ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME

AFGHANISTAN AND CHINA RELATIONS AMID THE U.S. AND NATO PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Master's Thesis

Mohammad Yousuf Ibrahimkhil

Ankara- 2021

ATILIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME

AFGHANISTAN AND CHINA RELATIONS AMID THE U.S. AND NATO PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Master's Thesis

Mohammad Yousuf Ibrahimkhil

Supervisor
Asst. Prof. Dr. Nilgün Eliküçük Yildirim

Ankara- 2021

APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE

This is to certify that this thesis titled “Afghanistan and China Relations Amid the US and NATO Presence in Afghanistan” and prepared by Mohammad Yousuf IBRAHIMKHIL meets with the commitee’s approval unanimously/by a majority vote as Master’s Thesis in the field of International Relations following the successful defense of the thesis conducted on 29/01/2021.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gözde YILMAZ (Chair)

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nilgün ELİKÜÇÜK YILDIRIM (Supervisor)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali İbrahim AKKUTAY (Member)

Prof. Dr. Dilawver TENGİLİMOĞLU (Director)

ETHICS DECLARATION

I hereby declare that:

- I prepared this thesis in accordance with Atılım University Graduate School of Social Sciences Thesis Writing Directive,
- I prepared this thesis within the framework of academic and ethics rules,
- I presented all information, documents, evaluations and findings in accordance with scientific ethical and moral principles,
- I cited all sources to which I made reference in my thesis,
- The work of art in this thesis is original, I hereby acknowledge all possible loss of rights in case of a contrary circumstance. (in case of any circumstance contradicting with my declaration)

Mohammad Yousuf IBRAHIMKHIL

ÖZ

AFGANİSTAN'DAKİ ABD VE NATO VARLIĞI KAPSAMINDA AFGANİSTAN VE ÇİN İLİŞKİLERİ

Mohammad Yousuf IBRAHIMKHIL, Sosyal Bilimler Yüksek Lisansı, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Danışman: Prof.Dr.Nilgün ELİKÜÇÜK YILDIRIM, Ocak 2021

Afganistan, Güney Asya ile Orta Asya arasında stratejik bir kuşakta yer almaktadır. Stratejik konumu, komşu ülkeleri ve büyük güçleri cezbetmektedir. Tarihi açıdan bakıldığında Afgan halkının yerleştiği bölgede çok sayıda mücadele, savaş ve çatışma yaşamıştır. Bu nedenle, bu gekilmeler istikrarsızlığa, güvensizliğe neden olmuş, bu da bölgeyi olumsuz etkilemiştir. Afganistan, Sovyetler Birliği'nden ABD ve NATO'ya kadar birçok yabancı güçle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Çin'in bu denklemde farklı bir konumu bulunmaktadır. Afganistan-Çin ilişkileri 1955 yılında diplomatik bağlarla tesis edilmiştir. 1955'ten önce coğrafi, ekonomik ve stratejik nedenlerle iki ülkenin resmi bağları bulunmamktaydı. İlişkilerin kurulmasından bu yana her iki ülkedeki siyasi değişiklikler, ülke politikalarının yolunu değiştirmekte ve ilişkileri etkilemektedir. Özellikle, Çin'in batısındaki komşularıyla ilişkilerini geliştirmeye yönelik yeni yaklaşımı olan Batı Kalkınma Stratejisi, ilişkileri canlandırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez Afgan-Çin siyasi, ekonomik, ticari, kültürel ve askeri ilişkilerini 11 Eylül sonrası dönem açısından tartışacaktır. Afganistan Hükümeti ile Taliban arasındaki Barış ve Uzlaşma Süreci vurgulanarak Afganistan'a yönelik Çin politikası, Afganistan'ın normalleşmesine odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, tez Afganistan ile Çin arasındaki ilişkilerin birkaç on yıl içinde nasıl geliştiğini de değerlendirecektir. Çin'in Afganistan'daki çıkarlarının ve bölgedeki güvenlik endişelerinin gerekçelerini ele alınacaktır. Bu çalışma, her iki ülkenin öndegelen politikalarını ve istikrarı sağlamada farklı yaklaşımların rolünü analiz edecektir. Afganistan'ın komşusu ve stratejik ortağı olarak Çin'in NATO ve ISAF birliklerinin Afganistan'dan çekilmesinin ardından oynadığı rolü gözden geçiren çalışma, Çin'in bölge ve Afganistan'daki endişelerini ve amaçlarını da ele alacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afganistan, Çin, NATO, Güney Asya, Afganistan-Çin İlişkileri

ABSTRACT

AFGHANISTAN AND CHINA RELATIONS AMID THE U.S. AND NATO PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is located in a geostrategic belt between South Asia and Central Asia. Its strategic location attracts the neighbour countries and great powers. From a historical perspective, the region where Afghan people settle has experienced many struggles, wars and conflicts. Therefore, these have caused instability, insecurity, which had a negative impact on the region. Afghanistan has faced many foreign powers from the Soviets to the U.S. and NATO. China has a different position in this case. Afghanistan-China relations were established with diplomatic ties in 1955. Before 1955 due to the geographic, economic and strategic reasons Afghanistan and China did not have any official relations. Since starting of relations, the political transformations in both countries changed the path of countries policies and effect the relations. In particular the Western Development Strategy, the new approach of China regarding developing relations with neighbours, revitalizes the relations. In this context, this thesis will discuss the political, economic, trade, cultural and military Afghan-Sino relations in terms of post 9/11 period. Chinese policy towards Afghanistan with an emphasis on Peace and Reconciliation Program between Afghan government and Taliban focuses the normalization of Afghanistan. In addition, the thesis will assess how the relationships between Afghanistan and China have developed in the a few decades. It will claim reasons for China's interests in Afghanistan as well its security concern in region. This paper will analyze the foreign policies of both countries and the role of different approaches in providing stability. Reviewing Chinese role as Afghanistan's neighbour, strategic partner, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of NATO/ISAF troops from Afghanistan, the study will also address Chinese concerns and aims in the region and Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, China, NATO, South Asia, Afghanistan-China Relations

To

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my honorable supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Nilgün ELİKÜÇÜK YILDIRIM. With her kind help and support I was able to write my thesis. Without her generous support and help, I might not be able to do this task.

It worth mentioning to thank the thesis committee that gave me a great opportunity to do this wonderful thesis on the topic (Afghanistan and China Relations amid the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan), which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to know about so many new things I am really thankful to them.

I would also like to thank my parents for their unequivocal, unique and generous support and help they have always extended throughout my life and especially at the stage of writing my thesis.

I would also like to thank my friends who helped me a lot in finalizing this thesis within the limited time frame.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3

THE U.S. AND NATO PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF CHINA

LIST OF TABLE

LIST OF SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS

TDOA	Time Difference of Arrival
AOA	Angle of arrival

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan stretches in a geostrategic location between South Asia and Central Asia. Its strategic location attracts the neighbour countries and great powers. From a historical perspective, the region where Afghan people settle has experienced many struggles, wars and conflicts. The history of Afghanistan can be traced back to 500 BCE. It was time when land, consisting presently Afghanistan, was ruled under the Achaemenid Empire. Historical evidences provide that the urbanized and advanced culture in that land was existed between 3000 and 2000 BCE. When the Achaemenid Empire fall in the Battle of Gaugamela in 330 BCE, Alexander the Great arrived in Afghanistan. After that historical event, Afghanistan has witnessed the rise of many empires, including the Greco-Bactrians, Kushans, Hephthalites, Safavids, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghorids, Khaljis, Timurids, Mughals, Hotakis and Durranis. In this respect Afghanistan can be regarded as a cradle of civilizations beyond the devastation of last century (UNESCO, 1994).

Afghanistan has been a geostrategically significant place in history. The land was as a gateway to India, connecting the ancient Silk Road, which carried trade from the West to China. As Afghanistan was situated on the route of trade and migration, it may be called the Central Asian roundabout since routes converge from the Middle East, from the Indus Valley through the passes over the Hindu Kush, from the Far East via the Tarim Basin, and from the adjacent Eurasian Steppe. Therefore, these have caused instability, insecurity, which had a negative impact on the region. Afghanistan gradually became a buffer zone between the British and Russian empires and gained its reclamation of Independence from British Empire in 1919 (Saikal, 2004).

A short-term trial of democracy ended with the coup in 1973 and the communist counter-coup in 1978. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 with a long and devastating war in order to support the Afghan communist regime, which it forced to remain under its rule. When the Soviets came under pressure by the anti-communist mujahedeen supported by international powers, they left the country in 1989. After a series of civil wars, Kabul took control of the Taliban in 1996. The

Taliban, which appeared in 1994 to finalize the civil war and conflict in the country, was a radical movement supported by Pakistan. This move captured 90% of the country's territory by 2001 (Atay, 2010).

After the terror attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, the Taliban regime, allegedly hiding Osama bin Laden, was overthrown as a result of military intervention by the United States and allied states and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The Bonn Conference created a process for the political restructuring of the country, including the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004 and the National Assembly elections in 2005. Despite the gains in forming a stable central government, the ongoing insurgency by the Taliban in different provinces, particularly in the south and east of the country, posed serious problems for the Afghan government. In early 2014, Afghanistan was going through a crucial and challenging time, as NATO and the United States handed over security responsibility to the Afghan National Security and Defence Forces (Çakmak, 2003).

In this case Afghanistan has confronted problems generating by many foreign powers from the Soviets to the U.S. and NATO. China has a different position in this picture. Afghanistan-China relations in terms of diplomatic ties date back to 1955. Since establishment of relations, the political approaches from both countries and the international conjuncture redefine the path of countries policies and effect the relations. Dating back to the time of Silk Road, the relations of Afghanistan and China had been located on the same line. Nowadays, there has been another project entitled as the Western Development Strategy developed by China in order to develop its economic and security necessities in the South Asia region. In particular, the new approach of China regarding developing relations with neighbours aims to revitalize the relations with the region's countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Nepal (Huasheng, 2012).

In this context, this thesis will discuss political, economic, commercial, cultural and military relations of Afghanistan and China in terms of post 9/11 period and ISAF and NATO presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the presence, attacks of Taliban in the

region and its capture of the Afghan administration had changed the approach of the Allies and China.

The first chapter discuss generally outlook of the region in terms of Afghanistan and China. The emergence of Chinese foreign policy revived in the last few decades of the 20th century. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has focused on promoting China's economic development while maintaining its political and social stability in China. The transformation of China played a significant role in Chinese foreign policy and enabled China to support economic growth and stability in the international order. In this case, China took steps to meet international economic change in terms of increasing the development of China. For the foreign policy of China, it is considered that foreign direct investments, financial or in-kind aids and technological supports have been critical in China's economic growth. China has taken into consideration Asia as a hub and various other international production and trade networks (Seerat, 2015).

On the other hand, China has direct and indirect effects on South Asia. Chinese direct effects can be visible through its evolving position in the South Asian Regional Cooperation Association (SAARC), involvements in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the future role of SAARC (Freeman, 2018). In the Chinese foreign policy there are "three evil forces" in the region. China assesses to suppress ethnic separatism, religious extremism and terrorism in the context of the South Asia. These problems and evaluations of China determine the interests of China and the countries of South Asia. Moreover, the Chinese approach towards Afghanistan analyzes in the first chapter. Dating back to 1950s, the relations between China and Afghanistan can be discussed in the beginning of the 21st century. The attacks of U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan were widely criticized by China despite of its lack of military participation in the war management of Afghanistan. The concerns and influences of China in Afghanistan and in the region can be laid in security and economic influence. As a security concern, the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, lack of security in the Wahkan Corridor and regional issues related to Xinjiang and Uighurs constitutes a problematic area for China (Sutter, 2012).

In the second chapter Afghanistan-China relations are discussed in depth to understand the relation's background from the 19th century to the end of the Soviet Invasion, in the aftermath of the Soviet Invasion, Taliban period and the last 20 years. The withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 gradually increased Chinese security concerns. The Afghan National Unity Government's foreign policy and its close ties with China could play a significant role in the stability and development of Afghanistan and the region. Moreover, in this part of this thesis Chinese strategic interests in Afghanistan will be analyzed in detail.

The third chapter the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan, and the repercussions for China will be assessed in terms of ISAF and NATO. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group among Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China try to meet the need of revive the peace process between the Afghan government and Taliban. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group also maintains prosperity, stability and peace in the region.

In addition, this thesis will refer how the relationships between Afghanistan and China have developed in a few decades. The study will assert reasons for China's interests in Afghanistan as well its security concern in region. This paper will analyze the foreign policies of both countries and the role of different approaches in providing stability. In the aftermath of the withdrawal of NATO/ISAF troops from Afghanistan maintaining the Chinese role as Afghanistan's neighbour, strategic partner, the thesis will also address Chinese concerns and aims in the region and Afghanistan.

In this study, the qualitative research method will be used. In terms of detailing the Afghan and Chinese relations, historical background of the relations and Chinese perspective to the region secondary sources will be discussed and the attitudes or characteristics of the states will be assessed. The study focuses on printed materials, United Nations (UN) and NATO publications and reports, books, articles, internet publications and related newspaper reports, magazines, reports and books by using Turkish and English sources.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL OUTLOOK ON AFGHANISTAN, CHINA AND THE REGION

1.1. Contemporary Politics and International Relations of China

In order to understand China's foreign policy, it is necessary to examine its history briefly. Throughout the years, in China, the middle kingdom was the world's richest, developed and powerful civilization. China is one of the four ancient civilizations of the world. With examples such as the Great Wall and the Four Inventions, it has a history of more than 5000 years (Komberg and Faust, 2005).

Particularly four inventions as papermaking, printing, gunpowder and the compass led the world's civilization to a next level in developing for writing, discovering and waging war. In the past, China considered itself to be the cultural center of the universe as one of the civilization centers of the world, and claimed that other nations whose origin was not China were barbarians as usual in many civilized communities. Throughout history, China has chosen to see its empire as the ruler of all humanity. Thus, China was only in a relationship with the tribute-paying states. The Eastern Han Dynasty period is known as the golden age of China, with its brilliant military and cultural achievements (UNESCO, 1994).

With the discovery of the Silk Road, extensive connections were established with the west. With the arrival of Buddhism, this period was a term when trade and foreign cultures were brought. According to Chinese sources, A.C. between 166 and 284, many Roman ambassadors came to this country. Nevertheless, it has made itself a developed country in the world by making efforts for the Chinese people to connect with other nations and learn different civilization from them. The discovery of the Silk Road also allowed the Chinese people to trade with Central Asian nations (Britannica, 2019).

Western Han dynasty began to rule in 202 B.C. and ended in 220 A.C. This period is considered to be the beginning of China's foreign relations, particularly with the Middle East and Central Asia abroad. The Western Han dynasty was terminated by Qin in 1644 and the Qin dynasty was under the pressure of the West in the 19th century. In the environment of the 19th century, Western forces managed to establish colonies in the coastal regions of China. Because of this, the country became poor and weakened, people suffered more than war and chaos. In addition, the Japanese took control of traditional areas of China, like the islands of Taiwan in the Eastern China Sea. In 1840, the opium war between China and Britain ended with China's defeat, and China was suddenly opened up to the world, ending with an unequal difficult treaty (Atay, 2010).

In the past 30 years, China's transformation in foreign policy has changed significantly. As Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai left the scene in the 1970s, the Cultural Revolution became stagnant. These political developments made foreign observers had no idea about the future. Mao's elected caliph, Huna Guofeng, was a weak, compromising candidate. Soon after, he was exiled from the political scene by Deng Xiaoping (Torigian, 2019).

Deng played a role in the dramatic changes of China if he was one of the first members and observers of the communist leadership. Mao had built relations with the USA in 1972. However, this was seen by many scholars as only a pragmatic way to deal with the Soviet threat. Although Deng Xiaoping strengthened his power in 1978, there were still changes to the rapid succession system. Deng gradually set up communes in the rural areas of China to establish a market to promote agricultural production. He also built particular economic zones on the east coast of China. He made a visit to the U.S., which no Chinese leader made in 30 years by the Chinese communist administration in the early 1979 (Dennon, 2007).

Furthermore, despite 20 years of Chinese support for his leadership in Hanoi, Deng ordered the invasion of Vietnam after returning from Washington in January 1979, as retaliation for Cambodia's Vietnamese occupation. The attacks in Vietnam

provided all international relations experts with signs that China's foreign policy would focus rather on communist solidarity rather than communist decision taken by the Chinese Administration (Dennon, 2007).

Initiative pragmatic steps taken in the economy and foreign policy by Deng Xiaoping were continued in the same balance by his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Under the management of Jiang Zemin and prime minister Zhu Rongji in the mids of 1990s, the steps for change accelerated and caused large foreign investments in China. According to the expert analysis of China's foreign policy, it indicates that there was more moderate responsibility for China's past superiority and greater integration with the current world order. Chinese leaders, following a strategy to deal with world conditions pragmatically, faced international norms and followed international peace developments and the harmony between China and neighbouring countries and other related powers, especially the U.S.A. and Russia. The evaluations of China's contemporary foreign policies demonstrate the eve of Chinese relations spreading with the international organization dealing with security, economic, political, and cultural and other problems, and the Chinese interaction with the rest world through economic changes in a period of globalization (Grant, 2012; 53-54). These developments on changing parameters of Chinese policy referred a continuous trend on predictability in the decisions of Chinese policy and in their decision-making process.

In general, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been concentrated on promoting China's economic development while its leaders maintain their political and social stability in China. Their demand of change and support played an important role in Chinese foreign policy and enabled China to support economic growth and stability in the international order. These have been done to partially active and generally by reassuring neighbour countries and other related world powers through the moderate diplomacy of China. The Chinese leaders do not regard China's economic, military, political power and influence as a threat for the rest of the world. They try to verify that the new position and attitude of the Chinese foreign policy

should be considered as an opportunity for a greater world development and international trade (Dennon, 2007).

In this process, international system takes into consideration that the Chinese diplomacy has a negative approach as an increasing power, emphasizes the norms of regional and international organizations and their adjustments in order to guarantee the system's future. China has made great efforts to meet international economic change in order to increase the development of China. For Chinese foreign policy, it is regarded that foreign direct investments, aids, technological support of foreigners have been critical in China's economic growth. China is a hub of Asia and various other international production and trade networks. China is the third largest nation that engage trade in the world and the first nation to consume goods and services in the world. China today assesses economic development as an essential basis for the CCP management to remain stable among Chinese entrepreneurs, essentially depending on the stable and robust world economy. At the same time, because of the world economy is increasingly dependent on China, the Chinese government has a significant impact on the international economy as a prominent center of production in the world, as well as a tremendous market with a stock market balance on increasingly outstanding positive trade and large foreign reserves (Chenggang, 2011: 1099-1101).

On the other hand, nationalism, ethnic issues and security priorities of China have an important place in contemporary foreign policy. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government was declared communism as the source of ideological unification and legitimacy, it gave greater importance to the rise of nationalism among the Chinese people. The purification and homogenization of the country is one of the most prominent instruments of the CCP administration in the context of nationalism. Chinese leaders resort to challenging measures, if necessary, to achieve improved military power and fixed national goals. With regard to Taiwan, it can even oppose the power of the US and its allies (Dennon, 2007). China has prevented from independence and separation from Taiwan and other autonomous regions and the political situation in Hong Kong. Moreover, the recent developments in the Xinjiang region indicates and some experts claim that China follows a policy of

assimilation and purification of the region by insisting the re-education system in detention camps (Albert, 2020).

More broadly, as Chinese leaders say, it aims to build national, economic, military and political power; however, China's role as a great power in Asia and the world is not yet clearly defined in these issues. The Chinese strategy in foreign relations is discussed among scholars and experts. They have different interpretations of China's foreign policies in the 21st century, and some of them have doubts about the continuity of China's recent initiatives and leaderships in many sectors (Johnston, 2003: 8-9).

On the other hand, some experts argue that Chinese leaders believe that they pursue a company strategy that might be good in the end. In addition this, some scholars and experts assert that China's initiatives may change partly great uncertainties and changes may push Chinese foreign policy in different directions from the past. However, scholars and experts have recently evaluated their open strategy, which is thought to have faced international reactions that were difficult to expect from China, under the influence and power of major China's interests and changeable actions. The Chinese strategy on "Peaceful Development Path of China" in foreign relations was announced to the public by the CCP's state council. Catching peaceful developments highlighted by this strategy was a consistent and ongoing pursuit of international events that lasted for 10 years. The article published in China's official and private perspective in 2006 called the Chinese foreign policy highlights that support China's strategy in world affairs (Zhang and Feng, 2019).

To sum up, the pressure on Chinese leaders to avoid sanctions and strong pressure that would prevent China's growth and development, during the Deng Xiaoping leadership in the 1990s was remained. The foreign policy of China is maintained with a local agent; Chinese leaders mostly concentrate on the country's economic and political transformation. All Chinese foreign policy aims at reliability and regional integration of the country's economic development (Dethlefsen, 2004).

The main issue of Chinese foreign policy is also the peace and development that guarantees China's own development and commercial connections. A peaceful and stable world is considered as essential for China in order to achieve its goals as a commercial leader of the world and limited wealthy society. In this context the Chinese government officials therefore strive to establish multilateral or unilateral relations with the regional and other countries (Huashen, 2012).

1.2. General South Asia Policy of China

1.2.1. China's south asia policy

South Asia and China today have a lot to learn from each other. The century, especially in view of last decade developments noted that China's arrival as an economic power has been assessed as a threat to the other powers' dominance. However, the economic influence of China is favourable to some scholars and experts. They see the Chinese developments as the subject of a "virtual trade cycle", which is beneficial to the region's less developed economies. In the second group of scholars and experts claim that this assertion is valid for several countries in South Asia but not all. China has direct and indirect repercussions on South Asia. Its direct influence is visible through its evolving position in the South Asian Regional Cooperation Association (SAARC), engagement in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the future role of SAARC which is a regional international organization between states in South Asia such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Freeman, 2018: 87, Hu, 2010: 291).

In the Chinese foreign policy approach there are "three evil forces" in the region. China needs to suppress ethnic separatism, religious extremism and terrorism in the context of the South Asia in terms of pre-emptive actions. These problems are indirectly consistent with the interests of China and the countries of South Asia. The emergence of a "nuclear belt" is another critical issue that could increase China's participation in the South Asia. This belt encompasses India, Pakistan and probably Iran, North Korea and China. All these countries officially announced nuclear powers,

with the exception of Iran. With the exception of China, the international community does not recognize either "legitimate" nuclear power. They all share more than nuclear aspirations like borders and a hostile history. If hostilities are derived from the "nuclear belt", China may be viewed as a "stabiliser" in the region. In order to support this dissertation, the Chinese participation in the six-part talks on solving the nuclear North Korean dilemma and its so-called "silk-road diplomacy" can be exemplified in this context (Shahnawaz, 2011: 77).

The Chinese official sources do not explicitly describe China's neighbourhood as land and maritime regions adjacent to the government, which many have quoted. But Chinese experts and scholars have written about the issue. The three-circle of China neighbourhood is identified by Yuan Peng of the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). The inner ring is made up of countries that share China's land boundaries. The middle ring involves maritime nations stretching from the interior of the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and even portions of Russia and Central Asia, which are not on China land boundaries. The outer circle extends event extends to Europe, Africa and America (Peng, 2003).

In the past, some scholars have ranked South Asia seventh in the Chinese Asia policy, Northeast and Southeast Asia. Moreover, scholars like Qi Huai and others have more explicit description in terms of sub-regions. These are situated in the surrounding and neighbouring areas which are Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia and South Pacific. In this context, the Chinese "periphery" can be described as East Asia, Russia, Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia (Malik, 2001: 85).

China's relations with other countries and regions such as Europe, South-East Asia, and Africa have been the key problems since the late 1970s, they claim. However, China-South Asia has a very conventional partnership, concentrating on military and political issues (Ye, 2008). For security purposes, China has approached South Asia as a prominent region. China has been seen to rediscover the significance of South Asia recently in the international relations literature. In China's international

and neighbourhood policies, South Asia's strategic significance grew throughout the new period. President Xi Jinping's latest program, entitled as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has improved Southern Asia's strategic importance as a Chinese scholar called "rediscover South Asia's strategic status" (Kumar, 2019).

That is stressed by many scholars and experts that China and South Asia had initiated a "new spring" in their relationships. China has regularly held high-level visits with all the countries of South Asia. The strategic importance of South Asia in Chinese foreign policy is noted as "South Asia has become a crucial region for China with India rising and growing, with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and China's Western Growth Strategy beginning a new process" (Lan, 2014).

Besides this, China is facing three forms of threats within itself. The first problem is the result of China's post-Mao political economy. The Chinese economic growth is a big trend of the 21st century. For more than three decades, China has experienced almost double-digit growth, realizing it the "manufacturing hub" of global economy. The high growth rate era (1978-2011) was over however, and the Chinese government made a promise to a "new normal." Currently, the economy faces significant systemic changes, with a comparatively weak growth of 7,3% in 2014 and less than 7% in 2015 (). The Chinese model of growth has created prosperity in China, but it is also evident in regional disparity and increasing rural-urban disparities to generate significant social and developmental problems. President Xi delivered his report to its 19th Party Congress in October 2017 and emphasized that "the main contradiction facing China is that China has developed unrequitedly and inadequately to satisfy the increasing needs of the population for a better future" (Xi, 2017: 34-35).

In minority areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet, the second question comes to the Chinese agenda. In China, 55 different ethnic groups are known. These groups constitute 8,4% of the total Chinese population. The importance of the Chinese minority reaches beyond its scale. These reach to 64% of China's total territory, despite of their limited population (Ertürk, 2016). Disruptions and uprisings were considered as an indication of the size of the problem of ethnic politics in the region

occurring in Tibet, March 2008 and in Xinjiang, July 2009. The countries of South Asia share China's Tibetan border with the Xinjiang areas. South Asian countries are witnessing tangible consequences in particular on the west region of China as a result of political and security turmoil. It was claimed that in the Pakistan - Afghanistan tribal areas, the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other dissident organizations found safe haven. That was seen as a grave threat to China's national security by the CCP Administration. As national anti-terrorist initiatives China's promulgation of a range of laws, notably its latest National Security Act in July 2015 and its first anti-terrorism Law in December 2015 were taken into action (Hu, 2010).

Instability or neighbourhood violence, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, is the third obstacle. The second and third challenges facing China are also linked. Xinjiang and Tibet thus play an important part in defining Chinese strategy against South Asian neighbours. As mentioned above China policy in South Asia is shaped by two remarkable issue, economy and security. China plans to enhance its presence in the region via economic strategies such as Western Growth Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Chinese foreign policy attaches great importance to the regional security and stability, develops relations in the South Asia regarding regional organizations such as South Asian Regional Cooperation Association (SAARC) (USIP Study Group, 2020).

1.2.2. Chinese approach towards Afghanistan

Afghanistan as a land country, approximately 652,230 square kilometres, 2600 km with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the north and 2430 km with Pakistan in the southeast and 941 km with Iran in the west and east in the northeast. It has a 91 km border with Turkmenistan. According to the characteristics of Afghanistan's topography, it is geography with small but fertile river valleys, deep valleys, deserts and high plateaus. The eastern part of the country is divided by Hindu Kush and Pamir Mountains and 24000 pot high peaks. Afghanistan, the Indian continental parade, and Iran and Central Asia, having an important geostrategic position, have attracted the attention of many conquerors throughout history. The high

mountains of this country caused the independence of the people and the defeat of the great empire in history. Therefore, this country was called the cemetery of the emperors. Afghanistan has always been occupied by invaders throughout history due to its geostrategic position as the crossroads of Central Asia. This land has struggled a lot to check that the trade between South Asia and Central Asia was safer, as the cause of the occupation. In this context, the Chinese perspective cannot remain inapplicable in Afghanistan and its geostrategic and geopolitical location in south Asia (CIA World Factbook, 2020).

In history, China regarded Afghanistan as a minor diplomatic neighbour. Afghanistan was one of the first countries to recognize Mao Zedong's Communist rule in 1950. Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1955 (Reuters, 2011). Nevertheless, the diplomatic and economic relations of both countries remained impassively until 2001. Bilateral relations between China and Afghanistan started to expand only after the creation of the new government under the presidency of Hamid Karzai in 2001 (Hong, 2013).

During this period, China was not getting engaged in politics and the monitoring security situation in Afghanistan when it started seeking economic possibilities in resource-rich Afghanistan. Despite China's clandestine helping in the 1980s to prepare the Afghan Mujahedeen to wage jihad against the Soviets, the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, China has not shown much interest in joining Afghan's post-2001 military and war campaign, which is allegedly not labelled as "subordinate partner" of the western alliance. Chinese policy chose to stay unrelenting from military and efforts, political reconstruction, and economic recovery (Huasheng, 2012). Despite China's lack of military participation in the war management of Afghanistan, free rides on the US-led stabilisation efforts were widely criticized as its mineral extraction extensions were extended in Afghanistan (Hong, 2013).

Along with the economic dividends of transcontinental connectivity of China, it also has a distinct political influence over Pakistan for the gain of Afghanistan, its

spatial closeness to the war-torn nation and its record of reluctance to interfere in Afghanistan's domestic affairs. This influence may theoretically be used by China to trigger an image of peace in Afghanistan. After its formation in 2014, President Ashraf Ghani has championed China's greater role in Afghanistan, not only in fostering peace talks for a permanent settlement, but also to encourage regional cooperation and economic development. Ghani put China, among other neighbouring countries, in the first circle of participation by setting the Afghan foreign policy agenda in 2014 (US DoS, 2017).

1.2.2.1. China's security concerns

China faces an alarming prospect of a steady worsening safety status in Afghanistan and future threats to Beijing's long-term economic activities. However, its uncertainties of geographical closeness between Afghanistan and the autonomous region of Xinjiang, are the first and perhaps most convincing motivation for China's further involvement with Afghanistan. The Taliban and a host of other transnational militant outfits are based in some parts between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, extreme elements from foreign countries are dangerously conceivable, using Afghanistan as a launch pad for building ties with China's already fragile Uyghur regions. There is also a concern that the theological pressures in Pakistan and Afghanistan of pan-Islamic groups could spill into China, aggravating Xinjiang's separatism (Huasheng, 2012: 3).

In addition to the increasing trepidation among Chinese officials, many of the Uyghur in exile are stated to have been found refuge in Pakistan's Tribal Areas (FATA) and provinces in south and east of Afghanistan (Chan, 2018). Many of the militants are thought to be gathered with others such as the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan (IMU), which became part of two groups, one for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and one for Islamism in the Khorasan Province. However, several Uyghur militant groups remain focused on establishing a series of attacks aimed at China in particular, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) or East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which aims to create an East Turkistan Islamic State in Xinjiang.

In other words, China's internal security concerns for restive Xinjiang Province are the first motive for growing activities in Afghanistan and around the region (Azizi, 2018).

Different international observers and academics have argue that China's strategies for Afghanistan have largely been embedded in the imperative of suppressing terrorism in their own countries U.S. efforts and ISAF efforts. While it may justify, although in part, China's lack of involvement in security operations in Afghanistan, China considers to recalibrate its measured restraint strategy as it has recently also shown a desire to participate in security discreetly (Zetterlund, 2009).

In this context the interview of Afghan Ambassador to Beijing in September 2018 can be taken into consideration. The Afghan Ambassador expressed that in an effort to counter al-Qaeda and so called Islamic State (ISIS) militants who tried to penetrate Xinjiang via the north east bordure of Afghanistan; mountainous Wakhan Corridor, China was able to train Afghan soldiers in Chinese soil. In addition, the construction of a Chinese military base is published by foreign media and intelligence agencies worldwide for a while Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan in Wakhan Corridor. While China has consistently refuted such claims, there were reports that Chinese military vehicles are present in the region. They apparently make it easier to build the training camp in order to locate at least one battalion of soldiers at a base, followed by the necessary weapons and military machinery (Chan, 2018).

Beijing has strengthened its experience with sporadic and aggressive terrorist attacks with increasing allegedly religious radicalism and nationalism in Xinjiang. However, this creates questions about the unrest in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Central Asian countries, which could reinforce Uyghur separatist attempts in return to weaken of China's territorial integrity (Ghiasy, 2017). In this case 27 people were killed in July 2009 in the capital of Xinjiang Province of Urumqi (Chatzky and McBride, 2019). The suspected military intervention in Afghanistan by China can therefore be legitimized in the name of protecting national security in view of its derogatory appearance to those in the country. By its involvement in Afghanistan,

China aims at combating the insurgent activities of Uyghur exile fighters of ETIM operating from Afghanistan, creating a control structure on its western frontier and reinforcing the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to defend against cross-border activists. In addition to these efforts, the Chinese newly adopted strategy for manipulating the economic power that they possess in Afghanistan may justify greater military cooperation and coordination along the Wakhan to further their geopolitical aims (Safi and Alizada, 2018: 46).

1.2.2.2. China's economic ınfluence

China's deepening interest in Afghanistan can be stated not only with Chinese national security concerns but also economic interests in the region. Afghanistan is at the border between Central Asia and South Asia. In terms of being a central center for commerce and transit pass, geographically strategic location offers it a competing edge over others. Afghanistan is capable of connecting South Asian, Central Asian, West Asian, and China markets and of using its central role to fuel economic growth and development in its home region. Afghanistan also has large mineral resources of rare earth metals, iron ore, copper, lithium, and more (Stanzel, 2016).

Afghanistan has also been a significant supplier of resources. The rich natural resource base of Afghanistan, if handled properly, is capable of replacing international assistance and reducing Afghanistan's reliance on donor countries. If it's not properly run, then the nation will become more chaotic and in dispute, rebellion by illicit mining. These cases will also hinder economic growth through the same natural resources and strategic situation. Therefore, one can argue that "geography" alone can either make Afghanistan or ruin it in the context of "geography is destiny" by Middle Eastern scholar Ibn Khaldun from14th century (UN Country Team, 2013).

China conducted and also held a low profile on matters pertaining to the nation from cooperating physically in military operations in Afghanistan. However, China is becoming ever more mindful of the resulting unsafely as the removal of US troops is

expected to be inevitable, possibly jeopardizing the opportunity for expanded development cooperations between Afghanistan and China, and affecting Chinese interests in the region. Having said this, China claimed that in the absence of economic growth, only minimal security can be accomplished. The infrastructure to promote smooth trade and transport are a necessity for the war-ravaged nation to establish its economic robustness (Zia, 2019).

The unveiling of the biggest ever infrastructure construction programme, in the Economic Belt of Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road, dubbed as the Belt and Road Initiative, has been declared in 2012 by President Xi Jinping. Chinese President Xi Jinping has also named the Modern Silk Road. With BRI, China seeks to build a vast network of railways, power pipelines, roads and smooth frontier crossings and, in essence, "break the Asian bottleneck" pitched by President Xi (Zia, 2019). The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding of 2016 (MoU), a promise made between China and Afghanistan in order to jointly foster collaboration and marks a major step for the potential inclusion of Afghans on the margin of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though it initially seemed to ignore Afghanistan, with an emphasis on traversing through Pakistan and Central Asia. China is connected to Northern Afghanistan with the Sino-Afghanistan Special Railway Transport Project and the Five Nations Railway Project, by means of a mutually beneficial China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connection. In the Badakhshan province of Afghanistan, China and Afghanistan have launched a fibre-optic link via a Wakhan Corridor (RFERL, 2019).

In this case, there are a variety of challenges. Although linkage with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) may be one of Afghanistan's most feasible routes for inclusion in the BRI, tensions with Pakistan minimize the possibility of such an agreement. It is obvious that China does not wish to lose the chance to take advantage of Afghanistan's geographical position and its projected US$ 1 trillion untapped treasury of natural assets for its own market ambitions. Although, particularly in view of the 33 other participating countries attach importance to this project, Afghanistan does not seem to be an integral component of the BRI. In addition, the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the immense internal infrastructure gap and politically

vulnerable links with Pakistan preclude Afghanistan from undertaking and ultimately retaining potentially profitable operations (Pandey, 2019).

However, in the previous two decades, economic and commercial ties between Afghanistan and China have greatly strengthened and are representing the upward trend. China has been a major trading partner with Afghanistan since the start of the war in 2001, and the bilaterally trade amount between China and Afghanistan was identified by the Chinese Foreign Ministry (Basit, 2019). In 2017, trade amount between two countries hit 544 million US dollars. There have been several changes that indicate a desire to reinforce international cooperation, the setting-up of the Chinese-Afghan economic committee in 2006, the agreement signed in 2010, and the free customs trade agreement signed in 2017. Moreover, Afghanistan is anticipated to export 23000 tons of pine nuts and saffron as well as various gemstones to China annually by opening the China-Afghanistan Air Corridor, supplying an enormous demand of the Chinese commodities (Awan, 2020).

1.2.3. China-Pakistan relations

China and Pakistan begin their diplomatic relations on 21 May 1951. The friendship has returned to centuries-long trading links as Chinese businessmen tour Pakistan on their business trips across the old Silk Road to the Middle East, Europe and the rest of the world. That is known that more than 2000 years ago prominent personalities like the Fa Xian and Xuan Zang monks visited sites today known as Pakistan (Fair, 2014).

The current literature draws the importance of the geostrategic and security factors, particularly shared Indian concerns, in shaping China-Pakistan ties. The adverse relations between Pakistan and India are well-known, a “intractable rivalry” rooted in the infamous 1947 division and fuelled by a variety of reasons like religious and nationality disparities, insurgency as well as contradictive territorial conflict over Kashmir (Boon, 2018). Many Pakistani elites consider India as a “existential threat, correctly or mistakenly”. These reasons tell mainly why Islamabad has always been its most geopolitical priority for its relations with Beijing, namely that China serves as

its main international balance against India and that of a defence backer. China's biggest supplier of weapons nowadays has supplied Pakistan with significant aid to become a nuclear weapons state (Barnds, 1975: 471).

Beijing regards India in the West, particularly after its 1962 border conflict, as a security and strategic matter. This sense of danger continued throughout the post-Cold War, partly because of the boundary conflict, as they had border conflicts in periodical situations. Beijing, however, sees India as a major security and strategic concern. In addition, Beijing sees New Delhi in his quest for regional leadership and attempted to exploit Pakistan's rivalry with India to "maintain New Delhi as scared as possible in its subcontinent and diminish his potential to threaten China" in matters such as the border conflict and wider regional power competition (Boon, 2016). The roots of the Chinese-Pakistani alliance are related to their shared views of India as a challenge and the consequent necessity of relationship security (Mohan, 2020).

The India element of China-Pakistan plays an important role. Firstly, there is an asymmetry in India's views of threats between the Islamabad and Beijing. China's relations with India are ambivalent. Although Beijing is concerned about New Delhi, backing for Dalai Lama and enhancing ties with the US and Japan, the entire complexity of China-India relations is not established in these perceptions. Trade and investment have gradually risen between both countries in the last 20 years even as India is still growing its trade gap with China and a source of bilateral frictions (MEA India, 2013).

Since 2005, China and India have diplomatically become strategic and cooperative allies for stability and growth. China and India share common views on global problems such as climate change, counter-terrorism and multilateral reforms (Roy, 2020). Chinese and Indian political elites also organize daily gatherings and talks. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met 18 times since 2014 (Xinhua, 2019), both leaders pledged for their countries at the Chennai Informal Summit in 2019 to "love one another and learn from each other, to achieve mutual growth and well-being, as well as the great rejuvenation of two cultures" (Ali, 2017). With this ambivalence was expressed, China has tried to include

Pakistan and India to expand its geopolitical and diplomatic latitude vis-à-vis both of them (Rizvi, 1994). Beijing has moved from a transparent pro-Pakistan position against Kashmir to the peaceful settlement of its territorial disputes between New Delhi and Islamabad (Rafiq, 2017). Furthermore, as Indo-Pakistani tensions rose and generated the opportunity for a military conflict that could destabilize the region and challenge China's interests, Beijing reiterated its support for Islamabad (Huasheng, 2012: 13).

Secondly, with the creation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the economic component of Sino-Pakistani relations has gained traction because it is still the security imperative that remains at stake. In the past, economics was not important. However, in a few decades Pakistan and China have participated for a long time cooperation in infrastructure. Pakistan and China signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2005, but the FTA had a small effect on the growth level of Islamabad, with Pakistan importing from China even more than it exported leading to a fluctuating bilateral trade deficit (China Daily, 2015).

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) promises, however, to change bilateral financial relations in unparalleled ways: the first major effort, after decades of robust diplomatic and military links between Beijing and Islamabad, is to improve economic links (China Daily, 2015). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is preparing to revitalize the flagging Pakistani economy and improve China's energy stability (Reuters, 2015) with a prospective value of $62 billion US dollar and including the joint growth of four major areas of the Pakistani economy, for instance Gwadar port, energy, transportation infrastructure, and the industry. The leadership of China is putting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) at the core and identifies it as the benchmark of the ties between China and Pakistan. The hall is also considered to be the flagship project of China's Xi signature strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in which observers perceive its results as an important achievement for the BRI (Small, 2015: 89).

1.2.4. Instability and conflict in Pakistan-Afghanistan region

As mentioned above, the Chinese security concerns focuses on the Uyghur in the region. Beyond the region, the rising numbers of Uyghur entering militant groups in Syria and Iraq is an important reason for concern for Chinese security services. The pattern is not new; in the 1990's, in Afghanistan and Pakistan a few Uyghurs was joining armed groups. Chinese security services were immediately granted priority which contributed to a first significant boost to international cooperation, both by creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and reciprocal networks of cooperation with states from Greater Central Asia. Lastly, the Taliban regime was taken closer to Afghanistan, as well as close cooperation with Pakistan (Sharma, 2010: 210).

Persistent insecurity and turbulent security conditions have generated safety problems for the region of South Asia in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a complex situation in Afghanistan. The geopolitical aim of China in Afghanistan is related to a number of considerations, including: its unique ties with Pakistan, Xinjiang peace and the will to play a greater regional role. Afghanistan, along with Pakistan's rising turbulence, is likely to shape China's western Xinjiang region (Xinhua, 2015). It is noted that national security, national solidarity, social peace, economic growth and regional cooperation between the three countries, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan must be in the interests of any military policies and activities taking place in the region. There is not much issue here, however, the Taliban problem will be dealt with by China through Pakistan, which is the cause of terrorism in the region (Huaseng, 2012).

The issue of China's Xinjiang Region is increasingly related to the network of the White paper on "Growth and Prosperity in Xinjiang" published by the Chinese administration in September 2009 which cited cross-border and transnational extremism. The severity of the ethnic and religious militant question in the Xinjiang Province is indicated in the intensity of the violence in Xinjiang, particularly after the riots on 5 June 2009. The Uigurs in China, especially the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), are concerned about China's claim as some terrorist attacks in

China. Thus, China has put the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as the key objective in pursuing international cooperation against terrorism (Chen, 2011).

1.3. The Chinese Aid Strategy

The increasing assistance from China has contributed to a contentious international controversy on the possible detrimental consequences of China's development activities (Chen, 2010). The Chinese government seems shocked by this, not least because international assistance had been seen as a medium for designing China's reputation as a "responsible stakeholder" (Chen, 2010; Brautigam, 2010). However, China's global aid efforts are not disclosed to foreign organisations, nor is a robust official aid database published in Beijing. This lack of accountability was widely criticized for the Chinese aid system outside and inside China. Although the western views frequently presume intentional confidentiality (Hu and Huang, 2012), the highest sophistication and fragmentation of the system are credited by Chinese scholars. The lack of transparency and accountability has given rise to speculation about the intentions of Beijing as in many areas such as human rights issues and the detention camps for the Uigurs recently (Mawdsley, 2012: 266).

Chinese reasons for aid cannot be grasped in regardless of a detailed knowledge of the long past of China's assistance programme. The country's assistance records can be followed to early days of the People's Republic. However, Chinese aid programs can be described as a historic supports (Lin, 1996). The substantial involvement of China has generally not been acknowledged in the creative geographies of international assistance. Indeed, China, in the early 1950s, began assistance to North Korea in the wake of the Korean War, then Vietnam and other neighbours to the south and to southwest, newly decolonized, in order to ensure their freedom and establish friendly ties. The first non-communist recipient countries in 1956 were Cambodia, Nepal and Egypt (Ma, 1994).

On the other hand, aid as a medium to facilitate Chinese foreign trade and investment became increasingly relevant in the mid 1990s. In December 1994

(FOCAC, 2006) and soon after the founding of the Export - Import Bank of China (Eximbank), China was in line to adapt its new concessional lending agenda to the Japanese assistance model, which linked trade and investment aid. Particularly, the 2006 Summit on Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) led China to agree in doubling their assistance to African countries. By 2009 under the Beijing Action Plan and China also created the China-Africa Development Fund for 5 billion US dollar (Dreher et al., 2017). Primarily, China has gradually expanded aid commitments and is today one of the world's largest development finance suppliers. During 2000-2014, over 4300 initiatives in 140 countries and territories were traced by Aid Data (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014: 188-190).

This brief overview of the Chinese assistance history reveals three major factors behind the support of Chinese people. These can be listed as political reasons for instance pursuing for recognition, economic interests for instance, promoting trade and investment, and humanitarian considerations, in particular the need to support the welfare of other developing countries. In this regard Chinese assistance can be considered as a unique aid program, but there is a large literature for the role of the Western "traditional" donors and the international financial agencies in assisting political, economic and humanitarian interests (SCIO, 2011).

Official Chinese sources consistently acknowledged that foreign aid is an important Chinese diplomatic tool. As the preamble to the first White Book on Foreign Aid through external assistance, China has strengthened friendly relations with other developing countries in establishing economic and commercial cooperation. While the idea of consolidated friendly partnership, it sounds rather vague, a often follows the referencing of "foreign countries". The Chinese leadership is based on the fact that economic modernisation and development are considered prerequisites for the rise of China in the world as an economic and dominant power in some cases and for the Chinese Communist Party to retain its authority and power (Dreher et al., 2015: 179).

In other respects, the international funding has remained a weapon to gain less developed and developing countries' political support during the war between China

and the West. Chinese foreign assistance contribution rose by around 67% from 223,5 million US dollar in 1989 to 374,6 million US dollar in 1990 when faced with economic sanctions and political exclusion from several states following student demonstrations in June 1989 in Tiananmen Square (Ma, 1994). International support is also understood by the United Nations Human Rights Council as a cause for China's record of human rights lawyers and political activists affiliated with the Charter 08 campaign amid crackdowns which was initiated by the prominent writer Liu Xiaobo, a petition calling for human rights, democracy and the end of one-party rule in China. In 2016 China was allowed to stay in the United Nations Human Rights Council with the assistance of the African countries amid its massive criticism. In this context of staying international community's organizations, the aid approach of Chinese foreign policy seem well-work-out (HRW, 2017).

Unlike previous years, the number of Chinese assistance projects in the period 1979-1987 demonstrated a strong connection to the value of a country as a Chinese export destination. The trade priorities of West donors (Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013) and non-DAC donors which can be called the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), such as India, were formed to shape support allocations. The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), the leading coordination body for Chinese aid, has been seen as an expression of the influence of trade motivations of Beijing in aid issue (Lum et al., 2009: 9-10).

A number of researchers stressed the key purpose of Chinese assistance in access to natural resources. Chinese assistance for Africa and Latin America is driven by business interests and primarily by natural resources production. But the evidence of suffers from an imprecise gap between broadly defined assistance and other sources of official support concentrate on a narrow description (Xi, 2015). During the 1996-2005 periods, no concrete link has existed between the distributions of Chinese aid through recipient countries with natural resources endowments. In the same way, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of China does not conform to natural capital. Official records and leadership announcements have repeatedly maintained across

Chinese aid tradition that China is providing assistance to support other developing countries “strengthen their autonomous growth capacities” (SCIO, 2014), “reduce hunger” and 'transform people's lives' (Zhang et al., 2015). Chinese foreign aid’s strong emphasis, for example, on physical infrastructure is focused on Chinese leaders’ conviction that economic growth is crucial (Oh, 2019: 5).

To detail Chinese aid distribution and compare with other prominent donors, the table will be convenient below:

	China	US	Japan
Sub-Saharan Africa	57,9	33,5	17.7
Middle East and North Africa	0,8	9,1	6.1
Latin America	12,5	23,1	8,1
Central and Eastern Europe	3,5	10,5	3,6
Asia	24,9	23,1	64,4
South Asia	9,9	4,2	16,4
Southeast Asia	7,5	5,6	42,9
Central Asia	4.4	3,5	2,4
East Asia and Pacific, non-Southeast Asia	3,1	9,8	2,7
Total	100	100	100

Table 1.1. The distribution of aid in regions by China, US and Japan in the term of 2000-2014 (%) (Golley, 2017)

It can be pointed out in the table above that approximately 25% of total the Chinese distribution of aid allocated to Asia and almost 10% of this was transferred to South Asia. With ever-increasing assistance and support, China has been entering the peaceful recovery of Afghanistan since 2001. The Chinese aid amount to Afghanistan had been increasing during process. Kabul’s largest public hospital is still the Jamhuriat Hospital, which is built with Chinese aid. A significant number of young students will study in vibrant and comfortable classrooms by the construction of the Chinese Department at Kabul University. Also completed this year is the building of the National Centre for Vocational Training and Education. The center will continue to educate more Afghan skills and is fitted with new training facilities. In 2014, China agreed to giving Afghanistan 2 billion Yuan for free in the next four years. The financial support is expected to complete next year the complete education building

and auditorium of the University of Kabul, a small-cost housing project to launch next year, and a solar power plant to be installed in the province of Bamyan (Yu, 2019).

1.4. The Western Development Strategy

China's government announced a Western Development Strategy in the November of 1999. The strategy was declared to be implemented in six provinces such as Guizhou, Qinghai , Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan and Shaanxi, five autonomous regions, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, one district Tibet and Xinjiang and Ningxia. The political leaders of China believed that the Western Development Strategy is an essential step towards the strategic Deng Xiaoping approach aimed at phasing out regional inequalities, improving ethnic group cooperation, safeguarding border protection and social stability. The technique has been perceived in different ways. Some scholars and experts have also asked whether the objective is to avoid the separatist tendencies that are among ethnicities, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, or to harvest natural resources so that China is more independent of energy and resources. Government sources say that regional disparities must be minimized by rising per capita income and infrastructure growth in the western region as the key components of the policy. (Debata, 2007:159-161).

The growth of western China is economically and geopolitically important Chinese adjacent countries' consequences. The territorial gains of China's western area have a long frontier. The Xinjiang boundary is some 5.000 kilometres, the Tibetan border is around 2500 kilometres and the Yunnan border is about 4.060 kilometres. In order to encourage coordinated regional growth, China recently released a guideline for furthering the development of its Western regions. Against the backdrop of the rising global economy that would improve domestic and global economies alike. West China's GDP rose from 1,67 trillion Yuan by the time the Western Growth Plan was launched in 1999 to 18,4 trillion Yuan in 2018 ($2.6 trillion). In China's west, there is the autonomous Tibetan region of Southwest China, and the provinces of Guizhou, Yunnan and Sichuan, which all have expanded rapidly in terms of large facilities. The differences between the Eastern and Western regions of China have been eased and the Western regions are now shifting from high to high-quality growth. The Western

Development Strategy is specifically intended to improve connectivity from within China and neighbourhood to western regions. The government has undertaken major transport infrastructure projects in Xinjiang to construct new highways to link Russia, Central Asia, and South Asia to the Xinjiang region. In Tibet, the government has built transportation networks with its neighbour Nepal (Sutter, 2012: 111-113).

From the perspective of Chinese national security, the Western Development Strategy is also significant. As two of three of China's boundary places in central and Western regions in China, and 20 out of 55 minorities live in the western sector, the Chinese Government has expressed concern about protection. There was also a clear fear of terror and separatism. Religious fundamentalism and extremism could spill over into China's minority regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Chen, 2004).

1.5. The Interests of China in South Asia from the Western Perspective

The U.S. operation of Afghanistan that began in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, 2001 was conceptualize as operations against terrorism in Afghanistan. The CSIS conducted a research on Chinese interests in Central Asia after the Cold War period. These interests are briefly illustrated below: Strategic Position China's attitude in Central Asia and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were determined as China's diplomatic policy to have a stable and productive international environment in the region. The relations between Asia and Beijing also aim at legitimizing China's position on important international issues and strengthening its relations with Russia as a counter to the U.S. power and influence (Sutter, 2012). In this case these interests can be defined below:

Security: China projects to limit any external support for the independence movement of Uyghurs in East Turkistan. China targets to fight against terrorists and criminals together with the regional states at the same time (Allison and Jonson, 2001).

Borders: Having a strict policy regarding its borders with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, China prioritizes the security and stability of

the border. This issue is one of China's foreign policy priorities and plays an important role in China's development plans (Sutter, 2012).

Economy: The main economic interests of China in the region are energy and mining. China is seeking large quantities of oil and gas in the region (Allison and Jonson, 2001).

The development of bilateral and cross-border relations with the regional states are key and of great importance to China. Due to close relations, both sides can benefit from mutual interests and contribute to stability and prosperity. Stability, trade development and cooperation are the main pillars in China's relations with its neighbours (Ashraf, 1986).

CHAPTER 2

AFGHANISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PROCESS

2.1. Afghanistan-China Relations from the 19th Century to the End of the Soviet Invasion

Throughout history, Afghanistan and China relations have been established through trade caravans via the Pamir and Wakhan corridor as East. Although the exchange of delegations between the two countries can be traced back to the first centuries, a small Afghan trade community had set up a colony in Eastern Turkistan as wealthy traders in the late 19th century (Kaushiki, 2019). The existence of this small colony led to the opening of a temporary Afghan consulate as the first Afghan diplomatic mission in the territory of East Turkistan (Xinjiang) in the early 1920s. In the aftermath of the establishment of the new People's Republic of China, Afghanistan signed a friendship agreement with China. Therefore, Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the PRC in 1950. For this reason, full diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and China began in January 1955. However, there was no clear evidence of the strong interests of the parties in strengthening bilateral relations at that time. In fact, China had chosen Pakistan as its primary ally in the region. There were two main reasons that China chose Pakistan as its primary ally. First, in 1950 Pakistan was among the first countries to end official diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) government on mainland China. Secondly, China already had border disputes with India. These were the main reasons that China established its full diplomatic relations with Pakistan in the early 1951. This acceleration weakened the development of Sino-Afghan relations. China had already chosen a partner in the region and China's interests in Afghanistan were only a simple aspect of its broad regional policy. Due to relations with the Soviets and Pakistan, Beijing generally accepted Kabul as its second-degree partner (Byron, 1990: 70-).

China and Afghanistan had normal relations during the period of King Zahir Shah. China chose to show much more interest in Afghanistan due to the deterioration

of China's relations with the Soviet Union after 1950. The new era of close relations began in 1957 as a part of the official visits of Afghanistan's new Prime Minister. During the visit Prime Minister Muhammad Dawood Khan and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En Lai, reflecting the first bilateral trade agreement between two countries, ten years of friendship and mutual non-aggression agreement was signed in Kabul in 1960. Three years later, an agreement was signed between Afghanistan and China on the official drawing of the common border extending 90 km to Pamir on 22 November 1963. After the drawing and determination of the border by the joint border drawing committee, the final protocol was signed on 24 March 1965 (Dupree, 1978). After signing, China expanded its aid to Afghanistan in the economic and technical fields. The first free fund worth 28 million was given to the Afghan government on 24 March 1965. As a result of this financial support of the Chinese Government, many agricultural and industrial projects started to operate in Afghanistan. As one of these projects, the Cotton weaving factory and the stone of Lapiz Lazuli technical workshop in the Bagrami region of Kabul were completed in 1970. Subsequently, the construction of a 62 km long dam and the excavation of a 85 km canal, as well as the Parwan irrigation project and the hydroelectric power generation in the region were completed in 1979 (Saikal, 2004: 207).

In 1970, China was a competitive country among other major powers that had an active role and influence in the development of Afghanistan. China provided nearly 200 Chinese technical consultants to Afghanistan. China is the fourth country to provide foreign aid with 7,2% after the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Germany. After 1970, the deterioration of friendly relations between China and Afghanistan due to the Soviet influence in Afghan politics caused the Chinese aids to be reduced. Davud Khan and his sympathizers toppled down King Zahir Shah with a military coup and established the Republic of Afghanistan instead of the monarchy and declared himself as president on 17 July 1973. After the Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed, the new President Sardar Mohammed Davud Khan reconciled in regional and major powers and diplomatic relations. In December 1974, in order to improve relations, he sent his brother, Mohammed Naim Khan, to Beijing as his special envoy. In response, China made 20,7 million dollars in aid with the newly established government in

Afghanistan, accounting for 0,7% of total foreign aid at that time. During this period, Sardar Davud Han's foreign policy changed rapidly and tried to find new alliances. As a result, relations with China were developed on 21 March 1978. The agreement was promised by the Chinese government to provide 100 million Yuan in various industrial and construction projects and to increase small-volume trade. But this protocol was abolished because of the Saur Revolution on 27 April 1978 (Hilali, 2001: 341).

2.2. Afghanistan-China Relations after the Invasion of USSR

One of the key schisms of Cold War history is the Sino-Soviet split. Their effect on both China's and the Soviet Union's foreign policies is fraught with great geopolitical and diplomatic consequences. The Sino-Soviet Cold War started in Afro-Asian countries with increased influence and control. China accused the Soviet Union of overtime to replenish the vacuum of the departure of the U.S. The Soviets accused China of the war and the developing tensions in collusion with the U.S. The Cold War between the two key communist nations therefore unveiled the myth of world communism. Two contact giants "were circling and circled, like two heavy-weight struggles, attempting to make hammerlocks, footholds and feints." (Hilali, 2001). South Asia, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by Brezhnev, became even more acute and tense in its own way, according to its Brezhnev doctrine. Moscow was entitled to interfere to preserve communist influenced governments under threat, probably to the Chinese government by domestic upheavals (Maizland and Laub, 2020).

After the Saur Revolution, China's relations with the new communist regime broke down because the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDRA) had broken diplomatic relations with the United States for the Vietnam invasion. However, China was involved in the U.S. attack on Vietnam. On the other hand, due to the fact that China armed Afghan revolutionaries against the established regime and also provided them with military training, the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDRA) condemned this Chinese action and eventually began to break the relations between the two countries (Saikal, 2004: 183).

In the aftermath of the Afghan-Soviet friendship agreement on 5 December 1978, the relations between Afghanistan and China weakened. As a result, China not only suspended economic aids to Afghanistan, but also fully supported the anti-communist Afghan Mujahedeen. The relations between China and the Afghan communist regime quickly turned into hostility. China has threatened the security of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan for the security of its own and its ally Pakistan, and has severely condemned this invasion and immediately left its diplomatic representative from Kabul. In 1980, various weapons were supplied to China by Washington. In order to fight the Russians in Afghanistan, it was decided to establish military troops in East Turkistan. People's Republic of China supported the Mujahedeen against the Russians with military training, weapons, organization, financial support and military advisors in Afghanistan. In 1989, the defeat and exit of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the emergence of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992 led to the normalization of Sino-Afghan relations again. But, there were no diplomatic missions between the two sides. The struggle of the factions to take power, the exacerbation of the civil war and the emergence of the Taliban in 1996 raised China's concerns about the security problems of East Turkistan (Seerat, 2015: 1-2).

2.2.1. Taliban period

After the Soviet forces left Afghanistan, the civil war began immediately to seize power among political parties and continued until 1994. Therefore, this situation led to the emergence of a new military movement. A small spiritual group emerged to protect the local people from bullying and robbery. For the first time, they called themselves Taliban in a town in West Kandahar. Their ranks were recently strengthened with students studying in the Deobandi Madrasas of the western border of Pakistan. The Taliban fought against the Russians with the "Haraka-i Enqelab-i Islami Party", mostly in the form of guerrilla fronts. Until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban successfully took control of Kabul, under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and this control was extended to 95% of Afghanistan (Walker, 2003). They claimed to be emerged with the aim of fighting against corruption, injustice and

notably warfare. Taliban was largely financed by the Arab countries and Pakistan, provided them with war training and weapons by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence-ISI. Taliban's regime was first officially recognized by Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and these states announced that they would provide financial support to the Taliban. In response, the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime for violations of human rights. China has not officially recognized the Taliban regime as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Seerat, 2015). As Taliban came to power, China's concerns about the security of East Turkistan revitalized. According to the reports, Uyghur militants have been fighting with Russia alongside Afghan Mujahedeen since 1986. The Chinese officials claimed that weapons and explosives used in the Xinjiang Province were brought from Afghanistan. According to some evidence, Uyghur militants were fighting in the Taliban front against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (McNeal and Dumbaugh, 2002: 14).

In the late 1990s, Beijing was concerned that the Taliban government was a shelter for Uyghur militants fleeing East Turkistan from China's persecution and oppression. That is asserted that China has established informal relations with the Taliban through Pakistan. The leader of Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omer, met with Chinese representatives in Kandahar in December 2000. This meeting was arranged by Pakistan. Mullah Omer assured the Chinese delegation in the meeting that Taliban will not allow any group to use Afghanistan soil against them and in response, Mullah Omer asked China to recognize its regime politically and protect it from UN sanctions, but the agreement could not be compromised (Small, 2013: 93).

It can be claimed that most probably the Taliban did not remove the Uyghur militants from their territory, but allowed them to operate with other groups, such as the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan (IMU), although it prohibited them in the establishment of military installations. China has softened the sanctions targeting the Taliban by the UN Security Council, and commercial relations were established immediately to show their international image at the same time,. China also provided

some assistance to the Taliban through Pakistan. Therefore, the two sides realized that they could do business with each other (Ashraf, 1986).

Despite the UN sanctions, China was good at establishing political and economic ties with Taliban regime. China would even sign economic agreements with the Taliban at the end of 2001. However, due to the September 11 attacks, Beijing postponed its decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban. In 2001, the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan was supported by China, and China established diplomatic relations with its newly established government under the presidency of Hamid Karzai. In recent years, instability and insecurity in Afghanistan have raised China's anxiety. For this reason, China suggested that this problem can be resolved through peaceful dialogues to stop the conflicts. China also requested international community to act as intermediaries during peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government (Jae et al., 2011: 15-16).

2.2.2. Hamid karzai period

Throughout history, when relations between China and Afghanistan have been observed, no political and military problems have ever arisen between the two countries. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Afghanistan was not a remarkable country in the foreign policy of China in the early of the 20th century. China did not have any diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, as the Soviets occupied Afghanistan. China was in a neutral state position during the Cold War period. In fact, during the civil war and the Taliban regime, China did not have an embassy in Afghanistan and no official diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. After the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, China was one of the first countries to have official relations with the newly established interim government led by Hamid Karzai (Tiffany, 2010). China reopened its embassy in Kabul in February 2002, after seven years, and provided humanitarian aid of 5 million dollars. Subsequently, temporary President Hamid Karzai visited Beijing. During the meeting, Chinese President Jiang Zemin promised assistance and continuous diplomatic support in the fields of rehabilitation and development. This meeting included China's participation in a

conference called “Kabul Declaration on Good-neighbourly Relations” which is called a joint declaration in which six countries bordering Afghanistan pledged “to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, promised to support the new restructuring process”. Later, multiple bilateral agreements were signed to further develop relations between Afghanistan and China and to facilitate closer and deeper economic and technical cooperation (Huasheng, 2012: 16-17).

The President of Afghanistan paid his first official visit to China in 2006. On this occasion, good neighbourhood, friendship, cooperation and other important agreements were signed with the aim of strengthening bilateral relations between Afghanistan and China (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2011). As a result of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Conference held in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia, both sides signed Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement and focused on international and regional issues. During this conference, Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai pledged to support China on the issues of China’s Tibet and Taiwan on behalf of the Afghan people (Shanthie, 2010).

President Karzai’s third meeting and second official visit to China, which started on 23 March 2010, resulted in the establishment of an Afghan-Chinese Comprehensive Cooperation and Partnership. As mentioned above, the role of China in Afghanistan was limited in the past, but this visit of President Karzai brought great success for the Afghan government. Chinese President Hu Jintao focused on five directions based on cooperative cooperation in his declaration. These are: Politics and Diplomacy, Economy and Commerce, Humanism, Multilateral Security and Police Affairs, Mutual Friendship and Trust for new generations culture (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2013).

Three pacts were signed between Afghanistan and China based on broad economic and technologic cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that he had deep political ties with the Afghan Government (Szczudlik- Tatar, 2014). During this official visit, China promised to provide 160 million Yuan aid to Afghanistan. Moreover, it ensured that tariffs were not given to training exchange programs and

Chinese-Afghan exports. In addition, the two countries strengthened regional and international relations and cooperation on these issues, and China promised to attend regional and international conferences in Afghanistan. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended a number of meetings such as the London conference on Afghanistan and the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Summit and other Chinese representatives on the fourth regional economic cooperation conference and Afghanistan international investment conference (Tahiri, 2017).

The comprehensive cooperation and partnership between China and Afghanistan was further developed in 2011. Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul paid an official visit to China in May 2011. The two sides changed views on strengthening bilateral cooperation and deepening bilateral relations in all areas. As a result, China provided 150 million Yuan grants to Afghanistan, and the two sides also signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement. China promised to train 131 Afghans in construction work. In addition, good cooperation was emphasized between the two countries in the fields of defence, security and culture (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2013).

2012 witnessed the historical rise of the relations between China and Afghanistan with its comprehensive strategic and cooperation partnership. The two countries paid high level official visits. When President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai visited China in June 2012, he attended the Beijing Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In September, the second vice-president of Afghanistan, Karim Khalili came together with Wen Jiabo at the second Chinese Eurasian Summit in China, and declared a joint declaration on the strategic and cooperative partnership between the two sides. Zhou Yongkang, a permanent member of the Political Bureau Committee, first visited the Kabul in September 2012, since the establishment of Afghan-Chinese diplomatic relations (Phillips, 2012).

The establishment and strengthening of a strategic cooperation and partnership for regional peace, stability and development were the main interests of the two sides. Afghanistan became an observer to the SCO Summit in Beijing (Chinese Embassy in

Afghanistan, 2012). After that, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Yıng attended the Ministerial Conference of Heart of Asia-Istanbul process in Kabul. As of 2012, the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue was launched, and its first and second meeting took place in Beijing and Islamabad.. At the end of the year, China attended the Fifth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference and International Communication Groups meeting in Tokyo (Scobell et al, 2014).

During the Euro-Asia Economic Conference, Karzai met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and his deputy Wang Yang during an official visit in September 2013. The two heads of state shared their views on deepening bilateral relations. The talks highlighted bilateral cooperation, including regional security and political situation, as well as political, military, economic and cultural relations. During the meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a five-point proposal to improve Afghan-Chinese relations (Chinese MFA, 2014). These are to strengthen strategic communications on important issues; the government needs to hold talks between the senior officials as well as between political parties and academics; to enhance the relations in the fields of economy, trade, development of projects and the development of energy resources and infrastructure. In addition, Xi Jinping promised to urge Chinese firms to invest in Afghanistan, to support peace and reconstruction as well as economic development; to establish a joint commission of security cooperation to combat drug trafficking and cross-border crime; to expand bilateral relations and cultural exchange between the two nations; to support the peace process in the United Nations and other important international and regional organizations, development and security in Afghanistan (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2015).

In response to these proposals of the Chinese President, the Afghan President replied that Afghanistan is ready for economic development, trade, cultural exchange and investment of Chinese investors in Afghanistan’s energy resources. During the official visit of the general director of foreign security affairs of the Chinese foreign ministry, a security agreement was signed with Kabul to combat terrorism across the border on 24 November 2013. The third round of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan tripartite dialogue was held in December 2013 in Kabul (Chinese Embassy, 2014).

These three countries emphasized the phenomenon of economic prosperity based on security and development, stability and peace in the region. The Chinese side also agreed to host the next tripartite meeting in 2014. In the last days of Hamid Karzai's rule, he met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in February 2014 as the last official meeting. After the topple of the Taliban regime, president Hamid Karzai paid five official visit to China. It is possible to say that this will be enough to be regarded as a historically productive period in the relations between Afghanistan and China. Chinese Foreign Minister Yi provides China with a large amount of assistance to Afghanistan without any prerequisites, for example, construction of hospitals, schools, roads, irrigation system and office buildings, as well as training more than 1000 government officials in China and providing hundreds of scholarships to Afghan students (Jalali, 2015: 3).

2.2.3. Ghani government period

The year of 2014 was an important term for the Afghan people. NATO planned to leave their troops from Afghanistan and a political and military transition took place in the middle of this year. In particular the election was postponed on 5 April 2014 to the second round on 14 June 2014. At the end, the Independent Election Commission announced Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as the winning candidate of the election in September 2014 (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2014).

President Ghani has declared the government's foreign policy in five circles to enhance the relations in order of priorities. These circles can be summarized as neighbouring countries, Islamic countries, the United States, Europe, Japan and Canada, Asian countries and international organizations (Katju, 2015).

China, as a strategic partner of Afghanistan, has a direct impact on other countries in the region, including Afghanistan, especially its economic and military power in the region. During Karzai administration, China was active in different fields. It was one of the countries that were active in the fields of economic, politics, development cooperation and strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. The Chinese

Ambassador to Afghanistan Deng was sent warm congratulations to the Afghan President for his presidency by the President of China on 13 October 2014. He also stressed that hard work and bilateral cooperation will be held in all areas. Then, the visit of President Ghani to China was welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, and at the sideline of the visit, cooperation agreements were signed in various fields such as economic, technical cooperation, strategic cooperation and China-Afghan deepening strategic cooperation partnership declaration (Chinese MFA, 2019). On this occasion, the Chinese President pledged to support the Afghan National Unity Government in the fields of development, economic, political and reconstruction fields. Xi Jinping welcomed the participation in the construction of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" which could be important in the regional connection, as well as the development of Chinese-Afghan relations. In response, President Ghani pledged of cooperating with the Chinese government against terrorism, extremism and cross-border smuggling, and assuring not to allow any group to use Afghan territory for activities against China. The success of this official visit to China, Ambassador Deng Xijun wrote an article titled "Unique and efficient state visit", he outlined five steps towards an efficient diplomatic relationship (Spegele, 2014).

First, Afghan-Chinese political relations have entered a new phase. Both parties are committed to maintain close cooperation and to strengthen strategic communication. President Xi stressed that Afghanistan supports the peace and reconciliation process "under Afghan leadership and Afghanistan ownership" as well as national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Xinhua, 2018).

Secondly, Afghanistan-China economic and commercial cooperation has gained new opportunities. China has increased its capacity for supporting the peace and restructuring process of Afghanistan and for independent development with Afghanistan. China also promised to help with the exploration and use of infrastructure, agriculture, water, conservation, and mineral resources (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2014).

Third, a new page is opened for Afghanistan-China security cooperation. Both sides agreed on their strong opposition to terrorism, fanaticism, and other organizational crimes and shared intelligence on border management, illegal immigration, human trafficking, illegal arms and drug trafficking. The Afghan side has assured the security of Chinese institutions and staff in Afghanistan. In response, the Chinese side has announced that it will hold seminars on Afghan Police in the fields of counter-terrorism and drugs smuggling (Ziekmke-Dickens and Droogan, 2010: 19)

Fourth, cultural exchange relations between the Chinese-Afghanistan nations entered a new phase. Both sides agreed to the development and promotion of cultural exchange, education, youth and media programs. In the next five years, China has committed in providing 500 educational scholarships to Afghanistan and support to the Chinese language training center in Afghanistan. In addition, both sides accepted visa exemption for diplomatic passport holders (Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2014).

Fifth, the Chinese and Afghani cooperation in international and regional has reached new results; Afghanistan and China organized the Fourth Ministerial summit on Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process. In addition, the two leaders decided to increase coordination and cooperation in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the South Asian Union for regional cooperation (Afghan MFA, 2016).

Afghanistan's Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah paid an official visit to China on 16 May 2016, seven bilateral cooperation agreements were signed between the two countries in Beijing. During the meeting, a Technical Cooperation Agreement worth 75 million dollars grants was signed called "One Belt One Road". In addition, seven agreements were signed between China and Afghanistan top officials, including 7.5 million dollars grant emergency aid agreements and economic and technical cooperation, 10.000 housing project agreements and the building of a conference hall at Kabul University (Chinese MFA, 2015).

The gradual withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 increased China's security concerns. On the other hand, according to National Unity Government's foreign policy, its close ties with regional power like China can play an important role in the stability and development of Afghanistan and the region; these two reasons have allowed both sides to establish close relations. Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao visited Kabul to participate in the 60th anniversary of Afghan-Chinese diplomatic relations in November 2014. During the visit, the Afghan government was provided with emergency aid worth 10 million Yuan and humanitarian aid materials over 1 million dollars due to the earthquake in northern Afghanistan. Since the establishment of the National Unity Government, many high-level official visits have been held between Afghanistan and China, including the tripartite strategic cooperation between China, Afghanistan and Pakistan for the formation of cooperation peace and restructuring (Norling, 2008).

2.3. Chinese Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan After 2001

Following the Karzai administration's announcement that oil, minerals and resources would open up to foreign investors by 2007, China has established stronger relations with Afghanistan since the outgoing Taliban regime in Kabul (Gray, 2013). In the 2010s, China seems to be closely watching the situation in Afghanistan and remains obsessed with continuing uprisings in Afghanistan. According to one local Chinese scholar, a secure Afghanistan is essential for China. Speaking in January 2013, Wang Lian, from Beijing University believed his country could "not afford to stand alone after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2014." Beijing's defence blank paper in March 2012, reports the security situation in Afghanistan remains critical (Guang, 2006).

Beijing's Afghan strategy is motivated by two main factors such as defending China from the threat of Islamic terrorism and keeping Afghanistan from other major states to dominate China.

In the earlier of 1990s, China has seen Afghanistan as the international epicentre for religious radicalism, which Beijing is afraid of unregulated spreading through Central Asia to Xinjiang (Huaseng, 2012). In late 2001, the US involvement and the continued military activity in Afghanistan continue to irritation China. Whilst Beijing was disappointed that the U.S. troops deployed and worked on the outskirts of China, it wished that the U.S. would succeed in eliminating Afghanistan's militant groups.

Afghanistan remains a critical priority in the fight against terrorism, mostly for the following three reasons (Swaine, 2010):

Afghanistan was, first and foremost, the first fighting for the jihadist struggle since 9/11. If an in-depth win cannot be accomplished during the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, militant groups will make a return in Afghanistan and Central Asia at all times.

Second, Afghanistan remains the spiritual backbone of terror, the leading figures of Al-Qaeda can seen actively linked to Pakistan and Afghanistan and almost all of the organization's prominent figures are from the jihad in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, drug manufacturing and transaction in Afghanistan has given considerable funding to the militant groups in the region.

Beijing also sees Afghanistan as a simple way to restrict or even contain China, for competing major powers. As a result, the U.S. forces in Afghanistan are ambivalent in China. Chinese foreign policy makers regard that the U.S. troops are focused on counter-insurgency activities and counter-terrorist operations. At least some Chinese foreign policy makers expect that the United States will accomplish the Afghan mission (Small, 2010).

In addition to this there is no strictly violent solution to the insurgence, Beijing does not want to be treated as a side-by-side between the United States and the Taliban.

Beijing, for its part, is a hiding strategy which calls for a non-military solution to the Afghan insurgency and supports attempts to find political compromises with the Taliban (Saraswat, 2020).

Afghan officials have engaged with China's leadership since the collapse of Taliban in a number of high-level diplomatic talks. As President of the Government of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai paid his first official visit to Beijing in January 2002. Karzai was said to have met with President Hu Jintao at several SCO summits during the subsequent years, including 2004 Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 2006 Shanghai, 2008 Dushanbe, in 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2010 Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 2011 Astana, Kazakhstan, in 2012 Beijing and in 2013 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Huaseng, 2012: 19).

2.3.1. Chinese strategic ınterests in Afghanistan

That is regarded that the big game will occur in Central Asia, and this position of the strong states of the world want to have it through the population. China is also busy competing with its rivals in Central Asia, such as Russia, India and the United States, to bring this land under its own population. Chinese politicians say that if China's influence declines in Central Asia, the Chinese economy, security and stability may be threatened. In China's foreign policy, according to the 1992 (Deng Xiaoping) statement, China should not "take seriously" the security issues in Afghanistan and the development of Afghanistan should be on the focus. In response to the ongoing war in Afghanistan, China wants peaceful resolution of the war. Following the "wait and watch" policy after September 11, China has lost its activity in Central Asia and wants to have an effect again for the purpose of economic development in the Central Asian territory. China needs an energy source for its growing economy. Natural gas and local mines in Afghanistan can meet this resource (Wishnick, 2009: 17).

After 41 years of fighting, a new understanding for a diplomatic solution emerged from the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. China's political and economic relations with Afghanistan have been extended in recent years with its

policies changing from “calculated ignorance” to strategic involvement. In Afghanistan, Chinese interests are mainly related to security and economic interests in the hope of incorporating Afghanistan into Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). It could be said that particularly in the sense of China’s transcontinental connectivity programs, that Afghanistan could forge a symbiotic commitment. Furthermore, China could allow Afghanistan to break out of its longstanding security concerns with the other factors such as interfering in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs and distinct geopolitical influence through Pakistan (Chawla, 2020).

As mentioned above, the approach of China for Afghanistan has been divided into two aspects. These can be expressed as security concern and economic concern. China has concerns on the prospects of the harmful protection situation in Afghanistan and the dangers which could raise for China’s long-term economic efforts. Also known as the New Silk Road, the BRI seemed to be circumventing Afghanistan. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding MoU, which was the agreement to jointly foster BRI collaboration, marked the start of Afghanistan’s entry into the transcontinental infrastructural growth. The MoU was signed by the Chinese and Afghanistan governments. The Special Railway Transport Project and the Five Nations Railway Project, as well as projects linking southern Afghanistan via the Economic Corridor of China-Pakistan (ECCP), in a mutually beneficial arrangement, are linked in northern Afghanistan to China. In the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan both countries have also formed a fibre optic connection through the Wakhan Corridor. The Afghan Rail Network is expected to be helpful in the transportation and industrial development of goods and services, according to the Ministry of Public Works and Afghanistan Rail Network (AFRA). The issue of shipping mining resources from Afghanistan to regional ports will also be addressed. Experts believe that the network will promote the transportation of farm products and connect the country’s provinces and centres (Chawla, 2020).

In the economic aspect the Chinese increasing participation in Afghanistan can also be attributed to the economic ambition of the region. Afghanistan has tremendous potential to connect the markets in South Asia, Central Asia, Western Asia and China

in terms of its strategic position. There is also an immense repository of minerals in Afghanistan, from rare earth elements to copper storage facilities, gold, iron ore and lithium. As the U.S. troops were in Afghanistan, China prepared for the ensuing instability for the region. The growing cooperation between Afghanistan and China may be threatened, thus sabotaging China's regional interest. China recognized that economic infrastructure robustness is a requirement for the growth of peace and security in Afghanistan, destroyed by the wars and conflicts (Ashraf, 2018).

China has proven to be one of Afghanistan's most important trading partners, and both parties thus appear to demonstrate a willingness to expand trade. As China has seen how important ties with Afghanistan are, trying to achieve the strategic geographical position of national States in the region, the amount of trade between accomplish has increased considerably. The bilateral amount of trade between accomplish reached 544 million US dollars in 2017, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Şahin, 2006).

As the intra-Afghan talks move ahead and the U.S. military withdrawal are in the agenda, the future of Afghanistan is reasonable. Afghanistan definitely needs the support of the international community, especially regional players who have dedicated themselves in Afghanistan to political, economic and security interests. Though Pakistan's position among regional actors remains vital to the stabilization of Afghanistan, in recent years Pakistan's most optimistic ally China has also shown its apparent commitment to extend Afghanistan. Since the latest proposal of Beijing for Afghanistan is "to be like Pakistan" the estimation of Chinese priorities and potential involvement in Afghanistan will be useful (Şahin, 2006).

In the manner of Chinese security concerns the geographical closeness between Afghanistan and its own Uyghur-dominated Xinjiang Region drives the Chinese ability to engage in Afghanistan. Terrorists also make the Taliban and many other transnational militant organisations their camps from Afghanistan as a launching pad. Moreover, China claims that the Uyghur-dominated Xinjiang Region is the source of three evils such as terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, also concerns that

Xinjiang will intensify separatism through the theological strength of pan-Islamic groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan's tribal areas. In Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan a number of displaced Uyghur rebels have sought a shelter. It is commonly claimed that the Uyghur militants are associated with the transnational terrorist organizations such as Taliban, Al Qaeda and the Islamic Revolution in Uzbekistan (IMU). It is asserted that many Uyghur fighters still continue to work on conceiving assaults against China. The most important reason for China to increase its activities in Afghanistan is homeland security concerns in the context of Xinjiang Region. China's internal security issues in the Xinjiang Region are the first and foremost justification for China to enhance its operations Afghanistan. The spread of the Islamic State in Afghanistan has seen as a source of instability (Chawla, 2020).

CHAPTER 3

THE U.S. AND NATO PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF CHINA

3.1. Brief Overview of September 11 Attacks

The United States of America were awakened by the terrorist attack of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. The planes that entered both of the towers of the World Trade Center exploded after entering the building, the scale of the destruction increased even more and both towers were destroyed with thousands of people in front of the eyes of the whole world. Following the attack on the World Trade Center, an attack was carried out by plane on the Pentagon (US Department of Defence), and while work was continuing in these two centers, two more bomb-laden vehicles exploded at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this time (Murphy, 2010: 107).

19 non-U.S. nationalities on 11 September 2001 had hijacked the plane minutes after takeoff, then crashes into the World Trade Center in New York, the Northern Pentagon in Virginia and the Pennsylvania countryside, four private passenger planes in Boston and Washington. In the terrorist attacks about 3000 civilians have been killed, the worst day in the U.S. on a single day since the American Civil War. The buildings, where about 50.000 workers were working, burst into flames. The people working below the impact sites, were evacuate massively. At 9:50 the south tower collapsed, the north town squashed off at 10:30, damaged another 24 million metres of office space in other buildings in Manhattan. A subway station, two electric substations and some 30 miles of cable were crushed (Karakaya, 2010).

The terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, the heart of the world's superpower the United States of America, have shocked the whole world. Many states were alarmed, the stock market was closed in England, and all airlines around the world have implemented emergency procedures. An atmosphere of great panic

prevailed in the world. The Buckingham Palace and the parliament building and many government buildings were under protection in London. The foreign missions of the states have also entered into an alarm situation. In France, the Council of Ministers gathered under the emergency code, law enforcement officers were gathered under one command. In Russia, the Ministry of Interior has taken high-level security measures on the possibility of a similar attack. The security measures in the US and Israeli diplomatic missions, military bases, institutions, schools and trade centers in Italy have been increased. Italian airline company Alitalia has announced that it has stopped all Middle Eastern flights. Among the military bases in the Netherlands, Maastricht and Eindhoven airports were switched to the alarm level, high-level security measures were taken at NATO's headquarters in Brussels and at the command center of the allied forces stationed in Mons (Hürriyet, 2001).

Transactions in the financial markets in New York were suspended after the attacks. The Commodity Exchange, which is the center of the US stock exchanges within the World Trade Center, disappeared with the central towers destroyed by the attacks. First of all, after the events, the dollar decreased, it lost 2% against the Euro. The gravity of the terrorist attacks and the Middle Eastern origin of the aggressors combined with the shock, the price of crude oil increased by 3,6 dollars to 31.3 dollars. On the other hand, the price of gold, which was traded around $ 271.40 in the London Stock Exchange before the attack, jumped to $ 287, and many European stock markets fell rapidly (Byers, 2007).

The discovery of the attackers' contact with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization on 11 September 2001 highlighted the concept of "radical Islam" as a threat in the United States and the world. Although Muslims were tried to be kept apart with this concept, a rising hatred towards Muslims has emerged in the world. In this context, the U.S. which started a global war in the fight against terrorism regarded the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization as responsible for the 9/11 attacks. First of all, the U.S. which overthrew the Taliban administration in Afghanistan, which hosted the organization, then occupied Iraq with similar approaches and ended the Saddam Hussein

administration, which it accused of international terrorism, in April 2003 (Çakmak, 2003).

The September 11 attacks have radically changed the threat perception of the U.S. and other allies, especially the U.K, and the terrorist hunt has spread to the world by adopting a global understanding in the fight against terrorism. The United States' other immediate reaction to September 11 was '"National Security Policy"' statement on 17 September 2001. The previous presidents announced similar tactics under the influence of other dramatic incidents in American history, including the Pearl Harbour bombing of 1941. What is typical is that all these occurrences have led to a new plan being proclaimed. The announcement of a new policy indicated that the previous strategy was ineffective in the way that the United States did not stop paralyzing strikes. The Bush Administration's policy was similar to the Clinton plan, but with detailed variations. The United States would actively seek to enlist assistance from the international community, which states that "nations do not need to be attacked until they can take legal action to defend themselves against forces posing an imminent risk of attack." (UNSC Res., 2001)

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia has increased. The competition of Russia, the U.S. and China has become more evident in order to control the natural wealth in the region, especially oil. This increasing interest of the Western world in the region after 9/11 was described as a second chance for Central Asia.

3.2. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001 in the fight against international terrorism after the September 11 attacks. The Security Council resolution 1373, which included the steps and strategies to be taken in order to determine a global approach in the fight against terrorism, gave special importance to the control of the financial resources of terrorist organization. In order to prevent the terrorists' moves around the world, it was noted that the protection of the borders

and the control of the identical documents and travel documents were important in the decision numbered 1373. In this context, it was recommended to advance inter-state cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In this respect, the development of information exchange, cooperation and coordination in judicial matters has been encouraged within the possibilities of national and international law (Rosand, 2003: 335).

On the other hand, for the operations organized in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks, an attack against one of the parties registered in Article 5 of NATO will be considered as if all members have been made, and in this case, the right of self-defence will be used within the scope of Article 51 of the UN Agreement (Halatçı, 2006). The operation started after the presence of Osama Bin Laden, who was regarded as the cause of the September 11 attacks by the U.S. intelligence agencies, in Afghanistan and the Taliban administration refused to give Laden. The Enduring Freedom Operation launched by the U.S. and the U.K. against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 was carried out without a clear decision of the UN Security Council. The parties alleged that they carried out the operation within the framework of the right of self-defence in accordance with the provision that the members' right to self-defence would not be prejudiced until the Security Council took the necessary measures if one of the members in Article 51 of the UN Treaty was attacked (Polat, 2006: 114-115).

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the UN Security Council addressed the issue at its meeting No. 4370 on 12 September 2001. The Council reaffirmed the objectives and principles of the United Nations treaty in its resolution 1368, the same day, and decided to combat all kinds of elements against international peace and security threats caused by terrorism. Assault operations started in the Northern provinces with Kabul, Kandahar and Jalad-Abad in Afghanistan. The US operation in Afghanistan had two main objectives. Its first aim was to destroy the Al-Qaeda organization, and the second was to destroy the Taliban regime and to establish a democratic legitimate state in its place (Novosseloff, 2002). The US intervention in Afghanistan has created serious problems for the future of international law. The

liquidation of the current administration and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state will damage international law. Although it is in constant change and development, the legal principles regarding the use of force under the UN Agreement must be respected. On the other hand, the efforts of the states that hold power such as the U.S. to legalize the use of power in the UN order and the direction of the international system in line with their own interests and purposes shake the trust and belief in international law and system in the world public opinion (Güngör, 2008: 12-13).

The terrorist acts carried out by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization on September 11, 2001, sent the U.S. to Afghanistan due to the establishment of Al-Qaeda allegedly. As a result of the affiliation of the Taliban, which was in power in Afghanistan with Al-Qaeda, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched against Afghanistan under the leadership of the U.S. As a result of this operation, the Taliban regime was destroyed and serious casualties were given to Al-Qaeda (Koçer, 2006).

After the collapse of the Taliban regime, the states supporting the international coalition signed the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001, in order to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in Afghanistan. In accordance with this agreement and the UN Security Council's decision No. 1386, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with the participation of 18 countries. The force began under the command of England on 16 January 2002. ISAF, whose responsibility area was only Kabul and its surroundings at the beginning of the operation, later started to work in all Afghanistan with the decision numbered 1510 of the UN Security Council (NATO, 2007).

The UN controlled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO supported and trained the Afghanistan Government Competences and domestic influence, establishing harmony and renewal circumstances. This project now concerns Afghanistan as a whole. ISAF was the first non-European Atlantic ground operation by NATO and the largest one in a variety of deploying units. ISAF's

significant responsibilities include support for Afghan management in expanding its authority across the region, leading stabilization and security operations interconnecting with Afghan National Security Forces, informing and assisting Afghan forces and supporting management on illegal armed group disarmament plans. At the behest of the Afghan Administration, ISAF supported the government's efforts in counter drug activities, offered assistance to government agencies and provides capabilities to the Afghan National Police (NATO, 2018).

ISAF led by NATO from mid 2003 to December 2014 under the UN mandate from ISAF. ISAF's mission was to develop Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to ensure security and allow Afghan officials to be registered so that Afghanistan can never become a sanctuary for terrorist groups. At its fishing ground, ISAF's forces were more than 130.000 from 50 NATO countries and allies. ISAF has remained NATO's longest military challenge (NATO, 2007)

However, it was an option strategy, not a requirement, to NATO Member States. ISAF played a very tricky role for the first three years in Kabul district, north and west Afghanistan with no aggressive areas. Until the expansion process reached to extremely Taliban areas by 2006, ISAF was not experienced as a major player for Afghanistan. The ISAF forces quickly realized that the paramilitaries of the Taliban and their allies had a never-ending struggle (Kocabaş and Öğün, 2014: 10-11).

The ISAF has helped to establish and redevelop the 28 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the protected areas outside and in Kabul. Both national and foreign actors have healthy opportunities to collaborate on restoration programs. In order to achieve this mission, NATO and its allies started extending their operating areas in four stages in Afghanistan, from the capital city of Kabul, to the whole region. NATO pushed to the northern part of Afghanistan during stage one from 2003 to 2004, under the command of German and French armies. At the same time, NATO began to take over from the UN Security Council authorities the ISAF mission. NATO stretched its forces to the west side of the world, where the Spanish and the Italian forces were, during the second process, which began in May 2005. When the

Taliban rule came down, these regions were ruled by Warlords of the North Alliances, so the areas of Afghanistan were comparatively secure (Kocabaş and Öğün, 2014: 62-63).

The international forces with the U.S. wanted to some findings in order to protect Afghanistan. The findings meant the capture of Taliban commanders. Like the Taliban top military leaders Mullah Obaidullah Akhund and Mullah Dad Ullah were operating from Pakistan's neighbouring tribal regions in Afghanistan. This promoted the United States and NATO to use and continue to target the drone technologies in areas that were extremely demanding for the U.S. troops. By conducting fewer operations with troops, NATO and the U.S. forces ended direct armed wars and the use of more drones to attack the target directly without the need of the army and high productivity. However, these drone attacks killed many civilians in the attacks of Taliban leaders in many villages and targeted houses (Salt, 2018: 115).

3.3. NATO in Afghanistan

NATO was established to respond to the mutual security challenges imported by the Soviet Union in 1949. It was established along with the United States and Canada by several Western European nations in order to provide mutual support for the Soviet Union following the Second World War. The European states struggled to restore their economies and to ensure their safety in the aftermath of Second World War. The foundation of the Alliance was part of a larger attempt to lead to three aims in and after the cold war: ending Soviet expansionism and disallowing the recovery of patriotic militarism in Europe by a strong North American continental life. In the aftermath of the Cold War the security concept of NATO has transformed from the Soviets to the conventional and new threats from the World. The members of NATO are called as democratic regimes and NATO supports democratic norms and values and guarantees that parties consult and work together in the area of security and defence related issues and long-term conflict prevention. As NATO has been participating in diplomatic settlements of confrontations and political efforts fail, the army carries over mechanisms of emergency response. These conflicts are settled

under Article 5 of the Washington Convention, Article 5 of the NATO Collective Security Section (NATO, 2017).

The collective code is at the forefront of the NATO security deal. It is the special and permanent code that binds the partners for asking them to protect one another together, and supplying the alliance with an essence of unity. The collective defence ensures that all participants are viewed as an attack against a partner. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is covered by the Code of Mutual Security. Invoked Article 5 of NATO for the first time in history, after the 9/11 jihadist attacks in the U.S. In the midst of various incidents, for example, in reaction to the situation in Syria, NATO has taken joint defensive procedures as well as the catastrophe between Russia and Ukraine. NATO has dynamically obliged troops to send mutual security activities to the alliance on an eternal basis. The NATO alliance took part in six tasks on three continents Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Kosovo Active Endeavour Operation in the Mediterranean, NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo, NATO Preparation in Iraq, and the African Union mission in Sudan. Active Endeavours Force (KFOR). (Destradi, 2012: 3-4).

3.4. The Involvement of NATO in Afghanistan

The International Security Assistance has been developed under the Bonn Conference Power (ISAF). The ISAF Command was captured by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in August 2003 as the first war mission from their Euro-Atlantic region in NATO's history. NATO's key role within the ISAF mission was confined until 2003 to supplying the UN ambassadors, foreign players and government institutes with security in the city of Kabul. The NATO-ISAF missions eventually spread to other key cities, and subsequently cover the whole region of Afghanistan. NATO is the key reason for the inclusion of the universal community Afghanistan to help stability and rebellion in Afghan security agencies, to build the way for reconstruction and powerful governance. It aims for Afghanistan to enjoy years of stability and protection after crises, destruction and scarcity, peace and security for

Afghans, as well as a self-supporting, peace and security elective administration (Moore, 2010: 17-18)

In Afghanistan NATO's participation is a triune structure:

"through the leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a universal squad of over 30000 forces that assists the Afghan jurisdiction in spreading and practising its control and effect across the country, creating the circumstances for stabilization and renovation,

A senior non-combatant representative, accountable for progressing the military- political characteristics of the Coalition's promise to the nation, who works thoroughly with ISAF, communicates with the Afghan administration and other global organisations and preserves associates with neighbouring nations. A significant programmed of collaboration with Afghanistan, focused on defence improvement, building defence institutions and the military characteristics of security division reform" (Destradi, 2012).

The NATO Summit in Riga devoted primarily to the ISAF mission of Afghanistan in contributing to Afghanistan's security and peace. The NATO leaders have reconfirmed their long-term support and resolved the general caution on when, where and how the army group will be used to improve the importance of the ISAF mission led by NATO in Afghanistan. Each ally will help the needed help and different countries, such as jets, helicopters and training teams also provide extra services for Afghan national forces, regardless of caution in an emergency (Destradi, 2012).

Identifying the long-term restoration stabilization issues and NATO leaders for growth called for greater universal inclusion and political, defence and financial considerations compensation. The motto was "there can be no security without development in Afghanistan and no development without security" in the Riga Summit (NATO Riga Summit, 2007).

3.5. Chinese Approach after the NATO Withdrawal

The international community was keen to convince the government of Afghanistan that they will not stand up for themselves despite the departure of the ISAF troops in late 2014. The concern remains, however, that the Taliban could once again throw a gap of power and takeover. Then, Afghanistan will be the most impacted country one again. While the international community has common views of risks, they are following different agendas in Afghanistan that inhibit successful regional cooperation. The U.S. follows the view that Afghanistan will be the central part of a modern Silk Road between South Asia and Central, East Asia and the Middle East as an economically developed zone. The tacit assumption is that economic inclusion can lead to improved safety prosperity, but at most that can only be done over the long term. In the short term, political disparities between regional countries are more likely to impede economic cooperation. In their own areas of influence, China and India seek to include Afghanistan more directly in international organisations. Both countries concern the post-2014 destabilization of Afghanistan particularly through the strengthening of Islamist terrorist groups, as a direct impact on their stability. The trends in Afghanistan are also of interest to other nations. Iran, for instance, is adopting a posture of ambivalence in fear of the U.S. impact after 2014 as well as the Taliban takeover (Akkurt, 2005: 153-155).

The Chinese policy towards the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan was before the September 11 attacks and China was more moderate to the Taliban Government. After the 9/11 events, Beijing declared that China was against all kinds of terrorism and declared that the United States would support the operation against the Taliban regime under three conditions. China never wanted an Islamist government in power of Afghanistan, because Afghanistan also believed that as long as the Taliban regime was strong, China’s security concerns would be at stake of risk in East Turkistan (Akkurt, 2005: 253-254).

On the other hand, China’s patronage with the U.S. operations would be a reason for good relations between the two countries, and China would be freed from

the U.S. economic sanctions (Fazil, 2014). In this case, the Chinese approach to Afghanistan after the 9/11 can be summarized in three points. China is against all kinds of terrorism and supports the operations against it. The operation against terrorism should be based on a certain proof. The goal should be clear and accomplished, provided that innocent people are not harmed. The function of the Security Council should be increased based on the United Nations main principles and Conditions. China is ready to participate in any negotiations against terrorism within the framework of the Security Council (Roy, 2006: 6).

On the other hand, there were two reasons why China did not participate in the military operation with the UN against the Taliban. China will not participate in any military operations abroad according to state policies. Good relations between China and Afghanistan were another reason.

China and Afghanistan have never engaged with military intervention, while the results of the political change of China were looking at who would win and who would come to power. Furthermore, NATO and ISAF were not allowed to use its soil to attack the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. China gave the United States political support for this operation only (Sanati, 2011).

The cooperation efforts of the Obama regime with China were impressive particularly in an efficient halting of the precipitous consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008. This would encourage these countries to gain crucial aid in the hope of restoring vast parts of Afghanistan's national infrastructure. Although the collaboration on Afghanistan during the Bush period were troublesome, the strategic realities of today are plausible for the rational role of Russia, China and India in rebuilding and educating a new generation of engineers and technicians in Afghanistan (Fox and Korski, 2008).

On the other hand, the same fundamental aim of stabilizing Afghanistan, China and the U.S. participation is at least theoretical cooperation potential. The U.S. analysts proposed that Beijing might use its unique Islamabad partnership to cajole Pakistan's

leadership to enhance its counter insurgency efforts. Others also called on China to open its Afghanistan-led border to be an alternative route for military and supply or even to send Chinese peacekeepers to the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support (Ashraf, 2008).

China, however, opposes undue pressure on Pakistan. In China's geostrategic calculus, a good ally in the area is a crucial doctrine. In the relations with Pakistan Beijing maintain a more optimistic balance of power vis-à-vis India, central Asia and the U.S. regional presence as well as having a degree of "strategic depth" by acting as a friendly geography buffer state (Guardian, 2014). Beijing has even declined to send soldiers to use them directly or work with Washington freely. The United States will intensify or encourage a long-term role in the region's terrorist threat to itself. This refusal to collaborate is the product of complex strategic expectations. In accordance with its five peaceful coexistence values, which are stressed non-interference and sovereignty respect China suggested a peaceful mediated solution to the Afghan war and whether the Taliban includes or controls the final settlement. That is possible that China will agree and cooperate with ruling power in Kabul (Small, 2010: 91).

It is clear that the U.S.-China collaboration in Afghanistan has significant limitations. In Afghanistan, China's economic interests support its broader geopolitical concerns, which are separate from those of the US. The investment-centric strategy of Beijing enables it to make allies and to deter rivals, promotes stabilisation, while holding its distance from troubled ISAF efforts, and strengthens its own position with and likely succeeding in the Karzai regime. It meets these goals at low cost relative to the alternatives (Goldgeir, 2021).

3.5.1. China's ıncreasing role in Afghanistan

NATO declared officially the end of its fighting mission in Afghanistan, after 13 years, on 28 December 2014. National Afghan Police and the Afghan military took over the defence of the country as the insurgency and civilian and military deaths began to increase. NATO / ISAF task flag was diminished and there was a new

Resolute Support Mission (RSM) flag in which NATO character is primarily limited to education, counselling, and assistance to the security forces in Afghanistan. (Moran, 2010).

The reactivating of the Chinese Embassy in Kabul in 2002 and China's growing economic activity have revitalized the ties with Afghanistan after the Taliban regime collapsed in 2001. The Chinese presence in Afghanistan became apparent when China made Afghanistan's biggest direct foreign investment in history. The Chinese signed a deal for the production of the Aynak copper mine in Logar province worth 3,5 billion U.S. dollar in Spring 2008 (Caetano, 2015: 11).

China's increasing presence in Afghanistan is related to the goal of expanding its Western provinces, which are economically more fragile. These provinces need access to raw materials and new routes for business in order to expand, and so the Chinese government seeks to tie them closer together with Central and South Asia and Iran. This aim is obviously also stressed by the 12th Five-Year Plan (2010-2015). China has a special concern for the security of the region, especially in relation to the protection of its extensive investment and local Chinese employees, as a result of the various investments made in Afghanistan. Regional stability is also critical for China's government and around Afghanistan, the persistent concern of instability on the frontier of Afghanistan and in Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Two incidents, the first of which was in a violent clash between the Uyghur minority and the Han people in Urumqi in July 2009, have stimulated Chinese leadership's anxiety about the future of Afghanistan after 2014 and its role in fostering peace for the entire region. The very violent Kirghiz-Uzbek conflicts in the southern parts of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 was considered the second time China's government is deeply worried about the future of Afghanistan. In this relation, Chinese experts were mainly surprised by the temporary loss of power of the south of Otunbayeva's provisional administration. The influence of such a crisis in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has already been apparent that there is no successful containment (SCO). Repeatedly, Chinese experts stressed that this was a shortcoming for the SCO, considering the situation in Afghanistan. Both of these

incidents, along with the planned ISAF withdrawal, prompted the government of China to aim to incorporate Afghanistan more effectively, both regionally and bilaterally, by the end of 2014. In this respect, Afghanistan was given the observer status which the president of Afghanistan Mr. Karzai had pursued since 2011 at the latest SCO Summit in Beijing in early June 2012. While this was a purely symbolic gesture, it still demonstrates that the States of SCO want to shoulder greater responsibility at the border with Afghanistan. This gesture also constituted a first, significant and clear step towards further integrating Afghanistan into the SCO (Akkurt, 2005: 256-260).

In the context of Chinese interests in Afghanistan in terms of international organizations, the SCO-Afghanistan Contact group on illegal drug trafficking has been formed since 2005 from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Xinjiang Province. The SCO-Afghanistan Action Plan on Insurgency, Illegal Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime was adopted in 2009. President Karzai and Chinese chairman Hu Jintao strengthened the relations between Afghanistan and China following the SCO Summit in Beijing in June 2012 through the signature of a "strategic partnership". This arrangement represents the long-term dedication of China in Afghanistan. Chairman Hu further stressed that the Chinese companies will be allowed the Chinese government to invest in Afghanistan and actively foster regional prosperity (Phillips, 2012).

The Chinese government has recognised that Afghanistan's future will influence the country as a whole, particularly Xinjiang Province in western China. That is why the involvement Chinese has to be taken very seriously in the security of Afghanistan. But the question remains whether the Chinese government is able, in addition to providing direct contributions, to take more responsibility for the rebuilding of Afghanistan and to recognize the position of the SCO. The capacity of the SCO will be constrained in particular since neither China nor Russia is keen to engage with the U.S. in the margin of the in SCO in for instance as an observer state. It is the absence of the U.S. and other participants from Europe that, in view of events in Afghanistan, raises questions on the part of the Americans about the direction of the SCO as the regional organisation (Caetano, 2015: 66).

In the context of China's increasing role in Afghanistan, the Aynak issue, mentioned above, deserves to discuss in detail. China has a special place to foster the stability and protection of the country that has been ripped apart by war. First, in Afghanistan, Chinese companies will set up beachfront and pave the way and path to other firms to continue investing. The mining industries of China, which draw their guidelines from the highest Chinese government levels, are dominated. While this state ownership limits business self-reliance, it offers a degree of isolation from market risk and, to a certain extent, modifies understanding of the risk itself. In order to attain greater national strategic objectives, a single organization might be able to take losses in the sense of stable global product supplies. Chinese corporations are also granted special status under state-owned undertakings to the government-supported loans at low-interest. Chinese companies, for instance, must be publicly accountable and show the profitability of their shareholders' contributions, and provide a realistic expectation of their returns. The mining industry is also working together with Chinese Eximbank, Chinese Development Bank and other governments to combine their investment offerings into comprehensive deals. If Aynak is successful, they will help to declare that, despite the volatile security situation, Afghanistan is a viable place for foreign investments (Small, 2010: 92-93).

Secondly, China enjoys the advantages compared with the U.S. or other ISAF states. Strengthening diplomatic ties with the government and people of Afghanistan, Chinese investments are less likely to target for insurgents. Despite China's tensions with Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, Afghan rebels typically do not attach China the same degree of animosity as they do in the U.S. (Small, 2010: 95).

Finally, by rapidly stabilizing China, ISAF will support committing to long-term sustainable investment and ensuring in Afghanistan (Brett and Ericsson, 2006). By contract work, projects such as Aynak have the ability to generate continuous growth, build employment, and improve other economic sectors. As the world's biggest consumer of copper, iron and almost all other metals (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016) China is one of the world's top mining industry drivers. In

conjunction with its aggressive plans to develop comprehensive transportation and energy ties with Central Asia, China is a natural export destination for Afghan minerals along with neighbours such as India. This has far higher economic effects than, for example, once international assistance for road construction. China will contribute to fill the economic hole in Afghanistan.

3.5.2. China's promoting ıntegration between Afghanistan and Pakistan

China considers Afghanistan and Pakistan as vital geostrategically relevant countries. In the context of chaos, conflicts or terrorism there will eventually radiate northward outside of its borders and into the five Central Asian states, Beijing sees Afghanistan as the epicentre of Central and South Asia. China sees Pakistan as a crucial state which will have a decisive effect on what happens in neighbouring nations, including Afghanistan. Moreover, in an environment where China has little allies, Beijing believes Islamabad is a long but profoundly worrying partner in the geostrategic line between South and Central Asia (Nathan and Scobell, 2012).

Though Chinese participation has developed and remains relevant in Pakistan, the presence of Beijing is relatively modest in Kabul and Islamabad. In addition, China considers that its influence is incredibly minimal in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, in both of these countries Beijing feels vulnerable and almost helpless. Although the Chinese government is pursuing a picture as a powerful major force, its approach to this turbulent region is slow and unfitting. In Beijing's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Empty Fortress strategy is also working, particularly as it is the perspective of China which must include not only those countries but also India, South Asia's sprawling giant. Western China is a large and lean-defending region highly susceptible to external intervention and Beijing views New Delhi with a significant susceptibility. It includes not only Xinjiang but also Tibet (Ashraf, 1986: 55).

Afghanistan and Pakistan are more critical than expected for Beijing because the two countries are Far East of China's political and economic heartland. The national security aims of Beijing in the Eastern core, which has the best defences and

the Han Chinese, are the mostly dominant ethnic group have a different aspect. However, the Far West is the weakest province for security in China and the concentration of ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs and Tibetans and having fewer of the Han Chinese. Beijing feels increasingly weak on western China's borders in Central and South Asia. This vulnerability dates back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Therefore, China has taken into consideration Afghanistan uneasily. Within this scope, Beijing has treated Afghanistan as Central Asia's terrorist epicentre since the 1990s. In the Central Asian States and Xinjiang, China expects an outpouring of Islamic extremism. Beijing was ambivalent about the continuing operations of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan and was distanced by the Chinese services that allow the nation to be secure (Scobell et al, 2018).

As far as the fate of Afghanistan is concerned, China considers Pakistan as the main region, located on the geostrategic fault line of Central and South Asia. For over 15 decades, Beijing enjoyed a friendly alliance with Islamabad, and Chinese and Pakistani leaders frequently term their country a "all-weather friendship." The importance of Islamabad, however, as a gateway of China into the Islamic world or a Chinese facilitator on the world stage, remains an important ally and a significant arms market for Chinese defence firms. In the 21st century, China has close partnerships and diplomatic links with a number of countries in the Middle East (Blitz, 2011).

China has become more and more worried about Pakistan's approaches, turmoil and Islamabad's failure to monitor Xinjiang extremists. Beijing cannot, however, allow itself to pull. China has a very frustrating and disturbing relationship with Pakistan. However, withdrawal does not appear to be a choice, as Beijing fears that China could cause further troubles and possible security problems. In the meantime, Pakistan will continue to welcome China simply for the explanation that there are no good and trustworthy friends in Islamabad except in Beijing. Pakistan sees the U.S. as untrustworthy. The assault of the Navy Seal team that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011 put in trouble the relations between Islamabad and Washington (Xiguang, 2011).

As Afghanistan considers the canopy of the SCO, Chinese scholars demand a trilateral coalition, known as the Pamir group, which links the boundaries of all three countries, to consolidate China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pamir group was supposed to revive the old Silk Road which crosses this area, with Chinese increasing investment to develop a network of roads, energy pipelines, electric grids and other infrastructures lending to AfPak with China. Near the town of Kashgar and in the far western end of China's Xinjiang Province lies the Wakhan Corridor, which links Afghanistan with China. China hopes that Kashgar will be reinstated as an existing launch pad in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia on the famed Silk Road. The quadrilateral freight railways between Xinjiang and Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently in active mode, with Gwadar port supplying energy supplies in the Middle East. Their land relations will also apply to Iran as mentioned previous chapters (Barnett, 2010)

3.6. Quadrilateral Coordination Group

In the aftermath of withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan the need of revive the peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban has revitalized in order to maintain prosperity, stability and peace. In this context the first meeting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States-China Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) was held in Islamabad on 11 January 2016. The group included Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard G. Olson, China's Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Deng Xijun and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry. The meeting recapitulated that the four the group committed to the realization of objectives mentioned in their statement in the Heart of Asia Conference in Islamabad on 9 December 2015. The group underlined that mutual efforts will facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process with a view to achieving ongoing peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. Moreover, the group emphasized the urgent need for direct talks between representatives of the Government of Afghanistan and representatives from Taliban in terms of maintaining peace process. They also stated that the Afghan-led and Afghan-

owned peace and reconciliation process aimed to protect the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016; DoS, 2016).

The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meeting was the outcome of a previous meeting that was held at the margin of the Fifth Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference which took place in Islamabad on 9 December 2015, between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken. On this occasion, all countries had committed "to facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process with a view to achieving lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region" and "agreed to work together to enhance mutual trust and confidence between Afghanistan and Pakistan to create an enabling environment for peace talks and broadening political, economic and security cooperation" (Baaber, 2015). Simultaneously, a trilateral meeting was also held between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US "to accelerate diplomatic and political efforts to put an end to the conflict in Afghanistan," (RFERL, 2016) thus highlighting the commitment of all states involved in pushing the peace process forward (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016)

The second meeting of the Quadrilateral Contact Group was held in Kabul on 18 January 2016. The delegation was led by Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan Michael McKinley and China's Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Deng Xijun (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016).

Addressing the meeting, Afghan Foreign Minister, Salahuddin Rabbani "invited the Taliban on behalf of the government and the people of Afghanistan to join the peace process and solve all differences through negotiations." At the same time, he also warned that those "Taliban members who reject talks and push for war would be isolated." This could be regarded in the context of the Quadrilateral Contact Group as an achievement in terms of including the Taliban to the Afghan peace and reconciliation process (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016).

The third meeting of the Quadrilateral Contact Group was held on 6 February 2016 in Islamabad. It was a positive move and a successful idea to shape the Quadrilateral Contact Community. Although it was the first of its kind, the "Quadrilateral" proposal was seen in the past to be related proposals that were not feasible. What makes this group efforts particularly unique, was that the US and China have kept their support for the mechanism of peace and reconciliation. This was not only brought prestige to the process but provided great hope and trust that the quadrilateral system would in time establish a framework for a potential agreement between the leaders of the Afghan government and Taliban (US DoS, 2016)

For the process to succeed, all sides will have to perform immense patience, maturity and openness to accommodate each other's views. Both principal stake holders such as the Afghan government and Taliban will have to move beyond the rhetoric, find the common ground. The negotiations with the Taliban had been initiated in the past by the Afghan government. However, now Kabul must move beyond giving statements and instead of focusing on galvanizing domestic support from forces opposed to the peace process. It not only has to convince the Taliban to enter into talks but must also accommodate them in the political process through a holistic and viable national reintegration programme. Furthermore, while the Taliban continue to wage attacks in an apparent effort to put pressure on the government to gain greater leverage, all efforts need to be made to reach out to the group before it embarks upon yet another spring offensive. Hence, the current window of opportunity must not be lost (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016).

The fourth meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China on the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation process was held in Kabul on 23 February 2016. The group pleased that President Ashraf Ghani, once again emphasized the strong commitment of the Government of Afghanistan for peace and reconciliation on 15 February 2016 with Taliban groups and Hezbi Islami Hekmatyar. The group also underlined strong support for the upcoming direct talks between the Government of Afghanistan and authorized

representatives of the Taliban and other groups. The QCG member states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, United States and China, invited all Taliban and other groups to participate in the first round of direct peace meetings with the Afghan Government which was expected to take place by the first week of March 2016 (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016).

The last meeting in Kabul needed direct talks with different parties during first week in March. It should also be remembered that there were two main Taliban factions since Mullah Umar's death. Mullah Akhtar Mansour headed the Taliban leadership; Mullah Rasoul led an anti-Mullah Mansour fraction and operated mainly in the Zabul and Herat provinces. Both parties reportedly clashed heavily in many areas of Zabul and Herat and in the faction of Mullah Rasoul. While the Taliban leadership allegedly chosen Mullah Rasoul by leading the splitter group affected the Taliban Alliance, Mullah Mansoul had no such influence as Mullah Mansour. It presented an incentive for the Afghan Government to locate and further consolidate Taliban groups so that they became more prone to simple pressures. The Afghan Government invited all the organizations that plan to oppose terrorism and wish to take part in the talks (US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2016).

Within this framework the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) aimed to further and facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process. The Chinese strategy in Afghanistan has been regarded that the stability and peace in the region will contribute to the Chinese interests in quelling the security and economic concerns Afghanistan and the region. It can be pointed out that in this context the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meetings will play a role in facilitating to reach a peace and stable Afghanistan in favour of Chinese foreign policy in the region and the relations with Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Locating in a strategic belt between South Asia and Central Asia Afghanistan has been attracted the neighbour countries and great powers throughout history. From a historical perspective, the region where Afghan people live has acquired many struggles, wars and conflicts. That's why it's called the graveyard of emperors. Serving as a gateway to India, connecting the ancient Silk Road, which carried trade from the Mediterranean to China Afghanistan has had a geostrategic location on many trade and migration routes. Before 1747, traditional relations between Afghanistan and China were recorded as trade, including the transmission of religious belief and Buddhism. In the 18th and 19th centuries Afghanistan was facing challenges from great powers of the time Britain and Russia. It was a country that did not have a free foreign policy in the second mid of the 19th century and it remained in a buffer zone between the two imperialists Britain and Russia, and therefore no diplomatic relations took place between Afghanistan and China.

After gaining the full independence in 1919, Afghanistan had the opportunity to establish relations with the outside world by having a free foreign policy. If we need to examine the relations between the two countries according to periods, in the first thirty years (from 1920 to 1950) relations between the countries were not quite and generally important.

The first diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and China were signed in 1955, followed by a shared border demarcation agreement of 91 km between the Afghanistan and China in 1963. In the second 50 years (from 1960 to 2000), but compared to the previous thirties, bilateral relations between Afghanistan and China show as efficient and important. Despite the common short and long border between the two countries, China's concern about internal security has risen, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s; three obstacles were encountered in the region: terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tension between the Sino-Soviet and Kabul regime was high on the one hand, and on the other hand, China provided economic and military aid to the

mujahedeen fighting the Russians, but things normalized somewhat with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.

During the civil war that lasted from 1990 to 1993, China remained only an observer to the situation in Afghanistan and was not interested in Afghanistan's internal affairs. With the emergence of the Taliban movement in 1994, the People's Republic of China did not formally recognize the Taliban regime, but according to some sources, it had held informal diplomatic talks between China and the Taliban.

In 2001, after the collapse of the Taliban regime, China immediately defeated its embassy in Kabul. Both official and informal visits were made by senior officials of the two countries and close relations were developed between the two countries. Especially, after the Karzai administration in 2007, these relations were further tightened, as the Esraf Ghani administration provided the opportunity for foreign investors to invest in the country's underground resources.

It has invested billions of dollars in underground resources and has provided a lot of economic aid to the Afghanistan interim government. An economic and technological cooperation agreement was signed between Afghanistan and China in 2009, and then multi-dimensional agreements were signed in 2010. The policy of good neighbourliness and good friendship was developed after Ashraf Ghani became the Head of the National Unity Government and signed bilateral agreements such as security, economy and trade.

Mutual visits and many joint agreements were signed in the fields of political and diplomatic relations. It was also emphasized that the two countries do not interfere with each other's internal affairs and respect their territorial integrity and independence. Additionally, China mediated between the Afghan government and the Taliban in the peace and reconciliation process.

Economic and commercial relations; after establishing diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and China, the volume of commercial and economic relations

has changed over time according to the political ties between the two countries. Economic and commercial volume increased after 2001; For example, from 2002 until 2013, the total import and export volume between the two countries was recorded as approximately 3,6 billion US dollars. In addition, China had provided millions of US dollars worth of economic aid to the Afghan government at this time. In addition, China, as the first foreign investor country in Afghanistan after 2001, has invested approximately USD 10 billion in Afghanistan mining and oil sector.

Military and security relations; China has never done a military intervention in Afghanistan. Throughout history, China had provided partial military assistance to Afghanistan in only two periods, for the first time during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China provided many different weapons, economic aid and military training to the warring Afghan Mujahedeen. For the second time after 2001, China had provided less military aid to the new government in Afghanistan than the US and other allies. This aid, which lasted from 2001 to 2016, is worth approximately US $ 80 million, including training for Afghan military forces, joint intelligence work in the field of security, and partial provision of military equipment.

Educational and cultural relations; because Afghanistan is an Islamic society, it has a religious belief and culture. On the other hand, the fact that the two countries have two different cultures led to a significant development of cultural relations between Afghanistan and China. Despite this, China has made efforts to strengthen cultural relations between Afghanistan and China, with the establishment of the new government in Afghanistan, China is immediately in Kabul.

He founded the Confucius Institute and provided Chinese language education and other cultural activities to Afghans. In addition, since 15, China has provided hundreds of educational scholarships to Afghan students.

As a result, Afghanistan-China relations have differed with the change of regimes in the two countries since its establishment. In the last few years, these relations between Afghanistan and China have further developed and each country has

given priority to its own interests; For example, with the collapse of the Taliban regime, China is based on two basic principles: its foreign policy regarding Afghanistan, economic interests and security concerns. Since China has a common border with Afghanistan, it is concerned about instability and security problems in the region. Indeed, China has invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan in recent years. In addition to these aids, he emphasized on preventing the instability that may come from Afghanistan to the East Turkistan region. During the US military intervention in Afghanistan, China implemented the "wait and watch" policy regarding Afghanistan and provided economic aid instead of military intervention. The expectation of the Afghan government from China is to contribute to the development and economic development of this country, to play an active role in the peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and to provide assistance to the Afghan military forces in the fight against terrorism. As we have stated, the recent deterioration of the political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan has left a negative impact on Afghan-Chinese relations, the reason is that Pakistan has been finding different dimensional relations between the two countries as one of the first and most important allies in the region. On the other hand, India's close relations with Afghanistan and millions of dollars of aid left a negative effect on Afghan-China relations. In the future, the situation of the relations between the two countries will be linked with time and the political situations in the region.

REFERENCES

Afghan MFA (2016). Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and China Sign Five Bilateral Cooperation Agreements'', http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/five-biliteral-agreements-signed-by-foreign-ministers-of-china-and-afghanistan-main.

Akkurt, Mehmet, (2005) Afganistan'ın Yapılanmasında Siyasi ve Ekonomik Stratejiler, yayınlar, IQ Kültür Sanat yayıncılık, İstanbul.

Albert, E. (2020). China-Taiwan Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations

Ali, G. (2017). China-Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Allison, R. and Jonson, L. (2001), (Editors), Central Asian Security the New International Context, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai Meets with Wang Yi http://gy.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1131896.htm

Ashraf, Sajjad, (2018). Can Pakistan facilitate Afghan peace? East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/05/can-pakistan-facilitate-afghan-peace/

Ashraf, Tariq Mahmud (2008) "Afghanistan in Chinese Strategy Toward South and Central Asia," Jamestown China Brief, vol. 8, no. 10 (May 13, 2008).

Ashraf, Fahmida (1986) The Strategic Wakhan, Strategic Studies Vol. 9, No. 2 (Wınter 1986), pp. 48-67

Atay, Fatima Özge, (2010) Impact of the Xinjiang problem on The China's External Relations: 1990-2010, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi) Ankara , Middle East Technical University, Aralık 2010.

Awan, Zamir Ahmed (2020) China-Pakistan: A journey of friendship (1950-2020), Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1189007.shtml

Azizi, Wahidullah (2018) "Afghan Mineral Wealth: A Double-Edged Sword," The Diplomat, 16 November 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/afghan-mineral-wealth-a-double-edged-sword/

Baabar, Mariana (2015) "Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, US vow to support Afghan-led peace process," The News, December 11, 2015, http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/81173-Pakistan-Afghanistan-China-US-vow-to-support-Afghan-led-peace-process#sthash.qrw5Yrzq.dpuf

Barnds, W. (1975). "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity." The China Quarterly 63: 463–489.

Barnett, Thomas P. M. (2010) "Afghanistan's minerals Deposits Now Super-Sized by U.S. Geologists," Globlogization, June 14, 2010, Thomas P.M. Barnett - Blog - Afghanistan's minerals deposits now super-sized by U.S. geologists

Basit, Saira H. (2019) "CPEC Emboldens China and Pakistan's Joint Effort to Manage Militancy," The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/cpec-emboldens-china-and-pakistans-joint-effort-to-manage-militancy/

Blitz, James (2011) "Pakistan Warns US It Could 'Lose An Ally,'" Financial Times, September 23, 2011.

Brautigam, D. (2010), 'China, Africa and the international aid architecture', African Development Bank Group Working Paper Series (107),

Brett Damian and Magnus Ericsson, (2006) “Chinese Expansion to Create New Global Mining Companies,” Commodities Now, LME Week Supplement

Britannica, (2019) “Han Dynasty”, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Han-dynasty

Boon, H. T. (2018). China’s Global Identity: Considering the Responsibilities of Great Power. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

Boon, H. T. 2016. “The Hedging Prong in India’s Evolving China Strategy.” Journal of Contemporary China 25 (101): 792–804.

Byers, Michael (2007) Soykırımdan Sonkırıma Savaş Hukuku. Çev. Hasret Dikici Bilgin, İstanbul: Detay Yayıncılık, 2007

Byron N. Tzou, China and International Law The Boundary Disputes, Praeger Yayınlar New York 1990, s. 70-71

Chan, Minnie (2018) “China is helping Afghanistan set up mountain brigade to fight terrorism,” South China Morning Post, 28 August 2018 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2161745/china-building-training-camp-afghanistan-fight

Chatzky, Andrew and James McBride, (2019) “China’s Massive Belt and Road initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 21 May 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

Chawla, Shalini (2020) Mapping China’s interests and engagement in Afghanistan, https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/mapping-chinas-interests-engagement-afghanistan

Chen, D. (2011), ‘China’s foreign aid work’, Qiushi (Seeking Truth) Journal 3(2), URL: http://english.qstheory.cn/international/201109/t20110924_112578.htm

Chen, D. (2010), ‘Strive to initiate new progress in foreign aid work - Thoroughly carry out the spirit of national working conference on foreign Aid [Nuli kaichuang yuanwai gongzuo jumian – shenru guanche luoshi quanguo yuanzhu gongzuo huiyi jingshen]’, Seeking Truth [Qiushi] (19): 42–44.

Chen, Z. (2004). The significance of west China development to Asian economic integration. In D. Lu & W. A. W. Neilson (Eds.), China’s west region development: Domestic strategies and global implications (pp. 439-464). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company.

Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 49, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2011), pp. 1076-1151

Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan (2011) China—Afghanistan Relations in 2009’’, http://af.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/introduction/t853111.htm

Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, 2013.Afganistan’da Çin Halk Cumhuriyetin Büyükelçilik, ‘’ China-Afghanistan Relations in 2012’’, son erişme(Eylül 2011), http://af.china-embassy.org.

Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, (2013). Ambassador Deng Xijun Calls on President of Afghanistan’’, (Ekim 2014), http://af.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1222622.htm

Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, (2014). A Unique and Fruitful State Visit’’, http://af.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/sbgx/t1222624.htm

Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, (2015). Li Yuanchao Attends Reception for the 60th Anniversary of China-Afghanistan Diplomatic Ties, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1311792.shtml

China Daily (2015). Backgrounder: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 2015., April 22. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015/04/22/content_20503693.htm.

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2015), 'The speech of the Chinese president Xi Jinping at the South-South Cooperation Roundtable Meeting at the United National Headquarters in New York on the 26th https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdmgjxgsfwbcxlhgcl70znxlfh/t1302399.shtml

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2019), Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, Stressing China Values Developing China-Afghanistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership and Hopes Afghanistan Achieve Enduring Peace and Stable Development'' https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1672735.shtml

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2014) https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2676_663356/

Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan, (2013). China--Afghanistan Relations in 2011, http://af.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/introduction/t1088794.htm

CIA World Factbook, (2020), Afghanistan, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/afghanistan/#geography

Çakmak, Cenap (2003) Amerıcan Foreıgn Polıcy And September 11. Perceptions Volume-VIII March-May 2003.

David B.H. Denoon (Ed) China: Contemporary Political, economic and international Affairs, New York University Baskı, New York 2007, s. 4-5

Debata, M. R. (2007). China's minorities: Ethnic-religious separatism in Xinjiang. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Destradi, Sandra (2012) Nadine Godehardt and Alexander Frank The ISAF Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Perceptions and Reactions of Regional Powers. GIGA Focus, 2012. No: 5.

Dethlefsen, Kmut (2004) China's Foreign Policy in Transition Dialogue on Globalization , FES Briefing Paper.

Dreher, A., A. Fuchs, B. C. Parks, A. M. Strange and M. J. Tierney (2017), 'Aid, China, and growth: evidence from a new global development finance dataset', AidData Working Paper No. 46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData

Dreher, A., P. Nunnenkamp and M. Schmaljohann (2015), 'The allocation of German aid: self-interest and government ideology', Economics & Politics 27(1): 160–184.

Dupree, Louis (1973) Afghanistan, Princeton University Baskı, New Jersey 1973-78-80,

Ertürk, Amine (2016). "Similarities and Differences: A Comparison of China's Ethnicity Policies in Xinjiang and Tibet", IHH Humanitarian and Social Research Center, İstanbul: http://www.ihhakademi.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Similarities-and-Differences-A-Comparison-of-Chinas-Ethnicity-Policies-in-Xinjiang-and-Tibet.pdf

Fair, C. (2014). Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fazil, Muhmmad Daim (2014) China in Afghanistan: Contemporary Engagements and Challenges Ahead, IOSR journal of Humanities and Social Science, Cilt, 19, Sayı, 8.

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (2006), 'Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm

Fox John and Daniel Korski, (2008) "Can China Save Afghanistan?" European Council on Foreign Relations, September 29, 2008

Freeman, Carla P. (2018) China's 'regionalism foreign policy' and China-India relations in South Asia, Contemporary Politics, 24:1, 81-97

Fuchs, A. and K. C. Vadlamannati (2013), 'The needy donor: an empirical analysis of India's aid motives', World Development 44: 110–128.

Hilali A.Z (2001) China's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Central Asian Survey, 20:3, 323-351.

HRW, (2017). The Costs of International Advocacy China's Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights

Hong, Zhao (2013) "China's Afghan Policy: The Forming of the 'March West' Strategy," The Journal of East Asian Affairs 27, No. 2.

Hu, S. (2010). Role of SAARC observers: A Chinese perspective. In S. D. Muni (Ed.), The emerging dimensions of SAARC (pp. 277–306). New Delhi: Foundation Books

Hu, J. and M. Huang (2012), 'Current situation and reform of China's foreign aid administration [Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu guanli tixi de xianzhuang yu gaige]', International Economic Cooperation [Guoji jingji hezuo] (10): 55–58.

Hürriyet Gazetesi, 15 Eylül 2001. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/11-eylulden-itibaren-dakika-dakika-teror-16146

Huasheng, Zhao (2012) "China and Afghanistan: China's Interests, Stances, and Perspectives," Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ghiasy, Richard (2017) "Opinion: why Afghanistan's stability is so important to China," South China Morning Post, 22 May 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2095156/opinion-why-afghanistans-stability-so-important-china

Goldgeir, James (2021). Retooling America's alliances to manage the China challenge, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/research/retooling-americas-alliances-to-manage-the-china-challenge/

Golley, J. (2017). The dynamics of Chinese regional development: Market nature, state nurture. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Grant, C. (2012). Russia, China and global governance. Centre For European Reform, London, 53-54.

Gray, Denis D. (2013) "China Could Prove Ultimate Winner in Afghanistan," Associated Press.

Guardian (2014). Nato ends combat operations in Afghanistan, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/28/nato-ends-afghanistan-combat-operations-after-13-years

Guang, Pan (2006) “The Role of a Multilateral Anti-terror Mechanism in Central Asia,” in Charles Hawkins and Robert R. Love, eds., The New Great Game: Chinese Views on Central Asia, Fort Leavenworth.

Güngör, Uğur (2008) “Günümüzde Barış Operasyonları”, Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, 4 (8) : 7-19.

Jae, H. Ku, Drew Thompson, Danile Werts, (2011) Northeast Asia In Afghanistan: Whose Silk Road?, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, USA

Caetano Thomas (Ed). (2015). Managing Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth: Can Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth Be Used to Rebuild the Economy? Task Force 2015 University of Washington Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies.

Jalali, Ali (2015) Forging Afghanistan’s National Unity Government’’, Peace brief, United States Institute of Peace, Cilt, 183.

Johnston, A.I. (2003). Is China a Status Quo Power? nternational Security Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring, 2003), pp. 5-56

Karakaya, İskender (2010) 11 Eylül 2001 Sonrası ABD’nin Değişen Güvenlik Algılamaları ve Politikaları, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.

Katju, V. (2015). Ghani and India: circles of separation. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/ghani-and-india-circles-of-separation/

Kaushiki, Nishtha (2019) Factors Contributing to an Emerging Russia-Pakistan Strategic Proximity: An Indian Perspective, Journal of International and Area Studies Vol. 26, No. 1 (June 2019), pp. 43-64

Khan, Amina (2016) Afghanistan-Pakistan-US-China Quadrilateral Coordination Group, Instıtute of Strategıc Studıes, 2016, 1-5.

Kornberg, Judith F. ve John R. Faust, (2005) China in World politics: policies, process, prospects, Lynne Rıenner Publishers , London 2005.

Kocabaş, Uğur and Öğün, M. Nesip (2014), NATO's Counterterrorism & Counterinsurgency Experience in Afghanistan, Lessons Learned Workshop Report NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara.

Koçer, Gökhan (2006) "Türkiye'nin Barışı Destekleme Harekâtlarına Katkısı", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 3 Sayı.11.

Kumar, S. (2019). China's South Asia Policy in the "New Era." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 75(2), 137–154.

Lan, J. (2014). Developments in South Asia in 2013: Accelerated transformation and overlying risks. In The CIIS blue book on international situation and China's foreign affairs (pp. 143–164). Beijing: CIIS/World Affairs Press.

Lin, T. (1996), 'Beijing's foreign aid policy in the 1990s: continuity and change', Issues and Studies 32(1): 32–65.

Lum, T., H. Fischer, J. Gomez-Granger and A. Leland (2009), 'China's foreign aid activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia', CRS Report for Congress (February 25), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

Ma, J. (1994), 'Wu Yi introduces the concept of 'Grand Strategies of Economy and Trade [Wu Yi jieshao: 'Da Jiingmao zhanlüe' gouxiang]', China Market [Zhongguo shichang] (7): 9.

Maizland, Lindsay and Laub Zachary (2020) Council on Foreign Relations, ‘’ The Taliban’’, The Rise of the Islamic Emirate, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan

Malik, J. Mohan (2001) South Asia in China's Foreign Relations, Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, 13:1, 73-90

Mawdsley, E. (2012), ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from Gift Theory’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37(2): 256–272

McNeal, Dewardric L.and Dumbaugh, Kerry (2002), China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism, Congressional Research Service

MEA India, (2013) Joint Statement- A Vision for Future Development of India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership. 2013. October 23. https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/22379.

Mohan, P. (2020). Is Indıa Equıpped To Counter The Growıng Chına-Pakıstan Nexus? https://southasianvoices.org/is-india-equipped-to-counter-the-growing-china-pakistan-nexus/

Moore, R. (2010). NATO´s Partners In Afghanıstan: Impact And Purpose, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 22.

Moran, Theodore H. (2010) “China’s Strategy to Secure Natural Resources: Risks, Dangers, and Opportunities,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Analyses in International Economics, no. 92

Murphy. Sean D. (2000) Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, The American Journal of International Law Vol. 94, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 102-139

Nathan, Andrew J., and Andrew Scobell, (2012) China's Search for Security, New York: Columbia University Press.

NATO, (2017). Why was NATO founded? https://www.nato.int/wearenato/why-was-nato-founded.html
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm

NATO missions all over the world, (2007), https://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-riga/html_en/riga07_02.html

NATO and Afghanistan (2018). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

NATO RIGA summit readers guide, (2007), https://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-riga/rdr-gde-riga-e.pdf

Norling, Nicklas (2008) "The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship," Central Asia-Caucasus Analysis.

Novosseloff, Alexandra (2002) "Birleşmiş Milletler'e Yeniden Canlılık Kazandırılması, Başlıca Amaçlar, Bir Durumun Önceden Kestirilip Ona Göre Davranılması ve Önleyici Rol Oynanması", Avrasya Dosyası. Cilt 8, No1, İlkbahar.

Oh, Y. A. (2019). Chinese development aid to Asia: Size and motives. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics.

Pakistan MFA (2016) Joint Press Release - Second meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group on the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation process, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government of Pakistan, https://af.usembassy.gov/second-meeting-quadrilateral-coordination-group-qcg-afghanistan-pakistan-united-states-china-january-18-2016/

Pandey, Shubhangi (2019) “Can China Drive the Afghan Peace Process?,” Observer Research Foundation, 18 May 2019

Peng, Yuan (2003) “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Attitudes,” in China in the American Political Imagination, ed. Carola McGiffert, Washington: The CSIS Press.

Phillips, Tom (2012). Senior Chinese official visits Afghanistan for first time in 50 years’ Telegraph gazete, Shanghai http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9560995/Senior-Chinese-official-visits-Afghanistan-for-first-time-in-50-years.html

Polat, Irfan (2006). “11 EylülTerörSaldırıları ve AmerikaBirleşik Devletlerinin Afganistan Müdahalesi”, (yüksek lisan Tez) Isparta.

Rafiq, A. (2017). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Barriers and Impact. United States Institute of Peace Report, 1–68.

Reuters (2018). China Says Military Ties ‘Backbone’ to Relations with Pakistan. 2018. Reuters, September 19. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-pakistan-defence/china-says-military-ties-backboneto-relations-with-pakistan-idUSKCN1LZ03P.

Reuters (2011) “Factbox: Relations between Afghanistan and China,” Reuters, 4 October 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-china-fb/factbox-relations-betweenafghanistan-and-china-idUSTRE79325D20111004.

Rizvi, H. (1994). “China and the Kashmir Dispute.” Regional Studies 12 (3): 91–99.

RFERL, (2019) “U.S., Russia, China Call For ‘Inclusive Afghan-Led’ Peace Process,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty https://www.rferl.org/a/us-russia-china-call-for-inclusive-afghan-peace-process/29906452.html

RFERL (2016) “Kabul Calls For ‘All Taliban’ To Join Peace Process,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, January 18, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-urges-all-taliban-to-join-peace-talks/27494103.html

Roy, S. (2020). “18 Mod-Xi Meetings, Several Pacts: Killings Breach Consensus, Dent Diplomacy.” The Indian Express, June 17. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-standoffdiplomacy-lac-incident-mea-6462195/

Roy, Denny, (2006), Lukewarm Partner: Chınese Support For U.S. Counterterrorısm in Southeast Asia, The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).

Safi and Mariam Bismellah Alizada, (2018) “Integrating Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative: Review, Analysis and Prospects,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2018, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kabul/15587.pdf

Salt, Alexander, (2018). Transformation and the War in Afghanistan. Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 12, No. 1 (SPRING 2018), pp. 98-126.

Sanati, Reza (2011) Transitioning Afghanistan in the Post-Withdrawal Era: Setting the Stage for a Stable Political Order, Alternatives :Turkish Journal Of International Relations ArşivCilt 10, Sayı 1

Saikal, Amin (2004) Modern Afghanistan A History of Struggle and Survival, London, I.B TAURIS Press.

Saraswat, Anushka (2020) Chinese Interests in Afghanistan: From Indifference to Strategic Involvement. https://diplomatist.com/2020/04/17/chinese-interests-in-afghanistan-from-indifference-to-strategic-involvement/

Scobell, Andrew, Ely Ratner, Michael Beckley.(2014) China’s Strategy Toward South and Central Asia An Empty Fortress. RAND Corporation,

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR525/RAND_RR525.pdf

Seerat, Rustam Ali (2015) China's Role in Afghan- Taliban Peace Talks: Afghan Perspectives, Institute of Chinese Studies , August 2015, ciltsayısı, 33 Delhi India.

Shahnawaz, Muhammad Shahrukh () 2011China and South Asia: Threats, Strategies, Cooperation and Expectations Pakistan Horizon , April 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April 2011), pp. 65-80

Shanthie, Mariet D'Souza, (2010) Karzai's Balancing Act: Bringing 'China' In?'', Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Sayı, 98.

Sharma, R. (2010). China's Afghanistan policy: Slow recalibration. China Report, 46(3), 201–215.

Small, Andrew (2015), The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, New York: Oxford University Press.

Small, Andrew (2010) "China's Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3.

Small, Andrew (2013) Why Is China Talking to the Taliban?'', Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/

Small, Andrew (2010) "China's Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 81-97.

Spegele, Brıan and Nathan Hodge, (2014) China Pledges $327 Million in Aid to Afghanistan'', The Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-pledges-327-million-in-aid-to-afghanistan-1414566221

Stanzel, Angela (2016) China's Interests in Afghanistan," The Asia Dialogue, 5 September 2016, https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/09/05/chinas-interests-in-afghanistan/

State Council Information Office (SCIO) (2011), China's Foreign Aid. White Paper http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284620.htm

State Council Information Office (SCIO) [Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi] (2014), China's Foreign Aid. White Paper http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm

Sutter, Robert G (2012). Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, 3rd Edition, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

Swaine, Michael D. (2009) China and the "AfPak" Issue, China Leadership Monitor, No. 31

Szczudlik- Tatar, Justyna (2014) "China's Evolving Stance on Afghanistan: Towards More Robust Diplomacy With" "Chinese Characteristics", Strategic File, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, sayı. 22.

Şahin, Şule (2006) 11 Eylül 2001 Sonrasında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Orta Doğu Politikası, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi.

Tahiri, Noor Rahman (2017). Afghanistan and China Trade Relationship, Munich Personal RePEc Archive.

Tiffany P. Ng (2010) China's Role In Shaping The Future of Afghanistan'' Carnegıe Endowment For Internatıonal Peace.

Torigian, J. (2019). Elite politics and foreign policy in China from Mao to Xi, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/elite-politics-and-foreign-policy-in-china-from-mao-to-xi/

United Nations Country Team in Afghanistan, (2013). Natural Resource Management and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Nairobi, UNEP, https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Afghanistan_NRM_report.pdf

UNESCO, (1994), History of Civilizationsof Central Asia, UNESCO Publishing.

UNSC Res. 1373, 2001 https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf

US DoS "Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," United States Department of State, https://www.refworld.org/publisher,USDOS,ANNUALREPORT,IRN,50ffbce5181,,0.html

US DoS. (2016) Joint Press Release of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, January 11, 2016, https://af.usembassy.gov/joint-press-release-quadrilateral-coordination-group-afghan-peace-reconciliation-january-11-2016/

US Embassy in Afghanistan (2016) The Fourth Meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China (February 23, 2016) https://af.usembassy.gov/fourth-meeting-quadrilateral-coordination-group-qcg-afghanistan-pakistan-united-states-china-february-23-2016/

US Institute of Peace China-South Asia Senior Study Group, (2020), China's Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia, https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/12/chinas-influence-conflict-dynamics-south-asia

Ülkü Halatçı, 11 Eylül Terörist Saldırıları ve Afganistan Operasyonunun Bir Değerlendirilmesi. Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika, 2006, Cilt.2, Sayı.7, 2006, s. 81.

Walker, Edward W. (2003) "Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia." Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 21–41.

Wishnick, Elizabeth (2009). Russia, China, And The United States In Central Asia: Prospects For Great Power Competition And Cooperation In The Shadow Of The Georgian Crisis, the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Xi, J. (2017). Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characterstics for a new era. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf

Xinhua News, (2019) Xi, Modi Meet to Promote China-India Mutual Learning for Shared Prosperity. 2019., October 12. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/12/c_138464897.htm.

Xinhua, L. (2015). China targeting ETIM in global counter-terrorism co-op: Spokesman. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015twosession/2015-03/02/content_19696598.htm

Xinhua, (2018). Xi calls for closer China-Afghanistan cooperation, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/10/c_137245000.htm

Xiguang, Li (2011) “New Silk Road could revitalize war-torn Afghanistan”, Global Times, 6 June 2011.

Vreeland, J. R. and A. Dreher (2014), The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council. Money and Influence, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ye, H. (2008). China and south Asian relations in a new perspective. In Y. Zhang (Ed.), Making new partnership: A rising China and its neighbours (pp. 217–336). Beijing: Social Science Academic Press.

Yu, Wang, (2019). Chinese Contribution to Afghanistan Obvious to All, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1719914.shtml#:~:text=Since%202001%2C%20China%20has%20joined,continuously%20increasing%20assistance%20and%20support.&text=In%202014%2C%20China%20pledged%20to,over%20the%20following%20four%20years

Zetterlund, Kristina, (2009). Pakistan, Consequences of Deteriorating Security in Afghanistan, Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Zhang, Yuyan Weijiang Feng (2019) Peaceful Development Path in China Springer 63-64

Zhang, Y., J. Gu and Y. Chen (2015), ‘China’s engagement in international development cooperation: the state of the debate’, IDS Evidence Report No. 116.

Zia, Hujatullah (2019) “A surge in China-Afghan trade,” China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/14/WS5c65346ba3106c65c34e9606.html

Ziekmke-Dickens, Caroline and Droogan, Julian (2010). Asian Transnational Security Challenge: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions, Macquarie University. Centre for Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism

TURNITIN REPORT

Yusuf Tez

ORIJINALLIK RAPORU

%7	%8	%2	%1
BENZERLIK ENDEKSI	İNTERNET KAYNAKLARI	YAYINLAR	ÖĞRENCI ÖDEVLERI

BIRINCIL KAYNAKLAR

1	journals.sagepub.com İnternet Kaynağı	%1
2	www.orfonline.org İnternet Kaynağı	%1
3	centreline.com.pk İnternet Kaynağı	%1
4	issi.org.pk İnternet Kaynağı	%1
5	carnegieendowment.org İnternet Kaynağı	%1
6	www.ssoar.info İnternet Kaynağı	%1
7	en.wikipedia.org İnternet Kaynağı	%1
8	www.dtic.mil İnternet Kaynağı	%1

Alıntıları çıkart	Kapat	Eşleşmeleri çıkar	< %1
Bibliyografyayı Çıkart	üzerinde		

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name and Surname: Mohammad Yousuf Ibrahimkhil

Place and Date of Birth: Kabul, 14 Feb 1987

Education:

Degree	Field	University	Year
Undergraduate	Administration & Management	Kabul University	2011
Graduate	International Relations	Atilim University	2021

Work Experience:

Work Place	Position	Year

Foreign Languages: English, Turkish, Hindi

Publications:

E-mail:

Phone:

Date: 23 Feb 2121