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Transformation of Ethnic/Nationalist Terrorist Organizations from Violence to Politics and Non-Violent Propaganda

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between ethnic/nationalist terrorist organisations, states, and public to explore why ethnic/nationalist terrorists organisations move from violent to non-violent propaganda to realise their political goals. I compare the cases of the PIRA and ETA when both groups were accepted as terrorist organizations by the British and Spanish states and other several countries, and they had few differences like a sectarian struggle in Northern Ireland, but ETA only fought against state itself. Firstly, I examine the development of nation and nationalism as a concept briefly and then utilise Robert P. Gurr's Ethnic Terrorism Model to compare the violent types and in each case. I find that there are several similar reasons why those terrorist groups leave the propaganda by the deed, the decreasing public support being the most important reason and the use of terrorism as a way to achieve towards their political goals by those organizations in both cases.

Table of Contents

Table of Figure(s)

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This thesis asks the question: what are the causes of behind the move of ethnic/nationalist organisations from violent to non-violent propaganda? In other words, it will be examined that why ethnic/nationalist terrorist move away from violence when, mostly, they were at the peak in their career in the pursuit of their political goals? To explore this question, this dissertation will analyse the cases of the IRA and ETA which performed terrorist acts since the 1960s in Northern Ireland and Basque Country, respectively. The next chapter, which lays out the methodology of this dissertation examines the justification for this research question in further detail. As it is stated in the following chapter, this dissertation utilises comparative study as a research method.

This chapter, on the other hand, reviews the related literature on terrorism and ethnic/nationalist terrorism. Because those two terrorist organizations known as the oldest ethnic terrorist groups in Europe and they are self-reliant to each other. Also, in this chapter, five major theories on terrorism, essential arguments of scholars who are specialists in their fields such as Crenshaw, Scheling, Crelinsten *et al.* and their frameworks such as instrumentalist, organizational, political communication, economic, and psychological approaches are explored. Furthermore, it will be mentioned how those terrorist organisations legitimise themselve through the use of political parties close to them.

In the chapter following methodology, there will be a historical background of the IRA and ETA. In this background analysis, what they did in their terrorist career such as important terrorist acts like assassination attempts or civilian killings and how they used the political wing in the electoral system are examined. Despite their violent history, both terrorist organizations renounced their violent acts, and even ETA apologized from their victims and their relatives. After all of these chapters, therefore, in which conditions the ethnic/nationalist terrorist organisations like the IRA and ETA give up the violence and turn to politics or non-violent propaganda will be framed and explored with the major approaches which are examined in the literature review chapter.

Defining the 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'

In the Oxford Dictionary, 'nation' is defined as a large group of people who live together and share the same culture, language, history and ancestors (Oxford Dictionaries 2018). As for the nationalism, Orwell suggests two different meanings: (i) the habit of accepting the humans could be classified like labelling insects and those millions and billions of humans can be labelled as just 'good' or 'bad'; and (ii) the identifying oneself with a single nation and take that nation beyond 'good' and 'bad', and expanding all of its interests (Orwell 1965). Second definition is more important in relation to this research. On the other hand, Grosby's definition of nation and nationalism is more cultural. According to him, the nation has social connotation such as wearing same clothes, eating same foods, singing same songs, speaking the same language and worshipping to same god (Grosby 2005). While birth within a particular territory could be a reason of being a member of a nation, there is no strict rule for being a member of a nation like having kins in a territory. An immigrant, for instance, could be a member of a nation with birth within the national borders. Orwell says nationalism must not be confused with patriotism because if one is a patriot then he or she believes that his or her nation is the best in the whole world, however, has no wish to force on other people because patriotism is defensive and culturally in its nature (Orwell 1965). In this case, an immigrant can be a patriot too. On the other hand, nationalism is a desire for power and every single nationalist wants more power and prestige for his or her nation but not for oneself at the cost of one's own individuality (Orwell 1965).

Walker Connor, one of the major scholars in nationalism debates, argues that the important thing is that people believe that a nation exists while in reality, it does not exist(Connor 1978). He further states that the concept of nation has been often linked to race, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Connor 1978). However, its meaning has changed from 'race' or 'blood group' and to citizenry of a state in the recent past, no matter what of their ethnic groups or blood of a person(Connor 1978). However, in Realpolitik that notion is nothing but a written definition. This issue will be mentioned in the next chapters. Connor's definitions lead us to a new debate which is the difference between a nation and an ethnic group. Smith (2010: Page no) defines an ethnic group as:

"a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites", and a nation as:

"a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members.".

After all those debates, we must talk about the disagreements between the 'nation' and 'ethnic groups'. Ultimately, Grosby says there is no community without internal conflicts, even there is a jealousy and conflicts in the families (Grosby 2005). In this case, ethnic conflicts and nationalist understanding becomes more popular and violent after that point. Because, according to the nationalist understanding, for instance, a nationalist must hate other nations or anyone who is not a true member of his or her nation, as Grosby states (Grosby 2005).

'Terrorism' and Literature on 'Terrorism'

A considerable amount of literature has been published on 'terrorism'. These studies show that there is no universal definition of terrorism, whilst many scholars have common explanations of it. If we look at the first use of the term, as Hoffman reminds us, the word of 'terrorism' was coined during the French Revolution as *régime de la terreur* of a system of 1793-1794 (Hoffman 2017). Original use of the term 'terrorism' was related to a revolutionary or anti-state activity instead of a revolutionary state (Hoffman 2017). As a common definition, in the Oxford Dictionary, the 'terrorism' is defined as "the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims" (Oxford Dictionaries 2018). However, those definitions are unsatisfying to find a generalisable definition from the -published research on this topic. Every scholar has different ideas and point of views according to themselves and those views explain us the concept from just one aspect. Anything could be a tool of terrorism such as bombing a building, the assassination of a significant person, the massacre of civilians, the poisoning of an animal or a human, or stealing a personal data of someone (Hoffman 2017).

All of those actions might include violence or not such as stealing data via technology which is a cyber-terrorism and it is not included in this dissertation. Over the past decade, most research in terrorism has emphasized the use of violence. According to Crenshaw, violence is intentional and optional for terrorists and they have not mental illness such as other approaches claims (Crenshaw 2003). Furthermore, as Hudson says, Paul Wilkinson, who was a political scientist studied on political violence and terrorism, sees the causes of

terrorism as same as the causes of revolution and political violence (Hudson 1999). Additionally, in this thesis, I will use the instrumentalist approach -which Crenshaw and Wilkinson also use- to make my dissertation much more understandable in the chapter of analysis . According to Wieviorka, there are two dimensions of terrorism; firstly, there is a fight against an enemy which carried out in the name of a society or a group of people, social class, nation or religious community and second is that they try to deliver a message using terrorism as a tool (Wieviorka 2003). There is an unambiguous relationship between terrorism and politics since Crenshaw sees the term 'terrorism' as a political label (Crenshaw 2003). On the one hand, the reductionist approach sees the terrorism as a synonym of political violence. On the other hand, according to Stewart and Wilkinson terrorism is a special tool of violence rather than a synonym for political violence or insurgency (Stewart et al. 1987).

Also, Crenshaw notes terrorism is a tool to achieve the political goals for terrorists (Crenshaw 2003). But the more important question is that 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' for whom? As Crenshaw claims, when people use the term 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' against someone, that calling is often a political or moral choice (Crenshaw 2003). It is not a war between the actors who try to defeat each other. According to Crenshaw, just a few terrorist organizations had achieved their political goals, therefore, it could be seen as a failure of terrorism (Crenshaw 2003). On the other hand, according to the organisational approach, terrorism is successful as long as terrorist organizations survivesince organisational approach sees the main goal of terrorism is 'to survive'. Those two approaches are more suitable to understand the 'ethnic/nationalist terrorism', nevertheless, the organizational framework is not fully proper for clarifying this kind of terrorism. Additionally, according to Olson, terrorist organizations do whatever they need and they try to keep their members in the group by giving both tangiblethings such as goods and money (Olson 1988) and intangible things such as respect or feeling of affiliation with a social community (Oots 1986).

On the contrary to Crenshaw, even she had a few similar claims, organisational approach claims that terrorist organisations' goals are not simply political since they have their internal dynamics and are unpredictable (Ozdamar 2008). Crenshaw criticises the organizational approach and states that terrorist organisations are not firms and they do not act according to external pressures, therefore, instrumentalist and economic approaches reveal what terrorism really is and terrorists' aims instead of organisational approach (Ozdamar 2008). The notable discussions and analyses of economic aspect of terrorism has emerged

during the 1970s by Crelinsten. As Crelinsten quoted from Martin Luther King Jr., the riot is the language of the unheard and a tool of communication and Crelinsten points out that violence is a form of communication used by actors who cannot utter their feelings with words or any other way (Crelinsten 2002). That approach called as 'Terrorism as Political Communication' in the literature and many incidents have been explored and explained within that framework. For instance, Pan Am Flight 103 was exploded by a terrorist bomb in the air over Scotland in December 1988 and consequently, 259 people on board were killed (Hoffman 2017). In this case, obviously, there was no link between terrorists and passengers and even flight members. That terrorist act was just a way of communication to announce their voices and purposes that to retailate of a 1986 U.S. bombing campaign against Libya as investigators claim (Encyclopædia Britannica 2008) . On the other hand, as Schelling (1973:10) states: "Violence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used. Successful threats are those that do not have to be carried out".

Additionally, that plane bombing could be seen as a pure terrorist attack. Unequivocally, Schelling criticises that approach and suggest that the meaning of terrorism is trying to change the government's political policies, not to destroy military since military victory is often the beginning of terrorism, not the end of it (Schelling 1973). On the other hand, according to the political communication framework, a terrorist attack does not have to have any direct effect on the victims as it was the case with Oklahoma Bombing in 1996. 'Terrorists' were both former U.S soldiers and members of extreme right-wing and militant Patriot movement and they were protesting policies of US Government but victims had no straight influence on those policies (Encyclopædia Britannica 2018).

There is a large volume of published studies describing the role of economics on terrorism and economical framework started by Landes with the skyjacking in the United States of America in 1978 and it rocketed with 9/11 attacks to USA (Sandler 2014). It is supported that William Landes had a view of terrorists as rational actors and they calculate the benefits and costs of their acts (Sandler 2014). Furthermore, another notable scholar Max Abrahms argues that terrorists are rational actors and he extremely criticized that there was zero percent of terrorist organizations' successful to achieve their political aims by attacking civillians (Abrahms 2008). In addition to Abrahms, Jones and Libicki strongly emphasised that 114 terrorist organizations announced that they gave up the terrorist attacks and got involved into the political process and they achieved their goals by politicisation (Jones &

Libicki 2008). Also, Wilkinson (1986) categorised the reasons of emergence of terrorist groups as economic discrimination, religion, nationalist/ethnic discriminations, religious fundamentalism and political ideologies. Economic discrimination could be seen as a genesis of terrorist organisations, however, under the light of new findings on 'terrorism' studies such as Piazza (2011), economic discrimination was determinative of domestic terrorism, but there is no clue that it is a predictive factor for international terrorism.

Even though some terrorist acts can be explained with economic theories, some types of terrorism, for instance, suicide terrorism, cannot be explained economically because according to economic approaches on terrorism studies terrorists make a cost-benefit analysis on their behaviours and acts but to take their own lives cannot be part of a cost-benefit analysis. In response to this, numerous studies have attempted to explain the terrorism from a psychological aspects. Based on this explanations, terrorists might have mental illness or can be fanatics (Ozdamar 2008: 98). Although some definitions of terrorism might be close to each other, there cannot be an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism or ethnic terrorism because as Wieviorka states:

''… those who studied terrorism were less likely to be scholars than journalists, former military officers, witnesses, or other persons involved in terrorist experiences. as often as not they did not pretend to be objective. As sociological, political, psychological, and even historical research has developed, it has become necessary to locate reliable sources, to make contact with the actors, and -why not?- to define and control the conditions for a scientific study of terrorism and terrorists'' (Wieviorka 2003: 605).

This dissertation attempts to argue both the literature on terrorism and ethnic/nationalist terrorism as discussed in the previous chapter. As mentioned in Chapter I, it starts with Crenshaw's instrumentalist approach to terrorism to understand the general dimension of terrorism and then moves on to Gurr's 'Ethnic Terrorism Model' to understand why people rebel. His model is employed since it sketches a comprehensible explanation for ethno-nationalist terrorism (Gurr 2000). Thus, the causes of ethnic/nationalist terrorism can play a significant role to understand the further causes to move from violence to politics and legitimacy of terrorist groups.

Ethnic/Nationalist Terrorism: Literature Review

The Duke of San Giovanni Carlo Pisacane is remembered with his famous theory, namely 'propaganda by the deed' in which he argues that ideas can be implemented by the deeds, and people will be educated if they are free, not free when they educated (Hoffman 2017). Pisacane was the first person who claimed that there must be an action if people want their ideas to be counted. According to Hoffman, Narodnaya Volka ('People's Will' or 'People's Freedom') was the first group to use Pisacane's dictum who challenged Czar of Russia in 1878 (Hoffman 2017). It is important to note the change in how terrorist group approaches innocent people. When Narodnaya Volka attempted to assasinate Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, terrorists in charge of assassination rejected to perform since he was with his family and they did not want to put innocent people like his children in danger (Hoffman 2017). However, the 'terrorist' organizations in the recent time have not abstained to kill innocent people on the way of their political achievement.

Much of the current literature on terrorism pays particular attention to ethnic/nationalist terrorism. In this field of study, a new debate has emerged to discuss whether a group is a 'terrorist' or 'freedom fighter'. Wieviorka claims that there is no definition of terrorism since one side's terrorist is considered as freedom fighter from the perspective of other side (Wieviorka 2003). That debate will not be argued in this dissertation due to the limited space, however, it clearly shows that there cannot be a clear and objective definition of terrorism. Hoffman reminds us when Israel government identified Yaser Arafat, who was a leader of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as a terrorist, he claimed himself as a freedom fighter and made a speech at United Nations General Assembly in which he addressed the difference between a revolutionary and terrorist. He, then, stated that: "For whoever stands by a just cause and fight for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist." (Hoffman 2017).

Frankly, that statement shows us the two sides of the term of 'terrorism' because, according to Hoffman, the early actors of terrorism did not hide behind the words like freedom fighter or guerilla (Hoffman 2017). While those debates have been going on, some scholars unequivocally argue that terrorism's best definition is acts of violence committed against innocent victims to gain political achievements through spreading fear (Deutch 1997). In addition to the literature on ethnic terrorism studies, Krueger and Maleckova surmise that terrorism is a response to indignity and frustration like economic or political discriminations

under the political repression, not a direct response to poverty or famine (Turk 2004). Several studies thus far have linked ethnic terrorism with politics, for instance, ethnic/nationalist terrorists believe terrorism means to get rid of a major group and achieve their political aims like political autonomy they want (Lefebvre 2003). On the other hand, Byman strongly criticise the general definitions and claims that those definitions neglect the motivations of actors and focus on their targets, however, the motivations of terrorists are crucial which could be seeking for a new regime, an ideological victory, or having their own state (Byman 1998). Quite the reverse, Sanchez-Cuenca claims that the territorial claim is what makes nationalist terrorists different from revolutionists, fascists or religious terrorists and they ask for independence or greater autonomy, thus they kill mostly to break the resistance of the State and by means of that the more they kill the more they will gain privilege from the State (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007).

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

Research Question and Cases Considered

This thesis addresses the following question: what are the causes of ethnic/nationalist groups like the IRA and ETA move from violence to politics and non-violent propaganda? That is to say, why ethnic/nationalist terrorists like the IRA and ETA leave violence and join to political process mostly? To answer this question, I analyse and compare two ethnic/nationalist groups, namely the IRA and ETA, from the beginning of their political violence to their ceasefire and finally abolishment. In order to explore this question, qualitative methods offer an effective way of making an analysis on textual documents. Among qualitative methods, comparison is essential for analysis in the research of political science since it enhance the power of description and reveal the similarities and differences between cases (Collier 1993). Considering that this thesis compare two ethnic/nationalist groups, comparative method is the most suitable method to employ. ‘‘Lijphart defines the comparative method as the analysis of a small number of cases, entailing at least two observations, yet too few to permit the application of conventional statistical analysis’’ (Collier 1993: 106).

In this dissertation, the design of the comparative study is based on ‘document analysis as a collection method of Case Studies and Comparative Analysis in Small-N Designs’ (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff 2016). In terms of sample selection, I decided to compare these two groups for many reasons. Firstly, these two groups are known as the oldest nationalist terrorist groups in the world (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Second reason is that although the IRA and ETA look like similar by having a the state as their single enemy, namely British and Spain, respectively, the IRA differentiates itself from ETA with a sectarian conflict (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Thirdly, a case can lead one to a singular outcome and it has limited point of view, however as Lakhdar Brahimi -former Foreign Minister of Algeria and UN representative- says in his interview, ‘‘… no two situations are alike and there are no ready-made formulas you can take from one place to another’’ (Philps 2018). Because of that, two oldest terrorist organizations in Europe will be very useful to examine the research question of this dissertation with the different point of views. These are the major reasons to choose the IRA and ETA as case studies in this dissertation. Historical backgrounds of these two ethnic groups are mentioned in the next chapter.

Conceptual Framework

In this dissertation, Gurr's Ethnic Terrorism Model is used to understand ethnic/nationalist terrorism's causes, the relationship between the state and terrorist groups, and how those groups are integrated through politics. In this model, Ted Robert Gurr outlines a framework to understand the causes of ethnopolitical terrorism. According to that outline, every conflict is different for each organization (Akcam and Asal 2005). Gurr argues that there are four factors of etiology of ethnopolitical terrorism which are (i) salience of ethnic and cultural identity of members and leaders of the group; (ii) how much the group has encouragement for political action; (iii) the group's capacity for collective action; and (iv) how much the group is available to have opportunities in the group's political environment that leads them through their political achievement (Akcam and Asal 2005).



Figure 1. Gurr's Ethnic Terrorism Model (Akcam and Asal 2005: 8)

Moreover, Gurr indicates that the structure of ethnic/nationalist terrorism is based on several variables such as revolt, organization's capacity, repression of state, group's perception of revolt activity, salience of ethnic identity, comparative disadvantages and advantages, opportunity framework, political/economic/cultural discrimination, authenticity of leadership, international support, territorial concentration, government's decision form and political-economic-cultural differences (Akcam and Asal 2005). In Gurr's model, all ethnic terrorist groups begins with rebellion (Akcam and Asal 2005). Following increased rebellion

incidents, governments apply pressure on rebellions and decrease their group capacity such as terrorists and ammunition. Government repression also decreases other factors of rebellion like leadership, support to the ethnic group and territorial density. Secondly, at the same time repression was decreasing the rebellion, other factors could be decreased by governmental repression as seen in the Figure 1. Rebellion has got disadvantages in this way. If a government increases its discriminations on rebellion, ethnic groups increase their acts leading to further increase of government's repression and discrimination on ethnic groups. The conflicts which were in the past can be encouraging for ethnic groups to rebel and some of them become unforgettable such as conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Akcam and Asal 2005: 7).

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The IRA & The PIRA

Ireland is a unique place in terms of ethnical problems since there has been a long history of conflict between Irish people and the rest of the Island.

‘‘The Gaels gradually merged with Ireland’s aboriginal inhabitants, the Ernai and the Cruithne, to form a social and cultural entity that was already dissimilar in some important respects from the order that prevailed in England at the height of the Roman Empire’’ (Kelley 1982: 1)

Kelley starts to explain the history of Irish people with that words and continues by stating that England was the forefront of European Reformation and became a Protestant kingdom whilst Gaels were Catholic. In 1560, however, after the Queen Elizabeth stepped into the throne, she had started to institutionalise the Gaels and convert their religion by establishing the Church of Ireland as the Protestant (Kelley 1982). The politics has always been concentric with the religion in Ireland. King James II took the throne in 1685 and 26 of 32 countries were declared as properties of the English government even though he was a Catholic, however religion was not just religion but a political badge between Catholics and Protestants as Kelley says (Kelley 1982).

After all of those conflicts, in January 1919 a group of young people founded a rebel organization named ‘Irish Republican Army’ (IRA) (Oglaigh na hEierann in Gaelic language) under the command of Michael Collins who was 29 years old military strategist and launched a struggle for freedom and independence (Kelley 1982). While that was happening, they already had a political wing which was named Sinn Féin as the largest nationalist party in both Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland. As English says, 1916 Easter Rising helped Irish people to give a birth for a fresh era and Irish nationalism succeded with Sinn Féin’s victory in 1917 through nationalist Ireland (English 2012). There have been several violence incidents against Protestants by the IRA as a sign of sectarian conflict, however the IRA did just not kill people because of they had different sectarian, but they aimed police, ex-soldiers, tramps, scholars in a political war (English 2012).

In 1969, the IRA could not protect Catholic people's rights and lives against Protestants and British government's repression and discrimination, therefore, a new organisation inside the IRA was born with the name 'Provisional Irish Republic Army' (PIRA). Since then, there have been two terrorist organisations according to British government, namely the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA (English 2012). Henceforth, I will mean the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Féin when I mention both the IRA and the PIRA, Sinn Féin or 'Provos' in the next chapters of this dissertation. There are many terrorist incidents in the history of the IRA and the most famous and crucial one was called Bloody Sunday. On Bloody Sunday, 13 Catholics had been killed and 29 wounded by security forces, and army officials claimed that they shot back as a self-defence because of direct fire by the IRA members (Kelley 1982). Until the 'Good Friday Agreement' there have been several attacks by the IRA and the most significant ones were Birmingham Bombing and the assassination attempt of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher while she were at Grand Hotel in Brighton during the Conservative Party Conference in 1984 (English 2012). The IRA was responsible from the death of 1,778 people and lost members almost double of that number. Thus the PIRA were the most dreadful organization while they claimed that they were representatives of the community which suffered by sectarianism, discrimination and the state (English 2012). Because of all the violence and terrorist acts carried out by the IRA, the United Kingdom Home Office proscribes the IRA as a terrorist organization in line with the defitinion as stated by Terrorism Act 2000 (The Home Office 2017). Following the Good Friday Agreement (1998), the IRA renounced its violence acts and and moved to a new phase to pursue legitimate politics. The consequences of this shift for both British state and Northern Ireland will be examined in Chapter IV.

ETA

''ETA is a clandestine organization whose only objective is to obtain as rapidly as possible and using all the means possible –including violence— the independence of Euzkadi'' (English 2016: 186).

That statement was made by ETA Executive Committee in 1962 and clearly shows that to achieve its goals for Basque Country, ETA could do whatever it takes. In the Basque Country which is located in a part of North-Eastern Spain and South-Western France, there has always been struggle between Basques and Spanish state domestically and France transnationally.

Before the foundation of ETA, during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-9, Spanish volunteers fought against fascism which represented by General Franco's rebels with his German and Italian allies (Blinkhorn 1988). This war was very violent with over 2.000 political deaths and its impact exceeded Spain and led sufferings in Basque region as well (English 2016). Due to the lack of integration with Basque identity or people in France and Spain, existence of such a territory led to emergence of the crisis which got more serious day-by-day (English 2016).

Although ETA was founded in 1959, it started its violent career at around the same time with the IRA and until 2011 killed over 800 people (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008). In time, Basques have started to feel themselves belong to Spain or France. For instance, literally, the Basques of Iparralde became French citizens in 1792, and the Basques of Hegoalde became Spanish citizens in 1876. However, belonging to both states as citizens culturally and socially took much more time for Basques (English 2016). Sanchez-Cuenca points out that the Basque Autonomus Community includes three provinces in the North of Spain, namely Álava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya. After the death of Franco, as a result of the first democratic elections Basque Country won their partly autonomous independence resulting in having their own parliament and government, police forces, education system, and health system (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008). However, ETA was founded for a bigger purpose which is the fully independent Basque Country. Furthermore, ETA's aims were based on Sabino Policarpo de Arana y Goiri who himself was the effective founder of Basque nationalism who claimed that they needed a defence for their culture and society by any means necessary (English 2016).

Unlike the IRA, in spite of being heavily Catholic, acts of ETA were not sectarian and aimed at Spanish state according to their political statements. In ETA's terrorist career, it has some dreadful terrorist acts like killing Spanish Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973 and car bombing in Barcelona in 1987 which twenty-one civillians –including several children— were killed and also Saragossa bombing killed eleven people including children in the same year (English 2016). Like most terrorist groups, they had a political wing in Spain, Herri Batasuna, meaning 'Popular Unity' or 'Popular Union' which was set up in 1978 and announced themselves as a political wing of armed terrorist group ETA (English 2016). ETA had many financial support and sources, similar to the IRA, as kidnapping and ransom, armed robbery, theft, owning their own shops, and different crimes, However, unlike the IRA, ETA used letters of extortion named 'Revolutionary Tax' and collected a large amount of money from businessmen who were Spanish or Basques (Horgan and Taylor 1999; Buesa and

Baumert 2012). Until 2011, ETA declared some ceasefires with Spanish state, but broke those ceasefires with several claims which were not originated from it. Lastly, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire in June 2011 and reaffirmed on 20 October 2011, therefore, ended its armed campaign and terrorist acts permanently (English 2016). In ETA's last statement made in April 2018, Basque separatist group claimed all direct responsibility for over 800 deaths in the name of nationalist struggle and said that 'they are truly sorry' (Jones 2018).

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS

The Legitimacy and Power

As mentioned in the literature review and historical background, 'The Troubles' era in Northern Ireland was more violent than the ETA's violent career because the PIRA's struggle against the Great Britain was also sectarian in addition to an ethnic conflict resulted in killings of several Protestant civillians and paramilitaries (White 1997). Both the IRA and ETA ceased their violent acts and decided to pursue their goals through political engagement, nevertheless, ETA's political wing Herri Batasuna was banned in 2003 before the call of permanent ceasefire of ETA. Then, new political parties appeared eventhough they announced they were not linked to ETA's political goals and its violence.

A strong relationship between political parties and ethnic/nationalist groups has been reported in the literature review.The cause of such relationship is considered as legitimising these terrorist groups in the public eye as prior studies have noted the importance of legitimacy. For instance, Crenshaw sees the legitimacy as the crucial problem in terrorism and political violence studies, because, according to her, both states and terrorist groups see each other as illegitimate powers and especially left-wing terrorist groups deny the legitimacy of the state and justify the use of violence on this ground (Cook 2003). Furthermore, some scholars, similiar to Crenshaw, like Horowitz also sees the seeking of legitimacy as essential for terrorist groups (Horowitz 1983). What is suprising is that, as mentioned before, Crenshaw sees the term terrorism as a political label and, as Cook argues that "… whoever is stuck with the label is also assumed to lack legitimacy" (Cook 2003: 109). On the one hand, terrorist groups try to legitimise themselves and their acts by referring to states or stronger ethnic groups as an occupier, coloniser and foreign force (Volkan 1997).

In the cases of the IRA and ETA, the lack of legitimacy comes from their insistence of using violence. Furthermore, while Crenshaw says that in order to be succesful against terrorism, the legitimacy is the key, she also argues that the states are the only legitimate entities, not terrorist organisations, which is not true in general considering the various perspectives towards the definition of terrorism (Crenshaw 1983). The important question is that how can we make a clear definition of terrorism while one identifies the other as a

terrorist and the other identifies itself as a freedom fighter. On the other hand, if we separate the politics and the power, it causes a lack of understanding in why terrorist groups start to violence and, then, leave it. Because as Mills reminds us, "the ultimate kind of power is violence" (Mills 1956: 171). The main goal of ethnic/nationalist terrorist groups like the IRA and ETA was to change the status quo and force the state to abandon their lands and, to achieve this, both terrorist groups used violence crucially. Because, all that terrorism wants is to gain power and change the political policies in their claimed lands, control and coerce the state and effect all changes with that power (Hoffman 2017). According to Hoffman (2017), the violence, at least the threat of violence, is the *sine qua non* of terrorists who believe that they can attain their political aims and triumph via violence. As mentioned before, ETA, undoubtedly, expressed the use of violence as a possible method to achieve their political aim in their statement (English 2016). In other words, violence is just a tool which lead those groups through their political goals, while another tool is being in a political process with a political party on the other hand.

The instrumentalist theory which also Crenshaw (2003) supported, makes that exact claim. As Taylor quoted from Morrison, "Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?" (Taylor 1997: 328). For the terrorists who believe in the armed struggle with guns in their hands and political process at the same time, it can be said that they use the violence and terrorism as a political communication because they want full independence besides the electoral triumph. Both ethnic groups the IRA and ETA did use the armed struggle and political parties to achieve their political goals like Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna at the same time. Bruce Hoffman splits the causes of use of violence by terrorists into five argument, those are, Attention, Acknowledgement, Recognition, Authority and Governance (Hoffman 2017).

As Hoffman (2017) reminds us, some terrorist groups have been successful to reach their goals, however the last two objectives could not be achievable for every terrorist groups and they are forced into come up against their end at last. Jones and Libicki claims that there are five major ways to end terrorism which are policing, military force, splintering, politics, or victory (Jones and Libicki 2008). In the case of power, against the IRA and ETA, the British and Spain states fought with their security forces and army and tried to defeat terrorists, however, the IRA and ETA fought back against the army and security forces mostly. While

ETA aimed at the police forces with the biggest rate (47.2%), the IRA aimed at the military members with the second largest piece of cake (40.1%) and aimed at civillians with 42.6% (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Again, the sectarian conflict shows up in that rates. According to Jones and Libicki (2008), there are two significant reasons for the termination of terrorist groups. First one is the decline of permorfing terrorist acts by the members and preferring to join the political process (43%), and the second one is that security forces kill or arrest leaders or key members of the group (40%) (Jones and Libicki 2008). For instance, between 1966 and 2001, the number of death caused by the IRA is 1,778 and the number of dead IRA members is 1,887 (English 2012). In other words, more than the IRA killed, it lost its members or supporters during 'The Troubles' period, and it was an important factor in decreasing reputation of the IRA in the eyes of people. After every terrorist actions of ETA, Spanish state hit back and increased the repression, as Gurr predicts in his Ethnic Terrorism Model, and killed or arrested one of the leaders of ETA like Javier Echebarrieta killing. In addition to this, Echebarrieta was the first killer and also first martry of ETA (Sanchez-Cuenca 2008). The British and Spain states tried to defeat terrorist groups with armed conflicts, however they could not be successful in two or three decades of their struggle against terrorist groups like the IRA and ETA. One of the reason behind that, as Crenshaw argues, those terrorist groups developed new violent or non-violent tactics against the states and they attracted more followers to some extent.

Political and Social Support

The first question in this study sought to determine why both the IRA and ETA left violence in spite of they had still supporters and their own field of war despite the diminished power . The IRA and ETA existed against the British and Spain states, with their political wing and armed wing together towards their political claims. Furthermore, that ethno-nationalist groups have shared almost same reason to fight against their enemies and referred to terrorism to claim protection of their lands and defeat the enemy, as Taylor quoted from Terence Clark who was the IRA supporter:

''I hadn't a political thought in my head other than I knew what we were doing was right because it was the get the 'Brits' out of Ireland. The more you hurt them, I thought, the more fed up they'll get up and want to get out'' (Taylor 1997: 104)

In addition, Sanchez Cuenca quoted the words from Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de ETA written by Francisco Letamendia:

‘‘The function of the armed struggle is not to destroy the enemy, for that is utopian, but it is indeed to force him, through a prolonged war of psychological and physical attrition, to abandon our territory due to exhaustion and isolation’’ (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007: 295).

J.Bowyer Bell said once, ‘‘Revolution is a young man’s game’’ (Bell 1998: vii). Both organisations were founded and leaded by young generation. For instance, Ernie O’Malley was 18 years old medical student who became one of the famous fighters of the IRA (English 2016) and the first funeral of the IRA was belonging to Thomas McElwee who was 23 years old when he died on hunger strike in 1981 (English 2012). As Hoffman says, the teenagers in Northern Ireland were evolved from throwing stones and molotov cocktails to gun-carrying and bomb-making and, finally, to members of the IRA (Hoffman 2017). Furthermore, ETA was founded by young university students in the era of Franco’s dictatorship. Also ETA was a precisely nationalist organisation and, then, developed socialist or Marxist dimensions (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca sees ETA in two categories which are political-military ETA (ETApm) and military ETA (ETAm) while ETApm was supporting the fight in both ways, namely armed conflict and political struggle, ETAm argued that all resources of organisation should be transferred to armed struggle (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). On the other side, in 1919, the IRA was founded at a time when the political and economic discriminations of Catholics were at peak, Due to the lack of capacity of the IRA to lead and protect Catholics from police and Protestants, it led to emergence of the PIRA in 1969 (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). As Sanchez-Cuenca states:

‘‘The Provisional IRA killed around 1,640 people between 1969 and 2001, twice as many fatal victims as ETA in a similar period of time, in spite of the fact that the population of Northern Ireland amounts to some 70 percent of the Basque population’’ (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007: 292).

These figures might be due to the difference of conflict and nationalist terrorism between the IRA and ETA. While both groups acted with nationalist motivations, the IRA’s

struggle was also sectarian leading to several killings of Protestant civillians (White 1997). On the other hand, whilst Basque nationalism was heavily Catholic (English 2016), ETA fought against only Spain state and they made an effort to avoid sectarian conflict, therefore, the conflict of ETA is lesser than the IRA (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Both organisations killed different kinds of people like military member, police officers and civilians. They have chosen their targets due to their ideologies and different reasons to fight. The IRA killed 1644 people in total while ETA had killed almost half of the IRA's total killings and most killings of the IRA were military members and civillians with 40% approximately while ETA's killings included 315 civillians with 40% and 315 police officers with almost the half of its total killings (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). The rates of civillians are similar for the IRA and ETA, however, if we have a look at the total killings, the difference of casualties is seen clearly due to the sectarian conflict. On the other hand, the death rate of military officers by ETA is suprisingly less due to their struggle against Spain state with 94 killings which is 12.1% of total killings, and it means that Spain State fought with ETA with its local security forces instead of strong army forces mostly (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007).

Because of the economic and ideological discriminations caused by British state, the Catholics in Northern Ireland aimed at getting revenge against the sovereignty undoubtedly. Sinn Fein and the IRA had a well-oiled relationship in the beginning, however with the Good Friday Agreement, disagreements had started in the IRA between the IRA and Sinn Fein. An old IRA member once said to the English about the Agreement "They've tried to sell a defeat as a victory" (English 2012: 315). As mentioned above, the IRA and ETA killed many civillians who were not involved in their political issues, but still they suffered. That situation could be understand with the political communication approach as Crelinsten supports, however, both terrorist groups had a strict political aim. According to them, every civilian casuality was serving to a very important purpose. In other words, every act and victim of the IRA and ETA was related to their achievement. On the other hand, as English says, the violence was not the only method Irish nationalist politics employed (English 2016) as they also used their political wing actively. However, as the Good Friday Agreement showed us, the British state was not ready to give up against ethnic/nationalist terrorism and the IRA figured this out before it was too late. An ex-IRA member uttered that "the truth that the outcome of a quarter century of war was not worth a single drop of anybody's blood" (English 2016: 115). Those statements are testimonies of why ethno-nationalist terrorism cannot be foreseen with psychological approach to terrorism because they were not

completely mentally ill people or they were not trying to become popular with respect to political communication approach. After the Good Friday Agreement, the IRA broke cease-fires many times and it shows that their aim was not just becoming popular because from the beginning of their violence career the British state addressed comments to the IRA and tried to make them sit on the negotiation table (Powell 2015).

Even ex-IRA members saw the terrorism just as a way to achieve their political aims and peace. Their armed struggle, in this process, helped the IRA to sit with British government on a negotiation table (English 2016). For a long time too many people died from both sides. As English (2016) says, many IRA members such as former Eamon McGuire questioned themselves whether they used violence unnecesseraily or did not. McGuire classified the phases of the struggle of members of the IRA as follows; firstly, rising up against an unjust system, secondly, the devastation of Stormont Agreement and finally political process to unite all Irish people and move on. If we have a look at from the point of view of political parties, there are different nationalist political parties in both the United Kingdom and Spain. However, the IRA and ETA earned repuation as a terrorist group beause they used terrorism as the primary method towards their political goals. For instance, SDLP leader Seamus Mallon was complaining about the negotiation of British government with the IRA, but did not approach to other parties in the same way because the IRA had guns while the others had not (English 2016). Furthermore, Tony Blair made a clear statement about that dilemma and he said that:

"The SDLP thought that they often got ignored because we were too busy dealing with Sinn Fein. 'If we had weapons you'd treat us more seriously' was their continual refrain. There was some truth in it. The big prize was plainly an end to violence, and they weren't the authors of violence" (English 2016: 119).

This shows us that Sinn Fein and the IRA used the violence as a tool, but other parties and ethnic groups in Northern Ireland did not. In the last era of the IRA, two out of three actions of them were thwarted by the security forces and the intelligence of Britain was very effective against the IRA and their supporters in both Northern Ireland or other parts of the United Kingdom (English 2016). Although there are various reasons behind the cease fire of the IRA, the diminished social support was essential since in time, both terrorist groups lost the support of the public. For instance, ETA was popular in the public eyes in the year which they did not kill anybody. Furthermore, just before the truce between ETA and Spanish state,

Herri Batasuna's votes were 12.9%. During the negotioation of the truce his votes increased to 17.7% which is a noteworthy rise considering the Basque region. However, when the truce was called off, the votes decreased to 10% (Sanchez Cuenca 2007). In addition to that, English (2016) added that like Sinn Fein, ETA has gained much more triumph politically rather than through the armed forces as part of the nationalist movement. Moreover, according to the statistics of a 1979 survey, people in the Basque Country described ETA as a patriot or idealist with 50%.In a similar survey in 1978, in Northern Ireland, 42% of Catholics were identifying the IRA as a patriot or idealist movement. Moreover, it is important to note that Sinn Fein's vote rose from 9.9% in 1992 to 16.1% in 1996 thanks to the truce took place in 1994, then it rocketed to 21.7% in 2001 and 24.3% in 2005 (Sanchez Cuenca 2007). In other words, the public really prefer the peace times since even if they want revenge or achieve some goals with violence and terror, the pecuniary loss and intangible damage is not unilateral.

As English says, several people in Basque region had doubts about ETA's violent methods. When Jose Luis Alvarez Santa Cristina (Txelis) was captured by French Police, she was leading ETA's political movement and made clear in 1997 that the violance of ETA was not necessary, and actually it was benefitting the Spanish state instead of Basque people domestically and internationally (English 2016). The same situation was also valid for the IRA and people who live in Northern Ireland. Richard English himself considers that the cause of the decrease of the public support for the IRA is its violent methods:

"Some might counter that PIRA publicity and support were generated not merely by their violence, but by other activities too: so the 1981 hunger strike gained far more attention for Bobby Sands than had the violent actions on his part which had led to his incarceration, and that strike itself generated significant recruitment to the movement. This was the view of republicans themselves, but also of their British opponents: the UK authorities were clear that among the effects of the hunger strike (even before the painful 1981 sequence had ended) was 'a sharp increase in the influence of the Provisional IRA in Catholic areas, the alienation of much of the minority community in Northern Ireland from government, and the disruption of political life. . . . The Provos and INLA have gained a new batch of recruits.' So the non-violent hunger strike in defence of PIRA violence had itself gained much momentum. And many people also encountered the republican movement's argument through their books rather than their bombs" (English 2016: 134).

This statement reveals that the public prefer to support the violence for victory up to a certain extend, however, when they see that it is possible to achieve their goals through less violent or non-violent actions, they withdraw their support for the violent actors or terrorist groups. Thus, they figured out that and they started to act without violence. By this way, Sinn Fein, the IRA and the supporters of them gained more support internationally and became popular in the international community. As English reminds us, the IRA had several instruments such as media, electoral campaign, local advice centres, and other publicity activities which had played important roles moving their politics forward and it figured out that they could use those instruments to achieve their political goals instead of violence and terrorism (English 2016). On the other hand, the Miltown Cemetery located in the West of Belfast has so many Catholic graves for both members and non-mambers of the IRA, their relatives or friends. Catholics in that area was suffered from the IRA violence too. From a different viewpoint, so many people joined to the IRA and ETA for different purposes because in their times they were famous and become an IRA men or ETA men was noteworthy. As English states:

" 'RA [PIRA] men were celebrities, especially in the seventies… Some women threw themselves at local celebrities. Some guys joined the 'RA to get off with women and never did ops.' Again (though again from a disaffected ex-Provo): 'In the nationalist comunity, in republican circles anyway, IRA men have considerable status, and for those Provos who look for sexual advantages from it, there is no shortage of women willing to give more than the time of day to IRA volunteers' " (English 2016: 143).

The fact remains that people could have gained reputation and respect through being a member of the IRA or ETA as terrorist groups. As Crenshaw (2008) describes the organisational approach to terrorism, since recruits might join to a terrorist organisation for different purposes other than an ideological loyalty frequently, expectations of members and organisations' objectives are not equal. With respect to the ex-IRA example above, the objective was being seen as an important and respectful person in the organisation (English 2016). On the other hand, organisational approach to terrorism cannot make ethnic terrorism understandable because if we have a look to Txelis codenamed ex-ETA member, Jose Luis Alvarez Santa Cristina, she broke off relations with ETA and she was announced as a traitor by ETA itself, and then, she has been murdered by ETA in front of her three-year-old child (English 2016). This example can be seen as individual incident, however, after all the people

in the Basque region has started to lose faith in ETA and its methods to achieve the political goals and independence on behalf of Basque Country, the decreased support of the people led to the ballot boxes. Those ethnic terrorism acts could be seen as nothing, but an instrument to achieve political aims used by the IRA and ETA. Because, besides some single incidents, those terrorists were not lunatic people and after all of that struggle they did give up terrorism because they realised they were losing everything they had. For instance, in 1992, one of ETA members critisised rigorously and stated 'evident loss of popular support' for ETA. According to him, ETA was acting like a dictatorship rather than a liberation movement (Alonso 2011). However, all literature on terrorism and philosophical-scholarly judgment says that the use of terrorism cannot be morally justified as it can be seen in the confession of an ex-IRA member after the Bloody Friday incident, written by Richard English in his book:

"I feel a bit guilty about it because… there was no intention to kill anyone that day. I think we were over-zealous… the risks were too high, and… I don't believe they [the British authorities] were capable of handling so many bombs at one time… I have a fair deal of regret that Bloody Friday took place… a great deal of regret" (English 2016: 147).

The Dialogue and Counter Terrorism

As mentioned above, according to Gurr's Ethnic Terrorism Model (ETM), another reason for stopping the violence might be due to the offical or unofficial dialogues between the states and terrorist groups or counter terrorism strategies implemented by the states against terrorist organisations. Establishing a communication with the terrorists is not enough to bring a peace by itself, but requires repression on these groups to complement communication, as Gurr argues (2005). In Tony Blair's prime ministry period, Jonathan Powell was a head negotiator with the IRA, and he noted that because of the concealment of the IRA and Sinn Fein, it was impossible to know what they were thinking actually (Spencer 2010). Both states negotiated with the IRA and ETA in their active periods. Although the IRA made several peace agreements with the state and broke them multiple times, those moves were strategical with the objectibve of putting pressure on the British state and make them sit on the negotiation table again and again (Ó Dochartaigh 2015). In early 1976, Brendan Duddy -who was an Irish businessman and fellow of Martin McGuinnes- stated that about the British interlucator Donald Midleton (DM) who withdrew from the negotiation table with the Provos':

"I said 'the IRA want peace, but we need a way out of this war. Let us talk and somehow we will end all of this killing'. DM agreed but said 'if the IRA is losing support, why should we aid them by giving them a way out?'" (Ó Dochartaigh 2005: 205).

As it can be seen clearly, even in the 1970s, the IRA was seeking for peace despite they chose the violant propaganda as a method to achieve their political goals. On the other hand, ETA and Spanish state were in touch for the peace process, and ETA's many leaders and key members were in French or Spanish jails or exiled. Moreover, ETA itself might be at the peak of debilitation and weakened materially and psychologically (Clark 1990). Two states practised both repression and the dialogue method at the same time. The IRA might be seen as a winner in terms of armed struggle against the British state, however, the British government did not capitulate to ethnic terrorism. As for ETA, national and international organisations, were interested in negotiations with ETA like other Basque parties such as Amnesty International, international terror groups, international press agencies and some countries like France, Belgium, Algeria *et al.* (Clark 1990). The Spanish government made clear peace agreements with ETA. Every time ETA broke the peace agreement, it led to decreasing public support for ETA. Moreover, ETA had the least public support right after they broke the peace agreements with the state and, in the years when they killed the highest number of soldier, police or civilian (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). The main reason behind stopping the violent propaganda could be seen as a result of decreasing support by the public to the terrorists.

Besides the dialogue, counter terrorism and use of intelligence is another method employed by the British and Spanish states against terrorist organizations. Both states tried to narrow down the IRA's and ETA's fields of war through the use of intelligence. Bamford (2005) and English (2016), for instance, claim that the British government gained big triumphs by identifying terrorists in Northern Ireland in the late 1970s. Some ex-IRA members also confessed that they were on tenterhooks because towards the end of the IRA struggle, the half of the total number of the IRA members were informers or intelligence agents. Acording to Bamford, in 1989, between Garry Adams and MI6 agent Michael Oatley some secret discussions started as a backchannel towards the Northern Irish Peace Process (Bamford 2005). At the same time, the state respression and armed struggle was being in the process against the terrorist organisations internally and externally. For instance, ETA members who were captured by security forces were transferred to prisons far away from

their homes and relatives with the objective of weakening ETA itself and its members psychologically (Alonso 2011). Furthermore, as mentioned above, the number of IRA members died during The Troubles' was more than they killed. On the one hand, with the deaths still the recruitment of the IRA and ETA decreased rapidly and it can be understandd with instrumentalist approach because people in Northern Ireland did not want to join to terrorist organisation after a certain point that state increased repression on terrorist groups and killed more and more of them. Furthermore, people avoided to join these groups, and it caused that their popularity decreased eventually . If those terrorist groups were religious fanatics, according to Psychological approach, settling them down would be harder because their inner beliefs are much more strict and hard to break compared to instrumentalist or organizationalist terrorist groups (Hoffman 2017).

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The objective of this dissertation is to explore the conditions in which ethnic / nationalist terrorists give up violent acts against the majority of the land or the state itself and turn their faces into politics and non-violent propaganda. . To address this question, I examined the cases of the IRA and ETA which are declared as ethnic/nationalist terrorist groups at national and international level. Although theoretical framework of this dissertation is composed of five major approaches to terrorism and ethnic terrorism, instrumentalist approach and Gurr's Ethnic Terrorism Model of structural causes of terrorism are considered as the primary approaches. Thus, I consider the strength of public's opinion and support as essential factors leading the terrorist groups stopping the violence.

The historical background chapter situated both Irish and Basque minority identities in the bloody history of the IRA and ETA. In doing so, the chapter pursued their origins and discussed their reasons to fight against the states and the majority groups. However, both organisations used almost same tactics and strategies in their activities such as car bombing, assassination and random attacks to the centres populated by civilians. It is occured that in the beginning of terrorist armed campaigns, they were strong and had a capacity of fighting effectively, yet they were ready to sit on the negotiaton table and leave the violence instead of fighting eternally. On the other hand, they used political wing with their armed struggle along with the powerful public support both electorally and physhically.

As stated in the literature review chapter, my hypothesis was that ethnic/nationalist terrorist organisations use terrorism as a tool to achieve their political goals, and the historical background and anaylsis chapters supported my hypothesis . The IRA and ETA sat on the negotiation table for many times and they announced constantly that they could make a peace agreement. There can be various reasons for a shift from violent propaganda to politics and non-violant propaganda in the case of ethnic/nationalist groups like the IRA and ETA such as policing, politics, a victory etc. However, the most common cause was the diminishing rate of public support for those organizations. Besides some terrorist attacks like the assassination of Blanco and the assassination attempt to Tatcher, most of the incidents are directly linked to the public and cannot be seen from the political communication approach. Furthermore, some individual incidents caused by terrorism can be understood with the organisational approach ecole, but those are not common as well.

Thus, my findings in the last chapter, largely comply with my hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that the violence in Northen Ireland and Basque Country was the crucial tool for the IRA and ETA to achieve political goals. By this way, it was easier to quit violence for terrorists who use violence as a tool contrary to the fanatic groups or others which use terrorism as a political communication or economical framework. As Gurr's ethnic terrorism model shows us, the relations between ethnic terrorist organisations,state and public are very strict and tangled. Furthermore, as Crenshaw reminds us, those people who feel themselves belong to a terrorist organisation are not lunatic or fanatic. The examples mentioned in the last chapter supports the main hypothesis that those kind of terrorists use terrorism as a tool and their foremost strength is public support. The findings of this dissertation suggest that this kind of terrorism is an essential part of social sciences and must be investigated more by social scientists for further possible threats.

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