SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

MURAT ARSLAN

JUNE, 2017

SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

BY

MURAT ARSLAN

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF PHD

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

AND

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY

JUNE, 2017

Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. M. Fazıl GÜLER
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctorate

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bilgen SÜTÇÜOĞLU
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Feroz Ahmad
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Feroz AHMAD (Yeditepe Üniversitesi)

Prof. Dr. Cemil OKTAY (Yeditepe Üniversitesi)

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bilgen SÜTÇÜOĞLU (Yeditepe Üniversitesi)

Doç. Dr. Boğaç EROZAN (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi)

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hanefi YAZICI (Bandırma 17 Eylül Üniversitesi)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

28/06/2017

MURAT ARSLAN

M. Arslan

Abstract

With two military coups, numerous coalitions, seven premierships and later presidency, Süleyman Demirel (1924–2015) was one of the most prominent figures of Turkish politics. The aim of this study is to examine Demirel's life within the framework of pragmatism in order to provide a better understanding of his political career, choices and preferences. The study argues that Demirel's life can be identified with an ongoing tension between principled action and pragmatism, where the latter dominated his stance in politics. It relies on the biographical method because it constitutes a different approach in the field of political science and provides an alternative reading of Turkish politics. Rather than being a sheer chronological work, the study represents Turkish political history via 'his story' and aims to encourage the reader to think out of the box.

Keywords: Demirel, pragmatism, biography, Turkey, political leaders, Justice Party

Özet

İki askeri darbe, çok sayıda koalisyon, yedi defa başbakanlık ve sonrasında cumhurbaşkanlığı ile Süleyman Demirel (1924–2015) Türk siyasetinin en önemli aktörlerinden biridir. Bu çalışma Demirel'in yaşam öyküsünü pragmatizm çerçevesinde inceleyerek siyasi kariyerini, karar ve tercihlerini daha anlaşılır kılmayı amaçlamaktadır. Buradan yola çıkarak Demirel'in yaşamı boyunca prensipler ve pragmatizm arasında bir dalgalanma yaşadığını söylemek mümkündür. Bu noktada siyasi duruşunda belirleyici olan etmenin prensipli davranıştan ziyade pragmatizm olduğunu öne sürmek yanlış olmayacaktır. Çalışmada kullanılan biyografi yöntemi, siyaset bilimi alanına yeni bir yaklaşım getirmenin yanı sıra Türk siyasal hayatına alternatif bir okuma sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu çerçevede, Cumhuriyet sonrası döneme, çalışmanın konusu olan Süleyman Demirel'in yaşam öyküsü üzerinden farklı bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Demirel, pragmatizm, biyografi, Türkiye, siyasi liderler, Adalet Partisi

Acknowledgements

During the difficult journey of writing this dissertation, I enjoyed the support of great people. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Feroz Ahmad. I was questioning myself as a PhD student when I met him. He was the one who cleared my head and guided me throughout the process. It was a great privilege to be able to work with him. I would like to thank to Prof. Cemil Oktay not only for providing me the chance to work in the department, but also for his valuable comments during the conversations we had. I am greatly indebted to Assoc. Prof. Boğaç Erozan for his detailed reading and his constructive criticism at all the stages of my research. I owe a debt of gratitude to Assist. Prof. Bilgen Sütçüoğlu for her insightful recommendations, support and friendship. She was one of those who endured me when I was dealing with stress. Dr. Bülent Şenses and Eren Özyiğit were always there with their friendship and encouragement.

I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, Özlen and Selçuk Arslan for their support from the first day of my academic training. Last but not least, I am grateful to my 'Triple S', my boys Selim and Selçuk, and my lovely wife Sernaz. Without them all this would be meaningless.

Table of Contents

Abstract i
Özet ii
Acknowledgements iii
Table of Contents iv
Introduction 1
1. Early Years (1924–1960) 8
2. The Rise of an Ordinary Turk (1960–1964) 33
3. Moderate Pragmatism (1964–1971) 62
4. In Political Turmoil (1971–1980) 100
5. From Hamzakoy to Çankaya (1980–1993) 172
6. In Çankaya (1993–2000) 213
Conclusion 254
Bibliography 260
Appendix A 274
Appendix B 276
Appendix C 277
Appendix D 278
Appendix E 279

Introduction

It was 10 November 1997 when I first saw Süleyman Demirel in the flesh. I was on a school trip to Ankara for the commemoration of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. A visit to Çankaya was also part of the program. I remember him surrounded by senior women wearing fur coats, resembling the secular, modern female prototype of the Republic of Turkey. After shaking hands with every one of us, he said, "Understand Atatürk well, kids; the republic as well." By then, as a 16 year old, I was moved by his approach regarding Atatürk and the republic. When I went back home, I told my father about my visit to Çankaya and Demirel's words. I remember him smiling faintly without saying a word. Years later, in the freshman year of the university when I was taking a course on Turkish Politics, I found out that Süleyman Demirel was not only a secular figure as I had thought of him, but also a nationalist, a liberal, a conservative, a democrat and others. He was a pragmatist; a person who acts according to the 'Zeitgeist' without adhering to principles.

After two military coups, numerous coalitions, seven premierships and later the presidency, Süleyman Demirel became the dominant figure of politics in Turkey in the second half of the 20th century. Apart from being the first generation of the republic, he was different from his predecessors since he did not belong to the republican elite like Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar. Demirel was born in a village in Isparta. He studied in a village primary school, continued his education in a public high school and graduated from the prestigious Istanbul Technical University. Appointed as the general manager of the State Hydraulic Works in his early thirties, he was a selfmade man who seized the opportunities provided to him by the republic. Süleyman Demirel has been one of the most discussed figures in Turkish politics. A considerable number of

publications was written by both journalists and academics on Demirel, in particular, and the periods coinciding with his political career. If one aims to approach his life and political career from a political science perspective, biography—among other methods—may be adopted.

Yet, above all, 'biography'—as well as 'autobiography'—is a literary genre. Novelists and intellectuals such as Virginia Woolf and Carl Gustav Jung wrote biographies. A well-known example is Oscar Wilde's 'De Profoundis', which is taken from the letters written by Wilde to Lord Alfred Douglas while in jail. 'De Profoundis' is an autobiography—a biography of a person's life written by the person himself or herself—alongside Ernest Hemingway's 'A Moveable Feast'. Moreover, Stefan Zweig, the Austrian author and intellectual, wrote biographies of the important figures of their times including Joseph Fouché and Marie Antoinette. Apart from this, historians write biographies. Isaac Deutscher's Stalin, Julian Young's 'Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography', François Georgeon's 'Abdulhamid II' and Andrew Mango's 'Atatürk' are recognizable examples. Examples could be multiplied. However, this study focuses on the introduction of biography into the field of political science and the development of political biography as a genre.

In political science, the genre of biography is generally ignored or not taken seriously by scholars. This is due to the fact that a great range of people, from journalists to politicians, can write biographies. Moreover, the field has been generally dominated by hagiographies which aim to glorify the political figures of their times. Also, biography is seen as a suspected genre because it lends itself to a discourse of old-fashioned narrative, beginning with the life and parentage of the subject and heading predictably towards death and posthumous reputation (Bolton, 2006, p. 1). According to Edinger, the descriptive biography has the risk to become a huge

chronological compendium as it assumes that the facts per se are enough to enlighten the reader (Edinger, 1964, p. 424). Furthermore, as an approach in mainstream political science, biography is criticized because it lacks analytical rigour and does not offer law-like generalizations (Rhodes, 2006, p. 43). At this point, it is no surprise that the title of Steve Weinberg's autobiography is 'Biography: The Bastard Child of Academe' (Weinberg, 2008). Another scholar who criticizes biography is Edward Hallett Carr. In his famous essay, 'What is History?', Carr emphasizes the impossibility of the exclusion of the individual from the society and blames biography as being the Bad King John theory of the history which reflects the view that what matters in history is the character and behaviour of individuals (Carr, 1967, p. 55). In other words, he rejects the famous "History is the biography of the great men." dictum. Forasmuch as the individual is the product of the society to which he belongs; it is irrational to analyze him in order to write history. On the other hand, Carr accepts that some biographies are contributions to the history such as Deutscher's works on Stalin and Trotsky but asserts that the rest are just historical novels (Carr, 1967, p. 59).

However, biographies may be exceedingly useful for researchers in the field of political science. In order to understand the role of the biography in this field, one should define the concept and emphasize its contributions to the field. Tracey Arklay defines political biography "as the form through which writers breathe life into archival documents such as letters and diaries, birth, death and marriage certificates and official records, to assist in the recreation of life" (Arklay, 2006b, p. 13). In the preface of her edited book, Arklay emphasizes the importance of political biographies by saying that they are an alternative narrative of events—a personalized view stressing the familiar and the specific (Arklay, 2006a, p. xi). After the definition and importance, she emphasizes its contributions to the political science,

> "It contributes the views of political actors sometimes in a contemporary context, sometimes with the benefit of hindsight. It can reinforce existing accounts of events or produce new accounts. It can add new perspectives and insights to existing accounts. It provides a medium through which the personal take on politics is able to be written in to conventional accounts" (Arklay, 2006a, pp. xi-xii).

British biography writer Ben Pimlott, who is the author of the biographies of political figures such as Hugh Dalton, Harold Wilson and Queen Elisabeth II, questions the future of political biography. According to Pimlott, political biography is the least analysed form of political writing (Pimlott, 1990, p. 214). The main reason behind that assumption is one's inability to stereotype the genre. In other words, political biography is a hybrid form of political writing. It can involve the use of psychology and sociology alongside with the historical method. As a distinguished biographer, Pimlott emphasizes the importance of relying on facts—"The biographer is tied by the truth, and has a duty to seek it out and not suppress it". He asserts in his article on the future of political biography (Pimlott, 1990, p. 216). On the other hand, the author should avoid himself offering a compilation of facts as the aim of the biography is not photographing the events but understanding them in the right context. As stated by Pimlott, the aim is, or should be, to understand an individual's life, the forces that shape it and the motives that drive it, in the context in which it is placed (Pimlott, 1990, p. 221). Consequently, it can be argued that the biographer has the duty of acting as a detective and interpreter at the same time. According to Banner, understanding the life of someone may require that a biographer retains in new types of historical investigation, such as oral history, i.e. to interview friends, relatives, and associates of the biographical subject or psychohistory to probe underlying motivations (Banner, 2009, p. 582)."Writing a biography is like entering a deep cavern. The cavern

is human life; the walls of the cavern are the evidence. From the lay of the land, you can tell the cavern is likely to be an interesting one. But until you light your lamp and crawl around, you don't know what you will find. You will never get the whole picture; there will always be crevices to reach" (Pimlott, 1999, p. 34). Behind the cavern metaphor lies the importance of the research and understanding and in order to analyze a life, the crucial question that the author should ask is 'why'. The question 'why' enables us to approach the subject from a critical perspective, to question their actions and the motives without ignoring the conjuncture of his times.

The aim of this study is to fill a gap in the existing literature. However, if the subject is the biography of an important political figure such as Süleyman Demirel, the researcher has to deal with a wide range of works by a variety of authors. Here, it is important to emphasize that most existing work is rather conducted by journalists such as Hulusi Turgut, Nimet Arzık, Yavuz Donat, Cüneyt Arcayürek and Yurdakul Fincancıoğlu. Although their biographies or memoirs provide great insights for the researcher, they will be excluded as they are not produced within the field of social sciences. The lack of thorough academic research on the subject is also worth mentioning. Within this framework, Ayşegül Komsuoğlu's book on Süleyman Demirel along with Zeyneb Çağlıyan İçener's and Derya Şimşek's unpublished dissertations are rare exceptions. Komsuoğlu herself underlines that her work is neither a biography nor a classic research study of political science (Komsuoğlu, 2008, p. 15). Instead, it focuses on the social and historical conditions, which shaped Demirel's leadership and mentality and then how Demirel influenced these conditions as a political leader. İçener's dissertation focuses on Süleyman Demirel's presidency within the framework of the statist role of the president in the Turkish parliamentary system. İçener argues that Demirel, despite not coming from the circle of political elites, was able to set up a

dialogue and balance with the states elites during his term in Çankaya (Çağlıyan İçener, 2010, p. iii). It is important to mention that both Komsuoğlu's and İçener's works do not cover the whole life of Süleyman Demirel. While Komsuoğlu does not include his years in Çankaya, İçener deals mainly with his presidency. Lastly, Şimşek's study (Şimşek, 2011), which is conducted in the field of history, provides a detailed biography of Süleyman Demirel. Her study provides comprehensive data regarding Demirel's life. However, it does not provide insight for further research in the field of political science.

From academic studies in the Turkish politics to columns of daily newspapers, Süleyman Demirel is often labelled as the pragmatic leader of Turkish political life. It can be argued that biography is a proper method to test such a hypothesis. Within this framework, Demirel's political actions and behaviour vis-à-vis crucial events are examined. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, asking the question 'why' at every stage of Demirel's life will provide the reader with an understanding of the intellect and the mentality of the era. As Ülgener stated, it is necessary to penetrate into the world of soul and mentality, which lies beneath a pile of form and substance on a surface (Ülgener, 1991, p. 12). This study also aims to provide an alternative reading to the history of modern Turkey through an individual perspective and a discussion of Turkish politics on the basis of Demirel's life and experiences.

Throughout the study, different sources are employed in order to reflect changing the dynamics of the long time period it covers. The study consists of media research, examination of political documents and archives and interviews. All the *Milliyet* newspapers published between 1960 and 2000 are examined in order to provide a factual framework. Other newspapers of the same period are also employed to cross check and complete *Milliyet* if needed. Local press of Isparta is also consulted

to provide a background for related chapters. Political documents and archival materials such as Demirel's pre-election speeches, assembly proceedings, and official publications of the political parties are studied. In addition to memoirs and the secondary literature on Turkish politics, Demirel's own writings constitute an important part of the research. Moreover, individual interviews are conducted with various political actors and Demirel's acquaintances. His office in Güniz Sokak is visited and the resources available there are also examined. All the translations used in the study belong to the author unless indicated otherwise. Since in some cases the translations fall short of providing the exact meaning—given the nature of the two languages—the original quotes are included in the text in footnotes.

In the following chapters, the aim is to discuss different periods of Demirel's life within the framework of pragmatism. Chapter 1 explores the period between 1924 and 1960, from his birth until the end of his bureaucratic career, which ended with the military intervention of 27 May. The beginning of his political career and the path towards the leadership of the Justice Party are the focus of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the years from 1964 to 1971, when Demirel became the prime minister and had to leave the office with the Memorandum of 12 March. Chapter 4, which deals with the period between 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980, focuses on Demirel in opposition, Nationalist Front governments and the escalating political violence in Turkey. Chapter 5, 1980–1993, studies the years during which Demirel was banned from politics, and the True Path Party was formed. It also studies his seventh premiership and eventually the road to Çankaya, which is also discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, an assessment is made to illustrate how Demirel's pragmatism is manifested, in each chapter, at different stages of his life.

1. Early Years (1924–1960)

Every individual is the product of his early past and politicians are no exception. In other words, for a better understanding of an individual, a researcher has to go back to their subject's roots. In most cases, these roots consist of elements such as homeland, family, education and work experience. Combined with the influence of socio-economical aspects and the conditions of the period, these factors play an important role in the emergence of his/her political character. In this respect, the study of Süleyman Demirel's past is extremely crucial for analyzing the development of his mind-set. Therefore, the chapter is about his early years consisting of his childhood, family and early schooling in Isparta and Afyon. Within this framework, the conditions of his times will not be neglected as they have an important role in the development of the individual. Later, the chapter will focus on his university years in Istanbul Technical University (ITU) where he started to gain an analytical perspective thanks to the modern engineering education. Following his ITU years, Süleyman Demirel was sent to the United States twice, in 1949 and 1954. During his first time, he worked for the Bureau of Reclamation and then five years later he was sent as an Eisenhower fellow. His years in the US coincided with the development of the anti-communist rhetoric in the Western World, which may have a significant impact on his later political discourse. Finally, the chapter focuses on his bureaucratic career as the general manager of the State Hydraulic Works (SHW), which he headed between 1954 and1960. These years witnessed the rise and fall of the Democrat Party (DP). As a successful bureaucrat, he was well appreciated by the DP cadres including prominent figures like Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. The influence of such individuals on Demirel and the disappointment caused by the intervention of 27 May can be considered as crucial moments in his understanding of politics. Basically, the early

years of Süleyman Demirel's life provide significant data on the roots of his pragmatism. This chapter analyzes that period by focusing on the key points that shaped his character and his political orientation.

Süleyman Demirel was born on 1 November 1924 in İslamköy, a small village in Isparta. His homeland Isparta is located in inner western Anatolia. Historically, the region was home to different civilizations from Romans and Byzantines to the Seljuks and the Ottomans. The Seljuks conquered Isparta in 1204 and within the framework of the attempts of turkification of Anatolia Hamidoğulları had been located to the region. Following the collapse of the Anatolian Seljuks, they ruled until the Ottomans took control of the province. Under the Ottoman rule, it was called Hamit Sanjak or Hamidabad Sandjak until 1920. After 1920, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara declared Isparta as an autonomous district.

During the national struggle, Isparta was under the threat of Italian occupation. The Greek occupation of Izmir and Aydın encouraged the Italian forces located in Antalya. On 15 August 1919, the local colonel Marki Franti visited the town's government office with a small battalion as a tour de force. However, he encountered the strong will of the local governor Talat Bey, who said that the foreign presence in the town was unacceptable. As a result of this unexpected conversation, the officer guaranteed that no Italian force would return to Isparta again (Turan, 1942, p. 1267). Later, the people of Isparta gave full support to the nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal until the end of the War of Independence (Böcüzade, 1983, p. 365).

As in many Ottoman provinces, the population of Isparta consisted of Muslims and non-Muslims. According to the censuses of 1872 and 1882, the population of the city was 33.110, including both Muslims and Christians (Böcüzade, 1983, p. 29). As stated in the census of 1935, the population of the province was 144.537, including the

districts (Ağlarcı, 1938, p. 706). The non-Muslims of Isparta were mainly Greeks and Armenians. There was no Jewish presence in the region. According to Böcüzade, the common language of all these different ethnic groups was Turkish (Böcüzade, 1983, p. 32). Almost the entire Muslims population in the region belonged to the Hanefi sect. Yet, there were some Mevlevi and Bektashi lodges in the villages around the town (Böcüzade, 1983, p. 32). Alongside the sanctuaries of different sects and religions, the province had a lot of madrasahs not only in the town center but also in the districts around. Some of these traditional educational institutions have existed since the Seljuk period. Starting from the second half of the 13th Century, these madrasahs started to spread across Anatolia. After Seljuks, Ottomans continued this tradition until their collapse (Sakaoğlu, 2003, p. 11). The madrasahs accomplished their mission by promoting traditional and religious values in the regions in which they existed. Following the proclamation of the Republic, they were closed down as they were seen as the institutions of the old order. However, their influence lasted for decades in provinces like Isparta.

Süleyman Demirel's homeland İslamköy was part of Atabey in the northeastern part of Isparta. Atabey is the name that the Seljuks granted to the governor of a province, who had broad authority alongside some autonomy from the capital (Turgut H., 1992, p. 27). Once called Agros, the town got its actual name after Ertokuş Bey who was a famous commander of the Seljuks. The name of the town was Aras during the Ottoman Era and it has been changed to Atabey in 1926. Even after many centuries, his legacy lasted among the locals because of the *madrasah* he built. In one of his interviews, Süleyman Demirel confirmed that the people of Atabey were so respectful to his legacy since they refused to beat drums that Ertokuş Bey had not liked (Arzık, 1985, p. 26). According to Hulusi Turgut, for a while Atabey was more

important than Isparta, but lately this role shifted to the latter (Turgut H., 1992, p. 27). As suggested in one of the articles published in local periodical *Ün*, the town was economically disabled as it was isolated from the public main road (Tahir, 1934, p. 44). Although Isparta was only 20 kilometres away from the town, according to the conditions of that time, it took almost 4.5 hours to get there (Arzık, 1985, p. 26). In an interview with Nimet Arzık, Süleyman Demirel said that he watched the lights of the city and while doing so he had always felt that these lights belonged to the city that was far from his own world (Arzık, 1985, p. 23). He claimed in the same interview that,

> "The acceptance of these facts was neither patience nor resignation but it was just the misunderstanding of destiny. The most important thing is to prevent our citizen from misunderstanding his destiny. The real mission is to tell him that this is not his destiny" (Arzık, 1985, p. 23).

It is worth mentioning that the conditions emphasized by him were relevant for most of the other provinces of Anatolia. The lack of basic infrastructure, long wars and poverty left villages run-down all over the country and İslamköy was one of them. Demirel, who was aware of the situation, described his homeland as, "not the richest nor the poorest village of Turkey" (Arzık, 1985, p. 26).

Süleyman Demirel was born under these conditions as the second child of his family after his sister Afife. He was the eldest of the boys, Şevket and Hacı Ali. His early name was Süleyman Sami Gündoğdu, but his surname was later changed to Demirel due to his great grandfather Yahya who was a blacksmith (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 31). In accordance with the ongoing tradition, he had been named after his grandfather Hafız Süleyman. His second name came probably from one of Isparta's most prominent figures, Böcüzade Süleyman Sami, who was an Ottoman bureaucrat and later a deputy in the Ottoman parliament. His father Yahya Çavuş spent eight years at

the battlefronts all over the empire including Çanakkale and Syria. Later, he kept his military rank as a nickname during his civil years. His other nickname was Paşa Dayı as he was a respected man in the village. After his return to his homeland, he participated in Mustafa Kemal's army to fight against the Greeks in Western Anatolia. In an interview with the journalist Nimet Arzık, Süleyman demirel noted,

> "My father had great influence in his neighbourhood. He supported the poor and wounded and he helped them regularly. He was a serious man with huge memory and great curiosity. He was literate even though he had not spent a day in school. He had religious knowledge and he was a good Muslim. He knew Ottoman history well but he also knew what was going on in the world" (Arzık, 1985, p. 29).

Yahya Çavuş could be one of the most prominent figures in İslamköy since he became the village headman or the *muhtar*. According to Mahmut Makal, in order to become the *muhtar* of a village, one has to own property along with plenty of friends and network (Makal, 1954, p. 64). In light of Makal's writings, it is plausible to say that Yahya Çavuş's prominence in the village helped him with his local political career. Alongside these activities, Yahya Çavuş was not only interested in farming and agriculture like the rest of the villagers but also involved in the opium trade. He knew his business well enough to get an expertise offer from the state owned TEKEL (Turgut H. , 1987, p. 17). According to Demirel, his father was a prudent man who avoided risk in every aspect of his life (Arzık, 1985, p. 30).

On the other hand, his mother, Ummuhan Hanım, was one of the many traditional women in Anatolia. In one of his interviews, Süleyman Demirel described her as a well-resigned, religious, relentless, hard working Anatolian woman (Arzık, 1985, p. 30). In accordance with the common paternalistic tradition, Ummuhan Hanım was not involved in the social life of the village but she was the one who took care of

the household matters. As stated in Makal's 'A Village in Anatolia', the position of woman in relation to men was the exact opposite of what was accorded them in civil life. In the eyes of the villagers women were practically of no value (Makal, 1954, p. 68). Therefore, many women like Ummuhan Hanım had to raise their children in those conditions that lasted for decades.

Süleyman Demirel's grandparents influenced him by imposing Islamic ways, thus playing a crucial role in the formation of his religious bearings. His grandfather, Hafız Süleyman, served as the voluntary imam of the Hıdırbey Mosque in İslamköy for 20 years. Like his son Yahya, he was a well-respected man in the village. On the other hand, his grandmother Şehriban Hanım was a practicing Muslim with a deep religious culture. She knew the Koran by heart. According to Demirel, she had a huge influence on his childhood (Arzık, 1985, p. 31). However, his religious orientation cannot be limited to his family education. İslamköy, like many other villages of Anatolia, had a religious tradition. According to Celal Kazdağlı, as of 1934, the population of İslamköy was 1800 and almost a hundred of them including both men and women knew Koran by heart (Kazdağlı, 1999, p. 60). On the other hand, Hulusi Turgut argued that in the İslamköy of 1930s, 90% of the men in İslamköy could read and write the Arabic script. Particularly, the presence of three high *madrasahs* in the village played an important role in the development of religious knowledge (Demirel Ş. , 2015, p. 92). However, these *madrasahs* and their libraries had been closed after 1926 (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 28).

Meanwhile in 1925, the region hosted the renowned Said Nursi who was in exile due to accusations that linked him to the Sheikh Said Rebellion. In Isparta, he continued to teach in a madrasah, but the crowds he attracted forced the governor to move him to the village of Barla (Mardin, 1989, p. 95–96). There, he started to write

his famous book *Risale-i Nur* and while doing so, he continued to stay in touch with locals of the region (Şahiner, 1974, p. 254). After spending many years in the region, in 1936, he was transferred to Kastamonu. However, Bediüzzaman kept his contacts with Isparta, particularly in the villages of Bedre, İlema, Kaleönü, İslamköy, Sav and Atabey (Mardin, 1989, p. 97). These contacts were responsible for distributing Said Nursi's letters to the others and were called the postmen of the Nur (Şahiner, 1974, p. 296). In his childhood memories, Süleyman Demirel remembers that a group of Said Nursi admirers in İslamköy wrote manuscripts of *Risale-i Nur* by hand in order to spread it across the region (Demirel S. , 1987, p. 79). In an interview with *Yeni Asya*, Demirel said that he had not met Said Nursi before 1955 without denying that his father was a visitor and admirer of him during his years in Barla. However, even if he had not met him, Demirel and his brothers took Koran lessons from Said Nursi's student and protégé Hafız Ali Ergün who had been taken under custody by state authorities and died in 1943 in prison (Demirel S. , 1987, p. 82). Accordingly, one may suggest that the family and the environment were the two main factors that shaped Süleyman Demirel's religious orientation. However, like many Anatolian families of the time, their orientation may be linked with tradition and conservatism rather than a more radical view of religion.

In parallel with the conditions of the region, the socio-economic standards of the family were modest at its best. Demirel emphasized the ambiguity of the situation, as "We were a peasant family who lived year to year, without any prospect of savings for difficult times. All peasants were like us" (Arzık, 1985, p. 33).Yahya Çavuş and Ummuhan Hanım inherited around 40 acres of land from their elders. The number may be considered as a sign of wealth in today's terms but back in those days it was just enough to survive the year. Accordingly, in the same interview, he added, "The state

was far away. There was neither pension nor unemployment insurance. We were not organized. We were the people who owned nothing and who struggled to live between the blue sky and the cracked soil" (Arzık, 1985, p. 37). Furthermore, their destiny was related to the weather conditions. A rainless winter and subsequent drought meant huge difficulty for the family. Almost 85 years later, in his inaugural speech in the opening of the Museum of Democracy and Development, Demirel said,

> "I used to see my dear late mother carrying water from the fountain and I remember how she suffered with her arms stretching out due to the heaviness of the water buckets. What motivated me for a career in the bureaucratic and political life was that picture of suffering" (Demirel S. , 2014, p. 21).

Such unfavorable conditions might have provided the peasants and Süleyman Demirel a different type of pragmatism that was based on short-term life struggle. After all, in an environment where even the weather conditions affected people's destiny that much, they knew that they had to find new ways to survive.

In the primitive economy of İslamköy, there was no supply-demand relationship. The peasants had no purchasing power at all. Instead, they tried to be self-sufficient by consuming the goods they produced during the season. Occasionally, they went to the city to buy the so-called four whites. Those were gas, salt, fabric as well as sugar, which was an expensive commodity back in those days and it was only offered to guests with tea or coffee. They produced oil from the opium they cultivated in their own field (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 53). The electricity was only available in the city and, instead, the villagers had to use gas oil. Süleyman Demirel said many times that the Turkey of today must know the 30s and 40s well in order to understand the importance of today and the Republic itself (Demirel S. , 2006, p. 760). Despite all difficulties, Demirel said, "We were a happy Anatolian family. A family who took life seriously,

who never complained about life struggle … who had never been disturbed by the society and who never disturbed society" (Arzık, 1985, p. 32).

In the Turkey of 1923, peasants constituted 10.3 million of the 13.6 million populations (Köymen, 2008, p. 109). These people had been traditionally exploited and abused by the notables of the countryside. They held the state responsible for their oppression. Their alienation from the state became more acute during the First World War due to wartime conditions (Ahmad, 1993, p. 76). Thus, in 1922, it was plausible for Mustafa Kemal to proclaim peasant as the lord of the nation. Ironically, they were not represented in the parliament. Yet it was not enough for Anatolian villagers to internalize the reforms in a short period of time. As a result, Ankara decided to form a new ideology and in order to spread it they introduced People's Houses in different regions. These institutions were responsible for educating people via various methods. For example, in Isparta region, they published a periodical called *Ün* between the years 1934–1949. Most of the articles were written by idealist republicans and their basic aim was to create a sense of national consciousness with the internalization of republican values like Six-Arrows. In the editorial of the first issue of *Ün*, Kemal Turan wrote, "The way of thinking and hearing of Turk belonging to different levels will be forged in there. As a member of a high community, our villagers will learn what to think and what to hear under the roof of the People's House" (Turan, 1934, p. 1).

After the proclamation of the republic, the new regime started a comprehensive reform program in the field of education. The Ottoman model was bimodal due to the existence of the modern schools and madrasahs. While the Ministry of Religion and Pious Foundations supported a traditional education model based on religion and faith, modern schools of the Ministry of National Education provided a secular education.

The duality between them ended with the introduction of Law on Unification of Education on 1924. The aim of the new law was to establish a modern secular system, which would help to transform the peasant masses of Anatolia into the citizens of the modern Turkey (Dinçşahin, 2015, p. 24). Within this framework, the aim was the cancellation of all religious courses in modern schools including Arabic and Persian. The religious symbols in colleges and in minority schools had been prohibited. History, geography, citizenship and Turkish replaced them as the new courses. All schools were centralized by the creation of the Board of Education in Ankara (Sakaoğlu, 2003, p. 172). According to Ernest Gellner, education plays a crucial role in the formation of nation-state, as the creation of a shared culture shaped by national education is the cement of a new society, which replaces previous complex structure (Gellner, 1983, p. 57). In parallel with Gellner, Ahmad suggests that the Kemalists wanted to create a new type of Turk who was very different from the Ottoman, just like the revolutionaries in France or the Bolsheviks (Ahmad, 1993, p. 77).

Süleyman Demirel started the village school of İslamköy in November 1930. The school was an adobe building, which was located above a stable. The education was mixed but few girls were present in the classroom. Hulusi Turgut wrote that he was a brilliant student who had never involved in fights like the other kids. Instead, he spent most of his time working at home or looking through the window (Turgut H. , 2014, p. 17). As the Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet in 1928, he became one of the very few literate people in the village. Then, he started to simplify the language of the *Ulus* newspaper in order to make it more understandable for ordinary men. Later, he said that since those days, he was prepared to speak the way that people would understand him easily (Kazdağlı, 1999, p. 11). Alongside school, he continued to help his family in daily activities. One of these was sheepherding, which

gave him one of his famous nicknames '*Çoban Sülü*'. At first, Demirel enjoyed his nickname but later added, "It was for my family, not for others" (Fincancıoğlu, 2000, p. 68).

After seeing his son doing well at school, Yahya Çavuş decided to send him to Isparta to further his education. It was 1935 and Süleyman Sami was finally in the city, whose lights he used to watch for years. The 1930s Isparta was a big town with a population of 12.000. As there was no hotel in town, visitors had to choose to stay at the inns or rent a house. Yahya Çavuş preferred the latter but he asked his mother to move with her grandson. In contrast to the egalitarian aims of the national education, in the secondary school of Isparta, the students were divided in three groups. Group A consisted of the children of the public officers. Group B were mostly the children of the middle class families such as artisans or tradesmen. Demirel enrolled in the third group, Group C, which consisted of peasant children. Years later, in an interview, he said "I had never felt humiliated because of my peasant roots" (Turgut H. , 2014, p. 17). Nevertheless, it did not take him long to attract his teachers' attention. Herein, one has to give credit to Hilmi Dilmen who was the director of school back then. As a local of Isparta, he not only worked in the director's office but also contributed to local intellectual life by writing articles on the development of education in the region for the periodical *Ün*. Dilmen was a good example of the idealist educators in the early years of the republic. He dedicated himself to the education of future generations of the republic and believed that Süleyman Demirel had a serious potential. In parallel with Dilmen's expectations, after spending two years in Isparta, he managed to succeed in the exams for free board education and his new destination was Muğla.

Süleyman Demirel left for Muğla from the train station of Isparta in September 1937. A year earlier, he was there to listen to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's speech on

March 26th. The purpose of İnönü's visit was the opening ceremony of a 13 km line built by Nuri Demirağ, a prominent businessman of the early-Republic. In accordance with the railway policies of the republic, the new line brought an end to the isolation of Isparta (Tekeli & İlkin, 2004, p. 290). In his speech, İnönü emphasized the role of the children of the new Republic of Turkey, who were a great source of power for the future of the country (İnönü, 1936). A year later, Demirel was in the station to go further his education offered by the state. After spending almost a year in Muğla, he had been transferred to Afyon High School where he would spend another three years. Afyon High School was different than the previous institutions in terms of physical conditions and competitiveness. There were also three different groups as A, B, and C. The students who chose the first two groups used to take French, which was more popular in those days. However, Demirel preferred Group C so as to learn English. Those were the years of the Second World War and most of the male instructors were enlisted in the army. As a result of this, the female teachers were in the majority. For instance, her English teacher, Leman Hanım was a good example of a woman that the republic would be proud of. She was from Izmir, was educated in the United States and came back to her country in order to teach English to the young generations (Arzık, 1985, p. 52). She not only taught her students English, but also introduced them to the western culture. From Demirel's point of view, the world presented by Leman Hanım was completely different than the one he knew (Kazdağlı, 1999, p. 70). Like his previous schools, Demirel did well in Afyon. When he graduated in 1941 from the branch of science, his grades were straight 10's and the only exception was gymnastics from which he had a 7 (See Appendix B). Back in those days, good graduates had two alternatives: medicine and engineering. Demirel preferred the latter and participated in the exams of the School of Engineering. Almost 150 of 4000 applicants succeeded in

the exams and one of them was Süleyman Demirel (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 72). Later, in one of his interviews, he said that the first shroud of an ill faith was torn apart (Arzık, 1985, p. 53).

Istanbul Technical University is arguably one of the most prestigious educational institutions of modern Turkey. In addition to its quality education, it was an institution reflecting the positivist ideology of the republican era. However, the history of the school dates back to Mustafa III (1757–1774) who wanted to create a western engineering institution. As a result of Sultan's efforts, the Imperial School of Naval Engineering *(Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Hümayun)* was founded in 1773 with the help of Baron de Tott. The main objective of the school was to raise experts on shipbuilding and cartography. During the following decades, the faculties of civil engineering and architecture were created in 1795 and 1847. Almost a century later, after the proclamation of the republic, it had been named as the School of Engineering with the establishment of the faculties of electrical and mechanical engineering (About İTÜ: History, 2015). From 1912 onwards, the state wanted to apply German, i.e. the von Humboldtian model in order to create national universities. However, the republic had to wait 13 years to introduce the necessary reforms. Finally, in 1933, Darülfünun has been transformed to Istanbul University. The aim was the same and due to the conjuncture, the German professors who fled from Nazi Germany facilitated the implementation of the von Humboldtian model (Tekeli, 2003, p. 76). According to the new law, the School of Engineering was transformed to Istanbul Technical University in 1944. The expectations were high but somehow the reality fell short.

In his biography of Mustafa İnan, famous professor of Istanbul Technical University, Oğuz Atay wrote,

> "They thought that a new Gauss, Newton, Pascal would emerge in the country but one thing had been forgotten. The unmethodical nature of the East had been

> forgotten. The reconciliation of the Eastern tradition with the scientific one had been forgotten. Basic principles had been forgotten. They thought that bringing the citizens of Germany would pave the way for the new Gauss. Unfortunately, it did not happen" (Atay, 1992, p. 68).

Meanwhile, in autumn 1941, Süleyman Demirel was in Istanbul to learn how to adapt his eastern mind-set to the western one. In one of his interviews, he argued that the main purpose of education must be the internalization of concepts such as the right way of thinking and reliable decision-making. According to Demirel, one of the main points which differentiate between the East and the West was the way of approaching problems. He suggested that the Western method reaches a conclusion by finding and analyzing the reasons causing the problem. Demirel added that the Eastern method assumes a conclusion and then looks for the causes (Arzık, 1985, p. 62). Later, he would say that he had never had any prejudice regarding any issue since he would rather look into the causes of that matter. According to him, it was all about being emotional or rational (Kazdağlı, 1999, p. 46). Finally, in autumn 1941, Demirel was in Istanbul to learn rational thinking on which he would rely for the rest of his life.

After settling in the university's dorm in Gümüşsuyu, he focused on maximizing the benefits of being in Istanbul, which he saw as a place full of science and technique (Arzık, 1985, p. 65). He first enrolled in the mechanical engineering but soon switched to the civil engineering. Later, in the yearbook, his friends would mention him as the great gift of mechanical department to the civil engineering department (Mörel, 2015, p. 91). He was hard working during the classes and, as a result, he had no trouble solving problems other students had difficulties with (Mörel, 2015, p. 91). One of his friends from the university years, Yüksel Erimtan recalls that he first heard Demirel's name as a student who remembered everything without even taking a single note during lectures (Erimtan, 2015, p. 90).

On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel preferred not to be involved in the social life of Istanbul. As stated before, for him, Istanbul was the place that could provide him with self-development. Like Isparta of his childhood, he described Istanbul as another city whose lights he watched from a distance (Arzık, 1985, p. 59). In his free time, he went to the famous Tünel district in Beyoğlu for Berlitz Language School where he would learn English. He had noticed that English would be very important in the coming age. He paid the tuition from his pocket money that he spent it frugally. Meanwhile, his brother Şevket enrolled to the School of Engineering. The two brothers spent the following five years together. Şevket was responsible for writing and delivering letters to the family while his elder brother controlled the cash. Years later, in an interview with Hulusi Turgut, Şevket Demirel would say, "Our favourite activity was to go to concerts. There were only two girls in the school, and the students were waiting in corridors to see them. The friendship of girls and boys was out of question" (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 79).

However, other friendships were possible. Like many prestigious schools, ITU provided good networking opportunities to its bright students from all over the country. Important political figures such as Necmettin Erbakan, Recai Kutan, Turgut Özal and his brother Korkut were in the Gümüşsuyu dorm during the 1940s and most of these names had strong religious orientation. For instance, Turgut Özal said that he learned Islam in ITU from the students who prayed regularly. Later, in the same interview, he added "Back in those days, the call to prayer was in Turkish but secretly we called it in Arabic. In Gümüşsuyu, we had a hut that we used as a small mosque. It was also secret as it was dangerous. I know Necmettin Erbakan from there" (Özdemir, 2014, p. 34). Although Özal did not give his name, Demirel was one of the regulars of the small mosque in Gümüşsuyu. Due to his traditional religious knowledge, he had no

difficulties adapting to the new community. According to Kazdağlı, Demirel also had good relations with the nationalist-Turkist cadres influenced by Nihat Atsız. During the Second World War, these people were pro-German but after the end of the war, their interest shifted to the United States. In the following decade, some of them, including Alparslan Türkeş, were sent to the Unites States (Kazdağlı, 1999, p. 102). Herein, it is worth to note that a decade later, in 1955, Türkeş's years in America coincided with Demirel's who was there as an Eisenhower fellow but their first meeting would be years later, after 27 May 1960.

Süleyman Demirel kept his relations with different groups but he never became one of them. Furthermore, there is no evidence whether he was affiliated with student associations such as the National Union of Turkish Students (MTTB). However, after the end of the Second World War, the political environment in Turkey was changing due to the rise of an anti-communist discourse and the politicisation of students was ongoing during the process. On 3 December 1945, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote an article in his newspaper, *Tanin* entitled '*Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan*.' It calls the citizens to rise and form a national front. In his article, Hüseyin Cahit accused Sabiha Sertel of promoting communism by emphasizing it was time for citizens and intellectuals to struggle against this ideology (*Tanin,* 3 December 1945). With his article, he obviously pointed the Sertels as a target. Consequently, the next day, on 4 December, the crowds raided on the couple's *Tan* newspaper and destroyed all equipment in the building. In her autobiography, Sabiha Sertel accused the single party regime and the Şükrü Saraçoğlu government of organizing the student groups for the raid on their newspaper (Sertel, 2015, p. 287). Years later, in an interview with the journalist Fikret Bila, Süleyman Demirel confessed that he was present during the raid on *Tan*. However, he emphasized that he was not involved in any kind of violence and he was there just

protesting. In the same interview, he added that anti-communism was very popular among university youth back in those days by underlining that he agreed with them (Bila, 2005, p. 20). It is possible to say that politics or ideology were not priorities for Demirel during his university years.

Normally, Süleyman Demirel's graduation from ITU supposed to be in 1948. However, due to the changes in the curriculum in 1944, one more course was added. Demirel and his classmates boycotted the decision but the university administration did not step back, resulting in their graduation to be postponed by six months. Thus, Demirel's year of graduation is 1949. This kind of collective resistance movement might have influenced the way Demirel perceived future student protests. Being just one course away from graduation, he started to work in a private company as site chief. His first duty was the construction of city halls in Burdur and Bucak (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 91). Meanwhile, he decided to take an important step concerning his private life. Süleyman Demirel and Nazmiye Şener were engaged in 1941 and it was time for them to start their own family. The couple's wedding was on 12 December 1948 and their marriage lasted almost 65 years. During and after his political career, Nazmiye Demirel accompanied him in many occasions.

In his famous novel *Tutunamayanlar* (Atay, 2002), Oğuz Atay told the story of a group of civil engineers who graduated from ITU. By describing them as 'disconnected erectus'—a phrase created by Atay himself—the author depicted their alienation and how they could not fit into the society and how they could not keep up with the necessities of the daily life even though they were civil engineers. Despite the fact that they belonged to a different generation of engineers, Süleyman Demirel might have been the antithesis of Atay's 'disconnected erectus'. As a pragmatic individual, he saw Istanbul as a ladder to reach his goals. His university education provided him

the analytical approach that he would use in every stage of his career. Finally, it was time for him to put his theoretical knowledge into practice. When he first came to Istanbul in 1941, it was the Second World War years and Turkey had a single party regime. Eight years later, the war was over and the transition to multiparty politics was complete in the country. Turkey and the world were prone to significant changes and the new conjuncture offered great opportunities to individuals with good education, from which Demirel would benefit too.

After his graduation, Süleyman Demirel started to work in Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (ESDA) due to his obligatory service. ESDA was one of the institutions that were founded in 1936 according to the von Humboldtian model. Its objective was to conduct field research in order to put academia's theoretical knowledge into practice (Tekeli, 2003, p. 77). Demirel's first task was to accompany an American group of engineers, who came to Turkey to prepare a feasibility report on the management of the Gediz Water Basin. He spent almost four months conducting field research with the Americans and while doing so, he managed to build good relations with them. As a result, in September 1949, his department wanted him to go to the United States to spend a year at the Bureau of Reclamation for conducting research on irrigation projects (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 108). Established in 1902, the Bureau of Reclamation was a state institution, best known for the dams, canals and power plants it constructed in the western states of the country (About Us: Mission/Vision, 2015). Being there was a great opportunity for any water engineer and Demirel took the job without any hesitation. However, he did not take his wife with him since his eight-dollar daily wage was not enough to make a living as a couple (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 108).

During his trip, Süleyman Demirel visited different states of the country. What he saw during his visits impressed him very deeply. In one of his interviews, he mentioned that he had spent three days sitting on a rock and watching the Boulder Dam situated on Colorado River (Turgut H. , 2015, p. 70). In the meantime, he observed the structure of the Bureau of Reclamation, which he would later take as a model for State Hydraulic Works. After spending almost a year in the Unites States, Demirel came back to Turkey in September 1950. However, the Turkey he found on his return was different than the one he had left a year before. As stated before, Turkey has already completed her transition to multi-party politics in 1946. Four years later, in the elections in May 1950, the Democrat Party seized the power with great majority. Adnan Menderes was the new prime minister and almost a week later, the parliament elected Celal Bayar as the president of the republic.

Following his return from the United States, Süleyman Demirel was sent to Adana in order to supervise the drilling activities on the Seyhan Dam. He first suggested that he could be more useful in developing projects thanks to the new techniques that he had learned during his visit to the United States. Yet, the order was clear and he departed for Adana with his wife. During the Adana days, Demirel spent most of his time making observations at the working site, which was seven kilometres away from the city centre. The couple stayed in Adana less than a year and on October 1951, Demirel was called to Ankara by his department to work as a project engineer. They were back in Ankara where they would spend the rest of their lives (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 112).

Süleyman Demirel spent three more years in ESDA, and in 1953 he was transferred to the Seyhan Bureau. One year later, the bureau had been reorganized and renamed as the Department of Dams. In parallel with the Democrat Party's economic

policy, new projects were in a row. In addition to Seyhan, the construction of the dams of Demirköprü, Kemer and Hirfanlı was under Demirel's control. As a young project engineer, Süleyman Demirel was being appreciated not only by his colleagues but also by the politicians including Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar. On the first Consultative Energy Congress in April 1953, Demirel gave a speech on the on-going projects. During his long speech, he sorted the locations, aims, costs, rant abilities and economic benefits of the projects point to point by making reference to numbers (Demirel S. , 1953). Important names of the Democrat Party, including Menderes and Bayar, were there and thanks to his excellent command of his subject, Demirel might have managed to impress them.

Meanwhile, the world was undergoing a significant transition. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the new struggle was between the United States and the Soviet Union. One of the former's most important weapons was the use of a strong anti-communist propaganda. United States Information and Exchange (USIE) and United States Information Service (USIS) were two institutions that ran the program in the world and Turkey was among the countries where they were very active. Actually, since 1945, Turkey had already been in good terms with the US administration due to post-war conjuncture and the Marshall Aid. Finally, in 1952, the country became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Eventually, with the pro-American Democrat party in power, Turkey not only became one of the most important allies of the US, but also an excellent environment for USIS and USIE to spread their anti-communist propaganda. Besides activities for the public, they also developed exchange programs for young bureaucrats. Most of these programs were fellowships, which aimed to send the promising individuals to the U.S. in order to increase their knowledge and manners (Örnek C. , 2015, p. 176). One of them was the Eisenhower Exchange

Fellowship. In 1953, to celebrate President Dwight D. Eisenhower's first birthday in the White House, a group of businessmen founded an international exchange program to honor his devotion to world peace (About Us: History of EF, 2015). Eisenhower Fellowship constitutes a good example of the anti-communist ideological organizations of the Cold War. As stated before, its main objective is to choose promising young leaders and to bring them together with their American counterparts. Turkey was one of the countries that participated in the program. The fellows were selected among young individuals who have already proved themselves in their fields. Accordingly, the first participant from Turkey was Süleyman Demirel.[1] As a bright bureaucrat with good command of English, Demirel fit into the picture well. He departed to the U.S. in mid 1954. In his second trip, he took Nazmiye Demirel with him. During his days in the U.S., he visited New York, Washington, Boston and San Francisco in order to observe the operational processes of various organizations. The duration of the visit was twelve months, but the couple came back to Ankara two months earlier (Turgut H. , 2014, p. 121). One may suggest that his experience in the U.S. sowed the seeds of anti-communism, which indeed surfaced, as one of the core issues of Demirel's rhetoric, in his future political career.

Shortly after his return to Ankara, in September 1955, the Minister of Public Works, Kemal Zeytinoğlu, visited Süleyman Demirel in his office. The purpose of the visit was to notify him on his appointment as the general manager of the State Hydraulic Works. It was a great opportunity for a 31-year-old bureaucrat. Yet, Demirel was reluctant to take it as it could be perceived negatively in the hierarchical structure of the organization. His first reaction was to call the general manager, Hikmet Turat to talk about his reluctance regarding the issue. Moreover, he refused to go to the office

[1] After Demirel, the other participants of the program in the 50s were Mahmut Sevek Sipahi in 1956, Nezir Kırdar in 1957, Veli Aytekin in 1958, Esrel Erkmen 1959 (About Us: Meet Our Fellows, 2015).

for a couple of days. However, the order was coming from the minister and it was not open to negotiation. When Demirel took the job, he encountered a resistance from the experienced regional directors. In order to break it, he invited them, one by one, to meetings to impress them by demonstrating his knowledge and capabilities on the issues (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 131).

Süleyman Demirel did very well during his five years term in the SHW. Tuğrul Erkin, who worked with him as a bureaucrat in many occasions, argued that Demirel became a legend in the eyes of the bureaucrats of his time. That was due to the fact that he became the general manager of a very important institution for the country's development at a very young age (Erkin, 2017). On his first day at the office, Demirel put "Our mission is to find the water that the people of Turkey needs" motto on the door. After that, he carried out reforms that would transform the SHW into a more efficient organization. He applied the organizational structure that he observed in the Bureau of Reclamation and created a well-functioning communication network within the institution. Demirel also started publishing monthly bulletins while building libraries in regional branches. He cared about the development of his staff's abilities and, in order to contribute to their development, he sent young engineers to the U.S., where they would learn about modern techniques. As a result, the SHW became one of the most successful institutions of the history of modern Turkey (Turgut H. , 2015).

On the other hand, his tenure in the SHW contributed to his political career. In other words, Süleyman Demirel's evolution from bureaucrat to politician started after 1955. On 8 April 1956, Adnan Menderes asked him to make the opening speech of the Seyhan Dam since he was involved in every stage of the project. After the speech, he would later say "I was the only speaker that day. After the speech was over, the crowds left. Then I sat on a rock and watched the dam and Seyhan for a long time" (Turgut H.

, 2015, p. 72). The day was so important for Demirel that a picture taken with Menderes and Bayar on that day is still there in his office in Güniz Sokak. During his term in the SHW, Demirel travelled to different regions of Turkey in order to start new projects. While doing so, he had the opportunity to make observations on his future potential voters. The article he wrote in 1958 to be published in the bulletin of the SHW was important. The name of the article was 'the Impressions of a Journey'. In the article, Demirel first praised the country and the citizens then mentioned the problems of Turkey and their solutions. He also referred to the achievements of the republic without neglecting the religious aspect. For example, he would say, "The mindsets of the young brains in Kayseri İmam Hatip HighSchool is the evidence of our moral case" or "There are 415 students in Bor Secondary School. 185 of them are the children of peasants" (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 141). Demirel concluded by stating, "My opinion is that a prosperous and civilized Turkey is not an imagination of the impossible. However, it requires determination, energy, effort and morale" (Turgut H. ,1992, p.141-142). The interesting thing about the article was the fact that no one could exactly tell whether it was written by a bureaucrat or a politician. A year later, he gave three speeches on the radio on village waters, dams and irrigation. His tone and wording were again more political than technical.

During his tenure in the SHW, Demirel built good relations with the DP cadres. In his book, Hulusi Turgut argued that during one of the cabinet meetings Adnan Menderes once said, "Watch out for this guy. He is the future prime minister" (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 132). Whether Menderes pronounced this phrase or not, it is obvious that Demirel did well enough to be appreciated by the Democrats. The businessman and engineer Şarık Tara would later say, "We were both beloved children of Adnan Menderes" (Tara, 2015, p. 84). In his memoirs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil mentioned that

Adnan Menderes arranged for him a meeting with Demirel to resolve an irrigation problem in Bursa where he was the mayor. After listening to him carefully, Demirel kindly rejected his request by giving a detailed answer. Although that was their first acquaintance, Çağlayangil emphasized that he was impressed by the excellent command of the young director (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 117). Herein, it is worth to note that Demirel was strongly supported by Tevfik İleri, the successor of Kemal Zeytinoğlu as the Minister of Public Works (Komsuoğlu, , 2008, p. 115).

On 27 May 1960, a group of officers carried out a military intervention. Members of the DP, including Adnan Menderes and President Celal Bayar, were ousted and arrested while the parliament was dissolved. The military intervention marked the end of the DP. While these developments were taking place, Süleyman Demirel was in Spain for an international conference on irrigation and drainage. He came back to Ankara on 10 June and immediately gave his resignation from his post in order to relieve himself and the minister. As an appreciated bureaucrat by the DP cadres, that may be considered as a pragmatic move on his part due to the junta's hostile approach against the government. It also marked the end of his career as a bureaucrat.

The first part of Süleyman Demirel's life provided him a traditional background with a different type of pragmatism, which he would benefit from during different stages of his political career. With his local accent, he would present himself to the crowds as a fellow villager, which was basically the reality. Since he came from similar roots, Demirel already knew much about his potential voters, which his political adversaries had yet to learn and understand. Back in 1941, it was time for him to learn the analytical approach, which he would use for the rest of his life to solve problems. Demirel was finally in Istanbul to start a new stage in his life. During his

ITU years, he was a hard working student with limited interest on politics. Even so, he managed to build relations with the Islamic and nationalist groups. After his graduation, he was sent to the United States twice, in 1949 and 1954, where he would not only specialize on technical and organizational issues concerning his field but he would also get acquainted with anti-communist ideology. After his return, he became the general manager of the SHW, a post that would help him to attract the attention of the DP cadres, including Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar. Demirel's career as a bureaucrat ended with the military intervention of 27 May 1960. According to Nilüfer Göle, the mindset of an engineer that preferred a man of technique to a man of cause, adopted an action-driven, pragmatic approach instead of principal and ideological beliefs. It acquired an outlook beyond ideologies and chose to be moderated in politics (Göle, 2012, p. 15). Throughout his upcoming political career, Süleyman Demirel carried out many actions, which confirmed Göle's statement above.

2. The Rise of an Ordinary Turk (1960–1964)

The military intervention of 27 May 1960 did not only mean the end of the ruling Democrat Party and a break to multiparty politics in Turkey, but also the end of Süleyman Demirel's bureaucratic career. Since Demirel had close links with the DP cadres during his tenure in bureaucracy, he immediately gave his notice of resignation following his return from Spain on 10 June. It was the beginning of a new career for him. Accordingly, Chapter 2 discusses the period from 27 May until the Justice Party (JP) Congress in November 1964, which resulted in Demirel taking the leadership of the party. Within that framework, the chapter will focus on the nature of the military intervention along with the politics of the period that followed. After his resignation, Demirel was called up to complete his military service, which he served as a reserve officer in the State Planning Organization (SPO). Later, he started his own contracting business under the Morrison Knudsen Company. Meanwhile, his involvement in politics was limited to the membership to the general administrative board of the newly founded Justice Party from which he resigned in 1963. However, he returned as a competitor for the leadership of the party. The victory of Süleyman Demirel came in November 1964, which was a significant turning point in his political career. Within that context, alongside chronological elaboration of the important political events, the chapter aims to analyze pragmatism in the political actions of Süleyman Demirel during his struggle for power.

In the aftermath of the military intervention, the developments in the political scene were both rapid and serious. The National Unity Committee (NUC) announced the dissolution of the parliament. On the same day, they invited a group of professors from Istanbul University to prepare a new constitution. The head of the constitutional commission was Sıddık Sami Onar, who was a law professor and the rector of the

university. According to Feroz Ahmad, the decision to involve intellectuals altered the nature of 27 May, transforming it from a military coup to an institutional revolution (Ahmad, 1993, p. 127). Meanwhile, the leader of the NUC, Cemal Gürsel, announced that the democratic order would be restored as soon as possible by emphasizing that he had no intention of becoming a dictator. In the same speech, Gürsel added that he had already warned the ones who lost their control for the sake of their political ambitions (*Milliyet*, 28 May 1960). In line with their strategy, the NUC formed the new government by appointing its members as ministers. Cemal Gürsel, who became the prime minister in the government, said that the elections would be held in three months (*Milliyet*, 29 May 1960). In the meantime, the NUC enjoyed serious support from the mainstream media. For instance, the editorial of *Milliyet* on 4 June praised the military intervention of 27 May as being too successful and legitimate to be called a revolution. The author asserted that the intervention was not only non-partisan and non-violent, but also successful in terms of not creating a hero and lacking dangerous political ambition (*Milliyet*, 4 June 1960). Moreover, large masses in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara widely acclaimed the military intervention of 27 May. However, the situation in small towns and villages in Anatolia was quite different. The research led by Erozan and Aslaner argues that despite the systemic propaganda in Anatolian villages, there was some small-scale discontentment against the movement of 27 May and the NUC (Erozan & Aslaner Karayel, 2015). Within this framework, one can suggest that such reaction contained an important potential of voters, which would be the case of the newly emerged political actors for the upcoming period and Süleyman Demirel was one of them.

During his tenure in the SHW, Süleyman Demirel postponed his military service due to his workload. But after his resignation, he was taken into custody by the

Central Command in Ankara. That was when his path crossed simultaneously with Alparslan Türkeş, one of the most influential members of the NUC. Türkeş was appointed by the committee to the under secretariat of the prime ministry. In his memoirs, Alpaslan Türkeş mentions that his old third-lieutenant Talat Çağman visited him in July 1960 in order to ask him to bail Süleyman Demirel out. Çağman was working in the SHW and had close relations with Demirel. Türkeş did not deny his friend's request, which guaranteed that Demirel would enroll to complete his military service as soon as possible. It is worth noting that Türkeş later said that it was the first time that he heard Süleyman Demirel's name. He also admitted that he had no idea as to what the SHW was. Çağman visited Türkeş two more times for further requests. His first demand was to keep Demirel in an officer candidate school near Ankara. Later he came once again to propose moving him to the SPO. Türkeş accepted both demands. Years later, he said that he did not see any necessity to mention his favor to Demirel (Turgut H. , 1995, p. 267). Another interesting coincidence was the fact that Staff Colonel Kenan Evren was the commander of Süleyman Demirel when he was in the officers' candidate school (Turgut H. , 1987, p. 60).

After spending six months in the school, in 1961, Süleyman Demirel was transferred to the State Planning Organization, which was an institution under the prime ministry. The SPO was founded on 30 September 1960 by the NUC in order to provide economic, social and cultural development. The main aim of the institution was to prepare and implement development plans (Bakanlığımız: Tarihçe, 2016). Article 129[2] of the 1961 Constitution regularized the SPO and it became one of the

[2] Article 129 – Economic, cultural and social development is based on a plan and development is carried out according to this plan. The organization and functions of the State Planning Organization, the principle to be observed in the preparation and execution, and application and revision of the plan, and the measures designed to prevent changes tending to impair the unity of the plan, shall be regulated by special legislation.

most important institutions during the period 1960–80. However the roots of state planning in Turkey go back further then 1961. Towards the end of the 1950s, when Turkey faced serious economic problems, institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) informed Adnan Menderes about the necessity of planning to overcome such difficulties. In his article on the genesis of state planning in Turkey, Vedat Milor argues that the intensity of pressure exercised from abroad to involve the government in development planning began to increase and, finally, the Dutch planning expert, Professor Jan Tinbergen, was invited to Turkey for the preparation of a development plan (Milor, 1990, p. 14). Tinbergen came to Turkey in 1959 to create a team of local experts. Süleyman Demirel was the head of the SHW at that time and both Tinbergen and Demirel worked together on the preparation of the economic plan (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 176). However, Milor suggested that despite inviting Tinbergen and his assistant Koopman to Turkey, the DP did not really mean to institute economic reform in the country. Although a committee of high-level civil servants who supposedly would be in charge of planning was formed, the government made it difficult for Koopman to receive assistance or to gather necessary data (Milor, 1990, p. 14). Then again, after the military intervention of 27 May, the junta decided to proceed with economic planning and the SPO became a center of attraction for educated brains of Turkey. One of them, Güngör Uras wrote that he was rejected by his first application due to the lack of a master's degree from the United States. According to Uras, the SPO was an American style institution, thus its administrators preferred recruiting candidates with degrees from American universities (Akman, 2012, p.144). The staff mainly consisted of academics from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University or *Mülkiye* alongside economists from Istanbul University and

Robert College and experts from the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey. Among them were important names such as Attila Karaosmanoğlu, Besim Üstünel, Nur Yalman, Talat Halman, Sadun Aren, Osman Nuri Torun and Turgut Özal (Akman, 2012, p.170).

After completing his military studentship, Süleyman Demirel started to work in the SPO and remained there until the end of the military service. Although Demirel's tenure in the SPO was due to an obligation, it would be plausible to say that the time he spent in the institution contributed to his knowledge regarding running the state and economic development. In his memoirs, Uras wrote that Süleyman Demirel always benefited from the SPO's experience during his premierships. He emphasized the fact that the undersecretary of the institution always sat next to him during the cabinet meetings (Akman, 2012, p.167).

While Süleyman Demirel was working for the SPO, he had been called to testify for the allegations of corruption in some dam contracts. The claims had been proved to be false but the commission needed his statement as general manager to close the file. Erhan Bener who was the head of the commission wrote in his memoirs that Süleyman Demirel came to the tribunal and claimed that the nature of the tribunal was political rather than judicial. Instead of answering technical questions of the court, he preferred to criticize the injustice of the extraordinary methods of post-27 May interrogations. Bener added that Demirel insisted that the trials conducted by ordinary people with no judicial experience were against law, constitution and human rights (Bener, 1978, p.53). What was expected from a pragmatic person like Demirel was not to criticize 27 May in the court. Yet it was a rational move for him since he had little room for maneuver. After all, he was a former bureaucrat who was widely acclaimed by the Democrats.

Süleyman Demirel completed his military service in the first months of 1962. During the years he spent in the army, Turkey witnessed important developments in the political scene. As stated earlier, Cemal Gürsel and the moderates in the NUC already expressed their intention to restore the democratic order and hand the power back to civilians. In order to achieve this, Gürsel eliminated the radical faction within the NUC on 13 November 1964. Fourteen members including Alparslan Türkeş, Orhan Erkanlı, and İrfan Solmazer were dismissed from their command and later they were sent to various foreign embassies of Turkey. On the day following the operation, Gürsel announced that the excluded members wanted to create a dictatorial regime instead of restoring the democratic order. According to *Milliyet*, the attitude of Gürsel towards 'the fourteen' has been appreciated so well by young crowds that they chanted his name as the safeguard of democracy (*Milliyet*, 15 November 1960). The reactions and their reflections on the press may be exaggerated but a serious obstacle against the transition to democracy was eliminated. However, the reorganization within the military command proceeded with the creation of the Armed Forces Union (AFU) by the influential commanders including Chief of General Staff Cevdet Sunay and Cemal Tural. The AFU aimed to control dissidents and factions within the army for the purpose of preventing any further coups. According to Ahmad, if one purpose of the AFU was to act as a watchdog over the junior officers, the other was to keep an eye on the activities of the NUC. Over time, the AFU became the real power and guarantor of the restoration of parliamentary rule (Ahmad, 1977, p. 168).

The Constituent Assembly came into activity on 4 January 1961 and on the same day, Fahri Özdilek read Cemal Gürsel's message, which pointed out the necessity to prepare the country for the elections as soon as possible. Özdilek emphasized that their objective was to establish the second republic (*Milliyet*, 7 January 1960). Almost

ten days later, political activity started with the application of the new party founders to the Ministry of Interior (*Milliyet*, 14 January 1960). According to Özdemir Kalpakçıoğlu, shortly after the elimination of the fourteen, the politicians were already working behind the scenes in order to form a political party that would aim to catch the DP's votes (Kalpakçıoğlu, 1968, p. 23). One of them was the founder of the New Turkey Party (NTP), Ekrem Alican, who was an old bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance. After resigning from his post, Alican went into politics under the DP and was elected to parliament twice in 1950 and 1954. During the first year of his second term in the parliament in 1955, he resigned from the party with eight other deputies due to the controversy on the right of evidence. Two years later, he became a candidate from the newly founded Freedom Party but did not get into the parliament. After the military intervention of 27 May, Alican was appointed as the Minister of Finance. Almost six months later, after the restoration of the political activity, he founded the NTP; his main motivation was to appeal to the DP's voters. However, Özdemir Kalpakçıoğlu argued that Ekrem Alican's personality, rhetoric and background were not good enough to impress large crowds. According to Kalpakçıoğlu, who was a journalist at that time, the New Turkey Party consisted of reportedly unpleasant administrators who had no clue about politics and Alican was standing on the center of such bleakness (Kalpakçıoğlu, 1968, p. 23). His claims may be a bit harsh but one can see several reasons regarding the failure of Ekrem Alican and his NTP. First of all, he was a technocrat at heart, not a politician. Secondly, he was not really against 27 May. As a matter of fact, he served as a minister in the Gürsel government. Last but not least, the support of Gürsel may have alienated him from the voters as they saw the NTP as a loyal opposition. As a result of this incapacity, he failed to become an important political figure in the aftermath of 27 May.

A new party founded by a retired general on 11 February 1961—Ragıp Gümüşpala's JP—seized the opportunity. Its cement was the feeling of victimhood caused by the intervention of 27 May along with the feeling to bunch together the people who were critical of it (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 28). That was almost true as each of the founders[3] was, to a certain extent, victim of the movement. For instance, Ragıp Gümüşpala was appointed as the Chief of Staff following 27 May but, after two months, he was dismissed from his command by the NUC along with five thousand other military officers. In addition to the retired officers, the representatives of various political views gathered under the roof of the JP. On the one hand, names such as Gökhan Evliyaoğlu or Hami Tezkan belonged to the pan-Turkist extreme right. On the other hand, there were also names like Tahsin Demiray who came from the Peasant Party and was a liberal influenced by Prince Sabahattin's ideas. According to Jacob M. Landau, the most important factors regarding the success of the JP in its formative years were the support coming from these influential groups and the pragmatic policies that it initially pursued. Landau added that these groups did not turn effective factions within the party as their common objective was to profit from the political vacuum left by the DP (Landau, 1991, p. 137). In other words, one can argue that the driving force behind the emergence of the JP was to catch the votes of DP sympathizers. Yet, the struggle of the party was a difficult one because of the post-27 May atmosphere. According to Ümit Cizre, the JP constitutes an important case regarding civil military relations. First of all, the party owes its own existence to a military intervention. Then again, the uniqueness of the JP in Turkish political life was the fact that the Armed Forces were the main factor, which shaped the ideology and the policy making of the

[3] The founders of the Justice Party were Ragıp Gümüşpala, Tahsin Demiray, Şinasi Osma, İhsan Önal, Etem Menemencioğlu, Mehmet Yorgancıoğlu, Muhtar Yazır, Necmi Öktem, Cevdet Perin, Emin Acar and Kamuran Evliyaoğlu.

party. Cizre furthered her claim by emphasizing that from the beginning to the end, there was not a single day on which the military factor had been ignored in the party agenda (Cizre, 2002, p. 35). Interestingly, the JP's dissolution was the result of another military intervention on 12 September 1980. Within this framework, it can be argued that the very same conditions played an important role in shaping the political approach of Süleyman Demirel who became the leader of the party in 1964. During his political career, Demirel often emphasized the importance of respecting and protecting the equilibrium among different factors. Such an approach could be interpreted as the outcome of his cautiousness and pragmatism, since the conditions of his times might have pushed him to take these factors into consideration. Hence, in order to understand the mindset behind this approach, one has to focus on the dynamics of the milieu in which the JP emerged.

Shortly before the restoration of political activity, Ragıp Gümüşpala wrote a letter to his former aide-de-camp Şinasi Osma, in which he indicated his intention to form a political party. Since his objective was to win the support of DP sympathizers, he wanted Osma to secretly test the water among them. While negotiations were progressing, the question of leadership of the new party emerged inevitably. Different names were proposed by different factions. For instance, a group of retired officers thought that Ragıp Gümüşpala would not be the best choice by claiming that the NUC was reportedly allergic to him. Instead, they proposed Ali Fuat Başgil's name, on which the democrats of Istanbul would also agree. However, Başgil rejected the offer as he thought it was too early (Kalpakçıoğlu, 1968, p. 24). The next candidate of the Istanbul group was Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, former governor of Istanbul, who was in Yassıada because of his close relations with the DP cadres. Gökay was reluctant to lead such a movement. Instead, he preferred to join Ekrem Alican's NTP, which was

supported by Cemal Gürsel. The last option was Ali Fuat Cebesoy who also rejected the proposal as he did not have the intention to go on a new adventure (Kalpakçıoğlu, 1968, p. 29). Finally, they agreed on Ragıp Gümüşpala as the leader of the party. The choice can be considered reasonable, as Gümüşpala was aware of the fragile conjuncture of the times. According to Tanel Demirel, Gümüşpala was not only a moderate figure, but he was also open to cooperation. His approach provided him the chance to get in contact with the different factions. For instance, on the one hand, he was controlling the hardliners within the party and, on the other, he was seen as an assurance by the front of 27 May. In other words, Gümüşpala's position may be interpreted as a facilitator among different actors who were eager to intervene. He played a crucial role by preventing the interruption of the multi-party regime (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 32). In order to achieve this, Gümüşpala had to make concessions to different actors of the political scene. Similarly, Cizre labeled his leadership period as the shaky years of opposition (Cizre, 2002, p. 56). Then again, Gümüşpala did not miss the opportunity to send messages to DP supporters. For example, after the military intervention of 27 May, 'tail' and 'fallen' were two terms used to describe the old democrats. In a speech, Gümüşpala criticized the usage of both terms by emphasizing that there were no such thing as 'tail' or 'fallen' but there were only honest, patriotic citizens (*Milliyet*, 6 March 1961). His words can be interpreted as pragmatic since he aimed to win the sympathy of DP voters. According to Mehmet Turgut, the attitude of Gümüşpala on that day signified a turning point for the JP as the party started to win the hearts of unhappy crowds (Turgut M. , 1990). One has to indicate that Gümüşpala usually preferred to remain cautious so as to make sure that the opposition and the army would not be alarmed by his words.

The JP under Gümüşpala leadership had to face many important situations in the conjuncture following 27 May. One of them was the constitutional referendum. Gümüşpala reluctantly claimed that his party supported the text prepared by the commission. Nevertheless, an article published in Metin Toker's *Akis* suggested that the JP, who was the inheritor of the DP, was implicitly encouraging his supporters to reject the constitutional text. Interestingly, in the same article, the author claimed that his expectation for the referendum was that 90% of the voters would say aye (*Akis*, 10 July 1961). The referendum took place on 9 July 1961 and the percentage of aye votes was 61.7%, while the participation was 81%. Right along with the aye votes which were lower than the NUC expected, the voters in cities like Aydın, Bursa, Manisa, Kütahya, Samsun, Izmir which the Democrats were strong, said no to the new constitution (TÜİK, 2008, p. 2–8). The results were at least encouraging for the JP. Almost a week later, Gökhan Evliyaoğlu wrote that one has to think about the participation percentage and the number of the no votes. He argued that the results might cause some changes in the parliament. Evliyaoğlu ended his article by emphasizing the necessity to reconsider the national issues again (*Son Havadis*, 15 July 1961). Then again, the forthcoming elections became even more crucial not only for the JP, but also for the future of the political regime in the country.

On 21 July, the Constituent Assembly decided that the general elections would be held on 15 October. On the other hand, they set the date for the propaganda on 15 September, only one month before the elections. Coincidentally, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were executed in Yassıada on the same day. Two days later, on 17 September, the execution of former Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was carried out according to the court's decision. The executions can be considered distressful for the JP but that also gave them the opportunity to win the hearts of the discontented crowds.

According to Tanel Demirel, the JP was being attacked by the army, youth organizations, bureaucracy and an important part of the press. Despite the unfavorable conjuncture, the party wanted to show that it was the continuation of the DP. In order to do so, they invited the wife of Namık Gedik, the interior minister of the DP who committed suicide after 27 May, to the podium during the meetings or they put the speakers to the planks that looked like gallows. Tanel Demirel suggested that the election strategy of the party was constructed upon victimhood (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 34). Moreover one of the most important slogans of the party "Look into our eyes, you will understand" was created by Celal Bayar's daughter Nilüfer Gürsoy (Fincancıoğlu, 2000, p. 76).

The elections were held on 15 October and the results were surprising for all sides. The JP won 34.8% of the votes and obtained 158 seats in the parliament. Its main competitor RPP won 36.7% of the votes with 173 seats. On the other hand, the NTP of Ekrem Alican and the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) of Osman Bölükbaşı won 13.7% and 14% of the votes, respectively (TÜİK, 2012, p. 25). The results were disappointing for the RPP and the army, as the parties that pretended to be the inheritors of the DP obtained more than 60% of the votes. Then again, the results were surprising as well for the JP. In his memoirs, Ferruh Bozbeyli admitted that their success in the elections was above their expectations by claiming that winning 14 seats from Istanbul was a surprise to them (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 160). Although the results signaled a coalition, the JP, which was encouraged by its electoral success, preferred to act reluctantly. Meanwhile, the NUC claimed that a national coalition would be ideal. The other issue was the presidential election. As might be expected, Cemal Gürsel was the strongest candidate but the JP proposed Ali Fuad Başgil. That was unacceptable for the NUC and, on 24 October, all party leaders were invited to Çankaya to guarantee

that they would stay loyal to the '27 May Revolution'. The leaders were forced to form a coalition and accepting Gürsel's presidency. Meanwhile, Ali Fuad Başgil who came to Ankara announced the withdrawal of his candidacy. On 26 October, Cemal Gürsel became President by winning 434 of 607 votes. There were also 156 blank votes (*Milliyet*, 27 October 1961). Shortly after the election of Gürsel, the parties started to negotiate to form a coalition, even though the JP was reluctant. İsmet İnönü founded the new government almost a month later. Finally, on 1 December, İnönü expressed his gratitude to the army due to its role during the transition period (*Milliyet*, 2 December 1961), which was also the end of the martial law. However, the influence of the military remained strong for the following period.

As he was doing his military service, Süleyman Demirel was not directly involved in the foundation of the JP. However, in an interview with Hulusi Turgut, he said that if he had not been in the army, he would have been the one who founded the party. Demirel added that everyone knew that he was active behind the issue with his whole body, heart and mind (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 215). However, in his memoirs, Ferruh Bozbeyli asserted that Süleyman Demirel did not have any relation with the party before 1962. He said that on the first days of 1962, they went to Demirel's house to invite him to the party on the recommendation of Mehmet Turgut. Bozbeyli added that there were photographs of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes everywhere alongside open books on the table (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 191). After the meeting that night, Süleyman Demirel finally became a member of the party.

However, for Demirel, politics was not enough to overcome financial difficulties since he was not a member of the parliament. In order to make a living, Süleyman Demirel rented an office in Ulus and started a construction business. Soon he became a contractor of the famous American firm Morrison Knudsen, a civil

engineering company which started to do contracting for irrigation projects in the United States. Over the years, the company became involved in the construction of the top ten projects in the world including the Hoover Dam (About MK, 2016). After the Second World War, the 1950s marked the company's engineering subsidiary, International Engineering Company, Inc., which was designed primarily to implement public works in less industrialized nations. For instance, its first project was a dam in India. By the mid1950s, the firm had been commissioned by foreign governments including Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iran (Morrison Knudsen Corporation History, 2016). In 1954, Harry Morrison was on the cover of the *Time Magazine* as the man who tamed rivers and moved mountains (*Time,* 3 May 1954). From 1962 onwards, Süleyman Demirel became the commissionaire of the company in Turkey. Although there was no evidence showing that Demirel's relation with the firm started in the 1950s when he was in the United States, it is highly likely that he made his first contact while he was there working for the Bureau of Reclamation. Süleyman Demirel's engineering and contracting firm realized projects in Ereğli, Erzincan and Ankara. Due to the rise of anti-American sentiment in the 1960s, Süleyman Demirel's relation with the Morrison Knudsen Corporation became a handicap for his political career. His adversaries seized the opportunity to criticize him by using the nickname 'Morrison Süleyman' that aimed to show him as a puppet of the United States.

Meanwhile, the main agenda of the parliament in 1962 was the amnesty of political prisoners. The issue was tenaciously brought into question by the hardliners. It was a group within the JP, which consisted of people like Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, Sadettin Bilgiç, Ferruh Bozbeyli and Fethi Tevetoğlu. Some of them had close relations with the DP cadres, while others were even relatives of former DP deputies. Their common ground was carrying out hostile and revanchist ideas against 27 May. According to

Ümit Cizre, even though the party leadership pledged loyalty to the army and 27 May, the JP could not escape their wrath as they were accused of being responsible for Talat Aydemir's two failed coups.[4] It was not true at all as Aydemir was against the NUC, the AFU, the RPP and finally the JP. Cizre added that the movement was the result of highly politicized, dismantled army structure (Cizre, 2002, p. 62–63). However, the disagreement in the coalition caused İsmet İnönü to resign from the premiership after six months. The new government was again founded under his leadership but that time the NTP and the RPNP were the RPP's partners while the JP was in the opposition.

Süleyman Demirel preferred not to interfere in controversial issues like amnesty. Instead, he wrote a series of articles in the magazine *Yol* on subjects such as economic development and prosperity. For instance, he suggested that the most important issue in the aftermath of Second World War was economic development. In the same article, Demirel argued that development was a humanity issue by making reference to the difficult conditions (*Yol*, 5 July 1962). He praised the western mentality by emphasizing their prosperity and western man's appetite for democracy (*Yol*, 26 July 1962). He argued that the secret of overall development was the creation of an administration based upon the national will (*Yol*, 3 August 1962). The emphasis on issues like the economic development and prosperity could be considered as the indication of that he had become a center-right politician. One can argue that Süleyman Demirel's approach was different from the rivalries within the party in terms of attitude. Instead of involving in daily political discussions, Demirel focused on a new

[4] Colonel Talat Aydemir was the commander of the Military College. Since he was in a military mission in Korea during 27 May, he had been kept out of the NUC. Aydemir conspired two different times, in 22 February 1962 and 20–21 May 1963. After the failure of both coup d'attemps, he was executed in July 1964. His failure could be considered as the restoration of the hierarchical order within the Armed Forces.

moderate path, which might be what the political scene needed back in those days. His timing was right since many voters were looking forward to normalization.

The congress of the JP convened in November 1962. Süleyman Demirel was on top of the list of the hardliners. His involvement in that list was mutually beneficial for both the hardliners and Demirel. While the former needed a moderate figure to appease the army, the latter needed a door to enter politics. Bozbeyli wrote that thanks to Mehmet Turgut's support, a favorable atmosphere surrounded Demirel's name as he was touted as not only an old democrat but also the prince of Adnan Menderes (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 192). Mehmet Turgut later admitted that he overestimated Demirel's state experience (Turgut M. , 1990, p. 292). On the last day of the congress, the list of the hardliners won the election. Süleyman Demirel became a member of the administrative board alongside names such as Sadettin Bilgiç, Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, Mehmet Turgut, Faruk Sükan, Orhan Süersan and Fethi Tevetoğlu (*Milliyet*, 4 December 1962). He was on the top of the list thanks to his impressive bureaucratic background and, as a result, he became the general vice president of the party. Meanwhile, his brother, Şevket Demirel, was there even before him as the provincial chairman of Isparta (Adalet Partisi, 1962, p. 13).

Süleyman Demirel's first duty in the JP lasted almost hundred days until his resignation because of a raid on the party building. The raid was the consequence of a series of unfolding events. On 22 March, former President Celal Bayar had been released form Kayseri Prison due to health problems. Bayar's release soon became a ceremony as his supporters greeted him enthusiastically. Bayar arrived in Ankara accompanied by a huge convoy. Although the JP was seen as the planner behind the issue, Demirel later said that the party did not have the power to organize such a welcome celebration (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 198). However, Sadettin Bilgiç claimed that

Süleyman Demirel was one of the forerunners in welcoming Celal Bayar. In his memoirs, he wrote that the party sent a committee with Demirel's approval to meet Bayar in Kayseri. Bilgiç added that when Bayar came to Ankara, Demirel insisted on visiting him at his house even though he has been warned by Bilgiç's father about the unrest that might cause. Demirel responded him by saying that a lot of water has flowed beneath the bridge and the wheel would not turn back anymore. In the meantime, he wanted to publish a congratulatory address for Bayar and insisted on putting it into the official records of the party (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 101–102). The next day, a group of protesters threw stones at the JP headquarters and Celal Bayar's house. On 24 March, the protesters besieged the building. Süleyman Demirel, who was alone in the building when the raid began, later said that he recognized some faces among the crowd of 300–400 people (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 98). As time passed, more members of the JP arrived at the building. Yet, the number of the protesters increased while the tone of the demonstrations started to become more violent as well. Sadettin Bilgiç later suggested that the military officers restrained the police and the gendarmerie intervened in order to control the crowd. However, Süleyman Demirel mentioned that the minister of interior gave them the runaround by admitting that he could not control the crowd (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 98–99). By the end of the day, the members of the party had to fight to get out of the building. Mehmet Turgut and Sadettin Bilgiç went to Süleyman Demirel's house to evaluate the situation. In his memoirs, Bilgiç mentioned that everyone was dispirited and daunted. In the same evening, he noticed that the page, which consisted of decisions to greet Celal Bayar, was torn out of the party's decision book; Bilgiç claimed that Süleyman Demirel was the one who did that (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 103). Mehmet Turgut wrote that Demirel started to talk after an uncomfortable silence and said,

> "It's over. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to do politics in this country. Let's finish it together and immediately. Because the opponents do not play the game by the rules. Under these conditions, I do not see any other option than quitting. It will be better if we do it together. If not, our ways are breaking up. Because I am determined" (Turgut M. , 1990, p. 122).

Turgut also added that Demirel insisted on tearing out the Bayar decision page, even though he was one of the main supporters of the same decision just two days earlier (Turgut M. , 1990, p. 122). Ferruh Bozbeyli said Demirel resisted the pressure within the party by saying that in contrast to the ones who have regular salaries due to their deputyships, he had a family to look after and a debt of 28.000 liras[5] (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 190). The raid on the party building continued on the following days. On 27 March, the protesters broke into the building and destroyed the furniture and documents of the party (*Milliyet*, 18 March 1963). Demirel was determined to resign from the party. In the early hours of 27 March, he went to Sadettin Bilgiç's house with Faruk Sükan. Bilgiç's father invited them in for a coffee. Inside, Süleyman Demirel said that there would not be a democratic regime in the country for another fifty years, so they decided to dissolve the party. The reaction of Sadık Bilgiç was clear as he said they do not have the right to dissolve the party. He advised them to have a shower first and then go back to their jobs (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 106). Sadık Bilgiç's words could be powerful and persuasive although it was not enough to dissuade Demirel from resigning. On the following day, twelve members of the general administrative board including Süleyman Demirel resigned from their duties.[6] Meanwhile, the conditional

[5] According to the exchange rate of 1963, the debt was almost $3000 U.S. dollars.

[6] The complete list of resigners: Cahit Okurer, Haldun Menteşeoğlu, Mehmet Turgut, Süleyman Demirel, Faruk Sükan, Reşat Özarda, Ertuğrul Akça, Sadettin Bilgiç, Ferhat Nuri Yıldırım, Ali Bozdanoğlu, Vedat Ali Özkan and Kadri Erogan. *Milliyet*, 29 March 1963.

release decision of Celal Bayar was lifted and Bayar was taken into custody in hospital (*Milliyet*, 28 March 1963).

Due to decreasing tensions during the following week, most of the resigners returned back to their duties but Süleyman Demirel was not among them. Later, he was accused by his political opponents for "taking his hat and leaving". However, years later, he admitted in an interview that the main motivation behind his resignation was the differences between himself and Ragıp Gümüşpala. Demirel argued that Gümüşpala considered him as a potential rival for the leadership of the party. He added that his friends threatened Gümüşpala by referring to him as an alternative. He claimed that the discontentment led to a lack of harmony within the party and as a result, both Gümüşpala and he were unable to do their daily jobs. Demirel added that he considered this as a break from politics, but also emphasized that what he resigned from was his duties, not the party. On the other hand, his resignation caused the creation of a rift between himself and the Bilgiç group, which would lead to a dichotomy and later resulted in a divided party (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 100–101). Whether it is true or not, one can suggest that due to his cautious character, Süleyman Demirel wanted to wait until all conditions became mature enough to support him in his political career. As expected from any pragmatic person, he aimed to be in the right place at the right time. Thus, being a member of Ragıp Gümüşpala's JP might not be beneficial for future prospects.

After his resignation, Süleyman Demirel went back to his construction business. As a subcontractor of the Morrison Knudsen Corporation, he focused on many projects in Ankara and other cities around Turkey. The project in Ankara was the construction of prefabs for the Middle East Technical University campus, where he would become a part-time instructor in the engineering faculty (Turgut H. , 1992, p.

187). Demirel admitted in an interview that his business was doing very well back in those days and he would have a promising future in the construction sector. In the meantime, he was also following politics (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 132). According to Hulusi Turgut, the JP wanted to nominate Süleyman Demirel as the candidate for Istanbul Municipality for the upcoming local elections. Demirel confirmed that the proposal was made in a meeting in Zeki Rıza Sporel's house but he also added he had to refuse due to his workload (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 203–204). At this point, it is worth noting that the JP won the majority in 42 cities including Istanbul in local elections on 17 November. The RPP won 23 cities and the NTP won only one (TODAİE, 2017). Normally, the JP's candidate for Istanbul was Nuri Eroğan but he was replaced by the RPP's Haşim İşcan based on RPP's objection due to Eroğan's delay in resigning from his previous post (*Milliyet*, 11 December 1963). However, the results of the local elections showed that the JP's votes were rising. Consequently, the NTP and the RPNP, who were afraid of losing more votes, withdrew from the coalition and on 2 December 1963, İnönü resigned from premiership (*Milliyet*, 3 December 1963). Three weeks later, İsmet İnönü formed the first minority government of the history of the republic with the support of the independents (*Milliyet*, 25 December 1963).

During the first half of the 1964, the main agenda of politics in Turkey was the Cyprus issue. However, Ragıp Gümüşpala's sudden death on 5 June pulled everyone's attention towards the potential leadership struggle within the JP. According to Tanel Demirel, the success of the JP in the local elections was the sign of a potential majority government in the next elections and the one who would become the leader of the party would also be the next prime minister of the country (Demirel T. , 2004). In his memoirs, Bilgiç wrote that the majority of the deputies wanted to see Süleyman

Demirel in this post. Accordingly, a committee of young JP members including Sadettin Bilgiç, Mehmet Turgut, Ferruh Bozbeyli, İdris Yamantürk and Cevat Önder went to his house in order to invite him to the party. However, Süleyman Demirel's response was negative (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 124). Ferruh Bozbeyli provided more details at that night. He admitted that while proposing the candidacy for general presidency to Demirel, they also added that the workload would be too heavy for one person to handle. Therefore, they suggested that Sadettin Bilgiç would be responsible for the party organization. Demirel, who saw that the duality could lead to a dichotomy within the party, responded by saying that the Union and Progress did the same thing and as a result the party started to control the government. In his memoirs, Bozbeyli confessed that his proposal was not necessary at all (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 194–195).

Even though Demirel gave a negative response to the first proposal, the pressure from the JP's young cadres continued. Bozbeyli said that a group within the party was already engaged in Süleyman Demirel's presidency, as Demirel himself spread the idea to many subsidiaries of the party organization (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 196). Finally, in the autumn of 1964, a group of five, Sadettin Bilgiç, Mehmet Turgut, Faruk Sükan, Cevat Önder and Cihat Bilgehan visited Süleyman Demirel in his office in order to convince him to accept the candidature (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 213). This time, Demirel asked them to give him some time in order to evaluate the situation. He was aware that it was not possible to run his flourishing construction business and be in politics. On the other side, he said in an interview that he was devastated by Adnan Menderes' execution and added that he was ready to face the challenge. Finally, after consulting his wife and parents, he decided to accept the proposal (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 133). However he preferred not to declare his decision to the public. Moreover, he did not participate to party events in a regular way. According to

Mehmet Turgut, there might be several reasons for Demirel's attitude, such as fear and waiting for the right time. Turgut suggested that Demirel wanted to wait and see the dissolution of the prominent hardliner group within the JP as he did not like the idea of coming to power as a part of that group (Turgut M. , 1990, p. 288). That was another sign of pragmatism since he preferred to maximize his personal benefits by acting according to the conditions, rather than principles.

Meanwhile, during the period following the death of Gümüşpala, Sadettin Bilgiç assumed the vice presidency of the party until the elections in the congress. At first glance, he saw that as a temporary duty. Mehmet Turgut said that Bilgiç was travelling all around the country and as a result crowds started to see him as the natural nominee for the presidency. Turgut added that Bilgiç did not hesitate to whisper Süleyman Demirel's name as the candidate (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 134). As time passed, the lack of a serious opponent in addition to the reluctance of Süleyman Demirel encouraged him to name himself as a candidate. Bilgiç later wrote that people like Orhan Süersan were angry with him, as he did not announce his candidacy. Finally, he decided to run for the presidency of the party. However, the hardline faction within the party wanted to name one single candidate for the congress. In order to solve the problem, Süleyman Demirel and Sadettin Bilgiç decided to send letters to twenty-eight prominent members of the party. In his memoirs Bilgiç emphasized that it was Süleyman Demirel who prepared the list.[7] Despite that, the results were in in Bilgiç's favor by 14 to 10 (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 126). Bozbeyli also confirmed that it was Sadettin Bilgiç who was the winner of the poll by 16 to 12.

[7] In his memoirs, Sadettin Bilgiç cited 25 names of the list including Ekrem Dikmen, Ata Bodur, Celal Kılıç, Cahit Okurer, Orhan Süersan, Ali Bozdoğanoğlu, İbrahim Tekin, Ahmet Topaloğlu, Cihat Bilgehan, Ertuğrul Akça, Etem Kılıçoğlu, Mehmet Ali Aytaş, Ali Naili Erdem, Mehmet Turgut, Cevat Önder, Mahmut Rıza Bertan, Şükrü Akkan, Mehmet Ali Ulusoy, Osman Kibar, Mehmet Karaoğlu, Kamil Özsarıyıldız, Kamil Tolon, İsmet Angı, Zahit Akdağ, Ali Sepici.

However Demirel objected to the results by claiming that Bilgiç conducted lobbying activities behind the scene (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 197). As a result, a new meeting was arranged at Cevat Önder's house. There, Gökhan Evliyaoğlu read Ali Fuad Başgil's message. In his letter, Başgil asserted that he had no objection to Bilgiç's candidature but otherwise he would come to stand as a candidate. The message caused unrest among the participants and the attempt to reconcile Demirel and Bilgiç failed the second time (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 198).

While the day of the congress was approaching, there were three candidates competing for the presidency of the JP. One of them was Tekin Arıburun. He was a general who was retired by the NUC after the military intervention of 27 May. Arıburun was a senator under the JP since 1961. Her wife was a DP deputy, who served her time in Yassıada. According to Cüneyt Arcayürek, Arıburun had necessary moral qualities, which would help him to be elected; however, the conjuncture of the period was extraordinary (Arcayürek, 1985a, p. 336). Furthermore, he was the representative of the moderate faction though the party was dominated by the hardliners. Thus, the real competition was going to be between Sadettin Bilgiç and Süleyman Demirel. Both candidates had their own strengths and weaknesses. Bilgiç was coming from a pro-DP family. His brother Sait Bilgiç was among the DP deputies who were put on trial after 27 May. His older brother Emin Bilgiç was a professor, who was ousted from the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography. He had made important contributions both to the foundation and organization processes of the JP. Besides, he had a huge influence on the grassroots of the party. Within the party cadres, Bilgiç was described as a courageous man of principle who followed a direct course instead of zigzagging (Ahmad, 1977, p. 235). On the other hand, he was considered as the representative of the ultra-nationalist and Islamic conservative cadres

of the party. Being the son of a mufti, his religiousness and nationalism had deeper roots than Süleyman Demirel's (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 37). In his memoirs, Alpaslan Türkeş admitted that the nationalists like him gave their support to Sadettin Bilgiç (Turgut H. , 1995, p. 388). However, the qualities that attracted Türkeş and his friends were not so desirable for other factions. Cemal Gürsel and the military kept Sadettin Bilgiç at a distance as they were beware of his potential revanchism. According to the rumors, the armed forces would not give power to the JP in case of a possible Bilgiç victory (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 130). For instance Arcayürek argued that Sadettin Bilgiç seemed too right wing in post-27 May conditions (Arcayürek, 1985a, p. 336). Furthermore, Bilgiç had one more important disadvantage, the weakness of his rhetoric. In September 1964, he gave a speech on the Cyprus issue which was broadcast live on the radio. Instead of speaking, he preferred to read it from a prepared script and while reading it, he had to stop frequently due to his stammer. As a result, Bilgiç's poor performance not only failed to impress the audience but it also caused people to question his capacity as a party leader.

On the other side, Süleyman Demirel had a different set of advantages. First of all, he was not a politician who carried revanchist ideas in his luggage. He was young bureaucrat, who was considered to be a modern man who knew about economics. Besides, he was put forward as Menderes' man, which won him the favor of the hardliners within the party (Ahmad, 1977, p. 235). Mehmet Turgut later confessed that they exaggerated Süleyman Demirel's state experience because their friends did not have much of it. Turgut also added that they did not have the opportunity to see Demirel's defects as he was not participating to daily party activities (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 131). Moreover, Demirel was not seen as a threat by the military. For instance, Cihad Baban wrote that Cemal Gürsel supported Demirel's general

presidency by emphasizing that he was well educated, modern and secular unlike many others within the JP (Baban, 1971, p. 265). Even Cemal Madanoğlu later told an American diplomat that Demirel was a modern man and his election as the party leader provided a more positive character to the JP (Smith, 1965, p. 190). Alongside his modern and secular image, Süleyman Demirel's traditional background provided him a good chance to win the support of the conservatives. According to Ahmad, Demirel epitomized the new Turkish politician, as he did not come from the traditional military bureaucratic intelligentsia, which had dominated politics in Turkey since the Tanzimat period (Ahmad, 1977, p. 236). He was a self-made man who was educated due to the opportunities provided by the republic. Being the son of a peasant family from Isparta, he was a modern fellow with a modest background. Tanel Demirel suggested that Demirel could be considered as someone who proved that it was possible to be modern without neglecting conservative values (Demirel T. , 2004). Finally, Süleyman Demirel enjoyed great support from the press and the business community. Cüneyt Arcayürek who worked for *Hürriyet* later admitted that they were confident of Demirel's victory in the upcoming congress. He also added that he could lose his job if Demirel did not win since he was one of main supporters (Arcayürek, 1985a, p. 388). Parallel to Arcayürek's confession, Fincancıoğlu claimed that during the last twenty days before congress, *Hürriyet* was no different from a press bulletin of Süleyman Demirel (Fincancıoğlu, 2000, p. 82). Indeed, the famous 'King of Dams' nickname was invented by the same newspaper. In addition to the press, the signal from Celal Bayar indicating his support for Süleyman Demirel had a significant influence in determining the result of the congress (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 135).

Besides his many advantages, Süleyman Demirel had three vulnerable points. First of all, he was being criticized because of his resignation from the party due to the

raid in March 1962. Demirel defended himself by claiming that his resignation allowed the general administrative board to work in good harmony. He also added that those who would not resign at the right time could harm their own causes (Demirel S. , 1964). Secondly, in a conjuncture including rising anti Americanism, he was the man who was identified with the United States due to his business relations. As stated before, he was the representative of the Morrison Knudsen Corporation. However, Demirel was never offended by claims that linked him to the United States. On the contrary, just before the congress, his supporters distributed a photograph of him with the American President Lyndon Johnson (see Appendix C). According to Yurdakul Fincancıoğlu, the appearance of the photograph helped Demirel to build a positive image in the eyes of the delegates (Fincancıoğlu, 2000, p. 84). The other weakness of Süleyman Demirel in the upcoming congress was the claims about his affiliation to a freemason lodge. Sadettin Bilgiç argued that the document showing Demirel's affiliation to the lodge was presented in 1962 by his countrymen Hacı Kadir and Hacı Mehmet Özkan (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 133). While the congress was approaching, Bilgiç's supporters distributed a brochure including the document in order to weaken Süleyman Demirel. Demirel responded to the claims by showing a paper signed by the grand master of the freemasons, Necdet Egeran. The paper indicated that Süleyman Demirel was not a free mason. Demirel added that he is a member of a family that did not sit down to have breakfast before reading the Koran (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 235). According to Ferruh Bozbeyli, Demirel's statement put Bilgiç and his supporters in a tight spot because they were seen as maligners (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 199). Cüneyt Arcayürek argued that Demirel never denied that he was a member of a mason lodge. Instead, he preferred to remain noncommittal in order to keep himself from unnecessary

discussions (Arcayürek, 1985b, p. 57). Although it is worth noting that the paper given by Egeran caused a dichotomy and later a division in the mason community of Turkey.

The JP congress opened in the Grand Cinema of Ankara on 27 November. It was expected to choose not only the leader of a party but also the future prime minister of the country. Besides, it was the first time since the foundation of the republic that a party would choose his leader with the votes of the delegates (Bektaş, 1993, p. 155). Although there were three candidates including Tekin Arıburun, the real struggle was between Süleyman Demirel and Sadettin Bilgiç. At first, it was Bilgiç who gave his speech but as expected, it was passionless and monotonous. The next day, Süleyman Demirel gave an impressive speech, which won him the appreciation of the delegates (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 137). In his speech, he emphasized the importance of two particular issues: democracy and prosperity. Demirel argued that the JP was the safeguard of the democratic regime in Turkey. He suggested that the people of Turkey were in need of an economic miracle, which could be created by the JP's efforts. He adopted an embracing discourse by emphasizing that they would struggle for the rights of everyone including the neutrals and those who do not share the same ideas. He promised peace and order in the country. He argued, "The dignity of the people, the reputation of the institutions will be placed above everything. Everyone will be the guardian of such dignity and reputation."[8] While doing so, he did not forget to promise total development with economic, social and moral aspects (Demirel S. , 1964). The speech was often interrupted by applause and ovations and at the end everyone including Demirel himself knew that he was going to become the leader of the JP (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 137). The speech on the day of the congress helped him to reinforce his existing positive image. While his all-embracing discourse calmed

[8] "Halkın hassasiyeti, müesseselerin itibarı her şeyin üzerinde tutulacaktır. Herkes bu hassasiyetin ve itibarın koruyucusu olacaktır."

the anxiety of revanchism, his good command of the economic issues impressed the delegates. Accordingly, on the next day, Süleyman Demirel won the election by getting 1072 of 1679 votes. His main contender Sadettin Bilgiç had 550 votes while Tekin Arıburun won only 39.

Süleyman Demirel's victory was acclaimed by different actors of the political scene. In the first instance, Cemal Gürsel expressed his appreciation by congratulating Demirel and the JP thanks to the plain good sense and the maturity in the congress. Gürsel admitted that he saw Süleyman Demirel as the safeguard of the regime but he also asked him to be deliberate and attentive in his speeches (*Milliyet*, 2 December 1964). Abdi İpekçi described Demirel as a leader who could solve issues without prejudices thanks to his modern, mature and moderate attitude. İpekçi added that the JP finally had a true leader (*Milliyet*, 30 November 1964). In addition to Gürsel and İpekçi, there were other people who were pleased by Süleyman Demirel's victory. For instance, Philip Clock, an American diplomat from the Embassy of Ankara wrote in his confidential report to the Department of State that a man identified with the United States had come to the head of the JP, Turkey's largest political party. Clock suggested that he saw this as a positive step by emphasizing that Demirel represented a moderate and tolerant approach to political affairs (Clock, 1965). At the end of the day, Demirel was in a position where he was appreciated by various actors for different reasons.

Süleyman Demirel stated many times that he never had lust for politics, and his involvement within that struggle was the result of a fait accompli. Moreover, he admitted that the difficult conditions of Turkey pushed him into the politics (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 193). However, his actions during the period between 1960 and 1964 not only contained political ambition but also a great deal of pragmatism. From his resignation until his struggle for the party leadership, Süleyman Demirel always

remained cautious without neglecting to take the conditions of the period into consideration. In other words, he preferred to be in the right place at the right time. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil described Demirel as “a person who does not show when he is angry; who does not react at once; who does not tell immediately what should be told finally. According to Çağlayangil, Demirel was “a chess master who calculates his every move and does not rush it, as any cautious and planned person would do. He is a mathematician and a young man who does not leave anything to chance making solid decisions” (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 114).

3. Moderate Pragmatism (1964–1971)

After the Grand Congress of the JP in November 1964, Süleyman Demirel was finally the leader of the main opposition party in Turkey. The following years would not only witness important political, economic and social developments in Turkey, but also manifest Demirel's rise and fall within the field of politics. Accordingly, this chapter will cover the period, which started with his leadership in 1964 until the military intervention of 12 March 1971. Within the period of seven years, Süleyman Demirel's JP won two general elections by majority and formed four governments. The chapter will elaborate his electoral campaigns by making reference to his speeches. From the first day of his involvement in politics, Demirel was aware of the importance of numbers. He overthrew İsmet İnönü government by rejecting the budget in 1965. Five years later, as a twist of fate, he was also overthrown by the rejection of his budget. After becoming the prime minister in 1965, Süleyman Demirel struggled to maintain the critical balance regarding civil-military relations. In order to do that, he often compromised on several subjects. These compromises led to the deepening of an already existing dichotomy within the JP, which would later cause the emergence of the Democratic Party in 1970. In the meantime, Turkey under the JP witnessed a significant economic growth during the period 1965–1970. That was partly due to favorable global economic conjuncture. Yet, the mixed economic system supported by the import substitution model provided the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie. It was in line with Demirel's progressive-developmentalist rhetoric to transform Turkey from a rural to an industrialized urban society. Finally, the second half of the sixties witnessed the rise of the social movements in the world and Turkey was inevitably affected by such changes. The Worker's Party of Turkey (WPT) got into the parliament in the elections of 1965. However, the real movement started out of the

parliament among the university youth. The pro-leftists' protests combined with rising anti-Americanism led to violence in the streets that would later pave the way for the military intervention of 12 March. Even though Süleyman Demirel benefited from the anti-communist rhetoric to catch more votes from the opposite camp, his messages about the street movements were interestingly appeasing as he often emphasized that protesting was a constitutional right. In brief, during the years 1964–1971, Demirel tried to fulfill the expectations of his supporters by acting as a technocrat who was looking for pragmatic solutions regarding political, economic and social issues. However, because of the delicacy of the political scene in the Turkey of that time, he had to leave his post after a military memorandum.

As any opposition leader, Süleyman Demirel's main objective was to come to power. The opportunity was provided to him by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in a regular leaders' summit in Cemal Gürsel's office in Çankaya on 8 December 1964. Alongside Demirel and İnönü, important names such as Osman Bölükbaşı, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Kemal Satır, Ekrem Alican and Fahri Özdilek were present (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 128) In the summit, Süleyman Demirel and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil criticized the government by emphasizing that the country was in a bad shape. The solution that they proposed was to call for an early election. As an experienced politician, İsmet İnönü's response was simple but striking. He reminded Demirel that in a democracy, the place for complaints should be the parliament but not the President's office. In other words, he invited Demirel to the parliament in order to settle a score (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 140). In his memoirs, Çağlayangil wrote that İnönü's reaction caused tension in the room (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 131). In order to break the ice, Cemal Gürsel had no other option than announcing the end of the meeting. Immediately afterwards, Demirel told Çağlayangil and Ali Naili Erdem that İnönü was

right when he said that government issues could not be solved in Çankaya. Hence, he proposed to go to the parliament for pay off (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 141). In order to secure the result, Süleyman Demirel compromised with the opposition leaders on negative vote for İnönü's budget proposal (*Milliyet*, 10 February 1965). Accordingly on 13 February, the proposal was turned down by 225 nay votes against 197 ayes (*Milliyet*, 14 February 1965). As he was not yet a member of the parliament, Demirel watched the ballot in a glass room situated in the parliament. He was confident and his confidence had stemmed from the calculations based on previous contacts with the deputies who were going to vote for the sake of the proposal (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 143). The result not only marked the victory of Süleyman Demirel but it was also İsmet İnönü's last premiership in his long political career. In other words, it was the end of the times of the Independence War heroes like İnönü, Gümüşpala and Bayar. Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel was on the spot as the first generation of the Republic (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 145).

After the fall of the İnönü government, Cemal Gürsel invited the opposition leaders to Çankaya to form a coalition government. At first stage, Süleyman Demirel was the candidate of the JP. Even though his premiership could easily be arranged by the resignation of a senator, Demirel denied becoming a prime minister without being elected. His attitude was pragmatic since he might have believed that focusing on long-term plans instead of short-term results could be more beneficial for him. He wanted to form a JP dominated temporary government, which could take the country to the elections as soon as possible. After the meeting in Çankaya, Cemal Gürsel and the leaders agreed on the neutrality of the potential prime minister. Gürsel's candidates were Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and Kemal Kurdaş. The JP brought İhsan Doğramacı's name to the table (*Milliyet*, 16 February 1965). The next day, all parts agreed that Suat Hayri

Ürgüplü would be suitable for the post. Ürgüplü was the son of an Ottoman Sheikh al Islam who served as the Minister of the Customs and the Monopolies in the Şükrü Saraçoğlu government. Later, he joined the DP in 1950 and he quit that post to pursue a career in the foreign ministry. After serving in capitals such as Bonn, Washington and Madrid, he returned to politics in 1961 as JP Senator. Although he was a member of the JP, one can argue that Suat Hayri Ürgüplü was a reasonable choice for the premiership due to his neutrality. The government was founded on 20 February 1965. It composed of members from all parties except the RPP and Demirel was assigned as the deputy prime minister.

However, Süleyman Demirel was not comfortable because of the issues within his own party. Even though he swamped Sadettin Bilgiç in the congress, Bilgiç had many supporters and he did not hesitate to criticize Demirel in different occasions. In his memoirs, Ferruh Bozbeyli said that Bilgiç organized meetings at his house in order to gather the ones who were resentful or angry with Süleyman Demirel. According to Bozbeyli, JP's main issue before Demirel was the dichotomy among the moderates and hardliners (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 206). Bozbeyli suggested that right after becoming the head of the party, Demirel started to organize another group within the party. The new group was called 'Under Oaths' or *Yeminliler* and it was based on the occupation of 147 important posts such as administrative board memberships, ministries. Thus, Demirel aimed to organize 147 loyal deputies to secure his place as the head of the JP. However Bozbeyli also confessed that the existence of the group was rather ambiguous, as he did not meet someone who said that he swore an oath (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 205). On the other hand, Sadettin Bilgiç argued that Süleyman Demirel founded this group in order to hamper his directorate of organization of the JP (Bilgiç,

2002, p. 135). Whether the group existed, Demirel, in the end, could manage to deal with the discord within his party in an unusual manner.

The Ürgüplü government was a transitional government and the most important expectation from it was to take the country to the elections in the same year. However, Süleyman Demirel benefited from the conditions by observing the mechanisms of the state. As the deputy prime minister, he had the chance to see the necessary actions after the elections. Moreover, he gained political experience by maintaining the fragile harmony among the coalition parties (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 248). According to W.B Sherwood, entry into government gave the JP several advantages. First of all, it meant that the RPP no longer controlled the election system. Furthermore, it at least assured the JP of the neutrality of the bureaucracy, which was considered the traditional ally of the RPP. Sherwood, finally, suggested that Süleyman Demirel's involvement within the government provided him with the opportunity to demonstrate his acceptability and responsibility vis-à-vis the army. This was vital because the senior military officers could fear that the JP would embark on a course of revenge for the military intervention of 27 May after assuming the power (Sherwood, 1967, p. 62). Demirel emphasized many times that he did not have revanchist ideas. Yet, as a deputy prime minister, he had the chance to prove this to the army and the opposition.

Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel was always confident of the potential success in the upcoming elections and he did not hesitate to claim that in different occasions (*Milliyet*, 28 July 1965). Even before the start of the electoral campaign, he visited the Black Sea Region in June 1965 as part of a nationwide tour. During the tour, he gave 53 speeches and engaged in many conversations with the citizens (Demirel S. , 1965, p. 196). Alongside messages emphasizing the importance of unity and solidarity, Süleyman Demirel's speeches were based on two main issues: anti-communism and

socioeconomic progress. For instance, in a speech in Samsun, he declared that the main objective of the extreme left movements was to change the order via lies and slanders. He also did not forget to call his audience to crush communism wherever they found it (Demirel S. , 1965, p. 167). Demirel also accused the previous coalition government by claiming that it did not fight against the extreme left (Demirel S. , 1965, p. 182). In addition to his anti-communist discourse, he knew how to combine the prosperity issue with local needs such as transportation, electricity, health services and education (Demirel S. , 1965, p. 189). During his visit to a prison in Rize, he promised that the law on execution of sentences would be revised before the elections (Demirel S. , 1965, p. 191). Within that framework, it would be plausible to say that Süleyman Demirel had very good command of many issues including the highly specific ones. Moreover, he knew how to present them as problems that would be fixed in a short period of time. Before the visit, he took along ten members of the party to prepare a comprehensive report in order to find out his party's strengths and weaknesses. Ferruh Bozbeyli, who was among the team, mentioned that there was a consensus about the JP's majority victory in the upcoming elections. But he also emphasized the importance of cautiousness vis-à-vis the army, the RPP and the youth. However, Demirel responded by saying that precautions would be useless at that stage and he would prefer to make it work as it goes along (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 210). In other words, he chose to wait until the elections, which would result with the JP's victory. Thus, he came to power to take the necessary precautions.

While the election campaign was approaching, the JP changed its emblem to a white horse, as it was easier to distinguish in the ballot paper especially for former DP supporters who lived in rural areas. However, the process of adoption of the emblem was a little complicated as the white horse was officially registered to another party

founded by Fuat Köprülü after 1960. Süleyman Demirel later argued that he knew Köprülü from the 1950s and he visited him to convince that it was the JP's turn to carry the torch. Köprülü, who was old and patient, embraced the proposal and he gave Demirel the white horse emblem. Demirel later claimed that the adoption of the emblem was a very successful job as it eased to convey their discourse to the public during the rallies. He added that whenever he said the voters to put the seal to the chest of the white horse, they were going wild in rallies (Sınayuç, 1995). The adoption of the white horse as the party emblem could be interpreted as a result of the weakening of the influence of 27 May in politics. Otherwise, a pragmatist like Süleyman Demirel would not be keen on appearing as the inheritor of the DP in such an obvious way.

The election campaign started in September 1965. The JP preferred to construct its discourse on socioeconomic development and anti-communism. Feroz Ahmad argued that except for its proclamations against the left, Süleyman Demirel and his party refused to commit themselves ideologically. In an interview, Demirel argued that they were against all 'isms' including liberalism and capitalism. After claiming that they were not for any diehard ideology or system, Demirel added that they would establish their economic views in accordance with the conditions of the day (Ahmad, 1977, p. 237). That was by all means a pragmatic approach since he clearly admitted that the conditions of the time would be the main factor in the process of determining his policies. According to Süleyman Demirel, politics was the tool of serving the country and the politician had to struggle so as to bring civilization and development to the nation. From such a point of view, H. Bahadır Türk argued that Demirel had a deep admiration to the material side of western civilization (Türk, 2014, p. 83). For instance, in his Diyarbakır speech on 29 September, he made a quick description of the region as a poor and neglected part of the country at a glance. Thus he promised the crowd

roads, water, schools, job opportunities and prosperity. Besides raising standards of agriculture and livestock breeding, he emphasized the necessity to build industrial complexes within the region (Kalpakçıoğlu, 1968, p. 174-179). According to Feroz Ahmad, Demirel and the JP appealed to the ambitions and the drive of the man in the middle rather than the man at the bottom. That being said, Ahmad argued that the promise of everything to everyone was the JP's prescription for electoral success (Ahmad, 1977, p. 238).

Even though JP's election manifesto called for the unity and the solidarity of the nation, Süleyman Demirel did not hesitate to criticize the RPP and the WPT by linking them with communism. His discourse against the WPT was aggressive to put it mildly. For instance, in a meeting in Maraş, he accused the WPT by aiming to change the order. Demirel advised his audience to chase traitors, bullies and bandits (*Milliyet*, 2 October 1965). However his criticisms were not only aiming the WPT. As a matter of fact, he planned to knock the RPP out by positioning it at the same side with the WPT. Then again, the adoption of the left of center discourse by İsmet İnönü gave Demirel the opportunity to show his rival as a manipulator of the army and military forces. For example, during his speech in Giresun, he read a piece of paper, which said "İnönü will do the same thing to you as he did to Menderes before". Demirel claimed that the paper he read from was sent by the RPP supporters. Whether it was true or not, he knew how to use it against İnönü and the RPP. He often emphasized that the army belonged to the nation and not the RPP. Later he admitted that by doing so he aimed to put the ones who took advantage of the army in a difficult position without neglecting to give credit to the armed forces (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 154).

During his electoral campaign, Süleyman Demirel won the support of different social layers. On the one hand, he impressed the urban and westernized citizens due to

his modern image and progressive-developmentalist rhetoric. On the other hand, he gained the sympathy of the conservative cadres by being in the front row during the Friday prayers, by remembering and addressing them with their first names or presenting himself as one of them by emphasizing his peasant roots (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014). An American diplomat, G. Lewis Schimdt who visited Uşak, Afyon, Balıkesir, Kütahya and Manisa in 1965 wrote in his report that the JP absorbed practically all the Republican Peasant's Nation Party (RPNP) supporters and it was doubtful that any of the RPNP candidates could be elected through the national remainder system (Schmidt, 1965, p. 115). It should be noted that the system was directly criticized by Demirel on many different occasions. During a speech in Kars, for instance, he labeled it as a dangerous invention that aimed to establish the rule of the minorities over national will (*Milliyet*, 21 September 1965). Despite the critics against Demirel, there was a consensus among politicians, the business community and the press that the JP would be the first party in the upcoming elections. *Milliyet* estimated that the JP would win 200 seats in the parliament. According to the same prediction, the RPP and the WPT would obtain 171 and 25 seats respectively while the others including the RPNP, the Nation Party (NP) and the NTP would gain 53 seats in total (*Milliyet*, 7 October 1965). The night before the election, Süleyman Demirel admitted that he was calm and he went to bed at a normal hour. Later in an interview, he would say that he always remained calm on the nights before the elections as he had done everything in his power. Demirel added that those who could not tolerate the results should not compete (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 258).

The elections results were a surprise even for optimistic JP supporters. According to the polls, the JP won the majority in the parliament by obtaining 52% of the votes, which ensured 240 seats. Meanwhile, his main contender, the RPP won only

28.7% of the votes and 134 seats in the parliament. Due to the lack of the electoral threshold and the national remainder system thanks to the 1961 Constitution, parties such as NP, NTP, WPT, and RPNP were able to enter to the parliament. It is worth emphasizing that the electoral turnout of 71.3% was approximately 10% lower than 1961 elections (TÜİK, 2012, p. 25). The election results showed a consolidation in the center-right as the JP absorbed the votes of the NP, the NTP, and the RPNP. On the other hand, it was a disappointment for the left. It can be suggested that the left of the center discourse of the RPP was not good enough to compete with Süleyman Demirel's promises especially in villages. The WPT caught the votes of the urban citizens including university youth, who traditionally voted for the RPP. According to the research conducted by Nermin Abadan and Ahmet Yücekök, the JP and the NP were mainly supported by the low-income groups in big cities, while the RPP and the WPT won the votes of upper income groups (Abadan & Yücekök, 1966, p. 114).

The 1965 elections were undoubtedly a big achievement for Süleyman Demirel but it would be a mistake to view it as an individual triumph. William Hale described it as a significant victory for pragmatism over tradition and dogma by making reference to Demirel's peasant origins, his insatiable appetite for hard work and his grasp for detail (Hale, 1994, p. 171). W.B. Sherwood described it as the victory of an organized, broadly based political party with genuine roots. According to Sherwood, Demirel was not the charismatic father figure or tribal chief of Turkish tradition like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and Adnan Menderes. He was basically a modern, pragmatic executive, an organizer whom Turkey needed back in those days (Sherwood, 1967, p. 54). Although both arguments were plausible, one may be inclined to the suggestion that Demirel's pragmatic approach was one of the main reasons for the success in the elections.

Süleyman Demirel won the support of many groups including the business community, peasants and may be even the army because of his pragmatic technocrat image, but at some point, he had to struggle in the field of politics in order to overcome the problems within his own party. Even though he defeated Sadettin Bilgiç in the congress, the Bilgiç group had still a remarkable influence in the JP. As stated before, there were rumors within the party group, which claimed that Demirel founded a group of under oaths so as to maintain the counterbalance. Sadettin Bilgiç argued that the group consisted of ex-moderates like Sadık Perinçek, Ahmet Dallı, İsmet Sezgin, Aydın Yalçın and İsmail Hakkı Tekinel (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 155). According to Bilgiç, the first incident that drove a wedge between two factions was the election of Ferruh Bozbeyli as the President of the Assembly. Bozbeyli was the only candidate for the post but the lack of rivals was the result of the efforts of the Bilgiç group (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 147). However, the real crisis would come during the process of the formation of the government.

On 24 October 1965, Cemal Gürsel gave Süleyman Demirel the task to form the new government. He was finally the prime minister at the age of 41. When he came to his parliament group, he showed the letter of Gürsel to deputies by asserting that they struggled together day and night to obtain that letter of fifty grams without forgetting to emphasize that the responsibility was heavier (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 262). Demirel's words were acclaimed by the JP group with cheers and applause. However, the positivity within the party group did not last for long. Three days later, when Demirel announced the new government, there was no clapping at all. He would later describe it as one of the most stressful moments of his political life (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 158). The reason was Demirel's decision to exclude Bilgiç and his friends from the government. Moreover, there were rumors in the party that accused

Demirel to cross the line by naming some low profile members as ministers in his government. Bilgiç supporters were clearly admitting that they would go for the black ball in the upcoming vote of confidence (*Milliyet*, 28 October 1965). After Demirel's contacts during the following days, two groups reached an accord. On 1 November, Sadettin Bilgiç declared that their reaction was in the process of moderation by emphasizing that the government would have the vote of confidence (*Milliyet*, 1 November 1965). The next day, the government program was accepted in the JP group. While the talks were continuing, Süleyman Demirel admitted that the cabinet was enough and under his responsibility. Demirel added that he could not work properly under such fear and stress (*Milliyet*, 2 November 1965). Thanks to the moderation between two groups, the government obtained the vote of confidence on 11 November by 252 aye votes against 172 nays and ten abstentions (*Milliyet*, 12 November 1965). Even though Demirel overcame that obstacle, the reaction within the party group could be accepted as the preview of further problems. Thus, Demirel's main objective for the following years would be to preserve the integrity of his party by managing his rivals sometimes by concessions or sometimes just by eliminating them.

However, the dichotomy within the party was not the sole problem. As the JP was seen somehow as the successor of the DP, a group consisting mainly of the former democrats, expected a general pardon which would include not only the former DP deputies in Kayseri but also the convicts of Talat Aydemir's attempted coup d'état. Although Demirel preferred to remain reluctant in the matter of including political prisoners to the scope of the pardon, Cemal Tural, Commander of the Land Forces, did not hesitate to write a letter in order to prevent the political amnesty. On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel chose to stay on the safe side. He argued that Tural's letter was not important at all as it was one of the four or five millions of letters under

circulation within the state mechanism (*Milliyet*, 5 December 1965). Even though Demirel preferred to ignore it, Tural's letter was important in terms of revealing that the army did not have the intention of keeping itself out of politics even though a new government backed with an important majority in the parliament was in power.

A major crisis that Süleyman Demirel had to face in the first months of 1966 came from Çankaya. In January 1966, Cemal Gürsel was struck with paralysis. As Gürsel's health conditions deteriorated impetuously, the doctors decided that it would be better to treat him in the US. When Demirel went to Çankaya to inform him, Gürsel was crying, as he had already lost his mental faculty due to the illness (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 282). On 2 February, Cemal Gürsel was sent to the Walter Reed Hospital in Washington by President Lyndon Johnson's personal airplane. His health conditions deteriorated further in the United States and when all hope was gone, he was sent back to Turkey. After his return, a committee of 38 doctors wrote a report of his incapacity and the quest to find a new president of the republic started (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 160–161). In a well-developed democratic system, the candidate should be a civilian on whom the parties in the parliament would compromise. However, the conditions of the times would not permit the election of such a candidate. In his memoirs, Sadettin Bilgiç wrote that he visited Süleyman Demirel in the prime ministry to discuss the issue. Bilgiç argued that they could not elect İsmet İnönü or the leaders of other parties since it would be unacceptable to the JP. Even if Demirel would be the candidate, it could be wastage of 10% within the JP because of secret ballot-open counting system. Finally Bilgiç added that a civilian candidate would satisfy no one and the plausible thing to do was to name the Chief of Staff Cevdet Sunay as the candidate for the presidency (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 162). Since the military intervention of 27 May, Sunay was a member of the AFU and a balancing figure that prevented many

attempts to carry out a coup. In an interview, Süleyman Demirel claimed that his preference for Sunay was the result of his commitment to the democracy, which was proved to be genuine in various occasions. Demirel added that he saw Sunay as someone who could help to establish civil authority (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 286–287). According to Ümit Cizre, the election of Sunay would be plausible for the JP as it could contribute to decrease the existing tension between the JP and the army. Cizre argued that Cevdet Sunay's presidency would not only contribute to smoothen the negative perception in the eyes of the military but it would also help the JP to get rid of the revolution phobia within the party (Cizre, 2002, p. 75). Although the report for Gürsel was prepared on 26 March, Demirel's contacts started earlier than that date. First he sent mediators to İsmet İnönü in order to smell the air. After having İnönü's approval, Demirel went to see Sunay at the end of a workday in the prime ministry. Since he wanted to keep his visit secret, he preferred to go alone. There, he offered the presidency to Cevdet Sunay by emphasizing that he had already guaranteed enough votes in the parliament. Demirel requested Sunay to help Turkey to progress within the democratic stability (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 163). Sunay's response was positive and shortly afterwards Demirel went to the prominent figures of his party. Ferruh Bozbeyli wrote in his memoirs that there were almost fifteen members in Mehmet Turgut's house when Demirel made his agreement with Sunay public. Bozbeyli emphasized that there was no single objection in the party to Sunay's presidency (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 232). Finally, Cevdet Sunay was elected as the fourth president of the republic with 461 votes. The candidate of RPNP, Alparslan Türkeş, had only 11 votes, while Celal Bayar who was not a member of the parliament won five votes (*Milliyet*, 29 March 1966). As stated before, the election of the President of the State, which would replace a figure like Cemal Gürsel, could pose a

problem in the conjuncture of the times but Demirel managed to satisfy almost all actors by offering them a feasible solution.

The senate partial elections on June 1966 did not only show that the voters were pleased by the performance of the JP but they also helped Süleyman Demirel to secure his position within his own party. The campaign trail started in late May and Demirel visited those 11 cities where the JP was powerful according to the previous election results: Eskişehir, Bursa, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Kayseri, Niğde, Adana, Ankara, Afyon, Uşak and Denizli (*Milliyet*, 28 May 1966). Almost in every speech, Demirel reminded the audience of his modest background in order to present himself as one of them. Again, he gave similar messages as in the previous campaign such as the indispensability of unity and solidarity or the necessity of economic progress and prosperity. However, at that time, he adopted a harder discourse. For instance, in his Bursa speech, he argued that 27 May could not always hang over the national will like the sword of Damocles. As a solution, Demirel proposed to use 27 May as an instrument to achieve peace. In the same speech, Demirel accused the RPP by exploiting the nation's beliefs and thoughts so as to repress freedom of thought of the citizens (Demirel S. , 1966, p. 33). Since the elections of 1965, Demirel and the JP were often criticized by the opposition of exploiting religion. Demirel answered the claims in Niğde by asserting that freedoms of thought and faith were fundamental rights as stated in the constitution. He added that they were aware that reactionism was a crime, which was subject to sanctions by underlining that the issue was often used by the ones who were in search of provoking the nation (Demirel S. , 1966, p. 67). The propaganda ended one day before the election and on the same day *Milliyet* wrote that the JP could lose votes by estimating that the party could win 27 chairs in the senate (*Milliyet*, 4 June 1966). However, the results were far better than *Milliyet*'s projection.

The JP won 35 chairs including four from the national remainder system by obtaining 58% of the votes. On the day after the elections, Demirel admitted that he was satisfied with the results without forgetting to criticize the national remainder system (*Milliyet*, 7 June 1966). The result of the elections not only helped Demirel to become more confident against the opposition, but it also gave him the chance to have a better control of his party by eliminating his rivals. For instance, Demirel and his party passed the law on the general pardon despite the opposition of the NUC. This could be considered as a defeat for 27 May as the NUC group requested from Sunay to veto the bill (Ahmad & Ahmad Turgay, 1976, p. 315). Moreover, in the 3rd Congress of the JP, he defeated Kadri Erdoğan by having 1239 votes against Erdoğan's 175 (*Milliyet*, 30 November 1966). According to Arsev Bektaş, the congress did not only cause the elimination of the ultra-nationalist wing from the party, but it also ensured that the headquarters to become stronger and more authoritarian. Furthermore, the amendments in the party's regulation strengthened the hegemony of the leader within the party (Bektaş, 1993, p. 158). Thus, according to Feroz Ahmad, Süleyman Demirel gained more freedom in his assignments within the party (Ahmad, 1977, p. 242). However, Demirel's leadership within the JP was far from having authoritarian tendencies since the party structure of the party back in those days was still too complex to be controlled by a single individual.

After gaining more control over his party, Süleyman Demirel was finally ready to focus on economic issues that he promised during his election campaign. The JP's government program was based upon two main issues: mixed economy and planned development (Sanal, 2000, p. 58). The latter was the result of the development policy, which was adopted after 27 May. As a matter of fact, Çağlar Keyder suggested that the establishment of the SPO of chosen technocrats seemed like the original aim of the

military intervention, considering the tone of the debate around the institution. Keyder furthered his argument by emphasizing that the director of the SPO functioned as a deputy prime minister in charge of the industrial sector (Keyder, 1987, p. 148). Moreover Demirel claimed on many different occasions that the plan was the necessary instrument in order to reach the goal of development and prosperity (*Milliyet*, 28 May 1967). When he was criticized of not respecting the plan, he defended himself by asserting that it was himself who gave the idea of planning to Adnan Menderes (*Milliyet*, 1 December 1966). Furthermore, Demirel argued that the plan was in parallel with the JP's philosophy, as it was not restricted by any doctrine or ideology (*Milliyet*, 1 July 1967). However, according to Ayşe Buğra, Süleyman Demirel was not a firm believer of development planning and consequently he ignored many plan provisions during the economic decision-making process (Buğra, 1994, p. 138). Instead, he preferred to modify the nature of the institution by asserting even in the party's election manifesto that the plan was not a tight jacket that should be worn as it stands (Adalet Partisi, 1965, p. 19). With respect to pragmatism, it was an expected move from Demirel since he would not hesitate to adapt new measures according to the emerging requirements. Therefore, he changed the structure of the SPO by assigning his friend Turgut Özal as the director of the institution. Ekrem Pakdemirli said that under the directorate of Özal, the SPO was primarily reinvented itself as a new institution, which focused on allocation of private sector's assets (Özdemir, 2014, p. 62). Thus, the first generation of planners did not click well with Özal because of the latter's religious orientation and his approach which place too much premium on private sector (Özdemir, 2014, p. 64). When Turgut Özal and his brothers were criticized in the parliament with the nickname *'Takunyalı Kardeşler'* which emphasized their religiousness, Süleyman Demirel defended Özal by saying that

he was a genius. Demirel said that Özal was an honest and hard-working fellow who got rid of the communists within the institution (*Milliyet*, 17 June 1968). However, in his memoirs Güngör Uras suggested that Turgut Özal preferred to keep the core cadre of the SPO. Uras also argued that Turgut Özal founded a new department, which focused on the incentives and their implementations in a separate building from the offices of the SPO. Uras claimed that the new department expanded with great pace by the recruitment of new personnel who were mostly elected by Özal himself (Akman, 2012, p. 208). The department was successful in terms of promoting the private sector. As a matter of fact, a businessman, Sakıp Sabancı would say Özal's assignment as the director of SPO was the realization of a dream for them (Birand & Yalçın, 2001, p. 35). However, there were also dissatisfied people within the institution and Jan Tinbergen was one of them. Only a few months after the assignment of Turgut Özal, Tinbergen resigned from the SPO by asserting that he was not needed anymore. However an anonymous expert from the institution interpreted Tinbergen's resignation as a gentle excuse as he did not want to approve the new planning operations (*Milliyet*, 30 August 1967). These claims could be true as Demirel and Özal reformulated the institution and its mission. According to Milor, politicians applied pressure on planners to distribute premiums to their clients in various forms, without caring about the effects of such subsidies on the economy (Milor, 1990, p. 26).

Süleyman Demirel emphasized the importance of industrialization in many different occasions by asserting that Turkey could not be a solely agrarian country (*Milliyet*, 28 January 1967). For instance, in a speech in İzmir, he asserted that factories would be constructed in territories that lay deep with nut, corn and wheat fields (*Milliyet*, 18 August 1967). According to him, that can be realized in a mixed economy that would be based on the cooperation of state and private capital. In order

to do that, he applied the import substitution model, which basically aimed at the creation of an industrial sector in an undeveloped country by using various tools. Albert O. Hirschman defined the concept more comprehensively by saying that it was a deliberate development policy that was applied by means such as protective duties, credit and fiscal policy tools, pressure on foreign importing firms and the establishment of state owned industries (Hirschman, 1968, p. 5). According to Keyder, the two important notions that supported the model in Turkey were the politicization of certain economic allocation mechanisms and the constitution of a domestic market. Keyder argued that the political economy of Turkey between 1960 and 1980 was constructed upon these two concepts (Keyder, 1987, p. 150). As stated above, the allocation of resources to public and private sectors were realized via the SPO. Although Demirel claimed that state would establish the basic structure of the industry (*Milliyet*, 11 January 1968), the groups like Koç and Sabancı began to emerge as the industrialists of the 1960s Turkey. He did not hesitate to assert that every talented individual could one day own a factory (*Milliyet*, 8 July 1968). On the other hand, the constitution of a domestic sector was equally important where the nascent industrialists could sell their products. In order to boost domestic demand, the state sector applied a loose wage policy, which had a direct effect on the private sector's wages too. For instance, Korkut Boratav argued that Turkey was one of the highest wage countries among its equivalents. Boratav suggested that the wages in South Korea, which constituted a solid example for export-oriented industrialization during 1970s, were 50% lower than Turkey (Boratav, 2013, p. 124–125).

The result of the economic policy during the second half of the 1960's was quite satisfactory in terms of economic growth. The growth rate of Turkey between 1965 and 1969 was almost 7%. Süleyman Demirel and other JP members often

emphasized that Turkey came second after Japan among OECD countries in terms of economic growth (Adalet Partisi, 1972, p. 99). Demirel later simplified it in his speeches by claiming that he added another Turkey to the existing one (Arcayürek, 1985b, p. 61). As a result of the growth, important investments including the Keban and Gökçekaya Dams, television and the Bosphorus Bridge were initiated during that period. Another important factor that accelerated growth during that era was the usage of credit from the Soviet Union. As stated repeatedly, Süleyman Demirel tried to remain distant from ideological issues but especially so with respect to the economic development. Although his discourse was against communism, he did not hesitate to claim that the friendship of Soviet Union would serve to the economic development (*Milliyet*, 27 September 1967). That was another pragmatic attitude of his since he neglected the ideological dimension to obtain economic gains. Thus he admitted in an interview that several industrial complexes such as İskenderun Iron and Steel Plant, Aliağa Petroleum Refinery, Seydişehir Aluminum Plant were built with the Soviet money (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 333). Due to abundance of the new projects, Demirel spent an important part of his time in Anatolia for groundbreaking ceremonies of state economic enterprises. On the other hand, the emerging private sector became stronger due to the lack of competition provided by the application of import substitution model. Consequently, starting from late 1960s, Turkey witnessed the rise of important industrial groups.

However, the economic conditions of craftsmen and little artisans deteriorated during the period since they could not compete with large-scale industrial groups. According to Feroz Ahmad, it was part of a trend that lasted since the foundation of the Republic, as small men were sacrificed on the altar of capitalism (Ahmad, 1977, p. 243). Nevertheless, the defeat of Demirel's candidate, Enver Sırrı Batur by Necmettin

Erbakan in the elections of Turkish Union of Chambers can be described as the signal of the discontentment of small business owners. As time progressed, the economic situation continued to deteriorate in the country. It was the result of the shortage of foreign capital necessary to subsidize domestic industry. Demirel defended his economic policy by claiming that there was not a single state without any debt in the world. He also added that being a rich person with debt is better than being a poor fellow with no debt (*Milliyet*, 1 July 1967). However, three years later, the country became poorer on the international scene. On 9 August 1970, Turkish Lira was devaluated 66.6% against foreign currencies in order to obtain foreign credit (*Milliyet*, 10 August 1970). Indeed, the next day, the international organizations declared that they would provide Turkey a credit of a billion American dollars for a three-year period. After the devaluation, Süleyman Demirel said that the aim of his government was to prevent the general price increase (*Milliyet*, 15 August 1970). Even though the devaluation of 1970 was successful in terms of finding necessary foreign loans, it was temporary and combined with the political instability within the country; economy became one of the factors that gave Süleyman Demirel a rough time.

However, the real threat for Demirel was posed by various political developments regarding both his own party and the sociopolitical environment in Turkey. The political tension between the university youth and the government rose to the highest level after the student riots in Paris in May 1968. The boycott that started at the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara spread swiftly to the Law Faculties in Ankara and Istanbul in the form of occupations. One may suggest that the motivation behind the protests was the sentiment of insurrection against all types of authority rather than specifically against the JP. Although a deal was reached before long as a result of the concessions of university administrations, that was the start of a

difficult period for the JP and its leader Süleyman Demirel, as the latter was not a genuinely accepted politician in the academic circles. For instance, a report on the attitudes of some young Turkish instructors written by Parker T. Hart, an American diplomat, suggested that those people had a contemptuous attitude towards Demirel as they saw him as an ordinary technician. Hart continued his report by claiming that they "referred to themselves as the elite and believed it was Demirel's duty to come to them in the manner of an inferior approaching a superior for a solution to the country's problems"[9] (Hart, 1966, p. 123). However, it seemed as though Demirel did not get offended by this approach. On the contrary, it may be believed that at least during the second half of the 1960s, Demirel adopted relatively tolerant or even reasonable discourse against the protests coming from university youth. As he was aware of the rights and freedoms of expression provided by the 1961 Constitution, he often emphasized that the world was sailing to new horizons and yesterday's riots were renamed as social phenomenon in the new conjuncture. Demirel claimed that they would keep their temper against the incidents in line with the state's dignity without neglecting to empathize with the issues of the youth (*Milliyet*, 14 June 1968). For instance, during a speech in the parliament, he argued,

> "I would like to state this as well. These kinds of incidents will continue to occur in free and democratic countries. I believe that there is no need to be worried due to these incidents, or let them lead to situations that would cause panic in the economic life. We will endure the mood of freedom and outcome of the freedoms, if we are not to endure, there is nothing to do for us; we have to resolve the problems calmly within the framework of right, reason, state of

[9] The list included academicians who were members of Law and Political Science departments in Ankara University. Among them were names such as Yılmaz Akyüz, Uğur Alacakaptan, Tuğrul Ansay, Bülent Daver, Burhan Gürdoğan, Tuncer Karamustafaoğlu, Ahmet Kumrulu, Ergun Özbudun, Oral Sander and Yıldırım Uler.

> law, our national interests and public order"(*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 19 June 1968, p. 252).[10]

Based on this statement, it can be argued that his approach to basic freedoms consists of a great deal of pragmatism. Rather than having a positive conceptualization of these freedoms, Demirel perceived them as problems of democracies, which may pose potential threats to the economy. The reason behind his moderate approach could be the fact that he did not want to escalate the events in order to avoid the possible threats to stability. Hence, on many occasions he continued that moderate attitude. For instance, he once used in party's congress in Ankara his famous statement "Roads will not wear out by walking." Demirel continued his words by claiming,

> "There is freedom of expression in Turkey. If there are factions that would cause anarchy, there are also laws to face them. There are criterias to assess governments. One has to respect that benchmark. You cannot criticize the government due to the fact that it did not close down a newspaper that you do not like. A strong government does not mean one which holds a stick to hit to the citizen's head but it is the one that respects the law and the rights of its citizens" (*Milliyet*, 9 November 1968).[11]

Demirel's statement was important as it was declared in the Ankara Congress of the JP in which the extreme right faction of his party was present. It can be emphasized that Süleyman Demirel's tolerance was pragmatic rather than genuine. His attitude was not the outcome of the values he adhered to, but the liberal atmosphere

---

[10] "Şunu da ifade edeyim ki hür ve demokratik memleketlerde bu tür meseleler olmaya da devam edecektir. Bunlardan tedirgin olmaya iktisadi hayatta panik yaratıcı birtakım durumlara meseleyi götürmeye de, zannediyorum ki lüzum yoktur. Hürriyet havasına ve hürriyetlerin verdiği neticelere katlanacağız. Katlanmazsak yapacağımız iş yok ve meseleleri sükunetle, soğukkanlılıkla hak, insaf, kanun devleti, milli menfaatlerimiz, kamu düzeni içinde halletmeye mecburuz."

[11] "Türkiye'de istediğini söyleme hürriyeti vardır. Memlekette anarşi yaratacak istidatlar mevcut ise bunları karşılayacak kanunlar da vardır. Hükümetleri ölçecek kıstaslar vardır. Bu kıstaslara uymak gerekir. Beğenmediğiniz bir gazeteyi hükümet niçin kapatmıyor diye tenkid edemezsiniz. Kudretli iktidar eline sopa alan ve her önüne gelenin kafasına vuran iktidar değil,vatandaşın hak ve hukukunu gözeten iktidardır."

generated of the 1961 Constitution. Accordingly, when the opportunity came to him, he would not hesitate to modify it by restrictive measures. Within that framework, the JP's election manifesto for the 1969 elections could provide an example in terms of limiting freedoms. The constitutional amendments that would limit the influence of the extremist movements were accepted as a national service for the JP. Furthermore, the manifesto stressed the necessity of the Council of Higher Education that would function under the presidency of the prime minister in order to provide improved cooperation among the universities (Adalet Partisi, 1969, p. 11). According to Süleyman Demirel, illegitimacy and unlawfulness were two great dangers for democracy, and as a result of this approach, he tried to resolve the issues within the limits of the law.

On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel's stance against communism at home was uncompromising. For instance, in the 2nd Congress of the JP, he would say that the struggle against communism was also a struggle to survive (Demirel S. , 1964). Moreover, he asserted in his party's congress in Adana that the left was the enemy of all. He continued his words by claiming that Turkey was not the right place for the servants of Marx and Lenin (*Milliyet*, 16 November 1966). According to Tanıl Bora, his vigorous anti-communism was a derivation of the fact that he was a typical Cold War right-winger during the twenty years of his career that intersected with the Cold War years (Bora, 2005, p. 563). From that point of view, one may suggest that his fear of a socialist revolution was genuine. Moreover, it would be plausible to argue that such allergy against communism was shared by the High Command too. Chief of Staff, Cemal Tural once warned the army by alleging that the communists were struggling to capture Turkey via revolution. Moreover, Tural's order was decided to be taught in each military unit once a month (*Milliyet*, 23 January 1967). Within that framework, it

would be plausible to admit that Demirel enjoyed serious support from some high ranked officers on his struggle against the left. However, instead of using it against street protests, he rather preferred to direct his anti-communist rhetoric against the RPP and the WPT to weaken them on the eyes of the voters. According to Demirel, those two parties were responsible of the anarchy that surrounded the country. For instance, in a speech in Izmir, Demirel accused the WPT and the RPP of being completely communist by admitting that the left and the left of center were both against the principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (*Milliyet*, 27 May 1968). It should be noted that from the first day in the government, Demirel was uncomfortable with the presence of the WPT in parliament not only because of the party's ideological stance but also because of his belief in the uselessness of the small parties in the legislative process.

According to Süleyman Demirel, the national remainder system was a serious threat for political stability and he did not hesitate to emphasize this in many occasions right after the 1965 elections. For instance, during the budget talks in February 1967, he asserted that the presence of five opposition parties was a factor that make becoming the governing party more difficult (*Milliyet*, 17 February 1967). As a result, the removal of the system became an important issue for the JP. However, opposition parties including the RPP were supporting the system as much as the JP was against it. Moreover, according to *Milliyet*'s survey, most of the academics from Ankara and Istanbul Law Faculties believed in the necessity of the system as it prevented a possible overwhelming majority of a single party.[12] Only four professors from Istanbul

[12] The list included names such as Bülent Nuri Esen, Arif Payaslıoğlu, Münci Kapani, Bahri Savcı, Hamide Topçuoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, Mukbil Özyörük, Adnan Güriz, Ergun Özbudun, Tuncer Karamustafaoğlu from Ankara Law Faculty and Sulhi Dönmezer, İsmet Giritli, Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, Selçuk Özçelik, Ragıp Sarıca, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Vakur Versan, Orhan Aldıkaçtı, Ülkü Azrak, Pertev Bilgen, Bülent Tanör, Erdoğan Teziç and Esin Örücü from Istanbul Law Faculty.

Law Faculty supported the removal of the system.[13] One of them, Sulhi Dönmezer admitted that he found it unreasonable to become a deputy due to some technicalities (*Milliyet*, 3–4 February 1968). Finally, in the beginning of March, the system was abolished and right after it was abolished the RPP and the WPT left the parliament as an act of protest. The removal of the national remainder system before the 1969 elections was a reasonable action on behalf of the JP since it constituted a serious obstacle for small parties including the WPT.

Another issue that Süleyman Demirel had to face before the elections was the discharge of the former democrats. Again, it required a constitutional amendment but this time the first step came from the leader of the opposition, İsmet İnönü. In May 1969, İsmet İnönü declared that he would work for the discharge of the former DP members in order to protect the constitutional order (*Milliyet*, 10 May 1969). The next day, Demirel responded to İnönü's statement by claiming that it was a positive step in terms of taking the country to the lasting peace (*Milliyet*, 11 May 1969). Celal Bayar and İsmet İnönü met at the latter's house on 14 May 1969 and the result of the meeting was the settlement of peace between two former political dissidents. İnönü suggested that it was an opportunity to bind up all wounds and he admitted he would stand behind his decision since he saw that as saving someone who had fallen into the well (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 189). Ferruh Bozbeyli argued in his memoirs that Demirel was satisfied with the developments as the issue was going to be resolved smoothly without any serious objection (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 271). However, Süleyman Demirel's optimism did not last long as the meeting of the High Command in the General Staff changed the course of events radically. On 15 May, the President of the Assembly, Ferruh Bozbeyli met Cevdet Sunay in Çankaya. Bozbeyli later said

[13] Those professors were Sulhi Dönmezer, İsmet Giritli, Hüseyin Nail Kubalı and Selçuk Özçelik.

that in the meeting, Cevdet Sunay directly told himself that the High Command was against the constitutional amendment (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 192). The next day, İsmet İnönü asserted that he would not interfere into the relations between the government and the military (*Milliyet*, 17 May 1969). The ongoing developments put Demirel in a tight spot. A day before the voting, on 20 May, Cevdet Sunay invited Demirel to Çankaya to warn him about the threat of a military intervention. Right after Sunay, during meeting of the Council of Ministers, Faruk Sükan, the Minister of the Interior confirmed that Sunay's words were reflecting the truth (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 195). On the day of the voting, Demirel proposed the cancellation of the amendment asking, "Is returning the political rights our duty; but, preventing the army from being offended is not?" He also added that he would step back otherwise[14] (*Milliyet*, 22 May 1969). As a result, the amendment was canceled, the parliament was closed temporarily for an early holiday and the issue was postponed until the end of the next elections (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 196). Demirel would later admit that he acted responsibly on the issue as he prevented a possible closure of the parliament by the army (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 380). Moreover, Ferruh Bozbeyli argued in his memoirs that postponing the amendment was reasonable on that day as it provided a temporary relief (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 284). However, Sadettin Bilgiç wrote in his memoirs that Demirel failed to satisfy both the army and the former democrats including Celal Bayar by not keeping his promises to both sides (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 187). On the one hand, the cancellation caused unrest within the dissidents in the JP and that later led to the deepening of the already existing dichotomy. On the other hand, the issue can also be described as the signal of an implicit power struggle between the army and the JP government.

[14] "Siyasi hakların iadesi vazifemiz de, orduyu rencide ettirmemek vazifemiz değil mi?"

While the 1969 elections were approaching, Süleyman Demirel was somehow aware of the deteriorating conditions. The protests in the streets, the rising tensions with the military, the dichotomy within his own party and the economic problems caused by the inflation put Demirel in a difficult position. As a matter of fact, Ferruh Bozbeyli mentioned that Demirel once said "We cannot go to the people to tell them not to vote for us" (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 312). Moreover, he had to deal with the extreme right led by Necmettin Erbakan who decided to form an independent group after being vetoed from the JP. That time, the JP's election campaign was shorter than the previous one as it started only 11 days before the election. In its party manifesto, the JP proposed constitutional amendments that could be interpreted as restrictive regarding the state of institutions such as universities, judicial bodies and TRT in order to gain more governmental control (Adalet Partisi, 1969, p. 9–13). The elections were held on 12 October and the JP managed to win 46.6% of the votes and 256 seats in the parliament while its main rival RPP won 27.4% and 143 seats (TÜİK, 2012, p. 25). Even though Demirel and İnönü expressed that they were pleased with the results on different occasions (*Milliyet*, 13–14 October 1969), their success was partly the result of the new electoral system that decreased the chances of small parties. The WPT for instance won only two seats in the parliament while the RPNP and the NTP won eleven and six seats, respectively, which were far lower than previous elections. Moreover, it is important emphasize that the electoral turnout of 64.3% marked the lowest in the general elections in the history of the Republic of Turkey (TÜİK, 2012, p. 25). Within that framework, one may claim that the ongoing political activity and the situation of the streets during the second half of the sixties alienated voters from political activity.

Despite such negativities, Süleyman Demirel knew how to keep the majority of his party in the parliament. But by all means, 1970 was a difficult year for him. In line with his earlier promises, he granted the discharge of the former democrats in November, right after the elections. However, it was not enough to appease the opposition within his party. As stated before, the dissidents existed in the JP from the first day of Demirel's general presidency. Yet, since then, he learned to manage them via several concessions. Even though Demirel won a greater control over his party in the 2nd Congress of the JP in 1966, the cabinet changes that he made in 1967 and the assignment of Sadettin Bilgiç to the Ministry of Communications could be considered as part of his appeasement strategy. However, after the 1969 elections, Demirel preferred to exclude the members of the Bilgiç Group from his new cabinet. Although the main motive behind that could be gaining a better control of his party for the upcoming term, it resulted with the alienation of prominent names such as Talat Asal and Yüksel Menderes who would later move to the side of opposition. Demirel, on the other hand, remained uncompromising against the outcries within his party by approving the expulsions of dissidents. As a protest, a group consisted of important names such as Sadettin Bilgiç, Ali Naili Erdem, Cevat Önder, Yüksel Menderes, Mehmet Turgut, Talat Asal and Faruk Sükan left the meeting of the general parliament (*Milliyet*, 8 January 1970). As time progressed, the rift within the party became larger and led to a memorandum against Demirel signed by 72 members of the party. Such a memorandum emphasized the disciplinary actions against the members of the party because their behavior in the parliament was in conflict with the constitution. However, Demirel ignored the memorandum by claiming that it was both unofficial and invalid (*Milliyet*, 19 January 1970). Only a week after Demirel's statement, Abdi İpekçi wrote in his column that the dissidents could try to overthrow the government

by voting against the upcoming budget proposal. Yet İpekçi added that such claims were only mere speculations as the dissidents were beware of the fact that such action could be perceived negatively in the eyes of the voters (*Milliyet*, 26 January 1970).

However, the speculations turned out to be true as the budget was rejected by 224 red votes on 12 February with 41 of them from the JP group. Demirel would later admit that it was one of the most unpleasant events of his political life by describing that moment as: "At first glance, my eyes went black, then the dome of the parliament flew up to the sky"[15] (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 201). According to Arsev Bektaş, the factions within the JP did not struggle to overthrow the general president. They were not against the general presidency of Demirel as they competed for the control of the cadres around him (Bektaş, 1993, p. 160). In parallel with Bektaş' comment, Mehmet Turgut, who was among the signatories, admitted that none of the dissidents had any aspirations regarding Demirel's position. Turgut added that all internal problems could be fixed right after the 1969 elections with conciliation and some good turn (Turgut M. , 1990, p. 371). Even though Demirel was known as someone who knew to maintain the balance, his uncompromising attitude against the dissidents can be interpreted on the basis several factors. First of all, after the 1969 elections, Demirel might have wanted stability within his party in order to realize the projected reforms for his following term. Secondly, he might have seen the election victory as an opportunity to get rid of the dissident faction. Finally, it may be claimed that he wanted to pull through his party from the dominance of the former democrats. By any means, Demirel's miscalculation would later cost him a majority government.

Right after the rejection of the budget proposal, Demirel gave his letter of resignation to Cevdet Sunay. Two days later, Sunay gave him back the duty of forming

[15] "Hani zaman zaman sorarlar 'En sıkıldığın zaman nedir?' filan diye. Ben bulup çıkaramam onu oradan. Ama o an gözlerim karardı. O meclisin kubbesi uçtu."

the new government. The new cabinet, which was announced on 7 March, consisted of the same members like the previous one. As a result of contacts and lobbying among different factions, the new government won the vote of confidence on 16 March. While 34 of the 41 dissidents did not to show up in the parliament, some of the remaining ones preferred to vote positively along with the independents and five deputies from the Union Party (*Milliyet*, 16 March 1970). Although Demirel looked as though he had overcome the problem, it would not be enough to prevent its potential division. Moreover, keeping it as a whole was not the only issue that he had to face during 1970. A commission of inquiry was constituted due to the resolution by the opposition to investigate the corruption allegations regarding Süleyman Demirel and his brothers. In a short period of time, the investigation became not only a political issue but also a threat, against him, used even by the members of his own party. After some lobbying in the parliament, Demirel managed to prevent the investigation with 309 'nay' votes against 276 ayes (*Milliyet*, 17 December 1970).

The 5th Congress of the JP was held in Ankara on 23 October 1970. Demirel won the presidency by obtaining 1425 votes while his opponent Aydın Yalçın won only 43. Moreover, Demirel's list was completely elected for the advisory board of the party (*Milliyet*, 24 October 1970). The victory was the result of the gradual elimination of the dissidents over the last year. On the other hand, 26 former members including Sadettin Bilgiç, Mehmet Turgut, and Faruk Sükan announced their intention to form a new political party. As the leader of the party, they agreed on Ferruh Bozbeyli's name. In his memoirs, Bozbeyli claimed that he was reluctant at first, but later he accepted the duty because of the pressure of his friends. Bozbeyli had already resigned from the duty of Presidency of the Parliament and almost a month after that, on 13 November, he resigned from the JP to lead the new party (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 328–330). The

Democratic Party was founded on 18 December 1970 and six days later Ferruh Bozbeyli was elected as President. The party had 35 chairs in the parliament and almost all of them were former members of the JP. Moreover, relatives of prominent former democrats, including Yüksel Menderes and Nilüfer Gürsoy, gathered under the roof of the Democratic Party (*Milliyet*, 20 October 1970). Even though the foundation of the new party signaled a fragmentation in the right, it may be argued that the Democratic Party was different than Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party (NOP) in terms of voter's profile. As mentioned above, the NOP pretended to represent the small business owners of Anatolia. On the other hand, the Democratic Party's discourse and program did not contain significant differences from the JP's. Furthermore, Tanel Demirel argued that if the emergence of the Democratic Party would be based on a strong class division, the party would survive more than seven years and its founders would not go back to the JP after an electoral failure (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 59). In other words, one may suggest that the Democratic Party was the result of Süleyman Demirel's inability to overcome the rifts within the JP.

While the problems within his own party put pressure on Süleyman Demirel, a development from the United States put him in an even tighter spot. That was the newly elected Nixon Administration's decision to fight against the heroin addiction in the United States. In September 1969, Daniel Moyhinan, the assistant to President Nixon, wrote a report that emphasized that 80–85% of heroin entering the United States originated as opium in Anatolia and was processed into morphine in Turkey. Moyhinan's proposition was simple: stopping the growing of opium in Turkey (National Archives, 1969). In order to do it, a task force including names such as Henry Kissinger, Al Haig, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Richard Helms—the CIA Director—was constituted in the following October (National Archives, 1969). In

parallel with the decisions from the meeting, on 17 November, Ambassador William Handley delivered Nixon's message that proposed the prohibition of opium farming in Turkey to Süleyman Demirel. In his telegram to the Department of State, Handley noted that Demirel was obviously surprised by the far-reaching nature of Nixon's request. He also added that the prime minister was reluctant to take the necessary precautions as he found it impossible to explain the issue to the farmers (National Archives, 1969). At this point, it should be noted that Turkey had been already limiting the opium plantations gradually since 1967. After getting the telegram of the ambassador, Kissinger wrote an information note to President Nixon that proposed the increased legal purchase of the 1970 crop coupled with an effort to get the Turkish government to make it illegal for the following years (National Archives, 1969). Several months later, in April 1970, Ambassador Handley visited Demirel again. During the meeting, Demirel claimed that no government in Turkey could destroy the existing crop as it might cause "a clash between the government forces and the people and would make the problem worse, since it would create public support for plantings." Demirel also reminded the ambassador that if he would ban the opium production, his party would lose the elections. Instead, he found an ambiguous solution that reflected his short-term pragmatism by saying, "We do not know how it will come up and will have to see at the end of this month. May be some of the plants will be killed by the cold" (National Archives, 1970). It could be indicated that Demirel's words reflected his tight position vis-à-vis the issue. According to Kyle T. Evered, the issue of local cultivators limited the Turkish compliance with demands for absolute bans in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After all, Turkey was a largely agrarian country with a ruling party that relied on its rural electorate (Evered, 2011, p. 302). In August, President Nixon met Ambassador Handley at the White House to discuss the ongoing

situation. During the meeting, Nixon emphasized that he would not prefer to embarrass Demirel government which he considered as an ally but added, “You tell them that we will not embarrass them publicly. But privately you should say that this issue is terribly important to us. That is the line” (National Archives, 1970). However, the reflections in the Turkish media were already quite different as for instance *Milliyet* used John F. Mitchell’s words from the headline as “I approve that Turkey must be punished” (*Milliyet*, 22 July 1970). Although Demirel asserted on the next day that no single country could punish Turkey (*Milliyet*, 23 July 1970), the issue was combined with the already existing anti-Americanism and soon became abrasive for his government. The number of cities that planted opium was down to seven from 32 since Demirel came to power in 1965. Even so, as time progressed, Süleyman Demirel who was once identified with the United States found him in a position, where he failed to satisfy both camps. Accordingly, he said in an interview that they had done everything that would not please the United States, including the opium issue and the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Demirel defended himself by emphasizing that the most important thing for him was the interest of his country without neglecting to add that it would not differ whether it was cooperation with the United States or the Soviet Union if there was an interest (Turgut H. , 2014, p. 327). Again, based on that claim, it can be argued that Demirel had the same unideological and pragmatic approach in terms of foreign policy.

As time progressed in 1970, the situation in the streets started to get out of control. On 15–16 June, the workers organized by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK) were in the streets to protest the anti-union law passed by the government. As things went out of control on the second day of the protests, the government had to invite the army to maintain control by proclaiming martial law.

Demirel later said in an interview that the secret agenda of the protesters was to provoke the army in order to overthrow the government (Gümüştekin, 1974, p. 38). Since the first day in the power position, Süleyman Demirel tried to maintain the delicate balance in the civil-military relations. Even though he had to compromise on several issues including the discharge of former Democrats, sometimes he did not hesitate to take the plunge. For instance, the decision to remove Cemal Tural from the position of the Chief of Staff could be considered as a bold action. The reason behind this was Tural's inspections on civilian institutions like the banks, TRT and PTT. Demirel later said in an interview that after the approval of Cevdet Sunay in a private meeting, it took almost seven minutes to pass the decree on Tural's resignation (Turgut H. , 1992, p. 371). Although Demirel succeeded in eliminating a strong figure such as Cemal Tural, his nervousness against the army was not over yet and when the situation deteriorated in the country, the juntas started to compete to seize the power. Memduh Tağmaç, the Chief of Staff, was aware of the secret activities within the army and did not hesitate to claim that the young officers were inclined to a leftist revolution (Batur, 1985, p. 179). In November 1970, Muhsin Batur, the Commander of Air Forces, wrote a letter to Cevdet Sunay in which he accused the government by being responsible for the existing situation. In his memoirs, Batur suggested that he believed in the necessity of an intervention in order to overcome the problems with the help of a national consensus instead of addressing to the political parties or politicians (Batur, 1985, p. 199). After the leaking of Batur's letter to the press, Demirel and the commanders met at the National Security Council (NSC) in Çankaya. When Sunay proposed the proclamation of martial law in order to control the situation, Faruk Gürler, the Commander of Land Forces, opposed since such a proclamation could create a false impression that would position the army under the control of the government.

Süleyman Demirel later said in an interview that the problem of Turkey was always the rejection of the superior will. He suggested that the intervention of 12 March was no different than the others as the main motive behind it was the army's desire to save the country that was stuck in the muddle (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 218–219). The next meeting of the NSC was held on 22 January 1971. Memduh Tağmaç, the Chief of Staff, gave a short speech that emphasized the difficulty of controlling the junior officers and the threats to both domestic and foreign securities. After Tağmaç, Süleyman Demirel took the floor and proposed constitutional amendments to overcome the issues. He also claimed that the JP was a result of the 1961 Constitution and since then his party won four elections. Demirel asserted that it would be wrong to assume that people are ignorant (Batur, 1985, p. 261–262). Although the joint declaration emphasized that the government and the army were in compliance with each other, one may suggest that behind the scenes they were far from agreement as the discontented commanders set another meeting at the General Staff in Ankara. Muhsin Batur wrote in his memoirs that he and Faruk Gürler had a divergence of opinion with Tağmaç as the latter thought that, as soldiers, they would not be capable of handling issues of the economy and others. However, Batur argued that if an engineer and a village lawyer pretended to run the country, there would be no reason for them to fail (Batur, 1985, p. 272).

As time progressed, the anticipation for a military intervention escalated to boiling point due to the incapacity of Demirel government in dealing with the problems such as increasing violence in the streets or the economic situation that kept getting worse. Among the juntas that surrounded the army, the one led by Gürler and Batur seemed like the one which was more eager to intervene. They also had the support of some civilians; mostly Kemalist left intellectuals who were organized under Doğan

Avcıoğlu's *Yön*. The aim of the junta was to carry out a national revolution on 9 March under Faruk Gürler's presidency and Muhsin Batur's premiership. However, Faruk Gürler's objection on the night before the intervention shattered the hopes of the supporters of the junta. Instead, the army decided to intervene within the framework of the chain of command despite the reluctance of the Chief of Staff Memduh Tağmaç. At the night before the memorandum, Tağmaç invited the Undersecretary of National Intelligence Service, Fuat Doğu, to inform Cevdet Sunay about the army's intervention. Although Sunay remained calm at first glance, the next morning, he asked Doğu to call Demirel in order to suggest him to resign due to health problems. When Demirel called Sunay, the latter admitted that he was unable to stop the process (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 251). The memorandum signed by Tağmaç, Gürler, Batur and Eyiceoğlu emphasized briefly the necessity of a competent and strong government, which could overcome the existing problems. Yet, it also stressed that otherwise the Armed Forces were ready to take control.

After the reading of the memorandum on the radio, Süleyman Demirel called his cabinet meeting in order to evaluate the situation. At the end of the meeting, he announced his decision to resign instead of going to the parliament and looking for vote of confidence. He later claimed that he never felt the support of the parliament during the whole process (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 256). Cüneyt Arcayürek wrote in his memoirs that Demirel defended his resignation by emphasizing that it was his decision that kept the parliament open, as the army would definitely halt the parliamentary activity in an alternative scenario (Arcayürek, 1985b, p. 369). His resignation letter was read in the evening of 12 March. It can be suggested that he preferred to be on the safe side by not resisting the generals' orders since he saw that as a temporary process. Although that was not the end of Süleyman Demirel's political

career, it was definitely an important turning point not only for him but also for the JP. He later said in an interview that he managed to keep his composure, as he knew that these kinds of events would happen in politics. As expected from his rationality and pragmatism, he continued by saying, "What are we going to do? The state is our state. We are going to save the state. We are going to fix the wounds of the state"[16] (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 254).

The study of the period between 1964 and 1971 delivers a good opportunity to analyze the pragmatism of Süleyman Demirel. After the military intervention of 27 May, he stepped into the scene as a technocrat who would run the country in a moderate way. In a country that was home to broad rights and freedoms provided by the 1961 Constitution, he claimed to remain distant to different ideologies. As a pragmatic man, he did not dedicate himself to any principles on any issue. Although he managed to accomplish it to a certain extent, it should be noted that Demirel had an anti-communist discourse since his initial involvement in politics. From his first day in the party leadership until the day he resigned from the premiership, he had always been proud of being aware of the delicate balance of Turkey. However, it can be argued that, at some point, the conjuncture of the period became too complex even for him to manage. Alongside all the political violence, economic problems, issues in foreign policy and the discord within his party put Demirel in a very difficult position. When the day of the memorandum came, he took again the safest position for himself by not denying the army's demands.

[16] "Ne yapacağız? Devlet bizim devletimiz. Devleti kurtaracağız. Devletin aldığı yaraları tamir edeceğiz."

4. In Political Turmoil (1971–1980)

Although the Memorandum of 12 March 1971 forced Süleyman Demirel to resign, it was by no means the end of his political career. As a member of the parliament and leader of the JP, he maintained his presence on the political scene from 12 March onwards. The next chapter will elaborate on events that occurred from that day until the military intervention of 12 September 1980. Accordingly, it will focus on the post-memorandum process and Nihat Erim's interim governments, which also had the reluctant support of the JP. Despite such reluctance, constitutional amendments ratified by the Erim government were in line with the JP's expectations. Demirel viewed the period as a transitory process that would eventually see the return of multi-party politics. He preferred to wait without neglecting the opportunity to eliminate his adversaries. After purging Nihat Erim, he obstructed Faruk Gürler's presidency by cooperating with Bülent Ecevit, who became the leader of the RPP. However, the situation in the ballot box proved to be not as favorable for the JP as it was a decade earlier. The fragmentation of the right due to the emergence of prominent figures such as Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş put Demirel in a tough position in terms of keeping his electoral base together. The 1973 elections resulted in the victory of Ecevit's RPP. Following the military intervention of Cyprus, Ecevit's coalition with Erbakan's National Salvation Party (NSP) fell apart as both parties desired to benefit from the possible situation by calling for early elections. This was when Süleyman Demirel stepped into the picture in order to prevent his adversaries' potential victory. The result was the first of the National Front governments under his premiership. Demirel adopted a strong nationalistic outlook from 1974 onwards. Once again, his choice was in line with the variable conditions and inevitably led to the escalation of violence in the streets. Towards the end of the decade, the situation in the streets as

well as the markets also spiraled out of control. Moreover, Iran's Islamic Revolution resulted in the United States' search for stability in the region. Although Demirel tried to adjust his policies to the new circumstances with steps like the 24 January decisions, such reforms required a strong administration. Thus, this chapter will delve into the process that led the country down the path towards the military intervention of 12 September. One may suggest that the 1970s were different than previous decades, and that new approaches were required. The only static thing was Süleyman Demirel's pragmatism and his capacity to reinvent himself. Consequently, this chapter will focus on Süleyman Demirel's pragmatism in occasions that he had to face several issues.

In terms of civil-military relations, the Memorandum of 12 March was by all means an important turning point for Süleyman Demirel and the JP. According to Ümit Cizre, it marked not only the end but also the failure of the JP's policies that focused on neutralizing the army and building good relations with it. Moreover, the intervention caused a loss of morale within the party (Cizre, 2002, p. 99). Normally, Süleyman Demirel and the JP had to be against the memorandum, but interestingly it was the opposition leader İsmet İnönü who preferred a critical stance against the army. Only days after the memorandum, İnönü claimed that the new order was not democratic at all and the only thing to do was to go to elections as soon as possible. He also emphasized that it was impossible for the parliament to work properly under such pressure (*Milliyet*, 16 March 1973). Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel remained calm even though he was the one who had to resign because of the commander's letter. It was due to his cautious and patient character since he might have wanted to wait and see the developments. Two days after the memorandum, on 14 March 1971, Demirel told his party group that they were facing an important crisis and that he would prefer not to express his thoughts until the right moment arose. He also advised his group to

follow ensuing developments without losing their tempers (Demirel S. , 1973, p. 11–12). He might be right in his stance as the crackdown within the army started immediately after the memorandum. Interestingly, it was Demirel who signed the papers in absentia that ordered the retirement of prominent reformists within the junta, including Celil Gürkan, Şükrü Köseoğlu and Lütfü Erol (*Milliyet*, 17 March 1973). The decision could be considered as the result of the High Command's intention to eliminate the inner circle of the 9 March Movement in order to ensure unity within the armed forces. At this point, it would be plausible to say that almost a week later after the Memorandum, Memduğ Tağmaç was in control of the situation. However, both Ahmad and Zürcher agreed that the example of the Greek military junta made him reluctant to assume power directly (Zürcher, 2001, p. 260). Ahmad noted that İsmet İnönü was aware of the dilemma by emphasizing his approach, which suggested that the military were forced to carry out reforms despite the anti-reformist majority in the Parliament (Ahmad, 1977, p. 290).

Accordingly, the next move was to find a prime minister so as to form a reformist 'above party' government. Only a week after the memorandum, on 19 March, Cevdet Sunay assigned Nihat Erim for the task. Erim was a law professor from Ankara University. He served as a deputy in the parliament and later as a minister under the RPP between 1943 and 1950. After 1961, he was elected again and served until 1971 when he would resign from his party after Sunay's appointment. Muhsin Batur wrote in his memoirs that none of the commanders except Memduh Tağmaç were informed about Erim's premiership as Sunay and Tağmaç did not prefer to consult them (Batur, 1985, p. 303). That may be considered as another sign of Tağmaç's intention to gain control of the intervention. After his appointment, Erim went directly to the leaders of the political parties. İsmet İnönü's decision to support

Erim by giving ministers to his cabinet caused unrest within the RPP. Party Secretary, Bülent Ecevit and members of the administrative board resigned from their duties by asserting that 12 March was against the left of center (*Milliyet*, 22 March 1971). On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel remained to keep his compatible stance during the foundation of the Nihat Erim government. He was aware that Erim would need to compromise as he needed the support of the JP. As a matter of fact, Erim said that if Süleyman Demirel would come to him once, he should go to him twenty times (Ahmad, 1977, p. 292). According to Ahmad, his words were inappropriate as he was pretending to be the head of a reformist government. Moreover, Erim's speech could be considered by the anti-reformists as a sign of weakness that would later cause opposition against the government (Ahmad, 1977, p. 292). When Demirel spoke in his party group, he advised discretion and the deputies decided to support Erim with 258 ayes versus ten nays (*Milliyet*, 23 March 1971). Formed on 27 March, the government was comprised of five ministers from the JP, three from the RPP and one from Turhan Feyzioğlu's Republican Reliance Party (RRP). The skeleton of the government was consisted of 11 technocrats such as Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, Şinasi Orel and Türkan Akyol who was also the first female minister in the history of the republic. After a process of negotiations, the government obtained the vote of confidence by winning 321 ayes versus 46 nays. 74 deputies did not show up and three others abstained from a vote. Even though the JP had a group decision, six deputies voted negatively. On the other hand, Ecevit and six deputies from the RPP did not attend to the voting (*Milliyet*, 8 April 1971). Later on, Demirel justified his decision to Mehmet Ali Birand by claiming "I voted aye for the government. Even though it was against my nature, my principles, I had to cross that bridge"[17] (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 270). He

[17] "Ben oy verdim hükümetlere. Mizacıma aykırı, prensiplerime aykırı. Ama ben bir köprüyü

emphasized several times the importance of keeping the parliament open. It can be debated that Demirel's words constituted a good example in explaining the replacement of the idea of principle action with pragmatism. In line with such an approach, it would be plausible to say that Demirel viewed the Erim government as a tool that could introduce restrictive measures into the 1961 Constitution.

After the formation of the government, Süleyman Demirel criticized the memorandum in an interview with journalist Abdi İpekçi by admitting that they had no intention of coming to power by overthrowing the Erim government. He added that the elected government should have left the power via elections and not because of a memorandum (*Milliyet*, 11 April 1971). In the second part of the same interview, Demirel said that the system resembled a boiling cauldron and it required some pressure relief valves in order to prevent its collapse. According to Demirel, such valves were the constitutional amendments and the referendum. He argued that the latter in particular could isolate the system from potential crises, as it would rely on the public opinion (*Milliyet*, 11 April 1971). One may suggest that such expectations were the main motivations behind Demirel's decision to support the interim government even though he was reluctant to do this. In order to overcome the existing dichotomy within his government, Erim expressed several times that their objective was to focus on the reforms as soon as possible. In the meantime, the violence was still rampant in the streets. Hence, the government declared martial law in 11 cities, including Istanbul and Ankara.[18] Later, the closure of organizations such as the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions and the Grey Wolves, the ban on newspapers and magazines, the custody of intellectuals like Çetin Altan and İlhan Selçuk followed.

---

geçeceğim."

[18] The other cities were Zonguldak, Adana, İzmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Eskişehir, Diyarbakır, Hatay and Siirt.

Even though the measures aimed to eliminate every threat to stability, the victims were belonged mainly to the left. On the first day of May, Nihat Erim announced that the existing constitution was a luxury for Turkey by claiming thatit was more liberal than many European countries (*Milliyet*, 2 May 1971). While discussions regarding the constitution dragged on, the kidnapping of Israeli Ambassador, Ephraim Elrom, caused a great shock within the country. The ambassador was shot and four days later the kidnappers were caught after an all-out search operation. The escalation of violence provoked the military, which in turn pushed the government to take even more rigid precautions.

Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel accommodated himself to the variable conditions by adopting a more aggressive discourse. For instance, he suggested that the state should most certainly not tolerate anarchy and claimed communist gangs were responsible for the situation (*Milliyet*, 5 June 1971). In line with such claims, Nihat Erim asserted that there would be no backtracking to the conditions before 12 March, emphasizing that special state security courts could be created if deemed necessary (*Milliyet*, 9 June 1971). It is worth noting that Erim's above-party government was able to take measures regarded as difficult for other political actors. The decision concerning the cultivation of opium in late June can be considered as a good example within that respect. According to the agreement-in-principle with the United States, the government gave its word that no opium would be cultivated in 1972. As was previously mentioned, that was one of the most important issues for the JP government prior to 12 March. On the other hand, shutting down the WPT and Necmettin Erbakan's NOP can be interpreted as almost impossible steps from Demirel's point of view.

The main objective of the government was amending the constitution. During negotiations, the JP, Bozbeyli's Democratic Party and Feyzioğlu's RRP experienced a minor rift with the government. In an interview with *Milliyet*, Hasan Dinçer from the JP said that his party had a favorable opinion on the constitutional amendments. Yet he proposed seven additional changes, including new measures such as referendum, and abolishing the post of senator for life (*Milliyet*, 11 June 1971). Another disagreement among the parties pertained to the issue of nationalization of resources. While the JP and the Democratic Party were against nationalization, the RPP was supportive of it. Throughout the process, Süleyman Demirel emphasized the importance of the joint action of the JP and the RPP as he was aware that, without the support of the RPP, it was impossible to constitute a majority. In conjunction with that, Bülent Tanör claimed that the JP and the Democratic Party supported the amendments from the first day even though they did not have the majority. In order to achieve it, they had to convince the RPP. After the pacification of the Ecevit wing, İnönü decided to support the amendments via a group decision (Tanör, 2016, p. 413). In mid August, the parties had almost reached a compromise on the exposure draft. On 27 August, Demirel gave a speech in the parliament. While emphasizing the necessity of the amendments several times, he argued that there was still way to go and said,

> "The articles present in this proposal are not the only ones, whose amendments we the Justice Party think of as essential and required. However, since the realization of the amendments depends on obtaining the necessary majority, today it is settled with the issues on which a broad consensus is reached and therefore the opportunity to amend is gained" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 27 August 1971, p. 259).[19]

[19] "Adalet Partisi olarak, Anayasa'da değişmesinde ihtiyaç ve zaruret gördüğümüz maddeler bu teklifte yer alanlardan ibaret değildir. Ancak, değişikliğin gerçekleştirilebilmesinin kafi sayının elde edilmesine bağlı bulunması dolayısıyla, bugün için üzerinde geniş bir mutabakat sağlanabilmiş ve böylece değişiklik olanağı elde edilebilmiş hususlarla yetinilmiştir."

The final disagreement among the parties was over Article 11, which stipulated fundamental rights and duties. However, the parties agreed on a final draft and when the day arrived to ratify it, the proposed draft was accepted by 362 ayes (*Milliyet*, 30 August 1971). The constitutional amendments brought on comprehensive restrictions, from fundamental rights to the universities and TRT. For instance, the principle of TRT autonomy was amended so that civil servants' affiliation with political parties and trade unions was forbidden by Article 119 of the constitution. According to Tanör, the restrictive and conservative changes in the constitution meant the JP won the first retaliatory round of 27 May and the 1961 Constitution (Tanör, 2016, p. 413). Ümit Cizre asserted that after the amendments, the JP became one of the main civil supporters of the 12 March regime, which aimed to fortify state authority against rights and freedoms. According to Cizre, such support and cooperation also implied the end of the JP's libertarian nature and its emergence as a state party that supported the interim regime (Cizre, 2002, p. 117). Within the same framework, Tanel Demirel admitted the JP benefited from military oppression so as to amend the 1961 Constitution (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 65). Yet, it can be argued that Süleyman Demirel and the JP benefited from the transitional period by ratifying the amendments they had in their cross hairs since the pre-12 March period, as most of the restrictions were spelled out in the JP's 1969 election manifesto.

However, the JP was more reluctant regarding the reforms. When Nihat Erim came to power, his main objective was the realization of a set of reforms. While Erim enjoyed serious support from the commanders, Süleyman Demirel and his party were unenthusiastic about the matter. On 18 September, the JP objected to the decrees in force of law that approved of the reforms. Party Secretary, Nizamettin Erkmen argued that the JP supported the reforms but they had to be carried out under the competence

of the parliament via laws, instead of the decrees in force of law (*Milliyet*, 18 September 1971). In line with such claims, Süleyman Demirel emphasized the importance of discussing said reforms in the parliament. He also added that from his point of view, saying aye to the reforms meant saying aye to the necessity of reforms, not to ambiguous measures. According to Demirel, the extent and the methodology of the reforms needed to be discussed both in the parliament and in public (*Milliyet*, 23 September 1971).

As time passed, the clash between the reformists and conservatives became more apparent whereas Süleyman Demirel's JP turned out to be the forerunner of the latter group. According to Feroz Ahmad, Demirel was not against measures such as land reform or agricultural tariffs as they could pave the way for capitalist progress. The reason of his opposition was the risk of losing more Anatolian voters, which were already alienated since 1961 (Ahmad, 1993, p. 153). Yet, it was a transitional period under the influence of the military and the commanders demanded that the government and the parties to focus on the reforms. The following day, from the podium at the parliament, Erim said that he was in agreement with the generals. He asserted that bravery was taking a step forward and telling the parliament whether to accept the 12 March Memorandum or not (*Milliyet*, 30 September 1971). Rather than taking that step, Demirel decided to withdraw five ministers from the cabinet. Although he emphasized that the vote of confidence would not go away by such withdrawal (*Milliyet*, 8 October 1971), his decision put Nihat Erim in a very tight position. Cevdet Sunay intervened, warning Demirel in order to overcome the problem, but even that did not stop Demirel from criticizing the government. On October 26th, he asserted in a meeting in Çankaya that most of the pre-12 March problems had still not been resolved. He went on by claiming that Sunay and Tağmaç were as responsible

as he was for the current situation. Right after Tağmaç acknowledged that he was responsible of the current state of affairs, Nihat Erim declared that the government had to resign (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 286). That was a victory for Süleyman Demirel and, indeed, he said that they went to his house at Güniz Sokak with his friends in order to celebrate with a bottle of Johnnie Walker Black Label (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 286).

However, the rejection of Erim's resignation letter gave the government some leeway. In his memoirs, Muhsin Batur wrote that the decision was made at the National Security Council meeting held on 27 October (Batur, 1985, p. 336). Almost ten days later, Demirel revoked his decision to withdraw five ministers from the cabinet but, in doing that, he knew that the government's days were numbered. On 2 December, a new crisis reared its head with the appointment of JP member, Mesut Erez, as a deputy prime minister. The fact that Nihat Erim did not consult his cabinet before the appointment was considered the final straw for the technocrats who lost their hope to realize the reforms. On 3 December, 11 technocrat ministers tendered their letters of resignation to Nihat Erim. In the letters, they emphasized the impossibility of ratifying radical reforms during the current volatile situation. According to them, the crisis that brought on 12 March still existed in a different guise. The ministers who signed the letter believed that the intelligentsia was offended during the post-12 March process (*Milliyet*, 4 December 1971). The resignation of the ministers could be described as the defeat of the ideals of 12 March. After all, they were selected for the cabinet in order to carry out the political and socio-economical reforms that Turkey needed. While the political reforms were partly realized in a restrictive way with the constitutional amendments, the rest remained untouched. On the other hand, the disappointment of Erim's technocrats also meant a victory for

Süleyman Demirel. During the six months following the 12 March Memorandum, Demirel knew how to tip the scales in his favor. He passed all the constitutional amendments he already aimed to do before 12 March and after dealing with that, he used his influence and number of chairs in the parliament to threaten the government. Thus, it may be considered that Demirel managed to transform an interim government backed by the military regime into a coalition government that required the support of his party.

Only three days after the resignations, the commanders and Nihat Erim met in Çankaya. The clash of ideas among the generals was still apparent as the Air Force under General Muhsin Batur represented the reformist wing while the army under Faruk Gürler was described as conservatives. When Batur began to speak, he argued that he would lose confidence in the possibility of the 12 March intervention to accomplish anything more but stopping violence. Batur asked for permission to retire from his office (Batur, 1985, p. 347). At the end of the meeting, Cevdet Sunay announced that he would appoint Nihat Erim to form a government that would rely on the parliament. Batur objected to Sunay, claiming that such a decision would be perceived not only as a compromise to the JP but also as a victory against 12 March (Batur, 1985, p. 348). However, Sunay was the one who had the final say so and Erim was reappointed. The new cabinet announced on 11 December was comprised of 14 ministers from the political parties and 11 technocrats chosen from the parliament. Among the former group, seven ministers were from the JP, four from the RPP and one from the RRP (*Milliyet*, 12 December 1971). Feroz Ahmad argued that Erim's second cabinet was a mix of conservatives such as Ferit Melen or Sait Naci Ergin with colorless bureaucrats who were completely different than the previous brain trust (Ahmad, 1977, p. 302). However, Erim was determined to carry out the reforms he had

failed to do so during his first term. He asserted that the principles would endure even though the individuals had gone (*Milliyet*, 14 December 1971). Thus, Erim preferred to be more cautious than the previous time. When he read out the government's program, he stressed there would be no other way for them but to cooperate with the parliament (*Milliyet*, 17 December 1971).

While the government achieved a vote of confidence with 301 ayes versus 45 nays, 91 deputies, most of who were from the JP, abstained from voting. Moreover, Bülent Ecevit and his inner circle did not show up for the vote (*Milliyet*, 23 December 1971). Four days later, Süleyman Demirel threatened the government, claiming that the vote of confidence not implied that they would approve every action of the government (*Milliyet*, 27 December 1971). Yet, Erim maintained his composure and finally made his peace with Süleyman Demirel at a dinner hosted by Sunay in Çankaya. During the same event, Demirel and Muhsin Batur talked for about 30 minutes (*Milliyet*, 7 January 1972). The reconciliation between the protectors of 12 March and the leader of the JP could be considered as an important step in terms of accelerating the return to normalized political activity. Hence, on the following day, Demirel claimed that the elections would be held as planned in 1973, and that the only thing that could stop them would be war (*Milliyet*, 9 January 1972).

Although Süleyman Demirel supported the return to daily political activity, he adopted a more aggressive discourse against the street movements, which was clearly confrontational compared to his approach during the 1960s. From the first days of 1972, the death sentences of three leftist students became a topical issue in Turkey. Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan were condemned to death for alteration and abrogation of the constitution. When the matter was presented on the parliament rostrum on 24 January, İsmet İnönü argued that political crimes should be excluded

from the scope of the death sentence. Although his argument was supported by his own party, the JP, the Democratic Party and the RRP objected to İnönü. The discord within the parliament grew apparent in the voting for a two-month extension of martial law. While the JP, the Democratic Party and the RRP voted for the extension, the RPP, members of the NUC and some independents objected to the matter (*Milliyet*, 25 January 1972). Süleyman Demirel's approach to both issues was in accordance with the view of his party. In an interview with the Turkish News Agency, he admitted it was impossible to describe the attempts that focused to change the nature of the regime as political actions. On the matter of extending martial law, he claimed that not only was it necessary for Turkey under such circumstances, but it was also a way of administrating the state of law. Demirel added that he did not believe that the existing conditions allowed the possibility of governing the country without martial law (*Milliyet*, 31 January 1972). At this point, one may suggest that the discord that made itself apparent within the parliament during early 1972 could be interpreted as an indicator of the polarization that would last until the end of the decade.

When the day of voting the death sentences for Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan came around, the debate in the parliament lasted almost nine hours. Speaker for the JP, Seyfi Öztürk asserted that the issue was about the survival of Turkey. He also stressed that the Grand National Assembly voted on 17 death sentences until then without any disturbance. According to Öztürk, the discussions were nothing more than a race of affection. The Democratic Party and the RRP also showed consent. Despite the RPP's opposition, the parliament accepted the application of the sentences by 238 ayes versus 53 nays. In line with their parties, Süleyman Demirel, Ferruh Bozbeyli and Turhan Feyzioğlu voted in favor of carrying out the sentences (*Milliyet*, 11 March 1972). After ratification by the Senate and Cevdet

Sunay, the RPP applied to the Constitutional Court to appeal the decision. Although the court decided to reverse, the parliament confirmed the sentences. Gezmiş, Aslan and İnan were executed on 7 May in Ankara. Years later, in an interview with Birand, Süleyman Demirel said that they did not have any alternative as it was necessary for the continuation of martial law. He added that they did so in order to save the parliament since the commanders of the martial law from Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir pressured the parliament for the approval of the sentences (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 2008, p. 289). That was another indication of his pragmatism since he preferred to act according to the conditions of the time rather than the principles under the pretext of saving the parliament. It can be asserted that the executions meant an important step as it contributed to the deepening of the conflict among the factions both in the parliament and in the society.

Meanwhile, the RPP faced important changes as the former secretary of the party, Bülent Ecevit, challenged the leadership of İsmet İnönü. Ecevit was the forerunner of the left-of-center policy and had divergence of opinions with İnönü since the 12 March Memorandum. From the first days of 1972, the supporters of Ecevit within the party won the congress elections in several cities, including Ankara. In an interview with Abdi İpekçi, Ecevit admitted that as a group, they were ready to accept the traditional leadership approach of İsmet İnönü. However, he added that their resistance was against those who thought that they could benefit from the opportunities of 12 March so as to sabotage the new cadre movement (*Milliyet*, 26 January 1972). The following day, İnönü accused Ecevit of using every means possible to capture the party. He added that the issue would resolve itself in the general congress within the framework of the law (*Milliyet*, 27 January 1972). A month later, the party decided to attend the congress in May as a result of the decision of the administrative board.

When the day of the congress arrived, the delegates preferred Ecevit's list by 709 votes against 503 votes for İnönü (*Milliyet*, 8 May 1972). As the results signaled the defeat of İsmet İnönü, he immediately resigned from his duty that he occupied for 34 years. A week later, Bülent Ecevit was elected as the 3rd Chairman of the RPP by winning 826 votes from 913 delegates. When he came up to the rostrum to give his victory speech, he promised he would set an order that would restrain both communism and fascism (*Milliyet*, 15 May 1972). Whether it would be possible or not, it is worth noting that Bülent Ecevit and his approach would be regarded as a serious threat for Süleyman Demirel until the end of the decade.

Thanks to his appeasement strategy, Süleyman Demirel's and the JP's moderation encouraged Nihat Erim to implement the reforms he failed to do so during his first term. However, his government was dependent on the JP's majority and soon it was Süleyman Demirel who was pulling the strings. Yet, the commanders of 12 March were still expecting to see the fruition of their intervention. Hence, Erim wrote a letter to the party leaders and asked for additional constitutional amendments. Those included the establishment of the State Security Courts, additional reforms for the universities, and a new type of majority system in the parliament in order to make it function more smoothly and finally the amendments pertaining to martial law (*Milliyet*, 27 March 1972). Although most of Erim's proposals were in line with the view of the parties excluding the RPP, another letter from Cevdet Sunay that asked for the suspension of political activity put Erim in a difficult position. The letter proposed the use of delegated legislations so as to pass the necessary reforms (*Milliyet*, 4 April 1972). Although the parties criticized the tone and the nature of the letter at first glance, he defended it by claiming that the authority to issue decree in force of law existed both in the French and Italian constitutions. Erim emphasized that the

parliamentary regime was alive and would continue to thrive (*Milliyet*, 5 April 1972). In a press conference on the following day, he argued that they had no intention to restrain the political activity by stressing that the authority he was provided with would be valid only until the elections. Erim also added that he was ready to resign if he failed to ease the inter-party relations (*Milliyet*, 6 April 1972). Almost all parties opposed the proposal. For instance, the JP rejected the conferring of power to the government while supporting the constitutional amendments (*Milliyet*, 10 April 1972). Nihat Erim resigned as Prime Minister on 17 April. At the end of his second term, he found himself in a situation without the support he had once depended on from different parts of the society. According to Feroz Ahmad, Erim had the intention to be a reformer from the start, but ended up as a creator of restrictive measures. That caused him the loss of the support of the intelligentsia. He did not hesitate turn to Süleyman Demirel for support whom he earlier attacked (Ahmad, 1977, p. 304). Since Demirel was waiting for such an opportunity, one may claim that Erim's turn paved the way for a greater influence of the JP on the interim government. At the very end, he did not have any option than resigning.

However, the commanders still believed the necessity of an above party government to complete the reforms. In late April, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü was appointed for the new government. Ürgüplü admitted that his intention was to form the cabinet based on the parties in the parliament (*Milliyet*, 30 April. 1972). The RPP, the Democratic Party, the RRP and finally the JP decided to provide ministers for his government. When all contacts were set and the government was formed, Cevdet Sunay rejected Ürgüplü's cabinet as it was not compatible with the 12 March Memorandum. According to *Milliyet*, the reason behind Sunay's veto was the existence of some undesirable figures that could undermine the reform process (*Milliyet*, 14 May

1972). Although *Milliyet* did not cite the names, it may be concluded that Cevdet Sunay and the commanders did not want those who were in Süleyman Demirel's inner circle such as Cevat Önder, Ali Naili Erdem and Cihat Bilgehan.

The government was founded by Ferit Melen on 22 May. Apart from being a senator from the RRP, Melen was also the Minister of Defense in both cabinets founded by Nihat Erim. After Erim's resignation, he served as acting prime minister and thus could be considered a reasonable choice in a transitory period, which aimed to complete the reform process. Hence, the program read by Melen in the parliament stressed the necessity of reforms in education, justice, administration, land, mining and agriculture. It also emphasized that the parliament that would decide if the government would ask for extra powers in order to suppress the violence. Melen also added that there would be no elections without the reforms (*Milliyet*, 30 May 1972). That might be considered as an implicit warning to party leaders, as one of them, Süleyman Demirel claimed several times that the electoral agenda should remain untouched in order to hold elections in October 1973. The Melen government had eight ministers from the JP, five from the RPP and one from the RRP. The rest of the cabinet consisted of technocrats that became essential in the post-12 March above party governments. The government obtained the vote of confidence on 5 June with 262 ayes versus 4 nays and 24 abstentions. 149 deputies did not show up on the day of the vote. While Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit and Alparslan Türkeş voted aye for the government, Osman Bölükbaşı and Ferruh Bozbeyli abstained from voting (*Milliyet*, 6 June 1972).

After the vote of confidence, the government focused on the reforms that it promised earlier. Accordingly, Ferit Melen visited the party leaders so as to reach a consensus. After the meeting with Melen, Süleyman Demirel said that the parliament was keen to sweep clean its agenda as soon as possible. Demirel assured that all issues

that occupied the parliament would be resolved quickly (*Milliyet*, 7 June 1972). On the other hand, he knew to pull himself and his party from the critics by stressing they were neither the government nor the opposition. According to Demirel, the multi-party democracy was there only in appearance as the new system was a sui-generis which had his own character (*Milliyet*, 15 June 1972). Despite such an ambiguous attitude, Melen announced that additional constitutional amendments were necessary in order to get rid of the enemies of the state by stressing that everything could be done for democracy (*Milliyet*, 11 June 1972). The new constitutional amendments included measures that would prevent threats against the regime such as the foundation of the State Security Courts (*Milliyet*, 15 July 1972). Süleyman Demirel promoted such amendments since he thought they were necessary for re-establishing the authority of the state. He admitted that the proposed amendments were not enough but the arithmetic of the parliament of the day would not allow the realization of further changes (*Milliyet*, 16 July 1972). On the other hand, the RPP had announced there was no need for additional changes in the constitution. Party Chairman Bülent Ecevit said he would not welcome amendments while the party assembly decided to participate conditionally in the commission meetings (*Milliyet*, 18 July 1972). Due to the discord within the parliament and the reluctance of the parties to assume responsibility, the issue soon became an open-ended process that would last longer than the Melen government.

However, the only matter that all parties reached a consensus on was the realization of elections on the exact date, i.e. on 29 October 1973. What made the matter more special was the fact that the elections would coincide with the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic. As previously stated, the realization of reforms desired by the 12 March regime became the prerequisite that stood in front of

the transition to daily political activity. Both Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit claimed many times that elections should be held as soon as possible. Moreover, during his visit to Elazığ, Ferit Melen said that it was his government's duty to return the country to a normal democratic regime as soon as possible. He also promised the citizens that elections would be held in October 1973 (*Milliyet*, 31 July 1972). Throughout the year, Süleyman Demirel continued to emphasize the necessity of returning to daily political activity. One may debate that the timing of his comments was appropriate since the domestic politics was in the process of normalization. Moreover, Demirel did not have much option since his adversary Ecevit was already calling for elections. Hence, during the 6th Congress of the JP, in which he was preeminently elected as Party Chairman, Demirel said that it would be impossible to tell the world what they were celebrating if there would be no elections on the 50th anniversary of the republic (*Milliyet*, 21 October 1972). It is also worth mentioning that the 6th Congress of the JP was quite different than the previous ones. Describing it as the most peaceful congress since the foundation of the party, Arsev Bektaş also stressed that members of the administrative board were re-elected from Süleyman Demirel's inner circle (Bektaş, 1993, p. 163). *Milliyet*'s Orhan Tokatlı wrote that the congress featured two main differences. Firstly, official cars at the door were replaced with private ones and secondly, a Janissary band was playing anthems inside the congress hall for the first time in the party's history (*Milliyet*, 21 October 1972). It may be discussed that even such existence could be considered as the signal of nationalist discourse, which would be adopted in the second half of the 1970s. In a country that was polarizing day-to-day, JP's stance could be considered as an important factor that would eventually pave the way for the Nationalist Front governments.

Although the general elections of 1973 were the main issue for the leaders of the political parties, the presidential election in March might be considered as a milestone in terms of the normalization of politics. Cevdet Sunay's term was expiring in Çankaya and there was a serious expectation in the army of Faruk Gürler's candidacy. Gürler had already replaced Memduğ Tağmaç as the Chief of General Staff after the decision of the Military Council in August 1972. However, such candidacy encountered the resistance of parties in the parliament that were seeking an end to the transition process. In other words, the party leaders opposed the practice that proposed electing the chief of staff as the next president of the republic. For instance, Süleyman Demirel asserted in his speech at the JP's party group that they would defend the validity of the constitution in the presidential election. He added that it was impossible to put the parliament's will in a pledge (*Milliyet*, 26 January 1973). Bülent Ecevit set a meeting with the commanders in order to smell the air. After the meeting, he announced that the commanders did not have any special demand regarding the presidential election. Ecevit also said that his request to meet Demirel after the meeting about the matter was rejected (*Milliyet*, 28 February 1973.). At first glance, one may suggest that Süleyman Demirel was confident that the JP's majority was enough to block the process. On the other hand, the reason behind such rejection could be his cautious character, as he might want to resolve the issue quietly without discussing it publicly. Thus, in a private meeting with Cevdet Sunay in Çankaya, Demirel opposed Gürler's candidacy by claiming that the establishment of the practice of promoting the chief of staff to the presidency would cause regime instability (Batur, 1985, p. 409).

Despite the reaction of the party leaders, Faruk Gürler decided to stand for the presidency. In order to do so, he resigned from the post of chief of staff and immediately afterwards, he was appointed as a senator from the quota and swore an

oath in the senate. However, Demirel and Ecevit did not step back as they continued to oppose Gürler. While Ecevit asserted that the pressure on the parliament was dangerous for the regime, Demirel claimed that the parliament would elect a president instead of appointing one. He also stressed that the JP's struggle was not against a person (*Milliyet*, 7 March 1973). At first glance, Demirel might have sounded like a democrat rather than a pragmatist with such claim. Yet, it is worth noting that the stance of Bülent Ecevit put pressure on him and pushed him to adopt a different approach. In other words, he might like to avoid looking like the one who cooperated with the commanders despite the fact he had done this after 12 March. However, political leaders were not the only ones who opposed such candidacy. Air Force Commander, Muhsin Batur, later wrote that he was against it from the first day as it could harm the prestige of the armed forces (Batur, 1985, p. 422). It may be contended that Batur's attitude was the revenge of Gürler's reluctance for the intervention of 9 March. Whether it was true or not, it would be plausible to say that the dichotomy amongst the commanders was another factor that encouraged party leaders during the process.

The pressure on the leaders peaked as the Election Day approached. In an interview with Birand, Cüneyt Arcayürek said that on a day before the election, an officer called on Süleyman Demirel's house and threatened him in order to secure Gürler's presidency. In bolstering Arcayürek's claims, Nahit Menteşe, a deputy from the JP, admitted that someone who introduced himself as a colonel did the same thing by inviting him to vote for the candidate of the Armed Forces (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 23). The election was held on 13 March. The Chief of Staff Semih Sancar and almost all the commanders except Muhsin Batur were in the parliament. Meanwhile, officers were working behind the scenes to lobby the deputies. Süleyman

Demirel later said that he heard rumors that suggested the units from Etimesgut were already deployed in order to intervene if Faruk Gürler would not be elected as the president. Demirel responded to these threats by asserting that the units that left Etimesgut were also the soldiers of Turkey and his only responsibility was to go up to the rostrum and vote (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 26). Bülent Ecevit also claimed that the parliament was almost occupied by the army, as the entrance of the civilians except deputies, journalists, and Faruk Gürler's son were not allowed (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 26).

When the counting started in the parliament after the first round, the results signaled the defeat of Faruk Gürler. The JP's candidate, Tekin Arıburun, won 292 votes while Gürler won only 175. 45 votes went to Ferruh Bozbeyli who was the candidate of the Democratic Party (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 27). Such results were enough for the commanders to comprehend that their candidate would not be elected. As the rounds progressed, Faruk Gürler's votes declined even further, as the deputies acted more audaciously against the pressure. At the end of the day, both the commanders and party leaders knew that they had to find another solution. In order to reach a mutual agreement, the commanders decided to step back and begin negotiating with the leaders. Their formula was an extension of the presidency of Cevdet Sunay, which was also supported by the dissident, Muhsin Batur. When Chief of Staff, Semih Sancar, met with Bülent Ecevit, they agreed on the Sunay formula (Batur, 1985, p. 414). On the other hand, Demirel preferred to keep a low profile probably because he thought that the 'wait and see' approach was the most convenient. However, it turned out that he met in secret with Semih Sancar. That was when he uttered his famous phrase, 'Yesterday was yesterday, today is today.'[20] Although he denied it at first, the

[20] "Dün dündür, bugün bugündür."

next day he had to accept it as the issue went public (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 28-29). In his memoirs, Muhsin Batur wrote that a group of generals, including Sancar and himself were together at a friends' house. Batur said that Sancar left the house without saying anything and when he came back he admitted he went to see Süleyman Demirel. On his return, Sancar gave a brief summary of the meeting. According to it, Demirel said that he would not wish to put the army in a difficult position. He continued by saying that he would support either solution. But he also emphasized that it would be difficult to find enough votes for Gürler so it would be more appropriate to extent Cevdet Sunay's term by amending the constitution (Batur, 1985, p. 415). Demirel's attitude during the process constitutes an important example of his pragmatism. While standing against the generals in front of the public, he did not hesitate to make concessions behind closed doors.

Even though Süleyman Demirel agreed with Sancar during their meeting, the extension of Sunay's term was rejected both in the parliament and the senate. On 28 March, Cevdey Sunay left Çankaya and Tekin Arıburun became the acting president. Thus, the following days witnessed even the discussions of an early election but the issue was resolved between Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit on Fahri Korutürk's behalf. Korutürk was a retired admiral who was a former ambassador to Moscow. His election could be considered as well enough in terms of resisting military dictum without offending the army itself.

Fahri Korutürk was elected as the 6th President of the Republic of Turkey on 6 April 1973 (*Milliyet*, 7 April 1973). According to Birand, Hikmet and Akar, the election of Korutürk also marked the end of the 12 March process (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 29). Whether it is true or not, it would be plausible to admit that party resistance against the army marked a significant turning point in terms of civil-military

relations in Turkey. Alongside that, such an attitude was equally important for Süleyman Demirel and the JP. According to Ümit Cizre, the main motif behind Süleyman Demirel's opposition to the proposed names was the result of a new approach taken by his party. Cizre argued that Süleyman Demirel used his majority and capacity to negotiate in order to assure the election of names that were not against his party. In other words, it was not important for the JP if the president was a soldier or not. The only important point was that he did not have a negative opinion about the party (Cizre, 2002, p. 103). On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel emphasized many times during the process that the will of the nation was above everything and would not be changed (Gümüştekin, 1974, p. 61). That was in line with the discourse he had adopted since the first day of presidential election discussions. Despite pressure from several segments of the military, Demirel preferred not to make concessions at least in front of the public. On the other hand, he did not act in a similar fashion less than a year ago during the voting on the death sentences of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan since the conditions and necessities of the times were different.

After the election of Fahri Korutürk as President, Ferit Melen tendered his letter of resignation in order to give Korutürk a chance to choose his own candidate. Süleyman Demirel supported the idea by stating that the setting up of a new government was necessary. But he also added that the JP did not have enough power to support a government in the parliament (*Milliyet*, 10 April 1973). On April 13th, Fahri Korutürk announced that Naim Talu was appointed as Prime Minister. Talu was one of the former presidents of the Central Bank who also served as the Minister of Trade in the previous government. Similar to the prime ministers of former interim governments, he did not hesitate to guarantee the realization of reforms (*Milliyet*, 13 April 1973). Yet, unlike previous ones, the elections were only six months away and

such reforms needed to be completed by October 1973. Talu was aware of his mission and he stated many times that his government's main objective was to prepare the country for elections (*Milliyet*, 19 July 1973). Because of the limited time, Naim Talu's government exhibited great dynamism on the reforms issue in an effort to complete the mission of the Memorandum of 12 March. By late June, almost all the political reforms were ratified by the parliament. Those included the formation of the State Security Courts that were designed to specialize on political crimes. Besides, additional repressive measures for universities were accepted. The reforms were mainly political since those of social and economic basis were left to the next government (Ahmad, 1977, p. 310). During the process, Süleyman Demirel did not hesitate to give his support as he probably saw this as another bridge to cross before the return to daily political activity, i.e. the elections.

Although Süleyman Demirel anticipated the normalization of political life with the upcoming elections, the scene was far more different than four years earlier. The closure of the WPT after 12 March created a political vacuum on the left and the RPP was the first candidate that would catch the votes of the left in a potential consolidation thanks to the new discourse adopted by Bülent Ecevit. The RPP's election manifesto for instance, named as *Ak Günlere*, which meant 'to White Days,' emphasized the importance of values such as social justice, liberty, and income equality (CHP, 1973, p. 4). The party manifesto suggested that the crimes in Turkey were the result of the defects not only within its social and economic order, but it was also the outcome of the clash amongst the social structure and some laws. Hence, the party proposed a general amnesty within the scope of the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the republic (CHP, 1973, p. 212–213). The approach, which was the result of the left-of-center policy, signified no doubt a big transformation for the party.

The JP on the other hand, was suffering from a reverse situation as the right was fragmented by the emergence of the new political parties. In other words, the JP, which obtained just over 50% of the votes in 1965, had to share his electoral base with the Democratic Party, the NSP, the RNNP and even the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) of Alparslan Türkeş. Furthermore, the Democratic Party had the support of one of the most prominent figures of the Turkish right, Celal Bayar. During his speech in the party's congress in Bursa, Bayar finished his speech by stating that the Democratic Party was a reliable and trustworthy political party (*Milliyet*, 8 July 1973). According to Ferruh Bozbeyli, the motif behind Bayar's support for the Democratic Party was his hostility against Süleyman Demirel (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 361). Thus, it was not only Celal Bayar who was against Süleyman Demirel. Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the NSP, was another political figure who sought to gain votes from the JP's electoral base. His conflict with Süleyman Demirel had its roots from the time he worked as the Secretary of Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges. When he was elected as president of the organization, his presidency was rejected by Demirel and had to vacate the office by means of police intervention. Erbakan had once tried to become a JP candidate but was rejected by Demirel before the 1969 elections. Then, he decided to run as independent. After being elected from Konya, he founded the NOP but his party was closed down during the post-12 March process. After spending some time in Switzerland, he came back to Turkey to lead the newly founded the NSP. As stated in the earlier chapter, Erbakan and his party claimed to be the representatives of small artisans and tradesmen in Anatolia, which suffered from the JP's policies that favored big industrialists during the latter half of the 1960s. Thus, the party manifesto suggested that there were three fundamental views in Turkey represented by three political parties. According to the NSP, the left view was represented by the RPP while

the liberal view was shared by the JP. In other words, material came first for the former while money came first for the latter. In spite of that, the NSP pretended to satisfy the nation, which claimed that morality should come first. Within the same framework, the NSP stood for the 'National View' that could be described as parallel to the right view (Milli Selamet Partisi, 1973, p. 15–16). Alongside the Democratic Party and the NSP, Turhan Feyzioğlu's RRP comprised of dissidents from the RPP aimed to catch the votes of the right segment of society.

Although Süleyman Demirel considered such fragmentation and severity of his adversaries as serious threats against himself, he remained confident of his party, admitting that the election would dress the wounds of the regime by bringing political stability (*Milliyet*, 29 April 1973). He believed that such stability would come about through a majority of the JP like the previous elections. Accordingly, in the election manifesto, the JP stressed that the nation's preference would be the continuation of stability as enlightenment welled up within it. After highlighting the importance of the national will, he also emphasized the necessity to revert to a referendum for major decisions concerning issues such as the social structure and general order (Adalet Partisi, 1973, p. 18). Furthermore, the party's manifesto suggested that the events from the past would not conduce towards disappointment and resentment (Adalet Partisi, 1973, p. 89–90). One may argue that the JP preferred once again to focus on issues concerning the economy and development instead of getting wrapped up in ideological discussions. While mentioning how to heal the wounds of the past, the party did not neglect the general amnesty issue first brought up by the RPP. It may be considered as part of the competition but the JP made a point that the amnesty issue should not offend the republic and the constitution. The party announced that it supported a reasonable general amnesty that would respond to the social needs by excluding

criminals, which would not be forgiven by the supreme nation (Adalet Partisi, 1973, p. 20–21). The difference between the RPP and the JP was that the latter was against the release of political prisoners whom it considered responsible for the rampant violence. It is interesting to note that the JP's election manifesto was the most moderate among the parties on the right spectrum.

As the elections were approaching, the main competition was between the JP and the RPP, i.e. Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit. The RPP's campaign started in Istanbul on 10 September. Bülent Ecevit claimed that the JP would be the party of the majority without forgetting to add his prediction that suggested that no party would come to power through a majority (*Milliyet*, 10 September 1973). The next day, JP Vice-Chairman, İsmet Sezgin announced that his party's slogans mostly derived from the election manifesto. Mainly, the JP was promising to find solutions to the issues such as unemployment, ignorance and desperation by promoting peace, order and development. The party invited the citizens to gather under their flag so as to reach a stronger JP that would also mean a stronger Turkey. Furthermore, Sezgin said that his party would ensure equal opportunity in order to eliminate income inequalities and the difference of prosperity among the citizens (*Milliyet*, 11 September 1973). It may be debated that such precision was the JP's answer to the RPP's approach towards socio-economical issues. It was not long before the JP's campaign included a series of promises such as tax deductions, title deeds for slums, social security for peasants, electricity and television in the villages and many more. On the other hand, the popularity of the RPP during election rallies held in several Anatolian cities worried Süleyman Demirel and the JP. Inter-party rivalry escalated, and competition started becoming more violent. Case in point, Ecevit was attacked with stones and bottles during the RPP's rally in Demirel's hometown Isparta. Further escalation was stopped

by soldiers called in the province. Although Demirel said he was against all kinds of violence (*Milliyet*, 28 September 1973), Ecevit accused him by claiming the attacks were organized by his brother, Şevket Demirel (*Milliyet*, 29 September 1973). Meanwhile, the JP rallies also witnessed violence. Süleyman Demirel's speech in Sivas was interrupted when his speaker cables were cut by protesters (*Milliyet*, 1 September 1973). One may claim that the election campaign of 1973 was far more contested than previous ones as rivalry among the political parties was at a feverish level.

Elections were held on 14 October 1973. In accordance with the competition in the rallies, the results pointed to a parliament without a single party majority. Bülent Ecevit won the election as his RPP obtained 33.3% of the votes and 185 seats in the parliament. On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel's JP had 29.8% of the votes and 149 of the seats. The NSP and the Democratic Party won 48 and 45 seats, respectively, in the parliament while each party obtained approximately 12% of the votes. Another right-wing party, Turhan Feyzioğlu's RRP won 13 seats. Notwithstanding the enthusiasm in the rallies, voter participation remained at 66.8%, slightly higher than the 1969 Elections (TÜİK, 2012, p. 25). The results could be interpreted as a clear failure for Süleyman Demirel as he came in second in an election for the first time in his political career. Although the fragmentation in the right might be considered as the main factor, it would be plausible to admit that the new discourse adopted by Bülent Ecevit played an important role in such failure as the RPP came first in major cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir previously dominated by the JP. From another point of view, it can be discussed that the voters punished the JP because of its cooperation with the military during the 12 March process. Even though Süleyman Demirel admitted many times he cooperated in order to keep the parliament open, it would be

worth to note that unlike the JP, Bülent Ecevit's reluctance and relatively principled stance on the issue of cooperation with the commanders was appreciated by the voters.

Nevertheless, the results signaled a coalition in order to form a government and the parties in the right spectrum constituted a majority in the parliament. However, Fahri Korutürk had to give the mission to form the government to the party that came first which was Bülent Ecevit's RPP. Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel stated they had no intention to neither form a coalition, nor participate in one. He also added that the RPP must form a coalition with the NSP and the Democratic Party (*Milliyet*, 17 October 1973). Accordingly, Ecevit visited Necmettin Erbakan so as to negotiate but he had to hand back the task to Korutürk as the NSP rejected his proposal. On November 13th, Süleyman Demirel was given the task. He commenced negotiations by visiting the Democratic Party, but Ferruh Bozbeyli's response was negative, as his party would not participate to a coalition under Demirel (*Milliyet*, 15 November 1973). Although Erbakan accepted his proposal, the two parties were still far from reaching a majority. Therefore, Demirel went to Ecevit to propose him a coalition government under his premiership, but this time he was rejected. After Demirel returned the mission, Korutürk insisted for a coalition between the JP and the RPP in a joint meeting (*Milliyet*, 20 November 1973), but it soon became impossible because of the reluctance of both sides. As time passed, the situation unfolded into a political crisis and the parties decided to wait it out until local elections on 9 December. The election results were almost the same as 14 December as the RPP won 37% of the votes, while the JP won 32.3% (TODAİE, 2017). Although Naim Talu tried to form a coalition that would take the country to early elections, the JP rejected Talu as it insisted for a national coalition under Demirel's premiership by excluding the RPP (*Milliyet*, 9 January 1974). The crisis was resolved when Bülent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan

reached an agreement. According to the protocol, seven ministries were assigned to the NSP, including the deputy premiership of Necmettin Erbakan. It may be disputed that the coalition of the RPP and the NSP was a constrained one and it could encounter difficulties in facing the social and economic problems that the interim governments of 12 March left unsolved.

Bülent Ecevit announced the government's program on 1 February without neglecting to highlight the sacrifices made by both parties. Besides stressing the importance of creating a fair balance in order to protect the public from the required price adjustments, Ecevit also said that his government would eliminate the law that restricted the freedoms of thought, belief, expression and press. Furthermore, the new government announced that it would release the cultivation of opium by claiming that the current policy was rigid and wrong (*Milliyet*, 2 February 1974). Süleyman Demirel, who was in the opposition, criticized the government in the parliament by asserting that the program did not include the struggle against extremist movements and communism and asked, "I wonder if the government thinks that the destructive activities towards the regime and the State were not serious enough to struggle against? In other words, does the government think that Turkey is not facing the danger of communism?" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 4 February 1974, p. 378)[21] His aim was to associate the government with the left and the communism so as to manipulate the parties in the parliament, including the Islamist NSP, which was the RPP's coalition partner. He also did not miss the opportunity to question the details regarding opium cultivation while pushing the government to announce whether it would keep his word regarding the issue (*Milliyet*, 5 February 1974). By doing that, he intended to put the

[21] "Acaba Hükümet, rejime ve devlete yönelmiş yıkıcı faaliyetlerin mücadele edilmesi gereken bir ciddiyet taşımadığı kanaatinde midir? Başka bir deyimle, Türkiye'nin komünizm tehlikesi karşısında bulunmadığına mı kanidir?"

government in a difficult position, not only in the eyes of the voters but also in terms of foreign relations. Despite opposition criticism, the government achieved a vote of confidence with 235 ayes versus 136 nays. 76 deputies did not show up on the day of the voting while two deputies abstained (*Milliyet*, 8 February 1974).

The new government had many issues to confront that gave Süleyman Demirel the opportunity to criticize the performance of the fragile coalition. First of all, Ecevit government hiked prices of seven main commodities including oil, sugar, metals and cement. The price hikes were long overdue as the global oil crisis in 1973 resulted in a great shock, especially for oil importing countries, including Turkey. Although Ecevit claimed that the budget had firmed up thanks to the price hikes, Demirel asserted that those responsible for the price hikes would definitely bear the consequences (*Milliyet*, 13 March 1974). Secondly, the general amnesty issue became a subject of dispute not only between the government and opposition, but also among coalition partners. As mentioned earlier, Süleyman Demirel insisted that those sentenced under Articles 141 and 142 were excluded from the scope of the amnesty. When the issue came to the parliament, 20 deputies from the NSP acted together with the opposition parties and the amnesty was ratified without the related articles. After the vote, the party assembly of the RPP was invited to an emergency meeting as important names like Turhan Güneş and Orhan Birgit discussed retreating from the coalition (*Milliyet*, 15 May 1974). Meanwhile, Bülent Ecevit announced that he leaned towards resignation. Accordingly, he proposed three options 1) immediate resignation, 2) resignation after the approval of the budget, or 3) reevaluating the situation with the NSP by setting new rules *(Milliyet*, 19 May 1974). After extenuating negotiations, both sides decided to make an effort in order to prop up the coalition but one may suggest that it would be a discontented process as the partners lost confidence in each other. While Süleyman

Demirel was enjoying the clash within the government, he also met with Celal Bayar so as to evaluate the chances for a national front. After the meeting, Demirel said that if required, a national front would be formed against the leftist government (*Milliyet*, 24 May 1974). That was an important shift of tone since it reflected Süleyman Demirel's future strategy. It could be argued that Demirel was aware of the fact that the only way to come to power was to organize all parties except the RPP under the same roof. Since these parties were in the right spectrum, the term 'national' could be a plausible way to gather them all. Moreover, time was also in favor of Demirel. The government was already in turmoil because of its own fragile nature and the economic difficulties. Furthermore, the U.S. Senate's decision to halt aid to Turkey in mid July put the government in a more difficult position.

Nevertheless, the developments in Cyprus changed the political agenda of the country immediately. On 15 July, the Makarios administration was overthrown by a coup organized by Nikos Sampson, a member of EOKA. EOKA was a nationalist organization that supported the idea of 'Enosis,' i.e. the union with Greece. On the day following the intervention, Bülent Ecevit announced that Greece was behind the intervention while Süleyman Demirel said that those who wanted to make a *fait accompli* to realize their goals would be frustrated in the end by stressing that the security of the Turkish community on the island was under the guarantee of the Republic of Turkey (*Milliyet,* 16 July 1974). Thus, on 20 July, Turkey intervened on the island by sending troops via assault boats. The first intervention could be considered as successful in terms of demonstrating Turkey's determination. Although the parties reached an interim agreement in Geneva, the violence against the Turkish community continued. During the process, Süleyman Demirel's stance was no different than any other party leader including Ecevit as the situation created a mood of

unity throughout the country. In a secret meeting on the parliament, he made a speech that emphasized such unity. Demirel asserted, "When the Grand National Assembly of Turkey acts as one body vis-à-vis the world by putting aside all its internal tensions, this at the same time is a sign that our nation as well is a single body regarding national matters"[22] (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 20 July 1974, p. 37). After the first conference in Geneva, Demirel claimed that there would be no peace if the violence against the Turks on the island did not cease. He also said that the foundations of peace and co-existence could not be built upon massacre (*Milliyet*, 6 August 1974). After the failure of the second round of talks in Geneva, Turkey conducted another intervention on 14 August and, in the end, took control of most of the northern part of island, which included most of the Turkish villages. During the whole period, Süleyman Demirel adopted a coherent supportive stance vis-à-vis the developments. In fact, he did not have much option than being in harmony with the government since the general mood in the country was not suitable for opposition or discord.

The military interventions in Cyprus put Bülent Ecevit at the peak of the popularity of his political career. Bedri Koraman, a cartoonist from *Milliyet*, who once depicted Ecevit as a small fellow sitting reluctantly next to the larger figure of Erbakan, reconfigured his cartoon by changing their places. In a cartoon published in August, Erbakan remained on the floor, while the confident Ecevit was sitting comfortably in the chair (*Milliyet*, 19 August 1974). Frustrated by the way events were unfolding, Necmettin Erbakan wanted to take advantage of the situation by promoting himself as the *mujahid* of Turkey. The infighting between the coalition partners soon became apparent as Ecevit claimed they had irreconcilable differences with the NSP

[22] "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, milli meseleler karşısında bütün iç çekişmelerini bir kenara atıp,cihanı aleme karşı tek vücut halinde hareket ettiği takdirde, bu, aynı zamanda milletimizin de milli meseleler karşısında yek vücut olduğunun işaretidir."

(*Milliyet*, 4 September 1974). Finally, a crisis arose with the rejection by the NSP ministers of Ecevit's Scandinavia trip. On 16 September, Bülent Ecevit announced his resignation from his duty by claiming that he would prefer to form an election government if the task would be given to him once again (*Milliyet*, 17 September 1974). Again, it would be plausible to admit that his desire for holding elections depended on his popularity after the Cyprus issue.

However, it was not only Bülent Ecevit who knew that such popularity could result with a rise in the RPP votes. Yet, Ecevit visited the Democratic Party to form a coalition. While he was looking for a coalition that would take the country to early elections in six months, Ferruh Bozbeyli insisted on holding the election in October 1975 in order to explain the reason of the coalition to his voters. Although *Milliyet* noted that the Democratic Party said no to the RPP (*Milliyet*, 25 September 1974), Bozbeyli claimed in his memoirs that his party did not reject the offer but instead the coalition's talks were interrupted due to the disagreements between himself and Ecevit (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 366). On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel and the JP adopted a more critical discourse against Bülent Ecevit's resignation. According to Demirel, the RPP created the crisis intentionally so as to exploit the military success in Cyprus for catching more votes. He also asserted that by doing that, the RPP would save itself from facing dire straits (Demirel S. , 1974, p. 34). It could be described as a pragmatic move since Demirel aimed to reverse the prestige that Ecevit gained from Cyprus.

After Ecevit returned the task to Fahri Korutürk, Süleyman Demirel was given the duty of forming a new government on 30 September. Demirel said that he commenced negotiations to form a government that would struggle against the left and communism without forgetting to deal with important issues of the country such as inflation, unemployment, and poverty (Demirel S. , 1974). After accepting the task,

Demirel said that he did not intend to offer partnership to the RPP or to form a minority government (*Milliyet*, 3 October 1974). He argued that the concept of a minority government was not available in the constitution, as the condition of the vote of confidence would not permit such concept (Demirel S. , 1974, p. 69). Instead, he wanted to cooperate with the NSP and the Democratic Party. Even though the NSP agreed to Demirel's offer, the Democratic Party's response was negative as Ferruh Bozbeyli asked for a coalition without any leader (*Milliyet*, 4 October 1974). In other words, he did not want Süleyman Demirel to become a prime minister. Demirel accused him by preventing the formation of a coalition that would fight against the left and communism, just because of opposing his prime ministry (Demirel S. , 1974, p. 69). After the Democratic Party's rejection, Demirel handed the duty back to Fahri Korutürk. The crisis continued, as negotiations among the parties did not produce a tangible result. In order to solve the crisis, Korutürk appointed Sadi Irmak as Prime Minister but Irmak's government did not achieve a vote of confidence. However, he continued as the acting prime minister until the formation of the first Nationalist Front government in March 1975.

Meanwhile, in October 1974, the 7th Congress of the JP was held in Ankara. As with the previous congresses, Süleyman Demirel gave a comprehensive speech in which he addressed several issues, including the failure of the JP in the 1973 election. Again, he emphasized that his party struggled to keep the parliament open during the post-12 March process, but added that such action was perceived differently by the voters. Demirel also argued that it was impossible to keep a record of straight successes and achievements (Demirel S. , 1974, p. 30-31). His opponent in the congress was Orhan Oğuz who claimed that his candidacy was the result of demands for innovation and fresh blood, which was coming from the political base within the JP

(Bektaş, 1993, p. 164). At the end of the day, Demirel defeated Oğuz by winning 1308 votes against 76. Moreover, the administrative board was formed once again by members who were close to the party leader (Bektaş, 1993, p. 164). After the results, Demirel warned his adversaries by asserting that those who thought that the JP was broken-down and exhausted would soon lose sleep (*Milliyet*, 24 October 1974).

By late February 1975, the government crisis still existed with no competent government in charge. In order to resolve it, Fahri Korutürk stepped in one more time to convince Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit for a national coalition between the JP and the RPP. However, the crisis remained unsolved because of both parties' reluctance for such partnership. Ecevit was still insisting on an early election while Demirel was trying to prevent it. As time went on, the odds started to show a nationalist front government formed by right-wing parties. In early March, Sadi Irmak was appointed once more to form a government. Irmak concentrated on gathering the parties for a national coalition but the hopes were gone when the JP, the RRP, the NSP and the NAP refused such an idea. Demirel said that there was no need for a national coalition by admitting a coalition with the RPP could only be possible in the case of war (*Milliyet*, 5 March 1975). His uncompromising attitude was mainly due to pragmatism rather than principled action since the only way for his premiership was a coalition with minor parties. In other words, Demirel knew that he would not be the prime minister in case of a coalition with the RPP. The rejection of the parties was considered as a signal of the impending Nationalist Front government. Furthermore, Ferruh Bozbeyli claimed that the Democratic Party would support a front government if it was led by Sadi Irmak (*Milliyet*, 7 March 1975). After a second round of negotiations in mid March, Irmak had to hand the task back to Korutürk.

Almost a week later, Süleyman Demirel announced that he reached a deal with the leaders of the parties on the right by emphasizing that he believed that none of the nationalists would oppose it (*Milliyet*, 21 March 1975). His words could be interpreted as an invitation and an allusive warning to Ferruh Bozbeyli, who was against Demirel becoming a prime minister. However, Bozbeyli's persistent stance made the coalition impossible as the other parties did not have an absolute majority. The deadlock was resolved with the resignation of nine deputies from the Democratic Party in order to support the new government. On the same day, Demirel said that the resignation of the Democratic Party deputies was beyond them. He also admitted they were constructing a government instead of forming one (*Milliyet*, 29 March 1975). Herein, it is worth to note that Celal Bayar could be an important factor in the decision of resignation of the nine deputies, as names like Sadettin Bilgiç, Mutlu Menderes and Talat Asal, with whom he had good relations, were among those who resigned. Moreover, even his daughter, Nilüfer Gürsoy, was one of the Nine. In parallel with such claim, Ferruh Bozbeyli argued that Celal Bayar preferred to support the JP, especially after 1973 because he wanted to regain his influence in the field of politics (Dağı & Uğur, 2009, p. 361–362). On the other hand, Sadettin Bilgiç wrote in his memoirs that the Nationalist Front was founded thanks to their efforts. According to Bilgiç, the lack of government in a process, which required adopting new economic measures due to the global oil crisis, was one of the main factors behind their decision. He admitted that a more aggressive Soviet Union and the communist terror with ethnic origins also played an important role in their resignation (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 238). Although Bilgiç was eager to take the praise, one may suggest that the formation of the Nationalist Front government could be accepted as Demirel's success and while doing that, he succeeded with driving a wedge in the Democratic Party, which was against his name.

The Nationalist Front government was founded on 30 March through a coalition of the JP, the NSP, the RRP and the NAP. The leaders of three parties were appointed as deputy premiers while Süleyman Demirel became prime minister. It was important for him, as there was a great majority that believed that 12 March marked the end of his political career. While the government program was announced on 7 April, it proposed mostly solutions concerning the economy such as; tax reduction for low-income earners, a new wage system for workers and social security benefits for women (*Milliyet*, 7 April 1975). As its name suggested, it was a coalition against the left and as the JP claimed, the biggest danger was communism (*Milliyet*, 10 April 1975). The government barely obtained a vote of confidence with 222 ayes versus 218 nays. After the vote, Demirel announced that the government crisis in the country was hereby over and the difference between the ayes and nays was not important anymore (*Milliyet*, 13 April 1975).

Although the Nationalist Front was founded on a pragmatic purpose such as hindering the early elections, it would be plausible to claim that it had a strong ideological presence that fed on nationalism and anti-communism. The existence of these concepts was more visible in the NAP and the NSP, as the JP had to adapt itself to the nature of such a stance just to keep the coalition alive. In other words, the main motivation behind Süleyman Demirel's nationalist discourse could be his pragmatic approach concerning the future of the coalition. In this context, Tanıl Bora suggested that Süleyman Demirel's strong anti-communist discourse was based on the aim of creating a hegemonic line of hostility that would unify the fragmented right in order to rehabilitate the JP's power. While doing that, Demirel did not hesitate to build a strategic partnership with the NAP that was in search of a paramilitary organization (Bora, 2005, p. 564). Accordingly, the pro-Front newspapers used the motto, 'Demirel

in the parliament, Türkeş in the street' and the mission was carried out by the NAP commandos (Ahmad, 1993, p. 165). Ferruh Bozbeyli, who preferred to stay out of the coalition, said that his party would support the government for its struggle against the communism (*Milliyet*, 15 April 1975). The result of such conciliatory moves among the right-wing parties provoked escalated violence during the second half of the 1970s.

Interestingly, one of the first victims of the violence was Süleyman Demirel himself. Almost six weeks after the formation of the government, on 13 May 1975, a man named Vural Önsel attacked Demirel right after a cabinet meeting and broke his nose. The police found an entry card to a RPP youth congress in the attacker's pocket. Later, at the hospital, Demirel said that the injury was not important but the incident itself was ugly. On the other hand, the reaction that came from Seyfi Öztürk, a minister from the JP, was more aggressive. Öztürk accused the RPP by saying that proof existed that Bülent Ecevit was the protector of anarchists and the leader of arsonists (*Milliyet*, 14 May 1975). While the attorney general asked for the execution of Önsel, the attacker said that he received orders from the People's Liberation Army of Turkey, a radical leftist organization. That same day, the RPP issued a manifesto that suggested the attacker has no relation with the party. Moreover, it invited the government to apologize because of the provocative and false accusations (*Milliyet*, 15 May 1975). Later, it turned out that not only did Vural Önsel have friendly relations with Süleyman Demirel, İsmet Sezgin and Necmettin Cevheri, but that he was also an ex-editor of the periodical *Sancak* in which the articles by the Nationalist Front members contributed (Ahmad, 1977, p. 351). Nevertheless, the violence soon turned against the RPP. On 21 June, a bus carrying Bülent Ecevit was pelted with rocks and, later, the crowd trampled him while he gave his speech. His bodyguards had to pull their guns and even fired into the air in order to disperse the attackers (*Milliyet*, 22 June 1975). The next day,

Ecevit asserted that the government envisaged the civil war by claiming that the leader of the attackers was JP Deputy, Ahmet Çakmak. On the other hand, while Demirel admitted that he was sorry about the incident at Gerede, he also emphasized that the accusations directed at the government were unfair and cruel (*Milliyet*, 23 June 1975). The violence spread to Diyarbakır the next day as RPP and NAP supporters fought before the rally of Alpaslan Türkeş (*Milliyet*, 24 June 1975). Bülent Ecevit's response to the escalating violence was to organize a Democracy and Freedom rally in Istanbul. According to *Milliyet*, an unprecedented crowd gathered in Taksim Square. There, Ecevit accused Süleyman Demirel by promoting fascism via the pro-government press. He also criticized the replacement of İsmail Cem with conservative Nevzat Yalçıntaş as the head of TRT. While emphasizing that they would be the watchmen of democracy, he asserted that he would never take his hat and leave like Demirel did years ago (*Milliyet*, 29 June 1975). One may suggest that Ecevit's words and the support of the crowd pushed the Nationalist Front leaders to temporarily take a more cautious stance, which resulted with a reduction in the ensuing violence.

However, the RPP opposition was not the only issue that Süleyman Demirel had to deal with. As the leader of a fragile government that inherited several problems from the previous one, Demirel was no like a captain who was trying to steer his ship through shoals. Firstly, the relations with the US had already been tense after the Cyprus intervention because of the embargo applied against Turkey. After the House of Representatives decided to prolong it, Demirel said in a press meeting there would be no cooperation if the embargo were not lifted (*Milliyet*, 3 August 1975). Thus, the government decided to hand over the joint military bases under Turkish Army control. One may suggest that during the 1970s, anti-American sentiment was still flourishing in Turkey and the Nationalist Front benefited from that by instilling nationalism in its

voters. Yet, it would be speculative to claim that Süleyman Demirel was against the United States during the period since what he cared was maintaining the coalition as far as possible and increasing the JP's votes in the next elections.

While the aftermath of U.S.-Turkey relations remained uncertain, the infighting within his own government put Demirel in a difficult position. The chairman of the NSP, Necmettin Erbakan accused Demirel of striving to divide the Nationalist Front. Although Demirel claimed on many different occasions that one had to defend the integrity of the government, according to Erbakan, he was the one who did not hesitate to take steps that would cause the end of the coalition (*Milliyet*, 10 August 1975). Erbakan's claims may be argued as being partly true as the JP aimed a consolidation on the right in order to gain the majority in the next election. Abdi İpekçi wrote in his column that the members of the JP believed in the fact that Necmettin Erbakan's NSP was created by the enemies of the JP in order to divide their party. Within the same framework, such enemies did not only shut their eyes to the return of Necmettin Erbakan, but also encouraged him to come back and form a new party (*Milliyet*, 21 August 1975). Despite such problems, Demirel managed to maintain the coalition by promoting the unity of the nationalist parties as all of his partners supported that idea (*Milliyet*, 3 September 1975).

The senate partial elections were due to be held on 12 October and the leaders viewed them as an occasion to test the stance of their voters. Thus, the election campaign could be described as a reflection of where they stood on the political spectrum during the last six months. Not surprisingly, Bülent Ecevit's rallies were attacked by partisans of the other parties as Demirel continued to deny accusations of his government being liable for the attacks. Thus, he did not hesitate to show Ecevit and the RPP as those responsible for the violence. For instance, in an election speech in

Gümüşhane, he blamed the RPP by protecting extremists who blew up a factory in Samsun (Demirel S. , 1975, p. 95). One may suggest that the use of the factory example is important, as economic development or achievement in a country of prosperity were practically sacred concepts for the JP. From the first day that he was involved in politics, Süleyman Demirel put special emphasis on the concept of 'Grand Turkey'. In a country that was facing an important social change generated by industrialization and rural-urban migration among other factors, such a concept constituted an ideal for the emerging low and middle classes in urban areas. Accordingly, Demirel's understanding of the concept reflected the search for prosperity and better standard of living as well as peace, unity and solidarity in the country (Demirel S. , 1977, p. 87). Thus, attacking a factory was no different than attacking to the ideal of the Grand Turkey. Against all this, Demirel argued that concepts like rationalism and inspiration that were necessary for nationalism would be enough to construct the Grand Turkey (Demirel S. , 1975, p. 126). Meanwhile, he kept warning the crowds about the risk of fragmentation, which could serve the left (*Milliyet*, 16 September 1975). On the other hand, Necmettin Erbakan said that Demirel's message was irrelevant by claiming that every party should work for itself during the pre-election process. As time passed, Erbakan became more critical against the JP. For instance, only two days before the election, he asserted that following the RPP and the JP was no different than madness (*Milliyet*, 11 October 1975). Demirel preferred to compromise, as he knew he would have to keep the coalition afloat after the elections.

The results of the senate partial elections on 12 October marked a standoff of the JP and the RPP as they filled 27 and 25 chairs, respectively, while the NSP won only two chairs. A poll conducted by *Milliyet* reflect the existing results to a potential

general election that showed an increase in JP and RPP votes but almost half a percent drop with NSP votes. It is worth to note that the Democratic Party and the RRP would be unsuccessful by all means while the NAP would double its deputies in the parliament (*Milliyet*, 15 October 1975). After the official results, both Ecevit and Demirel claimed they were both successful. It could be true as the new conjuncture marked the return to a bi-partisan system under the JP and the RPP. Yet, Demirel admitted that Ecevit was embarrassed, since he was the one who claimed that there would be no other way than elections. Herein, it can be concluded that Süleyman Demirel became more confident as the results were above his expectations. On the other hand, it became harder for him to sustain the Nationalist Front, as his partners and particularly the NSP did not perform well in the 12 October Election. Now, he had to face the opposition of Necmettin Erbakan, who would try to prevent the absorption of his party by the JP. Accordingly, only two days after the official results were announced, Erbakan declared they would insist on the application of the coalition protocol. Furthermore, as the spokesman for the independents, Sadettin Bilgiç said that the government would survive but he added they would support a coalition between the RPP and the Democratic Party in case of a governmental crisis (*Milliyet*, 16 October 1975). The next day, JP‘s Necmettin Cevheri announced that his party would not prefer to head to the elections without forgetting to add that they would not hesitate to call an early election if deemed necessary. To sum up, it would be plausible to admit that the results of the senate partial elections made the JP more confident while it made the National Front less durable.

However, even such confidence did not stop Süleyman Demirel to make more concessions to the NSP in order to keep the coalition afloat. Moreover, his diatribes against the opposition became even sharper as tension in the streets mounted. For

instance, in a press conference he admitted that those the communists labeled as fascists were actually those who were protecting the state (*Milliyet*, 11 December 1975). As the violence began to become more widespread, Demirel said that martial law could be declared if necessary without forgetting to add that the state could seize the universities to eradicate the ongoing events (*Milliyet*, 10 December 1976). He continued to deny the accusations, which would implicate his government to the murders of the NAP commandos. For instance, after the assassination of a leftist student, Hakan Yurdakuler, Demirel said the government was in no way connected to the incident. He also admitted that failing to find the perpetrators did not mean they were protecting them (*Milliyet*, 10 April 1976). On the other hand, his partner Alparslan Türkeş preferred to be less cautious than Demirel by claiming that if the nationalist youth would take a step back, the Communists would control the state (*Milliyet*, 22 July 1976). According to Türkeş, the political masters of the RPP were behind each bloody incident (*Milliyet*, 12 April 1976). Such attitudes may be believed as the result of the tolerance of Süleyman Demirel who wanted to maintain his position in the government. In order to do that, he did not hesitate to claim that there was no such things like right-wing terrorists and those mainly responsible for the ongoing anarchy were the radical leftists and their terrorists. Accordingly, he refused the attempts of the RPP to cooperate in order to prevent the violence. Herein, it is worth admitting that such behavior would soon cause political paralysis in the country. Alongside bickering within the coalition, another issue Süleyman Demirel had to confront was corruption allegations lodged against his nephew, Yahya Demirel who was accused of fictitious furniture exports to benefit from tax breaks. The story had been in the headlines for several days and at the end Yahya Demirel was arrested.

Although he was released on bond almost two months later, the process inevitably damaged the reputation of Süleyman Demirel.

Despite the pressure of the Nationalist Front, 1976 witnessed important developments in the labor movement in Turkey and the rally on 1 May constitutes an example. The main motivation behind the rally was the opposition against the State Security Courts. As a consequence of the call by the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions and the support of the RPP, a large crowd was present in Taksim Square and the rally ended without incident. However, the insistence of the government on the State Security Courts continued as Süleyman Demirel saw these necessary in order to solve the violence problem in the country. As time passed, worker resistance spread to various factories including Profilo and Ereğli Iron and Steel Company. Meanwhile, the JP had to deal with the RPP's strong opposition in the parliament. As a result of the combining factors, the government could not pass the resolution regarding the State Security Courts. The courts were abolished on 10 October with the enforcement of the Constitutional Court's decision (*Milliyet*, 11 October 1976). One may suggest that the process was totally abrasive not only for the Nationalist Front but also for Süleyman Demirel, as he was one of the main champions of the idea. Thus, Ferruh Bozbeyli invited Demirel to resign by asserting that the defeat of the government on the State Security Courts meant a motion of non-confidence (*Milliyet*, 14 October 1976). Consequently, it would be plausible to admit that Demirel's position deteriorated gradually during the first half of 1976.

Despite the problems within the government, Süleyman Demirel managed to sustain his authority within his party. In the 8th Grand Congress, Demirel was elected once again as the leader of the JP without any challengers. Moreover, he managed to muster the dissidents from Democratic Party under the roof of the JP. Names like

Mutlu Menderes, Nilüfer Gürsoy and Sadettin Bilgiç were elected to the administrative board from the top spots of the list (*Milliyet*, 25 October, 1976). The JP had already won the support of Celal Bayar in the senate partial elections and the return of the Democratic Party members made the party stronger in the eyes of the voters in the right spectrum. In a sense, it was the reverse of the fragmentation process within the JP that started in 1969 with the rejection of the budget proposal. Abdi İpekçi wrote that the defects of the 1970 crisis were almost eliminated with the return of the former dissidents and the JP would insist for early elections because it became stronger since its failure in 1973. He also noted that Demirel did not prefer to dissolve the coalition as it could have harmed his own party. According to İpekçi, the RPP no longer supported early elections and had Demirel resigned, Ecevit would have formed a coalition with the NSP to seize the opportunity of being in power during the pre-election process (*Milliyet*, 26 October 1976). As a result, Süleyman Demirel chose to wait for the right moment but it may be suggested that the Nationalist Front was living on borrowed time.

So Demirel started to put out messages emphasizing that the coalition was not indispensable for them. As the violence and worsening economic conditions paralyzed the government's processes, he became more prone to call for early elections. On 20 January, he supported the proposal of some members of the JP's board by admitting that he wished to hold the elections in May (*Milliyet*, 20 January 1977). Almost three weeks later, both Demirel and Ecevit announced on different occasions that they were ready for the elections (*Milliyet*, 12 February 1977). On the other hand, Necmettin Erbakan claimed that he was going to restrain the JP and the RPP from calling the early elections (*Milliyet*, 23 February 1977). His opposition was reasonable from his part as partial elections showed a decline in the NSP's votes that was interpreted as the

result of the coalition with the JP according to the party's members. However, the majority of the parties supported the election proposal and the parliament decided that the elections would be held on 5 June by 342 ayes. The RPP, the JP, the RRP and the NAP voted positively while the NSP refused to participate to the voting. On the other hand, the Democratic Party preferred to use its absentia vote (*Milliyet*, 6 April 1977).

While the country headed to the elections, the violence reached new heights. Bülent Ecevit was attacked several times respectively in Niksar, Şiran and finally in Erzincan where his bodyguards had to pull their guns while he was at the rostrum to give his speech (*Milliyet*, 29 April 1977). But the bloodiest incident of 1977 happened in Taksim Square on 1 May when the crowds that responded the call of DİSK rallied against the Nationalist Front. After a couple shots that caused panic among the crowd, the crossfire from the Intercontinental Hotel and the intervention of the police's panzer division transformed the situation into complete chaos. By the end of the day, 34 people were reported dead and soon the number went up to 36 (*Milliyet*, 3 May 1977). Like many previous incidents, both side blamed each other. Later, in an interview with Mehmet Ali Birand, Süleyman Genç said that the archives of the Special Warfare Department and intelligence unit could shed light to the incident. On the other hand, İsmet Sezgin argued that the incident was the result of the actions of some manipulators that aimed to provoke a social event. Sezgin acknowledged that the police were incapable of dealing with the crisis (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 169). Although politicians from both sides, including Süleyman Demirel, admitted their gratitude, the incident remained unsolved. But the threats concerning Taksim Square were not over after the 1 May incident. Almost a month later, Bülent Ecevit announced that he received a letter from Demirel that warned him against a threat of assassination during his rally. Ecevit saw that as an attempt of Demirel for preventing

the RPP's rally and announced that he would be in Taksim. Due to tighter security measures, the rally ended without any serious altercations.

One may suggest that the tension on the streets inevitably reflected in the leaders' discourses. During their campaigns, Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit continued to criticize each other. For instance, a week after the 1 May incident, Ecevit said that the dream of a coalition between the RPP and the JP was not possible. He admitted that two parties in the government wanted to benefit from the organizations involved in the Taksim Massacre. According to Ecevit, these organizations were part of the state mechanism but were not under the control of the democratic state of law (*Milliyet*, 8 May 1977). While Demirel rejected Ecevit's accusations, he did not shirk in pointing to the RPP as the protector of the ones that pull their guns against the state (*Milliyet*, 17 May 1977). The reflections of that offensive discourse could be found in the party's manifesto titled as '*Kervan Yürüyecektir*,' which meant that the train would march on. Unlike the previous manifestos of the JP, this was a short one, about 37 pages and almost 70% of it was consisted of ideological issues such as antagonism against the RPP, hatred against Communism, praise for nationalism and moral development. Accordingly, the JP invited all citizens to gather around Grand Turkey by admitting that it volunteered to serve the country with the support of the Grand Nation and with the blessing of God. The manifesto ended with an open call to nationalists to unite around the JP (Adalet Partisi, 1977, p. 38). Despite such an invitation, Süleyman Demirel's main target during his rallies was Necmettin Erbakan and the NSP. For instance, during his rally in Tokat, he asserted that the national view of the NSP was hogwash (*Milliyet*, 18 May 1977). Moreover, the next day in Bolu, he said that the NSP should be rubbed out as it was preparing to be RPP's stooge (*Milliyet*, 19 May 1977). Such criticism may be believed to be reasonable for Demirel

since he believed that he could obtain some votes from the NSP in order to further consolidate the right wing.

Nevertheless, the 5 June election results marked another coalition for Turkey. The RPP and the JP won 213 and 189 seats in the parliament, respectively, by getting 41.4% and 36.9% of the votes. The other right-wing parties, the NSP and the NAP got 24 and 16 seats, respectively, while the Democratic Party and the RRP won four in total. The electoral turnout of 72.4% was the highest since 27 May (TÜİK, 2012, p. 25). That was a significant failure for the latter parties as even Ferruh Bozbeyli, the leader of the Democratic Party was not elected to the parliament. Among the parties of the Nationalist Front, the NAP was exceptionally successful as it increased its number of deputies in the parliament from three to sixteen. On the other hand, the NSP lost half of its seats. In other words, the JP managed to consolidate some of the votes in the right spectrum as it absorbed most of the votes of its former coalition partners. Although Süleyman Demirel's strategy worked well in the 1977 elections, Bülent Ecevit's RPP was so successful that Demirel would need to cooperate with his old partners against whom he was very critical.

After the official results, Süleyman Demirel announced that the nationalists should unite to form a coalition, emphasizing that the government crisis was not resolved with the elections. He argued that the parties could solve the issue via negotiations (*Milliyet*, 9 June 1977). It can be argued that Demirel believed his only chance for premiership was to continue his polarizing nationalist discourse. Meanwhile, in order to obtain a majority, Bülent Ecevit was looking for 13 deputies whom he personally defined as individuals who were aware of their responsibility against the state and nation (*Milliyet*, 11 June 1977). Demirel was aware of such risk and he asserted that he was worrying about Ecevit's potential commitment to

disgraceful acts in order to come to power (*Milliyet*, 12 June 1977). Despite Demirel's fear, Ecevit did not manage to find the necessary number of deputies but, even so, he announced the government in the hope of receiving a vote of confidence. Demirel immediately announced that the actions of such a government were illegitimate, as it could never obtain the sufficient votes in parliament. By arguing that the issue became a matter of pride, he invited the parties to defeat the government via a motion of non-confidence. He was so confident in his claims that he began lobbying with the leaders of the NSP and the NAP for his next government even before the voting. The leaders published a joint declaration, which suggested that the formation, activities and decisions of the Ecevit government were illegitimate (*Milliyet*, 1 July 1977). That could be considered as the signal of the fall of a premature government and consequently, the parliament rejected it with 229 nays against 217 ayes. After the vote, Bülent Ecevit tendered his resignation to Fahri Korutürk and Süleyman Demirel was tasked with the formation of a new government.

Although Süleyman Demirel said that he was going to meet all the leaders including Bülent Ecevit, it is possible to assert he was in search of another Nationalist Front government. In this context, he visited Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş. At the end of the separate meetings, both leaders announced they were of one mind about the problems of the country and they said 'yes' to Demirel (*Milliyet*, 8 July 1977). Meanwhile, Demirel rejected Ecevit's suggestion to form a RPP-JP coalition under the premiership of a neutral candidate by claiming he agreed with the NSP and the NAP for the government (*Milliyet*, 9 July 1977). Negotiations amongst the parties on the number of ministries lasted longer than expected and as Necmettin Erbakan asked for more concessions. The government was finally announced on 21 July and the distribution of the ministries showed the level of Demirel's concessions. As the

majority partner, the JP had 16 ministries including premiership, while minor partners the NSP and the NAP had eight and five, respectively. While the numbers were not proportional with the number of deputies, Süleyman Demirel did not hesitate to compromise since he knew that both parties were indispensable for achieving a majority. It was another act of pragmatism by him that presented to what extent he could compromise so as to be in power.

Unlike before, the program of the 2nd Nationalist Front government suggested the setting up and fostering of civil democratic relations with the opposition for the protection of national interests and basic principles of the constitution (*Milliyet*, 28 July 1977). However, it was not enough to calm RPP deputies that previously suffered from policies of the earlier coalition. Yet, after long debates in the parliament, the government achieved a vote of confidence on 1 August with 229 ayes versus 219 nays. Despite the relatively positive tone of the program, it soon turned out to be that the new government was no different than the previous one in terms of dealing with violence. Tanel Demirel argued the NAP struggled to set up his own cadres within the bureaucracy while security forces turned a blind eye to the violence of the commandos. Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel and his JP preferred to be a mere spectator in order to maintain the coalition (Demirel T. , 2004, p. 72). It may be debated that Demirel was not apathetic at all against the issue. Instead, he did not raise his voice due to the crucial position of the NAP within the government at that time. As a result of these concessions, a serious opposition cropped up within the JP that aimed at Süleyman Demirel and the government. For instance, Mustafa Deliveli, a senator from Hatay, proposed the abrogation of the government while claiming the party's electoral base had moved to the NAP. Demirel rejected the critics and said they would stay in power as long as circumstances allowed. He added that there was no such JP-NAP shift but,

even if it were, that would be the result of the NAP's efforts before the elections. Demirel emphasized that the NAP candidates visited each village twice and added that in such a case, the JP had to visit more villages three times (*Milliyet*, 6 October 1977). Meanwhile, NAP İzmir Provincial Chairman, Osman Kırkyaşaroğlu argued the claims regarding the shift were true as hundreds of JP members switched to his party. He suggested that the JP's dissolution was inevitable as it was a party without any electoral base. According to Abdi İpekçi, such shift was the result of Süleyman Demirel's polarization or the 'Front' policy. İpekçi claimed that the parties benefitting from the polarization were those that stood in the extremes (*Milliyet*, 8 October 1977). Considering the fragile balance due to the arithmetic of the parliament, Süleyman Demirel's struggle to sustain the coalition became even more difficult for him.

Another development that caused friction in 1977 was the appointment of the land forces commander. After the retirement of Namık Kemal Ersun by the government's decision, the selection of the next commander became a problem between Süleyman Demirel and Fahri Korutürk. It was important, as according to custom, the commanders of the land forces were promoted as the chief of staff. Historically, the army appointments were made by a merit rating system that respected the precedence. Korutürk and the army reached a consensus around Adnan Ersöz who came first according to such system. However, Demirel preferred Ali Fethi Esener with whom he had better relations. As this went against the grain of the armed forces hierarchy, Korutürk vetoed the government decision twice. In an interview with Mehmet Ali Birand, Demirel mentioned that he visited Korutürk in order to convince him to sign the decision, as it became a matter of government prestige. However Korutürk rejected him once again (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 82). The crisis

was resolved with the appointment of Kenan Evren, a reportedly neutral candidate who was expected to retire after his current posting.

Towards the last quarter of 1977, the economic situation worsened due to the ongoing economic embargo and a downturn in the global economy. The government had to take precautions to secure a loan from the IMF. New measures included price hikes in energy including oil products and electricity, transportation and other commodities such as iron and cement. The government announced that there would be no increases in daily staples like sugar, tea and bottled gas, emphasizing that such measures were necessary for the improvement of exports and the nation's balance of payments (*Milliyet*, 9 September 1977). Süleyman Demirel said that they took such measures in order to fight inflation and stabilize the economy (*Milliyet*, 10 September 1977). Although there was serious reaction from different segments of society and from the opposition, the IMF found such measures insufficient and asked for more restrictions (*Milliyet*, 14 September, 1977). Accordingly, the Turkish Lira was devaluated almost 10% against foreign currencies. The Minister of Finance, Cihat Bilgehan said that the devaluation was the final measure. According to him, the granted credit from the IMF showed that Turkey was not a country on the verge of bankruptcy (*Milliyet*, 23 September 1977). Even though the decisions were necessary for an economic recovery, one may suggest that it made the government unpopular on the eyes of the voters.

The local elections provided a good opportunity for Bülent Ecevit, who wanted to benefit from such unpopularity. During his electoral campaign, he invited the citizens to rid themselves of the Nationalist Front by emphasizing the 11 December local elections would be the elections for Turkey's independence (*Milliyet*, 26 November 1977). As Ecevit speculated in his rallies, the result of the elections showed

the voters' dissatisfaction of the government. The RPP got almost 42% of the votes in the provincial council election while the JP had 37%. Despite a relative percentage difference, the RPP not only won in the greater municipalities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, but also in cities like Bursa and Aydın, where the JP was historically considered stronger (TODAİE, 2017).

After the local elections, the Nationalist Front government became fragile as resignations from the JP accelerated. When the number of the resigning deputies reached twelve, it took a censure motion to overthrow the government, whereas the government fell by 228 nays versus 218 ayes on the final day of 1977. It was the first time in the republic's history that a government was toppled by censure motion. Right after the voting, Süleyman Demirel went to Çankaya to tender his letter of resignation (*Milliyet*, 1 January 1978). That was also the end of the Nationalist Front governments that were considered the main culprits of the violence that embroiled the country for nearly three years. During both terms, Süleyman Demirel did not hesitate with an offensive nationalist discourse, which had polarized the country. Although that was partly the outcome of his ambition to keep the coalition afloat, one may claim that such polarization along with the worsening economic conditions deteriorated Demirel's popularity in the eyes of the voters.

Bülent Ecevit overthrew Süleyman Demirel and founded his new government by relying on the support of the 11 independents. In return, he handed ten of them ministries in his cabinet. Following his announcement of the program, the government got a vote of confidence with 229 ayes. On the day of the vote, Süleyman Demirel claimed they still had things to say and that they would continue to say these on every occasion (*Milliyet*, 18 January 1978). It may also be suggested that Demirel enjoyed being the opposition in a country paralyzed by political violence. Ever since 1975, he

had to deal with the opposition of Ecevit and now it was his turn to criticize the government. According to Demirel, the new government was founded upon various intrigues, political bribes and unethical affairs. During his speech, he avoided calling Ecevit as the prime minister. Instead, he would call him 'the head of the government'. As revenge of previous criticism lodged against the Nationalist Front, Demirel invited the new government to resolve the problem of anarchy by emphasizing that Ecevit had to reveal the counter-guerilla and agent provocateurs, which he once alleged to have been responsible for the chaos (*Milliyet*, 22 January 1978). According to Mehmet Ali Birand, Demirel's criticisms on the issue of counter-guerilla were cunning as they aimed to have the RPP come up against the army (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 84). As Demirel continued to apply pressure on the matter, Ecevit finally had to make an announcement, which argued that there was not such an official force called 'counter guerilla.' He defended himself by noting that during his election campaign, he mentioned some agent provocateurs but he did not pronounce them as counter-guerilla (*Milliyet*, 4 February 1978). Ecevit stated he would not be deceived by his critics, whose aims were manipulating and politicizing the army (*Milliyet*, 6 February 1978). Such attitude might be a step back for Bülent Ecevit who had earlier promised transparency in politics. Ümit Cizre argued that the JP wanted to tattle the imperfections of the RPP to the army in order to break the traditional alliance between them. In other words, Demirel tried to draw the RPP out as an unreliable and disgraceful partner for the army (Cizre, 2002, p. 139). In parallel with increased tension in the country, such tattling often attained a level of manipulation of the army against the RPP.

As time passed, Bülent Ecevit and his RPP grasped they could not cope with the violence that surrounded the streets. Moreover, the chronic economic problems that

would cause price hikes and inflation made the Ecevit government unpopular. Meanwhile, Demirel did not hesitate to pursue a strong opposition against the RPP. He emphasized that violence were still out in the streets and the cost of living would continue to increase due to devaluation. According to Demirel, the only success of the government was the partisanship (*Milliyet*, 6 March 1978). As he wanted to maximize the benefits of the government's failure, Demirel commenced a series of rallies in May that would continue until the JP Congress in October. The rallies were given various names including 'Respect the Flag' or 'National Rearing'[23] Meetings and they differed from election rallies in terms of their objectives. According to Demirel, the rallies aimed to strengthen national conscience and provide unity of belief against the danger the state and nation was facing back then (Demirel S. , 1979, p. 32). He pointed to the government as the one responsible for all misery, troubles and malignancies. Demirel suggested to the crowd that there was no need worry about the future as the worst-case scenario had already transpired during this government and the future could not be any bleaker than the existing situation (Demirel S. , 1979, p. 48). He continued to send messages to the army in order to manipulate it against Bülent Ecevit. For instance, in late-June, he said he did not understand the silence of the Chief of Staff against attacks on retired officers (*Milliyet*, 29 June 1978). The manipulation of the army by Demirel was just a part of his opposition campaign since he had already showed that he was willing to go to any extreme in order to knock the government out.

The 9th JP Congress assembled in Ankara on 21 October. Süleyman Demirel came to the event with Celal Bayar and both leaders greeted the crowd together. On opening day, Demirel gave a long speech in which he highlighted the country's bad condition. He claimed that the head of the government was not only the enemy of the

[23] The Turkish names of these meetings were *Bayrağa Saygı* and *Milli Şahlanış*.

existing order, but was also seeking to break down the regime (Demirel S. , 1978, p. 30). One can suggest that his critical railing against the government was appreciated by the delegates as he defeated his adversary Kamran İnan by getting 1439 votes against İnan's 88. After the election, Demirel promised that his struggle for the cause of the Turkish Nation would continue (*Milliyet*, 24 October 1978).

Starting early 1978, political terror reached a level that the imposition of martial law would have been no surprise to anyone. Though Bülent Ecevit wanted to manage the situation without the help of the army, the polarized political life combined with the lack of a stable government took the country to the point of no return. The final straw came from Kahramanmaraş, an eastern province of Turkey. The incident began on 22 December at the funeral of two leftist teachers. The confrontation of crowds opposing viewpoints soon became a sectarian massacre that was mostly aimed at the town's Alawite population. Attacks lasted almost three days and by the evening of 25 December, almost 120 citizens were dead and 1000 injured. Military troops were present throughout the entire incident, but they preferred not to intervene. In an interview with Mehmet Ali Birand, Bülent Ecevit said that the army rejected to get involved in the incident, claiming it had no authorization. Accordingly, Kenan Evren later said that intervention was impossible, as the government had not declared martial law (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 109). The massacre in Kahramanmaraş was the latest in a series of unfolding events that paralyzed the country since early 1978. Although Ecevit tried to run the country without martial law for a while, the escalating violence left him no choice but to call in the army in order to restore authority. Hence, he announced that the incident in Kahramanmaraş was a revolt directed against the state by emphasizing the impossibility to deal with it through ordinary measures (*Milliyet*, 26 December 1978). On 26 December, martial law was declared in 13 cities

including Istanbul and Ankara. Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel who was in the opposition criticized the government in a harsh way of being a mere spectator to the incident. He asserted,

> "I am addressing the high conscience of the Grand Assembly. The issue is not an issue of the government. If you do not interfere in this catastrophe, if you think of those who govern Turkey as irresponsible for the creation new catastrophes, if you do not enable those who govern Turkey to find timely solutions, they will not be able to find any solutions and eventually our parliaments could hesitate to provide the services the nation is really waiting for" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 4 January 1979, p. 297).[24]

Again, Demirel's attitude contained a big deal of pragmatism since he enjoyed being in opposition during these difficult times. After all, only a few months before, he was the one who had the face the same criticism.

The proclamation of martial law gave the opposition the chance to question the government's authority. JP's Ömer Ucuzal announced that martial law was the proof of the government's crash (*Milliyet*, 27 December 1978). In his memoirs, Süleyman Demirel blamed the government and the chief of staff by remaining mere spectators of incidents that lasted seven days. He noted that 659 citizens lost their lives in 13 cities during the year leading up to the proclamation of martial law, whereas the National Security Council failed to take the necessary measures until the Kahramanmaraş Massacre (Demirel S. , 1990, p. 63–64). As time passed, Demirel started criticizing Bülent Ecevit for interfering in the implementation of martial law. He argued that such behavior could harm the chain of command (*Milliyet*, 30 December 1978). One may

[24] "Yüce meclisin yüksek vicdanına sesleniyorum. Mesele bir hükümet meselesi değildir. Eğer bu faciaya el koymazsanız, yeni yeni faciaların meydana gelmesinde Türkiye'yi idare edenlerisorumsuz sayarsınız, Türkiye'yi idare edenlerin zamanında çare bulabilmesini sağlamazsanız; çare bulamazlar ve nihayet meclislerimiz, gerçekten milletin beklediği hizmetleri yapmakta tereddüde düşebilir."

interpret Demirel's attitude as a part of his strategy that aimed to manipulate the army against the RPP.

Unfortunately, martial law did not put an end to the violence in the streets. On 1 February 1979, *Milliyet's* editor-in-chief, Abdi İpekçi was murdered in an armed assault. The assassination of İpekçi was a great shock both for the government and opposition. The immediate reactions of Ecevit and Demirel were to give messages of cooperation in order to stop the violence. While Ecevit was announcing that a consensus of understanding with the JP was necessary before more tragic incidents, Demirel said that they were open to negotiations with the government to deal with the anarchy (*Milliyet*, 4 February 1979). However, the mood of optimism did not last longer as political ambitions of the leaders overshadowed hopes of cooperation. After only weeks after the assassination, Süleyman Demirel was back on stage to criticize the government. But that time, he went to extremes by claiming that the government was heading in a direction similar to Salvador Allende, who was overthrown by a CIA-backed military coup. He continued by saying,

> "I do not know how their end will come. But he is acting just like these people. I do not presume the Turkish army would commit to something like that. But the program they are conducting is the program of Allende. I do not know if they would end up like him or not" (*Milliyet*, 20 March 1979).[25]

One may regard Demirel's cheap shot as just another example of his aim to manipulate the army against his political adversaries. When the reactions started to come from the opposition and the public, he back-peddled, claiming that his words were misunderstood by the public. He underlined that he used the Allende example in order to refer to the government's economic policy (*Milliyet*, 22 March 1979). Whether it

[25] "Sonlarını nereden bileyim. Yalnız o da bunlar gibi yapmıştır. Türk ordusunun böyle bir şey yapacağına ise ihtimal vermem. Ancak icra ettikleri program Allende programıdır. Sonları aynı mı olur, ayrı mı olur onu bilemem"

was true or not, such attitude signaled that Demirel's perpetual conflict with the RPP would continue.

On the other hand, the economic problems of 1979 provided a great opportunity for Demirel who represented the main opposition party. Due to the embargo and worsening global economic conditions, Turkey was facing a serious liquidity crisis. The government's efforts, which included price hikes and currency devaluation was not enough to secure the necessary loan from international organizations, particularly the IMF. The amount of credit granted by the IMF was nowhere near was needed to close the country's current account deficit, as Turkey was an importer of commodities including petroleum. The result of the liquidity shortage was long queues in front of fuel stations and, of course, Demirel seized the opportunity to criticize the government because of the sputtering economy. In a speech following a dinner with businessmen, he asserted that the country could not be left to the hands of idiots (*Milliyet*, 3 April 1979). Although he admitted that he did not use the word for any specific person, his following criticism vis-à-vis the government's economic policy showed clearly that the target of these words was Bülent Ecevit and his cabinet.

By the end of the first half of 1979, the government of Bülent Ecevit became so unpopular that the deputies who sensed the bad conduct started resigning from the RPP. In a parliament based on a delicate balance of numbers, such resignations posed a major threat for the government's future. However, Süleyman Demirel preferred to wait until the senate elections, which also included the election of five deputies for the parliament. During his campaign, Demirel announced several times that the victory of the JP in five provinces would be the end of the existing government (*Milliyet*, 9 September 1979). Moreover, as a pragmatist, he did not hesitate to criticize his old partners, the NSP and the NAP by claiming that the feelings should not be part of the

election campaign (*Milliyet*, 20 September 1979). In line with Demirel's expectations, election results showed an absolute victory for the JP. Besides winning all five seats in the parliament, the JP obtained 30 seats in the senate while the RPP won only 12 seats *(Milliyet*, 15 October 1979). The results spelled the end of the Ecevit government that ruled the country for more than 20 months. Accordingly, on 17 October, Bülent Ecevit tendered his letter of resignation to Fahri Korutürk. Demirel interpreted his departure as a discharge of the nation rather than an ordinary resignation (*Milliyet*, 17 October 1979). It was practically true as the government fell short of expectations both in the political and economic arenas. In contrast with Ecevit's performance as a prime minister, one may suggest that Süleyman Demirel was successful at the post of the leadership of the main opposition party as he managed to weaken his political opponents with his strong critical discourse. While doing that, he adopted a pragmatic approach concerning many issues by putting the principles aside.

Fahri Korutürk appointed Süleyman Demirel the task to form the new government on 25 October. Aware that the country could not cope with another Nationalist Front experience, Demirel began seeking the support of his old partners in order to form a minority government. It contrasted his claims made only five years earlier that suggested the concept of minority government did not exist in the constitution. However, he knew he had to adapt himself to the changing conditions. Thus, he did not hesitate to form such a government. After a process of testing the waters, Demirel got the approval of Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan and founded his government on 12 November. The new government's program promised the resolution of 56 issues in a period of 100 days. Even though most of these issues were economic, Demirel admitted that the main problem was maintaining the safety of the lives and property of the citizens (*Milliyet*, 20 November 1979). The JP minority

government achieved a vote of confidence with 229 ayes versus 208 nays. The NSP and the NAP came out in full force while one RPP deputy, Cengiz Şenses voted affirmatively (*Milliyet*, 26 November 1979). That was the sixth government founded under the premiership of Süleyman Demirel.

Although Demirel admitted that their main objective was to restore peace, the violence continued unabated throughout the country. Finally, on 3 January 1980, a letter written by Chief of Staff, Kenan Evren was published in newspapers. Even though the letter was addressed to Fahri Korutürk, it could be a direct warning against the political parties that were seen as liable for the violence. Another important detail of the letter underscored the developments in the Middle East. According to that, there was a growing risk of a serious conflict in the region. Thus, it briefly invited all political parties to reach a consensus in order to restore the national unity (*Milliyet*, 3 January 1980). In his memoirs, Kenan Evren preferred to use the word 'memorandum' instead of letter. While emphasizing that the letter did not target a specific party or leader, Evren wrote that Demirel was wrong to take it personally (Evren, 1990, p. 341). However, Demirel continued to take it personally since he was the prime minister of the existing government. In a private meeting with Fahri Korutürk, he described the situation as a state of crisis in which the government was bypassed by the High Command (Demirel S. , 1990, p. 45). He met with Kenan Evren in order to solve the crisis. During the meeting, Demirel expressed his disappointment by admitting that from the first days of the government, he promised everything necessary to the army including laws, weapons, vehicles and money so as to quell the country's fire. Therefore, he asked Evren the motive that encouraged him to write such letter. Evren reiterated that the memorandum was clearly aimed at all political parties and constitutional institutions, stating that it had nothing to do with the government

(Demirel S. , 1990, p. 47). Despite Evren's comments, the letter could be considered as the sign of the army's intention to intervene in order to create a stable Turkey.

However, the commanders were not the only ones who wanted to bring stability to the country. After Iran's Islamic Revolution and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's subsequent escape, the West needed a strategic partner to replace Iran. Turkey seemed like a plausible choice apart from the fact that it lacked stability. According to Feroz Ahmad, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the end of détente was another factor that put the West in dire straits. Ahmad argued that these two developments enhanced Turkey's strategic position in NATO but there were few experts who believed that Turkey could handle the new responsibilities at the time (Ahmad, 1993, p. 174). In other words, the West needed a stable partner in the region and Turkey was far from meeting such expectations due to its existing political and economical problems. Unsurprisingly, Süleyman Demirel was there on stage to realize the reforms that would prepare Turkey in it reintegration back into the Western World.

Accordingly, the economic decisions of 24 January were, by all means, a radical step for the orientation of the economy. Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses argued that the new measures marked a turning point in Turkish economic development as they described the following years as Phase III that would last until the 2000–2001 crisis (Öniş & Şenses, 2007, p. 265). As previously mentioned, Turkey was facing a serious liquidity shortage especially during the latter half of the 1970s. It was not only the result of the import substitution model that became inefficient over time, but also the fact that the country's economy could not adapt itself to the changing economic order. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the global economy witnessed serious challenges including stagflation and a crisis in the balance of payments of developing countries. Moreover, the promotion of the import-substituting

industrialization in such countries through state incentives resulted with the emergence of inefficient industries that required long-lasting subsidization with negligible potential of international competitiveness (Öniş, 1991, p. 109). In other words, the period of national industrialization supported by the import substitution model completed its mission. In his memoirs, Güngör Uras mentioned the economic planning during the 1960s and 1970s paved the way for a new phase in Turkey's economy (Akman, 2012, p. 504). It is worth noting that the issue was not only valid for Turkey, as the conjuncture of the global economic system moved towards neo-liberal globalization that emerged in the form of an international market economy. The growing internationalization showed that the market economy had to rely on the expansion of global markets rather than a domestic one (Fotopoulos, 2002, p. 74). Thus, developing countries including Turkey knew they had to adapt themselves to the changing order.

When Süleyman Demirel asked for 100 days to resolve the main issues, he was aware he had to take radical steps in order to satisfy the IMF. So he appointed Turgut Özal as his Undersecretary of the Economy. Özal was a bureaucrat with an engineering background from ITU. He had close ties with Demirel from his university years and had appointed as the undersecretary of the SPO again by Süleyman Demirel. Özal's nomination as the head of the economy could be considered as a reasonable step from Demirel's part. Ziya Öniş argued that strong, organic links with transnational financial networks of the Özal experience might constitute an important source of political advantage in the era of neo-liberal globalization (Öniş, 2004, p. 118). Moreover, the necessary measures to be taken were already known by the government, as the IMF and the World Bank had been putting pressure on Turkey for a long while in order to

grant the required credit. Hence, Demirel and Özal needed to pass the decisions as soon as possible.

However, the adoption of economic measures was not easy for any politician. Not only did it require a strong devaluation of Turkish Lira against foreign currencies, but also resulted in significant price hikes of almost everything. Without doubt, Süleyman Demirel was aware of the political cost of these measures. Ekrem Ceyhun, who was present at the meeting as an undersecretary, mentioned that Demirel began the meeting by admitting that the decisions would be painful. However, he also added that serving the country was more important than politics. Then he announced that the negotiations had to be completed the same day, as they would be announced in the official gazette the following day (Özdemir, 2014, p. 108). The reason behind Demirel's hurry was to avoid potential backlash from the ministers. He kept them in a sort of detention in order to prevent the risk of a media leak. Meanwhile, the signed files were expedited to Çankaya in order to obtain the approval of Fahri Korutürk. Ceyhun said that the meeting ended at 2:00 a.m. and right after it, a telex was sent to Washington in order to inform the IMF (Özdemir, 2014, p. 109-111). It is worth noting that the Chief of Staff was already informed of the decision as Turgut Özal had visited the general ten days before the meeting (Özdemir, 2014, p. 112). Demirel and Özal were attentive about the implementation process, as they knew that the necessary measures were unprecedented for the country's economy. On the other hand, Demirel's involvement and attitude in the decision-making process of such radical decisions demonstrated his ability to adapt to changing conditions. The main motivation behind Demirel's behavior could be pragmatic since he knew that he measures were not only necessary for serving the country but they were also prerequisites for obtaining foreign

loans that could give a sigh of relief to the worsening economy. In other words, the conditions of the time pushed Demirel to take the decisions.

For all intents and purposes, the decisions of 24 January were a turning point for the Turkish economy. Apart from technical adjustments such as currency flotation and price hikes, the main motive behind these was to create an export-oriented economy that would be compatible with the free-market system. Yet, the application process of the decisions required strong political will. Ziya Öniş argued that a successful transition to a neo-liberal model required strong and effective leadership for three separate reasons. First of all, trust in the leadership and its commitment to the reform process was important in terms of granting support of the international financial institutions. Secondly, leadership was crucial for investments of the domestic and foreign capital. Finally, the public's acceptance of the leadership was vital to sustain the reforms (Öniş, 2004, p. 118). Moreover, the army believed that the existing structure of the parliament was far from fulfilling expectations. Still, it is worth reiterating that Turkey's future was important for the West thanks to its geo-strategic position.

Even though Turkey attained a relatively better position in accessing foreign credit after the 24 January decisions, the political situation continued to worsen. While the violence in the country continued unabated, Fahri Korutürk's expiring term in Çankaya became another issue that would lead to another political deadlock. Although Bülent Ecevit invited Süleyman Demirel and Necmettin Erbakan to take joint action, both leaders refused to compromise. Demirel invited other parties to elect the president by emphasizing they had the required majority (*Milliyet*, 3 April 1980). The JP suggested Sadettin Bilgiç as the candidate while the RPP chose Muhsin Batur, one of the most important figures of 12 March. Both parties were aware that the existing

structure of the parliament would not allow their candidates to be elected as the president. In his memoirs, Sadettin Bilgiç admitted that his election seemed like a long shot as not only the NAP and the NSP members would not have voted for him, but also 25% of JP deputies would have decided not to (Bilgiç, 2002, p. 266). Unsurprisingly, the parliament was unable to elect a president as the parties failed to cooperate. During the process, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, who was the Foreign Affairs Minister of the JP Government, was also the acting president since early April. After several turns, Demirel said that the result would end up the same even if hundreds of rounds were made. He referred to an article in the Greek Constitution, which recommended calling for general elections after the third round of inconclusive presidential elections (*Milliyet*, 10 May 1980). Meanwhile, the JP nominated Faik Türün, another 12 March general, in order to counter-balance Muhsin Batur, but such effort also proved inconclusive. After some more rounds, it became evident that the parliament would not come up with an efficient result. Therefore, Demirel proposed a constitutional amendment that anticipated the election of the president by the people. Although he emphasized that his proposition should not be perceived as a desire for the presidential system, Ecevit objected to him by arguing that a direct election of the president would mean revamping the entire political system (*Milliyet*, 22 May 1980). After an unsuccessful process of negotiations, both leaders were back to blaming each other as it was the case during the 1970s.

While the crisis for Çankaya diminished in significance due to the party disagreements, the commanders were following the developments closely. Kenan Evren mentioned that the idea of intervention appeared in his mind around April. In his diary, he noted, “If the situation continues like this and the parties continue to act insensibly, there would be no other option than intervention” (Evren, 1990, p. 428). To

exacerbate the presidential deadlock, violence continued unabated throughout the country and its new targets were politicians of different walks of life. On 27 May 1980, the assassination of Gün Sazak, who served as Minister of Customs and Monopolies in the existing Demirel Government, triggered a more serious incident in Anatolia. Sazak was a deputy from the NAP and his assassination provoked the rightist crowds in several cities including Çorum. Although the government and the commanders of martial law tried to prevent escalation via curfews, the days following 5 June saw incidents in Çorum gradually turn into a massacre like the example of Kahramanmaraş two years earlier. Yet, unlike Kahramanmaraş, Süleyman Demirel preferred to remain silent regarding the murders in Çorum. This incident ended with the intervention of the gendarmerie on 10 July.

However, it was not only the violence that made it tough on Demirel. In mid June, Necmettin Erbakan threatened him by withdrawing the NSP's support of the government. Despite this, Demirel managed to deal with Erbakan when his government achieved a vote of confidence on 2 July with 227 ayes versus 214 nays. The JP breathed a sigh of relief as the commanders were planning to intervene on 11 July. In his memoirs, Kenan Evren wrote that they had to postpone their plans, as they did not want to create the perception of "the RPP plus the army was equal to the government" one that was often used by Süleyman Demirel (Evren, 1990, p. 460). On the other hand, Evren's usage of the verb 'postpone' instead of 'cancel' for the intervention could be considered as a sign of its inevitability. Moreover, the course of events practically expedited the process. On 19 July, Nihat Erim, the prime minister of 12 March, was assassinated in Dragos (*Milliyet*, 20 July 1980), whereby the assassination of a labor union leader, Kemal Türkler followed Erim's just three days later (*Milliyet*, 23 July 1980). As the violence continued to escalate, the leaders started

calling for early elections. While Süleyman Demirel said that the elections could be held after 15 October, the NSP made an application for a more specific date: 26 October 1980 (*Milliyet*, 16 August 1980). Turgut Özal also said that early elections were of vital importance (*Milliyet*, 21 August 1980). Özal's statement was crucial since he was responsible of the implementation of the economic program.

Although the leaders admitted their intentions of calling for early elections, the commanders were determined to end the instability. The politicians were aware that an intervention would eventually occur. During the cabinet meeting on 11 September, Süleyman Demirel told his ministers to clean out their drawers and destroy any documents that would put them in a bind (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 173). After midnight, around 4:00 a.m., Nahit Menteşe, a JP member from his inner circle brought Demirel a letter that suggested the army had seized the power and that he had to leave for Gelibolu with or without his wife. At first glance, he preferred to travel alone as he was afraid of the reiteration of disgracing treatments from the example of 27 May. In an interview, he said that experiencing such treatment in front of his wife could be humiliating for himself (Altuğ, 1993, p. 52). After Nazmiye Demirel's insistence, the couple headed for Hamzakoy in the following hours. They were accompanied by another couple, Rahşan and Bülent Ecevit, as the commanders wanted to take both leaders in custody. Necmettin Erbakan was sent to İzmir while Alparslan Türkeş preferred to hide for three days in order to avoid the risk of a leftist coup. The intervention and curfew was announced on TRT in the morning of 12 September. The military intervention of 12 September was not only the end of an unstable decade, but was also the beginning of a long break with multi-party politics. For Demirel, it was the second time that he was forced out of office as a result of military intervention.

The period between 1971 and 1980 includes various data for researchers who aim to analyze Süleyman Demirel's pragmatism. Firstly, his cooperation with the commanders of the 12 March regime gave him an opportunity to pass the constitutional amendments that he had failed to do since late 1960s. Then, when the opportunity arose, he did not hesitate to overthrow Nihat Erim. Relying on his party's majority in the parliament, he managed to control the following governments via reconciliation or coercion. When the RPP became the first party in the 1973 elections and Bülent Ecevit gained further popularity after the intervention in Cyprus, Demirel struggled to prevent early elections so as to block his adversary's chance to obtain a majority. That was when he broke away from his moderate pragmatism he had benefitted during the 1960s. Although the pragmatism was still there, it could be that Süleyman Demirel of the 1970s was a polarizing figure. In order to consolidate the right and maintain the Front coalitions, he did not hesitate to adopt a nationalist discourse, which was hostile towards the left. Moreover, he was blamed for averting his eyes to the assassinations of figures from of opposite camp. During the process, Demirel tried to rely on numbers he always respected. He overthrew the RPP's coalition with independents by forming alliances with his old partners Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş. Then later, he formed a minority government he once criticized as being anti-constitutional. When he became prime minister for the sixth time in 1979, he adopted the 24 January measures in order to adapt the economy to changing global conditions. Although Turgut Özal played an important role during the decision-making and implementation processes, it may be believed that Demirel stood behind him with his political will without hesitating to endure criticism from not only the opposition but also the suffering masses. His pragmatism was still intact. He saw the necessity of the measures in adapting the country to changing economic and political conditions and it was his main

motivation to realize them. As time progressed, Süleyman Demirel was aware of the fact that intervention was approaching but he could not do anything to prevent it, as the spiraling violence provoked instability. Finally, on 12 September, Demirel had to leave his office by obeying the orders of the commanders.

5. From Hamzakoy to Çankaya (1980–1993)

The aftermath of 12 September witnessed the end of many concepts, institutions and actors that belonged to the previous 20 years, including the 1961 Constitution and the JP. One of the few actors of both the 1960s and 1970s who survived the difficult period was Süleyman Demirel. This time around, not only did he manage to climb back into the political arena as the leader of a political party, but he also struggled up the ladder to the presidency. After the entire struggle in his political career, once again, Demirel managed to adapt to changing conditions throughout the period in question. In this context, this chapter will cover the period between 1980 and 1993, during which Süleyman Demirel rebuilt his legacy. While doing that, he refused to come to terms with the commanders, which contrasted with his behavior during the post-12 March process. As stated earlier, he was sent to Hamzakoy alongside his adversary, Bülent Ecevit, right after the military intervention. After his discharge, Süleyman Demirel returned immediately to Ankara in order to observe the post-coup process. Right after the normalization attempts of the National Security Council (NSC), he founded the Grand Turkey Party, a move that landed him in Zincirbozan, a political prison that accompanied him and his old comrades from the JP, as well as other politicians from the RPP. Although he was released after spending almost four months in Zincirbozan, he was banned from politics by the council. The ban was lifted after four years by a referendum in 1987. However, the politics of the new decade were unlike the previous one and Demirel had to struggle to regain his popularity within the central-right. In order to do that, he challenged his old deputy, Turgut Özal who happened to be the leader of the Motherland Party (MP) that was in power. After gleaning some modest results in the 1987 elections with the True Path Party (TPP), Demirel was finally back in the parliament in the ranks of the opposition. In 1989,

Turgut Özal replaced Kenan Evren in Çankaya. As the natural leader of the central-right, Demirel and his TPP ended up as the first party in 1991 elections. Although Demirel refused to cooperate with the social democrats during the 1970s, this time he did not hesitate to form a coalition with the Socialist Populist Party (SPP) of Erdal İnönü. The result was his seventh premiership. Even though the coalition went relatively well, in terms of dealing with the political and economical problems of the country, Turgut Özal's sudden death paved the way for Demirel to the presidency of the republic. After a political career that spanned almost more than 30 years, he finally moved to Çankaya, to the proud venue, provided by the republic. The researcher studying the 1980–1993 period of Süleyman Demirel can observe him evolving into a more reasonable political figure. It could be argued that he revisited his moderate pragmatism of the 1960s. After all, the new decade required a new approach and, unsurprisingly, Demirel was there to fulfill the expectations of the times.

After receiving the notification of the commanders in the early morning of 12 September, Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit found themselves in a military camp in Hamzakoy, near Gelibolu. While expecting treatment similar to the example of 27 May, Demirel and Ecevit were treated kindly by the officers in the camp. During his obligatory residence, Demirel spent his time reading books and newspapers and taking notes (Altuğ, 1993, p. 61). He was allowed to phone his contacts in Ankara, but the line was tapped and the recordings were regularly sent to the National Security Council Headquarters (Altuğ, 1993, p. 58). Thus, Demirel started to use these phone calls as a tool for sending messages. Yavuz Donat mentioned that Demirel used the same method even while talking to his brothers. Instead of answering the caller's questions, he was discussing Turkey's problems without forgetting to emphasize that military movements could only exacerbate the situation (Donat, 1993, p. 14). He refused to accept visitors

as he thought it would legitimize his detention, which he described as illegitimate (Donat, 1993, p. 16). After spending almost a month in Hamzaköy, Demirel and Ecevit were released and returned to Ankara on 11 October. When they came back, they saw that political climate had changed in the capital since 12 September.

In order to realize their objectives, the commanders focused immediately on the removal of old institutions. The parliament was dissolved and control passed to the hands of the National Security Council, which was comprised of high-ranking commanders. The leader of the junta, Kenan Evren, was declared the Chief-of-State on 14 September. On 18 September, nearly a week after the military intervened, Evren became officially the Chief-of-State by taking an oath in the parliament with the other members of the NSC (*Milliyet*, 19 September 1980). Then, the council started seeking a new prime minister and a government. Turhan Feyzioğlu was the first name that the commanders thought of, but they agreed on Former Admiral Bülent Ulusu, who was later appointed to the diplomatic mission at Vatican. Since the economy was a major concern for the council, they decided to continue with Turgut Özal who was seen as the architect of the 24 January decisions. Accordingly, he was assigned as the Deputy Prime Minister. Although he was in custody in Hamzakoy, Süleyman Demirel played an important role behind the scenes in both decisions. In an interview with Mehmet Ali Birand, he accepted such a role by claiming that he expressed his positive opinion for Bülent Ulusu via Kemal Ilıcak, the owner of pro-JP newspaper *Tercüman*. Moreover, he admitted that Özal called him to obtain his blessing for the post in the cabinet. Demirel supported him by emphasizing that he would not like to see the state harmed (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 192–193). He sent a message to Kenan Evren suggesting him to protect Özal. The message was delivered via business tycoon, Vehbi Koç, and it also advised the council to hand the power back to a civil administration as

soon as possible (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 199). The reason behind his support for Özal could be pragmatic since Demirel might see Özal as a temporary actor who would stay loyal to him. The government of Ulusu was declared on 21 September and the first cabinet meeting convened the following day. After the meeting, Ulusu argued that his primary objective was the prevention of violence acts. He emphasized that the application of stability measures, which aimed to regulate and develop the country's economy, would be carried on meticulously (*Milliyet*, 22 September 1980). Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank continued to support the new administration. By emphasizing that the IMF was not a political entity, the officials from the organization announced that the credit flow to Turkey would continue as was projected in the stand-by agreement (*Milliyet*, 17 September 1980). While arguing that its economic policy was dictated from Washington, Feroz Ahmad suggested that the new administration adopted a foreign and military policy in parallel with the interests of the West in the region in order to compensate the negative effects of the Iranian Revolution (Ahmad, 1993, p. 183). In the meantime, the NSC aimed to depoliticize the country via several methods such as the dissolution of some trade unions from both political camps, the closure of political parties or controlling the universities through the creation of the Council of Higher Education.

Despite the preclusion of the administration, the leaders continued to carry on implicitly their political activities after their release from Hamzakoy. On 30 October, Bülent Ecevit announced he had resigned from the general presidency of the RPP. In his biography on Ecevit, Mustafa Çolak argued that Ecevit tendered his resignation as he thought that writing and speaking would be easier for an ordinary citizen (Çolak, 2016, p. 216). In other words, he wanted to rid himself from the pressure of being the leader of the RPP. However, such resignation brought Ecevit and his partisans to an

impasse and later a dichotomy that would last until the 2000s. After his resignation, he continued to criticize 12 September under the aegis of *Arayış*, a magazine he founded after the intervention. While Ecevit criticized the regime directly, Süleyman Demirel preferred a more implicit way. From the day that he returned from Hamzakoy, his apartment in Güniz Sokak became an important political landmark in Ankara. Meanwhile, the military regime was also following Demirel's activities. In an interview, Kenan Evren claimed that they were aware of his actions but they did not really know what was going on. "Demirel was sneaky, he was doing things under our nose" added Evren (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 203). As a consequence of his covert activities, Demirel was invited to the command headquarters building to give testimony. When the general in charge admonished him for the situation, he replied by claiming he had been in the business of politics for 25 years. He added that his visitors were friends and together they were a big family and emphasized that he would never be involved in anything illegitimate (Turgut H. , 1987, p. 149). Hulusi Turgut wrote that the number of daily visitors varied between 50 and 150 for the seven years following 12 September. Yet, this number increased to 500 or 1000 persons on some special days (Turgut H. , 1987, p. 149). Despite the interest and support of the citizens from different parts of the country, Demirel was uncomfortable as his hands were politically tied. Yavuz Donat, who was among his inner circle during the period, said that he started to calculate the number of cubes in a kilogram of sugar or the number of olives in a kilogram of olives out of sheer boredom. Donat argued that being stuck between four walls was difficult for someone like Demirel who was used to a dynamic lifestyle (Donat, 1993, p. 25). After putting up with such pressure for almost seven months, he broke his silence in Ankara, in a dinner organized by a fellow countryman association from Samsun. Towards the end of the night, he gave a speech in which he

compiled all the plans his government projected for Samsun before the military intervention. Demirel advised his crowd to be patient while claiming that the God would grant him the chance to bring all of these services to Samsun (Donat, 1993, p. 28). Although Demirel said that his decision to give a speech on that night was no different than failed brakes, he might have wanted to test the patience of the martial law commanders. Donat, who wrote the story in his column on the next day, argued that Demirel called him immediately to learn if any reaction had come from the administration (Donat, 1993, p. 29). Even though the commanders remained silent at first glance, the response came three days later. On 2 June, the NSC issued the Manifesto No. 52, which abolished the right of speech and delivering written statements for former politicians (*Milliyet*, 3 June 1981). The commanders saw them as the main cause of the process that led the country to 12 September and so they wanted to erase them from the political scene.

When it came to implementing the manifesto, Bülent Ecevit was jailed as a result of an article published in his magazine. Demirel remained silent against the decision since he was struggling to live to fight another day. That could be another pragmatic action as he was waiting for the right time. He continued to host his guests from different parts of the country in his house. Although his aim was to keep the JP organization alive, the real shock came almost four months later. On 16 October, Kenan Evren announced the abolition of all former political parties. Evren announced that the assets belonging to these parties would be immediately sequestered by the Treasury (*Milliyet*, 17 October 1981). That was not only the end of prominent parties like the JP and RPP, but it was also the first time since its foundation that Turkey had no single active political party. Yet, Süleyman Demirel decided to stay firm against the decision. Later, in an interview, he said, “I never believed that nothing could be over in

politics. No single thing… Do you know when politics end? When you lose your cause"[26] (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 207). So he immediately focused on the formation of a new political party. Yavuz Donat wrote that Demirel put his assistant Talat Polat in a room at Güniz Sokak to form a new political party. Polat immediately started to send letters and cards with Demirel's greetings to members of the party organizations all around the country (Donat, 1993, p. 33). While some of these members refused to answer Demirel as they were scared, some others proffered to stand next to him. For instance, Donat mentioned that Halit Narin, a pro-JP businessman of the 1970s, gave the keys of his two Kızılay apartments to support Demirel's political activities (Donat, 1993, p. 33).

While Süleyman Demirel was struggling to remain in the political scene, the NSC aimed to create a new regime. In order to do that, they formed a constituent assembly where technocrats replaced politicians. The assembly was comprised mainly of lawyers, academics and retired officers alongside five members of the NSC (*Milliyet*, 16 October 1981). None of the new members were elected. On the opening day, Kenan Evren gave a speech in which he emphasized that their main focus was to draft up a new constitution. He argued that the main reason behind the decision to shut down political parties was to provide the parliament a pressure-free environment (*Milliyet*, 24 October 1981). In line with Evren's speech, the Constitutional Commission started to work the following month. Towards the end of the year, Evren finally announced the calendar for a return to democracy. While setting the date of referendum for the new constitution as of November 1982, he foresaw elections to be held in the autumn of 1983. Evren's statement was welcomed by the West, and most

[26] "Siyasette hiçbir zaman bir şeyin bittiğine kani olmadım. Hiçbir şeyin ama... Ne zaman biter siyaset biliyor musunuz? Davanızı yitirdiğiniz zaman."

ambassadors responded positively by emphasizing that such a declaration reassured trust for both local and foreign institutions (*Milliyet*, 31 December 1981).

The draft of the constitution took shape during the first half of 1982 and the final version was ready for a referendum by the end of October. Since it was prepared under a military regime, its main concern was to prevent threats that could lead to instability. Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Gençkaya, who viewed it as a missed opportunity to create political institutions with broad consensus, argued that the NSC intended a major restructuring of the democracy to prevent the polarization, violence and deadlock that troubled the country in the previous decade (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009, p. 19). In order to do that, the constitution gave broader authority to institutions such as the Presidency or the NSC, while it handed the control of the universities to the Council of Higher Education. What concerned Süleyman Demirel and other former politicians was the article that banned the right to get involved in politics for ten years. While constructing a new regime, the generals did not forget the former politicians whom they saw as liable for the disorder and chaos. According to the Provisional Article 1 of the constitution, Kenan Evren would become President. The referendum integrated both the constitution and presidential election within the same ballot. Although that was an unprecedented action, being democratic was not among the concerns of the generals. The citizens went to the polls on 8 November and the percentage of ayes was 91.4% with an electoral turnout of 91.3% (TÜİK, 2008, p. 2). The numbers were also a surprise for the commanders. As a matter of fact, Kenan Evren, who became President after the referendum, claimed that the results were a surprise for him, as he predicted the percentage of ayes would be around 80–85% (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 254). According to Özbudun and Gençkaya, the referendum had highly dubious democratic legitimacy as the members of the NSC

implied that the regime would continue indefinitely in case of the draft was rejected (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009, p. 20). In other words, the threat of the council seemed to serve its purpose at least in the ballot box.

In the meantime, Süleyman Demirel and his inner circle did not support the constitution draft. That inner circle consisted of folks such as Sadettin Bilgiç, who had been expelled from the JP in 1970. As a twist of fate, at that time, the group so called under-oaths was against Demirel since they believed his time had passed. Nazlı Ilıcak argued that after the Constitution, Demirel and that group drifted apart for good (Ilıcak, 2012, p. 72). Although Demirel retreated into silence after the results of the referendum, such attitude could be considered as part of his cautious character that preferred to wait and see during the times of major transition. Only days after the referendum, he told Hasan Cemal that the reason for his silence was not his fear of the military administration. But instead he argued,

> "Nobody can call me a coward. If I am not making an open remark at the moment, it is not because I am afraid of the military administration. Timing is important. Time and ground are important. One has to choose it carefully"[27] (Cemal, 1986, p. 426).

Such words constitute an important example in terms of reflecting Süleyman Demirel's pragmatism. The right moment that he sought came in early 1983. In his new year's address, Kenan Evren announced they were expecting to achieve targets during the same year. Among the five targets presented by Evren, the transition to a parliamentary system held an important place (*Milliyet*, 1 January 1983). His words were a clear signal showing the military regime's intention on returning to multi party-politics. Therefore, the head of the constitutional commission, Orhan Aldıkaçtı proclaimed that

[27] "Kimse bana korkaksın diyemez. Şu anda açık bir çıkış yapmıyorsam, askeri yönetimden korktuğum için değildir. 'Timing' önemli. Zaman ve zemin önemli. Dikkatli seçmek gerek."

the foundation of new parties could be possible the following March (*Milliyet*, 16 January 1983).

However, the record result in the referendum encouraged politicians to step up their involvement in the politics. This could be done by forming a state party that would catch voters from different political factions. The military's first choice was Bülent Ulusu, who served as a prime minister immediately after the military coup. Compared to his peers, Ulusu could be considered as a relatively moderate figure. After testing the waters, he understood a political party would not be successful without Süleyman Demirel's support. Therefore, he sent a message to Demirel with Sadettin Bilgiç. He wanted to meet Demirel in order to get not only his blessing, but also his support for his party. Demirel responded his request by claiming,

> "I would gladly meet Bülent Pasha. If they invite me, I would go to his office at the prime ministry. But I would not go there secretly through the back door. And at the end of the meeting, if a journalist asks questions, I would say that I came here upon the invitation of the prime minister and we talked about several national issues"[28] (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 69).

That was a kind response had Demirel not been banned from politics, but under existing circumstances, it meant that Ulusu became the tool of a leader who should not have been involved in any political activity. Demirel might have wanted to avoid looking like someone who was ready to cooperate with the army. In parallel with such a claim, he said in an interview that, in the past, both sides were tainted from the formula of the RPP plus the army was equal to political power. He also argued that the same perception, the JP plus the army would be just as damaging (Ilıcak, 2012, p. 78). It is worth noting that while referring to the past, Demirel did not mention his

[28] "Bülent Paşa ile memnuniyetle görüşürüm. Davet ederler, Başbakanlık makamına giderim. Öyle arka kapılardan falan girmem. Çıkarken de gazeteciler sorarsa; 'Sayın Başbakan'ın daveti üzerine geldim. Çeşitli memleket meseleleri görüştük' derim."

cooperation with the 12 March regime which resulted with a serious decline in the JP's votes in the elections of 1973. In other words, although his attitude looked like principle action at first glance, Demirel's earlier actions showed that he could cooperate with everyone as long as he saw benefits in it. Besides, Demirel preferred to remain silent against the executions and tortures during the post-12 September period.

After a series of meetings in April 1983, Bülent Ulusu gave up the idea of forming a political party. That was a disappointment for Kenan Evren as he saw that even a banned Süleyman Demirel could still influence the political scene. Hence, the commanders started to look for a new candidate. Towards the end of April, another retired general, Turgut Sunalp, stepped into the arena to lead a political party. Upon his arrival in Ankara, he immediately gave the message that the party he intended to form would not be a continuation of Bülent Ulusu's objectives. Sunalp's underlying message was that he would not be meeting with former political leaders during the process of forming his party (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 73). New parties started to emerge immediately after the ban on political activity was lifted on 24 April. After the approval by the council, Turgut Sunalp founded the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), which aimed to attract voters on the right spectrum. The left version of the NDP was the Populist Party (PP), which was led by another retired general, Necdet Calp. The members of the military junta believed that they would continue to control the political life due to the success of these parties and after being encouraged by the approval rate of the new constitution.

While the commanders were busy designing the future politics of the country, the civilians were also planning to form their political parties. One of them was Turgut Özal, who had already resigned from the government in July 1982 prior to the referendum. In an interview, Kenan Evren said that Özal came to him to get his

permission. While Evren responded with a reluctant 'yes,' he also emphasized they would shut down the party if Özal attempted to nominate former members of parties like the NSP or the NAP (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 258). After reassuring Evren that his party would not be the continuation any previous ones, he founded the Motherland Party. Turgut Özal's MP was situated in the center as Özal himself declared he represented all political tendencies that had existed before the military intervention. Another advantage of the party was the support provided to him by the West. As the architect of the 24 January decisions, he had already built good relations with financial circles in the West. Even so, Turgut Özal was seen as an underdog since everyone believed that the voters would support the parties of the military regime.

However, Süleyman Demirel had some doubts about the victory of the parties backed by the regime. Right after the lifting of the ban on politics, Demirel came to realize his project, which was named after an ideal he used in his speeches since the 1970s: the Grand Turkey Party (GTP). Even though the name of the party was ready, the rest was uncertain due to the difficulties caused by the regime. First of all, Demirel was banned from politics at the time and he had to find a leader for his party. Moreover, this person had to be someone who had the junta's approval. So they tried Celal Bayar, who was seen as the natural leader of the Right. According to Nazlı Ilıcak, it was Demirel who insisted on Bayar, as he believed that he could be a catalyst during the process. In order to convince him, they met at dinner on 4 May. At first, Bayar seemed to accept the proposal, but later he rejected it asserting that he was too old to lead a new political party (Ilıcak, 2012, p. 102). Yet Ilıcak argued that age might not have been the only concern for Bayar, as he already had a falling out with the former JP members on the nature of 12 September. In order to support her claims, Ilıcak quoted Bayar's words that claimed,

> "12 September was a military coup just like 27 May. However, in my opinion, the country was saved, thanks to that operation. If 12 September had not been carried out, sooner or later, we would had seen hammers and sickles in the streets of the major cities of Turkey" (Ilıcak, 2012, p. 104).

It was clear that Bayar had his own interpretation of the issue and such understanding did not match Demirel's interests. It can be argued that Bayar and Demirel's different point of views reflected their approaches concerning the process. While Bayar had a positive opinion on the military intervention since his fear of the left was genuine, Demirel saw 12 September as a train crash which he would like to leave behind with minimum damage.

After the negative response from Bayar, Süleyman Demirel and the former JP members continued to look for a leader for the party. When Turgut Sunalp's name was tabled, Demirel remained reluctant. They agreed on Ali Fethi Esener who was a retired pro-JP general. Initially, Esener seemed like a reasonable choice. Not only was he a well-respected former general, but also a friend and a senior of Kenan Evren according to the military hierarchy. Nevertheless, Evren was against the attempt. He invited Esener to Çankaya so as to convince him not to found the party and to act in concert with Sunalp instead (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 231). He threatened to shut down his party (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 257). Yet, Esener resisted and founded the Grand Turkey Party on 20 May, the same day Özal founded the MP (*Milliyet*, 21 May 1983). During the following days, former JP deputies joined the new party. The interest shown in the party resulted with the reaction of the NSC and on 31 May, just 11 days after its foundation, the party was shut down by the Manifesto No. 79 of the Council. The decision not only dealt with the shutting down of the GTP, but also convicted 16 politicians from both the right and left wings as well. The list comprised of prominent

figures from the JP, the RPP, and it included Süleyman Demirel[29] (*Milliyet*, 1 June 1983). The day following the decision, Kenan Evren gave a speech in Çorum in which he blamed the old politicians whose goal was to divide the army. According to Evren, those people used Ali Fethi Esener to cause dissent within the military. He asserted that they would prefer to start out with people who did not carry vengeance in their luggage (*Milliyet*, 2 June 1983). Evren's words were important in terms of signaling the NSC's hostility against the former names. Under these conditions, Demirel chose not to resist against the orders of the council since he might have wanted to wait for the right time.

The departure of Süleyman Demirel was not only a huge relief, but also marked an opportunity for newcomers. Turgut Özal was the one who breathed a sigh of relief after the elimination of his main adversary. Hulusi Turgut quoted Özal, suggesting that the MP could be the winner of the elections had the GTP had been shut down by the Council. Moreover, Özal argued that his party would have difficulty crossing the election threshold of 10% in case the GTP remained open (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 145). On the other hand, there were also other newcomers who wanted to benefit from Demirel's mandatory departure. One of them was Head of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, Mehmet Yazar. In an interview with Yavuz Donat, Demirel predicted that Yazar might make a move during his absence. He continued his words by "Mehmet will try to replace me. Everyone knows him as our guy. He will take advantage of that and venture into politics. He will set up a party". When Donat asked Demirel about Yazar's chance of success, he replied that he did not stand a chance. Demirel did not trust Yazar, viewing him as someone who was in cooperation with the army. He asserted that he would crash the Union of Chambers

[29] The list included Süleyman Demirel, Ali Naili Erdem, Ekrem Ceyhun, Sadettin Bilgiç, Nahit Menteşe, Yiğit Köker, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil from the JP, Sırrı Atalay, Metin Tüzün, Celal Doğan, Deniz Baykal, Ferhat Aslantaş, Süleyman Genç, Yüksel Çakmur from the RPP, Hüsametin Cindoruk and Mehmet Gölhan from GTP.

upon his head if he made such a move (Donat, 1993, p. 72). As Demirel foresaw earlier, Mehmet Yazar stepped into the scene by mentioning the expectations for a new political party on the right, only two weeks after Demirel's departure for Zincirbozan (*Milliyet*, 16 June 1983). Such developments were the result of the belief that Süleyman Demirel's political life was finally over.

However, Süleyman Demirel had no intention of giving up. As a matter of fact, he began to draw the outline of a new political party on the way to Çanakkale with his close friends, Necmettin Cevheri and İsmet Sezgin. Sadettin Bilgiç and Nahit Menteşe were also in the car. Along the way, Demirel advised Cevheri and Sezgin to start the foundation of the party immediately. He said,

> "Millions that trusted us should not be abandoned. Political involvement might be banned, but guidance is free. Now, there is a big vacuum. Our friends who will set up the new party should name it 'True Path.' That is *As-Sirat al Mustaqim*[30] from the Quran"[31] (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 251).

Although the first name that came to mind was the 'National Will Party,' they agreed upon 'True Path' thanks to its easier pronunciation in Turkish (Altuğ, 1993, p. 109). After their return to Ankara, Sezgin and Cevheri took immediate action and the True Path Party was founded on 23 June 1983 under the chairmanship of Former Minister of Agriculture from the JP, Ahmet Nusri Tuna. However, the main agenda of the summer of 1983 was the NSC vetoes. Thus, on 7 July, the council vetoed 30 of the 34 founding members of the True Path Party. Even though the list included Ahmet Nusri Tuna, new members replaced the old ones without losing time. That time, Yıldırım Avcı, who was

---

[30] *As-Sirat al Mustaqim* can be translated as 'the straight way'. In the Quran, the term is described as the right path or the middle way that pleases God.

[31] "Bize inanan, güvenen milyonlar sahipsiz kalmamalı. Siyaset yapmak yasak ama yol göstermek de yasak değil ya... Şimdi, büyük bir boşluk doğdu. Yeni parti kuracak arkadaşlarımız partinin adını Doğru Yol koysunlar. Bu Kur'an-ı Kerim'deki Sır-at-i müstakimdir."

a member of the Constituent Assembly, became the Chairman. Nonetheless, the council once again vetoed almost half of the new members (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 328-329). The vetoes continued for more rounds until 24 August when the council announced that the TPP could not participate in the upcoming elections, as it did not meet the necessary requirements. According to Süleyman Demirel, such a decision was the result of the unequal and unfair attitude of those who controlled the power of the state (Turgut H. , 1987, p. 170). Yet, the aim of the decision was not only Demirel and the TPP. All political parties except the NDP, the PP and Turgut Özal's MP were left out of the electoral race.

While the NSC aimed to shape the political scene in Ankara, the detained politicians continued to criticize the council via letters. Süleyman Demirel, for instance, wrote a letter in which he emphasized the lawlessness of their detention. Demirel argued,

> "Zincirbozan could neither detach us from our beliefs nor from Turkey. It is the constitution, the right and justice that had been put in jail under the bars of Zincirbozan. Remaining silent against injustice is no different than being a part of it. So the need to express our opinions was the result of that belief."[32]

Demirel ended his letter by claiming that he would seek refuge in God and in the nation (Arzık, 1986, p. 44). Alongside personal efforts, the detainees issued a joint declaration to Edward Mortimer from The Times. Their statement was published on 9 August under the exact title of "Interned leaders denounce Turkey's poll as fraud." While pointing the injustice of the elections, the leaders compared Turkey's situation with that in Poland, emphasizing that their fight for democracy resembled the resistance of Lech Walesa. The conclusion of the letter underlined the impossibility of

[32] "Zincirbozan bizi ne Türkiye'den ne de inançlarımızdan koparamaz. Zincirbozan'da tel örgü içine konan bizler değil, Anayasa, hak, hukuk ve adalettir. Haksızlık ve adaletsizlik karşısında sessiz kalmak ona ortak olmak demektir. Görüşlerimizi dile getirmek ihtiyacı bu inançtan doğmuştur."

holding free and honest elections in a system where the votes were divided among people chosen by the generals (Turgut H. , 1986, p. 273). The declaration was delivered secretly to several journalists from Zincirbozan and unsurprisingly, its publication drew a rebuff by the NSC. As a result, there was a clampdown on the number of visitors and telephone calls of the detainees (Çavuşoğlu, 2007, p. 198).

However, the detainees struggled to find new methods of communication. In order to maintain timely contact with Ankara, Demirel corresponded with Nazlı Ilıcak who wrote a column in *Tercüman* newspaper. In fact, it was Ilıcak who started such correspondence on 15 June. In her first letter, she mentioned her disappointment with the ongoing developments in Ankara. While she was not expecting any response, Demirel replied to her on 19 June. In his first letter, he gave the signal of his new party by claiming,

> "We said unity and integrity. We said flag and the call to prayer. That was the true path. The aim of each Turkish nationalist should be the making of a Grand Turkey. We wanted a Turkey that had everything, with citizens who shared common values, a Turkey that could do anything under the guidance of the national conscience that could say whatever he or she thought. That was the True Path. That was the path leading to the Great Turkey"[33] (Ilıcak, 1990, p. 18).

As time progressed, Nazlı Ilıcak became the unofficial voice of Süleyman Demirel. When Evren attacked him in his speeches, Demirel responded via letters in which he blamed the NSC by using the armed forces in order to secure its position in power. According to Demirel, not only was it sinful, but it also had bad forebodings for Turkey (Ilıcak, 1990, p. 63). In another letter, he argued that Turkey had once been

[33] "Birlik ve bütünlük dedik. Bayrak ve ezan dedik. Bu doğru yoldu. Her Türk *Milliyet*çisinin hedefi, bir Büyük Türkiye yapmak olmalı idi. Her şeyi olan, insanları müşterek değerlere sahip, milli şuurun rehberliğinde, her istediğini yapabilen, her düşündüğünü söyleyebilen bir Türkiye'miz olsun istedik. Bu doğru yoldu. Büyük Türkiye'ye giden yoldu bu."

among 23 developed states—except India—that had parliamentary regimes. While calling that group of countries as the premier league, he admitted that Turkey was relegated to a lower division because of the military coup (Ilıcak, 1990, p. 48). Demirel used the metaphor of 'carthage' several times, suggesting, “Carthage will eventually collapse and the victory will ultimately be the nation’s” (Ilıcak, 1990, p. 166). He used this correspondence to send messages to his supporters. When it became official that only three parties would be in the election race, he invited his supporters to vote by using blank or invalid ballots. Another solution proposed by Demirel was the nomination of independents so as to prevent a result similar to constitutional referendum (Ilıcak, 1990, p. 159). Although initially it looked like a principled stance, such an approach constituted one of the few examples where acting in line with the principles was beneficial for Süleyman Demirel.

Alongside such efforts to communicate with the outer world, daily life at Zincibozan was similar to that of boarding school. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil mentioned that Süleyman Demirel woke up early in the morning, put on his suit and went to the cafeteria for breakfast. He spent the rest of the day working in his cell until the end of the day (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 263). Besides working in his office, he participated in seminars organized by other guests of the camp. The main aims were; to determine factors that caused the crisis in Turkey, and to come up with solutions for them. Specific issues like energy or foreign policy were discussed and the specialist of the subject gave a presentation. For instance, while Deniz Baykal made his presentation on energy, Çağlayangil gave a speech on foreign policy. In his memoirs, Çağlayangil mentioned that Süleyman Demirel was not only present at these seminars, but also made some concluding remarks at the end of each session (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 269). The most important contribution of Zincirbozan to Turkish politics might have been

the reconciliation of two different camps thanks to these seminars. Çağlayangil suggested that members belonging to different world perspectives saw their differences of opinion were negligible. He said, "There, we saw members of the RPP gave up their rigid statist approach. On the other hand, they saw we supported social justice." Çağlayangil added that he observed such change of aspect versus each other in prominent figures like Süleyman Demirel and Celal Doğan (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 268). In parallel with such claim, two years later, Hüsamettin Cindoruk asserted that the representatives of two opposing views came to an agreement in Zincirbozan and history was going to write that development in the future (*Milliyet*, 22 August 1985).

In the end, it was not only the politicians who established good relations at Zincirbozan at that time, the business community was there to support the old administrators as well. While Jak Kahmi sent a color television to the detainees, Vehbi Koç provided an air conditioner (Cılızoğlu, 2007, p. 264). Orhan Keçeli was responsible of the communication between the camp and the outer world. He visited Demirel three times in a week to inform him of the latest political developments (Taşkın, 2007, p. 86). Another regular visitor of Zincirbozan was Cavit Çağlar, who would later secure his place in Süleyman Demirel's inner circle. While introducing himself as the grandson of Çağlayangil, Çağlar was there almost every other day. In an interview, he said, "I was there when everyone was missing. That is how our dialogue developed. As time progressed, we became like father and son" (Altuğ, 1993, p. 120–121).

After spending almost four months at Zincirbozan, Süleyman Demirel and other politicians were released on 1 October. Once out, they saw the country was euphoric about the upcoming election. The elections were held on 6 November and Turgut Özal's Motherland Party was well ahead of the other two parties by obtaining

45.1% of the votes and 211 seats in the parliament. The PP and the NDP won 30.5% and 23.3% of the votes and 117 and 71 seats in the parliament respectively (TÜİK, 2012, p. 94–95). According to the results, the MP had the power to form a single-party government since it won the majority. That could be surprising for most of the citizens but was shocking for the commanders who witnessed a boost in their confidence after the constitutional referendum. In a television speech on 4 November, only two days before the elections, Kenan Evren had implicitly criticized Turgut Özal by Turgut Sunalp's request (Birand, Hikmet, & Akar, 1999, p. 272). The junta expected to integrate new faces into politics but such effort failed with the victory of the least desired option. Besides his relationship with Necmettin Erbakan's NSP during the 1970s, Özal was a man who built his reputation as Süleyman Demirel's bureaucrat and protégé. Still Demirel seemed not to have been stunned unlike the others. He argued there were three reasons that carried Özal to victory. Firstly, he was connected to himself. Secondly, he was not a soldier and, finally, he knew how to take advantage of the period between 1980 and 1982. He made good use of his title, television and domestic and foreign visits (Donat, 2005, p. 48). By all means, Turgut Özal seemed to consolidate the right, something that Demirel failed to do since the 1969 elections.

Yet Süleyman Demirel was aware that such success was the result of the absence of civilian leaders on the political scene. Moreover, his past experiences must have taught him that the right voter spectrum in Turkey was too broad for one single party to represent. Hence, he focused on getting his share. But the problem was the ban forbidding him from all political activity for ten years. Thus he continued to control the TPP behind the scenes. While doing that, his main objective was to maintain the organizational structure handed down from the JP. For this, he hosted thousands of delegates from all around the country in his apartment at Güniz Sokak. Another

method was correspondence. During 1984, Demirel wrote many letters not only to the members of its party organization but also to ordinary citizens (Donat, 1993, p. 127).

However, Süleyman Demirel's political presence was not limited to visits and correspondence. He wanted the TPP to get involved in the upcoming local elections. As state parties like the NDP and the PP failed in the general election, he believed his party would not only get the NDP's votes but it could also win votes in regions where the MP took the majority. But Turgut Özal also was aware of the risk. He wanted to prevent the TPP's participation in the elections in an implicit way by using the incomplete bureaucratic entanglements. On 4 January, he asserted they could not wait for other parties to be ready for the election (*Milliyet*, 5 January1984). However, the surprise came the next day when Özal set the date of 25 March for the elections (*Milliyet*, 6 January 1984). Even though the parties like the TPP or the Social Democratic Populist Party (SODEP) could participate to the polls, the short time allotted to organize put these parties into a tight position. The local elections were held on the exact date and the MP obtained 41.5% of the votes. Such a percentage was lower than previous elections but it was still good enough to secure the majority of the municipalities in the country including big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Another expected result was the failure of the regime-backed parties. The PP and the NDP won 8.7% and 7%, respectively. That was even lower than electoral threshold set by the new constitution. On the other hand, the SODEP performed well by obtaining 23.3% while the TPP came third with 13.2% (TODAİE, 2017). After having the results, Süleyman Demirel did not fall in despair. In order to explain his party's situation, he used the metaphor of a wounded bird that was expected to fly so soon. He argued that the TPP was a student humiliated by his teachers and one had to be patient to see him graduate at the top of the class. While underlining the financial problems,

Demirel claimed that the TPP was a mission party (Donat, 1993, p. 135). Although his emphasis on such characteristic of the TPP was significant, under the circumstances of the post-12 September process it was a reasonable move for Demirel to portray his party as a long-term project.

Although Süleyman Demirel was confident in carrying out such a mission, Turkey was still under the influence of its military regime. As a banned leader, Demirel did not have a chance to make himself heard by the crowds. Once more, he took a back seat in order to watch the developments as they transpired. Contrary to Demirel's silence, Turgut Özal became the Man of the Year 1984 (*Milliyet*, 31 December 1984). Under his administration, Turkey entered a significant process of transformation. Such change was not limited to economic liberalization since Özal also changed Turkey politically and socially. As the economy started to grow faster, a new class of bourgeoisie emerged in the country. While the old elite emphasized the importance of social welfare, justice and the state's obligation to guarantee these, the new elite talked only of how to make money and how best they could consume it (Ahmad, 1993, p. 209). As a result of the prominence of the free market, financial services became an important sector under the MP rule which would later accelerate the white-collar workers' emergence as a new class. Yet, these people were not only present in the private sector as Özal appointed them to key positions in the bureaucracy. They were mostly US-educated young fellows and the media called them the 'princes' of Özal. Thanks to the support of the prime minister and the military regime, they played an important role in the country's rapid transformation. Süleyman Demirel criticized Özal by going too quickly. In a conversation with Yavuz Donat, he argued that Özal would inevitably stumble, as he did not know how to apply the brake

(Donat, 2005, p. 59). In a short period of time, Demirel proved right as Özal started to lose popularity because of corruption and deterioration in the economy.

Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel was preparing to take steps that would accelerate his return to the politics. As the TPP congress approached, he wanted to manipulate the situation in order to keep the control of the party. The opposition he had to face came from Mehmet Yazar. Even before going to Zincirbozan, he predicted that Yazar would challenge his leadership sooner or later. But the TPP was Demirel's party and what he needed was a caretaker leader that would lead it until the right moment came. So he decided to support Hüsamettin Cindoruk who was a lawyer from his inner circle. Unlike Yazar, Cindoruk played an important role in the struggle of both the GTP and the TPP. On the other hand, Demirel believed that Yazar obeyed the generals blindly after 12 September (Donat, 2005, p. 133). In order to avert a possible Yazar victory, Demirel hosted the delegates from all around the country at his apartment so as to convince them to vote for Cindoruk (Donat, 1993, p. 159). Due to his persuasive skills, the newspapers started to call him as the coach of the TPP (*Milliyet*, 13 May 1985). The party congress was held on 14 May and Cindoruk defeated Yazar, obtaining 626 votes to 262. The following day, *Milliyet* used a headline arguing that the coach saved the pools coupon. The article underlined that Cindoruk was victorious due to the support of crucial men (*Milliyet*, 15 May 1985).

As the pressure of the military regime subsided, Süleyman Demirel started to become more visible on the political scene. During his holiday at his Tuzla summerhouse, he gave interviews in which he criticized Turgut Özal. The main focus of these critics was economic issues like inflation, income inequality and difficulties of the farmers (*Milliyet*, 11 August 1985). He argued that his struggle was not over yet as he still had things to say to the public (*Milliyet*, 18 August 1985). When Kenan Evren

criticized him in the opening day of the parliament, he asserted that he had the right of reply and issued a declaration of four pages. Demirel invited the rulers—as he referred to the council and the parliament—to lift the ban on politics in order to create a legitimate basis for discussion under the arbitration of the nation (*Milliyet*, 5 September 1985). Besides Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş also struggled to return to politics. While Ecevit founded the Democratic Left Party (DLP) under the general presidency of his wife, Demirel organized a tour that started from his homeland, Isparta. His visits were often under difficult conditions as he lacked necessary financial resources. Unlike the previous decade, he had to make his speeches on a table or chair. Moreover, these speeches were recorded by the local police in order to find some explicit content (*Milliyet*, 29 October 1985). However, that did not stop him from getting involved in daily political issues. By late 1985, an outsider who was not aware of the ban on politics would assume that Süleyman Demirel was the legitimate leader of a political party.

The year 1986 was the time the campaign against the political ban gained stream. Süleyman Demirel continued to challenge Turgut Özal for the leadership of the right. He used every opportunity to remain on the country's agenda. On 11 February for instance, he organized a reception for the 25th anniversary of the JP. Almost 4000 visitors were present and before long the reception became a huge show of force. The visitors shouted slogans like 'Süleyman the Magnificient,' 'Prime Minister' and finally *'Baba'* which means 'Father' in Turkish (*Milliyet*, 12 February 1986). The next day, Bedri Koraman depicted Demirel as an erupting volcano. Özal was there in the foothills, trying to hold together a shaking shanty house with a MP plate on it. (*Milliyet*, 13 February 1986) (See Appendix D). Meanwhile, the parties competed to catch the deputies of the NDP and the PP as both parties were expected to be out of the

parliament in the next election. The deputies of the NDP were shared among the MP, the TPP and the Free Democrat Party founded by Mehmet Yazar.

While the struggle to capture some chairs in the parliament remained, the parties turn their focus to the by-elections for the parliament. As the campaign process accelerated, the slogans of the parties came into the light. Özal's MP gave the message of stability to the citizens, whereas Demirel's TPP emphasized freedom (*Milliyet*, 13 August 1986). It was pragmatic of both parties since the former was in power as single party while the latter was the victim of a military intervention. Despite his ban, he was determined to get involved in the campaign. He argued that the case against him was not only dismissed, but also ignored by the people (Donat, 2005, p. 108). Demirel returned to the stage in Bafra on 11 September almost six years after the 12 September military takeover. When he asked, "Where were we?" the crowd went berserk (*Milliyet*, 12 September 1986). Süleyman Demirel was confident. In an interview with Yavuz Donat, Demirel used the metaphor of 'sick man' for Özal. Demirel stressed Özal's weakness by asserting that he could shake him with his first poke even though his hands were tied because of the ban. He claimed, "But in the second poke, in the second elections, I would drag him down" (Donat, 2005, p. 101). His confidence soon turned out to be true as the TPP came second after the MP by getting almost 23.5% of the votes. That was not only an obvious electoral success but it also was a message from the citizens to the parliament to lift the ban on politics. Demirel interpreted the results as a slap of the people to the government and he argued that the government should resign (*Milliyet*, 30 September 1986). Although Özal denied such a claim, he made changes in his cabinet by replacing some of his controversial ministers with fresh faces. It may be plausible to admit that the results of the by elections paved the way for old leaders to return to the legitimate political activity.

The year 1987 was the time the political scene started to normalize as there were developments signaling the return of the banned leaders. That could be assured by a constitutional amendment as the MP had the majority to do so. Bedrettin Dalan, the Mayor of Istanbul from the MP, mentioned that he pressured Özal to pass the amendment from the parliament, as it would be a wiser step to create a positive perception of his party (Dalan, 2016). Despite pressure from his own party, Özal remained reluctant and he preferred to take the issue to a referendum. As a twist of fate, Süleyman Demirel found himself in the position of the former democrats, as the process was similar to the one of 1969. While struggling to regain his rights, Turgut Özal referred to the past by asserting Demirel had no right to accuse the MP of being non-democratic. He argued that it was Demirel who stood against the amnesty of the former democrats (*Milliyet*, 20 June 1987). It can be argued that Özal's main aim was to eliminate the former leaders from the political scene for good. In order to achieve that, he did not hesitate to adopt a humiliating discourse. On 17 May, the parliament passed the required amendment and set 6 September as the date for the referendum. Although Özal did not often announce he was against the amnesty of the old leaders, he preferred to support the ''no' campaign via his advisors. For instance, Güneş Taner, a member of his inner circle, during the rallies, wore an orange T-shirt with 'no' on the front.

Turkey went to polls on 6 September and the ayes were slightly higher than the nays by 50.2% to 49.8% (TÜİK, 2008, p. 2). In the evening of the referendum, Turgut Özal announced on television that early elections would be held on next November (*Milliyet*, 7 September 1987). The main reason of such rush was the intention to prevent other parties from preparing for the elections. Even though the opposition parties did not like the idea at first glance, they did not have the option of losing time.

So the leaders started to take over their parties one by one. On 24 September, Süleyman Demirel was elected as the leader of the TPP after spending seven years in exile from politics (*Milliyet*, 25 September 1987), which marked another turning point in his political life as many people predicted that his political career had ended after 12 September.

After winning control of their parties, the opposition leaders tried to postpone the election so as to have a chance for a better organization. Although they succeeded on the issue of postponement, Turgut Özal managed to pass a law that would provide a serious advantage to his party in the upcoming elections. The attempts of Demirel and Ecevit to boycott the voting failed, as they could not convince İnönü to act together (*Milliyet*, 17 October 1987). According to the new law, the new date for the election was 29 November. Unlike the previous ones, the election campaign was relatively pale and quick since the opposition parties lacked both time and financial resources. Meanwhile, the MP used the advantage of being in power. Demirel's TPP constructed its rhetoric on the critique of the MP. While emphasizing unemployment, the high cost of living, and inequality, Demirel invited the citizens to put an end to the poor era (*Milliyet*, 16 November 1987). The election manifesto of his party was called 'The Program of Grand Turkey' and it invited citizens to get together for freedom, security and prosperity (DYP, 1987). During the 1960s and 1970s, Demirel enjoyed being the main party to win the votes of the mainstream right base. In order to do that, he revisited his moderate discourse of the 1960s, which can be interpreted as a return to moderate pragmatism. Yet, this new decade was different and required new qualities. As mentioned earlier, Turkey had been in a huge transformation under Turgut Özal's premiership. Feride Acar argued that the emergence of new urban classes in squatter areas of big cities and yuppies on the move seemed unimpressed by Süleyman

Demirel's rhetoric or personal charisma. In other words, the populist and conservative beliefs and values which were an asset during the 1960s and 1970s did not bode well with the qualitatively and quantitatively different ambitions and values of late generation urbanites, white collar workers or new liberal intellectuals. These people preferred to head towards the MP that had an alternative rightist rhetoric with a more daring nature (Acar, 1991, p. 191). In other words, at least until 1991, the TPP could not elude itself from being the party of rural masses as it failed to build up a rhetoric that would rally the poor urban masses (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 384). It turned out to be true since the TPP would obtain many of his deputies in the upcoming elections from Anatolian cities like Isparta, Manisa, Elazığ, and Samsun while failing to win a chair from Istanbul and Ankara (TÜİK, 2012, p. 18).

Turkey went to the polls on 29 November and the results showed the victory of Turgut Özal as his party came first by obtaining 36.3%. The SPP followed the MP by 24.8%. Süleyman Demirel's TPP was the third party that made it into the parliament with 19.2% (TÜİK, 2012, p. 93–94). Even though the percentages were relatively balanced, the distribution of the chairs in the parliament was definitely non-proportional as the MP got 292 seats, while the SPP and the TPP won 99 and 59, respectively (TÜİK, 2012, p. 93–94). That was the result of the amendments that Özal passed prior to the general elections. Although his party did not come first, the polls signalized an important achievement for Süleyman Demirel as he was the only one among the banned leaders who made it into the parliament. Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş all remained below the electoral threshold. Demirel interpreted the results as a positive step by claiming that they managed to enter into the parliament despite all the negativity. He added that the rest would come easily and quickly (Donat, 2005, p. 166). According to Demirel, his return to the political arena

was the result of his patience. In a conversation with Yavuz Donat, he emphasized that he made it slowly, step by step, without any rush (Donat, 2005, p. 180). Another example of his pragmatism was his attitude towards his old friends who turned their backs on him during the banned years. After the ban had been lifted, Demirel did not hesitate to cooperate with them. He managed to break with the past by dropping his grudges against them. According to him, setting things in order was the essential thing in politics. Thus, the door had to be left open to individuals if they intended to make a comeback (Donat, 2005, p. 171). Such an attitude was again a reflection of his pragmatism that helped him to return to politics.

While Süleyman Demirel consolidated his position, Turgut Özal was struggling to keep his seat that he occupied since 1984. Whether with the help of the electoral system or not, he was the absolute election winner according to the number of chairs in the parliament. This meant that he had to face the problems of the country such as a deteriorating economy and the Kurdish insurgence, which had long been delayed. To top it all, that time, his opponents were experienced politicians with genuine voter segments instead of the generals assigned by the NSC. Özal knew that the time was ticking against him. In order to prevent to be wiped out from the political scene, he aimed to move to the presidency. Kenan Evren's term was ending in November 1989. Since Özal was the leader of the party with majority in the parliament, he was the strongest civilian candidate for Çankaya. However, his majority was in jeopardy as the worsening conditions posed a direct threat to the MP. Hence, he wanted to amend the local elections to 1989, a year earlier so as to prevent a potential vote decline of his party.

Meanwhile Süleyman Demirel was aware of Turgut Özal's intention to move to Çankaya even though the latter avoided saying it explicitly. In a conversation with

Yavuz Donat, Demirel claimed that Özal was counting the days leading up to his move to Çankaya. He added that he would not show his true colors until the right time (Donat, 2005, p. 198). At first glance, it could be believed that Demirel was against such a move. Yet, thanks to his pragmatic character, he was on the verge of agreeing with Özal in terms of moving the elections to an earlier date. The compromise he asked was the amendment of the electoral law his party suffered from in the previous general elections. On 14 July, Demirel said he would support the constitutional amendment concerning the early election (*Milliyet*, 14 July 1988). However, he changed his mind in a short time by announcing he would not approve the early election if the parties in the parliament would not agree on the electoral law (*Milliyet*, 31 July 1988). Hence, the parliament decided to go to referendum by 284 votes. Demirel viewed this as an opportunity to manipulate the government. On the day of referendum decision, he asserted the government should resign if it failed to get the result it expected (*Milliyet*, 7 August 1988). Meanwhile, Turgut Özal gave messages arguing that he could leave the premiership and politics according to the results of the referendum (*Milliyet*, 19 September 1988).

The referendum for rescheduling local elections was held on 25 November 1988. According to the polls, the number of ayes was 35% while the nays were 65%. The electoral turnout was relatively high with a rate of 88.8% (TÜİK, 2008, p. 2). This was interpreted as a yellow light for Turgut Özal. His claim was based on the argument that 35% was slightly below 36.3%, the percentage of votes obtained by the MP in previous general elections (*Milliyet*, 26 August 1988). Yet, Demirel was critical. While asserting the nation had denied the government, he argued that an honest government would not spend another day in power after such results (*Milliyet*, 27 August 1988). It was a principled remark at first sight but Süleyman Demirel's political career was full

of occasions in which he preferred legality to legitimacy. Moreover, a fraction within the MP, the Holy Alliance comprised of nationalists and Islamists, put pressure on Özal as a result of the vote decrease (*Milliyet*, 28 September 1988). As mentioned before, Özal stated many times he consolidated three different fractions of the right and as time progressed, such unity became a severe issue within his party.

While the MP was facing the risk of cleavage, Süleyman Demirel focused on the consolidation of the right wing votes. After all, he was the right's principal leader since the mid 1960s and he wanted to reoccupy his place the army had taken from him (Ahmad, 1993, p. 202). On 11 November, he cited his three aims in an interview. First, he sought to prevent Turgut Özal's presidency. Second, he wanted to reopen the JP and, third, to increase the support for the TPP in urban areas. Demirel argued that Turgut Özal could not run for Çankaya if the MP's votes continued to slide (*Milliyet*, 11 November 1988). That was an important statement as such a drop in the local elections was almost inevitable due to worsening economic conditions.

The result of the local elections on 26 March was parallel with Süleyman Demirel's expectations. The MP obtained 21.8% of the votes while losing in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. That signaled a drop of almost 15% over previous general elections. The winner of the local elections was the SPP with 28.7% while Demirel's TPP came second with 25.1% (TODAİE, 2017). That was an important achievement for all parties except the MP, as almost all parties managed to increase their votes. On the day following the elections, Turgut Özal announced he was going to stay in power until 1992, i.e. the projected date of general elections. While asserting he got the message of the citizens, he claimed a big revision in his cabinet was about to transpire (*Milliyet*, 28 March 1989). Accordingly, five days after the local elections, he announced a new cabinet in which he sacked 12 ministers (*Milliyet*, 1 April 1989).

Özal might have carried out the revision to gain more popularity in order to secure his candidacy for Çankaya.

However, such changes were not enough to deal with the attacks of the opposition. From the day after the elections, Süleyman Demirel invited Özal to leave office. He argued that nobody could remain in power with just 20% public support (*Milliyet*, 28 March 1989). Without doubt, Demirel knew that Özal would not resign but wanted to put him under pressure so as to compel him to call for an early election. In a general meeting in the parliament, he called for elections by arguing,

> "Election is the solution; there is no other solution than renewing the election. It is not an early election, it is the renewal of the election. The people did not ask for early election, they say 'renew the election' and you are going to renew the election immediately. You are going to renew it as soon as possible" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 6 April 1989, p. 343).[34]

After all, the results of local elections showed a fragmentation on the right, which ended with Demirel's emergence as the principal leader. Starting from the morning of 27 March, he questioned the legitimacy of the MP by emphasizing several times that the MP could not make it into the parliament in case of early general elections. On 5 April, the TPP decided to propose a constitutional amendment that would let the holding of general and presidential elections in the autumn of 1989. The proposal also contained a direct presidential election by the people. While saying that the regime was at the losing end, Demirel argued that crisis was imminent if the system failed to find a solution (*Milliyet*, 6 April 1989). Although the opposition parties did not reach an agreement on a draft of the amendment, they continued to severely criticize the government on every occasion. For instance, the TPP boycotted the vote of

[34] "Seçim çaredir, seçimi yenilemekten başka çare yoktur. Bu, erken seçim falan da değil; bu seçimin yenilenmesidir. Millet erken seçim falan da istememiş, 'seçimi yenileyin' diyor ve seçimi bir an evvel yenileyeceksiniz. Mümkün olan en kısa zamanda yenileyeceksiniz."

confidence for the new cabinet on 11 April (*Milliyet*, 12 April 1989). During the summer of 1989, Demirel and İnönü attacked Özal, leaving him with no other option but to call for early elections. Demirel threatened him by saying that if the parliament intended to elect the president, they would definitely turn to the national will by resigning from the parliament (*Milliyet*, 11 June 1989). One may suggest that it was pragmatism again what made Demirel the 'guardian of legitimacy'. In other words, he might have utilized the concept as a pretext in order to maximize his position vis-à-vis his opponent.

Despite resistance from the opposition, Turgut Özal finally announced his candidacy for Çankaya on 17 October (*Milliyet*, 18 October 1989). That could be considered as a smart move on his behalf since he was aware he would be wiped out from the political scene in an early election. Therefore, he relied on his majority. Süleyman Demirel immediately called on the SPP to resign from the parliament so as to leave Özal with no alternative (*Milliyet*, 21 October 1989). But again, the parties failed to co-operate and on 31 October, Turgut Özal was elected as the 8th President of the Republic of Turkey. Despite the boycott of the SPP and the TPP during all tours, Özal managed to secure his place to Çankaya via the votes of the deputies of his own party.

From the first day following his election, Turgut Özal did not hesitate to say that he was going to be a different type of president. While arguing the claim that there were stereotypes for Turkish presidents, he suggested that he did not fit the existing template (*Milliyet*, 2 November 1989). In parallel with his claims, he adopted a pro-active approach. For instance, he supported Yıldırım Akbulut during the leadership struggle in the MP, as he wanted a low-profile prime minister who would not take a stand against him. On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel was aware of Özal's intention

to control the new government. However, he claimed that such control would not last long as Akbulut would eventually resist the pressure from Çankaya (Donat, 2005, p. 222). Another example of Özal's pro-active approach was his attitude during the Gulf Crisis that began in August 1990. From the first days of the crisis, Özal adopted a pro-American policy in order to obtain a favorable position after the end of the war. He bypassed the government and the parliament by engaging in telephone diplomacy directly with the White House (Ahmad, 1993, p. 200). Although such attitude was appreciated by the United States, it drew reaction not only from the opposition but from the Turkish Army as well.

After Turgut Özal's move to Çankaya, Süleyman Demirel preferred to maintain his distance from him. After all, his main objective was going to early elections as soon as possible and mincing words with Özal would not help him attain his goal. When the Kurdish insurgence heated up around March 1990, he decided to participate in the summit in Çankaya alongside with other leaders despite objections lodged within his party. Demirel justified his decision by claiming he was going to Çankaya in response to a state invitation, not that of some ordinary person. Although the summit ended with messages of unity against terrorism, other problems such as early elections remained unresolved. After the summit, Demirel announced once more that holding early elections would be the most efficient solution to extinguishing the fire that surrounded the country (*Milliyet*, 3 April 1990). During the following months, he used every occasion to oblige the government to take the election decision. Finally, the opportunity came to him in June 1991 after the MP congress. Certain aspects such as the failure of Özal's foreign policy, the deteriorating economy and the Kurdish insurgence in the southeastern provinces had already corroded the government. The delegates saw Mesut Yılmaz as a new hope that would reverse the process of collapse

of their party. Yılmaz was aware that time was ticking against the MP because of the worsening economy. Hence, on 14 August, he announced that the elections would be held in October.

The campaign for the 1991 elections was one of the most colorful ones in the history of Modern Turkey, as it witnessed the competition of many prominent politicians. Alongside traditional leaders such as Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş, relative newcomers like Erdal İnönü and Mesut Yılmaz were also present in the electoral struggle. According to the public opinion poll of KONDA, Demirel's TPP seemed to be the favorite of the upcoming elections by a 26% projected vote rate (*Milliyet*, 19 August 1991). In a comprehensive election manifesto called 'A New Turkey on the morning of 21 October', the party promised to rebuild the state of law, to assure economic stability, solve education problems, create the social state, deal with corruption of the past and limit bloodshed (DYP, 1991, p. 303–315). Unlike the previous manifestos of the JP and the TPP, there was also a strong emphasis on issues like human rights, and press freedom. Moreover, the manifesto combined a commitment to a genuine free market economy with the promise of an extensive list of social welfare provisions (Cizre, 1996, p. 148). While picturing the Turkey of the 2000s, the TPP promised to solve the problems caused by the administrations of the previous 11 years (DYP, 1991, p. 327). As the election campaign progressed, the promises of the leaders became more assertive. For instance, Süleyman Demirel claimed his first aim after the elections would be removing Turgut Özal from Çankaya (*Milliyet*, 27 August 1991). After such claims, Özal immediately attacked Demirel, claiming he was making a fool of the citizens with unreasonable promises (*Milliyet*, 21 September 1991). Such promises were really interesting as they

included bringing down inflation to below 10% in 500 days or two keys, including a house and a car for each citizen (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 382).

The election was held on 20 October. In parallel with many public opinion polls, the TPP came first with 27% and 178 chairs in the parliament. The MP and the SPP won 24% and 20.8%, respectively, by obtaining 115 chairs. Moreover, Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party and Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party managed to get into the parliament by winning 16.9% and 10.8% (TÜİK, 2012, p. 93). It is worth mentioning that the existing election law was to a detriment to small parties. However, leaders such as Alparslan Türkeş or Hatip Dicle succeeded by cooperating with major parties such as the WP and the SPP, respectively.

The results of the 1991 elections showed a coalition, and all eyes turned on Süleyman Demirel as the leader of the leading party. After all, he once again became the prominent figure of the political scene. It was mainly the victory of pragmatism since he obtained that place due to his patience and his ability to adapt himself to changing conditions. For instance, he partially managed to win the votes of urban communities that had a tendency to vote for the MP by including names like Tansu Çiller or Ersin Faralyalı in the party congress in 1990 (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 384). That was a wise move in parallel with the transformation of Turkish society during the post-12 September process. After the official results, Süleyman Demirel went to Çankaya to get the task of forming the government. While a lot of people expecting a coalition among the parties on the right, Demirel preferred to stand aloof since he did not want to create the perception that he was after another Nationalist Front government. He could go to the MP, but the two parties were at each other's throat due to the harsh rhetoric during the election campaign. Unlike the examples of the previous decades, Demirel turned to the SPP, the Social Democrats, in order to form a coalition

that was highly expected during the 1970s. Such a decision could be interpreted as the result of the mix of his pragmatism and experience in politics. While he became the prime minister, his coalition partner, Erdal İnönü was assigned to the post of Deputy Premier. Moreover, Demirel's choice of ministers was different than its previous governments since he replaced old politicians with new and young faces. Tansu Çiller was in the front line alongside businessmen like Cavit Çağlar and Mehmet Ali Yılmaz. His choices were immediately criticized by Hüsamettin Cindoruk as it did not reflect the political lines of the JP and the TPP (*Milliyet*, 27 November 1991). Even so, Demirel endured the criticism of his party organization.

The government enjoyed the support of 48% of the voters and it had the capacity to provide Turkey with stability and solutions to the country's many problems (Ahmad, 1993, p. 203). Then again, tension with Çankaya was also lessened thanks to steps taken by both Özal and Demirel. Since they were two pragmatic leaders, they might have known that holding a grudge against each other would not be beneficial for themselves. Moreover, the positive mood and the government's program were appreciated by the West, especially by the European Parliament thanks to emphasis on issues like human rights and democracy (*Milliyet*, 30 November 1991). According to Kemali Saybaşılı, as a result of the TPP-SPP coalition, Turkey managed to catch up with the era for the first time in its history. The era was the age of democracy (Saybaşılı, 1995, p. 49). It was a plausible argument since democracy was one of the main issues in the beginning of the 1990s following the fall of the Soviet Union. Within the same framework, Süleyman Demirel's adoption of the new rhetoric is important in demonstrating his pragmatism. As a Cold War right-winger, Demirel did not only manage to adapt himself to the new era, but also became one of its main actors.

One of the most important promises of the new government was finding a solution to the Kurdish question. In order to do that, Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü went to the region in early December. On 7 December, they came together with the public in Diyarbakır. The meeting soon turned out to be historical due to positive rhetoric adopted by both leaders. While İnönü highlighted a new era had begun in Turkey, Demirel argued,

> "We will look out for you and you should look out for us as well. Embrace your state, as the state is ready to embrace you as well. One can go nowhere by shedding blood. We are at your service. Let's throw a handful of soil to evil eyes" (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1991).[35]

He maintained his stance in the parliament by arguing, "We state it very clearly; every citizen of this country, Easterner, Westerner, Southerner, Northerner, they all will enjoy being a first class citizen" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 26 December 1991, p. 381).[36] Such optimism was actually the continuation of a process started by Turgut Özal during the Gulf Crisis. According to Murat Somer, the security issues in Northern Iraq and the rebellion led by the Kurdish Worker's Party pushed Özal to initiate conciliatory actions towards the Kurds as part of a more activist foreign policy in Northern Iraq. Such moves included an announcement by Özal which argued he was part Kurdish (Somer, 2004, p. 248). Within the same context, on the day following his speech in Diyarbakır, Süleyman Demirel announced in a meeting with the press that they recognized the Kurdish reality. He argued, "A person who speaks Kurdish or who claims that he has Kurdish origins is part of the Kurdish identity. Resisting this fact is

---

[35] "Biz size sahip çıkacağız. Siz de bize sahip olun. Devletinizi kucaklayın, devlet sizi kucaklamaya hazır. Kan dökerek bir yere varılmaz. Biz emrinizdeyiz. Gelin kem gözlere bir avuç toprak atalım."

[36] "Gayet açıklıkla söylüyoruz; bu memleketin bütün vatandaşları, doğulusu, batılısı, güneylisi, kuzeylisi, hepsi, birinci sınıf vatandaş olmanın keyfini sürecek."

no longer possible"[37]. Although Demirel's words reflected a change in state's approach to a chronic problem of the country, it soon turned out to be a missed opportunity for both parties. According to Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, one of the reasons for Demirel's failure to follow through his own initial political overture was the fact he was a traditional politician with no past to conceptualize the Kurdish issue as a distinct ethnic problem. Demirel's electoral campaign on democratization did not extend beyond criticizing of the 1980 military regime that had persecuted leaders including him. In other words, Demirel raised the expectations of Kurdish population with visits to the region but he was unwilling in terms of pushing through the required reforms (Barkey & Fuller, 1997, p. 69). It can be interpreted that Demirel's initial approach as pragmatic since it was a result of the coalition with the Social Democrats who pretended to be the voice of the citizens in the region. After all, the SPP was home for the prominent Kurdish politicians during the pre-election process. As time progressed, the worsening situation in the region became a major problem for his government.

However, the Kurdish insurgence was not the only issue Süleyman Demirel had to deal with. The assassination of journalists such as Uğur Mumcu and the growing activity of Islamic terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in big cities put the government in a difficult position not only vis-à-vis the voters, but also against the military. Alongside terrorism, the economy was not doing well as the inflation still remained relatively high. In other words, the euphoria that enveloped the country during first days of the government soon evaporated. To top it all, Demirel had great difficulty dealing with Turgut Özal as the latter was trying to get embroiled in political issues. In order to solve the problem, the government passed an amendment that would bypass Özal. While asserting he had no intention of sharing power, Demirel announced

[37] "Biz, siz diye bir şey yok, hepimiz varız. Hepimiz varsak, buradakiğ insan yani Kürtçe konuşan, 'Kürt asıllıyım' diyen insana da 'Kürt kimliği' diyoruz. Artık buna karşı çıkmak da mümkün değildir."

that a bypass law would facilitate the functioning of the state (*Milliyet*, 27 February 1993). The rivalry between Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal continued until April 1993. On 17 April, Özal passed away as a result of a heart attack. After his sudden death, all eyes turned on Süleyman Demirel since he was the strongest candidate for Çankaya. As a matter of fact, when Özal was still alive, people like Hüsamettin Cindoruk had already cited Demirel's name as the one who should replace him in Çankaya (*Milliyet*, 15 November 1992). Even Semra Özal, the mourning wife of the former president said Demirel deserved to move to Çankaya (*Milliyet*, 20 April 1993). Two days after Özal's death, on 19 April, Süleyman Demirel announced his candidacy for presidency. However, he had to convince Erdal İnönü as the TPP's number of deputies was not enough to secure his election. Although İnönü resisted at first, he finally agreed to support Demirel's candidacy. Finally, on 16 May 1993, Süleyman Demirel was finally elected as the 9th President of the Republic of Turkey.

As stated in the introduction, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of a more experienced and moderate version of Süleyman Demirel, a version who managed to well analyze the mistakes of the past. The only static thing in his character was his pragmatism. Thanks to such ability, he managed to survive the difficult banned times that lasted almost six years. Unlike his opponent Bülent Ecevit, he attempted to get involved in political issues from behind the scenes. He might have stood a chance by cooperating with the military regime as he did a decade earlier, but refused to do thaT knowing that doing so could damage his future political career. As a victim of a military intervention, he adopted a discourse based on democratic values. He took his political rights back via a referendum in 1987 and managed to get into the parliament with his new party, the TPP. When his party came first in the 1991 elections, he did not hesitate to cooperate with the SPP, the Social Democrats, in order to form a coalition,

which could be interpreted as another lesson learned from the past. After that entire struggle, the presidency came to him on a silver platter with the sudden death of Turgut Özal and as expected, he seized that opportunity to move to Çankaya. When humorist Bedri Koraman depicted him as the president at *Milliyet*, he added a footnote that argued, "In my short period of lifetime, I witnessed the rise of a political genius. While criticizing him many times in my cartoons, I acclaimed his struggle for freedom and democracy after 12 September. I wish him happiness in this final quest. And more importantly, I wish that he become the genuine president we have been missing" (*Milliyet*, 17 May 1993) (see Appendix E).

6. In Çankaya (1993–2000)

After all the years that he had spent in his political struggle, Süleyman Demirel moved to Çankaya in 1993. His new position required neutrality vis-à-vis all the political parties including his own. Since Demirel was an expert of adapting himself to changing conditions, acting in accordance with the new requirements had never been a big problem for him. In parallel with such a claim, his years in the presidency witnessed him becoming a statesman figure that claimed to act according to the requirements of the constitution. Unlike his predecessor Turgut Özal, he preferred to stay within the limits stipulated in the constitution. Due to such attitude, he became gradually the voice of the state during his presidency. Accordingly, the final chapter will cover the period from 1993 to 2000, the years that he spent in Çankaya as President. The 1990s were hard times for Turkey due to unstable governments, economic difficulties and rising Kurdish insurgence in the southeastern region. Moreover, the rise of the pro-Islamic Welfare Party caused anxiety in one part of the society mainly because of the perception that secularism was in danger. Such concern had soon become a crisis that led to the so-called 'postmodern coup' of 28 February. During the process, Süleyman Demirel preferred to stand alongside the secular elite. Although he later defended himself by claiming he acted that way in order to keep the parliament open, his attitude was criticized in conservative political circles. While his tenure in Çankaya was nearing an end, he came up with the idea of a semi-presidency where the president would be directly elected by the people. Despite such efforts, he failed to secure a second term in the office by amending the constitution and retired from politics in 2000. The consensus inpolitical and academic circles, suggests that Süleyman Demirel's term in Çankaya constituted a fine example of statesmanship. However, a biographer who focuses on different periods of his life may argue such an

attitude was the result of his pragmatic character, which would fit in any position whenever needed. In other words, had the conditions been appropriate, he could have easily become a partisan president or politician as he did earlier, in the 1970s. Within that framework, this chapter aims to prove that pragmatism was again the main theme during Süleyman Demirel's term in the presidency.

Even before moving to Çankaya, Demirel announced that he would not look back in case he was elected as president (*Milliyet*, 25 April 1993). That could be interpreted as taking a neutral stance by cutting all ties with his former party. Accordingly, in his inauguration speech, he emphasized he would respect the framework stipulated in the constitution, which also meant respecting the principle of neutrality. Demirel argued, "However, it is wrong to interpret neutrality such as sitting on the sidelines by rejecting to interfere with issues concerning the problems plaguing the country and the world." While referring to the constitution once more, he claimed that as president, he would exercise common sense in carrying out his constitutional duties under the supervision of the public conscience (Ergen, 2009, p. XLII-XLIII). Besides his loyalty to the constitution, the efficiency of the state was another issue that Demirel underscored on many occasions. He claimed that harmony among the institutions was a must so as to be labeled as an efficient state. He argued,

> "The state runs well, if all institutions work in harmony, if each of them keeps its place within the legislative and constitutional framework, if they use their authority and lay claim to their responsibilities. Thus, democratic stability will be achieved and democratic authority will be ensured" (Ergen, 2009, p. 2–3).

According to Zeynep Çağlıyan İçener, a well-functioning state was the beginning of everything regarding Demirel's understanding of politics (Çağlıyan İçener, 2010, p. 147). Although the İçener approach could be accepted relevant for Süleyman

Demirel's years in Çankaya, it could not be generalized for his entire political career. On the other hand, it is plausible to link it to pragmatism since Demirel knew how to meet the requirements of any post in the state mechanism, thanks to his experience.

Thereby, another talent that Süleyman Demirel mastered during his political career was to control developments from behind the scenes like he had done in the 1980s during his banned years. Thus, he implicitly tried to control the TPP, as he was aware that the leader elected by the congress would become the next prime minister. Interestingly, the process has a lot of similarities with his election as leader of the JP almost 30 years ago. As expected earlier, Demirel's departure from the TPP resulted with a struggle for a leadership. Tansu Çiller and İsmet Sezgin were those who stood out amongst the other candidates. While Çiller was an economics professor and a minister in the cabinet, Sezgin was an experienced politician from Demirel's inner circle. Even though Demirel asserted that he would not interfere to the leadership struggle, he implicitly pointed at İsmet Sezgin as his candidate for the premiership (*Milliyet*, 11 June 1993). One of the prominent members of the TPP at the time, Tekin Enerem, argued that Demirel would prefer Sezgin since he believed it would be easier to deal with him on many issues concerning relations between Çankaya and the government (Enerem, 2017). Despite the support of Demirel, Tansu Çiller managed to defeat İsmet Sezgin at the congress (*Milliyet*, 14 June 1993). Although her victory seemed to be a big surprise at first glance, it may be suggested that it was an uncanny similarity to Demirel's triumph against Sadettin Bilgiç three decades earlier. Similar to Demirel's technocrat image during those days, Çiller symbolized the modern woman with academic qualities that could solve the country's economic problems. Thanks to such advantages, she won the support of the media, which could be considered another similarity to the example of Süleyman Demirel of the 1960s.

Nevertheless, the problems of the Turkey of the 1990s were different and relatively more complicated than 30 years ago. First of all, Çiller had to ensure the continuation of the coalition with the SPP. Then, she had to deal with the worsening economy and the Kurdish insurgence that became steadily more violent. Yet, she was determined to take control of the reins. Thus, in her first cabinet, she eliminated almost all but three of the TPP's ministers from the previous cabinet. The list included names that were known for their affiliations to Süleyman Demirel, like Cavit Çağlar, Yaşar Topçu, Ekrem Ceyhun and even İsmet Sezgin (*Milliyet*, 26 June 1993). Such elimination could be interpreted as Tansu Çiller's intention to resist against Çankaya's control. On the other hand, this inevitably caused unrest within the TPP cadres.

Although Çiller was confident that she could overcome many problems concerning her party and the country, new issues continued to emerge even before after she obtained her vote of confidence. On 2 July 1993, in Sivas, crowds protesting against Aziz Nesin who was in the city to participate in the Pir Sultan Abdal Festival of the Alawite community burned the *Madımak* Hotel where many of Nesin's fellow intellectuals and folk dancers were staying. At the end of the day, Nesin was saved but 36 of the guests were declared dead. Even though the *Madımak* Incident could be considered another example of the violent massacres committed against the Alawite community, it resulted in a rising anxiety against reactionary movements as it alerted not only the urban elites but also the army. There, Süleyman Demirel adopted a neutral discourse by maintaining his distance from the increasing concern. In an interview with *Channel Four*, he claimed that the incident was isolated and it would be very misleading to generalize it without checking up on special conditions. Demirel argued that if the state was involved in it, the inspection must go to any lengths. While suggesting that it would be impossible to blame 16,000 citizens who were present on

that day, he emphasized that their leaders should definitely be interrogated (Demirel S. , 2000a, p. 17). His statement indicates that he preferred to portray the incident as an isolated event rather than a societal one.

On the other hand, just days after the Sivas incident and after the government had obtained its vote of confidence, village attacks conducted by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) put Çiller in a very difficult position. There, Süleyman Demirel intervened as the president of the republic, asserting there was no need for panic as the rules of democracy were running well. He argued,

> "People should trust the state. It had only been 48 hours since the government obtained the vote of confidence, so give the government the benefit of the doubt. It is impossible to find another government from that parliament." Demirel continued, "I am watching the developments carefully. I could give recommendations but I also have authority that would go beyond recommendations. I am the head of the National Security Council. I can chair a governmental meeting whenever I want. I could use my authority at these difficult days" (*Milliyet*, 8 June 1993).

Such a kind of approach was important as one may interpret that it reflected Demirel's adoption of a more state discourse in dealing with the country's problems. On the other hand, his statement was completely in accordance with the framework stipulated in the constitution for the duties of the president.

Yet, as was seen in many previous instances, the government was not always on good terms with Çankaya. Soon, Çiller and Demirel came to an impasse in trying to find a solution to Kurdish insurgence. When Çiller proposed a civilian model to solve the issue, she confronted the reactions of many camps, including those of not only Demirel and the army, but also of the opposition within her own party. Çiller's offer was comprised of steps such as the setting up a civilian NSC, and broadcast and education in Kurdish. Demirel immediately warned her by claiming that such steps

could be discouraging for the army that was fighting terrorism (*Milliyet*, 17 July 1993). But Çiller went further by arguing that Turkey should adopt the Basque model, which emphasized autonomy in the region. After a visit to Spain, she argued that she was very impressed with the Spanish example and proposed three main pillars for the new model: securing the borders, coming to terms with the parliament to ensure no compromises were made regarding terrorism, and restructuring local administrations. Although Çiller's propositions might have offered an alternative approach to the problem, she had to deal with the actors, who had traditionally adopted the official state discourse, with newly elected President Demirel as one of the forerunners. He reacted on the same day by inviting Çiller not to look for solutions in Spain. While claiming that there was no second method of struggle apart from the existing one, Demirel argued that the Basque model approach would not only be a waste of time but it would also served to lower pressure against the terrorists. According to him, there was no solution other than taking the guns of the armed men who resided in the mountains (*Milliyet*, 11 October 1993). Considering his speech made two years earlier, it was a great change of attitude since his previous stance neither emphasized nor included the armed struggle. One may suggest that such an attitude contained a serious deal of pragmatism rather than statesmanship, especially considering Turgut Özal's earlier openings regarding the issue. Instead of coming across with the traditional republican elites such as the army and the bureaucracy, Demirel preferred to line up with them in an effort to bolster his position in Çankaya.

On the other hand, Demirel emphasized the concept of constitutional citizenship in many occasions. For instance, in a press conference he held in late 1993, he said,

> "Everyone in Turkey is a first-class citizen. Amongs our individuals, there is no single person or a group with any privilege. This equality had always been a

> virtue of our Republic for the past 70 years and it does not only imply equality under the law but rather equality in regards to having the same rights and liberties" (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 46).

According to Metin Heper, Demirel's constitutional citizenship was a political approach in terms of recognizing ethno-cultural differences and accepting these as the normal state of affairs. Demirel recognized the differences between various communities by not referring to them as a result of their secondary identities, but rather as an outcome of basic rights and liberties that were enjoyed by different individuals or groups (Heper, 2007, p. 127-128). Although such an approach was in parallel with his Kurdish reality speech in 1991, it should be underscored that the method he proposed contained serious contradictions. In other words, when it came to dealing with the issue, Demirel preferred to stand alongside the hardliners. The conflict between Çiller and Demirel ended up with a victory for Demirel as the former was left with no other option than to adopt the hardliner discourse.

Yet, it was not only Süleyman Demirel who gave Tansu Çiller a difficult time. The departure of Erdal İnönü and the subsequent leadership uncertainty in the SPP emitted a signal that the government was soon to face a crisis of legitimacy. On 11 September 1993, Ankara Mayor Murat Karayalçın was elected as the leader of the SPP when he defeated his closest rival, Aydın Güven Gürkan by 559 to 403 votes in the first round (*Milliyet*, 12 September 1993). It was a sigh of relief for Çiller, as Karayalçın was not against the continuation of the coalition. In other words, his election would not pose a problem of legitimacy or instability for the government. Although Karayalçın announced that he would bring new conditions to Çiller, his propositions dealt mainly with local-level administration and corruption, issues which Çiller and the TPP were able to make concessions at the time (*Milliyet*, 13 September

1993). Çiller was experiencing problems within her own party since the old camp, which was known for its closeness to Süleyman Demirel, remained a serious threat. Nonetheless, she managed to emerge from the crisis stronger after the party congress on 22 November. Çiller interpreted her re-election by admitting her real general presidency had just begun since she ensured confidence and stability within her party (*Milliyet*, 22 November 1993). Of course, that was only her interpretation because the faction known for its close relations with Süleyman Demirel was still there, waiting for her weakest moment. In the meantime, it is worth noting Demirel did not at least explicitly delve into the internal affairs of his old party.

However, presidential duties were not merely limited to watching the developments in the internal politics, especially in a period when the international order was being put through some radical changes. Within that framework, the 1990s constituted an important example of change not only because of the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of the bipolar world, but also due to the emergence of new states in the former Soviet sphere of influence. As a politician who witnessed the whole Cold War period, Demirel was also capable of understanding the changing international conditions well. He knew that the emerging states could provide opportunities for Turkey in terms of economy or energy cooperation. That is why he emphasized several times the term 'Eurasia'. According to Demirel, one should emphasize that the relation among Turkey and the Turkic Republics was based on shared values such as history, religion, ancestry and culture. He argued that the terms 'Eurasia' or 'Turkic World' represented historical fact rather than some abstract concept created in the mind (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 65). It is worth noting that Demirel's emphasis on Turkishness did not rely on nationalism. Instead, it had pragmatic purposes, as he believed that cooperation could pave way to alternative economic gains for Turkey. On the other

hand, such an attitude constituted an important example of Demirel's capacity to adapt oneself to changing conditions. After spending a significant part of his political career as a typical Cold War right-winger, he managed to embrace change in the international order so as to seize upon new opportunities.

While Süleyman Demirel and the government were seeking new openings abroad, Turkey's economy was not doing well. At the beginning of 1994, in January, the dollar-Turkish lira exchange rate plummeted. Although the government intervened by raising interest rates, the fluctuating economy soon turned out to face one of the most severe crises of the country's history. On the first days of the crisis, Süleyman Demirel called the government to take further precautions by stating that the term of the 24 January measures was over. Such precautions included privatizing state economic enterprises, free floating of both interest rates and reforms in systems concerning taxation and export incentives (*Milliyet*, 24 January 1994). Although his propositions were no different than a bitter pill to swallow, he enjoyed presidential immunity, as the political risk of the measures would be weighed upon the government. Even though the implementation of new procedures was necessary, the government preferred not to rush. Instead, Çiller and Karayalçın tried to rein in the situation via provisional measures, which only served to further worsen the economic situation. Finally, on 5 April, the government announced radical decisions while Çiller claimed that Turkey was fighting an economic war of independence (*Milliyet*, 6 April 1994). The new measures included price increases and new taxes for the citizens and inevitably, it resulted in the alienation of the voting masses. Especially, disappointment with the SPP was at the highest level as the party failed to fulfill a most of its promises. According to Korkut Boratav, the economic crisis of 1994 was the final effort of the center-left parties to offer alternatives to neo-liberal policies (Boratav, 2013, p. 175).

In the meantime, Necmettin Erbakan's WP claimed to offer such an alternative for the low-income urban masses. Therefore, in the local elections in March 1994, the WP won in the two most important cities, Istanbul and Ankara, while coming in as the third party in Turkey with 19.1% of the votes. Although the TPP and the MP won respectively 21.4% and 21%, the rise of the WP became the trending topic (TODAİE, 2017). The interesting part was the fact that the Islamists did not come up with any new promises. From as far back as the 1970s, they emphasized values like social justice while criticizing economic inequalities. But the roots of the Islamic political movement went back to even an earlier period. While underlining the rift among secularism and Islamism in Turkey, Nilüfer Göle argued that it dated back to the 19th century when Islamists had challenged the essentially Western model of change adopted by the ruling elite. She suggested that the establishment of the NOP in 1970 had not only incorporated Turkish Islamism into the political system, but had also legitimized it via the parliament (Göle, 1997, p. 47). Parallel to Göle's argument, Hakan Yavuz claimed that the WP represented a platform for those who looked for a change in the secular system while asking for reforms in the system, within the bureaucratic structure (Yavuz, 1997, p. 63). He suggested that the party played an important role in the political socialization of the Islamic masses by mobilizing them to take part in the system, which resulted with an easing of the political participation (Yavuz, 1997, p. 66). Based on both arguments, one may underscore two factors that paved the way for the rise of the WP. First, the migration from Anatolia that continued through the decades ended up with the relocation of these masses to big cities. Secondly, the failure of the center-right and center-left parties in regards to creating favorable economic conditions for the urban poor created a backlash within society, resulting in a search for alternatives.

Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel adopted a cautious discourse against the rise of the Islamists. Despite the fact he was also a migrant with a traditional background from Anatolia, he preferred to line up with the secularist faction of the society. Such an attitude could be interesting for someone who did not take his pragmatism into consideration. But for Demirel, it was vital for him to act according to the requirements of his times. Even before the local elections, he did not hesitate to warn the Islamists on different occasions. When a group consisting of mainly WP deputies tabled a motion for the restoration of honors to the defendants of the assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Demirel reacted by organizing a press conference. He asserted, "Those irresponsible persons must know that they will bear their consequences if they go beyond the limits set by the laws and public conscience". Demirel ended the meeting by saying that there was no need to be overwhelmed while the state was in charge of its duty (*Milliyet*, 26 February 1994). When Çiller tried to benefit from the mood by organizing a meeting to honor the memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Demirel rejected her invitation by claiming that the situation changed and became a political issue and his constitutional position would not let him to participate to that kind of event in his capacity as president (*Milliyet*, 1 March 1994). That was another pragmatic move from him as he seized the opportunity to emphasize the dignity and the above-party nature of the presidency. Thanks to his position, he had the luxury to ease the concern of obtaining more votes, which enabled him the chance to refrain from populist discourse in the political scene. He preferred to wait in the wings and to intervene in political affairs at the right time. In other words, he gradually became the voice of the state. For instance, when a reporter from *New York Times* asked if he was worried about the rise of a fundamentalist party, his answer was negative but argued, "If these religious opinion holders would harm the state, it would

be impossible to keep their party's free and legal status". While pointing the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, Demirel underlined that all institutions were working properly and there was no need to worry for Turkey. (Demirel S. , 2000a, p. 95). In parallel with his earlier approach, he put particular emphasis on the efficiency and proper functioning of the institutions.

However, the rise of the Islamists was not Turkey's only concern in 1994. Further deepening of the economic crisis and the acceleration of the Kurdish insurgence put the already fragile government in an even more perilous position. Another factor indicating the coalition's vulnerability was the decline of the SPP's votes in the local elections. Despite all critics, Tansu Çiller's TPP came as the first party and its deputies were aware that would not be as strong as it was in 1991 in the next elections the SPP. But the government crisis occurred in July when the SPP announced that it would support a motion on Tansu Çiller's personal wealth. Even though Çiller managed to convince her coalition partners to vote against the motion, it resulted with a split in the SPP due to the ayes of some deputies (*Milliyet*, 15 July 1994). The following months of 1994 witnessed the emergence of the new crises that furthered weakened the government. According to a public survey published in October, 52% of the participants admitted that the government should resign immediately (*Milliyet*, 9 October 1994).

The day-to-day weakening of the government inevitably led to early election debates. Right in the middle of remaining discussions, Süleyman Demirel seized the opportunity and intervened from Çankaya. He asserted that the president of the republic should have the power to abolish the parliament whenever the system loses its efficiency. While saying that, he admitted that his claim was based on Article 104 of the constitution, which stated that the president had the authority to renew the elections

if the government cannot be formed within 45 days. On the other hand, Demirel argued that the application of such authority was not possible due to the restrictions spelled out in Article 116. He added that he always defended that the state was a constitutional project and such authority would provide the efficient working of the regime (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 93–94). The tricky part of Demirel's comments was the fact that his proposition could pave the way for a system change by expanding the authority of the president of the republic. At this point, he emphasized that he was not referring to himself but rather whoever was in Çankaya at the time, whether elected by the people or the parliament (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 109). By saying this, it may be assumed that he indirectly brought a new system into question. When a journalist asked him if he shared the same opinion with those who supported the presidential or semi-presidential systems, he responded that he certainly would not enter into this debate and reiterated that he wanted his state to be efficient (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 110–111). Although Demirel denied such a claim, it could be considered as another one of his pragmatic moves as his timing coincided with the weakest days of the government.

Meanwhile, the rift between Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller grew deeper when the latter modified Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's words from "Happy who he calls himself a Turk" to "Happy who he calls himself a citizen of Turkey" (*Milliyet*, 1 January 1995). Obviously, Çiller was aiming at the Kurdish population but her assertion soon backfired with the reaction from Çankaya. In an interview with the Financial Times, Demirel asserted he was against Çiller's approach. He argued that the concept of the nation would lose its meaning if one named himself as the citizen of Turkey. While claiming the concept of one nation was impossible to ignore, he asserted that the ethnic origins of those who constructed the nation would not matter and that the ethnic movements would certainly not to be tolerated (Demirel S. , 2000a,

p. 171). Although his words were in contrast to an extent with the notions like constitutional citizenship or the Kurdish reality that he pronounced earlier, his new attitude could be interpreted by the fact that his presence in Çankaya required a new discourse.

While the Kurdish issue continued to remain an unsolved problem, another one, sectarian tension among the Sunnis and the Alawites rose up after an attack on a coffeehouse in Gazi Mahallesi on 12 March 1995, which resulted with the deaths of two citizens, and many wounded (*Milliyet*, 13 March 1995). Due to the long history of conflicts and massacres, the Alawite community developed a solidarity that would help them withstand attacks. According to Ayşe Ayata, factors that reinforced such solidarity were the traditional advantages of a brotherhood-type of organization, their segregated communities in urban areas, their homogeny in terms of social class and way of life, as well as their networks of mutual help. As a result, they managed to mobilize their community into a political body and even armed defense organizations whenever deemed necessary. Ayata argued that the incidents in Gazi Mahallesi constituted an example for that kind of armed mobilization, as the Alawites managed to organize in less than an hour after the coffeehouse attack (Ayata, 1997, p. 68). In a short period of time, the situation not only got out of hand, it also spread to other parts of the city inhabited mainly by the Alawite community. Due the excessive use of police force, 17 citizens lost their lives in Gazi alongside with four others in Ümraniye. The situation returned to normal after the army intervened. But the process left behind a huge disappointment in the Alawite community because they saw themselves once again as the victims of unjust treatment. According to Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın, the Gazi Mahallesi incidents accelerated the process of fostering the development and preservation of the Alawite identity (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 400). Another factor

contributing to the rise of that sentiment was the reluctant stance of the state against the incidents. Even so, Tansu Çiller proposed to bind up wounds by ending the state's ignorance of the Alawites (*Milliyet*, 17 March 1995). However, her efforts remained non-committal as they were mostly aimed to satisfy her coalition partners rather than resolving the real problem. On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel preferred to abstain from making a statement on the issue. He might have done that as the issue was so complicated and fragile to be commented on. Compared to his attitude regarding other anti-Alawite massacres, it can be claimed that Demirel was aware of the severity and potential consequences of the incidents.

In the meantime, Süleyman Demirel was not reluctant to criticize Tansu Çiller and her government. Starting from early 1995, he did so by supporting the claims of Hüsamettin Cindoruk who could be considered not only as an old comrade but also his unofficial voice in the parliament. For instance, when Cindoruk admitted that people would go out into the streets if there would be no election, Demirel supported him by admitting that Cindoruk would know what he said. He added "The right of demonstration of the people is sacred and people may use this very sacred right when they are exhausted". Regarding the early election, he argued that it should be held when the country would feel the need to breathe (*Milliyet*, 26 January 1995). Tansu Çiller immediately reacted against both claims and said that these were aimed at creating chaos in the process of unifying the left (*Milliyet*, 27 January 1995). She might be mistaken as the nature of the coalition changed a lot compared to four years ago. It was not only because both Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü were no longer the leaders of their respective coalition parties, but also they were not on good terms with their descendants. Moreover, the SPP had the risk of dissolving due to the unification. As expected, on 18 February, two parties merged under the roof of the Republican

People's Party. That was a sigh of relief for Tansu Çiller, as the caretaker leader Hikmet Çetin had a positive attitude regarding the continuation of the coalition (*Milliyet*, 20 February 1995). However such relief lasted until the election of Deniz Baykal as leader of the RPP on 10 September. Unlike Çetin, Baykal was more critical of the role of the SPP in the coalition. Even though he said that they would not leave the coalition, he emphasized that he would look for an effective and productive partnership. Meanwhile, he did not hesitate to assert that they would take the country to the early election as soon as possible (*Milliyet*, 11 September 1995).

Despite the efforts, the coalition ended with the resignation of Tansu Çiller just 10 days later as a result of a disagreement. The issue was the removal of Necdet Menzir who served as the chief of police in Istanbul during the Gazi Mahallesi incidents. While Deniz Baykal insisted on the dismissal of Menzir, whom he viewed as responsible for the excessive use of police force, Çiller preferred to put her weight behind him (*Milliyet*, 22 September 1995). The result of the bilateral persistence was the end of the government of four years. On the following days, Çiller focused on forming another one. When she went to Çankaya to propose a minority government, Süleyman Demirel asked her to come back once she found the necessary support (*Milliyet*, 3 October 1995). When she came back with the support of Bülent Ecevit and Alparslan Türkeş, Demirel approved her minority government. However, her expectations collapsed after she failed to obtain a vote of confidence. That was partly due to dismissals and nay votes of 12 deputies from her party. Even though the list of dissidents included prominent names like Hüsamettin Cindoruk, Tansu Çiller did not hesitate to discharge them from the TPP (*Milliyet*, 17 October 1995). Demirel watched the process intently as most of the discharged members were from in his inner circle. Although there was no evidence that he was behind the developments, it may be

argued that the failure of Çiller paved the way for the early election he had stressed since the beginning of the year. Accordingly, he reassigned Çiller to form a government that would take the country to the early election. Such assignment evoked a reaction from Mesut Yılmaz, who questioned Demirel's neutrality. When Yılmaz argued the government would be of a 'byzantine' nature supported by Çankaya, Demirel claimed that he would assign Yılmaz if he would come and say that he had the majority. In a very short period of time, the situation reached a level where Çiller defended (*Milliyet*, 19 October 1995) Demirel against Yılmaz's threats that suggested of ejecting him from Çankaya in 1996 (*Milliyet*, 21 October 1995). Of course such pressure was on shaky ground, as Yılmaz had neither a majority nor the influence to overthrow Demirel, who had been winning the support of traditional Ankara elites.

The reason of such support was Süleyman Demirel's stance in dealing with the rise of political Islam. He had already demonstrated his loyalty to the principle of secularism on many occasions. For instance, he was the one who reacted immediately when Necmettin Erbakan said that the transition to the WP order was inevitable and asked if that transition would be bloody or moderate (*Milliyet*, 15 April 1994). Despite Erbakan's claims, the WP did not require a bloody transition as the polls predicted a serious rise in its vote rate. According to the survey by Konda for instance, the WP was expected to come second by 19.8% while the MP led with a rate of 21.5% (*Milliyet*, 21 December 1995). Meanwhile, Demirel was trying to prepare the ground for his potential actions. A week before the election, in an interview with Yavuz Donat, he admitted that he looked for a vote of confidence and added that the party with most deputies would be unable to form a government (*Milliyet*, 18 December 1995). His claim was important as Donat's question was designed to mean a potential victory of the WP.

As feared by the secularists, the WP emerged as the leader of the election held on 24 December by taking 21.4% of the votes. It was no means a landslide victory since the MP and the TPP won 19.6% and 19.2%, respectively. On the other hand, the left underperformed due to the dichotomy between Deniz Baykal's RPP and Bülent Ecevit's DLP. While the former obtained 10.7%, the latter won more votes with 14.6% (TÜİK, 2012, p. 93–94). The victory of the WP was the continuation of a trend that drew attention in the 1994 local elections. According to Sabri Sayarı, the high performance of the WP-controlled municipal administrations was an important factor. He argued "The municipal administrations run by the Islamist mayors since the 1994 election generally received high marks, particularly with respect to curtailing corruption in the city halls and providing municipal services to the working class neighborhoods" (Sayarı, 1996, p. 37). On the other hand, the challenge from the center-right still had a long way to go before it could persuade the poor urban masses. Metin Heper argued "In the 1995 national elections, the secular parties, including those on the left, did not offer the electorate well-thought-out and persuasive policy packages" (Heper, 1997, p. 36).

Even though the WP was the winner of the 1995 election, its number of deputies was far from a majority. While it obtained 158 seats in the parliament, the TPP and the MP won 135 and 132, respectively. Meanwhile, the DLP and the RPP obtained 76 and 49 seats (TÜİK, 2012, p. 93–94). Since a constitutional amendment raised the number of total seats in the parliament to 550, Necmettin Erbakan had to deal either with the TPP or the MP in order to achieve a majority. But his chances were very low due to the negative campaign waged in the mainstream media dominated by two big groups against the WP. Eric Jan Zürcher argued that two conglomerates (Doğan and Bilgin groups) controlled 66% of the market via newspapers and television

channels (Zürcher, 2001, p. 299). For instance, *Milliyet*'s 'Towards the Mother-Path' headline on the day following the election obviously encouraged a center-right coalition while refusing to take the WP into consideration (*Milliyet*, 25 December 1995). However, Süleyman Demirel preferred to adopt a cautious stance. In his ordinary press meeting on 20 January, he claimed the realization of free elections was one of the most important outcomes of a year like 1995, which witnessed plenty of negative developments. While praising the democratic process, Demirel admitted that he was aware of the post-election anxiety. He put special emphasis on secularism and Atatürk's principles in the vows of the deputies and added that those who tried to change these principles would inevitably fail. He made reference to the constitution and the separation of powers without forgetting to stress that all the institutions constituted the secular and democratic state (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 196─198). Demirel's cautiousness continued in the question-answer portion of the press meeting. In declining to express his opinion on the nature of the potential coalition possibilities, he emphasized that the existing parliament was one of the best for Turkey despite its fragmented structure. Meanwhile, he did not forget to deny the claims that suggested he preferred a coalition between the TPP and the MP (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 223─228). It may be argued that Demirel's neutral stance was not only the result of his loyalty to the constitution but he also wanted to see developments transpire before taking early action. Such a stance constituted another example of his 'wait and see' strategy he utilized during various parts of his political career.

As expected from his comments, Süleyman Demirel gave the task to Necmettin Erbakan. But none of the center-right parties had the intention of cooperating with the WP. After some futile rounds, Tansu Çiller was assigned with the task since the TPP had the most number of seats in the parliament. Again with pressure from the

mainstream media and business community, Çiller went to Mesut Yılmaz to reach an agreement. Although there was a lot in common between both parties, the issue concerning the premiership constituted an impediment. Even if they had managed to come to terms, they would need a third partner as their number of deputies was below the required number to form a coalition. After Çiller's failure, Yılmaz tried to form a government. At first glance, he went to the WP and both parties made serious progress. When the talks between the MP and the WP reached the stage of an agreement, Demirel gave messages arguing that there was no need to panic over neither secularism nor democracy (*Milliyet*, 20 Febraury 1996). However, the negotiations collapsed due to the persistence of Erbakan on several issues such as the partition of ministries amongst the partners. Moreover, Yılmaz became the target of secular circles due to the progress of negotiations with the WP. *Milliyet*, for instance, clearly invited him to think long and hard prior to initiating a partnership with Erbakan (*Milliyet*, 16 February 1996).

Due to the combined factors, Mesut Yılmaz was left with no other option but to return to Tansu Çiller. After a several round of talks, they reached an agreement based on a rotational premiership, with Yılmaz holding office during the first round, and Çiller during the second round. But, in the midst of negotiations, Süleyman Demirel warned Çiller by arguing Yılmaz would call for another vote of confidence once it was her turn at the premiership helm. He made it clear that government protocol could not replace the constitution (*Milliyet*, 3 March 1996). Despite that, Demirel approved the Mother-Path government since business circles and the media were looking forward to it. Moreover, once he became Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz claimed that the commanders also wanted a coalition between the MP and the TPP (*Milliyet*, 13 March 1996). Interestingly, during whole process, Demirel abstained from expressing his

opinion. Even though a coalition between the TPP and the MP seemed more preferable in his part due to several reasons, he might have wanted to stay within constitutional constraints by maintaining his neutrality as president. On the other hand, ignoring the WP would contradict the principle of loyalty to the national will that he put emphasis on throughout his political career. Instead, he wanted to wait in order to see further developments.

However, the Mother-Path government was obviously not standing on firm ground. It was a coalition constructed so as to restrain the Islamists from power. A serious disagreement could mean the end of the reluctant partnership. Moreover, Erbakan was waiting in ambush to shake the government. The opportunity he was looking for came in April with a motion to investigate Tansu Çiller's involvement in some government tenders. While corruption allegations put Çiller in a tight spot, Mesut Yılmaz's attitude made the situation even more perilous for the TPP's leader. Yılmaz allowed his group free rein and as a result, on 24 April, Çiller was sent to the Supreme Court for further investigation (*Milliyet*, 25 April 1996). While Çiller's popularity deteriorated, Süleyman Demirel did not hesitate to develop a better relationship with Mesut Yılmaz. *Milliyet* used the 'Father and Son' headline in order to describe such an association (*Milliyet*, 29 April 1996). Demirel's attitude towards Yılmaz could be interpreted as another example of his pragmatism since the latter was emerging as the potential leader of the center-right. As time progressed, the coalition became more and more vulnerable against attacks of the WP due to further claims of corruption.

While the government crumbled, Süleyman Demirel was travelling around the country, participating in various events. He was in Izmit on 18 May for the groundbreaking ceremony of a shopping mall. There, an assassination attempt was made on his life. Demirel was saved thanks by the timely intervention of one of his

bodyguards. The incident became more interesting when the press mentioned that the hit man was an Islamist from the *Nakşibendi* Order. Demirel stressed the importance of the case by inviting all citizens to show their respects to Great Atatürk (*Milliyet*, 20 May 1996). In a short period of time, he adopted the role of a secular father figure who did not hesitate to stand out against reactionary threats. When Tansu Çiller came to see him for a get-well visit, he continued that role by saying her "My daughter, I know the difficulties. I lived the same. Coalition is difficult. But you have to maintain the government. You have to avoid a government crisis" (*Milliyet*, 21 May 1996). In other circumstances, the failure of a government would not be one of the main concerns for a politician like Süleyman Demirel. But in that case, he was aware that the WP could come to power in case the existing government broke down. Moreover, such fear was shared among the secular masses and mainstream media. Accordingly, Demirel might have wanted to become the voice of the secular elites at the expense of eliciting a reaction from the traditional masses with whom he shared the same origins.

However, the political ambitions of the coalition partners were more important than salvaging the government. After long, drawn-out negotiations, the Mother-Path coalition ended in early-June. The improbability of maintaining the coalition between two center-right parties left Turkey with no alternatives other than a partnership with the WP or an early election. Moreover Tansu Çiller was in a tight squeeze since Necmettin Erbakan continued to goad her over corruption issues. In the end, a WP-TPP coalition was announced on 28 June after long negotiations. Erbakan, finally, became Prime Minister after 27 years in politics while Çiller was assigned as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, prominent figures of the TPP such as Necmettin Cevheri, Nahit Menteşe and Köksal Toptan were left out of the cabinet (*Milliyet*, 29 June 1996). As some deputies were already uncomfortable with an

alliance with the Islamists, the process inevitably led to some resignations within the TPP. Despite that, the Welfare-Path coalition managed to obtain the vote of confidence on 7 June by a slight majority with 278 'ayes' versus 265 'nays.' While ten TPP deputies voted against the government, there were also four abstentions. The list of dissidents included İsmet Sezgin, Köksal Toptan and Cavit Çağlar. The process continued later when these names resigned from the TPP (*Milliyet*, 16 July 1996). Even though these people were in Süleyman Demirel's inner circle, there is no evidence of any intervention from Çankaya since almost all these names had problems with Tansu Çiller from the first day of her leadership.

Unsurprisingly, Süleyman Demirel kept himself from prematurely interpreting the nature of the coalition. In parallel with the duties of a president, he preferred to monitor the developments and interfere when he deemed necessary. Apart from his constitutional responsibilities, that had been his way of doing politics for almost 35 years since he never acted rashly in taking action. As a matter of fact, he supported the new government in some interviews. For instance, when a reporter from *Der Speigel* referred to Necmettin Erbakan as a so-called Islamist prime minister, Demirel denied that comment by arguing that the WP obtained only 21% of the votes in a country where Muslims consisted 99.9% of the population. Then he asked if the other 79% were not Muslims since they had not voted for Erbakan. Secondly, he emphasized that the WP was a constitutional party to the fullest extent. While emphasizing that Turkey was different than countries such as Algeria or Iran, since it had been secular for 70 years, claiming that the citizens of the country were pleased with secularism. According to Demirel, the fact that 21% of the population voted for the WP could not be perceived as fundamentalism. When the reporter asked him the personality of Necmettin Erbakan, he described him as a very hardworking person and added that he

hoped his government would be successful. Later in the same interview, he asserted that none of the threats directed at the state would be able to succeed, since the state was equipped so well judicially, and could easily eliminate those kinds of risks against the state and the regime (Demirel S. , 2000a, p. 347–349). Demirel did not hesitate to become the official voice by adopting a strong state discourse. Ironically, the constitution he praised judicially was the one prepared in 1982 by the military junta. The only thing that varied was his position versus the constitution. As a victim of the post-12 September process, Demirel saw no harm in making reference to the advantages of the constitution he once harshly criticized.

Despite Süleyman Demirel's blessings, the Welfare-Path government has never been comfortable in office. First of all, it was under serious pressure from the mainstream media due to its Islamist nature. Secondly, the economy was still floundering as it was during most of the 1990s. Last but not least, the government was not the result of a cordial relationship between the partners since it was formulated through threats and blackmail against Tansu Çiller's corruption allegetions. In other words, it was no different than a powder keg on the verge of exploding. As time progressed, the government became more and more vulnerable, and Süleyman Demirel started to adopt a more aggressive discourse. Instead of criticizing in a direct manner, he did that by referring to secularism on different occasions. For instance, in his speech on the opening day of the parliament on 1 October 1996, Demirel put special emphasis on the republic's democratic and secular values. After stressing the anxiety versus the basic characteristics of the state, he argued that these characteristics could not be modified or changed and Turkey would remain a democratic, secular, and social state of law (Ergen, 2009, p. 71–72). Demirel's claims were not only applauded by opposition leaders, but were also acclaimed by the media. The Presidential Symphony

Orchestra performed at the entrance hall and *Milliyet* used 'the choir of democracy' motto as its headline on the following day (*Milliyet*, 2 October 1996). While the rift between the factions became even deeper, Süleyman Demirel preferred to stand in line with the opposition and the army. It was a plausible action on his part, not only due to his constitutional position as President but also because of the fact that new opportunities could have emerged in case of potential failure of the Welfare-Path government.

As time progressed, Necmettin Erbakan seemed to offer such opportunities with his actions and statements. When his Libya visit turned into a serious crisis because of Muammar Qaddafi's negative approach, his frivolous comments drew adverse reaction from both the opposition and his coalition partners alike. That was when Bülent Ecevit immediately claimed his party would get involved in a coalition if Çiller and Yılmaz managed to reach an agreement (*Milliyet*, 11 October 1996). Just as discussions were about to calm down, a new shock plunged the government into a more precarious situation. The car accident that occurred in Susurluk on 3 November 1996 revealed all the corruption the state had weltered in since a chief of police, a deputy from the TPP and a fugitive suspect were found in the same car after the crash. The fugitive with a false identity card was Abdullah Çatlı, a member of a counter-guerilla group who was involved in many incidents during the late 1970s and 1980s, including the massacre of Bahçelievler. Although the Interior Minister Mehmet Ağar resigned in the following days, the Susurluk accident became the symbol of corrupted relations that mired the state and politics. Over time, it turned out that the relations network had a much more complicated structure that traced back to unsolved murders, drug trafficking and political bribery.

Since the allegations were mainly against the state, Süleyman Demirel was left with no option than to intervene in the process. On 22 December, he invited all leaders to Çankaya for a summit. Although the summit did not produce a serious outcome except the abolishment of parliamentary immunity, it was important in terms of showing that the president was following the issue (*Milliyet*, 23 December 1996). Almost a week later, in his ordinary year-end press conference, Demirel highlighted the Susurluk incident. His main concern was defending the state against claims from different parts of the society. He argued, "It is not the state that is guilty, but those who commit crimes". According to Demirel, everyone should avoid himself from discrediting the state and its laws (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 307). Within that perspective, Tanıl Bora suggested that Süleyman Demirel made the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts of the state. According to Bora, he put special emphasis on protecting the abstract concept of the state from any harm (Bora, 2005, p. 567). Although Bora's argument is consistent in terms of showing Demirel's approach towards several state-related issues, it may be discussed that the differentiating between the abstract and tangible was a concept derived by Demirel in order to create invisible immunity against the allegations. In other words, he wanted to dignify the state so as to segregate it from the corruption that surrounded politics. That was a pragmatic move on his part, since such clear distinction not only spared the state but also himself as the president from political turbulence.

While claiming he had isolated himself from the daily political issues, Demirel continued his above-party position to do politics. And he did it his own way by touching the delicate equilibrium amongst the factions. For instance, he did not hesitate to praise the activities of the National Security Council, which was seen as the guarantor of a modern and secular Turkey. According to Demirel, the NSC was a

highly efficient institution whih aimed to protect the state and its principles. Moreover, he blamed journalists by focusing too much on daily issues while ignoring the activities of such an important institution (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 323). Demirel's emphasis on the NSC was important since the anxiety against the Islamists and discussions regarding the nature of the regime became more apparent those days. Moreover, he argued the most important problem for Turkey was to increase the duration of elementary/primary education from five to eight years (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 309). That was a critical matter since the status of the religious schools would be in jeopardy after such reform. Thus, Demirel's comments could be interpreted as a clear sign of his future stance versus the Welfare-Path government.

By the end of the year, everyone knew that 1997 would be a difficult year for the Welfare-Path Government. Almost at the beginning of the year, the dissidents from the TPP moved to the Democrat Turkey Party under the leadership of Hüsamettin Cindoruk. Interestingly, the founders of the new party mostly contained the names from the inner circle of Süleyman Demirel. In a documentary on 28 February, a prominent member of the WP, Bülent Arınç argued that Süleyman Demirel was conducting the situation like a virtuoso. Another claim concerning Demirel's approach came from Celal Adan, the TPP's chairman at the time. While claiming the dissolution of the center-right was the result of Demirel's attitude, Adan argued that the center-right could never become strong after that move (Son Darbe: 28 Şubat, 2012). These were the developments that would later alienate Süleyman Demirel from the traditional voter base he once relied upon. But, under the circumstances of the period, Demirel preferred to win the sympathy of the secularists and the army as he believed they constituted the prominent power elites.

In any case, it was not only the mainstream media, the secularist elites or Süleyman Demirel that applied pressure on the coalition. The deputies and mayors of the WP did not hesitate to increase the tension with their comments and actions. The most provocative incident for the army was a jihadist stage play on Jerusalem Night organized by the Sincan Municipality. The army reacted immediately on 4 February by rolling tanks into the district. It was an important move by the armed forces, even more remarkable for the fact that the generals preferred to contact Çankaya directly in issues such as the dismissal of the mayor of Sincan (*Milliyet*, 6 February 1997). In other words, they did not hesitate to bypass the government in issues concerning its jurisdiction. Although it was against common practice, Süleyman Demirel did not object the enforcement. It may be disputed that his attitude could have played an encouraging role that accelerated the sequence leading to the 28 February decisions. By the end of February, tensions reached a level that the Commander of the Naval Forces, Güven Erkaya announced that the reactionaries were even more of a threat than the PKK (*Milliyet*, 25 February 1997). Meanwhile, just a day before Erkaya's statement, Süleyman Demirel asked for a constitutional amendment that would grant the president the authority to take the country to elections. His pretext was preventing a potential military intervention via democratic practices (*Milliyet*, 24 February 1997). Such an attitude could be described as another sign of pragmatism since he tried to extend his authority by benefiting not only from the weaknesses of the government but also from the potential instabilities concerning the regime.

As predicted by many, the meeting of the NSC on 28 February resulted with some serious decisions concerning the future of the regime. Alongside general warnings like the commitment to Atatürk's principles and secularism, the list of decisions included compulsory eight-year education. While *Milliyet* described the

outcome as a 'fine-tuning' of the regime, the generals warned the government by claiming new political tension could pave the way to sanctions (*Milliyet*, 1 March 1997). Even though the NSC decided to forward the new measures as recommendations, the general tone of the text sounded like a memorandum. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan was reluctant to sign the decision package. Instead, he went to the leaders, but almost all of them including his coalition partner Tansu Çiller invited him to follow the NSC's measures. On the same day, Süleyman Demirel interpreted the proceedings as a message that argued, "Turkey is not at a crossroads. The road is defined, it is Atatürk's path". He also told Yavuz Donat that he would be a careful follower of the same path (*Milliyet*, 4 March 1997). Erbakan was left with no other option than to sign the document.

As time went by, 28 February turned out to be a long-standing process in which Süleyman Demirel, the Turkish military, the civil society network of the secular establishment and large sectors of the media ganged up against the reactionaries. Their motivation was their belief that reactionary Islam constituted the chronic, if at times undetectable, malaise of Turkish politics (Cizre & Çınar, 2003, p. 309–310). Among them, the role played by Süleyman Demirel was significant since he gradually grew away form his neutral position. He participated in a series of television programs where he defended the NSC's resolutions. His pretext was again the efficiency of the state apparatus and loyalty to the constitution. According to Demirel, the NSC was a democratic constitutional institution since the constitution was the result of a democratic process, namely the referendum. Within this framework, he said that no government could ignore a constitutional provision and in case if it did, it would be under the moral, political and national responsibility (Ergen, 2009, p. 1524–1525). Similar to many periods of his political career, he preferred the safest way by referring

to the constitution to interpret and comment on the political issues. Demirel's involvement in mainstream media continued during April 1997 where he continued to praise the secular, modern character of the regime. While stressing that there were concerns in some minds that another regime would replace the secular, democratic state of law, he invited all citizens to gather around the Republic (Ergen, 2009, p. 1585). Apart from some television interviews, he gave speeches in military institutions such as the War College. There, he emphasized once again that Turkey should not deviate from the path drawn out by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and added that Turkey in that respect, would continue to be a modern, democratic and secular country (Ergen, 2009, p. 1344). His special emphasis was meaningful since Turkey was in a fragile process due to anxiety against the WP. Demirel, as an experienced politician, might have wanted to benefit from the delicacy of the situation.

The post-28 February period witnessed many backward steps by Necmettin Erbakan to calm the rising reactions against his government. Finally, on 18 June, he tendered his resignation to Çankaya. On the same day, Süleyman Demirel met all the party leaders to look for an alternative solution. Although Çiller was looking forward to the task according to the coalition protocol, the opposition leaders pressured Demirel to give the duty to Mesut Yılmaz (*Milliyet*, 20 June 1997). There, Süleyman Demirel surprised everyone by assigning Yılmaz as the post of prime minister. Not surprisingly, such a move drew sharp reactions from the WP and the TPP. While Çiller described it as a Çankaya coup, Erbakan reiterated he resigned to pave the way for Çiller's assignment. He added that Yılmaz would be unable to obtain a vote of confidence (*Milliyet*, 21 June 1997). Despite the expectations of the former coalition leaders, Yılmaz managed to form his government by winning the support of almost all parties except the WP, the TPP and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's Great Unity Party. Thanks to such

broad base reconciliation of the opposition, the new Mother-Left-D government obtained the vote easily by 281 ayes against 256 nays (*Milliyet*, 13 July 1997).

Süleyman Demirel played a significant role in the post-28 February process. Apart from unproven rumors concerning his encouragement in the resignations of the dissidents from the TPP, most of his actions were in accordance with the constitution. The problem was in terms of legitimacy due to his neutral and above party position. For instance, he clearly did not shirk in supporting the opposition against the Welfare-Path government when he gave the premiership to Mesut Yılmaz. While his pretext was the vote of confidence, his mainstay was again the constitution. Demirel invited everyone to read Article 109[38] that gave the president the authority to appoint the prime minister (*Milliyet*, 26 June 1997). Considering his earlier career, it was not an unprecedented move on his part since he saw no harm in putting legality ahead of legitimacy. Another reflection of such an approach exists in his perception of 28 February. In contrast with the approaches of many politicians, Süleyman Demirel viewed the situation as a crisis rather than a post-modern coup. In a TRT television interview, he based his argument on the NSC's constitutional role and suggested it was completely legal for the armed forces to appeal to the council so as to express their discomfort (Ergen, 2009, p. 1667). Demirel argued that the 28 February process was completely different than that of 12 March 1971 since the government in the latter case was forced to resign by a memorandum (Ergen, 2009, p. 1667). Years later, in an interview with a parliamentary commission charged with investigating military coups, he denied all claims labeling 28 February as a 'post-modern coup.' He asserted,

[38] Article 109: The Council of Ministers shall consist of the Prime Minister and the ministers. The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The ministers shall be nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President of the Republic, from among the members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, or from among those eligible to be elected as deputies; they can be dismissed,by the President of the Republic, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister when deemed necessary.

> "I absolutely disagree since you are saying military intervention, but in what did it intervene? The parliament? The parliament is there. It was there so that there was the possibility to go to elections later on. The government? The government was also there. The constitution? It was also present. Let me say this: If the parliament, the constitution and the government were still there, it is because of the role I played" (Demirel S. , 2012, p. 95).

His claims rang partly true except the fact he had to make concessions from democracy to do all this. But then again, as long as an issue was in line with the constitution, it was sufficient for Demirel to describe it as legitimate. Although that was in contrast with his approach in the early 1980s, he saw no problem in adopting a new one. After all, pragmatically speaking, he was best at adapting himself to changing conditions.

The similar attitude continued on the issues of shutting down the WP by the Constitutional Court or the donning headscarves in public spaces. According to Süleyman Demirel, all matters should be assessed according to the criteria of constitutionality. While admitting that party closure was something unpleasant, he added that if the party in question violated the constitution, it would be meaningless to take a stand against the decision since the constitution was valid for all citizens (Ergen, 2009, p. 1731). When the Virtue Party (VP) was founded after the closure of the WP, Demirel did not neglect to warn the VP in a television interview with Mehmet Ali Birand. He did so by arguing that the new party could share the same sequel if it intended to conduct the same policies as the WP. On the other hand, he emphasized that the deputies of the WP could continue to their political activities since the closing decision only concerned the party (Ergen, 2009, p. 1779). Demirel referred to the constitution as an excuse to legitimize a controversial decision in the post-28 February process. Inevitably, such an attitude made him unpopular among the traditional voter base he had relied during his political career. In other words, at the risk of losing

popularity in the traditional realm, Süleyman Demirel became a reliable figure in the eyes of the secular elite.

On the other hand, it should be debated that the delicate situation of the period forced him to behave in that manner. After all, as President of the Republic, Süleyman Demirel had to look out for the efficient functioning of the regime. That included the prevention of all tensions among the institutions of the state apparatus, including the army and the political parties. According to Zeynep Çağlıyan İçener, the personal experience of Süleyman Demirel regarding civilian-military relations might have made him behave in such a manner since he wanted to prevent another political crisis from arising by maintaining the balance (Çağlıyan İçener, 2010, p. 185). In parallel with İçener's argument, Yavuz Donat once said that Demirel expended an extraordinary effort to keep the parliament open (Ergen, 2009, p. 1663). Although both arguments reflect a plausible approach on their part, they are insufficient for a broader understanding of the process since the most significant personal characteristic of Süleyman Demirel, his pragmatism, was neglected. From a perspective that included such pragmatism, Demirel might have chosen to stand on the seculars' side, as he believed that they were strong enough to provide him with new opportunities.

It would not be surprising if an experienced, pragmatic individual like Süleyman Demirel had not looked for personal benefit in such turmoil. Within that framework, his comments on presidential authority right in the middle of a crisis should not be considered coincidental. In a press conference back in January 1996, Demirel had already mentioned that the presidential system was something that came onto the agenda from time to time. While admitting that Turkey should discuss the presidency in broad terms, he said that he was pleased as the issue had been tabled for discussion (Demirel S. , 2000b, p. 224). Coincidentally or not, the next discussion

concerning the presidential system came onto the agenda after 28 February when anxiety surrounding the regime was at its peak. Demirel was already emphasizing on many occasions that the president must have the authority to renew the election whenever he deemed the regime to be in jeopardy. That time, it was his old companion, Hüsamettin Cindoruk who threw the discussion into the pot. On 7 April 1997, right in the middle of the post-28 February process, he argued that the transition to the semi-presidency would be the most effective way to overcome the existing crisis. The solution he proposed was based upon the two-round election system and a president with broader authorities. While suggesting going to the polls in three months, Cindoruk argued that Süleyman Demirel could not escape from the duty since he became the hope of the public (*Milliyet*, 8 April 1997). His emphasis on Süleyman Demirel was not surprising at all as Cindoruk acted many times previously as his unofficial spokesman.

A few months later, it turned out that Süleyman Demirel had no intention of escaping from the duty. As a matter of fact, he was the one who came up with the idea of system change that time. In September 1997, he stepped into the arena by proposing a constitutional amendment that would grant a directly elected president power to set up and lead the government. While his argument hindered instability caused by weak governments, Demirel stressed that Turkey could not run away from the discussions concerning the presidential system (*Milliyet*, 18 September 1997). In order to show the necessity of the amendments, Demirel appeared on several television programs starting from May 1997. In an interview with Güneri Civaoğlu, he gave more details of the system he had in mind. He argued that he would prefer a semi-presidency rather than a presidency since he was hesitant about implementing the latter in Turkey. According to Demirel, the system in France could be a good example: a semi-president with broader

authorities would be useful for the functioning of the regime (Ergen, 2009, p. 1652). In another program on TRT, he highlighted the instabilities by claiming there had been six different governments over the last four years. Then, he added that he did not intend to be the president himself but the only thing that he wanted was the well being of his country. While refraining from further comment, he invited everyone to discuss the issue (Ergen, 2009, p. 1666-1667). Although Demirel admitted that he asked for nothing personal, his claims were perceived differently, as he wanted the presidency for himself since his term in office was about to end in May 2000. So he stepped back and did not mention the issue in the opening speech of the parliament by admitting that the discussion was degenerated (*Milliyet*, 2 October 1997). As indicated earlier, it would be plausible to say that discussions of the presidency in a process of deep instabilities could be considered as another pragmatist action of Süleyman Demirel. It may still be argued that Demirel wanted to use his popularity among the secular elite in order to obtain not only broader authorities but also for a probable second term in the office.

Although his efforts on the issue of presidency had failed shortly, Süleyman Demirel continued to be the main actor of political life. After the failure of the Mother-Left-D government by a motion of confidence in November 1998, all eyes turned on Demirel to see who he was going to assign the duty of forming the next government. There, he made another surprise by appointing Yalım Erez, a former dissident from the TPP. After becoming independent, he remained in the inner circle of Süleyman Demirel while building dialogue with all the party groups in the parliament (*Milliyet*, 23 December 1998). What both Demirel and Erez had not calculated was Tansu Çiller's objection, since she believed that such appointment could cause rifts within her party (*Milliyet*, 5 January 1999). From all this uncertainty, a familiar name, Bülent

Ecevit emerged as the prominent leader. Thanks to his honest and experienced image, he managed to reconcile two rival parties of the center-right, the MP and the TPP under his premiership. Almost a week after his appointment, on 17 January, Ecevit's minority government obtained the vote of confidence by 306 ayes (*Milliyet*, 18 January 1999). Interestingly, Süleyman Demirel did not hesitate to appoint his old rival since he might have seen him to be the most reliable alternative among the rest.

Although the government of Bülent Ecevit was supposed to be a temporary one that would take the country to the elections, an important development changed everyone's calculations. On 15 February, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was brought to Turkey after being captured in Kenya by the Special Forces (*Milliyet*, 16 February 1999). That gave Ecevit a huge popularity and unlike the Cyprus issue 25 years ago, he managed to turn it to his advantage. Thus, in the elections on 18 April, the DLP came as the first party by obtaining 22.2% of the votes. The NAP and the VP were the followers with 18% and 15.4% respectively. The votes of the center-right parties, the MP and the TPP experienced a serious decline as they won 13.2% and 12%, respectively (TÜİK, 2012, p. 93). Due to the fact that no party obtained a sole majority in the parliament, another strange coalition of the 90's was formed among the DLP, the NAP and the MP.

However, the formulating of a coalition was a difficult process in which Süleyman Demirel played an important role. When the negotiations were on the verge of breaking due to ideological differences between the DLP and the NAP, he interfered personally to convince Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the latter. While arguing that the public opinion pointed in the direction of a coalition among the DLP, the NAP and the MP, he stressed that people would be pleased if Bülent Ecevit would succeed to form the government (*Milliyet*, 19 May 1999). Süleyman Demirel's emphasis on Ecevit was

important since the leader of the VP, Recai Kutan claimed that his party was ready for a third National Front government (*Milliyet*, 18 May 1999). The new government was founded at the end of May, almost 40 days after the elections. Since there was still palpable anxiety against the Islamists, the coalition protocol put special weight on issues like secularism, headscarves, and compulsory eight-year education (*Milliyet*, 29 May 1999). After all, the restoration of the regime after 28 February was still incomplete and one may suggest that Süleyman Demirel might have wanted to transfer the power from the military to civilians. Within that framework, Bülent Ecevit might have been one of the safest options during the process.

As a matter of fact, Ecevit implied his potential stance right after the elections, when a deputy from the VP, Merve Kavakçı took an oath in the parliament with her headscarf. While the deputies were protesting Kavakçı for 45 minutes, he made a historical statement, claiming, "This is not the place to challenge the state. Please teah this lady how to behave" (*Milliyet*, 3 May 1999). Similar to many examples during the late 1990s, the issue became a serious crisis with the contribution of the media. Then again, Süleyman Demirel was there to fan the flames. During an official visit to France, he named Kavakçı as an agent provocateur by saying that the state had verified information concerning his claim. While arguing that such kind of action would mean ignoring all sensitivities of the past, he suggested that the intention behind such action was to introduce the headscarf to the parliament (*Milliyet*, 5 May 1999). Such reconciliation between Demirel and Ecevit were unprecedented since they were archrivals during their entire political careers. According to Mustafa Çolak, the statist reaction against Merve Kavakçı had triggered the fact that Bülent Ecevit and his DLP had internalized the role as the defenders of the regime (Çolak, 2016, p. 280). Within

such a framework, the rapprochement between Demirel and Ecevit was a non-issue as they shared the same ideas in many issues concerning the state and the regime.

As time went by, rather than just being the guardian of the regime in the post-28 February process, it turned out that Süleyman Demirel had other expectations from Ecevit. After all, it would not be surprising if a pragmatist like Demirel did not have a hidden agenda. That time, his objective was to extend his term in the office, which was about to end in May 2000. Since he won the support of secular non-political actors during his presidency, all he needed was the political support in the parliament. Although Ecevit was eager to provide such support, some constitutional amendments were required for such changes. Even while coalition negotiations were still ongoing, he expressed that constitutional amendments would allow him to serve as president for two consecutive terms. He also added that these amendments could be realized without a referendum by means of a certain amount of support from different parties (*Milliyet*, 24 May 1999). In other words, Ecevit's proposition meant ten more years in Çankaya for Süleyman Demirel. But the issue was postponed due to the busy agenda of the country, which included the earthquake on 17 August, and the assassination of Ahmet Taner Kışlalı on 21 October. Throughout all these incidents, Ecevit and Demirel continued to work in harmony.

However, the discussion was inevitably tabled as Süleyman Demirel's days in Çankaya were numbered. In December, in an official visit to Bosnia, he claimed that he would not shy away from the duty in case there was such a demand. While supporting the 5+5 formula of Ecevit, he stressed that the president should be elected directly by the people (*Milliyet*, 7 December 1999). His timing was interesting because only a week before, Çevik Bir, one of the prominent generals of the 28 February process, said that he might run for presidency (*Milliyet*, 30 November 1999). As an

experienced politician, he knew that such a kind of statement made his candidacy more eligible on the eyes of parliament politicians. But Demirel was cautious and paid special attention not to look overly enthusiastic for the issue. For instance, in a television interview, he told that the leaders of the DLP, the NAP, the MP and the TPP reached an agreement on his behalf. But he also claimed that a constitutional change could not be made for any one person. Meanwhile, he did not forget to repeat that he would not shy away from serving his country if it would be necessary (Ergen, 2009, p. 2182).

Although Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel were confident of attaining the required 367 votes needed to pass the amendments, things did not go as they expected. While hoping to obtain the support of the opposition parties, Ecevit encountered problems even within his coalition. For instance, due to the reaction within the MP, Mesut Yılmaz announced that he could not force anyone to vote for the amendments (*Milliyet*, 21 February 2000). On the other hand, the TPP was reluctant and the VP was saying a conditional yes (*Milliyet*, 20 March 2000). Finally, in the first round on 29 March, the 303 ayes were far from the required number, 330. According to *Milliyet*, that was the result of the leakage in the MP and the TPP (*Milliyet*, 30 March 2000). The following day, Bülent Ecevit invited everyone who voted nay to reconsider his or her decisions. In fact, he said that he could even consider resigning from the premiership (*Milliyet*, 31 March 2000). Until the second round of voting, he continued to put pressure on the deputies via several measures including an open ballot even though it was against the Constitution. However, his efforts backfired on the day of the voting when the total ayes remained at 303. That also meant the end of Süleyman Demirel's political career after 36 years (*Milliyet*, 6 April 2000). As a twist of fate, while his rival Bülent Ecevit was struggling to give him two more consecutive terms, it

was the nay votes of the center-right parties that removed him from office. According to Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın, that was an indication of his changing image over time (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 437). It may be suggested that was again the result of his pragmatism especially during and after 28 February. In other words, Süleyman Demirel preferred to become the president of the secular elite at the cost of alienating center-right voters. He did so because he believed that standing with the stronger side could provide him new opportunities. On 16 May 2000, he was replaced by Ahmet Necdet Sezer. It marked his final day in state service.

Süleyman Demirel's term in Çankaya may have been the most important period in terms of analyzing his pragmatism since the requirements of the presidency were different from those he had encountered during his political career. Unsurprisingly, he managed to understand and meet all these necessities due to his experience in the state mechanism. From his first day in office, Demirel had claimed to be a constitutional president. In other words, he wanted to stay within the limits provided to the president by the constitution. He focused on the efficiency of the state and the regime. Since he was no longer concerned about the elections, he did not hesitate to warn the government on several issues. For instance, in contrast with his recognition of Kurdish reality in 1991, Demirel preferred to take the side of the hardliners and the army during his presidency. As time went by, he internalized the role of the guardian of the regime. While the anxiety against the Islamists surged after the victory of the WP in the 1995 election, he was there to emphasize the importance of secularism and democracy. Thus, he gained the support of secular actors including the mainstream media and the army. His popularity in the eyes of the same groups reached the highest level during the 28 February process in which Süleyman Demirel played a crucial role. He used his constitutional powers by appointing Mesut Yılmaz as the prime minister to remove the

WP from the government. When the country was suffering from political instability, he came up with the idea that argued that a presidency or a semi-presidency system would be beneficial for Turkey. He might have believed that he could maximize his power with the support of the secular elite despite the cost of losing his traditional base. After all, he was a pragmatic politician who waited for the right time. Within the same framework, he worked in harmony with his old archrival Bülent Ecevit after the DLP's victory in 1999 Elections. As a twist of fate, while Ecevit struggled to give Demirel two more consecutive terms in Çankaya, it was the center-right parties, the TPP and the MP that put an end to his political career. According to many, Süleyman Demirel's presidency witnessed his evolution to statesmanship. On the other hand, within the scope of pragmatism, Demirel was no different than in his previous decades. What he did in Çankaya was adapt himself to the requirements of his new position. Again, he was there waiting for the right time to seize opportunities that would maximize his benefit.

Conclusion

Süleyman Demirel passed away on 17 June 2015 at the age of 91. He did not return to active politics after his retirement in 2000 and spent the rest of his life in his apartment in Güniz Sokak. Whether by coincidence or not, his timing was again good since only months after his departure, in February 2001, Turkey faced one of the most severe economic crises of its history. His successor, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, was on the spot since his clash with Bülent Ecevit pulled the trigger. The crisis of 2001 did also mean the decline on behalf of the major political actors of the 1990s. The elections on 3 November 2002 resulted in a two party parliament with the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in power and the RPP in the opposition. The TPP, the MP, the DLP and the NAP were left out of the parliament. Afterwards, Süleyman Demirel preferred to adopt the role of a wise man of Turkish politics. His apartment became a place that was visited both by the members of the government and the opposition.

Almost eight months before his death, Demirel gave a speech in the opening ceremony of the Museum and Social Complex of Democracy and Development, which was built in his honor. There he gave a brief overview of his life. His speech was also a tribute to the republic. Demirel stated,

> "I was born in that village. My family still lives in that village. I left this village and reached to the highest office of the Republic of Turkey. This story is not a story of a long and narrow path stretching out to Çankaya from İslamköy, but also a struggle of the Republic for development and civilization and striving of my nation to find its own self. In fact, this story is about a period of time that may be counted as short in the lives of nations. So much so, I am the first President of the Republic of Turkey born after the proclamation of the Republic. This village is the story of the Republic and the witness of its success. A villager child born in İslamköy was able to be elected to the highest office of the State. This was achieved thanks to the Republic and Democracy" (Demirel S. , 2014).

Demirel's success cannot be explained only by the opportunities provided by the republic and democracy, but also by his pragmatism, which was incorporated in all the different stages of his life. Since the objective of this study is to illustrate his pragmatism via his biography, each chapter constitutes a sequence of his life. The first chapter focuses on the period between 1924 and 1960, his early years, in order to illuminate the roots of his pragmatism. Throughout these years, one may see Demirel sporting two different types of pragmatism. The first one, which was provided by his traditional background, constituted a toolbox that enabled him to cope with the hardship of surviving the rough conditions of the environment he lived in. The second type of pragmatism was an outcome of his engineering education that introduced him the mindset of a man of technique who would adopt a pragmatic approach rather than acting according to principles. Moreover, his career as a bureaucrat and his two visits to the United States delivered insights on his future political orientation.

The second chapter of the study covers the years between 1960 and 1964 that witnessed Süleyman Demirel’s emergence as a politician. Again, pragmatism was on the spot since he preferred to remain cautious and be on the safe side regarding many issues. Since he aimed to be in the right place at the right time, Demirel took the special conditions of the period into consideration and acted accordingly. When he became candidate for the presidency of the Justice Party, he benefited from the consensus that was established around his name among different actors of the political scene.

The third chapter of the dissertation focuses on the period between 1964 and 1971 when Süleyman Demirel adopted a moderate pragmatism. Due to his modern technocrat image, he managed to obtain the majority in the 1965 elections. After becoming prime minister, he embraced the role of a politician who would run the

country without becoming partisan regarding any issue. Since he knew that he had to maintain the delicate balance in the civil-military relations, he remained cautious vis-à-vis the army in the post-27 May process. Same cautiousness continued when political manifestations escalated towards the end of the decade. Demirel portrayed a tolerant image regarding the issue despite his anti-communist orientation. Yet, his tolerance might not be genuine since he was aware that his hands were tied due to the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution. When the situation got out of control in the following process, the army intervened via a memorandum on 12 March 1971. Demirel preferred to be on the safe side and resigned by obeying the orders of the commanders.

The fourth chapter of the study covers the period between 1971 and 1980 which again reflects Demirel's pragmatism. While cooperating with the 12 March regime to pass the restrictive constitutional amendments that he wanted since the 1960s, he did not care about the fact that he had to leave his office because of the memorandum. Since he knew that the interim governments needed his party's support, he used his influence to control them and later to overthrow Prime Minister Nihat Erim. When his party came second in the 1973 elections, he moved to the opposition and adopted a harder discourse against the Ecevit government. Since Ecevit wanted make the most out of his post-Cyprus popularity, Demirel stepped in to the scene with the National Front governments. Although he was not genuinely nationalist, he preferred to make concessions to the extreme right and the Islamists to maintain the coalition. While doing so, his criticism against the left became gradually harsher. On the other hand, he neglected the violence caused by the right wing since he needed his partners to secure his government's majority in the parliament. After two Nationalist Front governments, he founded a minority government, which he had claimed was unconstitutional once. That was when he adopted the 24 January decisions in order to bring Turkish economy

in line with the changing global conditions. Yet, his government failed to deal with the escalation violence and as a result Süleyman Demirel had to leave the office after the military intervention on 12 September 1980.

The fifth chapter dwells on the years between 1980 and 1993 which witnessed not only his return to the political scene but also his emergence as the president of the Republic. By means of his pragmatism, he managed to reinvent himself in order to adapt the new conditions of the post-12 September process and the 1980s. During his banned years, he tried to get involved in politics from behind the scene. Since he was the victim of a military intervention, he often made reference to democratic values. His moderate stance continued after his return to active politics in 1987. After the victory of his True Path Party in the 1991 elections, he founded a coalition with the social democrats, which constitutes another example of his capacity to reinvent himself according to the changing conditions. His moderate discourse continued during his premiership, especially concerning issues like the Kurdish Question. When Turgut Özal passed away on 17 April 1993, Süleyman Demirel was again in the right place at the right time to replace him in the presidency.

The sixth chapter of the study covers Süleyman Demirel's years in Çankaya that lasted between 1993 and 2000. The period is important in terms of analyzing his pragmatism since the requirements of his new post were different from the previous ones. However, Süleyman Demirel managed to understand them well due to his experience of the state mechanism. He did not intend to violate the constitution as opposed to his predecessor Turgut Özal. Instead, he focused on maximizing the efficiency of the state. While doing that, he was gradually estranged from his democratic discourse of the 1980s by adopting the role of a guardian of the regime. When the anxiety against the Islamists reached to a certain level after the victory of the

Welfare Party, Süleyman Demirel stepped in by emphasizing the importance of secularism. The same attitude continued during the 28 February process in which Süleyman Demirel played a crucial role. He did not hesitate to use his constitutional powers to remove the Welfare Party from the government despite the fact that he had to be neutral. As time progressed, he became a prominent figure in the eyes of the secular elites with the support of the mainstream media and the army at the expense of alienating his traditional base. When political instability reached to the highest level, he brought forward a system change that would pave the way for the presidency or semi-presidency. Towards the end of his term, Bülent Ecevit, his archrival during the 1970s, was the one who struggled to secure a second term for Demirel by amending the constitution. As a twist of fate, he had to leave office because of the negative votes of the center right parties including his former party.

Pragmatism constitutes an analytical framework that enables us comprehend Süleyman Demirel's life, political career, choices and preferences, which otherwise seem to be complicated to grasp. Demirel's life can be identified with a recurring tension between principled action and pragmatism. Yet a deeper study like this one illustrates that even when he was engaged in principled action, it was only because doing so was best for his interests. The study also provides an alternative reading of Turkish political life. Rather than being a sheer chronological work, the study represents Turkish political history via 'his story' and aims to encourage the reader to think out of the box. The individual's life through which the subject matter is studied brings the intersection of micro and macro factors into the picture, which otherwise could be neglected.

Political science and biography can be considered as strange bedfellows. Yet, this study aims to prove that biographical method can be valuable since it represents a

novelty among conventional methods employed in the field. Accordingly, there is room for conducting similar research by pairing different concepts with different actors like in the case of pragmatism and Süleyman Demirel.

Bibliography

Abadan, N., & Yücekök, A. N. (1966). 1961-1965 Seçimlerinde Büyük Şehirlerde Gelir Durumuna Göre Oy Verme Davranışları. *Siyasi Bilimler ve Hukuk, 21*(4), 103-117.

Acar, F. (1991). The True Path Party, 1983-1989. In M. Heper, & J. Landau, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (pp. 188-202). London: I.B. Tauris.

Adalet Partisi. (1962). *1962 Büyük Kongresi.* Ankara: Orijinal Matbaa.

Adalet Partisi. (1965). *Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi* (Vol. 21). Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı.

Adalet Partisi. (1969). *Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi* (Vol. 38). Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları.

Adalet Partisi. (1972). *Millet Hizmetinde Adalet Partisi* (Vol. 50). Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları.

Adalet Partisi. (1973). *Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi.* Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları.

Adalet Partisi. (1977). *Kervan Yürüyecektir: Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi.* Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları.

Ağlarcı, M. (1938, Nisan). Isparta'da Nüfus. *Ün*, p. 706.

Ahmad, F. (1977). *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy.* London: C. Hurst & Company.

Ahmad, F. (1993). *The Making of Modern Turkey.* London: Routledge.

Ahmad, F., & Ahmad Turgay, B. (1976). *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayatın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971.* İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Akman, H. (2012). *Saf ve Bakir Anadolu Çocuğu: Güngör Uras Kitabı.* İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Altuğ, K. (1993). *Demokrasinin Yaralı Yılları.* İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.

Arcayürek, C. (1985)a. *Yeni Demokrasi Yeni Arayışlar 1960-1965.* Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Arcayürek, C. (1985)b. *Demirel Dönemi, 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971.* Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Arklay, T. (2006)a. Introduction to Political Lives. In T. Arklay, J. Nethercote, & J. Wanna, *Australian Political Lives: Its Contribution to Political Science* (pp. xi-xiii). Canberra : ANU E Press.

Arklay, T. (2006)b. Political Biography: Its Contribution to Political Science. In T. Arklay, J. Nethercote, & J. Wanna, *Australian Political Lives: Chronicling political careers and administrative stories* (pp. 13-24). Canberra: ANU E Press.

Arzık, N. (1985). *Demirel'in İçi-Dışı.* İstanbul: *Milliyet* Yayınları.

Arzık, N. (1986). *Zincirbozan: Bir Yaz Boyunca.* Eskişehir: Mızrak Yayınevi.

Atay, O. (1992). *Bir Bilim Adamı'nın Romanı.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Atay, O. (2002). *Tutunamayanlar.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Ayata, A. (1997, September). The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 59-73.

Aydın, S., & Taşkın, Y. (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Baban, C. (1971). *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler.* İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.

Banner, L. W. (2009, June). Biography as History. *American Historical Review*, 579-586.

Barkey, H. J., & Fuller, G. E. (1997). Turkey's Kurdish Question, Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities. *Middle East Journal, 51*(1), 59-79.

Batur, M. (1985). *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde arkası.* İstanbul: *Milliyet* Yayınları.

Bektaş, A. (1993). *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980).* Ankara: Bağlam.

Bener, E. (1978). *Bürokratlar* (Vol. II). Istanbul: *Milliyet* Yayınları.

Bila, F. (2005, Eylül 11). Demirel: Evet, Tan gazetesini bastık. *Milliyet*, p. 20.

Bilgiç, S. (2002). *Dr. Sadettin Bilgiç'in Hatıraları.* Ankara: Boğaziçi Yayınları.

Birand, M. A. (Producer). (2012). *Son Darbe: 28 Şubat* [Motion Picture]

Birand, M. A., & Yalçın, S. (2001). *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü.* İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Birand, M. A., Dündar, C., & Çaplı, B. (2008). *12 Mart: İhtilalin Pençesinde Demokrasi.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.

Birand, M. A., Hikmet, B., & Akar, R. (1999). *12 Eylül: Türkiye'nin Miladı.* İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık.

Bolton, G. (2006). The Art of Australian Political Biography. In T. Arklay, J. Nethercote, & J. Wanna, *Australian Political Lives: Chronicling political careers and administrative stories* (pp. 1-12). Canberra: ANU E Press.

Bora, T. (2005). Süleyman Demirel. In M. Yılmaz (Ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Liberalizm* (Vol. 7, pp. 550-577). İstanbul: İletişim.

Boratav, K. (2013). *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.

Böcüzade, S. S. (1983). *Kuruluşundan Bugüne Kadar Isparta Tarihi.* İstanbul: Serenler Yayını.

Buğra, A. (1994). *State and Business in Modern Turkey.* New York: State University of New York Press.

Carr, E. H. (1967). *What is History?* New York: Random House.

Cemal, H. (1986). *12 Eylül Günlüğü: Tank Sesiyle Uyanmak.* İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi.

CHP. (1973). *Ak Günlere.* Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi.

Cılızoğlu, T. (2007). *Çağlayangil'in Anıları.* Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Cizre, Ü. (1996). Liberalism, Democracy and the Turkish Centre Right: The Identity Crisis of the True Pathy party. *Middle Eastern Studies, 32*(2), 142-161.

Cizre, Ü. (2002). *AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Cizre, Ü., & Çınar, M. (2003). Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 309-332.

Clock, P. (1965). Impression of Turkish Political Scene Five Months After Home Leave, March 9. In R. N. Bali (Ed.), *Turkey in the 1960's and 1970's Through the Reports of American Diplomats* (pp. 100-106). Istanbul: Libra.

Çağlıyan İçener, Z. (2010). Presidents, the State and "Democracy| in Turkey: The Ideas and Praxis of Süleyman Demirel. *Unpublished PhD Thesis*. Ankara: Bilkent University.

Çavuşoğlu, H. (2007). 12 Eylül ve Merkez Sağ. *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*(6), 183-201.

Çolak, M. (2016). *Bülent Ecevit: Karaoğlan.* Istanbul: İletişim.

Dağı, İ., & Uğur, F. (2009). *Yalnız Demokrat: Ferruh Bozbeyli Kitabı.* İstanbul: Timaş.

Dalan, B. (2016, November 21). (M. Arslan, Interviewer)

Demirel, S. (1953). *Bayındırlık Vekaleti Su İşleri Reisliği tarafından inşa ettirilmekte olan Amasya-Durucasu, Erzincan-Girlevik, Elazığ-Hazar Gölü Hidroelektirk*

santralleri ile Seyhan Barajı ve Hidroelektrik tesisleri hakkında rapor. Ankara: Türkiye I. İstişari Enerji Kongresi.

Demirel, S. (1964, November 28). Adalet Partisi İkinci Büyük Kongresindeki Konuşması.

Demirel, S. (1964, November 28). AP İkinci Büyük Kongresindeki Konuşması.

Demirel, S. (1965). *Yazdıkları ve Söyledikleri* (Vol. 17). Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Neşriyatı.

Demirel, S. (1966). *Seçim Konuşmaları 2* (Vol. 28). Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınlar.

Demirel, S. (1973). *1973 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru.* İstanbul: Adalet Partisi .

Demirel, S. (1974, October 22). Adalet Partisi Yedinci Büyük Kongresi Açış Konuşması.

Demirel, S. (1974). *Ekim 1974.* Ankara: Doğuş.

Demirel, S. (1975). *Milliyetçiler Birleşiniz.* Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkezi Basın Bürosu.

Demirel, S. (1977). *Büyük Türkiye.* Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları.

Demirel, S. (1978, October 28). A.P. 9. Büyük Kongresi'ni Açış Konuşması.

Demirel, S. (1979). *Bayrağımın Altında.* İstanbul: Göktürk Yayınları.

Demirel, S. (1987). *Kalkınmanın Manevi Yönü.* İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları.

Demirel, S. (1990). *Anı Değil İtiraf.* Ankara: Ayyıldız.

Demirel, S. (2000,)a. *Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel'in Yabancı Basına Verdikleri Mülakatlar.* Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi.

Demirel, S. (2000)b. *Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel'in Yıllık Basın Toplantıları.* Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi.

Demirel, S. (2006). *Devran.* İstanbul: ABC Medya Ajansı.

Demirel, S. (2012). *Darbe Tutanakları: "Bugünkü çamaşırı dünkü güneşle kurutamazsınız".* Ankara: Anka Yayınları.

Demirel, S. (2014, October 26). Inaugural Speech By H.E. Mr. Süleyman Demirel, The 9th President of the Republic of Turkey, on The Occasion of Opening Of The Museum and Social Complex of Democracy and Development.

Demirel, Ş. (2015). *Bizimköy.* İstanbul.

Demirel, T. (2004). *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Dinçşahin, Ş. (2015). *State and Intellectuals in Turkey: The Life and Times of Niyazi Berkes, 1908-1988.* Lanham: Lexington.

Donat, Y. (1993). *Demirel'in Yokluk Yılları.* Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Donat, Y. (2005). *Cumhuriyet'in Kara Kutusu: Süleyman Demirel Anlatıyor.* İstanbul: Merkez Kitap.

DYP. (1987). *Seçim Beyannamesi - Büyük Türkiye Programı: Hürriyet, Güvenlik ve Refah İçin El Ele.* Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi.

DYP. (1991). *Seçim Bildirgesi: 21 Ekim Sabahı Yeni Bir Türkiye.* Ankara: Doğru Yol Partisi.

Edinger, L. J. (1964, May). Political Science and Political Biography: Reflections on the Study of the Leadership. *The Journal of the Politics, 26*(2), 423-439.

Enerem, T. (2017, February 17). (M. Arslan, Interviewer)

Ergen, C. (2009). *Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Söylev ve Demeçleri.* Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Erimtan, Y. (2015, Ekim-Aralık). Demirel'i Anlatıyorlar. *İTÜ Vakfi Dergisi*, p. 90.

Erkin, T. (2017, February 17). (M. Arslan, Interviewer)

Erozan, B., & Aslaner Karayel, G. (2015). Anadolu'da 27 Mayıs: Bursa, Erzurum, Gaziantep (1960-61). In P. Semerci Uyan, B. Erozan, & N. İncioğlu, *Siyasetin*

Bilimi: İlter Turan'a Armağan (pp. 117-143). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Evered, K. T. (2011). "Poppies Are Democracy!": A Critial Geopolitics of Opium Eradication and Reintroduction in Turkey. *The Geographical Review*, 299-315.

Evren, K. (1990). *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* (Vol. 1). İstanbul: *Milliyet* Yayınları.

Fincancıoğlu, Y. (2000). *Demirel: Demokrasinin Duraklama Yılları.* İstanbul: Büke Yayınları.

Fotopoulos, T. (2002). New World Order and Nato's War against Yugoslavia. *New Political Science, 24*(1), 73-104.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Göle, N. (1997). Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites. *The Middle East Journal*, 46-58.

Göle, N. (2012). *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: Öncü Devrimcilerden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere.* İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Gümüştekin, U. (1974). *Yeni Bir Sosyal Mukaveleye Doğru.* İstanbul: Birlik Matbaası.

Hale, W. (1994). *Turkish Politics and the Military.* London: Routledge.

Hart, P. T. (1966). Attitudes of Some Young Turkish Instructors, December 9. In R. N. Bali (Ed.), *Turkey in the 1960's and 1970's: Through the Reports of American Diplomats* (pp. 119-125). İstanbul: Libra.

Heper, M. (1997). Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation? *The Middle East Journal*, 32-45.

Heper, M. (2007). *The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hirschman, A. O. (1968, February). The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82*(1), 1-32.

Ilıcak, N. (1990). *Zincirbozan Mektupları: Demirel'den Nazlı Ilıcak'a, Nazlı Ilıcak'tan Demirel'e.* İstanbul: Dem Yayınları.

Ilıcak, N. (2012). *12 Eylül Kazanında Bir Gazeteci.* İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

İnönü, İ. (1936, March 26). Başbakan İnönü'nün Isparta'daki Söylevi.

Kalpakçıoğlu, Ö. (1968). *İkinci Cumhuriyet'in 3 Başbakanı ve Olaylar.* Ankara: Nüve Matbaası.

Kazdağlı, C. (1999). *Demirel'in Liderlik Sırları.* İstanbul: Beyaz Yayınları.

Keyder, Ç. (1987). *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development.* London: Verso.

Komsuoğlu, A. (2008). *Siyasal Yaşamda Bir Lider: Süleyman Demirel.* İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları.

Köymen, O. (2008). *Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar, Üretenler ve Patronlar.* İstanbul: Yordam Kitap.

Landau, J. M. (1991). The Justice Party, 1961-1980. In M. Heper, & J. M. Landau, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (pp. 134-152). London: I.B. Tauris.

Makal, M. (1954). *A village in Anatolia.* London: Valentine, Mitchell & Co. Ltd.

Mardin, Ş. (1989). *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi.* Albany: State Universityof New York Press.

Milli Selamet Partisi. (1973). *Milli Selamet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi.* İstanbul: Fatih Yayınevi.

Milor, V. (1990, Fall). The Genesis of State Planning in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1-30.

Mörel, O. (2015, Ekim-Aralık). Demirel'i Anlatıyorlar. *İTÜ Vakfı Dergisi*, p. 91.

Öniş, Z. (1991, October). Review: The Logic of Developmental State. *Comparative Politics, 24*(1), 109-126.

Öniş, Z. (2004, July). Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective. *Middle Eastern Studies, 40*(4), 113-134.

Öniş, Z., & Şenses, F. (2007, December). Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development. *METU Studies in Development , 34*(2), 251-286.

Örnek, C. (2015). *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı: Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi.* İstanbul: Can Yayınları.

Özbudun, E., & Gençkaya, Ö. F. (2009). *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey.* Budapest: Central European University Press.

Özdemir, H. (2014). *Turgut Özal.* İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Pimlott, B. (1990, April-June). The Future of Political Biography. *The Political Quarterly, 61*(2), 214-224.

Pimlott, B. (1999). Is Contemporary Biography History? *The Political Quarterly*, 31-41.

Rhodes, R. A. (2006). Expanding The Repertoire: Theory, Method and Language in Political Biography. In T. Arklay, J. Nethercote, & J. Wanna, *Australian Political Lives: Chronicling political careers and administrative histories* (pp. 43-50). Canberra: ANU E Press.

Sakaoğlu, N. (2003). *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Eğitim tarihi.* İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Sanal, T. (2000). *Demirel Hükümetleri.* Ankara: Sim.

Sayarı, S. (1996, September). Turkey's Islamist Challenge. *Middle East Quarterly*, 35-43.

Saybaşılı, K. (1995). *DYP-SHP Koalisyonu'nun Üç yılı.* İstanbul: Bağlam.

Schmidt, G. L. (1965). A Trip Through Uşak, Afyon, Balıkesir, Kütahya and Manisa, October 8. In R. N. Bali (Ed.), *Turkey in the 1960's and 1970's Through the Reports of American Diplomats* (pp. 114-118). Libra.

Sertel, S. (2015). *Roman Gibi.* İstanbul: Can Yayınları.

Sherwood, W. B. (1967, October). The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey. *World Politics, 20*(1), 54-65.

TRT (Producer), & Sınayuç, O. (Director). (1995). *Süleyman Demirel Belgeseli* [Motion Picture].

Smith, E. D. (1965). Memorandum of Conversation with Cemal Madanoğlu, March 28. In R. N. Bali (Ed.), *Turkey in the 1960's and 1970's Through the Reports of American Diplomats* (pp. 187-193). İstanbul: Libra.

Somer, M. (2004). Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications. *Middle East Journal, 58*(2), 235-253.

Şahiner, N. (1974). *Bilinmeyen Taraflarıyla Bediüzzaman Said Nursi.* İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları.

Şimşek, Derya. (2011). Süleyman Sami Demirel'in Hayatı ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri. *Unpublished PhD Thesis*. Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi.

Tahir, M. (1934). Atabey Medresesi. *Ün*, p. 44.

Tanör, B. (2016). *Osmanlı Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri.* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Tara, Ş. (2015, Ekim-Aralık). Demirel'i Anlatıyorlar. *İTÜ Vakfı Dergisi*, pp. 84-108.

Taşkın, H. (2007). *Demirel'in Kara Kutusu Orhan Keçeli.* İstanbul: Neden Kitap.

Tekeli, İ. (2003). *Eğitim Üzerine Düşünmek.* Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Yayınları.

Tekeli, İ., & İlkin, S. (2004). Cumhuriyet'in Demiryolu Politikalarının Oluşumu ve Uygulanması. In İ. Tekeli, & S. İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken* (pp. 271-324). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Turan, K. (1934, Haziran). Halkevleri. *Ün*, p. 1.

Turan, K. (1942, Mart). Notlar ve İktibaslar. *Ün*, p. 1267.

Turgut, H. (1986). *12 Eylül Partileri.* İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları.

Turgut, H. (1987). *Güniz Sokağı.* İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları.

Turgut, H. (1992). *Demirel'in Dünyası.* İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları.

Turgut, H. (1995). *Türkeş'in Anıları: Şahinlerin Dansı.* İstanbul: ABC Basın Ajansi Yayınları.

Turgut, H. (2014). *Büyük Türkiye'nin Hikayesi.* İstanbul: ABC Medya Ajansı.

Turgut, H. (2015, Ekim-Aralık 2015). İTÜ'lü Süleyman Demirel. *İTÜ Vakfı Dergisi*, pp. 60-84.

Turgut, M. (1990). *Siyasetten Sahneler.* İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları.

TÜİK. (2008). *Halk Oylaması Sonuçları: 2007, 1988, 1987, 1982, 1961.* Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu.

TÜİK. (2012). *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri: 1923-2011.* Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu.

Türk, H. B. (2014). *Muktedir: Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.* İstanbul: İletişim.

Ülgener, S. F. (1991). *İktisadi Çözülmenin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Dünyası.* İstanbul: Der Yayınları.

Weinberg, S. (2008, May 9). Biography, the Bastard Child of Academe. *The Chronicle Review*, p. 2.

Yavuz, H. M. (1997, October). Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey. *Comparative Politics*, 63-82.

Zürcher, E. J. (2001). *Turkey: A Modern History*. I.B. Tauris: New York.

Webpages

About İTÜ: History. (2015, November 21). Retrieved November 21, 2015, from İTÜ Web Site: http://www.itu.edu.tr/en/about-itu/general/history

About Us: History of EF. (2015, December 7). Retrieved December 7, 2015, from Eisenhower Fellowships Web site: https://www.efworld.org/about-us/history

About Us: Mission/Vision. (2015, December 4). Retrieved December 4, 2015, from Bureau of Reclamation Web site:

http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/mission.html

About MK. (2016, March 8). Retrieved March 8, 2016, from Morrison Knudsen Corporation Web Site: http://morrison-knudsen.com/sample-page/

Bakanlığımız: Tarihçe. (2016, February 22). Retrieved February 22, 2016, from Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kalkınma Bakanlığı Web Sitesi:

http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/60SonrasiDonem.aspx

Morrison Knudsen Corporation History. (2016, January 8). Retrieved Januray 8, 2016, from Funding Universe Web Site: http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/morrison-knudsen-corporation-history/

TODAİE. Yerel Seçim Sonuçları. (2017, March 12). Retrieved March 12, 2017, from YerelNET: http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/basvuru_kaynaklari/secim_sonuclari/

Assembly Proceedings

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1968), 19 June, C: 28, B: 78.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1971), 27 August, C: 17, B: 156.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1974), 4 February, C: 1 B: 36.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1974), 20 July, C:13 B: 3.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1979), 4 January, C: 8, B: 31.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1989), 6 April, C: 24, B: 74.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (1991), 26 December, C: 2, B: 21.

Archival Documents

National Archives. (1969). *Memorandum for the Record, October 24.* Washington: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 357, Subject Files, Narcotics I.

National Archives. (1969). *Memorandum from the Assistant to the President (Moyhinan) to Attorney General Mitchell, September 18.* Washington: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 357, Subject Files, Narcotics I.

National Archives. (1969). *Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, December 27.* Washington: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 357, Subject Files, Narcotics I.

National Archives. (1969). *Telegram 775 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, November 17, 1120Z.* Washington: RG 59, Central Files, 1967-1969, INCO-DRUGS 17.

National Archives. (1970). *Memorandum of Conversation, August 17.* Washington: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 358, Subject Files, Narcotics III.

National Archives. (1970). *Telegram 1957 from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, April 2, 1115Z.* Washington: RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO-DRUGS TUR

Newspapers and Magazines

Akis

Cumhuriyet

Milliyet

Son Havadis

Tanin

Time

Yol

Appendix A

ABBREVIATIONS

- AFU: Armed Forces Union
- DISK: Confederation Of Progressive Trade Unions
- DLP: Democratic Left Party
- DP: Democrat Party
- ESDA: Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration
- GTP: Grand Turkey Party
- IMF: International Monetary Fund
- ITU: Istanbul Technical University
- JDP: Justice and Development Party
- JP: Justice Party
- MP: Motherland Party
- MTTB: National Union of Turkish Students
- NAP: Nationalist Action Party
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NOP: National Order Party
- NP: Nation Party
- NSC: National Security Council
- NSP: National Salvation Party
- NTP: New Turkey Party
- NUC: The National Unity Committee
- OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
- PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party
- PP: Populist Party

- RPNP: Republican Peasant Nation Party
- RPP: Republican People's Party
- RRP: Republican Reliance Party
- SHW: State Hydraulic Works
- SODEP: Social Democratic Populist Party
- SPO: State Planning Organization
- SPP: Socialist Populist Party
- TPP: True Path Party
- USIE: United States Information and Exchange
- USIS: United States Information Service
- VP: Virtue Party
- WP: Welfare Party
- WPT: Worker's Party of Turkey

Appendix B



Sahife: 13

Afgan LİSESİ

KOLU BİTİRME BELGESİ DEFTERİ

Ders yılı: 1940 – 1941 Devresi: Mayıs

| | | |

Appendix C

With Lyndon B. Johnson (28 August 1962)

Appendix D



(*Milliyet*, 13 February 1986)

Appendix E

(*Milliyet*, 17 May 1993)