

THE TURKISH – UKRAINIAN RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE MILITARY
DEFENCE FIELD IN THE SCOPE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

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ABSTRACT

THE TURKISH – UKRAINIAN RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE MILITARY DEFENCE FIELD IN THE SCOPE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

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This thesis analyzes the Turkish – Ukrainian relations in the military defence field in the scope of the Black Sea region. The developments of the relations between Turkey and Ukraine, the states' policy in the Black Sea as well as the military industrial complexes and the main agreements between Turkey and Ukraine in this field will be discussed in order to answer a question what are the reasons and nature of the Turkish – Ukrainian cooperation in the military defence sphere.

Keywords: Turkish – Ukrainian relations, Military Defence Field, Bilateral Interstate Cooperation, Black Sea region

ÖZ

KARADENİZ BÖLGESİ KAPSAMINDA ASKERİ SAVUNMA ALANINDA TÜRK – UKRAYNA YAKLAŞMASI

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Bu tez, Karadeniz bölgesi kapsamında askeri savunma alanında Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkilerini incelemektedir. Askeri savunma alanında olan Türk – Ukrayna işbirliğinin sebepleri ve doğası ne olduğunu sorusuna cevap vermek için Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkilerindeki gelişmeler, devletlerin Karadeniz'deki politikaları yanısıra askeri sanayi kompleksleri ve Türkiye ile Ukrayna arasında bu alanda yapılan başlıca anlaşmalar tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkileri, Askeri Savunma Alanı, İkili Devletlerarası İşbirliği, Karadeniz bölgesi

To My Family



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	x
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. The Scope and Objective of the Thesis	2
1.2. Literature review.....	3
1.3. Argument.....	16
1.4. Research Method	22
1.5. Organization of the Thesis.....	23
2. TURKEY’S PLACE IN THE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY	24
2.1. Ukrainian foreign policy orientation from 1991 until 2014	25
2.1.1. The main challenges in the Ukrainian – Russian relations before 2014 ..	26
2.1.2. Development of the Ukraine – EU relations until 2014.....	30
2.1.3. Ukraine – NATO relations before 2014.....	33
2.2. The main developments in the Turkish – Ukrainian relations from 1991 to 2014	36
2.3. The importance of Crimea and Crimean Tatars for Turkey	41

3. THE CRIMEAN CRISIS IN 2014 AS THE MAIN CHALLENGE FOR TURKEY’S AND UKRAINE’S SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION	46
3.1. Turkey’s policy in the Black Sea region since 1991	48
3.1.1. Importance of the Black Sea region for Turkey	48
3.1.2. Challenges in the Turkey – NATO relations.....	51
3.2. The Black Sea region in the Ukrainian foreign policy	54
3.3. The policy of Russia, NATO, and the EU in the Black Sea region	59
4. TURKISH – UKRAINIAN RELATIONS IN THE MILITARY DEFENCE FIELD AFTER 2014.....	67
4.1. The state of the Ukrainian military defence complex by 2014	69
4.2. The main achievements of Turkey in the military defence field.....	73
4.3. Turkish – Ukrainian military defence cooperation after 2014	80
5. CONCLUSION	89
REFERENCES.....	92
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	113
B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU.....	123

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BLACKSEAFOR	Black Sea Naval Force
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CE	Council of Europe
CGE	Computable general equilibrium model
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCAs	Defence cooperation agreements
EaP	Eastern Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood policy
EU	European Union
FTZ	Free Trade Zone
GDP	Gross domestic product
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
HLSC	High – Level Strategic Council
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA	Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SBU	Security Service of Ukraine
TAI	Turkish Aerospace Industry
TANAP	Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although some connections between the Turkish/Ottoman and Ukrainian people can be traced in history, the official relations between Turkey and Ukraine started with the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign state by the international community including Turkey. Since its independence, Ukraine has been pursuing the Western direction of development with a focus on joining the Euro – Atlantic structures, particularly the EU and NATO. In some periods, this direction was dominant in the Ukrainian foreign policy; in some – the government tried to implement a more so – called balancing policy, namely, developing relations both with the West and Russia. 2013 – 2014 was a breakthrough year when Viktor Yanukovich's refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 sparked massive protests, which was followed by a coup d'état and a loss of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation, which has always been opposing any attempts of Ukraine to join the Western structures.

After this crisis in Ukraine and the accession of Crimea into Russia, Turkish – Ukrainian relations reached a new strategic level. As most countries, Turkey considered Russia's action as annexation and supported not only the Ukrainian territorial integrity but also the rights of the historically indigenous people of the peninsula – Crimean Tatars. Even though Turkey did not join the Western sanctions, which were imposed on Russia as a response, Turkey and Ukraine began to cooperate in a new field, namely, the military defence one, thus bringing the relations to the strategic level. It is worth noting that from 1991 until 2014, diverse connections between the two countries had been developing in economic, cultural, social, and political spheres. Still, they were limited because Ukraine was going through a difficult transition period after 1991 in terms of domestic and foreign policy. However, the changes in the Black Sea region in 2014 led to a new rapprochement between Ukraine

and Turkey in the sphere, which was not seen before in the relations between these countries. Indeed, this cooperation is not limited to the realm of military purchases; the collaboration between the two in the martial realm is much more profound.

This thesis aims to understand the nature and the reasons for intense military – defence cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey pursuant to the 2014 events. The active cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine in this field has many dimensions and factors; however, this thesis will only be limited to the Black Sea region, particularly because the active cooperation between the two countries can be traced after the tremendous changes happened in 2014 in the Black Sea region. In this thesis, I will avoid the term annexation, which means the illegal occupation of one's territory, since to use it in my research, first of all, I need to have a discussion on this. Since it is not a subject of this work, the terms such as incorporation, accession, and similar to them will be used in order to keep objectivity on this particular topic.

As there is not much scholarly literature on Ukrainian – Turkish relations in general and more specifically on the rapprochement between Ukraine and Turkey in the military – defence field, this thesis aims to contribute to this gap in the literature. It is essential to understand the nature of and factors, which pushed Ukraine and Turkey for such close cooperation, as this rapprochement will certainly influence not only the bilateral relations between Turkey and Ukraine but also the two countries' relations with other key regional players in the Black Sea region as a whole.

1.1. The Scope and Objective of the Thesis

This thesis aims to study the Turkish – Ukrainian rapprochement, particularly its nature and reasons, in the military defence field that occurred after the political crisis in Ukraine, which led to the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the war in the Eastern part of Ukraine. Due to the fact that many external dynamics happening in the international arena may have affected the intensification of the relations between these two countries, the research is limited to the Black Sea region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region turned into an area of both cooperation and confrontation. Turkey, which historically has an exclusive right to govern the Straits, and which has the second – largest naval forces in NATO, the Black Sea is considered as an arena of possibilities to gain the leading role or at least to be

one among equal major powers independent from the Alliance. For Ukraine, the development of the policy in the Black Sea region was mostly ignored until 2014. Focusing primarily on the economic cooperation with the littoral states in the framework of one of the major regional organizations - Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) - Ukraine could not realize its potential. Refusing the entry into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) led by Russia and having limited relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) left Ukraine without a security umbrella, under which it could counter the possible threats.

The dynamics that emerged in 2014, particularly the incorporation of Crimea to Russia, were considered as a threat to the national and regional security and interests of Turkey and Ukraine. The analysis of the history of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations and the policy of each country in the Black Sea region reveals a basis on which Turkey and Ukraine started to build up their cooperation in the military defence field.

1.2. Literature review

The Black Sea region has always been a critical region in terms of geopolitics and an area of confrontation due to the economic, political, religious, and ethnic interests of littoral and non – littoral states. Since the end of the bipolar system of international relations, the Black Sea region has undergone a number of significant changes associated with the emergence of new states that sought not only to gain complete independence from the former Soviet centre but also wanted to develop relations with the West and become part of the European structures and institutions in order to obtain economic, political and even military assistance for further development as a sovereign state. Ukraine is one of the former Soviet states implementing related policy, especially after 2014, to be accepted by the Western countries into their organisations. Turkey, in turn, being one of the main actors in the Black Sea region and holding membership of NATO Alliance, is an essential partner for Ukraine in implementing its foreign policy. After the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the relations between these two countries reached a new level and, for the first time, started to develop in the military defence field.

As there is not much scholarly literature yet on the military cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine after 2014, I will conduct my literature review on the following:

first, Ukraine's and Turkey's policies in the Black Sea region; second, Turkey's and Ukraine's responses to the accession of Crimea, and third, Turkish – Ukrainian relations.

Since Ukraine became an independent actor in the Black Sea region relatively recently and even after its independence Ukraine did not have a certain policy in the region, scholarly literature regarding its policy in the Black Sea is limited. Arkady Moshes affirms that with the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine's policy was directed towards seeking “alternative leadership” in general and in the Black Sea region, particularly. Ukraine was involved in establishing regional cooperation without Moscow's lead, where it could be the first among the equals and by which Ukraine could be closer to the EU. However, as Arkady Moshes argues, the policy of Ukraine in the region was never completely independent, which led to the diminishing of its actual activity in the region.¹ Hanna Shelest, Yevgeniya Gaber, and Artem Fylypenko, in turn, argue that despite the fact that Ukraine is a littoral state of the Black Sea, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its strategic vision and activity in the region was not clear and rather limited. According to the authors, only for the last few years after the loss of Crimea, the Black Sea region became dominant in Ukrainian foreign policy. The scholars state that today's priority of the Ukrainian policy in the region is to develop, first of all, economic cooperation with the individual states.² Hanna Shelest adds that if Ukraine considers the Black Sea region not as a complex and interconnected system but develops its relations with littoral states on a bilateral basis, its foreign policy in the region will be successful.³

¹ Arkady Moshes, “Littoral States and Region Building Around the Black Sea,” in *The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building*, ed. Oleksandr Pavlyuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 2004), 79.

² Hanna Shelest, Yevgeniya Gaber and Artem Fylypenko, “Black Sea Policy of Ukraine,” *UA:Ukraine Analytica* 1, no. 19 (2020): 41-42,
https://www.academia.edu/42667022/Black_Sea_Policy_of_Ukraine.

³ Hanna Shelest, “The Black Sea Region as a Security Challenge for Ukraine,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (2011): 120,
https://www.academia.edu/1132121/The_Black_Sea_Region_as_a_Security_Challenge_for_Ukraine

Siemon T. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova, on the other hand, conclude that the war in the Eastern Ukraine and the accession of Crimea into Russia caused a change in Ukraine's Black Sea security policy and resulted in Ukraine's prioritizing its relations with NATO with the ultimate goal of becoming a part of the Alliance. However, according to these scholars, even though the West politically supported Ukraine during the crisis, it did not give practical support to resolve its conflict with Russia. Therefore, the membership of Ukraine in NATO seems to be a long way off.⁴ To sum up, the Black Sea became an influential agenda for the Ukrainian foreign policy only after the loss of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. This development pushed Ukraine not only to develop a clear foreign policy course towards the Black Sea region but also to seek new, solid alliances and allies in the region.

The scholarly literature on Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea region is much more developed. A.S. Gubanov argues that the end of the Cold War did not change the fundamental foreign policy directions of Turkey regarding the American – Turkish strategic Alliance. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new actors in the region, Ankara is able to play a more independent role from NATO in terms of regional policies. Gubanov further suggests that the military naval initiatives such as Blackseafor, Black Sea Regional Command, and Communication Centre, and Black Sea Harmony Operation proposed by Turkey in the Black Sea region can be considered as a response to the challenges of the United States and NATO, which also have their own interests in the region.⁵ Another scholar Koru also argues that by creating an institutional framework of cooperation between the regional countries, Turkey would be able to obtain leadership in the Black Sea despite the growing interest of the Western allies in the region.⁶ Zafer Eldem claims that

⁴ Siemon T. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova, "Ukraine and Black Sea Security," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, 2018, 14, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/bp_1812_black_sea_ukraine_0.pdf.

⁵ А.С. Губанов, "Политика Безопасности Турции в Черном Море: Военно-Морской Аспект Регионального Сотрудничества и Конкуренции," *Ученые записки Таврического национального университета им. В.И. Вернадского. Серия: Философия. Культурология. Политология. Социология* 27 (55), no. 1/2 66 (2014): 308, <http://sn-philocultpol.cfuv.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/036gubanov.pdf>.

⁶ Selim Koru, "Turkey's Black Sea Policy: Navigating Between Russia and the West," *Black Sea Strategy Papers*, 2017, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/turkeys-black-sea-policy-navigating-russia-west/>.

Turkey has already become a more autonomous and independent actor from NATO. For example, during the Russia – Georgian conflict, referring to the Montreux Convention, Turkey denied entry to the ships of the US Navy “Massey” and “Comfort” through the Straits.⁷

On the other hand, Nikolett Pénczváltó argues that despite Turkey's limited response to the Ukrainian crisis or the accession of Crimea into Russia, its policy cannot be considered as turning away from the West.⁸ Moreover, Yevgeniya Gaber states that the events of 2014 challenged the Turkish foreign policy in the Black Sea region when Turkey had to find a smooth balance between the two extremes: the containment of growing NATO presence that threatens Turkish national interest and security, on the one hand, and not letting Moscow convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake, on the other.⁹

Through applying the concept of regionalism, Duygu Çağla Bayram ve Özgür Tüfekçi argue that the Black Sea is more crucial for Turkey in comparison to the other littoral states since the Straits, which connect the entry to and exit from the Black Sea, are located within the Turkish boundaries. According to the authors, the Turkish policy in the Black Sea is based, firstly, on security and stability in the region by maintaining the balance of power; secondly, on geo – economics aiming to become a hub for energy and transportation lines.¹⁰ Alexander Vasiliev suggests that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea was viewed by Turkey as a shipping corridor with alternative transportation and trade routes that reflected the Turkish policy in the

⁷ Зафер Элдем, “Развитие внешней политики Турции в XX– начале XXI вв,” в *Беларусь—Турция: пути сотрудничества материалы международной научно-практической конференции, 8 декабря 2009 года* (Минск: Четыре четверти, 2010), 60, https://elib.bsu.by/bitstream/123456789/43553/1/safer-eldem_2010_Belarus_Turkey.pdf.

⁸ Nikolett Penzvalto, “Is Turkey Still a Reliable Ally? The Case of the Black Sea,” *AARMS* 18, no. 2 (2019): 87.

⁹ Yevgeniya Gaber, “Turkey’s Black Sea Policy: between “Russian Lake” and “NATO's Backyard,” *UA: Ukraine Analytica* 1, no. 19 (2020): 52, https://www.academia.edu/42666958/TURKEYS_BLACK_SEA_POLICY_BETWEEN_RUSSIAN_LAKE_AND_NATOS_BACKYARD.

¹⁰ Duygu Çağla Bayram and Özgür Tüfekçi, “Turkey’s Black Sea Vision and its Dynamics,” *Karadeniz Arastirmalari Merkezi* 15, no. 57 (2018): 7.

region.¹¹ Zeyno Baran also highlights the importance of maintaining control over the Straits in Turkey's Black Sea policy. Baran argues that Turkey opposes NATO's presence in the Black Sea because this activity will lead to the reconsideration of the Montreux Convention of 1936 that could result in the loss of the Turkish control over the Straits and thus, the Turkish role in the region will be significantly diminished. Moreover, the author suggests that any revision to the Montreux Convention can revive the long-standing enmity between Turkey and Russia, a country, who historically had ambitions to control the Straits in order to gain access to the warm water ports.¹² In addition, A.B. Teymurova states that the special authority over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles provides Turkey with a stable diplomatic position in the Black Sea. Its naval power is considered dominant in the region, and the improvement of the Turkish navy and its system can be regarded as proof of President Erdogan's determined ambition in his attempts to find new regional partners to expand the sphere of Turkey's geopolitical influence, as well as to improve the political climate in the region.¹³ In addition, Devlen claims that by defending the status quo and by strict adherence to the Montreux Convention, Turkey opposes the intervention of outside powers, thereby creating a de facto Turko – Russian condominium in the Black Sea.¹⁴ To conclude, the Turkish policy in the Black Sea is a balancing act between its Western allies and Russia. By implementing its own independent strategy in the region and having a geopolitically crucial location, Turkey aims to become a strong power in the Black Sea.

The crisis of 2014 led to the reconfiguration of the foreign policies of many actors, most importantly Ukraine. Turkey is a regional actor also directly influenced by the

¹¹ Alexander Vasiliev, "The Black Sea Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy: Russia & Turkey on the Black Sea," *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Black Sea Peacebuilding Network Russian Expert Group. Report no. 2010/2, 2, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Turkey_black_sea_report_eng.pdf.

¹² Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region," in *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives*, ed. Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), 90, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/92382/2008_Black_Sea_Text_complete.pdf.

¹³ А.Б. Теймурова, "Инициативы Турции в Сфере Морской Безопасности Черноморского Региона в конце XX – начале XXI в.," *Архонт* no. 3 (2017): 40.

¹⁴ Balkan Devlen, "Don't Poke the Russian Bear: Turkish Policy in the Ukrainian Crisis," *NOREF Policy Brief* (2014): 2, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180832/a5fa13f65a0a0fcece44339be2957279.pdf>.

accession of Crimea. Before proceeding to the analysis of the literature on the development of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations, it is necessary to analyse the literature regarding the position of these countries with regard to the crisis of 2014, in particular, the accession of Crimea to Russia. In the case of secession and later accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation, Turkey's position was an interesting one. Turkey recognized the incorporation as illegal and voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly decision about supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine on 27 March 2014. However, the country did not join the West in imposing sanctions against Russia. In the academic literature, such reaction is mainly characterised as “the middle road approach”¹⁵, “a muted reaction”¹⁶, or “a balancing act”.¹⁷

The most widespread argument in the literature about Turkey's stance is that the relations with Russia are vital for Turkey in economic, energy, and military terms, thus Turkey couldn't impose any sanction, but at the same time, it aims to defend the rights of Crimean Tatars as the “Turkic” people, who are historically indigenous people of the peninsula. Sezai Özçelik explains the balanced Turkish policy through the neo-realist approach arguing that the dependence of Turkey's economy on the Russian energy, trade, and tourism did not allow Turkey to join the Western sanctions; therefore, Turkish reaction was limited to the support of Ukrainian territorial integrity and to ensuring of the Crimean Tatars' rights and freedom.¹⁸ Fulya Ereker and Utku Özer also consider Turkey's position towards the Crimean incorporation in a similar way by stating that the asymmetric economic interdependence with Russia was a

¹⁵ Sezai Özçelik, “The Russian Occupation of Crimea in 2014: The Second Sürgün (The Soviet Genocide) of the Crimean Tatars,” *Troyacademy* 5, no. 1 (2020): 36, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1086236>.

¹⁶ Soner Cagaptay and James Jeffrey, “Turkey's Muted Reaction to the Crimean Crisis,” *Washington Institute*, March 4, 2014, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-muted-reaction-to-the-crimean-crisis>.

¹⁷ Adam Balcer, “Dances with the Bear: Turkey and Russia After Crimea,” *Working Paper* 08 (2014): 2, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_08.pdf.

¹⁸ Özçelik, “The Russian Occupation of Crimea in 2014: The Second Sürgün (The Soviet Genocide) of the Crimean Tatars,” 38.

dominant factor determining the pragmatic Turkish stance.¹⁹ Anika Binnendijk also supports this argument by claiming that the imbalance in the Turkish – Russian relations in the economic field and Turkey's dependency on Russian energy²⁰ pushed Turkey to choose economic interests over other regional considerations.

An essential part of the relevant literature is Turkey's willingness to show its independence from the West and its NATO allies in its foreign policy decision-making since 2014. Thus, N. Belyakova argues that any confrontation in the Black Sea will be detrimental for Turkey since any conflict will lead to the expansion of NATO's presence in the Sea that will diminish the Turkish regional power.²¹ In addition, Adam Balcer supports the idea that not only multidimensional ties with Russia but also “Turkey's disappointment with the West's performance in 2013 in the Syrian crisis, when Turkey and France were left alone in supporting NATO airstrikes against the Assad regime in retaliation for its use of chemical weapons”²² was the factor that affected Turkey's stance. Soner Doğan adds that this time Turkey did not fall into the Western embargo trap reminding the damage to the Turkish economy caused by the UN and USA sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990 Gulf War.²³ Turkey's balancing position in the Ukrainian crisis shows that it wants to extract as much benefit as it can for its own interests and to strengthen its status as an independent actor in the international arena, in general, and in the Black Sea region, in particular.

¹⁹ Fulya Ereker and Utku Özer, “Crimea in Turkish-Russian Relations: Identity, Discourse, or Interdependence?” *Athens Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 4 (2018): 373-374, <https://www.athensjournals.gr/social/2018-5-4-2-Ereker.pdf>.

²⁰ Anika Binnendijk, “The Russian-Turkish Bilateral Relationship: Managing Differences in an Uneasy Partnership,” in *Turkey's Nationalist Course. Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army*, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan, F. Stephen Larrabee, Anika Binnendijk, Katherine Costello, Shira Efron, James Hoobler, Magdalena Kirchner, Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Peter A. Wilson (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 115, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2589/RAND_RR2589.pdf.

²¹ N. Belyakova, “The Crimea and Russian-Turkish Relations,” *Russia and the Moslem World*, no. 9 (2015): 17.

²² Balcer, “Dances with the Bear: Turkey and Russia After Crimea,” 3.

²³ Soner Doğan, “Türk Dış Politikasında Kırılma Noktaları ve İstikrar Arayışı,” *İNSAMER*, November 16, 2016, https://insamer.com/tr/turk-dis-politikasinda-kirilma-noktalari-ve-istikrar-arayisi_397.html.

Ukraine's response to the actions of Russia was understandably assertive. After the treaty's signing resulted in the accession of Crimea by the Russian government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine summoned the Provisional Principal of Russia in Ukraine to submit a *note verbale* of protest on Russia's recognition of the Republic of Crimea and its subsequent annexation of it. Later the Parliament of Ukraine (*Verkhovnaya Rada*) called Russia's actions as a violation of international law and urged the international community to avoid recognizing “temporarily occupied” Crimea and Sevastopol as part of the Russian Federation. Along with filing a claim against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights, Ukraine introduced travel and business restrictions for Ukrainians and foreign citizens visiting the peninsula. Moreover, the Ukrainian government significantly reduced the volume of water into Crimea, stopped the movement of trains and buses, banned the broadcasting of a number of Russian state channels on the territory of Ukraine, and even created the Ministry of Information Policy, with the goal of countering “Russian information aggression”. In the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine asked the European Union, the United States, and NATO to consider all possible mechanisms to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Unfortunately, in the academic literature, there is not much research regarding the analysis of the Ukrainian response to the Russian actions. In addition to some analyses on the reactions of the international community and of some countries, scholars mostly focused on the consequences brought by the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation. This literature is vital in order to understand how Ukraine was affected by the events of 2014 and in what state it was while making decisions about further implementation of its foreign policy. On the impact of the accession of Crimea into Russia for Ukraine, Z. Oleksyuk and H. Schürenberg-Frosch argue that the acquisition of Crimea led to the loss of resources (land, labour, capital, natural resources) and foreign investments, which resulted in a decrease in real GDP by more than 4% and welfare by more than 7%.²⁴ Tadeusz A. Olszański et al. state that one of the significant losses for the Ukrainian economy was the nationalization of *Chornomornaftogaz* Company, which owns various natural gas deposits in the Black Sea shelf, by the Crimean authorities. Although a significant

²⁴ Zoryana Oleksyuk and Hannah Schürenberg-Frosch, “Ukraine's unconsidered losses from the annexation of Crimea: What should we account for in the DCFTA forecasts?” *Review of Development Economics* 23, no. 2 (2019): 898, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/rode.12574>.

proportion of the produced gas was consumed by the peninsula itself, some efforts such as purchasing two new drilling platforms were made to increase production; thus, it can be considered as a loss for the Ukrainian economy. Moreover, the loss of Crimea led to a reduction in the size of Ukraine's exclusive economic zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which means that it became impossible for Ukraine to implement projects regarding the extraction of hydrocarbons from the Black Sea shelf, which it had jointly planned with Western companies.²⁵ Michael P. Barry also focuses on the economic losses of Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea by applying a computable general equilibrium model (CGE). Barry argues that along with the gas and oil sector, the outputs in other sectors such as light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, extraction of minerals, forestry and fishing, agriculture, construction, and many others fell sharply, which resulted in the rise of prices.²⁶

While in terms of security, most of the academic literature considers the accession of Crimea as a threat to regional, European, or even world security, it clearly affected the national security of Ukraine. Indeed, the loss of Crimea, where the basis of the Ukrainian navy was located, crucially weakened Ukraine's position as a maritime power of the Black Sea region. Andrzej Wilk assumes that Ukraine *de facto* has lost almost its entire navy and 20% of its potential air forces and air defence. In addition, Russia obtained the whole infrastructure, namely, bases, warehouses, a research centre for helicopter aviation in Primorskiy, a unique training base NITKA for pilots, etc.²⁷ The Ukrainian response to the accession of Crimea to Russia was quite assertive as a result of the short - and long – term devastating consequences that affected all spheres of Ukraine's development. This development also led Ukraine to look for solid support from its allies.

²⁵ Tadeusz A. Olszański, Arkadiusz Sarna and Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, "The consequences of the annexation of Crimea," *OSW Centre for Eastern Studies*, March 19, 2014, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-03-19/consequences-annexation-crimea>.

²⁶ Michael P. Barry, "The Loss of Crimea How Much Does Ukraine Lose, and How Much Does Russia Gain, a Computable General Equilibrium Model," *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict* 2, no. 1 (2014): 104-105, http://jgpcnet.com/journals/jgpc/Vol_2_No_1_June_2014/5.pdf.

²⁷ Andrzej Wilk, "The military consequences of the annexation of Crimea," *OSW Centre for Eastern Studies*, March 19, 2014, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-03-19/military-consequences-annexation-crimea>.

Regarding the Turkish – Ukrainian relations, Y. Gaber argues that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey pursued to develop good relations with the newly independent states. Gaber explains the Turkish initiatives in the region as a way to establish a new foreign policy orientation by diversifying cooperation with the new regional actors. The Friendship and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed between Ukraine and Turkey in 1992, marked the beginning of Turkish – Ukrainian relations.²⁸ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, in an article published four years after the dissolution of the USSR, maintains that the Ukrainian – Turkish ties will continue to evolve but will be influenced by the developments in Ukrainian relations with Russia and the West. The scholar also highlights some disadvantageous conditions that can hinder the development of bilateral relations. Among them, the author considers the fear of the revival of the Russian Empire that brought Ukraine and Turkey together. According to Sezer, since neither of these two countries can guarantee the impossibility of such resurrection, the emerging of an alternative and more robust source of protection will deteriorate Ukrainian – Turkish relations. Moreover, the scholar pays attention to the rise of Islamic radicalism in the 1990s as a negative factor that can affect bilateral relations since Turkey is predominantly a Muslim country.²⁹ Hanna Shelest, Yevgeniya Gaber, and Artem Fylypenko also highlight some negative aspects, which already affected Turkish – Ukrainian relations. According to the authors, although after the crisis of 2014, the relations between Ankara and Kiev, which were previously profoundly economic, have been diversified and intensified in political and defence realms, Turkey's rapprochement with Russia in terms of procurement of Russian S – 400 missile systems, Russian involvement in the building of a nuclear plant and a new gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine, and Turkey's refusal to join sanctions against Russia had a negative impact on the partnership.³⁰

²⁸ Yevgeniya Gaber, "Turkey's Policy in the Black Sea Region: the Balance of Powers, Threats and Interests," in *Black Sea Region in World Policy: Actors, Factors, and Scenarios of the Future*, ed. Olga Brusylovska, Volodymyr Dubovyk, and Igor Koval (Odesa: Odesa Mechnikov National University Press, 2020), 28.

²⁹ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Ukraine, Turkey, and the Black Sea Region," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 94-95, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036685>.

³⁰ Shelest, Gaber and Fylypenko, "Black Sea Policy of Ukraine," 39.

Vyacheslav G. Tsivaty, on the opposite, by analysing the institutional model of political and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Ukraine, found out that recent changes in the international system and internal political upheavals, in general, did not affect the Ukrainian – Turkish relations. On the contrary, it increased the recognition of both countries in mutual strategic interests in the region.³¹ Hanna Shelest explores the variants of possible cooperation between Ukraine and different regional states to enhance the security and capacity of Ukraine in the region. The scholar suggests that although Turkey is one of the most influential states in the Black Sea due to its geographical location, naval advancement, economic potential, and exclusive rights to control the Straits, there are two problematic factors: firstly, Turkey opposes the construction of any alternative pipelines in the Black Sea in order to preserve the control of main transportations of oil and gas on its own territory; secondly, Turkey together with Russia may try to hinder the NATO's expansion to the Black Sea.³² Anar Somuncuoğlu, on the other hand, argues that although Turkey and Ukraine seemed to be in a position of competitors in the context of transportation, these two countries can actually cooperate through becoming transit partners for each other. Ukraine may form an alternative route for Turkey to reach the Central European and Baltic markets, while Turkey may connect the Middle Eastern market with Ukraine.³³

In the early 1900s, Ukrainian military chief Symon Petlura argued for creating a Black Sea Union including Georgia, Kuban, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine to resist the Russian expansion, emphasizing that Ukraine's cooperation with Turkey is crucial for the reasons that, firstly, Turkey is a major state in the region. Secondly, he believed that Turkey could unite the Caucasus against Russian expansionism. At the same time,

³¹ Вячеслав Циватый, “Украина–Турция: политико-дипломатический диалог геополитических соседей начала XXI века (институциональное измерение),” *Проблемы постсоветского пространства* 4, no. 2 (2017): 117.

³² Hanna Shelest, “The role of Ukraine in the enhancing security and economic cooperation in the Black Sea Region,” *Black Sea International Symposium “Black Sea Neighborhood”*. *Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Giresun Universitesi*, no. 7 (2009): 66-67, https://www.academia.edu/368024/The_role_of_Ukraine_in_the_enhancing_security_and_economic_cooperation_in_the_Black_Sea_Region.

³³ Anar Somuncuoğlu, “Turkish-Ukrainian Cooperation on new Transit Corridors,” *AVİM Conference Book*, no. 22 (2018): 42, https://www.academia.edu/37319498/TURKISH_UKRAINIAN_COOPERATION_ON_NEW_TRANSIT_CORRIDORS.

Antin Sinyavsky argued that the development of the Turkish – Ukrainian cooperation and trade could positively affect the security and prosperity of the region. Ostap Kushnir, by giving examples of the cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and Ukrainians in the 17th century, also states that the active cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine would allow them to develop military strength, thereby ensuring not only the security and prosperity of the region but also ensure stability on the EU borders and even the whole Middle East.³⁴

Yevgeniya Gaber, by examining the regional security challenges such as the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine, and Russia's intervention in Syria, argues that the Ukrainian – Turkish relations should not be considered as a reaction to the assertive Russian policy in the international arena. The author highlights that the “strategic partnership” between Ankara and Kiev was established earlier in 2011 with a mechanism of High – Level Strategic Council in order to promote bilateral relations between these countries. Furthermore, the scholar states that the Ukrainian – Turkish partnership possesses the necessary potential in military, political, and diplomatic realms in order to be a cornerstone in the new regional security structure.³⁵ However, V.A. Kanarova argues that the crisis in the relations between Turkey and Russia after the shooting down of the Russian military jet in 2015 was the impetus for the activation of the Ukrainian – Turkish relations. Turkey recognizes that its regional policy cannot be pursued without Ukraine as one of the key players in the Black Sea region; thus, Turkey actively supports Ukraine and its territorial integrity, provides military and economic

³⁴ Ostap Kushnir, “Ukrainian policies in the Black Sea littoral: history, current trends and perspectives,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 25, no. 2 (2017): 167, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14782804.2016.1219845?casa_token=JbsFZtURn3sAAAAA:JvwRXrLJSi8Xsiao4ofibUh0eglAY2jB0iSdGDwvXRQJop4-Ce0SQHR4Ug3bUwu3AL1gqq7N6sclJg.

³⁵ Yevgeniya Gaber, “Facing Regional Security Challenges: Ukrainian and Turkish Experiences,” in *Karadeniz ve Kafkaslar: Riskler ve Fırsatlar: Ekonomi, Enerji ve Güvenlik*, ed. Osman Orhan (Istanbul: TASAM Yayınlar, 2018): 99-100, https://www.academia.edu/27872858/Facing_Regional_Security_Challenges_Ukrainian_and_Turkish_Experiences_doc.

assistance. Moreover, both countries are working on a number of military – technical and military – industrial projects and continue to increase trade.³⁶

Turgut Kerem Tuncel and Ayşegül Aydingün, through revising the history of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations, conclude that by developing solid economic and political relations not only in a bilateral but also in a multilateral framework, these two countries could contribute to the regionalization of the Black Sea because both Turkey and Ukraine have vast potential due to their geopolitical importance, technological and industrial infrastructure, etc.³⁷ Maryna Vorotnyuk argues that the cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey in a partner good – neighbourly format requires intensifying efforts of both countries to fulfil bilateral interaction with the content of a strategic partnership that could smooth out possible conflicts of interests of these two countries in the region.³⁸ However, Y. Gaber, by analysing the Turkish policy in the case of the Russia – Georgian conflict in 2008, states that Turkey prefers multilateral rather than bilateral cooperation in its security policy in the Black Sea region and opposes any intervention in regional conflicts even one of the parties is its strategic partner. As claimed by the author, Turkey considers multilateral initiatives as a platform for the joint action of actors even with opposing positions. They also form the basis for a comprehensive regional security system.³⁹

The relations between Turkey and Ukraine have been developing in various realms since 1991. While before 2014, the relations between the two were predominantly strong in economic and social spheres, in the post – 2014 period, the relations have begun to improve steadily in the military – defence realm. While there are still many

³⁶ В.Н. Канарова, “Украинско-турецкие отношения в 2014-2019 гг.: динамика, тенденции, перспективы,” *Постсоветские исследования* 2, no. 7 (2019): 1536-1537.

³⁷ Turgut Kerem Tuncel and Ayşegül Aydingün, “Turkish-Ukrainian Relations Throughout History: Continuities and Strategic Requirements,” *AVİM Conference Book*, no. 22 (2018): 33.

³⁸ Марина Олександрівна Воротнюк, “Україна і Туреччина в контексті геополітичних трансформацій у басейні Чорного моря,” *Стратегічні пріоритети* 10, no. 1 (2009): 268, https://www.academia.edu/338582/Ukraine_and_Turkey_in_the_context_of_geopolitical_transformations_in_the_Black_Sea_area.

³⁹ Є.В. Габер, “Політика Туреччини в Чорноморському регіоні: двостороннє партнерство чи регіональна інтеграція?” *Вісник Одеського національного університету* 16, no. 10 (2011): 883, https://www.academia.edu/1053766/Turkish_Policy_in_the_Black_Sea_Region_Bilateral_Partnership_or_Regional_Integration_in_Ukrainian.

controversial issues in this partnership, such as Turkey's uncertain reaction to the accession of Crimea into Russia, different ideas about ensuring the safety of the Black Sea, alternative routes gas and oil transportation corridors, Turkey and Ukraine aim to intensify their relations in the new realms as well. The rapprochement in the military – defence sphere makes their partnership a strategic one. In this thesis, I will examine the nature and the reasons for the Turkish – Ukrainian rapprochement in the military – defence sphere, thereby fulfilling the wide gap in the academic literature.

1.3. Argument

The argument of the thesis is that the Ukrainian crisis followed by the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014 served as an impetus to the Turkish – Ukrainian rapprochement in the military defence field. From the Ukrainian perspective, the accession of Crimea into Russia was considered as a violation of the state's territorial integrity and its national security. Being not a NATO member and having a weak defence – industrial complex pushed Ukraine to develop bilateral cooperation with the countries supporting its position on the issue. The neighbouring Black Sea country Turkey is considered by Ukraine as a strong and reliable partner for the developing relations in the military defence field; first of all, because Turkey is a long – time NATO member with a modern defence – industrial complex; secondly, the Turkish – Ukrainian relations have been developing since 1991, they are not new; thirdly, Turkey always supported the independence of Ukraine, and now it supports the Ukrainian side on the issue of Crimea. From the perspective of Turkey, the incorporation of Crimea in Russia led to the rise of the Russian power in the region, on the one hand, and the expansion of the NATO's presence in the Black Sea, on the other, both of which are considered as a threat to the national and regional security and interests of Turkey. Secondly, during the last decade, Turkey has discords with its Western partners regarding the implementation of the foreign policy, which caused the suspension of the agreements on the supply of components and exclusion of Turkey from the joint programmes. Thus, Turkey, which aims at developing its own independent defence – industrial complex, had to find a partner, which could substitute the former ones. Ukraine, which inherited the technologies from the Soviet Union in the military defence production, seemed like a potential partner to develop the relations in this field.

In terms of the theoretical framework, before proceeding directly to the topic of bilateral cooperation of states in the military – defence sphere, particularly to the definition of military defence cooperation and the issue of when and how two states start to cooperate, it is necessary to consider the concept and preconditions of interstate cooperation, in general. Cooperation is one of the most effective mechanisms of interaction between states that have always been playing a fundamental role in international relations. In the discipline of international relations, the concept of interstate cooperation, its reasons, and preconditions have been studied by representatives of various schools of thought. Analysing modern literature on interstate cooperation, Helen Milner highlights the two most important theoretical achievements in the subject. First, despite the ongoing discussions, an agreement on the concept of interstate cooperation has been formed in the scientific community. Following Robert Keohane, many scholars define cooperation as a situation “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”.⁴⁰ In other words, interstate cooperation presupposes the existence of three elements: the common objectives of the partner states, their expectation of benefits from the cooperation, and the reciprocal nature of these benefits. Another important achievement of recent research on interstate cooperation emphasized by Milner is the development of hypotheses about the conditions under which cooperation among states becomes more likely to be developed in the framework of game theory to model relations at the systemic level. The scholar distinguishes six such hypotheses. The first one is a “reciprocity hypothesis” based on the possibility for partner states to have equal opportunities, both in obtaining benefits from cooperation and incurring losses in case of rejection to fulfil the obligations under a signed interstate treaty. Representatives of neoliberalism following economic reasoning argue that states cooperate only to maximize their absolute gains,⁴¹ whereas neorealists believe that, in fact, establishing cooperation is very difficult, even under the condition when all parties obtain absolute gains because states pursue relative gains as well, or in other words, seeks to compare their absolute gains with those of other

⁴⁰ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 51–52.

⁴¹ Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 4 (1991): 1303, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1963947>.

states. But it does not mean that cooperation is impossible; according to neorealism, cooperation will be likely in one condition if the balanced distribution of gains is achieved.⁴² Second, the “hypothesis about the number of actors” assumes that the more states involve in cooperation, the fewer benefits each of them will receive. Thus, the prospects of cooperation increase with a decrease in the number of interacting states.⁴³ Neorealists, on the opposite, argue that a state will prefer more partners since it will enhance the likelihood that relative gains of the better – positioned partners can be counteracted by more beneficial sharings emerging from interactions with weaker partners.⁴⁴ The third hypothesis on interstate cooperation is “the hypothesis of the iteration”, which suggests that the longer relationships between the states exist, the more likely these states will enter the stage of cooperation⁴⁵ (Axelrod's theory “shadow of the future”⁴⁶). Forth, “hypothesis of international regimes” or on the norms, principles, and procedures for decision-making, the totality of which is the centres of interstate cooperation. The neorealist and neoliberalist schools of thought agree on their importance in international cooperation, but the views differ in terms of defining the role of the international regimes in cooperation. Neoliberalists argue that regimes provide information about the behaviour of others, especially the likelihood of their cheating. In this way, regimes reduce states' uncertainty and fears that others will defect and, in turn, their own incline to do so, which makes cooperation more likely. Whereas neorealists assume that since states see the provision of information as a key political issue, it is also apparent that regimes can provide much information, and this can be influential, as the fears of some states reveal. The fifth hypothesis suggests that the existence of an epistemic community, i.e., the cooperation of professional experts

⁴² Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model,” *The Journal of Politics* 50, no. 3 (1988): 603, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2131460>.

⁴³ Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (1992): 473-474, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010546>.

⁴⁴ Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 506, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787>.

⁴⁵ Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” 474.

⁴⁶ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 232, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357>.

who share a common understanding of the problem and its way of solutions, can be a prerequisite for interstate cooperation. Finally, the last hypothesis, which resembles the so – called hegemonic theory of stability, assumes that the inequality of states in terms of power is conducive to interstate cooperation since the inequality allows the more powerful state to play the main role in organizing the system.⁴⁷ Realists, specifically the representatives of the defensive realism, also suggest that such imbalance in power facilitate interstate cooperation; however, it is argued that states will cooperate if one state becomes much stronger, significantly surpassing the power of the others; thus, the rest of the states of the system will begin to build up their own strength directed against the strengthened state by cooperating with each other (Balance of power theory).⁴⁸ Moreover, the balance of threat theory, which refines and complements the balance of power theory, claims that states will cooperate to balance the external threats rather than against power alone.⁴⁹

The representatives of the constructivist approach, in turn, argue that the assumptions on the preconditions of the interstate cooperation presented by neorealism and neoliberalism are limited to state interest defined in terms of military power or in terms of economic power, whereas analysis of modern interstate cooperation requires increased attention to the role of social norms and institutions, group values and identities, cultures and traditions that motivate the interests of the parties involved in cooperation.⁵⁰

Analysing the primary assumptions on the preconditions of interstate cooperation, in general, provides a theoretical basis for the current research on two states' cooperation in the military defence field. In this thesis, military defence cooperation is understood

⁴⁷ Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," 475-480.

⁴⁸ П.А. Цыганков, *Теория международных отношений* (Москва: Гардарики, 2003), 236.

⁴⁹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): 5, <http://ianchen.org/teaching/Walt1987.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Duncan Snidal and Michael Sampson, "Interstate Cooperation Theory and International Institutions," *Oxford Bibliographies* (2014), <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0093.xml>.

as mutual cooperation ranging “from coordinating defence policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology”.⁵¹ The military – defence cooperation constitutes, first, official defence cooperation, i.e., official interactions and documentation, which may lead to signing defence cooperation agreement; second, military cooperation, joint exercises, training, logistics; and third, defence industrial cooperation, including collaborative research, weapon procurement, and development.⁵²

While scholars are more focused on the military alliances as a form of interstate cooperation in terms of maintaining the security of a state, bilateral cooperation in the form of defence cooperation agreements (DCAs) is the most widespread form of institutionalized cooperation in this field. According to Brandon J Kinne, the main difference between DCAs and alliances is that alliances focus primarily on conflict; conflict – related obligations are an essential condition for an alliance. In contrast, bilateral DCAs exclusively address cooperation, excluding mutual defence or nonaggression obligations.⁵³ Indeed, Sean D. Murphy, in his research on the role of bilateral defence agreements between the USA and its European allies in maintaining European security, argues that the DCAs are more flexible and adaptive to the changing international system, in comparison to the multilateral defence agreements there are more easily to negotiate, amend and structure to suit special needs of each party.⁵⁴ Eva Hagström Frisell and Emma Sjökvist, in the study on Swedish security, argues that the occupied with the rising power of Russia and deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region, Sweden considers the bilateral military defence cooperation as an instrument to strengthen its national defence capability, at the same

⁵¹ Brandon J Kinne, “The Defence Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD),” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64, no. 4 (2020): 1, https://escholarship.org/content/qt9w01x2xp/qt9w01x2xp_noSplash_55bbf5575b57f411fe9f941715ebb307.pdf.

⁵² Jana Urbanovská, Martin Chovančík and Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, “German-UK defence cooperation amid Brexit: prospects for new bilateralism?” *European Security* (2021): 3.

⁵³ Kinne, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD),” 7.

⁵⁴ Sean D. Murphy, “The Role of Bilateral Defense Agreements in Maintaining the European Security Equilibrium,” *Cornell International Law Journal* 24, no. 3 (1991): 415-416, <https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=cilj>.

time the Swedish officials do not take NATO membership into consideration stating that it will create tension to its neighbourhood, especially Finland, and cause possible divisions among Swedish public.⁵⁵ Indeed, the research on the Swedish-Finnish bilateral cooperation in the military defence field shows that only through such cooperation small and medium – sized countries can improve military capabilities to be able to counter a possible armed attack from a powerful adversary. It is stated that the deepening bilateral military defence cooperation of these two non – allied states may serve as a tool to avoid the difficult decisions related to NATO membership.⁵⁶

The already mentioned scholar Brandon J Kinne in his work “Defence Cooperation Agreements as a Global Security Network”, was the first who developed a comprehensive theory of DCA formation by combining cooperation theory with network-analytic insights. Since cooperation theory presumes that states cooperate to attain joint gains,⁵⁷ the changes in the international arena following the end of the Cold War, the decline in the number of interstate conflicts, and the emergence of non – traditional threats have increased the joint gains for defence cooperation, which led to an increase in the number of DCAs. In the framework of cooperation theory, the author distinguishes four main factors for increasing demands in DCAs. Firstly, states want to modernize their military and improve their defence capacities through collaborative research, joint military exercises, education and training, and arms procurement. The author argues that wealthy and powerful states, which are active in the arms trade, are more preferable for defence cooperation due to their ability to supply weapons and other equipment. Secondly, states need to develop coordinated responses to common security threats, which is a long – standing motivation to sign DCAs. Thirdly, states are prone to align themselves with communities of like-minded and politically similar

⁵⁵ Eva Hagström Frisell and Emma Sjökvist, *Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations. A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2019), 13.

⁵⁶ Tomas Bertelman, *International Defence Cooperation. Efficiency, Solidarity, Sovereignty*. Report from the Inquiry on Sweden’s International Defence Cooperation. Fö 2013:B (Stockholm: Regeringskansliet/Ministry of Defence, 2014), 33, <https://www.government.se/contentassets/5c39a5fe2c2745f18c8e42322af4fbc4/international-defence-cooperation---efficiency-solidarity-sovereignty>.

⁵⁷ Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (1984): 18, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010304>.

collaborators. Lastly, Kinne states that signing DCAs with the members of NATO is an essential mechanism for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) states to be able to reach the Alliance's standards and eventually become a member. While Kinne states that joint gains can increase the possibility of signing DCAs, they are not sufficient alone. Kinne assumes that the lack of information about others' credibility or willingness to cooperate may limit the possibility of signing DCAs. The author argues that since such agreements include some sensitive issues concerning national security, such as access to classified information and strategy of defence policies, or weapons technologies, signatory countries should have the appropriate level of trust in each other in order to be sure that the other will not use the information to obtain unilateral gain.

Thus, the author offers to consider the network influence, which provides states with information about the trustworthiness of partners, thereby, reduces the risk of possible asymmetric distribution of gains. Kinne has identified two specific network influences: preferential attachment, when there is a highly active state – a “hub”, which endogenously attract new partners, and triadic closure, when the conditions, which share DCAs with the same third party, are prone to sign DCAs between each other.⁵⁸

This profound research on the approaches of analysing the bilateral military defence cooperation between states will serve as a theoretical basis in this thesis.

1.4. Research Method

So as to study the Turkish – Ukrainian relations in the military defence field, its nature, and reasons, this study relies on the extensive examination of primary and secondary sources in English, Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian. The present analysis focuses mainly on written and spoken languages, and to some extent, on statistical data. Regarding the primary sources, this research is based on the analysis of some documents such as official documents, agreements, statistical reports, online state archives, speeches, and interviews, while as secondary sources have been used elements, such as books, articles in journals and newspaper, websites, Ph.D. dissertations.

⁵⁸ Kinne, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network,” 802.

1.5. Organization of the Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters. The introduction presented the scope and objective of the researched issue and the literature review on the subject, the argument, the theoretical framework, and the research method used for the study.

In the second chapter, in the framework of the Ukrainian foreign policy orientation from 1991 until 2014, the historical background of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations and the importance of Crimea for Turkey will be presented.

The third chapter includes the analysis of Turkey's and Ukraine's policy in the Black Sea region since 1991 with a focus on the main priorities of and challenges for these two countries in the region, particularly the Crimean issue. Moreover, the policy of Russia, NATO, and the EU as the prominent actors in the Black Sea will be briefly analysed in order to have a complete picture of the dynamics under which the Turkish and Ukrainian regional policy was being formed in the last two decades.

The fourth chapter presents the main findings of the thesis, namely, the analysis of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations in the military defence field started in 2014. To understand what kind of needs the two countries have in this field, the chapter includes the analysis of the state of the Ukrainian defence – industrial complex as well as the main achievements and challenges in the Turkish defence industrial complex. The most important part of the findings is the study of the main agreements and projects conducted between Turkey and Ukraine since 2014.

In the last chapter, the summary of the research will be presented, including the conclusions of each chapter, which lead to the answer to the research question and the confirmation of the argument submitted to the defence. Moreover, in the conclusion part of the thesis, the main limitations of the research and the further research needed in this subject will be briefly discussed.

CHAPTER 2

TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The first contacts between the Turkish/Ottoman and Ukrainian authorities appeared a long time ago, which were expressed in the formation of short lasted military and political cooperation against common enemies. The most apparent attempts of such cooperation were conducted by Hetman Khmelnitskiy in 1648⁵⁹ and by Hetman Petro Doroshenko in 1669.⁶⁰ After the expansion of the Russian Empire, the contacts were cut off until the beginning of the First World War, when Ottomans actively supported the Ukrainian nationalists' organizations, which were fighting for independence from Tsarist Russia. It was not surprising that the Ottoman Empire was one of the states who recognised the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by signing the Treaties on Friendship and Alliance in 1918. Later with the emergence of the USSR in 1922, Turkey and the Ukrainian SSR signed a Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood. Speaking on January 3, 1922, at a reception on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty, M. Kemal Atatürk noted: "It is possible to say that Ukraine and Turkey are two neighbouring countries. Peer at the North. There is a Sea. But if you

⁵⁹ B. Khmelnitskiy made an alliance with the Crimean Tatars (vassals of the Ottoman Sultan) due to which the Polish Commonwealth was defeated. Bogdan Khmelnitsky wrote to Sultan Mehmed IV with an offer of citizenship (подданство). In 1650, he received a gracious letter on behalf of the Sultan with the acceptance of the Cossacks under the patronage of the High Port. Khmelnytsky himself received a caftan from the Caliph of the Faithful.

⁶⁰ Hetman Petro Doroshenko signed a treaty with the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars in 1669 in order to obtain support for a rebellion to overthrow the Lithuanian-Polish and the Muscovite rules, and to unite the divided Cossack Ukraine.

think for a moment that the Sea is absent, you will see that Turkey and Ukraine are the nearest countries to each other....”⁶¹

Analysing Ukrainian foreign policy orientation from 1991 until 2014 with a focus on the developments in its relations with Russia, the EU, and NATO provides the background on which Turkish – Ukrainian relations were building up.

2.1. Ukrainian foreign policy orientation from 1991 until 2014

The Denunciation of a Treaty on the Formation of the USSR led to the emergence of the newly sovereign states. All the post – Soviet countries needed to rethink their own national interests, which would be realized through the definition of new values, the search for new allies, the creation of new interstate unions, the adoption of new laws, etc. From the first days of its independence, Ukraine began to pursue an active policy in the international arena. The great importance for the development of the foreign policy of the young state was the Law “On the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy” adopted by the *Verkhovna Rada* in 1993 and its successor the Law “On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign policy” entered into force in 2010. The document determined the primary national interests of the country and consolidated the principles on which its foreign policy was to be implemented. It emphasized that Ukraine would pursue an open foreign policy and strive for cooperation with all countries of the world, avoiding dependence on individual states and groups of states. The Ukrainian foreign policy was proclaimed as active, balanced, flexible, and directed towards the development of bilateral interstate relations, the expanding participation in European regional cooperation, the cooperation within CIS, the membership in the UN, and other universal international organizations.

Within the framework of bilateral relations, four groups of states were identified as priority: border countries, Western member states of the EU and NATO, geographically close states, and states of Asia, Asia – Pacific, Africa, and Latin

⁶¹ İ. F. Çernikov, “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türkiye-Ukrayna ilişkileri (1918–1938),” (çev. Berna Türkdoğan), *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 19, no. 55, (2003): 307, <https://www.atam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/Igor-TCHERNIKOV-Mustafa-Kemal-Atat%C3%BCrk-and-Turkish-Ukrainian-Relations-1918-1938.pdf>.

America.⁶² In this paragraph, the directions of the Ukrainian foreign policy towards the first two groups of states will be analysed.

2.1.1. The main challenges in the Ukrainian – Russian relations before 2014

As noted in the Law, due to the historical past, the specifics of geopolitical, and the geo – economic position of Ukraine, the priority of its bilateral relations with the Border States is the relations with Russia that created the largest number of challenges for Ukraine. Even though Russia was one of the first countries, which recognized the independence of Ukraine on December 2, 1991, even before the actual signing of an Agreement on the Dissolution of the USSR on December 8, 1991, regardless of the personality of the president in both countries the relations between Russia and Ukraine were full of issues that worsened or subsided in different periods. The problems were associated with the division of military property, the breaking of long – term ties in the defence and energy spheres, as well as territorial issues. In terms of the military defence industry, Ukraine inherited from the USSR the second largest (40%) and the most valuable part of the military – industrial complex. Among them, there were the giants such as “Yuzhmash”, “Arsenal”, “Khartron” and others, which produced transport aircrafts, missile cruisers, tanks (Ukraine produced about 50% Soviet military vehicles), “Zenit” missiles, “Cyclone”, SS – 18 and many others. The only aircraft in the world combining high speed (800 km/h) and low fuel consumption AN – 70 was also produced in the Ukrainian SSR. Many of these enterprises were privatized by Ukrainian businessmen, which led to the diminishing or complete loss of economic ties with Russian customers. Indeed, in the USSR, the links of the production chain have been scattered throughout the Union, so Russia had to buy engines for ships and aircraft from Ukraine. It is worth noting that Ukraine inherited the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union; however, due to a Resolution on the Nuclear-Free Status of Ukraine adopted by the *Verkhovna Rada* on October 24, 1991, and a tripartite Agreement signed between Russia, the USA, and Ukraine on January 14, 1992, all atomic charges were dismantled and transported to Russia, strategic bombers

⁶² Верховна Рада України. Постанова Верховної Ради України “Про Основні напрями зовнішньої політики України,” July 2, 1993. Постанова втратила чинність на підставі Закону по. 2411-VI (2411-17) від 01.07.2010, ВВР, 2010, no. 40, Article 527, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=3360-12#Text>.

and missile silos were destroyed. In return, the United States and Russia provided guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.⁶³

The next challenge that emerged immediately after the dissolution of the USSR was the issue of Crimea. The State Duma of Russia decided to reconsider the constitutionality of the 1954 acts on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine and the basing of the Black Sea Fleet in the city of Sevastopol. The problem was resolved in May 1997 by signing three agreements in the framework of the “Big Treaty” on Friendship and Cooperation, providing the division of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and the subsequent separate basing of Russian and Ukrainian ships. The Russian Federation recognized Crimea as Ukrainian territory. The fleet was divided between Russia (56%) and Ukraine (44%). Sevastopol remained the base for the temporary deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on a lease basis.⁶⁴ In the 2000s, the issue of the Black Sea Fleet was considered with great difficulties, especially under President V. Yushchenko. On April 17, 2005, Yushchenko stated that the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol needs to be revised since the Constitution of Ukraine does not provide the possibility to stay the military bases of foreign states on the Ukrainian territory and gave the instructions to begin preparations for the withdrawal of the Russian fleet after 2017. However, in 2010 the Russian President Medvedev and the President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych signed an Agreement on Extension the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042, and it seemed that the issue was solved.⁶⁵ Another problem was the determination of the status of the Kerch Strait, which after the collapse of the USSR no longer fell into the category of inland waters. The Russian position was to preserve the previous legal status of the Azov – Kerch water area, which meant, in particular, the prohibition of its opening for unlimited

⁶³ Меморандум про гарантії безпеки у зв'язку з приєднанням України до Договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї : міжнар. док. від 5 груд. 1994 року, http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/MU94437.html.

⁶⁴ О.В. Бабенко, “2011. 02. 020. Внешняя политика Украины в 1990-2010 гг. (реферативный обзор),” *Социальные и гуманитарные науки. Отечественная и зарубежная литература. Сер. 5, История: Реферативный журнал*, no. 2 (2011): 109.

⁶⁵ С. И. Чернявский, “Россия-Украина: Ретроспектива Постсоветских Отношений,” *Juvenis scientia*, no. 3 (2017): 16.

access to third countries, not to mention the entry of the foreign warships.⁶⁶ The Ukrainian officials, in turn, had an idea that Ukraine should establish sovereignty over part of the Azov Sea and draw a line of a delimitation between Russia and Ukraine. Ultimately, in December 2003, Russia and Ukraine signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait, which, in particular, allowed entry of foreign ships, including military ones, through the Kerch Strait to the Sea of Azov to travel to the ports of Russia or Ukraine and back at the invitation of one of the parties. In the summer of 2006, the Government of Yushchenko proposed to revise the aforementioned Agreement and consider the Azov Sea through the prism of international law, i.e., not as internal water.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the status was unchanged until 2014.

The next challenge in Ukrainian – Russian relations was in terms of energy supply. As of February 1993, Ukraine's debt to the Russian company Gazprom exceeded 138 billion roubles (242.5 million dollars). In response to the announcement of the suspension of gas supplies to Ukraine due to non-payment, the Ukrainian authorities stated that in this case, Ukraine would block the transit gas pipelines. That situation became the starting point in the development of an open “gas conflict” between Russia and Ukraine. As a result of negotiations at the highest level to settle at least a part of the debt for natural gas, Ukraine agreed to transfer to Russia inherited from the USSR eight strategic bombers Tu – 160, three Tu – 95MS, and about 600 cruise missiles X – 22, which were in service with long-range aviation, as well as ground equipment.⁶⁸ Another crisis in the Russian – Ukrainian relations associated with disagreements over the so – called “gas issue” erupted at the turn of 2005 – 2006. In March 2005, Kiev declared that Russia needed to pay money, not gas, for the gas transition to Europe through Ukraine. In this regard, Russia announced an increase in the cost of gas for

⁶⁶ Министерство Иностранных дел Российской Федерации, *О переговорах по определению правового статуса Азовского моря и Керченского пролива и разграничению морских пространств в Черном море. О делимитации российско-украинской госграницы (Справочная информация)*, 16.11.2000, https://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/ua/-/asset_publisher/ktn0ZLTvbbS3/content/id/595928.

⁶⁷ Д.В. Малышев, “Керченский Кризис и Статус Азовского Моря,” *Постсоветские Исследования* 2, no. 2 (2019): 983.

⁶⁸ Чернявский, “Россия-Украина: Ретроспектива Постсоветских Отношений,” 15.

Ukraine. Kiev rejected Russia's proposals for a new contract, and on January 1, 2006, Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine. A few days after the termination of gas supplies to Ukraine, a new five – year contract was signed, according to which both the price of Russian gas and the rate of transit through the territory of Ukraine increased.⁶⁹ Until 2010 there were several similar disagreements on the gas price and the conditions of supply. After Viktor Yanukovych came to power in 2010, a revision of the gas price for Ukraine was initiated, which led to a decrease in the prices.

The last among the main issues and challenges in the Russian – Ukrainian relations is the emergence of European orientation in the Ukrainian foreign policy, notably, the intention to join the Euro – Atlantic structures after the collapse of the USSR, whereas the organizations launched by Russia on the post – Soviet space were ignored. In May 1992, Kiev refused to sign the Treaty on Collective Security of the CIS states and, generally, participate in any military alliance of the Commonwealth. In 1993, the Ukrainian leadership did not go beyond associate membership and did not sign an Agreement on the Formation of the Interstate Economic Committee of the CIS. Ukraine has not signed the CIS Charter *de jure* abandoning membership in the Commonwealth. The involvement of Ukraine in the process of Euro – Atlantic integration was extremely intensified after the “orange revolution” under President Yushchenko, who set the goal of Ukraine's joining NATO, which was ultimately not achieved. All Ukrainian leaders of the post – Soviet period, from L. Kravchuk to V. Yanukovych, announced their intention to join the Euro – Atlantic structures that were seen by Russia as a threat to its security.

Although Russia and Ukraine had a long history of co – existence in one state, Ukrainian independence led to the emergence of many problems in the relations of the two countries. Ranged from energy, territory, military to differences of visions in the implementing of the foreign policy, Russia and Ukraine had a lot of obstacles for successful development of the relations.

⁶⁹ “История газовых конфликтов России и Украины,” *Риа Новости*, December 13, 2019, <https://ria.ru/20191213/1562318504.html>.

2.1.2. Development of the Ukraine – EU relations until 2014

The starting point of the relations between Ukraine and the EU was the Declaration on Ukraine published by the European Union the following day after the referendum on the independence of Ukraine, which proclaimed the need for an open and constructive dialogue between the EU and Ukraine.⁷⁰ Already in September 1992, first Ukraine – the EU meeting at the highest level took place, where two Parties agreed on developing close cooperation.⁷¹ Since 1992 Ukraine became a permanent participant of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) by signing the Helsinki Final Act. This became evidence of the recognition of Ukraine's equality in the creation of democratic interstate relations and security in Europe.

Later in July 1993, the *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine proclaimed a new Foreign Policy Doctrine, which stated that the long – term goal of Ukrainian foreign policy is Ukraine's membership in the European Communities, as well as other Western European structures.⁷² Another critical step in the relations was an Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) signed in June 1994. The document enshrined the priority areas of cooperation, among which there were maintaining democracy in Ukraine by advising on the development of new legislation and practical support in the formation of democratic institutions, supporting market reforms, and helping to stabilize the Ukrainian economic system with the prospect of creating of the free trade area.⁷³ The agreement was ratified by the *Verkhovna Rada* in November of the same year but came into force only in 1998 after its ratifications in all EU member states.

⁷⁰ Kataryna Wolczuk, *Ukraine's Policy towards the European Union: A Case of 'Declarative Europeanization'* (Birmingham: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 2003), 25, https://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/eu_ukraine/ukraine_eu_policy.pdf.

⁷¹ European Commission, "Communique of the Meeting between Mr. Leonid Kravtchouk, President of Ukraine and President Jacques Delors and the Commission of the European Communities on September 14, 1992 in Brussels," Press Release, September 14, 1992, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_92_713.

⁷² Постанова Верховної Ради України "Про Основні напрямкизовнішньої політики України," <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=3360-12#Text>.

⁷³ European Commission, "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between EU and Ukraine," June 14, 1994, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_94_38.

On November 9, 1995, Ukraine was the first among the CIS countries to join the Council of Europe (CE) officially. This allowed the state to participate in the development of a joint policy of European states in relation to human rights, to transform national state and public institutions in accordance with European requirements.

On November 22, 1996, the European Commission presented the Action Plan for Ukraine to the European Parliament. The European Commission offered to continue support for democratic transformations in Ukraine and develop partnerships. In general, the concept of the Action Plan for Ukraine repeated the provisions of the 1994 Agreement. Along with support for economic reform in Ukraine and the transformation of Ukrainian society, the introduction of Ukraine into the European security system and the expansion of regional cooperation, the deepening of contractual relations, and the reform of the energy sector, the Action Plan called for an increase in the number of political contacts at all levels, expanding political dialogue on security issues, deepening connections with the Western European Union and interaction within the OSCE for the gradual integration of Ukraine into the European security system.⁷⁴ The document was approved by the European Parliament only in the spring of 1998, after the entry into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. In the same year, three days after the coming into force of PCA, President Kuchma signed a “Strategy on Ukraine's integration with the European Union” official proclaiming the European integration as a priority of Ukraine's development. In September 2000, the Ukrainian President adopted a concrete implementation plan named “European choice. Conceptual principles of economic and social strategy development of Ukraine for 2002 – 2011 regarding Ukraine's integration into the EU”. This document presented the creation of preconditions for joining the EU by 2011.

A Common Strategy approved by the European Council during the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 played an important role in Ukraine's bilateral relations with the EU. The EU Common Strategy identified new areas of deepening cooperation, which

⁷⁴ Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council. Action Plan for Ukraine,” Brussels, COM(96) 593 final, November 20, 1996, 28, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0593:FIN:EN:PDF>.

are trade and economic, foreign and security policy, internal affairs, and justice.⁷⁵ In March 2003, due to the document entitled “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (ENP), Ukraine received a status of “special neighbour”, on the basis of which in February 2005, the EU – Ukraine Action Plan was signed. The Plan included the main elements to strengthen democracy and to help prepare Ukraine for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as it encompassed the possibility of visa facilitation, deepening the dialogue on energy, transport, and the environment.⁷⁶ The next initiative that complements the already existing projects, in particular the European Neighbourhood Policy, was the Eastern Partnership Program adopted during the Prague EU Summit in 2009 by the official representatives of the EU countries and six post-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). The main goal was to create the necessary conditions for accelerating political and economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries by promoting political and socio-economic reforms in the countries participating in the Eastern Partnership Program.⁷⁷

A breakthrough in the relations between Ukraine and the EU was the start of negotiations on an Agreement of the Association of Ukraine and the European Union in 2007 and Ukraine's accession to the WTO in 2008. The EU – Ukraine Association Agreement consists of two parts – political that concerns cooperation in the field of foreign policy and security, control of migration flows, combating organized crime and terrorism, drug trafficking, etc., and economical. The economic part provides the creation of a free trade zone (FTZ) for the movement of goods, services, capital, and labour in order to ensure the gradual integration of the Ukrainian economy into the EU

⁷⁵ European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine, Document 1999/877/CFSP, 2-3, <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5dfc1114-75d5-4e56-9981-d1d2e18677da/language-en>.

⁷⁶ European Commission, “EU-Ukraine – Strengthening the Strategic Partnership,” Brussels, MEMO/05/57, February 23, 2005, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_05_57.

⁷⁷ Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague,” Brussels, 8435/09 (Presse 78), May 7, 2009, 6, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_declaration.pdf.

internal market, as well as the harmonization of Ukrainian rules and regulations with EU norms.⁷⁸ In March 2012, the document was initialled. However, its signing, scheduled for November 2013, was postponed at the initiative of the Ukrainian government. The refusal of President Viktor Yanukovich to sign the Agreement with the European Union was the reason for a political crisis. On March 21, 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed the political part of the Agreement, and on June 27, 2014 - the economic aspect, which provided the creation of a Ukraine – EU FTZ.

In this paragraph, by conducting an in – depth analysis of the documents, the main developments in the EU – Ukraine relations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were scrutinized. Without focusing on the personality of the Presidents of Ukraine, reigning in different periods, and taking into account the documents signed between the EU and Ukraine, it can be concluded that since the collapse of the USSR, the European direction of the Ukrainian foreign policy has been consistently present. It can be argued that in some periods, Ukraine implemented pro – Russian or “multi – vector” policy, but according to the Laws and Agreements adopted at different times, the core of its policy has always been the intention to integrate into the European structures. External factors could have influenced the implementation of this policy, but the essence remained the same.

2.1.3. Ukraine – NATO relations before 2014

The collapse of the USSR pushed Ukraine to search for its place in the European security system, as well. As it was mentioned above, Ukraine did not join the CSTO created by Russia within the CIS in 1992. However, since 1992 the Ukrainian leadership has made attempts to achieve NATO membership.

The first contacts between Ukraine and NATO were established on June 8, 1992, when the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, in Brussels met with the NATO representatives and promised to ensure the active participation of Ukraine in various programs initiated by the Alliance. In January 1994, Ukraine was the first of the CIS countries to enter the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). On March 13, 1995, a

⁷⁸ European Union External Action, “EU – Ukraine Association Agreement ‘Guide to the Association Agreement’ ,” https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/images/top_stories/140912_eu-ukraine-association-agreement-quick_guide.pdf.

Security Agreement was signed between Ukraine and NATO, which indicated that Ukraine should be guided by NATO instructions in the transfer and protection of information.⁷⁹ In 1997 Ukraine, on the one hand, signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with Russia; on the other hand, firstly, in May NATO Information and Documentation Centre was established in Kyiv; secondly, in July in Madrid, the Charter on Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed, which became the basis for the further development of bilateral cooperation and, thirdly, first Ukraine's mission to NATO in October was opened.⁸⁰ On the basis of the Charter, in the same year, the NATO – Ukraine Commission was established in order to ensure the proper implementation of the Charter. On November 4, 1998, Kuchma approved the State Program of Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO for the Period up to 2001. It provided the expansion of interaction of the Ukrainian ministries and departments with the relevant structures of the North Atlantic bloc. In 2002 the Ukraine – NATO Action Plan and a 2003 Target Plan were adopted, the purpose of which was to determine the strategic goals of Ukraine for its full integration into NATO security structures and the creation of a strategic framework for the existing and future Ukraine – NATO cooperation. Along with the need to reform political and economic spheres, the Document also determined the tasks in the field of reforming military structures, directions of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, as well as issues of financing joint action.⁸¹ On July 9, 2002, in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Programme, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the headquarters of the Supreme Commanders of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in the Atlantic and Europe was signed. The document provided NATO forces with the so – called “quick access” to the territory of Ukraine

⁷⁹ Memorandum of understanding between the NATO maintenance and supply organization (NAMSU) and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on logistic support co-operation, December 6, 2001, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_18839.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁸⁰ Oksana Kozlovska, *A Roadmap for Ukraine's Integration into Transatlantic Structures*. Report. Edited by Dufourcq Jean and Masala Carlo. NATO Defense College, 2006, 5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10340.5>.

⁸¹ NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,” November 22, 2002, Section II. Security, defence and military issues, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19547.htm.

not only during military exercises but also during military operations.⁸² This Memorandum was signed even despite the fact that it caused significant concerns for Russia. For example, the willingness of the Ukrainian side to provide its territory for any NATO operations contradicts Article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, providing that neither party will allow its territory to be used to the detriment of the safety of the other side.⁸³ Besides this, the Memorandum declares Ukraine's support for any NATO operations even without the sanction of the UN Security Council.⁸⁴ Moreover, adopted on June 13, 2004, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine emphasized the need to change the legislative base of Ukraine in accordance with NATO standards. It is also worth noting, Ukraine supported the NATO operation in the Balkans in 1999, and within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program, and Ukraine supported the US operation in Iraq in 2003 by sending its “peacekeeping” contingent to the region. Despite the fact that Kravchuk and Kuchma were considered as pro-Russian politicians and their policy was aimed at maintenance of good relations both with Russia and the West, it is essential to note that Ukraine's strategy towards joining NATO started immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

After the “orange revolution” of 2004 under the President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko, who represented himself as a pro – Western rather than pro – Russian, there were more active efforts aimed at Ukraine's entry into NATO. At a NATO Commission meeting in April 2005 in Vilnius, NATO allies invited Ukraine to launch an Intensified Dialogue on the country's aspiration to become a NATO member. The purpose of the

⁸² Меморандум про взаєморозуміння між Кабінетом Міністрів України і штабом Верховного головнокомандувача об'єднаних збройних сил НАТО на Атлантиці та штабом Верховного головнокомандувача об'єднаних збройних сил НАТО в Європі щодо забезпечення підтримки операцій НАТО з боку України. Меморандум ратифіковано Законом по. 1607-IV (1607-15) від 17.03.2004, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/950_005#Text.

⁸³ “Договір про дружбу, співробітництво і партнерство між Україною і Російською Федерацією,” Договір ратифіковано Законом по. 13/98-ВР від 14.01.98. Дію Договору припинено на підставі Закону по. 2643-VIII (2643-19) від 06.12.2018, ВВР, 2019, no. 1, Article 2, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_006#Text.

⁸⁴ Меморандум про взаєморозуміння між Кабінетом Міністрів України і штабом Верховного головнокомандувача об'єднаних збройних сил НАТО на Атлантиці та штабом Верховного головнокомандувача об'єднаних збройних сил НАТО в Європі щодо забезпечення підтримки операцій НАТО з боку України, http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/MU02220.html.

dialogue is to provide Ukrainian officials with the opportunity to become more familiar with what is expected from Ukraine as from a potential member of the Alliance and at the same time give NATO an opportunity to examine the reforms being carried out in Ukraine. During the Vilnius Summit, NATO and Ukraine signed a Document regarding Enhancing NATO – Ukraine Cooperation. Later in 2008, in Bucharest, V. Yushchenko made an attempt to obtain the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, representatives of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Norway, Spain, Hungary, and Belgium opposed this proposal.⁸⁵

The election of V. Yanukovych as President in 2010 has changed the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy, including relations with NATO. On July 1, 2010, the *Verkhovna Rada* adopted the Law “On the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy”, which in Article 11 proclaimed the non – aligned status of Ukraine that actually meant the refusal to join NATO. At the same time, the Law stated that Ukraine would continue a constructive partnership with NATO and other military – political blocs in matters of mutual interest.⁸⁶

2.2. The main developments in the Turkish – Ukrainian relations from 1991 to 2014

Throughout history, it is evident that Turkey has been consistently supporting Ukraine's independence; even in Ottoman times, independent parts of modern Ukraine were considered as a buffer zone with Russia. Although the Turkish – Ukrainian relations were frozen for 70 years, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey was one of the first countries, which recognized the independence of Ukraine in December 1991. In 1992 Ukraine and the Republic of Turkey signed the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation.⁸⁷ In the same year, by signing the Declaration on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the states started to develop relations at the regional level as

⁸⁵ Eunika Katarzyna Frydrych, “The Debate on NATO Expansion,” *Connections* 7, no. 4 (2008): 31-32, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26323362.pdf>.

⁸⁶ В.Н. Бабенко, “Украина и НАТО: Проблемы и перспективы,” *Актуальные проблемы Европы*, no. 3 (2019): 107.

⁸⁷ Tuncel and Aydingün, “Turkish-Ukrainian Relations Throughout History: Continuities and Strategic Requirements,” 15.

well. All the documents mentioned above served as the basis for the further development of Turkish – Ukrainian relations.

Until 2014, the relations between Turkey and Ukraine developed mainly in the economic field. The contractual framework for bilateral trade and economic relations consists of a number of agreements, the basis of which are the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (1992 year), Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments (1996), Agreement for the Prevention of Double Taxation (1996) and Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Administrative Cooperation (1996).⁸⁸ Indeed, economic relations between countries have improved every year, thus, already in the early 2000s, Turkey occupied 4th position in export among trade partners of Ukraine, and Ukraine was in 16th position among Turkish partners. The trade volume has increased from 1.240 billion dollars in 2000 to 6.705 billion dollars in 2013,⁸⁹ and the flow of investments increased both from the Turkish and Ukrainian sides. For example, in 2013, the total investment volume from Turkey in Ukraine was 215.2 million dollars.⁹⁰ The Turkish companies' investments are mainly in food and beverage, cleaning materials, clothing, forest products, minerals and metal, construction, and construction materials. In addition, for 2011, the primary goods imported by Turkey from Ukraine were iron and steel, chemical fertilizers and nitrogenous compounds, grain, vegetable, and animal oils, and many others. In comparison, Ukraine in the same year imported mostly fruits, nuts, spices, petroleum products, plastic products, textile materials, etc.⁹¹ In 2005 the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko offered the Turkish government to consider the creation of a free trade zone between countries,⁹² which would facilitate and significantly increase the

⁸⁸ *Торгово-экономические отношения Турецкой Республики с государствами – участниками СНГ (информационно-аналитическая справка)*, (Москва: Исполнительный комитет СНГ, 2017), 43, <https://e-cis.info/upload/iblock/6aa/6aaa395b427e0c8a51e6c756f16a6c46.pdf>.

⁸⁹ “Türkiye – Ukrayna Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri,” *DEİK / Türkiye-Ukrayna İş Konseyi, October 2018*, 1, <https://www.deik.org.tr/uploads/ukrayna-bilgi-notu-ekim-2018.pdf>.

⁹⁰ “Ukrayna’nın Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik – Ticari İlişkileri,” T.C. Kiev Büyükelçiliği, Ticaret Müşavirliği, Mayıs 2015, 58.

⁹¹ “Ukrayna’nın Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye ile Ekonomik – Ticari İlişkileri,” T.C. Kiev Büyükelçiliği, Ticaret Müşavirliği, Mayıs 2015, 52-55.

⁹² В.Н. Канарова, “Сравнительный Анализ Украинско-Турецких Отношений,” *Постсоветский материк* 27, no. 3 (2020): 35.

volume of bilateral trade; on February 3, 2022 the Free Trade Agreement was signed. In terms of tourism, Turkey became the second most popular destination for Ukrainian tourists; only in 2010, 568.000 people chose Turkey for vacation.⁹³ Furthermore, the High – Level Strategic Council (HLSC), established in January 2011, at the first meeting, signed an Agreement on Abolition of Visas, which was considered as an important step in the development of Turkish – Ukrainian relations.

Despite the fact that both countries, due to their geographical location, can be considered as a competitor for being an energy hub for resources supplied to Europe, the energy sector was also one of the main areas for developing bilateral cooperation. Energy activities aimed primarily at providing energy security of these two countries are governed by the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on Cooperation in the energy sector dated June 7, 2005. Moreover, basic directions of cooperation are also determined by the bilateral Working Energy group established to discuss issues in the field of energy, including the supply of natural gas to Ukraine via the TANAP pipeline (a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe). Ukraine and Turkey being the largest consumers of oil and gas, agreed on cooperation in a common search field and production of oil and natural gas in the water area of the Black Sea, the implementation of joint projects in the renewable energy industry and the coal industry, and on the participation of Ukraine in the development of the nuclear energy sector in Turkey.⁹⁴

The cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and science – based on the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation signed in 1996 occupies an essential place in Turkish – Ukrainian relations. According to this document, the countries agreed on enhancing the familiarization with the culture, developing cooperation in science, promoting collaboration among radio and television, etc.⁹⁵ Indeed, in the period

⁹³ Habibe Özdal and Viktoriia Demydova, *Turkey-Ukraine Relations: High Potential, Low Voltage*. Report. International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), 2011, 36, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02588.7>.

⁹⁴ О.И. Пошедин, eds., *Международные отношения и внешняя политика Украины* (Киев : НУОУ, 2013), 310, http://ir.nusta.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/doc/1639/1/1557_IR.PDF.

⁹⁵ "Agreement on Cultural Cooperation Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Ukraine," signed on November 27, 1996, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 22940: 9, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22940.pdf>.

between 2000 – 2013, partnership relations were established between 10 universities of Turkey and Ukraine, there were concluded relevant agreements on cooperation in the scientific field, as well as there was an active exchange of students and professors.⁹⁶ It is worth noting that many of the projects were implemented and financed through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the activities of which will be discussed in detail in the chapter devoted to Crimea and the importance of Crimean Tatars for Turkey.

Regarding the maintaining of national and regional security, on July 27, 1994, in Ankara, the Turkish and Ukrainian officials signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Fields of Military Training, Technics and Science aimed at establishing cooperation, first, in training and education of personnel, second, in mutual research, development and exchange of information, military technology and science, third, in the field of logistics, and forth, in mutual participation in the Defence industry fairs.⁹⁷ Later in 1998, noting the provision of an Agreement of 1994, the Government of Turkey and the Government of Ukraine signed an Agreement on Defence Industrial Cooperation, the main goal of which was to enhance cooperation of both states in the fields of research, development, and production of the defence good and services, procurement and the defence industrial cooperation in order to strengthen the defence industrial capabilities of Turkey and Ukraine.⁹⁸ In 2003, Turkey identified Ukraine as a “priority country” for Turkey, and in 2004 after the “orange revolution”, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, paid an official visit to Ukraine, where the “Enhanced Joint Action Plan” was signed. The document intended cooperation of two countries in the fields of strengthening security and stability in the Black Sea region, joint fights against crime and terrorism as well as the formation of the institutional framework of bilateral cooperation in terms of economic development, improvement of transit

⁹⁶ Özdal and Demydova, Turkey-Ukraine Relations: High Potential, Low Voltage, 38.

⁹⁷ “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Ukraine on Cooperation in Fields of Military Training, Technics and Science,” signed on July 27, 1994, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 22131, 20, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22131.pdf>.

⁹⁸ “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on Defence Industrial Co-Operation,” signed on May 21, 1998, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 24281, Article 1, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2001/01/20010108.htm#2>.

potential of Turkey and Ukraine, science and technology, maritime issues, etc.⁹⁹ Later in 2007, on the basis of the Agreement of 1994, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Defence Industry was signed, the main purpose of which was to ensure the cooperation in the military defence field on the principle of reciprocity and in accordance with the national laws and regulations of the cooperating countries.¹⁰⁰

It is important to note that the realization of the abovementioned Agreements was limited, no actual joint production or procurement of defence goods was recorded; nevertheless, the signing of these documents can be considered as an important signal that both countries were interested in the cooperation in the military defence field almost immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In addition to the bilateral cooperation, Turkey and Ukraine support each other within the framework of such international organizations such as the UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the Black Sea Forum. Cooperation in the military sphere continues both within the framework of the NATO – Ukraine Commission and within the framework of the Black Sea Group of Naval Cooperation (Blackseafor) and Operation Black Sea Harmony. NATO can also be singled out as another platform for cooperation between the two countries. As it was already discussed in the previous sections, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and other statesmen have repeatedly stated that the goal of Ukraine's foreign policy is integration into NATO and the EU and that this requires bringing the country's Armed Forces in line with NATO standards. The former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, during his visit to Turkey, said that cooperation in the military sphere between Turkey and Ukraine is an area of cooperation that has a future.¹⁰¹ It is worth noting Turkey is one of the donor states for the implementation

⁹⁹ Özdal and Demydova, Turkey-Ukraine Relations: High Potential, Low Voltage, 32.

¹⁰⁰ "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on Cooperation in the Defence Industry," signed on January 17, 2007, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 26990, Article 3, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/09/20080907-2.htm>.

¹⁰¹ Ильяс Камалов, "Турция и Украина: от Сотрудничества к Стратегическому Партнерству," в *Українсько-Турецькі Відносини: Стан і Перспективи Розвитку. Матеріали міжнародної конференції*, ed. О. Волович (Одеса: Фенікс, 2006), 55, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/07861.pdf>.

of the Trust Fund project in Ukraine NATO Partnership for Peace Program, within which the disposal of ammunition and light weapons is carried out.¹⁰²

To conclude, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were many developments in the relations between Turkey and Ukraine. In this paragraph, the developments in the subjects such as economy, culture, energy, and military were analysed. It is obvious that the most successful cooperation, which led to the actual realization of what was agreed on in the period between 1991 and 2013, was in the economic and cultural fields. Whereas the relations in the energy and military spheres were very limited despite signing a number of agreements.

2.3. The importance of Crimea and Crimean Tatars for Turkey

Since the collapse of the USSR, there is one more major topic in relations between Turkey and Ukraine. The return of Crimean Tatars, who were deported during the Stalinist regime to their native lands, is an important issue of cooperation between two countries. Turkey, being a guardian of all Turkic people and having a significant number of Crimean Tatar citizens on its territory, has always been supporting the return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland (most of them are initially from Crimea). Interestingly, after the declaration of Ukraine's independence, the issue of Crimea and Crimean Tatars did not become an arena of confrontation between the two countries; on the contrary, this sphere became a “friendship bridge”¹⁰³, an arena of cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. Crimean Tatars and the Crimean Peninsula itself are a very important dimension in Turkish – Ukrainian relations. This paragraph is devoted to the analysis of policies conducted by the Turkish government in Crimea before its accession into the Russian Federation.

It is known that the Crimean Peninsula has historical ties with Turkey. Until the 18th century, it was the territory of the Crimean Khanate, a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. However, in 1783 Crimea became a part of the Russian Empire according to the

¹⁰² Українська призма. Состояние и перспективы отношений Украины с соседними государствами. Анализ (Киев: Фонд им. Фридриха Эберта, 2012), 66.

¹⁰³ Maryna Vorotnyuk, *Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Turkey*. Report. New Europe Center. Discussion Paper. Kiev, 2016, 15, http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Aud_Ukr_Turk_01_32_eng-2.pdf.

Manifesto of Catherine the Great. The subsequent Russian – Turkish war in 1787–1791, which ended in a complete victory for Russia, and the Yassy Peace Treaty of 1791 completely consolidated Russia's position in the region. Since then, the influence of the Ottoman Empire, and then of Turkey, on the Crimean Peninsula was minimal. After the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, Crimea again began to attract the attention of Turkey. The growth of Turkey's interests in Crimea after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a result of not only the historical ties with the peninsula but also a large number of the Crimean Tatar population living in Turkey. Although there is no official data on the number of Crimean Tatar people living on the territory of Turkey, according to the various estimations, the number is about 4 – 6 million.¹⁰⁴ Due to the different political, economic, cultural, and social issues, the largest waves of migration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire were in the 18th – 19th centuries after the conquest of the peninsula by Russians. It is argued that during the period between 1783 and 1922, approximately 1.8 million Crimean Tatars migrated to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁵ The presence of a reasonably large Crimean Tatar diaspora on its territory allowed Turkey to transform the Crimean Tatars issue into an instrument of “soft power” on the Crimean Peninsula. Thus, since the beginning of the 1990s, under the auspices of Turkey, numerous programs and projects directed towards the support of Crimean Tatars have been implemented.

The most prominent and largest organization, via which many projects were implemented and financed, is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı*, TİKA). The Agency was founded immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, the aim of which was to provide technical assistance to newly emerged countries, with a special focus on Turkic countries and communities, and developing relations with them in the field of economy, trade, technology, culture, education, and social development through TİKA projects and programs.¹⁰⁶ In fact, TİKA has been entrusted with the functions of

¹⁰⁴ Henryk Jankowski, “Crimean Tatars and Noghais in Turkey,” *Türk Dilleri Araştırmaları* 10 (2000), <https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/jankowski.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Hakan Kırımlı, *Kırım Tatarlarında milli kimlik ve milli hareketler, (1905-1916)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996): 12.

¹⁰⁶ Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı (TİKA), <http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/hakkimizda-14649>.

managing all Turkish “donor” projects implemented through the state line abroad. Its activity was especially active on the territory of Crimea from 1994 up to 2014. During that period, the Representative Office of TİKA was officially located in Simferopol. The primary recipient of TİKA projects on the peninsula was the Crimean Tatar population. The following humanitarian assistance was carried out: financing of water supply systems in places of compact residence of Crimean Tatars in Crimea; assistance to individual families of Crimean Tatars; participation in the construction and restoration of educational institutions; provision of housing to Crimean Tatars through the program “1000 apartments”, which was implemented by 25% due to the rise in real estate prices in Crimea; financing of measures for the provision of medical care to representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group, as well as the allocation of funds to medical institutions; the establishment of twinning relations between the cities of Crimea and Turkey, which helped to implement joint tourist, cultural and economic projects; and many other projects.¹⁰⁷ The humanitarian aid from Turkey was also provided through the Turkish Red Crescent Society, the Crimean Tatars Diaspora (Crimea Foundation, Crimean Tatar Women's League), Crimea Muslims Fund, Turkish Charitable Foundation “*Kimse Yokmu Derneği*”, Crimean Tatars Culture and Mutual Aid Society in Seydişehir “*Kırım Tatar Derneği*”,¹⁰⁸ Turkic World Research Foundation, the Association for the Culture and Mutual Aid and many others.

In the sphere of education, Turkey participated in the organization of seminars, events for the Crimean Tatars' teachers and academicians in order to familiarize them with the peculiarities of Turkish national education. TİKA financed the construction of the Turkish educational institutions in Crimea and provided scholarships for higher education for Crimean Tatar students in Turkey (for example, Ankara still finances the Turkish scholarship program “*Türkiye Bursları*”, according to which the Crimean Tatars even after 2014 can study in Turkey). The agency contributed to the formation of research ties with Turkish scientists and the spread of the Crimean Tatar language.

¹⁰⁷ TİKA. Ukrayna: Proje ve Faaliyetler, 2015, <https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2015/Prestij%20Eserler/Ukrayna-kitapcik.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Александр Ирхин и Наталья Демешко, “Крымский аспект российско-турецких отношений: факторы «мягкой и жесткой силы»,” *Перспективы. Электронный журнал* 18, no. 2 (2019): 44-45, http://perspektivy.info/upload/iblock/b27/2_2019_1_37_49.pdf.

The activities of TİKA were also directed towards popularizing the common Ottoman historical past of Turkey and Crimean Tatars. It financed the restoration of the architectural monuments of the former Crimean Khanates and held the Turkic international symposia and scientific conferences on the basis of the Crimean Industrial Pedagogical University, where the bulk of the students are Crimean Tatars. Besides this, the popularization of history, culture, language, national heroes, as well as symbols of the Republic of Turkey was an important aspect of the activity of the Agency. Thus, TİKA held events in the educational institutions of Crimea in honour of the first President of Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, organized the presentation of the portrait of Kemal Atatürk and the flag of the Republic of Turkey to the educational institutions of Crimea, as well as it sponsored centres on the basis of the higher educational institutions of Ukraine studying Turkish language and literature.¹⁰⁹

The other major sphere of Turkish influence was religion. Several mosques were built on the territory of the Crimea funded by Turkish *Diyanet* (Department of Religious Affairs), private foundation “*Aziz Mahmud Khudai*” and the Turkish newspaper “*Zaman*”. Turkey was also involved in financing the theological educational institutions on the territory of the peninsula. In various regions of Crimea, there were madrasahs, whose activities were officially coordinated by the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Crimea, but in reality, their education process was led by representatives of the Turkish religious organizations. So, a number of madrasahs of Crimea such as “*Seit-Settar*”, “*Kalay*”, “*Kurman*”, or the Higher Islamic Madrasah were financed by the representative office of the Department of Religious Affairs in Crimea, the private religious foundation of Turkey “*Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi*”, the Turkish religious community “*Süleymaniye*”.¹¹⁰

In 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) published documents proving the long-term and generous funding of the *Mejlis* by the Turkish authorities. According to the analysts of the SBU, only from 2008 through 2012, Turkey transferred 3,590,178.27

¹⁰⁹ Ирхин и Демешко, “Крымский аспект российско-турецких отношений: факторы «мягкой и жесткой силы»,” 45.

¹¹⁰ Э. Муратова, *Ислам в современном Крыму: индикаторы и проблемы процесса возрождения* (Симферополь: Элиньо, 2008): 38-51.

US dollars, 8.7% of which was spent on projects that meet the public or state interests of Ukraine, 44.14% of this amount was spent on projects that meet the interests of the Republic of Turkey or certain Turkic-speaking ethnic groups of Ukraine, and 47.16% were directed to hidden financing of the Crimean Tatar politicized structures, public organizations, religious centres, and mass media. This funding was provided through the TIKa in Crimea.¹¹¹

To conclude, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened new possibilities for Turkish foreign policy. The Crimean Peninsula and its original inhabitants have deep historical ties that allowed Turkey to extend its sphere of influence in the region. However, the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014 has cut off the channels of the Turkish activities in the peninsula.

¹¹¹ Денис Батурин, "Многогранный межджис: лидеры национального движения, украинские патриоты, агенты влияния турецкой разведки," *Международная жизнь*, April 8, 2016, <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/15039>.

CHAPTER 3

THE CRIMEAN CRISIS IN 2014 AS THE MAIN CHALLENGE FOR TURKEY'S AND UKRAINE'S SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

The Black Sea region is one of the unique formations that have become an independent geopolitical zone after the collapse of the Soviet system. The ongoing integration processes developing within the region are based on the desire for rapprochement and interaction of national economies, the formation of regional economic groupings, the search for political compromises and security. Unfortunately, with the rising importance, the region has become not only a zone of cooperation but also confrontation, which led to the emergence of new threats and challenges to the security of actors and the region as a whole. The most severe challenge for the regional and national security of the Black Sea actors in the last decades was the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014. The precondition of this unprecedented event was a political crisis that started in Ukraine in November 2013, the reason of which was the refusal of the official authorities to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. Supporters of European integration demanded the resignation of the President and the Government of the country. The wave of unrest that began in Kiev spread to the other Ukrainian cities and regions. However, the authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea refused to support the opposition. On February 22, as a result of a *coup d'état*, power in Ukraine passed to the opposition, the President Viktor Yanukovich left Kiev. On February 23, the duties of the head of state were entrusted to the new speaker of the *Verkhovna Rada*, Alexander Turchinov.

At the legislative level, the accession of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into the Russian Federation in 2014 took just two weeks. It started on March 6, 2014, when the local legislative organ within its competence adopted a Decree on the All – Crimean referendum on the status of the peninsula with the aim of obtaining independence and the possible entry into the Russian Federation. On March

11, deputies of the highest representative bodies adopted the Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, in which it was noted that in the case of a positive expression of the will of citizens and on the basis of international law, Crimea “will be declared independent and a sovereign state with a republican form of government”¹¹² that would further facilitate the process of joining the Russian Federation. The Referendum, which presented two questions: “(1) Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? (2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine?”¹¹³ was held on March 16. The results were 95.5% of all votes cast supporting for Crimea to become part of the Russian Federation, with a turnout of approximately 83%.¹¹⁴ Thus, on the basis of the Declaration of Independence and the results of the referendum, the Resolution “On the Independence of Crimea” and “On the Status of the City of Sevastopol” was adopted on March 17, 2014. According to these documents, Crimea became an independent sovereign state on the territory of which there is a city with a special status – Sevastopol; it also appealed to the UN and all states of the world with a call to recognize the new state, which it has become, at least *de facto*. In the same resolution, Crimea turned to Russia “with a proposal to admit the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation as a new subject of the Russian Federation with the status of a republic”.¹¹⁵ On March 21, 2014, Russia adopted the Law “On the Ratification of the Treaty (of March 18, 2014) between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and recognition of Republic of Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation.”¹¹⁶

¹¹² Декларация о независимости Автономной Республики Крым и г.Севастополя, March 11, 2014, <http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/6/project/1203pr.pdf>.

¹¹³ Thomas D. Grant, “Annexation of Crimea,” *The American Journal of International Law* 109, no. 1 (2015): 68–69, <https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintlaw.109.1.0068>.

¹¹⁴ “Crimea referendum: Voters 'back Russia union',” *BBC News*, March 16, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097>.

¹¹⁵ Постановление “О независимости Крыма,” March 17, 2014, <http://crimea.gov.ru/act/11748>.

¹¹⁶ Ю.Е. Курилюк и И.Д. Семеновский, “Правовой аспект вхождения Крыма и Севастополя в состав России,” *Научные записки молодых исследователей*, no. 2 (2014): 77.

These unprecedented events were perceived by the Black Sea actors, particularly by Turkey and Ukraine, as a threat to their national security and regional interests. For Ukraine, obviously, the only threat is the assertive policy of Russia, for Turkey, in turn, not only the rising power of Russia but also the possibility of the expansion of the NATO presence challenges the Turkish security and interests in the region. Below, the analysis of Turkey's and Ukraine's policy in the Black Sea region is presented. The analysis reveals the main interests, priorities, and challenges of the two countries in the region.

3.1. Turkey's policy in the Black Sea region since 1991

3.1.1. Importance of the Black Sea region for Turkey

With the collapse of the bipolar international system and the weakening of Moscow's influence and military power in the Black Sea, Turkey became a rising power with the longest shoreline, which tried to take a leading role in the region. This explains the initiative to organize the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) proposed by Turkish President Turgut Özal in 1992. BSEC united 11 states of the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and Balkans: Azerbaijan, Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.¹¹⁷ On June 25, 1992, during the Summit in Istanbul, Representatives of these countries signed a Declaration on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which determined the priority directions and main mechanisms of this regional format of cooperation. The purpose of BSEC was the development of economic relations between the countries of the Black Sea basin. Moreover, this organization had the opportunity to influence the policies of its member countries¹¹⁸ since the development of economic cooperation through BSEC was also viewed as an influential mechanism to maintain peace and security in the Wider Black Sea region by, for example, bringing together Turkey, Armenia, and Greece under one roof.

¹¹⁷ In April 2004, Serbia was included in BSEC, since then the total membership consists of twelve countries.

¹¹⁸ Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region," 94.

Indeed, maintaining peace and security is one of the key goals of the Turkish policy in the Black Sea region. With the then success of BSEC, Turkey took the initiative to create a formal security framework in the region. In 1998, Turkey proposed the idea of forming a multinational naval force for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian assistance, search and rescue activities, and environmental protection activities with the participation of all coastal powers. In 2001 Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia signed an Agreement on the Establishment of the Blackseafor Naval Group. Because of the Russian – Georgian conflict in August 2008, Ankara even proposed to expand the mandate of Blackseafor, in particular, to include land and air forces, confirming that the purpose of this initiative is to solve the security issues in the region by the forces of littoral powers. However, this initiative did not find support from Bulgaria, Romania, and Georgia, which were interested in expanding the presence of the NATO naval forces in the Black Sea. After the Ukrainian/Crimean crisis since 2014, no exercises have been conducted within Blackseafor. Another regional initiative of Turkey was the implementation of the Black Sea Harmony Operation since 2004, the purpose of which was to ensure control over navigable waterways and search of suspicious ships in order to counter terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁹ In 2006 – 2009 Russia, Ukraine and Romania officially joined the operation.

The maintenance of security in the region is vital for Turkey in terms of energy, as well. Turkey, one of the largest consumers of gas and oil in the region and endowing unique geographical location, implements an energy security policy, which differs from the policy of other regional actors. Turkey, located between the leading suppliers of oil and natural gas and Europe, is actively promoting its geo – energy interests. In recent years, while the positions of Ukraine and the Balkan countries are weakening on the European gas market, the geostrategic role of Turkey is strengthening. Turkey's goal is to turn from a transit country into a regional gas hub.¹²⁰ By cooperating with

¹¹⁹ Mustafa Aydin, "Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power security agendas for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 9, no. 3 (2009): 281, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683850902934283>.

¹²⁰ В. Оздемир и И.А. Гулиев, "Энергетическая Дипломатия Турции," *Вестник МГИМО* 47, no. 2 (2016): 105.

Russia and Azerbaijan in terms of building new pipelines to Europe through the Turkish territory, Turkey is able not only to maintain its energy security but also put the EU in a position of dependence on Turkey.

Such an active policy of Turkey in the Black Sea region is aimed, first of all, at preventing the third strong player from entering the region and division of spheres of influence between Russia and Turkey. The regional naval initiatives proposed by Turkey in the Black Sea region are sometimes considered as a response to the challenges coming from NATO, particularly from the US. According to the Turkish authorities, the actual reasons for the intensification of the NATO naval forces in the Black Sea are the desire of the Alliance leadership to establish control over the routes of transportation of energy carriers in the region, as well as the desire to reduce the importance of the developing dialogue between the Turkish and Russian fleets. This approach is opposed by Turkey, which fears a decrease of its influence in the event of the constant presence of the NATO naval group in the Black Sea basin.¹²¹

After the accession of Crimea, Russia obtained the necessary military and political resources, which enabled Russia to strengthen its position in the Black Sea region. Despite the fact that the level of the naval combat capability of the Republic of Turkey in the Black Sea area is considered to be relatively high and the Turkish fleet is the largest naval platform in the Black Sea, the rising Russian power in the region is regarded as a challenge to the Turkish national security. However, regarding the crisis, Turkey had shown dual reaction: on the one hand, it recognized the accession as illegal, voted in favour of supporting the United Nations General Assembly decision about the territorial integrity of Ukraine on March 27, 2014, and stood up for the protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, it did not join the West in imposing any sanctions against Russia. The most widespread explanation regarding such position is that the relations with Russia are vital for Turkey in the economic, energy, and military terms, thus Turkey couldn't impose any sanction, but at the same time, it eagers to defend the human rights of Crimean Tatars belonging to the Turkic people, who are over and above historically indigenous people of the peninsula. Many

¹²¹ А. Болдырев, "Российско-турецкие отношения и проблема безопасности Черноморского региона," *Новое Восточное Обозрение. Открытый дискуссионный журнал*, (2013), <http://sn-philocultpol.cfuv.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/036gubanov.pdf>.

politicians, scholars, and experts consider this position as Turkey's willingness to show its independence from the West/ its NATO allies in foreign policy decision making since any escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea region will imply the involvement of NATO, which would be detrimental to Turkey as one of the key regional actors.¹²² Although Turkey is a NATO member, it seeks to maintain the status quo in the Black Sea region, adheres to the 1936 Montreux Convention, and prevent the excessive strengthening of the United States in the region, even in the case of acute regional political crises. The Montreux Convention of 1936 consolidated Turkey's sovereignty over the Straits. The Convention preserves the freedom of passage through the Straits for merchant ships of all countries both in peacetime and in wartime; however, the regime of the passage of warships is different in relation to the littoral and non – littoral states. Thus, for NATO, in order to be able to conduct freely certain types of exercises in the Black Sea, some clauses of the Convention should be amended or changed that will lead to a significant decrease in Turkish influence in the region. Thereby any expansion of NATO presence in the Sea is considered as a threat by Turkey. This position of Turkey was reflected in 2008 when a crisis broke out in Georgia and America wished to pass its high – tonnage ships through the straits; Turkey did not allow, claiming that this contradicts the Montreux Convention. Indeed, such policy during the Crimean crisis allowed Turkey to maintain a balance in relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the West as a whole. However, it is obvious that after the accession of Crimea into Russia, there were significant changes in the Turkish – Ukrainian relations that brought this relationship to a new – strategic – level.

3.1.2. Challenges in the Turkey – NATO relations

Turkey is a unique country in the Black Sea region; despite being a NATO member, it does not pursue a policy under the absolute influence of the Alliance; on the contrary, it tries to preserve its sovereignty in the issues, which can undermine its security. In order to understand why Turkey does not entirely rely on NATO in terms of maintaining security, it is essential to analyse the conflicts and disagreements, which have occurred during Turkey's membership.

¹²² N. Belyakova, "The Crimea and Russian-Turkish Relation," *Russia and the Moslem world* 279, no. 9 (2015): 17-18.

The political – military cooperation with the United States, which is a leader and a founder of NATO, was the main direction of Turkey's foreign policy after World War II. The Turkish – American rapprochement had grown noticeably already in 1946 when the Turkish government was hostile to the Soviet proposals on the issue of the Straits. The Turkish ruling circles did not hide the fact that the course of rapprochement with the United States was based on anti – Soviet policies. In 1952 Turkey became a NATO member, which was able to perceive financial, technical, and military assistance within the Alliance.

The history of relations between NATO and Turkey includes not only cooperation but also confrontation and some periodical disagreements. The first disappointment of the Turkish side was caused by the Cuban Crisis of 1962 when the US made a secret deal with the USSR regarding removing Jupiter ballistic missiles from the territory of Turkey in response if the USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba. The Turkish authorities learned on this deal only a few months later, then not only the Turkish government but also the public were disappointed with America's actions since it was said by the American authorities that the missiles would be removed due to their obsolescence.¹²³

Another important issue in the relations was Johnson's letter regarding the Cyprus crisis of 1964. In the letter L. Johnson in a categorical form, opposed Turkey's military intervention on the island, threatening the Turkish government with sanctions from the USA. The American President also recalled that the Turks had no right to use American weapons received by Turkey within the Alliance. Moreover, Johnson, in his letter, emphasized that in the case of military intervention by Turkey, Washington will not fulfil its obligations on protecting Turkey from the Soviet Union, which was also involved in the conflict.¹²⁴ Johnson's letter provoked indignation in wide circles of the Turkish public and youth, who saw it as an act of interference in the internal affairs of

¹²³ Süleyman Seydi, "Turkish—American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957-63," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 3 (2010): 451, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20720681>.

¹²⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson and Ismet Inonu, "President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu: Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as Released by the White House, January 15, 1966," *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 3 (1966): 386-387, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324028>.

Turkey. In many large cities, there were unrest and demonstrations. After the Cyprus crisis of 1963 – 1964, Turkey's foreign policy was subjected to an inevitable revaluation; Ankara began to establish contacts with a number of states for the first time.

The next crisis in the Turkey – NATO relations occurred when Turkey eventually implemented the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 in order to protect ethnic Turks after the Greek Cypriot coup on the island. The US government imposed the embargo on Turkey, which lasted from 1975 to 1978. The consequence was the strengthening of Turkey's aspirations to adhere to the principles of multi – vector and partly neutrality in its foreign policy.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, disagreements in relations between Turkey and NATO have continued. One of the main concerns was the Iraqi war of 2003, when Turkey, despite pressure from the American administration, refused to provide its territory for units of the US armed forces, which aimed to attack Iraq from the North. The situation became even worse when the USA started to support Kurds, particularly PYD/YPG, which are considered as terroristic organisations in Turkey.

Later in October of 2015, despite Ankara's objections, the American “Patriot” anti – aircraft systems were withdrawn from Turkey according to the NATO representatives in connection with a reassessment of the threats that have been caused by the armed civil conflict in neighbouring Syria. Moreover, after the incident with the Russian Su – 24, which was shot down by the Turkish military, despite the fact that NATO was completely in solidarity with Turkey's version on this issue, at the council of NATO permanent representatives on November 24 of the same year, Ankara did not receive the support it hoped for, since the Alliance considered it a matter between Turkey and Russia, and not between NATO and Russia. In addition, on July 15, 2015, Turkey witnessed the *coup d'état* attempt. The Turkish government accused Gülen, who is hiding in America and whom America does not deliver to Turkey. After these events in 2017, for different reasons, the Turkish government signed a contract with Russia for the supply of anti – aircraft missile systems S – 400, which caused many discords with America and NATO in general. As a result, Turkey was excluded from the

program for the production and equipping of NATO countries with F – 35 aircraft; thus, Turkey was left without fifth – generation jet fighters.

Moreover, it is worth noting the recent disagreement between Turkey and NATO, when in February 2020, Turkish units came under fire, as a result of which 34 Turkish soldiers were killed.¹²⁵ At that time, Ankara asked NATO for help in carrying out the operation, but NATO countries said they would not support the activation of Article 5¹²⁶ due to the death of the Turkish military in Idlib and would not consider the possibility of providing military assistance to Turkey in the case of an operation in this region.

Some of the issues in the Turkish – NATO relations discussed in this chapter show one of the main reasons for the Turkish unwillingness for the expansion of NATO presence in the Black Sea region and the desire of Turkey to develop its own military sphere.

3.2. The Black Sea region in the Ukrainian foreign policy

As it was discussed in the previous chapter, since the 1990s, the Ukrainian foreign policy has been more inclined towards the integration into the Euro – Atlantic structures. Back in 1997, a prominent American political scientist of Polish origin, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his work “The Grand Chessboard”, pays great attention to the importance of Ukraine in the region, saying that if Russia regains control over Ukraine with its 52 million population, large resources, and access to the Black Sea, it will turn into a powerful imperial state.¹²⁷ The scholar emphasizes that if Ukraine wants to keep

¹²⁵ Sedat Ergin, “Birinci yıldönümünde İdlib’de 34 askerimizin şehit olduğu saldırıyı hatırlamak...” *Hürriyet*, February 27, 2021, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/birinci-yildonumunde-idlibde-34-askerimizin-sehit-oldugu-saldiri-yi-hatirlamak-41750666>.

¹²⁶ Article 5 of the Collective Security Treaty of the Atlantic Commonwealth states that an attacker on one of the NATO countries must be considered as an attacker on all NATO countries. See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:~:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.

¹²⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 37, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/36/36669B7894E857AC4F3445EA646BFFE1_Zbigniew_Brzezinski_-_The_Grand_ChessBoard.doc.pdf.

its independence, it will have to become a part of Central Europe, particularly a part of NATO and the European Union.¹²⁸

Before 2014, when Ukraine lost the Crimean Peninsula, the Black Sea region did not take an important place in the state's foreign policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine started participating in regional organizations such as BSEC and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM). At that time, Ukraine was more focused on the large – scale communication projects within the BSEC, particularly on the construction of a ring highway around the Black Sea and a system of trunk pipelines, which was of great importance for transit oil and gas from Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the Near and Middle East to Europe through Ukraine. The BSEC was a critical element in the development of long – term strategic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, as well as the Middle and the Middle East. Thus, the organization was considered by Ukraine, first of all, as an important international legal instrument for the development of the entire spectrum of relations between the countries of the region. Throughout the years of existence of GUAM, in turn, Ukraine has been taking an active position by supporting initiatives that meet its national interests. By developing international cooperation within the framework of GUAM and the established structures, Ukraine was deepening bilateral relations separately with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. The priority area of cooperation between Ukraine and the GUAM countries was transport and transit, particularly the problems of the Transcaucasian and Eurasian transport corridors. However, because of the different reasons, the membership in these two regional organizations, together with participation in the naval initiatives such as Blackseafor and Black Sea Harmony initiated by Turkey, was limited.

Moreover, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, since its independence, Ukraine has been pursuing dominantly the pro – Western foreign policy aiming at integration of the state into the Euro – Atlantic organizations. Especially in terms of national and regional security, Ukraine, which did not join the Collective Security Treaty Organization functioning under Russia's supervision, started to develop its relations with NATO – under some Ukrainian Presidents, the relations were developing more

¹²⁸ Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, 99.

actively than under others. Thus, in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Programme (Ukraine joined in 1994) since 1997, Ukraine has been hosting the Sea Breeze naval, air, and land multinational military exercises in the Black Sea aimed at practicing joint actions of warships, aircraft, and helicopters, marines, special forces, search and rescue forces and other formations as well as improving the skills of interaction in crisis situations, during humanitarian actions, in the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters and other accidents.¹²⁹ After the “orange revolution” in 2004, the new Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko proclaimed Ukraine’s entry into Euro – Atlantic organizations as a main goal of the Ukrainian foreign policy. According to Yushchenko’s government, the only way to maintain national and regional security as well as to resist aggressive Russian policy directed towards its neighbours was to enhance NATO’s presence in the region by Ukraine’s joining the organization.

The election of V. Yanukovich as President in 2010 revived the hope that Ukraine will conduct a balanced foreign policy that would not infringe on the interests of either Russia or the countries of the European Union. On July 1, 2010, the *Verkhovna Rada* adopted a law “On the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy”. It proclaimed the non – aligned status of Ukraine, which actually meant its refusal to join NATO. However, the law stated that Ukraine would continue a constructive partnership with NATO and other military – political blocs in matters of mutual interest. In addition, it stressed that an important goal of its foreign policy is to join the European Union.¹³⁰ On April 27, 2010, Ukraine and Russia signed a “*Kharkiv Pact*”, according to which the period of stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine in Crimea was extended from 2017 to 2042 with an automatic extension of 5 years if none of the parties objects.¹³¹ It is worth noting that the agreement was signed in exchange for a

¹²⁹ Alisa Moldavanova, “Public Perception of the Sea Breeze Exercises and Ukraine’s Prospects in the Black Sea Region,” *U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth. U.S. Army*, (2013): 7.

¹³⁰ Закон України “Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики,” Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 2010, no. 40, Article 527, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17#Text>.

¹³¹ “Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Украиной по вопросам пребывания Черноморского Флота Российской Федерации на территории Украины,” signed on April 21, 2010, https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/45190.

reduction in the price of Russian gas for Ukraine. Thus, the conceptualization and defining of the strategy of Ukraine in the Black Sea region were put off.

The events that took place in Ukraine at the end of 2013 beginning of 2014, connected with the Euromaidan, the accession Crimea into Russia, the outbreak of war in the Eastern part led to the change of military balance in the Black Sea region. Therefore, on the one hand, the pro – Western direction in the Ukrainian foreign policy was solidified; on the other hand, these unprecedented events made Ukraine focus on developing its own policy in the region, as well. Along with the economic damage, Ukraine has lost its naval bases, infrastructure, and equipment located in Crimea. Currently, the Ukrainian Navy does not control submarine “Zaporozhye”, missile boat “Pridneprovye”, small anti-submarine ships “Lutsk”, “Khmelnitsky”, “Ternopil”, sea minesweeper “Chernigov”, anti-sabotage boat “Feodosia” and many others.¹³² Moreover, the Ukrainian Navy became significantly limited in its operational capabilities in the Black Sea that led to a decrease in the defence potential in the South of Ukraine. Since Ukraine is not a NATO member, the assistance provided by the Alliance after the Crimean accession to Russia and during the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine is limited. On July 9, 2016, at a meeting in Warsaw, the leaders of participating states and government of Ukraine – NATO Commission approved the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine, aimed at supporting Ukraine in improving its ability to ensure its own security, as well as implementing large – scale reforms in order to achieve NATO standards. The projects within CAP are being implemented through NATO capacity – building programmes and Trust Funds on reforming and modernizing the army in sectors such as logistics, command and control, cyber defence, military medicine, and rehabilitation of the wounded, etc. According to the open sources, as of March 2017, NATO has provided aid to Ukraine in the amount of more than 35 million euros through trust funds.¹³³

¹³² Е. В. Степанова, “Проблемы и Перспективы Развития Украинского Причерноморья в Новых Геополитико-Экономических Условиях,” *Економіка та Держава*, no. 4 (2016): 40, http://www.economy.in.ua/pdf/4_2016/9.pdf.

¹³³ Кристина Зеленюк, “НАТО выделил Украине более 35 млн евро через трастовые фонды,” *СЕГОДНЯ.ua*, April 26, 2017, <https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/nato-vydelil-ukraine-bolee-35-mln-evro-cherez-trastovye-fondy-1015925.html>.

However, since Ukraine is not a NATO member, the Alliance has no legal basis for activating Article 5 of the NATO Charter – an attack on one member is not considered an attack by the entire Alliance – for this reason, Ukraine is in need to develop bilateral relation with the NATO countries. The leader of such assistance is the USA. For example, for the period from 2014 to 2020, Ukraine received assistance in the amount of more than 490 million dollars. Moreover, equipment including modern communications, armoured vehicles, counter – sniper systems, and radar stations was transferred. In early 2019 alone, Ukraine received 37 launchers and 210 Javelin anti – tank guided missiles from the United States for a total of 47 million dollars.¹³⁴ In addition, in March 2021 Pentagon announced a new 125 million dollars package, which is designed primarily for the supply of two Mark IV patrol ships to Kiev, to ensure Ukraine’s defence of its territorial waters.¹³⁵

If before 2014, Ukraine did not pay much attention to the Black Sea region, considering it as an area of cooperation between littoral states dominantly in terms of economy and energy supplies, after the unprecedented events in 2014, which led to the rise of and solidifying the Russian power, the Black Sea region and the maintenance of its security would become the most important subject in the Ukrainian foreign policy. It is worth noting that in the Law on the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy adopted in 2010 with changes made after 2014 among the main priorities, there is the deepening cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the purpose of acquiring membership in the organization as well as ensuring the integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic, legal space for the purpose of gaining membership in the European Union.¹³⁶ However, the Black Sea region and the strategy of Ukraine in the region are still not included. Although Ukraine received great support from its Western partners, particularly from the USA, it could not join NATO yet to provide its security against the main threat – Russia.

¹³⁴ “США с 2014 года предоставили Украине около \$500 млн в рамках помощи от НАТО,” ТАСС, July 2, 2020, <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/8872889>.

¹³⁵ U.S. Department of Defense. *Defense Department Announces \$125M for Ukraine*. Immediate Release. March 1, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2519445/defense-department-announces-125m-for-ukraine/>.

¹³⁶ Закон України “Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики.”

Thus, now Ukraine is actively developing bilateral relations with the Black Sea regional countries, especially in the military defence field.

3.3. The policy of Russia, NATO, and the EU in the Black Sea region

In order to have a full picture of the dynamics in the Black Sea region, under which Turkey and Ukraine are cooperating, it is necessary to discuss the policy of other major actors of the region such as Russia, NATO, and the EU briefly.

The formation of Russia's policy in the Black Sea region began to take shape immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was affected by the conditions that emerged after 1991, namely, the growing role of Turkey; expanding the presence of NATO by joining the alliance of Bulgaria, Romania; the unresolved issue of the presence of the Russian fleet in the Crimea; the pro – Western direction of the foreign policies of Ukraine and Georgia; and the presence of “frozen” conflicts. In this regard, Russia had to take into account the fact that a new balance of power and a new structure of regional security was being formed in the Black Sea region. With Vladimir Putin's coming to power in 2000, the Russian policy in the Black Sea became clearer and obtained long – term strategy in the region. To strengthen the positions in the Black Sea region, the Program for the Revival of the Fleet for 2000 – 2010 was adopted; the realization of the programme was supposed to fully meet the country's needs for foreign sea trade and domestic transport as well as make the country a leader in transportation in the Black Sea region. The document on “the Fundamentals of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2010” adopted in 2000 included the main tasks such as ensuring guaranteed access for Russia to international maritime communications in the Black Sea, strengthening the international legal status and ensuring the activities of the Black Sea Fleet, ensuring the unimpeded passage of ships and vessels of the Navy through the Straits used for international shipping, etc.¹³⁷ On July 27, 2001, Russian President V. Putin approved the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020, one of the priority tasks of which was the improvement of the legal framework for the functioning of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, and the

¹³⁷ “Основы политики Российской Федерации в области военно-морской деятельности на период до 2010 года,” Утверждена Указом Президента РФ, March 4, 2000, https://flot.com/nowadays/concept/osn_napr.htm.

preservation of the city of Sevastopol as its main base.¹³⁸ Russia also actively advocated strengthening military cooperation with the littoral countries; therefore, it positively reacted to Turkey's initiative Black Sea Naval Force (Blackseafor) in 2001. It is stated that the active functioning of Blackseafor was caused by the fact that the USA and a number of its NATO allies planned to extend the Active Endeavour Operation, which was carried out by the Alliance in the Mediterranean. It was Russia and a NATO ally Turkey, which held similar positions on the issue. Both countries sought to prevent NATO expansion in the Black Sea that also aimed at gaining the leading role in the region. Thus, though Russia and Turkey were members of this programme, in 2006, they jointly vetoed the US proposal to expand NATO's Active Endeavour program into the Black Sea.¹³⁹ In addition, in terms of energy since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has implemented a policy aimed at increasing the dependency of the Black Sea littoral countries and the EU as a whole on the Russian energy market.

The geopolitical situation in the Black Sea region was changed rapidly after the Ukrainian crisis and the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014. The growing possibility of Ukraine's entry into NATO and the ongoing war in the Eastern part of Ukraine made Russia renew the main documents enshrining the Russian policy in the Black Sea. The most significant of them are the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2015), Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030 or "Fundamentals – 2030" (2017), Military doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015), Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation (2016). According to the Maritime Doctrine, in the Black Sea, the basis of the national maritime policy is the strengthening of the strategic positions of the Russian Federation, the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.¹⁴⁰ Moscow sees the

¹³⁸ "Морская доктрина Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года," Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации, July 26, 2015, <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1800>.

¹³⁹ Сергей С. Жильцов, "Политика России в Черноморском регионе: итоги и новые вызовы," *Проблемы постсоветского пространства* 6, no. 2 (2019): 157-158, <https://www.postsovietarea.com/jour/article/view/196/188>.

¹⁴⁰ "Морская доктрина Российской Федерации," Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации, July 26, 2015, Article 56, <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/555631869>.

enlargement of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian borders as unacceptable and considers it as a threat to national and regional security. In the “Fundamentals – 2030”, in the context of challenges to international security and threats to the military security of the Russian Federation, the US – developed concept “Global Strike” is noted. Russia sees its Navy, which possesses strategic nuclear forces and general – purpose naval forces, as an instrument of deterring and levelling the American concept. Thus, to maintain the world's second – largest fleet, after 2025, Russia will equip its submarine and surface forces with hypersonic missiles and robotic means for various purposes. In addition, it is planned to create a naval aircraft carrier complex.¹⁴¹ Thereby, Russia does not want to allow other powers to become dominant in the Black Sea region. In the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in terms of the main tasks of Russia in containing and preventing conflicts, there is a clause on strengthening the collective security system (CSTO, OSCE, CIS, etc.). Moreover, it is noted that the interaction with Abkhazia and South Ossetia is important in order to ensure joint defence and security.¹⁴² According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2018, with regard to certain issues related to the Black Sea, Russia is in favour of a politico – diplomatic settlement of conflicts. Moscow contributes to the settlement of the Transnistrian issue while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova and the special status of Transnistria; Russia also wants to normalize relations with Georgia with further assistance in the formation and development of new democratic states Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹⁴³ Moreover, the Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia's approaches for cooperation with its

¹⁴¹ Указ Президента Российской Федерации “Об утверждении Основ государственной политики Российской Федерации в области военно-морской деятельности на период до 2030 года,” no.327, July 20,2017, Article 44, <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42117/page/2>.

¹⁴² “Военная доктрина Российской Федерации,” Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации, December 25, 2014, Article 20, <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf>.

¹⁴³ “Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации,” Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации, November 30, 2016, Articles 57, 58, https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk8B6BZ29/content/id/2542248.

partners in the Black Sea and Caspian regions will be built on the goals and principles of the BSEC Charter.¹⁴⁴

Besides the deterrence of the NATO expansion and preservation of the post – Soviet space in its orbit of influence, the strategic goals of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region also include the increase of the EU's dependence on energy resources supplied from Russia, blocking the development of energy communications uncontrolled by the Russian Federation, and maximum switching of oil and gas transit from the Caspian region and Central Asia to its own territory.¹⁴⁵

In March 2014, when Crimea was reunited with Russia, the Russian Federation significantly increased its influence in the Black Sea region. At that time, the Russian authorities declared their intentions “to deploy the geostrategic potential of the Crimea” fully and to continue the development of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. After Crimea's accession, Russia was able immediately to put into service the heavy military equipment on the peninsula, which included fighter planes, bombers, and advanced air defence systems of the latest generation. Russia has also begun to invest actively in the modernization of its navy in Sevastopol, turning it into a modern combat – ready force of the last generation in the Black Sea.¹⁴⁶ All these are seemed to serve as a basis for the implementation of the policy in the Black Sea region, the main goals and tasks of which are enshrined in the documents mentioned above.

For NATO, in turn, the Black Sea region is regarded as the southern border of the Euro – Atlantic community directly bordering the Greater Middle East, which is perceived as a source of new challenges and threats to European security, especially after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Thus, the West is interested, first of all, in strengthening

¹⁴⁴ “Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации,” Article 60, https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248.

¹⁴⁵ Сергей Жильцов, “Черноморский Геополитический “Узел”: Схватка за Доминирование,” *Научное Общество Кавказоведов*, November 27, 2019, <http://www.kavkazoved.info/news/2019/10/27/chernomorskij-geopoliticheskij-uzel-shvatka-za-dominirovanie.html>.

¹⁴⁶ В.П. Петров, “Геополитическое Значение Крыма,” *Вестник РУДН. Серия: Политология* 20, no. 1 (2018): 23.

security and stability in the Black Sea region in order to prevent the spread of these threats to the West. For this reason, the deployment of NATO bases in the countries of the region with the goal of combating terrorism is an integral part of the Alliance's strategy in the Black Sea region. Awareness of the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East makes the West turn the Black Sea into a reliable and secure region, which can counteract and deter the threats coming from the Middle East.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, the maintenance of security and stability in Europe is highly dependent on NATO's ability to counter threats from the Greater Middle East, where the Black Sea region is one of the main routes of illegal traffic to Europe that creates favourable conditions for the coalescence of organized crime and terrorism. Besides, as it was mentioned above, the presence of a number of frozen conflicts in the Wider Black Sea also threatens the security of Europe and may lead to a change in the balance of power in the West.¹⁴⁸ Secondly, an important goal of NATO policy (together with the EU) in the region is a transformation of its states into developed democracies according to the Western standards in order to promote Western European values in the southern and eastern directions (primarily to the Middle East). Democratization of the regional states is planned to be implemented through their involvement in the Euro – Atlantic community by integration into institutions such as NATO and the EU. In addition, the creation of regional organizations and their activities should be controlled by NATO (and the EU) that will contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the region. Thirdly, with the beginning of the 21st century, the role of the Black Sea region has increased due to its location as an important point in the transit system of hydrocarbon resources from countries of Central Asia and the Caspian region, which can significantly affect the energy security of Europe. Thus, successful implementation of the strategy of the Euro – Atlantic community in the context of ensuring energy resources can guarantee European countries political independence from any energy blackmail from Russia or

¹⁴⁷ Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom," in *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*, ed. Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig (Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004), 22.

¹⁴⁸ Н.Н. Безнос, "Анализ Концептуальных Основ Стратегии НАТО в Черноморском Регионе," *Ученые записки Таврического национального университета им. В.И. Вернадского Серия -Философия. Культурология. Политология. Социология* 24 (63), no. 3-4 (2011): 154-155.

countries of the Middle East. Along with this, the construction and operation of new oil and gas pipelines will serve as a new impetus for the development of the economy of the states of the region.¹⁴⁹ NATO sees its role in this context as a guarantee and protector of a stable and safe operation of oil and gas pipelines in the region.

The accession of Crimea into Russia triggered NATO to reconsider and intensify its policy in the Black Sea. In 2016 the NATO Summit in Warsaw adopted a concept of “Tailored Forward Presence”, which was fully aimed at containing Russia and focused on strengthening the NATO positions in the Black Sea region. Within the framework of this concept, the members of the Alliance decided to deploy four multinational battalions, the European missile defence system in the Baltic countries and Poland and improve a multinational presence in the Black Sea region. Moreover, the concept includes intensification of multinational joint land training, maritime activity, and the presence of NATO forces.¹⁵⁰ In addition, after the incident in the Kerch Strait in April of 2019,¹⁵¹ NATO member states agreed on a package of measures “Black Sea Package”, which implies support for Ukraine and Georgia in response to Russia's “behaviour” in the region. These measures are aimed at improving NATO presence in the region, increasing NATO support to Ukraine and Georgia in areas such as naval and coast guard training, as well as port calls, exercises, and information sharing.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Sergiu Celac, “Five Reasons Why the West Should Become More Involved in the Black Sea Region,” in *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*, ed. Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig (Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004), 140.

¹⁵⁰ Hanna Shelest, “NATO in the Black Sea: Transformation of Approaches and Tailored Presence,” in *Black Sea Region in World Policy: Actors, Factors, and Scenarios for the Future*, ed. Olga Brusylovskaya, Volodymyr Dubovyk, and Igor Koval (Odesa: ONU, 2020), 105-106.

¹⁵¹ On November 25, in the area of the Kerch Strait, Russian border guards with the use of weapons detained three ships of the Ukrainian Navy, heading for the Sea of Azov. Three Ukrainian soldiers were wounded. In total, 24 sailors were detained. In Kiev, the actions of the Russian border guards were considered unlawful. According to the Ukrainian authorities, Moscow violated the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Moscow, in turn, called the incident a provocation of Kiev and said that Ukraine had violated key provisions of international law, created a threat to the movement of ships in the Azov Sea.

¹⁵² “Страны НАТО согласовали пакет мер против России в Черном море,” *РБК*, April 4, 2019, <https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5ca62bbe9a79479ffae39688>.

Needless to say, after 2014, NATO's policy in the region was directed towards the escalation of its presence in the Black Sea.

The European Union also became interested in the Black Sea region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the EU showed increased attention to the region, which was explained by its geographical location on paths to energy resources of states of the Caspian region, Central Asia and Iran. At that time, few projects were initiated by the EU in order to create a transport corridor from Europe to Central Asia (TRACECA, INOGATE).¹⁵³ The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007 made the intensification of European policy in the Black Sea region inevitable, primarily in the area of security of its own borders. There was a need to integrate the Black Sea countries into the system of foreign policy priorities of the European Union. Following the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, the Black Sea was proclaimed a “European area of responsibility”, and in 2007 the Black Sea Synergy program was adopted, envisaging the expansion of cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, and the environment.¹⁵⁴

There are minimum five categories of the EU interests in the Black Sea Region. Since the enlargement of the EU brought not only access to the resources but also frozen conflicts started to be in closer proximity to the EU borders, the European policy, first of all, is directed towards promoting continual stability and conflict management. Thus, the European Union did not recognize the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia and still considers it to be a violation of international law. Secondly, the policy is aimed at promoting democracy (free and fair election, civil society) in the regional states through the initiatives such as the Eastern Partnership (the EaP), Black Sea Synergy, or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Moreover, the EU aims to improve the economic environment and investment climate with the prospect of creating free trade with the Black Sea countries. Fourthly, the policy includes the security of energy supply to Europe, for example, through implementing the projects of modernization and development of energy infrastructure, and also through the

¹⁵³ К.С.Гаджиев, *Геополитика Кавказа* (Москва: Международные отношения, 2003): 375-379.

¹⁵⁴ Светлана Гаврилова, “Основные направления политики Евросоюза в Черноморском регионе,” *Международная жизнь* 14, no. 4 (2020), <https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/2336>.

diversification of energy supplies. Fifthly, the European policy is also directed towards the hindering of organized crime and terrorism in the region.¹⁵⁵

The brief analysis of the Black Sea regional policy of its major actors provided a needed puzzle to fulfil a picture of the dynamics occurring in the region, in the framework of which the Turkish and Ukrainian policy was formed as well as the cooperation of these two countries.

¹⁵⁵ Iryna Maksymenko, "The EU's Policy Towards the Black Sea Region," in *Black Sea Region in World Policy: Actors, Factors, and Scenarios for the Future*, ed. Olga Brusylovska, Volodymyr Dubovyk, and Igor Koval (Odesa: ONU, 2020), 85-87.

CHAPTER 4

TURKISH – UKRAINIAN RELATIONS IN THE MILITARY DEFENCE FIELD AFTER 2014

The Crimean issue of 2014, followed by the incident of 2015 with the Russian jet Su – 24, which was shot down by a Turkish fighter, led to the even more active rapprochement between Turkey and Ukraine. The meeting of the Presidents in Kiev in March 2015 marked the beginning of a new phase of bilateral relations. Turkish President Erdogan promised to provide Ukraine with a loan of 50 million dollars and 10 million dollars as humanitarian aid.¹⁵⁶ The economic relations have been boosted as well. According to statistics, in the period of 2014 – 2016, the average trade turnover between countries was 4.6 billion dollars.¹⁵⁷ However, because of the objective reasons associated with an exacerbation of the Ukrainian – Russian relations, the conflict in Syria, as well as the slowdown in economic growth in the Turkish Republic, in 2018, there was a decrease in turnover between countries by 3.9%.¹⁵⁸ The year 2019 gave a new impetus to deepening economic relations between the Black Sea countries. Not only did the trade turnover increase significantly in the first months of 2019, but also the governments of the countries began to discuss the introduction of a free zone trade, negotiations on which are still ongoing. Moreover, in 2017 with the abolition of passports allowed Turkish and Ukrainian citizens to travel to these countries with an

¹⁵⁶ Андрей Яшлавский, “Что президент Турции Эрдоган привез в Киев президенту Порошенко? Анкара выделила Украине кредит в 50 млн долларов,” *МК.ru*, March 20, 2015, <https://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/03/20/chto-prezident-turcii-erdogan-privez-v-kiev-prezidentu-poroshenko.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Вячеслав Г. Циватый, “Украина–Турция: политико-дипломатический диалог геополитических соседей начала XXI века (институциональное измерение),” *Проблемы постсоветского пространства* 4, no. 2 (2017): 110.

¹⁵⁸ Канарова, “Украинско-турецкие отношения в 2014-2019 гг.: динамика, тенденции, перспективы,” 1537.

ID card that deepened the relations in the tourism sphere as well. Negotiations are also underway on mutual recognition of a driver's license.

The cultural and scientific sphere of cooperation also keeps up with the previous ones. For 2009 – 2018 Turkey has funded about 15,000 Ukrainian research projects in the field of fundamental and applied sciences for a total of 1.2 billion dollars.¹⁵⁹ TIKA also continues to conduct many projects, but for this time, not on the territory of Crimea. Turkey is actively supporting the development of the Ukrainian culture, and in 2017, a department of Ukrainian language and literature was opened at Istanbul University. Annually there are cultural days of Turkish culture in Ukraine and Ukrainian culture in Turkey. Turkey actively attracts Ukrainians for higher education by providing various governmental grants.

Turkey also is actively supporting Crimean Tatars at all levels. Almost in each Ukrainian – Turkish meeting, Erdogan confirms that Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and that Turkey will protect the rights and national identity of Crimean Tatars. In March 2019, when there was a fifth anniversary of the entry of Crimea into Russia, representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora and Turkish citizens organized an action protest. Turkey, at the state and international levels, organizes a number of events dedicated to Crimean Tatars. Ankara also supports Kiev's initiative on the “Crimean platform”, the purpose of which is to bring the international community closer to the problem of the territorial belonging of the peninsula.

Along with these developments very briefly discussed above, there was an unprecedented intensification of relations between Turkey and Ukraine in the military defence field, which will be examined below. Before proceeding to the analysis on the main developments in terms of the bilateral military defence cooperation, it is important to examine the state of the military defence complexes in order to understand the needs and problems of both countries in the field.

¹⁵⁹ “За 10 лет Турция выделила \$1,2 млрд на научные исследования,” *Regnum*, June 8, 2019, <https://regnum.ru/news/2644096.html>.

4.1. The state of the Ukrainian military defence complex by 2014

Until 1991, the leading sectors in the defence industry of the Ukrainian SSR were the production of rocket – space, armoured and engineering equipment, transport aviation and ships, as well as special radio engineering systems. Moreover, about half of the ships of the Soviet naval fleet, strategic missiles, and tanks, the radio – electronic equipment was produced in the Ukrainian SSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited 25% of the military – industrial complex of the former USSR; at that time, the defence industry of Ukraine consisted of 1,840 enterprises, which employed 2,700,000 people or nearly 40% of the total working population. The products of the enterprises consisted of communications equipment, combat, and transport aircraft, tanks, aircraft carriers, missiles, and satellites.¹⁶⁰ However, the Ukrainian military – industrial complex did not have a self – sufficient production system, i.e., it was not capable of producing a final product, as, during the Soviet times, the final stage of the production of military products was accomplished in the factories located in the RSFSR. In 2010, the state concern “*Ukroboronprom*”, which was designed to unite the enterprises of the defence complex, was established. It included 134 state – owned enterprises, as well as the state – owned export and import company “*Ukrspetsexport*” and its subsidiaries such as “*Ukroboronservis*”, “*Ukrinmash*”, “*Spetstechnoexport*”, “*Promoboronexport*” and many others.

Thus, in 1991 the aviation industry of Ukraine consisted of 39 enterprises, which annually assembled about 350 aircraft. The leading organizations in this industry are the Zaporozhye machine-building design bureau “Ivchenko – Progress” named after academician Ivchenko, the production association “Motor Sich”, the Kharkiv State Aviation Manufacturing Enterprise, and others. For over 70 years, the engineering design bureau “Ivchenko – Progress”, which since 2011 is a part of the state concern “*Ukroboronprom*” has been creating engines for many types of aircraft and helicopters (AI-450, AI-222, AI-322 series, etc.), as well as special equipment for industrial use.¹⁶¹ The production association “Motor Sich” is engaged in the development and

¹⁶⁰ Stacy Larsen, *An Overview of Defense Conversion in Ukraine* (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 1997), 16, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/paper9.pdf.

¹⁶¹ “Главная,” *Ивченко-Прогресс*, <https://ivchenko-progress.com/?lang=ru>.

production, repair, and maintenance of aircraft gas turbine engines for airplanes and helicopters, as well as industrial gas turbine plants. Despite the fact that the production association continues to function, it even makes agreements with the foreign partners for the supply of the engines; its future is still uncertain. After Ukraine gained independence, Russia was the main buyer of the “Motor Sich” products. However, in 2014, when Kiev imposed a unilateral embargo on the supply of defence products to Russia, “Motor Sich” lost its largest sales market and immediately found itself in a crisis. China seized the opportunity after some deals between the management of “Motor Sich” and the Chinese investors; in the end, China began to own 56% of the shares. After the American officials expressed their displeasure with the situation, the Ukrainian Security Service blocked the deal and opened criminal cases of treason and sabotage.¹⁶² The case is not closed yet. Another Ukrainian company, which was in crisis after 2014 and even liquidated in 2017, is the Aviation Science and Technology Complex “Antonov”, engaged in the development, production, and repair of aircraft of the “AN” series. Ukraine inherited not only factories but products as well. In terms of quantity, the military aviation of Ukraine in 1992, being the largest in Europe, was the fourth in the world after the aviation of the United States, Russia, and China. However, the number of military aircraft capable of effectively intercepting air targets and performing air superiority missions has decreased many times over the decades. As of 2012, Ukraine formally had 36 Su – 27s and about 70 MiG – 29s, and only 16 of Su – 27s and 20 of MiG – 29s were in operation. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Ukraine from exporting 231 military aircraft and helicopters over the period of 2005-2012.¹⁶³

In terms of the production of the armoured vehicles, despite the fact that one of the largest factories named after Malyshev, in 1991 alone, produced 800 new tanks, and for the period 1992 – 2010 – no more than 400, the armoured sub – industry is self – sufficient and is capable of providing full production cycle of equipment from

¹⁶² Игорь Кармазин, “Двигатели прогресса: как США и Китай делят главный украинский завод,” *Известия*, Mart 17, 2021, <https://iz.ru/1137820/igor-karmazin/dvigateli-progressa-kak-ssha-i-kitai-deliat-glavnyi-ukrainskii-zavod>.

¹⁶³ Сергей Линник, “Состояние ПВО Украины,” *Военное Обозрение*, May 22, 2015, <https://topwar.ru/75266-sostoyanie-pvo-ukrainy.html>.

development to serial production of the final products (import components is 2-5%). For 2010, the industry enterprises offered national and foreign customers new armoured vehicles of their own production and services for the modernization of the Soviet – made vehicles, as well as engines for them with a capacity of up to 1500 hp. Among armoured vehicles, there is a complex of active protection “Zaslon”, the tanks T – 80UD and T – 84 “Oplot”, armoured repair and recovery vehicles “Atlet” etc.

Moreover, Ukraine inherited from the Soviet air defence a significant number of medium and long-range air defence systems such as S – 125, S – 75, S – 200A, V and D, S – 300PT, and “Buk” air defence systems. In April 2015, Ukraine adopted the S – 125 – 2D “Pechora – 2D” anti – aircraft missile system, created on the basis of a late modification of the Soviet low – altitude air defence system S – 125M1.¹⁶⁴

In the rocket and space industry from the former USSR, Ukraine inherited almost one – third of the space potential as 12 from 20 types of intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed and produced in the Ukrainian SSR. In Ukraine, there was a production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), SS – 18 known as “Satan” and SS – 24 known as “Scalpel” in NATO, launch vehicles “Cosmos”, “Cyclone”, “Zenit” and “Ocean”. Currently, industry organizations do not have the ability to manufacture final products, but they offer technical assistance for the modernization of previously produced equipment, design of optoelectronic systems, as well as the production of equipment for the composite fibers. According to Ukrainian experts, the production of remote sensing “Sich”, guided missile “Kombat” and “Konus”, rocket carrier “Zenit”, “Dnepr”, “Mayak” and “Cyclone” may correspond to the needs of foreign countries.¹⁶⁵ After the termination of the Treaty on Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles (INF Treaty) in 2019, Ukraine announced the possibility of starting the development of missiles of this class.¹⁶⁶ In theory, Ukraine can have

¹⁶⁴ Линник, “Состояние ПВО Украины,” <https://topwar.ru/75266-sostoyanie-pvo-ukrainy.html>.

¹⁶⁵ А. И. Кучеренков, “Современный оборонно-промышленный комплекс Украины и его конкуренция с Российскими спецэкспортёрами на мировом рынке вооружений и военной техники,” *Аналитические обзоры РИСИ* 26, no. 3 (2010): 7, <https://riss.ru/media/documents/e594e1c441d7483e9402bf743b568f2e.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ “З України зняли зобов'язання про нестворення ракет високої дальності, - Порошенко,” *LB.UA*, March 6, 2019, https://lb.ua/news/2019/03/06/421338_s_ukraini_snyati_obyazatelstva.html.

certain competencies in this matter, as the “Yuzhnoye” Design Bureau was the lead developer of the legendary strategic missile “Satan” mentioned above. In 2019, “Yuzhnoye” announced the creation of an operational – tactical missile system, “Grim-2”, which is essentially an analogue of the Russian complex “Iskander”. Moreover, the “Luch” Design Bureau developed a subsonic low – flying anti – ship missile “Neptune” based on the Soviet anti – ship missile system X – 35 “Uran”. “Luch” also developed and launched into mass production the “Stugna – P” anti – tank missile system with a firing range of about 5000 meters, and in 2016 began the development of the multiple launch rocket system “Vilkha”.¹⁶⁷

Until 1991, the number of vessels produced in Ukraine was about 40% of the total production of the former USSR. The shipbuilding industry of the Ukrainian SSR was capable of producing virtually all types of ships, power plants, and navigation equipment. However, the enterprises were not able to provide the final product since they did not produce the main marine weapons and some important naval technical means and equipment. According to experts, the modern Ukrainian shipbuilding industry is in a very deplorable state, but still, the enterprises offer potential customers services in the development and production of warships of various classes (from aircraft carriers to patrol boats), as well as generally competitive gas turbine engines with a capacity of 100 to 25 thousand hp.¹⁶⁸ The situation was worsened by the political crisis in 2014 and the accession of Crimea into Russia, as a result of which Ukraine lost the “Zaliv” and “More” shipyards, as well as a number of enterprises engaged in the production of auxiliary ships, naval components, and their repair, research organizations located on the peninsula.

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian enterprises and design bureaus of the sub – industry took leading positions in the production of universal radars, navigation devices, anti – aircraft missile guidance heads, radio control

¹⁶⁷ Андрей Митрофанов, “Военно-промышленный комплекс Украины: состояние и перспективы,” *Военное Обозрение*, February 21, 2019, <https://topwar.ru/154360-voenno-promyshlennyj-kompleks-ukrainy-sostojanie-i-perspektivy.html>.

¹⁶⁸ Кучеренков, “Современный оборонно-промышленный комплекс Украины и его конкуренция с Российскими спецэкспортёрами на мировом рынке вооружений и военной техники,” 10.

stations, sound – measuring systems of artillery reconnaissance, electronic control systems, equipment for radio communications, radio engineering and electronic warfare, aviation, and missile targeting systems.¹⁶⁹ Today, organizations such as “Aerotechnica”, “Radar” and many others operating in this sector are capable of supplying to the customers not only the components for individual electronic systems but also present a wide model range of the final products.

Ukraine inherited from the USSR a great potential in the military defence sphere. However, because of different reasons, Ukraine could not efficiently develop its defence – industrial complex. Relying mostly on the Russian market the most Ukrainian enterprises found themselves in crisis after the event in 2014. The war in the Eastern Ukraine, the loss of Crimea that led to the rupture of relations with Russia pushed Ukraine to focus on the development of its defence industrial complex. Although since 2014, Ukraine has been receiving military aid from the Western countries, particularly from the USA, England, Lithuania, Czech, Poland, and Turkey, Ukraine not being a NATO member, has to develop its own defence – industrial complex and the technologies inherited from the USSR are a good basis for it. By offering its modernised production to the foreign partners, Ukraine can increase its financial capabilities in the military defence field, and by strengthening bilateral cooperation with other countries, it can fulfil the gaps in its defence – industrial complex and modernise it according to the NATO standards. Turkey is one of the Ukrainian partners, which is also eager and in need to develop the relations with Ukraine in the military defence field.

4.2. The main achievements of Turkey in the military defence field

The history of military production in Turkey takes its roots in the Ottoman Empire, which was once one the most powerful Empires. Almost all military industry enterprises were concentrated on the territory of modern Turkey, particularly its Western part and Istanbul. In the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire started to lag behind European states and Russia in terms of technology of weapons production and the developments in the military field in general. Thus, by the start of World War I,

¹⁶⁹ Кучеренков, “Современный оборонно-промышленный комплекс Украины и его конкуренция с Российскими спецэкспортёрами на мировом рынке вооружений и военной техники,” 14.

the Empire was mostly importing weapons, mainly from Germany. Later in 1923 when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who became the first President of Turkey due to the victory in the national liberation struggle, considered that the presence of a developed defence – industrial complex independent of outside supplies is one of the main conditions for Turkey's political independence. The first military enterprises started to emerge, among the largest ones there was enterprise on the repair of artillery and small arms, production of equipment and ammunition (1924, Ankara), shipyard (1924, Gölcük), “*Tayyareve Motor Türk AŞ*” Aircraft Company (1926, Ankara), Aircraft Manufacturing Plant (1928, Kayseri). Aircraft production was suspended in 1939), the aircraft factory of the Turkish Aeronautical Association (1941, Ankara), aircraft engine factory (1945, Ankara).¹⁷⁰ After World War II in the early 1950s, Turkey, which perceived the expansion of Communism as a threat, intensified its military – technical cooperation with the West, particularly with the United States in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, in which Turkey joined in 1952. In 1950 the Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation was established, under control of which all military factories were transferred. During this period, new enterprises of the defence – industrial complex were established, such as repair factories of armoured vehicles and heavy weapons in Elmadağ and Adapazarı and aircraft building enterprises in İzmir, Kayseri, and Eskişehir, while the capabilities of the already existing ones were increased. By the early 1970s, Turkey's military – industrial complex was capable of meeting the state's needs of supply, repair, logistic support, production of small arms and artillery weapons. However, the Turkish factories still could not produce heavy and transport military equipment, communications, modern combat aircraft, and large warships. With the development of missile weapons and military electronics, the dependence of the Turkish defence industry on foreign suppliers was increased even more. In 1975, when the United States imposed an embargo on the supply of American weapons to Turkey as a response to the entry of the Turkish troops to Northern Cyprus, Turkey decided to switch its politics from the import substitution to the production of the most important types of weapons and military equipment on its own territory. Then the concept of the military supplies was formed, according to which Turkey's partners in the supply of weapons and military

¹⁷⁰ А. В. Кольцов, “Модернизация военно-промышленного комплекса Турции,” *Восточная аналитика*, no. 2 (2011): 75.

equipment were obliged to create defence industry enterprises on the territory of Turkey with the controlling stake owing by the Turkish side. Due to this policy, from 1970 to 1980, Turkey received a large number of licenses for the production of weapons and military equipment on its territory. Many of today's largest companies were established at that time: Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ-1973), ASELSAN (1975), later on, ASPIİLSAN (1981), and HAVELSAN (1982).¹⁷¹ Two years later, after 1978, when the USA lifted the embargo, an Agreement on the Development of Military – Technical cooperation between Turkey and America was signed. Among the most important projects implemented in the framework of this agreement was the construction of the plant for the production of F – 16C/D fighters, modernization of M – 48 tanks, organization of assembly production of Bell AN – 1 combat helicopters, the military infrastructure of Turkey, and joint military bases were also expanded.¹⁷² Although Turkey has been a NATO member, since the 1980s its main policy in the military field has been the achievement of maximum independence in the field of arms production. Indeed, in the last 17 years, the rate of local production has increased from 20% to 70%.¹⁷³ Moreover, Turkey is the world's 14th largest exporter of defence weapons, and in 2020 the Turkish companies such as ASELSAN, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), BMC, ROKETSAN, HAVELSAN, FNSS, and STM were included in the top 100 companies according to the Defense News.¹⁷⁴

In the last several years, Turkey has made a big breakthrough in the development of its military defence industry. The most important success is that Turkey took place among the top 3 countries in combat drone technology. It is interesting because, in 2001, Turkey and Israel signed an Agreement on the Supply of the Israeli unmanned

¹⁷¹ Ismail Demir, "Transformation of the Turkish Defense Industry: The Story and Rationale of the Great Rise," *Insight Turkey* 22, no. 3 (2020): 24, <https://www.insightturkey.com/commentary/transformation-of-the-turkish-defense-industry-the-story-and-rationale-of-the-great-rise>.

¹⁷² Кольцов, "Модернизация военно-промышленного комплекса Турции," 76-77.

¹⁷³ "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: "Savunma sanayinde son 17 yılda yaptığımız hamlelerle yerlilik ve millilik oranı yüzde 20'lerden yüzde 70'lere çıkmış durumda", " *T.C. İletişim Başkanlığı*, February 5, 2020, <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-savunma-sanayinde-son-17-yilda-yaptigimiz-hamlelerle-yerlilik-ve-millilik-orani-yuzde-20lerden-yuzde-70lere-cikmis-durumda>.

¹⁷⁴ "Top 100 for 2020," *Defense News*, <https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/>.

aerial vehicles (UAVs) “Heron”. However, in 2010 because of the Israeli military attack on the ship “Blue Marmara”, the diplomatic relations between the two countries were cut off, and as a consequence, all the agreements were suspended as well. Turkey asked the USA to supply the UAVs, but America refused it. Then, the Turkish authorities started to focus on the development of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles. Today, Turkey has been producing several types of UAVs, which are in great demand abroad. The most famous one is Bayraktar TB2, which has 27 hours and 3 Minutes of airtime and 27.30 feet altitude, was developed by the private company Baykar along with the products such as Bayraktar DiHA and Bayraktar Mini İHA. The next promising product of the company is Bayraktar Akıncı, which is equipped with locally produced ammunition such as MAM – L, MAM – C, MK – 81, MK – 82, MK – 83, SOM, and others.¹⁷⁵ Another Turkish company STM (*Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş.*), produces a lightweight and compact drone quadcopter Kargu type with electric motors and a simplified optoelectronic unit, which is capable of carrying warheads of various types and striking targets at a distance of up to 5 km from the operator.¹⁷⁶ Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) also successfully develops and produces UAVs. Thus, Anka – S can carry eight guided anti – tank missiles Cirit or four laser – guided gliding bombs MAM – L produced by Roketsan.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, the company Roketsan successfully modernizes the existing and develops the new aircraft guided weapons, which in their characteristics are considered to be competitive with the best analogies of the leading Western countries. Thus, in 2016, Rocketsan and the American company Lockheed Martin signed a contract to integrate the SOM guided missile into the armament of F – 35 tactical fighters. However, with the purchase of the Russian S – 400 by Turkey, the agreement was suspended. Among the company's developments, along with the already mentioned SOM guided missile, there are Cirit guided missiles with a semi – active laser homing head and an inertial measuring module and the UMTAS anti – tank guided missile. In addition to guided air – to – surface missiles, the company produces guidance kits for equipping standard air

¹⁷⁵ “Bayraktar DiHA,” *Baykar*, <https://www.baykartech.com/tr/uav/bayraktar-diha/>.

¹⁷⁶ “Kargu,” *STM*, <https://www.stm.com.tr/en/kargu-autonomous-tactical-multi-rotor-attack-uav>.

¹⁷⁷ “Anka-S Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” *Airforce Technology*, <https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/anka-s-unmanned-aerial-vehicle/>.

bombs with them. So, TEBER – 81 and – 82 are intended for installation on bombs of calibre 125 and 250 kg, respectively.¹⁷⁸

Continuing the theme of Turkey's achievements in the air force on the basis of the attack reconnaissance helicopter T – 129 “Atak”, which was produced by TAI with partner Agusta Westland under the license of the Italian A – 129 “Mongusta”, a modernised version “Atak – 2” equipped with new electronic warfare and communications equipment, as well as warning systems for radar and laser irradiation was developed by TAI.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, the T – 625 combat support helicopter is projected to be serially manufactured by 2021.¹⁸⁰

Having the largest and the most powerful navy in the Black Sea, Turkey tries to achieve independence from the foreign partners. MILGEM project started in 2004 is a national warship programme due to which for the first time Turkey designed a corvette-type military ship. In 2018 the project included four Ada class anti-submarine warfare corvettes and one ELINT corvette, four Istanbul class multipurpose frigates and TF2000 class anti – air warfare destroyers for the Turkish Navy, four Jinnah – class corvettes for the Pakistan Navy.¹⁸¹ Another important project, which is still under implementation, is TCG Anadolu (L – 400) building by Turkish shipyards “Sedef” under the license of the Spanish shipbuilding company “Navantia”. The ship has a helicopter and UAV carrier on board and sensors to monitor electronic attacks, and Naval Operations Command headquarters is considered as the largest combat ship in the Turkish Navy.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ “Solutions,” *Roketsan*, <https://www.roketsan.com.tr/en>.

¹⁷⁹ “ATAK 2 Helikopteri,” *Millisavunma.com*, May 9, 2020, <https://www.millisavunma.com/atak-2-helikopteri/>.

¹⁸⁰ “Gökbey,” *Turkish Aerospace*, <https://www.tusas.com/en/products/helicopter/indigenous-development/gokbey>.

¹⁸¹ “Turkey to Launch First Indigenous Frigate on Jan 23,” *Defenseworld.net*, January 20, 2021, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/28797/Turkey_to_Launch_First_Indigenous_Frigate_on_Jan_23#.YaDkE2BBzIU.

¹⁸² Hasan Al-Shaghel, “Türkiye’de son 5 yılda yaşanan gelişmeler | Savunma Sanayi 2015-2020,” *Ayam*, June 4, 2021, <https://ayam.com.tr/arastirma/turkiyede-son-5-yilda-yasanan-gelismeler-savunma-sanayi-2015-2020/>.

Turkey is also trying to provide its Ground Forces with domestic military equipment, the production of which mainly specializes in armoured vehicles, tracked infantry fighting and transport vehicles, as well as main battle tanks, which are produced by local companies such as FNSS, Otokar, BMC, Nurol Makina. Among the most successful products, there are “Altay” tank, Turkey's first own artillery system, T – 155 “Fırtına”, armoured vehicle “Kirpi”, “Cobra” and “Ejder Yalçın”, etc.

Despite the fact that manufacturers of armoured vehicles, artillery and missile weapons, ships, UAVs, electronics, etc., are actively developing, not all sectors have the technologies and capabilities to reach a level of complete independence from foreign partners and supplies. In the last 1 – 2 years the problem of imports has become even worse. After the Turkish invasion of northwest Syria in 2019, Finland stopped exporting steel to the Republic, and Great Britain suspended the participation of its firms in Ankara's first project to create a national fighter jet. Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Norway, and Sweden also banned the sale of military equipment to Turkish firms. Later, with the aggravation of the conflict in Nagorno – Karabakh in 2020, the British company Andair Ltd stopped supplying components, in particular fuel pumps, for the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 attack drones as well as the Canadian company Bombardier Recreational Products, which suspended the supply of aircraft engines used on the Turkish drones.¹⁸³ In fact, the lack of its own engine is one of the main challenges in the development of the military – industrial complex of Turkey. The project of the “Altay” tank was developed for an imported power unit. It was planned to install the German engine – transmission unit EuroPowerPack with MTU engine and Renk transmission. However, because of the differences in views on the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy, which led to the deterioration of the German – Turkish relations, Germany refused to sell its products. Turkey had to find another importer to be able to realize the project, in 2021, Turkey signed an agreement with the South Korean company Doosan and S&T Dynamics.¹⁸⁴ Another challenge for

¹⁸³ “UK company nixes exports to Turkey over Nagorno-Karabakh drone use,” *The New Arab*, January 14, 2021, <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/uk-company-cancels-turkey-exports-over-karabakh-drone-use>.

¹⁸⁴ “Almanya'nın ambargosu sonrası milli tank Altay'ın motoru için Güney Koreli iki firma ile anlaşıldı,” *Euronews*, March 9, 2021, <https://tr.euronews.com/2021/03/09/almanya-n-n-ambargosu-sonras-milli-tank-altay-n-motoru-icin-guney-koreli-iki-firma-ile-anl>.

the Turkish military defence industry was because of the purchase of the Russian S – 400 missile system in 2019; then, as a response, the USA removed Turkey from the F – 35 programme aimed at joint production of the fighter jet. In terms of the air defence system as well Turkey is still heavily dependent on foreign suppliers. Today, the basis of the Turkish air defence system is made up of American – made complexes, which are the venerable MIM – 14 Nike – Hercules and MIM – 23 Hawk complexes. Turkey wanted to supplement its air defence system with a more modern and powerful system. Therefore, it applied for the purchase of the American Patriot air defence system. However, because of the different reasons (official Turkish representatives claim that America did not want to the system, American representatives stated that Turkey demanded the transfer of technology as well) Turkey could not obtain Patriot, therefore it purchased the Russian S – 400 air defence system that led to the crisis in the Turkish – American relations. Today Turkey is actively working on the development of its own air defence system. As part of the HISAR project, the Turkish military expects to receive a full – fledged line of short, medium, and long – range air defence systems.¹⁸⁵

With different challenges, Turkey faces in the naval field as well. As an example, the Reis – class submarine project, the construction of which began back in 2015, also has a serious problem in the form of dependence on imports. This submarine was developed by German specialists on the basis of the finished Type 214 project; moreover, at least in the first years of service, the new boats will depend on American and German missiles and torpedoes until Turkey develops its own.¹⁸⁶

The analysis of the state of the Turkish military defence industry with a focus on its main achievements and challenges shows that in the last decade, Turkey has reached a new level in this field. The policy on achieving independence from the foreign partners in the defence industrial complex, implementation of which started back in the 1970s, gives its results – the local production has reached 70% – however, Turkey still remains dependent on import. The situation is worsened by the political discords between Turkey and its NATO allies, many of which are also the main importer of the

¹⁸⁵ "Hisar," *Roketsan*, <https://www.roketsan.com.tr/tr/urunler/hisar-hava-savunma-fuzeleri>.

¹⁸⁶ Кирилл Рябов, "Проблемы развития вооруженных сил Турции," *Военное Обозрение*, March 30, 2021, <https://topwar.ru/181401-problemy-razvitiya-vooruzhennyh-sil-turcii.html>.

products needed in the military defence industry. As it was discussed above, the discords usually resulted in suspension or embargo of supplies; thus, Turkey has to find other partners who can substitute the former ones.

4.3. Turkish – Ukrainian military defence cooperation after 2014

Despite the fact that the first connections in the military defence field were made back in 1994 with signing an Agreement on Cooperation in Fields of Military Training, Technics, and Science, in the framework of which an Agreement on Defence Industrial Cooperation was signed in 2007, the military defence cooperation was still limited. Only after the Ukrainian crisis and the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014, the Turkish – Ukrainian relations reached a new level in the military defence field. The first contacts were made in 2014, when the two countries agreed on cooperation in the defence industry, including projects for joint production of different military equipment such as warplanes, missile systems, aircraft engines, UAVs, radar production, armoured vehicles, navigation, and many others.¹⁸⁷ Even more active connections between the governments of Ukraine and Turkey in the military sphere began in 2015 when the Ukrainian delegation of the defence concern “*Ukroboronprom*” visited Ankara to discuss joint cooperation. As a result of the visit, Turkey provided approximately 1 million dollars to Ukraine for military ammunition.¹⁸⁸

In 2016, the former President of Ukraine, Poroshenko, visited Turkey, where the Strategic Cooperation Agreement was signed, according to which Turkey provided 4 million dollars for military ammunition and equipment to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Thus, Turkey, which supported the integrity of the Ukrainian state, began to provide not only humanitarian aid mentioned above but also military – financial assistance. The signed document consisted of a plan of military cooperation until 2020, including practical steps aimed at building up the operational capabilities of the Ukrainian

¹⁸⁷ Burak Çalışkan, “Türkiye ve Ukrayna İlişkilerinde Savunma Sanayii İşbirliği,” *Dünya Bülteni*, January 15, 2019, <https://www.dunyabulteni.net/turkiye-ve-ukrayna-iliskilerinde-savunma-sanayii-isbirligi-makale,21424.html>.

¹⁸⁸ Burak Çalışkan, “Two Allies in the Black Sea: Turkey-Ukraine Defense Industry Relations,” *İNSAMER*, August 30, 2019, 1.

military. The plan defines the directions and areas of military cooperation between the armed forces of the two states, in particular, reform and the army planning, military education and training of troops, advisory assistance, cooperation between the branches of the armed forces. According to the press service of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2016, the implementation of practical measures of cooperation in the military sphere will allow, on the one hand, to strengthen ties between two countries, and on the other hand, to direct efforts towards achieving the ultimate goal – the readiness of the armed forces of Ukraine for NATO membership in 2020.¹⁸⁹ In the same year, the parties created a Joint Group on the Coordination of Military – Mechanical Cooperation. The commission is headed by Deputy Defence Minister Igor Pavlovsky from the Ukrainian side and by Deputy Undersecretary for Defence Industries of the Ministry of Defence of Turkey Serdar Demirel from the Turkish side. Later in 2018, “Ukroboronprom” and the Office of the Military – Industrial Complex of Turkey signed a Memorandum on Cooperation in the military – industrial complex, according to which Turkey undertook to invest in the Ukrainian military – industrial complex and new joint projects. Moreover, Ankara pledged to provide financial assistance to Kiev in the amount of 15 million dollars during 2017 – 2021. These funds were supposed to be used to purchase Turkish weapons and train the Ukrainian military in Turkish training centres.¹⁹⁰ On October 21, 2020, during the visit of Ukrainian President Zelensky to Istanbul, a Framework Military Agreement and a Memorandum on Cooperation between the Ministries of Defence of Ukraine and Turkey were signed. The aim of the documents, which are also supposed to serve as a legal basis for the bilateral cooperation, is to develop the cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine in the military defence fields and, as a result, to strengthen defence capabilities of both countries.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ “Украина и Турция подписали план военного сотрудничества до 2020 года,” ТАСС, March 16, 2016, <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3286552>.

¹⁹⁰ Канарова, “Украинско-турецкие отношения в 2014-2019 гг.: динамика, тенденции, перспективы,” 1539.

¹⁹¹ “Ukraine and Turkey have a common vision of cooperation in the field of security and defense – President,” *President of Ukraine | Volodymyr Zelenskyy Official Website*, October 16, 2020, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-j-turechchina-mayut-spilnu-tochku-zoru-shodo-spivpr-64669>.

The most notable area of cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine is unmanned aerial vehicles. In 2018 two states within the framework of the meeting of the Joint Group on the Coordination of Military – Mechanical Cooperation signed a Memorandum on the Supply of unmanned aerial systems to Ukraine and the creation of a joint venture for their production. The meeting participants also analysed the state of implementation of joint projects in the military – technical sphere for the current year, in particular, the fulfilment of the contract for the supply of communication equipment to the Aselsan Company for the needs of the Ukrainian army. The parties agreed to transfer advanced technologies and software in the field of communications to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and signed a corresponding offset agreement.¹⁹² In 2019, six Bayraktar TB – 2 drones, three ground control stations, and 200 high – precision munitions (Roketsan MAM – L) were delivered to Ukraine in the amount of 69 million dollars.¹⁹³ In 2020 Ukraine proclaimed that it wanted to buy 48 more Bayraktar TB2 combat drones, which will be jointly produced by Ukraine and Turkey. It is worth noting that Bayraktar TB – 2, nicknamed “Pantsir – hunter”, proved to be incredibly effective in the fight against the Russian – made “Pantsir S – 1” air defence systems, which are in service with the Syrian, Libyan, and Armenian air defence systems. On December 14, 2020, Ukraine and Turkey signed an Agreement on the production of attack drones for the Ukrainian army. Under the terms of the agreement, Ukraine will also receive technologies for the production of attack unmanned aerial complexes.¹⁹⁴

In the same year, a joint venture named Black Sea Shield was established. In Turkey, the joint Ukrainian – Turkish enterprise is engaged in the development of an operational – strategic reconnaissance and strike unmanned complex Akinci. One of the main features of Akinci is that it can be equipped with a wide range of ammunition used in conventional aviation. In particular, the long – range SOM cruise missiles of

¹⁹² “Київ і Анкара підписали меморандум про поставку в Україну безпілотних авіакомплексів і створенні СП,” *Інтерфакс-Україна*, July 4, 2018, <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/515843.html>.

¹⁹³ “Україна почала підыскивать площадку для виробництва турецьких БПЛА Bayraktar,” *Інтерфакс*, October 23, 2020, <https://www.interfax.ru/world/733967>.

¹⁹⁴ “Турція буде виробляти для армії України корвети і ударні безпілотники,” *ТАСС*, December 14, 2020, <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/10254791>.

the Turkish company Roketsan, capable of destroying targets at a distance of about 250 kilometres.¹⁹⁵ It is essential that Akinci will use AI – 450T turboprop engines developed by the Ivchenko – Progress state – owned enterprise in Zaporozhye, Ukraine.¹⁹⁶ Since Canadian company “Bombardier Recreational Products” and its Austrian subsidiary BRP – Rotax GmbH & Co KG have suspended the supply of engines to Turkey, the Ukrainian engine was a good alternative.¹⁹⁷ In addition, recently, in November 2021, at SAHA EXPO Defence and Aviation Hybrid Fair, the companies Baykar and Ivchenko – Progress signed a contract on the supply of the Ukrainian AI – 322F Turbofan engine for the Baykar's Combat Unmanned Aircraft System (MIUS) project. At the same fair, the Turkish company Baykar signed a Technical Specification Agreement with another Ukrainian enterprise Motor Sich on the supply of MS500 Turboprop Engine for Akinci. MS500 will be an alternative for AI – 450T, which is already used in Akinci.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, under the auspices of the created common enterprise Black Sea Shield, by order of third countries, the first Ukrainian – Turkish combat module Serdar was designed, which is a universal remotely controlled and stabilized weapon system that provides high efficiency of both defensive and offensive operations against ground targets in all weather conditions, in dark or daylight hours. The main weapon of the combat module is a mobile version of the Ukrainian high – precision anti – tank complex “Skif” with two or four (in some versions) missile launchers.¹⁹⁹ In Ukraine, in turn, within the framework of Black Sea

¹⁹⁵ Андрей Шляхтин, “Как Украина с Турцией создают оружие будущего: фото, видео,” *Канал 24*, January 3, 2020, https://24tv.ua/ru/kak_ukraina_s_turciej_sozdajut_oruzhie_budushhego_foto_video_n1258412.

¹⁹⁶ Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey and Ukraine Boost Mutual Defense Ties,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 17, no. 162 (2020), <https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-ukraine-boost-mutual-defense-ties/>.

¹⁹⁷ “Вслед за Канадой Австрия отказалась поставлять двигатели для турецких «Байрактаров»,” *Репортер*, October 26, 2020, <https://topcor.ru/17087-vsled-za-kanadoj-avstrija-otkazalas-postavljat-dvigateli-dlja-tureckih-bajraktarov.html>.

¹⁹⁸ Ayşe Betül Bal, “Turkey’s Baykar, Ukrainian firm ink deal for unmanned aircraft engine,” *Daily Sabah*, November 12, 2021, <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkeys-baykar-ukrainian-firm-ink-deal-for-unmanned-aircraft-engine>.

¹⁹⁹ “Первый украинско-турецкий боевой модуль Serdar успешно прошел испытания: впечатляющее видео,” *ДонПресс*, June 6, 2019, <https://donpress.com/news/06-06-2019-pervyy-ukrainsko-tureckiy-boevoy-modul-serdar-uspeshno-proshel-ispytaniya>.

Shield, a joint venture will be created to produce Bayraktar TB2. The products of this enterprise will be 35% cheaper for the Ukrainian Armed Forces than the UAVs made in Turkey.²⁰⁰

After the massive loss of Turkish tanks in north – western Syria, which were hit by an anti – tank guided missile, in February 2018, Turkey agreed to purchase the Ukrainian complex of active protection “Zaslon – L” for more than 100 of its tanks. This Ukrainian complex of active protection of armoured vehicles was developed on the basis of the “Barrier” Soviet program of the 1980s. Later, on the basis of “Zaslon – L”, the Turkish company Aselsan has produced a complex of active protection Akkor Pulat.²⁰¹ In addition, within the framework of the agreement signed between the companies Spetstechnoexport and Roketsan in 2018, the Ukrainian explosive reactive armour systems “Duplets” are supposed to be used on the Turkish M60 main battle tanks.²⁰²

Another arms transaction between Ukraine and Turkey was Turkey's purchase of two S – 125M1 “Pechora – M1” air defence systems in 2019. During the modernization of the Soviet missile complex “Pechora” by Ukrainian defence enterprises, the range reached 45 km in comparison with the previous 25 km. An active homing head was created for the air defence missile systems, and new integral systems were introduced into the control elements of the complex.²⁰³ It was an interesting purchase since earlier Turkey has bought the Russian air defence missile system S – 400.

²⁰⁰ “Ударные беспилотники, крылатые ракеты, корветы. Как Турция вооружает Украину,” *Рамблер*, November 20, 2020, <https://news.rambler.ru/army/45280204-udarnye-bespilotniki-krylatye-rakety-korvety-kak-turtsiya-vooruzhaet-ukrainu/>.

²⁰¹ Tamir Eshel, “Ukrainian APS to Protect Turkish Tanks in Syria,” *Defense Update*, March 7, 2018, https://defense-update.com/20180307_akkor_pulat.html.

²⁰² “Ukraine, Turkey could start joint mass production of Ukrainian APS for Turkish M60 tanks,” *KyivPost*, December 14, 2018, <https://www.kyivpost.com/business/ukraine-turkey-could-start-joint-mass-production-of-ukrainian-aps-for-turkish-m60-tanks.html>.

²⁰³ “Defense Express: Турция закупает у Украины ЗРК С-125, чтобы уравновесить РФ в Чёрном море,” *Репортер*, November 18, 2020, <https://topcor.ru/17416-defense-express-turcija-zakupayet-u-ukrainy-zrk-s-125-chtoby-uravnovesit-rf-v-chernom-more.html>.

Moreover, the first activity in the field of radar systems between Turkey and Ukraine was the Memorandum of Understanding signed on April 8, 2016, between Havelsan and Ukraine's state defence industry enterprise Ukroboronprom for the joint production of the Passive Sensor System. On October 11, 2016, during the Arms and Security 2016 Exhibition held in Kiev, a cooperation contract for passive radar production was signed between Havelsan and Ukrinmash, a state – owned company under Ukroboronprom. With the project, it was aimed to increase the remote sensing capability of Turkey and Ukraine up to 600 km range. Later, in 2019 Ukrspetsexport and Savunma Sanayi Teknolojileri A.Ş signed an Agreement on the purchase of two P – 180U and two MARS – L Ukrainian radars.²⁰⁴

The Turkish – Ukrainian cooperation develops in the naval sphere as well. On December 21, 2020, the shipyard “Okean” signed a memorandum with the State Defence Concern of the Republic of Turkey on joint activities to implement a project to build a series of corvette – class ships for the Ukrainian Navy in pursuance of the Military Framework Agreement signed in October 2020 during a meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Turkey in Ankara, as well as a contract for the construction of corvettes signed by the parties on December 14 of 2020 in Kiev. The agreement provides the construction of five corvettes of the Turkish MILGEM project (type Ada) for the Ukrainian Navy. As of February 2021, only the hull of the corvette will be built at a Turkish shipyard. The remaining four corvettes are to be fully built – in Ukraine at the “Okean” plant.²⁰⁵ Reportedly, Turkish corvettes “Ada” is considered as an alternative to the unrealized plan for the construction of corvettes of project 58250 in Ukraine, which has been developed since 2005, long before the

²⁰⁴ İbrahim Sünnetci, “P-180U ve MARS-L Radar Alımı ve Kullanım Alanlarına Bakış!” *Defence Turkey*, April 21, 2020, <https://www.defenceturkey.com/tr/icerik/p-180u-ve-mars-l-radar-alimi-ve-kullanim-alanlarina-bakis-3985>.

²⁰⁵ “Ukrayna, Türkiye'den alacağı ilk korvet için 137 milyon \$ ödeyecek,” *Savunma Sanayii Dergilik*, February 22, 2021, <http://ssdergilik.com/tr/HaberDergilik/Ukrayna-Turkiye-den-alacagi-ilk-korvet-icin-137-milyon-odeyecek>.

events in Crimea, but at that time because of the lack of financial resources, the project was ignored.²⁰⁶

Moreover, at the 10th meeting of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian – Turkish Commission in 2016 on trade and economic cooperation, the countries agreed on a partnership in aircraft construction and the development of space technologies. The agreements included the readiness of Turkey and Ukraine to develop and produce new passenger and transport aircraft based on the “Antonov” State Enterprise. In particular, the development and production of the TAN – 158 passenger aircraft based on the An – 158 aircraft; a transport aircraft for the Turkish side based on the An – 178 aircraft; aircraft for the Turkish side based on the An – 70 aircraft.²⁰⁷ Later in 2018, Ukrainian state – owned enterprise “Antonov”, which is part of the state concern “Ukroboronprom”, and Turkish Aerospace Industry (TAI) have expressed interest in establishing a joint venture for the development, construction, and testing of the An – 188 transport aircraft. However, according to the interview of already ex – president of “Antonov” Aleksander Los in December of 2020, Turkey withdrew from cooperation with Ukraine on the creation of an An – 188 turbojet military transport aircraft due to the fact that, as Los says, one of the more long – standing partners of the Turkish aviation industry, which offered Turkey more interesting projects, has intervened. It is important to note that other projects have not been started as well.²⁰⁸

The cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine has reached the space sphere as well. In September 2020, at a meeting between Deputy Prime Minister for Strategic Industries of Ukraine Oleg Urusky with an official Turkish delegation headed by the head of the Turkish National Space Agency Serdar Huseyn Yildirim, the parties discussed cooperation in the space industry with the aim of creating joint programs in the space

²⁰⁶ “Украина объяснила закупку турецких корветов и беспилотников,” *Рамблер*, January 7, 2021, <https://news.rambler.ru/weapon/45565454-ukraina-obyasnila-zakupku-turetskih-korvetov-i-bespilotnikov/>.

²⁰⁷ “Киев договорился с Анкарой о совместном производстве самолётов,” *Военное Обозрение*, May 14, 2016, <https://topwar.ru/95233-kiev-dogovorilsya-s-ankaroy-o-sovmestnom-proizvodstve-samoletov.html>.

²⁰⁸ Fatih Mehmet, “Prof. Dr. İsmail Demir: Ortak üretim havuç olarak kullanılmamalı,” *DefenceTurk.net*, October 20, 2020, <https://www.defenceturk.net/prof-dr-ismail-demir-ortak-uretim-havuc-olarak-kullanilmamali>.

industry,²⁰⁹ which includes developing of launch technologies, satellite manufacturing, marketing and manufacturing of subsystems, and a program dedicated to the production of a common rocket launcher.²¹⁰

According to the analysis presented above, the Turkish – Ukrainian relations in the military defence field have been actively developing in all sectors of the defence industry since 2014. In 2016 in a press conference held during the visit to Turkey, The President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, stated that the military defence cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is aimed at defending the native lands: Turkey and Ukraine, it is not directed against any third parties. He also stressed that in the bilateral cooperation, there is a lot of synergy, which increases the defence capability of both Turkey and Ukraine.²¹¹ The President of Defence Industries of Turkey Ismail Demir, back in 2016 at a meeting with the Ukrainian representatives on the implementation of joint projects in the field of the military – industrial complex, stressed Turkey's interest in cooperation with Ukraine, adding that this cooperation will be very productive because by joining efforts, Turkey and Ukraine will become stronger.²¹² Later Demir noted that Ukraine and Turkey complement each other in the defence industry.²¹³ The incumbent President of Ukraine, Volodimir Zelensky, also emphasizes the importance of cooperation in the defence industry, which is decisive for the development of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey. Thus, in his recent official visit to Turkey in April of 2021, Zelensky said that Turkey and

²⁰⁹ Talha Yavuz, "Türkiye ile Ukrayna arasında uzay alanında iş birliği geliyor," *Anadolu Ajansı*, September 17, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/turkiye-ile-ukrayna-arasinda-uzay-alaninda-is-birligi-gelisiyor/1977134>.

²¹⁰ "Украина и Турция будут сотрудничать в космической сфере," *Рамблер*, December 23, 2020, <https://news.rambler.ru/conflicts/45489944-ukraina-i-turtsiya-budut-sotrudnichat-v-kosmicheskoy-sfere/>.

²¹¹ "Оборонное сотрудничество с Турцией не направлено против кого-то другого – Порошенко," *Укринформ*, March 9, 2016, <https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-politics/1979205-oboronnoe-sotrudnicestvo-s-turciej-ne-napravleno-protiv-kogoto-drugogo-porosenko.html>.

²¹² Александр Цабий, "Украина и Турция договорились о совместном производстве военной техники и оружия," *Telegraf*, February 15, 2016, <https://telegraf.com.ua/ukraina/obshhestvo/2307078-ukraina-i-turtsiya-dogovorilis-o-sovmestnom-proizvodstve-voennoy-tehniki-i-oruzhiya.html>.

²¹³ Ali Cura, "Turkey looks to expand defense ties with Ukraine," *Anadolu Ajansı*, October 11, 2017, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-looks-to-expand-defense-ties-with-ukraine/932768>.

Ukraine have a common point of view regarding further cooperation in the field of security and defence, in particular security of the Black Sea and the implementation of Ukraine's Euro – Atlantic course.²¹⁴ The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in turn, by stressing the support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and maintaining security in the Black Sea region, in April 2021 claimed that the defence industry is a crucial element of the Turkish – Ukrainian cooperation, the establishment of the “2 + 2” format (heads of the Foreign and Defence Ministries of the two countries) will help to strengthen coordination between the countries.²¹⁵



²¹⁴ “Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Zelenskiy: Türkiye'nin desteği çok önemli,” *TRT Haber*, April 10, 2021, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/ukrayna-devlet-baskani-zelenskiy-turkiyenin-destegi-cok-onemli-571801.html>.

²¹⁵ “Erdoğan Ukrayna Devlet Başkanı Zelensky ile görüştü: “İşbirliğimiz üçüncü ülkelere karşı bir girişim değildir,” *BBC News*, April 10, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-56701148>.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The aim of the thesis was to indicate the nature and the main reasons of the Turkish – Ukrainian rapprochement in the military defence field started after the Ukrainian political crisis, followed by the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in 2014. Taking as a basis the R. Keohane's definition of cooperation, according to which interstate cooperation presupposes the existence of three elements such as the common objectives of the partner states, their expectation of benefits from the cooperation, and the reciprocal nature of these benefits, the main assumptions developed by the different theoretical schools of thought on the conditions, under which the cooperation between the states are more likely, were also analysed. In this framework, the conditions for the bilateral military defence cooperation, which is understood as mutual cooperation ranging “from coordinating defence policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology”,²¹⁶ in the literature are presented as follows: states feel a need to develop coordinated responses to common security threats (the common objectives of the partner states); states want to modernize their military and improve their defence capacities (benefits from the cooperation + reciprocity of the benefits); states are prone to align themselves with communities of like-minded and politically similar collaborators.

Regarding the latter, indeed, the historical analysis on the development of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations from 1991 until 2014 shows that Turkey always defended Ukraine's independence from the former Soviet centre, which were challenging Ukraine's formation as a sovereign state, as well as the European direction of the Ukrainian foreign policy. Ukraine, in turn, supported all Turkish initiatives in the Black Sea region and gave freedom to Turkish activities in the Crimean Peninsula, with which Turkey has historical ties. The chapter on Turkey's place in the Ukrainian

²¹⁶ Kinne, *The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)*, 1.

foreign policy orientation shows that the relations between these two countries were supposed to be developed not only in the economic, social, and cultural spheres, due to the online archives of the Official Gazette of Turkey the Agreements on the Cooperation in the Military Defence field dated 1994, 1998 and 2007 were detected. Although, because of some reasons, no joint projects or procurements were indicated in the framework of these agreements, it is an important finding, which indicates the intentions of Turkey and Ukraine to cooperate in this field long before 2014. This analysis revealed a solid ground upon which Turkish – Ukrainian relations have been developing since 1991.

In the third chapter of the thesis, the policy of Turkey and Ukraine in the Black Sea region, particularly the two states' main interests and priorities as well as the main challenges in the region were analysed. The study shows that the incorporation of Crimea into Russia in 2014, which led to the rise and solidifying of the Russian power in the Black Sea, was perceived as a threat by both countries. Indeed, Turkey continues to support Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity as it did after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, from the Turkish perspective, not only the rise of the Russian power but also the possibility of the expansion of the NATO presence in the region was considered as a threat to the national and regional security and interests of Turkey though it is a NATO member.

The fourth chapter presents the main findings on the Turkish – Ukrainian cooperation in the military defence field that occurred after 2014. Before the analysis of the main agreements and projects conducted by these two countries, it was important to examine the state of the defence – industrial complex of Turkey and Ukraine in order to acknowledge what benefits the two countries can gain from this cooperation. Regarding Turkey, to a certain degree, its military production is still dependent on imports. However, during the last decade, because of the disagreements over the Turkish foreign policy, the relations between Turkey and its NATO allies, which were one of the main importers, were deteriorated. It caused the suspension of the agreements on the supply of components and the exclusion of Turkey from the joint programmes. Thus, Turkey, which aims at developing its own independent defence – industrial complex, had to find a new partner, which could substitute the former ones. Ukraine, which inherited the technologies from the Soviet Union in the military

defence production, seemed like a potential partner to develop the relations in this field. Ukraine, in turn, sees Turkey, first of all, as a NATO ally. Being not a member of the Alliance and having a very weak defence industry pushed Ukraine to develop bilateral cooperation with the countries supporting Ukraine in the Crimean issue. Developing relations with the NATO countries provide Ukraine with modern military products in accordance with the NATO standards, which is essential for a state aiming to join the Alliance.

The thesis could provide the answer to the research question and confirm the argument that was not studied in the academic literature until now. However, the research has its limitations, which can be overcome with further research. The most important one is that the subject was scrutinized in the scope of the Black Sea region. However, the dynamics in the neighbouring Middle East region could also affect the activation of this cooperation not only because of the embargoes from the West but also because of the increased need of Turkey for certain military products. Thus, the research on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East can make research more profound.

Moreover, at present it seems that as long as Turkey and Ukraine obtain benefits from the cooperation, the states will continue developing their relations in the military defence field. However, in terms of further research, it is essential to follow the development of the Turkish – Ukrainian relations in the military defence field because, firstly, the positions of these two countries on the NATO presence in the Black Sea are opposite. Ukraine aims to join NATO and considers the Alliance as the only way to maintain its national and regional security; Turkey, in turn, considers the expansion of the NATO presence as a threat to its regional interests. Secondly, although Turkey still has not recognized Crimea, it actively develops relations with Russia. How it will affect the relations with Ukraine and how Ukraine and Turkey will develop their relations under such circumstances is the subject to be analysed in further research.

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A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Trk ve Ukrayna halkı arasındaki baęların tarihte izleri bulunsa da, Trkiye ile Ukrayna arasındaki resmi iliřkiler 1991 yılı sonunda Sovyetler Birlięi'nin daęılması ve Ukrayna'nın uluslararası toplum tarafından egemen bir devlet olarak tanınmasıyla başlamıřtır. Ukrayna, baęımsızlıęını kazanmasından bu yana, Avrupa – Atlantik yapılarına, zellikle AB ve NATO'ya katılmaya odaklanarak Batı ynnde bir geliřim izliyor. Sadece bazı kısa dnemlerde hem Batı hem de Rusya ile iliřkiler geliřtirerek, daha ok szde, bir dengeleme politikası uygulamaya alıřtı. 2013 yılında Viktor Yanukovi'in AB ile Ortaklık Anlařmasını imzalamayı reddetmesi byk protestolara yol atı ve ardından Kırım Yarımadası'nın Rusya'ya katılmasıyla sonulandı. Bu kriz Trkiye – Ukrayna iliřkilerinin yeni bir stratejik dzeye ulařmasına neden oldu. oęu lke gibi Trkiye de Rusya'nın eylemini ilhak olarak deęerlendirdi ve sadece Ukrayna'nın toprak btnlęn deęil, aynı zamanda yarımadanın tarihsel olarak yerli halkları olan Kırım Tatarlarının haklarını da destekledi. Buna karřılık olarak Rusya'ya uygulanan Batı yaptırımlarına Trkiye katılmasa da Trkiye ve Ukrayna yeni bir alanda, yani askeri savunma alanında iřbirlięi yapmaya başlamıř oldu ve bylece iliřkiler stratejik dzeye tařındı. 2014 yılına kadar iliřkilerin aęırlıklı olarak ekonomik, sosyal ve kltrel alanlarda geliřtięini belirtmekte fayda var.

Bu tezde, toprakların yasadıřı iřgali anlamına gelen ilhak teriminden kaındım, nk arařtırmamda kullanmak iin ncelikle bu konuyu deęerlendirmem gerekiyordu. Bu alıřmanın konusu olmadıęı iin, tarafsızlıęı korumak adına katılma ve benzeri terimler kullanıldı.

Bu tez, 2014 olayları sonrasında başlayan Ukrayna ve Trkiye arasındaki yoęun askeri savunma iřbirlięinin nedenlerini ve doęasını arařtırmayı amalamaktaydı. Trkiye ve Ukrayna arasındaki bu alanda aktif iřbirlięinin birok boyutu ve faktr var; ancak bu tez sadece Karadeniz blgesi ile sınırlı, nk iki lke arasındaki aktif iřbirlięi, 2014 yılında zellikle Karadeniz blgesinde meydana gelen muazzam deęiřikliklerin ardından gzlenmektedir.

Bu konuda çok fazla bilimsel literatür bulunmadığından, mevcut tartışmaların tam olarak anlaşılması için literatür taraması; Karadeniz bölgesi kapsamında Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkilerinin yanı sıra Ukrayna ve Türkiye'nin Karadeniz bölgesindeki politikasına ve bu iki devletin Kırım'ın Rusya'ya katılımı konusundaki tepki ve tutumlarına da genişletildi. Akademik literatürü incelerken, askeri savunma alanında 2014 olaylarından sonra başlayan Türkiye – Ukrayna yakınlaşmasına ilişkin bir analizin olmadığını gördüm. Böylece bu tez literatürdeki bu boşluğa katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamıştır. Ukrayna ve Türkiye'yi bu kadar yakın bir işbirliğine iten unsurların ve doğasının anlaşılması elzemdir, çünkü bu yakınlaşma sadece Türkiye ve Ukrayna arasındaki ikili ilişkileri değil, aynı zamanda iki ülkenin diğer önemli bölgesel ve hatta bölge dışı ülkelerle olan ilişkilerini de kesinlikle etkileyecektir. Ayrıca Karadeniz'in oyuncularını ve bölgenin dinamiklerini etkileyecektir.

Bu tezde argümanım, Ukrayna krizinin ardından 2014 yılında Kırım'ın Rusya Federasyonu'na katılmasının askeri savunma alanında Türkiye – Ukrayna yakınlaşmasına ivme kazandırdığı yönünde. Ukrayna perspektifinden bu yakınlaşmanın temel nedeni, Kırım'ın kaybının devletin toprak bütünlüğüne ve ulusal güvenliğine tehdit olarak görülmesiydi. Ukrayna'nın NATO üyesi olmaması ve zayıf bir savunma sanayi kompleksine sahip olması, bu konudaki tutumunu destekleyen ülkelerle ikili işbirliğini geliştirmek zorunda kalmasına yol açtı. Komşu Karadeniz ülkesi Türkiye, Ukrayna tarafından askeri savunma alanında gelişen ilişkiler için güçlü ve güvenilir bir ortak olarak görülüyor. Bunun sebeplerinden biri Türkiye'nin, uzun süreli bir NATO üyesi ve modern bir savunma sanayi kompleksine sahip olması; ikincisi, Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkileri 1991'den beri gelişiyor olması; üçüncüsü, Türkiye her zaman Ukrayna'nın bağımsızlığını destekledi, şimdi de Kırım konusunda Ukrayna'nın argümanlarını desteklemesi. Türkiye açısından bakıldığında, ilk olarak, Kırım'ın Rusya'ya katılması, bir yanda bölgede Rus gücünün yükselmesine, öte yanda NATO'nun Karadeniz'deki varlığının genişlemesine yol açmıştır. Her ikisi de Türkiye'nin ulusal ve bölgesel güvenliğine ve çıkarlarına tehdit olarak değerlendirilmektedir. İkincisi, son on yılda, Türkiye, uyguladığı dış politikalar konusunda Batılı ortaklarıyla anlaşmazlıklara düşmesi askeri tedarikine ilişkin anlaşmaların askıya alınmasına ve Türkiye'nin ortak programlardan dışlanmasına yol açtı. Bu nedenle, kendi bağımsız savunma sanayi kompleksini geliştirmeyi hedefleyen Türkiye, eskilerinin yerini alabilecek bir ortak bulmak zorunda kaldı. Askeri savunma

retiminde Sovyetler Birlięi'nden gelen teknolojileri miras alan Ukrayna, bu alandaki iliřkileri geliřtirmek iin potansiyel bir ortak gibi grnyordu.

Doęrudan arařtırmaya gemeden nce, arařtırma sorusunu cevaplamak ve argmanımı kanıtlamak iin bir temel teřkil eden teorik bir ereve geliřtirmem gerekti. Bu nedenle ncelikle iřbirlięinin ne olduęunu, iki devletin ne zaman ve nasıl iřbirlięi yapmaya bařladıęını inceledim. Robert Keohane'ye gre iřbirlięi, “aktrlerin davranıřlarını bir politika koordinasyonu sreci aracılıęıyla bařkalarının gerek veya beklenen tercihlerine gre ayarladıkları” bir durumdur. Dięer bir deyiřle, devletler arası iřbirlięi  unsurun varlıęını kapsıyor: ilk, ortak devletlerin ortak amalarının olması; ikinci olarak, iki devletin iřbirlięinden fayda beklentilerinin olması; ve ncs, iřbirlięinden kazanılan faydaların karřılıklı dengeli olması. Brandon J Kinne, “savunma politikalarını koordine etmekten, ortak tatbikatlar yrtmeye, ortak silah ve teknoloji retmeye” kadar uzanan karřılıklı iřbirliklerini askeri savunma alanındaki iřbirlik olarak tanımlıyor ve byle iřbirlikleri iin eřitli nedenler n gryor. Birincisi, devletler ordularını modernize etmek ve ortak arařtırma, ortak askeri tatbikatlar, eęitim ve ęretim ve silah tedariki yoluyla savunma kapasitelerini geliřtirmek istiyorlar. İkinci olarak, devletlerin, ortak gvenlik tehditlerine karřı koordineli yanıtlar geliřtirmesi gerekiyor. ncs, devletler, kendilerini benzer dřncelere sahip ve siyasi olarak benzer iřbirliki topluluklarla hizalamaya eęilimlidir. Son olarak Kinne, Barıř iin Ortaklık Program'ındaki devletlerinin NATO İttifak'ının standartlarına ulařabilmesi ve nihayetinde ye olabilmesi iin NATO yeleriyle iřbirlikleri yapmasının nemli bir mekanizma olduęunu belirtiyor.

Genel olarak devletlerarası iřbirlięine ve zel olarak askeri savunma alanındaki teorik yaklařımlara dayanarak, arařtırma sorusunu cevaplamak iin oęunlukla resmi belgeler, anlařmalar, evrimii devlet arřivleri, konuřmalar ve rportajlar, istatistik raporları ieren birincil kaynakların yanı sıra kitaplar, dergiler ve gazetelerdeki makaleler, web siteleri, Ph.D. tezleri gibi ikincil kaynakları analiz yntemini kullandım. Kullandıęım kaynaklar İngilizce, Rusa, Trke ve Ukraynaca idi.

Arařtırma, 1991 yılından 2014 yılına kadar Ukrayna dıř politika yneliminin ve Trkiye'nin politikasındaki yerinin analizi ile bařlamaktadır. Analiz, Sovyetler Birlięi'nin daęılmasından sonra Ukrayna'nın kendisini iki kutup arasında bulduęunu

gösterdi: bir tarafta Batı ve diğer tarafta Rusya. Sonunda Ukrayna, gelişimini Batı yönünde ilan etti ve farklı cumhurbaşkanları döneminde bu yönü takip etti, sadece bazı dönemlerde politikanın uygulanması dışarıdan sınırlandırıldı. Ukrayna'nın eski Sovyet merkezinden bağımsızlığını her zaman savunan Türkiye, kalkınmanın Avrupa yönünü destekledi. Ukrayna ise Karadeniz bölgesindeki tüm Türk girişimlerini destekleyerek, Türkiye'nin tarihi bağlarının olduğu ve kendi çıkarlarının da bulunduğu Kırım Yarımadası'ndaki Türk faaliyetlerine serbestlik verdi. Kırım Yarımadası'nın Türkiye ile tarihi bağları olduğu biliniyor. 18. yüzyıla kadar, Kırım Yarımadası Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bir parçası olan Kırım Hanlığı'nın topraklarıydı. Ancak, 1783'te Büyük Katerina Manifestosu'na göre Kırım Rus İmparatorluğu'nun bir parçası oldu. Daha sonra Rusya'nın tam zaferiyle sonuçlanan 1787 – 1791 Rus – Türk savaşı ve 1791 Yassı Barış Antlaşması Rusya'nın bölgedeki konumunu tamamen pekiştirdi. O zamandan beri, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve ardından Türkiye'nin Kırım Yarımadası üzerindeki etkisi çok az düzeyde kaldı. 1990'ların başında SSCB'nin dağılmasından sonra Kırım yeniden Türkiye'nin ilgisini çekmeye başladı. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra Türkiye'nin Kırım'daki çıkarlarının artması, sadece yarımadayla olan tarihsel bağların değil, aynı zamanda Türkiye'de yaşayan çok sayıda Kırım Tatar nüfusunun da bir sonucuydu. İlginçtir ki, Ukrayna'nın bağımsızlığının ilanından sonra Kırım ve Kırım Tatarları meselesi iki ülke arasında bir çatışma alanı haline gelmedi; tam tersine, bu alan bir “dostluk köprüsü”, Ukrayna ve Türkiye arasında bir işbirliği arenası haline geldi. 2014 yılına kadar Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkileri ağırlıklı olarak ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel alanlarda geliyordu. Ancak, Türkiye Resmi Gazetesi'nin çevrimiçi arşivleri sayesinde 1994, 1998 ve 2007 tarihli Askeri Savunma Alanında İşbirliği Anlaşmaları tespit ettim. Bu anlaşmalar çerçevesinde herhangi bir ortak proje veya satın alma belirtilmemiş olsa da, Türkiye ve Ukrayna'nın bu alanda işbirliği yapma niyetlerini 2014'ten çok daha önce ortaya koyan önemli bir bulgu oldu.

Türkiye ve Ukrayna'nın Karadeniz bölgesindeki politikalarının araştırılması, iki devletin bölgenin öneminin yanı sıra başta Kırım'ın Rusya'ya katılması olmak üzere bölgedeki temel sorunları içermektedir. 2014 yılına kadar Karadeniz'e yönelik ayrı bir politika uygulamayan Ukrayna açısından, Kırım'ın kaybedilmesi sadece ekonomik ve siyasi sıkıntılara yol açmadı, savunma alanında da ciddi tahribat oluşturdu. Ukrayna'nın Kırım ile fiili olarak neredeyse tüm donanmasını ve potansiyel hava kuvvetleri ve hava savunmasının %20'sini kaybettiği iddia ediliyor. Rusya tüm

altyapıyı, yani üsleri, depoları, araştırma merkezlerini vb. elde etti. Şu anda, denizaltı “Zaporozhye”, füze teknesi “Pridneprovye”, küçük denizaltı karşıtı gemiler “Lutsk”, “Khmelnitsky”, “Ternopil”, deniz mayın tarama gemisi “Chernigov”, sabotaj önleme botu “Feodosia” ve diğerleri Ukranya’nın kontrol altında değil. Ayrıca, Ukrayna Donanmasının Karadeniz’deki operasyonel yeteneklerinde önemli ölçüde sınırlı hale getirdi ve bu da Ukrayna’nın güneyindeki savunma potansiyelinin azalmasına neden oldu.

Türkiye için ise Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılması, bölgede önemli bir rol oynama fırsatı veren yeni bir ufuk açtı. Türk politikasının bölgedeki temel hedeflerinden biri, bölgesel aktörlerin bir araya getirildiği farklı bölgesel örgütler oluşturarak ulaşmaya çalıştığı barış ve güvenliği sağlamak olmuştur. Karadeniz bölgesi dış politikasında her zaman önemli bir yer tutar çünkü her şeyden önce Türkiye Karadeniz’de en büyük deniz gücüne sahiptir; ikincisi, Türkiye’nin Boğazları kontrol etme münhasır hakkı vardır; son olarak, Türkiye önde gelen petrol ve doğal gaz tedarikçileri ile en büyük enerji tüketicisi olan Avrupa arasında yer almaktadır. Kırım’ın Rusya’ya dahil olması, Rus gücünün konsolide olmasına ve buna cevaben Karadeniz’de NATO’nun genişleme olasılığına yol açması nedeniyle Türkiye için büyük bir zorluktu. Türkiye’nin ilhak olarak kabul ettiği Kırım’ın Rusya’ya katılması, hem Rus gücünün askeri anlamda sağlamlaşmasına hem de Kırım’daki tüm Türk faaliyetlerinin sona ermesine ve dolayısıyla Türklerin yarımada üzerindeki etkisinin azalmasına yol açmıştır. Öte yandan, Kırım’ın Rusya’ya katılması bölgedeki NATO varlığının genişlemesine yol açabilir. Bu, Türkiye için aynı zamanda ulusal güvenliği ve bölgedeki çıkarları için bir tehdit olduğunu savunuyorum çünkü her şeyden önce NATO varlığının genişlemesi bölgedeki Türk etkisini azaltacaktır, ikincisi Türkiye için NATO tarihi ve bazı NATO ülkeleriyle mevcut anlaşmazlıklar nedeniyle güvenilir bir ittifak değil. Türkiye, bir NATO üyesi olmasına rağmen, Karadeniz bölgesindeki statükoyu korumak, 1936 Montrö Sözleşmesine bağlı kalmak ve ABD’nin (İttifak’ın lideri) bölgede aşırı güçlenmemesini istemektedir. 1936 Montrö Sözleşmesi, Türkiye’nin Boğazlar üzerindeki egemenliğini pekiştirdi. Sözleşme, hem barış zamanında hem de savaş zamanında tüm ülkelerin ticaret gemilerinin Boğazlardan geçiş serbestliğini korur; ancak, savaş gemilerinin geçiş rejimi, kıyıdaki ve kıyıdaki olmayan devletlere göre farklıdır. Bu nedenle, NATO’nun Karadeniz’de belirli türdeki tatbikatları özgürce

yapabilmesi için, Sözleşme'nin bazı maddelerinin, bölgedeki Türk etkisinin önemli ölçüde azalmasına yol açacak şekilde değiştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Bu iki ülke tarafından yürütülen ana anlaşmaların ve projelerin analizine geçmeden önce, iki ülkenin bu işbirliğinden neler kazanabileceğini anlamak için Türkiye ve Ukrayna'nın savunma sanayi kompleksinin durumunu incelemek önemliydi. Türkiye'de askeri üretim tarihi, bir zamanlar en güçlü imparatorluklardan biri olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na dayanmaktadır. 18. yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti, silah üretim teknolojisi ve genel olarak askeri alandaki gelişmeler açısından Avrupa devletlerinin ve Rusya'nın gerisinde kalmaya başlamıştır. 1923 yılında, ulusal kurtuluş mücadelesinde elde ettiği zafer nedeniyle Türkiye'nin ilk Cumhurbaşkanı olan Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, dış kaynaklardan bağımsız gelişmiş bir savunma sanayi kompleksinin varlığını Türkiye'nin siyasi bağımsızlığının temel koşullarından biri olarak görüyordu. Türkiye, NATO üyesi olmasına rağmen, 1980'lerden bu yana askeri alandaki ana politikası, silah üretimi alanında maksimum bağımsızlığın sağlanması olmuştur. Nitekim son 17 yılda yerli üretim oranı %20'den %70'e çıkmıştır. Araştırma, Türk askeri savunma kompleksinin ana başarılarının, her şeyden önce insansız hava araçlarının (Bayraktar TB2/DİHA/Akıncı, Kargu, Anka-S); ikincisi, saldırı keşif helikopterinin (T – 129 “Atak” Atak-2); üçüncü olarak, savaş gemilerinin (Ada sınıfı denizaltı savunma harbi korvetleri, ELINT korvetleri, TCG Anadolu vb.); dördüncü olarak, Zırhlı araçlar (“Kirpi”, “Cobra” vb.); ve beşinci olarak güdümlü füzeler/bombalar (Cirit, MAM – L, UMTAS vb.) geliştirilmesi ve üretilmesi. Zırhlı araç, topçu ve füze silahları, gemiler, İHA'lar, elektronik vb. üreticilerinin aktif olarak gelişmesine rağmen, tüm sektörler yabancı ortaklardan ve tedariklerden tam bağımsızlık seviyesine ulaşmak için gerekli teknoloji ve yeteneklere sahip değildir. Türkiye'nin savunma sanayi kompleksinin en zayıf noktası kendi motoru olmaması ve zayıf hava savunma sistemlerine sahip olmasıdır.

Ukrayna ile ilgili olarak, 1991 yılına kadar, Ukrayna SSC'nin savunma sanayiinde önde gelen sektörler roket - uzay, zırhlı ve mühendislik ekipmanı, nakliye havacılığı ve gemilerin yanı sıra özel radyo mühendislik sistemleri üretimi idi. Ayrıca, Sovyet deniz filosunun gemilerinin yaklaşık yarısı, stratejik füzeler ve tanklar, radyo-elektronik ekipman Ukrayna SSR'sinde üretildi. Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünden sonra Ukrayna'nın eski SSCB'nin askeri sanayi kompleksinin %25'ini miras aldığını

belirtmekte fayda var. Bununla birlikte, Ukrayna askeri sanayi kompleksi, Sovyet döneminde bile askeri ürünlerin üretiminin son aşaması RSFSC'de bulunan fabrikalarda gerçekleştirildiği için nihai bir ürün üretme yeteneğine sahip değildi. Her halükarda, Ukrayna askeri savunma kompleksi motorlara, uçaklara ve özel ekipmanlara (AI – 450, AI – 222 motorlar, “AN” serisi uçaklar vb.); zırhlı araçlara (aktif koruma kompleksi “Zaslon”, T – 80UD ve T – 84 “Oplot” tankları vb.); hava savunma sistemlerine (S – 125, S – 125 – 2D “Pechora – 2D” vb.); evrensel radarlar, navigasyon cihazları, uçaksavar füzesi güdüm başlıklarına vb. sahiptir. Ancak, Ukrayna'nın savunma sanayinin en zayıf noktalardan biri Sovyetler Birliği'nden miras kalan ürünlerin eski olması ve özellikle Kırım'ın kaybedilmesinden sonra gemi inşa endüstrisinin içler acısı durumda olması. Bunlar savunma sanayinin büyük ölçüde ithalata bağımlı hale gelmesine yol açmıştı. 2014 yılından itibaren Ukrayna başta ABD, İngiltere, Litvanya, Çek, Polonya ve Türkiye olmak üzere Batılı ülkelerden askeri yardım almasına rağmen, Ukrayna NATO üyesi olmadığı için kendi savunma – sanayi kompleksini ve teknolojilerini geliştirmek zorundadır. SSCB'den miras kalanlar bunun için iyi bir temeldir. Ukrayna, modernize edilmiş üretimini yabancı ortaklarına sunarak askeri savunma alanındaki finansal yeteneklerini artırabilir ve diğer ülkelerle ikili işbirliğini güçlendirerek savunma – sanayi kompleksindeki boşlukları doldurabilir ve NATO standartlarına göre modernize edebilir.

Türkiye'nin ve Ukrayna'nın askeri savunma kompleksinin güçlü ve zayıf yönlerinin analizinden sonra, bu devletlerin hangi sektörlerde işbirliği yaptıkları ve işbirliği yapacakları öngörülebilir hale geliyor. Türkiye ile Ukrayna arasındaki en dikkat çekici işbirliği alanı insansız hava araçlarıdır. 2018 yılında, Askeri Mekanik İşbirliği Ortak Grubunun toplantısı çerçevesinde iki ülke, Ukrayna'ya insansız hava sistemlerinin temini ve üretimleri için bir ortak girişim oluşturulmasına ilişkin bir Mutabakat Zaptı imzaladı. Taraflar, iletişim alanındaki ileri teknolojileri ve yazılımları Ukrayna Savunma Bakanlığı'na devretmeyi kabul ettiler ve ilgili bir ofset anlaşması imzaladılar. 2019 yılında 6 adet Bayraktar TB – 2 adet drone, 3 adet yer kontrol istasyonu ve 200 adet yüksek hassasiyetli mühimmat (Roketsan MAM – L) Ukrayna'ya teslim edildi. 2020'de Ukrayna, Ukrayna ve Türkiye tarafından ortaklaşa üretilen 48 Bayraktar TB2 savaş uçağı daha almak istediğini açıkladı. 14 Aralık 2020'de Ukrayna ve Türkiye, Ukrayna ordusu için SİHA üretimine ilişkin bir Anlaşma

imzalandı. Anlaşma şartlarınca, Ukrayna ayrıca insansız hava komplekslerinin üretimi için teknoloji transferinin de dahil olduğunu iddia ediyor.

Aynı yıl, Karadeniz Kalkanı adlı bir ortak girişim kuruldu. Bu girişim Türkiye’de, operasyonel – stratejik bir keşif insansız hava kompleksi olan Akıncı'nın geliştirilmesi konusunda iş birliği yapıyor. Akıncı'nın Ukrayna'nın Zaporozhye kentinde bulunan devlete ait Ivchenko – Progress işletmesi tarafından geliştirilen AI – 450T turboprop motorları kullanması esastı. Kanadalı “Bombardier Recreational Products” şirketi ve Avusturyalı yan kuruluşu BRP – Rotax GmbH & Co KG, Türkiye'ye motor tedarikini askıya aldığından, Ukrayna motoru iyi bir alternatif olarak değerlendirildi. Kasım 2021'de SAHA EXPO Savunma ve Havacılık Hibrit Fuarı'nda Baykar ve Ivchenko – Progress şirketleri, Baykar'ın İnsansız Savaş Uçak Sistemi (MIUS) projesi için Ukrayna AI – 322F Turbofan motorunun tedariki konusunda bir sözleşme imzaladı. Aynı fuarda Türk Baykar firması, Akıncı'ya MS500 Turboprop Motor tedariki konusunda bir başka Ukraynalı işletme olan Motor Sich ile Anlaşma imzaladı. MS500, Akıncı'da halihazırda kullanılan AI – 450T'ye alternatif olacak.

Türk tanklarının Suriye'nin kuzey batısında bir tanksavar güdümlü füze tarafından vurularak büyük kayıplar vermesinin ardından, Şubat 2018'de Türkiye, 100'den fazla tankı için Ukrayna aktif koruma kompleksi “Zaslon – L”yi satın almayı kabul etti. Bu kompleks 1980'lerin “Bariyer” Sovyet programı temelinde geliştirildi. Daha sonra, Türk şirketi Aselsan, “Zaslon – L” temelinde bir aktif koruma olan Akkor Pulat kompleksini üretti. Ayrıca Spetstechnoexport ve Roketsan firmaları arasında 2018 yılında imzalanan anlaşma çerçevesinde, Türk M60 ana muharebe tanklarında Ukrayna patlayıcı reaktif zırh sistemleri “Duplet”in kullanılması hedefleniyor.

Ukrayna ve Türkiye arasındaki bir diğer silah alışverişi de Türkiye'nin 2019 yılında iki adet S – 125M1 “Pechora – M1” hava savunma sistemi satın almasıydı. Sovyet füze kompleksi “Pechora”nın Ukrayna savunma şirketleri tarafından modernizasyonu sırasında menzili, önceki 25 km'ye kıyasla 45 km'ye ulaştı. Ayrıca, hava savunma füze sistemleri için aktif bir güdüm başlığı oluşturulmuş ve kompleksin kontrol elemanlarına yeni entegre sistemler eklenmiştir.

Ayrıca Türkiye ile Ukrayna arasında radar sistemleri alanındaki ilk faaliyet, 8 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Havelsan ile Ukrayna'nın devlet savunma sanayi kuruluşu

Ukroboronprom arasında Pasif Duyusal Sensör Sistemi (PASIS) ortak üretimine yönelik Mutabakat Zaptı oldu. 11 Ekim 2016'da Kiev'de düzenlenen Arms and Security 2016 Fuarı'nda Havelsan ile Ukroboronprom'a bağlı bir devlet şirketi olan Ukrinmash arasında pasif radar üretimi için bir işbirliği sözleşmesi imzalandı. Proje ile Türkiye ve Ukrayna'nın uzaktan algılama kabiliyetinin 600 km menzile çıkarılması hedeflendi. Daha sonra, 2019 yılında Ukrspetsexport ile Savunma Sanayi Teknolojileri A.Ş., iki adet P – 180U ve iki adet MARS – L Ukrayna radarı alımına ilişkin anlaşma imzaladı.

Türk – Ukrayna işbirliği deniz alanında da geliyor. 21 Aralık 2020'de “Okean” tersanesi, Ukrayna Donanması için bir dizi korvet sınıfı gemi inşa etme projesinin uygulanmasına yönelik ortak faaliyetler konusunda Türkiye Devlet Savunma Endişesi ile bir mutabakat anlaşması imzaladı. Anlaşma, Ukrayna Donanması için Türk MİLGEM projesinin (Ada tipi) beş korvetinin inşasını sağlayacak. Şubat 2021 itibariyle korvetin sadece gövdesi bir Türk tersanesinde inşa edilecek. Kalan dört korvet tamamen Ukrayna'da “Okean” fabrikasında inşa edilecek.

Türkiye ve Ukrayna arasındaki işbirliği uzay alanına da ulaştı. Eylül 2020'de, Ukrayna'nın Stratejik Sanayilerden Sorumlu Başbakan Yardımcısı Oleg Uruski ile Türkiye Ulusal Uzay Ajansı başkanı Serdar Hüseyin Yıldırım başkanlığındaki resmi bir Türk heyeti arasında yapılan toplantıda taraflar, fırlatma teknolojilerinin geliştirilmesini, uydu imalatını, alt sistemlerin pazarlanmasını ve imalatını, ortak bir roketatar üretimini içeren uzay endüstrisindeki işbirliğini görüştüler.

2014'ten bu yana Türkiye ve Ukrayna, askeri savunmada işbirliği konusunda birçok toplantı gerçekleştirdi ve bu, satın almalar ve ortak projelerle ilgili toplu anlaşmaların imzalanmasına yol açtı. Tezin argümanı olduğu gibi, askeri savunma alanında Türkiye – Ukrayna yakınlaşmasına ivme kazandıran, Kırım'ın Rusya Federasyonu'na katılması olmuştur. 2014 yılında Kırım'ın kaybedilmesinin ardından Ukrayna, Kırım'ın Rusya'ya katılması devletin ulusal güvenliğini tehdit ettiği için askeri savunma alanında diğer ülkelerle işbirliği yapma ihtiyacı duymuştur. Ukrayna açısından Türkiye iyi bir ortak olarak görülüyordu çünkü her şeyden önce Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkileri yeni değil, Türkiye güvenilir bir ortak; ikincisi, Türkiye her zaman Ukrayna'nın bağımsızlığını destekledi ve şimdi de Kırım konusunda Ukrayna tarafını destekliyor; üçüncü olarak,

Türkiye, NATO'ya katılmak isteyen Ukrayna için önemli olan modern bir savunma sanayi kompleksine sahip olan uzun süredir NATO üyesi olan bir ülkedir.

Türk perspektifinden Karadeniz bölgesi kapsamında askeri savunma alanında işbirliğinin nedenleri ilk olarak Kırım'ın Rusya'ya katılması; ikincisi, NATO'nun genişleme olasılığı. İkisini de Türkiye bölgedeki güvenliği ve çıkarları için bir tehdit olarak görüyor. Askeri savunma üretiminde Sovyetler Birliği'nden teknolojiyi devralan Ukrayna, Batılı ihracatçı ortaklarıyla anlaşmazlığı olan Türkiye için de güvenilir bir ortak olarak görülüyor.

Şu anda Türkiye ve Ukrayna işbirliğinden faydalandığı sürece devletler askeri savunma alanında ilişkilerini geliştirmeye devam edecek gibi görünüyor. Ancak daha ileri araştırmalar açısından askeri savunma alanında Türkiye – Ukrayna ilişkilerinin gelişimini takip etmek elzemdir çünkü öncelikle bu iki ülkenin Karadeniz'deki NATO varlığı konusundaki konumları birbirine zıttır. Ukrayna NATO'ya katılmayı hedefliyor ve İttifak'ı ulusal ve bölgesel güvenliğini korumanın tek yolu olarak görüyor; Türkiye ise NATO varlığının genişlemesini bölgesel çıkarları için bir tehdit olarak görüyor. İkincisi, Türkiye Kırım'ı henüz tanımamış olsa da, Rusya ile aktif olarak ilişkiler geliştiriyor (ekonomik, enerji, savunma sanayi gibi önemli alanlarda). Ukrayna ile ilişkileri nasıl etkileyeceği ve Ukrayna ve Türkiye'nin bu şartlar altında ilişkilerini nasıl geliştireceği daha sonraki araştırmalarda analiz edilmesi gereken bir konu.

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