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THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
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LITERATURE

The Category of Negation

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MASTER'S THESIS

ADVISOR

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ



YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ SAVUNMA SINAV TUTANAĞI

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Öğrencinin Adı Soyadı	Birgol Saadoon MUSTAFA	
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<p>Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği hükümleri uyarınca yapılan Yüksek Lisans Tez Savunma Sınavında Jürimiz 08/01/2016 tarihinde toplanmış ve yukarıda adı geçen öğrencinin Yüksek Lisans tezi için;</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OY BİRLİĞİ <input type="checkbox"/> OY ÇOKLUĞU²</p> <p>ile aşağıdaki kararı almıştır.</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda aday başarılı bulunmuş ve tez KABUL edilmiştir. <input type="checkbox"/> Yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda aday başarısız bulunmuş ve tezinin REDDEDİLMESİ³ kararlaştırılmıştır.</p>		
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Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak sunduğum “The Category of Negation” adlı çalışmanın, tezin proje safhasından sonuçlanmasına kadar ki bütün süreçlerde bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurulmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin Bibliyografya’da gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve onurumla beyan ederim.

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Jespersen (1917); Horn (2001); Zeijlstra (2007); Hintikka (2002); Geurts (1998) gibi yazarlar ağırlıklı olarak cümlelerin olumsuzlaştırılmalarıyla ilgili çalışmalar yapmaktadırlar. Bu yazarlar sözcük ve eklerin olumsuzluğuyla fazla uğraşmazlar. Olumsuzluğu oluşturan iç unsurlar ve olumsuzluğun İngilizcede geçirdiği evrime odaklanırlar.

Cümle birlikteliği olumsuzluk boyutunda ortaya çıkan kutupluluk öğelerinin dağılımı ele alınmıştır. Bütün önermeler olumsuzluk odaklı ele alınmıştır. Bu olumlu kutupsal unsurlarla direkt etkileşim halinde yapılmamıştır. Uygun olmayan yorumlar ve olumsuzluklar bu çalışmanın ana konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bağlam duyarlılığı nicelik ve belirsizlik unsurlarıyla verilmiştir. Standart veya standart olmayan olumsuzlama varsayım ilişkisiyle verilmiştir. Olumsuzlama, semantik pragmatik determinizm ile belirlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Olumsuzlaştırma, kutup öğeleri, bağlam duyarlılığı, pragmatizm, anlambilim

ABSTRACT

The Category of Negation

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Much literature on negation (Jespersen 1917; Horn 2001, Zeijlstra 2007, Hintikka 2002, Geurts 1998) primarily deals with sentential negation and pays comparatively lesser attention to both lexical and affixational types of negation, if not to mention its historical evolution in English as well as the inner constituents of negation.

The distribution of polarity items found under the scopes of the clause-mate negation and the ways the whole proposition (or part of it) is brought into the focus of negation (that does not interact directly with the positive polarity items) to produce infelicitous interpretations are also among the major concerns of the research. Context sensitivity is provided by items (quantifiers and indefinites), the standard and non-standard negation as well as interrelatedness of presupposition and negation are specified using the so-called semantic-pragmatic determinism.

Key Words: Negation, polarity items, context sensitivity, pragmatics, semantics

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INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Language is a powerful tool that allows us to describe not only the state of the world as we see it, but also the world as it is not e.g. though I regularly, at one and the same coffee shop, order tea, but the shop has run out today, the waiter might say “We don’t have any tea today” when I enter. Negative sentences are very informative, flexible and effective when expectations are violated. This flexibility leading to pragmatic complexity may be approached, in terms of contextual distinctions in a functional domain and the extent to which the expression of these distinctions “betrays” the one-meaning-one-form principle.

In its naive interpretation, a negation is a refusal or denial of something. If your friend thinks you owe him five dollars and you say that you **don’t**, your statement is a negation. A negation is a statement that cancels out or denies another statement or action. **"I didn't kill the butler"** could be a negation, along with **"I don't know where the treasure is."** The act of saying one of these statements is also a negation. Some negations can be good news, like **“No, you don’t have a cavity”** or **“No, that report isn’t due today.”**

Negation clearly transforms utterance interpretation when it is explicitly introduced into a sentence. Impressively, negation manages to insert itself into sentence interpretation even when it is not (explicit) (e.g. I can hardly answer your question/ The door is almost open, etc.). This omnipresence of negation in itself makes it a worthwhile focus of investigation. In order to present three main lines of research linked to the interpretation of sentences containing negation, one will begin with the more intriguing case, i.e., when meaningfully and gradeably some negation is apparently implied but not explicitly introduced. Imagine that a guest arrives at your home – I will refer to him as Tom – and you offer him something to drink:

(1) Would you like a tea or a coffee?

Note that there are no negatives in this utterance. Yet, many would argue that there is one implicitly because the offer tea or coffee intimates but not both. This enrichment (often

referred to as a scalar implicature) is not encoded into the disjunction or, yet it seems salient to many intuitions that it is. The main debate in the pragmatic literature has pitted those who argue that this sort of enrichment is automatic (Levinson, 2000) against those who point out that it is an option that depends on context (e.g. Noveck and Sperber, 2007). This represents one more avenue into the study of negation in “use”. The second avenue of research – determining the meaning of negation -- is exemplified when one considers Tom’s negative response to (1), e.g. a simple shake of the head. Note that his refusal, not only reverses a potential affirmative utterance but, involves a logical entailment because it amounts to saying “no” to both the tea and the coffee. Tom’s refusal shows how negation can be applied to an entire proposition, reverse truth values and provide entailments. This example oversimplifies the task of defining the meaning of negation; however, negation is renowned for leading to ambiguity in comprehension. Note how the same shake of the head can be confusing when it serves as a response to a negative question, as in

(2) You don’t want coffee?

If negation serves to reverse truth-values only, a “no” to (2) leads to an affirmative because two “no’s” arguably make a “yes”. However, a negative response here typically means a confirmation of the questioner’s negative concept (no coffee). Although negation in conversational exchanges can appear to reverse truth values, it does not consistently do so. In the meantime, negation does appear to be carrying out something consistently. The attempt at getting at the lexical meaning of negation represents one of the main difficult domains and issues for EFL learners that might lead to a sort of misunderstanding and confusion.

A third line of investigation concerning negation is scope. Does a “not” apply to the whole of a proposition or to just a part of it? Note that with the shake of the head with respect to (1), a negative response applies to the whole sentence. However, it is not always clear whether this wide scope is appropriate. Consider the example from Wilson & Sperber (1981):

-Lydia’s sister didn’t play a piano sonata.

Most intuitions would agree that the negated concept has something to do with what Lydia's sister played (or, rather, did not play); a wide scope reading would undermine the notion that Lydia has a sister. Now, consider the utterance:

-All the children did not fall into the water.

This might seduce an English-speaker to understand it as having wide scope (whose reading would be *Not all the children fell into the water*), but it could also mean. *None of the children fell into the water*, if one assumes that the negation has a more narrow scope (i.e. All are not in the water), as its surface level indicates. How negation's scope is applied is a central concern for research in linguistic-pragmatics.

Although negation is critical for communicating many meanings, processing negative sentences can be slow and effortful. In sentence verification tasks, participants who are asked to evaluate the truth of a sentence describing a picture take significantly longer to evaluate negative sentences compared to positive ones (Clark & Chase, 1972; Carpenter & Just, 1975; Just & Carpenter, 1971, 1976). Research indicated that this or that response is found even when a negative makes the sentence logically true (e.g. "A robin [is/is not] a truck")—suggests that negation is slow to integrate with the rest of the sentence. Similar results have been found in probe-recognition tasks (Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Kaup, Ludtke, & Zwaan, 2006). Collectively, this work suggests that processing negative sentences is often difficult.

EFL learners are thought to face difficulty in recognizing as well as producing negative speech acts due to their pragmatic incompetence which may cause misunderstandings as well as blockage of comprehension and production. This idea may be ascribed to the fact that one utterance can have a multitude of functions and the addressers' intents are not always clearly perceived, hence learners may comprehend the literal meaning only and ignore the real intended meaning.

The present study is an attempt to check students' recognition and production in the realm of negation pragmatically. It tries to uncover the types of error students commit in the various contexts leading to contextual misinterpretations. Thus, it tries to find out the reasons

behind such weaknesses according to which remedial procedures are to be detected to overcome these difficulties.

Aim and Goals

The present study aims to investigate the pragmatics of negation as a linguistically universal phenomenon and thus to be helpful in EFL learners' coping with the difficulties in terms of its realization and interpretation in different types of speech acts. To add new perspectives in the dimension of intralanguage negation is also one of the central goals of the paper. The hierarchy of these goals, in fact, is the main factor making inevitably necessary to illuminate the historical evolution of this category in English (and in some other languages).

Hypotheses

In the present study, it is hypothesized that:

1. Negative sentences are more informative when expectations are violated.
2. It takes participants significantly longer to evaluate the truthfulness of negative sentences as compared to positive ones.
3. context affects negative sentence processing by modulating degrees and types of communicant's (un)favourable attitude to what has been said.

Method(ology) and Procedures

The methodology and the appropriate procedures reside on the inside that people use language to accomplish meaningful and attitudinal actions and the negating can be fully described by accounting for the activity sequences, in which they occur, and when it comes to the "weight" of the "atoms" of negation, they play crucial, though differing roles in sense- and attitude-making. As negation seems to intervene between T(hemes) and VP (verb phrase) (syntactic-semantic level due to which sisterhood would need to be loosened), on the one hand, and between morphology (affixational level) and semantico-pragmatic level, on the other hand, the "atoms" of negation are converging and diverging as social behavior does, showing that this phenomenon can only be understood in terms of local interactional

contingencies. And as the “affirmation-negation” polarity must always be overtly expressed in the remnant (as the most important part), and can never be recovered under VP ellipsis (e.g. Turkey will not violate the terms of the treaty: and indeed [violate the treaty] he won’t, but #not violate the treaty he will).

These hypotheses necessitate to take further steps in the following sequence:

- 1) The methodology used in this research rests on the observation that the presence of one linguistic form (which is variable) with several different shades of meaning may suggest conceptual transfer patterns in which the form was first used to denote one meaning before it was extended to designate one or more additional meanings. And the transfer is a historical process and can be accounted for, with reference to the principles of diachronic linguistics;
- 2) Since linguistic forms of the category of negation are not invented arbitrarily, but are meaningful when they are introduced for some specific subfunctions and since the motivations for using these forms are external to language structure, external (i.e., the selection and how we adapt them to the needs of communication) are more powerful than the internal ones.
- 3) The systemic approach here is realized through its structural-relational subtype, in which systematicity is provided via “whole-part” relationship where priority is with the whole. The status of auxiliary procedures has been delegated to implicatures and presuppositional operations.
- 4) Atheoretical account of semantics and pragmatics of negation from its inception up to the present time; and focusing on the evolution of negative types as well as providing a detailed review of theories, concepts, principles and studies that are of particular relevance for the present study;
- 5) Considering the presuppositionally backgrounded semantics and pragmatics of negation in a variety of contexts;

Scope Limitation

This study limits itself to revealing the various aspects of pragmatics of negation, in (a) contexts in which these negative forms are used and (b) how negative sentences correspond

to their affirmative assertions in terms of “denial”, “disagreement”, “absence of somebody or something” or “ an opposite idea or quality”.

Importance

The present study is intended to be an ambitious step forward to understand how students recognize and explore the pragmatics of negation for varying purposes (e.g., as a sociological strategy, or a developmental aspect of communication, etc.) The other contribution of the research is due to “covering” the role and scope of negation in syndetically conjoined two or more semantically contrasting clauses. Shedding light to the potential of “but” in terms of “presuppositions” is also essential in underlying the “expectation” of its “meaningful crossing” with “while” and “and” within the category of negation. Finally, all these findings will enable and inspire English teachers to use the role and capacity of the category of negation more fundamentally and effectively.

Structure of the Research

The aim and goals, as well as the hierarchy of the above mentioned aspects of the research consider the structure of the process in terms of the following “labour division”: Chapter 1 is concerned with the universal nature and the historical evolution of the category of negation in the light of “the Jespersen’s Cyclic Theory” and other opinions, including the analyseable data not only from English, but also from some Romance, Slavonic (Russian) and Uralo-Altaic (Turkish) languages. The pragmatics of negation, its interrelationship with the speech acts theories, gradability and dis(ambiguity) of its meaning as well as the interplay of the presuppositionally backgrounded information with varying types of negation are the major tasks of Chapter 2.

The conclusion part systematizes the conformity of the findings with the basic assumptions of the research and works out a set of reliable results on the basis of which “the pedagogical implications” and “perspectives” parts necessitate the reasons of (a) how to implement the gains in the elaboration of the teaching of EFL, and (b) how and to what extent to re-consider the revealed in-depth potential of the negating as a universal phenomenon in different

languages. “References” part includes both general survey and the problem-specific, i.e., directly field-specialized sources.

CHAPTER 1

THE CATEGORY OF NEGATION: DIACHRONICS AND UNIVERSAL NATURE

Our goal in this chapter is to bring together current theories of the syntax of negation and the semantico-pragmatic arguments to elucidate the diachronic development of the expression of negation in conformity with the so-called “Jespersen’s cycle” which comes at the very start of Jespersen (1917: 4):

“The history of negative expressions in various languages makes us witness the following curious fluctuation: The original negative adverb is first weakened, then found insufficient and therefore strengthened, generally through some additional word, and this in its turn may be felt as the negative proper and may then in course of time be subject to the same development as the original word.”

This assumption is illustrated by means of two full cycles from Romance with the examples in (1):

1. a. ne dico
 b. non (□ne+eonum)dico
 c. jeo nedi
 d. je ne dis pas
 e. je dis pas

In Latin, the negation in (a) begins with the particle “ne” preceding the finite verb. In the first cycle, as Jespersen argues, “ne” is strengthened by the indefinite “eonum” (“a thing”) which becomes the new particle “non” in (b). The second cycle begins with the weakening of “non” to “ne” in old French (c), which is in turn “strengthened” by a particle derived from an indefinite in Modern French (d). Weakening of “ne” to the point of silence (disappearance) gives “birth” to the colloquial (e). And thus, the previously redundant particle assumes the ability to express the negation.

Jespersen's 3-stage/cycle negation is examined by the examples which concern the development of negation particles with respect to the head of the clause, i.e. the finite verb. But there is a parallel pattern in the development of negative argument expressions. Modern Romance languages demonstrate numerous cases of argument phrases which are (affirmatively) indefinite in form but which express negation e.g. the Catalan sentence in (2) shows that a word which historically meant "a thing" now means "nothing":

2. Res l'espanta (=Nothing scares him)

For Ladusaw, the development of negation-expressing argument phrases from regular indefinite arguments has the following stages: first the argument is a regular indefinite argument, then it becomes a co-occurring "supporter" of the clausal negation, and finally it becomes an independent expressor of negation. These, in fact, ("one thing" > "anything" > "nothing") are the three of the Jespersen argument cycle, which can be represented by (3):

3. a. She didn't say one thing.
b. She didn't say anything
c. She said nothing (1993: 437-38).

Although (a), (b) and (c) of (3) are intended to claim that semantic changes seem to involve only these three stages, it is nothing but "remain blind" to an intermediate stage between the 2nd and last stages. There are two differences between 3(b) and 3(c): the absence of negation on the head of the clause and the ability of the object argument to express negation. In standard English, as the field-specific literature states, negation cannot be marked on the head of the clause when it is expressed in the object argument.

While the development of sentences like 3(c) might make these two changes simultaneously, the evidence (of Romance languages and) non-standard dialects of English shows an intervening stage. In the context of this case the argument cycle is better represented by (4) with four stages:

4. a. She didn't say one thing

- b. She didn't say anything
- c. She didn't say nothing
- d. She said nothing.

The stage 4(c) has been called “negation cancelling”, “negative concord”, “negation of negation” and “the determinate negation”, where a single semantic negation is indicated by both the head of the clause and the argument expression (i.e., the direct object). A stage involving the so-called “negation of negation” of Hegel has been a necessary and even productive step in the development of argument expressions which are able to express negation independently. It is therefore not surprising to find that the Turkish sentence in (5) and the Russian sentence in (6) have more than one concordant correspondences:

- 5.
 - a. Kamil dersi anlamadı – Kamil didn't understand the lesson
 - b. Kamil heç ne anlamadı # Kamil didn't understand nothing
 - c. Kimse heç ne anlamadı # Nobody didn't understand nothing
- 6.
 - a. Katya ne uznala yego – Katya didn't know him
 - b. Katya nikogo ne uznala # Katya didn't know nobody
 - c. Hukto nikogo he uzna # Nobody didn't know nobody

The ditransitive clause heads (i.e., verbs) with two obligatory argument-objects make it necessary to reconsider the stages represented in (4), (5) and (6) on account of one more argument expressor as the sole indication of negation. With this in mind, we see that Turkish and Russian (as well as non-standard English dialects) will not reach the end of the cycle until it is no longer possible to expand the clausal structure, since these cyclic dimensions are controlled and regulated by the following “fluctuations” of the “semantic negation”:

- 7.
 - a. Negating the head of the clause (proper for all languages);
 - b. Head-negation supported by the so-called strengthener-negation
 - c. Strengthener-negation able to cancel the head negation, and/or to function as an independent expressor of negation.

The interrelationship of the two basic cycles, as some linguists and logicians claim is universal and independent (Ladusaw 1993: 439) what, in fact, can hardly hold true for all the languages. It is true that for the languages like English, the principal source for the strengtheners in the head cycle are the strengtheners from the argument cycle while for the languages like Turkish or Russian such kind of restriction of the “trajector” of negation is impossible since the “tension” introduced by negating of optional elements of a clause can hardly be bound in the scope of the obligatory arguments of the head (expression of the clause).

8. Kimse kimseye hiç zaman hiç yerde hiç ne vermedi.

One-neg-one-neg-dat-neg-time-neg-loc-neg-n.-give-neg-past-3rd SG.

1.1 Diachronics of Negation

The first part of this chapter discusses the historical development of the English negator system, from the Anglo-Saxon or old English period to present day or the new English period, in connection with the O. Jespersen’s Cycle phenomenon (Jespersen 1917: since Dahl 1979) and proposes a broader approach for Jespersen’s cycle: an approach that is inclusive to both to traditional Jespersen’s Cycle Languages (Van der Auwera 2009), as well as atypical Jespersen’s cycle languages. English is among the latter, along with languages that deviate in one way or another from what the current understanding of Jespersen’s cycle predicts. The proposed approach views Jespersen’s cycle as a phenomenon that targets intensified predicate negation and with time elevates it to propositional. This view agrees with current theories of Grammaticalization and syntactic change (Roberts and Roussou 2003; Van Gelderen 2004; Chatzopoulou 2013), while the semantic representation of Jespersen’s cycle is given as an instance of upward lexical micromovement (Chatzopoulou 2012).

English maintained a contrast between two negators; NEG1 and NEG2, complementary distribution throughout its history, as a part of its inheritance from Proto-Indo-European (Folwer 1896; Moorhouse 1959; Joesph 2002; Forston 2010; Rastorgueva 1983). The

English NEG2 is a polarity item in each consecutive linguistic stage, an element licensed exclusively in nonveridical environments in the sense of Giannakidou (1998), such as imperatives, interrogatives, conditionals, optatives, etc (Chatzopoulou and Giannakidou 2011, 2012; Chatzopoulou 2011, 2012, 2013; Van der Auwera 2006).

The diachrony of English negation, regarding NEG1 as well as NEG2, deviates from the traditional understanding of Jespersen's cycle in that at no point in its attested history did sentential negation in English manifest a multiple or spread negative stage, though during the whole old English and early middle English periods, the addition of a second element, took place after a point for the emphatic expression of negation. However, it is obvious that the history of English indeed provides evidence of negator renewal.*

In this research, we propose a broader description of Jespersen's cycle's phenomenon, inclusive both to typical and atypical Jespersen's cycle manifestations, with English placed among others. The proposed approach takes into account not only morphosyntactic and phonological particulars of the negation markers; more than that, it also explicitly places its regularities in the semantic framework of the category of negation. This is an intuition that is found in the Jespersen's cycle literature (Horn 1989; Van Kemenade 2000; Robert and Roussou 2003; Kiparsky and Condoravdi 2006; Van der Auwera 2008, 2010).

Jespersen's Cycle Traditionally

The term "Jespersen's Cycle" (after Jespersen 1917) was first used by Östen Dahl in 1979 to refer to the process by which the expression of negation in a language tends to increase and decrease in complexity over time in regular way.

French is the prototypical example on a language that exhibits such a development and is typically mentioned in all studies throughout the Jespersen's cycle literature, being among the three languages of Jespersen's original corpus (the other two being English and Danish)

* The term "negator renewal" in a connection to Jespersen's cycle was introduced by Van der Auwera (2010).

-
1. II ne peut venir ce soir stage 1 old French
 - II ne peut pas venir ce soir stage 2 middle French
 - II peut pas venir ce soir stage 3 modern French
 - ne neg can neg come this evening

2.

	English	Dutch	
Stage 1	ne...	en...	Etimology of the second word
Stage 2	ne...na: ht	en...neit	na:ht na wiht “no creature/thing”
Stage 3	... noht	...niet	Niet ne iet “no thing/nothing

Jespersen’s exact phrasing regarding the weakening and strengthening of the negator was mainly based on phonological and syntactico-semantic principles (see Kiparsky and Condoravdi 2006). However, the negator renewal path in the languages he studied was morpho-syntactic; all three languages (English, French and Danish) manifested a doubling function of sentential negation itself. This has always been a permanent effect in the understanding of Jespersen’s cycle. As a result, Jespersen’s cycle is described in the field-specific literature as a diachronic multistage process that involves three main stages, as it was recently mentioned by de Swart (2010:14). Her description of each stage is given relatively considering the positions of the verb:

3. Preverbal expression of sentential negation stage 1

Discontinuous expression of sentential negation stage 2

Postverbal expression of sentential negation stage 3

A similar three-stage description for Jespersen’s cycle is given in Burrige (1983), Bernini and Ramat (1996), Haspelmath (1997), Zanuttini (1997), Horn (1989), Hoeksema (1997), Roberts and Roussou (2003), Van der Auwera and Neukermans (2004), Mazzon(2004), and

Lucas (2007), among others (see for more in Van der Auwera 2009: 38). Several intermediate stages have also been postulated, the number of which can vary depending on the level of detail and/or the languages under consideration. Intermediate stages are generally the stages of ambiguity or competing forms, in which either one of the exponents of propositional negation can be optional (Schwegler 1990; Honda 1996; Donhauser 1996, Van Kemenade 2000, Zeijlstra 2004, Rastorguyeva 1983, Sehwerter 2006, among others). English shows evidence for intermediate stages, stages in which the former exponent of a propositional negation is in preverbal stable position with the new one. But this is where the English negating markers manifested a Jespersen's cycle in the traditional sense, both for NEG1 and for NEG2.

1.2 The Typicality of English Doubling Stage

The traditional description for Jespersen's cycle have demonstrated that English is problematic in that it does not have a stage 3, which is the stage of postnotional verb negation, while the stage of discontinuous negation or more generally, the stage of doubling was characteristic for the evolution of the English verb system. For instance, as Rastorguyeva argues (1983: 126), one of the conspicuous features of old English syntax was multiple (i.e., doubling) negation within a single clause or sentence. The most common negative particle "ne" was usually placed before the verb but it was often accompanied by other negators such as "nāht" or "nōht" (which had developed from "ne" + "ā-wiht" with the meaning "no thing"). These negators reinforced the meaning of negation. e.g.

Ne con ic nōht sinȝan ...tc nāht sinȝan ne cūce ("I cannot sing"-lit. "cannot sing nothing"; "I could not sing"). "nōht" was later shortened to "not", a new negative particle.

The other peculiarity of old negation was that the particle "ne" could be attached to some verbs, pronouns and adverbs to form single words:

... he ne mihte nanting ȝesēon ("He couldnot see anything"-lit. "He couldnot see nothing"); "nān" derived from "ne ān" with the meaning "not one".

In “hit nā būton Ȝewinne næs” (it was never without war”) “næs” was originated from the merging of “ne” and “was” with the meaning “no was” (i.e., was not).

“none”, “never”, “neither” are traces of such forms.

An explanation for the lack of stage 3 comes from the fact that English, being a strict negative concord language at least until the first half of the Middle English period, employed two syntactic strategies of negative reinforcement. On a par with negative concord structures in Italian and Spanish (cf. Zanuttini 1991; Lake 1990; Herburger 2001), the English negators were generally required in case the n-word was preverbal.

After the significant decline of negative concord structure to the end of Middle English and preference of NEG1 and NEG2 indefinites for both preverbal and postverbal positions, Strategy 2 was further stabilized as the dominant strategy for negative reinforcement. As a result, it was Strategy 2 that gave rise to the negator NEG2 and a discontinuous stage of sentential negation did not occur in English. This development is reminiscent of the “nāht”, which deviates from prototypical Jespersen’s cycle patterns in a similar way: English in its Anglo-Saxon period exemplified a doubling stage. The correlation of Jespersen’s cycle with word order is a hypothesis entertained since Vennemann (1974) and Harris (1976).

The early new English period, as Rastorguyeva states (1983: 265-67), witnessed the development of a new set of negative forms with the auxiliary verb “do”. In the 16th and 17th centuries the analytical negative forms with “do” freely interchanged with the simple forms, without “do”, cf. the following instances from the works of Shakespeare:

I know not why, nor wherefor to say live, boy...

and wherefore say not I that I am old?

Towards the end of the 17th century the use of simple forms and “do-periphrasis” became more differentiated: “do” was mainly-found in negative statements and questions. Thus the “do-periphrasis” turned into analytical negative and interrogative forms of simple forms: present and past. The growth of new negative and interrogative forms with “do” can be accounted for by syntactic conditions. By that time the word order in the sentence (as was stated above) had become fixed: the predicate of the sentence normally followed the subject.

The use of “do” made it possible to adhere to this order in questions, for at least the notional part of the predicate could thus preserve its position after the subject. This order of words was already well established in numerous sentences with analytical forms and modal phrases: cf.:

Do you pity him? No, he deserves no pity.

Will thou not love such a woman?

Likewise, the place of the negative particle “not” in negative sentences with modal phrases and analytical forms set up a pattern for the similar use of “not” with the “do-periphrasis”. Cf: “I will not let him stir” and “if I do not wonder how thou dearest venture”. The form with “do” conformed with the new pattern of the sentence much better than the old simple form (though sentences with “not” in postposition to the verb are still common in Shakespeare: “I know not which is which”).

The use of several negative particles (inherited from old English multiple negation system) and forms continued throughout the Middle English period e.g.:

Ne bryng nat ever man into thyn hous (Chaucer)

(“Don’t bring every man into your house”-lit. “not Bring not every man into your house”).

Note: “ne” is a negative particle used with verbs, “nat” the other one, originated from “nāht/nōht”.

No berd hadde he, ne nevere should have (Chaucer)

(Lit: No beard had he, nothing never should have”).

In Shakespeare’s time the use of negation is variable.

So it is not with me as with that muse... Good

madam hear me speak,

And let no quarrel, nor no brawl to come,

Taint the condition of this present hour(Shakespeare)

Gradually, as a result of the weakening, of the first negator and strengthening of the second negating element (it, together with the “efforts” of word order, “paralysed” and restricted the use of the first negator and gradually absorbed both its meaning and function), double negation went out of use. On the other hand, as Rastorguyeva claims, “In the age of Correctness the normalizing 18th c. –when the scholars tried to improve and perfect language, multiple negation was banned as illogical: it was believed that one negation eliminated the other like two minuses in mathematics and the resulting meaning would be affirmative. These logical restrictions on the use of negations became a strict rule of English Grammar” (Rastorguyeva 1983: 282).

In (2009), Van der Auwera draws a distinction between Jespersen’s cycle, understood as involving doubling and the negative style in general. We maintain the term Jespersen’s cycle for all negative cycles, with or without a doubling stage (if not to speak of the tripling stage or more commonly negation spread” in a lot of languages, e.g., Turkic and Slavonic Languages), given that in his 1917 phrasing O. Jespersen said that negation in strengthened “generally” through some additional word”. He did not say “always”.

As mentioned before, the three main stages of Jespersen’s cycle concern the development of negation particles positioned with respect to the head of the clause, i.e. the finite verb. But there is a parallel pattern in the development of negative argument expressions. The great majority of Modern Romance, Turkic as well as Slavonic languages offer us numerous cases of argument phrases which are (affirmatively) indefinite in form but which express negation (rhetorical questions, unreal conditionals, antonymic expressions, etc.)

For Ladusaw (1993: 437-38), the development of negation-expressing argument phrases from regular indefinite arguments has the following stages: first the argument is a regular indefinite argument, then it becomes a co-occurring “supporter” of the clausal negation, and finally, it becomes an independent expresser of negation. We could call these the “one thing”, “anything”, “nothing” stages of the Jespersen argument cycle, represented as:

- a. She didn’t say one thing.
- b. She didn’t say anything.

- c. She said nothing.

These examples, in fact, represent semantic stages followed by single items like “personne” and “res” in Romance languages (equivalents of which are “one thing”, “anything” and “nothing” in the examples above), whose meanings seem to have changed without change in form. Ladusaw (1993) argues that argument polarity items like “any” and “ever” should also be analysed as non-referential indefinites.

Following Ladusaw (1979) and Keenan and Faltz (1985), I will assume that the nonreferential indefinites that we call negative polarity items must be roofed by an operator which is polarity reserving in the sense of a category which includes clausal negation in two ways: (a) with regular indefinites, for phrases with a good deal of descriptive content like that in (b) below, a referential construal is preferred; while those with minimal description content in (a) tend to be construed as nonreferential:

- a. She didn’t talk to a student.
b. She didn’t talk to a student of mine who lives next door.

Returning to the cycle above, the move from stage (a) - “She didn’t say one thing” – to stage (b)- “She didn’t say anything”-, the “strengthening” of the negation, is the development of nonreferential negative polarity indefinite. We assume that nothing changes in the semantic interpretation of an indefinite when it takes on this status. The grammaticization of nonreferentiality will entail that (a) the item must have a license in the clause, and (b) additionally, its licenses must be restricted to the polarity reversing operators in whose scope it can consistently function as a strengthener. So the first move in the cycle produces a negative polarity argument and the theory of indefinites allows us to see that it is not a change in denotation. In the next move, the negative polarity item becomes a potential expressor of negation and it, actually, involves two steps, the first which is the development of negative of negative concord or negative doubling system. The final argument cycle (moving from “b” to “c”, i.e. from “She didn’t say anything” to “She said nothing”) demonstrates how the negative polarity item becomes a potential expressor of negation, what in itself is evidence that the argument expression alone is sufficient to express clausal negation. The rule (which demonstrates the reason of ungrammaticality of “Any of them

didn't talk to her") states that most of negative polarity items ("any") in addition to being logically rooted by their licenses, they also must be "commanded" by them in surface structure (i.e., must get adopted to their requirements within the allowable potential of this or that language). As a consequence, the first indication that an argument expression is losing its conventional polarity item status is its ability to appear in positions structurally superior to its erstwhile license. But this interrelation takes place in different ways in different languages e. g. "Any of them didn't talk to her" is ungrammatical in English while in Turkish it can be regarded in both meanings of "any" typical in the context of "didn't" (Onların her biri/Onlardan kimse onunla konuşmadı). That is, under the command of the head negation (=didn't), which is, unlike English, an absolute superior to "Onların her biri/Onlardan kimse" which means "Onların hepsi", the sentence could become a well-formed sentence which, on the other hand, was due to "any of them"'s gaining its status as a stronger polarity item, and finally, when it became grammatical, it was clear that it had acquired the ability to be not only an independent license of the expression of negation. Rather, it became the "commander" of the predicate-verb negation. More than that, such kind of renewal of "labour division in sentential negation" led to the so-called "negation spread" or multiple negation in a lot of languages. And it means that the frequency of the negative concord and multiple negation in those languages is much higher than the ratio of unilateral negation. To put it otherwise, it is the semantic negation effect which, in fact, allows e. g., a negative existential quantifier to function as an independent expressor of negation and the key to this dilemma is in Jespersen's categorical classification of parts of speech according to which nouns (and noun equivalents) are the category of the highest dominating degree to be modified by the 2nd degree dependence representatives, i.e., verbs and adjectives to be directly dominated by the 1st degree nouns. And in order to explain the evolution of Jespersen's cycle in different languages we are to consider not only the specific features of the surface structure. The chief "commander" of these languages ("reflecting the world viewing manner") seems to be the semantics-based negative polarity configuration. e.g. Neither in Turkish nor in Russian the predicate-verb can be used affirmatively if the signifier is of negative character:

#Kimse bildi (=nobody knew") and "#nikto znal" (= nobody knew) are the mere violations of the semantic agreement between "kimse" and "bildi" on the one hand, and "nikto" and

“znal”, on the other. Unilateral dependence of this character enables us to come to mean that the Jespersen cycle can hardly be interpreted in a unitary way. It mostly covers the basic development stages of the category of negation, which cover not only the sentential negation made by negating the predicate, either verbal or nominal. Being a universal feature negation is “everywhere” in the sense that if we say that “My pen is blue”, it, in fact, covers more denials than it affirms, i.e., “not anybody else's pen” which is “not black or red “, etc. In this sense, it is closely connected with the presuppositionally backgrounded or commonly shared information or knowledge. As a consequence, it is “commanded” and “logically roofed” by semantics (as well as pragmatics) due to a cognitively established “license agreement”.

1.3 Negation Variants in English

This section will first introduce negation variants and discuss the relationship between negation and non assertive forms, on the one hand, and tag questions and subject–operator and inversions, on the other hand. Following this is an exploration of the focus (as well as scope) of negation, transferred. Finally, we will discuss double negation and redundant negation.

The major negative forms in English include “not”, its contracted form “n’t”, “never”, “neither”, “no”, “nobody”, “nothing”, “no one”, “nor”, “nowhere” and “none” which Biber et al (1999: 159) classify into two groups, namely “not–negation” (including “not”, “n’t”) and the “no-negation” (including all the other forms). Biber et al (ibid: 170) state that three out of ten negative forms in written genres are of the “no-negation” type while the corresponding figure for conversation is one out of ten. The categories for “not/n’t” and “never” include all instances of “not /n’t” and “never” respectively. “No–negation” includes (1) all instances of “no” used as a determiner (e. g. I have no idea), adverb (e. g. there is no escaping it), and pronoun (no one likes doing that) but excludes its use as interjection (e. g. No , I don’t think so) or in formulaic expressions such as “by no means”, “no doubt”, “no longer” and “no matter how”; (2) “nobody”, “nothing”, “nowhere”; (3) “none” as a pronoun (i.e., excluding its uses in expressions like “nonetheless”, “none the worse”, etc... ; and

finally (4) “neither” as a determiner (e. g. She apologizes – neither of us knows what for; Taner and Joey exchanged glances, but neither said anything).

The other usage of “neither” (e. g. a man with a sword , yet he can neither kill nor die; no such payment is ever demanded, or even hinted at–but neither is it rejected), together with all instances of “nor” from the category “neither/nor”. The findings from the data analysis and the field –specific research works allow us to make the following observations: First, negative forms are more frequent in speech, fiction (with the possible expectation of science fiction) and humour. Second, the frequencies of “not–negation” and “no-negation” are quite stable across genres whereas there are considerable variations for “n`t- negation” which typically occurs in speech, fiction and humour. Finally, in terms of proportions, “n`t negation” accounts for the largest proportions of negative forms in fiction and humour and particularly speech, while “not–negation” makes up the largest proportions in all other genres. While “not” and “n`t” do not differ semantically, there are differences in their distributional and syntactic features. The contracted negative “n`t” always takes an operator, i. e., an auxiliary or modal verb whereas the full form “not” does not. Biber et al (1999: 159) observe that “no-negation” can usually be converted to “not –negation”, but the reverse conversion is less frequent. “No” is primarily used as a determiner, while “not-to-no” conversion is only possible when a nominal element is negated (e. g. I have no idea = I have not an idea). A verse or adjective cannot be negated with “no” (e. g. I did no think she would win it; # It should no be difficult). The conversion from “no” to “not-negation” or vice versa, can result in a change in emphatic force expressed, discourse function, and in some instances, meaning as well. “No” negation is generally more emphatic than “not–negation” possibly because “no” is pronounced with a stress (cf. Biber et al 1999: 159). But we think the “secret” of this “strength” lies in the “depth” of the absolute rejection. Consequently, (1b) is (even intuitively) more emphatic than (1a):

(1) a. So Andy doesn't like any such thing, do you Andy?

b. Of course, they`ll do no such thing.

“Not” and “no” also differ in their discourse functions, negative forms taking “not” (including “n’t”) are analytic negation while those taking “no” (also “neither, nor”) are synthetic negation. In Biber’s (1988) multi-dimensional analysis of register variations, analytical negation is a linguistic feature (corresponding to Turkish “-me” or “değil”) positively weighted on dimension 1, which is an important indicator that distinguishes between spoken and written registers, while synthetic negation is a linguistic feature positively weighted on dimension 2. “Not” and “no” express different meanings in predicative and comparative structures although they do not differ much in terms of meaning in most cases. In predicative structures (“Sam was not a politician, not in the elected sense any way”) “not –negation” is basically neutral whereas “no-negation” is essentially evaluative (cf. Quirk et al 1985: 779-80; Biber et al (1999: 159). What is negated in the bracketed example is the Sam’s category membership (Biber et al 1999: 159) as specified by the speaker (e. g., his not being a politician in the elected sense). In contrast, the negation by “no” (“until a collector has a warehouse in which to keep his collection, he is no collector, he is merely furnishing his home) is evaluative –with or without a warehouse, a collector is a collector. In instances like this, “no” is not used to negate objective the category membership, but to evaluate negatively the quality which the speaker views as essential to that category. However, not all instances of “no–negation” are evaluative. For example, “You are no cop” actually means “You are not a cop at all” while “Brown is no fan of football” simply means “Brown is not a fan of football at all”. There are also cases where replacing “no” with “not” may result in a change in meaning, in addition to the neutral vs. evaluative distinction. This is true for structures such as “no more than” and “no less than”, which denote a quantity or a degree. “No more than x” can mean “a maximum of x” or “only/just x”, whereas “not more than” only means the former. The three negative personal pronouns “nobody”, “no one” and “none” also differ either style or usage. “Neither” can be used in a way similar to “no one” or “none” and like “none, “neither” can be used independently (e. g. I’ve been trying but neither answers) or followed by “of” indicating scope (She apologizes–neither of us knows what for). The difference between “neither” and “no one/none” lies in that the former is used when two parties are involved, whereas the negation with “no one/none” involves more than two parties, accordingly, the corresponding positive form of “neither” is “both” while the corresponding for “no one/none” is “all”.

1.4 Negation vs. Non-assertive Elements in English

Closely allied with negation are non-assertive forms such as “any”, “anybody”, “anything”, “either”, “ever” and “yet” which frequently occur in negative sentences and questions. These forms are non-assertive in relation to their corresponding assertive forms, namely, “some”, “somebody”, “something”, “too”, “sometime(s)” and “already”, which usually appear in positive sentences. But when an assertive form such as “already” is used in a negative sentence, the speaker implicitly assumes that something has been done. On the contrary, when a non-assertive form such as “at all” appears in a positive sentence, the speaker implies that something is likely to happen. The speaker’s use of “some” in a question implies that he hopes the addressee has some crisps and expects to share some whereas the normal use of the non-assertive form of “any” indicates that this is a simple inquiry.

For the same token (3. a-b) can be viewed as an invitation while (3.c) is a question, or an insincere invitation at best:

1. a. If John major hasn’t already decided when the General election is going to be, I’ll be astonished.

b. I said think yourself Lucky you get any extra at all.

2. a. Have you got some crisps?

b. Have you got any cash?

3. a. Would you like some coffee?

b. Do you want some tea?

c. Do you want any salad?

A fundamental difference between assertive, non-assertive and negative forms lies in polarity. Polarity is also important in tag questions in which the statement and the question tag usually have opposite polarities. Specifically, there are three types of tag questions in terms of polarity; (a) a positive statement followed by a negative tag (e. g. 4); (b) a negative statement followed by a positive tag (e. g. 5); and (c) a positive statement followed by a positive tag (e. g. 6). Of these types (a) is the most common and is roughly twice as frequent as type (b) while type (c) occurs occasionally. Note that a question tag can be added to an incomplete clause in the statement, as exemplified in (4.b) and (5.b):

(4) a. Well, now he is going, isn't he?

b. Drunk driving, wasn't it?

(5) a. I can't be waiting for you all night, now, can I?

b. Not too much, is it?

(6) a. Your coffee break lasted until three o'clock, did it?

(b). So we are making a movie, are we?

(c). Let's go and have a look then, shall we?

Tag questions of types (a-b) are mainly used to elicit agreement or confirmation from the addressee (cf. Biber et al 1999: 209), whereas type (c) tag questions are frequently used to draw a conclusion (6a-b). Like a comment question (7a), type (c) tag questions can also be used to express a doubt or irony (7b). It is also of interest to note that in replies to type (b) tag question, the addressee uses "no" if he/she agrees to the negative statement (8a) and uses "yes" if s(he) disagrees (8 b).

(7) a.- You'd be surprised

- Would I? How little you know me...

b.- ...but he couldn't believe that, not really. "And this is the real reason you want us to stop meeting, is it?"

- No, it isn't, no.

(8) a. - Well you didn't realize it was going over, did you?

- No.

- It catches you by surprise.

b. - You didn't have any of that stuff today then, did you?

- Yeah, I had a glass this morning.

The most common negation forms of subject-operator inversions in both written and spoken English include “neither” and “nor” while “no way” seems to occur typically in conversations. Furthermore, in some cases, subject-operator inversion can affect the meaning of a sentence. For example, (9a), without inversion expresses a positive meaning (i.e. “You could see such a film as recent as ten years ago”) whereas (9b) with inversion is negative in meaning (i.e. “You couldn't see such a film even ten years ago”) (see Quirk et al 1985: 793).

(9) a. Not even ten years ago you could see such a film (Quirk et al 1985);

b. Not even ten years ago could you see such a film (Quirk et al 1985).

1.5 The Scope and Focus of Negation in English

For exploring the scope and focus of negation, we will only consider the most common and important negator “not”. Nevertheless, not all sentences containing “not” express a negative proposition. The most obvious exceptions include rhetorical questions (e.g. 10a) and exclamations (e. g. 10b). While they take a negative form, (e. g. 10a) actually means that she should have an ambulance, and (10b) means that it is surely thrilling:

(10) a. Can't she have an umbrella ?

b. Yes, isn't it thrilling?

The scope of negation refers to the part of a clause which is potentially affected by the negator (cf. Biber et al 1999: 175). In addition to the scope of negation, the focus of negation is also essential in interpreting a negative sentence. As all sentential constituents within the scope of negation can be negated, the context (and in speech, also sentential stress) normally indicates which part is actually negated while other parts are unaffected. The part which is actually affected by the negator is the focus of negation. The scope and focus of negation are important for interpretation because whether a sentential constituent is within the scope of negation, and particularly, which constituent is the actual focus of negation, can affect the meaning of a sentence. As such, sentences (a) and (b) in (11-12) express different meanings:

(11) a. But I don't really think so

- Just too bad, I don't think that, I really don't think that's fair.

(12) a. I tried not to think of it that way, I really did.

b. I didn't try to hide it oddly enough!

Negation, as noted above, can be locally continued to the word or phrase immediately following the negative form, or affect the whole clause. The former is referred to as “local negation” (as in 12 a “... tried not to think ...”) while the latter as “clausal negation” (cf. Quirk et al 1985: 787; Biber et al 1999:175). There are, however, important exceptions to this scope of negation .e. g., in partial negation of “all”, “both” and “everybody”, etc. in the subject position, the scope of negation can be extended to the subject while the focus of negation falls upon such determiner or pronoun. Hence (13a) actually means that not all papers will be through. In transferred negation the scope of negation is extended beyond the boundary of the main clause to the subordinate clause where the prediction becomes the focus of negation. Consequently, in (13b) the preposition “it's important” is rejected.

Another special case is the negation of modal verbs. Quirk et al observe that there are two kinds of negation of modal verbs: auxiliary negation and main verb negation e.g., when the modal verb “may” expresses a permission, it is the auxiliary usage (e.g.13c); when “may” expresses a possibility, it is the main verb usage (e.g. 13d). In auxiliary negation, a modal

verb is included in the scope of negation whereas in main verb negation, it is excluded from the scope of negation. As a modal verb in English always precedes a negation, the scope of negation is extended to the modal verb in auxiliary negation. Nevertheless, modal verb can also become the focus of negation in auxiliary negation in proper contexts, even when the modal auxiliary occurs in the initial position of a clause, as in questions like (13e) where “will” is capitalized for emphasis in the original text:

(13) a. I mean all the papers won’t be through but they can tell us whether it’s

B. I don’t think it’s important.

C. No, you may not draw a picture

D. You may not sell your first ...article, but don’t let it put you off.

E. Will she not come back again?

As seen from (14) below, the focus of negation usually falls upon a modifying or restrictive element and if there are more than one item joined by “and” or “or”, they become multi – focuses of negation:

(14) a. Certainly, what happened between the late fifties and early seventies was not a political revolution, not a revolution in economic thought and practice

B. I could not even comb my own hair or dress myself.

If we compare (15 a, b. and c), it will be clear that the adverbial of reason can hardly be regarded remaining outside the scope of negation (as some scholars state), because it functions as the focus of negation. This assumption holds true for a very simple reason: focus, unlike the topic is not a centralized notion; it changes in accord with each change of the scope of negation, which means: each clausal negation has its own scope and focus. The adverbial of reason in (15.b) is also the focus of negation whereas the negated part of (15c.) is ambiguous between the readings: “he turned gay, but the reason ...was not that we left him” vs. “because we left him, he didn’t turn gay”. If not the linguistic context suggested by the previous sentence (15b) “Don’t get upset just because of that old sad”, “he didn’t turn gray” in its own way would have given rise to the third reading as “although we left him, he

didn't turn gay". Because of the context of clause (a) only the first reading is felicitous (He was always gay .We simply didn't notice it. He didn't turn gay because we left him).

(15) a. You won't hear them because the human ear can't pick them up.

b. Don't get upset just because of that old sad.

c. He didn't turn gay because we left him.

Examples of the (15a) type are predominant; in proper contexts, however, even a preposition can become the focus of negation because of the contrast suggested by the other one, which creates this opposition due to its joint efforts with the adversative conjunction "but":

16. The audience immediately feels that the speaker is not talking to them but at them.

1.6 Transferred Negation in English

In terms of localization, sentential negation (in every language) is closely associated with and conditioned by "movability", i.e. spread of the scope and focus of negation. Non-transferred negation is typically found in argumentative writing such as academic prose. But in some cases where the negative form is in the main clause, it is sometimes hard to determine whether the transferred negation actually occurs. When a modal verb or an adverbial occurs in the main clause, it is most probable that negation is not transferred from the subordinate clause as in (17) and (18). Transferred negation typically occurs in informal genres and the verb that is most frequently used in transferred negation is "think" (the other verbs expressing opinion are "believe" "imagine" "suppose, "consider" ,etc). According to Quirk et al (1985: 1112), a pattern like this can be a main clause or a comment clause, depending upon its position. In (19a) "I don't think" is a main clause while in (19b) it is a comment clause. As a comment clause (which, in fact, is functioning as a "hedging element"), it appears that the difference between "I don't think" and "I think" does not lie in polarity but rather in the extent of certainty (see Quirk et al 1985: 1114). Hence, the speaker is more uncertain in (19 b-c) than in (19 d):

(17) .a. “No-one wants me to play for another couple of weeks but I don't see I have any alternative ”, says Lambert.

b. Sam started to tell me about the game but I don't think I caught a word.

(18) a. I can't believe he'll still be hungry, pig that he is.

b. No, you wouldn't think she was overweight

c. You don't honestly think that I couldn't help.

(19) a. “I don't think there is any reason for embarrassment, he said

b. No, I don't fancy going to party, I don't think

c. Yes, he should of gone then, I don't think

d. You don't have to go to the theatre for so long I think

Transferred negation, as a type of indirect negation, indicates a reduced “strength scale” of negation (Horn1978). As Shen (1984: 4) observes, the degree of negation becomes lower when the negator is further away from what is negated. As such, (20a) expresses a stronger attitude than (20b).

(20) a. I think I haven't got a lot there. No, that's not a lot.

b. I wasn't I? and I don't think I have any, I don't know

The indirect and reduced negation is also appropriate as a politeness strategy but not effective in argumentation.

Note: while transferred negation reduces the strength scale of negation, double or/and multiple negation can act in two ways in different languages.

E.g. in English, it can actually cancel the negative polarity and produce a positive meaning (“He doesn't know nothing” = He knows everything) while in Turkish and Russian it strengthens the negative polarity, preserving the negative meaning of each negated sentence constituent:

Turkish: Kimse bir şey bilmiyor

Nobody onething know-neg 3rd sG

Nobody knows anything

Russian: nikto ne znayet dorogu

Nobody neg know 3sg way – acc . s9

Nobody knows the way.

1.7 Double/multiple negatives cancelling / not cancelling each other's polarity

Negation “travel” within the sentential frame is “measured” and understood in different ways by different scholars. For those, who approach the problem from the mere presence of negative meaning expressing elements there are six major types of negation in English.

Type 1- it is the pattern of a negative predicate which is followed by an adjective or an adverb with a negative prefix or suffix as shown in (21). In this case, the negative predicate and the negative affix cancel the polarity of each other, thus producing a positive meaning. However, as Jespersen (1924: 332) stated, while two negative forms may produce a positive meaning, they do not exactly cancel each other. Being much more frequent in writing, this pattern typically occurs in formal written genres such as religious writing news reportage and reviews, biography, and academic prose as well as careful speech. For Krifka (2005), the forms “happy”, “not unhappy”, “not happy” and “unhappy” can be arranged in this order which reflects the gradual increase of negating “happiness”.

(21) a. His panic was not irrational (= His panic was rational)

b. No, I'm not homeless (= I've got a home)

Type 2 – This type occurs due to the co-occurrence of a negative form with “without”. In this pattern, the prepositional phrase can function as a predicative (e. g. 22 a), a post-modifier of a noun (e. g. 22 b), or an adverbial (e. g. 22 c-d).

(22) a. She was not (a person) without dignity.

b. It's not nice in the car without a stereo.

c. They were not released without (paying) money.

d. But you can't pass your exams without working hard.

In (22 a), “without paying money” expresses the reason of their “being released” and its affirmative/positive form would be: They were released paying money, whereas in(22 d), the 2nd negation (“without working hard”) functions as the condition for “your being able to pass the exam” and this double negation also expresses a positive meaning as the negativeness of “can't pass” is neutralized by the “without” part (i.e., “But you can pass your exams (with) working hard” or “But you can't pass your exams if you don't work hard”).

Type 3 – The two negative forms, appearing in the main and subordinate/embedded clauses, cancel the polarity of each other and produce a positive meaning for the sentence, as exemplified in (23).

The assertion expressed in double negation of this type, nevertheless, is made to a lesser extent than a positive sentence. For example, (23 a) does not mean exactly that “there are exceptions” either; neither does (23c) mean “I trust him”. This category is found equally possible to occur in formal written genres and casual speech:

(23) a. I am not saying there are no exceptions.

b. And don't kid yourself I won't hit you here.

c. Not that I don't trust him or anything.

d. This does not mean that negotiation should not be attempted with a much larger firm.

- e. If we don't know the data we cannot focus on the issue.

TYPE 4- This type of double negation refers to a combination of two negative forms in the same clause. Examples (24a-c) involve a second negative form in the infinitival or gerundial complement, which is offset by the first negator. In (24 d-e) the two negative forms also cancel the polarity of each other and the whole sentence expresses a positive meaning. However, the double negation of this type is not identical to its corresponding positive form (i. e., where two negative forms are removed), which is illustrated by (24 b)below:

- (24) a. He can't afford not to, Hanson thought.
 b. You can't decide not to go.
 c. You didn't mind not going to that pub tonight.
 d. Oh well you sleep on sherry though it makes you sleepy, you can't not sleep.
 e. A world is as similar as possible to this one but in which Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy is certainly not this world, ..., but is not certainly not this world in the context.

“Can’t decide not to go” in (24 b) does not mean “can decide to go” but rather “have to go”, while “cannot not” means “cannot but” instead of “can”.

TYPE 5- There are also two negative forms in this type but unlike the previous types, they do not cancel each other. Rather, one of the negative forms negates a certain aspect of the proposition expressed to make it more specific, or strengthens the proposition.

E.g. in (25 a-b) the first case of “not” negates “here” i.e., “you haven't put a spoon here” and “you won't have one here”; in (25 c.). The second instance of “not” negates “at the ground level” and the conjoined second clause makes it clear that it can at the top level; in (25d) the second “not” negates “with children”, which implies that “it may be a matter of talking with adults, but not with children” while (25e) is an example of strengthening the proposition by combining “not” and “even”. It appears that sentences like (25 a–b) typically occur in conversations while those like (25 e – e) are more common in written genres:

- (25). a. - I put a spoon somewhere.
- Well, not here, you haven't
- b. - No, I meant tomorrow morning.
- Not here you won't
- c. No it wouldn't, can't, can't not at the ground level, it will sit at the top.
- d. It's not just a matter of talking, you see, with children
- e. And thus the doctrine of Protagoras is not true for anyone, not even for Protagoras himself.

Type 6 - The final type of double (or multiple) negation is stigmatized (cf .Biber et al 1999: 178). Here a non-assertive form is replaced by a negative form. For example, in writing or careful speech, “no books” (in accord with the instruction of Prescriptive Grammars) would be replaced with “any books in (26 a) while “say nothing” should be replaced with “say anything” in (26 b). Examples (26 c-d) show that a repetition of negative forms can achieve a “strengthening effect” (Biber et al 1999: 178). In (26c) the first occurrence of “nothing” should actually be replaced with non-assertive form “anything” while the 2nd occurrence is negative; in (26 d) “no nothing “ should actually be “not anything” while example (26 e) is an instance of multiple negation (“n't”; “hardly” and “no”). Here “hardly” is redundant while “no” equals the non-assertive form “any”, with the whole sentence producing a negative reading. “Not” has sometimes been used as a non-assertive form in a way similar to “any” (e. g. 26f). Such stigmatized usages, however, are almost exclusively restricted to non-standard English such as casual conversations or fictional dialogues. They are extremely rare in formal written genres and careful speech. Sentences as exemplified in (26g) can hardly be viewed as an instance of double negation because “nobody” has a special meaning here- a person of no importance.

- (26) a. I ain't got no books.
- b. I mean they don't do nothing for nothing.

c. Don't say nothing.

d. And how they just don't know what to do, there is no jobs, there is no nothing.

e. I haven't hardly had no fogs today.

f. Well mummy hasn't got not money.

g. "... you end where you begin", Gallo writes, "Like you're nobody". The difference is that Baker is no nobody. He is a fine writer.

As for the "redundant negation", also known as expetive negation, it refers to the linguistic phenomena where negative elements do not contribute to the sentential meaning. It is found in many languages, for example, Dutch, English, French, Greek, Russian, Turkish, Chinese and other languages.

CHAPTER 2

NEGATION AS A UNIVERSAL CATEGORY

As some scholars state negation is one of the few truly universal grammatical categories since every language has definite grammaticalized means to deny the truth of an assertion expressed by an ordinary affirmative declarative sentence (Horn 2010: 1; Horn and Kato 2000:1; De Swart 2010:2; Miestamo 2007:553; Murphy 2014:12). Yet the expression (and the content) of this category varies significantly both from language to language and historically even within the same language. On the other hand, much literature on negation (Jespersen 1917, Morn 2001, Hinfikka 2002, Geurts 1998) deals with clausal/sentential negation and pays comparatively lesser attention to lexical negation in general, and to affixal negation in particular (Lisez, 2012). Antonymy as a part of semantic negation is treated in the domain of lexicology and only to some extent in semantics (Lehrer 1985, Ljung 1974); As for the affixal and contrastive negation, they receive lesser attention even in the domain of morphology (Umbach 2005). Some linguists also make a claim that cross-linguistically negation can be dispreferred in actual discourse or even some categories get more specific

reading under negation (Schmid 1980:39; Matthews 1990:84) e.g. Some grammars of individual languages also offer explanations to the incompatibility of a perfective/completive aspect category with negation. Thus, Crowley (1982: 226) claims that "...the negative form of the verb is semantically incompatible with the modifier "tai" (in Paamese), as this indicates completive actin, whereas negation indicates that the action is not yet completed". In a similar way, Hagman (1977:90) notes on Khoekhoe (Khoisan: Central Khoisan): "The frequent use of this [non-punctual aspect] with negation may be explained by the fact that the non-occurrence of an event is not as definable in time as its occurrence". Miestamo's typological studies (2003, 2005) on negation focuses on the structural differences that negatives show vis-a-vis affirmatives as a result of which a basic distinction is made between symmetric and asymmetric negation. Out of the extensive sample of 297 languages (Miestamo 2005: 180-181), a genealogically and a really balanced subsample of 179 languages was used for the calculations, among which, in turn, there were 49 in which the direct effect of asymmetry was the loss of some grammatical distinction(s) under negation. The other common characteristic is that the (verbal) paradigms used in negatives differ from those used in affirmatives and such situations are referred to as paradigmatic asymmetry. According to Miestamo (2005), symmetric negation is based on language-internal analogy: the structure of the negative copies the structure of the affirmative and it takes place under the pressure of cohesion in the system. Asymmetric negation, on the contrary, is based on language-external analogy: the structure of the negative copies/grammaticalizes aspects of the asymmetry found on the functional level (semantics, pragmatics). Cast in terms of the functional asymmetry between affirmation and negation would appear as follows: Negation is essentially stative whereas affirmation is not, truthfulness of which can be examined in the examples below:

- (a) Chris knows the song.
- (b) Chris does not know the song.
- (c) Chris drank the coffee.
- (d) Chris did not drink the coffee.
- (e) Chris didn't stop singing.

- (f) Chris didn't stay.

As seen from the examples, the situations reported by negative statements are stative, i.e., they report situations with no change in the universe (5b.d), but affirmatives describe both stative (5a) and dynamic (5c) situations. The verbs in (5e,f) pose problems for the stativity account (verbs meaning “stop” or “stay”, when negated), and do actually report situations that involve change in the state of the universe. These are, however, special cases and do not affect the overall picture e.g. Some languages behave in a different way in such situations, i.e., in cases when there is no cross-linguistic tendency for perfective aspect to be incompatible with negation. In Turkic languages, for instance, the negative differs from the affirmative in that the lexical verb may lose its finiteness and often a copula/auxiliary (“değil”) is added as the finite element of the negative. In the Standard negation sentence in Turkish, the negative marker attaches to the lexical verb which loses its finiteness and the copula now carries the finite verbal categories of (subject) person and tense:

- (1) O benim kardeşim(dir)Kardeşim değil(dir).
He (is) my brother He is not my brother

If to convert into affirmative, the special negative marker should disappear but the semantic character of the negative and affirmative statements does not change i.e. both the finiteness of the lexical verb (affirmative) and its loss+the copula denote one and the same stative structure. But we dare add something special concerning the change of both stativity and dynamicity in cases of expanding them by even an optional adjunct:

- (2) O artık benim kardeşimartık.....değildir.
He is already my brother He is not.....any more.

In both cases, by adding “artık”/”already”-“any more” the character of stativity is lost and the evident change of the interpersonal relationship turns the stativity into a dynamic structure. The same rule holds true for the sentences with “there is/are” and their negative variants: These constructions in Turkish, both in affirmative and negative forms, are clearly accounted

for by stativity of negation and affirmation, while the above mentioned expansion would turn stativity into the “change of the existing state” capturing both dynamicity and stativity of the new state:

(3) There is a book on the desk ... not a book.....(stativity)

There is a book on the desk already not a book.....already (dynamicity+stativity)

In other words, the functional-level asymmetry turning of stativity into dynamicity+stativity is due to language-external analogy, in that in some languages negation of the head element can be strengthened and its territory enlarged by adding an appropriate dynamic adverbials.

Stativity of negation for Vander Auwera (2006) is also relevant in explaining why a majority of languages has a special negation strategy for imperfectives.

Comparing:

(4) a. (Chris did not drink the coffee) and 4.b. (Chris was not drinking the coffee), Miestamo and Auwera argue that these examples both describe stative states of affairs. This is where they go wrong. In fact, the negation in 4(a) proposes a motivation for the preference for some other action (Chris didn’t drink the coffee; he poured it on the floor). His dispreference for perfective aspect in negatives shows that there is no clash between the stativity of negation and perfective-type meanings, because it denies that “drinking” is completed and in so doing we claim that there occurred no change in the existing state of the things (if he “did not pour the coffee...”). But in the context of his preference for “pouring it”, the stativity gives its place to dynamicity and in so doing we express a change in the state of the things.

Second, imperfectives (here “Chris was not drinking coffee” as a dynamic predicate expressed in the progressive aspect in English) are not inherently stative, either, since it signals a fact that he, at the moment, was doing something else. Thus not only are there no grounds for perfective-type aspect to be less compatible with negation, but there are no grounds for imperfective aspect to be more compatible with negation either.

Concerning the restricted use of aspectual categories in negation, some linguists (e.g. Miestamo 2005) propose that the prototypical discourse context of negatives (e.g. semantic presuppositions) can provide such motivations. So far as we have shown that negatives typically occur in contexts where the corresponding affirmative is supposed, it would be odd if the following sentence was uttered out of blue, i.e., without the pregnancy of the speaker's wife being proposed:

(5) Oh, my wife is not pregnant.

With the corresponding presuppositional affirmative ("My wife is pregnant") present in the context, all properties (tense, aspect, person, etc.) of the negated event can hardly need be specifically marked. This, semantically proposed pragmatic preference (a functional-level asymmetry between affirmation and negation) has been conventionalized as a grammatical restriction in languages that restrict the occurrence of some grammatical categories in the negative. Next, the analysis of the data shows that when restrictions occur, we indeed find perfects and imperfectives being excluded in the negative, but not perfectives, which is precisely the opposite of what Schmid and Matthews have claimed. The affirmative perfective, for instance, in Turkish as a holistic category expresses the completed state of an event ("Okumuşum"), while its negative (especially when preceded by "hala" ["yet"]) denotes dynamicity, or continuity of an action in both morphological type ("Okumamışım") and the copula-used form ("Okumuş değilim"). The neutralization account between the two cases (i.e., "Okumamışım" and "Okumuş değilim") would then predict that if any category survives under negation, the semantically simplest form, in some sense, would be the one in favour (and on the basis) of which the neutralization would occur. Accordingly, the "Okumamışım" and "Okumuş değilim" may be distinguished in all grammatical contexts but not in the negative, while "Okumamışım" is, in this sense, both formally and meaningfully simpler, unmarked form, the copula-based "Okumuş değilim" being marked in both planes (extra "copula" with its negative meaning converting "Okumuş" into negative perfective). But from the point of functional potential, the unmarked negative perfective member is more powerful and can make greater number of oppositions, i.e., a formally unmarked member ("Okumamışım") is blocked in the negative (expressing a stative meaning) while "Okumuş değilim", as a marked member denotes both aspectual or continuity and stativity. In type 1

(“stativity”) there is no difference between the affixational and copula-based perfective members, so we cannot infer anything about the role of markedness and in terms of this approach how negation is formed is not relevant (“grammatical neutralization” of the 2 perfective forms).*

We also think it reasonable to say a few words about the communicative potential of affirmatives and negatives in communication. In Russian, affirmatives and negatives with “to be” [“bit”] and Turkish affirmatives with “olmak” can hardly make a difference between old and new information with personal subject markings, as 6 (a, b) and 6 (c, d) demonstrate:

a. Ona	doktor- Ø	c. O	hekim - Ø	(1)
b.	He doktor	3sg	noun	
Ona	Neg+noun	She	is a doctor	
3sg	Is (not) a doctor	old	New	
She				
Old	New			

As for the Turkish negative sentences of the given type, they are formed by the explicit 3rd person singular (but it holds true for all personal pronouns) marking though differences between new and old information remain the same.

O	hekim değil(dir)	6.d.
3sg	noun Cop. Neg.	
	Present	
Old	new	

Both affirmatives and negatives in English apply appropriate person subject markings, which, in turn, do not change the distribution of old and new information, as in 7.a and b:

7.a. She	is a doctor
3 rd Sg	Link+noun
b. She	is not a doctor
3 rd Sg	Link+neg+noun
old	new

2.1 Semantic and Syntactic Types of Negation

From the point of view of all these and other available statements, negation as a complex phenomenon is involved in selecting different forms of categorical statements such as general negative and particular affirmative respectively. In complex statements negation is generally used in the function “if it is not true that...” applied to the affirmative statement. e.g.

She is not a doctor □ It is not true that she is a doctor.

This complexity has found its reflection in the definition of the category as well. For instance, for Kogiyakov (1975: 240), it is “the utmost wide notion in which the most general and fundamental properties, features, connections and relationships of subjects, phenomena of the objective world are reflected.” More than that, we argue that negation exhibits essential diversity and its wide scope can hardly be restricted to grammatical and even semantic levels. On the contrary, its narrow scope variety is subject to cross-linguistic variation: Some languages exhibit the felicitousness of narrow scope readings in gradable adjectives and adverbs also pointing out morphological and sentential types of negation (Zevakhina 2015:3).

As mentioned in the Introduction part, there exists a simple relationship between any statement and the negation of this statement: If one is true, the other is false; if one is false, the other is true. In other words, any statement in the objective world has its opposite (or contradictory value) (Fediuk 2008). Many scientists have made attempts to understand the nature of linguistic negation in terms of its semantic scope types and functional potential in

communication. Though negation is a universal phenomenon it (and its types) display(s) different strategies both cross-linguistically, and in the framework of different languages. The other debatable problem is based on understanding the discourse function(s) of the category of negation. Some argue that negative patterns perform the discourse function of denial (da Cunha 2007: 1638), while some others claim that “only negative constructions that are a productive means of reversing the truth value of a proposition can be considered expressions of standard negation” (Miestamo 2005: 42). Lices (2012: 49) classifies various types of affixal negation into two main groups- direct and indirect. Further, speaking about the shades of negation, the author mentions its such dimensions as diminution, badness, inferiority, reversal of actions, etc., as opposed to the black and white nature of the “not” type of negation, usually found with sentential or verbal negation (ibid: 52). This classification is based on the two laws of negation defined in the Aristotelian approach: Law of Contrarity (LC) and Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). The type of negation that obeys both of these laws is termed as “contradictory” (e.g., alive/dead) and the other one that obeys only the LC but not LEM, is termed as “contrary” (e.g., hot/cold). Direct negation is characterized by the “not” element in the derivative with respect to its base. An “unhappy” person is a person who is “not happy”. Similarly, a “non-white” box is a box that is “not white”. Direct negation thus encompasses both types of negation as described above-contrary as well as contradictory negation. Indirect negation, on the other hand, is that type of negation which may not look like a logical negation ($P \rightarrow \neg P$) but is still a negation in terms of its connotation comprising subtypes as “reversal of action” (tie/untie), “inferiority” (tension/hypertension), “insufficiency” (normal/subnormal), “badness/wrong” (conduite/meconduite), “opposition” (terrorist/anti-terrorist), etc. (Ibid: 53-54). For Rzaev et al (in progress: 619-20) and Maclin (1996: 204), negation in its broader sense includes such gradable dimensions as denial, disagreement, absence of somebody or something “or” an opposite idea or quality.”

Such kind of diversity of opinions originated (as seen from Chapter 1) from a desperate endeavour to give a coherent account of negative (both multiple and negative concord types) phrases encountered in different periods of the history of English (and the other languages). More and more opinions (and grammars) appear one after another, each focusing on a particular aspect and building a theory around it, e.g., Case Grammar (Fill More), Feature Grammar (Jacobson and Rosenbaum, Systemic Grammar (Hudson). It is obvious that each

proposal will tackle the problem of negation in a particular way. For instance, Chafe considers negation against the assignment of new and old information. According to him, out of the two inflexional units, i.e., negative and affirmative one “perhaps” may be regarded as the antonym of the other” (Chafe 1970: 229-30). In his interpretation, the distribution of old and new information is heavily dependent upon the pitch. Non-initial negatives and double negatives have been given thorough treatment by Postal (1974:95-98), where a number of points are raised, discussed and argued about. As Mykchaylenko states “in language competence there are three models of describing “not” in Modern English-functional as a negation marker, distributional as a constituent of the phrase and the sentence, and communicative as a marker of intentions: negation, denial, refusal, prohibition (1999:184). Thus, we can assume that negation has many markers in addition to the dominant negative marker “not” (affixal/adverbial and other semantic units of negative meaning). As “not” can be a constituent of various paradigms, its form is very changeable: It can be full (is not, have not, will not) or contracted (isn’t, haven’t, won’t, didn’t, etc.). The scientists until now haven’t come to a common opinion concerning either the grammatical form or the scope of the negation. The structuralists satisfy themselves only with describing the form of the negative status which is marked by the insertion of the special function word “not” usually used after the auxiliary part of the finite.

Considering negation as a core element of human communication we are attempting to provide a brief overview of the varied and often contradictory literature that exists regarding linguistic negation in general. It is necessarily select because of the sheer magnitude of scholarly positions and publications on the subject. We, therefore, will proceed from the universal nature of negation to a coordination of specific types of negation attested not only in English but also in cross-linguistic typological literature.

Agreeing that negation is a universal nature of all human languages, Horn (2010: 1) portrays it as the “sine qua non of every human language.” Horn and Kato (2000: 1) present the universality and uniqueness of linguistic negation as follows:

“Negative utterances are a core feature of every system of human communication and of no system of animal communication. Negation and its correlates truth values, false messages, contradiction, and, irony-can thus be seen as defining characteristics of the human species.”

Writing specifically about the universal status of negation and its clausal type, Miestamo (2007: 553) claims that every language has at least one construction “the function of which is to negate a clause”. De Swart (2010: 2) also posits that “all human languages establish a distinction between affirmative and negative statements” multifaceted nature of which is encoded in different ways in different languages. Horn (2010: 1) also states that along with “a plethora of negative adverbs, verbs, copulas, quantifiers, and affixes”, negation extends to negative concord, negative incorporation, and the widespread occurrence of negative polarity.” As negation touches every element and sphere of language and its use, it brings to bear complex interactions with morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. According to Horn (2010: 1), negation is “at the core of the mental faculty of language” and while its universality has made it a major source of linguistic research, its complexity has made it a major source of linguistic contention. Following the “distinctiveness” (which in many cases is named as the “markedness”) theory developed by the Prague Linguistic Circle (namely, by Trutetzkoj and Jakobson), Greenberg (1966: 50) states that “the negative always receives overt expression while the positive usually has zero expression”, as can be seen in the examples below:

- (1) a. Sam is happy
- b. Sam is unhappy
- (2) a. Sam ate a hamburger
- b. Sam didn’t eat a hamburger.

Greenberg sees these negative devices (“un”-; and “didn’t”) as evidence of “the marked character of the negative as opposed to the positive.” This form-related markedness of negation is enhanced by Givon’s contention that “negative structures are syntactically more constrained than their affirmative counterparts” (in De Swart 2010: 3). Horn (2001: 154-203) significantly expands the findings of the Oppositional Analysis from the point of the content plane and argues that negation is also marked semantically in addition to its formal properties which are not found in the positive or affirmative member (2001: 156). Evaluating psycholinguistic and pragmatic features of negation, Horn substantiates the position that “affirmative sentences are easier than the negatives” (2001: 169) since negation requires

additional mental resources to process. This contention was confirmed by the recent psychological theory as well (e.g. Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird 2012: 543-44). Horn presents Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Theory as an explanation of the difficulty of understanding negative statements. He even dares to state that “the markedness of negation” is “born in the pure pragmatics of conversational implicature” (2001: 201). With this in mind he claims that the real asymmetry of negation is not to be found in the mere logical denial of an affirmative proposition, but in relation to a pragmatically motivated denial of an assertion by a speaker. Further developing his pragmatic theory of negation by implementing the notion of scalar and q-based/r-based implicatures, Horn explains the complex nature of the markedness of negation as follows:

Negatives.... are by nature no more false than affirmatives, but prototypically they are psychologically harder and more loaded, epistemologically less specific and less valuable, emotively more inhibiting (or at least less highly valued), and pragmatically more difficult to use appropriately within an arbitrary discourse context” (2001: 203).

Similar to Horn’s thinking, Payne (1997: 282) considers negation under the broader category of “pragmatically marked structures”. Both Horn and Payne acknowledge the importance of morphology, syntax, and semantics to a proper understanding of negation.

2.2 Negation in terms of Semantics-Pragmatics Interplay

Diversified yet pragmatically motivated understanding of negation is as old as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and has continued over the intervening millennia (see Horn 2001: 1ff).

The earliest model of Transformational Grammar (TG) originating from syntactic structures is not an exception in this sense and works on the assumption that “every sentence of the language will either belong to the Kernel or will be derived from the strings underlying one or more Kernel sentences by a sequence of one or more transformations” (Chomsky 1957: 45), every kernel being “a simple declarative, active sentence with no complete verb or noun phrase” (Ibid: 107). For Chomsky, “the simplest way to describe negation is by means of a transformation which introduces “not” or “n’t” ... (Ibid: 61).

The scope of negation, its formal aspects and grammatical consequences have been the main concern of Klima’s research whose results appeared in a long article “Negation in English” (1964). Klima’s study substantially contributed to reformulation and modification of the concept of the negation-based transformation.

In the course of several years' work on particular aspects of linguistic negation a number of theoretically important points emerged. The majority of recently published research has come from scholars schooled in Chomsky’s syntax-centric principles and parameters (P&P). Pollock (1989: 420-21), based on Chomsky’s 1955 proposal that “tense and agreement morphemes should be analysed as separate syntactic entities of an abstract level of representation”, posits that negation should also be considered, arguing that his study of English and French substantiates in “inherent barrier” that he terms NegP(hrase). This “split inflection hypothesis” adopted in 1991 by Chomsky (1995: 136) claims that NegP, as a functional category, interacts with tense and agreement. The theory has been developed since then to include a NegP Spec(ifier) (Zeijlstra 2004: 164) and the importance of “c-command” (Laka 1991: 65). NegP heads most aspects of negation, including negative polarity movement, scope, concord, and word order. Syntax, in this sense (mainly from the point of word order principle in English) accounts for nearly all aspects of negation. The “Labour Division” between Semantics and Pragmatics in terms of negation can be characterized as follows: Semantics is used to confirm the existence of NegP as a universal core of all languages (without which affirmation itself as “a one-winged bird” would lose its value and effect in communication) while Pragmatics has played a more relevant role in the orientedness of the so-called “indirect” potential of language units and phenomena in interactional processes. This is the approach utilized in nearly all published research on negation, both cross-linguistically and separately in a definite language. As some scholars point out, contradiction is the basis of dialectical negation and in its dialectical sense, negation is not just saying “no” or claiming the non-existent or destroying in any possible way what has been uttered by someone. It should in no way endanger (through providing the

unity of contradictory elements, the connection of the old and the new, rejection of and keeping the elements necessary for the development and improvement of mutual (intercourse) a possibility for further elaboration and enhancing the intercomplementary relation of contradictory roles of affirmation and negation.

At the same time, a cursory reading of studies on negation (especially from Chomsky's school of thought) reveals at least as much contention as it reveals agreement. NegP, for instance, is normally thought to be generated below T(ense)P (Pollock 1989: 421), but Laka (1991: 66) argues that separate languages (e.g. Basque) require just the opposite. Some believe n-words are negative indefinites or quantifiers while others believe them to be "semantically non-negative" (Penka 2007: 269-70). Zeilstra (2011: 112) contends that both De Swart's view that negative indefinites (NI) are negative quantifiers and Penka's theory that they are semantically non-negative are inadequate. Zeilstra argues for "split-scope constructions after quantifier raising" (2011: 137). Whether negative polarity items (NPI) are c-commanded (as De Swart states in 1998: 175) or not is another area of scholarly contention (Hoeksema 2000: 26). The point is there is as much contention about negation as there is agreement within the most prominent school of thought, consequently; this list could be greatly expanded. But let's try to hear and consider some opposite "voices" as well. Chomsky's TG has experienced its share of external contention. One of the more famous disagreements came from Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 205) who characterized Chomsky's early position as "objectivist" in the sense that "grammar is a matter of pure form independent of meaning or human understanding". Defending the role of metaphor in language, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 209-210) label Chomsky's "objectivism" a "myth". The development and spread of Functional Grammar (FG) has increasingly challenged Chomsky's standpoint. The founder of the FG (but not without an undeniable influence of the assumption of the Prague Linguistic Circle which states that the main task of linguistics should be to identify the contribution of each language unit to the process of communication) Dik and Hengeveld in (1997: 2) argue that FG uses "the term communicative competence" rather than Chomsky's (1965) "grammatical competence". They continue as follows:

We mean that NLU's (natural language user's) linguistic capacity comprises not only the ability to construe and interpret linguistic expression, but also the ability to use these expressions in appropriate and effective ways according to the conventions of verbal interaction prevailing in a linguistic community.

Considering language a psychological/social reality "codetermined by the contextual and situational information available to speakers and addressees", they confess that it is hard to comprehend a feature of language that this is more true of than it is of negation.

Being a universal but a highly contested feature of language negation has been investigated cross-linguistically, which, in turn, gave rise to a lot of disagreements in the linguistic literature.

2.3 Cross-linguistic/typological negation

As assumed above, although negation is a universal feature of every human language, it is also a highly contested feature which is “regulated” by the specific content and expression planes of this or that language and in this paper we present evidence in favour of a unifying account of the category of negation in spite of the diversity of different scales/degrees of negation by its varied types. The existence of such correspondences (i.e., the common “negating” power) and divergences (i.e., diminished or increased negation), together with the shared distributional properties, provides strong support for the relation between negative and positive polarity items, the resumptive qualification of which “is the semantic mechanism underlying the interpretation of both positive and negative polarity” (Falaus 2008: 51)*. It is also often assumed that when one side felicitously rejects an assertion made by the other side, the 1st side thinks that the proposition asserted by the second is false. This assumption underlies various disagreement arguments used to challenge contextualism (which is in contrast with the semantics-preferred approach above) about some class of expressions. As such, many contextualists have resisted these arguments on the grounds that the disagreements in question may not be over the proposition literally asserted (cf. Björnsson and Finlay 2010; Montminy 2012; Sundell 2011; Plunket and Sundel 2013, etc.) Khoo (2015: 511) still goes further: focusing on epistemic modals, he argues that some epistemic modal disagreements are in fact not over the proposition literally asserted by the utterance of the epistemic modal sentence. This method, for him, provides a way to break the stalemate, and reveals a new data point for theories of epistemic modals to predict- that is, how there can be such modal disagreements in terms of contextualistic, relativistic and expressivistic theories of the “negating” power of the relativistic epistemic modals.

A prima facie motivation for “rejecting (one of the “atoms” of negation) is contradicting” is the fact that it accounts for the contrast between minimal pairs like the following:

- a. Sue: I’m a doctor
- b. Tim: # No, I’m not a doctor
- c. Tom: No, you are not a doctor.

The explanation goes as follows: both Tim and Tom express that they reject Sue's assertion; however, only Tom in fact rejects Sue’s assertion since only he claims that what Sue asserts is false. Thus, from the point of “rejection” (as a “negating” element) the reason Tom's utterance is infelicitous is because he attempts to reject Sue's assertion, but in fact he fails to do so, since he does not claim that what she said is false. Tom's utterance, on the contrary, is felicitous because it succeeds in its rejection aim, since he claims that what Sue said is false.

* Classification and characterization of the polarity items according to the negative strength of the contexts that determine their distribution will be dealt with later (the author.)

It naturally follows that in general a necessary condition for a rejection of some assertion to be felicitous is for the utterer to claim that what is asserted is false (Khoo 2015: 518-19).

Before passing to the universal typology of negation (with all its “ingredients”, “contradiction and “rejection” being its two indispensable constituents), we would like to point out one more assumption which spreads to all the constituents of “negation”: Contradiction, e.g., states that an object can at the same time possess or not possess any quality. That is why, as some scholars emphasize (Fediuk2008), “If the definition of any quality is correct, the negation of this quality cannot be correct at the same time by any means”.

These common as well as specific features of the (constituents of) negation clarify the semantics of negation, on the one hand, and they make it more entangled and necessitate in-depth research of this category, on the other.

Dahl (2010: 9) defines “modern language typology” as “the systematic study of cross-linguistic patterns and cross-linguistic variation”. He also argues that typology provides an important and “secure empirical basis” for theoretical linguistic analysis. It was, in fact, Jespersen (1917), who laid the foundation of a typological study of negation. His delineation nature of the cyclic nature of negative particle weakening reinforcement, and replacement is now labelled and known as Jespersen's Cycle (1917: 4-5). He is also credited with recognizing that the negative particle often precedes that which is being negated (now called the Neg-first Principle) (as demonstrated in Chapter One's “The Evolution of Negation” part). Having studied the negation in approximately 240 languages, Dahl (1979: 98) classifies negation as either morphological or syntactic, while Payne is credited with introducing the term “standard negation” (Payne 1985: 198). Kahrel (1996: 35) reviews the “term negation” (negative indefinites) in 40 languages from an FG perspective .Dryer provides a detailed global overview of the order of negative morphemes (2005: 454; 2013a: webpage) shedding light on the affixal negation and the position of negative morphemes (2013b: webpage). The findings of these studies, finally, provide the basic structure of the presentation of negation in terms of general identification of some types of it.

2.4 Standard negation

The term “standard negation” originated from Payne, who in his (1985: 198), defines it as the “... type of negation that can apply to the most minimal and basic sentences. Such sentences are characteristically main clauses, and consist of a single predicate with as few noun phrases and adverbial modifiers as possible”.

Suggesting zero-valency weather sentences (“It does not/doesn't snow”, It is not/isn't raining”) as examples of standard negation, Payne believes these sentences apply “not” and “n't” as standard negators in English. These standard negators, also mildly laments the implication that other forms of negation are “nonstandard”. Miestamo defines standard

negation as “the negation of declarative verbal main clauses” (2007: 553) and also discusses negative imperatives, existential, and non-verbal clauses separately. While Dahl considers standard negation primarily clausal/sentential (Dahl 2010: 11), Payne (1985: 200) is careful to point out that there are exceptions

1. In Miestamo’s (2000, 2003, 2005) classification, based on a representative sample of 297 languages, negatives come in two basic types: symmetric and asymmetric. The distinction pays attention to whether or not negatives differ structurally from affirmatives in addition to the presence of negative markers. This can be observed from the point of view of constructions on the one hand and paradigms, on the other. Negative clauses with symmetric negative constructions do not differ from nonnegatives in any other way than by the presence of the negative marker(s). As Miestamo argues, this is the case in English, Turkish, Latvian, Lezgian, Indonesian and French. In asymmetric constructions, in contrast, further structural differences-asymmetries are observed between negatives and nonnegatives e.g. Chucki, Finnish, Korean, English, Turkish also show asymmetric constructions. In symmetric paradigms the correspondences between the members of the paradigms used in the affirmatives and negatives are one-to-one, for example, in Dutch and English (at least, partially).

In asymmetric paradigms such one-to-one correspondence does not obtain; this is what happens in English, where the affirmative makes a distinction between the nonhypothetical and the assertive, but the negative may only use the latter in English, Russian, Turkish, which, in turn, leads to the lessening of paradigmatic choices in the negative, only one form for responding to the two available in the affirmative. Miestamo argues that symmetric negation, both constructionally and paradigmatically, is more common than asymmetric negation in the sample languages (Miestamo 2007: 556-57).

Miestamo’s classification of negation is based on the binary oppositional membership principle, which identifies negation as either symmetric or asymmetric. In symmetric negation, the only change made to the affirmative construction is the addition of a negative marker. In asymmetric negation, additional structural differences (e.g. “değil” in Turkic languages) are evidenced (Miestamo 2005: 237; 2007: 556). This differentiating possibility allows Miestamo (2007: 558) to divide asymmetric negation into four “subtypes”, depending on the nature of the structural adjustment:

- 1) A/Fin: “the finiteness of the lexical verb is reduced or lost and a new finite element is usually added”.
- 2) A/NonReal: “Negatives are marked for a category that refers to nonrealized states of affairs” (implicature-based irrealis);

- 3) A/Emph: “characterized by the presence of marking that denotes emphasis in nonnegatives”
 - 4) A/Cat: “the marking of grammatical categories differs from their marking in affirmatives in other ways” (tense, aspect/mood, and person in Turkic, and Slavonic languages)
2. The constructional-paradigmatic as well as semantic-pragmatic distinction between the four subtypes of asymmetric negation can be identified as follows:
- In A/Fin negatives, the finiteness of the lexical verb is reduced or lost and a new finite element is usually added. This subtype can be divided into further subtypes according to the relationship between the negative marker and the finite element. This subtype is always constructional where negative marking is on the added finite element (Finiteness and negation are loaded onto the added auxiliary) e.g.
- Ben hocayım – Ben hoca değilim/ Gideceksen – Giden değilsen

In subtype A/Non-real negatives are marked for a category that refers to nonrealized states of affairs-most commonly a general irrealis category. In English, Turkish and Russian the affirmative can make a distinction between realis and irrealis mood, but in the negative only the irrealis (but with its affirmative implicatures) is possible:

If I were young again = Implies “I am not (and can never be) young again.
 If I had not been treated so badly... = But I have been treated so badly.

The paradigm has A/NonReal asymmetry, as there is only one form available in the negative corresponding to two in the affirmative. The distinction between realis and irrealis is lost in the negative.

Subtype A/Emph is characterized by the presence of marking that denotes emphasis in nonnegative. The affirmative can distinguish between the nonhypothetical and the assertive. The latter is a more emphatic category. As the negative uses the assertive corresponding to both choices in the affirmative, the distinction is lost and we may conclude that there is paradigmatic asymmetry of subtype A/Emph. We find both constructional-paradigmatic and semantic-pragmatic asymmetry of this subtype. e.g. How could you allow yourself to think so? = You shouldn’t have allowed yourself to think so.

Finally, in the subtype of A/Cat negatives, the marking of grammatical categories differs from their marking in affirmatives in other ways, the most commonly affected categories being tense-aspect-mood (TAM) and person-number-gender (PNG). In Turkish “Sen ki bana telefon açacaktın” the affirmative construction besides its negative meaning has also asymmetry in the marking of tense since future in the past

has a special implicit negation marked by a discontinuous marker the suffixal part of which (-tin) marks the distinctions in the affirmative and these lost distinctions in the negative still functioning as the marked negative member display both constructional and semantic-pragmatic asymmetry of type A/Cat/TAM in that negation is not marked by any negative marker(s) to the corresponding affirmative. Proposing functional explanations for different types of standard negation, Miestamo (2007: 559) states that there are various ways in which negation differs from affirmation on the functional level (in Semantics and Pragmatics). The following aspects of this functional level asymmetry are relevant for the explanations (Miestamo 2007: 559; Givon 2001: 369-398): (i) stativity vs. dynamicity: affirmatives can report stative or dynamic states of affairs, while negatives report only stative ones; a clause that negates an event refers to no change in the universe, that is, to a stative state of affairs; (ii) reality status: in their semantics, affirmatives belong to the nonrealized; and (iii) discourse context: negatives are prototypically used as denials, that is, in contexts where the corresponding affirmative is somehow present or supposed, but the typical contexts of affirmatives are not restricted in this way.

The explanations themselves are based on the following analogy:

- (a) Symmetric negatives copy (as stated above) the linguistic structure of the affirmative and are thus language-internally analogous to these affirmative structures; this is motivated by pressure for system cohesion.
- (b) Asymmetric negatives which copy aspects of the functional-level asymmetry between affirmation and negation are thus language-externally analogous to these functional-level asymmetry phenomena. Different subtypes of asymmetric negation are structural reflections of different aspects of the functional asymmetry: the stativity of negation motivates subtype A/Fin, the semantic connection between negation and other conceptualizations of the nonrealized is responsible for subtype A/NonReal, and the prototypical context of negatives motivates-in different ways- both subtype A/Cat structures where grammatical distinctions are lost.

Miestamo's general binary concept is informative in which symmetric negation is provided by affixation (unhappy, dishonest, unreal, etc. in English; *mutsuz*, *rahatsız*/*olmamış*, *yazmamak*, etc. in Turkish; *bessovestny* [dishonest], *nenadyozhny* [unreliable] in Russian).

Most typologists concur that there are at least three major types of negation. Payne (1985: 207-231) and Dahl (2010: 12) list these as “negative verbs”, “morphological negatives” (or affixal negation), and “negative particles”. Payne adds “negative nouns” and “secondary

modifications” (1995: 228), the latter including changes in word order or tone that co-occur with the three major types of negation.

Negative verbs, according to Payne (1985: 207), always “co-occur” with the lexical verb used to express the affirmative. Negative verbs, in turn, are of two types: “higher negative verbs” and “negative auxiliary verbs”. Dahl (2010: 20) states that the uncommon higher negative verbs are verbs which mark negation and take a clausal complement. Payne (1985: 2012) argues that the negative auxiliary verb is ideally “marked with all the verbal categories” (tense/aspect, person, number, etc.) and “the lexical verb assumes an invariant, participial form”.

Morphological negatives are formed when a negative morpheme is attached (generally affixed) to a verb or auxiliary. Opinions differ as to whether the process forms part of the derivational or inflectional morphology. Payne notes the former in (1985: 226) while Dahl (1979: 81; 2010: 16) contends that affixal negation is inflectional, not derivational, because it “interacts rather intimately with these-aspect, mood and person/number”, especially when it is a suffix. The other debatable aspect of the problem is due to such a fact that “the behaviour” of various types of morphological morphemes completely differs from language to language and even within the frame of one and the same language. e.g. neither in English nor in Russian negative prefixes can change the lexico-grammatical status of the words they are attached to (lucky-unlucky; happy-unhappy; honest-dishonest; real-unreal; fortune-misfortune etc. in English; sistemno-bessistemno [systematically-without any system], poryadok-besporjadok [order-disorder], umny-bezumny [wise-unwise], etc. in Russian.

As for the Turkish language the affixal negation is usually realized by means of the addition of negative suffixes and auxiliary prefixes to appropriate verbs, nouns, adjectives etc, the results of which can vary essentially. E.g in “anlamak-anlamamak” (to understand-not to understand) the negator functions within the frame of the lexical meaning of the verb, while in “mutlu-mutsuz” the derivational suffix “-suz” creates a gradable negative meaning as compared to the first member of the binary polarity, i.e., “mutlu”. “Gayri” in “Gayrimenkul” (movable-immovable) also adds the identical negative meaning to the positive or unmarked member of the polarity opposition within the adjectival system. However, at the Turkish clausal/sentential level, the negation of the head constituent, i.e. the adjectival predicate can also be formed analytically, by means of the “değil” attached to the positive member (e.g. o mutlu değil-dir = o mutsuz-dir).

Contribution of negative particles is also one of the debatable aspects of the problem. Dryer (2005:454) lists negative particles as the most type of negation (used in 477 of 1011 languages). A negative particle is an independent and variable word that encodes negation on

the clause (“not” in English). This is the construction that most exemplifies Miestamo’s notion of symmetric negation (2007:553-54).

For Payne (1985:223), variations in negative particles often serve as important syntactic markers. It can mark variation in mood (Hungarian), tense/aspect (modern standard Arabic), or “the grammatical category of the predicate” (Iraqi Arabic and all the other spoken varieties of spoken Arabic). The cases where one negative particle is employed for verbal predicates and another for non-verbal predicates will be expanded in the discussion to follow.

Payne’s (1997:282-84) tripartite classification of negation has been listed under the three types as “lexical negation”, “morphological negation”, and “analytical negation”. In lexical negation “the concept of negation is part and parcel of the lexical semantics of a particular verb”. e.g. his example the English verb “lack” can be considered as the lexical negative of “have”. His morphological negation mirrors its counterpart in O. Dahl and others. For him (and as stated above), analytic negation combines with the other elements of the sentence/clause (with the verbs, in particular) in different ways. Unlike English, in a lot of languages (e.g. Slavonic and Turkic languages) negation can be reinforced on account of negating more than one member of a sentence. In most typological studies of negation, the so-called lexical negation (in terms of its subtypes and gradable varieties) has been neglected as such. Even in Payne’s (1997:284) classification system (which, in fact, we adopt) with its word-internal lexical negation only some languages allow “multiple expression of negation”. For Dahl (2010:19-20), such doubling of negation is instantiated either as two negative particles (as in old English almost exclusively with one positioned on each side of the verb-see the Historical Evolution of the system of negation in chapter 1) or as a particle and a change in the form of the verb. Payne (1997:284) adds “word order change” accompanied by a particle or affix as a third type. The point that should and need be considered here is the observed asymmetry in English (and possibly in other languages) that negation may precede a quantified subject NP in the first position, but not a definite subject np or a proper name and this asymmetry is due to semantic rather than syntactic, restrictions (Brandtler 2006: 177). The starting point for our discussion is the intriguing asymmetry of the following pairs of English and Russian sentences:

- 1) a. Everyone could not get hold of tickets
b. Not everyone could get hold tickets
- 2) a. Mnogiye moi druzya smogli pridti na sobraniye.
b. He mnogiye moi druzya smogli pridti na sobraniye.

The sentences differ, obviously, with regards to the position of the negation, but all the four sentences are grammatically correct. In 1 (a) and 2 (a) the quantifiers “everyone” and “mnogiye družya” (many of my friends) precede the negation. While in 1 (b) and 2(b) the negation precedes the quantifiers. This, as Brandtler points out, could be thought to effect the interpretations – but it doesn’t. The standard reading of 1 (a) and 2 (a) is in fact (more or less) the same as in 1 (b) (i.e., “it is not the case that everyone got hold of tickets = there are at least some that did not hold of tickets) and 2 (b) (i.e., “it is not the case that many of my friends were able to come to the meeting=there were at least some that could not come to the meeting). Admittedly, in both 1 (a) and 2 (a) the quantifiers do take scope over the negation and the analysis, for instance for 1 (a) renders the marginal reading that “for everyone, it is the case that they did not get hold of tickets” (i.e., no one got hold of tickets). In some languages – for instance Turkic – the qp-neg interpretation seems to be the only one possible (Zeijlstra 2005:77).

Interestingly, scalar quantifiers like “many” and “few” seem to display a true ambiguous behaviour, however:

3) Many arrows didn’t hit the target.

4) Not many arrows hit the target.

The interpretation of (3) and (4) may be identical (especially with stress on “many” in (3): “it is not the case that many arrows hit the target”. Whereas (4) presupposes that few arrows hit the target, (3) only presupposes that many arrows did not but many arrows may have hit the target anyway. The standard analysis of (3) is thus that the negation is within the scope of the quantifier ($\forall \neg$), while the reverse is true for (4) ($\neg \forall$) (Brandtler 2006:182).

In Aristotelian logic, there is a crucial distinction between “predicate denial” (sentential denial) and “predicate term denial” (constituent negation). While sentential negation obeys two laws, the law of contradiction (LC) and the law of the Excluded middle (LEM), constituent negation only obeys the former (i.e., LC). For instance, in (5), it is obvious that LC holds, since both propositions cannot be true at the same time. But LEM does not hold: it is possible that Sven is “neither” friendly nor unfriendly*. In other words, both propositions may be false simultaneously:

5) Sven is unfriendly / Sven is friendly.

* These predicates are analysed by Horn (1989) as “scalar predicates”.

There is also a syntactic distinction between sentential and constituent negation. Several basic tests were proposed in Klima (1964) for distinguishing between the two notions: Either/too

Sentential negation: Sven is not friendly , and Bertil isn't, either/*too.

Constituent negation: Sven is unfriendly; and Bertil is, too/*either.

Tag questions (positive or negative assertions)

Sentential negation: Sven is not friendly, is he? = No, he isn't

Constituent negation: Sven is unfriendly, isn't he? = Yes, he is.

The accuracy of Klima's tests have been questioned (e.g. Jackendoff 1972, Culicover 1981, Brandtler 2006), since the tests give rise to conflicting results.

Instead of Aristotelian "predicate denial" and "predicate term denial" types of negation, Brandtler (2006:183) uses "narrow" and "wide" scope negations. Negation is semantically and syntactically narrow if it takes scope over a limited number of clause constituents but wide if it takes scope over the sentence as a whole. In English, sentential negation is prototypically coded grammatically through negating the predicate, either its verbal or nominal form as in "He does not know English"/"Jane has not graduated from her university yet", etc. narrow scope negation is coded as either a negative prefix or suffix as in "Jane is insincere" vs. "Jane is sincere" or "He was bad tempered and grace-less in defeat" vs. "Her movements were graceful and elegant".

If to judge the situation from Aristotle's claim that the relation between the subject and the topic may be either affirmed or denial, then we can illustrate this thus: to deny a predication, negation has to take scope over the subject-predicate relation at the linguistic level. Following Horn (1989:504), we also take it that negation takes scope over the predication relation as a whole, over both the subject and the predicate. In this case the reference is left in fact, along with the presupposition of existence; the topic np refers to a referent and a relation between the topic np and the predicate is still asserted. To put it differently, sentential negation denies that the asserted relation between the topic np and the predicate holds (Brandtler 2006:190-191).

The "nonstandard negation" is the "unfortunate term" simply referring to sentential forms of negation that do not qualify as "standard negation". These include negation encoded on

imperatives, non-verbal predicates, and existential sentences (Murphy 2014:19). For Miestamo (2007:561) "... in a clear majority of languages, imperatives use a negative strategy that differs from standard negation". According to Dahl (2010:27), "the primary asymmetries are either differences in strategy" between declarative sentences and negative imperatives, or "differences in verbal construction" between positive and negative imperatives. The latter applies to Arabic.

As Miestamo states in (2007:561), non-verbal and existential predicates "are often negated by non-standard strategies". As Dahl explains (2010:27), many languages do not use copulas with non-verbal predicates and may well use a different strategy for negating copula-less clauses. Dahl also indicates that existential predicates are similar to non-verbal ones in many languages, though they might not share the same strategy of negation. This is certainly true of Arabic, Turkish, Russian and some other languages, partially at least, if not wholly.

2.5 The Scope of Negation

One of Aristotle's never fading insights is his basic assumption that "every proposition is of subject-predicate form and is either true or false" (Horn 1996:1), since the relation between the subject and the predicate can be either affirmed or denied. This contradiction between affirmative and negative sentences with identical subject-predicate form is of fundamental semantic importance meaning: both (affirmation and negation) cannot be true at same time. This is referred to as the law of contradiction.

10) Socrates is ill.

11) Socrates is not ill.

If sentence (10) is true, (11) cannot be true simultaneously. But negation can also go along a different line which is known as the law of the excluded middle (LEM). LEM "requires that of any two opposite propositions, one is true" (Zeijlstra 2005:46). These two laws predict that sentences (10) and (11) can be neither true nor false at the same time: one of them must be true (by virtue of LC). Aristotle adds an intriguing twist to the truth conditions of these sentences: if the subject (Socrates) denotes an entity that does not exist, (10) must come out false, while (11) must come out true. This is so, since it is not possible for a dead or nonexistent man to be ill but if he does not exist, it is also true that he is not ill^{*}. For Russell, "The king of France is bald" is "a complex kind of existential proposition" (in Strawson 1950:322), consisting of a conjunction of three assertions: a) existence (there is a king of France); b) uniqueness (there is not more than one king of France), and c) property (there is nothing which is king of France and which is not bald). Analyzing the negated counterpart of

^{*} This analysis has been subject to criticism. There is also a logic problem to this analysis, since "negative attributes are no more ascribable to nonexistent subjects than are positive attributes". (Horn 1985:15).

this sentence as ambiguous with regards to the scope of negation, Russell considers the subject np (the king of France) as an existentially quantified conjunct (i.e., there is only one King of France) which may or may not be in the scope of negation. In case the quantifier (i.e., the determiner “a” with the meaning “one”) has scope over the negation as the proposition is false, since France is a republic. This is due to the fact that the assertion of existence is false. If the reverse scope relations hold as in “The King of France is not bald”, the proposition turns out true, since there is no king of France (and logically, a nonexistent man cannot be “bald”). The negated assertion of existence correctly predicts that “it is not true that there is a King of France”.

Both Aristotle’s and Russell’s analyses of negative scope and vacuous subjects can be criticized for being somewhat counter-intuitive, though in ordinary language use, we usually do assume the existence of the subject, even in negated sentences.

Negation is in essence the relation between opposites-between meanings (or expressions denoting meanings) which are fundamentally inconsistent with each other. In principle, opposed terms must be equal in their opposition: one term cannot be more opposite than another. But in natural language opposites are never equal. There is a consistent imbalance between the unmarked expression of affirmation and the marked expression of negation (in accord with the requirements of the oppositional analysis procedure developed by the Prague Functional School); between the general utility of affirmative sentences and the pragmatically loaded uses of negative sentences; between the simple logic of double negation and the not uncomplicated pragmatics which ensures that denying a negative is never quite the same as asserting a positive (is real 2004/2006:701) and it’s not just that negative and affirmative sentences are unequal - they are also to some degree incommensurable: not every negative sentence has a direct affirmative counterpart, not does every affirmative have a simple negation. Natural languages commonly include a class of constructions which do not themselves express negation or affirmation, but which are restricted to sentences of one or the other polarity. The existence of inequality and imbalance between affirmation and negation is closely connected with the gradability or the scope of these polarity members (negation, in particular), which suggests that the resources which languages provide for negative and affirmative meanings can be surprisingly different from and even independent of one another.

Gradability or the scope of negation, getting adapted to the effectiveness of communication, can have scope over the clause (clausal negation) or one of the constituents of a clause (constituent negation). For Payne (1997:293), scope of negation is “the variable portions of a clause that can be negated”. De Swart (2010:255) states that in some languages like German, “there is a strong correspondence between the linear order of constituents... and the scope of negation: in languages like English with a “less flexible word order”, intonation fixes the scope of negation on the clause (wide scope) or on specific constituents (narrow scope). De Swart defines “contextual information” as that which focuses the scope of negation in the

absence of “syntactic or phonological indications”. As mentioned above, Horn argues that negation, including its scope, is largely pragmatically determined without denying the importance of syntax and semantics. Wide variety and flexibility of the scope of negation has made it the most fundamental of all logical relations and as the marked member of the polar opposition, negation dominates most discussions of polarity and as Horn notes (1989:45), it is always suspect – ontologically, epistemologically, and even morally. It is just due to this factor that the appropriate use and interpretation of a negative sentence requires a context in which the information it conveys is somehow particularly relevant (Israel 2004/2006:706). Negation intimately interacts with every aspect of linguistic inquiry, including phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics and as Murphy puts it “it should be no wonder that this universal feature of language is so conceptually contested” (Murphy 2014:21). And the key to this crucial usefulness lies precisely in its peculiar asymmetry with affirmation. Having a marked distribution, negation is used primarily in “contexts of plausible denial” (Wason 1965). As Strawson puts it, “the standard and primary use of “not” is specifically to contradict or to correct; to cancel as suggestion of one’s own or another’s” (1952:7). And one does not normally deny something unless one thinks that someone might believe it. And as much as negative sentences are associated with denial, their use is sharply distinguished and in a sense depends on the use of affirmative sentences. The basic point is clear enough: the use of negation, both in discourse and in a range of syntactic contexts, is systematically and significantly restricted in comparison with affirmation. This is why negation (and its scope) is reactive: it is useful where it responds to and opposes what is, or what might have been, expected and in terms of this, negation is so peculiarly suited for the so-called “negative” speech acts – e.g. denial, rejection, refusal, etc – whose basic function is to answer and oppose some other speech act. Such speech acts, not themselves inherently negative, can also be accomplished without the use of negation (e.g. A: can I have a kiss? B: you can go to hell?). But the reactive nature of the implicit negation (“no, never!” or “how can you dare?” etc) makes it inherently well-suited for their performance. Presumably, this is why such speech acts feel so “negative”, and also perhaps why negation itself tends to carry such pragmatically negative connotations (Israel 2004/2006:708). As negation is often experienced as an unpleasant sort of construction, speakers may employ various sorts of indirection to soften the ill effects of a negative utterance. For this purpose, communicants may and do systematically strengthen or weaken negation. In general, strengthening takes the form of an inference from a formally contradictory negation “not-p” to a strong contrary assertion “q”, effectively ignoring the logical possibility of something being neither “p” nor “q”. Horn (1989:55) explores this phenomenon of “contrary-negation-in-contradictory-clothing” as it appears with affixal negation (unhappy=“sad”), negative raising phenomena (I don’t think you should=“I think you should not”, and sentential negations (Elma doesn’t like squid= “Elma dislikes squid”). The fact is negation allows such contrary readings with evaluatively positive (e-positive) predicates, the denial of which may indirectly express an evaluatively negative (e-negative) judgement. Thus, for example, we find contrary readings

available with (weakly) e-positive predicates as in (6), but not with e-negative or strongly e-positive predicates, as in (7):

- 6) a. He's not nice (= "he's mean")
b. She's not happy (= "she's sad")
- 7) a. He's not mean (= "he's nice")
b. She's not sad (= "she's happy")
c. She's not ecstatic (= "she's miserable")

Similarly, with affixal negation, the English "un-" prefix in (8) yields contrary meanings in combination with e-positive roots, but tends not to combine at all with the contrary e-negative roots (Zimmer 1964)

- 8) Happy: unhappy sad: *unsad
Kind: unkind cruel: *uncruel
Wise: unwise foolish: *unfoolish

The pragmatics of contrary negation is clearest in the phenomenon of "neg(ative) – Raising", as in (9) where a matrix negation is interpreted as applying to an embedded constituent:

- 9) a. I don't think you should do that (= "I think you should not...")
b. I don't suppose you expect to win (= "I expect you wouldn't...").

For Lakoff (1969) and Prince (1976), neg-raised sentences are typically felt as weaker and more tentative than their otherwise synonymous counterparts with lower-clause negation and the phenomenon appears to be motivated largely by the need to hedge or mitigate the expression of a negative judgement. The rule holds true for Turkish and Russian and it is the simple semantics of negations in general that makes it ideally suited for rather complicated pragmatic functions. Polarity (and its scope), thus, is inherently asymmetrical – not because it is logical, but rather, because there is so much it has to do.

* (The other aspects of the scope phenomena observed with negation will be dealt with in "negated universal quantifiers" – the author)

CHAPTER 3

DEVICES AND COMPONENTS OF NEGATION

3.1 Negation Indefinites and Quantifiers

The main concern of this section will be a distinction between syntactic and semantic sentential negation by discussing some core properties of the downward entailing quantifiers (DE quantifiers) “no/nothing”.

The syntactic tests applied to these quantifiers demonstrate that “no/nothing” can give rise to both syntactic and semantic sentential negation.

The literature is mixed regarding the classification of negative indefinites and negative quantifiers. Payne (1975) and Dahl (2010) place them within sentence/clause level negation. Payne (1987:293) lists them under “constituent negation”. Dahl (2010:29) maintains that negation and quantification of “show up in combination” act together as in “No man is island”. Payne (1985: 204ff) also distinguishes between “negated quantifiers/adverbs (no one, often, always, etc.) and “inherently negative” quantifiers / adverbs (nothing, nobody, never, etc.), what is demonstrated in (11):

11. a. Nothing happened
 b. I saw no member of/nobody from the committee.

Downward Entailing quantifiers denote a monotone decreasing function and thus introduce contexts that support inferences (Ladusaw 1980; Van der Wouden 1994).

Discussing sentential negation, Klima (1964) proposes the question tag test: a prototypical neg-s combines with a positive test tag, while an Aff-s combines with a negative question tag, as illustrated in (12) and (13):

(12) John did not buy a book, did he?

(13) John bought a book, didn't he?

The tags associated with sentences, containing “no/nothing” in object position tend to be negative, indicating the sentence is aff-s, as shown in (14):

(14) a. John bought no book, didn't he?

 b. John bought nothing, didn't he?

“No” and “nothing” in subject position systematically give rise to positive tags, as in (15):

(15) a. Nothing could refute that argument, could it? (neg-s).

 b. No men love her, do they? (neg-s).

Beghelli (1995) divides DE-quantifiers into non-negative and negative DE-quantifiers. “No/nothing” always gives rise to a neg-s in subject position and usually to an aff-s in object position. Thus there is a subject-object asymmetry with “no/nothing” when it comes to question tags.

This helps us to understand Sapir’s interpretation (1930:21) taken from Horn (1989: 221):

“not everybody came” does not mean “Some came”, which is implied but “Some did not”. Logically, the negated [not every] should include the totalized negative, i.e., opposite on contrary [none] as a possibility, but ordinarily this interpretation is excluded and the totalized negative (contrary) is expressed by negating the corresponding quantifier or non-specifying selective [not {one/any/a} ...].

In this example “not everyone” is used to mean “not some” instead of “some”, since negation only modifies the topic selection (making it less inclusive), it does not deny the reference. Hence the negated quantifier pronoun (QP) (not everyone) still refers to that set as a whole (because of its expressing “indefiniteness”). As a consequence, a negated QP states that “of the total set, there are some members for which this predication does not hold”. This is the true meaning of a negated quantifier; that the relation may also hold for some other members is in fact only implied. If to come back to the scope phenomena observed with negation and universal quantifiers, it is evident that regardless word order, negation seems to take scope over the universal QP.

But one can hardly remain blind to fundamental scopal difference depending on word order. Wide negation takes scope over the subject-predicate relation pragmatically; we do however regard the topic as being outside the scope of negation (see Horn 1989: 502-18). Narrow negation takes scope over the selection, i.e., over one of the referring alternatives. But while the former is a predicate denial, the latter is a predicate affirmation (since negation does not take scope over the predicate relation). In the case of a universal quantifier (e.g. “all”), both narrow and wide negation have more or less identical interpretations “predicating something (e.g. flying) of not every man amounts to denying it of every man. In the same way, the proposition that “no man flies” is not identical with but logically equivalent to the proposition that it is not the case that some man flies “(Horn 1989: 509). But the negation, regarded in the syntactic literature as a unique head that projects its own phrasal category (Zanutlini 1991) is normally assumed to be generated outside the VP (the verb and its complements, including the subject NP). In accord with the assumption that quantifiers differ from definite NPs in that definite NPs denote individuals, while quantified NPs denote sets, only one selection is possible for definite NPs while there are several selections (alternatives) available for QPs. This is so, since any QP refers to a set as a whole: saying something of “no member” is also saying something about “all members”. Thus, negating a QP leads only to modification of the topic selection. Consequently, the seemingly strange phenomenon that negation always outscopes the QP as both a semantic and pragmatic fact that predicating

something of not every man amounts to denying it of every man (Brandtler 2006: 197). Because of the need to distinguish between universal and scalar (indefinite) quantifiers from the point of the different scopal behaviors they display, let's once again look at the issues below:

(16) Not many arrows hit the target.

(17) Many arrows hit not the target

Examples (16) and (17) clearly have different interpretations. Whereas the quantifier in (17) takes scope over the negation (QP-neg, i.e., negates the object), the reverse holds for (16): the negation takes scope over the quantifier (neg-QP). Jackendoff (1972: 327) elaborates one more difference between (16) and (17) noting that only the interpretation in (16) holds in the passive:

(18) The target wasn't hit by many arrows.

The presuppositional reading of (16) is also compatible with the standard sentential reading of the negation "it is not the case that many arrows hit the target (i.e. few arrows hit the target). This leads Jackendoff to regard (16) as an instance of s(entence) negation (1972: 327) while (17) displays VP-negation (in the sense that "not the target" is a constituent of the VP). But this analysis is somewhat confused in (16), the negated QP (not many arrows") is the topic of the affirmed proposition. But in its passivized version (18) the definite NP "the target" is the topic-the quantified NP within the comment. And, in fact, we are dealing with a standard sentential negation in (18): "It is not the case that the target was hit by many arrows". Sentence (16) may thus, on the basis of Jackendoff's passivization test be interpreted as the "it-cleft" which enables the scope negation take scope over the topic selection while in (17) negation may take scope over the predicate relation. The difference in interpretation has, in fact, to do with the semantic nature of the quantifiers.

If to remember that quantifiers always predicate something of a set as a whole, a denied predication like (17) above does not exclude the possibility of many arrows hitting the target simultaneously. The predicate negation does not affect the topic selection or the reference, and a quantifier like "many" is imprecise. Example (16) on the other hand (i.e. "not many"), can never have the interpretation of (17), since narrow negation explicitly cancels the topic assignment of "many" in favour of some other topic alternative on the scale (e.g. "few").

Even though the negated QP ("not many") implicates "few", it does not mean "few". We also see if from the different truth-values: if no arrows hit the target, it is also true that "not many" arrows hit the target. But it is definitely not true that "few arrows" hit the target. Haspelmath (2013: webpage) defines indefinite pronouns as "nominal or adverbial" expressions that directly translate "nobody", "nothing", "nowhere", "never", etc. He classifies indefinite pronouns based on how they interact with "predicate negation" ("ordinary negative clauses").

The vast majority of languages tested employ negative indefinites with predicate negation (170 of 206, i.e. 83%).

They are termed negative concord (NC) languages elsewhere. Scholars distinguish between “N-words” used in NC languages and negative polarity items (NPIs). Van der Wouden and Zwarts (1993: 201) write that NC is the term for “where multiple occurrences of morphologically negative constituents express a single semantic negation, as exemplified in the Turkish language (19a and b) below. De Swart (2010: 248) posits that the “two main classes of languages” are negative concord languages and double negation languages. The latter, which are less common and primarily European (e.g. Germanic), according to de Swart (2010: 249) “value first-order iteration” (two negatives make a positive). N-words are mostly negative indefinites and their negativeness is a contentious subject. For Penka and Zeijlstra (2010:779), NPIs “are words or expressions that can only occur in contexts that are in some sense negative”. For Tailan(1984: 160), the selection of 19.(a), where negation is expressed by the suffix “-me” ...over a structure with a lexical negative “değil” in 19(b), is determined by certain pragmatic conditions:

(19) a. O-nun-la bir daha gör-üş-me-yeceğ-im.

He-gen-with one more see- recip-neg-fut-1SG

I will not see (socialize with) him again.

b. O-nun-la bir daha gö-üş-ecek değil-im.

He-gen-with one more see- recip-fut not-1SG

He argues that being the more “marked” member, (19)b is less frequently encountered than an unmarked member [i.e.,(19)a], which, in turn, has fewer conditions for its realization, while (19)b is subject to more syntactic constraints. This imbalance in the type and number of constraints correlates very well with the frequency of the structures in actual language use.

The case is that different types of predicates in Turkish (and other Turkic languages) have distinct surface markers for negation. Verbal predicates employ the suffix “-me” after the verb base [exx(20)a and b], substantive predicates are negated by “değil” when then receives the predicate inflexional suffixes [exx(21)a.and b.) and existential predicates have their own negative predicate “yok”^{*} with necessary tense, person suffixes [exx(22)a.and b.]

20 (a) Erol iş-e basla-dI

Work-dat-start-past

Erol started work

^{*} The other meanings of the verb “yok” are not the object of this study (The Author)

(b) Erol iş-e başla-ma-dı

Work-dat start-neg-past

Erol didn't start work.

21 (a) Erol başarılı bir iş adam-ı-ydı

Successful one business man-poss.3SG-past

Erol was a successful businessman

(b) Erol başarılı bir iş adam-ı değil-di

successful one business man-poss not was 3SG

Erol was not a successful business man

22.(a) Bahçe-de köpek var(existential predicate)

Garden –loc dog exist

"There is a dog in the garden.

(b). Bahçe-de köpek yok

Garden – lok dog exist - not

There isn't a dog in the garden.

As a surface marker of negation “değil” (in the examples above) has functions other than merely negating predicates. Being embedded under “değil” the person marking and any postclitics on the verbal predicate move onto the higher predicate, leaving the embedded verb non-finite in form. But not all sentences with a verbal predicate “değil” since there are, as Taylan (1984: 1619) notes, certain restrictions on the tense, aspect and modality suffixes that the embedded verb may take. Among this set of markers, only the presumptive past “-mış”, the progressive “-iyor”, and the “future” are acceptable on the verb embedded under “değil” as examples (23)c, (24)c and (25)c below illustrate, respectively. On the other hand, an embedded verb marked with the past tense “dı”, aorist “ır”, necessity modality “-meli” and the optative modality “ye” yield ungrammatical strings as seen in the unacceptable “c” sentences of (23) -(26) below:

23 (a) Erol İstanbul –da otur –muş

loc live-past

Erol has lived/ lives in Istanbul

(b) Erol Istanbul-da otur-ma-mis

-loc live-neg-past

Erol has not/does not live in Istanbul

(c) Erol istanbul-da otur –mus degil

loc live-past not

Erol has not/ does not live in Istanbul.

24 (a) Yazın her gün deniz-egid-iyor-du-k

Summer every day see-dat go-habit-past-1pl.

We would go to the sea every day in summer

b. Yazın her gün deniz-e git-mi-yor-du –k.

Summer every day see-dat go-neg-habit-past-1pl.

We didn't go to the sea every day in summer .

c . Yazın her gün deniz-e gid-iyor degil-di-k

Summer every day see-dat go-hab neg-past-1pl.

We didn't go to the sea every day in summer

25 (a) Bu haber-i Erol-a söyle-yeceğ-im.

This news-acc. –dat tell –fut - 1st SG.

I will tell this news to Erol.

(b) Bu haber –I Erol –a söyle - me –yeceğ – im

This news -acc -dat tel - neg -fut - 1SG

I won't tell this news to Erol

C . Bu haber - I Erol – söyle - yecek değil - im

This news - acc -adl tel - fut neg - 1SG

I won't tell this news to Erol.

(26) a . Erol –u sev – di – m

-acc love – past – 1SG

I lovectl Liked Erol

B . Erol – u sev – me – di – m

-acc love - neg - past - 1SG

I didn't like/love Erol

C . #Erol - u sev - di de ğ - il - im/# sev –di – m de ğ il

(27) a . Ben hata –lar- ı –mı gör - ür – um

I mistake –pl – poss 1 acc see – aor – 1SG

I see my mistakes.

B . Ben hata – lar – ı –mı gör - me – m

I mistake – pl – poss 1 –acc see – neg – 159

c.# Ben hata – lar – ı –mı görür de ğ ilim /# gör * ür üm de ğ il

(28) a . Erol – a yardım et – meli – sin

...dat help be of - necess - 2nd SG

You should help / be of help to Erol

b . Erol – a yardım et - me - meli - sin

-dat heip be of –neg- necess - 2nd SG

You should not help / be of help to Erol

You should be of - neg – necass – lnd 59

C. Erol-a yardım et *meli de ğ ilsin) (Erola yardım etmek zorunda de ğ ilsin)

Taylan's (1984:163) argument that a sentential structure under the negative particle “de ğ il” is not possible when the embedded verb is marked with “-meli” can hardly hold true for 28(c), which assumes that in the complex structures the shift of the inflexional endings from the embedded verb (such as person marking and auxiliary postclitics) onto the higher level with

“değil” is obligatory. This can be observed not only in (23) c and (24) c, but holds true for (28) c as well. One more aspect of the case: when the verbs embedded under “değil” are negated with the suffixes “-me” and “-meli”, the result is double negation which is also known under the term “negative doubling” usually functioning as a type of the negative concord (the other type being labelled as “negative spread”) (Basten 1986).

The other interesting point is connected with the interrelationship (and restrictions) of “değil” and the postclitic “mi”, which in its neutral position, occurs sentence finally. In such cases (especially in the so-called polarity questions) the conditions are pragmatically favourable for the use of the predicate particle “değil” as a parallel structure with the postclitic-based predicate:

(29). Erol o iş-i –kabul et –me – miş –mi?

that job-accept – neg - has –postclt.

Hasn't Erol accepted that job?

As the polarity question with postclitic “mi” questions the assertion and is unmarked, embedding of the structure under “değil” is acceptable, which is demonstrated by (30) below:

(30) . Erol o iş – i kabul etme – miş değil(-mi)?

That job – acc – accept - neg –past 3SG– değil(-postclitic)

(Isn't it the case)that Erol hasn't accepted that job.

Since in external negation (with “değil”), the presupposition and the assertion of the sentence (“Erol o işi kabul etmemiş”)are negated, it is impossible to have a marked polarity question in Turkish whose juxtapositioned formation (where “-mi” is in a position other than S –final and in each case a certain constituent is singled out to be questioned with the rest being presupposed) requires conditions that are pragmatically incompatible and hence cannot be processed readily:

(31) Erol – mu o iş – i Kabul et –me –miş?#Erol değil – mi o iş – i kabul etmemiş.

The two negative structures require different contextual pragmatic conditions to be met for their realization. Let's consider the following situations (exemplified by Taylan 1984:171) to illustrate the different pragmatic conditions associated with each negative structure:

A. Erol gets in his car to get to work, turns on the ignition key but the car would not start. He tries again with no success, in which case he turns to his friends and says:

(32) Bu sabah araba çalış-ma-yacak galiba

This morning car start-neg-fut 3SG possibly

I think/possibly the car won't start this morning. (It is the case) that the car won't start this morning.

The corresponding complex structure where embedding under "değil" has taken place would be infelicitous in such a situation.

(33) Bu sabah araba çalış-acak değil galiba

This morning car start-fut Neg possibly

"I think/possibly the car won't start this morning".

(It is not the case that the car will start this morning.

The situations described above (+ the semantic structure of the examples) imply that Erol's car won't work, but the degrees of negative certainty are considerably different. In (32) the speaker verbalizes his negative assertion using a simple negative structure expressed by the suffix "-me" which is the pragmatically appropriate form, while (33) is not suitable in this context, since a denial of the affirmative has been considerably strengthened by "değil" due to the full certainty/belief of Erol. The negative structure with "değil" here can be pragmatically preferable in a situation as below:

Erol, who has not used his car for two months, gets into it and turns the key. The car wouldn't start. He tries again, but in vain; then he explains the case to his friend:

A car that has not been used for two months will, naturally, not start with the first turn of the key.

The other version of Erol's conclusion (as Taylan suggests: *ibid*: 171-72) argues that the simple negative form in (34) below is infelicitous, or, at best, awkward: (34) A car that hasn't been used for two months won't naturally, start with the first turn of the key.

The structure embedded under "değil" used for external negation of the presupposition and assertion can convey (and, in fact, conveys) the assumptions of the situation and its denial. Since a negative assertion is not the desired message, (34) is not pragmatically favourable.*

In what concerns sentence negation, in terms of "negative spread" in Turkic (and even Slavonic and Romance) languages, this domain, as the inflexional and analytical negative markers demonstrated in the examples above, is delimited by overt strong negative

* The asymmetry of the negation scope and divergency of pragmatic conditions of the two different negative structures in Turkish need to be more systematically and fundamentally investigated than done here (The author)

element, indefinites and quantifiers, as well as some negative phrases, overtly having scope over the verbal element (cf. Matos 1999: 175).

Haegemen (1995) claims that negative concord results from Neg-Criterion, a universal condition which determines the distribution of the negative elements. For him, this condition is not restricted to NegP (i.e., the negating of the predicate element) and operates whenever the negative elements may establish a specifier-head agreement relation. The Neg-criterion applies to the following configurations: (i) raising of negative items into specifier-head of some functional projection above NegP (e.g., the subject-negation cases) as in 32; (ii) specifier-head of NegP+the specifier position occupied by a negationless operator identified by a C-commanding

(complement-commanding) Neg-Phrase (as in 33), and finally, (iii) specifier-head of NegP, where the specifier is an expletive null operator identified through a chain by a postverbal negative phrase, as in 34. The following examples are analysed using the Haegeman Neg-criterion:

32.(a) Nikto ne zvonil

Neg-one neg call-past 3SG

(b) Kimse telefon açmamış/= Kimse telefon açmış değil:

Neg-one call-make-neg-past 3SG /=Neg-one-call-make-past-neg 3SG

(c) Nobody has called

Neg-one 3SG pres.call-past

33 (a). Erol nis kem ne govori

Neg-to-one-neg-speak-past-3sg

(b). Erol kimse ile konuşmamış/...Konuşmuş değil

Neg-one-with-speak-neg-past/...speak-past-neg-3SG

(c) Erol has not talked to anybody/#...nobody

Pres-3SG-neg-talk-p.-dat-indef.pr.sg.

(34)a. Nikto nikomu ne zvonit

Neg-one neg-one-dat-neg-call-pres. 3SG

b. Kim-se kim-se-ye telefon aç-mı-yor

Neg-one-neg-one-dat-call make-neg-pres., 3SG

c. Nobody calls anybody/#nobody

neg-one-call-pr..3SG-indef-one-SG

However, the Haegemean's (1995) neg-criterion is not able to account for negative concord which claims that multiple occurrences of morphologically negative constituents express a single semantic negation, since 32(a) and (b), 33(a) and (b) and 34(a) and (b) can hardly be reduced to structures presenting a single negative element licensing multiple constituents with underspecified polarity features.

Irrelevance of Haegemean's (and all of those who support this criterion) Negative Concord theory can be observed in one more case: Negative strategies used in imperatives, existential and nonverbal clauses often differ from standard negation. More than that, the interaction between negative indefinite pronouns and standard negation shows interesting cross-linguistic variation in terms of whether the latter co-occurs with the indefinite and whether the indefinite is inherently negative.

After this survey of standard negative strategies (and their realizational possibilities in different languages), a few words on the position of negative markers in the clause are in order. Already Jespersen (1917) had noted that negative markers tend to be placed before the elements they negate. Dahl's (1979) and Dryer's (1992) findings show that this Neg-First principle, as Horn (2001) calls it, holds for negative particles regardless of basic word order, but basic word order does play an essential role in the case of negative auxiliaries, which are usually placed after the lexical verb in languages with object-verb basic word order (e.g. "Bu kitabı okumuş değilim" in Turkish). Dahl (1979) also notes that negative markers are commonly placed in relation to the finite element rather than in relation to the whole clause, and they tend to come as close to the finite element as possible. However, this centripetal pattern of negation is not consistent cross-linguistically, since "... negation may be a logical operator or a type of speech act, a basic element of semantic representations or a pragmatically loaded form of communicative interaction" (Israel 2004:701). If we disregard the complexity of scopal properties, the role of negation in natural language usage, is anything but straightforward. Not only is "not" used as an expression of polarity and denial in "common parlance" as in "I don't want to go to the cinema tonight" or "Sarah is not a music lover", but it is also frequently used as a hedging device in discourse as in "I don't know, but I think it is a good idea to go swimming", where no real sense of polarity and denial is conveyed (Tottie and Paradis 1982; Tottie 1991; Paradis and Willners 2006:1052) or a modifier of degree as in "the water is not hot" said about water that may be warm, lukewarm or cool (Bolinger 1972; Horn 1989; Israel 2001, Giora et al 2005).

To avoid confusion it is important to point out that the meaning of negation is its varying use potential in conceptual space of sentence/language elements. E.g. negated antonymic adjectives (“not dead”) differ from antonymic adjectives qualified by degree modifiers in that the oppositeness relation is in focus. It is within this spirit that Horn (2004:10) starts that what is said and not implicated in scalar expressions such as “it’s warm” is that something is at least warm, which is a lower bound interpretation. Negating “warm”, as in “not warm” denies the lower bound and the interpretation is “cool” and “not cool” is understood to mean “warm”. The prediction is that the “warm”/“cool”- scale is symmetric in the sense that there is no difference between the negated adjective and the coded antonym (not warm=cool). Upper-bound interpretations of negation, however, are arrived at by implication, i.e. post-semantically. Such interpretations presuppose syntactic, semantic or prosodic cues and the function of the negator is to promote the interpretation “it’s not warm, it’s hot” (Horn 2004:10). Criticizing the literalist account, Colston claims that the metalinguistic function of negation is essential for the understanding of the use of negation in natural discourse and verbal politeness has a crucial explanatory function. Based on the view of negation as mitigation, Giora (2006) suggests a functionally oriented proposal of negation in text. She argues for a functional equivalence hypothesis, which starts that the role of the negator may be either one of mitigation of the negated concept, i.e. “not warm” communicates “less than warm” rather than “cold” or one of eliminating the positive concept resulting in its absolute opposite, if the textual function of the negated expression calls for such an interpretation. Giora’s results are indirectly supported by Holleman’s (2000) data which show that speakers are sensitive to the hedging function of negation in that they prefer negated positive meanings to negative terms e.g. “not succeeding” to “failing” for unfavourable descriptions.

3.2 Negation in Existential, Imperative and Exclamative Clauses

The negative strategies used in existential and exclamatives have received considerable less attention in the literature than standard negation. Existential clauses are often negated by non-standard strategies. The following examples demonstrate both the ways and the scope of negation in Turkish, Russian and English:

- 1) a. Tam net domov
There aren’t houses there
Orada ev(ler) yok
- b. Tam net nıkakıkh domov

There aren't any houses there

Orada hiç bir ev(ler) yok.

c. Nigde net nıkakıkh domov

There aren't no houses nowhere

Hiç yerde hiç bir ev yok

In all the Turkish examples, there is a special negative existential “yok” completely different from the positive existential “var” and from the ordinary verbal negator “-me”. The Russian examples also demonstrate the so-called multiplied negation, which, in turn, requires the negated nouns be used in the accusative case. If Turkish negating particle “yok” is only sentence final, the Russian negator can shift its place freely, e.g. it can both precede and follow the noun it negates. As for in the English examples, the negative existential “not” follows the verb “to be”. The central point in Croft's (1991) article is that such cases of variation can be interpreted as ongoing change from one type of another. If to take another Turkish existential sentence denoting “probability”, we'll witness still more potential of the negativity and its effectiveness: “Kemal ofisinde ola bilir” – Kemal might be in his office. Local – pass – 3sg be possible

The negation of this sentence can go along two lines: First, it is negated (in accord with the strength of evidence) in different ways: (a) weak certainty (Kemal might not be in his office) (Kemal ofisinde olmaya bilir – standard negation expressed by adding the negative suffix “-me” to the existential verb); as for the second case, negation can be expressed by means of “değil” as a result of which the certainty gains ground as if the respondent has an evidence to make the statement “Kemal ofisinde olası değil” and thus to negate the assumed expectation of the questioner as Taylan (1984:172) states, in cases, when negative requests are made, it is the verbal negation that is preferred over embedding under “değil”. Imagine a situation, when a doctor, after examining his patient who has complained from stomach problems, wants to tell him that he has to be careful with what he eats. The doctor instructs:

Bol-bol süt içeceksin. Çiğ sebze, meyve ye-me-yecek-sin
A lot of milk drink-fut-2sg. Uncooked vegetable, fruit eat-neg-fut-2sg
“You will drink a lot of milk. You won't eat uncooked vegetables or fruit

Though in the future tense form, “içeceksin”, in fact, is in the imperative mood, used to denote obligation of the patient, but not a request, and in its implicit form, it is a real prohibition (or insistent instruction) of not violating the doctor's instruction. The sentence in form is declarative in the indicative mood, but functionally the negative

“yemeyeceksin” “tells” the patient what he should eat/drink and what he shouldn’t. This particular speech act can be conveyed only by the structure where the main verb is negated by suffixation rather than a structure embedded under the negative predicate with “değil”. But given a different situation, “değil” can be used as an appropriate device. For instance if that patient tries to reach for an orange at the dinner table, his wife may say:

O	meyve-yi	yi-yecek	değil-sin	herhalde.
That	fruit-acc	eat-fut	not-2psg	probably.

I suppose you are not going to eat that fruit.

All though “... are not going to...” formally expresses a lower range on a negation scale as opposed to “but, it is not the case that you can violate the doctor’s instruction”; it is counter-directional which means that when intensified it moves away from each other in opposite directions of the scale. Actual, contextual meanings of these negated expressions in language use are relevant portions of their meanings which have a strong bias towards one or the other. To make it more precise, “yemeyeceksin” is strongly bounded while “... are not going to...” is strongly unbounded leaving “a window” for an implicit request reminding the patient of the doctor’s instruction. If not to exaggerate, in a very indirect way, the patient’s wife is simply saying “don’t eat that uncooked fruit”, which is a negative request as a speech act. The speaker’s “o meyveyi yeme-yeceksin her-halde” could be uttered with the intention of making a negative respect; thus, the same illocutionary force is conveyed as in the previous sentence with “değil” but in a less indirect and less subtle way. As seen from the analysis of the two negative structures in Turkish, the choice of one structure over the other is directly conditioned by (the scale of) this or that illocutionary act and a structure with the whole sentence negated is pragmatically (and semantically) suitable only when the sentence is presupposed to hold for both speaker and the hearer.

Discussing various types of negation in exclamatives in English, Turkish and Russian, we argue that morphological negation is felicitous in exclamatives. However, sentential negation exhibits diversity. Its wide scope variety seems to be absolutely ungrammatical in all the 3 languages under consideration. On the contrary, its narrow scope variety is subject to cross-linguistic variation: some languages display the felicitousness of narrow scope readings in gradable adjectival and quantity exclamatives. Finally, expletive negation makes for a criterion of rhetorical exclamatives.

As Michaelis (2001) and Zevakhina (2015) state, exclamatives express a speaker’s high spirit, disappointment and/or surprise about an observed state of affairs that violates their expectations. Cross-linguistically, they form a stable group of grammatical structures, among which the most wide-spread and well-known are rhetorical structures, and “wh-“ exclamatives. Negation of exclamatives is usually formed by means of a negative marker (particle or affix) that form an antonym of a gradable adjective or

adverb. The following examples from the mentioned Languages illustrate the assumption set forward above:

- 1) What an uninteresting book this is! (Oda 2008: 251)

What neg-adjective np dem. be

Russian and Turkish exhibit similar patterns what can be seen from the following examples:

Russian: Kakaya ne-krasivaya istoriya!

what-nom-F., sg neg-pleasant-nom., story-nom, sg.

Turkish: Planlarına inanması nasıl da zor!

np-pl-dat belief-pos adv. part. Neg-adv

Your plans are so inconceivable.

As observed by Jespersen (1923), in many Languages negative exclamation can have a reading in which the negation is not interpreted according to its canonical logical meaning.

Elliptical exclamative clauses consist of just the exclamative phrase, usually an NP or adjective phrase.

“Well, how unnerving!” Jane sympathized.

neordinarnaya reshimost!
determination!)

Kakaya

(What an extraordinary

Bu nasıl bir terbiyesizlik!

(What impoliteness!)

Secondly, there are those consisting of the exclamative phrase plus a clause which may be finite declarative, infinitival or present participial:

How shameless to treat the old (people) like this!

Kakaya beda roditsya schastlivoy!
onun bu halini görmeseydim!

Keşke

For Collins (2005:13), “what-exclamatives occur mainly as main clauses rather than subordinate clauses (86.7%), whereas how-exclamatives in English occur mainly as

subordinate clauses (73.9%). The most common function for subordinate exclamative was object of verb, for both what-exclamatives and how-exclamatives:

Only now he realized what a chance he hadn't used to make his relatives and himself happy!

Even now I am appalled at how little anyone knows of what they really are.

We also think it reasonable to drop a few words to show that there are significant differences between rhetorical questions and rhetorical exclamatives, especially with respect to the role of negation and licensing of negative polarity items (NPIs). That there would be no need to provide an answer and pragmatically speaking, it is clear that rhetorical questions, being not queries from an illocutionary point of view (since they are assertive in nature), have been stated by several Linguists and Logicians (Bosque 1980; Escandell 1990, 1999; Gutiérrez, Rexach 1997, 1998; Han 1998, 2002; Asher and Reese 2005). Positive rhetorical questions have the illocutionary force of a negative assertion, while negative rhetorical questions have the illocutionary force of a positive assertion (Sadock 1971), as the following examples below demonstrate:

When did your mother lift a finger for you?

Who would give a red cent for that player?

What hasn't Juan done for Mary?

Hasn't one and the same God created all of us?

These rhetorical questions respectively assert or presuppose the following propositions: "Your mother never did anything to help you / Juan has (always) done/help Mary a lot/ (Everybody knows that) all the people / the rich and the poor were created by one and the same God; nobody would give a red cent for that player.

If to consider the main characteristics of rhetorical statements, we are to point out the following syntactic and semantic properties which they share with standard exclamatives: (i) They express factive propositions, (ii) they only allow gradable adjectives and adverbs ; (iii) they have a high degree interpretation and (iv) there is a constituent obligatorily attached to a focus position (Bartra and Vilalba 2007);

For Zanuttini and Portner (2003), semantically rhetorical exclamatives are exclamatory sentences whose meaning is normally opposite of the one literally expressed , i.e., the speaker expresses an emotive attitude toward a proposition that appears to be the polar reverse of the one expressed e.g.,

You are not an idiot at all!

One could claim that this property is due to a covert or underlying negative operator, i.e., one that is not operational in syntax, but is pragmatically active. More interestingly, this negative element has narrow sense: The scopal domain of this negative operator is not the whole proposition. Its scope affects only the property elicited in the exclamation, e.g. uttering an exclamation below, the speaker is communicating that the least expected property that anybody may attribute to C. Schiffer is the property of being ugly:

That Claudia Schiffer is nothing but a real disappointment to her family!

But in “Real Madrid played really well!”, the speaker may express her disappointment about the fact that real Madrid played worse than expected.

An exclamation such as “You arranged such a nice party!” also implicates criticism when the event referred to turns out to be a real disaster, while in “You proved to be a really smart guy”, irony, as some linguists state (Paradis and Willners 2006; Giora et al. (2005), has mitigating effects attenuating the impact of the speaker's judgment on the addressee; nevertheless, such sentences can also be used to insult or make fun of somebody. More than that, certain rhetorical questions have an exclamatory content and can express an emotive state (surprise, anger, etc). e.g.

When did I say something like that?/!

How come nobody was coming!

When negation occurs in an exclamatory sentence, it tends to be expletive (Espinal 1997; Portner and Zanuttini 2000; Villaba 2004). In such cases, as Andueza and Gutierrez-Rexach (2010: 23) argue, it makes no contribution to the interpretation of the whole sentence. e.g.

What lies haven't we heard from Juan?/!

The Turkish exclamatory construction “Söylemediğin bir şey bırakmadın ki” instantiates the topical proposition “Her şeyi söyledin” and the other to express the speaker's epistemic stance (“I still don't believe my ears”). Although this construction does not overtly reflect this division one can analyze the scalar proposition as an unlinked topic, and the following (covertly understood) part as providing additional information about this point (i.e.) expressing the speaker's attitude toward this proposition). or in the other Turkish example (“kimleri görmedik ki”) the widespread use of question forms in exclamation, both direct and indirect, has a straightforward semantico-pragmatic basis. To put it otherwise, the use of hidden exclamatives (where the attitude of the speaker to what has occurred does not find its overt or explicit expression) as exclamatory complements are widespread in all languages evidencing that an interpretively: Vague exclamatives have the same indeterminacy as the question-form complement “I can't believe how she treats as compared to “how you dare treat us so wildly!”

For Collins (2005: 4) exclamation marks do not serve to advance a discourse informationally, but rather to express the speakers' affective stance or an attitude, often reinforced by an interjection as in:

Oh, how she wished she would (not) have met him that night!

The event or state towards which the speaker's attitude is expressed is presented in the form of presupposed open propositions, and thus is backgrounded as uncontroversial information by the speaker. For another, exclamative clauses are unable to serve as answers to questions [because the information which provides the answer to a question will normally be asserted rather than, presupposed]. e.g. "what a strong performance she gave!" is not an answer to the question "Did she give a strong performance?":

Finally, the value of the variable expressed by the exclamative phrase is not specified, simply interpretable as extraordinary. Thus, "How impolite he is" implicates that the property denoted by the exclamative phrase lies at the extreme end of some contextually given scale, that it is greater than any alternatives that one might consider. It is from this scalar implicature that the affective stance associated with exclamative utterances derives (Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996: 384; Collins 2005: 5). Some writers are uncritically specific in describing this stance as, for example, one of "surprise" or unexpectedness. However, in observing "what a delicious dinner you've made!" Zanuttini and Portner (2003: 54) point out that a speaker "doesn't mean to imply that he or she didn't expect a good dinner". Rather, the speaker implies that the tastiness of the dinner exceeds the range of possibilities previously under consideration, presumably something like the range of tastiness (i.e. "viable") the speaker has experienced at other people's houses. It also in no way needs to imply that the speaker expected anything less at this house.

3.3 The components of negation

Some scholars understand negation in a broader sense and argue that the components of negation are mainly known under the terms "denial /rejection", "disagreement", "absence of somebody or something" (see the "Negation in Existentials" section) and "an opposite idea or quality" (Maclin 1996: 204; Rzygov et al: in progress).

Denial (from Latin "denegare") means the act of denying or contradiction: that a declaration or the fact stated is not true: opposed to affirmation (WNTCD 1983: 485). This term denotes one of the explicit concepts of the notion "implication" ("assertion" being its other prior concept). Thus "John is not married" corresponds to the affirmative sentence "John is

married” through explicitly denying whatever is explicitly asserted by the corresponding affirmative sentence. In terms of this approach we can construct the semantically more interesting notion of implicit assertion and denial or implication. E.g. “The previous novel of this writer was more interesting than his last novel” can be made explicitly negative as “This author's last novel is not as interesting as his previous novel” (Lyons1995: 445).

Investigating denial as a sociological strategy widely used in the expression and defence of ideologies, Van Dijk claims that people, well aware of conflicting ideologies also know that their expression of specific opinions may be “heard” as expressions of normatively unacceptable ideology. Opposite ideologies are usually reflected in the argumentative, explanatory of legitimating discourse of group members sharing the ideologies thus criticized, for instance in well-known disclaimers such as “I am not racist, but ...” (Van Dijk 1998: 100-1).

Interpreting “denial” in the sense of “double negative” (i.e., “double concord” in its “neutralizing potential”), Huddleston (1984: 423) states that negatives “doesn’t know” and “nothing” in the sentence “He does not know nothing about it” would only be used as a denial- i.e., a contradiction of a previous explicit or at least implicit negative assertion- in this case a denial of the proposition “he knows nothing about it”. Logically, the two negatives cancel each other out and the sentence with them is equivalent to the positive statement “He knows something about it” though from a systematic point of view the negatives can hardly cancel each other in other languages, ... for instance, in Turkish or in Russian (Rzayev et al: in progress).

As Khoo states (2015: 517), we usually express “disagreement” with someone using words like “no”, “false,” and “wrong”, which express that they reject the expressed assertion. “Rejecting” is “contradicting” in the sense that “to reject an assertion just is to claim what is asserted by it is false” (Ibid: 517).

A prime facie motivation for “rejecting is contradicting” is the fact that it accounts for the “contrast” between minimal pairs like the following: “A” and “B” are wondering whether the bank is open (it’s Saturday). “A” has just called a friend who told him that the bank was open last Saturday.

A: The Bank is open today.

B¹: No, the bank might be open today. Banks are never open on national holidays and we still do not know whether today is a national holiday. In the example, B’s rejection of A’s assertion is felicitous, but B clearly does not claim that the bank is “not open”. To see this, notice the contrast between B’s rejection in the following manner (comparing it with B’s answer in the previous sentence):

B².# That's false, the bank might be open today. Banks are never open on national holidays and we still don't know whether today is a national holiday.

In the last case (B2) claims that the bank is not open today, which clashes with her subsequent claim that the bank might be open today. Nothing like this clash is felt in B1 utterance. But since B1's utterance is not odd, the example shows that there are felicitous rejections in which the rejecter intuitively rejects the targeted assertion but does not claim that what is asserted is false. Here's another example:

A: Jim ate some of the cookies from last night.

B³: No, he ate all of the cookies from last night.

Again, B3's rejection of the A's assertion is suitable even though B3's does not claim that what A says is false—of course B3 believes that Jim ate “some” of the cookies since she believes that he ate “all of them.” Thus, we have two *prima facie* counterexamples to “rejecting is contradicting”. In response, the defender of “rejecting is contradicting” might hold that our examples are not genuine cases of rejections.

Pre-theoretically, to reject something is to refuse to accept it. But what is someone who rejects an assertion thereby refusing to accept? A natural place to look for answer to this question is the influential works of R. Stalnaker (1978, 1998, 2002) with the following hypothesis about what it is to say “no” in response to an assertion:

- (a) To reject a proposal is to assert that one refuses to accept it; and
- (b) In English, the answer word “no” is conventionally used to reject proposals.

Part (a) of the hypothesis connects rejecting a proposal with making it common ground that one refuses to accept it, while evidence for part (b) of the hypothesis comes from the fact that we use “no” to reject different kinds of proposals, both linguistic and non-linguistic. However, it doesn't follow from “the Rejection Hypothesis” that every utterance of “no” in response to an assertion results in rejecting it, or that uttering “no” in response to an assertion is the only way to reject it. For instance, if asked a “Yes-No” question, “No” has both uses:

A: Did Bill quit smoking?

B: No.

C: No, your question is out of place- he never smoked in the first place!

The resulting theory (acceptance + The Rejections Hypothesis) advocated by Khoo (2015: 15-16) entails that one way to reject an assertion is to say “No” to it, and that you ought to do so if you want to make it common ground that “P” not be common ground in your conversation.

3.4 “Contrast” Based negation Via “But”

Our analysis of the contrastive connector “but” is based on the observation that (i) the contrast induced by “but” relates to the information structure of the conjuncts and (ii) the use of “but” requires a denial with respect to an implicit question. For Umbach (2005: 207), “but” combines additively (as in “and/also”) and exclusion (as in “only”) and includes “semantic opposition”, “denial of expectation”, and “topic change”. The “concessive” use is also typical (though not so frequently) for “but” Robin Lakoff, for instance, proposed to distinguish between two types of “but”: “semantic-opposition- but”, which conjoins two semantically contrasting clauses, and “denial of expectation-but” for which the contrast is speaker dependent, in the sense that the opposition derives from certain “feelings” or “expectation” of the speakers (Lakoff 1971: 132-133).

Wilson also recognizes the two distinct functions of “but” (Wilson 1975: 118). Lakoff interpreted the 2nd type of “but” in terms of “presupposition”. For him the sentence “John is a republican, but he is honest (p but q) presupposes a generally acknowledged interpretation like “Republicans are dishonest”! From this it can be deduced that “If John is a republican, then John is not honest.” That is to say, there is an underlying “expectation of the form” “if p then q”, which the sentence “p but q” is intended to deny, in some way. Accordingly, Lakoff assumes that the general principle for the occurrence of “but” is that when “S1 and S2” is asserted with one or more presuppositions from which Exp. (S1→S2) can be deduced, then “but” can replace “and” the sentence will be grammatical relative to those presuppositions (Lakoff 1971: 67).

For Umbach, due to the contrastive accents in the topic parts, the answers in each of (1) – (3) question-answer dialogues have to comprise at least two conjuncts, otherwise Adam would ask for a continuation: “and/but what..?”

In (1) Adam asks about all the children, and Ben addresses only a subset of the children in the first conjunct and the remaining in the second conjunct. In (2), though Adam asks about small children only, Ben first refers to the bigger ones, and Adam has to wait for the second conjunct to get the required information. In (3), Adam's question is answered by the first conjunct and the second conjunct offers information Adam did not ask for. Either way, in each of the dialogues (1)-(3) Adam's question is completely answered in the end:

- (1) a. Adam: What did the children do today?
b. Ben: The small children stayed at home and/but the bigger ones went to the ZOO
- (2) a. Adam: What did the small children do today?
b. Ben: The bigger children went to the zoo, but/and the small ones stayed at home.

- (3)
- a. Adam: What did the children do today?
 - b. Ben: The small children stayed at home, but/and?? The bigger ones went to the zoo.

Contrary to the commonly accepted assumption (“that in a coherent question-answer dialogue the answer has to refer to the subject matter of the question”), in (2) and (3), information about an additional topic is provided without rendering the answers unacceptable. Comparing (1) and (2)/(3), we observe that in the latter case the use of “but” instead of “and” is obligatory (or, at least strongly preferred). In fact, “but” here indicates a topic change. For Umbach (2005: 208), a “but-sentence” has to include a denial with respect to an implicit question relating to the alternatives given by the foci of the conjuncts. In (2), for example, the focus in the “small children” triggers the presupposition that there exist other (groups of the aforementioned) children the speaker also wants to talk about. As Krifka argues (1999), contrastive topics must comply with a “distinctiveness condition” requiring that they are subject to different rheme predications. Assuming that a sentence is an answer to a “possibly implicit) question, the role of the contrastive topic consists in indicating that the answer is a partial one. For example, in (1b) the answer given in the first conjunct is partial with respect to the question in (1a), since it is entailed by the entire answer.

We find two more types of approaches concerning the semantics and pragmatics of “but” (in addition to Lakoff’s and Huddleston’s interpretations):

(1) A contrast indicated by “but” has to involve conjuncts which are similar in the some respects and dissimilar in other respects. This view goes back to Mann and Thompson (1988) and elaborated in, e.g., Asher (1993) requiring conjuncts to be structurally similar and semantically dissimilar for a contrast to be licensed. According to the second one, a contrast expresses a denial of expectation, the first conjunct triggering an expectation refuted by an inference from the second conjunct: “but” presupposes a proposition R such that “P” implies not-R and “Q” implies R. In the case of “Q” being equal to R, the contrast is construed as a concession (Winter and Rimon 1994; Grofe et al 1997).

As Lang (1984) assumes, coordinated elements, first, have to be semantically independent, neither of them subsuming the other, and, secondly, there has to be a “common integrator”, i.e. a concept subsuming both conjuncts, This can be demonstrated in the examples below:

- 4. a. John bought the beer, and/but Mary bought the port.
- b. John only paid for the beer, not for the port.

Lang’s coordination conditions are genuine conditions on alternatives and apply to coordination because coordinated elements constitute alternatives of each other. Being

required for “and” and “but”, “similarity plus “dissimilarity” constitutes a prerequisite for the use of “but”, but it does not characterize “but” as opposed “and”.

As for “the denial-of-expectation” account, contextual or world knowledge cannot be decisive for the use of “but”, which is also demonstrated by the example below:

5. a. Adam: Did John clean up his room and wash the dishes?

- e. Ben: [Yes] John cleaned up his room, but [no] he didn't wash the dishes.
- c. [Yes] John cleaned up his room, but [no] he skipped the washing up.
- d. [No] John didn't clean up his room, but [yes] he did the washing up.
- e. [Yes] John cleaned up his room and [yes] he washed the dishes.

The answers by a “but-conjunction” relate to the question as follows:

- (i) If the question in (5.a) is answered by confirming both conjuncts, the use of “but” instead of “and” is unacceptable (as in answer 5.b),
- (ii) if one part of the question is confirmed and the other part denied, the use of “but” is perfect (as in answers c., d., and e.)

From the examples, it can be concluded that if a “but-sentence” is an appropriate answer to a question comprising two conjuncts, one of the conjuncts will be confirmed and the other one will be denied. This characteristic is central to the analysis of “but” because it clearly separates “but” from “and”. It is called “confirm + deny condition”, the contrasted elements of which have to be mutual alternatives in the sense that they require similarity + dissimilarity.

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