

T.C.
ISTANBUL SABAHATTİN ZAİM UNIVERSTY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

WHY DO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FAIL?
SOMALI'S AMISOM CASE

MASTER THESIS

Faysal Mohamed Hassan

Istanbul
February, 2021

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Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Hamit ERSOY

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THESIS APPROVAL

This study has been approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for M.A. Degree in Political Science and International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Hamit ERSOY

Prof. Dr. Nasuh USLU

Prof. Dr. İrfan Kaya ÜLGER

Prof. Dr. Ali GÜNEŞ

Director, Graduate Education Institute

DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis dissertation titled “Why UN peacekeeping operations fail?”, it is my own work and I worked according to the rules of scientific ethics and education when I produced it. I have collected and used all information and data in accordance with the scientific ethics and guidelines on writing this thesis of Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim Universitesi. In both the text and bibliography, I have fully referenced all the direct and indirect quotations and all the resources I have used in this work.

Faysal Mohamed Hassan

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ABSTRACT

WHY DO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FAIL? SOMALI'S AMISOM CASE

Master, Department of Political Science and International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hamit ERSOY

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For more than two decades of efforts, the United Nations and its regional partners, including the African Union bloc, have been involved in various peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa, whose goals have not yet been achieved. Somalia was plunged into bloody chaos in 1991 following a civil war that toppled the former government and its entire establishment.

The term peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN charter, although it involves military operations in order to maintain peace and security in areas ridden by conflicts such as Somalia. Fewer UN operations have so far neutralized complex situations across the globe. The study investigates the failure of U. N's peacekeeping operations with a particular focus on the UN supported peacekeeping operations led by A.U that are still ongoing in Somalia. The country neighbors with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

The purpose of this study is to identify the importance of Somalia's national army and how a country fails in achieving effective stability through the involvement of foreign hands as such as peacekeeping troops. For this purpose, the study uses Qualitative data conducted in the literature and further discussion with a retired military general who participated in the 1977 Ethiopian-Somalia war. The analysis showed that the U. N's approach on Somalia has only deteriorated the condition with increased terror attacks and civilian deaths. The results found that the AMISOM exchanged their aid with sex at their camps across the southern parts of the country. In this regard, some of the countries that have contributed troops to the mission share territorial disputes with Somalia which is a major problem in restoring order and defeating the terror organizations such as ISIL and Al-Shabab.

The study concludes that foreign interventions prolong existing local problems. Strong Somali national army with AMISOM troops is required to handle the overall country's security.

KEY WORDS: AMISOM, conflicts, security, army, Civil war, peacekeeping.



ÖZET
B.M. BARIŞ KORUMA OPERASYONLARI NEDEN BAŞARISIZ
OLMAKTADIR? SOMALİ’NİN AMISOM (SOMALİ AFRİKA BİRLİĞİ
MİSYONU) VAKASI

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Hamit ERSOY

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Yirmi yılı aşan bir süredir Birleşmiş Milletler ve Afrika Birliği bloku dahil bölgesel ortakları, Somali Yarımadasında (Afrika Boynuzunda) farklı barış koruma operasyonları ile iştigal olmaktadır ve hedeflerine hala ulaşamamıştır. 1991 yılında, sivil savaş sonrası Somali eski hükümetini ve tüm kurumlarını çökerten kanlı bir kaosu içine sürüklenmiştir.

Somali gibi çatışmaların içindeki yerlerde, barış ve güvenliği sağlamak için askeri operasyonları içermesine rağmen, BM sözleşmesinde barış koruma teriminden bahsedilmemektedir. Şuana kadar dünya genelinde sadece birkaç BM operasyonu kompleks durumları etkisiz hale getirebilmiştir.

Bu çalışma özellikle de Somali’de devam eden BM destekli A.U. tarafından yönetilen barış koruma operasyonlarına odaklanarak, BM’in barış koruma operasyonlarının başarısızlıklarını incelemektedir. Ülkenin komşuları Kenya, Etiyopya ve Cibuti’dir.

Bu çalışmanın amacı Somali ulusal ordusunun önemini ve bir ülkenin, barış koruma birlikleri gibi yabancı ellerin müdahale olması ile nasıl tam fonksiyon istikrar sağlanamayacağını ortaya koymaktır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma literatürden ve 1977 yılında gerçekleşen Etiyopya-Somali savaşında görev yapmış bir emekli askeri general ile yapılan ilave mülakattan alınan kalitatif verileri kullanmaktadır.

Analiz göstermektedir ki, BM’nin Somali’ye yaklaşımı, artan terör saldırıları ve sivil ölümler ile sadece durumu daha da kötüleştirmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın bulguları AMISOM’un ülke genelindeki kamplarında yardımlarını seks karşılığında yaptığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu çerçevede bazı birlikler, düzenin yeniden inşa edilmesi ile ISIL ve Al-shabab gibi terör örgütlerinin yenilgiye uğratılmasında başlıca soruna sebep olan Somali ile bölgesel çatışmalar meselesine katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Bu alıřma yabancı mdahalelerin mevcut lokal problemlerin varlıđını uzattıđı sonucuna varmıřtır. AMISOM askerlerine sahip gl Somali ulusal ordusu lkenin genel gvenliđini sađlamada řarttır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELEER: AMISOM, atıřmalar, gvenlik, ordu, İ savař, barıř koruma.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
ARS	Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
AU	African Union
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IRA	Interim Regional Administration
ISF	International Stabilization Force
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
SNA	Somali National Army
SNP	Somali National Police
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
UNSOM	UN Assistance mission in Somalia
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
UNSOA	UN Support Office for AMISOM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The UN is the world's largest international organization and one of its main objectives is to prevent war and ultimately reduce global conflicts. It was founded in 1945 to replace the League of Nations that had collapsed after losing respect in its member nations and failing to stop wars such as World War II. The United Nations has been launching a single peacekeeping policy a year since its inception in 1948. Seventy years after the first operation, conflicts over the use of peace and the activities of the peacekeepers have both changed dramatically. As a result, modern peacekeepers are faced with an unfinished or failing system. The peacekeeping name is nowhere to be found in the UN charter and at the same time, is regarded as a major tool that eases wars and brings resilience to war-torn areas. In other words, the whole purpose of the body was to preserve world peace. In Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is mentioned that both military and non-military actions would be taken to anyone that violates the international peace. The non-military means is specifically included in the chapter VI of its charter (Burkle, F. 2017).

{Boutros-Ghali, (1996) defined 'Peacekeeping' as follows; "it is the deployment of United Nations' presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Security has the ultimate power to authorize military actions."

The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (also known as the permanent five, big five or P5) are the five states to whom the UN Charter of 1945 grants a permanent seat on the council. (Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (2020) *Wikipedia*.). The body had sent its first missions during its infant times. Three years after the formation of the UN, (UNTSO) was established to declare ceasefire between Israel and its Arab neighbors and one dispatched to Pakistan and India. These missions still exist and are regarded as the longest running missions to be ever erected in the overall history of the UN. To determine whether or not PKOs are successful, a general framework for their analysis needs to be identified. However, in order to develop any conceptual framework or to see a rational idea, it is important having good grasp of the

reasons for the achievement of the PKO and failure of the PKO. Many discussions regarding the operation of the PKOs, the Brahimi Report included, allege that incomprehensible failures, lack of training, insufficient troops (UN Document, 2000). During the PKO it may fail to exercise its authority because of its weakness, where there are various views, organization and legal diversity where the peacekeeping function and peacekeeping troops have slight control that affects the operation of peacekeeping. Hence, it would be unreasonable to put the blame on the PKOs for failing to exercise authority without considering their causes of failure. There is a huge gap amid the ideological thoughts in UN's PKO and how to start working on it. Therefore, to conduct a compliance assessment of PKOs compatibility, it is necessary to study the reasons of success and failure, which includes the conflicting variables, and the advancement of a conceptual analysis framework, following the assessment of PKOs. But such research is lengthy and will impact the study.

It is not my intention to explain all the causes of failure or to formulate a PKO evaluation framework to determine whether PKOs are appropriate. As such, the purpose of this study is one of the most important but not discussed issues of the PKO effect. The study also aims to provide an overview of PKOs in the subject of hurdles in thinking, preparing a plan, placement and implementation. These are the principles of pacification, authority, peace-treaty, the UNSC and support of budget. PKOs of UN can only be distributed after UNSC approval. The budget for this project was accepted by UNGA after approval of council decision to install it. Prior to and after deployment, three complementary principles of pacification - permission, neutrality, and usage of force only in self-defense - became the guide lines of all operations of pacification. However, there is not any direct reference regarding the principles in UN Charter. These principles were developed following the experiences of UN in Gaza. There is talk of a policy of acknowledging that once a peace agreement expressing approval for a PKO deployment is decided by the parties to the dispute, PKO is in a good position to survive even before the UNSC approves the deployment.

1.2. Problem Statement

Civil war and internal conflicts are not the only source of staggering security problems that most of the times leave huge implications on the civilians in Mogadishu and across other parts of the country. The AMISOM soldiers who were brought to protect civilians found themselves in a critical breach of international law including civilian shootings and sexual allegations. Between 2016 and 2017 AMISOM, soldiers killed 95 civilians and wounded 86 others. Most victims were not given a fair trial or justice in the death of their loved ones (UNSOM, 2017). In this regard, all AMISOM personnel are not legally protected from any act committed in their position and AMISOM members who commit crimes in Somalia are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their home state. The authors found that AMISOM soldiers raped women and girls younger than 12 years and sold sex services and their strategies included humanitarian assistance such as providing medical care, water for sex. (Richard J. Wilson, 2014). This provision indicates that Somalia has not effectively prosecuted a military member of AMISOM for crimes he or she committed in Somalia. Despite the agreement that AMISOM staff are required to respect Somalia's laws and regulations, the conflict of laws contributes to the complexity of many peacekeeping operations. The agreement clarifies some shared responsibility between the Somali government and AMISOM for the arrest, interrogation and detention of AMISOM personnel for violations in Somalia, while the responsibility for prosecuting AMISOM personnel rests with the AMISOM member's state.

The problem here is that AMISOM soldiers have gained so much advantage that they are not accountable for their actions. The mission seems to have focused on the protection and security of national leaders and functioning institutions such as the presidential palace also known as (Villa Somalia), but has left one of the most important issues such as the protection of citizens. The lack of Somali police or intelligence units and the reliance on foreign troops have had a major impact on terrorist attacks across the country since the collapse of the previous government in 1991. (Ceelhuur, 2019).

The security situation has been changing, with 288 incidents in May 2019, 269 in June and 218 in July. Many of those incidents were the killings and shootings associated with the crimes and attacks on Al-Shabaab, including those using advanced explosives. The

level of crime and war-related incidents remained strong since January, with a slight decline in June and July. The number of terrorist-related incidents remained at an average of 75 per month in May and June, with 53 incidents in July. (UN Security Council, 13 August 2020, p. 3)

1.3. Rationale of the study

This research aims to find the main reasons for AMISOM's failure in its peacekeeping operations in Somalia. A lot of experts as well as the officials of the government have chosen the response of UN to the Somali disaster that resulted in more than 300,000 people deaths and the highest number of undernourishment and misery in Somalia. There are certain facts regarding UN peacekeeping mission remain unknown, but the facts that have emerged suggest the reasons why missions are failing to achieve peacekeeping in Somalia. In order to understand how UN has failed in its efforts to keep peace in Somalia, one must look at the events that are taking place. The event that sparked real chaos in Somalia was the fall of a leader in a nearby area known as Ethiopia. The SNM was founded in 1981 by the Isaac family. The feud continued as both Mengistu and Siad Barre began to lose the power of an impossible fight. In 1989, another family was formed called the USC. With so many groups and families around him, Siad Barre finally withdrew in January 1991. During this time, Somalia had no government and no peace. The disaster in Somalia is receiving international notice, although nothing has been done to prevent the situation from deteriorating. The UN has ignored the disasters in Somalia because of a busy agenda full of other obligations; "rich man's war," said the UN's Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

These missions renew their authority in each session without any previous plans to leave the country. Peacekeeping in Somalia has failed due to the fact that the UN has been negligent, unorganized, incompetent, and preoccupied for false reasons. Members of the UN did not ignore the condition for a long time and did not take any action in a timely manner to prevent the crisis in Somalia from escalating. Even after the situation escalated, political priorities stole the UN's attention and caused its members to ignore the necessary information to make it work. The AMISOM mandate includes the gradual surrender of its

security obligations to the Somali military and that goal is yet to be achieved. Their departure is of great importance in achieving a lasting security solution to the recurring security problem that tends to target citizens in the capital and other parts of Somalia. If AMISOM leaves, it would provide a good opportunity for the Somali national army and the international funds that were working to carry out peacekeeping operations. Those funds can be used to rebuild national security and to improve security intuitions. There has been previous research done, but this paper will look likely to find out how UN and other regional partners can change their strategies in the process of maintaining lasting peace. Al-Shabaab has been a major security issue for Somalia as a whole, but if Somali troops are given the same role, they will be able to restore order. The study will play an active role in the security of Somalia and may add value to the ongoing peace process in the country.

1.4. Significance of the Study

This study shows policy changes regarding how the UN and other regional allies operate in Somalia and specifies the extent to which Somali forces can play a role in securing the country, rather than relying on foreign forces. The main function of the national army is to fulfill their vows to protect their country's borders from any external aggression (Goobjoog, 2016). The list does not end there of reasons for success or failure as they differ in different conflicts. As Richey said, 'every conflict is diverse; Each needs to have its own analysis and treatment'. (Rikhye, 1995)

AMISOM's case is not a foreign aggression, but an organized peacekeeping operation which has the support of the international community including UN, EU and the AU, but it has failed to protect citizens and restore order in areas they are stationed (Horn Cable TV, 2016). The key benefits of this study are to discover the potential role of Somali army which no longer exists after the collapse of former government in 1991. The international community will identify the key gaps that are encumbering the security sector and the peacemaking process at large. The other major benefits include increased awareness of the Somali government and other regional stakeholders, decline of security crisis and the increase of possible payouts to the Somali national soldiers.

1.5. Literature Review

Intervention in internal conflicts may be for the government or the opposition. Intrastate conflict as a war between two parties inside the borders of a nation having at least 200 deaths. Intrastate conflict is divided into ethnic, religious and ideological groups. The study of Reagan investigates military and economic interference. It inspects whether this interference succeeds in ending internal conflicts. In this regard Reagan made use of a cost benefit analysis of the intervener. However, he argues that actors who support and oppose the interveners will also manage cost benefit analysis. (Reagan, 1996) According to Reagan, military intervention is to provide troops, equipment, intelligence and economic interference, trade and sanctions of economy. Reagan believes that when third parties interfere, they do so to put an end to ongoing conflicts. The key objective of the interference force is the provision of firmness to the government and the region. Reagan argues that third-party intervention does not involve prolonging internal conflict, but rather ending the conflict over the terms of the interfering state and bringing stability to the area. A cost benefit analysis was conducted by the intervening parties and those involved in internal conflict on whether to resume or end the conflict. Reagan found that almost 70% of the time military intervention is used, the economy is used 7%, and the combination of both is used 23% of the time. Mixed economic and military intervention will lead to a successful conclusion of the conflict. Reagan (2002) pay attention on third-party intervention and its impact on the extent of inter-state conflict. He (Reagan) believes that foreign states are intervening as a way to manage a conflict and reduce its duration, magnitude, or violence. Third parties must create a scenario in which both parties agree that it is better to find a solution than to continue to fight.

The costs concerned with immigration can be handled by states intervening through asymmetric intervention, which one side supports on the other. Intervening states need to consider whether it is worth to continue the fight until victory is achieved or the conflict is resolved. Intervention may shift the balance of power on behalf of the government to a place where it is in their best interests to negotiate instead of the opposition forces continuing to fight. In the case of an ethnic internal conflict, Reagan argues that the

approach of military intervention is not the right one as the cause of ethnic conflict is when a group highlights wealth in society. Reagan also expects the timing of the intervention to affect the timeframe of a conflict. He (Reagan) argues that the opposition will be weak if the intervention is early and the opposition will be defeated easily. Intervention at the beginning of a conflict is expected to increase the costs of forming an opposition group, which reduces the group's chances of fully developing opposition to the government. If the opposition is allowed to form and develop the committee, it may be willing to take on more costs because the group believes it has a chance to defeat the government. Reagan found that intervention after conflict is more likely to end sooner than intervention at the beginning of the conflict. Military and economic intervention increases the timeframe of an internal conflict without diplomatic intervention. Besides the intervening party seeks to bring both parties to the negotiating table. The military and economic intervention prompts the urge to continue the fight. The authors consider economic and military intervention important, but the success of using both techniques hang on whether diplomatic mediation comes with economic or military intervention (Regan & Aydin, 2006) Reagan's articles (1996, 2002, and 2006) show progress in research on foreign intervention. Research begins by examining whether economic or military intervention has the potential to end a conflict. This changes to how intervention affect the timeframe of conflicts. The final section examines the timing of the intervention and which one is successful in bringing the conflict to an end. However, studies never examine how intervention affects the conflict between states.

Findlay and Kwang (2006) states that nations are more likely to intervene if actors from other areas intervene. The authors argue that states that intervene support the government if they share a similar interest. If a state has no common interests and wants to overthrow the government, the intervening state is likely to support the opposition in an attempt to balance against the interests of the government. There are three aspects that affect whether or not a state intervenes:

- The first one is that there are 'consistent' characteristics that determine whether or not a state intervenes

- Secondly, the 'static' nature of the conflict also affects whether or not states intervene
- Thirdly, the variations in the conflict affect the duration of the intervention.

Carment and Rowlands (1998) made a number of assumptions regarding intervention. Firstly, the interveners are actors (rational). Secondly, they(intervenors) have specific goals. Thirdly, the effects of actions are just as important as their content. Authors devise intervention strategies that include military involvement, low-intensity peacekeeping troops, and strong military intervention. The intervener will make use of cost benefit analysis on every intervention type and will use full military if others fail.

Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) broke the intervention into third-party involvement and the context of the Civil War state. Furthermore, the dimensions of civil wars are divided into the characteristics of the Civil War state and the characteristics of the Civil War. States with grievances against the government prolong the period of a conflict. It is very difficult for the big states to regain control over the states and prolong the duration of the civil war. The findings of the authors support their argument that a uniform or balanced intervention increases the timeframe. Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008) said that the support group, the government or the opposition is more likely to win, while others are less likely to win the military.

Pickering and Kisangani (2006) explained unilateral intervention as foreign military intervention in another nation to affect the conditions of economy, community or politics. The authors said further that a hostile intervention within the state would decrease the quality of life. It will improve only after the removal of the repressive government. Pro-government intervention is less likely to have negative consequences associated with anti-government intervention. The authors further clarify that violence and military intervention will not always create a sustainable environment for democratization, economic growth or improvement of living standards.

Pekson (2012) argues that if there is pro-government intervention, it indicates that the government has international support and provides credibility and fairness to the government. It also enhances the military capabilities of the state and allows the state to be in favor of military power. Interfering in support of opposition groups lead the

government to view these groups as a threat, using government power to defeat opposition groups. Military intervention will not bring about change in government unless the intervening force uses massive military forces. But, the use of these forces could lead to the total downfall of the government.

The opposition groups find it difficult to win without outside intervention. When an opposing group faces intervention, the chances of the opposition winning the conflict increase. If there is a strong opposition group, the intervention in favor of the government is more likely to happen (Gent., 2008) Gent found that pro-opposition intervention was likely to increase the chances of winning the conflict. While these groups often defeat the government, the third-party opposition groups are more likely to intervene. If the states do not care about the conflicting state, they will not intervene as engaging in conflict is not in the best interest of the state.

In peacekeeping the term and its concept is yet to be established a meaning full definition in the UN charter although it involves military personnel in order to maintain peace and security in areas ridden by conflicts such as civil wars. (UN, 2008). The author in (An Agenda for Peace; (1992), defined 'Peacekeeping' as follows: "it is the deployment of United Nations' presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military or police personnel and frequently civilians as well." (Boutros-Ghali,1992)

The first stages of the peacekeeping were meant to tackle a range of global problems including civil wars and conflicts in order to establish ways to build self-confidence, disarmament, enforcement of arms embargoes, law and order assistance, combating terrorism, hostage rescue, drug interdiction, and naval peacekeeping. (UN, 1995). Dennis examined why most of the UN operations have failed. He argues the UN has initially reduced the chances of success in the peacekeeping industry by ignoring the factors and realities from the past history. (Dennis C. Jett, 1999),

The inability of the UN to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and the Genocide of Rwanda is to be blamed on the peacekeeping structure and how the UN handles in high profile dilemmas across the globe (Dennis C. J., 1999). This became visible when the United Nations Peacekeepers stood by as Hutu killed some 800,000 Tutsi. In Bosnia, the

UN declared safe areas for Muslims but did nothing to secure them, letting the Serbs slaughter thousands in Srebrenica after the Peacekeepers were used as hostages by the Serbs to avoid a military action from other Western countries. (Max Boot, 2000).

Dennis believed that three major factors contributed to the rise and the popularity of peacekeeping in the late 80s and early 90s which were the end of the cold war that ended political tensions between U.S. and the Soviet Union, the surge of civil wars and the rise of humanitarian concerns. (Dennis, 1999). Michael & Nicholas studied the 138 UN peacekeeping operations conducted in conflict zones and found that they did not contribute to any peace in these areas and instead intensified the violence. They argued that each mission must be built to fit the conflict, with the right mandate and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new players committed to peace, building governing institutions, monitoring and policy implementation of peace settlements. (Michael D. & Nicholas S., 2006)

Dennis found that despite the enormous internal UN failures, there are major external factors that are causing the incompetence of the organization's peacekeeping to stumble which includes the lack of cooperation between the warring sides, the resources of the country itself and the involvement of foreign hands who often fuel up the conflicts of a particular country, seeking their own private interests. (Dennis C. J., 1999)

Max argued that the only two interventions that succeeded in the post-cold war era were conducted outside the UN in the Balkans and many massacres were stopped with the repatriation of hundreds of refugees to their homes. In the article *Paving the Road to Hell*, he suggested that the United Nation should play as a benevolent global hegemony by applying liberal imperialism theory. (Max B., 2000)

The UN peacekeeping operations tend to do more harm to the civilians who have been assigned to protect. Shawcross writes that "the Bulgarians in Cambodia were said to be more interested in searching for sex than for cease-fire violations.". (William S., 2001). Shawcross also explores how in some instance's humanitarian aid, such as food shipments serve only to supply the combatants and to prolong the suffering of the starving people for whom the food was intended. He gives evidence that while nations claim to rely on the

UN as a peacekeeping mechanism, they withhold funds and complain about the inefficiency of the UN (William S., 2001).

To make matters worse, UN peacekeepers do not have the language skills to communicate with local people or, occasionally with each other. In Cyprus, for example, there are few Greek or Turkish-speaking peacekeepers; similar to Arabic or Nuer in South Sudan, Albania or Serbo-Croatia in Kosovo and France or Haitian Creole in Haiti (Séverine A., 2019). The author points out that the U. N's failure in peacekeeping is not due to lack of resources, but lack of structure and the methods that it applies such as universal approaches, for example the UN often focus on top down approach which starts from the elites and hosts expensive conferences in order to pave the way for an agreement between rebel leaders with the aim of holding national vote and declaring victory. The author strongly criticizes this approach, but suggests that the UN should start with local realities and then formulate a customized strategy using the following efforts. For inspiration, it is only necessary to look at the pockets of peace that already exist in many of the UN war-torn areas.

Thinking and acting locally should initiate a bottom-up approach and peace on earth. Foreigners in capitals and headquarters do not conceive, design and execute peace programs. These are intended beneficiaries with the help of outside organizations. (Severin A., 2019). Roland analyzed 11 UN missions in depth and found that only two could build lasting peace. He writes that greatest risk to the United Nations is not operational failure, but some major opinion divergences among the security council members. Only the SC has the authority and the ability to give peacekeeping mandates (Roland P., 2014). Although some progress has been made in lengthy research on the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operation in Libya has been revealed, that the deployment of peacekeepers at municipal levels did not improve security in the region where the military is stationed (Eric M. and Cyrus S., 2018).

1.6. Theoretical Framework

A number of articles and journals have been written which are contributing to the literature of peacekeeping and which follows the end of Cold war. Attempts to theorize

peacekeeping operations are relatively recent (Barnett 1995; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010; James 1990; Pugh. 2003). He (Johnstone (2005)) said the increase in defending literature was due to three main factors in the post 1989 era. The first one is the increase in the number of PKOs since 1999 carried out by the UN and regional organizations. The second one is the release of the Brahmi Report which occurred in 2000 and the third one is the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 which are considered as an important stage in the need to rethink new types of threats to international security and the international community. These attacks transformed the way security analysis is conducted. In fact, Johnstone (2005) further argued that the 9/11 event presents a trend that began a few years ago in the analysis of peacekeeping in the broader context of the theory of international politics and international relations. Therefore, the need to expand the study of peace activities includes research writings (Paris 2000; Pugh 2003). He (Paris (2000)) suggested that there is a need to examine the PKOs in order to overcome practical operational issues and instead examine the peace missions as a window into a forum that can focus on major events related to international politics.

Furthermore, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2004) explained that despite the many writings by different scholars on PKOs, the strengths, weaknesses, and experiences of these operations have little or no effort to critique influence of global politics and the role of peacekeeping within it. In these writings the researchers tried to fill the gaps by showing two different views in the theory and practice of peacekeeping in the Westphalian and post-Westphalian positions. Bellamy (2004), Bellamy and Williams (2004) and Pugh (2004), in 'International Peacekeeping' on Peace Operations and Global Order, D. Williams has designed a method that divided the field as a new way of thinking about peacekeeping as 'problem-solving' and 'critical' approaches. On the contrary, the critical theory calls into question the prevailing international order, which in fact exposes the interests of serving and protecting the interests of the underprivileged with the aim of changing the order (Cox 1981; Booth 2007). An important proportion of the peacekeeping literature moves toward the theoretical framework of 'problem-solving', which, in his (Pugh, 2004) view, restricts the ability of peacekeeping students to think intelligently about the role of peacekeeping.

According to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 19), there is a need to think theoretically about peace operations which is important because ignoring theory from peacekeeping studies will restrict the ability to fully understand the complexities involved in peacekeeping operations. This is due to the fact that, as these researchers have described, setting the context of peacekeeping in a theoretical framework helps us to understand the complex social interactions involved in the work of peacekeeping. Hence, now to investigate four key theoretical approaches that can be found in the literature of peacekeeping, which provide a possible framework for peacekeeping research analysis and interpretation. (1) the basic principles of each theory, (2) their shortcomings and (3) the main arguments of their critics and alternative ways of thinking about them.

1.6.1. Liberal Peace Theory

Liberal Peace Theory, the paradigm of liberal peace occupies a very important place in the theoretical discourses of international relations (Dunne 2011). As a theoretical framework, liberalism varies significantly from realism in that it considers the international system to be anarchic (Morgenthau 1973; Keohane 1986; Vasquez 1983; Waltz 1979; Wayman and Diehl 1994 to name a few). Although different realist scholars make different assumptions based on different orientations of the political realism, they agreed on three common assumptions (Holmberg 1998: 12). The first one is that the realists emphasize the centrality of the state, which is the main player in the international organization, and the anarchic condition prevails in the lack of a world government. The Second one is that the state is being looked as a rational actor which seeks to maximize the benefits they expect. The third one is that the centrality of power is a vital component of theoretical framework of the realist. Here the presumption is that in the international arena, nations seek power in order to expand their position. Therefore, the purpose of the nation in the international system is to increase the means of power. The implication of the principle of liberal peace is that the democratic nations do not wage war against other liberal democracies. The fact that liberal nations must choose not to wage war, and that they are likely to be at least relatively be in peace compared to 'less than liberal' nations because they are leaning towards liberalism, explains why democracies have failed so

much and are slipping into anarchy. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 23) argued that the researchers who follow the theoretical traditions of liberal peace offer two explanatory justifications for this situation. Firstly, liberal democratic nations possess well-established domestic political institutions including an independent judiciary, a legislature with an efficient judiciary. Furthermore, many international organizations, including these states, are guided by democratic ethics, values, and policies that abandon war as a tool for achieving the objectives of foreign policy and good international relations (Owen 1994). Secondly, the tendency for war between democratic nations decreases because democratic norms and values guide these states to 'recognize each other's legitimacy'. Further strengthening this argument, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 24) said: From a liberal point of view, liberal peace intervention is compulsory and justified on the basis of the fact that a society that has went into conflict and armed violence with unfavorable consequences on its citizens can no longer demand non-intervention and sovereignty (Jabri 2010: 42). Hence, opponents of the current application of the principle of theory of liberal peace have, as it exists today, partially limited the ability of the UN to use a peace process to impose the neo liberal version of the current liberal peace agenda under three conditions: First, the events in Cambodia have led to the invitation conflicting parties to the UN to help establish democratic governments. When invited (Richmond and Franks 2011). Secondly, when UN peacekeepers were deployed to protect democracy by re-establishing democratic governments that have been ousted by illegal means, as happened in Haiti and Sierra Leone. Thirdly, as was the case in Bosnia, Iraq and Somalia when UN and other regional organizations seek to establish liberal peace in the subject of interfering in the issues of the so-called failed states.

1.6.2. Cosmopolitanism and Peace Operations

According to (Björkdahl 2005; Hannerz 2005; Nussbaum 1996), the novel interest in cosmopolitanism, specifically in the latter part of the last century, was due to the globalization, nationalism, identity politics, cosmopolitan and migration. Björkdahl (2005: 215) illustrated that cosmopolitanism is looked at as another political possibility to nationalism and that cosmopolitan values emphasize political content and accountability

(Held1995). In the context of the international system, cosmopolitanism is seen as an approach that can address new types of threats to international security, such as international terrorism and organized transnational crime, which cannot be resolved by the nation through single man effort, but by the network of states that demand the synergy of efforts (Kaldor 1999). Björkdahl (2005: 215-216) retained the reality of the threat of these global problems and the efforts to face them through concerted efforts established by states, the form of the Cooperative Alliance, which can be seen as a cosmological mode, also serves as a platform for a global responsibility to promote and uphold the humanitarian principles and norms associated with cosmopolitanism. In fact, the practices of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement have been cited as an example of a universal politics capable of defending human rights. The main argument of the Cosmopolitan method is that the development and dissemination of cosmopolitan values is seen as a potential contribution to creating the situations required for the avoidance of conflict. Hence, the building of peace and stability can be obtained by the spread of cosmological values, so peacekeeping measures must be taken to promote these values and to stand by the commitment to humanitarian principles and norms. This belief is based on the belief that conflict prevention rules and theories have cosmological features. Creating this theoretical framework, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (2005) created a compelling case for the promotion of cosmopolitan peace efforts, which must be conducted by the UN emergency peace service, which is sufficient to protect the public. (Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2005) The cosmopolitan approach has been criticized in a number of ways despite its merits. Firstly, there is a belief that the art of a cosmopolitan rhetoric can be used by powerful states to further cover up their natural resource extraction interests. This is one reason why researchers need to investigate the benefits that such cosmopolitan PKOs serve. Secondly, cosmopolitanism has been criticized as an 'illusion' (Himmelfarb 1996: 77), or 'abstract universalism' (Barber 1996: 30), and is based on the simple concept of novel conflicts between innocent victims and their persecutors (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin 2010: 27)

1.6.3. Global Culture and Peace Operations

This approach is originated in world political theory, which lies in the subject of sociology (Boli and Thomas 1999; Thomas et al. 1987; McNeely 1995). World political sociologists involve themselves in understanding the human society's rules, customs, and culture. According to Paris (2003: 442), "there is a unique global culture which encompasses the formal and informal rules of international social life". Global culture defines the key actors in world politics. Hence, these informal and formal social norms guide the international system, national relations and world politics, as well as have a profound impact on the PKO's design and conduct. The formation of global political theorists of sociology will help to explain why the global cultural approach to peaceful actions makes some strategies appropriately well thought out and legitimizes others. Peace missions are strategies to fulfill their mandates and achieve peace (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010: 26). It refers to the design and deployment of peacekeeping agencies to implement policy tools that comply with the rules of a particular global culture. Hence, the main weakness of this theoretical framework is that it restricts peacekeeping agencies such as the UN and rejects certain policy tools of regional arrangements (e.g., the African Union), primarily because it is not possible to help a peace process achieve peace because they do not comply with the acceptable rules of the international community without first considering the strategies.

1.6.4. Critical Theory

This theory takes a departure from classical theories to the study of international politics. Over time, it receives works from Cox (1981), Horkheimer (1982) and other researchers of the Frankfurt School and important security researchers, specially those associated with Aberystwyth (Booth 2007; Wyn Jones 1999). Hence, the main principles are designed to aid the interests of the (capitalist) countries that dominate at the expense of world edge, and fail to question this existing defective world order (Cox 1981). Critical theorists insist that theory is never politically neutral, based on the inherent flaws of traditional theories (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010: 27). Critical theory, therefore, try to expose the

injustices associated with orthodox theories and to explore ‘structural change’ as a means of achieving human liberation (Horkheimer 1982). According to Pugh (2004: 39), the critical theorists explore very limited, problem-solving contexts in peacekeeping operations and peacekeeping interventions. Or administrative purpose i.e., to maintain the politics of a particular world order under the auspices of liberal imperialism. Critical theorists say that global capitalism divides the world into halves rich and halves poor, the latter being characterized by political instability, economic decay and poverty with the result of failure of the nation because of the rise of anarchy. Thus, the disorder in the peripheral area made the PK deployment necessary by representatives like the UN and regional organizations, by the global center in order to protect the capitalist international economy. Hence, as stated by Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 28), based on the studies of Pugh (2004) and Duffield (2001), the need and implementation of peace measures is necessary. To preserve the ‘neo liberal economic order’ that exists around the world.

1.6.5. Conclusion

So, after discussing a great detail of the different theories, I agree that there is not a single theory that fully explains the full range of issues in PKOs. This is because, as Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010: 29) acknowledged that the theoretical traditions offer a variety of ways to understand the nature of peace. The choice of theoretical framework is to know the fact that it determines what to read and how to read it. The ways in which these choices affect potential research outcomes make it very unlikely that a theory will fully explain the complexities of contemporary peace activities, especially with different actors on a continent such as Africa. Although this limitation is mentioned, I argue that peacekeeping is best understood by the use of multiple theories to uncover the objectives of peacekeeping agencies, peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions and the role of these missions as well as the interest which they serve. Under the OAU rule, state centralism and the rule of sovereignty completely prevented the use of PKOs to deal with internal conflicts (Badmus 2008; Imobighe 1996). By legislating the Constitution, this gives the institution the right to intervene in responding to harsh circumstances. The AU Constitution lays the groundwork for allowing African peacekeepers to reinstate order in

a member state, allowing the AU to export democratic values to states experiencing instability. The desire and willingness to accept the principle of liberal peace does not mean that all its philosophical and logical positions are well embedded in the efforts to maintain peace in Africa. They are largely not due to mismanagement and political crises in a number of nations of the continent. In the light of this the normative frameworks of APSA liberalization principles and accordingly the AU peacekeeping forces are being forced to reinstate order. Despite this advantage of the liberal theoretical tradition, it cannot only explain and get a hold on the reality of novel peace of Africa and its security management system, and the whole range of issues involved in complex PKOs in the world's direct-war zones such as Somalia.

1.7. Research Questions

The 30-year-old Somali civil war has strong support from the UN and its regional partners. Yet no other country with a history of civil war has left such conflicts for so long. Apart from the bigger question which is why UN peacekeeping operations fail, there are few questions that this study would be addressing.

Those questions are as follows:

1. Does foreign intervention really work?
2. Why did the operation of AMISOM fail?
3. Does AMISOM's operation prevent Somalia from having its own military?
4. Why can't Al-Shabaab be defeated?

To answer those questions, research will use correlational methods to test the truth of a false idea.

1.8. Research Gap

Somalia has been locked in wars for decades. Many solutions could be put in place, including the presence of AMISOM troops, but the situation is worsening. It was time to change course. (Laura H., 2017). If the AU forces begin to transfer security to the Somali

national army, the local army will defeat the terrorist organizations that are disrupting security, as they have more knowledge of the reasons than any other foreign troops. The previous operations that UN has conducted in conflict zones have little impact on decreasing violence, also foreign involvements often increase the conflicts of belligerents in any country that has civil war experience and might not add any value to the peace initiatives. (Michael D. & Nicholas S., 2006). Establishing peace efforts through the grassroots, allows the country to rebuild its troops, defeat Al-Shabaab and much more without the involvement of foreign hands such as the UN and the AU and the neighboring countries. EU spending alone on the mission is €20 million a month and this budget could have made a significant contribution to the country's domestic force. (Global Viewer, 2017). AMISOM support also comes from the UN and other key regional partners.

The Somali experience shows that a lot of the traditional elements of UN's traditional military activities are also timely in today's peacekeeping missions. As a result of the changes that have led to the failure of Somalia's strategic plan, a few basic policy amendments must be made for the peace to stay viable. The first hurdle is for national policy makers to differentiate between the proposed activities of UN that are important to integrated security and those that are less important to society but that have little impact on global order. Once an agreement reaches its strategic objectives and an intervention has been decided, the international community should define "something" about practical, achievable ideas and implement all the necessary mechanisms for implementing approved decisions. In short, the use of peacekeeping missions should not be undermined via efforts to integrate peacekeeping and warfare under the rubble of peacekeeping force. The PDD-25 must go a long way in applying these lessons to a strong yet flexible goal that recognizes the limitations of peacekeeping operations while maintaining this tool as an integral part of the national security strategy behind the Cold War environment.

The other available literature focuses on the collapse of the Somali state, as well as the consequences that followed, such as the civil war and famine and the UN's intervention, which were less successful. Moreover, focusing on the history of the UN's failure, changes have been made, but none of the scholars found out why the UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia lasted longer than those of other states.

The country has been in a dilemma for more than 30 years despite the UN's efforts to stabilize it. Although the authors and scholars have largely contributed to the failure of UN's peacekeeping operations, the root causes of the country's persistence in failing for a long period of time are yet to be identified. Somali large institutions including the police and the military are still under construction and underpaid as compared to AMISOM troops where one working soldier earns \$822 a month (APA News, 2018). To restore peace and the rule of law, there must be a common power for the sovereign state and its strong institutions (Thomas H. n.d). The upcoming researchers can take an essential role in seeking answers for these questions which are Why does the UN favor foreign troops over local troops? And why change is needed to protect the country and defeat Al-Shabaab.?

1.9. Limitations

The study uses secondary data, which means that some of the content is very old and not part of the first-hand data. Most of the literature was driven from books, scholarly writings, academic posts, journals etc. Sometimes the availability of books has been a major problem and some data was too expensive to be obtained. Time has been another obstacle for this academic work. Some of the A.U officials, whom we requested to be interviewed for this study were not available to comment on the allegations presented by the former Somali general whom we found during the study. The other limitations were lack of funding and there were not enough respondents to this issue, other than the general who was interviewed for this research.

CHAPTER II

U.N Peacekeeping Operations: Different case studies

2.1. Introduction

The peacekeeping literature has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War, and a number of studies have examined the hope of peacekeeping in terms of its failures and successes. These upsurges suggest that the nature of the conflict has shifted from regional to internal - conflicts that occur within regional borders, thus making peace effort to be achieved with difficulties. UN peacekeeping interventions have sometimes been seen as successful in some cases (such as El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Mozambique) and failures in others (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia). However, when one looks at the interventions of the civil war, the intriguing question is not only why the UN has succeeded or failed but also what causes success or failure in Africa. However, it is difficult to professionally investigate the causes of these successes and failures.

AMISOM's peacekeeping mission is not the first to be sent to Somalia, but the UN and the United States with an international opposition treaty have previously failed to remove warlords and restore tranquility after the collapse of the country's functioning government in 1992. (Ahmed, I., & Green, R. (1999). They have African Union mandate and the support of the United Nations. In 2018, Human Rights Watch reported that some AMISOM soldiers have used humanitarian assistance provided by the mission to coerce vulnerable women and girls into sexual activity. (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Some other similar failed UN peace keeping cases include:

2.1.1. The Srebrenica Genocide

In the context of war and human history, these crimes are unknown for their purpose and cruelty: the 2007 verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had found three former high-ranking Bosnian Serbian officials responsible for the Srebrenica genocide. Europe and the world have been revisiting Bosnia and Herzegovina every year for the past 17 years with the hope that the continent will remember the worst

crime in post-World War II history and that hopefully it won't happen again. And something similar was said in 1945 but it happened again. It happened a year after the Rwandan genocide in Srebrenica. (Biserko, 2012)

In July 1995, 8,372 innocent Muslim men and children, 500 of them under the age of 18, were killed in a brutal massacre in the small eastern city of Bosnia. This was seen as another step towards fulfilling the Serbian leadership. Nevertheless, it was a shocking example of human downfall and political nonsense. It turned out to be the worst and last atrocity to be committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Srebrenica genocide proved as a failure, not only for Serbia who planned, supported the war, but also for the EU and the UN, which were greatly involved in tackling with the dispute in former Yugoslavia. The EU and the UN both acknowledged their key responsibility for failing to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica. (Biserko, 2012)

The memory of the genocide in Srebrenica should be remembered throughout the European Union. The European Parliament declared 11th July 11 as the day of remembrance in 2009. The Secretary-General's personal envoy, Jasushi Akashi, acknowledged the UN Security Council's failure and responsibility for not intervening to save the people at the UN. Refuge. During a visit to Srebrenica by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, he expressed his remorse that the UN could, but did not prevent genocide. He further said that Srebrenica is, 'a holy ground' for innocent victim families, and also for the UN. (Biserko, 2012)

The Serbian leadership has been denied this for 17 years, yet it is, along with the perpetrators, held primarily responsible for the massacre. In 2012, the newly elected President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic said: 'Srebrenica is not genocidal'. The European Commission immediately and strongly rejected it. He also warned Belgrade for any attempt of rewriting the history. In 2010, the Serbian parliament, with a two-thirds majority, passed a resolution condemning to avoid use of the word "genocide". He apologized to the families of the victims because not everything had been done to avoid that tragedy. (Biserko, 2012)

The resolution, which follows the 1997 ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), was an attempt by the government to clear the way on Serbia's approximate functioning

of the European Union. The ICJ, which has no key evidence of involvement in the Serbian massacre due to the collusion between the ICTY Attorney General Carla del Ponte and Belgrade cleared Serbia as responsible for the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, but pleaded guilty in failing to prevent the slaughtering in Srebrenica. (Biserko, 2012)

The resignation of President Nikolic did not come unexpectedly. Srebrenica denial of genocide promoted politics and community in Serbia. Despite the motion of Parliament, the denial actually gained strength, especially in education, after the ICJ ruling. A number of books had been written to deny genocide and reduce the number of victims. Srebrenica is said to have been invented to blacken Serbia's reputation and the Serbian people. (Biserko, 2012)

The ICTY which was established by the UN in 1993 to prosecute those accountable for gross violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, issued two Srebrenica genocide verdicts and found several former high-ranking Bosnian Serbs official guilty of genocide. Six Bosnian Serbs and former Serbian brass are still on lawsuit before the Hague tribunal for genocide in Srebrenica. According to the finding of ICJ in 2007 judgment, genocide had taken place in Srebrenica. (Biserko, 2012)

However, the process of confronting and admitting the truth in Srebrenica as well as Serbia's attempts to forcibly reshape the former Yugoslavia continues to stagnate. Future similar mishaps cannot be avoided if the reality about Srebrenica and previous genocides and crimes are unknown. In fact, the attempt by former President Tadic to pass a resolution on the parliamentary Srebrenica sparked a heated debate in Serbia. This debate showed the depth of Serbian frustrations and denials, thus refusing to confront the nation's role in history, more particularly in relation to the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The previous government and parliament have been accused by irresponsible and 'dangerous, dissatisfied and short-sighted policy', surrender to 'jihad fundamentalist Bosnian propaganda lies' and the Bosnian and Croatian crimes against Serbs. (Biserko, 2012)

Thus, although former high-ranking Bosnian Serbian warlords Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic were finally arrested after fleeing in Serbia and sent to The Hague tribunal for genocide lawsuit. However, in Serbia the genocide is still in denial. Hence, the

international community, especially the EU, has provided conditions for countries in the region based on full cooperation with the Hague tribunal. Serbia is definitely a special case. It undertook four wars and supported and participated in the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As yet, its cooperation with the Hague tribunal has been largely calculated and the role of the ICTU in introducing a historic justice in the region is largely absent in Serbia. (Biserko, 2012)

The international community has so far failed to fulfill its moral and political responsibility to Serbia and the world, there is still an opportunity for international factors to be more effectively addressed and to make amends for the past shortcomings. At this point, it is important to help support and strengthen the courage of Serbian society, which has been weakened by two decades of political, military, economic and social and information disasters and anti-European campaigns. (Biserko, 2012)

There are two ways that the international community can take and follow in this regard. One would aim to ensure education, the main tool, truly embodies progress, including the issue of Serbia's responsibility in the wars of the 1990s. The other is to help confirm that the deniers are guilty. This path means following a law similar to the practice in Germany and some other European countries, which punishes denial of genocide. None of these options are possible in the near future, because, among other things, there is not a single courageous and determined leader in Serbia today who needs to accept this challenge. They are lacking the required courage. (Biserko, 2012).

2.1.2. The Rwandan civil war (UNAMIR Mission)

Fighting between Rwanda's main Hutu government and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) armed forces first crossed the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbor Uganda in October 1990. Several ceasefire accords were followed, which included negotiations on July 22, 1992 in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania, which was granted by the 50-member Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I) and was provided by African organization Unity (OAU). War broke out in the north of the country in early February 1993, hampering extensive negotiations between the Rwandan

government and the RPF, which were backed by the OAU and supported by the United Republic of Tanzania. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

In 1993, the active involvement of UN in Rwanda began during the time when Rwanda and Uganda requested that the RPF send military observers across the Commonwealth to prevent military use. The SC established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda in June 1993 in order to confirm that no military support reached Rwanda. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

In the meantime, the Arusha talks, arranged by Tanzania and OAU, were reconstituted in March 1993 and at last resulted in a peace accord in August 1993. The Comprehensive Peace Accord called for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government calling for a democratically elected government, with the exception of elections, the repatriation of refugees and the unification of the two-armed forces. Both sides called on the UN to help implement the agreement. In August 1993, NMOG I was replaced by NMOG II force an expanded version, with about 130 personnel to act as a pending interim measure to maintain neutral international force. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

The SC by Resolution 872 (1993), established another international body, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in October 1993 in order to facilitate the parties to implement the accord, observe the implementation and to help the government in transition. UNAMIR's militarized regional branch headquarters were established following the arrival of the party, and became operational on 1st November, 1993, when NMOG II components were incorporated into UNAMIR. The deployment of the UNAMIR Battalion in Kigali, comprising of people from Belgium and Bangladesh, was completed in the first half of December 1993, and on December 24 the Kigali Weapons Protection Area was established. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

The UN requested the contribution of troops, but in the beginning only Belgium with force of 400 troops and Bangladesh with a logistics component of 400 troops provided personnel. It took almost five months for them to reach the approved strength of 2548. But there were delays in the implementation of the agreement due to many unresolved issues between the parties. As a result, the interim government never happened. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

As the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed while they were returning from peace talks in Tanzania in April 1994, a Rwandan plane crashed in yet-to-be-determined circumstances landing in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. This sparked a wave of political and ethnic killings: the prime minister, cabinet ministers and UNAMIR peacekeepers were the first ones among the victims. The killings, which targeted Tutsi and moderate Hutus, were carried out mainly by armed forces, the Presidential Guard and youth militants of the ruling party were later confirmed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' Special Rapporteur on Rwanda. The power of the government crumbled as the RPF resumed its progress from the north and east of Rwanda. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

Then the formation of an interim government occurred but failed to prevent the massacre. The RPF's southward movement has greatly increased the number of displaced people and refugees. On 28th April, 1994, 280,000 people fled to Tanzania in order to get rid of the violence. A second wave of refugees went to Zaire. The UN and other agencies provided unprecedented levels of emergency assistance. UNAMIR attempted to organize a ceasefire, but without success, its personnel were attacked on a high scale. When few nations unilaterally withdrew their groups, the SC reduced the strength of UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270 by Resolution 912 (1994) on 21st April 21, 1994. The UNAMIR forces somehow managed to provide safety to thousands of people of Rwanda who sought shelter at places under the authority of UNAMIR. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

The SC adopted Resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 and imposed an embargo of arms against Rwanda. This resulted for a call of emergency international action and elevate the strength of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops. However, it took almost six months to deliver troops to member states. In order to contribute to the protection of the public, the Council, under Resolution 929 (1994) of 22nd June 1994, ordered several national humanitarian actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. French-led multinational forces launched Operation Turquoise, which made a humanitarian security zone in southwest of Rwanda. The operation came to an end in August 1994 and UNAMIR took charge of the region. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

Then the RPF forces seized control of Rwanda, ended the civil war and set a broad-based government. The new government announced its commitment to the 1993 peace agreement and promised UNAMIR to co-operate in the return of refugees. When the conflict erupted in April 1994, UNOMUR visitors expanded their surveillance operations in Uganda to the entire border region. However, the SC slowly curtailed the move, with UNOMUR leaving Uganda in September. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

By October 1994, at least half a million people were killed out of an estimated 7.9 million people of the total population. About 2 million people fled to other nations, and 2 million were displaced internally. The UN humanitarian appeal, which began in July 1994, raised \$ 762 million, thus enabling it to respond to a massive humanitarian hurdle. The Commission of Experts, set up by the SC in September 1994, said there was "great evidence" that Hutu elements had committed genocidal acts against the Tutsi group in a "coordinated, planned, methodical and systematic way". In December 1994, the final report of the Commission was presented to the Council. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

After that, UNAMIR resumed its efforts to guarantee the security and stability, to support humanitarian aid, to remove landmines, and to resettle refugees. However, Rwanda was in favor of ending the operation, saying that UNAMIR did not respond to its requirements. The SC notice that request, and in March 1996 UNAMIR left. In a meeting which was arranged by Rwanda and the UN Development Program in 1996, the international donors pledged \$ 617 million to rebuild the nation. UN agencies continue to support humanitarian assistance and help refugees to return. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

The SC set up an international tribunal for Rwanda "responsible for the genocide of Rwandan and Rwandan citizens and other perpetrators for the sole purpose of punishing those responsible for genocide and other serious humanitarian offenses in the territory of neighboring states from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994" on 8th November 1994. The tribunal based in Arusha released the first charges in 1995 and conducted the first trial in 1997. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

After five years, the UN and the entire international community have been accused of failing to stop the genocide. Considering the enormity of what happened and the questions

surrounding the actions of the UN and its member states before and after the crisis, in March 1999, with the approval of the SC, the Secretary-General appointed an independent investigation regarding those acts. Among the members was former Prime Minister of Sweden Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea Professor Han Sung-joo and Lieutenant General Rufus M. Kupolati rtd. of Nigeria. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

On 15th December 1999 the outcomes of the investigation were made public. The investigation concluded that the failure of the international community to respond was due to a lack of resources and political will, also the judgment errors regarding the type of events in Rwanda. The Secretary-General on 16th December 1999 while expressing deep regret over the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, said in a statement that he accepted the results of the report. He noted the importance of the lessons learned from the investigation and welcomed its recommendations to make sure that the UN and the international community act to avoid or prevent any other such disaster in the future. (Rwanda - UNAMIR Background, n.d.)

2.1.3. How U.N, failed Rwanda

In a statement released on Thursday 16th 1999, the United Nations and its member states failed to discredit Rwanda in 1994, ignoring evidence of a planned genocide, and finally abandoning it when the Rwandan people needed the most protection. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan in an independent report said that the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda had been destroyed by insufficient mandate from the outset, and was later demolished by the Security Council's denial to strengthen it once the massacre began. The authorities - Annan and then General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali - could not or did not want information from the field that a major assassination was taking place and that they should do something to prevent it. (Winfield, 1999)

Annan, the head of UN peacekeeping operations at the time of genocide, acknowledged the failure of the UN and expressed his "deep regret" on behalf of the organization in a statement. Annan, order the report to learn the truth about the role of the UN in the

genocide. He then appointed a three-member panel in order to conduct a 6-month analysis, and he turned over all the files of UN and Archives and the personnel of UN for testimony. The former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson led a group, which included former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo and Nigerian Major General Rufus Modupe Kupolati. Carlsson told a press conference that *"there is a failure to explain why the UN has not been able to stop or prevent genocide, it is a lack of resources and a reluctance to take the necessary commitment to avoid the genocide."* (Winfield, 1999)

The UN began a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda in October 1993 in order to keep track of the ceasefire accord between the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front and the government of Rwandan Hutu. This task, which did not allow the use of military force to achieve its objectives, was limited to investigating violations of the ceasefire, assisting with humanitarian aid of the capital, Kigali as well as lending a hand in the security. This task was not enough after the massacre of 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus following the Rwandan President's plane crash on 6th April, 1994. (Winfield, 1999)

The report misled the UN in a number of key areas up to that date, which included the failure to act on the famous cable sent by Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire on 11th January, 1994. Genocide. This cable was obtained by Annan, was not shared with the SC, and did not gain any follow up, such an important evidence said in the report. Moreover, the UN and the SC in August 1993, ignored an evaluation done by the UN human rights investigator for Rwanda who also predicated the occurrence of a genocide.

However, most of its criticisms of the report points at how the UN and especially its members of the Security Council reacted when the killings began. Within months of the completion of the failed Somalia mission, there was little political will within the House to recognize a strong peacekeeping force, especially from the US, which killed 18 Americans. After the murderers in Rwanda killed 10 Belgian peacekeepers during the onset of the genocide, the unwillingness to keep the peacekeepers in the right place greatly strengthened their mandate. (Winfield, 1999)

The report cited the withdrawal of peacekeepers from a school where thousands of civilians were expected to be safe, a major reason for the persistent bitterness that Rwandans felt towards the UN over the continuing massacre there. The report said, "The

way the troops left, including attempts to pretend that the refugees did not actually leave, was disgraceful," (Winfield, 1999)

The report then made 14 important recommendations, which included to start a plan of action in order to avoid any other genocide by calling the chief of UN. Also, that the UN apologizes to Rwanda. (Winfield, 1999).

2.1.4. UNTSO Peacekeeping in Middle East

The 1948 Arab-Israeli war broke out immediately after the declaration of independence by the State of Israel on 14th May, 1948, when five Arab states invaded the territory under a former Palestinian mandate. In 1947, and then on May 14, 1948 again, the US gave real recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel, but at the time of war, the US continued an arms embargo against all militants. (*U.S. Department of State*, n.d.)

The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1818 (the Partition Resolution) on 29th November, 1947 which in May 1948 divided Great Britain's former Palestinian mandate into Jewish and Arab nations. Under the resolution, part of the religious importance surrounding Jerusalem would be under international control supervised by the UN. The Palestinian Arabs decline the recognition of this provision, which was considered in favor of the Jews and unjust to the Arab people, who would remain in Jewish territory under secession. The US found a middle path by supporting the UN resolution, but motivated dialogue between the middle eastern Arabs and Jews. (*U.S. Department of State*, n.d.)

The UN resolution provoked conflict between Jewish and Arab groups in the Palestine. The fighting began with attacks by irregular groups of Palestinian Arabs affiliated with local units of the Arab Liberation Army, which included volunteers from Palestine and neighboring Arab countries. These groups began their ambush against Jewish cities, colonization and the armed forces. Jewish forces were comprised of underground fighters from the Jewish community of Haganah in Palestine, and two small disorderly groups, Irgun and LEHI. The aim of the Arabs was to stop the resolution of partition and avoid the making of a Jewish state. On the other hand, the Jews believed that they would gain

control over the region given to them under the partition plan. (*U.S. Department of State, n.d.*)

On 14th May, 1948 after Israel declared its independence, fighting with other Palestinian Arabs intensified, with other Arab forces invading the region under a former Palestinian mandate. On May 14, the Arabs blast off an air strike on Tel Aviv, which was opposed by the Israelis. Following the operation, Arab forces from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt occupied the former Palestinian territory. Saudi Arabia sent an organization that worked and fought under the command of Egypt. Forces from Transjordan which were British-trained eventually interfered in the conflict, but in areas which were a part of the Arab state under the UN program only and the secession of Jerusalem's separation. After the initial fighting, Israeli forces, now under joint command, were able to retaliate. (*U.S. Department of State, n.d.*)

Despite two ceasefire attacks brokered by the UN during the conflict, the fighting continued until 1949. Israel and the Arabs did not settle any formal war agreements until February 1949. Under different agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria, these countries agreed to truce. In 1947, Israel gained some of the areas previously granted to the Palestinian Arabs under a UN resolution. Egypt and Jordan regained control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The truce lasted until 1967. The US was not directly a part of the negotiations, and they hoped the Middle Eastern instability would not intervene with the UN and US international balance of power. (*U.S. Department of State, n.d.*). This conflict brought the deployment of the U.N's longest serving peacekeeping mission in Middle East. It was created in May 1948, UNTSO was the first ever peacekeeping operation established by the United Nations. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfil their respective mandates. The mission still continues and yet there is no clear mandate outlining their departure from the region.

2.1.5. Kashmir Conflict

The Kashmir issue has been in the UN forum for the last forty years and is yet to be resolved. The non-implementation of different UN resolutions on the issue is a reminder that this international body has not yet played its role in the Kashmir issue. The Kashmir dispute over the partition of the subcontinent by the British in 1947 has become a bitter tradition over time. The worst thing is that despite two direct wars over the issue in 1948 and 1965 respectively, both Pakistan and India have failed to lose tradition. The first war against Kashmir in 1948 woke UN to act, which produced a number of resolutions, the most important of which were the 13th August 1948 and 5th January 1949 resolutions. Taken together, they called for a referendum in Kashmir to determine the future situation. These resolutions were followed by UN efforts and positions of the UN observers in Kashmir were an important part of the UN involvement in the Kashmir problem at the time of Cold War. But, the variations of the Cold War era, emphasized by the adjustments demanded by Pakistan and India in the bipolar world created such impediments to the problem which is beyond the mechanism of UN. (Shakoor, 1998).

The Second War against Kashmir in 1965 created the Tashkent Agreement in 1966, which bypassed the UN by bringing normalcy to the relations between Pak-India, which came under the purview of the UN. Moreover, the separation of East Pakistan which is the end result of the war between Pakistan and India in 1971. It not only put the Kashmir issue on the backbone, but also the UN in the Kashmir conflict. India argued that the end of the Shimla Agreement between Pakistan and India in July 1972 excludes any role of the UN in conflict. The argument of the Indian side for many years not only discouraged new attempts by the UN on the Kashmir issue, but at times appeared to be absent completely. (Shakoor, 1998).

However, the Cold War years proved that issues involving a person's right to self-determination are simply not desirable. They must be addressed from the right perspective; else they will not be able to manage Kashmir as it is for India today. The crisis in Kashmir, which became a famous uprising in the autumn of 1989, had once again brought the struggle of the people of Kashmir to the forefront. People were fighting for their right to self-determination, which was enshrined in the UN Charter. The uprising

was discussed at the UN General Assembly on Kashmir. It led to a revival of Indian claims that the resolutions were no longer related. (Shakoor, 1998).

As a matter of fact, the resurgence of the Kashmir issue at the United Nations is a testament to the fact that an arena of international reputation like the UN couldn't just shy away of its obligations. Sooner or later, it will have to take on issues marginalized due to Cold War politics. (Shakoor, 1998). This mission has more similarities with the Middle East one , because they both started three years after the creation of the U.N it self and still they are famous because they never have achieved on their main mission which was to convey a lasting peace in the conflicts that they have intervened.

2.1.6. Peacekeeping operations in Somalia

The US-led operation in 1992-93 was part of a broader benevolent and PK exertion in Somalia, beginning in 1992 and ending in 1995. The intervention ended on October 3 in the Battle of Mogadishu. 4, 1993, in which 18 American soldiers and 100s of Somali soldiers and civilians died. These events lead up to Somalia's intervention in 1992 started in 1991, when Somali dictator Mohammed Siyad Bare dethrone by military regime established by an alliance of opposition military officers. Two of the most powerful warriors - Ali Mahdi Muhammad and Muhammad Farah - soon began to fight between themselves. Endless conflicts resulted in the destruction of the agriculture of the nation and as a result food shortage across the country. In 1991, UN estimated that about 4.5 million Somalis were starving. Under international pressure, militant groups, Aydid, included agreed to stop the shooting, letting UN spectators into the country and conducting relief operations there. In April 1992, a UN relief operation called Operation Provided Relief reached Somalia. But this task proved to be very difficult as different Somali soldiers ignored ceasefire and committed several wars and hijacking and looting of food trucks.

2.1.6.1. Early Efforts of UN

Despite the turmoil following the ouster of President Siad Barre, the UN has continued its humanitarian assistance in Somalia, with full involvement in the country by March 1991. In the following months, the security situation compelled the UN to retreat its personnel from Somalia on a number of occasions, but it continued its humanitarian operations as far as possible in collaboration with the ICRC and NGOs. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

The terrifying condition in Somalia resulted in the active involvement of the Secretary-General of the UN, the OAU, the LAS and the OIC with the political aspects of the disaster and push for a solution to the dispute.

The General Secretary Javier Perez de Cueller told the Security Council that he wanted to take an initiative to restore peace in Somalia on December 27, 1991. After consulting the incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he then asked the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, James O.C. Jonah to pay a visit to the region. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

Despite the continuous fighting in Mogadishu in January 1992, Mr. Jonah took a group of senior UN officials to Somalia. During that visit, all faction leaders, except General Aidid, expressed support for a ceasefire in Mogadishu. However, there was a unanimous support for the role of the UN to bring national reconciliation. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

The SC adopted its Resolution 746 (1992) supporting the Secretary-General's decision to send a technical team to Somalia in order to plan a ceasefire. The council also demanded that the committee develop a higher priority plan to guarantee the provision of humanitarian assistance. From March 23 to April 1st the team visited Somalia. The interim leader Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed letters of agreement on monitoring the ceasefire and arrangements for the equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian aid on March 28 and 27, 1992, respectively. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

2.1.6.2. Establishment of UNOSOM

In response to the Secretary-General's recommendation, the security council embrace Resolution 751 (1992), which decided to establish the UNOSOM in Somalia on 24th April, 1992. The Council called on the Secretary-General to work with the LAS, OAU and OIC to consult with all Somali parties to hold a conference on national reconciliation and unity.

According to agreements with two major Somali factions in Mogadishu, the monitoring of a ceasefire by 50 unarmed UN military observers was decided. In terms of humanitarian assistance, the security personnel expected in the contracts were UN personnel, providing security and protection for equipment and supplies at ports and airports in Mogadishu, and from there delivering humanitarian supplies to the city's distribution centers in its immediate vicinity.

The Secretary-General informed the SC that the two main factions in Mogadishu agreed to immediately stop unarmed spectators. In early July 1992, the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General of Pakistan Imtiaz Shaheen and the Party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu. The Secretary-General informed the SC after considerable delays and difficulties, the agreement had been approached with key faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 UN personnel as part of the UNOSOM in the capital. The GOP agreed to give one unit for this purpose. On 14th September, 1992, the first contingent of security forces arrived in Mogadishu. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

2.1.6.3. Expansion of UNOSOM

From May 4 to July 19, 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative held consultations with different Somali leaders. The Secretary-General reported the tough security and political conditions to the Council in Somalia and the plight of the country in terms of humanitarian assistance, recovery plans and the need for institutional restoration. The Secretary-General decided that the UN should "transform" its involvement in Somalia

and expand its efforts to bring about an efficient ceasefire across the nation, while at the same time promoting reconciliation within nation.

The Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report on 27 July 1992 and plead all Somali parties and factions to assist UN efforts to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the victims. This decision was strongly supported by the council and a decision to send another technical team to Somalia was taken. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

The Security Council, through its Resolution 775 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report on 28 August 1992 and approved the rise in the strength of the UNOSOM. The Council called on the Secretary-General to resume his efforts in cooperation with the LAS, OAU and OIC to find a comprehensive solution to the issues in Somalia. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

2.1.6.4. Deployment of UNITAF

The first components of the UNITAF were lead on December 9, 1992 in Mogadishu. At that time the UNITAF forces expanded their operations in Somalia to key relief centers. UNITAF's main goal was to create a safe environment for emergency humanitarian assistance in Somalia. When that was done, the military command was transferred to the UN. Meanwhile, UNOSOM was responsible as a whole for political aspects and humanitarian aid to Somalia. A good coordination on the ground and at UN headquarters was established between UNITAF and the UN. UNOSOM stayed in the capital and resumed to cooperate with UNITAF and plan to transition to normal peacekeeping operations. (Britannica, August 14, 2014).

Additionally, to US forces, UNITAF added Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

The Secretary-General presented a report to the Security Council on Dec 19, 1992, outlining the steps taken to implement Resolution 794 (1992), and outline his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and its transition from UNITAF to PKOs. The Secretary-General recommended that the Council postpone its decision on such a change until it was clear whether UNITOF had achieved its objective or not. It was suggested the Secretary General that it should wait for the ceasefire, the control of heavy weapons, the establishment of a new police force and the disarmament of illegal gangs. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

In another report to the Council on January 26, 1993, UNITAF Secretary-General congratulated the Government on the speedy and successful protection of key population centers and the uninterrupted delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid. As for the UNOSOM, he pointed out that its main concern at the time was planning to switch from UNITAF's operations to UNOSOM II. (Britannica, August 14, 2014).

2.1.6.5. Peace Agreements

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General ordered a meeting at the ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from January 4 to 15, 1993, and ordered a UN-sponsored National Reconciliation Conference. The meeting was attended by a total of 14 Somali political movements, including representatives of the LAS, OAU and OIC General Secretaries and the Chairman of the Standing Committee and the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement.

At the meeting the following three agreements were concluded and signed:

1: 8 January 1993 General Agreement

2: the terms of the ceasefire agreement and the methods of disarmament and

3: the criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation Conference and the agreement to create an ad hoc committee to assist in resolving any issues pending the agenda and the informal meeting.

On March 15, 1993, the informal assembly agreed to convene a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

2.1.6.6. Transition to UNOSOM II

The Secretary-General reported to the SC on his proposals for the transition from UNITOF to UNOSOM II on March 3, 1993. Since the adoption of Council Resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, UNITOF has sent about 37,000 troops to south and central Somalia. UNITAF's presence and activities have had a positive effect on Somalia's security situation and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the country still had no functioning government, no organized civil police force and no decent national armed forces. The security threat posed by the UN and its agencies, UNITOF, the ICRC and NGOs were even greater in parts of Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. Moreover, neither UNITOF nor UNOSOM troops were deployed in the Northeast and Northwest or on the Kenya-Somalia border, where security continued to be a concern. (Britannica, August 14, 2014).

Therefore, if the Security Council decided that the time has come for UNITOF to switch from UNOSOM II, the latter must grant enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN charter to establish a safe environment across Somalia. The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military unit of 20,000 and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide logistical support to carry out the assigned tasks. In addition, the US government agreed in principle to provide a tactical rapid reaction force to help UNOSOM II's commander. UNOSOM II would include civil servants, numbering approximately 2,800. The Secretary-General recommended May 1, 1993, the date for the transfer of budget and administrative authority from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was then decided that the military command transfer would take place on May 4th. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

2.1.6.7. Establishment of UNOSOM II

The Security Council adopted Article 814 (1993) of the Security Council under Article VII of the UN Charter on 26th March, 1993, which decided to expand the scope and mandate of UNOSOM according to the recommendations of the Secretary-General. It approved the mandate for the extended UNOSOM until 31 October 1993. It called on all Somali parties to fully comply with their obligations, especially the agreement on the implementation of the ceasefire and the methods and disarmament of the Council. They ensured the safety of the personnel of all organizations involved in humanitarian and other aid to Somalia. All neighboring countries were called to co-operate in enforcing the arms embargo created under 733 (1992) Resolution. (Tubbs, 1997).

Other facilities of the resolution called on the Secretary-General of the Council, via its Special Representative and with the help of all related UN agencies to provide humanitarian and other aid in the political rehabilitation of the Somali people. The aid includes relief of economy and Somali rehabilitation, repatriation of refugees and displaced people in Somalia, re-creation of national and regional institutions throughout the country, establishment of Somali police, and public information activities in support of UN operations in Somalia. (UNITED Nations Operation in SOMALIA, n.d.)

2.2. The Somali Post-Civil war- AMISOM

On 20th February, 2007, the UN security council endorsed 1744 resolution to reintroduce a peacekeeping force aimed to support the country's Transitional Federal government and to secure international aid. The idea popped up after the failure of an Ethiopian intervention and IGAD's peace deployment in 2005. The two operations fought with an Islamic military movement (UIC) that threatened neighbors and the West's interests in the region. (Jakkie Cilliers, 2010).

The idea behind AMISOM's claim that so far, the AU was sending one of its member states was to broaden the view of the African problem in an African solution, but used it without the necessary tools such as machinery and power to carry out such a difficult task in a war-torn country (Isabel K. et.al., 2013). The authors believe that AMISOM's image

did not take long to create indifference in the minds of Somali elites and the population after inviting Ethiopian and Kenyan forces to participate in the alleged sexual harassment of its troops.

However, both countries, Kenya and Ethiopia share a common hatred for Somalia and may have ambitions for the country, and this greatly enhanced the mission and the local people see them as working forces. (Pontian O., 2017). This Peacekeeping is only tackling superficial symptoms of Somalia's anarchical disorder, but ignoring key substantial elements that are necessary in the state building process which are cooperation between intervening foreign states, rebuilding the country's army and removing national interests in order to be solved the underlying problems (Isabel K. & Düsterhöft A. I. Gerlach, n.d). The lack of sufficient political and financial commitment by the AU member states and the international partners made the AMISOM mission to perform ineffectively during its presence in Somalia (Romani Prodi Report, 2008).

2.3. The Dilemma of the U.N peace enforcement

US troops volunteered for Somalia in an effort to end human suffering and hunger in the summer of 1992. During the next 27 months, the US mission to Somalia presented a number of different challenges to the US military, including many peacekeeping missions. After seeing the first achievement in creating safety and saving thousands of lives, US troops fought forces of Somalia and were withdrawn later in 1994 (Albright & Madeleine K, 1996). This provides a sight of the problem of coercive acts taking place in the chaos of a country ravaged by famine and ethnic strife. During the operation in Somalia, many traditional "peacekeeping" policies were ignored and the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement was darkened. The combination of illegal values and failure to adhere to the basic principles of peacekeeping led to inequality, confusion and ultimately reversal with deadly consequences. Finally, the US' experience in Somalia may point to a change, if not more, in US contributions to peace work. Studies from Somalia on the problems associated with peace enforcement ensure clear testing so that similar issues can be successfully controlled or mitigated in the upcoming time. In an

effort to raise awareness of the critical difficulties associated with these interventions, an assessment of the complexities that have created the state of modern peace is needed.

2.3.1. Optimism after Cold War

The end of the Cold War led to assumption about affairs of world in future. The new political climate seems to be creating an environment in which the UN can play a role in corporate governance as its founders originally thought. President George W. Bush had announced the start of a novel world order noticeable by the lack of bipolar disorder and expanded international cooperation. In line with this theme, international unity was the basis of foreign policy in the administration of President-elect President Bill Clinton and (Allard & Kenneth, 1995). UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a special statement to the UN Security Council entitled an **Agenda** for Peace in June 1992. Heartened by the extraordinary achievement of the combined safety achieved during the Persian Gulf War, his goal was to make references to strengthen UN in the area of peace and safety in the novel post-Cold War region. He was thinking of an extended part outside classical peacekeeping, which allows for the introduction of a form of coercive work already known as "coercion for peace." (Allard, C.K. 1995)

A year later, the Secretary-General noticed that an Agenda for Peace had already expired. In the words of Boutros-Ghali, "Now there is a need to provide new answers to unexpected questions. History is fast direction which is not entirely clear." (Allen, Kenneth W et al, 1993) The "unexpected questions" he referred to had further concerns about UN support for peace efforts in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Indeed, by the early summer of 1993, the initial enthusiasm and optimism for the UN's renewal and its role in the world had been severely curtailed. The worst was yet to come, at least in Somalia.

2.3.2. The Making of the "Somalia Syndrome"

Since the start of 1991, endless and extensive civil war, illegality and famine have led to deaths in Somalia. An international aid organization began flowing into Somalia in an effort to eradicate hunger and suffering in 1992. In a country without effective government

or high support infrastructure, food had become a basis of power. As a result, local "war lords" started to seize 80% of the aid supplies. (Armstrong, Charles L., 1994)

The UN approved SCR 751 in April 1992 authorizing involvement in the civil war in Somalia that directed to the establishment of the UNOSOM I. 50 UN military viewers had been positioned in Mogadishu but had shown limited success in their efforts to provide security assistance and facilitate an end to the war. In July, the UN requested more aid planes for its states. President Bush responds to Operation Provided Relief - U.S. Authorized for the use of military equipment. Shipping aid supplies and the Pakistani security force with 500 men to Somalia. Despite the heavy security force and large supplies of supplies being sent to Somalia over the next few months, safety conditions across the country tended to deteriorate. (Arnaod, S.L., 1993)

In the Pentagon the involvement of military in the situation had been described by many as a "bottomless pit," (Baker, Caleb, 1993) hunger estimates reached more than 1000 victims per day and the spread of poverty in Somalia led to increasing social growth and pressure to "do something." The UNSC in December 1992 declared that the condition in Somalia "poses a serious threat to international security." The Secretary-General and the associate states are official to "use all means necessary to create a safe haven for humanitarian activities in Somalia." (Baker, James H., 1994). President Bush then launched the mission RESTORE HOPE, in which the US would deploy 28,000 troops to the UNITAF. (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1994) Defense Secretary Dick Cheney clarified to the state in Meet the Press "our aim is to restore order so that relief efforts can continue, and then hand over the responsibility of defending the country to UN forces." (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1994). In theory, this could be a temporary job precisely designed to build a safe environment for the delivery of public services. ("Establishment and Organization of the United Nations peacekeeping mission," 1994)

UNITAF intervened and carried out a very fruitful mission in Somalia from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993, when it joined the UN peacekeeping force, UNOSOM II. Although the majority of troops returned home, the Clinton administration saw UN control as the only solution. Meanwhile, the expanded UN force included decommissioning of fighting groups and many other nation-building exertions. More and more without prudence, the

residual U.S. forces found themselves defending themselves as the safety state worsened, and they took sides against one of the fighting parties. ("Improving the capacity of the United Nations peacekeeping," 1994)

On the night of October 3, 1993, an attack intended to capture a Somali warlord turned into a 16-hour firefight pitting a hundred or so Army Rangers and commanders against several hundred unusual Somalis. Somalis surrounded the Rangers on the crowded streets of Mogadishu and turned it the deadliest firefight in the history of UN peacekeeping missions. Nineteen U.S. soldiers were killed, 70 wounded, and a helicopter pilot arrested ("Empowering the United Nations," 1993). "How could this happen?" asked the President of his advisers (Boyd, Morris J., 1995). After witnessing the horrific hiding of Somali masses vandalizing the body of US soldier on the roads of the city of Mogadishu, the US community again asked how a "humanitarian" campaign be ruined in a race between Somalis and the ones sent to help. The cost of living and blood goes beyond what the US society was agreeing to pay for the dangerous country where the interests of a less important nation were at stake. In Congress many wanted the removal of US troops and some even demand that the Secretary-General and the Secretary of Defense resign. (Brisson, D. B., 1994)

Responding to the outrage of public and political violence in the worst times of retreat in Mogadishu, President Clinton set a date to end the American people's participation in the UN nation-building in Somalia. Contrary to UN officials, he came looking for the newly arrived commander General Mohammad Aideed, bringing the bloody Ranger army, and ordered all US army to leave Somalia on March 31, 1994 (Christman, D.W., 1996). With the departure of the US, other allies started to follow. After failing to command Mogadishu in the ongoing security situation, the UN decided to withdraw from Somalia on 31st March, 1995, and abolished UNOSOM II. Back in 1992 turmoil, the future of Somalia remained in the hands of its people. 3rd October riots sparked further political violence - President Clinton's strategy to support make a UN PK force capable of international intervention with the help of American workers (Clark, J., 1993). Criticism of the United States 'involvement in the Somali issue showed growing dissatisfaction with international peacekeeping responsibilities and led to a major overhaul of the United States' expected participation in the United Nations authorizing international peacekeeping efforts.

Congress Republicans quickly embarked on a campaign to reduce the ability of the President to send US troops to other countries and to prevent them from operating under the rules of foreigners. (Clark, Walter and Robert G., 1996). Going back to the broader policy, White House officials hid the PDD 13, which was their emerging plan to get the US top military forces to authorize the most important way to adopt a UN peacekeeping mission. (Crigler, F. T, 1993). That review was reflected in the next issue of PDD-25 in May 1994, Clinton's Administrative Policy for the Transformation of Peace. In fact, that file signaled a policy change by President Clinton in ending the "most powerful leadership" that emerged at the beginning of his management. To address the need for "highly targeted options" and "dynamic analysis of needs," it developed strong new guidelines on when and how to deploy US troops abroad. (Crocker, Chester A, 1995)

Failure in Somalia had put the UN at its feet in many ways. President Kennedy once noted, "In Washington a successful policy has a thousand parents, while an unsuccessful policy is an orphan." (Curtis, Willie., 1994). For the fact that the well-thought-out proposal to capture the brutal warrior, General Aided, sought for a surprise attack that killed 23 Pakistani soldiers, backed by Ambassador of US to the UN and the Mogadishu offensive. But the casualties of the "unacceptable" ranger were tortured in chase of a UN operation and that fact alone became a threat to the President's newly emerged policy. (Dallachie, Charles A., 1995)

2.4. Query 1 of Research

Can foreign intervention help? We quote substantially some of the leading intellectuals in international relations theorists.

Rosenau defines the concept of intervention as synonymous with imperialism, aggression, colonialism, neocolonialism, war and other gross terms that are used to designate the non-cooperative interactions of nations. (Rosenau 1969, 152),

Damrosch stated that "the intervention was developed based on a general concept of the problem. In the discipline of international law, 'intervention' generally means an improper interference by an outside power with the territorial integrity or political independence of

a state.” (Damrosch 1993). Otte defined the concept of intervention in a similar way. He deeply conceptualizes the term on the side of military intervention. He defines the military intervention as an act of the states related to their perceived national interests and foreign policy objectives. Its purpose is the same as that of other form of foreign policy; it is intended to make the target state do what the intervener wants it to do. (Otte, 1995)

Freedman defined intervention as “the use of armed force to influence the character and course of a developing conflict which is neither taking place upon nor directly threatening national territory, and does not touch upon any specific obligations to allies”. However, he points out that these normative ways of defining intervention make it hardly possible to distinguish the concept from the notion of influence. (Freedman, 1994). As Regan points out, there exist various types of third-party intervention. There also exists a range of intervention strategies that may be employed by the interveners (Regan, 2000). Yoon argued that intervention entails different levels of actions ranging from verbal statements, economic assistance or the withholding of economic assistance, initiation or increase of arms supply, deployment of advisers, deployment of combat personnel into a war zone, to actual military engagement in combat. (Yoon, 1997)

Pearson described foreign military intervention as “the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country, or a group of countries in concert, across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or actions by troops already stationed in the target country”. (Pearson, 1974)

Peksen argued that military intervention contributes to the rise of state repression by enhancing the state's coercive power and encouraging more repressive behavior, especially when it is supportive or neutral towards the target government (Peksen, D. 2012). Results from Bivariate Probit and Logic Models estimated on time-series cross-section shows that supportive and neutral interventions increase the likelihood of extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment, and torture. Hostile interventions increase only the probability of political imprisonment according to Peksen.

2.5. Research Question 2

Why was the foreign military intervention in Somalia a failure? Seeks answers to the failures faced by foreign forces since their arrival in Somalia. The dragging of dead U.S. soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu was a turning point in the United States' highest-level intervention in Africa. The images which were broadcasted around the world outraged many. In October 1993, the elite American forces launched a deadly attack on the Somali capital, Mogadishu. (UN, 1994). Their aim was to capture a key Somali warlord, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed. But the US forces faced fierce resistance from Aideed's militia. A US Black Hawk helicopter was shot down. In the ensuing battle, hundreds of Somalis were estimated to have died, 18 Americans and two UN soldiers were killed. At the time, the United States was leading a UN's mission to end the civil war and famine in Somalia. (BBC, 1993).

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines a comprehensive research methodology including the design, research setup and tools such as data collection processes with concise data breakdown. The study was inspired by UN research on "Civil Defense: Building a Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia," a report by the UN Office of Human Rights and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) covers the period from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017. During this time, UNSOM recorded 2,078 deaths and 2507 injuries. More than half of the wounded (60 per cent) were killed by Al Shabab militants, 13 percent in the clan militias, 11 percent in state actors, including military and police, 4 percent in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and 12 to unknown or unidentified attackers.

“Ultimately, civilians are paying the price for failure to resolve Somalia’s conflicts through political means,” said the head of UNSOM, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia Michael Keating. “And parties to the conflict are simply not doing enough to shield civilians from the violence. This is shameful.”

Citizens were victims of an illegal attack - both by direct targeting and by indiscriminate bombings and suicide attacks by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Such attacks, which are prohibited under human rights and humanitarian law, are, in many cases, likely to be war crimes, and it is important that perpetrators are identified and held accountable, the report said. The worst-case scenario in a single day was the bombing of two Somali capitals, Mogadishu, on October 14, attributed to Al-Shabaab by Somali government officials, in which at least 512 people were officially reported dead since December 1, with 357 wounded.

“This barbaric act was the deadliest attack with an improved explosive device (IED) in Somalia’s history and surely one of the worst ever on the continent, if not the world,” Special Representative Keating said. “Sadly, its impact will be felt for a long time.”

Significant numbers of civilian casualties - 251 killed and 343 wounded - was attributed to clan militia in areas where federal or state security forces were largely absent. The report stated that “The drought has intensified clan conflict due to competition over resources. These conflicts are exploited by anti-government elements to further destabilize areas, diminish prospects for lasting peace and weaken civilian protection.”

It should be noted that the number of casualties to AMISOM, including the Somali National Army and the police, was much lower than that of Al Shabab terrorists.

“Nevertheless, such casualties are of utmost concern as they undermine the Somali population’s trust in the Government and the international community, which in turn expands the space in which anti-government elements continue to operate,” said by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein.

UNSOM HRPG International Best Practice, records victims of human rights-based monitoring, MRM guidelines and the UN Field Manual on the serious abuse of children in armed conflict. The report points to civilian deaths where there is good reason to believe that they were killed or injured as a direct result of military equipment and the actions, decisions and / or motives that cause them to be most directly related to conflict. UNSOM monitored allegations against all parties to the dispute and reports violations regardless of who started them. It conducts interviews, site visits, and other methods of data collection, following strict rules to ensure the confidentiality of resources to avoid injury and to ensure the trust of the UN. Although the report seeks to determine the number of people injured during the period of reporting, it should be noted that all civilian deaths are not in violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. According to international humanitarian law, parties must at times separate civilians from combatants and civilian objects and military targets and take all reasonable measures to prevent loss of life, death or injury or destruction of property from an attack aimed at a legitimate military purpose, which does not violate international humanitarian law. UNSOM recognizes that the death of civilians and destruction of civilian objects during an armed conflict, no matter how grave, may not in and of themselves violate international law and makes every effort to identify as precisely as possible the party responsible for a particular civilian casualty (Illegal Protection of OHCHR, 2017)

The report found that AMISOM forces were involved in the killing of 95 innocent civilians, including children (Grubeck, 2011). According to the report, foreign troops also injured 86 other people with widespread sexual allegations during that period. This research of AMISOM's failure to maintain peacekeeping and security in Somalia has been analyzed from practical and reliable data including authentic academic writings, books, journals, newspapers and other educational resources to assess the causes of the failure of the operation.

3.2. Research Design

Life without inquiry is not worth living for a human being (Socrates, 469-399 BC), where research is regarded as a tool for gathering information, assessing existing knowledge and exploring new knowledge and adventure. We have two widely spread models of research: one is quantitative and other one is qualitative. This research will be based on a type of research that focuses on literature-based research, with the aim of developing new ideas and assumptions that mean it is qualitative in nature. The ethnographic or interpretative research is mainly known as Qualitative research. It is defined as a scientific method of observation to gather non-numerical data. This type of research refers to “the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and description of things and not to their counts or measures” (Aspers, P.& Corte, U., 2019) The aim of a good qualitative study is to access the phenomena of interest from the perspective of the subject; to describe what is going on; and to emphasize the importance of both context and process (Heyink, J & Tymstra, T, 1993).

Quality research is a form of research that analyzes information transmitted through language and behavior in natural environments. It is used to obtain detailed information on a wealth of information about basic beliefs, values, feelings, and behavior. Its methods are derived from a variety of disciplines and traditions. (Crabtree BF & Miller WL, 1992). Qualitative methods originate from different disciplines and traditions. They are used to learn directly what is important to them from patients and others, to provide the context needed to understand quantitative outcomes, and to identify important variables for future clinical studies. Although qualitative inquiry has emerged as a way to "reaching the parts

that other methods cannot reach" (Pope C & Mays N, 1995). It also causes some distrust because it rarely provides a generalize foundation for clinical decisions and procedures.

Some qualitative approaches use techniques (such as statistical content analysis) to determine the significance of results, while others rely on the thought reflection of researchers. Ethnography is a kind of inquiry that combines these approaches, and we use techniques from this tradition to explain our themes. Ethnography is a semi-structured way to learn about people and their culture. With specific questions in mind, ethnographic researchers immerse themselves in the environment to learn meanings, traditions of behavior, and important ways of thinking when a group of people emerge in unheard encounters with a focus on specific questions. (Ventres W.B & Frankel R.M, 1996) The use two or more evaluators helps in ensuring the reliability of ethnographic data, as well as a detailed calculation of how the study analysis is performed. Researchers can verify their results by collecting data from private sources, presenting basic results to study participants' opinions, and carefully examining alternative or "unique" data. These strategies are likely to be more advanced as they emerge to agree on the need for greater road skills in quality research (Inui TS & Frankel RM, 1991). There are frequently used techniques when using Qualitative research and include random data collection, descriptive field notes, critical event reports, detailed analysis documents, instructional interviews, etc. Some qualitative methods use technical methodologies like statistical analysis for determining the value of the findings, while others depend on the assumptions made by the researcher. Ethnography is a way of asking questions which can combine these methods, and we will use these methods from this culture to show our findings. (Lincoln Y.S. & Guba E.G., 1985).

3.3. Research Setting

The study highlights the important reasons behind the UN's peacekeeping failures over the past few decades with a particular focus on AMISOM mission which serves under the African Union mandate and the support of the United Nations. In order to produce valid and reliable research, the study employs three methods which are, content analysis, textual analysis and transcribing. Amy cited CA as a technique used to recognize patterns in

logged interactions. To analyze content, the researcher systematically collects data from inscribed, spoken, or graphic texts books, newspapers and journals, speeches and meetings, Content Web content and social media content and photos and movies (Amy Luo, 2019)

Content analysis can be both quantitative (focusing on calculation and measurement) and qualitative (focusing on translation and comprehension). In both cases, you analyze the results by dividing the words or "code" into sections, themes and concepts in the text. Content analysis is used by researchers to determine the benefits, messages and effects of communication content. They can also comment on the makers and viewers of the books they review. Content analysis can be utilized to quantify when certain words, phrases, subjects or concepts occurs in a set of historical or contemporary texts, for example, you can analyze campaign speeches for frequency to explore the importance of employment issues in political campaigns. It can also be used to find the differences over time or between candidates using terms such as unemployment, jobs and job and statistical analysis. In addition, content analysis can be used to create quality impressions by analyzing the semantic and semantic relationship of words and concepts, to gain a more qualitative understanding of employment issues in political campaigns, to identify the term unemployment in speech, and to identify other terms. Or explore the meanings of these relationships and better understand the phrases that follow and the intentions and goals of different campaigns. Because content analysis can be applied to a wide range of texts, it is used in a variety of fields, including marketing, media studies, anthropology, cognition, psychology, and the social sciences. It has a variety of benefits: identifying relationships for how ideas are expressed, understanding the intentions of an individual, group or organization, identifying campaign and communication biases, showing communication differences in different contexts, and analyzing the effects of interactive content such as flow information or response of audience.

The second type of the method which is textual analysis. All kinds of information can be derived from the text – from its literal meaning to the subtext, symbolism, assumptions, and the values it reveals. It is widely used to describe, interpret and understand texts and it often aims to connect the text to a broader social, political, cultural, or artistic context. Text analysis is often used extensively in written language, remembering how broad the

word “text” is and how different approaches can be. Usually working within a specific theoretical framework (e.g., using postcolonial theory, media theory, or semiotics), researchers try to connect the elements of their texts with issues in contemporary politics and culture. They can analyze many different aspects of the text:

- Word selection
- Design elements
- The position of the text
- The target audience
- Relation to other texts

Text analysis in this context is generally creative and qualitative in its approach. Researchers try to shed some light on the underlying politics or social context of the cultural object they are examining. (Jack Caulfield, 2019)

The third type, the study employs is transcribing. it is converting speech to text word for word. Transcribing is a common practice when conducting interviews because it enables you to perform analysis. It can be done in the following five steps,

- Choose your preferred transcription method
- Transcribe the audio
- Add speaker designation and time stamps
- Clarify the transcript where needed
- Proofread the transcript

The research is mainly based on Somalia, an East African country that has been embroiled in controversy for decades. Civil war is an armed struggle between organized political parties in a state, often to control the state or to establish a new state. (Andrew Haywood, 2011). Over the past two decades the situation in Somalia and the context in which it has taken place have been constantly changing. It has evolved from a civil war in the 1980s, with the fall of the empire, factionalism and warlordism in the 1990s, to a globalized ideological conflict in the first decade of the new millennium.

3.4. Data Collection and Sampling

Qualitative research is infinitely creative and detailed. Qualitative commentaries are constructed and various methods can be used to understand data such as content analysis and grounded theory (Glazer & Strauss, 1967). Key aspects of qualitative research,

- Events can be understood enough if they appear as a theme. Hence, a qualified researcher is immersed in this field, in the natural environment. The circumstances of the case were not made; They are natural. Nothing is predetermined or taken lightly.
- Qualitative researchers want their students to speak for themselves and express their views through words and other actions. Hence, qualitative research is an interconnected process in which educated people teach the researcher about life.
- A qualitative researcher is an important part of the data, apart from the participant's participation, no data is available.
- Research design takes place during the study and can be modified or changed as it progresses.
- For a good researcher, there is no single truth, which shows subjectivity and exists only as a reference to the observer.
- Theory is driven by data, and develops as part of the research process and when data is gathered.

Due to the involvement of time and cost, qualitative models often do not take samples from large-scale data. The main criticism is the issue of insufficient authenticity or reliability. Due to the nature of the qualitative data and source in one case, it is hard to put in the traditional standards e.g., because of the key role a researcher has played in data production, it is not possible to demonstrate quality studies. Also, content, events, situations, and interactions cannot be duplicated at any level or extended in a broader context than one that is read with confidence. The time required for data collection, analysis and interpretation is very high. Analysis of qualitative data is difficult and requires the knowledge of a local expert to understand qualitative data and should be taken seriously in doing so. Therefore, this makes quality research more expensive, a much

deeper understanding of the study situation. The best ways to gather relevant information are individual interviews, focus groups, observations and research

Qualitative data collection and analysis simultaneously proceeds usually; Ongoing innovation affects the kind of data gathered and the way they are gathered. Creating notes called memos is an important way to collect data and analyze data as a continuous analysis. Notes follow the researcher's idea and help guide the final idea in answering the research queries and provide an idea or theory as an explanation for the answers. These memos support all relevant analysis of data tasks suggested by Miles and Huberman: data reduction (context exclusion), data presentation (description editing) and conclusions (describing results) (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The validity of quality research is often called honesty or trustworthiness. Common methods of checking authenticity include compliance checks. Independent codes can sample raw data and generate codes or categories to test the compatibility of data reduction methods. The use of affiliate checks is also common. Research participants who generate raw data, often referred to as informers, may be asked to review definitions and definitions taken from the data (e.g., "Does this represent your information?", "Did I capture the concept of this event?"). Other participants, especially those affected by the study, may also have a say on the outcomes.

Qualitative data analysis often follows a general induction approach (as opposed to a hypothetical-deductive approach) in the sense that no clear theories are imposed on the data in the test of a particular hypothesis. Instead, data are allowed to "speak for themselves" through the emergence of conceptual categories and descriptive themes. These themes are usually embedded in a framework of interconnected ideas which "makes sense". The researcher refers to the literature on a topic in an attempt to explain the conceptual framework, with a theory (or revision of one), describing the phenomenon being studied. Very different interpretations are considered before the researcher makes a coherent argument as transparent as possible (indicating how the conclusion was reached) so that others can judge the authenticity of the study. This is not to say that qualitative researchers will never use deductive reasoning. Conversely, if a very specific hypothesis can be removed from a more general theory, qualitative researchers can explore this hypothesis using simple data collection methods (interview, observation, document retrieval). The results are obvious. (Yin, 2009), in fact, recommends that in most

contextual studies there should be theoretical propositions prior to data collection and analysis. This research uses existing knowledge, which is called secondary resources. This includes the use of literature from previous research, books, journals, articles, media products, government reports, as well as historical information.

3.5. Conclusion

This is basically a desk study with analysis of secondary data. Secondary data analysis can be described as the analysis of data collected by other researchers or organizations for their study. The analysis units for this study are; Official organizational documents, published research, books and mass media publications related to peace operations in Somalia which relates to the UN, AU and the European Union. Therefore, data was obtained from secondary sources which includes; Published research and mass media sources, including official corporate documents, books and articles.

Additionally, I used documents of organizations such as reports on annual basis, mission reports, corporate charts, news releases, advertisements and public relations material gathered from corporate websites and other trusted and genuine online sources, they are expected to provide in-depth insight into important information relevant to fulfilling the research purpose.

Mass media sources such as international news organizations are important as data sources useful in reporting conflicts and international organizations in general, and, according to the focus of this study, they are highly related to the study and possess a lot of important information which I studied and analyzed qualitatively for my research.

Furthermore, I used books, reviewed articles and research reports from research institutes, and published research for my study. I gathered all the relevant information regarding Somalia and the peacekeeping operations, their causes and failures, quantitatively analyzed them and compared them with other material in order to find the root causes of the failure and to provide suitable solution.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Background

Although Somalia is racially, religiously and linguistically similar, it is divided into ethnic groups in order to restore their ancestry to their common ancestor. It had become an important part of state administration and political competition during the period of Colonia for the kings of Italy and Great Britain. Rulers of Colonia had established a patriarchal distribution of system of resource, implemented strategies for segregation and succession of families, and participated in corporate punishment. All of these strategies will be used in the next violence.

Somalia gained independence ten years later from 1950 to 1960 under UN rule. The North and South states came together under a multi-party democracy that lasted from 1960 to 1969. In 1969, President Siad Barre came in to power. From 1969 to 1978, the Barre dynasty enjoyed widespread interest in and support from the Soviet Union and its Western institutions. While portraying Somalia as the constitutional state of international actors, Barre developed a patriarchal state that revolved around family self-awareness. The government sponsored and provided weapons to the leaders of the organizations, which is a way to increase relations between communities that had previously lived together and married in minor disputes. Instead of excluding certain families altogether, Barre collaborated with the main characters in other families, creating divisions among the larger families. During this time, the law gave the state greater power to imprison and enforce. Powerful officers, soldiers, and security agencies were set up, including the NSS and Victory Pioneers. Despite numerous incidents of political violence, it led to the death of a few people; from 1945 to 1975 not a single incident caused more than 100 deaths. (Bradbury, Mark. 2008)

After 20 years of rule, the country fell into civil war, killing hundreds and displacing more than a million to neighboring countries, Kenya and Ethiopia. As a result of the fierce clashes between the warlords and the government, the armed struggle prompted the overthrow of President Siad Barre, who later fled to Nigeria for an amnesty and the

country became even more chaotic to be occupied by the UN. While the southern and central regions were in turmoil, in the north, Somaliland emerged from Somalia, declaring independence in 1991. In the northeast, Puntland became an independent state within the Somali federal structure in 1998. Both Somaliland and Puntland have enjoyed some degree of stability.

My research suggests that AMISOM has provided significant success, but that it has been restricted by major structural, political, and operational challenges. The most important achievement achieved by it was the transformation of Somalia and the protection of federal governments. It also reduced al-Shabab from the "Golden Age" in 2010 and forced top forces out of Mogadishu in 2011. AMISOM has helped as well in increasing access to assistance and provided various relief to many Somalis. The operation also provides a security base that relies on all other international actors in Somalia.

Some major issues were there as well. AMISOM has failed to defeat Al-Shabab, has rarely been able to operate as a united mission due to dissimilarities between its military allies, and has tried to do important non-military stability measures. It could not force Somali officials to reconcile and implement a plan for national security aimed on defeating Al-Shabab. Therefore, today AMISOM is facing an insurmountable enemy like other peacekeeping organizations while waiting for Somali politicians to build effective local security forces that will allow it to descend.

4.2. Somalia: A country without army

The Security Council agreed unanimously to outspread the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandate in the country until May 2019. The security situation was deteriorating day by day. 2 car bombs resulted in the death of six people on August 5, 2018; one was in Mogadishu, and another in neighboring town. After some days later, a renown young businessman was killed, provoking protests wanting better liability and safety. AMISOM was first installed to Somalia in 2007 with a six-month warrant to fight al-Shabab, an anti-government terrorist organization. At first a secret Uganda peacekeeping force, AMISOM was growing in size and capacity, and now has 22,000 troops from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Sierra Leone. Not like

traditional peacekeeping operations, AMISOM participated in anti-insurgency campaign, completing itself as a real force until the SNA was strong to fight the group of jihadi alone.

"Somalia is like cleaning a pig," a colonel of Uganda at AMISOM said to international policy. You clean it, and then it gets dirty. "He compared Somalia to Afghanistan, arguing that the Taliban could easily recapture the country if the coalition left in Afghanistan. This was also true in Somalia.

Somalia has been rated by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world for 11 years, representing the worst modern war and global economic development. But Somalia has never been a war zone like this before. The Republic of Somalia was a stable, prosperous democracy after the British occupation of Somalia and the unification of the former Italian colony of Somalia in the first ten years after independence, after the unification in 1960. While politicians set out nationalistic ideals on behalf of Greater Somalia, the country built a powerful force called the "African Lions" with the help of Soviet Union. The country's military academies were well-resourced to support effective training at that time.

Nowadays, after 10s of years of military dictatorship, failed foreign escape, civil war and armed uprising, there is not enough money for things like radio and security equipment. Most soldiers of SNA work on flip flops. (Amanda Sperber, 2018)

4.3 Foreign Military Intervention

The findings of this study show that foreign intervention can make the situation worse in war-torn countries such as Somalia. This study is intended to investigate why UN activities fail despite collective support. Scholars who have previously done research on this topic have emphasized the importance of the UN in mitigating the crisis in the regions but have also questioned and criticized the policies established with the goal of resolving the global crisis. For example, Dennis found that massive internal and external factors contributed to the failures of the UN. Among the factors he mentioned were the lack of cooperation between the warring parties, the involvement of foreign hands that often-

fueled national resources and conflicts of a particular country, seeking their own private interests. (Dennis c. Jet, 1999)

William Showcase, author of 'Deliver Us from Evil', writes that the UN's peacekeeping operations will start more problems for the citizens they are assigned to protect. For example, he takes the example of Bulgarian soldiers sent to Cambodia for peacekeeping operations, who are more interested in sex than ceasefire on the sides of the conflict.

In his book, he explores that humanitarian aid, such as food transportation, can only be used to supply combatants, and thus prolong the suffering of people who are starving for food. The notable failures in the UN's peace keeping operations include the shortage of staff that have the necessary knowledge of the intervened country and a good example is UN supported mission of AMISOM.

One notable failure of UN peacekeeping operation is the shortage of personnel with the necessary knowledge about the country involved and a good example is the UN supported mission for AMISOM. Some peacekeepers do not have the linguistic skills in order to communicate. During a mission in Cyprus, some peacekeepers did not able to speak the local languages such as Greek or Turkish. This also applies to, Albanian or Serbo-Croatian in Kosovo, Arabic or Nuer in South Sudan and French or Haitian Creole in Haiti. (Séverine Autesserre, 2019)

This study found that the UN's preferred approach to deal with the civil wars and creating peace on the warning sides contributed less to decrease violence. The top-down approach starting from the upper castes and holding expensive meetings between rebel leaders can subsidize even more diverse issues in this regard. In his latest article on the peacekeepers crisis, Séverine Autesserre said that peacekeepers have no resources but a structural deficit that does not apply to its universal policies when operating in a foreign country.

4.4 UN Experience in Somalia

The UN's involvement in Somalia emerged, when the country plunged into a bloody civil war, which took the lives of 300,000 people and displaced more than 800,000 people into the neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. The Republic of Somalia gained

independence from the colonists in July 1960, after the unification of the Trust Territory of Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland and the state of Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland)).

The unification of the two was to liberate the country as a result of mixed conflicts and was led by young Somali nationalists, mostly known as the SYL (Somali Youth League). After a nine-year parliamentary system, President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and the Supreme Revolutionary Council military junta came to power after a bloodless uprising. The word junta means meeting or 'committee' and originated in the national and local junta that organized the Spanish resistance to the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808. (John S. Richardson & Juan Vernet, 2000). The involvement of the UN originated when the country now descended into a bloody civil war that claimed 3000,000 lives (UN, 1992). The United Nations response has been far-reaching and system-wide, including peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building.

Reesman described peacemaking as a practical conflict transition that focuses on establishing equal power relations to avert future conflict, including the establishment of ways to often agree on ethical decisions within warring parties. (Reesman, W. 1994). What is different from peacekeeping is that peacemaking seeks complete reconciliation among disputed stakeholders. For the first time in 40 years, the Security Council was allowed to exercise its powers to the fullest at the end of the Cold War, mainly due to the power struggles between the US and its rival, the USSR. The body has authorized the deployment of peacekeeping forces to certain countries, such as Somalia, Cambodia and Mozambique. In 1992, the UN launched the UNOSOM I mission to oversee the ceasefire which was intended to stop the war. According to the UN, the order was extended to include the protection of humanitarians identified as sending a Pakistani battalion to Somalia in September. At the time, the Somali conflict was not a UN issue. It was much more complicated than the mission involved, because the warring sides turned a deaf ear to stop the war. In addition to blocking international aid, the warlords attacked aid workers and shelled food supplies arriving at Mogadishu's main port.

In December 1992, a multinational task force led by the United States was sent to join the peace process, which was continuing in the formerly troubled country. Peace is enforced

when blue helmets are used by the military to neutralize any situation and only the Security Council should issue such an order. The term enforcement appears in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and prescribes the use of military operations by order of the Security Council. (UN Charter).

“When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.” (Article 44 of the UN Charter Reads.)

Shortly after the launch of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in May 1993, one commentator claimed that Somalia has become "the testing ground for new peacekeeping and peacemaking ideas for the United Nations"(S. M. Makinda, 1993). UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who had a longstanding in the country, was very determined to send an intervention team to Somalia. This intervention was considered an attempt in many ways: it was the first time in the history of the UN that law enforcement work was directed by the Secretariat; and it was the first time that the UN had taken full responsibility for governing the country; and, finally, it was the first time that the UN peacekeeping mission had been given the enormous task of providing relief supplies, disarming combatants, making political reconciliation and rebuilding society. When UNOSOM II was ousted from Somalia in March 1995, it had not yet established public institutions and a well-established government, but it had provided valuable lessons for those involved.

The biggest success of peace enforcement was the defeat of the famine, which allowed food routes to reach rebel-held areas in the Somali capital. Both peace making and peace building have so far achieved little in the country.

4.5 Transition Period

The Security Council ordered the withdrawal of the UN forces in March 1995, botching to implement sustainability in its costly enforcement operations. According to the UN the

time of the withdrawal, the immediate threat of further famine had been averted, but there were no reconciliation congregations held, putting the little achievements in sabotage. The failure to contain insurgency and mitigate guerilla wars, the U. N's main withdrawal was caused by the death of 42 troops that were serving under the mission including 18 U.S. soldiers. (New York Times, 1993).

AMISOM swapped and included IGASOM which began with the aim of creating comprehensive dialogue and reconciliation between the Somali conflicting sides. The 8000 troops were dispatched in September, 2006 but with the approval of the African UN and the endorsement of the UN IGAD is comprised of Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan. The AMISOM Mission was created by the Security Council of the African Union in January 2007 to replace IGASOM. Both AMISOM and IGSOM are approved by the Security Council.

4.6 AMISOM as Challenge

In analyzing an interview, we were with a retired Somali general, two themes discussed in this section emerged. These themes are an imminent challenge for AMISOM to allow Somalia to have its own independent military organizations and the international community has no problem supporting foreign forces operating with their funds.

The data reveal that the collapse and the absence of the Somali forces is not only a source of job security for the foreign troops but also puts the country in a position that it relies on the foreign troops for its domestic issues such as stabilizing and defeating the higher terrorist organizations and a good example is Al-Shabaab. Former Somali military commander Ahmed Abdi Abubakar has suggested that AMISOM's presence in the country could further complicate the deteriorating situation and undermine the country's plan to stand on its own two feet. He discussed why the UN is investing in foreigners and financially ignoring Somalia's path to having independent military institutions.

Mr. Abubakar discusses that 'If the Somali army is given large funds to go to AMISOM, Al Shabab will be defeated and the operation will sooner or later become history and the international community, mainly known as the UN, does not want that to happen. The

\$230 salary given to each Somali soldier is not enough to be liberate an entire country.” He noted that AMISOM's reactive approach to terrorist attacks was inadequate to maintain security and gave the Al-Shabab group more opportunity. The group is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda operating in East Africa, especially in Somalia. The UN and its allies in the country do not like to defeat Al Shabab, because AMISOM stays in their camps and attacks only when the UN and the EU give their green light. We have seen many times that AMISOM did not join the front line when Somali national forces were fighting Al-Shabab. The general suggested that “Never assume that International community including the UN would spend time rebuilding Somalia’s army, they might support the local police, but it is the Somali government’s responsibility. The military represents the flag, the soil and the nationwide as whole.”

4.7 The Threat of Al-Shabab

Western governments see growing force of al-Shabab group as a big threat to Africa Horn. The western forces learned enough about the illegal U.S. intrusion that appeared in the 1991-93 "Black Hawk Down" which made them realized that this was not the solution. However, with al Qaeda assisted forces controlling Somalia's ruined Mogadishu, there is every motive for Western and African democracies in the region to be concerned. On August 24, 2010 al-Shabab claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed at least 30 people, counting 6 members of parliament. Till the three-year-old Somali temporary government stands up to the trial, there is good hope for steadiness in the 6,000-strong AMISOM operation, which is largely controlled by Ugandan and Burundian forces and heavily funded by the countries concerned about East Africa threat. (Scott B., 2010)

"There are not many countries lining up to join this mission," says E.J. Hogen-doorn. "Everybody is worried, but no one wants to be the one endangering their forces' lives.

"Now we hear of reinforcements for AMISOM, but even the Ethiopian contingent numbered 40,000 troops, and they still weren't able to pacify the place," he added. Ethiopia took over Somalia from 2007 to 2008, when Al Shabab was less intimidating.

This is not to say that Somalia does not have foreign intervention. Twenty years after the fall of Somalia's last government, the country has received a major foreign aid package. Today, half the population survives on foreign food aid. But foreign forces are strengthening the hand of nationalist or religious extremist politicians, and boycotting American intervention and the legacy of the Ethiopian invasion has become the hardest warlord network. On August 24 2010 Al-Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohammed Rage said that al-Shabab would launch a war on "invaders" - targeting Burundian and Ugandan militaries on AMISOM.

Hit by al-Shabab attacks in Kampala, in 2010 has promised to increase troops to the campaign and there are gossips that South Africa will donate to the overall defense force. However, AMISOM said the resolution would have to come from the Somali government. The transitional government is still recruiting forces to prepare for an attack on al-Shabab, most of them European Union-trained in Uganda. Fighting with al-Shabab continues in Somalia amid moderate Islamist militants. (Scott B., 2010)

AMISOM spokesperson Maj. Barigye Bahoku said "We have to dissipate the perception that AMISOM is looking for more soldiers to fight Al Shabab,". "Our mandate is to maintain peace and create an environment for national discussion and political settlement. We cannot directly confront Al Shabab, but we have the right to self-defense when we are attacked." (Scott B., 2010)

4.8 AMISOM Mandate

Since being sent to Mogadishu in March 2007, AMISOM has undergone significant changes. Geographically, these operations began to protect other regions in Mogadishu, but they have continued to spread southern Somalia. Militarily, AMISOM has extended from the early capacity of 1,600 to more than 22,000 forces. This mission is one of the important peace initiatives ever done. It depends on an extraordinary group of international partners to support the goal of helping Somalia achieve stability.

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017), AMISOM must pursue the following objectives:

1. Begin regular assignment of safety errands from AMISOM to Somali safety militaries on the capabilities of Somali safety armies and political and safety development in Somalia;
2. Reducing the danger posed by Al-Shabaab.
3. Support security processes in Somalia at all levels and assist to stabilize, reconcile and build peace in Somalia;

Since their arrival in 2007, both the UN and the AU have repeatedly expanded mission orders without departure plans due to national security concerns. However, their departure may be challenging, but previous military operations in Somalia have been far less successful. AMISOM Operation is the longest running African mission in East Africa. [...]

According to the same resolution of UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017), AMISOM has the authority to perform the following functions required to achieve the following objectives:

1. Maintain presence in the areas specified in the AMISOM Concept of Operation, with a focus on major population centers.
2. Appropriately, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali security forces from assisting in the performance of their duties, without aiding their efforts to build reconciliation and peace and the security of vital infrastructure.
3. To defend its people, services, installation, gear and operations, and to safeguard the safety and liberty of its people, as well as to UN staff authorized by the Security Council
4. Countries and the AU emphasize that the supply of goods is a joint responsibility between the UN and the AU, including areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, especially those critical to improving the human condition and vital to AMISOM funding.
5. To carry out targeted activities against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including cooperation with the Somali Security Force
6. Advising and assisting Somali security forces, soldiers and police, in collaboration with UNSOM and in line with National Security Architecture

7. To restructure AMISOM, as security conditions permit, authorized AMISOM personnel in support of police personnel within the ceiling, and to provide updates on restructuring through the Secretary-General;

8. Coordinating with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia, on a temporary basis, as appropriate to defectors;

Table 1 below summarizes 9 operations installed in Somalia between 1992 and 2015.

The last four were arbitrary operations conducted by Kenya and Ethiopia.

Table 4.1.: Failed military operations in Somalia 1993-2015

Operation	Exit Year	Participated by	Mechanism	Success or Failure
UNSOM 1	1993	Changed circumstances	Successor mission	Failure
UNITAF	1993	Avoid quagmire	Successor mission	Partial success
UNSOM2	1995	Withdrawal of Key TCC	Phased withdrawal	failure
IGASOM	2006	N/A didn't deploy	Successor mission	Failure
International Stabilization Force	2008	N/A didn't deploy	Successor mission	Failure
Ethiopian Intervention 1	2009	Avoid quagmire	Phased withdrawal	Partial success
Kenyan Intervention	2012	Legitimacy \$ Financial costs	Re-Hatted forces	Partial success
Ethiopian Intervention 2	2014	Legitimacy \$ Financial costs	Re-Hatted forces	Partial success

Ethiopian Intervention 3	Ongoing	---	---	Too soon to Tell
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Table 1 - 1

Table 2 explains in depth the causes that resulted the failure.

Table 4.2: The causes that resulted the failure

No.	Results	Description	Source
1	Peacekeeping as a tool	International organizations are a tool that works for the strong nations that seek obsolete gains on the weaker nations and it also destroys the power of the nation-state.	(Adrew Heywood, 2011) Global Politics
2	Sexual Abuses	Soldiers from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have sexually abused and exploited vulnerable Somali women and girls on their bases in Mogadishu. The 71-page report documents the sexual exploitation and abuse of Somali women and girls on two AMISOM bases in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, since 2013.	(Samer Muscati & Laetitia Bader, 2014)
3	Increased violence	The Islamist armed group Al-Shabab subjected people living under its control to harsh treatment, forced recruitment, and carried out deadly attacks targeting civilians. In only 2019 UN office in Somalia reported 982 deaths under the AMISOM watch.	(Feakin, T, 2014) Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
4	External Factors	Huge external factors that are causing the incompetence of the organization's peacekeeping stumbles which include the lack of cooperation between the warring sides, the resources of the country itself and the involvement of	(Marchal R, 2000) Critique Internationale, (8), 64-64

		foreign hands who often fuel the conflicts of a particular country, seeking their own private interests.	
5	Wrong Approach	U. N's failure in peacekeeping is not lack of resources, but lack of structure and the methods that it applies such as universal approaches, for example UN often focus on top down approach which starts from the elites and hosting costly conferences in order to pave the way for an agreement between rebel leaders in the aim of holding national vote and declaring victory.	(Séverine Autesserre, 2019) Foreign Affairs.
6	Timing Problem	Since the inception of the UN endorsed mission of AMISOM operation it had renewed its mission several times without prior and clearer vision of the operations fate. Before its end time AU renews the stay of the foreign troops in the country.	(Lotze, W & Williams, P, 2016) The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia (pp. 17-21, Rep.)
7	Structural problem	The study found that bottom up strategy is the best way to deal with war torn countries. The structural problem of top down approach only increases violence and promotes the interest war stakeholders.	(Séverine Autesserre, 2019) Foreign Affairs.
9	Territorial ambitions	Kenya and Ethiopian who were part of the mission share historical enmities with Somalia and might have territorial ambitions, and this has largely affected the mission and the local population saw them as an occupation force	https://www.mustaqbalradio.net/saldhigga-muran-badeedka-soomaaliya-iyo-kenya-aragtida-sharciga-iyo-filashada-soomaaliya/
10	Financial Interest	The study has found that Kenyan soldiers in Somalia exported illegal charcoal from Kismayo port. This trade produces millions each year.	(Little, P, 1992) Traders, Brokers and Market 'Crisis' in Southern Somalia. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 62(1), 94-124.

1: U. N supported mission of AMISOM is challenging Somalia's national army role to secure the country.

4.9 Hypothesis

The role of the UN and its partner, including AMISOM in peacekeeping, should not be overlooked and will ultimately contribute less than the results of the past decades. In the writings of some scholars the UN is considered as an international government. In this research using the null hypothesis, it was found that the failure of the UN was not related to a lack of funding and perhaps that international forces would use more modern and sophisticated weapons during their patrols and in war-torn countries such as Somalia. This policy causes missions to fail and proves that 138 UN peacekeeping operations conducted in the conflict zones including Somalia found that they did not add any contribution to peace in these areas and instead raised violence. In the case of Somalia, the UN and its partners did not hold peace talks at the grassroots level, but continued to hold costly meetings and seminars for some elites, failed politicians and contractors who did not have a broad vision of the country's stability. The bottom up approach is to think and act locally and start peace on the ground. Foreigners in capitals and headquarters do not conceive, design and launch peace programs. According to previous scholars and academics such as Séverine Autesserre, these are the intended beneficiaries with the help of outside organizations. In 2010, the number of Al-Shabab fighters was estimated at 300, compared to 22,000 AMISOM troops working to largely protect the government and civilians. But how can that large number of forces not defeat the less trained terrorists? Logically the Somali mission seems to be a never-ending task that aims to move forward at all costs.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusion

It is tough to evaluate the PKOs performance without conceptual framework objectively. Therefore, comment on PKO's image is problematic. For example, after 17 peace operations assessment between 1945 and 1998, Pushkina described it as 'successful': partially successful and not successful (Thomas W. Jacobson. 7). However, other researchers may vary from Pushkina's estimate. All researchers have dissimilar reasons for the success and failure of PKO. All of these are related and impact PKO results in one way or another. The most common causes are the conditions surrounding the conflict and the situations leading up to the peace treaty, accessibility of consent to disputes, support of foreign community, decisive process and peace preservation principles affecting peace process results. In addition, factors such as UNSC support, the intensity of the argument and funds for the action also disturb peace incentives. Still, unless there is harmony between the command, strategy, planning, program, architecture, process and networks, PKO is unable to succeed.

Somalia has been in the grip of conflicts for almost three decades. Several possible solutions have been proposed, including the dispatch of AMISOM troops, but the situation bounces back. Is it time to change approach? the study suggests. This study does not ignore the role of AMISOM in taking one of the most complex security situations in the continent that has yet to be neutralized, but it acknowledges the missing role of the Somali National Army. The country has owned one of the largest military armies in the Horn of Africa. The UN along with its European Union patinas and other major regional actors need to adopt new policy changes that Somalia aims to support the initiatives to rebuild its military. As the study has found, the country's national army reduces large amounts of money for reconstruction, which the UN and their companions spend on foreign troops. The study inquires further research on the topic, particularly how the Somali National Army can take responsibility for the security of the country to completely transform the ongoing African Union mission.

Due to lack of commitment from countries capable of participating in military PKOs, the use of UN PKOs will be challenging as long as there is a regional explosion; and has significant incentives to increase the participation of non-Western countries. Also, as the reluctance of major donors such as US to provide fund for UN PKOs grows, their magnitude will progressively shrink and they will not be able to cope with the vicious intricate encounters of the future. Conceptual change is needed to rely heavily on performance, technology, and to rebuild response capability instead of heavy footprints. It makes sense to assume that the UN PKO should be one of the main options to restore peace in the conflict zone. According to Doug Hammerskjold, former United Nations Secretary-General - "The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but rather to save mankind from hell" - the UN. Not a letdown.

UN actions in Somalia have spawned everything but not "international peace and security." Its inability to provide security to the Somali people indicates that it has failed to destroy everything it intended to stand. Members of the United Nations will never forget their mistakes in the Somali crisis and they will not repeat them. The lessons learned from the UN failure are reminiscent of the chaos caused by the neglect of circumstances in Somalia due to a lack of political value. The actions taken by the UN in the future must be constantly targeted! While reflecting its concern on an equal basis on all issues. UN's main objective is to "maintain international peace and security":

The Conflicts in Africa are becoming more complex, protracted and more violent. The devastation due to these conflicts caused a great hurdle to international peace and security. Hence, the significance of a viable mechanism for maintaining lasting peace and security in the region cannot be overstated. Peacekeeping since the UN was established in 1945 is an effective tool for conflict management and resolution. However, the peacekeeping decision of the Cold War in Africa is facing some peculiarities of the situation, which urgently need positive changes.

The study deeply explored the crisis in Somalia and UN peacekeeping efforts in addressing the challenges of the PKOs. The study revealed some challenges that are hampering the permanent resolution of conflicts in Africa. Some of these challenges include the following: the conditions surrounding the conflict and the situations leading

up to the peace treaty, accessibility of consent to disputes, support of foreign community, decisive process and peace preservation principles affecting peace process results. In addition, factors such as UNSC support, the intensity of the argument and funds for the action also disturb peace incentives. But the most important thing is the Somali army lacks the right support from the international community which is necessary to maintain peace. The crisis and violence in Somalia which includes the insecurity and the political issues cannot be resolved unless the country has its own stable military forces. But the international community is overlooking the Somali army due to which they are not getting the required support. Also, the Somali people trust more on the foreign troops rather than their national army for their national security which is the main problem. Therefore, these challenges, if properly addressed by profitable solutions, can lead to a short period of time to end conflicts and avoid their future recurrence.

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5.2. Recommendations

As the Somali government begun registering and organizing its army, the national forces liberated key strongholds that used to be a haven for the Al-Shabab terror group. The 160-page length UN report has praised how the Somali government is handling the process of rebuilding the vanished army. (BBC Somali, 2019).

There is no doubt that rebuilding a nation's military will take some time, but in order to pay attention to the security problems of Somalia, some steps need to be considered

- i. The UN should prioritize the long-term stability of the country by supporting the Somali army.
- ii. Al-Shabaab, which has caused some significant problems for the Somali state, should be removed before the departure of foreign forces.
- iii. The UN should conduct a review of its policies to support the military.
- iv. The UN should allocate reasonable funds to the Somali National Army to bridge the salary gap between the local army and AMISOM forces.
- v. The UN should lift military sanctions on Somalia, which is another problem defeating terrorist organizations.
- vi. The armies of countries that share territorial disputes with Somalia should be removed from the mission.
- vii. The UN must play its part in reducing the interference of neighboring countries to achieve the goal of rebuilding the Somali army.
- viii. Only Somali military experts should lead missions because they have more knowledge than other foreign forces.
- ix. The United States should continue to fund humanitarian activities to a greater extent. To avoid other failures such as Somalia, the United States should not support or participate in UN peacekeeping or peacekeeping operations involving civil war unless all major warring factions seek a peaceful solution to the problem and there is an articulated and achievable end state.

There are other important policy considerations that need to be set,

- A. The AU must guarantee that all accusations of delinquency by AMISOM forces are carefully investigated and that perpetrators are held accountable for their crimes. In this case, the accountability of the mission is very much needed in justifying the good behaviors that correct the effectiveness of the mission
- B. AMISOM's main international partners including UN, EU, U.S, AU and the Somali authorities (federal and regional) should make the establishment of an inclusive, capable and professional Somali security a top priority. This is a

prerequisite for severely reducing the threat of Al-Shabaab and enabling a successful AMISOM exit from Somalia.

- C. Somalia's fellow citizen, especially Kenya and Ethiopia, must guarantee their guidelines and operations comply with the mandate of AMISOM. Deviation from the official mandate of AMISOM fuels the uprising and adversely affects the state and regional security of Somalia.



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APPENDIX

AMISOM is challenging Somalia's army

Place of the Interview: Mogadishu

Date: 02/04/2020

Q. What were the causes of the downfall of the Somali National Army?

Ans: As everyone knows, the Somali National Army has collapsed. There are a lot of reasons for that collapse, and the international community has taken the lion's share of blame. In addition to that and as a result of social injustices and uproar in the society, the Somalis contributed to that fall. The consequences of the destruction of the army were seen on the state of society. In short, foreign states have given angry Somalis the opportunity to break up the national army and they (society) have completely snatched that opportunity.

Q. Why was the money donated by the international community to Somalia not spent on the Somali National Army?

Ans: The funds (in the form of wages) offered by the international community were spent on AMISOM and not on the Somali National Army. The reason those funds were averted away from the Somali army is that if those funds were spent on the Somali army instead of AMISOM, Al-Shabaab will be swiftly defeated and eliminated, something that international community does not want. So, they instead spend every penny on their own army (AMISOM), who are selflessly their minions, working only with their brains and being completely obedient to them. The Somali army received only a drop of the ocean and the amount they received was much less than the amount that AMISOM received. Therefore, the public should not be misinformed and should be well informed that the very small amount of wages paid to the Somali army is neither capable of defeating Al-Shabaab nor boosting their morale. In addition, these small wages to the Somali military are often paid by the Somali government and not by the international community.

Q. What is the reason behind AMISOM troops being always defensive and barely on the offensive?

Ans: The reason why AMISOM forces rarely go on the offensive and are mostly stuck in their barracks is that they are not paid by the Somali government, but the International Community. So, they take orders from the International Community and not the Somali government. They (AMISOM) attack only when they are ordered by the international community, and their own purpose is to stay in their barracks and not take part in the fighting. The Somali government is helpless because it cannot order AMISOM to march with the Somali army and attack Al-Shabab.

Q. What must be done to defeat al-Shabaab?

Ans: The only way to eradicate al-Shabaab is to build and empower the Somali National Army. The present government has put a lot of effort into doing this, which is notable. The qualities of the army will have to be enhanced and their skills must be elevated, along with their wages which should also be increased. Both the government and its people should help the process together and they should keep in mind that no foreign army will protect their country for them. We have seen how futile and pointless the presence of foreign troops is and it only worsens the situation. You have seen how often they (AMISOM) drive their tanks and kill innocent civilians. In my opinion, Al-Shabaab and AMISOM have more similarities than differences. In the end, it is the sole duty of the Somalis to protect their country. So, we must pull all together and form a formidable army that can defend us from any enemy. Something that the military lacks in the re-creation process until it is aware that there are no "rules and regulations" yet approved by the Parliament bound to protect the army. And because of the tight budget the government works with, there cannot be "army employment". The army hired for the job will have to fit the available budget, and so the rights of those employed will be fully met, including giving them their salaries on time. Thanks to the Turkish brotherhood state, there seems to be a major improvement in our military.

Q. Is the international community honest about the reconstruction of Somalia's military?

Ans: No, the international community is not honest about helping the Somali army to rebuild the process. They do not want our country to have a powerful army and thus they do not want to help in building a strong army. All they do is help in building the "police forces" whose jobs rarely involve fighting Al-Shabaab and are mainly confined within cities.

Hence, we should be the one building our army because the fact is that nobody will fix a broken house for us until we do. We have to do the foundation part and then we can get some help from foreigners, but until we take the first step, there is no way that they will lend us a hand. Our army was partially disintegrated by foreign countries (including both neighbors and outsiders) and they are now avoiding getting into the reconstruction process.

Q. Finally, does the ongoing "peace keeping project" serve the purpose and interests of AMISOM?

Ans: Sitting idly and not doing much is good for AMISOM and serves their interest in the best possible way as they fully get paid, so there is no logical reason that they want to leave. Most of the blame is on the "donors", as they are the ones who give the AMISOM troops the order to either march and fight or sit. They are playing everyone, including us, performing some surreal dramas.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Bio

B.A., in Global studies | M.A., in Political Science, & Int'l relations| | Independent Columnist|
Part Time Fx Trader |

About

I am an experienced journalist with over 5 years of experience in both Online and Television. I have worked as an English news Editor for couple of news sites including Hiiraan.com which is a leading East African site that covers regional reports .

I have also an intensive know-how on research and grant writing, as I took part with numerous projects carried out in and outside Somalia. Now As an Independent columnist I have contributed Op-ed to many international Media names such as Daily Sabah.

Experience

Title: **English News Editor**

Company: Hiiraan Online

Location: Somalia ,

Time: 8 Years

Responsibilities

As an English Editor my main duty was to write at least three big events for the site, also post other reports sent by other journalists working for the company. Most of the day I was spending at least 8 to 9 hours to write, edit, oversee reports and also proofread.

Title: **Project Manager**

NGO: Sovoyodo

Location: Somalia

Time: 2017.....2019

Responsibilities

1. Planning and overseeing the Project

2. Monitor Progress
3. Write Reports /Success Stories
4. Hold Training and Workshops, etc

Title: **Field specialist Reporter**

Company: Radio Ergo

Location: Somalia,

Time: 2017....2018

Responsibilities

Core responsibilities of this job was to cover reports on Famine, droughts, Social justice, IDPs, etc

Accomplishments

- Creative PowerPoint Slide Design and Animation
- Forex Trading A-Z with live Examples of FX Trading
- Grant writing : Keys to a Successful Proposal
- Grant writing for none Profits and Freelance writers
- Secret Sauce of Great writing
- The Complete Technical Analysis Trading Course

Publications

Kenya's undiplomatic behavior toward Somalia signals failure at ICJ

publication dateJul 29, 2019 publication descriptionDaily Sabah

<https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/07/29/kenyas-undiplomatic-behavior-toward-somalia-signals-failure-at-icj>

Somalia president names new Mogadishu mayor, ousts Thabit Abdi

publication dateJan 21, 2018 publication descriptionHiiraan Online

https://hiiraan.com/news4/2018/Jan/146352/somalia_president_names_new_mogadishu_mayor_ousts_thabit_abdi.aspx

New UK ambassador to Somalia arrives in Mogadishu

publication dateJan 13, 2017 publication descriptionHiiraan Online

https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2017/Jan/139825/new_uk_ambassador_to_somalia_arrives_in_mogadishu.aspx

Somalia: Sincere Advice to President Gaas

publication dateMar 12, 2015 publication descriptionGarowe Online

<https://www.garoweonline.com/en/opinions/somalia-sincere-advice-to-president-gaas>

Education

Bachelor's Degree In Global Studies and International Relations

University: New Generation University College /

Location : Addis Ababa , Ethiopia.

M.A. in political Science and International Relations

University : Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University

Location: Istanbul / Turkey

Languages

Somali, English, Arabic