaining 47 per cent of the votes cast and 341 seats in parliament (Dinçşahin 2012, pp. 632, 634). This electoral victory was the turning point for the political transformation of Turkey along with Erdoğan's vision because the

[105] E-memorandum issued by the Office of the Chief of General Staff was a warning against the AKP to remind that the military was still the guardian of the fundamental principles of the Republic, especially secularism, and ready to take action once the AKP fails to comply with the principles.

discrediting of the military due to e-memorandum ruled out the possibility of a direct military challenge to the AKP's electoral hegemony in the post-2007 period (Öniş 2012, p. 136). Moreover, closure case against the AKP in 2008 on the ground of being a center of activities against the constitutional principle of "laicism" was another futile attempt of the secular elite to challenge the AKP's hegemony (Atasoy 2011, p. 93). However, it only consolidated Erdoğan's democracy discourse, portraying the secular elite as the enemies of the people since they defy the will of the people.

When two leaders confronted resistance to institutional change they resorted to plebiscitary mechanisms to bypass representative democracy and intermediary institutions, and defeat the opposition. The AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan enacted constitutional amendments to restructure the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors to prevent another closure case. Facing strong resistance from the opposition in the parliament, the government again took the issue to a referendum in 2010 and accomplished subjugating the Constitutional Court (Dinçşahin 2012, p. 637).

Chávez already subjugated the legislative to the executive through issuing decree-laws in areas ranging from economic development to land reform since he obtained the legislature "enabling powers" to rule by decree in certain policy areas in 2000 (Pérez 2012, p. 62, Corrales & Penfold 2007, p. 102, Wilpert 2005, p. 13). Moreover, in 2006 the National Assembly granted Chávez special powers to legislate by decree for a period of 18 months and within these time period Chávez issued a total of 66 decrees (De Venanzi 2010, p. 57). It is evident that Erdoğan is following a similar way since the declaration of martial law for an undefined time period following the

unfortunate coup attempt on 15th of July in 2016, which granted him the right to issue decrees and up until now Erdoğan issued controversial decrees in key policy areas.

Due to parliamentary system of Turkey, Erdoğan's personalization of power was delayed to the post 2008 period. When Erdoğan became the first president elected by the Turkish electorate in 2014 with a small margin (51.79 %), he realized that the concentration of power in the parliamentary system would be troublesome. Therefore, he initiated a debate over a possible shift to the presidential system in Turkey by demanding a different presidential system with a Turkish take and without strict checks and balances. Due to the failure of Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in the drive for the presidential system cause, Binali Yıldırım succeeded him in May 2016. The resignation of Davutoğlu raised concerns about Erdoğan's domination over the AKP with alleged palace coup accusations.[106] Considering Erdoğan's rejection of impartial presidency on grounds of being the first elected President of Turkey, his efforts to sustain domination hint at the possible use of decree power to bypass the legislature like Chávez, once there is a shift to the presidential system.

4.7. Pressure on the Opposition

Charismatic authority that the leaders have granted them enormous power, which gave the leaders the chance of breaking the rule of regularized and bureaucratized form of leadership (Canovan 1999, p. 6, Canovan 2004, p. 242, Kriesi 2014, p. 363). Emotional attachment to the charisma of the leader was provided and enhanced by

[106] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/05/ahmet-davutoglus-future-turkish-prime-minister-balance

direct and personal ties between the leader and followers. Direct relationship between the leader and the electorate through media appearances enabled the rejection of intermediary institutional structures and the system of checks and balances associated with the liberal democracy model (Ellner 2010, p. 84). In addition, being the embodiment of national will bestowed the leader the ability of denouncing the opponents as traitors of the nation as they refused to comply with the national will (Wilpert 2005, p. 24).[107] When the leaders confronted strong resistance of the opposition or harsh critique, they punished the dissidents by giving tax penalties, denying state resources or benefits and firing from positions.

The main contender of the AKP and Erdoğan was the military and secular elite including retired generals, judges, prosecutors, journalists, professors, party and NGO leaders. Therefore, once the AKP and Erdoğan installed political domination, starting in 2007 through the Ergenekon operation and other investigations including Balyoz, Sarıkız, Kafes, and Eldiven by which many officers and high-ranking generals were arrested, it discredited the military (Dinçşahin 2012, pp. 636-637, Kalaycıoğlu 2012, p. 3).[108] Constitutional amendments through 2010 referendum enabled the AKP and Erdoğan to restructure the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors and the Constitutional Court.

[107] Using the discourse of the embodiment of the will of the people, Chávez declared "This is not about Hugo Chávez, this is about a people," and he collectivized his struggle by stating "We the Bolivarians, we the revolutionaries, we are not afraid of any threats by any oligarch no matter how rich or powerful" (Zúquete 2008, p. 100). Similarly, Erdoğan still constantly uses the discourse of the national will to legitimize his punitive measures against the opposition as necessary for the sake of the people. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/26/turkish-people-erdogan-democracy

[108] For details see Bardakçi (2013) "Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey under AKP Rule".

The main contender of Chávez was Venezuelan bourgeoisie controlling the private media, the national chamber of commerce (*Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela*-FEDECAMARAS), Venezuelan Workers' Federation (*Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos* -the CTV), and management and union officials associated with the national oil company, PDVSA (Parish et al. 2007, p. 217, Kingsbury 2013, p. 581, Wilpert 2005, pp. 28-29). The constitution by raising the stakes of ruling incited further political polarization and the opposition searched the ways of challenging the vision of Chávez and opposing the political transformation Chávez initiated. One attempt was a nationwide general strike starting in December 2002 and continued until February 2003, which that shut down the oil industry and hurt the national economy (Wilpert 2005, p. 15). The supporting groups for strike were including political parties, business groups, trade unions (the CTV), and the employees of the PDVSA (Sylvia & Danopoulos 2003, p. 73, Parish et al. 2007, pp. 221-222). However, this attempt failed to force Chávez to resign and even rendered Chávez the chance of asserting his control over PDVSA by firing almost 60 percent of PDVSA's staff, and creating a parallel union structure and business associations loyal to the government (Corrales & Penfold 2007, p. 102, Hawkins 2015, p. 10).

Another strive of the opposition was the coup attempt in 2002 arresting Chávez in 12 April and removing him from power for two days. The coup attempt was legitimized on the ground of Chavista involvement in killing more than a dozen and wounding the demonstrators deviated from a planned route and moved toward Miraflores Palace (Parish et al. 2007, p. 218, Sylvia & Danopoulos 2003, p. 73, Wilpert 2005, p. 14). However, after becoming interim president, former president of the business

association FEDECAMARAS, Pedro Carmona tried autogolpe by dissolving the legislature, firing the Supreme Court and nullifying, by presidential decree, 49 laws contradicting business interests (Sylvia & Danopoulos 2003, p. 73, Parish et al. 2007, p. 217). Consequently, the actors planning the coup disagreed over post-Chávez period and disbanded. Meanwhile, Chavistas rallied for Chávez's return and Chávez reaped the benefits of his mobilization of the poor majority and he was able to return to power within two days.[109]

One of the last two attempts of the opposition was collecting signatures for a recall referendum in 2004, which backfired as well since the electorate voted overwhelmingly to reject the attempted recall, by a margin of 59 to 41 per cent (Parish et al. 2007, p. 224, Wilpert 2005, pp. 15-17). The other was electoral boycott of the opposition for the National Assembly elections in 2005, which bestowed Chávez more room for maneuver in the Assembly with controlling all 167 seats.[110] Consequently, by 2006 the opposition was defeated. Either way, peaceful or not, the opposition failed to overthrow Chávez and retrieve old political system. All the steps taken to defeat Chávez backfired and rather opened the way of Chávez's hyper-presidentialism by contributing to the legitimacy of Chávez's new political system which searched for the empowerment of the masses along with the leader's domination in the political system.

[109] Erdoğan too was able to escape from a coup attempt in 15th of July 2016. Even if the actors and motives behind the coup attempts were different, it added another similarity to the leaders' political life.

[110] One benefit of the pro-Chávez dominated Assembly for Chávez was the pass of 27 laws in addition to a special law that gave the president powers to legislate on a wide range of matters for eighteen months (Kornblith 2013, p. 54).

Chávez realized that frequent elections to give his regime a plebiscitary character (Hidalgo 2009, p. 90). Referendums granted him his wishes unless he could mobilize the supporters. Even though Chávez failed in referendum for reelection in 2007, he could mobilize the Chavista grassroots in 2009 and along with the success of economic and social policies, he was able to win the electoral support and achieve reelection. Moreover, consecutive electoral successes bestowed him chance of pushing for distorting checks and balances either by filling the positions in other branches of the government by his partisan supporters like the CNE case or purging the dissidents. To put pressure on the judiciary, Chávez government fired hundreds of judges in lower courts in 2006 and intimidated other judges as well (Hawkins 2015, p. 11). Consequently, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (*Tribunal Supremo de Justicia*-TSJ), which has the power of judicial review, came under domination of Chávez.

By depending on the referendums for validating new political system, Chávez established a new system in which accountability is low, and the rule of law is weak (Hidalgo 2009, p. 79). The rule of law drastically deteriorated under Chávez because he violated separation of powers by subjugating the legislative through executive decrees and judiciary; human, civil, and political rights; the freedoms of expression and association; and judicial independence (Kornblith 2013, p. 51). Supposed to be autonomous institutions of the state in a liberal democracy bended knee to the president and his lieutenants (Hidalgo 2009, p. 79, Hawkins 2015, p. 11). Lack of horizontal accountability between the presidency and other branches of the government led to hyper-presidential system or what Guillermo O'Donell (1994) labeled as "delegative democracy" in Venezuela. Taking the discussions on desirable

presidential system of Turkey in near future into consideration, it is more likely that Erdoğan will follow Chávez's path in hyper-presidentialism.

In the course of gathering and consolidating their power, both Chávez and Erdoğan used crowds to intimidate their adversaries (de la Torre 2000, p. 4). Chávez through demonstrations, participatory organizations and '*Alo Presidente*', Erdoğan through election rallies and the AKP group meetings or those in the Presidential complex addressed the crowds and consolidated their charismatic political leadership. Mass meetings were tools for the leaders to incorporate the masses in politics and as de la Torre (2000, p. 4) emphasizes they are political dramas wherein people feel included in the political scene as true participants. Combined with majoritarian emphasis of the leaders, the mobilization of the crowds was essential for both show-offs the power of the majority, garner legitimacy and overpower the opposition.

Using Manichean discourse, the leaders divided the population into two groups: true patriots or called as the people against the corrupted elite, the oligarchy. The oligarchy signified self-serving elites who work against the homeland (Zúquete 2008, p. 105). The elites controlling the key sectors in the country and collaborating with external enemies of the regime, especially the U.S. for Chávez, constituted most dangerous internal obstacle to the new political system and political vision of the leader. Nevertheless, despite its elitist overtones, the oligarchy connoted the ones who questioned the leaders' authority or refused abiding by it. During the Gezi Protests in 2013, Erdoğan both pointed interest rate lobby with external links and scum (*çapulcu*) as responsible of so-called coup attempt against him by bringing different segments of

society, not just the elite. Similarly, Chávez targeted the elite controlling the general strike and called them as the enemies of the homeland (Zúquete 2008, p. 105).

Identified by the leaders as one of the main enemies of the people, the media was among the main targets.[111] Even though the leaders permitted the existence of opposition media, they took punitive acts to suppress the mainstream media resisting their political vision.

Table 17: Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom

Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Barometer Rankings											
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011-2012	2013
Turkey	100	115	113	98	100	101	102	122	138	148	154
Venezuela	77	96	90	90	115	114	113	124	133	117	117

As comparison of the press freedom rankings published by the Reporters without borders, press freedom in two countries deteriorated strikingly and in post-2013 period still the countries rank around the last quartile.[112]

[111] Chávez accused the opposition media as "enemies of the people" because they violate fundamental human right of to be informed (Zúquete 2008, p. 103).

[112] See Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Barometer at https://rsf.org/en
In late 2016, Turkey reached its lowest in media freedom, especially social media, by blocking reach to social media following the arrest of the politicians from the opposition party, the HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi- Peoples' Democratic Party) and journalists from the opposition journal Cumhuriyet (Republic). On internet freedom scores of Freedom House, Turkey slipped into 'Not Free' category and ranked 61st just after Venezuela, being the last of 'Partly Free' category.

The personal rift between Erdoğan and Aydın Doğan who owns the largest media corporation, the Doğan Group, resulted in the largest tax penalty ever issued in the history of the Turkish Republic (roughly US$2.5 billion) (Dinçşahin 2012, p. 637). Media bosses silenced editorials criticizing the government. In a similar fashion, Chávez refused to renew broadcast license of the local private media company RCTV by accusing of coup generator (Corrales & Penfold 2007, p. 111, Hawkins 2015, p. 11). Moreover, the media in the two countries have suffered from constant pressure and self-censorship as both governments instead of closing the media channels applied these tactics to block criticism.[113] In addition to silencing the opposition media, for disseminating conservative and socialist values and propagating political vision, both leaders established new media channels such as TV channels, newspapers and radio stations.[114] Even though these new communication channels contributed to press freedom at the beginning by challenging the hegemony of the business and secular elite on the media, once the leaders established their political hegemony, the partisan media curtailed press freedom by propagating for the government through distorting the news (Hawkins 2015, p. 11).

Ordinary citizens were also the targets of the leaders if they were the part of the opposition. The event called Tascón List (*Lista Tascón*) in Venezuela demonstrated that the populist government does not abstain from punishing the ordinary citizens of the opposition by denying their access to public sources such as public contracts, jobs and social benefits, besides being threatened by firing from public offices (Penfold-

[113] For details about self-censorship in Turkey see Yesil (2014) "Press Censorship in Turkey: Networks of State Power, Commercial Pressures, and Self-Censorship" and in Venezuela see Acosta-Alzuru (2014) "Melodrama, reality and crisis: The government–media relationship in Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution".

[114] Corrales and Penfold (2007, p. 110) state that the Chávez government established three more television stations, acquired more than 145 local radio stations and 75 community newspapers, and created dozens of administration-friendly websites.

Becerra 2007, p. 74, Corrales & Penfold 2007, p. 108, Hidalgo 2009, p. 83, Ellner 2010, p. 91).[115] Similar discrimination charges were discussed in Turkish public as well, once the rumors of different lists of candidates for public jobs were spread.[116]

[115] Lista Tascón is the event named after making public the names of more than 3 million registered voters who had supported the opposition by Chavista legislator Luis Tascón. As the National Electoral Council had five directors and four of them were Chavistas, Tascón obtained the list of the 3.4 million voters who had signed the request to recall Chávez in 2004 and signatories became the targets of government discrimination (Kornblith 2013, p. 52).

[116] http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/memur-adaylarina-fisleme-iddiasi-geziciler-cemaatciler-chpliler-ve-kurtler-k-1177063/

5. CONCLUSION

Even if there might be some shortcomings and problems, this study is an ambitious attempt at comparing Turkey with a Latin American country. The foremost quality of the dissertation is that it is one of a kind in comparing Hugo Chávez and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Moreover, although there is scholarly work on the relationship between populism and Turkish politics, and even articles comparing Turkey with Latin American countries within the framework of populism, this dissertation can be distinguished by providing a detailed comparative account of Turkey and Venezuela and their prominent leaders, Hugo Chávez and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Regarding the determinants of populism, the hypotheses this dissertation generated require further testing through increasing the number of cases. In order to reach overarching deductions about the validity of background conditions of populism, the conditions discussed in this study should be traced through the study of other populist regimes. Moreover, generalizing the causal relationship between populism and democratic decay which this study avoided to propound necessitates further analytical testing.

Even though there is a lively debate on populism and an effort to define populism on the basis of nationalism and xenophobia owing to rising far right parties or candidates in elections around the world, this study suggested a definition of populism built on that of Weyland, with an emphasis on populism as a political strategy. Consequently, with a minor alteration, this study defined populism as the political strategy of a charismatic leader to realize his political vision by sporadically or systematically

mobilizing the people through appealing to their socio-economic needs, empowering the excluded, and promising to solve daunting problems by exalting the majority.

In order to reveal the antecedent conditions of populism, this study delved into the different and common characteristics of the two cases, Turkey and Venezuela. Even though Turkey and Venezuela differed in historical, economic, demographic, religious, and political structure as well as institutions, they shared similar conditions which were the breakdown of the traditional party system due to the discrediting of what were then the governing political parties, high social inequality, support for a strong executive unrestrained by checks and balances, and firm belief in the democratic system as the World Values Survey data demonstrated. A high level of inequality along with the devastating effects of neoliberal policies, a strong democratic impulse and support for strong executive in both countries explained why the two countries were receptive to strong leaders.

In addition to these necessary but insufficient conditions, socioeconomic policies and policy preferences of the leaders in the political realm explained why the electorate chose to support these leaders. At the beginning of their rule and including the electoral campaign process, the leaders appealed to the democratic impulse of the excluded majority by criticizing the exclusionary character of the establishment and the deficiencies of representative democracy. Once the leaders were able to attain power by the populist strategy, consecutive electoral successes bestowed them with the opportunity of personalizing and consolidating their power.

Critical of what they regarded to be the deficiencies of representative democracy, both leaders and their inner circles proposed their own versions of democracy, conservative and participatory. By their discourse on returning power back to the people or speaking in the name of the people, the leaders claimed that their versions were superior and beneficial to the people thanks to the reincorporation of the excluded masses into politics and the oversight of their well-being in the political system. To legitimize their political project, the leaders claimed that they were struggling for moral values and prosperity of the people. Consequently, with the claim of defeating the corrupt elite and incorporating the excluded majority into politics, the leaders' populist discourse could foster a Manichean worldview.

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