

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ
ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
MEDYA VE İLETİŞİM ÇALIŞMALARI
ANABİLİM DALI

**VARIETIES OF POPULISM IN TURKISH DEMOCRACY DURING
THE 1970s**

Tezli Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Kerem Ak

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T.C.

ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü'ne,

Prof. Dr. Fatih Keskin danışmanlığında hazırladığım “Varieties of Populism in Turkish Democracy during the 1970s (Ankara, 2021)” adlı yüksek lisans tezindeki bütün bilgilerin akademik kurallara ve etik davranış ilkelerine uygun olarak toplanıp sunulduğunu, başka kaynaklardan aldığım bilgileri metinde ve kaynakçada eksiksiz olarak gösterdiğimi, çalışma sürecinde bilimsel araştırma ve etik kurallarına uygun olarak davrandığımı ve aksinin ortaya çıkması durumunda her türlü yasal sonucu kabul edeceğimi beyan ederim.

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Adı-Soyadı ve İmza

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ABBREVIATIONS

AP *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party)

DP *Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party)

CGP *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi* (Republican Reliance Party)

CHP *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party)

CKMP *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (Republican Villagers Nation Party)

DİSK *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey)

HP *Hürriyet Partisi* (Liberty Party)

MGK *Millî Güvenlik Komitesi* (National Security Council)

MHP *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (National Movement Party)

MKP *Millî Kalkınma Partisi* (National Development Party)

MSP *Millî Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party)

SCF *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Liberal Republican Party)

TCF *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party)

TİP *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (Workers' Party of Turkey)

TBMM *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

YTP *Yeni Türkiye Partisi* (New Turkey Party)

INTRODUCTION

'Rise like Lions after slumber

In unvanquishable number,

Shake your chains to earth like dew

Which in sleep had fallen on you -

Ye are many - they are few.'

Percy Bysshe Shelley

The people who remained as the silent actors of history for a long period of time began to take revolutionary steps aiming to put an end to the oppression of a handful of traditional agents of power and authority. Against the overwhelming numbers of the former group, the latter was forced to give up most of their political and economic privileges and to renounce their sole claim to political power. The French Revolution of 1789 was the climax of the story about how the dominant class, whose members included nobles and clergymen, lost its influential position in society and political life and gave rise to the emergence of a new actor: the people. Following this, the revolutionary ideas based on liberty and equality spread across different geographies around the world and change the direction of world politics.

In this revitalized political environment, it became almost impossible for a leader to hold the power in his hands without taking a side with the people and appealing to their demands. By being fully aware of this new condition, Napoleon envisaged politics in the future and described it as “the art of stirring the masses” (Crick, 2005: 627). It is implied that to possess political power does not require the necessary knowledge and skills but the ability

to reach the people and gain their support. Considering the recent political landmarks such as Trump's election victory and Britain's Brexit decision, they would come to nothing without mobilizing the masses for a common cause (Inglehart & Norris, 2016); therefore, Bonaparte's claim seems to have proved itself.

This political tactic of going to the people and ensuring their mobilization for a shared purpose is not an invention of our time, and it has become the main aspect of almost every ideological or political movement. Among all, it is heavily associated with populism in the literature. To put it simply, appealing to the people is one of the main tenets of populism (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004; Laclau, 2005a). This is also evident when we consider the early populist experiences in the second half of the 19th century. These are depicted as agrarian populist movements, namely, the Russian intellectual socialism called *narodniki*, and the American farmers' radicalism led by the U.S. People's Party (Canovan, 1981: 13). Despite the fact that both evoke a pastoral picture in mind they are inherently different from one another in terms of their social and political contexts.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a group of intellectuals in Russia took the idea of supporting the thoughts and beliefs of ordinary man and attempted to overthrow the tsarist government of the Russian Empire. The reason for their determination on this idea was the rise of capitalism in the empire (Walicki, 1969: 91), and this was not something to be welcomed without any opposition. The Russian intellectual circles, or *narodniks* resorted to the populist standpoint and aimed to revolutionize the tsarist government with the support of the people. By being heavily influenced with Aleksandr Herzen's (1812-1870) idea of natural communism, which designates the rural institutions or *obscina* as "the social and economic basis of a new society to be achieved through revolution", these intellectuals held campaigns in the Russian villages and made significant efforts to create the revolutionary

consciousness among those living in these villages with whom they would put an end to the tsarist regime (Anselmi, 2018: 52-53). There is nothing to be misunderstood in their program; however, the main problem of their revolutionary movement was its utopian nature. Canovan (2004: 247) touches on this issue and describes it as a mistake made by the Russian intelligentsia by highlighting its members' adventurous attempt to take the ordinary people as the basis of their revolutionary agenda.

On the other hand, the People's Party in the USA (1892-1909) is also considered as one of the early populist experiences. A question about whether there is any connection between this and the Russian populism—due to the fact that both emerged at the dawn of the twentieth century—can be asked, but this is nothing more than a sheer coincidence. While the Russian intellectuals went to the people with the hope of revolutionizing the tsarist government, the American farmers and their associations, or more specifically those in the West and central regions of the USA who suffered financially in the late nineteenth century (Hicks, 1955: 34-35), stood against the established institutions and defended their demands in the political arena.

Regarding the formation of the People's Party, also known as the Populist Party, we can consider it as a third party along with the USA's other two major political parties, but it is hard to put the former in the same equation with the latter group. The political organization of this third party became available with the incentives of several reform groups—most of which were farmer alliances and unions (most notably the Farmer's Alliance and Industrial Union)—and this was a hindrance against the possibility of acting collectively and following a political agenda independently (Postel, 2007: 12-13). This in-party crisis did not prevent the party from entering the 1892 presidential elections in which it gained a slight electoral

success; nevertheless, this did not repeat itself for a second time. As a result, like the Russian intellectuals' populism, the early American populism had a relatively short lifetime.

The impact of these two early populist movements was not rich enough for the scholars to conduct comprehensive studies on populism; however, through the introduction of Peronism in the Argentinian politics, populism gained an influential success, which is still felt across the Latin American continent. Considering the abundant populist experiences, it is possible to describe three different kinds of populism in Latin America, namely, classical populism or Peronism, neoliberal populism or neo-populism, and radical populism (de la Torre, 2017).

Juan Peron represents the most striking example of the classical populism period in the Latin American continent. The comprehension of his political success through populism is closely related to the socio-economic conditions of Argentina during the 1930s and 1940s. These years of Argentina's economic boost corresponds precisely with the years of WWII and ends with the implementation of the Marshall Plan generated to prevent the communist propaganda by providing financial assistance for the European economies. On a closer inspection, Argentinian society was experiencing sensational socio-economic changes such as "interruption of overseas immigration, transformation of agricultural economy, and industrialization", which disturbed the demographical conditions in the country (Germani, 1978: 127). With the growth of the industrial sector, the Argentinians concentrated on the urban areas offering new jobs and possibilities, and a new class consisting of workers in the cities was formed. They were the ones who witnessed the growth and prosperity made possible with the rise of industrial sectors, but at the same time, they were unable to benefit from the richness brought about by the new economic developments (James, 2001: 8).

It was Peron who used this environment to implement his “populist project” by establishing close relationships with the urban workers. Although this was not welcomed by other members of the 1945 military junta and he was put into prison due to his actions, the support he received from the urban workers led him to be released from the prison and to win a landslide victory in the 1946 presidential elections (Mouzelis, 1985: 335; Jansen, 2011: 88). In other words, through his policies targeting at the urban workers, Peron was able to make a strong connection with these workers and their unions, and in return, they helped him to survive the pressures delivered by the established political parties and figures in 1945 and to become the president in 1946 (James, 2001: 9). Although he went through a military coup and exile in the later years of his ruling, his populist influence has both outlived him and overstepped the boundaries of his country.

The impact of Peron and his strategic use of populism is incommensurable due to the fact that the populist politics have stayed as the defining element of the Latin American politics since then, which shows that populism can adapt itself to different ideologies occurred in different times. The second wave of populism or neo-populism in Latin America is associated with the rise of neoliberal turn in global politics during the 80s and 90s (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1996; Cammack, 2000). By borrowing elements from classical populism such as appealing to the unorganized masses and drawing a sharp line between these masses and the economic elites, neo-populists dealt with the economic conditions of their supporters, who mostly consisted of those included in the lower segments of the society, at the time of an economic crisis (Weyland, 1996), but their method was different from their predecessors. For instance, the populist project of Peron contains statist motives in order to build “a strong national state in opposition to local oligarchical power” (Laclau, 2005a: 193). On the other hand, those following a neo-populist project gave up on the idea of maintaining national

resources for the sake of a strong nation and “privatized what their populist predecessors nationalized” (de la Torre, 2017: 199).

The literature is abundant with the neo-populist examples. The leaders such as Carlos Menem of Argentina, Alberto Fujimori of Peru, Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil, Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador, and Andrés Pérez can be considered as neo-populists (Weyland, 2004: 149). Due to the fact that Menem and Fujimori held the presidential office for ten years, studies about neo-populism are mostly about these leaders. According to Weyland (1999: 383), there is “a marriage of convenience” between these neo-populist leaders and neoliberalism. Menem followed a political agenda based on privatization of national resources such as national railroad systems, nuclear power plants and sanitation services and brought billions of dollars to the Argentina’s economy (Corrales, 1998: 32). In the similar neoliberal vein, Fujimori revitalized the Peru’s economy and prevented the threat of hyperinflation (Barr, 2003: 1162). In short, both leaders applied significant economic reforms in order to tackle with the economic hardships in their countries, which enabled them to increase their popularity in the eyes of their electorates and to secure their positions for years (Weyland, 2003: 1999).

In the framework of neoliberal administration, several Latin American leaders’ usage of free market model helped them to keep the inflation rates under control; however, this began to change towards the end of the 1990s, and the problems such as unsatisfactory growth rates, frequent economic crises and social inequalities appeared in the continent (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011: 3). Under these circumstances, the Latin American electorate became suspicious of the existing liberal political institutions and turned themselves into the radical “outsiders” who waged war against those holding the key of political power (Doyle,

2011). This phenomenon is often labelled as “the left turn” in the Latin American politics (Cleary, 2006; Cameron, 2009; Remmer, 2012; Mazzuca, 2013).

Due to the fact that the political parties of this third wave of Latin American populism followed a leftist or socialist political agenda, there are some minor differences about how they conceptualized the people and the elites. For instance, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela employed his punishing and redemptive rhetoric in order to designate the evil, or the enemy and to claim that he was only a representative of the people who would save them from this evil. Unlike Peron whose support was based on the working classes, Chávez addressed directly to the people in general, or “the giant that awoke” by encouraging them to join “the crusade” against the enemy which he demonized and charged with being in close relationship with the imperialist powers such as the USA (Hawkins, 2009: 1040-1041). Similarly, Rafael Correa of Ecuador made a distinction between “the morally superior common folk” and “the corrupt and immoral representatives of the privileged” (Conaghan & de la Torre, 2008: 278). In comparison to Chávez and Correa who did not face a serious difficulty in defining the people, Evo Morales in Bolivia struggled to postulate the claim of a united concept of the people due to the fact that the Bolivian population was composed different ethnic groups (Madrid, 2008: 484). Therefore, he had no choice to make changes in his choice of policies by taking the strong social movements into account and appealed to those groups “in conflict with the opposition” (de la Torre, 2013: 28).

Considering the three waves of Latin American populism explained above, it is possible to make comparisons among them by touching on how they understood democracy. In the first case, Peronism was a source of national identity but lacked strong institutionalization as a political party, which was an obstacle for the Argentina democracy to flourish in the 1950s (McGuire, 1997:1). Neo-populism was also far from

institutionalization, but turned its attention from the collective action to the individual action by replacing the general will with the will of the people; therefore, it corresponds to the ideals of liberal democracy more than classical populism or Peronism (Weyland, 2001: 16). As for the relationship between the radical populism and democracy, it is hard to draw an ultimate conclusion. On the one hand, the inclusionary side of democracy was put forward with the participation of people from different segments of the society, as can be seen from the efforts of Morales who appealed to a large group of voters such as indigenous people, white population and *mestizos* (those who have both Spanish and European origins) (Madrid, 2008). On the other hand, all of the three representatives of radical populism “used constituent assemblies to augment executive powers, allow for presidential re-election, and weaken institutional checks and balances” and stepped into the form of “competitive authoritarianism”¹ (Weyland, 2013: 19).

While the populist framework was working and evolving in the Latin American democracies, the Western Europe and the United States was experiencing challenges such as ideological and political crises in the 1960s, social problems in the early 1970s and widespread social protests due to the emergence of new social movements in the 1980s (Betz, 1994: 1). These years marked the great cultural and political transformations in the European continent. Especially, during the 1960s and the 1970s, the number of social, cultural and political movements increased significantly and set the environment for the emergence of a new hegemonic project in the 1980s. For instance, the major events such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Prague Spring of 1968, the counter-culture movement, the second-wave of feminism, the anti-war protests against the Vietnam War in the 1960s and the early 1970s,

¹ Competitive authoritarianism refers to a political environment in which democratic institutions are understood as the source of political power; however, those in power use them for their own political interests by undermining the forces of opposition (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 5).

the growing concern over the environment and nature and so on contributed to the rise of democratic demands both in the European and North American continents. These social, cultural and political developments were interpreted as a change in the definition of democracy by those included in the New Right of the 1980s, and by promoting “the traditional values and freedom of enterprise” against the movements led by different social groups, they put their ‘hegemonic project’ into motion and waged a political war against the Welfare State (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 165-170). As a result, the right-wing political leaders such as Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margaret Thatcher in the UK dominated the world politics during the 1980s.

With the New Right’s upper hand in world politics, other political parties leaning on the right-wing politics increased their influence in the European continent during the 1980s and 1990s. The most striking examples of them were the populist radical right parties²; however, it is important to mention some basic differences between the neo-conservatives and the populist radicals. While the former group supports the neoliberal interpretation of the economy and promotes the traditionally-celebrated values while the latter one pays more attention to the concept of nativity and might disregard the neoliberal standpoint (Mudde, 2007: 28). Another important element of the populist radical right parties was their claim about being different from the traditional extremist groups such as neo-fascists and neo-Nazis (Betz, 1994: 3). The former dissociated themselves from the old extremists—who are known for their tendency in totalitarianism and social Darwinism—and adopted “a new potent master frame combining ethnonationalism based on ‘cultural racism’ (the so-called ‘ethno-

² Some of them are *Front National* in France, *Fremskridtpartiet* in Denmark, *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway and *Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs* in Austria. For a detailed list of these populist radical right parties and their electoral successes, please see Betz’s (1994: 3) study.

pluralist' doctrine) and a populist (but not antidemocratic) anti-political establishment rhetoric" (Rydgren, 2005: 416).

As the effects of globalization became more palpable in the European continent, the popularity of the populist radical right parties grew among some members of the society. In this regard, the social groups that did not benefit satisfactorily enough from the process of globalization voted for the populist right-wing parties (Zaslove, 2008). Those social groups considered as "the losers of globalization" probably struggled to find a job, lacked a rich educational background and cared about the concept of national citizen more than global citizen (Teney et al., 2014: 592). They felt threatened "with significant increases in international integration, post-industrialization, the rise of 'post-materialist' values and policy orientations" and tended towards the populist radical right parties during the 1980s and 1990s (Swank & Betz, 2003: 216). In general, the emergence and increasing popularity of these parties can be seen as "pathological normalcy" rather than normal pathology since their main aim is to promote what is known against what have been presented (Mudde, 2010, 2013). In other words, some certain segments of the European societies did not instantly adopt what the process of globalization brought, and the populist radical parties appealed to these possible voters as a political alternative defending an anti-globalization stance in democratic grounds.

In comparison with the Latin American populism which stands out for its inclusive aspects, one can easily label the European populism as exclusionary due to its ethnic, nationalistic and protectionist traits. As a matter of fact, this has been studied by some scholars such as Mudde & Kaltwasser (2011, 2013) and Filc (2015). Apart from this, the European populism is associated mostly with the right-wing parties while the Latin American populism is with the left-wing parties (Rodrik 2018). The reason for this distinction does not

result from their understanding of populism but their ideological stances (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011). This contributes to the functionality of populism in terms of its applicability to both right-wing and left-wing political discourses (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017). In other words, political parties with different ideologies make use of populism in order to gain political legitimacy. By being aware of this, there are also left-wing populist examples in Europe such as SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain.

As explained above, the use of populism by the European radical right parties includes exclusionary aspects and confines the conceptualization of the people to the European continent; on the other hand, there is an “active, inclusive, democratic and emancipatory” tone in the SYRIZA’s conceptualization of the people who should not be seen “as an enemy but rather as an ally of democracy in times of economic and political crisis” (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014: 138). In parallel with this inclusionary aspect, Podemos also takes side with the people for the realization of popular sovereignty and social justice (Kioupkiolis, 2016).

When dealing with all sorts of populisms around the world, we can point out the fact that populism has gathered a momentum worldwide since the introduction of Peronism, and it has proven its adaptability to the contemporary politics, which is conducted online. Gerbaudo (2018: 746) stresses that there is “‘an elective affinity’ between social media and populism” and that social media enables populist actors—both from the right and the left—to appeal to the common folk and mobilize them against the establishment. The right-wing populists uses social media for castigating the media elite and spreading xenophobia whereas their left-wing counterparts criticize the economic elite and show their support for the people (Engesser et. al, 2017). To make it clear, traditional populism has evolved into the “populism 2.0” thanks to the Internet and social media platforms (Gerbaudo, 2014), and the political

parties with populist tendencies give performances online according to their defining ideologies.

So far, we have mentioned the history, development and spread of populism in different geographies, as well as its adaptability to different ideological stances and use of new media platforms such as the Internet and social media. Now, it is useful to describe the scholarly attempts to define what exactly populism and its components are. In this regard, the edited volume of Ionescu and Gellner (1969) based on the inter-disciplinary academic research of the conference held in the London School of Economics in 1967 offers great insights for a better comprehension of the term. The academic interest on the term began to gain a momentum with Canovan's (1981: 13) study of populism based on its seven types under two titles, namely agrarian populisms (e.g. the People's Party in the USA and the *narodniks* in Russia), and political populisms (e.g. Peronism in Argentina). According to Canovan (1981: 294-5) the important focus should be given to the fact that "all forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation of and appeal to the people and all are in one sense or another anti-elitist"; however, she furthers that these two concepts include ambiguity in themselves and possess different meanings in different geographies.

With the increase in populist examples in the world during the second half of the twentieth century and the twenty-first century, scholars have developed their own definitions for the term of populism. For instance, it has been explained in various ways such as "a language" (Kazin, 1998), "a political strategy" (Weyland, 1996), "an ideology" (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004), "a way of constructing the political" (Laclau, 2005a), "a political style" (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014), "a Manichean discourse" (Hawkins, 2009), and "a political rhetoric" (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Among these, Mudde's (2004: 543) ideational approach to populism consisting of two necessary elements (i.e. appealing to the

people and adopting an anti-elitist political stance)—which bears a strong similarity with the study of Canovan (1981)—provides an effective framework for the empirical studies like this thesis.

Considering the usefulness of populism in explaining various political phenomena in different countries, it can also be employed in order to shed light on the political world of Turkey. Toprak (1992: 62-3) identifies two different populisms occurred in Turkish political history: the first one is “intellectual populism” which dates back to the late Ottoman Period and continues during the one-party government under the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the second is “political populism” which begins with the landslide electoral victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1950 elections. He furthers that the former considers the people in the countryside as the holders of national values and bears a strong similarity to the CHP’s *halkçılık*, which adopts a corporatist view of society instead of one defined with the existence of different classes. In this kind of populism, as can be seen in the Russian *narodniki* movement as well, the people are passive actors due to the presence of intellectuals. This changes with the Turkish people’s political choice in favour of the DP in the 1950 elections, which is the mark of the transition from intellectual populism to political populism in Turkish politics.

Before the beginning of the DP rule in 1950, the global crises of 1940s caused by the WWII created serious effects on Turkey’s economy and politics despite its neutral position in the war. In addition to this, the one-party government of CHP was ruling the country for almost three decades according to the Kemalist ideology. Although its success was a crystal-clear fact during the early years of the Republic, the certain segments of the Turkish society (i.e. traditionalists and conservatists) were still kept away from the state affairs. These citizens lacked a source of identity due to the absence of appropriate representation

mechanisms. In other words, the country was in need of democratic reforms which would meet the demands from the public domain.

The absence of an oppositional party was a serious obstacle for Turkey to bring democracy for everyone, and some policies of the one-party government were not welcomed by the dissidents inside it. The Land Reform Bill of 1945 was one of the most critical moments occurred in Turkish politics since the law was in conflict with the interest of CHP's powerful landlord members (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998). Consequently, this oppositional group inside CHP gave rise to the establishment of the DP in the following year. The aim of the new party was to gather the people on its liberal political side with a severe criticism of CHP's top-down political motives. The DP officials were also aware of the significance of close and positive relationships with the press due to its overwhelming power on the creation of public opinion. Especially, the problematic 1946 elections created a sort of sympathy between the press and DP, and this sympathy was one of the significant factors behind the growing popularity of DP across the country (Yıldız, 1996: 487).

The DP officials had troubles in distinguishing their party from CHP during its initial years (Ağtaş, 2008) due to the fact that the former showed its devotion to the latter's party principles based on the Six Arrows of Kemalist ideology (Baytal, 2007: 549); however, the charismatic leadership of Adnan Menderes and his party's appeal to the Anatolian people with traditionalist aspects played decisive roles both in distancing the party from CHP and achieving a landslide victory in the 1950 elections. The DP that repeated this electoral success both in the 1954 and 1957 elections began to adopt an antidemocratic form of politics towards the end of its rule by gradually leaving its promises on the promotion of democracy (Özçelik, 2010). Consequently, its 10-years ruling ended up with the 1960 military coup and the

execution of its important members (Adnan Menderes, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, and Hasan Polatkan).

The most striking development after the 1960 military coup is the Constitution of 1961. This new constitution created as a reaction against the authoritarian policies of the DP is considered as “the most liberal constitution” of Turkey; what’s is more, it brought significant changes such as introducing the constitutional or pluralistic democracy, setting up new institutions (e.g. constitutional court), autonomising the national public broadcaster and universities, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of minorities and other social groups, and restraining the powers of authorities (Arslan, 2005: 281). To provide a more concrete example, by abandoning the common conceptualization of Turkey in terms of its aspect of classless society and acting in accordance with the global conjuncture of the time, different social actors in Turkey began to emerge and develop in Turkish society. In other words, actors such as workers, conservatives, anarchists and so on were becoming both socially and politically more conscious of themselves, but this did not welcome with content among different dynamics of power in the country. Therefore, the Constitution of 1961 did not remain intact. It faced serious changes three times under the influence of military governments due to the reasons such as restraining the basic rights and freedoms and strengthening the power of the state (Atılğan, 2020: 70-1). This failed to ensure a peaceful decade, and the country was in a such a chaos during the 1970s. The events such as political murders, anarchy and crises became an everyday reality. A new social and political order was attempted to be created following the end of the DP in the 1960s, but then it was understood that it would take several years to implement such an order both in society and politics. In fact, the closed DP continued to influence other successive political parties during the next two decades.

The populist discourse of DP including its “clientelist incorporation of the rural population and patronage-induced private initiative” left significant impacts on the successive centre-right political parties (Sunar, 1990: 753). Among such parties, the Justice Party (AP) that was founded after the 1960 coup came out as the second political party in the 1961 general election. Especially, the AP under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel came to power alone in the 1965 and 1969 elections by keeping the DP heritage alive and representing the “voice of silent majority” (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 350). This shows that the DP populism outlived the party and provided the key of holding the political power for the successive centre-right political parties.

There are shared values among the members of the centre-right political family in Turkey. According to Erken (2012: 218), the political parties belonging to this family supports a populist democracy, glorifies the national will, adopt moderate nationalism and political statism, possess religious conservatist values, and keep laicism and Atatürk’s reforms in their agenda. Among these, the inclusion of the people as the nation in the process of democratization and the glorification of their will above anything else provide useful hints for the success of the centre-right political parties in Turkey. Naturally, a democratic discourse consisting of populist elements such as standing for the will of the people and bringing their demands to the political realm is one of the most recognizable characteristics of the centre-right political parties in Turkey.

Despite the association of Turkey’s centre-right political parties with the populist tendencies, we can also detect the presence of left-wing populism in Turkish democracy. Through the transformation of the CHP from a state party to a people’s party over the discourse of centre-left (*ortanın solu*) in the second half of the 1960s and Bülent Ecevit’s holding the leadership of the party in 1972, populism began to be employed by a party

claiming to be situated in the left side of the centre (Erdoğan, 1998). Thus, along with the AP's right-wing populism, the CHP's left-wing populism entered the political spectrum of Turkish democracy during the 1970s.

The first thing attracts attention when reviewing the history of Turkish politics and democracy in general is the right-wing political parties' hegemony. This hegemony was first introduced in the 1950s with the DP, adopted in the 1960s and the 1970s by the AP and developed during the time period after these years by other political parties of the right. The share of populism in maintaining this hegemony for decades is considerably high, and therefore studies about populism in Turkey in the literature generally deals with the right-wing populism (Sunar 1985, 1990; Erken, 2012; Akçay, 2018; Öztürk, 2020); on the other hand, there are relatively less studies on left-wing populism (Erdoğan, 1998; Boyraz, 2020) and comparative analysis of both right-wing populism and left-wing populism (Elçi, 2019; Özdemir, 2020) due to the fact that the latter kind of populism entered the Turkish politics in the second half of the 1960s and developed in the 1970s. Therefore, there is a need of conducting more comparative analyses between these two kinds of populism. In parallel with this, this thesis concentrates on the AP's right-wing populism and the CHP's left-wing populism in Turkish democracy over the political discourses of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit. Thus, the goal of the thesis is to reveal the political communication repertoire of both leaders over the term of populism in Turkish democracy in the 1970s. While doing this, I will follow the conceptualization of populism as a *Pharmakon*, or a kind of "powerful substance" that can be used "both as a poison and a cure", provided by Tormey (2018: 2) and analyse the term and its relationship with democracy; in other words, I will conduct the analysis of populism in Turkish democracy without either labelling the term as a danger to democracy or celebrating it as a positive phenomenon for democracy.

The political environment of the 1970s in Turkey offers a great opportunity for this thesis based on the relationship between populism and democracy. Boratav (1983: 8) states that “populism in Turkey was evident with all of its components (except for a short interruption) during the years between 1962 and 1976” from an economic standpoint. By excluding the 1960s, I will conduct an analysis of populism in Turkey during the 1970s from the political perspective with the claim that the term continued to be employed in politics until the end of this decade. By considering İsmet İnönü’s stepping down as the leader of the CHP in 1972, the reason for determining to analyse populism during this decade only is that I intend to study the term in Turkish democracy over two political leaders, namely Süleyman Demirel, and Bülent Ecevit.

In fact, Demirel and Ecevit were the two influential political actors of Turkish politics during the time period starting from the 1960s to the year 2002. The former became the AP leader in 1964 while the latter took the leadership of the CHP in 1972. After the 1980 Turkish coup d’état, both leaders were suspended from politics for almost seven years, and their political parties were closed. Following the later years, they continued to do politics with their newly-founded political parties. Apart from this information, a complete analysis of the political careers of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit exceeds the limit of this thesis. Rather, for a fair comparison between right-wing populism and left-wing populism, I will take the leadership of Ecevit in 1972 as the starting point and conduct the analysis over a time period of nine years until 1980.

Demirel and Ecevit were the leaders of the two prominent political parties of the 1970s: the AP, a centre-rightist political party, and the CHP, a centre-leftist political party, respectively. Considering the above information about the flexibility of populism, the term is extremely appropriate to conduct such an empirical analysis. In fact, one can also detect

another two leaders who left their mark on Turkish politics during the 1970s: the MHP's Alparslan Türkeş, and the MSP's Necmettin Erbakan. But the fact that they addressed to a certain segment of the society, not the whole society as Demirel and Ecevit did—prevents an analysis to be conducted from the populist lenses (Özdemir, 2020: 329-33); therefore, excluding the former two out of our scope along with İnönü and concentrating on the latter two leaders suit the needs of this thesis.

The presence of several alternatives about how to define populism stems from the fact that the term was/has been used in various geographies by the political parties with different ideological stances. But it seems that two aspects are common in every kind of populism: championing the ordinary people and adopting an anti-elitist political perspective. Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology both reflects the flexibility of the term and carries these two common populist components. By being stick to the minimal approach to populism, I will reveal the term's presence in Turkish politics and its relationship with democracy during the 1970s.

As for the methodology, I will apply content analysis to the parliamentary minutes of Demirel and Ecevit delivered in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) between the years 1972 and 1980 with the aim of revealing the frequency of the populist rhetoric and observing the changes in this rhetoric over this time period of nine years. After conducting this quantitative analysis, I will qualitatively assess the parliamentary minutes of both leaders in relation to the democratic principles, which will elucidate the connection between populism and democracy in the context of Turkish politics. Also, this qualitative analysis of their speeches will help us to detect the certain characteristics of Turkish right-wing populism and left-wing populism and their approach to democratic principles. Finally, the findings to be elaborated at the end of the thesis will contribute to the enrichment of the existing literature

about populism and serve as a reference for the future studies to be conducted about the term's reflections in Turkish democracy.

To provide information about the thesis in general, it consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides the theoretical framework of populism. It mainly discusses different definitions proposed by several scholars and explains the components of the term. In addition to these, the history and development of democratic politics will also be given for a better comprehension of the relationship between populism and democracy.

In the second chapter, the democratic developments during the late Ottoman period and the political history of modern Turkey starting from its early years until the 1970s will be explained. The populist movement occurred in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the nineteenth century will be scrutinized with the aim of showing the fact that the idea of establishing a new state based on populist-democratic principles had an historical background. Following this, the early democratic development after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the transition from intellectual populism to political populism, and the evolution of populism into antidemocratic politics will be dealt with respectively. Following these, this chapter ends with the detailed description of Turkish democracy of the 1970s over the term of populism.

Finally, the last chapter is about the empirical analysis of this thesis. After describing the data and method, the results of the quantitative analysis conducted will be presented with explanations. Additionally, the data will be analysed qualitatively at the end of this chapter to make sense of the right-wing populism and the left-wing populism in Turkish democracy.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Democracy has a utopian aspect which could not be achieved completely. By keeping this in mind, it becomes acknowledgeable that “there never has existed, and never will existed, any true democracy” since “it is contrary to the natural order that the majority should govern and the minority should be governed” (Rousseau, 2002: 201). In this sense, populists make their appearance in the political world with a claim of bringing this utopic aspect of democracy to the reality as much as possible.

In this chapter, the term of populism will be scrutinized through its components in order to constitute the conceptual framework of this thesis. Firstly, the academic debates around the term will be depicted based on its components such as appeal to the people, anti-elitist political stance, Manichean worldview and role of the leader. Then, the term of democracy will be explained with its history and different interpretations in order to reveal its possible connections and differences with the populist phenomenon. Finally, the relationship between these two concepts will be addressed according to the goal of this thesis.

1.1. Populism

As one of the core elements of today’s politics, the term of populism has a history of over one-hundred-and-fifty years. Although such a long history is enough for a term to be conceptualized in detail, the scholarly attempts to develop a fully-fledged theory of populism have forced difficulties due to the term’s widespread usage in different geographies across the world. It is not inappropriate to claim that almost all of the democracies have populist experiences since it is “as ancient as democracy” (Molyneux and Osborne, 2017). This close connection between these two concepts is based on the fact that both promise a fair and equal political environment for the people.

Before deepening this connection, it is necessary to make a sense of the populist phenomenon over the relevant studies. The edited book titled “Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics” (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969) offers various perspectives in order to draw meaningful definitions about populism. In the book, Donald Macrae deals with the term as an ideology, Peter Wiles sees it not as a doctrine but a pathological syndrome, and Kenneth Minogue considers it as a political movement. These conceptualizations generate more questions about the term rather than clearing the black clouds around it. However, Peter Worsley (1969: 218, 245) states that “there has never been a populist international”, and proposes that “it is better regarded as an emphasis, a dimension of political culture in general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or type of organization”. Through this proposition, the impossibility of the term’s conceptualization under a single title becomes obvious.

Since it is out of the question to apply one definition of populism to different populist experiences, Canovan (1981: 7) holds the view that such an attempt generates only more conflicts; therefore, she puts forward the typological understanding of populism by using Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance³. Through her typology of populism, she captures the diversity of populist experiences in two dimensions (i.e. agrarian populism and political populism). Despite her contributions to a better understanding of the term,

³ Wittgenstein (1953: 31-2) gives the example of games such as “board-games, card-games, Olympic games and so on” and points out the fact that these different types of games do not share “something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that”; in other words, these games have different rules and require different competencies, but the point is that these rules and competencies in each game share, either big or small, similarities and relationships with each other. According to this way of reasoning, Wittgenstein claims that “games form a family” due to the fact that they have similarities, which are also called as “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein, 1953: 32).

Laclau (2005a: 6-7) sees her typology more like “a map of the linguistic dispersion” and criticizes it by stating that “the logics governing that dispersion require far more precision.”

Since populism is derived from the Latin word, *populus*—which means people—the first question that can be asked in a scholarly attempt to aiming to make sense of the term should be about the people, and this question requires an in-depth answer. In this respect, in order to disclose what exactly populism means, focusing on the process of ‘discursive production of the people’ seems to offer plausible outcomes. Laclau (2005a: 77-78) depicts two ways of constructing the social realm; the first is through the logic of difference, which operates the particularity of demands, and the second is through the logic of equivalence, which highlights the shared aspect of these particularities by determining “an antagonistic frontier”. The articulation of this antagonistic frontier that plays a key role in ‘the creation of an equivalential chain’ among the differential demands is what constitutes the people; however, this “has to be consolidated through the emergence of an element which gives coherence to the chain by signifying it as a totality” (Laclau, 2005b: 44). In parallel with the Lacanian concept of *objet petit a*⁴, this element is called as “the empty signifier” which both strengthens and represents this chain (Laclau, 2005a: 162-163). To provide a clearer picture of this discursive approach to populism, the people are constructed with the compilation of different demands uniting against those in power, and the production of empty signifiers (e.g. the claim of we are the people) is what gives a meaning to this construction and maintains it at the same time.⁵

⁴ According to Lewis A. Kirshner (2005), the Lacanian concept of *objet petit a* is “a fantasy that functions as the cause of desire”; however, it is in fact “mediator of desire.” Laclau (2005a: 115) uses this concept in his definition of populism in order to show that “the whole is always going to be embodied by a part”; for instance, only a part of the population is presented as the whole, thereby causing troubles such as ignoring different social groups and oversimplifying the political representation mechanisms in a diversified society.

⁵ Regarding Laclau’s (2005a) construction of the people as an empty signifier, Mudde & Kaltwasser (2017: 9) asserts that this is exactly why populism is a highly effective way of doing politics since

From a discursive standpoint, the importance about the definition of populism is given to language or discourse, and the literature contains plenty of such definitions of populism. In parallel with this, in his study of populism in the United States from a historical perspective, Kazin (1998: 1) describes the term as “a language” that is employed in order to ensure the mobilization of the honest ordinary people against the group of elites who strive for their own interests. In another historical (and also thematic) analysis of populism, Hawkins (2009: 1042) sees it as “a Manichean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” and operationalizes this definition in the presidential speeches given by various political actors from different countries, especially those in the Latin American continent. Additionally, in his research on the 2016 US presidential election, Oliver & Rahn (2016: 190) considers populism as “a type of political rhetoric that pits a virtuous ‘people’ against nefarious, parasitic elites who seek to undermine the rightful sovereignty of the common folk.”

Populism becomes comprehensible by making use of the discursive approach. Nevertheless, there are other approaches to populism in the literature due to the fact that it lacks some sort of wholeness. This is the “empty heart” of populism, which is deprived of some key concepts to be found in other ‘grand ideologies’, explains why it is “more likely to attach itself than be attached to” (Taggart, 2000: 4). In parallel with this, Mudde (2004: 543) portrays populism as “a thin-centered ideology” used in society consisting of “two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” in order to promote “the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” in politics. The description of populism as a thin ideology is pertinent since it is in need of other ideologies and deprived

various social groups with different demands can come together and act collectively for a common cause through this creation of “a shared identity.”

of a comprehensive agenda to deal with the political problems of vital importance (Stanley, 2008: 95).

Attributing an ideological aspect to populism implies the nature of the term and reveals its weakness. However, this weak nature of populism can be useful for realizing the true goal of democracy, which is to provide a fairer environment for the people. In this regard, Canovan (2002) sees populism as the ideology of democracy and claims that it can help the people to make sense of democracy, which is a way of reducing the complexities in democracy by “taking politics to the people”. Rather than being ‘programmatic’, populism offers a ‘moralistic’ view of politics “in which there are only friends and foes” (Mudde, 2004: 544). This populist perspective that describes politics in a simple way can facilitate the understanding of democracy and its promises by the common people.

In addition to the theoretical advantages of the ideational approach, this standpoint about populism offers great opportunities for scholars to conduct more empirical studies. To exemplify some of such studies, Pauwels (2011) employs a dictionary-based text analysis to measure populism in Belgium over the party manifestos and magazines, Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011) uses another dictionary-based content analysis for the measurement of the term in the Western European countries over the election manifestos, and in a similar vein, Rooduijn et al. (2014) make use of content analysis in order to measure whether populism is contagious in Western Europe. By adopting the techniques used in these second and third analyses and improving their usage for understanding populism qualitatively as well, March (2017) employs the ideational definition of the term in the British political setting.

From the above descriptions and usages of two approaches to populism, it is clear that both share similarities and differences at the same time. Stavrakakis & Katsambekis (2014: 122) suggest that the ideational approach is in a close connection with the discursive

approach; in parallel with this claim, Aslanidis (2018: 1244) asserts that the ideational approach is “unable to escape discursive implications.” Gidron & Bonikowski (2013: 15) affirm that “both stress the Manichean framework of politics and the distinction between ‘us and them’ as a fundamental component of populist rhetoric”, but they point to “important theoretical and methodological differences”, which are useful for explaining why two approaches are different. Mudde (2017: 40) describes Laclau’s (2005a) discursive approach as “a highly abstract, normative, universal theory in which ‘the people’ has no specific content”, and he highlights the use of moralistic view of politics in his ideational approach, which “is empirically oriented, positivist, and aimed at developing mid-range theoretical levels.”

As explained above, the literature is rich with studies based on either the discursive approach or the ideational approach. But there is also a third approach to populism, which conceptualizes the term as a political strategy. The definition of populism as political strategy highlights the impact of the leader in a political project. Kurt Weyland (1996: 5) states that there are three main elements in this approach to populism: (1) the presence of ‘a personal leader’ appealing to an ignored mass, (2) his direct and unmediated communication with the people, and (3) the existence of low levels of institutionalization in the given political context. According to this definition, the emergence of populism is dependent upon the support to be received from the lower segments of society by a strong leader with influential and manipulative communication skills. By attracting the attention to the leader, Barr (2009: 38) similarly defines populism as “a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages.” In other words, the strategic approach put an emphasis on the concept of mobilization to be performed against those in power by an individualist leader, and this “behavioural” element

differentiates the strategic approach from the ideological and discursive interpretations of the term (Barr, 2019: 44).

The empirical studies of this strategic approach are mostly about the leaders and their party structures. For instance, Weyland (2001: 18) associates the emergence of both classical populists and neo-populists with their personalistic aspects that helped them to receive “massive yet mostly uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of people.” Roberts (2003) also explains the political success of Chávez during the 1990s with the breakdown of Venezuelan party system. Nevertheless, Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 386) finds the strategic approach unsatisfying and claims that populism, as seen in the examples of France and the Netherlands, “can indeed thrive in an environment of tight party discipline and organization.”

In addition to these three approaches to populism, some scholars define the term as a political style. In their study of Belgian populist parties over the TV broadcasts, Jagers & Walgrave (2007: 322) defines populism as a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people and further that “these political actors can be politicians and political parties, but also movement leaders, interest group representatives, and journalists.” This way of dealing with populism as a political communication style increases the range of the studies about the term in an extraordinary way. Slightly different from the definition above, Moffitt & Tormey (2014: 387) emphasizes the concept of “political style” and claims that the “performative elements” should be scrutinized more. This way of analysing the populist phenomenon gives more prominence to the elements outside the content of the message; in other words, it focuses on the body language, gestures and clothing of the populist leaders. Instead of a deductive approach to populism, an inductive approach consisting of three elements, which are “appeal to ‘the people’; crisis, breakdown, threat; and bad manners”, is offered for the analysis of contemporary populist phenomena across the world (Moffitt &

Tormey, 2014: 382). The importance given to the performative elements rather than the language is criticized since the latter plays a key role in conveying the populist message (Aslanidis, 2018: 1244).

Types of Populism	Definition of Populism	Unit of Analysis	Methods & Techniques	Scholars
Discursive Approach	A political discourse in which the people positioned against the elites are constructed and presented as the whole	Texts, speeches, public discourse about politics	Historical analysis and thematic analysis	Kazin (1998), Laclau (2005a), Oliver & Rahn (2016)
Ideational Approach	A thin-centered ideology that sees the political world from a Manichean perspective and supports the will of the people	Party manifestos and magazines, election manifestos	Dictionary-based text analysis, either quantitatively or qualitatively	Mudde (2004), Pauwels (2011), Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011), March (2017)
Political Strategy	A political strategy built around the image of a leader who appeal to the people in a low insitutionalized political environment with his/her populist policies	Party structures, leaders	Comparative historical analysis, case studies	Weyland (2001), Roberts (2003), Barr (2009)

Political Style	A style of politics that focuses on the performative elements of political actors rather than the language	TV broadcasts	Quantitative content analysis	Jagers & Walgrave (2007), Moffitt & Tormey (2014)
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Table 1.1: Types of populism in the literature.⁶

In the Table 1, the varieties of populism have been given based on the most frequently-used conceptualizations of the term in the literature. Of course, this number can be increased since populism is “a contested concept” (Weyland, 2001). As seen from the table, the studies mostly employ either the discursive style or the ideological perspective. After reviewing various approaches to populism and their utilization in empirical studies, scrutinizing the core components of the term is useful for us to construct the populist framework.

1.1.1. Appeal to the People

The arsenal of populism is the people; in other words, without the existence of the former, it becomes impractical to mention the latter. This part generally deals with who are the people and how they are constructed from the populist perspective. Although I will explain the different understandings of the people in a later part titled ‘Democracy and Populism’, I will mention the meanings of the people and how the populists create a unified concept of the people by using the elements of the discursive approach.

The question about who the people are has at least three answers. These are the people as the sovereign, the people as the nation, and the people as the common people. The first

⁶ I created this table based on the studies of Bonikowski & Gidron (2013) and Aslanidis (2018).

definition is about the explanation of the people from the democratic perspective in which they hold the power of sovereign. The second definition enables them to be conceptualized according to the shared values among the members of a nation. Finally, the third definition includes socio-economic elements with which the common people are described as opposed to the elites (Pasquino, 2008: 15-16).

The people can be constructed with the individuals who either share national and cultural values or belong to the same socio-economic class. The European right-wing populists tend to describe the people by making use of the former condition and excluding minority groups while their left-wing counterparts broaden the category of the people by defining them according to the latter condition (Roberts, 2017: 299). These two conceptualizations of the people see them as a homogenous group or an undifferentiated mass since the members possess the same qualities. However, the populist concept of the people does not reflect the reality in the given society since it is “a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population” and nothing more than “an imagined community” (Mudde, 2004: 546).

There is not a possibility for all of the people in a society to gather around the same goal; therefore, the populist version of the people has to be imagined and constructed though a small part of the whole. Laclau (2005a: 82) claims that “there is part claiming the whole”, which summarizes the Lacanian concept of *object petit a*. How does it become possible? What mechanisms are used in the construction of the people? The logics of difference and equivalence that, as explained before, are the constituents of the discursive approach are utilized in order to construct the people. Since the concept of a unified people does not reflect the reality and will never achieve it, it is required to make “a radical investment” in a partial object so that we can speak of the presence of populism (Laclau, 2005a: 101-117). In fact,

the result of this construction with the investment in a small part of the whole does not yield ‘some kind of original identity’ but claims to be this original identity itself (Laclau, 2005b: 48). Claiming a specific kind of group in a multicultural society to be the real people or bringing the interests of one class only to the forefront in a society with several social classes can be shown as examples of this investment operation.

Populists assert that the political agenda should be regulated and realized according to the will of the people (the people that have been constructed after a successful investment), which has a superior position due to the fact that it is associated with “justice and morality” (Shils, 1996: 98). The populist aim is to provide fair conditions for the people by trusting their purity and honesty. In fact, populists put so much “faith in the common sense of the ordinary people” since they believe that the people “possessing moral superiority and innate wisdom” are the key for “the most complex problems of the modern world” (Betz, 1998: 4).

1.1.2. Anti-elitist Political Stance

One of the most effective ways of explaining the meaning of something is to think its opposite. In populism, the construction of the people is heavily dependent upon the declaration of an antagonism or enemy that will enable us to draw the line between who are the people and who are the elite. This distinction between the two is a prerequisite for the emergence of populism. In the previous part, the people are depicted as a group of individuals who stand for being good, pure and virtuous. In this part, focusing on the opposite terms of these descriptions will give an idea about who could be the elites.

Broadly speaking, the elites are those who have a conflictual relationship with the people. Both are homogenous groups with an antagonistic relationship (Mudde, 2004: 543). If “the voice of the people is the voice of God—*Vox populi, vox dei*” (Hawkins, 2009: 1043),

the elites are the ones who constantly ignore this voice for the sake of their own interests. Through this simplistic distinction, the latter is perceived as a hindrance, or a threat to the former.

The populist description of the elites is not restricted only to politics. When it comes to defining what is the obstacle and who is behind it, populists act fairly generous to consider anyone as their enemy. According to them, the elites can take many forms such as external forces, corrupted establishments, powerful money kingdoms, and even the individuals working for any of these; in other words, they are “the financial tycoons, intellectuals, journalists, in a sense all those who are definitely not part of the common people, who simply don’t belong to them” (Pasquino, 2008: 20). Despite this diversity, populists still leave an open door for the elites not to be depicted in negative terms. There is a chance for them not to be seen as an enemy as long as they possess tendency to favour the interests of the populists (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 12).

Populists are expected to give up on their anti-elitist rhetoric when they are in power; however, they always find some forces to blame for their own failures. They “continue to behave like victims; majorities act like mistreated minorities” (Müller, 2016: 42). In other words, they simply exclude themselves from the group of the elites since they cannot blame themselves for their political failures. While being in power, they tend to reconceptualize the elites with the use of economic terms and hold them responsible for their own unsuccessful and inefficient political activities such as Hugo Chávez’s blaming the economic elite during his efforts to democratize Venezuela and Alexis Tsipras’s criticism of the humiliating attitudes of the Greek lobbyists and oligarchs (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017:13).

1.1.3. Manichean Worldview

The two aspects of populism mentioned in the previous two parts prove that populist interpret the political world from a minimalistic point of view. According to them, there are only black and white; in other words, they leave no room for alternative colours or other shades of these two colours. Through this Manichean worldview, they divide the society by drawing sharp lines and hold the claim that they take a stand with the people against the elites.

The concepts of *yin* and *yang* found in the Ancient Chinese philosophy implies a sort of balance in which two opposing poles, such as light and darkness, complement each other and help us to explain the meaning of universe and the things inside it (e.g. light is followed by darkness and this circle which forms one day). This dualistic relationship is behind the idea of a religion called as Manicheanism, but it, unlike yin and yang, possesses the promise of salvation to be obtained after a struggle. In a similar vein, populists see the political world consisting of two contrary forces, namely the good people and the corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004; Laclau, 2005a; Hawkins; 2009). Although these two contrary forces take many forms “such as in-group versus outgroup, good versus evil, moral versus immoral, nation versus anti-nation, pure people versus corrupt elite, and patriots versus traitors” (Selçuk, 2016: 574), the importance lies in the fact that populists, from a Manichean perspective, describe the political world as a battling ground and defend the ideals of the people with positive connotations in order for justice to be served.

As explained earlier, both the people and the elites are seen as homogenous groups from the populist perspective. While the former group is conceptualized with the ordinary citizens of the society, the latter can include several actors and even the establishment. For

instance, the populist right-wing parties in the 1990s strictly excluded the minority groups from the definition of the nation and blamed the elites for betraying their people (Mudde, 2007: 65). According to this, there are two different types of exclusion in the European context of populism. The first one is the ethnic exclusion imposed on the minorities, and the second one is the moral exclusion of the elites from the people. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 34), this trend seems to continue in the contemporary Europe.

The usage of a Manichean discourse is also commonly used by the populist leaders of the Latin American countries. Unlike in Europe, having an indigenous ethnicity and being a member of a minority group can create opportunities for the populist leaders in the Latin American continent to win over the people. For instance, Morales in Bolivia managed to build a strong connection with the people through his indigenous identity, and Fujimori gained popularity in Peru, where different races live together, thanks to his minority background. In both cases, the pure people and their populist leaders were positioned against the corrupt elites described according to their European descendants (Mudde&Kaltwasser, 2017: 72-73).

The understanding of the political world as two antagonistic camps by the populist leaders is the reason behind the polarization of the political realm. This can end up with the oversimplified descriptions of the democratic people. The surprising part is that such statements can be found even in the most developed democracies of the contemporary world. For instance, Nigel Farage's celebration of the UK's decision to leave the European Union as a "victory for the real people" and Trump's discriminative remarks about his supporters and the other people are the two examples (Müller, 2016: 21-2). Consequently, such a way of doing politics from a Manichean worldview carries the possibilities such as breeding

hatred among the citizens, obstructing the healthy governability of society and diminishing the prestige of democratic institutions.

1.1.4. Role of the Leader

The name of a political leader conjures up a specific political movement, it helps us to make associations with abstract concepts. For instance, one who has limited knowledge of the Nationalist Socialist German Workers' Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union can produce various arguments about these parties when hearing the names of Hitler and Stalin. In a similar vein, the political image of a populist leader is useful for speculating about what type of populism he employs in the given political setting. Still, such a deductive attempt may lead us to reach complex conclusions or prevent us from having one due to the availability of some common aspects in those representing two different ideologies; therefore, it is useful to explain how the distinction among the leaders of different political agendas is made, or more specifically, what marks the difference between a populist leader and another type of leader.

It is possible to encounter several studies dealing with the connection between fascism and populism in the literature (Germani, 1978; Fennema, 2005; de la Torre, 2016; Eatwell, 2017). Relying on such studies can serve as a functional way to comprehend the distinction between a populist leader and a fascist leader. While the former tends to act in accordance with the principles of parliamentary democracy (Fennema, 2005: 8), the latter does not hold the opinion that the people can actually rule (Eatwell, 2017: 369). Regarding a possible connection between populists and fascists, de la Torre (2016: 123) finds a similarity between these two in terms of the conceptualization of their “imaginary construction of the people-as-one”, but he furthers that populists intend to gain legitimacy with the popular elections

and tend to avoid being in a pursuit of turning the regime into a dictatorial one while the fascists follow “extraordinary politics as war against internal and external enemies.”

Populism does not have a strong ideological agenda as fascism. It is ridden with contradictions, and Germani (1978: 88) explains this aspect of populism by asserting that it “usually includes contrasting components such as claim for equality of political rights and universal participation for the common people, but fused with some sort of authoritarianism often under charismatic leadership.” Apart from this, two concepts, namely authoritarianism and charisma, enters the picture in terms of finding the defining characteristics of a populist leader. Mudde & Kaltwasser (2014: 384) associates the former with a *caudillo*, a term used widely in the Latin American countries in order to depict “a masculine and potentially violent” leader, not a populist leader.

As for whether charisma can be regarded as an essential feature of a populist leader, recalling the Weberian conceptualization of charismatic authority is important. According to Weber (1958: 6-10), there are three types of authority (i.e. legal, traditional and charismatic), and charismatic authority is the one in which the presence of a hero-like figure with powerful rhetoric skills is the key of ruling the people. From a populist perspective, Weyland (2001: 22) claims that charisma is associated with populist leaders empirically, not theoretically. This was proven in the study of Van der Brug & Mughan (2007: 45), which tested whether charisma played the key role in the success of right-wing populists in the Dutch elections, and they concluded that policies, not charisma, were the reason behind this success. Additionally, Barr (2003) states that the second-generation of neo-populists in the Latin America should be more creative than their predecessors who gained the support of the people with the usage of neoliberal economic policies and built a personalistic governance.

In other words, the charisma of a leader or his policy preferences may not be enough for implementing his populist project successfully.

The presence of a charismatic or personalistic leader, who aims to build a direct relationship between him and the people, is not a precondition for the emergence of populist movements. There are several populist movements which lack the presence of a leader. The most notable ones are the right-wing Tea Party and the left-wing Occupy Wall Street movements in the USA; in addition to these, other examples are “the amorphous coalition protesting against the ‘stuttgart 21’ project in Germany, the so-called White Marches in Belgium, the various anti-austerity-measures protests in Europe and Israel, and even the spontaneous protest movements that collectively constitute the Arab Spring”, all of which are considered to include populist tones such as protesting the elites and taking a side with the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014: 385-386).

Although there are leaderless populist movements that can spring up and flourish in different geographies, the ones with personalistic leaders seem to create a more permanent influence on their political contexts. The main reason behind this is that a populist leader claiming to represent the will of the people has the potential to build ‘a personal communication’ with them and thus providing ‘a sense of belonging’ to them (Weyland, 2017: 59). After the establishment of such a bond between the leader and the people, the former aims to mobilize the latter against those in power with an anti-elitist discourse. The stronger and firmer this bond is, the more likely the populist movement can achieve a political success.

1.2. Democracy

Despite the noticeable differences between populism and democracy, the emergence and development of the former cannot be comprehended without explaining the meaning and aspects of the latter. For this purpose, the term of democracy will be dealt with in detail before elaborating its connection with populism. Firstly, the roots of the democratic thought will be tracked down by describing the aspects of (direct) democracy in Athens of Ancient Greece. To provide a comparison with Athenian democracy, the representative government style of the Roman Republic will be portrayed. Then, their impact on the development of the modern democratic thought will be analysed. Following this, the ideas of Rousseau, Tocqueville and Mill on democracy will be assessed. Finally, the contemporary interpretations of democracy (i.e.) deliberative democracy and radical democracy) will be analysed.

Athens of the Ancient Greece between the 6th and 4th centuries BC gave birth to democracy. It was direct democracy enabling the Athenians to govern themselves. Their government system was based on “the separation of initiative and decision” (Hansen, 1981: 345). On the state level, there were three government bodies, namely, the Assembly (*ekklesia*), the Council of 500 (*boule*) and the popular courts (*dikasteria*). The Assembly was charged with taking initiatives and making policies, and the Council was responsible for realizing these initiatives and policies and managing the administration of the state (Thorley, 2004: 28). The job of the courts was to make decisions based on the existing laws and the decrees of the people; however, in the conflicting cases, the priority was given to the former (Sealey, 1987: 32).

Not all of the citizens of this ancient city had the right to be part of the democratic governance. Most notably, the foreigners, women and slaves were excluded from the

government; however, the male population was allowed for attending the Assembly as equals and the citizens over thirty also had the right to be assigned as a magistrate or a legislator or a juror (Hansen, 1999: 97). Also, it was necessary for the Athenians to register in their local administrations (*demes*) in order to prove their citizenship and participate actively in the politics. This was important since the members of the Council were selected by lot according to these local administration registrations (Sinclair, 1998: 106). There were some restrictions on the membership for the Council such as possessing satisfactory financial power and representing a broad audience (Thorley, 2004: 31-32). The presence of the Council of 500 and the local administrative organs was a significant factor in ensuring unity and equality among the citizens both on the national and local levels.

Democracy was born in Ancient Greece but not faded once the Athenian city-state was destroyed. It continued to serve the needs of the ordinary people. Despite the impossibility of direct democracy in larger states, it is also possible to find democratic tones in the ancient Roman Republic consisting of the Senate and the People of Rome (*SPQR*). These two were the major political actors of the Republic that had an inseparable relationship. The Senate possessed strong aristocratic elements with its prestigious members; nevertheless, it was also open to ‘some successful outsiders’ since it “had no fixed external boundaries, no fixed membership, no legal status as a stratum, and no common rituals” (Hopkins and Burton, 2006: 45). This meant that the representatives of the people were able to be a member of the Senate from time to time. Above all, their representative bodies had considerable political powers such as making laws, deciding for battle and determining the government officials (Mouritsen, 2004: 1). It is important to state that they made such decisions collectively not individually as in Athens.

The presence of the Senate highlights the aristocratic side of the Roman society, and the voice of the people in politics reveals the traces of democracy. In particular, the elites were in need of the support to be given by the people, and the former's political stance was heavily dependent upon the reactions delivered in the assemblies by the latter (Morstein-Marx, 2004: 122). In addition to this, the emergence of tribunes as the representatives of the people and the protectors of their rights gave the impression of a more democratic government aligning with the voice of the Romans (McGing, 2010: 179-80).

The political traditions of the ancient Greeks and Romans bring different interpretations about what the appropriate form of government should be and who should participate in this government. On the one hand, the government form of Athens was direct democracy, and it was utilized effectively for almost two centuries due to the fact that the city occupied a really small territory. Its citizens participated in the state affairs individually and equally despite the exclusion of certain groups. So far, everything except the exclusion of specific social agents seems relatively democracy considering the conditions of ancient times; however, according to Raaflaub (2007: 3), the Athenian democracy was “enormously productive and at the same time destructive.” In parallel with the latter condition, Plato (2003) likens the democratic state to a ship and its citizens to the sailors of this ship competing with one another in order to be the captain. To be the captain of a ship or the head of a state requires some skill; in other words, the result of giving the power in the hands of “ordinary people”, who don't possess the necessary competencies about dealing with the state affairs, is going to be catastrophic. On the other hand, the Romans made use of a republican regime in which the people understood as a mass played a key role in making crucial decisions about the Republic. Nevertheless, the members of the Senate were those who were holding the real power both economically and politically. Unlike the Athenians,

the Roman people were exposed to manipulative discourses given by their superiors, who “sought to generate the impression of overwhelming popular consensus behind their projects that would rout their opponents from the Forum or force acquiescence within the Senate, or both” (Morstein-Marx, 2004: 281). In this sense, the Athenian citizens held an unprecedented political freedom on the individual level while their Roman counterparts were understood as a collective body and used as a political pawn by those acting with their ambitions.

The emergence of modern democratic thought owes a considerable debt to direct democracy of Athens and Rome’s representative government. In the former, the citizens take the helm of the political conduct with their votes and participate in the decision-making processes without any intermediate actor. However liberating it is, it does not seem to achieve the same success in larger societies. In parallel with this idea, the establishment of a representative government consisting of the people’s delegates can be a practical solution to the problem about how to ensure the government of a crowded population. Arriving such a conclusion does not mean that the free and equal aura of Athenian democracy should be put aside totally; in other words, it should be modified by benefiting from the wisdom and experiences of those who are capable of ruling.

The need of reshaping democracy indicates the problem stressed by Plato, which is the direct participation of ‘unskilled people’ in the government. Rather than replacing them with the experts, Rousseau (2002) believes in the wisdom of the former and proposes his concept of general will. The meaning of the term lurks in its name, which implies a sort of unity, wholeness and thus positivity. What it concentrates on is “the common interest”, and it “is general, not because a broad number of people subscribe to it but because its object is always the common good of all” (Dunn, 2002: 10). This is seemingly beneficial for the people in general; however, Rousseau (2002: 166) asserts that “whoever refuses to obey the general

will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than he shall be forced to be free”; in other words, there is no room left for those with different perspectives, and this gives an idea about how the general will may become extremely authoritative and result in a totalitarian regime suppressing opposing opinions.

The presence of the general will can offer a true identity for a large group of people sharing the same values and norms; however, societies are also home for others from different backgrounds or with various perspectives. It would be undemocratic to allow for the majority rule at the expense of the minority. Alexis de Tocqueville (2012: 411) warns the possible dreadful consequences of giving an unlimited power to the individual, extends this example to the majority and asks “have men, by gathering together, changed character?” It is not suggested that the common interest of the people should be eliminated totally; however, it has to be stripped of its ultimate power so that the threat of ‘a tyrannical majority’ can be eliminated and those with authentic perspectives find grounds to express themselves freely. In parallel with Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill (2015: 66) associates the existing obstacles in the modern societies with “the tyranny of opinion” and supports the idea that this insistence on ‘conformity’ should be overcome by promoting the ‘eccentricity’ among the people. In other words, Mill proposes the encouragement of those possessing different opinions conflicting with the common good and thus extends the scope of political freedom.

By celebrating the opinion of the majority and also including the minority groups in the process, the chance of implementing a true democracy increases, but this is not enough due to the question about what the ideal type of government should be. Mill (2015: 224) addresses this problem and claims that “the ideal type of perfect government must be representative.” Thus, every individual can possess the chance to participate, albeit indirectly, in politics. To ensure this does not offer an unproblematic society. While the

problem with direct democracy is the possible emergence of the tyranny of the majority, it is “the tyranny of the elected” in representative democracy. The concept of the separation of powers comes into the play here. It is based on the division of the governmental powers into three distinct units, namely, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary, each of which has its own officials and provides a check-and-balance mechanism to one another (Vile, 1998: 14). Through this separation mechanism, the powers of the government are restricted and clarified, which prevents the rights and freedoms of the people from being exploited at the same time.

Monitoring the powers of the governors and thus preventing them from exercising repression on the governed are the logics behind the concept of the separation of powers. In this regard, the Federalist Papers written for the championship of the new Constitution of the United States in 1777 and 1778 by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay serves as an example. Through this and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which was a product of the 1789 French Revolution, liberal ideas and constitutional arrangements dominated the world’s agenda until the early twentieth century. In other words, the political sphere of the world politics experienced a reconstruction with the rise of liberalism consisting of a set of ideas such as “constitutional and parliamentary government, economic individualism and the distinction between religious and political authority” (Gould, 2002: 1-3).

During the time period between the Enlightenment and the WWI, it was undoubtedly impossible to mention the presence of a fully-functional democracy around the world despite the political renewal brought by the liberal ideas and constitutional restructure. Especially, Many Western European countries of this period were no more than “liberal autocracies, or semi-democracies” since most of the people were still deprived of the right to vote and their

elected representatives faced strict restrictions on making laws (Zakariya, 1997: 27). In other words, the reason behind the impossibility of implementing a fair democratic regime was related to the concept of equality.

The introduction and spread of liberal ideas were beneficial for the free expression of dissident voices, but granting this freedom was not applicable to all of the citizens. In other words, different social groups were able to express their thoughts without any constraint but unable to ensure their opinions to be represented fairly in the government because of the absence of a system guaranteeing that every citizen's vote should be considered equally. On this matter, Mill (2015: 296) explicitly states his objection to equal voting by claiming that some can create more influence than others based on their educational background and that the institutions of the state should adopt this perspective. As more educational opportunities were provided for the large proportion of the population, instead of such a perspective, more equalitarian ones began to be debated in various countries with the aim of realizing democratic ideals.

Although the laws about enfranchisement was enacted in different European states during the late nineteenth century, these laws did not include women. It took some time for them to obtain the right to vote as their male counterparts. Through the movement of universal suffrage starting from the early twentieth century, both adult men and women were able to vote. This was an important democratic action. One of the states that took such an earlier democratic action was the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), and it had the potential to realize a true democracy with its constitution and active public sphere. Nevertheless, the breakout of the Great Depression led its constitution to be put aside (Kennedy, 2004: 154-155), and the Republic was unable to escape from its horrifying fate. In fact, the civil society in Germany was convenient for an effective democratic regime to be implemented

effectively; however, the reason for why totalitarianism haunted the country for almost two decades was the fact that its impotent political institutions deepened the existing social cleavages and thus “obstructed meaningful participation in public life” (Berman, 1997: 424).

The example of the Weimar Republic shows that the problem, despite its significance in terms of promoting democracy among the wider masses, was not about who to vote but what to do after the elected government and how to monitor its decisions. Here, it becomes useful to mention other types of democracy that go beyond the association of the act of voting. Of course, democracy seems to be unattainable without the participation of the people; in other words, they should vote and thus make their preferences visible in the political environment; however, some scholars hold the opinion that more should be done for the realization of a true democracy. The concept of communicative action presented by Habermas (1984) brings a new dimension to the interpretation of democracy through its emphasis on interpersonal interaction exchanged in order to comprehend what the situation means exactly and determine the actions to be taken about it. To be more concise, “a majority vote alone cannot legitimate an outcome when the basic liberties or opportunities of an individual are at stake” (Guttman & Thompson, 1997: 30); therefore, the political actors, both the represented and the representatives, are required to make discussions. This form of democracy is called as ‘deliberative democracy’. In this type of democracy, both the people and their representatives debate over the decisions by providing their reasons openly and publicly and reach a compromise on the terms that will affect the whole population and be maintained for some time (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 3-7).

It can be said that the apparatus of deliberation seems to deepen the theory of democracy in a positive sense; however, from a critical standpoint, there is a flaw in it. According to Mouffe (2000: 45-49), consensus over decisions cannot be built without

excluding alternatives, and she furthers that “consensus in a liberal-democratic society is – and will always be—the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations.” In other words, with the promotion of public sphere to reach consensus through reason, deliberative democracy ignores “the dimension of undecidability and the ineradicability of antagonism, which are constitutive of the political” (Mouffe, 2000: 17), and it thus becomes possible to mention another type of democracy: radical and plural democracy, which supports the extension of liberal democracy in the direction of freedom and equality. As a response to the emergence of the New Right, whose ideology consists of liberal and conservative elements, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 176) encourage the Left to protect the atmosphere of the democratic revolution of the previous decades (e.g. social movements of the 1960s and 1970s) by building a bond between the various struggles with ‘the logic of equivalence’, and further that “the task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy.”

1.3. Democracy and Populism

In this part, the concepts of populism and democracy will be explained together in order to offer a scope for this thesis’s main goal, which to reveal the influence of populism on Turkish democracy in the 1960s and 1970s. These two concepts resemble each other since giving the political power to the people is a common theme of both. Despite this similarity between them, they conceptualize the people in different ways. Firstly, I will touch upon two meanings of the people: the democratic view of the people, and the populist view of the people. The former adopts the “irreducible plurality” of the people enjoying themselves as free and equal individuals while the latter holds the view of “a homogenous community with a shared collective identity” (Rummens, 2017: 564). Then, I will make the distinction

between a representative government and a government by the sovereign people in order to illustrate who should rule from the democratic and populist perspectives. Following this, I will associate the emergence of populism with the representational failures and the political and economic crises. Such undesired conditions have a significant role in the spread of populist ideas in society; therefore, populism is not often regarded as a positive phenomenon by many scholars. However, it is possible to come across some favourable interpretations about it in the literature. I will depict these two perspectives respectively and then conclude the chapter with the description of a minimal approach of populism that is convenient for the empirical studies of populism (Kaltwasser, 2012).

The emergence of either democratic politics or populist politics becomes possible only through the active participation of the people in the process. Therefore, the essential step to be taken is to define who these people are, which will enable us to reveal the border of the close connection between democracy and populism. The terms of plurality and singularity are useful in terms of getting the picture of the people from the democratic and populist perspectives.

The term of the people implies plurality from a democratic perspective. Democracy has long faced troubles in “how to decide who legitimately make up ‘the people’ (...) entitled to govern themselves in their own association” (Dahl, 1999: 46). In other words, he touches on the problem about how to constitute the *demos*. Apart from this, the diversity in society prevents the people from being considered as a unified entity from the democratic perspective. Every individual belonging to the group of the people has his or her own particularity, and due to this very reason, it is impractical to speak of the people as a whole in a tangible way. Instead, the liberal democrats adopt “a *hypothetical* account of the people” and make use of the term “as an abstract construction, which ground the legitimacy of the

democratic state through a constitution” (Espejo, 2017: 612). This hypothetical conceptualizes of the people leads them to be considered as politically equal and unique individuals who are able to participate in the politics and determine who is going to govern them. The presence of constitutional guarantees ensures the healthy functioning of modern democracies based on the distinction between the governed and the governors. The important thing to state here is that the latter has a greater position than the former, and this is where populists problematize the democratic system and give rise to another interpretation of the people.

On the other hand, in parallel with the concept of singularity, populism tends to deny any sort of fragmented version of the society and claims that its inhabitants or the people form an authentic unity. To ensure this, populists hold “the *historical* account of the people” and interprets the term “as contingent political movements that surge from demands of actually existing groups of citizens who organize to claim their rights from the state, or to redress wrongs done to the poor, the vulnerable, or the oppressed” (Espejo, 2017: 612-613). Apart from this, it becomes possible to construct the people as a unified entity, and there are at least two ways of doing it: people as the nation (held often by the right-wing populists), and people as the popular class of the society (adopted by the left-wing populists). The former view of the people sees them as both *demos* and *ethnos* sharing the same national and traditional values while the latter one describes them as “those left behind, who labor and strive to survive, those who are exploited by the elites, the Establishment and even by organizations such as the parties and the ‘official’ trade unions” (Pasquino, 2008: 16). The people, either as the overwhelming majority of a nation or as the inferior class of a society, consist of individuals whose demands are not addressed satisfactorily by the ruling elites. Populists interpret the division between the ruled and the rulers as a clear-cut borderline that

leads to a polarized society. Such an environment enables them to determine their political agenda and present a proper identity to the people.

It is now clear that the construction of the people from the democratic perspective does not follow a simplistic and minimalist path as in its populist version. This is useful for explaining how the sovereignty of the people is understood in democracy and populism. Democracy implies the impossibility of a collective will based on the fact that there is no such thing as a unified people. This argument seems plausible considering the substantial degree of diversity in contemporary societies. There arises the need for a representative government. It has four principles: (1) elections are employed for the determination of the representatives, (2) these representatives can hold a certain degree of autonomy, (3) the governed possess the freedom of speech, and (4) the decisions on public issues are not made without being discussed (Manin, 2002: 6). Through these principles, the people redirect the rule of power intentionally and determine their representatives. The representative government is responsible for following the needs and demands of its subjects while making decisions; however, it possesses the authority to take actions independently from the represented. This partly proves the superior position of the representative government compared to the electorate; however, the latter continues to possess some fundamental freedoms such as expressing their opinions freely and selecting different representatives in the next election.

On the other hand, populism rejects any superior representative body and sees the subjects of the country as a unified entity with the power of ruling themselves; in a way, populists adopt the Athenian version of democracy. They base their ideology on ‘the people’ and support it with other interrelated concepts such as “democracy”, “sovereignty” and “majority rule” in order to eliminate the need of the representative government and to achieve

the government by the sovereign people (Canovan, 2002: 33). To put it in other words, populists—unlike their counterparts who adopt the constitutional guarantees for the functioning of democracy such as protecting individual freedoms, ensuring representational mechanisms for minorities and regulating the political power—claim that democracy becomes possible only through the unmediated rule of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 405). The priority is given to the people themselves in terms of sovereignty, which makes the borderline between the sovereign people and the ruling elite clearer and thicker (Canovan, 2002: 34). This serves the determination of who is the friend and who is the enemy. Thus, populists attempt to mobilize the masses against the ruling bodies of government by assigning themselves as the true voice of the former group.

It is a well-known fact that one's falling into disfavour serves another's interests. In other words, a major political failure has the potential of giving birth to new opportunities for other political actors. This is more or less the explanation of the emergence of the populist phenomenon. The questions to be asked here are how a favourable political authority give a way to populism and which promises the latter leads the political legitimacy of the former to be shaken. To answer the first question, the focus should be on the times of political and economic crises which can lead the authority and power of the present government to be put into question. During such troubling times, the representation mechanisms of democracy may face difficulties in answering the needs and demands of the people. It is important to remind that the people are often those who feel the burden of the political and economic gridlocks at the most, and if their burden is not relieved to a satisfactory degree, it is most likely that their trust and devotion to the government will be replaced with disappointment and discontent. When it is the case, populists put the blame on the ruling elite and attempt to take the stage of representation by assigning themselves as the true representatives of the people. Apart

from this, the precondition of populism is based on the failure of the existing representation mechanisms whose job is to provide an identity for the people and to sustain this as long as possible. For instance, Argentina's Infamous Decade (1931-43) mostly characterized by the wrongful acts of the oligarchical organs at the polls and their conflict with the workers and their unions set the stage for Juan Perón, who managed to gain the support of the working-class and mobilize them for his victorious political career (McGuire, 1997: 44-99).

The success of the populist phenomenon is dependent upon the production of a popular identity and its propagation on the available masses through an influential and charismatic leadership. The availability of the masses stems from, as stated above, some sort of deterioration in the existing government that can be held responsible for the increasing social unrest. This means that the people lack proper representation on the governmental level and possess "unfulfilled demands", which provide an environment for the production of a popular identity (Laclau, 2005a: 177). By presenting himself as the speaker of the popular will, a charismatic leader promotes this popular identity among the holders of unfilled demands, or the people (Hawkins et. al., 2017: 270).

The promise of populism is basically to give the people what they deserve. The populist way of achieving this goal is to eliminate all the intermediary institutions and actors since they are considered as the obstacles preventing the demands of the people from being fulfilled. The reason behind why these demands remain unfilled is that the procedural aspect of representational democracy. To put it simply, the true decisions to be made take some time due to the presence of different variables during the process (e.g. constitutional restraints and legal codes). This can take even a lot longer at the times of crises, and in return, the people begin to perceive that "'politics as usual' cannot deal with the unusual conditions of crisis" (Taggart, 2002: 69). Populists press this issue in order to go beyond the weary procedures

and undermine the prestige of the government organs of representative democracy. They often tend to offer oversimplified solutions to the problems that require to be tackled by taking different perspectives into account. Therefore, populists are intolerant of the procedures (Crick, 2005) that are considered as obstacles to the realization of the desired demands raised by the people.

When analysing the core elements of democracy, one can find two mutually complementary concepts: popular sovereignty associated with the collective will of the people, and the rule of law concerning the fundamental rights of every individual. The former ensures “the public autonomy of citizens” by enabling them to be included in the political arena while the latter assures “the private autonomy of members of society”; what is more, the attempt of questioning which one has a superior position would be futile since they require each other (Habermas, 1998: 258-261). Therefore, it can be said that there lays a balance at the heart of the democratic thought, and it is ensured through the rule of the people and the legal protections of diversity. This balance prevents the majority from exercising the political power in a relentless and uncontrolled way and enables the rights of individuals and minorities to be kept under guarantee. To put it simply and clearly, democracy supports the majority rule but refuses to acknowledge that it has the ultimate power since society contains minorities and other social groups as well. Every social actor has the right to claim to power as long as they have the majority. This confirms the idea of power as “an empty place” for which different groups contest equally in certain periods according to some undisputable rules (Lefort, 1988: 17). However, populism eliminates this contest of several competing actors and holds the view that the political power belongs to the people as a homogenous unit of society. It thus comes into the conflict with the democratic logic by presenting itself “as the closure of the empty place of democracy” (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Rummens, 2017).

A number of political parties, each of which appears in the political arena as the representatives of the people, compete with each other in order to take possession of the political power. There is nothing wrong with this competition as long as it is repeated through periodic elections in which none of the political parties is excluded. Since they all are running for the same goal in a competitive ground, the conflicts among them are inevitable. Such a conflictual political environment is the precondition of democracies since there is not only one right side. In other words, a democratic environment can be created and maintained with the presence of several representative parties in conflict. The important thing is to prevent the existing conflicts from being transformed into the antagonistic form of friend/enemy relation through the adoption of “agonism”, a different form of “we/they relation” in which the parties in disagreement consider themselves as “political adversaries” rather than as mere political enemies (Mouffe, 2000: 19-21). As stated before, populism takes place in this democratic environment as the representatives of the people; however, populists leave no room for other political parties regarding the representation of the people by asserting “We are the 100 percent”, and this leads populism to be considered as a threat to the regular functioning of democracy (Müller, 2016: 3-4).

In the setting of liberal democracy which rejects the Rousseauan understanding of democracy assigning an ultimate emphasis to the general will of the people, there are laws securing the diversity of the society and a model of dividing the power with the intention to ensure the healthy functioning of the system and prevent those holding the power from disrupting it. Populism is seen as a threat, a disruptive movement to liberal democracy since it leans on the idea of the general will at the expense of the rights and freedoms of others resisting this idea and its supporters act autonomously by ignoring the customary political framework and bending the constitutional guarantees for their own political ends (Rummens

2017: 561). That's why, there are dark clouds around the term of populism. Canovan (1999) turns these dark clouds into "a shadow" attached to democracy and associates the emergence of populist phenomenon with the tense relationship between the former's core principles (i.e. pragmatic and redemptive sides). Instead of labelling populism as a threat, she first gets to the heart of it and claims that it already exists inside democracy. The pragmatic side of the latter helps the modern and sophisticated societies to stand upright with an institutional logic and a series of procedural rules; on the other hand, there is a contrary logic in its redemptive part that believes in the power of the people and its transformative capacity (Canovan, 1999, p 10). This condition of imbalance can lead to more radical options in the political world, and "populism arises as a response to an asymmetry brought about by an excess of (pragmatism) and a deficit (of redemption)" (Arditi, 2004: 138). It fills the gap in a balanced way and "makes politics transparent, offering a short-cut that bypasses philosophical disputes and institutional niceties" (Canovan, 2002: 34). Then, the idea that populism is actually useful for a more stabilized form of democracy can be viewed in positive terms.

From the perspective of radical democracy, the populist way of doing politics is not dangerous. The meaning of democracy is the power of the people, and this is the whole idea of radical democracy (Lummis, 1997: 22-25). The populist claim is about restoring democracy and giving the power back to the people, thereby bringing its intimate connection with radical democracy into view. Laclau (2005a: 259-260) puts this connection into words and describes the latter as "populist" since it enables the people to be constructed politically "as a new historical actor". The people in populism signal an unattainable universality (e.g. the association of Lacan's *objet petit a* with the Real); in other words, this group does not host every person in society—which is already impossible due to individual differences—but contain only a part of the people. This part's lacking wholeness or totality does not

prevent it from holding the claims such as representing the people in general, being their voice and bearing their message. It is a process in which a disparate “universal signification” (i.e. the people) is represented by one of its inner part (i.e. a certain segment of the people), and this process of replacing the former by the latter is called as “hegemony” (Laclau, 2005a: 70).

Hegemony thus becomes useful for making sense of the political realm. From the populist perspective, the hegemonic constructions take place with the use of the logics of difference and equivalence. The former is the sign of uniqueness of each existing demand in society while the latter thrives on constructing a whole out of these unique demands; however, it is significant to note that the articulation of this unity or collective identity—against the enemy—out of the differences does not lead them to lose their unique aspects (Laclau, 2005a: 77-83). Apart from this, Laclau (2005a) reshapes the realm of political theory by presenting the project of radical democracy (a normative theory), offering the theory of hegemony to understand the way of politics and support the populist politics as a form of politics (Nielsen, 2006). Thus, populism escapes from the label of being a threat to democracy and becomes the key element of it.

It is now clear that the interpretations of populism can vary according to one’s political standpoint: the liberal perspective tends to label it as a negative phenomenon on the grounds that it attempts to restrict the political field; on the other hand, the radical democratic perspective considers the term as an essential element of democracy that bring the people into the forefront of politics as a transformative power. Although these two interpretations offer great insights about how to make sense of populism, Tormey (2018: 2) finds them unsatisfactory and proposes that the term should be understood as *Pharmakon*, which is a kind of drug possessing both fatal and remedial side-effects; with more simpler terms,

populism can lead to both positive and negative outcomes. This way of seeing the term enables us to avoid using any kind of biased arguments about it.

Both liberal democratic and radical democratic perspectives deal with populism according to their own normative standpoints, which makes it harder to study populism in a wide range of geographies around the world. By acknowledging this problem, Kaltwasser (2012) presents “the minimal approach” for the study of populism. This approach offers important advantages for the researchers of populism such as avoiding normative biases, situating their researches on the main elements of the term and generating more reliable findings “since minimal definitions of populism do not have a preference for an ideal model of democracy, they are less prone to develop normative biases that predetermine the findings” (Kaltwasser, 2012: 185).

CHAPTER 2

CONSTRUCTION OF POPULIST DISCOURSE AND POLITICS IN TURKISH DEMOCRACY

This chapter deals with the populist experience of Turkey. It is wrong to associate Turkish experience of populism with modern Turkey due to the appearance and spread of populist tendencies in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, I will first explain these populist tendencies during the late Ottoman period (1876–1922) in which the contemporary interpretations of sharing and holding the power permeated the whole empire (i.e. the people as the shareholder of political power instead of the Sultan as the absolute authority). Then, I will provide a chronologic picture of how democratic principles were adopted gradually in modern Turkey through the CHP's intellectual populism implemented by the founder of the New Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and developed after his death by İsmet İnönü, and the introduction of political populism with the DP during the 1950s. After setting the historical development of populism, I will analyse the populist phenomena of the 1960s and 1970s in particular by scrutinizing the ideologies and political activities of Süleyman Demirel's AP and Bülent Ecevit's CHP.

2.1. Ideological Changes in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire whose military and political influence shaped the world for a long time made little progress during the 17th century, and there was a widespread belief that the Empire lost its dominant position to its European counterparts in the 18th century. With the confidence of the victories gained in the previous centuries (especially the military ones), its officials were reluctant to keep up with the changing conditions in Europe and continued to regard themselves as the superiors. Once they witnessed the changes and their impacts in the world, they acknowledged that the Empire began to lose its authority and power on the

international level. Then, they sought for the alternatives that would bring back the glory of the past and save the Empire from being collapsed. Starting from the Tulip Era (1718-1730)⁷, the Ottomans began to familiarize with the developments in Europe and became more enthusiastic about westernizing the Empire. This trend never stopped until its dissolution in 1922 and determined the political and social direction of the new nation-state, modern Turkey.

During the 18th and 19th centuries, the European society in general were going through radical changes that left a great impact both on the continent and around the world. Especially, the liberating ideas of the French Revolution led the multinational empires to pay more attention to their internal affairs. As one of these multinational empires, the Ottoman Empire strongly felt the outcomes of the Revolution and could not prevent several Balkan nations to declare their independence⁸. The idea of nationalism provided a sort of national identity for these nations, and by witnessing this closely, the Ottoman officials brought this idea to their agenda and put forward the concept of Ottomanism (*Osmanlıcılık*) in order to instil the consciousness of being Ottoman into the non-Muslim communities in the Empire (Demir, 2011). In other words, the Empire was in a process of creating an umbrella term for the nations inside to identify themselves with it.

⁷ This period starts with the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 and ends with the Patrona Halil Revolt in 1730. Its name is the title of the book written by the Turkish historian, Ahmet Refik (1881-1937), and this period has been known as the Tulip Era (*Lale Devri*) since the publication of his book. The importance of this period lies in the fact that the Empire began to westernize itself; however, the Ottoman society reacted against the westernization efforts by claiming that the adoption of the Western values was hurting the Empire, and this reaction never disappeared until the establishment of modern Turkey (Mardin, 1991: 12-3).

⁸ Greece was the first nation that gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832. This was followed by Serbia and Romania in 1878 and Bulgaria in 1908. According to Sarıay (2012: 8), there is a similarity among these independence movements since these Balkan nations gained their independence as a result of the Ottoman-Russian wars, and he justifies that the Russian propaganda of nationalism in the Balkans accelerated the Ottomans' withdrawal from the region.

It is necessary to make the distinction between the nationalistic movements of the Balkan countries and the emergence of Ottomanism in the Ottoman Empire. The impact of the French Revolution is evident in the former; on the other hand, as Ortaylı (1987: 90) explains, the latter “was an idea generated as a reaction to the Revolution” in order to provide a sort of “Ottoman nationality or patriotism” that would prevent the revolutionary ideas of nationalism from prevailing in the Ottoman territory. Through the *Tanzimat* reforms such as the Edict of *Gülhane* of 1839 (*Tanzimat Fermanı*) and the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856 (*Islahat Fermanı*)⁹, both of which aimed to expand the rights of the non-Muslims in the Empire, the Ottomans made efforts to prevent nationalism from being actively used by different minority groups or national communities as a way of leaving the Empire and gaining their independence from it.

The ideology of Ottomanism in theory was developed in order to identify the ideal Ottoman citizen. The need for defining this arose from the classical Ottoman social structure that was based on the distinction between the rulers (*beraya*) and the ruled (*reaya*).¹⁰ In addition to this, the Muslims in the Ottoman society had greater advantages compared to the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. Naturally, social inequalities were an everyday aspect of the Ottoman society, but this became a significant problem as the consciousness of the people from different nations inside the Empire increased with the changing world conjuncture. Ottomanism was then put forward as a pragmatic way for hindering the spread of such a perspective that would bring great destructions to the Empire, but it later gained ideological

⁹ According to Zürcher (2000: 87-8), the reforms of the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1871) was not only the result of the external pressures but also the sign of approving the Western way of socio-political changes for the prevention of the breakdown of the Empire.

¹⁰ Akşin (2007: 9-19) states that this social structure was maintained until the mid-16th century, and in the following centuries, it was affected by various internal and external dynamics (e.g. the rise of the *ayans* or local notables and the early development of capitalism in Europe). In this regard, to make changes in the Ottoman society became inevitable during the *Tanzimat* period.

importance (Somel, 2009: 88). In this regard, the definition of the ideal Ottoman citizen in the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 (*Kânûn-ı Esâsî*)¹¹ was the most serious step.

The reforms of the *Tanzimat* period in general are considered as important in terms of their potential to ensure the socio-political change. Akşin (2007: 31) describes the *Tanzimat* period as the very beginning of the Turkish struggle of human rights, constitutional state and democracy. In spite of this, there was a discontent with the reforms made during this period. By taking an oppositional stance against the *Tanzimat* reforms, the Young Ottomans under the leadership of Namık Kemal and Ziya Pascha criticized the reformers due to the fact that they “misinterpreted the concept of exploitation, created an upper class and forgot the elements of Islam and their own cultures”; additionally, these Young Ottomans claimed that the architects of the *Tanzimat* reforms were not “westerners” in a true sense because of “their failure to comprehend the libertarian and parliamentary tendencies in the West” (Mardin, 1991: 15-6). Apart from these, it is understood that Ottomanism promoted by the *Tanzimat* reformers did not receive a widespread support; however, it enabled the Ottomans to gain new social perspectives about politics (Demir, 2011: 344).

In addition to Ottomanism, another political ideology appeared in the Empire. Since Ottomanism, which was developed and promoted according to the multinational nature of the Empire, failed to create the expected impact, the Ottomans looked for alternative ways of saving their country from the destruction. One of these was Pan-Islamism (*ümmetçilik*), which meant bringing the Islamic communities together under one Islamic state. From the Ottoman perspective, this political ideology “was more actively advanced than the Ottoman

¹¹ In the 8th Article of the Constitution, it is stated that “all subjects of the empire are called Ottomans, without distinction whatever faith they profess; the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost according to conditions specified by law” (The Ottoman Constitution, 2005). For the full version of this constitution, visit <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm>.

Sultan was not only the head of the Ottoman Empire but also the Caliph of all Muslims” (Lewis, 1968: 124).

During the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II, pan-Islamism was used as the state ideology. He employed it as the Sultan to create a collective consciousness in his people over the theme of Islam and as the Caliph to unite the Muslims outside the Ottoman lands in his Empire over the same theme. Mardin (1991: 94-5) states that Abdülhamit’s usage of pan-Islamism in both local and foreign politics achieved a slight success in the former and provided “the Anatolian peasantry lacking a sense of unity with a consciousness built on the separative aspects of Islam.” The pan-Islamist ideas were also visible in the Ottoman intellectual circle. Namık Kemal who promoted the pure values of Islam and criticized the *Tanzimat* reformers due to their weak consideration of these Islamic values “advanced the idea of a pan-Islamic unity, under Ottoman leadership, to accept, adapt, and diffuse modern civilization through Asia and Africa, and thus create an Eastern balance of power to counter that of Europe” (Lewis, 1968: 142).

Finally, there was the idea of pan-Turkism that was developed in the late 19th century by the Turkic intellectuals who spent some time in the Russian Empire and then settled in the Ottoman Empire. The distinction between pan-Turkism and Turanism or pan-Turanism can help us to form a clear picture of the former. Pan-Turkism was about ensuring the unity of all Turks both inside and outside the Ottoman Empire while Turanism or pan-Turanism was a much more comprehensive ideology aiming to bring the Ural-Altaic peoples (e.g. Hungarians and Finns) under the same roof (Landau, 2004: 26). İsmail Gasıralı, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmed Ağaoğlu and Hüseyinzade Ali Turan¹² were the most recognizable figures

¹² Since all of these intellectuals either were born in the Russian Empire or spent some time and took education there, the Russian intellectual movements left an impact on their careers and helped them

who contributed to the development of the pan-Turkish ideology. According to Lewis (1968: 348), these intellectuals “were acquainted with the very considerable achievements of Russian Turcology; they had encountered—and reacted against—the pan-Slav movement and mystique; they were affected by the populist and revolutionary tendencies current among the intelligentsia of the Russian Empire.” Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that the pan-Turkism, like the emergence of Ottomanism as a reaction to the nationalistic ideas of the Revolution, was an ideology put forward in order to challenge the Russian pan-Slav movement.

The ideologies appeared in the 19th century Ottoman Empire indicates the shaken authority of the Sultan and his family and the growing importance of the people. Before this century, the Ottoman Sultanate that was the source of the ultimate power was solely responsible for maintaining the peace among different ethnic and religious communities in the Empire; however, through the impacts of stupendous developments in Europe such as the French Revolution and the nationalistic movements, the Ottomans began to be in search for different point of views in order to prevent their multinational empire from being collapsed. They made use of ideologies with populist tones in order to restore the order in the Empire. Among these ideologies, the most noteworthy one for this thesis is the last one, pan-Turkism due to its relatively long lifetime and contributions to the foundation of modern Turkey. In the following part, I will elaborate it and describe its narrowed version—which is Turkism—in the context of the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

to form their ideas by considering the political conditions both in the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

2.2. Ottoman Legacy in the Establishment of Modern Turkey

The influence of the West increased significantly in the Ottoman Empire starting from the 18th century. The main reason for this was to put an end to the worsening condition of the Empire by keeping up with the changes happening in Europe. In a general sense, this process starting with the Westernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire is called as Turkish modernization (Mardin, 1991). Through these efforts, the Ottomans were going through a transition from the dynasty to the people, which provided the inspiration for the establishment of modern Turkey (Özden, 2006).

With the emergence of different ideologies in the 19th century, the emphasis of the people increased in the Ottoman Empire. The First Constitutional Era of 1876 occurred with the influence of the Young Ottomans and the Second Constitutional Era of 1908 following the Young Turk Revolution were the proofs of justifying this emphasis. In other words, the establishment of a parliament consisting of two bodies (i.e. the Senate or *Âyan Meclisi* and the Chamber of Deputies or *Meclis-i Mebusan*) put a limit on the power and authority of the Sultan by opening a space for the voice of the people in politics. This voice made it possible for the Republic of Turkey to be established after the catastrophic years of the WWI and the Turkish War of Independence. Here, it is necessary to explain the ideological aspect of the new Republic.

As explained in the previous part, there were ideological movements such as Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism and Turanism spreading in the Ottoman Empire. They were brought to the agenda of the Empire by either its officials or intellectuals, and sometimes both. Considering their scope, their proponents paid attention to the people with different ethnic and religious backgrounds living in the same land, or the communities of the

same religion or race in different parts of the world. For this reason, none of them seemed promising for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who played the key role in the establishment of the Turkish Republic since his main concern was “the people of Turkey” (Lewis, 1968: 352). In fact, a narrower version of pan-Turkism, or Turkism¹³ was what he meant by the people of Turkey. The ideology of pan-Turkism was developed for Turkish peoples in general; on the other hand, Turkism concentrated on the Turks living in the Anatolian peninsula. With this aspect of the latter, it is intelligible why it was preferred for the establishment of a new nation state to be situated in the same area. What is more, the ideology of Turkism was an effective tool for ensuring the unity of the people in the war-torn country (Mardin, 1991: 291). In other words, Turkism played a key role in raising a national consciousness among the Turkish people. Associating the development and spread of nationalist ideas in Turkey with this ideological stand is true; however, it is the pan-Turkish ideology where we should look for the roots of Turkish nationalism.

Yusuf Akçura is an important figure for his efforts in the development of Turkish nationalism. As an emigrant to the Ottoman Empire, he contributed to the establishment of a collective conscious based on being a Turk. For this, he took part in the foundation of the *Türk Yurdu* Association together with other pan-Turkish ideologs such as Hüseyinzade Ali Turan and Ahmet Ağaoğlu (Saklı, 2012: 6), began to publish the magazine having the same name with this association and contributed to the formation of the non-governmental organization named *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts) (Tokluoğlu, 2012: 122). He also produced several works based on the promotion of the pan-Turkish ideology, and the most

¹³ Turkism that was stripped of pan-Turkism and combined with the Western and Islamic values as the sign of being Ottoman by Ziya Gökalp gained popularity with the ideological stance of the Party of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası*) based on Westernism, Islamism and nationalism during the late Ottoman period (Berkes, 2012: 411).

famous one is *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Policies) in which he presents this ideology as a remedy for the Empire struggling to survive. In this work, he discusses three ideologies (i.e. Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism) and assesses them in terms of their potentials to prevent the Ottoman Empire from the destruction. According to him, since pan-Turkism would receive less criticism nationally and internationally compared to the other two ideologies and win over the hearts of the Turks living in the Empire and elsewhere (e.g. Turks living in the Russian Empire and the Central Asia), it is the most suitable one for the task of creating a national consciousness (Lewis, 1968: 326-7; Yavuz, 1993: 199-206; Georgeon, 1996: 135-6; Zürcher, 2000: 189).

In addition to Akçura's attempt to create a national identity, Ziya Gökalp is another intellectual figure who is known for his contributions to the development of pan-Turkism and the creation of Turkish nationalism. Gökalp was interested in the pan-Turkism as well and wrote poems about Turanism in the magazine *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) (Lewis, 1968: 351, 358). In this magazine, he focused on the concept of "new language" and wrote in Turkish; in addition to this, he contributed to the dissemination of nationalist ideas in İstanbul by writing articles in Akçura's *Türk Yurdu* magazine (Saklı, 2012: 7). Georgeon (1996: 137) touches on the difference between the ideas of Akçura and Gökalp by stating that the former acted as a strategist while the latter was a true ideolog, and he furthers that "Gökalp's nationalism with its popular, romantic and legal aspects was more appropriate to the bureaucratic tendencies and the Turkish society and the aspirations of the petit bourgeois."

The influence of the founding figures of the pan-Turkish ideology is evident in Gökalp's works on the concept of Turkishness. He made use of the works of Hüseyinzade Ali Turan for his slogan "I belong to the Turkish nation, I am a member of the Islamic ummah, and I am from the Western civilization" (Tokluoğlu, 2012: 124-5). As can be

understood from this slogan, Gökbalp concentrated on the mostly-discussed question of his time: how to become a part of the Western civilization without being westernized, and he claimed that the Turkish nation would be involved in the Western civilization by employing the concept of national culture emphasizing the unity in language and religion (Tokluoğlu, 2013: 114). His most famous work on this matter is his prose work *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization) in which he draws attention to this unity in order to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Through his ideas, Gökbalp left a strong impact on Mustafa Kemal, and in a way, helped him to designate the ideology of the new nation-state to be founded (Belge, 2009: 32-36).

2.3. One-party Government Populism: *Halkçılık*

It is necessary to analyse what populism meant in different periods in order to make a sense of the term usage in Turkish politics, and it is important to state that the one-party populism, or *halkçılık* is not the same as the populist phenomenon that understands the political environment consisting of two opposing camps. This distinction manifests itself Turkey's permanent transition to multi-party politics in 1946 and becomes clearer with the CHP's handing over the government to the DP after the 1950 elections. The political stance of the DP based on the idea of the people positioned against the ruling elites marks the difference between populism used in the literature and *halkçılık* adopted by the one-party government. Therefore, we can describe two kinds of populism in Turkish politics: the CHP's *halkçılık* and the DP's political populism.¹⁴ This part deals with the former one with its ideology and usage during the one-party government.

¹⁴ Before the introduction of the DP in Turkish politics, populism was employed in different periods for different purposes. For instance, it was used in the late Ottoman period as a reference point against the absolute authority by a group of intellectuals, in the Turkish War of Independence period as a discourse that will ensure the mobilization of the Anatolian people in order to fight for their land, in the New Republic (until the Great Depression occurred in 1929) as the source of legitimacy of the

The reason for why we are unable to use the term of *halkçılık* synonymously with populism is that the former lacks some certain aspects of the latter. The definition of who the people are is useful to elaborate this distinction. In Atatürk's *halkçılık*, there is "a seamless community without any internal fissures", which makes it impossible for us to detect "any notion of antagonism" (Laclau, 2005a: 209). In this regard, the contributions of Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp to defining who the people are worth mentioning. The former deals with this question by ignoring the term of nation and describes the group of the common people as a socio-economic class consisting of "poor peasants in the countryside, small enterprises and waged laborers in the cities" while the latter explain this group in a wider sense by making use of the Durkhemian solidarist perspective and include everyone—except for the educated elites—in it (Karaömerlioğlu, 2009: 274). Moreover, Gökalp (2006: 79-85) touches on the need for a lively interaction between the educated and the people: the former should go to the latter both for receiving cultural elements from them and bringing the Western civilization to them. In this way, he overcomes the understanding of the people as a socio-economic class, which Mustafa Kemal strongly opposed due to his insistence on the classless nature of the Republic.

Halkçılık stands out as an impetus to the establishment of modern Turkey. It can be considered as a sign of breaking away from the traditional Ottoman government system and other similar regimes that put the people into the background. According to Karaömerlioğlu (2009: 275), this concept signifies national sovereignty as the foundation of the new Republic by attributing the ultimate power and authority to it. Although some doubted that *halkçılık* echoed the ideals of Bolshevism, the Turkish officials insisted on the fact that the former had

new regime, and in the post-1930 Turkey (until the DP's emergence in 1946) as a highly elitist discourse by those ruling the country (Karaömerlioğlu, 2009).

authentic aspects in order to prevent any confusion about it. In this regard, the following statement of Mustafa Kemal given to a newspaper correspondent working for *Le Petit Parisien* summarizes the clear distinction between Turkish *halkçılık* and Russian Bolshevism:

It should not be forgotten that our regime is not a Bolshevik system. Because we are not either Bolsheviks or communists; we can be neither of them. Because we are nationalists and deferential towards our religion. In a word, our type of government is a democratic one to the core, and this means “self-government” (halk hükümeti) in our language.

This government serves the demands of the nation directly and ensures the governance of the nation and the country. Through this aspect, it is the master of its own destiny. This is what will be enforced in all of our government bodies (Atatürk, 1997: 72).

The concept of self-government in the quote above implies that the people have the ultimate power and authority and govern themselves without the intervention of any external force. To make it happen, a nation must be economically independent as well. Despite the difference between their conceptualizations of the people, Akçura and Gökâlp agree on this. By being aware of the overwhelming and devouring power of European capitalism in non-capitalist societies, the former author states that “If the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class by profiting from European capitalism, the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim” (Akçura, 1333/1917: 2521-22 as cited in Berkes, 1998: 426). As explained before, his ideal description of Turkish society is based on the establishment of a class society, which is in conflict with Mustafa Kemal’s views.

On the other hand, Gökalp's opinion about the establishment of a Turkish nation based on independent economy without creating a class society reflects Mustafa Kemal's desire for the new Republic. There is no room for polarization in Mustafa Kemal's *halkçılık*, and he sees society as "an authentic bearer of nationalism" by making use of the term "corporatism", which indicates the harmonious functioning of a society with the regular and effective performance of its smaller units (Karaömerlioğlu, 2009: 275). According to Gökalp, the implementation of the division of labour and the reinforcement of solidarity in society can yield fruitful outcomes such as preventing social polarization, boosting the national economy and maintaining the national consciousness (Sağlam, 2004: 83). In short, it can be said that Gökalp's view, not Akçura's, provided the necessary political and economic direction for Mustafa Kemal and his party CHP.

During the one-party government of CHP, no concessions were made with regard to the principle of *halkçılık*. Despite small changes, it never lost its importance until the emergence of the DP in Turkish politics in 1946, and the CHP accepted it as one of its six founding principles, also known as the Six Arrows,¹⁵ in 1931 and 1935 (Karaömerlioğlu, 2009: 275). Following the 1929 Great Depression, statist politics were on the rise around the world while liberal ones and democratic regimes were losing their importance. Turkey also adopted such statist politics by compromising its populist principles, and during the 1930s, the top officials and intellectual circles used more populist references in their political discourses (Karaömerlioğlu, 2009: 282-3). The inconsistency here was this: the state was industrializing the society by being in conflict with its populist principles such as ensuring social solidarity and maintaining social unity (Çelik, 2009: 88). Therefore, especially after

¹⁵ The remaining principles are republicanism, nationalism, laicism, etatism and reformism. Together with populism or *halkçılık*, they make the Six Arrows.

the Great Depression, the one-party government populism or *halkçılık* was paternalist (İnsel, 2009: 24), and it was also “elitist, top-down, bureaucratic and anti-democratic” as encapsulated in the slogan “despite the people, for the people” (*halka rağmen, halk için*) (Karaömerlioğlu, 2009: 283).

2.4. Early Democratic Movements Before the Democrat Party

In democratic regimes, the people participate in the process with their votes, and the presence of alternative political parties is a must so that we can mention a healthy and functional democracy. For this reason, it is not possible to consider the one-party rule, which alone dominated Turkish politics until the end of WWII, as a truly democratic one. However, the foundations of the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and the Liberal Republican Party (SCF) during this period can be interpreted as the steps taken for a democratic life.

The TCF was founded on 17 November 1924 as the first opposition party in Turkey. Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay and Adnan Adıvar included in the founding members of this new party, and despite the fact that they fought alongside Mustafa Kemal during the Turkish War of Independence, they feared the possibility that their comrade-in-arms would replace the republican regime with a dictatorial one (Erdoğan, 2005: 33). As understood from this, the TCF was a reaction against the radical ideas of Mustafa Kemal, and therefore it had a conservative political stance (Yılmaz, 2006: 58). Additionally, it adopted liberalism in its party program and embraced political liberalism by keeping the party membership open to all Turkish citizens (İnsel, 2005: 66-7). Through these, we can describe the TCF as a liberal-conservative political party.

The establishment of the TCF posed a danger to the new regime due to its oppositional political stance, and this was not welcomed by the officials of the CHP. The presence of an oppositional force in a post-war country meant a sort of resistance towards the change. İsmet

İnönü¹⁶ was one of those who were worried about this possibility and stated his discontent with the TCF by equating opposition with revolution (Arabacı, 2005: 115). Following the Sheikh Said Rebellion¹⁷ occurred in the Southeastern Anatolia in 1925, the Turkish government enacted the Maintenance of Order Law (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) in order to put an end to the rebellion. Through this law, all of the dissident voices were silenced, and the TCF was no exception even though it did not have a direct relationship with the rebellion (Zürcher, 2005: 9, 119).

Another party that prevents the one-party government from being labelled as an undemocratic one is the SCF, which was founded in 1930 by Ali Fethi Okyar. It is significant to state that this party did not enter the politics as an independent voice due to the fact that Mustafa Kemal requested his friend, Okyar to found it. There were several reasons behind the idea of establishing a political party such as overcoming the social discontent with the state, ensuring the supervision of the government and proving the democratic nature of the Republic to the sceptical minds of European nation states (Ertem, 2010: 88). Mustafa Kemal was careful about achieving these goals; therefore, he himself determined the MPs of the SCF, and one of them was Ahmet Ağaoğlu, whose national and liberal ideas helped the new political party to determine its ideological standpoint (Erdoğan, 2005: 33). Apart from this, it can be said that the early opposition parties in Turkey followed a liberal tradition.

The fact that the SCF was a puppet party founded upon the request of Mustafa Kemal was not a threat to the Republic at first. However, this was about to change in a short period

¹⁶ Despite his disapproval of the TCF, İnönü was the one who supported Turkey's transition to multi-party politics in 1946.

¹⁷ This was a rebellion against the republican regime with the rise of Kurdish nationalism, which was the result of the Abolition of the Caliphate holding the Turkish and Kurdish societies together and the repressive policies targeting the Kurdish identity. As soon as it was suppressed, most of its leaders were executed and many Kurdish people were forced to evacuate the Southern Anatolia region according to the orders of the Independence Tribunals (*İstiklâl Mahkemeleri*) (Zürcher, 2000: 247-51).

of time. The SCF received great interest from the people, especially those living in the Western Anatolia, and competed with the CHP in the 1930 Election¹⁸ (Ertem, 2010: 83-4). Following the election, the SCF officials made complaints about the poor and unfair conduct of the election, and Okyar made a proposal to the Assembly for the investigation of the irregularities in the election; however, the government declined it, and Okyar had to step back (Aysal, 2009: 596-599). As a result of this, Okyar who did not want to be in a political conflict with Mustafa Kemal decided to dissolve the SCF on 17 November 1930. In addition to this, the outbreak of the Menemen Incident (*Menemen Olayı*)¹⁹ showed the fact that Turkey was not ready for multi-party politics yet.

As can be understood from the short lives of the TCF and the SCF, the early democratic movements in Turkey were far from achieving a success. In a country which went through several catastrophic wars and faced strong criticism about the changes and reform both from political and social spheres, it would be an imaginary expectation for these movements to yield fruitful outcomes. Consequently, the one-party government restored its authority and power through the statist politics until the introduction of the DP in 1946 in Turkish politics.

2.5. Political Populism: Opposition and Change in Turkish Democracy

The Republic of Turkey was founded based on the democratic principles, and the one-party government ensured political stability in the Republic. Despite these, the communication between the state and the people followed one-way path, and the latter was kept out of politics due to the former's "state is everything" policy. In the early period of the

¹⁸ The most important aspect of this election was the fact that there was not a suitable environment for the voters to reflect their free will on the polls (Tunçay, 1981: 271-2).

¹⁹ It was another revolt performed against the new Republic. In Menemen, a small town of İzmir in the Western Anatolia region, a group of people, whose aim was to replace the republican regime with Sharia or the religious law, murdered Lieutenant Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay and other two municipal watchmen (Tunçay, 1981: 293-5).

Republic, certain steps were taken for the realization of a democratic state; nevertheless, as stated in the previous part, none of these gained a permanent status. Through the transition to multi-party politics with the DP in 1946, the CHP's elitist *halkçılık* began to lose its importance, and as the lost actor of politics, the people began to perform their role in determining the political authority with their votes (Ünder, 2009: 153).

It is quite appropriate to claim that Turkish politics entered a new era with the DP. Through the rise of democratic regimes around the world—especially in Europe—after the WWII, Turkey also acted in accordance with the world conjuncture. In this regard, considering its decision to adopt a more democratic way of politics is not a pure coincidence. Also, the Turkish government was aware of the need for such a change to be realized in the country, and the following statement of İsmet İnönü, who took the leadership of the CHP after Mustafa Kemal's death, touches on this need:

Our only deficiency is the lack of a political party against the governing party.

Our country has previous experiences about this. In fact, the government officials provided incentives for those who wanted to make such attempts. It is an unfortunate for them not to be succeeded due to the reactions raised twice in the country. However, the establishment of another political party will be possible thanks to the natural processing of the libertarian and democratic atmosphere in accordance with what the country needs.²⁰

As an opposition party, the DP was not totally different from the CHP since the founders of the former were the previous members of the latter. The most important incident

²⁰ The quote was regarded as a message to Celâl Bayar and his friends (Toker, 1990: 29). Also, it is an interesting fact that İnönü made this statement despite the presence of the National Development Party (MHP), which was an opposition party founded before the DP (Ahmad, 1996: 30).

that led the fractions in the CHP to come to surface was the Land Reform Bill of 1945.²¹ After it was passed despite the strong criticism in the Assembly, four PMs²² presented a motion to the Assembly for “the precise and appropriate implementation of national sovereignty and in-party democracy”²³ (Ahmad, 1996: 30). This opposition movement continued and took different forms with some individual acts of protest, which consequently ended up with separations in the CHP. For instance, the critiques of Menderes and Köprülü on the *Vatan* newspaper about the CHP led them to lose their party memberships, and these were followed by Koraltan’s expulsion from the party and Bayar’s decisions to resign from his duty in the Assembly (Ahmad, 1996: 29-30). Then, these four political figures founded the DP on 7 January 1946.

There was a strong similarity between the party programs of the CHP and the new party despite small changes. The latter adopted the 6 principles of the former in its party program but with a more liberal perspective (Karpas, 2010: 490-1). According to Ahmad (1996: 30), the DP had no choice but to include these six principles in its party program since an opposite decision carried the possibility of violating the Constitution and leading the activities of the party to be terminated.

The real breaking point between the DP and the CHP was about their perspective about *halkçılık* or populism. The overall goal of the DP was to realize democracy and reflect

²¹ According to Lewis (1968: 474-5), this bill was one of the CHP’s populist policies aimed to help the peasants with no or little land and to make use of the arable lands by reducing the influence of the big landowners and nationalizing their landed property; however, it was not implemented instantly due to the criticism received both from the press and the powerful landowners in the CHP.

²² Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan and Mehmed Fuad Köprülü were these four PMs. Menderes was an influential landowner, Bayar was the supporter of free enterprise, Koraltan was one of the notables in the countryside with his bureaucratic background, and Köprülü was a historian who valued the Ottoman legacy (Karpas, 2010: 52). The CHP government did not adopt a negative attitude towards the opposition of these PMs in order to clear the party’s totalitarian image and to strengthen the in-party relations by resolving the disagreements (Karpas, 2010: 487).

²³ This motion is known as the Motion with Four Signatures, or *Dörtlü Takrir* in Turkish political history since 4 PMs put their signatures on it.

national sovereignty in politics; however, according to its officials, the CHP's top-down political stance was a hindrance. By determining to follow a bottom-up path and emphasizing the significance of individuals freedoms, the DP adopted an antagonistic political identity and criticized the CHP based on its exclusive political stance (Ahmad, 1996: 31). In other words, populism had an intellectual dimension during the one-party government while it took a political direction with the DP and occupied more space in Turkish politics (Toprak, 1992: 62). Compared to the CHP's intellectual populism that excluded the ordinary folk from the state affairs, the DP utilized an inclusive form of populism, appealed to the people and mobilized them against the CHP (Sunar, 1990: 749).

2.6. An Antidemocratic Turn: The Democrat Party Governments

The DP pioneered the use of political populism in Turkish democracy as a reaction to the CHP's intellectual populism. Unlike the latter, the former enabled the people to participate actively in politics and to determine who would represent their will. Through the DP's use of this kind of populism and its victories in several elections, the succeeding political parties—especially those tending to the Right—made use of populist discourses, and the political framework of the centre-right politics in Turkey began to be formed (Çavuşoğlu, 2009). Considering the DP in particular, doing politics from a populist perspective led it to win three general elections during its political lifetime; however, it failed to keep its populist promises and gradually distanced itself from the principles of democracy. For a better understanding of how the DP entered an antidemocratic path, Özçelik (2010) provides three stages; the first stage covers the opposition years of DP, the second one is about its first government, and the third one describes its authoritarian years.

In the first stage, the DP acted as an opposition party, but it faced serious difficulties in order to conduct its role effectively. One of these difficulties was the debate about to what

extent the DP, which included the same principles of the CHP in its own party program, was a distinguished political party; as a result of this, the DP built its political image based on “complaining, criticizing and demanding concessions constantly from the government”, which eventually forced the ruling party, the CHP to answer these demands in “a more liberal way” and agree on issues such as adopting direct election system, granting administrative autonomy to the universities and liberalizing the press (Ahmad, 1996: 35-36). What is more, different cycles of the society such as “peasants, workers, intellectuals and landowners” began to sympathize with the political stance of the DP, whose officials were fierce critics of the CHP government, and this enabled the party to strengthen its oppositional role in the Parliament after the 1946 general election²⁴ (Karpas, 2010: 252-255).

In the 1950 General Election, it came to power alone with an overwhelming majority in the Assembly.²⁵ The secret of the DP’s success was in close connection with its claim that it represented the national will. By blaming the CHP for ignoring the national will and not trusting the people’s political maturity, the DP strengthen its claim as the representative of the national will (Özçelik, 2010: 171). It also carried out some effective PR techniques during the elections, and the most famous one was the poster on which this simple and clear message was written: “Enough! Word is Ours!” (*Yeter! Söz Milletindir!*).

In the second stage, Turkey went through several important changes under the Presidency of Celal Bayar and the Prime Ministry of Adnan Menderes. During its first government, it followed Atatürk’s Six Arrows, promoted economic development and maintained good relations with its electorate. As the opposition party, the CHP set the agenda

²⁴ According to the election results, the DP did not obtain “a sensational success” due to the fact that the CHP received the majority of votes; however, there were serious debates about different practices of electoral fraud performed during the election (Zürcher, 2000: 308-9).

²⁵ Unlike the previous election, this election, in which the method of secret ballot and open counting was applied, was considered as a free and fair election, and the DP won 408 of the 417 seats (Zürcher, 2000: 315-7).

around the danger of religious reaction (*irtica*) and claimed that Atatürk's reforms were under a threat; however, the DP government proved that such concerns were invalid by enacting the Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk (*Atatürk'ü Koruma Kanunu*) on 25 July 1951 (Ahmad, 1996: 66).²⁶ As for economy, through the foreign aids, the DP made investments for those living in the countryside, and most of these investments targeted agricultural sector.²⁷ For the maintenance of good relations with its electorate, who mainly consisted of those living in the countryside, it aimed to "cut across primordial and class divisions and to bind the people to the party" by distributing the state sources "for loyalty and support" or employing the strategy of patronage/clientelism²⁸ (Sunar, 1990: 750).

In the third stage, the DP gradually abandoned its political discourse based on democracy and adopted an antidemocratic political stance. This led it to lose its popularity among the people²⁹ and to be in conflict with others such as the intellectuals, the press and the army. Through Menderes's repressive policies targeting the universities and the press, the debates about "one-man rule" were intensified (Ahmad, 1996: 68).

Starting from the year 1954, Menderes took several measures to control those who were influential in the production and circulation of ideas. According to his discontent with the autonomous positions of the İstanbul Technical University and Ankara University, he

²⁶ Although the DP government carried religious elements to politics by enacting laws about the recitation of the *ezan* in Arabic and the compulsory religion lessons at schools, it abided by the secularist principle of the state (Kurtoğlu, 2005: 212).

²⁷ For this state-supported agricultural sector, Oktar & Varlı (2010: 9-16) touches on the introduction of the mechanized agriculture in the country and its role in the considerable growth in this sector.

²⁸ According to Bora (2009: 502), patronage means the distribution of public resources for the realization of political power, and as a subfield of it, clientelism is the attribution of a client dimension to this distributional relationship. He furthers that the transition to modern politics in Turkey occurred with the transformation of patronage to clientelism.

²⁹ The 1954 General Election was the greatest success of the DP since it received 57% of the votes, which was the result of the people's content with the DP's economic policies (Ahmad, 1996: 75). However, the 1957 General Election, in which the DP lost its widespread popularity, changed the picture and led the party to "lose its right to claim the holder of national will" (Ahmad, 1996: 87).

enacted a law authorizing the Minister of National Education with the power to discharge the academicians from their jobs (Tangülü, 2012: 397). Also, his government accelerated its intervention in the Turkish press by taking oppressive measures. Through the 1954 law which prevented the journalists from verifying their claims at the courts³⁰, and the 1956 regulations about this law, which aimed to eliminate criticism about the government in the press, the DP violated some basic freedoms such as freedom of thought and freedom of expression (Yıldız, 1996: 492-6; Kubilay, 2014: 32-4). Although not only the DP but also other political parties made such attempts aiming to restrict and control the activities of the press (Kubilay, 2014: 34), this does not change the anti-democratic nature of the laws targeting the press.

In addition to the universities and the press, the DP government took steps to increase its authority among the people and other political parties. The most notable one was the establishment of the National Front (*Vatan Cephesi*).³¹ Menderes pioneered this political movement with the aim of confronting those bearing “grudge and enmity” against his government and used the national radio, on which the names of the members of this movement were announced on a regular basis, for the propaganda purposes (Keloğlu-İşler, 2007: 124-5). This created a polarized society (Özçelik, 2010: 184), and the message was clear: *you are either with us or the enemy*. The DP attempted to ensure the same control mechanism on the political level as well. Its hysteria about a possible coup to be led by the army with the support of the CHP increased the level of oppressive measures. According to this, the Committee of Inquest (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) was formed on 18 April 1960 “with the

³⁰ The DP government drew heavy criticism for its support for this law and faced in-party disagreement; consequently, some of its members left the party and founded the Liberty Party (HP) in 1955 (Yıldız, 1996: 494).

³¹ Menderes miraculously survived the 1959 Gatwick plane crash in which 15 members of the DP lost their lives. His survival was interpreted as “the will of god”, and his government used this image by describing the participation in the National Front as “a religious and national duty” (Ahmad, 1996: 473-474).

aim of inspecting the destructive activities of the CHP and a certain group of the press” (Esen, 2010).³² In short, the oppression of the DP government permeated into both society and politics; as a result of this, the first and successful coup of Turkish democracy was staged on 27 May 1960 by the army, and the important DP politicians such as Adnan Menderes, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan was executed by the orders of the National Unity Committee (MGK), which was established after the coup (Akıncı, 2014: 63).

All in all, the DP achieved a political success in its early years through the populist politics such as positioning itself against the establishment, appealing to the people, claiming to represent their will, boosting economy with clientelist politics and presenting Menderes as a charismatic leader. Through populism, it provided a new direction for Turkish politics and left a strong impression on the subsequent right-wing political parties. Regarding the years with the DP government, the populist mode of politics proved that it could provide benefits for the people and at the same time pose a danger to Turkish democracy. By conducting their policies cautiously to avoid the latter condition, the inheritors of the DP focused on the former one in order to gain political legitimacy.

2.7. The Justice Party: Süleyman Demirel Impact

The DP government that came to power with the votes of the people, disengaged its democratic ideals gradually and was overthrown as a result of the 1960 military coup. A member of the junta, Alparslan Türkeş announced on the radio that the Turkish military seized the control of the country in order to overcome the social polarization and restore democracy. Following the coup, the National Security Council (MGK) was established, and

³² The Committee of Inquest was a political formation that was superior to the Parliament and the judiciary bodies was established in order to investigate almost all of the existing institutions in the country, but one month after its formation, the first military coup was staged due to the fact that the Committee was the extreme manifestation of an antidemocratic regime (Ahmad, 1996: 99-102).

it terminated the political activities of the DP on 31 August 1960 and ordered its closure on 29 September 1960 (Zürcher, 2000: 351-3). The MGK under the leadership of Cemal Gürsel continued to act as the top institution that was running the country until the 1961 General Election.

Not only the DP but also its electorate with large numbers, who were distanced from politics during the previous one-party government, received a serious blow due to the 1960 military coup. In order to address this electorate, whose right to be represented politically was disenfranchised, the Justice Party was founded on 11 February 1961 by Ragıp Gümüşpala (a retired four-star general), Tahsin Demiray (a publisher), Şinasi Osma (a retired staff colonel), İhsan Önal (a medical practitioner), Ethem Menemencioğlu (a professor), Mehmet Yorgancıoğlu (a businessman), Muhtar Yazır (an economist), Necmi Ökten (a retired general), Cevdet Perin (an associate professor and a writer), Emin Acar (a lawyer), and Kamuran Evliyaoğlu (a journalist) (Demirel, 2004: 28-29). In addition to the AP, as the successors of the DP, two other political parties, namely The Republican Peasants' Nation Party (CKMP) and the New Turkey Party (YTP) were founded; however, the AP rose to prominence as the real heir of the DP (Çavdar, 1985: 2090).

Ragıp Gümüşpala who had a military background took the leadership of the AP and held this position until his sudden death in 1964. The reason why a person with military roots was selected for the leadership post of a new party established right after a military coup becomes comprehensible when analysing the conditions of the period. The dramatic end of the DP and the executions of its important figures were at the top of the country's political agenda; therefore, those who were interested in new political formations had to act reasonably by taking the very recent past into consideration. In this regard, one of the founders of the AP, Şinasi Osma touched on the benefits of the selection of a person with

military past for the party's leadership since "such a move would eliminate the unintended consequences" (Demirel, 2004: 32). Under the leadership of Ragıp Gümüşpala, the AP came out as the second party of the 1961 General Election by receiving 34,8% of the votes; nevertheless, the party experienced its golden years under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, who took the post after Gümüşpala's death.

Demirel proved himself as the leader of the AP during the 1960s and strengthen his strong leadership image during the 1970s. Therefore, we can analyse him and his party in detail by considering these two decades separately. Firstly, the AP was the government alone during the second half of the 1960s, and Demirel left no doubt about his leadership qualities both in his party and the country. Through his resignation from the government due to the 1971 military memorandum, he came out as "a strong leader" and contributed to gathering other right-wing political parties together under the same roof. In this regard, he formed the National Front Governments (*Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümetleri*) in the second half of the 1970s. During these years, Demirel was discontent with the 1961 Constitution and its articles³³ since, according to him, the autonomous judicial bodies established after the adoption of this constitution obstructed the healthy and free realization of the national will and restrict the government's executive powers (Bora, 2005: 569).

³³ According to Arslan (2005: 281-4), the 1961 Constitution served as a reaction against the possibility of the rise of a political party resembling the Democrat Party, had articles undermining the national will, produced independent judicial institutions to check the constitutionality of the laws enacted and led the military personnel to control the political agenda. He also mentions the liberating aspects of the new constitution, which symbolized Turkey's transition [from majoritarian democracy] to constitutional/plural democracy and put an emphasis on the protection of the rights of the minorities; however, he furthers that this constitution was never produced for the sake of liberal values only since the main goal was to avert a possible one-party government or one-man rule like the previous DP government under the leadership of Menderes.

The AP entered the 1965 General Election under the leadership of Demirel. During the election campaign, it adopted an anti-communist stance and a political discourse consisted of Islamist elements while the CHP put forward its famous slogan “centre-left” (*ortanın solu*) (Duman & İpekşen, 2013: 123). In this election in which the small-scale political parties had more PMs thanks to the national remainder system, the AP received 52.9% of the votes and won 240 of the 450 seats, and this result was “an indicator of Demirel’s approval as a leader by the people (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 142). According to Ahmad (1977: 241), this election victory was not enough for the party to overcome its “identity problem” since it contained “a wide assortment of political types: secularist intellectuals and reactionary Islamists, officers and the anti-military, former Democrats of all hues and those new to politics.” The diverse nature of the party posed difficulties in ensuring the in-party stability and compromise. However, through Demirel’s re-election for the AP’s leadership post in 1966, the party “began to lose its ultra-conservative, religious, ‘caliphatist’ (*hilâfetçi, dinci*) character (as the press described it) though that did not prevent it from exploiting religion for political ends” (Ahmad, 1977: 242).

In addition to strengthening its in-party relations, the AP government fixed the country’s economy by ensuring the political stability, making more public investments and keeping the inflation rates under control; additionally, it avoided taking extreme measures about the student protests³⁴, which occurred both all around the world and in Turkey (Demirel, 2004: 50). This enabled the party to repeat its success in the 1969 General Election, but the country was far away from political and economic stability. In the following years, the problems such as “student and working-class militancy, social and economic changes,

³⁴ Demirel’s words “the roads are not worn away by walking” summarize the AP’s tolerance towards the increasing number of boycotts, protests and occupations (Çavdar, 1985: 2092).

growing political conflict, and the world situation”³⁵ made the country ungovernable, and Demirel was blaming the 1961 Constitution and the leftist forces such as the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP) and the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) for dragging the country into a sort of political deadlock; consequently, things spun out of control, and the military intervened in Turkish democracy for the second time on 12 March 1971 with a military memorandum ³⁶ (Ahmad, 2003: 132-133). This military memorandum ended differently from the 1960 coup. While politicians faced death penalties in the latter, the elected president resigned from his office and handed over the government to the military officials in the former.

The restoration of democratic politics did not take place until the 1973 General Election. The AP under the leadership of Demirel did not perform well at the polls due to the fragmentation in the right-wing political parties³⁷, and Demirel became the opposition party against the coalition government consisting of the CHP and the National Salvation Party (MSP). Following the breakdown of this coalition government in 1975, Demirel, who was regarded as an outdated politician by some critics, launched a political operation aiming to unite the Right against the Left and formed the First National Front government consisting of other right-wing political parties such as Necmettin Erbakan’s MSP, Alparslan Türkeş’s

³⁵ The abolition of national remainder system before the 1969 General Election (which received strong criticism from the small-scale political parties like the TİP), the AP government’s attempts to restrict the activities of particular workers’ unions like the DİSK, the workers’ protest in İstanbul 15-16 June 1970, the leftist students’ bank robberies and anti-American stances, the neo-fascist militants’ attacks on the professors, and the Islamists’ statements about denying Atatürk and Kemalism were some of the examples that brought about a chaotic atmosphere in the country (Ahmad, 2003: 133-134).

³⁶ On the difference between this and the previous 1960 coup, Demirel (2005a: 250) states that the high command in the military acted promptly by giving an official warning to the government due to the possibility of another “non-hierarchical” coup to be led by some colonels, like the 1960 coup.

³⁷ The AP received 29.8% of the votes because the voters had options from the Right such as Ferruh Bozbeyli’s Democratic Party and Erbakan’s MSP, whose voting rates were 11.9% and 11.8% respectively (Demirel, 2004: 65).

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Turhan Feyzioğlu's Republican Reliance Party (CGP) (Bektaş, 1993: 36). Demirel achieved this political success by presenting Ecevit's CHP as an almost communist party and adopting an anti-communist and national discourse (Demirel, 2004: 70-1). Demirel pioneered the Second National Government, which lasted shorter than the first one, after the 1977 General Election.

Considering the CHP's increasing popularity in the eyes of the people, it was not expected that Demirel would come to power again. However, the AP came out as the first party from the 1979 mid-term election, and Demirel formed his third government with the partial support of the MHP and the MSP. During his third term, Demirel was not able to reverse the worsening economy and politics in the country despite his efforts such as introducing a new economic model with the 24 January decisions (*24 Ocak Kararları*)³⁸ and declaring a state of siege (Demirel, 2004: 75-76). To provide the general condition of the AP during the 1970s, it is hard to say that it was as successful as in 1960s since it mostly came to power together with other right-wing political parties, except for Demirel's government in 1979. This last government was also short-lived due to the 12 September 1980 military coup which was orchestrated by the army with the aim of overcoming the social, economic and political conflicts in the country.

2.7.1. The Democrat Party Legacy in the Justice Party

It is no secret that the AP adopted the legacy of the DP in its party program, discourse and politics. Due to the profound impact of the latter on Turkish politics, the successor

³⁸ Through this program, Demirel undertook the duty of revitalizing the economy in the country whose economic life was brought to a standstill due to both national and international troubles (i.e. anarchy and 1979 oil crisis respectively) (Alkan, 2020: 870), but this economic policy was far from creating the intended impact, and there were several strikes in different sectors such as metal, glass and textile due to the inability of workers to compete with the economic crisis and increasing prices (Çelik, 2020: 592-593).

political parties of the Right—and even those having a leftist program—conducted more populist policies, or gave more attention to what the people demanded. In other words, instead of following a top-down model, adopting a bottom-up strategy, which the DP owed its political victories, favoured the implementation of a more democratic program and enabled the main principle of the Republic of Turkey—which is “sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the Nation”—to be applied in a true sense. Despite the DP’s distancing itself from the ideals of democracy and the 1960 military coup, this bottom-up strategy continued to be utilized by the political parties of the 1960s. According to this, what is going to be discussed in this part is about the DP’s populist political tendencies (i.e. building a strong communication with the voters through the strategy of patronage or clientelism and enabling them to occupy more place and time in national politics) and their reflections on the AP.

Following its foundation, the AP did not face considerable difficulties in completing its party organization across the country. Its emergence as a political party became easier and faster thanks to the previous DP organizations; for instance, the previous members of the DP in İzmir located in the Aegean region of the country became the new members of the AP and enabled it to complete its organization there (Bektaş, 1993: 34). As stated in the previous part, there was a diversity among the members of the AP, and the political figures having affiliations with the closed DP were one of the groups that ensured this diversity. Some of them were Neriman Aġaoġlu, Melahat Gedik and Erol Aksal, and such figures made efforts to form the new party according to the DP tradition (Bektaş, 1993: 150-151).

In addition to the fact that the AP benefited from the availability of political sources of the DP during its foundation phase, the former continued to use the political tactics of the latter in order to maintain its communication with its electorate (Bektaş, 1993: 34). Starting

from the early years of the Republic, despite the ideology of “towards the people”, there was a disconnection between the centre and the periphery (Mardin, 1973: 83). By being aware of this social structure in Turkey, the DP appealed to the members of the latter, who were “the small-holder peasants and the expanding, but still small, commercial, industrial urban labour groups” (Sheerwood, 1967: 55). In order to gain the support of these people and maintain this support, it made use of patronage—a political strategy enabling the party to win over the masses and their votes—as a result of this, the electorate (particularly peasants) began to associate themselves with the party, involved in state affairs more frequently and became less dependent upon the bureaucratic elites (Sunar, 1985: 2083-2084). Considering the benefits of patronage for a political party and its electorate, the AP adopted and improved this as the DP legacy, and it became a suitable political strategy for a political leader like Demirel who was viewed as the voice of the ordinary people in politics (Heper & Keyman, 1998: 264-265).

As a political party emerged after the 1960 military coup, the AP adopted the goal of the DP, which was to prevent the forces in the centre from disturbing the subjects in the periphery. For this goal, the AP went to the countryside and adopted the mission of bringing the troubles of the people living there to the political agenda of the country. Before taking the post of the AP’s leadership, Demirel worked as a bureaucrat for Menderes’s DP and became acknowledged about the needs of the ordinary people and how to ensure their support for the party (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 113). This shows that he had known the political strategy of patronage and its benefits for the success of the party for a long time. According to Bora (2005: 574), Demirel understood politics as bringing socio-economic services to the people and thus legitimized clientelism and populism; in other words, he not only adopted the DP’s discourse on serving the people but also took it to another level.

The AP took apparent steps in order to make the people comprehend that it inherited the DP's way of conducting politics. For instance, in the 1965 General Election in which the CHP came up with the slogan "centre-left", the AP also made its political stance clear and took a stand with the DP tradition. It even changed its party emblem to a white horse, which was used before by the DP, and this move "convinced the majority of the electorate of its loyalty to the old order" (Steed & Abadan, 1966: 341).

In general, the DP's impact on the formation and development of the AP is undeniably great. According to Erdoğan (2005: 34-5), both are often regarded as the representatives of the liberal tradition; however, it is better to describe them as "developmentalist-populist" political parties, and as he furthers, their way of understanding the political arena can be associated with the "anti-pluralist" perspective due to their claim to be the representatives of the national will. In addition to these, it is worth mentioning that the AP showed more tolerance against the opposition forces and paid greater attention to the protection and promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms compared to the previous DP governments (Demirel, 2005b: 551-552).

2.7.2. National Populism and National Will Discourse of Süleyman Demirel

As a part of the populist ideology, the concept of national populism implies the unity of the people who makes the nation. Its effective usage in national politics can pave the way for a political party to come to power. In the context of Turkish politics, the right-wing political parties such as the DP and the AP made use of it effectively. According to Bora & Canefe (2008: 646), one of the main elements of national populism employed by these political right-wing political parties is the discourse of "serving the people", in which the articulation of politics is ensured through the clientelist relations, politicians are seen "as the

officers, not the superiors, of the people”, and the act of doing politics is defined as a sort of “competition” based on who will serve the people at the most; in other words, the meaning of serving the people is popularized and nationalized. Apart from these, the following maxim can be extracted: *to serve the people is to serve the nation*.³⁹

Demirel’s political style cannot be considered without the concept of national populism. Bora (2005: 553) provides three main aspects of Demirel’s nationalism. Firstly, it had an antagonistic relationship with the left-wing populism of the 1960s and 1970s in terms of the definition of the people: the former defined them according to the concept of the nation while the latter’s interpretation of the people was based on the socio-economic conditions. Secondly, Demirel appealed to the people by using his hometown accent⁴⁰, borrowing metaphors from everyday life and adopting an authentic reasoning style. Thirdly, he embraced the idea about the mixture of the modern thought and the traditional way of life. Regarding the third aspect, Bora (2005: 553) states that Demirel, who was aware of the material and spiritual dimensions of modernism, tended to support the “material” growth (e.g. benefiting from the scientific and technologic developments) in a pragmatist sense and

³⁹ Due to the absence of restrictive institutions or laws in the 1950s, the DP followed a “populist and pragmatic” development program, and its successor, the AP sustained this program in the framework of its political discourse known as “Great Turkey” (*Büyük Türkiye*) during the 1960s; however, through the worsening economic conditions and the coalition governments of the Right, the APs ideal of Great Turkey that carried more or less the same framework of the DP underwent serious changes, and the party adopted a political program evoking nationalist ideas (Koca, 2020: 386-387).

⁴⁰ It is not incidental that Demirel included elements from the vernacular in his political discourse. In a way, his way of doing politics with the language used by the common people overcame the perception that the Turkish voters were not able to make sound political decisions. According to Bora & Erdoğan (2006: 635-6), the conservative populist perspective in Turkish politics with the rejection of such a perception regards the common people as the true holders of “common sense”, and Demirel is the one who made this association of the people with the concept of common sense possible with his use of daily language consisting of “simple, descriptive sentences in the form of question-answer.”

sustained the support of the religious and conservative people by defending and promoting the Islamic values.

In parallel with his national populism, another important concept in Demirel's discourse was "the national will", which was, according to him, the most significant element for a country to be accepted as a democratic one. In other words, the realization of national will meant a true democracy for him. To do accomplish the latter through the former, both the DP and the AP made significant attempts; however, there is a clear distinction between these two parties about their understanding of the national will: the DP and Menderes took extraordinary measures in silencing the dissident voices by relying on their claim to be the representative of the national will while the AP and Demirel avoid entering such a path and showed more respect towards the core elements of democracy (e.g. opposition) (Demirel, 2004: 222-226).

For Demirel, holding elections, ensuring the people's participation in these elections and maintaining the superior position of the Parliament were the requirements of the realization of the national will. Especially, he put emphasis on the importance of voting and elections and stated that the elected government should leave political power only through another election to be held (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 289). In other words, he was against the extra-parliamentary forces intervening democracy (e.g. the army), and the following statement explains clearly why he was against such forces:

The extra-parliamentary opposition, pressure groups or forces cannot participate in realizing the sovereignty. They cannot articulate the national will. In fact, it is unlikely for us to make the concept of extra-parliamentary opposition legitimate. ...Nowhere around the world, the trust of extra-

parliamentary forces and pressure groups is not consulted in order to come to power. In this regard, it is impossible for them to determine the fate and duration of governments in any of the democracies, and our constitutional order cannot recognize such an act as well. (Demirel, 1974: 70, as cited in Demirel, 2004: 227).

2.7.3. National Front Governments of the Right

The National Front Governments were formed twice under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel between the years 1975 and 1977. The first one lasted for over two years while the second one did not show the same political performance. The importance of these governments lies in the fact that the Right in Turkey made itself too visible by forming an alliance among the conservatist, nationalist and Islamist political parties against the threat of communism and other leftist forces.

The First National Government can be regarded as a success story for both Demirel and his party. He entered the 1973 General Election as “a victimized [former] prime minister” with great hopes; however, the election resulted in an unexpected defeat for him, and he accepted the election results by stating “the nation gave us the duty of opposition” (Çavdar, 1985: 2095-2096). Considering the breakdown of the CHP-MSP coalition government following the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and the ephemeral government of Sadi Irmak in the following year, the opposition duty of Demirel was replaced with the duty of forming a government. After his meetings with the CGP, the MHP and the MSP, he formed the National Front Government on 31 March 1975 and took over the management of the country on 12 April 1975 (Sarıbay, 2005: 586).

This attempt to unite the political parties of the Right received support from even those having conflict with the AP.⁴¹ Thus, different socio-economic groups such as “the AP’s large industry and business bourgeois, the Anatolian notables and middle-class merchants of the Democratic Party and the MSP’s Islamist-national bourgeois” came together under the same flag, and the MHP took the responsibility for determining the ideology of this unification; nevertheless, it was not possible for the society to find peace due to the increasing gun violence and crime incidents that were the result of the existing sharp political and social division (Çavdar, 1985: 2096-2097).

To provide the portrait of the Turkish politics in 1970s, the country was in political turmoil. During the decade, the quarrels between the forces of the Right and the Left hit the headlines. In such an environment where the political and social division became the part of everyday life, Demirel took a stand with the political actors of the former against the threat of communism. By doing that, he made a sort of generalization for a reason, Bora (2005: 564) suggests that Demirel might even aim to create a hegemonic discourse based on communism in order to reunite the political parties of the Right under the roof of his party. From this perspective, one cannot deny that he achieved his goal but could not help to prevent the country from facing the upcoming destruction in its democracy.

The first National Government remained in power until the decision about a snap election was made. After the 1977 General Election which was scheduled to an earlier time due to the economic and social troubles in the country, Demirel formed the Second National Front Government as a result of the CHP’s losing the vote of confidence; however, as in the

⁴¹ 12 PMs from the Democratic Party, which was established by the old members of the AP, and Celal Bayar, who had disagreements with Demirel, provided their support for this coalition government (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 193).

previous coalition government, the country was in a chaotic condition, and an ordinary citizen was unhappy with the rising prices, energy restrictions and anarchy on the streets (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 196-9). In addition to these, the reactions of the opposition forces under the leadership of Ecevit increased and led the 12 PMs of the AP to resign after his meeting with them at *Güneş Motel*⁴²; consequently, the Demirel's coalition government fell before the beginning of the new year.

2.8. Transformation of the Republican People's Party under Two Leaders

After the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, İsmet İnönü took over the management of the CHP and continued his post as the leader of the CHP until the year 1972 when Bülent Ecevit succeeded him. İnönü was the key man of Turkey's transition from one-party government to multi-party politics, and his contributions to the restructure of his party and country were undeniably great. This part deals with the transformation of the CHP starting from the years with İnönü. In this regard, it is useful to divide this part into three subparts. Firstly, I will take a look at the difference between the CHP in power and its opposition years in order to provide hints about to what extent a political party, which has held the power for many years, can go through changes in its way of doing politics. Then, I will touch on the reform movements and İnönü's falling out of favour in the CHP. Finally, I will conclude this part with the description of Ecevit's CHP.

Before the emergence of the DP in 1946, İnönü's CHP was struggling with both the country's economic problems, which stemmed from the WWII. İnönü was not interested in going to the war since he had no intention to "repeat the tragic error of October 1918" (Lewis,

⁴² This meeting was secretly held at this hotel, but it hit the headlines soon after this (Hürriyet, 22 December 1975). Except for one, all of other PMs who resigned from the AP supported for Ecevit to form the government, and ten of them were included as ministers in his new government (Komşuoğlu, 2008: 201).

1968: 295). Although he managed to escape the possibility of being involved in the battlefield by declaring the country's neutrality, some economic measures had to be taken in order to reduce the devastating impact of the war on the national economy. In this regard, the National Defence Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*), which gave extensive powers to the government such as price controls, increasing working hours, cancelling weekly holidays and tax increases, was enacted in January 1940, and the Wealth Tax Law (*Varlık Vergisi*), which forced the minorities to sell their assets, was approved by the Parliament in November 1942 (Ahmad, 2003: 97-98). In addition to these, the Law of 1943 concerning the taxation of soil products (*Toprak Mahsülleri Vergisi Kanunu*) was approved and adopted, and this damaged the relationship between the middle farmer and the CHP government (Birttek & Keyter, 1975: 459). These laws were the reason for why the CHP received a widespread criticism and discontent from different cycles of the society.

After the war, the CHP did not give up on its statist policies, and this time it began to face opposition from its own members. As explained before, the Land Reform Bill of 1945 and the following debates around it in the Parliament led the DP to be founded in 1946 by the dissident voices of the CHP. From a positive point of view, it can be said that İnönü saved himself from the in-party opposition with the establishment of the DP. However, the rising criticisms about the CHP and its policies left him no choice but to make several concessions such as approving direct election system, abolishing the title of National Chief, granting scientific and administrative autonomy to the universities, pardoning the press offences, canceling the Law of 1943 concerning the taxation of soil products, enacting the Worker's Insurance Law and so on (Eroğul, 1990: 14).

The reason behind the steps taken to signal the change in the CHP was that İnönü was aware of the strong possibility about the DP's increasing popularity among the people, and

he aimed to win over the people's hearts through these policies and laws. However, the people demanded more than these and supported the DP for the next government in the 1950 General Election. Thus, the country opened a new page on politics with the rule of the DP, which would continue until the 27 May 1960 military coup. During its rule, the DP brought back the one-party government, to which it put an end in 1950, and took extreme measures to secure its rule. In return, the CHP under the leadership of İnönü accelerated its opposition activities and sought for the social support it had lost by highlighting the undemocratic aspects of the DP and its policies. Özçelik (2010: 186) states that the political debates of the time period covering the years between 1945 and 1960 concentrated mostly on democracy, and regarding the political stance of the CHP during these years, she claims that the CHP reminded the DP in opposition by defending and promoting the democratic ideals of the country.

The 1960s marked a new era both around the world and in Turkey. As the decade of the social groups seeking for freedoms and identities, the era opened a new chapter in world politics. In other words, “the wind of change” blew all over the world and left an unforgettable mark both in international and national politics. The political parties of the decade formed or redefined their political stances ideologically in order to find the biggest audience among the people of changing societies. In this regard, the CHP's official announcement of the “centre-left slogan” can be considered as the requirement of the world conjuncture of the 1960s. Despite the intensive in-party debates about this movement, the CHP adopted it as the party program before the 1965 General Election with the aims of showing its support to the critics of the Right, making its new political stance—which bore no close connection with communism and other radical left-wing political parties (e.g. the

TİP⁴³)—clear to the political audience of the country and highlighting the welfare state implementations (Ağtaş, 2008: 198-9).

The centre-left slogan was employed in the CHP's campaign for the 1965 General Election. By employing this slogan, İnönü intended to place his party's traditional policies in a framework; in other words, rather than portraying a new political image, he created an umbrella term for what was already there (Günay, 2008: 235). By being unable to offer something new, the CHP suffered a defeat at the polls. Following this election defeat, those defending the centre-left slogan made great efforts both for the party organization and the people to comprehend the meaning of it, and for this purpose, they went on nationwide tours, which enabled the party to build and strengthen its interaction with the people (Esmer, 2008: 76).

Although the centre-left slogan did not achieve a political success at first, the young and radical members of the CHP under the leadership of Ecevit were determined to bring a new party program to be structured around this term. According to Ecevit, the party was in need of a populist perspective like the one adopted by the political parties of the Right such as the DP and the AP. These parties owed their political success to populist politics such as going to the people and ensuring their mobilization. In parallel with the weight of being the state party, the CHP had not employed such populist politics. Ecevit had the opinion that the CHP should take a populist turn; however, his biggest challenge was İnönü.

The relationship between Ecevit and İnönü already cracked due to the latter's support for the governments of Nihat Erim formed after the 1971 military memorandum. According

⁴³ According to Alper (2008: 204-205), the CHP in the first half of the 1960s had no clear political prescription to offer and failed to satisfy the reformists and radicals; that's why these social groups, especially the university students, began to sympathize with the TİP, which was the first socialist party in the Parliament.

to Ecevit, any political activity performed under the influence of a military intervention was a barrier against the realization of democracy. For this reason, he openly expressed his disagreement with İnönü and accelerated his activities to bring reforms to the CHP. In the 5th Extraordinary Congress of May 1972 which was held in unfair conditions, Ecevit's PM list was accepted despite İnönü's severe criticism, and Ecevit took the leadership of the CHP. Alper (2008: 211) interprets this situation as the victory of Ecevit's radical populist reformism against the moderate statist reformism. In parallel with this idea, the defeat of İnönü against Ecevit created a sensational reaction in the Turkish press, and the transition from "National Chief's Party to the People's Party" hit the headlines (Ağtaş, 2008: 201).

Under the leadership of Ecevit, the CHP's popularity grew among the people, but it fell into decline at the end of the 1970s. In the first election with a new leader, the party came out as the first party and formed a coalition government with the MSP. During this government, Ecevit left no grey area about the Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974, and this enabled him to earn the nickname "the Conqueror of Cyprus" and to obtain the highest election rate of the CHP (41.4%) in the 1977 General Election; nevertheless, the anarchist movements, the deepening economic crisis and the defeat in the 1979 Mid-term Election led both him and his party to fall into disfavour (Alper, 2008: 211-212).

2.8.1. Kemalist Ideology in the Republican People's Party

The Kemalist ideology or Kemalism is what constitutes the CHP, its party program and official ideology. In Turkey, it was first used in the magazine named *Muhit* by Ahmet Cevdat Emre, who wrote articles about democracy, and he defined the term as "a doctrine that belongs to the school of democracy with its apparent political principles" (Uzun, 2010: 245). As explained in one of the earlier chapters of this section, Kemalism has six principles

(i.e. republicanism, nationalism, populism or *halkçılık*, statism or etatism, laicism, reformism or revolutionism), which were officially adopted by the CHP and included in its 1935 party program⁴⁴.

As can be seen in different interpretations of democracy, the Kemalist ideology has never had a fixed definition. Especially after the 1930s and the introduction of multi-party politics in Turkey, both academics and political actors attributed various meanings to the term such as rightist Kemalism, leftist Kemalism, statist Kemalism and liberal Kemalism; in other words, both political parties of the Left and the Right made changes in the six principles of Atatürk and created their own versions of Kemalism in order to associate themselves with the founder of the Republic and gain political legitimacy (Uzun, 2010: 246).

As for the CHP's adoption of these six principles and the changes in them through the years, İnönü acted cautiously in reinterpreting them despite the changing conditions of the 1960s while Ecevit reconstructed three of these principles, namely, *halkçılık*, etatism, and revolutionism. In the former's centre-left discourse, the following statement of his published on the magazine *Kim* on 13 August 1965 shows both his strong devotion to the Atatürk's six principles and the ambiguity of his version of the centre-left discourse:

⁴⁴ In the 1935 CHP party program, republicanism is defined as "the form of government which represents and realizes most safely the ideal of national sovereignty; nationalism is associated with "the special character and the entirely independent identity of the Turkish social community"; populism dictates that "the source of Will and Sovereignty is the Nation" and interprets "the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people"; the goal of etatism is "to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible" and adds that "the interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual builder, as well as to encourage private enterprises, and also to regulate and control the work that is being done"; laicism means separating "ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State"; and revolutionism aims "to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles which have since been elaborated" (The Republican Party, 1935).

While ensuring our development, I desire to explain and determine the dimensions of the expressions such as “leftist” and “rightist”, which are used both economically and socially in the today’s civilization. We have implied the same thing by saying that we have been “statist” for forty years. That’s why, I have said that we are “at the left of the centre.” In fact, we have at the left of the centre since the day we said we were laicist/secular. Those who talk about impiety regarding our secular stance now get used to it. If you are halkçı/populist, you are at the left of the centre. (...) You are reformist, not conservative. The Constitution has a social base. You adopt social justice, and you should not be afraid of being “at the left of the centre” (Abadan, 1966: 157, as cited in Ağtaş, 2008: 200).

When analysing the centre-left discourse of Ecevit, the three principles mentioned above undergo some important changes; however, there is a strong emphasis on the people in each of these principles. Firstly, Ecevit’s understanding of populism is inherently different from the Kemalist way of *halkçılık*. According to Erdoğan (1998: 27), the former recognizes “presence of social classes and antagonisms” by going beyond the latter’s “solidarist-corporatist imagination of the social world.” Thus, it proves a certain disengagement of Ecevit’s populism from the Kemalist *halkçılık*. Yeğen (2009: 69) touches on this distinction and associates with the former’s with “the notion of justice suffering from the modern conflicts that have become possible due to the development of a national capitalist market and the growth of the cities.”

Other Kemalist principles being exposed to a kind of configuration are etatism and revolutionism. The fact that the state only is responsible for implementing the reforms—from the Kemalist perspective—renders the analyses of these two principles separately

unnecessary. Through Ecevit's centre-left discourse, the people, not the *state*, are held responsible for the social change (Yeğen, 2009: 71); in other words, the state in his duties such as pioneering the transformation of the society and ensuring the preservation and continuation of the reforms has an active partner.

To provide a brief summary of the change of the Kemalist ideology in İnönü's CHP and Ecevit's CHP, it was reproduced in the former one without radical changes. On the other hand, Ecevit who defended the idea of reinterpreting the Kemalist principles with a radical tone pioneered the transformation from the state party to the people's party in a true sense. Particularly, he reconstituted the principle of *halkçılık* and made it possible to be associated with the term of populism; in addition to this, other principles such as etatism and revolutionism were subject to change.

2.8.2. From the Centre-left Discourse to the Ideology of Democratic Left: Bülent Ecevit as a Charismatic Leader

The declaration of the CHP as being located at the left of the centre is an indicator of a change in the party's political program and perspective. But it is interesting that the CHP was not the first party that stated its political and ideological stance based on the left-of-centre discourse. Before the 1960s, regarding the difference between the DP and the CHP, Menderes told a reporter that his party was a "leftist" party with a distance of "two-fingers" from the centre; in other words, he dismembers his party from the CHP tradition politically but superficially with simple terms instead of "using a more European political language" (Günay, 2008: 234). The emergence of new political parties with different ideologies through the 1961 Constitution led the CHP to restructure itself and İnönü to declare the CHP as being located at the left of the centre for a long time covering the early years of the Republic. As Günay (2008: 251) points out, İnönü's usage of centre-left stopped the spread of the

perception of change in the CHP since it was “a facile deviation” preventing such a perception.

Ecevit’s usage of centre-left provides a clearer and more authentic meaning, which can be symbolized as the transition of a state party to a “people’s” party. Especially, in his book titled “Centre-left” (Ecevit, 1966), he provides the ideological background of centre-left and its populist hegemonic project on the national level (Alper, 2008: 211). Regarding the impacts of the leftist movements around the world, Ecevit (1966: 32) provides four examples: the far left in Russia and its satellite countries, the leftist formations in the Arabic countries such as Egypt and Syria, the emergence of social democracy in Europe, and the communist influence of China. By basing centre-left on the third example, Ecevit (1966: 27), who disregards being at the right or at the centre or their extreme versions due to their inability to meet the country’s needs for progress and development, supports the idea that the Turkish people should adopt a leftist political perspective (i.e. democratic left), which is also suitable for the European concept of social democracy.

The authenticity of Ecevit’s centre-left relies on his remarks about the democratic aspects of the Ottoman social system. Ecevit describes the presence of the Ottoman pluralist society, the autonomous aspects of different nations in the Empire and the restrictive power of some institutions and classes (e.g. judicial bodies, religious bourgeoisie or *ilmiye* class and the army) on the Sultan and his government in order to bear out his populist argument with the acquaintance of the Turkish people with the components of democracy (Ecevit, 1966: 36-7). In addition to the influence of social democracy of Europe, he adds a national meaning to his concept of centre-left, or democratic left; in other words, he blends Akçura’s opinions on social classes and Gökalp’s emphasis on the concept of nation together for his prescriptive solution to both the party and the country.

After introducing a strong association both historically and theoretically, Ecevit provides a list of political party ideologies consisting of far right with its outdated methods, conservatives with their resistance to change, centralism or those situated at the centre with passivist tones, centre-left, and far left with its loose interest in democratic ideals. Regarding the aspects of those being at the left of the centre; they are “populists, defenders of social justice and social security, progressivist, revolutionist, reformist, statist with a clear direction and plan; they hold on the idea of freedom, show respect towards the individual and humanity and take a side with social democracy” (Ecevit, 1966: 36-7). With these, Ecevit determines the defining aspects of “centre-leftists” and the new CHP.

Through the discourse of centre-left, Ecevit replaced İnönü as the new leader of the CHP; however, he improved this political discourse after taking the leadership post. He adopted the ideology of democratic left, and this was something different from social democracy since it did not include a Marxist framework⁴⁵ (Bozarslan, 2009: 460). Despite the fact that this new ideology suffered from the issue of authenticity, there were still some elements such as promoting small property ownership and ensuring the economic development first with the peasants, which could be relatively considered as original (Alper, 2008: 205-206). In other words, Ecevit’s democratic left carried the goal of implementing “infrastructural reforms”, not the ones aiming to make changes in superstructure (e.g. Kemalist reforms) (Bozarslan, 2009: 460). In fact, Ecevit aimed to ensure the sustainability of a stabilized country with social justice and to create a hegemony based on Atatürk’s

⁴⁵ On this distinction between democratic left and social democracy, Aytürk and Bora (2020: 310) also touches on the lack of Marxist ideology on the former, but they attract the attraction to the understanding of an egalitarian society in Ecevit’s version of democratic left which supports the idea that the Turkish people, excluding “the big interest groups”, can be described as “an unprivileged, classless and united mass.”

superstructural reforms in social base by promoting the idea of small property ownership (Alper, 2008: 208).

The idea of small property ownership included not only having a land but also financial assets in the industrial sector, and the group of ordinary people would be saved from “a parasitic mercantile class”, whose members included “middlemen, usurers and big landowners”, through the establishments of cooperatives with duties such as ensuring the peasants to be organized and providing loans for them (Alper, 2008: 207-208). As for the extent of promoting small property ownership in terms of industrial sector, the project of creating a public sector (*halk sektörü*)⁴⁶ would be put into practice. With this, it was aimed to create a sort of “balance and check system against the monopoly capital”, but the efforts to realize this failed (Aytürk & Bora, 2020: 311). Regarding the second authentic aspect of the CHP’s democratic left ideology, Ecevit intended to industrialize the peasantry by forming urban-style villages (*köy-kentler*), which would ensure centralized inhabitations and become home for cooperatives and small-scale industry; however, “the peasants were in fact demanding the fair distribution of public land, not a radical land reform” (Alper, 2008: 208-209). Consequently, this project remained unrealized like the idea of public sector.

The ideology of democratic left required the party and its officials to build close connections with the ordinary people; in other words, the party should appeal to them. But who were they exactly? In this group, there were different socio-economic groups such as “peasants, workers, officials, craftsmen and artisans”, and Ecevit made serious efforts to present himself as someone belonging to this group (Erdoğan, 1998: 26-7). As an expected feature of a populist leader, he directly addressed to the people and their demands and

⁴⁶ Since this project bore a resemblance to the social corporatist model of the Scandinavian countries and Germany, it was not an original production of Ecevit (Aytürk & Bora, 2020: 311).

position them against those undermining them under the influence of his charismatic leadership. He even had a nickname *Karaoğlan*, which enabled him to sustain his communication with the people effectively and portray himself as a kind of hope for a better future.⁴⁷ Through the phenomenal slogans such as “We will make the land reform”, “The land belongs to who cultivates it, the water belongs to who uses it”, “We want a fair system”, and “The current system is to be changed” (Ağtaş, 2008: 215), he drew his charismatic image based on his populist communication with the masses.

Ecevit’s role in the Cyprus dispute even strengthened the charismatic leadership image he possessed. His popularity grew beyond belief among the people during the second half of the 1970s, which enabled him to serve as a prime minister for the second time after the failure of Demirel’s 2nd National Government in 1978. But this picture changed at the end of the 1970s with the 1979 Mid-term Election, in which his voting rates reduced spectacularly due to the increasing incidents of anarchy, student protests, economic crisis and social discontent with the country’s political and economic directions. All in all, his ambitious political stance based on populism against the conservative side of the CHP enabled him to take the leadership of his party. Towards the end of the 1970s, he “gave up” his “populist hegemonic project” with the aim of “protecting the state” (Erdoğan, 1998: 26-7)⁴⁸; however, in a political setting divided between two opposing camps, his political

⁴⁷ According to Oğuz (2018: 88), this political nickname was given to him by an old Anatolian lady who asked him to bring “brighter days”; in this sense, the sense of hope among the people was strictly attached to his charismatic leadership. In addition to this, Ecevit received several nicknames during his political career such as *Büllende*, which reminds the rise of a socialist leader, Salvador Allende in Chile during the early 1970s, and the Third Man enabling him to be seen as an equal to Atatürk and İnönü (Kaynar, 2020: 1027-1031).

⁴⁸ Given to the fact that the violent incidents were the truth of everyday life in Turkey in the 1970s, there was a chaotic atmosphere on the streets around the country. During the years between 1978 and 1979 alone, 2457 people lost their lives in political violence incidents such as massacres (i.e. Malatya and Kahramanmaraş) and assassinations of intellectuals and students (Akça, 2020: 114-115), all of which occurred due to the increasing tension between the forces of radical right and radical left.

program leaning on the Left of the political spectrum, by which he drew an overt line between his party and other radical left political parties, “proved the possibility of a hegemonic leftist politics by deepening and equating the popular-democratic antagonisms” (Ağtaş, 2008: 220).

2.8.3. Cyprus Conflict and Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974

The Cyprus dispute is not a solved issue that has been brought up to the world agenda since the second half of the twentieth century.⁴⁹ Generally speaking, the disagreement stems from the pretensions of the Greek and Turkish communities living in the Island, as well as the global attention to it. Through the Zurich and London Agreements, the establishment of an independent Cyprus with its people⁵⁰; however, both political and social conflicts continued to hound the island during both the 1960s and the 1970s. The proactive actions of the Greek administration such as attempting to remove Makrios’ thirteen proposals to amend the constitution⁵¹, implementing the Akritas Plan⁵², and the Bloody Christmas performed by the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots⁵³ kept the tension high in the 1960s. Due to the fact similar incidents continued in the early 1970s, the Turkish military launched a peace operation on the island in 1974 and brought it into a successful conclusion, which favoured Ecevit in national politics in Turkey.

⁴⁹ In fact, due to the geographical significance, the interest of other civilizations, empires and nations in the Island never disappeared (Vatansever, 2010: 1488-99).

⁵⁰ According to the decision made, a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president would rule the new Republic to be founded; however, it never remained long in history due to the Cypriots Greeks’ desire to unite with Greece (Kasım, 2007: 59).

⁵¹ Some of these proposals were “the veto rights of both the president and the vice president, the abolition of separate election by each group’s representatives, and the unification of municipalities”, and following the refusal of the Cypriot Turks, the Island was in chaos (Yılmaz, 2010: 9-10).

⁵² The plan was designed with the aim of eradicating the presence of Turkish Cypriots on the island, but what is special with this plan was the use of violence if necessary (Artuç, 1989: 56).

⁵³ On 21 December 1963, the Turkish Cypriots on the island became the target of violent attacks launched by the Greek Cypriots who acted in accordance with the Akritas Plan (Keser, 2011).

Cyprus that had been under the influence of empires such as the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire became a republic with the agreement signed on 1960.⁵⁴ But this was not enough for the people on the island consisting of both Greeks and Turks to lead a conflict-free life. Such conflicts began to rise right after the establishment of the Republic, especially the Greek side's policies threatening the presence of Turks in the island (i.e. constitutional amendment proposals, the Akritas Plan and the Bloody Christmas) put the republican regime in danger and led the Green Line, which stood for the division of the Greek and Turk population in Nicosia, to be drawn on 30 December 1963 (Vatansever, 2010: 1513). In the following year, the tension increased in the island and led one of the three guarantor countries, Turkey to consider a military intervention in 1964. However, the USA showed its strong opposition to such a decision with its president, Lyndon B. Johnson's letter (also known as Johnson's letter to İnönü), which İnönü considered as "disappointing" due to Johnson's threatening tone in the letter (Johnson & İnönü, 1966: 388-393). But the real reason behind Turkey's dropping its decision to launch a military operation on the island was the fact that it was not technically ready for such an operation (Özdemir, 1989: 253).

In the early 70s, Greece, which was being governed by the military junta, began to increase its authority on the island and intervene in its politics. This made official with the coup d'état staged against Makarios's government on 15 July 1974 by the Greek junta. Five days later, the Turkish military that could not put an end to the conflict on the island due to technical impossibilities in the previous decade decided to launch the Cyprus Peace Operation⁵⁵, which ended with success in the following month. Although even this was not

⁵⁴ This agreement signed by three guarantors (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom) included terms such as protecting the independent status of the island and giving upon the old-fashioned theses over the future of the island (i.e. *enosis* and *taksim* respectively) (Vatansever, 2010: 1505-1506).

⁵⁵ In an interview given to the BBC, Ecevit describes the background of the intervention of the Turkish army in the island with these words: "We didn't want to resort to military action. That's the reason

enough for a conflict-free island, a thick border separating the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was drawn.

On the national level, the Cyprus operation's success helped Ecevit to strengthen his political stance in the eyes of other politicians and the people in general. Through his self-confidence and determination that were significant for this successful operation, Ecevit proved that leftist politicians were no less nationalist than their rightist counterparts and that he, as a leftist politician, was able to take the necessary actions in the case of a national cause (Demirel, 2009: 438). Naturally, this helped him and his party to increase their prestige in the eyes of the people and to escape from inappropriate political tags.

In addition to taking the leadership of the CHP after a determined in-party campaign and winning the 1973 election, Ecevit developed his charisma and political style by taking a firm stand on the Cyprus conflict and bringing it to a successful conclusion. In fact, he was given the title “Conqueror of Cyprus” (*Kıbrıs Fatih'i*) after the operation, which transformed him into a sort of national hero.⁵⁶ Although he brought this popularity to the political arena and put an end to his coalition government with the MSP in order to come to power alone, this plan did not come true due to his failure to receive the vote of confidence from the Parliament and the establishment of the 1st National Front government eliminating the possibility of holding a snap election; what is more, the country continued to experience such political crises during the second half of the 1970s and faced “the longest government crisis

why I went to Britain immediately after the coup that is I went there on the 17th, and talked to Mr. Wilson, Mr. Callaghan and colleagues and inquired if we could do something together as to guarantor pass. Unfortunately, I couldn't receive a positive reply, and we didn't have any time to lose. So, we acted” (BBC News Türkçe, 2018, Timestamp 4:31)

⁵⁶ The posters of Ecevit wearing a helmet were visible in many public places (Özcan, 2020: 299).

in its history”, which would come to an end with the 1980 military coup (Özcan, 2020: 299-303).



CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter is about revealing the aspects of populism and its connection with democracy in Turkish politics between the years 1972 and 1980. For this, I will use content analysis method and apply it to the parliamentary minutes of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, who were the leading Turkish political leaders during the 1970s. With these speeches delivered on the National Council and the Senate of the Republic⁵⁷, I will first analyse the rate of populism and its aspects in Turkish politics quantitatively and then explain the relationship between populism and democracy qualitatively.

To be more specific, I will investigate the populist tone in the parliamentary minutes of Demirel and Ecevit by making use of the dictionary-based quantitative content analysis. Then, in parallel with the findings of this analysis, I will conduct a qualitative analysis on the same data and describe the close connection between populism and democracy in the context of Turkish politics with the aim of clarifying the relationship between these two concepts.

During the empirical analysis, I will seek answers to the following questions: (1) Which elements of populism dominate the political agenda of Demirel and Ecevit? (2) What are the changes in these populist elements during the time period provided? (3) What are the distinctive aspects of different populisms (i.e. right-wing populism and left-wing populism) in Turkish democracy? (4) What was the quality of interaction between populism and democracy in general? According to the results, the political leaders of both the CHP and the

⁵⁷ With the adoption of the 1961 Constitution on 27 May 1961, it was decided that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) had two main governmental bodies, which were the National Council (*Millet Meclisi*) and the Senate of the Republic (*Cumhuriyet Senatosu*). The main reason behind the establishment of such a binary system was to prevent arbitrary decrees to be enacted by bringing different perspectives about a topic into the agenda of decision makers (Özgişi, 2012: 55-59).

AP formed their political agenda with a discourse that was mainly on appealing to the people and conceptualizing the political world from a Manichean worldview. Secondly, despite both drastic and slight changes in their usage of populist discourse, these leaders employed populism mainly before and after the elections. Thirdly, the most visible difference between right-wing populism and left-wing populism in Turkey is based on their conceptualization of the people. Finally, it can be said that populist politics such as going to the people and taking side with them against anti-democratic forces help the democratic principles to be promoted in Turkey during the early years of the 1970s; nevertheless, such politics accelerated the creation of a polarized country at the end of the decade.

In the following parts of this chapter, I will reintroduce the elements of populism (e.g. appeal to the people, anti-elitist political stance and Manichean worldview) according to the information provided in the theoretical part of this thesis. Then, I will explain the dictionary-based content analysis. Following this, I will present the results of the quantitative analysis conducted. Finally, I will reveal how and to what extent Demirel and Ecevit, who can be regarded as the representatives of the right-wing populism and the left-wing populism respectively, employed populist policies in Turkish democracy through a qualitative analysis of populism applied on the parliamentary minutes of these two leaders.

3.1. Aspects and Varieties of Populism

As explained before, I will adopt the minimal approach to populism. The reason for that the term lacks a comprehensive framework which can be found in other grand ideologies (Taggart, 2000). As Canovan (1981: 294) proposes, there are two common aspects of populist phenomena around the world, namely, appealing to the people, and adopting an anti-elitist political stance. Despite the fact that other aspects of populism might be visible in different

political environments, this finding indicates the unsophisticated nature of populism. Thus, rather than a thick ideology, it is better to deal with it as “a thin-centered ideology” which can be found in the ideologies of the right and the left (Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004).

With these two elements, the political world, according to the populist imagination, consists of two antagonistic camps: the good (e.g. those who share the same values or socio-economic background), and the bad (e.g. those who undermine the former). As explained clearly in the theoretical chapter, the first group is a constructed and homogenous group whose members are seen as either the nation excluding minorities and other ethnic groups inside, it or the common people belonging to the same social class; what is more, the rightist political parties tend to use the former definition while their leftist counterparts adopt the latter one (Pasquino, 2008: 16). This provides a significant hint about the elasticity of populism.

The same kind of homogeneity and elasticity can be also found in the adversary group consisting of those carrying features opposing aspects. This relationship is exactly the same one existing between the ruled and the rulers. Of course, this example can be extended since the second group can include elites of different sectors (i.e. politics, economy, culture and media), supranational institutions or even the most developed countries (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 11-16). This shows how two populist elements can take different forms based on the given political environment. By considering this, adding another element to the populist analysis can be a useful tool for the measurement of populism. Therefore, I will employ Manichean view of politics⁵⁸ as the third element for this analysis since such a

⁵⁸ On his quantitative analysis of populism in contemporary Turkish politics, Elçi (2019: 390) makes use of the Manichean view of politics as the third element due to its function as a bridge between the other two components of populism.

political view elaborates the distinction between the people and the elites and presents this "as an ethical and moral confrontation between good and evil, redemption and downfall" (de la Torre, 2007: 389).

3.2. Data

The raw data of the thesis includes 112 parliamentary minutes of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit between May 1972 and September 1980. Firstly, the reason for why I chose the former date as the starting point for collecting the raw data is the fact that Ecevit became the leader of the CHP on 14 May 1972, and for a fair comparison between the right-wing populism and the left-wing populism in Turkish democracy, it is reasonable to conduct the analysis starting from this date. Also, I did not include any speech delivered after September 1980 since both the CHP and the AP were closed down, and the political activities of their leaders were suspended with the decision made by the military regime of 12 September.

Regarding the parliamentary minutes of Demirel and Ecevit, I collected their speeches delivered in the National Assembly and the Senate of the Republic. The official website of the TBMM (www.tbmm.gov.tr) contains the collection of parliamentary minutes of Turkish politicians starting from the year 1908 and offers access shortcuts such as the presidents' speeches, the prime ministers' speeches, the parliamentary activities of all the PMs and so on. Since the duty of forming the government alternated mainly between Demirel and Ecevit during the time period to be scrutinized⁵⁹, I used the shortcut listing all of the activities of the

⁵⁹ After the governments formed under the influence of the 1971 military regime such as Nihat Erim's 33rd and 34th governments, Ferit Melen's 35th government, and Naim Talu's 36th government, Ecevit formed the 37th, 40th and 42nd governments while Demirel formed the 39th, 41st and 43rd governments. In this picture, there is also Naim Talu's 38th provisional government formed as a consequence of the breakdown of the coalition government of the CHP and the MSP.

PMs and accessed the parliamentary minutes of both leaders. Then, I checked the dates of these parliamentary minutes and picked the suitable ones according to the time period provided above.⁶⁰

Among the studies of the scholars measuring populism, it is possible to encounter different sources for the collection of raw data such as TV broadcasts (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), party manifestos (Pauwels, 2011), or election manifestos (Rooduijn et. al., 2014). Among these options, I first eliminated the first option due to the fact that Turkey's national public broadcaster, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) lost its autonomous position and became a neutral institution with a regulation adopted in 1972, and this enabled those holding the political power in their hands to interrupt TRT's institutional activities (Aziz, 2013: 201). In their study of populism in Greece, Vasilopoulou et al. (2014: 394) draws attention to the benefits of using parliamentary speeches by implying the presence of biased news and the misrepresentation of opinions in the media. Regarding the second option for the use of raw data, I also dismissed the idea of using party manifestos since they are written in a fixed and serious tone in order to offer policy options (Pauwels, 2011: 104).

As for the reason for why I did not use election manifestos, this analysis covers a time period of 8 years and includes two political leaders only. Although these leaders became the prime minister multiple times during the 1970s, the number of their election manifestos is not satisfying to produce reliable results. Also, the usage of election manifestos as the raw data is more appropriate for such a study of populism dealing with various political parties from different countries (Rooduijn et. al., 2014: 566). Therefore, compared to these election manifestos, the use of parliamentary minutes as the raw data for the analysis of populism

⁶⁰ For the distribution of the parliamentary minutes over the years, see the Appendix A.

stands for a better option in terms of achieving a satisfying number of data and thus yielding more consistent findings.

Last but not least, the speeches delivered in the parliaments are full of populist references such as glorifying the values of the people or the nation in general, highlighting the significance of the parliament as the concrete example of the will of the people, declaring threats and enemies of the nation and so on. Therefore, the use of parliamentary speeches possesses the potential of analysing and measuring populism.

In sum, I will use the parliamentary minutes of Demirel and Ecevit as the raw data of this analysis on populism. Firstly, these minutes are formal speeches that are accessible to any scholar aiming to conduct a study on populism in Turkey. Secondly, they contain the exact words of the Turkish politicians and political leaders, which guarantees the use of reliable data in the analysis. Thirdly, the number of these speeches is more than enough to conduct the analysis properly and effectively as compared to the other forms of data (e.g. election manifestos). Lastly, it seems that the use of parliamentary minutes or speeches for this analysis, which measures populism in Turkey in the 1970s, stands for an appropriate and accurate option.

3.3. Method

In this part, I will measure populism by making use of the content analysis. For an effective and comprehensive conduct of this analysis, Krippendorff (2004: 87) touches on the necessity of the co-existence of quantitative and qualitative techniques such as counting the words and making interpretations. According to this, I will first apply the first technique in order to reveal the frequency of the populist rhetoric in the speeches of both leaders over

a time period of eight and half years and then the second one with the aim of examining the link between populism and democracy in Turkish politics.

Given the fact that analysing numerous texts or documents manually can be time-consuming activity for the researcher, the use of computerized techniques provides great conveniences. One of these techniques is dictionary-based content analysis, which is the application of a dictionary consisting of a set of certain words to a huge amount of data (Neuendorf, 2002: 126-127). By bearing this definition in mind, researchers can use either standard dictionaries available in the literature or more authentic ones created by themselves. On this matter, Neuendorf (2002: 129) claims that the use of standard dictionaries might invalidate the findings (e.g. producing irrelevant or futile results) and urges researchers to customize their own dictionaries according to the needs and goals of their analyses.

Regardless of the type of method or technique, an analysis is not considered as complete and successful unless the issues of reliability and validity are ensured. The former is about obtaining the same results by using the same technique in different time periods while the latter deals with what is going to be measured and ensures that the researcher keeps track of this (Neuendorf, 2002: 112). The analyst should ensure the reliability of his/her analysis due to the fact that an unreliable measurement is far from generating “valid conclusions”; however, it should be noted that “reliability does not guarantee validity” (Krippendorff, 2004: 213). In other words, the former alone is not enough for a complete study due to the requirement of the latter as well.

Before introducing the dictionary that I will use for the analysis of populism in the Turkish context, the issues of reliability and validity in the computer-assisted dictionary-based content analysis need to be explained as well. Upon the comparison between computer-

assisted analysis and human coding, Aslanidis (2018: 1245) praises the former's promise for “perfect reliability”, but at the same time he draws the attention to the issue of validity. Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011: 1278) touches on this issue and finds that the validity of classical content analysis is higher than computer-assisted content analysis; however, they conclude that the latter is still applicable since it is “sufficiently valid.”

3.4. Dictionary of Populism

While constructing the dictionary of populism for the analysis of populist rhetoric in the political discourses of Demirel and Ecevit, I observed the populist words offered both by international and national scholars. To be specific, I examined the populist words provided in the literature by various scholars and included some of these words in the dictionary that I created for this analysis; in addition to this, I also determined and added a group of certain words with a capacity to reflect the political environment of the 1970s in Turkey.⁶¹ For the analysis, I used the MAXQDA software that is used for the quantitative analysis. It helps the researcher to apply his/her dictionary to the data provided and shows the words searched in the context of a sentence. After the analysis of sentences with populist references, I detected and extracted the false positive words.⁶²

3.5. Results

Figure 1 shows Süleyman Demirel's right-wing populist discourse while Figure 2 demonstrates Bülent Ecevit's left-wing populist discourse. According to these, both leaders used more populist words referring to the people and Manicheanism than the ones criticizing the elites in their political discourses. In other words, the elements of appealing to the people

⁶¹ See Appendix B.

⁶² See Appendix C.

and understanding the political world from a Manichean perspective are the driving forces of both right-wing populism and left-wing populism. Also, in neither of these populisms, the adoption of an anti-elitist political stance is not of great importance. As for the changes in the use of populism in Turkish politics over the years, fluctuations can be observed in both of types of populisms, but between the years 1973 and 1979, the populist rhetoric dominates the political discourses of both Demirel and Ecevit.




Figure 3.1: Süleyman Demirel's right-wing populist discourse over the years.




Figure 3.2: Bülent Ecevit's left-wing populist discourse over the years.

Comparing the two populist elements, namely, appealing to the people and Manichean worldview, the latter was used more often than the former both by Demirel and Ecevit. Although the CHP, which did not reach the necessary number of PMs for forming the government by itself after the 1973 general election, formed a coalition government with a right-wing political party, the MSP in January in 1974, the Manichean aspect of populism dominated the political arena in Turkey together with the stress on the appeal to the people. For the Cyprus Peace Operation performed in the same year, Turkey faced a strong opposition from one of the two super powers of the time, the USA—against which it took a stand over the issue of cultivating opium poppy—and the relations between two countries deteriorated severely. Two significant results of this political tension were the arms embargo remained in force until 1978 and the anti-American movement in Turkish society. In other words, the relations between Turkey and its ally promoting democracy all around the world against the threat of communism received a serious blow, which led the former to become an open target for the anti-democratic forces. Additionally, Ecevit who came within a whisker

of holding the political power following the 1973 general election increased his popularity among the people thanks to his perseverance in the Cyprus conflict and intended to use it for his own political end; however, this decision ended up with a failure that caused to a political crisis to be felt in the country until the end of the decade (Özcan, 2020: 299-303). By analysing these studiously, Demirel adopted a Manichean and people-centrist political discourse and used it in order to form the first National Front government in 1975.

As for the second half of the 1970s, populism continued to dominate the Turkish political environment and played a significant role in the political careers both Demirel and Ecevit. As in the previous election, the CHP came out as the first political party according to the results of 1977 election, but, as in the previous election, it was unable to form the government by itself; as a result of this, Demirel formed his second National Front government. By increasing the volume of populism in his political discourse and gaining the support of 11 PMs, who resigned from Demirel's government, Ecevit succeeded in coming to power. This government that consisted of the PMs with different political inclinations was not enough for the normalization of the polarized politics; in fact, the social realm also became extremely polarized due to the increasing anarchic incidents, ethnic and religious divisions and political murders. To put it clearly, the sense of order and harmony was lost both in politics and society gradually during the second half of the 1970s, which led Turkish democracy to be interrupted for the third time.

3.6. Two Populisms in Turkish Democracy⁶³

The element of anti-elitism, as demonstrated in the previous part, occupies the least space in the political discourses both Ecevit and Demirel. We can find an explanation for this with the 1971 military memorandum and the suspension of party politics until the 1973 general election. In other words, the increasing influence of military in politics became visible with the above-party governments formed between the years 1971 and 1973, which left little room for the political leaders to express their criticism openly. However, the discontent was not totally absent in Ecevit and Demirel, who advocated the free elections to be held and the will of the people to be the dominant voice in politics. For the solution of crises to occur in democratic countries and the vitality of ensuring the will of the people through the free elections, Demirel remarks:

We didn't invent democracy. Look at the modern world, no country overcomes crises by postponing the elections; on the contrary, many countries hold the elections at an earlier date in order to resolve such crises. But if the question is what or who the nation is and becomes associated with an ignorant majority, one can consider the option of postponing elections not for one year but even ten years. Of course, it is called as sham democracy. There will be no actors of sham democracy in this Parliament (Demirel, 20 November 1972).

On the same topic, Ecevit also supports the idea of holding the free elections with a strong emphasis on the Constitution. His point is to follow the election date provided in the

⁶³ Translations of parliamentary minutes delivered by Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit belongs to me, and their transcripts in Turkish can be accessible to all on the official website of TBMM (https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/tutanak_sorgu.html).

Constitution for the next election. Additionally, he draws attention to the healthy and regular functioning of democracy for the realization of reforms with the following statement:

Are things going to be scheduled until the election date provided in the Constitution, or is the election date going to be adjusted according to the things scheduled? It is necessary to make the final decision about it and follow it; it is the former way from a democratic perspective... Things are to be scheduled according to the election date provided in the Constitution, and the elections are to be held on time (Ecevit, 1 June 1972).

Additionally, Demirel points out the realization of the national will and touches on the significance of maintaining the presence and functioning of the Parliament in order to achieve a stabilized country with the following statement:

Stability in issues such as electoral law, electoral systems and political organization should be absolutely ensured; in addition to this, the national will should be made visible. It is not possible for systems, which only make the national will visible only and do not ensure stability, to last long. Because holding the elections is not a goal, but an instrument for a country to ensure its self-government. In this respect, it is necessary to consider stability and the reflection of national will together. Here, the general principle that you cannot make a sacrifice is the absolute operationalization of State mechanism. You can enact ideal laws that reflect the national will perfectly. But if these laws don't bring stability to the country and not help the state to be operationalized, it means that they don't achieve a result. Then, a vacuum, an emptiness is formed. This is the power vacuum/void. It is the emptiness of government bodies in the country, and it is inevitable that there will be

attempts to fill this emptiness. The condition of stability in a country is the existence of an established and respected Parliament which ensured its superiority. (Demirel, June 1973).

A democratic regime possesses aspects such as promoting the will of the people, holding elections on the regular basis, following the constitutional rights and freedoms, and supporting the superior position of the Parliament. Regarding the restoration of democracy in a country under the influence of anti-democratic forces, the description of political stances of the CHP and the AP provides important hints about whether this restoration can be made. According to Ecevit;

Our concern is democracy. Those who do not care democracy enough can take risks about the democratic regime. The CHP is a sensible political party that cannot take such risks; it has attached its destiny to the destiny of democracy in Turkey. In recent or distant past, we have put ourselves in danger several times with the aim of saving and protecting democracy. If necessary, we are ready to put ourselves, as individuals or a political party, in every kind of danger for the same purpose. However, we have never been and won't be such a party that jeopardizes democracy and gambles on it with personal feelings or intriguing party strategies (Ecevit, 22 March 1973).

For the explanation of the AP's political identity, Demirel makes the following remark:

Revolutions are de facto practices; in other words, whether they will be accepted is beside the point. They are not desirable incidents in a democratic regime. However, what is going to do is to ensure the restoration and re-functioning of the regime once such an incident is the case. Turkish democracy

will gain strength by ensuring the working of its institutions in harmony, bringing out the place, duty and power of everybody and traditionalizing these. Since it was founded in 1961, the AP has acted patiently and adultly against the incident, which the elected parliaments have been dealt with, without distilling the nation; at the same time, it has supported the basic principles of democracy such as votes, electorate and the people's unconditional right of sovereignty (Demirel, 26 March 1974).

Through the 1971 military memorandum that caused an interruption in Turkish democracy, there was a hindrance for an elected prime minister and his government to maintain the democratic regime; in other words, the people were deprived of their right of self-government. With the title of the last prime minister of the country before the memorandum, Demirel states that it is an undesirable transformation of constitutional states to dictatorial governments and delivers the following quote:

We are obliged to empower the State. It is possible to empower the State by going beyond the borders of law; however, the authority to be provided by going beyond the borders of law is an aspect of dictatorial regime, and you distance yourself from open regime, open society. You are obliged to empower the State within the law (Demirel, 13 June 1973).

As the new leader of the CHP, Ecevit touches upon the fact that to be distanced from democracy cause a chain reaction that will obstruct any progress in economy. Thus, he makes a close connection between democracy and economic development, but his understanding of the former is the one leaning on the left. He explains how close Turkish democracy was to this at the second half of the 1960s and that the 1971 military memorandum prevented this and a desired economic development as well with the following statement;

If Turkish society had been left alone, it would have pushed the rulers to give upon the primitive capitalist path. It even began to push them. The people reduced the votes of the AP, which is the main supporter of this type of capitalism in our political world, from 52,9% to 46,53% at the end of its first 5-year administration. Additionally, despite its slowness and unwillingness, the AP began to yield to this conscious pressure generated by the people during its second term. Nevertheless, the 12 March interruption in our regular political development partially extended the duration of primitive capitalism, which lost its validity for Turkish society (Ecevit, 17 February 1973).

It is also viable to mention Ecevit's concept of public sector (*halk sektörü*). He presents "public sector as the third sector", which is based on the principle of forming direct public partnerships rather than partnerships open to the public", and claims that those responsible for the production, or the great majority consisting of "peasants, workers, craftsmen, artisans, minor officials and the retired" will increase it and that the measures taken "to protect the majority of the society against the exploiters, middlemen and usurers" will become useless due to the fact that the former's taking initiatives means the need for the latter.⁶⁴ In other words, by making a distinction between who is the people and who is not included in this category, he presents his populist project and thus adopts a wholly different populist approach than Kemalist corporatist one (Ağtaş, 2008: 214).

Before the 1973 general election, both Ecevit and Demirel stated that the people should have the final word in democracy and that the political parties representing the people on politics should do their duty in the Parliament without the influence of anti-democratic

⁶⁴ Ecevit's speech delivered on 19 October 1972.

forces. However, such Parliaments in any country around the world had to deal with the tension between democracy and communism, which was the most serious issue during the Cold War period. In other words, there was a danger of communism that disturbed the development and spread of democratic ideals. In this regard, Ecevit prescribes the following medicine for his country:

The effective way of preventing communism, especially, inside a democratic regime is to strengthen the democratic left, which is now a fact that is known all around the world. There are almost no level-headed intellectuals left, except for some of our officials and politicians, who would take the fallacies like the center-left's opening doors for communists. As seen in the countries from Scandinavia to India, communism falls away in reverse proportion to the democratic left's success and duration at the power. To be more clearly, the stronger democratic left is in a country the weaker communism is in that country (Ecevit, 17 February 1973).

Thus, by basing his argument on the examples around the world, Ecevit presents a new path for Turkish politics to overcome the threat of communism. On the same matter, Demirel also gives the example of Western countries where “communism is set free and where citizens’ conscience and reason were trusted in order to protect the existing regimes”⁶⁵ from the danger of communism. Regarding the maintenance of Turkish democracy, he points out the importance of the republican regime in the country and states that Turkish people “are obliged to better know and understand the Republic”; in other words, he implies that the

⁶⁵ Demirel’s speech delivered on 13 June 1973.

threat of communism can be prevented if the existing values are promoted, or they are not replaced with new ones.⁶⁶

These quotes show that both leaders considered communism as a threat and offered different solutions. According to the result of the 1973 general election, people put more faith on Ecevit's argument than the one emphasized by Demirel, who ran the country during the second half of the 1960s and resigned from his post due to the 1971 military memorandum. More importantly, going to the people and holding the election in 1973 put an end to the military governments and favoured democracy in the country; however, the restoration of democracy did not wholly eliminate the threat of communism, and this threat continued to be a hot topic in the country's politics.

Ecevit, whose party was unable to come to power alone due to its voting rate at the polls in 1973, agreed with another young leader, Necmettin Erbakan and formed a coalition government with his party, the MSP. This government launched the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974. Despite the success of this operation, the coalition was short-lived and cracked in the same year. This caused a political crisis in the country. As the loser of the 1973 general election, Demirel attempted to use this crisis for his own political end, and by presenting communism as the real enemy of nation-states, he aimed to bring the political parties of the Right together under the roof his party, the AP. The following quote perfectly explains his influential political strategy:

The world in in the middle of a fight for ensuring the order. On the one side, there is communism, and on the other side, we have national democracy. This is the fight. The world in in the middle of a fight for ensuring the order. (...)

⁶⁶ Demirel's speech delivered on 13 June 1973.

we support the solidarity and unity in Turkey, libertarian democracy, peace, respect towards national and moral values and protection of these values. Yes, we invite those who want to be with us, we say that we shall defend these if you want to do so. We invite you to forget what happened yesterday and the resentments you had due to political reasons and to get it off your chest—I have nothing to say to those considering communism not as a threat. Those who consider communism as a threat, join us. Our country has been on the edge of a cliff, it is in dire straits, and there are significant problems in its economy and other systems. The time period between the years 1971 and 1973 demonstrated the type of danger in Turkey, so we say that we should act together (Demirel, 9 March 1975).

Demirel's call for fighting against the common enemy (i.e. communism) was approved by the political parties such as the CGP and the MHP, which had 13 and 3 PMs in the Parliament respectively, and the previous coalition government's partner, the MSP. As a result of this, the first National Front government was formed with these four political parties on 31 March 1975, which can be also interpreted as a political success for Demirel since he managed to bring the political parties of the Right under the same roof. During the first months of this government, Ecevit with the title of opposition leader held a rally in Gerede, Bolu, which has a border with the capital city, Ankara; and he was unable to end it peacefully due to the acts of violence occurred during the rally (Cumhuriyet, 23 June 1975). In a way, this foreshadowed the political and social turmoil to take place in the country in the following years. By attracting the attention to the offensive political jargon of the National Front government, Ecevit warns the Parliament with the danger of a civil war with the following statement:

We have never spoken of war, hostility and fight in Turkish society. But the concept of fighting is frequently used by Mr. Demirel. The one who makes use of this concept certainly adopts the concept of “front” as well. Forming a government with this concept of front stands for such a government that provokes a quarrel, disrupts the peace and take the country to the civil war. Giving a government the name of “front” has no other meaning. Violence, fight, hostility, hatred... These are indispensable to the front philosophy. On the other hand, we do not speak of front, fight and hatred; we only speak of peace (Ecevit, 16 February 1976).

As such, the violence in the country reached its peak moment during the Labour Day celebrations before the 1977 general election. On this day, which is also known as the *Taksim Square Massacre (Kanlı 1 Mayıs)*, 34 people lost their lives, and hundreds of more were wounded (*Hürriyet*, 2 May 1977). This tragic incident favoured Ecevit, who played a key role in the Cyprus conflict and promoted the idea of a better future for the country, and enabled him to increase his popularity among the people. As a result of this, Ecevit’s party, the CHP came out as the winner party of the 1977 general election with the highest voting rate that the party had had since the 1950 general election. As Ecevit was unable to form the government alone after the 1973 general election, he faced the same political fate despite this exceptional victory at the polls. On the other hand, by claiming that “filling the vacancy of power is our *raison d’être*”⁶⁷, Demirel formed the 2nd National Front government with the support he received from the MSP and the MHP. This government that was even more short-lived than the 1st National government received criticisms such as failing to ensure the

⁶⁷ Demirel’s speech delivered on 29 July 1977.

security and unity in the country, impoverishing the people and distancing itself from the Constitution, and all of these led it to be removed from power with the motion of censure, which was the first example of its kind in Turkish politics since the foundation of the Republic (Özdemir, 1989: 244).

Following the removal of the the 2nd National Front government as a result of the motion of censure, Ecevit formed a new government in January 1978. Regarding the main duties of this government, Ecevit states:

Due to the recent incidents affecting our country, it has been a primary duty for our nation and its Parliament to protect and promote democracy and the Republic against every kind of anti-constitutional attempts that aim to dissolve the main principles of Atatürk's legacy, the Republic of Turkey, the independent and democratic regime or the Republic, and that have tended to create a regime based on oppression and terrorism, and that pursue to suppress the citizens' right to live freely, in peace and without fear and their security of life and the principle of rule of law. The main goal of our government that applies for the vote of confidence of the Parliament and wholly relies on the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Turkish Nation in the first place is to serve this duty to be fulfilled (Ecevit, 12 January 1978).

Nevertheless, the anarchic incidents continued and even increased during Ecevit's government. In the massacres took place in Malatya and Kahramanmaraş, which are two neighbouring cities located in the Mediterranean and Eastern regions of Turkey respectively, several citizens with different religious and ethnic backgrounds were murdered brutally.

Among these two, Dinler (2020: 681) describes the latter as the biggest massacre of Turkey organized by the people. In a way, these massacres proved that violent acts targeted not only workers but also the people in general. In these circumstances, a normal citizen had to continue his life with the fear of being killed at any time. In other words, peace in society was eradicated in Turkey.

After the 1979 mid-term election, Demirel became the prime minister again and encapsulated the problems in the country under the two main titles: anarchy and economy. Considering these titles, he states:

One of the two most significant problems in Turkey is about anarchy, separatism, vandalism, defeatism, neutralization of alevi and their wind of change; and the other one is about the paralysis of producing economy, and it is necessary to re-functionalize this economy. There are no two different solutions for these two problems. There are no two different solutions for re-functionalizing the paralyzed economy and saving the country, which turned into a sort of bloody sea, from this trouble, this disaster, this calamity, this horror (Demirel, 29 February 1980).

With regard to the economic crisis in the country, Demirel's government implemented a new economic program aiming to change the country's economic framework (known as *24 Ocak Kararları*) and introduced neoliberal capitalism to Turkey. Although he stressed that this program was something different and "away from politics" and that his purpose was "to put an end to poverty in Turkey", Ecevit gives the following statement about this:

(...) what needs to be done is not to deal with the issues of political decision beyond the scope of politics and present them as something remaining outside of politics. What needs to be done is, especially in these times of crisis, to achieve the political reconciliation for a while among those who adopted democracy in the framework of the democratic rules of politics. Being dependent upon the ability to achieve this, the prestige of politics and political parties increases, and our democracy strengthens. However, it is understood that this can be never obtained with the attitude of Demirel's government and mindset. With Demirel's economic model to be implemented and its inevitable social and political results, it is now clear what the country would face in the future and that our democracy would be and have been exposed to certain dangers (Ecevit, 29 February 1980).

In the country which was dealing with problems of all sorts, another massacre targeting the leftists and *alevis* occurred in Çorum in May 1980 and resulted in 57 deaths (Dinler, 2020: 677-9). Thus, the people were convinced of the fact that relying on the political parties and their officials was a futile attempt. This public perception based on discontent and fear was one of the most important reasons for the 1980 coup. To provide a brief summary of the attempts made to solve economic and socio-political problems in the country, neoliberal model of economy was introduced for the former, and the military stepped in to bring an end for the latter (Koca, 2020: 393-4).

CONCLUSION

This overall aim of this chapter is to represent the goal of the thesis and the findings of the empirical analysis on populism and its relationship with democracy in Turkey of the 1970s. After acknowledging and explaining these, I will complete the chapter with the limitations and shortcomings of the thesis and the recommendations for future studies.

Populism is not intrinsic to today's world and does not occur only in certain political environments. It has a long history, carries the possibility of emerging almost everywhere and serves as an effective political tool both for political parties both of the Right and the Left. From this point of view, populism is a useful term for explaining the political environment in Turkey during the 1970s over the political discourses of Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, who were the leaders of the most influential rightist and leftist political parties of this time period respectively.

There are different approaches to populism in the literature. In this thesis, I adopted the one which sees the term as “a thin-centered ideology” with two characteristics: appeal to the people and anti-elitist political stance (Mudde, 2004). For the empirical analysis, I also added a third one, Manichean worldview to the theoretical framework due to its usefulness for linking two main aspects of the term (de la Torre, 2007; Elçi, 2019).

The democratic ideal of ensuring the government of the people is also possible in populist ideology. This close connection explains why we can encounter populist incidents both in the most and least developed democracies. But there are opposing views about how to interpret the relationship between populism and democracy. Some defend the idea that the term should be seen as an impetus for realizing the democratic ideals (Canovan, 2002;

Laclau, 2005a) while others hold the opinion of regarding it as a threat to democracy (Müller, 2016; Rummens, 2017). There is also a third perspective that deals with populism in a neutral way (Kaltwasser, 2012). I analysed the relationship between populism and democracy in Turkey during the 1970s according to this third approach.

The results of the empirical analysis show that both Demirel and Ecevit included populist elements in their political discourses. To be more specific, the populist elements, namely appeal to the people and Manichean worldview, shaped their political discourses during the time period provided above. Despite its lesser importance, the remaining aspect of populism (i.e. adoption of anti-elitist political stance) is also visible in the political repertoires of both leaders. According to the findings, both leaders benefit from the populist way of doing politics at times of crises and elections. On this matter, populist usage reaches its peak in Turkey during the general elections of 1973 and 1977, the Cyprus Peace Operation, and the National Front governments.

It is also significant to remind that Turkish democracy of the 1970s witnessed two types of populism: right-wing populism, and left-wing populism. The former is represented by Demirel and the AP while the latter is associated with Ecevit and the CHP. In spite of the similarities they share, there are still differences between these two types of populism. The most visible difference is about the definition of the people. Demirel, in parallel with Atatürk's definition, sees the group of the people as a single unity and associates them with the nation itself while Ecevit elaborate this definition with the use of social classes and define those in this group according to their socio-economic status. Secondly, although Manicheanism is evident both in right-wing populism and left-wing populism, the former, as can be understood from the name of the National Front governments, draws a clear and

divisive border between itself and other political parties while the latter stands for its political discourse avoiding such a decisive boundary with the aim of attracting the attention of different social groups.

Regarding the relationship between populism and democracy in Turkey, the former acted as a driving force for re-functionalizing the latter after the 1971 military memorandum; however, this changed during the second half of the 1970s, and insisting on the Manichean worldview not only created a political world consisting of two opposing camps but also polarized the society in Turkey. As a result of this, democracy revived with populist policies after the military governments of the early 1970s was suspended once again at the end of the decade due to the rising concerns over how to handle the polarized politics and divided society in the country.

Democracy does not mean only either realizing the will of the people or trusting the institutions' superiority unconditionally. This is an illusion. Democracy relies on a sort of balance between the people and the institutions, and this balance is necessary for ensuring and maintaining a democratic regime (Canovan, 2002). If such a perception that relies only on the will of the people is associated with the realization of democracy, those who want to make use of this can distance themselves from the democratic ideals. Similarly, when the institutions possess an ultimate authority that ignores the needs and demands raised in the public sphere, we cannot speak of democracy in a true sense. The concept of the will of the people is the idea behind democracy; on the other hand, the presence of superior institutions is a must for keeping those in power on the right track. In other words, there has to be an equilibrium between two essential aspects of democracy. In the case of an asymmetric tie between them (e.g. insisting on the institutional authority at the expense of the will of the

people), populism can be utilized as a political tool in order to restore the democratic balance (Canovan, 2002: 34).

The acquaintance of the Turkish people with democracy dates back to the late Ottoman times. The democratic ideas penetrated into the Ottoman Empire, which was governed with absolute monarchy for centuries, during the second half of the nineteenth century. From this time period onwards, the Empire entered into the process of modernization, and a series of reforms aiming to guarantee the rights of its subjects or the people were implemented. In other words, there was an attempt to create an actor who would become a sharer of power, and this actor was, certainly, the people. But this move was not planned by the people, or they were not the ones who demanded and fought for a more democratic life. Instead, the intellectuals were the ones who speak on the behalf of the people and asked for a fundamental change in how to deal with power. This perspective that includes aspects such as giving a battle against the authority, claiming the representatives of the people and deciding what is good for them is not something intrinsic to the founder fathers of Turkey. In other words, it was this Ottoman inheritance with which the new Republic was built: additionally, it was not put aside until the permanent transition to the multi-party democracy in 1945.

As explained in the second chapter of this thesis, some political parties (the TCF and the SCF) were formed with the intention of proving the country as a democratic one during the early years of the Republic; however, these political parties did not have a long political life due to the fact that the Turkish society was not ready for the democratic idea, and the CHP remained as the only political party in the country. During the one-party era, a series of reforms (also known as *Atatürk's* reforms) were implemented with the aim of democratizing

the country and the people. In this sense, it is possible to make a connection between the late Ottoman reforms and Atatürk's reforms since both were put in force with the decision made by those who spoke on the behalf of the people. In spite of the people's passivity during the process, we can also claim that the populist policies of the Ottoman intellectuals and the new Republic's founders favoured the realization and development of a more democratic society.

Without the active participation of the people, democracy loses its meaning and function. Also, there should be political alternatives for them to choose since society consists of subjects with different worldviews and backgrounds. In this regard, it is impossible to mention the presence of a fully-functional democracy in Turkey until the foundation of the DP, whose members consisted of the dissidents within the CHP, and its participation in the 1946 general election. Although the DP entered the political picture as an alternative to the CHP, a democratic understanding of politics was not implemented instantly in the country due to the severe discussions about the credibility of the 1946 general election (Zürcher, 2000: 308-9). In the next general election held four years later, the DP with populist policies such as going to the people, asking their vote and promising them to bring their demands to the political agenda and its landmark victory at the polls indicated a sort of social change. Interestingly enough, there was "a peaceful transition of power" from the CHP to the DP. In other words, the one-party government in office for almost three decades abided by the will of the people. This was also a significant change in the way democratic principles should be implemented. During both the late Ottoman period and the early Republican regime, what the elites dictated was superior to the will of the people, but then the 1950 election reversed this situation in the favour of the latter.

The idea of going to the people in a true sense that was introduced by the DP was adopted by not only the political parties of the Right but also the CHP. To give an example for the former, the AP that was established after the closure of the DP as a result of the 1960 military coup followed the political path introduced by the DP and received significant support from the people during the second half of the 1960s. It even improved this legacy and maintained it during the 1970s under the strong and influential leadership of Demirel.

On the other hand, the CHP that was presented itself as the state party for long years began to change its political image, and its officials realized that they were unable to contribute to the development of democracy in the country without taking a side with the people. In this regard, during the 1960s when İnönü was still the leader of the CHP, the debates about the party's founding principles circled around the idea that the party should go to the people. One of those who played a key role in insisting on the adoption of a more populist political stance was Ecevit. As one of the masterminds behind the idea of centre-left discourse, Ecevit had to deal with the traditionalist wing of the CHP led by İnönü who acted hesitantly about transforming the party from a state party to a truly populist one. After the leadership competition in 1972, Ecevit's idea of a more populist party prevailed, and he took the leadership of the CHP. As the new leader of the CHP, he expressed his opposition against the elitist understanding of governing the country and supported the idea that democracy could prosper only with the people. This was one of the reasons behind his first political success in the 1973 general election. Thus, it can be said that a populist understanding of doing politics enabled Ecevit to improve both in-party democracy and the country's democracy in general. Regarding the latter claim, it is significant to mention that Turkish democracy of the early 1970s relied on not only the right-wing populism of the AP but also the left-wing populism of the CHP, and the populist policies adopted both by the Left and

the Right successfully ensured the transition of political power from the anti-democratic forces to the people themselves.

Holding elections on regular basis is, of course, a prerequisite for democracy. This is the way how the people act as active players in politics and become responsible for their governments. But they do not participate directly in the process in a way that the ancient Athenians did since modern societies are much larger and extremely more complicated than their society. Rather, as in the ancient Roman Republic, the citizens' determination of their representatives with their votes is a common practice in modern, sophisticated societies. In a modern sense, democracy is not only about what the majority dictates but also related to bringing the demands of other social groups or minorities into the political agenda. It is true that who received the majority vote can rule, but it does not mean that the elected officials of the majority can exercise power arbitrarily and ignore the demands of the rest of subjects in society. Such usage of power first hurts the regime by conflicting with the democratic principles and threatens the maintenance of political stability and prosperity. Rather than solely acting in accordance with what the majority dictates, a democratic government also deals with the demands raised by various social actors: in other words, it cannot ignore the dissident voices. Therefore, the presence and maintenance of democratic necessities such as constitutional constraints and separation of powers that prevent the elected governments from silencing the minorities for the sake of the majority.

As in the populist instances around the world, the political leaders with populist tendencies tend to adopt a minimalized understanding of the people as a single and united group, and they hold the claim that they are the one and only representatives of the people (Müller, 2016: 3-4). Such an understanding of the people is the idea behind Rousseau's

(2002) understanding of democracy, which glorifies the majority and forces the minority groups to associate themselves with the majority rule. This means, in a way, restraining the rights and freedoms of those social groups. In addition to this, the political parties and their leaders that present themselves as the sole representatives of the people and ignore the legitimacy of other political parties put the development of democratic politics in danger.

Democracy is not a regime in which only one political party is available for the people to associate themselves with it. Rather, there has to be different political parties for the people consisting of various social groups. In other words, the agonistic perspective of democracy that promotes diversity and sees the possible benefits of political conflicts can ensure a fair political environment (Mouffe, 2000: 19-21). On the other hand, if the people are given only one option or forced to take a side with it against the designated enemy, an environment of polarization rules not only the political world but also the social world.

The populist conduct of politics provides a clear path for a country struggling for the realization or restoration of democracy. Once this struggle has ended with a success, the insistence on the political path that the majority only matters might create serious troubles for the healthy functioning of democracy. This was the exact reason behind the military's decision to intervene in Turkish democracy for the first time in 1960.

The DP played a key role in putting an end to the anti-democratic one-party government in 1950 and introducing the capabilities of a democratic regime to the Turkish people. It took the government peacefully from the CHP and came to power with the promise of realizing a true democracy in the country and bringing the needs and demands of the people to the forefront. So far, its populist strategy enabled the country's regime to be recognized as a true democracy. Nevertheless, during the second half of the 1950s, the DP and its officials

gradually began to break their promises on a more democratic country that helped them to gain political legitimacy in the eyes of different social groups in the country (Yıldız, 1996; Kubilay, 2014). Toward the end of the decade, the DP that presented themselves as the sole representative of the people based on its spectacular voting rates at the elections completely broke up with the democratic principles (Özçelik, 2010: 184). The party took extreme antidemocratic measures by introducing the National Front, which divided the society into two camps, and setting up a commission, whose members consisted of the DP members only with a duty of monitoring the activities of the opposition and the media; as a result of these, the democratic revolution of Turkey ended up with the 1960 military coup.

Regarding the Turkish experience of populism, it would be a mistake to assess the term as a threat to democracy since the AP inherited the DP populism and made use of it until and after the 1971 military memorandum. Especially, populism proved its usefulness for mobilizing the people and bringing them to politics with the aim of replacing the military rule with the will of the people. But it is an unquestionable fact that populism possesses the danger of polarizing the politics and society. In this regard, the populist tendencies of the CHP and the AP during the first half of the 1970s helped the country to restore its democracy and give the people the right of determining the government with their votes; on the other hand, especially due to the world conjuncture of the time period which was the dilemma between democratic forces and communist forces, it would be a sound claim that the excessive use of populist political discourse based on Manicheanism not reduced but accelerated the political and social division in Turkey during the second half of the decade.

As explained throughout the thesis, I avoided adopting a positive or a negative interpretation of populism with the concerns about the validity of the findings. To be more

specific, seeing the term as a reinforcement of democracy would mean ignoring its possible dangers to the regime, or adopting an opposite interpretation of the term would prevent us from seeing its possible benefits for realizing a more democratic regime. According to this, Tormey's (2018) conceptualization of the term as a *Pharmakon* enables the empirical studies to be conducted objectively.

Populism is also considered as a reactionary political movement, and it is often associated with the appearance of political leaders, who offer oversimplified solutions for a political crisis or an economic crisis or both, in politics. In this regard, Demirel and Ecevit adopted such a solution against the governmental crisis in Turkey in the early 1970s and held the opinion that this crisis would be solved with going to the people and allowing them to decide who should rule the country with their votes. Indeed, the crisis in the country partially solved with a free and fair election held in 1973. With the difficulties that country faced in later years such as the decaying relationships with the USA—which acted as the defender of democracy around the world—due to the Cyprus conflict, the insistence on the National Front governments established against the threat of communism, and the increasing polarization both in political and social spheres, the way of conducting politics from a populist perspective could not prevent the wounds dressed in the early 1970s from bleeding again at the end of the decade.

According to this, we can describe populism as a tool to control the fire. The metaphor of fire stands for holding the power, and the use of populism can enable those aiming to come to power to achieve their aim with the mobilization of the people. This seems to be a democratic way due to the active participation of the people in the process. But there is always a danger of great destructions such as polarizing the society and disrupting the

democratic functioning of politics when populism is excessively used by those who do not prefer to see the negative aspects of such a political tool. These two aspects of populism are remarkably useful in explaining the Turkish democracy during the 1970s; in other words, the relationship between the two concepts enable us to make sense of the political environment of the country during this decade. To restate this with simpler and clearer terms this time: *populism favoured and accelerated the process of returning to democracy with the promise of realizing the will of the people during the first half of the 1970s, but its understanding the political world consisting of two opposing camps prevented the further democratic development during the second half of the decade.*

The above explanation of the Turkish political environment in the 1970s is this thesis's most evident contribution to the existing literature about populism and democracy in Turkey. In other words, this thesis provides useful insights about the development of populism in Turkey which first met the term with the introduction of the DP. More specifically, populism that was introduced by a right-wing political party was adopted and developed by another rightist party, the AP. Considering the political successes of such political parties leaning on the Right, the term proved its usefulness for gaining political legitimacy. This did not slip the CHP's notice, and the party decided to replace its statist image with a more populist one. Although its officials took serious steps to make this decision come true, it was not realized properly and thoroughly until the leadership of Ecevit. Consequently, another type of populism was introduced in Turkish politics, and the left-wing populism represented by Ecevit's CHP stood together with the right-wing populism of Demirel's AP during the 1970s. I dealt with these two types of populism in this thesis and intended to provide a deep and detailed understanding of their political performance in Turkish democracy.

Another possible contribution of this thesis is the relationships of both right-wing populism and left-wing populism with Turkish democracy of the 1970s. Through his populist discourse carrying elements from the DP populism, Demirel managed to bring the political parties of the Right divided in the previous decade together with his National Front governments. As can be understood from the name of these governments, Demirel created a political camp against the communist threat. It is significant to remember that this was different from the DP's National Front since Demirel's version signified a political move generated against the threat of communism on the international level, not a separatist strategy aimed to strengthen the legitimacy of his political party against the opposition. Nevertheless, it is not wrong to claim that his governments caused national politics to be comprehended from a logic of friends and foes and thus accelerated the creation and development of a polarized society. On the other hand, the left-wing populism, which yielded its first political success in the removal of military influence on politics with the 1973 general election, stood out as a distinguished type of populism and developed itself around the charismatic leadership of Ecevit, whose popularity among the people increased with his role in putting a decisive end in the Cyprus Peace Operation. Lastly but not least, against the proven success of populism used by the solely rightist political parties, a leftist political party, the CHP's own interpretation of populism also proved itself with the record voting rate of the party in the 1977 general election.

The most serious limitation of this thesis is the fact that the analysis of populism focused one decade only. As explained in the methodology part, the reason for why I concentrated on the 1970s is that Ecevit took the leadership of the CHP in 1972 and took place in politics as a leader. Although Demirel was the leader of the AP in the previous decade, I did not include the 1960s in the empirical analysis of populism since my focal point

was to analyse two different types of populism and their relationships with democracy over two political leaders, not three. In this regard, a possible shortcoming of the thesis is that it does not provide an empirical proof for the revival of the right-wing populism after the 1960 military intervention and the preliminary phase of the left-wing populism built around the concept of centre-left in the second half of the 1960s.

Although this thesis provided significant insights about the close connection between populism and democracy with its inspection of the co-existence of right-wing populism and left-wing populism in Turkish democracy during the 1970s, there is much more to be done. According to my personal opinion, there is a need for more empirical studies focusing topics such as to what extent the AP inherited the DP populism, how the CHP transformed itself from a state party to a populist party, and what possible benefits the use of populism as a hegemonic project can yield for different social groups. Additionally, it is no doubt that conducting studies on the possibility about whether populism can be utilized without posing dangers to essential democratic principles such the existence of institutions and the promotion of diversity in society will bring new interpretations about the way of doing politics in countries like Turkey whose political history is full of populism.

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NEWSPAPERS

Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 23 June 1975.

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Hürriyet Newspaper, 2 May 1977.

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Year	Demirel	Ecevit	Total
1972	2	6	8
1973	3	3	6
1974	16	14	31
1975	7	1	8
1976	2	2	4
1977	8	5	13
1978	2	14	16
1979	8	7	15
1980	5	7	12
Total	53	59	112

Table A. 1: The number and year of the documents used for the data.

Appendix B

Populist Components	Turkish	English
Appeal to the people	Millet	Nation
	Halk*	People
	İrade**	Will
	İşçi	Worker
	Köylü	Peasant
	Memleket	Memleket
Anti-elitist political stance	Çevre	Group
	12 Mart	12 March
	Ambargo	Embargo
	Bunalım	Oppression
	Baskı	Crisis
	Bürokrat/bürokrasi***	Bureaucracy/bureaucrat
Manichean worldview	Biz****	We/us
	Tehdit****	Threat
	Terör	Terror
	Tehlike	Danger
	Faşizm/faşist	Fascism/fascist
	Komünizm/komünist	Communism/communist

Table B.1: The dictionary created for the quantitative analysis of populism.

* (Pauwels, 2011); ** (Elçi, 2019); *** (Bonikowski and Gidron, 2016); **** (Espinal, 2015)

Appendix C

Abbreviated words		Removed words
Name	Abbreviated	
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi	TBMM	milletvekil-
Millet Meclisi	MM	milletler-
Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi	CKMP	halk sektör-
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	CHP	Halk Bankası
Halk Partisi	HP	Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti
Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi	THKP	Filistin halkı
Halk Kurtuluş Partisi	HKP	Yunan halkı
Türk Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu/Cephesi	THKO/C	İran halk
Türkiye İşçi Partisi	TİP	Halkevi
İşçi Partisi	İP	Halka
Ülkücü İşçiler Derneği	ÜİD	halk ordusu
Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi	TİİKP	halk eğitimi
Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi	TSEKP	halkçılık
Türkiye Komünist Partisi	TKP	teşhişçi
		tedhişçi
		dişçi
		gösterişçi
		yemişçilik
		memleketler
		çevre yol-
		bizatihi
		bizzat
		bizim ülkemiz
		sahibiz
		talibiz

Table C.1: The abbreviated and removed words from the dictionary created.

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to anatomize the concept of populism and its varieties in Turkish democracy during the 1970s. The existing literature about the term contains heated debates since it is a highly ambiguous term. Some scholars suggest that populism should be regarded as a threat to democracy while others support the idea that the term can act as a sort of impetus for the development of a democratic regime. By considering the fact that the adoption of either of these two perspectives directly affects the results of a study dealing with populism, the term is dealt with objectively. In this regard, the speeches of two dominant and prominent political figures of the 1970s, namely Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, delivered in the Parliament are analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively with the use of content analysis. The results of the quantitative analysis show that populist components of appeal to the people and Manichean worldview dominates the political discourses of both leaders. As for the results of the qualitative analysis, it becomes obvious that their understanding of populism carries differences. According to this, Demirel represents the right-wing populism while Ecevit stands for the left-wing populism. Generally speaking, the use of populism helped the development of democracy in Turkey, which was interrupted due to the 1971 military memorandum; nevertheless, considering the political world from two antagonistic camps and spreading the same idea in society led the country to face serious political, economic and social crises, and its democratic regime was suspended again with another military intervention in 1980.

Keywords: Populism, Democracy, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Content Analysis

ÖZET

Bu tez 1970’li yıllarda Türk demokrasisi özelinde popülizm kavramını ve çeşitlerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Oldukça muğlak bir kavram olduğundan dolayı popülizm hakkındaki literatürde hararetli tartışmalar mevcuttur. Bazı yazarlar kavramın demokrasiye karşı bir tehdit olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini önerirken diğerleri ise demokratik rejimin gelişimini sağlayabilecek bir tür itici kuvvet olarak algılanmasını savunmaktadırlar. Bu iki bakış açısından birini benimsemenin popülizm kavramı üzerine yapılan çalışmaların sonuçlarına doğrudan bir etkisi olacağı düşünülerek bu çalışmada kavram objektif olarak ele alınmaktadır. 1970’li yılların iki baskın ve öne çıkan politik aktörü Süleyman Demirel ve Bülent Ecevit’in Parlamento’da verdikleri konuşmalar popülizm kavramı üzerinden içerik analizi yönteminden yararlanılarak hem niceliksel hem de niteliksel olarak incelenmektedir. Niceliksel analizin sonuçlarına göre hem Demirel hem de Ecevit’in politik söyleminde popülizmin halka gitme ve Maniheizt dünya görüşü bileşenleri ağır basmaktadır. Niteliksel analizin sonuçları ise liderlerin popülizm anlayışları arasında farklar bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Buna göre Demirel sağ kanat popülizmin, Ecevit ise sol kanat popülizmin sözcüsü konumundadır. Genel olarak bakıldığında ise 1970’li yılların başında popülizme başvurulması darbe nedeniyle sekteye uğrayan Türk demokrasisinin gelişimini sağlamış ancak siyasetin iki zıt kutup şeklinde yorumlanması ve bunun sosyal zemine de sıçraması sonucunda ülke ciddi politik, ekonomik ve sosyal krizlerle yüzleşmek zorunda kalmış ve ülkedeki demokratik rejim de 1980 askeri darbesiyle bir kez daha askıya alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülizm, Demokrasi, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, İçerik Analizi