

**T.R.
POLICE ACADEMY
INSTITUTE OF SECURITY SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

**CORE COMPONENTS OF
EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE**

**MASTER'S THESIS
Hasan GÜL**

**Supervisor
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ufuk AYHAN**

ANKARA- 2015

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Hasan GÜL tarafından hazırlanan “Core Components of Effective Intelligence ” başlıklı bu çalışma, 12/10/2015 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda (oybirliği / ~~oyçokluğu~~) ile başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından Uluslararası Güvenlik Anabilim Dalında İngilizce Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.



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
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12 / 10/2015

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Hasan GÜL

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ufuk Ayhan for his support. I would also like to thank to Turkish Police Academy as well as thank to my committee members, Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Yayla, Assist. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali Tekin for their feedbacks and valuable critiques.

I must recognize my family for their constant support. In this effort, my beautiful wife, Çiler Gözde, gives me encouragement, understanding, and unfettered honesty whenever it is most needed. I would like to thank my wife for her endless supports and critiques.

ABSTRACT
T.R.
Police Academy
Institute of Security Sciences
Department of International Security
Core Components of Effective Intelligence
Hasan GÜL
Master's Thesis
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ufuk Ayhan
2015, 123 (Excluding appendices)

This thesis aims to figure out the core components of effective intelligence. Therefore, the author of this thesis combines all related literature with definitive perspective of intelligence, theory of intelligence, impact of analysts and analysis and oversight of intelligence. Furthermore, all related data, documents, reports, articles, books and resources are reviewed and analyzed. All the literature regarding intelligence is reviewed which is based on library research. In addition to this, qualitative research methods are used to have inductive approach. Through this way, the bridge between intelligence and how intelligence may be more effective is built.

This thesis, analyses four main chapters to indicate the components of effective intelligence. In the first chapter, definition of intelligence, processes of intelligence and function of intelligence are analyzed. In the second chapter, reasons of having theory on intelligence, approaches on intelligence and views are analyzed. In the third chapter, functional core components of analysts and types of analysis are discussed. In the fourth chapter, definition and function of democracy, democratic oversight and needs of democratic oversight and approaches on democratic oversight and mechanism are analyzed.

At the end of the study, it is indicated that there might be several core components of effective intelligence. The results reveal that there can be three essential core components of effective intelligence as analysts and analysis on intelligence, theory of intelligence and oversight of intelligence. By gathering of

those three core components, effective intelligence and core components of effective intelligence can be revealed.

Key Words: Intelligence, Effective Intelligence, Oversight of Intelligence, Analyses and Analyst of Effective Intelligence, Theory of Effective Intelligence.



ÖZET
T.C.
Polis Akademisi
Güvenlik Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Uluslararası Güvenlik Anabilim Dalı
Verimli İstihbaratın Ana Bileşenleri
Hasan GÜL
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ufuk AYHAN
2015, 123 (Ekler hariç)

Bu tez, verimli istihbaratın ana bileşenlerini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamıştır. Dolayısıyla yazar, ilgili tüm literatürü istihbaratı tanımsal açıyla, istihbaratın teorisiyle, istihbarat analizcisi ve analizin etkisi ve istihbaratın denetimiyle birleştirmiştir. Buna ek olarak, ilgili tüm veriler, belgeler, raporlar, makaleler, kitaplar ve kaynaklar incelenip, analiz edilmiştir. İstihbaratla ilgili tüm literatür taranırken, kütüphane araştırması yapılmıştır. Buna ek olarak, niteliksel yöntem kullanılarak, tümevarım yaklaşımı amaçlanmıştır. Bu sayede, istihbaratla istihbaratın nasıl daha verimli hale getirileceği arasında ki köprü kurulmuştur.

Bu tez, verimli istihbaratın ana bileşenlerini belirlemek için, 4 ana bölümü analiz etmiştir. İlk bölümde, istihbarat tanımı, istihbaratın süreçleri ve istihbaratın fonksiyonları incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde, istihbaratta teori olmasının nedenleri, istihbarat üzerine yaklaşımlar ve görüşler analiz edilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde, analizcinin işlevsel temel bileşenleri ve analizin türleri tartışılmıştır. Dördüncü bölümde, demokrasinin işlevi ve tanımı, demokratik denetim ve demokratik denetime olan ihtiyaç, demokratik denetim üzerine yaklaşımlar ve mekanizmaları analiz edilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın sonunda, bu tez verimli istihbaratın temel bileşenlerinin olabileceğine dikkat çekmiştir. Yapılan araştırmanın sonucuna göre, verimli istihbaratın üç temel bileşeni olabilir; istihbaratta analiz ve analizci, istihbarat teorisi

ve istihbarat denetimi. Bu üç temel bileşenle, verimli istihbarat ve verimli istihbaratın temel bileşenleri ortaya konulmuştur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İstihbarat, İstihbaratın Denetimi, Analiz ve Analizcinin İstihbarata Etkisi, Verimli İstihbaratın Teorisi.



CORE COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

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INTRODUCTION

Khan (2009) asserts that, even there is an attempt to improve a theory of intelligence and universally accepted definition of intelligence, there is a little success for almost fifty years in the field of intelligence studies. However, there are several views on the definition of intelligence. One of the traditional definition of intelligence is constituted by Sherman Kent (1949). Kent (1949) argues that intelligence is knowledge on other state's capabilities, abilities and vulnerabilities. Khan (2008) defines intelligence as information and his definition of intelligence is also a kind of concept.

Furthermore, Cornal and Black (2011) also argue that the intelligence is information in order to protect to interests and goals. According to Gill and Phythian (2006), intelligence is a secret activity, which has its own covering and processes. They also argue that intelligence is a kind of umbrella, its activities, planning, and information collection to analysis and dissemination in order to guarantee security against threats by applying preventive policies and strategies. Additionally, Johnson (2007) asserts that the intelligence is information, which can be defined according to its function.

On the other hand, Warner (2002) defines intelligence as a service for the decision makers in order to minimize the risks against rival powers. Therefore, according to Warner's (2002) definition, it can be said that intelligence, as a kind of information or processed information, is secret activity to establish security of states against any kinds of threats and risks such as social, political, economic.

Sun Tzu (600 bc), a well-known strategist on war, emphasizes the importance of knowledge as intelligence. Land (2004) emphasis Tzu's ideas that one can have more accurate and reliable assumptions and prediction that result with victory, solely knowing oneself and enemies in terms of capabilities and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, Warner (2009) argues that intelligence has to be studied against the potential threat of being an ill of intelligence rather than force for good.

It might be asserted that having a theory of intelligence is essential to have intelligence that is more effective however; there is a gap regarding the theory of intelligence in the intelligence literature. To illustrate,

“Theory, Sims believes, can therefore be a tool to answer many of the larger questions of intelligence. What is it? Why does it exist? Why do states retain it? To generalize and find causation, she argues, we need theory. Theory would then be useful to the scholars studying intelligence, to the profession itself as well as to the larger world around it” (as cited in Bay, 2007:8).

Therefore, it is argued that intelligence needs to have a theory in order to find answers to whole different kinds of intelligence questions which can enhance the perception of intelligence and study of intelligence. For that reason, intelligence can be improved by having a theory. Moreover, there might be more answers to the large amount of intelligence questions. “Theory is an important building block for intellectual disciplines, whether in intelligence or any other fields” (Ehrman, 2009:6). Ehrman refers to the essentiality of having a theory for intelligence as an intellectual discipline. As a result, it can be argued that having a theory of intelligence can contribute to the efficiency of intelligence.

Through the light of literature review, analysts and analysis may have a great impact on having effective intelligence. Improvement of intelligence analysts' some features and characteristics may have a contribution to the effectiveness of intelligence. Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that there might be the core competencies as skills, abilities, characteristics and knowledge that make intelligence analysts more successful, which may result in more effective intelligence.

Moreover, it may be argued that analysis of intelligence is essential for having effective intelligence owing to the fact that intelligence analysis can strengthen intelligence in terms of accuracy, reliability, relevancy and clarity. In addition to this, types of intelligence analysis can support intelligence analysts to have more accurate, certain and reliable intelligence analyses. According to Moore (2012), there are four types of analysis to have effective intelligence as descriptive, explanatory, interpretive and estimative analysis. Moreover, there is a predictive intelligence analysis, which has an impact on the achievement of intelligence analysis. Predictive intelligence analysis is a process where intelligence analysts try to predict

future events on what may have happened. It utilizes appropriate tools and methodologies in order to have conclusions and results about the future events.

“True intelligence analysis is always predictive. A single event can shape the future of a field of study, direction of research, or outcome of a problem. The goal is to be able to predict this event or scenario” (Tindall, 2006:80). At this point of view, predictive intelligence analysis is one of the most important types in intelligence analysis, since true intelligence analysis is based on predictive intelligence analysis. Therefore, it might be asserted that analysts and analysis of intelligence may have impact on having effective intelligence

In addition to this, it may be asserted that oversight of intelligence is another core component of effective intelligence. Democratic oversight is a kind of monitoring and controlling of intelligence agencies, communities or organizations by executive, legislative and judiciary power. These three-separated powers have mechanism, procedures, rules and regulations on Intelligence agencies communities and organizations. Control and oversight of intelligence are one of the most complicated and compulsive issue because ‘*Sed quis custodiet ipso custodiet?* But who will guard the guards?’ (Lowenthal as cited in Filip, 2006:35). There is an issue of oversight of intelligence community in literature review. Therefore, according to Lowenthal (2009), it can be coped with intelligence agency problems in terms of accountability and transparency by having executive, legislative authority, power’s control and overseeing. Hence, Lowenthal (2009) argues that executive and legislative branches of state have to be responsible for controlling intelligence agencies activities and operations.

It might be argued that as the intelligence communities can be more accountable by oversight mechanism, the possibility of having effective intelligence is also increased. Therefore, the democratic oversight of intelligence can be essential to have effective and efficient intelligence and intelligence communities. Owing to the fact that democratic states and societies construct rules, controls and other mechanism not solely for protecting rights and freedoms of citizens but it also aims to prevent abuse of power and authority and misconduct of intelligence agencies, communities or organizations. To have well-structured democratic oversight

mechanisms and system, democracy and democratic values have to be defined and perceived which might be increased the efficiency of intelligence.

This thesis aims to figure out the core components of effective intelligence. Through literature review, the author of this thesis combines all related literature with definitive perspective of intelligence, theory of intelligence, impact of analysts and analysis and oversight of intelligence. Through this way, the link between intelligence and how intelligence may be more effective can be built.

The central objective of this thesis is to figure out the core components of effective intelligence through literature review. There are also sub- objectives like:

1. Identifying how intelligence can be more effective.
2. Identifying the definition of intelligence, the function of intelligence, the process of intelligence to have effective intelligence.
3. Finding the answer of ‘are there any impacts of intelligence analyst and types of analysis on efficiency intelligence’.
4. Analyzing the impacts of having theory of intelligence to have more effectiveness.
5. Identifying the importance of oversight of intelligence and how intelligence can be accountable to have intelligence that is more effective in democracy.
6. Suggesting for future research on intelligence literature.

The author of the thesis aims to establish the core components of intelligence. There is lack of sources on specifically focusing on the core component of effective intelligence. Therefore, to uncover this, all the literature regarding intelligence is reviewed based on library research. In addition to this, Qualitative research methods are used in order to have inductive approach. Therefore, all related data, documents, reports, articles, books and resources are reviewed and analyzed.

For this reason, this part supplies an overview regarding each chapter in literature review. It explores the literature under four main chapters in order to indicate the components of effective intelligence and then how effective intelligence has to be perceived in the first chapter. Furthermore, processes of intelligence and functions of intelligence in terms of efficiency are analyzed.

In the second chapter, theories, approaches and views on intelligence are analyzed and discussed in order to have answers concluding on whether intelligence has to have a theory or not. What kinds of methods and approaches have to be applied in terms of enhancing the intelligence and its efficiency? All chapters are structured in order to combine and improve the components of effective intelligence.

In the third chapter, impact of intelligence analysis and analysts on effective intelligence and intelligence communities are analyzed and discussed in the second chapter. The core competencies of intelligence analysts are analyzed in order to have a kind of methodology. Then, the types of intelligence analysis are examined.

In the fourth chapter, oversight of intelligence and intelligence communities are analyzed. To have comprehensive perception and perspective, definitions on democracy, function of intelligence in democracy, democratic oversight, need of oversight and approaches are also examined in terms of intelligence and intelligence communities' efficiency. Then, democratic oversight mechanisms are analyzed.

CHAPTER ONE

INTELLIGENCE

In the literature, it is reviewed that there is a discussion on how intelligence can be more effective. Most of scholars, authors and specialists on intelligence emphasize perception of intelligence, process of intelligence and functions of intelligence to have effective intelligence. For this reason, the author examines the definition of intelligence, process of intelligence and functions of intelligence in terms of efficiency.

1.1. INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is one of the oldest concepts for societies and states in the history of humanity. It has been important variable as an essential part of survival for empires, kingdoms, states and society. Maintenance of empires, kingdoms and states are highly depended on the ability for protection of their interests and goods through having knowledge. Therefore, basic way for protection of empires kingdoms and states' priorities are maintained by the knowledge. Therefore, the following quotation from Sun Tzu is meaningful:

“It is in these five matters that the way to victory is known. Therefore, I say: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril”(as cited in Land, 2004:2).

Sun Tzu, a well-known strategist on war, emphasizes the importance of knowledge, because as one knows oneself and the enemy in terms of capabilities and vulnerabilities, one has ability to calculate all possibilities hence one has more accurate and reliable assumptions and prediction, which results in victory (as cited in Land, 2004). However, as one ignores itself and enemies' vulnerabilities and capabilities, one cannot have any success in the field of battle (as cited in Land,

2004). Therefore, knowledge may be a determinative factor for survival and victories. Furthermore, while Sun Tzu emphasizes the importance of knowledge, he also refers to the quality of knowledge, that is essential variable whether you are successful or not. Smith and Hatlebrekke (2010) make a quotation from Sun Tzu that all actions are based on knowledge and superior knowledge is complicated to achieve that may alter through people to people and will declare victory.

“Superior knowledge is difficult to attain. It depends on people like I Chih or Lu Ya, who can keep their competing alliances separate and maintain the consistency of their disparate realms. Knowledge is the basis for any action. Superior knowledge will assure victory” (Sun Tzu, as cited in Smith and Hatlebrekke, 2010:159).

Sun Tzu argues that knowledge is the basic condition for all actions because without knowledge you cannot have any success in your decisions and interpretations (cited in Smith and Hatlebrekke, 2010). On the other hand, if you have the qualified knowledge superior, it is obvious that you will have victories by using featured intelligence people. As a result, intelligence as knowledge has been significant effect on societies and states. Therefore, it can be claimed that intelligence and intelligence communities have to be enhanced in order to increase their efficiency.

1.2. DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is a secret work including intelligence process as target, collection and actions in order to maintain security against any kinds of internal or external threats. The purpose of intelligence as an organization is production of its activities by using knowledge. Kent (1949) argues that intelligence is knowledge and it should be well limited otherwise, some kinds of knowledge may be lost. Having the stretched knowledge, people should focus on the high-level positive intelligence (Kent, 1949). First, people should understand that positive intelligence is based on what other states do hence it aims to have foreign intelligence in order to protect U.S.A. and her ideals (1949). Kent argues that

“How the other country is going to receive the policy in question and what it is prepared to use it what the other country lacks in the way of countering force (i.e.) its specific vulnerabilities; what it is

doing to array its protective force; and what it is doing , or indeed can do, to mend its specific vulnerabilities”(1949:5).

Therefore, intelligence should provide knowledge on the other states’ capabilities, abilities and potentials to apply policies. Specifically, knowledge of vulnerabilities of other states should be delivered on the time for decision makers who are responsible for producing policies in terms of their state’s interests and goals (Kent, 1949). Furthermore, leaders should be aware of the other countries social, economic, political and cultural features in order to evaluate the other states’ vulnerabilities (Kent, 1949). Hence, knowledge should have some priorities and specific concentration as a product.

Nevertheless, there are some critiques on Professor Kent’s definition of intelligence in the literature. According to Hatlebrette and Smith (2010), intelligence should have more comprehensive and deeper explanation in order to understand intelligence as a whole. According to Herman (2002), intelligence is directly related with information specialist and power so that, as one increases his/her abilities and capabilities in terms of knowledge, the other states losing something that should be protected. In other words, information specialist is essential to know something that adversary wishes to deny referring other states vulnerabilities.

On the one hand, power refers to the protection of covert information by using capabilities and capacities of intelligence organizations, which is the ability of a state on intelligence (Herman, 2002). Therefore, intelligence is a kind of special information that can be used in order to increase state power against others. In addition to this, there are also different kinds of perception regarding intelligence in the literature. One of them is based on outcome and means of information. According to Cornall and Black (2011), intelligence should be defined as information, which depends on two parameter as means and outcome. If intelligence is defined how was obtained, it could be defined that intelligence is covertly obtained information that is ability of intelligence officers to transcend barriers to get information which is outcome (Cornall and Black, 2011). In addition to this, if intelligence should be defined in terms of its means, intelligence should create an opportunity for government by having the information to apply policies (Cornall and Black, 2011). As a result, intelligence refers to collection of information and processing of

information. For this reason, intelligence is defined as “information that enables you to protect your interests or to maintain a valuable advantage in advancing your interests over those posing threats to them” (Cornel and Black, 2011:6). In this respect, intelligence as information is to have an advantage when others do not have in terms of existing threats for your goals and goods.

On the one hand, there are some arguments about intelligence definition basing on production shaped by information. In such perception, intelligence is a production after its process is completed (JICA, 2012). As a result, to define intelligence, it should be had production processing and analyzing of raw information. Then it should be had product which is effective intelligence (JICA, 2012). Briefly, some arguments are emphasized intelligence as a production in order to define intelligence and to increase the efficiency of intelligence.

Moreover, there are also some argumentations regarding the definition of intelligence, referring to the threats. According to this approach, intelligence is ability to get rid of threats against states hence intelligence should be defined in terms of threats (Deeper, 2011). Robertson explains and defines intelligence according to the reason of intelligence’s existence, which is threat (as cited in Deeper, 2011). Additionally, intelligence is a kind of capability in order to have absence of threats owing to the fact that, intelligence can cope with a statement or expression of intention in order to hurt, destroy, punish to the states and societies (as cited in Deeper, 2011).

Based on discussed issues, "intelligence is one of the most essential notions for states’ security and protection against threats" (Caparini, 2007:4). As the knowledge is increased, the possibility of having success on against threats and risks are also decreased. Such a perception might have direct effect on the efficiency on intelligence and intelligence activities. In addition to these statements, it might be asserted that perception of intelligence is also important to have efficiency on intelligence because of the fact that intelligence policy and activities might be shaped and applied according to the perception of intelligence.

In the literature, there are some general and classical views on the definition of intelligence, the perception on intelligence, or the functions of intelligence. Firstly,

intelligence is a secret work in order to cope with internal and external threats and risks by using knowledge. Moreover, intelligence is a kind of activities so that foreign states' vulnerabilities and capabilities can be perceived and evaluated in order to protect states' interests and goals against others (Herman, 2002). Secondly, intelligence can be defined as unique information in order to protect states' power, which may include social, political and economic power against other states. Thirdly, intelligence might be defined as information, which obtained secretly. In addition to this, intelligence has its means and outcome that have effect on definition of intelligence. Means refer to the results of intelligence such as benefits, advantageous against other states. On the other hands, outcomes refer to the difficulties in the process of having intelligence (Cornell and Black, 2011). Difficulties are handled and then intelligence is disseminated as product. Finally, there are also some other views argue that intelligence cannot be defined as only an information. Even though information cannot be excluded from the definition and the perception of intelligence because of the fact that information is a part of intelligence process (JICA, 2012). However, according to Robertson, intelligence is more than information that intelligence is also an ability to deal with threats (as cited in Deeper, 2011).

As a result, intelligence has always been evaluated as an essential part of states' and societies' priorities, values, interest, and goods owing to the fact that intelligence provides security, absences of threats. Because of these reasons, it should be well defined and perceived what is intelligence in terms of effectiveness. Therefore, effective intelligence can be classified as featured knowledge or qualified converted information in order to have internal and external security in terms of social, economic and political these are the general views on what is effective intelligence and what should we understand from intelligence in terms of having success that is mentioned above. Now, the process of intelligence, essential to reveal the importance of analysis in order to have effective intelligence, is to be discussed.

1.3. PROCESS OF INTELLIGENCE


Intelligence has a kind of cycle, which may be also seen as process in order to have production where information gains currency. Therefore, in this cycle there are some

requirements and levels. According to the FBI Intelligence cycle, there is process of intelligence, which includes requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production reporting, dissemination (Carter, 2004).

Planning and direction are a kind of outline that needed information is identified in order to receive to the consumer. It also has implementation plans to fulfill the requirements that identified by relevant agency. In addition, this part should be responsible for end of intelligence to support decision-making. Another part of cycle is collection, which is gathering raw information according to what is needed and which information should have priorities in terms of necessary. In this part, there can be interviews, human source operations, searches, technical and physical surveillance to have necessary information. In the part of processing and exploitation, great amount of information is prepared in a proper way by analysts. Analysts can study through different kinds of methods. These methods may include language translation, data reduction, description that can be defined as elimination of great amount of information for what s/he needs to reveal (Carter, 2004).

Another level is analysis and production where raw information is converted intelligence. Besides, this level is to prepare level for intelligence production because of the fact that there is integration, evaluation and analyzing of data or documents in order to reveal reliability, validity and relevance of information. Consequently, raw intelligence, which is the particles, is converted finished intelligence as connected particles. Finally, there is dissemination level is to distribute dots or connected dots to the consumers. Dissemination can deliver three types of production as intelligence information reports, intelligence bulletins and intelligence assessments. After these compact process, intelligence is uncovered as production for consumers hence process of intelligence has essential role in order to have accurate, reliable and valid productions. Additionally, all of these levels are also indicated in a figure to have deeper understanding (Carter, 2004).

Figure 1.1: The Process of Intelligence



Source: Carter (2004: 64)

According to Figure 1.1, intelligence process begins with the collection of all covert and overt sources to have information for collection level. Having conclusion of collection, these sources are controlled whether they are reliable or not. If the reliability of sources is proved, the collation level begins in order to classify information according to what includes (Carter, 2004). After collation level, it is passed to the analysis level. Analyzing level may be evaluated as one of the most important part of intelligence owing to the fact that all decision-makings and applications of decisions are defined according to the analyses (Carter, 2004). To have efficient and effective analysis, there should be link analysts, logical reasoning and hypothesis testing while different types of information are flowing. Thus, predictions, estimation and conclusions on what consumer wants to know are reported which is another level as tactical, strategic and periodical reports (Carter, 2004). These reports are prepared for dissemination level. Dissemination level is one

of the final destination of information because of the fact that intelligence is ready for consumers and decision makers (Carter, 2004). Finally, decision makers evaluate performance of intelligence community and her productions. Decision makers or policy makers may offer some changes in the process of intelligence. They may offer some kinds of suggestions in order to improve quality of production as intelligence. To illustrate, decision makers or policy makers can redefine the intelligence requirements that may have direct effect on accuracy and effectiveness of intelligence. Therefore, all parts of intelligence cycle are worked in proper way in order to have successful process of intelligence, which may also affect the achievement of intelligence (Carter, 2004).

On the other hand, some scholars make different argumentation on intelligence process, which is based on the threats and risks evaluation. Purpose of all levels of intelligence process is focus on absence of threats and risks (Deeper, 2011). Then, information, which is converted intelligence, should be used in order to get rid of risk and threats or minimize risks and threats (Gill, 2012). In security studies, threat is used mostly as political and military concept that remains undefined in many other social sciences. Nonetheless, by widening the security concept from the traditional military and diplomatic security, to the new economic, societal and environmental dimensions, the threat concept has also widened. It has been applied to a series of new threats not only to the state but also to the other referents of new security concepts, from human beings to global security (Brauch, 2015). Therefore, in the process of intelligence, the new parameters and variables should be considered in order to enhance the intelligence and its capacity in terms of efficiency.

Besides, another essential parameter should be evaluated risk. In security policy and in the national and international security studies specifically in the post-Cold War era, the management of global risks has become one of the essential topics (Brauch, 2015). Therefore, focusing on absence of risks and threats as production in the process of intelligence is essential priority for some scholars. Consequently, analysis part of intelligence process is essential because of the fact successful production is highly depend on the evaluation, interpretation and direction of decision makers according to analysts' skills, abilities and quality of analysis (Moore and Krizan, 2003). After having an examination of intelligence process, it is

discussed the function of intelligence according to the different understanding of intelligence that has great impact on expectations from analysts as intelligence specialists.

In conclusion, process of intelligence is also essential to perceive the efficiency in intelligence. There are different approaches such as traditional and more progressive approaches on intelligence cycle. The traditional process of intelligence consists of five different parts. The goals of consumers' who can be decision maker or policy maker and their interests are determined. Furthermore, different types of requirements and needs are also determined in order to have a kind of well-designed road map. To illustrate, threats are identified and classified according to the possibility of threats. Then, policy makers' interests and goals are defined. Therefore, it might be argued that this part of process of intelligence planning and direction is considered as an outline.

In addition to this, collection of information begins with searching relevant data and sources that may be cover or overt. All obtained information is ordered according to the level of relevancy and priority. All information is collected to have deeper understanding on capabilities, potential threats or intention that might be a risk against safety of state and society.

The processing and exploitation of information is to begin by analysis. To illustrate, information is reviewed and arranged in order to eliminate non-relevant or incorrect information. By this way, analysts can find a way to connect different parts of processing of information by applying some techniques and methods (Carter, 2004).

Information is getting currency by the analysis part of process of intelligence. Analysts are beginning to summarize data, extracting information and producing knowledge. To illustrate, analysts determine potential threats that might be an organization, group against public safety. Moreover, analysts figure out the potential threats connections and relations. Analysts try to reveal threats' features such as their methods, tactics and also analysts try to reveal their supporters, financial sources. As analysts have more certain and accurate knowledge, the possibility of successful of intelligence is also increased (Carter, 2004).

Additionally, analysts have to disseminate intelligence to policymakers and other consumers. Disseminations may have different forms and types such as strategic or operational assessments (Carter, 2004). Therefore, policy makers can use intelligence to apply a policy or have a decision.

End of the intelligence process, production as intelligence is evaluated in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of intelligence, which might be categorized as feedback stage. Policy makers offer their suggestions on the intelligence production and the intelligence is reevaluated by policy makers (Carter, 2004).

On the other hand, approaches that are more progressive focus on the risk and threats evaluation on the process of intelligence (Deeper, 2011). Development on security concept has uncovered with new economic, societal and environmental aspect resulting in enhancement of threat concept (Brauch, 2015). In security literature, specifically in the post- Cold War era, the management of global risks has become a major security task (Brauch, 2015). This task involves risk rather than security captured the nature of the post-Cold War era by focusing both on every day risk management and on catastrophic risks (Brauch, 2015). It is also argued that risk analysis is a topic of international security studies before the events of 11 September 2001, however many risk theorists argued that risk analysis is better suited for dealing with issues of terrorism and migration (Born and Leigh, 2005). Therefore, there are different types of new threats and risks, which may have an effect on process of intelligence (Deeper, 2011). As the new threats and risks reveal, processes of intelligence are also being revised.

1.4. FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

There are different kinds of intelligence communities' models in the world that result in different kinds of expectation and functions. Generally, in developed democratic countries, intelligence services are separated from police and law enforcement institution. "The only responsibility of intelligence services are collecting necessary information and delivering the product to the decision makers" (Gookins, 2008:66).

On the other hand, some intelligence communities have more responsibilities than others have as a part of executive. Therefore, intelligence agencies not only have to product intelligence, they also have to carry out an executive action that can be seen in the United States and France. In the USA, FBI accounts for attorney or officers of Department of Justice if it is necessary on their production (Vitkauskas, 1999). As a result, function of intelligence communities can be changed according to the state's structure and philosophy. In the Canada, intelligence community is separated from the police and expectations from intelligence community is well designed (Vitkauskas, 1999).

Canadian security intelligence service (CSIS) have to advise to decision maker government and law enforcement authority in investigating threats against national security. Hence, the fundamental priority of CSIS is based on investigation of threats against security of Canada in terms of economic, societal and physical security. Moreover, CSIS is responsible to inform government on their activities in the intelligence process and CSIS has to provide sensitive analysis and interpretation of their productions. Indeed, to be effective, CSIS provides advice and early warning to decision makers. As a result,

“It appears that, in dealing with threats to national security, security intelligence service first collects intelligence and provides intelligence assessments and advises the government. In addition, it works closely with law enforcement institutions in the detection, apprehension and prosecution of those responsible for security-related offences.” (Vitkauskas, 1999:21).

An intelligence service is responsible for producing intelligence, interpretation of intelligence for decision makers and support governments while governments have to apply a policy. In addition, the main responsibility of intelligence community is having good intelligence process, which includes case, effective analysis of information and dissemination of production. Furthermore, function of intelligence is providing accurate, certain and important information for decision makers. According to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) report, information should be available to answer:

“What is happening or will happen in the decision maker's operating environment, How and why we got in the present situation, The whole picture including particular details, What others are doing, What others have not seen or what is needed in order to see more than others do, and elements to make an overview based on all said before”(JICA, 2012:18).

Therefore, intelligence should deliver certain information about environments, others and their vulnerabilities and capabilities. The expectation from intelligence service is based on certainty of information that is one of the main functions as a decision-maker. Another perspective on function of intelligence, which is military perspective, is based on operational capability and activities. According to the US's Department of Defense Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence (J-2), intelligence should have capability so that enemies' ability could be degraded or destroyed by using technology, telecommunications etc. (2013). Additionally, intelligence should provide essential information on adversary's vulnerabilities, capabilities and intention in the process of decision for consumers. In addition, intelligence should deliver very detailed analysis of descriptive features, which may include physical environment, and possibilities of enemy's future capabilities and intention. Besides, intelligence should provide critical reviews and analysis in order to explore plans and possible operations of adversary that commanders should have reliable and reasonable assumptions and predictions. In addition to this, experts who are well educated and practiced have to capability to receive plans and possible operations of enemies, analysis of enemies' vulnerabilities and capabilities from different perspective and reliable and valid prediction on enemies such as what they can do, what kinds of sources they have, what their priorities are. Therefore, expectations of intelligence service are very high which also affects the perception of intelligence in terms of function. Finally, uncovering of adversary intent and eagerness are one of the fundamental functions of intelligence therefore, intelligence experts have to make some future projections and release some outcomes about enemies (J-2, 2013). To illustrate, intelligence officers are responsible for valid and reliable prediction on adversary future capabilities and vulnerabilities. How adversary can react for different cases etc. These expectations determine the function of intelligence for military perspective (J-2, 2013).

In conclusion, there are different kinds of expectations on intelligence, which defines functions of intelligence. All of them have different kinds of priorities and interests on function of intelligence that analysts and analysis part also have effect on functioning of intelligence. One of the functions of intelligence is based on accountability. "Intelligence communities and agencies account for on their

intelligence production and activities" (Caparini, 2007:1). They have to explain and prove that their preferences on intelligence activities is more beneficial for state's security interests and priorities. Therefore, intelligence communities are also responsible for application and realizations of intelligence's activities and processes (Jensen, 2012). Intelligence communities are responsible to inform governments on intelligence. Intelligence communities have to present accurate and certain information on the others enemy's activities, capabilities and vulnerabilities (J-2, 2013). Furthermore, intelligence communities have to advice to the decision makers on threats which against to the national security (J-2, 2013). Thirdly, intelligence communities are responsible for forecasting on enemies' possible future capabilities, abilities and vulnerabilities (J-2, 2013). Moreover, they have to make deeper reliable and reasonable analysis on enemies' plans or operational capabilities in order to restrict or destroy enemy threats (J-2, 2013). Following section includes how states and intelligence agencies may have intelligence that is more effective by focusing on analysts and analysis part of intelligence.

1.5. CONCLUSION

It might be asserted that intelligence has great impact on states and societies' priorities, needs and goals due to the fact that intelligence provides security, absences of threats and guarantee for states and societies. Therefore, it should be well defined and perceived what is intelligence in terms of effectiveness. However, there is not only one definition of intelligence that has been agreed upon experts, scholars, intelligence communities. Even though there is no one definition of intelligence, intelligence can be defined as featured knowledge or qualified converted information in order to have internal and external security in terms of social, economic and political fields.

Intelligence's process, which can be also defined as cycle, has its unique requirements. Process of intelligence is essential because of the fact that intelligence is getting currency against threats and risks by processing. There are planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production reporting, dissemination parts of the process of intelligence (Carter, 2004).

Function of intelligence can be different from each state and state's organizations. Intelligence can provide knowledge on the other states' capabilities, abilities and vulnerabilities. For example, intelligence should present certain and accurate information about others a vulnerabilities and capabilities. Intelligence communities can be responsible for advice to decision maker government and law enforcement authority in investigating threats against national security and can be responsible for informed government on their activities in the intelligence process. Intelligence communities can be also responsible for executive action.

Another approach on function of intelligence is based on military perspective. Intelligence should some capabilities in order to enemies' ability on potential capability of damages. Intelligence can be responsible for present information on adversary's vulnerabilities, capabilities and intention in the process of decision for consumers. Intelligence can be responsible for providing critical reviews and analysis in order to explore plans and possible operations of adversary. Intelligence communities can be responsible for receiving plans, strategies, and possible operations of enemies by using expert intelligence officers (J-2, 2013).

CHAPTER TWO

THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE

2.1. INTRODUCTION TO THEORY ON INTELLIGENCE

Even though intelligence is one of the oldest phenomena of states and societies, theoretical basis of intelligence is still undeveloped. Moreover, it might be argued that essentiality of theory of intelligence has been ignored. Firstly, it is tried to indicate why theory of intelligence is essential to study in terms of efficiency of intelligence. There are some essential questions are tried to be answered such as how theory may affect and increase the efficiency of intelligence? How experts of intelligence and decision makers can benefit from theory of intelligence in order to protect state's interests and goals? Secondly, there are different approaches on the intelligence and intelligence studies that affects theories on intelligence. These approaches are constructed according to functions of intelligence, nature of intelligence and responses to the changes in world systems in terms of political, economic and social. Furthermore, positivism, realism and rationalism are decisive factors on approaches that will be analyzed. Thirdly, intellectual discussions and concepts about theory of intelligence are analyzed under the titles of views on theory of intelligence. Moreover, there are different kinds of explanations, frameworks and definitions that have different features and contents. People, consist of experts, academicians, scholars have different preferences and priorities, new ideas, questions are discussed.

2.2. REASONS OF HAVING THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE

Rathmell (2002) argues that modern intelligence community was evolved between Second World War and Cold War period. This intelligence community perception and its characteristics are shared with modern states and capitalist institutions (Rathmell, 2002). Furthermore, the modern intelligence communities' requirements, goals and interests were also defined in the cold war period. Rathmell (2002) asserts

that there were three core features of intelligence communities were essential. The first one was the scale of the perceived threat, which is based on ideological struggle supported by nuclear threat of nuclear annihilation (Rathmell, 2002). The second one was based on the militarized nature of the targets, which focus on the technical military, scientific and economic parameters (Rathmell, 2002). The third one was the predictability of the geopolitical context that generally focuses on USSR's strategic and military posture (Rathmell, 2002). As a result, it might be asserted that the modern intelligence communities were constructed. However, when the modern intelligence communities were getting shaped and structured, intelligence communities and policies makers did not give enough importance to the theory of intelligence. In the literature, there is no commonly accepted theory of intelligence (Khan as cited in Coyne, 2014). However, having a theory of intelligence is essential to explain and understand to the intelligence. Therefore, intelligence also needs to have a well-developed theory and perception of theory because of its essentiality for the national security against the threats and risks.

It might be emphasized that a theory is a kind of notion to explain the complex facts or structures. Moreover, a good social theory have the power of simplified the issues or phenomenon.

“Simplified means that it reduces the complex phenomenon under consideration to a process involving a small number of drivers or variables. These variables relate to one another in some way. The nature of the variables and their interrelationships allow the theorist to explain how this complex process work” (Lahneman and Goldman, 2011:108).

As a result, having a theory makes easier to explain and understand the concepts or phenomenon, even it is very sophisticated. This theoretical perception might be applied on intelligence because of the fact that intelligence also has its very sophisticated components such as intelligence process, knowledge management and technical difficulties which might be directly connected with states' security against any kinds of threats and risks.

Warner (2009) argues that intelligence should be studied, since it might be a force to protect the good. Otherwise, intelligence may turn into a struggle by using force.

“Intelligence, if we understand it, might someday be more clearly a force for good. If intelligence is ever to be a force for good, then it must be studied. We can bet that, if we remain ignorant of it, intelligence will certainly be a force for ill” (Warner as cited in Bay 2007:7).

Therefore, if intelligence is essential to be studied for good, it needs to have a theory. By having an intelligence theory, it can be claimed that intelligence can be decontaminated from being an only force. In this way, not only intelligence has a theory for good but intelligence theory also would be a guide to have reforms in order to empower intelligence and intelligence communities against threats and risks, which is good for state security.

Intelligence theory is necessary in terms of having advanced policies in order to optimize the reliability and certainty of intelligence for policy makers who are responsible for national security (Johnson as cited in Bay, 2007). “A theory of intelligence is needed to guide the policy makers and the intelligence community primarily in regard to be able to answer the question of when intelligence is likely to succeed or fail”(Johnson as cited in Bay, 2007:8). This statement emphasizes the importance of theory in terms of intelligence forecasting. Therefore, if intelligence as a phenomenon has a theory, intelligence community can make more accurate and proper forecasting that result in more successful intelligence policies and policy makers.

Evolution of intelligence communities, reforms in intelligence and intelligence affairs may depend on the having a theory which guide on how intelligence should be and what intelligence is to be. To illustrate,

“Jennifer Sims, professor in security studies, stresses that intelligence cannot be reformed without a good and thorough understanding of the theory behind the definition of intelligence, what it is and should be” (Bay, 2007:8).

Therefore, having a good theory in intelligence may open the horizons of intelligence communities, intelligence officers and policy makers. As intelligence has more reforms on different components of intelligence that can be based on different levels such as organizational, intelligence analysts or decision makers states can cope with intelligence failures and states can minimize intelligence failures.

Moreover, an intelligence theory can reduce the ambiguity of different variables that have effect on the quality of intelligence which include power of statement, causality accuracy, and reliability. Hence, Intelligence is getting a very useful instrument by applying theory. To illustrate,

"Theory, Sims believe, can therefore be a tool to answer many of the larger questions of intelligence. What is it? Why does it exist? Why do states retain it? To generalize and find causation, she argues, we need theory. Theory would then be useful to the scholars studying intelligence, to the profession itself as well as to the larger world around it" (Bay, 2007:8).

According to quotation above, Sims argues that theory of intelligence can be used in order to answer completely different kinds of intelligence questions. Hence, theory for intelligence should be studied academically which results in more answers to the large amount of intelligence questions. "Theory is an important building block for intellectual disciplines, whether in intelligence or any other fields" (Ehrman, 2009:6). By this statement Ehrman (2009) emphasizes the intelligence as intellectual discipline and he improves his statement by referring three main offer of a well-developed theory. In the first place, it can be argued that a theory is a framework so that somebody can understand a subject and then explain the subject. To have enough and apparent explanation, there has to be a definition which has ability to break the subject into pieces. Moreover, these pieces result in more accurate and certain perception and explanation on a topic. Ehrman (2009) asserts that having definitions in a framework is also beneficial for intelligence officer who are working in the fields. Furthermore, definitions not only divide into subject in more manageable small pieces, it also provides a common vocabulary for those who have a chance to understand each other clearer and faster. Therefore, the efficiency of the intelligence officers are getting to increase by having a general framework includes practical and useful definitions.

In the second place, a theory may have the ability to produce models that they can constitute cases. By these kinds of models, it can be evaluated or testified the intelligence communities' or intelligence officers' expected behavior or reflections. Ehrman (2009) argues that models in theory are also a chance to have enough experiment by testing or models can observe analysis because of the fact that intelligence officers or intelligence institutions' expected behavior. Furthermore,

intelligence officers and intelligence communities may have more refined forecasting or expectation by having models.

In the third place, a theory may help to recognize the gaps in intelligence as knowledge. Therefore, the gaps in intelligence and its process can be determined that may be asserted it is first step to perceive what is known or what is not known. Ehrman (2009) argues that as the gaps is getting to be identified in knowledge; these gaps turn into objective to have deeper data collection and analysis. In this way, intelligence officers and intelligence communities can be aware of what they have to do so that they can get rid of gaps in knowledge.

In conclusion, theory on intelligence as a beneficial production of systematic and rational thinking can be used in order to explain the difficult realms or complex phenomenon in a proper way. By having such perception and applications of a theory, the issues on intelligence and its sophisticated parts can be easily handled. In the second place, a theory is essential guide for the policy makers because of the fact that the reliability and the accuracy of intelligence can be increased by having a well-developed theory. Furthermore, intelligence communities and decision makers have more rational prediction and future projections. Hence, policy makers can apply more realistic and logical intelligence policies. In the third place, by having a theory, intelligence communities and intelligence officers have a chance to know limits of their sources, capabilities on an issue or case that result in less intelligence failures. Hence, the awareness of what is known and unknown is increased the efficiency of intelligence. In the fourth place, it can be asserted that intelligence theory might be defined as a very useful tool which provides answers to the large amount of intelligence questions. Therefore, intelligence experts and policy maker can cope with very complex and different kinds of intelligence problems. Moreover, the ambiguities on intelligence the gaps and its process can be determined and reduced by application of theory which may be resulted in enhancing the quality of intelligence's productions.

2.3. APPROACHES ON INTELLIGENCE

There is no intelligence theory or a definition of intelligence that intelligence communities, policy makers or scholars have been compromising. To illustrate, Khan asserts that “For almost 50 years scholars within the field of intelligence studies have focused on the development of an all-encompassing intelligence theory and a universally accepted definition of intelligence, with little success” (Khan as cited in Coyne, 2014:27). Therefore, there is a disagreement on the definition of intelligence and the theory of intelligence, which results in different approaches on theory of intelligence. Gill asserts that it should be noted that the development of a universally accepted definition of intelligence remains a contentious and widely debated topic (Gill as cited in Coyne, 2014). Consequently, even though there is no one excepted theory of intelligence, there are different approaches on intelligence theory and definition of intelligence. Michael Warner argues that

“There are two general groups of intelligence scholars. One camp understands intelligence as “information for decision-makers”, while the second group stresses the role of covert action, thus defining intelligence as a form of “warfare by quieter means” (as cited in Lochovsky, 2014:20).

These two different perceptions of intelligence offer two intelligence definitions. In the first group, one’s perception of intelligence is based on the mean for the decision makers. As an example, Coyne (2014) emphasizes Warner's decision making statement that “one school of thought has adopted an American military model of intelligence which argues that intelligence can be anything from any source that aids decision- making” (26). It focuses on the production of intelligence communities and intelligence officers. This approach does not interest in how intelligence is obtained. Therefore, the question how intelligence has to be obtained is not a matter. On the other hand, the second group emphasizes the secrecy of intelligence in severe circumstances by referring warfare (Coyne, 2014). Therefore, intelligence as an activity has to be done secretly in order to inform officers or decision makers by keeping silence (Coyne, 2014). Moreover, the second approach argues that covert actions is very essential to have information which is a defined as intelligence (Coyne, 2014). To illustrate, the secrecy perspective has gained wide acceptance as illustrated by the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC)

specifically describing intelligence as covertly obtained information (as cited in Coyne, 2014). Thus, secrecy is one of the core components of the intelligence and intelligence activities and intelligence as information has to be obtained in secrecy.

Tanase argues that there are three approaches on intelligence study having their unique features and difference between each other's. According to Tanase, the first approach is generally favored international historians aims to have information as a mean so that policy makers or decision makers can easily have a decision by using intelligence for all unique cases (n.d). Furthermore, it focuses on the relationship between organizational structure of intelligence and policy making in order to explain and perceive it (Tanase, n.d). Additionally, scholars who are favor of this approach argue that intelligence as a mean or product has three essential parts, which are process of intelligence collection, to the origin and nature of individual sources of intelligence and to the accurate and certain use of these parts. Hence, these parts are also important which has to receive enough attention in order to produce knowledge for the decision makers (Tanase, n.d).

According to Tanase, the second approach which is inspired by political science, emphasizes essentiality of level of analysis and decision on intelligence in order to explain and understand the intelligence failures and success (n.d). Main concerns of this approach are organization and cognitive obstacles because of the fact that these have direct negative impact on effective usage of intelligence in the policy processes (Tanase, n.d). Furthermore, the reasons of its concerns are based on the prejudices that are personal, political and institutional because of the fact that they have an effect on intelligence performance in decision-making process. Therefore, this approach attempts to identify and analysis different kinds of biases have effect on intelligence and decision making process.

In addition to this, Tanase argues that the third approach differs from other two approaches that mentioned above because of the fact that this approach does not interest in intelligence as a tool for policy makers (n.d). On the contrary, the focus of this approach is to study and analysis state's power and state's control on intelligence (Tanase, n.d). Moreover, scholars' main concern is based on the understanding the role of ideology and state's power in political, social and cultural life rather than pure

intelligence studies (Tanase, n.d). Therefore, they study intelligence to have better understanding of state's control on society's cultural and political life.

By the cold war, intelligence studies also reshaped and affected by cold war variables hence intelligence studies has a new approach as anticipative approach. The purpose of this approach is anticipated the risks and threats against the state's and states' interests and goals. "The aim of the anticipative approach is to assist decision- and policy-makers in preparing strategies for risk mitigation" (Davis as cited in Coyne, 2014:29). Therefore, aim of this anticipative approach is the support the decision and policy makers in order to produce more future projections. As strategies are empowered and well developed, the estimative power of intelligence is also increased. Hence, intelligence communities and decision makers have more effective strategies against risks and threats.

In conclusion, there are different approaches on the intelligence and intelligence studies. Some scholars argue that intelligence is only information for decision makers and they do not interest in how information is obtained (Warner as cited in Lochovsky, 2014). On the contrary, some of scholars assert that intelligence has its unique features, process and purposes (Coyne, 2014). Therefore, intelligence is more than only providing information to the policy makers. All Intelligence activities and process might be done silently, hence; secrecy is vital factor on intelligence (AIC as cited in Coyne, 2014). In addition to these, some scholars focus on the structural issues that may result in intelligence failures (Tanase, n.d). On the other hand, political function of intelligence is also preferred to study. Main purpose of this approach is based on how states benefit from intelligence in terms of her interests and goals (Tanase, n.d). Consequently, by the cold war, all world system and states are affected in terms of social, political and economic that was resulted in evolution and revolution of different components of states organizations. Intelligence also affected through the cold war because of the fact that intelligence's concept was changed (Rahtemell, 2002). Main concern of this approach is based on the assist to the policy and decision makers in order to reduce new risks and threats (Davis as cited in Coyne, 2014).

2.4. VIEWS ON INTELLIGENCE THEORY

To understand the views of scholars on intelligence, it may be useful to focus on how intelligence is defined. Since, definition about intelligence is a kind of guide for development of theory of intelligence. Furthermore, definition of intelligence is a guide to perceive how scholars construct their theory of intelligence. Analyzing of the definitions may give a hint on intelligence that makes easier to understand the main components and features of the scholars' theory about intelligence. Hence, the scholars' views on the definitions of intelligence will be also analyzed beside their approaches on theory of intelligence.

Gill (2012) emphasizes the secrecy of intelligence in his definition of intelligence. Gill argues that "Intelligence mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities" (2012:207). He defines intelligence as a secret activity and he describes the features of intelligence. Intelligence should have the ability to calculate and forecasting possible threats and opportunities in order to maintain security and power. Furthermore, he detailed definition of intelligence in the book "Intelligence in an Insecure World" written by Peter Gill and Mark Phythian. Gill and Phythian argues that

"Intelligence is the umbrella term referring to the range of activities from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including where deemed desirable, covert activities" (Gill and Phythian as cited in Ioannou, 2013:21).

Intelligence as a conceptual definition has broader meaning for Gill, since intelligence has its processes, goals, interests and strategy. Intelligence is complex phenomena, hence Gill's definition of intelligence also emphasizes the function of intelligence as a mean to end. Intelligence is a kind of tool in order to apply preventive policies against any kinds of threats and risks. Therefore, intelligence as a secret activity is defined through its nature, process and purpose. Moreover, Gill's definition of intelligence refers to the security policy owing to the fact that decision

makers need to have accurate intelligence when they apply a policy. Hence, this definition not only encompass basic definition on intelligence, it also emphases functions of intelligence for security policy against threats and risks.

Normative theories assert that what ought to be done in a specific field (Goldman, 2011). This approach does not explain a case or a situation on how it works. Focus of this approach is power of ideas, which cannot be testified. On the other hand, explanatory theories, called as positivist school, criticize normative theories (Goldman, 2011). Since, normative theories' assumptions and claims cannot be, falsified (Goldman, 2011). Therefore, positivists assert that true knowledge has to be based on observation. Gill argues that

“One school of thought holds that the role of theory is to order, explain, predict and that the validity of the theory can be assessed only against empirical data. The other believes that there are no facts independent of theories; all knowledge is socially constructed. Thus, facts can never be submitted to decisive empirical validation; anti-foundationism or postmodernism hold this view” (Gill as cited in Goldman, 2011:109).

There are two schools on intelligence theory (Gill as cited in Goldman, 2011). According to Gill (2011), one school of thought which is explanatory asserts that function of theory is based on explain something by using empirical data, observation and testing. Therefore, theory should have power of positivist school of thought and its requirements. On the other hand, the other school of thought, which is normative theory, asserts that all knowledge is constructed and shaped by society and its unique situations (Gill as cited in Goldman, 2011). There are no facts or phenomena that had not been affected and constructed by socially.

Gill and Phythian (2006) discusses these two different schools of thought and then they argue that these two schools' approaches may be combined. Positivist school is essential to have rational evaluation, which may increase accuracy of future intelligence strategies and policy (Gill and Phythian, 2006). Furthermore, it is essential to explain the some certain situations. To illustrate, intelligence as a product may have more reliability because of the fact that it can be testified. On the other hand, there are many variables in intelligence studies, which are rapidly affected and changed by other parameters (Gill and Phythian, 2006). Therefore, empirical data

and testing may not be enough to perceive and apply intelligence policy. Consequently, in RAND report, Gill (2006) argues that

“However, neither of these positions is adequate, and “critical realism” rejects this Manichean divide. The first is impossible in the real world because social systems are open, not closed. This is especially true for intelligence: Notice the role of mysteries, secrecy, deception and the like. The second is a counsel of despair that negates conventional social science...Scientific inference, drawing conclusions about one thing from something else, “cannot be reduced either to strictly logical inference (deduction) or to empirical generalization (induction). Scientific inference is not only about applying formal logic; it also involves reasoning, creativity, the ability to abstract, and theoretical language in order to see meanings and structures in the seemingly unambiguous and flat empirical reality” (Treverton et. al., 2006:5).

As social system, intelligence also opens to both external and internal variables and factors. There are many kinds of factors in intelligence because of its nature. Furthermore, for most of science field, scientific inference may have conclusions or outcomes on an issue or a case because it applies some methods such as deductive and inductive methods (Treverton et. al., 2006). However, this does not mean that scientific inference might be obtained by using classic methodology and perception. Scientific inference may include notion of creativity, abstract and conceptual language in order to perceive and interpret structures and social phenomena as it can be seen intelligence studies. Therefore, Gill combines positivist school’s components, which include observation, testing, and empirical data with normative school’s components including new ideas, concepts, abstract thinking (Treverton et. al., 2006).

As a result, Gill defines intelligence as secret activity, which has its process such as targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action (Treverton et. al., 2006; Carter, 2004). Main purpose of intelligence is having prediction about possible threats and risks in order to have enough calculation and forecasting. In addition to this, according to Gill, theory of intelligence is based on both normative and positivists approaches (Treverton et. al., 2006). Gill tries to combine two approaches features to have more effective intelligence theory.

Johnson defines intelligence as information that is obtained secretly (Johnson as cited in Nethshitzhe, 2005). Johnson argues that intelligence includes two

fundamental and grand meanings (Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005). The first one is based on getting and interpretation of information on possible threats and opportunities by using intelligence agencies (Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005). The second one is based on information, which may be obtained from clandestine or open sources (Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005). To illustrate, Johnson asserts that

"Intelligence commonly encompasses two broad meanings. The first one relates to the acquisition and interpretation of information by the secret agencies about threats and opportunities that confront the nation, in an attempt to reduce the gaps and ambiguities that plague open sources of knowledge about the world. A nation especially seeks secret information to help it prevail in times of war, with as few casualties as possible. The second is that, based on information derived from denied and open sources, policy makers' call upon their intelligence agencies to shield the nation against harm while advancing its interests through secret manipulation of foreign events and personalities"(Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005:5-6).

According to Johnson, intelligence is defined according to its functions (Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005). Intelligence is a kind of tool in order to minimize the gaps and ambiguities against other state that may be potential danger by acquisition and interpretation of information (Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005). Specifically, intelligence as secret information can reduce the cost of war in terms of human loss. Furthermore, policy makers may require information as intelligence in order to protect state's interests and goals against external interference and manipulations (Johnson as cited in Nethshitenzhe, 2005). Therefore, intelligence communities and their production as intelligence can provide defense on behalf of state's interests and goals.

Furthermore, Johnson (2010) defines the traditional understanding of intelligence and he contributes some notions to the definition of intelligence. He describes the traditional definition of intelligence by referring intelligence cycle and how intelligence is obtained. Then, Johnson (2010) discusses the other features of intelligence that are covert actions, counter operations against foreign threats and risks in order to protect nation's interests and goals. To illustrate, Johnson argues that

"Strategic intelligence may be defined broadly as a set of activities conducted by government agencies that operate largely in secret. These

activities include, foremost, the collection and interpretation of information drawn from a mixture of open and clandestine sources to arrive at a product—knowledge—useful to illuminate foreign policy deliberations ... Finally, these agencies have a mandate to conduct counterintelligence operations designed to protect a nation's citizens and secrets against attacks from hostile intelligence services and other threats" (2010:1).

Another function of intelligence, which might be included in definition, is manipulation of external events and cases against other nations' goals and interests (Johnson, 2010). By this way, intelligence communities can protect their international interests and goals against foreign threats and risks (Johnson, 2010).

Johnson argues that intelligence theory is essential for policy makers and intelligence communities owing to the fact that theory of intelligence make easier to perceive and explain intelligence' achievement and failures. To illustrate, Johnson asserts that by the theory of intelligence policy makers and intelligence communities may have more power on their policies, decisions and applications because of the fact that they have chance to have a theory of intelligence and its' advantageous (as cited in Bay, 2007:8). For instance, theory of intelligence leads policy makers and intelligence communities. Hence, policy makers and intelligence communities have a chance to cope with failure and minimize failure. As the failures of intelligence are diminished, victories of intelligence and its application and policies can be increased (as cited in Bay, 2007).

Johnson argues, "Good theory should have explanatory power, parsimony, and the attribute of falsifiability" (Johnson as cited in Lahneman and Goldman, 2012:108). Johnson assets that a good theory of intelligence should have some features, which are based on positivist school of thought. Theory should have power of simplification of complex phenomena (Johnson as cited in Lahneman and Goldman, 2012). For instance, theory may have ability to explain intelligence's cycle and all components of intelligence cycle. Furthermore, a good theory of intelligence might be disproved because some variables might be changed or affected by the time therefore variables might be needed to revise. Hence, falsifiability of an intelligence theory is essential to have more realistic and rational theory of intelligence.

Johnson (2010) argues that intelligence cycle is essential to develop a theory of strategic intelligence. His intelligence cycle consists of five parts as planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis and dissemination. To illustrate, Johnson declares that

“Any theory of strategic intelligence must be built around the so-called intelligence cycle, a model that describes the flow of activities necessary for the collection and the interpretation analysis of information. The cycle consists of five phases: planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination. Each step involves behavior that must be taken into account in any theory of intelligence” (2010:2).

Johnson (2010) emphasizes role of intelligence cycle in the process of developing a theory of intelligence. Therefore, Johnson (2010) describes his perception of intelligence according to his intelligence cycle and some propositions. In the article “Brick and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence”, Johnson (2010) also discusses and defines the key notions of theory of intelligence by referring propositions.

Coyne (2014) summarizes Johnson’s views on theory on intelligence according to the article “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence”. Coyne (2014) argues that Johnson has innovative approach in order to develop a strategic intelligence theory. Coyne argues that

“Johnson provides a body of literature with a particularly innovative approach to developing a strategic intelligence theory. This approach involves developing a range of propositions through the explorations of strategic intelligence with particular focus on historical analysis using the intelligence cycle as an organizing framework. The approach uses the development of propositions and identifications of paradoxes to set the scope of the theoretical framework that an intelligence theory must encompass to be successful. It could be argued that the historical approach may not be sufficient deal with the changing security context of threats in the 21st century. This critique aside, the approach successfully explores the possible issues that a theory must encompass and furthers the discourse on intelligence theory by focusing on the outputs of the intelligence process” (2014:29).

As a result, Johnson describes and discusses a framework on theory of intelligence by referring strategic dimension of theory. His theory of intelligence is mainly based on the intelligence cycle. According to the all components of intelligence cycle, he offers some propositions on each parts of intelligence cycle.

Furthermore, his propositions generate a theory of intelligence that may have a chance to be successful. He also discusses the issues on intelligence by referring historical events on intelligence failures that have damaging effect on outputs of intelligence process. Therefore, his theory of intelligence is also a kind of guide to the intelligence communities and intelligence policy makers.

In conclusion, Johnson defines intelligence as information that has to be obtained secretly. He asserts that main purpose and function of intelligence is to minimize gaps and ambiguities in order to cope with dangers. Furthermore, another function of intelligence is to protect state's interests and goals against external threats and increase the states' advantageous in terms of goals and interests. Besides, his theory of intelligence is based on the positivist school of thought. He argues that theory of intelligence is essential in order to perceive and clarify intelligence achievement and failures. Fundamental component of his theory of intelligence is based on intelligence cycle in order to maximize intelligence achievements and effectiveness.

Warner (2009) defines intelligence as a service for the decision makers in order to minimize risks against rival powers. Warner (2009) also refers to the function of intelligence while he is defining intelligence. According to Warner (2009), main concern of the intelligence and function is protection of the state's sovereignty. "In practical terms, intelligence informs and executes decision; it helps to make leaders more confident that they know the risks around them and their regimes" (Warner, 2009:19-24).

Warner's definition of intelligence has also two sides. One of them is related with intelligence functions and responsibilities that mentioned above and the other one is related with practical function of intelligence. Warner (2009) argues that intelligence is an assistance to the leaders so that they have more confident against risks and ambiguities. As intelligence communities inform leaders on risks and apply decision of leaders, leaders may have more self-confidence. Therefore, intelligence is also defined according to its functions by Warner's definition.

Warner argues that defining intelligence is essential to have a theory of intelligence therefore well develop theory of intelligence is directly related with having a good defined intelligence. He asserts that

“one would expect to find a sophisticated understanding of just what ... "intelligence" is ... however, we search in vain. Historian Walter Laqueur warns us; so far, no one has succeeded in crafting a theory of intelligence (as cited in Bay, 2007:4).

As a result, there is no well design and satisfied definition of intelligence, which also results in absence of intelligence theory, which may have some vital features of positivist or normative school such as explanatory power, falsifiability, new ideas, concepts or abstract thinking.

Warner (2002) argues that there should be a definition of intelligence that directly affect and related with theory of intelligence. It is not only essential to revolutionize intelligence communities and their functions and responsibilities but it also crucial to support and contribute to the scholars and intelligence communities. According to, Warner asserts that

“Why does this matter? Various agencies have gotten along well enough for many years, thank you, without a suitable-for-framing definition of intelligence. One can add, moreover, that providing them with such a thing is hardly likely to revolutionize their work. And yet, the definition I just proposed could assist the growing number of scholars who study the field and might ultimately help the Intelligence Community in several respects” (Warner as cited in Bay, 2007:8).

Therefore, having a well develop intelligence theory is important, since theory of intelligence can be a guide for intelligence communities, scholars and decision makers. For instance, intelligence communities may have some changes, reshaping on their works that they encounter with problems hence, they produce more reliable and accurate intelligence to decision makers. Therefore, decision makers also may have some benefit from having a theory of intelligence because of the fact that intelligence officers disseminate more certain, accurate and testified knowledge to decision makers. In this way, decision makers have more confident when they apply some policy on state's security and protection of state's interests and goals.

In the RAND workshop report on "Towards a Theory of Intelligence" in 2006, Warner maintains his views on intelligence and theory of Intelligence. He claims that there is a relation between intelligence theory and definition of intelligence (Treverton et. al., 2006). Both of them have an effect on each other; hence, it can be asserted that theory of intelligence and definition of intelligence dependent from each. Therefore, Warner discusses the definitions of intelligence in the workshop report of RAND in 2006. Warner argues that there are two general views on definition of intelligence. One of them explains and defines intelligence as information for the decision makers (Treverton et. al., 2006). The other one defines and explains intelligence according to the secrecy feature of intelligence. Warner argues that intelligence is a kind of activity that is done secretly in order to perceive and manipulate foreign entities (Treverton et. al., 2006).

Moreover, Warner discusses and analysis other definitions of intelligence in the RAND report. One of them emphasizes the nature of intelligence, which is secrecy. His discussion refers to why intelligence works has to be done secretly. Other definition of intelligence underlines the importance of intelligence for state. Intelligence is such essential that the existence of state depends on the intelligence. The last one refers to the covert and clandestine activity of intelligence that is nature of intelligence in order to obtain confidential information or espionage activities. In RAND workshop report, Warner argues that are three different definition of intelligence that is based on different kinds of preferences and needs (Treverton et. al., 2006). In the first one, states need to have lots of information from different sources that might be open or confidential sources. In the process of obtaining information, secrecy is one of the fundamental ingredients of intelligence activities (Treverton et. al., 2006). Furthermore, states need to have intelligence institutions or communities that they have to be good at keeping intelligence in secrecy. Therefore, in a practical manner, definition of intelligence has to have secrecy as the component of intelligence definition. In the second place, there is a competitive international contest where states dispute each other in order to protect their national interests and goals (Treverton et. al., 2006). Moreover, intelligence is essential for states' survival because existence of states depend on their sovereignty in terms of social, political and economic interests and goals. Specifically, in the battlefields and its severe

conditions, intelligence has vital role on protection of states' secrets against any kinds of espionage (Treverton et. al., 2006). In the third place, intelligence also includes clandestine activities and information (Treverton et. al., 2006). Indeed, espionage is essential part of perception of intelligence and definition of intelligence because of the fact that espionage encompasses both covert actions and information (Treverton et. al., 2006). Therefore, over last century or so, espionage means that covert actions and information which is intelligence. Moreover, perception of intelligence has similarities for state that can be observed in Germany, France and Russia that intelligence means secrecy and statecraft.

As a result, Warner defines intelligence as information and secret service for decision makers in order to minimize risks and protection of state's sovereignty (Treverton et. al., 2006). Furthermore, he asserts that theory of intelligence has importance because of the fact that intelligence officers can disseminate more certain, accurate and testified knowledge to decision makers. In addition to these, his theory of intelligence is also developed according to his definition of intelligence. Warner emphasizes the importance of secrecy, covert actions and protection of state's interest and goals in both in definition of intelligence and theory of intelligence (Treverton et. al., 2006).

Besides Warner's theoretical approach in intelligence, Sims definition of intelligence is based on collection and analysis of information. Therefore, the core of definition of intelligence is based on information that might be obtained from open or clandestine sources. Lamanna argues that Sims defines intelligence "as the collection and analysis of information for the purpose of providing advantage to decision maker" (Sims as cited in Lamanna, 2011:11). Intelligence is information that has its process such as collection of information in order to submit policy makers or decision makers (Sims as cited in Lamanna, 2011). Hence, policy makers might be strengthened against other states' policies and interests in terms of protection of national interests and goals.

Moreover, Sims has different approach on definition of intelligence when her statement is compared with other scholars, experts or academicians. Although most of scholars that mentioned above emphasize the secrecy and covert action in the

definition of intelligence, Sims excludes covert action and secrecy from her definition of intelligence. According to Sims (2005), covert action cannot be included in the definition of intelligence because of the intelligence can only be thought as assistance to the covert action which a secret policymaking. Intelligence is basically getting information, analysis of information and dissemination of information (Sims, 2005). Therefore, covert action as secret policy making in order to overthrow a regime or government cannot be part of notion of intelligence. Secondly, Sims (2005) asserts that there may be a conflict between notion of intelligence and secrecy, since secrecy cannot be a component of intelligence's definition and intelligence systems. She criticizes the idea of excluding people who have different professions and positions in the intelligence and its processes because of concept of intelligence (Sims, 2005). On the contrary, she asserts that excluding of people may result in contra productivity (Sims, 2005). Therefore, secrecy cannot be included in definition and concept of intelligence.

Sims' theory of intelligence is based on the increasing of intelligence community's performance through four key classification of intelligence. "Sims's theory of intelligence prescribes what is necessary for an intelligence service to provide decision advantage through the optimization of four functions: collection, anticipation, transmission, and counterintelligence" (Piotrowicz, 2011:2-3). Main purpose of her theory of intelligence is having an advantageous of decision makers against other states in competitive fields. Therefore, all four part of successful intelligence is essential for her theory of intelligence. In the first part, collection of information is fundamental beginning of successful intelligence. In the second part, assumptions on a topic according to what intelligence community has by collection are second level. In anticipation, all kinds of risks and threats and variables may be calculated and then assumptions can be exhibited. In the third part, accuracy of intelligence on a topic which ordered by decision makers is vital for states' interests and goals. Therefore, transmission of intelligence to the decision makers or policy makers is also one of the important factors of successful intelligence. In the fourth part, counter intelligence also may a vital factor for state's interests and goals in a competitive field and it might be argued that counterintelligence capabilities may provide a guarantee for all collection, anticipation and transmission. All key

classifications need to have protection against any kinds of counter intelligence activities hence capabilities and abilities of intelligence communities on counter intelligence are also important.

Sims (2005) refers to what kinds of features has to be required for a good theorist and theory in order to explain that a good theory's power of explanation and prediction. She asserts that

“Good theorists come up with notions. Grounded in data, these ideas nonetheless spring more from imagination than from experience. In physics, one does not find a string or a quark; one comes up with string theory and then considers whether it fits with the data. A good theory does fit, but it also generates interesting insights about the data that you couldn't have discerned without it” (as cited in Lahneman and Goldman, 2011:108).

As a result, Sims argues that theory should have the power of explanation on an issue and theory should be a kind of guide on what has to be done (as cited in Lahneman and Goldman, 2011). Such a perception of theory also refers to the normative approaches on theory that they are deeply based on power of ideas in order to explain and forecast.

In conclusion, Sims (2005) asserts that intelligence is collection and analysis of information which can be obtained from open or clandestine sources. On the contrary, to the other scholars, Sims (2005) argues that secrecy and covert action cannot be component of definition of intelligence. She argues that core fundamental function of intelligence is protection of national interest and goals. In addition to these, Sims (2005) asserts that good theory of intelligence should have the power of explanation and prediction. Furthermore, theory of intelligence is essential to have more advantageous for decision makers by optimize four function of intelligence by collection, anticipation, transmission and counter intelligence.

David Khan defines intelligence as information and his definition of intelligence is also a kind of concept (Khan as cited in Bay, 2007:10). His views on intelligence are shaped by his theory of intelligence. He asserts that theories of intelligence may be acquired by three different ways as psychological, mathematical and historical. He defines and explains three different theories and his theory of intelligence bases on an historical theory of intelligence.

In the first place, according to the RAND workshop report in 2006, Khan asserts that as a mental phenomenon, theories of intelligence have also psychological aspect in terms of surprise effect that is temporal. To illustrate,

"There is a psychological aspect to any theory of intelligence. Intelligence is a mental phenomenon, and therefore so is its contrary, surprise. Though in a few cases people are surprised because they did not have enough information, more often they are surprised because they did not have enough time to make sense of the flood of facts... Intelligence fails people less from lack of facts than from lack of time..." (Treverton et. al., 2006:4).

People can surprise because of scarcity of information that might be seen and observed in a few cases. On the other hand, people may surprise because of scarcity of time which results in senseless evaluation and perception of facts. Therefore, people may encounter more failure because of scarcity of time rather than lack of facts.

In the second place, a mathematical theory can be used because of the fact that mathematical theory may empower the forecasting capability of intelligence by testing. Moreover, as the surprising effect of information is increased, the value of information is also increased. Mathematical theory may also be useful owing to the fact that accuracy of intelligence may be empowered by application of mathematical theory's method. In the Rand workshop report on toward a theory of Intelligence in 2006, David Khan argues that

"A mathematical theory might quantify intelligence and so make it more precise and amenable to testable prediction. The mathematician and engineer Claude Shannon, in his path breaking The Mathematical Theory of Communication, divided information into bits, or binary digits, of information. He then showed that the more surprising the information is, the more valuable it is. This may be taken as a first step towards quantifying intelligence... And the pieces of knowledge that men do not know about one another the secrets are likewise rendered discrete and also able to be manipulated" (Treverton et. al., 2006:4).

As a result, there are great amount of raw knowledge that this knowledge has to be divided in two pieces in order to make statistical and mathematical manipulation. Furthermore, divided knowledge is a kind of chance owing to the fact that secrets of others can be analyzed, interpreted and manipulated. Therefore,

mathematical theory can be beneficial for theory of intelligence and perception of theory of intelligence.

In the third place, Khan (2006) defines and explains the approach of historical theory. Historical theory tries to describe intelligence in three time periods as past, present and future. Moreover, he divides intelligence in two parts as physical and verbal. In the Rand workshop report on *Toward a Theory of Intelligence* in 2006, David Khan argues that

“A historical theory looks at intelligence in the past, the present, and the future. Intelligence can be divided into physical or verbal. Physical intelligence consists of information drawn from things—seeing troops, hearing tanks, or smelling food. Animals use physical intelligence, as have men since ancient times. But, while it lessens anxiety and steadies command because commanders can see or hear the enemy troops or guns, it has rarely been decisive in warfare. Verbal intelligence acquires information from a written or spoken source such as an order or a plan. It magnifies strength by giving commanders time to prepare. So, when it emerged as a major factor with the growth of radio in World War I, it gave armies major victories for the first time. Verbal intelligence transformed intelligence into a significant instrument of war” (Treverton et. al, 2006:3).

Physical intelligence is based on the information that may be obtained by different abilities as seeing, hearing and smelling. Since ancient times, both human being and animals are using physical intelligence for their interests and needs. To illustrate, commanders need to observe or hear the enemies’ guns or troops. However, physical intelligence cannot be seen as vital factor in the battlefield. On the other, verbal intelligence, which may obtain information through written or spoken sources, may be vital factor in the battlefield. By verbal intelligence, commanders can have more time to have evaluation and preparing for war. To illustrate, in the Second World War, importance of verbal intelligence was emerged because of the fact that communication became easier and faster by using of radio. Therefore, verbal intelligence made intelligence as one of the essential instrument of war.

David Khan’s theory of intelligence also includes three statements that are optimizing resources, supporting elements of the war and part of defense that refers to the intelligence in present. Firstly, David Khan asserts that

“intelligence optimizes ones resources, this is the fundamental and ultimate purpose of intelligence according to Kahn as it sets the null hypothesis and explains what a commander does when he has none or faulty intelligence” (Kahn as cited in Bay 2006:10).

Main purpose of intelligence is optimizing resources in order to explain intelligence failures or provide something by using resources. Therefore, this statement also refers to the function of intelligence. Moreover, in RAND workshop report in 2006, David Khan argues that

“In the present, three intelligence principles can be put forward. The first combines steadying command and magnifying strength by optimizing resources. When commanders do not have enough intelligence, they must replace it with their own forces and their will. Logically, the implication of insufficient intelligence is enemy surprise” (Treverton et. al, 2006:3).

The principle of intelligence in present provides certain and accurate communication and enhancement of military power by using resources effectively. Even if commanders do not have enough intelligence, commanders must benefit from their capabilities such as forces and will. Otherwise, enemy surprise may be inevitable because of the implication of insufficient intelligence.

Intelligence has a kind of supporting role in battlefield as Khan asserts “intelligence acts as an auxiliary; it is not a primary weapon in war” (Khan as cited in Bay, 2006:10). Keegan has similar view on the function of intelligence in the war; he argues that even though intelligence is essential in the war, states may have victory by using raw physical military power (Keegan as cited in Bay, 2006). In the RAND workshop report in 2006, David Khan argues that “It is indeed a force multiplier and facilitator of command, but it cannot always make up for insufficient strength or inadequate leadership” (Treverton et. al., 2006:3). Intelligence may be very useful for commands as facilitator and multiplier however; intelligence cannot cope with insufficient military force or unsuccessful leaderships.

Intelligence is not only essential for defense, it also essential for offence. However, even though intelligence has a supporting effect on defense and offence intelligence is one of the fundamental factors of defense in the battlefields. David Khan asserts that “intelligence is essential to the defense but not the offence. Intelligence exists in both cases, but acts in different ways” (as cited in Bay,

2006:10). Moreover, he asserts, “there cannot be defense in war without intelligence” (as cited in Bay, 2006:10). Function of intelligence is crucial for defense rather than offense in wars. In the RAND workshop report in 2006, David Khan asserts that “a commander must know an enemy will attack in order to defend. The attacker imposes his will on the defender, reducing the attacker’s uncertainty, and so his need for information” (Treverton et. al., 2006:4). Therefore, intelligence is one of the vital factor in battlefield owing to the fact that defense of a commander’s territory depends on information which is provided by intelligence. As commander has information, s/he can have more certainty on enemy hence, ambiguity can be reduced about enemy’s capabilities.

Future on intelligence has two issues, which are not easy to be solved. One of them is based on forecasting. It is tough to have prediction and projection on future because of the fact that there are lots of variables and ambiguities. The other one is based on the persuasion of decision makers or policy makers about the facts and realities. Policy makers may have tendency on what they want to have in terms of their interests and goal. In the RAND workshop report in 2006, David Khan argues that

“The future raises the two unsolvable problems of intelligence. One is predicting the future and the other is convincing policymakers of what they may not want to believe. While these problems are intensified by the proliferation of unbreakable systems of cryptography, they may be ameliorated by humankind’s greater reliance on facts and logic, its thirst for knowledge, and the tendency towards least effort, which intelligence aid” (Treverton et. al., 2003:4).

Even though there are problems of intelligence that are empowered with technological and technical development, intelligence may cope with such issues by humankind’s capabilities and desire to the knowledge. Therefore, intelligence may assists and support human being on prediction and convincing policy makers in the future.

As a result, David Khan defines intelligence as information and he focuses on the theory of intelligence (Treverton et. al., 2006). He asserts that theory of intelligence can be obtained by three different approaches as psychological, mathematical and historical (Treverton et. al., 2006). He argues that all theories have

psychological expect that intelligence also has it. Psychological theory can be used to perceive surprise effect and cope with surprises. Mathematical theory can be used in order to have forecasting and reduce ambiguities. Finally, historical theory, which is favored by David Khan, is essential to understand intelligence in three time period as past, present and future. In addition to this, historical theory dives intelligence in two types as physical and verbal. Furthermore, Khan's theory of intelligence has three statements, which are optimizing of resources, assistance to war and helping to the defense in war.

2.5. CONCLUSION

Modern intelligence is emerged between Second World War and cold War period. All of intelligence communities and intelligence requirements are also affected in the cold war period (Rathmell, 2002). Even though different kinds of revolution and improvement are appeared, there is a scarcity of theories on intelligence. Therefore, it might be asserted that there is gab on theory of intelligence in the intelligence studies. Furthermore, theory of intelligence is vital because of some reasons. Theory of intelligence can be a guide for intelligence communities in order to cope with dangers, which may be threats and risks. Theory makes easier to perceive intelligence as a phenomena and its very complex process (Lahneman, 2011). To realize this statement, intelligence needs to have reforms that theory may supports to have more reforms. Hence, Intelligence communities and intelligence might be empowered (Warner as cited in Bay, 2007). Secondly, theory may optimize reliability and certainty of intelligence that results in less intelligence failures (Sims as cited in Bay, 2007). Moreover, ambiguities may be reduced because of the fact that theory can be useful to give answer to the many kind of questions (Sims as cited in Bay, 2007). As the gabs and ambiguities are decreased, known and unknown can be easily determined which may reduce the risks (Ehrman, 2009). Thirdly, theory may provide models that are also a chance to have enough experiment by testing or the models can observe analysis because of the fact that intelligence officers or intelligence institutions' expected behavior (Ehrman, 2009). Moreover, theory may

provide definitions, which provide common spoken or written words (Erhman, 2009). Hence, intelligence officer may understand each other clearer and faster.

There are also some approaches on intelligence studies that have direct impact on theory of intelligence and definition of intelligence. Intelligence might be defined as only information for the decision and policy makers for one of the approaches (Warner as cited in Lochovský, 2014). Furthermore, such an approach does not care about how information is obtained that means intelligence can be obtained from both open and clandestine resources (Coyne, 2014). On the contrary, to this approach in some respect, some scholars argue that even if intelligence can be defined as information, intelligence is more than such a statement. Secrecy is one of the essential components of intelligence hence intelligence is information that has to be obtained secretly (Coyne, 2014). All intelligence activities have to be done in secretly because of the fact that secrecy is part of nature of intelligence.

There are also approaches, which are favored by academic disciplines such as historians and political scientists. Even though they have similarities and differences in some point, their main purpose is to have more efficiency in intelligence (Tanese, n.d.). One of the approach is favored by international historians studies the relationship between organizational structure of intelligence and policy making so that decision makers have more accurate and certain decisions on an issue (Tanese, n.d.). The other approach is preferred by political scientists emphasizes level of analysis and decision in the intelligence processes (Tanese, n.d.). Main purpose of this approach is to explain and analysis the biases which have effect on intelligence success, failures and decision-making processes.

In addition to these, there are also alternative approaches on intelligence and intelligence studies. One of them is based on the function of intelligence as a kind of tool. This approach focuses on the state's power and control on intelligence by referring politics, society and culture. Therefore, scholars of this approaches study intelligence to have better understanding of state's control on society's cultural and political life (Tanese, n.d.). The other approach is emerged by the cold war and its effect on states, which is anticipative approach (Davis as cited in Coyne, 2014). New variables of cold war also affect the states' threats and risks evaluation and

calculation (Davis as cited in Coyne, 2014). Therefore, aim of this anticipative approach is the support the decision and policy makers in order to produce more future projections in order to cope with new threats and risks of cold war and cold war's effects on states' futures.

Even though there are views on theory of intelligence, views on theory of intelligence have more similarities rather than diversities. One of the main questions on theory of intelligence is based on intelligence for whom. To give an answer to this question, most of views on theory of intelligence define intelligence as information for decision or policy makers, which can be obtained secretly. Secrecy and covert action is essential for most of scholars because of the fact that nature of intelligence is based on secrecy (Gill, 2012). Moreover, another main question on theory of intelligence is based on how intelligence should be obtained? Most of theorists, experts and academicians argue that intelligence can only be obtained by using clandestine sources whereas some of scholars argues that intelligence as information can be obtained from open or clandestine sources (Johnson as cited in Netshitenzhe, 2005). Another question on theory of intelligence is based on what should intelligence do? Views are based on purposes or functions of intelligence. It might be argued that intelligence should minimize ambiguities, risks and threats against state's interests and goals (Treverton et. al., 2006). Furthermore, it might be argued that intelligence should have the capability of prediction and future projections in order to protect state's interests and goals (Treverton et. al., 2006). Another essential question on theory of intelligence is based on how intelligence should be studied or what kinds of methods should be applied in the process of intelligence? Most of scholars argue that intelligence has to be studied by using positivist and realist approaches (Treverton et. al., 2006). Realism might be preferred because of competitive international social, political and economic environment. Moreover, positivist school of thought might be preferred because of the fact that scholars want to apply requirements of positivist school of thought. By this way, rational theory of intelligence may have direct effect on efficiency of intelligence (Johnson as cited in Lahneman, 2012).

CHAPTER THREE

IMPACT OF ANALYST AND ANALYSES

3.1. INTRODUCTION TO IMPACT OF ANALYST AND ANALYSES

Analysis may be described as the most essential part of intelligence process because of its facilities. Analysis is solely one part of the intelligence process; however, it is the significant part of that process (George and Bruce as cited in Mcmillan, 2012:52). Moreover, Mcmillan (2012) argues that “both the inputs and the outputs of the intelligence process are reliant on analysis and on the methodology used in conducting the analysis, and the relevancy of the inputs and outputs, to the understanding of the situation” (2012:52).

Intelligence analysis is not only essential, it is also crucial in the process of intelligence in order to have intelligence that is more effective. It might be argued that process of intelligence is shaped and defined according to intelligence analysis that results in intelligence as product. All kinds the inputs and outputs of the intelligence process are based on the analysis. Moreover, relevancy of all inputs and outputs is determined by analysis, which also results in perception of the cases on intelligence work.

“The products of successful analysis convey intelligence that meets or anticipates the consumer’s needs; these products reveal analytic conclusions, not the methods used to derive them. Intelligence products are successful if they arm the decision maker, policymaker or military leader with the information and context—the answers—needed to win on his or her playing field. Such intelligence enables consumers to be more effective by making them smarter than they are before, smarter than the people they play with, and smarter than those they play against” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:105).

Intelligence analysis is also crucial; because successful analysis may match and connect the consumers’ expectations with consumers’ interest, needs and goals. Intelligence might be called as successful and effective as long as it supports the decision makers or consumers by supplying information and answers. Such an

analysis not only makes intelligence more effective, it also makes consumers or decision makers more powerful and effective against the enemies.

Furthermore, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has some suggestions and similar argumentations on intelligence analysis in order to have more success. According to the WMD Commission's major recommendations on analysis focused on improvements in:

- "Management of analysts,
- Utilization of nontraditional sources, including open sources,
- Understanding of how foreign denial and deception can have an impact on collection and analysis,
- Long-term research and strategic thinking, and particularly,
- Tradecraft (or methodology) through much improved training, especially to produce analysis that is more rigorous and transparent" (Bruce and George, 2008:5).


Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission emphasize the importance of managing analysis and using of different kinds of non-traditional sources. Moreover, intelligence analysis can uncover the foreign denial and deceptions, which may have an effect on collection of information and analysis. Analysis also has to be focus on long-term research and strategic thinking in order to have more powerful, estimative and predictive analysis. In addition to this, it also refers to the importance of methodology on analysis in order to have more accurate, certain and reliable and apparent intelligence analysis.

Furthermore, analysis stage of intelligence is essential because of the fact that it reflects the countries' vulnerabilities, abilities, priorities and societies' anthropological features such as daily lives practices, preferences, religions etc. All kinds of information are reviewed and transformed as intelligence for policy makers' usage that may be seen as essential role of analysis in the process of intelligence. Therefore, analysis part may be seen as most critical part in order to have successful intelligence production, which refers one aspect of effective intelligence.

3.2. FUNCTIONAL CORE COMPONENT OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYST

Analysis part of intelligence is one of the most important parts of intelligence to have successful and effective intelligence. Therefore, intelligence analysts should have indispensable features. For this reason, it is aimed to explain what kinds of characteristics, abilities, skills and knowledge features all intelligence analysts should have those features. Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that analysts should have four main features to have effective intelligence that includes abilities, characteristics, knowledge and skills. They also illustrate a table, which indicates characteristics of intelligence analysts (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: The functional core competencies for Intelligence Analysis



Source: Moore and Krizan (2003: 96).

3.2.1. Characteristics

Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that success of intelligence analysts can be measured by applying some evaluations according to the defined features. Moreover, intelligence analysts may be more successful in their intelligence work if they try to apply Moore and Krizans' Model for successful intelligence analysts.

“Who are the most successful intelligence analysts? What makes them successful? In setting forth the functional core competencies for successful intelligence analysis we observe there are characteristics which, while not necessary for successful intelligence analysis per se, do seem to be associated with analysts considered to be the most successful at their trade” (2003:105).

Therefore, successful intelligence analysts and their features can be described who are the most successful intelligence analysts in their intelligence work. There are some vital characteristics of the successful intelligence analysts such as self-motivation and curiosity. Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that

“Probably the most indispensable characteristics of successful intelligence analysts are high self-motivation and insatiable curiosity. Analysts want to know everything they can about the objects under their scrutiny. Reading and observing voraciously, they ferret out every possible piece of information and demonstrate a sense of wonder about what they discover. As new fragments appear, novel connections are discovered between the new and older information as a result of intense concentration leading to epiphanies moments of “aha” thinking. The most successful analysts tend to enjoy their work. It’s play, not work” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:105).


Self- motivation and curiosity are the essential characteristics, since these two characteristics are decisive features on characteristics of successful intelligence analysts. Intelligence analysts should have eagerness to learn different, new and interesting things that may help intelligence analysis. When intelligence analysts learn something or searching something, intelligence analysts should have enthusiasm to study by having self-motivation and curiosity. For instance, intelligence analysts should have a kind of voracious on reading, observation that may turn into fruitfully obsession that result in ability of creation different perspective and discovering connections on intelligence work.

3.2.2. Abilities

“Abilities arise from aptitudes that can develop from an individual’s innate, natural characteristics or talents. Although aptitudes may largely be determined by a person’s genetic background, they may also be enhanced through training” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:108).

Abilities are one of the core components of successful intelligence analysts. Even though most of abilities develop from innate features of human being, abilities can be improved or strengthened. Therefore, intelligence analysts should have abilities of communication, teaming and collaboration, and thinking. By these abilities, intelligence analysts can realize analyses that are more successful. Moore and Krizan illustrate a table, which indicates abilities of intelligence analysts as communicating, teaming and collaboration and thinking that can be seen in the Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Abilities required for successful intelligence analysis



Source: Moore and Krizan (2003: 107).

3.2.2.1. Communicating

Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that there are three communication abilities, which are aural, graphic / visual and oral, are one of the essential aspects of intelligence analysis. Aural ability refers to listen, hear and understand the spoken sentences or words. Moreover, Moore and Krizan (2003) assert that this ability can be enhancing by applying some techniques of active listening. Therefore, intelligence analyst's ability on communicating with decision makers or consumers might be improved. Graphic/visual ability refers to see, view and perceive symbols. It is based on perception and interpretation of information might be graphic or visual. Lastly, oral ability refers to communication with others by spoken words or sentences, which is unique for human being. Development of oral communication ability is essential because of the fact that "effective oral communication directly affects the intelligence analyst's credibility" (Moore and Krizan, 2003:108).

Intelligence analyst should communicate with others who have different characteristics, cultural values and bias. Furthermore, individuals' characteristics, culture and society may have an effect on their communication abilities. Therefore, intelligence analysts have to be aware of such variables and intelligence analysts can find a way to communicate with others.

3.2.2.2. Teaming and collaboration

Intelligence analysts should have the abilities teaming and collaboration. They have to be open to the team working and collaboration. Furthermore, intelligence analysts should have eagerness to work with others and have idea of negotiation. As intelligence, analysts have the feeling of teaming and collaboration, the possibility of effectiveness of their work is increased. To illustrate,

"Teaming and collaboration abilities enhance intelligence analysis, since the analyst's relationship with consumers, peers, subordinates, and supervisors shape the intelligence production process. Formalized means of enhancing all these abilities can lead intelligence professionals to considerably greater effectiveness as analysts and leaders of analysts" (Moore and Krizan, 2003:108).

Others who might be group members, decision makers, consumers or supervisors can easily affect intelligence as a product and intelligence process. All these people are also parts of intelligence and intelligence analysis. Therefore, the ability of teaming and collaboration may have an impact on the intelligence analysts' analysis.

In addition to these, Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that there are four teaming abilities as influencing, leading, following, synergizing those intelligence analysts should have all of them. Moore and Krizan (2003) declare that intelligence analysts should have the ability of influencing the other who may be superiors, peers or subordinates. Moreover, intelligence analysts can able to persuade the others by indicating enough valid evidence or conclusions. As the ability of influencing is increased, the success of analysts in intelligence work is also increased (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Secondly, leading is another ability that intelligence analysts should have such an ability (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Intelligence analysts who are more skilled and successful on intelligence analysis have to lead and direct others, which is a kind of serve as a role model. Furthermore, leading includes working together with other in order to produce more desirable intelligence analysis outcomes which results in improvement on field of intelligence analysis (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Thirdly, following is also another essential ability because of the fact that intelligence analysts have to be a good follower. Intelligence analysts have to develop this ability in order to work within a team, taking direction and acting according to the direction (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Finally, synergizing which is drawing on the other three abilities refers to achievement a common goal by cooperation (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Therefore, the possibility of having success on intelligence analysis is increased when people work together for a common goal rather than working alone.

3.2.2.3. Thinking

“As our species designation—*sapiens*—suggests, the defining attribute of human beings is an unparalleled cognitive ability. We think differently from all other creatures on earth, and we can share those thoughts with one another in ways that no other species even approaches” (Terence W. Deacon as cited in Moore and Krizan, 2003:109).

Human being has a unique ability that human being has the ability of thinking and human being can share the thoughts with others. This unique ability makes people privileged than the other species. For example, human being can perceive and evaluate situations such as events, cases. People can calculate different dimensions of the events that people can create a cause and effect relation on a case or events. Therefore, all possible reasons, effects and results can be calculated by thinking, which is also essential for intelligence analysts in order to have successful intelligence analysis. Moore and Krizan (2003) argue that there are three thinking abilities are required as information ordering, pattern recognition and reasoning.

Information ordering is based on arrangement of data in order to have meaningful order, which is determined according to defined or sets of rules. By this ability, often with assistance of technology, people can arrange information, which results in analysis, synthesis, and extraction of meaning. "The arrangement of information according to certain learned rules leads the analyst to make conclusions and disseminate them as intelligence" (Moore and Krizan, 2003:110). Therefore, intelligence analysts may have some conclusions which results in dissemination of information. Information is disseminated as intelligence by the ability of information ordering.

Humans can detect patterns and impose patterns to the events and entities so that they can perceive patterns. Moreover, people are not aware of such a categorization and pattern imposition, which is pattern recognition "Humans detect patterns and impose patterns on apparently random entities and events in order to understand them, often doing this without being aware of it" (Moore and Krizan, 2003:110). Therefore, intelligence analysts can make pattern recognition. Furthermore, Intelligence analysts can identify what targets are doing hence intelligence analysts can make forecasting or prediction on targets and intelligence analysts can classify patterns according to their essentiality and privileges (Moore and Krizan, 2003).

Reasoning is another important component of the ability of thinking. People may have some conclusions, explanations descriptions. "The ability to reason is what permits humans to process information and formulate explanations, to assign

meaning to observed phenomena" (Moore and Krizan, 2003:110). Therefore, intelligence analysts also process information in order to assign meanings.

Furthermore, intelligence analysts can process information and they can transform information into intelligence by having some meaning and explanation in three ways as induction, deduction and abduction. Firstly, Inductive reasoning is based on combination of different kinds of pieces of information in order to have results or general rules. Moreover, there is causality in the inductive reasoning. To illustrate, Moore and Krizan (2003) argues that "a child learns to associate the color red with heat and heat with pain, and then to generalize these associations to new situations". A child can have the ability of inductive reasoning by observation a having cause and result relationship to have generalization for new situations. Therefore, an intelligence analyst can also use the ability of inductive reasoning on intelligence work. Secondly, deductive reasoning is based on the application of general rules to specific issues in order to have conclusions. Intelligence analyst can utilize this ability by interpreting information. For instance, Moore and Krizan assert that

"An analyst who follows the nuclear weapons program of a country might notice that a characteristic series of events preceded the last nuclear weapons test. Upon seeing evidence that those same events are occurring again, the analyst might deduce that a second nuclear test is imminent" (Moore and Krizan, 2003:110).

An intelligence analyst can use ability of deductive reasoning from a general event to the specific event. Intelligence analysts can make calculation on a specific case in order to predict the possible conclusions by using evidence. Hence, intelligence analyst can make forecasting on a specific event as seen in the example of nuclear weapon test. Thirdly, 'abductive reasoning' is based on the insight by asking questions in order to perceive and explain the events. To illustrate, Moore and Krizan explain their view on 'abductive reasoning' by giving an example that

"given two shipping manifests, one showing oranges and lemons being shipped from Venezuela to Florida, and the other showing carnations being shipped from Delaware to Colombia, abductive reasoning is what enables the analyst to take an analytic leap and ask, "Why is citrus fruit being sent to the worldwide capital of citrus farming, while carnations are being sent to the world's primary exporter of that product? What is really going on here?" (2003:111).


Therefore, intelligence analyst tries to anticipate the reality behind the apparent event by asking questions. Moreover, Intelligence analyst tries to have reasonable connections, causality on the event as it might be seen in the example. Intelligence analyst tries to perceive and have reasonable explanations on a case or event by using ‘abductive reasoning’.

3.2.3. Skills

“Any institution that relies on professionals for success and seeks to maintain an authentic learning climate for individual growth must require its members to read (to gain knowledge and insight), research (to learn how to ask good questions and find defensible answers), discuss (to appreciate opposing views and subject their own to rigorous debate), and write (to structure arguments and articulate them clearly and coherently)” (Foster, 1996:74- 79).

Intelligence communities also need to have intelligence analysts as professional in order to have achievements in intelligence work. Intelligence analysts as professional require having enough reading, research, discussion and writing skills so that intelligence analysts may have success in their intelligence work. Moore and Krizan illustrate a table, which indicates skills of intelligence analysts that can be seen in the Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Skills required for successful analyses



Source: Moore and Krizan (2003: 112)

Furthermore, there are similar kinds of expectation from analysts so that states can have intelligence that is more effective. For instance, Bruce and George (2008) try to describe what kinds of skills should be owned by USA's intelligence analyst that listed as:

- "Mastery of the subject matter as well as related U.S. policies,
- Understanding of research methods to organize and evaluate data,
- Imagination and scientific rigor to generate as well as test hypotheses,
- Understanding of unique intelligence collection methods,
- Self-awareness of cognitive biases and other cognitive influences on analysis,
- Open-mindedness to contrary views or alternative models that fit the data,
- Self-confidence to admit and learn from analytic errors" (2008:3)

As a result, Professors Bruce and George (2008) argue that intelligence analysts should have some skills and characteristic that define the quality of intelligence whether it is effective or not. Intelligence analysts should be professional and expert on intelligence subjects and requirements. For example, intelligence analysts should have ability of literacy in order to have capability on scientific methods on researching, collection of data, documents. In addition, intelligence analysts should have capability of testifying hypothesis whether it might be true or not that empower the reliability of intelligence analysis of analysts. Intelligence analysts can get rid of any kinds of cognitive biases, which may have damaging effect on analysis by using self-awareness. Moreover, intelligence analysts cannot be afraid of accepting their mistakes on intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysts can apply analytic methods and if there is a mistake, they can admit their mistakes.

3.2.3.1. Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is one of the essential skills that intelligence analysts can transform information to intelligence. Furthermore, critical thinking includes some features, which make it more valuable. Moore and Krizan argue critical thinking can be defines as

"An intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action.... Thinking about our thinking while we're thinking in order to make our thinking better" (2003:113).

Therefore, critical thinking can be defined as a process in which there are conceptualizing, applying, analysis, synthesizing and evaluation of information. This information is emerged through some features such as observation, experience reasoning or communication. In addition to these, critical thinking is crucial for questioning. “Without critical thinking, current beliefs and methods are not questioned” (2003:113). Thus, the power of analysis is enhanced by critical thinking because of the fact that intelligence analysts can examine the current belief and methods which result in more certain and accurate explanations.

3.2.3.2. Literacy

Intelligence analysts should have the skill of literacy because of the fact that intelligence analysts are responsible to read very complex and sometimes specific documents, notes, paragraphs that might be written in a different languages. Moore and Krizan claim that "Literacy skills are crucial for understanding the target, the consumer and the intelligence process and it is also necessary for conducting research"(2003:114). Consequently, the skill of literacy might be determined as turning point owing to the fact that responsibilities of intelligence analysts are firstly perceive the target, the consumer and the intelligence process.

3.2.3.3. Computer Literacy

Use of technological tools is also important for intelligence analysts. Computer is one of the essential tool that intelligence analysts can use it. Intelligence analysts can benefit from computer program for statistical works, grouping information, management of information researching etc.

“These tools for manipulation, correlation, and presentation of information are a means to an end: the production of intelligence. An analyst’s skillful use of them hastens arrival at that end” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:114).

By using computer tools, information can be used for more beneficial and quicker ends in order to have successful intelligence production.

3.2.3.4. Expression

“The results of analysis are useless if they are poorly presented. The capable analyst must be competent and experienced in presenting analysis both orally and in writing. Effective oral and written skills are therefore essential for the intelligence analyst” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:114).

Expression of analysis is crucial for intelligence analysts because of the fact that purpose of intelligence analysis is dissemination of knowledge as intelligence to the policy makers or decision makers. Therefore, expression of results of analysis is also part of successful intelligence analysis work. According to Moore and Krizan (2003), there are three expression types as speaking and presentation, storytelling and writing, which are important for effective intelligence analysis, and analysts.

3.2.3.5. Foreign Language Proficiency

“To be truly successful, analysts must be proficient in the language(s) employed by the subjects of their analysis. Without such proficiency they cannot completely comprehend target intentions and actions. When analysts misunderstand their targets, the intelligence they provide to consumers thus will be inaccurate or misleading” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:116).

Foreign language skill have direct relation with the success of intelligence analysts owing to the fact that intelligence analysts can only have a chance to have deeper, certain and accurate information about enemies or targets by usage of foreign languages. Targets or enemies’ intention and possible action can be perceived by using their own language that they communicate with each other. Moreover, foreign languages skills can prevent inaccurate or misleading productions of intelligence analysts, which are disseminated, to the policy makers or decision makers. By the foreign language skill, intelligence analysts may know targets or enemies cultural values, beliefs, priorities, preferences, biases and other social features, which determine the perception of people.

3.2.3.6. Research

“Research skills provide discipline and consistency for the creation of value-added intelligence. By providing methodologies for defining the requirement to be answered, as well as methodologies for answering that query, research skills ensure analytic consistency and enable thorough exploration of the issues” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:118).

Research skills present a chance for intelligence analysts that intelligence analysts can increase the quality of intelligence. By research skills, intelligence analysts may apply methodologies. Having methodologies, for intelligence analysis, results in some opportunities for intelligence analysts. Intelligence analysts may easily fulfill the intelligence requirements and find answer to queries. Moreover, research skills may provide analytic consistency and exploration of issues for intelligence analysts. As a result, intelligence analysts can improve the quality of their production as intelligence.

3.2.3.7. Information Gathering and Manipulation

“Information is the grist for intelligence analysis, and to be successful, analysts must aggressively seek it out. Different information/data manipulation skills are required for the various stages of the intelligence process” (Moore and Krizan, 2003:119).

Having information and usage of information might be determined the possibility of success because of the fact that all intelligence activities and works are based on the information. There are different types of required information manipulation stages as collection, monitoring, organizing, analysis/synthesis, interpretation, dissemination, coordination, evaluation (Moore and Krizan, 2003). The intelligence collection stage is based on the gathering of information and direction of collection process. Intelligence analysts select and filtering the information to display value of information (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Therefore, intelligence analysts collect information and then eliminate information according to the level of relativity.

Monitoring stage is based on the test of validity and reliability of information. Data are summarized and descriptors are analyzed by intelligence analysts (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Intelligence analysts check and observe the information whether information is able to usage or not. Organizing stage is based on the arrangement formatting and maintenance of data in order to access usable format (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Hence, intelligence analysts arrange the information and data in order to have a reasonable order and form.

Intelligence analysts may also analysis or synthesis the information's patterns, anomalies, relationships and trends, which are analysis and or synthesis stage (Moore and Krizan, 2003). This stage of information process is a kind of categorization information and examination of information. Interpretation stage is based on the transformation of information into the intelligence. Intelligence analysts analyze and synthesize information through critical thinking that results in intelligence (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Therefore, intelligence analysts begin to perceive and then evaluate the information by critical thinking. Information is getting currency by interpretation, which results in evaluation of information as intelligence.

Dissemination stage of process is based on dissemination of information turned into intelligence to the users. In addition, most of dissemination is electronic (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Coordination is another part of the information gathering and manipulation process. Intelligence analysts and managers need to have collegial skills (Moore and Krizan, 2003). They need to have coordination skills in order to gain information and to have manipulation of information.

The last stage of gathering information and manipulation is evaluation. By evaluation, intelligence can be discussed more than single agency (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Therefore, there is a kind of collaboration, which results in determination of intelligence requirement and enhancement of intelligence.

3.2.3.8. Project / Process Management

Project management is based on limited scope and goals whereas process management is based on infinitive scope and open ended goals. Besides, project and


process management require planning implementation, monitoring and negotiation skills (Moore and Krizan, 2003). Both of them are essential skills that intelligence analysts should have them because of the fact that project and process management can define needs, requirements and intelligence analysts may have an outline to have successful intelligence work.

3.2.4. Knowledge

“Without a solid knowledge base concerning the region or issue to which the analyst is assigned ... the individual will not even know what questions to ask. That is, the person will not really be qualified to be called an analyst” (Ronald et al., as cited in Moore and Krizan, 2003:120).

It might be argued that knowledge is one of the most required competencies of the intelligence analysts because of the fact that intelligence analysts cannot have any kind of success in the intelligence work without having enough and qualified knowledge. Moore and Krizan illustrate a table, which indicates knowledge of intelligence analysts that can be seen in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Knowledge required for successful intelligence analysis



Source:Moore and Krizan (2003: 120)

The most fundamental requirement of intelligence analysis is based on having knowledge, which directs and determines intelligence processes, requirements and priorities. For example, knowledge has the power of defining and configuration on questions that intelligence analysts are responsible to ask questions and find reasonable answers to that questions. According to Moore and Krizan (2003),

“Knowledge consists of familiarities, awareness, or understanding gained through experience or study; it includes both empirical material and that derived by inference or interpretation. Depending on the specific target, the knowledge required can vary widely” (120).

There are familiarities, awareness or understanding in knowledge that might be gained thorough experience or study. Moreover, required knowledge can be differing from other knowledge that is defined by specific target. Therefore, all kinds of different and specific target result in variations of knowledge are required.

3.2.4.1. Target Knowledge

According to Moore and Krizan (2003), intelligence analysts need to know context, background, history, common knowledge, social resources in order to give an answer to the consumers.

“By providing the context into which analysts place their work, fields of study such as anthropology, comparative religion, economics, geography, history, international relations, psychology, and sociology all interact to contribute vital knowledge about the target, which both analysts and consumers need to understand” (121).

These fields of studies have interaction with each other, which may contribute to have essential knowledge about target. Moreover, target knowledge creates a context where intelligence analysts may determine and shape knowledge about target by using fields of studies that mentioned above. Lewis (2005) argues that

“Target knowledge provides context and understanding which is derived from cultural familiarity, the subtle messages in language, and other indicators that can only be divined from knowledge and understanding of the target. Target knowledge is what makes an analyst truly valuable to his commander or customer” (33).

Intelligence analysts may have context and perception by having by target knowledge that benefit from indicators such as language, culture, sociology, history etc. Moreover, Intelligence analysts become more valuable for their customer or commanders because of the fact that intelligence analyst can submit target knowledge, which corresponds to customers’ goals, priorities and interest.

3.2.4.2. Professional Knowledge

Intelligence analysts need to know professional knowledge on intelligence work in order to have success in their intelligence work. Furthermore, intelligence analysts have to be aware of state's policies, goals, interest and priorities in order to frame their intelligence work. Lewis (2005) argues that

“Professional knowledge comprises the remainder of the knowledge competency. It incorporates knowledge of the larger Intelligence Community, knowledge of the unit, commander, or customer, and knowledge about the analytic resources directly and indirectly available to the analyst. Professional knowledge allows the analyst to anticipate and answer the unique needs of her/his customers in a manner that influences their decisions most effectively” (34).

By professional knowledge including different types of knowledge such as knowledge of the larger Intelligence Community, knowledge of the unit, commander, or customer, and knowledge about the analytic resources intelligence analyst can forecast the consumer's needs or interest in order to find a reasonable solutions. Moore and Krizan argues that

“Analysts need to know what specific sources of information relevant to a particular inquiry are available for exploitation. Knowing which expert sources and subject matter experts can guide the analytic process, or can offer different or additional perspectives, enhances intelligence work”(2003:122).

Intelligence analysts need to have specific knowledge while they search on intelligence work that searching according to professional knowledge may be a decisive factor on success of intelligence work. Moreover, having specific and professional knowledge can direct process on intelligence work and it may result in exhibition of different kinds of aspects. Hence, professional knowledge may enhance the intelligence work. To illustrate, intelligence analysts should be aware of the intelligence communities and governments' policies and politics that are useful knowledge in order to delivering accurate and reliable intelligence.

In conclusion, Moore and Krizan argue that there are core competencies that make intelligence analysts more successful. Therefore, as the intelligence analysts have more success in their intelligence work, the possibility of effectiveness of intelligence is also increased. They define and construct the core vital features that

intelligence analysts should have in order to produce more successful and effective intelligence. According to Lewis (2005),

“The NSA Moore and Krizan model of functional core competencies for intelligence analysis is the best, most complete, and perhaps the only model in the IC that addresses the competencies required of successful intelligence analysts. Their study suggests that the necessary skills, abilities, and knowledge can be trained and refined by rigorous institutional training programs tailored to the communities and consumers they serve. The characteristics required of intelligence analysts cannot be trained and therefore must be identified prior to selection for analytic training or at least in the very early stages of it” (34).

It might be argued that Moore and Krizan enhanced a well-qualified, deterministic and structured model that might be unique. Intelligence analysts need to have these competencies in order to have successful intelligence analysis. By application of such model, intelligence analysts may have skills, abilities and knowledge that can be improved by training programs. Moreover, although characteristics of intelligence analysts cannot be trained, characteristics required of intelligence analysts can be identified prior to selection for analytic training. Therefore, intelligence communities and intelligence’s consumers may have intelligence that is more effective.

3.3. TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES

It might be argued that types of intelligence analysis are also crucial because of essentiality of intelligence analysis in order to have effective intelligence. Types of intelligence analysis can support intelligence analysts to have more accurate, certain and reliable. According to Moore, there should be four types of analysis to have effective intelligence as descriptive, explanatory, interpretive and estimative analysis (2002). Therefore, Moore (2002) declares that that four types of intelligence analysis as fundamental is essential so that efficiency in intelligence can be enhanced and protected. Even though four types of intelligence is seem as fundamental types of analysis, predictive intelligence analysis which has a few similarities with estimative analysis in some points can be added to the types of intelligence analysis as one of the fundamental analysis.

3.3.1. Descriptive Intelligence

“Description is a process that reports an event, person, place, or thing. Descriptive Intelligence is a reactive, event-driven process closely linked to a particular information source. Based on measurable facts, or the characteristics of facts, it reports evidence by describing specific events or characteristics” (Moore, 2002:14).

Descriptive intelligence analysis is a kind of process describes and reports something having an importance. Hence, descriptive intelligence analysis is based on the descriptions of any kinds of event, case, person, place or something that has a value for analysis. According to the specific information, the events or cases constructed and described which are strengthened by measurable facts or characteristics of the facts. Furthermore, Moore (2002) illustrates a table that all requirements and features of descriptive analysis should be well design (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Descriptive Intelligence Analyze

Analysis Type	Description and Requirements		Measures of Success						
Descriptive	Reactive Analytic Process	Event Driven	Meets or Anticipates Customer Needs	Readiness					
		INT-centered		Timeliness					
		Internal and External Redundancies and Overlap		Accuracy					
	Reports Information	Fact Based		Conveys Intelligence	Objectivity				
		Describes Verified Events			Usability				
		Based on Measured Characteristics			Relevance				
	Skills	Information Gathering and Manipulation			Conveys Intelligence	Decision Points			
		Foreign Language Proficiency							
		Expression							
		Research							
		Critical Reasoning							
		Project/Process Management							
		Basic Literacy							
		Computer Literacy							
	Abilities	Communicating	Conveys Intelligence	Decision Points					
		Thinking							
		Teaming and Collaboration							
	Knowledge	Target			Conveys Intelligence	Decision Points			
		Customer Requirements and Limitations							
	Analyst Characteristics	Self-Motivated					Conveys Intelligence	Decision Points	
Observant									
Intensely Concentrates									
Assistive Technology	Allows User to Perform Basic Tasks More Easily	Conveys Intelligence							Decision Points

Source: Moore, (2002:14)

To have descriptive analysis, there should be well-qualified intelligence analysts in order to have descriptive analysis because of the fact that descriptive analysis only can be realized by expert analysts who have core competencies as

abilities, skills and knowledge and characteristics. Intelligence analysts are able to use abilities, skills, knowledge, and characteristics that may have direct effect on quality of intelligence analysis. Moore (2002) asserts that

“Mastery of critical reasoning skills, coupled with mastery of information ordering, and lesser competency in pattern recognition abilities allows the selection, weighting, and manipulation of pertinent evidence. When the raw information is non-English, these analysts draw on their mastery of foreign languages to describe what is being said. Project and process management skills enable them to organize their work environment to make best use of their time. Knowledge of the target and the customer’s requirements facilitates the inclusion or exclusion of specific details. When possible, assistive technology generates statistics and reports that facilitate the description of the subject of the analysis. Successful analysts are expert at manipulating this information” (15).

All kinds of competencies of intelligence analysts are available for the descriptive intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysts can benefit from competencies on descriptive analysis. By using critical reasoning skills, intelligence analysts can detect patterns and impose patterns to the events and entities and intelligence analysts process information in order to assign meanings.

Moreover, intelligence analysts can arrange of data and information in order to have meaningful order. By the foreign language proficiency skills, intelligence analysts can cope with inaccurate or misleading productions of intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysts can easily describe what is being said in their analysis. By the project and process management skills, intelligence analysts can define needs, requirements and intelligence analysts may have an outline that results in efficient usages of time and organized work environment. By the knowledge skills, intelligence analysts can creates a context where intelligence analysts may determine and shape knowledge and intelligence analysts corresponds to customers’ goals, priorities and interest. Therefore, inclusion or exclusion of specific details is simplified. By technological proficiency skills, Intelligence analysts can benefit from computer program for statistical works, grouping information, management of information researching which may result in more beneficial and quicker ends on description of subject. As a result descriptive intelligence analysis is a kind of process that defines and enrolls events, persons, places, environments or something.

In addition, success of descriptive intelligence analysis can be measured by evaluating some variables such as consumers' needs and conveys of intelligence. Consumers' needs on intelligence may include readiness, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, usability relevance. Descriptive intelligence analysis can also convey intelligence that has to describe decision points to the decision or policy makers.

3.3.2. Explanatory Intelligence

“Explanation reveals why something is so. Explanatory Intelligence is the result of a rationalized analytic process that employs methods of reasoning to reveal contexts for facts and inferences” (Moore, 2002:16).

Explanatory intelligence analysis can uncover something on analysis as facts, patterns, and contexts, reflects rationalized analytic process that intelligence analysts can use reasoning skills and methods in order to reveal facts, meaning and consequences. To have sufficient and effective explanatory analysis, intelligence analysts should focus on cases that have to be revealed. Therefore, explanatory analysis can uncover connection, plans, projects, intentions, purposes, interests or goals and explanations such as who are they, who, what are the roles of people, what kinds of connection they have etc. Furthermore, intelligence analysts can benefit from their reasoning abilities on explanatory analysis in order to conclude what they have to explain that explanatory analysis should be supported by enough reliable, accurate clues or evidence. David T. Moore illustrates a table that all requirements and features of explanatory analysis should be well design (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Explanatory Intelligence Analyze

Analysis Type	Description and Requirements		Measures of Success	
Explanatory	Rationalized Analytic Process	Employs Catalogued Best Practices	Meets or Anticipates Customer Needs	Readiness
		Collaboration Eliminates Redundancies		Timeliness
		Metrics Quantify Success		Accuracy
	Uses Methods of Reasoning to Explain Information	Abduction/Induction/Deduction		Objectivity
		Insight		Usability
		Pattern Recognition/Information Ordering		Relevance
	Skills	Information Gathering and Manipulation	Conveys Intelligence	Analytic Conclusion
		Foreign Language Proficiency		
		Expression		
		Research		
		Critical Reasoning		
		Project/Process Management		
		Basic Literacy		
		Computer Literacy		
	Abilities	Communicating	Decision Points	
		Thinking		
		Teaming and Collaboration		
	Knowledge	Target	Rigorous Analysis	Competitive
		Intelligence Community Resources		
		Government Plans and Policies		
Customer Requirements and Limitations				
Available Analytic Resources				
Analyst Characteristics	Self-Motivated	Adds Value		
	Observant			
	Intensely Concentrates			
	Questions Convention			
Interactive Technology	Manipulates and Displays Information Enabling Novel Analytic Explanations			

Source: Moore, (2002:17)

“Analysts who are successful at producing explanatory intelligence are expert at reasoning. They combine a mastery of deductive, inductive, and abductive abilities with intuition, to masterfully order evidence, seeking patterns that may explain its context. Both collaboration and critical reasoning skills help ensure the work is minimally affected by corporate and cultural biases” (Moore, 2002:17-18).

Reasoning is essential to have successful explanatory intelligence analysis. Therefore, intelligence analysts have to blend reasoning abilities as deductive, inductive and ‘abductive’ in order to explain evidence and patterns. Intelligence analyst can use ability of deductive reasoning from a general event to the specific event so that intelligence analysts can make examination, reviews and explanations on a specific case. Inductive reasoning is based on combination of different kinds of pieces of information in order to have results or general rules that intelligence

analysts can benefit from inductive reasoning ability in order to explain evidence, cases or patterns. 'Abductive reasoning' is based on the insight by asking questions in order to perceive and explain the events or cases that intelligence analyst can perceive and have reasonable explanations on a case, event, evidence by using 'abductive reasoning'.

In addition, success of explanatory intelligence analysis can be measured by evaluating some variables such as consumers' needs, conveys of intelligence and rigorous analysis. Consumers' needs on intelligence may include readiness, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, usability relevance. Explanatory intelligence analysis can also convey intelligence that may include analytic conclusions, decision points to the decision or policy makers. Besides, explanatory intelligence analysis can have accurate analysis that should have some feature as competitiveness, adds values. Success of explanatory analysis can be measured by those variables.

3.3.3. Interpretive Intelligence

“While in some instances, distinctions between explanatory and interpretive intelligence may blur, interpretive intelligence really deals with “the significance of observed phenomenon and makes judgments about what has happened” (Moore, 2002:20-21).

It might be asserted that there is no certain differentiation between explanatory and interpretive analysis. However, the differences are that interpretive intelligence analysis can answer what and why something happens in order to have judgments. Interpretive intelligence analysis has the ability of elimination of unnecessary information, data and documents. It should be only focus on what it has to be revealed. Interpretive intelligence analysis should be objective that there should not be any kinds of prejudices and biases. Furthermore, interpretive intelligence analysis should have well calculation of all variables such as analyzed state society, economy and cultural features in order to have more realistic and reasonable analysis. Moore (2002) asserts that

“Collaboration is essential for successful interpretive analysis. Intelligence issues requiring such analysis are rarely clear. Biases often

interfere and threaten to cloud judgments. So practitioners of interpretive analysis are masters at teaming and collaboration, known means of assuring complex issues are adequately dealt with”(21).

Intelligence analysts should have eagerness to work with others and have idea of negotiation because of the fact that possibility of effectiveness of interpretive intelligence analysis may increase as intelligence analysts have the feeling of teaming and collaboration. Furthermore, interpretive intelligence analysis can be protected against biases and prejudices as intelligence analysts can be open to teaming and collaboration, which may results in more successful interpretive intelligence analyses. David T. Moore illustrates a table that all requirements and features of interpretive analysis should be well design that can be seen in the Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Interpretive Intelligence Analyze

Analysis Type	Description and Requirements		Measures of Success		
Interpretive	Adaptive Analytic Process	Agile Flexible System Responsive to Change	Meets or Anticipates Customer Need	Readiness	
		Integrates Analytic Processes		Timeliness	
		Employs Technology and Target Forecasting		Accuracy	
	Uses Methods and Techniques of Analysis to Interpret Evidence	Evidentiary Inference		Objectivity	
		Analysis of Competing Hypotheses		Usability	
		Opportunity Analysis		Relevance	
		Linchpin Analysis			
		Statistical Analysis			
		Matrix Analysis			
	Link Analysis				
	Skills	Information Gathering and Manipulation			Conveys Intelligence
		Foreign Language Proficiency			
		Expression			
		Research			
		Critical Reasoning			
		Project/Process Management			
		Basic Literacy			
		Computer Literacy			
		Communicating			
		Thinking			
	Abilities	Teaming and Collaboration		Rigorous Analysis	Competitive
		Target			
		Intelligence Community Resources			
		Government Plans and Policies			
	Knowledge	Customer Requirements and Limitations		Conveys Intelligence	Decision Points
		Available Analytic Resources			
		Exhibits a Sense of Wonder			
		Self-Motivated			
	Analyst Characteristics	Fascinated with Puzzles		Rigorous Analysis	Adds Value
		Exhibits A-ha Thinking			
Observant					
Reads					
Fruitfully Obsessed					
Intensely Concentrates					
Takes Variable Perspectives					
Makes Creative Connections					
Questions Convention					
Exhibits a Sense of Humor					
Playful					
Collaborative Technology		Enables Easy Sharing of Information	Rigorous Analysis		
	Tracks Analyst's Needs and Preferences				
	Directs to New Opportunities				

Source: Moore, (2002:20)

As a result, interpretive intelligence analysis should have capability of processing different kinds of inputs that has to be resulted in integration of analytic process. Moreover, interpretive intelligence analysis is also anticipated that the consumers' needs can be satisfied. Consumers' needs on intelligence may include readiness, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, usability relevance. Interpretive intelligence analysis can also convey intelligence that may include analytic conclusions, decision points to the decision or policy makers. Besides, interpretive analysis can have accurate analysis that should have some feature as

competitiveness, adds values and collaboration. Success of interpretative analysis can be measured by those variables.

3.3.4. Estimative Intelligence

“Estimation provides evidence concerning the past state of an entity or target. Most of the analysis conducted in estimation is concerned with the aggregation of data or identifying relationships within the data that are relevant to support a hypothesis” (McMillan, 2012:53).

Estimative intelligence analysis is based on the evaluation of past and present state of an entity or target. It utilizes aggregation of data or identified relationships within data in order to support a hypothesis. Therefore, there should be powerful estimative intelligence analysis because of the fact that estimation is essential for decisions makers who are responsible for applying and producing policies against other states vulnerabilities, abilities and goals in order to protect their own well - being. Therefore, it is essential to know other states' possible actions and responses in order to protect your interest and goods. In this point, estimative intelligence analysis has important role because policies are shaped and applied after this analyses process. To have qualified estimative intelligence analysis, analysts should have enough knowledge, experiences and reasonable evidences for their predictions and assumptions. Moore (2002) illustrates a table that all requirements and features of estimative analysis should be well design (Table 2.4).

Table 3.4: Estimative Intelligence Analyze

Analysis Type	Description and Requirements		Measures of Success			
Estimative	Proactive Analytic Processes	Anticipatory	Meets or Anticipates Customer Need	Readiness		
		Holistic Approach		Timeliness		
		Synergistic and interdependent environment		Accuracy		
	Predicts Based on Experience, Knowledge, and Modeling of Information	Analyst and Customer act as team		Objectivity		
		Evidentiary Inference		Usability		
		Trend Analysis		Relevance		
		Systems Analysis		Conveys Intelligence	Analytic Conclusions	
		Game Theory			Decision Points	
		Bayesian Analysis			Implications of Choices	
	Skills	Information Gathering and Manipulation			Rigorous Analysis	Holistic
		Foreign Language Proficiency				Competitive
		Expression				Adds Value
		Research	Highest Level Possible			
		Critical Reasoning	Collaborative			
		Project/Process Management				
	Abilities	Basic Literacy				
		Computer Literacy				
		Communicating				
	Knowledge	Thinking				
		Teaming and Collaboration				
		Target				
	Analyst Characteristics	Intelligence Community Resources				
		Government Plans and Policies				
		Customer Requirements and Limitations				
		Available Analytic Resources				
		Curious				
		Exhibits a Sense of Wonder				
		Self-Motivated				
		Fascinated with Puzzles				
		Exhibits A-Ha Thinking				
		Observant				
		Reads				
Fruitfully Obsessed						
Integrated Technology	Intensely Concentrates					
	Takes Variable Perspectives					
	Makes Creative Connections					
	Questions Convention					
	Exhibits a Sense of Humor					
	Playful					
	Extension of Analysts					
	Anticipates Analysts' Wants and Needs					
	Acts in Analysts' Interests					
	Proposes Analytic Conclusions					

Source: Moore, (2002:24)

As a result, estimative intelligence analysis also should have a comprehensive approach referring to the cooperation and communication between analysts and consumers team, absences of environmental factors. Estimative intelligence analysis is also anticipated that the consumers' needs can be satisfied. Consumers' needs on intelligence may include readiness, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, usability relevance. Estimative intelligence analysis can also convey intelligence, which may include analytic conclusions, decision points to the decision or policy makers. Besides, estimative analysis can have accurate analysis, which should have some feature as holistic, competitiveness, adds values, highest-level possibility and collaboration. Success of interpretative analysis can be measured by those variables.

3.3.5. Predictive Intelligence


“Predictive analysis is a process allowing the intelligence analyst to predict future events. Predictive analysis is not guessing but is based on solid analysis using the appropriate tools and methodologies...” (Lewis, 2005:13).

Predictive intelligence analysis is a process where intelligence analysts try to predict future events on what may happen. It utilizes appropriate tools and methodologies in order to have conclusions and results about the future events.

“True intelligence analysis is always predictive. A single event can shape the future of a field of study, direction of research, or outcome of a problem. The goal is to be able to predict this event or scenario” (Tindall, 2006:80).

It might be argued that predictive intelligence analysis is one of the most important types of intelligence analysis because of the fact that true intelligence analysis is based on predictive intelligence analysis. Moreover, one event might be essential because of its impacts that one event can shape the future of a field of study, direction of research, or outcome of a problem. It can define and describe the structure of possible studies, which may have effect on outcomes of a problem, and it can manage the research. Therefore, the main purpose of the predictive intelligence analysis is to predict the events or scenarios. Furthermore, prediction can be applied by performed using demanding, organized, collaborative and highly structured thinking and techniques, which are, require. There has to be at least two parameters in order to apply predictive intelligence analysis as using a methodology and multidisciplinary understanding of issue (McMillan, 2012). To illustrate, McMillan (2012) illustrates a graphical depiction of the Kalman Filter methodology (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5: The Kalman Filter Methodology



Source: Mcmillan, (2012:53)

Clark asserts the steps in using the Kalman Filter methodology and illustrates the concept of prediction:

- 1) "First, estimate at least one past state and the present state of the entity under observation such as a terrorist organization. Each estimate must contain some definition of the uncertainty involved with the entity estimation.
- 2) Determine the forces, which acted upon the entity to influence it to arrive at its present state and include some measure of confidence interval or measure that was used in determining these forces. If it is an extrapolation, then the same forces will be acting on the entity in an unchanged manner.
- 3) If making a projection, the same factors are acting on the entity, but a projection estimates the changes in existing forces, which are likely to occur in the future and include some measure of confidence in your estimation.

- 4) If making a forecast, it is necessary to identify the new forces that may or may influence the entity.
- 5) Determine the future state of the entity based on the assessment of forces. Stronger and more certain forces are weighted higher than those that are determined to be weaker and more uncertain" (R.M. Clark as cited in Mcmillan, 2012:56-57)

In the first place, according to the Kalman Filter methodology, intelligence analysis has to be estimate at least one past and present situation, capabilities, abilities, resources of the entity by observation in order to have more accurate, certain, reliable and clear definition about state of entity. To illustrate, Tindal (2006) asserts, "What forces (technology, organizational structure, etc.) have affected the entity during the last several years (Al Qaeda would be a good entity to practice on)?" (82). Tindall applies Kalman Filter methodology on a terrorist organization Al Qaeda. He makes a predictive analysis on terrorist organization Al-Qaeda forces that may be technology, organizational structure, resources, and capabilities in order to perceive and measure the impact on Al-Qaeda.

In the second place, by the Kelman Filter methodology on predictive intelligence analysis, forces, which have effect on entity and present state of entity, can be determined. In addition, the confidence level of forces can be measured. If the forces are exploration, same forces will be acting on the entity in an unchanged manner. "When there is little uncertainty and a high level of confidence concerning the forces that are exerting pressure on an entity, then the method used is extrapolation" (Clark as cited in Mcmillan, 2012:57). Therefore, if there is high level of confidence concerning forces the extrapolation predictive method is used that same forces will be acting on the entity in the same manner.

In the third place, by the projections, changes on existing forces or factors can be estimated. Therefore, it can be estimated that what factors or forces may have an impact on the entity. To illustrate, Tindal maintains his example on Kalman Filter methodology by asking, "What forces are expected to affect Al Qaeda over the next several years?" (Tindal, 2006:82). The possible effect of forces on the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda as an entity can be predicted by predictive intelligence analysis. In the fourth place, when forecasting is made for the predictive intelligence

analysis, the identification of the new forces is also essential for predictive intelligence analysis, since new forces may have an influence on the entity.

In the fifth place, determination of future state of entity, which is based on the assessment of forces, has to be defined and described in order to have measurement of forces' impacts. As the more powerful and certain determination of forces are increased, the stronger and more certain forces are weighted higher than those that are determined to be weaker and more uncertain.

3.4. CONCLUSION

Effectiveness of intelligence is open to the different variables that analysts and analysis may have great impact on intelligence. It might be argued that there are some features and characteristics of intelligence analysts, which may have impact on effectiveness of intelligence. Moore and Krizan argue that there might be core competencies as skills, abilities, characteristics and knowledge that make intelligence analysts more successful. Lewis (2005) argues that

“In May of 2003 the JMIC published Moore and Krizan’s model of the functional core competencies for intelligence analysis. This study offers possibly the best model of competencies by which analysts should be recruited, educated, trained, and assessed or certified against”(45).

Moore and Krizan constitutes a model as functional core competencies in order to define and construct the core vital features that intelligence analysts should have in order to produce more successful and effective intelligence. Moreover, their model offers essential answers and solutions on analysts' recruitment, education, training and assessment. To illustrate, Moore and Krizan argues that

“Given that the analyst’s purpose is to create intelligence, success means following an effective process (rigorous analysis, sound management) and creating a quality product (that conveys intelligence and meets the consumer’s needs). To do this requires appropriate abilities, knowledge and personal characteristics for rigorous intelligence analysis and production. Well-honed capabilities to communicate, cooperate and think, coupled with the skills that ensure technical competency, provide the means for intelligence work. Informed, deep knowledge of the issues and their background provides both content and context for analysis. Analysts who are motivated to succeed, to know targets, and to share that

knowledge ensure that consumers receive intelligence of the highest caliber” (2003:123).

It might be argued that Moore and Krizan enhanced a well-qualified, deterministic and structured model that might be unique (Lewis, 2005). Intelligence analysts need to have these competencies in order to have successful intelligence analysis. They argue that the purposes of intelligence analysts are to produce successful intelligence. They define success as a kind of adhering effective process where there has to be accurate, certain and reliable analysis, management and qualified production as intelligence. Furthermore, this effective process can disseminate intelligence and consumer’s needs, interests and goals can be satisfied. To realize having successful intelligence, there has to be core competencies for intelligence analysts. As intelligence analysts are getting to apply the core competencies, they have more success on intelligence, which increases efficiency of intelligence.

In addition, it might be asserted that there are fundamental types of intelligence analysis, which are descriptive, explanatory, interpretive and estimative and predictive analysis. Types of intelligence analysis is also crucial for effective intelligence because of the fact that types of intelligence analysis can strength intelligence in terms of accuracy, reliability, relevancy and clarity (Moore, 2002). In the first place, descriptive intelligence analysis is a kind of process describes and reports something having an importance. Therefore, descriptive intelligence analysis is based on the descriptions of any kinds of event, case, person, place or something, which has a value for analysis. According to the specific information, the events or cases are constructed and described which are strengthened by measurable facts or characteristics of the facts (Moore, 2002). In addition to this, explanatory intelligence analysis is based on revelation of something on analysis as facts, patterns or a context reflects rationalized analytic process. Therefore, explanatory analysis can uncover connection, plans, projects, intentions, purposes, interests or goals (Moore, 2002). Moreover, interpretive intelligence analysis is based on answering why something happens in order to have judgment. Moreover, interpretive intelligence analysis has the ability of elimination of unnecessary information, data and documents and it has

to be objective in order to cope with any kinds of prejudices and biases (Moore, 2002). Additionally, estimative intelligence analysis, which is based on the evaluation of past and present state of an entity or target, utilizes aggregation of data or identified relationships within data in order to support a hypothesis. Furthermore, estimative intelligence analysis has to be able to convey intelligence that may include analytic conclusions, decision points to the decision or policy makers. In the last place, predictive intelligence analysis is a process where intelligence analysts try to predict future events on what might be happened. It might be argued that predictive intelligence analysis is one of the most important types of intelligence analysis because of the fact that true intelligence analysis is based on predictive intelligence analysis (Lewis, 2005). Predictive intelligence analysis utilizes appropriate tools and methodologies in order to have conclusions and results about the future events. Therefore, it might be asserted that the main purpose of the predictive intelligence analysis is to predict the events or scenarios.

CHAPTER FOUR

OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

4.1. INTRODUCTION TO OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

There has been always a kind of dilemma for democratic states and societies in terms of intelligence community's oversight because of the nature of intelligence. Intelligence communities are established so that they can serve the states and societies' interest and priorities such as national, societal and economic security of the state (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014). Therefore, intelligence agencies, communities or organizations have some exceptional rights, privilege and capabilities in order to serve people. On the other hand, intelligence agencies' exceptional rights, privilege and capabilities might be potential threats to not only the democracy but also the democratic virtues (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014). They might be also in danger and threat to the efficiency of the intelligence agencies, communities or organizations because of its power and authority that may result in inefficient intelligence organizations. Therefore, intelligence agencies, communities and organizations need different kinds of controls and oversight mechanisms by executive, legislative and judicial power.

Intelligence agencies and organizations might also cause a struggle for democratic states because of its role and nature. As intelligence agencies, communities or organizations cause challenges to the democratic states, their success or efficiency might be damaged. Intelligence communities or organizations are responsible for producing knowledge regarding national threats in order to present information to the civilian elected authority (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014). In addition, intelligence agencies are responsible to advice and warn to the civilian elected authority on possible threats and risks (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014). On the other hand, all intelligence activities and implication are realized in secrecy, which might be an issue because of abuse of power and violation of authority (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014). Therefore, secrecy may cause a struggle for effectiveness of intelligence agencies, communities or organizations. To illustrate,

intelligence agencies are responsible for covert operations which may include interference to the privacy, property etc. Hence, there has to be certain defined rule, regulations and limitation on its operation and activities, which may ensure the efficiency of intelligence agencies, communities or organizations and their work.

Intelligence communities' power and authority might be abused in order to protect their interests and goals that can be contradicted with their functions, responsibilities, democratic values, rights (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014). To illustrate, they can suppress the opponents of government or other agencies hence they may create fearful environment by manipulated intelligence in order to have effect on government decision-making and change public opinion. Therefore, risk of politicization of intelligence might be serious danger and threat to democratic societies and states, which may have negative impact of intelligence organizations and their productions' objectivity and reliability (Gookins, 2008). As the intelligence communities are being politicized, the effectiveness of intelligence agencies, which can only be measured according to the well- defined functions and responsibility in democracies, is getting to be diminished. Hence, violation of power and authority of intelligence communities can only be controlled and prevented by current rules, regulations and laws in practice (Gill as cited in Filip, 2006).

As a result, democratic states' and societies' construct rules and other mechanism is not only for protecting rights and freedoms of citizens, but it is also aimed to prevent abuse of power, authority and misconduct of intelligence communities. Mainly, control mechanisms are based on democratic oversight systems and structures. In the first place, democracy is handled in definitional terms and in terms of theoretical approaches. In the second place, after having enough discussion on democracy, functions of intelligence are discussed. Democratic oversight is analyzed in the approaches and theoretical terms. In addition to this, it is also significant to examine and discuss the need for democratic oversight and oversight mechanism, which are executive, legislative and judicial.

4.2. DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY

There is a basic and fundamental definition of democracy. Ober (2007) asserts that democracy comes from Greek word is the power of people where people select government and people involve in selection process of government which is turned into the rule of people (Bühlmann, et al., 2008). Moreover, to define a society and country whether they have democracy or not, there should be free, competitive and multiparty elections. As public participating in politics, this public and their country are seen more democratic society and state. To increase the participation of public in politics, there should be some kind of basic guarantees as social, political, economic and religious rights, which result in high quality democracy.

In addition to this, there are also different definitions and perception on what is democracy such as institutions, procedures and civil liberties. To illustrate,

“Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles” (Karademir, 2012:12).

Therefore, democracy should have three essential parameters. There are institutions and procedure that reflect the preference of people on policies, and leader by some application such as elections, institutions and procedures, which limit the violation of power by executive governments, institutions and procedures. In the second place, limitation of the executive power against any kinds of abuse of authority and power is also one of the essential components. In the third place, civil liberties such as right of communication, transportation and property are also other component of democracy (Bühlmann, et al., 2008). Other aspects of principles of democracy are the results of these three components, which might be exemplified as rule of law, check and balance, are also directly related with accountability (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2014).

Furthermore, there are also other types of definition for democracy. To illustrate, Can (2002) makes a quotation from Schumpeter who argues that democracy is simply characterized a political method and political mechanism in order to choose political leaders. Hence, democracy is a method, which creates an opportunity for people in order to choose their leaders in a competitive political field for a limited period because of the fact that people may not be satisfied, so they may have an ability to change political leader for next election.

On the other hand, Can (2002) makes a quotation from Beetham argues that it should be combined liberal and Marxist tradition, so that it might have had more well design and limited definition of democracy. He asserts that there should be participations of local community institutions and self-management of cooperatively owned enterprise, which results in high participation and independency for people. Furthermore, civil rights result in free and equal political rights, freedom and political equality (Bühlmann, et al., 2008). In addition to these, having social and economic rights might be concluded as democratic autonomy. Therefore, people can easily govern themselves. As a result, democracy is comprehensive framework that has different kinds of aspects and dimensions mentioned above.

In addition to these, rather than having simply a means as representative democracy, democracy has to embrace as a cure for different kinds of problems, which may include inequality, unaccountability, injustice, secrecy, and limitations on freedom. Roland N. Stromberg argues that democracy is everything to everyone as

“In popular parlance, democracy has become confused or amalgamated or overlaid with other ideas. There is a puzzling conflation of things logically separate or even contradictory in what is commonly called democracy” (Stromberg, 2015:7)

Therefore, democracy is very complicated paradigm, which includes rights, responsibilities, limitations, restrictions, differentiations. Democracy is based on having experience on combining different pieces in a picture.

In conclusion, there are similar and different kinds of definition and perception on democracy and its feature. The basic definition of democracy might be defined as rule of people in which people involve in selection process of government.

In addition, there has to be freedom referring to the civil rights, equality referring to the political rights in order to describe society or country that has democracy (Bühlmann, et al., 2008). Furthermore, democracy can be defined as a kind of method, which creates an opportunity for people in order to choose their leaders in a competitive political field for a limited period (Schumpeter as cited in Can, 2002). Moreover, this methodology may create an advantageous for the people that they can change the governments, political leaders or political authority through elections. In addition to this, there has to be some features of democracy and democratic states as there are human rights, which protect people against violence, abuse of authority, torture, etc. Furthermore, there has to be bills of the rights result in right to vote that provide justice in terms of equal participation. There are institutions and procedures that reflect the preference of people on policies and leader by some application such as elections, institutions and procedures, which limit the violation of power by the executive governments, institutions and procedures. Civil liberties such as right of communication, transportation, property, and trade are also other components of democracy. Therefore, citizens' political and social lives can be protected in that way. As a result, it might be argued that democracy has quite exhaustive virtues, methods, concepts and theories, which may have direct impact on effective intelligence and communities.

4.3. FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN DEMOCRACY

There are different kinds of intelligence communities' models in the world that result in different kinds of expectation and functions. Generally, in developed democratic countries, intelligence services are separated from police and law enforcement institution (DCAF, 2002). The only responsibility of intelligence services is to collect necessary information and delivering the production to the decision makers (Gookings, 2008).

On the other hand, some intelligence communities those have more responsibilities than others which have as a part of executive. Therefore, intelligence agencies not only have to product intelligence, they also have to carry out an

executive action that can be seen in the United States of America. In USA, FBI accounts for attorney general or officers of Department of Justice if there is a need regarding on oversight on intelligence communities' production (Vitkauskas, 1999). As a result, function of intelligence communities can be changing according to the state's structure and philosophy. In Canada, intelligence community is separated from police and expectations from intelligence community are well designed (Vitkauskas, 1999). Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) have to advise decision makers, the government and law enforcement authority in investigating threats against national security. Hence, the fundamental priority of CSIS is based on investigation of threats against security of Canada in terms of economic, societal and physical security. Moreover, CSIS are responsible for informing government on their activities in the intelligence process. Furthermore, CSIS have to provide sensitive analysis and interpretation of their productions. Indeed, to be effective, CSIS provides advice and early warning to the decision makers. As a result,

“It appears that, in dealing with threats to national security, security intelligence service first collects intelligence and provides intelligence assessments and advises the government. In addition, it works closely with law enforcement institutions in the detection, apprehension and prosecution of those responsible for security-related offences” (Vitkauskas, 1999:21).

An intelligence service is responsible for producing intelligence, interpretation of intelligence for decision makers and supports the governments while governments have to apply a policy. In addition, the main responsibility of intelligence community is having good intelligence process, which includes concentrated issue or case, effective analysis of information and dissemination of production. Furthermore, function of intelligence is providing accurate, certain and important information for decision makers. According to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2012) report, information should be available to answer:

“What is happening or will happen in the decision maker's operating environment, How and why we got in the present situation, The whole picture including particular details, What others are doing, What others have not seen or what is needed in order to see more than others do, and Elements to make an overview based on all said before” (18).

Therefore, intelligence should deliver certain information about environments, others and their vulnerabilities and capabilities. As a decision-maker, the expectation from intelligence service is based on certainty of information that is one of the main functions. Another perspective on function of intelligence, which is military perspective, is based on operational capability and activities. According to the US's Department of Defense Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence (J-2), intelligence should have capacity so that enemies' ability could be degraded or destroyed by using technology, telecommunications etc. (J-2, 2013).

Intelligence should provide essential information on adversary's vulnerabilities, capabilities and intention in the process of decision for consumers (J-2, 2013). In addition, intelligence should deliver very detailed analysis of descriptive features, which may include physical environment, and possibilities of enemy's future capabilities and intention (J-2, 2013). Intelligence should provide critical reviews and analysis in order to explore plans and possible operations of adversary that commanders should have reliable and reasonable assumptions and predictions. Experts who are well educated and practiced have to in their capability to receive plans and possible operations of enemies, analysis of enemies' vulnerabilities and capabilities from different perspective and reliable and valid prediction on enemies such as what they can do, what kinds of sources they have, what are their priorities etc. (J-2, 2013).

As a result, expectations of intelligence service are very high which also affects the perception of intelligence in terms of function. Uncovering adversary intent and eagerness are one of the fundamental functions of intelligence, therefore, intelligence experts have to make some future projections and release some outcomes about enemies (J-2, 2013). To illustrate, intelligence officers are responsible for valid and reliable prediction on adversary future capabilities and vulnerabilities in order to get how adversary can react for different cases etc.

It may be concluded that, there are different kinds of expectations on intelligence, which defines functions of intelligence in democracy. All of them have different kinds of priorities and interests on function of intelligence. One a hand, intelligence agencies may also be responsible for investigation of threats against

security of a state in terms of economic, societal and physical security. Moreover, intelligence agencies may be responsible for informing government on their activities in the intelligence process. On the other hand, intelligence agencies, communities or organizations may be responsible for producing and dissemination of intelligence to the government decision and policy makers. It is essential to understand the function of intelligence agencies in democratic states and societies because it may have an impact and determine democratic oversight on intelligence, which will be also examined.

4.4. DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT ON INTELLIGENCE

Democratic oversight is a kind of monitoring and controlling intelligence agencies by executive, legislative and judiciary power. These three-separated powers have mechanism, procedures, rules and regulations on intelligence agencies, communities and organizations. The executive power that has immediate control, decides on Intelligence agencies' budget, responsibilities and priorities. The legislature power, which is based on parliamentary control by that determines and defines laws. To illustrate, the rule of law is essential aspects of democratic oversight. For that reason, Intelligence agencies should be accountable to law, which should have harmony with international norms, and laws. Moreover, law defines Intelligence agencies' responsibility, duties and capabilities. Intelligence agencies should have some certain rules and regulation, which prevent the arbitrary use of authority and power to have public's trust and confidence.

Therefore, rule of law elaborates rules and regulations are crucial for democratic oversight, since, "it is the only way of ensuring the rights of individuals against the state and against one another" (Karademir, 2012:52). The judiciary power, which applies laws to the intelligence agencies and officers, is responsible for judgment of intelligence communities' policies and applications whether they violate the laws or not.

In addition to these, there are some international norms and standards for oversight of security and Intelligence agencies. Generally, these standards and norms

define and describe how they should be accountable for laws, states and representatives of people and in what kinds of way might be more transparent. Professors Born and Leigh conduct a chart where there are international organizations and institutions' norms and standards are well-described in Table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1: Organization, Standards and Sources

Organisation	Norm/Standard	Source
UNDP	Democratic civil control of the military, police and other security forces (report enumerates principles of democratic governance in the security sector)	Human Development Report (2002)
OSCE	'The democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police' (specified by a detailed set of provisions)	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994)
Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly)	'Internal security services must respect the European Convention on Human Rights...Any interference by operational activities of internal security services with the European Convention on Human Rights must be authorised by law.' 'The legislature should pass clear and adequate laws putting the internal security services on a statutory basis'.	Recommendation 1402 (1999)
EU (European Parliament)	Specifying the 'Copenhagen Criteria' for accession to include: 'legal accountability of police, military and secret services [...].'	Agenda 2000, § 9
Summit of the Americas	'The constitutional subordination of armed forces and security forces to the legally constituted authorities of our states is fundamental to democracy'	Quebec Plan of Action (2001)
Inter-Parliamentary Union	'Democratic oversight of intelligence structures should begin with a clear and explicit legal framework, establishing intelligence organisations in state statutes, approved by parliament. Statutes should further specify the limits of the service's powers, its methods of operation, and the means by which it will be held accountable'.	<i>Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices</i> , Handbook for Parliamentarians no. 5. Geneva: IPU/DCAF, 2003, p. 64.
Assembly of Western European Union (WEU)	'Calls on the national parliaments to: (1) Support plans for reforming intelligence systems, while defending parliamentary prerogatives with a view to more efficient and effective democratic scrutiny of intelligence gathering activities and of the use to which that information is put.'	Resolution 113 (adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 4 December 2002 [9 th sitting].)
OECD	The security system [including security and intelligence services] should be managed according to the same principles of accountability and transparency that apply across the public sector, in particular through greater civil oversight of security processes.	DAC Guidelines and Reference Series 'Security system reform and governance: policy and good practice', 2004

Source: Born and Leigh, (2005:14)

As a result, institutions and organizations have different kinds of functions in order to have control on security and intelligence agencies. Executive controls are based on the tasking, defining priorities and making resources available. Moreover, executive controls are based on the general problems, financial concerns and policies such as defining of intelligence agency's budget. Legislature controls are based on law making, regulations and rules. The judiciary control is based on judgment regarding wrong applications, policies and actions of intelligence agencies (Born and Leigh, 2005). Hence, democratic oversight of Intelligence agencies is essential to have more accountability, transparency, respect to the rule of law that increase the level of efficiency of intelligence and her communities.

4.5. NEEDS FOR DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT

Intelligence agencies are crucial parts of the national security and protection of the democratic state. As democratic states have more powerful and capable intelligence agencies; they may have more security and protection of their goals, purposes and interests. However, there might be a crucial issue on this securitization and protection of state's goals, purposes and interests because of the fact that the nature of the intelligence, agencies, communities or institutions' working style and structure. Therefore, it might be argued that there are several reasons to have oversight mechanism on intelligence agencies, communities or institutions.

In the first place, Born and Mesevage (2012) declares that there are three main reasons as enhancing democratic governance of intelligence service, to uphold the rule of law, to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence agencies, communities or institutions' activity. According to Born and Mesevage,

“One of the fundamental principles of democratic governance is the accountability of state institutions to the electorate. Furthermore, because intelligence services make use of public funds, the public has a right to know whether those funds are being used in a proper, legal, effective, and efficient manner” (2012:17).

Intelligence agencies, communities and institutions have to be accountable to the public on their intelligence works. Moreover, public have a right to know how

their money is spent and whether there is an abuse of authority on intelligence communities and their works. Therefore, public have right of check and monitoring whether intelligence communities or institutions use funds in a proper, legal, effective and efficient manner. Born and Mesegave argue that

“Intelligence services, like any other government agency, are obligated to respect and uphold the rule of law. Even the existence of a threat to national security is not sufficient reason for an intelligence service to break the law. Illegal activity on the part of an intelligence service not only violates the rule of law that the service is obligated to protect but also brings the service and the government into disrepute domestically and internationally. In particular, the use of special powers by intelligence services needs to be closely monitored because of the potential that exists for the violation of human rights” (2012:18).

Intelligence agencies as a tool are essential part of states’ security. However, it can be argued that intelligence agencies, communities and institutions cannot break the law which is not tolerated. Even though intelligence communities assert that some actions and policies are inevitably for national security, whole activities and works of intelligence communities have to be done in conformity to the law. Moreover, violation of authority and rule of law may results in undesirable conclusions such as disrepute of government and intelligence communities in national and international fields. Therefore, intelligence agencies, communities and institutions have to be monitored. Born and Mesegave assert that

“Because intelligence services play a vital role in protecting national security and because their resources are limited, it is important that those resources be used effectively and efficiently rather than wastefully and without purpose. Thus, a well-designed intelligence oversight system needs to monitor whether the intelligence services are indeed deploying their resources in a manner that achieves the priorities set for them by the executive while obtaining the most value for the taxpayer money spent”(2012:18).

Intelligence communities have crucial responsibilities and functions in order to maintenance of national security. They have limited resources, which cannot be used wastefully and without purpose. Therefore, effective and efficient uses of resources are also depended on the democratic oversight of intelligence agencies, communities and institutions. Intelligence agencies need to have well designed oversight mechanism in order to control whether they are on the right path or not in terms of their responsibilities, works and policies.

In the second place, secrecy is one of the core requirements of intelligence organizations and agencies. On one hand, one of the core requirements of democratic states and societies is transparency and accountability. Therefore, even if intelligence agencies need to have secrecy in order to protect the state and societies' interests and priorities, they have to be respectful for the democratic accountability and civilian control. On the other hand, even if democratic countries have openness and transparency intelligence services' operations and actions are based on secrecy. Secrecy might be called as shield for their operations and actions. However, secrecy might be an issue for democratic state and societies owing to the fact that intelligence agencies may abuse this secrecy on behalf of their goals and priorities. As a result, it is essential that executive, legislative and judicial powers should have a close eye on the Intelligence agencies, communities and institutions' works and actions.

In the third place, intelligence services may have right to apply certain policies and operations which may violate the citizens' rights such as interfering with citizens' property or their private communications with others. Therefore, it is clear that there is a limitation on human rights that there has to be a control and monitoring system by democratic oversight. There are serious concerns on security and intelligence agencies actions and implications that may challenge the human rights of the citizens. According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (COE):

“Serious concerns exist that internal security services of COE member States often put the interest of what they perceive as those of national security and their country above respects for the rights of the individual. Since, in addition, internal security services are often inadequately controlled, there is a high risk of abuse of power and violations of human rights, unless legislative and constitutional safeguards are provided”(as cited in Born and Leigh, 2005:16).

Internal security services, which may also include intelligence service, might be seen above the citizens' rights and interest. Therefore, such a perception results in insufficient control and monitoring of intelligence that there is high risk and threat of abuse of power authority. There might be open threat to the human rights unless having legislative, constitutional and executive oversight mechanism is provided.

In the fourth place, in the process of Cold War and after the September 11 2001, intelligence agencies and organizations are readjusted and modified according to the new threats and risks such as nuclear and terrorist attacks, epidemic illnesses, failed states etc. Born and Leigh assert that

“During the post-Cold War era and especially after 11 September 2001, the intelligence communities of nearly all states are in a process of readjustment to the new security threats. The greatest perceived threat to the functioning of democratic societies is no longer that of a foreign military invasion, but rather organized crime, terrorism, spillovers of regional conflicts or failed states, and the illegal trafficking of people and goods. This readjustment process should be under the supervision of the elected civilian authorities who can provide assurance that the restructuring of the services are aligned to the people’s need” (2005:16).

Hence, the traditional threats such as foreign military invasion are no longer exist and high risk. In such a political, economic and social paradigm, this readjustment policies and implications need to be controlled by civilian elected authority who guarantees citizens’ rights and interests against any kinds of violation of power.

In the fifth place, intelligence agencies are responsible for production of knowledge by having some process and analysis of information that is ordered by civilian elected authority. To illustrate, intelligence officers are responsible for evaluation of possible threats. However, this evaluation and assessment cannot be politicized. Bruneu and Matei assert that

“An additional danger is intelligence politicization, which can happen two ways: “down” (i.e., policymakers “dictate” to the intelligence professionals what product they want); and “up” (with intelligence professionals willingly providing policymakers with the product they know the decision makers want). Politicization leads to the misuse by the executive branch, for its own political ends, of intelligence agencies and their inherent special privileges” (2011:63).

Politicization issue of intelligence is one of the hazardous dangers for society and state because of the fact that intelligence agencies may lose their functionality regarding on protection of state’s security, goals, priorities and interests. Politicization issue can be occurred in two ways. First one is based on the desire of policy makers coming from down. Policy makers may force to the intelligence officers in order to produce intelligence on behalf of their priorities, interest and

goals. Second one is based on the possible interests of decision makers coming from up. Intelligence officers and policy makers willingly try to produce intelligence that decision makers want to have it. Both of them are serious issue for the intelligence communities because of the fact that intelligence agencies' capabilities and resources are used to gain particular advantageous. Therefore, to get rid of politicization of intelligence, there should be democratic oversight mechanism that prevents the politicization of intelligence agencies. By this way, all kinds of assessments and evaluation of intelligence agencies are based on objectivity and citizens' needs and priorities.

In the sixth place, intelligence agencies and organization can be used as a tool against citizens and all opposition parts of societies unless having a democratic rules and regulations that limit and define the responsibilities and duties of intelligence agencies. To illustrate, if there is no culture of democracy and democratic oversight in a state, there might be authoritative or totalitarian regimes that might act against human rights, values and societies' interests and priorities. Therefore, there has to be powerful institutions and structures that define and limit intelligence agencies' power and duties.

In conclusion, intelligence agencies are one of the essential parts of national security for states therefore intelligence agencies' success and achievements have crucial role for states' interests and goals. Because of these reasons, which are examined above, intelligence agencies need to have well established oversight mechanisms in order to have control and monitor whether the intelligence agencies work in a proper way or not. Hence, democratic oversight mechanisms are important indicators in order to keep intelligence agencies' effectiveness that there are some theories and approaches on democratic oversight on Intelligence agencies.

4.6. APPROACHES ON DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES

Gill argues that there should be many different kinds of control and oversight mechanisms on intelligence agencies in order to prevent a violation of power and

abuse of authority. He discusses and outlines four levels of control and oversight for intelligence agencies (as cited in Filip, 2006). First one is based on the internal mechanism, which has to be applied by the intelligence agency itself (Gill as cited in Filip, 2006). Second one is based on the executive power's control and monitoring that generally is applied by parliamentary decision and rule (Gill as cited in Filip, 2006). Third, one is based on the other kinds of state powers' applications such as legislative or the judicial power. Last one is based on the civil societies' control and monitoring. Therefore, Gill's structure reflects a separated powers check and balance model. By this way, democratic oversight of intelligence agencies, communities can be controlled also the efficiency of intelligence agencies can be maintained.

Lowenthal argues that control and oversight of intelligence are one of the most complicated and compulsive issues because "Sed quiscustodiet ipso custodies? But who will guard the guards? (as cited in Filip, 2006:35). He discusses that it can be coped with intelligence agency problems in terms of accountability and transparency by having executive, legislative authority and power's control and overseeing. Hence, he argues that executive and legislative branches of state have to be responsible for controlling intelligence agencies' activities and operations.

Bruneau and Dombroski highlight that "within the realm of civilian control of the armed forces as a subset of civil-military relations, probably the most problematic issue is control of the intelligence services" (as cited in Filip, 2006:35). They emphasize that there is a serious contradiction between democratic values such as respect for the law, openness accountability and transparency and Intelligence agencies' actions and implementations, which are based on secrecy. Furthermore, they claim that effective and successful democratic oversight process is shaped by having enough control and overseeing on intelligence agencies. They also refer to the structure and features of monitoring mechanism by stating that "a common mechanism to control intelligence is by separating it into different agencies, to control intelligence is by separating it into different agencies to prevent any single entity from having a monopoly on its production or use" (as cited in Filip, 2006:36). They emphasize the importance of separated and independent monitoring branches as legislative, judicial or public because of the fact that self-monitoring mechanisms

by the executive or internal way might be subjective. Hence, this situation might be resulted in insufficient check and control systems.

Maier and Huluban assert that there are overseers and controllers that should be in harmony between each other in order to have efficient controlling and monitoring (as cited in Filip, 2006). They refer to the positions of Intelligence officers and policy makers. Both of them should perceive their interest and priorities that make easier to evaluate dynamics. Hence they can easily perceive the cases whether they have to be controlled or not.

In conclusion, it might be argued that almost all views emphasize the importance of oversight mechanisms and systems for intelligence communities and organizations. Separated control mechanisms and systems may result in more sufficient conclusions that the efficiency of intelligence agencies can be easily maintained (Bruneau and Dombroski as cited in Filip, 2006). Furthermore, it might be argued intelligence agencies, communities, institutions' accountability, and transparency challenge can be solved by control mechanism. Even if there are some differentiations on how to control and check the intelligence communities' actions and implications, it is argued that there should be independent and powerful mechanisms or systems on Intelligence agencies, communities and institutions such as executive, legislative and judicial (Gill as cited in Filip, 2006).

4.7. DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT MECHANISM

Generally, in democratic states, there are independent and separated powers as executive, legislative and judicial are responsible for oversight of intelligence communities and their activities. All of them have different and specific rules and policies in order to maintain accountability and transparency of intelligence agencies. Moreover, these mechanisms are essential for the effectivity of intelligence and intelligence agencies, communities. It might be asserted that there is a direct connection between oversight mechanism and effectiveness of intelligence and intelligence agencies, communities and institutions. As the oversight mechanisms are empowered, the possibility of having effective intelligence is also increased.

4.7.1. Executive Oversight

On the one hand, intelligence agencies, communities and institutions are essential organizations for government because of the fact that they are also responsible to apply governments' policies and priorities on national security agenda. However, nature of intelligence secrecy might be an issue because of abuse of power and authority. Therefore, it is not only to have internal control system, it also has to be external control systems such as governmental monitoring systems.

On the other hand, governments might misuse intelligence agencies. There is open threat that Intelligence agencies might be turned into a political party organ (Bruneau and Matei, 2011). Thus, all responsibilities and duties of intelligence agencies have to be defined and described by laws. Moreover, Intelligence agencies, communities, institutions, and their members should have assurances that guarantee of protection of their social, economic and political rights. By this way, intelligence agencies can get rid of the potential threats and force come from governments and they do not have to obey to apply government's priorities and interests, which might be subjective and not related to the national security of the state. Therefore, there has to be more effective and objective executive oversight.

It would be a value that it should be perceived the responsibility of executive oversight. Hence, it has to be understood the functions of executive overseeing. Marina Caparini has interesting argumentation on decision makers responsibilities on intelligence agencies and how the functions of executive oversight can be described. According to Caparini executive oversight has different functions as

- “Involvement in the elaboration of the mandate and statute of the intelligence agencies (through governmental decisions, ordinances and emergency ordinances).
- Projection of the budget levels and allocations (synonymous with a closer implication in spending choices, as opposed to the legislative).
- The executive usually goes through a complex internal and inter-agency process of deliberation and negotiation regarding the finances fixed for every intelligence agency. It is then approved, or not, by Parliament.
- Monitoring intelligence activities through inspectors and other similar institutional arrangements” (as cited in Filip, 2006:38).

As a result, function of executive oversight is based on detailed examinations and controls. All activities of intelligence agencies, communities and institutions have to be depending on the written rules and regulations. The financial structure of intelligence agencies have to be well designed and controlled. How and where intelligence agencies spend money and investments have to be defined. All of these are required functions need to have developed monitoring system. Therefore, there has to be well-designed monitoring system, which has to be established by executive power.

The intelligence communities need to have executive oversight for guiding intelligence activities and directions in order to have legitimacy and accountability. Before having certain activities, intelligence agencies required processes in order to produce knowledge have to be checked and controlled whether intelligence process is done in a proper way or not. Therefore, democratic governments may establish some departments, councils or committees in order to observe intelligence agencies' activities and actions. According to the DCAF (2002) working papers series no.13, the mission of an executive intelligence oversight-board can be to:

- “Review periodically the internal guidelines of each service concerning the legality or propriety of intelligence activities.
- report periodically on its findings and any activities that raise serious questions of legality or propriety
- Forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning activities in which a question of legality has been raised.
- Conduct such investigations of the intelligence activities of the services as it deems necessary to carry out its functions” (2002:10- 11).

Therefore, DCAF (2002) offers that periodically the intelligence agencies' activities and actions should be checked and be controlled in terms of legality and accountability. It might be reports, reviews boards or investigations under the authority of executive branch. Moreover, According to the DCAF working paper series no.13, the mission of a policy review committee can be to:

- “Establish requirements and priorities for intelligence.
- Review the intelligence program and budget proposals and report to the government, the minister or prime minister as to whether the resource allocations for intelligence respond to the intelligence requirements of the government.

- Promote collaboration between the services and provide checks and balances within the system.
- Conduct periodic reviews of intelligence products, evaluate the quality of the product, and develop policy guidance to ensure quality intelligence and to meet changing intelligence requirements.
- Submit an annual report.
- Make recommendations on intelligence matters” (11).

As a result, requirements, interests and priorities have to be determined by executive power. Intelligence agencies’ budget has to be determined and it has to be controlled whether intelligence agencies use its financial resources in a proper way or not. Furthermore, there might be a collaboration mechanism that also increases the control and efficiency of intelligence agencies between other security agencies. All productions of intelligence agencies have to be analyzed in term of quality and relevance that is part of recommendation.

In conclusion, intelligence communities are crucial for applications of national security policies. Intelligence communities have different kinds of capabilities and power in order to serve the national security and its policies. However, nature of intelligence might be an issue because of violation of power and authority. Therefore, there has to be internal and external control referring to the executive oversight mechanism. Executive oversight is one of the essential parts of intelligence agencies. To have more effective monitoring and control system, there has to be well designed structures including some committee, boards and review mechanisms. Moreover, to have more powerful, executive oversight, professors Born and Leigh assert that

- “Intelligence legislation should contain two distinct rights of access: the right of the executive to relevant information in the hands of the agency and the right of the agency heads to have access to the respective minister;
- The Minister should be legally responsible for the formulation of policy on security and intelligence matters. He should also be legally entitled to receive agency reports at regular intervals as well as being legally responsible for the approval of matters of political sensitivity” (2005:59).

Therefore, there should be interdependency between executive branches and intelligence agencies in order to have accountability that is more powerful and

transparency by some rights such as accessing each other easily. Furthermore, responsibilities of ministers should be well defined and dependent on the rules and regulations, which increase the responsibility of the ministry. Hence, relevant ministry is forced to be more attentive on intelligence activities and policies.

4.7.2. Legislative Oversight

Legislative or parliamentary oversight can be categorized as the one of the most representative oversight mechanism in democratic states because of the fact that directly elected representatives of citizens apply this overseeing. In a democratic system, source of power is based on citizens' preferences, priorities and interests, which are represented in parliamentary system because legislative branch confirms "dependence on the people" (as cited in Filip,2006:37). Hence, legislative oversight is important because it represents people and their will it may directly regulate intelligence communities and their activities.

Filip (2006) makes a quotation from Giraldo in order to indicate the importance of legislative oversight. He asserts that Legislative oversight is also essential because of "the accountability of the intelligence community, to maintain the quality of the policy, and to ensure the transparency and legitimacy of the policy and consequently the stability of policy" (as cited in Filip, 2006:37). Therefore, legislative participation may increase the level of transparency and accountability of intelligence agencies. As intelligence communities have more transparency and accountability, they may have more legitimacy by legislative oversight. Furthermore, legislative oversight may prevent the executive and intelligence agencies' abuse of power and authority because of the fact that executive power is also examined and controlled in parliamentary branch. Hence, representative of executive branch are responsible for informing the members of parliament who are representative of citizens.

In a democracy, all fields of state's activities and implications are open for parliamentary oversight including intelligence communities too. Legislative or parliament's involvement on intelligence oversight may help to guarantee that

security and intelligence organizations are serving the state's interest and preferences by respecting laws.

Parliamentary oversight of the security and intelligence communities are a valuable tool for democratic societies. Born and Leigh prepare a well-designed comparison of parliamentary oversight of intelligence communities in seven selected democratic states in America, Europe and Africa. Table 4.2 demonstrates the current state regulations and policies for those selected seven democratic states. These states have at least one or more parliamentary oversight mechanism on intelligence agencies. These mechanisms and structure also include oversight of intelligence on budget, legality, efficiency, accountability and transparency. Therefore, by having such control mechanism in parliaments and legislative branches make the control of intelligence agencies easier in terms of democratic oversight.

Table 4.2: Countries, Oversight Bodies and Mechanism

(1) Country	(2) Mandate of Oversight Body	(3) Budget Control Powers of Oversight Body	(4) Type of oversight body; Membership, Clearance, Appointment of Oversight Body	(5) Subpoena powers	(6) Prior notification requests
(A) Argentina	Reviews legality and effectiveness of the services, including citizens' complaints.	Both scrutiny and authorisation powers.	Parliamentary oversight body of 14 MPs as member, appointed by parliament. There is no security vetting.	No.	Not regulated by the law.
(B) Canada	The SIRC checks legality and efficacy of the agency.	SIRC has no authorisation powers, yet can comment on CSIS's budget.	External independent expert oversight body of max. 5 experts as members, appointed by Prime Minister. Members are under oath.	Yes.	No prior notification required.
(C) Norway	The oversight focuses primarily on legality of the services, including human rights protection.	No budget oversight function.	External expert parliamentary oversight body; max. 7 members (non-MPs) but appointed by parliament.	Yes, all persons summoned to appear before the Committee are obliged to do so.	Agencies are forbidden from consulting with the Committee about future operations.
(D) Poland	Overviews, legality, policy, administration and international cooperation of services. Effectiveness is not checked.	Commission scrutinises the services' draft budget and its implementation.	Parliamentary oversight body: max. 9 MPs as members, appointed by parliament. All members undergo security vetting.	No.	No legal duty.
(E) South Africa	Its oversight purview includes legislation, activities, administration, financial management and expenditure of the services.	The committee does not oversee the Intelligence services' budgets per se, but its purview includes financial management of the services.	Parliamentary oversight body; committee consists of 15 MPs, appointed by President. Members are vetted.	Yes	No legal duty.
(F) United Kingdom	Finance, administration and policy of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ with a view on efficiency. It does not check legality.	Committee scrutinises the finance together with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee but has no authorisation power.	Parliamentary oversight body of 9 members drawn from both Houses of Parliament, appointed by the Prime Minister.	No.	No legal duty.
(G) United States	Reviews all intelligence agencies. Approves top intelligence appointments. It checks both legality and effectiveness of the services.	Both oversight committees possess budget authorisation powers.	Two Congressional oversight committees, consisting of 20 (House) and 17 (Senate) Congressmen, appointed by House and Senate leaders.	Yes, on both committees.	Yes, except in times of acute emergency, in which the agencies can delay reporting for 2 days.

Source: Born and Leigh, (2005:78)

Parliamentary oversight should be clearly independent from the ruling party by applying some policies. Parliament or legislative power has to be responsible for appointing and removing members of the oversight committees. Moreover, to have more objective committees and commissions, there has to be representation of all

parties according to their number of members in the parliaments. Government ministers' involvements in committee and commissions memberships have to be limited according to the laws, which guarantee the objectivity of committees and commissions. By this way, the level of independency of committee and commissions are increased. Furthermore, the chair has to be selected by the parliaments, which might be minimizing the domination and manipulation of the ruling parties.

In parliamentary systems, there are some committees to have more strength control on Intelligence agencies. Hence, such kinds of oversight committees have to check and control whether intelligence communities' work in a defined and legitimate way or not. The oversight committees should have eagerness to be curious on intelligence communities' activities and actions. These kinds of committees should have awareness on essentiality of access to information regarding intelligence communities' activities and. The committee might have investigators in order to access information. The investigators may produce reports that increase the trust and accountability on intelligence communities.

On the other hand, intelligence communities have the awareness on accountability to the parliaments and her committees. To illustrate, Geneva Center For the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) (2002) argues in working paper series no.13 that

- "Keep the oversight committee informed concerning intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities.
- Provide the oversight committee upon request any information or document in the possession, custody or control of the service or person paid by the service.
- Report in a timely fashion to the oversight committee information relating to intelligence activities that are illegal or improper and corrective actions that are taken or planned" (2002:12).

Therefore, Intelligence communities should have consciousness to inform parliamentary committees. As intelligence agencies inform the legislative branches, they may become democratic state organizations since they are getting more accountable and transparent in front of the parliaments that representative of citizens.

In conclusion, it might be asserted that legislative or parliamentary oversight can be categorized as the one of the most representative oversight mechanism owing to the fact that elected representatives of citizens apply legislative oversight mechanism. In democratic systems and states, source of power is based on citizens' preferences, priorities and interests that are represented in parliamentary. Furthermore, intelligence communities are under the observation of legislative or parliamentary part of democratic states, which are responsible for the protection of whole citizens' social, political and economic interests, priorities and goals. Therefore, intelligence communities cannot apply or act according to their own interest and goals, which may also increase the level of effectiveness of intelligence communities. In addition to this, legislative or parliamentary oversight may increase the level of transparency and accountability of intelligence communities. As intelligence communities have more transparency and accountability, they may have more legitimacy by legislative oversight. Therefore, legislative oversight may prevent intelligence communities' abuse of power and abuse of authority.

4.7.3. Judicial Oversight

Judicial oversight of intelligence's communities is based on the control of legality of the Intelligence communities' activities and works whether they are in conformity to the constitutions, laws and human rights. The purpose of judicial oversight is application of legal frameworks that define the rules regulations, capabilities and limits. Hence, judicial oversight might be seen as a guarantee against the breaking of the laws.

Rule of law is essential aspects of democratic judicial oversight. For this reason, intelligence communities and their members have to be accountable to law, which should have harmony with international norms, and laws. Moreover, law defines intelligence agencies' responsibility and capabilities how they do an investigation according to the laws and what are the steps that intelligence agencies have to follow, what are the procedure of covert operations and limits. Therefore, rule of law elaborates the rules and regulations, which are crucial for democracy and

democratic oversight, since, “it is the only way of ensuring the rights of individuals against the state and against one another” (Karademir, 2012:52).

Intelligence communities and their members should respect to the human rights, which protect individuals from any kind of inhumanity and degrading treatment. Human rights and intelligence activities have essential connection in democratic states. To guarantee respect for human rights, international organizations have some agreements, laws and regulations. To illustrate, on December 17, 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a rule code 34/169 for law enforcement officials that all agencies of criminal justice system, every law enforcement agencies should be accountable and representative of community that empowers their legitimacy in term of democratic principles (Can, 2002:19). Therefore, even if there is no direct reference to the intelligence agencies, intelligence agencies also are responsible to this rule because of the fact that intelligence communities might be seen as part of law enforcement system.

Intelligence communities and their members are part of democratic state that they cannot be considered above the law. Hence, intelligence communities and their members have to have consciousness that all activities have to be accountable to the laws. Furthermore, constitutions have to include some certain rules, which protect the individuals’ rights and freedoms. By constitutional rules and regulations, intelligence communities and their members cannot have the ability to violate any kinds of human rights. To illustrate, any kinds of arbitrary activities of intelligence agencies have to be sentenced to harsh penalties that minimize the threats of violation to citizen rights.

Judicial oversight is also responsible for effective control of intelligence communities. There has to be types of structures that should have some procedures and regulations. In these structures, the individuals’ human rights and constitutional rights have to be protected. According to Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) (2002) argues in working paper series no.13 the attorney general should follow the some steps in order to have judicial oversight to be effective as,

- "Receive and consider reports from the services.
- Report to the minister responsible, the prime minister or the president in a timely fashion any intelligence activities that raise questions of legality.
- Report to the minister responsible, the prime minister or the president decisions made or actions taken in response to reports from the services.
- Inform the minister responsible, the prime minister or the president of legal judgment affecting the operations of intelligence services.
- Establish or approve procedures for the conduct of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with law, protect constitutional rights and privacy. The procedures should also ensure that the use, dissemination and storage of information about citizens acquired through intelligence activities are limited to that necessary to achieve governmental purposes" (2002:14).

As a result, attorney in general should establish a system, which ensures the intelligence activities are compliance with law and constitutional rights of citizens. Intelligence agencies should receive the reports in order to control whether their activities are in compliance with constitution and laws.

Moreover, there are many kinds of attorney general examples from all around the world in order to control intelligence activities through the courts of law, which is also part of judicial oversight. For instance, attorney general in Canada has right to the interception and monitoring of communications of the intelligence agencies. In Australia, "Judges may be appointed as prescribed authorities to preside over proceedings involving actions arising from issued warrants where there is a dispute of violation of rights" (Netshitenzhe, 2005:17). As a result, attorney general or judges may have the rights that make oversight more effective in terms of judicial oversight.

In conclusion, it might be argued that judicial oversight of intelligence communities' control of intelligence communities' works in terms of constitutions, laws and human rights. Furthermore, it might be asserted that one of the main aims of judicial oversight is applications of legal frameworks, which define the rules regulations, capabilities and limits. Law has to define and describe intelligence communities' duties, responsibilities and functions and intelligence communities have to be accountable to the law. Furthermore, law can force intelligence communities in order to obey to the rules and regulations. Intelligence communities and their member have to have consciousness that all activities hast to be accountable to the laws. It can be argued that as intelligence communities can be accountable to

the law by application of judicial oversight mechanism, the possibility of effectiveness of the intelligence communities and intelligence is also increased. Therefore, judicial oversight of intelligence communities is also crucial for the effective intelligence communities and intelligence because judicial oversight mechanism can evaluate and check whether intelligence communities apply policies and works within the law frame. In addition to these, intelligence communities and their members has to respect human rights, which protect individuals from any kind of torture that can be guaranteed. By rules and regulations, intelligence communities and their members cannot have the ability to violate any kinds of human rights, which may have positive impact on having effective intelligence communities and intelligence.

4.3.8. Conclusion

It might be argued that the democratic oversight of intelligence is essential in order to have effective and efficient intelligence and intelligence communities owing to the fact that democratic states and societies construct rules, controls and other mechanism for not only protecting rights and freedoms of citizens. It is also aimed to prevent abuse of power and authority, and misconduct of intelligence agencies, communities or organizations. To have well-structured democratic oversight mechanisms and system, democracy and democratic values have to be defined and perceived which might be increased the efficiency of intelligence.

It can be argued that democracy is rule of people in which people involve in selection process of government by free, competitive and multiparty elections (Ober, 2007). Furthermore, democracy can be defined as a kind of method, which creates an opportunity for people in order to choose their leaders in a competitive political field for a limited period (as cited in Can, 2002). By this methodology, there might be advantageous for the people that they can change the governments, political leaders or political authority by the elections. Components of democracy are also essential for oversight mechanism. Hence, there are human rights to protect people against violence, abuse of authority or any kinds of torture. There are different kinds of

institutions and procedures that reflect the preference of people on policies and leader by some application such as elections, institutions and procedures, which limit the violation of power by executive governments, institutions and procedures. As a result, it might be argued that democracy has quite exhaustive virtues, methods, concepts and theories that there can be only effective intelligence and intelligence communities in such democracy.

Functions of intelligence can be changed and differentiated according to the expectations and perceptions on intelligence and intelligence communities. One a hand, according to Deeper (2011), intelligence communities, agencies or organizations may be responsible for investigation and detection of threats against security of a state in terms of economic, societal and physical security. Moreover, intelligence agencies, communities or organizations may be responsible for informing government on their activities in the intelligence process. On the other hand, intelligence agencies, communities or organizations may be responsible for producing and dissemination of intelligence to the government decision and policy makers (Vitkaouskas, 1999). It is essential to understand the function of Intelligence agencies in democratic states and societies because it may have an impact and determine the democratic oversight on intelligence. Furthermore, democratic oversight mechanisms are important indicators in order to keep intelligence agencies' effectiveness that there are some theories and approaches on democratic oversight on intelligence communities.

There are enough argumentations and reasons which emphasis the importance of oversight mechanisms and systems for the intelligence communities (Born and Mesevage, 2012). Even if there might be different theories and approaches on need of oversight on intelligence, it might be argued that almost all views emphasis the importance of oversight mechanisms and systems for Intelligence communities and organizations. According to Gill, different and separated control mechanisms may result in more sufficient conclusions that the efficiency of intelligence communities can be easily maintained (as cited in Filip, 2006). Furthermore, Lowenthal claims that intelligence communities' accountability and transparency challenge can be sorted out by control mechanism (as cited in Filip, 2006). Even though there are

differentiations on control and check the intelligence communities' actions and implications, it is argued that there has to be independent and powerful mechanisms on intelligence agencies, communities and institutions such as executive, legislative and judicial.

In addition, intelligence communities are essential for protection and applications of national security policies. Intelligence communities have different kinds of capabilities and powers in order to serve the national security and its policies. However, according to Gill, nature of intelligence might be an issue because of violation of power and authority (as cited in Filip, 2006). Therefore, to have more effective monitoring and control system, there has to be well-designed structures oversight mechanism. Furthermore, governments might abuse intelligence communities for their interests, priorities and goals. Hence, it might be argued that there is open threat that intelligence communities can be turned into a political party organ (Bruneau and Matei, 2011). Such a situation may result in the disappearance of true functionality of intelligence communities, which is ineffectiveness of intelligence, and intelligence communities. Therefore, all responsibilities and duties of intelligence agencies have to be defined and described by laws and controlled in order to have the effective intelligence and intelligence communities (Bruneau and Matei, 2011). As the powerful oversight mechanisms are strengthened and applied, the possibility of having effective intelligence and intelligence communities are also increased.

Democratic oversight is based on the monitoring and control of Intelligence communities that there are different kinds of systems, mechanism organizations in order to have overseeing on Intelligence communities. Most all democratic states have the same fundamental oversight mechanisms as executive, legislative and judicial oversight on intelligence agencies, their activities, implications and policies. Caparini claims that executive controls are based on the tasking, defining priorities and making resources available for intelligence agencies (as cited in Filip, 2006). Parliamentary oversights include general problems, financial concerns and policies such as defining of intelligence agency's budget (Born and Leigh, 2005). Judicial oversight of intelligence's agencies is based on the legality of intelligence agencies'

activities whether they are convenience to the constitutions, laws and human rights (Born and Mesevage as cited in DCAF, 2012). The purpose of judicial oversight is applications of legal frameworks, which define the rules regulations, capabilities, and limits. Therefore, it might be argued that democratic oversight of Intelligence communities is essential to have more accountability, transparency, respect the rule of law that increases the level of efficiency of intelligence and Intelligence communities.

According to literature, it might be proclaimed that there are three main oversight mechanisms in democracy in order to control and protect the functionality of intelligence communities, which result in maintenance of effective intelligence, and intelligence communities. According to reviewed literature, executive oversight mechanism is based on the control of activities of intelligence communities from finance to the administration. There are different monitoring systems, which manage and control whether intelligence communities work in the defined and ruled circumstance or not (Born and Leigh as cited in DCAF, 2005). Furthermore, executive oversight is essential because of the fact that executive oversight can be a guide for intelligence communities. Intelligence communities can work more effective and proper way owing to the fact that executive oversight can direct intelligence communities' works and actions, which also result in more legitimacy and accountability. Therefore, whole requirements, interests and priorities have to be determined by executive branch and controlled by executive power (Born and Mesevage as cited in DCAF, 2012).

Additionally, it can be asserted that legislative or parliamentary oversight is based on the control of representatives of citizens. By legislative or parliamentary oversight, intelligence communities are under the observation in order to protect whole citizens' social, political and economic interests, priorities and goals on intelligence works and activities. Therefore, if intelligence communities do not apply or act according to their own interest and goals, the level of effectiveness of intelligence communities are increased. Moreover, legislative or parliamentary oversight may contribute to the transparency and accountability of intelligence communities by controlling mechanisms (as cited in Filip, 2006). It might be asserted

that as intelligence communities become more transparent and accountable, the issue of intelligence agencies' abuse of power and abusing authority can be prevented more easily. In addition to this, it can be argued that judicial oversight of intelligence's communities is based on the control of legality of the Intelligence communities' activities and works whether they are convenience to the constitutions, laws, rules, regulations and human rights (DCAF, 2012). Laws can not only define and regulate the intelligence communities' responsibilities and functions, laws can also determine responsibilities and functions of the Intelligence communities. Therefore, it can be argued that risk of abuse of authority and power can be diminished by judicial oversight mechanisms. As intelligence communities can be accountable to the constitution, laws, and regulations by application of judicial oversight mechanism, the chance of being more effective intelligence communities and having more effective intelligence can also be increased.

CONCLUSION

Intelligence has always been evaluated as an essential part of states' and societies' priorities, values, and interest owing to the fact that intelligence is more likely to guarantee the security of the states' and societies' social, political and economic priorities, interests and goals. Absences of threats and risks or minimizing them are highly depended on having effective intelligence and intelligence communities. Effective intelligence can prevent the intelligence and its communities from failures. Hence, achievement of intelligence and intelligence communities can be maintained. States and societies' priorities, interests and goals, which can be social, political and economic activities, can be protected more powerful by having effective intelligence. States and societies' social, political and economic activities, interests and goals can be strengthened against any kinds of threats and risks.

This thesis is expected and hoped to be a kind of guide for intelligence communities, experts and decision makers in order to have more success on intelligence works. Moreover, it might be argued that there is a scarcity of intelligence studies in the social science. This thesis is likely to make contribution to the intelligence studies in the social sciences. Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to provide demonstration of the core components of effective intelligence.

Intelligence can be more effective by having three core components as (1) analysts and analysis on intelligence, (2) theory of intelligence and (3) oversight of intelligence. According to literature review, it may be asserted that analysts and analysis of intelligence are one of the essential parts of having effective intelligence. The competencies of intelligence analysts, which are skills, abilities, characteristics and knowledge, can contribute to the success of intelligence analysis. Furthermore, it might be asserted that there are fundamental types of intelligence analysis, which are descriptive, explanatory, interpretive and estimative and predictive analysis. Types of intelligence analysis is also essential to effective intelligence because of the fact that types of intelligence analysis can strengthen intelligence in terms of accuracy, reliability, relevancy and clarity. Additionally, through literature review, it might be

argued that the democratic oversight of intelligence is crucial in order to have effective and efficient intelligence and intelligence communities owing to the fact that democratic states and societies construct rules, controls and other mechanism not only for protecting rights and for freedoms of citizens. It is also aimed to prevent abuse of power and authority and misconduct of intelligence agencies, communities or organizations. There are three fundamental oversight mechanisms as executive, legislative and judicial oversight. As oversight mechanisms are applied on intelligence and intelligence communities, intelligence communities and intelligence can be more effective. Even though different kinds of revolution and improvement are appeared, there are no enough theories on intelligence. Therefore, it might be asserted that there is gap on theory of intelligence in the intelligence studies. Moreover, there are reasons on having a theory on intelligence. Complex process of intelligence can be perceived easier by having a theory and theory may optimize reliability and certainty of intelligence, which results in less intelligence failures. Furthermore, theory may provide models that are also an opportunity to have enough experiment by testing or the models can observe analysis because of the fact that intelligence officers or intelligence institutions' expected behavior. As a result, this thesis indicates effective intelligence can emerge by keeping together the three core components that are analysts and analysis on intelligence, oversight of intelligence and theory of intelligence.

For further research, there can be interviews with intelligence officers, decision makers and experts in order to ask how intelligence can be more effective. Therefore, there may be more comprehensive synthesis in which theoretical approaches can be combined with practitioners' needs and priorities. Successful intelligence policies and activities can be studied as case study in order to demonstrate the fundamental and common features as structures, strategies, methodologies and techniques. There can be comparative studies with a few powerful states intelligence communities in terms of their intelligence structure, intelligence culture, management of intelligence and intelligence policies.

This thesis is also encountered a number of limitations. The first limitation is that this thesis can only access to the open sources. There is data on intelligence

communities' official views or recommendations. The second limitation is that there are not enough academic studies on intelligence and there is a scarcity of scientific studies on intelligence and effective intelligence. Therefore, there are serious limitations on data collection and literature review.

As a result, the main objective of this thesis is to provide a demonstration of the core components of effective intelligence. This thesis demonstrates that there might be core components of effective intelligence. By gathering of the three core components, which are analysts and analysis on intelligence, theory of intelligence and oversight of intelligence, effective intelligence can be reached.



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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

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Doğum Yeri : Erzurum
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Lisans Öğrenimi :İ. D. Bilkent Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü
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