Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of Peace Studies

Peace and Conflict Studies MA Programme

THE ROLE OF INSURGENCY IN TERMS OF FACILITATING NONVIOLENCE: A MODEL PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION

Hüsamettin Ulaş Öztürk

Thesis of Master of Art

Ankara, 2016

THE ROLE OF INSURGENCY IN TERMS OF FACILITATING NONVIOLENCE: A MODEL PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION

Hüsamettin Ulaş Öztürk

Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of Peace Studies

Peace and Conflict Studies MA Programme

Thesis of Master of Art

Ankara, 2016

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

The jury finds that Hüsamettin Ulaş ÖZTÜRK has on the date of 27/05/2016 successfully passed the defense examination and approves his/her Thesis of Master of Art titled "The Role of Insurgency in Terms of Facilitating Nonviolence: A Model Proposal for Cooperation".

Assoc. Prof. Nezir AKYEŞİLMEN (Jury President)

Assoc. Prof. Havva KÖK ARSLAN (Main Adviser)

Assoc. Prof. Emel Gülden OKTAY

I agree that the signatures above belong to the faculty members listed.

Prof. Sibel BOZBEYOĞLU

Graduate School Director

DECLARATION

I promise that my thesis/report is completely my own work and that I have provided a source for every quotation and citation. I give permission for paper and digital copies of my thesis/report to be kept in Hacettepe University's Graduate School of Social Sciences' archives under the conditions indicated below:

☐ My thesis/Report can be accessed in full from any location.

☐ My thesis/Report can only be accessed from Hacettepe University premises.

☒ I do not want my thesis/report to be accessed until ..1.. year(s) later. After this amount of time if I have not applied to an extension of time, my thesis/report can be accessed in full from any location.

27/05/2016

Hüsamettin Ulaş Öztürk

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank to thank my thesis jury for their understanding and tolerance. I also wish to thank Assoc. Prof. Havva KÖK ARSLAN for accepting me to the program, trusting me and giving me the chance to contribute the field of peace and conflict studies.

I wish to thank Professor Jorgen Johansen as well for his patience during his magnificent supervision; and Professor Stellan Vinthagen for his openness to new ideas, even the ones he does not agree with.

I also would like to express my gratitude to my neurologist Professor Rana KARABUDAK for her undeniable contribution to my health.

Additionally, Hacettepe University Libraries in both campuses, and Mehmet Akif Ersoy Museum Library worth mentioning for providing me extraordinary study conditions.

Lastly, I wish to thank my beloved mother and sister, without whose support I could not finish my study, for standing by me unconditionally with patience and love.

ABSTRACT

Öztürk, Hüsamettin Ulaş. The Role of Insurgency in Terms of Facilitating Nonviolence: A Model Proposal for Cooperation, Thesis of Master of Art, Ankara, 2016.

This thesis is built on the hypothesis that in the presence of cases where waging nonviolent struggle is either inefficient or impossible, insurgence might make nonviolence applicable. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to offer a model for a healthy cooperation process between insurgency and nonviolence. First, the thesis explores the terms "national power", "authority", "obedience" and "force" to provide an insight about the concept of nonviolence. Following that, paralyzers that make nonviolence inefficient or obstacles that stand for circumstances which make surging nonviolence impossible are introduced. After that, the way insurgency counteracts with each paralyzer and obstacle is explained. Finally, the methods of cooperation are presented. It is deduced at the end of the study that insurgency may be able to serve as a facilitator only if it meets certain criteria most important of which is to keep its distance from taking the cause to point of no return situations. At the final analysis, this would only be possible with the ultimate purpose of nonviolence.

Key Words

Nonviolence , Insurgency, Cooperation , Transformation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AFSPA	Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts
ANC	The African National Congress
CIS	Commonwealth Independent States
EZLN	Zapatista Army of National Liberation
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front
IAEA	The International Atomic Energy Agency
IRA	Irish Republican Army
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	The National Security Agency
The US	The United States (of America)
The UN	The United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization

TABLES

Table 1: Success Rates of Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns: 1900-2006

FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

According to Steven Pinker, "many kinds of violence have declined up to the present" as a result of social, cultural, and material changes (Pinker, 2011). While early humans were more prone to apply violence, modern civilizations detached themselves from it. Although what Pinker offers is arguable since one can claim structural violence to be escalated over time in parallel with scientific advancements: "if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition" (Galtung, J. 1969). Still one can definitely mention about decline in the popularity of violence. The more ethicalness of violence had been questioned, the less credit it is given to the extent that violence is claimed to be contrary to human biology (The Seville Statement on Violence).

Nonviolence, on the other hand, has proven its effectiveness and efficiency: its success rate is much higher than violence. Chenoweth and Stephan indicated that "between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.7). Moreover, the variety of methods make nonviolence flexible against its opponents since they "have successfully used nonviolent resistance methods, including boycotts, strikes, protests, and organized noncooperation to exact political concessions and challenge entrenched power." (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.6). Still, despite the effectivity of nonviolence, there are cases in which nonviolence struggles were ended with failure despite high participation (e.g. Burmese People Power Uprising in 1988). In extreme cases, on the other hand, "the state's role may be dominant to the point that *it virtually annihilates civil society* (such as in Albania under the rule of Enver Hoxha or North Korea under Kim Il Sung)" (Powers, Vogele, Kruegler and McCarthy, 1997, pp.99-100).

On this basis, this study is based on the question "to what extent insurgency facilitates nonviolence to be available by optimizing environment for it?". In the context of that

main question, two sub-questions asked are “how can insurgency and nonviolence cooperate with a common final goal that the movement becomes completely nonviolent?” and “how can insurgency be transformed into nonviolence by using nonviolent means?” were asked. The three hypotheses supporting these questions are: first, there are cases where nonviolent methods are either inefficient or impossible to implement; second, in cases where nonviolence is either inefficient or impossible, insurgency may be more effective in terms of weakening the oppressor’s power; and lastly, in such cases, insurgency can take the situation to a point where nonviolence becomes applicable.

The first Chapter of the study is composed of three parts. First part tries to clarify the main concepts of the argument such as power (national power in particular along with its sources and dimensions), authority, force and obedience. The relationship between force and obedience is also revealed to show how effective it is to aim pillars of power of an authority to make it impossible to use force. The second part of Chapter 1 explains nonviolence, its background, advantages, tactics, means and optimum environment. The same part also clarifies paralyzers and obstacles. Optimum environment stands for the optimum circumstances that enable nonviolent struggle to function at its best and most efficient form. What is meant by “paralyzers” in this study are the factors which make nonviolence possible but inefficient. The term “obstacles” was used for variables that make waging a nonviolent struggle completely impossible. Last part is on the subject of insurgency. Since this study is based on the assumption of instrumentality of cooperation between nonviolence and insurgency in particular (rather than other violent methods), it is essential to analyse insurgency, its elements, dynamics and tactics.

The core chapter of this study is Chapter 2. Although nonviolence is considered as the most reasonable choice and violence as an unpleasant one, it is argued that insurgency facilitates nonviolence since it takes the oppressor’s power away by using violence (yet it doesn’t guarantee insurgency to prevail just because it prevented the other party to prevail, here nonviolence steps in). In specific conditions mentioned above which were called obstacles and paralyzers, the effectiveness of nonviolence becomes questionable. At that point, for various reasons, it is presumed that it may be more beneficial and less risky if insurgency steps in. Chapter 2 in this respect explains how insurgency

overcomes each paralyzer and/or obstacle in order to break sheaths of pillars of power and therefore make nonviolence applicable.

The second part of second chapter intends to explain cooperation process by answering the question "how should cooperation be achieved?" Since each situation has its own dynamics and similarly, each movement has variety of agendas, a monolithic type of cooperation between nonviolence and insurgency can hardly cover all those different circumstances. For that reason, four types of cooperation offered here are hidden, synchronous, rotational and inorganic/separated cooperation.

What Chapter 2 aims to clarify additionally are red lines of the insurgency that stand for extreme situations which take insurgency to an irreversible point. Assuming that insurgencies show similarities with governmental bodies for their complex and multidimensional organizational structures, one can say that what motives people to disobey an authority/regime may also apply for insurgencies. Indiscriminate violence, excessive violence, exploitation of people, infringement of agreements and atrocities are red lines that have the potential of taking insurgency (and therefore nonviolent movement if their cooperation is open) to the point of no return.

Lastly, Chapter 2 portrays the replacement process based on the assumption that insurgency prevails on what it intends to do and opens the path to nonviolent struggle by optimizing the environment. Replacement process can be called "decision process" as well since it is the phase in which next step of the movement is determined. If the signs of maturity of the movement are obvious, and pillars of power becomes vulnerable against nonviolence, nonviolence steps in. on the other hand, even if mentioned signs are not visible, if it is believed that insurgency can protect nonviolence and nonviolence can somehow operate, replacement takes place anyway.

The third chapter of this study focuses on the transformation process. After a hypothetical victory against an oppressor, members of the movement may fall under the illusion that with the decline of the oppressor, every problem that they suffer is solved and their role on the movement is over as was seen after the Egyptian Revolution. That illusion may cause revolution to be unfinished and sow the seeds of other conflicts. The first part of Chapter 3 is based on integration of nonviolence into the puzzle. Firstly, the starting point of transformation is determined as reducing violence. Unless violence

which is expected to be present as long as insurgency exists is not reduced, there is always the danger for the oppressor to take back its power. Secondly, the chapter explained the dangers of aftermath revolutions and the possible obstacles that a movement can face both from its environment and from the movement itself. Insurgents may pose a danger especially when they are asked to step down from their positions. Also, they might claim the whole achievement which is not rare. Against such complications, the movement can grow a self-defense mechanism.

Second part of third chapter is on negotiation. The first priority of negotiation is ceasefire for the reason that ongoing violence may disrupt negotiations and therefore prevents full transformation. In addition, in order to get a well-functioning society, every element of the society, including those who supported the oppressor should be a part of the new system in terms of decision making and politics. The role of different layers of the society in terms of determining positions and interests is also stressed in this part.

Disarmament is handled in this study as essential for preventing possible re-escalation of violence between parties. Because of the possibility for insurgents to refuse giving up their weapons; and the "loser trauma and unacceptability" among "losers" and "highly addictive victor glory" among "winners" (Galtung, 2000:p.47), there is the danger of repetition of violent conflict.

Lastly, normalization is analysed as the final step of transformation. In order to assure a well-functioning society to be established and to prevent re-escalation of the conflict, two procedures must be put into action which are truth, justice, mediation and reconciliation; and restoration and state-building. What makes truth the first subclass is that truth is the first precondition for reconciliation for two reasons: firstly, truth is needed to assess and analyse the root causes of the conflict for preventing future conflicts. Secondly, it is essential for a healthy reconciliation process.

With the assumption that truth is revealed, it was offered that justice mechanism should start working. It was also suggested that one type of justice mechanism would not satisfy the need of society for reconciliation since both distinguishing war crimes and justifiable acts; and "legal" combatants and "illegal" combatants would be hard.

Mediation, a process of eroding trauma by solving disputes between parties, easing grievances and eroding tendency of parties to resort to violence again, is mentioned as a short-term solution. Reconciliation, whereas, is a long term process that takes decades to be completed. With rehabilitation and reconstruction, it is hoped that, physical, structural and psychological damage is repaired.

The last step of transformation that was offered in this study is restoration and state-building. After reconciliation, in which the damage is repaired, state-building steps in in order to establish a new system instead of patching the existing system. It is indicated that if three dimensions of state-building are satisfied, it is hoped that the transformation process is completed.

CHAPTER 1

POWER AND NONVIOLENCE

1.1. POWER, AUTHORITY AND FORCE

1.1.1. Force

The simplest definition of force is "the energy released by physical and social powers" (Arendt, 1970: p.45). In this context, any activity that releases energy and interacts with its surroundings can be called force. Since any physical impact on the bodies, -that includes ""forces of nature" or the "force of circumstances"" (Arendt, 1970)- "human life is impossible without an exercise of force against the physical environment" (Moran, 2002) to the extent that they "cannot breathe, bathe or walk across the grass without killing" (Moran, 2002). The main misconception occurs when force is equated with violence which arises the need of distinguishing force from violence. Although violence is an expression of force, the scale of activities included by force is much wider. As an example, (although there is no doubt that it is a manifestation of force), it can be discussed whether the activity of a surgeon who cuts an arm with gangrene is using violence or not. Likewise, nonviolent struggle is a manifestation of force, despite not being violent.

In legal perspective, on the other hand, force is opposite of violence: while force is legal and protecting the system, violence, on the contrary is an illegal devastating activity. "Force represents the interests of the present social system, while violence is the cutting edge of an alternative system" (Rapoport and Alexander, 1982: p.154).

In brief, force is any activity that is done causing energy release as a result of interacting with self or the surroundings.

1.1.2. Authority and Obedience

1.1.2.1. Authority

Although it is claimed that authority has lost its concreteness as a concept since it has been vanished from the modern world (Arendt, 1961:p.91), its presence seems not to be able to be vanished so long as the current governance system continues. Authority can be defined as the relationship between the one who commands and the one who obeys whether this relationship is natural or artificial; and whether by free will or coercion. Still, Hannah Arendt distinguishes authority from force by arguing the mutual recognition between two parties assures perpetuity of authority: "The authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place" (Arendt, 1961:p.93). Unlike force, authority resorts to violence as an indirect means: what authority aims is to keep the continuity of existing system by persuasion; whether by rendering stability or threating by using violence legally which is called "the order". In micro scale, one can talk about a relationship based on authority between a mother and her child; or a teacher and his student. Likewise, no matter how liberal it is, the presence of a state preconditions authority between the state (and the government, "managing" the state) and its citizens.

The main feature that distinguishes authority from tyranny is that unlike tyranny, authority uses its sanctions based on laws, not according to its own will and interests (Arendt, 1968:p.97). Tyranny, For Hannah Arendt, is "the most violent and least powerful of forms of government. Indeed one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence is that power always stands in need of numbers, whereas violence up to a point can manage without them because it relies on implements" (Arendt, 1970:pp.41-42). This, however, can make one easily question the very basis of laws. If laws are made by a common agreement, then there must be a common interest in need to be protected. If, on the other hand, the laws are prepared by the top actors of the hierarchy, then an "own will" can be mentioned. Therefore, modern interpretation of

authority may be more legitimized and legalized version of tyranny in that aspect. The idea of distinguishing legitimate power and violence narrows down the set of actions that can be categorized as violence. When legitimate power, which gives the holder "power monopoly on use of violence" (or legitimate use of force), is not considered as violence, or at least is called reasonable violence or legitimate violence, any attempt of disobedience has the potential to be considered as a threat and be treated with violence by the authority. Still, what makes people obedient is not the fear of facing violence in return of their potential disobedience, but the very authority itself.

1.1.2.2. Obedience

Being subject of an authority automatically creates the need of obedience in order to both maintaining the authority and remaining as a subject of the authority. The question here is that does authority keep people obedient or does the need of obedience necessitate an authority? In the experiment he published in his book "*Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View"*, Stanley Milgram questioned the obedience towards authority and in what circumstances people tend to obey the order unquestioningly:

> *The real focus of the experiment is the teacher. After watching the learner being strapped into place, he is taken into the main experimental room and seated before an impressive shock generator. Its main feature is a horizontal line of thirty switches, ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts, in I5ivolt increments. There are also verbal designations which range from SLIGHT SHOCK to DANGER—SEVERE SHOCK. The teacher is told that he is to administer the learning test to the man in the other room. When the learner responds correctly, the teacher moves on to the next item; when the other man gives an incorrect answer, the teacher is to give him an electric shock. He is to start at the lowest shock level* (*15 volts) and to increase the level each time the man makes an error, going through 30 volts, 45 volts, and so on.*
>
> *The "teacher" is a genuinely naive subject who has come to the laboratory to participate in an experiment. The learner, or victim, is an actor who actually receives no shock at all. The point of the experiment is to see how far a person will proceed in a concrete and measurable situation in which he is ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim. At what point will the subject refuse to obey the* experimenter? (Milgram, 1974:p.3)

The results of the experiment showed that 48 to 65 percent of the subjects went to the highest shock level even though being uncomfortable (Milgram, 1974:p.69). The reason for majority of subjects to continue shocking so called victims was not being threatened

since the experiment had based on volunteering and they could have left at any point; rather, the reason of their determination was that the orders came from a legal authority. "The ordinary person who shocked the victim did so out of a sense of obligation-a conception of his duties as a subject-and not from any peculiarly aggressive tendencies" (Milgram, 1974:p.5). Majority of the people (65% according to the experiment) consider whatever that is legal is ethical/moral and whatever that is not legal is unethical/immoral, no matter what the outcome is. That might be either because of the perception of morals the society is given which praises obedience to the legitimate authority and condemns disobedience to the authority no matter what the reason is; or because of lack of accountability since the responsible for actions who obey the orders is the one who gives the orders. For Milgram, many of the subjects have more or less the same moral values with any of us and they even see disobedience as a proper act (Milgram, 1974:p.6), yet that certainty between right and wrong does not keep them from obeying the orders. Milgram continues with explaining the reasons of obedience:

> *…there is a set of "binding factors" that lock the subject into the situation. They include such factors as politeness on his part, his desire to uphold his initial promise of aid to the experimenter, and the awkwardness of withdrawal. Second, a number of adjustments in the subject's thinking occur that undermine his resolve to break with the authority. The adjustments help the subject maintain his relationship with the experimenter, while at the same time reducing the strain brought about by the experimental conflict* (Milgram, 1974:p.7).

Nazi soldiers and officers, Otto Adolf Eichmann in particular because of his symbolic role, are some of the most significant examples of obedience to the authority. Despite the fact that Eichmann was indeed anti-Semitist, his anti-Semitism did not go beyond through his time's current. As the economic and social circumstances combining with totalitarian aspect and created sense of superiority to supress the humiliation coming from the First World War (Berger and Gerson, 2006:p.189) failure made anti-Semitism a mainstream idea (Arendt, 1973:p.356). Eichmann, who did not have a bright career or education and whose intelligence was below the average (Arendt, 1963:p.139), was charged for Jewish emigration and concentration at the beginning, then facilitating extermination of Jewish population after 1941. He is claimed to be one of the responsible people for atrocities committed in concentration camps in which over 5 Million Jews were killed including the infamous Auschwitz Camp. In 1960, he was

caught by Israeli foreign intelligence service Mossad and security service Shin Bet (Strover, Peskin and Koening, 2016:p.81) and executed by hanging after a symbolic trial. Hannah Arendt claims that he was an ordinary citizen without monstrous drives and extraordinary barbarism, rather he was only obeying the authority: "whatever he did he did, as far as he could see, as a law-abiding citizen. He did his duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law" (Arendt, 1963:p.128). Eichmann was but a law abiding citizen who defended himself by claiming he was a Kantian based on Kant's idea of "freedom can never be posited on the fact that the rational subject is able to choose in opposition to his (legislative) reason, even though experience often enough proves that this does happen" (Kant, 1797:p.20) although contrary to Kant's idea of that people, eventually, autonomously legislate themselves (Kant takes a step further and claims that people who are the legislators "cannot at the same time be the ruler, for the ruler is subject to the law and through it is obligated to another, the sovereign" (Kant and Ladd, 1999:p.122). Yet one cannot claim that Eichmann was completely distorting the prescriptions offered by thinkers such as Hume and Hobbes.

1.1.3. Power

Power, in Mao Zedong's terms, "grows out of the barrel of a gun" (Zedong, 1965:p.224). That is, "a consensus among political theorists to the effect that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power" (Arendt, 1970:p.35). Hannah Arendt adds the argument about power: "The amount of violence at the disposal of any given country may soon not be a reliable indication of the country's strength or a reliable guarantee against destruction by a substantially smaller and weaker power" (Arendt, 1970:p.10)

Still the narrow definition of Mao which assumes violence to be the equal of power as does not fill many gaps about power. For Lukes, most of the definitions of power are fallacious. He claims that defining exercise of power as "a dispositional concept, identifying an ability or capacity, which may or may not be exercised." (Lukes, 2005:p.109); or "power over exercise" which focuses on power holder's power over its subject (power of A over B) (Lukes, 2005:p.109). What Lukes pointed out is that rather

than being power holder's dominance over their subject, power is the act of consent by the subject of power to the power holder, his/her obedience in other words.

> *Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name*. (Arendt, 1970:p.44)

In this context, one may claim that the main source of national power is obedience of people to whom they want to hold and control the power. The perception of that power needs a collective empowerment comes from the utopic idea of "voluntarily obedience". That point of view may force one to ask the question "can't power obtained with obedience provided by force be called power?". To such question, Gene Sharp provides an explanation that obedience itself is the source of power, whether obtained by free will or by force (Sharp, 2003:p.19). If there is lack of obedience in different types, which are the sources of power, power will eventually fall. According to Gene Sharp, there are six sources of power which are "authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material sources and sanctions" Arendt, 1970:pp.18-19).

Although power is claimed to be the collection of active and constant acts above, Power is not only an exercise of ability or capacity of an agent or agents, but also may not exercise. The expression of power in this context may be theoretical and methodological (Lukes, 2005:p.14). Therefore, controversies may center on concreteness of power since the abstractness of it moves it away from tangibility, hence not definability:

> *...power is real and effective in a remarkable variety of ways, some of them indirect and some hidden, and that, indeed, it is at its most effective when least accessible to observation, to actors and observers alike, thereby presenting empirically minded social scientists with a neat paradox.* (Lukes, 2005:p.64)

1.1.3.1. Dimensions of Power

According to Lukes, there are ways to exercise power which he calls "dimensions": "decision-making"; "decision-making and non-decision making"; and "decision-making and control over political agenda" (Lukes, 2005:p.29).

1.1.3.1.1. One-Dimensional View

One dimensional power is that power is "actual power" (Lukes, 2005:p.17) which is decision making. Decision making done by a party, Party A for instance, affects Party B, is the indicator of power of A over B. One-dimensional view of power "involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation." (Lukes, 2005:p.19)

1.1.3.1.2. Two-Dimensional View:

The two-dimensional view suggests that power is not only decision making that is domination of one party over another, but also the other party's willingness of compliance towards the authority of dominating party over it (Lukes, 2005:p.21). Similar to what Gene Sharp suggests, two-dimensional view claims obedience of subjects of power to be the indicator of the extent of the power holder's power.

1.1.3.1.3. Three-Dimensional View

Tree-dimensional can be defined as "securing the consent to domination of willing subjects" (Lukes, 2005:p.109). In other words, it is conflict prevention and social engineering to an extent. Unlike one-dimensional and two-dimensional views, three-dimensional view focuses on relationship of power with social and institutional forces whereas the other dimensions are more individualistic. "Decisions are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals between alternatives, whereas the bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals' choices" (Lukes, 2005:p.25). Unlike the narrow view towards power that is inclined to estimate power on individual acts, three-dimensional view rather claims power to be sustained by socially and culturally (Lukes, 2005:p.26), not based on the decisions of individuals. Moreover, power can be observed and estimated in cases where actual conflict does not exist. Power, is not only the ability to dominate the other party and secure its obedience, but also "influencing, shaping or determining his very wants" (Lukes, 2005:p.27).

(a) behaviour

(b) decision-making

(c) (key) issues

(d) observable (overt) conflict

(e) (subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences revealed by political participation (Lukes, 2005:p.29)

(a) decision-making and nondecision-making

(b) issues and potential issues

(c) observable (overt or covert) conflict

(d) (subjective) interests, seen as policy preferences (Lukes, 2005:p.29)

(a) decision-making and control over political agenda (not necessarily through decisions)

(b) issues and potential issues

(c) observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict

(d) subjective and real interests (Lukes, 2005:p.29)

Figure 1: Three Dimensions of Power

The author of this study intended to show in Figure 1 that several layers of power are connected to each other, making up power as a whole.

1.1.3.2. Pillars of Power

Since obedience is assumed to come with satisfaction of needs, holder of the national power (whether a democratic ruler or the oppressor) is expected to either ensure the needs of people (to be satisfied) or their obedience (let it be by intimidation or coercion). In order to provide obedience and strengthen the source of power, there are

elements that power relies on. Those elements that provide assurance were called "pillars of power" in this study.



Figure 2: Pillars of Power

Each pillar that drawn by the author on Figure-2 stands as represents one of the essential elements which support power and prevent power to collapse. It should be noted that those pillars may be used in positive way by satisfying needs of people to provide support from people who are subjected to the power; or they may be abused by being used as means of coercion and intimidation to assure obedience for the survivability of the power.

1.1.3.2.1. Public Relations/Media:

While media can be used as a tool of revealing the truth and guaranteeing transparency of a country; it can also be used as a means of mass persuasion, social engineering and exposure as well.

1.1.3.2.2. Local Cooperation:

Local cooperation supports power basis by decision making. The more locals are willing to cooperate, the stronger the power holder is; and the more locals participate in decision making, the more stable power basis stands. In cases of international pressure or foreign attempts of overthrowing power, local cooperation may act as a counteraction mechanism and foil those attempts; or it can be part of a method that is designed to neutralize a nonviolent struggle.

1.1.3.2.3. Law Enforcement:

The basic goal of law enforcement is expected to protect the overall power structure, and its sources from internal threats. As law enforcement's main goal is to fulfil the domestic need of security of a country, which would supposedly increase the sense of trust amongst people; it, for example, can be used to suppress opposition.

1.1.3.2.4. Military:

The purpose of military is to "minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces operating from outside its institutional and territorial confines" (Huntington, 1957:p.1) and to protect power structure from external threats.

1.1.3.2.5. Financial Efficiency:

Financial sources and resources at the power holder's disposal make power stronger. It is less likely to expect unrest amongst people in wealthy countries than places where the power holder has low income or purchasing power of people is low. However, in cases where power is under threat, financial efficiency of the power holder may be used to take people's wills under control. In either case, financial efficiency consolidates power.

1.1.3.2.6. International Support:

The main function of international support is to increase stability of the power holder and fill the gaps on other pillars of power that make it (the power holder) vulnerable.

1.1.3.2.7. Political Efficacy:

Political efficacy of power holder can be twofold: it can be either interpreted as the power holder's ability to govern the power and those who empower him/her; or it can be political efficacy which "refers to the person's belief that political and social change can be effected or retarded and that his efforts, alone or in concert with others, can produce desired behaviour on the part of political authorities." (Sills and Merton, 1968:p.225(vol.12)).

1.1.3.2.8. Control over Religion:

Since religion is an important motive on people's behaviours, as Shariati put it, "It can destroy or revitalize, put to sleep or awaken, enslave or emancipate, teach docility or teach revolt" (Hazleton, 2009:p.197), power holders need compatibility in terms of religion with those who empower them, or take control under his/her control in order to maintain his/her power.

1.1.3.2.9. Bureaucracy:

Because of its role in policymaking, bureaucracy have a massive role on supporting power since it is the main determinant of people's consent is the policies of a state. "It has been observed that non-elected bureaucrats are not neutral executors of legislative policies and do in fact, have enormous discretionary powers and responsibilities in decision making which also creates opportunity for irresponsible actions" (Richardson and Baldwin, 1976:p.310)

1.1.3.3. The Relationship between Power and Authority

The relationship between power and authority may be claimed to be symbiotic: although anarchists claim otherwise (May, 1994:p.50), power cannot exist without a power holder/authority, -let it be tyranny or a collaborative institution- since obedience is one of the essential of power; and an actor is needed, therefore to obey. That requisiteness also applies the other way: what makes an actor the authority is power he/she holds; and the concreteness of his/her authority is scaled by the amount of power at his/her

disposal. One should note that what is tangible is not the authority itself in most cases; rather the vulnerability of the authority is directly proportionate to solidity of power. Authority itself cannot be taken down (unless the authority is a dictator, who is the only source that is keeping a system functioning gets killed which would create a power vacuum so that the system collapses with him/her) without its sources of power are cut.



Figure 3: Power-Authority Relationship

Figure 3 indicates the relationship between power and authority. The triangle at the top of power that stands for authority, both is dependent on power on which it is constructed, and has the function of keeping power as a whole.

1.1.3.4. Power-authority-force Relationship

Considering that the solidity of authority is depended on the extent of power it holds, one can deduce that the determinant factor of the survival of authority is its relationship with power: what weakens or overthrows the authority is the weakness of power columns; or the weakness of bonds between power and authority. Similarly, the degree of solidity of power; and rigidity of bonds between power and authority are determining elements in terms of consolidating status of authority.

As force, which is any action that affects its surroundings, has the potential of stripping the subject of power "of the choice between compliance and noncompliance" (Lukes, 2005:p.22), one may claim that it can be used as a means of establishing or demolishing the power, and therefore the authority.

1.1.3.4.1. Force in Favour of Authority

Firstly, force can be used to guarantee the solidity of the authority. In such cases, the main function of force is to prevent pillars of power to collapse and assure the concreteness of bonds between authority and power. The first function of force in favour of authority is empowerment of pillars of power. In cases where one or more pillars of power are to collapse, force may support them at where they lack. If, for example, financial efficiency is attacked directly (physically) or indirectly (such as sanctions or boycotts), the authority may respond violently (e.g. protecting the resources) or nonviolently (e.g. using counter strategies) in order to secure its financial structure.

The second function of force in terms of ensuring the survivability of the authority is coercion. Force may be used to increase the effectivity of the authority in terms of decision making (one-dimensional), to secure obedience of people (two-dimensional) and to assure ideological compatibility (three-dimensional). Arendt states that "men can be "manipulated" through physical coercion, torture, or starvation, and their opinions can be arbitrarily formed by deliberate, organized misinformation, but not through "hidden persuaders," television, advertising, or any other psychological means in a free society." (Arendt, 1970:p.28). What oppressors often resort to in order to protect their power is coercion that exists "where A secures B's compliance by the threat of

deprivation where there is ‘a conflict over values or course of action between A and B’” (Lukes, 2005:p.21).



Figure 4: Cases Where Force is used in Favour of the Authority

Figure 4 indicates the use of force in favour of the authority. Force in this case may be seen as leverage that supports and holds power in order for it to not to collapse.

1.1.3.4.2. Force against Authority

In cases where force is used against authority, force can be used to weaken pillars of power and take power away from the authority as it is illustrated in Figure 5. Similar to where it is used in favour of authority, when force is used against the authority force can

be faced in many different forms. While it can be nonviolent struggle, it may also pose a threat to the authority as armed resistance. Just like authority, which controls the power, the people whose obedience is essential for power may also use coercion. Coercion that is used against the authority (which is called "A") by people who are subjected to it ("B") is defined by Linda D. Molm as "the use of punishment to obtain rewards from another. B coerces A by punishing A's failure to reward B and withholding punishment when A's rewards to B are forthcoming" (Molm, 1997).



Figure 5: Cases Where Force is used Against the Authority

1.2. NONVIOLENCE

The very first question that must be answered in order to determine the boundaries between nonviolent struggle and insurgency and to clarify what differentiates nonviolence from insurgency (and other violent methods) is "what is nonviolence?". First of all, despite the word "nonviolence" creates the impression of "absence of violence", the fact is that the absence of violence does not make a struggle/movement nonviolent.

> *"The mere absence of war, as Augustine perceived does not make peace in any meaningful sense; there must be justice and tranquility as well. Likewise, the mere absence of violence does not make nonviolence in any significant sense. There must be some positive features of conduct, minimally in the way of a concern or respect for others in order for it to exemplify nonviolence as a moral position."* (Holmes, 2014:p.40)

In other words, nonviolence needs violence to exist since it is "against violence" rather than "without violence" (Vinthagen, 2005:p.146). Therefore, like its converse, violence, contemporary nonviolence is a set of reflections of ideas to the action. If one takes the fact that peace is "a continuous process beyond the antagonist dualism" (Vallejo, 2012:p.43), and nonviolence is more than a means of overthrowing regimes, it can be said that violence will always remain even though as an idea or a historical fact. That gives nonviolence the mission of preventing nonviolence so long as it exists.

Pacifism, on the other hand, is based on "non-action" or "non-resistance" unlike nonviolence. Yet it is an undeniable fact that if we assume ahimsa as the earliest and the most basic form of nonviolence, we should accept that nonviolence sprang up from pacifism. As mentioned above, majority of religious texts offer pacifism or non-resistance. Gandhi makes the distinction between pacifism and nonviolence by calling pacifists cowards and praises nonviolence as "the greatest and the activest force in the world" and adds: "One cannot be passively nonviolent" (Johnson, 2006:p.124).

1.2.1. Evolution of Nonviolence

Like any other method, nonviolence had evolved, changed its shape and revised its methods over time based on the circumstances it is in. While early forms of nonviolence

focused on spiritual and philosophic aspect of nonviolence, which is called "pacifist tradition" (Johansen, 2014), "pragmatist tradition" was more socio-political oriented (Johansen, 2014). It is important to analyse the history and evolution of nonviolence since as nonviolence had evolved, the approach of nonviolent school of thought towards violence has also changed.

1.2.1.1. Early Forms of Nonviolence

For most historians, known nonviolence dates back to Hinduism, one of the oldest religions whose roots are old as 35000 years (Ellwood and Alles, 2007:p.200). The basis of Hindu nonviolence is the idea of Karma which basically claims that "one becomes good by good action, bad by bad" (Laumakis, 2008:p.87). Jainism, which is derived from Hinduism –although its followers claim it to be "millions of years old" (Ellwood and Alles, 2007:p.228)- is claimed to be the first religion that used a term equivalent to nonviolence. *Ahimsa*, whose literal meaning is "no harm", would consist of five virtues which are "no harm, truth telling, non-stealing, chastity and non-possessiveness" (Kothari, 2012). In this context, Jainism would classify violence in four categories that are "intentional violence" (Kothari, 2012) which is to "injure, abuse, oppress, enslave, insult, torment, torture or kill any creature or living being" (Harris, 2006:p.23), "subsistence-related violence", "occupation-related violence" and "adversary-related violence" (Kothari, 2012).

1.2.1.2. Contemporary Nonviolence

In early 1910's, when a young Indian lawyer returned from the United Kingdom, he started a movement, seemed to be harmless (it was indeed physically harmless, maybe not for the ones who applied it, but for the ones whom it was used against) for British Raj, later would be the very basis of the independence of India. The stunning victory of Indian Independence Movement, led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, that prevailed without firing a single bullet (except clashes between Indians and British Raj during pre-Gandhi era) was something unique (and somehow new for the ones who lack of historical knowledge) for the world so that it made Gandhi "the most powerful man on the earth" (Roy, 1921). What makes Gandhi unique in terms of nonviolence is that he

was “first and foremost a political activist” (Kurlansky, 2008) and a nonviolent preacher. In Gandhi’s perspective, unlike what his predecessors, pacifism was “cowardice and unmanly” (Kurlansky, 2008).

In 1950’s the idea of pragmatist tradition of nonviolence was adopted by Martin Luther King Jr. In Kurlansky’s words, “Mahatma Gandhi took up the ancient but powerful idea of *ahimsa*, or nonviolence, and made it familiar throughout the world. Martin Luther King Jr. followed in his footsteps” (Kurlansky, 2008). In 1970’s, Gene sharp took that method one step ahead; nonviolence became more organized, practical rather than spiritual and now had a scientific base. It had “what to do’s” and “how to do’s” step by step (Sharp, 2013).

1.2.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Nonviolence

1.2.2.1. Advantages of Nonviolence

Nonviolence, a force that has the ability to make rulers “just other persons” (Sharp, 2013:p.17) is based on enervating the current without using violence, yet waging a struggle by using any other means is considered the most humane system by many. Its success rate that is higher than its violent counterpart (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.7) and its reversibility as opposed to violence (Johansen, 2014) make nonviolence much more preferable than violence.



Table 1: Success Rates of Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns: 1900-2006

(Source: Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict)

Erica Chenoweth and Mari J. Stephan interprets the statistics by arguing that the key element for the success of nonviolence is participation rate which is mostly higher than violent resistance movements, and mobilization that is allowed by this participation is in favour of nonviolence (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.31). High participation may increase diversity and increased diversity will have three benefits: a) The more diverse members of movement are, the more people with different ethnicities and ideologies can be influenced which will increase the impact of the movement; b) It will retain the movement from being the subject of a single group and c) The higher number of people encourages more people by giving them the sense of security (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.11). Rather than a small or ethnic group, which can cause separation in a society, a mass movement consisted with different groups will create the sense of belongingness among the society. This can both create more mechanisms (tactical diversity and innovation) necessary for success thanks to diversity and make transition process after the fall of target much smoother.



Figure 6: The Effect Participation on Security-Force Defections

(Source: Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict)

What can be indicated from Figure 6 is that although both violent and nonviolent campaigns have the potential of causing defections and loyalty shifts from law enforcement and military, the success rate of nonviolent campaigns in terms of causing ethical concerns amongst security forces (because of high level of participation which may increase the sense of empathy), attracting them and causing "disaffection and even mutiny" (Sharp, 1973:p.390)

> *For nonviolent campaigns, the probability of security-force defections steadily increases as membership in the resistance campaign grows. On the other hand, the odds of successfully converting military forces to the insurgent side remain between 10 percent and 40 percent for violent insurgents, with only a modest increase in probability as participation increases. Faced with a violent insurgency, security forces are likeliest to unify behind the regime, as the fight becomes a contest of brute force rather than strategic interaction. Under such conditions, security forces may become even more loyal to the regime, or the regime may purge ambivalent troops from its ranks.*(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.48).

Furthermore, nonviolent struggles have lower rates of casualties. Since receiving violent responses from regimes is less expectable in cases where the movement is nonviolent,

contrary to violent campaigns, “the casualties and the destruction suffered by the resisters are almost always far lower in nonviolent struggles than in comparable violent conflicts” (Sharp, 1973:p.384).

1.2.2.2. “Modus Operandi” of Nonviolence

Besides higher participation rate, better mobilization and reversibility, what makes nonviolence advantageous over other methods is flexibility with regard to methods. Variety of different strategies towards different situations and environments give nonviolence upper hand in terms of unpredictability. Shifts in strategies may be necessary especially “when opportunities arise to accelerate momentum, or when unanticipated serious opposition is encountered.” (Sharp, 1973:p.497). The variation and flexibility of methods “may also add variety and interest—and often newsworthiness—to the campaign” (Sharp, 1973:p.498).

Regardless what the desired outcome is, whether to compel the oppressor to cooperate on simple demands, or to overthrow it completely, the logic behind all of the methods and mechanisms of nonviolence is to weakening the oppressor’s power. As mentioned on “Power-authority-force Relationship” section, force may be used as a tool to take away the authority’s power. Therefore, nonviolence seeks to find the oppressor’s “Achilles’ heel” (Sharp, 2010:p.25). If one or more of the pillars of power that support the overall power structure is vulnerable to nonviolence, it is expected power relations to shift (Sharp, 2010:p.34) which will result with the oppressor’s necessary cooperation or its ultimate downfall.



Figure 7: "Modus Operandi" of Nonviolence

The green arrows shown in Figure 7 stand for nonviolence: In order to weaken/paralyze/overthrow the oppressor, nonviolence aims to take down one or more pillars that support power structure of the oppressor. As it is shown, the cracks on pillars of power are indicators of weakened (and to be collapsed completely unless the oppressor cooperates) functions of those pillars. While nonviolence may select one pillar of power in minor cases, if the goal is to overthrow the oppressor, it is essential for a nonviolent movement to attack more than one pillar: "Shifts in methods may also be made to change the kind of pressures applied to the opponents or to compensate for weaknesses in the nonviolent struggle group." (Sharp, 1973:pp.497-498).

According to Gene Sharp, there are four mechanisms and three major methods that make nonviolent struggle work.

1.2.2.2.1. Mechanisms of Nonviolence

1.2.2.2.1.1. Conversion:

Conversion is a mechanism that aims expressing the suffering and grievance of the nonviolent movement in order to persuade "that the resisters' cause is just" so that "they may come to accept the resisters' aims" (Sharp, 2010:p.35). It is the mechanism that is least likely to succeed (Sharp, 2010:p.35).

1.2.2.2.1.2. Accommodation:

When the demands of nonviolent movement are not threatening with regards to the current power structure, oppressors may be inclined to reaching an agreement.

> *Sometimes, a regime will accommodate a request or demand of pro-democracy forces, not out of respect or courtesy, but because the regime may want to defuse social tension, influence attitudes of foreign governments, impress citizens of its concern for the welfare of the people, or bring an issue to closure before opponents can exploit it for their own purposes.* (Helvey, 2004:p.38)

1.2.2.2.1.3. Nonviolent Coercion:

One may define nonviolent coercion as taking down the oppressor's power without taking down the oppressor itself. Major economic and social blows that are implemented by nonviolence may force the oppressor to cooperate. "Although the opponents' leaders remain in their positions, and adhere to their original goals, their ability to act effectively has been taken away from them" (Sharp, 2010:p.36).

1.2.2.2.1.4. Disintegration:

Disintegration is the mechanism which takes down the opponent's power "so complete that they do not even have sufficient power to surrender" (Sharp, 2010:p.36).

1.2.2.2.2. Methods of Nonviolence

As mentioned above, what give nonviolence upper hand are its flexibility and the variety of the methods it uses. A collection of actions and non-actions may weaken the pillars of power which is expected to result dissolution or downfall of the oppressor. The intention behind those actions and non-actions is preventing the power structure of an oppressor to function well, making "the enemy to do something wrong" (Sharp, 2013:p.67), or surprising the opponent and decreasing its morale (Sharp, 2013:p.67). Gene Sharp maps three major methods of nonviolence:

1.2.2.2.2.1. Protest and Persuasion:

Protest and persuasion method is related to "conversion mechanism" of nonviolence since it is the tool of giving message of the movement and declaring its grievance and suffering: "The use of these methods shows that the resisters are against or in favor of something, the degree of opposition or support, and, sometimes, the number of people involved" (Sharp, 1973:p.51). Ten subclasses of protest and persuasion are used to fulfil the goal of reaching out to people and the oppressor which are:

- *Formal statements*
- *Communications with a wider audience,*
- *Group representations,*
- *Symbolic public acts,*
- *Pressures on individuals,*
- *Drama and music,*
- *Processions,*
- *Honoring the dead,*
- *Public assemblies*
- *Withdrawal and renunciation* (Sharp, 1990:pp.51-54).

1.2.2.2.2.2. Noncooperation:

Noncooperation, whose meaning is that "the resisters in a conflict either deliberately withdraw some form or degree of existing cooperation with the opponents or the resisters refuse to initiate certain forms of new cooperation" (Sharp, 1973:p.54), is the

method that aims to paralyze the oppressor (Sharp, 2013:p.127). The subclasses of noncooperation are:

- *Ostracism of persons*
- *Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions*
- *Withdrawal from the social system*
- *Action by consumers*
- *Actions by workers and producers*
- *Action by middlemen*
- *Action by owners and management*
- *Action by holders of financial resources A*
- *Action by governments*
- *Symbolic strikes*
- *Agricultural strikes*
- *Strikes by special groups*
- *Ordinary industrial strikes*
- *Restricted strikes*
- *Multi-industry strikes*
- *Combination of strikes and economic closures*
- *Rejection of authority*
- *Citizens' noncooperation with government*
- *Citizens' alternatives to obedience*
- *Action by government personnel*
- *Domestic governmental action*
- *International governmental action* (Sharp, 2013:pp.55-61)

1.2.2.2.2.3. Nonviolent Intervention:

Nonviolent intervention is a method that is used in severe conditions which need urgent action in order to "intervene directly to change a given situation" (Sharp, 1973:p.62). There are five sub-methods of nonviolent intervention:

- *Psychological intervention*

- *Physical intervention*
- *Social intervention*
- *Economic intervention*
- *Political intervention* (Sharp, 1990:pp.62-64)

1.2.2.3. Optimum Environment

Much of the same with methods other than nonviolence, an optimum environment is needed for nonviolence to function and operate in a sound way. Methods of nonviolence are shaped by weak spots of the oppressor's power columns. If nonviolent struggle is to be waged, it is expected that operating area/environment allows some conditions which are free press, ideological compatibility, questionability and accountability of the oppressor, expendability of the oppressor in the sight of international community, economic efficiency of the movement (Harger and Hall, 2015), the movement's influence on the oppressor (the oppressor's dependence on the people in this context), high participation rate to the movement, international support, and democratic climate.

1.2.2.3.1. Free Media

Since one of the main goals of nonviolent struggle is creating awareness to gain support, either free press, or trustworthy narrators/eyewitnesses play a vitally important role on showing the oppression that people are facing. Although technology allows people today to reach almost anywhere in the world, information pollution can easily make the reliability of claims questionable. Mainstream media, on the other hand, is a powerful tool to reach masses. In cases that press is free, the voice of oppressed can be heard by both the oppressor and target group(s). If local media is biased but international media is interested in the case, a reliable narrator/eyewitness can be useful to show what is going on as well as the demands of the movement. In such a situation, trustworthiness is a crucial factor because of the reason that, as stated above, reliability of the narrator has the ability to convince people better. As for the question "what makes a person

reliable?", one can say to be known well by the international community, intellectual competence and experience in the field are factors that make a person trustworthy before the eyes of international community.

Besides media in its classical meaning, social media can play the role of early warning system to detect upcoming violence and helps nonviolent movement to take action in advance.

> "*Yet there are advantages to having field officers — members of trust networks who consist of paid staff or volunteers, or a combination of the two — who report events on a regular basis and are available, if need be, for rapid verification of event reports and to intervene in tense situations on short notice…*" (Bock, 2012:p.206).

Besides helping nonviolence to take precautions before violence occurs, a well-functioning media helps nonviolence on ongoing violent conflicts as well. Ushahidi, for example, which is an election-monitoring tool, was "developed to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election violence in 2008" ("About Ushahidi"). Its superiority to mainstream media in terms of that it "had been better at reporting acts of violence" (Shirky, 2011:p.16) made other movements to adopt it. Information technologies that are alternating to mainstream media may provide an advantageous environment to nonviolent attempts. Two important advantages can be provided by information technologies which are early warning system and spreadability of information. An well-operating early warning system increases the possibility for nonviolence to succeed.

> *"[T]o the extent that these technologies (social media, crowdsourcing, bounded crowdsourcing, digital mapping, crowd feeding, bounded crowd feeding, and restricted feeding), used together, can increase the chances that nonviolent social movements will have greater success, then they collectively turn the warning-response gap on its head." (Bock, 2012:p.124)*

The other advantage of information technologies is spreadability of information. Information technologies have the potential to inform the oppression people are facing to the rest of the world.

> *New information technologies do not topple dictators; they are used to catch dictators off-guard. Today, being an effective social movement means utilizing social media. However, the world has seen interest in change expressed from within Iran, and this may prove to be the most destabilizing outcome of the protests. The regime's brutalities streamed around the globe. The world saw the dissent; the regime knows the world saw the dissent.* (Howard, 2011:p.12)

1.2.2.3.2. Ideological Compatibility of the Movement

Ideological compatibility of the movement both in local and international level is one of the key contributors of participation. Ideological proximity may create the sense of empathy among the people who are indecisive or observe the events. The possibility of demanding democracy to be supported internationally, for instance, is higher than demanding fascism or monarchy in today's conditions. The ideological legitimacy, however, should not be approached with the assumption that the more it promotes equality and freedom, the more it will be supported: Zeitgeist of the era that is lived is a decisive factor for a nonviolent movement to receive support. In local scale, determining ideological factor is related to compatibility of the movement's ideology with mainstream ideology accepted by the widest layer of the society. In a country with a population of nationalists, a nationalist movement using nonviolence is more likely to be supported. Internationally, on the other hand, it is more preferable that the movement's ideology doesn't contradict with international norms. It must be stated that international support in this case, is twofold: the first actor meant with international is a collection of communities holding power and sharing the same values or at least concordant on same values. The United Nations can be a good example for defining such an organization.

1.2.2.2.3.2.1. Ideological compatibility in local scale:

In local scale, a movement whose ideology is compatible with ideology of the majority; or with a particular group (i.e. the target group) is likely to be successful. If, for example, nationalism is an ideology that is adopted nation-wide, the potential of a nonviolent movement with nationalist motives to succeed is probable. Likewise, it is naturally expected from a religious community to sympathize with a movement that is holding the same beliefs. Similarly, in cases where the support of a specific group is

sought, the importance of ideological compatibility can be seen. In Mexico, although Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), a group that was established to "demand basic rights-land, housings, jobs, food, health care, democracy and justice-with much emphasis on the rights of peasants and indigenous peoples" (Resurgent Voices in Latin America:p.201), was a secular left wing organization, since majority of the people were Catholics EZLN was forced to take actions such as prohibition of alcohol (Mayan Voices for Human Rights).

1.2.2.2.3.1.2. Ideological compatibility in International scale:

In international scale, ideological proximity with mainstream international community is essential to be supported. The possibility for demanding democracy to be supported by majority of the foreign actors, for instance, is higher than demanding fascism or monarchy in today's conditions. However, one should not be deluded that the approach of "the more a nonviolent movement promotes equality and freedom, the more it will be supported internationally" is not always valid. Since "end of the history" political system today is democracy, a movement with liberal values might be supported. However, a movement with the same goal would not receive the same support 200 years ago. Still, there are exceptions. Even though a movement's goal is not to establish democracy, it can still receive support from mainstream international community. One, in this context, may claim that ideological proximity and common interests motived the West on turning blind eye on Samuel Doe's Coup D'état against his relatively more tolerant predecessor, William Tolbert in 1980 (Page and Davis, 2005:p.128 (vol.5)), and supporting Doe's Liberia with $402 million between 1981 and 1985 which was "more than during the entire previous century" ("Liberia: More U.S. Support Needed, 10/22/'95", 1995).

1.2.2.3.3. Questionability/Accountability of the Oppressor

As with ideological legitimacy, oppressor's questionability and accountability is an important factor for a movement to be supported and participated in both cases: in which oppressor lacks accountability and the cases where the oppressor prefers transparency. What makes accountability pleasant is that both cases can be turned to the movement's advantage.

In cases where the oppressor is questionable (democracies in general), and can be held accountable for its activities, there may be a positive image amongst people. The illusion of transparency can support that positive image. Still, accountability of the oppressor can be used in a nonviolent movement's favour. Firstly, its transparency can make the oppressor vulnerable judicially. Facing an international tribune can be daunting for an oppressor. Moreover, revealing corruption, human rights violations and injustice in such cases is much easier. In this context, the more transparent an oppressor is, the easier for movements to find its weak spots. Lastly, the reliance that the oppressor can be held accountable for its actions may be encouraging for people to participate in the movement.

In dictatorships/tyrannies, on the other hand, people might be afraid of participating in a nonviolent movement based on the fear that questioning the authority may bring heavy consequences such as disappearing, executions and economic pressures. However, the situation may be transformed into vice versa. Negative image of the oppressor makes people tend to stop supporting it. The sense of suffering and unreciprocated behaviours of the oppressor causes more participation. Furthermore, if lack of accountability of the oppressor reaches the extent of causing disturbance internationally, the response from foreign actors is expected to be either international tribunal or sanctions against the oppressor. Since, what scares dictators is facing international sanctions rather than possible reactions from their "subjects", waging nonviolent struggle is expected to be more achievable.

1.2.2.3.4. Expendability of the Oppressor

No matter how idealistically nonviolent school approaches to objectivity of international community, it is an undeniable fact that governments support regimes that are close to them in terms of their own interests. In this context, expecting foreign actors to support regimes that are not pleasant for them would not be realistic. If there is unconformity between the oppressor and foreign actors; -economically like Venezuela case where increased taxes over foreign companies caused serious disputes; or when militarily threatened as it happened in Iran where Green Revolution is praised by the West- and if there are alternatives/substitutes for that oppressor, it can be expected from international actors to discard the oppressor. Therefore, expendability of the oppressor in the sight of

international community is a crucial factor for a nonviolent movement's success. International actors whose interests are conflicting with oppressive regimes tend to support nonviolent movements inside that country for a number of reasons. First reason is that a violent movement may commit war crimes which can put their foreign supporters into a difficult position. The second reason that makes foreign actors to support nonviolence is the easiness of nonviolence. Because of its ability to create sympathy among people, its practical methods and success rate, nonviolence is logically more useful and less costly than supporting violent movements in some cases.

In some other cases, however, ideological proximity with the movement might be partial. Different groups with different ideologies, yet with similar short-term goals and priorities may cooperate under the umbrella of nonviolence. In such cases, foreign actors "may support particular factions of a nonviolent movement in order to ensure that if or when successful the 'right' factions rise to power in the new regime" (Steger, Battersby and Siracusa. 2014:p.736).

1.2.2.3.5. Economic Efficiency of the Movement

Economic effectivity of nonviolent movement is one of the conditions that has an important role on taking power of the oppressor away. Economy is the key element of obedience. Many authoritarian regimes use economy as a means of holding obedience of people if not loyalty. The more a people's income and purchasing power are, the less they tend to risk their routine at the cost of their freedom. Therefore, taking away the oppressor's economical advantage will cause cracks at its power and collapse finally. Nonviolence suggests that economical non-cooperation is the way of paralyzing power of the oppressor (Sharp, 2003:pp.42-43). Still, for achieving this goal, economic efficiency is prerequisite. The more nonviolent movement holds economical advantage, the more oppressor needs to cooperate with it. In South Africa, for instance, where 73% of land was "white area" (areas that belonged to Apartheid Regime and white population) (Khumalo, "20 years on, still waiting for the ANC to deliver", 2014), collective boycott made Apartheid government economically collapse. Although anti-apartheid movement consisted of low-incomed members, refusal of buying was devastating enough for the economy. Economic dependency is also related to the

structure of the country. While boycott of farmers is more important in rural countries, refusal of consumption or withdrawal of bank accounts by people living in urban areas in urbanized capitalist countries can be much more effective.

1.2.2.3.6. Oppressor's Dependence on People

Besides economical dependency, oppressor's dependence on the community in terms of politics and military can be used in favour of nonviolent struggle. Political support and military duty is one of the essentials of power. However, having the advantage of numbers can sometimes be a precondition in order to achieve the goal of weakening the oppressor's power. Boycotting elections for example, needs a huge percentage of people to make a difference. . Likewise, the more governmental positions are occupied by the members of the movement the easier paralyzing the power of oppressor gets. In cases where army is not professionalized, refusal of military service or participating law enforcements can take the oppressor's chance to intervene protesters violently away.

1.2.2.3.7. High Participation Rate

A well planned nonviolent strategy might seem to be enough to wage a healthy, successful nonviolent struggle. However, without enough participation, such movement is highly likely to fail. In this context, although non-cooperation of people with the oppressor is highly contributing and its importance cannot be denied, their active participation is the actual crucial determinant. Therefore, the more participation received, the more powerful the struggle will be.

> *Higher levels of participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success, including enhanced resilience, higher probabilities of tactical innovation, expanded civic disruption (thereby raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo), and loyalty shifts involving the opponent's erstwhile supporters, including members of the security forces.* (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.10)

For many of the elements of nonviolence to be efficient, a certain amount of participation is essential. The effectivity of demonstrations and marches in terms of creating influence depends on the number of people participates. Likewise, participation rate is a decisive factor in nonconsumption boycotts.

There are a lot of cases in which a nonviolent struggle starts with a few people, but only reaches its potential to affect the other party after hitting a substantial amount of people, such as Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, where demonstration of small group of students in Hefei "spread to Beijing, Shanghai and then to about fifteen other cities. The number of students swelled into the tens of thousands." (Kerns, 2011:p.43). The possibility of success for a movement, therefore, is up to diversity inside a movement and raised number of participants.

One should note that what is meant by "participation" here is the amount of people compared to the population, or rate in other words. Also, quality of participants is an undeniably important factor. The more participants have the force of using sanctions against an oppressor, the more nonviolent struggle tends to prevail.

1.2.2.3.8. International Support

International support may be both useful and/or disadvantageous. The more are there international community with economic or political power over the oppressor -such as sanctions-, the more likely the nonviolent movement to succeed. Moreover, every action of an organized movement costs money. Financial support has the ability to ease finding alternative methods thanks to financial flexibility provided by foreign financers/sponsors. Nevertheless, foreign support may make the movement suspicious and create an image of an "external operation to take down an actor opposing to demands and pressures from mainstream foreign actors" easily.

International support may be both useful and/or disadvantageous. If the international community is in favour of the movement, and applies sanctions to the oppressor, the success chance for nonviolent movements increases. What is meant by "international support" differs from international actors who are mentioned on "Ideological Proximity" part. International support to a movement may arise from ideological proximity as well as political reasons, economical interests or military concerns(using nonviolence to weaken the oppressor), even though grievance and suffering of people are ignored. International actors may be "foreign governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and global civil society"

(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.54). The support may be with propaganda, political support, diplomatic recognition, consultancy or financial aid.

Even if international community and the nonviolent movement have different ideologies, an ongoing conflict between the oppressor and international community may force international actors to adopt "lesser of two evils" approach. The reason for Ba'ath Party to be supported by the West in 1963 "Ramadan Revolution" was that approach.

Economic interests are another reason for foreign actors to support nonviolent struggle in a country. If an oppressor prefers not to enjoy trading with other countries and to save its resources to itself, such as nationalizing oil or applying enormous taxes to foreign countries, it is highly likely for foreign actors to support to a nonviolent movement in order to weaken the oppressor. After many revolutions, foreign supporters expect from the new regime to loosen previous regime's economic policies towards other countries in return of their support.

Military tensions between countries may be another motive for foreign countries to support a nonviolent movement for the purpose of distracting the oppressor in terms of military and law enforcement. By doing so, it is hoped to get a "win-win" result. A hypothetical victory of a nonviolent movement may open the path of an alliance with the new regime/government. In case nonviolent struggle fails, there will be a weaker and exhausted enemy which is more pleasant. Moreover, since a nonviolent struggle attempt is presumed to meet a violent response from its opponent –as it is the nature of oppressors-. Such violations that are committed by the oppressor may be used as trump by international actors legally.

The type of support from international actors can vary. Although, "[T]he aid often comes in the form of government financial assistance, sanctions targeting the adversary, diplomatic recognition or other forms of support for leading opposition activists, or NGO funding or training" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.54), it may also be by using propaganda tools such as media. Because nonviolent struggle is in need of massive amount of effort and a certain level of participation, it might be enormously costly. A movement which is made of poor segment of the society is usually not prepared to a long-term struggle financially no matter how determined its members are. At that point foreign sponsorship is vital for the continuity and survival of the movement. Similarly,

sanctions against the oppressor can be a financially equalizing factor. It is assumed that the weaker an oppressor gets, the stronger a movement becomes (relatively). Giving training to the members of a nonviolent movement is another type of foreign support. Finally, propaganda in favour of the movement has the potential to attract more support (internally and externally) and create sympathy among people which is hoped to result more participation(example).

What makes international support disadvantageous is that it may create a negative image in the sight of local community. An oppressor can easily claim the movement to be proxy of foreign actors which "can at times delegitimize a movement in the eyes of the domestic population by leading to accusations of corruption within the movement" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.55). Also, foreign sponsor can create "free-rider" problem. If "local populations perceive that participation in the campaign is unnecessary because of foreign patronage" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.55), the movement may fail before reaching its full potential despite the support it takes.

1.2.2.3.9. Democratic Climate

Democratic climate falls under the grey area on the list of circumstantial idealities in terms of nonviolent struggle, since nonviolence is based on the assumption of facing a certain amount of oppression from the other party (or parties).

In democratic climates, freedom of expression without the fear of being punished can increase the participation to nonviolent struggle. The more people are allowed to raise their demands publicly, the less they tend to practice violence. Moreover, a democratic atmosphere may lead the press to reveal the wrongdoings of the oppressor. Although democracy is the prerequisite outcome of nonviolent struggle according to nonviolent school of thought, notably Gene Sharp, who offered democracy as the only alternative to democracy in "From Dictatorship to Democracy", there are two scenarios in which democracies oppress people: first, an occupying force may be a democratic country and loyal to its democratic values in spite of occupation. The second possibility is that despite the presence of democracy, economic inequality and corruption can be present.

What makes nonviolence advantageous is that it can be benefited from both democratic and undemocratic atmospheres.

In democratic and semi-democratic countries, the absence of fear of facing excessive violence and oppression, people are expected to participate in nonviolent movements easily. Since laws in a democratic country allow freedom of expression, it is unlikely for members of a movement to suffer because of activities like demonstrations. In a democratic climate, people are able to support nonviolent movements openly which gives nonviolent movements an upper hand: unlike nonviolent struggles under authoritarian regimes, members of the movement do not need time to wait until the movement reaches "maturity". Lastly, transparency and accountability of the opponent may provide psychological advantage to the movement. If participants of a movement are certain about that they will not be mistreated, and even if they face such mistreatment, they will be able to hold their perpetrator accountable; they will be less hesitant about participating in the movement.

In undemocratic atmospheres, nonviolent movements turn the disadvantageous situation to their favour. Since unmentioned suffering and collective hatred of people who are living under authoritarian regimes is highly probable, at a moment of "explosion", it can be expected from them to participate in the movement. The starting point of Tunisian Revolution, for example, was self-immolation of 26 year old fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi who was slapped by a police officer, and "in response to this physical and psychological attack" (Loremont, 2014:p.31).

> *This is not to say that Bouazizi's self-immolation was not inspiring and empowering, much less to say it was not an incitement to action, but rather to maintain that the protests that followed his self-immolation must have capitalized on longstanding rebellious instincts that Ben Ali's police state repressed but could not fully eradicate* (Gana, 2013:p.12).

In addition to it, loyalist shifts in undemocratic systems may be more expectable in undemocratic countries. Violent responses against nonviolent and peaceful attempts may create sympathy among civilian citizens who are loyal to the oppressor. Loyalty shift among security personnel is crucial for their key role in terms of being direct subjects of the oppressor's use of violence against the members of the movement. The possibility for participants of the movement to be treated unjustly and poorly as a result of actions of security forces is an important factor at loyalist defections. "[N]onviolent campaigns may also lead soldiers, policemen, and (often later) their commanding officers to question the viability, risks, and potential costs of military actions against the nonviolent campaign" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011 p.19).

1.2.2.4. Paralyzers and Obstacles

As some specific conditions mentioned above have the potential of making nonviolent more doable, there are situations that either decrease the practicability of nonviolence or preclude it completely. The further conditions are from optimum climate listed above, the harder nonviolent struggle to be waged. In this study, conditions that make nonviolent struggle impossible are called obstacles. The situations in which nonviolence has limited feasibility, but does not have the ability of making any difference are called paralyzers.

As there are optimum conditions for nonviolence to be waged healthily and successfully, and applicability of nonviolence depends on the degree of presence of those conditions, it can be expected that vice versa situations decrease practicability of nonviolent struggles. This study divides those negative situations into two: paralyzers and obstacles.

Paralyzers stand for conditions in which nonviolence is applicable, but has no effect in terms of making any difference or achieving any goal. In other words, paralyzers are the possible barriers that do not prevent nonviolence completely, but rather render it dysfunctional by taking its efficiency and power away. Unlike obstacles (that is mentioned below), in situations where paralyzers are present, nonviolence is either allowed or limited to a certain extent (that nonviolent is still possible despite some complications), but lacks making difference. The reason for paralyzers to be inefficient is that nonviolent struggle does not have the ability to weaken the oppressor's power columns.

Obstacles, on the other hand, are conditions that make nonviolent struggle impossible to be waged. In contrast to paralyzers, nonviolence is not allowed by any means and any nonviolent method is blocked completely. In this context, nonviolent struggle does not differ from violence in terms of response that it gets.

A point that shouldn't be missed is that the same factor that affects nonviolent struggle can be a paralyzer or an obstacle based on its severity. Another important fact that should be noted is that there are cases in which only paralyzers are present; cases where paralyzers and obstacles coexist together; or the ones where only obstacles are

encountered. Still, the scenarios in which paralyzers and obstacles coexist exclude the significance of paralyzers. Since it is impossible for nonviolence to be implemented in the presence of obstacles, it is unimportant whether paralyzers are at stake or not.

1.2.2.4.1. Paralyzers

Paralyzers are possible barriers that do not prevent nonviolence completely, but rather render it dysfunctional by taking its efficiency and power away. Nonviolence basically seeks to attack the opponent's sources of power. In cases where means of nonviolence are defunctionalized, which means its ability of weakening the other party's power, waging nonviolent struggle may slightly make a difference.



Figure 8: Paralyzers

The highlighted area in Figure 8 indicates the cases where a nonviolent attempt faces paralyzers. What is shown by continuous green horizontal line in figure 2 is the nonviolence attempt, and the point it becomes dashes indicates inefficiency. The first line is hypothetical nonviolent struggle which is presumed to function well (and therefore is made continuous) and the point that it meets vertical line (paralyzers) is when the idea of nonviolent struggle is embodied. There are 13 paralyzers that a movement may have to suffer from: Economic inefficiency, biased media, telecommunication paralyzers (restricted access to information and communication surveillance), being ideological/political minority, being ethnical minority, low participation rate, inefficiency of participants, political inefficacy, confronting a

superpower, legal paralyzers, professional armies, exploitation of nonviolence and a nonviolence-familiar opponent.

1.2.2.4.1.1. Economic Inefficiency

Economic inefficiency is one of the most crucially important paralyzers since financial power is essential for every regime to keep functioning. Not-being able to affect the oppressor economically makes nonviolence much harder to achieve victory. In totalitarian systems like fascism or socialism, all the resources of the country belong to the state and the state does not take or need taxes of its citizens, so, refusing taxpaying is either impossible since there is no tax, or it hardly affects the oppressor even if taxpaying is present. In such regimes, strikes also do not seem to be possible because of the reason that state is the monopoly of provision of needs and services. Therefore, unlike downfall of Apartheid in South Africa, in which black people refused to buy any goods on Mondays that made Apartheid regime yield, in regimes where state holds resources, it is impossible for people to refuse working.

If, on the other hand, what is mentioned is open market, globalization weakened borders that made governments less dependent on its own citizens and has given alternative sources to use. Cheap manpower makes outsourcing appealing. This makes strikes much harder to succeed, because there will be an alternative work force waiting to be replaced with jobs of those who work-to-rule or stop working completely. In the US, for example, there is an increasing number on companies that are moving their factories to be operated in countries with cheaper manpower. Sensata Company, for example, notified its workers that "in 2012 all of their jobs would be outsourced to China" ("Bainport leverages election in outsourcing fight", 2012). What is noteworthy is that outsourcing is already preferred by companies even without facing general strikes from their workers. Low income of participants of nonviolence and being economic minority also weakens economic efficiency. If there is an ethnic or religious dispute and ones who wage nonviolent struggle are economically powerless, the majority who holds most of the income is not likely to cooperate with the minority in order to maintain its economic power. Low income takes the advantage of threatening a state by withdrawing bank deposits away.

1.2.2.4.1.2. Biased Media

Biased/adherent visual and printed media is another factor that paralyzes functionality of nonviolent struggle. Media is an important tool which can be used by both oppressor and nonviolence. It has the ability of showing the same event in many different ways and wordings. The danger, "is not simply the corruption of an internal culture – as could happen in any business – but, through the media's political influence, the ability to wield power over public life and the 'national conversation' in quite unaccountable ways." (Freedman, 2014:p.12). For Couldry, "media power refers to the 'concentration in media institutions of the symbolic power of "constructing reality" (both factual representations and credible fictions)" (Couldry, 2002:p.4). As a tool of "constructing reality", media, either at the hands of an oppressor or a private institution that is benefited from an oppressor can easily manipulate the truth.

> *[M]edia power is best understood as a relational property – the ability, in competition with others, to hegemonize the resources concentrated inside the media – but the popular shorthand for media power, as previously noted, often refers to those individuals who sit at the top of the largest communications corporations across the globe.* (Freedman, 2014: p.31)

In oppressive regimes, media is either belongs to the state, or people with interest-based motives who are close to the oppressor. The ones who use media as a tool of counter insurgency generally are "a small group of people who occupy commanding positions across the economy, politics, culture and authority and who impose their world views and everyday regimes on those who lack 'elite' power" (Freedman, 2014:p.32). Such manipulation and misinformation contains anti-propaganda against a nonviolent movement in order to decrease its credibility and degrade its image before the eyes of public opinion. Besides its enormous power, media can be limited by an oppressor or can limit itself. Censorships applied by an oppressive government can be threatening for owners of the private media who after all seek to have benefit alongside with their ethical concerns. It is already nearly impossible for media organs belong to the state to flout the ban unless some exceptions such as personal attempts of people working for the state media, yet opposes its policies; or in case the state is weakened and it lost its controlling body. Self-censorship is another possibility. Media organs that have organic

ties or mutual benefits with the oppressor can create a self-censorship mechanism in order to prevent any confrontation with the oppressor. In both cases, reaching out to masses becomes so hard which may decrease participation rate, efficiency of the movement and sympathy from other actors. Lastly, disinformation can confuse people easily. Doubts that are created by contradiction of different claims make it harder for people to distinguish truth from falsehood. After First Gulf War, in which Iraqi army didn't show any significant presence, Iraqi media announced the defeat of the US Army which led people go out to streets and celebrate the victory of Iraqi Army ("After the War: Baghdad; Claiming Victory, Iraq Holds Its Fire", 1991).

1.2.2.4.1.3. Telecommunication Paralyzers

Telecommunication has proven its importance in last decade after Egyptian Revolution (also known as "Facebook Revolution") in 2011; or Iranian Green Movement in 2009, which was conducted in spite of draconian policies of Iranian Government. Still, since technological advancements work in both ways, oppressors use technology, telecommunication technologies in particular, against nonviolent movements. There are two main elements of telecommunication paralyzers which are insecurity due to surveillance and telecommunication restrictions. Those paralyzers have the possibility to neutralize telecommunication tools, especially social media, by blocking its two vital functions (in terms of contributing nonviolence) which are "communication among the participants and would-be participants who elected take part in the protests; and broadening the range of tactical options open to those participants" (Gelvin, 2012:p.57).

The known history of modern mass surveillance dates back to four decades ago ("Q&A: What you need to know about Echelon"). Although designed as a wartime surveillance program, ECHELON soon became "a global system for intercepting communications" (Schmid, 2011:p.11). That demilitarization of surveillance may be the result of growing popular movements and nonviolent demonstrations. Since it is hard for governments to avoid nonviolent struggles when they reach their potential, governments might have thought that suppressing nonviolence before it starts would

be a better defence policy. Today, one can mention about many surveillance techniques that were designed to prevent anti-governmental actions.

> *Surveillance techniques include surveillance by human operatives* (*the proverbial unmarked van, as well as discreet interviews of parties of interest, searches of property and vehicles, and other means), cameras and other recording devices, satellite imagery and aerial surveillance, and many forms of electronic surveillance.* (Harvey, 2014:p.410)

Although there are raising voices about privacy and human rights concerns, and "procedures have been enacted to ensure that it does not occur" (Harvey, 2014:p.233), "[G]overnment abuse of electronic surveillance is still possible" (Harvey, 2014:p.233). It is revealed that social media and internet use are two of the most threatened means of communication after Edward Snowden disclosed NSA's PRISM program. With PRISM, personal e-mails, Facebook messages, YouTube visits, Skype talks and even personal documents made on a computer connected to the Internet are traced ("NSA/CSS POLICY MANUAL 1-52", 2013).

The results of surveillance vary from premature exposure of the movement (and its members) to lack of sense of secrecy and security which may decrease participation. Precautions as a result of having intelligence about the movement's next step can also damages nonviolent struggle.

The other aspect of telecommunication paralyzers is telecommunication restrictions. Blocking certain websites, limiting internet connection (in terms of time, such as shutting down for a certain period of time; or restricting connection quality), preventing SMS trafficking, etc. are some of the telecommunication restrictions. Telecommunication restrictions may damage nonviolent struggle in two ways: first, it avoids the movement to reach maturity and come to its full potential. Secondly, it makes revealing the truth more difficult if not impossible and therefore makes revelation need more effort. After allegedly rigged elections in Iran (Dabashi, 2011:p.23), protests in several places arose, which would later be called Green Movement or Twitter Revolution. What makes Green Movement significant in this case is that protesters got organized via social media. "The intensive use of social media during the 2009 presidential election period stemmed from an already widespread base of Internet users in Iran, the anonymity that Twitter and blogs offered, and the well-established popularity of these interactive services." (Harvey, 2014:p.731)

Ironically what cut the momentum of Green Movement was what gave it that very momentum. When Iranian government "blocked social networking sites periodically and arrested too many of cyber activists as well" (Moghanizadeh, 2013:p.10), the movement started falling into decline. The combination of less communication, less participation, less security and difficulty of revealing the truth caused Green Movement to end up with failure.

1.2.2.4.1.4. Being Ideological/Political Minority

The combination of possibility of facing rigid response from the oppressor, low participation and severe opposition from majority of the population make being-ideological-minority in authoritarian systems extremely challenging. The first challenge that a nonviolent movement can face is defamation. Questioning the legitimacy of the movement may decrease its credibility in the sight of population. In authoritarian regimes, national constitutional laws may contradict with the international rule of law contrary to the principle that "the rules of a national legal system do not have the purpose of conflicting with a rule of international law" (Basedow and Siehr, 2000:p.84). That contradiction has the potential for nonviolent movements to be declared unlawful according to the constitution of that country; even though no action of the movement conflicts with the international rule of law. The second possible problem is low participation and loyalty shifts. No matter how right the cause of movement is, and how unjustly they are treated, it is highly unlikely for a community to support people whose aim is to overthrow that community's ideology. If an authoritarian system is established by a popular revolution (e.g. Soviet Russia or China in their early forms), people are tend to defend the system which they formed.

Being an ideological/political minority causes a paradoxical situation if demanding democracy is a precondition of nonviolence. If the majority rules the country democratically, demanding otherwise will contradict what nonviolence offers. In this regard, one can make the deduction that struggling for a non-democratic system cannot be called nonviolent since what it demands is a system other than democracy. Furthermore, the problem with democracy is that whether something is right or wrong – including human rights- is determined by the majority and disagreement with a

democratically prepared constitution is likely to be considered as a non-democratic act. So long as the laws are not openly contradicting with the international rule of law, they can be "flexed". In this context, a democratic country can be an oppressor. As an example, one can mention about Switzerland minaret referendum in 2009. After the constitutional banning of minaret construction was approved by 57.5% of the voters ("Swiss voters back ban on minarets", 2009), opposition has arisen, claiming that the law is "defamation of religion" and against religious freedom which is a basic human right. However, the challenging problem was that Swiss state and the majority of its citizens (of which constitution is made by those two) did not see constructing minarets as a religious expression since they are the ones who domestically decide whether something is a human right or not. Another scenario is that if the majority of a country oppose to democracy and rules based on the ideology they feel belongingness to, imposing an ideology -even if it is democracy-, is anti-democratic.

1.2.2.4.1.5. Being Ethnical Minority

Ethnic minorities in some cases suffer from adversity of waging nonviolent struggle. First problem of being an ethnic minority is that it is harder for people from different ethnicities to empathize with ones who are waging nonviolent struggle. Easiness on justification of violence against an ethnic minority is a problem that can be easily faced. Less empathy and more sense of "us" and "them" may motivate an oppressor at responding nonviolence with violence. Even though there are ideological similarities, a group with different ethnicity might not create the same impact with those who share the same ethnicity. In a country based on a nationalist culture, a socialist movement from an ethnic minority is less likely to be supported by socialist from the minority, even though one can say socialism is an international political system and reject nationalism. In Turkey, for instance, Turkish leftists adopted a nationalist perspective towards Kurdish Movement despite their similar ideologies, and "this contradiction had produced divergent left-wing nationalisms, one Turkish the other Kurdish, instead of a revolutionary left in Turkey" (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2012) Secondly, if there is a combination of ethnicity with economy and politics, the situation can be even more severe. In cases where ethnic majority dominates ethnic minorities politically and economically, it will tend to not to support a nonviolent movement waged by minorities

in order to not to lose power. Naturally, an overpopulated group politically and economically in a country where division is made in terms of ethnicity will have to struggle much harder to wage a proper nonviolent struggle because of less support, less participation and less effectivity

1.2.2.4.1.6. Low Participation Rate

Economically powerful or not, politically effective or not, ethnically majority or minority, if participation is low, none of the advantages listed above are prone to lose their sufficiency. As mentioned on *Why Civil Resistance Works*, participation is the key element for nonviolence to be achievable (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.10). Low participation may appear because of many different reasons. One of the main reasons is fear caused by the oppressor. The fear might range from worries about economic consequences of participating in a movement to physical harm including police violence or even the possibility of facing capital punishment. The greater the risk is, the less people are prone to participate.

Besides the severity of the oppressor's possible response, fruitfulness of benefits of loyalty is another factor that decreases participation rate. Majority of the people are happy with the system that nonviolent activists seek to destroy or change, they will defend the oppressor let's leave participating a movement actively. People may tend to not to participate because they are threatened, but because they do not simply want to. The motive of such non-participation can either roots in displeasure or hate towards nonviolent movement and what they support, lack of empathy; or sympathy towards the oppressor. In both cases, where either participation is punished hardly, or non-participation is awarded generously, it is significantly hard to receive participation.

1.2.2.4.1.7. Inefficiency/Inferiority of Participants

The efficiency of participants is at least as important as participation rate. The first problem that a nonviolent movement can encounter with is lack of knowledge and training. Since nonviolent struggle "requires discipline and preparation" (Donnely,

2010), a poorly planned nonviolent movement attempt by poorly prepared participants is expected to fail. This kind of unskilled attempt may result with devastating outcomes as well such as backlash from the society and mass arrest.

Although Chenoweth claims that 3.5% participation of the population is enough to take down an oppressor (Chenoweth, "My Talk at TEDxBoulder: Civil Resistance and the "3.5% Rule"" 2013), the baselessness of the argument can be easily seen by taking into consideration that the participant factor is excluded. If, a hypothetical nonviolent movement is made of only unemployed people, even if their number corresponds 5% of the population (which is higher than what Chenoweth offers), that movement's chance to make a visible difference will be low. If, on the other hand, participants are doctors, even if their number corresponds 0.5% of the population, the oppressor can be weakened significantly.

1.2.2.4.1.8. Political Inefficacy

Political inefficacy has proven itself to be a crucially important factor in terms of making nonviolence inefficient. What makes political inefficacy that important is the fact that the power that a nonviolent movement holds, or its ability of affecting power is inversely proportional with the oppressor's power. If the members of a movement occupy fewer positions, the lesser it is expected to be their ability of influencing political (and relatedly economic and social) structure of a country. In such cases occupying the majority of the population for a nonviolent movement slightly has an impact on its success, rather, it being politically can make a group's population just numbers on the page. The reason for political inefficacy to be discussed under paralyzers is that oppressors can still be overpowered (like Moi case mentioned below), but it may take much more time and effort than where political inefficacy is not present.

Nusayris, who "constitute some 12 percent of the Syrian population" (Pipes, 1989) has dominated "the government, hold key military positions, enjoy(ed) a disproportionate share of the educational resources" (Pipes, 1989) from Hafiz al-Assad's Coup D'état in 1970 until 2011, when people revolted against the oppression. Sunni population, despite being majority, had neither political power nor economic efficiency under al-Assad family who ruled Syria with an iron fist. Another noteworthy fact that can be

derived from Syrian case is the presence of soldiers with Sunni background in the army, who "made up a large number of lower-ranking soldiers, in proportion to their share of the general population" (Cambanis, 2015). What can be deduced from the presence is that lower political efficacy has the potential to decrease participation.

As with Syrian case, the 24 year-long rule of Daniel Arap Moi can be taken as an instance of how political efficacy of the oppressor can affect neutralize of the effectivity of high population and participation. "Using censorship and imprisonment, Moi centralized all power in the presidency and officially declared KANU the sole legal political party of Kenya. He displayed open favouritism to his Kalenjin people, raising the ire of the Kikuyu and Luo." (Page and Davis Jr., 2005:p.222 (vol.5))

Still, oppositions which started in 1982 "became too powerful" (Page and Davis Jr., 2005:p.222 (vol.5)) forced Moi to allow multiparty elections. After 20 years of struggle, Moi was forced to step down in 2002.

1.2.2.4.1.9. Legal Paralyzers

Legal/juridical/ constitutional paralyzers which justify violence have the potential of complicating predisposition of a movement to be nonviolent. Legal paralyzers show itself in three phases of nonviolent struggle: pre-struggle (legal barriers such as criminalizing nonviolent methods), during-struggle (use of force against members of the movement) and post-struggle (aftermath process in case of the movement's failure).

First legal barrier is the deterrence of law that may decrease participation which was experienced by many successful nonviolent movements, from Indian Independence Movement to Civil Rights Movement in the US. Criminalizing nonviolent protests and having demonstrations depended on state permission are some of the problems that a movement can face before it gets mobilized. Many governments today, by availing the vagueness of definition of self-defense, criminalize nonviolent action in their criminal code, such as Article 105 of Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, which subjects ant-government activists (regardless whether violent or nonviolent) to 10 years of imprisonment ("Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China" 2014); or The

Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act in the US that gives animal right activists the same status with terrorists ("Analysis of Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act", 2006).

The second part of legal paralyzers is confronted during nonviolent struggle. Although many governments claim to allow peaceful protests, they may act violently against nonviolent actions under the disguise of self-defense. The openness of Constitution of the Republic of Turkey to interpretation, for example has allowed (and still allows) governments to interfere protesters with use of force. Despite the phrase "Everyone has the right to hold unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission" of Article 34 gives the impression of liberty in terms of demonstration, continuation of it restricts that liberty and gives the article vagueness with regard to lack of definition of national security and public order:

> *The right to hold meetings and demonstration marches shall be restricted only by law on the grounds of national security, public order, prevention of commission of crime, protection of public health and public morals or the rights and freedoms of others.*
>
> *The formalities, conditions, and procedures to be applied in the exercise of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches shall be prescribed by law.* ("The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey", Article 34)

Another problem during-struggle legal paralyzers that is related to the first one is the difficulty of clarifying the concept of "proportionate use of violence". Although international treaties, as well as national constitutions, forbid use of violence by law enforcement and military against non-combatant civilians, the vagueness causes a loophole that allows those elements use violence against nonviolent civilians. Some of the phrases from "Police Use of Force" section of the U.S. National Institute of Justice shows the level of uncertainty when it comes to define the term "use of force" and "excessive force: "There is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of use of force; …but no universal set of rules governs when officers should use force and how much; The frequency of police use-of-force events that may be defined as justified or excessive is difficult to estimate" ("Police Use of Force", 2015). Similarly, Ethical Principles of Law Enforcement manual of Turkish National Police gives the right of "using proportional power" ("Ethical Principles of Law Enforcement") without

defining proportionality. The absence of clear and universally agreed definition paves the way of analogy in terms of assessing the situation which means that legality of an action that law enforcement faces and counter-action that law enforcement applies entirely based on how person in charge interprets. Giving initiative of making inferences can be a threatening factor that may prevent nonviolent struggle to work vigorously since neither force, nor use of force or excessive force is clearly defined.

Humanly violence against nonviolence is another legal factor, -in spite of controversies still going on-, that may affect the efficiency of a nonviolent struggle. One of the most prominent examples to that kind of violence occurs in hunger strikes. In Declaration on Hunger Strikes, accepted by World Medical Association, "…a hunger striker who has issued clear instructions not to be resuscitated lapses into a coma and is about to die. Moral obligation urges the doctor to resuscitate the patient even though it is against the patient's wishes" ("Declaration of Malta", 1992) which is contradicting with the same association's Tokyo Declaration, stating that if a prisoner refuses nourishment by knowing the consequences, he or she can't be subjected to artificial feeding. Artificial feeding, or force feeding, which simply done "using restraint chairs that holds the prisoners' hands, legs and head in place. A feeding tube is then inserted into the nose" (Mock, G., 2015) or done by nutrient enema as well, meaning feeding a patient via a tube, inserted into large intestine in cases patients are not able to be fed orally (Lloyd and Powell-Tuck, 2004). It is reported that in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 45 of 106 men in hunger strike were force fed with unnecessary force ("New report exposes violent tactics used to break Guantanamo hunger strike", 2013).

The last phase of legal paralyzers occurs in post-struggle stage. The unpleasant aftermath consequences may prevent starting a new struggle and make continuity of the struggle harder. Because of the same reason mentioned above, a nonviolent act can be defined as crime; and inhumane treatment that is used by law enforcement and military can be considered as "justifiable" based on the constitution of that country, or due to the loopholes in international treaties and law. In Kashmir, for instance, despite the verification of the protests to be nonviolent, protester were arrested based on India's AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Acts) and Disturbed Areas Act, dozens of young men were arrested by reason of "agitation and nonviolent terrorism" ("'Non-violent terrorism' and India's dirty war in Kashmir", 2010). Per contra, use of excessive

force to the extent of violence against non-combatant law enforcement/military personnel who refuse to show hostility against a nonviolent struggle is another factor that may debar the participation from law enforcement/military participation. When people who are trained to obey the orders are faced with the dilemma of doing one of "two right things" in their perspective, they may tend to obey the orders -not only because they believe those orders to be made under circumstances justifying violence they are to apply, but also the danger of facing hard consequences-; as well as they still have the potential to refuse to commit unethical acts.

1.2.2.4.1.10. Professional Armies

Refusal of military duty is a devastating action for taking an oppressor's power away since most dictatorships and authoritarian regimes rely on military power as aggression is the nature of such regimes. When an oppressor holds military power in its hands, a possible threat against its existence is highly possible to be retaliated with military force. In cases, however, where people refuse to do participate in any military action and doing military service, oppressors become vulnerable against nonviolence. A problem occurs, however, when a country's military system based on professional armies, semi-professional armies or even security companies. Such situations both make refusal of military service impossible and make it harder to reach people who are in the army so long as they are given their salaries frequently, sufficiently and adequately. In Libya, after civil war broke out in 2011 following of protests were responded with violence and turn from being nonviolent to clashing with the police, Libyan Army which was semi-professional back then, started hiring mercenaries, mostly from black Africans living both inside (mostly from Sirte and Bani Waled) and outside of Libya. A professionalized army became a short-term solution to refusal of the government's call of recruitment and scepticism of army personnel who are ordered to fight against their fellow citizens. After Gaddafi's money started running low along with undeniable fact of heavy NATO support to rebels, the mercenaries started falling back. Although it did not succeed in long-term, Gaddafi's "diamond mercenaries" can still be taken as an example to realize the importance of outsourcing or professionalizing the army strategy as a response to refusal of military service.

1.2.2.4.1.11. Exploitation of Nonviolence

Since the effectivity and low-risk advantage of nonviolence is known and embraced by many, the danger of exploitation of nonviolence increases. Not only people who demand freedom and dignity or seek to overthrow oppressive rulers/governments, but also fascists, oppressors and far-right or far-left groups can use nonviolence. In that scenario, nonviolence can easily turn into a dangerous weapon. Although none of them succeeded yet, the rising presence of nonviolent radical right wing parties across Europe (Goodwin, Ramalingam and Briggs, 2012) possesses a serious danger. "Radical right political parties are predominantly non-violent and operate within the rules of democracy; in fact, most actively seek to disassociate themselves from historical or perceived ties to their extreme and violent counterparts" (Goodwin, Ramalingam and Briggs, 2012). A hypothetical successful execution of such movements can cause two consequences, particularly in case they are done beforehand of a "pleasant nonviolence":

1) They prevail: any nonviolence attempt afterwards will be much more challenging because the "enemy" that is aimed to be overthrown will have already come by using nonviolence and therefore will be familiar with the tactics a movement may use
2) They lose: the bitter experience will force an oppressor/unpleasant party to be more cautious against nonviolent movements besides the oppressor's advantage of a widespread prejudice among people against nonviolence. The oppressor, in that case, can easily use manipulation tactics by labelling every nonviolence movement as a fascist coup attempt. Consequently, every nonviolent movement will become suspicious

1.2.2.4.1.12. Nonviolence-Familiar Opponents

The ability of nonviolence to yield its opponent by minimizing casualties without compromising its principles, and its enormous success rate have been attracting masses more and more; and as a result of that the number of nonviolent campaigns increased

over years (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.7). However, it not only did draw attention of the oppressed, but also the oppressor. The transparency of nonviolence gave oppressors (e.g. dictatorships, foreign governments that support dictatorships, etc.) the opportunity to analyse its mechanism and methods.

Even though one may claim that nonviolence is a dynamic and flexible force rather than a stable one, and it can form different methods based on circumstances; what makes oppressors to analyse nonviolent methods so dangerous is the possibility for them to adopt the mindset of nonviolence. That understanding of mindset gives oppressors the advantage of being prepared against nonviolent struggle. Much of the same with oppressive regimes which are prepared specially for violent response from people they oppress and therefore lacks of useful response against nonviolence; nonviolence is prepared for violent exercise from other party and shapes its methods based on that assumption that it will answered with violence. Therefore, a hypothetical passive or nonviolent response from the other party may be harmful for nonviolent movements. The reason for a nonviolent response from the oppressor to be dangerous for nonviolent struggle is the same with the reason of what makes nonviolence successful is: more participation (e.g. filling emptied positions by nonviolent movements after strikes, registering army, etc.), less physical harm, more international support, more legitimacy and more public support. The second scenario is based upon the assumption that even though the oppressor does not respond nonviolence with nonviolence, since it knows the methods that are likely to be used by nonviolent movements in case it analyses nonviolence and discovers its own "Achilles' heel", but responds to nonviolence by covering every gap which nonviolence will try to penetrate. An oppressor who knows the paralyzers listed above will not hesitate on putting each and every of them that are available to use in circuit.

Another scenario is that oppressors can grow immunity to nonviolent struggle. Immunization may occur in two ways: the first way for a government to be immune against nonviolence may occur after a successful nonviolent revolution and the second can be witnessed after a failed nonviolence attempt.

Since there is no guarantee for the participants of a nonviolent movement to remain politically correct, a government that is established after a nonviolent revolution might

become an oppressor. What makes such governments advantageous is that experienced former nonviolent members of an oppressive regime may have strong ability to create empathy with the nonviolent movement and predict its next move. South Africa can be given as an example. After nearly 40 years of (both armed and nonviolent) struggle against Apartheid system, (that ended with black population to end discrimination), ANC, which is made of members of anti-Apartheid Movement, became the ruling party. However, being- dominant party since 1994 resulted lack of accountability for ANC:

> *In the absence of a credible opposition, however, South Africans continue to vote largely according to racial identity. This has subsequently entrenched the political dominance of the ANC, which continues to be perceived as the party representing the black majority; and has spurred the withdrawal from the democratic process of those sections of the electorate who do not identify with the dominant party. The weakness of the political and parliamentary opposition equally raises concerns over how we can ensure that government remains accountable to its citizens.* (Brooks, 2004)

Although there were already controversies about dominant party system, questionable policies of now-president Jacob Zuma has increased grievance among people. As recordings of conversations between director of public prosecutions in South Africa, Bulelani Ngcuka and integrity vice president of the World Bank Group, Leonard McCarthy came to the surface ("Details of Zuma spy tapes emerge", 2014), widespread corruption and power exploitation allegations against Zuma arose. Besides over 700 charges including "to manipulate the prosecutorial process" ("Zuma's position weakens as he loses battle to keep 'spy tapes' under wraps", 2014), fraud, racketeering ("Spy tapes: DA hopes to reinstate 783 charges against Zuma", 2016), Zuma is accused of "spying apparatus, tried to muzzle the free press, militarised the police force and attempted a clampdown on democracy within his party" ("Electing for lesser evil will not get us very far", 2012). In October, 2015, demonstrations started by students who intended to protest increased university fees "by between 10% and 12% ("South Africa: Fees must fall protests will continue as Jacob Zuma to meet students", 2015). As a response, South African police fired stun grenades at students who lit fires outside President Jacob Zuma's offices in Pretoria ("Fees Must Fall: South African students and police clash in tuition cost protests [Photo report]", 2015). Although Zuma announced

that there will not be any increase in university fees, “thousands took to the streets to demand that President Jacob Zuma resign from his post” (“Zuma Must Fall: Thousands protest in South Africa to demand Jacob Zuma's resignation”, 2015) by December under the name of “Zuma Must Fall”. Instead of using police force, civilian ANC members prepared counter protests after ANC declared Zuma Must Fall members racist (“'Zuma must fall campaign can only polarise society': ANC”, 2016). One can say, in brief, that the reason for Zuma and ANC to manage protests well and to consolidate their position might be their nonviolent background.

The second cause for oppressors to have the potential of growing immunity against nonviolence is failed nonviolent attempts. In cases where nonviolent resistance is tried to be implemented, yet could not succeed, the oppressor may become more cautious and can build defense mechanisms.

One of the defense mechanisms is post-factum legislation changes in cases where the oppressor is exposed to a major nonviolence threat, yet managed to overcome it. Legislation changes may vary from changing citizenship and immigration policies, imposing restrictions, legalizing surveillance and loosening police restraints. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, for example, an act that was assembled by Parliament of the United Kingdom, prescribed increased police power including taking “intimate body samples” (“The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act” 1994, c33, part iv, sec. 54); “extension of powers to search persons' mouths” (“The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act” 1994, c33, part iv,, sec. 59); and powers to stop and search in anticipation of violence (“The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act” 1994, c33, part iv, sec. 60). In March 2015, Turkish parliament passed two package laws (Law No. 6638 and Law No. 6639 of “Police Powers and Duties Law, the Law on the Gendarmerie’s Organization, Duties and Authorities, and Some [Other] Laws”) that are showing similarities with Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

> *In particular, Law No. 6638 enhances police powers to conduct searches, use weapons, wiretap, detain individuals without a warrant, and remove demonstrators from scenes of protest. The Law also increases penalties for certain actions taken by demonstrators, provides for closer monitoring of car rental information by car rental companies*

> *The other "package law," Law No. 6639, amends the Law on Internet Media Regulation to extend government control over the Internet, giving the Prime Minister and other relevant ministers the power to immediately request the removal of Internet content and/or blocking of a website when a court order for such action has been delayed and a risk to public or national security exists. The Law also addresses other Internet-related matters, electronic communications, and the processing of personal data and privacy protection, and amends the relevant article on covert operations funding in the Public Finance Management and Control Law.* ("Turkey: Recent Developments in National and Public Security Law", 2015)

What makes Police Powers and Duties Law, the Law on the Gendarmerie's Organization, Duties and Authorities, and Some [Other] Laws, or "Homeland Security Package" significant is that it was passed after two major protests, namely Gezi Park Protests in 2013 and Kobani Protests in 2014 (both of which started nonviolently and transformed into violent clashes).

Besides increasing police authority and legalizing strict responses against protests, governments may hold legislations against members of the movements based on the circumstances they are in. One can take revision of immigration law in France after 2005 riots as an example. Since majority of the protesters were French citizen immigrants ("Civil Unrest in the French Suburbs", 2006), French Government took a step to deter another wave of protests by passing a new law that restricts family immigration and citizenship regulations for immigrants ("France's New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled", 2006).

Restricting communication channels and taking precautions that are supposedly cause interruption on the movement's organizational structure may be another set of tactics which is adopted nonviolence-immune governments. Unlike small movements in their beginning phase, it is hard for movements that reach maturity and affect masses to reshape their organizational structure since such de novo reorganization can take time and be costly. Also, the movement may lose its momentum during that process. Therefore, although it can adopt new methods and tactics, then-failed nonviolent mass movements hardly change their organizational structures. An oppressor which is familiar with the movement may use what is revealed from the past nonviolence

attempt. That usage includes cutting the movement's financial, communication and support sources, defaming key figures of the movement and most importantly, integrating informants and agent provocateurs inside the organization.

Informants and agent provocateurs have a special role in terms of serving the oppressor against nonviolent movements. While informant's role is to give intelligence to the oppressor about the movement which allows precautions by the oppressor, agent provocateur's role is much deeper. According to Gary T. Marx, the role of agent provocateur consists of justifying state violence, creating paranoia and sabotaging or hijacking the movement.

> *The consequences of agent-provocateur actions are more obvious. The agent may go along with the illegal actions of the group, he may actually provoke such actions, or he may set up a situation in which the group appears to have taken or to be about to take illegal actions. This may be done to gain evidence for use in a trial, to encourage paranoia and internal dissension, and/or to damage the public image of a group.* (Marx, G.T. 1974)

1.2.2.4.1.13. Confronting Superpowers

Waging a nonviolent struggle against a superpower can be challenging. Superpowers, apart from other state actors, usually contain many of the paralyzers. Facing multiple paralyzers in their most intense forms can be extremely difficult to overcome. Confrontation with a superpower oppressor may be either directly (such as movements that are waged by the citizens of superpower countries) or indirectly (e.g. waging nonviolent struggle against allies or client states of the superpower).

What is meant by indirect confrontation is that if there is a symbiotic relationship between a superpower and a smaller state (the oppressor), it is presumed that superpower will support the oppressor against a nonviolent movement. Considering that the advancement of media and propaganda tool in a country is up to technological and economic development of that country, one can make the deduction that the most advanced propaganda tools belong to superpowers. As mentioned on "biased media" section, information technologies can be used as a means of both establishing and overthrowing power. Therefore, black propaganda can be expected to be one of the

tools that superpowers generally use. Anti-propaganda (or black propaganda) can be applied to both institutes and individuals. Because "authoritarian regimes always conduct propaganda battles over broadcast media" (Howard, 2011:p.10), and superpowers support those states to protect their investments (Martin, Johansen and Meyer, 2012), a movement in client states can have difficulty against such sophisticated anti-propaganda. Although invasion of Kuwait is far from being nonviolent, it can be a good case for one to understand how anti-propaganda mechanism works. In 1990, after Iraqi troops entered Kuwait, a congressional hearing was held in which a "15-year-old Kuwaiti girl with the assumed name of "Nayirah" *describe Iraqi troops taking babies from incubators* in the al-Adon Hospital and throwing them on the floor to die" (Wills, 2007:p.3). It was later discovered that Nayirah was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States (Andersen, 2006:p.170) and the hearing was staged to justify the Gulf War. Moreover, defaming the nonviolent movement is a tool that superpowers can use. If there is a movement/establishment whose presence is conflicting with the interest of the oppressor, and therefore superpower, the superpower may use the tools of propaganda to make people question the authenticity of the movement.

Since superpowers hold the power of sanctions more than smaller states, they may prevent international support to nonviolent movements. Even though a country shares the same ideology with a nonviolent movement that is struggling in another country, its dependency to a superpower may prevent it to support the movement. The hesitancy of countries in terms of helping the movement openly makes nonviolent struggle harder to wage.

As mentioned on "Telecommunication Paralyzers" part/section, surveillance systems can be serious complications for nonviolent movements. If one takes the fact that by 2015, 2999 of total number of 4155 satellites belong to Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) (former USSR countries), the USA and China ("Satellites by Countries and Organizations", 2016), it will be clearly seen that superpowers dominate telecommunication systems. In this context, it can be said that a movement in an ally/client state of a superpower has to compete against complex intelligence systems.

Attempts of justifying oppressive acts of their client states/allies, and erecting legal barriers against solutions (that are to disadvantage of their interests) are common among superpowers as well. Despite atrocities, including indiscriminate violence and

massacres that were openly committed by Israel (Vilijoen, 2015), 40 UN resolutions concerning to the solution of Palestine-Israel conflict were rejected by the US from 1965 to 2011 (“Security Council - Veto List”, 2015). Likewise, the findings of United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic that “chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children” (“Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013”, 2013) in 2013 in Ghouta did not change the stance of Russian federation and China. Three resolutions that offer condemnation and sanctioning Syria were collectively rejected by Russia and China, and one other by only Russia (“Security Council - Veto List”, 2015).

Direct confrontation of a nonviolent movement against a superpower may be either as a result of invasion/occupation that is implemented by a superpower; or inside a superpower state itself, by its own citizens. Since the invasion is a completely military process and unlike occupation, it does not seek to establish a governmental body ("Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals”, 1949:pp.55-56), it is arguable that nonviolence can be implemented against such short-term activities. Moreover, the structure of occupations changed over time. While occupation can be implemented by occupiers, it can be waged by ““third-party government” or “government by proxy”” (Dilulio, 2003). Therefore, what is analysed in this thesis is confrontation of its citizens against a superpower.

In common with indirect confrontation, individuals or movements in direct confrontation with superpowers can be exposed to anti-propaganda as well. Smear campaigns, false accusations, profiling and defaming can be very common in superpowers as a result of paranoia. Since interventionism is the nature of superpowers -although it is an “imperial diplomacy, that is, as a continuation of colonialism by contemporary means” (Falk, 1984)-, it can be expected from superpowers to perceive any opposition as threat. Therefore, accusations that are coming from superpowers may arise from their defence mechanism, as well as intentional motives. The factor that affects nonviolent movements in anti-propaganda cases is that the paranoia of being targeted may reflect to the citizens as well, and may end up with justification of

violence by the hand of the state. As a result of this, anti-propaganda may go beyond simply labelling. A set of guidelines for example, called "Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools" was issued by FBI In January 2016. What makes those guidelines notable is that "animal rights and eco-terrorists, and anti-government or radical separatist groups" ("Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools", 2016) were classified in the same category with white supremacists and Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

> *Under new guidelines, the FBI is instructing high schools across the country to report students who criticize government policies and "western corruption" as potential future terrorists, warning that "anarchist extremists" are in the same category as ISIS and young people who are poor, immigrants or travel to "suspicious" countries are more likely to commit horrific violence.* ("The FBI has a new plan to spy on high school kids across the country", 2016)

Gulag case in the USSR shows similarities with legal defense mechanisms of other states. According to Article 70 of SFSR Penal Code, (which was the replaced version of early Article 58), criticising Soviet Union itself was a crime:

> *Agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of undermining or weakening Soviet power or of committing specific especially dangerous crimes against the state; the spreading for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet political and social system; and furthermore the spreading, production or storage, for the same purpose, of literature with such content* (Feldbrugge, Berg and Simons, 1985:p.627)
>
> *[V]erbally spreading knowingly mendacious fabrications which defame the Soviet political and social system, is punishable by deprivation of of freedom for up to three years or by corrective labor for up to one year or by a fine up to one hundred rubles* (Feldbrugge, Berg and Simons, 1985:p.344)

Gulag camps, from 1918 to 1980's, held a large scale of group of people, including "high-profile political dissidents and ordinary citizens" (Sevcenko and Gabriel, 2011). It is relatively easier in superpower states, therefore, to declare people "public enemies".

Waging nonviolent struggle can be even harder when anti-propaganda is combined with superior intelligence. The same with indirect confrontations, governments use mass surveillance against domestic threats as well. Monitored internet trafficking, telephone

calls, illegal eavesdropping members of nonviolent movements, security cameras with face recognition feature and satellite monitoring can make waging nonviolence against superpowers more challenging. Superpower states like the US or China monitor their citizens both legally and illegally under the guise of national security. The US government, for example, "with assistance from major telecommunications carriers including AT&T, has engaged in massive, illegal dragnet surveillance of the domestic communications and communications records of millions of ordinary Americans since at least 2001" ("NSA Spying on Americans"). Even though using anonymous networks like Tor Project encryption of messages in order to protect privacy can be considered as precautions to an extent, the fact that "NSA obtains full copies of everything that is carried along major domestic fiber optic cable networks" (ibid) weakens nonviolent struggle by making it more predictable. China, in addition, has taken domestic mass surveillance one step further that the new Anti-terrorism Law requires internet companies to hand over their encryption codes and data ("China expands domestic surveillance power", 2015).

Social engineering, social reconstruction and perception manipulation are important tools in terms of directing and shaping masses according to what is desired. Unlike anti-propaganda, social engineering is not restricted with media tools; rather, it affects social, economic and even demographic structure of a society, through a wide scale of tools that vary from education to health policies. For Noam Chomsky, "although it remains unsaid, it is evident enough that those who control resources will be in a position to judge what is "socially constructive," to engineer consent through the media, and to implement policy through the mechanisms of the state." (Chomsky, 1989:p.16)

One of the methods that is in the range of capabilities of superpowers is dispossession in order to balance demography. Changing a region's ethnic structure in order to distribute elements which are posing threat; and equalizing loyalty percentage may decrease the possibility of "widening circles effect" (in which nonviolence starts in a place where opposition is strong, then spreads other places). Examples of dispossession policy throughout the history can be found. One of those examples can be deportation of Crimean Tatars, which later transformed into ethnic cleansing. In Crimea case, "while the social engineering aim was overt, an intention to actually exterminate whole communal groups remained" (Levene, 2013:p.311).

Health policies may affect social structure as well: both in favour of its loyalists (e.g. increasing their life quality) and to the disadvantage of movements (e.g. forced sterilization). "Social engineering solutions that address unhealthy behaviors by simply outlawing or controlling their practice have the potential to achieve mass behavior change" (Gilbert, Fiske and Lindzey, 2010:p.704). Health policies that are intentionally handled badly have the potential of both making opposition yield and punishing ones who resort to nonviolent struggle (although it may also backfire and cause widespread disorder).

Constructing a pleasant society through education may cause long-term difficulties for movements in superpower countries.

> *the media indeed serve a "societal purpose," but quite a different one. It is the societal purpose served by state education as conceived by James Mill in the early days of the establishment of this system: to "train the minds of the people to a virtuous attachment to their government," and to the arrangements of the social, economic, and political order more generally.* (Chomsky, 1989:p.13)

Lastly, substitutability of workforce in superpowers is generally higher than other countries in terms of easiness of accessing alternative labour sources.

1.2.2.4.2. Obstacles

Obstacles, in this study, stand for any condition that makes nonviolence impossible or not different from violence in terms of response that is received from the oppressor. In such cases, either nonviolence is not allowed by any means or does not make any difference from armed struggle in terms of negative consequences in short term. The main difference between obstacles and paralyzers is that while paralyzers allow nonviolence to be waged, yet makes it difficult to be waged or inefficient; in cases where obstacles are met, the extremity of response from the oppressor and severity of the conditions make nonviolence impossible to be waged and leaves movements that attempt to wage nonviolence struggle seriously damaged.



Figure 9: Obstacles

In Figure 9, similar to Figure 8, what is focused on is the highlighted area. Green continuous line until vertical line indicates nonviolent struggle that is not actualized yet and dashes indicate inefficiency. The point where continuous green line meets the vertical line stands for when nonviolent struggle is embodied. The reason for dashes to not to penetrate vertical line unlike paralyzers is because of the impossibility of waging nonviolent struggle where obstacles are present. 6 main factors can be listed under obstacles which are extremely low population, extremely low participation, impossibility of revealing truth, complete justification and legalization of violence, receiving the same response with violence, and irreplaceability of the oppressor.

1.2.2.4.2.1. Extremely Low Population

The first obstacle a movement can widely face is extremely low population of a group that intends to wage nonviolent struggle. As stated on "obstacles" sub-chapter, participation is one of the most important elements that make nonviolence doable and efficient. Yet, participation alone is not enough when the population of that specific group is too low to make a significant difference, even if all of the members of a group aim to take down an opponent, (i.e. an oppressor) by nonviolence without any wastage in terms of participation. In this context, even if %3.5 rule of Erica Chenoweth which suggests that sustain and active participation of 3.5% of population is enough to wage a successful nonviolent struggle -despite the existence of cases in which oppressive regimes could not withstand against even lower percentages of participation- (Chenoweth, "My Talk at TEDxBoulder: Civil Resistance and the

"3.5% Rule"", 2013), is taken as a verity, and it is presumed that it guarantees a nonviolent movement to overthrow an oppressor, there are still cases that do not fit into that rule. Even by assuming that the whole populations are made of healthy adults who show willingness to participate a nonviolent struggle, the 3.5% rule doesn't apply for Baluchi people who occupy 2% of Iran's population (Erlich and Scheer, 2016:p.126); or Chechens who make only 0.88% of Russia.

1.2.2.4.2.2. Extremely Low Participation

Extremely low participation rate may avoid nonviolent struggle completely since the "critical source of the success of nonviolent resistance is mass participation, which can erode or remove a regime's main sources of power when the participants represent diverse sectors of society" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.30). If the minimum amount of participants cannot be obtained, it is highly likely for a movement to not to achieve its goal and therefore end up with collapse. "Unless campaigns find ways to mobilize mass participation, disrupt the normal order of things and deprive opponents of their means of maintaining the status quo, even the most righteous causes fall flat" ("Participation is everything - a conversation with Erica Chenoweth", 2012). There may be a number of reasons for low participation. Economic concerns, political/ideological reasons, possibility of facing heavy consequences in case of participating, lack of information and communication, etc. might restrain people to participate in a movement. The important factors when scaling looseness of participation are the ratio of participants to population of operating area; and the scale of struggle based on desired outcomes (whether the goal is to overthrow an oppressor completely or demanding a basic right).

Low participation rate does not also prevent nonviolent struggle, but also, creates negative impression for those who are to wage nonviolent struggle in future. Lack of media coverage and low support may be a discouraging factor for future movements in the same operating area.

In Qatar, for example, nonviolent struggle couldn't go beyond three Facebook announcements of protests that were never executed (Qatar: Why Protests Won't Happen Here, 2011). The ill treatment and incommunicado detention, the wealth of

Qatari citizens who make up %15 of the population, well-managed security and strict laws caused nonviolent struggle to not to be waged except individual attempts (ibid).

1.2.2.4.2.3. Impossibility of Revealing Truth

Another obstacle that cripples one of the most effective means of nonviolent struggle (media and communication) is impossibility of revealing truth. In absolute dictatorships which are either completely isolated from the rest of the world or isolate their citizens. If accessibility to a country or a certain part of the country cannot be done; or the media is monopolistic and completely belongs to the oppressor, the means of nonviolence become useless: since there is nobody to make a proper observation and even if there is, still cannot inform other people, the oppressor can write any scenario for public opinion and give any role to nonviolent activists. Killing for example, a member of the nonviolent movement can be justified so long as his/her perpetrators put an AK-47 on his/her chest after killing him/her. Since the media belong to the oppressor and obliged to exculpate the oppressor by using the propaganda tool, seeing headlines stating "terrorist caught dead" is highly likely. Besides disinformation and misinformation, accessibility of information can be made impossible by the oppressor. Along with small periods of blackouts, there can be sometimes long term general disruptions as well. In Syria, the government has been shutting down the Internet nationwide since 2011 systematically ("Syria's Internet Reportedly Shut Down", 2012).

About North Korea, as an example, there is no healthy information whether a nonviolent struggle is/was/has waged so far or not since the only TV broadcast is held by the state and the internet is restricted. According to Amnesty International, several restrictions and violations in North Korea in terms of freedom of expression and access to the information occur:

Information and access to the country continues to remain tightly restricted, hampering investigation of the human rights situation.

Despite repeated requests, the government continued to deny access to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in North Korea and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food as well as to Amnesty International and other independent human rights monitors.

Opposition of any kind is not tolerated. According to reports, any person who expresses an opinion contrary to the position of the ruling Korean Workers' Party faces severe punishment and so do their families in many cases.

In October 2006, the fifth annual Reporters Sans Frontiers Worldwide Press Freedom Index listed North Korea as the worst violator of press freedom. The domestic news media is strictly censored and access to international media broadcasts is restricted. According to reports, at least 40 journalists since the mid-1990s have been "re-educated" for errors such as misspelling a senior official's name.

The entire North Korean press is under the direct control of Kim Jong-il, particularly the Rodong Shinmun (The Worker's Newspaper), the Korean Central News Agency, and the national television JoongAng Bang Song. Each journalist is reportedly indoctrinated so as to be able to render, without mistakes, the grandeur of the late president Kim Il-sung and of his son Kim Jong-il.

Any unauthorized assembly or association is regarded as a "collective disturbance", liable to punishment. ("North Korea: Human rights concerns", 2006)

1.2.2.4.2.4. Complete Justification of Violence

Justification of violence and/or oppression has the potential of blocking a nonviolent struggle completely. Violence that is applied by the oppressor is justified in three ways: justification by the society (i.e. cultural violence), justification by the mainstream international community and legal justification.

Firstly, in cases where violence is approved, people who represent the group that seeks using nonviolence will have either extremely low or no tendency of receiving sympathy which is expected to suppress participation. Collective demonization and justification violence against a particular group may remove the distinction between violence and nonviolence. Violence against the other party might be defined as "true", "good", "right", "sacred" and "beautiful" (Galtung, 2000:p.33). Any attempt, violent or nonviolent, may be seen equally violence-deserved. In Yemen, for instance, the untouchable group called "al-Akhdam"(the servants), are subjected to systematic violence by the rest of the society. A report that is prepared by Human Right Council in 2012 as follows shows the extent of grievance of al-Akhdam:

> *The Committee is concerned about reports of long-standing discrimination and marginalization of some minority groups such as the Al Akhdam community, 80% of which is illiterate and which suffers from extreme poverty, and has inadequate*

> *access to health care, water and other basic services. The Committee is particularly concerned that in the context of the 2011 unrest, the Al Akhdam community has suffered from acts of aggression and intimidation, which have allegedly not led to any investigation and prosecution so far* ("Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant", 2010)

The discrimination and demonization brings justification of violence along with it. Without any legal protection, nor social sympathy, even a harmless demonstration (what is meant by "harmless" is when the demonstrations do not pose any significant threat to oppressors) is under the danger of being answered by excess violence ("Racial discrimination in Yemen; Stories from Akhdam Women", 2011).

International justification may appear because of two reasons. The fist reason for an international actor to justify violence may be as a result of compatibility with the oppressor so that it overlooks atrocities. That justification based on interests brings double standards with it which means overlooking an unjust behaviour (generally against an unpleasant party in their point of view). During Egyptian Revolution in 2011, international actors openly supported the nonviolent movement that took down Hosni Mubarak. Egyptian people, whose "voices have been heard" ("Obama praises Egyptian revolution", 2011) in Obama's words, have been praised both during and after the revolution by the USA and the European Union. When Mohamed Morsi, the first fairly elected president of Egypt, issued a declaration stating his immunity from any legal charge, lit the fire of another wave of protests in November, 2012, which were not only enraged by Morsi's dictatorial reforms, but also political and economic instability Egypt had been suffering since the 2011 revolution. What is controversial was that unlike 2011 revolution, people who are protesting Morsi did not only intend to overthrow Morsi, but also demanded a Coup d'état which happened in 2013. Soon afterwards, al-Sisi, the new president of Egypt started a witch hunt across the country, resulting with a widespread arrest of Muslim Brotherhood members, anarchists and leftist activists along with local and foreign journalists. Among those atrocities, the most prominent one is Rabaa Massacre in 2013, resulted with death of thousands of people. Like 2011 revolution, protesters were peaceful and similarly, used nonviolent technics. However, unlike 2011 revolution, army intervened this time and killed between 1,000 and 2,600 people. Still, despite the fact that current junta regime was much more devastating than its

predecessor, Mubarak regime, in short term, al-Sisi announced to be "restoring democracy" and praised for "the pivotal role that Egypt has played in this region for so long" by John Kerry (("It's Time for the US to Support Democracy, Not Dictatorship, in Egypt", 2015). Although one may claim the West brought up negative reactions against the coup, comparing with 2011 revolution, it can be easily said that they did not go beyond words.

The second type of international justification of violence occurs when a nonviolent movement's interests and interests of the mainstream international community are contradicting, even if the oppressor is not pleasant for mainstream international community. Based upon "lesser of two evils" principle, international community may choose not to intervene ongoing oppressions in a country where the oppressed is an unpleasant party. Against the danger of an unpleasant actor (whose interests are conflicting with interests of the international community) come to power, mainstream international community may allow current government to remain in power.

The third kind of justification of violence is laws that justify violence. When violence is made lawful especially by the hands of law enforcement, it would be difficult for one to think of a continuous nonviolent struggle. Another possibility that can make use of violent force against nonviolent struggle is the openness of laws to interpretation or non-existence of related laws. People in stateless status may also suffer from violence since they are not subjected to some of laws of the countries they live in. the combination of those three elements make waging nonviolent struggle impossible. The ongoing genocide makes Myanmar a notable example of how crucial the importance of a country's laws can be.

In Myanmar/Burma, where "methods of disciplinary punishment by the police force are designed and implemented so as to encourage impunity for egregious violations of people's rights" ("BURMA/MYANMAR: Disciplinary punishments for police who assault and torture no substitute for criminal sanctions", 2015), even people with citizen status suffer from excessive repression. In addition, harsh punishment policies after nonviolence attempts have a crippling effect on nonviolent movements. Amendments of Peaceful Gathering and Demonstration Law prescribe "rejection of protest permits by the authorities and the subsequent arrest of those who demonstrate without permission"

(“Burma: Increased number of political prisoners calls for renewed international pressure”, 2014). Harassment and torture also pose a threat to nonviolent activists (“Myanmar education law protest: Students 'at risk of torture and abuses'”, 2015). “Restrictions on civil rights, including on their freedom of movement, such as via the denial of passports” (“Rule By Law: An Analysis of the Use of Legislation to Stifle Civil Society Space in Burma”, 2013), is as well some of the possible consequences. In such climate, it is impossible for Rohingya Muslims, who cannot enjoy any of the rights of official citizens and who face much worse treatment to wage nonviolent struggle.

Rohingya Muslims in Arakan, “the most oppressed people on earth” (“World's most oppressed people's plea to Australian Government”, 2013), have been subjected to direct violence by Buddhist gangs, cultural violence by the society and structural violence by the state. Being stateless since 1982 (“COUNTDOWN TO ANNIHILATION: GENOCIDE IN MYANMAR”, 2015), Rohingya Muslims have been suffering from restricted, education, travelling and reproduction, banned worship (“"The Most Oppressed People in the World" Burma Imposes a Two-Child Policy on the Rohingya”, 2011) and less rights (including limited rights of buying property) without receiving proper medical assistance (“Burma (Rep. No. 192827)”, 2011). Ongoing ethnic cleansing that is done by Buddhist groups with the participation of law enforcement took Rohingya people to the “final stage of genocide” (“Burma's Rohingya Facing 'Final Stages of Genocide'”, 2015). According to International State Crime Initiative (ISCI)’s report on genocide in Myanmar, there are strong evidences indicating an ongoing genocide against Rohingya people.

> *systematic, institutionalised stigmatization and dehumanisation; subjection to harassment, violence and terror; the organised isolation and segregation of the Rohingya into detention camps, prison villages and a ghetto; and finally the systematic weakening of the Rohingya community. Taken together these overlapping stages provide compelling evidence of genocidal persecution against the Rohingya.* (Green, McManus and Venning, 2015:p.52)

1.2.2.4.2.5. Receiving the Same Response with Violence

As mentioned on "Advantages of Nonviolence" section, one of the factors that makes nonviolence advantageous to violent resistance is the lowness of possibility for nonviolence to receive a violent response. What makes violent resistance dangerous and less effective is that it can cause regime's supporters "to unify against the threat" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.43) which supposedly decrease loyalty shifts from law enforcement and participation from neutral/indecisive population. That argument may be true only if it is presumed that the oppressor and its supporters react differently to different methods, say violent resistance or nonviolence. However, in cases where nonviolence is treated in the exact same way with violence, and considering devastative consequences of a hypothetical mass nonviolent movement (since such movement is expected to be waged by a high number of people), a well-functioning nonviolent struggle is impossible to be waged. When nonviolence is not distinguished from violence or when it receives the same response from the oppressor, waging nonviolent struggle loses its means to achieve its goal.

Firstly, the possibility for the oppressor to envisage massive violence against participants of a movement (let it be nonviolent) indicates the lowness of its need to those members of that movement. The factors that decrease an oppressor's need to local population were mentioned about on "Paralyzers" section. The less dependence of an oppressor is, the more severe its methods are expected to be. In cases where oppressors take the severity of its response to the extent of indiscriminating violent and nonviolent movements, one can say it is impossible for a nonviolent movement to harm the oppressor's pillars of power.

Also, since nonviolent struggle cannot be waged secretly with a small number of people unlike armed resistance, it is expected for the number of people who participate nonviolent struggle to be higher than number of those who choose violence at a minimum, especially in mass demonstrations and sit-ins. If the oppressor (and its supporters) is determined to use violence regardless of the method that is used and the number of participants, the number of casualties is estimated to be enormous.

Another complication that a movement has to challenge to is exposure of participants. After a purported failed-nonviolent struggle, the oppressor may start a manhunt

campaign. Since nonviolent struggle can hardly be waged secretly like a shadow organization; and its key element of success is participation, it should be done openly with a certain number of people in order to be effective. However, when the intention of the oppressor is to annihilate the participants of a movement, waging nonviolent struggle is highly risky. Mass executions, indiscriminate violence, persecution and imprisonment are some of the consequences of manhunt against members of a nonviolent movement if one takes it into the consideration that those consequences are often mentioned for members of violent movements.

1.2.2.4.2.6. Irreplaceability of the Oppressor

The widespread mentality of "lesser of two evils" that makes international actors to act hesitantly when it comes to react against unjust practices is the last obstacle to be mentioned about. The danger of power vacuum in case of withdrawal of the oppressor; or the possibility of a more unpleasantness of new ruling force (that take charge after the oppressor) in terms of interests of power elites may make mainstream international community hesitant about supporting nonviolent movements and make them more prone to tolerate unjust policies of the oppressor. As those two factors, power vacuum and unpleasant charge-takers can be observed in different cases, they may coexist in one case as well.

Saudi Arabia might be the most flagrant example of cases in which irreplaceability of an oppressor causes international justification of transgression under the pretext of "lesser of two evils". Being the largest oil producer country with production of 12.9% of world oil (International Energy Agency, "2015 Key World Energy Statistics", 2015)), Saudi Arabia has been enjoying military support (Spillius, "US secures record $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia", 2010) and political privileges ("Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations", 1946) thanks to its economic importance for the mainstream international community, its role of suppressing Islamic movements and its moderate policies in terms of international relations. That compatibility gives Saudi Arabia upper hand to other countries when it comes to human right violations. Although Human Rights Watch reports indicated several human rights violations including child detainees and systematic violence in prisons, interrogations

and trials without the assistance of lawyers, punishing journalists for reporting on "protest against the local electricity company" ("World Report 2012: Saudi Arabia", 2012), excessive violence against nonviolent protesters ("World Report 2013: Saudi Arabia", 2013) and convicting nonviolent offenders to execution (Saudi Arabia: Surge in Executions, 2014), Western countries turn "a blind eye to the country's undemocratic form of government" (Maddex, 2007:p.377) because the possibility of Islamist to take power or in case of facing a growing Iran threat in Arabian Peninsula.

1.3. INSURGENCY

Despite being one of the oldest conflict solution methods with its approximately 5000 years old roots (Boot, "The Guerrilla Myth", 2013), the term "insurgency" became an issue whose borders are in need to be determined after September 11 Attack and the US invasions afterwards. The reason for such a need to arise is the controversies around lawfulness of rebellions; and questionability of legitimacy of actors who are participating in those rebellions in terms of ethics, international politics and law of war. One of the main reasons for confusion is the wideness of insurgency which includes other violent methods, yet differs from them in many ways. For asymmetry of warfare had deepened by 21st Century, the methods of modern warfare has been changed synchronically which led people ignore the fact that one man's terrorist can be his freedom fighter as well. In spite of proportionality of attacks that are used by insurgents to occupying forces (even if attacks of insurgents are even less violent or barbaric), since the doer of those attacks are not belligerent according to international law and before the eyes of mainstream international community, their acts are not justified no matter whether the intention is based on self-defense or territorial ambitions.

This study will analyse insurgency based on the definition of Bard E. O'Neill:

> *A struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics* (O'Neill, 2005:p.15)

It should also be noted that insurgency is not equal with revolution or rebellion, nor terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Although insurgencies can end up with revolutions in

some cases, the goal of insurgency can be weakening the authority, forcing it to negotiate or overthrow a government completely by using the means of violent force; and often to create a counterstate (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.1). If insurgency is strong enough, seeks to overthrow a regime and succeeds, then it can be called a revolution. The second important point is that insurgency should not be confused with terrorism. Insurgency can adopt terrorism as a method but not necessarily. For terrorism to not have a certain definition and the term combatant can be both broadened and narrowed, the activities of insurgency can be defined as both guerrilla warfare and simply terrorism. Still, not every guerrilla movement is insurgency. Hasan-i Sabbah insurrection (Hashashis), for example, waged guerrilla warfare (Rajput, 2013:pp.26-27), yet it is hard to call the movement an insurgency since political agenda of Hasan-i Sabbah was not clear. Similarly, although drug cartels in Mexico used nearly every known methods of guerrilla warfare including "targeted assassinations, ambushes, raids, blockades (narcobloqueos), combined arms assaults (active shooters with grenades), and the use of crude car bombs" (Sullivan and Elkus, 2011), they are far from being insurgents. On the contrary to Hashasis or Mexican cartels, First Chechen War was definitely an insurgency at its beginning although methods of terrorism or guerrilla warfare were not used.

1.3.1. Elements of Insurgency

For an insurgency to function well, four essential needs must be fulfilled (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.1):

1.3.1.1. Leadership

The main missions of leadership are commanding and controlling, planning, providing organizational and managerial skills, managing mobilization and creating solution for unifying ranks (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.2). In spite of the efficiency of a movement under a single leader, history shows that many insurgencies were formed under multi-leaderships sharing the same agenda.

1.3.1.2. Combatants: Although combatants are the ones who conduct actual fighting and carry out operations keeping the movement alive, they are not the movement itself,

rather, the purpose of their presence is “only to carry out the same functions as the police and armed forces of the state” (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.7).

1.3.1.3. Cadre: Cadre is “political activists and local political leaders of the insurgency” (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.2). Cadre is responsible for accomplishing the goals of a movement politically. The movement provides guidance and procedure to the cadre and receives solutions from it. (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.2).

1.3.1.4. Mass Base: Mass base is the population of the counterstate who are sympathizers of the insurgent movement. Although they do not participate the fighting, are the primary source of recruitment for the insurgent movement. (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.3)

1.3.2. Dynamics of Insurgency

1.3.2.1. Leadership:

Leadership for any activity is essential and has vital importance. “Insurgency is not simply random political violence. It is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction to establish and set the long-term way ahead, short-term guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence” (FMI-3-07.22, 2004:1.22). Leadership is responsible for movement to be known, recruitment, gain popular support and analyse grievances.

1.3.2.2. Objectives:

Without clarifying what is aimed, what made that aim spring up (ideological, political or economic grievances) and how this aim will be fulfilled, the movement does not go beyond an unsophisticated uprising (mostly) destined to fail.

1.3.2.3. Ideology:

Ideological background of an insurgent movement may rarely be compatible with the regime it wants to overthrow where the regime is blamed for deviating from its cause.

However, insurgency mostly contradicts with the authority's ideology and offers political alternatives to the existing ideology.

1.3.2.4. Environment and Geography:

Insurgent groups determine their tactics based on the physical structure of their operating zones.

1.3.2.5. External Support:

Although not necessary for a movement to continue operating, external support may provide material support that insurgency lacks of.

1.3.2.6. Phasing and Timing:

The timing for deciding to switch from defensive phase to offensive phase is crucially important.

1.3.2.7. Cause:

What distinguishes a well-organized insurgency from a chaotic unrest is a carefully determined cause. One should know the difference between a cause and an ideology in terms of insurgency. Groups with different ideologies may share the same cause. The more problems are visible, the stronger a cause is. "What makes one country more vulnerable than another to insurgency is the depth and the acuity of its existing problems" (Galula and Nagl, 2006:p.16). There may be more than one cause especially considering that insurgent groups are generally consist of different groups with different causes. Yet a shared all-over cause is a necessity for a healthy working insurgency. In order to achieve this, tactical manipulation may be beneficial. If finding a common cause is problematic, a temporary cause and flexibility in terms of cause will be effective in short-term. (Galula and Nagl, 2006:pp.17-18).

1.3.3. Tactics of Insurgency

Tactics that are used by insurgency may vary based on political atmosphere, economic conditions, the extent of popular support and geographical conditions. The most common tactics used by insurgency are:

- Cell networks
- Terrorism
- Psychological warfare
- Guerrilla warfare
- Political mobilization
- Propaganda and mass persuasion
- Online Warfare

The determining factors of choosing the tactic(s) which will be used are weaknesses of the opponent that will respond insurgency with counterinsurgency tactics. Those weaknesses are “absence of problems, absence of the machine for the control of the population and geographical conditions” (Galula and Nagl, 2006:pp.21-24).

CHAPTER 2

COOPERATION BETWEEN INSURGENCY AND NONVIOLENCE

Nonviolence is a method that is designed to be waged in certain conditions. It is not a magical wand that has the ability of solving any conflict and turning every unpleasant system into peaceful and just safe havens. Useless nonviolence reminds the philosophical question: "If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?". In this context, one may ask whether nonviolence struggle can still be called “struggle” if it does not go beyond an idea . Extraordinary conditions have the potential to take nonviolence’s efficiency away. The most extreme form that makes nonviolence to seek an alternative is self-defense (as explained in the “family case” above). The most practical and effective method in short term seems to be violent struggle. It must be clear that using violence in right place and in a right way not only secures lives of the members of a movement, but also nonviolence itself.

> [W]ielding weapons, especially firearms, let both participants in nonviolent struggle and their sympathizers protect themselves and others under terrorist attack for their civil rights activities. This willingness to use deadly force ensured the survival not only of countless brave men and women but also of the freedom struggle itself… Willingness to engage in armed self-defense played an important role in the southern Freedom Movement, for without it, terrorists would have killed far more people in the movement. (Cobb, 2014:p.6)

What motives the oppressor to use violence is often the danger of facing violence by the ones it oppresses; and therefore, being violent or nonviolent will not change the outcome some specific occasions. In such situations, excess (excessive violence, harm and costs) may force the oppressor to find a common ground.

2.1. INSURGENCY AGAINST PARALYZERS

The first case that insurgency facilitates nonviolence is where paralyzers make nonviolence doable but ineffective. As mentioned, what makes nonviolence useless in such cases is that nonviolence cannot take down or weaken power columns of an oppressor for various reasons from low participation to economic inefficiency or adherent media.



Figure 10: Role of Insurgency against Paralyzers

As can be seen in Figure 10, insurgency in cases which nonviolence is inefficient penetrates the "wall" of paralyzers that means what makes nonviolence inefficient do not have the same influence on insurgency.

2.1.1. Economic Inefficiency

Considering that an economically inefficient group cannot increase its income all of a sudden without foreign support or illicit activities like stealing or smuggling, the only way to equalize economic powers is weakening the oppressor financially by using the means of insurgency. Sabotage is one of those methods that can be used by insurgent movements. Sabotaging central bank, its money arrival routes and its physical assets may make weaken the oppressor's financial status. Likewise, sabotaging other sources that make the oppressor function is highly likely to make the oppressor lose money. Sabotaging gas pipelines for example, will be extremely costly for the oppressor since

neither industry depending on gas, nor transportation will be able to work properly. Attacking symbolic economic figures is also an effective way to decrease the oppressor's strength psychologically which will reflect to the economy. The aim for 9/11 attacks to choose World Trade Center, for instance, was not to maximize casualties, nor it was chosen randomly or it was a coincidence. World Trade Center was the symbol of American economy. In Bin Laden's words, "what was destroyed were not only the towers, but the towers of morale in that country" since they were America's "economic landmarks" (Bamber, "Bin Laden: Yes, I did it" 2001). Insurgency also can force foreign investment away by making it feel insecure in its operating area including the investor's own lands if the foreign investor is the very financer of the oppressor or there is significant benefit got by the investment. In such activities, direct violence is not necessarily used. Giving message is the main concern of an insurgent movement here which can be done by intimidating (planting fake or real bombs, anonymous letters, etc.) or kidnapping key figures. With this, one of main income sources of the oppressor might be cut. Forcing oppressor to mobilize to maximize its cost is another method. Abu Bakr Naji refers the power of exhaustion in his book "Management of Savagery" which has been used by many Islamic groups including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State during their asymmetric war against occupying powers, America most notably.

> Exhausting the forces of the enemy and the regimes collaborating with them, dispersing their efforts, and working to make them unable to catch their breath by means of operations in the regions of the choice states, primary or otherwise, even if the operations are small in size or effect. Although the blow of the rod may only strike a (single) Crusader head, its spread and escalation will have an effect for a long period of time. (Naji, 2004:p.16)

Attacking the enemy in one place will cause it to alarm all the likes of the target in different places which will exhaust it and cause financial cost increase incrementally until it will have to choose its priorities which are listed in order from most important to the least: personal protection for ruling institutions, foreigners, economy and entertainment. By the time the enemy focuses on its primary assets, it will ignore less important ones and withdraw from front lines which will cause psychological devastation affecting the economy (Naji, 2004:pp.20-21)

2.1.2. Biased Media

As for biased/adherent media, one of the main reasons for media to be biased is the presence of just a small portion of media. Where media is local in a tyrannical regime, it is highly expected for media to be biased and manipulate the truth. While violence is a perfect attention getter, nonviolence does not "sell" as violence does except the cases in which revolution is a distinct possibility. Since revolutions are dependent on attracting masses, they need to reveal the truth that there is an ongoing oppression for the sake of laying a foundation of international support; or creating sympathy among locals to increase participation. For optimizing the atmosphere of healthy distribution of information about the cause, ideology and demands of the movement, more journalists must come which can be provided by insurgency. Once violence is obvious and the fighting becomes "commercial", therefore starts being broadcasted by the media, nonviolence can start playing its role. In addition, revealing the truth by force can be sometimes easier. Military documents obtained after the capturing of bases or liberated prisons in which people are tortured may reveal the atrocities that the oppressor committed. One can claim that nonviolent struggle can be much securer for journalists (especially foreign journalist whose death will make a tremendous impact on international community; and whose ransom are much higher than local ones) than where insurgency is ongoing which is probably true. Here an ethical dilemma steps in: in order to prevent that impression, the movement can use the tool of illusion that there are no active clashes, rather, one-sided violence occurs. A second alternative might be separating insurgency and nonviolence ostensibly, moving insurgent part of the movement to slightly less visible areas to bring nonviolence into the forefront.

2.1.3. Telecommunication Paralyzers

Mass surveillance and other telecommunication paralyzers may make nonviolent resistance harder to be waged as mentioned. Insurgency in such cases can take the oppressor's advantage of readiness that comes from surveillance away. The first advantage of insurgency that makes telecommunication paralyzers inefficient is that in insurgencies, the possibility for members of insurgency to be exposed is much lower than nonviolence. Unlike nonviolent struggle, insurgencies hardly resort to

telecommunication tools in order to get organized, which is supposed to decrease exposure of the members of the movement. The second factor that makes insurgency favourable is that insurgency demands much more complex intelligence to be fought against properly.

> *In insurgency situations, the government organized force is confronted by a small guerrilla group that is dispersed in the general population with no or very small signature. Effective counterinsurgency operations require good intelligence. Absent intelligence, not only might the insurgents escape unharmed and continue their violent actions, but collateral damage caused to the general population from poor targeting may generate adverse response against the government and create popular support for the insurgents, which may result in higher recruitment to the insurgency.* (Kress and Szechtman, 2009)

With its advantage of secrecy, insurgency may be able to catch the oppressor unprepared without being noticed by surveillance systems. Also, sabotaging energy resources such as power plants, nuclear reactors and base stations may cause temporary disruption which is hoped to paralyze the oppressor surveillance systems. Lastly, as Kress and Szechtman put forward, insurgency may use the oppressor's vulnerability in terms of telecommunication and intelligence into its favour by forcing the oppressor to commit atrocities which will increase recruitment.

2.1.4. Being Ideological/Political Minority

Being ideological/political minority is another challenge that nonviolence may face, which can be dealt with insurgency. If the movement occupies a very low percentage of the population in terms of its political/ideological stance, there will be legal, social and cultural barriers from its operation area. Insurgency, in such cases, may ease nonviolence to operate and widen its radius of action.

An example being Iraq, where Sunni population constitutes 32-37% of the population, is "locked out of key jobs at universities and in government, their leaders barred from cabinet meetings or even marked as fugitives" and "cannot get help finding the body of loved ones killed in the war, and Shia banners are everywhere in Baghdad" ("Shias dominate Sunnis in the new Iraq", 2012) under

predominant authoritarian Shia rule. As a result of combination of their suffering and corruption allegations (Andersen, "Corruption and Authoritarianism in the 'New' Iraq", 2013), Sunnis led a number of protests starting from 2012 ("Iraq mass protests mount pressure on Maliki", 2012). Due to opposition from overwhelming Shia majority, however, the protests gained a little sympathy from other groups despite being brutally suppressed. The Iraqi government did not compromise until Sunni insurgency gained ground after 2013, which forced Iraqi government to release 3000 prisoners ("Iraq protesters win first demand", 2013), raise in salaries and eventually removal of al Maliki (Chulov, Harding and Roberts, "Nouri al-Maliki forced from post as Iraq's political turmoil deepens", 2014). The Iraqi case may be the indicator of importance of insurgency in cases where members of the movement constitute minority in terms of ideology and politics.

2.1.5. Being Ethnical Minority

What lies at the core of the problem at a result of being a minority in terms of ethnicity is justification of violence against the "other". Since the majority is the ruling class and has the authority, it has the impression of right of domination over the minorities who it rules. In a possible conflict caused by tyrannical acts of the majority, it is easy to justify violence against minorities because the majority is hardly affected by it: since democratic institutions (if there is any) are in favour of the majority, the army is made of the majority and the ruler is from the majority, the damage caused in a conflict will not affect majority as much as it affects minority. Therefore, expecting such healthy empathy form the majority is barely realistic. Overcoming the problem can sometimes be possible by insurgency. Spreading conflict to all the layers of a society rather than a single group, equalizing grievance and suffering, and causing deprivation may create the sense of empathy. If that can achieved successfully, the barrier of being a minority against nonviolent struggle is hoped to be lifted. It can be claimed that intensifying a conflict and causing harm will increase the sense of otherness, demonization, hatred and revenge. It may be true in some conditions as well as it is not if some specific situations where the criteria for creating empathy are met. Those criteria are simply proportionality of violence that is used, minimizing casualties, aiming only combatants,

willingness of ceasefire, showing good intention and avoiding irreversible damage as much as possible.

2.1.6. Low Participation Rate

The impact factor of low participation rate that is avoiding efficiency of nonviolence can be diminished by insurgency in order to make nonviolence efficient. Firstly, if the population is enough for waging nonviolent struggle, which is more than 3,5% as Erica Chenoweth offers as prerequisite for a successful nonviolent movement (Chenoweth, "My Talk at TEDxBoulder: Civil Resistance and the "3.5% Rule"", 2013), yet majority of the population is not willing to participate, an attempt of nonviolent revolution will face the possibility of defeat unless it attracts people who are not enthusiastic about being part of a nonviolent movement. What makes insurgency advantageous over nonviolence in such cases is that unlike nonviolence, not necessarily masses to participate to an insurgency despite its undeniable contribution to both nonviolence and insurgency. What Chenoweth claims is that participation rate of violent insurgency campaigns is much lower than nonviolent ones for having more barriers to participation. The rightness of this argument is the very reason for insurgency to function better than nonviolence when participation is low since insurgency does need less people than nonviolence.

2.1.7. Inefficiency/Inferiority of Participants

Insurgency does not prerequisite its members to be as qualified as members of nonviolent struggle to be expected. Since the most effective method of nonviolence is disobedience and noncooperation, the members of a nonviolent movement are expected to be effective in terms of affecting the pillars of power that the oppressor holds. However, as mentioned in Chapter-1, the inefficiency/inferiority of the participants may decrease the possibility for oppressor to be affected dramatically to the extent that it is willing to cooperate. Insurgency, notwithstanding, does not seek such sufficiency from its members in grassroots level. While nonviolence necessitates capableness with regard to influencing pillars of powers of the oppressor (economically, politically, financially, etc.), insurgency does not seek the same degree of sufficiency. Considering that average

training duration of insurgents varies from “forty-six days” (Elliot, 2003:p.284) to “a number of months” (Hosenball, “Said Kouachi, Suspect In Charlie Hebdo Attack, Trained In Yemen: Reports”, 2015), and the aim of those trainings is to give combatants basic knowledge of warfare, it can be presumed that an insurgency made of unqualified and unemployed members of a society will be more effective than its nonviolence counterpart that is waged with the same cadre.

2.1.8. Political Inefficacy

Political inefficacy occupies a considerable area among the paralyzers of nonviolence. When political inefficacy is at stake for an oppressed group, their population does not have a significant importance and can slightly influence decision makers especially if the oppressor has enough number of people who can keep the system functioning and economically untroubled. To overwhelm the power of oppressor, an insurgent movement can choose the tactic of compelling oppressor to centralize the authority by weakening local administrations. The more authority is centralized, the less control it has over periphery. Threatening local leaders and their cadre loyal to the oppressor, keep them away from providing service, cutting their economical sources, decreasing their mobilization and lowering their sense of security is expected the oppressor to find alternatives in order to not to lose the areas of operation for insurgents completely. Since empowering local administration can be costly and a replacing current leadership with a new one cannot change the outcome, the oppressor will have to lower the authorization of locals and increase central power which will end up loosening other parts of the country politically. What insurgency can do at that point is to create alternative centers of power in order for nonviolence to be politically effective when it starts operating.

2.1.9. Legal Paralyzers

As mentioned on “Paralyzers” section of Chapter 1, nonviolent movements can face legal barriers before, during and after their struggle. Insurgency in such situations has the function of preventing nonviolence to face legal problems; and protecting it after a failed attempt of nonviolent revolution. The first function of insurgency against legal

paralyzers is that it may create the sense of lesser of two evil by intensifying the violence that it applies. If the violence reaches its peak without crossing the "red lines" (which is explained in this study), and keeps its struggle which is possible in most cases since "the endurance of insurgents, who are motivated by ideology and zeal, would be at least as high as that of the government" (Kress and Szechtman, 2009), the oppressor may be willing to revise its legal policies. Furthermore, insurgency can use the situation of insecurity that it caused to its advantage. With the assumption that "the population will align with the side that is perceived as better protecting it, or at least less threatening" (Kress and Szechtman, 2009), the insurgent movement can promise and provide security, it may assure sympathy from people which results decriminalization of the oppressors before the eyes of the population. When the popular support is cut, the oppressor will be forced to change its judicial system.

Another effective method that might work is collective and individual intimidation against the members of law enforcement. By doing so, it is hoped that even though legislation system of a country allows excessive use of violence to law enforcement, its members will hesitate intervening nonviolent protesters.

> *Indeed, the idea of nonviolent struggle was newer in the black community, and it was protected in many ways by gunfire and the threat of gunfire. Simply put: because nonviolence worked so well as a tactic for effecting change and was demonstrably improving their lives, some black people chose to use weapons to defend the nonviolent Freedom Movement. Although it is counterintuitive, any discussion of guns in the movement must therefore also include substantial discussion of nonviolence, and vice versa.* (Cobb, 2014:p.2)

One can deduct from what Cobbs offers that insurgency in some cases may meet both needs which are protection and intimidation at the same time in order for nonviolence to function without being affected by legal paralyzers.

2.1.10. Professional Armies

Refusal of military as an act itself might have proved itself to be useful; yet in some particular cases, the efficiency of that method may be taken away. For example, professionalized armies, private military companies or militia forces meet the oppressor's need of recruitment. An oppressor who has enough men to fight for it feels that its dependency on the population that is threatening it with nonviolence decreases.

Therefore, nonviolent struggle not only loses its leverage, but also has to deal with barrels directed towards its members held by determined soldiers. What is aimed in such situations should be creating the need of oppressor for recruitment rather than aiming to prevail against the army itself violently. The more military personnel, especially high ranked officers is targeted by insurgency, with such tactics like kidnappings, sabotage, assassinations, etc., and the more casualties occur, the more will professional soldier candidates withdraw. After a certain point where armed forces loyal to the oppressor lacks number to meet the expected needs, the oppressor will have to try recruiting from the members of society waging nonviolent struggle. At that point, insurgency should take a back seat and let nonviolence use the situation on its favour since optimum environment for military aspect will have been met.

2.1.11. Exploitation of Nonviolence

The possibility for fascists or extreme groups to wage nonviolence poses a great danger for existing nonviolent movements as well as future nonviolent movements. Both possible consequences can be extremely harmful since there will be either tyranny/dictatorship who is familiar with the tactics of nonviolence in case of that movement's victory; or causing great caution and demonization towards nonviolence. Another scenario is a revolution loop where "good nonviolence" and "bad nonviolence" prevail against each other continuously. Insurgency has several advantages to prevent such situations from a victorious "bad" nonviolence, or a devastating failure to a vicious revolution-counter-revolution cycle. Nonviolent movements are designed to take down governments, overthrow dictators or struggle against tyrants, not organizations with invisible networks and asymmetric power columns. Therefore, due to its structure, nonviolence is vulnerable against insurgencies that are designed to struggle against nonviolence or shaped after the appearance of it.

2.1.12. Nonviolence-Familiar Opponents

The assumption of that states with armies are prepared against violent responses (to the extent that they sometimes provoke people to use violence in order to move the conflict into a violent ground) and therefore vulnerable against nonviolence- is applicable for

opposite situations where insurgency has the potential of finding very Achilles' heel of the oppressor. An oppressor which makes its preparations for nonviolent struggle will have to ignore violent possibilities because of financial and strategic incapability. The first mistake can be done is empowering law enforcement for nonviolent protests and neglecting the army. Another mistake can be civilian outsourcing in order to decrease the efficiency of boycotts and work-to-rule strikes. The more, financial support from the oppressor's foreign allies –if there is any- will probably be spent on easing economic tensions which are aimed to be created by nonviolence. What is advantageous for insurgency is that while the oppressor covers every gap on its power columns for nonviolence, it gives a great elbow room to insurgency. Weak military targets, poorly protected members of the system and economy vulnerable to violence can force the oppressor to back down. Forcing an oppressor to prepare for nonviolent response against its atrocities should be arranged delicately: if the oppressor senses that there is a preparation for insurgency, every member of the movement regardless whether violent or nonviolent will be labelled as terrorists, which will justify hard responses against them. Therefore, the impression should be that the movement is purely nonviolent and preparations are in that direction until the oppressor finished its adjustments. After the oppressor takes the desirable shape, insurgency may step in. Such situations can increase the possibility of victory: if the oppressor chooses to remain defensive in an orthodox way, nonviolence will prevail as offered by nonviolence school. Or oppressor can take a radical decision and choose blocking nonviolence nonviolently, it will increase its vulnerability to insurgency and its violent tactics.

2.1.13. Confronting Superpowers

Struggling against a superpower is much more challenging than an ordinary dictatorship for its enormous resources, military capability, advanced intelligence and international political influence it holds. In both direct and indirect confrontation cases, insurgency may be able to make nonviolence stronger against superpowers. However, insurgency must be carried out carefully for the same reason that a superpower gives so much importance to its image. Creating a sense of civil war or a widespread rebellion will most probably cause the superpower to get more aggressive to remove the illusion that it is weak militarily.

One of the advantages of insurgency over nonviolent struggle in direct confrontation is that secrecy of the movement can be protected much better in insurgencies comparing to nonviolence. Advanced surveillance systems have the capability of monitoring every step of a mass movement before it is operationalized. Insurgency can operate with a small group of motivated people to which penetration is hard unless there is a need of recruitment. This also prevents pre-mature exposure which will motivate the superpower to take action. Small cells combined after the movement is mature enough to start a nonviolent struggle makes precautions impossible for the superpower. Exhausting enemy intelligence by misdirection also may be useful for a movement. Since one of the characteristics of superpowers is highly developed economy and a wide range of resource alternatives, affecting a superpower with nonviolence does not seem to be realistic. Both labour force and material resources can be provided from different channels if what is mentioned is a superpower and any boycott harms only to the movement itself.

What should be aimed in cases of indirect confrontation is cutting the superpower's access to the resources and its support to the oppressor. If transportation is limited by attacking routes of resourcing in cases of indirect confrontation, forces on the ground will run out of essential for continuing to operate. Another tactic might be moving war to the very homelands of superpowers. A severely attacked superpower who does not have a strong doctrine of remaining in one place and continuing its support to the oppressor, and who assesses pros and cons of a current situation would consider the necessity of that support especially if its own citizens' security is at stake. After superpower's resources are hit, the people it governs start questioning the sanity of its policies which allows nonviolence to step in into a much eligible ground to implement its tactics. A superpower relies on its force of intimidation. What is pleasant for a superpower, especially after 20^{th} century, is to avoid direct intervention and try to deter a party from committing an act that is contradicting with the interests of superpower, so, a its image has a vast role. A national unrest is therefore, is a frightening factor for a superpower since it defames national and international image of superpower in terms of security and order. A carefully planned insurgency may force a superpower to find a common ground which is hoped to open a way for nonviolence.

2.2. INSURGENCY AGAINST OBSTACLES

Unlike paralyzers, obstacles do not allow cooperation between insurgency and nonviolence until they (obstacles) are defeated to a certain extent by insurgency. Refusal of basic rights; impossibility of accessing information, revealing the truth and communication; justification of violence; indiscriminate violence regardless whether a threat to the existence of an oppressor exists or not; and power vacuum that makes authorities to turn blind eye to oppression and suffering of people just in order to secure interests make any movement undoable.



Figure 11: Role of Insurgency against Obstacles

What one can interpret from Figure 11 is that after the vertical point (where nonviolence goes beyond being an idea and is tried to be embodied) that without the grey line which represents insurgency, the whole area would be blank meaning that the only option in such cases is insurgency.

2.2.1. Extremely Low Population

The possibility of having an extremely low population makes nonviolence impossible no matter how eager the participants of a nonviolent movement. In such cases, although insurgency does not have the ability of making nonviolence efficient since it can neither increase the population unless some exceptions such as recruiting militants from outside, nor it can force people to participate (or it can more precisely, but will not be a

long-term policy nor it will be effective) to a nonviolent movement or start one. If one takes the fact into the consideration that the percentage of active military personnel does not exceed 5% of the population of the country in which rate of military personnel to the population is the highest (Hackett, 2012), and that guerrilla warfare can prevail against organized military forces that are much larger in terms of population to the extent that 1:10 ratio can be enough in some cases, it is possible to deduce that an eager population whose number is sufficient for nonviolence can prevail by using insurgency.

2.2.2. Extremely Low Participation

In cases where participation is too low to the extent that it is impossible to wage nonviolent struggle, insurgency may be useful in two ways: either it facilitates nonviolence to be efficient with regards to participation, or it aims the oppressor by using its advantage over nonviolence that is insurgency may achieve more than what nonviolence can with the same amount of people. The first policy that insurgency can resort to occurs when population of target mass is high, yet participation is low due reasons varying from avoidance out of fear to lack of trust to the movement. In such cases, terrorizing the opponent and force it to be more cautious may increase zeal among people. The second factor that makes insurgency pleasant is that in cases where participation is too low, waging insurgency with existing participants would be more effective. If, for instance in a country with population of 10,000,000, only 0.5% of people (which is lower than what Erica Chenoweth prerequisites) are willing to start a movement with the intention of overthrowing an oppressive regime, mentioning about a successful nonviolence struggle would not be realistic. An insurgency, however, with 50,000 militants would be expected to be much more effective.

2.2.3. Impossibility of Revealing Truth

The first obstacle that is expected to be breached by insurgency is the impossibility of revealing truth and isolation of the society, both in local level, which can be done by isolating one layer of a society from other ones, strict surveillance and disruption of communication; or in international level, referring to prevention of foreign media to get healthy and objective information, or avoiding locals to access international sources of

information. Monopolistic media, serving for the oppressor also can pose a serious problem as it barricades objective distribution of information, and misleads people with disinformation and misinformation for the purpose of creating the illusion of well-functioning society amongst people. The main reason for nonviolence to be useless against this kind of strictness in terms of information is that nonviolence can hardly be done anonymously unlike insurgency. For participation is highly important for nonviolence and it is almost impossible for it to be done anonymously, identities of a nonviolent movement's members may be under the danger of exposure. If a government, a dictator, a tyrant or a democratic oppressor accept any attempt of indicating the truth as a threat to its basis, the possibility for it respond with violence under the guise of self-defence. Moreover, communication is one of the essentials of nonviolent resistance. Because every step of citizens is observed, and communication channels are closed, nonviolence can be impossible. A long term nonviolent campaign, for those reasons, can be highly costly and infertile. Insurgency, on the contrary to nonviolence, can be carried out by a few people. The main purpose of cell networks is to keep secrecy of a movement and protect anonymity of the rest of the group in case of exposure of one cell. By doing so, both distribution of information in local level can be possible and casualties can be minimized. Preparing flyers is also an alternative for revealing the truth during a hypothetical cooperation between insurgency and nonviolence. In international level, the fact which cannot be ignored that insurgent groups can mobilize better than nonviolent movements, and crossing borders is much easier can facilitate reaching out to the international community. After the truth is revealed and reached more people, the cause gained popularity, attention of international media is taken and reaction of international community is caused, it is expected the oppressor to respond less harshly to nonviolent struggle, therefore nonviolence can be practised.

2.2.4. Complete Justification of Violence

If oppression is justified by local and/or international community, and is claimed to be applied within the frame of international law, any violent precaution or response against nonviolence in order for the oppressor to maintain its power is within possibility. Nonviolent school claims that the more oppressor use violence, the more it is likely to

lose power; and since what gives it power is obedience of people, each killing makes it less powerful. What nonviolent school misses is that so long as violence is justified, there is no red line of violence that can be used to the extent that willingness of sacrificing life may not be enough to overcome violence. Abductions, detentions without any charge, torture, blackmailing, humiliation, discrediting and defaming, false accusations of degrading crimes, etc. may be so severe that it can force one to give up and compromise. Although insurgency has the equal possibility of facing such excessive treatment, it has several advantages over nonviolence in such situations: firstly, as stated above, insurgency can be waged within secrecy unlike nonviolence which is not an underground activity due to its nature. Secondly, insurgency does not need masses to participate actively to fighting. Justification of violence can be conquered by dragging the oppressor and its allies to the middle by using insurgency. After reaching a certain amount of proportionality in terms of violence without violating the borders (such as atrocities against non-combatants, committing war crimes, vandalism, etc.), the oppressor may appeal for negotiations. International actors who legitimize violence can also feel under pressure and feel obliged to condemn violence from both sides. What should be noted is that bringing counter parties to a pleasant position is a long and challenging process. After a certain level of exhaustion and willingness of negotiating along with questioning legitimacy of violence are provided, nonviolence can appear on the stage and welcomed by weary actors.

2.2.5. Receiving the Same Response with Violence

Indiscriminate violence, meaning that with or without any threat posed to the other party, receiving the same response regardless what method is used, what is demanded and whether there is a way of solving the problem or not- is one of the obstacles that make nonviolence impossible. Determination of the oppressor to wipe out an entire group of people can sometimes be so high that neither nonviolent struggle, nor a huge portion of insurgency methods such as threatening, terrorizing combatants, sabotage of economic assets and anti-propaganda can stop it from doing so (e.g. Nazi attitude against Jewish people). One of ways of turning that excessive hatred into one's favour can be targeting decision-making mechanism. After committing so many atrocities and by the time body count swells, the oppressor makes so many enemies, real and

imaginary, that it gets paranoid. Therefore, the more an oppressor gets paranoid, the less it trusts the others which create the sense of requirement of trustworthy subordinates. A well-prepared insurgency with proper tools may isolate the oppressor by targeting its subordinates, conductors and decision makers until the oppressor is completely alone. Because there is no decision maker but the oppressor, it should execute every decision by itself. Nonviolence at that point may catch the oppressor in a vulnerable state. Another alternative is to start a nonviolent campaign and protecting it with arms from outside. With this method, it is hoped that both nonviolence is waged all along and the amount of time needed is shortened. Still, in such conditions, waging nonviolent struggle without taking the oppressor to a common ground.

2.2.6. Irreplaceability of the Oppressor

Irreplaceability of power holder from the perspective of mainstream foreign actors may turn a blind eye on oppression it causes. For last 4 decades, power had been restructured the definition of power vacuum has changed accordingly. While the prerequisite for power vacuum was to lack of substitute in terms of administration, "properness" was added to list of criteria of power vacuum, meaning that even though there is an alternative candidate for ruling, if contradicting interests with mainstream international actors are at stake, the situation is still accepted as power vacuum. The assumption of that what nonviolent struggle aims is an unpleasant end from the perspective of mainstream international actors can allow us to say the efforts to overthrow the oppressor peacefully will not be supported; and violence against the members of the nonviolent movement will be ignored by international actors if not supported. What insurgency can do is to make actors supporting the oppression active parts of the conflict by dragging them into a violent state. Attacks on foreign soils, aiming assets of target countries, online warfare and terrorizing citizens without harming non-combatants will result with two possibilities: first possibility is withdrawal of support by third party actors which is the better alternative. Second possibility is foreign military intervention as a support to dictatorships which may help the cause indirectly. Because military in long term becomes costly (economic burden and heavy casualties) in long-term, foreign forces will have to cut their support to the oppressor and leave the power to a legitimate authority.

2.3. COOPERATION PROCESS

As there is no single method for waging violence, and different methods are used for different circumstances, building a single model of integration of insurgency into nonviolence would be a mistake. Cooperation takes its shape based on characteristic of the oppressor (whether a dictator who is supported by foreign actors or a tyrant that isolate his/her country form outside; the way it reacts to disobedience; the level of its popularity, financial efficiency, political influence, technological capacity, military power, international support, etc.), current status of the countering movement (population, education, experience, financial capacity, access to resources/means of both insurgency and nonviolence demands, local and international credibility, political efficacy, etc.) and circumstances of the area of operation (demographics, population, geographic conditions, location, culture, traditions, history and background, natural resources, etc.).



Figure 12: Cooperation in "Paralyzers"



Figure 13: Cooperation in "Obstacles"

Both figures shown above indicates approximately the same situation since the edge (the black vertical line at the beginning of highlighted area's right side) that symbolizes the neutralisation of paralyzes or obstacles is passed which means the environment in either case is optimized for cooperation.

2.3.1. Types of Cooperation

After analysis of external elements and identification of the structure of the movement, type of the cooperation can be chosen:

2.3.1.1. Hidden Cooperation

Hidden cooperation based on making two movements, insurgency and nonviolent resistance, look like separated in order to protect image and reputation of the nonviolent movement. As nonviolent struggle continues, insurgency targets pillars of power which nonviolence aim to take down. By weakening pillars that are chosen, it is hoped that nonviolence which cannot harm them normally can bring them down with the assistance of insurgency. The hiddenness can continue after the oppressor is overthrown or it can be revealed based on conditions.

2.3.1.2. Synchronous Cooperation

Unlike hidden cooperation, synchronized cooperation is done openly. While nonviolent movement aims to fulfil its duties which are paralyzing oppressor financially, militarily and politically by disobedience; insurgency weakens the oppressor, keeps nonviolent struggle doable by preventing oppressor to cause harm and gets attention intentionally in order to take attention away from nonviolent movement.

2.3.1.3. Rotational Cooperation

This type of cooperation's intention is to assure protection of nonviolent struggle. It is done as a pre-nonviolence activity in order to make the oppressor willing for ceasefire, negotiation and finding common ground. What is important in rotational cooperation is that insurgency should be shaped by the means of nonviolent struggle plans to use. The determination of pillars of power that are pointed gives insurgency guidelines to conduct the struggle. In some cases, however, it can be vice versa based on circumstances. If the methods which insurgency can successfully carry out are limited, nonviolence alternates and limits itself based on the remaining options of the insurgency.

2.3.1.4. Inorganic (Separated) Cooperation

What differs inorganic cooperation from hidden cooperation is that there is no active cooperation between two struggles, nor interaction/communication between middle and low level members is at stake. Still, one may call it cooperation for commonality of goals. Inorganic cooperation allows both nonviolent struggle and insurgency to be flexible on their own terms.

2.4. RED LINES OF INSURGENCY

When it comes to the cooperation between nonviolence and insurgency, the most crucial point is determining red line(s) of insurgency in order to prevent a "point of no return" situation. The importance of red lines comes from the need of cooperation and assistance of both nonviolence and insurgency. Losing civilian and military personnel

(defections) participation, financial, popular and international support, willingness of the oppressor for negotiation; causing violence of oppressor to be justified, condemnation from third parties, rage of local population, demonization, suffering, irreversible damage and degrading people's values make failure of a movement highly possible. Red lines of insurgency in terms of continuity of nonviolence consist of five main elements:

2.4.1. Indiscriminate Violence

One of the most harmful activities that make legitimacy of a movement to be questioned is indiscrimination that is done between combatants and non-combatants. Intentionally harming non-combatant women, children, elderly, clergy and men who did not participate violence with any means (including physically supporting, financing or propagating the oppression) is likely to cause decrease on participation to the movement, withdrawal of financial support from both internal and external actors, negative media coverage and increase the severity of the oppressor. The level of violence towards non-combatants can harm the movement's image to the extent of leading people to participate opposing parties.

2.4.2. Excessive Violence

Regardless the status of the ones to whom violence is applied (whether combatant or non-combatant), methods that are used while implementing insurgency may cause unrest. Mistreatment to prisoners of war (such as famishing, taking them away from their basic needs, disregarding their dignity, etc.), torturing, mutilation of dead bodies of enemy combatants, public executions and mass executions, and forced recruitments may thin the line between the oppressor and the oppressed if those methods are used by insurgency since point of origin of a movement against an oppressor is the oppression suffered from. When the difference between the oppressor and the oppressed decreases, people will tend to approach doubtful to the movement even if transformation from insurgency to nonviolence is completed.

2.4.3. Exploitation of People

One of the most common mistakes of insurgencies is having the illusion that people whom they are fighting for should be grateful and insurgents have the right of enjoying some certain privileges. That mindset leads insurgents to exploit people. Cutting on aids sent to people, getting a share from products such as harvests, taking tributes from commercial establishments and even asking ransom in exchange for life safety are some of the methods that exploitation resort to. If we take the fact that economic interests are the main cause of most of the conflicts throughout the history into our consideration, claiming exploitation not to be a factor that causes isolation of insurgency from grassroots would not be realistic.

2.4.4. Infringement of Agreements

When the movement reaches negotiation phase in which meeting some conditions are essential for continuity of meetings. Temporary ceasefire, freedom of movement and lifting state of emergency are some of the primary prerequisites of negotiations. Similarly, after reaching an agreement and peace process starts, disarmament, reconciliation, integration of displaced people as a part of normalization and truth commissions are brought to the table. In such cases, even if the ultimate goal is to overthrow the oppressor, the conditions of agreement must be met. Transgressing ceasefire, violating disarmament, breaking agreements unfairly and betraying promises of safety and/or protection may take the chance of negotiating opposite parties impossible for good as well as damage credibility of movement. What should not be overlooked also is the possibility of failure of the movement. Such violations like infringement of agreement are likely to open the door for more severe atrocities that can be faced in cases of failure.

2.4.5. Atrocities

Besides direct violations of human life and dignity; and agreements broken unjustly, atrocities that are committed against infrastructure, assets and properties of people, non-combatants (indirectly) and structures considered untouchable by general can be considered as a part of red lines of insurgency. Attacking particular structures which are hospitals, schools, structures and worshipping places; harming natural resources belong

to people like agricultural areas, irrigation channels or farming gardens as well as the ones that don't belong to people such as forests, rivers, lakes and wells; killing animals (both domesticated and wild animals); pillaging; injustice amongst people based on membership of a faction which generally occurs when an insurgent does not receive the same punishment with non-combatant members of the community who commit the same crime; and endangering people by using them as human shields or taking them (non-combatant members of the same community which insurgency belongs to) hostages may be reasons that make nonviolence impossible to be implemented after insurgency or at least make the switch to nonviolence much harder. One should note that exceptions in those cases are possible. Schools, used as hideouts or armoires are common during violent conflicts which arise an ethical dilemma about untouchability of them.

2.5. REPLACEMENT PROCESS

As certainty of applicability of nonviolence becomes obvious, the movement starts considering making nonviolence the primary actor rather than co-actor of insurgency or remaining in background. Determining where and when ("when" depends on the type of cooperation) to replace nonviolent struggle with insurgency is dependent upon various criteria:

The first sign for insurgency lose its efficiency can be sensed when the oppressor's actions are not justified by its allies, subordinates and supporters due to the harm that is caused during its fight with insurgency. Although peace, truce and reconciliation are far from being at the agenda, the oppressor might be urged to decrease level of violence that it uses. That decrease of justification may occur in both local and international level. Loyalists of the oppressor may start finding the oppressor's violence so extreme that the conflict cannot be solved for this extremeness. Likewise, international actors may feel irritated by excessive violence of the oppressor they support. Another indicator of that it is time for nonviolence to step in as the main actor is unpleasantness of violence. Apart from justification of violence applied by the oppressor, displeasure of violence stands for a general opposition of violence from both sides. In such cases, insurgency should immediately retreat to prevent nonviolence to be held responsible for being part of the same movement with insurgency, avoid receiving blames and to

declare its innocence. If cooperation is rotational, it is expected to occur automatically. If any of other cooperation types is implemented, the transformation must be done as fast as possible. The third aspect is readiness of opposite parties for alternatives other than violence. Arising considerations of negotiation, ceasefire, armistice and truce can make declining insurgency a necessity. At the point that oppressor demands ceasefire and negotiations, it should be assumed that those demands are sincere and truce must be seen as the first short-term priority. At this point, deactivating insurgency should be considered either temporarily or permanently based on the current scene. Even if truce is not offered by the oppressor, truce demanding masses for/with whom the movements continues its struggle should not be ignored. As one of the main concerns of a movement is to distinguish itself from the oppressor, choosing to eliminate insurgency and activate a full nonviolence struggle may be the wisest choice. However, one should note that this only applies if conditions are available that switching to nonviolence does not have irreversible consequences, especially in cases where the oppressor is uncompromising and fully operating in terms of military. Decrease on popular support is factor that indicates either insurgency does not function well because of misapplication; or exhaustion of people; or because nonviolent alternatives seem to be present. Decreasing popular support may look the movement an elitist struggle that ignores people's demands and needs. To avoid such approaches and rigid reactionary mindsets towards the movement, nonviolence must step in.

Besides seeking reasons listed above, nonviolence can be replaced with insurgency without those reasons which takes this study to "where" s of replacement of nonviolence. First of all, the main goal of insurgency is to make nonviolence doable and the entire argument centers on this hypothesis. Therefore, as soon as signs for possibility of nonviolence become visible, nonviolence must be integrated while insurgency is abandoned step by step. Availability of nonviolence can be understood either experimentally which means measuring reactions of the oppressor to small-scale protests; or from a detailed analysis of the way oppressor protects its pillars of power as well as comparing the current state of situation with theoretical "optimum environment". The more, nonviolence in some cases might be forced to step in, cases where insurgency loses its efficiency for instance, and therefore does not function in a pleased way. When insurgency's benefits do not exceed its harms, unpleasantness of its

violent methods and negative consequences become more visible. That's why when it is sensed that insurgency does not meet what is expected, it should be replaced with nonviolence. The most difficult dilemma, perhaps, occurs when insurgency is about to prevail. The point where decision of "whether or not to stop" the insurgency should be carefully assessed. Although stopping insurgency before overthrowing the oppressor endangers victory, it will surely ease reconciliation process. Nonviolence -that is put into practice without any necessity in spite of distinct possibility of victory- has the potential to create sympathy not only amongst followers of the movement but also opponents since it shows the good intentions of movement.

CHAPTER 3

TRANSFORMATION

When history, military history in particular, is researched, one can find cases of commanders with great military achievements and heavy political losses (Hannibal is the most significant example for it); and vice versa situations where leaders have made immense achievements -while otherwise had been expected- despite military defeat. Overcoming to a party, therefore, is a distinct concept from victory. Chronologically, victory is a post-conflict act whose certainty becomes visible only after overcoming process is completed. Therefore, overcoming an opponent is not equal with being victorious. What distinguishes a triumphant commander from the political genius is that distinction. Overcoming the opponent may be the first step, yet it alone does not provide the ultimate victory. Victory in this case depends on during-process after the point of replacement of nonviolence. It is crucially important that victory depends on how well insurgency is transformed into nonviolence and it must be assured that the presence of insurgency is completely removed from the movement. Still, in order to have a complete transformation, the steps negotiation, disarmament and finally normalization (that ends with state building) must be fulfilled in this order as shown on Figure 14.



Figure 14: Transformation Process Shown in the *Hourglass Model*

(Source: Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 3rd Edition)

3.1. INTEGRATION PROCESS

Integration of nonviolence may be applied differently in different situations, generally based on the type of cooperation that is used. While hidden and synchronous types of cooperation between insurgency and nonviolence can be a long process since entrenched structure of insurgency is hard to be eroded; rotational cooperation has its own dynamics which provide transformation within itself. Inorganic cooperation, on the other hand, may need more than one nonviolence movements by the end of struggle.

3.1.1. Reducing Violence

As the movement reach the threshold where neither insurgency alone, nor cooperation is necessary, the role of insurgency is decreased step by step. In hidden and synchronous types of cooperation, it is assumed that there is a common leadership or two leaderships

sharing the same goal and stick to a commonly prepared plan. One-sided ceasefire declarations, reducing attack rate and severity, negotiations and peace calls are the preliminary of reducing violence. Although "sleeping insurgency" that is posing a threat to the oppressor, acts of kindness and public goodwill gestures are effective methods of creating sympathy among masses. There are three layers of a movement that should be aimed one by one with different means and strategies:

3.1.1.1. Reducing Violence in Grassroots Level

Since the most important element of nonviolence is participation, increasing the population of movement is crucially important, so, attracting masses must be the first goal of a movement that is transforming itself to nonviolence. Yet, a considered amount of insurgents may still remain outside of this new formation of the movement. People who are lacking proper education of nonviolence and its methods; and whose skills are centred on methods of insurgency will tend to be distant naturally. To overcome that problem, what the movement can do is to integrate insurgents group by group into society as regular citizens and give them proper education until the idea of nonviolent struggle is inculcated into them. By doing so, it is hoped that the more people leave insurgents, the more will participate into nonviolent struggle.



Figure 15: Reducing Violence in Grassroots Level

What should be noticed in two figures is that attracting masses into nonviolent movement and transferring insurgents to nonviolence does not only reduce black which

is representing insurgency, but also it narrows down the cooperation shown as grey area.

3.1.1.2. Reducing Violence in Mid-Level

Applying violence-reducing policy to mid-level group of insurgency is the hardest one among all three layers. First of all, the interaction between mid-level members of insurgency and mid-level members of nonviolent struggle is much lower than it is in grassroots and leadership level. Integrating insurgency specialists into nonviolence also does not seem to be a realistic solution for their lack of experience at nonviolence. Lastly, if the idea of treating mid-level the same with the way grassroots are treated (meaning making mid-level insurgents "ordinary citizens") is tried to be applied, failure is inevitable. Almost no member of insurgency, a field commander for instance, who has a prestigious position in the movement and respected by their subordinates would want to leave his/her position. Therefore, mid-level members of insurgency should be put into a very slow integration program by the assumption that transformation process is concluded by then. The method of integration is best given by mid-level members of nonviolent struggle in order to avoid a hierarchical tension.



Figure 16: Reducing Violence in Mid-Level

The first thing here that stands out in Figure 16 is the fixity of nonviolence. Nonviolence here does not have to compromise or change its stance. Unlike grassroots case, both insurgency and nonviolence neither extend nor reduce themselves since no

interaction or cooperation is present until transformation process. What only happens is that nonviolence "keeps" mid-level insurgency stabile. The reason for insurgency to have an ankle is that it forms itself based on the stance of nonviolence.

3.1.1.3. Reducing Violence in Leadership

Comparing to other two layers, leadership level is the easiest one in terms of reducing violence and integration of nonviolence. For the reason that it is expected that there has been cooperation to the extent that all the footsteps are decided collectively from the beginning, burying their guns is an already-planned act. Renouncing violence and choosing "more legitimate" grounds publicly; and disbanding remains of insurgency are enough for leadership of insurgency to complete its transformation.



Figure 17: Reducing Violence in Leadership

What makes transformation of insurgency in leadership level different from other two layers is that it does not necessarily need a long process. The suddenness of leadership's transformation makes transition to nonviolence much easier in that layer.

3.1.2. Intra-Competing System

Rotational and inorganic cooperation of insurgency and nonviolence may not be as easy as hidden or synchronous cooperation types, for the possible obstacles that can be met. What is intended by an intra-competing system is to prevent any possible aberration/deviation that can occur. In many cases, the illusion of winning the war makes people who are waging the war refuse compromising because of the perception of unnecessary sacrifice towards any tolerant act. The more people are oppressed, the more they tend to be extreme; and the more their gains are from insurgency, the more they will get chance to practise their extremity which leads them to oppress their opponents. Those sentences can be repeated consecutively by exchanging subjects and objects. Intra-competing system's goal is to break that vicious cycle and avoid violence spiral.

Regardless the level of idealism of a movement, a certain amount of corruption is inevitable, considering the economic, psychological and political factors which make human factor briefly. Sense of safety in numbers, for example, with freedom of movement along with minimum responsibility compared to post-conflict processes such as state building or peacetime governance, may make members of the movement be pleased by conflict more than peacetime. Dependency on foreign actors financially can have a tendency of permanence. The undeniable fact that active members of movements hardly participate work force, rather, they are being paid by the movement which either funded by local population or foreign financers. Either way, the privilege of high income may lead members of movement oppose to transformation. Although main motive of movements is the presence of dictatorship, semi-dictatorship structure in movements most of the times is an unassailable fact. Leaderships of such movements are hardly interchangeable and determined by organizational hierarchy meaning that in case of death or resignation, the next leader is already decided. Unlike peacetime, political power of leadership is not questioned properly. Such political power and authority may make members of a movement hesitant towards peace.

In situations where intra-resistance against peace is present, intra-nonviolence in a movement can be an effective tool to overcome divergence inside the movement. If economy is the main reason as offered, and the movement is not willing to provide

economic privilege to those who seek to it (members of the movement) at the cost of preventing peace, cutting their financial sources may force them to cooperate. If financial source is coming from the movement itself or locals, stopping to pay salaries and making suppliers to boycott divergence is hoped to force divergents to cooperate. If they are sponsored by foreign actors (e.g. states or organizations), the root cause for that sponsorship should be taken into consideration, which is the authority and prestige over people. Cutting power of divergents and taking their authority away by dismissing them from the movement has the potential to withdraw sponsors to support them. Moreover, attracting members with lower positions who follow high-levelled divergents financially will make divergents powerless.

Political ambitions may lead the members of a movement to be displeased of peace terms. Giving up power and authority that is held might be hard for those who are in mid-level positions or leadership. That may come from high post-conflict expectations from the movement or it might be a planned act. Either way, in order to have a healthy transformation process, political interruptions and attempts must be intervened nonviolently. Dismissal of those who are seeking power at the cost of peace and appointing alternative actors who are loyal to the plans and interests of the movement on their positions in order for them to resist nonviolently to divergents can be an effective solution. If the type of cooperation that is used is inorganic, there is the possibility of ideological disputes that become apparent after the oppressor is overcome. Although the ultimate goal, which is overthrowing the oppressor, is met, the sense of transformation, normalization, reconciliation justice and state building may vary. In order to prevent being in the position of "facilitator of coup", members of a movement regardless its background (whether nonviolent or insurgent) should conduct a nonviolent campaign against its former allies. Anti-propaganda campaigns, social boycotts, boycotting elections that are executed by rival party and providing local and international support may take down divergents. Likewise, there is a possibility of ideological dispute that is arisen from the movement itself. Different agendas, different opportunities perceived or increasing radicalization within the movement can put peace in danger. In such cases, what must be done is to either find a common ground by negotiating with divergents or to paralyze them by replacing them with ideologically

more compatible members. Restricting access of divergents also to the movement is hoped to prevent rise of ideological dispute.

3.2. NEGOTIATION

Negotiation process in cases where there is mixed resistance (insurgency and nonviolence) is twofold: pre-negotiation conditions and during negotiation procedures. The first step of negotiation is ceasefire that is done during reducing violence process in order to prepare parties for negotiation. One should note that distinguishing ceasefire from disarmament is essential. While disarmament offers freeing actor(s) from means of violence completely, by methods of extermination of means of violence, handing them to a third party or storing them in a neutral or consensual place; ceasefire is a temporary activity that can be done one-sided or mutually in order to prevent violence in short-term. The reason for choosing ceasefire instead of disarmament is to prevent other party to see the unarmed opponent week and try to take advantage of current situation.

After ceasefire terms are agreed and negotiation preparations start, one crucial need must be satisfied: education. Not only the negotiators but also all three layers of the movement should receive education based on interest assessment, peace and nonviolence since "(i) it explains the roots of violence; (ii) it teaches alternatives to violence; (iii) it adjusts to cover different forms of violence; (iv) peace itself is a process that varies according to context; (v) conflict is omnipresent." (Boersama, Brown and Harris, 2006:p.217).

> *...the development of peace education as a central component of peacebuilding provides an opportunity both to embed the core values of conflict resolution around nonviolence and emancipation, and in defining a transformative cosmopolitan model which seeks to apply these values in peacebuilding* (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 2011:p.226)

Choosing right actors is a decisive factor for getting a fair agreement at the end of the negotiation process. One of the most important factors here is assurance of representation. Although it is important for negotiators to be from nonviolent part of the movement, lack of representation of both combatants and non-combatants may end up with dissatisfaction of interests and needs. Lederach's framework of peacebuilding

clarifies actors of peacebuilding which helps determining each layer that must be represented:



Figure 18: Lederach's Framework for Peacebuilding from Below

(Source: Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 3rd Edition)

What is important is that one sided well-representation may cause unpleasant results for both parties. Therefore, rule of representation and well-chosen actors must be followed by the oppressor. The last factor affecting negotiations in terms of role of negotiator is third parties that are involved into peace talks. If third party is an international actor and works as facilitator, after each and every disagreement, it will be exposed to criticisms for not being neutral. Alliances between facilitator and the oppressor or the movement, historical closeness, bad reputation and lack of credibility may lead negotiation process to dead end.

Determining own interests as well as predicting the opponent's, and offering positions based on those interests is a decisive factor for survivability of negotiation. Since negotiation in such cases where violence occurred is overly delicate, the most suitable method that is used would be interest-based negotiation, because "the primary principle of interest-based negotiations is to emerge or get a good understanding of your and the other party's interests and to develop or invent creative options that will meet those interests" (Katz, Lawyer, 1985:p.5).



Source: from Floyer Acland, 1995: 50

Figure 19: Interest Based Negotiation

(Source: Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 3rd Edition)

Despite the hardness of giving up interests, in some rare cases, it might be needed. Reassessing needs and interests shown in Figure 19 would not only make agreement easier, but also creates sympathy on the other party to the extent that it may be more compromising about its interests. Based on agreement upon interests, positions that are already flexible thanks to interest-based negotiation method will be shaped. One should keep in mind that positions are determined and changed only after interests and needs are stabilized.

> *[W]hen negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock themselves into those positions. The more you clarify your position and defend it against attack, the more committed you become to it. The more you try to convince the other side of the impossibility of changing your opening position, the more difficult it becomes to do so.* (Fisher and Ury, 1991:pp.7-8)

Therefore, an interest-based negotiation can both avoid gridlock situations but also allows positions to be interchangeable.

When agreement is close to be reached, the movement's ability of ascertaining pleased overcomes, and distinguishing unpleasant positions from positive ones although they serve for the same goal is a determining factor on reaching a positive consequence. Acceptation of the fact that "one side losses to reach agreement instead of demanding one-side gain as the price of agreement" (Fisher and Ury, 1991:p.12) in cases which this study analyses is the most efficient way to settle a positive agreement. If agreement is openly in favour of one party, despite acceptance of losing party, it will sow seeds of deeper conflicts that may explode even more violently than previous ones.

3.3. DISARMAMENT

Disarmament is the essential element of agreement for that preventing escalation of violence in cases where disputes in spite of agreement are possible. Withdrawal of arms, extermination of them under the surveillance of neutral parties, storing them in a third country, or an accepted place where parties are restricted to access them (one party cannot access arms without the consent of other one), and handling them to a third party whose purposes are assured to be peaceful are methods that can be chosen based on circumstances. With the assumption that a country is under threat, if a tyrant/dictator is overthrown while the system is kept, balancing population of army by increasing number of deficit group in terms of population would be a part of disarmament although arms are not given away.

In many cases, it is witnessed that local participants of insurgency, especially those in rural areas, are not willing to give up arms. Tribal leaders who maintain their power with arms, former guerrillas, mercenaries from both sides, villagers, or even traders who would carry arms to protect their trade are highly likely to object the idea of disarmament. Inciting those groups to hand over guns peacefully is an important part of disarmament in terms of having a healthy transformation process. Financial support in exchange for arms, as well as political empowerment may ease those groups to be convinced.

Finally, in order for disarmament process to be just and well-done, monitoring from an agreed third party is necessary. As absence of arms will increase their value in terms of their economic value on the market since the physical effectivity of them will increase. The fewer arms are, the more the use of remaining ones as a means of self-empowerment increases. For preventing corruption, coup attempts and crime, disarmament must be monitored. Monitoring process can be done by local committees chosen amongst trusted actors from both sides, international actors such as peace organizations or referee states or a mix of local and international actors as a result of cooperation.

3.4. NORMALIZATION

Normalization is the final stage of transformation, with three layers in it which are truth, justice, mediation and reconciliation; and restoration and state-building. Each stage makes following doable. Following figures summarize the normalization process.



Figure 20: Normalization in "Paralyzers"



Figure 21: Normalization in "Obstacles"

3.4.1. Truth, Justice, Mediation and Reconciliation

Establishing truth commissions, whose primary purposes are "investigating and reporting on key periods of recent abuse" which "are often official state bodies that make recommendations to remedy such abuse and to prevent its recurrence" ("What is Transitional Justice?", 2009), acts as facilitator of justice. Truth commissions "are non-judicial inquiries established to determine the facts, root causes, and societal consequences of past human rights violations" (ibid). The more radius area of truth commission's operation and research is increased, the more truth is likely to be revealed: seeking to reveal not only direct violence, but also cultural and structural violence will prevent injustice. Investigation of crimes that are committed must be done by professionals who have experience on that field and whose neutrality is not doubtful.

After truth is revealed, first thing that should be done is implementing justice. One should note that in such cases where nonviolence and insurgency coexisted, one type of justice may not be enough to satisfy every need of society. While combatants fighting for the oppressor who did not violate any red line would be treated with similar applications of transitional justice to be integrated into society, both members of insurgency and the oppressor's forces who transgressed red lines are supposed to face retribution in order to prevent them face less punishment under the name of "combatant victims" at the cost of violence against their victims

After traumatic events like invasion or civil war, even after justice is implemented, collective memory of a community that suffered loss might still cause grievance, and that grievance can reflect as another wave of violence. Likewise, triumphant party may show same symptoms in spite of their gains. Victory addiction and sense of superiority may prompt people to revive violence. Delegitimization, the "salient mechanism that frees human beings from their normative and moral restraints and justifies participation in violence" (Tropp, 2012 p.29), and psychology of win or loss between different groups, must be eroded by mediation. Mediators from third parties and from those communities as well are supposed to create the sense of empathy within and between different communities.

Unlike mediation, reconciliation is a long-term process whose duration varies in terms of the intensity of conflict, from months to years and even decades. The most important precondition for reconciliation of cases which this study analyses is that the whole process must be nonviolent in terms of methods, language that is used and education since "nonviolent efforts at reconciliation and persuasion are deemed more effective and in the long term more sustainable for resolving conflicts than the use of physical force" (Kurtz, 1999:p.213). First step of reconciliation is rehabilitation, which can be defined as early steps of normalization. Since the goal of ideal society is determined by the movement from the beginning, there would be a set of criteria of stable optimal state, which people are tried to be transformed and integrated into. Although it may be claimed that rehabilitation is for one to get his/her home and to go back to his/her routines, considering the possibility of that their routines might be one of main root causes of a conflict, it cannot be said that rehabilitation, and therefore transformation, is done successfully. Moving displaced people to their homes by keeping demographic separation; or giving soldiers -who served for atrocities and be released then- same kind of mentality with their previous state can hardly be considered as rehabilitation. Rehabilitation in this case, is to adept people the new system designed for preventing violence to be escalated again; and to make them adopt new principles of that system. What is meant here by "new system" is future assurance. The system includes releasing of political prisoners, compensation to those who are affected from structural and cultural violence (direct violence victims are expected to have be compensated already in justice process) and reconstruction of physical (e.g. public properties, injuries,

permanent damages on people and their belongings) and psychological (trauma, disorders, grievances, etc.) losses caused by the conflict.

3.4.2. Restoration and State Building

Restoration can be defined as re-building activity that is offered after truth, justice, mediation and reconciliation processes are done successfully. Unlike reconstruction mentioned above, state-building does not focus on repairing what already exists, yet damaged or broken. Rather, its main goal is to construct a new system on debris of previous one. It must be noted that in cases where an oppressor is taken down with cooperation of insurgency and nonviolence, it would be unrealistic to expect an anarchical system to function since "a minimally functioning state is essential to maintain peace. Other institutions, actors and alternative sources of authority may be essential in their own right, but they are no substitute for the state in the long term" (Menocal, 2009). Unlike peacebuilding which is an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:p.21), and whose aim is to maintain peace where state is not a necessity if third-parties can provide what is demanded, state-building does need state as an actor for meeting demands of citizens in order to satisfy long-term needs of continuity of peace. Since peacebuilding will already have done from bottom to top, a top to bottom approach focused on state (Haider, 2010) would not undermine grassroots and its demands. Still, a "bottom to up state-building" is possible. A model created by Beatrice Poulingy states that integrating intangible dimensions of state resilience and state building which are political, judicial and security (Pouligny, 2010:p.3).

3.4.2.1. Political Dimension

According to Poulingy, "modern states must perform a variety of functions beyond holding the legitimate monopoly on the use of force in a given territory" (Pouligny, 2010:p.3). Although validity and efficiency of centrality in terms of governing is not doubtable, instead of having a central governing system empowering citizens, central governing system empowered by its citizens may provide desirable optimality of bottom

to top state building. Participation of diverse groups into constitution formulating that aims to restore a political community also is an important element of local empowerment (Pouligny, 2010:p.3). Transparent and highly-participated elections that provide equality amongst citizens, anticipated by Pouligny, may provide fairness in terms of state-building: "The issues of boundary de-limitation and voter registration are particularly crucial from this perspective. They not only define voter constituencies, but also refer to more fundamental questions related to the definition of "nationality" and "citizenship", the recognition of equal citizenship and (re-) allocation of resources." (Pouligny, 2010:p.5)

3.4.2.2. Judicial Dimension

Constitutions and judicial systems, made by international community, which are accepted to be ideal have possibility to not to fit into the local system. By imposing locals to accept a judicial system that is not compatible with their ethic and cultural codes will make those constitutions "no more than a paper" (Pouligny, 2010:p.10). Therefore, judicial system should be eligible accordingly with local codes. Moreover, security issues must be analysed in order to understand perceptions towards it, since it varies from country to country.

3.4.2.3. Security Dimension

Security, according to Pouligny, is a relative concept. Limiting security customs of local people based on international values may harm their sense of security (Pouligny, 2010:p.12). Small arms for instance, might be a part of a group's culture and create a sense of lack of security among them.

> *In any given country, different stakeholders may also perceive and define their security problems in different ways. These may be influenced by a wide range of emotionally, socially and culturally traumatic events, losses, isolation, the destruction of social norms and codes of behaviour that most individuals and communities face in fragile situations, which are often characterised by a high level of violence and unpredictability in the daily life.* (Pouligny, 2010:p.12)

What should be done in such cases is to abolish the reasons that make people feel the necessity of having small firearms. In other words, establishing security, assuring the

sense of security to be settled and convincing local population the unnecessariness of keeping their firearms is the last stage of state-building.

CONCLUSION

Nonviolence has proven itself as an efficient tool when it comes to overthrow dictatorships, forcing tyrannies to negotiate and ending repression that is caused by amiss policies. The advantage of flexibility, reversibility and safety in terms of casualties compared to its violent counterparts makes nonviolence pleasant for those who intend to implement it. The increasing popularity of nonviolnce does not only attract masses who want to avoid irrecovable situations, but also promotes ones who prefer violent methods. With its overwhelming effect on security defections (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:p.46) and high (and increasing) success rate along with its capability on finding weak spots on pillars of power of the oppressor, it is an undeniable fact that nonviolent struggle overpowered violent methods in many parts of the world. Still, nonviolence, like any other method, works under some certain conditions, minimally available ones if not the most pleasant. Free media in a country, favourable ideological compatibility in local and international scale, the oppressor's accountability, the expendability of the oppressor before the eyes of mainstream international actors, movement's economic efficiency, the oppressor's dependance on people, high participation to the movement, international support and democratic climate are the elements that optimiza the operation area of nonviolence.

Disruption of optimum environment in that sense is expected to make waging nonviolent struggle harder or even impossible depending on circumstances. Conditions that make nonviolent struggle ineffective (paralyzers) and conditions that make it impossible (obstacles) must be analyzed in order to cope with possible complications that is faced. Struggle against oppressive regimes is often challenging for a variety of reasons ranging from attitude of international actors to local cooperators. Circumstances which a movement is in may be so severe that the movement ends prematurely which can result ireeversible consequences.

This study aimed to bring a comprehensive perspective towards the situations that make nonviolence either completely inefficent although does not prevent it to be waged, or

situations where waging nonviolence impossible. Today, countries like North Korea which isolated itself completely from outer world, or Saudi Arabia that is enjoying Western support thanks to its vast resources, on the other hand, pose a serious threat to nonviolent activists and they remain being challenges against nonviolent school of thought. In addition, contrary to common thought, oppression can be witnesses in almost any political system including democracies. Distortion of the truth and laws that are open to interpretation can easily serve as an oppressor. What's found by analyzing those state was that pillars of power of an oppressor may be immune to nonviolence, and insistance on nonviolence may decrease its flexibility and that can be harmful for the cause. Oppressors may use excessive methods to suppress nonviolence and ensure members of the society to not to resort the same methods by intimidation, coercion and creating paranoia. Furthermore, the mentality of "violence is never justified" in such cases may end up with more violence as a result of choosing not to apply violence in order to prevent a greater destruction.

When Gene Sharp indicated that every dictatorship has its own Achilles' heel, he was most probably right. However, seeking an enemy's weak spot with a single method may lead us to failure time by time. Facing paralyzers, obstacles or mix of them (lates one is the most realistic scenarion) that have been told from the very beginning of this thesis is highly possible when waging struggle against an oppressor. What was offered is that in cases where nonviolent is either impossible to be waged or inefficient even though it is allowed, insurgency may be able to open the path of nonviolence by attacking the oppressor's pillars of power which are protected against nonviolence, yet vulnerable to insurgency. It was also claimed that if nonviolent school of thought embrace the idea that insurgency in some cases may be helpful and adopts the mechanism of cooperation, both effectivity and flexibility will be increased, because there will have been a larger scale of tactics (both from nonviolence and insurgency) and more alternatives.



Figure 22: Overall Desired Process (Paralyzers)



Figure 23: Overall Desired Process (Obstacles)

Two figures above summarize what had been being told in this study step by step. Figure 22 stands for "paralyzers" situations in which nonviolence can operate on a limited ground yet is far from being efficient at achieving its goal. The first vertical line indicates where the idea of nonviolent struggle is embodied. In that phase, nonviolence is inefficient whereas insurgency below it functions well. Figure 23, similar to Figure 22, starts with a hypothetical nonviolent struggle that is tried to be embodied, and yet encounters severe response from the oppressor which forces it to step down. The second vertical line symbolizes situations where insurgency enables nonviolence to operate effectively. At those situations, a visible cooperation until getting to a pleasant state is prerequisite in many of the situations although some exceptions are possible. The last vertical line is the indicator of goal that is achieved. After that point, it was offered that

insurgency, if there is still, should be reduced step by step and it should give its place to nonviolence completely. During that process, negotiation, disarmament and normalization both as a part of solution and prevention of conflict to escalate again must be carried out.

At the end of this study, it was found out that the level of devastation when a group/movement resorts to nonviolence may be higher than insurgency in some cases. Insistence on nonviolence at times may cause irreversible consequences. Still, given that nonviolence is still a pleasant method with numerous advantageous aspects; the idea of replacing it with violence completely would be dangerous. Nonviolence should be implemented where it can be implemented if one seeks to overthrow an oppressor in less violent means. If one, whether a person or a movement, wishes nonviolent to be their method regardless the situation they are in, they must take the fact that insurgency has the potential of making nonviolence possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

2015 Key World Energy Statistics (Statistical Data). (2015). Paris: International Energy Agency. Retrieved March 29, 2016, from https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld_Statistics_2015.pdf.

About Ushahidi. (n.d.). Retrieved February 10, 2016, from https://www.ushahidi.com/about

Andersen, H. (2013, April 24). Corruption and Authoritarianism in the 'New' Iraq. Retrieved March 28, 2016, from http://muftah.org/corruption-and-authoritarianism-in-the-new-iraq/#.VxnODvl97IV

Andersen, R. (2006). *A century of media, a century of war*. New York: Peter Lang.

Arendt, H. (1961). *Between past and future, six exercises in political thought*. New York: Viking Press.

Arendt, H. (1963). *Eichmann in Jerusalem; a report on the banality of evil.* New York: Viking Press.

Arendt, H. (1968). *Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought*. New York: Viking Press.

Arendt, H. (1970). *On violence*. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Arendt, H. (1973). *The origins of totalitarianism*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace.

Bamber, D. (2001, November 11). Bin Laden: Yes, I did it. Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1362113/Bin-Laden-Yes-I-did-it.html

Basedow, J., & Siehr, K. (2000). *Private law in the international arena: From national conflict rules towards harmonization and unification: Liber amicorum Kurt Siehr* (Vol. 1000). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.

Berger, J. P., & Gerson, S. P. (2006). *Teaching Jewish history*. Springfield, NJ: A.R.E. Pub.

Bock, J. G. (2012). *The technology of nonviolence: Social media and violence prevention*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Boersema, D., Brown, K., & Harris, I. (2006). Assumptions behind Different Types. In *Spiritual and political dimensions of nonviolence and peace*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Boot, M. (2013, January 18). The Guerrilla Myth. Retrieved December 28, 2015, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323596204578243702404190338

Brooks, H. (2004). The Dominant Party System: Challenges for South Africa's Second Decade of Democracy. *EISA Occasional Papers*. Retrieved from https://eisa.org.za/pdf/OP25.pdf.

Buckley, C. (2015, December 28). China expands domestic surveillance power. Retrieved April 27, 2016, from http://www.pressreader.com/usa/houston-chronicle/20151228/281603829435466/TextView

Burma (Rep. No. 192827). (2011). US Department of State. Retrieved from www.state.gov/documents/organization/192827.pdf.

BURMA/MYANMAR: Disciplinary punishments for police who assault and torture no substitute for criminal sanctions. (2015, June 1). Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-080-2015

Cambanis, T. (2015, November 05). Assad's Sunni Foot Soldiers. Retrieved April 02, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/05/assads-sunni-foot-soldiers-syria

Chenoweth, E. (2013, November 04). My Talk at TEDxBoulder: Civil Resistance and the "3.5% Rule". Retrieved April 10, 2016, from http://rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04/my-talk-at-tedxboulder-civil-resistance-and-the-3-5-rule

Chenoweth, E. & Stephan, M.J. (2011). *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare)*. New York, USA: Columbia University Press.

Chomsky, N. (1989). *Necessary illusions: Thought control in democratic societies*. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Chulov, M., Harding, L., & Roberts, D. (2014, August 11). Nouri al-Maliki forced from post as Iraq's political turmoil deepens. Retrieved March 29, 2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/nouri-al-maliki-iraq-forced-out-prime-minister

CLAIMING VICTORY, IRAQ HOLDS ITS FIRE. (1991). Retrieved February 28, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/01/world/after-the-war-baghdad-claiming-victory-iraq-holds-its-fire.html

Cobb, C. (2014). *This nonviolent stuff'll get you killed how guns made the civil rights movement possible*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant (Rep. No. CCPR/C/YEM/CO/5). (2010). New York: Human Rights Committee. Retrieved May 2, 2016, from www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR.C.YEM.CO.5.doc.

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations: Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946 = Convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies: Approuvée par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 13 février 1946. (1974). New York: United Nations.

Couldry, N. (2002). *The place of media power pilgrims and witnesses of the media age*. London: Taylor & Francis.

Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. (n.d.). Retrieved April 8, 2016, from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm

Dabashi, H. (2011). *The green movement in Iran*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Dasa, R. (2002). *Gandhi in 21st century*. New Delhi: Sarup & Sons.

Declaration of Malta, 1991

Dilulio, J. J. (2003). Response: Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview. *Harvard Law Review, 116*(5), 1271-1284. doi:10.2307/1342727

Donnelly, K. (2009). *Handbook for nonviolent campaigns*. Retrieved March 3, 2016, from http://www.soaw.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=644

Elliott, D. W. (2003). *The Vietnamese war: Revolution and social change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975* (Vol. 1). New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Ellwood, R. S., & Alles, G. D. (2007). *The encyclopedia of world religions-revised edition*. New York: Facts on File.

Erlich, R. W., & Scheer, R. (2016). *The Iran agenda: The real story of U.S. policy and the Middle East crisis*. New York: Routledge.

Essop, R. (2016, February 29). Spy tapes: DA hopes to reinstate 783 charges against Zuma. Retrieved April 05, 2016, from http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/29/Spy-tapes-sags-DA-hopes-for-reinstatement-of-783-charges-against-Zuma

Falk, R. A. (1984). Superpower intervention in the third world: The US case. *Habitat International, 8*(3-4), 223-230. doi:10.1016/0197-3975(84)90053-5

Feldbrugge, F. J., Berg, G. P., & Simons, W. B. (1985). *Encyclopedia of Soviet law* (2nd ed.). Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff.

Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1991). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in* (2nd ed.). New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books.

FMI-3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations. (2004). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army :.

Freedman, D. (2014). *The contradictions of media power*. London: Bloomsbury.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research, 6*(3), 167-191. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690 .

Galtung, J. (2000). *Conflict transformation by peaceful means (the transcend method): A manual prepared by the Crisis Environments Training Initiative and the Disaster Management Training Programme of the United Nations*. Geneva: United Nations.

Galula, D., & Nagl, J. (2006). *Counterinsurgency warfare theory and practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

Gana, N. (2013). *The making of the Tunisian revolution: Contexts, architects, prospects*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Gelvin, J. (2012). *The Arab uprisings: What everyone needs to know*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gilbert, D. T., Fiske, S. T., & Lindzey, G. (2010). *The handbook of social psychology* (5th ed., Vol. 1). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Goodwin, M., Ramalingam, V. & Briggs, R (2012). *The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe.* Institute for Strategic Dialogue

Green, P., McManus, T., & Venning, A. (2015). *COUNTDOWN TO ANNIHILATION: GENOCIDE IN MYANMAR* (Rep.). London: International State Crime Initiative.

Grootes, S. (2014, September 29). Details of Zuma spy tapes emerge. Retrieved March 03, 2016, from http://ewn.co.za/2014/09/29/Details-of-Zuma-spy-tapes-emerge

Hackett, J. (2012). *The military balance 2012*. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Harger, K.R., and Hall, J.C. 2015. Obedience and Income Levels. Applied Economics Letters, 22(2): 94-98

Haider, H. (2010). *State-society relations and citizenship in situations of conflict and fragility*. Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

Harris, S. (2006). *Letter to a Christian nation*. New York: Knopf.

Harvey, K. (2014). *Encyclopedia of social media and politics*. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

Hazleton, L. (2009). *After the prophet: The epic story of the Shia-Sunni split in Islam*. New York: Doubleday.

Helvey, R. L. (2004). *On strategic nonviolent conflict: Thinking about the fundamentals*. Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institute.

Holmes, R. (2014). *On war and morality*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Hosenball, M. (2015, January 08). Said Kouachi, Suspect In Charlie Hebdo Attack, Trained In Yemen: Reports. Retrieved April 17, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/08/said-kouachi-yemen_n_6439300.html

Howard, P. N. (2011). *The digital origins of dictatorship and democracy: Information technology and political Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Iraq mass protests mount pressure on Maliki. (2012, December 28). Retrieved March 29, 2016, from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/12/201212287534652684 5.html

Iraq protesters win first demand: Release of 3,000 prisoners. (2013, February 03). Retrieved March 29, 2016, from http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=56773

Iyengar, R. (2015, October 28). Burma's Rohingya Facing 'Final Stages of Genocide' Retrieved February 30, 2016, from http://time.com/4089276/burma-rohingya-genocide-report-documentary

Jebreal, R. (2015, June 5). It's Time for the US to Support Democracy, Not Dictatorship, in Egypt. Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://www.thenation.com/article/its-time-us-support-democracy-not-dictatorship-egypt/

Johansen, J. (2014). Nonviolence – More than absence of violence. Retrieved April 24, 2016, from https://jjohansen.net/2014/01/05/nonviolence-more-than-absence-of-violence/

Johansen, J. (2014). Nonviolence – More than absence of violence. Retrieved March 10, 2016, from https://jjohansen.net/2014/01/05/nonviolence-more-than-absence-of-violence/

Johnson, R. L. (2006). *Gandhi's experiments with truth: Essential writings by and about Mahatma Gandhi*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Johnson, R. L., & G. (2006). *Gandhi's experiments with truth: Essential writings by and about Mahatma Gandhi*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Jongerden, J., & Akkaya, A. H. (2012). The Kurdistan Workers Party and a New Left in Turkey: Analysis of the revolutionary movement in Turkey through the PKK's memorial text on Haki Karer. *European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14*. Retrieved from http://ejts.revues.org/4613

Kant, I., & Ladd, J. (1999). *The metaphysical elements of justice: Part of The Metaphysics of Morals*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Katz, N., & Lawyer, J. (1985). *Communication and conflict resolution skills*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt.

Kerns, A. (2011). *Who will shout if not us?: Student activists and the Tiananmen Square protest, China, 1989*. Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century Books.

Khatri, S. S. (2011, May 25). Qatar: Why Protests Won't Happen Here. Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shabina-s-khatri/qatar-why-protests-wont-h_b_830129.html

Khumalo, F. (2014, April 24). 20 years on, still waiting for the ANC to deliver (Part 1). Retrieved April 19, 2016, from http://newafricanmagazine.com/20-years-on-still-waiting-for-the-anc-to-deliver-2/

Kothari, S. (2012, June 23). Satyagraha Foundation » Blog Archive » Concept of Nonviolence in Jainism: A System for Inner Peace and Happiness. Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://www.satyagrahafoundation.org/concept-of-nonviolence-in-jainism-a-system-for-inner-peace-and-happiness/

Kress, M., & Szechtman, R.. (2009). Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario. *Operations Research*, *57*(3), 578–585. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25614776

Kurlansky, M. (2006). *Nonviolence: Twenty-Five Lessons From the History of a Dangerous Idea*. New York: Modern Library, Kindle Edition

Kurtz, L. (1999). *Encyclopedia of violence, peace & conflict* (Vol. 2). San Diego: Academic Press.

Laccino, L. (2015, March 11). Myanmar education law protest: Students 'at risk of torture and abuses' Retrieved January 16, 2016, from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/myanmar-education-law-protest-students-risk-torture-abuses-1491479

Laccino, L. (2015, October 22). South Africa: Fees must fall protests will continue as Jacob Zuma to meet students. Retrieved March 12, 2016, from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/south-africa-fees-must-fall-protests-will-continue-jacob-zuma-meet-students-1525137

Laumakis, S. J. (2008). *An introduction to Buddhist philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laremont, R. R. (2014). *Revolution, revolt, and reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and beyond*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals (Vol. 8, Rep.). (1949). London: THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION. Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-8.pdf.

Lazare, S. (2016, March 06). The FBI has a new plan to spy on high school kids across the country. Retrieved April 20, 2016, from http://www.salon.com/2016/03/06/the_fbi_has_a_new_plan_to_spy_on_high_school_kids_across_the_country_partner/

Levene, M. (2013). *The crisis of genocide: Annihilation: Volume II: The European Rimlands 1939-1953* (Vol. 2). Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Liberia: More U.S. Support Needed, 10/22/'95. (1995, October 22). Retrieved May 02, 2016, from http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/DC_2210.html

Lloyd, D., & Powell-Tuck, J. (2004). Artificial Nutrition: Principles And Practice Of Enteral Feeding. *Clinics in Colon and Rectal Surgery*, 107-118. Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2780045/

Lukes, S. (2005). *Power a radical view* (2nd ed.). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Martin, B., Johansen, J., & Meyer, M. (2012). Non-violence Versus US Imperialism. *Economic & Political Weekly*, *47*(38), 82-89.

Marx, G. T. (1974). Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant. *American Journal of Sociology*, *80*(2), 402-442. doi:10.1086/225807

May, T. (1994). *The political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Menocal, A. R. (2009). *'State-building for peace': Navigating an arena of contradictions* (Briefing paper). London: Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved May 4, 2016, from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4811.pdf.

Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority: An experimental view*. New York: Harper & Row.

Mock, G. (2015, February 9). A Conversation on Force-Feeding Hunger Strikers at Guantanamo. Retrieved December 27, 2015, from https://today.duke.edu/2015/02/gitmoforcefeed

Moghanizadeh, S. (2013). *The role of social media in Iran's Green Movement* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Gothenburg). Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg Department of Applied Information Technology.

Mogul, P. (2015, December 16). Zuma Must Fall: Thousands protest in South Africa to demand Jacob Zuma's resignation. Retrieved March 12, 2016, from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/zuma-must-fall-thousands-protest-south-africa-demand-jacob-zumas-resignation-1533610

Molm, L. D. (1997). Risk and Power Use: Constraints on the Use of Coercion in Exchange. *American Sociological Review, 62*(1), 113-133. doi:10.2307/2657455

Moran, G. (n.d.). IS A WORKABLE ETHIC OF NON-VIOLENCE POSSIBLE? Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/ethic.pdf

Morse, A. (2011, June 11). "The Most Oppressed People in the World" Burma Imposes a Two-Child Policy on the Rohingya. Retrieved February 29, 2016, from https://www.pop.org/content/most-oppressed-people-world

Morudu, P. (2012, September 11). Electing for lesser evil will not get us very far. Retrieved April 06, 2016, from http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2012/09/11/electing-for-lesser-evil-will-not-get-us-very-far

Murphy, K. (2006, November 01). France's New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled. Retrieved April 07, 2016, from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-new-law-control-immigration-flows-court-highly-skilled

Naji, A. (2004). *Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass*. (Translated by William McCants)

Nasser, A. (2011, July 30). Racial discrimination in Yemen; Stories from Akhdam Women. Retrieved March 11, 2016, from http://afrahnasser.blogspot.com.tr/2011/07/racial-discrimination-in-yemen-stories.html

New report exposes violent tactics used to break Guantanamo hunger strike. (2013, July 10). Retrieved February 03, 2016, from http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2013_07_10_guantanamo_hunger_strike_violence_obama

Nonviolent action. (n.d.). Retrieved April 03, 2016, from https://www.fortlewis.edu/peace/NonviolentAction.aspx

North Korea: Human rights concerns. (2006, November 28). Retrieved April 29, 2016, from http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/304

NSA/CSS POLICY MANUAL 1-52 (Rep. No. NSA/CSSM 1-52). (2013). National Security Agency.

NSA Spying on Americans. (n.d.). Retrieved May 01, 2016, from https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying

Obama praises Egyptian revolution. Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/02/11/egypt.us.reaction/

Olzen, J. (2012, October 31). Bainport leverages election in outsourcing fight. Retrieved February 2, 2016, from http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/bainport-leverages-election-in-outsourcing-fight/).

O'Neill, B. E. (2005). *Insurgency & terrorism: From revolution to apocalypse* (2nd ed.). Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.

Page, W. F., & Davis Jr., R. H. (2005). *Encyclopedia of African history and culture*. New York: Facts on File.

Pinker, S. (2011). *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. Viking. Kindle edition

Pipes, D. (1989). The Alawi capture of power in Syria. *Middle Eastern Studies, 25*(4), 429-450. doi:10.1080/00263208908700793

Police Use of Force. (2015, April 13). Retrieved January 9, 2016, from http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx

Potter, W. (2006). Analysis of Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act. Retrieved March 21, 2016, from http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/aeta-analysis-109th/

Pouligny, B. (2013). *State-society relations and intangible dimensions of state resilience and state building: A bottom-up perspective*. Florance: EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE.

Powers, R. S., Vogele, W. B., Kruegler, C., & McCarthy, R. M. (1997). *Protest, power, and change: An encyclopedia of nonviolent action from ACT-UP to women's suffrage*. New York: Garland Pub.

Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools (Rep.). (2016). Office of Partner Engagement Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved from https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf.

Rajput, A. (2013). *Hasan-i-Sabbah: His life and thought*. Xlibris.

Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H., & Woodhouse, T. (2011). *Contemporary conflict resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (3rd ed.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Rapoport, D. C., & Alexander, Y. (1982). *The Morality of terrorism: Religious and secular justifications*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 (United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic). (2013). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf

Richardson, I. L., & Baldwin, S. (1976). *Public administration: Government in action*. Columbus, OH: C.E. Merrill Pub.

Richardson, I.L. and Baldwin, S. (1976) Public Administration; Government in Action. Columbus Ohio: Charles E. Merill Publishing Company. A Bell and Howell Company.

Roy, B.K. (1921, April 30) The World Will Hear More About Gandhi, *The Independent*

Rule By Law: An Analysis of the Use of Legislation to Stifle Civil Society Space in Burma. (2013, September 30). Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.burmapartnership.org/2013/09/rule-by-law/

Sahlin, P. (2006, October 24). Civil Unrest in the French Suburbs, November 2005. Retrieved April 04, 2016, from http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/

Satellites by Countries and Organizations. (n.d.). Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=

Satyagraha Foundation » Blog Archive » Concept of Nonviolence in Jainism: A System for Inner Peace and Happiness. (n.d.). Retrieved April 24, 2016, from http://www.satyagrahafoundation.org/concept-of-nonviolence-in-jainism-a-system-for-inner-peace-and-happiness

Saudi Arabia: Surge in Executions. (2014, August 21). Retrieved May 03, 2016, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/21/saudi-arabia-surge-executions

Security Council - Veto List [Table]. (2015). In *Security Council - Quick Links*. The UN. Retrieved from http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick

Schmid, G. (2011). *Reporton the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system)* (Rep. No. A5-0264/2001 PAR1). European Parliament.

Sevcenko, L., & Gabriel, B. (2011). Guantánamo Public Memory Project. Retrieved April 21, 2016.

Sharp, G. (1973). *The politics of nonviolent action*. Boston: P. Sargent Publisher.

Sharp. G. (1990), *Waging nonviolent struggle: 20th century practise and 21st century potential*, Extending Horizons Books

Sharp, G. (2003). *There are realistic alternatives*. Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution.

Sharp, G. (2010). *From dictatorship to democracy: A conceptual framework for liberation* (4th ed.). East Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution.

Sharp, G. (2013). *How nonviolent struggle works*. Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution.

Shias dominate Sunnis in the new Iraq. (2012, April 03). Retrieved March 23, 2016, from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/shias-dominate-sunnis-in-the-new-iraq-1.1269416

Shirky, C. (2011). *Cognitive surplus: How technology makes consumers into collaborators*. New York: Penguin Books.

Sills, D. L. & Merton, R. K., (1968). *International encyclopedia of the social sciences*. New York: Macmillan.

Sim, D. (2015, October 23). Fees Must Fall: South African students and police clash in tuition cost protests [Photo report]. Retrieved March 12, 2016, from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/fees-must-fall-south-african-students-police-clash-tuition-cost-protests-photo-report-1525389

Smith, C. (2012, November 29). Syria's Internet Reportedly Shut Down. Retrieved May 01, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/syria-internet-down_n_2211458.html

Smith, D. (2014, August 28). Zuma's position weakens as he loses battle to keep 'spy tapes' under wraps. Retrieved March 16, 2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/28/zumo-spy-tapes-released-corruption-south-africa

Spillius, A. (2010, September 13). US secures record $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8000747/US-secures-record-60-billion-arms-sale-to-Saudi-Arabia.html

Steger, M. B., Battersby, P., & Siracusa, J. M. (2014). *The SAGE handbook of globalization*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Stoner, E. (2012, July 14). Participation is everything - a conversation with Erica Chenoweth - Waging Nonviolence. Retrieved April 23, 2016, from

http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/participation-is-everything-a-conversation-with-erica-chenoweth

Stover, E., Peskin, V., & Koenig, A. (2016). *Hiding in plain sight: The pursuit of war criminals from Nuremberg to the War on Terror*. Oakland, California: University of California Press.

Sutton, C. (2013, May 29). World's most oppressed people's plea to Australian Government. Retrieved February 29, 2016, from http://www.news.com.au/world/worlds-most-oppressed-people-plea-to-australian-government/story-fndir2ev-1226653127698

Swiss voters back ban on minarets. (2009, November 29). Retrieved December 27, 2015, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8385069.stm

The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. (1982). Ankara: Prime Ministry, Directorate General of Press and Information.

The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994

The Seville Statement on Violence - UNESCO. (n.d.). Retrieved April 26, 2016, from http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/seville.pdf

Tropp, L. (2012). *The Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Turkey, Turkish National Police. (n.d.). *Ethical Principles of Law Enforcement*. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from https://www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Dkmanlar/ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT.pdf

Vallejo, C. (2012). *Plurality of peaces in legal action: Analyzing constitutional objections to military services in Colombia*.

Vallejo, C. (2012). *Plurality of peaces in legal action: Analyzing constitutional objections to military services in Colombia*. Berlin: Lit.

Vij, S. (2010, February 17). 'Non-violent terrorism' and India's dirty war in Kashmir. Retrieved February 27, 2015, from http://kafila.org/2010/02/17/non-violent-terrorism-and-indias-dirty-war-in-kashmir/

Viljoen, J. (2015). Engaging an aesthetics of the 'invisible' in graphic narratives to represent violence ethically. *Continuum Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 29*(6), 847-860. doi:10.1080/10304312.2015.1040728

Vinthagen, S. (2005). Ickevåldsaktion. En social praktik av motstånd och kontsruktion. PADRIGU. Gothenburg, Gothenburg University**:** 486, from https://jjohansen.net/2014/01/05/nonviolence-more-than-absence-of-violence/

What is Transitional Justice? (2009). Retrieved April 01, 2016, from https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf

Willis, J. (2007). *The media effect: How the news influences politics and government*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

World Report 2012: Saudi Arabia. (2012). Retrieved January 22, 2016, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/saudi-arabia

World Report 2013: Saudi Arabia. (2013). Retrieved January 28, 2016, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/saudi-arabia

WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. (2014, July 15). *Burma: Increased number of political prisoners calls for renewed international pressure* [Press release]. Retrieved May 3, 2016, from https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/burma/15740-burma-increased-number-of-political-prisoners-calls-for-renewed

Zedong, M. (1965). *Selected works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol II*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Zeldin, W. (2015, November). Turkey: Recent Developments in National and Public Security Law. Retrieved April 01, 2016, from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-security-law/turkey.php

'Zuma must fall campaign can only polarise society': ANC. (2016, January 18). Retrieved March 12, 2016, from http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/01/18/‘Zuma-must-fall-campaign-can-only-polarise-society’-ANC

APPENDIX 1: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY OF DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES

Date: 13/06/2016

Thesis Title / Topic: The Role of Insurgency in Terms of Facilitating Nonviolence: A Model Proposal for Cooperation

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

Date and Signature

Name Surname: Hüsamettin Ulaş Öztürk
Student No: N12223115
Department: Department of Peace Studies
Program: Peace and Conflict Studies
Status: ☒ Masters ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Assoc. Prof. Havva KÖK ARSLAN

Detailed Information: http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr
Telephone: 0-312-2976860 **Fax:** 0-3122992147 **E-mail**: sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr

APPENDIX 2: THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES

Date: 20/06/2016

Thesis Title / Topic: The Role of Insurgency in Terms of Facilitating Nonviolence: A Model Proposal for Cooperation

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options stated below on 18/06/2016 for the total of 136 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 3 %.

Filtering options applied:

1. Approval and Decleration sections excluded
2. Bibliography/Works Cited excluded
3. Quotes excluded
4. Match size up to 5 words excluded

I declare that I have carefully read Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports; that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

20/06/2016
Date and Signature

Name Surname: Hüsamettin Ulaş Öztürk
Student No: N12223115
Department: Peace Studies
Program: Peace and Conflict Studies
Status: ☒ Masters ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Assoc. Prof. Havva KÖK ARSLAN