'GUARDIANS OF THE REGIME: THE MILITARY AS AN ASPECT OF CONTINUITY IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE'

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THESIS

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis study examines the effects of the theory of the 'protectors' class mentioned in Plato's State. It assesses the scope of the 'natural guardian' role of the Turkish military. Since the army considers itself as a natural element of the state's administration, it assumes that it has a say in politics. Within the framework of this theory, the influence of the "natural guardian" role of the military on Turkish politics will be examined.

This thesis is made of five main parts. The first is the introduction, which also includes the theoretical background. In the second part, historical perspectives on the military are analyzed by paying particular attention to the role of the "guardians." In the third part, the military interventions in the Late Ottoman period will be examined within the framework of the same role. In the fourth part, the interventions in the Republican period will be evaluated. Furthermore, lastly, but not least, the commitment to the primary mission in realizing military coups will be examined in the same chapter. Finally, in the conclusion part, the four parts of our thesis will be evaluated and finalized.

Accordingly, the purpose of the thesis is to analyze the Turkish military's interventions in politics within the framework of the guardian role attributed to the soldiers by Plato.

Keywords: Military, Natural Guardianship, Military Interventions, Policy, Civil-Military Relations

ÖZET

Bu tez çalışması, Plato'nun Devlet eserinde bahsedilen 'koruyucular' sınıfı teorisinin, Türk ordusu üzerindeki etkilerini incelemek ve 'doğal koruyuculuk' rolünün kapsamını incelemektedir. 'Doğal koruyuculuk' rolü içerisinde, ordu, bulunduğu ülkenin yönetiminin doğal bir üyesi olduğu gibi, ülke üzerinde söz hakkı sahibi olmayı da kendine hak saymaktadır. Bu teoriyle beraber süregelen ordu ve/veya asker sınıfının günümüze kadar bu altyapıyla gelişmesiyle Türk Ordusu'nun, 'doğal koruyuculuk' rolünün Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Siyasi Hayatı'ndaki etkileri incelenecektir. Tez çalışmam; beş ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, tezimin giriş bölümü olup, tezimi oluşturan teoriler hakkında bilgilendirme ve bağlantılama bölümü olacaktır. İkinci bölümde, Türk Ordusu'nun, doğal koruyuculuk misyonunu almasına sebep olan tarihi süreç mercek altına alınacaktır. Üçüncü kısımda ise, koruma ve kollama misyonu çerçevesinde Geç Osmanlı Dönemi'ndeki ordu refleksleri ve hareketleri incelenecektir. Aynı zamanda bu dönemde oluşan tarihsel sürecin, bu misyona katkısı anlatılacaktır. Dördüncü başlıkta, Cumhuriyet Dönemi'ndeki gerçekleşen müdahaleler söz konusu teorik bakış açısıyla değerlendirecek, aynı zamanda askeri darbelerin, atfedilen rol ile ilişkisi incelenecektir. Sonuç kısmında ise, tezimizin dört bölümünün değerlendirmesi ve sonuçlandırılması yapılacaktır.

Bu çerçevede, tezin amacı Türk Ordusu'nun siyasete müdahalelerini Platon'un askerlere atfettiği koruyuculuk rolü üzerinden incelemektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Ordu, Doğal Koruyuculuk, Askeri Müdahaleler, Politika, Sivil-Ordu İlişkileri

In Memory of Suat Emre ILVAN...

PROLOGUE

To Erdem Ozan YILMAZ, Eylül AYDIN, Işıkcan KESKİN, Fahri Kaan ARSLAN, Ömür ÖCAL, who are with me during my master's process and always do not hesitate to give their support

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1. INTRODUCTION

What is the military? Plato states in the state, "When the war begins, a military, a warrior class, a group of guards will be needed. Thus, as society develops, a distinction between those who govern and those who are governed will emerge" (Platon, 2008, p. 54). Throughout the history of the world, people needed armed forces to protect the clans, tribes, and states to which they belong, and to attack if necessary. Armed forces established for this purpose have transformed into the military by becoming more and more professionalized within the hierarchical structures shaped within communities. The emergence of the military, starting from Ancient Greece, created the classes the Rulers and the Ruled. This class separation paved the way for the people of military origin to be more influential within the state. Besides, the structure that Plato sees as 'Guardians' was born out of the need to protect society against external attacks. This structuring, which took on the duty and responsibility against these external attacks, would naturally claim ownership of the city-state. Guardians would also be useful in terms of domestic policy, as they would act as a law enforcement force to ensure internal security.

In fact, the 'protectors' class in the Turkish conjuncture did not develop only among the military. Apart from the structures existing in the military, it also achieved the mission of "protection" politically, and in this respect, cases that took place in the historical process took place. However, the Turkish military in a different way from the others, as dictated by their authority, they did not hesitate to use his political mechanisms at the point of regime change. As a matter of fact, this authoritarian process showed its presence in political decisions through the understanding of Westernism after the understanding of Ottomanism.

The idea of the guardian military, the principles of its establishment, its natural duty of protecting the state, and its goal of attacking the enemies in line with the national interests are logical within its framework. However, militaries around the world did not hesitate to use their might to take over the power to face threats to themselves or the state.

Here, it is necessary to ask the question that forms the basis of our thesis: From where the military coups originate, and why do they happen? A significant majority of political scientists say that coups occurred as a result of a period and its unique conditions. About these particular conditions, Mehmet Zeki Duman says that these are economic decline, civil administrations losing their official legitimacy, conflicts between the military and the government, and international conditions in favour of the coup (Duman, 2019, p. 146).

In terms of Turkish history, from the Hunnic Empire to the Republic of Turkey, Turkish states faced wars, occupations, and threats throughout their history. For this reason, their periodic political regimes were also under threat due to internal threats, as well as threats to their geographies. The task of protecting the regime, which the Turkish military has developed as a natural reflex and set as a principle, has caused its involvement in politics many times, sometimes due to external threats and sometimes due to the developments in domestic politics. At this very point, the interventions of the Turkish military as the governing class came into insight within the traditional framework. This situation sometimes paved the way for the military to be criticized by politicians and citizens. This mission has been accepted or criticized by many authors and continues to be criticized. At the same time, the relevant mission caused many turning points in Turkish Political History.

The military's role from the Ottoman viewpoint has been evaluated in a structure bearing the conquest missions that existed in other empires, but the Ottomans faced the military's intervention to politics in the process leading to its decline. At the end of the 18th century, the land loss of the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of the idea of reshaping the military and administrative institutions.

In the environment formed as a continuation of these processes, the first coup attempt of the military took place with the Kuleli Case in 1859. Then the military intervened in politics by opening the Second Constitutional Period in 1908, and Halaskar Zabitan (Rescuing Officers) the March 31 incident in 1909, and the Sublime Porte Raid in the last 1913, respectively. Here, it is worth mentioning the Committee of Union and Progress. A group under the leadership of Enver and Talat Pashas controlled the 1913 Sublime Porte Raid. The military which pursued a more active political role within the framework of these effects in the subsequent periods had prepared the environment of a coup culture that would continue in the Republic of Turkey. The Committee of Union and Progress had the opportunity to make a coup due to the political anxiety it felt about the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. When we look at it from this point of view, the fact that the Turkish military has an active role in the political and social processes since the Ottoman era constitutes the traditional basis of Turkish politics (Öztürk, 1993, p. 174).

In light of all this information, our research will be on what kind of actions have been taken by the Turkish military in the cases where it assumed by principle, the mission of protecting and guarding the integrity and regime of the state, and on which concerns of existence and politics the Turkish military attributes this mission too. In the period beginning from the date of enforcement of the 1876 Constitution until today, the behaviour of the Turkish military within the constitutional and

political reflexes has changed; but the common anxiety has always remained the same. There is not a significant difference between the junta reflex shown by the Committee of Union and Progress and the reflex shown by Talat Aydemir and his team in 1963. Investigating the source and historical background of these reflexes will be the main framework of our thesis.

Furthermore, the reflections of the relations between the military and politics in Turkey will be examined. The reason for this is the fact that the military was intervening in politics through specific aims. According to Ümit Cizre Sakalloğlu, the military-civil structure relationship has created a legacy that strengthens the independence of the Armed Forces (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.151). At the same time, political autonomy, defined as the military's ability to transcend and exceed the constitutional authority of democratically elected governments, can include not only direct but indirect effects on the government. Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu stated that the military sees itself as a 'protector of national interests', behind all powers, supranational and above politics (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 153). The military's intervention into politics was going to gain continuity by remedying the defective sides of politics or disqualifying the entities which would be a threat against itself. The military which always wanted to keep the perception of being the "ruling" class and which does not release this authority, has always been perceived as a threat for political parties. As the guardian of the revolutions and constitution, the military is seen as a structure above politics. In case a threat occurs against anything it embraces as a guardian or security principle, the military resorts to take action related to the situation. This situation sometimes has been done with the direct hierarchical intervention of the military, and sometimes with memoranda made to the government of the period. According to Plato, the presence of the army class was logical and

appropriate in terms of external powers. However, he mentions that the military class poses a threat to its members or the civilian population if it is not properly trained. For this, he says that empathy skills must be developed during their training processes. Accordingly, the purpose of the thesis is to analyze the Turkish military's interventions in politics within the framework of the guardian role attributed by Plato.

2. PRINCIPLES OF THE TURKISH MILITARY AND THE REASONS FOR EXISTENCE

In the history of Turkey, the military's perspective on the state and politics, and its relationship with them have always drawn attention. It is necessary to understand how and for what purpose the place, role and responsibilities of the military in the state affect country policies. Mitigating and preventing this impact has always been a debated issue in Turkey. The perception of keeping a control mechanism over the state, which is not only considered to be essential for the military but is also a requirement of Plato's "Rulers" class, has been continuously seen as a reason or an excuse by civilians, and this has turned into a situation that strengthens the military's hand. According to Mehmet Zeki Duman; that is why the military has never refrained from using their institutional privileges. The civil authority, in turn, has taken legal action to limit this power (Duman, 2019, p. 146). However, the military tried to pacify this defence and protection reflexes of the civil authority by citing threats to the regime or other situations arising on this claim.

In modern armies, hierarchy and closeness are dominant. According to Akyaz, the principal attitudes towards the concepts of obedience and discipline inherent in the military are constant threats to civilians or civil authorities (Akyaz, 2009, p. 421-422). According to Maurice Duverger, the armies are at the forefront as they consider themselves the founding elements of the states, and therefore they do not step back from involving in power struggles. The military, whose sole purpose and reason for existence is an absolute commitment to the state and to ensure the commitment of the state to itself and protecting the state against all threats, exists so that those in power

could exist safely against people (Duverger, 1964, p. 123-126). Naturally, the military did not hesitate to use its might in the face of all kinds of internal and external threats.

The coups indeed had an impact on the culture of democracy and political institutionalization. From this point of view, in cases of weak political and democratic situations, coups might have positive and negative effects (Duman, 2019, p. 147-148). If we need to comment in addition to this though; I can say that the military intervention is the idea of bringing order to the political and social chaos of the coup processes. When the democratic values of civil society are evaluated at the level of civilization, military intervention will do more harm than good. This is obviously; the tradition of military intervention will only drawback the political, cultural, economic and social structure of the country in which it is located.

Based on this information, we will examine the basic principles of the Turkish military's existence in the following section. We will follow a chronological process to assess these principles. These processes were initiated by the military cadres in the late Ottoman period and continued in the Republican era. To understand civil-military relations in the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to observe the social and political structures. In this respect, the fact that the Ottoman military's impact reached a level to make changes in the monarchic system (dethroning the Sultan, opening the parliament, etc.) is proof of the influence of the military (Öztürk, 1993, p. 174). If we look at the effects of the modernization processes in the Ottoman Empire, according to Feroz Ahmad, the conservative and status-quo dependent character of the ruling class allowed neither reforms in the state nor the disabling of the old elite ruling class. The Turkish military, who were the pioneers of modernization, were also the pioneers of Kemalism, which became the dominant ideology in the political spheres with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Duman, 2019, P. 145). The character of the

military, which emerged through this process, also revealed the direct or indirect relationship between the military and the politics in Turkish political life. When viewed from this perspective, the strict nature of the military hierarchically combined with the natural protective character in its internal dynamics.

The relationship between the military and politics have always been a determinant in Turkish political life, due to its impact on society and the intellectual frameworks, its importance on the execution of domestic and foreign policies, and its creation of the perception of state = military. The reason for this is that the military sees itself as the natural ruler. The military has always been an element of threat for those in power, due to its closed form, and its hierarchically underground and strict administrative structure. The military has always taken advantage of its organized structure; however, sometimes it has faced problems stemming from this very structure. Evaluating what military coups emanate from is vital at this point. Although there are exceptions, any situation the Turkish military perceived as a threat to the regime or its ideas has been turned into a reason for military intervention by finding a constitutional basis.

The question of how to save the Ottoman Empire, which emerged during the collapse of the Empire, pitted the liberal and the nationalist intellectual wings in Europe against one another. The Unionists prevailed and formed the philosophy of the state to be established. Seeing the possibility of establishing a nation-state, they made an effort to take over the control of the state apparatus. According to Halis Çetin; the 1908 coup was the first de facto start of this, and the military took over the administration (Çetin, 2003, p.195). Thus, the first signs of the Republic emerged, and the idea of establishing a nation-state from the ashes of a collapsed empire became eminent within the Ottoman military.

According to İlter Turan, the military stated that modernization was on the rise in the military-politics axis and the military decided to mobilize the internal dynamics it had for the liberation of the Ottoman Empire. One of the greatest pieces of evidence of this is the attempts to counter the power of the monarchy for the sake of modernization. (Turan İ., 1997, p. 124).

Towards the end of the 18th century, the idea of reforming various administrative and military structures, as a result of the increasing losses of territory, gained traction in the Ottoman Empire. However, the military class severely opposed this idea as it contradicted their interests. The nuisances experienced during this period forced the government to make reforms. The military has clearly shown its discomfort in this regard. They have intervened by attempted coups, such as Kuleli Incident (1859), Second Constitutionalism (1908), the March 31 Incident (1909), and the Sublime Porte Raid (1913).

One of the most exciting and significant events in the military's tradition of coups, which still stands today, is the Sublime Porte Raid carried out by the Committee of Union and Progress in 1913 (Hale, 2014, s. 43). Therefore, in the second part, we will focus on the Committee of Union and Progress, the initiator of this coup tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire. They aimed to regain the Ottomans' lost prestige by way of Turkism and establish a reformist nation-state with new military and political actors (Mardin, 1997, p. 221). When analyzing Turkish political life, it is easy to see that this movement lead by the Union and Progress has left significant marks on the last period of the Ottoman Empire, and the first years of the Republic of Turkey.

As it will mention in the subsequent chapters, it will study the coups or political interventions experienced in the Ottoman Empire from the perspective of Plato's theory. The Committee of Union and Progress was defending the idea that "Turks have no friends but Turks" alongside the notion of a Turkish nation-state in parallel with the necessity of the age. This ideological framework which they defended at the end of the War of Independence, was finally adopted by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, and by the founding cadres (Duman, 2019, p. 153). Within the period, applying a centralized power to the modernization process would organizationally be helpful in the realization of revolutionary initiatives. The military's intervention in political power increased while the supervision over the military decreased as it gained autonomy. Rather than dividing the core viewpoint of the Rulers class, this situation would allow the military to single-handedly controlled without disrupting the administrative structure. The Union and Progress were loyal to this idea and found it more feasible. However, the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress concentrated the power in one single place was not enough for them to prevent their internal power struggles.

Additionally, the thesis will focus on the military interventions during the late -Ottoman period and the party structure of the Committee of Union and Progress. The party structure was not as influential, as the Committee of Union and Progress, according to the many opinions that it will elaborate on in the subsequent parts of the thesis. The purpose of examining the Union and Progress is that they had both a meaningful role within the military and aimed to influence political processes. Furthermore, the question of how the power struggle within the Committee was influential on the political processes they were a part of, will be examined.

So, what were the main principles of the Union and Progress? This party, which will be examined in the subsequent chapters on the grounds of its philosophy, took union and progress as a mission and a vision, as its name suggests. From their establishment to dissolution, the road map built by trained officers, who aimed at modernization and saving the homeland, guided the Committee of Union and Progress.

On the other hand, although the military's stance and perspective on politics in the first years of the Republic tried to be prevented by the directives of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, it should be stated clearly that there were opinions against the situation. Particularly, the opinion of Eric A. Nordlinger was included in the research of Frank Tachau and Metin Heper. According to Nordlinger; the nationalist regime of the early 1920s stated that the military was a 'rule maker' (Heper, 1983, p. 19) (Nordlinger, 1982, p. 22). However, we have to say that this is a necessity in the construction of the Kemalist regime and that there is no dictatorial viewpoint in the full sense. Because the soldier class; is a higher elite than any other segment of society in terms of intellectual level and modernization. What is meant by the elite level here is not economic or physical power, but the social happiness of the regime to be established for the liberation of the country. The knowledge and experience of the people who will form the regime are very important in this respect.

Looking at the Turkish Political Life, one can argue that the coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, which carried out since the introduction of the multiparty election system, were the result of the military considering coups as part of its responsibility. Therefore, it is evident that the Turkish military, which considers itself as a hegemonic structure as well as the founder and the protector of the regime, also sees

itself as a political power. The duty of protecting and guarding the country gave cause for this duty to become a belief.

The core principles of the Turkish military, which they concretely demonstrated, that paves the way for coups are cited in Article 5 of the Constitution as the primary purposes and duties of the military, "to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy, to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society." As seen in the article, one comment can be made that the tradition of the military is equated with the state structure. Because the founding organization of the Republic of Turkey is composed of soldiery and the military sees itself as the most important pillar in the foundation of the state. On the other hand, the independence and the integrity of the Turkish Nation are under the protection of the military. Thirdly, the military is the guarantor of the state's indivisibility. Its strength is directly proportional to the indivisibility of the state. Furthermore, finally, safeguarding the Republic and democracy, ensuring the welfare, peace, and happiness of the people and society are the principles that the military considers as its responsibility.

Another reason for the occurrence of coups in Turkey is that some groups and institutions within the society embrace the ideology that only the Turkish military can fix the instabilities of the political system. Safeguarding the order requires power and since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, this authority has been the Turkish military.

If we have to analyze the two elements based on which the military felt it has to intervene in politics and did not hesitate to use its coup reflex, the first element was the military's assuming the task of modernization, when the state was in a difficult

situation. The second, as already mentioned, the military held itself equal to the state. Lastly, the military believed that it had a say in daily politics as well as in issues regarding the security of the state (Hale, 2014, p.14). However, as a footnote, in contrast to all the intervention reflexes of the Turkish military, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the founding cadre stated that the military should not be involved in politics at all and should stay out of it (Duman, 2019, s. 153).

If we are looking at an ideological point, Kemalism exists in the ideology basis of the military of the Republic of Turkey. The military's structure was shaped within the framework of this ideology which attributes several responsibilities to the civilians. The military naturally thinks it has the right to intervene in politics in case of disruptions. The right to intervene is something that the commanders use to remind them that they are in power, rather than a right naturally granted to them (Şen, 2005, p. 116). However, as Hasan Emir Aktaş or Teyfik Erdem had some opinions state that the military and bureaucrats used Kemalism as an 'ideological tool' to legitimize their existing hierarchical positions. One of the attitudes shown in a military coup in Turkey, the military itself, is that seen as the real owners of the country. Looking from the military's perspective, since it considers itself an authority equal to the state, it does not trust the other civil or political elements (Duman, 2019, p. 153).

Kemalism can be interpreted as an official ideology based on the West's achievements over political systems in the Renaissance and Enlightenment Age. However, it was revised according to the views, morality, and perception of modernity of the founding cadres of the Republic of Turkey. On the other hand, according to Hasan Emir Aktaş, the fact that some of the principles in Kemalism have divinized. Moreover, the reforms were initiated in a short period from top to down rather than naturally spreading over some time. In contrast to the experiences in the

West, the political system was not based on a legitimized ground accepted and appreciated by the people. Kemalism adopted certain anti-democratic measures to protect the official ideology of the modern Turkish state and the political regime (Aktaş, 2017, p. 218 - 219).

Another reason causing coups is the claim that the regime, the state, or society is under threat. Especially with the coup of 1960, Kemalism became an important principle, and the military did not hesitate to seize power. From then on, the military reprimanded every element that is considered a threat to the regime. The Internal Service Act was the basis for these condemnations. The reason for the coups was that the secular, democratic, social state and the rule of law were in danger. Military interventions were preferred to prevent political instability and restore the constitutional order.

According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the Turkish military who educated ‘Internal Service Law’ about details of protection for the Republic of Turkey responsibility against internal and external enemies, was to saw themselves as President of the country with graduating from military school (Birand, 1984, s. 38).

Plato stated that the military has a say in the governance of the countries with its understanding of "natural guardian". In the eyes of the Turkish army, this understanding was provided by the legal infrastructure. This mindset gathered under a certain founding ideology and put into practice; it was directed towards a task that the army structure saw as a necessity. The military knows that it has the right to intervene in politics for the welfare and security of the country in situations of internal or external chaos. For this reason, the authority and responsibility of the Turkish army have been shaped within the framework of the relevant general rule.

3. THE MILITARY IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD

In the first part, it has been seen what the coup culture in the Turkish military consisted of in principle and structurally since the Ottoman Empire, and on what grounds the military implemented its duty of protection. This part will focus on the coup culture in the Ottoman Empire alongside the communities and institutions that formed chaos. The Young Turks can be a plausible example as it was claimed that they led the trend in the establishment of the coup culture in the Ottoman Empire.

The Young Turks movement emerged with the goal of independence as a result of the economic decline. The Young Turks tried to control the government as an authoritarian force in the light of its principles. Young Turks, who presented the reasons for the economic collapse to the society through the criticism of power, and weakened the dynasty, were able to impose the constitutional order in 1876 (Ahmad, 2017, p. 41). During the imposition period, they had an essential structure in terms of organization.

However, the Young Turks were divided into two groups: liberals and unionists. Liberals were in the upper class of society. They were characterized by their adoption of the Western culture, being well-educated, and having a foreign language (French were their preferred language, as it was popular at the time). They were in favour of constitutional monarchy and saw Britain as an idol, as they described her as the mother of parliaments. Ideologically, they were pro-Ottoman. (Ahmad, 2017, p.47)

The Unionists formed a committee in 1889. They were defending the constitutional order, but unlike the liberals, they wanted to abolish the monarchy.

They desired to change the economic and social order. And then, under the leadership of Ahmet Rıza, they published a newspaper called 'Meşrevet' in French and Ottoman in Europe in 1895. At first, they called themselves the Young Turks, later they were organized under the name of the Union and Progress (Zürcher, 2018, p. 131). Having a positivist worldview paved the way for them to defend the idea of a centralized government and Turkish nationalism (Aktar, 1993, p. 38). Rather than Britain, the Unionists took Japan and Germany as a reference. In unity and integrity (union), they wanted to achieve their goals by taking reformist steps (progress) (Ahmad, 2013, p. 47).

The Unionists were from the lower-middle class. They were composed of public officers, artisans, and low-ranking officers. They were dissatisfied with the corrupt system, which supported the promotion of those who were affiliated with the dynasty and were assigned by the Sublime Porte and the Palace. They also wanted to eliminate all this corruption that they saw as an obstacle to modernization. During the modernization period in July 1908, there were conservatives supported by the Sultan. Conservatives, the high-level bureaucrats supported by liberals, and the Unionists, supported by the organizational structures within the military and society, were in a power struggle. The Unionists won the elections in November and December 1908. The struggle came further into light under the new political situation that emerged after the elections (Ahmad, 2017, p. 48). The organization of the Unionists caused the voice of the opposition in the Ottoman Empire to make itself heard.

On the other hand, there were British sympathizers as well within the Union and Progress. People like Mizancı Murat, Ahmet Bedevi (surname as Kuran), Dervish Vahdeti, Sabahaddin, and Kamil Pasha were ineffective compared to opponents (Akşin, 2017, p. 217).

Namık Kemal defined the words union and progress. He referred to the unity and integrity of the Ottoman Empire with the word union and depicted the progress of modern civilization equipped with educational and technical means with the word progress (Berkes, 2019, p. 405). However, he intended to carry the word of progress further forward. In this respect, he adopted the reformist perspective of the West (Berkes, 2019, p. 299). In a letter he wrote in 1882, Namık Kemal mentioned that westernization would become inevitably problematic in the future. This letter was important in terms of the concept of progress. It also showed how deep the concept of the press had become (Berkes, 2019, p. 368). One may argue that it had become a real political weapon in the Ottoman Empire.

The Committee of Union and Progress had a young cadre when it was first established. According to Sina Akşin, the Committee of Union and Progress, one of the revolutionary movements that emerged with the French Revolution, was the continuation of the Young Turks (Akşin, 2019, p. 199). It was first established by the students of the Military Medical School as the Progress and Union in 1893 (Mayatepek, 2015, p. 51-52). Their program aimed to ensure constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, equality, the security of life, and property. Their founding purpose was to make reforms in the Ottoman Empire. As the Ottoman Empire was heading towards a collapse, the political climate was suitable for reforms. They were beginning to take over authoritarian power. The Committee had some kind of mysticism. It was a result of their confidentiality and their encrypted communication methods.

Sina Akşin says that Ahmet Rıza changed the name of the organization between 1889 and 1895 (he says it more likely happened in 1895) as a result of the interaction between the members of Ittihad-Osmani in Istanbul. Akşin states that they

changed their name to the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (Akşin, 2017, p. 51).

The threat to the independence of the state and its expulsion from the area created serious problems for the Ottoman Empire. This situation led every individual with nationalistic views to sympathize with the Union and Progress. Loyalty to the Committee was a critical sign of dedication. Every Turk who wanted to live independently in their homeland had a goal to struggle under the Committee of Union and Progress (Yalçın, 2019, p. 31). Each member of the Committee considered himself as a natural protector and freedom fighter.

Their presence in the military was the most critical force for the Committee of Union and Progress since they were controlling the armed forces. It was the most convenient way of keeping authority (Ahmad, 2013, p. 96). This presence is an excellent example to understand that Plato's class of Rulers consists of soldiers. The aim was to become an authority over the entire state by controlling the armed forces. This situation naturally meant taking over the state's administration.

Many authors, historians of the period have mentioned the struggles the Committee of Union and Progress had at the expense of their lives. The Committee enabled the people of the empire to gain the perception of being a nation. They also struggled for independence against the dynasty (Karabekir, 2019, p. 18). According to Talat Pasha, the Committee of Union and Progress was widespread throughout the country with its organization, more robust, and deep-rooted than it was believed, and it was an institution that sincerely believed in its heritage (Akal, 2018, p. 238). If one would provide an example for Talat Pasha's opinion, Celal Bayar could be the correct

one. Bayar, who always described himself as a Unionist before and after the establishment of the Republic, internalized his Unionist ties.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın sees the Committee of Union and Progress as a move of self-defence that came off the soul of the Turkish Nation in difficult times. It was a product of rebellion and dedication, embodied in the defence and liberation of the homeland. Every Turk who wanted to save oneself was coming together and fighting under the Committee of Union and Progress (Yalçın, 2019, p. 26).

According to Kazım Karabekir, not the Sultan and his slaves, but the Committee of the Union and Progress was the real owner of the homeland. To him, the Committee of Union and Progress was a nation's attempt to organize, who gained to nation's independence at the expense of its own life and blood and striving to protect it (Karabekir, 2019, p. 18).

There was consensus within the Committee of Union and Progress that even the internal ideological conflicts could not alter the defence of the homeland. However, there were also frequent disagreements within the Committee. The reasons for these disagreements were that they were not homogeneous compared to other organizations, and there were frequent differences of opinion about administrative styles, social understandings, and religious perspectives. The only solution was to form a consensus by bringing individuals to reconciliation. The solution also needed to include policies that were free from individual ambitions and interests (Yalçın, 2019, p. 78).

The Union and Progress, which was aware of the fact that the Ottoman Empire was slowly coming to an end, took action. Its members believed that the Armenians should have continued to oppose Abdulhamid II under the umbrella of the Committee.

The aim was to prevent Armenian resistance against the Ottoman Empire and to weaken Abdulhamid II. Due to this attitude of the Union and Progress, the pressure on intellectuals and libertarians increased. Some of the Unionists fled to France. On the other hand, some of them planned coups. The plots in 1896 and 1897 failed (Akşin, 2019, p. 48). The organizational structure of the Union and Progress was not one to be identified and brought down with the first exposure. Because this organization structured like a grape bunch, ultimately uncovering the Union and Progress was not possible.

While analyzing the Committee of Union and Progress it would be appropriate to assess its merger with the Ottoman Freedom Society. The Ottoman Freedom Society established in Thessaloniki in 1906. Then, after the 1907 merger with the Progress and Union Society in Paris, the name was changed to Ottoman Union and Progress. Enver Pasha was a member of the Ottoman Freedom Society. Later, as a result of the Second Congress of the Young Turks, he met with the Committee of Union and Progress for the first time. Kazım Karabekir was another member. He stated that he established the centre of the Monastery with Enver Pasha, whom he regarded as his guide (Karabekir, 2019, p. 79). Later, Enver Pasha, who would have a crucial impact on the politics of the Ottoman Empire, would be a prominent figure in the Union and Progress.

The Ottoman Freedom Society included educated officers. This society did not have any connection with the Young Turks at first. Ottoman Freedom Society benefited from the experiences of organizations and struggles that emerged in 1905. They were active in Damascus and Rumelia. After the Second Constitutional Period in 1908, they provided cadres to the Union and Progress (Akşin, 2017, p. 131).

The Committee of Union and Progress was born as a political society. Then it became a political party. However, they did not depart from the principles that emerged since their foundation. Despite acting as a political party, they remained loyal to their spirit of community, hence their real strength and gravity. (Yalçın, 2019, p. 31). The community and the party structures were entirely different. However, one may argue that the Union and Progress was a community first and foremost.

During the process of Ottoman society becoming Turkish society, led by the Union and Progress, changes were experienced only in standard terms, and the generation of the period was able to adapt to these changes. On the other hand, they could not attract Muslim or Non-Muslim people other than those who were Turkish, because the idea of union, which was new at the time, was not fully understood. According to Feroz Ahmad, the multi-headed leviathan of Abdulhamid II was hiding the truth of lack of unity. If Abdulhamid II would be dethroned, it could be possible to create an Ottoman society in line with the views of the Union and Progress and form a unity (Ahmad, 2013, p. 403). Thus, the Committee of Union and Progress argued that with the dethroning of the Abdulhamid II, the troubles experienced in the country would disappear.

In the processes leading up to the revolution, the policies of Abdulhamid II on the military had an impact. These policies were the politicization of the military and the disruption of the principle of progress payment. Within the military, there were officers, bonded with one another through patriotism, educated in modern military schools. Educated officers conflicted with the high-ranking yet underqualified officers, who were promoted only due to their loyalty to the Sultan. This situation led low-ranking military personnel and public officers to flock to the ranks of the Union and Progress, who were opposing Abdulhamid II. The aim was to end Abdulhamid's

despotism. It was also to re-enact the constitution, which abolished in 1878 (Ahmad, 2017, p. 14).

According to Niyazi Berkes, the opposing view of Abdulhamidism was a pro-openness-honesty that would set aside libertarian and liberal deception. They wanted to keep the progressiveness of the Young Turks in the background and prioritize their goals of unity. They wanted to keep the Islamic concepts and rules away from the old meaning, which they aimed to distort in the cause of seeming more western-oriented. To them, there was no need to purity Islam with such a perspective, because it did not need it (Berkes, 2019, p. 342).

One of the most critical pieces of evidence to the Committee's coup culture is the re-enactment of the 1876 Constitution and the dethroning of Abdulhamid II. Some saw these as a revolutionary movement. Others viewed these as an excellent example of the coup culture (Ahmad, 2013, s. 13). No other organization in the political life of the Ottoman Empire had as much power to make such an impact on the rulership. In addition to the wishes and the efforts of the Committee, with the support of the society and the help of the armed forces, Second Constitutional Monarchy was declared on July 23 1908 (Mayatepek, 2015, p.49).

The Second Constitutional Monarchy was declared on July 23, 1908 (July 9, 1324) with 21 gunshots. This movement was the first movement to take over the administration as a reaction to the current order (Mayatepek, 2015, p. 56). The Committee of the Union and Progress and the Young Turks compelled Abdulhamid to resign. Within the Union and Progress, which set out on the principle of reform, a compulsion to create a modern society emerged. The Committee's dominance on the politics of the Ottoman Empire from that date onward shows its effectiveness in the

period that followed. However, despite their continuing dominance, opposition groups began to emerge. It will examine this process, which, according to some, started the coup culture in the Union and Progress, and to others, was the first seed of the revolution. First of all, what were the processes that led to the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy? If it looks at the processes, the coup executed by the Committee of Union and Progress branch in Thessaloniki. Although the Committee declared freedom on July 23, they were only able to do so in Rumelia. They did not have the gravitas to pull this off in other parts of Istanbul and Anatolia (Akşin, 2017, p. 130).

Tarık Zafer Tunaya described the Second Constitutional period as the political laboratory of the Republic. The road led to the Republic passed through the studies and discussions carried out during the Second Constitutional Era (Akşin, 2019, p. 55-56). At this point, five prominent features of the Union and Progress are worth mentioning:

1. Turkism: A significant portion of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress consisted of Muslims. The majority of the Muslim population was Turkish. Even though they were not ethnically Turkish, they considered themselves Turkish and tended to Turkism.

2. Youth Structure: The Committee of Union and Progress, a revolutionary organization, included the young population by its nature. Because young and single people were responsible for illegal or dangerous work.

3. Leaders: As Plato pointed out in the 'State', the fact that they were in the ruling class and having people in the civil wing, as well as the military wing, was an essential source of power for the Committee of Union and Progress.

4. The fact that they were educated: From the beginning, the majority of the members of Union and Progress were students or graduates with a Western vision.

5. Bourgeoisie: The Committee of Union and Progress aimed to create a bourgeois culture within Turkish society, not only because they had a Western mentality, but also because it was the elite class.

One of the main reasons behind this intervention is the negotiation held by the British and Russian rulers in Reval at the beginning of 1908. This negotiation prompted the Committee of Union and Progress to declare the constitutional monarchy as soon as possible. The revolts of Enver Pasha and Niyazi Bey, as well as the telegrams written in a harsh language sent from the Monastery and Thessaloniki, frightened Abdulhamid II and forced him to declare the Ottoman Basic Law (Kanun-u Esasi) (Mayatepek, 2015, p. 53). I can say that this situation is not caused by an obligation, but by a request. Because, the constitutional order was a necessity in the course of the world, as well as the request of the Union and Progress for the new political order of the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, with the declaration of the Second Constitutional Era, ensuring the security of liberty, justice, and life and property were among the main objectives of the Committee of Union and Progress. If it shows evidence for this situation, the most important one is that after the declaration of Constitutional Monarchy, especially the public regarded the Union and Progress sympathetically. However, with the re-declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy, the Union and Progress suffered weakness in administration. The reason for this was that they took over the government unexpectedly, and the bureaucrat class fell into turmoil (Ahmad, 2013, p.31).

One of the main goals of bringing constitutional monarchy back was the effort of the Committee of Union and Progress to create a modern society (Akşin, 2017, p.17). The Committee of Union and Progress consisted of graduates or students of Tıbbiye (1827), Harbiye (1834), and Mülkiye (1859), which were modern and qualified schools of the period. Thus, the victory of the Second Constitution was also the victory of these students. However, after this victory, they did not step back from using deterrence methods to keep the power (Akşin, 2017, p.28). The reason for this can be evaluated as a strategic tool of the Committee, which sought to gain authority.

According to Sinan Akşin, forcing Abdulhamid II to declare the constitutional monarchy was a victory for the Committee of Union and Progress. On the other hand, however, they allowed the Sultan to keep his ability to fight off or to control the developments (Akşin, 2017, p. 139). When viewing the Second Constitutional Monarchy as an idea, it was not only a victory of independence but a necessary measure for the upcoming political processes.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın interpreted the situation as: "The declaration of Constitutionalism was an unexpectedly enormous success for the Committee of Union and Progress. The Palace, which made the entire empire tremble, was demolished overnight. All over the country, there was a frenzied chant of freedom. Government influence collapsed everywhere, and the Empire was in a state of anarchy throughout. The Palace, the Porte, the provincial governments, the police, and the people were all surprised. A password was circulating: Liberty is here!" (Yalçın, 2019, p. 41). According to Feroz Ahmad, this coup should have been described as a revolutionary movement because the aim was to bring back a constitution that was adopted thirty-two years ago and thus save the state (Ahmad, 2013, p. 33). Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın commented that the re-declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy on 23-24 July 1908

was an unexpected success for the Committee of Union and Progress. However, Abdulhamid's sudden decision to quit resisting and surrender dragged both the country and the bureaucrats into a great deal of turmoil (Yalçın, 2019, p. 41).

After the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy, letters of gratitude delivered to Abdulhamid disturbed the Committee of Union and Progress. Within the first days of the Constitutional Monarchy, Sultan's name was not mentioned in the Committee of Union and Progress reports, and they were stating that the new order was a result of their efforts. Military officers wanted to know how the Constitutional Monarchy was declared in reality. Nearly 300 soldiers were sent to Istanbul to see if there was any harm to Abdulhamid II. After this incident, there was respect for Abdulhamid II by the Committee of Union and Progress. However, they were also harshly criticized by the opposition group inside (Akşin, 2017, p. 141).

The Committee of Union and Progress faced weakness with the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy II. After gaining power, they were weak in administrative terms with an inexperienced point of view. The Committee was conservative, and they were not intended to destroy the existing parliamentary structure. For this reason, they left the government to the experienced statesmen and preferred to observe as constitutional guards. According to Plato; the guardians are equating the idea of state administration to laws. State administration cannot take place where there is no law. When viewed in terms of this theory; The Committee of Union and Progress monitor it to protect the state administration. However, in April 1909, after the cabinet of Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who did not have Unionist positions, collapsed without facing the insurgents. The Committee assumed that they could consolidate their position by directly taking over the responsibility. Unionists declared the Second Constitutional Monarchy, but its effects were limited only to Rumelia, as

they were not powerful enough to influence Istanbul or Anatolia. To control Istanbul, they should have prepared for factors such as a civil war or foreign intervention (Akşin, 2017, p. 139).

According to Feroz Ahmad, the beginning of the 20th century in Turkey was July 23, 1908, with the re-enactment of Abdulhamid's 1876 Constitution, which was abolished 30 years ago. The Unionists realized the importance of the change in their lives with the re-enactment of the constitutional order. Society shifted from an introverted structure to an outward one. Young Turks tried their best to make up for the lost time quickly. They tried to achieve social change as well as changing the political order (Ahmad, 2017, p. 44).

According to Mehmet Zeki Duman, the Young Turks coup, which led to the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908, became a tradition and inherited to the Republican era. The military's attitude to laws and civil governments paved the way for it to define itself as absolute power. The military acted as the principal founder and protector of the state and claimed to have undertaken the protection of the Kemalist regime. The military has applied its traditional and institutional power as a method of oppression on civil will. Rather than the military showing off its strength, the real reasons behind the coups were ideological (Duman, 2019, p. 159). While agreeing with this view, it is clear that the effects of the coup culture were present in all the military interventions.

The Revolution or Coup of 1908 is the end of the Palace's authoritarian influence over politics. After that, politics fell into the hands of the Porte, a distinguished coterie (Ahmad, 2013, p. 195). In the period, after the Revolution of 1908 (described as a coup by some), the effects of the Unionist views and the vague

structure of the organization felt. etc. lack of reputation and political experience) The Committee existed as a spokesman of the public authority rather than a political party that became the representative of social and economic interests (Ahmad, 2013, p. 191). Another significant result of the Revolution of 1908 was that it had been the beginning of open and free party politics for the first time in the Ottoman Empire. With the beginning of this new period, certain concepts began to be reinterpreted and shaped. According to Feroz Ahmad, some of these concepts were motherland, union, progress, and liberty (Ahmad, 2013, p. 405). He added that the final significant result of the 1908 Revolution was that it initiated a comprehensive period of intellectual differentiation. It is the sum of the efforts made to reveal the meaning of progress which was the second crucial concept of the revolution (Ahmad, 2013, p. 410). In parallel with this approach, describing the Second Constitutionalism as a revolution is correct in terms of its method. The most important reason for the justification of this idea is the fact that a regime change has occurred. This blow, taken by the monarchy, if not directly, caused the emergence of the new political process. The national and liberal values came to the fore and the Committee of Union and Progress's prestige significantly increased.

Some see this incident as a bourgeois revolution. There were many severe economic transformations during the Unionist's power. To create the national bourgeoisie, many economic developments such as the transition to national banking (national bank of reputation), economic and financial practitioner (adaptation of the war economy applied during the war period) took place (Toprak, 2016, p. 81) Just for this reason, some do not see it as a revolution. Sina Akşin, while referring to the revolutions in the world, states that there were delays in the realization of revolutions and one has to look back further in time to distinguish (Akşin, 2017, p. 374). While

agreeing to this view, we will study the examples of this case in the Republic of Turkey later on.

The Unionists, who took power in 1908, carried out the modernization project by organizing reforms in every field while preserving the status of the dynasty. A plausible question would be why they continued this modernization process without overthrowing the dynasty. In terms of getting the support of the public, this could have constituted an opposition for Unionists, for the society was not ready for such a serious change. A counter-opposition could have been formed for the Unionists in getting the support of the people. Because society was not such a serious change (Tikveş, 2011, p. 185). The time frame that rendered possible the change to take place in every sense occurred during the revolution led by Mustafa Kemal. Monarchy abolished, and the Republic was established. Feroz Ahmad said that if the dynasty was allowed to play a symbolic role, it would threaten the attempt to establish a new Turkey (Ahmad, 2017, p. 25). From another point of view, completely overthrowing the monarchy could have caused a severe dislike for the Union and Progress among the people. This situation was a point that a revolutionary organization should have taken into consideration. Receiving public support was critical during the modernization process.

The Committee thought they had achieved their goal; however, the fact that they were inexperienced caused difficulties in handling the power. Although there were low ranking officers in their group, they had no competence in terms of statesmanship (Akşin, 2017, p. 144). That situation was particularly the case in revolutionary/coup processes. Committees and juntas focus mostly on the process of intervention, but they do not plan for later. That was the exact situation of the Committee.

The Committee's legitimization took place in conjunction with the Ottoman Basic Law (Kanun-u Esasi), which took its elemental form in 1909. Consequently, the Committee moved from Paris to Istanbul. However, the real power came after the Raid on the Sublime Porte (Çeker, 2016, p. 53).

During the process, the first action was dissolving the parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan). According to Sina Akşin, in the uncertain environment of 1908, many MPs elected from the Committee of Union and Progress were no longer in the party. Also, they thought that some of them could leave. An election would be suitable for the Committee of Union and Progress. Therefore, the Unionists carried the negotiations of dissolving the parliament and changing specific articles of the Ottoman Basic Law (Kanun-u Esasi) (Akşin, 2017, s. 302).

The Committee of Union and Progress did not have a political program because they did not have the necessary experience. They were not able to find a reference since no such work existed in Turkish. They were not even aware of the difficulties of the parliamentary mechanism. While they took the defence of the country as a priority, they were suddenly left with no other option than to assume the responsibility of the state's administration. That was unexpected on their behalf (Yalçın, 2019, p. 39). The regulation of 1909 showed itself in the changes in the bylaws of the Committee. At the top of the organization, the head office which consisted of three members continued to exist and one of the leaders was the secretary-general. Under this structure, there were provincial delegations, shire delegations, borough delegations, and if necessary, village delegations which were all elected by the general assembly (Akşin, 2017, p. 236-237). The Committee of Union and Progress tried to make long-term plans. This situation shows how long the organization wanted to remain in power.

Although they were significantly inexperienced when they took power, the period between 1908 and 1918 was very significant for the Union and Progress. Even though they have lost power from time to time, they managed to control the government (Yalçın, 2019, p. 63). According to Sina Akşin, 'Although the constitution is not the main goal for the Unionists, they are close to the Abdulhamid administration. The reason for this is that the Unionists and the rulers of the tyranny are from the same nation and ruling class.' (Akşin, 2017, p. 268).

If about approach the subject from the viewpoint of the rankers' officers, they understood that they would be purged from the military in a short time. They did not welcome this situation at all. However, none of these issues was enough to keep the Union and Progress from power. An opponent and constitutional structure that could confront the Committee of Union and Progress was necessary. (Akşin, 2017, p. 162). The struggle of the groups within the regime, who wanted to be influential, and to maintain their formal existence, became tougher. Therefore, it was possible that would be a serious power struggle between the Committee and the advocates of the regime. Regime advocates advocated tyranny within institutions. On the other hand; association advocates were trying to pull their power focus to their side.

The Committee of Union and Progress was not structurally homogeneous. This trait, from time to time, paved the way for internal disagreements. Particularly after becoming a legitimate political party, the number of organizations opposing the Committee increased. According to Kazım Karabekir, the Committee of Union and Progress was not only compelled to deal with the internal turmoils but also to resist greater external and internal dangers (Yalçın, 2019, p 53). Despite all these difficulties, the Committee managed to be influential.

It is necessary to state the other aspects of the Committee of Union and Progress, which differentiated them from the other parties of the period. Although a significant number of its members had military origins, there were civilian members as well. However, a sharper trait that distinguished it from others was the distinction between the committee and the party. Sina Akşin states that it was mainly a committee. According to him, it was an organization with members, clubs, local and central congresses everywhere. The party consisted of MPs (Akşin, 2019, p. 65). In this sense, as mentioned before, it would not be wrong to say that the committee side was more effective in the decision-making process.

The Committee nominated the notables whom it can trust in the provinces. According to Sina Akşin, this situation was born out of necessity. The Committee found the Rumelia, where they nestled in before the declaration of the Second Constitutionalism, closer to itself rather than Anatolia. The reason for this was that the military always felt alert in Rumelia, where most of its personnel consisted of educated officers. Also, Rumelia was always under external threats. Thus, they favoured the notables in Rumelia in the elections (Akşin, 2017, p. 257).

Sina Akşin, who thought what delayed the losing of Balkans was the Unionist's passion for modernization, stated: "In a feudally ruled Ottoman Empire, time was running against the state, however, in a bourgeois administration, there was a possibility that the time would not work against the state. This possibility, when combined with favourable conditions such as the Tripoli War, the rebellion in Albania, the complicated domestic political atmosphere, and the Union and Progress not being in power, pushed the Balkan states into action" (Akşin, 2017, p. 323). Although agreeing to Sina Akşin, it has to be stated that the difficulties experienced

by the Ottoman Empire became an opportunity for the Union and Progress. To take advantage of this opportunity, the Committee had the chance to use its power.

The 31 March Incident paved the way for the overthrow of Abdulhamid II and the attempts to be made against him (Akşin, 2017, p. 370). The March 31 Incident, which lasted 13 days with the support of the people, began on March 31, 1325, on the Rumi calendar, corresponding to April 13, 1909, on the Gregorian calendar. The Palace and the Sublime Porte viziers seemed to have accepted the current situation in new Istanbul, which was founded by March 31 Incident and lacking the Union and Progress. This compulsory silence in Istanbul was the complete opposite of the determination of the armies in Rumelia. The protest telegrams were sent by the Committee of Union and Progress to the parliament, the government, and the Palace (Akşin, 2017, p. 210). With the Hareket Ordusu (Military of Action) suppressing the revolt, the number of casualties in Istanbul has been this many for the first time since Vaka-i Hayriye (Erdem, 2019, p. 4). It was the Committee of Union and Progress that dethroned Abdulhamid II. It is necessary to claim that Derviş Vahdeti, a dissident within the Committee, paved the way for the March 31 Incident. After 13-days in 1909, the Hareket Ordusu suppressed the uprising, and the Union and Progress overthrew Abdulhamid II and replaced him with Mehmet Reşad. With the dethroning of Abdulhamid II, one of the most critical obstacles to the Committee of Union and Progress was eliminated. Mehmet Reşad did not interfere with decision making in political issues while the Committee played an authoritarian role. This incident, which led to a parliamentary regime in the Ottoman Empire, is the most significant example of political change in Ottoman history (Mayatepek, 2015, p. 51-52).

There are three views about by whom the March 31 Incident was organized. The first argued that since the Union and Progress profited most by the end of the

movement, it is possible that the whole incident was organized directly by them. The second opinion, which is wrong according to Sina Akşin, is that it was Abdulhamid II who organized the incident. The last one, supported by Sina Akşin as well, is that the rebellion was planned by the opposition wing, which also included Prince Sabahattin. Prince Sabahattin represented the liberal wing in the Ottoman Empire. When authority lost its main focus, 'decentralization and private enterprise' would increase. The number of supporters of Prince Sabahattin would increase in this way. (Ahmad, 2017, p. 46) Prince Sabahattin and the opposition did not embrace the uprising since they saw it as a show of force by the military wing. Although it is not known by whom the rebellion was organized, they believed that the military was provoked. According to the general understanding, if the Sultan was held responsible for the rebellion, the oppression against the Committee of Union and Progress would not have been justified. If the opposite situation was experienced, the dethroning of Abdulhamid II would have been considered unfair. This uncertainty was because the Union and Progress would profit from both situations (Akşin, 2019, p. 59-61).

The Committee, despite having the power to do so, did not bring its supporters to higher positions in the administration. The Unionists preferred to use the power indirectly rather than directly. They were able to have their plans forcibly adopted by the Sultan and execute the plan by the persons in the administration. That was a committee-party, (both the Committee of Union and Progress and the political party branch of Union and Progress) that was able to overthrow a sultan and replace him with another after the March 31 Incident (Akşin, 2017, p. 257). It would not be wrong to claim that such an attitude aimed to get the permanent support of the public. The vision of the Union and Progress caused such a reflex. However, the Committee

showed different political attitudes depending on the conditions of the period. Due to this processional attitude, society has approached the processes pragmatically.

According to Sina Akşin, the March 31 Incident was a sign of failure. It turned out that the II. Constitutional Monarchy, which had big dreams, was a difficult and troublesome process. The government under the control of the Committee of Union and Progress could not prevent such an explosion. On the other hand, the prestige and dignity of the Committee were also affected. The loss of prestige experienced by the military, which gave the Union and Progress power to control the government again, was also important. The Declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy was mostly organized by the low-ranking officers within the Union and Progress. There was tension between the educated high-ranking officers and the low-ranking ones (Akşin, 2017, p. 224). However, the Union and Progress were not in the limelight. The Committee, which avoided being at the forefront due to its confidential structure, chose Enver Pasha and Resneli Niyazi Pasha as its representatives. Now the Committee would become more visible. According to Sina Akşin, the Union and Progress were using violent methods. Surprisingly, they adopted these means after 1908. Even though the Committee lost power for some time despite their dominance, to be able to syllogize these methods, the last congress of the Union and Progress, which Sina Akşin also referred to, should be studied (Akşin, 2019, p. 65). Although the Society lost its power from time to time, it retained a serious authoritarian power. However, to infer that they used violent methods, one should look at the last congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1918.

Ismail Safi's comments on the March 31 Incident states that the uprising aimed to prevent the discharging of uneducated officers from the military, purge the officers affiliated with the Committee, remove the Union and Progress from the

administration, and make the religious rule dominant. Hasan Fehmi, who was an Albanian-origin pro-Ahrar Party author and was prominent due to his anti-Union and Progress articles, was killed on April 6, 1909, and the murder considered to be an assassination because the killers never found. This murder was one of the justified, though not entirely, reasons for the March 31 Incident (Safi, 2019, p. 146).

Meanwhile, Feroz Ahmad talks about the importance of the Third military. If the Third military, under the command of Mahmut Şevket Pasha in Macedonia, did not make moves to save the constitutional order, the Committee of Union and Progress could have failed. Mahmut Şevket Pasha, who was not a Unionist, supported the constitution and wanted the Ottoman Empire to be liberated from the old regime, however, because he was an officer trained in Prussia, he believed in the military hierarchy and did not favour the involvement of the low-ranking officers in politics. The Third military, on the other hand, was a nest for a lot of Unionist officers, including Enver Pasha, who was an attached in Berlin in April 1909, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Third military headed to the capital and suppressed the uprising. The Committee and the constitution were saved, but the Unionists had to pay a hefty price (Ahmad, 2017, p. 50).

When the echoes of the March 31 Incident were noticed in Rumelia, the Committee of Union and Progress took action. The reason for this was the fact that the Unionists saw themselves as the guardians of liberty and the constitution. Hence, they considered any action taken against them as a coup, and they believed that this incident was a coup attempt. According to Sina Akşin, the opposition against the Union and Progress can be considered reactionary because the elimination of the Committee meant that the institutions of the old order would fill the gap (Akşin, 2019, p. 61-64). Therefore, after the March 31 Incident, the opposition against the

Committee of Union and Progress was in a difficult position. The Union and Progress restrained the opposition by saying that anyone who opposed them was in favour of the March 31 Incident (Akşin, 2019, p. 70).

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians who kept up with the nationalist uprisings had restarted the war, and the young Unionist officers wanted an offensive to take Edirne back. That is why the Sublime Porte was raided. The Committee of Union and Progress raided the Sublime Porte on January 23, 1913, partly due to the processes in the aftermath of the March 31 Incident. The Unionists were agitated by the events in Edirne, and they marched to the Sublime Porte as a crowd. The guards, whose commanders were neutralized, could not prevent the raid, and two officers and a commissioner were shot in the resulting chaos. Yakup Cemil, one of the most prominent of the Unionists, killed Nazım Pasha, who was cursing and claiming that he was deceived during the events (Akşin, 2019, p. 77-78).

The Sublime Porte was a prime ministry building. The raid by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who were opposing the Kamil Pasha cabinet and had the aim of taking over the political power, was the result of long-time planning. Losing the Balkan Wars and facing the prospect of losing Edirne was the excuse for the raid. It was a military coup that emerged for the sake of liberty in the Ottoman Empire. It was carried out while the Kamil Pasha cabinet was in a meeting, Ohrili Nafız Bey, Kıbrıslı Tevfik Bey, and the commissioner Celal Bey were shot to death. The number of casualties in the raid was eleven in total. Enver Pasha entered Kamil Pasha's room and made him write a resignation letter at gunpoint, and as soon as the letter was signed, he took it to the Palace. Sultan Reşat accepted Kamil Pasha's resignation letter and appointed Mahmut Şevket Pasha in his stead, as the Committee forced him to do so. According to İsmail Safi, the Committee of Union and Progress,

which had low public support, started its dictatorship. The Unionists, who wanted to establish a nation-state, entered the First World War with a perspective of Turanism (Safi, 2019, p. 147). Turanism emerged in the last years of the Ottoman Empire with the influence of nationalist movements in Europe. It aimed to unite all the Turks living in the world under a single country and flag. As we can understand from here; The First World War was important for the Unionists' idea of Turan.

According to Feroz Ahmad, it would be wrong to evaluate this process, which led to the overthrow of Kamil Pasha, as a movement that the Unionists attempted in despair, believing that Edirne was lost. He argued that the coup had been planned for a long time and it would be more appropriate to search the reasons for the coup in the appointment of Kamil Pasha as Grand Vizier (Ahmad, 2013, p. 146).

By raiding the Sublime Porte, the Committee of Union and Progress completely took over the control of the government. For the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire (except that Sultan Osman II was killed by the Janissaries), the act of overthrowing the rule took place, and they formed their government with the grand vizier Mahmut Şevket Pasha. After the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, Sait Halim Pasha became a grand vizier. According to Alper Çeker, it showed that the control of the government was taken over with a coup. The fact that the society retained military power enabled it to achieve this success (Çeker, 2016, p. 68-69). Consequently, the Committee of Union and Progress's control continued until World War I (Çeker, 2016, p. 70). When we look at the approaches of İsmail Safi and Alper Çeker, one may claim that the Sublime Porte Raid which was carried out by the Committee of Union and Progress brought a form of dictatorship.

Another element that threatened the Union and Progress was the traditionalist pashas. There were times when Mahmut Şevket, who became pasha during the rule of Abdulhamid II, put the Union and Progress under challenging situations. Mahmut Şevket Pasha left his mark on politics after the March 31 Incident which was the beginning of a state of emergency (Akşin, 2017, p. 370). For example, Mahmut Şevket Pasha made his weight felt until 1912 with the support of the so-called Unionists. It prevented the Union and Progress from fully controlling the government by preventing the Unionist MPs from becoming ministers. (Akşin, 2019, p. 65). The imperialist states supported the opposition to prevent the economic reforms of the Unionists and while backing uprisings of the nations within the Empire.

The assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha is as vital as the March 31 Incident. Both incidents led to the dissolution of the opposition. Such an environment helped the Union and Progress to expand their political influence. Sait Halim Pasha assumed the role of a big brother within the party. The supervisory government of the Unionists became the main government position. (Akşin, 2017, p. 368). This event was the sign that the Committee took the strings as well as it was intimidation to the opposition.

Another criticized action of the Committee of Union and Progress was that it hid the agreements that broke the country from the public. Mainly, after the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, the dissolution of the opposition made this process easier. Tension continued to increase even further by the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war. Internal struggles within the Committee of Union and Progress also fueled the situation. Sina Akşin mentions that Yusuf Hikmet Bayur made a negative judgment against the Committee of Union and Progress. Sina Akşin states that this issue should be examined in detail (Akşin, 2017, p. 407). From the perspective of the

"Rulers", it might be thought that exposing the operations to the public would pose a threat to the authorities. In addition, it is thought that it would be useless for the public to express their opinion on the subject.

Ideologically, the idea of Turkism became a political movement thanks to the Committee of Union and Progress. Since the Unionists could not deny the existence of the Empire, they felt the need to be careful in defending this idea, thus they worked secretly (Akşin, 2017, p. 384). According to Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Turkism will enable the Europeanized society that is influenced by Western cultures to transform into a different society that supports nationalism (Ülken, 2019, p. 208). This view of Turkism emerged as an ideology that embraced the Western enlightenment in general but indigenous in its origins.

The second significant ideology was pan-Islamism which emerged under the supervisory government of the Unionists. Even an organization was formed around the idea. Islamism, a movement in which Islam was accepted as the official religion, and the head of the state was the caliph, emerged as a stance against the increasing colonization of the Muslim states in the 19th century (Ülken, 2019, p. 201).

The last movement is westernization or Europeanism as Hilmi Ziya Ülken called it. Those who followed Europeanism believed that the answer to the question of how to save the state could only be found in the European methods (Ülken, 2019, p. 205).

The tension between the military and the civilian wing of the Unionists was evident at the 1912 Congress, which was the first time the Committee held it in Istanbul and was open to the public (Akşin, 2017, p. 319). the conquest of Edirne created a wave of joy throughout the country. It significantly helped the Union and

Progress to expand its sphere of influence and significantly increased its power. If it was not for the timely interference and courage of the Union and Progress, making no progress was a possibility in the face of European resistance, just as Abdulhamid II missed the opportunity to take back the lands that he had previously lost (Akşin, 2017, p. 394).

In July 1912, a military uprising aimed to overthrow the Union and Progress government. Those who planned the uprising were anti-Unionist military officers, who aimed to bring liberals to power. They were successful. According to Feroz Ahmad, if it was not for the Balkan War which broke out in September of 1912, the supporters of the Union and Progress within the military would have been purged. He says, in this respect, Turkish history might have played out in a very different way under a liberal government (Ahmad, 2017, p. 14-15). The aim here is that the liberal cadre who does not want to be under the authority of the Committee of Union and Progress wanted to have a say in terms of the country's rule. The outbreak of the Balkan War revealed the need for the Unionist cadres in the military. This purge, planned by the liberals due to the war, had to be suspended. This incident played a critical role in the continuity of the Unionists in the military.

After 1913, the Turkish military began to evolve into a different structure. It was politicized and used by the Unionists. According to Feroz Ahmad, it was a significant operation in the direction of modernization. The government and the military, in the hands of the Turkish lower-middle-class, jointly supported the same revolution. The Unionists, the architects of the reforms that affected social life, boasted that they brought the country into the capitalist era in 1918 (Ahmad, 2017, p. 16).

The primary task of the Committee of Union and Progress, which seized power, was to make ideology effective in the military in line with its view of unity and progress and to eliminate all opposing ideas that would stand against it. The character of the military was dramatically altered in a few years in line with this perspective. Those who thought to be unable to accept the dominance of the Union and Progress retired in 1914 when Enver Pasha became the minister of war. On the other hand, with a decree issued, they set out an idea that would constitute a progressive republican perception far from the traditional Ottoman military structure (Ahmad, 2017, p. 16). This monopolistic view was apparent in civilian life as well as in the military. Elimination of the civilian opposition can be shown as an example of the monopolistic view of the Union and Progress.

The government intervention that occurred within the Committee of Union and Progress was the authoritative behaviour taken by the party administration against the attorneys. The Elections of 1914 were held under the absolute control of the Union and Progress. As the opinion of the Committee of Union and Progress shifted to the left, the likelihood of "uncomfortable" opinions from the attorneys it contained and selected from its lists increasing (Akşin, 2017, p. 440). After 1914, the idea of defending the homeland was replaced by the idea of handling the world war and the government. Even though there was intellectual unity in the committee-party relationship, there were opposing movements in practice.

With the decision, in line with the modernization steps, passed by the Committee of Union and Progress in the 1916 congress, religious courts were taken away from Shaykh al-Islam and were tied to the ministry of justice. This decision was important in terms of secularization and was the result of the idea of modernization (Akşin, 2017, p. 463). The distinction between religion and state affairs differed in the

Union and Progress's understanding. A centrist understanding that did not revolve around religion and strong in terms of education and economy was developed (Berkes, 2019, p. 401). If we compare the three ideologies mentioned by Hilmi Ziya Ülken, these modernization steps should be evaluated within the framework of Europeanism. Niyazi Berkes also has a statement confirming the issue. (Yalçın, 2019, p. 75) The world war was going to be a serious test for the Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress saw the capitulations imposed on them as an obstacle to modernization and tried to capitalize on any chance they get rid of these in the process of independence (Akşin, 2019, p. 97).

The Last Congress of Union and Progress convened on 1 November 1918. According to Sina Akşin, inviting new members of the party to be established to this congress shows that this separation is not seen with an evil eye. At the congress, the dissolution of the Committee of Union and Progress was clear. However, there were different opinions about whether to establish a new party or not, in the end, though, the decision was taken to establish it. The new party's manifesto was framed at this congress. A committee was established under the direction of İsmail Canbolat Bey, and it was decided that the new party should leave the revolutionary direction and have a more liberal character. In the voting held on November 5, 1918, with 35 positive votes against 9, 4 of them abstaining, the Committee of Union and Progress officially became history and a decision was made in the Teceddut Party. The closure of the Committee of Union and Progress has only legally ended. The Committee of Union and Progress was officially closed but the idea of Unionism would not end with the change of the organization's or party's name. The cadres that established the republic consisted of people who had Unionist views (Akşin, 2017, p. 469). Evaluated within this frame of thought, some consider the Republican People's Party as a

continuation of the Committee of Union and Progress. For example; Caner Erdoğan states that the ideological affinity between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Republican People's Party draws attention. He states that this is due to pro-westernization and opposition to monarchy-theocracy (Erdoğan C., 2017, p. 367).

The former Unionists described themselves as nationalists and they were trying to take the lead in the resistance. In 1918, Sultan Vahdettin had no desire to be a leader. According to Feroz Ahmad, this lack of desire was the reason for him to sign the Treaty of Sevres, despite the pressure from the public and the nationalists not to approve it under any circumstances. The military was also confused. Some officers followed the sultan, thinking that he would lead the fight for independence. When Sultan Vahdettin started to take sides with Britain, they participated in the national struggle initiated by Mustafa Kemal. Due to the patriotic views of the Unionists, the military's loyalty to the capital ended and the military developed a nationalist identity (Ahmad, 2017, p. 17). In parallel with this, according to Sina Akşin, the Committee of Union and Progress turned into the Republican People's Party. There were ideological and sociological ties between the two. We know that the Committee of Union and Progress also struggled to gain full independence. Many think that the Turkish War of Independence and the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were much more effective and successful, and free of the mistakes of the Second Constitutional Monarchy. To examine the success of this process, it is also necessary to observe the ties between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Second Constitutional Monarchy. However, some of the former Unionists did not accept the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his cadre and attempted assassination in İzmir in 1926 (Akşin, 2017, p. 471). If we were to comment on the assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, it was quite natural that the Unionists, who did not want to lose the power of

the "rulers" class, wanted Mustafa Kemal's authority to be shaken. The reason was that the Committee of Union and Progress, which initiated the liberty process and brought it to a significant point, wanted to be influential in politics. Mustafa Kemal, despite being a former Unionist, disaccorded with the Union and Progress on so many levels, thus left the Committee. For this reason, they did not see the freedom struggle and revolutions in the country as their revolutions. (Akşin, 2019, p. 107). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on the other hand, wanted a complete departure from the corrupt past and the republic is the representation of this intention (Ahmad, 2017, p. 11). With this interpretation of Feroz Ahmad, it is possible to say that a very different and radical change occurred with the arrival of the Republican regime.

It would not be right to talk about the Committee of Union and Progress and not to mention Talat - Enver - Cemal Pasha, one of the important leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. However, according to Feroz Ahmad, the leadership of the Committee was always collective, thus mentioning only the trio of Talat, Enver, and Cemal, who came to power after 1914, would greatly simplify the entire process. This does not mean that for ten years Talat Pasha after 1909, Cemal Pasha in terms of civil and military administration and Enver Pasha after 1913 did not leave any traces in Turkish politics. Within the trio, Talat Pasha was the closest person to leadership thanks to his intelligence and spirit; however, he could not go further than being at the head of serious factionalism. Talat Pasha grew stronger as the Committee took over provincial administrations. As the minister of internal affairs, he strengthened his position in the Committee (Ahmad, 2013, p. 193).

On the other hand, the Unionists, who continued to fight by not breaking their relations with Talat Pasha, took part in the struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and fought against the Enver Pasha faction under the guidance of Talat Pasha.

During this period, Talat Pasha took sides with Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the resistance that started in Anatolia. This situation was effective until peace was achieved. Kara Vasıf told Mustafa Kemal "You are our commander in chief according to the instructions received from Talat Pasha" at the Sivas Congress. This was proof that the Unionists left the administrative power to Mustafa Kemal during a new establishment process. (Akal, 2018, p. 316). According to Feroz Ahmad, Enver Pasha emerged as a leader after spearheading the raid on the Sublime Porte, and he got to the position due to the changes in the situation and his personality. Finally, Cemal Pasha was the oldest among the trio. He was brave, as well as hard-working. He demonstrated his qualities in Baghdad, the anti-Unionist Baghdad after the 1909 uprising in Adana, during the raid on the Supreme Porte in Istanbul and Syria. (Ahmad, 2013, p. 193). Bernard Lewis stated that until 1918, the trio created was a military dictatorship (Lewis, 2015, p. 224).

According to Erik Jan Zurcher, the nationalist movement was based on the Union and Progress. Thanks to the essential contributions by Mustafa Kemal, the Unionists came back together. They followed a common policy, away from political factions (Zurcher, 1984, p. 106).

In the light of this information and the structures within the military, we have seen how the culture of the coup in Turkish political life was implemented by the Committee of Union and Progress, both to a committee where it was kept secret and to a political party. Many think that the Committee of Union and Progress was a revolutionary organization and laid the foundations of today's secular republic in terms of both an idea and physical struggles. Others, on the other hand, blame the Committee for the lack of an entirely democratic culture today and for the coups that harmed the democracy in the Republic of Turkey. My personal opinion is; The

Committee of Union and Progress united with the instinct of protecting the difficult administrative power of an empire and the borders of the countries to which they were affiliated. In this sense, they have embarked on a vital and adventurous path and achieved a lot of success on this path. However, their success has hampered them in the long run. As their responsibilities increased due to both internal opposition and external threats, they were blamed as the chief architects of the Ottoman Empire's collapse. Theirs was just a last attempt at liberation. If it was not for that attempt, the founding cadres of the Republic of Turkey would not exist, and there would not be an heir to the Ottoman Empire in this century.

From the point of view of the theory of the thesis, the military class used the "natural guardian" authority due to the resulting chaos and wanted to save the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks played an important role in ending the absolute monarchy. The imposition of the constitution and the transition to the parliamentary system limited the powers of the Sultan to a certain extent. The military and the Young Turks who claimed to be intellectuals did not hesitate to cooperate within the process. One may argue that this heritage later passed into the Republican period.

4. THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD

This period of coups in the Ottoman Empire was carried on as a cultural heritage after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Although Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wanted to adopt the principle of keeping the military away from politics, the military wanted to intervene, and did so, whenever it felt there was a threat to the security or the republic's ambition to catch up with the modern states.

The legal basis of the coups during the Republic of Turkey period was the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, Article 35, which was enacted in 1934. As an internal structure of the state, the military undertook the task of protecting the state from threats from external enemies and ideological threats from the internal ones (Erdem, 2019, p. 4). With the power derived from this article, the military, whenever there was a situation perceived as a threat, saw intervening as its right.

The military interventions occurred in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. According to Levent Ünsaldı, the military took over the title of the political judge in everyday life in this sense. On the other hand, it emerged as the unifying power of politics and society. The military is "the nation itself", "the guardian of the motherland and the patriotic faith", and "the guarantee of the unity, independence, and the stability of the state" (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 13). Based on this approach, Mehmet Zeki Duman agrees with Ünsaldı and says that the military is the real owner of the state and it acts according to the task of protecting it (Duman, 2019, p. 148). However, the opinions that it made some justified interventions with the instinct of defence and protection should also be evaluated.

Besides, certain coup attempts, which rather had the nature of a warning, have taken place in Turkish Political Life. These notices called "muhtıra", which was

derived from the Arabic word "ihtar", and means warning note in Turkish. For example, the military intervention of 12 March 1971 is called 12 Mart Muhtırası in Turkish. The peculiarity of 12 Mart Muhtırası is that it was not an attempt to overthrow the government of the period directly, rather it was a successful attempt to change it (Erdem, 2019, p. 1-2). In this criterion, it is seen that the military not only had a tendency to take direct control of the government but also had a tendency to change it.

The military warnings which will be examined in this chapter happened on 22 February 1962, 21 May 1963, and 12 March 1971. Today, the social memory which remained ineffective in expressing opinions on these military initiatives, weakened the quality of the comments on the events and evolved into a historical process that is gradually erased. However, the majority of research led to the conclusion that these military interventions are still affecting the political processes. Interventions serve the desire and need of disabling the current political rule and controlling the social life. For this reason, citizens have always been affected by these processes.

Before talking about these junta movements, it is necessary to interpret what events played a role in the formation of these movements and how the processes were shaped. If we look at the development of democratic culture, according to Eric Jan Zürcher, Turkish democracy has had the legacy of parliamentary election experiences since 1876 and the legacy of multi-party democracy between 1908-1913 and 1923-1925, and in 1930. Even though democracy was not deeply rooted and was easily contained and prevented, it was present enough not to require it to be built from scratch (Zürcher, 2018, p. 253).

It would not be wrong to claim that the military officers formed the founding cadres of a new state. In this respect, a situation in which the military had no say in

the Republic of Turkey was unthinkable. However, for the practice of democracy to be implemented, political life had to take action together with the multi-party life and settle on a ground. Few attempts were made in the Republican Era for the transition to multiparty politics but all of these failed and the parties were closed. These were the Progressive Republican Party, which was active between 1924 and 1925, and the Free Republican Party, which was active for a short time in 1930 between August and November. After these two failed attempts, the transition to multi-party life came in 1946. The National Development Party, founded in 1945 by Nuri Demirağ, was the first opposition party of the Republic of Turkey after the Second World War. However, despite participating in the municipal elections in 1946 and the general elections in 1946 and 1950, the National Development Party was ineffective, and it was spontaneously dissolved on 28 May 1958 after the death of Nuri Demirağ in 1957.

Turkey's multiparty period of the after-show successful opposition toppled by a military end of the coming to power and the ruling reign impact and producing both positive and negative, so many opinions by examining the historical perspective of the Democrat Party, the data will be better understood the junta period will occur. To analyze the establishment of the Democrat Party, it would be correct to look at the influence of the Republican People's Party on the country's administration.

The establishment of the Democrat Party led to the 1929 Great Depression and the Second World War period between the authoritarian tendencies of the opposition ground out as a discourse in Turkey. However, two proposals by the Republican People's Party to reduce damage to the national economy during the war gave rise to this ground. The first was the Wealth Tax. Those who could not afford the heavy taxes imposed by the state were sent to Askale to work in stone quarries. Some

arbitrary practices that took place caused the bourgeoisie to react against the government. However, the real blow came from the Law of Provision of Land to Farmers (Çitfçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu). This law aimed to divide certain parts of the lands of large landowners to employ small farmers. This situation led the large landowners to sympathize with, and even form the opposition. 99.75 % of the landowners had small farms of less than 500 acres. Those who opposed the legislation were the parliament members whose relatives were landowners, and their spokesperson was Adnan Menderes, who was a large landowner from Aydın (Zürcher, 2018, p. 245-246). When viewed in this sense, one may argue that the reaction was neither political nor ideological, but economic.

According to Feroz Ahmad, the cooperation of the military and bureaucratic elites, landowners, and the growing bourgeoisie in the country, which had a say in politics, formed the basis of the success of the War of Independence and the Kemalist regime. In this sense, with the rise of urban and rural capitalists, the alliance that formed the basis of the regime lost power. The structure of land feudalism was getting increasingly intolerant over getting united with the bourgeoisie. The impact of the opposition clicked with this intolerance (Ahmad, 2017, p. 105).

The emergence of the opposition within the parliament became evident in the budget negotiations in 1945. Celal Bayar, who was the last prime minister of Atatürk, Adnan Menderes, Feridun Fikri Düşünsel, Yusuf Hikmet, and Emin Sazak voted against the budget. These were the same names who opposed the Law of Provision of Land to Farmers as well. Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan submitted the motion called the Memorandum of the Four, which had an important place in the establishment of the Democrat Party. They were expelled from the party as a result of their harsh criticism of the rejection of the motion.

Nevertheless, again, according to Erik Jan Zürcher, this movement known as the Memorandum of the Four aimed to reform the Republican People's Party rather than establishing a new opposition party. Nevertheless, this motion became the symbol of the beginning of the organized political opposition after the war (Zürcher, 2018, p. 245-246). It was only Celal Bayar who resigned from his parliamentary post, and then from the Republican People's Party with his own will. With President İnonü's support for Celal Bayar, the Democrat Party was established on 7 January 1946.

The Democrat Party immediately started preparing for the 21 July 1946 elections. Despite the party was indecisive at first whether to enter the elections or not, they decided to proceed. Since these elections were held based on the open vote - secret count, they were referred to as dubious elections by the opposition and conservative groups. As a result of these elections, which were thought to be illegal, the Republican People's Party had 395, Democrat Party had 64, and the independent candidates had six seats in the parliament.

The close ties between the military and the Republican People's Party were one of the subjects harshly criticized by the Democrat Party. During the Victory Day celebrations on 30 August 1947 and 1948, the Chief of Staff, General Salih Omurtak addressed President İnönü as the supreme commander. The Democrat Party criticized this as a clear indication of the stratification of the military (Koçak, 2017, p. 32). This reaction was the result of the Democrat Party's concerns over the alliance between the military and the Republican People's Party.

So, what was the attitude of the military after the 1946 elections? As Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Çoşar pointed out, especially the young officers reacted to the election disgrace of 21 July 1946. (İpekçi & Coşar, 2012, p. 9). By the memoirs of officers and the high-ranking soldiers, it is evident that the military was in constant

contact with the Democrat Party, though that was unofficial. Orhan Erkanlı, a member of the National Unity Committee mentions in his memoirs the negotiations held between the military officers and Celal Bayar both before and after the 1946 elections. Sıtkı Ulay also states that the 1946 elections were a disappointment (Koçak, 2017, p. 38). Cemal Madanoğlu, who served in the National Unity Committee in 1960, strikingly said in his memoirs regarding the 1946 elections, "We all were supporting the Democrat Party, except the generals." From this point of view, one may claim that the junta movement within the military started in those years. Alparslan Türkeş underlined the fact that young officers showed great effort in the establishment of the Democrat Party (Koçak, 2017, p. 35-36). Some of the low-ranking officers within the military were sympathizers of the Democrat Party. Cemil Koçak claims that according to the discourse of Avni Doğan of the Republican People's Party, the military was preparing for a coup against the Republican People's Party government in 1946 (Koçak, 2017, p. 47). There were Republican People's Party sympathizers as well as Democrat Party sympathizers within the military.

The Republican People's Party would have chosen in the period after the 1946 elections. The differences of opinion between the Democrat Party and the Republican People's Party were not significant. They even had similar opinions on many issues. However, they had different views on the liberalization policies. While the Republican People's Party wanted to maintain statist tradition, the Democrat Party argued that the liberalization was substantial in eliminating the hardships in the economy. In 1946, the Republican People's Party made a new five-year economic plan. This plan is required to ensure proficiency using self-potential and to enable regulation by the state. However, this economic plan was abandoned in 1947 and the "Turkish Development Plan", which included the Democrat Party's demands, was

adopted. According to Eric Jan Zürcher, there was hardly any difference between the economic policies of the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party. The only difference was that the Democrat Party's demand to sell state institutions was not welcomed by the Republican People's Party (Zürcher, 2018, p. 250). This demand was not in line with the tradition of statism, one of the principles of the Republican People's Party.

On the other hand, the Republican People's Party elected Recep Peker as prime minister, and he launched a campaign to stop the attacks on the Republican People's Party while trying to suppress the opposition. The Democrat Party wanted to keep the tension in politics high so that the Turkish public could take action with the desire to secure the opposition. (Zürcher, 2018, p. 248).

In addition to the reforms made in politics, the adoption of a new economic plan was the beginning of a new period in Turkey. The principle of statism, which was created in the 1930s as one of the main principles of the Republican People's Party, was the focus of criticism by the domestic capital of the period. The Democrat Party went so far as to describe the statism policy as fascism to take advantage of this situation and increase its effectiveness in politics. Moderate figures such as Celal Bayar said that the state's direct intervention in the economy was not right, but that it should undertake a supportive role. Stating that they were uncomfortable with the economic progress, the capital owners founded the Istanbul Merchants Association in January 1947. The Association's main point of criticism was the inefficiency of statism in the development of the economy, and the Democrat Party supported this opinion (Zürcher, 2018, p. 251). The Republican People's Party saw all of these as a threat to its principles and struggled against the discourse and the political actions of the Democrat Party.

Another issue of discussion was the claim that the Republican People's Party moved away from the principles and revolutions of Atatürk, and the Democrat Party assumed his legacy. Retired general Kenan Esengin, in his memory of 1948, mentions the officers assigned to meet with Celal Bayar. In this meeting, Celal Bayar stated that he was more sensitive towards Atatürk's principles and revolutions than the Republican People's Party (Koçak, 2017, p. 35-36). However, in my opinion, when it comes to the Democrat Party's activities, the party drifted away from statism, dealt blows to secularism in the fields of education and religion, and chose an economic plan that was not in line with the Kemalist principles.

On the other hand, developments within the military continued. Alparslan Türkeş, a member of the National Unity Committee, said that Salih Omurtak rejected the offers of the leadership of corps command. Likewise, he mentions that lieutenant general Necati Tacan's and general Muzaffer Tuğsavul's names were also suggested for leadership and rejected (Koçak, 2017, p. 37).

In the 14 May 1950 elections, the Democrat Party's strategies to gain power came to the fore. In 1947, the new Trade Union Act was enacted, which gave the working class the right to organize unions, as well as to ban the political activities of unions and the right to strike. The Democrat Party, which wanted to get the support of the unions, promised to give the unions the right to strike with the promise of a new election. The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, did not want to lose the support of the unions despite the ban it put in place with the new Trade Unions Act (Zürcher, 2018, p. 252).

In the second general election held on 14 May 1950, the military was concerned. According to Cemal Koçak, if the elections did not take place as expected and if something similar to the 1946 elections was experienced, it was not clear what

kind of intervention would be made (Koçak, 2017, p. 40). According to Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Coşar, there is a possibility that the Republican People's Party will lose the election and power may be lost. For this reason, it was thought that a group of high-ranking officers in the military had given İnönü suggestions that "if the election is lost, the election results will be ignored" and "the assurance of the power". On the other hand, Seyfi Kurtbek, a retired officer, wanted to prove to Celal Bayar that the military was not in the hands of the Republican People's Party, but theirs (İpekçi & Coşar, 2012, p. 9). Assuring the Democrat Party in terms of the opinion of the military members was to make the Democrat Party feel comfortable in a sense.

In the meantime, the Democrat Party nominated some retired officers in the 1950 elections to integrate the military into politics. While Seyfi Kurtbek and Fahri Belen nominated from the Democrat Party-list, names such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Refet Bele, who had been in the ranks of the Republican People's Party for years and had taken part in the War of Independence, also joined the ranks of the Democrat Party (Koçak, 2017, p. 39). This transfer of retired officers from the Republican People's Party might mean that there was opposition within the military towards the policies of the Republican People's Party. However, this interpretation is open to discussion, for it would not be correct to say that the military took an attitude as a whole, as there were different opinions within the military itself.

It didn’t happen as predicted of the junta movement which would take action in the case of a Republican People's Party victory in the 1950 elections. According to Erik Jan Zürcher, the elections held on 14 May 1950 were free and honest. 80 % of all voters went to the polls. That would mean 8 citizens (Birand, 2016, p. 63). The Democrat Party, whose slogan "Enough! It is People's Word!" took its place in the literature of the Turkish political life, came to power by taking 53.4% of the votes,

while the Republican People's Party took 39.8%. Republican People's Party had 69 seats in the parliament while the Democrat Party had 408 (Zürcher, 2018, p. 252). According to Cemil Koçak, the result of the 1950 elections paved the emergence of a core junta structure. Members of the junta, ignoring the rank hierarchy among them, adopted a new structure (Koçak, 2017, s. 47). This structure showed formed a new group that the junta members within the military wanted to take over the duty of protection.

According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the 1950 elections were a turning point for Turkey. The increasing social reaction and the weakening of the ruling party, which was described as tired over the years, brought the victory of the Democrat Party, nicknamed Demirkırat (Iron White Horse). Thus, these elections were called the White Revolution (Birand, 2016, p. 61). On the other hand, Mehmet Ali Birand pointed out the same junta structure with Cemil Koçak. This junta, who wanted to draw the attention of soldiers and to give the power to its İsmet İnönü, was rendered ineffective by İnönü's political moves. However, the Democrat Party would remember this attitude of the military (Birand, 2016, p. 67). If we evaluate from this point of view, the attitude of the Democrat Party towards the attitude of the soldier will attract more attention in the coming period.

Feroz Ahmad describes this period as political, social, and economic life towards the military coup of 27 May 1960, rather than the period of the election victory of 1950 (Ahmad, 2019, p. 122). In this sense, the existing period was not a victory, but a road to collapse.

The most crucial supervisor of the government in this new constitutional process was the opposition and therefore, the parliament. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was the strongest institution of the period (Ahmad, 2015, p.

168). On the other hand, it clearly shows us that some low-ranking officers, whose names will be heard frequently during the military's intervention processes in politics, started to act from that time. Some of the names in the coup of May 27, 1960, were able to take part in the preparation of a coup against the Republican People's Party government (Koçak, 2017,p.38).

On 5 June 1950, at the beginning of the Democrat Party's rule, a threat of military intervention arose. The Democrat Party would frequently encounter similar situations in the future. However, some officers including those who had sympathy for the idea of intervention were satisfied with the change of government. From time to time, this situation would lead to crises. The threat of military intervention emerged on 5 June 1950 after the conversion of the azan to Arabic. According to Celal Bayar, the president of the time, it would be an unnecessary and unwilling change. This situation would turn into a power struggle between the Prime Minister and the President. The foundations of the 1960 military intervention started to emerge (Birand, 2016, p. 85). The military saw this change regarding the call to prayer as a threat to secularism.

From an economic point of view; the situation in the 1950s was not heartwarming contrary to popular belief. Despite the concessions granted to foreign investors did not have a serious impact on the economic development of the country. According to Feroz Ahmad, this was not due to the size of the investments. The reason was partly the underdevelopment of domestic capital and the level of economic underdevelopment. The domestic capital, which has a foreign partnership, remained small compared to its stronger partner in capacity. This practice created a sustainable dependency that started in the 1950s (Ahmad, 2017, p. 146). The area that the Democrat Party relied on and achieved the most was economic development. This

situation created a positive outlook within society. However, taking development steps without plans and programs was the most crucial economic defect. According to Sina Akşin, this was one of the essential factors which contributed to the 27 May coup (Akşin, 2019, p. 260). However, the problem was not only the negative changes in the economy. Dependence on foreign capital and external resources was increasing. Economic dependence would eventually lead to the political one.

Towards the end of 1950, the "Halk Evleri"[1] problem arose in domestic politics. People's Houses were established in the period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to convey the spirit of the Republic to the people. The opposition came from the Democrat Party. In the multi-party state scheme, an institution should no longer be in the hands of a single party, namely the Republican. People’s Party. Despite being uncomfortable with this situation, the Republican People's Party agreed to this demand (Birand, 2016, p. 97). The Democrat Party's monopolization of multi-party life was beginning to emerge.

In 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO. According to Feroz Ahmad, with the ratification of the NATO membership in February, Turkey assumed the duty of advocating the Western cause, and with the Treaty of Ankara on 28 February 1953, Turkey tried to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western world. Turkey turned to the imperialist ranks of the West against the Arab world, which continued its national resistance. Ahmad thought that under the new alliances, it was not surprising that Turkey behaved the way it did and assumed the duty of advocating the Western cause in its region (Ahmad, 2017, p. 144). In a sense, Turkey's assume this task based on his request to look cute in the West had to achieve economic and political power. The alliance would influence the political atmosphere in Turkey as well.

[1] ‘’People Houses’’

Turkey has experienced a significant boom in agriculture. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the Marshall Plan helped the development of agriculture. The flow of liquidity provided agricultural benefits. In 1953, Turkey was the fourth in the world in wheat production. However, since this development was not based on industrial production, it was tried to be provided with economic aid (Birand, 2016, p. 85). There was a serious drought in 1954, and the economic growth was not sustainable. Turkey, which was fourth in wheat production in the world in 1953, had to buy wheat from the U.S. just a year later (Birand, 2016, p. 123). This deal, which at first appeared advantageous for Turkey, had been more beneficial for the West. Thus, Turkey became more dependent on foreign support.

In the 2 May 1954 elections, the votes of the Democrat Party increased. The result was devastating for the Republican People's Party. This rate was the highest rate of votes received by a party in multiparty life until then. Thus, 93% of the seats in the parliament belonged to the Democrat Party. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, even though Turkey had a multi-party system in place, the Democrat Party was as powerful as a single party. However, again, according to Birand, this was the beginning of the collapse. (Birand, 2016, p. 104). The result of the elections and the policies of the time emphasized the monopoly of the Democrat Party. These developments drew the attention of the military. As the officers wanted to show their power, they started to develop some likely scenarios. However, it would not be correct to analyze this situation only as a power struggle between the military and the government. The government and the military were very susceptible to a confrontation with each other amid the difficulties experienced above the general regime principles.

Feroz Ahmad argued that the unrest within the military arose in the mid-1950s. Turkey's NATO membership caused a political and technological divide between the officers of the military. Those who support Democrats drew the generals to their side and prevented the low-ranking officers from acting under a general (Ahmad, 2019, p. 122). The military was taking heed of the complaints of the lower and middle class, who were on a negative road. High inflation and political instability negatively affected society (Ahmad, 2017, p. 151). Increasing social grievances justified the grounds for an intervention in the eyes of the military. Getting the support of society was necessary for the military to justify its actions.

In line with Feroz Ahmad, İsmail Safi claimed that the first coup plots against the Democrat Party were in 1955. Apart from the reaction within the armed forces, the Democrat Party's victories in the 1950 and 1954 elections caused serious discomfort in the opposition. Orhan Kabibay and Dündar Seyhan, officers in İstanbul, formed the first junta organization. Officers such as Ahmet Yıldız, Suphi Gürsoytak, Orhan Erkanlı, Faruk Güventürk and Necati Ünsalan joined the organization as well (Safi, 2019, p. 148).

In 1955, the infamous incidents of 6-7 September occurred. The government, which was focused on the Cyprus dispute, turned it into a national issue. The negotiations in London came to a deadlock. The news published in the Istanbul Express lit a fire under the events. In the paper, it was written that Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki was bombed and damaged by the Greeks. Thereupon, the events in İstanbul escalated. Students on the streets were chanting "Cyprus is Turkish!". On the other hand, there were attacks on the shops of minorities on İstiklal Street. The events got so out of hand that the tanks were sent to intervene. The Governor of Istanbul, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, resigned during the events. The Minister of Interior Affairs of

the period, Namık Gedik, defined the events as the revolt of the youth and resigned from his post. That was the most troublesome period for the Democrat Party (Birand, 2016, p. 126). The Democrats earned negative points for being unable to prevent the events from escalating and failing to find political solutions.

Then there was an incident that caught the attention of the military. In November 1955, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes implemented the famous "Sarol Formula" of Mükerrem Sarol. He was in a difficult situation and was trying to save his political career. His cabinet was dealing with resignations. While making this move, he addressed the Democrat Party group. He said, "I put my political career in your hands. You are a delegation representing national sovereignty. You can even bring back the caliphate if you wish." Some officers saw this as a threat to the regime. On the other hand, some found this speech unfortunate (Birand, 2016, p. 129). For many, this was the turning point. The military showed a severe reaction to this statement. From this point on, the process was heading towards military intervention.

In 1956 and later on, the organization within the military started to be more active. Talat Aydemir said in his memoirs, "Everyone wanted to unite and cooperate under the basis of our ideals, and I was getting offers from of my friends." (Koçak, 2017, p. 130). There were several junta structures within the military, and a power struggle arose among them.

There was pressure on the opposition. The Press Law and the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations that passed in 1956 were like a war against the opposition. The Democrat Party was tightening its policies, acting as a single party. Universities, political parties, media, journalists, etc., were all under pressure (Birand, 2016, p. 134-135). All this pressure on the public sphere led to comments and reactions arguing that the Democrat Party's time was up.

In 1957, it was possible to talk about a "coup" process. According to Talat Aydemir, there was a need to take over the control of the government by a coup, if necessary. Although, Aydemir embraced May 27 ideologically, his return to the country from Korea after the coup had not resulted in a positive outcome. Cemal Koçak; described it as his first disappointment after the coup. (Koçak, 2017, p. 130-131). Due to what transpired, Talat Aydemir had concerns about the soundness of the military intervention process that might have happened in the future.

On the other hand, the campaign for the 27 October 1957 Elections was ongoing. It was a tense political period. Therefore, the elections were going to be held earlier than expected. The Democrat Party had lost serious power. The opposition parties, the Republican People's Party and the Republican Nation Party, made a joint declaration, with promises such as constitutional amendment, a bicameral legislative institution, a constitutional court to check the compliance of the laws, and the right to strike for unionized workers. The Republican People's Party took its proposals one step further and promised the civil servants the right to form unions while assuring to abolish the non-democratic laws (Ahmad, 2017, p. 153). The strike bans were one of the restrictions that caused the Republican People's Party to lose the previous elections and the party wanted to repeal these as soon as possible.

In the 1957 elections, the Democrat Party gained power once more by receiving the 47.3% of the votes and had 419 seats in the parliament. The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, received 40.3% of the votes and increased its number of seats in the parliament to 173. That was an increase in the Republican People's Party’s votes compared to the elections of 1950 and 1954 (Karpat, 2012, p. 172). The results of this election were an outcome of the failures of the government

rather than the success of the opposition. The Democrat Party started to lose power with this election.

The junta organization in Istanbul contacted Major Samet Kuşçu in 1957 to take advantage of his influence within the military. The members expected that the government would change in the 27 September 1957 election, however, with the victory of the Democrat Party, this hope was gone, and preparations for the coup started (Safi, 2019, p. 148). So although the Democrat Party was victorious, it caught the attention of the structure that took action to bring about its collapse.

On 17 February 1959, Adnan Menderes was on his way to London to sign the Treaty of Zurich which would lead to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The flight was going to be in stormy conditions. The journey was troublesome, and the pilot lost control of the plane, which led to a crash. Adnan Menderes was treated in the London Clinic. Thanks to this incident, all the problems were forgotten. Adnan Menderes was on bad terms with the opposition before returning to Istanbul; however, the ice melted during the meeting with İsmet İnönü. After the plane crash, Adnan Menderes started to be seen as divine by the public, and the military was highly uncomfortable with this situation (Birand, 2016, p. 151-155).

In 1959 and 1960, the coup preparations accelerated. Especially the investigation against the opposition in the parliament, and the establishment of the Commission of Investigation by the Democrat Party prepared the ground for the junta activities to gain pace. Adnan Menderes heard the rumours, but he did not think that such a thing would occur. (Safi, 2019, p. 148).

As we said at the beginning, unlike the military mentality, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who also has a military background; the transition to the democratic system, which a new state is trying to achieve after its establishment, is not similar to the

military profile under Plato's "natural guardian" thought. It is an exceptional situation to foresee that the progress of the country under military tutelage may create serious problems for the future of the country. However, after the death of Atatürk, with the transition to multi-party life, a consensus such as claiming the founding values began to be formed within the Turkish military, considering the existence of certain political threats. Because here, Plato's idea of "natural protection" started to emerge as intuition in the Turkish military. The policies that emerged with the Democrat Party in power have turned this perception into an activity.

4.1 The Military Coup Of May 27, 1960

Towards the end of the decade, the only thing to do for the officers was to decide the date of the coup. The antipathy of the military to the Democrat Party government, which had been increasing since 1955, evolved into serious political action within the military.

There were serious problems within the Democrat Party while the process was heading towards an intervention. Especially in the years leading up to the coup process from 1955, Menderes tended to act in control against the party parliamentary group. As a result of the general elections held in 1957, the Democrat structure began to lose power. On the contrary, the Republicans raised the number of seats they had in the parliament from 31 to 178. According to Feroz Ahmad, Menderes began following populist policies to prevent the public from realizing that the Republicans were on the rise. It was a recession in economic terms and the economic situation was a far cry from what it was promised initially. Using religion for political benefits,

which was heavily criticized by the Republicans, was among these policies (Ahmad, 2017, p. 138).

Cemil Koçak mentioned the infrastructure of the reactionary attitude of the intellectuals against the Democrat Party government as follows: To overthrow the government, the intellectuals embarked on a brave struggle, which the Democrat Party wanted to suppress by using reinforced police forces and even soldiers. Moreover, the Western democracies were worried about the situation. The most important of it all was that the Turkish youth, inspired by Atatürk, was challenging the dictator. Atatürk has entrusted his work to the youth. Atatürk explained in his Speech to the Turkish youth, to whom he entrusted the Republic, what their duties would be. "Those who hold power within the country may be in error, misguided, or may even be traitors." (Koçak, 2017, p. 110). The Democrat Party was now in its final turn. The increasing grievances from both the public and the opposition were the sign of the party's fading power. İsmet İnönü, the leader of the Republican People's Party, talked about the destruction of press freedom on January 10, 1960, and said, "Each citizen knows that situation of the press in Turkey is the subject of complaint and disaster. This situation is a talking point for the whole free world''[2] (Koçak, 2017, p. 88). This statement by İnönü announced the current situation to the world. This attitude by İnönü, whom the military considered as their great commander, was one of the things that triggered the military.

İnönü was not only talking about the freedom of the press but he also wanted to send particular messages to the youth, especially college students. On April 1st, 1960, he said to his student visitors, "Important tasks await you in the coming days, and you will be victorious, we trust the youth." When evaluated in terms of timing,

[2]"'Her vatandaş biliyor ki; Türkiye'nin basın rejimi, bugün birinci derecede şikayet ve felaket konusudur. Bu rejim, bütün hür dünyanın diline düşmüştür.''

there were claims that these messages by İnönü laid the ground for the enormous student demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara (Koçak, 2017, p. 88). One of the processes that led to the 1960 Coup was the formation of the Committee of Investigation, which allegedly formed to take revenge. This committee, established on April 27, 1960, had powers such as banning publications and investigating political activity. According to Tanel Demirel, the aim behind the establishment of the committee was not to shut down the Republican People's Party or to weaken the MPs by removing their immunity. On the contrary, it aimed to soften the reactions that were shown, and succeeded at that, albeit partially (Demirel, 2011, p. 325). In a report delivered to Menderes on May 25th, it was claimed that the Republican People's Party intended to take power by creating chaos. According to Democrats, since the Republican People's Party had nothing more to offer to the public, resorting to illegal, unofficial ways to gain power was their only option. Furthermore, that was the reason behind the atmosphere of unrest after 1957 (Erdem, 2019, p. 5). However, if we evaluate it from an objective point of view, the efforts of the Democrat Party to pacify the opposition and to throw the responsibility helped to prevent periodic reactions and clarify the events.

Perhaps the most significant development was the emergence of the student movements. On April 28, 1960, students at Istanbul University had a large demonstration. The demonstration at such a scale that the military was called for action, as the police force thought to be insufficient. As the events escalated further, one student died, and 40 were injured. The rector of Istanbul University was maltreated. The government declared martial law, and the classes were cancelled. However, banning the broadcast of the events during this process was not the correct action and it led to the exaggeration of the events among the public, and those who

thought that everything would stagnate were utterly wrong. According to Feroz Ahmad, the government countered the protests by declaring martial law; however, this was not enough to calm things down. Menderes was too late in taking these actions. The officers who were against the Democrat Party government were about to make a decision (Ahmad, 2017, p. 138). On April 29, 1960, protests started at Ankara University. Students from the Faculties of Political Sciences, and Law began to protest. The police force was again inefficient, and the military was called for action once more. As the incident escalated, the government struck its attitude, Menderes gave speeches on the radio and made approaches to increase spirituality in the squares.

On April 30, 1960, Prof. Ali Fuat Başgil invited the government to resign. Celal Bayar said, "No, the time for warning has passed. Now is the time for punishment.", which was an example of how using violence constituted evidence of the government's loss of control (Akşin, 2019, p. 259). This statement by Celal Bayar gave legitimacy to the military's right to intervene.

The silent march of the cadets of the military academy on May 21st heralded the coup. Alparslan Türkeş’s declaration on Ankara Radio about the country’s governmental takeover was brought the end of the political period on 27 May 1960. (Kabasakal, 1991, p. 199). The evolution of the student demonstrations into the silent march of the cadets of the military academy triggered the coup (Erdoğan, 2017, p.103). This rally on Atatürk Boulevard on May 21, 1960, was intimidating to the government. The only solution that remained was that Menderes took a step back from his attitude. The anti-constitutional practices of Menderes signalled the approaching coup (Ahmad, 2017, p. 9). On May 26, 1960, an authority shattering attitude was shown. The aviator officers turned their backs on Menderes during his

visit. One may argue that a frightening end for Menderes was approaching (Koçak, 2017, p. 20-21). The junta named the National Unity Committee and consisting mainly of young officers, carried out the coup (Akşin, 2019, p. 259). The slogan ‘’Military-Youth-People hand-to-hand’’ was influential in the realization of the coup (Deniz, 2018, p. 13). The aim of the military intervention of May 27 was a revolution (Birand, 2016, p. 194). The objective should not have been perceived as overthrowing the government. The junta aimed to make reforms within the existing system.

According to Tevfik Erdem, the military intervention of May 27, 1960, was approaching. However, it could not be foreseen because it was a situation that had never been witnessed in the Republican period (Erdem, 2019, p. 5). In this sense, the government and the Democrat Party were caught unaware, and they had no idea what was awaiting them during this process. The only exception was Celal Bayar, because, due to the experiences from the times of the Union and Progress, he could have guessed what was awaiting them.

Feroz Ahmad's statement about the National Unity Committee is striking. He argued that the group was a mixed coalition of separatists within the Armed Forces, all aspiring to power. Although it consisted of a large group, the number of generals was minimal. From this point of view, hierarchical rules have violated (Deniz, 2018, p. 13). The reason why the junta, consisting of a team of 38 people, acted large and cumbersome was the existence of more than one group that wanted representation and could not get along with each other. Groups outside of this process created a problem with a 'normal' reflex and a discrepancy within the military. (Ahmad, 2017, p. 153). After the military intervention, a power struggle would continue among the juntas.

The members of the junta were generally educated in the military schools of the Republic and influenced by the charisma of Atatürk. After the death of Atatürk, as

is always the case after the death of a charismatic leader who left their mark, those who hold power was considered ordinary and weak compared to the previous ones. The young officers in the military were dissatisfied with the new lifestyle that they did not feel belong to, and also the new structure formed by the high-ranking officials and the capital owners, who were the bourgeoisie. Income inequality was the primary source of unrest (Ahmad, 2017, p. 147).

The National Unity Committee took over the control after this process. Cemal Gürsel was the head of the committee. Consisting of 38 people (Cemal Madanoğlu, Fahri Özdilek, Haydar Tunçkanat, Suphi Gürsoytak, İrfan Baştuğ, Alparslan Türkeş, etc.), the National Unity Committee has completely taken over the power to maintain the standards administratively. On the other hand, as Osman Deniz pointed out, the National Unity Committee, in their own words, did not have any plans or programs to implement after the intervention. Besides, there was no consensus within the Committee. It was stated that each member of the committee had patriotic feelings but was not experienced in evaluating and coordinating domestic and foreign policies. The military intervention of May 27, 1960, was, in Feroz Ahmad's view, the last of its kind. The reason for this was that low-ranking officers carried out the military intervention against the high command (Ahmad, 2017, p. 20). In this respect, one may argue that the military intervention of 1960 was similar to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. In this sense, changes in the system were deemed necessary in terms of the conditions of the period. Democratic rights and freedoms, which were intended to be set idea the early 1960s, were incorporated into a new and libertarian constitution.

One of the passive parts of the 1960 military intervention process was the Revolution Courts. The Revolution Courts, which were established with law number

62 and dated 18 August 1960, were to be established before the National Unity Committee when the government deemed it necessary according to the constitution. These courts were mobile. The judges and prosecutors, on the other hand, would be chosen by the National Unity Committee among the candidates nominated by the government. The duty and the responsibility of the courts were to prosecute those who attack the personality of the president. It was to judge all kinds of propaganda (regardless of the field) who were against the national revolution activities and principles and who could harm them. (Koçak, 2017, p. 62). On the other hand, the courts should have tried citizens of Kurdish origin, but this remained an opinion. The Minister of Industry of the time, Şahap Kocatopçu said that the law was anti-democratic. According to him, criticizing individuals and authorities, as long as it did not contain an element of threat, should not have been considered a crime. (Koçak, 2017, p. 64)

The government had a favourable opinion regarding the repeal of the law on the court procedure. However, as a bound opinion, the proposal for the abolition of the law should have come from the National Unity Committee. Cemil Koçak stated that the National Unity Committee gave the approval of the Revolution Courts to be formalized by law, and no information was given to the government, and no proposal was received. However, if the government showed the same attitude, that would have been perceived as a conflict of interest between the government and the National Unity Committee. In the meantime, the Prime Minister requested to contact the National Unity Committee. The ministers dealing with the issue would convey their thoughts on the cabinet's thoughts on the Revolution Courts, but this communication did not yield a qualitative result (Koçak, 2017, p. 64-67). The lack of coordination

between the government and the National Unity Committee suspended the establishment of the Revolution Courts.

On September 29, 1960, the Democrat Party was closed, and in the following days, it was announced that the ministers and members of the parliament were confiscated and committed crimes. In response to the decision taken by the National Unity Committee on the ruling party, no legal action will be applied to the opposition parties, and the prohibition of political and propaganda activities created a symptom of discomfort by the Democrat Party supporters in the society. The general view among the supporters was that those in power could be guilty, but the millions of Democrat Party voters and members should not have been ostracized and accused. In Osman Deniz's opinion, this distinction between parties can be considered to be the first mistake of the 27 May process. He thought it appropriate that not making this distinction between parties would be healthier (Deniz, 2018, p. 13-14). In this sense, the National Unity Committee was getting reactions from society even at the very beginning.

Meanwhile, as the new power, the National Unity Committee took over the political responsibility regarding the solution of the problems inherited from the Democrat Party rule. One of the essential problems was the economy. The military intervention had an economic reason as well as a political one. In line with the economic policy implemented in the Democrat Party's time, the current economic improvement was in the direction of growth rather than development. The National Unity Committee, on the other hand, created an economic program aiming at both development and growth (Ahmad, 2019, p. 132). The first step to be taken in line with this program was the establishment of the State Planning Organization. This institution, which has to formulate the economic development plans of the state with

the authority obtained from the constitution and the government, became one of the most important institutions brought by the 1961 Constitution. In addition, it completed its function on 20 June 2011 and gained a new structure as the Ministry of Development (Ahmad, 2019, p. 133). The State Planning Organization, which had the task of creating the economic development plans, became one of the essential institutions brought by the 1961 Constitution and completed its function on June 20, 2011. At the end of October 1960, the Armed Forces wanted to do what was necessary to end the ideological differences that existed within the National Unity Committee. According to Osman Deniz, one group within the committee aimed to liquidate the other group by way of a coup. Such a situation would require support from the Armed Forces. In terms of the Armed Forces, the National Unity Committee was a whole (Deniz, 2018, p. 18).

The National Unity Committee was divided between two views. One group defended that the revolution was successful and accepted by society. According to this view, the next thing to do was to form a constituent assembly, prepare a constitution, and hold elections. The other group said that the revolution had not yet fully achieved its purpose and elections should not be held. The goals of the country's leading sectors (education, economy, industry, agriculture, etc.) should be thoroughly examined, enacted, and put into action. They believed that military rule should continue to realize these aims (Deniz, 2018, p. 16-17). The idea that the realization of revolutionary processes cannot take place in a democratic environment is regarded as an easy task when viewed on a processual basis. But the stage of realization of revolutionary processes by democratic methods is always interpreted as ideal.

In the segment that said that the democratic process should be started as soon as possible, some people were in contact with the Republican People's Party. Some of

the names were the president Cemal Gürsel, Haydar Tunçkanat, Mucip Ataklı, Emanullah Çelebi, and Halim Menteş who was not a part of the committee but was in the same opinion with the others. In the second group, Alparslan Türkeş was dominant. Osman Deniz considered Alparslan Türkeş as the real leader of the revolution. So how and why Cemal Gürsel become the head of the state? The person to be presented to the Turkish nation and the world had to be qualified in terms of military career compared to others (Deniz, 2018, p. 17-18). Alparslan Türkeş was appointed as the deputy of the prime minister. According to Osman Deniz, he was the leader of the revolutionary structure. He established a secret committee with people like Talat Aydemir and had carried out activities in this direction even before May 27. His aim was not to bring the Republican People's Party to power but to realize the reforms (Deniz, 2018, p. 16-17). In the revolution planning of the group, the aim was to pacify the parties and to produce permanent policies in the long term. The goal was to take revolutionary steps that could not be done in a democratic system.

According to Ismail Safi, these two groups agreed to overthrow the Democrat Party. The first group was not ideologically homogeneous. In the first year after the military intervention, there were differences of opinion. Therefore, the purge of the 14 was also the result of these differences. The National Unity Committee tried to establish a new order for the state after the liquidation (Safi, 2019, p. 148).

In this sense, the first move was to lead the society to elections by preparing a new democratic constitution. However, Alparslan Türkeş, who was the head of the group of 14, did not intend to abandon the military rule without realizing the reforms. This group of 14 consisted of the following officers: Staff Colonel Alpararslan Türkeş, Staff Lieutenant Colonel Orhan Kabibay, Staff Major Orhan Erkanlı, Naval Staff Major Münir Köseoğlu, Staff Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kaplan, Tank Major

Muzaffer Karan, Staff Major Sefik Soyuyüce, Infantry Major Fazıl Akkoyunlu, Naval Senior Captain Rıfat Baykal, Staff Major Dündar Taşer, Staff Captain Numan Esin, Staff Captain İrfan Solmazer, Staff Captain Muzaffer Özdağ, and Gendarmerie Captain Ahmet Er (Koçak, 2017, p. 55).

As far as Koçak also stated; Ruhi Soyuyüce, brother of Sefik Soyuyüce, a member of the National Unity Committee, on his speech on the events, Şefik Soyuyüce said, "The situation is dire! The committee has become inoperable. Today or tomorrow, the day is uncertain, but Türkeş and his supporters will dissolve the committee with a new intervention and establish a new cadre. These days are very critical. To attempt such a thing, no matter who does it is a betrayal to May 27th. How will they face our people and military?" According to Cemil Koçak, members of the National Unity Committee were armed in the meetings during this period (Koçak, 2017, p. 51). In this tense environment, the elimination of separatist views within the committee started to discuss. After taking over the government, the junta fell into disagreement within a short period. As a result of the investigation made by Cemal Madanoğlu, at the end of the course of the processes of the National Unity Committee, Cemal Gürsel was making an announcement to the Turkish nation on the radio on the morning of November 13, 1960. The National Unity Committee dismissed 14 officers and assigned them to various missions abroad in the following days. In about six months, the National Unity Committee dissolved itself but the commitment to the ideals of the May 27 would remain. Osman Deniz pointed out that within the conditions of the period, while some said that the 14 was right, others said that it was perfect that the National Unity Committee had no more function. The potential power of the ‘Revolution’ was lost (Deniz, 2018, p. 19). Alparslan Türkeş and his team were supported in this respect because the loss of power and authority of

the revolution process caused the effectiveness of the National Unity Committee to be questioned.

Tevfik Erdem described the dismissal of the 14 as a coup in his column. The investigation commission headed by Cemal Madanoğlu made a coup within the junta. Everything was not settled, thereupon. Young officers did not give up their desire to intervene in politics because they could not achieve their goals (Erdem, 2019, p. 8).

The dissolution of the 14s group within the National Unity Committee, prepared the ground to show unity and solidarity with the Republican People's Party. However, organizations within the Democrat Party also started to work. Young officers within the Armed Forces, who took part in the military intervention despite the risk of dying, started to regroup. The 14 was making plans for a minimum of 4 year-period to implement the programs they had seen fit for Turkey's future. Besides, a serious antipathy for the Republican People's Party was rising among them, they were saying, ‘’The possibility was not made to go to the elections quickly. This is the Republican People's Party's game. This game was played and the 14s event was blown up’’ (Deniz, 2018, p. 19). The liquidation of the 14s, in addition to questioning the authority of the National Unity Committee, caused an increase in the reaction against the Republican People's Party. The İsmet İnönü factor was felt seriously in the military.

Cemil Koçak said that the dismissal of the 14 was a twist of politics since those who plotted the May 27 coup used the same tactic that they criticized, Abdulhamid II's policy of exile when the need arose. He argued that what happened was not a violation according to them. At the same time, he stated that the "violation" of the 1924 Constitution overthrew the Democrat Party power and that constitutional intervention took place instantly. There were also many opinions regarding the issue

of evaluating the dismissal of the 14 as a constitutional violation (Koçak, 2017, p. 75). After the purge, new juntas started to be formed within the military. Attempts emerged against the. May 27 plotters, who were considered to betray the spirit of May 27 (Koçak, 2017, p. 52).

For Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, rumors of ill-gotten gains were all over the place. On the other hand, the National Unity Committee targeted prominent political figures. According to Cemil Koçak, the Committee wanted to use the political figures as bait to ensure its intimacy in the eyes of the public. Celal Bayar, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Refik Koraltan had become the target of illegal wealth claims (Koçak, 2017, p. 75). The trumps that the Committee held were also causing the legitimacy of military intervention. In the eyes of the public, the legitimacy of military intervention was measured by the gravity of individual crimes as well as by crimes arising from political errors. However, in this respect, it would not be wrong to say that the National Unity Committee was criticized as well.

The purging processes of lecturers and officers were also allegedly causing upheaval across the country. In the following days, Yassıada trials started. During the trial period, a total of 592 defendants were tried in 19 different trials. Crimes committed by the Democrat Party, constitutional violations, and corruption; the events of September 6-7 were the main topics. Adnan Menderes's "Baby", and Celal Bayar's "Dog" cases were in the first scope (Birand, 2016, p. 253). The trials were tough, and the voting held by the National Unity Committee regarding the death penalties resulted in 13 ayes and nine nays. As a result of the Yassıada trials, a decision on capital punishment was made for 15 people. Immediately after these decisions, Adnan Menderes attempted suicide, yet he was rescued and treated. In the wake of the capital punishment orders, İnönü and other party leaders met with the president Cemal Gürsel

and pleaded to prevent carrying out of the death penalties. However, since the decision was confirmed, according to Martial Law Commander Cemal Tural's understanding of the law, who took full responsibility, the execution orders could not be withdrawn (Deniz, 2018, p. 29). The National Unity Committee carried out the capital punishments, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were executed on September 16, 1961, while Adnan Menderes was executed a day later (Çavdar, 2013, p. 97). The death sentence of former President Celal Bayar was commuted to life imprisonment due to the age limit.

Regarding the executions, Osman Deniz said, "Not carrying out the executions before the morning, as it was customary by the execution law, but hastily doing it on the afternoon of September 17, 1961, is a sensitive issue that has to be criticized by legal authorities." (Deniz, 2018, p. 31-32). According to Mehmet Ali Birand, executions showed the real power of the military (Birand, 2016, p. 268). On the other hand, the execution of Adnan Menderes was the end of an era in Turkey. The multi-party system, which was established in 1946, was wounded for the first time. The stain of having a prime minister executed in the history of Turkey would not be cleared for generations (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 12). Today, these execution orders are still debated in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 91).

After the Yassıada Tribunals and carrying out the execution orders, the Constituent Assembly began working, and the new constitution was presented to the public by referendum. It was July 9, 1961. According to Çavdar's view, definitions such as National Awareness and Idealism, National Unity, Turkish Nationalism in the introductory text of the constitution where the referendum was held, is that the military intervention was at the level of a revolution. At the same time, it is stated that the revolution was based on the people and that it was realized in line with the

demands of the people. Çavdar said that this emphasis also affected the constitutions in 1971 and 1980 (Çavdar, 2013, p. 101). In the referendum, by getting 61.7% ayes and 38.3.% nays, the constitution of 1961 was accepted. With the adoption of the Constitution, the bicameral structure, the National Assembly, and the Senate came to life. The Senate was composed of senators including former members of the National Unity Committee and former presidents. It consisted of 150 members, who were elected directly by majority voting within six years, and all were at or over age 40 and graduated from a higher education institution (Çavdar, 2013, p. 102). The National Assembly consisted of 450 members elected by the proportional representation system every four years. These two structures represented the Grand National Assembly. The Grand National Assembly would choose the president, for seven years, among its members by way of majority voting (Ahmad, 2017, p. 157).

Several liberal laws were adopted with the new constitution. These liberties included a more comprehensive range of civil rights, the autonomy of universities, and a broader right of association for students (Ahmad, 2017, p. 163). There were examples such as those with socialist views establishing a party for their political representation. According to Feroz Ahmad, these changes were very new to Turkish society, which was still trying to understand the Kemalist idea (Ahmad, 2017, p. 20). The activities of political parties and the establishment of new parties were supported. There was an emphasis on the independence of the judiciary (Çavdar, 2013, p. 110). Although the new constitution contained many freedoms, it evaluated due to the current political environment and revolutionary style.

Thanks to the rights arising from the new constitution, a small working-class that was led by a cadre with an absolute class consciousness remained politically active. The workers had constitutional rights such as collective bargaining and strike

and they were represented by the Confederation of Labor Unions of Turkey (Türk-İş), which was conservative in a sense. Türk-İş was founded on July 31, 1952, by the well-known US labour organization AFL-CIO. Therefore, some who left the Türk-İş in 1967, founded the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (Ahmad, 2019, p. 134). Although it did not actively exist in the constitution, the method of proportional representation, which can be regarded as a symbol of pluralism, was introduced by the military intervention of May 27, 1960. According to Sina Akşin, the coups of March 12, 1971, and September 12, 1980, which he accepted as counter-revolutionary, restricted the institutions and principles that emerged with the coup of May 27, 1960, but could not altogether remove. He added the Senate of the Republic as an exception but stated that it displayed a negative image as an institutional structure (Akşin, 2019, p. 265-266).

The Constitutional Court of Turkey was another controversial institution introduced with the 1960 Constitution. Its main duty was to examine the conformity of existing or future laws with the constitution. Accordingly, it was rejecting many sanctions and proposals. According to Feroz Ahmad, the Constitutional Court drew reactions from conservative governments (Ahmad, 2019, p. 130-131). Even the institutions that emerged in the processes of military intervention had a certain degree of contrast compared to each other.

On the other hand, high-ranking commanders in the Armed Forces would also be assigned a task. The National Security Council, consisting of the ministers, the Chief of the Staff and the military representatives, was established. According to the statement of Feroz Ahmad; in this sense, the Armed Forces gained autonomy and were seen by civilians as 'the guardians of the newly established order’. In a short period, the military became a part of the political and socio-economic life in Turkey.

On the other hand, the military became active in the economy from 1961. Within the scope of economic development goals, the military had its own goals. For that reason, the Military Solidarity Organization (OYAK) established in 1961. The budget of the organization consisted of a 10% cut from the salaries of officers and was transferred to the most profitable initiatives in the economy of the period. In this sense, OYAK was a company, but it was a company affiliated with the state's own Ministry of National Defense. Feroz Ahmad considered the military as the guardian of the blossoming capitalism rather than abstract concepts such as nation or Kemalism. (Ahmad, 2019, p. 130-131-132). My comment on this issue is that the military intervention made under the concepts of "Kemalism" or "nation"; is the facilitation of the army's intervention to the ground of the Turkish economy in the capitalist system. The aim is economic as well as ideological.

According to Kemal Karpat, the process of drafting the 1961 Constitution was anti-democratic. During the formation of the Constituent Assembly, the former members of the recently closed Democrat Party were not included in the legislature. From this point of view, the Constituent Assembly was formed under the supervision of the Republican People's Party and a group of left-wing intellectuals. According to Karpat, the 1961 Constitution fulfilled the 'libertarian constitution' understanding attributed to it but left the government dysfunctional in terms of regulating freedoms in this sense (Karpat, 2012, p. 188).

According to Erik Jan Zürcher, the 1961 Constitution had a broader political umbrella for both left and right-wing compared to the previous constitution. It was also more liberal. Wider political freedoms led to the establishment of parties that were reluctant to speak out (Zürcher, 2018, p. 284-285).

With the 1961 Constitution, the basis was prepared for the establishment of new political parties and a transition to multi-party life. According to Feroz Ahmad, although the 1961 Constitution brought a new political and constitutional order, the underlying structure remained the same. There was a need to fill the vacuum left by the closure of the Democrat Party (Ahmad, 2019, p. 135). Even though it was closed, its leaders imprisoned due to anti-constitutional actions, and three of its ministers executed, there was still sympathy for the Democrat Party among the voters. Accordingly, some politicians wanted to take advantage of this. The Justice Party, founded by Ragıp Gümüşpala, aimed to attract these voters. The National Unity Committee was sympathetic to Ragıp Gümüşpala because he was a former general. The Justice Party, which started the necessary work to replace the Democrat Party was now beginning to prove itself. (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 105). It would not be wrong to say that the sympathy to the Democrat Party was based on the feeling of victimhood. Especially; when looking at the sociological and sociocultural structure of Turkish society, there is a behaviour of claiming and going above a possible victimization situation. This behaviour is also necessary to evaluate it from a moral point of view brought about by the values of Islam that have seen poverty and believe in it. The Justice Party, which seen as the continuation of the Democrat Party, had tried to turn this victimhood into opportunity.

The National Unity Committee also attempted universities for the need for revision in the field of social and education. With Law No. 114 published in the Official Gazette dated October 28, 1960, a retirement decision was made for 147 academicians. (Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 28 Ekim 1960, p. 2426) Sıddık Sami Onar, who took part in the preparation of the 1961 Constitution, resigned from his position as rector at Istanbul University to protest the decision. At the same time, Turhan

Feyzioğlu did the same at the Middle East Technical University. According to Cemil Koçak, this liquidation in the universities was the result of the changes in the new order. The revolutionists' purge of academics at the universities in 1933 was due to their inability to keep up with the regime. The Republican People's Party made a similar purge to leftist academics in 1945. It was time for the liquidation of the May 27, 1960 layout (Koçak, 2017, p. 113-114). Osman Deniz says the professors forced to retire were considered Democrat Party supporters (Deniz, 2018, p. 16-17).

It will be useful to talk about the views of Prof. Sencer Divitçioğlu, one of the witnesses of the period, on May 27th. While he was an associate professor at the Faculty of Economics at Istanbul University in the 1960s, he stated that he supported the military intervention and student movements and interpreted the events from a Marxist perspective. He supported the 27th of May, but in his view, this movement was an atypical bourgeois movement. The representatives of the bourgeoisie were the university youth from the enlightened middle class. In the student movements, the primary purpose was the upheaval against any political dictatorship. In Divitçioğlu's words, university students "did not fight for the sake of doing something, but for the destruction of something." (Koçak, 2017, p. 112).

Sina Akşin's described the 27 May Intervention both as a coup and a revolution. According to him, this movement led to the expansion and adoption of the foundations of the democracy established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. On the one hand; the welfare state, in addition to applications such as pluralism, the State Planning Organization, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Turkey Radio and Television Corporation and institutions such as the Senate of the Republic was implemented. (Akşin, 2019, p. 265).

In his article, Hasan Emir Aktaş describes the 1960 military intervention as an attempt to reestablish the revolutionary system with the support of the social units that wanted to ensure modernization in a time when the military and bureaucracy was at risk of losing their ideological and economic positions. The 1961 Constitution ensured the establishment of new political and legal institutions alongside libertarian principles and articles. However, like Kemal Karpat, Hasan Emir Aktaş spoke of the pacification of the old politicians through anti-democratic means. This method is aimed at gaining legitimacy for the coup plotters (Aktaş, 2017, p. 219-220).

The 1960 military intervention was the first coup for the Republic of Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish army had suffered a coup stemming from the policies of the Democrat Party, for which the basic founding reflexes were weakened. When evaluated in today's conditions, with the new political environment brought by the 1961 Constitution, which is the most liberal constitution, it has caused the establishment of the military intervention culture. The fact that the Democrat Party came out of the bosom of the Republican People's Party and created a new excitement and hope for the citizens. However, from another aspect, the process of seeing the policies of the Democrat Party as a regime threat by the Turkish army and the Republican People's Party emerged. General opinion formed in the army with the emergence of social events was necessary to intervene in case of 'internal and external regime threat'. A junta within the military saw that the threat had occurred and started military intervention. As a result of this process, in Plato's words, the guardians had taken away the authority of the rulers. Thus, the "natural guardian" role was taken. As a result of this situation, the Turkish army would intervene in politics when the opportunity arises.

4.2. Talat Aydemir's Coup Attempts

The politics of the 1960s had changed compared to previous periods and continued with May 27. According to Feroz Ahmad, the politics of the 1960s were completely the opposite of the previous decade. Especially after May 27, pretty much everything was politicized, and the liberties and rights brought by the new constitution increased the effectiveness of the politics. University students formed structures favouring The Worker's Party of Turkey. There were left-wing students across the country and especially at universities (Ahmad, 2017, p. 166). Turkish people did not feel isolated from the world anymore. Because even the smallest settlements could follow leftist Marxist sources. Thus, Turkish people would integrate with the world. The reason for this was that left-wing sources were available at low prices. Watching the developments, the right-wing was more uneasy than before. They began to put their strength forward in the struggle against communism. On the other hand, the Cold War and the political developments in the Middle East were affecting Turkey (Ahmad, 2019, p. 134).

Alongside the 1961 Constitution, which was accepted by the majority of the people on July 9, 1961, the Political Parties Act and the Electoral Law were passed by the parliament. The elections were to be held as soon as possible. The aim was to return to democracy as soon as possible (Deniz, 2018, p. 32). However, there was a group within the military that thought that this return was too early, and the military intervention was not yet completed. This group especially conceived the Justice Party as a threat. The Armed Forces Union was holding power within the military. The Armed Forces Union held the power within the military during this process. Officially, this union held general power, but this was not clear.

Another group within the military was "the Junta of Colonels". This junta, under the command of Talat Aydemir, took an attitude completely opposing İsmet İnönü and the Republican People's Party. According to them, the military had not completed its mission. The soldiers should not have returned to the barracks before the realization of the reforms (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 19).

The elections were held on October 15, 1961. The parties exercised their democratic propaganda rights throughout the country. In the elections, the Justice Party (34,80%) and the New Turkey Party (13,72%) received 48,5% of all the votes, which meant, according to Kemal Karpat, that the heritage of the Democrat Party was coming to power (Karpat, 2012, p. 190). The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, received 36.74% of all votes. Contrary to the air of disappointment in the Republican cadres, those in the Justice Party felt victorious.

According to Osman Deniz, for the government to be formed and to have strong power, it had to form a coalition with the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party. However, he saw this situation as utterly contrary to the nature of politics. He thought that a coalition between the Republican People's Party, which claimed to be the representative of social democracy, and the Justice Party, which was not only the continuation of the Democrat Party but also intended to abolish the bicameral structure, would be madness (Deniz, 2018, p. 32). Osman Deniz's opinion was plausible since it was unlikely for these two opposing parties to come together. Also, Republican People's Party was closer to the idea of the 'left of the middle' rather than 'social democracy' in the relevant period'. The reason for this was that the left-wing parties (TLP etc.) prevented the rise of other parties in Turkish politics. When evaluated in this sense, it would not be wrong to think that the policy of the Republican People's Party wanted a monopoly on the left-wing in the relevant period.

From the military's point of view, the results of the elections were disappointing. The soldiers were unable to intervene in the elections. Celal Bayar invited the supporters of the Democrat Party to vote for the Justice Party. From the number of votes the Justice Party received, it looked like the public did not support the military intervention. The public perceived the military intervention as a threat. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the military was displeased with the results. The military was uneasy (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 20-21).

On the other hand, the military command took a series of measures in the early 1960s to prevent the junta movements. With an excellent transition process carried out within the scope of these measures; it was necessary to establish a control network within the Armed Forces to prevent threats that could come from the bottom up. As a requirement of this supervisory sensitivity, the Armed Forces Union was established in 1961 to control all groups and activities within the military. This union, which included the Chief of General Staff, commanders of naval, land and air forces, and officers of all ranks in its staff, would provide support to the Council of Ministers regarding the decisions on national security and coordination. However, the union had serious political power and became the guarantor of the new constitution (Ahmad, 2017, p. 21). On the other hand, according to Metin Toker, the Armed Forces Union gave its first strong message with the Yassıada trials, and its rivalry with the National Unity Committee was revealed (Toker, 1991, p. 26). Here, an alternative to the 'natural guardian' role emerged within the army itself. The differences of opinion within the army also caused competition among the 'natural protectors' who had the motive to rule. What Plato mentions is the difference of education in terms of soldiers also caused differences of opinion within the military.

With the 1961 election results, the Justice Party, the ideological heir of the Democrat Party, caught the attention of the Armed Forces Union. The same situation was true for the New Turkey Party. The generals, who did not want the country to be under a similar regime, reacted to the election results in this sense. Compared to the National Unity Committee, they were not very keen on the transition to party politics, and frankly, they showed significant tenacity in this regard (Erdem, 2019, p. 8-9). It would not be wrong to say that the Armed Forces Union had increased its effectiveness compared to the National Unity Committee in this sense, which led to a period that they could call a "deep coup". In Osman Deniz's opinion, there was a group that was thinking of splitting the Armed Forces Union in Istanbul and Ankara and overthrowing the high-ranking officers who were in power (Deniz, 2018, p. 49). The staff of the Armed Forces Union was generally composed of officers with the rank of staff colonel. In addition to those, it included some generals and admirals. In the future, it would gradually affect the upper ranks. However, this move was blocked by the Armed Forces Union. Periodic meetings would be held under the chairmanship of Memduh Tağmaç, the Deputy Chief of General Staff (Deniz, 2018, p. 24).

Within the Armed Forces Union, there were ideas to influence the Permanent Group established. Influencing the Permanent Group on this issue also raised questions. The Permanent Group was a group established within the General Staff to exercise the powers of the organization. Osman Deniz insisted on relaying his ideas to Talat Aydemir, but Talat Aydemir's chief of staff, Fahrettin Ermutlu, was not very keen on meeting with him. Still, he insisted on his request for a meeting and met with Talat Aydemir. Talat Aydemir said that they would not interfere with the Permanent Group, but that he understood Osman Deniz's concerns and that he should remain calm. He also stated that everything within the Permanent Group was carefully

reviewed and there was no conflict of opinions. Turning to Osman Deniz, he said that if the issues he was uncomfortable with continued, they would not hesitate to intervene (Deniz, 2018, p. 26-27-28).

In addition to the activities of the National Unity Committee, the activities of other institutions would also be taken under control. Those were the Republican People's Party, the Justice Party, and the Constituent Assembly. In the meetings held in Ankara, two topics were discussed in general. The purpose of this was not to deviate from the main purpose of current revolutionary policies and the 1960 intervention. In addition, it was to keep the political environment under control. The Justice Party was already in the limelight to repeat the Democrat Party's similar practices.

The National Unity Committee controlled the military from May 1960 to June 1961. However, with the establishment of the Armed Forces Union, the National Unity Committee began to weaken. Members of the committee were prevented from entering the barracks. From this point of view, the military would no longer be under the committee's policies. A group led by Cemal Gürsel, Osman Köksal, and Cemal Madanoğlu aimed to disband the Armed Forces Union. From this point of view, the National Unity Committee wanted to regain its power. Cemal Gürsel prepared a precautionary package. However, this step was blocked by the Armed Forces Union. After that, an ultimatum was given to the National Unity Committee and the head of state. (Deniz, 2018, p. 24).

On the other hand, Osman Deniz mentioned that the influence of the Armed Forces Union increased after the liquidation of the fourteens. He was about to replace the National Unity Committee. The Armed Forces Union thought that the Constituent Assembly was under the influence of the Republican People's Party. They even

believed that the constitution would be shaped per the views of the Republican People's Party. However, the Armed Forces Union wanted to give power to neither the Republican People's Party nor the Justice Party. Because, to the Armed Forces Union, things would go back to how it was before the military intervention on May 27, 1960, if they were allowed to gain power (Deniz, 2018, p. 22-23).

The goals of the Armed Forces Union were listed as follows in Osman Deniz's book "Harbiyeli Aldanmaz": (Deniz, 2018, s. 20-21).

1. To push NUC on the right track and to ban it from acts that jar the Armed Forces prestige.
2. To unite the groups that emerged within the Armed Forces after November 13, and to link them to the chain of command.
3. To prevent politics and politicians from infiltrating the Armed Forces.
4. To hold the elections swiftly and turn the parliamentary politics.

The activities of the Armed Forces Union were carried out through groups in Istanbul and Ankara. These groups would implement their plans and programs through the meetings, and the Chief of General Staff would lead the process. Since the establishment of the Union, the National Unity Committee started to lose power and became ineffective.

The meeting held on October 21, 1961, was very critical. Representatives of Istanbul and Ankara gathered in Istanbul. In this sense, it was not necessary to go back to before May 27 politically. Precautions had to be taken, and the fate of the Armed Forces had to be determined. The dissatisfaction within the Armed Forces Union arising from the results of the election held on October 15, 1961, increased

significantly. After this stage, the Armed Forces Union drafted an agreement so that the gains of military intervention were not lost because of the results of the election. They signed the "Istanbul and Mürted policies" which a new military intervention planned to protect what the current military intervention accepted as gains ın the meetings held in Istanbul and Ankara on October 21 and 22, 1961. (Ünsaldı, 2008). In return, it was to prevent the opening of parliament and the election on October 25. In addition, it was decided to seize rule on October 25, 1961. The prepared protocol had to be submitted for the approval of the commanders and the Chief of General Staff. Hence, a delegation went to Ankara. Within the framework of these plans, the Chief of Staff convened extraordinarily on October 23, 1961, with 24 generals, of which four were commanders in chief. Right after, General Cemal Gürsel met with the party leaders on the night that connects (Ünsaldı, 2008) October 23 to October 24. The protocols were shown and taken on October 21, 1961, which feature the warning (memorandum) of the Armed Forces Union to the current supervision. The solution presented by the Armed Forces Union was the presidency of Cemal Gürsel and the premiership of İsmet İnönü. Thus, the authority would be given under the control of the Armed Forces Union (Deniz, 2018, p. 33).

The hour for action was expected in Istanbul and Ankara on October 22, 23 and 24. The commanders of the land, naval and gendarmerie forces had signed the protocol. However, the air force commander and the chief of general staff had not signed the protocol. There was a tense waiting. On the one hand, the members in Ankara were putting pressure on the General Staff. In Istanbul, the pressure was on Faruk Güventürk. It was asked to take action before the news came from Ankara. According to Osman Deniz, if there were a delay the opportunity could not be seized. It stated that Faruk Güventürk was not very keen on the operation and was hesitant.

21 October protocol had a request to be passivated. However, this was meaningless for the people who were going to make the military intervention. According to them, the intervention should be carried out under any circumstances. Talat Aydemir, the Commander of the Military Academy, said that they would take the situation under control in Ankara. However, on the contrary, the General Staff took the situation under control (Deniz, 2018, p. 33-34).

On October 24, 1961, negotiations with the party leaders were completed. As a result, it was decided that the parties would declare their commitment to the May 27 and the Armed Forces. That was a precondition; the Armed Forces Union prepared a text, and the party leaders signed it. They officially accepted the May 27 Revolution and declared that they would remain loyal to it. Besides, it made Cemal Gürsel the president. The Çankaya Protocol and the 21 October military coup protocol were made common text. On the other hand, despite these events, the reaction of the National Unity Committee continued (Deniz, 2018, p. 36).

According to Osman Deniz, the National Unity Committee could not prevent the Armed Forces Union from becoming "symbolic" under its power. Besides, the National Unity Committee could not influence the internal decisions of the Armed Forces Union. In this atmosphere, the influence of the Armed Forces Union increased. Officers who were assigned to civil duties began to return to their positions. The Armed Forces Union was organizing within itself. Division, corps, military, force commanders, the General Staff and the Naval Forces were working outside their positions. They were establishing a separate network of organizations to contribute to the process of military intervention (Deniz, 2018, p. 22).

The Assembly convened again on October 5, 1961. General Cemal Gürsel was elected the President of the Republic. In this sense, the Çankaya Protocol paved the

way for the transition to a democratic regime. The leader of the junta became the President. However, in the continuation of this process, with the Çankaya protocol, a transition to democratic life was experienced again. According to Osman Deniz; Turkey would be faced with democratic wrangling pre-May 27. The reason for this was the fact that the October 21 protocol did not enter into force. Despite the signing of the Çankaya Protocol, the parties continued to oppose May 27 (Deniz, 2018, s. 37). The possibility of returning to the pre-27 May period offered an excuse to lay the groundwork for a possible new military intervention.

General Cemal Tural issued an order as soon as he returned to Istanbul from Ankara. In the order, it was written that the activities of the Armed Forces Union, of which he was a member, was ceased. According to him, parliament and democracy were back in action. Members of the organization should now return to their duties in the military. The Istanbul group, on the other hand, was surprised and angered at the situation. The letter sent by Talat Aydemir to Faruk Güventürk clearly expressed this anger. The order of Cemal Tural had revealed opposing opinions within the organization.

On the other hand, the conversation between Faruk Gürler and Cevdet Sunay was remarkable. The question was the cessation of the activities of the Armed Forces Organization. Cevdet Sunay completely rejected and stated that the Armed Forces Union would continue its work (Deniz, 2018, p. 37).

There was a group led by Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay and Cemal Tural. According to Osman Deniz, this group was thinking of becoming heroes who established democracy by agreeing with politicians. Nonetheless, there was an opposing group that included other commanders within the military. These officers thought that they were betrayed. The opening of the parliament in October 1961 and

the formation of the coalition government under the leadership of İnönü posed a problem. Finally, İnönü was the prime minister (Deniz, 2018, p. 46-47).

Cemal Tural contacted İsmet İnönü after this process. The meeting was possible thanks to the Çankaya Protocol. In December 1961, the coalition government, of which İnönü was prime minister, kept under supervision. The National Unity Committee believed that the coalition between the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party, under the leadership of İnönü, would be successful but the members of the Armed Forces Union were unsatisfied with the situation (Deniz, 2018, p. 37).

The Armed Forces Union convened in December 1961. This meeting was critical for the future of the Union. The first of the decisions taken; is the decision of Cemal Tural regarding his decision on the dissolution of the organization, that he continues this duty as form. Cemal Tural's membership was suspended. The second decision was that the Armed Forces Union would continue its meetings and activities. The third decision is; Sadettin Canberk on behalf of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Intelligence Staff Colonel Vahit Gürkan would attend the meetings representing the Military Commander vacated by Cemal Tural. The final decision was critical. The Union accepted the Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay as its chairman. According to Osman Deniz, the organization decided to continue as a whole. Meanwhile, the parliamentary democracy started to function. The Constitution was put into effect. In such an environment, the operations of the Armed Forces Union were posing a risk (Deniz, 2018, p. 43).

There was a struggle here no longer with the ruling class but with the internal structure of the soldier. The question of to whom "natural guardianship" and the ability to rule pass had to be answered within the army itself. For this situation, a

rivalry would begin between the Armed Forces Union and the National Unity Committee. When evaluated in this sense, the main representatives of the ruling class were the army itself.

Turkey was on the verge of another crisis due to the process that began with the 1961 elections. The military was hesitant to show a united stance. The officers were divided into two groups. Talat Aydemir was one of the most prominent officers. He and the officers of his opinion gathered under a single roof. They had particular demands, such as the cancellation of the election results, the closure of political parties, and the dissolution of the National Unity Committee. Besides, a new military structure was needed (Ahmad, 2015, p. 183). A junta called the Junta of Colonels, under the leadership of Talat Aydemir was planning to take action.

A discourse in the memoirs of Dündar Seyhan, who was expelled from the military with the claim of working in partnership with Talat Aydemir, was a good example of the junta movement on February 22, 1962. According to Dündar Seyhan, news began to spread among some Kemalist officers that an organization established to overthrow the existing system. Seyhan said, "They aimed to eliminate İsmet Pasha and his cadre, pick up the revolutions of Atatürk from where he left off, thus accelerating Turkey's march towards the West." (Seyhan, 1966, s. 73). In this sense, we see that the junta structure resembled those in the period of the Union and Progress.

According to Osman Deniz, Talat Aydemir was the most active soldier person in Ankara. He was one of the commanders who set the meeting agendas of the Armed Forces Union and was active in decision making. Currently, his discomfort from that period has been instrumental in the formation of a new military structure (Deniz, 2018, p. 22). At this point, the symbol of the 1960 military intervention was the

Military Academy, and Talat Aydemir was the first name that came to mind within the institution. The cadets and officers of the Military Academy tried to make the 27 May military intervention achieve its purpose (Deniz, 2018, p. 29). Clearing the way for lower-ranking officers to act independently was a threat. Feroz Ahmad's opinion is May 27 was a bad reason for this result (Ahmad, 2015, p. 183). Talat Aydemir had a strict opinion of the 14. "They always wanted to stay on top like the cream of milk.", he said. He claimed that this group that approached him during the February 22 attempt had no views.

To understand Talat Aydemir's point of view on the order of the time, one should also look at his memoir. He said the following regarding his role in the political environment of the period: "I made up my mind. The course of the country was wrong. By cooperating with those of similar opinions, I began to think of ways to save the Turkish military from the awful situation they ended up in due to the negligence of the party in power. Moreover, I also pondered on what course of action to take to put an end to this situation." (Aydemir, 2010, p. 10). According to Cemil Koçak, Talat Aydemir explained how he started the coup process and made a decision within the framework of these views. He stated that the first seeds of this initiative were planted in 1956 (Koçak, 2017, p. 129).

According to Cemil Koçak, Aydemir and his friends thought that the spirit of the Democrat Party was back. They believed that this situation was evident in the 1961 elections. It was typical in terms of their interpretation of the course of the events. The Democrat Party was closed, but the mentality it created was still there. They once again had the majority in the elections (Koçak, 2017, p. 123). However, it was confirmed that Talat Aydemir and his team, who regarded the process as a threat, thought of ways to eliminate this threat to complete the reforms of 1960.

Talat Aydemir was dissatisfied with the situation. He thought that May 27 could not achieve its goals. He said that just like the pre-military intervention of 1960, the public was divided into two opposing groups. The principle and spirit of "National Unity" could not be embodied. Kemal Karpat's narrations revealed Talat Aydemir's opinion about the 1961 elections. The coalition between the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party that emerged after the elections was neither dynamic nor consistent. He described the current situation as a counter-revolution (Karpat, 2012, p. 191). The inability to implement the reformist movements that formed the basis of the intervention required a new military intervention. (Demir, 2006, p. 161-162).

İsmet İnönü's attitude towards the Armed Forces Union was apparent. According to İnönü, there was a possibility of a new military intervention within the Armed Forces Union. He sensed the situation and made attempts to suppress these interventions. His first action was to divide the organization from within and prepare person lists. To carry out and observe these control mechanisms first-hand, he planned trips to the Armed Forces Union. The breaking point was İsmet İnönü's visit to the Military Academy on February 5, 1962 (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 54). According to Osman Deniz, the reason for this unexpected visit was the rumours about Talat Aydemir, the Commander of the Military Academy. These rumours were told "the mighty colonel of the revolution", "the colonel who made what they say everywhere", "the colonel and commander worshipped by the students of the Military Academy". This is how the people of Ankara defined him. But a more important rumour was the "person who made harsh statements to the situation that the transition to democracy was calculated in agreement with the National Unity Committee so that the Republican People's Party came to power as soon as possible". At the same time, he agreed with all the staff colonels, who were stationed in Ankara. My view was that

this was the most interesting situation for İsmet İnönü. Talat Aydemir was seen as the head of the movement and became one of İsmet İnönü's primary targets. Aydemir (Deniz, 2018, p. 50).

The visit to the Military Academy was very striking. Talat Aydemir welcomed İsmet İnönü with a ceremony that could almost be called a show. According to the statement of Osman Deniz, Aydemir gave a briefing to İnönü. In this briefing, Aydemir gave obvious and precise answers. A meeting was held after the meeting with the Military Academy command and instructors personally. Talat Aydemir constantly tried to keep İnönü busy with other topics. İnönü was alert to this situation and wanted to have lunch with the students. Aydemir stated that students were not ready for the occasion. However, upon İnönü's insistence, he was taken to the education gathering place in the inner garden of the school. In the meantime, the students were marching to vacate the area. The students were in their armed training attire when İnönü and the commanders greeted them. However, the students responded with scowling glances and harsh steps. İnönü reacted to this situation and got angry with Talat Aydemir. The reason for his reaction was not being to contact the students. So, to speak, after the visit, İnönü got Aydemir's plan. Talat Aydemir was delighted with the outcome of the visit. İnönü had set his goal now. The target was Talat Aydemir and his team. (Deniz, 2018, p. 51). Cemil Koçak stated that the visit was a disappointment for İnönü. This event is a good example of Plato's distinction between managers and soldiers. Because the military class has come across and reacted to the current political structure although it is not holistic. As a military class, Talat Aydemir's structuring thinks that 60 military intervention policies with the motive of protection are under threat. This event must be evaluated from this point of view.

A military intervention protocol was signed on February 9, 1962, which included many high-ranking officers. The aim was to break the bond between the military and İnönü because İnönü's prestige was a threat to Talat Aydemir and his team. Cemil Koçak stated that similar names who decided on the military intervention expressed their opinion that they gave up the intervention in another meeting held a few hours later. Talat Aydemir, on the other hand, wanted the high command to support him and the military intervention to be carried out by them. According to him, the aim here was to preserve the hierarchy (Koçak, 2017, p. 125). February 9, 1962 day, the structure of the military junta was one of those times that can be seen clearly in the history of the Republic of Turkey. İsmet İnönü was accustomed to the coup movement and such structures in the military. Therefore, he did his best to take precautions against Talat Aydemir and his team. A leader representing the political wing would engage in a struggle against the military wing's effort to establish dominance.

Considering the situation in which the junta movement first started, it was thought that the number of officers to participate in the military intervention would be high at the beginning. That would be the case both in rank and number. However, rather than the high command, low-ranking officers, as on May 27, would lead the military intervention (Koçak, 2017, p. 124). From the perspective of the chain of command, Talat Aydemir and his junta were less in number compared to the rest of the military.

From then on, the Group of Colonels, led by Talat Aydemir and consisted of military colonels, aimed to emerge as a junta. Until the reforms brought by the events of May 27 settled, which included the founding principles of the Republic, democracy should not be adopted. There was no trust in the RPP-JP coalition in the long run.

Judging by this criterion, the political structure had to be out of order (Safi, 2019, p. 148).

According to Cemil Koçak, Talat Aydemir's absence in the country during the military intervention on May 27, 1960, determined his political future. According to Talat Aydemir, the February 22 movement was a real May 27 action against the putschists who betrayed May 27. The purpose of February 22 is; the realization of the unfinished and interrupted May 27 military intervention (Koçak, 2017, s. 130-131). According to Cemil Koçak, this situation reflected the real feelings and thoughts of the revolutionary officers (Koçak, 2017, p. 124).

On the night of February 20, 1962, rumours began to spread that Talat Aydemir and his group would take action. Some of the military members who heard this, experienced mobility. The officers of the First Armored Division Tank Battalion of the Etimesgut Armored Units School were on the alert. The alarm was lifted because Talat Aydemir was unaware of what had happened. Staff Major Bahtiyar Yalta lifted the alarm when he learned that there was a mistake, but the situation was different. According to Cemil Koçak, Talat Aydemir and his team thought the military would give a general opinion. However, when there was no general opinion Aydemir and his team took responsibility for the intervention. Yet, on the evening of February 21, 1962, the Military Academy started the intervention. This intervention was due to an obligation. The groups that opposed Talat Aydemir and his team tried to disentitle the commanders of the junta group (Koçak, 2017, p. 125).

Osman Deniz said in his memoirs, "On February 21, 1962, Colonel Emin Aytekin, the Chief of Staff of the Academies, summoned me to his room. He said that things got out of control in Ankara since yesterday and that Talat Aydemir called there to make a report." Aydemir reported the following in his report: "On February

20, Colonel Şükrü İlkin and Colonel Selçuk Atakan were summoned and taken into custody. Then they summoned me. I did not attend. I sent Staff Colonel Turgut Alpagut, to replace me. They also detained him. The applications I made for the release of the detainees were not answered. I decided to spend the night of February 20-21 at school. According to the information I received, Air Colonel Haydar Tunçkanat and Staff Colonel Mucip Ataklı, members of the National Unity Committee, entered the Air Force Headquarters wearing their official uniforms and started the operation in cooperation with Brigadier General Hüsnü Özkan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Citing imaginary scenarios suitable for the operation they prepared, they reported to the General Staff that I alerted the Military Academy and the troops in its vicinity." In his conversation with Osman Deniz, Emin Aytekin told of his kinship with Talat Aydemir as well. Aytekin's protectionist motive wanted to prevent something from happening to Talat Aydemir. Aydemir said, "We are on duty. Those who were detained at the General Staff were not released. Aviators from the Committee occupied the Air Force. They are manufacturing many conspiracies. For now, we are in the right position. We take no action. All troops in Ankara, except the Air Force, support us. There is no unit under the command of the General Staff. We are in control of the situation. We will not make a move unless provoked." (Deniz, 2018, p. 72-73-74). Although Talat Aydemir said that he was in control of the situation, the reality was different. For their plans were revealed and everyone was waiting for a move that could come from them. According to Ismail Safi, Talat Aydemir sensed a trap against him. Talat Aydemir’s group wanted to implement the military intervention they planned. The date they set for the intervention was the night of February 21. It might have been thought that the alarm was not taken seriously, but the General Staff had taken measures for possible intervention (Safi, 2019, p. 149-

150). However, the plan had to proceed in secret. The worst scenario that could occur in the military coup was the spreading of the news that a coup would be carried out.

On February 22, hours were now counted for intervention. Talat Aydemir had learned from the news at 12.30 that the Istanbul team was not with him. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the only options for him at that point were either quitting his plans or press on with the intervention. Taking the risk of a skirmish, he chose to stick with the plan and continue. Immediately afterwards, he gathered the cadets in a conference hall and gave a speech that would spark them. The cadets were looking forward to the order from their commander, and it came. It was time to fight now (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 68-69). We can understand from here how Plato influences the country's politics as a result of the education and upbringing of the military class, with his understanding of "natural protection". At the command of his commander, the soldier showed his determination to intervene to assume the role of "natural guardian". When evaluated from another angle, Plato also stated that due to the educational deficiency of the military class, it can be involved in the civilian population and politics (Plato, 2008, p. 398). In this case, it would not be wrong to say that the military structure is considering intervening in politics in a 'national feeling'. However, it should be pointed out here that the motto and the signal of the intervention were remarkable. The motto chosen for the intervention was "saviour", and the signal word was "bouncer". The motto and signal were inspired by the "Savior Officers" from the era of the Ottoman Empire. From this point of view, it would be appropriate to look for the origin of this junta movement in the back pages of history. I look at the historical process here, Halaskar Zabitan; it was organized against the Party of Union and Progress in favour of the Freedom and Entente Party in 1912. The method of Halaskar Zabitan, who gave a memorandum against the majority of the

Union and Progress was taken as a reference again on February 22, 1962. However, this time, the aim is to intervene rather than deliver a memorandum. Taking the role of "natural protector" by taking reference from "Savior Officers".

At 16:00, there was an event that would determine the fate of the rebellion. The Presidential Guard Regiment passed into the hands of Fethi Gürcan, the person closest to Talat Aydemir. He gave the good news to Talat Aydemir. However, the good news ended with a decision taken by Talat Aydemir. The release of the commanders and ministers by order of İsmet İnönü, who was in the Presidential Palace, determined the fate of the operation (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 74). From now on, everything would be against Talat Aydemir. The announcement made by Chief of General Staff Cemal Gürsel from the radio house and İsmet İnönü's approach to the events brought the end of the operation. Talat Aydemir thus became ineffective.

Aydemir decided to stop the operation, taking into account the events that may occur if the operation carried out. On the night of February 22, the İnönü-Sunay team negotiated with Aydemir, and at the end of the meeting, the coup was abandoned in return for pardoning the putschists. New events broke out on February 22, 1962, the day Talat Aydemir was released, upon Prime Minister İsmet İnönü said that the cadets of the Military Academy were deceived during his speech regarding the coup attempt. Some students placed a wreath with the words "Those from Harbiye cannot be deceived" at the Atatürk Monument in Taksim. These words would later become the motto of May 21st. As a result of these developments, an investigation was opened against cadets, and they were taken to court (Demir, 2006, p. 163-164).

It would be wrong to look at the 22 February 1962 junta movement in one criterion. Cemil Koçak said that if this junta movement was successful, it would leave

indelible marks in Turkish political history. He stated that Talat Aydemir and his team acted to complete the missing parts of May 27 (Koçak, 2017, p. 121). Even if they had worked for the realization of May 27, they would later take action to carry out the real 'revolution'. However, Talat Aydemir's first coup attempt as a Staff Colonel on February 22, 1962, was unsuccessful (Karpat, 2012, p. 191). On the other hand, Talat Aydemir said, in his memoirs regarding the February 22 initiative, “It was not an attempt at a dire experience. It was a reaction against the political environment İnönü created by pushing aside the countless troubles of the country." Those who carried out the February 22 attempt were not taken to court. However, according to him, taking them to court would reveal the guilty (Koçak, 2017, p. 135).

This attempt by Talat Aydemir is a reaction against the acceleration of the transition to democracy and the failure of the policies described as the 1960 revolution in a sufficient period. Against this situation, the structures of the status quo views of the army and the way and method applied by President İsmet İnönü in terms of military and political strategy, a new attempt was prevented before the effects of an existing coup ended. The main idea to be read here is that in Plato's "natural guardian role" from a structure that carried out the military's 1960 military intervention, it displayed an attitude that preserves the process after the intervention suddenly. The military took the initiative to be in charge of Talat Aydemir and her team to protect the structure. On the other hand, Talat Aydemir and her team provided the beginning of a process that they believed to be correct in line with their principles. When evaluated in terms of this process, it was the first unsuccessful coup attempt in the history of the Republic of Turkey.

The junta movement on February 22, 1962, was suppressed. Talat Aydemir was retired after February 22. Despite the unsuccessful result, he did not give up, he

would just put his plans in motion later on. Also, it was hard for him to find allies within the military, yet he did not quit trying (Koçak, 2017, p. 138). Talat Aydemir conveyed his perspective on politics with the following sentences: "As a soldier, I never thought of dealing with politics and eventually entering political life. But as a staff officer, I have always closely followed the domestic and foreign politics of the country." (Aydemir, 2010, p. 9). However, Cemil Koçak saw this situation as a complete contradiction and criticized Talat Aydemir's approach to politics (Koçak, 2017, p. 128).

It is necessary to mention two problems encountered in this process. The first, according to Ismail Safi, was the problem of functionality in politics. Because in the first junta movement, they had a serious problem with this. The second problem was how to assist the retired officers, who were expelled as a result of the first attempt. For Talat Aydemir to be able to wear his uniform again, he and his friends had to retake active duty. However, for that, the first problem had to be resolved (Safi, 2019, p. 149-150).

According to Cemil Koçak, the experience of May 27 showed Talat Aydemir that one should be strict on political issues. From this point of view, Talat Aydemir said, "The purpose of May 27 cannot be seen as simply closing a party and then establishing a new constitution and some legal or political institutions." (Aydemir, 2010). The first goal was to create a Kemalist front. Establishing this front was difficult due to the weight of İsmet İnönü. Moreover, Aydemir and his team considered themselves superior to everyone else. According to Cemil Koçak, this attitude was a weakness. This view resulted in the junta being unable to gain strength. However, the group led by Orhan Kabibay, who was expelled from the National

Unity Committee, took action to establish an Atatürkist Party. This movement would lead them to be effective in the field of politics as well (Koçak, 2017, p. 135-136).

According to Demir, the junta, which caused the February 22nd events, wanted to link the movement they planned with the "Kemalism Doctrine" (Demir, 2006, p. 165). Cemil Koçak interpreted that this doctrine conveyed by Talat Aydemir would fill a significant gap. Because, according to Aydemir, the lack of a doctrine of the operation created a significant deficiency. The "Kemalism Revolution Program", of which Cemil Koçak mentions, has many principles. These principles included elements such as conformity to the republican regime, increasing the level of awareness of Turkish nationalism in society, adopting a secular state understanding, having a revolutionary perspective, fair distribution of income, and state supervision in the field of education. According to Cemil Koçak, nothing was surprising regarding the doctrine; however, there were differences between the views of the Kemalists and Talat Aydemir (Koçak, 2017, p. 132).

Talat Aydemir's cause gave hope to a group in the Turkish left-wing. Intellectuals like Doğan Avcıoğlu, who was writing in Yön magazine, had sympathy for Talat Aydemir. *Yön* was a magazine that included many important authors such as Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhan Selçuk, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and Niyazi Berkes. At that time, these publications about Kemalism's populist and statist view had an impact on the left. In this sense, the intellectuals in the magazine were supporting society in the triangle of military, university and bureaucracy (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 92). Talat Aydemir saw this support as an essential reason for the military intervention process.

The initial date range given for the new operation was 20 March - 20 April 1963. The reason for that was the continuing courses in the Tank School headed by

Fethi Gürcan. According to the information received by the police, on March 20, 1963, the date was given up. Talat Aydemir and his friends had a meeting following their planning. In this meeting held on 15 May 1963, the date of the new coup attempt determined. All preparations were to be made for the coup attempt, which was planned for 20-21 May 1963. Talat Aydemir's leadership was unquestionable. He also stated in his memoirs that the emergence of another leader was not possible (Aydemir, 2010). Talat Aydemir approved the plan made by Fethi Gürcan. According to Cemil Kocak, this plan was the same as the one on February 22, 1962. The main focus of the operation was Ankara. The plan was intended to be carried out as soon as possible (Koçak, 2017, p. 139-140). However, there was an element that Talat Aydemir could not foresee. Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the 14, who received the news of the second junta initiative, had ensured that the government was informed. On May 20, 1963, İsmet İnönü received the information yet did not find it worthwhile. Talat Aydemir gave the order for military operation (Çakmak, 2008, p. 51). The first target was the radio. The coup declaration regarding the initiative was read throughout the country. According to Cemil Kocak, mentioning Talat Aydemir when the first revolution declaration was read was not enough by itself. It was announced that the Turkish Armed Forces took control of the country. However, the operational power of the junta was negligible. The forces consisted of a group of cadets, a small number of retired officers, and three tanks waiting in front of the radio station. However, nothing happened in Istanbul after the announcement (Koçak, 2017, p. 141). During military interventions, seizing the capital could be seen as seizing control of the country. Yet, acting independently from the chain of command was very risky.

The centre of the new coup attempt was the Military Academy. Later in the process, 28th Division Artillery Command, Armored Units School Guard Regiment

Cavalry Group, and 229th Infantry Regiment in Ankara would be included. On the other hand, the 1st and 2nd Armored Brigades and the Naval Academy were on alert in Istanbul. Talat Aydemir also expected support from the air force, but even though the expected support did not come, he was in favour of the continuation of the initiative. As Osman Deniz stated, the plan was based on obtaining the support of the troops by seizing the radio station and publishing the declaration signed by Talat Aydemir (Deniz, 2018, p. 215).

From then on, the counter-movements started. 28th Division Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ali Elverdi, who was aware of the operation, went to the radio station. Alongside two soldiers, he raided the radio station and had the lieutenant who made the announcements of the operation arrested. It was necessary to make an instant return to the people and the opposing front. Elverdi personally took the speaker's chair and instructed the troops to return to their barracks and stay there until further order (Önal, 2017, p. 21). According to Mehmet Ali Birand, this declaration of Elverdi dealt the fatal blow to Talat Aydemir and his team. Now, the troops loyal to the Armed Forces were aware that the team behind Talat Aydemir was not a holistic force (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 109). The radio station, in this sense, was like a war front. The two groups, as opposed to each other, were trying to control the place. The aim was to convey the necessary authoritarian message to the citizens and military units.

Aydemir's troops occupied the radio station for the second time. Ali Elverdi was arrested. The communiqué of the Headquarters of the Revolution was reread to retake the power and ensure control. It was now believed that the radio station had to be passivated. The radio station was disconnected from the transmitter in Etimesgut by the government. With the disconnection of the radio from the transmitter,

uneasiness spread among the public. People began to pour into the streets (Safi, 2019, p. 150). According to Cemil Koçak, what had transpired after midnight on May 21 was a fiasco. The Military Academy could not take the necessary action. Many retired officers, who were or were expected to take part in the initiative, had arrived late. Some did not even come. Troops piled up wherever had to be seized, but there were no additional attempts (Koçak, 2017, p. 140-141).

The situation between the fronts in Ankara was tense. The jets of the Air Force started to cruise in Ankara skies. The radio broadcast was under the control of the government, and Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay dealt the fatal blow for the opposing front. Sunay gave the necessary ultimatum to the military units. In the unstable environment that emerged from that moment on, great disarray arose in the Military Academy. As a result of the withdrawal of the troops affiliated with Aydemir and his team, the movement began to weaken. The interventions of the jets resulted in a second unsuccessful attempt by Talat Aydemir and his team. Aydemir, after the operation, mentioned how vital it was to silence the radio broadcast.

Talat Aydemir and his team were arrested after the attempt. The Council of Ministers declared martial law in Ankara and Istanbul for more than a year and in Izmir for five months (Koçak, 2017, p. 210). Three courts were established for the defendants by the Ankara Martial Law Command for the start of the trials. The main defendants of the coup were movement tried in Martial Law Court I, while Talat Aydemir and his team were tried in Court II and the cadets of the Military Academy in Court III (Demir, 2006, p. 168). The trials ended on September 6, 1963. Decisions included seven executions, 29 life sentences, and 45 acquittals (Önal, 2017, p. 22). The defendants had appealed. The Military Supreme Court upheld four death sentences and overturned the other three sentences. It was decided that the cadets of

the Military Academy should be expelled from school due to indiscipline. Talat Aydemir and other 22 February's members were executed (Çakmak, 2008, p. 55). Prisoners who made the May 21 initiative benefited from the amnesty law, which will come in a few years (Koçak, 2017, p. 141).

According to Sina Akşin; these operations who carried out by Talat Aydemir on February 22, 1962, and May 21, 1963, contributed to İsmet İnönü's multi-party democracy process. He said that Talat Aydemir thought that the order that emerged after May 27 was not "revolutionary". Therefore, he felt the need to intervene (Akşin, 2019, p. 266).

The May 21 process had almost put Talat Aydemir and his team into a political stalemate. Their insistence on intervention has been seen as "empty dreaminess" by some groups. Some say that underlying this desire for intervention was a severe belief in unity. My comment is that for the sake of their own goals and ideals, Talat Aydemir and his team became a serious political figure in the desire for "unity and progress". However, to assume the role of "natural protector", they have sought the administration of the state, acting independently of the military's chain of command. In cooperation with President İsmet İnönü and the Turkish army, it was necessary to intervene in instability that would be experienced in the continuation of the 1960 military intervention. When evaluated in this respect, the victory of 'natural guardianship' has been in the hands of the political elite.

4.3 Memorandum Of March 12, 1971

The impact of May 27 and the junta movements were laid the groundwork for the process leading up to March 12, 1971. The traces of the 1960 military intervention

could not be overcome yet, and these traces had an important meaning to feel the "guardian" role of the military. The military wanted to feel the weight. Despite his internal turmoil and the dilemma of 'democracy' and 'revolution', he did not want to take his hand over politics and society.

According to Tuğçe Erdoğan, the military intervention on May 27, 1960, by determining the upcoming processes and the place of the military in the Turkish political life, announced the arrival of the memorandum of March 12, 1971. She stated that the period between May 27 and March 12 affected the future generations of Turkey. It also gave rise to the idea of forming a party (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 91). Indeed, to support this view, the internal reflexes in the military that emerged with the military intervention in 1960 and subsequently took place in 1962 and 1963 show that this unknown continues. It is also a sign that the soldier's confusion has not been concluded.

She stated that the state of chaos can be understood from the newspaper statement in Nihat Erim's 12 March Memories book, from the announcements of January 1, 1971, New Year celebrations, and the statements of the President, prime minister and parties (Erim, 200, p. 168).

According to Feroz Ahmad, the political tension, social change movements and events around the world that had increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s took place in turn. Considered in terms of the economy, the head was beginning to show serious problems in Turkey. The level of development in the industry was insufficient to meet the high growth rate. Expectations were insufficient in this sense (Ahmad, 2017, p. 172). Besides, the generals were in a privileged position within Turkish society. Their interests were in favour of preserving the status quo. Their fate depended not on a political party or a leader, but the regime. The primary values that

they were concerned about were stability and social peace. They could have preferred to overthrow a government that could not provide these values (Ahmad, 2017, p. 22). However, the process leading up to the 1971 memorandum should be seen as a reflex against the political and economic problems of the period, rather than a regime concern. Meanwhile, the military developed an authoritarian mentality, thinking they had the right to intervene with those whom they deemed inappropriate.

There was political instability in these years, but it was only the threat of military intervention that held the coalitions together. The Justice Party became the most successful party in the November 1963 local elections (Ahmad, 2019, p. 135). While the Republican People's Party received 37% of the votes, the Justice Party became the first party with 45% of the votes. The idea of ending the partnership with the Republican People's Party arose among the right-wing parties (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 120). The Justice Party took over the flag as a continuation of the Democrat Party and aimed to gather the right-wing under a single roof.

On the other hand, in 1968, there were youth movements that took place first in France, then in other European countries and the United States. These movements were against the established order. University youth movements, even though their effects decreased in other countries, were permanent in Turkey. The permanence caused it to turn to the left-wing (Akşin, 2019, p. 267). The arrival of the 6th Fleet of the U.S. to the Turkish ports was blockaded during the youth and student movements in Turkey. In Feroz Ahmad's words, during the events, both the nationalists and left-wingers called for an independent Turkey. The government of the time asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reassess foreign relations according to the conditions of the period (Ahmad, 2019, p. 137). In the period leading up to March 12, the left

movements had a significant impact. Particularly, the political events of the generation of 68: Turkish youth have been one of the factors that shaped March 12th.

According to Cemil Koçak, the student movements; appeared as an opponent of the various junta movements that existed within the military in 1971 to gain power. Koçak states that the aim of the activists and demonstrators was not preparing the ground for a new military coup. However, these movements had the effect of walking into a bear trap (Koçak, 2017, p. 155). From the viewpoint of the activists, of course, the aim was not to prepare the ground for military intervention, but the impact of the left movements on the politics of the period was one of the tools that laid the ground for discussing military intervention.

Regarding the business community in Turkey, Feroz Ahmad emphasized the ineffectiveness of competition between small businesses and large companies. Mostly the reactions of small business owners to Süleyman Demirel increased. They thought that Demirel had betrayed them. In the environment that emerged after the 1969 elections, this dissatisfied group turned its back on the Justice Party, causing the party to lose its electoral power (Ahmad, 2019, p. 140).

As the 1970s approached, the prime minister of the time and the leader of the Justice Party Süleyman Demirel, and his government were experiencing difficulties. Anti-US backlash in society after the 1964 Johnson letter, the discomfort of the military due to the Workers Party of Turkey gaining seats in the parliament and the strengthening of some leftist organizations were some examples of these troubles. At the same time, the military was reacting to the restoration of the political rights of the former Democrat Party members. In addition to all these interior problems, Demirel's government was dealing with problems in foreign policy (Ertem, 2018, p. 657). As

will see in the subsequent chapters, the foreign pressure on Turkey, resulting in internal conflicts significantly affected the years between 1970 and 1980.

Tension in the streets had been escalating since 1970. The working class demonstrated in Istanbul on June 15 and 16, 1970, protesting a bill against DİSK. The reason for this; in the bill of the Demirel Government, it was aimed at closing unions that did not have a high rate of workers. The Republican People's Party also voted for this bill. Cemil Koçak was critical of this action of the Republican People's Party, as it was contradicting their social-democratic views. Despite all the discussions, the bill accepted in Parliament (Koçak, 2017, p. 158-159). The demonstrations on June 15 and 16, 1970, was the largest protest by workers in the history of Turkey. Approximately 70 thousand workers attended the rally, in which four people died and more than a hundred injured. However, the footsteps of the impending coup showed itself with the harshness of the intervention which was carried out (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 202). In which the events in Turkey, showed that entered a difficult period periodically. Individuals or institutions that took over authority also could direct existing politics.

According to Sina Akşin, the student events were turning into guerilla warfare (Akşin, 2019, p. 268). Feroz Ahmad argued that the current situation in Turkey was ready to burst. The transformation of student and worker movements into militancy, changes in the economic and social sphere, and the political turmoil that was growing day by day were creating dangers (Ahmad, 2019, p. 140). On the other hand, schools and universities, which exceeded their capacity, were a suitable environment for those who would take part in left and right-wing militancy. Feroz Ahmad stated, the current situation in Turkey was ready for a serious crisis. The dangerous factors were the transformation of the student and worker movements into militancy, changes in the

economic and social sphere, and the growing political turmoil (Ahmad, 2019, p. 140-141). As mentioned above, Feroz Ahmad summarized the sphere of influence of the youth regarding politics in a way similar to, yet more detailed than, Cemil Koçak. The memorandum of 1971 was an ultimatum, the impact of which was felt among left and right-wing youth movements.

The beginning of 1971 is now a period of inactivity of the government. The Demirel Government was incapable of showing any reflexes due to internal and external issues. The nominee to come to power ‘to do what was necessary’ was obvious: the military. In this sense, the military's intervention in politics was expected (Ertem, 2018, p. 657). The generals were discussing how to carry out the intervention. Would it be a movement to take over the government or just a memorandum that would lead to a change of government? That was the point of discussion (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 245)

Several foreign publications had examined the situation in Turkey at the beginning of 1971. Cemil Koçak mentioned, the famous British magazine *The Economist* had commented on the situation in Turkey at the beginning of 1971 and described 1971 as the year that Turkey's fate would be decided (Koçak, 2017, p. 199). The article written by the magazine at the beginning of 1971 was published on the first page of the Cumhuriyet newspaper as well. Comments such as "The situation in Turkey greatly deteriorated in recent weeks... It is so hard to figure out how the Demirel Government would retain power. To many, the question is not if there will be a military intervention occur but when..." were made. "For now, commanders are not involved; however, if the situation worsened, the staff would have to act, under pressure from young officers... If the Turkish military intervened, they would do so not to abolish democracy but to restore it."

Cemil Koçak mentioned again the French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote the following regarding Turkey: "It can be seen how angry the Turkish authorities are in the face of the unrest that has been around for months. The situation heading towards collapse in every field, and there could even be a regime crisis in the country. The government could not resort to drastic measures due to the mood within the military.". The Turkish military declared that it had no intention to pressure the government, and its primary duty was to protect the country. The letter that Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur presented to the President on November 24 was an ultimatum. In this letter, General Batur asked for the withdrawal of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the establishment of a constituent assembly to defend Kemalist principles. Moreover, according to General Batur, the guardian of the secular state and national sovereignty was the military (Koçak, 2017, p. 197). As will see in the 1980 military intervention, the foreign press, whenever there was a possibility of military intervention in Turkey, reflected it. Another troublesome process that took place in early 1971 was the continuous strikes. Besides, there was a serious loss of workforce from January 1, 1971, until March 12, 1971, when the memorandum was issued. The Demirel government could not control the situation. Consequently, he lost the support of his party group. In Feroz Ahmad's view, this situation triggered military intervention. Meanwhile, Demirel's loss of the support of his party group was questioned by the military (Ahmad, 2019, p. 142).

According to Tuğçe Erdoğan, the escalation of violence was heightened by the abduction of four American soldiers in Ahlatlıbel, including Sergeant Jimmy R. Finley who was an American soldier. Deniz Gezmiş and his friends carried the environment of violence to the top with this incident they carried out on March 4, 1971. According to Tuğçe Erdoğan, the process leading to the March 12

memorandum emerged with this incident (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 91). Although Tuğçe Erdoğan's interpretations are plausible in a sense, this can still be elaborated upon. The reason for this is that the process leading to the 12 March 1971 memorandum was not limited to the stated reason alone. Left and right movements were just one of the reasons for the memorandum of March 12. These and all other events constituted the reasons which cleared the way for the memorandum of March 12.

According to Tevfik Erdem, the situation that provides the basis for the process leading to the March 12 Memorandum was violent acts of left-wing youth groups (Erdem, 2019, p. 9). Feroz Ahmad also gave her opinion in this respect, but he stated that there was a change in the perception of "left-wing violence" in the mid-1970s. Feroz Ahmad, regarding the left-wing violence in early 1970, said that they hoped to light the fire of revolution by leading the workers to revolt with anti-capitalist actions (as they thought it occurred in June 1970), or with some anti-western actions such as kidnapping American soldiers or prominent figures (Ahmad, 2017, p. 194).

A coup attempt took place on March 9, 1971, just before the memorandum. From this point of view, Tevfik Erdem evaluated March 12 as the intervention of the chain of command that prevented the March 9 coup attempt. If we examine the 9 March 1971 coup attempt, it is considered to be weak compared to the 12 March memorandum. Representatives of officers identified as radical within the military attempted this initiative. It alleged that Muhsin Batur and Faruk Gürler juntas were associated with youth organizations. However, as Talat Aydemir stated (mentioned in the previous chapters), he contains its theory under the "coup attempt". To many, Doğan Avcıoğlu was the architect of the set of ideas underlying the 9 March 1971 initiative (Erdem, 2019, p. 9). Articles by Doğan Avcıoğlu and his friends had a

positive impact on Talat Aydemir and his friends on their organization in terms of ideas.

Apart from the junta structures within the military, organizations were also emerging in the civilian field. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the point of view of these groups was the same: to overthrow the Justice Party and ensure the continuity of the May 27 movement (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 210). Doğan Avcıoğlu started to write for the *Devrim Magazine,* after publishing the *Yön Magazine* in the early 1960s to provide the theoretical infrastructure. According to Barış Ertem's report, Doğan Avcıoğlu, like İlhan Selçuk, was defending the intervention of the rule of the military in his writings. The commanders, who were also affected by these left-wing intellectuals, gathered on March 9, 1971, to finalize the coup decision. However, the coup could not be carried out because Land Forces Commander Faruk Gürler gave up at the last minute (Ertem, 2018, p. 657). The military representative of this revolutionary theory was Cemal Madanoğlu, the Senator for the Quota. He was the head of "left-wing junta" which was one of the most assertive structures of the period (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 212).

Doğan Avcıoğlu stated that he was dissatisfied with how the revolutions took a back seat after the adoption of the parliamentary system. According to him, the parliament had put "Kemalist national revolutions" in the second plan and prepared the ground for the domination of conservative forces. This situation caused the liquidation of the revolutionary movements that were critically important for the well-being of Turkish society and the development of the country. On the other hand, Doğan Avcıoğlu continued by saying, "The Turkish military has always played a prominent role as a progressive power in our history for the last century." He referred to the question posed by this thesis as well, the role of the military as a natural

guardian of the regime (Avcıoğlu, 7 April 1970, p. 7). Koçak tells about, Avcıoğlu argued firmly that Kemalism, along with its past, was still valid in the 1970s, and it was correct (Koçak, 2017, p. 170). According to Cemil Koçak, what March 9 supporters and Doğan Avcıoğlu saw as a real problem was the issue of development of Turkey. To them, a non-capitalist approach had to be implemented. The aim, in this regard, was to separate Turkey from the imperialist bloc. As in the Kemalist perspective, the aim was to lean towards nationalization. Policies such as land reform, a planned development strategy were in consideration (Koçak, 2017, p. 172). From this point of view, the strategies aimed were similar to the systematic development plans of the Republic period.

Doğan Avcıoğlu was expressing his views on about May 27, 1960, answered the question that there could be an exemplary military coup attempt: "May 27th was a successful attempt. However, at that time, there was no 'accumulation of ideas' in society to carry out 'radical revolutions. In this respect, May 27 could do only that much. Whereas now there was an accumulation of ideas that could be attributed to the masses, which did not exist in the days before May 27." (Koçak, 2017, p. 173-174).

Doğan Avcıoğlu stated the following views in his article dated March 2, 1971, in Devrim newspaper: "It seems that the parliamentary system is coming to an end. Those in the rule of the country are incapable. The politicians were hopeless. The attempt is expected. In the conditions of Turkey, things could not be worse." Cemil Koçak relayed Doğan Avcıoğlu's words on the possibility of success of the March 9 coup attempt: "The appropriate and necessary defence against these dangers is openly using violence. Violence would prevail in the first phase of the revolution. The revolutionary government will use the following elements to put pressure on society if the need arises: legislation, police, organized intelligence services, propaganda,

military. The aim was not just to dismantle any organized political activity that the government could not contain, but to make all kinds of destructive and divisive acts illegal. Besides, laws should limit the duties and rights of citizens, and the government should have a sufficiently wide margin of judicial discretion." (Koçak, 2017, p. 174).

The coup attempt of March 9 was carried out based on these ideas which were based on a view they called "leftist Kemalism". Memduh Tağmaç, the Chief of Staff at the time, prevented the preparations for the coup attempt after the information provided by the National Intelligence Organization (Erdem, 2019, s. 9). However, the idea of the intervention was still alive. The military was openly discussing the possibility of a coup.

However, the main process was beginning. The military decided not to watch the process any longer. It was clear that the Demirel government going to lost control. Thus, the military did not want to wait any longer. Chief of General Staff Memduh Tağmaç had to accept the process in which Muhsin Batur's opinion prevailed. The summit held on 11 March 1971 was the summit where the final decision was taken (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 245). The four prominent generals of the military, the Chief of Staff Memduh Tağmaç and the Commanders of the Land, Navy, and the Air Forces, gave a memorandum to the presidents of the Assembly and Senate, and, especially, to the President Cevdet Sunay on March 12, 1971 (Ahmad, 2019, p. 142). The military intervened in politics after approximately 11 years. By 13:00, these four generals had decided on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces and took action. The memorandum consisted of three articles (Ertem, 2018, p. 658). Their demand, which led to the intervention, was to secure the constitution. At the same time, they wanted a reputable government that could implement the reforms. As can be understood from

here, the High Military Command forced Süleyman Demirel to resign. They even stated that if Demirel did not resign, they would seize power. According to Feroz Ahmad, this situation paved the way for anti-democratic measures due to the guarantees provided by the 1961 Constitution (Ahmad, 2017, p. 176). The aim here was to justify the intervention. With Feroz Ahmad's comment; the threat of the constitution threatened the foundation principals of the state guarded by the Armed Forces. (Ahmad, 2017, p. 9-10). One may attribute the accuracy of this comment to the behaviour of the Armed Forces from the very beginning. The reason was the military intervention idea put forward by the military as a general view to fill the administrative gap. The military was experienced in turning the existing threat situation in its favour.

As soon as the memorandum was received, the Council of Ministers convened extraordinarily. In the meeting, it was decided that the government should resign. At the same time, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel gave his resignation to President Cevdet Sunay (Ertem, 2018, p. 658). According to Sina Akşin, the coup was carried out with left-wing rhetoric. He that the coup was made against the left-wing. However, as a discourse, there was a point of view based on the emergence of left-wing discourse. Another critical point here was that the military intervention took place not with the coup attempt on March 9, but with the memorandum on March 12. Five generals, one admiral, and 35 colonels, who were described as the plotters of March 9, were removed from their posts (Akşin, 2019, p. 268). The idea of the intervention was a view that prevailed throughout the armed forces. However, the methodological differences among the juntas turned the process into an authority struggle within the military.

With the resignation of Süleyman Demirel, a problem arose for the commanders who gave the March 12 memorandum. They were uncertain in the face of the question of how to exercise their power. According to Feroz Ahmad, they thought that they would face similar problems that were experienced by the Greek junta movement, which took place in 1967. This situation kept the March 12 commanders from using the power directly. They also thought that opposition within the parliament would emerge against them. Likewise, in this context, an above-party government appeared as an option (Ahmad, 2017, p. 178). Therefore, differences of opinion between themselves would arise. To prevent this, they took an attitude far from closing the Assembly and political parties (Ertem, 2018, p. 659-660). According to Cemil Koçak, the characteristic of the new government was the technocrats. All necessary reforms were intended to be implemented quickly (Koçak, 2017, p. 191).

According to Barış Ertem, the military intervention of March 12, 1971, had a serious impact on the Justice Party, which was deposed from power. On the other hand, another party affected by this process was the Republican People's Party. Due to the opinions opposing the memorandum, there were differences of opinion within the party. Mostly, İsmet İnönü's positive attitude towards military intervention on March 12 was remarkable. However, the most apparent reaction within the party against this attitude came from the party's General Secretary, Bülent Ecevit. The most significant difference of opinion emerged with İsmet İnönü's announcement that he would send ministers to the newly established cabinet. Following İsmet İnönü's decision, Secretary-General Bülent Ecevit resigned from his position in the party. After his resignation, Ecevit entered into a consensus with the party members who supported him. With this newly found agreement, they opposed the decision of İsmet İnönü to send ministers to the newly formed cabinet. Against 76 votes in favour, 50 deputies

and senators from the Republican People's Party, including Ecevit, voted "no" for the motion on the authorization. Although Bülent Ecevit and his supporters lost the voting, there was now a new power centre within the Republican People's Party (Ertem, 2018, p. 660). Barış Ertem described the party as going to an extraordinary congress in an environment of division. İsmet İnönü had attempted to liquidate Ecevit and his team. Kemal Satır, one of the closest names to İsmet İnönü, was chosen to do it. Satır had collected a sufficient number of signatures (368) and submitted the relevant petitions to İsmet İnönü on April 16, 1972. Thus, the extraordinary congress process was entered (Ertem, 2018, p. 661).

In this environment, there was a search for a new figure who could coordinate all these processes and prepare the country for the upcoming period. As Feroz Ahmad noted, Prof. Nihat Erim, who called the 1961 Constitution "a condescension for Turkey", was considered as the ideal candidate for the role. Nihat Erim was being considered as a name, which both the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party would approve (Ahmad, 2019, p. 143). The general opinion was that the close ties Nihat Erim had with the Republican People's Party would lead him to be supported by the conservative group within the party. However, this caused significant issues in 1972.

According to Cemil Kocak, the government was seriously worn out in a short time. In this sense, it can be claimed that the magic of the command echelon of the March 12 junta ran out. Because of the attitude taken against the revolutionary left, the real purpose of the memorandum was revealed. There were devastating consequences for the revolutionary section of March 12. Those who thought that the military intervention had taken place and would continue with revolutionary expectations were mistaken. (Koçak, 2017, p. 192). During the two years after the

memorandum, all activities were brought under control. In April 1971, martial law was declared in 11 provinces. The martial law was extended by the Parliament every two months (Ahmad, 2017, p. 181). In 1973, martial law began to be lifted partially. Finally, it was lifted in Ankara and Istanbul. In September 1973, the martial law of the March 12 period ended (Koçak, 2017, p. 210).

According to Feroz Ahmad, the 12 March 1971 memorandum was not surprising for a significant part of Turkish society. But very few people could guess the rationale and course of the intervention. At first, many people thought that the March 12 military intervention was carried out by radical, reformist officers. The sub-text of the memorandum blamed Suleyman Demirel’s government what experienced an ideological fight in Turkey (Ahmad, 2019, p. 142). The overall way of the intervention created uncertainty about the process by which separatist groups would take over authority. In this sense, the liberal intellectuals of the country expected that the Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur, who supported the reforms of the 1961 Constitution, took the responsibility and authority. They demanded the existence of a "strong and prestigious" government in line with Atatürk's principles. The first thing to do was reestablishing law and order. With the declaration of the memorandum of March 12, a file was suited against the Workers Party of Turkey. It was the public prosecutor who opened the case. The reason was anti-constitutional acts such as communist propaganda and supporting the Kurdish separatists. Besides, prosecutors wanted the abolition of all youth organizations affiliated with the Turkey Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev-Genç) (Ahmad, 2017, p. 177).

Feroz Ahmad talked about the Nationalist Movement Party's youth organization, the Grey Wolves, which was encouraged by the state's activities in this process. This organization, seeing the situation arising from the actions of the state,

started to use violence against those whom they identified as "leftists". As in the city, they targeted teachers whom they saw as sympathizers of the Workers Party in villages or rural. These organizations oppressed the left as it tried to be suppressed by the memorandum. Demands to improve working conditions along with union militancy and higher wages were suspended as the leftists were silenced. Feroz Ahmad saw this as one of the short-term successes of the military regime. (Ahmad, 2017, p. 178).

On the other hand, important changes made to the constitution. With the constitutional draft enacted by the Assembly and approved by the Senate, 35 articles were amended. On the other hand, nine provisional laws were introduced. Their aim here was to influence the current political system and to prevent it from being affected by external factors. In Feroz Ahmad's view, the commanders were not sincere enough in their reformist calls. As he stated, General Faruk Gürler, who was the strongman of the junta, said the same on September 28, 1971. Ahmad said that the right-wing government would not realize the reforms that the commanders intended. This draft amendment to the Constitution failed to restore law and order. The failure due to this situation made the Military High Command an obligation to regulate the entire political field in the military intervention that would take place on September 12, 1980 (Ahmad, 2017, p. 182). In addition to the constitutional processes, de facto changes made to all institutions in the state and society. To this extent, the liberal constitution was shelved. With the definition of Nihat Erim, "the possibility of going back to the period before 12 March" was eliminated. The rightist view in the country was strict regarding the 1961 Constitution. In this direction, the intervention of March 12 removed the previous structure, which was costly for society and luxury for a country that wanted to move quickly towards capitalism (Ahmad, 2019, p. 144).

The reflections of constitutional changes had an impact on social life and trade unions. The "social state" understanding introduced with the 1961 Constitution aimed to protect the rights of workers. However, it was later thought that the rights given to the working class were disproportional to the level of development of the period. With the regulations made after the March 12 memorandum, the military tried to solve this problem in favour of the capital. Accordingly, the confidence of the bourgeois class grew in the 1960s. As a result of this process, to increase their political power, they established TUSIAD, the Turkish Industry, and Business Association, in 1971 (Ahmad, 2019, p. 133-134).

According to Feroz Ahmad's comments, changes and measures carried out in the constitution were not enough for Turkey. In the 1970s, the global economic recession and the increase in oil prices made it difficult to combat the economic crisis. Because in the ongoing processes, the occupation of Cyprus and the arms embargo imposed by the United States have further increased the current crisis (Ahmad, 2017, p. 22-23).

A year after the 12 March military intervention, many leftist and socialist organizations were destroyed. The martial law courts of March 12 consistently gave convictions. Two and a half months after the March 12 memorandum, the People's Liberation Army kidnapped and executed the Israeli Ambassador Ephraim Elrom (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 274). Shortly after the assassination, Mahir Cayan was captured wounded in armed conflict. Around the same period, guerillas of the People's Liberation Army were killed in armed conflict in Nurhak Mountains. Mahir Çayan and his friends were captured but managed to escape from military prison.

On the other hand, the death sentences of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Arslan and Hüseyin İnan were approved by the Supreme Court. Following the approvals, the

President signed the execution orders. The last team, led by Mahir Çayan, kidnapped three Englishmen from a British base in Sinop. They aimed to force the override of the death sentences for Deniz Gezmiş and his friends. However, they were killed in Kızıldere within a few days. (Koçak, 2017, p. 201-202). Tevfik Erdem interpreted these executions as follows: "Ten years ago, the May 27 coup resulted in the execution of three right-wing politicians. In the days following March 12, on May 6, 1972, there were three leftist students on the gallows: Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan, Yusuf Aslan. Executions from both the right and the left would take place on September 12, 1980, without delay." (Erdem, 2019, p. 9). According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the witch hunt started in May 1971. In the continuation of this operation, which was called the Sledgehammer, and involving intellectuals from all parts of the country, processes led up to the execution of Deniz Gezmiş and his friends. After 12 March 1971, the country was being put into a comprehensive control mechanism. Herein, it would not be wrong to say that it was the army that pulled the strings during the period.

In the days when Deniz Gezmiş and his friends were executed, the Republican People's Party was dealing with the power struggle that emerged from the division within. Those who thought that İsmet İnönü should hand over the leadership were in the majority. In the party's 5th Extraordinary Congress, the race between İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit resulted in the victory of the latter. İnönü left the leadership of the party that he headed for 34 years. Thus, the 12 March Memorandum had affected not only the leader of the Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel but also the former President of the Republican People's Party, İsmet İnönü. The reason why İsmet İnönü lost his position was his relatively positive approach towards the memorandum of March 12 (Ertem, 2018, p. 671).

The effects of March 12 on politics did not only affect political parties. Presidential elections would come next. The term of Cevdet Sunay was about to end and the elections for the new President would be held. Barış Ertem characterized this situation as a new crisis period between the military and civilian politicians. The main reason for this crisis was that the 12 Martists wanted to have Gen. Faruk Gürler, who was also the Chief of General Staff, as president, instead of Cevdet Sunay. Ertem said that Gürler would quit his role as the Chief of Staff to become a Senator of Quota, thus clearing his way for the presidency. Süleyman Demirel, who resigned from the government as a result of the March 12 Memorandum, declared that he was against the possibility of Faruk Gürler being elected President. According to Demirel, the President should be elected by the Grand National Assembly. According to Barış Ertem, the attitude of the Republican People's Party towards the Presidential election was not apparent until Faruk Gürler's official candidacy. However, the military tutelage perspective that caused Ecevit to react to İsmet İnönü continued during the candidacy period of Faruk Gürler (Ertem, 2018, p. 664-665).

Faruk Gürler's candidacy in the Presidential elections became official. However, it was seen that the political party leaders displayed similar attitudes after the announcement. According to Süleyman Demirel, saying that the Grand National Assembly would elect the President was not a fancy wording spoken to hide some things. Bülent Ecevit showed the same attitude in his statements. On the day that Faruk Gürler resigned from his position as Chief of Staff, Ecevit said that Republican People's Party would not step back (Arslan, 2019, p. 129). Candidates for the presidential election gradually emerged. The candidate of the Justice Party was Tekin Arıburun, the candidate of the soldiers was Faruk Gürler, and the candidate of the Democrat Party was Ferruh Bozbeyli. Tekin Arıburun, Faruk Gürler and Ferruh

Bozbeyli received 282, 175, and 45 votes respectively. Since the 2/3 majority vote could not be achieved in the round, the President could not be elected, and a second-round was to be held (TBMM, 1973, p. 147). However, since this majority of voters could not be achieved in the next four rounds, the Presidential election was not finalized. According to Barış Ertem, Faruk Gürler withdrew from the candidacy due to the stalemate of the elections. Justice Party candidate Tekin Arıburun did the same. Since the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party did not find a candidate to support jointly, the presidential election was not resolved for that period (Ertem, 2018, p. 666-667).

Negotiations for the presidential nomination started again in a short time. Meanwhile, the proposal for the election of the President directly by the people was made by Süleyman Demirel (Arslan, 2019, p. 128). This proposal by Demirel, who once said that the Assembly should elect the president, was remarkable but it was rejected. However, in the joint meeting, Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit agreed on the candidacy of the Quota Senator, retired Admiral Fahri Korutürk. According to Sina Akşin, Korutürk was independent of the parties for he was a genuine soldier. He was known as cosmopolitan and liberal. He was also a senator who opposed the establishment of State Security Courts. His candidacy was seen as an adverse response to the Armed Forces (Ahmad, 2019, p. 146). Thus, the 15th round of the Presidential election was held on April 6, 1973. Fahri Korutürk was elected as the 6th President by receiving 365 votes (TBMM, 1973, s. 224-225). According to Barış Ertem's interpretation, with the transition period of the March 12 memorandum government, the military and civilian political struggle continued. This one-month period, which also prolonged during the presidential election, resulted in the victory of a candidate who was supported by civilian politicians (Ertem, 2018, p. 668).

The Republican People's Party, which set out with its new president, would enter an election process. They had an opportunity to take advantage of the disadvantages of the military regime. According to Feroz Ahmad, the dissolution of the Workers Party on July 20, 1971, created an ideological vacuum. As a result, a serious number of voters started to gather around the new Republican People's Party, which had the social democratic view and led by Bülent Ecevit (Ahmad, 2017, p. 184). The Republican People's Party had taken steps to turn the crisis into an advantage. The "left view" could manifest itself due to the emerging political vacuum. This situation would be reflected in the 1973 elections.

The elections were held on October 13, 1973, and ended the regime of March 12. The Republican People's Party emerged victorious by getting 33.3% of all votes, while the Justice Party came second by receiving 29.2%. The National Salvation Party, which was established in place of the National Order Party, participated in this election and gained 48 seats in the parliament. Bülent Ecevit began to negotiate with the National Salvation Party regarding the possibility of a coalition (Ertem, 2018, p. 655). According to Sina Akşin, the Republican People's Party, known as the most Atatürkist party, and the National Salvation Party, a party known as Islamist, formed a coalition on January 26, 1974 (Akşin, 2019, p. 270). With the coalition taking office in February 1974, the March 12 period, which lasted for three and a half years, came to an end (Ertem, 2018, p. 671).

However, the coalition government led by Ecevit did not last long. Bülent Ecevit resigned from the government in September 1974, unable to endure the demands of the National Salvation Party and to enter early elections. However, he failed to find a new government partner. On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel could not secure the support of the Democrat Party, which prevented the establishment of a

right-wing coalition. However, Süleyman Demirel was able to solve this situation with a political move. He established a mixed government by adding to their ranks the nine deputies who decided to leave the Democrat Party.

According to Tuğçe Erdoğan, Celil Gürkan said that the Air Force Commander Muhsin Batur went to the U.S. alone before the memorandum. Batur was thought to have engaged in an American-backed military intervention due to the question asked by the Chief of the United States Air Force, General Ryan, "You soldiers, don't you think it is time to intervene?" According to the interpretation of Tuğçe Erdoğan, overthrowing of the elected government by the soldiers who believed to have the right to directly intervene in the parties, also affected the upcoming periods, and pushed Turkey into another stalemate, namely the coup of September 12, 1980 (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 111).

With the memorandum of March 12, 1971, Turkish political life was seriously shaken. This time, the army did not choose to intervene directly but opted to overthrow the current government with a memorandum. During the period from 27 May 1960 to 12 March 1971, the chaotic environment of the country has increased over time and this process has reached the top with the emergence of the youth movements. One can consider this situation as "chaotic or a reflection of the libertarian current in the world" It is very normal for Turkey to participate in this process in the libertarian/left-wing understanding of the period in which societies are in.

Although the high command did not involve in the process, two unsuccessful attempts by Talat Aydemir and his friends/group have taken place. Again, the 'natural protectors' preferred to act against the power of the advancing civil authority.

However, they were disturbed by the threat of a new 'Democrat Party' culture, with the coming of the Justice Party in the 1963 elections. Despite this, the army had set aside its role of the 'natural guardian' until March 12, 1971. According to the progress of the developments in civilian politics, the attitude of the army would also be evident in this respect. But as the civilian authority grew stronger, the military saw itself as left out of the process. A new understanding of the 'Democrat Party' was riveted with the strengthening of the rhetoric of the Justice Party. However, in the process leading up to 1971, the weakness of the administrative mechanisms of the Justice Party had dragged the country into a great depression. The ineffectiveness of the state institutions, the shortcomings of the political power in the decision-making processes and the chaotic environment in which the country is dragged has to be emphasized. It had prepared "the necessary ground for the army". The army once again intervened according to its "natural guardian" role and the legal support it received from the Internal Services Law. Not only the government but all other parties were affected to a certain extent by this process. March 12 was a front pillar of the September 12, 1980, coup. The army would not abandon the role of "guardians".

4.4 The Coup Of September 12, 1980

After the interim regime of 12 March 1971, left and right-wing violence had occurred in universities and other fields. This situation was not new. Similar situations occurred before and after March 12, even paving the way for the military's intervention in politics.

According to Feroz Ahmad, the generals were privileged in Turkish society and had particular interests in protecting the status quo. The sustainability of their

existence was not in the hands of a party or a leader. The continuity of the regime would determine their fate. To this extent, their concerns were stability and social peace. They could have had the intention to overthrow a government that could not maintain social order (Ahmad, 2017, p. 22).

On the other hand, the nature of the violence was different from the structure that emerged in the mid and late 1970s. In the 1970s, the left organized anti-capitalist uprisings and kidnappings of representatives with the capitalist mindset. New left understanding took advantage of the chaos and demoralization that existed in the mid-1970s. Taking advantage of this situation, it was aimed to transfer the perception of the law-and-order regime and its 'saviour' role to society. According to Feroz Ahmad, the best proof that this understanding is much more successful is September 12, 1980 (Ahmad, 2017, p. 194). It is necessary to support the view that the damage to the social order and political system of the country should be justified. At the same time, it is necessary to agree with Feroz Ahmad's view of the 1980 coup that took place within a thinking system that mostly opposed the leftist view.

Additionally, Mehmet Ali Birand talks about the unrest of the soldier in the process leading up to the 1980 coup. This situation started, especially with the Nationalist Front governments. It was predicted that the structure formed by the coalition of the Justice Party - the National Salvation Party - the Nationalist Action Party, which was the First Nationalist Front government in 1975, would make significant progress in domestic and foreign policy. The period of 1975-1977 did not go as expected and changed in a very different direction. Especially the first Nationalist Front, which Necmettin Erbakan was a part of, had a multi-vision and dispersed ruling style (Birand, 1984, p. 44). The failure to achieve the expected political stability laid the groundwork for military intervention. The military was

impatient to intervene in civilian politics since the commanders saw this as their responsibility. The coup of September 12, 1980, was a reflection of such attitude.

The problem of the Second Nationalist Front government, which was formed on June 5, 1977, and received a vote of confidence on August 3, 1977, was more remarkable. It was time for appointments in the military, and there were problems in the processes of the Navy and Land Forces. The replacement of the Chief of General Staff of the period, General Semih Sancar, would be determined. This person would be determined especially as a result of the appointment to the Land Forces Command. There were three candidates for the position: General Adnan Ersöz, General Fethi Esener, and General Şükrü Olcay. The candidate, the Second Nationalist Front government, wanted was General Fethi Esener. President Fahri Korutürk reacted harshly to the candidacy of Esener. The President described the situation as a coup in the military. Many rumours were raised about the appointment process. According to these, Adnan Ersöz was a supporter of the Republican People's Party and Fethi Esener had sympathy for the Justice Party. In this environment of chaos, Kenan Evren, newly appointed to the Aegean military, suddenly became the number one candidate. On the night of August 31, 1977, Evren was appointed as the Chief of Staff by the decree of the President (Birand, 1984, p. 47). President Fahri Korutürk, who wanted to prevent the politicization of the military, unwittingly made a move preparing the ground for the military's intervention in politics. With the appointment of General Kenan Evren, the military would begin to be more reactive to existing and potential political problems. It was obvious that September 12 would be. However, the role of the Universe, which is critical, accelerated the process of the coup. Especially according to Evren; There was a thought that intervention was essential for the political and social movements of the period and early action was a necessity in terms of timing.

According to Feroz Ahmad, the necessary mechanisms for crushing the dissidents in universities and factories were in place. The leftists in Turkey, in response to these changes, had gathered around the new leader of the Republican People's Party. The view of social democracy was slowly manifesting itself in the 1970s. Feroz Ahmad said that this ideology was partly responsible for the September 12, 1980 coup. According to Feroz Ahmad, another reason for September 12, 1980, military coup is political anarchy. In his view, the left anarchy before the 12 March 1971 coup was designed to trigger the revolution. The aim was to resurrect it (Ahmad, 2019, p. 146-148).

On the other hand, some events before September 12 would turn into a political campaign after September 12. If we look at Şerafettin Turan's comment, some criticisms made before the military intervention and about the Turkish language were remarkable. The right-wing, following the path of the Democrat Party and especially Süleyman Demirel, brought serious criticism to the policies regarding the purification of Turkish. This policy, which Şerafettin Turan defined as enrichment, also received criticism from the right-wing apart from the Justice Party (Turan, 2019, p. 424).

Sina Akşin stated that violence was increasing in the country towards the end of the 70s. Especially the violent incident in Kahramanmaraş on December 22, 1978, turned into a civil war as a result of the insufficient measures taken by the security forces. 109 people died, and 500 homes and workplaces were damaged during the attacks. Akşin evaluated these events as a Sunni-Alevi conflict rather than a right-left fight. Besides these events; right and left-wing police chiefs, prosecutors, professors, journalists and so on known individuals had encountered these violent incidents. They were either killed or subjected to violence (Akşin, 2019, p. 272). Increasing violence

was a sign of social disorder. Turkish society was heading towards a division in every sense. The military had begun to make preparations to use its authority given by the Internal Services Law.

The incidents, which started to increase after the events in Maraş, reached their peak in the middle of 1979. Now the number of people killed within a day reached 20. According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the murder and terror models used during the day changed and more than one person was targeted in the murders. A significant majority of the events were attributed to leftist groups, while it was alleged that the rightists carried out some violent cases to defend themselves. The state was too perplexed to take measures against these incidents (Birand, 1984, p. 75-76). It is necessary to say that the claim that the existence of left-wing terrorism was responsible for all the political murders of the period is meaningless. But one should not overlook the fact that this situation paved the way for the serious transformations in politics.

The first clear warning of the Chief of Staff Kenan Evren took place on March 3, 1979. Evren, in the chaotic environment they were in, said in the comments of the government and the opposition "Internal and external forces work almost hand in hand. I want you to know very well that nobody can divide this country. You may try as you want." President Fahri Korutürk was suspicious of this statement and worried about military intervention. He even told reporters, "The Armed Forces should be out of politics." (Birand, 1984, p. 108-109).

According to Mehmet Ali Birand, the military wanted to oust Ecevit from the Republican People's Party. The aim of the Grand Congress to be held on May 24-26, 1979 was to take the general presidency away from Bülent Ecevit. For this, the military wanted to penetrate the people who were active in the congress. For this, he made Party General Secretary Orhan Eyüboğlu an intermediary. Eyüboğlu started to

express his opinion that he was going badly. However, that was not the case. Bülent Ecevit was victorious in the Grand Congress. With this incident, the Armed Forces indirectly intervened in politics but did not get any results (Birand, 1984, p. 116). The military failed in its attempt to control the political sphere.

As of December 1979, there was restlessness within the military. According to Feroz Ahmad, the generals had begun to discuss the time and context of the next intervention. The first aim was to warn the politician since they found it easier to demanding them to establish the order and get everything right. According to Ahmad, if the military wanted to prevent extremism and bloodshed, they would have intervened long before September 12, 1980. Because the violence increasingly continued after 1974. At the same time, there were other concerns, such as the developments in Iran and the second Cold War environment (Ahmad, 2019, p. 154). In addition to agreeing with Feroz Ahmad's view; the aim was to adapt the political system and constitutional change to the conditions of the current economic sectors. The aim was to establish a nationwide political understanding beyond human life, and this understanding was not "Kemalism".

According to Şerafettin Turan, the first reason for the 12 September 1980 military intervention was economic difficulties. With the establishment of the new cabinet, Süleyman Demirel would leave the economy to a name that would become very familiar after September 12. In December 1979, he appointed Turgut Özal, who had known him well since 1950 and whom he knew from Istanbul Technical University to the head of the Undersecretariat of Prime Minister and Undersecretariat of State Planning. The steering wheel of the economy was handed to Turgut Özal. In this process, it was said in the propaganda of the Demirel government that the economic order would be established and improved. Accordingly, the economic

package later defined as "January 24 Decisions" was announced on January 24, 1980. In this economic package, the following decisions were taken: 1. Encouraging exports, 2. Freeing interests and prices, 3. Taking every measure to attract foreign capital, 4. Re-determining exchange rates every day, 5. Acting in moderation, both in wage increases and supporting agricultural products. Due to the effects of these economic policies, there was a significant increase in fertilizer, paper, fuel, electricity, and transportation costs (Turan, 2019, p. 426-427). However, the Turkish Lira lost value against the dollar and was devaluated from 40TL to 70TL. For the success of the stabilization package, workers' wages had not to be increased. However, according to Sina Akşin, this was difficult to do in multi-party democracy (Akşin, 2019, p. 272). On the other hand, the decline in living standards and economic difficulties caused serious reactions in society. Opposition parties also focused on economic problems. Republican People's Party Chairman Bülent Ecevit expressed his criticism about the process. Turgut Özal, who was the architect of the January 24 decisions, aimed to get the support of the Armed Forces with the briefings they gave, especially Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and high-ranking commanders (Turan, 2019, p. 426-428). There was a situation that was overlooked by the government, which saw Turgut Özal's move economically beneficial and thought that it would come to a straight line thanks to the solution policies implemented. Meanwhile, the military was considering the intervention in a precise way. Chief of Staff Kenan Evren was openly expressing that he was considering military intervention (Birand, 1984, p. 203).

The coup was loudly approaching. The negativities occurred during the process of Süleyman Demirel being too active in the appointment process of the Land Forces Command in 1977 and trying to position his close names. These negativities

would manifest themselves after the minority government received a vote of confidence. 36 days after the minority government received a vote of confidence, the Armed Forces sent a letter to the President. This letter, which was received by President Fahri Korutürk on December 27, 1979, resembled a memorandum, although unlike that of March 12, 1971, according to Şerafettin Turan's interpretation. The letter was full of complaints. The commanders wanted an end to anarchy in the country. Otherwise, they said that they would do what was necessary. However, the majority of the politicians had said that this letter was not noteworthy and not relevant to them. They ignored the incident with contempt. Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the main opposition party, did not think that the letter was addressed to him since they did not have a say in the decision-making processes. The letter was left unclaimed (Turan, 2019, p. 428-430). The letter had an addressee. They had taken the letter on all the segments they had to deal with. Physically, however, the letter remained in the middle.

Fahri Korutürk's term in the office expired on April 6, 1980. The presidential election was held but no result was achieved. According to the Constitution, the President of the Senate of the Republic, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, from the Justice Party, took over the office as the deputy. This process lasted five more months due to the political parties' failure to compromise. As a twist of fate, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil was the acting President during the coup of September 12, 1980 (Turan, 2019, p. 433). According to Sina Akşin, the failure to conclude the presidential election turned into a complete disgrace. The inability of the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party to decide on a suitable candidate put the process in a deadlock. On the other hand, this was not a problem for the Justice Party because the acting President was one of their ranks (Akşin, 2019, s. 273). Political ambitions, extended to obtain

the Presidency. However, the President was the representative of the Turkish people, and it could not be attributed to any political party. Therefore, one of the greatest proofs of corruption was this power struggle for the presidency.

In April 1980, the military's idea to intervene in politics was clear. During the National Sovereignty and Children's Day celebrated on April 23, 1980, General Kenan Evren said "The situation is not good at all! Nothing has been taken care of. I think we will eventually have to intervene in this. During our meetings with the Force Commanders, I concluded that it would be appropriate to wait for the next week. If the situation continues this way, and the parties are still in such a lack of understanding, there is no other way than intervention." These words were an indication that the military had no tolerance for the current political process. However, on 17 June 1980, the National Security Council and the entire command line that participated in the extended martial law meetings convened. For the action to take place, the ideas were solidified (Birand, 1984, p. 209). As a result of the plan made within this framework, the date of July 11, 1980, was determined for military intervention. However, the operation was postponed after the Demirel government received a vote of confidence from the parliament. Kenan Evren explained the withdrawal of the "Bayrak" plan with the following words: "The government received a vote of confidence. So, we said we are doing a coup against a government that has received a vote of confidence. We cannot explain this to anyone." (Turan, 2019, p. 436-438).

In July 1980, interest rates were freed. Following this, a lot of bankers emerged who wanted to withdraw money at high interest rates. According to Sina Akşin, interest rates were so high that a particular segment of the society, who did not expect such a rise, sold their assets and real estate and gave them to bankers.

However, towards mid-1982, this structure collapsed, and people became impoverished (Akşin, 2019, s. 285-286).

Meanwhile, internal turmoil in the country continued. The government's vote of confidence did not reduce the political tension in the country. On the contrary, violence was increasing day by day. Solution proposals in the parliament and commissions could not be finalized. In this case, the General Staff sent a list of 18 points to the Prime Ministry on August 5, 1980. There were many issues in the list of recommendations, from violence to the economy, from public services to security. However, this letter of the General Staff was not a recommendation but a task because a deadline was set for the letter to be answered by the Prime Ministry. Until August 25, 1980, the General Staff was waiting for an answer. However, the letter remained unanswered. Because, according to Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, the proposals in the letter could not have been realized in such a short time. That was sufficient to provide a basis for the military's intervention in politics (Turan, 2019, p. 439-440). This letter was more than a warning, it was a harbinger of a military intervention that would come in the continuation of the solution plans that could not be realized. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was helpless and could not find a ground to defend himself in the face of the upcoming military intervention.

Final preparations were made for military intervention and the command was awaited for action. According to Şerafettin Turan, the meeting held at the General Staff on August 26, 1980, was clear evidence of this. At this meeting, what to do before and after the intervention was planned. Closing the Parliament, planning who will be the Head of State, etc. issues were discussed at this meeting. The meeting reports were signed by 6 generals. The statement made by General Kenan Evren on August 30, 1980, Victory Day was the harbinger of the coup. Finally, the intervention

date had to be determined. Election rounds for the Presidency were ongoing. The General Staff called all military and corps commanders to a meeting to spread the idea of intervention. At the meeting, it was decided that the military intervention would be carried out per the chain of command. The date set for military intervention was September 12, 1980. The operation would start at 04:00 (Turan, 2019, p. 442-443).

Before the military intervention took place, the press and broadcasting business was in a normal course. In any way, measures were taken against any situation that would disrupt the possible flow and provide awareness regarding the operation. The 'Bayrak' plan was operational. The Republican People's Party party building was surrounded by a squad soldier. Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the Republican People's Party, learned this information over the phone at his home. Ecevit called the General Staff and received confirmation that the military intervention had taken place. At the same time, Süleyman Demirel was complaining about the military intervention while arguing that sovereignty should belong to the nation (Birand, 1984, p. 285).

In the early hours (at 04:00) of September 12, 1980, the Turkish Armed Forces intervened in politics under the leadership of Chief of Staff Kenan Evren. Within the scope of the intervention, it was decided to close the party headquarters, as well as to take the party leaders under custody. The immunity of the deputies was lifted. All departures abroad were banned. The Head of TRT News Department Doğan Kasaroğlu was informed of the military intervention a day before. However, not to attract attention, publications were made on the ongoing agenda topics. In the early morning of September 12, the coup was declared from all the radio and TV broadcasts in Turkey via the famous letter read by Kenan Evren.

According to Kemal Karpat, the September 12 coup was planned very well. Necessary precautions had been taken for any reaction that might occur within the military. The military remained tied to the chain of command and hierarchy. Kemal Karpat also mentions that the military wanted the coup to be embraced by the people. The primary purpose was to legitimize the military intervention. At the same time, it created a "real national unity longing" in the opinion of the people with the decrease of trust in the politicians of the period and the increase in partisanship. The military had used this longing to its advantage. Establishing civilian support was the key to the success of the military intervention (Karpat, 2012, p. 210). According to Şerafettin Turan, the military intervention of September 12, 1980, like the military intervention on May 27, 1960, was based on the Internal Services Act. This basis was emphasized in the letter written by Kenan Evren as the President of the National Security Council. According to Şerafettin Turan, the military intervention was different from the 12 March Memorandum form the aspect of the closure of the Assembly. It had similarities to the intervention of 27 May 1960. Promises such as the elimination of terrorism and clearing the way for democracy were made to legitimize the military intervention in the eyes of the people (Turan, 2019, p. 445).

According to Cengiz Sunay, the September 12 coup did not arise due to an existing deficiency. The traditional institutional identity of the army stemming from the Turkish modernization movement had changed in the republican period. September 12, 1980 coup was one aspect of this change (Sunay, 2010, p. 7).

According to Feroz Ahmad, only a handful of people in Turkey knew the real motivations of the generals who carried out the coup. During this period, the generals said that they carried out the coup to save the state and citizens from social segregation, economic collapse, and violence caused by political parties and

politicians. Besides, they said the state would be neutral. In this context, the National Security Council, which included the prominent commanders, was established under the chairmanship of Kenan Evren (Ahmad, 2019, p. 154). Apart from General Kenan Evren, other members of the National Security Council were Land Forces Commander General Nurettin Ersin, Air Force Commander General Tahsin Şahinkaya, Naval Forces Commander Admiral Nejat Tümer, Gendarmerie General Commander Sedat Celasun (Akşin, 2019, p. 275).

According to Kemal Karpat says that the common point of the three coups is to protect secularism, as there have been great changes in the issues of secularism and religion. In addition, the main purpose of September 12, was not out of respect and trust in democracy and political parties. It was because the military wanted to provide him with a civilian base of support. If we look at Kemal Karpat's critique of the political situation in Turkey, the main discussion was not about ideologies and principles, but on 'balances and calculations'. In this respect, the aim of achieving the country's prosperity is less important than the maintenance of political balances (Karpat, 2012, p. 211).

On October 11, 1980, the detention of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit ended. However, with the signature of the Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Haydar Saltık, they were given new instructions. Accordingly, the leaders of the political parties under surveillance should inform the authorities of their political activities and their travel status. That situation did not apply to Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan, who were staying in Uzunada, because they were still in detention (Turan, 2019, p. 450-451).

The National Security Council was on the top of the iceberg. In this case, the martial law commanders had the power a huge impact but that was overlooked.

According to Feroz Ahmad, they were in favour of harsh measures for the re-establishment of law and order. One of them was Necdet Üruğ, Commander of the First Military, and Martial Law. The conflicts within the command echelon were not well known. Due to the disagreements that occurred in the period, the existence of two groups was accepted, which the ‘extremists’ and the ‘moderates’. The 'moderates' group demanded a political regime that was not in favour of harshness. They argued that power should be handed back to civilians as soon as possible. They also sought alliance and agreement with the second-class (inferior) politicians of the old parties. On the other hand, there was a group of extremists who wanted to eliminate the old politicians, reestablish the whole political structure and retain power. They even aimed to enter the elections by establishing their political party. According to Feroz Ahmad, the primary purpose here was to destroy the liberal regime introduced by the 1961 Constitution. Ahmad argued that Kenan Evren acted as a mediator and avoided the image of a strong man. Among the factions, the extremists had won the debate (Ahmad, 2017, p. 215).

On the other hand, according to Feroz Ahmad, the generals decided to support Kemalism by remaining loyal to the republican ideals. The citizens, on the other hand, were overwhelmed by the deterioration of law and order, the increase in inflation and the shortage of essential consumer goods, political conflicts, and the inefficient parliament structure. Therefore, they welcomed the martial law policies and the promise of stability (Ahmad, 2017, p. 215). When looking at it, there was a very important segment in the society who were against the 1980 coup. If evaluate based on the acceptance rate of the 1982 constitution (91.37%), it can be considered to be a satisfaction. However, the current situation; should be evaluated according to the political and social structure of the period. The current agenda of the generals was

soon described as counter-revolution. Another aim was to create an attitude that was the opposite of the political and socio-economic benefits provided since the 1960s. For this purpose, the National Security Council suspended the constitution, all professional organizations, and trade union confederations.

Additionally, all political parties were closed on October 16, 1981, and their assets were transferred to the Treasury (Akşin, 2019, p. 275). After the closure of the political parties, new parties were established to benefit from the political vacuum. They would act within the limits set by the 1980 military intervention. In this context, one may argue that the military intervention of 1980 still has its shadow on today's politics.

The National Security Council passed 268 laws by the end of 1981. 51 of these were new laws, and the remaining 217 were amendments (Akşin, 2019, p. 275). Thus, the third blow would occur. According to Feroz Ahmad, the September 12 coup was more radical and radical than the 27 May. The power and the parliament were seized. The military did not hesitate to use its right to intervene to ensure stability and eliminate political gaps.

Süleyman Demirel faced a similar situation during the March 12, 1971 memorandum. At that time, the military wanted Süleyman Demirel to resign. He found himself in the same situation with the coup of September 12, 1980. The justification was no different from the previous ones. The military seized power by assuming that the political, social, and economic order was deteriorating, the government was incompetent, and violence was spreading. According to Feroz Ahmad; Süleyman Demirel lost control in both military interventions and endangered the regime. The military justified its right to intervene for these reasons. (Ahmad, 2017, p. 9-10). Suleyman Demirel said about September 12, he would express his

uneasiness about the military intervention to maintain public order. Although not directly, it implied that the environment of anarchy and turmoil experienced before September 12 was a justification for the coup and that it might have been "planned". Sina Akşin argued that the ideological side of the September 12 order should be examined (Akşin, 2019, p. 279). Süleyman Demirel did not believe in the idea that military intervention would be carried out at all, even though he was experienced in this regard. In the process leading up to the 1980 military intervention, he thought the military would be more unifying and understanding. He thought that a possible intervention would not target him (Birand, 1984, p. 200).

Another aim of the generals was the political restructuring of the country. State institutions were also included in this process. The reason for this was the concern of the potential emergence of the junta movements. Meanwhile, they wanted to prevent urban youth from being active in politics. According to Feroz Ahmad, the focus was the left-wingers and the revolutionary groups (Ahmad, 2017, p. 218). Especially unions and non-governmental organizations should be eliminated. DİSK and MİSK were closed and some of their members were convicted.

The format called as "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" was accepted for the suppression of the leftists. Kenan Evren and his friends, with the backing of the United States, said that the best method in the fight against communism was Islam. Evren always said that he was devoted to Kemalism, but when he appeared before the public, he was not afraid of religious emphasis. It was also ordered to teach "Atatürk's Principles and History of Revolution" in universities. Sina Akşin says that practices such as compulsory religious education, building mosques in Alevi villages, and especially choosing all the staff of newly established universities from and religious sects were the products of this effort (Akşin, 2019, p. 279). In addition, According to

Feroz Ahmad, the defence of a group known as the "Aydınlar Ocağı" did not prevent it from being suppressed (Ahmad, 2017, p. 218). The main task here was to fight terrorism. In this context, thousands of arrests and detentions took place. Torture was widespread and systematic (Ahmad, 2019, p. 154).

According to Şerafettin Turan, the 12 September 1980 military intervention hurt Kemalism. It was noteworthy that, under the name of contributing to Kemalism, the institutions established by Atatürk were closed one by one. The generals aimed to remove freedoms altogether (Turan, 2019, p. 453).

According to Sina Akşin, the right-wing in Turkey did not contribute much to democracy. They opposed the March 12 and September 12 coup processes only in appearance. However, they welcomed the authority provided by these coup processes. For example, Alparslan Türkeş and his teammates, who were detained for four and a half years after September 12, reportedly said, 'We are in prison, but our thoughts are in power.' (Akşin, 2019, p. 277-278). If we look at this interpretation of Sina Akşin, it may be necessary to think that the military intervention in 1980 was carried out with right-wing jargon and ideology.

According to Feroz Ahmad, one of the main tasks of the military order in the 1980s was economic development towards international market forces and globalization. The regime wanted to pay lower wages to workers to make the Republic of Turkey more productive and competitive. (Ahmad, 2019, p. 146). One of the authoritarian aspects was the Associations Law. The functioning of the associations has been made difficult. According to Sina Akşin, associations were bound by strict and detailed rules, and excesses were punished. The fact that this process was under the control of the police caused problems. It was a law that made people and institutions who wanted to become an association think again. Sina Akşin

says that the anti-democratic methods of September 12 are still valid and cannot be overcome (Akşin, 2019, p. 277). According to Feroz Ahmad's report, 47,319 of the 51,000 workers on strike were affiliated with the Revolutionary Workers Union Confederation in September 1980. On the other hand, people who were supposed to be partisans among mayors and governors were dismissed. Instead of them, the relevant authorities, officer cadres were brought. The country was blockaded by the military (Ahmad, 2017, p. 216).

Meanwhile, mixed reactions were received from abroad on September 12th. It was especially noteworthy that the United States of America viewed the coup process positively. Mehmet Ali Birand said that the U.S. was defending the necessity of military intervention in Turkey since the beginning of 1979 (Birand, 1984, p. 193). According to the report of Sina Akşin; the presence of Tahsin Şahinkaya who the Commander of the Air Force of the time, was in the United States the day before the coup, made us think that it was directly related to the incident. The reaction from the European countries was the opposite of this. The European Council brought some restrictions to Turkey (Akşin, 2019, p. 279-280).

The National Security Council had established a new order. Arrests and trials were ongoing, and people were accustomed to that in the 1980s. To preserve this order, an Advisory Board was established in October 1981 to start work on the new constitution (Ahmad, 2017, p. 219). The National Security Council appointed the members of the Board, but as the name suggested, the board would only provide consultancy. Members would consist of 160 academicians who were not affiliated with a political party. Orhan Aldıkaçtı, a professor from İstanbul University Faculty of Law, played an essential role in the process of drafting the new constitution. Meanwhile, the law that cleared the way for dissolving political parties and

confiscating their assets was passed. The president obtained many powers, especially regarding the judiciary, higher education, and the military. (Akşin, 2019, p. 276).

In November 1981, the Higher Education Law was passed. According to Feroz Ahmad, the essential purpose of the law was to dismiss all teaching staff who were of the centre-left view. Liberal lecturers were dismissed by Law No. 1402. Educational institutions became the ideological guardians of September 12. People of "Nationalist-conservative" would be effective in directing educational institutions. Universities had to be purged of politics (Ahmad, 2017, p. 219). According to Sina Akşin, a heavy blow was dealt with the administrative autonomy of universities with the establishment of the Council of Higher Education. Public universities were affiliated with the Council of Higher Education. Seven of its members would be elected by the President, seven by the Council of Ministers, seven by the Interuniversity Council, and one by the General Staff. The President of the Republic would elect the president of the Council of Higher Education. Sina Akşin defined the president of the Council as a highly authorized 'super rector'. Criticizing the election and appointment methods of the members of the Council of Higher Education, Sina Akşin says that village headmen were chosen by the villagers and apartment managers by the landlords. In this case, he states that the most knowledgeable and scientists of the country suffer a loss of rights (Akşin, 2019, p. 276-277).

On the other hand, the second institution that will prepare the constitution and make laws was the Constituent Assembly, which was created with the law passed on June 29, 1981. It aimed to overhaul the legal system entirely and to initiate a period of strict democracy under military tutelage. The objective was to end the chaos. This situation has also formed the basis of previous military interventions. However,

compared to previous periods, the results of September 12 were more effective (Akşin, 2019, p. 276).

In January 1982, the National Security Council announced the calendar of Turkey's return to civilian politics. The first step was the amendment of the draft constitution and its presentation to the public through a referendum. After the adoption of the Constitution, new laws regarding political parties and election processes would be enacted. As a result of the enactment of laws, it was aimed to hold general elections towards the end of 1983. A meeting was held at the Presidency on 17 July 1981 for the draft new constitution. The announced constitutional draft made the Presidency very strong. For instance, the President had the power to dissolve the parliament. On the other hand, with the decrees to be issued, he would be able to rule the country. He could directly appoint members of the Constitutional Court. With the new laws and provisions to be enacted, unions and associations could be taken under control. According to Feroz Ahmad, the new constitution meant "democracy without freedom". The President increased her powers with the veto power over the law and constitutional changes on October 19. These changes were followed by powers such as the appointment of military judges and high-ranking officials, the Chief of General Staff, calling for a National Security Council meeting, and leading it (Ahmad, 2019, p. 160-161). Publicity and discussion of the new constitution enabled politics to become active again. However, the opening of the new constitution to discussion and the focus of criticism caused the government to worry. As a result of this situation, the leaders of the parties that were closed on February 12 were banned from participating in the constitutional debates.

On the other hand, 44 members of the Peace Association were arrested just to intimidate. As reported by Feroz Ahmad, a British journalist in Ankara, described the

arrest as "a war against intellectuals". Besides, former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was detained, tried, and consequently imprisoned. This incident further increased the political tension in the country. Kenan Evren warned by saying that Turkey was in a period of transitioning to democracy, and this was the last chance for the country (Ahmad, 2017, p. 219-220).

In such an environment, Turkey went to the polls on November 7, 1982, to vote for the new constitution. The 1982 Constitution, which was accepted with a 91.37% 'yes' vote against the 8.63% 'no' vote, entered into force on 9 November 1982. In Feroz Ahmad's view, the junta's excessive insistence and warnings forced the Turkish citizens to say yes to the 1982 Constitution. But in a short time; it was the constitutional articles that unified those who approved Kenan Evren and the constitution and prevented the political work of the former politicians. Criticisms worried the National Security Council. For this reason, it prohibited criticism of Kenan Evren's comments on the constitution. According to Feroz Ahmad's comment; The National Security Council described Kenan Evren's speeches as "enlightening and informing the public about the nature of the document" (Ahmad, 2017, p. 230).

On the other hand, according to Feroz Ahmad, voters who voted on the 1982 constitution knew that if they did not accept the constitution, the military rule would postpone the so-called "transition to democracy". The generals did not expect the 91.37% yes vote since the 1961 Constitution received a 62% affirmative vote (Ahmad, 2017, p. 222). In my view, even voting rates need a distinction in terms of the democratic criterion of military intervention. Military intervention is a method that damages democracy, but constitutional voting established a democratic approach even among military interventions. Voting ratios varying under the understanding of the democracy of the military give an idea about how "democratic" the environment is.

At the same time, with the referendum, on November 9, 1982, the President of the Republic was elected in addition to the constitution. The victory of Kenan Evren, who took the office of President, was considered his success. Kenan Evren, who thought that he was loved as much as Atatürk, became the 7th President of Turkey (Ahmad, 2019, p. 161-162). According to Feroz Ahmad, the results of the constitutional referendum increased the self-confidence of the generals and civilian supporters. According to them, new political forces would emerge to replace the old ones. The new laws would keep all members of the 1980 parliament away from all political activities for five years and political party leaders for ten years. However, it was challenging to bring an understanding of "new and clean politics". President Kenan Evren announced on November 12, 1982, that the new elections would be held in October 1983. Thus, the process of legitimizing the constitution formed by the military order became official. Next was the formation of parties loyal to them that would represent the September 12 mentality (Ahmad, 2017, p. 222).

According to Sina Akşin, propaganda in favour of the 1982 Constitution was allowed. President Kenan Evren was already at the head of this propaganda process. Because the existing constitution had to be adopted and formalized by the people. The coup of September 12 preserved some of the institutions established by the 1961 Constitution. These were the Constitutional Court, High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, State Planning Organization. However, according to Sina Akşin, the referendum for the 1982 Constitution was carried out using anti-democratic methods. Voters who did not participate in the election were threatened. Citizens who do not participate in the voting were told that they would be denied the right to vote and be elected for 5 years. When evaluated in this context, the 91% 'yes' vote for the 1982 Constitution should be considered normal. Sina Akşin claims that this percentage of

votes was given to get rid of the Kenan Evren (Akşin, 2019, p. 278). According to Ismail Safi, Kenan Evren's actions to get the constitution accepted was more like a politician than a soldier. He toured around the country to obtain support for the Constitution and forced the society to vote. Kenan Evren's presidency was legitimized in this way (Safi, 2019, p. 152).

After the Constitution was adopted, the aim was to establish a party close to the understanding brought by September 12. A politician was sought who could be close and loyal to this philosophy. The "Nationalist Democracy Party" was established. Turgut Sunalp was appointed as the head of the party. According to Feroz Ahmad's comment with the introduction of Turgut Sunalp, those in favour of toughness among the generals were victorious (Ahmad, 2019, p. 162).

Now it was necessary to begin the new political process. Therefore, the new political parties law came into effect on April 24, 1983. Specific changes were made with the new law. New parties to be established had to have at least 30 members (Ahmad, 2017, p. 222). The National Security Council immediately lifted the political ban. However, the pressure on the politicians continued. The National Security Council could veto new politicians for any reason. According to Feroz Ahmad, the new parties would have to see the "September 12 conception" as a legacy. With Article 97, parties were forced to accept the existing understanding. At the same time, parties were shaped ideologically with the new political life (Ahmad, 2019, p. 162).

A threshold of 10 % was imposed to prevent an increase in the number of parties in the parliament. The party that failed to pass the threshold in the elections would be out of parliament. With a small number of voting potential, some parties lost their right to be represented in the parliament. On the other hand, the new parties faced specific difficulties. Thus, three parties could participate in the general elections

on November 6, 1983: The Motherland Party headed by Turgut Özal, the Populist Party headed by Necdet Calp, and the Nationalist Democracy Party, also known as the 'state party', led by Turgut Sunalp. According to Sina Akşin, the leaders of these three parties could be considered close to the military regime (Akşin, 2019, p. 280-281). In the constitutional referendum, I said how much the democratic environment was not felt. However, this situation had changed slightly in the general elections.

Before entering the elections, the most prominent person among the leaders was Turgut Özal. This situation was because he had an image of a liberal, anti-state, anti-bureaucratic style. It was also his promise that he would return to civilian rule as soon as possible. This is why Turgut Özal was ahead in public opinion polls. The generals found the solution to this problem in attacking Turgut Özal. However, this situation attracted even more attention and reaction from the public (Ahmad, 2017, p. 224).

In such an environment, the first election after September 12 was realized and the results were distressing for the generals. Because of the open support given, the Nationalist Democracy Party became the third party, taking 23.27% of the votes. The Populist Party became the second party with 30.46% of the total votes. The Motherland Party, headed by Turgut Özal, won the election with 45.14% of the total votes. Due to the penalty of 10.000 TL imposed on the citizens who did not participate in the election, the turnout was 92.3 %. According to Feroz Ahmad, the Motherland Party's winning this election did not legitimize the party. Because the two 'real' parties, the Social Democracy Party and the Grand Turkey Party, whose participation was banned and could not participate in the elections. Therefore, the next year's local election would be an opportunity for the Motherland Party to prove itself (Ahmad, 2019, p. 163).

After taking power with the 1980 military intervention, the generals faced an issue that persists today. Kurdish question, as well as being an issue today, was also an issue in the 1980s. The whole country was under martial law after the coup, yet although it was lifted in other provinces, martial law continued to be in effect in the Eastern provinces. At first, those who had a say in the administration thought that the Kurdish resistance could be solved by military means. For them, it was not a significant internal problem.

If taking a look at the figures that came out with the military intervention of September 12, 1980, more than 230,000 people were tried in the military court. In these trials, 517 people were sentenced to death. Fourteen thousand people were lost of citizenship. One hundred seventy-one people died from torture during the interrogations. The number of people who suffered financial damage and were deemed "unreliable" thus dismissed without loss of life is 30,000. More than 1,000,000 people have been blacklisted. A total of 98,404 people were tried for ideological crimes, regardless of their opinion. The curfew and martial law were implemented in the period that started with the 1980 coup and continued until 1983 (Çetin Y., 2006, p. 97).

According to Feroz Ahmad, the perception of the military in the eyes of civilians had changed with the military intervention of September 12, 1980. The military was no longer an institution that corrected political or civil disorders. The long-term presence of the National Security Council in power between 1980 and 1983 and the Presidential Advisory Council between 1983-1989 was cited as evidence of this situation. Political debates in the 1980s caused criticism of the existing policies of the military. The regime’s encouragement of Islam against the left and its practices contradicted the principles of Kemalism. The other part that Feroz Ahmad drew

attention to was the understanding of equality. Pashas of the period abandoned this very popular look seen in peasant societies. What was important was a structure that encouraged wealth. The country's intellectuals; did not see the military as a corrector of civilian defects (corruption, political inefficiency, etc.). On the other hand, the questioning of the 1961 Constitution by the military regime set the ground for the country's intellectuals to question the 1971 and 1980 military interventions. The libertarian mentality of 1960 was replaced by autocracy. It was a regressive political structure rather than a progressive one (Ahmad, 2017, p. 250-251).

According to Ismail Safi, September 12 was a serious turning point in Turkish political life. It was the first time that the Turkish Armed Forces intervened in politics as a whole (chain of command). If a comparison is made with the March 12 Memorandum, the method of direct intervention was used. There was no physical resistance. According to Ismail Safi, it is necessary to look at the problems of the social, economic, cultural and political chaos of the 1970s to see the situations that caused the 12 September to occur. The division in Turkish political life had spread to politics and therefore to society. It formed the process leading to the 1980 military intervention. At the same time, the economic difficulties had prepared the ground for the process to turn into chaos. In this sense, the economic loss arising from Turkey's 1980 military intervention, is said to be close to 50.4 billion dollars. (Safi, 2019, p. 151-152). The pains of the process created by September 12 were not completed with the process in the 1980s. Similar pains continued based on the political and sociological problems experienced throughout the country today.

According to Davut Dursun; a sufficient number of processes have come to the fore for the reasons that constitute the background of September 12 to occur. (the fragmentation that dominated the Turkish political life in the seventies, the lack of

cooperation and dialogue between the parties, the pressures created by the social and economic developments on the political system and the searches caused by the unmet demands, the political institutions that could not solve problems, inability to evaluate the importance of the regional security problems observed in the international arena for the world system etc.) (Dursun, 2019, p. 7).

According to İsmail Safi, the 1980 coup was carried out on strong grounds such as internal turmoil, terrorist incidents rendering the country uninhabitable, political instability reaching its peak - not being able to elect a president after 115 tours of election is an example - economic crisis, etc. The September 12, 1980 coup is the source of many of the executions, arrests, tortures, and practices that enabled participation in terrorist organizations. With the decisions taken on January 24, 1980, import substitution policies would be replaced by liberal economic policies, but the need for strong governments to implement these decisions was shown and seen as a justification for the US backing of the coup. It was also stated that this coup was made to prevent the regime export of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Safi, 2019, p. 152). In this section, Ismail Safi's criticism of the 1980 coup is a reflection of a defensive attitude. Rather than thinking that the reasons for the 1980 coup are justifiable, the cause-and-effect relationships need to be examined correctly.

Turgut Özal saw the upcoming elections as a serious threat and took measures to ensure his party's victory. He considered passing a law that would limit municipal elections to parties participating in general elections only. However, Turgut Özal was afraid that President Evren would veto such a law. For this reason, he immediately decided to go to the elections and not leave the opposition any time to organize a campaign (Ahmad, 2017, p. 224). Özal's economic program was the beginning of a transformation that would create great social and economic turmoil. For the success of

Özal's prescription, he asked the generals to suspend the defendant's policy for five years. That was precisely what the military coup of September 12, 1980, provided him. The generals planned to achieve long-term stability by excluding the Turkish people from politics to lay new foundations for the political system (Ahmad, 2019, p. 155-156). The political regime established after 12 September 1980 should be associated with Turkey's inability to solve the issue of political unrest and other problems stemming from that. The generals succeeded in keeping the whole system out of politics by banning old politicians and establishing new institutions. Until the rights of former politicians Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan, and Türkeş were reinstated in the 1987 referendum, the entire political fabric of the country changed. The centre-left and centre-right were fragmented, and non-system parties, such as Islamists and neo-fascists, began to play a critical role (Ahmad, 2019, p. 175).

Özal not only accepted the theses of Islam as an antidote to the left but both he and the majority of his party were genuinely attached to a culture laden with elements often portrayed as Islamic. That was the culture of Turkey's lower-middle class. Members of this class are on the edge of the Kemalist Revolution and the Westernization associated with this revolution. Their Westernization was rather superficial as they believed that the West only provided the means to deal with the material world, that their moral and social values were superior to those of the West. They argued that the Kemalist regime had failed to provide the Turks with a new identity and that severing them from Islam, it led to an identity crisis (Ahmad, 2017, p. 257).

The 12 September 1980 coup was perhaps the harshest form of intervention in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The military had used the ideology of Kemalism as a shield for itself and intervened in politics. It was in line with the

‘natural guardian’ role. Compared to previous military interventions, the loyalty to the army's chain of command was obvious and practices were much harsher. In the process following the 1960 military intervention, the 1961 constitution was adopted. However, it was not as anti-libertarian as the 1982 Constitution of September 12.

Although Fahri Korutürk's was not in favour of military intervention, it was the Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, who was pulling the strings. Moreover, the military had more grounds for intervention compared to the previous coups. The increase in violence, economic difficulties, and the inefficiency of the political parties were used as the main excuses. The army tried to eliminate Bülent Ecevit at the Grand Congress of the Republican People's Party. Thus, they had failed and realized that they would not be successful without intervening in politics directly.

As a result of all this, the army carried out the 1980 coup. With this process, it is obvious that Turkey has transformed in political, social, and legal terms which would last for decades. The "natural guardian" role has enabled the army to change the system and become a major actor in politics.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we examined the effects of the 'protector' class, which is mentioned in Plato's State work. They claimed to be an alternative to the rulers. At the same time, we observed how the military intervened in politics. The Turkish military saw itself as a natural part of the political system and believed that it has a say over the state. Such attitude is in line with the "protectors" theory. This role of "natural protector" has been proved many times through military interventions. In the eyes of the Turkish army, this understanding was provided by the legal infrastructure. The Turkish army knows that it has the right to intervene in politics for the welfare and security of the country in situations of internal or external chaos. For this reason, the authority and responsibility of the Turkish army have been shaped within the framework of the relevant general rule.

My thesis examines how the Turkish military intervenes in politics and constitutional order from the necessary aspects. In line with these investigations, although the Turkish army aims to protect the country from external threats, one may argue that the aim of intervening in politics to save the state is very apparent.

In the light of this information and the structures within the army, we have seen how the culture of the coup in Turkish political life was implemented by the Committee of Union and Progress, both as a society where it remained hidden and as a political party where it was legalized. In the establishment, rise and collapse of the Committee of Union and Progress, I think that a revolutionary organization and the foundations of the present secular republic are both intellectual and national struggles. However, the Union and Progress became the main focus of the coup culture in the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, rather than linking it directly to the Committee of

Union and Progress, it would be correct to evaluate this according to the ideologies and interests of the members of the organization. For this reason, this organization, which started with the Committee of Union and Progress, and whose power in the army cannot be denied as much as it touched the political life; has also attempted to protect its existence. By combining the difficult political power of an empire with the instinct to protect the state, the Committee of Union and Progress embarked on a vital and adventurous path and achieved many successes in this way. However, their achievements started to pose an obstacle to them in the long run. From the moment their responsibility increased, they were shown as the main responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The military class, who wanted to get out as an alternative to the rule in the Ottoman period and took the ability to rule, used the "natural guardian" authority due to the resulting chaos, war, and administrative difficulties. On the other hand, due to the economic and political difficulties of the period, the current understanding of monarchy changed with the Young Turks who were influenced by the West. The approach that started with this change has also made a transition to the Republic period.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wanted a transition to democracy by excluding the army officers from politics. That was in contrast with the role of natural guardian. Therefore, it is an exceptional situation to foresee that the progress under military tutelage may create serious problems for the future of the state. However, with the transition to multi-party life, a consensus such as claiming the founding values began to be formed within the Turkish army, considering the existence of certain political threats, after the death of Atatürk. Because here, Plato's idea of "natural protection"

started to emerge as intuition in the Turkish Military. The policies that emerged with the Democrat Party in power have turned this perception into an activity.

The 1960 military intervention was the first coup for the Republic of Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish army had realized a coup stemming from the policies of the Democrat Party, for which the basic founding reflexes were weakened. When evaluated in today's conditions, the new political environment brought by the 1961 Constitution, which is the most liberal constitution, has caused the establishment of the military intervention culture. The process of seeing the policies of the Democrat Party as a regime threat by the Turkish army has emerged for general opinion formed in the army with the emergence of social movements. It was necessary to intervene in case of "internal and external regime threat". As a result of this process; In Plato's words, the guardians had taken away the authority of the rulers. Thus, the "natural guardian" role was put into the ruling activity. Accordingly, the Turkish army would intervene in politics when the opportunity arises. On the other hand, the 1980 putschist structure found the 1961 Constitution, which was formed after the 1960 military intervention, very libertarian and luxurious. This situation paved the way for questioning the 1971 and 1980 military interventions (Ahmad, 2017, p. 249-250). On the other hand, after the 1960 coup, a rivalry began between the Armed Forces Union and the National Unity Committee. The obvious winner would be the Armed Forces Union.

The attempts of Talat Aydemir on February 22, 1962, and May 21, 1963, were a reaction against the acceleration of the transition to democracy and the failure of the objectives of the "1960 revolution". The differences of opinion within the army inevitably affected the process. Aydemir and his team provided the beginning of a

process that they believed to be in line with their principles. When evaluated in terms of this process, there had been two failed coup attempts in the history of the Republic of Turkey. However, they have sought the country's administration, acting independently of the military's chain of command, to assume the role of "natural protector". However, this desire has failed. Although the 1962-1963 junta movements aimed at the realization of major constitutional reforms, they worshipped an ideal that was difficult to reach due to the cause-effect relationship.

Seeing as the real owners of the state, the 'natural protectors' preferred to act against the power of the civilian authority. However, they were disturbed by the threat of a new 'Democrat Party' culture, with the coming of the Justice Party in the 1963 elections. Despite this, the army had set aside its role of the 'natural guardian' until March 12, 1971. But as civilian authority grew stronger, the military saw itself as left out of the process. Social and political incidents between 1961-1971 carried the tension in the country to higher levels. In the period leading up to 1971, the weakness of the administrative mechanisms of the Justice Party had dragged the country into a great depression. It had prepared "the necessary ground for the army" due to the ineffectiveness of the state institutions, the shortcomings of the political power in the decision-making processes and the chaotic environment in which the country drifted. The army once again intervened in line with the "natural guardian" role and the legal support it received from the Internal Services Law. Not only the government but all other parties were affected to a certain extent by this process. March 12 was a front pillar of the September 12, 1980 coup. It was like a reset button. The machine restarts at every reset, but after a certain time, it would stop working again.

The September 12, 1980 coup was perhaps the harshest form of intervention in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The military had used the ideology of Kemalism as a shield for itself and intervened in politics, irrespective of the basic thinking system of Kemalism. The "natural guardian" role Plato assigned for the soldier was to create its military authority and perspective for the Turkish army on September 12th. Compared to previous military interventions, the loyalty to the army's chain of command was obvious and practices were much harsher. In the process following the 1960 military intervention, the 1961 Constitution was adopted. However, it was not as anti-libertarian as the 1982 Constitution of September 12. The constitution was said to be prepared based on Kemalism but in reality, it had nothing to do with Kemalism, except for a few formal articles. In one respect, the army normalized military interventions almost every ten years. The aim was to re-emphasize its authority. The increase in violence, economic difficulties, and the inefficiency of the political parties were used as the main excuses. As a result of all these, the army carried out the 1980 coup. With this process, it is obvious that Turkey has transformed in political, social and legal terms which would last for decades. The "natural guardian" role has enabled the army to change the system and become an authority in political processes.

The Turkish military has been prominent in politics many times from the late Ottoman period to the present day. Playing a significant role in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the military thought to have the right to intervene in politics. However, when looking at world history, we see that democracy cannot be created under military rule. Even Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk decided to take off his military uniform and became an elected President. Democracies cannot be shaped under a dictatorial rule. Just before his death, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk warned the

military to stay away from politics. However, the course after him was evaluated in the axis of protecting his ideas and protecting the Republic. The 1960 military intervention has a libertarian understanding. However, when the scope of this intervention is evaluated, it is not a correct perspective to say "1960 is a revolution." A democracy stemming from the coup process cannot be described as a "revolution", even if it has a liberal understanding. This situation causes the military intervention to be justified and the military to see itself as a single source of authority.

As a result, the military has been a prominent actor since its existence in Turkish political life and had a say in political processes. In other words, the presence and idea of the military have been at the centre of the state. The soldier is in the role of a saviour, and the Turkish nation adopts this view since the Turkish military is a part of the Turkish nation. Against any political, military, or economic threat that may arise, the citizens want to see the army on their side. The military is a critical element for the defence and the independence of the state. However, the army's isolation from politics is the most critical condition. Because democracy cannot find a place under any military order or dictatorial regime, this situation will not go beyond appearance even if it does. Because this time, the worldview and ideological understanding of the soldier will be involved, and democracy will not be possible in such an environment. However, when considering it in the constitutional framework, the 1961 Constitution is an exception in this case. Because the architects of it put forward a constitution that was libertarian and compatible with world standards. However, even though the 1961 Constitution contains such libertarian articles, it has become a constitution that the Turkish nation could not fully adopt in terms of periodicity. However, despite this, it was successful but has also become the excuse for military interventions that will

occur after it. Although it has become a threat to democracy as well as a guarantee, the presence of the military has always been crucial in Turkish political life.

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