REFUGEE EMPLACEMENT IN URBAN AREAS: THE MULTI-SCALAR MOBILITY PATTERNS AND LOCATION CHOICES OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN IZMIR, TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

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Although refugee mobility has been considered as a movement taking place at international/regional scales for different reasons in the literature (i.e., forced displacement, labor migration), it is also an open-ended, multi-scalar process that could be traced at the local/urban level. However, the literature is dominated by methodological nationalist approaches, which do not adequately address the geographic continuity of mobility at different scales (international, intra-national and intra-urban), the local socio-spatial outcomes of international refugee mobility, and the underlying mechanisms that lead to the formation of different mobility/emplacement patterns. In this study, by linking the concepts of multi-scalar approach to mobility, emplacement, and local welfare systems to each other, it is aimed to offer an analytical framework to trace the multi-scalar mobility patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey and to uncover the mechanisms behind the differential patterns of mobility. Concerning the empirical focus, a three-stepped fieldwork was designed to reflect the multi-scalar approach of the study (Turkey – international mobility; Izmir – intra-national mobility, and Basmane, Buca, and Karabağlar – intra-

urban mobility). In particular, with the multi-scalar framework adopted in this study, the intertwined relationship between refugees' mobility patterns and strategies to access welfare was uncovered. Secondly, the locational attributes (of destination countries, cities, districts/neighborhoods), the local welfare systems (types of welfare components; types/ roles of welfare providers; dialogue/cooperation/conflict between welfare providers and recipients), and the ethnic background/class positions of refugees were found decisive in the formation of different mobility patterns.

Keywords: Syrian refugees, methodological nationalism, multi-scalar approach, emplacement, Izmir

ÖZ

MÜLTECİLERİN KENTSEL BAĞLAMDA YERLEŞME VE MEKAN OLUŞTURMA SÜREÇLERİ: İZMİR'DEKİ SURİYELİ MÜLTECİLERİN ÇOK-ÖLÇEKLİ HAREKETLİLİK ÖRÜNTÜLERİ VE YER SEÇİMLERİ

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Mülteci hareketliliği, literatürde her ne kadar zorla yerinden edilme, işçi göçü gibi pek çok farklı sebeple uluslararası ve/veya bölgesel ölçekte gerçekleşen bir insan hareketliliği olarak ele alınsa da, açık-uçlu ve çok-ölçekli bir doğası olan, kent ölçeğinde de takip edilebilen bir hareketliliktir. Ancak, göç ve hareketlilik literatürüne, farklı ölçeklerde (uluslararası, ulusal ve şehir içi) vuku bulan mülteci hareketliliğin coğrafi sürekliliğini, uluslararası mülteci hareketliliğinin yerel sosyo-mekansal sonuçlarını ve farklı hareketlilik örüntülerinin oluşmasının altında yatan mekanizmaları açıklama noktasında oldukça yetersiz kalan metodolojik milliyetçi yaklaşımlar hakimdir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mültecilerin farklı ölçeklerdeki hareketlilik örüntülerini ilişkisel biçimde alan ve ülke içi / kent içi farklı hareketlilik örüntülerinin oluşmasına sebep olan mekanizmaları ortaya çıkaran analitik bir çerçeve sunmaktır. Söz konusu analitik çerçeve, mülteci hareketliliğinin çok-ölçekli karakteri ile, mültecilerin kent içindeki yerleşme/mekan oluşturma ve yerel refah sistemlerine erişim stratejilerinin birlikte ele alınmasıyla oluşturulmuştur. Saha çalışması ise araştırmanın çok-ölçekli yaklaşımını yansıtacak

şekilde üç aşamalı olarak tasarlanmıştır (Türkiye – uluslararası hareketlilik; İzmir – ülke içi hareketlilik ve Basmane, Karabağlar Buca – kent içi hareketlilik). Araştırmada mültecilerin ülke içi ve kent içi hareketlilik örüntüleri ile refaha erişim stratejileri arasında anlamlı bir bağ olduğu görülmüştür. Ayrıca, sunulan analitik çerçeve ile farklı hareketlilik örüntülerinin oluşmasında, gidilen kentin/mahallenin yerel dinamiklerinin, yerel refah sistemlerinin (refah kaynakları, refahı sağlayan aktörlerin kimliği ve rolleri, refah sağlayıcıları ile faydalanıcılar arasındaki diyalog, iş birliği ve çatışma zemini) ve mültecilerin etnik kökenleri ve sınıfsal pozisyonlarının oldukça belirleyici etkilere sahip olduğu ortaya konmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriyeli mülteciler, metdolojik milliyetçilik, çok-ölçekli yaklaşım, mekan oluşturma, İzmir

To my greener and brighter days

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
ASPB	Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DGMM	Directorate General for Migration Management
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MÜLTECİ-DER	Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği
NASS	National Asylum Support Service
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
TEC	Temporary Education Center
TR	Türkiye
TUIK	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Mobility is not the story of capital alone. In today's world not only capital, goods, and remittances but also laborers, students, asylum seekers, refugees seem to be all on the move. For the last decade, migrant/refugee mobility has surpassed all other forms of mobility concerning its huge impacts on international relations, policymaking, and even in our daily lives. According to the latest statistics of the International Organization of Migration (IOM, 2019), by 2019, approximately 272 million people have been on the move as international migrants, two-thirds of whom are migrant laborers. This figure was 220 million in 2010. However, recently, the movements related to the forced displacement of people due to "persecution, conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations" are occupying the agendas of nation-states. Because, by the end of 2013, for the first time after the Second World War, the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide had exceeded the limit of 50 million to reach 79.5 million by the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2020). Among 79.5 million forcibly displaced people, internally displaced people constitute the majority (45.7 million) and are followed by refugees (26 million) and asylum-seekers (4.2 million).

The roles of civil war in Syria and concordant Syrian mobility to neighboring countries and the European Union cannot be underestimated in these figures. According to the Syria Regional Refugee Response statistics of UNHCR (2020) around thirteen million Syrians have been displaced since 2010, when the first sparks of political conflict in Syria were observed. Nearly six million Syrians (49% of the total displaced) have internally displaced within the borders of Syria, while the remaining have been migrated to neighboring countries, the EU, and the USA. Since 2011, Turkey has become the top destination for Syrian refugees[1] throughout the last nine years by hosting 3.626.734 registered Syrians (65% of total internationally displaced Syrians – 5.570.382) by October 14, 2020 (UNHCR, 2020). Turkey

[1] Although Syrians in Turkey are not legally recognized as "refugees" but rather the ones "under temporary protection", I prefer to call them "Syrian refugees" in this study, since they have become urban refugees in Turkey by living in exile for approximately ten years.

is followed by Lebanon (16%; 879.529), Jordan (12%; 659,673), Iraq (4%; 242,704) and Egypt (2%; 130,085). Overall, 95 % of registered Syrians (5,291,041) prefer to live in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas while only 5% of them (280,088) (prefer to) live in camps allocated to them. This trend can be traced to Turkey, too. Among 3.626.734 Syrians, only 1.64% of them live in refugee camps by October 2020, while the majority 98% have been spread to the whole country, especially to the metropolitan urban areas.

Although these figures are shocking, international (refugee) mobility and immigration are not new topics in social sciences. As Tuzi (2018) points out, the share of international migration in the world's total population has been stable around 3% for the last two decades. What makes international mobility a hot debate in various disciplines is not about its volume but its concentration in specific geographies, its unpredictable, uneven, and complex nature in terms of scale, patterns, mode of mobility, its management/monitoring, and its impacts on societal, economic, political and cultural relations.

Despite the recent scholar attention on the national/local outcomes of international mobility, the literature is still dominated by methodological nationalist approaches that regard refugee mobility as a movement between countries A and B. The question of “what happens next when the national borders are crossed and how do refugees/migrants decide on where to settle in and emplace” have not properly addressed yet. In specific, “the methodological nationalism” in migration and mobility studies is a matter of criticism (as mentioned by Boustan et al., 2010; Barberis and Pavolini, 2015; Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002) since it examines refugee mobility as a journey between countries/nation-states and take nation-states as the primary units of mobility/migration analysis. These studies mostly cover the issues related to the international/national governance of migration and asylum, resettlement and integration processes (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016; Torun et al., 2018) and leave little room for the discussions on the internal, inter-region, inter-urban and intra-urban forms of mobility and the local social, economic, cultural, political and spatial outcomes of these movements (i.e., emplacement, place-making, ghettoization, residential mobility). Concretely, the questions of "What happens next when refugees cross the borders of the destination countries?" "Where do refugees initially go and settle in?", "Which factors and actors are decisive in refugees' settlement and location choices in destination countries?", "Why do refugees settle/emplace in certain locations?" and many more remain unanswered within this nationalist framework.

Accordingly, my criticism on methodological nationalism is about its empirical blindness regarding the local and spatial outcomes of refugee mobility. To clarify my point, I would like to present an example case as follows. Imagine a country having the migration policy-context that obliges refugees either to settle in camps or pilot cities. With a methodological nationalist lens, we will simply regard this settlement process as taken for granted and assume that refugees would either choose of one of these options. However, we will fail to recognize what would happen if refugees do not settle in them. Because methodological nationalism does not specifically look for under which conditions refugees decide on where to settle, whether refugees would relocate somewhere else or not. Even more, it does not query what happens if refugees reject to settle in camps or pilot cities. In a way, it fails to recognize the responses to top-down decisions from the bottom-up and how refugees react to the resettlement, mobility and integration policies designed top-down (Zogata-Kusz, 2012; Zincone and Caponio, 2006). Similarly, it does not draw on the place-making and emplacement processes and does not query how refugees would access to necessary resources, services and relations to be emplaced. Therefore, by looking at the mobility between countries A and B through seeing mobility as taken for granted, the methodological nationalist approaches fail to draw on refugees' struggles and strategies to emplace in some certain localities, especially when we acknowledge that refugee mobility is taking place between localities (not countries) (Skeldon, 2017). The empirical blindness of methodological nationalism in drawing on the local outcomes of mobility also fails to recognize the multi-scalar character of the refugee mobility (i.e., the intertwined patterns of international, intra-national, inter-urban and intra-urban mobility that take place in the axis of displacement and emplacement).

As the second criticism (in addition to the lack of local and spatial perspective), methodological nationalism confines the concept of society to the boundaries of nation-states and labels refugees as homogeneous groups (sharing a common history, ethnic and cultural traditions, concerns) apart from the citizens of the given country. Methodological nationalist approaches often limit the analytical focus of mobility to rather fixed categories such as "ethnic communities", "ghettos", "assimilation /integration" and regard refugees as self-segregated individuals to live apart from the rest of the society (Güngördü and Bayırbağ, 2019). By doing so, it fails to recognize the different mobility trajectories of refugees that originate from the different class positions (both in the country of origin and destination), gender, economic-social capital, preferences, ethnicity, household size and expectations etc. In this way, methodological nationalism fails to uncover the unique patterns of mobility of each refugee household by not looking upon the subjectivity, politics of mobility and the underlying mechanisms that lead to the emergence of different patterns.

Thirdly, by seeing nation-states as the leading policy/decision maker in the regulation, management and governance of mobility, migration, resettlement and integration, methodological nationalism fails to recognize the actors - other than the state - who affect/shape the mobility patterns and emplacement strategies of refugees. This is a huge failure because, the recognition of the non-state actors becomes critically important especially in cases of policy/political vacuums[2], where the state (partially) fails to govern the mobility and its multi-scalar outcomes. At this point, it is necessary for me to exemplify what I mean by policy/political vacuums and how methodological nationalism fails to explain what happens in cases of such vacuums.

In Turkey, the only resettlement and/or accommodation policy that the State develop for Syrian refugees is the temporary protection centers. However recently, only 1,64% of Syrians under temporary protection status live in these centers (by October, 2020). This situation perfectly reveals the policy vacuum in refugees' accommodation/resettlement in Turkey, because this policy fails to include the vast majority of Syrians who spread to the various border and metropolitan areas of Turkey (98,36% of the total). If we employed a methodological nationalist lens and focused on state-led approaches to refugee mobility and resettlement, we would have given special attention to refugees' accommodation in refugee camps. By doing so, we would have failed to include the resettlement process of those who spread to whole country. Similarly, we would have failed to uncover the underlying mechanisms (factors and actors) that affected Syrians' intra-national mobility patterns in Turkey and their settlement in specific urban areas like Kilis, Gaziantep, İzmir. In sum, methodological nationalism does not allow us the situations where state is not the leading actor and accordingly, do not offer a framework to uncover which non-state actors fill / address the gap of the State in governing refugee mobility.

In addition to the abundance of studies adopted the methodological nationalist thinking, my second criticism to the migration/mobility literature is the lack of studies that focus on the refugee emplacement and place-making processes. Although the resettlement[3] and (re)-integration[4] debates are abundant in the literature, they do not properly address the local and

[2] All the failures and in-action and non-action situations of the State regarding the top-down management/governing of mobility, migration, resettlement, integration and emplacement of refugees (eg. The lack of resettlement policy, lack of employment policy etc.).

[3] Resettlement processes of refugees which refer to safe and controlled settlement of refugees in third/destination countries.

[4] Integration is defined as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society" (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). Reintegration is defined as the "equated with the achievement of a sustainable return

socio-spatial dimension of refugees' struggles to emplace, to access welfare and to engage the social, economic and cultural relations embedded in the destination localities. In line with methodological nationalism, these two concepts follow the same modernist thinking of the state and society. Here, resettlement literature put greater emphasis on how the state regulate, manage and govern mobility and its outcomes in collaboration with third-sector organizations; while re-integration debates look at the same process with the emphasis on the (civil) society. Accordingly, from my perspective, both the resettlement and re-integration debates are the "sister-concepts" of methodological nationalism as they take society as one single entity which refugees (as the outsiders) should integrate into. Despite to two-sidedness[5] debates in integration literature, the strong emphasis on the duality of natives and refugees are still there as if refugees are not subjected to same processes of exploitation, destitution and exclusion just as their native peers in their struggles to survive and emplace (Harvey, 2004). As another aspect of criticism, the resettlement and re-integration debates assume the destination countries are meaningful homes to which refugees shall incorporate into more or less the same way. However, they seem less concerned with the heterogeneity of social, economic and cultural relations to be engaged into and accordingly, fail to recognize the local dynamics and processes in the localities (to be settled in which refugees engage in the social, economic, cultural relations). In specific, the position of localities/cities within the multi-scalar power relations, the demographic characteristics of localities, the class positions of the inhabitants and the welfare provision mechanisms are not much concerned in resettlement and re-integration discussions. Similarly, they do not explicitly touch upon the role of non-state actors affecting refugees' mobility trajectories and place-making strategies.

As my third critique to the migration and mobility literature, there is a huge gap in the literature regarding the mobility trajectories and experiences of refugees in the Global South, which have become evident aftermath of the Syrian refugee influx to Syria-neighboring countries. Regarding the Syrian refugee influx, although the literature is dominated by the experiences of the Global North countries where refugee mobility, resettlement, emplacement, and integration processes have been primarily regulated by the nation-states and the supranational/international humanitarian agencies via social housing, dispersal and refugee camp applications (Galera et al., 2018; Katz et al. 2016; Sales, 2002; Spicer, 2008; Strang et al., 2017), we have limited knowledge on the intra-national/inter-urban/intra-urban mobility

– in other words the ability of returning refugees to secure the political, economic, [legal] and social conditions needed to maintain life, livelihood and dignity" (Macrae, 1999 as cited in UNHCR, 2004).

[5] The reciprocal nature of the integration process in which both the local community and newcomers share the responsibilities and obligations of living together (European Commission, 2003).

and settlement/emplacement patterns of Syrian refugees in the Global South where there is a policy/political vacuum pertaining to this problem (ASPB, 2015; Fawaz, 2017; Ndinda et al., 2006). Especially in countries like Turkey, where the significant policy/political vacuums are observed in addressing refugees' initial reception, resettlement, emplacement, and integration, we rarely find concrete discussions on the mobility trajectories, emplacement and location choices of Syrians in a relational way.

In sum, the dominant methodological nationalist, top-down and state-led approaches to refugee mobility in the literature fail to recognize

- the intra-national, inter-urban and intra-urban patterns of refugee mobility, where refugees struggle to find the best locations to settle in and emplace (i.e., fail to recognize the continuity and multi-scalar character of refugee mobility)
- the local socio-spatial outcomes of international refugee mobility (i.e., emplacement process)
- the factors and actors that affect/shape refugees' mobility patterns, emplacement strategies and location choices when the states (especially in the Global South countries) are partially absent and/or failed in (i.e., the policy/political vacuums) in managing migration, refugee mobility and asylum.

To address these gaps in the literature, by taking massive Syrian refugee inflows to Turkey as the contextual and the empirical case, I seek answers to my main research question as follows.

1.1. The main research question and sub-questions

"In a context characterized by policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management, how do (Syrian) refugees decide on where to settle in / emplace? Which actors/factors become decisive in their location choices at different geographical scales?" As seen, I query both the continuity/multi-scalar character of refugee mobility at different geographical scales (i.e., country/province/district/neighborhood selections) and local/urban scale outcomes of refugee mobility by tracing Syrian refugees' mobility patterns/location choices under the policy/political vacuums. Accordingly, I also try to answer the following sub-questions:

- Question(s) regarding the drivers of Syrian refugee mobility under policy/political vacuums
    - What are the drivers and outcomes of Syrian refugee mobility taking place at different geographical scales (international, national, local) under policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management in Turkey?

- Which factors/motives are decisive in shaping Syrian refugees' country/city/district/ neighborhood selections?
- Which actors are involved in Syrian refugees' country/city/district/neighborhood selections under policy/political vacuums? What are their roles?

Question(s) regarding the emplacement and location choices of Syrian refugees under policy/political vacuums

- What are the dimensions of refugee emplacement? What are the emplacement strategies of Syrian refugees in Turkey under policy/political vacuums?
- How do Syrian refugees (manage to) access necessary resources and services that are vital for their survival and emplacement in the new urban settings in Turkey, under the policy/political vacuums?
- Why do Syrian refugees settle in some specific locations or why do they spread to different locations in urban areas? Which attributes of urban settings/locations attract refugees to settle in and emplace?
- What are the motives/factors behind Syrians' intra-urban mobility, location choices and housing pathways in urban areas?
- Who are the actors that shape/influence refugees' location choices in urban areas? Precisely, how does the interplay among central/local governments, market actors, civil society organizations, informal social networks, key local actors and refugees affect refugees' location choices?

1.2.The theoretical focus of the research

Regarding the gaps/failures I defined, I challenge the dominant literature by proposing a bottom-up, multi-scalar and actor-centered approach to uncover the differing mobility and emplacement patterns of Syrian refugees in Izmir (Turkey) under the policy/political vacuums.

Firstly, as opposed to methodological nationalist approaches that regard mobility as a linear close-end between countries/nation-states, I regard refugee mobility as a multi-scalar and continuous socio-spatial process to be traced by refugees' location choices at different geographical scales. Because, as become evident in Syrians' massive inflows to Turkey, crossing the national borders of Turkey has not been the end-point of Syrians' journey. Instead, a new journey has begun for Syrians who now struggle for settling the best locations where they can forge a new life. Here, by building on Skeldon's (2007) argument suggesting that mobilities take place among localities rather than countries, I challenge methodological

nationalism through adopting a multi-scalar approach to mobility. At the first place, this multi-scalar lens enables me to trace the geographic continuity of Syrians' international, intra-national, inter-urban and intra-urban mobility patterns in Turkey.

Secondly, it enables me to see the open-ended nature of mobility and the temporality of both the situations of mobility and immobility. For example, a refugee household that has settled permanently in Gaziantep may decide to move to Izmir by asserting that they face severe problems in holding on to the job market there, cannot overcome the language barrier and exclusionary attitudes, or simply to meet their changing expectations. The same is valid for the intra-urban mobility of refugees. Stemming from this example, I argue that the situations of mobility and immobility are intertwined and both of them depend on refugees' expectations, needs, class-positions, social and economic capital and the opportunities/barriers of emplacement that refugees come across with their destination localities. Accordingly, the multi-scalar approach also helps me to further query how refugees, as the mobile subjects, experience mobility/immobility and react to top-down decisions/policies affecting their movements from bottom-up. Moreover, it enables me to uncover all factors and (non-state) actors (macro/meso/micro-level) who (in)directly shape the mobility and emplacement patterns of refugees. In specific, with this multi-scalar lens, I grasp both the scales of governance (how mobility and migration is governed by different actors operating at different scales) and scales of operation (the decisions and actions of refugee households, decision-makers, civil society organizations, local governments, local grassroots, welfare providers, local tradespeople, landlords etc.), which in overall help me to uncover the underlying mechanisms affecting the mobility/immobility of refugees.

Thirdly, the multi-scalar lens enables me to ask "what happens next when the national borders are crossed" and focus on the local outcomes of international refugee mobility discussion within the context of refugee emplacement and place-making in receiver cities. Here, the literature on emplacement (Bjarnesen and Vigh, 2016; Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015, 2018; Korac-Sanderson, 2016; Wessendorf and Phillimore, 2019) helps me to show the continuity of refugee mobility at the local scale (in the forms of intra-urban mobility) in relation with refugees' strategies for place-making and network building. Because, unlike resettlement and re-integration, the concept of emplacement points finger at the geographic, spatial, and local aspects of refugee mobility by emphasizing the relation between the position of localities within the multi-scalar networks of power and individuals' strategies for settlement (Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015, 2018). However, the emplacement literature does not explicitly look for how refugees emplace and engage the social, economic, cultural relations embedded in the

localities. In other words, they do not elaborate on how the barriers/opportunities of localities for social inclusion/place-making are associated with refugees' situations of mobility/immobility. Accordingly, emplacement discussions do not provide an analytical framework to identify and conceptualize the underlying mechanisms that affect refugees' place-making strategies and intra-urban mobility patterns, in a relational way. In empirical terms, the emplacement literature helps me to see how Syrian refugees' mobility in Turkey has not come to end when refugees settled in Gaziantep and/or Izmir. It shows me why refugees have selected certain urban areas and certain neighborhoods/localities to settle in, but it does not help me to uncover how Syrians emplace and which actors/factors become decisive in the selection of the localities to be settled in. More specifically, emplacement literature, by itself, does not enable me to uncover how Syrians' struggles to access housing, income, food, clothing creates new forms of mobilities between certain locations in Gaziantep and/or Izmir.

At this point, I employ the literature on the local welfare systems (LWS) (Andreotti et al., 2012) to enrich my discussion on emplacement strategies of refugees in urban settings. The LWS discussion enables me to define refugee emplacement as an access-oriented process, as the ultimate goal of being mobile for refugees is to go and emplace in localities where they can access the resources, services and services they need to survive. Accordingly, the local welfare systems (with different welfare providers and welfare arrangements) either attract refugees to settle in a certain locality or to make them relocate from that locality (especially in cases where refugees cannot engage social and economic relations in that locality). Here, by locating the term "access" to the center of discussion in relation with the LWS, I better uncover what do refugees seek to access the most and who provides them. Moreover, the LWS concept help me to understand how refugees' class positions in the destination country/city/locality, ethnic backgrounds, economic and social capital, expectations and preferences as well as the localities' demographic, locational, economic and social conjuncture can be decisive in refugees' settlement or not in certain locations. In empirical terms, this framework enables me to uncover the underlying mechanisms of refugees' intra-urban mobility in Izmir that evidently takes place between Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca districts, for example.

In sum, the multi-scalar framework I developed by building on the literature on emplacement, location choice, social inclusion/exclusion and local welfare systems enables me to trace the multi-scalar mobility patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey in a relational way and helps me to uncover the mechanisms (actors and factors) behind the different patterns of mobility.

With the help of this framework, as the thesis statement, I argue that refugees' location choices at different geographical scales are all associated with refugees' struggles to emplace in urban areas– to access welfare. Here, the areas that refugees (prefer to) settle in determine the welfare sources and services to be reached and the social networks to be engaged by refugees. Therefore, refugees' location choices can be regarded as the spatial dimension of the emplacement where emplacement can be defined as "refugees' struggle to access welfare resources and services in destination settlements by forming/engaging in social networks and developing ad-hoc strategies for social inclusion". I further argue that under policy/political vacuums, refugees' engagement to local welfare systems in which the "gatekeepers"[6] act as the primary welfare provider/ distributor is the key condition of emplacement in urban areas. Within this context, I argue that refugees cannot freely decide on where to settle in and emplace, as their choices are bound to variety of factors (individual expectations, welfare offerings of the settlements etc.) and non-state actors who are addressing refugees' initial accommodation, emplacement and access to basic services (during the partial absence of the State). Through uncovering the actors and factors affecting international, internal/intra-national and intra-urban location choices of refugees, this framework helps me to define refugees' differing emplacement strategies /patterns and the type and roles of the non-state actors (who either fulfill the gap or take the advantage of the absence of the State) who shape refugees' mobility and emplacement patterns.

1.3. The empirical focus of the research

Since, I aim to propose a multi-scalar approach to explain different mobility and emplacement patterns of Syrian refugees under policy/political vacuums in Turkey, I devoted special effort to determine the empirical focus of this research which reflects my multi-scalar concern. Firstly, I traced the international (movements from Syria to Turkey), intra-national (movements across Turkish cities) and intra-urban (movements within the cities) mobility patterns of Syrians have been in a relational way and mapped the mobility patterns of Syrian refugees. Secondly, I specifically searched for a specific location/locality from which I may start to construct my multi-scalar fieldwork. Here, I looked for a specific locality through which I could trace both the international, intra-national and intra-urban mobility of Syrian refugees. By following this logic, I selected Basmane Area in Izmir as my core empirical focus. Because, Basmane is both an "international transit hub" for refugees who hope to cross EU borders by sea, a "regional transit hub" where Syrian refugees are dispersed to other spots at

[6] Local key actors acting as welfare providers and/or bridges between welfare providers and refugees (as welfare recipients)

the Aegean coast either to settle or seek ways for the overseas journey to EU borders and a "local transit hub" that distributes Syrians to different parts of Izmir either in the form of everyday mobility among work-home-leisure and residential mobility. Therefore, Basmane is the medium of my multi-scalar and multi-sited analysis, through which I geographically build my fieldwork. Within this framework,

- Turkey – as the country case – where I trace Syrian mobility at the international and national scales,
- Izmir – as the city case – through which I trace Syrian mobility at the intra-national scale, Basmane (in Konak District), Buca and Karabağlar Districts – as district/neighborhood cases – through which I trace Syrian mobility at the local/intra-urban scale.

Turkey, as the leading country in the region that hosts the vast majority of internationally displaced Syrians, provides great insights for me to draw on how Syrian refugees have become urban refugees struggling to survive in the new geography. Moreover, the case of Turkey enables me to portray the refugee subjectivity in emplacement and location choice processes under the policy/political vacuums. Because Turkey as a transition and destination country, has not yet developed comprehensive policies and legislations to address Syrians' accommodation, emplacement and integration.

Secondly, I selected Izmir as the city case because it is among the top-ten provinces in Turkey where the Syrian refugees have been concentrated the most. Besides being a metropolitan area offering various services and resources, Izmir's strategic location at the Aegean coast of Turkey attracts Syrians. Because Syrian refugees in transit – who hope to cross EU borders by the Aegean Sea – come to Izmir to arrange the illegal crossings. Even more, for transit Syrians, Izmir is their first stop at the Aegean coast because Izmir has strong highway and railway connections with Istanbul and provinces in Central Anatolia (e.g. Ankara). Through Izmir, transit refugees may easily reach out to other spots along the Aegean coast of Turkey where they can start their overseas journey to the Greek Islands. For that reason, as a both destination and transit city, Izmir has a critical role in Syrians international and internal mobility in Turkey.

Regarding the local foci of this research, I selected Basmane Area in (Konak District), Buca and Karabağlar Districts in Izmir to examine the intra-urban mobility patterns of Syrians in Izmir and to understand why Syrians have concentrated and emplaced in these three districts. Moreover, the observable mobilities of Syrians between these three localities help to uncover the dynamics that create intra-urban movements. In this pattern of intra-mobility, Basmane

stands at the center, Because, although some Syrians moved from Basmane to the other parts of the city, Basmane still serves as “a local bazaar” for Syrians where they can buy/sell goods; “as a community hub” where they can meet one another and get socialized; “as a center of information and consultancy” where they may apply to public authorities, NGOs and solidarity initiatives, “as a job market “where they may search for jobs available for them. Therefore, even if they don't live there anymore, all Syrians somehow happen to pass Basmane. Therefore, Basmane is the medium of my analysis.

Karabağlar and Buca Districts come forward as popular destinations that host a remarkable number of Syrians who have mostly relocated from the Basmane Area. To say, as various experts and public officers I interviewed emphasized that these districts are now hosting a remarkable Syrian population from Basmane who still have strong connections to Basmane (i.e., workplaces, places of socialization, etc.). Moreover, thanks to chain migration, these districts are attracting more and more Syrians, especially after the year 2016 (EU-TR deal).

Here, I have to note that Syrians' dispersal within these districts is not even. During my visits to the areas, I found out that there are some neighborhoods Syrians are concentrated the most, as Kosova, Kadıfekale, Kocakapı, Etiler, Faikpaşa, Agora, Çimentepe and Ballıkuyu neighborhoods in and around Basmane Area; Yıldız and Gediz neighborhoods in Buca District; Yunus Emre, Karabağlar, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay, Uğur Mumcu neighborhoods in Karabağlar District.

During my visits to Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, I gradually decided on whom to interview with to uncover the underlying mechanism behind Syrians’ mobility patterns. Firstly, I found out that Syrians’ ethnic background, ethnic and family ties, year of arrival to Turkey, intention of migration to Turkey, expectations, needs, social and economic capital and registration status are all associated with their mobility and emplacement strategies. Most importantly, I also found out that both the actions/discourses of the state and non-state actors (macro, meso, micro-level) operating at different scales have to do with Syrians’ differing emplacement stories. Accordingly, I decided to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews with Syrian refugees and all other actors who are involved in Syrians' emplacement and location choice processes. In specific, I conducted interviews with public authorities (central and local), market actors, CSOs, informal social networks, local key actors and Syrian refugees. In determining the sample of Syrian refugees, I both take the spatial distribution of Syrians in Izmir and their ethnic background into account to represent a true image/profile of Syrians living in Izmir. Accordingly, I tried to reach out to Syrian Arabs, Syrian Turkmens and Syrian

Kurds who are living or once lived in Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts. I made a pilot study in January 2019 to identify the potential interviewees and to collect initial data to see whether my research question and sampling are appropriate. Between 10 July-16 August 2019, 13-19 October 2019 and 10-15 February 2020, I carried out my main case study. My resulting sample consisted of the following:

- A total of 25 interviews conducted with main decision /policy makers and administrative units including local branches of central authorities (2), local governments (4), neighborhood mukhtars (13), NGOs and local initiatives (6)
- A total of 31 interviews conducted with Syrian refugees
    - Syrian Arabs (13), Syrian Kurds (11) and Syrian Turkmens (7)
- A total of 22 interviews conducted with local key actors including political figures – political party members (2), public officers (3), market actors (realtors and local tradespeople) (7), NGO officers taking initiatives (3), elderly people and opinion leaders (2), religious community leaders (2) and mafiatic figures (3)

As in any qualitative research, I do not claim that my sampling of participants perfectly represents the Syrian population in Izmir, but rather it helps me grasp the prominent discourses, tendencies and progresses related to Syrian refugees' emplacement and location choices in Izmir. Here, I attached great importance to conducting interviews with the local key people (i.e., the oldest inhabitants, mukhtars, tradespeople, etc.) who have the greatest knowledge on the characteristics and demographic profile of the settlements and the changing social and economic relations of the settlements, aftermath of the refugee influxes. Because they share the knowledge that they gained through various experiences and occasions, and therefore, each interview conducted with them bears more information than the ones that would be conducted randomly with Syrian refugees and local inhabitants in the given settlements. Therefore, I paid special attention to the interviews with the "local key actors" in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca to whom I managed to learn about after each interview with Syrian refugees.

The outline of the thesis is as follows. Firstly, in Chapter 2, I introduce and operationalize the concept of mobility by highlighting its causality, subjectivity and multi-scalar character. There, I discuss mobility as a socio-spatial phenomenon rather than a sole physical act. By building on this argument, in Chapter 3, I discuss the local/urban-scale outcomes of international refugee mobility with regards to the emplacement literature. In specific, I query how internationally displaced persons/refugees gradually become urban refugees who struggle for engaging social relations and for accessing the services and resources that are vital for their

survival and settlement in the new geography. Accordingly, I briefly outline the type of resources and services that refugees struggle to access in urban areas. Besides, I portray the social relations that refugees should engage to mobilize the resources they need. In Chapter 4, I discuss the spatial dimension of refugees' struggle to emplace with regards to their intra-urban location choices and housing pathways. Here, I examine state-led and refugee-led settlement processes. For refugee-led processes, I theoretically discuss the factors and actors (underlying mechanisms/motives) behind refugees' initial and subsequent location choices in urban areas. Here, I take a closer look to the association between location choices and housing pathways of refugees since access to the accommodation is the initial and essential element of any emplacement process in urban areas. In Chapter 5, I define the methodology of the research, data collection tools, sampling (of areas and participants) and data analysis methods. Here, I also portray the policy/political vacuums in Turkey in addressing Syrian refugees' initial reception, accommodation, resettlement, emplacement and integration, which affect refugees' strategies of emplacement and location choices.

Chapters 6 and 7 are the empirical/findings chapters where I discuss the mobility patterns and location choices of refugees at different geographical scales under the policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management in Turkey. In Chapter 6, I uncover the international/national mobility trajectories of Syrian refugees whose journey ended up in Turkey. There, I look for the motives/factors behind their arrival and settlement in Turkey and try to figure out the types and roles of actors who facilitate/hinder their migration to Turkey. Similarly, concerning the motives behind selecting Turkey as the destination country, I portray the internal mobility patterns of Syrian refugees which have ended up in Izmir, for now. Again, I report the factors/motives/actors behind refugees' internal mobility and city selection processes. As the continuation of the previous chapter, in Chapter 7, I look for the intra-urban mobility of Syrian refugees in Izmir by tracing their location choices and housing pathways. There, I specifically look for why Syrian refugees concentrate in some specific locations in Izmir by providing evidence from the interviews I conducted in Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts. I also look for the increasing Syrian population exchanges between these three settlements. To enable discussion, I uncover the factors and actors affecting/shaping/influencing Syrians' initial and subsequent location choices in Izmir by focusing on the local case study areas: Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts. In Chapter 8, based on the findings of Chapters 6 and 7, I propose a bottom-up, multi-scalar and actor-centered relational framework to explain the mobility trajectories, emplacement and location choices of refugees under the policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management. Chapter 9 is the conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

REFUGEE MOBILITY AS A MULTI-SCALAR, MULTI-DIMENSIONAL AND MULTI-ACTOR SOCIO-SPATIAL PHENOMENON

In the introduction chapter, I briefly outlined the complex, unprecedented and multi-scalar nature of international refugee mobility by statistics and numbers. I also argued that explaining refugee mobility by numbers is not enough to understand its actual dynamics and outcomes. Here, I suggest that to examine the local outcomes of international human (refugee) mobility, first of all, we need to properly define mobility as a process rather than a fact and mere physical action. More specifically, to understand the local outcomes of the international refugee mobility; the types and motives of mobility, subjectivity multi-scalar nature of mobility, the actors, factors and mechanisms that embrace or limit mobility should be investigated in a holistic way. This is needed because, mobility trajectories of refugees are not only determined by the very own decisions of mobile subjects – i.e. refugees, but also by international treaties addressing resettlement of refugees, treaties among countries to manage irregular human mobility, national policies on resettlement, integration, the redistribution of resources and services, the operations of NGOs at different scales, the attitudes of host societies, the local governance of migration, the profile of social and ethnic networks and so on.

To make such a discussion, first, it is worth explaining why human mobility is not just a physical geographic movement that takes place among points A and B. Here, I need to locate the term mobility to its proper theoretical context by defining it as a socio-spatial phenomenon. To do this, I will refer to recent debates on mobility- the mobility turn and new mobility paradigm-. Secondly, I will both address the causality and subjectivity of refugee mobility that are shaped by the actions and strategies of various actors operating at different geographical scales. To be clear, I will mention how global power relations, the applications/policies of supra-national organizations/states and economic, political and social conjuncture in given geographic contexts affect mobility trajectories. Within this flow, I will also address the following questions: "Who are mobile? Why do people get mobilized?". By answering these, I will be able to draw what refugee mobility is actually referring to and why do (some) people are internationally, nationally and locally mobile.

2.1. Critical review of the term mobility

In lexical terms, mobility means the ability to move from one physical space to another. This physical understanding dominated the literature for decades in which mobility was examined as a geographical/physical movement between fixed points of A and B, a movement that is originated from a need or demand for better utilities (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011). However, after World War II, when international human mobility had reached out to be fifty million which in turn resulted in the formation of new political geography; the mobility discussions took another form: mobility as a social phenomenon. This new formation challenged the long-lasting discourses on mobility (regarding mobility as a physical phenomenon) in a way to highlight the social, cultural, economic and political aspects of human mobility. The changes in the definition and comprehension of the term mobility can be discussed under for main categories as follows:

- 1920-1950: mobility as static and physical term
- 1950-1980: horizontal and vertical mobility
- 1980-2000: the spatial turn in social sciences
- 2000+: the mobility turn in social sciences and new mobility paradigm

2.1.1. 1920-1950: Mobility as a static term

The 1920s, as the peak period of modernist project, is a good starting point. Because the idea of mobility was highly associated with the notions of liberty and freedom which were not the characteristics of a feudal society but the modernist one, at those times (Cresswell, 2006). Modernist project aimed to actualize the transition from agricultural society to industrial society through making huge investments on urban areas in terms of transportation and communication systems, infrastructure, architecture as well as through providing the grounds for open, rational, secular and democratic societies. For both aims, modernist cities had been designed as the attraction centers both for rural to urban in-migrants and immigrants from less developed countries, who wanted to enjoy the utilities of industrialist and capitalist development. In a similar vein, mobility was granted as a right for modern citizens to move freely within the borders of the state as well as to other states as tourists (Cresswell, 2006).

Indeed, human mobility was one of the pre-requisites to fulfil modernist project and it recognized as geographical/physical phenomenon. Since the modernist projects were built upon the ideas of modernist nation-state, modernist cities and rational societies, the units of analysis for tracing and measuring the physical human mobility was determined in two scales: urban and national. As Adey et al. (2014) put forward, urban scale mobility referred to daily

mobility of urban residents between home-work place-leisure, the transportation modes chosen for the necessitated mobility and its volume as well as residential mobility of in-migrants within modernist cities. Having triggered by the modernist advances in transportation, communication systems as well as diversified and dispersed urban functions in cities (new residential areas, suburbs, CBDs, recreational areas etc.), mobility was seen a necessity for urban residents to engage in daily urban life. National scale mobility was recognized a fixed (static) and linear journey of refugees/immigrants that take place between country A (departure country) and B (arrival country) (Fontanari, 2019; Skeldon, 2017). This understanding regards refugees' arrival to country B as the end point of mobility and fails to recognize the internal mobility patterns of newcomers within the borders of countries. Taking nation-state as a unit of analysis is based on the idea that nation-states organize the society (citizens) and reproduce social relations within their territories. Society, here, was regarded as a uniform entity in which citizens should fulfil their citizenship duties (obeying laws, paying taxes etc.) to enjoy the rights granted. Society, as a uniform entity, was highly celebrated by modernist scholars, but in reality, it failed to recognize differences in society in terms of class, income, gender, race and ethnicity (Urry, 2000). In this perspective, migrants/refugees/newcomers and citizens were regarded as two separate isolated groups sharing different values in a way to deepen the social dichotomy as citizens and "others". It was not a coincidence that "politics of assimilation" had gained popularity in this period to minimize any difference that might threat the widely accepted national ones.

Taking refugee journey as fixed, straightforward, linear physical movement among nation-states and seeing newcomers and citizens as closed, homogeneous but isolated groups were problematic in three ways because,

- Human mobility/refugee mobility is taking place among localities, not nation states (Skeldon, 2017). To say, refugees'/immigrants' aim is not to pass through the national borders and settle in wherever comes along the route. Instead, they aim to emplace in some specific localities (city/neighbourhood) where they could eventually reach out to things or rights that they are looking for. This fact necessitates the adoption of multi-scalar approaches to refugee mobility.
- Refugee mobility is not a linear and straightforward process. As various scholars point out (Içduygu and Yükseker, 2012; Tuzi, 2018; Yıldız and Sert, 2019), during the movement, there are multiple factors that affect the pattern, duration and end point of mobility. Even the origin and destination points are the same, each journey is different from each other due to different motives behind the movement, the routes and transport modes chosen and problems faced during cross-bordering. Yıldız and Sert

(2019) emphasize the immobility situations within mobility – mobistasis (waiting at the queues to cross borders, (un)forced overnight stays in some locations in/out of the route etc.) to draw attention to heterogeneity in refugee mobility trajectories.

- The dichotomy of citizens and newcomers is irrational, since newcomers are also subjected to same processes of exploitation, dispossession and everyday life struggles just as citizens (Güngördü and Bayırbağ, 2019). However, the reaction of these two parties to these processes differ with respect to their level of income, gender, ethnicity and social status, etc. Thus, societies are not uniform and homogeneous entities but heterogeneous ones at individual level.

These problematic views on mobility until the World War II (WWII) dominated the mobility literature. However, as the world witnessed the displacement and international mobility of approximately around 50 million people during and after the WWII, social, political and economic dimension of human mobility came to the fore in mobility literature, as discussed below.

2.1.2. 1950-1980: Horizontal and vertical mobility

The new geographical and political setting of Europe after WWII had remarkably revived the discussions of displacement, mobility and emplacement. During the early 1950s, human mobility was recognized as a social and political phenomenon (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011; Salazar and Smart, 2012) in a way to take into account the (un)forced refugee mobility after the war and their impacts of the redefinition of societies and (re)production of spaces. In the late 1970s, with the increasing struggles of nation-states to engage in new global economic order, discussions on mobility as a social phenomenon included two major topics: horizontal (geographic) and vertical (economic, financial, cultural, intellectual) mobility (Salazar and Smart, 2012). For the latter, the widely known example is social mobility referring to both individual and collective movement upwards or downwards in socio-economic hierarchy (Adey et. al, 2014). At that time, social mobility as the new and hot debate in social sciences had undergone some criticisms claiming that the increasing focus on the social side of the mobility gradually undermined its spatial dimension (Adey et. al, 2014).

2.1.3. 1980-2000: Spatial turn in social sciences

From the early 1980s, globalization and neoliberal economic policies have triggered and facilitated the massive flow of goods, capital and people. Despite the fact that this neoliberal downturn has been labelled as the era of financial de-territorialisation, we witnessed re-

territorialisation of capital in some specific and strategic locations and accordingly the movement of people from less developed regions to developed ones in which capital, investments and opportunities have been concentrated. All these processes attracted social scientists to examine the socio-spatial consequences of the new economic and political ordering and how space is (re)produced. This spatial turn in social sciences was built upon Lefebvre's ground-breaking argument that regards "space as a socially constructed one*"* (Lefebvre, 1991). This argument was later supported by Massey (1984) which highlighted the effects of in-out movement of capital on the repositioning of nation-states/cities in global order and the (re)production of urban spaces. Massey's (1984) "relational understanding of space" contributed to the revival of the spatial turn in social sciences.

Spatial turn has been kept as a core debate by political economists and urban theorists (including Castells, Harvey and Soja). The notions of flows, fluids, networks and their spatial trajectories had been emphasized in mobility studies so as to prescribe global mobility and its various impacts on daily life with a relational perspective. The contributions of Castells (1996) are worth here to briefly discuss since he put great emphasis on social and spatial aspects of mobility in explaining network societies. He argues that the units of analysis to capture the movements of peoples and commodities should not be centers but networks. Because in today's globalized world, it is becoming ever complex to identify the start and end points of any movement that is originated from a center. Instead, there are multiple interconnected nodes in the route which have different positions in global ordering. Castells' network debate also has a social dimension which claims that it is getting easier to climb the ladder in terms of socio-economic status if anyone managed to engage in social networking relations. A similar connotation to networks is global fluids and these terms are often used interchangeably. However, contrast to networks, global fluids refer to unprecedented, uneven and unpredictable movements of capital, information and human of which it is hard to clearly identify the start and end points as well as the nodes in between (Kaplan, 1996). In sum, the spatial turn in social sciences provided insights for the mobility turn in 2000s.

2.1.4. 2000+: Mobility turn in sociology

The increasing pace, speed and diversified patterns of movements (of capital, commodities and human) and their impacts on global economy and network relations uncovered the necessity of mobility research in social sciences. Apart from classic mobility debates that issued the dichotomy of fixity-statis, post-millennium mobility turn embraced mobility (and mobile subjects) in relation with fixity and broke down the dominancy of static, sedentarist and territorialist (i.e., borders) approaches in social sciences (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011;

Sheller and Urry, 2006). To say, mobility would no longer be defined as the opposite of fixity, but rather defined in relation with fixity. As Büscher, Urry and Witchger (2011) argue, the mobility research has adapted a movement-driven approach and focused on various types of mobility (potential, blocked, ongoing, (un)forced, short-term, long-term movements) and fixity (resettlement, emplacement, place-making, dwelling practices, overnight stays etc.) that affect or shape social, economic, cultural and politic relations in the world. One of the motives behind the mobility turn in the millennium was the need to determine not just the mobility/movement between points A and B but to understand the geographic restructuring of movements that affect socio-spatial reorganization of societies (Pucci, 2016). One of the driver figures of this turn is undoubtedly Bauman (2000) who emphasized the importance of mobility as a "scarce opportunity" that is chased by human beings as remark of freedom and individualism of post-modern times. However, he also admits that mobility has become an unequally distributed commodity that is not free and accessible for all.

The mobility turn also denoted a change in the definition of society in two ways: through emphasizing the declining position of nation-states in defining society and through the recognition of multiple identities other than race and ethnicity (Urry, 2000). For the former, as Kaufmann (2014) asserts mobility has become a guide to read the contemporary societies. For the latter, Urry (2000) introduced new forms of mobility in the global world that shook the traditional territory-based understanding of society as imaginative travel, virtual travel, object travel and corporeal travel. To recognize these new forms of mobility and their impacts on the reproduction of social relations, Diken (1998) argues that "mobile theorizing" is necessary. He simply claims that the fixed and immobile research subjects and structures in social sciences need to be replaced by mobile subjects on the move that periodically reconstruct the social order (in terms of class, race and gender) and the spatiality of social relations.

2.2. The new mobility paradigm

It is worth here to mention the new mobility paradigm (Sheller and Urry, 2006) as a separate topic. Because the paradigm contributes to mobility research in various ways and better defines what we call as mobile subjects. To start with, the new mobility paradigm regards human mobility as a social and political process having different patterns, trajectories, causes and effects that are observable at different geographical scales (international to local). Despite its greater focus on the network relations, flows and global fluids; the paradigm challenges the idea that mobility of goods, commodities, capital and human is free, limitless and liquid (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Instead, the paradigm elaborates mobility as bounded and limited one that is shaped by global-local power relations. Moreover, it includes both the situations of

mobility and immobility as moving, settling, dwelling, overnight stays in transition zones etc. In relation with power relations, mobility is to be monitored, contained and regulated by various actors at different administrative scales (Güngördü & Bayırbağ, 2019). For example, at supra-national scale (as in EU) the prevention of illegal overseas human trafficking and the application of strict visa procedures are the hottest policy fields in migrant/refugee mobility, while at national/country scale, the right to move within country borders, the acceptable frequency, mode and trajectory of refugee mobility constitute the hottest debates on migration/mobility. Such debates have brought along the discussions on the politics of mobility and immobility (Blunt, 2007) that examine how the decisions/actions of mobile subjects are being shaped by power relations, political actors, decision makers and other external factors – practice of mobility (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011).

Secondly, the new mobility paradigm deals with how the processes of social and geographic displacement and emplacement have been experienced by mobile subjects with respect to race, ethnicity, gender, class and position within power relations (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Through the examination of globe-spanning power relations, the paradigm challenges the methodological nationalism and territorial nationalism in migration/mobility studies (that focused on fixed analytical focuses as ethnic enclaves, ghettos as if they are mutually exclusive from other spaces and socio-spatial relations) (Barberis and Pavolini 2015; Çağlar and Glick-Schiller 2015) in three ways:

- Rather than imagining space as a closed, fixed, static and physical entity, the paradigm conceives space as a socially constructed and relational one (in terms of the position in spatial networks). The paradigm emphasizes the on-going (re)production of spaces with respect to economic, political, natural and cultural changes that (in)directly affect everyday life. Instead of choosing one locality as the unit of analysis, it focuses on multiple localities.
- The paradigm attaches great importance to the portrayal of the differences between spaces and hypothetically relocates every space/locality with respect to its role and position within global power relation.
- The paradigm takes the multi-scalar nature of human mobility into account and breaks down the logic of nation-states as the main units of analysis for international mobility.

By doing so, the paradigm,

- Not only deals with the increasing pace and volume of human mobility, but its global to local trajectories, patterns, modes, causes and effects with respect to power relations.

- Focuses on both socio-spatial impacts of de-territorialization and re-territorialization since these processes are intertwined and interrelated. For example, as Sheller and Urry (2006) argue, to actualize car-driven mobility, constructing a petrol station as a fixed entity is a necessity. Similarly, so as to achieve overseas migration, overnight stays are necessary in some specific places along the route. This way of thinking also helps us to understand the immobile situations in the process of mobility – as in mobistatis debates (Yıldız and Sert, 2019).
- Examines space with a relational perspective through claiming that all places are connected and have differing roles (center-periphery; transition zone etc.) as nodes in global to local networks. As Sheller (2017) puts forward, "nowhere can be an island".

The new mobility paradigm has transforming impacts on migration and refugee studies, as well. Starting with the discussions on the erosion of nation-state borders, de-territorialization and de-centralization; (im)mobility practices of refugees and migrants have gained importance in mobility research (King, 2012; Hannam et al., 2006). The introduction of abstract forms of mobility (imaginative travel, virtual travel etc.) and transnational identities emerged with the advances in communication technologies have changed the face of diaspora studies, citizenship and integration debates as they have gone beyond traditional fixed categories of space and embedded social relations within closed ethnic, racial, cultural and class-based groups. Moreover, the studies arguing the intertwined and circular nature of fixity and mobility provided new grounds of discussion to study desettlement-resettlement; deterritorialization-reterritorialization; displacement-emplacement in a relational way, instead of taking these concepts as the opposite of the other. To be clear, both the mobility turn and the new mobility paradigm helped researchers to break down the binary dichotomies which denied the interconnection, continuity and simultaneity of both fixity and motion (Glick-Schiller and Salazar, 2012; Glick-Schiller and Çağlar, 2016; Sheller & Urry, 2006). With all these aspects, as Blunt (2007) asserts, mobility research open new perspectives for migration and refugee studies with respect to methodology, power relations and politics of (im)mobility.

Despite the fact that the new mobility paradigm, as the latest debate, that is built upon spatial turn discussions of the 1980s and mobility turn discussions of 2000s, there are some limitations and/or missing pieces in the discussion which hinder the comprehension of the complexity of multi-scalar and multi-dimensional aspects of global human mobility. To start with, new mobility paradigm offers limited information regarding the methodology to examine the multi-scalar causes and impacts of mobility, especially refugee mobility. Secondly, despite the emphasis on immobile situations within mobility/movement; the paradigm does not properly

touch upon how to analyse immobile situations (such as emplacement, dwelling etc.) in relation with mobility. Thirdly and most importantly, although the paradigm attaches great importance to the practices of mobility (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011), the discussion, so far, has been built on top-down political management of mobility and how these top-down processes have been experienced by mobile subjects (i.e., refugees). In other words, the paradigm suggests the examination of mobility within globe-spanning power relations and signifies the politics (as well as the power holders, political actors) behind it, however, it reads the process top-down and neglects the bottom-up strategies clashing/challenging with these top-down political decisions. To understand the multi-scalar nature of mobility, we need to clarify the following issues: the scalarity, causality and subjectivity of refugee mobility.

Regarding the scalarity of refugee mobility, one should keep in mind that, the movements taking place at different geographical scales (international to local) are not independent of each other. As Güngördü and Bayırbağ (2019) argue the typical mobility trajectory of refugees involved the following consecutive steps: "displacement – escape/jumping over the barriers – arrival – search for a place to settle and then settling", all of which have "policy / political implications" at the relevant scale of governance. Moreover, the gains and losses in each step that refugees experience affect the success or failure of the consecutive one. Secondly, the unequal living conditions as a result of global power relations, wars, disasters, political conflicts among countries, social unrests, political in-action and non-action situations (policy/political vacuums); the aspirations, expectations and goals of individuals can be counted among the causes of mobility (i.e., causality of mobility). Within this framework, we may either define mobility as a survival strategy, as a strategy to stay alive, as a strategy to reach out better opportunities, living conditions and resources; as a strategy to emplace, as a strategy to engage social relations etc. It is possible to give various examples that regard mobility as a strategy.

At this point, it is worth to discuss that not all refugees/immigrants/displaced persons have the right to move with similar conditions. To say, while the mobility of some privileged people (capital owners, investors, rich tourists, etc.) is encouraged, the others face limitations, deportations, strict controls, etc. throughout their journey across countries or within countries. This fact urges me to discuss the subjectivity of refugee mobility with its limits. As various scholars put forward so far, mobility/the right to move is a scarce resource that is unevenly distributed among people (Fontanari, 2019; Skeggs, 2004). There are various factors behind determining who may move or not. Globe-spanning power relations (Glick-Schiller and Çağlar, 2016) that unevenly distribute resources, opportunities and rights among people and

the policies of nation-states that restrict the movements can be counted as factors that determine the subjectivity of mobility.

At international scale, those who have skills, capital, resources and ideas are more likely to be free and decisive on their movements, while the others are subjected to prove that they are eligible to move. The typical example is the semi-permeable border-crossing applications that are now issued in various European countries. To say, while capital owners, investors, academicians, professionals and high-income tourists could easily cross national the borders with less bureaucratic processes and welcomed by institutions and society in general; those who have low-skills, who seek family reunification, seasonal workers, refugees are more likely to be awaited in line to be accepted (Güngördü, 2015). From this perspective, I claim that those who have power and resources are freer to be mobile, since they could afford to cover the costs of being mobile and since they are welcomed by host countries. Moreover, those who are granted international protection status as asylum-seeker, refugee or those who are registered to public authorities are more likely to be mobile, as well (Tuzi, 2018). However, such linear and straight-forward perspectives revolving around power, resources and legal status may prevent us to understand the mobility of those who have limited power and resources and who in need of being mobile so as to reach out power and resources in other countries. If such people cannot meet the requirements of migration regimes and cannot fulfill the legal procedures, they may end up choosing illegal pathways to migrate to another country. One way or another, they manage to be mobile. Therefore, human mobility could be driven both from power and powerlessness.

According to Cresswell (2010) the politics of mobility – the power relations and state surveillance - determine individuals' motives to move, where to go, how to go, which trajectories to follow, the decisions on following legal or illicit steps as well as how mobility is experienced. The duality among those who can be mobile and those who are in need of being mobile is evident in state regulations, policies and political discourses. Glick-Schiller and Salazar (2012) reflect on this by using the term "regimes of mobility". By calling it regime, they draw attention to role of states and relevant authorities in allowing and facilitating the mobility of those who are privileged; while enforcing limitations and filtering mechanisms for the others (Fontanari, 2019). The most effective filtering mechanisms can be named as border-crossing procedures which are driven from various supra-national, international and national policy outcomes, as well as visa, passport and permits regulations. As Bekkers (2017) argues, national borders may be seen as "physical borders designed to keep the 'other' out or at least immobilize them".

From Glick-Schiller and Salazar's (2012) perspective, it is likely to claim that nation-states contribute to the actualization of the regimes of mobility through developing policies regarding whom to be accepted or excluded with respect to their ideologies, national values and positions in political and economic order. Especially after the terror attacks of early 2000s and political conflicts in Middle East, the financial crisis of 2008 and concordant austerity measures, regimes of mobility have become evident in relation with the rise of security concerns, national sovereignty discourses and border protection (Fontanari, 2019; Glick-Schiller and Salazar, 2012). Within this perspective, mobility is to be regarded as a threat to national security and social order as well as a financial burden to national budgets.

2.3. Concluding remarks

So far, I argued that the concept of mobility offers much more than a mere physical movement taking place among localities. Apart from static, sedentary and methodologically nationalist approaches that define mobility as an opposite of immobility, here I discussed mobility as a socio-spatial phenomenon that is triggered or limited by global power relations, state interventions and multi-scalar policy frameworks of nation-states that limit or encourage mobility. I also argued that both mobility and immobility situations are not mutually exclusive but intertwined. At this point, I discussed both the causality and subjectivity of mobility regarding mobility turn and new mobility paradigm debates. In that sense, I referred to the top-down policies affecting the form, pace and outcomes of mobility, legal frameworks regarding mobility and especially migration, international treaties and principles of international protection regimes, global power relations and refugees' expectations and needs as the causes of mobility. Regarding the subjectivity of mobility, I focused on how mobile subjects themselves react to these policies, legal procedures, policy vacuums, international treaties and uneven power relations and develop their strategies for mobility.

By giving reference to the new mobility paradigm, I discussed the continuity of refugee mobility at different geographical scales along with the limitations on the mobility (under regimes of mobility discussion). I also drew the changing meaning and trajectories of mobility at different scales. With reference to the mobility turn, new mobility paradigm and regimes of mobility debates, I discussed refugee mobility as a movement across localities that has social, political, economic and spatial dimensions rather than a sole physical movement across countries (e.g., emplacement process, the relations between residential mobility and refugees' efforts to engage in economic, cultural and social relations in the destination settlements).

CHAPTER 3

THE LOCAL OUTCOMES OF MULTI-SCALAR REFUGEE MOBILITY: REFUGEE EMPLACEMENT IN URBAN AREAS

In the previous chapter, I argued how refugee mobility cannot be regarded as a mere geographic movement among countries, since it is a multi-scalar and continuous process taking place between different localities. Although for many scholars, the journeys of the households/individuals finish in the destination locality, I argue that this situation of physical (im)mobility signals the beginning of a new journey, which is called emplacement. Accordingly, in this chapter, firstly I will introduce the literature on emplacement. Particularly, I will try to draw the factors that necessitate the emplacement of refugees and briefly talk about who needs to be emplaced with reference to the notion of urban refugees. To do this, I will discuss what do refugees need to access the most for their survival, emplacement and social inclusion in the new urban settings. Later on, I will try to identify the actors - who are involved in the emplacement process in urban areas with reference to different contextual examples from the literature.

3.1. Refugee emplacement: The review of the literature

Before discussing how the term emplacement is defined by different scholars, it is worth to start by explaining what emplacement is not. Firstly, emplacement is not the counter opposite of the term displacement. Both emplacement and displacement processes are the outcomes and the integral parts of refugee mobility, and thus are not binary dichotomies (Glick-Schiller and Salazar, 2012). As Çağlar and Glick-Schiller (2018) argue, displacement and emplacement are not mutually exclusive but interrelated processes under the conditions imposed by globe-spanning power relations. Similarly, Bjarnesen and Vigh (2016) highlight the interrelatedness among emplacement and displacement by defining these terms as "mutually constitutive processes of (dis)embeddedness". Secondly, emplacement is not synonymous with the term resettlement. Because the resettlement process refers to the safe and controlled hosting of refugees in third countries (which is guided by international treaties and guidelines of supranational organizations as UNHCR). Besides, resettlement policies

concern the immediate needs of refugees as sheltering (in refugee camps, social housing), access to humanitarian services as temporary guests. On the other hand, emplacement debates take into account the local consequences of mobility regarding how refugees – as permanent residents - engage in social relations that facilitate their access to the necessary resources and services in the new urban settings. Thirdly, emplacement is not only about the physical setting on the contrary to its lexical definitions (Bjarnesen and Vigh, 2016). Instead, emplacement covers the social, economic, political, cultural and spatial aspects of forging a new life in urban settings.

In similar line with the arguments above, Çağlar and Glick-Schiller (2015, 2018) define emplacement "as the relationship between the continuing restructuring of place within multi-scalar networks of power and people's efforts, within the barriers and opportunities of a specific locality, to settle and build networks of connection". In the given definition, scholars draw attention to both top-down and bottom-up approaches to emplacement, highlighting the role of the contextual settings of the settlements within global power relations and newcomers' individual efforts to engage social and economic relations that are embedded in the given settlements. Secondly, scholars indirectly refer to the importance of refugees' strategies to form and engage in network relations. Building on the idea, various scholars regard emplacement as a networking and place-making strategy. Bjarnesen and Vigh (2016) define emplacement as “refugees' strife for reaching out better living conditions within existing socio-economic conjuncture of localities”. Accordingly, Wessendorf and Phillimore (2019), define emplacement as the process of "forging a new life" in the destination locality. They attach great importance to networking relations in (refugees') emplacement process by stating the facilitator role of social networks in refugees' social integration. In a similar vein, Korac (2003) touches upon the critical role of network building and maintenance of these networks in refugee emplacement. As seen from the definitions above, refugee emplacement is not a process that is governed top-down under formal citizenship principles. Instead, it is a bottom-up process in a way to include all formal and "informal practices of social inclusion" (Korac-Sanderson, 2016) and refugees' efforts to start a new life in urban settings.

3.2. Who needs to be emplaced? Becoming an urban refugee

In relation with emplacement debates, the notion of urban refugee recently gained popularity in refugee studies. Because, according to the estimates, around 61% of the internationally displaced people across the world live in urban areas by 2018 (UNHCR, 2018). Moreover, according to DGMM – Directorate General of Migration Management (2020), Turkey hosts the largest urban refugee population by October 14, 2020 (3.627.991), where the 98.36% of

the Syrians under temporary protection (3.568.534) live in urban or peri-urban areas; while only 1,64% of them (59.457) live in camps allocated to them by October 2020. Similar to the trend in Turkey, the share of urban-based refugees within total refugee population is 68% for Pakistan, 97% for Islamic Republic of Iran (UNHCR, 2018).

The notion of urban refugee was firstly mentioned by UNHCR in 1997 in the report called "Comprehensive Policy on Urban Refugees". The initial definition of the term covered the refugees who prefer to live in urban areas and who had also lived in urban or semi-urban areas in their country of origin (Danış, 2018). In the latter definitions, urban refugees are labeled as the ones who prefer to live in urban areas by their own choices. Both asylum-seekers, refugees, people under temporary protection and unregistered people in urban settings are to be counted among urban refugees (Jacobsen, 2006).

Refugees prefer to live in urban areas due to economic concerns at the first place, including the abundancy of income-generating activities, job opportunities, aid mechanisms, public and private services including housing, commerce, education, health, leisure etc. in urban areas (Güngördü and Bayırbağ, 2019; Jacobsen, 2006). Secondly, the need of engaging social networks to access the necessary resources and services and the need of being recognized and politically represented often urge refugees to live in urban areas where various NGOs, initiatives, lobby groups, solidarity organizations are actively in operation and where previous rural migrants, ethnic immigrants have already settled (Güngördü and Bayırbağ, 2019). The cosmopolit, multicultural and anonymous character of urban areas also attract refugees in a way to smooth the process of adaptation (Jacobsen, 2006).

I argue that as internationally displaced persons become urban refugees, their daily concerns and struggles somehow start to display similarities with their native peers. In other words, just as native inhabitants, refugees find themselves in some situations in which they have to compete for scarce job opportunities, engage in housing and labor market, network relations, and everyday social interactions. As Harvey (2004) notes, refugees are now subjected to the uneven distribution of "costs and benefits of neoliberal regimes" through engaging the processes of exploitation and accumulation by dispossession in the destination settlements. In addition to the problems faced in accessing resources and services, refugees need to deal with the negative attitudes of natives who often blame refugees for the worsening economic conditions, unfair competition (in labour market) and uneven redistribution of resources, increasing crime rates and any many other negativities in the social order (Bauman, 2002; Campbell, 2006). Moreover, the ambiguities regarding the status and rights of refugees, the

negative attitudes of public figures and the anti-immigrant orientation of policies/political discourses deepen the disadvantage and vulnerability of refugees (Danış, 2018; Sanyal, 2012).

Here, the legal statuses of refugees in destination countries need further discussion since they play decisive roles in the future lives of refugees. Since every nation-state has the right to decide on whom to accept in its national territories (basing on Sovereign Equality Norm) and has the right to develop its own legislation for international protection according to international laws; refugees are subjected to different procedures in different countries (ASPB, 2015). For example, if an individual is granted a refugee status in country A, this status and associated rights for the refugee are only to be legally recognized in country A. Moreover, nation-states often introduce different set of rights for different legal statuses granted. Mayblin and James (2019) highlight this situation by giving an example from UK. They put forward that while refugees have the full access to the benefits system and the labor market in UK; asylum seekers are to be provided with a pre-determined financial support and accommodation on no-choice basis, (if case they are able to demonstrate their destitution). As another example, in Germany, those granted refugee status enjoy the same welfare rights with German citizens including the financial subsidy given by public authorities for covering the costs of accommodation, health and education services (ASPB, 2015). However, asylum-seekers and those under temporary protection enjoy limited rights when compared to refugees.

From another point, Mingot and Mazzucato (2017), Spicer (2008), Strang et al. (2017) address the relationship between refugees' legal statuses in receiving countries and their level of acceptance by the receiving societies. They all claim that asylum-seekers are more prone to discrimination/exploitation in receiving countries since they are often treated as passive agents who are strongly dependent on limited social protection that states granted. Similarly, Jacobsen (2006) argues that asylum seekers are in more disadvantageous positions than those granted refugee status in the society due to inadequate provision of welfare rights. At this point, the disadvantaged positions and vulnerability of displaced persons/refugees in urban areas and various forms of exploitation, discrimination and destitution make me discuss the different forms of social exclusion that refugees face in receiver countries/cities to better define the services and resources they wish/struggle to access.

- Social exclusion of urban refugees

Poverty and social exclusion sometimes used interchangeably, however by definition, social exclusion is a broader and complex term in which the notion of poverty is embedded. Because, while poverty debates mostly evolve around distributional issues (i.e., individuals who lack of

financial assets and resources) (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003); social exclusion debates give primacy to relational issues as the processes of social inclusion, participation and integration in relation with power relations (Room, 1995). Various scholars (Bernard et al., 2019; Reimer, 2004; Shucksmith, 2001) define social exclusion as a multi-dimensional, dynamic and relational process. Its dimensions range from the lack of assets, poverty, material dispossession, racist harassment, ethnic discrimination, alienation, socio-spatial isolation to cultural marginalization, all of which somehow intertwined (Davies, 2005; Dobusch, 2013; Harvey, 2004; Gerometta et al., 2005; Spicer, 2008). Levitas (1999) touches upon three dimensions of social exclusion as: redistributive, social integrationist and moral underclass. The first dimension refers to the financial and material lackings of individuals that are below the average - i.e., poverty, while the other two concern the failures in individuals' engagement to formal labour market, respectively.

Social exclusion, in practice, includes both distributional and relational matters (Shucksmith, 2001; Reimer, 2004). By distributional dimension, the scholars refer to the uneven redistribution mechanisms which often prioritize some groups over the others in a way to create conditions of poverty and social exclusion for those who are excluded. Relational dimension, however, refers to the individuals' needs towards engaging social networks and institutional relations so as to access welfare and to be politically recognized and represented. Gerometta et al. (2005) are mostly concerned with the relational aspect of the social exclusion and define the term as the outcome of the absence of interdependence and participation. In terms of absence of interdependence, the scholars refer to individuals' non-engagement to labor market and social networks to generate income and access resources. For the latter, they underline the inactive participation of refugees in institutional affairs, cultural organizations and consumption relations, in general. To reverse the outcome, they support refugees' engagement to labor market, social networks and everyday relations as the means of social inclusion.

Stemming from the overall discussion, I argue that refugees in urban areas both suffer from the distributional and relational dimensions of social exclusion. Moreover, the interrelation among two worsen the situation. To say, the experience of poverty often leads more socio-spatial isolation from social relations; while isolation/non-participation to social networks results in refugees limited or no access to welfare arrangements. When we consider the disadvantaged position of refugees in the new geographies and the forms of social exclusion they are exposed to, we may regard emplacement process as refugees' struggle to access to necessary resources, services and social relations to survive. Here, the question of "access to

what" comes forward to be answered to grasp the types of resources and services that refugees need to access in the new urban settings.

3.3. Access to what? The factors/dynamics affecting the emplacement process

For an individual to survive (regardless of being refugee or asylum seeker), he/she must be able to access proper sheltering, food, hygiene items, clothing and heating materials and financial means (e.g., savings or aid) at the first place. This list could be longed as refugees get used to their new environments and engage in social, economic and cultural relations. Accordingly, refugees may need to access to the housing market, labour market, health, education, aid and employment services, NGOs and public institutions providing aid, local solidarity networks, livable environments and so on. At this point, the challenge is to uncover and categorize the type of resources and services necessary for the survival and emplacement of refugees. Because the type of services demanded varies among refugees with respect to the socio-economic, cultural, political stances of refugees as well as their expectations, needs and desires. By acknowledging the individual differences, here, I will refer to the prominent documents (e.g., international treaties, country reports on migration and resettlement, and academic researches) that address the refugees' needs in urban areas regarding the reception, survival, settlement and integration processes, to provide a framework to discuss the type of services and resources necessary for refugees' emplacement in urban areas. Firstly, I start with Geneva Convention on Refugees (1951) which is the prominent document regarding the status and universal rights of refugees.

The Convention admits that every country has the right to determine its international protection system and rights to be granted to "refugees". However, the states are obliged to provide some basic services and resources for refugees with regards to universal human rights and the principle of ensuring individual dignity. Accordingly, the Convention simply makes some suggestions for countries to be followed in their national legislation and introduces refugees' rights under the topics of wage-earning employment, self-employment, rationing, housing, public education, public relief, labor legislation and social security and freedom of movement. In specific, the Geneva Convention (1951) urges nation-states to grant the following rights to lawfully staying refugees:

a. Right to engage in wage-earning employment - just as the nationals of other foreign countries (some limitations shall be applied) (Article 17)
b. Right to self-employment - not less favourable than the nationals of other foreign countries (Article 18)
c. Right to rationing - the same treatment accorded to nationals (Article 20)

d. Right to housing - not less favourable than the nationals of other foreign countries (Article 21)
e. Right to public education- (Article 22)
    - for elementary education, the same treatment accorded to nationals
    - for education other than elementary education, not less favourable the nationals of other foreign countries
f. Right to public relief- the same treatment accorded to nationals (Article 23)
g. Right to labor legislation and social security - the same treatment accorded to nationals (some limitations shall be applied) (Article 24)
h. Freedom of movement- right to close the place of residence (Article 26)

As another international document, I briefly go over the Council Directive 2001/55/EC (The Council of European Union) regarding temporary protection. The articles related to rights of those under temporary protection, which member states shall apply, are as follows:

a. Right to obtain residence permits - limited to duration of stay under TP (Article 8)
b. Right to engage in employed or self-employed activities - with access to social security (Article 12)
c. Right to access accommodation – including financial support for accommodation, when necessary (Article 13.1)
d. Right to take assistance regarding social welfare and means of subsistence - when relevant resources are lacking (Article 13.2)
e. Right to access emergency care (Article 13.2)
f. Right to access education (Article 14.1)
    - for TPS under 18- the same treatment accorded to nationals
    - for adult TPS –general education system

As another document, the "Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration" (2014) (the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) introduced the standards of rights that shall be granted to asylum-seekers and refugees in European Countries. The handbook aimed to guide member states in designing their own legislations on asylum and migration with respect to EU law, European Social Charter and other relevant documents. In the handbook, right to access labor market, education, accommodation, health, social protection and free movement are highlighted as the main themes regarding the humanitarian protection of displaced persons.

As an academic research on refugee integration in German cities, Katz et al. (2016) determine the tasks to be fulfilled by German authorities (public, private and civil actors) for successful integration of newcomers, based on the issues covered in the joint working paper of OECD and European Union (2016) named "How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe?" and European Parliament's (2016) report called "Labour Market Integration of Refugees: Strategies and good practices". Accordingly, they introduced seven themes to be considered in policy-making as housing, education, access to labor market, health care, access to services and security. As another research, by prioritizing the issue of security, Pless et al. (2013) calculate a "livelihood index" to refugees in urban settings that considers four main factors: employment, housing, financial security and physical safety. Lastly, Jubany-Baucells (2002) denotes housing, employment, education and health care as the primary elements of social welfare to refugees in the Spanish context.

In general, both in international treaties, institutional reports and academic researches, refugees access to accommodation, health and education services, employment opportunities and other forms of income-generating activities are highlighted as the services that are necessary for refugees to forge a dignified life in new geographies. While these prominent documents highlight the redistributional aspects of refugees' social inclusion to host societies, some scholars including Reimer (2004), Hickey and Bracking (2005) emphasizes the relational aspects of social inclusion (refugees' access to social networks, representation mechanisms, NGOs and public institutions). At this point, I need to portray the type of actors that refugees need to engage in social relations with.

3.4. Who provides? The actors involved in the emplacement process

Determining the types of service providers is not an easy task due the complex nature of the social relations. Both formal - informal and large - small scale actors are involved in provision of services and resources either by their own or in cooperation with others. The form and scope of the services provided by these actors depend on the institutionalized and legal settings of countries, market conditions, urban governance models, how division of labor has been set among actors and the coordination/conflict among them (Galera et al., 2018).

To identify the type and roles of actors who have upmost importance for refugees' access to necessary resources and services, I will once again refer to the social exclusion literature. As discussed by Reimer (2004) and Spicer (2008), forming/engaging social networks and get in touch with service providers are crucial for refugees' survival and emplacement in destination localities. Moreover, by engaging such relations, refugees also access to practical information,

assistance, guidance, fiscal and moral support (Sales, 2002; Spicer, 2008). For refugees, falling aside from these relations may hinder their well-being and survival in the urban settings.

There are several organizations and researchers who tried to identify the social relations necessary for social inclusion of some specific groups, especially refugees. The African Foundation for Development - AFFORD (2000) emphasizes the roles of family, ethnic organizations, religious groups, political figures and home-town associations in facilitating refugees' adaption to their new social environment. Mingot and Mazzucato (2017) provide a detailed overview of actors that play decisive roles in the social integration/inclusion of refugees. They take the formal and informal modes of operation into account and especially emphasize the role of semi-formal organizations (i.e., self-help) in covering urgent financial and basic needs of refugees such as proper food, health care, funeral and cultural organizations, school payments etc. As formal actors, they refer to state, international organizations, and market. For semi-formal actors they provide a long list covering refugees' associations, religious organizations, social clubs, rotating credit associations, burial societies and faith-based organizations. Among semi formal organizations, scholars devote special attention to hometown associations (also known as diaspora organizations), which are formed by refugees/immigrants themselves to ensure ethnic solidarity and to increase the level of collective welfare of the members of the associations (Mingot and Mazzucato, 2017). Lastly, they explain the role of informal gatherings of refugees and family members as sources of social protection. Parallel to Mingot and Mazzucato, Hickey and Bracking (2005) touch upon the importance of socio-political actors in by directing attention to how state-led social provision of services have become politicized in recent decades. They, firstly, refer to civil society organizations as representatives of collective interests of socially excluded people. Secondly, they mention the role of political parties, political (local) elites and informal political networks in dealing with chronic poverty with respect to their ideological/political standing and capabilities.

Apart from legal and moral types of social relations/networks, Bracking (2005) also argues for illegal and immoral forms of relations. To say, she admits that the actions of state, market, civil society, informal groups/networks have a word to say on poverty and social exclusion of individuals. However, she also admits that "the worlds of poor are more often shaped by the frames of big men', gangsters, organized criminals, warlords, dealers, patrons, and (with varying degrees of legality) landlords and employers, powerholders…". In her research, Bracking (2005) tries to portray how material resources (of welfare) are allocated to individuals by legal-illegal and moral-immoral types of relations, and how individuals respond

to these differing ways of resource allocation (Table 1). As seen in Table 1, when resources are distributed by the state, market and NGOs in an accountable and legal way (as in part A of the table), the coping strategies of individuals are likely fall in area A (legal and moral). If the resources are legally but not necessarily evenly distributed by the state and other formal actors, or when individuals feel the shortage of resources regarding their own living expenses and necessities, they may engage in illegal ways of resource allocation – part B of the table. When governing actors employ the options in part C, individuals' reactions tend to fall in part B. However, if poverty and exclusion harshly be felt for a long time, individuals may turn towards the actions in part D. Although these arguments fall behind the scope of this thesis, Bracking's emphasis on the informal, informal and immoral types of resource allocations help to better define the type of actors in urban settings (especially in cases of policy/political vacuums in the fair and just redistribution of resources).

Table 1: Resource allocation types along the axis of legality and morality
Source: Bracking (2005) (adjusted from the original version)

		legal		**illegal**
moral	**A**	* Redistributive politics	**B**	* Survivalist corruption
		* Progressive taxation		* Grease money
		* Gifts and claims		* Theft from the rich
		* Wage labour		* Pilfering from employers
		* Small businesses		* Informal economy
immoral	**C**	* Property rights	**D**	* Murder
		* Inequality		* Rape
		* Punitive taxation		
		* Rent		
		* Elite aggrandisement		

As the most comprehensive explanation covering the actor/social relation typologies above, based on Polanyi's (1944) "modes of economic integration" (the principles of market exchange, redistribution and reciprocity), Reimer (2004) discusses the role of bureaucratic, market, associative and communal relations in the processes of social inclusion and social exclusion of individuals in the society. Reimer defines market relations (like Polanyi) as individuals' engagement to income-generating activities and the consumption economy. However, regarding the redistributional matters he also drew the importance to bureaucratic and associative relations, which are representing the state and NGOs, respectively. Bureaucratic relations refer to hierarchical institutions which are managed by law, rules and strict division of labor, whereas associative ones mostly cover flexible groupings of professionals around common interests and goals (as non-profit organizations, social clubs, grassroot organizations etc). Lastly, communal relations refer to the ones (informally) formed

and managed by family, friends and acquaintances sharing especially same ethnic origin, socio-economic status and cultural background. According to Reimer (2004), individuals need to access and engage all these four relations so as to integrate in society and daily relations. Here, it is worth to discuss these four main actors/social relations one-by-one to better understand the role of service providers in the survival and social inclusion of refugees in urban areas.

3.4.1. Bureaucratic relations/actors

Reimer defines bureaucratic relations as rational, legal, hierarchical, accountable and formal, where the redistribution of resources is based on the socio-economic positions and legal status of individuals in the society. Laws, policies, legal documents are all used in the allocation of the rights, resources and services to the individuals. These relations are typically found in state and governmental structures where division of labor is strictly adapted. Regarding refugees' successful emplacement and integration processes in the host countries, the availability and accessibility of public services and the support given by public authorities are quite determinant. To access public resources, refugees have to meet the necessary conditions set by the institutions and legal authorities. Thus, beginning from their first day and onwards, refugees struggle to engage in bureaucratic relations to forge a new life in the new country on legal grounds (i.e., by registering to public authorities at the first place). The country examples below show how engaging in bureaucratic relations affect the initial reception, resettlement (accommodation) and integration (employment, access to basic services as education and health) processes of refugees in host countries.

In Germany, both the state (also state-owned companies) and third sector organizations (e.g., the German Red Cross etc.) work in coordination to manage the reception processes of refugees (Galera et al., 2018). Once displaced persons arrive in Germany, they are to be settled in one of the five initial reception centers in the country where they could register and process their asylum applications, cover of basic needs and undergo a basic medical monitoring. With regards to settlement and accommodation, asylum seekers are offered two options with a paid allowance: either to reside in (state-led) reception centers or rent a house – private accommodation (Galera et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2016). For the first option, asylum seekers' expenses to survive (food, heating etc.) are covered by center and allocated allowances (around 135 Euros), whereas in the second option, asylum seekers receive higher amounts of state allowances (around 354 Euros) to cover the costs of living (Katz et al., 2016). However, as Galera et al. (2018) note, the content of welfare services for asylum seekers are relatively limited when one compares them with services provided to citizens, refugees and other

recognized migrant populations. When asylum-seeking process is completed and individuals are granted with the refugee status, new procedures are to be applied. Firstly, refugees are sent to predetermined municipalities in one of the sixteen federal states of Germany according to the tax revenues, quota applications and population sizes of the federal states (Katz et al., 2016). Within this framework, refugees are not allowed to choose the locations (municipalities) to be settled and also not allowed to move to another one on their own. (ASPB, 2015). By this application, it is aimed to ensure fair, logical and accountable redistribution of resources as well as the even allocation of refugees to different parts of the country (Katz et al., 2016). Regarding paid-employment, refugees and the ones under protection have the right to access labor market without any restriction and additional process, while asylum seekers have to wait for three months following their asylum application to search for a job (Galera et al., 2018).

In United Kingdom, social inclusion of asylum seekers/refugees is not as easy as it seems due to the strict rules and procedures followed in the grant of rights to displaced persons (Spicer, 2008). With the legal adjustments after 1996, local governments in UK were authorized with the duty of providing support to asylum seekers and refugees which had generated great pressure on local budgets and local housing stock in localities (Sales, 2002). However, with the enacted act in 1999, the duty of supporting newcomers has become more centralized with the establishment of NASS agency (National Asylum Support Service). NASS operates in coordination with local governments and various non-state organizations. Again, with the act, the dispersal of asylum seekers to selected localities was introduced as a settlement policy to minimize uneven concentration of asylum seekers especially in London and South-Eastern parts of the country (Sales, 2002; Spicer, 2008). Asylum seekers in UK are not allowed to benefit from public funds, but they are given public allowances by NASS at minimum level for survival (Strang et al., 2017). Accommodation of asylum-seekers is also managed by public agencies (including local authorities) by settling them in certain locations on no-choice basis. When asylum procedure is completed, refugees are granted with social rights just as UK citizens (Sales, 2002).

Regarding initial reception and settlement of asylum seekers in France, the State is the leading actor in the provision of initial accommodation and financial allowances (Galera et al., 2018). In the provision of welfare services, the State works in collaboration with voluntary organizations. Regarding the paid employment, it is not very likely for asylum seekers to access labor market since the process of obtaining work permits is complex and highly bureaucratic. Similarly, in Greece, the State is the key actor in governance of immigration

(Galera et al., 2018). Regarding accommodation, the State works in collaboration with private sector actors (for temporary options), UNHCR and other relevant third sector organizations are responsible for the operation of reception centers and the provision of the housing allowances. In Italy, the content of public services offered to asylum seekers seems more comprehensive (than the other country examples) since these services include food, accommodation, legal consultancy, social support and integration programs to empower asylum seekers both in social and economic ways. These services during the initial reception period are jointly provided by the State, local governments, and to an extent by private sector (especially for the provision of accommodation) (Galera et al., 2018). Canada, as another example, provides public sponsorship for refugees which covers income grant up to one year, accommodation and basic services for initial adaptation (Lamba and Krahn, 2003).

3.4.2. Private sector/market relations

Again, with reference to Reimer (2004), market relations cover all exchanges of services and products in a "relatively free" market context. Th redistribution of resources and services in the market is basically depended on the interrelation among demand and supply. Refugees need to hold the necessary resources to be exchanged in the market to cover their needs. By market relations, Reimer refers to all monetary exchanges taking place between service providers and service recipients (e.g., staying overnight in a pension, renting a dwelling, buying products, benefiting from a private consultancy service etc.).

Refugees' engagement to market relations is twofold: engaging income-generating activities and engaging social relations which may mobilize economic resources. Firstly, refugees need to access income-generating activities as paid-employment, or attempt to set up their own businesses, or involve in local small-scale production activities (e.g., refugee women knitting wool) to gain the economic/financial assets to be exchanged in the market. Regarding this, the level of unemployment in the locality, the availability of jobs, the existence of a variety of sectors where refugees could seek for jobs, the attitudes of employers and native employees towards refugees in labor market as well as the legal framework of employment in overall affect refugees' engagement to income-generating activities. Secondly, as newcomers are granted with the refugee status (or other forms protection) and become relatively less depended to state support, they are expected to engage market relations by negotiating with the market actors. To engage labour market, refugees need to involve in the negotiation and bargaining processes taking place among employers and employees in (formal /informal market) and other actors involved (e.g., labour unions) who may mobilize the economic resources.

3.4.3. Associative relations

The context of associative relations is too broad to cover both the institutionalized structures (e.g., supranational/international aid and humanitarian protection organizations, refugee councils) and loose/flexible local initiatives of solidarity (grassroots of local solidarity) (Reimer, 2004). These types of relations are typically found in civil society organizations. Civil society organizations could be both short and long-term depending on the scope of interest and the problem defined prior to the establishment of organizations. For example, a NGO aiming to work for social cohesion of refugees in urban settings might be in operation for decades, if its financial maintenance can be ensured. However, an organization that is established right after a natural disaster, i.e., earthquake, to provide accommodation for victims, is likely to be closed down once the organizations fulfil its goals.

With respect to the provision of welfare for refugees, civil society organizations mostly offer services for the collective interests rather than individual expectations (Gerometta et al., 2015). The collective mood of action also contributes to the political recognition of refugee groups and urges policymakers to give some thought on the matters raised by refugees. The involvement of civil society organizations in the provision of services not only helps public authorities in this matter, but also meets the urgent/basic needs of individuals who are otherwise be neglected. However, as Sanyal (2012) draws attention, CSOs' perception of refugees as isolated social groups in the need of support may hinder the processes of social inclusion and integration.

At this point, it is appropriate to provide some country examples regarding the roles of civil society actors in the governance of migration and asylum. In United Kingdom, refugee community organizations that are run by refugees themselves, come forward as the leading CSOs aiming to empower asylum seekers and refugees (Sales, 2002). Their initial aim is to provide information and consultancy to newcomers to UK and creating a platform that refugees could exchange information and gather with their acquaintances and/or people of different ethnic origin. As the second area of interest, they help displaced persons in UK to access housing. Secondly, refugee agencies (e.g., the Refugee Council), that are formally structured, generally aim to empower refugees in socio-economic ways. They might either run by native professionals and refugees, but in overall they concern refugees' access to housing, labor market, consultancy, health and education services, as well as political representation channels (Sales, 2002). Especially regarding initial accommodation, these agencies provide information for refugees about the conditions of the housing market and try to create both short and long-term sheltering options for refugees (Mayblin and James, 2019). Mayblin and

James (2019) further denote that refugee organizations in UK contribute to fulfilling of the gaps arose from the policy vacuums in immigration and asylum processes.

Besides international and national CSOs, various refugee-led communities in UK operate at the local scale to address refugees' integration processes (Spencer, 2016). These local initiatives often deal with short-term issues with respect to their limited social capital and funding, but they have the potential to produce great effects on the lives of its members by directly touching upon the issues concerned. Their power comes from the voluntary enthusiasm generated from the strong and intimate interaction among its members and from the good connections maintained with other local organizations. By establishing such good connections, these initiatives are more likely to raise funding for their projects from public, private and formal third sector organizations. Galera et al. (2018) introduce some examples for such local initiatives across Europe. Angalia in Greece is a small-scale local organization operating on voluntary basis. Its target group is composed of both refugees, destitute people and native locals who hit hard by the economic crisis of the year 2008 and concordant austerity measures. Regarding that, the organization aimed to provide material resources and voluntary services to cover the basic and immediate needs of its members. For example, it distributes food, cloths, heating and sanitary materials, blankets and any other material needed by the members. Angalia in Greece often involves in joint projects with other local initiatives and NGOs operating at different scales but does not have any direct relation with the state and EU institutions.

As another example, Singa in Germany works for facilitating the integration of refugees to German society. The initiative aims to create a social platform where German citizens and refugees encounter, interact and exchange culture. By involving in joint projects with public institutions, EU agencies, private and third sector actors, the initiative also aims to ensure the active engagement of refugees to labor market and the improvement of refugees' language and negotiation skills. Jacobsen (2006) also introduces a unique example of local organization in Kampala, where refugees from different ethnicities establish their self-help schools to provide free education for refugee and local children, despite all bureaucratic obstacles.

3.4.4. Communal relations

Refugees often build informal social networks outside or within localities. For the former case, international refugee networks especially in the form of transnationalist relations come forward; while for the latter, daily encounters, family, kinship and reciprocity relations become

important as means of local social inclusion in urban settings. Below, I give further details regarding the characteristics of such informal networks:

- Overseas networks / transnationalist relations

Thanks to the advances in communication and information technologies (and also their reflections on mass media, TV and radios), a person within four walls may be as mobile as a traveler. One may get in touch with his/her relatives/friends from different continents with just a click on Skype and Facebook. By transnational relations, it is no longer logical to label ethnic communities as homogeneous localized groups who lost the chances of interaction with their families and networks back in their homeland. Instead, it is observable that refugees can maintain their connections in their homeland and preserve their national identities, culture and traditions by frequent interactions with the ones sharing similar identities and values. Regarding the effects of transnationalist relations on emplacement processes of newcomers, two counter-views exist in literature. On the positive side, it is argued that transnational connections may emotionally support newcomers by breaking down the feeling of loneliness in the new settlement. Accordingly, the settlement in the homeland is often regarded as the "*cultural-spiritual home*" (Graham and Khosravi, 1997) which helps refugees to preserve and reproduce former identities. While newcomers are struggling to engage in their new social environment, the maintenance of close relations with the homeland may minimize their level of hopelessness. From another point of view, it is argued that transnationalist ties degrade the role of neighborhoods as places of activity in which social relations are (re)produced (Nie and Erbring, 2000; Kraut et al., 1998). Having strong transnational relations may prevent newcomers from searching the ways to feel belonged in the new locality and thus may hinder the process of networking and getting in social interactions with others. The lack of social interactions with others may allow the production of closed refugee communities in which individuals may struggle in between their local and national identities (Phillips, 2007). However, it is still too early to support such a cross-cut correlation. As Graham (1998) argues, with the new technologies people may be more de-localized in terms of interactions and experiences but at the same time they may maintain their physical and localized existences in their daily social life.

- Local networks based on (un)intended encounters

Regarding the network relations established and maintained within and across localities, I need to portray the processes and daily encounters that allow newcomers to build networks. Because, from the first day and onwards, refugees interact with various people and subject to spontaneous encounters with others even though they did not intend to. Wessendorf and Phillimore (2019) argue that three types of encounters play crucial role in refugee

emplacement processes as fleeting encounters, crucial acquaintances and friendships. The sorting of these encounters starts from random and unintended meetings to long-term intended interactions. Especially in the initial days, the coincidentally interactions (*fleeting encounters*) of refugees with people outside of personal networks may provide crucial information regarding the accommodation options and the ways of accessing to services. Secondly, *crucial acquaintances* stand for the regular/frequent interactions among refugees and neighbors, colleagues and acquaintances from charities and religious communities. These relations often depend on the enduringness of the platforms (workplaces, NGOs, charities etc.) that enable such interactions.

Sharing the same logic with Wessendorf and Phillimore (2019) but employing differing categorizations, Glick-Schiller and Çağlar (2016) identify three types of "sociabilities of emplacement" as proximal, workplace, institutional. Proximal sociabilities stand for encounters with neighbors in close spatial proximity such as encounters in street or apartment (not the whole neighborhood); while workplace sociabilities include paternalistic ones with colleagues and employees. Lastly, institutional platforms like offices of public institutions and NGOs, etc. serve as a hub of interactions. People seeking similar intentions and goals happen to come together in such formal places but form informal relations – i.e. friendships.

- Local networks based on shared identity – long term networks

As another form of refugees' social networks, Reimer (2004) argues for the communal relations that are generated from shared identities and interests among refugees. Refugees often gather around shared ethnic, linguistic, cultural and socio-economic identities and form long-lasting networks of solidarity in which every member is treated equivalent. However, within these communal groups, the resources may not be redistributed in equal terms since some groups may be prioritized over others in the community (depending on the urgency of the need, age, gender, status) (Reimer, 2004). Becoming a member of these communal relations necessitates the adoption of the common shared identity and having good relations with other members of the community. Hence, these relations are considered as long-term networks that are based on the principles of trust, loyalty, reciprocity, frequent gatherings and custom. So as not to be excluded from these informal networks, refugees should not breach of confidence and challenge the goals and collective attitudes of the members of the network.

Local informal refugee networks provide social and economic support for its members often by the very own savings of its members (since they are not seeking funding from formal agents). In that sense, they may be small in the scale of operation, but they have considerable

effects on integration processes of refugees since they provide grounds for representation, solidarity and recognition for refugees in their new environment. Especially for unregistered/undocumented people, engaging such networks is vital for their survival in urban settings (Avato et al., 2009 as cited in Mingot and Mazzucato, 2017) when we consider that they are unable to access state-led resources and services. Therefore, for unregistered refugees, forming and maintaining strong ties with the family members, with the other individuals from the hometowns, with co-ethnics and the ones sharing similar cultural and economic backgrounds play critical roles in their emplacement processes (Mingot and Mazzucato, 2017). Apart from refugee-led networks, local solidarity initiatives also contribute to the social inclusion of refugees by providing social support. As Galera et al. (2018) exemplified, when refugee influx to Europe reached its peak in 2015, a remarkable number of EU citizens were mobilized to greet refugees and meet the immediate needs emerged in specific localities in collaboration with third-sector organizations.

Either in the form of random encounters, institutional sociabilities or long-lasting friendships; all efforts of gaining social capital contribute to the emplacement processes of refugees. As Bourdieu (1986) defines, social capital refers to all resources accessed and possessed by refugees via durable social networks that enable refugees to advance their level of knowledge, consciousness, education and socio-economic statuses. Regarding emplacement, two types of social capital come forward in literature: bonding and bridging social capital (Ager and strang 2008 and Putnam, 2000; Casey 2016; Korac 2003). While bonding capital concerns the relations among refugees and co-ethnics/compatriots; bridging capital refers to interactions of refugees with host society/native inhabitants. Both bonding and bridging capital play facilitative roles in refugees' emplacement processes from the first day onwards. Because, in initial periods, refugees focus on engaging their own ethnic communities to gain information, to adapt their new social environment, to get the information regarding the resources, services and opportunities available as well as to protect themselves from external struggles as discrimination, harassment and xenophobia (Barnes, 2001; Lamba and Krahn, 2003; Ryan and Mulholland, 2014). For subsequent periods, bridging capital/social networks play determining roles in the social positioning of refugees in their new environment, especially when public authorities and CSOs fail to provide adequate reception, integration and settlement services (Korac, 2003). As refugees somehow interact with native inhabitants/members of host society, they may find new ways to get out of their protective closed circles and reproduce their identity apart from their ethnicity. The more they interact with natives, the more they feel belonged to their new environment. However, as Korac-Sanderson (2016) highlighted, bridging social networks have nothing to do with the assimilation of newcomers regarding their identity and

values. Instead, it is a two-sided process where the two parties interact by mutual respect and tolerance. Despite some views overstating that bonding capital becomes ineffective in subsequent phases of refugee emplacement (Bloch and McKay, 2014); it is not very likely to distinguish the effects of both of them in social positioning and integration of refugees, since they are not "either-or categories" (Putnam 2000; Ryan and Mulholland, 2014).

- Interrelations among four type of actors / social relations

As Reimer (2004) argues in detail, engaging social relations with diverse service providers and all other types of actors involved in the process of emplacement – the bureaucratic, market, associative and communal relations - is crucial for social inclusion of individuals. However, Reimer also argues that engaging one of these relations is not enough for individuals (i.e., refugees) to guarantee their survival and well-being. Refugees need to engage all these four types of relations since it is impossible to distinguish these relations from another, i.e., all of them are somehow intertwined. Concretely speaking, actors often operate in collaboration in the provision of services - such as health - especially when the costs and tasks are too heavy carry without collaboration. For example, regarding social integration of refugees, the states and civil society actors often work in collaboration. While the states deal with the development of policies and financial framework of integration; civil society actors play parts in the application of these policies and maintain its role as a mediatory among the state and refugees. As another example of the intertwined and complex relations between different actors, I would like to discuss the provision of housing/accommodation for refugee in the European context. It is true that most of the European countries address the issue of refugee accommodation by providing social housing and accommodation in reception centers/temporary protection centers/refugee camps.

However, due to the limited financial and human resources, states cannot provide these services forever. At this point, civil society actors come to the scene and support refugees by providing them rent allowances, finding short-term accommodation options and even being the sponsors of refugees in the rental housing market. In the housing market, refugees mostly seek for affordable housing and thus negotiate with property owners and even real estate officers. For affordable and even free accommodation, refugees often ask the help from their families, friends and solidarity networks and therefore rely on communal relations. It is possible to increase the number of examples, through which we can see how different actors address the same needs of refugees with varied tools - although they are not necessarily work in collaboration. Notably, addressing the same issue may often generate conflicts among actors (Reimer, 2004).

3.5. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I aimed to explain the meaning, dynamics and outcomes of international refugee mobility in urban settings. By building on the main argument of Chapter 2 - that is, movements are taking place among localities rather than countries-, I briefly discussed how and why international displaced people have eventually become urban refugees who seek a new life with better life opportunities (Bjarnesen and Vigh, 2016; Danış, 2018). I built my argument on the fact that the majority of refugees now prefer to live in urban areas (where public/private/voluntary services, resources, employment opportunities are abundant when compared to refugee camps, protection centers and rural areas). It is no coincidence that, approximately 61% of the total population of displaced persons live in urban areas, according to the estimates of UNHCR (2018).

To reflect on these growing tendencies of refugees to emplace in urban areas, I devoted special attention to understand what emplacement means and why refugees need to emplace. In that regard, rather than the counter opposite of displacement and the synonym of resettlement, I counted on Çağlar and Glick-Schiller's (2015; 2018) definitions suggesting that refugee emplacement is a social, political, economic and spatial phenomenon that is shaped and reshaped by the relations among power networks and individuals. Accordingly, I elaborated refugee emplacement as a process that is both shaped top-down (by governments, politicians, policies, legislations, power relations) and bottom-up (by individuals, ethnic groups, local communities etc.). Secondly, I drew importance to the new forms of mobility (as inter-urban, intra-urban) generated by the emplacement process itself to reveal why emplacement is not the endpoint of refugees' journey across countries, but a beginning of a new one. Because refugees need to access resources and services in urban areas to survive but in reality, these resources and services (income-generating activities, housing, health and education services, charities/NGOs) are not evenly redistributed in urban areas. Refugees' needs to reach out to the public/private/voluntary services provided in different locations create intra-urban movements in the form of everyday mobility and residential mobility. In that regard, emplacement is also referring to refugees' struggles (and the spatial reflections of these struggles) to survive and to access necessary resources and services for their well-being.

At this point, I identified and explained the types of resources and services that refugees exactly need to access to avoid social exclusion, discrimination, and alienation in urban settings by compiling various policy documents, international treaties (as the Geneva convention) and academic research on the universal rights, well-being and welfare of refugees. Here, I figured out that refugees need to access accommodation, income-generating activities,

employment, education and health services, (social) security, protection and social welfare, the most. Moreover, regarding the social exclusion literature – re-distributional and relational dimensions - I noted that refugees' access to these services is a challenging process since the necessary services and resources are provided by a mix of actors operating at different locational settings. Accordingly, I argued how holding financial power and assets is not enough for refugees to achieve social inclusion by highlighting why refugees need to participate and engage in social relations (through which the resources and services are redistributed among social groups).

In identifying the type and roles of the actors involved in the provision of necessary services and resources for refugees in urban areas, I gave reference to Hickey and Bracking (2005), Reimer (2004) and Mingot and Mazzucato (2017). As the scholars highlighted, both formal/informal, moral/immoral, institutional/noninstitutional/flexible, big/small-scale actors including central/local governments, market actors, international civil society organizations, grassroots organizations, refugee solidarity networks, home-town associations, faith-based organizations, family relations, political elites/parties, self-help organizations, opinion leaders, etc. play decisive roles in refugees' reception, emplacement and integration processes in receiving cities. In this discussion, I also highlighted how each of these actors' operations and discourses somehow binds the actions of the others (i.e., they are either collectively or individually address the same processes/issues). Therefore, the level of coordination and conflict among actors affects the provision and redistribution of services for refugees. Here, I conclude by emphasizing the fact that the services and resources for refugees are not evenly distributed across localities. Therefore, the locations that refugees settle in have the upmost importance in their access to these services. Accordingly, to fully grasp how refugees manage to access resources and services necessary for their survival, we also need to investigate the location choices of refugees in urban areas. In the following chapter, I will discuss the location choices/settlement patterns of refugees in urban areas.

CHAPTER 4

THE SPATIALITY OF EMPLACEMENT: REFUGEES' INTERNATIONAL, INTER-URBAN, INTRA-URBAN MOBILITY AND LOCATION CHOICES

In the previous chapter, I discussed why and how internationally displaced persons become urban refugees and why do they need to emplace. Accordingly, I identified the resources and services that refugees need to access to survive, to increase their well-being, to emplace and to be socially included. I also noted that refugees' access to such services is a challenging process since these services and resources are dispersed across urban areas and provided by a bunch of different actors. Under such circumstances, refugees develop strategies to ensure their survival and to access the necessary resources and services for their emplacement in the new geography. During my literature review on the survival and emplacement strategies of refugees in urban areas, I came across four types of strategies as follow:

- to hold financial assets and/or to maximize household income and resources (either by engaging income-generating activities, saving money, working in multiple jobs, consuming less etc.)
- to engage in relations with the central authorities, local actors, market, civil society organizations and informal local networks who may mobilize the aid and other forms of allowances for refugees
- to be mobile among localities to access different services provided in different localities – daily intra-urban mobility
- to select the most suitable locations to settle in where refugees could access affordable accommodation and engage income-generating activities, etc.

Regarding the first option, refugees' strategies to maximize income are often discussed under the themes of survival strategies, household strategies and coping strategies (Caplowitz 1979, Mingione 1987; Snel and Staring, 2001). Snel and Staring (2001) explain coping strategies as "all the strategically selected acts that individuals and households in a poor socioeconomic position use to restrict their expenses or earn some extra income to enable them to pay for the necessities (food, clothing, shelter) and not fall too far below their society's level of welfare".

By the definition, it is understood that refugees' strategies to balance their income and consumption behaviors seem to have a word to say on refugees' access to services and resources. Regarding household income, financial and monetary assets, Pavlovskaya (2004) refers to both formal (wages, stipends, subsidies for elder, children etc.) and informal resources (informal subsidies from relatives, friends, unpaid housework etc.); while Mingione (1987) and Snel and Staring (2001) argue for monetary (earnings, wages, aid from formal institutions) and non-monetary resources (mutual support, domestic production of food and clothes, etc.). Overall, refugee households aim to hold both these formal and informal means to increase their chances of accessing welfare.

For the second option, I take Pavlovskaya's (2004) discussion on the multiple economies as the reference point. According to Pavlovskaya, households engage formal and informal relations with the state and the private sector actors to maximize their resources. Similarly, Mingione (1987) draws two types of coping strategies as the ones developed to better use of internal household resources and the ones developed to mobilize external resources that are provided by various actors. From another perspective, Snel and Staring (2001) identify coping and/or survival strategies in four categories: the limitation of overall household expenditures (i.e., consuming less, the use of household's sources and capabilities - savings, domestic production of food etc.), the engagement to the labor market, the development of strategies to generate income and the seeking of support of service providers. Lastly, Lewis (1970) introduces two patterns of behaviors, that households develop to cope with social exclusion and poverty, as self-isolation from the society and turning back to solidarity-based social relations (e.g., family).

The third option urges me to look at the daily intra-urban mobility patterns of refugees. Because, as stated in the previous section, to access the necessary services and resources, which are unequally distributed in the urban areas, refugees have to be mobile between the settlements where these services are provided. The typical example is the daily commute of urban residents between homes and workplaces. From another perspective, it is nearly impossible for refugees to access accommodation, employment opportunities, aid, leisure time activities within the boundaries of a single settlement. Because, especially in central locations where workplaces, commerce and leisure time activities are heavily concentrated, it is not easy for refugees to rent flats at affordable prices. For that reason, the typical daily intra-urban mobility trajectories of urban residents are taking place among home, workplace and commercial/recreational facilities. In short, intra-urban mobility becomes a necessity for refugees to access different sources of welfare that are dispersed across localities.

The fourth option is about refugees' location choices in urban areas. Location choices are the integral parts of refugee emplacement processes, since from the first days and onwards, refugees make location choices either to access affordable accommodation, to remain close to co-ethnics, to spend the first days in a secure neighborhood etc. Here, refugees' location choices act as plug-ins for refugees that enable them to articulate in redistribution mechanisms. Therefore, choosing a locality to settle is more than a physical action for refugees. Location choices also determine which services and resources to be reached and whom to be contacted to mobilize necessary resources and services. For that reason, in selecting a settlement to be settled, refugees do not only look to the physical aspects of the settlements (e.g. central/peripheral location, environmental quality, etc.) but also to the social, economic, cultural and political relations embedded in them.

Therefore, refugee emplacement has a spatial dimension that we can uncover by tracing the initial and subsequent location choices of refugees in urban areas. In this chapter, I aim to do so. I will summarize the theoretical discussions on refugees' location choices in urban areas by referring to the public-led and refugee-led approaches.

4.1. Location choices of refugees: Country, region and city selection

In literature, the debates on refugees' location choices are mostly found in ethnic segregation discussions (Bolt and van Kempen, 2003; Rephann and Vencatasawmy, 1999; Zavodny, 1999). The researches mostly dealt with the initial and subsequent location choices of refugees with a temporal focus and tried to understand which factors are decisive in the segregation processes and in the formation of ethnic enclaves and ghettos. However recently, new approaches have been applied to understand the contemporary dynamics of refugee settlements in urban areas with a focus of highlighting the state-driven and/or structural[7] and subjective drivers of location choices. To better understand why refugee subjectivity in location choice processes matters, we need to understand the limitations and failings of state-driven applications.

4.1.1. State-driven drivers of refugees' location choices

Refugee camps are the most popular and preminent short-term solutions for addressing the accommodation needs of refugees in destination countries. Refugee camps can be defined as

[7] Regarding structural drivers of location choice, public-led / state-driven (un)forced location choices of refugees come forward. In that sense, refugee camps, asylum centers, urban dispersal policies and social housing applications are discussed in the literature with respect to their positive and negative sides on the future of urban refugees.

special protection zones that are designated for the collective coverage of displaced persons basic needs (Zetter, 2012). However, in practice, the regulations in refugee camps are highly criticized for creating spatial barriers among displaced persons and host society in a way to foster social segregation. That is, the encampment of displaced persons – as temporary guests - with no/limited mobility hinder their integration both to the institutions and social relations of the host country (Darling, 2006; Sanyal, 2014). However still, refugee camps are used as effective political tools to regulate public opinion against refugees and to minimize the risk of social discomfort by keeping refugees isolated.

The second state-led location choice driver is the application of dispersal policies. States often predetermine the locations to be settled by asylum seekers/refugees or give incentives to asylum seekers/refugees to encourage them to settle in predetermined locations. This approach is mostly applied in Sweden under "Whole Sweden Strategy" and many other countries as Britain, Denmark, Norway, etc. for a variety of reasons (Darling; 2016; Rephann and Vencatasawmy, 1999; van Liempt, 2011; Wren, 2003). Firstly, it is aimed to ensure the even redistribution of asylum seekers across the country to spread the social, economic and political burdens of hosting displaced persons to different regions/urban areas. Secondly, states often aim to prevent over-concentrations of asylum seekers/refugees in some specific parts of the country where the housing stock, the infrastructure capacity, the revenues of local governments and the taxation system might be unable to cover the increasing costs. As the third reason, the states often aim to minimize the level of social discomforts of native citizens by keeping asylum-seekers/refugees settled in strictly controlled settlements. Dispersal applications are mostly applied on a no-choice basis meaning that asylum seekers/refugees who have been accommodated in the selected localities should remain there unless the otherwise is allowed. However, dispersal applications are not sustainable in the long term. Because they are not designed to address refugees' integration processes in the long term. As another state-led accommodation/housing options, social-housing applications are simply designated by the states to provide affordable accommodation for refugees. Typical examples could be found in UK where high-rise social buildings are allocated for asylum-seekers till their application processes ends (Zetter and Pearl, 2000).

Regarding the state-led accommodation, different methods and procedures are applied in countries. For example in Northean European countries, refugees are initially accommodated in reception centres at low costs. In Finland and Luxembourg, displaced persons are allowed to seek for alternative options in the housing market during the process of asylum seeking (Ndinda et al., 2006). In Sweden, the accommodation procedure is slightly different. Refugees are to be accommodated either in reception centers or flats provided by National Immigration

Board or directly seek housing in the rental housing market. While families are provided private flats, single refugees share flats with others.

In France and UK, access to accommodation is a lot costly for asylum seekers than Northern countries, due to the relatively low capacity of the reception centers run by the state and voluntary organizations (Ndinda et al., 2006). In UK, with minor exceptions, asylum seekers are accommodated under the dispersal programme on no-choice basis, in which housing options are provided in settlements where the housing stock is available for affordable prices (Sales, 2002; Strang et al., 2017). Asylum seekers facing the risk of destitution can also receive financial support for accommodation from NASS (National Asylum Support Service). In Germany, asylum seekers are provided accommodation in reception centers for an average of three months (ASPB, 2015; Galera et al., 2018). After one year of residing in Germany, asylum seekers are dispersed to (pre-determined) states (*eyalet*) where they could accommodate in pensions or flats arranged by the State. Once granted with the status, refugees are also allowed to receive public grants and rent allowances. In the Netherlands, local authorities play critical roles in the provision of public housing for refugees. As ASPB (2015) denotes public houses that are owned by the local authorities compose at least 67% of the rental housing in the Netherlands. For refugees (with status A) and humanitarian residence permit holders, local authorities are obliged to provide public housing. However, asylum seekers are to be accommodated in reception centers on a no-choice basis.

Distinct from Europe, in African countries, the accommodation of asylum seekers/refugees is not addressed by the states but rather by UNCHR and I/NGOs operating at the field (Ndinda et al., 2006). For example in South Africa, refugees are treated as unwelcomed strangers and therefore no special policy effort is directed towards receiving and accommodated displaced persons. Similar to South Africa, refugees in Lebanon are not granted any support from government for accommodation and other services. Refugees are all on their own to meet their basic needs (ASPB, 2015). Also in Jordan, the majority of refugees (80%) have spread across to country and sought for housing in the market, while only 20% of them settled in refugee camps that are run by the state (ASPB, 2015).

As seen above, state-led accommodation applications often fall behind to meet the sheltering needs of refugees in the long term because of the financial and institutional limitations and the scarcity of affordable and available housing stock. It is not a coincidence that once asylum seekers are granted refugee status, the majority of states allow them to engage in rental housing

market. This increasing refugee subjectivity in location and housing choices urges me to portray how refugees as active agents manage to access accommodation in market conditions.

4.1.2. Refugee-led / subjective drivers of refugees' location choices

Regarding the refugee subjectivity in the location choice processes, three theories come forward in literature: the spatial assimilation theory, the place stratification model and the preferences model. Firstly, spatial assimilation model compares the initial and subsequent location choices of refugees and concludes that as refugees integrate and their level of acculturation increases in time, they tend to move to less-segregated parts of the cities. To say, in initial periods refugees mostly prefer to settle in ethnic neighbourhoods where they could benefit from the outcomes of ethnic clustering in the form of strong kinship relations, friendship, solidarity etc. These ethnic network relations based on solidarity help refugees to reach out information regarding the public services and the housing and labor market conditions (Aradhya et al., 2017). However, as refugees get used to their new environment, to the values and norms of the host society, learn the language and engage in public and market relations; they prefer to move to the less-segregated parts of cities. Because, as the level of acculturation increases, the social distance between natives and refugees decreases, which in turn decrease the social risks of sharing the same environment. Therefore, according to the theory, ethnic enclaves/neighbourhoods are transitional locations where refugees initially settle until they adapt the institutional, social and economic aspects of their new environment (Aradhya et al., 2017). Secondly, the place stratification model suggests that the discriminatory manners of the native inhabitants, the anti-immigrant policies of governments and the legislation often create spatial barriers for refugees in their location choices in a way to foster ethnic spatial segregation (Alba and Logan, 1991). The unwelcoming attitudes of natives and institutions often enforce refugees to settle in the segregated parts of the cities, although refugees are financially able to settle in less segregated parts.

These two models are highly criticized for overgeneralizing the roles of socio-economic statuses of refugees and their level of acculturation with the natives as the decisive factors behind the location choices. As Magi et al. (2015) argue, higher socio-economic status of refugees does not necessarily result in less spatial segregation. Refugees often prefer to maintain their lives in the ethnic neighborhoods regardless of their status and the level of discrimination faced.

Unlike these two models, preferences model offers new grounds to analyse the complex social and location-specific drivers of residential mobility of refugees (Aradhya et al., 2017;

Ibraimovic and Masiero, 2014). Preferences model is sub-divided into two categories in literature as the network theory and the homophily model. The former suggests that refugees prefer to settle in locations where they could form and maintain formal/informal social networks through which they can benefit from the social capital embedded in them (Aradhya et al., 2017). In a similar vein, the homophily model argues for refugees' tendency to settle near to the ones who share similar ethnicity, culture, religion and socio-economic statuses through which they could benefit from social interactions based on solidarity. However, these models are often criticized for being unidimensional since they ignore refugees' critical relationships with the state, the market and the civil society actors.

Regarding the temporal basis of location choices, two categories are employed in literature as initial and subsequent location choices (Massey et al., 1999; Zavodny, 1999; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). The time span for the term "initial" varies in literature but in broader sense it refers to the period in which refugees try to get used to their new environment, its institutions and social relations. In broader sense, it covers the period up to six months/one year (Danso, 2002). Accordingly, "subsequent" periods refer to the ones when refugees are somehow managed to emplace and engage in social relations.

Subjective factors of refugees' location choices are also studied with respect to different geographic scales as country, region, urban and neighbourhood. Country/national scale location choice factors attract great attention in the literature, especially in the times of massive refugee influxes. Among the factors, geographic closeness (Crawley and Hagen-Zanker 2019), migration policies and international protection schemes of destination countries (Day and White, 2002) and ease of transportation (Balkan and Tümen 2016) come forward. These factors are followed by the labour market conditions and employment opportunities (Borjas, 2001), the economic opportunities in receiver countries (De Vroome and van Tubergen, 2014) the welfare generosity and the quality of public services (Balcılar and Nugent 2019; Borjas, 1999) and the existence and structure of social networks (Boyd, 1989).

However, the literature on the urban/local scale location choice factors is quite complex and diverse when compared to the discourses at the national scale. Here, as the two main categories of location choice factors, we see the dominancy of economic and cultural factors in the literature. While some studies highlight economic factors of location choice over cultural ones (Blom, 1999, Jayet et al., 2016) some supports vice versa (Zavodny, 1999). The main logic behind such a rigid categorization is the effort to understand which factors come forward as the main drivers of ethnic segregation and dispersion. However, in practice, the pure

dominancy of one set of factors over others is not the case due to the intertwined relation among the location choice factors. Here, I will discuss these factors under three categories as socio-economic, socio-cultural and socio-spatial not because such strict categorizations are applicable in the literature, but rather to ease the reading process by grouping the factors under relevant categories. I acknowledge the intertwined relation between these three categorizations.

I will start discussing the socio-economic dimension of refugees' location choices in urban areas by drawing the importance of refugees' access to housing/accommodation (see Table 2). Refugees' access to accommodation is the upmost critical factor in shaping refugees' emplacement/location process in urban areas. Because, from the first day and onwards refugees seek ways to find accommodation options either to spend the night, to survive or to feel secure. No one can emplace in a settlement where he/she cannot be accommodated in. Therefore, accessing housing/accommodation is the precondition of any emplacement process. In that regard, several studies highlighted the affordability housing (cheap housing stock) (Carter et al., 2017; Jayet et al., 2016; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Netto, 2011; Waxman, 1999) as one of the most decisive factors of initial and subsequent location choices of refugees. Because, due to the financial limitations faced, refugees tend to settle in areas where housing and living expenditures are relatively low when compared to the other neighborhoods. For that reason, housing affordability as a factor of location choice often overshadows refugees' desire to live in close spatial proximity to the co-ethnics and even to family (Djuve and Haagen, 1995). It is not a coincidence that, refugee households initially settle in inner-city deprived areas which are characterized by affordable housing with poor infrastructure and architectural quality (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005).

Table 2: Refugees' location choice criteria (at urban scale)

		Location choice criteria	
SOCIO-ECONOMIC	**accommodation / housing**	The affordability of housing	Carter et al., 2017; Jayet et al., 2016; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Netto, 2011; Waxman, 1999
		the availability of housing stock	Aslund 2005; Carter and Osborne 2009; Mott, 2010; Kleit and Galvez, 2016; Robinson and Coleman, 2000; Vang, 2010
		the physical conditions of the housing stock	Aslund, 2005; Murdie, 2008; Phillips, 2006; Ziersch et al. 2017
		the knowledge of the local housing market	Carter and Osborne, 2009
		the attitudes of landlords / local actors towards refugees in housing market	Ball, 2012; Murdie, 2008; Poppe, 2013; Teixeira, 2008

		discrimination from housing market	Aradhya et al., 2017; Carter and Osborne, 2009; Ndinda et al., 2006; Schönwalder and Söhn, 2009
	public / private / voluntary services	the existence and availability of public / private / voluntary services	Aslund, 2005; Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001
		the welfare generosity	Borjas, 1999; Zavodny, 1999; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008
		decent and qualified infrastructure systems	Musterd and Van Kempen, 2007; Teixeira and Murdie, 1997
		the existence and variety of transportation systems	Carter and Osborne, 2009
	employment / labour market	The availability of jobs	Jayet et al 2016; Hyndman et al., 2006; Mott, 2010
		type of labor demanded / available sectors	Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Martin Martin and Jimenez Aguilera, 2017
		local unemployment rates	Aslund, 2005
		discrimination in the labor market	Batsaikhan et al. 2018; Helbling and Kriesi, 2014; Hugo, 2005; Güngördü, 2018
SOCIO-CULTURAL	social networking, solidarity and social support	the existence of earlier migrants / pioneer refugees	Damm, 2009; Jayet et al., 2016; Zavodny, 1999; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008
		the existence of co-ethnics	Aradhya et al 2017; Clark, 2009; Ibraimovic and Masiero, 2014;
		the existence of other immigrant groups	Zorlu and Mulder, 2008
		the existence of relatives / family members	Boyd, 1989; Lamba and Krahn, 2003
		the existence of local solidarity networks	Skyrme, 2008
		the existence and operation of local key actors	Fawaz, 2017
	discrimination	everyday discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, colour and gender	Danso, 2002; Logan et al., 2002
	security	peaceful neighborhoods with low crime rates	Robinson et al., 2007
SOCIO-SPATIAL / locational attributes	proximity to public services, central locations, workplaces	spatial proximity to public services	Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001
		spatial proximity to city centres, other central/ commercial locations	Balampanidis and Polyzos, 2016
		the spatial proximity to potential job opportunities and current workplaces	Arapoglou and Sayas, 2009; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008
		peaceful, secure and calm living environments	Robinson et al. (2007)
		the ethnic character of the localities	Aslund (2005)

Table 2 (continued)

Secondly, regardless of the rental prices, the availability of housing stock to meet the sheltering needs of refugees is also a factor of location choice, since not all neighbourhoods (especially the central ones) contain available flats for rent (Aslund 2005; Carter and Osborne 2009; Mott, 2010; Kleit and Galvez, 2016; Robinson and Coleman, 2000; Vang, 2010).

Thirdly, the physical conditions of the housing stock are the other determinants of location choice, since refugees have the right to live in decent dwellings (Aslund, 2005; Murdie, 2008; Phillips, 2006; Ziersch et al. 2017). Lastly, refugees' knowledge of the local housing market (Carter and Osborne, 2009) regarding the availability of affordable housing stock, the average rent prices, the attitudes of landlords/local actors towards refugees in housing market (Ball, 2012; Murdie, 2008; Poppe, 2013; Teixeira, 2008), housing conditions etc. affect refugees' decisions on where to settle in. Refugees often refrain to look for housing in areas where they have limited information regarding the housing market and neighbourhood characteristics.

Refugees also prefer to settle in locations where the level of discrimination in the housing market is minimal when compared to other parts of the city. Discrimination in the housing market is an important topic to be discussed since refugees often face difficulties in finding houses in neighborhoods dominated by the native population (Aradhya et al., 2017). This situation limits refugees' options for settlement and often enforce refugees to look for housing in more-segregated but less-preferred areas of cities (Schönwalder and Söhn, 2009). Even in ethnic neighbourhoods, where the level of refugee discrimination is relatively low, real estate officers, landlords might be reluctant to rent their dwellings to refugees who have different racial, ethnic, religious and cultural orientations (Carter and Osborne, 2009; Ndinda et al., 2006). However, as Magi et al. 2015 emphasize, refugees' avoidance from discriminatory actions inevitably fosters ethnic segregation which in turn hinders the two-sided integration process.

Besides affordable and available housing, refugees also look for the provision and affordability of public/private/voluntary services (health, education, commerce, leisure) offered in the settlements before they decide on where to settle (Aslund, 2005; Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001). Secondly, as a factor referring both to the provision of welfare services and the abundancy of income-generating activities, refugees are often attracted by the welfare generosity in the neighbourhoods (Borjas, 1999; Zavodny, 1999; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). The existence of decent and qualified infrastructure including sewage, water, electricity and telecommunication systems (Musterd and Van Kempen, 2007; Teixeira and Murdie, 1997) and a variety of transportation systems (Carter and Osborne, 2009) also attract refugees to settle in some specific locations in urban areas.

The labor market conditions also affect refugees' location choices especially after the initial periods of emplacement. Because, with respect to the increasing costs of living in the new environment, refugees face with the need to engage in income-generating activities. At least

one member of refugee households actively seek for possible jobs in the local market, especially when aid mechanisms fail to cover the increasing costs of emplacement. However, just like finding a shelter, finding proper jobs with decent wages and social security is ever-diffucult in refugee-receiving countries. Because, refugees are often seen as burdens to national/urban economies (Batsaikhan et al. 2018) and potential rivals in the job market (Hugo, 2005). As in many European countries, refugees are often blamed for the worsening working conditions (jobs with no fixed contract, no social protection, limited wages), and for the increasing rates of poverty and unemployment (Helbling and Kriesi, 2014; Güngördü, 2018). Doubled with negative public reactions, the strict requirements for obtaining work permits, and the offering of limited job opportunities in pre-determined sectors also hinder refugees' access to labor market. Under these conditions, refugees' own strategies to reach out the labor market, and especially to the informal labor market become critical for them to sustain their lives. The labor market conditions in terms of availability of (formal) jobs (Jayet et al 2016; Hyndman et al., 2006; Mott, 2010), type of labor demanded / available sectors (Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Martin Martin and Jimenez Aguilera, 2017) and local unemployment rates (Aslund, 2005) are also determinant in the location choices of refugees. Despite all precautions and monitoring by public authorities, refugees' access to informal labor market often act as al life-saver when refugees' are not welcomed in job market and when their entry to formal job market is somehow limited.

Regarding the socio-cultural factors of refugees' location choices in urban areas, the existence of family members, kindship relations, early settled co-ethnics, countrymen, friends and colleauges, the operation of civil society organizations, life-style security, minimal risk of crime and discrimination come forward in the literature. In general, refugees' access to social support and solidarity mechanisms is emphasized the most. Refugees' access to social support simply refers to the informal social networking relations of refugees in host communities. These relations could be defined as relations with co-ethnics, pioneer refugees, family, relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances. As discussed by Hickey and Bracking (2005), Mingot and Mazzucato (2017) and Reimer (2004) in Chapter 3, social networks, communal relations and informal forms of social solidarity are quite critical for the survival and integration of the refugees. Because such networks enable refugees to access information, housing and labor markets, health, education and other necessary services and resources required to reach decent living conditions (Damm, 2009; de Vroome and van Tubergen; Fawaz, 2016; Lamba and Krahn, 2003).

At the first place, the existence of earlier migrants/pioneer refugees (Jayet et al., 2016; Zavodny, 1999; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008) act as a pulling effect for refugees. Because especially for subsequent refugees (who prefer to enjoy the outcomes of already existing social networks) reaching out the social capital embedded in such networks become critical. Here, pioneer refugees are expected to guide newcomers in finding accommodation and jobs as well as helping them to maintain their social relations as in back home (Damm, 2009; Jayet et al., 2016). In specific, pioneer refugees often help newcomers to convince landlords, give information about the housing contracting processes and be guarantors when needed to facilitate newcomer refugees' access to housing (Robinson et al., 2007). Therefore, durable social networks with co-ethnics often fosters "ethnic group solidarity" (Lamba and Krahn, 2003) and eases the process of refugees' social and economic integration (Aradhya et al 2017; Clark, 2009; Ibraimovic and Masiero, 2014). Just like co-ethnics, the existence of other immigrant groups who have experienced similar mobility trajectories and emplacement processes also attract newcomers to settle in some specific areas (Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). The existence of pioneer refugees, other immigrants and co-ethnics in neighbourhoods often encourage chain migration flows and accordingly result in the formation of ethnic enclaves, and ghettos (Aradhya et al 2017; Massey, 1990).

The existence of family members/relatives also attracts newcomers to settle in some specific areas. For many researchers, the existence of family bonds comes forward as the most critical determinant of location choice, especially for cases in which subsequent refugees directly come and settle in neighbourhoods where their family members have already settled (Boyd, 1989; Lamba and Krahn, 2003). As another source of solidarity, the network relations with local solidarity initiatives, local grassroot organizations and civil society organizations come forward as a topic of discussion under refugees' location choices. Because such organizations/initiatives often assist refugees in accessing welfare resources and services, especially aid (Skyrme, 2008). Local key actors (local political figures, opinion leaders, housing contractors, real estate agencies, religious figures, mukhtars, officers of local public agencies, elders etc.) who may play critical roles in refugees' access to necessary resources and services also affect refugees' location choices in urban areas (Fawaz, 2016).

In relation with refugees' needs towards social support and solidarity, escaping from discrimination and all other forms of social exclusion can be also named among socio-cultural location choice factors. Refugees tend to avoid everyday discrimination (verbal and physical harassment by native inhabitants) based on their race, ethnicity, religion, colour and gender by settling in locations where such risks are minimized (Danso, 2002; Logan et al., 2002).

Refugees also look for locations where crime rates are low (Robinson et al., 2007). When compared to natives, it is an important criterion for refugees since they are somehow locked in deprived neighbourhoods of low income due to their disadvantageous positions in society and due to the discriminatory manners of natives that entrap refugees in ethnically-segregated neighbourhoods. Among their limited location options, refugees try to find the best locations where they could maintain the basics of a family life without any physical/verbal harassment (Craig et al., 2004). Because the experiences of racism and harassment may lead to higher levels of refugees' self-isolation from the society.

In relation with socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions, we see that socio-spatial factors/locational attributes of settlements also have significant impacts of refugees' location choices. Firstly, refugees' spatial proximity to public services is mentioned in various studies as a pull factor. Because it is argued that being in close spatial proximity to local public services not only increases the level of refugees' well-being but also saves them from the additional costs (e.g., transportation cost) of accessing public services (Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001). To say, instead of splitting up and spend hours to reach these services; children may go their schools which are in walking distance, parents go their workplaces and elderly people may reach out social services offered in the same neighborhood. Therefore, refugee households prefer to settle in city centres or other central locations where welfare services are abundant and varied. In that sense, refugees prefer to settle in neighborhoods that in close spatial proximity to city centres, other central/ commercial locations of the city and public transportation hubs (Balampanidis and Polyzos, 2016).

The spatial proximity to potential job opportunities and current workplaces also comes forward as an important location choice factor for refugees (Arapoglou and Sayas, 2009; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). Thirdly, the peaceful, secure and calm living environments attract refugees to settle in them. Because, as Robinson et al. (2007) argue, after many days/months of dis-stability and insecurity (during asylum), refugees seek for places "where they could put down roots". Permanent stays in certain locations rather than temporal accommodation in different places come forward as an important strategy for refugees to ensure security. However, only few of them are lucky enough to find such secure places in initial periods. Refugees also prefer to live in peaceful and tolerant neighbourhoods where they could maintain their lifestyle, cultural traditions, religious practices without any compromise. Lastly, the ethnic character of the localities, i.e., level of ethnic segregation, is also a pull factor for refugees. As Aslund (2005) put forward, if the concentration of refugees/immigrants in neighbourhoods rises by 1%, the probability of subsequent refugees to settle in such locations rises by 4%. Because

refugees prefer to take the advantage of ethnic concentration to increase the level of their cultural recognition and political representation. Moreover, by forming and maintaining ethnic solidarity networks they aim to find ways of holding to life in their new social environments. In sum, I argue that every refugee household is a unique case and their location choices are highly associated with their needs, expectations, social and economic capital as well as their level of negotiation with the providers of the services and resources needed. Accordingly, the locations that refugees' settle may have different locational attributes which are not likely to be grouped in strict categorizations. Moreover, every locality has different mix of service arrangements to be offered. Thus, both differing refugee household preferences and differing service arrangements in different localities play decisive roles in location choices of refugees. The most prominent locations that refugees settle in urban areas are discussed in literature as city centres, central locations, locations close to workplaces, peripheral areas, inner-city ethnic neighborhoods, calm and discrete neighborhoods etc. However, the options are not limited to those mentioned.

By the discussion, we see that the choices of location are not only bound to refugees' very own preferences, instead, there exist various actors (native landlords, local solidarity groups, public institutions) and factors (conditions of housing and labor market, long-lasting public policies, etc.) that shape and/or limit refugees' options for settlement. At this point of the discussion, I want to discuss the relationship between refugees' access to housing and location choices. Because, as seen in various studies (Carter and Osborne, 2009; Carter et al., 2017; Jayet et al., 2016; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Netto, 2011; Waxman, 1999), refugees' access to accommodation/housing is the precondition of any emplacement process since refugees cannot forge a new life in settlements where they cannot accommodate. Here, by giving various examples from different country contexts, I want to highlight the intertwined relation among to two. Moreover, by uncovering how refugees managed to access accommodation, I will also be able to identify and exemplify the types of actors who are involved in refugees' emplacement processes and thus, location choices.

4.2. The relationship between refugees' housing pathways and location choices

In this sub-chapter, I will critically evaluate the refugee narratives that took part in various academic studies. The example refugee narratives below (housing pathways of refugees) were

taken from Aigner (2018), Balampanidis (2019), Fawaz (2016), Robinson et al. (2007) and Teixeria (2009) each of which represents different housing pathways[8] of refugees.

First, Robinson et al. (2007) provide detail information about the housing pathways of Liberian, Somali and Polish immigrants in United Kingdom. According to the researchers, up to one month from their first arrival to UK, Liberian immigrants are mostly accommodated by the Home Office in shared accommodation facilities located both in London and Sheffield. Then, Liberian immigrants are transferred to the pre-arranged housing units in Sheffield by the joint collaboration of Home Office, Sheffield City Council and rental market actors. On the other hand, for Somalis, a different approach has been applied. Unlike Liberians, Somalis seem to rely more on their friends, relatives and other Somalis to whom they met in UK in accessing their initial accommodation. Especially the ones called as "agents" - who facilitate Somalis' journey from Somali to UK in the exchange of money - help Somali immigrants in finding their initial accommodation. Before being subjected to the dispersal program (forced accommodation outside London), Somali immigrants either accommodate in their friends'/relatives' flats for free, rent dwellings or stay in the hostels arranged by public authorities. At the end of the first week, Somalis are dispersed to several locations outside London by NASS (National Asylum Support Service). After the first month of dispersal, Somalis are located in properties of NASS in Sheffield. Up to one year (with the possibility of extension), Somalis stay in such properties, until they are transferred to dwellings provided by Sheffield City Council for long-term accommodation. For Polish immigrants, from their first days and onwards, friends, relatives and rental market actors play important roles in their access to temporary and long-term housing. Most of the Polish immigrants contact with their friends, relatives and other Polish immigrants before coming to UK and arrange their initial accommodations. After the first month, when they gradually enter the rental market, they look for rental dwellings for their own.

As other examples, Aigner (2018) draws the different housing pathways of three refugees in Austria who are from Syria, Armenia and Afghanistan. Firstly, Aigner (2018) defines Mahmoud's (Syrian refugee) housing pathway as a "migrant-assisted" one in which migrant networks played the major role in his access to accommodation. During his initial days, Mahmoud shared a room in the reception center with six other asylum seekers which was

[8] Regarding the correct usage of terminology among various alternatives (housing careers, housing biography, housing trajectories), I chose to use "housing pathways" to draw both the housing situations (the number, location, tenure of dwellings), housing experiences of refugees in a time-span (including the social relations engaged) and their strategies to access housing (Aigner, 2018; Balampanidis, 2019).

rented out by migrant profiteers (in Traiskirchen) to whom he met through his migrant friends resided in Traiskirchen (a settlement in 30 km from Vienna). After the first week, he stayed in a pension in Lafnitz (a settlement approximately 90 km away from Traiskirchen) where he shared a room with four people. Again, he accessed this pension through his migrant friends. After staying there approximately for a month, he was granted with a refugee status which enabled him to enter housing market. With the help of his strong migrant network, he rented a one-room-flat in Vienna with his four countrymen from a Syrian landlord. Only after two months, they moved to another flat in Vienna which was also rented by a Syrian landlord. For these two flats, Mahmoud did not sign contracts since they accessed these accommodations by Syrian intermediators/strawman/profiteers who are subletting the flats in an illegal way to the newcomers who do not have a right to lease contract in housing market. Within this "profit-driven informal rental submarket", Mahmoud did not experienced solidarity among Syrian countrymen, because he paid rent prices over the actual market prices. However, he and his countrymen were grateful to Syrian profiteers for facilitating their access to accommodation. After five months, when Mahmoud gained knowledge about the rental housing market, he managed to move to larger flats in the central settlements of Vienna. This time, he made contracts with the landlords and paid rental prices in market average.

As another case shared by Aigner (2018), I will now look at Nabil's housing pathway. During his first three months Nabil, a Syrian refugee, shared a tent with eight other people at reception center in Traiskirchen. Later on, he was accommodated in a room in refugee house Diakonie (Vienna) for a month. During this period, thanks to his voluntary work as a translator in refugee support programmes, he actively interacted with Viennese people. His networks within and outside the reception center enabled him to access his first private accommodation. He found his first flat with the help of one of his friends from the reception center, who introduced Nabil with a landlord. The Austrian landlord was too generous to give her luxury home in a central location in Vienna to Nabil and his nine friends, for free. Only after two months again with the help of a friend from the reception center, he moved to his second flat (cheap rent, two rooms) to be shared by a Syrian fellow. Two years later, Nabil was granted with the refugee status and he started to search new long-term accommodation through internet. By his chance, he came across with a unique advertisement of a dwelling of non-profit company for rent on a website and immediately applied. He managed to pay the down payment with the financial help of his first landlord and moved there. Narek's, an Armenian immigrant, housing pathway is quite different from the two cases above. In his first month in Austria, Narek was accommodated in a room shared by twelve other immigrants at the reception center in Traiskirchen. For the subsequent nine months, he stayed in two different refugee houses of

Caritas in Vienna. After the rejection of his asylum application, he was accommodated in another refugee house of Caritas, in which he shared a room with an immigrant. At the end of five years, Narek was eventually granted with the refugee status and rented his own rental flat of one room in Vienna.

As the last individual example, we may look at Katalin's (Balampanidis, 2019) housing pathway. Katalin, a Romanian refugee, struggled to access housing in Athens, due to lack of reception, employment and housing policies in Greece. Because, in Greece, immigrants/refugees are all on their own to access accommodation, hence, they seek ways to engage in rental housing market. Katalin initially settled in a small studio apartment with other fourteen immigrants. The rent was covered by his Romanian flat mates, so he stayed there for free. At the end of six months, he managed find a job in construction sector and with his financial savings, he rented a larger flat to be shared by eight Romanian people. Again, by employment reasons, she moved to Corfu Island and rented a house there. After several years, he moved to Athens and with the help of Romanian network in Athens he found a flat to be rented. As he gradually improved his economic conditions, he moved to a better-quality dwelling with his brother and after two years, she moved to a less-crowded, calm and cozy neighbourhood in Athens. At last, Katalin and his wife managed to buy a house in Acharnai. As seen by Katalin's housing pathway, in the lack of public policies regarding accommodation, refugees may have to rely on their own social and economic capital.

Apart from Europe, refugees struggle to access accommodation also in other continents. For example, in British Columbia - Canada, newcomers have to deal with high rental prices in the market due to the lack of available housing stock (Teixeria, 2009). During this struggle, immigrants mostly rely on their own personal networks instead of ethnic solidarity groups in accessing accommodation. As Teixeira (2009) put forward, new immigrants in British Columbia initially settle in their friends' and/or relatives' dwellings for free. Then, once immigrants find jobs and make savings, they look for dwellings for their own in rental market. For African countries, prominent examples come from Nab'ah neighborhood in Beirut from Fawaz (2016).

With the Syrian influx to Beirut after 2011, Nab'ah has become a destination locality for refugees due to its affordable housing stock (mostly informal slum type housing and two-three room apartments some of which were subdivided into smaller units). Refugees either followed their pioneer family members who already settled or chose to settle in Nab'ah due to the existence of a strong Syrian network in the neighborhood. However, with the uneven influx,

the rental prices were increased and various profiteers emerged in housing market who wanted to make extra profits by renting apartments to newcomers (by making some adjustments to the apartments: sub-dividing the apartments, adding extra floors above). Moreover, some wealthy people (investors) across the country bought some entire buildings in Nab'ah and mostly sub-divided the flats to be rented to refugees. Since most of these investors were outsiders to Nab'ah, local realtors started to manage these buildings in the neighborhood and for some cases building managers acted as bridges among landlords and refugee tenants. Realtors were in charge of collecting the payments, contracting lease agreements, ensuring building maintenance, etc. Under these circumstances, refugee tenants mostly encountered with realtors and building managers in the local housing market.

Overall, in each case, we see that the initial and subsequent location choices of refugees go hand-in-hand with their housing pathways. Secondly, refugees' access to accommodation, and thus, location choices are bound to the actions and discourses of various actors who are involved in the housing market including public institutions, civil society organizations, ethnic solidarity groups, homeowners and realtors. For example, regarding the housing pathways of Liberians and Somalis in UK, we see how government support and control (Home Office, Sheffield City Council, NASS dispersal policies) play critical roles in these groups' access to initial accommodation. For Polish immigrants, we witness the importance of pre-contacts with Polish inhabitants in reaching the initial accommodation.

In Mahmoud's housing pathway, we see how the grant of the refugee status and ethnic landlords, strawmen with migrant background and the ethnic network relations in Vienna played facilitative roles in his access to the rental housing market. Again, in Mahmoud's narrative, we observe how migrant profiteers take the advantage of the newcomers/immigrants/asylum seekers in the housing market by renting flats with higher prices above the market average. Nabil's housing pathway is a unique one, since he managed get in contact with local people in his initial times in Austria, who helped him in accessing his temporary accommodations. Moreover, the people he met in the reception center acted as "door-openers" (Aigner, 2018) by introducing Nabil to his potential landlords. Katalin, as another example, struggled to find temporary accommodation in Athens due to the lack of housing policies for refugees in Greece. From the beginning, he was on his own to find accommodation. His story shows us that, especially in countries/cities where there are no proper political/policy sets for the accommodation of refugees, refugees are somehow forced to rely on their economic and social capital in accessing housing. Similarly, in British Columbia, we saw how personal networks acted as life savers for new immigrants in reaching

initial accommodation and how the level of social and economic capital is decisive in immigrants' access to long-term accommodation. However, in Beirut, we saw a totally different situation. Various profiteers and investors emerged in Beirut's housing market to benefit from the financial outcomes of the refugee influx.

Here, we also see that housing pathways of refugees are quite different from each other. The very own preferences of refugees regarding where to settle as well as the local housing market conditions, the type and roles of actors in the housing market, the attitudes of market actors towards immigrants, the power of local ethnic/native solidarity groups, the level of state intervention to housing and location choices of refugees and the operations of civil society organizations all play decisive roles in shaping refugees' access to temporary and permanent accommodation.

4.3. Concluding remarks

In the previous chapter (Chapter 3), I discussed refugee emplacement as a process in which refugees struggle to reach out necessary services and resources for their survival, well-being and integration and struggle to engage in relations with services providers and various actors who would mobilize these necessary resources. Building on it, in this chapter, I tried to figure out refugees' emplacement strategies which they develop to ease/ensure their access to necessary resources and services. After a rigorous literature review, I grouped refugees' strategies under four categories as follows: holding/maximizing the financial assets of the household, being mobile across different localities on the daily basis- i.e. workplace to home, engaging relations with services providers/resource allocators and selecting the most suitable locations to settle – i.e., location choice.

This discussion brought me to the main focus of this chapter, that is, understanding the dynamics (factors and actors) behind refugees' location choices in urban areas. Here, I looked at state-led (social housing, camps, asylum center, dispersal policies) and refugee-led location choice models (spatial assimilation, place stratification and preferences models) by giving country/city examples from the literature. I devoted special attention to the preferences model (homophily and network models in specific) to draw the importance of refugees' preferences and the formation/maintenance of social networks. In line with preferences models that prioritize refugee subjectivity in location choices, I discussed refugees' location choice motives under three categories as socio-economic, socio-cultural and socio-spatial. Here, I drew attention to the agency of refugees by acknowledging that refugees' location choices are not purely subjective choices that are solely bound to refugees' very own preferences. Instead,

there exist various actors (landlords, local solidarity groups, public institutions) and factors (conditions of housing and labor market, location-specific factors including peace and security, proximity to public services etc.) that shape and/or limit refugees' options for settlement. Explicitly, I expressed the intertwined relation between the location choices and housing pathways of refugees. Because as evidence shows, one could not settle and emplace in any locality where he/she could not find a place to spend the night or a home for longer accommodation. As Carter and Osborne (2009) state, access to housing is the first and required step for refugees to forge a new life and look for other essentials of survival as job-seeking, language training etc. Accordingly, I drew why and how refugees' relations/interactions with public authorities, NGOs, solidarity groups, actors in the housing market are determinant/influential in refugees' housing and location choices.

Overall, I constructed the theoretical basis to understand the location choices of refugees in urban areas. In the following chapter, by building on the theoretical framework I outlined here, I will introduce my research methodology, sampling and case studies.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHODS

In this chapter, I briefly aim to introduce the epistemological and ontological premises of this research along with the sampling (of participants and case study areas), the data collection and data analysis methods employed. I will specifically explain the theoretical premises that I considered when locating Turkey (country), Izmir (city), Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca (districts) to their proper theoretical contexts (concerning their roles in Syrian refugee mobility in Turkey). I will explain the pilot and main field studies I conducted in Izmir and emphasize their contributions to the empirical findings of this research.

5.1. Research methodology – Ontological and epistemological aspects

Defining the ontological and epistemological stances of any social research is quite essential to understand the methodological strategy that is adapted to answer the main research question (Iosifides, 2012). Therefore, I determined my research methodology with respect to my main research question which is "In a context characterized by policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management, how do (Syrian) refugees decide on where to settle in / emplace and which actors/factors become decisive in shaping their initial and subsequent location choices at different geographical scales?" As seen, this research is not a descriptive one that tries to list the factors/actors behind the location choices and housing pathways of refugees. Rather, it is an explanatory one concerned with the portrayal of the underlying mechanisms, actors and factors that shape/affect/influence refugees' emplacement and location choices in urban areas.

In determining my research methodology, I once again reviewed the "problematic" methodological approaches that I detected during the literature review phase. The most problematic methodological issue I detected was "methodological nationalism" in migration and mobility studies (as in Barberis and Pavolini, 2015; Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002). Methodological nationalism in migration studies favors nation/state/society as the primary units of social analysis and comprehends society as a

uniform entity which is composed of individuals sharing the same values, norms and identities. I criticized it because, the concept of society in methodological nationalist thinking is defined on the "national" basis (i.e., national citizenship) which leaves immigrants/refugees outside of the definition. Immigrants/refugees are often elaborated as separate, isolated homogeneous communities apart from the rest of the society. However, in this research, I regard immigrants/refugees as the organic members of the receiving societies, in which both the so-called "natives/citizens" and "refugees" are exposed to the same processes of exploitation, destitution and social exclusion in their everyday lives (Harvey, 2004).

My critics on the methodological nationalism made me query the applicability of positivist thinking in this thesis. Because, as Iosifides (2017) points out, positivist thinking uses the concepts on the surface, - which are mostly "taken for granted state thinking" - regardless of the mechanisms and processes that reproduce them. Positivist studies pay limited attention to the underlying mechanisms that reproduce the social reality, unless various experiments and empirical evidence are systematically collected and analyzed to propose alternative realities. In contrast to positivist thinking, I devote special attention to understand the underlying mechanisms and relations (the interplay among structure and agency) that (un)directly shape/affect refugees' emplacement and location choices.

There are also some other aspects of positivism which shows why I cannot pursue a positivist social research. Before introducing them, it is better to take a brief look at what positivism suggests. For positivism, reality refers to observable and measurable events/phenomena. The emphasis on empirical observation and experiment comes from the idea that the reality has a value-free nature, and therefore, precise and cohesive results of empirical research pave the way towards the objective reality. With its insistence on empirical observation and objectivity, positivism argues for the existence of universal social realities which are not to be questioned. To some extent, I argue that positivism reduces social reality to empirical, regular, frequent, logical events (reductionism - Iosifides, 2012) and I criticize it for its dependency to quantitative measurement methods as the tools for reaching social reality. Not surprisingly, the causality of events is determined by empirical analysis that looks at the constant and repeating conjunctions of events (Iosifides, 2017). As seen, positivism cannot meet the goals of this thesis and fail to uncover the underlying mechanisms that result in refugees' different experiences of emplacement, location and housing choices. Moreover, the causality expressed in positivist thinking does not match what I defined by causality in this thesis. For example, we cannot understand the causality of refugee mobility by one-sided quantitative methodology – by looking at the volume and typology of the mobility, spatial concentration indexes etc.

Lastly, as I examine the nexus among top-down and bottom-up actors involved in the process of refugee emplacement and location choice, I find out that I need a methodology that favors inductive reasoning. At this point, interpretivism comes into the scene as a methodology that would help me to take refugees' own narratives of emplacement and location choice at the center of the discussion.

In its simpler forms, interpretivism suggests that social reality is socially produced and depended on how social actors define, explain and describe it (Blaikie, 1993). However, according to Iosifides (2017), interpretivism fails to distinguish its ontology from its epistemology (epistemic fallacy – Iosifides, 2012) by building the social reality on the subjective meanings and interpretations of the social actors. Thus, social reality cannot be purely objective since it is already pre-interpreted by the social actors. In addition, unlike the definition of social reality in positivism, interpretivism defines social reality as a time/space/context-depended phenomenon rather than a fixed and stable one (Blaikie, 1993). However, interpretivism accepts different narratives and experiences of social actors as "different social realities" and fail to regard such different narratives of social actors as "different comprehensions of the same reality" (Iosifides, 2017). Therefore, there are no rooms for causal explanations of realities in interpretivism. In this way, interpretivism provides little insights for me to examine the underlying factors and interplay among different agents that are affective in the formation of social realities. In overall, interpretivism is not helping me in explaining the causality of refugee mobility and emplacement along with their socio-spatial outcomes. Similar to interpretivism, I also reject to employ post-structuralism and relativism, since they ground the social reality on language, discourses and concepts without social agents and fail to recognize interactions among structures and agents as well as the interplay among various social agents (Iosifides, 2017).

My strong emphasis on uncovering the underlying mechanisms and interplay among several actors who are involved in refugee emplacement, location choice and housing processes lead my research towards critical realism (CR). Because in its simplest form, critical realism aims to explain the causality and the underlying mechanisms that generate events and processes by asking "how" questions to understand the social world (Bhaskar, 1978; Iosifides, 2012; 2017). Unlike interpretivism, critical realism highlights the intransitive forms of social the world which exist independently from our knowledge. However, it does not mean that critical realism rejects the transitive dimension (concepts, theories, models) of the social world (Bhaskar, 1978). Critical realism takes the symbols, meanings and interpretations attached to describe social events and phenomena into account, but it regards these transitive forms as entry points

of understanding the social events and phenomena. With its strong emphasis on intransitive dimensions (real entities), critical realism admits that we might reach out "provisional, fallible and partial" knowledge of the social reality (Iosifides, 2017). In overall, critical realism includes both subjective (experiences of social events, interpretations), actual (all social events regardless of whether they are experienced or not by the social agents) realms as well as the generative mechanisms of such realms (Iosifides, 2017). Critical realism suits my research aims since I aim to uncover the underlying mechanisms (actors and factors) affecting/shaping Syrian refugees' mobility /location choices taking place at different geographical scales under policy/political vacuums in Turkey. However, in line with critical realist thinking I am aware of the fact that I cannot fully grasp the underlying mechanisms and the context of the relationship among the structure and the agency in the location choices of refugees, but I can partially explain them.

Explaining the mechanisms of social events in critical realism is far ahead of positivist approaches of causality which are empirically and statistically analyze the relationships among two or more variables. As Iosifides (2017) expresses, critical realism looks for three causal aspects of social realities as: agential, structural and cultural causal powers. Agential powers include subjective experiences of social agents, their interpretations and intentions, while the structural ones mostly refer to "material dimensions" that generate social events. In my case, I regard refugees' intentions, strategies and experiences, the attitudes of local people towards newcomers, the discourses of key actors, policy makers and political figures as agential causal powers of mobility and emplacement; while I elaborate the economic and political conjuncture of countries, the migration and welfare policies, the rights granted to refugees, the global power relations and the processes of exploitation and destitution as the structural causal powers that result in the formation of different trajectories of refugee mobility. Lastly, cultural causal powers include all forms of cultural, political and ideological standings that lead to the formation and/or legitimization of social events. For my case, I regard the existence and operation of refugee solidarity groups, the notions of belonging, security, identity and as the cultural causal powers of refugees' mobility and location choices.

However, again as Iosifides (2017) notes, I also shall look at the emergent causal powers behind social realities - which are the outcomes of interplay among different social actors including individuals, public institutions, market actors, etc. The identification of such emergent causal powers that (un)intentionally shape refugees' emplacement strategies and location choices are critical for fulfilling the research aims. Because I am not only examining the causality of multi-scalar mobility, emplacement and location choices of refugees, but also

the interplay among top-down and bottom-up actors who affect refugees' emplacement and location choice processes.

In summary, the adaption of critical realism into qualitative migration studies helps researchers to examine both the discourses and interpretations of actors, social practices and types of relations in the everyday lives of individuals in a way to uncover the causal/generative mechanisms behind the formation of migration processes. Therefore, in this research, to understand why refugees are either dispersed to or concentrated in some specific localities, I look for the generative/explanatory mechanisms behind the patterns of dispersal and concentration. Here, the use of ethnographic data collection methods to grasp how refugees' themselves experience and interpret the processes of mobility, location choice and emplacement is quite critical to identify the generative mechanisms. This is also useful to grasp the refugee subjectivity in migration processes and thus to avoid methodological nationalism. At this point, it is worth to introduce my fieldwork that I developed in accordance with my multiscalar, relational framework and critical realist approach to social inquiry.

5.2. Constructing the fieldwork

As I discussed in the introduction section, I constructed the fieldwork of this research by tracing the international (movements from Syria to Turkey), intra-national (movements across Turkish cities) and intra-urban (movements within the cities) mobility patterns of Syrians have been in a relational way and found out that Basmane Area in Izmir stands at the very center of all these mobility patterns. Accordingly, I selected Basmane Area as the medium of my multi-scalar analysis and multi-sited fieldwork. At the second stage, I determined my sampling of interviewees with respect to the spatial redistribution of Syrian refugees in Izmir, Syrians' class positions in Izmir, ethnic backgrounds, year of arrival to Turkey, intention of migrating to Turkey. I also planned to interview with the policy/decision makers, NGOs operating in the field of migration and local key actors (mukhtars, tradespeople etc.). Later on, I decided to conduct a pilot field study in Izmir between 15-19 January 2019. I aimed to

- to collect some information regarding my research question (so as to understand whether my question has a reflection in the case of Izmir)
- to query whether Izmir and especially Basmane Area is the best location to built my fieldwork on
- to gain information regarding the spatial concentration/dispersal of Syrians in Izmir
- to gain information regarding the profile of Syrian refugees in Izmir

- to identify and meet with the key actors who have a word to say on Syrian refugee influx to Izmir (prior to my main field research in Izmir),
- to ask the help of these key actors in reaching out Syrian households and translation support (in Kurdish and Arabic),

Prior my visit to Izmir, I contacted with my thesis advisor, committee members and academicians who have already engaged in migration studies and who have been conducting research on the governance of Syrian refugee influx to Turkey to guide me in reaching potential contacts in Izmir through their individual networks. With their help, at the first place, I managed to get in touch with several volunteers from Kapılar Initiative (*Kapılar İnsiyatifi* - which is located and operating in Basmane) three days before my arrival, who have done remarkable projects so far to address Syrian refugees' daily struggles and their integration process in Izmir. I also contacted with ASAM (The Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants – *Sığınmacı ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışma Derneği*) and conducted a fruitful interview with a leading officer in ASAM regarding the characteristics of Syrian population in Izmir, the most preferred locations in Izmir by Syrians and the support services that ASAM offers for Syrians. I also visited the mukhtars of Kadıfekale, Kosova and Kocakapı neighourhoods (in and around Basmane) to gain information regarding the Syrian profile in these neighborhoods.

In my first visit to Basmane, the three volunteers of Kapılar Initiative shared lots of information about how Basmane has turned out to be a transition zone for Syrians (overnight stays, last stop before going to Europe, first stop before moving into the other parts of Izmir), a central location to settle down especially after EU-TR deal in 2016 (through offering various public services, cheap housing, job opportunities – low waged jobs with no social security-, being the hub to multiple transportation modes, network relations based on similar ethnic, cultural background, where other refugee groups live) and a community hub for Syrians (to get socialized, to access consultancy services, to buy/sell Syrian products).

The volunteers from Kapılar initiative also reported that, Basmane has been and still the initial stop of Syrian refugees in Izmir. Because Basmane is the most accessible location in Izmir thanks to the Basmane Railway Station which links Izmir to Anatolian cities and which links Basmane to other parts of Izmir with the developed metro-systems. Secondly, the migration culture in Basmane, which has developed after 1950s when rural in-migrants from South-East Anatolian cities of Turkey migrated to Izmir (along with other developed urban areas in the West), and the familiarity of the local inhabitants and local tradespeople in Basmane with in-

migrants, immigrants and refugees have attracted Syrian newcomers. Sharing similar views with the volunteers of Kapılar initiative, one of the oldest inhabitants of Basmane (to whom I met via the Initiative) explained how Basmane attracted Syrian refugees as a transition zone and a central location to settle down with the following words:

> *Basmane has always become an important spot for Kurd in-migrants, Arab population coming from Mardin, Afghan and Iraqi refugees. Basmane is a critical stop on immigrants[9] journey towards Europe. Because it is the first location that they came in Izmir since Kurd networks, network of Afghans and Iraqis are strong in here and since it is the heart of commerce and trade and…of course human smuggling which developed in the area aftermath of the arrival of Afghan population. In my opinion, people are coming to Basmane to make the necessary preparations to go to Europe…the majority of them do not intend to settle here permanently. However, it is not easy to cross because it is dangerous and risky. However, one way or another, Afghans have been stuck in Basmane and looked for the ways of starting a new life. Similarly, Syrians are experiencing the same. Although they came here to contact with human smugglers and go, only a small number of them managed to go. Especially after 2016, when refugee boats are directly monitored and intervened along the Aegean coasts of European countries, Syrians could not dare to take this risk. Just like Kurd in-migrants from Diyarbakır, Mardin, Afghans and Iraqis, Syrians willingly or unwillingly started a new life in Basmane. To an extent, Basmane is both a transition zone and an area to be settled and start a new life. Basmane is an attractive location since accommodation is also cheap because there are a lot of hotels/pensions room sharing options with affordable prices in Basmane. There are lots of associations, initiatives, public institutions in Basmane which are growing in number to offer food, clothing and aid to Syrians. Moreover, in Basmane, Syrians can find jobs in shoe-making, garbage collection, construction sectors.*

Similarly, a volunteer from Kapılar Initiative declared that the affordability of life in Basmane, despite its central location, is an important pull factor for Syrian refugees. However, he also added that Basmane's transitionary role is not only limited to refugees/immigrants in transit. He emphasized the role of Basmane as a transition zone, since nearly every Syrian has come there to meet their relatives, to reach out ethnic networks, to get in touch with human smugglers to pass EU, to get consultancy from several NGOs operating at the site. Moreover, he explained that Syrians who initially settled in Basmane have been moving to some other locations in Izmir, which also signals another dimension of Basmane's transitionary role, as follows.

> *…Basmane is offering a lot for Syrian refugees. However, it is not a fancy neighborhood in Izmir. For many inhabitants of Izmir, Basmane is the center of crime, illegal affairs, although it is not that much. The multi-ethnic character of Basmane, the rapid population circulation, some apparent smuggling activities, the crowd in Basmane are often found inappropriate by some early Syrian settlers of Basmane. Of course, the old and deteriorated houses in which Syrians are mostly suffer from humidity, bedbugs, rats and*

[9] Actually, he is referring to asylum seekers and refugees.

dirt have to do with Syrians' relocation to other neighborhoods in Izmir. Syrians who can afford to live in better houses, Syrians who have a stable job and proper wage and Syrians who have relatives, friends in other parts of Izmir mostly prefer to move from Basmane. They mostly go Karabağlar, Buca, Torbalı depending on their ethnic background, jobs, expectations and so on.

Parallel to these arguments, the leading officer in ASAM, with whom I interviewed, emphasized that Syrian population in Izmir has been dispersed throughout Izmir with respect to the affordability of life, healthy living conditions, services offered, job opportunities available and ethnic, cultural and religious networks existing within diverse districts. The officer also denoted Karabağlar and Buca as the other two main destinations of Syrian refugees in Izmir:

First of all, regarding the ethnicity of Syrian population, we have Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens which have been dispersed to different districts of Izmir. Recently, there are two popular destinations for Syrians in Izmir apart from Basmane. Karabağlar and Buca. According to my experience in ASAM and the narratives of our counselees, Syrian Arabs prefer to go Gediz neighborhood in Buca, Kurd population prefer to go to Karabağlar and outskirts of Basmane and Turkmens go Torbalı. Of course, there are various reasons behind but in general, ethnic backgrounds of Syrians and cultural preferences, the existence of relatives, the job opportunities come forward as the main reasons of relocation of Syrians from Basmane to these districts.

The local tradespeople and real estators in Basmane to whom I talked informally also emphasized the circulation of Syrian population in Basmane and reported that Syrians now prefer to live in less central but more peaceful and affordable parts of Izmir including Torbalı, Karabağlar and Buca. During my pilot study in Izmir, I also visited the mukhtars of Kosova and Kadıfekale Neighborhoods in Konak District. The mukhtars informed me about the Syrian population living in their neighborhoods with respect to their ethnic, religious background and income level, where they work, in which conditions they live, how they access public/municipal resources, how they access to housing etc. They both emphasized that Syrian population in Izmir is composed of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. They also noted that refugees tend to settle in neighborhoods where their relatives and friends have already settled, where affordable housing options are available, where they may speak the same language and engage in similar daily activities with their neighbors.

The information I gathered regarding the Syrian profile in Izmir urged me to design my sampling of participants by paying attention to the ethnic differences. Because all the interviewees highlighted that ethnicity played decisive roles in Syrians initial and subsequent location choices in Izmir. Therefore, to represent the Syrian population in Izmir, I decided to conduct interviews with both Syrian Arabs, Syrian Kurds and Syrian Turkmens. However,

prior to the interviews, I assumed that the legal status of Syrians as registered/unregistered might be an important indicator to grasp the different intra-urban mobility trajectories and location choices of Syrians in Izmir. However, I could not reach a convincing information that suggests legal status of Syrians has to do with the spatial concentration or dispersal of Syrians in Izmir.

Lastly, I conducted two pilot interviews with Syrian refugees living in Basmane (with the help of Kapılar Initiative) to understand the suitability of my interview questions and to get an idea of how Syrians explain their emplacement process and location choices in Izmir (and which actors and factors they emphasize the most in their narratives). In overall, during my pilot study in Izmir, I gained prior knowledge on the ethnic composition of Syrians in Izmir, Syrians' dispersal in Izmir, the common factors and actors affecting Syrians mobility and emplacement.

In sum, my pilot study in Basmane Area, Izmir helped me to better construct my fieldwork and to determine sampling of the interviewees. Now, at this stage, I want to present the details of the logic of my fieldwork. In specific, I will discuss why I selected Turkey (as the country case), Izmir (as the city case), Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca (as local cases) for my multi-scalar analysis of Syrian refugees' different mobility and emplacement patterns.

5.3. The fieldwork: Case study

In selecting the case study, I devoted special attention to choose the country, city, districts and neighbourhoods in a way to ensure their coherency with the main research question, research objectives and the theoretical and empirical setting of this research. Accordingly, I constructed my fieldwork with respect to the following criteria. The case studies should

- ensure the trace of the continuity of refugee mobility at different geographical scales- (international, national and local).
- play a critical role in international, national and local Syrian refugee mobility.
- host remarkable numbers of Syrians and other ethnic communities.
- provide insights to trace how international displaced persons become urban refugees (who engage in social, economic, political and cultural relations in the urban areas that they have settled).
- exemplify the situations of policy/political vacuums in addressing migration and asylum through which I could portray the refugee subjectivity in emplacement processes.

Therefore, I ended up with the following decision: Turkey (as the country case / Syrian mobility at the international – national scales), Izmir (as the city case / Syrian mobility at the national – local scales), and Basmane (Konak), Buca and Karabağlar (as local cases – Syrian mobility at the local scale). By doing so, I managed to build a multi-scalar, relational, bottom-up and actor-centered perspective to understand the emplacement and location choice processes of refugees in urban areas. In the following sub-sections, I explain in detail why I chose this three-stepped case study setting.

5.3.1. Why Turkey?

Turkey is a unique case to be studied since it is a critical node for international refugee mobility in the world (especially between Europe and Asia) with respect to its strategic geographic position. Here, I will briefly mention why I selected Turkey as the country example under three statements, as follows:

- Turkey has a critical position in Syrian refugee mobility and mobility from Middle East/Asia to Europe both as a transit and a destination country.
- Turkey is the leading country in hosting displaced Syrians.
- Turkey provides great insights to grasp the emplacement strategies and location choices of refugees in destination countries as an example case where policy/political vacuums in addressing refugees' reception, resettlement, emplacement and integration take place.

Regarding the first and second statements, from the earlier days of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has witnessed remarkable migration flows both from Europe and Asia – including the refugee flows originated from population exchanges among Turkey and Greece (1923-1924), from Balkans including Bulgaria (1950-1989), from Iran as a result of Iranian Revolution and Iran- Iraq war (1979-1980), from Iraq as a result of Gulf War (1990-1991) (Karadağ, 2015). Moreover, acting as a bridge among Europe and Asia, Turkey has been a transit hub for people who are hoping to pass European countries to forge a new life (Düveli, 2013). It was the year 2011, when Turkey found itself in the middle of one of the most massive refugee influxes of the world: Syrian refugee influx. At first, Turkey hosted only 252 Syrians in the earlier days of the influx (April 2011) who were mostly activists, journalists and protesters hoping to return back soon (Ogli, 2019), however, as days goes by the number has increased exponentially. Thanks to the "open-door" policy applied between 2011-2015 which was based on the assumption that "Syrians shall return soon", Syrian refugees entered Turkey from the border gates without any bureaucratic obstacle and passport requirement (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018). Turkey is now the leading country in hosting internationally displaced Syrians since

2011 along with the first sparks of political unrests in Syria. By October 2020, Turkey hosts 65.1% (3.626.734) of the total number of registered Syrian refugees to other countries of asylum (UNCHR, 2020). Turkey is followed by Lebanon (15.8%), Jordan (11.8%), Iraq (4.4%) and Egypt (2.3%) (Figure 1).



Figure 1: The spatial redistribution of Syrians across the leading countries of asylum

As the civil war continued and socio-political tensions arose in Turkey due to the lack of proper policies addressing the accommodation, mobility and security of Syrian newcomers (Dinçer et al., 2013; Öner et al., 2020), in mid-2012 Turkey gradually abandoned its open-door policy and imposed restrictions and limitations regarding Syrians' border-crossings (Özen, 2016), until the strict border policy applied in 2016. It was the year 2016 when the Turkish government imposed the passport and visa requirements for Syrians (Öner et al., 2020). All these efforts to restrict Syrian mobility to Turkey paved the ways towards the Joint Action Plan among European Union and Turkey in March 2016, which is publicly known as EU-TR deal. To control the irregular and unofficial migrant movements (especially) at the Aegean Sea, the deal was made. On one-to-one basis, it was agreed that every irregular migrant who managed to pass to Greek islands from Turkey would be returned back to Turkey, and in response, EU would accept to issue the resettlement process of another Syrian to Europe (Baban, IIcan, and Rygiel, 2017). It was also agreed that Turkey would receive financial awards (around 3 billion Euros at first place) from EU along with some applications of visa-free travel of Turkish people to European countries in exchange of its efforts to prevent irregular crossings to EU over Aegean Sea (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016). Despite the restrictions and the EU-TR deal, Turkey still ranks at top among the other countries in hosting Syrian refugees. The statistics show us that, rather than a transit country located along the

Balkan route (a route followed by refugees from Middle East to Europe) (Figure 2), Turkey is now a favorable country to settle in and forge a new life.

Figure 2: The geographic location of Turkey along the Balkan route
Source: refugeesintown.org

In other words, as Memişoğlu and Ilgıt (2016) argue, Turkey is turning out to be a "country of immigration" while also maintaining its role as a transition country. The role of EU-TR deal seemed to be quite critical in changing Turkey's position in the international migrant flows, by limiting the over-sea crossings to EU.

The EU-TR deal seems to achieve its goals in preventing irregular migrant flows at the Aegean Sea (at the expense to risking transit refugees lives with dangerous border-crossing attempts) According to the statistics of UNHCR, the number of "refugees and migrants arriving by sea to Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Malta" was 1.032.408 in 2015 and most of them were observed in Turkey - Greece route (more than 850.00 sea arrivals to Lesvos and Samos, Chios islands) (UNHCR, 2020). However, from 2016 to 2019, the number remarkably decreased from 373.652 to 123.663. Especially after the EU-TR deal, Syrians hoping to pass to EU somehow stuck in Turkey due to the high risks of unsafe journeys and the increasing costs of human smuggling after strict controls of the Turkish and Greek governments.

As the third reason to select Turkey as the country case, Turkey provides great insights to examine how Syrian refugees manage to emplace and decide on locations to settle under

policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management (i.e., the lack or partial lack of health, education, resettlement, integration, accommodation and aid policies and programmes for refugees). Since one of my research aims is to draw how refugees manage to emplace in urban areas in cases of policy/political vacuums, Turkey perfectly fits here as the case country.

- The policy/political vacuums in the governance of Syrian refugee influx in Turkey

Up to 1950s, Turkey's migration and asylum processes were managed by Law No. 2510 on Settlement (1934). According to the Law, the right to asylum and settlement in Turkey was only granted to individuals having "Turkish descent and culture" who were expected to adopt Turkish identity and norms (Öner and Genç, 2015). Turkey's insistence on Turkish background and identity continued till 2006 and took place in Law No.5543 on Settlement. Although having signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and the concordant 1967 New York Protocol to address and regulate international refugee mobility, Turkey put geographical limitation to the Convention and accordingly bestowed the right to asylum only to the ones coming from Europe, in a way to maintain its insistence on *having Turkish background* as the condition to issue asylum applications. Even in 1990s, when Turkey faced with massive influxes from Iraq as an outcome of the Gulf War, the geographical limitation was strictly applied. However, the influx of Iraqi migrants led to the introduction of the first regulation of asylum in Turkey in 1994 (*İltica ve Sığınma Yönetmeliği*).

According to the Regulation, non-European asylum-seekers granted with the status of temporary protection on the condition that their reasons of asylum were found verified. This temporary protection granted by Turkey was valid until UNHCR would begin to issue the asylum applications of applicants (Öner and Genç, 2015). In 2005, along with EU accession negotiations, the National Action Plan was entered into force in Turkey which introduced modernized regulations for the management of migration and asylum. However, it was the year 2013, when Turkey introduced its first asylum law, Law No. 6458 - Law on Foreigners and International Protection, as a response to the massive Syrian influx in Turkey. The Law issued the conditions and implementation procedures on entry/exit of asylum seekers, deportation, residence permits and introduced a new institution called Directorate General of Migration Management (*Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü*) which was charged with the management of migration and asylum in Turkey. as the leading authority under Ministry of Interior (Demirhan and Aslan, 2015)[10]. The Law no. 6458 accepted the geographical

[10] In cooperation with DGMM, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) under Prime Ministry was also entitled with the duty of helping DGMM in registration of Syrians, constructing and managing refugee camps designated for Syrians.

limitations put on Geneva Convention and did not introduced any article regarding the asylum right of Syrians in Turkey. By the Law, Syrians are entitled with the temporary protection status as they were assumed to be temporary guests in Turkey till the civil war ends in Syria. Based on Law no. 6458, Temporary Protection Regulation entered into force in 2014. By the Regulation, the rights to be granted to individuals under temporary protection are introduced. In specific, the conditions for accessing state-funded health, education, labour market, medical care, and social welfare are explained in the regulation. However, it is strictly noted that to benefit from these public services, Syrians must register to public authorities and gain a temporary protection status.

By the Law and regulation, we see that Turkish government has adopted a service-based humanitarian approach in the management of Syrian influx, however this approach is often found inadequate by some scholars due to the ambiguities in the application of temporary protection status and its failings in properly addressing the issues related to Syrians' initial reception, settlement, accommodation, integration and access to services (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016; Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, 2016; Sarı and Dinçer, 2017). Here, the first criticism is about the international protection. Syrians who were granted with the temporary protection status is not allowed to apply for asylum in other countries (Baban et al., 2016). This means that Syrians somehow accepted to remain as guests in Turkey and they would return to Syria when the war ends in Syria. Secondly, Syrians are obliged to register in provinces they have settled/plan to settle. Although Syrians are free to choose their destination provinces, they are not allowed to travel freely among provinces or move to other provinces without getting the necessary permissions from the relevant authorities. It seems that there is a duality in managing the internal mobility of Syrians in Turkey. Thirdly, the legislation is far beyond addressing Syrians' basic needs in a comprehensive way and granting rights at the international standards. Fourthly, both the Law and the Regulation did not specifically mention the division of labor among public authorities in addressing refugee-related issues and fail to touch upon how the coordination between different public and civil society actors would be ensured and monitored. Lastly, the legislative framework introduced DGMM as the primary actor that leads the governance of the Syrian refugee influx from top down, but it did not introduce any article regarding the role of local governments – especially municipalities - in the governance process. Even more, by the same legislative framework, municipalities are not allowed to provide cash allowances for Syrian refugees but allowed to involve in in-kind campaigns, when necessary.

To illustrate, I will briefly elaborate Çamur's (2017) findings of his study on the municipal services of Syrians in Izmir. As Çamur (2017) critically notes, the services of both the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality and district municipalities are comprised of limited "in-kind aid" (*ayni yardım*). With some exceptions as Konak District Municipality who put considerable efforts on developing joint projects with NGOs addressing the needs of Syrians; other district municipalities provide short-term/partial supports (food, clothing and hygiene materials) and often organize ateliers of music, photography and courses of Turkish language. When municipalities were asked the reasons behind their lack of support for Syrian refugees, the typical answers given are as follows (Çamur, 2017): "the refugee issue is not our policy concern", "there is no legal grounds of financially supporting Syrians with respect to the Turkish legislation", "the lack of an institutionalized structure addressing refugee-related issues", "the ambiguities in the provision of rights for those under temporary protection", "the lack coordination and information share among central and local authorities in migration management". When I evaluate this weak apologia, I also see that municipalities often consciously refrain from supporting Syrian refugees in order not to annoy Turkish citizens (i.e. voters of local elections) who also seek for municipal services.

In general, I elaborate the political/policy in-action and non-action situations of the central and local governments in Turkey, as the top-down policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management. In the discussion below, I briefly explain them under four sub-headings as accommodation/resettlement, employment/income generation, public services and integration.

- Accommodation and resettlement of Syrians

According to the Temporary Protection Regulation, Syrians are to be accommodated in refugee camps (temporary accommodation centers which are composed of tents and containers) managed by AFAD and Turkish Red Crescent on behalf on the Turkish State. Other than refugee camps, no policy/programme has been developed so far to address the accommodation issue of Syrian refugees. As the most relevant policy/statutory provision, Article 24 of the Regulation states that Syrians under temporary protection may be allowed to settle in cities, when there is no perceived risk of any circumstance affecting public order, security and health. Accordingly, Syrians may choose to live in any city they desired unless the opposite is declared. However, they are expected to settle and remain settled in cities where they had already registered. When Syrians decide to move to another city, they must inform the public authorities and get the permission. However, in cases of exceeded refugee capacity, the governorships may not accept new registrations to their provinces. Despite such obstacles

and tough living conditions in urban areas, the vast majority of refugees prefer to settle in cities. As Syrians settled in cities, the number of refugee camps has decreased from 23 to 7 by November 2020 (DGMM, 2020). As the number of Syrians in urban areas increased, so did their demand for housing/accommodation. There is no restriction for Syrians' entrance in the rental housing market, however, they are not allowed to buy a property. In their seek of housing in urban areas, refugees face many obstacles. Firstly, only Syrians who hold a valid temporary protection ID can rent house. However, since the temporary protection IDs of Syrians is not equivalent to the residence permits, Syrians are treated as short-term guests in rental housing market, who are often subjected to discrimination and exploitation by property owners and realtors (Şimşek and Çorabatır, 2016).

- Employment / income-generation

In terms of employment, the conditions of Syrians' access to labour market are indicated in the Regulation. Until 2016, the right to obtain work permits was only granted to the foreigners having a residence permit (based on Law on Foreigners Work Permit) and since the vast majority of Syrians were not given residence permits but allowed to stay in Turkey under temporary protection regime, they could not apply for work permits (Özen, 2016). However, with the updates in 2016, the Regulation now allows Syrians to apply for work permits to be employed in cities that they registered with public authorities, after six months of the registration. As Şimşek and Çorabatır (2016) highlight, wages of Syrians who obtained work permits cannot be lower than the minimum wage. However, some quota and restrictions are also introduced in the Regulation. Firstly, the number of Syrian workers in a workplace cannot exceed 10% of the Turkish workers employed. Secondly, Syrians can only be formally employed in the sectors that are determined by the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services. However, the bureaucratic procedures for employers to hire Syrian workers are exhausting and time-consuming. By 2018, only 15.000 Syrians obtained working permits among a million Syrians who are eligible to work (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018). The legal limitations of Syrians' access to formal labour market inevitably led to the illegal forms of employment in which Syrians' are somehow forced to work with low wages and no social security (Baban et al., 2016). Due to scarcity of jobs and increasing competition in the job market, Syrians confront with the dilemma of whether to remain out of labour market or engaging in it for their economic survival.

- Public services

The Regulation introduced the conditions for Syrians' access to aid, health and education services. Firstly, aid basically comprise of temporary/monthly cash assistance, food and cloth

support, legal counselling (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018). Cash assistance is distributed by the Turkish Red Crescent in the form digital cards/voucher system (Kızılay Cards) which is equivalent to 133 TL (app. 17 dollars by April 2020). Apart from public authorities, various international and local NGOs designate their own aid programmes (to be monitored by the State) and distribute them to their target groups who are mostly determined by governorates and the Turkish Red Crescent (according to the selection criteria for social assistance in the Law) (Şimşek and Çorabatır, 2016). However, based on some political concerns (spying and conspiracy, transparency issues), the State imposed restrictions on the operation of international humanitarian agencies in Turkey and obliged these agencies to pay fees to operate in Turkey, to hire Turkish staff to ensure the high ratio of Turkish officers over officers of other nationalities and to collaborate with Turkish Red Crescent (Ogli, 2019). Under the restrictions imposed by the Turkish state several I/NGOs in Turkey prefer not to register to operate in Turkey but cooperate with national and local NGOs to implement their projects (Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, 2016). However, as Aras and Duman (2019) argue the level of cooperation/coordination among NGOs is still low in Turkey, so as the coordination among public institutions and NGOs.

Regarding education, Syrian children at primary and secondary level of education have the right to enroll public schools free of charge, as indicated in the Temporary Protection Regulation. Before that, in 2015, temporary education centers (TECs) were opened in refugee camps/selected urban areas for the "guest" Syrian students which aimed to follow the Turkish/Syrian education curriculum in Arabic (Öner and Genç, 2015). The basic motive of TECs was to keep refugee children in education system while they live in Turkey and therefore, they were not designed as equivalents of public schools in Turkish education system which follow a long-term comprehensive education curriculum (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018). However, as the civil war continued and the number of Syrian children who could not receive proper education increased, the Ministry of Education in Turkey took a big step towards integrating Syrian children to Turkish education system. At first, beginning from 2017, the temporary education centers were closed and Syrian children enrolled in these centers were transferred to public schools in Turkey by 2019. To enroll to public schools, a valid ID was kept compulsory. However, Syrians face various struggles in integration to the Turkish education system mainly because the language barriers. Since the medium of instruction is Turkish, Syrians cannot (or barely) follow the courses (Öner and Genç, 2015). Moreover, due to the linguistic/cultural differences and the problems in communication, Syrian children are mostly exposed to discrimination at school by their native peers (Yüce, 2018). As the result of the language barriers, the financial difficulties and the discrimination

faced at schools and legal procedures, by 2019, the number of Syrian children who enrolled to public schools remained quite low than expected (around 40% of the total number of Syrian children at school age) (unicefturk.org).

With regards to health care services, Syrians under temporary protection may access to medical care from all public hospitals, other second/third step medical care facilities, and Migrant Health Centers[11] and Migrant Health Units which were established after 2015 by the joint project of Ministry of Health, Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrant (ASAM) and World Health Organization (WHO). However, private hospitals and healthcare facilities are not included in state-funded healthcare system for Syrians. Unregistered Syrians may also benefit from emergency health services and from health services for protection from contagious and epidemic diseases (Keleşmehmet, 2018). However, by 2015, unregistered Syrians were also given right to take first step medical care in Migrant Health Centers. However, in practice, the treatment of Syrian patients in public hospitals is not appreciated by some Turkish citizens and doctors, as Syrians are found responsible for the excessive workload of hospitals and decreasing quality of healthcare services (Erdoğan, 2018).

- Integration

Despite the efforts of Turkish state to address the basic needs of Syrians under temporary protection; the initial accommodation, emplacement and integration of Syrians have not properly addressed yet. As Şimşek and Çorabatır (2016), the word "integration" has not yet used in Turkish legislation since Turkey has not yet define itself as a "land of immigration" (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016). Although Syrians are in Turkey for more than nine years, the Turkish state still regards Syrians as temporary guests and refrain to develop any ad-hoc policy for their integration. Moreover, the temporary protection status granted to Syrians is confusing and ambiguous since it grants very few rights to Syrians at the expense of restricting their applications of international protection statuses. Temporary protection regime in Turkey provides limited rights to Syrians when compared to the "refugee" status. Accordingly, a remarkable share of Syrians in Turkey prefers not to be registered so as not to be stuck in Turkey as long-term guests having limited rights (Öner et al., 2020). The conditions required to access the rights granted are also challenging. First of all, to benefit from any state-funded services, Syrians have to register with Turkish authorities and obtain an ID card. However,

[11] Migrant Health Centers are specifically designed with the influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey with the aims of providing medical treatment with high quality and efficiency.

once Syrians are registered, they are obliged to remain in the city that they registered. They should go to the hospitals of this city, engage labour market in this city and ask for the permission of public authorities to travel/move to another city. The location-specific character of the registration limits Syrians' mobility and increases their precarity in urban areas, since they cannot freely move to other locations where they would hopefully reach better living conditions. Moreover, as Syrians' refrain to be registered, they find themselves in precarious conditions in urban areas due to the fact they are not allowed to benefit from public services without an ID. The ambiguities in legal status and rights granted along with the restriction of movement across cities can be seen as the sources of Syrians' precarious living conditions in Turkey and as big obstacles against integration.

- Political discourses / political vacuums

Apart from policy vacuums in the governance of Syrian influx in Turkey, I will now briefly talk about the political vacuums that inevitably affect the content of policies and public opinion towards the newcomers. During the open-door policy (2011-2015), the mainstream media kept pushing news that represented Turkey as a hospitable country where welcomes Syrians as brothers, friends and relatives. To some extent, such discourses had repercussions in public opinion since Syrians were seen as temporary guests. At that time, state-funded services, financial and moral contributions of international/local NGOs and even informal solidarity groups were highly appreciated. However, as Syrians become urban refugees who also became welfare recipients, the public perception towards Syrians have changed in a negative way. Especially the competition in the job market for scarce job opportunities among "Syrians" and "Turkish citizens" and exploitation of both parties' workforce by employers have resulted in social tensions which spread to the whole. As public opinion changed, so did the political discourses.

Especially after the EU-TR deal in 2016, which reinforced Turkey's position as the leading country in hosting Syrians, political discourses have changed accordingly in a way to show how Turkey is playing a strategic role among EU and Middle East. Aftermath of the Deal, to ease down the public unrest which arose from the widespread public opinion that Turkey is dealing with issues that European countries transferred to Turkey, the key political figures in the government struggled to find a balance between anti-immigrant and humanitarian discourses towards Syrians. In that regard, for all planned actions for the favor of Syrians, key political figures first conduct informal political opinion polls to measure the level of reaction of Turkish citizens. For example, when President Erdoğan mentioned a project that aimed to provide social housing for Syrians; opposite views against the project have become

widespread and accordingly, the project was cancelled immediately. In this anti-immigrant climate, as found repercussion in the mainstream media, the government's Syrian policies were believed to be leading reasons behind AKP's (Justice and Development Party) lose out to the opposition parties in local elections of March 2019 (Diken, 2019). Accordingly, after the elections, local governments mostly refrained to involve any project for the welfare and well-being of Syrians in a way not to contradict with the widespread anti-immigrant discourses of Turkish citizens.

Syrians' precarious living in Turkey reached its peaks when Turkey decided to open its Greece borders to refugees who wish to pass Europe in early March 2020. This shocking decision was legitimized in the eyes of the public as a response to the airstrike of Syrian Armed Forces to Turkish Battalion in Idlib, Syria (end of February, 2020). As the consequence, thousands of people rushed into the borders and attempt to pass the EU borders despite all the oppositions and armed intervention of Greece. As Greece did not allow refugees to cross its borders, refugee set up tents and waited. Various international/national NGOs and humanitarian agencies as well as the Turkish Red Crescent provided water, food, clothes and tents to refugees. However, thousands of refugees suffered from unhealthy conditions while waiting and the worst they were caught unprepared when COVID-19 spread the whole world.

Under such an ambiguous anti-immigrant policy and political environment in Turkey, Syrians are somehow left alone with limited resources and support to take care of their lives. In the partial absence of the State, various international local NGOs, market actors, opinion leaders, religious communities, and solidarity groups have addressed the refugee-related issues. At this point, Turkey offers great insights for us to see the strategies and actions of both top-down and bottom-up actors under policy/political vacuums. In overall, the Turkish context of migration management allow us to draw the types and operations of various actors who are involved in resource allocation and service provision for refugees as well as Syrians' mobility and location choices.

5.3.2. Why Izmir?

Izmir is the third biggest metropolitan urban area and a port city in Turkey located at the Aegean coast of Turkey, which hosts 4.367.251Turkish citizens by October 2020 (TUIK, 2020) (Figure 3). Izmir is among the top ten provinces in Turkey that hosts remarkable number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. According to the official statistic, Izmir now hosts 147.155 Syrians by November 2020 (4.05% of the total number of Syrians in Turkey) (DGMM, 2020). Although the role of Izmir in international migration and asylum

movements has recently become evident aftermath of the Syrian refugee influx to Turkey, Izmir has historically been an important node/settlement in internal/international migration flows.

Figure 3: The geographic location of Izmir in Turkey
Source: Wikipedia.org

Izmir has historically been one of developed cities in Turkey due to its strategic location as an important port city. Its civilization history dated back to 3000 B.C, despite the wars, epidemics disasters and social conflicts that took place throughout its history (Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, 2020). With its developed/developing port and logistics sector, shipping trade, production industry, agriculture activities, textile and tourism, Izmir has attracted rural in-migrants from less-developed south-eastern provinces of Turkey from 1950s. Until the 2000s, Izmir was the second most important city (following Istanbul) that attracted rural in-migrants (Işık, 2017). For rural in-migrants who migrated from their hometowns because of the income losses/decreasing productivity in agriculture sector and problems faced in accessing public services, Izmir was quite attractive with its developing services, industry and logistics sectors which offered new sources of employment and income. Besides the developed economy, the accessibility of Izmir from Anatolian cities by railways and highways had to do with the increasing in-migrant population in Izmir. Following the rural in-migration trend, Izmir has also been one of the important destinations in the urban-to-urban migration that started in the 1970s (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1999; Işık, 2017). Accordingly, Izmir's population has rapidly risen from 768.411 in 1950 to 1.427.173 in 1970 and 3.370.866 in 2000 and 4.367.251 in 2019 (TUIK, 2020) (Table 3).

Table 3: Population changes in Izmir from 1927 to 2015 – Turkish citizens
Source: TUIK, 2020

	1940	**1950**	**1970**	**2000**	**2019**
Population of Izmir	640.107	768.411	1.427.173	3.370.866	4.367.251

Regarding the Syrian refugee influx to Turkey, Izmir has been one of the most preferred destinations for Syrians from the very first days of the influx. The number of Syrians living in Izmir has gradually increased over years, both because of the arrival of Syrians wish to settle in Izmir at the first place, of those who could not hold on to life in other provinces and of those who wish border-crossing to reach out EU but stuck in Izmir after the EU-TR deal (Table 4).

Table 4: The number of Syrians under temporary protection in Izmir

	2015[12]	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**
Syrians under temporary protection	74.000	-	101.466	138.742	145.503	147.155

Despite Turkey's strict border policy applied after 2016, Siviş and Uzgören (2019) report the reasons behind the increasing Syrian influx in Izmir as follows: the increase in the number of Syrians registered to public authorities who wish to access to public services, the prolonged/extended and even permanent stays of Syrian refugees in transit after the EU-TR deal, the increase in the number new-born Syrian babies and the arrival of Syrian newcomers who were once resided in some other provinces in Turkey.

From the earlier days of Syrian refugee mobility in Turkey and EU, Izmir has frequently appeared in the media by its transit role for Syrians who are hoping to cross EU borders by following the Balkan route. To an extent, Izmir emerged as an important transit hub for refugees "on the Eastern Mediterranean migration route to Europe" (Siviş and Uzgören, 2016). As the "last stop" in Asia, Izmir's close spatial proximity to Greek islands (app. about 80 km to Lesvos and Chios from the city center of Izmir) makes the city a gathering place of transit refugees (Ogli, 2019). As seen from the Figure 5, once refugees manage to arrive Greek islands from Izmir or other nearby locations without any interruption, they follow the Balkan route towards Athens, Thessaloniki, Belgrade, Budapest, Vienna and onwards to reach out the developed countries as Germany, Denmark and Netherlands at most.

Moreover, with its nodal position in the national transportation network, Izmir has a strategic role in the redistribution of Syrians to other hot spots at the Aegean coast of Turkey, from

[12] The number of Syrians under temporary protection in 2015 was taken from Yıldız and Uzgören (2016), since I could not reach the number of Syrians under temporary protection in Izmir for the period of 2011-2015. Because the officers in DGMM reported that the statistics produced before the year 2016 do not belong to their institution, and therefore, they did not find it ethnical to share the numbers with researchers external to public institutions.

where Syrians may also head to Greek islands in illegal ways. In specific, the Basmane Train Station and attached highway system attract transit refugees to arrive Izmir first so as to go the other coastal areas (Kuşadası, Bodrum, Ayvalık, Çeşme, etc.) (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Syrians' routes to Greek islands and main departure points at the Aegean coasts of Turkey
Source: sözcü.com.tr

Until the Deal, Izmir was mostly known by its transitory role. However, when the majority of transit refugees stuck in Izmir after the EU-TR deal and as the overseas journey become ever dangerous and expensive, Izmir's role as a destination locality has been shined out (Öner et al. 2020; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016). Undoubtedly, the developed health, education services, transportation, infrastructure and communication services, the diversity of commerce and trade activities, availability of job opportunities in different sectors come forward as the leading pull factors for Syrians to emplace in Izmir. The increasing number of Syrians stuck Izmir and their struggles to forge a new life after EU-TR deal provide insights for me to draw how international/national policy changes could affect the mobility, settlement and emplacement processes of refugees. In other words, Izmir provides great insights for me to examine the local outcomes of the political/policy vacuums in Turkey regarding the migration and asylum management. In overall, my motives behind selecting Izmir as a case study are as follows:

- Izmir is among the top ten provinces in Turkey where hosts a remarkable number of Syrian refugees,

- Izmir is in a very strategic position in international and internal refugee mobility due to its critical geographic setting on the Aegean coast of Turkey,
- Izmir is a transit city for Syrians and other refugees on their way heading to EU,
- Izmir is a destination settlement for Syrians to settle in and emplace thanks to the variety of services (aid, health, education, employment) and NGO supports offered,
- Izmir is a metropolitan urban area having a long-lasting migration history.

The redistribution of Syrian refugees in Izmir is uneven. To say, when we look at the spatial distribution of Syrians in Izmir, we see that the population is dispersed to all thirty districts of Izmir (Table 5).

Table 5: The Syrian population under temporary protection across the districts of Izmir – 2019
Source: DGMM, October 2020

District	**Syrian Pop.**	**District**	**Syrian Pop.**	**District**	**Syrian Pop.**
Aliağa	387	Dikili	185	**Konak**	**35587**
Balçova	82	Foça	780	Menderes	1869
Bayındır	826	Gaziemir	1684	Menemen	2575
Bayraklı	10105	Güzelbahçe	10	Narlıdere	152
Bergama	215	**Karabağlar**	**29971**	Ödemiş	538
Beydağ	23	Karaburun	280	Seferihisar	1112
Bornova	**27327**	Karşıyaka	478	Selçuk	214
Buca	**15200**	Kemalpaşa	1598	Tire	730
Çeşme	344	Kınık	110	**Torbalı**	**10705**
Çiğli	1333	Kiraz	48	Urla	176
				IZMIR	**145503**

As seen from Figure 5, the central districts of Izmir (Konak, Buca, Karabağlar, Bayraklı, Bornova, etc.) host the majority of Syrians. The services and opportunities offered in these districts in terms of health, education and employment, the existence and operations of public institutions, NGOs and local solidarity networks, the variety and affordability of services, goods and accommodation options and the locational advantages (e.g., the ease of transportation) seem to play decisive roles in attracting Syrians to settle in them. Both for transit refugees hoping to cross EU borders soon and long-term refugees in Izmir, central districts as Konak (especially Basmane – as the hub of refugees), Karabağlar, Bornova and Buca (despite their relative distances to Basmane) are the most preferred locations. However, the spatial distribution of Syrians in these three districts is not also even.

As several scholars argue Basmane, Kadıfekale, Çimentepe, Ballıkuyu, Yeşildere, Zeytinlik and Agora neighborhoods in Konak District, Yunus Emre, Yeniçamlık, Karabağlar, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay and Uğur Mumcu neighborhoods in Karabağlar District, Gediz and Yıldız neighborhoods in Buca District, Işıkkent, Pınarbaşı, Doğanlar and Mevlana

neighborhoods in Bornova District and Atatürk neighborhood in Torbalı District are the top destinations of Syrians in Izmir (Karadağ, 2015; Ogli, 2019; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018; Yıldız and Uzgören 2016) (Figure 6). As Belanger and Saraçoğlu, (2018), Karadağ, (2015) and Öner et al., (2020) argue, the spatial dispersal pattern of Syrians in Izmir has to do with the ethnic structure of districts (even neighbourhoods) and employment opportunities offered.



Figure 5: The top-five settlements of Syrians under temporary protection in Izmir – 2019

. At this point, it is worth to look at studies that identified Syrians' spatial dispersal in Izmir with respect to their ethnic structure. For example, Karadağ (2015) labels Kadifekale, Agora, Çimentepe and Ballıkuyu Neighborhoods in Konak Districts as the settlements of Syrian refugees with Kurd origin; while labelling Gediz and Yıldız Neighborhoods in Buca for the settlements of Syrian Arabs. On the other hand, Syrian Turkmens settled in Pınarbaşı, Işıkkent, Doğanlar and Mevlana Neighbourhoods. (Karadağ, 2015).

Apart from ethnicity and labour market-related choices, some Syrian groups prefer to maintain a semi-nomadic life in rural areas of Izmir – especially around Torbalı- where they work as seasonal workers in agriculture sector (Ogli, 2019). It is a preferable option for transit refugees who intend not to register with Turkish authorities but seek ways to collect money to afford crossing the EU borders. Stemming from this fact, I selected my local cases – district / neighborhood scale cases as Konak, Buca and Karabağlar. In the following sub-section, I will briefly portray the reasons of selecting these districts.



Figure 6: The neighbourhoods where Syrians have settled the most
Source: (Karadağ, 2015; Ogli, 2019; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018; Yıldız and Uzgören 2016)

5.3.3. Why Basmane (Konak District), Karabağlar and Buca Districts?

- Why Basmane Area?

As an inner-city deprived neighborhood offering a variety of affordable services and accommodation options and as a neighborhood having a migration history, Basmane is the first stop of Syrian refugees in Izmir and therefore, is my starting point to construct the relational perspective in examining the intra-urban location choices of Syrians in Izmir. Besides being a transition zone for transit refugees, Basmane is also one of the most preferred locations for Syrian newcomers to settle in and forge a new life. The Konak District, where Basmane locates in, hosts 35.587 Syrians under temporary protection by 2019 (24.35% of the Syrian population in Izmir) according to the official statistics of DGMM (2020). However, we do not know the exact number of Syrians in Basmane, since Basmane is not an administrative unit but a *semt*[13] in Konak District, which covers twenty-three neighborhoods (with a

[13] Basmane is an area that is composed of several neighborhoods – which is called as *semt* in Turkish. Semt can be translated to English as "urban settlement area". Semts are not administrative units.

population of 45.440). The area in red (in Figure 7) indicates the unofficial boundaries of Basmane referring to the historical context of the area. Konak Square (the main public square of Izmir) and ferry ports is in five minutes distance by car from Basmane. Basmane is also in five minutes walking distance from Kültürpark, which is the biggest inner-city park, fair and recreation area in Izmir (Figure 7).



Figure 7: The location of Basmane in Izmir
Source: Yandex maps

Especially after the EU-TR in 2016 which resulted in the overstay of transit refugees in Izmir, Basmane has become a Syrian-led settlement in the very heart of Izmir. As Öner et al. (2020) point out, with the gradual increase of the number of Syrian refugees settling in Basmane since 2011, the area is now called as "Little Syria" by Izmirlis[14]. To better understand the role of Basmane in Syrian refugee mobility in Turkey and Izmir, first of all, I need to explain why I regard Basmane both as a transition zone and a destination settlement. Throughout in Izmir' history, Basmane has always been one of the prominent settlements in in Izmir. During the Ottoman and Early Republican period, Basmane District was an area of prosperity where hosted the elites of that times. Therefore, the architectural quality and housing variety were at the highest level. Especially the "Kortejos" – Jewish housing style- having an inner courtyard which is surrounded by various large rooms were common in Basmane (Öner et al. 2020). During 1800s, various commercial activities had started to emerge and especially chintz

[14] The native inhabitants of Izmir.

(*basma kumaş* in Turkish) ateliers had been concentrated in the area. Basmane took its name from these chintz ateliers.

The area is also known by Basmane (Railway) Station which was built in 1863-1866. With its opening, Basmane became the transportation hub in Izmir since the railway station acted as a connecting bridge among Anatolian cities and Izmir. As railway transportation gained pace with the investments of the young Turkish Republic on railway and highway systems, the connecting role of Basmane Railway Station became ever important (Figure 8). Especially after 1950s, parallel to the increasing rural in-migrant population in Izmir, Basmane Railway Station had become an important city-image for its residents, especially for those coming from rural parts of Anatolia to İzmir (with respect to rural to urban migration in Turkey that had reached its peak during 1950s). It was also the symbol of "hope" for the newcomers who had come all the way to İzmir so as to reach better life standards.



Figure 8: Basmane Railway Station
Source: pinterest.com

As the first stop in Izmir where rural in-migrants who came to Izmir by train, Basmane has been the symbol of a new beginning for the rural newcomers as the initial location where rural the struggle to become urbanites has started. Accordingly, the rural in-migrants mostly settled in and around Basmane, since it was the first location they had arrived. Moreover, as a central location in Izmir, Basmane offered various public and commercial services, affordable housing options (with respect to deteriorated historic housing stock) and employment opportunities in sectors including textile, leather, small scale production (i.e., shoe making) and electronics (Wissink, Düvell and van Eerdewijk, 2013). As rural in-migrants settled and engaged in social and economic relations in Basmane, the demographic and social characteristics of Basmane have started to change. First, with the settlement of rural in-migrants who had been employed in small ateliers, construction sites and services sectors in Basmane, the area had become a sort of "labour settlement" with affordable but low quality

housing, cheap restaurants and coffee houses ("*kahvehane / kıraathane*"s[15] in Turkish) which mostly served for rural in-migrants as the places of socializing. Even more, as the population of single male in-migrants had increased in Basmane, who initially came there before their families to provide the grounds of the migration of the remaining family members, various "pavyon"s[16] and estaminets were opened as places of entertainment for rural male in-migrants.

Second, to meet the accommodation needs of the increasing in-migrant population in the area, various historic but deprived and abandoned buildings[17] - especially the Kortejo[18] type of buildings in Basmane - were bought or rented by some inventors who aimed to turn these buildings into pensions/guest houses/hotels which offered rural in-migrants monthly/daily accommodation. With the active use of İzmir International Fair (in the area which is now known as Kültürpark), which attracted thousands of international and internal tourists, Basmane became the "hotel district" of Izmir. As with the demographic and cultural changes in Basmane, the majority of long-term inhabitants of Basmane have moved to other locations in Izmir.

Following the rural in-migrants, after 1980s, Basmane hosted the Afghan and Iraqi asylum-seekers who were hoping to cross European borders. Basmane was quite attractive for asylum-seekers due to its central location, accessibility, affordable housing options and variety of services offered along its migration culture. However, as some of asylum-seekers could not manage to leave Turkey due to political, bureaucratic and economic obstacles, they mostly stuck in Basmane and gradually changed the social and cultural relations in Basmane, just like the rural in-migrants once did. This time, the former rural in-migrants started to move to other locations in Izmir as they affiliated the asylum-seekers and low-income population in the area with the social unrests, increasing crime rates and fights in Basmane (Öner et al. 2020). As human trafficking, illegal and informal economies were associated with Basmane and its immigrant residents; investments and services to Basmane have gradually decreased.

[15] Local coffeeshops / teahouses in Turkish context which functions as the local spots socializing for male inhabitants of the given neighborhoods.

[16] The term "pavyon" refers to night clubs specific to Turkish culture which are designated mostly for men to get socialized, to have food and drinks (with alcohol), to listen to folk / arabesk music, to meet / chat with women who are working in these clubs to entertain the customers.

[17] Mostly abandoned due to the fire disaster in October 1922 and the population exchange among Turkey and Greece in 1923.

[18] Jewish buildings having large courtyards

After 2011, Basmane's transitory role has been strengthened with the arrival of Syrian refugees. As Öner et al. (2020) and Wissink, Düvell and van Eerdewijk (2013) argue, Basmane has gained international popularity during the Syrian refugee outflows, as an important transition hub of refugees along the route from Syria to European countries, where smuggling operations have been concentrated. As Öner et al. (2020) note, there were money transfer vendors, shops selling life jackets, phone cards and all necessary items to be used during dangerous border-crossings and oversea journeys. Such activities were so evident especially in 2014 when human smuggling at Aegean coasts of Turkey reached the peak. In defining Basmane as a transition hub for immigrants/refugees, the scholars highlighted the accessibility of Basmane as a central area located between the heart of Izmir (Konak Square) and the main railway station (*Basmane Gar* in Turkish) and its affordable housing, employment opportunities, diverse commercial activities which enable Syrians' temporary/long-term stays in the area. Especially until 2016, Basmane was a temporary stop for Syrians hoping to head to Europe soon. Because with its strong transportation network, Basmane was distributing Syrians to various coastal locations at the Aegean coast of Turkey either by bus and/or private vehicles, where they can illegally cross to Greek islands. Basmane also acted as a transition zone for Syrians in transit by providing them affordable accommodation, food and clothing support (by NGOs) along with short-term temporary jobs in informal economy.



Figure 9: The Hotels District in Basmane
Source: Yandex maps

The hotels/pensions in and around the famous "Hotels District" were over-crowded during Syrian refugee influx between 2012-2016 (Figure 9). Although the hotels were relatively cheap with regards to their location in Izmir and quality; as Syrians kept coming, the hotel owners booked the rooms for prices above the market average and took the financial advantage of this situation.

As no rooms to be find in the hotels and the price of accommodation has risen, some Syrian refugees ended up in parks, streets, public squares in and around Basmane. For those who could not afford to stay in hotels and those who did not want to book in a hotel by their ID, Kültürpark (the biggest inner-city park of Izmir – 5 minutes walking to Anafartalar Street) and Agora Park in/near Basmane were the alternatives of short-term accommodation (Figure 10). Either in small tents or on blankets and cartoons, Syrians spent the nights for free in streets/parks.



Figure 10: The location of Kültür Park and Agora Park

However, especially after EU-TR deal[19], which caused the Syrian refugee population to get stuck in Izmir as the cost and risk of oversea crossings have increased, Basmane come forward as a favourable destination to be settled in and emplaced. As Özerim and Crawley (2016) highlight, Basmane has become a "home" for Syrians, rather than a "pit-stop" on the road to EU. As the Syrian population increased in the area, so did the commercial activities that target Syrian customers. Basmane now hosts various Syrian-led shops which are representing the

[19] To prevent illegal overseas crossings in the Aegean Sea that mostly take place between Greek islands and Turkey, the Deal was made among EU and Turkey. The Deal was made on one-to-one basis which means that for every Syrian refugee returned to Turkey, EU agrees to host a Syrian refugee to be resettled in EU (Öner et al., 2020).

samples of Syrian cuisine and bakery, clothing shops and beauty salons which have signboards in Arabic. However, Öner et al. (2020) also direct attention to the increasing peculiarity of Syrian refugees in Basmane by shedding light to the discrimination, alienation, social exclusion and exploitation that Syrians face in their daily lives, especially in the housing and labour market.

In overall, Basmane can be seen as an international transition hub for refugees along their route heading to Europe; as an inter-regional/inter-urban transition hub through which refugees in transit go to other coastal areas along the Aegean Sea, as an intra-urban transition hub for refugees and in-migrants who initially settle in Basmane moves to other locations in Izmir. The transitionary role of Basmane enables us to trace the mobility trajectories of refugees in the context of "arrival – stay – relocation".

However, despite its central location, offerings and opportunities, some Syrian refugees – who were initially settled in Basmane – have preferred to move to other locations in Izmir. As I was told several times during my pilot study, Syrian refugees who managed to save money, who found proper jobs, who engaged in family life and who were not comfortable with the multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan and chaotic social environment of Basmane, have gradually moved to other locations in Izmir. At this point, Karabağlar and Buca come forward as the top destinations for the relocations of Syrians in Izmir. Moreover, these districts are now hosting considerable number of Syrians and are popular destinations for refugees coming to Izmir as the result of the chain migration.

In the previous sub-section, I mentioned that Basmane is not only a hub for Syrians to get socialized or to settle permanently but also a transition zone through which Syrians gradually move from Basmane to other locations in Izmir including Karabağlar, Buca and Bornova. Among them I selected Karabağlar and Buca as case study areas as a result of a rigorous literature review I made on the location choices of Syrian refugees in Izmir (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018) and the pilot study I conducted in January 2019. Accordingly, I identified three reasons to select Karabağlar and Buca as the local case studies, in addition to Basmane.

- Karabağlar and Buca host remarkable shares of Syrian population in Izmir (these districts are among the top-five (in Izmir) in hosting Syrian refugees).
- Karabağlar and Buca come forward as the two main destinations for Syrians who moved from Basmane.

- Karabağlar and Buca enables me to trace the intra-urban mobility of Syrians in Izmir (by tracing Syrians relocations from Basmane except from the ones who came Karabağlar and Buca as the result of chain migration - i.e., subsequent comers).

- Why Karabağlar?

Karabağlar is one of the metropolitan districts of Izmir that locates along the southern axis of Izmir (Figure 11). It is in six kilometers distance from Konak Square (the oldest and very center of Izmir -Izmir Watch Tower), approximately seven kilometers to Alsancak (new commercial area of Izmir) and six km to Basmane Railway Station, by car. Karabağlar is one of the oldest settlements and crowded districts of Izmir with a population of 480.925 by 2019 (TÜİK, 2019).



Figure 11: The location of Karabağlar District in Izmir
Source: Yandex maps

Approximately 200 years earlier, Karabağlar was mostly composed of black grape vineyards (*kara üzün bağı*). Until 1950s, these vineyards were the main income sources for the residents of Karabağlar (also known as Bozyaka and surroundings). With the influx of rural-in-migrants in 1950s and onwards, these vineyards were rampantly demolished as the result of the rapid industrialization and irregular urbanization practices (The District Municipality of Karabağlar, 2020). When it was the year 1970, the vineyards near the main southern axis of Izmir – today this axis is called as Yeşillik Boulevard – were totally disappeared. Of course, the opening of small-scale furniture ateliers on the huge plain areas around Yeşillik Boulevard had to do with this result. In time, these furnishing businesses have grown and after 1990s Karabağlar became one of the leading locomotives of Turkish furniture sector. The furniture sector in Karabağlar had become the channel of income for its residents.

Today, along Yeşillik Boulevard, it is possible to see various small to large scale furniture ateliers and showrooms as well as other sub-industries of furniture industry (Figure 12). Following the development of furniture industry, two important industrial sites were constructed in Karabağlar and Buca, named as Karabağlar Industrial Site (Karabağlar Sanayi Sitesi) and Sixth Industrial Site (Buca 6. Sanayi Sitesi).



Figure 12: The location of Yeşillik Boulevard, Karabağlar Industrial Site and Sixth Industrial Site

Figure 13 shows the population distribution in Karabağlar District. As seen, the population is concentrated in neighbourhoods that are close to the city center and the ones along Yeşillik Street and industrial sites. Just as the local population, the distribution of Syrian refugees in Karabağlar District is uneven. Karabağlar hosts 29971 Syrians under temporary protection (20,59% of the Syrian population in Izmir) by 2019 (DGMM, 2020). Although we don't know the official Syrian population statistics on neighbourhood scale (because it is not shared by DGMM and other relevant public authorities), various studies put forward that Syrians have been mostly concentrated in Yunus Emre, Karabağlar, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay, Uğur Mumcu neighbourhoods (Figure 13) (Karadağ, 2015; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016). As noted by Saraçoğlu and Belanger (2018), especially after the year 2016, around 600 Syrian workers have been settled in Limontepe neighbourhood in Karabağlar to remain close to the textile ateliers in which they work as labours. According to Ogli (2019), the low housing rents in Karabağlar is an important pull factor for Syrians. In

addition to this, based on my observations in the field, I claim that Syrian workers prefer to settle in some specific neighbourhoods of Karabağlar (i.e., Limontepe, Yunus Emre) to remain close to workplaces and job opportunities.

Figure 13: Dispersal of Syrian refugees in Karabağlar District
Source: endeksa.com; DGMM (2020)

- Why Buca?

Besides Basmane Area and Karabağlar, Buca is my third spatial focus. Buca is the most crowded district of Izmir with a population of 510.695 in 2019 (TUIK, 2020). Located at the southern axis of Izmir, Buca is one of the neighbouring districts of Karabağlar. The center of Buca is in nine kilometers to Konak Square (Izmir Watch Tower) and ten kilometers to Alsancak (Figure 14).



Figure 14: The location of Buca District in Izmir
Source: Yandex maps

Buca is one of the oldest settlements in Izmir, whose history dated back to the Roman Empire. Buca was the home of Rum, Turks and Levantine populations for long decades and it maintained its sub-urban character till 1950s. With the influx of rural in-migrants from south-eastern Anatolia after 1950s, Buca faced with the uneven settlements of in-migrants which have changed the social and economic relations. Buca hosts 15200 Syrians under temporary protection by 2019 (10.44% of the Syrian population in Izmir). Its central location, health, education and employment services along with affordable accommodation options come to the fore as the pull factors for Syrians. However, as in Karabağlar, Syrian population in Buca is not evenly distributed. Among forty-seven neighborhoods in Buca, only Gediz and Yıldız neighborhoods are mentioned in literature as popular Syrian settlements in Buca (Figure 15). Because, according to the declarations of the mukhtar of Gediz neighborhood, at least 10.000 Syrians are living only in Gediz neighborhood.



Figure 15: The dispersal of Syrian refugees in Buca District
Source: endeksa.com; DGMM (2020)

5.4. Whom to interview: The sampling of participants

In this research, I employed qualitative methods of data collection. However, in the beginning, I used the quantitative data on refugees' multi-scalar mobility – statistical information regarding the number and volumes of movements - in defining the research problematic and the main research question. Here, I traced the volume and patterns of the international mobility of refugees and specifically looked at the statistical data showing the spatial concentration of refugees in countries, cities and even in neighbourhoods.

To understand the underlying mechanisms of refugees' mobility, emplacement and location choices, I both looked at the structural factors and the agency of refugees in their emplacement and location choice processes. Therefore, I attached great importance to the experiences,

interpretations and strategies of actors who are involved in all these processes (policy makers, service providers, local key actors, refugees, etc.). To grasp all these subjective experiences and underlying mechanisms of refugee mobility and emplacement; I used in-depth semi-structured interviews as the qualitative data collection method. I also took field notes to recall my professional reflections to Syrians' narratives and to note and (even sketch) interesting instances and occasions that I came across during the interviews.

Since this research is a qualitative one, I applied theoretical sampling[20]. Because my primary aim here is to collect data in an iterative way for theory generation until theoretical saturation is achieved (Bryman, 2012). In other words, I followed an iterative movement between the sample and theory, and I aimed to simultaneously collect, categorize and analyze data until I was ready to generate conclusions. Here, in the application of theoretical sampling, the key issue was to select sampling that is meaningful to answer the research question and to test the emerging theoretical/analytical stances of the research (Bryman, 2012). Regarding my research question[21], firstly I reviewed the literature and then I conducted a pilot field study in Izmir to determine my sampling of participants/interviewees.

During the literature review and my pilot study in Izmir, I found out that Syrians have been mostly concentrated in three districts (Konak, Buca, Karabağlar) of Izmir. This fact made me to further query the mechanisms that resulted in the spatial concentration of Syrians in some specific locations in Konak, Karabağlar and Buca Districts. I selected my sample of participants from these areas where Syrians have been spatially concentrated and emplaced the most. By acknowledging that refugees' emplacement and location choices in urban areas are not only bound to their preferences but also to the actions and discourses of other actors who affect their class positions and the level of access to welfare (e.g., the state, the market); I decided to interview with a range of actors who are involved in these processes. At this stage, I recalled my discussion on the service providers and actors involved in resource allocation to

[20] I would have also employed generic purposive and convenience sampling, but I did not. Because although generic purposive sampling would help me to purposively select my samples to portray the generative mechanisms (actors, factors and interplay among actors in policy / political vacuums) behind Syrians' emplacement, access to welfare and location choice processes in Izmir; it would fail to help me to develop the relational framework in explaining these mechanisms. Secondly, convenience sampling was not also inapplicable, since interviewing with sample participants who were available in time of the interviews would not significantly contribute to my discussion on Syrians' location choices.

[21] Recalling the research question: "Under of policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management in Turkey, how do Syrian refugees decide on where to settle in and which actors/factors become decisive in shaping their initial and subsequent location choices at different geographical levels?

refugees (in Chapter 3) in determining the types of actors to whom I need to interview (e.g., Reimer's categorization of social relations as bureaucratic, market, associative and communal). Accordingly, I designed a three-stepped interview setting including public authorities/NGOs/local initiatives of solidarity; Syrian refugees; local key actors (local tradesman, elderly people, opinion leaders, political figures etc.) (Table 6).

Table 6: The three-stepped sampling

Public authorities / NGOs / local initiatives of solidarity	Syrian refugees	Local key actors

At the first place, prior to my visit to Izmir, I identified the local branches of relevant Ministries involved in migration management, the municipalities, the NGOs and the mukhtars who might have a word to say on Syrians' emplacement processes in Izmir. I carefully selected these actors by identifying their field of operation and once I convinced that I could get insight information (about Syrians' mobility, emplacement, location choices and access to welfare services), I contacted with them to get appointments.

Regarding my second set of interviews with Syrians, I needed to select a sample which would represent the characteristics of Syrian population in Izmir the most, in accordance with my analytical framework, temporal and spatial focuses. In that sense, my sample should represent the following:

- both Syrian Arabs, Syrian Turkmens and Syrian Kurds (ethnic dimension - to include all Syrian groups in the research, to draw the differences in the experiences of different ethnic groups, if there are any)
- Syrians who came to Izmir before and after the EU-TR deal in 2016 (temporal dimension - to draw the effects of policy/political decisions on Syrians' mobility and emplacement strategies)
- Syrians who once lived and/or living in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca (spatial dimension - to understand the motives behind Syrians' location choices and relocation decisions)

Once I decided on whom to interview with, I searched for the ways to reach out Syrian refugees to conduct interviews. Since I do not have a personal contact with the Syrians in Izmir, I asked the help of NGOs officers and academicians to get in the Syrian network through which I would reach potential interviewees. Engaging this network was also necessary since (as I was told by academicians and the NGO officers) Syrian households would be reluctant to involve

any kind of social research as some of them are still unregistered and as they are trying to stay away from any potential conflict which may harm their future in Turkey. Under these circumstances, first I interviewed with two Syrian households to whom I managed to reach with the help of Kapılar initiative in Basmane. For these two interviews, I worked with voluntary/professional translators. Before the interviews, I clearly stated my role as the researcher, the aims of the research and expected outcomes to refugees. I convinced Syrian refugees that I would not ask their personal information and their status of registration. Once they agreed to conduct interview with me, I kindly asked them to sign the consent form. At the end of these two interviews, I asked the interviewees if they would help me to reach out Syrians from their own networks. By applying the snowballing technique, I managed to conduct interviews with Syrians in Basmane area. I repeated these steps prior to all my interviews with Syrians. For the interviews with Syrians in Buca and Karabağlar, I asked the help of the officers of MÜLTECİ-DER (*Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği*) to reach out potential interviewees. Thanks to their efforts, I reached my first samples and conducted interviews with the support of a professional translator who speaks both Kurdish and Arabic. Again, I applied the snowballing technique for the interviews in Buca and Karabağlar.

Thirdly, I planned to conduct interviews with the local key actors who involved in refugees' emplacement processes, when the State is (partially) absent – i.e., policy/political vacuums. In specific, I decided to interview with the local tradesman, hotel/pension owners, real estate officers and all other relevant local actors who have a story to tell or and experience to share regarding Syrians' mobility and emplacement in Izmir.

5.5. Interview design

Since I planned to conduct three different sets of interviews as described above, I developed three different interview outlines. For the first set, I developed approximately twelve questions to be asked to public and NGO officers. I queried the role and position of institutions/organizations/initiatives in the governance of the Syrian refugee influx in Turkey. In a logical order, I questioned the policies and applications that address Syrian refugee influx to Turkey and Izmir in particular, if there are any. I also questioned how the public institutions and non-governmental organizations reacted to the economic, cultural, political and spatial outcomes of Syrian influx to Izmir and some specific locations in Izmir. I wondered whether they regard Syrians as temporary guests or urban refugees who are engaging daily urban relations. Later on, I asked the Syrian profile who they have encountered the most and their experiences with the Syrians who came to them either to register, to reach out services/aid or

to ask for guidance. I also questioned specifically whether these institutions/organizations address the location choices and accommodation issues of Syrians in Izmir.

Regarding the second set of interviews with Syrian refugees, I designated my interview questions in line with my analytical framework. Firstly, I questioned why and how Syrians decided to come and settle in Turkey (international mobility). Secondly, I tried to figure out why and how Syrians chose to come and/or settle in Izmir (internal mobility/inter-urban mobility). For both of them, I specially asked the factors and actors that affected the choices and actions of refugees. Later on, I queried Syrians initial and subsequent locations in Izmir from their first days and onwards. I designated questions to understand the intra-urban mobility of Syrians in Izmir with respect to their location choices and housing pathways. At the same time, I questioned how they manage to access services and resources necessary for them to survive and to forge a new life in Izmir. By specifically questioning how Syrians managed to find accommodation from their first day onwards, I aimed to draw the actors who played critical roles in the process. For the third set of interviews, which were to be conducted with local key actors, I decided not to prepare any structured interview questions. Because I did not know the profile of such actors and their roles in the refugee emplacement processes beforehand.

5.6. The main field study in Izmir

Between 10 July-16 August 2019, 13-19 October 2019 and 10-15 February 2020, I conducted my main field study in Basmane, Izmir. Before I went to Izmir, I got appointments from officers of local governments, NGOs operating at the field of migration and provincial branches of public institutions. With some exceptions, I managed to get appointments to conduct interviews, beforehand. Moreover, to determine the methods regarding how to reach out Syrian refugees living in Izmir, prior to my trip to Izmir, I contacted with two academicians to whom I have personal relations and officers from Kapılar initiative and ASAM. During our talks, I noticed that Konak, Buca and Karabağlar Districts still come forward as the most preferred locations for Syrians in Izmir. However, I also noticed that Syrian population in these districts are uneven. I combined this information with the findings of other studies in literature that provide information regarding the Syrian settlements in Izmir (Karadağ, 2015; Ogli, 2019; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018; Yıldız and Uzgören 2016). With the information that I gained at the field, I identified the neighborhoods that Syrians in Izmir have settled the most as in Table 7. Therefore, regarding my temporal and financial constraints, I decided to conduct interviews in these specific neighborhoods rather than the whole districts.

Table 7: Sampling of neighborhoods

Basmane Area	**Karabağlar District**	**Buca District**
Kadıfekale Kocakapı Faikpaşa Agora Ballıkuyu Zeytinlik neighborhoods	Yunus Emre Limontepe Devrim Günaltay Uğur Mumcu neighborhoods	Gediz Yıldız neighborhoods

I managed to conduct interviews with the three groups that I pre-determined (as public authorities/NGOs/local initiatives of solidarity; Syrian refugees; local key actors (Table 8). In the first phase, I conducted semi-structured interviews with public authorities, NGOs operating in the field of migration and human rights, local solidarity organizations to gain knowledge about how they govern and address Syrians' emplacement processes in Izmir. Here, I attached importance to the interviews with the mukhtars (the local administrators of neighbourhoods), since they had the detailed insight regarding Syrian population in their neighbourhood, as well as changing social and economic relations in the neighborhoods after the Syrian refugee influx.

Table 8: The resulting sample of public authorities/NGOs/local solidarity initiatives in Izmir

Public authorities / NGOs / local initiatives of solidarity (25)	
Local branches of central authorities (2)	**Local governments (4)**
Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (DGMM - Izmir) Izmir Provincial Directorate of Family and Social Policies*	Governorship of Izmir* Izmir Metropolitan Municipality Konak District Municipality Buca District Municipality*
Neighborhood- scale administrators /mukhtars (13)	
Basmane Area: Kadıfekale, Kocakapı, Faikpaşa, Agora, Ballıkuyu, Zeytinlik	
Karabağlar District: Yunus Emre, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay, Uğur Mumcu	
Buca District: Gediz, Yıldız	
Non-governmental organizations and local initiatives (6)	
Kapılar Initative	MÜLTECİ-DER
Halkların Köprüsü Derneği	ASAM
Konak Mülteci Meclisi	Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği

*interviews via phone-call

For the first set of interviews, I interviewed with key officers from Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (DGMM, Izmir) and Izmir Provincial Directorate of Family and Social Policies. I tried to get appointments from the Izmir Provincial Directorate for

Environment and Urbanization, Izmir Provincial Directorate for National Education and Izmir Provincial Directorate for Health to conduct interviews. During the phone calls, these institutions refused to give appointments to me by stating that they do not have any specific policy and program for Syrian refugees in Izmir. They all encouraged me to contact with the municipalities. I managed to interview with the officers from municipalities listed in Table 10 except from Karabağlar District Municipality. The Municipality refused me on the basis that they have no specific policy for Syrians under temporary protection. I visited the mukhtars of the selected neighborhoods without getting appointments. I directly went their offices and asked for their contribution. Fortunately, (except two mukhtars who seemed reluctant at the first place), they did their best to answer my questions. Regarding the NGOs, I selected the ones which are directly addressing refugees' issues in their emplacement processes in Izmir (i.e., accommodation, consultation, aid etc.). I managed to conduct face-to-face interviews with NGO officers by appointment and we also made Skype calls, when necessary.

Table 9: The resulting sampling of Syrian refugees in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca

	Basmane Area	**Karabağlar D.**	**Buca D.**	**Total**
Syrian Arabs	4	0	9	13
Syrians Kurds	3	8	0	11
Syrian Turkmens	6	1	0	7
Total	13	9	9	31

Secondly, I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with Syrian refugees in Izmir who are residing/once resided in Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts. In total, I conducted thirty-one interviews with Syrian Arabs (13), Syrian Kurds (11) and Syrian Turkmens (7) (Table 9). Here, I need to explain why I attached importance to the ethnic differences in my sampling. Because as I mentioned before, ethnic background and ethnic networks in Izmir play decisive but different roles in Syrians' emplacement and location choices of Izmir. As seen from the sampling, I devoted most of my time and effort to conduct interviews with Syrians Arabs and the Syrian Kurds. Because, although I could not reach the official statistics that show the Syrian population in Izmir with regards to ethnicity; based on my personal observations at the field and the off-the-record information I gained through mukhtars and NGO officers, I gave weight to interviews with Arabs and Kurd people to represent the ethnic composition of Syrians in Izmir. Again, as seen from Table 9, in Karabağlar District, I did not conduct interviews with Syrian Arabs (since their numbers and visibility is quite low in Karabağlar). Similarly, in Buca, I only conducted interviews with Syrian Arabs. It was mainly because of the ethnic composition of Syrians in these districts. In

sampling of Syrian refugees, I both took the ethnic characteristics of Syrian refugees in Izmir and their spatial distribution in Izmir into account.

In selecting my sampling of Syrians, I devoted great effort to represent the profile of Syrian population in Izmir. In that sense, regarding the ethnicity, age, gender, year of arrival, employment status, registration status, current location in Izmir and the intention of migrating to Turkey, I tried to formulate a balanced sampling. The basic characteristics of the sampling are as follows (Table 10). First, I interviewed with different age groups ranging from 18 to 70. The average age of the Syrian sampling is 39. Second, I interviewed with sixteen female and fifteen male Syrian respondents. Third, although there is no possibility for me to know the exact number of unregistered Syrians in Izmir (since there is no official record), I attached importance to conduct various unregistered respondents to see whether there are meaningful differences or not in Syrians' location choices in Izmir with respect to their registration status. In that sense, I interviewed with nine unregistered and twenty-two registered Syrians (who were granted with the status of temporary protection) in Izmir. Fourth, I interviewed with seventeen pioneer Syrians who have arrived Turkey before 2016 and fourteen subsequent Syrians who came to Turkey after 2016. I took the year 2016 as a breaking point since the EU-TR deal made in that year affected Syrians' decisions to migrate to Turkey and to Izmir.

In sampling, I also took the intentions of Syrians in migrating to Turkey into account. In specific, seven respondents declared that they came to Turkey to cross to European countries over Greek islands; while nine of them came to settle temporarily and fifteen to them to settle permanently. Regarding the employment status, my sampling is composed of fifteen employed (current) and sixteen unemployed Syrians.

Table 10: The characteristics of Syrian refugee sampling

Age	18-70
Gender	Female: 16
	Male: 15
Registration status	Registered: 22
	Unregistered: 9
Year of arrival to Turkey	Pioneer (before 2016): 17
	Subsequent (after 2016): 14
Employment status	Employed: 15
	Unemployed: 16
Intention to come to Turkey	To cross to EU countries: 7
	To settle temporarily: 9
	To settle permanently: 15
Current location in Izmir	Basmane: 13
	Karabağlar: 9
	Buca: 9

Prior to interviews with Syrian refugees, I did not specifically aim to conduct exactly thirty-one interviews. Because as Bryman (2012) argues the researchers cannot know how many interviews are needed before ceasing the data collection process, if reaching out the theoretical saturation is the primary concern in the sampling. Theoretical saturation is the point when researcher finds out that no new information is coming out of interviews which may contribute to the emergent theory and to the theoretical categories that the researcher wants to fulfil (Bryman, 2012). It is not the point when the researcher feels the "sense of deja-vu" due to the repetition of some arguments. Accordingly, I continued to conduct interviews until I was convinced that I was not hearing something new from the interviews regarding the factors and actors affecting Syrians' mobility, emplacement, location choice and housing choices. Once I decided to quit interviewing with Syrian refugees, I cross-checked the information coming out of the interviews with the information that I gained from public authorities, mukhtars, NGO officers and local key actors. Because I noticed that these actors have the valuable knowledge of the Syrians' emplacement processes in Izmir since they work hand in glove with numerous Syrian refugees.

In addition to the interviews with public officers, NGOs and Syrian refugees, I conducted interviews with the local key actors in Basmane, Buca and Karabağlar whom I labelled as the people who somehow involved in/witnessed Syrians' emplacement processes in Izmir. However, prior to my visit to Izmir, it was not possible to identify these local actors. At the beginning, I was assuming that in the partial absence of the Turkish state in addressing refugees' emplacement and integration processes, there have to be other actors who are addressing these issues. Therefore, during my interviews with Syrians, I devoted special attention to figure out the types and roles of such actors who either act a bridge or as an obstacle in Syrians' emplacement process Izmir. As I learned the contact information of the "local key actors" I got appointments and conducted twenty-two interviews with them (as in Table 11).

Table 11: The resulting sample of local key actors

Political figures – political party members (2)	Elderly people and oldest inhabitants (2)
Public officers taking initiatives (3)	Religious community leaders (2)
Housing market actors (real estators and tradespeople) (7)	Illegal actors (mafiatic figures[22] in the entertainment sector in Basmane) (3)
NGO officers taking initiatives (3)	

[22] By mafiatic actors, I mean people who are engaged in illegal activities, who use force to gain some hidden interests and most importantly, who are labeled as "mafiatic" by the inhabitants of the settlements where they engage in some illegal businesses.

5.7. Limitations of the research

It was inevitable to conduct this research without any constraints. Firstly, I faced with financial and temporal constraints in conducting the field study. Although, I was awarded with "Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Grant for 2020" to conduct my field research in Izmir; I stayed in Izmir only for a month, except from my short-term visits to Izmir in 13-19 October 2019 and 10-15 February 2020. Moreover, since I currently work as a full-time research assistant, I managed to take a month off from my university. Under these circumstances, I carefully organized my everyday activities and interviews before I went to Izmir. Unfortunately, my plan did not work perfectly. I faced with unexpected delays for some of my interviews (interviews with public institutions) and some rapid interviews with short answers due to the reluctance of officers. Because the governance of Syrian refugee influx is still a highly debated issue in Turkish politics and accordingly, public officers often refrain to talk about their political stances and policies of the institutions that they are affiliated with. Luckily, I managed to contact with public officers either by face-to-face conversations or by phone calls. Public officers did not allow me to record the interviews, because they all stated that they did not want to get in trouble with their superiors just because of sharing their own thoughts.

Secondly, it was not an easy task to conduct interviewees with Syrians since some of them were reluctant to give information regarding their experiences. To break down this unwillingness and to build a dialogue based on trust, I gave information regarding my identity as a PhD student and a researcher prior to every interview. I also briefly mentioned the content of interview questions to show interviewees that I only need their narratives of emplacement regardless of their personal information and political stances. After several visits for informal talks, I managed to convince Syrians to conduct interviews. For my forty-one attempts to conduct interviews with Syrian refugees, I managed to conduct thirty-one. The remaining ten were both composed of rejections from the beginning and partially conducted interviews. I did not include the partial interviews with Syrians in the findings part, since I could not fully grasp Syrians' experiences of mobility, emplacement and location choice. The interviews took approximately forty minutes, at least.

For the interviews with Syrian Arabs and Syrian Kurds, I was helped by a professional translator. Although the translator devoted special attention to translate Syrians' sentences with minimum loss of the meaning and context, the translation process often disrupted the stream of conversations. However, despite the language barrier, we managed to conduct interviews with maximum efficiency. After each interview I conducted with Syrians, I asked

their for helping me to reach other Syrians living in the area, their relatives or friends who could be volunteer to share his/her experiences. Except four households who were slightly confused about my "real identity" – whether a spy, or government officer - Syrian interviewees did their best to reach out other potential interviewees for me. With this snowballing technique, I managed to conduct thirty-one interviews with Syrian households in total. I conducted the interviews in the houses of refugees with the help of the translator. I used a recorder in all the interviews with the consent of Syrians prior to the interviews.

Interviewing with the local key actors was challenging. Since these people are individuals who mostly do not have an institutional affiliation (as a public officer or NGO officer), it was not easy to reach out these people and convince them to take a part in a research project on Syrian refugees in Izmir. It was not also easy to get the contact details of these people. However, with the help of local tradespeople and elderly people, I managed to contact with them. Since I did not imagine how these people would treat me, I refrained to visit them without appointments. I also gave an effort to explain myself as a researcher and PhD candidate in METU. I convinced them that I would not ask their political opinion, religious views, how they make money and their personal information. Ten of them did not allow me to record the interviews since they wanted to remain anonymous. Therefore, I took notes during the interviews.

5.8. Data analysis: The application of grounded theory

In this study, I employed the grounded theory as the qualitative analysis approach. Because, at the first place, I aimed to uncover the underlying mechanisms (actors and factors) that affected/shaped Syrian refugees' emplacement and location choices in Izmir. To do this, I needed to examine how Syrians have experienced and narrate these processes, because I was not testing any pre-determined hypothesis that I constructed by reviewing the literature and documents on the issue. I was not trying to justify any theory in the literature. Instead, I was hoping to develop a new relational framework to explain/understand the mobility trajectories, emplacement and location choices of refugees at different geographical scales under policy/political vacuums. Accordingly, the only way to develop such a theoretical framework was to collect data from those who experienced or involved in these processes.

As the crucial step of grounded theory applications, prior to my data collection process, I identified my theoretical sampling (as I discussed in detail in the previous section). As the summary of sampling, first I identified the sample of areas (in line with my problem definition and the research question coming out of it) and then the sample of participants. Grounded theory enabled me to simultaneously conduct the sampling, data collection and data analysis

processes thanks to its iterative nature. By going back and forth among sampling, theory and analysis, I managed to narrow down my research question in a way to better reflect my original concern.

After each day of interviews, I listened the interview records, reviewed my notes and put additional remarks on my field notes, in order not to miss any contextual detail embedded in the narratives of the interviewees. Once I quitted interviewing – at the point of theoretical saturation, I transcribed the recorded interviews and I made clean copies of the interview notes that I took in cases of no tape record. Regarding transcription of the interviews, I asked the help of a student who was studying sociology at that time. However, to get into the data, I listened all interviews and checked whether the transcriptions reflected the original ideas/narratives of Syrian respondents.

For each of the interviews, I coded (open coding) the important phrases of interviewees line-by-line. At this stage, I used N-VIVO to group my raw data, codes and categories. After I finished coding (which actually took two months), I went over them in a comparative way and for each set of discussions (i.e., mobility, emplacement, location choice) I evaluated these codes. I specifically looked for whether the codes were also emphasized in other interviews or were unique codes. I also looked for the similarities and differences between Syrians' expressions on the same topics, and "theory-related materials" (Bryman, 2012). At the same time, I checked whether new interviews are needed or not to fulfil the meaning of a code/theme denoted by the interviewees. If so, I conducted more interviews to see whether this code would emerge or repeated. Once I convinced myself that I reached theoretical saturation, I rigorously worked on the codes I determined line-by-line. Through comparing and contrasting these codes, I developed the categories on which I built my relational framework. Here, I once again conducted few interviews with NGO officers through Skype meetings to test the validity of my categories and hypotheses. After the "saturation of categories" stage (Bryman, 2012), I read the transcripts once again but this time with regards to my theoretical stances. By doing so, I managed to draw the relationships among the categories and built the first bricks of my emerging relational framework.

For each of the interview questions, I identified the codes and the categories regarding the emplacement and location choice processes of Syrian respondents, however it is not likely to discuss them here in detail. Therefore, in Table 12, I showed the most critical codes and categories that I used in constructing my theoretical framework. I managed to categorize the factors/motives and actors that Syrian respondents mentioned in their narratives with respect

to their own way of expression and the corresponding categories in the literature that these factors and actors are referring to. In the findings part, I explain these categories in detail by drawing why and how I (manage to) create them.

Table 12: Examples of the initial codes, categories and core categories coming out of interviews

Topic	Examples of open coding	Categories	Core category
Governance of Syrian influx to Turkey and Izmir	"No one helped us when we crossed the borders" "I only relied on my family to cover my basic needs" "No home, no food, no clothing, no guidance by the state"	Lack of reception, resettlement, integration policies	**Policy and political vacuums**
Syrians' emplacement in Izmir – How did they interpret and experience this process	"Our settlement in Izmir was the outcome of our struggle to stay alive" "We struggled to feel included" "To start a new life, we needed to solve our accommodation issue, food, clothing, employment." "To be a part of the society, you needed to know how things work, to whom to contact to solve your issues" "We needed to select the best location to cover our needs with minimum costs"	Fighting social exclusion Network building Selecting the locality to settle Strategy to survive	**The process of network building to access to welfare resources and services**
Location choices (LCs) of Syrians in Izmir / Motives / factors affecting Syrians' LCs	"We first went Basmane, because it was the center of Izmir where all the necessary institutions and shops were located" "We settled in Basmane because the accommodation was cheap despite its centrality" "We moved to Karabağlar because the Kurdish network was there and we wanted to feel belonged"	Existence and availability of public services Existence of (ethnic) solidarity networks Affordability of housing	**Access to accommodation** **Access to social support** **Access to public services**
Actors affecting Syrians' LCs	"my family was already settled there" "an NGO officer guided me to a real estator in Karabağlar" "the mukhtar of Kadıfekale neighborhood helped me in finding my initial flat" "local tradespeople informed about the housing prices and available houses" "with the help of the Syrian network in Basmane I found my first job" "religious community in Gediz attracted me to settle here" "an officer from the Konak municipality helped me find a house" "the human smuggler who helped my family to arrive Lesvos also found me a room to stay"	Public officers Family members Mukhtars Local tradespeople Illegal actors NGO officers Solidarity groups	**The State** **The market actors** **CSO** **Informal local networks**

5.9. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I explained the research methodology, sampling of areas and participants, data collection tools, pilot and main field studies, limitations of the research and data analysis methods. Here, I determined the epistemological and ontological premises of this research based on critical realism. Following my methodology, I identified my data analysis method as the grounded theory. Grounded theory enabled me to develop a relational framework from bottom-up based on the narratives of Syrians and other relevant actors who experienced/shaped/affected Syrians' emplacement and location choices. In accordance with the grounded theory and I applied theoretical sampling.

Firstly, I determined my fieldwork. Through tracing Syrians' international, intra-national and intra-urban mobility patterns in a relation way, I identified the medium of my multi-scalar analysis as Basmane Area in Izmir. In specific, I chose Turkey (as the country case to trace Syrian mobility at the international/national scales), Izmir (as the urban area/city case to trace Syrian mobility at the national/local/urban scales), and Basmane (Konak), Buca and Karabağlar (as local cases to trace Syrian mobility at the local/intra-urban scale). Here, Basmane stands both as a transition zone (for transit refugees) and an attractive central area at the heart of Izmir for Syrians to settle in, while Karabağlar and Buca come forward as the other popular settlements for Syrians in Izmir which are now hosting a remarkable Syrian population.

To determine the sampling of participants, after a rigorous literature review, I pre-interviewed with academicians, practitioners, public and NGO officers who are involved in refugee-related processes. By acknowledging that pure subjectivity is not the case for Syrian refugees in their emplacement processes and location choices, I decided to hear the narratives of policy-makers, market actors, national/local key opinion leaders, municipalities, mukhtars and NGOs who are affecting/shaping refugees' decisions/strategies on emplacement and location choice. I also attached importance to conduct interviews with local key actors (i.e., local tradespeople, religious figures, mukhtars) who have the deepest knowledge on the social and economic relations of the given settlements. In short, I designed a three-stepped interview setting including public authorities/NGOs/local initiatives of solidarity; Syrian refugees; local key actors. In total, by applying the snowballing technique, I conducted twenty-five interviews with public authorities/NGOs/local initiatives of solidarity, thirty-one interviews with Syrian refugees and twenty-two interviews with the local key actors.

Following the research aims, methodological stances and methods employed in data collection, in the following two chapters (Chapter 6 and 7), I try to uncover the mobility trajectories, location choices of refugees at different geographical scales in Turkey (in specific Turkey/Izmir/Basmane-Karabağlar-Buca).

CHAPTER 6

SYRIAN REFUGEES' MOBILITY AND LOCATION CHOICES AT INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SCALES: SETTLING IN TURKEY AND IZMIR

The empirical chapters of this research are devoted to drawing the continuity of Syrian refugee mobility at different geographical scales under the policy/political vacuums, with regards to Syrians' emplacement and location choices in Izmir, Turkey. To enable the discussion, we need to recall and acknowledge Skeldon's (2017) argument that claims (refugee) mobility is taking place among localities rather than nation-states. This argument is critical to grasp the fact that border-crossing is not the endpoint of refugee mobility but rather is the beginning of a new one: internal mobility. Here, internal mobility refers to refugees' mobility within the destination country when they search for a region/city to settle in. Again, finding a city to settle is not the endpoint of the journey. This time, refugees try to find the best location (e.g., district/neighborhood) to settle where they can survive and forge a new life. This process refers to the intra-urban mobility of refugees which may be traced by the housing pathways of refugees in urban areas. As seen, refugee mobility across localities is composed of successive and repetitive steps taking place at different geographic scales as international, national (internal)/inter-regional/inter-urban and intra-urban mobility. All these steps of refugee mobility have different motivations, patterns, limits, outcomes and policy/political implications as briefly described below:

- International mobility arises from crises (i.e., disasters), the failures in national politics/policies of countries to ensure the safety of its citizens. At the second place, international politics, treaties among countries, conflicts/dialogue among the countries of origin and destination, the guidelines of supra-national organizations such as the United Nations play determining roles in border-crossing and resettlement in a third safe country.
- Internal mobility of refugees in host countries heavily depends on the national, regional and urban policies regarding housing, employment, aid, mobility and

security. The economic positioning of cities and the opportunities (for employment, housing, access to public services etc.) offered in cities also affect the location choices of refugees. The more a region/city is welcoming multicultural and resourceful, the more it attracts refugees to settle in those cities.

- Intra-urban mobility is triggered mostly by the needs of refugees to shelter, to access services, to find a job, to engage in daily social and economic relations. This search for better living creates intra-urban mobility that is unique for each refugee household.

Here, it is critical to grasp the bounded relationship among the refugee movements taking place at different geographical scales. To better illustrate, if a refugee household fled from the on-going war in their country, the basic motive of their movement is to ensure the security and well-being of the household members. Accordingly, the household is expected to go to a country in which they would feel secure and protected, a region/city where they would reunite with their co-ethnics and form their network of security and solidarity. Moreover, as Güngördü and Bayırbağ (2019) argue the success/failure of any policy/political discourse in one of these steps inevitably affects the success/failure of associated policies in the next step. Accordingly, the local outcomes of refugee mobility are not only bounded to local dynamics but also to the international/national migration policies, international protection procedures, resettlement, housing, employment and aid policies as well as to the policy/political vacuums in migration and mobility management and refugees' strategies to address all these issues.

Therefore, if one aims to understand the local outcomes of refugee mobility in urban areas, as in this research, he/she need to examine the motives, patterns, limits and outcomes of mobility taking place at different geographical scales of mobility. For that reason, in this chapter, I will begin the discussion by examining why Syrian refugees have decided to settle in Turkey and concordantly in Izmir before I discuss why Syrians emplaced in some specific districts/neighbourhoods in Izmir. Both for Turkey and Izmir case, I will draw the factors and actors involved in the decision-making processes of refugees.

6.1. International mobility and location choices of Syrian refugees: Moving to Turkey

There are various international/national sources that prevail the official spatial redistribution figures of Syrian refugees across different destination countries/countries of asylum (DGMM, 2020; UNHCR, 2020), however, it seems that limited attention has been paid in the literature to the reasons behind the selection of destination localities by Syrian refugees. When I

reviewed the literature to grasp why Turkey has been the leading country in hosting the majority of displaced Syrians, I came across with few studies. Firstly, as various scholars (Akbaş et al., 2016; Baban et al., 2016; İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016; Kirişçi, 2014) argue Turkey's open-door policy[23] and concordant temporary protection applications come forward as important pull factors for Syrians. As Baban et al. (2016) argue the Turkish government opened its gates to Syrians in 2011 with the assumption that Syrians would return to Syria soon, when the war ends. In the beginning, the open-door policy was developed for the Syrian "guests" who were to be emplaced in refugee camps that were constructed for the purpose of ensuring protection and humanitarian assistance, registration and provision of basic services including health and education. Besides refugees in transit who came to Turkey to cross EU borders by the Aegean Sea, the open-door policy attracted Syrians who were looking for short-term and permanent settlement options in Turkey. Thus, Turkey has gradually become an immigration country for Syrians. However, recent reports and media news assert that after the Joint Action Plan in 2015 and the concordant EU-TR deal in 2016, Turkey gradually stepped back from its open-door policy by closing its borders with Syria to inflows and outflows (Human Rights Watch, 2018). As another aspect of Turkey, Baban et al. (2016) draw the strategic geographical location of Turkey in between Middle East/Asia and Europe as a pull factor for refugees in transit who hope to reach out European countries to seek for asylum. Thirdly, Syrians' knowledge of Turkey which have developed over decades due to the cultural, commercial, business and political relations taking place among Syria and Turkey are to be counted among the pull factors. Kirişçi (2014) noted the reciprocal visa liberalization between Turkey and Syria (which was entered into force in 2009 when the political relations of the two countries were close and mild) as an important facilitator of Syrians' migration to Turkey. During the earlier waves of civil war in 2011, some Syrians took the advantage of this visa liberalization and migrated to Turkey without facing bureaucratic obstacles at the border gates. As the political conflicts in Syria diffused and got savage, the Turkish State extended this application for Syrians who run away from the war but had no passports.

When I examine Syrian respondents' migration to Turkey, first of all, I recognized that the decision to migrate was a conscious but mostly an immediate one which derived from the powerlessness and desperation of Syrians experiencing the war. The time took to decide on the move is between three days to three years. When I elaborated the statements of twenty-one (out of thirty-one) Syrian respondents, who simply argue that the main motive of leaving Syria was to survive and not to die at the end of the day, I understood why immediate decisions

[23] Open-door policy adopts the principle of non-refoulement and the provision of sheltering and other basic services for registered Syrians in Turkey (Akbaş et al., 2016).

were made. All of seventeen pioneer Syrians[24] justified that they left Syria to ensure their survival and wellbeing, since they directly witnessed the dark and savage side of the armed conflict in Syria. Among the seventeen pioneer Syrians only five of them declared that they had the financial means to cover the cost of the journey while the remaining twelve did not. They also stated that they were psychologically unprepared to leave Syria. On the other hand, the "subsequent Syrian refugees"[25] (14) mentioned other motives of leaving Syria as reaching out income-generating activities and to run businesses, offering better economic living conditions to the family members and accessing health services. Under such conditions, it is seen that Syrians' decisions to leave Syria are mostly originated from their political, social and economic powerlessness and desperation regardless of the year that the decisions were made.

The intention of migrating to Turkey has varied with respect to the year of leaving Syria/migrating to Turkey. As seen in Table 13, seven Syrian respondents stated that they migrate to Turkey with the hope of crossing EU borders by the Aegean Sea, while nine respondents came to Turkey to settle temporarily till the civil war ends in Syria and the fifteen respondents intended to settle Turkey permanently. Although the number of those who intend to settle permanently is relatively high when compared to others, we see that only three pioneer Syrians shared this intention. The remaining twelve were subsequent Syrians who came migrated to Turkey after 2016. As explained in the following paragraphs, subsequent Syrians mostly came to Turkey by following their Syrian relatives and migrants who had already settled in Turkey.

Table 13: Syrians' intention behind their migration to Turkey

Intention	Syrian Arabs		Syrian Kurds		Syrian Turkmens		Total
	Pioneer	Subs.	Pioneer	Subs.	Pioneer	Subs.	
Transit	3	1	2	1	-	-	7
Temporary settlement	3	-	3	-	3	-	9
Permanent settlement	-	6	1	4	2	2	15
Total	6	7	6	5	5	2	31

With regards to selection of Turkey as the destination country (please see Table 14 for all drivers/motives behind Syrians' migration to Turkey), in line with the arguments in the literature, the majority of Syrian respondents (19) (especially the pioneer Syrians) stressed the

[24] Syrians who came to Turkey between 2011 and 2016. Here, the year 2016 was selected as a breaking point since progresses in migration legislation of Turkey starting by late 2015 (Joint Action Plan and EU-TR deal) considerably affected Syrians' international and internal mobility in Turkey.

[25] Syrians who came to Turkey after 2016.

importance of the open-door policy and visa liberalization (4) among two countries as the main drivers of their decision to migrate to Turkey. As Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) noted crossing Turkish borders "without any conflict with border officers and armed forces" was the leading motive towards his migration to Turkey, since he and his family do not have valid passports. Nineteen Syrian respondents, one way or another, touched upon the importance of "less bureaucracy" in border-crossing, as seen in the following quotes.

> *We were not planning to leave Syria until a bomb hit a hospital in our neighbourhood. Suddenly, armed conflicts took place in our street. At that moment, my husband and I decided to leave our home and even Syria to protect our children and new-born baby. We had no passport and no money and Turkey was the only country that welcomed us*. (Fatıma, Arab, female, 27 years old)

> *Turkey welcomed us by saying that 'we will welcome you even if you do not have a valid identity, passport and even a name'. No other country did that. We just registered at the border with the information based on our declarations. No officer went after to unveil who we were. Luckily, we are trustworthy people*. *(*Ahmad, Kurd, male, 52 years old)

> *When no one wanted us to leave Syria, when no one understand why we escape from war, only Turkey understood us and welcomed us…I arrived to Kilis just like I arrive to Damascus.* (Abdulbaki, Arab, male, 60 years old)

Table 14: The motives / drivers behind Syrians' migration to Turkey

Core category of motives	Sub-categories	Frequency of mention
Socio-political	Open-door policy of Turkey	19
	Visa liberalization	4
	Positive attitudes of key political figures and Turkish society	10
	Right to mobility and freedom of choosing the city to settle	7
Socio-spatial	Turkey as the neighbouring country	9
	Turkey as the bridge among Asia and Europe (Strategic geographic location of Turkey)	7
Socio-cultural	Existence of relatives / family members	17
	Existence of pioneer Syrians	16
	Turkey as a country of Islam	15
	Knowledge of Turkey, Turkish culture and language	8
	Turkey as a safe country	4
Socio-economic	Business relations with Turkey	4
	Welfare generosity in Turkey	3
Total		**31**

Especially for pioneer Syrians, the open-door policy of the Turkish state was an important opportunity to escape the savage and violence back in Syria. In relation with the open-door

policy, the positive attitudes of key political figures in Turkey for Syrian refugees under the discourses of "brotherhood", "religious fellowship", "neighbouring" and the welcoming attitudes of Turkish society were also the factors that encouraged Syrian refugees to migrate to Turkey. Ten of the pioneer Syrians who came to Turkey between 2011-2012 appreciated the attitudes of the Turkish society and the government during the first waves of the war in Syria and stated how these attitudes positively affected their migration to Turkey. However, as civil war continued and new Syrian influxes to Turkish cities have increased, the welcoming attitudes of Turkish attitudes gradually changed in a negative way. Especially after 2013, when Syrian influx to Turkey reached its peak, political figures have left their welcoming attitudes.

As another political pull factor, seven Syrian respondents touched upon the right to mobility within Turkish borders. Malak (Kurd, female, 40 years old) explained this as follows:

> *In European countries or others around Syria, Syrians are enforced to live in camps for an indefinite period of time and even worse they are often sent to pilot cities where starting a new life is nearly impossible. However, in Turkey, we learned that we do not have to settle in camps, we are told that we can live in any city we want. This freedom of mobility is a blessing of the God.*

It was surprising to hear the right to mobility and the freedom of choosing the city to settle were mentioned explicitly by the Syrian respondents as important motives behind their decisions to migrate to Turkey. It was the sign of Syrians' good knowledge of Turkey and Turkey's migration and resettlement policies. It was also a sign of how refugees negatively considered the idea of living in refugee camps. Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) explained this by the following sentences:

> *Camps are like open-prisons and once you get in them you will never know when you will be free again. If I was told that I would stay in camps in Turkey, I would never migrate to Turkey or I would try to migrate in illegal ways to go to wherever I want.*

In a similar vein, Zeynep (Turkmen, female, 25 years old) touched upon how being mobile in the country of asylum is an important opportunity for people trying to survive in a new social environment, as follows:

> *…No asylum seeker is lucky enough to hold to life in the city or refugee camp he/she is forced to live. Once we face discrimination we have to move, once we are harassed, we have to move, once we cannot find jobs, we have to move…In most countries you are not allowed to move, however in Turkey you are free and everywhere could be your home to live for some time.*

Apart from Turkey's political stance in hosting Syrians, Syrian respondents also mentioned the strategic geographic location of Turkey as an important pull factor (16). Both for refugees in transit, short-term and long-term Syrian refugees, Turkey's geographical position offers a

variety of opportunities to fulfil their aims. First, by being the border neighbour of Syria, Turkey has attracted the majority of Syrians (9) who hoped to return to Syria soon. These people intentionally preferred to settle in refugee camps constructed, in border cities that are in close proximity to their hometown or in metropolitan cities across Turkey where they could engage income-generating activities in informal labour market and benefit from various services offered in these cities before they turn back to Syria. Secondly, the strategic geographic location of Turkey between Asia and Europe attracts refugees in transit who hope to cross European Union borders to seek for asylum. Seven of Syrian respondents who regards Turkey as a transit country rather than an immigration country explicitly stated that they chose to migrate to Turkey for only a short period of time until they manage to pass Aegean Sea. Amine (Arab, female, 35 years old) and Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) respectively exemplified this with the following sentences:

> *…My husband and I want to go to Germany. Because our lives would be saved there. Germany is generous, they protect refugees like us...Turkey is also good but Turkey does not provide us a safe future. We came to Turkey not to settle here but just to cross to Lesvos[26]. Because the distance from Ayvalık[27] to Lesvos is the shortest. However, since we could not collect the money to cover the journey, we are still in Turkey.*

> *…Kurds in general are not welcomed in Turkey for decades. Accordingly, I never dreamed of a future in Turkey. I'm here in Turkey now just to cross to European countries. Turkey is a country on my way, nothing more. If Turkey was not that close to Europe, I would not come there.*

Syrian respondents also draw the socio-cultural motives behind their decision to migrate to Turkey. All the three ethnic groups touched upon the how the existence of relatives/family members to have settled in Turkey long before the civil war in Syria attracted them to come to Turkey (17 out of 31 respondents). Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) explained this as follows "I would never believe that I could leave Syria to migrate to another country like Turkey, if I did not know anyone who are settled there. They are the only reason for me to migrate to Turkey."

Especially for Syrian Kurds who have Kurd relatives who are spread across Turkish provinces, the existence of relatives and family members came forward as a critical criterion of country selection. Except one, all other Syrian Kurd respondents stated that they never thought to go another country than Turkey, since they have relatives in Turkey to whom they can rely on,

[26] A Greek island located in the Aegean Sea

[27] A settlement within Balıkesir Province which is located in the norhtern part of Turkey's Aegean coast

who would help them in covering their needs and forging a new life in Turkey. Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) explained that

> *Thanks to my uncle and aunt-in-law who live in Mardin for years, I never thought that where would I go when I faced with the bombs, deaths and jihadists in Afrin…I came to Turkey to forget everything that I saw in Syria with the love, support and care of my uncle's family.*

Avşin (Kurd, female, 30 years old) also put forward the importance of the existence of relatives and family members in Turkey as a motive of migration, as follows:

> *In 2017, I came to Izmir. I did not spend any time in refugee camps and I did not think too much about where should I go in Turkey, which city offers more to me etc. I directly came next to my brother who came in Izmir in 2012. I was quite lucky because my brother took care of everything to start a new life in Izmir. He found a good flat, he found a full-time job, he collected some money and bought necessary housewares. He engaged new friendships with Turkish and Syrian people some of who have sisters to which I could interact with.*

Similarly, the existence of pioneer Syrians in Turkey is one of the motives that encouraged Syrians to migrate to Turkey. Sixteen Syrian respondents stated that they followed the pioneer Syrians who "dared" to leave Syria. Especially for the subsequent comers, the existence of pioneer Syrians who settled in Turkey in the first waves of political conflicts in Syria, acted as an important pull factor since the subsequent comers benefit from the already established social relations in destination localities by their pioneer peers. Malak (Kurd, female, 40 years old) stated that she was encouraged by pioneer Syrians who managed to forge a new life in Turkey. By the help of her neighbours in Aleppo, she contacted with Rojbin who already settled in Turkey three years ago (in 2015) and learned the tricks of crossing Turkish borders and accessing aids.

Salim (Turkmen, male, 60 years old) also drew how a pioneer Syrian he met via social media (who have been living in Turkey since 2013) convinced him to migrate to Turkey. He stated that

> *I never thought to leave Syria, I thought I would die in here. However, I met Halim in Facebook by chance and we became good friends. He called me many times to convince me to come to Gaziantep but I refused it. In 2017, he came to Syria in illegal ways and picked all my stuff. Therefore, I left Syria permanently to settle in Turkey. I finally convinced to settle in Turkey because Halim told me that he started a good life in Turkey, he has a nice home to stay, he has money, he has friends with whom he go to the Mosque.*

Salim's statements are also critical to understand the impact of religious orientation of Turkish society in Syrians' decision to migrate and settle in Turkey. The practice of Islam and the importance attached to Islam in political discourses seem to deeply affect Syrians (especially

who label themselves as conservatives). Fifteen Syrian respondents highlighted the Islamic orientation of Turkey and the conservative way of living that is practiced in Turkey among the pull factors that affected their country selection. Reşid (Arab, male, 40 years old) highly appreciated the practice of Islam in Turkey and stated that "Turkey is truly a country of Islam. This is the only reason why I came to Turkey." Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) also touched upon the importance of Islamic culture in Turkey by stating that

> *We were living in a small Islamic village in Azez[28] where we live in accordance with Islamic requirements. Here in Turkey, we can still do it…I never wanted to migrate to Europe where my children might lose their cultural and religious identity. I convinced myself to migrate to Turkey just because my children would still be able to practice Islam.*

As another important pull factor, eight Syrian respondents mentioned that their knowledge of Turkey, familiarity with the Turkish culture, traditions and Turkish language were decisive in their country choices. Especially the ones who visited Turkey before for touristic purposes and business, who visited their friends, relatives living in Turkey and who followed news and publications on Turkey emphasized the importance of this matter. Serhad (Kurd, male, 25 years old) stated that

> *I know Turkey very well. At least 7 or 8 times I visited Turkey. I have seen Mardin, Diyarbakır, İstanbul, Gaziantep and Mersin. I know how Turkish people look like, how they behave, which type of music they listen to, the economy of Turkey... Even I learned some Turkish phrases when I visited Turkey. My knowledge of Turkey encouraged me to come there at the first place. I thought that I would decide later if any better option emerges.*

In addition to Serhad, Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) explained that his knowledge of Turkish was the leading motive behind settling in Turkey, with the following sentences:

> *…I thought that my knowledge of Turkish would bring me advantages in Turkey. Because when I speak Turkish I believed that Turkish society would kindly welcome me and help me when I need. Turkish people are not fond of Arabs and Kurds, but they welcome Turkmens as their brothers because we share the same values, traditions and even the language.*

Syrian respondents also claimed that Turkey is a safe country where the risk of involvement to a war is low and where is well-protected by the Turkish army. Four Syrian respondents emphasized the importance of feeling "safe and secure" in the destination country after witnessing war, crime, death and destitution in the hometown. Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) stated that "Turkish is a big, strong and safe country. They opened its gates just to

[28] A settlement in Alleppo Province in Syria

protect us from death and misery. I feel safe here, I can sleep at nights, I feel physically protected".

Last but not least, Syrian respondents highlighted socio-economic motives behind their migration decision to under which I grouped under two categories: business relations with Turkish partners, welfare generosity of Turkey. For the former, four male Syrian respondents stated that they settled in Turkey to strengthen their business relations with Turkish partners which became the only available source of income-generation at that time. Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old) further explained this process with the following sentences.

> *For the last ten years, I frequently visit Turkey to run my business. I was bringing local Syrian shoes to be sold in the Turkish market. I have worked in collaboration with two local small shoe-making ateliers in Turkey. As the conflict in Aleppo became savaged after 2013, I could not continue to run my business in Aleppo and as I run out of cash I thought that going to Turkey and working with my Turkish partners as the only valid option for my future.*

Rezan (Kurd, male, 25 years old) also pointed out how having good relations with business partners and colleagues affected his decision to come to Turkey by stating that

> *My business partners in Izmir called me many times because they were worried about me. They said that they could share their bread and bed with me. They said that they have a room for my family. One night in Afrin we heard the voices of armed conflicts in our neighbourhood. My children started to cry. At that moment, I called my Turkish business partner Osman and I only said that "we are coming my brother, get prepared".*

Lastly, three Syrian respondents claimed that the economic performance of Turkey in recent years, the abundance of public services when compared to other Islamic countries, the variety of employment opportunities, the amount of aids granted to refugees either by the State and NGOs operating in the field of migration and asylum affected their settlement decisions in Turkey.

When Syrian respondents were asked with whom they migrated to Turkey, the answers given were alone (12), family (15), friends (3) and neighbours (1). Those who came alone are mostly refugees in transit or pioneer Syrians who left their family behind to prepare the necessary conditions for the arrival of the remaining family members. Only three subsequent Syrians declared that they migrated to Turkey alone. Those who migrated to Turkey with family members constitute the majority among the Syrian respondents. Among them, the number of subsequent Syrians (9) are relatively higher when compared to their pioneer peers (6). All subsequent Syrians with families expect one (8) preferred to migrate to Turkey to settle permanently and forge a new life in Turkey. On the other hand, pioneer Syrians with families came to Turkey either with the intention to stay temporarily (3) and permanently (3). Three

respondents (as pioneer Syrians) who came to Turkey declared their initial intention as to cross EU borders to seek asylum while the remaining one respondent who came to Turkey with his neighbours intended to stay permanently.

Table 15: Actors affected/involved in Syrians' migration to Turkey

Actors involved	Frequency of mention by each interview
Relatives / family members in Turkey	16
Pioneer Syrians in Turkey	7
Syrian / Turkish acquaintances in Turkey	6
Turkish Friends in Turkey	4
Human smugglers in Turkey	4
Turkish state / political figures in Turkey	3
(Turkish) business partners in Turkey	3
Relatives / family members in Syria	2
Friends in Syria	1

At this point, we see that family members/relatives are important actors who are actively involved in country selection processes. Accordingly, when Syrians were asked to introduce the actors who are affected their decision-making processes, migration and initial settlement in Turkey, they mentioned nine different actors as seen in Table 15.

From Table 15, we see that the relatives/family members in Turkey have the upmost influence on Syrians' migration to Turkey. As discussed above, the relatives/family members who had settle in Turkey prior to civil war or during the initial waves of the war and who already engaged in social and economic relations in Turkey attract the other members of the family to come and settle in Turkey. It seems that the frequent calls from the relatives/family members in Turkey convinced Syrians who were not planning to leave Syria. Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) explained this as follows:

> *My three distant relatives in Izmir, who have settled there like 10 years before, called me many times to warn me to leave Syria as soon as possible. They guaranteed that they would take care of me and my children. Since 2013 to 2019, they called me like a thousand times and when I saw that I could not survive anymore in Syria, I decided to take their advice and migrated to Turkey.*

Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) also touched upon how her relatives in Mardin convinced her to migrate to Turkey with the following sentences:

> *My family is all Kurd. My aunt was born and raised in Mardin and she is a Turkish citizen. She married with a Kurdish guy in Mardin. She is wealthy and she runs a fancy restaurant with her husband. I was surviving with my friends in Syria despite the war and violence we faced every day. However, my aunt called me many times, cried on the phone to beg me to come to Mardin. Because I lost my mother and father in a bomb attack in*

Kobane and now my aunt is my closest relative. She told me that I could attend to school and learn business here and she convinced me that I would have a safe and beautiful life in Mardin. To save my life and make her happy, I left Syria permanently.

For both temporary and permanent stays in Turkey, the influence of relatives in Turkey is remarkably important to be discussed further. Vahap (Arab, male, 42 years old) explained how important it was to take a call from his uncle in Turkey when we sought ways to cross EU borders. He said that

I always dreamed of living in Germany, but I never had the chance to collect the money for the journey. During the war in Syria, my uncle who lives in Şanlıurfa called me and told me that I could save money if I worked in his friends' grocery store. He also told me that I could stay in their home as long as I want. This was a huge opportunity for me and crossed the Turkish border at that night.

Acquaintances in Turkey also played similar roles in attracting Syrians to migrate in Turkey. Seven respondents stated that the calls from their acquaintances, former colleagues, friends of friends etc. encouraged their migration decision to Turkey. Similarly, the socio-economic conditions and relative comfort of pioneer Syrians in Turkey and the calls of these pioneer Syrians attracted subsequent Syrians to migrate to Turkey. Ayşe (Arab, female, 18 years old) explains this as follows.

Firstly, one of the religious figures in our neighborhood (in Idlib), Ahmad went to Turkey. He was alone…For some time, we could not hear from him. Seven months later, he called other important man in the neighborhood and told him that Turkey is safe and welcoming. My father is a visionary man, he immediately decided to follow Ahmad and leave Syria for our safety, health and education. I pray for Ahmad every day for saving our life.

From another perspective, Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) stated that for Syrians who were still in Syria, those who dared to leave everything behind and leaving Syria were heroic characters. She specifically highlighted that especially for young people who dream of living a fancy life, the photos of their peers in Turkey who are having fun, enjoying Turkish coffee and shisha, overcrowded gatherings in cafes and many others attract young Syrians. A young Syrian newcomer Eslem (Arab, female, 20 years old) justified Ebral's arguments with the following explanation:

My father never wanted to leave Syria. He was in the armed forces for a long time. However, my brother and I, even my mother, always wanted to flee from the fear and depression we faced in Syria…Through Instagram, we saw how happy our friends were who migrated Turkey one or two years before. I was admiring them. They were constantly sending me messages like you should come there as well. We compelled our father to leave Syria and after he was injured by the opponents, he was convinced.

As another actor, Syrians' Turkish friends in Turkey seem to play facilitative roles in Syrians' migration to Turkey as seen in Rojin's words (Kurd, female, 30 years old)

During the Syrian influx to Turkey, I saw that how important is to build long-lasting friendships from the university years, not to lose contacts friends met during the vacations in Turkey. I have nobody but my two friends in Turkey to whom I met during a summer school in Istanbul. They begged me to come to live with them because they were worried about me and my family who were still in Al-Malikiyah[29]. Thanks to their welcoming attitudes and hosting, we are now all safe.

Human smugglers were also mentioned (4) during the interviews with Syrian respondents. Although they are illegal actors who are to face with criminal sanctions due to their illegal operations of human trafficking in Turkey, they continue their activities in a way to attract Syrians who hope to cross the Aegean Sea on their way to Europe. Four respondents declared that they contacted with the smugglers that they meet in Syria to cross European countries who channeled them to their partners in Turkey. Rojhat (Kurd, male, 27 years old) explained this process as follows.

I was planning to go to Europe. I contacted with the smugglers here. They told me that Turkey is the best option for this matter since the borders are open and Turkey is close to Greek islands. Then I contacted with Turkish smugglers with the reference of the ones I met in Syria. I went to Ayvalık but I could not manage to cross both because I was swindled twice and the boat sank....

In addition to the application of the open-door policy (for Syrians who flee from war regardless of whether they have valid passport/identity or not), the leading political figures in Turkey attracted Syrians with their welcoming attitudes in the initial years of the civil war in Syria. Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) explicitly said that

I was thinking that Turkey is our hidden enemy until President Erdoğan was in Syrian media channels with a smile on his face. He was calling out to Syrian people who were affected from the war to come to Turkey as privileged guests. That was shocking. I responded to that call and headed to Turkey.

As other key actors who affected Syrians' decisions to migrate to Turkey, Syrian respondents highlighted the role of business partners in Turkey (3) and friends in Syria (2). In overall, when I go over both the factors and actors that affected/influenced Syrians' migration to Turkey either to cross EU countries or to settle in Turkey for short/long period of time, I see that the motives of migrating to Turkey varied with respect to ethnic background of the Syrians and the year of arrival of Syrians to Turkey. For the former, both Syrian Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens touched upon different dimensions of country selection processes. Firstly, all Kurd respondents (11) highlighted the existence of relatives and family members in Turkey who migrated long before the political conflicts in Syria, and six of them mentioned this as the

[29] A settlement located at the north-east of Syria which is very close to Syria – Turkey border.

leading motive affecting their arrival to Turkey. Kurd respondents stated that they took the advantage of following their relatives in Turkey who have already settled and engaged in the social, economic and cultural relations embedded in the localities they had settled in. Kurd respondents also mentioned how their business relations with Turkish firms/partners became decisive in their country selection. Respondents stated that their frequent business trips to Turkey and daily/weekly interactions with their colleagues and partners positively contributed to their knowledge of Turkey and thus facilitated their migration and adaption to Turkey. On the other hand, for Syrian Arabs, the religious orientation of Turkey with respect to the practice of Islam in Turkey came forward as an important pull factor. Additionally, Syrian Arabs seemed to be attracted from the discourses of key political figures in Turkey who frequently used the term "religious brotherhood" several times in their speeches during the first waves of refugee influx to Turkey. Unlike Arabs, Turkmen respondents emphasized their knowledge of Turkey, Turkish culture and society and especially Turkish language as the assets they have in deciding where to go to ensure their survival, safety and well-being. Syrians' motives to migrate to Turkey also varied with respect to the year of the arrival to Turkey. Seventeen of thirty-one Syrian respondents migrated to Turkey between 2011-2016 (pioneer) while the remaining fourteen migrated after 2016 (subsequent). For pioneer refugees, the main motive behind their migration to Turkey was the application of the open-door policy for Syrians who fled from war. The positive attitudes and welcoming discourses of key political figures also seemed to encourage Syrians to migrate. It is understood that pioneer Syrians have been attracted by the mild and positive political and societal discourses that present the good will for hosting Syrians as guests in Turkey. Pioneer migrants also selected Turkey, since Turkey is the border-neighbour of Syria. Especially for those, who hoped to turn back to Syria soon, settling in Turkish cities close to the border was a typical strategy. For refugees (hoping to be) in transit to cross European borders, Turkey's open-door policy and strategic location between Europe and Asia were the two main motives highlighted. For subsequent Syrians, the existence of pioneer migrants who are either the family members, relatives, neighbors or colleagues ranked at the top among other motives of migration to Turkey. Secondly, the right to mobility in Turkey, welfare generosity of Turkey, the cultural closeness and practice of Islam come forward as the motives of migration to Turkey for subsequent Syrians.

In short, either intentionally or not, starting from the year 2011 we witnessed how Syrian refugees have become urban refugees who seek better life conditions in Turkey. Moreover, we also observed the remarkable and gradual decrease in the number of Syrians residing in refugee camps. By October 2020, only 1,6% of Syrians live in refugee camps, while the majority 98,4% have been spread to the whole country, especially to the metropolitan urban

areas. At this point, it is worth to discuss which factors and actors have been decisive in Syrians' internal mobility in Turkey (i.e., city/urban area selection process).

6.2. Internal mobility and location choices of Syrian refugees: Settling in Izmir

When borders are crossed there are two options for Syrian refugees in the Turkish context. The first one is to be registered to public authorities and accordingly, to gain access to refugee camps and/or obtain the right to settle in any province in Turkey. Settling in camps seems to be the strategy for refugees who have limited resources to meet their basics needs (as sheltering, food and cleaning), who have limited information regarding where to go and who have limited/no access to ethnic/refugee networks that could help them to settle. The refugee camps offer immediate assistance and help for basic needs, however in time, they may play restrictive roles in refugees' lives. The restrictions may be summarized as the forced dependency of refugees on aid mechanisms, the civil imprisonment and limited rights to mobility, limited engagement to national and local economy, limited chances of interaction with the rest of the society. The second option for refugees is not to register with public authorities and settling in urban areas. Especially for those who want to migrate to Europe for asylum, to avoid from taxation and to remain mobile; remaining out of the state control is an appealing option (Bekkers, 2017). As Lubkemann (2008) points out, when displaced people gain a protection status, their mobility could be restricted and they could be enforced to reside in some specific places as pilot cities and refugee camps. It is not a coincidence that, some Syrians in Turkey prefer not to be registered to stay away from state-monitoring and surveillance so as to take the control of their lives. Both for registered and unregistered refugees, the challenge becomes the selection of the most suitable location to settle in.

To examine the choices of Syrian refugees in Turkey regarding their settlement in camp and urban areas, first of all, I need to briefly recall the policies in Turkey that concerns Syrians' settlement and accommodation. İçduygu and Şimşek (2016) argues the one and only accommodation policy that the Turkish state introduced so far is the construction of refugee camps (temporary protection centres). During the first waves of civil war in Syria, Turkey designated its accommodation /resettlement policy for hosting Syrians only for a short period of time. Accordingly, starting from 2011, Turkey constructed twenty-one refugee camps in eleven provinces. However, the Turkish state did not obliged Syrians to settle in those camps. Instead, Syrians were/are allowed to settle in any province they want, provided that they are registered in the provinces they are planning to settle (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016). However, those who prefer to remain out the of camps are expected to cover their own accommodation and living expenses. Although there were several efforts by key political figures to provide

social housing for Syrian refugees with low credit long-term mortgages, there is no social housing and rent allowance applications designated yet for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey.

In refugee camps, tents and containers are used to provide sheltering for refugees (Günaydın-Temel and Kahraman, 2018). Various services are offered in refugee camps including education, health, psycho-social support, hygiene, security, laundry, recreation, cultural and religious facilities which are funded publicly (The Ombudsman Institution, 2018). Additionally, refugee households are given AFADKART and KIZILAYKART, the voucher systems that grant cash allowances to Syrians. Although the services provided in the refugee camps in Turkey are appreciated by international/national civil society organizations (Orsam, 2015), the vast majority of Syrians in camps have moved from the camps to settle in urban areas across Turkey. Following these, only seven refugee camps are now in operation while the remaining were closed as the number of refugees accommodated decreased gradually. According to İçduygu and Şimşek (2016), Syrians prefer to leave refugee camps mostly because to gain their freedom. İçduygu (2015) also touches upon the other motives of relocation and denotes that overcrowded population in the camps, Syrians' growing networks with other Syrians in urban areas, the growing kinship relations and the increasing financial independence of Syrians have opened up new horizons for them to be accommodated and settled in elsewhere. Following these arguments, I see that only five Syrian respondents (four pioneer and one subsequent refugee out of thirty-one) settled in refugee camps in Hatay (3), Kilis (1) and Adana (1) prior to their settlement in urban areas. Four pioneer Syrians who settled in refugee camps from six months up to two years declared that their settlement in refugee camps was a necessity rather than a choice due to the financial limitations and the lack of relatives and friends in Turkey who would help them. Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old) further explained this by the following words:

> *I came to Turkey alone because my father and brother remained in Syria to defend their beliefs. I did not know anyone in Turkey, I had no money. I only had a passport which brought me to the refugee camp in Hatay. Settling in the camp was the only option for me but I always felt like I was imprisoned. Therefore, as I contact with NGO officers and learn the ways to forge a new life, I left the camp.*

Similarly, Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) stated that settling in the Kilis refugee camp was the only option that she and her husband have since they have very small amount of money which was insufficient to meet their basics needs. For those who did not settled in refugee camps, the dispersal patterns across Turkish cities are complex. When we look at the top ten destinations of Syrian refugees in Turkey (in general) (Figure 16), we immediately see the spatial concentration of Syrian refugees in border cities to Syria (e.g., Kilis, Gaziantep,

Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Mardin) as well as in metropolitan areas including Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and Ankara (Baban et al., 2016; Güngördü, 2019; Kirişçi, 2014; Özdemir, 2017).



Figure 16: Top-ten provinces in Turkey that host Syrian refugees (December, 2020)
Source: gigm.gov.tr

According to Lordoğlu and Aslan (2016) and The Ombudsman Institution (2018), the motives behind Syrians' city choices are listed as affordable private accommodation, residing in close proximity to relatives, friends and co-ethnics, affordability of services in destination localities, employment opportunities. It is likely to increase the number of these factors in accordance with refugees' socio-economic background, ethnicity, religious orientation, gender, age and individual preferences as well as the offerings of the destination localities. When Syrian respondents were asked to name the initial localities they had settled in (Table 16), the majority of them (26) declared that they initially settled in urban areas (also see Figure 17).

Table 16: Initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Turkey

Camp	**Metropolitan / border**	**Syrian Arabs**	**Syrian Kurds**	**Syrian Turkmens**	
Hatay	Border	3	0	0	3
Kilis	Border	0	0	1	1
Adana	Border	0	0	1	1
Total		**3**	**0**	**2**	5
Urban Area	**Metropolitan / border**	**Syrian Arabs**	**Syrian Kurds**	**Syrian Turkmens**	
İzmir	Metropolitan	4	6	2	12
Diyarbakır	Metropolitan		1		1
Gaziantep	Metropolitan/border	2	1	1	4
Hatay	Metropolitan/ border			1	1
İstanbul	Metropolitan	2			2
Kilis	Border	2	1		3
Mardin	Border		2		2
Mersin	Metropolitan/Border			1	1
Total		**10**	**11**	**5**	**26**



Figure 17: Initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Turkey

6.2.1. Izmir as the initial location in Turkey

Among these twenty-six respondents, twelve of them stated that their initial location was Izmir (12). For all ethnic groups seen in Table 16, Izmir managed to be the initial destination city/settlement. For example, as a pioneer Syrian, Avjin (Kurd, female, 20 years old) stated that she came to Izmir in 2012 to get married and settle in permanently. Avjin is one the representatives of the increasing number of marriages between Syrian and Turkish nationals after 2011, which became a growing trend especially for Kurd population both in Turkey and Syria. Especially in the first waves of the civil war in Syria, the marriages between Syrian young women or even children and Turkish men (by consent or by force) found great repercussions in the mainstream media (Milliyet, 2018; T24, 2011). Avjin explained why such marriages became popular at that time by saying that

> *We have a lot of Kurdish relatives and friends who are living nearly in every province of Turkey. However, the Kurd network in Izmir is one of the strongest one. Everyone takes care of each other and hold each other's back. For that reason, my family wanted me to migrate to Izmir where I would be safe. My father called our distant relatives in Izmir and asked whether they could host me or not. At the very time, I met my future husband on the phone, and I liked his voice. He said that he saw my picture and liked me. Before I went to Izmir, our marriage was arranged, and I went to Izmir as a future bride. Getting married was important for every Syrian girl, since marriage promises you protection.*

On the other hand, Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) declared that he came to Izmir in 2014 to migrate to European country by the Aegean Sea. He did not come to Izmir with the intention of settling there. However, according to his explanations, since the expense of human smuggling for overseas journeys has become expensive due to the strict controls of armed forces of the two sides (EU countries and Turkey), he stayed in Izmir to collect the money necessary for smuggling (Table 17).

Table 17: Initial locational choice criteria – for Izmir case

	Initial locational choice criteria	**Frequency**
Pioneer Syrians (2)	Existence of relatives / family members	1
	Existence of ethnic (solidarity) networks (Kurd network)	1
	Strategic geographic location	1
Subsequent Syrians (10)	Existence of relatives / family members	9
	Existence of employment and income-generating activities	7
	Existence of pioneer Syrians	7
	Existence and availability of various public services (health, education, aid)	6
	Existence of ethnic (solidarity) networks	6
	Strategic geographic location	2
	Political orientation of Izmir	1
Total		**12**

For the subsequent Syrian respondents, the motives behind initially settling in Izmir are quite diverse. First of all, the vast majority Syrian respondents (9) stated that the existence of relatives and family members in Izmir - who migrated to Izmir long before the civil war and/or during the civil war in Syria – is the most attractive motive behind their decisions to settle in Izmir. Because, as discussed in the migration to Turkey section, the relatives and family members in destination localities encourage the other members of the family to come by providing the economic, social and cultural grounds of emplacement. Fatıma, Arab, female, 27 years old) explains this as follows.

> *Our initial and last stop in Turkey is Izmir. Because our distant relatives have been living in Turkey for approximately 10 years. We have no connection in other provinces, even worse we do not know the conditions in other provinces for Syrians like us…We did not hesitate to come to Izmir, because we never doubted for our future here. We always know that our relatives protect us and help us when we needed. Our relatives are the only reasons why we came to Turkey.*

Avşin (Kurd, female, 30 years old) drew the importance of the existence of relatives and family members in Izmir from another perspective:

> *…Besides providing me a safe home to stay, my brother in Izmir also helped me to find a job. By his connections he developed in six years, he made several phone calls and find me a job in a phone shop where I mostly work as a translator rather than a saleswoman.*

Secondly, seven Syrian respondents declared how important was the existence of employment and income-generating activities in Izmir in their city selection process in Turkey. As Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) highlighted that being employed or running businesses become valuable resources of income for Syrians who face the upmost levels of poverty, destitution and desperation in destination countries. She explained this issue by the following sentences.

> *…If you do not have the savings in bank accounts, if you do not have enough amount of gold to be exchanged, I'm sorry but you have to work no matter the conditions or find the ways to generate income. Especially if you are a new country where are not very welcomed, your survival is depend on the money you make. For that reason, when I consider where to settle in Turkey, I contacted with pioneer Syrians from Facebook to ask which city is the best for Syrian refugees to find jobs…Since our employment is not fully supported by the Turkish state, we look for informal employment opportunities. One of the pioneer Syrians told me that I could find a job in shoe-making ateliers in Izmir with good working conditions and I came to Izmir.*

Rezan (Kurd, male, 25 years old) also stated the importance of employment opportunities offered in destination localities. He said that he was not thinking of migrating to another country since he did not want to face poverty and to start a new life from the lower steps of social mobility. However, as the civil war in Syria became harsher and his business activities

slowed down in Syria, he turned back to the calls of his business partners in Turkey who were ready to host him and his family. Rezan explained this process as follows.

> *When things get wild in Afrin, I felt that my family is in danger. I was aware that my wife and children want to leave there. However, I could not dare to migrate because I was thinking that I could not afford to cover the expenses of migration and resettlement. Besides the concerns of my family when my business failed in Afrin due to the war, I decided to move. In that process, I called my business partners in Izmir, who invited me several times to leave everything behind in Syria and asked them whether we could make money in there. If they would have said no, I would never dare to migrate to Izmir.*

Thirdly, seven Syrian respondents touched upon the existence of pioneer Syrians in Izmir, who fled in initial periods of the war, as an important pulling factor behind their settlement in Izmir. Pioneer Syrians encouraged both the refugees in transit and the refugees questioning the suitability of Izmir to settle in either temporarily or permanently. For the former, Elif (Arab, female, 50 years old) drew the importance of information gathered from the pioneer Syrians who have passed through the same ways. Elif highlighted that getting insight information from the pioneer Syrians often act as life-savers in the sea of unknowns. She explained it as follows.

> *…Imagine that you have to cross a big forest at night by yourself and you do not know which path to follow. Also, you do not have a torch that lighten your way, a knife to protect yourself and a shoulder to rely on. This was exactly my feelings for Turkey because I did not know the country before I came there. All I knew was Turkey was very close to Greek islands and therefore Europe. Since my overall aim was to go to Europe after the devastating effects of the war in Syria, I searched the internet to collect information regarding how to cross Europe by Turkey. Luckily, I met with some Syrians who managed to pass and who could not via Facebook. Especially the ones still in Turkey told me some tricks of arriving Izmir where they named as the best option to collect money for the journey and to cross the Aegean Sea. In short, Syrians who came here earlier guided me to me come to Izmir.*

Additionally, the role of pioneer Syrians in attracting potential settlers of Izmir should not be underestimated. As Ayşe (Arab, female, 18 years old) emphasized, pioneer Syrians often guide newcomers regarding where to look for affordable housing, where to buy cheaper products, where to work and to whom to contact for specific needs. Instead of experiencing all these process with positive and negative instances, pioneer Syrians' know-how is less costly and useful for Syrian newcomers in choosing the locality/urban area to settle in.

Fourthly, the abundance of public services offered in Izmir was highlighted by six Syrian interviewees as an important pull factor. In Izmir there are various public institutions (partially) addressing migration and asylum-related issues including refugees' access to basic services. There are nineteen local branches of Ministries in Izmir which are dominantly located in the city center. Apart from central branches of Ministries in Izmir, local governments (the Governorship of Izmir, Metropolitan Municipality of Izmir and district

municipalities) also involved in the provision of non-cash allowances and services for Syrians. With respect to public health services, Syrians have a variety of options to get basic treatment and medical care in Izmir. Syrians under temporary protection can access health services in public hospitals (33 in total) taking place in several central locations in Izmir. In terms of education, in line with the legislation and national policies of Syrians' access to education services, Syrian children in Izmir can enroll to public schools for free just like their local peers. Similarly, Syrian youngsters can register public universities in the case they are able to fulfil the requirements of enrollment. Lastly, Syrians in Izmir may access cash allowances of the Red Crescent at various locations in Izmir. In the light of this brief information regarding the public services offered in Izmir, Eslem's (Arab, female, 20 years old) arguments make greater sense. She reported that Izmir as a "big city" offers everything she needs, as follows:

> *In Izmir, there are numerous public hospitals which all welcomes us. This is important for me because my father is sick. Moreover, there are a lot of universities which I may enroll if I work hard and learn Turkish. Luckily, language courses are also a lot. The existence of them all make me feel safe and protected in Izmir.*

As another motive behind Syrians' settlement in Izmir, six interviewees emphasized the role of ethnic (solidarity) networks in Izmir. Especially for Syrian Kurds, the Kurdish network in Izmir was quite decisive in their settlement decisions, which was formed and strengthened during 1950s, when rural in-migrants in south-eastern cities of Turkey started to move to developed urban areas in the north-west (including Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir). At those times, Izmir, with its developing manufacturing, food, textile and industry, foreign trade sector and modernized agriculture, attracted in-migrants (Özen, 2016). After 1950s, Kurd in-migrants had constituted the majority of rural in-migrants in Izmir as the result of the huge flows from Diyarbakır and Mardin. Kurd in-migrants in Izmir formed their own ethnic solidarity networks to forge a new life in their new social and demographic environment. Forming solidarity networks was not a choice but a necessity for Kurd people mostly because of the noteworthy hostility of middle-class "Izmirlis" (local inhabitants of Izmir) against them (Saraçoğlu, 2010). Saraçoğlu (2010) also makes clear that the image of Kurds in the eyes of Izmirlis, as the ones disrupting social order, has been quite effective in the reproduction of anti-migrant or anti-Kurd discourses in the society. Therefore, to avoid discrimination and to ensure solidarity within the Kurd population, Kurd in-migrants formed their own solidarity networks and settled in specific locations in Izmir (Basmane, Kadıfekale in Konak district), where they could practice their own cultural and social habits and where they could belong to. This Kurdish network in Izmir influenced the subsequent comers having a Kurdish identity. Malak (Kurd, female, 40 years old) explained why the Kurdish network matters for Syrian Kurds as follows.

…We, as Kurds, are not quite welcomed in Turkey. We are to face discrimination if we could not manage to act in collective sense. It is not a coincidence that Kurd people want to live close to other Kurds. Because living together strengthens collective action and solidarity. Izmir is one of the best examples of that spirit of solidarity among Kurd people…Especially those who struggled to engage labour market in Izmir when they first settled in Izmir now help Kurd people from Turkey and Syria. Of course, the main reason behind my settlement in Izmir was the power and influence of the Kurdish community on the social and economic relations in Turkey. If you are a member of this network, no one can put you down.

In similar line with Malak's arguments, Avşin (Kurd, female, 30 years old) explained that the protection and solidarity that the Kurdish network offers to its "informal" members was quite appealing. She stated that

To feel belonged in a new city is not easy. You need to meet new people, trust people, frequently visit and contact people and so on. However, if you know that you will be welcomed by a community where everyone is similar to you, you may feel belonged. Our little community of Kurd people exactly provides this and I came to Izmir because of this community.

Apart from Kurdish network in Izmir, Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) explained the importance of Turkish Islamic community in his location choice with the following sentences: "Thanks to the solidarity of Turkish people and especially Turkmens who are also respectful to Islam, I'm in Izmir now. With the existence of them, I feel like I'm in Syria. I feel secure and protected."

Two Syrian respondents mentioned the strategic geographical location of Izmir as a pull factor. Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) stated that Izmir is most critical node between Asia and Europe due to its accessibility and closeness to Greek islands. Faruq used the following arguments to further explain his opinions.

On my way to Europe Izmir was the first location I came in the Aegean coast. Because Izmir is the most accessible location along the Aegean coast. By railway Izmir is connected to Anatolia and inner cities. Izmir is also accessible by car and by bus since it is surrounded by high quality highways. It is not a coincidence that Izmir is the meeting point of all refugees who hope to go Greek islands. Secondly, Izmir is very close to various islands…Izmir is a critical location for refugees who want to go to Europe just like me.

Following Faruq's arguments Elif (Arab, female, 50 years old) noted that Izmir's closeness to Greek islands make the city as the hub of refugees in transit. For Elif, what attracts refugees the most is Izmir's strategic location on the way towards European countries. Lastly and surprisingly, Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) touched upon the political tendency of Izmir, as a secular city which is open to differences, as a pull factor. It is surprising because Samir is fond of conservative way of living (with respect to his commitment to Islam) which

might contradict with the political stances of the majority of Izmirlis[30] who label themselves as social democrats. However, Samir supported his arguments with the following sentences.

> *Izmir is tolerant city which is open to differences. It is a politically liberated city and no one is intervening one another. Cultural and religious differences are tolerated here, according to my opinion. I also know people who could contradict my opinions, but I can freely carry out my Islamic duties and no one judges me although we are totally different in terms of physical appearance and world view.*

6.2.2. Initial locations at urban scale other than Izmir

Fourteen of thirty-one Syrian respondents indicated that their initial choices to settle for short or long-term was not Izmir. Unlike their twelve Syrian peers who initially settled in Izmir, these fourteen Syrians settled in different urban areas, which I labelled as metropolitan[31] and border cities. Although the number of interviews seems inadequate at the first place to draw conclusions, they are useful to exemplify the general tendency in Turkey regarding Syrians' internal mobility in Turkey. As seen in Table 18, Syrian respondents both settled in metropolitan (Istanbul, Diyarbakır) and border cities (Kilis, Gaziantep, Mersin, Hatay and Mardin) some of which are also known by their metropolitan character.

Table 18: Initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Turkey other than Izmir

Urban Area	Metropolitan/border	Syrian Arabs	Syrian Kurds	Syrian Turkmens	Total
Gaziantep	Metropolitan/border	2	1	1	4
İstanbul	Metropolitan	2	1	0	3
Kilis	Border	2	0	0	2
Mardin	Metropolitan/border	0	2	0	2
Diyarbakır	Metropolitan	0	1	0	1
Hatay	Metropolitan/border	0	0	1	1
Mersin	Metropolitan/border	0	0	1	1
Total		**6**	**5**	**3**	**14**

Among all provinces, the ones offering employment opportunities and various public services (health, education) seem to attract Syrian refugees the most. In that regard, Gaziantep comes forward as the most preferred initial location in Turkey by Syrian interviewees (other than Izmir). Four respondents who declared Gaziantep as their initial choice in Turkey highlighted the developed economy of Gaziantep within the region. They all stated that Gaziantep offers various job opportunities with its developed industry and growing popularity in gastronomy sectors. Syrian respondents also mentioned the provision of qualified health and education services as an important economic pull factor. Additionally, Gaziantep's proximity to Syria is

[30] Turkish inhabitants of Izmir

[31] By metropolitan cities, I refer to cities which have developed economies and which are ruled by metropolitan municipalities.

seen as an indicator of the cultural similarities between Turkey and Syria which played a critical role in Syrians' preference of Gaziantep to settle down. From another perspective, Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) drew the strategic role of Gaziantep in international refugee mobility. He stressed that Gaziantep is the initial meeting point of Syrians who hope to go to European countries. According to Karim, human smugglers in Syria channel Syrian refugees to meet their Turkish smugglers in Gaziantep. After the initial gathering in Gaziantep, Syrian refugees are redirected to locations along the Aegean Sea.

Istanbul ranks second among the seven provinces. Similar to Gaziantep, Istanbul is mostly preferred by its developed economy, metropolitan character, employment opportunities both in industry and services sectors and the range of public and private services offered. Regardless of a small city with limited economic and social offerings to newcomers, Kilis was also preferred by Syrian respondents due to its spatial proximity to Syria, the existence of relatives and family members who moved there prior to or during of civil war in Syria, the existence and strength of ethnic networks (especially the Kurd network) and cheap accommodation options.

Notably, the existence and operation of several international/local non-governmental organizations who basically provided food, clothing, hygiene materials, translation and social-support services in Kilis were important pull factors. Mardin, Hatay and Mersin provinces also attracted Syrian refugees with their developed economies and cultural resemblings with Syrian provinces due to cultural exchanges between the countries for decades as a result of their close proximity to each other. Additionally, the Kurd population and strong Kurd network in these three provinces and Diyarbakır played decisive roles in the settlement decisions of Syrian Kurds.

When we look at Table 19, we see the motives behind Syrian respondents' initial location choices in Turkey. For fourteen respondents, who did not settle in refugee camps and Izmir initially, the leading motive behind their city selection is found as the existence of employment and income-generating activities in urban areas (five out of fourteen respondents). In that regard, respondents highlighted the importance of finding a full-time job with decent working conditions, running a new business and becoming entrepreneurs in their settlement decisions. Because all these four respondents declared that without regular income, it is impossible to hold on life in a country where you are not truly welcomed by its citizens.

Table 19: Initial location choice criteria of Syrians who initially settled in other urban areas than Izmir

Initial location choice criteria	Frequency of mention
Existence of employment and income-generating activities	5
Existence and availability of public services	4
Existence of relatives / family members	3
Knowledge of the urban area	2
Meeting with human smugglers	2
Affordable housing / accommodation	1
Strategic geographic location	1
Existence and operation of NGOs	1
Existence of friends	1
Total	**14**

Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) told how he needed to work despite his age and health issues to generate income to cover his health expenses. He said that

> *I initially went to Istanbul because everyone knows that Istanbul is the heart of Turkish economy. I went to Istanbul to find a job which is enough to cover my dialysis expenses. Although I intended to stay in Turkey for a short time till the war ends, I could not return. In Syria I worked in construction, agriculture and services sector, so according to my experience and age I thought that I could find a job and I managed to find it.*

Secondly, Syrian respondents drew the decisive role of their access to public services (i.e. existence and availability of public services) in city selection process. Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) who initially came to Turkey for temporary settlement told that he initially settled in Mersin[32] to register and to benefit from free health services and social aids granted by the Turkish state. Similarly, Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old) said that he looked for the population of the city and the number of public institutions, hospitals and education facilities. Because he reported that he and his family came to Turkey with the intention of settling permanently due to the on-going war in Syria. Although his primary intention in settling Istanbul was to enter labour market, he touched upon how the provision of public services became decisive when he considered the needs of his family. Thirdly, three respondents (out of fourteen) explained the existence of relatives and family members as the primary motive behind their city selection. This was expected because, we already saw that how the relatives and family members who had already settled in Turkey became key actors in contacting, convincing and helping Syrian refugees to migrate to Turkey. Now, we see their similar influence on city selection process. Serhad (Kurd, male, 25 years old) and Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) stated that their Kurd relatives living in Mardin (who are Turkish nationals) was the motive behind their initial settlement to Mardin. Fourthly, Reşid and Zeynep stated that they initially settled in Gaziantep and Hatay since they had the knowledge of the

[32] A metropolitan urban area located in Turkey - Syria border

economy, demography, location and culture of these provinces prior to their settlement. They settled in Gaziantep and Hatay with the assumption that they could "fit in" the way of living in these urban areas. Reşid (Arab, male, 40 years old) stated that

> *I knew Gaziantep very well. That's why I came there at first. I have friends and relatives in there. I know that Gazianteplis*[33] *respect to Islam and all its requirements. Its economy is good enough for me to find job as well.*

As another aspect of initial location choice at urban scale, two respondents said that they followed the guidance of human smugglers. Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) explicitly stated that he initially went to Gaziantep from illegal ways to meet with the human smugglers who would help him to cross European borders. Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) justified the claims of Karim by saying that "I did not intend to go Gaziantep, because I did not know anything about there. The smugglers I contacted in Syria told me that I would go Gaziantep and then to Izmir, I just obeyed them."

Lastly, four different motives behind the location choices of refugees at urban scale were mentioned by Syrian respondents including affordable housing/accommodation (1), strategic geographic location of urban areas (1), existence and operation of NGOs in the field of migration and asylum (1) and existence of friends (1). More precisely, Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) said that she initially settled in Kilis for a short period of time with the hope of returning to Syria soon, because of the cheap housing options. She claims that Kilis as a small urban area provides relatively cheap housing with respect to its unqualified housing stock and low popularity when compared to other provinces in the same region (as Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Gaziantep). On the other hand, Abbuldaki (Arab, male, 60 years old) highlighted the geographic proximity of Kilis province to Syria as a pull factor especially for the ones who migrated to Turkey temporarily. Abdulbaki also highlighted the existence and operation of NGOs that serve especially for Syrian newcomers in the border cities of Turkey as an important pull factor. Lastly, Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) denoted the role of her friends living in Mardin, who facilitated her decision-making process regarding where to settle in Turkey. So far, I discussed the motives behind Syrians' initial location choices at urban scale and tried to understand which factors/motives play critical roles in shaping Syrians' location choices. I also discovered that not all Syrian respondents continue to live in urban areas that they had initially settled. To say, nineteen Syrian respondents are now not living in urban areas/camps that they had settled initially, while twelve Syrians who initially settled in Izmir continue to live there. Now, it is worth to examine the internal mobility patterns of Syrian

[33] Native inhabitants of Gaziantep province

respondents in Turkey by drawing their location choices and relocation decisions at urban scale, to grasp the motives behind their decision to settle in Izmir, as the final destination.

6.2.3. Relocations from the initial settlements

- Reasons of relocation for Syrians who initially settled in refugee camps in Turkey

As seen in Table 20 and Figure 18, when the five respondents who initially settled in refugee camps were asked to explain the motives behind their relocation to urban areas, they touched upon the importance of the following issues which I grouped under five categories as the existence and availability of various public services (2), the existence of employment and income- generating activities (2), the affordability of living (1), the existence and operations of NGOs (1) and the existence of relatives/family members (1). Although all five respondents appreciated the services offered in refugee camps, as Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old) denoted that the services offered and money granted to camp settlers were not enough to live in a dignified way. Accordingly, all the five respondents stated that within six months – two years of time, they prepared themselves both financially and mentally to forge a new life in "big" cities of Turkey if they could not turn back to Syria. When I looked at which provinces they headed to after leaving the camps, I saw that Syrian respondents settled in metropolitan urban areas including Gaziantep (2), Adana (1), Şanlıurfa (1) and Bursa (1).

Table 20: Syrian respondents' motives behind relocations from refugee camps to urban areas

Pse.	First des. in Turkey	Des. until Izmir	The main motive for moving out	The main motive behind settling in Izmir
Amine	Hatay (camp)	Gaziantep	Existence and availability of various public services Affordability of living	Discrimination by native inhabitants Existence and availability of various public services
Vahap	Hatay (camp)	Şanlıurfa	Existence of employment and income- generating activities Existence of relatives	Existence of employment and income- generating activities
Zekire	Hatay (camp)	Gaziantep	Existence and operation of NGOs	Discrimination by native inhabitants
Ramise	Kilis (camp)	Adana	Existence and availability of various public services	Existence of employment and income- generating activities
Gülümser	Adana (camp)	Bursa	Existence of employment and income- generating activities	Existence of employment and income- generating activities

As seen from Figure 19, former camp settlers mostly preferred to settle in metropolitan urban areas (except from Bursa) which are in close proximity to Syria. Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) explains this process as follows.

> *…We (as family) decided to settle in Adana. Because the people with met in camps were talking about how Adana is a developed city where Arab population is considerably high. We also learned that health services are quite qualified in Adana. My husband also thought that he could find a job in such a big city.*

Similarly, Zekire *(*Arab, female, 25 years old) clarified how they decided to settle in Gaziantep as follows: "Gaziantep was the home of Syrian Arabs at those times. They were powerful, they were running businesses and Syrians helping newcomers. To make more money to afford a better life, we settled in Gaziantep." As the exceptional example, Gülümser (Turkmen, female, 37 years old) told that they moved from Adana camp to Bursa province to be employed in textile and shoe-making sectors in line with their profession.

Regarding the decision to relocate and settle in Izmir, the existence of employment and income-generating activities (3), the discriminatory actions and attitudes of native inhabitants in the urban areas settled (3) (i.e., discrimination by native inhabitants), and the existence and availability of public services (1) came forward as the pull factors of Izmir. Vahap (Arab, male, 42 years old) highlighted the importance of employment opportunities in city selection in Turkey by the following statements.

> *I initially went to Urfa where my uncle was waiting for me. I worked in a grocery store as a salesman thanks to my uncle who arranged the job for me. I worked there for a year and collected some money. After one year, with the Syrian and Turkish friends I met in Urfa we decided to open our own grocery store in a city bigger than Urfa. After several negotiations, we decided on Izmir especially for its increasing population during summer.*

Similarly, Gülümser who initially settled in Bursa for the hope of finding a job in textile and shoe-making sectors stated that the competition in Bursa to be employed in these sectors was quite harsh. She said that while her employers were kind to her, her colleagues in the ateliers in which we worked together were quite unwelcoming. She explained the level of discrimination that she was exposed to in her workplaces as follows.

> *Although I could speak Turkish and communicate with Turkish people, my Turkish colleagues excluded me just because I came from Syria. They blamed me for stealing their friends' job. They insulted me, they made me cry several times. At the end I found out that Bursa is quite a conservative and nationalist city. Then I decided to move to Izmir where Turkmens are highly welcomed in shoe-making sector*.

Resembling Gülümser's experience, Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old) expressed that the most decisive motive behind her move to Izmir from Gaziantep, where she hopefully settled initially, was the experience of discrimination and even harassment by native inhabitants of Gaziantep. Zekire said that

> *We, as family, came to Gaziantep by trusting the strong Arab community there. However, we saw that we as Syrians were not welcomed there…The tradespeople and homeowners were all trying to take more money from us or give us misinformation which damage us. Our lovely Turkish neighbors in Gaziantep told us that we could go to Izmir which is a big city hosting various different ethnic groups.*



Figure 18: Syrian respondents' relocations from refugee camps to urban areas in Turkey

Similar to the above arguments, there are fourteen Syrian respondents who relocated from their initial locations with different motives behind. When we look at the subsequent location choices of these fourteen Syrians other than Izmir (Table 21 and Figure 19), we see that they preferred to settle in Istanbul (2), Kocaeli (1), Antalya (1) and Bursa (1), which are known by their developed urban economy, diverse economic sectors in operation, developed labour market and metropolitan character. Here, we see refugees' access to employment and income-generating activities as the primary motive behind relocation decisions to Kocaeli, İstanbul, Antalya, Mersin and Hatay.

Seyyid's (Arab, male, 45 years old) narrative is the best example to understand the meaning of employment opportunities for Syrians. Seyyid firstly settled in Istanbul to run business in the shoe-making sector with his two Turkish business partners. Seyyid was appreciating his quick engagement to business relations in Istanbul while his family was enjoying the health and education services provided. However, after two years, his business was collapsed due to the increasing costs of raw materials and due to the harsh competition in the market. After that he started to look for a job to cover the expenses of his family, luckily within a month, with the help of this Turkish friends in Istanbul, he found a part-time job in construction sector in Kocaeli. As Seyyid claims, the job was good but he was away from his family. He constantly looked for a job in other provinces where he could move with his family. Luckily, by a Turkish friend whom he met in Kocaeli, he heard that in Izmir, shoe-making sector was growing and more importantly he learned that Syrian workers who are experienced in shoemaking were welcomed in Izmir. Immediately, he decided to settle in Izmir.

Table 21: Syrian respondents' motives behind relocations from their initial urban settlements

Pseudonym	**First dest. in Turkey (A)**	**Other des. (B)**	**The main motive of relocation from A to B (destinations other than Izmir)**
Karim	Gaziantep	*	*
Ebral	Kilis	*	*
Abdulbaki	Kilis	*	*
Muhammed	Istanbul	*	*
Seyyid	Istanbul	Kocaeli	Existence of employment and income-generating activities
Reşid	Gaziantep	Istanbul	Existence of employment and income-generating activities
Serhad	Mardin	Istanbul	Existence of employment and income-generating activities
Ahmad	Diyarbakır	*	*
Mohammad	Gaziantep	*	*
Rojin	Istanbul	*	*
Havin	Mardin	Antalya	Existence of employment and income-generating activities
Salim	Gaziantep	*	*
Şerif	Mersin	*	*
Zeynep	Hatay	Bursa	Existence of employment and income-generating activities

Regarding the selection of Izmir as the final destination (Table 22), we see how the employment opportunities offered in the city in tourism, construction, services and production sectors attracted Syrian refugees to settle in there. As seen in Table 23, the existence of employment and income-generating activities comes forward as the leading motivation behind Syrian interviewees' relocation to Izmir from other urban areas in Turkey (11).

Table 22:The motives behind Syrians' relocation to Izmir from other urban areas in Turkey

The leading motives behind relocation to Izmir	Frequency of mention
Existence of employment and income generating activities	11
Affordability of living expenses / housing	7
Exploitation by tradespeople/employees (in previous settlements)	6
Discrimination by native inhabitants (in previous location)	5
Social and cultural life	4
Existence and availability of various public services	3
Strategic geographic location	2
Total	**14**

Syrian respondents mentioned that by moving to Izmir that they either hope to find a proper job with social security and sufficient wages (4), to start a new business to make more money rather than working under unstable conditions as labors (4), to face less competition in labor market (2) and to save money for overseas journeys from Turkey (1). The narratives of Seyyid and Havin, as discussed above, are the two good examples of how and why the job opportunities offered and economic sectors in operation in Izmir are attracting Syrians to settle in there. Regarding the start of a new business, Abdulbaki's (Arab, male, 60 years old) narrative is quite informative. After the first year in Kilis, where he initially settled in Turkey, Abdulbaki found out that he could start a new business. His business idea was to run a small shop selling Syrian spices, foods and other local foods (including Syrian bread). He was fond of this idea because he said that Syrians in Kilis had struggled to find proper foods to eat since they were not quite familiar with the Turkish food market and cuisine. Therefore, he looked for a "bigger city" (than Kilis) where the Syrian population is increasing and where he could reach out more and more Syrians. In the end, he found out that Izmir is the best location to start this business with respect to the criteria he mentioned.

From another perspective, Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) mentioned that labour market in Izmir is far less competitive than the labour market of Istanbul. He said the following.

> *… For old men like me, the job opportunities are scarce. The young men with experience take all the jobs. Therefore, I struggled to find job in Istanbul. As time passed and I remained unemployed, I decided to make a move. As another big economy in Turkey with smaller labour market than Istanbul, I decided to take my chance on Izmir…*



Figure 19: Syrian respondents' relocations from their initial urban settlements to Izmir

In addition to Muhammed, Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) stated that Izmir's labour market is suitable for part-time jobs (that do not necessitate a valid identity to be hired) which is quite critical for Syrians who try to collect the necessary money to cover the expenses of human smuggling to European countries. He further noted that after his failed several attempts to cross to Greek islands, he ran out of money he had and tried to search ways of collecting money by doing daily, part-time jobs in Izmir.

Other than employment and income-related motives, seven respondents stated that the affordability of housing and living expenses in Izmir attracted them to settle there. The respondents claimed that despite being a metropolitan area, the food, clothing and heating expenses in Izmir are far affordable than other metropolitan urban areas. Besides, all the seven respondents stated that housing/accommodation options in Izmir are varied and affordable. Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) explained this as follows.

> *My relatives in Kilis told me that Izmir remains quite cheap when compared to others like Istanbul, Bursa. They said it by experience. They have been there several times before and thus they know Izmir. Since it became obvious that I could not return Syria soon, I decided to move to another city where the living conditions are better and social life is diverse. Since my relatives told me that housing in Izmir is cheap along with the cheapness of cafes and markets, I decided to move to Izmir.*

As the third motive, six respondents reported that they escaped from the exploitative working conditions and discriminatory manners of the employees/local tradespeople in the previous settlements. Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) stated that although he is a Turkmen who is quite familiar with the Turkish culture and language, the tradespeople and real estators were quite rude and exploitative to him. More precisely, he explained how he struggled the most in finding accommodation in Mersin although he had the money. Şerif stated that

> *When I first go to a real estate office by saying Selamın-aleyküm, I was more than welcomed by the real estators. However, once I start to speak with my broken Turkish accent to ask for houses for rent, they immediately change their attitudes towards me by saying "hmm, are you Syrian?". Although I have the money which is enough for renting a proper house in central Mersin, they say that they have no houses to display, although the windows of the offices are full of advertisements.*

As the complementary of Şerif's arguments, Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) told that several real estators in İstanbul refused to show him the available houses just because he is Syrian. He also argued that real estators asked higher prices than the actual rent prices to rent him a house. As another example, Rojin (Kurd, female, 30 years old) stated that when she went to local bazaars in Istanbul to buy some fresh vegetables, she came across with various sellers who ask high prices from her.

Parallel to the above arguments, five Syrian respondents complained about the level of discrimination they are exposed to by native inhabitants in their former settlements. Zeynep (Turkmen, female, 25 years old) argued that both in Hatay and Bursa, she and her family were not welcomed by the Turkish residents, although they were not doing any harm to anyone. She explicitly told that

> *…Turks were looking at us like we are rubbish. Even the people we came across in streets for the first time stared at us for minutes and tried to disturb us by their looks. In initial times, I was introducing myself as a friendly Turkmen who likes Turkish people. However, as Turkish people continued to exclude me by their looks and words, I gave up introducing myself.*

Similarly, Ahmad (Ahmad, Kurd, male, 52 years old) told that despite he is not in a behaviour that contradicts with the social order, he was not welcomed by his neighbours in Diyarbakır. He said that only Syrian Kurds talked to him. He was quite upset for being discriminated just because his identity as a Kurd and a Syrian. Ahmad further denoted that the discrimination he faced in Diyarbakır urged him to move to another city like Izmir, where ethnic and cultural differences are to be neglected with respect to the cosmopolitan character of the city.

As another motive of relocation to Izmir, four respondents drew the importance of the social and cultural life in Izmir as a means of attraction. Especially for younger Syrians the existence of diverse cafes and shops, outdoor activities, touristic activities, art performances etc. seem to attract them to settle in Izmir. Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) said that she found Izmir as a live and culturally rich city with its cinemas, theatres, fair, beach clubs at the sea sides, various restaurants and cafes all of which have positive impacts on her feel of belonging to the city. Similarly, Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) told that as a single man, he is quite happy with the night life in Izmir and entertainment facilities across Izmir. He further noted that

> *The social life in Izmir attracted me since I need to get socialized and meet with new people who are open and tolerant to ethnic differences and who are non-judgemental. Before I came to Izmir I already knew that the natives of Izmir are quite modernized and social people.*

Non-surprisingly three respondents highlighted the existence and availability of various public services in Izmir as a pull factor while the other two – who came to Izmir with the intention of crossing to the European countries – stressed the importance of the strategic geographic location of Izmir at the Aegean coast of Turkey, as a decisive factor behind their relocation to Izmir. When we look at the motives that brought Syrian respondents to Izmir, we may come to a general conclusion suggesting that Syrians look for affordable ways of emplacing in a new social environment in which they would be treated as a native inhabitant.

Apart from the factors that attract/enforce Syrian refugees to settle in some specific urban areas, there are several actors who are somehow involved in Syrians' location choice processes by giving them advises, by sharing their own experiences, by offering protection, by providing monetary/non-monetary aids. Especially in our case, in which the Turkish state is partially absent in addressing Syrians' initial reception, accommodation and resettlement processes; the individual/household strategies of Syrian refugees and the actions/attitudes of several actors, who either fill or exploit the absence of the State (e.g., service providers, civil society organizations and market actors), become decisive in Syrians' emplacement and location choice processes.

When Syrian respondents were asked to name the actors who intentionally or vice versa become affective in their city selection processes, they mentioned several actors whom I grouped under eleven categories as relatives/family members (12), pioneer Syrians (12), individual/household (11), business partners/colleagues (6), Turkish friends in Turkey (6), Syrian friends in Turkey (5), human smugglers (4), public officers (4), neighbours in Turkey and Syria (3), ethnic solidarity networks (2), NGO officers (1) (Table 23). While I was going over the transcripts to identify the typology of the actors, I figured out that the types of actors differ in Syrians' initial and subsequent (i.e., relocation) location choices. In other words, the actors affecting Syrians' initial location choices at urban scale are quite different than the ones affecting Syrians' relocation decisions (subsequent location choices). In addition, the type of actors involved in the location choice processes also varied with respect to the ethnicity of Syrians (Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens).

Table 23: Actors involved in initial and subsequent location choices (relocation) of Syrians in Turkey

Actors involved	**Syrian Arabs**		**Syrian Kurds**		**Syrian Turkmen**		**Frequency of mention**
	Initial	**Reloc.**	**Initial**	**Reloc.**	**Initial**	**Reloc.**	
Relatives/family members	4	0	7	0	1	0	12
Pioneer Syrians	4	4	2	0	2	0	12
Individual/household decision	1	0	0	3	2	5	11
Ethnic solidarity networks	0	2	2	1	1	0	6
Business partners/colleagues	1	2	1	0	1	1	6
Turkish friends in TR	1	3	2	0	0	0	6
Syrian friends in TR	0	3	0	1	0	1	5
Human smugglers	2	0	1	1	0	0	4
Public officers	2	1	0	0	0	1	4
Neighbors in Turkey/Syria	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
NGO officers	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total							**31**

Regarding their initial location choices in Turkey, I found out that Syrians were mostly affected by their relatives/family members (12) and pioneer Syrians (8). It was not surprising

to see the remarkable effect of relatives/family members on Syrians' city selection processes in Turkey, because as been discussed several times in this chapter, by providing physical/social protection, monetary and non-monetary support, by offering free accommodation the relatives/family members of Syrians attract Syrian newcomers to settle in cities that they had settled. The arguments of Eslem and Serhad justify my claims on this matter, as follows.

> *...My relatives in Izmir not only offered us accommodation in their houses but also gave very important information regarding the health services in Izmir which was quite important for us since my father is sick. Thanks to their support, kind and intimate invitation, we decided to settle in Izmir*. (Eslem, Arab, female, 20 years old)

> *The main reason of my settlement in Mardin is the existence of my relatives. They offered me free accommodation, money, food and everything I needed. I was totally broke since I lost my financial savings in Syria and with their invitation I was able to start a new life from the beginning* (Serhad, Kurd, male, 25 years old)

Secondly, pioneer Syrians in Turkey who came to Turkey before and during the civil war in Syria affected subsequent Syrians' city selections mostly by sharing their own experiences and providing inside information regarding the offerings and opportunities of planned destinations. Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) asserted that the pioneer Syrians who migrated to Izmir long before and who he met via social media convinced him to settle in Izmir by providing detailed information regarding the practice of Islam in Izmir and the level of tolerance and discrimination to Syrians by Izmirlis. On the other hand, Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) touched upon the importance of the information shared by pioneer Syrians who had tried and managed to pass to European countries from Izmir. Faruq stated that

> *Although I could not succeed yet, one day I will go to Europe. I came to Izmir to pass to Europe. I selected Izmir among other locations along the Aegean coast of Turkey because I contacted various Syrians who are now in Germany and Netherlands. They all guided me to go to Izmir where I could get in touch with the professional smugglers. Not all smugglers are trustworthy, and these Syrians also helped me to find the smugglers who are not swindle Syrian refugees.*

On the other hand, in relocation decisions of Syrian interviewees, surprisingly we see that relatives and family members become ineffective in Syrians' relocation decisions, while individual/household decisions and preferences come forward (8). As seen in the following quotations, it is mostly because of the fact that as Syrians manage to engage social and economic relations in the settlements they have emplaced, they gradually gain their financial independence which enable them to make their own decisions on their lives. In addition, as they get used to their new social environments, make new friends, learn the ways to access public services and resources, contact with native inhabitants; Syrians gradually become less dependent to other actors who once supported them in these matters. Zeynep's (Turkmen,

female, 25 years old) story is a good example of the above discussion. After initially settling in Hatay by her knowledge of the city and the existence of her relatives, Zeynep moved to Bursa and then to Izmir. She claimed that, after she felt engaged in some affairs to earn some money to cover her expenses in Hatay, she managed to make her mind to forge a new and independent life. She told her story as follows.

> *…I could continue my life in Hatay. However, it is a small town and if I were still living there, I would always somehow depend on my relatives in Hatay. Since we could not turn back to Syria, we as a family started to think where to start a new life and after several discussions we decided to move as we find job opportunities.*

Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) told that, triggered by the discrimination he and his family were subjected to in Diyarbakır, he decided to move to Izmir where he could enroll his children to a school in Izmir where they could get qualified and modernized education. He said that in the two years-time in Diyarbakır, he worked in various part-time jobs with low wages but yet the managed to make some savings which helped him in taking the decision to migrate to Izmir. In relocation decisions of Syrians, we also see the effect of Syrian friends met in Turkey. Just like relatives and family members, friends met in Turkey attract Syrians to move to some specific urban areas by encouraging them with their experiences and by inviting them. Similarly, contacts with the members of ethnic solidarity networks in planned destination localities often convince Syrians to come and settle there.

There are also some actors who were effective both in initial and subsequent location choices of Syrian refugees at the urban scale. For example, business partners/colleagues in Turkey either invite their Syrian partners to maintain their business in Turkey or to start a new one. Secondly, Turkish friends met prior to the civil war and or the ones met in Turkey during the war and the neighbors in Turkey often guide their Syrian peers and even invite them for a short period of time. Surprisingly, public and NGO officers met in registration desks, border gates and refugee camps often guide Syrian refugees when they are asked to guide them. Rather than making concrete statements, public officers mostly guide Syrians who lack proper knowledge of Turkey in their city selection processes. Public officers give basic information regarding how to rent a house, how to register and how to access aids in planned destinations.

6.3. Concluding remarks

As you may recall, the main aim of this research is to uncover the underlying mechanisms (actors and factors) affecting/shaping Syrian refugees' mobility/location choices taking place at different geographical scales under the policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management in Turkey. To do this, first of all, I examined the motives behind Syrians'

migration to Turkey by portraying the underlying motives and actors who have roles in Syrians' country selection processes. I started the discussion by examining why Syrians initially migrated to Turkey among other surrounding countries. Because as discussed in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, refugee mobility is taking place among localities in which various successive steps are to be followed as Güngördü and Bayırbağ (2019) stressed as "displacement—escape/jumping over the barriers and arrival—search for a place to settle and then settling". By acknowledging that all these successive steps are intertwined and are the continuation and complementary of each other, I started the examination by portraying the international mobility trajectories of Syrians who ended up in Turkey. After uncovering the underlying mechanisms behind Syrian interviewees' migration to Turkey, I examined why Syrian refugees have specifically concentrated in border cities and especially in metropolitan urban areas in Turkey. Building on this discussion, I examined why and how Syrian refugees decided to settle in Izmir. Here, I looked for the motives behind Syrians' settlement to Izmir as the initial location in Turkey and the motives behind Syrians' relocation to Izmir from other urban areas and refugee camps in Turkey. I further looked for whether Syrians' intention to come to Turkey, the year of their arrival to Turkey and their ethnic background (Arab, Kurd and Turkmen) have to do with the differing motives of migration (underlying motives and actors affecting Syrians' decisions to settle in Izmir). Here, based on the examination of the international and internal mobility trajectories of Syrian refugees by questioning the increasing subjectivity of refugees in location choice processes under the policy/political vacuums (that have been arisen from the partial absence of the Turkish state in addressing Syrians' initial reception, accommodation, emplacement and integration processes), I will draw several conclusions.

Firstly, Syrians' international and internal (national) mobility trajectories cannot be examined as sole physical actions which are independent of the social, economic, political, ethnic and cultural conjuncture of the origin/destination countries and expectations and desires of Syrians (parallel to the discussions of Creswell and Merriman, 2011; Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015; Sheller and Urry, 2006). As seen from the discussion that I built on Syrians' narratives, in mobility pathways and all initial and subsequent location choices of Syrians, there are various social, economic, political motives behind. In the analysis phase, I figured out that Syrian interviewees (total of thirty-one interviewees) preferred to migrate to Turkey - mostly because of the social, political and economic powerlessness and desperation they faced in Syria - whose intentions to migrate to Turkey can be grouped under three categories as follows: to cross European borders as a refugee in transit (7), to temporarily settle in Turkey till the war ends in Syria (9) and to permanently settle in Turkey regardless of whether the war would end or not (15). Ensuring the physical security and well-being was one of the main goals behind

Syrians' selection of Turkey as the destination country. Having urged with the concern of security, the majority of Syrians decided to migrate to Turkey since they believed that Turkey would provide a safe and secure living environment. Even this tiny example shows us that, mobility is not just a physical movement among two or more different points, it is a complex spatial outcome of Syrians' struggle to stay alive, survive and forge a new life.

In specific, I found out that, thirty-one Syrian refugees highlighted the open-door policy of Turkey (19), the existence of relatives/family members (17) and pioneer Syrians (16) in Turkey and the political and religious stance of Turkey (15) as the pull factors. With the open-door policy Syrians had arrived in Turkey without a serious bureaucratic obstacle at the gates and with the help, support and guidance of their relatives/family members and pioneer Syrians, Syrian respondents managed to access accommodation, food, clothing, hygiene materials and public services. Similarly, in selecting their initial locations in Turkey, Syrian refugees dominantly looked for the existence of relatives/family members (13), employment and income-generating activities (12), existence and availability of public services (10), and the existence of ethnic solidarity networks (7) and pioneer Syrians (7) in the destinations they planned to settle. However, in relocation decisions of Syrians, we see that the role of relatives, family members and pioneer Syrians become minimized as Syrians become urban refugees by engaging the social/economic relations in cities they have settled. Political figures and policymakers also lost their popularity among Syrians, since there were not any comprehensive policy addressing refugees' access to accommodation and all other necessary services and resources in Turkish cities. As refugees need to take care of themselves and develop their strategies to ensure their access to income and public services, they sought ways to access the necessary financial means and money in the first place. At this point, we see the increasing importance of refugees' access to employment and income-generating activities in their subsequent location choices in Turkey (15). When I also take the increasing concerns of Syrians for finding affordable housing/services into account (7), I come to an early conclusion that social and economic concerns/motives increasingly becoming more and more decisive in Syrians' location choices in Turkey.

At this point, I would like to further highlight how Syrians' immobility and mobility situations are dependent on their class-positions in the destination localities and accordingly to their "success" in engaging the social, economic and cultural relations embedded in the given localities. In specific, in Bourdieuan terms, the findings showed that refugees' class and social status in Syria and associated economic, cultural and social capital were effective/decisive only in the initial location choices of Syrians. Precisely, the relatives, friends, business

partners, colleagues that Syrian refugees have been in contact for many years were the ones that Syrians initially contacted when they decided to migrate to Turkey. The level of social capital that Syrians have, helped them to access to their initial shelter, food and support and accordingly affected the initial location choices of Syrians in Turkey. Similarly, some Syrians went to some specific locations in Turkey (Istanbul, Izmir, Gaziantep, etc.), where they believe they could engage in the job market and education system with respect to their education level, linguistic advantages, skills and jobs. However, as become evident in relocation decisions, the importance of economic, social, cultural capital of Syrians gradually decreased. What became important has been Syrians' new class positions that they now gained in destination localities. Specifically, rather than their education level, relatives, friends and jobs, their engagement into job market, their strategies and financial tools to mobilize welfare resources became more and more important.

Stemming from this fact, although refugees' individual contacts (i.e., social networks) were quite decisive in their initial location choices in Turkey, in their relocations, we saw the decisive effect of their engagement (or not) to daily social and economic relations and the new networks they build or fail to build in the chosen localities. Here, Syrian respondents explicitly stated that the discrimination they face in the housing and job market in the initial locations, the language barriers, the negative attitudes of host communities and service providers triggered their relocations to some other cities. Those who could engage in housing and labour market and those who could break down the language barrier and actively present in the daily relations continue to stay in the chosen locations, whereas those who could not "hold on to life" in their initial locations are somehow "forced" to move.

Nearly all respondents highlighted the importance of accessing employment opportunities and income-generating activities, affordable housing and public services in their relocation decisions. Here, we saw that not only refugees financial/economic tools and expectations but also the inclusionary or discriminatory attitudes of the providers of these opportunities and services become decisive. Therefore, Syrians' intra-national mobilities in Turkey have to do with the class-positions of Syrians in the chosen locations, the social, economic and political conjuncture of the chosen locations within the multi-scalar network of power relations, the conditions of housing and labour market and the attitudes of native inhabitants and service providers in the chosen location.

Accordingly, in line with Çağlar and Glick-Schiller (2015) and Fontanari (2019), I claim that refugee mobility is not a purely subjective process in which refugees are free to choose the

locations to be settled concerning their desires, needs and expectations. The negotiations of Syrians with the public authorities, market actors, civil society organizations and individual networks (engaging social relations with services providers and resource allocators) who are operating at different administrative scales become quite decisive in Syrians' location choices at country and urban scales. Even in countries like Turkey, where the State is partially absent in addressing newcomers' initial reception, accommodation, emplacement and integration, refugees are not free to decide on where to settle without any compromise of other actors either in the form of support or discrimination. Therefore, to understand the location choices of Syrians and why refugees concentrate in or dispersed to some specific geographies, we need to adopt a multi-scalar, multi-dimensional and multi-actor perspective. The evidence showed us that, in understanding the internal mobility trajectories and location choices of Syrian refugees, we also need to identify the type of actors who are involved in Syrians' access to services and resources and most importantly portray the type of social relations that refugees (need to) engage in localities they (prefer) to settle. When Syrian respondents were asked to introduce the actors, who shaped/guided/influenced their initial and subsequent country and city choices, they mentioned twelve different actors in total whose roles and contributions (guidance, invitation, etc.) have varied in Syrians initial and subsequent location choices at the urban scale.

In specific, I saw that methodological nationalist thinking in refugee mobility fails to recognize the varied motives behind mobility by solely looking at the border-crossing and resettlement processes. As highlighted by Barberis and Pavolini (2015) and Çağlar and Glick-Schiller (2015) taking the nation-state as the unit of examining the migration/mobility patterns results in misleading and partial conceptualizations regarding the causality and outcomes of the refugee mobility. As the evidence showed, Syrians' mobility continued within Turkey after border-crossings, as Syrians have struggled to settle in localities where they could fulfill their expectations the most. Even more, the evidence showed that the Syrian refugee influx to Turkey cannot be regarded as a collective and homogeneous movement since Syrians have followed different paths of mobility with different aspirations and expectations. Therefore, it became obvious that methodological nationalism cannot help me to uncover the internal patterns and dynamics of refugee mobility within the borders of Turkey. As the ultimate aim of Syrian refugees is to find the best locality/location where they would emplace, in the next chapter, I will employ the literature on refugee emplacement to uncover the dynamics that create intra-urban mobilities.

CHAPTER 7

SYRIAN REFUGEES' INTRA-URBAN MOBILITY AND LOCATION CHOICES AT THE LOCAL SCALE: EMPLACEMENT IN BASMANE, KARABAĞLAR AND BUCA

Chapter 6 argued that refugee mobility is a dynamic and complex process having continuity at different geographical scales. Specifically, by building on Skeldon's (2017) argument suggesting that (refugee) mobility is taking place among localities rather than nation-states, I claimed that refugee movements are not to cease once refugees arrive in the destination countries. Because when the national borders of destination countries are crossed, refugees disperse to different urban/rural areas in accordance with their expectations and/or government resettlement policies. In that sense, I also claimed that refugees' international, internal, inter-urban, and intra-urban mobility trajectories are not independent of but are the continuation of each other. Within this perspective, in the previous chapter, when I was querying why Syrian refugees settled and emplaced in Izmir with growing numbers, first I questioned why they decided to migrate to Turkey. Second, in a relational way with the motives to migrate to Turkey, I drew the motives behind Syrian refugees' settlement in Izmir. Here, as I expected, I figured out that Syrians' preferences to settle in Turkey and Izmir are quite interrelated. In general, Syrians aim to settle in areas where they could survive and access the necessary resources and services to forge a new life in a new social environment. Notably, I also figured out that Syrian refugees' location choices at an urban scale are not only bound to their expectations, needs, and desires; but also to their class-positions, social/economic capital in the new geographic/economic context and the discourses/actions of several actors who are (in)directly involved in refugees' initial reception, emplacement, location choices in Turkey. Accordingly, based on Syrians' narratives, I found out that Syrian refugees settle in urban areas where they could reach out the support and services they needed and where they could quickly get in contact/engage in social relations with the actors who take part in the provision of support, services and resources to refugees.

In this chapter, similar to Syrians' redistribution across Turkey, I query whether Syrians' intra-urban mobility in Izmir - in terms of their initial and subsequent location choices (relocations) - have to do with their struggles to access necessary resources and services and to engage social and economic relations in the given localities. My pre-assumption is that Syrians' arrival and settlement in Izmir is not the endpoint of their mobility trajectories; instead, it is the beginning of a new one. Syrian refugees now struggle to reach out to different services and resources, redistributed/provided unevenly across Izmir.

Here, I further argue that in the partial absence of the Turkish State, as the "so-called" primary actor addressing migration and asylum, the local actors involved in the provision of support/services/resources in Izmir play determining roles in attracting Syrians to settle and emplace in them. Accordingly, in this chapter, I aim to portray the motives behind Syrian refugees' initial and subsequent location choices in Izmir (concerning Syrians' emplacement strategies and housing pathways) by focusing on Basmane (Konak District), Buca, and Karabağlar Districts. Here, I adopt a temporal perspective to detect refugees' changing needs in time and concordant location choices. I also direct special attention to figure out whether differing service provision and resource allocation mechanisms in districts have to do with Syrians' location choices in Izmir. The outline of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, I will briefly discuss the social, economic, and cultural characteristics of the three selected settlements that might attract/attracted Syrian refugees to settle in them. Secondly, I will query why Syrian refugees have been densely concentrated in Basmane Area (especially in the first five years of the refugee influx to Turkey), Karabağlar and Buca Districts by uncovering the motives/actors behind Syrians' initial and subsequent location choices in Izmir. Thirdly, I will focus on the population exchanges among these three settlements.

7.1. What does Basmane offer to Syrian refugees?

Basmane, an inner-city deprived[34] settlement area in Konak District with an approximate population of 45.440, consists of twenty-three neighbourhoods (*semt* in Turkish) sharing similar architectural, demographic, social and economic characteristics (TUIK, 2020). As an historic settlement at the heart of Izmir, Basmane has historically been the "home" of various ethnic and religious groups including Greeks, Jewish people, Muslims, Afghan, Iraqi, Syrian refugees and urban/rural in-migrants. According to unofficial figures, by 2019, it is estimated

[34] In planning discipline, the notion of "deprived areas" in general refers to the zones of poverty, the inner-city areas who are damaged by wars and disasters, the areas which failed to keep up with the social and economic progresses of cities that they are located, the areas which are known with bad reputations, illegal affairs and crimes, the areas in which the value of real estates is constantly decreasing, the areas which are not attracting private and public investments (Işıkkaya and Önel, 2008).

that approximately 25.000 -30.000 Syrians are now residing in and around Basmane Area (including the unregistered Syrians) (interviews with mukhtars). As an area whose social, cultural and economic identity has exposed to significant changes with respect to its changing population characteristics over the decades, Basmane is now known as "the guesthouse of Izmir" (Egepostası, 2017). The reputation of Basmane as a guesthouse became more evident during the Syrian refugee influx as Syrians have largely settled in the area. Thanks to its old, deteriorated and available housing stock and various hotels/pensions/guesthouses, Basmane has offered affordable accommodation options for Syrian refugees.

Especially for Syrians hoping to go European countries, the cheap hotels/pensions in Basmane - which were mostly transformed from the former Kortejo type of buildings - have been the most popular accommodation type. Because the hotels/pensions in Basmane have been historically hosting rural in-migrants, Afghan and Iraqi refugees in Izmir and therefore have the experience of offering different accommodation options for a range of budgets. The majority of hotels located around the famous "Hotels District" offered daily, weekly and monthly accommodation options for Syrians. Unlike the chains of touristic hotels, small hotels in Basmane allow room-sharing, over-crowd accommodations and bookings of rooms for a couple of hours. Secondly, rental housing market in Basmane is offering various short and long-term accommodation options for Syrian refugees with affordable prices (relative to other inner-city areas of Izmir) thanks to the historic but deteriorated housing stock (Öner et al., 2020) (Figure 20). Recently, with respect to the declarations of real estators, mukhtars and NGO officers in Basmane, the average rent asked from Syrians for a flat range between 600–1500 TL depending on the size, quality and location of the flats. These prices were formerly ranged between 250-300 TL in 2016 (Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016) for shanty-type houses suffering from dirt and humidity and 400-600 TL in 2018 for deprived and unfit dwellings (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018).

Another accommodation option for Syrian refugees is the overnight stays in public parks, squares and streets. This was a highly preferable option for Syrians who were engaged in smuggling activities - which necessitate them to spend some days in Izmir until the necessary arrangements were made by the smugglers. As a hotel owner in Basmane declared, hotels and pensions were nearly full until 2015 because of the over-population of Syrians waiting for smuggling operations. According to him, Syrians who could not afford to stay in hotels and daily flats, who were broke, who preferred to save money before the overseas journey either willingly or unwillingly stayed the night in public parks. Especially Kültürpark, which is the biggest inner-city park in Izmir nearby Basmane, was home to hundreds of Syrians in transit

until 2015 (Coşkun and Kılıç, 2019). An officer from ASAM Izmir also pointed out the critical role of Kültürpark by saying that

> *Especially between 2012-2014 Kültürpark was one of the symbols of Syrian refugees' suffering and desperation. Hundreds of Syrians were waiting for the day to go to Europe. Elderly people, children, women, sick people were among them. Some NGOs and informal initiatives provided food, clothing, blankets and hygiene materials for Syrians but these were quite limited. Syrians have spent various nights and days in Kültürpark by taking care of themselves.*

Figure 20: The old and deteriorated housing stock in Basmane
Source: The author

Regarding the public services, there are various public institutions (partially) addressing migration and asylum-related issues including refugees' access to basic services in Izmir. Fourteen of the nineteen public authorities, which are listed by DGMM as the important public institutions in Izmir for Syrians under temporary protection, are located in Konak District (also including Pasaport and Alsancak) and therefore in close proximity to Basmane. Especially the institutions that Syrian refugees frequently/scarcely visit, including Izmir Directorate General of Migration Management, Izmir Governorship, Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Izmir Provincial Directorate of Security and Izmir branch of the Turkish Red Crescent are all in 15-17 minutes walking distance to Basmane (Figure 21). Although public institutions are not legally allowed to grant cash allowances apart from the allowances distributed by the Red Crescent, these institutions often provide guidance and in-kind allowances and therefore facilitate refugees' access to sheltering, food and protection.



Figure 21: The location of refugee-related public institutions in and around Basmane Area

Apart from the central branches of Ministries in Izmir, local governments are also involved in the provision of some in-kind allowances for Syrians, although the amount of allowances are limited with respect to the legal restrictions imposed on local governments in addressing refugee-related issues and to reluctance of local governments in addressing the refugee-related issues (Çamur, 2017). Regarding the municipal services for Syrians, an officer from Konak District Municipality stated the following.

> *We are a distinguished municipality in addressing refugee-related issues in Izmir. According to unofficial records, there are approximately 45.000-50.000 Syrians only in Konak District, which means that besides the native inhabitants of Izmir, we are in charge of providing municipal services for Syrians…Although Syrians are not politically recognized as service recipients as Turkish citizens...Although we want to provide cash allowances to Syrians at least to cover their basic and urgent needs, we are not allowed to do it because of the related legislation. However, we try to involve in various projects developed by NGOs in Izmir and try to build an interactive platform to gather decision-makers, NGOs and Syrians to exchange experiences and develop ad-hoc implementations to address the needs of Syrians. We start campaigns to collect food, clothing, books, toys and hygiene materials to be given to Syrian refugees. However, we know that it is not enough to remedy the problems of Syrians in Izmir and especially in Basmane Area.*

With respect to public health services (according to the information taken from the official website of Izmir Provincial Directorate of Health), there are two Migrant Health Centers,

eleven Migrant Health Units, two district polyclinics, one state hospital and one training and research hospital which are quite accessible to the Syrian refugees in Basmane (Figure 22).



Figure 22: Centers of medical care for Syrian refugees in walking distance to Basmane Area

Regarding social aids for refugees, Izmir Governorship Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Office and Izmir Turkish Red Crescent Service Centre (*Izmir Türk Kızılayı Hizmet Merkezi*) - which are both located 17 minutes by walking from Basmane -, are the authoritized institutions where Syrians may apply for Kızılay Card, winter assistance, Kızılay Card – Monthly cash education support–, cash assistance for disabled persons, psycho-social support and any kind of support related to their rights (Figure 23).



Figure 23: Key spots for Syrians to apply for aid

Regarding the education services for children at school age, especially after 2016 Syrians were granted similar rights with their native peers and accordingly allowed to enroll in public schools in provinces that they are registered. Before 2016, there were five temporary education centers (TECs) for Syrians, one of which was located in Konak District (Figure 24).



Figure 24: The location of the former TEC in Konak District

In terms of public transportation, due to its inner-city central location, Basmane acts as an inter-regional and intra-urban transportation hub in which various public buses, metro, sub-urban trains and tram are operating frequently in an interconnected way to ease intra-urban daily transportation and to facilitate the users' accessibility to inter-city bus terminal, ferry ports and airport. For commerce and trade, Basmane has been historically the center of daily commerce. Especially Anafartalar Street - a long pedestrianized street connecting Izmir's commercial areas (Kemeraltı), the main public square (Konak Square), Basmane Railway Station - is the main address for retail shopping and social networking both for Syrian refugees and local people (Öner et al. 2020) (Figure 25).

Along Anafartalar Street, various local and Syrian-led shops (bakeries, groceries, barbershops, dress shops, exchange offices, coffee shops), barbers, beauty salons take place. They provide some selections of Syrian Cuisine, Syrian *shawarma* bread and deserts, clothing and hygiene items for Syrian refugees. Due to increasing population of Syrians in Basmane, local tradespeople also put signboards in Arabic in front of their shops or hang explanations in Arabic to shop windows to attract Syrian customers.



Figure 25: Anafartalar Street

The shops along Anafartalar Street not only provide cheap niche products but also act as spaces of everyday encounters for Syrians and local inhabitants (Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018). Moreover, the coffee houses, small shops, cafes and restaurants along Fevzipaşa Boulevard, Anafartalar street, Çorakkapı Mosque and Hatuniye Square became the places of bargaining and negotiation among human smugglers and transit refugees, which were quite observable even for an outsider (Figure 26). For all these reasons, as Öner et al. (2020) note, Basmane is now known as "Little Syria". Besides, as the hub of human smuggling, Basmane hosts various shops selling life jackets and daily-use phone cards. The central location of Basmane enables its residents' access to historic trade center of Izmir – Kemeraltı, the main square of Izmir where various shops are located – Konak Square and the new commercial area of Izmir – Alsancak, by walking or by public transportation.



Figure 26: The critical spots for commerce and smuggling operations in Basmane

In terms of employment, Basmane also offers diverse job opportunities for its native inhabitants and Syrian newcomers, especially in the services sectors. The existing Kurd and Arab community in Basmane, which were formed and maintained by in-migrants from Diyarbakır and Mardin provinces, guide/help Syrians in finding jobs. Although recently (by 2016), Syrians have been awarded to obtain working permits (to be employed formally), the bureaucratic procedures that are found time-consuming by the employers and the language barriers that Syrian face in labour market have resulted in few applications than expected. With respect to the figures shared by Siviş and Uzgören (2016), it is seen that approximately 680 applications were issued between 2016 and 2018 only in Izmir, which was considered quite low by the scholars when compared to the Syrian refugee population in Izmir.

Under such circumstances, the bureaucratic obstacles, the language barriers, and the urgency of finding a job to survive enforce Syrian refugees to enter informal labour market in which they are exposed to harsher ways of exploitation by the employers who mostly take the advantage of Syrians' desperation (Karadağ, 2015; Siviş and Uzgören, 2016; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016). According to Siviş and Uzgören (2016) the sectors that Syrian refugees are employed informally in Basmane are as follows: manufacturing, construction, food, electronics, wastepaper collection, other low-skilled jobs. Besides the informal labour market, entrepreneurship has increasingly becoming a trend in Basmane. Especially Syrian Arab entrepreneurs who have the financial means and connections in Basmane started to run new businesses in services sector by opening restaurants, groceries, bakeries and clothing shops. As an officer from MÜLTECİ-DER declared, Syrians who managed to save money and engage in relations with wealthier Syrian and Turkish investors and Syrians who suffered from the unfair and exploitative working conditions in Basmane (and Izmir) prefer to try their chances as entrepreneurs. The figures shared by Siviş and Uzgören (2016) confirm this claim. As the scholars state the number of newly opened enterprises in Izmir have dramatically increased from 19 (2016) to 188 (2018) in two years-time.

Regarding the social support mechanisms in Basmane, the long-lasting Kurd in-migrant network and the networks of Afghan and Iraqi refugees comes forward. Especially for Syrian newcomers who do not have any relatives and friends in Basmane, the importance of such networks is huge. As an officer from Halkların Köprüsü Derneği (People's Bridge Association) declared the Afghan refugee network in Basmane did a great job in guiding Syrian newcomers regarding where to accommodate, where to apply for aids, how to manage bureaucratic paper-works. As another significant mechanism of social support, I want to highlight the role of non-governmental organizations in Basmane who have taken active roles

in addressing refugees' needs. There are around 200 NGOs and service providers in Izmir who serve for refugees (especially for Syrians), the majority of which (125) is located close to Basmane (UNHCR, 2020). While I/NGOs in Izmir mostly address the issues where the Turkish State fail to provide (refugees' access to health, education and employment services); local informal initiatives mostly focus on the provision of small-scale in-kind food and clothing aids to Syrians.

7.2. What does Karabağlar offer to Syrian refugees?

Karabağlar is one of the central districts of Izmir which is located along southern axis of Izmir. According the figures of TUIK (2019), Karabağlar is the second crowded district in Izmir (after Buca) with a population of 480.925. Karabağlar district, one of the oldest settlements in İzmir, was named after the vineyards that were once within the borders of the district. The face of Karabağlar started to change with the industrialization and the accompanying in-migration of Kurd population from Diyarbakır and Mardin to Izmir after 1950s, and parallel to this, the agricultural and winemaking activities in the district came to an end over time. The rapid industrialization and irregular urbanization in Karabağlar (Karabağlar Belediyesi, 2020) contributed to the image of the district which stands up to today.

The small-scale ateliers which were once attracted rural in-migrants/workers have been replaced with small/medium/large size production units which are specialized mostly in furniture, textile and automotive sectors. Now, Karabağlar is known as one of leading districts specialized in home/office furnishing by hosting various firms, showrooms and production units which are mostly located along/around Yeşillik Boulevard. Parallel to the growing economy of Karabağlar District thanks to the furnishing activities, two significant industrial sites were opened on Yeşillik Boulevard: Karabağlar Industrial Site (*Karabağlar Sanayi Sitesi*) and Sixth Industrial Site (*Buca 6. Sanayi Sitesi*). Accordingly, with the advances in industry, Karabağlar has attracted workers/employers/investors to settle in due to its close proximity to the industrial sites. As the mukhtar of Yunus Emre neighborhood stated, since 1960s Karabağlar has been hosting the majority of workers in Izmir and therefore still known as a worker settlement. However, he also noted that as Izmir became crowded in time and as the inner-city settlements could not bear the increasing/additional population, the neighborhoods of Karabağlar which are located on the peripheries of Konak District (eg. Üçyol, Hatay) have gained popularity. Accordingly, the face of these neighborhoods has changed with the construction of four to ten-storey buildings, opening of various shops providing a variety of services. However, the neighborhoods that are located on the south of İhsan Alyanak Boulevard and Şehit Pilot Volkan Koçyiğit Boulevard (Karabağlar,

Yunusemre, Devrim, Günaltay, Limontepe neighborhoods) continue to remain as the representatives of worker settlements in Izmir (Figure 27). According to the mukhtar of Limontepe neighborhood, in these so-called worker settlements, the old and deprived housing stock – which contains *gecekondus* (squatter housing) - offer affordable living for its residents. He further claimed that the negative image of these neighborhoods as worker settlements and as nodes of poverty, resulted in the socio-spatial isolation of these neighborhoods from the rest of Izmir.



Figure 27: The so-called worker settlements in Karabağlar where Syrians settled in the most

The affordability of living in these neighborhoods, their proximity to industrial sites and firms/showrooms/ateliers along Yeşillik Boulevard and the existing Kurd community in them seem to attract Syrian refugees who have limited financial means and social capital. According to DGMM, the population of Syrians under temporary protection in Karabağlar is 29.971 by 2019. As various studies uncovered, Syrian refugees in Karabağlar have mostly settled in low-income neighborhoods in Karabağlar including Yunus Emre, Karabağlar, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay, Uğur Mumcu neighbourhoods, that are known as the worker settlements in the District (Figure 28) (Karadağ, 2015; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016). As further noted by Saraçoğlu and Belanger (2018), Limontepe - as an old squatter settlement homing to low- income Turkish, Kurdish and Alevi worker families – has been hosting Syrian workers who mostly employed in textile firms (in Konak and Karabağlar Districts). Complementary to this, an officer from MÜLTECİ-DER declared the following:

> *It is not surprising that Syrian Kurds prefer to settle in Limontepe, Yunusemre and the surrounding. Because the Kurdish community in there not only offers protection, a home to stay but also help Syrians to access employment in nearby industrial areas.*

The Syrian settlements in Karabağlar have gained attention especially after EU-TR deal in 2016 which resulted in the increasing Syrian population in Izmir. An officer from ASAM explained this process as follows:

> *Karabağlar has always been a hot destination for Syrians in Izmir. However, as Syrians could not turn to Syria and could not cross to Greek islands especially after 2016 and as the transit refugees in Basmane could not bear to live under bad conditions, refugees looked for the conditions where they could forge a new life and where they would earn money. As the inner-city industrial area with affordable housing, some specific neighborhoods in Karabağlar stepped forward including Limontepe, Devrim and Günaltay.*

The old and deprived housing stock and the squatter housing in Karabağlar provide affordable accommodation options for Syrian refugees who have limited income and economic sources. In Karabağlar, flat rental and sub-letting applications are popular ways of accessing accommodation for refugees. Apart from affordable accommodation options, similar to Konak District, Syrian refugees in Karabağlar can benefit from health, education, social aids and transportation services following the national regulations. As the other municipalities Karabağlar District Municipality is not allowed to give cash allowances to Syrian refugees. Within this limited frame of operation, The Municipality rarely organizes food and clothing campaigns for Syrians and often contributes to projects of some NGOs addressing the issues of Syrians in Izmir (e.g., *Yaşama Köprü Kur* Project). Similarly, the district governorship of Karabağlar has organized few campaigns to collect stationery equipment and clothing for Syrian children at the school age (Karabağlar District Governorship, 2020). For education services, Syrian children at school are given the right to enroll to public schools by 2016. However, before 2016, Syrian children in Karabağlar District were expected enroll to two temporary education centers located within the district boundaries (Figure 28).



Figure 28: The location of the former TECs in Karabağlar District

Regarding health services, Syrians take medical care from one Migrant Health Center, twelve Migrant Health Units, three district polyclinics and two training and research hospitals that are located in Karabağlar District (Figure 29).



Figure 29: Centers of medical care for Syrian refugees in Karabağlar District

To reach out state-funded aid, including Kızılay Card, winter assistance, monthly cash education support, cash assistance for disabled persons, Syrians under temporary protection may apply to the two authorized institutions as Izmir Governorship Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Office and Izmir Turkish Red Crescent Service Centre (Türk Kızılayı Hizmet Merkezi) in Konak District.

For commerce and trade, Karabağlar is well known by the furniture showrooms and shops providing automotive spare parts that are located along Yeşillik Boulevard. Since these two sectors are the heart of local economy of Karabağlar, the services sector in the district have been organized accordingly. To say, instead of cafes, restaurants, clothing shops, coffeehouses, supermarkets etc., there are several artisan restaurants specifically targeting the workers in the industrial sites as primary customers, firms selling sub-industry products for furniture and automobile and local groceries and markets serving for the inhabitants of Karabağlar.

The furniture, textile and automative firms/showrooms/ateliers along the Yeşillik Boulevard and in the Karabağlar Industrial Site and the Sixth Industrial Site not only contribute to the

development of services sector in the district but also vitalize the local economy by providing employment opportunities both for its native and Syrian inhabitants. Depending on their skills and qualifications, Syrian refugees are mostly employed informally in textile, furniture, automotive and transportation firms (Siviş and Uzgören, 2016). Accordingly, the scale of production and the developed human and economic capital in the Karabağlar District act as pull factors for Syrian refugees to settle in there.

Regarding the support and solidarity mechanisms that provide cash or in-kind support for Syrian refugees, the Kurdish community ranks at the top. As the mukhtars of Günaltay, Devrim and Limontepe highlighted Kurd people in Karabağlar traditionally take care of each other for decades. The community is quite informal in which the members share food, money when necessary and help the ones who are in need of accommodation, job, income and emotional support. The same is also valid for Syrian Kurds as well. Again, as the mukhtars claim, rural Kurd in-migrants of 1960s, 1970s and 1990s now take care of Syrian refugees who struggling to start a new life in Izmir. As the other social support mechanism, NGOs operating in Izmir often address the issues of Syrian refugees residing in Karabağlar, however, there are no NGOs directly located and operating in Karabağlar.

7.3. What does Buca offer to Syrian refugees?

Buca, as an old settlement located at the southern axis of Izmir - neighboring Karabağlar, is the most crowded district in Izmir with a population of 510.695 by 2019 (TUIK, 2020). The center of Buca is in 8.8 kilometers to Konak Square (Izmir Watch Tower) and 9.7 kilometers to Alsancak. With respect to Syrian influx to Izmir, Buca became one the hot destinations for Syrian refugees by hosting 15.200 refugees by 2019 (DGMM, 2020). However, Syrian population in Buca is not even, but is concentrated in two neighborhoods, namely, Gediz and Yıldız (Figure 30). To better understand why Syrian refugees have concentrated in these neighborhoods, first I need to briefly go over the economic, social and spatial characteristics of Buca.

The history of Buca dates back to Roman Empire but the area is well known with its multi-ethnic character by homing to Rum, Turk, Levantine, Jewish, Dutch and English populations from eighteenth century till the population exchange in 1922 (The District Municipality of Buca, 2020a). After the exchange, various migrant groups coming from Balkans were settled in Buca and reshaped the social, cultural and economic relations in the area. With the arrival of rural in-migrants to Izmir, Buca became one of the hot destinations for them with its small-scale but growing industry, agriculture and husbandry activities. The rapid and uneven squatter

housing type of development in the peripheral neighborhoods in the area (e.g. Gediz neighborhood) have changed the historical prosperous image of the district. Now, the economy of district depends on the commerce, small-scale industry, agriculture, husbandry and forestry activities. While the commercial and industrial activities are concentrated along Yeşillik and Akçay Boulevard and other urbanized parts of the district; the agriculture, husbandry and forestry activities are spread to the rural areas in Buca. Industry is the backbone of Buca's economy. BEGOS Organized Industrial Site (Buca Ege Giyim Organize Sanayi Bölgesi) and Buca Sixth Industrial Site (*Buca 6. Sanayi Sitesi*) are the main units of industrial production and employment. While the former specialized in clothing and textile, the latter is known as "Otokent / Autocity" and operates in auto maintenance and automotive supply industry. These two main industrial sites and other sub-industries developed in the area are the main sources of employment in which Syrian refugees are also employed. According to Siviş and Uzgören (2016), Syrians in Buca are mostly engage in labour market by accepting to work informally in manufacturing, construction, furniture, transportation, textile and automotive sectors in Buca.



Figure 30: The locations of Gediz and Yıldız neighborhoods

Apart from the employment opportunities, Syrian refugees in Buca District may access to health, education and municipal services provided in the area in accordance with the national legislation. Additionally, Buca District Municipality organizes and engages in various events/projects addressing the needs of its Syrian inhabitants. The most well-known project

was the establishment of "Refugee Support Desk" (Mülteci Destek Masası) in the beginning 2019 which was the joint project of UNHCR and the municipality. The municipality declared that they reached 3.486 Syrian refugees in a year. The desk played critical roles in the provision of counselling services for legal issues and services, in the identification and guidance of families in need, in the initiation of social harmony projects (The District Municipality of Buca, 2020b). However, despite some efforts to raise campaigns for meeting the food, clothing, heating needs of Syrians, just like other municipalities, Buca District Municipality did not provide cash allowances to them. The refugee-related in-kind activities of the Municipality, therefore, remain inadequate to remedy the problems that Syrians' face in their new social environment in Buca.

In terms of the medical care services, Syrians may benefit from the health services in one Migrant Health Center, two Migrant Health Unit, one state hospital, one district polyclinic and one training and research hospital which are existent within the district boundaries (Figure 31).



Figure 31: Centers of medical care for Syrian refugees in Buca District

For social aids including Kızılay Card, winter assistance, monthly cash education support–, cash assistance for disabled persons, Syrians under temporary protection may apply to the two authorized institutions as Izmir Governorship Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Office and Izmir Turkish Red Crescent Service Centre (*Türk Kızılayı Hizmet Merkezi*) in Konak District. For education, Syrian children at school age may enroll to the public schools

serving in the district by 2016. Before 2016, Syrians were expected to enroll the temporary education center in Buca (Figure 32).



Figure 32: The location of the former TEC in Buca District

Regarding the commercial activities, Buca offers limited services for its inhabitants including local market, groceries, coffee and teahouses which address basic daily needs of its inhabitants. Despite the existence of various university faculties in the area, student-oriented commercial activities still remain inadequate to vitalize the economy of the district. Students and inhabitants of Buca prefer to go Konak District for commercial activities. Regarding the operation of civil society and solidarity mechanisms for Syrian refugees, there are no formal initiatives that are operating in Buca. Syrians in Buca mostly benefit from the services of NGOs and solidarity initiatives that are in Konak District.

As the main channel of solidarity, the Islamic (religious) network in Gediz neighborhood comes forward. Although this network does not have a formal identity (e.g., as a foundation, initiative, association) it is well known in the area. Based on the declarations of the neighborhood mukhtar, Syrian inhabitants and local tradesman, this network refers to the informal gatherings of the İmam (the religious leader in a mosque), some oldest inhabitants of Gediz who express themselves as highly-committed to Kur'an, some local tradesman and the members of some congregations established for different sects. The network is quite powerful in Gediz since it organizes several weekly informal gatherings where the participants share food, clothing and even money with each other, learn Kur'an, comment on the requirements of Islam and how to channel young people and children to follow the principles of Islam. The network is also powerful for reproducing the social relations in Gediz. For example,

"outsiders" who are not a relative, acquaintance, colleague of the inhabitants of Gediz and especially the ones who are thought to be "infidel" are not welcomed at all. They cannot easily rent a house, open a shop and even engage in daily interactions with the natives. Even if such profiles settle in the area (due to the close proximity of Gediz to surrounding industrial sites and affordability of housing), the social pressure put on them make them move from Gediz. Accordingly, while the existence of such a poweful Islamic community is an asset for its inhabitants, it is a source of threat for others.

So far, I briefly discussed the role of Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts in Syrian refugee mobility and emplacement processes in Izmir. I also uncovered the social, economic, spatial and cultural characteristics of these settlements to better understand the why refugees prefer to settle in these areas, the most. In the following sub-chapter, with regards to this pre-discussion, I will draw the intra-urban location choices of Syrian refugees in Izmir by tracing their housing pathways from their first days in Izmir and onwards. I devote special attention to the population mobility between these three settlements to better draw the motives behind the relocations of Syrian refugees within Izmir.

7.4. Intra-urban mobility and location choices of Syrian refugees in Izmir

As discussed in Chapter 5, Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts come forward as the three leading settlements, where Syrian refugees have settled remarkably. By 2019, they host 35587, 29971 and 15200 Syrians under temporary protection, respectively, which is corresponding to the 56% of total number of registered Syrians in Izmir (DGMM, 2020). Despite having different social, economic, cultural and spatial characteristics, these settlements not only witnessed remarkable refugee influxes but also observable population exchanges among them. With regards to the initial location choices of the sampling in Izmir, I figured out that twenty-one Syrians (out of the total thirty-one) initially settled in Basmane (Table 24). Sixteen of them are pioneers who initially settled in Basmane before 2016, while the remaining five are subsequent comers after 2016.

On the other hand, five respondents declared that they initially settled in Karabağlar and other five respondents stated that they initially settled in Buca (Figure 33). Regarding the current locations of the sampling, Basmane comes forward by hosting twelve Syrian refugees, which is followed by Karabağlar (nine respondents) and Buca (nine respondents) (Figure 34). When these two figures are to be compared roughly, it is seen that although there is a balance between the three districts in terms of current location choices for refugees, Basmane has a noticeable predominance in the initial location choices of refugees.

Table 24: Initial and current settlements of Syrian respondents in Izmir

	Basmane Area		Karabağlar D.		Buca D.		Total
	Initial	Current	Initial	Current	Initial	Current	
Syrian Arabs	8	4	0	0	5	9	13
Syrian Kurds	6	3	5	8	0	0	11
Syrian Turkmens	7	6	0	1	0	0	7
Total	21	13	5	9	5	9	31



Figure 33: Initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Izmir



Figure 34: Current locations of Syrian respondents in Izmir

7.4.1. Basmane Area as the initial location in Izmir

As said above, Basmane comes forward as the most popular initial destination in Izmir for the sampling. With its central and strategic location, public/private/voluntary services, diverse accommodation options, multi-ethnic character and migration history/culture, Basmane has attracted both short-term and long-term Syrian refugees in Izmir. As an officer from Konak Municipality noted "Basmane was home to refugees and will continue to be. Its centrality, deprived environment and migration culture will continue to attract future refugees". Similarly, a local politician and a former member of Kapılar Initiative explained why Basmane is strongly associated with the refugee-related situations in Izmir with the following words:

> *Basmane is the hub of local initiatives and civil society organizations who address social issues especially the issues of poverty, social exclusion, immigration, displacement and asylum. Therefore, the area is well known by refugees who plan to or already came to Izmir. Moreover, different ethnic groups live in Basmane for decades have contributed to the cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic and colourful demography of Basmane which has attracted not only Syrians but also Iraqis, Palestinians, Afghans, Iranians, Turkmens and many others. Of course, the affordability of life in Basmane due to its old, dilapidated, out-of-date physical environment…but at the same time the employment opportunities, houses, commercial services it offers to refugees are to be counted among pull factors for Syrians.*

Similar to the statements above, an officer of Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği stated that

> *Basmane is like a big and crowded guesthouse. It offers variety of accommodation options for Syrian newcomers although the pricing of these options often become exploitative…What I would like to point out that, those who are broke sleeps in the park at nights, those who have a little money spends the night in a hotel room with money others, those who have money can rent a house. All of them can only happen in Basmane in Izmir, not in another area.*

In line with these arguments, now I will give voice to Syrian refugees to hear why and how they initially settled in Basmane from their own words. To keep coherency of discussion, I will refer to Table 25 which lists the motives (codes) of intra-urban initial location choices of Syrians in Basmane by the frequency of mention.

According to Table 25, the leading motive behind Syrians' initial settlement to Basmane is related to accommodation/housing. Twenty respondents (out of twenty-one) highlighted the affordability of different accommodation/housing options in the area as the leading motive behind their settlement. More specifically, seven respondents claimed that rental housing prices were affordable when they had initially settled there, six respondents mentioned the price of booking hotel rooms in Basmane was cheap when compared to other central parts of

Izmir, five respondents explained that they were hosted by their relatives/friends/other refugees for free and the two respondents stated that they shared a single flat with other refugees with affordable prices. Regarding the first, Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) made the following explanation, which includes the main idea of the other six respondents' arguments:

> *When I decided to move to Izmir, I searched the housing prices in Izmir from the internet. I also read the refugee-related manuals and some news to have an idea of the characteristics of settlement. I learned that Basmane is an old but refugee-friendly neighborhood with various old houses for rent. When compared to other neighborhoods, I found the prices cheap and directly came and settled in Basmane.*

Table 25: The motives behind settling in Basmane as the initial location in Izmir

Affordability of accommodation Rental housing : 7 Hotel / pension : 6 Free accommodation: 5 Flat-sharing : 2	20
Availability of the rental housing stock	12
Existence and support of relatives / family members	13
Proximity to relatives / family members	13
Existence and operation of humanitarian agencies	12
Existence of human smuggling operations	9
Strategic location in the Aegean Region and Izmir	9
Existence and support of pioneer Syrians	7
Existence and support of refugee / asylum seeker network –	6
Existence and support of (ethnic) solidarity networks / communities	6
Existence of employment and income-generating activities -	5
Proximity to (potential) workplaces	5
Existence and support of friends / acquaintances	3
Proximity to public services	3
Existence and availability of public services – health	3
Existence and availability of public services – education	2
Total	**21**

Secondly, Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) touched upon the availability and cheapness of booking a hotel room, especially in initial years of the Syrian refugee influx. He stated that as a single refugee hoping to go to Europe at those times, he was attracted with the cheap prices asked for a room in "Basmane Hotels District". He noted that while he was having lunch in a cheap restaurant in Konak Square (the main square of Izmir) in his first day in Izmir, he asked the waiter to guide him in finding a cheap accommodation for three weeks. Karim said that "*The waiter immediately told me that I would directly go to Basmane where there are various cheap hotels, pensions and guesthouses for refugees and poor people like me*." Similarly, Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) stated that

> *…As a well-known fact, the hotels around the main railway stations are the most cost-effective ones. It is like a tradition in middle east countries. Although I did not know*

anything about Basmane, I checked whether the prices are ok or not via the internet. Of course, I was right. Me and my family directly settled in one pension room in Basmane.

Thirdly, five respondents declared that they initially came to Basmane since their relatives, family members, friends and acquaintances offered them free accommodation in their own houses for some time. Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) exemplified this as follows:

…After several calls from my distant relatives in Izmir, me and my children migrated to there. My relatives offered me their old, small and one-room house to live for some time, until I managed to find a job and get in a better house. That was a good offer and was very convincing because I knew that I could not afford to rent a house with my very little savings from Syria.

Fourthly, as Serhad *(*Kurd, male, 25 years old) mentioned flat-sharing tradition of refugees in Basmane was quite attractive for him, since he could not afford to pay the rent of a whole flat but a small one which he was sharing with at least ten other "Syrians sharing the same destiny with him". Besides the affordability of diverse housing/accommodation options, twelve respondents highlighted the availability of the rental housing stock in Basmane as the motive behind their settlement to Basmane. The most well-known options were the rental of whole flats, illegal/informal rental of inactive spaces in buildings (e.g., storages in basements), the rental of rooms in flats and the sub-letting applications. Especially for the first, even the flats in deteriorated buildings which do not have proper infrastructure and even windows and/or doors were rented by Syrian refugees who temporarily seek for a shelter. Thanks to the old, historic and abandoned housing stock in Basmane, the realtors, homeowners and investors took the advantage of renting their no-demand flats to Syrian refugees with prices over their actual market values. Salim (Turkmen, male, 60 years old) explained the importance of finding a shelter with the following sentences.

…For an old man like me, moving about different locations to find a rentable house could be very exhausting. Therefore, Basmane was the best option for me since there were various type of rentals ranging from fancy flats to storages with humidity. Although prices were a bit high and some realtors try to swindle refugees, Basmane was the heaven of rental housing.

As the other motives of settling in Basmane, thirteen respondents highlighted the existence and support of their relatives/family members in Basmane. Both for pioneer and subsequent comers, the guidance, financial and in-kind support of relatives, a room to spend the initial days, the use of the same language in everyday conversations were indeed important. Because especially those who have limited information about the destination settlement and who lack financial means to start a new life; the guidance, support and hosting of relatives/family members become quite decisive in intra-urban location choices. Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) explained this as follows.

If my relatives weren't living in Basmane, I would go where they are. Basmane is only a name for me, what matters is the existence of my relatives who take care of me and my family… Let me briefly say how important they are. First, they picked us from bus terminal, they hosted us for six months in a one-room flat until I found a job. They gave us food, water and even their clothes for us to wear. Although we are not living together now, they still ask whether we need something or not.

Similarly, Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) explained that they (as a family) migrated to Basmane in 2017 since, their relatives convinced them to migrate to Izmir where their children may enroll public schools and get proper education. Samir further noted the following:

Basmane is in the heart of Izmir…My cousins live in Basmane and they know how my twin girls can get good education which is vital for their future in Turkey. My cousins said that they could enroll my kids to the school where their own children were enrolled. They also said that they could cover the expenses of my kids. Our existence in Basmane is the result of the intimate call of my cousins.

As other eleven respondents highlighted the existence of their relatives/family members, who have already settled in Basmane, is one the leading pull factors. Because these people help Syrian newcomers to forge a new life by covering their expenses, giving emotional support and facilitate their access to public services. In this way, relatives/family members seem to address a variety of issues that the State/central and local governments are supposed to address. Therefore, it is not surprising that all these thirteen respondents preferred to settle close their relatives, a motive that brought them to Basmane. As another motive of settling Basmane, twelve respondents explained how the existence and operation of humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and local solidarity initiatives played decisive roles in their location choices. Especially in the partial absence of public authorities to address Syrians' access to public services, it seems that humanitarian agencies (regardless of their type, scale and aim) play critical roles in addressing refugee-related issues, according to the respondents. For example, seven (out of twelve) respondents claimed that they queried the voluntary or NGO-driven services that are existent in Izmir and made their final decisions accordingly. Although the existence and operation of NGOs was not the leading motive behind their settlement in Basmane, it seems that the NGOs addressing refugee-related issues remarkably influenced the initial location choices of Syrians. Among various in-kind services offered by NGOs (food, clothing, social events, psychological support, language support etc.), the guidance and counselling services come forward in the narratives of the respondents. Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) exemplified this as follows.

…No matter what I'm in a foreign country. I do not know Turkish, I do not understand Turkish. Who would I go to when I need something? At this point Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği act as a connecting bridge. It connects me to life, to health services in Izmir. God bless every people I met there…They showed me how to register for aid

services, how to get appointments from hospitals. The State would have done this but instead, the association helped me.

From another point of view, Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) stated that refugee-related NGOs not only address the issues of long-term refugees, but also of refugees who plan to resettle in another country. Rojhad explicitly reported that

I came to Izmir to cross to Greek islands and to learn how I manage to do this with no harm. I applied to ASAM and Kapılar. They were all in and around Basmane and I settled Basmane with the intention of a short stay. Especially ASAM told me my rights and the ways to follow to formally go to Europe. Although I could not leave Turkey, I still appreciate their effort.

Stemming from the arguments of Rojhad, I want to discuss the strategic location and role of Basmane in overseas journeys to Greek islands and European countries. As nine respondents stated Basmane is the hub of international Syrian mobility with the human smuggling operations concentrated in the area. According to Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old), Basmane is an "interesting" settlement in the center of Izmir, where refugees can negotiate with human smugglers in cafes, drink coffee with smugglers and buy life vendors from local shops. Faruq further noted that despite the visibility of all these illegal smuggling operations in Basmane, the "public forces" are not intervening in them. In addition, Abdulbaki (Arab, male, 60 years old) declared that he knew Basmane before he came there only because its reputation as the center of hope for migrating to Europe.

The other motive behind Syrians' initial settlement to Basmane is the existence of informal social support mechanisms. To say, seven respondents highlighted how the pioneer Syrians, existent refugee networks and ethnic solidarity networks in Basmane affected their initial location choices. The respondents all touched upon the emotional support that these networks provided during their initial settlement in Basmane. The informality in communication and interaction and the intimacy in daily dialogues made refugees trust to these networks. The pioneer Syrians who have settled in Basmane in the earlier periods of Syrian refugee influx to Turkey were the key actors behind the chain migration, since they shared their knowledge and experiences of settling in Basmane with Syrian newcomers via various channels including informal chat, social media platforms. For example, Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) told me that he contacted pioneer Syrians through the social media to ask whether Izmir and especially Basmane – where the pioneers live – are suitable for the practice of Islam without any intervention. After several questions regarding Basmane, he said that he was convinced to settle in Basmane. From another point of view, Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old) stated that after the discrimination she faced in housing and labour market in Gaziantep by native

inhabitants of the city, she decided to settle in Izmir with the guidance of her neighbours. However, she had limited knowledge on Izmir at those times. She said that to gain knowledge about Izmir and to learn where she would search for rental housing, she contacted with a pioneer Syrian via Facebook. As Zekire said the pioneer Syrian, who is an old and helpful lady at her fifties, convinced her to come and settle in Basmane where she also lives. According to Zekire, this lady not only guided her but also provided a room in her flat for free. Zekire pointed out that this lady continues to present her support to her which she really appreciates.

Similar to the support presented by the pioneer Syrians, the existing refugee/asylum-seeker networks in Basmane (which are mostly composed of long-term Afghan and Iranian refugees) come forward as important pull factors for Syrians. The knowledge shared by this refugee networks, the migration culture developed in Basmane which has been developed with the experiences of these long-term refugees attract Syrian newcomers who have limited support, financial means and knowledge to forge a new life in a new social environment. Vahap (Arab, male, 42 years old) – a Syrian entrepreneur who came to Izmir to run a new business with his partners – said that he came to Basmane to make a market survey to see whether their business initiative would be successful or not. He explains the process as follows:

> *…I had limited knowledge of Izmir before I came and learn how things work in Izmir… To make a market survey for my new business, I came to Izmir. While I was chatting with the owner of a restaurant who is an Afghan… speaking good English…He told me that refugee population in Basmane needs refugee-owned shops which sell goods for refugee customers with affordable prices. He told me that he could inform his Afghan network to find someone who could help in finding a location in Basmane. Our relation started this way. Later on, this Afghan network helped me to move to Basmane, to find a house, to carry my belongings to my house, to deal with the bureaucratic aspects of opening a new grocery store. Thanks to them, I settled in Basmane.*

Similarly, a Syrian officer from Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği shared his own experience with the members of the Afghan network, as follows:

> *When I came here, I did not have a single contact. All I know was that I escaped from the violence, abuse and deaths in Syria and I needed stay in a safe place. I came to Izmir because I thought that I would try to smuggle to go to Europe. However, I stayed there because Basmane provided everything I need. The two Afghan refugees I met in a café, to whom I could speak English with, helped me to start a new life there. They hosted me in their crowded house, they gave me food, they guided me how to reach social aids. Now, I do the same for Syrians who are not as lucky as me.*

Just like the refugee networks, the ethnic solidarity networks in Basmane (which are formed and maintained mostly by the members of some specific ethnic groups) play critical roles in influencing the initial location choices of Syrians in Izmir. As six respondents argued, the Kurd and Arab networks in Basmane attracted Syrian newcomers who feel belonged one of

these networks. Especially the Kurd network, which was formed and strengthened with the efforts of rural Kurd in-migrants from Diyarbakır and Mardin encouraged, attracted Syrian Kurds to settle in Basmane. Similarly, the network of Arab rural in-migrants from Mardin acted as a magnet for Syrian Arabs who have limited financial means and connections in Izmir. These networks played significant parts in covering refugees' accommodation, food and clothing needs, in helping refugees' engagement to labour market in guiding refugees regarding how they access services and how to handle bureaucratic procedures.

As another motive mentioned by five Syrian respondents, we see the importance of the existence of employment and income-generating activities in Basmane. Especially for refugees in transit, finding short-term jobs to save money for the smuggling costs is very crucial. From another perspective, Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old), as a subsequent comer, said that he consciously preferred to settle in Basmane to remain close to employment opportunities (especially in shoe-making) in a refugee-friendly settlement like Basmane. He said that he learned how the labour market works for refugees in Izmir. He further noted that remaining close to job market increase the chance to be employed, as follows:

> *My intention of coming to Turkey, Istanbul, Kocaeli and Izmir was always related to finding a proper job to cover the expenses of my family. I'm good at construction and before I came to Izmir… I learned that employees come to Basmane and select construction workers among Syrians on weekly basis…Although the offered wages are low, I needed to get any job which pays me money. As you see, I came Basmane to find a job.*

As understood from the arguments of Seyyid, residing close to workplaces and employment opportunities is an important spatial factor of refugees' initial location choices. Similarly, the existence and availability of public services (health, education, aids, transportation etc.) and the close proximity to these public services were also highlighted by three respondents as the motives behind their settlement in Basmane.

7.4.2. Karabağlar (District) as the initial location in Izmir

As the second local focus of the research, I would like to discuss why Karabağlar District has been attracting Syrian refugees to come and settle there. Before the discussion, I want to recall the fact that not all neighborhoods in Karabağlar are to be settled by refugees. As will be remembered, there are some specific neighborhoods that Syrians have specifically concentrated. These neighborhoods are Yunus Emre, Karabağlar, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay, Uğur Mumcu neighbourhoods. (Karadağ, 2015; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2018; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016).

Five Syrian respondents (one pioneer, four subsequent) declared that their initial settlement in Izmir was the Karabağlar District. Before jumping to the location choice narratives of these five respondents, it is worth to give voice to public, NGO officers and mukhtars to gain broader information about the attractiveness of the area for Syrian refugees. An officer from Karabağlar Municipality declared that

> *…Actually, Karabağlar has recently gained popularity as a liveable neighborhood for refugee populations. The profile of Karabağlar has to do with this trend. I mean, firstly, Karabağlar historically served for Kurd in-migrants from Diyarbakır. Because the growing industry in the district created job opportunities for the newcomers. Accordingly, gecekondus have been concentrated nearby these industrial areas and became the home of Kurd workers… Although in the last decades Karabağlar is attracting other ethnic populations, our district is still known by its strong Kurdish identity. Therefore, especially Syrian Kurds who are either the distant relatives or acquaintances of the Kurd inhabitants of Karabağlar came and settled in Karabağlar. We do not know the exact numbers because of the unregistered Syrian population but I can honestly say that we observe a significant increase in Syrian population in the southern neighborhoods of Karabağlar especially after 2016, when some Syrians who were planning to go to Greek islands did not manage to go.*

Complementary to the declarations of the municipal officer, and the mukhtar of Devrim Neighborhood – as a popular destination of Syrians - stated the following.

> *…Yes, Karabağlar became a hot destination for Syrian refugees, especially to those who fled from the chaos and crowd of Basmane. Of course, I know some Syrians who directly and firstly came there but the number of them is low. However, Karabağlar is like the second spring of Syrians who experienced the dirt, chaos, dilapidation, exploitation, swindling, discrimination, insult in Basmane. I honestly say that because Syrians in my neighborhood told me so. I can speak Kurdish and I can understand them. What attracts Syrians the most in Karabağlar is the strong and long-lasting Kurdish community who are welcoming Syrian Kurds mostly…The quality and affordability of housing and job opportunities in nearby industrial area in textile, automotive, construction, paper collection, furniture sectors also attracted Syrians who plan to settle there permanently.*

The topics highlighted above by the municipal officer and the mukhtars match with the key findings that I derived from the narratives of the Syrian respondents (Table 26). First of all, five respondents, who stated that their initial settlement in Izmir is Karabağlar, mentioned that the main motive behind their settlement was the existence and support of their relatives/family members in Karabağlar. The existence of relatives attracted newcomers since these relatives fulfil many tasks that public authorities and even NGOs fail to address. The relatives who had already engaged in social and economic relations in Karabağlar played critical roles in facilitating newly arrived refugees' integration to their new social environment and in covering their basic needs as accommodation, food, heating etc. Secondly, four respondents touched upon the existence and support of Kurd network in Karabağlar as an important pull factor. As a pioneer Syrian Avjin (Kurd, female, 20 years old) stated that due to the strong Kurd network

in Karabağlar which still has powerful connections with the Kurds in Mardin, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Hakkari, Van, her parents arranged her a marriage with a Kurd man (having Turkish citizenship) to ensure her safety in Izmir. She explained this as follows:

> *…My marriage was a pre-planned one but that's okey. The main reason behind my marriage and my settlement in Karabağlar was the existence of powerful Kurd network of which my husband is a member. The members of this network take care of each other, solve each other's problems, share food and experience, protects the Kurdish identity and so on…*

Table 26: The motives behind settling in Karabağlar District as the initial location in Izmir

Existence and support of relatives / family members	5
Proximity to relatives / family members	5
Existence and support of (ethnic) solidarity networks / communities	4
Affordability of accommodation	3
Existence of employment and income-generating activities	3
Proximity to (potential) workplaces	3
Calm and secure living environment	1
Existence and availability of public services – education	1
Total	**5**

Malak *(*Kurd, female, 40 years old) also pointed out that her main motivation to settle in Karabağlar was the existence of the Kurd community. According to Malak, for a refugee who wants to settle permanently in a specific locality, a solidarity network that takes care the newcomers is a must. She came to this conclusion by drawing that she could not get any support and guidance from the Turkish State regarding accommodation and settlement processes which made her query how she could manage to survive and leave in Turkey – a country that she has limited information about. She further stated that if she somehow could not get in touch with the Kurd community in Izmir, she would never come and settle in Karabağlar. The existence of a caring and powerful Kurd network convinced her that her urgent needs would be covered by the community.

Affordability of the rental prices in Karabağlar comes forward as another pull factor for Syrians (according to three respondents out of five). The old and partially deteriorated *gecekondu* type of buildings, aged to new three-four storey buildings, the buildings evacuated due to urban transformation constitute the affordable housing stock of Karabağlar (Figure 35). The mukhtar of Günaltay neighborhood explains why housing is considered to be affordable with the following words.

> *Karabağlar has been the home of worker class for decades. Especially the Kurdish population who have been employed in various sectors including construction, agriculture, automotive spare parts, cleaning, garbage collection, textile, furniture, auto maintenance and so on have all lived in Karabağlar District…To say, the outskirts of Karabağlar – especially the southern part - had never become fancy settlements to attract*

rich people. They are known as low-income outskirt neighborhoods where housing and other services are designed mostly for worker class…That's why housing prices are on average and affordable for many. When you look at where Syrians settle the most, these neighborhoods at outskirts come forward.

Figure 35: Samples from the building characteristic in Karabağlar

Building on the mukhtar's argument I want to further discuss the role of employment opportunities in Karabağlar as important pull factors, which are mostly arisen from the small to large scale industrial activities in the district. As three respondents highlighted, Karabağlar offers various low to high-skill job opportunities for Syrians in furnishing and construction sectors. Thinking that she was usurping the rights of local workers by accepting to work under market conditions, Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) said that her access to job market was the most crucial motive behind her settlement in Karabağlar. She continued as the following:

…As a single brave Syrian woman, I needed to stand upon my own feet. I do not want to go back Syria…to the center of misery…I will stay there, be strong and continue…To do this, I need a proper job to guarantee my future. For that reason, I came and settled the area (Karabağlar) where I have the highest chance to find a job matching my skills. Being in close to industrial areas along Yeşillik Street means that I can hear any job opportunities from the tradespeople and grocery, I can immediately go for any job call and so on...

Apart from employment opportunities, respondents also mentioned the calmness and secure environment in Karabağlar and the existence of education services for the children at school age as the motives behind initially settling in Karabağlar.

7.4.3. Buca (District) as the initial location in Izmir

Buca, the most crowded district of Izmir, hosts 15200 Syrians under temporary protection by 2019 (TUK, 2020). Just like Karabağlar, Buca District has become one of the hottest destinations of Syrians especially after the EU-TR deal in 2016 which blocked the illegal overseas journeys of the refugees to Greek islands. Despite the media coverage and local political discourses on how Buca has turning out to be a Syrian settlement, Syrian population in Buca is concentrated in two specific neighborhoods: Gediz and Yıldız. According to muktar of Gediz neighborhood, the Syrian population in the neighborhood increased gradually and reached its peaks after 2017. As the mukhtar asserted the most important motive behind is the suitability of the neighborhood's religious and cultural characteristics for Syrian refugees to settle in. He said that

> *Our neighborhood…composed of Turkish Arabs and Turkish people…their common characteristic can be seen in their love and passion to their country and their commitment to Islam. We have a small but powerful community in which kinship relations are strong, where marriages happen between local families. Therefore, we are a closed community…to outside. However, recently, we open our arms to anyone and especially Syrians who are respectful to our values.*

Regarding my sampling, five Arab respondents (out of twenty-one), who I labelled as subsequent comers, stated that they initially settled in Buca as their first destination in Izmir. In parallel to the arguments of the mukhtar, three of them said that the existence of their family members, who had settled in Buca, prepared the necessary grounds for the chain migration. Ayşe (Arab, female, 18 years old) explained how his brother who had settled in Gediz neighborhood two years before her settlement affected her settlement in Gediz, with the following sentences:

> *My brother is three years older than me. After we lost our father, he became the leader of the family. For that reason, first he came to Izmir alone. He learned how to register, how to go to hospital…university conditions…first he stayed in a crowded flat with other Syrians who he met in Izmir. Then he found a job and in time rented his own flat. Then he called me and said that he arranged everything. All I had to do was packing and illegally smuggle to Turkey. I did that.*

Secondly, as seen in Table 27, three respondents highlighted the affordability of rental housing in Buca District, in general. Fatıma (Arab, female, 27 years old) said that although she and her family came to Buca to be hosted by their distant relatives for a while, she was also attracted by the affordability of housing in the area. She said that "the average rental prices in Buca

were affordable for our budget. Moreover, the housing quality is much better than other areas with similar rental prices." Thirdly, two respondents highlighted their cultural similarities with the local inhabitants of Gediz as a factor of attraction. In specific, they mentioned how the conservative and religious way of living in Gediz neighborhood with respect to Islam influenced their location choices. Eslem (Arab, female, 20 years old) stated that

> *…I'm a religious woman and I live accordingly…we specifically came and settled in Gediz…I learned the neighborhood from other Syrians in Izmir whom I met on Facebook. The Islamic community is wise and good, the trade and daily relations are all in line with Islam. We specifically searched for such a place where we would practice my religion freely*.

Table 27: The motives behind settling in Buca District as the initial location in Izmir

Existence and support of relatives / family members	3
Proximity to relatives / family members	3
Affordability of accommodation – free accommodation	3
Cultural similarities with the inhabitants	2
Conservative / religious way of living	2
Total	**5**

7.5. Actors affecting/influencing the initial location choice in Izmir

Regarding the actors who affected/influenced the initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Izmir, I derived fourteen different types of actors from the narratives of the respondents (both for Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca). Although some respondents did not directly mention any actor as someone who shaped their decisions, they indirectly give some names in explaining where they initially settled and how they accessed their first accommodation/housing in Izmir. I also include them in my analysis of actors.

As seen in Table 28, the relatives/family members of the Syrian respondents are the most critical actors in shaping newcomers' initial settlement in Basmane. As discussed previously, these actors provide the necessary grounds of physical and economic survival for the newcomers. These actors address a variety of issues that public authorities (central to local) and NGOs fail to address. They provide initial accommodation (by giving a whole flat for free, flat-sharing, room-sharing etc.), in-kind support (food, clothing etc.) and cash support (giving/lending money) for refugees. These actors also enable refugees' access the services and resources they need by engaging them their own social networks. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the majority of Syrian respondents preferred to settle in Basmane where their relatives/family members had already settled and ready to offer emotional and economic support.

Secondly, as we saw in the narratives of Samir and Zekire, pioneer Syrians who had settled and already engaged in the social and economic relations embedded in Basmane affected seven respondents' initial settlement in Basmane. The interesting thing is that these pioneer refugees are mostly strangers they meet online, not the respondents' acquaintances or friends. As all these seven respondents claim, talking to a stranger who have already passed the desired paths urged them to rethink and/redesign their plans. Rojin (Kurd, female, 30 years old) explained the role of pioneer Syrians in Basmane in her location choice as follows:

> *After deciding to leave Istanbul, I looked for another city to settle. I thought that I could take some advice from other Syrians. I sent a message to the group "Suriyeli Gençler" which I am a member via Facebook and asked that where I could find a job and settle permanently. Under my post, a Syrian woman from Basmane wrote a lot of things. She answered everything I asked and introduced me with other Syrians who had also settled in Basmane. Their support brought me to Basmane.*

Table 28: The actors who affected/influenced Syrians respondents' settlement in Basmane as the initial location in Izmir

Relatives / family members	13
Pioneer Syrians	7
Members of ethnic solidarity networks	6
People met randomly (in Izmir)	6
Individual / household decision	5
Human smugglers	5
Actors in housing market (hotel / pension owners, realtors, home-owners)	5
NGO officers	4
Refugee / immigrant networks	2
Mukhtars	2
Market actors (commerce)	2
Public authorities	2
Total	**21**

Similarly, members of ethnic solidarity networks in Basmane come forward as one of the main sources of guidance, help and support for prospective Syrians. Both Kurd and Arab communities in Basmane, which were formed organically after the arrival of rural in-migrants mainly from Diyarbakır and Mardin after 1950s, have been addressing various issues of Syrians in Basmane. Especially the network of in-migrants from Mardin has a power in shaping the social relations in and around Basmane. It is not a coincidence that Syrian refugees with Kurdish origin have contacted with "Mardinli"s – people from Mardin province- prior to their arrival to Izmir. Avşin's (Kurd, female, 30 years old) arguments highlight how the personal relations with the leading figures of the ethnic communities may become decisive in refugees' initial location choices at urban scale. Avşin stated that

> *…Through our distant Turkish relatives in Mardin we managed to contact two important Kurdish men in Izmir, Ahmet and Azad. We called them by the phone and they told us*

(she and her brother) that they were living in Basmane for more than 30 years. Just because we are Kurdish and we called by reference, they told us that we would come to Basmane with our luggage. They said that they would take care of the rest. The rest was home, job, food, money…You see, how big is their support…First, my brother went there. He settled and found a job. Later on, I went next to him.

In addition, Afghan and Iranian refugees in Basmane, to whom Syrians met online or by chance, play part in attracting Syrians to settle in Basmane by sharing their own experiences and knowledge with potential refugees. As we saw in the narrative of Vahap, these former refugees convinced two Syrian respondents to settle in Basmane by promising their help to facilitate Syrians' access to housing and labour market. Besides ethnic and refugee networks, as in Karim's story, the social relations formed by daily encounters along Anafartalar Street and Hatuniye Square, the people met in cafes, parks and streets, the elderly people and opinion leaders in Basmane to whom Syrians came across by chance also influence Syrian newcomers' decision on where to initially settle.

As the other important actors affecting Syrians' initial settlement in Basmane, we see human smugglers (as five respondents mentioned). Since smugglers pre-organize the journeys of Syrian refugee in transit, they mostly inform their "*customers*" regarding where they should come. However, as I saw in two cases, Syrian refugees who did not deal with smugglers long before their journeys also came to Basmane to negotiate with human smugglers. Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) explained how human smugglers resulted in his settlement in Basmane with the following sentences:

…My intention was to go Europe. That's why I came Izmir…to meet with smugglers…I learned from the news that they are mostly located in Basmane. I came there. I made deal with one of them stayed in a hotel in Basmane for five days. After that, I understood I was swindled because I could not reach him. Since hotel was too expensive to stay longer, I found someone who would sublet me his house. Because I was not registered.

As other important actors, five respondents highlighted the role of actors in the housing market (realtors, home-owners) and hotel/pension owners in their settlement in Basmane. For the first, Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) explained how the owner of the pension where he and his family settled initially affected their decision to further stay in Basmane by renting a flat. He said that the pension owner was quite friendly and asked affordable prices to book a room. Just because the owner was refugee-friendly, Mohammad and his family decided to stay there. Moreover, as Mohammad told the owner also guided and helped them whenever necessary. As Mohammad strengthened his dialogue with the pension owner who also speak Kurdish, he gradually engaged in social and economic relations in Basmane and forged a new life there.

Similarly, as two respondents claimed the positive and non-discriminatory attitudes of realtors convinced them to rent a house in Basmane.

Mukhtars (2) and NGO officers (2) also played significant roles in affecting Syrians' initial settlement in Basmane although they did not intend to. Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) implicitly put forward how an NGO officer he met in Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği helped him in finding his first flat with the following sentences:

> *…I had no knowledge at first. I went there to ask for their help for me to hold on to life in Izmir. A Syrian guy there said that he is living in Basmane…close to the building of the association. I got positive vibes from him, took his advice and rented a flat on the same street with him.*

Syrian respondents also indirectly mentioned the role of market actors (2). The operations of local tradespeople, by targeting Syrians as potential customers, convince some Syrians to remain in the area to easily reach various products and services. Similarly, the provision of health, education and, aid services in Basmane inevitably highlights the importance of public authorities who are engaged in the provision of such services. On the contrary to all these examples that highlight the role of some other actors in affecting location choices in Izmir, five respondents claimed that they settled in Basmane by themselves, to say, without any guidance, influence, suggestion and invitation of others.

Regarding the respondents' settlement in Karabağlar as their initial location in Izmir, I found that three actors play decisive roles (Table 29). First, the family members/relatives who already settled in Karabağlar encourage the chain migration. As all five Kurdish respondents highlighted that their initial location in Izmir was Karabağlar since their relatives/family members had already settled and prepared the necessary conditions for their arrival of the remaining part of the family. Secondly, the Kurd ethnic community in Karabağlar, which has been formed and strengthened day by day after the influx of Kurd rural in-migrants (after 1950s) came forward as another important actor attracting Syrians to settle in there. Malak's and Avjin's narratives were good examples for understanding how the leading figures in Karabağlar Kurdish community can reassure refugees with the help of ethnic codes. Thirdly, the neighbourhood mukhtars play critical roles in Syrians' access to accommodation (4). Here, mukhtars act as filtering mechanisms by selecting the potential inhabitants among all Syrians who ask their help in finding accommodation. Mukhtars channel these selected potential inhabitants/tenants to realtors and homeowners with whom they have personal relations. Therefore, the mukhtars both filter/narrow down the pool of potential tenants and facilitate the interaction between homeowners and potential Syrian tenants.

Table 29: The actors who affected/influenced Syrians respondents' settlement in Karabağlar as the initial location in Izmir

Relatives / family members	5
Members of Kurdish network	5
Mukhtars	4
Total	**5**

For settling in Buca (specifically Gediz and Yıldız neighborhoods) as the initial location in Izmir, four actors stepped forward (Table 30). As in Karabağlar, all five respondents mentioned that their relatives/family members affected their settlement in Buca by offering emotional, economic support and guidance for various issues that the public authorities and NGOs fail to address (i.e., accommodation, cash allowances, food, clothing, public services etc.). As in Eslem's story, pioneer Syrians who are to be met via social media or by daily encounters may affect newcomers' location choices by the share of experience and knowledge.

Table 30: The actors who affected/influenced Syrians respondents' settlement in Buca as the initial location in Izmir

Relatives / family members	5
Members of Arab network	3
Religious (Islamic) figures	2
Pioneer Syrians	1
Total	**5**

Thirdly, although the respondents did not directly mention the role of religious (Islamic) figures in Buca as actors affecting their location choices, I saw that the discourses and practices of religious groups/religious figures in Gediz and Yıldız play significant roles in convincing conservative Syrian refugees to come and settle in Buca. Similarly, the Arab network in Buca also attracted Syrian refugees by offering emotional and economic support (3).

7.6. Motives/reasons to stay in the initial locations in Izmir

So far, I discussed the motives behind Syrians' initial settlements in Izmir by giving reference Syrians' narratives on their location choices. Here, I queried whether Syrian respondents remained to settle in their initial locations or not. I figured out that twelve of the twenty-one respondents who initially settled in Basmane continued to live there, while the four of five respondents and all five respondents remained in Buca and Karabağlar, respectively. In specific, nine Syrians moved from Basmane to other areas in Izmir, while only one Syrian relocated from Buca to Basmane. All five Kurd settlers in Karabağlar remained in the area. Before drawing why some respondents relocated to other parts of Izmir, it is worth to discuss why they have remained in their initial settlements. Regarding the reasons to stay in Basmane,

I found out twenty-one different reasons. As seen in Table 31, the existence and availability of public services (7), proximity to public services (7), relations with local people and inhabitants (7) and central location/accessibility of Basmane (7) came forward as the leading reasons behind Syrian respondents' preference to remain in Basmane. Regarding the first, the health, education, social aids, transportation, telecommunication and various other services offered in Basmane seemed to attract Syrian respondents especially those in need of medical care, those having children at school at, those seeking for social aids. Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) exemplified this process as follows:

> *We are happy for living in Basmane because Basmane is a heaven for us because my dad's hospital and my kids' school are all in Basmane. We could be living anywhere else, but it is very hard to find a school that would accept my kids. In other locations in Izmir it is not very likely to send my kids to school since Syrians are not welcomed in general. Besides the school in Basmane is very qualified due to locating in a very central location. Since I'm working all day long, I cannot bring my kids to school or my dad to hospital for his weekly controls. We are happy with the qualified services offered for us in Basmane for free.*

Gülümser (Arab, female, 25 years old) also touched upon the importance of public services offered in Basmane. She said that

> *As Basmane is the hub of Syrians, there are public institutions for us to go and ask for guidance...the Municipality, Kızılay (the Red Crescent), Göç İdaresi (DGMM) are all in here. Besides, we have a medical center in Basmane that is designated for us. Their existence in here increases my comfort.*

Table 31: The motives behind continue to reside in Basmane

Existence and availability of public services	**7**
Proximity to public services	**7**
Relations with local inhabitants	**7**
Affordability of housing/accommodation	**7**
Central location/accessibility	**7**
Engagement to (rental) housing market	**6**
Existence and affordability of commercial activities	**6**
Preservation of ethnic identity, use of native language	**6**
Existence of employment and income generating activities	**6**
Proximity to commercial activities	**5**
Existence and operation of humanitarian agencies	**5**
Existence and support of (ethnic) solidarity networks/communities	**5**
Proximity to (potential) workplaces	**5**
Making friends	**4**
Frequent encounters with local tradespeople	**3**
Affordability of living	**3**
Getting married and engaging family life	**3**
Multi-ethnic character and tolerance to differences	**3**
Existence of relatives/family members	**3**
Proximity to relatives/family members	**3**
Becoming entrepreneurs	**2**
Number of respondents remained in Basmane	**12**

As in Ahmad's and Gülümser's narratives, I also figured out that besides the existence and availability of public services, the proximity to these services (7) is also important. All seven respondents, who highlighted the role of public services in their preferences to stay in Basmane, also touched upon how living in walking distance to services matter in their decisions.

Secondly, Syrian respondents in Basmane drew how the emerging and tightening social relations between them and other Syrians and local people become decisive in their decisions to stay in Basmane. Seven respondents stated that, they gradually engaged in daily relations in Basmane with their own efforts and with the help of personal networks. As they learned some Turkish words, phrases and increased their visibility by rambling around the streets in the neighbourhood; they stated that they got used to their new social environment. Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) stated that although being an old lady lacking self-confidence due to her age, she devoted effort to construct good relations with her local neighbors. She exactly said the following:

> *…I live alone, I'm old. I need someone who could take care of me. The friends that I came to Turkey and Izmir with are no longer with me. To survive and to live a peaceful life, I knew at the beginning that I have to meet new people and gain their trust. I also knew that communicating only with other Syrians is not a solution. Therefore, by spending time in parks, trying to read some newspapers, trying to communicate with local grocery and market, I learned some key words and sentences in Turkish. Once I did that, I gained the sympathy of Turkish people… At first, they were looking me like I'm an alien but in time I gained their respect. In seven years, I manage to build conversations with the majority of local people in Basmane… Now I'm a part of the society of Basmane and therefore, I will never go somewhere else and start from the beginning.*

In that sense, I claim that the daily interactions with local people and other refugees (7), making new friends in the neighborhood (4), frequent encounters with the tradespeople and inhabitants of the area in overall foster refugees' sense of belonging to area and make them stay in such locations. Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) highlighted the importance of making new friends in engaging social relations in the neighborhood. In specific, she said that

> *as you meet and build good relations with other inhabitants of the neighborhood, the market owners, the butcher, the real estator, the hairdresser, you learn more about the routines of daily life and how things work. As you make friends, you feel as a part of this community… you feel belonged.*

As another factor increasing the sense of belonging to Basmane, three respondents highlighted the role of marriage and engaging family life in here. Gülümser (Arab, female, 25 years old) and Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) said that although they came to Basmane with different motives, they permanently stayed there after they got married and settled in there.

Moreover, the tolerance of local inhabitants towards refugees, which was considered as a result of the multi-ethnic character of Basmane, also attracted two respondents (Şerif and Samir) to remain in Basmane. Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) highlighted that the cultural diversity in Basmane which has enhanced in time with the contribution of Afghan, Iraqi, Syrian and Turkmen refugees and accordingly the tolerance of local people towards ethnic, religious and cultural difference made him feel comfortable and free in Basmane. For that reason, he still believes that he could not live in any locality than Basmane in Izmir.

Another motive behind Syrians' preference to stay in Basmane is the affordability of housing. The historic and deteriorated houses and abandoned buildings that are found risky for any type of disaster and that are subjected to urban renewal, the unused areas in the basements of buildings, the extensions made to existing buildings (especially after the zoning amnesty) provided affordable housing for Syrian refugees. Salim (Turkmen, male, 60 years old) stated that because of the affordability of rents in Basmane, he never thought of moving somewhere else. He said that the homeowners, mukhtars, tradespeople, homeowners are all engaged in the rental housing market, because they somehow involved in refugees' struggles in Basmane. He specifically said the following.

> *Housing is the most important thing for you is you are a refugee, a stranger, an unlovable person. If you go for the neighborhoods of the "white natives" they will ask high prices for unworthy houses and even worse if you accept the pay the price they may still do their best not to rent this house to you. Therefore, the refugee culture of neighborhoods is important…Basmane is just like that. Although the conditions are poor and prices are above the normal prices in the market…for refugees…you can always find a shelter with a roof.*

Similarly, Serhad *(*Kurd, male, 25 years old), who initially settled in Basmane and shared a flat with other Syrians, said that Basmane was the only place where he could live as a single refugee and it still is the only place. He stated the following:

> *Basmane's housing market is so developed. Because the circulation here is not comparable to any other area in Izmir. First, the most vulnerable and broke people came here because this is the only place that welcomes them…As they survive, earn some money, learn the language and how to communicate with natives, they move to better parts or they rent better houses. The same is valid for me, but I never wanted to leave this place…Because I know that no real estator will take care of my housing problem and do their best to find me a house with a decent rental price.*

Besides seven people who directly mentioned housing/accommodation processes as decisive factors that affected their stay in Basmane, six other refugees also implicitly touched upon the relationship between finding an accommodation and settling in some specific areas. They noted that, engagement to rental housing market – i.e., easily finding a rent for flat, convincing

home-owners, getting the support and help of real estators, civil society officers and mukhtars – made them continue to settle in Basmane.

For seven Syrian respondents, the other reason for remaining in Basmane is its central location and accessibility in Izmir. Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) stated that Basmane is quite accessible for all the inhabitants of Izmir with metro, bus, sub-urban trains, tram systems. Similarly, Serhad *(*Kurd, male, 25 years old) mentioned how Basmane's central location is quite attractive for him to stay there since he can go to his workplace with a single bus in 10 minutes, he can go to language course by walking and he can enjoy walking at the seaside after a short metro journey. Diverse commercial activities in Basmane also mentioned by six respondents as an important aspect of the area that make them stay in there. Amine (Arab, female, 35 years old) stated that

> *There is no other place as good, as diverse, as lively and livable as Basmane in Izmir. By walking for a couple of minutes, I reach Kemeraltı where various clothing shops, coffee houses, jewellery shops, cafes, restaurants are located. Similarly, I can reach Çankaya, Konak and Alsancak again by walking or by a single bus. I do not have go for long distances to reach anything I need. In Syria, my house was in a village so you may not understand how important is to meet the immediate needs.*

In Amine's words, I figured out that proximity to commercial activities (5) has as equal importance as the provision of diverse commercial services (6). For that reason, all other six respondents mentioned how being close to these services increase the attractiveness of the area in a way to make them stay in the area. Additionally, Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) stated that the existence of various shops selling similar products, the old and a bit deprived physical environment of Basmane, the low-income levels of the inhabitants of Basmane in overall affect the prices of goods and services offered in the area. To exemplify how low cost of services in Basmane attracts her to settle there permanently, she stated the following:

> *I saw a red skirt on the window of a shop at Konak Square, I wanted to buy it but it was 70 TL. Sometime later, I saw the same skirt in a shop on near Çankaya metro station, it was 45 TL. I can increase the number of such examples to show the costs of services and goods in Basmane are quite lower than other central areas of Izmir*.

Preservation of the ethnic identity and the use of native language in everyday relations also mentioned by six respondents as important motives behind their stay in Basmane. Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) said that besides engaging everyday interactions with local people, the within-group interactions which help refugees to protect their own identity, ethnicity, culture, norms and especially the language have the upmost importance for surviving in a new social environment without paying high prices. In parallel to Ramise's argument, Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) touched upon the importance of speaking Kurdish in

everyday as a mean to preserve the Kurdish identity. He explained this with the following words:

> *I can learn and speak Turkish, but do I really have to? I'm Kurdish, it was not my preference to leave Syria. I was forced to. My existence in Turkey does not mean that I will gradually become a Turkish. I have to teach Kurdish to my children, undertake whatever necessary to protect our long-lasting norms and traditions. The Kurdish population in Basmane encourages me and helps me to fulfil my duty. Therefore, I never thought of leaving Basmane.*

The existence of employment opportunities, income generating activities and availability of jobs (6) and chances of entrepreneurship (2) also have words to say on the preferences of Syrian respondents to remain in Basmane. Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) said that the diversity of customer profile, the existence of various ethnic groups make Basmane the hub of niche services for different tastes. She further noted that as her husband figured out the local market conditions, he sought for employment in refugee-related services and in time he became successful enough to open his own shop in Basmane. From this quotation I also understand how the entrepreneurship opportunities (2) could become critical in refugees' decisions to leave the neighborhood or not. From another point of view, Amine (Arab, female, 35 years old) explained that besides many good aspects of Basmane (e.g. diversity of commercial, cultural and social activities), the high chances of engagement to labour market in Basmane when compared to other locations in Izmir, is an important pull factor. She said that although the jobs offered are mostly short-term, residing close to the heart of labour market helps her to catch up every news regarding job opportunities. Here, I also draw the importance of residing close to (potential) workplaces as a motive of stay in Basmane. Lastly, as in the initial intra-urban location choices of Syrian respondents, we see the importance of the proximity to (3) and existence and support of relatives/family members (3), ethnic solidarity networks (5) and humanitarian agencies, informal local initiatives in Syrians' decisions to remain in Basmane, as they continue to be supported by these mechanisms.

Regarding the reasons to remain in Karabağlar, all five initial Syrian settlers of Karabağlar mentioned the existence/support of and proximity to relatives/family members, while four of them highlighted the importance of the support of Kurdish network in the area (Table 32). As expected, these factors continue to attract refugees in the later periods of their emplacement in Karabağlar, as they still need emotional and economic support from their nearest. As new motives, I found out that engaging the social relations with local Kurd people and with other Syrian Kurd population increased the respondents' attachment to the area. Rezan (Kurd, male, 25 years old) said that first he was depended on a few people in Kurdish community to whom he met in a shisha café. Later, as he felt the support of his new friends and as he frequently

met with them in parks, streets and cafes, he met with other people as well. As a result of these encounters, now he has daily interactions with his native neighbours, other refugees and local tradespeople which foster his sense of belonging to the area.

The last motive is the central location of the area. However, unlike centrality of Basmane, two respondents defined centrality of Karabağlar as its closeness to industrial sites in the district. For example, Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) said that Karabağlar has a very central location for a worker to reside in, since by a single bus and even by walking, workers may go to their workplaces (which are heavily concentrated along Yeşillik Boulevard). As an employee of a furniture firm hosting the customers at the entrance, Havin drew the importance of living a central locality like Yunus Emre neighborhood (in Karabağlar) especially when she needs to be in her workplace sharply on time.

Table 32: The motives behind continue to reside in Karabağlar

Existence and support of relatives/family members	5
Proximity to relatives/family members	5
Existence of ethnic solidarity networks	4
Relations with local inhabitants	3
Central location/accessibility	2
Number of respondents remained in Karabağlar	**5**

For the respondents residing in Buca District (Gediz neighborhood), the motives to remain in Buca are clear and expectable. First, just like Basmane and Karabağlar, the existence and support of (3) and the proximity to relatives/family members (3) are the upmost important reasons to stay (Table 33). When I consider the profile of Syrians, who chose Buca as their initial location in Izmir, I better understand why family bonds really matter for them. As being the subsequent comers who arrived in Izmir after the fifth year of the refugee influx to Turkey, they came near to their families/relatives who have already prepared the necessary conditions for the arrival of the other by engaging in local social and economic relations. Just as their motive to settle in Buca, the stay in the area is closely tied to family bonds. As another motive, those who said that they initially settle in Buca because of the religious way of living and practices of Islam, the reason for still settling in the area is the sense of belonging that developed as they engaged in social relations with the other members of Islamic community. Eslem (Arab, female, 20 years old) used the following words to describe how her connections with the local religious community increased her sense of belonging to Gediz neighborhood.

> *...Gediz is like the heaven...without any interruption I can freely engage in religious interactions with Turkish Muslims and Syrian Muslims. Every week, we meet in the houses of a community member to share our religious knowledge and to get to know each*

other better. This brings along a sense of solidarity and belonging which make me stay in here like forever.

Table 33: The motives behind continue to reside in Gediz (in Buca District)

Existence and support of relatives/family members	3
Proximity to relatives/family members	3
Existence of ethnic solidarity networks	2
Conservative/religious way of living	2
Number of respondents remained in Buca	**4**

Although this situation of immobility (i.e., continue to reside in initial locations) is a matter of choice for Syrian refugees, it is not purely subjective. In other words, although Syrians' good relations with natives, their level of engagement to their new social environment and housing and labour market come forward in their narratives as the main motives behind remaining settled, it is also true that some refugees stay in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca as they believe that they won't be able to engage in social and economic relations in other parts of Izmir due to their language barriers, ethnic background, class-position and limited economic and social capital. For example, I have already mentioned that (except one), all the initial Syrian Turkmen settlers of Basmane remained in the area. Although Syrian Turkmens seem to prefer to stay here due to the services and opportunities offered by Basmane, in fact, they do not think of moving from Basmane as they cannot find a house in any other district of Izmir at such affordable prices and cannot participate in social relations so comfortably. As another example, some Syrian Kurds state that they do not want to live in Basmane because they are despised by Arab bosses and cannot get their rights in the Basmane job market. However, they also believe that if they live elsewhere, they won't have the chance to be employed at all. It is possible to increase the number of examples, thus, when commenting on the mobility/immobility situations of Syrians in Izmir, we need to take into account both the subjective preferences of refugees and their economic and social capital, which will affect their class position in Izmir and their decision to be mobile.

7.7. Relocations from Basmane to other parts of Izmir: Karabağlar and Buca

As evidence showed, a remarkable share of Syrian respondents (ten out of thirty-one) had relocated from their initial settlements to settle in some other parts of Izmir. In line with the arguments of key local actors in Izmir (public and NGO officers, opinion leaders, mukhtars), intra-urban mobility of Syrian respondents (with respect to their housing pathways) were mostly observed in two directions: from Basmane to Karabağlar (three respondents), from Basmane to Buca (five respondents) and from Buca to Basmane (only one respondent). Although the respondents mentioned some other short-term relocations for employment and

health reasons, they are to be overshadowed by the refugee mobility between these three settlements in Izmir.

7.7.1. Pushing motives from Basmane

Apart from Syrian respondents who preferred to remain in their initial settlements in Izmir, I also found out that some others have relocated from their initial settlements to settle in some other neighborhoods/districts. In general, five respondents (all Syrian Arabs) declared that they have moved from Basmane to Buca, while other four of them (three Syrian Kurds and one Syrian Turkmen) relocated to Karabağlar. As an exception, there is also a respondent who claimed the vice versa by stating that he moved from Buca to Basmane. In line with the information I gained through the interviewees with key NGO officers, opinion leaders, local tradespeople, mukhtars and public officers, what I derived from the narratives of Syrians was that the Syrian refugee concentration in Basmane that was quite immense in the first five years of the refugee influx has gradually decreased as Syrians have remarkably begun to move to Karabağlar and Buca Districts. Although there were some short-term relocations to Torbalı and Bornova districts for employment reasons (Karim and Faruq as seasonal agriculture workers; Şerif, Zeynep as workers in shoe-making industry in Işıkkent / Bornova), and illegal crossing attempts (Rojhad went to Muğla to cross to Kos island), the majority of relocations have taken place between two main directions: Basmane to Karabağlar and Basmane to Buca.

Regarding the first relocation of Syrian respondents – i.e., Basmane to Karabağlar, it is worth to give voice to the key actors in the area who have experienced and observed this movement. Since these actors have been touching upon various Syrians' lives, they have the deepest knowledge on the dynamics of relocations. First, in parallel to Karadağ's (2015) argument, NGO officers and mukhtars highlighted the overcrowd, immense ethnic concentration and associated chaos in Basmane as important push factors. Second, a representative of Kapılar initiative and opinion leader in Basmane said that the relocations from Basmane have to do with the ethnic conflicts among Arab, Kurd and Turkmen groups. According to the representative, the historic conflicts among Arabs and Kurds have become quite observable in Basmane too, as these groups are somehow experienced of living together. By his own experience in Basmane, he claimed that Syrian Arabs are relatively wealthier than the Syrian Kurds in Basmane, since Arabs have organized themselves to better address the issues they are struggling with. For example, the wealthier Arabs engaged in entrepreneurship and opened shops in Basmane which also provided opportunities for the employment of other Arabs, while some others contacted with several NGOs to mobilize aids for themselves. By doing so, as the representative claims, Syrian Arabs have gradually taken the control of the social and

economic relations in Basmane. On the other hand, Syrian Kurd population attached great importance to the provision of emotional and economic support to each other in a collective sense but did not attempt to dominate the social relations in Basmane. As the economic and cultural differences among these two parties have sharpened; tensions, fights and abuses have become evident in a way to make refugees relocate to more peaceful and calm settlements where they would live with the people sharing the same ethnicity and culture. Similar to this argument, a real estator in Basmane touched upon the increasing social tensions among Arab and Kurd populations. He stated that as some Arabs engaged in the local economy by opening shops and by involving in illegal businesses (like drug dealing); Turkmen and Kurd populations distanced themselves from the Arabs. Even more, the so-called exploitation of Kurdish laborers (in the job market by the Arab employees) triggered the social unrests in Basmane. This social distance among ethnic groups became even bigger in time in a way to result in the desire for ethnic segregation and concordant relocations of refugees from Basmane Area.

The mukhtars of Devrim neighborhood in Karabağlar and Gediz neighborhood in Buca District touched upon a different dimension of Syrians' relocations from Basmane. They all highlighted the increasing costs of accommodation (i.e., rental prices, hotel/pension bookings) especially in the last three years when refugees in transit stuck in Izmir (aftermath of the strict border controls under EU-TR deal in 2016) as one the reasons of Syrians' relocations to their neighborhoods. As indicated by the hotel/pension owners that I interviewed, in the earlier days of Syrians' influx to Izmir, the room prices were approximately 50-100 TL per night. However, especially after EU-TR deal, the hotel/pension owners asked higher prices for bookings (app. 150-200 TL) as the demand increased. Furthermore, some hotel/pension owners declared that they would no longer accept Syrian guests since they did not want to be labelled as "Syrian hotels". For rental housing market, a real estator in Basmane stated that Syrians have reinvigorated the rental housing market in Basmane by renting old, deprived houses by accepting to pay rents over the market prices, as follows:

> *…Basmane in recent decades is left to its own as its labelled as the hub of crime, smuggling, etc. Accordingly, no significant public or private investments have been made to the area. As no one take care of Basmane, its buildings and infrastructure have ruined in time and Basmane became the home of poor people and refugees. The property owners took the advantage of it and have rented their houses to these desperate people by asking really high prices. Normally a 40-year-old flat with 2 rooms and a saloon is to be rented approximately for 500 TL if it has proper windows, doors and wood flooring. However, for the same house, homeowners ask for 1000-1100 TL from Syrians in the last two years. They ask it because they know that refugees do not have any place to go. They also know that no one but Syrians would rent their old, dirty houses with no windows…*

Complementary to this quotation, another real estator in Basmane drew the ethnic discrimination in the housing market. He said that Turkish property-owners mostly refrain to rent their houses to crowded Arab families or to families who have more than two kids. Because they want to prevent overcrowded settlements in a single flat which raises question marks in the heads of local people regarding "what are they doing within the four walls of the houses?" Secondly, the language barriers and prejudices of Turkish society towards Arabs hinder refugees' access to rental housing market. Associated with this, property-owners in Basmane often ask high prices than usual from Syrian Arabs, while asking relatively low prices from Syrian Turkmens, as the mukhtar of Gediz neighborhood (in Buca) asserted. He also noted that the bad reputation of Basmane (among the inhabitants of Izmir) as the hub of chaos, crime, illegal businesses like smuggling, woman trafficking, drug dealing etc. make conservative Syrian Arabs move to safer and calmer settlements like Gediz.

After the brief discussion on how the key local actors have experienced the relocations of Syrians, now we can examine why Syrian refugees themselves moved from Basmane to Karabağlar and Buca. Table 34 provides an overview of the push factors/motives which made Syrian respondents to relocate from Basmane to settle in Karabağlar and Buca.

Table 34: The push factors/motives which made Syrian respondents to relocate from Basmane

From Basmane to Karabağlar	**F.**	**From Basmane to Buca**	**F.**
Ethnic conflicts/tensions and sense of insecurity	3	Unsuitability of Basmane for family life	5
Chaos and crowd in Basmane	3	Existence of entertainment venues and shops selling alcohol	4
Bad reputation of Basmane as the hub of crime and illegal affairs	2	Unsuitability of Basmane for religious practices	4
Increasing accommodation/housing costs	2	Discrimination in the housing market	4
Discrimination in the housing market	1	Ethnic conflicts/tensions and sense of insecurity	3
Accessing economic resources to live in a better neighborhood	1	Bad reputation of Basmane as the hub of crime and illegal affairs	3
Geographic limitations	1		
Total	**3**		**5**

To start with, just as key local actors mentioned, ethnic conflicts/tensions between Syrian ethnic groups populations and concordantly the sense of insecurity in Basmane were highlighted both by Syrian Kurds (3) and Syrian Arabs (3) as important reasons for moving from Basmane. Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) explained how ethnic tensions in Basmane made him move to Karabağlar with the following sentences.

> *…At the beginning everything was nice…Syrians were connected to each other …Those were the times that I felt safe. However, as we got used to live in Basmane, learned how*

things work out, we found ourselves in the traps of ethnicity and competition…I mean, we all noticed that to live in Basmane we need money and to reach money we need to work. But as in everywhere else, jobs are scarce. The luckiest ones opened their own shops…They were mostly Arabs who had savings in dollars. Kurd people were not that lucky since they do not have much more to take care of each other…Arabs hired Arab employees and paid them good wages or used their money and power to convince other employees to hire Arabs. This situation was too obvious and Syrian Kurds were pissed of their positions in the market. As the tension increased day by day, brickbats and fights among Arabs and Kurds became a part of everyday life…I mean the problems in job market triggered ethnic tensions which are the main issue now in Basmane…To stay away from these conflicts, I decided to move to Karabağlar which is close to Basmane but far calmer than it.

In the quotation above, Rojhad complained about the increasing dominancy of Syrian Arabs in the local economy of Basmane and class-based social tensions which triggered the long-lasting ethnic conflicts between Arab and Kurd populations. In a way, competition in the job market brings back the ethnic tensions that seemed to be left in Syria. From another point of view, Abdulbaki (Arab, male, 60 years old) stated that the culture, traditions and habits of Arabs and Kurds are quite different from each other which make it impossible for these two groups to live together in same district. Abdulbaki said that

Arabs prefer to live inside the houses, we respect our privacy. We love to host our neighbors, relatives regardless of their numbers, however, some Kurds think that we are planning something bad in our houses and often attack to our houses. As another example, we as Arabs often condemn the socialization of Kurd women in parks and streets and their loud laughter. When we say something to such women in the street, another fight begins among these two groups. After some time, it becomes really hard to tolerate them all. So, leaving Basmane was a necessity for me.

Secondly, in relation with the on-going ethnic conflicts in the area, all Syrian respondents who moved from Basmane to Karabağlar highlighted how the chaotic environment in Basmane affected their decisions to move. As mentioned by the key local actors I interviewed with, the increasing refugee population in Basmane, the crowd in the streets, parks and commercial areas, the language barriers among groups, the over-demand for housing, job opportunities and public services, the ethnic conflicts and social tensions that arise from the living practices urge some inhabitants to move to somewhere else. Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) claimed that as the refugee population increased in the area, he had difficulties in engaging daily interactions with the others as he has no information about who are the newcomers. He further noted that "*When I decided to avoid socializing with others, I also lost my sense of trust to others. At this point, I decided to move somewhere else where I can trust again."*

Associated with the discussion above, Syrian respondents also complained about the bad reputation of Basmane as the hub of poverty, crime and illegal businesses (i.e., smuggling) as

it affects public opinion for the inhabitants of the area in a negative way. For example, Zeynep (Turkmen, female, 25 years old) told that

> *At first, I did not know that Basmane is such a bad place. Even more, I found Basmane very safe, calm, tolerant and refugee-friendly and for such reasons I thought that I could live here like forever. But I as met with the inhabitants of the area and figure out their profile, as I heard some rumors about some people, as I came across with various fights with knives, and as I came across with smuggling bargains in the parks, I strongly thought that staying in here would harm me and my family. That's why I decided to move from Basmane.*

A similar argument came from Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old). Although he initially preferred to settle in Basmane as he found the area refugee-friendly, his opinion has changed in time as he figured out "the dirty businesses" in Basmane (in his own words). He said that he no longer wanted to be labelled as a "Basmaneli"[35] since this label is used by others to point finger at those who are actively involved in smuggling, human/woman trafficking, drug dealing and many other illegal businesses in Basmane. Seyyid noted that to live a dignified life, he moved from Basmane to Buca, where he would no longer be a part of the "degenerated community" of Basmane.

Syrian respondents also highlighted the issues related their access to accommodation/housing as a decisive motive behind their relocation decisions by declaring their discomfort for the increasing rental prices in Basmane especially after the EU-TR deal - which resulted in the uneven increase of the refugee population in the area. Respondents also mentioned the different forms of discrimination that they faced in the housing market and the ethnic filtering applied by homeowners and real estators as the push factors. To start with, two respondents who moved to Karabağlar from Basmane started that as the Syrian population increased in the area, so did the rental prices. Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old), who initially settled in Basmane due to the cheapness of booking a hotel/pension room and stayed in the area due to the affordable rental prices, explained how the affordability of housing is no longer a characteristic of Basmane with the following sentences:

> *Basmane…I have a lot to say on Basmane…Basmane is my hope and also my biggest disappointment. It was my hope because it welcomed me with open arms, but later, it kicked me. I came to Turkey, Izmir, Basmane to leave behind all the ethnic struggles back in Syria. However, they all revitalized in Basmane. Instead of solidarity and refugee-brotherhood, we as refugees, fell out with each other. We saw it in the housing market…At the beginning to rental prices were low, let's say 300-400 TL for an old, dirty flat having two small rooms with broken windows and no heating. It was okey, unless we afford to find a shelter. However, as the population increased the houses the rents increased. I mean...rents jumped to 700-1000 TL. Here, the dirty game began. The rents increased for*

[35] Inhabitants of Basmane.

> *every refugee but especially for us…I mean the Syrian Kurds…the rents became even higher. Because homeowners mostly favoured Turkmens and Arabs and asked lower prices from them. I know it by experience. We were asked 1500 TL for such terrible houses while Turkmens were asked 500 TL. I have many experiences like that. At the end, I pissed off and moved from there.*

Mohammad's quotation not only uncovers how rental prices have increased in time but also reveals the ethnic discrimination applied in housing market towards Syrian refugees. As respondents highlighted the discrimination (by realtors, mukhtars and property owners) they had to face in Basmane made them to move to Karabağlar and Buca. Just as the arguments of a real estator in Basmane, especially Arab respondents complained about the negative attitudes of homeowners who refuse to rent their houses to families with kids. Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old) touched upon this issue as follows:

> *…I knocked the door of several estators and mukhtars in Basmane and told them that I'm looking for a house. The first question they asked was the size of my family…To say, how many kids and siblings I have…At first, I found it okey since I thought that these people try to know me, but later I figured out that they ask it to see whether I fit to their criteria. Since we are a crowded family, we could not easily find a house…We were forced to accept higher prices than usual...And when I found a better house with a lower rent in Buca, I immediately left Basmane.*

Complementary to the complaints above, Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old) stated that once she entered the housing market, she came across with the negative and discriminatory attitudes of the actors in the housing market. She said that her Arab identity created obstacles in finding a flat for rent, since the Arab identity is mostly associated with "jihadists, terrorists and unhygienic people" by the Turkish society. She noted that under such circumstances, Turkmens and Kurds are favoured in the housing market. Although the arguments of Zekire (as a Syrian Arab) and Mohammad (as a Syrian Kurd) contradict with each other regarding which ethnic group is subjected to more discrimination in the housing market, these quotations reveal that some homeowners, realtors and mukhtars engage in such discriminatory attitudes towards refugees which make them to relocate to somewhere else, at the end of the day.

As the other significant motives for Syrians' relocation from Basmane, we may talk about the so-called "unsuitability" of Basmane's social environment for family life and the existence of entertainment venues selling alcohol and religious practices, which were all driven forward by Syrian Arabs. First of all, all five Syrian Arabs, who moved to Buca from Basmane, stated that the over-crowded, multi-ethnic population of Basmane, the existence of illegal businesses in the area, the existence of various entertainment venues serving alcohol at nights and the selling of alcoholic drinks in the local markets of Basmane all have negative effects on the family life

in Basmane. To better illustrate, we may take a brief look at the narrative of Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) as below:

> *Basmane is good, Basmane is nice, but it is not a heaven for families. If you are single, things are nice because you can control yourself. However, it is not easy to protect the wife and kids in such a crowded environment. At the beginning, I could not see how Basmane could affect my family life, but now I see...I have a son who is 30 years old, he had never drunk alcohol before, however, he saw many people drinking alcohol in Basmane and even in night clubs and aspire to do so. Second, my daughter at 16 start to question why she is wearing a head scarf. To prevent such confusions, I decided to settle Buca.*

Second, as a motive that can be derived from the narrative of Muhammed, unsuitability of Basmane for religious practices come forward (4). Vahap's (Arab, male, 42 years old) narrative helps us to better understand the process, as follows:

> *…People I met in Basmane made stay in here for some years, however, even for the sake of these people I could not continue to settle there. Because the local inhabitants are not respectful to Islamic traditions. Let me ask you something…How could it be possible to drink alcohol, sell alcohol and sell drugs in a neighborhood that is Muslim?... The answer of these questions are my reasons to leave Basmane.*

Lastly, I will discuss the level of economic capital of refugees (that enable some to move to "better" neighborhoods) and the geographic limitations in Basmane. For the first, Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) stated that he somehow "stuck" in the poverty of Basmane since he could not reach out stable income and paid employment. As he improved his economic conditions, he managed to a rent flat in a "cozier" neighborhood in Karabağlar (Yunus Emre neighborhood). Lastly, the hills around Basmane (on which Kadıfekale, Kosova and some neighborhoods take place) obstruct refugees' access to their workplaces, schools and health centers by walking. For that reason, especially the respondents with ages said that they moved to more plain areas in Karabağlar which are still close to the social and commercial life in Basmane.

7.7.2. Pulling motives of Karabağlar and Buca Districts

Regarding the motives behind Syrians' increasing settlement in Karabağlar and Buca Districts, first of all, I interviewed with municipal and NGO officers, academicians, mukhtars and local tradespeople in the area, since they have greatest insight of the refugee profile in the district based on their own observations and experiences. For Karabağlar case, both officers from ASAM and MÜLTECİ-DER and the mukhtars of Yunus Emre, Günaltay, Devrim and Karabağlar highlighted that the affordability of rental housing stock in the district and the strong Kurd solidarity mechanisms existing in the area are the leading pull factors for Syrians especially those who have Kurdish background. For the first, as the summary of the

information gathered from the real estators, the rental prices range between 600-800 TL for 2+1 or 3+1 flats having an average net area of 80 sqm in twenty to thirty-ear-old three to four-storey buildings. For new buildings the rents rise up to 1500 TL depending on the quality and location. Recently, with the urban transformation practices implemented in some neighborhoods of Karabağlar (Cennetçeşme, Salih Omurtak, Bahriye Üçok, Limontepe, Ali Fuat Erden, Umut, Gazi, Özgür, Yüzbaşı Şerafettin ve Devrim) the old and worn-out housing stock in the district has been renewed, and parallel to this, an increase is observed in rental prices[36]. The mukhtar of Günaltay justified this information by stating that

> *The rental prices are quite affordable when compared to other districts of Izmir having the same distance to the city center. Even more, the prices are affordable when we think about the renewed housing stock in the area…The image of Karabağlar is changing but not the profile of its inhabitants. Historically, it has become the home of worker class…those migrated from south-eastern Anatolia…those who have a single wage to cover the expenses of the whole family…and it still is…because the automotive, textile and furniture industry still provide jobs for the inhabitants and potential inhabitants of Karabağlar. The affordability of rents is associated with the working-class culture of Karabağlar.*

He further noted that the solidarity spirit among the workers in Karabağlar, which has strengthened and transferred from generation to generation, assured Syrian refugees to settle there and be a part of a strong community who might hold their back. Although this solidarity spirit is mostly associated with the Kurd network in the area, the mukhtar believes that this spirit cannot be solely attributed to the Kurd population.

An officer from Karabağlar District Municipality also touched upon how the rental housing stock in the district attracts newcomers. He also drew that the accessibility of Karabağlar, by various transportation modes (bus, metro, minibus) which operate frequently, has to do with the increasing refugee concentration in the area. He asserted that as Syrians found jobs in Kemeraltı commercial area, industrial ateliers along Yeşillik Boulevard and surrounding industrial sites, they started to settle in Karabağlar where they can reach to their workplaces within a maximum of twenty minutes with a single bus. At this point, he emphasized the potential of industrial ateliers in and around Karabağlar as the population magnet especially for Syrian workers who seek to be employed. According to the individual experiences of a volunteer/officer from *Konak Kent Konseyi Mülteci Meclisi* (Konak City Council Refugee Assembly), the affordability of rental housing and availability of employment opportunities

[36] Recently, various urban renewal projects started in some areas in Cennetçeşme, Salih Omurtak, Bahriye Üçok, Limontepe, Ali Fuat Erden, Umut, Gazi, Özgür, Yüzbaşı Şerafettin ve Devrim neighborhodds that were labelled as risky areas by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (https://www.insaatderyasi.com/karabaglar-kentsel-donusum-plani-askiya-cikti-2448h.htm).

Karabağlar mostly attracted Syrian refugees who were formerly residing in Basmane. The narratives of five Syrian respondents who declared that they relocated to Karabağlar from Basmane complement to the arguments of the key people I interviewed with regarding why they preferred to move to Karabağlar (Table 35).

Table 35: The reasons/motives behind Syrians' relocation to Karabağlar

Existence of employment and income-generating activities	3
Proximity to (potential) workplaces	3
Ethnic, cultural and class-based similarities with local inhabitants	2
Affordability of housing / accommodation	1
Central location and accessibility	1
Total	**3**

First, all three respondents stated that they moved to Karabağlar to be close to their (potential) working places and job opportunities. Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old), who left Basmane because of the increasing ethnic tensions in the area, said that Karabağlar is the heart of refugee labour market, since various furniture and textile firms in the area increasingly hire Syrian labours for lower wages than their native peers. He specifically said the following:

> *…Before leaving my flat in Basmane, first I find another one in Karabağlar…Why Karabağlar…Because living in Karabağlar and meeting with its inhabitants would help me to reach the labour market. Secondly, I thought that, if I was lucky enough to find a proper job, it would be very nice if I easily go to my workplace by walking or by bus.*

Complementary to Rojhad's arguments, Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) stated how the job opportunities in Karabağlar's industry affected his location choice with the following sentences.

> *…When I couldn't escape…I mean I couldn't collect the money for smuggling. I accepted my destiny and I noticed that I do not want to live in a hell like that. If I would no longer engage in smuggling so there was no reason for me to stay there. During my time in Basmane, I heard that many others had already gone to Karabağlar to find a job. I followed them.*

From the quotations, I figured out that both the existence of employment opportunities and Karabağlar's proximity to the inner-city industrial sites of Izmir come forward as the leading motives behind Syrians' choice to settle in the area.

Second, I found out that, Karabağlar attracted Syrian Kurds the most, due to the existence of a strong worker and Kurdish community. Except one Turkmen, the respondents who subsequently settled in Karabağlar were all Kurds. Accordingly, all Kurd respondents highlighted how the ethnic and class-based similarities between them and the local inhabitants of Karabağlar become decisive in their location choices. Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) who

moved from Basmane with respect to the increasing heterogeneity, mistrust and social disruption, stated that the idea of living together with others who share the same language, culture, values and level of income was quite appealing for her and she made her decision accordingly. Again, Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) drew the importance of ethnic and cultural similarities that he shares with the Kurd inhabitants of the area by saying that "living with people sharing my values and morals restores my trust for other people, which I think I lost in Basmane when I was found too unworthy to find a proper house to live in Basmane, by the Basmanelis". From the narrative of Mohammad, apart from the importance of ethnic, cultural and class-based characteristics of the inhabitants of the preferred destinations, I also see that an inclusive housing market is another matter of attraction. As the other three participants stated, accessing affordable housing in Karabağlar (without discrimination and xenophobia in the housing market) positively affected refugees' decisions to settle in Karabağlar. To illustrate, Zeynep (Turkmen, female, 25 years old) said that, in Karabağlar, it is possible to find rental flats with proper infrastructure, heating systems for affordable prices. Moreover, as she noted, the mukhtars, realtors and even the property-owners are more friendly than the ones in Basmane, as they offer their help and support when needed.

Syrian respondents also mentioned the central location and accessibility of Karabağlar with various transportation modes (bus, metro, minibus) as a pull factor. Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) stated that Karabağlar is connected to Konak Square, Alsancak and the main commercial street of Izmir – Kıbrıs Şehitleri Street – Kemeraltı (historical city center) and seaside by bus. Similarly, Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) expressed his satisfaction with the frequency of buses along Yeşillik Street which enable him to arrive his workplace in time.

For the reasons behind Syrians' increasing concentration in two neighborhoods in Buca District, namely Gediz and Yıldız neighborhoods, local key people emphasized some characteristics of the area. First, an officer from Buca District Municipality declared that Gediz neighborhood, where Syrians settle the most in the district, can be regarded as a peripheral one when compared to other settlements of Syrians including Basmane, Agora and İkiçeşmelik. However, the operation of various transportation modes increases the accessibility of the area, and thus, attracts newcomers to come and settle in. The officer also touched upon the affordability of rental housing for newcomers since the housing stock is composed of buildings at the age of approximately 30 to 40. He further noted that in Gediz neighborhood, he mostly came across with Syrians who once lived in Basmane. At this point, it is worth to give voice to an officer/volunteer from *Konak Kent Konseyi Mülteci Meclisi* (Konak City Council Refugee Assembly) who clarified the Syrian mobility between Gediz and Basmane. The

officer, who was involved in refugee-related projects and processes for fifteen years, said that Gediz can be seen as the settlement of Basmaneli Syrians[37]. As another characteristic that attracts Syrian refugees, a well-known and elderly opinion leader in Gediz put forward that the inhabitant profile of the neighborhood is mostly composed of the ones who have the highest respect for Islam religion. He further said that the neighborhood attracted Syrian refugees with its peaceful and conservative climate.

In line with the declarations of key actors, five respondents touched upon housing affordability, ethnic and cultural relations in Buca and locational aspects as pull factors (Table 36). However, unlike Karabağlar, all five respondents highlighted the existence and support of religious networks as the main reason behind their relocation to Buca, especially to the Gediz neighborhood. Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) explained the importance of the religious practices in the area with the following sentences:

> *…When compared to Basmane, Gediz is a heaven. There is no chaos, no dirty businesses…Everybody is respecting to each other…They say good morning, Selamın Aleyküm…All these values come from the Islamic tradition. The cemaat (Islamic community) is working really hard to keep us all together. I have heard their contributions to the revitalization of Islamic traditions…Their existence attracted me.*

Table 36: The reasons/motives behind Syrians' relocation to Buca

Existence and support of religious networks	5
Conservative and religious way of living	4
Ethnic and cultural similarities with local inhabitants	4
Affordable housing / accommodation	4
Safe and calm living environment	3
Proximity to (potential) workplaces and Basmane	2
Total	**5**

Similarly, four respondents mentioned the importance of the conservative and religious way of living in Buca as an attractive factor. Vahap (Arab, male, 42 years old) emphasized that the social relations are organized around Islamic practices and the products to be sold in shops – especially in local markets and butchers – are all suitable for consumption by the local inhabitants. To be clear, he said that men get socialized on Fridays before and after Friday Prayer, women gather at home very frequently to read Kur'an and to talk about some "women stuff" and youngsters attend to daily prayers and stay away from alcohol and drugs. Vahap listed all these as the reasons behind his choice of Gediz, as a neighborhood to settle in permanently. Unsurprisingly, the same four respondents mentioned the importance of the concentration of Arab population in the area. Because as Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old)

[37] Syrian refugee who formerly resided in Basmane Area.

said that living together with other Arabs to whom she can speak Arabic and share similar views, values and norms make her feel stronger, safer and belonged. After the experience of discrimination by native inhabitants and other ethnic Syrians she said that she found peace within the Arabic community in Gediz.

As another motive behind settling in Buca, four respondents mentioned the affordability of housing rents in the area. Just as in Basmane and Karabağlar cases, refugees' access to affordable accommodation options continues to play decisive roles in their relocation decisions. Lastly, three respondents emphasized their desire to live in a safe and calm environment (as oppose to Basmane) and two respondents highlighted the geographic proximity of Gediz neighborhood to their (potential) workplaces in the inner-city industrial sites of Izmir (e.g., Sixth Industrial Site) and central locations (e.g., Basmane) in Izmir, as significant reasons behind their relocations from Basmane to the Gediz neighborhood.

7.8. Actors affecting Syrians' choices to stay and relocation

- Choices to stay/remain

So far, I discussed the motives behind Syrian respondents' decisions to stay and/or to relocate and I found out that depending on the profile, expectations, ethnic background and social and economic capital of refugees, the locational choices have varied. Similarly, when I queried the actors (in)directly involved in Syrians' decisions to remain still and to relocate, I came across with various actors. Regarding the actors playing parts in Syrian respondents' decision to stay in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, I identified sixteen different actors, as seen in Table 37. As the leading actor, we see the members of ethnic solidarity networks. The Kurd and Arabic networks undoubtedly played critical roles in addressing the basic and most critical issues of refugees: accommodation, access to job market, access to public services, security, protection, support and sense of belonging. Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) explained the role of such ethnic communities as follows:

> *…Basically, we never feel alone…you know that there will be always someone who will knock your door and ask "how are you?". If you manage to trust and be trusted in return, the Arabs protect you like a father, it feeds you, it comforts you… thanks to the elderly Arabs in Basmane, I found a job, a house to live in, I learned Turkish a bit, I learned how to survive in here.*

In specific, all five respondents remained in Karabağlar highlighted the economic and emotional support that the Kurdish community provided to them, while four respondents in Gediz neighborhood mentioned the actions of the Arab community with great appreciation. Just as in Basmane, these networks provided the necessary information, guidance, protection, cash and in-kind allowances for refugees which are necessary for the processes of

emplacement and integration. Malak *(*Kurd, female, 40 years old) emphasized how she could not imagine a life apart from the Kurd community of which she is now the member of, with the following sentences:

> *The people I met there not only helped me to cover my urgent needs in my first days in here…As I get in this community and I met with marvelous people, they helped my find a home with proper sanitary system, they covered the expenses of my kids' education, clothing and food expenses. They also provided me clothes…They helped me earn money by selling the knits I made…Their existence is also the sign of security and protection.*

Table 37: Actors who affected Syrian respondents' choices to remain settled

Basmane	**Fre.**	**Karabağlar**	**Fre.**	**Buca**	**Fre.**
Kurdish, Arabic and Turkmen networks	8	Kurdish community	5	Arab community	4
Mukhtars	8	Relatives/family members	4	Relatives/family members	4
Relatives / family members	7	Mukhtars	3	Religious community	4
Local inhabitants	6	Homeowners	2	Local inhabitants	2
Syrian network	6	Local inhabitants	2	Mukhtar	2
Homeowners	6			Homeowners	1
Realtors	5	**Total**	**5**	**Total**	**5**
Mafia/people engaged in illegal businesses	5				
NGOs / CSOs	5				
Local tradespeople	5				
Local political figures	3				
Public officers (ind.)	3				
Opinion leaders	3				
Total	**12**				

Among various domains of support that these networks involved in, the provision of accommodation/housing ranks at the top. By offering free accommodation and flat sharing options, by asking lower rental prices than usual, by being the guarantors to convince homeowners to rent the flats and by resettling refugees to refugee-homes where various single refugees also reside; these networks attempt to fill a huge gap in addressing the accommodation needs of Syrian refugees, an issue that the Turkish State has failed to address. For example, Salim (Turkmen, male, 60 years old) stated that the ignorance of the Turkish State and local governments regarding the accommodation of Syrians led Syrians to look for alternative actors who could address the issue. At this point, Arab, Kurd and Turkmen communities come forward as "the heros". These heroes opened their houses to Syrians, shared the rooms and even the beds, although there were not their duties.

Secondly and interestingly, we see neighborhood mukhtars as important actors who affect Syrians' decisions to leave or stay. Eight respondents in Basmane, three respondents in Karabağlar and two respondents in Buca touched upon three different roles that the

neighborhood mukhtars played and explained how these roles convinced them to stay in the area. Firstly, Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) said that mukhtars are the "first public officers" that refugees consult and ask for help. Because, according to him mukhtars have the greatest information about the profile of inhabitants, the social and economic relations and the services provided in the settlements. Mukhtars often guide/inform Syrian refugees about the available job opportunities and even reference them to get the jobs. As Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) argued, when her husband was looking for a job in Basmane, the mukhtar of Agora helped him and arranged meetings with potential employees. According to her, the mukhtar also helped her husband in handling bureaucratic affairs when her husband decided to run his own business. Mukhtars also guide and help refugees regarding how they could access housing and labour market, how they can handle bureaucratic issues and where they could get specific services. Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) stated how the mukhtar of Faikpaşa neighborhood helped her to find an accommodation with the following words:

> *When I first came here, I did not know anyone…I went to some realtors to help me find a house but they all told me that whether I have a relative or an important acquaintance in Basmane…When I said no they said that there were a lot of Syrians looking for a house…When I was desperate and when I was sitting on the sidewalk, a man came next to me and started to speak Kurdish. I said "Arab Arab" and he started to speak Arabic very poorly…But he managed to understand my problem and asked if I had a family, kids or anyone having health problems. He also asked whether I had an identity card. I said yes…and… I said that I was alone for the time being but also said that I was waiting for my family who were still in Syria. The laughed me and said that "don't be so desperate I will help you". The introduced me an elderly man and convinced him to rent the house to me. The homeowner was not looking pleased but thanks of the mukhtar, I rented my first house. After that, when I faced any problem I knocked his door. He's my savior in Basmane and my reason to be here.*

Thirdly, three respondents highlighted how the mukhtars act as interfaces among refugees and public officers. Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) explained this by saying the following:

> *Although I'm living here for four years, I still do not have enough knowledge on the services provided by the municipalities. One day, our mukhtar (the mukhtar of Kocakapı) knocked my door and ask whether I wish to apply for the Kızılay aids and when I said "yes" he gave my name to the officers. He also knocked my door to ask whether I want to apply for the milk campaign of the (Metropolitan) municipality. He also arranged it. I can give various examples of this and they all make me feel belonged to my neighborhood.*

Besides mukhtars, seven respondents mentioned their relatives/family members in Basmane as leading figures who shape their decision to remain to settle in Basmane. Similarly, in Karabağlar and Buca, the majority of respondents (for each four respondents out of five) highlighted their relations with relatives/family members as the reasons behind settlement in these areas. Just as the members of the ethnic communities, the relatives/family members who

had settled in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca long before the arrival of others, prepared necessary conditions for emplacement and integration. More precisely, they addressed the accommodation and employment issues of newcomers and guided them in accessing to health, education services and aid when necessary. They also supported newcomers emotionally and economically and lower expenses and costs of forging a new life in a new social environment.

Local inhabitants also come forward as important actors who (in)directly affected refugees' sense of belonging to Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca which in turn affected refugees' decisions whether to leave or not (total of ten respondents). Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) emphasized that the welcoming attitudes of the local inhabitants fostered her sympathy to the social relations in the neighborhood. She also said that by building good relations with her neighbors, she learned the ways of getting appointments from public hospitals, withdrawing cash from ATM, applying for food and clothing allowances of civil society organizations. From another point of view, Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) stated that local inhabitants often acted as guarantors in the housing market and played critical roles in convincing other local inhabitants to rent their houses to Syrian refugees. He further noted that the welcoming attitudes of local inhabitants helped refugees to get used to their new environments without fear of discrimination and isolation. In a way, good relations with local inhabitants (becoming friends with them) increased Syrians' sense of belonging to the areas settled.

As another actor affecting Syrians' intra-urban mobility (i.e., residential mobility), six respondents in Basmane mentioned the Syrian network in the neighborhood they had settled. Just like ethnic communities/networks, relatives/family members and local inhabitants, the other Syrians in the area with whom our respondents share similar experiences of mobility and emplacement played critical roles in addressing newcomers' access to accommodation, support and social aids. As Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old) exemplified this with the following sentences:

> *…Surely, the dialogue with former Syrians who have already experienced the struggles of living here (in Basmane) is valuable…Firstly…you can speak your native language and fully express yourself. Maybe this is the hardest thing in a foreign country…When you express yourself properly, your chance of being helped increases. In that regard, former Syrians can remedy your problems. For example, I met some of them via Facebook and some of them in the market and butcher. They helped me to find a house, they helped me to pay the rent until I got social aids. They asked whether my kids need something. From now on, I never want to be apart from them.*

Interestingly, we also see how the actors in the local rental housing market of Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca – specifically the homeowners and realtors – became critical in Syrians' location choices in Izmir. As nine respondents (in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca) highlighted

the attitudes of such actors – either welcoming and discriminatory – determined whether refugees manage to access housing or not. For example, Salim (Turkmen, male, 60 years old) stated that in the absence of public authorities in the management of refugee accommodation in Turkey and Izmir, the housing market actors determined the rules of the game. Depending on the supply and demand, they set the rental prices for refugees and selected the potential tenants. Even more, holding the necessary economic means is not enough for refugees to rent a house. According to Salim, refugees need to be awarded as "perfect potential tenants" aftermath of various tests applied by the realtors and homeowners. More precisely, Salim said that

> *…You need to be a member of the dominant ethnic community in the area where you look for housing or at least share similar ethnic background, values, and language with the homeowners. Otherwise, you may not find a house to rent, even though you have the money to pay. Luckily, I'm Turkmen and thanks to my Turkish identity, I managed to find a house without facing discrimination.*

Regarding this issue, a shocking argument came from Serhad *(*Kurd, male, 25 years old). He complained about the ethnic discrimination and filtering applied in the rental housing market of Basmane. In specific, he said that he could get why homeowners often applied filtering, but at the same time, he was struggling to understand the role of the realtors in Basmane. He stated that "*they are market actors seeking profit, but I saw that they are making ethnic discrimination. Especially some realtors in Basmane refrain to show rental houses to Arab and Syrian Kurds. They favour Turkmens*." He further noted that, realtors often convince homeowners to rent their houses to Syrians whom they favour the most. A realtor in Basmane confirmed the ethnic filtering he often applies. He told me that

> *…As an honoured Turkish man, I hold the back of oppressed Turkmens. Of course, I reserve some of my housing stock for them. I'm not ashamed of what I'm doing. I will continue to find houses for Turkmens in need, I will be their brothers, in every way that I can. Actually, the State should favour them, but I think the political interests detain them from engaging such activities…Making money is not the only aim for me, I will share my bread with them, when necessary…In case you will ask me why I don't favour Syrian Kurds and Arabs, I can freely say that they have their own protection mechanisms…*

The explanation of the realtor bears great insights to draw the differing roles that different actors play in addressing refugee-related issues in the absence of the State (i.e. public authorities) who is supposed to be the leading actor in migration and asylum management. The realtors not only provide emotional support to refugees but also address the critical issues that refugees suffer the most– i.e., accommodation and economic support.

As another striking finding of this study, I found out that key political figures in the settlements and mafia type of illegal organizations in the neighborhoods also influence refugees' location

choices by affecting refugees' access to basic needs and services. To start with, three Arab respondents in Basmane reported that they are helped by the local representative of Justice and Development Party in Basmane who channel the food and clothing support of the State and NGOs to Syrian Arabs in Basmane by using his political power and political network. Based on the declarations of the respondents, I managed to reach his figure and conducted a short interview. He simply stated the following.

> *…Let me be clear, I am not that powerful to help Syrian refugees in Basmane. As the representative of the dominant political ideology in Basmane, I try to contact key people who would help Syrians in Basmane. There is nothing illegal about it. When my friends working in Kızılay asked me how many Syrians are in need of food and clothing in Basmane, I contact with the mukhtars I know personally in Basmane and ask them to prepare a list of names for me. We are discriminating any Syrian, we are not labelling them. I know, it is not my duty to activate the official support mechanisms but my duty in the party allows me to do such things. Things work like this in Basmane and even in Turkey.*

For the latter, as five respondents in Basmane highlighted, the mafia organization in the entertainment sector in Basmane, who are also claimed to be involved in illegal businesses like woman trafficking, smuggling and drug dealing, played active roles in the provision of housing especially for Turkmen refugees. Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) stated that although he did not ask the support of this mafia organization, he heard various examples of how mafia leaders arranged houses for Turkmens. He said the following:

> *As the anonymous heroes of Basmane, I heard that Halid and his "gang" have identified the empty, abandoned old houses in Basmane, have broken their keys, have cleaned them, have put some furniture in it and have given them to Turkmens in need for free. Some support their action as the real Turkish men while some others think that they try to shadow their illegal businesses that discomfort the local inhabitants.*

I heard the same from the local tradespeople, realtors and some other Syrian respondents. They all stated that by using their power and economic resources, the mafia organization that rule the "night life" in Basmane "solves" the accommodation problem of Syrian Turkmens in the area. To better understand how the mafia "solves" the issue, with the help of my growing network in Basmane, I managed to interview with this so-called hero named "Halid". Halid told me that he uses his power to help oppressed Turkmens who have been marginalized for decades. As a Turkish citizen paying the bills, he thinks that he had the right to help others in need. He also believes that it is the duty of people who have power to give a leg up to the Turkish State in addressing some issues. Regarding how he is engaged in the housing market in Basmane, he stated the following:

> *At first, we are not doing something illegal…I know that you feel this way…However, I accepted to interview with you because I want to show how we can help refugees, our blood brothers. I help Turkmens in finding accommodation. In Basmane, I am now paying*

the rents of at least 24-25 houses all of which I gave to Turkmens for free. The good part is that they don't know me. I do this for favour. Moreover, when I find abandoned houses that are not in use anymore, I make the necessary repairs and grant the houses to Turkmen refugees. I will continue to do so.

Apart from this shocking example, I saw that NGOs and local solidarity initiatives in Basmane often become decisive in affecting Syrians' decisions to move or stay by addressing various issues that they are struggling with. Although local NGOs are not directly involved in refugees' access to housing, labour market and public services due to their limited powers and budgets, they provide language, legal and psychological support to refugees, which contributes to the refugees' sense of belonging to the area in which they are settled. Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) stated that Kapılar initiative put great effort to increase the comfort of Syrian refugees in Basmane. In specific, the collective dinners, the multi-cultural events that welcome refugees and natives, the language and translation support, the guidance and share of practical information regarding how to access services and most importantly, the one-to-one relation that the volunteers of the initiative develop with refugees make refugees feel as a part of the local community in Basmane. Such one-to-one relations are worth to devote further attention since some NGO officers often take initiatives (regardless of their affiliation and competence) and address some specific problems of Syrians. For example, Gülümser (Arab, female, 25 years old) stated that before she got married, an officer from Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği helped her by inviting Gülümser to stay with her until she got married or find a house to rent. As another example Serhad *(*Kurd, male, 25 years old) mentioned Izmirli Müzisyenler Derneği by highlighting their music-based activities in Basmane which bring all Afghan, Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens together in a way to contribute to peace and tolerance. As seen, refugee-related NGOs address a variety of issues regarding the settlement, emplacement and integration of Syrian refuges which make them connected to the area.

The other actors who affect Syrians' decisions to remain settling are found to be the local tradespeople (5). As Ebral (Arab, female, 67 years old) and Amine (Arab, female, 35 years old) highlighted, the various market actors, who are providing the basic goods/services and targeting the specific needs of Syrian refugees, indirectly contribute to the attachment of Syrians to the areas that they are living in. Besides the provision of goods/services, local tradespeople (grocery, tailor, butcher, realtor etc.) often help refugees to find immediate solutions to their problems (i.e,. where to buy Izmirim Card for public transportation) and guide them regarding how to access accommodation and social aids. Moreover, as we see in Cennet's (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) story below, refugees' daily and/or frequent

interactions with local tradespeople also increase the sense of trust among the two parties which in turn foster the sense of belonging. She stated that

> *…I really appreciate the welcoming attitudes of the butcher and grocery in Basmane. Thanks to their friendliness, in time, we developed a good communication…Before I met them, I was feeling like "we should move" somewhere nicer but as I got to know them I want to remain close to them. Because when my husband goes to work, they are the only people whom I can rely on when something bad happens to me.*

Interestingly, four respondents in Buca (out of five respondents) declared that the Islamic (religious) community in the district positively affected their decisions to remain in Buca. Because, by labelling themselves as conservative and loyal Muslims, they stated their appreciation of the religious practices in Gediz neighborhood. Fatıma (Arab, female, 27 years old) said that although the housing affordability and the existence of her relatives in Gediz were the reasons of her settlement in Buca, the religious community in the neighborhood increased her attachment to the area. She explained this process with the following sentences:

> *I believe that God sent me there. I would have never imagined that I would feel safe, happy and belonged in any place apart from my country. The local inhabitants who are closely engaged in Islamic practices, the imam who is constantly telling us good and divine things and organizing the daily activities in the neighborhood, the mukhtar who is also engaged to Islam are all together represent the Islamic community here which make me feel belonged to Gediz.*

Similar to Fatıma, Eslem (Arab, female, 20 years old) emphasized the daily relations in Gediz which are organized with respect to the Islamic practices. Precisely, she said that especially Syrian refugees give importance to not to work and engage any activity during the worship times in the day and not to hinder to read Kur'an within crowded groups of people especially in Fridays. For Eslem, the religious actors in Gediz are giving hope and strength to refugees to cope with the obstacles and therefore, are important figures that make Syrians settle in the area.

Public officers who often take initiatives (regardless of the general attitude and competence of the institutions that they are affiliated with) (3) also become effective in Syrians' decisions to stay or relocate. Şerif (Turkmen, male, 42 years old) mentioned that although the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality was not allowed to provide cash allowances for Syrians, a municipal officer he contacted with helped him in accessing allowances by informing him about the operations of several NGOs in that regard. Even more, Karim (Arab, male, 28 years old) stated that he met an officer from Kızılay to whom he contacted with the reference of the mukhtar of Etiler neighborhood. This officer helped Karim to get aid as soon as possible by adding his name in the list of so-called "priority help", although he does not have any health

problem or disadvantageous conditions when compared to his peers. According to Karim, this officer also hosted him in his house for a couple of days until Karim found a house.

Similarly, opinion leaders in the settlements, who are known as the religious and/or political figures, elderly people all may have an impact on refugees' decisions by (in)directly influencing refugees' access to information, aid, accommodation and public services. Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) explained how an elderly political figure in Basmane, known by the name Süleyman, acted as the owner of the Basmane by involving in every matter. Ahmad stated that although he found such interventions very inconvenient in the first place, as he got in touch with this person, he started to feel sympathy to him. Because, according to Ahmad, Süleyman takes care of the Arab population in the neighborhood and does his best to solve their problems since his mother is also Arab.

- Choices to relocate

Regarding the actors who are (in)directly affected Syrians' decision to relocate, I identified twelve different actors. In Table 38, you may see the actors involved in the processes of leaving Basmane and relocating to Karabağlar and Buca, in separate columns. To start with the process of leaving Basmane, we see the members of Kurdish and Arabic network as the leading figures in affecting Syrians' choices to leave. Because while such networks are helpful for their new members who are sharing similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds, they may not be that helpful for others who are outside the community which in the long run foster discrimination and ethnic conflicts among different groups. Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) stated that he decided to leave Basmane aftermath of the discriminatory actions of the Arab community in the housing and job market of Basmane.

According to Rojhad, the Arab community in Basmane favoured their own members by providing them accommodation, using their own networks to mobilizes aids to Syrian Arabs, by hiring them or finding jobs for them which in turn put Syrian Kurds and Turkmens in a disadvantaged position. Therefore, just as in Rojhad's story, many respondents decided to leave Basmane to stay away from the community of Syrian Arabs who dominantly reshaped the social and economic relations in Basmane. Although Syrian Kurds complained about the discriminatory actions of the Syrian Arab community, similar complaints came from Syrian Arabs regarding the Kurd community. As we see in Abdulbaki's (Arab, male, 60 years old) story, Syrian Kurds are blamed for intervening the daily actions and traditions of Syrian Arabs in a way that leads to discrimination, brickbat and even knife fights.

Table 38: Actors who affected Syrian respondents' choices to move/relocate

Leaving Basmane	**Fre.**	**Relocating to Karabağlar**	**Fre.**	**Relocating to Buca**	**Fre.**
Kurdish and Arabic network	6	Kurdish network	2	Religious community	4
Hotel / pension owners	5	Homeowners	2	Arabic community	4
Homeowners	4	Mukhtars	1	Homeowners	2
Realtors	4				
Mukthars	3				
Other Syrians	3				
Employees	1				
Total	**9**		**3**		**5**

Secondly, five respondents declared that the hotel/pension owners who once opened their doors to Syrian refugees, now turned their back to refugees by increasing the booking prices of rooms which are beyond the affordable levels. As the essence of the arguments of other five respondents, Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) stated that the hotel owners doubled the prices – especially after mid 2016 - with argument of the high demand for rooms. He said various families were somehow "kicked out" from the hotels that they had sheltered as they could not afford to pay the price. He further noted that mark-ups were not only limited to the booking prices. The realtors and homeowners applied arbitrary pricing policy for rental housing. To say, depending on the ethnicity, size of the household, number of kids, number of people having health problems, income level and occupation of refugees, they asked different prices from refugees to rent their properties. Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) illustrated this as follows:

> *…At the beginning to rental prices were low, let's say 300-400 TL for an old, dirty flat having two small rooms with broken windows and no heating. It was okey, unless we afford to find a shelter. However, as the population increased the houses became scarce and rents increased. I mean...rents jumped to 700-1000 TL in general. Here, the dirty game began. The rents increased for every refugee but especially for us…I mean the Syrian Kurds…the rents became even higher. Because homeowners mostly favoured Turkmens and Arabs and asked lower prices from them. I know it by experience. We were asked 1500 TL for such terrible houses while Turkmens were asked 500 TL. I have many experiences like that…*

Mohammad's quotation is also important for us to uncover the role of realtors and homeowners, as well. As an argument that derived from the narratives of four respondents, in the absence of the State and any policy that regulate the accommodation of Syrian refugees, the actors in the rental housing market become quite powerful as they decided on refugees' access to housing. As all four respondents highlighted realtors/homeowners either facilitated refugees' access to rental flats by accepting to rent their houses and asking lower prices than the market. Even more, as Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old) argued there were some rumors in Basmane claiming that some Turkmens accessed housing for free as they were welcomed

by Turkish homeowners. On the other hand, realtors and homeowners also had the power to hinder and prevent some refugees' access to housing by not renting the houses, not showing the houses or asking higher prices than the market price. The ambivalent actions and attitudes of the actors in the housing market inevitably affected Syrians' decision to stay in or move from Basmane, as they could not emplace and live in a settlement where they could not be accommodated.

At this point, it is worth to mention the role of the neighborhood mukhtars – as local administrative figures – in affecting Syrians' location choices in Izmir. Just as realtors and homeowners, mukhtars also actively take place in the local housing market. As they know the majority of neighborhood residents, they often involve in the social and economic relations in the neighborhoods. In theory, they are charged to fulfil their duties with the principle of equality, however, in practice, depending on their political stance, ethnicity, religion, culture and socio-economic position, they may favor and prioritize some groups over others. As an example of this, Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) stated that the mukhtar of the neighborhood, where he was an inhabitant of, involved in the provision of aid to Syrian Arabs. According Rojhad, the mukhtar who has an Arabic background, uses his own networks to mobilize aid for Syrian Arabs in his neighborhood. Again, as Rojhad claimed the mukhtar does not care about the Syrian Kurds and Turkmens at all. Complementary to this, Seyyid (Arab, male, 45 years old) drew the role that the mukhtar play in the housing market. He stated that he favored Syrian Arabs and facilitated their access to housing with affordable prices by convincing the homeowners that he knew personally. His attitudes detached Syrian Kurds and Turkmens from the neighborhood.

From another point of view, three respondents mentioned their relations with other Syrians in Basmane as important motive affecting their decisions to leave. As Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) stated it was not easy to live in the same settlement with three different ethnic Syrian groups who have long-lasting conflicts and problems for decades. As the number of the representatives of these groups increased in Basmane, so did the number of assaults, fights and misunderstandings. Even more, as each group protected and favored their own members, several conflicts took place in housing and labour market. As a result of this, ethnic isolation emerged as an inevitable solution, as Faruq stated. From a similar viewpoint, Rojhad (Kurd, male, 27 years old) mentioned the discriminatory actions of employees in Basmane who preferred to hire workers who share similar ethnic and cultural background with them while repelling the skilled workers who have distinct ethnicities.

Apart from the actors who are affecting Syrians' decisions to move, there are also some actors who encourage Syrians to relocate and settle in some specific settlements. To start with, we see that the members of ethnic networks in different settlements come forward as the leading actors affecting Syrians' decisions of settlement. Both for Syrians who moved from Basmane and settled in Karabağlar and Buca, these networks played critical roles. As Faruq (Kurd, male, 54 years old) and Mohammad (Kurd, male, 32 years old) stated, the welcoming attitudes of the Kurd inhabitants of Karabağlar to whom they can speak the same language, share problems, ask for protection and guidance attracted them the most in their decision to settle in Karabağlar. Similarly, Zekire (Arab, female, 25 years old) declared that with respect to the support and courage that she took from her Arab fellows in Gediz, she decided to settle in the neighborhood.

Similarly, according to four respondents, the religious community and the leading Islamic figures in Buca also attracted Syrian Arabs to come and settle in the district. By offering a conservative way of living which is organized according to Islamic traditions, the Sunni Arab community in Gediz neighborhood attracts Syrian refugees sharing the same beliefs. As Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old) and Vahap (Arab, male, 42 years old) emphasized in their narratives, Islamic community in Gediz neighborhood attracted them by offering a safe, calm and conservative living. This community is also powerful in acting as a filtering mechanism by preventing the settlement of Syrian Kurds or any other group that they find disrespectful to their values by not allowing them to enter local housing market.

The welcoming attitudes of the homeowners and mukhtars in these two districts also encouraged Syrian refugees to settle in these areas. In particular, the mukhtars' openness to guide Syrian newcomers to shelter and their positive attitude towards solving the problems of refugees serve as a refugee magnet. Mukhtars who are willing to act as an interface among refugees and public authorities in the provision of services and social aids have more impacts on Syrians' location choices. Similarly, the willingness and helpful attitudes of homeowners in these two districts attract refugee newcomers. Moreover, just like the religious communities and mukhtars, homeowners often act as filtering mechanisms by not renting their houses to the ones having different values, ethnic backgrounds and cultures than them.

As the other three participants stated, access to affordable housing in Karabağlar without discrimination and xenophobia in the housing market positively affected the settlement decisions in the area. To illustrate, Zeynep (Turkmen, female, 25 years old) said that, in Karabağlar, it is possible to find rental flat with proper infrastructure, heating systems for

affordable prices. Moreover, as she noted, the mukhtars, realtors and even the property-owners are more friendly than the ones in Basmane, as they offer their help and support when needed.

7.9. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I examined the intra-urban mobility trajectories (which are related to international and national mobility processes) of the selected Syrian sampling by looking at their initial and subsequent location choices and housing pathways in Izmir. To do this, I conducted field studies in three local foci as Basmane, Karabağlar, and Buca. The reasons behind choosing these three spatial focuses were the Syrian population they host and the observable Syrian refugee mobility among them. As will be remembered, after a rigorous literature review and various interviews I conducted in Izmir (with public officers, academicians, NGO representatives etc.), I found out that Basmane Area is the "hub" and "home" of Syrian refugees in Izmir to which Karabağlar and Buca Districts are attached as the residential extensions. In other words, I found out that from the first days of the Syrian refugee influx to Izmir, Basmane has always been the area where Syrian refugees are heavily concentrated. However, in the ninth year of the influx, remarkable one-way relocations of Syrian refugees from Basmane to two specific settlements, namely, Karabağlar and Buca Districts, have been observed. By tracing the intra-urban mobility of Syrian refugees between these three settlements, I tried to uncover the underlying motives, factors, and actors behind refugees' location choices in Izmir in this chapter.

The first finding of this chapter is that Basmane stands out as the first settlement where Syrian refugees initially settle in Izmir. Twenty-one (out of thirty-one) respondent stated that their initial location choice in Izmir was Basmane. Among them fifteen respondents were pioneer Syrians (who came to Turkey before the EU-TR deal in 2016), while only five of them came after 2016. However, for subsequent Syrian respondents, Buca and Karabağlar also come to the scene as the preferred locations. Here, only five subsequent respondents settled in Basmane as their initial choice, while nine of them settled initially in Karabağlar and Buca. As the summary of the long explanation of this fact, I found out that for the early comers, Basmane acted as a refugee magnet with its central and transitionary location (i.e., strong transportation connections with Anatolia, important spots on the Aegean coast of Turkey), affordable accommodation options, multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan character – migration culture, various public and private services (education, health commerce), several NGOs operating in the field of migration and asylum, ethnic solidarity networks and smuggling operations. Basmane seemed to offer whatever necessary for the survival of the early settlers who had limited

economic and social capital. Therefore, both Syrian refugees in transit and Syrians intending to stay in Turkey either for a short or long-term preferred Basmane as their initial location.

However, Basmane's popularity as the "hub" and "home" of Syrian refugees cannot only be explained by how its welfare offerings and support mechanisms (e.g., affordable housing, central location, health, education and commerce facilities, NGOs) have attracted Syrians to choose to settle in there. Because although most of the respondents emphasized how they were attracted by the opportunities that Basmane provide for emplacement and survival, some respondents implicitly highlighted that they did not have other settlement options than Basmane due to their income and education level, language barrier, ethnic background and class positions in Izmir. Some respondents explained that Basmane is one of the unique settlements in Izmir where "non-İzmirlis" and even "non-Turkish" people can create their own spaces representing their culture and class relations and can build their own social networks. Accordingly, Therefore, refugees' settlement in Basmane (i.e., the state of immobility) is not only related to their subjective preferences, but is also about refugees having few other options to settle down due to their social/economic capital and class positions in Izmir.

The second finding of this chapter is that Syrian refugees do not continue to reside in the first locations (especially Basmane) that they had settled. Although the majority of Syrian respondents (twenty-seven out of thirty-one) declared that their initial location choice in Izmir was a conscious one, some of them preferred to move to other settlements in time as their expectations changed, as they felt discomforted and most importantly as they could not engage in social and economic relations in the localities they settled in. Again, both the preferences/needs and the class-position/ethnic background of refugees (refugees' level of engagement into the existing social relations) become decisive in relocation decisions. Here, those who managed to hold on to their new social environment and build their own networks of solidarity continue to remain settled while those who could not engage in housing and labour market and could not break down the language barrier (forcibly) move to somewhere else.

In that regard, I found out that regardless of their year of arrival to Izmir, nineteen respondents still reside in the first locations that they had settled, while the remaining twelve moved to other locations with different motivations behind. When I queried whether the year of arrival to Izmir has to do with refugees' decisions to stay or relocate, I figured out that both pioneer Syrians (who came to Turkey/Izmir before 2016) and subsequent Syrians have relocated from their initial locations. Here, Basmane comes forward as the leading settlement where Syrians

settle in and move from the most. Among twenty-one respondents who declared that they initially settled in Basmane when they arrived in Izmir, nine moved to Karabağlar and Buca Districts. More precisely, the Syrian population concentrated in Basmane started to dissolve over time; however, this distribution was not towards the whole of Izmir, but towards two spatial foci as Karabağlar and Buca.

Regarding the motives that urge refugees to relocate, we see two main types: the motives behind (forcibly) leaving the place of residence and the motives that attract refugees to move to a specific settlement. For the first, ten respondents put forward that the ethnic conflicts/tensions and the sense of insecurity in Basmane (6), the bad reputation of Basmane as the hub of crime and illegal affairs (5), the discrimination in the housing market of Basmane (5), the unsuitability of Basmane for family life (5), the existence of entertainment venues and shops selling alcohol (4), the unsuitability of Basmane for religious practices (4), the chaos and crowd in Basmane (3), and increasing accommodation/housing costs in Basmane (2) affected their decisions to leave the area. Here, Syrians put great emphasis on the level of discrimination and exploitation they have faced in Basmane. For all ethnic groups, the discriminatory attitudes of the landlords, local tradesman and native inhabitants were quite decisive in their engagement into housing and labour market. Although Syrians attribute these exclusionary attitudes to their non-Turkishness, that is, their ethnic background, the class positions of the refugees have also been one of the important determinants in this exclusion process. In other words, we can say that people who have economic resources, work in a certain job, can pay their rent on time, get along with landlords, open a shop in the neighborhood, provide employment are more easily accepted by native inhabitants, while those who do not have sufficient resources and social environment are forced to leave the neighborhood. Moreover, those who forced to leave the neighborhoods moved to one of the fewer options for settlement where they believe that they would hold on to existing social and economic relations.

Accordingly, all three respondents who relocated to Karabağlar stated that the existence of employment and income-generating activities in Karabağlar (3), the geographic proximity of Karabağlar to (potential) workplaces (3), the ethnic, cultural and class-based similarities that Syrian refugees share with the local inhabitants (2), and the affordability of housing in Karabağlar came forward as the pulling motives. On the other hand, people who relocated to Buca highlighted the roles of the existence and support of religious networks in Buca (5), the conservative and religious way of living in Buca (4), the ethnic and cultural similarities that they share with local inhabitants of Buca and the affordability of housing (4), in their decisions

to relocated from Basmane. All these show us that Syrian respondents' motives to relocate are differing from the motives of selecting the initial location. Syrians' decision to relocate is related to the aim of being involved in social and economic relations in their city of residence and being fully emplaced (rather than physical and basic economic survival). We see that Karabağlar attracted Syrians with its employment opportunities, while Buca with its conservative and religious way of living.

Moreover, in relocation decisions of Syrians we see the decreasing effects of formal and informal solidarity channels while we also see the deepening individual concerns of refugees to increase their socio-economic well-being by engaging job market and earning income and accessing affordable housing and services. Similarly, we also see that as refugees manage to survive in their new social environments, they increasingly tend to protect their ethnic identity, language, religion, and values by engaging ethnic networks and by forming ethnic clusters in some specific areas. In short, I claim that the essentials of successful emplacement in host cities become more decisive in time in refugees' location choices.

The third main finding of this chapter is that refugees' intra-urban mobility – i.e., initial and subsequent location choices – are tied to their access to accommodation/housing. Because individuals can not settle and emplace in any locality where they cannot accommodate. As the justification of this argument, via Syrian respondents' narratives on their intra-urban mobility in Izmir, I figured out the importance of the availability and affordability of housing, diversity of accommodation options, the level of discrimination/welcoming in the housing market, the attitudes and actions of actors involved in the provision of housing are quite determinant in refugees' decisions to settle, to stay in and to relocate to some specific locations. Here, it is evident that both in their initial and subsequent location choices, refugees dominantly choose to settle in areas where they can reach healthy, safe, and decent housing with affordable prices and where they no longer face discrimination and alienation in the housing market. This evidence also shows that the trace of refugees' housing pathways was an appropriate tool to trace the multi-scalar mobility trajectories of refugees.

The fourth and last finding of the chapter is that, as evidence showed, the intra-urban mobility of Syrian refugees in Izmir is not only bound to the preferences and social and economic capital of refugees but also to the actions and discourses of diverse actors who are (in)directly involved in refugees' access to necessary services and resources in the partial absence of the public authorities. Just as in the country/city selection process (i.e., internal mobility), refugees look for the options where they could easily meet their urgent needs and reach out

accommodation and aid services, emotional and economic support, security, protection, solidarity, employment, and where they could engage social relations with the providers of such services. Regarding the initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Izmir, I identified fourteen different actors. Here, we see the dominancy of Syrians' close relatives/family members in affecting the choices since they help Syrian newcomers first-hand and directly touch upon newcomers' lives. Specifically, by opening their houses, providing a safe shelter, and meeting refugees' urgent needs, relatives/family members play critical roles in the initial reception and accommodation of Syrian newcomers. The first-hand economic and emotional support provided by relatives/family members is, thus, the essence of survival for refugees in their new social environment. In a similar vein, ethnic solidarity networks (mostly the Kurd and Arab networks in Basmane, Karabağlar, and Buca) played critical roles in attracting Syrian refugees by offering free/affordable accommodation, economic support and guidance to Syrians who share similar ethnic and cultural identities with them. These networks facilitated Syrian refugees' survival and emplacement by giving them practical information on how to register, how to apply for social aids, how to access accommodation, labour market, education, and health services. Parallel to the actions of ethnic solidarity networks, pioneer Syrians and people met randomly also share their experiences and knowledge on the practical issues and facilitate refugees' access to essential services and resources.

On the other hand, when we look at the actors affecting Syrians' decisions to stay in or relocate to some specific settlements (fifteen different actors), we see that the roles of relatives/family members have diminished slightly. However, the ethnic solidarity networks seemed to play more decisive roles than they played in the initial location choices of Syrians. Nineteen respondents (out of twenty-one) stated that they either stayed or relocated to some specific locations to get the support and protection of Kurd and Arab networks existent in those areas. According to the respondents, these networks play crucial roles in the preservation of the language, culture, customs, and the social/political recognition of people with different ethnic grounds. By reproducing the social, economic, and political relations in the settlements and by intervening in occasions affecting the social order, these networks act as the "informal rulers" of the given settlements. In some cases, like Gediz neighborhood, religious (Islamic) networks play similar roles by reorganizing the localities' social relations.

Interestingly, we see the decisive roles of the mukhtars in Syrians' decisions to remain settling or to relocate to other areas. Seventeen of thirty-one respondents stated that mukhtars, as the local administrators of neighborhoods, often help Syrians by guiding them on practical matters and engaging them to their networks, which in turn facilitate refugees' access to

accommodation, employment, and public services. Even more, by acting as the bridges among public authorities, NGOs and refugees, some mukhtars actively participate in the mobilization of aid for refugees. In a similar vein, everyday encounters and frequent interactions between refugees and local inhabitants, the welcoming/discriminatory actions of native populations come forward as the other determinants of refugees' relocation decisions. As expected, refugees tend to settle in areas where they can be a part of social and economic relations and where they can feel socially included.

The housing market actors are also worth emphasizing, since both in Syrians' initial and subsequent location choices, we see how home-owners, realtors, and hotel/pension owners play decisive roles. These actors regulate the housing market by pricing the houses, by welcoming or discriminating refugees, by acting as filtering mechanisms via selecting potential tenants concerning their ethnicity, household size, number of kids, political stances, occupation, income, and education levels. Lastly but interestingly, we also see the importance of mafia-type organizations who "secretly" reshape the social order in neighbourhoods and decide which ethnic groups or refugees would reach out to local housing and job market and public/private services.

All in all, by comparing the motives and actors that affect/shape/influence Syrian respondents' initial and subsequent location choices in Izmir, I concluded that, as refugees gradually get used to the new social and economic relations in Izmir, they tend to look for the best locational options where would bring advantages to increase their access to proper accommodation, better job opportunities and various public services. In other words, under the policy/political vacuums in migration and integration issues which necessitate refugees' own efforts to manage their emplacement process, we see that refugees' struggles to access the services and resources necessary for their social inclusion/emplacement in Izmir are strongly associated with their locational choices in Izmir. Even more, as refugees' struggles have gone beyond ensuring physical survival and safety, they have sought to engage social and economic relations and interactions with a bunch of actors who would contribute to their overall well-being, rather than relying on the first-hand economic and emotional support of their relatives/family members and solidarity networks. All these show us that, as refugees' strategies have shifted from physical survival to socio-economic and cultural survival (i.e., essentials of emplacement processes), their location preferences in Izmir have changed accordingly. Within this perspective, the intra-urban mobility of refugees, which I traced by following the housing pathways of refugees, can be regarded as the local spatial reflections of refugees' struggle to access necessary services and resources for their survival and emplacement and therefore

should be seen as the continuation of the international/internal mobility trajectories of refugees.

In overall, in order not to spoil the consistency of the discussion, I describe the emplacement of Syrians in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca mostly as a matter of preference in relation to the provision of certain resources and services. However, as I have emphasized at certain points of the discussion, Basmane is a place where Syrians both settle willingly and have to settle because they know they cannot stay elsewhere in the city. To be more precise, Basmane stands out as a place where all ethnic groups can express themselves with their own identities and have access to cheap housing and services. However, Basmane is one of the limited settlement options for Syrians to emplace in Izmir, as it is socially and economically segregated from other wealthier and ethnically homogeneous parts of Izmir by labeling as the hub of poverty, low-income groups, in-migrants (from less developed provinces of Turkey) and irregular refugees. Therefore, the popularity of Basmane as the "hub of Syrian refugees" cannot only be explained by refugees' preferences to settle in here, but also by its socio-economic, ethnic and political position in Izmir. The same argument is valid for Syrians' settlement in certain locations in Karabağlar and Buca. It is possible to increase the number of examples, thus, when commenting on the mobility/immobility situations of Syrians in Izmir, we need to take into account both the subjective preferences of refugees and their economic and social capital, which will affect their class position in Izmir and their decision to be mobile.

The literature on emplacement enabled me to see that Syrians' economic/social capital, class positions, ethnic backgrounds and locational attributes of localities within the multi-scalar power networks and welfare offerings of localities play decisive roles in refugees' intra-urban mobilities. However, the emplacement literature does not sufficiently question what strategies refugees have developed to get involved in local social and economic networks where they are going, and more importantly, whether these strategies conflict with the dynamics of that location. For this reason, in order to understand why do refugees spatially concentrate and emplace in certain settlements or why do they move to some other settlements, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of local relations and the processes of conflict and dialogue between actors in relation to them. Accordingly, in Chapter 8, I explain how the "local welfare systems" and "local social, cultural and economic dynamics" of Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca affect Syrians' emplacement strategies and the conditions that make refugees to remain settled and to relocate.

CHAPTER 8

A RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO EXAMINE REFUGEES' EMPLACEMENT IN AN URBAN CONTEXT

Intending to uncover the continuity of refugee mobility at different geographical scales (international to local) and portraying the local/urban-scale outcomes of international refugee mobility, in chapters 6 and 7, I traced the mobility trajectories of Syrian refugees starting from their initial arrival to Turkey to their emplacement in Izmir. To portray Syrian refugees' international/internal/inter-urban and intra-urban mobility trajectories and the underlying mechanisms behind (i.e., factors/actors), I focused on the location choices and housing pathways of refugees and accordingly, I designated a three-stepped case study:

- Turkey as the country case (i.e., international mobility – country selection)
- Izmir as the city/urban-scale case (i.e., internal/inter-urban mobility in Turkey – the selection of a city/urban area to settle)
- Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts as local/district/neighborhood-scale cases (i.e., intra-urban mobility – the selection of a district/neighborhood to emplace)

In the empirical chapters of the research (Chapter 6 and 7), firstly, I found out that Syrian refugees had concentrated in some specific cities in Turkey (Izmir, Istanbul, Gaziantep, etc.) and some specific locations in these cities (e.g., Basmane Area in Izmir). The spatial concentration of the Syrian population in some specific locations urged me to query why and how Syrians settled in such cities/urban areas although they are not channeled or forced to do so by the public authorities (please recall the discussion on the policy/political vacuums in the management of the Syrian refugee influx in Turkey – Chapter 5). I also found out that Syrian refugee population exchanges were taking place between these locations in an observable manner.

What these findings showed me is, refugees continued to be mobile across different settlements rather than remained settled in their initial locations in Turkey. Even more,

refugees continued to be mobile in the situation of immobility – emplacement – which can be traced by refugees' daily commutes between home and work and, most importantly, by their residential mobility and housing pathways. These facts showed me that refugee mobility is a continuous and multi-scalar process. Besides, I figured out that the different mobility steps are intertwined (i.e., decision to migrate, country selection, city selection) and mostly revolve around the refugee households' primary goal (e.g., ensuring physical security; engaging labour market). Secondly, in chapters 6 and 7, I also queried the factors/motives and actors affecting/shaping/influencing Syrian refugees' mobility trajectories at different geographical scales in Turkey. Because unlike Germany, UK, Canada, Austria, and other examples from the Global North (Galera et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2016; Lamba and Krahn, 2003; Sales, 2002; Spicer, 2008 Strang et al., 2017), Turkey has not yet developed a comprehensive policy set to strictly manage/govern and regulate mass refugee influxes by addressing the initial reception, accommodation, resettlement, emplacement, and integration of refugees. This fact urges me to question how Syrian refugees address all these issues. I found that refugees' location choices depend on a variety of factors (expectations of refugees, conditions of planned destinations, class positions, ethnic backgrounds of refugees etc.) and the actions and discourses of several actors who are playing critical roles in addressing the issues that are supposed to be addressed by the Turkish State (e.g., accommodation, initial reception, etc.).

Stemming from this discussion, in this chapter, I aim to briefly go over the empirical findings on the location choices of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Izmir to contribute to the literature by showing how the local dynamics (local actor typologies, redistribution of welfare), ethnic backgrounds and class positions of Syrians that are redefined in the destination localities decisively affect the mobility and emplacement patterns of Syrian refugees in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca. By building on the emplacement literature, in this chapter, I will specifically discuss how the local welfare packages/systems in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca affect Syrians' situations of mobility and immobility. First, I will briefly summarize the factors and actors affecting Syrians' location choices in Turkey/Izmir and then, based on them, I will discuss my emerging relational framework.

8.1. The factors/motives affected Syrians refugees' emplacement and location choices

- The factors/motives behind Syrians' migration to Turkey – international mobility

With regards to the main motives behind Syrians' migration to Turkey, I noticed that socio-political and socio-cultural motives come forward (Table 39). I found out that the selection of Turkey as the destination country by Syrians has to do with the political/policy framework

regarding migration and asylum in Turkey (as in Day and White, 2002), the social networks of Syrians in Turkey (i.e. existence of relatives, pioneer Syrians, co-ethnics) (as in Boyd, 1989) and the geographic strategic location of Turkey (as in Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 2019) by being both a neighbouring country to Syria and a bridging country between Asia and Europe and as a country with welfare generosity and employment/business opportunities (as mentioned by Balcılar and Nugent, 2019; Borjas, 2001; de Vroome and van Tubergen, 2014). Precisely, the open-door policy of Turkey which was applied extensively during the initial years of Syrian influx to Turkey (2011-2015) came forward as the leading motive (along with visa liberalization, right to mobility and welcoming attitudes of key political figures) that affected Syrians' country selection. Secondly, the existence of relatives, family members, co-ethnics and acquaintances who had already settled in Turkey before the civil war in Syria and the existence of pioneer Syrians who arrived Turkey during the first waves of the political conflicts in Syria were mentioned frequently by the respondents as attractive motives. Interestingly, Syrian refugees (especially Syrian Arabs) highlighted the importance of the practice of Islam in Turkey and the cultural and religious similarities they share with the Turkish society as pull factors.

Table 39: The leading motives behind Syrian refugees' migration to Turkey

Initial - Turkey	**Fre. of mention**
Open-door policy of Turkey	19
Existence of relatives / family members	17
Existence of pioneer Syrians	16
Turkey as a country of Islam	15
Positive attitudes of key political figures and Turkish society	10

All these motives signal that Syrians mostly looked for secure physical, social and cultural conditions that were necessary for their survival and well-being in destination countries. Accordingly, the open-door policy of Turkey was quite convincing for Syrians since it was the sign of the Turkish State's willingness to host and protect Syrians who had fled from the war. Turkey's mild and positive attitudes for Syrians in the first waves of the civil war in Syria, the opening of temporary protection centers, Turkey's collaboration with international civil society organizations in addressing the needs of Syrians in refugee camps and the belief and foresight of Syrians that their basic needs would be met and their physical security would be ensured in Turkey attracted Syrians to migrate to Turkey. Besides, the practice of Islam in Turkey and associated cultural similarities among Turkish and Syrian Muslims were the signs

of how Syrians have attached great importance to preserve their religious and cultural identity in destination localities. Similarly, the existence of other Syrians, relatives and friends was also attracting Syrians since these people are the grantors of Syrians' physical, cultural and economic survival in Turkey.

However, while socio-cultural (existence of relatives/family members, pioneer Syrians, Turkey as a country of Islam) socio-political (open-door policy, positive attitudes of key political figures) and socio-spatial factors (strategic geographic location of Turkey) were more critical for pioneer Syrians; socio-economic factors (relative welfare generosity of Turkey, existence and availability of employment and income generating activities, availability of public services) were more decisive for subsequent Syrians.

The increasing importance of Syrians' socio-economic concerns in their decisions to migrate to Turkey is quite comprehensible, since holding the financial means to be exchanged with necessary services and resources is the first and most important condition for a refugee to live a dignified life in the destination country. It is also true that subsequent Syrians are relatively more comfortable in choosing where to settle, since they mostly came Turkey as the result of the chain migration. That is, pioneer Syrians who initially came and settled in Turkey prepared the necessary grounds (finding accommodation, job, learning how to access public services etc.) for the migration of the others. Accordingly, while the motives of pioneer Syrians in migrating to Turkey were mostly about ensuring their physical survival, well-being and security, subsequent Syrians were mostly interested in economic and social conditions in destination countries which are vital for them to forge a new life. For all ethnic groups, the motives behind migrating to Turkey are more or less similar.

- The factors/motives behind Syrians' location choices in Turkey – internal mobility

Since the Turkish state has not yet introduced any comprehensive policy and legislative framework to address Syrians' initial reception, accommodation, resettlement and integration in Turkey; Syrians take the advantage of choosing the locality they wish to settle. However, Syrians are expected to remain in the provinces that they settled and registered. Although Syrians are required to get permissions from the public authorities in cases of short/long-term or permanent relocations, these processes are not strictly controlled and monitored by the State which inevitably result in the internal mobility of Syrian refugees across different provinces. Under such circumstances, when Syrians (total of thirty-one respondents) were asked about their initial location choices in Turkey, only five respondents reported that they initially settled in refugee camps, while twenty-six of them had spread to different urban areas. Among the

ones who initially settled in urban areas, only twelve respondents declared that they initially settled in Izmir. For those who settled in refugee camps the reasons behind were the financial lacks and economic powerlessness which prevent them forging a new life by their own. For those who initially settled in urban areas across Turkey, we see that they mostly preferred to settle in Syria-neighboring cities and metropolitan areas of Turkey. Settling in border cities was quite advantageous for Syrians who hoped to temporarily settle in Turkey for a short period until the war ends in Syria, while metropolitan urban areas (Gaziantep, Istanbul, Izmir etc.) were enabling the long-term settlements of Syrians by offering a variety of services and opportunities.

Strongly associated with the motives of migrating to Turkey, I found out that Syrians initially prefer to settle in cities where they could reach the support of their relatives, family members, pioneer Syrians and where they could reach first-hand information regarding how to register, how to access public services and resources that are necessary for their survival. This finding is justifying the claims of a growing literature on the decisive role of social networking for refugees in their mobility, emplacement and integration processes (Aradhya et al., 2017; Boyd; 1989; Damm, 2009; Jayet et al., 2016; Lamba and Krahn, 2003; Zavodny, 1999; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). I also found out that socio-economic motives including the existence of employment and income generating activities (as mentioned by 2018; Güngördü, 2018; Hugo, 2005; Hyndman et al., 2006; Jayet et al., 2016; Mott, 2010) and existence and availability of various public services (as mentioned by Aslund, 2005; Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredricksson, 2001) were highlighted by the respondents as significant motives behind their initial location choices in Turkey (see Table 40).

Interestingly, the existence and operation ethnic (solidarity) networks were mentioned as a separate topic of discussion. Especially for the Syrian Kurds, the strong, bounded and effective Kurdish communities in Izmir, Diyarbakır and Mardin which were initially formed after 1950s (concordant to the migration of Kurd rural in-migrants to developed urban areas of Turkey) have attracted Syrian Kurds, since these ethnic communities have been addressing a variety of issues (which the State and other relevant actors have failed to address) regarding their members' access to accommodation, labour market, services, protection and security. When I consider the other motives that are listed in Table 40, I confidently claim that Syrians have mostly prioritized their physical and economic survival in choosing the localities to be settled. There is no significant difference among the three ethnic groups regarding the city selection criteria.

Table 40: The leading initial location choice criteria of Syrian respondents at the urban scale

Initial locational choice criteria	Izmir case – Fre. of mention	Other urban areas – Fre. of mention	Total
Existence of relatives/family members	10	3	13
Existence of employment and income-generating activities	7	5	12
Existence of ethnic (solidarity) networks	7	3	10
Existence and availability of various public services (health, education, social aids)	6	4	10
Existence of pioneer Syrians	7	0	7
Strategic geographic location	3	1	4
Total			**26**

Regarding the relocation decisions of Syrians (i.e., movements across urban areas), I figured out that both push and pull factors play decisive roles. To start with the push factors (Table 41), eight Syrian respondents reported that they faced discrimination by native inhabitants (in the form of ignorance, assault, verbal abuse) especially in accessing accommodation and public services in their initial locations in Turkey. They said that they were treated like this just because of being a foreigner and most importantly being a Syrian in Turkey. Similarly, six respondents drew how their labour force had been exploited by the employees as they were forced to work with lower wages with no social security. Even more, three of them mentioned the exploitation that they were subjected to by the tradespeople who asked higher prices for goods and services above from the market prices. All these respondents highlighted the discrimination and exploitation they faced in their initial locations as the motives behind their relocations to other urban areas. No surprisingly, all of the fourteen respondents (who were discomfort with the discrimination and exploitation they faced in their initial locations) preferred to move to Izmir, "where the level of tolerance to other identities and differences is relatively high". Here, we see how the discriminatory and exploitative attitudes of native inhabitants, actors in the hoıısing market (realtors, home-owners) and local tradespeople urge refugees to move to other areas where they would face no/lower levels of discrimination and exploitation (similar to the findings of Aradhya et al., 2017; Ball, 2012; Carter and Osborne, 2009; Murdie, 2008; Ndinda et al., 2006; Schönwalder and Söhn, 2009; Poppe, 2013, Teixeria, 2008 – discrimination of refugees from the housing market; Danso, 2002 and Logan et al., 2002 – everyday discrimination based on race, ethnicity and religion; Batsaikhan et al. 2018; Helbling and Kriesi, 2014, Hugo, 2005 and Güngördü, 2018).

Table 41: Push factors for Syrian refugees

Discrimination by native inhabitants (in previous settlements)	8
Exploitation by tradespeople/employees (in previous settlements)	6
Total	**14**

When we look at the pull factors that attract Syrians to come and settle in Izmir, we clearly see that Syrians' struggle to settle in urban areas where they could forge a new life and where could reach out the necessary resources and services that enable their long-term settlement in Turkey. As seen from Table 42, Syrian respondents highlight the necessities of the forging a dignified life in urban areas.

Table 42: Pull factors for Syrian refugees- Izmir case

Existence of employment and income-generating activities	14
Affordability of living/housing	7
Existence and availability of various public services	4
Social and cultural life	4
Strategic geographic location	2
Existence of relatives and family members	1
Existence and operation of NGOs	1
Total	**19**

Firstly, the majority of Syrians stated that they took the decision of relocation to access employment and income-generating activities (14) (as in Güngördü, 2018; Hugo, 2005; Hyndman et al., 2006; Jayet et al., 2016; Mott, 2010). This motive was the leading motive for all ethnic groups who moved to Izmir or other urban areas to start a new life. Because, as respondents emphasized, they need to possess enough money (and other financial means) to cover their basic needs including food, clothing, heating, hygiene materials, accommodation etc. and to cover the expenses of health, education and other public services and to access commerce and leisure time activities.

Access to employment and income-generating activities is quite critical for Syrians in Turkey since the Turkish state (in collaboration with EU and I/NGOs) grant very limited and insufficient amount of aid to Syrians under temporary protection (approximately 30 dollars)[38]. We also see that the affordability of living and housing (7) (as in Carter et al., 2017; Fawaz, 2016; Jayet et al., 2016; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Netto, 2011 and Waxman, 1999), the existence and availability of various public services (4) (as in Aslund, 2005; Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredricksson, 2001), social and cultural life in destination localities (4) come forward as motives of relocation to Izmir. When compared to the motives behind initial location choices of refugees, we see that economic, social and cultural motives were attached greater importance by refugees. Rather than seeking first-hand emotional and economic support from the family members/relatives, ethnic solidarity networks and pioneer Syrians, Syrian refugees now look for the social and economic conditions of the planned destinations

[38] Approximately, it is equivalent to 10% of the minimum wage in Turkey.

to decide on whether these destinations offer suitable grounds of emplacement and integration. In other words, in relocation decisions, refugees struggle to find the best location to be settled where they could engage social, cultural and economic relations by accessing employment, income, accommodation, public services, social and cultural activities.

- The factors/motives behind Syrians' location choices in Izmir – intra-urban mobility

Regarding the initial location choices of Syrian refugees in Izmir, we see that Basmane Area came forward as the hottest destination in Izmir for all ethnic groups and for all Syrians who came to Izmir (and Turkey) with different intentions. We see that the vast majority of Syrian respondents (twenty-one respondents out of thirty-one) had settled in Basmane as their initial location in Izmir. Among them sixteen respondents were pioneers, while only five of them were subsequent Syrians. On the other hand, only ten respondents stated that they initially settled in Karabağlar and Buca Districts (who were mostly the subsequent Syrians who came and settled in Izmir after 2016 as the result of the chain migration).

When Syrian respondents were asked why they had initially chose to settle in Basmane (Table 43), they reported that they were mostly attracted by the affordability of different accommodation options (hotel/pension, rental housing, flat-sharing, etc.) (20) and availability of the rental housing stock (12), the existence of and the proximity to relatives/family members (13), the existence and operation of humanitarian agencies (12), as well as Basmane's strategic location at the Aegean Coast and Izmir. For Karabağlar and Buca, the existence of and the proximity to relatives/family members, the affordability of accommodation and the existence of ethnic solidarity networks came forward as the pull factors (Table 43).

Here, we see that accessing accommodation/housing is the leading motive for refugees in deciding where to settle (Aslund 2005; Carter et al., 2017; Jayet et al., 2016; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Kleit and Galvez, 2016; Netto, 2011; Robinson and Coleman, 2000; Vang, 2010; Waxman, 1999). Especially for low-income Syrians and Syrians without financial savings, finding a shelter to spend the night became the most critical issue. Basmane, where is also known as the Hotel's District at the very center of Izmir, offers a variety of accommodation options for all budgets. Secondly, we see the strong dependence of Syrian refugees to support mechanisms (e.g., relatives/family members, humanitarian agencies, pioneer Syrians) through which they can get first-hand emotional and economic support, information and guidance. Most critically, the support coming from the relatives/family members was found very decisive in affecting Syrian refugees' settlement choices in Izmir (as in Boyd, 1989; Lamba and Krahn, 2003). Similarly, in Karabağlar, we see that the support provided by

relatives/family members and the strong Kurd in-migrant community, pioneer Syrians and co-ethnics in the area were highlighted by the respondents as the pull factors, while also in Buca, greater importance were both attached to the existence of the relatives/family members and the Arab community (as in Aradhya et al 2017; Clark, 2009; Ibraimovic and Masiero, 2014; Lamba and Krahn, 2003; Skyrme, 2008). The ethnic solidarity networks existent in these areas are quite powerful to address the urgent needs of their new members, to give practical information, to guide newcomers in accessing accommodation, public services and aid. These networks are also quite protective for the newcomers who are sharing similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds, while they are often unmerciful to "others". Therefore, residing close to the support mechanisms in the settlements are quite critical for Syrian refugees especially during their initial days/weeks in Izmir.

Table 43: Syrian respondents' initial settlements in Izmir and the leading motives behind their settlement decisions

Basmane		**Karabağlar**		**Buca**	
Affordability of accommodation	20	Existence and support of relatives / family members	5	Existence and support of relative /family members	3
Availability of the rental housing stock	12	Proximity to relatives / family members	5	Proximity to relatives / family members	3
Existence and support of relatives/family members	13	Existence and support of (ethnic) solidarity networks / communities	4	Affordability of accommodation	3
Proximity to relatives/ family members	13	Affordability of accommodation	3		
Existence and operation of humanitarian agencies	12	Existence of employment and income-generating activities	3		
Existence of human smuggling operations	9	Proximity to (potential) workplaces	3		
Strategic location in the Aegean Region and Izmir	9				
Total	**21**	**Total**	**5**	**Total**	**5**

In overall, we see that accessing accommodation and support mechanisms were quite decisive in Syrian respondents' initial location choices in Izmir. However, as the evidence showed, Syrian refugees did not continue to settle in their initial settlements in Izmir. Ten respondents (out of thirty-one) had moved from their initial locations to be settled somewhere else. Among them, three respondents moved from Basmane to Karabağlar, five respondents from Basmane to Buca and one respondent moved from Buca to Basmane. For those who preferred to remain settled, the reasons behind were as follows (Table 44). The settlers of Basmane highlighted that their access to public services (7), good relations with the local inhabitants (7), the affordability of accommodation and the central location of Basmane in Izmir (7) were quite decisive in their preference to stay in Basmane, since all these factors increased their sense of

attachment to the area where they now engage in and reshape the social and economic relations.

Table 44: The reasons to stay in the initial locations settled in Izmir

Basmane		**Karabağlar**		**Buca**	
Existence and availability of public services	**7**	Existence and support of relatives/family members	5	Existence and support of relatives/family members	3
Proximity to public services	**7**	Proximity to relatives/family members	5	Proximity to relatives/family members	3
Relations with local inhabitants	**7**	Existence and support of (ethnic) solidarity networks/communities	4	Existence of ethnic solidarity networks	2
Affordability of housing / accommodation	**7**	Relations with local inhabitants	3	Conservative/religious way of living	**2**
Central location/accessibility	**7**	Central location/accessibility	2		
Total	**12**	**Total**	**5**	**Total**	**4**

On the other hand, the settlers of Karabağlar and Buca emphasized the role of their relatives/family members and ethnic solidarity networks in their decisions to remain in these settlements. They also shed light on to their increasing daily interactions, cultural and religious activities with local inhabitants as reasons behind their stay. In overall, we see that residing close to support mechanisms (relatives/family members and ethnic solidarity networks) is still a hot topic for Syrian refugees. However, they now attach more importance to their access to public services and engagement to the social relations with local inhabitants (as in Aslund, 2005; Balcılar and Nugent, 2018; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001).

- Relocations from Basmane to other parts of Izmir: Karabağlar and Buca

As noted earlier, ten Syrian respondents (out of thirty-one) had moved from their initial locations in Izmir to be settled in some others. Here, we see that both the push and pull factors play critical roles in the decisions to relocate. For the former, as in Robinson et al. (2007), Danso (2002) and Logan et al. (2002) we see that ethnic conflicts/tensions among different ethnic groups in Basmane, the bad reputation of Basmane as the hub of crime and illegal affairs, discrimination in Basmane's housing market against some ethnic groups and increasing costs of accommodation came forward as the push factors. In general, Syrian refugees who moved from Basmane mostly declared that they escaped from the everyday discrimination by natives and by other ethnic Syrian groups and the discrimination in the housing market which reflected itself as the increasing rents and scarcity of housing for refugees. Moreover, respondents were also complaining about the unsuitability of Basmane for "family life" and for "the religious/cultural practices" as they associate Basmane with the illegal businesses, smuggling operations and chaotic everyday relations.

Regarding the pull factors (Table 45), Syrians who moved to Karabağlar highlighted income-related concerns the most. For them the existence of employment opportunities in shoe-making, textile, automotive and furniture industry in the district was the leading factor (as in Jayet et al 2016; Hyndman et al., 2006; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Martin Martin and Jimenez Aguilera, 2017; Mott, 2010). Secondly, they touched upon the cultural and class-based similarities they share with the Kurd inhabitants of the area (as in Skyrme, 2008). Accordingly, they mentioned the support of the Kurd in-migrant and worker community in Karabağlar as a pull factor. For those who moved to Buca, the religious community especially in Gediz neighborhood was a matter of attraction which enabled them to practice the requirements of Islam by living a conservative life. For those who complained about the chaotic and frustrating social relations and so-called illegal businesses (i.e., drug dealing, smuggling etc.) in Basmane, the social relations that are reorganized in accordance with the religious discourses in Gediz neighborhood were quite attractive. For both settlements, Syrian respondents reported the affordable rents for houses with better infrastructure and architectural quality than the ones in Basmane as important motives behind their settlements in Karabağlar and Buca (parallel to the arguments of Carter et al., 2017; Jayet et al., 2016; Malcata-Rebelo, 2012; Netto, 2011; Waxman, 1999).

Table 45: The reasons to move Karabağlar and Buca

Karabağlar	**Fre.**	**Buca**	**Fre.**
Existence of employment and income-generating activities	3	Existence and support of religious networks	5
Proximity to (potential) workplaces	3	Conservative and religious way of living	4
Ethnic, cultural and class-based similarities with local inhabitants	2	Ethnic and cultural similarities with local inhabitants	4
Affordability of housing / accommodation	1	Affordable housing / accommodation	4
Central location and accessibility	1	Safe and calm living environment	3
		Proximity to (potential) workplaces and Basmane	2
Total	**3**	**Total**	**5**

8.2. Access to what? The conceptualization of the welfare needs of refugees

As an outcome I derived from the discussion above, I figured out that Syrian refugees' location choices at different geographical scales are associated with their changing needs and expectations. In specific, when I tried to conceptualize what do Syrian refugees need to access the most in the destination settlements (by building on the categories in Geneva Convention on Refugees (1951) Council Directive 2001/55/EC; Handbook on European Law Relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration (2014) and the academic researches of Hickey and

Bracking, 2005; Jubany-Baucells, 2002; Katz et al., 2016; Pless et al., 2013; Reimer, 2004), I managed to identify five core categories as access to accommodation/housing, services (public and private/commercial), employment and income-generating activities, social support and physical and cultural security – lifestyle security via rigorously going over the transcripts by coding the key phrases of Syrians (as an example of coding see Table 46). For each of the categories, I provided at least one example quotation in Table 46.

Table 46: Access to what?

Relevant quotations of Syrian respondents	Codes	Core category
Country scale – international mobility My relatives in Izmir not only offered us **accommodation** in their houses but also… (Eslem, Arabic, female, 20 years old) **Urban-scale – internal mobility** …I was looking for **affordable accommodation** in a secure locality…. (Ebral, Arabic, female, 67 years old) …They offered me **free accommodation**, money, food and everything I needed. (Serhad, Kurd, male, 25 years old) **District/neighborhood scale – intra-urban mobility** …Basmane is an old but refugee-friendly neighborhood with **various old houses for rent…**When compared to other neighborhoods, Ebral, Arab, female, 67 years old) …The waiter immediately told me that I would directly go to Basmane where there are **various cheap hotels, pensions and guesthouses for refugees** and poor people like me. (Mohammad, Kurd, male, 32 years old) … Basmane was the best option for me since there were **various type of rentals ranging from fancy flats to storages**…Salim (Turkmen, male, 60 years old)	Affordable housing / accommodation Diversity of accommodation options Availability of the rental housing stock	**Accommodation /housing**
Country scale – international mobility My relatives in Izmir…gave very important information regarding the **health services** in Izmir which was quite important for us since my father is sick. (Eslem, Arabic, female, 20 years old) **Urban-scale – internal mobility** …there are a lot of **universities** which I may enrol if I work hard and learn Turkish. Luckily, **language courses** are also a lot…(Eslem, Arabic, female, 20 years old) …We also learned that **health services** are quite qualified in Adana. My husband also thought that he could find a job.... For all these reasons, we settled in Adana. (Ramise, Turkmen, female, 33 years old) **District/neighborhood scale – intra-urban mobility** …Basmane is a heaven for us because my dad's **hospital** and my kids' **school** are all in Basmane. We could be living anywhere else, but it is very hard to find a school that would accept my kids. Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) There is no other place as good, as diverse…and liveable as Basmane in Izmir. By walking for a couple of minutes, I reach Kemeraltı where **various clothing shops, coffee houses, jewellery shops, cafes, restaurants** are located…Amine (Arab, female, 35 years old)	Welfare generosity Existence and availability of various public services (health, education, aid) Affordability of public services / cheapness of goods and services Proximity to public and commercial services	**Services (public and private/ commercial)**
Country scale – international mobility …after 2013, I could not continue to run my business in Aleppo and as I run out of cash I thought that going to Turkey and **working with my Turkish partners** as the only valid option for my future. (Seyyid, Arabic, male, 45 years old)		

Table 46 (continued)

Urban-scale – internal mobility My intention of coming to…Istanbul, Kocaeli and Izmir was always related to **finding a proper job** to cover the expenses of my family. (Seyyid, Arab, male, 45 years old) … After one year, with the Syrian and Turkish friends I met in Urfa we decided to **open our own grocery store** in a city bigger than Urfa. (Vahap, Arabic, male, 42 years old) **District/neighborhood scale – intra-urban mobility** …living in Karabağlar and meeting with its inhabitants would help me to **reach the labour market**. (Rojhad, Kurd, male, 27 years old) … in Basmane, I heard that many others had already gone to Karabağlar to **find a job**. I followed them. (Faruq, Kurd, male, 54 years old)	Existence of employment and income-generating activities Access to labour market Entrepreneurship activities	**Employment and income-generating activities**
Country scale – international mobility …I came to Turkey to forget everything that I saw in Syria with **the love, and care of my uncle's family**. Havin (Kurd, female, 28 years old) …Turkish people are not fond of Arabs and Kurds, but they welcome Turkmens as their brothers because we **share the same values, traditions and even the language**. (Şerif, Turkmen, male, 42 years old) **Urban-scale – internal mobility** … **Kurd network** in Izmir is one of the strongest...Everyone **takes care of each other and hold each other's back**. For that reason, my family wanted me to migrate to Izmir where I would be safe. (Avjin, Kurd, female, 20 years old) Thanks to the **solidarity of Turkish** people and especially Turkmens who are also **respectful to Islam**, I'm in Izmir now…(Samir, Turkmen, male, 52 years old) **District/neighborhood scale – intra-urban mobility** If my **relatives** weren't living in Basmane, I would go where they are. Basmane is only a name for me, what matters is the existence of my **relatives who take care of me and my family**. Ahmad (Kurd, male, 52 years old) …**Suriyeli Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği** acts as a connecting bridge. It connects me to life…They showed me how to register for aid, how to get appointments from hospitals. Muhammed (Arab, male, 70 years old)	Existence of relatives/family members Existence of ethnic (solidarity) networks Existence of pioneer Syrians Existence and operation of NGOs Existence of friends Existence of humanitarian agencies Proximity to social support mechanisms	**Social support**
Country scale – international mobility … I convinced myself to migrate to Turkey, because my children would still **be able to practice Islam**. Samir (Turkmen, male, 52 years old) Turkish is a big, strong and **safe country**. They opened its gates just to **protect us from death and misery**. I feel safe here, I **can sleep at nights**, I feel **physically protected**. (Ramise, Turkmen, female, 33 years old) **Urban-scale – internal mobility** I was looking for affordable accommodation in a **secure locality**. (Ebral, Arabic, female, 67 years old) Izmir is a **tolerant city** which is **open to differences**…**Cultural and religious differences are tolerated** here…(Samir, Turkmen, male, 52 years old) **District/neighborhood scale – intra-urban mobility** …The Islamic community is wise and good (in Gediz), **the trade and daily relations are all in line with Islam**. We specifically searched for such a place where we would **practice my religion freely**. Eslem (Arab, female, 20 years old) … Gediz is a heaven…**no chaos, no dirty businesses**…Everybody is **respecting each other**…(Muhammed, Arab, male, 70 years old)	Knowledge of the area The sense of security /protection Practice of religion /traditions/norms The use of native language The level of tolerance/respect The level of discrimination/ exploitation by native inhabitants/ tradespeople	**Physical and cultural security – lifestyle security**

I later realized that these five core categories that refugees are looking for in their destination settlements, are corresponding to the "welfare components/domains" that would help them to increase their social, cultural, physical and economic well-being. In other words, I argue that urban refugees struggle to access to all these five domains of welfare to forge a new dignified life in their new social environment. However, the relevant importance of these welfare domains changes for every household depending on time, place and expectations. Here, the use "welfare" as the umbrella concept enables me to grasp the content and the context of Syrian refugees' struggle to emplace in urban areas they have settled because, as highlighted by Greve (2008), the concept of "welfare" not only refers to material but also non-material aspects as well-being and prosperity. Accordingly, I regard refugee emplacement process as Syrian refugees' struggle to access welfare resources and services that are necessary for their survival, well-being, integration and belonging. Before stating why and how the concept of "welfare" is central to my discussion on refugee emplacement, it is worth to define what welfare is. To do this, I will briefly outline the different perspectives on welfare which were critically examined in Greve's (2008) research.

In literature, the concept of welfare is defined and discussed in various fields, including political science, sociology, psychology, however concrete contributions to the literature came from two fields: economy and sociology. Economic approaches to welfare refer the maximization of utility in monetary terms. In that sense, individuals are drawn as rational decision makers who are constantly seeking for maximizing their utility. As another perspective suggests, besides the accumulation of money and capital, the redistribution of money/monetary gains is also related with individual and collective welfare. However, this economic perspective of welfare has been exposed to severe criticisms for neglecting the social dimension of welfare and well-being of individuals. Sociological approaches to welfare seem to address these criticisms. First of all, welfare is highly associated and sometimes interchangeably used with subjective wellbeing and happiness in sociological and social policy debates (Easterlin, 2001). As a subset of well-being discussions, welfare debates are mostly interested in individuals' satisfaction from public services, living environments, workplaces, relations with other social agents, etc. Unsurprisingly, welfare in the form of happiness and satisfaction becomes highly subjective in a way to not be measured. Therefore, the concepts of individual and collective welfare are relational and speculative terms that may be comprehended differently by each individual and group depending on time, place, individual expectations, the level of income, the level of assets held and the opportunities offered (Greve, 2008).

The comprehension of welfare in terms of "subjective well-being" inevitably urge me to consider the combined effects of both monetary and non-monetary aspects on the level of individual and collective welfare. Apart from the definitions of welfare, the debates on *who provides welfare* is another important dimension to discuss. Because, even in today, the concept of welfare is highly associated with the state in which the state is seen as the primary actor in ensuring the accumulation and redistribution of money/monetary gains (Greve, 2008). Moreover, the State is charged by the provision of all the services and resources which may contribute to the overall well-being and happiness of its residents. However, welfare is much more than the publicly provided services. Greve (2008) also points to this issue and explains the private (e.g., the market) and voluntary channels (e.g. NGOs, families) of welfare provision. One of typical examples of private provision of welfare is called occupational welfare which refers to the cash benefits, coverage of food and accommodation, expenses of travel and leisure, child allowances and so on which are provided by private employers to the employees (Greve, 2008).

In overall, the concept of welfare refers to a variety of processes and factors including the aid mechanisms and services that save individuals from the traps of poverty and social exclusion; all public and private services (health, education, employment) that increase the physical, mental well-being and happiness of individuals and all social groups in the society and all sources and channels of income-generating activities. Although it is possible to discuss individual welfare, well-being of families, collective welfare as distinct debates, I will not go into such distinctions in my discussion. Because, in empirical terms, I am not looking for what welfare means to refugees or how it is comprehended by refugees, but instead I am interested in understanding how refugees' struggle to access welfare services and resources that are necessary for their survival, well-being and emplacement in the new urban settings affect their mobility patterns and location choices at different geographical scales.

In that sense, I need to identify the types of welfare services and resources that refugees' need to access when forging a new life in a new locality, at first. Secondly, I need to discuss how and by whom the welfare services are provided and how refugees manage to access them. Based on the theoretical discussion on the components of welfare and Syrian interviewees' narratives on their emplacement processes, I summarized the attributes of each five of the welfare components I proposed in Table 47.

Table 47: Components/domains of refugee welfare in urban areas

Components of refugee welfare	Attributes of each component of refugee welfare
Accommodation/housing	Access to decent, proper, affordable and healthy accommodation - Reception centers - Temporary protection centers/refugee camps - Social housing - Private housing (housing rental or purchase) - Flat sharing /subletting - Guesthouses - Provision of housing allowances/rent allowances
Public and private/commercial services	Access to available, affordable and qualified services and redistribution mechanisms - Health - Education - Aid /cash and in-kind allowances - Information share/guidance /legal counselling services - Cultural and social activities - Commercial activities - Leisure time activities - Transportation, infrastructure and telecommunication services
Employment and income-generating activities	Access to labour market and job opportunities with secure and dignified working conditions - Formal/informal labour market - Entrepreneurship (opening up new businesses, engaging new business partnerships) - Individual entrepreneurship/collective entrepreneurship - Paid employment/unpaid employment/self employment - Jobs with social security/jobs without social security - Legal/illegal forms of income-generation
Social support	Access to all kinds of non-material social support that are provided by the actors below: - Relatives/family members/kinship relations - Friends/neighbours - Colleagues/business partners - Local solidarity networks - Ethnic/refugee networks - Acquaintances - International/national scale civil society organizations - Humanitarian agencies - Native inhabitants - Co-ethnics - Other immigrant/refugee groups - Political representation mechanisms - Key local opinion leaders (elderly people, religious figures etc.) - Social media platforms - Random daily encounters with people
Physical and cultural security – lifestyle security	Access to safe and secure living/social environments - Body and mental health - Physical integrity - Social dignity - Preserving the ethnic, cultural, religious identity - Freedom of expression - Level of discrimination/exploitation - Verbal and physical assaults - Level of tolerance/respect - Sense of belonging - Use of native language - Practice of ethnic, cultural and religious traditions, norms

For the first category, that is, access to accommodation/housing, I refer to all forms of affordable and available public, private and voluntary accommodation/housing options for refugees either in the form of refugee camps or social housing, flat sharing, private housing. Secondly, regarding the services and resources that refugees shall access in urban areas, again, I included all forms of public and private services including health, education, aid, employment, transportation, leisure and commercial services. Here, I gave priority to health, education and aid services as the three essential components of refugee welfare in urban areas. I also marked the importance of legal counselling, mental support mechanisms, cultural, social and leisure time activities and the transportation, infrastructure and telecommunication services that are appealing to all income, ethnic and cultural groups.

As the third welfare component, I referred all forms of employment (formal/informal, waged or not, stable/flexible, jobs with social security / jobs without social security, skilled jobs/unskilled jobs) and all forms of entrepreneurship (running a new businesses, opening up new branches, engaging new business partnerships) and all other forms of income-generating activities (street peddling, engagement to illegal economy etc.) under the category of labour market/employment and income-generating activities. Fourthly, I included various forms of non-material support (e.g., solidarity, consultancy, guidance and help) under the social support category. Although the scope and content of the concept of social support is huge, I preferred to add the attributes which I directly derived from the narratives of Syrian respondents. Accordingly, in this category I referred to the non-monetary social support that are provided by relatives/family members, friends, neighbours, colleagues/business partners, native inhabitants, local solidarity groups, ethnic communities, relief agencies, local administrative units, political representation mechanisms, local grassroots, local initiatives, international/national scale civil society organizations, humanitarian agencies, key local actors, opinion leaders and so on.

Lastly, under the category of physical and cultural security – lifestyle security, I referred to all cases that might contribute to or threaten the body/mental health and physical integrity of individuals (i.e. injuries, assaults, physical harassment) under physical security category, while I included all forms of racism discrimination, xenophobia, alienation and exploitation and any intervention to refugees' life-styles, cultural and religious practices, traditions, values and social relations under cultural security category. Vice versa, I also count all forms of actions/discourses that increase refugees' security, safety, protection and all processes that foster refugees' sense of belonging to their new social environments.

I strongly believe that the concrete identification of the welfare components that Syrian refugees seek to reach in urban areas in Turkey enabled me to understand and define what the emplacement process is all about. Accordingly, I define refugee emplacement as "refugees' struggle to access welfare resources and services in destination settlements by forming/engaging social networks and developing ad-hoc strategies for social inclusion". Stemming from this definition, I regarded refugees' decisions to move, to settle and to relocate (i.e., location choices) as the spatial dimension of refugees' struggle to access welfare resources and services. However, at this point, I acknowledge that refugees' strategies for emplacement, access to welfare and location choices are not only bound to their own needs, preferences and capabilities but also to a variety of actors who are somehow involved in the provision of the so-called welfare resources and services. Especially under policy/political vacuums in regulating refugees' access to welfare components (like in Turkey), the discourses/actions of the "welfare providers" other than the State/public authorities become quite decisive in refugees' emplacement processes and location choices. Therefore, in the following discussion, I try to uncover the types and roles different actors who are (in)directly effective in Syrian refugees' emplacement strategies and location choices at different geographical scales.

8.3. The actors involved in/affected Syrians refugees' emplacement and location choices

Refugees' access to welfare resources and services is not only depend on refugees' mobility, individual efforts and financial means they hold. Refugees also need to engage relations with the actors who are involved in the provision and redistribution of these services and resources. Especially in cases of policy/political vacuums, where public authorities do not fully address and meet refugees' welfare needs; the actions, discourses, attitudes and competences of the actors other than the State, the dialogue/conflict among them in the provision of services all become critical for refugees' access to welfare. Moreover, in the lack of top-down comprehensive policies and mechanisms that prioritize the just and fair redistribution of welfare elements to refugees, the partial, territorialized and localized forms of welfare provision come forward. Accordingly, refugee populations concentrate in some specific locations/settlements where they would "easily" engage in the local relationship patterns that determine the provision of welfare. To understand the mobility trajectories and location choices of Syrian refugees, we need to identify the type of actors who are involved in Syrians' access to services and resources and most importantly portray the type of social relations that refugees (need to) engage in localities they (prefer) to settle. In the following discussion, I will

specifically outline the actors that affected Syrians' international/internal and intra-urban mobility – i.e., location choices at different geographical scales.

- Actors affecting Syrian refugees' migration to Turkey

Regarding the actors who became influential and effective in Syrians' migration to Turkey, I identified twelve different actors, whose role differed from each other. In Table 48, I only provided the top-five actors that affected Syrians' country choices. Parallel to the motives behind their migration decisions, Syrian refugees (of all ethnic backgrounds) mostly highlighted the role of their relatives/family members in Turkey who had settled in Turkey prior to war and/or during the initial waves of the war (16). Frequent calls, intimate invitations from the relatives/family members in Turkey and the promised economic and emotional support by them attracted and encouraged refugees to head to Turkey. Similarly, pioneer Syrians (7) who had migrated to Turkey especially during the initial days of the political conflicts in Syria, Syrian/Turkish acquaintances (6) and Turkish friends of the respondents in Turkey (4) were acted as "guides" who constantly provided information regarding the conditions in Turkey. They also helped the subsequent comers in meeting their basic needs and giving practical information when necessary. In that sense, relatives/family members and pioneer Syrians/co-ethnics came forward as the leading figures who are addressing a variety of issues (including refugees' accommodation, food and clothing, etc.) that the public authorities were supposed to address. Therefore, Syrian refugees initially went to some urban areas/settlements in Turkey where the relatives/family members and pioneer Syrians had settled the most.

Table 48: Actors who affected Syrians refugees' migration to Turkey

Actors	**Fre. of mention**
Relatives / family members in Turkey	16
Pioneer Syrians in Turkey	7
Syrian / Turkish acquaintances in Turkey	6
Turkish Friends in Turkey	4
Human smugglers in Turkey	4

As another interesting finding that comes out the interviews is that human smugglers had been quite affective in Syrians' arrival to Turkey and the coastal areas of Turkey along the Aegean Sea, since they provided the grounds for Syrians to cross European borders. Human smugglers give directives to Syrians who hope/wish to go to Europe regarding the initial meeting point, locations for transfer and final destination before the journey. Although, as in another country, the operations of such smugglers are not allowed and strictly monitored by the Turkish State, as Syrian respondents claim, they are not hard to reach and to contact.

- Actors affecting Syrian refugees' intra-national mobility in Turkey

The types and the roles of actors involved in Syrians' initial location choices in Turkey (i.e., city selection process) are more or less similar to the ones that affected Syrians' country choices (Table 49). Firstly, as evidence showed, relatives/family members (12), pioneer Syrians (8), business partners/colleagues (3), Turkish friends in TR (3), human smugglers came forward as the most influential actors. However, in relocation decisions/subsequent location choices of refugees in Turkey (again see Table 49), we see that the relatives and family members of Syrians, who have been the leading figures in Syrians' initial country and city choices, remarkably lose their popularity and dominancy in guiding/shaping Syrians' relocation decisions. I came to this conclusion by interpreting the fact that none of the Syrian respondents mentioned the roles of their relatives/family members in their relocation decisions although these people were the reason behind their migration to Turkey.

Table 49: Actors affecting the intra-national mobility patterns of Syrian respondents in Turkey

Actors affecting the initial loc. choices in TR	**Fre.**	**Actors affecting the relocation decisions in TR**	**Fre.**
Relatives/family members	12	Individual/household decision	8
Pioneer Syrians	8	Syrian friends in TR	5
Business partners / colleagues	3	Pioneer Syrians	4
Turkish friends in TR	3	Business partners / colleagues	3
Human smugglers	3	Turkish friends in TR	3
Total	**31**	**Total**	**19**

Similarly, the acquaintances of Syrians in Turkey became less effective in time since they are no longer asked about the conditions and opportunities in Turkey. These two facts that I derived from the narratives of Syrian respondents show that as Syrians get used to their new social environment in Turkey, access to information, consultancy and public services, managed to make their own money and gain their financial independence; their tendency to rely on their relatives, family members and acquaintances in shaping their future decreases. Here, I want to highlight how individual/household decisions have become the leading force behind Syrians' relocation decisions. As Syrians get used to their new social environments, engage social relations with other Syrians, immigrants of different ethnic backgrounds and Turkish inhabitants and as they gradually become financially and emotionally independent, they feel more confident in taking their own decisions regarding where to live, whom to contact, what to access and how to pursue a life. We also see that the colleagues and new friends met in initial locations of Syrians have become influential in Syrians' relocation decisions. Especially the Turkish colleagues of Syrians guide Syrians regarding the employment opportunities across different parts of Turkey. Similarly, pioneer Syrians and

business partners of refugees continue to be effective in guiding and supporting Syrians in their struggles to be emplaced.

- Actors affecting Syrian refugees' intra-urban mobility in Izmir

The actors who are shaped/affected Syrian respondents' location choices in Izmir are more diverse and complex than the ones who affected the country/city selection processes. Because, in the partial absence of the Turkish State and public authorities setting policies top-down, local actors who developed ad-hoc but mostly short-term solutions to the problems of refugees (in accessing accommodation, public services, aid and income, etc.) came forward. That is, both the individual social networks of Syrian refugees (e.g., relatives, friends, pioneer Syrians met via social media) and the local service providers (market actors, NGOs) played critical roles in affecting Syrians' initial and subsequent location choices in Izmir. I tried to examine the types of roles of the actors who were effective in Syrians' initial settlements to Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca and in Syrians' relocations among these three areas.

To start with the initial location choices (Table 50), unsurprisingly, I saw the dominant role of relatives/family members for all ethnic groups both in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca. They were quite influential because with their own efforts, budgets and means, they addressed a variety of issues that the public authorities supposed to address. They provided "starter packages" for Syrian newcomers which mostly included free/short-term accommodation, food, clothing and hygiene materials, emotional support, guidance in finding jobs, getting appointments from public authorities, enrolling kids to language courses / education system and so on.

Secondly, by playing similar roles with the relatives/family members of Syrians, the members of ethnic solidarity members also stepped forward in attracting Syrians who needed a second circle of support, that is, the use of native language in everyday relations, cultural and political recognition, feeling secure, protected and belonged and engaging in trust-based relations. At this point, the strong Kurd in-migrant community in Basmane and Karabağlar were quite influential in attracting Syrian Kurds with the oral promises regarding the protection of the Kurdish identity and language. On the other hand, Arab community partially in Basmane but mostly in Buca (Gediz neighborhood) attracted Syrian Arabs who proactively practice their religion, customs and traditions as in the country of origin. As the other important actors affecting the initial settlements of Syrians in Izmir, we see the ones who mostly provided instant/short-term guidance, emotional and psychological support, practical information about

how and where to search for housing, aid and public services. These actors are pioneer Syrians, people met in Izmir by chance, neighborhood mukhtars, realtors, local tradespeople etc.

Table 50: The leading actors affected the initial location choices of Syrian respondents in Izmir

Basmane	**Fre.**	**Karabağlar**	**Fre.**	**Buca**	**Fre.**
Relatives/family members	13	Relatives/ family members	5	Relatives/family members	5
Pioneer Syrians	7	Ethnic solidarity networks	5	Ethnic solidarity networks	3
Ethnic solidarity networks	6	Mukhtars	4	Religious (Islamic) figures	2
People met in Izmir	6			Pioneer Syrians	1
Total	**21**	**Total**	**5**	**Total**	**5**

With respect to the subsequent location choices of Syrians in Izmir (i.e. relocation decision), we see two types of actors as the actors who made Syrians to settle in the already settled locations and the actors who made Syrians to move to somewhere else. For the first, among sixteen different actors, we see the decisive role of ethnic solidarity networks (Table 51). Undoubtedly, the economic and emotional support provided by these networks increased Syrians' sense of belonging to these networks and to the settlement they are living in. As mentioned by the majority (of the respondents), moving somewhere else is out of question because, any movement would loosen up the level of within group interaction which might inevitably push Syrians to the edges of loneliness and desperation. The same is valid for the strong kinship relations. Syrians who preferred to settle in their initial location highlighted that they wanted to remain close to their relatives/family members.

Table 51: The leading actors affected Syrian respondents' choices to remain settled in their initial locations

Basmane	**Fre.**	**Karabağlar**	**Fre.**	**Buca**	**Fre.**
Kurdish, Arabic and Turkmen networks	8	Kurdish community	5	Arab community	4
Mukhtars	8	Relatives/family members	4	Relatives/family members	4
Relatives / family members	7	Mukhtars	3	Religious community	4
Local inhabitants	6	Homeowners	2	Local inhabitants	2
Syrian network	6	Local inhabitants	2	Mukhtar	2
Homeowners	6			Homeowners	1
Realtors	5				
Total	**12**	**Total**	**5**	**Total**	**4**

Thirdly, neighborhood mukhtars, who mostly acted as interfaces between refugees, NGOs and municipalities, are also mentioned as important figures by Syrian respondents. The guidance, knowledge and intimate attitudes of mukhtars helped to increase Syrians' attachment to the

areas that they had settled in. Syrians' good daily interactions and encounters with the local inhabitants were also highlighted as the motives that helped Syrians to engage the embedded social and economic relations which in turn made them feel as a member of the community. Similarly, the inclusionary attitudes of the actors in the housing market (realtors, homeowners) and local tradespeople fostered Syrians' sense of belonging to the local communities.

Regarding the relocations of Syrian respondents, interestingly, the roles of the ethnic solidarity networks, housing market actors and mukhtars were remarkably shined out (Table 52). Here, the exclusionary or inclusionary actions and attitudes of these actors strongly determined the relocation patterns of Syrian refugees in Izmir. To say, in settlements where these three actors are quite tolerant and welcoming to Syrians, Syrians mostly preferred to remain settled. On the contrary, Syrians, who were exposed to different forms of discrimination, exploitation and xenophobia in their initial locations, mostly ended up in some other settlements/locations where offered calmer, safer and less discriminatory living environments. Therefore, by leaving Basmane to be settled in Karabağlar and Buca, Syrian respondents actually escaped from the social pressures that Arab and Kurd communities put on each other and the exploitative manners of realtors, homeowners and local tradespeople in the provision of housing, goods and services. Parallel to these, those who relocated ended up in some settlements, where they would be a part of the ethnic community, where they would face no/less discrimination by realtors and homeowners in accessing accommodation/housing, where they would be helped by the local tradespeople and mukhtars in reaching out public and commercial services.

Table 52: The leading actors affected Syrian respondents' choices to move/relocate

Leaving Basmane	**Fre.**	**Relocating to Karabağlar**	**Fre.**	**Relocating to Buca**	**Fre.**
Kurdish and Arabic network	**6**	Kurdish network	**2**	Religious community	**4**
Hotel / pension owners	**5**	Homeowners	**2**	Arabic community	**4**
Homeowners	**4**	Mukhtars	**1**	Homeowners	**2**
Realtors	**4**				
Mukhtars	**3**				
Total	9	**Total**	3	**Total**	5

8.4. Who provides? The conceptualization of the actors as the welfare providers

Based on the narratives of Syrian respondents, I identified various actors who (un)intentionally/(in)directly affected Syrians' decisions to migrate, to move, to settle and relocate. At this point, to better understand the roles of each of these actors in Syrians' location choices, I tried to conceptualize the type and roles of these actors by employing the actor/social

relation typologies introduced to the literature by Bracking (2005)[39], Hickey and Bracking (2005)[40], Reimer (2004)[41] and Mingot and Mazzucato (2017)[42] (see chapter 3 for the detailed coverage of the actors / social relations). After several attempts to code the name and role of the actors that Syrian respondents mentioned in their narratives, initially, I grouped these actors as "welfare providers" under four main categories as the State, the market actors, the civil society organizations and informal local networks (Table 53). I called them welfare providers because as discussed in detail in Chapter 7, these actors play crucial roles in refugees' access to accommodation, public services, employment and income-generating activities, social support and security, and thus, (un)intentionally/(in)directly affect Syrian refugees' mobility patterns and location choices.

Table 53: Who provides "welfare" for Syrian refugees

Example quotations	Core categories
…We had no passports and no money and **Turkey was the only country that welcomed us**. (Fatıma, Arabic, female, 27 years old) **Turkey welcomed us** by saying that 'we will welcome you even if you do not have a valid identity, passport and even a name'. No other country did that. (Ahmad, Kurd, male, 52 years old) …**in Turkey, we learned that we do not have to settle in camps**, we are told that we can live in any city we want. (Malak, Kurd, female, 40 years old) One day, **our mukhtar (the mukhtar of Kocakapı)** knocked my door and ask whether I wish to apply for the Kızılay aids and when I said "yes" he gave my name to the officers. He also knocked my door to ask whether I want to apply for the milk campaign of **the (Metropolitan) municipality**…Ramise (Turkmen, female, 33 years old)	**The State / public authorities**
…As the conflict in Aleppo became savaged after 2013, I could not continue to run my business in Aleppo and as I run out of cash I thought that going to Turkey and **working with my Turkish partners as the only valid option for my future**. (Seyyid, Arabic, male, 45 years old) …The **tradespeople and home-owners were all trying to take more money from us** or give us misinformation which damage us… (Zekire, Arabic, female, 25 years old) When I first go to a **real estate office by saying Selamın-aleyküm, I was more than welcomed by the real estators**… (Şerif, Turkmen, male, 42 years old)	**The Market**

[39] Bracking (2005) mentions the legal /illegal and moral/immoral social relations in the provision of services and resources to individuals.

[40] Hickey and Bracking (2005) highlights the role of the socio-political actors (political parties, political (local) elites and informal political networks) and discusses how the state-led provision of services have become politicized.

[41] Reimer (2004) discusses the role of *bureaucratic, market, associative* and *communal relations* in the processes of social inclusion and social exclusion of individuals in the society.

[42] Mingot and Mazzucato (2017) discuss the roles of formal (state, international organizations, and market), semi-formal (hometown associations, religious organizations, social clubs, rotating credit associations, burial societies and faith-based organizations) and informal actors (informal gatherings of refugees and family members) in social integration processes.

Table 53 (continued)

…they are **market actors** seeking profit, but I saw that they are making ethnic discrimination. Especially **some realtors in Basmane** refrain to show rental houses to Arab and Kurd Syrians… (Serhad, Kurd, male, 25 years old) …I really appreciate the welcoming attitudes of **the butcher and grocery** in Basmane. Before I met them…I was feeling like "we should move" somewhere nicer...(Cennet, Turkmen, female, 47 years old)	
Settling in the camp was the only option for me but I always felt like I was imprisoned. Therefore, as **I contact with NGO officers** and learn the ways to forge a new life, I left the camp. Zekire (Arabic, female, 25 years old) …Basmane is nothing without **Kapılar initiative**. They take care of Syrians, they give us foods, cloths, they inform us. They make us feel safe in here. (Samir, Turkmen, male, 52 years old) …We, as Syrians take care of each other but our budgets are limited. Fortunately, we have some organizations that help us like **Syrian Solidarity Organization**. (Gülümser, Arab, female, 25 years old) …Food and sheltering the are needs of everyone, but we also need some good things that increase our hopes for future. There are **some organizations in Basmane that organize music and drama courses** for kids and even for adults…(Serhad, Kurd, male, 25 years old)	**The civil society organizations**
My **three distant relatives** in Izmir, who have settled there like 10 years before, called me many times to warn me to leave Syria as soon as possible. They guaranteed that they would take care of me and my children…. Cennet (Turkmen, female, 47 years old) …Surely, the **dialogue with former Syrians** who have already experienced the struggles of living here (in Basmane) is valuable…From now on, I never want to be apart from them. (Ramise, Turkmen, female, 33 years old) …one of the **religious figures in our neighborhood** (in Idlib), **Ahmad** went to Turkey... My father is a visionary man, he immediately decided to follow Ahmad and leave Syria for our safety, health and education...(Ayşe, Arab, female, 18 years old) …Through **Instagram**, we saw how happy our friends were who migrated Turkey one or two years before. I was admiring them. They were constantly sending me messages like you should come there as well…(Eslem, Arab, female, 20 years old) … I have nobody but my two **friends in Turkey**…They begged me to come to live with them because they were worried about me and my family…(Rojin, Kurd, female, 30 years old) …I met **Halim in Facebook by chance** and we became good friends. He called me many times to convince me to come to Gaziantep. (Salim, Turkmen, male, 60 years old) …Of course, the main reason behind my settlement in Izmir was **the power and influence of the Kurd community** on the social and economic relations in Turkey. If you are a member of this network, no one can put you down. (Malak, Kurd, female, 40 years old) …The **local inhabitants** who are closely engaged in Islamic practices, **the imam** who is…organizing the daily activities in the neighborhood…are all together represent **the Islamic community** here which make me feel belonged to Gediz. (Fatıma, Arab, female, 27 years old)	**Informal local networks**

In determining and explaining these four core categories of actors, I took Reimer's social relations typology (bureaucratic, market, associative and communal relations) at the center of the discussion since I found it quite comprehensive to include all actors I identified from the narratives of Syrian respondents (Table 53). I redetermined the names of the categories in a way to grasp the actor typologies that I derived from the narratives. To start with, the category of the State refers to the Turkish state since the Turkish State is the leading policymaker and legislator in governing Syrian refugee influx to Turkey and the primary actor in the design, redistribution and provision of welfare resources and services (despite the policy/political vacuums detected). Under this category, I included all relevant ministries, directorate generals, governorships, municipalities, local administrative units. As seen from the example quotations in Table 53, Syrian respondents highlighted the welcoming attitudes and discourses of the representatives of the Turkish state, the open-door policy of Turkey which facilitated Syrians' arrival to Turkey and the existence and availability of public services (health, education etc.) as effective factors shaping their mobility and location choices.

Secondly, I determined the market actors as the second core category. Here, I included all actors operating under free market principles who are providing accommodation, health, education, counselling, telecommunication, infrastructure, transportation services and diverse commercial products. Among various market actors operating under the rules of free market, here I included the ones who are involved in refugee emplacement process the most (the housing market, labour market and trade of goods and services).

Regarding the civil society, I refer to "all the non-state actors" (Sunata and Tosun, 2018) including international/national/local NGOs, third-sector organizations, intergovernmental organizations refugee community organizations (as home-town associations) who work under the principles of formality, accountability, trust and coordination[43] (e.g. the international third sector organizations, hometown associations, charities, refugee councils etc.). I also included both the flexible/loose organizations as the sources of associative relations. Although these two parties aim to reach out the same goal, their approaches remarkably vary. For example, while international civil society organizations follow strict bureaucracy to identify the

[43] Here, I interchangably use the terms civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although a growing literature exists on the differences of the two, I do not aim to go through the distinctions since I both count on NGOs and CSOs operating in the fields of migration, asylum and integration, as welfare providers for refugees in urban settings. For that reason, to keep the coherency in the discussion, I use the term CSOs to cover both third-sector organisations, NGOs, I-NGOs and NGO-Rs. The prominent examples of third-sector organizations are World Bank, UNHCR and IOM which mostly operate in *between of* the state and the market (Mayblin and James, 2019) to govern various dimensions of immigration (Galera et al. 2018; Mingot and Mazzucato, 2017).

eligibility of refugees in granting aid, local grassroots get into action mostly based on verbal declaration. Fourthly, resembling Reimer's communal relations, I introduced the informal local networks category to refer to the actors from who refugees' get first-hand support (e.g., share of practical information, free accommodation, economic and emotional support etc.) and to all informal/ daily/flexible interactions that refugees engage in. I specifically include ethnic solidarity networks, kinship, friendship and family relations, relations with colleagues and acquaintances, interactions with native inhabitants, co-ethnics and pioneer refugees and transnational/overseas and virtual networks (social media gatherings).

Table 54: The welfare providers
Source: Afford, 2000; Hickey and Bracking, 2005; Mingot and Mazzucato, 2017; Reimer, 2004 and the author

Public / The State	Central and local authorities including the following: - Institutions and organizations affiliated with the Presidency - Ministries - Directorate Generals - Provincial Directorates (local branches ministries) - The governorships - Metropolitan municipalities - District municipalities - Municipal corporations - Administrators at local scale (i.e. mukhtars)
The market	Housing market - Home / property owners - Housing contractors - Realtors - Real estate officers - Hotel / pension owners Trade of goods and services - Tradespeople - Companies / firms (international to local) - Entrepreneurs - Small scale ateliers / production units - Commercial websites - Black market - Street peddlers Labour market - Employers / Self- employed people - Career websites - Job finding institutions - Enrerpreneurs
The civil society	- International third sector organizations (UN, UNHCR, IOM) - National / local NGOs of solidarity - Refugee councils - Refugee-led organizations / NGO-Rs - Hometown associations - Charities - Faith-based organisations - Grassroot initiatives

Table 54 (continued)

Informal local networks	- Transnational relations - Ethnic (solidarity) communities - Co-ethnics - Pioneer refugees - Friends / Acquaintances - Family bonds / kinship relations - Neighbours - Colleagues - Native-led informal solidarity groups - Virtual networks (social media)
The gatekeeper	The actors facilitating refugees' access to welfare services and resources: - Members of ethnic solidarity networks - Market actors (realtors, local tradespeople) - Elderly people / opinion leaders - Mukhtars - Political figures / local representatives of political parties - Religious figures (e.g. the imam) - Mafiatic figures - Public officers / NGO officers taking individual initiative - Relatives / family members

For the first, I refer to all actors who actively play roles in regulating the social and economic relations in the settlements through protecting the social order and setting the frames of the public opinion. For example, the neighborhood mukhtars in Basmane are quite influential in managing the attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Especially the mukhtars having Arabic and/or Kurdish origin devote great efforts to prevent the assaults and discriminatory attitudes against Syrians, by frequently visiting local inhabitants and local tradespeople to listen to their concerns and to calm their nerves. By speaking the language, mukhtars with Kurdish/Arabic origin act as bridges between refugees and local inhabitants in facilitating daily interaction. As the facilitators of dialogue, mukhtars play critical roles in preventing tensions among the two parties. The mukhtar of Limontepe in Karabağlar District explain his role as follows:

> *We are a small neighborhood and our population is mostly composed of Kurd, Alevi worker class families. Recently, we host countless numbers of Syrians. With some of these Syrians we share same ethnicity, culture and religion, but with some others we cannot even communicate…To say… There are some Arabs come and go but they actually cannot stay to long because they cannot integrate into the Kurdish culture, which is quite dominant in here…What the community expect from me is to keep the social order in Limontepe and protect our values. In that regard, although I do not have the competence, in tea and coffee houses, parks and any other public gathering places, I try to increase the communication between Kurd inhabitants of Limontepe and Syrian Kurds who recently settled in the neighborhoood. As two groups can understand each other, the level of tolerance and respect increases. So does the peace in the neighborhood.*

Similarly, pioneer Syrians who had settled in Basmane prior or during the war show great efforts to change the negative public opinion against Syrian newcomers by showing great

respect to the Turkish culture, language, values and norms. As a pioneer Syrian Abdulbaki (Arab, male, 60 years old) stated that he felt like he should act as a pacemaker for the Syrian newcomers in order to lower the ethnic tensions among Syrian groups and tensions among Syrians of all ethnic backgrounds and native inhabitants. He specifically said the following

> *…I have been through various difficulties until I gained the respect of the Basmanelis and in later periods the respect of the Gedizlis. Due to my skin color, it was obvious that I'm a stranger, a Syrian, an unwanted person... At first the majority of Turks in Kilis and Izmir stayed away from me, did not communicate with me. I was aware of the fact that I should gain their trust and respect if I would stay in Turkey…and I did. First I learned the language although I still speak poorly. Then I learned to smile all the time, I tried to say "Selamın-aleyküm", "nasılsın", "iyi akşamlar" when I entered a market, a shop, a tea house. I did not involve in any fight, assault and crime. I did not make noise in my flat. However, I did all of these not only to protect myself but also to protect other Syrians who might face similar difficulties. I felt that I should act properly to be a good example for the newcomers. Because I wanted to keep the peace in Basmane…and this is my role.*

In addition, the elderly/oldest inhabitants in the settlement, religious figures, well-known tradespeople often find themselves acting as a "balancer" in the regulation of social relations between the two groups. Raziye (Turkish, female, 65 years old), one of the oldest inhabitants of Karabağlar, declared that

> *I was born and raised in Karabağlar. I know every corner of it, I know how things work in here. I know everyone who lives in here. Whenever a problem occurs everyone come and ask me to intervene in. I'm like the mother of every children and adult in Karabağlar. When Syrians came, nothing has changed in this matter. Now, I try my best to guide Syrians, help them in finding houses, furniture, food, clothing and wood for heating. When they have problems, they come and ask me first. When Turkish and Syrian boys fight each other, their families come to me first to ensure the peace. It is not that easy, but for the sake of everyone in Karabağlar, I need to do it when all these people trust and believe in me.*

In the second category, I included all actors who are acted as bridges among refugees and welfare providers in refugees' access to accommodation/housing, employment opportunities, public services and aid. To start with, the Kurd and Arab in-migrant networks in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca not only provided first-had support and guidance to Syrians but also helped the new members of the community by engaging them into their social/personal networks. In this way, with the reference of leading figures in the ethnic communities, Syrian refugees managed to meet their potential employees and homeowners. Secondly, the elderly people and/or oldest inhabitants of the settlements tried to facilitate Syrian refugees' access to cash and in-kind allowances by organizing petitions to be submitted to the Governorship of Izmir, the municipalities and neighborhood mukhtars. By doing so, these elderly people (who are known and respected by the key figures in the public institutions) involved in the mobilization of welfare resources for Syrian refugees. Moreover, they often become the

guarantors for Syrian refugees to convince the reluctant homeowners to rent their houses to refugees. An elderly Turkish woman aged seventy-one, who is known as "Elif Teyze" – aunt Elif – in Karabağlar, reported her facilitator role in Syrians' access to aid and housing with the following words:

> *…I'm the "Elif Teyze" of all people in Karabağlar. I'm a very enterprising person, I go after my rights, and demand whatever necessary to access my rights. That's why people know me. I cannot stand exploitation, I intervene in any situation in which someone is subjecting to unjust treatment…Since I regularly contact with municipal officers and the officers in the Governorship (of Izmir), they all know me too…When Syrians came here, they were all suffering. Although some of them were registered, they did not have a bread to eat. Their suffer impressed me a lot and I decided to do something. With the support of Turkish people, I did what I was good at. I organized a petition to demand food, milk, bread, clothing and hygiene material support for refugees and I submitted it to the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality with the help of an officer I knew there. At the end, the Municipality helped within the limits of their competence…What else I did…Hmm, yes. I try my best to break the bias of Turkish homeowners against Syrian refugees in Karabağlar. I either talk to them to convince them or be the guarantor of Syrian families who are urgently seeking housing…What else can I do for easing their life in Turkey…?*

Similar to "Elif teyze", the opinion leaders – i.e., the political, religious, intellectual figures in the settlements play parts in facilitating refugees' access to accommodation, employment and aid. For example, "Hüseyin Abi" in Basmane act as a bridge between Syrian refugees, NGOs and local tradespeople in Basmane. Although he has no organic connections with Syrians and cannot speak Arabic and Kurdish, he wants them to be better-off in Basmane. With the help of Kapılar initiative in Basmane – a initiative that he is a volunteer of – he uses his own connections in Basmane to provide food and clothing with affordable prices to Syrians. The imam (sect leader) in Gediz neighborhood also devotes significant efforts to collect the old but clean clothes of the native inhabitants to be given to Syrian refugees in need. He also tries to accommodate Syrian Arabs who want to settle in Gediz by convincing homeowners to rent their houses. He explained his role as the following:

> *…Besides my duties as an imam, first of all I'm a humble human-being. Thanks to God, my conditions are good and I want everyone to be like me. Our Syrian brothers, who committed themselves to Islam, are in need…Not as an imam but as a person known by the inhabitants of Gediz, I use my personal relations for the sake of Syrian Arabs, our religious brothers, in Gediz. I first convince realtors to show good houses to Syrians and then to ask low prices from Syrians. I remind them that we are also Muslims and we need to hold each other's back.*

The realtors both in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca also play crucial roles in Syrians' access to housing by convincing potential homeowners and by using their bargaining skills to lower the rents for the sake of the refugees. Although, they often apply ethnic filtering, that is, selecting to whom to help based on ethnicity, the efforts of realtors in Syrians' accommodation cannot be underestimated. A realtor in Basmane justifies my claim with the following words:

"I'm Turkish and I deeply committed to the Turkish identity. Therefore, it's my duty to help Turkmens coming from Syria. I specifically help them by finding houses close to my office. In this way, I would help them whenever necessary."

As another important figure, Şiraz (Syrian, female, 25 years old) acts as a bridge among Syrians in Karabağlar and the NGO where she works as a translator. Since she has the knowledge on the operations of the NGOs, the context of aid provided to refugees and the public services offered for Syrians under temporary protection; her doors are open to anyone having questions on such matters. She often gives advises to Syrians on how to apply for NGO-based services such as legal counselling, psychological support, language courses etc.

Neighborhood mukhtars as guides, facilitators and guarantors in refugees' access to welfare can also be labelled as the gatekeepers. For example, the mukhtar of Kadıfekale neighborhood is a well-known figure in Basmane as he tries his best to establish the bridge between Syrians in his neighborhood and the local authorities. By informing the Syrian inhabitants one-by-one about the services and campaigns of the local governments, he tries to raise the public awareness for the rights of Syrians in Turkey and to encourage Syrians to follow the campaigns. While explaining the importance of Syrians' access to municipal services he reported the following.

> *A year and a half year ago, Izmir Metropolitan Municipality initiated a milk campaign for Syrian newborns and children at the school age. However, Syrian mothers did not even know about this campaign although they needed it. To make the mothers benefit from the campaign, I rigorously listed the ones who fit the target group of the campaign and then I went to their door and asked whether they want to benefit from it. Of course, the majority of them wanted to reach milk. Then I contacted with the Municipality and insisted to make Kadıfekale as one of the pilot settlements to initiate the campaign. Fortunately, they came to our neighborhood. After that, Syrians often ask me whether there is a similar campaign or not and I still try to help them.*

As another example of how neighborhood mukhtars mobilize aid and resources for refugees, I will now share the experience of a mukhtar in Basmane[44]. He said that as a newly elected mukhtar, he tries his best to provide cash and in-kind allowances to the inhabitants of the neighborhood. In reaching his goal, he frequently uses his political network (a fact he barely admitted). As a member of the ruling party in Turkey (Justice and Development Party) for long years, he has deep and intimate friendships with some others in the Party who are now assigned for key positions in public institutions. By using his friendships and political relations, he manages to mobilize aid especially for the Arab population in his neighborhood.

[44] As the mukthar wished his identity to be anonymous, I did not share the name of the neighborhood.

Because, as a Turkish Arabic, he said that he could imagine the sufferings that the Syrian Arabs now face. Within this framework, he explained how he facilitated Syrian Arabs' access to different cash or in-kind aid, as follows.

> *…I am newly elected…Thanks to our inhabitants, after many years, a Turkish with Arab background managed to be elected…It is mostly because of the arrival of Syrian refugees to our neighborhood who are mostly Arab. They revitalized our economy and made us recall our culture, although they do not have the right to vote. To reward their efforts during my election campaign, and fulfil my duties as a humanitarian person, I now try to do my best to solve their problems…of course, within the official limits of my duties as a mukhtar. I'm in direct contact with Kızılay – (the Red Crescent) and the Governorship of Izmir to explain the sufferings of the Syrian Arabs in my neighborhood. I have a friend working in Kızılay, who knows and appreciates my efforts. Because of this, he sometimes calls me…to ask do I know anyone who specifically need for stationery equipment, for example…or calls for the clothing support. Mostly, I prepare a list for him to notice. Sometimes, I ask the help of a friend of mine, who is one of the representatives of Basmane and who knows the inhabitants in person. Their good will and efforts help me to provide aid for Syrians. We work as a team.*

From the narrative of the mukhtar, we not only see how he mobilizes aid for Syrians by using his individual network but also how the local political figures and public officers become decisive in the provision of aid for refugees. In that sense, although being at the risk of contradicting with the principles of the institutions they work, public officers often facilitate refugees' access to aid by engaging informal relations with local key actors (e.g., mukhtars, local solidarity initiatives, local political figures) under their personal initiative. Similarly, local political figures who have good connections with public officers and key people in international/national NGOs often act as bridges among refugees and these institutions/organizations. Accordingly, one of the representatives of Justice and Development Party in Basmane stated the following:

> *…Let me be clear, I am not that powerful to help Syrian refugees in Basmane. As the representative of the dominant political ideology in Basmane, I try to contact key people who would help Syrians in Basmane. There is nothing illegal about it. When my friends working in Kızılay asked me how many Syrians are in need of food and clothing in Basmane, I contact with the mukhtars I know personally in Basmane and ask them to prepare a list of names for me. We are not discriminating any Syrian, we are not labelling them. I know, it is not my duty to activate the official support mechanisms but my duty in the party allows me to do such things. Things work like this in Basmane and even in Turkey.*

Similarly, a political figure from one of the opposition parties in Turkey - HDP (*Halkların Demoratik Partisi* - People's Democratic Party) in Basmane informs Syrian refugees in the area about the activities of NGOs (e.g., Kapılar initiative) and even encourages them to participate in such activities. Because he believes that by frequently participating in NGO-based activities like food courses, movie nights, collective knitting and drama sessions,

refugees do not only feel included but also learn the ways to act collectively for their cultural and political recognition.

As the last example of the gatekeepers, I will discuss the role of the local "mafiatic" actors in refugees' access to accommodation and employment. Although these actors are mostly engaged with informal and illegal economic activities, they often use their economic and symbolic power in making favours and meeting some others' needs. For example, one of the leading figures operating in the entertainment sector in Basmane (managing several *pavyons* – night clubs), who explicitly admits his mafiatic businesses, is quite powerful in Syrian Turkmens' access to free accommodation. By renting various houses to be granted to Syrian Turkmens for free, by renovating old and abandoned flats, rooms, storages and by "giving instructions"[45] to the realtors in Basmane (for showing the rental houses only to Turkmens), he helps Syrian Turkmens in finding houses. He also stated that he often "gives instructions" to local tradespeople to hire Syrian Turkmens as employees by stating that he would pay the wages. He explained his role in Syrian Turkmens' access to accommodation and employment with the following sentences.

> *I am one of the oldest, powerful and respectful inhabitants of Basmane. I know how things work here, how people make money here. I am involved in a range of economic activities…construction, entertainment, agriculture…but recently I'm mostly engaged with entertainment sector. It is a hard sector which has its own rules which are not for everyone. Therefore, for many Basmanelis, I'm a dark person (laughing). However, no matter what I do for a living I provide jobs for hundreds of people in Basmane. I also actively take part in donation and help organizations…without my name… I'm doing this to get the prayers of the people in need. For the same reason, I help Syrians in Basmane. However, let me say it first, I have a nationalist character. I am committed to my country, my flag, my language and culture. Therefore, I mostly help Syrian Turkmen who are oppressed by their Kurdish and Arabic peers in the market (meaning the housing and labour market). In the earlier years like 2013 or 2014, there were few Turkmen families in Basmane. At those times, I rented twenty houses at one hand to be given to Turkmen households, I did not except any payment back. However, as the Turkmen population increased, I gave instructions to some realtors I trust and asked them to save the rental houses for Syrians. Since they all respect me, they accepted. Likewise, I talked to local tradespeople and investors I know to hire Turkmen workers. These are all my tiny efforts to make their life better in Turkey. God saves the Turks.*

Long story short, in my attempt to portray the profile of the "welfare providers" who not only affected Syrians' location choices and mobility patterns but also their level of access to welfare resources and services under policy/political vacuums in Turkey, I identified five main actor types as the State, the market actors, the civil society, the informal local networks and the gatekeepers. I strongly believe that these five-stepped categorization of welfare providers is

[45] in his own words

useful to grasp who fills / attempts to fill / responds to the (partial) absence of the State in addressing issues related migration and asylum (including refugees' access to accommodation, labour market, social aids, public services and so on). It will also be useful to identify the types and roles of the "local welfare providers" whose significance become evident in refugees' access to welfare. Accordingly, in the following discussion, I will briefly outline the local relationship patterns and local welfare arrangements in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca to grasp how they become decisive in intra-urban location choices of Syrian refugees.

8.5. The localized and territorialized forms of welfare provision

For the Turkish context, it is not easy to uncover the welfare provision mechanisms, since there is a variety of institutional/noninstitutional and formal/informal actors taking part in the provision of accommodation, employment, aid, security, health, education services for refugees in the (partial) absence of the Turkish state in addressing migration, asylum and refugee-related issues. In other words, in the lack of reception, resettlement, accommodation, welfare and integration policies (that are designed and implemented by the collaboration of the central/local authorities and the civil society), several actors emerge either to fill the gaps left by the State or to take the advantage of the absence of the State by delivering services according to their own interests/profits. Under such circumstances, with respect to the types and roles of the actors, we inevitably come across with the differing forms of local welfare provision, as we see in the cases of Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca. In each form, the type and role of the actors change and so does the level of cooperation and conflict among them. Therefore, to understand the relationship between Syrians' intra-urban location choices and the local welfare provision arrangements/mechanisms of the settlements, I decided to identify both the types/roles of the actors involved in the welfare provision (i.e. the local gatekeepers) and the relationship patterns between these actors (in the form of cooperation and conflict). In accordance with this, now I will describe the features of local welfare mechanisms in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, and discuss how these mechanisms affect the decisions of Syrian refugees to settle or not in them. Firstly, I will clearly explain what I mean by "local welfare arrangements/mechanisms" by giving reference to "local welfare systems" discussion of Andreotti et al. (2012). Secondly, I will introduce the local welfare systems of Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca with respect to the five main domains of welfare I outlined earlier.

As the role of states as the leading "welfare providers" has diminished with the changing economic and political conjuncture in recent decades - that is the dominancy of neoliberal discourses in the form of regional/local development and individualism – localized forms of welfare provision have come forward. Especially with the adaption of active inclusion policies

after the late 1990s (aiming fair and just redistribution of resources among different social groups), flexible and individualist forms of welfare provision have been employed in a way to bring the local actors to the front (Kunzel, 2012). In collaboration with the state, market and third-sector organizations, local actors have been charged to provide basic services and resources for individuals (e.g., refugees). The changing and decentralized forms of welfare provision as well as the pluralization of welfare providers and beneficiaries have resulted in the formation of bottom-up, actor-oriented, context-depended approaches in welfare provision. Within this framework, the concept of "local welfare systems" (LWS) comes forward to represent the changing dynamics in welfare provision. Andreotti, Mingione and Polizzi (2012) introduced the term to reflect on both the local welfare states and the local welfare mixes. They refer to both public-led and informal forms of welfare provision by the local actors. In that sense, Andreotti et al. (2012) define the context of LWS as "dynamic arrangements in which specific local socio-economic and cultural conditions give rise to different mixes of formal and informal actors involved in the provision of welfare services." By this definition, one could claim that LWS is a dynamic form of welfare provision in which the location-specific conditions/constraints, local (cultural, economic, social) resources and the profile of local key actors, service providers, and inhabitants are critical. Accordingly, one could assert that every locality has its own welfare arrangements and a mix of welfare providers.

LWS has three main characteristics as the following: the decentralized/rescaled/localized forms of welfare provision, the active participation of welfare beneficiaries and the involvement of civil society and informal network relations to welfare provision. For the first, Andreotti et al. (2012) refer to a new form of relationship among welfare beneficiaries, informal service providers and local market actors, where welfare beneficiaries are treated as consumers. Beneficiaries'/customers' capabilities of mobilizing the local resources become critical in the operation of LWSs. This brings us to the second attribute of LWS, that is the active participation of the welfare beneficiaries to the local social and economic relations. The scholars argue that social inclusion is a by-product of "excluded" individuals' own efforts to access labor market and other forms of income-generating activities. Hence, not only access to welfare resources but also engaging in social relations (the state, the market, civil society and informal networks) that mobilize these resources are critical for refugees' social inclusion. As the third attribute, the scholars argue for the active operation of civil society organizations in welfare provision. However, one should keep in mind that CSOs may help to minimize socio-economic distances among local inhabitants through targeting the groups in welfare need. However, they may also foster social inequalities especially when individuals' capacity

is limited to reach out civil society relations and when market actors are overrepresented (Andreotti et al., 2012).

Andreotti et al. (2012) also draw the advantages and disadvantages of LWS. Regarding the positive sides, they highlight the cost/time effectiveness in localized service provision systems. However, they also argue for the risk of isolated and disconnected forms welfare arrangements that may create social and economic inequalities among territories. Hence, localized provision of welfare is far beyond the decentralization of duties and competences to the local scale. In the formation of LWS, both individuals, formal and informal actors and territorial aspects play critical roles. By taking these three aspects to the center of discussion, Andreotti et al. (2012) actually refer to the "territorialization of welfare policies" where the notions of territory and space make greater sense. At this point, the following question arises to be answered: "What are the territorialized forms of social inclusion and emplacement in relation with local welfare systems?" To answer this, first, we need to draw the differing the local welfare systems that are shaping the social and economic relations in the given localities and that are affecting refugees' access to welfare services and resources in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca. Specifically, we need to direct attention to the locational attributes, the types/operations of welfare providers, the dialogue/cooperation/conflict among different actors which all are becoming more challenging and complex in the partial absence of the Turkish state in the provision of welfare for refugees.

In explaining the local welfare systems in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, I will benefit from the information that I provided in Table 55. There, for each of the five welfare components (access to accommodation/housing, public and private/commercial services, employment and income-generating activities, social support and security), I provided the name, type and role of the actors/welfare providers. Regarding the types, I employed five main categories as the State/public authorities (denoted as P), the market (M), civil society (CS), informal local networks (ILN) and the gatekeepers (MI).

For the roles of the welfare providers, I used three categorizations as guidance, facilitation and provision. Guidance refers to all kinds of information, experience and knowledge share that refugees benefit from in accessing welfare. It is different from "facilitation" because by guiding refugees, these actors do not act as intermediaries but rather as mentors. However, facilitator actors -i.e., the gatekeepers, act as bridges among refugees and welfare providers by directly involving in the process. Lastly, "provision" refers to the direct provision of goods,

resources and services by the providers. The actors in bold bits in the Tables 55, 56 and 57 show the most dominant/decisive actors in the provision of welfare components for refugees.

Table 55: Welfare provider typology in Basmane

Access to what	Welfare provider	Type	Role (major to minor)
Accommodation/ housing	**Mukhtars**	**P, MI**	**Guidance – facilitation**
	Realtors	**M, MI**	**Provision – facilitation**
	Homeowners	**M**	**Provision**
	Hotel/pension owners	**M**	**Provision**
	Civil society	CS	Guidance
	Kurd and Arab networks	**ILN, MI**	**Facilitation - provision – guidance**
	Relatives/family members	**ILN, MI**	**Provision – guidance – facilitation**
	Pioneer Syrians	ILN	Guidance - provision
	Elderly people/opinion leader	ILN, MI	Guidance – facilitation
	Mafiatic figures	**MI**	**Facilitation - provision**
Public and private/ commercial services	Izmir Metropolitan Mun.	P	Provision
	Konak District Mun.	P	Provision
	The Governorship	P	Provision
	Mukhtars	**P, MI**	**Guidance – facilitation**
	Local tradespeople	**M**	**Provision**
	Businesspeople/investors	M	Provision
	Civil society	**CS**	**Guidance - provision**
	Kurd and Arab networks	ILN, MI	Facilitation - guidance
	Political figures	**MI**	**Facilitation**
	Mafiatic figures	**MI**	**Facilitation**
Employment and income-generating activities	Mukhtars	P, MI	Guidance - facilitation
	Local tradespeople	M	Provision
	Businesspeople/investors	**M**	**Provision**
	Kurd and Arab network	**ILN,MI**	**Guidance – facilitation**
	Relatives/family members	ILN	Guidance
	Pioneer Syrians	ILN	Guidance
	Elderly people/opinion leader	ILN, MI	Guidance – facilitation
	Mafiatic figures	**MI**	**Facilitation - provider**
Social support	**Relatives/family members**	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Civil society	**CS**	**Provision**
	Friends/acquaintances	ILN	Provision
	Refugee networks	ILN	Provision
	Ethnic solidarity networks	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Native inhabitants	ILN	Provision
Physical and cultural security – lifestyle security	**The policeman**	**P**	**Provision**
	Civil society	P	Provision
	Ethnic solidarity networks	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Relatives/family members	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Pioneer Syrians	ILN	Provision
	Political figures	MI	Provision
	Mafiatic figures	MI	Provision

In the case of Basmane, we see that the actors involved in the welfare provision are quite diverse and complex. For each welfare item, the types, roles and dominancy of actors are changing. For example, while Kurd and Arab networks in Basmane are quite decisive in

refugees' access to accommodation/housing, by using their individual networks, convincing homeowners and redirecting refugees to realtors they know; they play minor roles in refugees' access to public services. Under such a complex welfare provision system, the realtors, homeowners, hotel/pension owners and relatives/family members come forward as the primary providers of accommodation/housing for refugees in Basmane; while the mukhtars, civil society, pioneer Syrians, elderly people and opinion leaders in Basmane guide/help Syrian refugees to get in contact with the housing providers. The Kurd and Arab networks and mafiatic figures in Basmane are also quite decisive in refugees' accommodation by using their economic and symbolic power to convince the realtors and homeowners to rent their houses, to prioritize some groups (some specific ethnic groups, people having health issues etc.) over the others in reaching out affordable houses, to provide houses when necessary by renovating the unused, old and deteriorated parts of the buildings.

Regarding refugees' access to public and private/commercial services, Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Konak District Municipality, the Governorship of Izmir come forward as the main providers of public services (health, education, transportation, etc.) and aid; while the local tradespeople an businesspeople/investors in Basmane are the leading actors in the provision of the commercial goods and services. Here, the mukhtars and civil society organizations and initiatives put remarkable efforts on guiding refugees' regarding where and how to register, to enroll kids to school, to get appointments from the hospitals, to apply for the Kızılay Card and other forms of cash and in-kind allowances provided by different NGOs. The Kurd and Arab networks, political figures/the representatives of political parties and mafiatic figures play significant roles in the mobilization of aid and resources to be granted to Syrian refugees again by using their economic and symbolic power and individual network relations.

For employment and income generating activities, we see local tradespeople and businesspeople/investors as the main job providers and the mukhtars, relatives/family members, pioneer Syrians, elderly people and opinion leaders as the guides who give practical information regarding the employers looking for new personnel, the available and appropriate sectors, wages, working conditions etc. Here, mafiatic figures act as both facilitators and providers by offering job opportunities for refugees within their close networks. For social support and security, we see the dominant role of refugees' informal local networks that are mostly composed of relatives/family members, civil society, refugee networks and ethnic solidarity networks. These actors help refugees to practice their cultural and religious traditions, to use of native language, to increase their cultural and ethnic recognition.

Table 56: Welfare provider typology in Karabağlar

Access to what	Welfare provider	Type	Role (major to minor)
Accommodation/ housing	**Mukhtars**	**P, MI**	**Guidance – facilitation**
	Realtors	M	Provision
	Homeowners	M	Provision
	Relatives/family members	**ILN**	**Provision – guidance**
	Kurd network	**ILN, MI**	**Provision – guidance - facilitation**
	Elderly people	ILN, MI	Guidance - facilitation
Public and private/ commercial services	Izmir Metropolitan Mun.	P	Provision
	Karabağlar District Mun.	P	Provision
	The Governorship	P	Provision
	Mukhtars	**P, MI**	**Guidance - facilitation**
	Local tradespeople	M	Provision
	Kurd network	**ILN, MI**	**Guidance - facilitation**
Employment and income-generating activities	Mukhtars	P, MI	Guidance – facilitation
	Kurd business/tradespeople	M, MI	Provision
	Businesspeople/investors	**M**	**Provision**
	Kurd network	**ILN, MI**	**Guidance - facilitation**
	Relatives/family members	ILN	Guidance
Social support	**Relatives/family members**	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Friends/acquaintances	ILN	Provision
	Kurd network	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Native inhabitants	ILN	Provision
Physical and cultural security – lifestyle security	The policeman	P	Provision
	Kurd network	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Relatives/family members	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Elderly people	ILN	Provision

Regarding the actor typology in Karabağlar (Table 56), firstly, we see the realtors, homeowners, relatives/family members and Kurd network as the leading housing providers for Syrian refugees. We also see the role of the mukhtars, Kurd network and elderly people in guiding Syrians about the rental prices and available houses, but most importantly, we see their role in enabling the interaction between refugees and homeowners by using their symbolic power in Karabağlar, which facilitates refugees' access to proper housing. For public and private services in Karabağlar, Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Karabağlar District Municipality, The Governorship of Izmir and the local tradespeople in Karabağlar come forward as the main providers. In reaching the services that these actors offered, the neighborhood mukhtars and Kurd network in Karabağlar act as guides and facilitators by using their own networks to mobilize the resources and services

The local tradespeople and businesspeople in Karabağlar, who are mostly engaged in furniture, automotive and textile sectors in Karabağlar can be regarded among the gatekeepers that regulate the economic relations in the settlement by providing various low/middle-skilled job opportunities (mostly with wages lower than the substance level) for Syrian refugees. Here, the neighborhood mukhtars and Kurd network in Karabağlar enable refugees' engagement to

labour market by redirecting refugees to the businesspeople they personally know, by giving good references for refugees and by introducing refugees with their potential employers. Although they favour their co-ethnics the most, their contributions to the refugee employment in Karabağlar cannot be underestimated.

Table 57: Welfare provider typology in Buca (Gediz neighborhood)

Access to what	Welfare provider	Type	Role
Accommodation/ housing	**Mukhtar**	**P, MI**	**Guidance – facilitation**
	Realtor	M	Provision
	Homeowner	M	Provision
	Relatives/family members	ILN	Provision – guidance
	Arab network	**ILN, MI**	**Facilitation -provision – guidance**
	Religious figures	**ILN, MI**	**Facilitation - guidance**
	Elderly people/opinion leader	ILN, MI	Guidance - facilitation
Public and private/ commercial services	Izmir Metropolitan Mun.	P	Provision
	Buca District Mun.	P	Provision
	The Governorship	P	Provision
	Mukhtars	**P, MI**	**Guidance - facilitation**
	Local tradespeople	M	Provision
	Arab network	**ILN, MI**	**Guidance - facilitation**
Employment and income-generating activities	Mukhtar	P, MI	Guidance – facilitation
	Local tradespeople	M	Provision
	Businesspeople/investors	**M**	**Provision**
	Arab network	**ILN, MI**	**Facilitation - guidance**
	Religious figures	**ILN, MI**	**Facilitation - guidance**
	Relatives/family members	ILN	Guidance
	Elderly people/opinion leader	ILN, MI	Guidance - facilitation
Social support	Relatives/family members	ILN	Provision
	Religious figures	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Arab network	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Native inhabitants	ILN	Provision
Physical and cultural security – lifestyle security	The policeman	P	Provision
	Arab network	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Relatives/family members	ILN	Provision
	Religious figures	**ILN**	**Provision**
	Elderly people/opinion leader	ILN	Provision

For social support and physical/cultural security, again we see the role of informal local networks. Again, the interactions and dialogue among refugees and the relatives/family members, Kurd network, native inhabitants and elderly people come forward as they reshape the social and cultural relations in Karabağlar. In Buca (Gediz neighborhood), similar to the actors involved in Basmane and Karabağlar, we see that the realtors, homeowners and relatives/family members are the leading housing providers. By acting as guides and facilitators, the mukhtars, Arab network, religious figures (e.g., the imam) and elderly people play important roles in refugees' access to decent and affordable housing in Buca (Table 57).

Here, unlike Basmane and Karabağlar, we begin to see the leading roles of the religious figures in the area.

As Gediz neighborhood is known by its religious character where the everyday relations are reshaped in accordance with the practices and traditions of Islam, the leading religious figures inevitably involve in all processes that concern the inhabitants of the Gediz neighborhood. In the provision of public and private/commercial services, the Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, Buca District Municipality, the Governorship of Izmir and the local tradespeople come forward as the main providers.

As in Karabağlar, the mukhtar and Arab network in Gediz neighborhood facilitate refugees' access to public services especially by mobilizing aid and giving practical information to refugees regarding how to apply and benefit from public services. Again, in the provision of social support and physical/cultural security refugees' informal local networks play important roles by regulating the social, cultural and religious relations in Buca

In overall, as seen in the above discussion, the types and roles of the actors involved in the welfare provision has been varied in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca. Here, the actors indicated by bold bits in the tables 55, 56 and 57 are the ones who come forward in reshaping social and economic relations in the given settlements. By guiding refugees about where and how to reach public/private services, by directly involving in the provision of services/resources and by facilitating refugee' access to services via using their economic and symbolic power, these actors -i.e., the local gatekeepers- determine the ways of welfare provision in the three refugee settlements. With this information, now, we can draw the local welfare systems of Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca and discuss how these systems attract or repel refugees from settling in them. Because not only what these actors offer to Syrians but also what they do not offer/fail to offer is decisive in refugees' settlement decisions.

8.6. The local welfare system of Basmane

Basmane is a highly preferable settlement for Syrian refugees from the very first waves of the Syrian refugee influx to Turkey. With respect to the narratives of Syrian refugees and local key actors, Basmane is both a transition zone for the ones hoping to cross to EU countries and a favourable destination to settle permanently for all ethnic groups.

As summarized in Table 58, by locating at the heart of the third biggest metropolitan area of Turkey, Basmane provides various public and private services, diverse and affordable

accommodation options, employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for refugees which attract Syrians who wish to forge a new life in Turkey. Besides, the existence of Kurd and Arab in-migrant solidarity networks, the Afghan, Iraqi and Iranian refugee populations contribute to the multi-ethnic, solidarist and tolerant social environment in Basmane. With its strategic location in the region and within Izmir, its rich sources of welfare and openness to differences, its migration culture, its NGOs and solidarity mechanisms Basmane steps forward as the hottest destination for all Syrian refugees in Izmir.

Table 58: The local welfare system of Basmane

What kind of a place?
low-income (mostly working class), multi-ethnic and deprived settlement in the heart of Izmir

Who lives there?
Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic in-migrants who lack the social/economic capital to afford to move somewhere else.
Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and Iranian refugees

What does Basmane provide for Syrian refugees?

- Various affordable accommodation/housing options
- Employment and entrepreneurship opportunities
- Diverse public and private/commercial services both for refugees in transit and/or long term and short-term refugees
- Both a transition zone and a preferable area to settle permanently
- A tolerant, multi-ethnic living environment – homing to all ethnic groups from Syria
- Grounds of solidarity – existence of various NGOs, refugee and in-migrant networks
- Chances of socialization – network building, multicultural events etc.
- Ground of cultural and political recognition
- Low costs of living for all Syrians
- Accessibility (hub of transportation modes, central location)

The actors forming the local welfare system of Basmane – the main welfare package	**Acc.**	**Pub./pri. services**	**Emp.**	**Soc. Support**	**Security**
The mukhtars (P, MI)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
The civil society org./ local initiatives (CS)	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Kurd network -– ethnic solidarity (ILN, MI)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Arabic network – ethnic solidarity (ILN, MI)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Arab businesspeople / Arab tradespeople (M)		✓	✓		
The relatives/family members (ILN, MI)	✓			✓	✓
The realtors (M, MI)	✓				
The homeowners (M)	✓				
Hotel/pension owners (M)	✓				
Political figures / political party representatives (ILN, MI)		✓	✓		✓
Mafiatic figures (ILN, MI)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Public authorities –public services (P)		✓			

Basmane's role in Syrian refugee mobility also needs to be discussed within the context of mobility/immobility. Because Basmane's role as both a transition/destination settlement has

not been shined out after the Syrian refugee influx. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, from early 1950s, Basmane has been the initial settlement and the home of various Turkish in-migrants from Diyarbakır and Mardin who migrated to Izmir with the hope of accessing public services, labour market and better living conditions. Its close proximity to Basmane Railway Station, the cheap hotels/pensions nearby and the historic but deteriorated housing were acted as in-migrant magnet.

The changing face of Basmane with the arrival of Turkish low-income and mostly Kurdish in-migrants has attracted Iraqi, Afghan and Iranian refugees who mostly came to Izmir on their ways towards Europe. In line with these demographic changes, Basmane has been labeled by the native Izmirlis as the hub of foreigners, Kurdish workers and those who could not engage in social, economic and cultural patterns of daily relations in Izmir. In other words, it is world of "non-Izmirlis". Therefore, it is not a coincidence that Syrians having limited financial tools, limited economic/social capital end up in Basmane. Accordingly, the class positions of Syrian refugees in Izmir have to do with their spatial concentration in Basmane.

Again, in Table 58, we see that various actors are in operation to provide the main welfare components that are necessary for refugees' survival and well-being. For all welfare component, we see a bunch of actors addressing the issue. For example, regarding the provision of housing/accommodation for refugees, there are nine different actors involved. Similarly, eight different actors play critical parts in refugees' access to public and private/commercial public services. The diversity of actors involved in welfare provision is undoubtedly attracting Syrian refugees to settle there, a fact that also came out of the interviews.

However, some actors involve in the provision of welfare services and resources only for some ethnic groups rather than the whole Syrian population in Basmane. To say, with the strong influence of Kurd and Arab in-migrant network in Basmane, there are three sub-packages of welfare that are designated for meeting the welfare needs of some specific ethnic groups (Syrian Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens). In each of the three welfare sub-packages, different actors work collaboratively to mobilize welfare resources and services for the target ethnic group, at the risk of differentiating and marginalizing the other ethnic groups. For example, some mukhtars, realtors and NGO officers in Basmane, who mostly have a Kurdish background, act in collaboration with the key figures in the Kurdish community in Basmane. In specific, the mukhtars often favour Syrian Kurds in reaching affordable rental housing and employment opportunities by involving them to their personal networks and/or asking the help

of their acquaintances who might help refugees. They also guide Syrian Kurds on bureaucratic matters, when necessary. Similarly, the realtors who are mostly former in-migrants from Mardin and Diyarbakır prioritize the housing needs of Syrian Kurds over other ethnic groups. As they admitted, they often reserve the best housing options for Syrian Kurds and often decline Arab or Turkmen customers by asserting that they have no houses to show. The realtors also help unregistered Syrian Kurds (who cannot legally rent a house for their own) by involving in the subletting applications. Additionally, NGO officers of Kurdish identity often reserve the clothing, food and hygiene materials to be given to the most disadvantageous Kurd refugees.

Arab network in Basmane is also quite decisive in the redistribution of welfare services and resources specifically to Syrian Arabs. The realtors and homeowners having Arabic background often prefer to select Syrian Arabs as the tenants, while leaving the other Syrians out of the housing market. Similarly, the Arab businesspeople and tradespeople, who are mostly former in-migrants from the cities located at the south eastern of Turkey prefer to hire Syrian Arabs as a mean of solidarity towards the Arabic newcomers. Most strikingly, the mukhtars having Arabic identity, political party representatives, some public and NGO officers operate in collaboration to mobilize aid for Syrian Arabs by using their economic and symbolic power in Basmane. The most evident example of this is the mobilization of the food and clothing allowances of the Red Crescent to be granted to Syrian Arabs in Basmane with the informal attempts of an officer from the Red Crescent, a local presentative of Justice and Development Party in Basmane and a mukhtar in Basmane. These actors favour Syrian Arabs at the risk of excluding the others from the aid mechanisms.

Regarding the access of Syrian Turkmens to welfare services in Basmane, the realtors and mafiatic actors (mostly operating in the entertainment sector) who label themselves as Turkish nationalist and conservative are the two leading figures who facilitate Syrian Turkmens' access to affordable rental housing, labour market and who guide them in reaching public services. They also try to ensure the physical security and protection of Turkmen population in Basmane by supporting the discourse that Syrian Turkmens are being abused and harassed by the Syrian Kurds and Arabs. Therefore, to understand the relationship between refugees' access to welfare and the intra-urban location choices, we need to uncover not only what are offered in the settlements but also for whom and by whom are these services offered.

Under such circumstances, although Basmane is a highly preferable location to be settled temporarily and permanently, the ethnic conflicts among Syrian Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen

population in everyday life and the conflicting actions of actors under different sub-packages of welfare decrease the preferability of Basmane for all ethnic groups. In other words, the sub-packages of welfare which are designated for the sake of some specific ethnic groups over the other are both the means of ethnic solidarity and the means of discrimination and conflict towards the others.

In that sense, while Basmane attracts all Syrian groups having different ethnic backgrounds and intentions of mobility with its reach welfare offerings, it also repels them with its everyday chaos, crowd and ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, Basmane's role as a transition zone in Izmir gets ever strengthened. Because here, Basmane is not only a transition zone for refugees in transit, but also for the long and short-term Syrian settlers in Izmir who were once settled in Basmane but then moved to Karabağlar and Buca with the increasing ethnic tensions and discrimination in the housing/labour market of Basmane.

Now, in the light of this information, we can define for whom Basmane's local welfare system is attractive. In specific, I can portray the profile of Syrian refugees who (prefer to) "buy" or "forced to buy" the welfare package offered in Basmane, as in the following:

- Pioneer Syrians of all ethnic groups who settled in Izmir before the EU-TR deal in 2016 (which prevented massive refugee outflows to European countries from Turkey): attracted by the abundance of public and private/commercial services, NGO support, affordability of accommodation, availability of rental housing stock, employment and business opportunities, refugee and in-migrant solidarity networks, migration culture, tolerant and multi-ethnic living environment, the central location at the heart of Izmir.
- Syrians who had relatives in Basmane who migrated long before from Mardin and Diyarbakır – attracted by the existence and support of relatives/family members, pre-arranged marriages, family unification.
- Syrians who settled in Izmir with different intentions:
    - Syrian refugees in transit – attracted by the strategic location of Basmane in the country/region/urban area, NGO support, refugee-oriented commercial activities, smuggling operations, availability of short-term informal unemployment opportunities, refugee networks, migration culture, daily/weekly/monthly booking options in hotels/pensions with affordable prices.
    - Syrian refugees who wish to settle in Izmir temporarily and/or permanently – attracted by the abundance of public and private/commercial services, NGO

support, affordability of accommodation, availability of rental housing stock, employment and business opportunities, refugee and in-migrant solidarity networks, migration culture, tolerant and multi-ethnic living environment, the central location at the heart of Izmir, places of socialization/cultural exchange and recognition.

    - Syrians who still hope to cross to European countries – attracted by the short-term informal employment opportunities and income generating activities, the strategic location of Basmane in the country/region/urban area, affordability and availability of short-term hotel/pension bookings and rental housing, NGO support, refugee networks, migration culture.

- Syrian refugees who want to/need to be close to public services – attracted by the migrant health units/centers and other health care facilities in the area, language courses, vocational courses and legal counselling services offered, primary/secondary schools that welcome Syrian students, cash or in-kind allowances provided by the local governments and/NGOs in Konak District.
- Syrian Turkmens (pioneer and subsequent) – attracted by the economic and emotional support provided by a variety of Turkish actors having nationalist, protective and conservative ideologies (including neighborhood mukhtars, the realtors, the homeowners, NGOs and local initiatives, mafiatic figures etc.), the affordability and availability of rental housing, availability of employment and income-generating activities, refugee and in-migrant networks, migration culture, NGO support, various public and private/commercial services, tolerant society.
- Syrian Arabs who frequently benefit from aid mechanisms and employment/business opportunities – attracted by the cash and in-kind allowances that are specifically mobilized for them by a bunch of actors sharing Arabic identity (the mukhtars, the political party representative, public officer in the Red Crescent), employment opportunities and entrepreneurship, the Arab in-migrant network formed by the in-migrants from the south eastern provinces of Turkey.
- Syrian Kurds having strong relations with the Kurd in-migrant community – attracted by the strong, powerful Kurd in-migrant community that provides economic and emotional support for the Syrian Kurds, the existence of NGOs and local initiatives that protect and monitor the rights of the Kurds, political recognition, collective organizations enabling cultural exchanges between Turkish and Kurd populations.
- Syrians who could not afford to move to somewhere else and those "stuck" in Basmane – despite being distracted by the discrimination and exploitation in housing and labour market, these people do not possess the financial/economic tools and social

networks to move to somewhere else. The fear of "not holding on to life" in other locations than Basmane repel some groups from the idea of moving.

8.7. The local welfare systems of Karabağlar and Buca (Gediz neighborhood)

Besides Basmane Area, various neighborhoods (Yunus Emre, Karabağlar, Limontepe, Devrim, Günaltay, Uğur Mumcu neighbourhoods) in Karabağlar and Gediz neighborhood in Buca come forward as the hot destinations of Syrian refugees in Izmir. To better grasp the reasons behind their popularity, it is worth to remind the characteristics of these settlements that attract refugees the most and to draw the local welfare systems offered in them. First of all, Karabağlar is known as a worker-class district that houses mostly Kurd in-migrants to dominantly migrated from Diyarbakır and Mardin after 1950s, to find jobs in the growing industry of Izmir. By being in close proximity to the main industrial sites of Izmir, Karabağlar has been hosting Turkish and Kurd worker-class families for the last decades. Accordingly, what attract Syrian refugees the most is the existence of a strong Kurdish worker-class community in Karabağlar (Table 59). Being a member of this Kurdish community not only facilitates refugees' access to accommodation, employment, services but also helps them to protect their Kurdish identity, language, norms and values. Therefore, Karabağlar is mostly preferred by Syrian Kurds who wish to remain close the Kurdish community and potential employment opportunities offered in Karabağlar Industrial Site and Buca 6th Industrial Site which are specialized in textile, furniture and automotive spare parts sectors. The affordability of rental housing, the central location/accessibility of the area by various public transportation modes, the calmness and security are the other attracting features of Karabağlar.

When we look at the local welfare system of Karabağlar, we see the leading and decisive role of the Kurdish community in reproducing the social and economic relations in the settlement. By controlling/monitoring the housing and labour market, by providing free accommodation (although scarcely), by ensuring the security and social order in the neighborhoods, by guiding its members and Syrian newcomers regarding how to benefit from public resources and even by facilitating refugees' access to housing, employment and aid services, the Kurdish community in Karabağlar is the main welfare provider. In strong association with the leading figures in the Kurdish community, the neighborhood mukhtars are also significant welfare providers in Karabağlar. They provide guidance to Syrian Kurds, inform them about the bureaucratic steps to be followed to apply for aid and services, inform them about the job opportunities etc. They also act as bridges among refugees and the realtors/homeowners/employees by ensuring the reconciliation between the two parties. Undoubtedly, the relatives/family members of Syrian Kurds who had migrated to Izmir long

before the civil war in Syria are the providers of refugees' basic needs as accommodation, food and clothing. They provide the basic welfare components that are necessary for the physical survival and well-being of refugees at the first place, later on, they continue to help Syrian newcomers by guiding them and facilitating their access to housing and labour market via their own social networks. As other important actors, the Kurd businesspeople/investors contribute to the employment of Syrian refugees in Karabağlar, by mostly hiring Syrian Kurds.

Table 59: The local welfare system of Karabağlar

What kind of a place?
low-income, working class settlement that is close to the inner-city industrial sites of Izmir

Who lives there?
Mostly Kurdish working-class in-migrants who lack the social/economic capital to afford to move somewhere else.

What does Karabağlar provide for Syrian refugees?
- A strong Kurdish worker-class community – protection of the Kurdish identity
- Employment opportunities – closeness to the main industrial sites of Izmir
- Central location / accessibility of Karabağlar by various public transportation modes
- Affordability of rental housing
- Calm and secure living environment – suitability for family life

The actors forming the local welfare system of Karabağlar – the main welfare package	**Acc.**	**Pub./pri. services**	**Emp.**	**Soc. Support**	**Security**
Kurd network – Kurdish community (ILN, MI)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
The mukhtars (P, MI)	✓		✓		✓
Relatives/family members (ILN)	✓		✓	✓	✓
Elderly people/opinion leaders (ILN, MI)	✓				✓
Kurd business & tradespeople/investors (M)			✓		

Under such circumstances, when we query for whom Karabağlar is a favourable destination to settle in, we may come to the following conclusion (which I derived from the narratives of Syrian refugees) by listing the profile of Syrians who buy the welfare package offered in Karabağlar:

- Syrian Kurds who want to live with their co-ethnics – attracted by the strong Kurd in-migrant community, use of Kurdish in everyday relations, maintenance of cultural traditions.
- Syrians who had relatives in Karabağlar who migrated long before from Mardin and Diyarbakır – attracted by the existence and support of relatives/family members, pre-arranged marriages, family unification.
- Syrian Kurds who came to Izmir as the result of chain migration – attracted by the existence and support of relatives/family members, co-ethnics who had already settled

and emplaced in Karabağlar, the provision of basic welfare components by the relatives/family members including free accommodation, food, clothing etc.

- Syrian Kurds who faced discrimination in the housing and labour market of Basmane – attracted by the welcoming attitudes of Kurdish realtors, tradespeople and businesspeople/employees.
- Syrian Kurds whose labourforce has been exploited mostly by the Turkish and Arabic employers in Basmane – attracted by the Kurdish working-class identity of Karabağlar
- Syrian Kurds who run away from the everyday chaos, crowd and ethnic conflicts in Basmane (mostly families and elderly people) – attracted by the homogeneous ethnic population in Karabağlar, the strong Kurdish network, less crowd than Basmane, less offices, shops, cafes, teahouses and shopping facilities etc. than Basmane.
- Syrian refugees seeking employment opportunities / working in the nearby industrial sites – attracted by the close proximity of Karabağlar to the main inner city industrial sites of Izmir (Karabağlar Industrial Site and Buca 6th Industrial Site), the availability of job opportunities (either short-term or long-term).
- Syrian Kurds who managed to increase their level of income and afford to move from Basmane – attracted by the better housing quality, quality of the infrastructure and built environment (when compared to Basmane).

Unlike Basmane and Karabağlar, the most attractive feature of Buca (Gediz neighborhood) for Syrian refugees is the existence of a strong Arab and Sunni community which enables and encourages Syrian Arabs to maintain their ethnic and cultural traditions/practices and to pursue a religious way of living (where the community shows the highest respect for the practice of Islam) (Table 60). Secondly, Gediz neighborhood's closeness to Buca 6th Industrial Site and Yeşillik Boulevard along which various furniture ateliers/showrooms and firms of automotive spare parts are located is an attractive feature of the settlement. Here, living close to the (potential) workplaces where Syrian refugees are likely to work encourages Syrians to come and settle in the neighborhood. In addition, the affordability of rental housing for better quality houses than Basmane and the ethnic homogeneity, calmness and security of Gediz neighborhood are attracting Syrian Arabs.

Regarding the local welfare system in Buca (Gediz neighborhood), the first thing to mentioned is the dominancy of Arab and Sunni community on the reproduction of social and economic relations in the area. They set the unwritten rules of the neighborhood life for its inhabitants and informally control whether the inhabitants act in accordance with these rules. The leading figures in the Arab and Sunni community are also involved in determining what are to be sold

in markets and shops, by using their symbolic power on the local tradespeople. For example, although the selling of drinks with alcohol is not legally prohibited, the majority of markets in the area prefer not the sell, as the consumption of such drinks is forbidden in Islam. The Arab and Sunni community also facilitate their new members engagement to housing and labour market, again by using their power and personal networks. As the other significant actors in Gediz, we may talk about the relatives/family members of Syrian newcomers, who both act as providers, guides and facilitators in refugees' access to welfare services.

Table 60: The local welfare system of Buca (Gediz neighborhood)

What kind of a place?
Low/middle income settlement mostly known by its conservative / religious social environment

Who lives there?
Mostly Arab and Sunni households

What does Buca (Gediz neighborhood) provide for Syrian refugees?
- A strong Arab and Sunni community
- Employment opportunities
- Conservative/religious way of living – suitability of the area for family life
- Affordability of rental housing with proper quality (when compared to Basmane)
- Calm and secure living environment
- Ethnic homogeneity (the dominancy of people with Arabic origin)

The actors forming the local welfare system of Buca (Gediz neighborhood) – the main welfare package	**Acc.**	**Pub./pri. services**	**Emp.**	**Soc. Support**	**Security**
Religious figures – Islamic community (ILN, MI)	✓		✓	✓	✓
Arab network (ILN, MI)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Relatives/family members (ILN)	✓			✓	✓
Arab business/tradespeople/realtors (M)			✓		

Lastly, the businesspeople and tradespeople having Arabic background help refugees to engage in labour market by offering them jobs, hiring them and being references for them when necessary. Within this framework, when I consider who buy the welfare package offered in Buca (Gediz neighborhood), I come to the following outcome:

- Syrian Arabs who want to live with their co-ethnics and Arabic in-migrants from Mardin – attracted by existence and support of the strong Arab in-migrant community, use of Arabic in everyday relations when necessary, maintenance of cultural traditions.
- Syrian Arabs committed to Islam – attracted by the conservation/religious way of living in Gediz, the frequent/daily practice of Islamic requirements, the organization of social and economic relations in Gediz in accordance with Islam (e.g. no night clubs/bars, limited selling of alcohol).

- Syrian Arabs who came to Izmir as the result of chain migration – attracted by the existence and support of relatives/family members, co-ethnics who had already settled and emplaced in Gediz, the provision of basic welfare components by the relatives/family members including free accommodation, food, clothing etc.
- Syrian Arabs who faced discrimination in the housing and labour market of Basmane – attracted by the welcoming attitudes of Arabic realtors, tradespeople and businesspeople/employees.
- Syrian Arabs who run away from the everyday chaos, crowd and ethnic conflicts in Basmane (mostly families and elderly people) – attracted by the homogeneous ethnic population in Buca, the strong Arab and Sunni network, lesser interactions with Kurd and Turkmen groups, lesser crowd than Basmane, lesser offices, shops, cafes, teahouses and shopping facilities etc. than Basmane.
- Syrian Arabs seeking employment opportunities / working in the nearby industrial sites – attracted by the close proximity of Gediz to the main inner city industrial sites of Izmir (Karabağlar Industrial Site and Buca 6th Industrial Site), the availability of job opportunities (either short-term or long-term).
- Syrian Arabs who managed to increase their level of income – attracted by the better housing quality, quality of the infrastructure and built environment (when compared to Basmane).

8.8. Concluding remarks

Based on the analysis of the underlying mechanisms that affected Syrian refugees' location choices at different geographical scales (in chapter 6 and 7), in this chapter, I aimed to contribute to the literature by showing how the local dynamics (local actor typologies, redistribution of welfare), ethnic backgrounds and class positions of Syrians affect the mobility and emplacement patterns of Syrian refugees in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca. Here, I discussed how the local welfare packages/systems in particular have affected Syrians' situations of mobility and immobility in Izmir.

To do this, first, I summarized the factors/motives and actors that influenced/shaped/affected Syrians' decisions to migrate to Turkey, to settle in Izmir, and to emplace in Basmane, Karabağlar, and Buca Districts in Izmir. Here, I found out that refugees' location choices at both scales are remarkably associated with their struggle in accessing some specific services and resources they need. To illustrate, they either struggle to access economic and emotional support or a shelter to spend the night, a safe and welcoming living environment.

As became evident in various narratives, I argued that Syrian refugees mostly preferred to go and settle in the areas/settlements where they would access to the things, resources and services they are looking for. At this point, to better grasp the relationship between refugees' struggles to access services/resources and their location choices (at different geographical scales), I tried to conceptualize what exactly Syrian refugees wanted to/needed to access in the countries, urban areas, districts, and neighborhoods they (plan to) settle(d). Here, by building on various policy documents, international treaties, and the studies of Hickey and Bracking (200); Jubany-Baucells (2002), Katz et al. (2016), Pless et al. (2013) and Reimer, (2004); I identified five core categories of services and resources that Syrian refugees struggled to access the most as access to accommodation/housing, services (public and private/commercial), employment and income-generating activities, social support, and physical and cultural security – lifestyle security. At this point, I noticed that these five main categories are corresponding to the "welfare domains/components" that are significantly discussed in the social exclusion/inclusion literature. The use of "welfare" as the umbrella concept enabled me to better identify the content of each of these five domains by taking both the monetary and non-monetary aspects of individual and collective welfare into account.

In the category of "access to accommodation/housing," I refer to all forms of sheltering, short or long-term accommodation options either public-led (e.g., social housing, refugee camps) or private-led (flat renting, subletting) or refugee-led/voluntary (sharing flats, spending the nights at the street). In the services category, I include all forms of public (e.g., health, education, aid) and private/commercial services, while in the category employment and income-generating activities, I addressed all forms of employment (e.g., formal/informal), entrepreneurship, and illegal businesses (street peddling, smuggling etc.). Regarding the social support category, I specifically focused on non-material support (e.g., consultancy, guidance, emotional support) provided by family members, co-ethnics and civil society organizations etc. Lastly, by physical and cultural security – lifestyle security, I referred to all exclusionary and inclusionary processes that affect refugees' body/mental health, physical integrity, security, safety, protection, cultural and religious practices, traditions, and values (e.g., discrimination by native inhabitants, protection of ethnic identity and language by ethnic solidarity networks).

When I elaborate on the location choices of Syrian refugees (at international/national /local scales) regarding the five welfare domains, I see that the main motive behind the initial location choices of refugees is to ensure the physical survival, well-being, and security (by accessing essential services and sheltering). However, the motives behind relocations (subsequent choices) are mostly about to be emplaced and hold on life by engaging in the labor

market, cultural and social relations embedded in urban areas. As Syrians gradually become urban refugees who now independently struggle to hold to a new life in Turkey apart from the support of their relatives, friends, and members of ethnic, social networks; finding proper jobs and running new businesses and becoming entrepreneurs become the critical challenges of their lives. Of course, I do not claim that socio-economic concerns are the sole motives behind relocations of Syrians, instead, I want to highlight how the meaning/aim of mobility has changed for Syrians in the last nine years (as Syrians become permanent residents/urban refugees in Turkey rather than temporary guests) from ensuring physical survival and security to ensuring socio-economic and socio-cultural well-being.

In conceptualizing the profile of the actors who affected Syrians' access to welfare and location choices in urban areas, I benefited from the actor/social relation typologies of various scholars, including Bracking (2005), Hickey and Bracking (2005), Reimer (2004) and Mingot and Mazzucato (2017). By explicitly building on Reimer's categorization of social relations, I identified five main actors: the state/public authorities, market actors, civil society organizations and informal local networks, and gatekeepers (Figure 45). I named these actors as the "welfare providers", because I found that they are actively involved in the provision of the so-called five welfare components: accommodation, public services, employment, and income-generating activities, social support, and security. Here, the category of the State refers to all public institutions, including ministries, municipalities, and local administrative units.
For market actors, I include actors who provide services and goods under free-market principles. Regarding the category civil society, I refer to all non-state actors who are either institutionalized or flexible in their operations (e.g., UNHCR, Kapılar initiative in Basmane). Fourthly, by informal local networks, I refer to all informal/daily/flexible interactions that refugees engage in with their relatives, family members, friends, co-ethnics etc. Fifthly, under "the gatekeepers" category, I refer to the actors who play decisive roles in the reproduction of the social/economic relations and reorganization of the social order in the settlements. These so-called gatekeepers are either the neighborhood mukhtars who facilitate refugees' access to aid by using their political power and personal networks in mobilizing the resources or the mafiatic figures who hold the back of some groups by using their symbolic power to control the social order in the neighborhoods, and so on. Although the gatekeepers may be included under the former four categories of welfare providers, their facilitator role as the bridge/interface between refugees and welfare providers urged me to discuss them under a separate category.

As seen, in the partial absence of the Turkish state in addressing Syrian refugees' welfare needs, these actors' types and roles are quite decisive in refugees' access to services and resources that are necessary for their survival, well-being, and emplacement. Moreover, in the lack of the top-down provision of the welfare, localized and territorialized forms come forward in which various local actors operate either in collaboration/cooperation or conflict, trying to offer welfare services and resources for refugees. Inevitably, different local forms of welfare provision emerge in each locality (i.e., settlement) with respect to the locational attributes, the demands/needs of refugees settled, and the type, sources, and competences of local actors operating. To better understand these localized forms of welfare provision, I referred to "local welfare systems" discussion that was introduced by Andreotti et al. (2012). Accordingly, to better define the relationship between Syrians' intra-urban location choices and their access to welfare, I tried to figure out the local welfare systems (i.e., welfare packages) of Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca.

Within this framework, Basmane, a low-income (mostly working class), multi-ethnic and deprived settlement in the heart of Izmir, attracts Syrian refugees with its diverse public/private/voluntary services offered by various actors, affordable housing options, employment opportunities, central location, multi-ethnic character, migration culture, and strong refugee in-migrants networks. Its local welfare system is composed of the mukhtars, civil society organizations, local initiatives of solidarity, the Kurd and Arab networks, the realtors and the mafiatic figures who play critical roles in the provision of the five domains of welfare. However, there are also three separate sub-packages of welfare that are formed to provide welfare for the three main ethnic groups of Syrians (Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens). Although I named these sub-packages of welfare with respect to the ethnic backgrounds of Syrians, they are actually representing the different class-positions of Syrians in Basmane.
In addition, although their existence can be regarded as a richness in Basmane, the competition among them in favouring the welfare of the one ethnic group over the others inevitably triggers the ethnic conflicts/tensions between these three groups. The increasing ethnic conflicts and tensions urge some refugees to move somewhere else, although Basmane offers abundant welfare sources. At this point, Karabağlar and Buca come forward as the two favourable destinations offering ethnic homogeneity, calmness, security, and protection to refugees. However, I also find out that not all Syrian households are “lucky” enough to escape from the discrimination and exploitation they face in the housing and labour market of Basmane. By concerning/believing that, they will not be able to “shelter” and “survive” in other settlements than Basmane due to their class-positions, low income, language barriers and limited social/economic networks; they found themselves stuck in Basmane.

Karabağlar (known as a low-income working-class settlement nearby the inner-city industrial sites of Izmir), mostly homing the Kurd in-migrants from Diyarbakır and Mardin, attracts Syrian Kurds who dominantly fled from the ethnic conflicts, discrimination and exploitation they faced in Basmane. Its local welfare system is composed of the strong Kurd community, Kurd mukhtars and Kurdish business-people and realtors who played crucial roles in reshaping the social relations in Karabağlar under Kurdish culture. These actors also actively participate in the provision of a safe, secure, ethnically homogeneous living environment and facilitate Syrian Kurds' access to public services and employment. On the other hand, Buca (specifically Gediz neighborhood) attracts the Arab and Sunni Syrians who wish to live under Islamic requirements and Arab culture. Gediz neighborhood, known as a conservative settlement close to the inner-city industrial sites of Izmir, is now homing Syrian Arabs who escaped from the ethnic tensions, discrimination in Basmane and who seek employment opportunities in the surrounding industrial sites. Its local welfare system perfectly reflects its character, as Arab in-migrants mostly from Mardin, pioneer Syrian Arabs, the leading religious figures, and the Arab businesspeople/tradespeople dominantly provide welfare to its inhabitants.

In sum, the relational framework I built on the narratives of Syrian refugees shows that Syrian refugees' choices to migrate to Turkey, to settle in Izmir and to emplace in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca (i.e., the patterns of spatial concentration and dispersal and the international/national/local mobility patterns) are all tied to their struggles to access welfare services and resources they need the most. In other words, Syrian refugees settle in localities, where they would easily reach out accommodation, employment, aid, public services, protection and security and where they would become a part of the society by engaging the social and economic relations embedded in the given settlements. From this perspective, it is evident that the welfare components offered in the settlements, the welfare provision mechanisms (i.e., how and by whom the welfare resources and services are offered), the class positions and ethnic backgrounds of Syrians and the level of their economic/social capital have the upmost importance in interpreting the location choices of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I focused on the multi-scalar mobility and emplacement patterns Syrian refugees under the policy/political vacuums (in migration and asylum management) in Turkey. In specific, by adopting a multi-scalar approach and acknowledging that refugee movements are taking place among localities rather than countries; I queried why Syrian refugees tend to settle in certain locations in Turkey (initial location choices) and why they continue to be mobile across localities (relocation / subsequent location choices). To enable discussion, I tried to uncover the underlying mechanisms (the actors and motives/factors) affecting/shaping Syrian refugees' mobility/location choices in Turkey.

Secondly, by taking Turkey as the country example, I took a glance at the mobility and emplacement experiences of refugees in the Global South countries, where top-down, comprehensive, and strict policies are missing in addressing refugees' initial reception, accommodation, resettlement, emplacement and integration (unlike the majority of Global North countries including UK, Canada, Austria, Germany, etc.). By highlighting the increasing refugee subjectivity in the location choice processes (as in Turkey), I aimed to end up with a bottom-up, multi-scalar and actor-centered relational framework to explain the mobility trajectories, emplacement and location choices of refugees under the policy/political vacuums.

Regarding the epistemological and ontological stances of the research, I adopted critical realism since I was concerned with uncovering the underlying mechanisms (factors, motives/factors) that affected refugees' location choices. Here, I determined my sampling, data collection, and analysis methods accordingly. At the first place, I constructed my fieldwork through tracing and mapping the international (movements from Syria to Turkey), intra-national (movements across Turkish cities) and intra-urban (movements within the cities) mobility patterns of Syrians. Secondly, I specifically searched for a specific location/locality from which I may start to construct my multi-scalar fieldwork through which I can trace the refugee mobility taking place at different scales. Accordingly, I selected Basmane Area in

Izmir as the medium of my multi-scalar analysis. Within this multi-scalar framework, I determined a three-stepped case study which included the following:

- Turkey (as the country case – international mobility of Syrians)
- Izmir (as the city case – intra-national mobility of Syrians), and
- Basmane Area (in Konak District), Buca and Karabağlar Districts (as district/neighborhood cases – intra-urban mobility of Syrians).

Then, during my visits to Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, I gradually decided on whom to interview with to uncover the underlying mechanism behind Syrians' mobility. Here, I devoted special attention to hear the narratives of Syrian refugees since they are the ones experiencing mobility first-hand and they are the ones who have addressed their resettlement and emplacement under the policy/political vacuums in Turkey. In selecting the sampling of Syrian refugees, I applied theoretical sampling and I both looked at the spatial distribution of Syrians in Izmir (to include the Syrian population in Basmane, Buca and Karabağlar) and the ethnic background of Syrians (Arab, Kurd, Turkmen) to better represent the profile of Syrian refugees in Izmir. Secondly, I gave voice to national/local key actors (including public authorities, local governments, NGOs, solidarity initiatives, local tradespeople etc.) who (in)directly involved in the different stages of emplacement. Accordingly, I managed to conduct a total of seventy-eight semi-structured interviews with the following sampling:

- A total of 25 interviews conducted with main decision /policy makers and administrative units including local branches of central authorities (2), local governments (4), neighborhood mukhtars (13), NGOs and local initiatives (6)
- A total of 31 interviews conducted with Syrian refugees
    - Syrian Arabs (13), Syrian Kurds (11) and Syrian Turkmens (7)
- A total of 22 interviews conducted with local key actors including political figures – political party members (2), public officers (3), market actors (realtors and local tradespeople) (7), NGO officers taking initiatives (3), elderly people and opinion leaders (2), religious community leaders (2) and mafiatic figures (3)

Within this context, I carried out the discussion under two main areas of research as

- the portrayal of the underlying mechanisms (factors/motives and actors) behind Syrian refugees' mobility at international/internal-national/local-urban scale and,
- the development of a bottom-up, multi-scalar and actor-centered relational framework to understand the dynamics of refugee mobility and emplacement in urban areas.

For the first research area, I made a rigorous literature review on the mobility, emplacement and location choices of refugees in destination countries/cities (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and accordingly in Chapters 6 and 7, I examined the factors/motives and actors that affected Syrians' migration to Turkey, settlement in Izmir and emplacement in Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, in a relational way. For the second research area, I critically evaluated the findings of Chapter 6 and 7 and by building on the Syrians' narratives on their location choices, I proposed a relational framework in which I linked the location choices of Syrians with their struggles to access welfare in destination localities (Chapter 8). I will now briefly outline these two main research areas' findings by grouping them as empirical and theoretical findings.

9.1. Empirical findings

As a summary of the empirical findings, I briefly discuss the underlying factors/motives and actors that affected/shaped Syrian refugees' migration to Turkey, settlement in Izmir and emplacement in Basmane Area, Karabağlar and Buca Districts.

Firstly, when I looked at the dynamics behind Syrians' country and city/urban area selections, I found out that the motives behind Syrians' initial and subsequent choices have varied significantly. To say, while in the initial periods of the civil war in Syria, Syrians were hoping to ensure their physical safety and security by migrating to Turkey and some specific areas in Turkey (border cities and metropolitan cities of Turkey); in later stages, they started to migrate to Turkey to get rid of economic destitution, poverty and social exclusion they face in Syria. The open-door policy of Turkey, the welcoming attitudes of political figures towards Syrians (especially in the initial months of the war), being the neighboring country to Syria as a country of Islam and being the most strategic country on Syrians' route to Europe, all make Turkey as a favorable country to migrate. Syrians' relatives/family members who had settled in Turkey long before the war, the pioneer Syrians who migrated to Turkey in the initial weeks of the war, the Turkish friends, business partners, acquaintances of Syrians came forward as the leading actors that attracted Syrians to settle in Turkey. These actors' existence was crucial for Syrians, since these actors provided first-hand economic and emotional support to Syrians. For all these reasons, despite its strict-border policy application (2016), which sharply lowered the number of Syrian inflows to the country, Turkey is still hosting the vast majority of displaced Syrians both as a transit and destination country.

However, Syrian refugees' state of mobility did not end when they (managed to) cross the Turkish borders. They either dispersed across Turkey to be settled where they could forge a new life or settled in the refugee camps that the Turkish state constructed for them (i.e., internal

mobility of Syrians in Turkey). Since settling in camps was not kept compulsory, most Syrians had initially settled either in the Syrian-neighboring cities (e.g., Kilis, Mardin, Mersin) or in the metropolitan urban areas of Turkey (e.g., Istanbul, Ankara, Gaziantep). I found out that my sampling of Syrian refugees followed the same trend in Turkey. Only five of the Syrian respondents settled in refugee camps initially, while the remaining twenty-six dispersed to urban areas whose journey ended up in Izmir, for now.

In deciding where to settle initially, Syrians mostly looked for the conditions that would ensure their physical survival, well-being, and security; while in their subsequent choices, they seemed more interested in settling in the areas where they could integrate into the labour/housing market and where they could engage in the embedded social, economic and cultural relations. I also found out that Syrian refugees have settled in locations where they could access various public/private services, feel safe and protected by the support mechanisms, face less discrimination, and engage in the labor market. Here, what I want to highlight is that, as Syrians became long-term urban refugees (rather than short-term guests in need of temporary sheltering, support and protection), they started to look for the ways to ensure their engagement in the social, economic and cultural relations in the areas they settled in (rather than ensuring their physical survival and security). Here, Syrians' class and social status in Syria and their economic, cultural and social capital have mostly affected their initial choices, since they helped them to reach out their initial contacts, shelter, food, aid and support. However, Syrians' pre-migration class positions and capitals have not helped them to hold on to life in Turkey, access to welfare resources and engage in the labor market. To some extent, the majority of refugees have experienced downward mobility and deskilling in Turkish metropolitan areas, as they could not engage in social and economic relations by using the economic, cultural and social capital they brought with themselves (Bélanger et al., 2021). On the other hand, Syrians' "success" to mobilizing welfare resources, engaging in informal labor market in Turkey have been strongly associated with their new class and social positions in Turkey. Therefore, Syrians' emplacement patterns can also be explained by their diverse strategies to mobilize resources and finding jobs in informal labor market in Turkey (regarding the emphasis on "informal" labor market please Chapter 5 – "access to employment" section). Here, both the class positions of Syrians in Izmir/Turkey and the locational/contextual attributes of destination settlements become decisive in Syrians' emplacement strategies and the patterns of mobility/immobility (Bélanger et al., 2021).

Within this perspective, I understood why Izmir has been attracting Syrian refugees (all of the ethnicities) from the first days of Syrians' influx to Turkey both as a transition city and

destination city. For refugees in transit, Izmir has always been a strategic spot between Turkey and European countries. Its geographic closeness to Greek islands has encouraged thousands of Syrians who hope to reach Europe after an expensive and dangerous overseas journey arranged by the smugglers. Especially until 2016, when the EU-TR deal entered into force, Izmir was known for its transitionary character. In that regard, Izmir was mostly homing to Syrian refugees in transit, who either stayed for weeks or months in cheap hotels/pensions in and around Basmane. With the EU-TR deal in 2016, Syrians' illegal overseas journeys were strictly monitored and prohibited, which made Syrians in transit have been stuck in Izmir. It was also the year when Izmir's role as a favorable destination city was shined out. As the third most significant metropolitan urban area in Turkey, Izmir offers various services, resources, and opportunities for its Syrian population, including those stuck in Izmir. Its developed housing and labour market, commercial activities, migration culture, multi-ethnic character, and accessibility have attracted Syrians to come and settle in there. Today still, Izmir is among the top-ten destinations in Turkey in hosting Syrian refugees.

Regarding their initial locations in Izmir (i.e., intra-urban location choices), Syrian refugees mostly highlighted the importance of finding proper and affordable accommodation, as they urgently needed shelters to spend the nights and to protect themselves. Syrian refugees also attached importance to the support mechanisms (relatives/family members, co-ethnics, pioneer Syrians, humanitarian agencies, ethnic solidarity networks) to help them reach protection, accommodation, economic and emotional support, guidance, and information. Moreover, by homing to Kurd and Arab in-migrants from Mardin and Diyarbakır, Afghan and Irani refugees, by offering a variety of public and private/services and by hosting various public authorities, NGOs and local initiatives addressing refugee-related issues, Basmane was and still is the first stop of Syrian refugees in Izmir.

Although Syrians initially preferred to settle in Basmane where they could access first-hand economic and emotional support from their families, co-ethnics, civil society organizations; in their subsequent choices, they preferred to settle in neighborhoods where they would engage in the social, economic and cultural relations and where they feel strong attachment and belonging. Therefore, Syrians have gradually moved from Basmane to some specific neighborhoods in Karabağlar and Buca, where they would live in harmony with their co-ethnics and no longer face discrimination by the Turkish society and other ethnic groups as in Basmane. At this point, it was striking to find out that, just as the tensions between Turkish and Syrian populations, the ethnic conflicts within the Syrian population (the conflicts between

Syrian Arab, Kurd and Turkmen populations) were quite decisive in the relocation decisions of Syrians in Izmir.

As another empirical finding I uncovered is that Syrian refugees' location choices are not only dependent on their preferences, needs and expectations but also on the actions and discourses of several actors[46] (including civil society organizations, realtors, local tradespeople, mukhtars etc.) who are (in)directly involved in the provision of the necessary services and resources for refugees to survive. Therefore, the inclusionary/exclusionary attitudes of these actors and refugees' interactions (conflict vs. dialogue) with them are quite decisive in refugees' access to these services and their location choices. In that regard, when I queried the actors who affected Syrians' initial and subsequent location choices at the different geographical scales, I found out that the choices have been shaped by a variety of actors who partially, individually or collectively address refugees' welfare needs (including the local governments, ethnic communities, religious leaders, mukhtars, real estators, tradespeople, local solidarity initiatives, friends, families etc.).

Regarding refugees' initial location choices, the actors who provided first-hand economic and emotional support to refugees and who directly addressed refugees' basic needs in Turkey as food, clothing, hygiene materials and sheltering came forward. In specific, I figured out that Syrian refugees initially preferred to settle in urban areas where their relatives/family members, co-ethnics, friends/acquaintances, pioneer Syrians had already settled in and where various civil society organizations had already deployed. However, the actors affecting Syrians' subsequent location choices were the ones who provided second-hand support by guiding Syrians in accessing proper accommodation, employment, aid, public services and by facilitating Syrians' engagement to social, economic, and cultural relations in the areas settled in. Here, the refugee networks, ethnic (solidarity) communities, and key local actors, including the mukhtars, opinion leaders, local initiatives, and tradespeople, came forward.

When I examined the actor typologies of Basmane, Karabağlar, and Buca (Gediz neighborhood), where attract Syrians the most, I noticed that in each of them, different local actors play critical roles in attracting/repelling Syrian refugees. When I compared the actor typologies in these three settlements, I clearly understood why the intra-urban mobility in Izmir was mostly taking place among these three areas where Basmane stands at the center. With its various public/private services offered by a variety of actors, migration culture, multi-

[46] the actors that either fill/attempt to fill or take advantage of the partial absence of the Turkish state in providing welfare to refugees.

ethnic character, and central location, Basmane is still a favorable settlement that attracts Syrian refugees of all ethnicities and all intentions to settle in. However, Basmane's popularity as the "hub" and "home" of Syrian refugees cannot only be explained by how its welfare offerings and support mechanisms (e.g., affordable housing, central location, health, education and commerce facilities, NGOs) have attracted Syrians to choose to settle in there. Because as some respondents emphasized, their settlement in Basmane occured on no-choice basis. In other words, Basmane is one of the unique settlements in Izmir where "non-İzmirlis" and even "non-Turkish" people can create their own spaces representing their culture and class relations and can build their own social networks and accordingly those who have limited social/economic capital often find themselves stuck in Basmane although they want to leave. Therefore, Basmane is characterized by both in the context of mobility and immobility due to the class positions and the level of social/economic capital of refugees.

On the other hand, for those who can afford to move from Basmane (because of the ethnic conflicts within the Syrian population, the tensions between Syrians and the native inhabitants, the discriminatory and exploitative attitudes of local market actors in Basmane), Karabağlar and Buca come next as the other favorite destinations.

Although they are not as rich as Basmane in terms of the services and resources provided, the affordability of rental housing in them and their central location and closeness to industrial sites where refugees might be employed increase their attractiveness. Most importantly, for those who moved from Basmane, sharing similar class-positions and ethnic backgrounds with the native inhabitants of these settlements was a matter of attraction. In its simplest form, Karabağlar offers a strong sense of solidarity and belonging thanks to the well-established Kurd working-calss network in the district, while Buca offers a secure and conservative way of life where the collective practice of religion (Islam) is the character of the district. Here, Karabağlar is mostly homing worker-class Kurdish in-migrants and Syrian Kurds who primarily escaped from the ethnic conflicts, tensions and exploitation they faced in Basmane. On the other hand, Buca (Gediz neighborhood) is homing to Arab and Sunni Syrians who prefer to maintain a conservative life based on the rules of Islam and who want to protect themselves from chaotic and conflicting social relations (as in Basmane).

Under these circumstances, Basmane serves "a transition zone for Syrians (overnight stays, last stop before going to Europe, first stop before moving into the other parts of Izmir), a central location to settle in especially after the EU-TR deal in 2016 (through offering various public services, cheap housing, job opportunities) and a community hub for Syrians (to get

socialized, to access consultancy services, to buy/sell Syrian products)". On the other hand, Karabağlar and Buca stand out as Basmane's residential extensions and/or residential satellites,

- as they are mostly homing Syrians who fled from the everyday chaos, crowd, ethnic conflicts and social tensions in Basmane and
- as their Syrian inhabitants still maintain their social, cultural, and economic relations in Basmane.

In that regard, Basmane is the perfect spatial focus to trace the relationship between international, internal/national, inter-urban and intra-urban mobility of Syrian refugees in Turkey, as it has played critical roles in each of these scales of mobility.

9.2. Theoretical findings

At this stage, I will briefly discuss my theoretical findings, which I believe will make important contributions to the migration, mobility, location choice, and (refugee) emplacement literature. In this research, I aimed to develop an alternative framework (to methodological nationalism) to explain differing mobility/emplacement patterns of refugees in destination countries (especially under policy/political vacuums) by linking the concepts of multi-scalar mobility, emplacement and local welfare systems in a meaningful way. I strongly believe that the multi-scalar framework I developed is the main contribution of this research to the literature.

Firstly, adopting a multi-scalar approach to mobility, through defining it as an on-going, open-ended socio-spatial process, enabled me to challenge the methodological nationalism in migration and mobility studies. Here, I traced the different mobility patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey at different scales (international to local) with a relational lens and I managed to draw the multi-scalar character and the continuity of refugee mobility across scales. Although refugees' border-crossings and resettlement in host countries are often regarded as the endpoints of international movements, I noticed that Syrian refugees' state of mobility do not come to an end when the Turkish borders are crossed. From the narratives of Syrian respondents, I figured out that when Syrians cross the Turkish borders, they face the challenge of deciding where to go, where to settle and forge a new life. Accordingly, I saw that refugees were concentrated in certain border and/or metropolitan urban areas in Turkey, including Gaziantep, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir where Syrians believed thar they could reach out the services they needed and where they could engage in social, economic and cultural relations. The same was also valid for Syrians' intra-urban mobility, as they settled in some certain districts/neighborhoods, where provide the most convenient services and resources for emplacement. Here, by tracing the international, internal and intra-urban mobility

patterns/trajectories of Syrian refugees in a relational way, I showed geographic continuity of refugee mobility at different scales. This multi-scalar trace of refugees' mobility patterns also enabled me to present the different paths of mobility that are followed by refugees in their struggles to emplace in Turkey.

Secondly, the multi-scalar approach employed in this study offered an alternative perspective for policymakers/researchers to explain the mobility/emplacement patterns especially in Global South countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, etc.) that are facing severe policy/political vacuums. Because, as I figured out in the case of Turkey, the use of the concepts/methods developed by the Global North countries (like UK, Germany, Austria, Canada where refugees' initial reception, accommodation, dispersal and emplacement is dominantly controlled and regulated by the State and public authorities), are not helpful to explain the mobility/location choice patterns in countries where the State is partially absent in addressing migration and asylum-related issues. For example, with state-led and methodological nationalist approaches we cannot explain how Syrian refugees take subjective decisions regarding their location choices in Turkey where the Turkish state has not yet introduced any concrete policy regarding the accommodation and resettlement of Syrians. However, with this example, I do not claim a purely subjective process, since Syrians' decisions are shaped by a variety of actors who either try to fill the gap of the State or take advantage of the absence of the State by exploiting the vulnerable positions of Syrians in Turkey. To figure out how the gap of the State is filled/addressed by non-state actors, again I employed multi-scalar thinking.

By the multi-scalar approach, I managed to identify the scales of governance concerning the refugee mobility. In specific, I uncovered how migration and mobility is governed by actors operating at different scales. This was necessary because territorial movements of refugees cut across governance measures taken by authorities established at different scales. With the multi-scalar frame, I reveal the tactics/strategies of refugees for mobility and emplacement and also the policies/actions of various actors who affect the tactics/strategies of refugees. Accordingly, this approach also helped me to define the scales of operation - the actions, decisions of refugee households, different actors operating at different scales. For example, it helped me to interpret how "the EU-TR deal"[47] in 2016 affected Syrian refugees' international, intra-national and intra-urban mobilities in Turkey.

[47] As deal concerning the management and control of international refugee mobility.

The multi-scalar approach also enabled me to identify the "non-state actors" whose actions/discourses and policies become critical under policy/political vacuums in migration and asylum management as in Turkey. More specifically, unlike methodological nationalism, the multi-scalar approach allowed me to present the bottom-up reactions to top-down policies and/or the policy/political gaps. In overall, the multi-scalar approach to mobility helped me to address several issues that methodological nationalism fails to address. Specifically, the multi-scalar approach enabled me

- to trace the geographic continuity of Syrians' international, intra-national, inter-urban and intra-urban mobility in Turkey.
- to see the open-ended nature of mobility and the temporality of both the situations of mobility and immobility.
- to query how refugees experience mobility/immobility and react to top-down decisions/policies affecting their emplacement strategies from bottom-up.
- to uncover all factors and (non-state) actors (macro/meso/micro-level) who (in)directly shape the mobility and emplacement patterns of refugees.

Via the multi-scalar lens, I reached one last finding: The term mobility cannot be defined as the opposite of the term of immobility. Because even in the resettlement and emplacement processes in urban areas, which are considered as the states of immobility– refugees continue to be mobile to access the welfare resources and services they need. The typical examples are the daily commutes between home, workplace and shopping centers, and refugees' residential mobility in urban areas.

In overall, the construction of my discussion on multi-scalar refugee mobility enabled me to answer the following question: "What do happen next when the national borders of the destination countries crossed by refugees?". Specifically, via the multi-scalar lens, I managed to provide answers to this question by highlighting the fact that "refugees are in a state of mobility to find places where they will eventually/ultimately be emplaced".

The concept of emplacement helped me reflect on the empirical blindness of methodological nationalism by showing the geographic continuity of refugee mobility at the local scale (in the forms of intra-urban mobility) in relation with refugees' strategies for place-making and network building (Bjarnesen and Vigh, 2016; Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015, 2018; Korac-Sanderson, 2016; Wessendorf and Phillimore, 2019). Because, unlike resettlement and re-integration, the concept of emplacement acknowledges the geographic, spatial, and local aspects of refugee mobility by emphasizing the relation between the position of localities

within the multi-scalar networks of power and individuals' strategies for settlement (Çağlar and Glick-Schiller, 2015, 2018). In addition, unlike resettlement and re-integration discussions that read the place-making process with state-led top-down lens, the concept of emplacement helped me to read the same process from the bottom, through the eyes of refugees and other relevant local actors.

With the help of the emplacement literature, I uncovered the factors/motives (i.e., the causality of mobility) and actors (i.e., the agency and subjectivity of mobility) that affected Syrian refugees' mobility/emplacement patterns and location choices in Turkey. It helped me to understand why refugees spatially concentrate in certain locations or spread to different localities by uncovering the social, economic, cultural, and political reasons behind it. By emphasizing the subjectivity of refugees in place-making processes, the emplacement literature has helped me to figure out that both refugees' own strategies/expectations, class positions, ethnic background, the level of social/economic capital, the local/locational dynamics of the destination settlements and the negotiations between various actors who are involved in the place-making process have a word to say on the formation of different patterns of emplacement in Izmir. However, it did not provide plausible arguments to explain "how" refugees manage to emplace in the localities they have settled. To answer this "how" question and to better define refugees' emplacement strategies in relation with the local dynamics of the destination settlements, I benefitted from social exclusion/inclusion literature and the concept of "local welfare systems" (LWS) (Andreotti et al.,2012).

This LWS framework helped me to define refugee emplacement as an "access-related process", since the ultimate goal of being mobile for refugees is to go and emplace in localities where they can access the resources, services and services they need to survive. The term "access" was quite critical here, because in explaining why Syrians settled in Izmir, Basmane or Karabağlar, I found out that Syrian respondents frequently mentioned that they tried to "access" to the support of their relatives, NGOs, aid mechanisms, sheltering, food, income, employment and so on. For that reason, in defining what do refugees need to access the most, I reviewed the social exclusion literature, since social exclusion is primarily dealing with access-oriented problems that are resulting from the unfair/limited redistribution of "welfare services and resources" among different social groups. Within this framework, I managed to categorize the services and resources that refugees' struggle the most to access under five main categories of welfare: accommodation/housing, services (public and private/commercial), employment and income-generating activities, social support and physical and cultural security – lifestyle security.

Here, I found that Syrian refugees' migration to Turkey, settlement and emplacement in Izmir (Basmane, Karabağlar, and Buca) are all related to the provision of these five welfare components. Refugees have settled in the areas that offered the most suitable "welfare package" that are consisted of these five components. I also drew from Syrians' narratives that there is an integral relationship among refugees' location choices and their access to accommodation. Because one cannot settle and emplace in any location where he/she cannot accommodate. Accessing accommodation is the first and most critical step of any emplacement process, and for that reason, I specifically looked for how Syrian refugees managed to access housing/accommodation in Turkey.

The identification of the welfare needs of refugees in urban areas enabled me to define better what refugee emplacement is. Here, I defined emplacement as "refugees' struggle to access welfare resources and services in destination settlements by forming/engaging social networks and developing ad-hoc strategies for social inclusion". Accordingly, I elaborated on refugees' location choices as the spatial dimension of their struggles to access welfare.
I also figured out that holding the necessary financial/economic means for refugees is not enough to reach these welfare packages offered in the localities. Refugees also need to be involved in the welfare packages, which are formed by a variety of actors/welfare providers who either try to fill the State's gap (i.e., the primary welfare provider) or take advantage of the absence of the State. From Syrians' narratives, I derived more than twenty actors whose roles in the welfare provision are too complex to identify. Again, by referring to the social exclusion literature to draw the type and roles of the welfare providers in Turkey, I introduced five primary welfare providers as State/public authorities, the market actors, the civil society, the informal local networks, and the gatekeepers. The gatekeepers have the upmost importance here, since they both play decisive roles in the reproduction of the social relations and reorganization of the social order in the settlements and in facilitating refugees' access to welfare via mobilizing the welfare resources and services by using their own social networks and political power.

Although their types and roles vary in each locality (in Basmane, Karabağlar, and Buca), the gatekeepers were mostly the neighborhood mukhtars, the realtors, the leading figures in Kurd and Arab communities and the mafiatic figures. Especially in the partial absence of the Turkish state in the provision of welfare to Syrian refugees, the services and resources that the local welfare providers and the gatekeepers provide become quite critical for Syrians' survival and well-being in their new environments. One my main contribution to emplacement literature is

the identification of the types and roles of these gatekeepers and their effect on refugees' intra-urban mobility and emplacement patterns.

Here, refugees' involvement in the welfare packages offered is not easy as it seems, because each of the welfare packages has its own ways and tools to be used to provide welfare, which are not suitable for all welfare recipients. For example, Karabağlar's welfare arrangement is explicitly designated for addressing the welfare needs of Kurd in-migrants and Syrian Kurds, where Syrians with other ethnicities are left outside the system. Similarly, Buca's system is dominantly ruled by the Arab in-migrants, mostly from Mardin, pioneer Syrian Arabs, the leading religious figures and the Arab businesspeople/tradespeople. As another example, Basmane's local welfare system is mostly composed of the mukhtars, civil society organizations, local initiatives of solidarity, the Kurd and Arab networks, the realtors and the mafiatic figures. Interestingly, there are also three welfare sub-packages in Basmane, which are designated for favouring the rights/interests of one specific ethnic group over the others (e.g., the welfare sub-package for Syrian Turkmens).

The competition/conflict between the three sub-packages of welfare in Basmane for reserving the resources and services for their members not only results in the conflicting forms of welfare provision but also triggers ethnic tensions among Syrian Kurds, Arab and Turkmen populations in Basmane. In other words, the already existing conflicts between Kurd, Arab and Turkmen groups in Syria seem to be transferred to Turkey (as both of these groups migrated to Turkey), which significantly affected the concentration/dispersal patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Izmir. Even worse, the long-lasting ethnic conflicts seemed to gain a new dimension as these groups now struggle to reach scarce resources and opportunities in a harshly competitive environment. Here, it is not a coincidence that Syrian Kurds in Basmane have gradually moved to Karabağlar (where Kurd actors predominantly provide the welfare) while Syrian Arabs have settled in Gediz neighborhood (where Arab and Sunni actors are the local welfare providers). Therefore, although in theory, the dialogue and interaction between refugees and native inhabitants is highlighted as a mean of integration and/or socio-spatial segregation (Rottman and Kaya, 2020); in this research, I found out that the level of dialogue and/or conflict between different ethnic Syrian groups is more decisive in the location choices of refugees.

At this point, I confidently argue that refugees' engagement to LWS is closely tied to their class-positions in that specific locality, ethnic background at the level of social/economic capital they have. Accordingly, the local welfare systems (with different welfare providers and

welfare arrangements) either attract refugees to settle in a certain locality or to make them relocate from that locality (especially in cases where refugees cannot engage social and economic relations in that locality. Stemming from this fact, I figured out that Syrian refugees' intra-urban mobility in Izmir are closely tied to the local welfare systems offered in different localities. Here, "location choice" means more than a physical settlement to a specific locality for refugees because this choice determines which welfare resources would be reached and to whom to be contacted in the emplacement process. Thus, "the selected locations act as plug-ins for refugees to access local welfare mechanisms". Accordingly, as refugees get to know Izmir, they look for the best welfare system which matches their needs and expectations and make their location choices accordingly. However, I also noticed that the local welfare systems offered not only to attract Syrians to settle in but also to repel them from settling.

In overall, through combining the concepts of multi-scalar approach to mobility, emplacement and local welfare systems, I managed to uncover the underlying mechanisms that lead to the formation of different mobility and emplacement patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Firstly, mobility is not a purely subjective process in which refugees freely decide on where to go and settle in. Here, not only the preferences, needs, and expectations of refugees, but also the types and roles of the actors addressing the gaps of the State are determinant in refugees' location choices under the policy/political vacuums. Secondly, there is an intertwined relationship among refugees' location choices and their struggles to access welfare (i.e., emplacement). Thirdly, just as the dialogue/conflict between refugees and native inhabitants; the dialogue/conflict within the refugee community becomes decisive in refugees' location choices. Lastly and most importantly, both the locational attributes (of destination countries, cities, districts/neighborhoods), the local welfare systems (types of welfare components offered; types and roles of welfare providers), the ethnic background, class positions and economic/social capital of refugees, the discourses/actions/operation of the gatekeepers, the negotiations (dialogue/cooperation/conflict) between refugees and welfare providers, refugees and native inhabitants and different ethnicity and/or class-oriented welfare packages affect the mobility/immobility patterns of refugees, under policy/political vacuums.

9.3. Policy recommendations

By acknowledging that Syrian refugees' mobility patterns/location choices are all tied to their struggles to access welfare resources and services that are necessary for their survival, well-being and integration, I have few policy suggestions for the Turkish State and public authorities who are in charge of addressing refugee and welfare-related issues.

Firstly, in the ninth year of the Syrians' influx to Turkey, it is unacceptable that Syrians are still seen as "temporary guests" who shall return to Syria as soon as the war ends. Although in practice, Syrians are "refugees", they are still politically and legally recognized as the ones "under temporary protection regime" in Turkey. Their recognition as short-term guests detains public authorities from developing comprehensive resettlement and emplacement policies for Syrians in Turkey. When compared to the status of refugees, temporary protection provides insufficient and ambiguous rights to Syrians. In specific, there is no concrete regulation/policy document on how Syrians shall access to accommodation, employment, and public services (despite the recent regulations on Syrians' access to education and medical care). Syrians are still their own to solve their accommodation issue. There is no strict policy other than the sheltering of Syrians in refugee camps.

Regarding Syrians' access to employment and income-generating activities, the road towards formal employment is full of quota applications and bureaucratic procedures. The aid granted to Syrians under temporary protection is equivalent to one-tenth of the minimum wage in Turkey and thus insufficient to meet even the basic needs of Syrians. To remedy the disadvantageous positions of Syrians in Turkey, Syrians should be granted the status of refugee. Then, in the light of the rights granted to Syrian refugees, the resettlement and integration policies should be developed to ensure the fair and just redistribution of the services and resources assigned to refugees. In this process, it is necessary to ensure the division of labor between different public institutions and enable these institutions to work in coordination with each other. Here, the Directorate General of Migration Management may assume the leading role.

These are all necessary because when Syrians are not legally and politically recognized, they face severe problems in being recognized by the native society. This situation paves the way towards harsher forms of discrimination, xenophobia, exclusion and exploitation against refugees. Especially in the absence of the State, who is supposed to manage and regulate the refugee-related issues as the primary actor, refugees are far more open to exploitation and discrimination in their struggle to access welfare services and resources. Therefore, Syrians' legal and political recognition in Turkey is strongly needed as it will lead to the inclusion of refugees to the welfare distribution mechanisms and lower the level of exploitation and discrimination that refugees face.

Secondly, the top-down management of the Syrian influx in Turkey is not applicable. Today, local governments are only allowed to provide in-kind allowances for refugees within their

service territory. Local governments, local civil society organizations, and key local actors in urban areas, where they host remarkable refugee populations, should be included in the designation of welfare policies and the redistribution of services and resources to refugees. Because as become evident in the case of Izmir, the welfare needs and expectations of refugees and the problems that refugees face in accessing welfare vary across localities. Based on all their inside information, local governments (especially municipalities) can develop the most appropriate policies for refugees' needs. The assignment of larger competencies to municipalities in addressing refugee-related issues may enable municipalities to include refugee-dominant settlements in the planning processes and to develop ad-hoc planning policies. Here, the central and local authorities should cooperate with local NGOs, refugee associations, and local initiatives of solidarity since all these organizations know the welfare needs and expectations of Syrians first-hand.

Thirdly, the ambivalent regulations on refugees' mobility within Turkey should be removed. Here, Syrians are allowed to be mobile initially until they register to public authorities in provinces they plan to settle. However, once Syrians are registered, their mobility is limited. Even for a short-term visit to other provinces, Syrians should get permission from the authorities. Even worse, when Syrians register, they are granted a temporary protection status, which also prohibits their mobility to other countries as asylum-seekers. Such ambivalent applications in the management of Syrian mobility in Turkey contradicts with refugees' right to mobility. Therefore, not registering to public authorities is a good idea for many Syrians not to lose their right to mobility and asylum to third countries. By doing so, Syrians are giving up their right to benefit from public services that come with the temporary protection status. In this case, my recommendation is that the Turkish state should take exact steps towards determining Syrians' legal status and rights and preparing consistent policies for all Syrians' needs and rights from their first entry into the country to the grant of refugee status. Here, the policies need to be designed following the five main welfare components: accommodation/housing, services (public and private/commercial), employment and income-generating activities, social support and physical and cultural security – lifestyle security.

I firmly believe that the recommendations that I grouped under three categories will provide substantial grounds towards the just and fair redistribution of welfare services/resources to refugees in line with the international standards. I also believe that the state-led provision of welfare (especially accommodation, employment, aid and public services) will help prevent the uneven and massive influxes of Syrians to Turkey's metropolitan areas where these welfare components are abundant. Accessing state-led welfare, I believe, will not only decrease the

disadvantageousness of Syrians but also will help to minimize the level of exploitation that Syrians harshly face in their struggles to access welfare. The provision of state-led welfare to Syrians (at least until Syrians are granted with refugee status) will also break down the power of discriminatory/exploitative actors within the localized/territorialized and ethnicized local welfare systems who use their economic and symbolic power to prioritize one specific group of Syrians over the others. In overall, I believe all these signs of progress in the provision of welfare will contribute to the foreseeable and manageable redistribution of Syrians across Turkish cities.

9.4. Alternative future research topics

In this study, by employing a multi-scalar approach to refugee mobility, I concluded that refugee mobility is an on-going and open-ended process. I believe that, in further studies, the open-endedness of refugee mobility should be further discussed to overcome the temporality of this research. To say, this research covers the story of the years of 2019-2020 and to reach out more concrete conclusions regarding the local underlying dynamics behind refugees' intra-urban mobilities, a new fieldwork needs to be conducted again Basmane, Karabağlar and Buca, to see whether the current settlers of these localities are still there or relocated to somewhere else.

Secondly, a comparative study of different cases can be made by setting out criteria for refugees' location choices in other countries experiencing policy/political vacuums in migration management. Thus, a more advanced analytical framework can be produced to better explain refugees' spatial dispersion and concentration patterns, especially in Global South countries. Scholar attention can be devoted to the identification of the non-state actors (or local welfare systems) who are affecting/shaping refugees' location choices in different contexts, again in a comparative manner.

Thirdly, the multi-scalar logic of this study can be employed in other studies to explain the relationship between refugees' access to welfare and their multi-scalar mobility patterns and to reach out generalized results on this matter. In such studies, the most critical issue would be the identification and selection of a specific locality where researchers could construct the multi-scalar and multi-sited fieldwork. I believe that the identification of the settlements like Basmane, through which both the international, intra-national and intra-urban mobility trajectories can be mapped through, would a great contribution to the mobility/migration literature.

Fourthly, scholar attention can be devoted to the identification of the non-state actors and/or local welfare system/packages that are affecting/shaping refugees' location choices and mobility patterns in different contexts, again in a comparative manner. Similarly, further research can be made on exploring impact of the class-positions of refugees (that are redefined in the destination localities) on the intra-urban mobility patterns of refugees.

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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE



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12 Haziran 2019

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Doç.Dr. Mustafa Kemal BAYIRBAĞ

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız **Feriha Nazda GÜNGÖRDÜ'nün "Suriyeli Mültecilerin Konuta Erişimi ve Barınma Stratejileri: İzmir Örneği, Türkiye"** başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve **286-ODTÜ-2019** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ
Başkan

Prof. Dr. Tolga CAN
Üye

Doç.Dr. Pınar KAYGAN
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şerife SEVİNÇ
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Müge GÜNDÜZ
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Süreyya Özcan KABASAKAL
Üye

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal information	
First name(s) / Surname(s)	Feriha Nazda GÜNGÖRDÜ
Address(es)	
Telephone(s)	
E-mail(s)	
Nationality	
Date of birth	
Gender / Marital status	
ORCID	
Work experience	
Company / Dates Location Occupation or position	**Çankaya University** **October, 2016 –** Ankara, Turkey Research Assistant (Department of City and Regional Planning)
Company / Dates Location Project Occupation or position	**DIVERCITIES (EU 7th Framework Programme Project)** **June, 2013 – February 2017** Ankara / Istanbul, Turkey "Governing Urban Diversity: Creating Social Cohesion, Social Mobility and Economic Performance in Today's Hyper-Diversified Cities: The Case of 14 European Countries" Junior Project Researcher
Company / Dates Location Project Occupation or position	**Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe** **September, 2015 – February, 2016** Ankara, Turkey "Strengthening Institutional Capacity for Environmental Management in Turkey" Project Consultant
Company / Dates Location Project Occupation or position	**Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey** **February, 2014 - July, 2015** Ankara, Turkey "The Connecting Capacity of Local to National and Global Market: The Impact of Accessibility and Connectivity on Regional Inequalities and the Role of Regional Development Policies" Project Assistant / TUBITAK Research Fellowship
Education	
Graduate	**Middle East Technical University (Ankara, TURKEY)** **September, 2015 – May, 2021** **Ph.D, Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments** (CPGA: 4.00/4.00) Thesis Title: Refugee Emplacement in Urban Areas: The Multi-scalar Mobility Patterns and Location Choices of Syrian Refugees in Izmir, Turkey Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kemal BAYIRBAĞ **Middle East Technical University (Ankara, Turkey)** **September, 2012 – September 2015** **M.Sc. Regional Planning** (CPGA: 3.74/4.00) Thesis Title: Diversity in Times of Economic Crises: Changing Discourses and Policies on Diversity in European Countries and Turkey Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayda Eraydın

Undergraduate	**Middle East Technical University (Ankara, TURKEY)** **Sept, 2007 – June, 2012** B.Sc.,Major City and Regional Planning CGPA: 3.32 / 4.00 3rd Top Scoring Graduate
High School	**Milli Piyango Anatolian High School, Ankara, TURKEY** Graduation Average: 4.94 / 5.00
Elementary School	**Büyük College, Ankara, TURKEY** Graduation Average: 5.00 / 5.00 Top Scoring Graduate
Other Professional and Academic Projects	
	Project Title: Housing Satisfaction, Expectation and Urban Transformation Research in Planned Developed Areas Cases from Worker Settlements / Blocks in Ankara **Start / End Date:** 01/10/2020 - **Funded by:** Çankaya University Department of Scientific Research Projects **Position:** Project Associate / Researcher
	Project Title: Strategies of Settling, Location Selection, and Access to Housing of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Case of Izmir **Start / End Date:** 01/07/2019 – 15/11/2019 **Funded by:** Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (RWI) **Position:** Project Coordinator (Principal Investigator)
	Project Title: Preparation of Scientific Report and Feasibility Report to be submitted to the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology in order for" Ereğli Demir ve Çelik T.A.Ş." to gain Special Industrial Zone (ÖEB) status **Start / End Date:** 23/01/2018 - 30/06/2018 **Funded by:** OYAK General Directorate, Turkey **Position:** Project Associate / Researcher
	Project Title: Preparation of Scientific Report and Feasibility Report to be submitted to the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology in order for "İskenderun Demir ve Çelik T.A.Ş." to gain Special Industrial Zone (ÖEB) status **Start / End Date:** 17/01/2018- 30/06/2018 **Funded by:** OYAK General Directorate, Turkey **Position:** Project Associate / Researcher
Articles & Publications	
Book(s)	Eraydın, A., Demirdağ, I., Güngördü, F.N., and Yenigün, Ö. (2017), *DIVERCITIES: Dealing with Urban Diversity – The case of Istanbul.* Middle East Technical University Ankara, Xerox, The Netherlands, ISBN 9789062664597.
International Book Chapter(s)	Güngördü, F.N.and Bayırbağ, M.K. (2019). Planning in the Age of Mobilities in *Urban and Regional Planning in Turkey: Issues and Challenges*. Editors: Uzun, Nil. Özdemir, Sarı Burcu. Özdemir, Suna Yaşar. Springer:Berlin. (Indexed by SCOPUS)

National Book Chapter(s)	Güngördü, F.N. (2019). Küresel Göç Hareketlerinin Kültürel,Sosyo-Ekonomik Ve Mekansal Etkilerini Yerel Ölçekten Okumak: Bir Planlama Sorunu Olarak Suriyeli Mülteci Krizi. in *Göç, Mekan, Siyaset: Toplumsal – Mekansal Hareketlilikler ve Planlama*. TMMOB Şehir Plancıları Odası: Ankara. ISBN: 978-605-01-1303-7.
Articles in International Journals	Güngördü, F. N and Kahraman, Z. E. (2021). Investigating Syrian Refugees' Choice of Location in Urban Areas as a Subjective Process: A cross-case comparison in the neighbourhoods of Önder (Ankara) and Yunusemre (Izmir). *International Journal of Islamic Architecture*. (Indexed by AHCI–published by July 2021) Orhan, E., Kahraman, Z. E., Güngördü, F.N. (2020). Building a Framework for Analyzing Quality of Life at Neighborhood Level: An empirical case from Ankara. *Journal of Construction in Developing Countries*. 25(1): 63-82. (Indexed by ESCI, EBSCO) Güngördü, F. N. (2018). Processes and Factors of Social Exclusion in Arrival Cities: Attitudes towards Syrians under temporary protection in Tarlabaşı, Istanbul. *GRID - Mimarlık, Planlama ve Tasarım Dergisi*, 1 (2), 177-198. (Indexed by AVERY and CROSSREF)
International Conference Presentations and Proceedings	Güngördü, F.N. and Kahraman, E. (2018), *Kentsel Dönüşümde Uygulama Öncesi Süreçte Yerel Halk Katılımı: Yıldızevler Mahallesi, Ankara Örneği*, ISUEP2018 International Symposium on Urbanization and Environmental Problems: Transition/Transformation/Authenticity, 28-30 June 2018, Anadolu University – Eskişehir. Güngördü, F.N. (2017), Deepening Disadvantage of Women, Youngsters and Children in Times of Austerity: Evidence from European Cities, 7th Nordic Geographers Meeting, 18-21 June 2017, Stockholm, Sweden. Orhan, E., Kahraman, E., Güngördü, N. (2016), *Evaluation of Quality of Life Indicators at Neighborhood Level: A Regeneration Case from Ankara, Turkey*, International Symposium on Urban Design, 3-5 October 2016, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Güngördü, N., (2016), *Immigrants from the eyes of 'Receiver Societies: Syrian Immigrants and Social Exclusion Practices in Çukur and Bostan Neighborhoods*, Istanbul. IMISCOE 13th Annual Conference, 30 June - 2 July 2016, Prague, Czechia. Güngördü, N., Yersen, Ö. (2015), *Rethinking the Impacts of Neoliberal Urban Policies and Practices on Diverse Neighbourhoods: The Case of Tarlabaşı*, Conference on Governing Social Diversity in Warsaw: , Problems and Prospects, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland.
National Conference Presentations and Proceedings	Güngördü, F. N. (2018). Küresel Göç Hareketlerinin Kültürel, Sosyo-Ekonomik Ve Mekansal Etkilerini Yerel Ölçekten Okumak: Bir Planlama Sorunu Olarak Suriyeli Mülteci Krizi, 8 Kasım Dünya Şehircilik Günü 42. Kolokyumu, 7-9 Kasım 2018, İzmir, Türkiye. Güngördü, F.N., (2016), *Kültürel Ve Ekonomik Uyum Paradoksu: Göçmenlerin Toplumsal Kabul Süreçlerine Yönelik Kent Ölçeğinde Çıkarsamalar*, 8. Ulusal Sosyoloji Kongresi, 1-3 Aralık 2016, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye. Güngördü, F.N. and Eraydın, A. (2014), *2008 Finansal Krizinin ve Kemer Sıkma Politikalarının Avrupa Birliği'ndeki Göç ve Göç Politikalarına Etkisi*, KBAM 5. Kentsel ve Bölgesel Araştırmalar Sempozyumu Bildiri Kitabı, Ankara.
Open Access Project Reports	Eraydın, A., Yersen, Ö., Güngördü, F.N. and Demirdağ, I. (2016). Fieldwork Entrepreneurs, Istanbul. (Ankara): METU. Eraydın, A., Yersen, Ö., Güngördü, F.N. and Demirdağ I. (2015). Fieldwork Inhabitants, Istanbul. (Ankara): METU. Eraydın, A., Yersen, Ö., Güngördü, F.N. and Demirdağ, I. (2014). Governance Arrangements and Initiatives in Istanbul. (Ankara): METU. Eraydın, A., Yersen, Ö., Güngördü, F.N. and Demirdağ I. (2014). Assessment of Urban Policies in Istanbul. (Ankara): METU.
Organizational Duties	Beyond all Limits Congress 2018: International Congress on Sustainability in Architecture, Planning, and Design. Ankara, Turkey - Congress Organizing Secretary Beyond all Limits Congress 2018: International Congress on Sustainability in Architecture, Planning, and Design, Ankara, Turkey. Workshop Organization (with Z. Ezgi KAHRAMAN)

Courses taught / assisted	CRP 122 – Statistical Methods for Planners CRP 128 – Topographic Measurement and Site Planning CRP 225 – Research in Planning CRP 230 – Urban Sociology CRP 301 – Planning Studio III (Strategic Planning) CRP 302 – Planning Studio IV (Strategic Planning) CRP 329 – Fundamentals of Regional Planning and Development KENT 501 – Urban Design and Renewal Studio I KENT 531 – Urban Design and Renewal Studio II
Skills & Competences	
Mother tongue(s)	Turkish
Other language(s)	English Proficiency: METU EPE: 84.5/100 YDS: 92,5/100

	Understanding		Speaking		Writing
European level (*)	Listening	Reading	Spoken interaction	Spoken production	
English	C2/ advanced	C2/ advanced	C2/ advanced	C2/advanced	C2/advanced

Social and Organisational skills and competences	High levels of oral and written communication skills, ability to work in a multi-cultural environment, high motivation, fast problem-solving, rapid and accurate organizational skills, friendliness, self-determination.
Computer skills and competences	Microsoft Office Programs – Advanced SPSS – Intermediate N-VIVO –Intermediate Adobe Photoshop - Intermediate Abode Illustrator – Intermediate Gephi-Intermediate ArcGIS - Beginner
Education Certificates	"GAR Autumn School" organized by Migration Research Platform (Göç Araştırmaları Derneği GAR) – 08-12 September 2018 "Methods Training Workshop on Network Analysis and Regional Power Studies" organized by Center for European Studies METU – 15-19 June 2015
Awards	METU Graduate Courses Performance Award (2015-2016 Academic Year) 3rd Top Ranking Student – 2012 METU, Department of City and Regional Planning Dean's High Honor List – 2010-2011 (Fall), 2011-2012 (Fall) Dean's Honor List – 2008-2009 (Fall), 2009-2010 (Fall), 2009-2010 (Spring), 2010-2011 (Spring), 2011 – 2012 (Spring)
Hobbies and Personal Interests	Tennis, European basketball, classic/progressive rock, Mediterranean cuisine, tango and waltz, history of art (Baroque and Renaissance), Russian and Turkish literature
References	References available upon request.

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Mülteci hareketliliği, her ne kadar uluslararası yazın ve politikalarda hayatta kalma, insani ve adil koşullarda yaşama gibi pek çok farklı sebeple uluslararası ve/veya bölgesel ölçekte gerçekleşen bir insan hareketliliği olarak ele alınsa da coğrafi ve ölçekler arası devamlılığı olan, kent ve mahalle ölçeğinde de süregelen bir hareketliliktir. Ancak literatürde, mülteci hareketliliğini ulus-devletler arasında gerçekleşen bir hareketlilik olarak gören metodolojik milliyetçi yaklaşımların hakimiyeti söz konusudur. Metodolojik milliyetçilik çerçevesinde yapılan çalışmalar büyük çoğunlukla mülteci hareketliliğinin, göç ve sığınma süreçlerinin uluslararası/ulusal yönetişimi ve mültecilerin gittikleri ülkedeki entegrasyon süreçleri ile ilgilenmekte ve mülteci hareketliliğinin yerel/kentsel ölçekteki sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel, mekansal ve politik sonuçlarına yeterince değinmemektedir. Bir başka deyişle, mültecilerin gittikleri ülkedeki ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel ilişkilere dahil olma süreçleri ile mekan oluşturma stratejileri metodolojik milliyetçi çalışmaların gölgesinde kalmıştır. Buradan hareketle, metodolojik milliyetçi yaklaşımların, üst-ölçek yukarıdan-aşağıya devlet politikalarına karşı aşağıdan yukarıya gelişen reaksiyonları (örn. mültecilerin bu politikaları nasıl algıladığı ve hangi stratejileri geliştirdiği) hesaba katmayarak, hareketliliğin en temel öznesi olan mültecilerin yer seçimi, yerleşme ve mekan oluşturma süreçlerini de göz ardı ettiğini ileri sürmek mümkündür.

İkinci olarak, metodolojik milliyetçilik, göç alan ülkelerdeki sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilerin yeniden düzenlenmesinde "vatandaş" ve "mülteci" ayrımını vurgulamakta ve mültecileri gittikleri ülkenin diline, kültürüne, kurumsal normlarına uyum sağlamakta yükümlü," kendi içinde "homojen" topluluklar olarak görmektedir. Bu bakış açısı ile mültecilerin farklı sınıfsal pozisyonları, beklentileri, ihtiyaçları, ekonomik/sosyal sermayeleri, aile yapıları, kültürleri, ideolojileri, cinsiyetleri gibi pek çok hususta heterojen yapısı göz ardı edilmekte ve bu farklılıkların yarattığı farklı sosyal, ekonomik ve mekânsal ilişki örüntüleri ortaya çıkarılamamaktadır.

Metodolojik milliyetçiliğin yetersiz kaldığı üçüncü husus ise, devletleri ve kamu otoritelerini göç ve hareketlilik yönetimindeki başat aktörler olarak görerek, devlet-dışı aktörlerin mültecilerin yer seçimi, hareketliliği, yerleşme ve mekan oluşturma süreçlerini etkilerini etraflıca ortaya koymamasıdır. Metodolojik milliyetçiliğin bu yönü, özellikle politika boşlukları / vakumları olarak tabir ettiğim süreçlerde öne çıkan devlet-dışı aktörlerin varlığını göz ardı etmektedir. Böylece, metodolojik milliyetçi yaklaşımlar devletin politika üretemediği, üretmekten çekindiği ya da geliştirdiği politikaların sonuçlarını ön göremediği durumlarda, devletin söz konusu açıklarını kapatmak ya da bu açıktan oluşan durumları suiistimal etmek için öne çıkan aktörlerin kimliği ve rollerinin tespiti konusunda açıklayıcı bir çerçeve sunamamaktadır.

Metodolojik milliyetçiliğin yanı sıra, bu çalışmanın göç ve hareketlilik literatürüne yönelik bir başka eleştirisi, mültecilerin kentsel bağlamdaki yer seçme, hareketlilik ve mekan oluşturma örüntülerinin, bu örüntüleri oluşturan mekanizmalarla birlikte açıklanması yönündeki eksikliktir. Her ne kadar entegrasyon (integration) ve yerleştirme (resettlement) kavramları bu eksikliklerin belirli boyutlarına değiniyor olsa da bu kavramların temelinde yatan metodolojik milliyetçi metodoloji, göç ve sığınmanın yerel/kentsel sonuçlarını bu süreçleri doğrudan deneyimleyen mültecilerin ve yerel aktörlerin gözünden incelenmesini oldukça zorlaştırıyor. Ayrıca, yeniden yerleştirme ve yeniden entegrasyon tartışmaları mültecilerin hedef ülkelerini, mültecilerin hayatlarını kuracakları nihai "evler" olarak görerek, bu evlerin içindeki sosyal, ekonomik, mekânsal ve politik heterojenlikleri göz ardı etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, göç ve sığınma süreçlerine "devlet" tarafından bakan yeniden yerleştirme ve yine aynı süreçlere sivil-toplum tarafından bakan entegrasyon tartışmalarının ampirik kısıtlarını aşma noktasında önemli katkılar sunan mekan oluşturma (emplacement) kavramının literatürde ön plana çıkarılması gerekmektedir. Mekan oluşturma, yer-yapma olarak da Türkçe göç yazınına kazandırılan "emplacement" kavramı, mültecilerin gittikleri ülkede kendi mekanlarını nasıl oluşturduklarını, hayatta kalmaları ve hayata tutunmaları için gerekli olan refah kaynaklarına nasıl ulaştıklarını ve tüm bu süreçlerde etkili olan aktör ve faktörlerin tespiti için önemli bir başlangıç noktasıdır.

Göç ve hareketlilik literatürüne üçüncü eleştiri olarak ise, Suriye-komşu ülkelere Suriyeli mülteci akınının ardından iyice görünür hale gelen, Küresel Güney'deki mültecilerin hareketlilik örüntüleri ve deneyimleri ile ilgili çalışmaların azlığıdır. Var olan çalışmalar ise çoğunlukla Küresel Kuzey ülkelerinin deneyimleri ve devlet-odaklı yaklaşımlarını Küresel Güney dinamiklerini okumak için uyarlamıştır. Halbuki, Suriyeli mülteci hareketliliği sürecinde görüldüğü üzere, devletler her zaman çok kapsayıcı, hiyerarşik olarak belirleyici ve bağlayıcı politikalar zinciri ile göç ve hareketlilik sürecini yönetememektedir. Bu durumda da göçün ve sığınma ile ilgili süreçlerin devlet-odaklı bakış açısıyla ele alındığı sosyal konut uygulamaları, dağılım/yayılma politikaları, mülteci barınma merkezleri / kampları gibi uygulamalar ışığında Küresel Güney'in göç dinamiklerini ve politikalarını tartışmak anlamlı sonuçlar üretmemektedir.

Bu araştırmanın teorik ve ampirik kurgusu, literatürde tespit edilen problem ve açıklardan yola çıkarak geliştirilmiş olup, çalışmanın araştırma sorusu aşağıdaki gibi belirlenmiştir. "Göç ve iltica yönetimindeki politika/siyasi boşluklarla tanımlanan bir bağlamda, (Suriyeli) mülteciler ülke/kent/mahalle yer seçimlerini nereye göre yapmakta ve nereye yerleşeceklerine nasıl karar vermektedir? Söz konusu çok-ölçekli hareketlilik örüntülerinin oluşmasında hangi aktör ve faktörler belirleyici rol oynamaktadır?" Araştırma sorusundan da görülebileceği üzere, bu çalışmanın ana amacı mülteci hareketliliğini çok-ölçekli ve açık-uçlu bir süreç olarak ele alarak, farklı hareketlilik örüntülerinin oluşmasına neden olan mekanizmaların aşağıdan-yukarıya detaylı bir biçimde açıklanmasına olanak sağlayacak bir analitik çerçevenin oluşturulmasıdır.

Söz konusu analitik çerçevenin temelinde, mülteci hareketliliğinin çok-ölçekli, çok-aktörlü ve çok-boyutlu bir sosyo-mekansal süreç olarak tanımlanması yatmaktadır. Bu tanım ile, mülteci hareketliliğini ülkeler arası gerçekleşen ve devletlerin liderliğinde yönetilen bir kapalı-uçlu bir hareketlilik olarak gören metodolojik milliyetçi yaklaşıma eleştirel bir tutum sergilenmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, bu çalışmanın ana omurgasını, mülteci hareketliliğinin örüntülerini, yönetişimini ve sonuçlarını ilişkisel bir biçimde tartışan çok-ölçekli yaklaşım oluşturmaktadır. Çünkü, Türkiye – İzmir – Basmane ekseninde Suriyeli mülteci hareketliliğinin takip edilmesiyle, söz konusu

hareketliliğinin mültecilerin Türkiye'de herhangi kente ya da barınma merkezine yerleşmesiyle bitmediği, aksine mültecilerin uluslararası hareketlilik örüntülerinden daha karmaşık örüntüler takip ederek Türkiye içinde de hareketli olma hallerini sürdürdükleri görülmüştür. Suriye – Türkiye sınırını geçerek ülkeye giriş yapan Suriyeli mültecilerin, devlet tarafından önceden belirlenmiş ve zorunlu kılınmış bir yerleştirme ve barınma politikası olmamasından hareketle, ülkenin farklı yerlerine dağıldığı ampirik bir biçimde ortaya konmuştur. Bu bağlamda, çok-ölçekli bakış açısı mülteci hareketliliğinin uluslararası, ülke-içi, kentler arası ve kent-içi olmak üzere farklı biçimlerde vuku bulduğunu göstermiştir.

İkinci olarak, çok-ölçekli bakış açısının benimsenmesiyle, hareketlilik sürecinin zamansal karakteri de ortaya konmuş ve hareketlilik ile hareketsizlik süreçlerinin birbirinin karşıt koşulları değil de tamamlayıcı unsurlar oldukları anlaşılmıştır. Daha net olmak gerekirse, Suriye-Türkiye sınırını aşarak Kilis'e giden ve oraya yerleşen bir mülteci hanehalkının hareketlilik sürecinin bittiği düşünülse de bu aslında o zaman kesiti için geçerli bir durumdur. Araştırmanın analiz safhasında da sıklıkla görüldüğü üzere, mülteciler daha iyi koşullarda yaşama, kamu hizmetlerine erişme, iş bulma gibi pek çok farklı sebeplerde ülke içinde farklı kentlere gitmişlerdir. Dahası, mülteciler gittikleri kentlerde de hareket halinde olmaya devam etmiş, İzmir örneğinde görüldüğü üzere, hatırı sayılır bir kısmı kentte ilk yerleştikleri lokasyonlarda kalmamıştır. Bu hikaye, hareketsizlik süreci olarak görülen "hedef kente yerleşme" sürecinin uluslararası hareketliliğinin sonu olarak görülebileceğini ancak nihai bir hareketsizlik durumu olarak kabul edilemeyeceğini göstermiştir. Örneklerden yola çıkarak, mültecilerin hareketsizlik/hareketlilik durumlarının iç içe olduğunu ve bu durumların mültecilerin beklentileri, ekonomik ve sosyal sermayeleri, sınıfsal pozisyonları, hedef kentteki sosyal ve ekonomik ilişki ağlarına dahil olup olamamaları (ör. İş bulma), misafir toplumla kurulan ilişkinin dinamikleri, hedef kentteki/yerleşimdeki dinamikler gibi pek çok değişkene göre belirlendiğini öne sürmek mümkün olmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, araştırmanın metodolojisinin temelindeki çok-ölçekli yaklaşım, mültecilerin aşağıdan yukarıyla politikalar ile politikasızlık durumlarına göre geliştirdikleri yerleşme stratejileri ile devlet-dışı (yerel) aktörlerin mültecilerin

hareketlilik / hareketsizlik durumlarını etkileyecek her türlü söylem ve aksiyonun ilişkisel biçimde ele almaya olanak sağlamaktadır.

Üçüncü olarak, çok-ölçekli yaklaşım, "mülteciler ulusal sınırları aştığında ne olur" sorusuna, mültecilerin hedef kentlerdeki/yerleşimlerdeki “mekan oluşturma” süreçleri bağlamında cevap üretilmesini sağlamaktadır. Burada, “mekan oluşturma” ile ilgili literatür, mültecilerin yer yapma ve ağ kurma stratejileriyle ilişkili olarak yerel ölçekte (kent içi hareketlilik biçiminde) mülteci hareketliliğinin sürekliliğini göstermeme yardımcı oluyor. Çünkü, yeniden yerleşim ve yeniden entegrasyondan farklı olarak, yerleştirme kavramı, yerelliklerin çok ölçekli güç ağları içindeki konumu ile bireylerin yerleşim stratejileri arasındaki ilişkiyi vurgulayarak, mülteci hareketliliğinin coğrafi, mekansal ve yerel yönlerine parmak basmaktadır.

Ancak mekan oluşturma/yer yapma (emplacement) literatüründe, mültecilerin hedef yerleşimlerdeki sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel ilişkilerine nasıl dahil oldukları, bu süreçte hangi aktörlerle karşılaştıkları ve ne tür bir etkileşim ya da alışveriş içerisinde oldukları tartışmanın merkezinde yer almamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, söz konusu çalışmalar yerelliklerin sosyal içerme/yer oluşturma konusundaki engellerinin/fırsatlarının, mültecilerin hareketlilik/hareketsizlik durumlarıyla nasıl ilişkili olduğunu detaylandırmaz. Böylelikle, mültecilerin mekan-oluşturma süreçleriyle ilgili tartışmalar, mültecilerin yer seçme stratejilerini ve kent içi hareketlilik örüntülerini ilişkisel bir şekilde etkileyen temel mekanizmaları tanımlamak ve kavramsallaştırmak için bütüncül analitik bir çerçeve sağlamaz.

Örnekle açıklamak gerekirse, mekan-oluşturma literatürü, Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'deki hareketliliğinin, mülteciler Gaziantep ve/veya İzmir'e yerleştiğinde nasıl sona ermediğini anlamaya yardımcı olmaktadır. Daha net olmak gerekirse, bu kavram mültecilerin yerleşmek için neden belirli kentsel alanları ve belirli mahalleleri seçtiklerini gösteriyor. Ancak Suriyelilerin nasıl yerleştiklerini ve yerleşilecek yerlerin seçiminde hangi aktörlerin/faktörlerin belirleyici olduğunu keşfetmeme noktasında yetersiz kalıyor. Daha, mekan oluşturma literatürü tek başına Suriyelilerin barınma, gelir, yiyecek ve giyime erişim mücadelelerinin Gaziantep ve/veya İzmir'deki belirli

yerler arasında nasıl yeni hareketlilik biçimleri yarattığını ortaya çıkarmamı sağlamıyor.

Bu noktada, mültecilerin kentlerde mekan-oluşturma süreçleri/stratejileri yerleştirme stratejileri hakkındaki tartışmayı zenginleştirmek için yerel refah sistemleri (local welfare systems) ile ilgili literatürü kullanıyorum. Refah tartışması, mülteciler için mobil olmanın nihai amacının, hayatta kalmak için ihtiyaç duydukları kaynaklara, hizmetlere ve hizmetlere erişebilecekleri yerlere gidip yerleşmek olduğunu ve dolayısıyla da mekan oluşturma sürecinin "erişim-temelli" bir süreç olarak ele alınabilmesini olanaklı kılıyor. Buna göre, yerel refah sistemleri (farklı refah sağlayıcıları ve refah düzenlemeleri ile) ya mültecileri belirli bir yerleşime çekecek ya da onları belirli bir yerleşimden başka bir yerleşime taşınmak durumunda bırakacak bir etkiye sahiptir (özellikle mültecilerin o yerleşimde sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkiler kuramadıkları durumlarda). Refah sistemleri tartışması ile, mültecileri belirli yerleşimlere çeken ve (çoğu zaman zorunlu olarak) uzaklaştıran refah bileşenlerini ve bu bileşenlerin sunumunda/sağlanmasına rol oynayan yerel aktörleri etraflıca tartışmak mümkündür. Dahası, yerel refah sistemleri kavramı mültecilerin hedef ülke/şehir/yerellikteki sınıf konumlarının, etnik geçmişlerinin, ekonomik ve sosyal sermayesinin, beklentilerinin ve tercihlerinin yanı sıra yerelliklerin demografik, yerel, ekonomik ve sosyal konjonktürünün mültecilerin kent- içi hareketliliğini nasıl etkilediğini anlamak noktasında açıklayıcı bir çerçeve sunuyor. Örnekle açıklamak gerekirse, bu çerçeve, Basmane, Karabağlar ve Buca arasında yoğun bir biçimde gözlemlenen hanehalkı konut hareketliliğinin (residential mobility/intra-urban migration) altında yatan mekanizmalarının tespit edilmesini sağlıyor.

Özetle, mekan oluşturma, yer seçimi, sosyal içerme/dışlama ve yerel refah sistemleri literatürüne dayanarak geliştirilen çok ölçekli çerçeve, Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mültecilerin farklı ölçeklerdeki hareketlilik örüntülerini ilişkisel bir şekilde izlemeyi ve farklı hareketlilik modellerinin arkasındaki mekanizmaları (aktörler ve faktörler) ortaya çıkarmayı kolaylaştırmaktadır.

Araştırmanın metodolojisi eleştirel gerçekçilik olarak belirlenmiş olup, örnekleme, veri toplama ve analiz yöntemlerimi bu metodolojiye göre şekillenmiştir. Veri toplama

sürecine başlamadan önce, ilk olarak saha çalışmasının nerede ve ne zaman gerçekleşeceğine dair yazın taraması ve pilot araştırmalar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu süreçte, Suriyeli mültecilerin uluslararası (Suriye'den Türkiye'ye), ülke içi ve kent içi hareketlilik örüntüleri izlenmiş, mekansal olarak haritaya işlenmiş ve hareketliliğin yoğunlaştığı hatlar ve alanlar belirlenmiştir. İkinci aşamada da farklı ölçeklerde gerçekleşen mülteci hareketliliğinin ilişkisel biçimde izleneceği bir yerleşim/yerellik tespit edilmeye çalışılmış ve araştırmanın çok-ölçekli yapısına uygun bir saha araştırması süreci kurgulanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çabaların sonucunda İzmir'deki Basmane semti, mülteci hareketliliğinin çözümlenmeye başladığı temel giriş noktası olarak seçilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, saha çalışması araştırmanın çok-ölçekli çerçevesiyle uyumlu bir biçimde belirlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye Suriyeli mültecilerin Suriye-Türkiye arasında vuku bulan uluslararası hareketliliklerinin takip edilebildiği ülke örneği, İzmir mültecilerin ülke içi hareketliliğinin takip edilebildiği kent örneği; Basmane, Buca ve Karabağlar ise mültecilerin kent içi hareketliliklerinin takip edilebildiği mahalle/ilçe örnekleri olarak seçilmiştir. Bu durumda Basmane'nin mülteci hareketliliğindeki kritik rolünün net bir biçimde ortaya konması büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Burada Basmane, hem AB sınırlarını deniz yoluyla geçmeyi ümit eden mülteciler için bir "uluslararası transit merkez", mültecilerin Ege kıyılarındaki potansiyel geçiş noktalara geçebilmek için öncelikle gelmek durumunda olduğun bir "bölgesel geçiş merkezi" ve İzmir içinde iş-ev-eğlence ve konut hareketliliği ekseninde gerçekleşen hareketlilik kapsamında ise bir "yerel geçiş merkezi" olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Öte yandan Karabağlar ve Buca ilçeleri, mültecilerin şehir içi hareketliliğinin izlenebileceği Basmane'nin konut uzantıları (residential extensions / satellites) olarak önem kazanıyor.

Basmane, Karabağlar ve Buca'ya yapılan ziyaretler sırasında, Suriyeli mültecilerin farklı hareketlilik örüntülerinin altında yatan mekanizmayı ortaya çıkarmak için kiminle röportaj yapılacağı/kimlerle görüşüleceği noktasında detaylı bir çalışma yapılmıştır. Öncelikle, göç ve hareketlilik sürecinin en başat özneleri oldukları için Suriyeli mültecilerle derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmesi planlanmıştır. Suriyeli mültecilerle gerçekleştirilmesi planlanan görüşmeler için örneklem çalışması

yapılırken teorik örnekleme (theoretical sampling) yöntemi kullanılmış, Suriyeli mültecilerin İzmir'deki mekansal dağılımları (Basmane, Buca ve Karabağlar'daki Suriyeli nüfusu dahil), etnik kökeni (Arap, Kürt, Türkmen), Türkiye'ye geliş nedenleri, Türkiye'ye geliş yılı, İzmir'e geliş nedeni gibi değişkenler hesaba katılmıştır. İkinci olarak da mültecilerin mekan oluşturma ve yerleşme süreçlerinin farklı aşamalarında doğrudan ya da dolaylı yoldan yer alan ulusal/yerel kilit aktörlerle (kamu yetkilileri, yerel yönetimler, STK'lar, dayanışma girişimleri, yerel esnaf vb. Dahil) derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmesi planlanmıştır. Sonuç olarak ise, aşağıda detaylıca belirtilmiş olan üç kategoride yer alan kişiler toplamda yetmiş sekiz yarı-yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir.

- Kamu kurumları ve sivil toplum örgütleri – göç ve iltica yönetiminde rol oynayan aktörler: Kamu kurumları (merkezi, taşra), yerel yönetimler (valilik ve belediyeler), muhtarlar, sivil toplum kuruluşları, yerel dayanışma inisiyatifleri, dayanışma platformları : toplam 25 derinlemesine mülakat
- Suriyeli mülteciler – Basmane, Karabağlar ve Buca'da ikamet eden, ikamet etmiş olan mülteciler: toplam 31 derinlemesine mülakat
- Yerel kilit aktörler – mültecilerin yer seçimi, mekan oluşturma, refah hizmetlerine ve temel ihtiyaçlarına erişim noktasında dolaylı / doğrudan rol oynayan yerel aktörler: politik parti temsilcileri, esnaf, emlakçılar, ev sahipleri, kanaat önderleri, mahallenin en eski ve sözü geçen sakinleri, dini dayanışma ağlarının kilit üyeleri, kurumlarının/bağlı oldukları organizasyonların politikalarıyla çelişmek pahasına inisiyatif alarak sürece dahil olan kamu ve sivil sektör yetkilileri – toplamda 22 derinlemesine mülakat

Araştırmanın pilot saha çalışması 2019 yılının ocak ayında İzmir'e gerçekleştirilen kısa süreli seyahatlerle gerçekleştirilmiş olup, ana saha çalışması ise 10 Temmuz – 16 Ağustos 2019, 13 – 19 Ekim 2019 ve 10 – 15 Şubat 2020 tarihlerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Saha çalışmasının bulgularını detaylıca açıklamadan önce, araştırmanın temel hedeflerini hatırlamakta fayda vardır. Öncelikle bu araştırma, şu an İzmir'de ikamet etmekte olan Suriyeli mültecilerin, Türkiye'ye göç etmelerinden bu yana süregelen hareketlilik ve mekan oluşturma örüntülerini çok-ölçekli bir bakış açısı ile ele

almaktadır. Çok-ölçekli bakış açısı ile göç ve iltica hususlarında politika vakumlarına (policy/political vacuums) sahip olan Türkiye'de, Suriyeli mültecilerin belirli yerellikler / yerleşimler arasında gerçekleşen hareketlilik ve hareketsizlik durumları irdelenerek, mültecilerin neden belirli yerleşimlere gittikleri, neden belirli yerleşimler arasında hareket ettikleri, bu hareketlerin ardında yatan mekanizmalarla birlikte açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'deki ilk kent seçimleri ve İzmir'deki ilk yerleşim/mahalle/ilçe seçimleri (initial location choices) ile Türkiye ve İzmir'deki ikincil, üçüncül yer seçimleri (subsequent location choices) birbirleriyle ilişkili bir biçimde ortaya konmuştur. Tartışma boyunca, mültecilerin ilk ve ardışık yer seçimlerini etkileyen faktör ve aktörler ilişkili oldukları bağlam çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Türkiye ülke örneği olarak seçilerek, yukarıdan aşağıya, hiyerarşik ve bütüncül bir göç ve iltica yönetimi politikaları (karşılama, barınma, yerleştirme, kamu hizmetlerine erişim, entegrasyon) olmayan ya da söz konusu politikaların uygulanması aşamasında sorun yaşayan Küresel Güney ülkelerinde göç ve iltica ile ilintili hareketlilik örüntülerinin (metodolojik milliyetçi yaklaşımlar haricinde) sebep sonuç ilişkisi içinde tartışılabileceği bir analitik çerçeve sunulması da araştırmanın hedefleri arasında yer almıştır.

Bu kavramsal ve teorik tartışmayla ilişkili olarak araştırmanın temel bulgularını, araştırmanın çok-ölçekli perspektifine göre açıklamak doğru olacaktır. Bu bağlamda, ilk etapta Suriyeli mültecilerin neden Türkiye'ye iltica /göç ettiklerini, bu hareketin altında yatan mekanizmalarla birlikte açıkladıktan sonra, Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye içindeki ilk ve ardışık yer seçimleri neticesinde ortaya çıkan hareketlilik örüntüleri tartışılacaktır. Sonra, Suriyeli mültecilerin neden İzmir'e yerleştikleri (neden ilk oraya buraya geldiler ya da neden İzmir Türkiye'deki ilk seçimleri değildi) ve İzmir'de hangi mahalleye/ilçeye yerleştikleri yine sebep sonuç ilişkisi içinde irdelenecek ve mültecilerin kent-içi hareketlilik/hareketsizlik durumlarının altında yatan mekanizmalar ortaya çıkarılacaktır.

İlk olarak, Suriyeli mültecilerin ülke ve kent seçimlerinin (ilk ve ardışık yer seçimlerinde) birbirinden çok farklı olduğu, her mülteci hanehalkının kendi hareketlilik yörüngesi ve örüntüsü olduğu en temel bulgu olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Ancak, mültecilerin ilk ve ardışık yer seçimlerine yönelik anlatılarında yer seçimlerini

etkileyen faktörler karşılaştırmalı bir biçimde ele alındığında bazı temaların ön plana çıktığı görülmüştür.

Suriye'deki iç savaşın ilk dönemlerinde Suriyeliler Türkiye'ye ve Türkiye'deki bazı belirli bölgelere (Türkiye'nin sınır şehirleri ve metropol şehirleri) göç ederek fiziksel güvenlik ve güvenliklerini sağlamayı umdukları; daha sonraki aşamalarda Suriye'de karşılaştıkları ekonomik yoksulluk, yoksulluk ve sosyal dışlanmadan kurtulmak için Türkiye'ye göç ettikleri anlaşılmıştır. Türkiye'nin açık kapı politikası, siyasi figürlerin Suriyelilere karşı (özellikle savaşın ilk aylarında) kucaklayıcı tutumları, Türkiye'nin bir "İslam ülkesi" olarak Suriye'ye komşu ülke olması ve Türkiye'nin Suriyelilerin Avrupa'ya giden rotasında en stratejik ülke olması hepsi Türkiye'yi önemli bir hedef ülke haline getirmiştir. Savaştan çok önce Türkiye'ye yerleşen Suriyeli yakınları/aile üyeleri, savaşın ilk haftalarında Türkiye'ye göç eden öncü Suriyeliler, Türk arkadaşlar ve iş ortakları, Suriyeli mültecileri Türkiye'ye çeken başat aktörler olarak öne çıktı. Bu aktörlerin varlığı, Suriyelilere birinci elden ekonomik ve duygusal destek sağladıkları için Suriyeliler için çok önemliydi. Tüm bu nedenlerden dolayı, ülkeye gelen Suriyeli girişlerinin sayısını keskin bir şekilde azaltan sıkı sınır politikası uygulamasına (2016) rağmen, Türkiye hala hem transit/geçiş hem de hedef ülke olarak yerinden edilmiş Suriyelilerin büyük çoğunluğuna ev sahipliği yapmaktadır.

Araştırmanın bir diğer ampirik bulgusu, Suriyeli mültecilerin hareketlilik durumunun, Türkiye-Suriye sınırlarının geçilmesi, bir kente ya da kampa (geçici barınma merkezi) yerleşme ile sona ermediğidir. Mülteciler, ya yeni bir yaşam kurabilecekleri bir yere yerleşmek üzere Türkiye'nin dört bir yanına dağılmışlar ya da devletin kendileri için inşa ettiği mülteci kamplarına yerleşmişlerdir. Kamplara yerleşmek zorunlu tutulmadığı için, Suriyelilerin çoğu başlangıçta ya Suriye-komşu şehirlerine (örneğin Kilis, Mardin, Mersin) ya da Türkiye'nin metropol kentsel alanlarına (örneğin İstanbul, Ankara, Gaziantep) dağılmıştır.

Suriyeli mülteciler başlangıçta nereye yerleşeceklerine karar verirken çoğunlukla fiziksel olarak hayatta kalmalarını, refahlarını ve güvenliklerini sağlayacak koşulları aramış; sonraki seçimlerinde ise, işgücü/konut piyasasına entegre olabilecekleri ve yerleşik sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilere dahil olabileceklerini düşündükleri

alanlara yönelmişlerdir. Suriyeli mültecilerin çeşitli kamu/özel hizmetlere erişebilecekleri, kendilerini maddi ve manevi güvende hissedecekleri, destek mekanizmalarıyla korunabilecekleri, daha az ayrımcılıkla karşılaşabilecekleri ve işgücü piyasasına girebilecekleri yerlere yerleşmeyi tercih ettikleri görülmüştür. Burada vurgulamak istenilen husus, Suriyelilerin (geçici barınma, destek ve korumaya ihtiyaç duyan kısa süreli misafirler değil de) Türkiye'de uzun süredir ikamet eden "kentsel mülteciler" olarak, fiziksel olarak hayatta kalmalarını ve güvenliklerini sağlamaktan ziyade, sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilere dahil olmanın yollarını aramaya başladıklarıdır. Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında, araştırmanın odağındaki İzmir kentinin Suriyeli mülteciler için neden önemli bir çekim merkezi olduğunu anlamak kolaylaşmaktadır. İzmir hem Avrupa'ya geçiş hem de uzun/kısa süreli yerleşimler için uygun bir lokasyon olmasının etkisiyle, transit mültecileri ve kentsel mültecileri kendine çekmektedir. Transit mülteciler için İzmir her zaman bir stratejik lokasyon olmuştur. Ege Denizi'ndeki Yunan adalarına olan yakınlığı nedeniyle, Asya'dan Avrupa'ya geçip iltica sürecini başlatma isteyen Afgan, İranlı, Iraklı ve Suriyeli mülteciler için önemli on yıllardır önemli bir çıkış kapısı olmuştur.

Özellikle AB-TR anlaşmasının yürürlüğe girdiği 2016 yılına kadar İzmir, geçiş niteliği ile tanınıyordu. Bu bağlamda İzmir, Basmane ve çevresindeki ucuz otellerde/pansiyonlarda haftalarca ya da aylarca kalan Suriyeli mültecilere ev sahipliği yapıyordu. Ancak AB-TR anlaşması ile Suriyelilerin yasadışı sınır geçiş denemeleri sıkı bir şekilde izlenip yasaklanmış, bu yasadışı yolculuğun tehlikeleri, zorluğu ve maliyeti nedeniyle transit geçiş yapma niyetinde olan Suriyeli mültecilerin büyük bir kısmı İzmir'de "mahsur" kalmıştır. Bu gelişmelere paralel olarak 2016 yılı, İzmir'in elverişli bir destinasyon kenti rolünün öne çıktığı yıl oldu. Türkiye'nin üçüncü en önemli metropol kenti olan İzmir, İzmir'de mahsur kalanlar da dahil olmak üzere Suriyeli nüfusu için çeşitli hizmetler, kaynaklar ve fırsatlar sunarak, yeni bir hayat kurmak isteyen Suriyeli mülteciler için öne çıkan bir kent olmuştur. Gelişmiş konut ve işgücü piyasası, ticari faaliyetleri, göç kültürü, çok-kültürlü ve etnik karakteri ve erişilebilirliği ile Suriyeli mülteci nüfusunu buraya gelip yerleşmeye kendine çekmiştir.

Bu bilgiler ışığında, Suriyeli mültecilere neden Türkiye'de ilk olarak İzmir'e geldikleri ve yerleştikleri sorulduğunda, mültecilerin uygun ve güvenli koşullarda barınma / konaklama ve temel hizmetlere ve kaynaklara ulaşma amaçları ön plana çıkmıştır. Suriyeli mülteciler, İzmir'e yerleşmeleriyle ilgili olarak ayrıca ekonomik ve duygusal destek, rehberlik, danışmanlık ve hayatta kalmaları ve gittikleri kentteki sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilere tutunabilmelerine yönelik her türlü bilgiye ulaşmalarına yardımcı olacak destek mekanizmalarının (akrabalar/aile üyeleri, öncü Suriyeliler, insani yardım kuruluşları, etnik dayanışma ağları) varlığına önem verdiklerini belirtmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda, Mardin ve Diyarbakır'dan gelen Kürt ve Arap göçmenlere, Afgan ve İranlı mültecileri uzun yıllardır barındıran, göç ve sığınma alanında faaliyet gösteren kamu kuruluşlarına ve sivil toplum örgütlerine ev sahipliği yapan Konak İlçesi'ndeki Basmane Semti, Suriyeli mültecilerin İzmir'deki ilk durağı olma özelliğini taşımaktadır.

Suriyeliler başlangıçta ailelerinden, eş-etnik gruplardan (co-ethnics), sivil toplum kuruluşlarından ilk elden ekonomik ve duygusal desteğe ulaşabilecekleri Basmane'ye yerleşmeyi tercih etseler de sonraki yer seçimlerinde sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkiler içinde olacakları ve güçlü bir bağlılık ve aidiyet hissedebilecekleri mahallelere yerleşmeyi tercih etmişlerdir. Bu nedenle Suriyeliler, Basmane'den taşınmaya başlamış ve etnik ayrımcılığa, dışlanmaya uğramayacakları ve günlük ilişkilerde dil ve kültürel bariyerlerle karşılaşmayacaklarını düşündükleri mahallelere yerleşmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda, Karabağlar İlçesi'ndeki Yunus Emre, Günaltay, Limontepe, Karabağlar mahalleleri ile Buca İlçesi'nde Gediz (İnönü) ve Yıldız mahalleleri ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu kentsel hareketlilikten anlaşılacağı üzere, Türk vatandaşları ile Suriyeli mülteciler arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar, dil ve kültür farklılıkları gibi hususlar kadar, Suriyeli mültecilerin kendi içlerindeki kültürel, dini, etnik ve sosyo-ekonomik farklılıklar da mültecilerin İzmir'deki yer seçim süreçlerinde belirleyici roller oynamaktadır.

Araştırmanın bir başka önemli ampirik bulgusu ise, Suriyeli mültecilerin yer/konum seçimlerinin yalnızca kendi tercihlerine, ihtiyaçlarına ve beklentilerine değil, aynı zamanda mültecilerin hayatta kalması için gerekli hizmetlerin ve kaynakların sağlanmasında önemli rol oynayan çeşitli aktörlerin (sivil toplum kuruluşları,

emlakçılar, yerel esnaflar, muhtarlar vb.) eylemlerine ve söylemlerine de bağlı olduğudur. Bu nedenle, bu aktörlerin kapsayıcı / dışlayıcı tutumları ve mültecilerin onlarla olan etkileşimleri (çatışmaya karşı diyalog), mültecilerin ihtiyaç duydukları hizmetlere erişiminde ve konum seçimlerinde oldukça belirleyicidir.

Suriyeli mültecilerin yer seçimlerini etkileyen aktörlere daha detaylı bakılırsa, mültecilere ilk elden ekonomik ve duygusal destek sağlayan ve mültecilerin gıda, giyecek, hijyen malzemeleri ve barınma gibi temel ihtiyaçlarını doğrudan karşılayan/sunan aktörlerin ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Spesifik olarak, Suriyeli mültecilerin akrabalarının/aile üyelerinin, eş-etnik gruplarının, arkadaşlarının/ tanıdıklarının, öncü Suriyelilerin yerleştiği ve çeşitli sivil toplum kuruluşlarının halihazırda konuşlandığı kentsel alanlara yerleşmeyi tercih ettiklerini anladım. Suriyelilerin ardışık yer seçimlerini etkileyen aktörler ise, Suriyelilere uygun barınma, istihdam, yardım, kamu hizmetlerine erişim konusunda rehberlik eden ve Suriyelilerin bölgedeki sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilere katılımını kolaylaştıran aktörler olmuştur. Burada mülteci ağları, etnik (dayanışma) toplulukları ve muhtarlar, kanaat önderleri, yerel girişimler ve esnaf dahil kilit yerel aktörler öne çıktı.

Suriyelilerin İzmir'de yerleştikleri en önemli üç mekansal odak olan Basmane, Karabağlar ve Buca'nın (Gediz mahallesi) aktör tipolojileri incelendiğinde, her birinde farklı yerel aktörlerin faaliyet gösterdiği ve bu aktörlerin hizmet sunma biçimlerinin, sınıfsal pozisyonlarının, etnik kökenlerinin, söylemlerinin ve davranışlarının Suriyeli mültecileri bu yerleşimlerden çekme ya da belirli bir yerleşimden uzaklaşmak noktasında kritik roller oynadıkları görülmüştür. Bu üç yerleşim yerindeki aktör tipolojileri karşılaştırıldığında ise, Suriyeli mültecilerin İzmir'deki kent içi hareketliliğin, neden Basmane semti Merkez olacak şekilde bu üç mekansal odak arasında gerçekleştiği daha net anlaşılmıştır.

Çeşitli aktörlerin sunduğu çeşitli kamu/özel hizmetleri, göç kültürü, çok kültürlü karakteri ve merkezi konumu ile Basmane, tüm etnik kökenlerden Suriyeli mülteciler için avantajlı bir yerleşim yeri olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Ancak Basmane'nin popülaritesi Suriyeli mültecilerin "kısa süreli geçiş noktası" ve "evi" olarak, yalnızca sunduğu refah kaynakları ve destek mekanizmaları (örneğin, uygun fiyatlı konut,

merkezi konum, sağlık, eğitim ve ticaret tesisleri, STK'lar) ile açıklanamaz. Zira bazı Suriyeli görüşmecilerin de vurguladığı gibi bazı mülteciler için Basmane'ye yerleşmek bir tercih değil, bir zorunluluk durumuydu.

Başka bir deyişle Basmane, İzmir'de İzmirli olmayanların ve hatta "Türk olmayanların" kendi kültürlerini ve sınıf ilişkilerini temsil eden kendi mekanlarını yaratabilecekleri, kendi sosyal ağlarını inşa edebilecekleri sınırlı yerleşim yerlerinden biridir. Ayrıca, sınırlı sosyal/ekonomik sermayeye sahip olan, İzmir'deki sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilere gerek dil bariyeri gerek kültürel farklılıklar gerek eğitim durumları ve meslekleri nedeniyle dahil olamayan ve "tutunamayan" mültecilerin bazıları da Basmane'de sıkışıp kaldıklarını, kendilerini daha ait hissedebilecekleri başka yerleşimlere ise kısıtlı sermayelerinden dolayı gidemediklerini beyan etmişlerdir. Bu nedenle Basmane, mültecilerin hem sınıf konumları hem de sosyal/ekonomik sermaye düzeyleri ile ilişkili olarak mültecilerin hareketlilik ve hareketsizlik durumlarını birbiriyle ilişkili bir biçimde analiz edilebileceği bir odak olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Öte yandan Basmane'den taşınmayı göze alabilenler/başarabilenler için (Suriye nüfusu içindeki etnik çatışmalar, Suriyeliler ile yerli halk arasındaki gerilimler, Basmane'deki yerel piyasa aktörlerinin ayrımcı ve sömürücü tutumları nedeniyle), Karabağlar ve Buca yeni yerleşim odakları olarak mültecileri çekmektedirler.

Bu yerleşimler, sunulan hizmetler ve kaynaklar açısından Basmane kadar zengin olmasalar da, kiralık konutlar fiyatlarının uygunluğu ve mültecilerin istihdam edilebileceği sanayi sitelerine yakınlıkları bu alanların çekiciliğini artırmaktadır. En önemlisi de Basmane'den taşınanlar için, bu yerleşimlerdeki nüfusun etnik, kültürel ve sınıfsal pozisyonları açısından mültecilere paralellik göstermeleridir. Karabağlar, en basit haliyle, ilçedeki köklü Kürt işçi ağı sayesinde güçlü bir dayanışma ve aidiyet duygusu sunarken, Buca, ise güvenli ve muhafazakar bir yaşam tarzı sunuyor. Burada Karabağlar, çoğunlukla Basmane'de yaşadıkları etnik çatışmalardan, gerilimlerden ve sömürüden kaçan işçi sınıfı Kürt göçmenler ve Suriyeli Kürtleri kendine çekerken, Buca (Gediz mahallesi), İslam'ın kurallarına göre muhafazakar bir yaşam sürdürmeyi tercih eden ve kendilerini kaotik ve çatışmalı sosyal ilişkilerden korumak isteyen Arap ve Sünni Suriyelilere ev sahipliği yapıyor.

Araştırmanın yukarıda özetlenen ampirik bulgularından yola çıkarak, araştırmanın ana sonuçlarını ve göç, iltica, mekan-oluşturma ve yer seçimi literatürüne olan teorik katkılarını tartışmak mümkündür. İlk olarak, Suriyeli mültecilerin birbirinden farklılaşan hareketlilik örüntülerini ülke/kent/mahalle seçimi ekseninde ilişkisel bir biçimde ele alan çok-ölçekli bakış açısı bu araştırmanın en önemli metodolojik ve teorik katkısıdır. Bu bağlamda, mülteci hareketliliğini (kesintiye uğrasa da) devam eden, açık uçlu sosyo-mekansal bir süreç olarak tanımlayarak çok ölçekli bir yaklaşım benimsemek, göç ve hareketlilik çalışmalarında metodolojik milliyetçiliğe karşı bir analitik çerçeve/metodoloji üretilmesini sağladı.

Mültecilerin ev sahibi ülkelerdeki sınır geçişleri ve yeniden yerleştirilmeleri genellikle uluslararası bağlamda hareketliliklerinin son noktası olarak görülse de, mültecilerin hareketlilik durumu Türkiye sınırları aşıldığında sona ermemektedir. Mülteciler, kendilerine en uygun hizmetleri sunan, ait hissedebilecekleri, ayrımcılığa ve dışlamaya uğramayacakları ve de en önemlisi sınıfsal pozisyonlarına ve sermayelerine bağlı olarak sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilere tutunabilecekleri kentler/mahalleler arasında hareket halinde olmayı sürdürmektedirler. Mültecilerin hareketlilik örüntülerinin, çok-ölçekli yaklaşımla takip edilmesi, mültecilerin Türkiye'ye yerleşmek ve Türkiye'deki sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilere tutunabilmek için verdikleri mücadele sürecinde geliştirdikleri stratejileri de anlamayı olanaklı kıldı.

Çok-ölçekli yaklaşım ayrıca, farklı idari ölçeklerde faaliyet gösteren kamu kurumlarının, sivil toplum örgütlerinin, özel sektör aktörlerinin, etnik dayanışma ağlarının, dini toplulukların ve nicelerinin mültecilerin yer seçimi ve mekan oluşturma süreçlerindeki etkilerini birbirleriyle ilişkili bir biçimde ele alınması sağlamaktadır. Çok ölçekli çerçeve ile Suriyeli mültecilerin hareketlilik örüntülerini ve yer seçim taktiklerini/stratejilerini ve ayrıca mültecilerin taktiklerini/stratejilerini etkileyen çeşitli aktörlerin politikalarını/eylemlerini ortaya koymak mümkün olmaktadır. Çok ölçekli yaklaşım, aynı zamanda, Türkiye örneğinden yola çıkarak gibi göç ve iltica yönetimindeki politika/siyasi boşluklar altında eylemleri/söylemleri ve politikaları kritik hale gelen "devlet dışı aktörlerin" belirlenmesinde çok önemli bir rol oynadı. Daha spesifik olarak, metodolojik milliyetçiliğin aksine, çok ölçekli yaklaşım, yukarıdan aşağıya politikalara ve/veya politika/politik boşluklara aşağıdan yukarıya

tepkileri de hesaba katarak, göç ve hareketlilik örüntülerini etkileyen her türlü aktör ve faktörün ortaya çıkarılmasını kolaylaştırdı.

Çok ölçekli yaklaşımın yanı sıra, mekan-oluşturma (emplacement) kavramı, farklı ölçeklerdeki yer seçimi sürecinin (ülke/kent /mahalle), daha spesifik olarak, ilk ve ardışık yer seçimlerini etkileyen aktör ve faktörlerin ortaya konmasıyla ilgili gerekli teorik çerçeveyi sundu. Mekan-oluşturma kavramı ile yer seçimi literatürünü (location choice) ilişkili bir biçimde okumak, mültecilerin gittikleri kentteki/mahalledeki sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilere tutunma mücadelelerinin mekana nasıl yansıdığını ve hatta bu mücadelenin nasıl bir hareketlilik örüntüsü yarattığını anlamaya yardımcı oldu. Başka bir deyişle, bu ilişkisel çerçeve, mültecilerin göç ve hareketlilik örüntülerini etkileyen temel motivasyonun "hedef kente/yerleşime yerleşme ve mekan oluşturma" olduğunu gösterdi ve mültecilerin hareketlilik/hareketsizlik süreçlerinin söz konusu mekan-oluşturma sürecinde ihtiyaç duyulan kaynak, hizmet ve sosyal desteklere erişimle doğrudan ilişkili olduğunu ortaya çıkardı.

Mekan oluşturma kavramı ayrıca, yer seçimi sürecini mültecilerin ve diğer ilgili yerel aktörlerin gözünden aşağıdan yukarıya doğru okunmasına ve Suriyeli mültecilerin Türkiye'deki hareketlilik örüntülerini etkileyen faktörleri ve aktörleri ilişkili biçimde ortaya çıkmasına yardımcı oldu. Ek olarak, mültecilerin neden mekânsal olarak belirli yerlerde/yerleşimlerde yoğunlaştığını ve neden farklı yerleşimler arasında gözlemlenebilir bir biçimde hareket halinde olduğunu bu süreçlerin arkasındaki sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel ve politik nedenleri ortaya çıkararak açıklamayı sağladı. Ancak, mekan-oluşturma literatürü, mültecilerin yerleştikleri yerleşim yerlerine "nasıl" yerleşmeyi başardıklarını açıklamak için makul argümanlar sağlamadı. Bu "nasıl" sorusunu cevaplamak için, sosyal dışlama/dahil etme literatüründen ve "yerel refah sistemleri" (local welfare systems - LWS) kavramından faydalanmak önemli bir ihtiyaç olarak belirdi.

Söz konusu yerel refah sistemleri tartışması, Suriyeli mültecilerin mekan oluşturma ve yer seçim süreçlerinin "erişimle ilgili bir süreç" olarak tanımlanmasında önemli bir rol oynadı. Çünkü mülteciler için mobil olmanın nihai amacı, hayatta kalmak için ihtiyaç duydukları kaynaklara, hizmetlere ve hizmetlere erişebilecekleri yerlere gidip

yerleşmekti. Burada "erişim" terimi oldukça kritikti, çünkü Suriyeliler neden İzmir, Basmane veya Karabağlar'a yerleştiğini açıklarken, sık sık akrabalarının, STK'larının, yardım mekanizmalarının desteğine ve barınma, yemek, gelir, istihdam gibi temel ihtiyaçlarına "erişmeye" çalıştıklarından bahsettiler. Buradan hareketle, Suriyeli mültecilerin mekan oluşturma sürecinde en çok neye erişmek istediklerini tanımlarken, özünde bir "erişim" sorunu olan sosyal dışlanma kavramından ve ilgili literatürden faydalanıldı. Bu bağlamda hem Suriyeli mültecilerin anlatıları hem de literatürden hareketle, mültecilerin en çok erişmeye çalıştıkları hizmetler ve kaynaklar beş ana refah kategorisi altında sınıflandırıldı: barınma, hizmetler (kamu ve özel), istihdam ve gelir getirici faaliyetler, sosyal destek ve fiziksel ve kültürel güvenlik - yaşam tarzı güvenliği.

Ancak, mültecilerin anlatılarında da ortaya çıktığı gibi, mültecilerin bu söz konusu temel refah bileşenlerine erişimleri sadece kendi finansal güçleri, sosyal ve ekonomik sermayeleri ile alakalı değildir. Mülteciler, bu refah bileşenlerini sağlayan/sunan/ dağıtan refah sağlayıcılar ve aracı aktörlerle de ilişki içinde olmak ve bu ilişkiler üzerinden de refah kaynaklarını mobilize etmek durumundadır.

Suriyeli mültecilerinden anlatılarından yola çıkarak, refah kaynakları ve hizmetlerinin sunumunda ve mültecilere ulaştırılmasında kritik rol oynayan aktörler incelendiğinde yirmiden fazla "devlet-dışı aktörün" sürecin içinde olduğu görülmektedir. Bu aktörler, özel sektör, sivil toplum, enformel yerel ağlar ve aracılar/kapı bekçileri (the gatekeepers) olmak üzere dört temel başlıkta incelenebilir. İzmir örneğinde açıkça görüldüğü üzere, Suriyeli mültecilerin refaha erişimde en kritik rolü aracılar/kapı bekçileri oynamaktadır. Bu aktörler, yerleşimlerdeki sosyal ilişkilerin düzenlenmesinde ve mülteciler ile refah sağlayıcıları arasında bir köprü görevi görme noktasında öne çıkmaktadırlar. Aracılar/kapı bekçileri, Basmane, Karabağlar ve Buca örneklerinde yerel refah sistemlerinin ana aktörleri olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır.

Ancak, mültecilerin yerel refah sistemlerine katılımı göründüğü kadar kolay değildir, çünkü refah sistemlerinin tüm refah alıcıları için uygun olmayan hizmet sunuma ve kaynak sağlama biçimi vardır. Örneğin, Karabağlar'ın refah sistemi, Kürt işçi sınıfının

ve Suriyeli Kürtlerin refah ihtiyaçlarını önceliklendirmekte ve alandaki diğer sosyal ve etnik grupların ihtiyaçlarını göz ardı etmektedir.

Bu noktada, mültecilerin yerel refah sistemlerine katılımının, sahip oldukları sosyal/ ekonomik sermaye düzeyine, mültecilerin etnik kökenlerine, mültecilerin o kentteki/ yerleşimdeki sınıfsal pozisyonlarına bağlı olduğu görülmektedir. Buna göre, yerel refah sistemlerinin (farklı refah sağlayıcıları ve refah düzenlemeleri ile) ya mültecileri belirli bir bölgeye çektiklerini ya da onları belirli bir bölgeden uzaklaştırdığını iddia etmek mümkün olmaktadır.

Bu araştırmada genel olarak, hareketlilik, mekan oluşturma ve yerel refah sistemleri ile çok ölçekli yaklaşım kavramlarını birleştirerek, Türkiye'deki Suriyeli mültecilerin farklı hareketlilik ve mekan oluşturma örüntülerine yol açan temel mekanizmaları ortaya çıkarmak hedeflenmiştir. Araştırmanın en temel teorik ve ampirik sonuçlarından birincisi, hareketlilik sürecinin – yani, mültecilerin nereye gidecekleri ve yerleşecekleri konusunun- subjektif bir husus olmadığıdır. Burada sadece mültecilerin tercihleri, ihtiyaçları ve beklentileri değil, aynı zamanda mültecilerin karşılaştıkları, ilişki kurdukları aktörlerin eylemleri ve söylemleri de belirleyicidir. İkinci olarak, mültecilerin yer seçimleri ve refaha erişme mücadeleleri arasında iç içe geçmiş bir ilişki vardır. Üçüncüsü, tıpkı mülteciler ve yerli halk arasındaki diyalog/çatışma gibi; mülteci topluluğu içindeki diyalog / çatışma da, mültecilerin yer seçimlerinde belirleyici hale gelir. Son olarak ve en önemlisi, hem yerel özellikler (hedef ülkelerin, şehirlerin, ilçelerin, mahallelerin özellikleri), yerel refah sistemlerinin (sunulan refah bileşenlerinin türleri; refah sağlayıcıların türleri ve rolleri), mültecilerin etnik kökeni, sınıf konumları ve ekonomik/sosyal sermayesi, aracıların/kapı bekçilerinin söylemleri, mülteciler ve refah sağlayıcıları, mülteciler ve yerli sakinler arasındaki müzakereler (diyalog /işbirliği /çatışma), farklı hareketlilik örüntülerinin oluşmasında belirleyici roller oynamaktadır.

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