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INTRODUCTION

Contrary to western liberal democracies where traditional political institutions have established and both inter-societal and inter-state relations have more calculable outcomes, it is a hard task to analyse the foreign policy motives of a country like Turkey where the democratic transition is still in maturation and the state institutions are not conventionalized yet. As an example, analysing the last 30 years (1995-2015) foreign policy behaviours of France would give the researcher a comfort as the behaviours of France would be "predictable" and relatively easier to be theorised based on certain assumptions. But it would be a much harder task for a "fictional researcher" who aim to analyse the foreign policy of France between 1789-1815 where state institutions are shattered, public opinion is extremely polarized, and the country is in a dramatic transition in a very short time. The predictability of the foreign policy behaviours of France towards its neighbours would be a very hard task since all contemporary realist, liberal and constructivist assumptions would have an explanatory power at certain levels. Studying the Turkish foreign policy, considering the great domestic transformation of last 10 years, brings the same complicacy as the country I examine at 2005 and 2015 have totally different domestic conditions and foreign policy priorities. In this work, I will analyse the main factors that determine the foreign policy of Turkey towards its conflicted neighbour, Armenia, and later I will analyse in deeper the acceleration of the reconciliation process between two countries starting with 2005 letter of Erdogan to Kocharyan that resulted with 2009 accords which aimed to start diplomatic and "normal" relations between two countries and the subsequent failure its ratification. I will start with discussing the theoretical aspect of

the Turkish foreign policy and will follow a descriptive and case-centric methodology where international relations theories are used in a pragmatic manner to understand a particular event instead of explaining Turkey foreign policy in a single broad and universal theory. Firstly, I will summarise the main IR theories and their applicability to Turkey-Armenia case and as my introduction about the domestic transformation imply and I will use social constructivist theory as a frame of the theoretical background to understand the effects of the domestic transformation of Turkey to its constructed identities before and after 2009 protocols. But also I will argue the historical perception of Turkey in relation with Armenia, the overview of the international environment as a systemic factor and Azerbaijan as both an economic and identical factor as other determinants. There are important academic works that study Turkey-Armenia relations as a case study level but there is still an inadequate literature that attempt a systematic study to understand the main determinants of significant policy shifts such as 2009 protocols on a theoretical basis. The multi-theoretical analysis of Turkey-Armenia problems that focus the identical shifts based on domestic transformations is an important subject because of its descriptive power to be applied for other frozen conflicts such as Armenia-Azerbaijan, Russia-Georgia, Cyprus problems where historical perceptions, discourses and identities construct new identities based on domestic and international transformations. In this context, analysing each problem between Turkey and Armenia individually and searching for the commonalities at these main parameters is a useful technique that enable us to comprehend all economic, domestic, international and political variables separately. I will use this technique to summarise the main conflict sources between Turkey and Armenia, which

are the Armenian genocide conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the recognition of the borders, and subsequently analyse these parameters based on these abovementioned variables.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

To analyse the foreign policy of Turkey towards Armenia is a challenging task that demands to consider multifactor explanations such as economic, political, historical factors together with the effects of both domestic and international environment at the same time. The complexity of Turkey-Armenia relations in general and the factors that drive Turkey to start a reconciliation process with Armenia at 2000s in particular makes it difficult to constitute a theory-centric foreign policy analysis that Beach (2012: 214) describes as "…aiming at building cumulative knowledge by generalizing the findings of a particular case to a broader set of cases of a given phenomenon", and drive me to take a case-centric approach as Beach (2012:214) added "to understand why a particular outcome happened in a particular case, using theories as analytical tools instead of a predictive explanations that can be tested `scientifically`." Indeed, relations of Turkey with Azerbaijan as one of the main determinant factors that shape Turkey's foreign policy towards Armenia has explanatory aspects from both realist and constructivist theories that entangle the analyser to be in a situation where the outcome of Turkey's relationship with Azerbaijan regarding Armenia problems can be explained satisfactorily with competing theories at the same time. I do consider this as the natural outcome of international relations analysis since it is an overtheorizing attempt to generate a "theory of everything" at social sciences. It is a very challenging endeavour to explain the behaviours of states within a single theory considering that even the natural sciences cannot explain the "behaviours" of subatomic particles (Quantum) and the celestial bodies (Astrophysics) at a single theory (in case of the nature of that object is not "stable" in essence). The Nobel awarded "Wave-Particle

Duality” fact of De Broglie (1923) at physics is a good example to explain a natural phenomenon with two theories together to get a profound understanding to the subject as Einstein (1938:263) noted for this phenomenon: "It seems as though we must use sometimes the one theory and sometimes the other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new kind of difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do." As an example for our case, Turkey`s foreign policy to Azerbaijan which is one of the determinant factor of Turkey-Armenia relations, especially after 2009 accords can be explained both with material incentives (Turkish demand to energy resources of Azerbaijan) that can lead us to a realist approach. On the other hand same incentives also have an identical feature (the Turkic solidarity with Azerbaijan) that suggests a constructivist analysis. This duality to explain the behaviours of states do not form a paradox because contrary of an over-theoretical approach, states do necessarily always act as rational and stable entities, especially when it comes to particular foreign policy at a particular time. It can be generally suggested that realist theories have the power to explain the long term trends, on the other hand the role of identity may be a more explanatory factor to analyse a limited period of time especially when states experience an internal complication such as a domestic political turmoil that results with more ambivalent foreign policy choices that even can be tagged as irrational. In my case, analysing the foreign policy of Turkey towards Armenia based on 2009 protocols have the same complications. As an example to such “irrational” behaviour; if Azerbaijan is an indispensable ally for Turkey and the relationship cannot be risked for the sake of Armenia, then why did Turkey

started reconciliation initiative to open the borders with Armenia that will draw to the opposition of Azerbaijan? And from the same point of view why did Turkey later choose to appease Azerbaijan and freeze the reconciliation process with Armenia as there was no significant development to resolve the problem at Nagorno-Karabakh region and no significant shift at international system before and after the 2009 protocols? Zakaria (1992:198) propose "a good account of nation`s foreign policy should include systemic, domestic and other influence, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what factors." that can be a guidance on how to choose which factor is determinant at to understand which particular case. Therefore, I will use international relations theories in a pragmatic and heuristic manner to understand the main variety of factors that lead Turkey to choose a particular foreign policy at a particular time. For this purpose first of all I will summarize the main assumptions of competing international relations theories in an order together with their explanatory powers of Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia and suggest the main factors of Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia between 2005 to 2015 with a synthesis of Neoclassical and Constructivist theories.

Structural Realist Analysis:

Classical realism that explain the state behaviours with human nature and has historical roots from Thucydides. On the other hand, first outlined by Kenneth Waltz (1979), Structural realism (or Neorealism) explains the behaviours of states with systemic-level factors and suggests a theoretical approach where the behaviour of a state can be explained by the "placement of countries in the international-political

system" (Waltz 1990:6-7) in proximity to great powers and with its relative material resources. According to this approach, anarchy in the international system that creates a Darwinian "survival of the fittest" environment push states to set up survival as the main goal of their foreign policy and states acts egoist way to seek their national interests in order to survive and the distribution of power among the great powers and the particular state's placement in this system matters to understand what states want. Small states are not important and vulnerable in a bipolar system unless they do not form an alliance to balance against the rival great power. This approach naturally suggests that USA-Russia power struggle (as an example) is important to understand Turkey-Armenia relations. Turkey enjoys a certain autonomy to set its foreign policy on Armenia case and do not feel to form an alliance both with USA and/or Russia on Armenia case. Russia apparently support Armenia and USA also pressurize Turkey to find a resolution on Armenian genocide case, but Turkey still resist the pressures of two relatively great powers and seek an autonomous foreign policy based on its own assumptions perceived by its history, political factors, etc. So Turkey`s "resistance" to the "international system" is not been punished as the nature of system and alliances are ambivalent. Russia is apparently against the Armenia policy of Turkey, but meantime Turkey and Russia have extensive economic cooperation that prevents Russia to take a decisive policy to dissuade Turkey. USA also do not endorse Turkey's Armenia policy but the importance of Turkey as a key ally prevents USA to take decisive action, too. In this context, systemic pressures do not give a determinant explanatory guidance to analyse Turkey Armenia relations. The main problem why systemic factors are not determinant to understand the motivations of Turkey to start

and stall the reconciliation process with Armenia lies at conception of the theory that seeks to explain according to King (1994:104-5) “as much as possible with as little as possible” as Turkey Armenia conflict have many determinants such as economic, historical and identical factors and fast transformation of domestic balances in Turkey even at yearly basis (contrary to developed western democracies where a temporary domestic turmoil do not open the political system under discussion). Therefore it is hard to analysis a short period of time (2005-2015) of a regional conflict with grand theories that rest upon explaining broader trends of international relations.

According to defensive structural realism, states seek to maintain their position in the system. Because the defensive action is relatively easier and safer than an offensive action. If we apply this assumption to Turkey’s foreign policy to Caucasus in general and to Armenia in particular, we need to analyse the relative powers of states in the region and the great powers together. In this formula we can state the position of Russia as a great power that have ambitions to dominate its influence over the region as we experienced Russia-Georgia war and Russian military support to Armenia. Russia and Armenia are strategic allies together with Iran (although pro-western groups also have strong basement at political culture) and we can assume that these three countries form an alliance to counterbalance the domination of the western powers where we can input USA, EU and Turkey as a NATO member and consider Azerbaijan as an energy rich state that seek a balance between these two groups. Structural realism gives a good leverage to understand Armenia-Russia alliance since Armenia is surrounded by two “hostile” states, Azerbaijan at East and Turkey at West, and considering the economic and military growth of Azerbaijan within last 10 years thanks

to its energy sources and Turkey as a regional power it is understandable why Armenia form a strategic alliance with Russia to balance the power equilibrium in the region. On the other hand this structural realist assumption do not serve an explanatory insight why Turkey started a reconciliation process with its weak neighbour as Turkey do not face with any sort of direct or indirect threat neither from Armenia nor Russia. Also this theory does not explain why Turkey stalled the process after 2010s as there was no significant transformation at the international system within such as short time to shift the foreign policy decision of Turkey. Both US and Russia was and is still supporting the reconciliation process between two countries. So a relatively weaker state that seek an alliance between two great powers is not an explanatory analysis to understand Turkey`s policy choices, because as a country which sustain good relations both with USA and Russia (presumably conflicting great powers for Caucasus region), Turkey has a certain autonomy to plan its foreign policy towards Armenia without strong pressures from any of these powers that I will analyse deeper at case study section.

Offensive structural realism assume that international system pressure states to maximize their own power and seek regional hegemony towards others and suggests that an alliance between states (so balance of power) is not stable in the long term as states do not trust each other. Recognition of borders problem between Turkey and Armenia can be used as a tool to test the main assumptions of structural realism as the problem implies a territorial claim by Armenia to Turkey. Can Armenia's unwillingness to explicitly recognize the Treaty of Kars, thus current borders with Turkey be interpreted with offensive structural realist assumptions? Or can Turkey's military

assistance and strategic alliance with Azerbaijan be interpreted as an intention to gain more power at the cost of Armenia? The answer can be “unlikely.” Armenia is not in a position to claim land from Turkey not only in terms of military power, but also the situation that virtually no Armenian is living at the eastern Turkey today. So in any consideration, it is not a realistic assumption to suggest Armenia have such aspirations. In this case, we need to explain the unwillingness of Armenia’s behaviour to explicitly recognise the current borders with other factors such as history and identity that drive us out of realist conceptions. Realist theories are also not explanatory tools to understand the nature of Turkish support to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is an energy rich country that sustained a fast economic growth from 1995 to today and do not need the military support of Turkey against Armenia which has a constantly declining economy. These sort of supports have more symbolic meaning that we may better explain with “Turkic solidarity.” Another main assumption of realist theories that underline the “security dilemma” where Jervis (1978) gave the example of `Prisoner`s Dilemma` as the lack of trust between states led one state to heighten its security also led the other state to do so and creates a spiral effect, is not a useful tool to understand Turkey-Armenia relations. A mistrust exists between two countries, but this does not trigger an armament race as the roots of the conflicts between two states are not material, but identical and historical. On the other hand, the same security dilemma notion perfectly fits to understand the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where both Armenia and Azerbaijan conduct an armament race based on the mistrust of the other side. As systemic factors do not give us a sufficient insight, we can search for state level factors that brings us to Neoclassical Realism.

Neoclassical Realist analysis:

Neoclassical Realism is emerged in 1990s, where Structural Realism could not explain the end of Cold War, as a new approach to criticise the attempt of Structural Realism of explaining everything with system-level factors. One of the main pillar of this approach is real world politics cannot be explained in a pure theoretical model, but theories can only be used in a pragmatic way as tools to explain why particular state acts in a particular way and a particular time which is also in accordance with my analysis to understand Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia. Neoclassical Realists assume that state-level factors should be analysed together with system-level factors and call state-level factors Beach (2014:65) summarized as “elite debates” and “autonomy of leaders” and postulate that a group of high level politician can identify the national interest of a state in their own concept. Foreign policy decisions are made from top to down which means domestic political process inside a state from top level of decision makers is a crucial variable together with systemic pressures which is an important variable for Turkish foreign policy decisions that gradually centered around Erdogan’s leadership (top) after 2009 and there is no significant demand from public level (bottom) to solve or freeze Turkey-Armenia problems as it does not affect the daily life of ordinary people significantly (except the border cities of Turkey which represent only a very small portion of Turkish population). Contrary to Structural Realism that assume the national identity and national interests corresponds, Neoclassical Realists suggests that national identity is a complex notion and vary from

state to state regardless of their relative powers and placements in the international system. Indeed, countries that have similar material capabilities can have very different foreign policy choices depends on the perceptions (and misperceptions) of elites and this will give us a leverage at case study section to analyse Turkish foreign policy based on Turkish identity which is a very crucial element to understand Turkey-Armenia relations. Neoclassical realism prioritise empirical evidence over theoretical parsimony in parallel with my analysis. Neoclassical realism can be used as a tool to describe the decision-making process of Turkish foreign policy, especially after 2002 when AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power. The assumption of neoclassical realism that national identity and national interest do not necessarily correspond suggests states are not always rationally behaving entities by analysing which foreign policy best fits to the national interest of state and the national identity of a state influence the policy choices. Turkey-Armenia rapprochement process accelerated at 2005 with the letter of Erdogan to Kocharyan proposing a joint history commission to solve long-lasting problems between two countries and resulted with 2009 protocols, but later the protocols failed to be ratified by the parliaments of both sides. As both Turkish and Armenian governments were holding a substantial power at their parliaments enough to pass the ratification of protocols, the reason can be explained with a significant policy change after 2009. Here, system level factors are unable to explain this rapid policy shift as there was no notable change at the international system to affect Turkey Armenia relations. This led us to bring up another discussion that search for domestic factors to explain this policy change that I will discuss later at case study section. In summary, shift of the balance of power between

Erdogan and Gul, who had competing and sometimes conflicting ideas about "national interests" of Turkey, in favour of Erdogan gradually after 2009 and the rising "autonomy" of Erdogan to set up foreign policy decisions is an important factor that led us to understand the policy shift in partly. But the role of Erdogan has only a descriptive (not explanatory) power to understand the foreign policy change and we need to review other international relations theories to test our assumptions.

Liberalism (system level factors):

Liberal theories that emphasize system level factors have two main variants which are weak liberal theory and strong liberal theory. Both of these two theories underline the interdependence between states and its effects on the foreign policy behaviours. The main assumption is countries who are dependent to each other (especially economic interdependence where states trade with each other at certain intensity so domestic companies and people benefit from free trade environment) there is a higher cost of conflict between two states, so both states refrain from conflicts as Polachek (1980) argues. In this equilibrium export companies pressure governments by their lobbies to maintain trade relationship or governments can be more dependent to foreign investments. At the end, the exit cost of interstate conflicts are higher at such economic interdependence situations. Strong liberal theories goes one step further and suggest that such interdependence also creates a social interaction between nations and creates a "pluralistic security community" (Deutsch 1968) based on compatible values, thus a shared identity. Turkey and Armenia lacks this sort of intergovernmental institutionalized relationship since the foundation of the Republic

of Armenia because of the nonexistence of diplomatic relations. As the borders are closed, Turkish goods are exported to Armenia through Georgia inefficient way and traders of both countries support the opening of borders to establish direct trade relations. But the amount of the indirect trade between Turkey and Armenia cannot be compared with the huge economic partnership of Turkey and Azerbaijan as Turkey is the biggest import partner of Azerbaijan, so the explanation of the motivation of Turkey to initiate a reconciliation process with Armenia cannot be explained with a narrow economic point of view by comparing the trade relations between two countries. On the other hand a wider perspective, we can assume that Turkey wants to play a greater economic and political role at Caucasus so the long lasting conflict between Turkey-Armenia, (especially the genocide controversy) and Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is an obstruct against Turkey's intention to use its potential soft power in the region. This can give us a better leverage about why reconciliation process started, but on the other hand does not explain us why does it halted later in a very short time. The relationship between international institutions and state foreign policy interests that propose institution-rich environment produces more cooperative states which lead us to the Neoliberal Institutionalism cannot be applied to analyse Turkey-Armenia relations considering the lack of even the basic diplomatic relations between two states. Turkey-EU relations could be a factor to analyse Turkey-Armenia relations from this approach as EU called Turkey to start diplomatic relations with Armenia and to recognise Armenia genocide. To understand at what level does it explain Turkey's initial rapprochement policy, we need to analyse Turkey-EU relations that I will give a brief overview at case study section. Anyhow this cannot be a main

determinant and can only be considered as a supportive explanation as Turkey is not a member of EU, so the imperative power of EU towards Turkey is naturally limited. But this can give us a clue the reason of the latter policy of Turkey to halt the ratification of protocols as Turkey-EU relations were also deteriorated in parallel.

Liberalism (domestic factors):

There are also many mid-range liberal theories that focus on domestic factors such as public opinion, role of media and interest groups that shape the foreign policy of a state in a particular time. A general classification of weak and strong liberal theories explain the impact of these factors to the state. The explanatory power of liberal theories rise when we analyse democratic countries where public opinion is being considered more carefully through polls and this gives us the `bottom-up` nature of liberal theories in contrast to the `top-down` approach of neoclassical realist theories. Although the relationship between public opinion and democracy initially suggests a "positive" outcome, there is an academic literature to analyse the qualitative nature of the public opinion. As Gabriel Almond (1950) depicted American the public opinion that is later called as "Almond and Lippmann consensus" principle describes public opinion as volatile, irrational and susceptible to manipulation, thus opinion of the public do (or should) not reflect the national interest. Anyhow, the public opinion can be counted as an explanatory factor only when "the issues involved are very salient to the voters" (Knecht and Weatherford 2006) and does not directly affect the foreign policy behaviours of a country at secondary issues where there is no crisis, military threat, etc. Turkish public opinion can also be described as volatile and the public

opinion does affect Turkey foreign policy to a degree especially after 2005 where we observe a new phenomenon at Turkey that can be described at the "democratisation of Turkish foreign policy" as I analysed in detail at case study section. But this descriptive analysis would be very limited as the essence of Turkey-Armenian problems does not pose a significant threat to the sides enough to trigger a public interest to problems, especially at Turkey side. As a general principle, liberal theories can be explanatory tools when there is a substantial threat (or the perception of threat by voters) that affects public opinion considerably. Strong liberal theories (such as neo-functionalism) in general underlines the impacts of international institutions on state foreign policy goals. EU could be a good example of such strong institutions that reshape the essence of interstate relations where common interests and identities between member states transform them in a cooperative direction if Turkey and Armenia would be EU members.

Constructivism (system and state level factors)

The essence of Turkey-Armenia conflicts that arise from a synthesis of historical perceptions and reconstructed identities based on mistrust between two countries naturally requires to analyse constructivist theories more than other state or system level theories. Indeed, at least the apparent problems and statements from executives of both countries are always in relationship with different perceptions of history and the mistrust of one side creates a counter mistrust at other side which reinforce and create a discourse that reproduce itself. In this section, I will summarise mainstream

constructivist theories and analyse their explanatory powers to Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia either as general theories or analytical tools to be used as descriptive models. Starting from system level explanation; in his famous article of “Anarchy is what states make of it” Wendt (1992) argues that anarchy is not an inherent essence at international system, but it is socially constructed by the states. With this social creation notion his theory differentiate from realist and liberal theories and define three main socially constructed culture of anarchy perception by states; a Hobbesian, a Lockean and a Kantian culture where states consider each other as enemies, rivals and friends respectively. Wendt suggests international system exists in one of these cultures depends on how states perceive others and construct a system of anarchy. His explanation underlines that ideas are also important together with material factors and theorize his approach with system level factors as the construction of the international system and the perceptions of states within this system. The approach that focus to identities, ideas and the self-perception of the countries in relation with the “other” can also be analysed with domestic factors that relatively best fit to understand the main motives of Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia even though the complex nature of Turkey-Armenia relations is not easy to be explained within the framework of a single theory. This conceptual framework of constructivism suggests identities do not only form at system level, but domestic social practices also constitute the perception of “us” and “others” that are the main elements to shape the foreign policy of states. These domestic social practices are influenced in a daily construction with external world and form the identity of that state. Hopf (2005:238) argues that “Interaction with the US and Europe produces, reinforces, and counteracts

the discourses of Russian identity at home" and suggests three main discourses in the reconstruction of Russian identity in 1999 that are "New Western Russian", "Liberal Essentialist" and "New Soviet Russian" discourses. Depends on how Russia see itself and the outside world, Russia choose a particular foreign policy action shaped by its constructed identity. At this point we have a very useful tool to understand how Turkey perceive itself at 21st century, which is the strategic depth doctrine of Ahmet Davutoglu (2001) who was a former professor of international relations, the former minister of foreign affairs and the current prime minister of Turkey as of 2015 August. The main frame of his doctrine is adopted as the grand strategy of Erdogan governments since 2002. Davutoglu emphasize the geo-strategic position of Turkey as the heir of Ottoman Empire and its potential role towards former Ottoman territories in Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and North Africa. He suggests a foreign policy where Turkey is centrally positioned itself as a regional, even global, power instead of being a peripheral ally of NATO and realise its geo-strategic potential. This self-proclaimed new position of Turkey naturally seeks to diversify its economic, political and cultural relations with its neighbours instead of seeking its long-awaited membership to EU. This new vision is also in conformity with the newly gained self-confidence of Turkey after the economic successes that tripled GDP within 10 years. Anyhow, a shift from "liberal" foreign policy preferences to a "conservative" policy preferences can be explained with a similar shift at AKP identity that we can use social constructivism as a useful analytical tool as this state-level explanation cover the identity formation of Turkey both with external factors (such as EU relations; initial successes until 2005, deterioration at relations and reproduction of identity based on these shifts) and

domestic factors (transformation of Turkey, polarisation and counter discourses that construct contradicted discourses inside country and an identity based on mistrust to both domestic and external factors). The reason to call AKP identity instead of Turkish identity is the accelerated “polarisation” (Baskan:2012) at Turkish society during these years at such point that a threat perception from one side of this polarity, suppose that Erdogan supporters, create a counter perception from opponents. So it is more explanatory to distinguish polarised identities in Turkey at this period. As a conclusion, the transformation of the state identity of Turkey is “not only how that state’s identities are produced in interactions with other states, but also how its identities are being produced in interaction with its own society and the many identities and discourses that constitute that society” (Hopf 2002:294) which lead us to understand the domestic transformation of Turkey and the effects of the identity it created at 2005 and 2015to Turkey foreign policy. Finally, another distinctive feature of Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia rather than abovementioned temporary shifts at Turkish politics is the role of historical perception that we need to analyse as a separate variable at case study.

BACKGROUND

A. A short summary of Turkey-Armenia relations:

Turkey-Armenia relations started at 1990 with the independence of Armenia from Soviet Union. Turkey was the one of the first countries that recognised the independence of Armenia and initial relationship was established with Ter Petrosyan government, but at 1993 Turkey closed the border after the Armenian invasion to Azerbaijan territories to unite with Nagorno-Karabakh. Relationship worsened after 1998 elections when Kocharyan government set the international recognition of Armenian genocide as a priority for Armenia foreign policy (ESI:2009) and choose a hardliner position on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey-Armenia Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was established in 2001 at Vienna and worked as a provisional commission to identify the problems between two countries and recommendations. TARC asked an independent legal opinion to ICTJ about the legal consequences for the events of 1915. ICTJ (2002:8) concluded that United States Genocide Convention cannot be interpreted retroactively and no legal, territorial and financial claim can be arose by such a retroactive analysis. But also ICTJ added (2002:17) that, the term genocide may be applied to many and varied events that occurred prior to entry into force of the Convention. As a result ICTJ statement implied that any event before 1951 do not have legal consequences as the term genocide was not defined yet at 1915, but added that if it would have retroactive consequences, then 1915 events would fit to the definition of genocide. Some Turkish members of TARC such as Gunduz Aktan (2005) resigned from office as a protest of ICTJ statement accusing ICTJ to answer a

question that was not asked-Gunduz underlined that the question to ICTJ was for a legal opinion, not a historical one-and TARC issued its final recommendations on 2004 to the respective governments (TARC: 2004). On April 10, 2005, Erdogan (2005) sent a letter to Kocharyan proposing the establishment of a joint history commission to study events of 1915 at archives and historical records to share their findings with the international public. Swiss government proposed a meditation effort that is accepted by both sides on 2007 and the initial efforts maturised on the way to 2009 accords (MFA:2009). Turkey President Gul sent a warm congratulation to newly elected Armenia President Sargsyan for his election as the new president of Armenia and as a response Sargsyan invited Gul to watch World Cup qualifying match between Turkey and Armenia on September 6, 2008. Gul accepted the invitation and first time in history a Turkish president visited Armenia. After intensive diplomatic efforts, two countries signed Turkey-Armenia accords (complete version of Protocols can be found at Philips:2012) on April 2009 that started diplomatic relations, opening borders, economic, cultural and political cooperation and implement a dialogue on historical conflicts. Azerbaijan president Aliyev condemned the protocols shortly afterwards and even threatened Turkey to increase the cost of natural gas sales (Mikhelidze: 2010). Azerbaijan`s reaction urged Erdogan to have a visit to Baku and Erdogan clearly stated that the protocols will not be implemented without a resolution at Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (The Jamestown Foundation: 2009). On the other hand Armenian Constitutional Court (2010:6) stated that "the Protocols cannot be interpreted or applied…that would contradict the provisions of the preamble to Armenia's constitution and the requirements of paragraph 11" of its Declaration of

Independence. The Court also ruled that the Protocols placed no obligation on Armenia regarding any "third party" (2010:4) where implied Nagorno-Karabakh conflict." Turkey protested the statement of the Armenian constitutional court to refer paragraph 11 which Turkey objected for a long time because of the attribution to genocide and western Armenia terms that Turkey contradict with the protocols. As a result the protocols has not been ratified by the parliaments of both countries and did not enter into force.

B. Main parameters

From this short introduction of the course of diplomatic events between two countries we can list 3 outstanding problems between two countries to analyse later about the Turkey foreign policy towards Armenia; Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenian genocide conflict and the recognition of the Turkey-Armenia borders conflict. I will start with giving a short summary of these 3 factors in this section and continue to analyse how they affect the Turkey foreign policy decisions towards Armenia at case study section.

i.Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey-Azerbaijan relations:

Before starting to analyse to thorny problem of Nagorno-Karabakh it is useful to give a short summary of Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship to be able to get a better understanding of why Karabakh, correspondingly Azerbaijan, is one of the pillars at Turkey-Armenia relations. Azerbaijan people are linguistically the closest cousins of Turkey Turks among other Turkic countries and gain a special sympathy inside Turkey

as the citizens of both countries are mutually intelligible with each other. Similarity can be compared with UK-USA relations at cultural level. This cultural and identical connection between two nations reaches to the extent that Turkey and Azerbaijan are called as “one nation with two states” by the presidents and prime-ministers from both sides (OWPAR: 2010). Besides this cultural connection there is extensive economic and strategic cooperation on energy fields. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that carry Azerbaijan crude oil to Ceyhan port of Turkey, South Caucasus Pipeline that carry Azerbaijan natural gas from Caspian sea to Erzurum city of Turkey together with other proposed giant infrastructure projects such as Nabucco pipeline project that connects Shah Deniz fields of Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey with the aim of reduce the European dependence on Russian energy makes Azerbaijan an indispensable ally for Turkey (Ibrahimov: 2015). Also there is a strong military cooperation started with Azerbaijan-Armenia war on Nagorno-Karabakh as Turkey is supplying military assistance on arms and military education bases.

Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-majority enclave inside Azerbaijan territories that is de jure a part of Azerbaijan but de facto an unrecognised self-declared republic. It was an autonomous oblast inside Azerbaijan SSR during the Soviet era. Tensions raised when Armenian-majority parliament of the enclave voted in favour of seceding from Azerbaijan in 1988. A referendum was followed which was boycotted by Azerbaijani minority and the resulted with a decision of independence from Azerbaijan. Inter-ethnic clashed followed the referendum and turned into a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 1993, Armenia invaded Nagorno-Karabakh region and other territories of Azerbaijan close to the region and war ended in 1994 with the victory of Armenia.

The war resulted with ethnic cleansing at both Armenia and Azerbaijan as around 700.000 ethnic Azeris displaced from Armenia, NK and the occupied territories, and around 235.000 ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan (Beehner:2005). Peace fire was signed in 1994 and although peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been held under the mediation of OSCE Minsk Group, the Minsk process is under criticism as not being effective until today.

ii.Armenian genocide conflict:

The origin of the feud between two countries comes from the history of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, especially 1915 where the Ottoman government enacted a law, following the Russian invasion and armed struggles by Armenian militant groups that seek independence, to deport all of the Armenian population at Anatolia except Istanbul and Izmir to Syria. The result of this deportation had catastrophic consequences for Ottoman Armenians and a substantial proportion of Armenian population is perished during this deportation by massacres and starvation. Although the definition of 1915 events are widely and feverishly discussing among the historians of both sides majority of the international historians define this forceful deportation as a genocide. In general, “Armenian side” consider this as a planned genocide (Dadrian:1995) and Armenia together with the Armenian diaspora launch an international campaign to call 1915 as a systematic and deliberate genocide conducted by then Ottoman government to exterminate the Armenian population, on the other hand “Turkish side” and Turkey as a state deny the genocide term and define these events as “shared pains” (BBC:2015) of both sides by underlining the attacks of armed

Armenian militias to Muslim villages to seek an independent Armenia before 1915 (Lütem:2009).

The genocide controversy of both sides consists a major obstacle to normalise the relations as the perception of the history of both sides contradict each other very sharply. We can observe a slight difference at Turkish narrative of 1915 during last 10 years as Armenian genocide discussion is not a taboo anymore by the rise of civil society during the democratisation process of the liberal period of AKP governments from 2002 until 2010s (Philips:2012). The traditional narrative of Turkey as a state policy until the end of 1990s was to describe the "tehcir kanunu" (relocation law) of 1915 as a self-defence action of Ottoman government to prevent the military rebellion and terrorist acts of armed Armenian militias when Ottoman army was fighting against Russia. This version of history supported by Turkey as a general was underlining attacks of Armenian militias to the Muslim population and negating the mass massacres conducted to Armenians. On the other hand a more balanced approach was adopted by the Turkish governments during 2000s. This new approach was still denying the deportation of Armenians as genocide, but admitting the sufferings of Armenians and calling it as a "shared pains" of both Armenians and Turks together under the chaos of WW1 conditions. Nevertheless, the huge gap between Turkish and Armenian perceptions of history continues to exist as the main motive of the discussion is political rather than historical for both sides.

iii.Recognition of borders:

Recognition of Turkey-Armenia borders is another problematic topic of Turkey Armenia relations. This topic is widely discussed during the 2009 protocols and created a crisis that resulted with the suspension of the reconciliation process. Current Turkey-Armenia borders are recognised by Treaty of Kars that is signed by Turkey, Soviet Armenia, Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Georgia in 1921. Although Armenia do not clearly reject the treaty and/or officially claim territory from Turkey, the position of Armenia regarding the current borders is ambigious (Goksel:2010). The paragraph 11 of the Armenia Declaration of Independence declared at 1918 states that "The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia." (Concourt:2010) and Turkey objects both elements of this paragraph. First element is it seeks the international recognition of Armenian genocide which Turkey strongly rejects and the second element is the usage of the term "Western Armenia" to define the eastern part of Turkey (The Jamestown Foundation: 2010). Turkey consider this as dissent of Armenia to the recognition of the current Turkey-Armenia borders and assume it a basis for Armenia to claim territories from Turkey. This article at the declaration of independence which consist a part of Armenian constitution created a major problem when 2009 protocols were brought by Armenian government to its constitutional court. The constitutional court upheld the conformity of the protocols with the constitution but added a clause states that the protocols cannot be interpreted or applied in a way to contradict with the requirements of paragraph 11 of

its Declaration of Independence. Turkey criticized the decision of the court (MFA:2010) as a setback of the 2009 protocols and this brought the suspension of the protocols.

C. Assessment of the international and domestic political environment

1990s were important for Turkey-Armenia relations as one of the most important determinant of the relations, the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan that resulted with the unilaterally sealing the border by Turkey happened at this period. Also in order to have a better understanding to the main foreign policy goals and motives of the rapprochement policy of Turkey towards Armenia at 2000s, it is important to analyse the international and domestic political environment of the time that affected the decision making process of the foreign policy actors.

i.International environment:

Baskin Oran (2010) describes the traditional foreign policy strategy of Turkey during the cold war was moderate and protectionist that tends to manage the regional disputes in a passive way as long as it do not consider a direct threat to its security and mostly aligned with the western world with seeking EU membership. Dissolution of Soviet Union ended the passive foreign policy strategy of Turkey which was structured in cold war environment and brought a major change at the Caucasus policy as Turkey found many new and small neighbours at the eastern borders instead of a super power. These developments triggered a major transformation from traditional to an active foreign policy for Turkey that seeks to increase its relationship with post-Soviet countries in Eurasian field. Oran (2013) describes 1990s was a decade that Turkey

mainly focused to its “Turkic brethens” of the post-Soviet era. In this period, Turkey assumed a role of “big brother” towards these newly independent Turkic countries in order to fill the power gap that arose with the dissolution of Soviet Union as Russia had not been succeeded to end is own turmoil of the new political atmosphere yet. Although Turkey launched a massive campaign to “re-establish” its historical connections with all new Central Asian countries both at government and NGO levels and send missions of businessmen and politicians to develop new economic cooperation ways, Turkey put a special emphasis to Azerbaijan at this new campaign as it was culturally and geographically the closest thus the most promising country to Turkey. 2000s was another new decade that shakes the balances of the world again with the rise of radical Islam after the 2001 terrorist attacks in USA. Rise of AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey as a conservative democratic movement that has roots with Islamism brings up a new discussion at Washington as the promotion of the “Turkish Model”, as “an example of modern, moderate Muslim state that works” (Kenyon:2012) instead of the radical Islamic movements that widely links with terror against USA in particular and the Western world in general. Indeed, Turkey was a good example of a model country at many aspects by its economic boom and rise of the middle class throughout the decade, democratic reforms and the new strategic vision of Turkish foreign policy that seeks “zero problems with its neighbours” (Walker:2011). The foreign policy choices of Turkey towards Armenia and the rapprochement process was in a coherence with this new strategic vision of the country. During this new rapprochement and reconciliation process Turkey was in a complicated position of a country that both seeks to extend its exceptional cooperation with Azerbaijan and to

resolve the knotty problems with Armenia in coordination with its new foreign policy perspective. Another aspect of the international environment was the enlargement strategy of EU and the Turkey as a candidate country that was in the waiting list for a long time. 2000s brought a new dynamism at first five years for Turkey-EU relations where Turkey had many achievements at democratisation, economic and political reforms, relations with neighbours and at second 5 years it turned into stagnation, even deterioration and as Alessandri (2010) noted "puts Turkey`s Western orientation into test" at the this later stage. We will also analyse the effects of Turkey-EU relations to the Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia at the case study section as although recognition of Armenian genocide was not an official criteria for Turkey, the pressures from many EU members to Turkey for the resolutions passed by parliaments to call to Turkey for recognition made EU one of the agents in this conflict.

ii.Domestic environment:

Economic stagnation and political instability can be a general depiction of 1990s Turkey as the attacks of Kurdish PKK militants evolved from small scale terrorist attacks to a low intensity warfare with state forces during these years. This instability continued throughout of the decade and Turkey entered the new millennium with the heavy economic crisis of 2001 that resulted with great devaluation on Turkish Lira, skyrocketing the interest rates and rise of inflation together with 5.7% drop at GDP that can be described as a plummet both in economic and political terms. Coalition government of the term invited the Turkish vice president of the World Bank, Kemal

Dervis, to Turkey as the head of economy inside government to implement structural reforms on economy. Thanks to these new economic reforms Turkey entered the millennium decade with a reformed and stabilised economy on monetary and fiscal fields. The bill of this political unstability and economic crisis is paid by the traditional secular elites from both right and left parties and the results of 2002 parliamentary elections was a political earthquake for them as most of the dominant parties of 1990s failed to pass the %10 election threshold of Turkey and fell outside of the parliament. The strong single party era of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) that won a victory with %34 votes and hold the majority at the parliament started with this elections until 2015. Erdogan governments achieved economic successes, GDP rose 3 times and foreign trade rose 4 times at the first 6 years from 2002 to 2008. This economic impetus that brought significant welfare to the voters resulted with electoral victories during the decade. Another reason of the success of AKP was the elimination of the role of military elites in Turkish politics and the democratisation process. However, the inclination to democratic and liberal policies reduced after 2007 election victory gradually and dubious charges at the trials of the former generals that accused to plan military coup to withdraw AKP government continued with the restrictions on press freedom brought a new argument of authoritarianism in Turkey politics after 2010. The sharp reaction from different opposition groups came at 2013 summer with Gezi Park protests that turned into a massive civil unrest and the response of the government to these protests were even sharper. 6 months later of this massive unrest, a corruption scandal erupted and police investigations and detentions followed to some key members of AKP government officials. The connections of the police and

prosecuters of these detentions with Fettullah Gulen movement, an Islamic community leader that had dominant influence at bureaucracy and business at AKP period thus the political "ally" of AKP governments against former secular elites until this corruption scandal, let the government to launch a counter detention campaign to these prosecutors and police that alleged their links with Gulen movement and creation of a "parallel state" (Lowen:2014) structure in bureaucracy to overthrow the AKP government. A domestic turmoil continues until today at various political groups until 2015 general elections where AKP still hold its strong position as the first party that gained %40 of the votes but lost the majority in parliament and could not form a single party government. Domestic developments during this 13 years AKP era already left permanent marks and changed the political climate of Turkey substantially and seems to continue its gravity in Turkish politics for a period of time so it is very important to understand the new transformation of Turkey politics as it also affected Turkey foreign policy fundamentally. I will analyse this era and the results of this new term on Erdogan's foreign policy strategy based on the "strategic depth" doctrine of Ahmet Davutoglu, the current prime minister of Turkey and the architect of the foreign policy of the era. Besides the institutional evolution of Turkish foreign affairs based on the domestic transformation between 2002 to 2015 AKP era, it is also important to understand the personal influence of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and how his personal judgments shape foreign policy decisions of Turkey during this era. At foreign policy decision making level, I will discuss the effects of "strategic depth" doctrine, personalisation of foreign policy and their effects to Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia at the case study section.

CASE STUDY

A. Analysis of reconciliation process:

In this section, I will analyse 2009 protocols between Turkey and Armenia and investigate the economic, international, domestic, historical and legal factors and Azerbaijan factors separately to understand at what extend does these factors have shaped Turkish foreign policy before and after 2009 protocols. My main aim is to comprehend what factors led Turkey to start a rapprochement policy with Armenia that resulted with 2009 protocols and what factors prevented the ratification of protocols that halted the reconciliation process. Although my work is limited with Turkey foreign policy only, I will also review Armenia policy behaviours as a variable since Armenia discourses reinforce and counteract Turkish discourse emanated from the existing distrust between both sides which is consistent with the social constructivist theory as the main determinant to explain Turkey foreign policy choices.

The main dilemma of the 2009 accords was Turkey and Armenia have conflicting and contradicting incentives to sign the accords and to normalise the relations based on mutual mistrust that reconstruct their discourses and identities. Analysing the economic factors as a start can give a good guidance to the rest of the analysis because we can see the sharpest difference between Turkish and Armenian policy motives at economic factors.

B. Economic factors:

Various IR theories assume that one of the main drives of states to design their foreign policy behaviours is potential economic outcomes. In this paragraph I will make a comparative analysis of Turkey and Armenia economies and present why economic cooperation (with Armenia) is not a main drive that determine Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia, but contrary an important fact to understand Turkey support to Azerbaijan. A brief economic comparison can easily reveal the imbalance between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey is a country which has more than 80 times higher GDP (Worldbank: 2015) in terms of nominal values compared to Armenia. Even only this gap can suggest us why the main drives of Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia cannot be based on economic incentives as improving the relations can bring a negligible contribution to Turkish economy only. Opening the borders may only bring significant benefit to the border city of Kars and surrounding towns as the economy of this city was affected sharply after the decision of Turkey to close the Armenia border in 1993. Opening the Armenian border can also increase the transportation volume of Trabzon harbour as it can be a good alternative to Georgian sea ports that are not stable especially after 2008 clashes between Georgia and Russia. But considering Turkey as a whole, these are very minor regions and the economic potential of opening the border cannot be compared with huge investments and economic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan companies have 5 billion USD investment in Turkey and Turkish ones have 6.3 billion USD in Azerbaijan. Both countries have realised many major joint-projects on energy and transportation that makes them strategic economic partners in the region. Currently thousands of Turkish companies

are operating in Azerbaijan and vice versa. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev stated that "Azerbaijan's investments to Turkey will make up about $20 billion" (TNA:2015) at a joint press conference of Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu's visit to Baku. One of the main foreign policy strategies of Turkey is to be an energy hub between East and West. Turkey has so many operating and planned natural gas and oil pipeline projects, mainly with Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. This energy hub strategy formulised with 1990s and accelerated at 2000s and directly affects Turkey`s strategic foreign policy targets. The idea of being energy hub is not only to supply energy to Turkey which its industry desperately need to continue economic growth, but also to transport the Russian and Central Asian-mainly natural gas-to European markets. Azerbaijan is the key country for Turkey to be an energy hub which is one of Turkey`s key foreign policy strategy (Dis Politika:2002) and there are many operating and planned pipeline projects that aim to connect the energy fields of Azerbaijan with European markets (For main pipeline projects of Turkey with Azerbaijan; Bruno: 2008). Turkey is a net oil and gas importer and Azerbaijan is not only one of the most important natural gas supplier of Turkey, but also the cheapest one comparing Russia and Iran. The demand from European countries to reach the energy fields of Asia with bypassing Russia also made the future of Turkey-Azerbaijan energy projects more promising than before. Therefore there is no economic rationale for Turkey to improve relations with Armenia at the cost of risking the relations with Azerbaijan. So it can be concluded that Turkey do not have an economic drive but have economic risks to normalise the relations and open the border with Armenia.

On the other hand, it is the economic incentives that drive Armenia to seek the normalisation of relations and opening the borders with Turkey. Armenia is a land-locked country and the borders are sealed by Azerbaijan and Turkey from east and west. The way to connect with international markets from Russia by Georgia border also become unreliable after 2008 crisis and Iran became the only alternative route for Armenia. Armenia imports significant amount of goods from Turkey but the trade takes place through Georgia which increase the costs. Population constantly declines after the collapse of Soviet Union and the country continues to struggle with poverty. The only viable route for Armenia to reach western markets seems to be through Turkey and all these facts makes Armenia, not Turkey, to be beneficiary from opening the borders. Therefore normalising the relations by establishing diplomatic relations and opening the borders "unconditionally" (without a political gain such as Nagorno-Karabakh and/or genocide controversy that we will discuss later) does not bring a net benefit to Turkey in terms of economic aspect, contrary it brings significant economic risks by deterioration of relations with Azerbaijan as we have observed right after 2009 accords are declared. For this reason taking the consent of Azerbaijan is important for Turkey to normalise the relations with Armenia that we will discuss as Azerbaijan factor separately.

C. International factors:

i.International community

Turkey faces with an international campaign to recognise Armenian Genocide that can explain one of the political motivations of Turkey to start reconciliation process at the first decade of 2000s. International recognition of Armenian genocide receive the utmost objection of Turkey and contrary, it is one of the main foreign policy goals of Armenia together with Nagorno-Karabakh problem as there are special sections allocated for these two foreign policy goals at the website of Armenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA Armenia website). Edward Nalbandian, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia predicates this ongoing policy at his various speeches (Armenpress:2015). From Armenian side any foreign policy option that will question Armenian genocide is simply impossible as genocide is still a very sensitive topic that constitute a cornerstone that shapes Armenian identity both in Armenia and at the diaspora (Black:2015). The campaign of the recognition of Armenian genocide especially at parliamentary level is been conducted by influential Armenian diaspora at the western world and as of 2015 more than 20 countries accepted 1915 as Armenian genocide at parliamentary levels. On the other hand, the resolutions adopted by parliaments is being severely protested by Turkish government as it is called as the "legislation of history" (Osipova:2010). The strong opposition of Turkey to these resolutions generally follows the reconsideration of the diplomatic relations at certain degrees with that country. One effect of these resolutions at Turkish public level is to stimulate the existing dissent by "Turkish mistrust of the West" (Gordon and Taspinar:

2008) and the main motivation to pass a resolution at parliaments to define 1915 events is seen by Turkey as political rather than historical. As a result, one of the reasons for Turkey to start its rapprochement policy was to solve the long lasting genocide problem with its neighbour to prevent such parliamentary resolutions and to increase its soft power at regional and global level. We can note that it is not a determinant, but a supplementary factor to shape Turkey foreign policy as these parliamentary resolutions are not resulted with a significant policy change at Turkey side until now.

ii.European Union

At the beginning of AKP era, there was a pro-EU atmosphere at Turkish politics because of positive statements from both sides that were prompting democratisation reforms of AKP governments. On the other hand, EU membership policy gradually lose its priority as a primary foreign policy objective after 2005 and deterioration reached its height after 2010 after Turkey seek a "multidimensional foreign policy" as Davutoglu (2010:12) noted in his article when he complained that "Turkey's accession process is manipulated by EU domestic politics" (2010:16). There are several reasons of this policy change. The mutual declarations about the relations was generally positive from 1999 Helsinki Summit to 2004 Bruxelles Summit that EU finally started membership negotiations with Turkey. EU membership strategy continued to be a priority for Turkey without an alternative during this period. However, membership process stalled by some internal and external problems after this period. First major

obstacle was the Cyprus problem as Cyprus was admitted to EU as a new member state without a solution on Cyprus conflict, Turkey did not accept to start direct relationships with Republic of Cyprus, as an EU member state. Another reason was the obstacles and discriminative discourses coming from politicians of some of the important member states such as France and Germany to imply that "Turkey does not belong to Europe" (EUbusiness:2010) and a privileged partnership should be established instead of full membership. Europe's ability to absorb new members and cultural differences of Turkey was also widely discussed in EU at this stage and these reactions created a similar negative reaction from Turkish side both at state and public level. Turkish public opinion to EU membership declined from %73 in 2004 to %44 in 2013 (Today`s Zaman: 2013), Turkish officials openly discuss about "alternative" regional cooperations to EU and although both EU and Turkey sides "officially" continued to express their desire to continue efforts for the membership accession, it can be said that EU membership lost its priority as the main course of Turkey foreign policy. Turkey's new-gained confidence because of continuous economic growth during this period together with European debt crisis accelerated this comprehension until today.

This alteration Turkish policy course towards EU membership had an effect on the foreign policy towards Armenia, too. As the relationship deteriorated, EU's power to influence the policy decisions of Turkey also diminished significantly and the calls from EU parliament for Turkey to recognise the events of 1915 as genocide or opening the borders and normalise the relations do not have a substantial impact on Turkey's foreign policy toward Armenia especially after the second half of the decade.

Meantime, as Alpay (2009) noted “calls from the European Parliament for the recognition of the “Armenian Genocide”… be set as a precondition for Turkish membership in the EU, are perceived as part of the prevailing anti-Turkish stance of Europe.” As a result, we can state that EU initially can be counted as one of the factors that leads Turkey to start reconciliation with Armenia and the deterioration of Turkey-EU relations can be considered as a factors to explain the shift at Turkish foreign policy after 2009. We can explain EU factor extensively to analyse its relationship with domestic factors as Turkey’s “interaction with EU produced, reinforced and counteracted the discourse of” Turkish identity at home that Hopf (2005:238) suggested for Russia. Before moving on to domestic factors, we can conclude that Turkey at 2005 as a country that started full membership negotiations with EU and accelerated the reconciliation process with Armenia was domestically a different country from the Turkey at 2010 where EU membership lost its importance as a variable to positively affect Turkey-Armenia relations.

iii.United States

The sensitivity of Turkey to the legislation of Armenian genocide reaches its peak when it comes to United States. 24th of April which is the historical date of the detentions of 250 Armenian intellectuals at Istanbul is conventionally observed as the Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day. The political tension between Turkey and US raises at the prior of April 24 every year because of the uncertainty whether US president will call the 1915 massacres as genocide or not. Turkey pressurize US not to call 1915 as a

genocide at the remembrance day and on the other side Armenian origin voters at US also pressurize the president to call 1915 as genocide. As a general tendency, Republicans are more hesitant that Democrats not to dissent Turkey as a geopolitically important ally. Political tension between Turkey and US rose once again at the eve of Armenian genocide remembrance day when US House of Representatives introduced a new resolution to call the president to declare 1915 as Armenian genocide. (GPO:2007). The "fear" or Turkey about the official recognition of 1915 as genocide intensified with the election of Barack Obama as during the 2008 presidential campaign Obama explicitly defined 1915 as Armenian genocide. The political atmosphere at the eve of 2009 accords that USA may "this time" recognize Armenian genocide can be counted as one of the reasons that enforce Turkey to initiate a reconciliation process with Armenia as normalizing the relations would include permanent solutions to one of the long standing problem that compel Turkey at international arena for a long time. In fact, one factor for Turkey to start reconciliation policy with Armenia was to prevent the international recognition of 1915 as a genocide and Turkey would plan to solve this problem before the centennial commemoration that would come at 2015.

On the other hand the new foreign policy doctrine of Turkey under Erdogan governments called as zero problems with neighbours and strengthen its soft power gives a better explanation to Turkey's that significant policy choice. Because even after Turkey stalled to ratify agreements US still refrain to call 1915 as a genocide (Tapper:2015) not to deteriorate the relations with Turkey, a crucial US ally in the middle east. As a result we can count the US pressure of "threatening" Turkey to call

1915 as genocide can be a supportive factor to understand Turkey`s motivation of starting the reconciliation process, but not a determining factor.

D. Domestic factors:

As Turkey is still a very dynamic and developing country that transforms its democracy and institutions even within a decade, I have taken a descriptive and explanatory approach and avoid to make a prediction-oriented analysis considering the complexity of Turkish Foreign Policy decision-making procedures because of the fast changing domestic environment especially starting with the rise of AKP at 2000s. The main puzzle of why did the 2009 protocols stalled, and if it was doomed to stall why did it started just a few years ago can only partially be explained with international factors or the uncompromising stance of Armenia regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and border disputes that we will analyse later on, but any explanation that neglects the domestic turmoil in Turkey that shaped the newly constructed and competing Turkey identities at the period between 2005 to 2015 would be incomplete an unsatisfactory. It is a new phenomenon at Turkey to observe a strong interaction between domestic policies and foreign policy as we observed domestic developments such as the political struggle of Erdogan against the former secular elites to form a popular “Muslim democratic” (Jenkins:2003) movement after 2002 election victory and its association with the post-Arab spring developments at Egypt and Syria. From 2002 to 2005 AKP (Justice and Development Party) focused on progress for EU membership and launched many democratic reforms that can be interpreted as to gain domestic support and weaken

the opposition from army and secular elites that were eliminated gradually after 2007 election victory of AKP. The main discourse of AKP from 2002 to 2007 was a liberal-democrat party with populist Islamic motives at symbolic level. During this stage, Turkey was seeking to enhance membership negotiations with EU and constantly working on democratic reforms at domestic policy and seeking zero problem policy with its neighbours and increase its soft power in accordance with the new geo-strategic vision. In summary, positive interactions with EU and its neighbours produced and reinforced a positive identity in Turkey towards its neighbours. The initial motive to launch a reconciliation process with Armenia can be interpreted in conformity with this "liberal-democratic" identity of Turkey that time. Transformation of Turkey after 2007 elections and domestic dissatisfaction that generated an authoritarian tendency at the political atmosphere especially after 2013 Gezi park protests also transformed the perception of Erdogan governments and zero problem policy shifted to fractious policies where Erdogan-consequently Turkey foreign policy-assumed a constant threat from outside world, especially from US and EU. Indeed, the admiration of western world to Erdogan governments gradually turned into an accelerating criticism especially at last 5 years. Meanwhile, discriminative discourses and objections from leaders of some EU members such as Germany and France against the Turkey`s membership to EU can also be counted as a factor that counteract a negative discourse and identity at Turkey foreign policy, but the main determinant was the domestic turmoil in Turkey since 2013 protests to today, corruption scandals, parallel state controversy and tension between government and various opposition groups created an extremely polarized two competing domestic identities, Erdogan supporters and

Erdogan opponents. This domestic polarization also created two discursive formation in Turkish identity. The prevalent discourse perceive any criticism towards his domestic politics dubiously and rejected as Erdogan (HDN: 2013) stated not to recognize European Parliament decisions about such criticisms. We can conclude that the domestic transformation in Turkey and the new identity that prevails at Turkish foreign policy choices after 2010s eliminated the positive role of EU to prompt Turkey-Armenia reconciliation process and led Turkey to take its foreign policy choices towards Armenia independently from EU influence that can be considered one of the factors to explain the policy change of Turkey after 2009 protocols.

Another domestic factor to explain the policy change of Turkey before and after 2009 is the personal differences at the prevailing leadership to Turkish foreign policy. There was a personal difference between the former president Abdullah Gul who supports a more positive approach to solve the long-standing problems of Turkey in a shorter time and a better integration with EU and the western world and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is the most influential and popular political leader yet and has a more reserved and cautious approach to foreign policy choices especially when it may receive a negative response from voters. Abdullah Gul was also the person who initiated the football diplomacy with Armenia who was known with his liberal approach at domestic politics compared to Erdogan. He was an influential and reputable political figure during the formulisation of the reconciliation process between the foreign affairs bureaucracy of two countries together with his similar minded minister of foreign affairs, Ali Babacan who conducted the first initiatives and negotiations between 2007-2009 that resulted with 2009 protocols. On the other hand

this foreign policy that was more eager and ready to take risks to normalise the relations with Armenia gradually evolved into a more conservative approach that take each step cautiously to refrain any crisis with Azerbaijan. This evolution at Turkey foreign policy with Armenia that we can find clues from the personal opinions of Erdogan can be analysed together with the general transformation of Turkey in accordance with the personalisation of Turkish politics under the leadership of Erdogan that gradually advanced from 2009 to the general elections of Turkey at 2015 June. 12 years with Gul, a book written by the Ahmet Sever (2015) the former chief advisor of Abdullah Gul, that triggered a furious debate gives us a better insight about the disagreement of two leaders on Turkey-Armenia reconciliation efforts and 2009 protocols. The newly published book gives a brief summary and main developments during the presidency of Gul and include a section about Turkey-Armenia relations. Sever reveals the dissension between Gul and Erdogan about Turkey's "Armenia policy" and expose how Erdogan viewed the reconciliation policy of Gul as "too much" and "unnecessary" (Sever:2015). As a conclusion, we can summarize that the sharp domestic transformation of Turkey between 2005 and 2015 which created contradicting identities and the personal ideological differences at the leadership that conducts reconciliation process before and after 2009 protocols are one of the determinant factors that explain Turkey's foreign policy towards Armenia. On the other hand, domestic transformation of Turkey cannot fully explain the main drives of Turkey foreign policy without analysing the long term frozen conflicts between Turkey and Armenia which forward us to analyse historical controversy about the definition of 1915 and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

E. Historical factors:

Although an international academic literature to discuss the genocide exists, the political aspect of the problem generated "biased historians" from both sides that started their "historical analysis" by pre-setting a goal of aiming either to deny genocide (Turkish side) or to prove genocide (Armenian side) with an ideological motive instead of historical one. This clashing perceptions have a crucial effect on Turkish foreign policy behaviours towards Armenia, as even it can be asserted that controversy of whether 1915 was a genocide or not lies at the centre of the Turkish foreign policy decision-making at Armenia related topics. Thus, the role of history deserves to be analysed as a separate variable.

In this section, I will start with domestic discussions at Turkey about Armenian genocide controversy and continue with a summary of the Turkish perception of history of 1915 and argue why it is one of the main factor that resulted with the failure of 2009 protocols.

The assassination of Hrant Dink-a prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist with his distinctive ideas suggesting that Turks and Armenians should discuss and resolve their outstanding problems themselves-on 2007 by a 17 years old ultra-nationalist person created a massive reaction and around 100.000 people protested the murder of Hrant Dink on the streets of Istanbul with banners of "we are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians" (Harvey: 2007). These protests continued with "I apologize" campaign that collected thousands of signatures to the text stating: "My conscience does not accept

the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I emphasize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them" (Ozyurek:2009) Although these campaigns and opening the traditional version of history under discussion also brought a nationalist reaction that call the abovementioned demonstrators as `traitors` they also led the civil society to question the official narrative and a vibrant new atmosphere flourished first time. The acceleration of the reconciliation process of Turkey-Armenia relations started at such a turbulent period where liberal and conservative ideas were competing.

One of the main stimulus to deny 1915 events as genocide that is still prevalent among people in Turkey is to perceive the history of WW1 as a "conspiracy of imperialists" to disintegrate the Ottoman Empire by seducing the minorities in the empire successively. This understanding of historical legacy that is also called as "Sevres Syndrome" (Jung: 2003) is extensively shared at certain degrees by an important proportion of the Turkish population so any attempt that reconsider and criticize this historical narrative receive a sharp reaction from the majority of the voters, thus there is also a political risk for decision makers to open this narrative into discussion. As the domestic transformation of Turkey during AKP period brought a new phenomenon that public opinion is taken into account much more than 1990s to design the Turkish Foreign Policy, it is important to understand the public perception in Turkey about "Armenia question." This perception comprehend the Armenian independence movement that started at the end of 19th century and resulted with the tragedy of 1915 massacres from this point of view and tend to read the deportation of Armenian

population as a `self-defence` action against `imperialists grand powers` that seek to destroy Turkish state.

The traces of this perception of history is not only prevalent among the majority of Turkish people but also can also be found at the foreign policy makers of Turkey, especially in ministry of foreign affairs bureaucracy. The attacks of ASALA (CIA:2013), a militant Armenian nationalist group that conducted terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats at from 1970s to 1990s also triggered this negative sentiment as the most of the victims of ASALA was diplomats so the fellow associates of the same foreign affairs bureaucracy. So we have to seize this perception that both shape the domestic policies and the foreign policy makers incentives to affect Turkish foreign policy on Armenian genocide controversy, one of the main problems of Turkey- Armenia relations. This "foreign intervention" concept is still widespread through Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy and general public sentiment so outside pressures by European parliaments and campaigns conducted by Armenian diaspora to make Turkey forcefully accept Armenian genocide creates a backlash by Turkish side.

Besides the Sevres syndrome, a major objection of Turkey is the perception that correlate 1915 massacres with Jewish Holocaust which Jewish people are exterminated just because of their Jewish identity. "Turkish side" consider this approach as an injustice interpretation of history and underline the lack of an ideological anti-Armenian motivation and an institutional state policy that aim for such deliberate extermination. Contrary, Turkish discourse consider the deaths as a result of severe war times conditions and losses from both Turkish and Armenian side. Turkish

narrative underlines the revolts of Armenian militant groups that launched an armed rebellion against Ottoman Empire for an independent Armenia during the WW1 and emphasize the collaboration of these groups with Russian army and conclude that the measures taken by Ottoman government to deport Armenian population was a `self-defence action of the state`. The main distinctive feature of Turkish perception is to expound the deaths as a result of widespread famine and inter-ethnic violence where massacres are committed by both sides against each other. The statement of Bernard Lewis (2002), a prominent history professor at Princeton University to describe the events of 1915 is in accordance with Turkish point of view as he defined the 1915 massacres as:

What happened to the Armenians was the result of a massive Armenian armed rebellion against the Turks, which began even before war broke out, and continued on a larger scale. Great numbers of Armenians, including members of the armed forces, deserted, crossed the frontier and joined the Russian forces invading Turkey. Armenian rebels actually seized the city of Van and held it for a while intending to hand it over to the invaders. There was guerilla warfare all over Anatolia. And it is what we nowadays call the National Movement of Armenians against Turkey.

The inclination of Turkish point of view that underlines the reason and underestimate the result of 1915 massacres is still a main tendency to shape Turkey foreign policy perspective to Armenia regarding the ongoing historical dispute.

Regardless of the historical controversy, one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy context is to put historical discussions to aside and focus on the legal consequences of 1915 events to Turkey. Main foreign policy statement of Turkey that did not change from the beginning of the controversy until today is to see the controversy as a legal problem instead of a historical one and underline that the term genocide was coined by Raphael Lemkin after the WW2 to distinguish what happened

to European Jews from previous war time massacres and the term genocide as a legal term first defined at 1947 cannot be interpreted retroactively, thus cannot be used to define 1915 events. We will analyse this legal approach deeper at the border recognition section.

This history conflict was and still is one of the most important determinants of Turkey policy towards Armenia and it was both the reason and the failure of 2009 protocols. If a date should be set to start the reconciliation process between Turkey and Armenia we can set 2005 when Erdogan officially proposed a joint history commission to establish a common perception of history by his April 10, 2005 letter to Kocharyan that he stated "it is not a secret that we have diverging interpretations of events that took place during a particular period of our common history. These developments..continue to hamper the development of friendly relations between our two countries today" (MFA:2005). One of the main reasons for Turkey to start the reconciliation initiative was to agree on the definition of `1915 events`-as called by Turkish side-that also take the objections of Turkey into consideration. The failure of the protocols after the statement of Armenian constitutional court to underline genocide recognition as an indispensable goal for Armenia also shows us the importance of the definition of 1915 to analyse the Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia. We can understand the validity of this historical sensitivity for Turkey and how it still shapes Turkish foreign policy from the article of Ahmet Davutoglu at 2014 titled as "Turkish-Armenian elations in the process of de-Otttomanization or dehistoricization: Is there a just memory possible?" (Davutoglu: 2014). In this article Davutoglu summarize and emphasize the common history of Turks and Armenians together under the Ottoman Empire and criticize the

Armenian version of history that portrayed Ottoman period as repressive and neglecting the common culture that he called as Euro-centric and underline how this common history led to the events of 1915 that Davutoglu (2014:29) describes as “an inextricable problem as a result of external intervention by the Great Powers from 1877 to 1914”. All these statements coming from the highest decision makers of Turkey`s foreign policy highlights that history and its interpretation is still a very critical factor to understand the philosophical background that shapes the Armenia policy of Turkey. As a result, we can conclude that it was an indispensable condition for Turkey to reach on a mutually acceptable compromise on the definition of 1915 events for both sides and the statement of Armenian constitution court is considered by Turkey as a rejection of solving the genocide problem at joint history commission and led the failure of the protocols.

F. Legal factors:

It is hard to make a clear distinction between historical factors with the border recognition by Armenia and the genocide recognition by Turkey but the potential legal consequences of these cases deserves to analyse them as a separate legal factor. As I summarised at the background section, Armenia`s Declaration of Independence and its definition of eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia” creates an ambiguity about the recognition of the current borders. Armenian authorities states that they do not have territorial claims from Turkey, on the other hand Armenia still refrain to explicitly declare to recognise the Treaty of Kars that determine the existing borders between

Turkey and Armenia. There is a strong objection in Armenia coming from the nationalist opposition groups such as Dashnaks and Armenian diaspora to the recognition of the current borders and Sarkisian government was harshly criticised by this opposition as former foreign minister of Armenia Oskanian (2009) stated that "The protocol is worded such that not only do we agree to respect the territorial integrity of Turkey, but in the next sentence, we consent to renounce our historic rights as well as even the theoretical possibility of regaining historic justice." This "historic rights" rhetoric at hardliners of Armenian side trigger the existing doubts of Turkish side and continues to stand as a problem in the context of international law. The legal aspect of the problems in fact is not limited with a narrow described territorial dispute between two countries, but is part of a broader controversy which can be identified as "genocide reparations". As a result, uncertainty of Armenia`s stance about common borders is perceived by Turkey as an objection to recognize the borders that leaded to the suspension of the ratification of protocols by Turkey after the ambiguous statement of Armenian constitutional court that is described at the background section.

G. Azerbaijan as a critical factor:

Although the nature of Turkish support to Azerbaijan can be analysed at different levels in which one of the reason is counted at the economic factors as Turkey and Azerbaijan pursue an extensive economic cooperation mainly on energy fields, cultural variables such as the ethnic and linguistic ties between two nations surpass the

confinement of sole economic incentives. As I summarize the developments that led to the failure of the ratification of protocols at background section, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan played a very crucial role at all stages of the reconciliation process between Turkey and Armenia. Contrary to the desire of the Armenian side to start an unconditional process with Turkey to start diplomatic relations and opening the borders, such initiative to open the borders by Turkey was in contradiction by its own nature as the reason to close the borders unitarily by Turkey itself was the invasion of Azerbaijan territories by Armenia. So it was not a realistic perception to distinguish the opening of the common borders from Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Abdullah Gul, as a more eager leader-compared to Erdogan-to solve the problems with Armenia and the person who accelerated the reconciliation process, even stated that the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia would not precede resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Although there was no reference to Nagorno-Karabakh at 2009 protocols, according to David Philips (2012:47-48), the chairman of TARC, Turkey side was assured by United States that a resolution at NK problem "would be considered in parallel". The pressures by US and EU to establish a compromise between two extreme sides was so intense that both Turkey and Armenia accepted conciliatory gestures and both NK and Genocide topics as the essential conditions were kept out of the protocols by respective sides. But these two substantial but non-spoken problems was still existed as a great obstacle that eventually led to the failure of the protocols. The statement of the constitutional court of Armenia (CONCOURT:2010) that underline that the protocols cannot be interpreted or applied in a way to contradict with the Declaration of Independence which brings up

the genocide recognition problem was once underlined that there was still an unresolved historical perception problem between Turkey and Armenia, and the multiple announcements of Erdogan that the protocols are directly dependent on a resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh clarified that Turkey do not change its position without receiving a significant progress from Armenia to withdraw from at least one or two provinces of Azerbaijan, if not from Karabakh.

CONCLUSION:

The main dilemma of 2009 accords that resulted to its failure was both countries initiated reconciliation process that led to 2009 accords had contradicting foreign policy goals which led both sides into a quandary even at the very beginning of the process. Economic incentive of Armenia to normalize the relations with Turkey was contradicting economic interests of Turkey as it bring the risk to resent Azerbaijan. A mutually acceptable resolution on the understanding of 1915 events which was one of the main pillars of Turkey's incentive to start a reconciliation effort was also fundamentally contradicting with the essential principle of Armenian foreign policy goals that seek to force Turkey to accept and call 1915 events as a genocide. In fact, the scope of 2009 protocols was contradictory between two countries. Armenia aimed to constrain the scope of the protocols with starting diplomatic relations, thus opening the borders to connect with the outside world to solve its economic problems. Armenia was not in favour of establishing a joint history commission and accepted this condition involuntarily by outside pressure (Philips: 2012). On the other hand, the main foreign policy goals of Turkey to initiate reconciliation process and to sign 2009 accords was to agree on a mutually agreeable solution to the history conflict before the centennial of 1915.

The nature of Turkey-Armenia relations is based on mistrust that arose from the history which shaped the identities of the sides and their perception to each other. As an example, Armenian constitutional court`s decision-that seem as the apparent reason to the failure of the protocols-might not be taken as a territorial claim by

Turkey in a relationship based on a Kantian culture (Wendt: 1999). The decision of the constitutional court had 3 main implications for Turkey. One of them was to call eastern Turkey as Western Armenia which is perceived by Turkey as the reluctance of Armenia to recognize the common borders and a potential territorial claim as genocide reparations. Second interpretation of Turkey was the content of paragraph 11 that attribute the declaration of Armenian genocide recognition as a state policy by Armenia. This was contradicting with Turkish foreign policy goal to start reconciliation with Armenia in essence. Third objection was the court statement that indented `the protocols are exclusively bilateral and cannot be attributed in a relationship with a third party`. This part is naturally perceived by Turkey as to exclude protocols with Nagorno-Karabakh problem that Turkey was objected since from the beginning. Turkey involuntarily accepted to limit the content of the protocols without a specific attribution to NK problem, but was also assured by US that a resolution at NK problem "would be considered in parallel" (Philips: 2012) and the unwillingness of the Armenian side to take synchronous steps to solve the NK problem (such as withdrawal of at least 1 province surrounding Karabakh) was in contrast with Turkish foreign policy goal to solve Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan problems concurrently.

As a conclusion we can finalise the result of the failure of 2009 protocols with 3 main elements. One of them is discrepancy of the protocols in letter and in spirit, which was contradicting with the main foreign policy goals of both Turkey and Armenia. As the content of the protocols and the expectations of both sides were essentially contradicting, only a mutual perception based on a certain level of trust and cooperation could save the fate of the protocols. But the nature of Turkey-Armenia

relations is based on a “socially constructed anarchy” and the Armenian constitution court`s statement accelerated the existing mistrust of Turkey and lead Turkey to suspend the ratification of the protocols.

Second element was the domestic transformation of Turkey both at state and society levels. When the rapprochement policy initiated at 2005, the domestic identity of Turkey, its relationship and identical perception with the outside world (here Turkey-EU relations as the external variable) was different than 2010s where Turkey gradually construct first a Lockean and then a Hobbesian culture of anarchy especially after 2013 domestic turmoil in Turkey.

And finally, with the failure of 2009 protocols it is been understood by both sides that Turkey-Armenia relations is fundamentally related with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as Azerbaijan is an indispensable ally for Turkey both at economic and political aspects. It seems that after a poliheuristic analysis of the policy options, Turkey does not consider to risk its relationship with Azerbaijan for the sake of a solution to problems with Armenia and a prospective solution in the region will apparently have a multilateral aspect among three countries unless a new identical perception prevail in the future.

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