CYBERCODIFICATION AND INVISIBLE DOCUMENTATION
OF
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MASTER OF SCIENCE
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
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ABSTRACT

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OF

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In this study, I am examining the troublesome relation between power and the individual. Power and the individual are mutually productive entities. Yet, power emerges as the predominant figure. Power tries to put the individual under a continuous control to include the individual in the production process via surveillance techniques. Surveillance is more effective in today's world than ever before. Capitalist power gains a global character and it experiences itself as itself for the first time in history. Deleuze calls this stage the era of societies of control. In societies of control, the individual is constituted by various and different

disciplinary institutions at the very same time. Power benefits from information and communication technologies to control the individual in the contemporary era. Population registration systems are significant in this account. They are the principal tools of today's power to keep a continuous eye over the individual and to comprise him in the production process. Every population registration system is a part of the global power dynamics and it influences the construction of citizenship. In Turkey, MERNIS -the Central Population Administrative System- can be regarded as an example of this kind of system. MERNIS may be considered as a nation-wide surveillance mechanism. It is an exercise of power that is compatible with the contemporary rationale of control societies. Nevertheless, it does not work as expected. There is a considerable lack of rationality in the functioning of MERNIS. In the final analysis, the Turkish State has not adequately understood the significance of MERNIS both nationally and globally.

Key words: Power, the individual, surveillance, societies of control, technology, governmentality.

ÖZ

NÜFUSUN SİBERKODLANMASI VE GİZLİ DOKÜMANTASYONU

Topal, Çağatay

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Anabilim Dalı

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Bu çalışmanın amacı iktidar ve birey arasındaki gerilimli ilişkiyi incelemektir. İktidar ve birey birbirlerini karşılıklı olarak üreten kurumlar olarak tarih sahnesine çıkarlar. Bu üretim ilişkisinde baskın olan güç iktidardır. İktidar, bireyi denetim teknikleri vasıtasıyla sürekli bir kontrole tabi tutarak üretim sürecine dahil etmeye çalışır. İktidarın uyguladığı denetim teknikleri günümüzde hiç olmadığı kadar etkili bir hal almıştır. Kapitalist iktidar küresel bir karakter kazanmış, tarihte ilk defa kendini kendi olarak deneyimleme şansına kavuşmuştur. Deleuze tarihin bu dönemini kontrol toplumlarının çağı olarak adlandırır. Kontrol toplumlarında birey çeşitli ve farklı birçok disiplin kurumu tarafından aynı anda kurulur. Bu toplumlarda iktidar bireyi kontrol etmek için ağırlıklı olarak bilgi ve iletişim teknolojilerinden

yararlanır. Nüfus kayıt sistemlerinin bu teknolojiler içinde önemli bir yeri vardır. Bu sistemler iktidarın bireyi sürekli izleyebilmesi ve üretim sürecine dahil edebilmesi açısından oldukça etkili iktidar araçlarıdır. Nüfus kayıt sistemleri küresel iktidar ağlarının bir parçasıdır ve vatandaşlığın kavramsal kuruluşuna doğrudan etkide bulunurlar. Türkiye'de uygulanmaya calýţýlan MERNİS -Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi- nüfus kayit sistemlerine örnek teşkil edebilecek bir yapılanmayı işaret eder. MERNİS kontrol toplumlarının rasyonalitesine uygun olarak ulusal çapta örgütlenmiş bir denetim mekanizması olarak ele alınabilir. Bu gerçeğe rağmen MERNİS'in verimli çalıştığı iddia edilemez. MERNİS'in işletilmesinde açık bir rasyonalite eksikliği göze çarpmaktadır. Türk devleti MERNİS'in günümüz tarihsel bağlamındaki etkisini kavrayamamakta ve MERNİS'e gereken önemi vermemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İktidar, birey, denetim, kontrol toplumu, teknoloji, yönetimsellik.

To my mother, my brother

and to the memory of my father

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

... all dies so fast, no sooner born.
Samuel Beckett

*Knowledge that is absolutely sure
it's infallible -that's faith.*
D-503, We, Yevgeni Zamyatin

The interaction between power and the individual is an uneasy one. It can be said that there is a continuous struggle between these two entities. This is a never-ending fight, which has both a destructive and a productive feature. The immanent characteristic of the fight -destructive production or productive destruction[1]- is operational for both parties. This tension is useful, especially for power; but, it is an undeniable fact that the individual, too, can exploit this relation and develop a powerful strategy of resistance.

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[1] In "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy", Schumpeter discusses capitalism around the concept of "creative destruction". This is to define the non-stationary and evolutionary characteristic of capitalism. Schumpeter argues that creative destruction is the very essence of capitalism and capitalism works and proceeds by creatively destroying or destructively creating. (Schumpeter, J. A. (1950), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, pp. 81-86)

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Power and the individual have such a solid relation that it becomes inevitable to experience a melting process[2]. Power melts into the individual and the individual melts into power. They are re-created in this melting. They gain new forms, new identities and new definitions. While being re-formed from the very beginning, power and the individual also reshape history. It is a historical reality that all contacts of power and the individual and so the reshaping of history occur in given material concrete conditions. That is to say, a historical-materialist analysis appears crucial to understand the complex and varied dynamics between power and the individual.

Such an analysis necessitates a closer look at some important concepts and a discussion of these in relation to their material history. However, since the struggle of power and the individual usually continues around some fundamental concerns, the focus should be on the changes of these concerns in a specific history, rather than on the concepts themselves. Besides power and the individual, the significant concepts for this study are freedom, surveillance, bio-politics, technology, production, information, communication, governmentality, citizenship and resistance. I am going to examine these concepts mainly in three different but sequential and certainly related time periods. These periods are called the stages (societies) of sovereignty, discipline and control. In all three societies, there are certain methods and technologies which societies use in order to create an "ideal" individual for the

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[2] See Berman's discussion on the arguments of Marx and Engels. A parallel analysis of the concept of "self-destruction" in Berman and Schumpeter's "creative destruction" will be especially useful in comprehending the tense relation between the individual and power. (Berman, M. (1982), All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, Simon & Schuster, New York, pp. 87-129)

continuity of their own existence. They have made use of various and different techniques. While these techniques were more cruel and brutish in the societies of sovereignty, power practices have since gained a more human feature. Namely, the evolution of the technologies of power to create a "new" individual -citizen- has tended towards a situation that is more acceptable and easily adaptable. In this way, power can produce bio-politically a prototype individual, who will guarantee -to a great extent- the re-production of the mechanisms of power. This indicates, at the same time, the presence of a vicious circle through which power is constantly produced and turns out to be a reified formation. This is one significant issue, which hides the real characteristic of power.

Surveillance is probably the most crucial weapon of power, whose most fundamental peculiarity is its diffusion across the whole plane of the society. Surveillance can be widespread like power itself. This is obviously more visible in contemporary -control- societies considering the developments in communication and information technologies. These can be seen also as new technologies of power. Among surveillance techniques are education, imprisonment, military duties, medical and psychological treatments and, above all, population registration systems.

The usefulness of population registration systems cannot be overlooked for the individual as well as for power. First of all, registration means the possibility of access to many opportunities, rights and benefits for the individual. In today's world, it also means less bureaucracy, faster public service, more "free" time and more security. However, there is a reverse or dark side of the picture. Considering the

communication revolution in contemporary society, there emerges a very real possibility that we are becoming more and more subject to a continuous process of surveillance. The individual will inevitably face a dilemma between experiencing a "secure" controlled life or an "insecure" uncontrolled life. It must be admitted that, in either case, there is neither a completely secure nor absolutely uncontrolled life. The interesting point is that security and freedom appear to be counter-concepts, which run counter to each other. Actually, in the formation of registration systems, the dominant perspective is generally the one, which is fed by security concerns.

MERNIS (Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi) -The Central Population Administrative System-, which is being applied in Turkey, is one example of such systems. MERNIS, like other similar counterparts, aims to provide an efficient and effective public service. But, again like the others, it creates a considerable danger for the individual's freedom and privacy. On the other hand, it must certainly be mentioned that MERNIS functions in a more different way than other more efficient systems in, for example, Sweden and Norway. It cannot be said that MERNIS works rationally. As a matter of fact, it can hardly be claimed that MERNIS is being conducted with the right perspective -the one, which sees the importance of information and knowledge with a global point of view.

In any case, MERNIS can be regarded as a surveillance practice. Like all surveillance mechanisms, MERNIS is also directly related to the considerations of power -the state authority. Yet, it will be misleading to stop the analysis of MERNIS at this level. MERNIS happens to exist within global power interactions. So, the true

positioning of MERNIS could not be achieved without looking at the global dynamics. The citizen of today's world is not only that of his country or his nation-state but also that of the whole world. In this respect, the process of reshaping the individual as a citizen cannot be seen solely as a national matter. This is a governmentality problem basically on the global level. There is no outside of the global village and the starting point must be the powerful global "governments".

In these circumstances, it should be apparent that resistance against these mechanisms has to be organized with a global point of view. Power is really powerful and widespread all over the world. However, this is because power needs the individual who can give the necessary material infrastructure to power. Power automatically comes together with the opportunities of resistance since it inevitably provides escape points. A productive individual is more valuable for power than an unproductive one. So, it must give the individual the chance of being productive. The question the modern individual has to confront is how he can create and sustain an indocile productivity. The answer should be sought in an autonomous self, which is being continuously formed within self-organized resistance practices operating with a global perspective.

CHAPTER II

BASIC CONCEPTS

*A concept is a set of inseparable variations
that is produced or constructed on a plane of
immanence insofar as the latter crosscuts the
chaotic variability and gives it consistency.*
G. Deleuze & F. Guattari

In this chapter, I will present a brief summary of the concepts of the study. I will mainly focus on meanings and definitions of the concepts themselves rather than on the thoughts of historical figures associated with these concepts. With this introductory section, I will also make clear how the concepts are going to be dealt with and which meanings of the concepts are going to be used in the rest of the study.

My first and the most fundamental concept is power. Though it seems to be associated with a centralist repressive entity, I use the concept to refer to a diffused system of complex mechanisms, practices and experiences. That is, I follow a Foucauldian path. Power, in this regard, appears to have a characteristic of being capillary, productive and existing in the very social relations, which constitute society (Fraser, 1995; 133).

The second concept is the individual. The individual is analyzed as both the subject and the object of power. He is the target of power. For the sake of clarification, I sometimes use the term "subject" instead of the individual. The dual feature of the individual, for example, will be clearer if we refer to "subject". Foucault (1994; 221) mentions that "subject" has two meanings: being subject to other(s) and being tied to his own self. This duality, in a way, shows how close and blurred the borders between freedom and power are.

The individual, moreover, has his own knowledge. But, this knowledge is known to power, too. Power works through the knowledge of the individual. It is the inevitable and vital part of power mechanisms. Via knowledge, power develops certain norms. The individual is shaped in accordance with these norms and turns out to be a "normal" subject. He, at the same time, becomes the object of power. Knowledge is directly related to the constitution of the subject as the object (Rawlinson, 1995; 304-305).

The individual, as both a subject and an object, is produced in bio-political structures. That is, the individual comes face-to-face with a bio-power. The aim of bio-power, Ewald (1995; 282) argues, is to manage the life of the population.

This management entails some specific strategies, such as surveillance. Surveillance is crucial to create a docile productive individual. Power wants maximum outcome with minimum cost. This can be realized by making the individual his own guardian. With the application of certain technologies, Foucault (1980; 155) indicates the individual happens to exercise his own surveillance over himself.

Technology gains importance for developing new surveillance techniques. In such an era -whether we call it the information, communication or computer age-, power has obtained very useful[3] tools. The computerization of all knowledge gives unbelievable means to power. Actually, what is being computerized is not just knowledge, but life itself. So, it can be easily claimed that total surveillance is now possible.

Citizenship takes shape within this complicated framework of power, knowledge, bio-politics, surveillance and technology. A "new" concept, world citizenship, has emerged in this complex widespread electronic communication (Bell & Logan, 1997; 216). Yet, world citizenship cannot be tied only to new technologies. It is the outcome of power dynamics since power is globally organized.

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[3] Though technology seems to be useful for some people especially occupy the positions of power, it may emerge as the most useless thing for others. According to Kelly, for example, armies represents a total uselessness of the electronic age; not only useless, but very costly as well. (Kelly, M. "The Technology of Uselessness", CTHEORY, 9/7/1994)

CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF POWER

Every word is a prejudice.
Friedrich Nietzsche

For the only way one can speak of nothing is
to speak of it as though it were something, just
as the only way one can speak of God is to
speak of him as though he were a man.
Samuel Beckett

In this chapter, I will examine some of the prominent figures who have written on the topic of power. Here I will offer some introductory comments. I will use the concepts examined in the previous section[4]. It should be mentioned that most of the theorists discussed below give a definition of human essence while analyzing power.

According to Hobbes, the innate characteristic of the individual is the quality of being self-interested. Since all people are free and equal, there emerges a conflict. This is the situation in which free individuals can put forward and defend their own benefits. Yet, there is no possibility that all these "equal" interests can be realized. So, a necessity arises for a "legitimate" authority, which puts the equal but different

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[4] In this chapter, I will draw on the lecture notes of the political sociology course given by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu in the Department of Sociology at METU.

interests into an order. Individuals thus have no chance except to willingly surrender their government rights to the state (Held, 1997; 41). Power uses the rights of the individual, in this case, to form a liveable world. It is an appearance of the individual; but power is (must be) beyond the individual. For it has to construct a society and provide the conditions of society's existence. To be able to achieve such a construction, power gives itself a divine position. Hobbes calls this "divine" power Leviathan. Leviathan has an autonomous and self-managing character (Bauman, cited in Clegg & Wilson, 1991; 232). This autonomy emerges as a result of a consensus of individuals and it means being able to produce a certain type of individual, who produces respectively the autonomy and legitimacy of the absolute power.

A similar process is seen in Locke, but with more emphasis on decentralized and multiple forces (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 7). Locke's assumption on human nature is that the individual is a free and rational creature. So, he can question power and intervene in the process when needed. Locke gives more space to the individual than Hobbes does. Nevertheless, Locke seems to ignore how powerful power can be and how powerless the individual might be before this authority. Such a liberal condition of government in no way guarantees equilibrium between power and the individual. Actually, this may further strengthen the autonomous position of power since individuals appear to be more active in the constitution of power. Namely, power becomes more legitimate than it does in a Hobbesian view.

An alternative to the conceptualizations of Hobbes and Locke is that of Rousseau. His assumption carries Locke's one step further saying that "man...is

everywhere in chains" (Rousseau, in Held et al, 1983; 71). That is, the individual is social. Rousseau offers a "social contract" on the basis of self-government. He assumes that it is possible to reach a "general will". Individuals are able to create such a consensus and power must be the outcome of this condition. The individual's socially rational nature leads him to believe in the necessity of the power of consensus. It can therefore be claimed that the individual has to approve a kind of totalitarian position whether he likes it or not. Rousseau appears to neglect the possibility of the existence of many different voices within the so-called general will. Besides, he does not properly analyze the emergence of the consensus and ignores a great deal of social dynamics in this emergence. All individuals may be inherently good, rational and social. Yet, this does not mean that the consensus they have reached will have to be good, rational and social.

Marx conceives the tense characteristic of power, which Rousseau cannot comprehend. Power is the result of specific historical, material and social conditions. There are conflicting classes and forces that struggle against each other for power. So, it cannot be independent from antagonism. Actually, power goes compulsorily hand in hand with conflict. Power is there where conflict and struggle are. Marx's argument is that power is the reflection of the dominance of a particular social class rather than a general consensus. Contrary to the previous three figures, Marx does not limit his analysis to the interaction between power and the individual. He goes beyond this relation and interrogates the very legitimacy of power. Power is something that must be abolished, not something that must be produced and

preserved. How this can be achieved is a little bit problematic since there is a strong possibility to produce new power dynamics in this process. Before power is completely demolished, a different kind of power should be established. This is basically the power of the majority. The question is whether this power belongs to the majority in reality or to a particular elite in that majority group. Such a power also has the risk of neglecting the diversity within the majority and potentially transforming itself into an absolute power.

Despite this possible negativeness, it should be mentioned that there is a considerable challenge in Marx against the notion of human essence. Like power, the individual is the outcome of historical and material practices. However, he is not a passive outcome. He can actively take part in the constitution of history. The fundamental characteristic of the individual for Marx is to be able to transform the world. In this process, the individual also transforms and produces himself. Yet, at the same time he re-creates power relations.

Weber faces a similar impasse. While he argues that rationalization is essential, he is aware of its drawbacks. A proper administration or a legitimate power should work in a rational way. From this arises the idea of rational legitimacy. Rational legitimacy, Swingewood (1998; 229) denotes, is based on the legality of definite regulations and the use of power in accordance with these rules. Power takes its legitimacy from its rationality, in this case. But, it is not so clear where power gets its rationality. Rationality appears to have an immanent feature. It comes to a point at which the individual cannot intervene in the mechanism. He becomes a part of the

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rational machine as a rational being. To Weber, there is no escape from rationalization. Thus for an effectively running power, the individual needs more and more iron cages. Everywhere rationality is the necessary nightmare of humanity.

This necessity might not have to be a future dystopia. Actually, widely diffused power relations may also signify the widespread possibilities for opposing it. Examining Foucault's argument on the interaction between freedom and power is important in this regard. One significant point, for Foucault, is the area in which power emerges. The effects of power are primarily seen on human bodies. The body is the main target of power. Foucault, in a way, extends the analysis of Weber beyond the domain of legal rationality and examines other rational power practices exercised on the body (O'Neill, 1994; 236-237). All power applications and so rationality are to give the individual a certain form. Power comes from the very bottom in fact not from the very top. The starting point is the individual. Power exists in small, particular human relations. It is an everyday practice; not just a totalitarian centralized exercise. Foucault argues that there is no power without resistance. In fact, they need one another. Like power, resistance also exists in the everyday life of the individual. The departure point of power is the departure point of resistance as well.

Deleuze and Guattari give a similar but certainly stronger account of power than that of Foucault. They argue that there is a machinic process in life. Machines are the motors of production. However, they are the products of this machinic process as well. They produce everything and are produced by other machines at the

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same time. Life itself is a machine. Machines constitute the multiplicity of life. Multiplicities act via continuous de-territorialization and re-territorialization experiences. The individual and power come together in this complex. The individual, in the first instance, is abstracted from his current territory and then is articulated into another territory (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; 606). Power follows a similar logic. It is de-territorialized first and then re-territorialized again in a different context. This process indicates an endless togetherness of re-destruction and re-creation. That is to say, power and the individual continuously annihilate and re-generate each other in different patterns. It can be told that the connection between the individual and power are mutually inclusive.

In Negri and Hardt's opinion, a new sort of power is on the agenda in contemporary era. Following Deleuze and Guattari, Negri and Hardt point to the existence of multitudes. Multitudes are the effects of bio-political power. Yet, this power now has a global characteristic. The individual is the focal point of globally organized power dynamics. Though there exist many distinct power practices, only a specific model of power is in question. Negri and Hardt call this paradigm "Empire". This new paradigm produces a worldwide legitimacy (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 13), which is derived from a consensus moulded by an imperial perspective. Since power can be organized all around the world via information and communication technologies, the consensus on the legitimacy of Empire is not so difficult to reach. Empire works through decentralized power applications with a centralized logic.

The traces of such a dispersed notion of power can be found in Machiavelli. He considers power as a line of action, which is constructed in a flux surface of politics. Machiavelli emphasizes that power cannot have a single, originating and decisive centre (Clegg & Wilson, 1991; 232-234). Besides, it should be stated that he analyzes the matter of consensus in a very impressive way. According to Machiavelli, power must produce such a consensus that convinces individuals that power works for their benefits. From this point of view, Hardt and Negri (2000; 15) assert that Empire has to widen the areas of consensus that support its power. Consequently, power that emerges in this context appears as the power of common consent. The consensus produced here legitimates the site of power. So, power disseminates its rationality originating from the very bottom.

From Hobbes onwards, the conceptualization of power has come to a very interesting point. While Hobbes sees power as an essential centralized structure, Negri and Hardt consider power as decentralized bio-political exercises that are not essential at all. While some figures do not question this essentialism, some others - especially Marx and after- put the questions about the legitimacy and function of power on the agenda. But, the more important point is that the strategies of power are examined. The troublesome relation between the individual and power can be understood better by scrutinizing the strategies rather than the essence. A true study - historical materialism- of these strategies helps us to grasp how power can use some technologies and how it produces life. Marx and his successors make considerable

observations on this account and they analyze surveillance as the most significant of all the strategies.

The effect of surveillance has become more visible especially during the second half of the twentieth century. This is a phenomenon that comes undeniably with technological improvements. Though, in the early times, computers are welcomed for announcing the coming of future achievements in the information area (Calder, 1970; 205), they also open a wide range of possibilities for improving surveillance mechanisms. The interesting issue is that while power can develop its surveillance capacity, at the same time, it can make its position more legitimate in the eyes of the individual. Since surveillance practices are usually built upon legal regulations, the individual does not deem it necessary to investigate the logic behind these practices. Namely, constitutional rules make it easier and more legitimate to exercise surveillance (Beetham, 1991; 159). Surveillance is presented in a different format, which seems useful for the individual. As a matter of fact, it can be defended to a certain degree that some surveillance applications are useful. However, such a defensive positioning will be dangerous if it is forgotten that these applications are power-generated and work within a certain perspective, which is inclined to exercise a certain kind of power.

CHAPTER IV

POWER IN MODERN TIMES

Our gods are here below, with us, in the Bureau. in the kitchen. in the shop, in the toilet. The gods have become like us -ergo, we've become like gods.

D-503, We. Yevgeni Zamyatin

The necessity to evaluate a social phenomenon with both its positive and negative sides has become more critical in the age of modernity. This is essential if we are to break free from the iron cage. However, it must be admitted that it is not so easy to comprehend the nature of modernity. Modern thoughtlessness, Connolly (1993; 4) remarks, is to think within similar frames and not to dispute how our thinking is guided. The power of modern institutions stems from their capacity to reproduce themselves in truly intelligent ways. Power prevents the individual from questioning it. Namely, power compels the individual to believe the fact that he is not what he should be. So, the individual does not question the reliability of power but looks for his faults. In this way, power conceals its real face (Bauman, 1991; 175-176). In fact, it can be claimed that the peculiarity of power is to hide something and to make some other thing more visible than it is. Nothing is completely open and

understandable in the era of modern power. But, the opposite may also be true. Everything is truly clear and perfectly knowable.

The freedom of the individual is very much related to his being able to question power as well as himself. The characteristic of self-accusation amounts to the inability of "breaking on through to the other side[5]". Nietzsche exemplifies this inability with the notion of the ascetic ideal. This idea is examined in the specificity of Christianity. Nietzsche notes that the individual suffers his own existence and searches for the reason of this suffering and for his guilt. Christianity gives this reason to the individual and tells him who is guilty. The individual is the answer according to Christianity (Nietzsche, 1989; 140). Nietzsche clearly shows here how the individual is transformed into be a docile, passive and wretched being. The individual sees himself as guilty of everything evil and he deliberately desires pain. Christianity teaches the individual to wish suffering. Modernity is not so different from Christian thought. To Nietzsche, modernity is characterized by an idea of secular power, which is based on a religious foundation (Ansell-Pearson, 1998; 116). So, modern power wants the same thing -to domesticate the individual. But, it has different and more influential techniques, for example rationality.

All history of rationality, in one respect, can be read as the history of the normalization of the individual. Modernity -particularly the idea of Enlightenment- takes reason as the departure point and produces a definition of the rational individual. This means, at the same time, that in modern sense a normal individual is

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[5] The Doors.

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possible and essential. Modern power, in this process, leads the individual into a tunnel of disciplinary practices. The individual is surrounded by various applications and tools of modernity, such as money, culture, organizations, economy and the city. All these rationalities take part in the process of producing a normal individual. Simmel demonstrates this characteristic of modernity in his writings on the metropolis and money economy. Money economy and the metropolis transform the individual into quantities, which can be evaluated on the basis of punctuality, calculability and exactness (Simmel, 1997; 177). Simmel implies that rationality has come to a point, at which the individual is no longer the creator of the reason but its object of exercise. He is more of an object than a subject.

A similar pessimism is seen in Kafka. Kafka conceptualizes power as a reified master that can never be reached. The individual is only able to get in contact with the tools of power, such as bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is an important part of power for Kafka. Like Simmel, Kafka thinks that the individual is a file, whose procedure is complete or incomplete (Fischer, 1998; 34). Bureaucracy or any other tool of modern power gives a definite meaning to the individual. The compulsory relation of the individual with bureaucracy shows that he should not force the conditions much and be content with his situation. He learns to be docile and not to struggle just like Nietzsche describes. For Kafka, as well as Foucault, power is the condition of the modern and unitary subject (Bennett, 1991; 77). In the same way, the modern individual is the condition of the modern power. Power guarantees its endurance by settling its very logic in the mind of the individual. He is reduced to his own master.

To clarify this point, Kafka (2000; 21) says in one aphorism: "The animal gets the whip from its master and it begins to whip itself to become the master..." This is exactly what modern power wants; a governance without a governor with self-governing individuals (Dunsire, 1993; 26).

To draw such a pessimistic picture of modernity may be misleading. Modernity cannot be viewed as a one-sided fact. With reference to Marx, Delanty (2000; 16) holds that modernity is self-contradictory. Together with Marx, the driving force of modernity becomes self-constitution. And the self is socially and historically constructed. Therefore, modernity carries its antidote in its very heart. The individual is not in a hopeless position. One way of deconstructing the contradiction is to affirm it. This may seem "contradictory", too. From a Nietzschean point of view, modernity can be said to produce, in a way, an infinite repetition of indecisive and purposeless historicalness (Pippin, 1999; 511). To affirm this indecisive modern life is to accept it as so. Even though this acceptance may appear to be a passive mode of action, it is, in fact, a very crucial step for one of the most revolutionary ways to live. Life is regarded as neither totally rational nor completely non-rational. Modern life is what it is; both productive and destructive, both positive and negative. The individual has to confront this inevitable fact. The affirmation of the modern way of life is the first step towards a willful and obstinate living experience.

The importance of Nietzsche in understanding power stems from his bringing out the nihilist character of modern power. In modern times, the individual has lost

his main reference -god- since god is dead. There is a lack of transcendental value. In this case, according to Nietzsche, the individual begins to worship the state (Goyard-Fabre, 2001; 157). What is transcendental now is the state; that is, generally speaking power. This is the escape of the individual from nihilism. The individual tries to find out new meanings and power provides a crucial one. Power becomes the aim. Actually, power forces itself as the most important aim of the individual. The individual is stuck in a power network. No matter how insistent he tries to be saved from nihilism, it exists where modernity is lived. And there is almost nowhere into which modernity cannot reach. This useless endeavour of the modern individual points out that he fears to face his destiny. It is no doubt a destiny. Every attempt to put off confrontation with this fact strengthens power and makes the struggle against power more difficult at each time. In this process, power creates masses, which are happy with the discourses of equality, freedom and fraternity.

Nietzsche conceives modernity as a practice of massing (Akal, 2001; 164). The individual is lost in the mass. That is, modernity, for Nietzsche, is by no means an indicator of the autonomous individual. Rather, it shows the deployment of a slave ethics. This is the ethics of the masses. The masses are the people who cannot notice that they are the effects of power. Because of this, they are not able to become individuals in the real sense of the word. They are the individuals of power and the modern individual is nothing but the standard individual of mass culture, who is formed from the inside by power via in-formation technologies (Nalbantoglu, 2001; 14, 22).

The will to power, which must be directed at the self, is more and more directed at power in the modern age. The individual tries to obtain power before he overcomes himself. In the end, power gets the individual since it does not need a particular personality. It works through whoever is the object.

CHAPTER V

TYPOLOGY - STAGES OF POWER

> *If they will not understand that we are bringing them a mathematically infallible happiness, we shall be obliged to force them to be happy.*
> State Gazette, We. Yevgeni Zamyatin

> *The actual ulterior purpose of the whole system of salvation of the church is to make people ill. And the church itself -doesn't it set up a Catholic lunatic asylum as the ultimate ideal? -The whole earth as a madhouse?*
> Friedrich Nietzsche

The evolution of power can be analyzed in three different stages. This distinction is based on the relation between the individual and power. In all three stages, the individual is the target of power. However, the techniques of power are differentiated. Moreover, the rationality of each stage is dissimilar. This dissimilarity is especially valid when the first stage is compared with the second and the third stages. The third stage, to some extent, can be seen as the upper level of the second. Yet, it indicates a stage, which must be examined separately.

The phases of power are respectively societies of sovereignty, societies of discipline and societies of control. It is useful -and essential- to analyze these three types on the basis of production relations. With reference to Foucault, Marx and

Deleuze, the literary critic Hardt (1995; 37) specifies the differences among these three societies. He suggests that societies of sovereignty refer to feudal relations of production. Societies of discipline are characterized by the formal subsumption of labour under capital. And societies of control refer to the real subsumption of labour under capital. With this perspective, in all three societies, it can be claimed that there is an effort to subordinate the individual in the process of production. For the individual is the main agent of production and so his labour should be exploited in some way. Actually, this is a common logic in all three stages. The difference results from the fact that the methods of exploitation have become more human-centred from societies of sovereignty onwards.

5.1. SOCIETIES OF SOVEREIGNTY

To Foucault, the power of reason is a bloody one (Focuault, 2000e; 176). This sentence characterizes societies of sovereignty very well. Power, in this era - until the 18th century, in which the French and Industrial revolutions took place-, uses brutish techniques to direct the individual towards the truth. Torture is one way of doing this. Torture is generally made in public so that other people can bear witness to the power of the sovereign. Power, in this way, is placed in the minds of individuals. The individual knows that it is impossible to resist power. Power uses torture as a legal method. This helps power to obtain a legitimate basis. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982; 145) mention that the cooperation of power and law makes torture a rightful action. Individuals conceive that the criminal deserves torture since they do

not worry about questioning the legitimacy of the sovereign. Power has a divine ground and so it monopolizes the truth. The rationale of torture is based on a specific truth assumption, which cannot be interrogated in any way. Actually, such an attempt necessitates capital punishment. This is probably the biggest sin and fault.

The fundamental aim of torture is to make the individual confess his guilt. Torture, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982; 146), is a practice of validation of the justice of power. By means of torture, the individual is forced to admit his fault and the rightfulness of the sovereign. This is the method of power to teach truth to the individual. In such an exercise of power, there is an implicit assumption that the individual is in some way corrupted and seperated from the truth. Power, as the conveyer and defender of truth, tries to normalize the individual. Yet, it must be mentioned that, most of the time, this normalization process results in the death of the individual.

It becomes clear from the applications of the sovereign power that the body of the individual is the main area for exercising power. Punishment is realized through the body of the individual. A notion of prison itself as punishment is absent in societies of sovereignty (Foucault, 2000b; 105). So, normalization via imprisonment is not possible at that time. Power is more inclined to exterminate the body rather than to reproduce it in a different shape. It might be suggested that the body is used to save the soul and pain is the essential factor for salvation of the individual's soul. Pain provides the necessary condition for the individual to be able to lessen the feeling of guilt. The supplier of pain is power. Power urges the individual, through

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bodily pain, to investigate his existence. The individual should reach a conclusion that he suffers because he has to. Namely, the result of the investigation is already determined by power. Power allows a kind of questioning that proceeds towards one and only definite direction. This is the one through which power is legitimized.

So, it can be argued that in societies of sovereignty, power appears to educate the soul more than the body. The body is used as a gate into the soul. By torturing the body, power aims to disclose the transcendental truth. Owen (1994; 170) asserts that the objective of investigation is to produce truth in the absence of the accused. In fact, truth is produced during torture; but it outlives the death of the individual. Power teaches people how they have to live by way of death rituals. That is to say, sovereign power arises on the death of the individual. Its foundation is more related to killing than to living.

Despite this fact, societies of sovereignty should somehow produce the material conditions of its existence. In order to achieve this, it needs labour - especially human labour. To produce the materiality of sovereign power, it is necessary to produce life not death. And this necessitates a very important shift in the comprehension of the relation between the individual and power.

5.2. SOCIETIES OF DISCIPLINE

Mcnay (1996; 92) states that the growth of capitalism goes hand in hand with the production of a submissive, productive and trained source of labour power. The rise of societies of discipline drops into the same time period with modernity -

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beginning with the 18th century and lasting to 1970s. The roots of modernity can be discovered in the historical events that form the substructure of capitalism. All these concurrences point to a change in the dominant rationality.

Disciplinary power regards life as its main target. Power now strives to produce the individual. The mechanisms of power are not only for punishment in the modern era; but also for giving a new personality to the individual. The body is again the focal point of power. Foucault (1979a; 26) says that the body is subject to a microphysics of power. What is at stake is a bio-political power that has a diffused and complex formation. The subjection of the individual is provided via rational techniques. Power normalizes the individual by using these new methods on the basis of the individual's knowledge. In fact, power and knowledge are inseparable in societies of discipline. Knowledge is produced by power and the individual becomes the most significant object of knowledge (Foucault, 1979a; 26-28). In societies of discipline, the importance of the individual is understood for being able to continue and preserve power. With this perspective, power also changes the techniques of and more importantly the rationale behind punishment. Punishment in societies of discipline, Gordon stresses, is conceived as a moral representation, not as terrorism (Gordon, 1995; 42).

The change in power's logic can be more easily seen in its normalization applications. Power creates its own norms and imposes them on individuals. But, this imposition is not a coercive one. Ranson (1997; 48) indicates that it is an indeterminate interplay between the individual and power. The individual takes norms

in his every contact of power. As a matter of fact, he is almost always in the process of norm-imposition. Each experience of the individual with power means a new change in his personality.

The constitution of new personalities is secured by three techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and the examination (Foucault, 1979a; 170). Disciplinary power requires a continuous visibility of the individual and during this observation it determines the non-normal elements. Then, via examination, disciplinary power forms a kind of data bank to use in normalization practices (Owen, 1994; 175-176). Power works through surveillance mechanisms. Surveillance is essential to obtain the knowledge of the individual. Power uses surveillance also for creating a sense of self-observation. Foucault uses the concept of "panopticon" to make this point clear. This concept refers to the situation in which the individual is observed without knowing he is being observed. The individual does not know whether (when) power observes him and thinks that he is continuously under surveillance. So, he turns out to be his own watcher. In this way, disciplinary power guarantees the docility of the individual.

Dean (1995; 296) emphasizes that disciplinary techniques are economically and politically cost-effective. This means that power can obtain the maximum benefit with the minimum cost. The docility of the individual secures to a considerable extent a continuous productivity. Because of his docile position, the individual cannot oppose power. Power thus gains a very efficient and effective resource of its reproduction.

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With the notions of political docility and economical productivity, power gains a bio-political feature. Bio-politics is concerned with the life of the population. It is about everything that is related to population. Bio-politics, Dean (1999; 99) suggests, concerns the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions that effects the lives of individuals. Power, in this respect, not only operates on the individual level; it also directs its attention to the whole population. It creates social norms for every public section of society, such as health, education, justice and the military. Disciplinary power gives a normal shape to the population within these sections via the institutions of discipline. At this point, a crucial concept comes into play: the police.

Foucault asserts that the police govern people by intervening into the lives of individuals. Yet, this intervention has a positive character. The happiness of people, Foucault mentions, is the condition of power's strength (Foucault, 1988; 158-159). Power's interest lies in the production of happy individuals and happiness is defined by power not by individuals. In all disciplinary practices and institutions, it is learned that to be happy is to be normal. Power wants normal people who are happy with their contentedness. The police provides the necessary material conditions of contented happiness.

The police work by controlling the common activities of individuals (Foucault, 1981; 248). This control gives power the opportunity of forming new definitions of the experiences of life according to its priorities. Actually, this is the process of the examination. New definitions are used to define new people of power.

The individual becomes both the object and the subject of power (Owen, 1994; 192) in societies of discipline. Power constitutes the individual and thus the population as the target of discipline; but at the same time, he is the agent of power. This is a process of both objectification and subjectification. While turning the individual into the object of its normalization effects, power should provide an area of freedom for him. Foucault (1994; 229) claims that power needs free subjects in order to be realized. Subjectification is essential for this reason. The domination exercised on non-free, slave or dependent individuals cannot be called power. Free people have the capacity to affirm the legitimacy of power with their free consciousness, which is crucial for disciplinary power. Stewart (2001; 119) says, on this issue, that the discourse of domination appropriates a language of empowerment. Yet, it must be indicated that power should have enough power to be effective to "secure" the freedom of individuals (Pfiffner, 2000; 22).

All these subjectifications and objectifications of individuals take place in the framework of what Foucault calls governmentality. By governmentality, Foucault first of all refers to a complex formation of power mechanisms whose target is the population. This power uses political economy and security tools in its interactions with individuals. Second, governmentality points to a shift in the conceptualization of power in the West. Lastly, it indicates the end of the administrative state of the 15th and 16th centuries. Governmental power is defined, Foucault argues, with respect to its mass of population (Foucault, 1979b; 20-21).

Governmental power, Foucault (1979b; 20) tells us, first emerges in the 18th century. Foucault refers here to the historical events of the 18th century. This period is mainly regarded as the era of revolutions. Specifically with the Industrial and French Revolutions, together with the notion of governmentality, disciplinary practices arise. So, it must be kept in mind that governmentality and discipline evolve together. The administrative state, which Foucault attributes to the 15th and 16th centuries and which he defines as a society of discipline, is still dominant after the 16th century. Actually, it gains its real feature after this century.

All the applications of modern power and capitalism are perfect examples of disciplinary practices. The birth of modernity and its economic and intellectual substructure accelerate the exercise of these practices. Capitalism in that stage benefits considerably from disciplinary applications. Actually, capitalism itself creates such technologies. The historical transformation from feudalism to the capitalist mode of production can give us the reasons behind the transformation of rationality from sovereignty to governmentality. The rise of political economy as the science of capitalism is worth analyzing, in this respect. According to Foucault (1979b; 18), the science of political economy is constituted to study the relations among population, territory and wealth. The usefulness of political economy is that it provides the scientific legitimacy and necessary rationality for the normalization of individuals. Normalization, Berger (1996; 18) suggests, is realized via this rationalization of social life. Power in the modern age with the aid of its ideological scientism also carries the very idea of governmentality. That is, Wright (1998; 224) argues, power

relies on internalized cognition and self-governance that are shaped by means of surveillance, normalization and differentiation.

Namely, it would not be wrong to say that disciplinary power preserves its existence with the rationality of governmentality until the third stage of power. Yet, it must be admitted that the third stage of power sustains some vitally important characteristics of the second. The perspective of governmentality is still influential in the third stage of power. Power has a materialist character (Foucault, 2000d; 153) like disciplinary power does. The target of power is again population. However, there is a crucial change in the interaction between the individual and power. This is something beyond disciplinary reason. It is this schizophrenic character of the third stage that differentiates societies of control.

5.3. SOCIETIES OF CONTROL

The main assumptions of Foucault on power are crucial if we are to better understand societies of control. Power cannot be conceptualized as a reified entity. Nor can it be seen as a purely repressive force. Power can be experienced in many ways and in diverse forms. And maybe most important of all, power exists only when it is exercised. In this sense, it is about the actions of individuals. Foucault (1994; 229) remarks that governing results in the construction of fields of individuals' actions. In societies of control, power can design these fields much more effectively and efficiently than disciplinary power can because it acts globally. Due to the very same logic, it can penetrate into the smallest localities. Literally, these localities are

the real sites of power since it comes from the very bottom. However, there is an important issue that should not be missed here. Power, which is exercised on local levels, has a global logic. In this stage of power -beginning after the Second World War and materializing itself especially with the emergence of computer technology along with the neo-liberal policies-, the boundaries between various areas of disciplinary power are abolished. All practices of power get mixed up with each other. This mixture ruins all national and international territories and gains a global feature.

The idea of global power is indeed the very characteristic of capital and the analysis of power cannot be excluded from that of capitalism. The operation of capitalism follows a schizophrenic logic like power in societies of control. Deleuze and Guattari (1982; 5) say that schizophrenia refers to the universe of reproductive desiring-machines. Capital and thus power produce and are produced in such a way. This is an endless process and the desire of capital to expand can never be satisfied and stopped. It can be asserted that capital achieves its self-actualization, in the full sense of the word, in the contemporary era.

5.3.1. MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF SOCIETIES OF CONTROL

This era sees important changes in the organization of production factors. There are new challenges to classical industrial relations. Bell enumerates seven fundamental shifts. To begin with, the service sector gains importance over manufacturing. Secondly, professional and technical employment rises. The third shift

is that education becomes the basis of social mobility. Fourthly, the necessity of human capital is placed on the agenda. Related to this, fifthly, intellectual technology becomes increasingly significant. Sixthly, communication emerges as the main infrastructure. And lastly but most significantly, knowledge appears as the source of value (Bell, 1999; xv-xvii).

The last concern is crucially important because it directly effects the other developments. It requires a change in the rationality of the capitalist organization of production. In especially advanced capitalist countries, production can no longer be carried out with an industrial logic since it now exceeds the limits of industrialization. It has moved beyond the mechanisms of Taylorism and Fordism. The logic of production cannot be limited to the fixed determinations of labour, capital, land and technology. These need to be defined all over again.

There emerges a requirement for flexible production systems. One of the inseparable parts of contemporary production discourse is flexibility. Flexibility, in principle, refers to the free mobility of capital. It requires labour to be flexible, too. Capital forces labour to behave in the same way it does. The resistance of labour is difficult since capital also transforms labour while experiencing its own transformation. However, a very important point must be mentioned again. The tendency of capital towards flexibility is not a new issue. Actually, capital did experience such breakthroughs in the past (Harvey, 1989; 191). What's new is the presence of sufficient material conditions for capital to be able to perceive itself as itself. The contemporary world provides capital what it, in reality, needs. It is much

easier for capital to spread its logic throughout the world. It can reach the farthest point. As a matter of fact, there is no distant and improbable place. Production is realized where necessary conditions are provided. Foreign direct investment is one example. It can be seen as the globalization of production (Urey, 1995; 72).

Globalization of capital brings new contradictions. Capital seems to operate with a decentralized perspective. This is because there is no centralized key figure in the process of production. Capital continues its basic function -accumulation- in different, diverse and complex production sites. Nevertheless, the rationale of capital is the same no matter where it functions. Robinson (2001; 159) indicates that globalization leads the world into a single mode of production and a single global system. He adds also that no country can remain outside the networks of global capitalist accumulation (Robinson, 2001; 160). This shows that while capital works through decentralized strategies, it preserves a centralized feature. Capital thus needs both global and local points of view. Globalization is essential because it accelerates the accumulation process. Localization is crucial, on the other hand, since it secures the effective exploitation of small production fields. Locality, indeed, is the way to globalization. Globalization begins from local areas. What's at stake now is glocalization[6].

The possibility of such a world derives primarily from the development in the information field. For this reason, some call the era "the information age". New economic conditions are framed within an informational viewpoint. According to

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[6] As an interesting note. the Management Club at METU publishes a magazine called "Glokal".

Castells (2000a; 10), the new economy has three integral characteristics: it is informational, global and networked. These three features summarize very well the nature of today's capitalism. Capitalism is now a global reproduction system that exploits global information through globally decentralized networks. Each network has an autonomous peculiarity. It has the capability of reproducing itself and it decides on its own where, how and what to do. Besides, it can create and use its own information sources and knowledge database. But via communication technology, a network is able to reach every kind of information where it is. In the same way, it can share its own knowledge with other networks. This system forms a whole within which elements can behave autonomously with the help of continuous information transfer. This is peculiar to this age. In this respect, Castells (2000a; 10) mentions that the novelty of this era is the emergence of new informational technologies; not the rising importance of knowledge. What defines contemporary society is the way information can be used. It is possible to use information for almost any reason and at any time via today's technology.

5.3.1.1. TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Strijbos states that technology is about collective forms of action, not about individual ones. Collective actions of technology build a technological society according to Strijbos (2001; 527). The notion of a technological society is more related to today's era. The reason for this phenomenon can be found in the nature of today's technology. The incredible progress and inventions in technology

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unavoidably influences society. These developments find their real meanings in concrete applications within society. Society begins to be framed in accordance with technological comforts, facilities and means. In this process, society gains a new role and reproduces technology and exploits it as much as it can. Taking into consideration the characteristic of technology of this age, which operates through global communication and information networks, the idea of a technological society turns out to be an inevitable reality.

So, technology becomes a part of life. It creates a culture in life. Since it can enter every area of life, so too can its culture. Beyond this, technology has the power to construct a global culture. Actually, globalization of both production and culture are highly dependent on the development of information and communication technologies (Mackay, 1995; 243). Technological society thus is a global society. The other way around is also true. Global society is a technological society. Global culture follows a path similar to that of technological progress. The culture of this era is technological to a great extent. It gains a different appearance and content. Apart from this new content, technology obtains a considerable power over the individual. In Virilio's view, new technology has three divine properties: ubiquity, instantaneity and immediacy (Armitage, 1999; 44). With this divinity, technology, which already seems to be the leading force of global technological society, gains a reified authority. It is beyond the comprehension of the individual and it must be accepted as so. Besides a new culture, technology constructs a new space for life: cyberspace. Life is created in a new format within cyberspace. To Virilio, it has no fixed coordinates and

the individual loses his connections with society, nature and himself. For this reason, it is a dematerialized sphere (Kellner, 1999; 111).

At this point, it should be emphasized that technology cannot be a source of anything on its own. It cannot determine an emergence of a new kind society or new economic production models. So, the rise of technological society necessitates other significant historical conditions. These conditions, unlike those of cyberspace, exist in a deeply materialized realm. In this realm, the individual indeed gets in similar relationships with his environment and himself like he does in cyberspace. He again loses his connections; but he gains a new personality immediately after. Virilio, in this respect, seems to echo Deleuze and Guattari. Cyberspace and real space are now mixed into each other. The individual has two lives, one in the real and the other in the cyber world. Yet, it is not so easy to separate these since they are mutually inclusive and reproductive. In this respect, the real and cyber worlds must have a common origin. That is to say, they arise from the same materiality.

This materiality is nothing but global capitalism. Contemporary technological developments cannot be externalized to the political economy of globalization. The important shifts in today's production dynamics and technological changes emerge together. Together they constitute the new peculiarity of capitalism. One crucial peculiarity in this stage of capitalism is the acceleration of the commodification process. Capitalism can turn everything into commodities much more easily with the help of technology. The commodity of global capitalism, Kroker and Weinstein argue, is the one which is "politically fascistic, culturally a cynic, relationally a

sociopath and psychologically an exponent of object-relations theory". Actually they call today's world virtual capitalism and claim that virtual capitalism recolonizes everything (Kroker & Weinstein, 1994; 4,10). Colonization of the world is not so strange and interesting considering the essence of capitalism. The strange thing is that virtual capitalism creates new areas, which are also virtual, to exploit the individual. This is the very creativity of capitalism's intelligence. When capitalism cannot turn the individual into a commodity in the real world at some point for some reason, it frames a new world. Though the new world is a cyber or virtual one, the exploitation experienced by the individual is unquestionably a very real one.

This materiality of virtual capitalism is supported by a suitable discourse. This discourse supports the idea that technology gives way to freedom. New technologies, cyberspace and virtual reality open a wide range of possibilities for action. Freedom is determined within the limits of the political economy of global capitalism, and thus the limits of its main discourse -neo-liberalism. Armitage denotes that neo-liberal discourse of technology legitimizes the political and cultural control of the individual. He also touches on the totalitarian character of technology and asserts that technology latently includes totalitarianism (Armitage, 1999; 1, 3). Hence, technology is not so liberating. Although it provides an extremely vast field, it defines at the very beginning what freedom is. This description is made under the influence of certain predetermined neo-liberal discourses. Capitalism requires an individual type who resembles fascistic, cynical, sociopathic and objectified characteristics of its commodity. In this way, it can hide its totalitarianism. This totalitarianism does not

appear as a problem for the individual in reality since the individual is stuck in virtuality. The individual becomes a commodity in the end and consumed by other commodities. This totalitarian complex destructs the reality of the individual and gives him a new reality, which is composed of limitless virtual freedom. It is true that the new reality has no boundaries. The only boundary is the comprehension of the individual. Yet, it is a concrete fact that the individual is a social becoming constituted in a neo-liberal framework.

This is one of the foremost appearances of alienation since the individual's capacity to freely produce and transform himself and his environment is seriously disrupted. Technology has an important ideological side in this context. In this age, technology appears as a neutral entity. The class dimensions of technological developments are not so much questioned. Technology is regarded as a classless and autonomous structure. With reference to Kofler (1971), Mandel touches on five critical properties of technology. Technology and science, Mandel mentions, are revealed as outcomes of an autonomous power. The emergence of technological rationalization represses the value systems of human beings, which causes a process of de-ideologization. Technical rationality also prevents individuals from interrogating the system and social problems are transferred to specialists who are educated to solve such issues. The personal and social satisfaction brought about by technology is another significant concern, which increases its legitimacy. Lastly, class rule is replaced by an anonymous technological dimension (Mandel, 1978; 501). The result is a purely ideological society, the legitimacy of which is accepted without

examination and inquiry. Technology is accepted as a given, objective reality. Its rationality and neutrality are spread out all over the world via information networks. Communication serves to construct a smooth and comfortable world free from any class conflict. Networks carry ideology-free information and truths. But, what they transfer in reality, Castells (2000a; 23) implies, are cultural -that is ideological- codes. Codes are, in a way, the definitions of exploitation procedures. They form the ideological infrastructure of global capitalism. Technology operates through these cultural ideologies. The culture-ideology, Jameson (1998; 46) says, reappropriates the world by framing it as functionally useful as it can be.

One crucial group of conveyers of global capitalism's ideology is made up of specialists as mentioned above. These people are sometimes called experts or technocrats, too. Experts are accepted as science people, who do not support any ideological approach. Their opinions are not based on political concerns. Experts work according to the requirements of "efficiency". Efficiency is regarded as the ultimate aim and society adopts this aim since it has scientific and rational connotations. Efficiency considerations are effective especially in economic issues. According to Centeno (1993, 311), capitalism legitimizes itself by claiming the efficiency of its economic processes. Capitalism creates a very scientific ideology, in this sense. This is the ideology of efficiency. The concern is the efficiency of economic mechanisms rather than its social results. The ideology of efficiency also has crucial implications in other fields of the system. One of its most important effects is in the applications of governmentality. The scientific disciplines and

technologies of capitalism take the actions of subjects as the objects of their study. Individuals, in this way, become the products of expertise. Consequently, subjects reproduce the legitimacy of expert knowledge (Johnson, 1993; 143) and so the ideology of efficiency. Actually, efficiency is vital for governmentality exercises. The logic of governmentality makes efficiency a compulsory and routine policy for global capitalism. Capitalism requires efficient productivities and looks for a legitimate ground to materialize this. It forces its legitimacy to be produced on an individual level with the rationality of efficiency. Capitalism works by forcing the agents of efficient productivity to construct the materiality of the legitimacy of their actions themselves.

5.3.2. POWER IN CONTEMPORARY ERA

It has been mentioned that power in its third stage has a schizophrenic character and this kind of power is exercised in societies of control, which are situated historically in the contemporary age. The organization of power does not follow a specific and determined path. Power diffuses continuously. It cannot be exercised only in closed areas. It destroys all boundaries. The individual in societies of control is reshaped by a great variety of disciplinary practices and institutions at the very same time. That is to say, the individual is subject to more than one disciplinary mechanism at a given time. So, he does not change his personality from time to time, but is instead a mix of different personalities. And for this reason, he cannot have a fixed personality.

Deleuze suggests that in societies of discipline the individual starts to be reformed constantly. In societies of control, on the other hand, he can finish nothing. He is included in an endless reformation within a complex of military, education and corporation practices that work together on his personality (Deleuze, 1992; 5). The individual experiences various disciplinary mechanisms at one time. It does not matter whether he is in a school, a hospital or a barracks. The individual is a student, patient and a soldier. He, who is educated in a school, lives like a madman in an insane asylum. The individual experiences health care in a barracks and education in a prison. The world, Foucault (2000c; 131) says, is a grand lunatic asylum whose governors are psychologists and whose people are patients. Now, everywhere is not only just a lunatic asylum. The world in the contemporary age turns out to be a grand prison, a grand hospital, a grand school and a grand barracks. The individual becomes a patient in this strange complex if he is still not a patient. Societies of control require exactly this kind of individual. They operate through patient individuals. Power in control societies tries to cure the individual. Nevertheless, power does not concern so much to make the individual better. It should discover a balance between making the individual either patient or healthy. This balance forms the definition of being healthy in societies of control. The individual is regarded sometimes as a healthy patient sometimes as a patient healthy one whichever is suitable for power.

Hardt and Negri define societies of control as those societies in which governing mechanisms that spread through the brains and bodies of individuals

become more inherent in the social field and more democratic. They assert that, in societies of control, normalizing disciplinary practices are both strengthened and generalized. The relation between these practices and the individual is not static like in societies of discipline. It is a flexible and changing one (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 23). Power and the social realm are more related than in disciplinary societies. Since power in societies of control is flexible, it can create new strategies in order to reach the unreachable social fields. Due to this flexibility, power can also influence the individual more easily. It provides him a wider area for his free action. The wider the area of the individual, the more effective and efficient power operates. In this way, power can control the individual from many different perspectives and it can lead the individual to where he can become more productive. The productivity of the individual may also be controlled by the so-called democracy of power in societies of control. The democratization feature of contemporary power makes it easier to include a lot of individuals into its mechanisms. This is very much related to the flexibility of power. Democracy gives the individual the chance to produce anywhere and whatever he wants. The individual has the freedom to choose. This freedom resembles Marx's definition of free labour.

Free labour stands for the kind of labour, which is saved from the feudal ties of the sovereign. Free labour can now choose freely to work under the command of the capitalist. Capitalism gives the individual the liberty to use his labour wherever he wants. But, it determines in which realms the individual can work. In this capitalist definition, the individual does not have the right of speech. Capitalism makes use of

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the discourse of liberty to restrain liberty itself and realizes this under the name of liberalism. Hindess indicates that individual liberty is seen as a limit by liberal political reason. It is a limit to the legitimate reach and effectiveness of government. According to Hindess, liberal thought brings liberty and domination together (Hindess, 2001; 93-94). Power in societies of control governs individuals by making them free. The liberty of individuals constitutes the limit for power in two different but related meanings. It describes the legal, social and economic rights of the individual, to which power should show respect. These rights form a boundary, which power cannot go beyond. Power can be accepted as legitimate and can become effective only within the boundary. This point of view seems to be in favour of the individual because he has a shield that he can use against power. Yet, there is the other side of the coin. The boundary also determines the point, which the individual cannot go beyond. In general, to determine is to limit. So, a defined freedom is always a limited freedom. However, power does not appear to limit freedom, but to enlarge it.

O'Malley states that power appears to delimit freedoms to a very limited extent. Power rules people via "indigenous" governances, according to O'Malley. Indigenous governance is mainly an inherent characteristic of everyday life. It is conceived as the initiative of individuals rather than the imposition of power (O'Malley, 1996; 313). Power sets up democracy starting from the bottom of society. That is, individuals are educated to apply liberal democracy in their everyday practices. Since all individuals are included in this process, there emerges a social

production of indigenous governance as well as at the individual level. Liberal discourse is appropriated by individuals and the rationality behind it is not questioned. Indigenous governance, in effect, signifies a distance form of government.

Contemporary governmentality, Miller and Rose suggest, points to "action at a distance". It does not spoil the autonomy of individuals while shaping their social and economic behaviour. The autonomy of individuals is considered as the main economic resource by power (Miller & Rose, 1993; 88, 100). Power imprisons individuals into their own autonomy in societies of control. While disciplinary power encloses the individual in factories, schools, hospitals and prisons, neo-liberal government frees him from these closed production areas. That is, disciplinary power works by obstructing and limiting the actions of the individual. Power in control societies, on the other hand, gives him a slavery that allows the individual to live freely and consequently to become more productive economically.

Lemke asserts that neo-liberalism causes the realm of the social to become an economic sphere and dictates a notion of "personal responsibility" and "self-care" (Lemke, 2001; 203). Power defines the social realm in economic terms. However, this discourse of political economy seems to be socially acceptable as well as economically useful. Neo-liberal discourse predominantly uses the ideology of efficiency in the process of economization of the social sphere. Economization introduces social-wide rationalization and self-realization strategies. The effect is personally responsible but socially indifferent individuals. This responsibility must be understood in an economic sense. The sociality of the individual is damaged. He now

worries mostly about his economic self-actualization. This is just what contemporary power wants because the self-production process of the individual is also the production process of power.

While the individual enjoys his autonomous position, power enjoys its diffused position, which transforms the society of individuals into a mass of individuals. All those concepts, "indigenous governance", "autonomy of individuals, "governance from a distance" and "personal responsibility" express the same neo-liberal conceptualization of power in the age of societies of control. This age, Bogard (1991; 333) mentions, is characterized by mass surveillance, computerized matching and profiling systems, probabilistic and insurial models and decentralized social control. All these mechanisms can be regarded as the ones used to frame autonomous individuals. Individuals are turned into free production machines of power. They internalize the two most important features of neo-liberal power: efficiency and flexibility. The most efficient and flexible machine of global capitalism is the individual.

Machines are everywhere, observe Deleuze and Guattari. Machines form new machines. They continuously develop new connections and are continuously redeveloped. Machines produce and never stop producing (Deleuze & Guattari, 1982; 1-2). There is, in other words, a never-ending process of production. Because of this, machines and production are equalized. And, life is production. Production is everywhere and everything. The individual is not an exception. If there is an essence of the human being, it is production; but production in a schizophrenic fashion, not in

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a bio-politically determined way. The natural production of the individual cannot be defined with economic concerns. It goes far beyond the ideology of efficiency and flexibility.

The interesting point is that capital has almost the same schizophrenic logic. Namely, capital itself necessitates endless production. Limiting or intervening the operation of production is not a situation that capital can accept. Capital wants to spread like a cancerous tumour. This tumour makes other production machines, especially the individual, sick. In societies of control, the tumour of capitalism gains a considerable and frightening power. Capital harms the production capacity of the individual. Afterwards, it attempts to treat his sickness. Capitalist power improves the condition of the individual; however, the individual is now like a patient who has recovered with an artificial heart. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the individual is subject to a de-territorialization/re-territorialization process. This is also perpetual. Power defines the individual differently in each case of de/re-territorialization.

The individual production machine is continuously re-coded in societies of control. The individual, who is alienated from his real productive capacity, has a new machinic code. He is not a machine any more. He is instead a pre-coded machine. One fundamental property of control societies is the significance of code, which signifies the individual; the code is the password according to Deleuze (1992; 5). It embodies the individual in the production realm of global power. Capitalism cannot survive without pre-coded production machines. For this reason, it must provide the material conditions for a permanent codification process. And since it has a

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schizophrenic character, it is essential for capitalism to create a global de/re-codification strategy. Globalization is one of the most powerful solutions to this problem. In the age of societies of control, the problem is thus to constitute a global governance that must be suitable for the nature of capital.

5.3.2.1. GLOBAL AGENTS OF POWER

A globally organized power surpasses the logic of national or regional power concerns. It should take into account all social, economic, political and cultural issues in the world. Power in the contemporary era cannot remain blind to global dynamics. Nation-states cannot be regarded as the main actors any more. Power becomes so global that it cannot be closed and defined within national boundaries. There emerge different global agents in this age. Some have political, some economic, some military and some have humanitarian aims. In effect, they all want to take part in shaping the world with their own perspectives. The United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NATO, European Union and international humanity organizations - for example OXFAM, Amnesty International, UNICEF and Greenpeace- are some important and effective examples. These actors are the parts of global governance and they have compulsory connections with each other. They seem to be autonomous in nature. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, their autonomy serves global capitalist power. Considering non-governmental organizations for instance, Hardt and Negri (2000; 313) maintain that NGOs are capillaries of global power. The point that must be kept in mind here is that global organizations actively participate in the bio-

political production of life. Namely, in some way, they produce the material conditions of global power. One other crucial thing is that these organizations deal with various problems of different world issues. With the help of global organizations, power is able to manage the differences, variations, diversifications and conflicts in the world.

According to Dillon and Reid, the shift to global governance indicates the need of orchestrating the complexity of the world. Global governance accepts the complexity as given and creates self-governing areas for this complexity. Besides, it defines new personalities for the complexity with reference to markets, consumption, production and rights (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 46-48). Power certainly abandons a repressive perspective regarding different colours of life. The aim of power is to support these dissimilar formations and to construct a large ground for its legitimacy. In addition to this, power obtains considerable surplus from this complexity. This can be regarded as one of the vital consequences of global govermentality.

Luke introduces the concept of contragovernmentality to describe the power emerging in the contemporary age. Contragovernmentality, Luke claims, rewrights the individual as denationalized subject. It provides the juxtapositions of economic, cultural and social areas in which individuals can frame shared identities. The juxtapositions point to the unstable and constant combinations of a great number of global agents, such as transnational firms, trading blocs, media networks and international organizations (Luke, 1996; 492, 500, 506). The identity of the individual and that of social complexities are formed in accordance with the rationale

of global power. Identities no doubt have global connotations though they are shaped within local proximities. Carriers of power also have local networks and they can operate through regional, national and individual mechanisms as well as global ones.

War arises as a significant mechanism of global power in societies of control. A large-scale war does not seem so possible in today's global conditions. Yet, local or regional wars are very common. War is part of the global system. The reasons why most wars occur in the world cannot be traced without looking at the global dynamics, which have effects on the breakout of wars. War, which works via information and communication -like profit organizations do-, Dillon and Reid (2001; 64-65) argue, is seen as a strategy for wealth creation in the contemporary world. This is especially true considering the war industry. Global agents of power spend inconceivable amounts on war. Kelly (1994; 5) describes missile systems of this electronic age as a 100% loss of capital. However, such systems are unquestionably important for global power. Contemporary power also needs military authority besides an economic one. The political economy of this age certainly has a reference to war. Blain (1994; 828-829) asserts that politics and war indicate two different strategies; but these are easily convertible to each other. Power can use war as a part of its policy. Actually, war may give legitimate ground for exercises of power. The reverse is also true. Power creates a legitimate ground for war. And it can be said that power works like a war machine and benefits a lot from this situation.

Hardt and Negri mention that wars carried out today under the leadership of the USA seem to be legitimate interventions since they appear in favour of

international justice. The USA has the duty of a world police. This position of the USA is strengthened via international norms as well as its military hegemony (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 180). Namely, power uses both military and political authority at the same time. The discourse of global power hides the main intentions behind war. Power realizes its military interventions with a humanitarian discourse. As a matter of fact, these interventions have many supporters among the world's countries. Many countries actively participate with their military forces and take responsibilities in international interventions.

This kind of humanitarian intervention is generally realized according to international regulations and agreements. However, there is always a leading figure especially regarding the armed forces. And this figure is usually the USA. The USA is generally considered as the most powerful economic, military and political force in the world. It is the lone super power of the global system. The United States can be regarded as the imperial state of the contemporary era.

Shaw (1997; 498) describes the 18th century imperial British state as a complex structure within which there are many local institutions with large but variable autonomy. In the same way, the United States also has a lot of autonomous mechanisms through which to exercise its imperial power. These mechanisms have in fact autonomous identities, but in a legal sense. As an imperial power, the USA can manipulate almost every international organization according to its interests. Yet, it appears to do so for the sake of world peace or in the name of the war on terrorism.

Hardt and Negri draw a picture of a global constitution pyramid. They depict the United States at the top of the pyramid. The upper part of the pyramid includes other powerful nation-states and the United Nations, which the USA uses to create a notion of togetherness and to legitimize its power. The middle part consists of the networks of transnational corporations. Nation-states are also placed in the middle of the pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramid are the institutions or groups that represent the interests of people. These mechanisms of representation are there for eliminating people from operations of power (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 309-311). The pyramid has autonomous formations on each level. All these structures help to serve global constitution of power to remain strong as long as they work properly. The USA has the economic but especially the military power to lead other nation-states, transnational and international institutions. The United States is able to organize the conditions of legitimization of its imperial power on all three levels, respectively with the United Nations, nation-states, non-governmental organizations and the media. Individuals seem to be perfectly represented via these tools and it appears that the real power belongs to them.

In this structure, classical nation-states turn out to be the losers. Yet, according to Castells, the strengthening role of international actors does not necessarily indicate the end of the nation-state. Castells accepts, however, the negative effects on the nation-state. He emphasizes that the nation-state has lost its power and legitimacy (Castells, 2000b; 269). It is true that the modern nation-state does not exist any more. A national power strategy cannot succeed in the age of

global imperial power. On the other hand, the nation-state does not disappear. It continues its existence but in a different format and with different responsibilities. The nation-state of the contemporary era is articulated to the process of globalization. Its new functions are determined by global needs of the imperial power. Nation-states, Hardt and Negri argue, are the structures that control the flow of wealth to and from the imperial power. Besides, it realizes the division of wealth and disciplines its own population. That is, the nation-state realizes the bio-political organization of its people (Hardt & Negri, 2000; 310). The nation-state behaves like local branch offices of global imperial power. It shapes its population in accordance with the global necessities. Individuals are educated not just with reference to national priorities. They get training suitable with global concerns. They are educated as global citizens. The global power supplies the essential infrastructure to the nation-state for the codification process of the population. The nation-state has the responsibility to produce politically docile and economically productive individuals. Namely, the local bio-political production is the duty of the nation-state.

5.3.2.1.1. THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER CONTROL

The nation-state is in charge of governing its people by giving them the necessary mentality for the reproduction of the conditions of global power. It uses a wide range of mechanisms for this purpose. There are both general and local techniques that the nation-state can manipulate for framing the individual. The family is one of these governmentality technologies. It emerges as the smallest entity -except

the individual himself- for exercises of power. But, it is maybe the most important area. If the family itself internalizes the rationality of power, it can easily constitute the newborn members as an ideal citizen. Consequently, an effective codification comes true. Therefore power provides the family survival conditions. It is included into the system via basic life strategies. Power realizes this operation by means of registration systems. The family in the modern era, Donzelot suggests, turns out to be an obligatory supporter of power. The family register comes to the agenda as a useful practice that urges normative social requirements and economic-moral behaviours (Donzelot, 1979; 92). A morality, which is defined economically, is useful for both power and the family. The notion of economic productivity is legitimized without any doubt with the help of morality discourse. Actually, the family conceives of productivity as a right for itself. This is something desired and essential. It is essential for the continuity of the family. In this respect, morality appears as a right. The family must be able to obtain the social conditions to live in a moral way.

Cohen and Arato (1992; 262) assert that modern power is composed of a discourse of public right as well as disciplinary practices. That is to say, power controls the individual by giving him some social rights. The more rights the individual gets, the greater the scale of control becomes. Introducing new rights amounts to introducing new descriptions. Power enlarges its domain via such descriptions. Rights thus have a repressive side. Foucault criticizes liberal rights in two respects. Rights help to legitimatize the institutions of domination, whose legal function is to protect rights of the individual. In addition, rights make it easier to

exercise normalization applications (Pickett, 2000; 405). Power-originated rights benefit power rather than the individual. Rights can be regarded as a part of normalization. They help the individual to join the operation of the system. The individual participates in the running of power mechanisms. In a way, he wants power and voluntarily takes a role in normalization. The individual turns out to be a cog of the machine.

One of the main spheres, in which the consciousness of right is given, is education. School continues the process the family starts. The individual is now in a more social realm. Socialization of the individual continues under the cooperative control of the family and the school. Here, he learns some important responsibilities. Actually, he is taught that responsibilities come first. The perspective of power is rather community-oriented in disciplinary institutions, such as schools. Such policies encourage the individual to accept responsibilities, but do not do much to emphasize his rights according to James and James. The individual is thus regarded as a threat that must be kept under continuous control (James & James, 2001; 222). It can be understood that power also uses responsibilities along with rights. As a first step, responsibilities are imposed. Then rights are constructed on this ground. Power assumes that a responsible individual knows better how he can use his rights efficiently and without damaging the balance between responsibility and right.

In its education practices, power sees the individual as a potentially dangerous entity. So, power takes some precautions to prevent these potentialities. This approach of power recalls the Nietzschean concept of "resentment". McCarthy and

Dimitriadis claim that resentment is inherent in the techniques of the self-regulation of the population in modern society. For this reason, it is directly related to governmentality (McCarthy & Dimitriadis, 2000; 172). Namely, power affirms itself by naming the individual evil. The whole rationality of governmentality reflects resentment from this perspective. Consequently, the mechanisms of power can be considered as the institutions of resentment. Power controls the deviant individuals via resentment techniques by defining them as evil. People, classes, groups, individuals who may interrupt or damage the production process of power are classified as inconvenient. Christie (1993; 174) mentions that lower classes are easily transformed into dangerous classes by market economy, which demands rationality, utility and profit. The dangerous people require a special interest in power's view. This interest of power may take the form of penality in some cases.

In societies of control, the field of penality widens. It is applied in a diffused fashion and with various techniques. With the help of information and communication technologies, controlling potentially dangerous individuals becomes much easier and faster. Power's ruling field expands in the contemporary age. It now also rules digitally. Jones defines this rule as the rule at a distance, which is based on electronic procedures. It works automatically and is very flexible. The operation of digital rule is realized in principle with electronic exclusion and monitoring. Moreover, digital rule includes two significant aspects of penality: preventative controls and preventative measures (Jones, 2001; 11-19). This electronic penality system cannot be taken as classical punishment strategies. In control societies, exclusion from

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electronic mechanisms -these are everywhere- can really be regarded as an important punishment. This is also an indicator of the status of the individual, who is excluded. The conceptualization of dangerous individuals by power can be easily comprehended by looking at these practices. Yet, it must be kept in mind that power's fundamental aim is not to externalize individuals but to make them productive by eliminating their dangerous -unproductive, deviant and rebellious- sides. Exclusion may be the best way to promote the inclusion of these individuals. It forces individuals to experience a self-governance and thus a self-penality.

There is a considerable fact, however, that societies of control are turned into societies of penality. There emerges a transition, Wacquant (2000; 1) argues, from the social state to the penal state. This is a result of neo-liberal discourse. Wacquant touches on three benefits of the idea of the penal state in terms of the employment of insecurity. He mentions that the penal state disciplines the marginal segments of the working class. Besides, the dangerous members of this class are neutralized and enclosed. Lastly, the penal state reconstructs its authority among these marginal spheres (Wacquant, 2000; 1-2). It is clear once again that power uses both inclusion and exclusion techniques to make individuals productive. Power knows how even insecurity can be included in the production process. It makes profit from everything.

The widespread character of control technologies, which is exploited by power, provides clues about the penality feature of contemporary authorities. The emerging aim of these systems is to create an environment, in which socially disruptive elements can be determined and treated, socially productive elements can

be protected and socially unproductive elements can be made productive. For this purpose, power forms a mechanism, which it can use to classify these different sections of society concerning their productivity capacities. This tool must indeed be a very diffused and effective strategy. It must be efficient and fast. And most important of all, this mechanism should include all individuals.

CHAPTER VI

SURVEILLANCE

It's so nice to feel that someone's keeping a sharp eye on you, kindly protecting you from making the slightest mistake, the slightest misstep.
D-503, We, Yevgeni Zamyatin

Today, punishment is more polluting than crime.
Friedrich Nietzsche

Surveillance is crucial for a production system, which must be supervised in a continuous fashion. Global power is based on such a system. It requires persistent production machines. This everlasting property of production makes it essential to have an incessant observation mechanism. Surveillance cannot be attributed to the contemporary era. It existed even before the emergence of capitalism; but with capitalism, surveillance becomes inevitable. To control the organization and process of production, capitalism benefits from some specific surveillance techniques along with a highly organized bureaucracy. Bureaucracy provides capitalism with more rational tools for surveillance. With the development of information technology, capitalism obtains more effective methods. It unites these methods with the rationality of bureaucracy. So, it cannot be said that surveillance is a contemporary phenomenon. Regarding this issue, Lyon and Zureik (1996; 3) state that large-scale

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surveillance carried out by bureaucracy emerges with modernity, not with new technologies. What these technologies give capitalism is an opportunity to form a global bureaucracy. The beauty of technology is that while it appears to eliminate bureaucracy, it sets up a non-bureaucratic bureaucracy.

Power should constitute a legitimate ground to be able to utilize surveillance properly. Actually, what power does is not called surveillance. Power constructs a public security or utility system and supplies public service. To provide such a service, power needs the knowledge of individuals. Knowledge forms the infrastructure of surveillance. The organizations of state or private bureaucracy are the institutions of knowledge collection. Dandeker suggests that modern capitalism has a collective rather than an individual knowledge. Bureaucracy is where knowledge is produced, stored and applied (Dandeker, 1990; 13). This collective data bank is used to frame a surveillance strategy. So, power should get healthy and actual knowledge of individuals. The data must be constantly updated. To solve this problem, bureaucracy cooperates with information technology in order to reach new knowledge at any moment. With this kind of electronic data, power can apply surveillance much more efficiently. What's at stake is electronic surveillance.

When power applies electronic surveillance, it usually acts with reference to security concerns. To supply better services to individuals may not seem related to security. Nevertheless, power also wants to secure the provision of these services. This is necessary to keep the individual in contact with the applications of power. Power certainly tries to bring out insecure elements by means of electronic

surveillance. However, it cannot realize this without observing the whole. Such a system thus makes every individual a potential target of being arrested (Baker, 2001; 22). Though the individual gains access to a number of public services via electronic resources, he has to pay a price for this comfort. This price is sacrifice of privacy to some -sometimes to a great- extent. But, power claims that the problem of privacy is seriously dealt with. As a matter of fact, this is very true. Power takes some precautions to prevent the raising of privacy consciousness. The interesting point is that power does so with the help of surveillance techniques. On the one hand, surveillance can be seen as a threat to privacy. But, on the other hand, it emerges as a protector of the rights of individuals. Without surveillance, Westin (1971; 372) argues, society is not able to protect its citizens in the age of communication. Power uses surveillance itself to legitimize surveillance. It seems necessary for the good of society. Besides, it comes to point as a technological requirement. Thus, surveillance becomes natural. The expected outcome of this situation is surveillance society.

6.1. SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY

Surveillance society functions via computer technology. Computers make it possible to collect unrecorded information. Furthermore, they facilitate the storage, analysis and retrieval of information.[7] In this way, power systematizes an information network. Information flows through communication channels among the mechanisms of power. What is transferred with information is in effect power. Moreover,

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[7] Economist. 05/01/99.

considering the fact that the information in circulation belongs to the individual, a new life comes into view for the individual. Since contemporary power is very much information-oriented, the individual must be defined in information terms. Haggerty and Ericson (2000; 613) denote that power transforms the body into pure information, which is certainly more mobile and comparable than the individual himself. The importance of information for power is that it indicates a calculable, transferable, changeable mathematical unit. Power requires rationalized exercise points. This means that everything must be turned into a code. So, the individual is defined as simple information. He must be simplified because surveillance cannot cope easily with a complex structure, like the human being. The individual is re-territorialized as a simple code. Power now strengthens its position against the individual. He loses its incomprehensible original complexity and gains an understandable, logical and apparent personality. Numbers are always more comprehensible and more manageable than individuals. What power tries to do is to create numerical individuals.

Despite this simple aim, the surveillance system of power is indeed a complicated one. It consists of many components. Actually, the diffused and eclectic characteristic of power can be observed in surveillance practices. Contemporary surveillance does not run through centralized entities, but through decentralized and autonomous machines. Haggerty and Ericson name this machinic process of observation "surveillance assemblage". They assert that there is a tendency to bring different technologies together with the aim of increasing the capacity of surveillance

(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; 610). Surveillance is realized on a schizophrenic plane. This is how and why the surveillance capability of power is multiplied. Power can make use of almost everything in its surveillance practices because everything can be reduced into information or electronic currents. Surveillance, in this respect, can be perceived as the administration of all kinds of data.

Taking into consideration this context, it can be comfortably said that the organization of surveillance is global. There are global data collection and evaluation systems, like Echelon. Echelon, which is conducted by five English-speaking countries under the leadership of the United States,[8] is one significant example. It is an important one because it also shows whom surveillance serves in principle. This system forms the worldwide surveillance mechanism of big capitalist powers. So, it must be remembered that the decentralized surveillance, in some way, can serve centralized powers. This is due to the very inequalities of global power interactions. Thorton (2002; 5) mentions that there is a seriously uneven distribution of information technologies, which brings out the digital divide. This digital division is an indicator of social and economic divisions, too. Surveillance, like any other global phenomenon, is not neutral.

There is an obvious class dimension to surveillance practices. Surveillance is exercised differently over individuals from different classes. Lower and lower-middle class individuals are especially likely to experience a dense and rigid surveillance compared to middle and upper classes. Some other concerns may also become

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[8] Forbes. 10/15/2001

effective in policies of surveillance. For example, it can be claimed that blacks face these applications more than whites do in some advanced capitalist countries. Though surveillance is generally exercised at places where whites live or work, the main negative effect is directed against blacks. Fiske mentions that commercial districts, fields of public recreation and upper class residential areas are given surveillance priority. These areas are mostly used by whites. This is the division of the city, according to Fiske. The areas inhabited by blacks are coded as "no-go" areas (Fiske, 1998; 73). Power realizes a different surveillance over blacks. Actually, it exercises surveillance by not really exercising surveillance. The white areas are assumed to be the sites of security, and power takes measures against any possible deviancy. The black sites, on the other hand, are the ones where insecurity exists. And this insecurity must be seen to all other people, especially to whites. To be preventative, Fiske (1998; 83) argues, surveillance should define an abnormality by means of its looking not its doing. The visibility of an abnormality forms a basis for a normal life. Power itself frames the social conditions for abnormalization. But, it makes this with the aim of normalizing individuals. That is, power needs an abnormality in order to produce a "normal".

The normalization concern of power is also valid for blacks. Yet, power applies different strategies. While the sites of blacks are visible to whites, the reverse is true. The life of whites can be observed by blacks. So, blacks are led to a dissimilar path of normalization. They have to follow a more difficult method because they are coded as abnormal. Whereas the issue for whites is to avoid being abnormal, it is to

get rid of being abnormal for blacks. This method can be regarded as an exercise of self-governance techniques. People now watch over themselves and in addition, they experience the foresight and prevention methods of surveillance (Boyne, 2000; 299). Power works through the potentialities. It makes some assumptions about the in/security of individuals and takes some precautions. Power's logic is the logic of the police. It mainly acts from a security perspective.

Surveillance society can be equated with policed society. Considering the electronic age, maybe we must say also police society. In the contemporary era, society has to face up to the policing of power. But at the same time, it has to take on this role. It must be the police. The police of control societies have a very distinctive partner compared to previous times. This partner is the e-police. The e-police also use the techniques of foresight and prevention. Actually, it can use more effectively than classical police does. It can reach, for instance, the secret networks of potentially evil individuals who are inclined to commit a crime.[9] Together with a police society, a state of security is on the agenda. This is a police state, whose engine is fear (Dennis, 2001; 1). Without insecurity, there is no security; likewise without abnormality, there is no normality. To create insecurity necessitates a condition of fear. And the source of fear is power itself. There emerges a need for paranoia in order for power to exercise an effective mode of surveillance. Moreover, this must be universal -like global terrorism- since contemporary power is not content with regional or national realms. So, it can be asserted that power wants a

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[9] Forbes. 11/12/2001.

continuously insecure world although its objective comes into view as a more secure, peaceful and comfortable global society.

6.1.1. PRIVACY VERSUS SECURITY

A secure life sphere cannot be supplied without giving any price. This price is generally paid by individuals. The individual should forgo his privacy rights to a considerable degree. Since power runs through information and communication technologies in the contemporary era, security and privacy concerns are directly related to computers. Computers metamorphosed the identification of private and public spaces. The privacy of the individual is severely curtailed through this computerization. The protective walls of privacy, Lyon (1994; 180) says, are digitally collapsed. With the ruin of the walls, the borders between the private and the public become blurred. Computers mix the two realms into one another. So, the public seems more private and the private more public. A transparent individual emerges (Rule, cited in Lyon, 1994; 52). This transparency is maintained and strengthened by computerized records of the individual. The individual, with his numeric identity, is more subject to surveillance. His visibility to power increases. Computers may help a more secure public space to come up. Yet, this does not mean that the private sphere is also secured. The public appears to surpass the private. It gains a new definition, however. The public emerges such that the private is secured, too. The private sphere is massed into the realm of the public. Computers hold individual records en masse. These records are the roots of public surveillance.

The roots are electronic in computer-based surveillance. And this may include some crucial problems for the individual. Computers' inability to forget may make surveillance stronger, Miller (1973; 22) claims. Power does not want to forget. It wants the records of all whats, hows, and whys related to the individual. This helps power to carry out a lifelong surveillance. The individual exists with his computer record. Without this code, he is not alive. On this account, Lyon (1994; 59) emphasizes that an electronic record can be deleted with no trace behind. An individual with no personal record is regarded as officially dead in such a computerized social system. Power can thus easily play with the life of individuals. The past, present and future of the individual can be changed via simple keystrokes.

The individual is transformed into electronic codes or data. What's under observation is this data. With reference to Clarke (1991), Bennett calls this situation dataveillance. The aim of dataveillance is to locate suspicious individuals by means of a general screening. That is, all individuals are considered as dangerous (Bennett, 1996; 239). The operation of dataveillance is influenced by a security perspective. Generalized observation amounts to the desire of power to form a public security rather than a private one.

Actually, there is a concern related to private security. This is about the protection of personal electronic data. Technology is generally inefficient in providing this security. Power, which takes the primary advantage from technology, is the foremost potential danger to privacy. It is inevitable, in this case, to form legal regulations. Taebi (1996; 104) asserts that without appropriate privacy legislation,

technology provides very little -sometimes no- protection for ordinary individuals. The contradictory characteristic of surveillance becomes clear here. Power has to define some regulations to limit its own realm of action. This can be taken as a proof to support the fact that the real danger to privacy comes from power itself. The danger is especially prevalent for the "average" citizen. He is the one who needs the protection most. This kind of legal protection is also useful for power. Power defines a new type of privacy for the individual.

6.1.2. THE INDIVIDUAL, THE MARKET AND SURVEILLANCE

Privacy means an infinite realm of freedom, according to power. But this freedom has significant connections with the electronic sphere. Privacy and freedom of the individual must be defined in both cyber and real spaces. Actually, the two spaces are not so different from each other in contemporary power relations. Nevertheless, it is not wrong to argue that cybernetic interactions gain more importance over the "real" ones. The new reality of control societies is cyber-reality. In this respect, the cyber freedom and privacy concerns become more momentous.

Capitalism defines the individual's freedom basically with respect to consumption. Consumption is presented as the most important area for the individual to identify him and to achieve self-realization. It tries to extend this freedom domain. So, capitalism grants new opportunities to the individual to better enjoy his freedom. While providing new self-actualization areas, capitalism also creates new production sites for itself. That is, the individual produces the power of capitalism via

consumption. In this line of actions, power has the chance to enrich its surveillance capacity. The world of free consumption, Lyon (1994; 136) claims, is at the same time the world of social surveillance. The more the individual enters the area of consumption, the easier he can be converted into electronic codes. This brings a denser observation over the individual. The individual should register and give his personal information when for example applying for a credit card. This information may be shared among different private or public institutions. From this arises a notion of trade surveillance. According to Lyon (1994; 140), trade surveillance forms a connection between capitalist power and the surveillance of consumers by means of indirect non-compulsory methods. Namely, power realizes surveillance in a smooth way. The individual himself wants to be subject to surveillance -consciously or unconsciously- most of the time. The individual rarely complains about this situation because for the most part he benefits from it. Gotlieb (1996; 164) suggests that the adaption of individuals to surveillance techniques can be seen as responses to needs and market forces. The inclusion of the individual in the system is an indicator of a necessity. The individual needs to be absorbed by the market. Otherwise, he cannot last a satisfactory life in this information age. The market gives him the chance of being accepted to the realm of comfort.

Capitalism does not provide this opportunity of comfort to everyone. The market does not want to include some individuals. That is to say, there is an exclusion process besides that of inclusion. Gandy introduces the concept of "panoptic sort" related to the excluding feature of the market. In addition to its

collection, storage and process functions, the panoptic sort also identifies, classifies and assesses the information of the individual. At the end of these stages, the individuals who will be included and excluded are determined with the perspective of maximum profit and minimum risk (Gandy, 1996; 132-136). From this analysis it becomes apparent that surveillance works unequally. It contributes to the preservation of a class-based social structure. Via surveillance, power is able to determine not only the dangerous elements of society but also low-income individuals, who cannot produce a sufficient amount of surplus for the market.

With its inclusion and exclusion abilities, electronic surveillance turns out to be a subject constitutor. Power obtains a strong discursive weapon in this respect. Power uses a technological discourse to frame the appropriate individual. Since technology has directly scientific connotations, its effects are conceived mostly as scientific. On this ground, the individual considers surveillance very natural and "normal". In other words, it is reified. As Perolle mentions, the privacy of the individual seems to be violated by technology not by power. He adds that the result of reification is the replacement of social interactions by technological rationality (Perolle, 1996; 55).

Power benefits from this scientific rationality in hiding its ideological position. Reification of surveillance mechanisms prevents the individual from asking the right questions. The individual can question, for example, why the system fails in some cases. On the other hand, he does not need to ask about the political economy of surveillance. From one point on, what is significant for the individual is whether his

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electronic codes or data are held in a right and healthy fashion. Actually, a number of privacy issues are related to this so-called problem. Miller touches on the importance of accuracy, integrity, security and privacy concerns in relation to the computerized personal data. These are mainly about the accuracy of personal data, the relation between computer and data, the prevention of unauthorized accesses and the possible problems that might arise should the system go away (Miller, 1996; 269-271). The necessity of such a system is not in question because it is obviously vital. Surveillance is presented as having a neutral characteristic. Namely, data becomes an ideological discourse in the hands of power.

Poster denotes that one significant feature of the database is its distance from any specific authority. In addition to this, data is recorded by many and anonymous people, which weakens the possibility of an authority's presence. Therefore, the database comes into view as a discursive practice that directly strengthens the power of its owner or user (Poster, 1996; 182-183). The anonymity of people who deal with databases reflects also the anonymity of power. Though database is nothing but a concrete appearance of power, the individual regards it as an essential technological phenomenon. But this phenomenon defines new identities for the individual. Databases are machines to produce retrievable identities according to Poster (1996; 186).

A flexible identity is crucial for global power. Power can reach and use these identities whenever needed. To materialize this requires a universal site. From this angle, the exploitation of cyberspace is important for power. Cyberspace helps power

to form electronically coded information. Digital encoding, Whitaker (1999; 50) says, gives way to a universal language. Power constitutes a global technological language, which may be understood by anyone. In fact, this language is the ultimate ground of global citizenship and individuals, who do not want to break from the world, should learn this language. The emergence of such a language can be regarded as a compulsory result of specific global power dynamics. The computerized world makes a computerized language[10] indispensable. More and more people begin to live in a computerized world and use its language. Besides being an inevitable fact, cyberspace provides the individual some crucial self-realization areas. Miller (1996; 324) argues that the Internet is a site of self-governing anarchies and individual creativities. In this complex context, power obtains suitable material conditions of the global panopticon.

The panopticon of the contemporary age is different from that of Bentham's imagination. Power today applies a more diffused and denser mode of surveillance. Modern surveillance, according to Lyon (1994; 68), is more capital-intensive and it aims at a self-policing of the individual. Power in societies of control makes itself invisible as a centralized entity. It becomes visible in decentralized daily practices. It does not use classical observation methods to control the individual. It relies on cybernetic tools. Dandeker (1990; 129) denotes that with computerized systems, the

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[10] In his dystopia "We", Zamiatin talks about a future society, whose language is based on mathematical regulations. Actually, everything is constituted with a rational, numerical and scientific perspective. There are state mathematicians, who deal with possible irrational social deviances. These mathematicians feel a great admiration for the perfection of the product table.

police forces of power become more mobile. The individual, who is turned into digital codes, is more easily reachable. Power is able to control a digitally identified individual from everywhere. This universal identity of the individual, Miller (1996; 295) suggests, makes it easier to follow the individual and to exercise control over him. Power obtains a frightening authority over the individual.

This strength of power is not just a forceful one. It also has a consensual basis. That is, power's mobile police forces are individuals themselves. Power is a legitimate complex in the eyes of the individual because it provides his basic survival needs. But power does more than this. It also creates new necessities for the individual and gives him the opportunity to take advantage from these. Whitaker claims that power operates by serving the desires of the individual. There arises a seductive and insidious participatory panopticon in this process (Whitaker, 1999; 141-144).

The most important element of power is the individual himself. Power transforms the individual into a conveyer of its mechanisms, rationality and exercises. It does this by empowering the individual. The empowered individual becomes a voluntary element of power practices. He acts in accordance with the reason of power. With reference to Cruikshank (1994), Dean argues that there are four crucial characteristics of empowerment. Firstly, empowerment indicates a particular type of rationality of government. Empowerment makes it more difficult to evaluate the usage of power. Besides, the working of empowerment is based on definite forms of knowledge. Lastly, empowerment introduces both coercive and voluntary application

of power by eliminating the dichotomies between power and the individual (Dean, 1999; 68-69). Power empowers the individual according to some predetermined rationalities. Thus the individual cannot act in the way that he wants. His empowered freedom is within power's limits. This means that power loads some responsibilities onto the individual. These responsibilities force him to behave in ways that suit the interests of power. This coexistence of freedom and responsibility prevents the individual from questioning the real nature of power. The reason is that he becomes power himself and self-criticism is indeed a very tough matter. In these conditions, the individual cannot grasp his real position with respect to power. In this manner, power gains its strongest ally.

The individual not only helps power to operate effectively but also to be implemented on himself. Whitaker argues that new information technologies have two contradictory sides. On the one hand, they enable and empower the individual; but on the other, the individual becomes more vulnerable to surveillance (Whitaker, 1999; 101). This is the fundamental principle of power in control societies. The individual is more included within the system by being equipped with more rights. In return for this, power is also included more within the life of the individual. Power and the individual become mutually productive entities. The individual now must be global since power is so. Power cannot be content with national citizens. It wants independent, flexible and global citizens.

CHAPTER VII

CITIZENSHIP

*I watched the gigantic cranes, made of clear glass,
slowly rolling along glass rails and, just like the men,
obediently turn, bend, and invert their cargo into the
innards of the INTEGRAL. They were the same, all one;
humanized, perfected men.*

D-503, We, Yevgeni Zamyatin

Janoski emphasizes four main features of citizenship. He underlines that
citizenship begins with membership in a nation-state. It includes active and passive
rights and obligations. The rights of citizens are universalistic as protected by law and
are applied to all citizens. Citizenship implies a notion of equality. This equality is
framed within certain limits balanced with both rights and obligations (Janoski, 1998;
9-10). The emergence of citizenship can be said to fall in with the rise of the nation-
state. The nation-state consists of legally equal people with legally equal rights and
responsibilities. All rights are provided naturally when the individual is born within
the borders of nation-state. Some rights of the individual have a universalistic
property, but the individual may have some other rights, which carry only national
connotations. This is true for responsibilities, too. The individual should fulfill both
national and universal obligations. Namely, the local and global life of the individual

develops hand in hand. But, definitions of citizenship are usually made at the local level or with the common agreements of national powers. Power may have the initiative in the formation of modern citizenship's substructure. Yet, modern citizenship also requires active participation of individuals to shape these conditions.

Modern citizenship, Kalberg (1993; 97) suggests, comprises civic responsibility, social trust, egalitarianism and world-oriented individualism. The modern individual obtains his citizenship rights by performing his obligations. The responsibilities of the citizen are defined more and more on a global basis. The new global character of egalitarianism, civic responsibilities and individualism are good indicators of this trend. In contemporary society, the conditions of citizenship are compulsorily constructed in accordance with global concerns. The changing political economy of the world enforces nations to develop new regulations on citizenship. The interesting point is that new definitions like the old ones are made within the limits of law. Citizenship is closed in the discourse of law in both cases. And law has unquestionably liberal point of view. Neo-liberal discourse, which once operated at the local level, forms a global perspective of citizenship today.

7.1. NEO-LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

According to Orwin, the citizenship definition of liberal democracy is characterized by civility. Civility, he says, is attributed to more than a citizen who can live his rights freely but also can recognize others' rights. This citizen is bourgeois (Orwin, 1992; 76, 85). Liberalism gives a self-responsible picture of the citizen. A

good citizen must be aware of common social responsibilities but at the same time he claims his individual rights. The citizen in the liberal democratic system must be able to demonstrate that he is an independent individual. Liberalism prepares the necessary conditions for the citizen by supplying the rights. Via civility, liberalism builds a new type of community. Orwin (1992; 85) asserts that this community is made up of different individuals with equal rights. What is crucial for the liberal view is the autonomy of citizens from strict social ties. Liberal society is composed of autonomous individuals. Liberal discourse also respects the differences of individuals. The existence of such differences is indeed significant for liberalism. Liberalism prepares a legitimate ground for itself by giving equal rights to everyone no matter in what respect or how different each person is.

With the idea of civility, liberal democracy opens a social field for collective actions of dissimilar citizens. Citizens need such areas to experience their citizenship status in the real sense. And this area is inevitably political. According to Turner (1993; 3), citizenship is about the social membership obtained within modern political collectivities. This area cannot be identified with only political terms, however. It is also a cultural and economic area. Actually, though neo-liberalism seems to provide a site for political movements, the usage of this site for political reasons is not so common compared to the usage for cultural and economic activities. Power creates consumption-centered social activities for citizens' actualization needs. Citizens have the freedom to choose in this vast area of consumption. But, freedom becomes limited to this vast area in capitalism and it finds its meaning in advertisements. With

reference to Lasch, Meijer indicates that ads present consumption as an alternative to protest. Besides, alienation itself is turned into a commodity by the help of ads (Meijer, 1998; 237). Not only alienation but also freedom is commodified by the market economy. Citizens liberate themselves by consuming. They choose and consume with their free will and their own private economic power.

The contemporary world, Saunders asserts, is characterized by a privatized consumption, which is the expression of individual freedom and consumer choice. This freedom leads citizens to enjoy senses of self-worth, autonomy and security, causing a wish to take part in collective life (Saunders, 1993; 60, 85-86). Consumption may be defined as a realm of freedom. However, it is essential to interrogate which kind of freedom the individual experiences and which forces describe this freedom. It is very doubtful whether the political field produced within the dynamics of consumption may give a sufficient opportunity for citizens to realize an effective politics. As a matter of fact, this is a market-driven politics.

Politics in such a neo-liberal discourse cannot dare to question its source and its realm of activity. That is, citizens have political rights. Nevertheless, each citizen is led primarily to other social areas. A non-politicized citizen is the object of neo-liberalism. The changing nature of political interests further feeds this situation. Falk (2000; 10) suggests that political differences lose their importance with globalization and elections turn into routine and meaningless activities.

It is essential to analyze neo-liberalism together with its economic material infrastructure. Modern citizenship is framed under the effects of the market economy

and capitalism. The force, which creates a large-scale sphere of cultural, economic and political self-realization, is the market economy. This is no doubt true. Yet, there is an important concern that must be considered. Capitalism does not provide all these opportunities to every citizen. Capitalism generates high welfare standards for the mass of the population in the West, Roche argues. However, he adds that it also generates social inequalities for all citizens (Roche; 1992; 231). Namely, liberal democracy is not so democratic. Not every citizen can benefit from this kind of democracy. To achieve a proper satisfaction from this system, citizens need an economic power also. But, liberal discourse does not make this point clear. It conceals economic aspects of citizenship by developing a legal-based discourse on citizenship. Though there is an obvious economic inequality among people, liberal democracy imposes the possibility of equality. But it ignores the fact that even if such equality can be constituted, it is of no use without economic considerations.

Capitalism tries to form a global citizenship in this context. In fact, it claims to achieve this. But as Falk (2000; 14) says, this is instead a premature citizenship. The idea of global citizenship cannot be a concrete reality for a considerable part of the world unless the resources of contemporary society are shared in a just way. Ichilov (1998; 19) emphasizes this point claiming that the world is going to have two poles; an information elite that controls the global economy and the unemployed masses. While some people become global citizens in the real meaning of the word, others are transformed into the global poor. The egalitarian discourse of neo-liberalism cannot work in the material world of capitalism since the source of

inequality and injustice is the market economy itself. So, neo-liberal discourse is grounded in unequal economic realities.

The conflicting characteristic of power can also be seen in citizenship practices. Neo-liberalism has both inclusionary and exclusionary processes. The included citizens are generally in better economic positions. The excluded others have equal rights with the lucky class. But they cannot use these rights properly for their legal and survival problems. Turner argues that the inclusion side of citizenship involves the re-allocation of resources. The exclusion side, on the other hand, is concerned with constructing identities with respect to an imagined solidarity (Turner, 2001; 192). In this account, there cannot be a question of equal allocation of global resources in the contemporary world. The included class has the power to organize this allocation and not to transfer anything to the excluded class. Via this class, however, the included class defines and preserves its identity. The later must first of all deserve to be a citizen in the eyes of the former. Turner (2001; 192) says the contribution of individuals to the ongoing system is an important criterion to be included in citizenship.

The contribution of the mass, who cannot use global sources properly, is a considerable one, in fact. The global power and its allies owe their existence to this contribution. For this reason, they have to provide at least minimal survival conditions to the excluded mass. That is, power should in some way include, these people in the global production process. From this point of view, they are included, too. Yet, this inclusion is instead lived as exclusion. Power applies different inclusion

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strategies for different classes. This is due to the flexible property of power. Global power has the capacity to build up suitable methods separately for each segment of the population. In principle, it owes this flexibility feature to information and communication technologies in principle.

7.1.1. TECHNOLOGY AND CITIZENSHIP

Two important characteristics of modern power are efficiency and flexibility. This is mostly related to computer technology. Power can work on a global scale via computers. The same opportunities are prevalent for the individual. He can act more efficiently and flexibly by means of electronic communication. The individual obtains the power to surpass national borders and to interact globally. The space of global interactions is cyberspace.

According to Whitaker, cyberspace is an endless tabula rasa, which is continuously reconstructed. The individual interacting via cyberspace develops new expressions, a new consciousness and a new self (Whitaker, 55-56). Cyberspace provides the individual with more and faster fields of expression. Moreover, the individual may become more effective in manipulating the existing relations between power and other social agents. Cyberspace brings cyber-democracy into view. Individuals interacting in cyberspace lose their worldly status and class properties. This space creates cyber-equality. The power positions of individuals become insignificant. Cyberdemocracy may really offer a democratic space for citizens. Yet, the entrance cannot be said to be democratic. There are some limitations and

requirements in this democracy and only a limited number of world citizens can meet these necessities.

Cyberdemocracy, Tsagarousianou (1998; 171) argues, emerges in such a context that there exists a global deregulation and privatization of the telecommunications industry. In these conditions, the democracy of cyberspace is a virtual one. It has no meaning for the great mass of people who cannot reach the necessary technological substructure for an entrance visa. This is a private democracy and the individual can live it only by paying for it. That is, cyberspace is not a particularly public sphere. The regulations related to cyberspace are made not by the initiatives of people but mostly by the powerful institutions of social structure. Miller (1996; 325) emphasizes that "big guys" unavoidably frame a bureaucratic order in cyberspace to keep the interactions under control. It can be guessed that these "big guys" are the global powers of the world; big capitalist corporations, powerful political and military forces, which also rule the cyberworld as well as the real one. They can decide who is able to use or not use cyberspace. They can also determine how cyberspace can be used. Thus, cyberdemocracy is subject to some authoritarian practices.

The flexibility notion of technology is damaged in this process. Power, which gives way to flexibility at the same time creates means to restrict it. This is a predetermined flexibility. Whitaker mentions that one effect of flexibility is an inescapable and permanent insecurity. From this emerges a need for stability and predictability (Whitaker, 1999; 75). That is to say, power cannot cope with its own

product. Much of flexibility is not useful for power. It tries to stabilize things, people, facts and actions to govern them more easily. Therefore, neither in cyberspace nor in the concrete world can citizens experience flexibility thoroughly. There are always totalitarian applications imposed by power. And information technologies are not exempt from this rule.

Informational technologies, Whitaker emphasizes, promote change and risk but also include the technical means to reduce risk. This self-correcting peculiarity helps technology to become more adaptable to the environment by defining and isolating potential risk factors. Whitaker argues that this is the characteristic of nothing but surveillance (Whitaker, 1999; 75-76). While technology produces its risk-aversion techniques, it automatically sets up a surveillance mechanism. In the same way, cyberspace takes precautions against potential risks. Namely, this is a matter of potentiality and possibility. No matter who he is, anyone who enters the system means a potential danger and must be controlled. Power's self-correction amounts to monitoring the individual on a constant basis. Actually it attempts to correct the individual since the main source of flexibility, risk and insecurity is not power but the individual.

Liberal power, Dean says, empowers and activates free choices of individuals, consumers, professionals and other social agents. But, on the other hand, it determines norms, standards, performance criteria and quality controls. In this manner, power monitors, measures and evaluates these social agents (Dean, 1999; 165). Power requires a controlled flexibility and risk. Though liberal power seems to

encourage risk-taking, it also calculates the possible effects of this behaviour for its permanence and for the protection of the production process. And interestingly, it appears to does this monitoring for the sake of citizens and with respect to certain limits of law. Penenburg (2001; 5) claims that such surveillance strengthens individual liberty and safeguards. It may do so. Yet, it must be questioned whose liberty and safeguards are made stronger against whom and in which way.

Power may use surveillance technologies to provide a better public service and a more comfortable social life to citizens. It may guarantee their liberty and safeguards. However; citizens must pay for this comfort, security and better quality of life. This contradictory duality is the main characteristic of every surveillance mechanism including social security and population registration systems.

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CHAPTER VIII

POPULATION REGISTRATION SYSTEMS

Freedom and criminality are just as indissolubly linked as... well, as the movement of an aero and its velocity. When the velocity of an aero is reduced to 0, it is not in motion; when a man's freedom is reduced to 0, he commits no crimes.

D-503, We, Yevgeni Zamyatin

The basic purpose of population registration systems is to enhance the social and economic conditions of citizens. These systems have a generally centralized feature. The records, in this regard, are used for objectives formed by a centralist perspective. This brings into view a crucial question. There is a considerable possibility that power can use the data of a population for strengthening its own position. Related to the population registrations in England, Higgs denotes that nineteenth century data collection aims to facilitate individual self-help and provide local political accountability. In this process, individuals are the main beneficiaries. After 1870 with the spread of central data usage, the state begins to replace citizens (Higgs, 2001; 192). This does not mean that citizens have no use for these systems. Actually, a registration system is useful for the state -in general power- only if it is also useful for its citizens. The interest of power is focused more on improving

citizens' conditions rather than in making itself more powerful. A powerful state is the one that is non-powerful. Such a power is certainly not a weak one. But, it spreads its strength to various parts of society and it does not gather its forces and strength in one center. What is central is the location of collected data.

The global feature of power engenders a need for global standards for registration procedures and applications. Though every country has its own system, a common international organization is a necessity to be able to realize a comparative analysis between countries. Such an organization can also give overall information about world population by constructing a data bank on the whole world. This information can be used to build strategies with specific or general purposes regarding different parts of the world.

To materialize a global system, there necessitates some international institutions and organizations. The United Nations, World Health Organization and International Institute for Vital Registration and Statistics are some of the most important of these institutions. Related to the comparison problem, the Statistical Commission thinks that comparability can only be achieved via the same general concepts, definitions and classifications.[11] These definitions should be accepted and implemented by all countries to construct an effective and meaningful system. The formation of standards cannot be said to precede the global applications. In fact, these common concepts are the outcomes of ongoing exercises of national or local

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[11] United Nations Statistical Office. April 1996. pp. 5-6.

registration systems. The need for comparability indicates this point. So, the question to be addressed is why comparability is essential.

Comparability means observation, identification and assessment. These of course are significant characteristics of a surveillance system. A global system of registration provides a legitimate ground for global surveillance mechanisms. The importance of global standards can be understood easily by taking into consideration the global feature of production. Since production is carried out on a global scale, power requires global regulations and normalization practices. So, it can be argued that comparability forms standards rather than the other way round. And then, power benefits from these standards for further comparisons. Consequently, new comparisons are used to frame new standards. These may be some common definitions in favour of world citizens. Yet at the same time, these are the standards of an efficient, flexible and productive labour force. Such a productive capacity is vital[12] for global power. And power should ensure the healthiness and preservation of this capacity. The first important step in being able to guarantee healthy productivities is high-quality registration systems.

The most important benefit of these systems for the individual is that he gets a legal proof of his identity via registration. This proof provides a protection for the individual regarding his human and civil rights. Besides, it shows his membership in society. For a nation, on the other hand, registration systems are crucial to develop

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[12] An interesting point is that the statistical information regarding the life issues of the population is called "vital statistics system".

better programmes and plans to improve the well being of citizens. Some significant application fields are social development plans, public health, maternal and child care, family planning, security, education, housing and economic development. Via these systems, a nation can save a considerable amount of money.[13]

The inclusion and exclusion of the individual is realized through the procedures of registration. Registration is the proof of life and death. It also gives a sociality to the individual. This sociality is an absolutely rational and modern one. It necessitates a ground of rationality for its existence and registration provides this ground. In order to be accepted as a human being, the individual should adapt to this rationality. That is, power does not want unregistered individuals and it imposes its rational legitimacy onto them with the purpose of embodying individuals within the production process. The individual does not get his universal personal rights with his birth. These rights are not given inherently to him. To obtain his natural rights, the individual has to be registered. Without registration, the individual cannot gain the status of citizenship. And without citizenship, he cannot do anything. He cannot maintain his life. Namely, being a citizen becomes more important than being the individual. Furthermore, it turns into the foremost condition of being an individual. In this way, power obtains a legitimate site to define and shape the individual in line with its own norms. It monopolizes the characteristics of being the individual. In these circumstances, an individual free from the standards of power is not possible.

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[13] Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Statistics Division. United Nations. 1998, p. 4.

To be able to constitute such a system, power should obtain the support of a very broad section of society. To enumerate these groups will be useful to better comprehend the diffused character of power. These are first of all government itself, along with registration institutions, medical societies, hospitals, the courts, law societies, organizations for nutritional campaigns, religious groups, educational institutions and groups. We can also include village leaders, funeral directors, spiritual leaders, those who oversee customary and civil marriages, human rights organizations, midwifes, coroners, public opinion makers, regional and community leaders, women's groups and associations, planners, policy makers and researchers, and the general population itself.[14]

For an efficient and effective registration system, power must be able to reach all individuals without exception. For this reason, power has to build up a serious cooperation with all kinds of institutions and people that have a direct effect on the life of the individual. It must transfer its rationality to these institutions. This is not so difficult, in fact. Most of the institutions are also beneficiaries of registration systems. In this regard, it can be claimed that their interests are in agreement with those of power to some extent. And beyond this, it must be kept in mind that the institutions do not have an independent identity from power. Actually, they are the machines of the complex power mechanism and they have crucial roles in the constitution of the individual.

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[14] Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Statistics Division, United Nations, 1998, p. 25.

In addition to the support of institutions and individuals, there are some other necessary conditions for strong registration systems. The most significant of all, Baum argues, is the commitment of the central government to allocate essential resources for the improvements of these systems. Government on all levels should ensure the necessary cooperation. Besides, the institutionalization of legislation and regulations needs government support. A central registration authority is another requirement. This is essential for the coordination of registration activities all over the country. Baum asserts that registration systems must take into account the needs of data users. He adds that an active notifier system is also necessary for an efficient system. That is, there must be people who will notify registration centers about vital events. An effective system should create the need for registration as well as a consciousness of procedures of registration. Namely, it must be able to show the usefulness of registration. Training of a large number of people whose jobs are related somehow to registration is another important concern, according to Baum (1996; 163-166).

The legitimatization of registration systems must inevitably be provided by power. This can be provided through legal arrangements. Law also helps the system to operate better. Power must form a central organization to collect all information at one center. Power can also construct decentralized structures to make registration procedures faster, stronger and more effective. The centralized data center gives power the opportunity to transfer the information to other official institutions more easily. This center, moreover, can make the decentralized local networks

communicate effectively with each other and produce more reliable information. Coordination that the center provides brings the advantage of updating the information at any moment. For an effective updating, the system should assure a continuous and accurate flow of information. It should incorporate individuals, in this regard, into its operations. Citizens are turned into active executers of the system. Power must realize a nation-wide system of training to effectively form registration systems. The aim is to make not only responsible officials of registration but also to encourage all citizens to become aware of the necessity of registration. This is an essential step for the legitimization of the system. The construction of a consciousness leads to the rapid diffusion and acceptance of registration systems throughout the country. What is diffused with the registration processes is power itself. So, what is useful for the individual is useful for power.

8.1. THE ELECTRONIC STATE

Power constitutes a containment network with registration systems. Its main objective is to make every individual a member of the system. This amounts to better living conditions for the individual. The individual, as a citizen of power, no doubt gets the chance to continue a high quality life. But, this is a power-defined quality. In contemporary societies, this quality must have an electronic side. Power can provide a lot of services via electronic means. Electronic power is able to overcome and eliminate massive and clumsy structure of the bureaucratic state. The outcome of the computerization of public services is the electronic state. This computerization trend

can also be seen more widely in the private sector and power certainly cannot be reduced to the state. Yet, the state is a strong agent. The electronification of the state, in this regard, indicates a new phase in the organization of power. Power is organized within the logic of contemporary technology. İnce emphasizes that information and communication technologies are the inevitable means of the electronification of the state. The fundamental aim is to construct a state structure whose capacity of processing information is increased. This state must also be able to make decisions and respond to the public needs of citizens quickly (İnce, 2001; 13). Namely, the state gains flexibility in accordance with the reason of contemporary power. It combines technology and information. And it works through technological information.

İnce argues that the electronic state is an informational state. For him, information is a distinctive resource that must be seriously protected in democratic societies. In these societies, information sharing is common, which leads to a participative, fair and transparent democracy. The state provides understandable, useful, actual, correct and complete information to citizens in democratic societies. Citizens can influence the operation of the public services via their demands. Such a system can best be achieved with the electronic state (İnce, 2001; 22-25). Since the electronic state includes -to a great extent- the knowledge of all citizens, information sharing is more easily realized. More clearly, citizens may share their knowledge with the state or power in general. Nevertheless, power may not share the same amount of knowledge with citizens. As the moderator of an electronic information-sharing

system, power can manipulate the procedures and regulations for its own interest. Power must respond to the requirements of citizens while supplying the service. However, citizens should consider the priorities of power, too. The reason is that the information-sharing mechanism of the electronic state is a reciprocal one. Citizens should give what power needs to run the system. That is to say, citizens supply the main input: knowledge. In this respect, power appears to be the biggest beneficiary. It does not have to make clear anything about its specific knowledge. It does have to display openly what kind of knowledge it collects. And this knowledge is already known to individuals. Power sometimes may not give even this very basic information. But beyond this, there is always a question of how and where power uses this information.

Secondly, İnce mentions that the electronic state is a technical state. It is technology-intensive. What defines the strength of a state in this age is technology intensiveness. The electronic state is constituted on definite and evident technical foundations (İnce, 2001; 26). The electronic state operates with a technological perspective. It appropriates the rationality of technology. It is almost fed by only purely technical resources. For this reason, it develops a technological reason. Human reason finds its reflection in technology for the electronic state. The reification of human reason turns into the reification of technology. Technology seems to dominate human reason. While rationality may be seen as an outcome of human thought, technology creates its own rationality. This rationality is, strange to say, adopted by a vast majority of citizens, institutions and the state without arising

any question. Technology provides the mathematical certainty that people and power look for. Power can give definite definitions -which are more definite than themselves- of its operations, applications and services. This technology-oriented point of view sees the faults, problems and drawbacks of the system as the outcomes of the technological system that are badly administered. Sometimes these problems may also be considered due to the lack of technological resources and experience. The technology-oriented view does not attribute the responsibility to technology itself. In this case, the electronic state is perceived and set up as an absolute entity. It is perhaps more absolute than any other kind of state in history. It has a scientific mathematical foundation. And science -as the biggest ideology- gives the electronic state an indisputable power. Citizens have to accept the scientism of such a state and to benefit from its incredible service opportunities.

There are some good examples in the world, which carries out the electronic state successfully. It must also be considered that these states have comparatively well-designed registration systems that work effectively. A successful case of the electronic state is the e-citizen system of Singapore. Some important factors behind this success must be mentioned. First of all, in Singapore, the usage of information and communication technologies is very diffused. One fourth of the population has Internet access. A relatively low population (about 4 million) helps the state to solve public problems and provide services more easily and quickly. The state works via a web site called "e-citizen". In this site, there is a figure named "life journey". This

conceptualization points to the fact that the state is always close by its citizens during their whole life (İnce, 2001; 55-56).

The existence of a necessary infrastructure has an important role in the actualization of the Singapore case. The country has enough technological resources. This system provides a very good public service to citizens. Citizens can take advantage of this system during their entire life. It is a lifetime service. However, it is possible to view the system from a different angle. Citizens do not have such an option to refuse the service provided. They have to use it whether they wish to or not. And they should benefit from it from their birth to their death. The state examines almost every possible problem and essential service in the life of its citizens. It sets up definite stations in their life journeys. Citizens must certainly spend some time at these stations. With the term "life journey", the state also defines what kind of life is suitable for its citizens. The figure contains titles on education, military service, settlement, family, transformation, work, health, law, legal regulations and employment (İnce, 2001; 56-57). The state includes certain responsibilities and rights within the service it supplies. In this way, it introduces an inherent citizenship identity.

Two further successful cases, especially concerning their registration systems, are Norway and Sweden. Regarding the system of Norway, there are several reasons for its success. Every municipality in Norway has its own registration office controlled by the national registration office. Religious and formal institutions are require to give information of vital events to registration offices. Every citizen in

Norway has an identity number, which provides consistency between records. This number can be used by public and private institutions. This gives the possibility to compare records. Through the processing of information coming from local offices, the records at the central population register are renewed on a daily and weekly basis. The information in the national register can only be used with the permission of the national center. On-line information, on the other hand, can be used by the national insurance administration, the police, highway administration, banks and commercial institutions.[15]

The registration system of Norway is organized on both national and local levels. There is centralization and decentralization at the same time. There is a continuous renewal process of population records. Citizens' knowledge is held in a reliable fashion and citizens can reach the right public service more quickly. Related institutions are able to make use of these updated records when needed. This means that the public service can reach citizens more quickly, too. A reliable registration and renewal of personal records is important to determine the needs of citizens at any moment. Thus, renewal of records means also renewal of needs and services. This process continues under both central and local control. This cooperation implies a constant and inevitable observation of citizens. Namely, citizens experience a total surveillance.

In the Swedish case, there is an integrated registration system that supplies every public service. Citizens can use this system with the help of just one number: a

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[15] DİE (State Institute of Statistics), 1999; pp. 8-9.

personal identification number. The developed public consciousness on registration issues is a significant factor that increases the performance of registration systems in Sweden. That various benefits are obtained with this system is another factor. Besides, there is almost no bureaucratic procedure during registration process. That the same and the one system, which works through an effective computer network, is prevalent in the whole country also affects the performance positively.[16]

As in the system of Norway, citizens in Sweden can obtain public service by means of one simple identification number. This increases the accessibility of services. But, it also makes it easier for the state to reach citizens. The state provides all conditions and facilities for citizens to include them within the system. This helps citizens to adapt to the registration processes more easily. A consciousness of registration comes automatically in this case. In both countries, the system works very well and citizens are able to enjoy good public service. From this respect, Norway and Sweden still preserve their characteristic of being a welfare state to a considerable degree. There is a social system that can be identified as social democracy in both Norway and Sweden. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this welfare is a highly controlled one. Citizens are eligible for welfare according to some predetermined regulations and standards. There is almost no possibility to break the rules of the system. The state guarantees this via continuous surveillance. Even though there are well-defined legal regulations to protect individual privacy, citizens' actions are subject to continuous control. These two states thus have

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[16] DİE (State Institute of Statistics), 1999; pp. 9-10.

totalitarian properties as well as democratic ones. In other words, the citizens of Norway and Sweden live two of the most democratic totalitarianisms in the world.

Despite this totalitarian side, the e-state with its widespread registration network is a desired stage for both power and the individual. Power can realize its aims more effectively with the help of the e-state. The individual, on the other hand, can reach almost every public service via computer technology. Yet, the e-state is generally difficult to construct. This is especially true for underdeveloped and developing countries. The idea of an e-state, for these countries, reflects the desire of being able to be articulated into the contemporary world. It is in effect the essential condition of globalization. The e-state means to save from bureaucratic and massive structure. It signifies a flexible state. The e-state can respond more flexibly to global change. This is extremely important to survive in these historical and material realities. Every state, which wants to have a say in globalization, has to take a step towards the revision of its structure by means of information and communication technologies. Turkey is one of them.

In the report of the Directorate of Administration Improvement, which operates under the control of the prime ministry, it is stated that the functions of a contemporary state must be limited to justice, security and defence. In Turkey, however, the state is very large beyond these compulsory services. For this reason, it cannot provide public services properly. In Turkey, public organization and government structure become larger, which leads to the politicization of public staff. This causes the strengthening of the state over the individual. The state becomes an

organization that gives every service. Consequently, it appears to run for itself and not for its citizens.[17]

This clumsy structure of the state results from the traditional, highly bureaucratic mechanisms of the state. The state is usually seen as a sacred phenomenon. Citizens do not question it. They generally obey its rules. Since it is a sacred state, citizens cannot have it actually. The owner is the state itself. It has citizens. While serving its citizens, it serves its own bureaucracy, in fact. As a result of this, the massiveness of the state grows bigger. Naturally, the state cannot fulfil its obligations to citizens. It does not take these responsibilities seriously. The state is not interested in such issues. Its concern is to preserve the status quo. Considering the flexibility and efficiency features of modern governance, such a bureaucratic state has almost no possibility of success and survival. The contemporary world forces nations to construct an electronic state, which is rooted in information and communication technologies. Underdeveloped and developing countries are not exempt from this compulsion. One crucial step for this adaptation is to set up an electronic registration system.

The attempt of Turkey in this direction is the establishment of MERNIS, Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi -the Central Population Administrative System. This project aims at the computerization of population records. MERNIS is no doubt the most important project of the Turkish State. The completion of this project is essential if Turkey is to adapt to processes of globalization. An efficient and effective

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[17] The Directorate of Administration Improvement, p. 1.

MERNIS produces the information inventory of Turkey's population. This inventory is the most valuable resource for any country in the age of information and communication.

8.2. THE CENTRAL POPULATION ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (MERNIS)

The code related to MERNIS was accepted in 1972. This is the population code numbered 1587.[18] According to this code, the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs[19] develops a number system for Turkish citizens and foreigners whose population registration is held in Turkey. The objective of this system is to facilitate information transfer to population registers and to form a network between the records of various public institutions. This number is taken as the base in the records of the institutions.[20] The population code numbered 1587 is the legal step to construct a one-number registration system. This is the Identity Number of the Turkish Republic. Identity numbers of the whole population are kept at one center. In this way, the information of citizens about their situations on issues of population, taxes, health, justice, security and military service[21] becomes easily

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[18] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, p. 17.

[19] The constitution of the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs has its roots in the Ottoman period. The principal aim of the institution at that time was to collect taxes effectively. Afterwards, this institution began to collect population information. In 1904, the state realized a general census that comprised all the territories of the Ottoman Empire and formed a population registry. This registry was the basis of today's system. (Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs (1998), MERNIS, Ministry of Internal Affairs Ankara)

[20] Population code numbered 1587, article 65, additional article 4-(11/15/1984-3080/art. 5).

[21] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, pp 37-38.

reachable from one center. Related power mechanisms can use individual information whenever and wherever needed. The individual is now not so far away from power. Power is able to find citizens at any time. Fundamentally, the surveillance capacity of power inevitably increases.

The emphasis on the six issues mentioned above is important to analyze the perspective of power. These are essential fields for power in the process of including the individual into the system. They also give an idea about the priorities of power. Power wants a smooth system. Because of this, security concerns gain importance. Power preserves security by creating a notion of general insecurity. Since every citizen is under control, power assumes all of them as potential deviants. Together with the security issue, justice comes into view. Justice is essential to provide a fair sense of security. In a way, it is a kind of legitimization of security. Justice and security balance each other. It can be asserted that these two provide the legal basis of surveillance. Since that surveillance may have counter effects against the privacy of citizens is an undeniable fact, power should minimize these negativities. Legal regulations and justice are crucial tools in this respect beyond their classical functions.

One substantial novelty of MERNIS is the application of one number for one person. An urban Turkish citizen has about forty identity numbers, 80 % of which are permanent. The purpose of a one-numbered system is to prevent the repetition of information and inconsistencies. This system helps the state to combine the various kinds of information on its citizens. By making life easy for citizens, a one-numbered

system supplies perfect, rapid and reliable services.[22] One number is an indicator of the centralization of power. This is the centralization of not only power, but also the identification of the individual. Power strives to lessen the personalities of citizens at least in a mechanical sense. That is, the fragmented personality of citizens makes it difficult for power to control them. Thanks to his fragmented identities, the individual can develop a number of diverse resistance practices against power.

To control such a complex machine is not easy for power. The human machine is already a tough one. The individual has, in any case, more than one personality and he is subject to an everlasting transformation. This transformation may sometimes surpass the limits if power. Yet, to weaken the nature of the human being is possible for power. One way is to imprison him into one definite personality. This personality should eliminate other personalities. The individual must have only one identity. If above all this identity is defined within scientific terms, the individual has no place to escape. With MERNIS, the identity of the individual is constituted so. That is, science gives him a name. Information and communication technology approves and registers this name. The individual now has a tested and approved name. He can be a citizen willingly. His name is one and only. More important than this, his number is one and only. Everyone can know him. But, in the first place, power does. After all, this achieved personality is the work of power. The artist is the one who best knows his work.

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[22] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, p 40.

Power gives a centralized characteristic to the individual. It closes him in one central location. This location is the individual himself. It centralizes itself, too. The informational data bank indicates the centralization of power. However, power is decentralized as well as centralized. The central database is the centralized part; the individual is the decentralized one. The center is not the brain of power. Power has no brain. It lives in the individual. It lives in the networks. The center is like a busy information station -absolutely the busiest one. Every passenger visits -should visit- this station at least once. Power exists on highways and in these stations of life.

With no passenger or load, a transportation company has to be condemned to bankruptcy. With no individual, power has to shut up shop. Highways and stations have no meaning at all without the individual. The individual travels on these ways and pauses at these stations through power. The other way around is also true. Power travels through the individual and pauses at the same stations. When the individual goes to the toilet of the station, he sees power in the mirror. In information highways, the individual lives in power and power lives in the individual.

8.2.1. THE MAIN (DIS)ADVANTAGES OF MERNIS

This mutually productive relation between the individual and power comes together with some (dis)advantages for both the individual and power. The individual experiences these benefits in his daily life and power realizes the benefits in everyday applications. From this perspective, MERNIS has concrete and immediate effects on the life of citizens. It is important to keep in mind that a one-numbered system framed

within MERNIS has an especially significant role in being able to materialize these benefits. In its MERNIS booklet, the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs enumerates some important benefits of MERNIS.

In the first instance, the benefits deriving from MERNIS can be seen in economic and financial interactions of the individual with power. By means of MERNIS, the pursuit and allowance of taxes are made easier. All possible unjust treatments the individual may face in his rights and obligations about economic and financial issues can be avoided. In the procedures related to the taking and giving of credits, there is no need for a security investigation of the applicant. The information of the individual can be obtained at once, which makes everything easy and quick for both parties. MERNIS also makes it easier to open and search for an account at banks. The taking and giving of checks and bills become easier. This provides the advantage of being able to prevent fraud and cheating. In the practices of execution and mortgage, the accounts of the individual can be more easily controlled.[23]

These practices basically promote a smooth economic life for the individual. The logic of MERNIS is completely compatible with the ideology of efficiency concerning the economic considerations between the individual and power. An efficient system is useful for citizens. But, it is more useful for power. While the individual may be more satisfied with the service, the benefit of power is a considerable amount of money and resource saving. In addition to this, one other thing that also becomes more efficient is the control of power over the individual.

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[23] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, pp. 40-41.

MERNIS gives power the capacity of continuous control over the individual via its information and communication substructure. The technology of MERNIS presents efficient control mechanisms. From the idea of control arises an important assumption of power while organizing the economic relations of the individual. Power acts with an inherent security concern. The practices of MERNIS in the economic field are interested in taking measures against possible unsafe events. And power assumes that these possibilities usually result from the individual himself, not from power. That is to say, who is controlled is the individual. There is no question of controlling power. In other words, MERNIS principally operates against the individual. Power is taken as having an innately secure feature. The danger, in this case, may come from the individual. So, he is the target, which must be constantly controlled.

The second advantage of MERNIS, according to the booklet of the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, is thus in the field of security. This has to do with the ability of MERNIS to facilitate the surveillance of citizens as they enter and leave the country. It also simplifies the procedures for obtaining a passport. MERNIS helps power to monitor the movements of convicted people and to catch criminals. It deters people who are inclined to commit a crime. With the help of MERNIS, police can easily run the processes of obtaining a driving license. Police can also follow and catch, according to the booklet, drunk drivers and those who fall asleep at the wheel, disobey speed limits and always change their place. Another benefit of MERNIS is that it lessens the formalities for getting a license for a firearm.

It also reduces the formalities in recruitment processes for both public and private institutions. The investigation about applicants can easily be done. Moreover, the works of citizens in public institutions are lessened. This brings money, time and energy saving for both citizens and the state. The document of conviction record is now unnecessary except for the private sector since this information already exists in the computer records of each citizen. Furthermore, citizens are not negatively effected, thanks to MERNIS, even if their registration files or registration numbers are lost. The similarities between names or surnames of citizens are not important, either. They do not form a problem any more. Citizens can still preserve their rights via MERNIS.[24]

The security issue comes more into view in this case. Now, what's at stake is the security of the individual besides that of power. Power protects citizens' rights. Computerization of citizens' information provides power with the ability to respond immediately to potentially unsafe situations. The subjects of such events are again citizens. So, power indeed protects citizens from themselves. Yet, power may also be the cause of insecurity. Its mechanisms may be harmful in some way or in particular cases for the production of society. Power should consider these drawbacks and build up a strong structure against these kinds of internal inconsistencies. MERNIS can be seen from this point of view. It is a self-control mechanism for power. It locates power on a scientific and efficient ground. MERNIS computerizes the practices of

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[24] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs. 1998. p. 41.

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power. Thus, it harmonizes power with the contemporary logic of power-individual relations. This harmony leads to the legitimization of power.

By means of MERNIS, power is able to control the movements of citizens. This includes both international and intra-national activities. MERNIS provides a mechanism of constant observation to follow every movement of the individual. Power definitely makes it much easier for citizens to go from one place to another. The mobility of the individual rises. He can change his place more easily -sometimes even without changing his current position. Bureaucratic barriers are eliminated to a great extent. Citizens can pass for example from one institution to another within a very short time. They can get a driving licence, passport or visa in less time than might otherwise be the case. The individual can move more freely and rapidly.

This speed and freedom may work in two ways for two different types of people. For normal citizens, speed and freedom are highly preferable. The fact that freedom and speed are defined in the domain of power is not so important. They enjoy the advantages of a free and fast life, which MERNIS provides. Life flows on a smooth plane for normal citizens. For abnormal people, on the other hand, life is not so comfortable. Though they can also move freely and quickly, power can quickly get hold of them. The individual is not the only agent who experiences a free and rapid movement. Power also flows freely and rapidly. It reaches every point that the individual reaches at the very same time. Consequently, the abnormal or deviant citizens cannot continue a free life for a long time. Power finds out the place of such people with the help of MERNIS no matter how rapidly they change their places.

When they are reached, the normalization process starts for abnormal citizens. Related power institutions normalize these people in related methods. MERNIS recodes abnormal citizens as normal ones after normalization finishes.

As a matter of fact, the normalization process never finishes. It always restarts in different ways. MERNIS guarantees the continuity of an ongoing reshaping process of the individual via its huge information databank. The necessary urgent information is taken immediately by authorized public institutions. These institutions continuously search for so-called deviant people and to locate their whereabouts in a very short time. MERNIS must observe all citizens -normal or not- to be able to determine who is abnormal, dangerous, sick or criminal. The whole society is thus assumed potentially dangerous, abnormal, sick and criminal. Namely, MERNIS unavoidably constitutes a diffused surveillance system. This system is very flexible. With MERNIS, power can exercise a flexible surveillance. The increase in the mobility of power and the individual also increases their flexibility. With an increased flexibility, MERNIS is able to include more people because it reaches unregistered people with ease. It is a method of computerized flexible inclusion.

In the booklet of the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, it is said that MERNIS facilitates the works of citizens related to military service. Its database includes information on the recruitment and discharge dates of citizens. The place of military service is also contained in MERNIS. These records are essential to

protect the rights of citizens in their relations with military service offices. The benefit of MERNIS for the state is that it helps the state to pursue and seize deserters.[25]

It is absolutely true that citizens do not have to spend hours and days to be able to get a simple document that shows their situation in relation to military service. Things progress very quickly and without delay. The same quickness is seen in the recruitment of male citizens. They are turned into a soldier in a very rapid way. The barracks is an influential place for normalization applications of power. It refers to a structure where one of the foremost examples of disciplinary practices is applied. The role of MERNIS can be understood more easily in this respect. It may be a perfect tool for comprising the individual within the wheels of normalization.

One crucial feature of military service is that it requires an unconditional obedience to strict military rules. A soldier cannot question these rules and orders. He performs the orders without considering whether they are true or false. The individual gains a different identity in the barracks. He becomes a soldier-citizen. This signifies a new codification process for the individual. The aim of this military codification is to construct absolutely docile soldier-citizens. A soldier must be productive as well as docile. His production is mainly related to reshaping the superstructure of power rather than framing its substructure. It reproduces the reason of power. MERNIS is one of the most important parts of the substructure of power's military reason. It supplies inputs for the system. In fact, the first step of recruitment is MERNIS. It firstly recruits people into citizenship and then into military service.

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[25] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs. 1998. p. 41.

Military service may be considered to be absolutely essential in countries like Turkey. It may be attributed sacred meanings. It has a kind of reified character. This holiness is an effective means to make soldiers obey orders. Namely, the rationality of military service somehow has a sacred ground. The individual has to internalize both rationality and holiness at the same time. Though it seems contradictory, military service can be both rational and sacred. In this specific case, rationality and holiness of power has the same feature. Both are reified. That is to say, military service has a holy rationality or rational holiness. So does power in general. The cooperation between rationality and sacredness leads the individual to internalize discipline. It causes him to develop a kind of self-control or indigenous governance. And this is really a strong sense of self-control. The starting point of such indigenous governance is no doubt MERNIS. It is the point at which the rationality of registration and the holiness of respecting an authority figure are linked to one another.

Regarding the health of citizens, the benefit of MERNIS is that every citizen has only one file that contains all his health information. This file consists of the information from birth to death and information is held at one center. This system provides immediate information during treatment. In this way, MERNIS helps health personnel to avoid making the wrong diagnosis and cure. Besides, the load and cost of holding files and archives no longer exist.[26]

Via MERNIS, the health of citizens can be controlled more efficiently. Since there is a central health databank, health institutions can take precautions against and

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[26] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, p. 41.

intervene the possible health problems of citizens. The databank also provides the correct and actual information about citizens. This reduces the risk of becoming ill. Furthermore, the period of treatment is decreased. This system operates due to the centralized information gathering and networks between the related institutions. The health of citizens is continuously observed from the very beginning. The individual is registered just after his birth. With this registration, the keeping of the individual's health records begins. This is an important step towards a healthy society. The aim of power is indeed such a society. But, a healthy society can be reached only through constant surveillance. Power should determine the unhealthy cases as soon as possible to keep society healthy.

A healthy society is necessary for the continuation of some crucial activities in society. These activities include the ones related to the production of society. In effect, a healthy society means a productive society. Production is unquestionably the main dynamic of power relations. What healthy citizens produce is their life conditions. Being healthy is also good and necessary for them. Together with their life, on the other hand, they simultaneously produce the material conditions for power to exist. The life of citizens is shaped within certain power interactions in a given time and space. The individual and power are mutually inclusive entities. The life conditions of the individual are determined in daily practices of power. That is, power defines the life of citizens. The health of citizens is defined by power. The individual appropriates this definition. Actually, he does not have so many alternatives. While power cures citizens and makes them productive again, it also

repairs defected parts of production system. MERNIS is functional, in this regard, in locating the broken parts of power.

The health of citizens is thus the health of power. From a similar point of view, it can be claimed that the disease of citizens is the disease of power. Who is sick, unhealthy and defected is not only the individual but also power itself. Nevertheless, power prevents the individual from comprehending this fact. MERNIS has a significant role at this point. It makes the individual the focal point of normalization exercises -medical treatment for example. MERNIS is a system that basically functions through citizens' knowledge. It can be said that some knowledge of power may be included in MERNIS. Yet, its logic is to control the individual not power. It is a power-guided system.

The individual does not have a sufficient capacity to influence the functioning of MERNIS. Since MERNIS is fundamentally governed by power, power can manipulate its operations for its own interests. As a result of this, power can refrain and hide itself. This makes the individual more visible. Consequently, the current problems in society seem to stem from the individual. While the source of problem appears to be the individual, the source of the solution becomes power. Power presents itself as the remedy of social problems. The individual is one of these problems and he should be dealt with in this respect. Power solves the individual like a social problem. The individual is normalized during this dissolution stage. He also changes his identity. He is transformed into a different state. The dissolution of the

individual brings new solutions and uneasiness both for power and the individual. Namely, power produces non-solutions together with solutions.

On the issue of education, MERNIS holds all the information about the education of citizens. The information on primary, secondary and university education are included in the MERNIS database. With this system, official correspondences and interrogations are no longer required. MERNIS provides the state with the opportunity to obtain every kind of statistical information on the education of the population.[27]

MERNIS provides the knowledge of citizens' education background at any moment. This facilitates the compulsory relations of the individual with power. The interactions between citizens and power become easier, faster and smoother. From the side of the state, such a databank of the population's education is vital. Power can use this information for short and long term planning. It is able to find out the education problems of citizens at both the local and national levels. This helps power to develop better education programs and strategies. The basic purpose of power is to educate all people. It tries to create a more qualified workforce. This leads to a pool of educated and highly skilled labourers.

Educated people are especially essential for power in this age. Power requires intellectual labour today much more than at any other time. The most valuable resource is a mature and trained human capital in contemporary society. This fact makes it essential for power to form an inventory of educated and uneducated

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[27] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, p. 42.

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citizens. MERNIS helps power to frame the education map of the country. In this way, power can control the educational positions of citizens. It can canalize their educations into predetermined directions. That is, power itself educates citizens. The orientation of power is always the production of its material conditions. It thus gives citizens such an education that they also aim to reproduce the requirements of power. From this point of view, education can be regarded as one of the normalization practices of power. The importance of education for power is that it is a lifelong process. Power should organize a lifelong education strategy for citizens in this regard. It could not set them free so that citizens can do their own way.

The way of citizens must always be made by power. Power uses education not only to make citizens productive but also to determine their productivity. The production capacity of citizens is to a considerable extent defined by power. Power may apply different education practices for different people. It differentiates citizens. This is a kind of division of labour. This division is made by power. It observes citizens with the help of MERNIS and evaluates their current situations in terms of the abilities, inclinations, behaviours and social backgrounds of citizens. While some citizens may require more education, some may not at all. MERNIS helps power make a right decision to determine who needs how much education. This is the optimization of education policy. In this way, power can construct an efficient and effective plan to use its resources for educating the population. The outcome of this system is well-educated citizens at a very low cost. These citizens help the production system of power to improve to a further extent. They can achieve this,

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Actually, they are expected to do this because power gives the required training to citizens so that they can fulfill its expectation.

With MERNIS, the booklet of the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs mentions that there is no need to make a periodic census. Every newborn child is registered at once. Besides, every dead person is deleted from the register. At the end of the year, population figures can be determined for these birth and death records. The state can follow the population events in each province via MERNIS. It can determine the movements of population and residence changes. This means that the population of each province becomes certain. In the light of this information, the government and municipalities can revise the current plans about that province.[28]

MERNIS can give the actual information on population at that very moment. The goal is to obtain this information at both the national and local levels. Changes can be observed immediately. Power gets the immediate number of the population by means of MERNIS. It also obtains the information about the social and economic characteristics of citizens. The principal function of MERNIS is this: to frame a general database of the whole population. This database is one of the most significant weapons of power in this era. Power can benefit from the MERNIS database to observe every step of the individual. It is compulsory for people to be registered in MERNIS. Otherwise, they cannot be assumed as citizens and cannot gain the rights of citizenship. This gives power the ability to constitute a nation-wide surveillance

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[28] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, p. 42.

mechanism. That is, the foundation of diffused surveillance comes into view with the construction of a population databank.

The important feature of this database is that it is an electronic one. Power is able to get immediate information of citizens owing to this computerized character of MERNIS. MERNIS makes the individual more reachable from the point of view of power. Power can learn the essential information about the individual without further investigation. Since MERNIS also has the role of building a network between public institutions, the information of the individual can easily be shared among these entities. This facilitates and accelerates the interference of power in the life of citizens. Power can now more easily lead the individual into its desired ends. This is due to the new flexibility and efficiency of power. These features mainly result from the computerization of power practices. The electronization of power's applications is also useful for the individual considering the social security systems.

With MERNIS, every citizen has only one social security number. The services of different social security institutions -the retirement fund, social insurance institution, and institution of independent employees- are joined. In this way, bureaucratic correspondences can be eliminated.[29]

Power can bring better service to citizens by way of a one-number system. The organization of MERNIS as a network makes services of power come easily and quickly to the individual. Through networks, services flow along with the information of the individual. To be able to serve, power inevitably needs the knowledge of the

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[29] The Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 1998, p. 42.

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population. The role of the MERNIS database becomes more apparent at this point. Power uses this database to classify citizens according to their various needs. Social security systems are shaped in accordance with these differentiated needs of people. In this regard, MERNIS provides power with flexibility.

Together with their function of helping citizens, social security systems have another function. These systems are the means of containing individuals within the system. They are vital steps in becoming or being a citizen. The individual turns into a citizen by obtaining a social security number. This is the MERNIS number in our case. Social security systems give a definition of citizenship. A citizen is the person who should have social insurance and security. This is almost a universal fact. The right of having social insurance can be regarded as one way of subsuming the individual. It also legitimizes the inclusion process of citizens. Social security systems enable a peaceful transition of the individual to citizenship by supplying the essential public and private rights.

It should be accepted that MERNIS has many useful outcomes for citizens. It indeed makes life easy for the individual in many respects. But, it also makes life easy for power. As indicated above, its foremost benefit for power is the inclusion of the individual into the production system through a legitimate process. The individual is the focal point of power since it is the most important conveyer of power practices. The individual in this case is both the object and subject of power. MERNIS is a tool for these subjectification and objectification procedures.

The individual no doubt is the object of those exercises that power uses to normalize him through MERNIS. Once citizens are registered, the knowledge of citizens is kept in the MERNIS database during their life and even after. Power holds the knowledge of the individual as an object. That is to say, the individual is transformed into an object in the form of knowledge. Power can use this knowledge at any time to manipulate the individual. The information in MERNIS can be revised. This signifies a revision also in the process of objectification. The individual as an object may be moulded into different forms of knowledge. This means that power can recode these objects.

Codification of citizens is a part of the process of subjectification as well as that of objectification. Power thus constitutes the individual as the subject of power. The practices of power give an ever-changing personality to the individual. Power uses the database of MERNIS to achieve this transformation. The individual is incorporated by the production system in new forms and identities at every time. The flexibility of MERNIS makes the subject constitution flexible, too. The result is also flexible: flexible subjects. Consequently, power obtains a suitable prototype of the subject. The subject of power is both flexible and efficient. Citizens develop a consciousness of flexibility and efficiency willingly or unwillingly. This is mainly because of the computerized character of MERNIS. The operation of MERNIS inevitably influences the functioning of citizens. Citizens adapt to the speed and effectiveness of the system.

Power realizes subjectification and objectification of the individual via codification applications whose fundamental focus is MERNIS. Codification can be regarded as a mechanism of re/de-territorialization. The individual flows through different networks. He changes his position from one institution to another, public or private. MERNIS accelerates this flow considerably. The individual is thus subject to the constant bombardment of vast amounts of dissimilar codes. He gains a new location as soon as he leaves the former one. He does not have a permanent territory. He experiences the processes of re/de-territorialization at the very same moment in this respect. Therefore, the individual cannot have a fixed identity.

The conflict arises at this point. On the one hand, MERNIS re/de-territorializes the individual. On the other hand, it tries to frame him in one identity defined with one number. This is nothing but the will to control the schizophrenic feature of the individual's personality. Power makes use of MERNIS to dominate the complexity of the individual. In this sense, MERNIS is turned into a totalitarian tool. The totalitarianism of power is not so visible since MERNIS provides a lot of facilities for citizens. MERNIS is a kind of democratic mask of domination. In most of the cases, the important thing for the individual is a more secure, easier and more comfortable life. MERNIS gives such a life to citizens. A secure, controlled life is preferred to an insecure, uncontrolled one. In other words, citizens may forgo their freedom in order to live in a secure, comfortable and easy way. The individual may still benefit from a large number of freedoms. He may also act in the way he wishes.

Nevertheless, almost all the actions of the individual become visible to power. MERNIS thus can be regarded as an attack against the privacy of citizens.

8.2.1.1. MERNIS AND PRIVACY

One of the most significant criticisms of MERNIS is that it is seen as the first and foremost step in abolishing individual privacy. MERNIS is a system whose function is to keep and process the knowledge of citizens. Through MERNIS, this knowledge is known to some power-related institutions. Actually, it is not so clear which institutions know and use the knowledge of the individual and to what extent. It can be claimed that power must be able to reach at least a part of individual knowledge in order to keep the system going. That is, this minimum amount is necessary to preserve the existence of both power and the individual. The knowledge in MERNIS is not properly known. But, the report prepared by the Middle East Technical University -though a very old one- can give some clues about the content of MERNIS.

First of all, the database of MERNIS includes the main population records. Among these are the MERNIS number, the place of registration, information on the birth and names of parents. The database also contains the registration of marriage and divorce, that of transferring register and other events such as adoption, disownment, the disappearance of individuals, the cancellation of registration and inheritance. In addition to these, the records of retirement, widowhood and orphanage are included in the MERNIS database. It also includes the corrected data.

The registration of individuals who enter into and who leave Turkish citizenship, that of foreign citizens and that of individuals having double citizenship are kept in the MERNIS database. In addition to these, the database comprises the registrations of education, occupation and residence. The records of passport and death are other concerns in MERNIS. Lastly, the database includes a section about the other events related to the individual. This section contains the knowledge that is seen as essential. The information in this part is used in the events, for example, marriage, disease and obtaining a driving licence.[30]

At first glance, the knowledge collected by power may not be considered to be so private since a lot of people and many institutions already know it. Some knowledge of citizens may also be known publicly and this fact may be regarded as normal. From this perspective, privacy may not be taken as an important issue. What is private and not private is not examined properly. Each knowledge, which is attached to a certain name and address is private knowledge.[31] The content of knowledge comes second. Thus, the knowledge of the individual is private as long as it is used with his name or address. The protection of privacy should consider such issues that personal information can only be used and shared within the framework of strictly determined regulations. Otherwise, violation of privacy is highly possible. This violation can be regarded as using the private knowledge against the individual himself and as taking interest from this action.[32] Whether the party that gains a

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[30] METU, 1980, pp 5.4-5.23.
[31] From the interview made in the State Institute of Statistics.
[32] From the interview made in the State Institute of Statistics.

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benefit is the state or not is not important. The state or power in general also must be subject to legal regulations and sanctions.

The interesting point is that power should form a legal framework, to which it too has to conform. However, there are some international arrangements besides national regulations. One example is the directive of the European Council that was accepted on July 25th, 1995.[33] It may be said that the privacy matter is especially taken seriously on the international platform. The member nations should adapt to these universal rules. There are in principal three significant considerations that must be dealt with by power. First, the information can only be used in a way that is compatible with the aim of collection. Citizens must be able to access and correct their records. Finally, only authorized institutions can use the information.[34] Therefore, the state has to consider these three requirements about privacy. The objectives of the information collected in MERNIS must be made clear and known to the public. The accessibility of their personal information by citizens should be guaranteed by power. Beyond this, power must provide the opportunity to the individual to control which processes are carried out with his knowledge.

An authorized person from the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs mentions that privacy is defined as not giving information to people. He adds that MERNIS is not open to individuals. It functions in a closed-circuit network. Public institutions can get the knowledge within the framework of their authorities.

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[33] The Informatics Foundation of Turkey (TBV), 2000, p. 15.
[34] From the interview made in the Department of Computer Engineering at Hacettepe University.

Since MERNIS is close to people, there is no problem like privacy. That authorized person also says that there are legal arrangements on the privacy issue.[35] It is normal that everyone cannot reach every information in the MERNIS database. On the other hand, citizens cannot ask for their own knowledge, either. Interestingly enough, this can be presented as a protection practice of privacy. Power does not trust its citizens. This is an understandable fact to some extent. But, the individual should have the right not to trust power.

The state must prove its reliability in the eyes of citizens. The best way is to use the dynamics of law. The law drafted by the National Organization of Information Security can be regarded as an attempt of power to protect the privacy of information. According to the Informatics Foundation of Turkey, this law gives an institution, which is established within the state, an opportunity to intervene in a very large portion of society. The arrangement is not only directed to establish an organization but also related to both state and public and private spheres. In other words, power intervenes into public and private lives. To the Informatics Foundation of Turkey, the law builds up a structure that is harmful to public rights and freedoms.[36] Namely, the state assumes itself as the absolute authority to form regulations on privacy. Power ignores the opinions of other social agents. The Informatics Foundation of Turkey emphasizes that no non-governmental organization takes part in the preparation of the law draft.[37] Power behaves in a contradictory way

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[35] From the interview made in the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.
[36] The Informatics Foundation of Turkey, http://www.tbv.org.tr.
[37] The Informatics Foundation of Turkey, http://www.tbv.org.tr.

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with the privacy issue from the very beginning. It tries to protect the rights of public and private persons for the sake of, but against themselves.

One of the interesting views on privacy is that there is no privacy problem[38] in MERNIS since the knowledge in the database is already known.[39] This may seem interesting but actually not so unusual and strange. As in this case, power sometimes asserts that privacy is not a big issue to be considered in the operation of MERNIS. Actually, there may not be such a problem for power because there is no private knowledge in MERNIS. This approach also finds its echo in the MERNIS booklet prepared by the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs. In this booklet, there are no words like the right of privacy, protection of privacy or violation of privacy. The privacy concern is totally passed over. It may be claimed that power reflects its real thoughts with these attitudes towards the privacy problem. Privacy may not be so important considering the fundamental aim of MERNIS. It is a secondary issue. If it can be seen as a problem, it is due to the fact that the privacy concern may obstruct the efficient and flexible functioning of MERNIS. Therefore, it must be solved. That is to say, it is a significant problem not because there is a

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[38] This may mean that according to the state, the privacy of the individual is not subject to any violation. Yet, it can also be argued that the individual has no privacy at all. The state cannot or does not want to understand the meaning of individual privacy. In this regard, it does not seem to worry about legal arrangements on the issue of privacy. Here, a definition of privacy is missing. The state does not provide a definition since the state does not see any necessity for it. In these circumstances, the privacy of the individual is assumed as a non-existent entity. This non-existence causes the violation of privacy, which is very existent, to be comprehended as non-existent. The state does not include the problem of violation of privacy in its discourse. It remains non-discursive. When this problem is included in the discourse of the state, this takes place in the way that the state wants.

[39] From the interview made in the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.

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considerable attack against individual freedom and privacy. But, it is so because it harms the efficiency and flexibility of the system. In this respect, it can be asserted that the priorities of power are different from those of citizens. Its perspective also differs from that of citizens.

One academician in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University asserts that MERNIS is carried out with a policial point of view. Legal regulations are neglected and MERNIS is dealt with mainly from a security perspective.[40] Though MERNIS must be a means of giving citizens a better service, power's principal concern appears to construct a more secure country. Citizens, in this case, are regarded as potential deviants, who should be kept under continuous control. Yet, power should create a solution for the conflict between security and privacy. It has to determine the limits of state interference into the lives of individuals. In fact, security and privacy do not have to conflict each other. In the case of MERNIS, however, they seem to be so. The reason for this is that power gives priority to its own security rather than to the security of citizens. From this angle, the regulations on privacy are more inclined to secure the existence and legitimacy of power. The preservation of individual security and privacy is not the ultimate objective of power. While setting up limits, power forms these limits not for its actions. It forms them for the privacy of the individual. It never defines real limits against its exercises.

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[40] From the interview made in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University.

MERNIS seems to be the most important tool of power in constituting a secure, efficient and flexible production system whose effects can spread throughout the country. It has both positive and negative outcomes for the individual and power. Nevertheless, these effects come into view if and only if MERNIS is able to function efficiently and effectively.

8.2.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF MERNIS AND THE TRAGICOMEDY OF THE SYSTEM

An efficient MERNIS indicates that Turkey has the ability to produce life with its own resources. The importance of MERNIS increases in the global dynamics of today's world. The communication and information revolutions make the existence of a functional and rational MERNIS very essential in this age. The social scientist in the Institute of Population Studies denotes that MERNIS is the most important project of the country on the way to globalization. He says that Turkey must be able to produce its aggregate knowledge in order to navigate the global world. MERNIS is also crucial for being able to adapt to the European Union. Therefore, it must be conducted from a global standpoint.[41]

MERNIS cannot be regarded as just a national system. Its logic is shaped within a global context, in which information and communication technologies are extremely dominant in the sphere of production. MERNIS is an outcome of global

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[41] From the interview made in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University.

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necessities before the national requirements[42]. It is the main resource to provide the basic input to production. This input is the information of population. Information is unquestionably the fundamental factor of production for both global and national economies. The significance of MERNIS stems from the fact that it can supply actual, fresh and revised information into the current system of production. MERNIS constitutes an efficient and flexible structure for information transactions between the various social agents. But, it cannot do this without a global perspective. It must operate in accordance with globally compulsory concepts. MERNIS itself must firstly be efficient and flexible if its aim is to obtain such products.

Such a system is the first step to turn the classical state structure into an electronic state. This state is more successful in providing public services to its citizens. With this feature, the electronic state is a state of effective service. An academician mentions that the electronic state is not a powerful state but it is the one that provides better service. He emphasizes that the state can connect the crucial public and private projects with the help of MERNIS. MERNIS has the role of a bridge for such connections. This provides better public service for citizens.[43] The electronic state is an important way to eliminate or shorten the distance between the state and citizens. The state and its services become more accessable for the individual. The Directorate of Administration Improvement says, in this respect, that

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[42] I should admit that this argument of mine leads me to ignore some local dynamics that influence the relation between the individual and power. Though, in the final analysis, MERNIS should be constituted and conducted with a global perspective, there are no doubt local and national powers that have significant effects on the operation of MERNIS.

[43] From the interview made in the Department of Computer Engineering at Hacettepe University.

the new state gives citizens a central position in their services and above all it realizes these services for citizens.[44]

At this point, the crucial question must be raised. To what extent is the Turkish state successful in the institutionalization of MERNIS and the concept of an electronic state? It seems very difficult to give a positive answer to this question. Neither the state nor a good portion of society can understand the vitality of MERNIS and the electronic state. According to the social scientist in the Institute of Population Studies, the state has no proper vision on the usage of information collected in the database of MERNIS. It is not able to comprehend the significance of MERNIS at the macro level. He claims that the state tries to build up MERNIS with a highly centralized view. There is a lack of a global-minded administration.[45] Since the importance of MERNIS cannot be internalized by the project operators, the completion of MERNIS seems to take a further time. The state started the project in 1974 and MERNIS is still a long way off from being fully operational , or for that matter being operational at all.

The authorized director in the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs indicates that MERNIS has taken a long time because of technological insufficiency, the lack of personnel and a large population. He says that data entry took a lot of time. He adds that Turkey is a very crowded country compared to European countries. This characteristic of Turkey, he mentions, makes it hard to

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[44] The Directorate of Administration Improvement, p. 6.
[45] From the interview made in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University.

construct MERNIS in a quick and effective way.[46] Besides, the academician in the Computer Engineering Department at Hacettepe University points out that the untimely[47] start of the project is another reason for the failure of MERNIS at the first stages of the project.[48] The academician in the Institute of Population Studies, however, underlines that there are crowded countries in Europe and elsewhere in the world -like Germany, England and the USA-, which has gained a considerable success in the application of MERNIS-like systems. In Turkey, he points out, there is very little commitment to MERNIS especially in the political arena since it does not provide a short-term political rent for politicians and bureaucrats.[49] As a counter and interesting response to the view of lack of personnel for data entry, a director in the Institute of State Statistics emphasizes that only one person would have been enough to enter the whole records of population in this last 28 years of MERNIS (1974-2002).[50]

There are some acceptable reasons in not being able to complete MERNIS. The untimely start may be regarded as one of them. When the state began the project, it did not have enough technological background and capacity. For today, it seems that this problem can be and t a great extent already has been solved. Yet, there are

[46] From the interview made in the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.
[47] This untimely start of the project can be regarded as an attempt of the Turkish state to shorten the transition period from societies of discipline to societies of control. Since the necessary substructure for MERNIS was not and has not been mature enough for a considerable time (at least until 1995), MERNIS cannot be carried out effectively today. Nevertheless, this also shows the lack of desire to adapt to global developments. Even though the infrastructure of MERNIS has been constructed to a great extent, the mental infrastructure has not been able to be established yet.
[48] From the interview made in the Department of Computer Engineering at Hacettepe University.
[49] From the interview made in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University.
[50] From the interview made in the Institute of State Statistics.

questions about the efficiency of MERNIS. The academician in the Institute of Population Studies underlines that technology appears to solve every problem in the opinion of most state officials.[51] But it does not and cannot. Technology is useless without an essential rationality. There is a vital problem in the logic of the state in the application of MERNIS. This is the lack of rationality. The state tries to construct MERNIS but it cannot conceive of the logic behind it. Actually, MERNIS necessitates a different kind of rational standpoint, which surpasses the current rationality of state officials, politicians and bureaucrats. This is the rationality that places MERNIS in a global world order rather than within the borders of a nation-state. It is essential to form a global vision on MERNIS. The state should grasp the essentialness of globalization concerning the technological developments in information and communication.

Akgül touches upon the fact that Turkey has not been able to understand the meaning of technologies represented by the Internet. Beyond this, the country cannot understand the very fact that information, science, technology and R&D are parts of a whole. According to Akgül, Turkey has neither a vision and a national organization nor participative mechanisms. He mentions that we have no national plan. There is not a conscious and organized effort that aims to make way for the Internet. There are only islands. No mechanisms and processes exist and there is no belief and commitment in such processes (Akgül, 2001; 2).

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[51] From the interview made in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University.

It can be claimed that the state distrusts some technological developments. Technology, the Internet and the computer are something suspicious, uncertain and unknown for the state. This is a kind of resistance to technological rationality. But, it cannot be considered as a criticism of this emerging type of reason. Rather, the resistance of the state is an obvious escape from an inevitable fact. The state cannot dare to face the change. In effect, change comes together with a major challenge to the existing order[52]. Power must question the material conditions of its existence, in this case. A practice of self-assessment is generally difficult for static, inflexible and strict structures. This makes self-criticism necessary and may force the state to admit the fault, impotence or weakness of its mechanisms. Such a situation means questioning the legitimacy of the state. Putting its own legitimacy into the question is maybe the last thing power can wish to do.

The state, before everything, should question the organization of MERNIS. MERNIS with its current situation cannot be accepted as an efficient registration system. The chief mistake in MERNIS is that it is not a residence-based system. There are a number of people who appear registered where they do not live. That is,

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[52] At this point, it can be claimed that the present situation of the state is not compatible with the properties of a state that rule in a society of control. Actually, neither is the Turkish state a control state, nor is Turkey a society of control. The state is not a proper carrier and applier of surveillance and control practices. Although it is assumed that the state is the most important institution, which conducts the control exercises, there emerges a resistance within the state itself. On this ground, the supports and the agents of control appear as other powers rather than the state, including some non-governmental organizations. Another interesting point is that despite the fact that it is very logical to expect resistance from the bottom of the society -the people and their organizations-, it is the state itself that resists the control logic of the contemporary age. Therefore, it cannot be said that the state resists against itself. The Turkish state is not a state of control. It resists the global change in the rationale of power, which respectively challenges the traditional bureaucratic power of the state.

the place of residence and the place of registration are in most cases different.[53] Due

to this feature, the system cannot provide the social and economic information of a

particular district or province.[54] There is thus no local information of the

population.[55] MERNIS seems to be a non-functional and ineffective system. The state

thinks that MERNIS can solve the existing problems of population registration. Yet,

MERNIS cannot create miracles on its own. Technological rationality is not enough

to continue a nation-wide organization. It must be supported by the rationality of

efficiency, flexibility and globalization. Actually, these are inseparable. Nevertheless,

the state does not seem to understand this unavoidable cooperation.

The authorized person in the Directorate of Population and Citizenship

Affairs says that it is not so difficult to form a residence-based system since the

infrastructure is almost ready.[56] As it can be understood here again, the state

conceives of technology as the predominant factor in the operation of MERNIS. It

neither questions the rationality of technology nor introduces a new and essential

kind of another rationality.

Contrary to the above argument of the director in the Directorate of

Population and Citizenship Affairs, another director but in a different state institution

-the State Institute of Statistics- claims that with this existing situation, MERNIS will

take another ten years to be completed. He emphasizes that there is a considerable

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[53] From the interview made in the Institute of State Statistics.
[54] From the interview made in the Organization of State Planning.
[55] From the interview made in the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University.
[56] From the interview made in the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.

lack of human capital, experience and infrastructure. MERNIS must certainly be organized on a residence-base. He underlines that there is a legal regulation[57] that enforces such a system. But it does not work. This is due to ignorance of the state and citizens. According to this director, the state should become more active and coercive to make the legal arrangements concerning MERNIS functional and effective.[58] The academician in the Department of Computer Engineering at Hacettepe University underlines the fact that the institutions, which are keeping or will keep the records of citizens' residences, have to be better organized. He argues that one valid address must be held by one institution: the police.[59]

The very fact that the state cannot collect the information on citizens' addresses is one example that shows the sad situation of the state on the issue of MERNIS. Another striking example is the very low proportion of the public institutions that use information and communication technology: only 11%. The standardization between the institutions that share information is considerably weak. Only 17% of the upper-level managers see the information technology as vitally crucial and essential. In 86% of the institutions, there exists no administrative information system and no decision support system.[60] It is not so logical to expect that such a state will be able to realize the electronic state.

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[57] In the MERNIS booklet of the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, it says that although the residence-based registration is a legal obligation, it has not been effectively applied. As a result of this, the connection between the information of the individual and that of his residence has broken.

[58] From the interview made in the Institute of State Statistics.

[59] From the interview made in the Department of Computer Engineering at Hacettepe University.

[60] Radikal, 05/11/2002, "E-Devletin 'altı' döküluyor".

Akgül maintains that information technologies have a strategic importance for Turkey. The state must be restructured with a new reason which is compatible with modern technologies, science and management. The state, Akgül indicates, should have a view that aims to serve citizens and encourages the individual's free development. It also must be a social state. An efficient MERNIS is a must for these objects to be realized. Yet, with the present method and speed, MERNIS cannot go beyond being a story (Akgül, 2001; 2). Turkey has to produce and use information technologies according to Akgül. And this is not a matter of preference (Akgül, 2001; 2). The country and the state have no other chance than choosing to develop and use information and communication technologies. This is a matter of life or death for a state in this contemporary era. If Turkey is interested and willing to be a part of the global world and the processes of globalization, it would be better to evaluate MERNIS and its policies on the notion of the electronic state. The state should question its own sincerity about whether it indeed wants an efficient MERNIS.

The tragicomedy of MERNIS in particular and the state system in general comes into view at this point. The problems of freedom, privacy, codification and governmentality must be analyzed in this original context of Turkey. Since the Turkish State is deprived of a sufficient global rationality, and of course the necessary technological, political and economic resources, the relation between the individual and power in Turkey does not seem to resemble the countries where the MERNIS-

like systems function properly. Lack of rationality in state mechanisms appears to be to the advantage of the individual[61].

Though MERNIS is able to produce and keep a huge amount of population information, it is uncertain that the state can use this information to form effective subjectification and objectification procedures. Whereas the individual is included into the system in some way, power still cannot comprise him completely. Therefore, power cannot achieve a proper codification process. It is unable to construct a strong control mechanism and to fully apply the normalization practices. This stems from the inefficient and inflexible structure of the Turkish State. Power in Turkey cannot manage to control its citizens properly.

In spite of the fact that the state has begun to use information technologies, it appears not to comprehend how functional and effective they can be in the reproduction of politically docile and economically productive individuals. Such individuals are absolutely essential for any kind of power. However, the Turkish State lacks the rationality to conceive of this fact. It still insists on applying the

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[61] The lack of rationality in the state may seem as an advantage for the individual since the state can construct an effective control mechanism. Nevertheless, the citizens in Turkey may have to face more dangerous effects than the citizens in the advanced countries where an effective control has been established. The state's lack of rationality indicates also the lack in the stability, certainty and legality of the system. Turkish citizens, in this regard, may be subject to a more dangerous type of surveillance, which is a hybrid between societies of discipline and societies of control. In other words, the strucutures and agents power in Turkey may be considered as compatible neither with disciplinary nor with control practices. Therefore, the citizens can be considered as living somewhere between these two types of society in the same way as Deleuze describes the position of Kafka's protagonists. Another serious danger is that the citizens cannot conceive the implications of such in-between position. They are unaware, to a considerable extent, of the fact that MERNIS can be turned into a dangerous surveillance tool. Moreover, they are also unaware of the consequences of an inefficient MERNIS

traditional control techniques over the individual. The state shows a kind of inherent and useless resistance against contemporary techniques of subjectification and objectification of citizens. It seems to prefer more totalitarian methods rather than democratic control. Power in Turkey is unaware of the possibility of democratic totalitarianism.

Taking into consideration this impotence of the state, it cannot be claimed that the freedom and privacy of the individual is subject to a serious attack. Although MERNIS is the most important phase of this attack, the state cannot benefit wholly from this tool. Consequently, citizens, in the same manner, cannot properly take advantage from the benefits and facilities that MERNIS offers. However, they are not exposed to a continuous surveillance. Accordingly, citizens in Turkey, strange enough, are freer than those in other countries in which there is an effective registration system. MERNIS does not fulfill its actual function for the time being. In fact, power does not seem to be able to make out the nature and essentialness of this function.

In such a context, the ability of the individual to resist power increases. The areas of freedom are larger and on that account, citizens can act more freely without necessarily experiencing the effects of surveillance. On the other hand, it must be indicated that even within the limits of a well-functioning registration system, there is always the possibility of resistance.

CHAPTER IX

THE POSSIBILITY OF RESISTANCE

Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves;
and only when you have all denied me will I
return to you.

Friedrich Nietzsche

According to Foucault, power produces its own resistance (McNay, 1996;
101). There is resistance where there is power. Hence, like power, resistance is
everywhere. Foucault asserts that if power relations exist in all social spheres, the
reason is that freedom also exists in all social arenas. There must be at least a certain
degree of freedom on both sides -power and the individual-, so that a power relation
can be exercised. That is, there is absolutely a possibility of resistance in a power
relation. If this were not so, power relations would not be able to exist (Foucault,
2000a; 236). Therefore, power and resistance are inseparable. Power, in effect, needs
free individuals.

Though power tries to normalize the individual, it cannot achieve this
completely. The individual is the outcome of complex power interactions. But, it
cannot be asserted that nothing else except power is effective in the constitution of
the individual. The individual actively participates in his subjectification and

objectification processes. Power does not have an ultimate authority over the individual. Actually, such domination is not useful for power itself, either. Power should create self-actualization areas for the individual. This is necessary because the individual produces the material conditions of power while realizing himself. Namely, power forms the means of resistance together with those of domination.

Technological developments can be taken up from this perspective. On the one hand, technology provides power with various tools for codification, surveillance and normalization -such as MERNIS. On the other hand, it gives individuals unbelievable opportunities to be able to become organized -such as the Internet. Miller asserts that the Internet is a realm of self-governing anarchy. The Internet and telecommunication today make the obstacles of time and distance unimportant. They give way to "virtual communities" and "communities of common concerns" (Miller, 1996; 324,334). Cyberspace is a valuable means for resistance purposes if it can be exploited effectively. The point is that the individual must learn to rule cyberspace and the Internet. He should not accept cyberspace and its consequences passively. But, he must manipulate and take advantage of it in the most efficient manner. The individual has the capacity and ability to realize this.

Though big capitalist corporations and nations attempt to put the Internet under their control; this is not an easy job. The Internet may indeed be more anarchic than the real world. This contributes a variety of resistance methods. Opposition groups and individuals are introduced to a number of strategies of resistance via information and communication technologies. The trick is to be able to spread the

usage of these technologies throughout society. The Internet may be a means to develop a consciousness on this issue. And its effect will be on a world scale. It is not a national tool. On this account, it can help a global sensibility and consciousness to grow.

In this contemporary age, the Internet and information technologies are especially crucial for opposition groups as well as for power. Since power is organized with a global mentality and by means of information and communication, counterattacks and resistances should also be organized in this way. Technology cannot be regarded only as the tool of power to dominate people. It is also a tool of resistance. It is a global tool of resistance as in the case of power. With the help of the Internet, resistance groups, which carry out different activities in different parts of the world, should cooperate against power within the framework of a common global objective.

A global perspective is inevitably significant for resistance. The forces of resistance should understand that such a perspective must be directed not only towards the abolition of existing power relations but also towards the creation of a new social realm. This can be achieved within the limits of today's world. In this respect, the forces of resistance must develop its struggle in the same context of power. There is no outside concerning the global character of contemporary power. Hardt and Negri point out that today's power (Empire) can only be opposed on its own level of generality. It is essential to force the processes of power towards their limits and pass over these limits (Hardt and Negri, 2000; 206). Forces of resistance

must thus avoid taking a transcendental position before power. Opponents must conceive the fact that they must operate with the tools and in the positions that power provide.

The aim of resistance should not be to produce new power relations. Therefore, the struggle with power should not continue with the same logic of power despite the fact that it may be necessary to use the same mechanisms with power. The aim must be to abolish the future power relations together with the present ones. The target of resistance is the concrete material conditions of power production, in this case. Resistance should also abolish the rationality of power and offer an autonomous constitution of alternative life worlds. The rejection of the system by itself has no meaning except leaving individuals in a nihilist position according to Hardt and Negri. Such a denial may strengthen power rather than weakening it. Hardt and Negri emphasize that the forces of resistance (multitudes) have a significant productive capacity and it is essential to comprehend this feature of opposition by focusing the realm of production (Hardt and Negri, 2000; 216-217).

The revolutionary forces have to create an alternative and should show that it is possible to make it real. The transformation of a society begins predominantly from the materiality of production relations. The interactions between power and the individual are shaped in accordance with the reason of the present mode of production. Forces of resistance should question this reason, their current position and the necessary position that they have to take against power. That is to say, revolutionary forces must reevaluate the conditions of both power and their

dynamics. This is a practice that Nietzsche calls the "transvaluation of values", according to Hardt and Negri. The massive rejection does not simply signify a negative expression. It is a moment of positive creation at the same time (Hardt and Negri, 2000; 274). The forces of resistance experience a kind of creative destruction. What's at stake is the creation of an ever-changing new sociality out of an old system that does not encourage the reproduction of revolutionary forces any more. From a certain point on, power begins to obstruct this reproduction since power can no longer determine the dynamics of revolutionary forces. Besides, power has to feed the revolutionary practices willingly or unwillingly more and more compared to previous times.

The globalization of power makes it essential for the forces of resistance to claim a global right to live well. A national citizenship that is defined in egalitarian terms cannot be a sufficient demand. This is nothing but an obvious trap of power. Revolutionaries cannot be content with the so-called rights that power gives. They should get the whole world. This is an ascribed right of the people because they are the main agents of producing life. Forces of resistance have to create a collective definition of an autonomous global citizenship. Namely, they must be able to determine their fate in a global context. Hardt and Negri (2000; 400) denote that people (multitudes) must be able to control their own movements together with their right of global citizenship.

According to Hardt and Negri (2000; 403), the people in the world must be provided with a social wage and a guaranteed income. In this respect, the forces of

resistance should aim to obtain the conditions in which human beings can live with their fundamental human and natural rights. This aim again must be gained on a global scale. Hardt and Negri (2000; 406) add that the people (multitudes) should reclaim the means of production. Consequently, the people gain control over their labour-power and over the production process. This is also to lay a claim on the newly created social and individual realm. The people impose their own revolutionary lifestyles and dynamism on the totalitarian fixity of power.

The fixation characteristic of power can be easily observed in population registration systems, such as MERNIS. Though it is mainly a flexible tool and gives the individual a flexible identity, in the final analysis, MERNIS fixes the individual in a number. Power hides this fact very well by putting forward the advantages of MERNIS. MERNIS is a global means of power to define a notion of citizenship for the individual. Thus, it identifies globally fixed limits for the individual. The first thing to do, in this case, is to question the global or national citizenship defined by MERNIS. The individual must be able to define himself on his own as being aware of the material conditions of his existence. He cannot be satisfied with the rights introduced by MERNIS. The individual must break the practices of normalization carried out by means of MERNIS. He should recognize in which material conditions MERNIS emerges and for whom it serves in the final case. Namely, the individual must discover the class property of MERNIS. On this account, he must determine his position in the relations of production considering the present nature of the means of production. This is essential for the individual to examine correctly the current mode

of production. The individual therefore cannot accept the life imposed by power via MERNIS. He has to define his own life by himself by exploiting the opportunities created by power -including MERNIS. And most important of all, he should realize that he can achieve nothing without being organized with other individuals.

Hardt and Negri define the forces of resistance (multitudes) as bio-political self-organization. They use the term "Posse" to indicate the autonomy and productive activity of this self-organization (Hardt and Negri, 2000; 407, 411). The forces of resistance are not static and dependent beings. They are autonomous dynamic becomings. They produce their autonomy and collectivity while resisting power. As a result, they continuously renew themselves. They go beyond themselves every time they produce. With their notion of "Posse", Hardt and Negri echo, in a way, the Nietzschean concept of "Will to power". "Will to power" necessitates that the individual accept the material reality of historical conditions and himself. In this historical context, he now questions the existence of power, himself and the relation between power and himself. "Will to power" is the attempt of the individual to surpass himself in this material context. Therefore, the individual and resistance forces should reevaluate and overcome themselves before power. That is to say, to be able to struggle against MERNIS, it is essential for individuals to begin questioning for themselves. MERNIS is not a pure creation of power. The individual has to face and become aware of the fact that he is a part of the power production system and must define his position again.

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CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

A virtue must be our invention; it must spring out of personal need and defence. In every other case, it is a source of danger. That which does not belong to our life menaces it...
Friedrich Nietzsche

Whether a path is correct or not becomes clear only when the aim is reached.
Franz Kafka

There is no final one. The number of revolutions is infinite.
D-503. We. Yevgeni Zamyatin

There is a notion of global power today more than ever before. Power is organized and produced with a global perspective. Power in the contemporary age cannot be separated from material political economic interactions. It unquestionably has a capitalist characteristic. It is this feature that turns power into a global organization. Yet, capitalist power finds its real global reflection in the age of information and communication. One of the predominant peculiarities of capital is that it diffuses in a schizophrenic manner. No matter how strong and insurmountable they are, the borders lose their importance for power. Power can surpass the borders owing to technologies of information and communication.

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By means of computer technology, power displays a widespread property. It can reach almost everywhere. This indicates an increasing trend of decentralization in the actualisation of power. Contemporary power is exercised at local levels as well as on a world scale. Information and communication technologies also provide efficiency and flexibility for power. It now is able to produce a maximum possible outcome with a minimum possible cost and input.

The most fundamental concern for power is production. Power wants to guarantee the continuity of the current mode of production. This is crucial to produce the desired material conditions. Power can achieve this in a very flexible and efficient way with the help of computer technology. Production includes the formation of both the political economic necessities and human capital. The human side of production means the creation of subjects of power. However, it also points to the creation of objects. The subject and object of power is one and only: the individual. While power produces the individual, it makes him produce power at the same time. In this process, power always uses economically and politically cost effective techniques. The result is similar to the methods. The individual is transformed into an economically productive and politically docile citizen.

Power transforms the individual into a citizen, who is mostly content with his life conditions. This citizen is produced within the networks of subjectification and objectification mechanisms. Power again benefits from information and communication technology at this point. The mechanisms of subjectification and objectification are supported by technology to a great extent. Power has more tools

to normalize the individual. In the contemporary era, it realizes a faster and more effective normalization process compared to previous times. The individual can be included within the production system more easily as a citizen. Actually, he becomes a volunteer, in most cases, to produce the materiality of power. The reason for this is that the individual as a normalized citizen may benefit in various ways.

There is another important factor for the individual to accept the inclusion smoothly. This inclusion takes place in a very legitimate way. In societies of control, the legitimacy of power is strengthened by information technology. Technology comes together with the notion of scientism. The developments in technology can be regarded as scientific improvements also. A significant property of science is that it creates its own legitimacy. That is to say, it is generally accepted that science is inherently legitimate. If there occurs a fault in scientific data or findings, these can be solved within the context of science again. Science appears as an ideology in a way. It gains a reified character. The political economy of scientific results is not being questioned much. The results are given the status of "natural" facts. Information and communication technologies are primarily considered as such facts. The scientism phenomenon behind these technologies is exploited very intelligently by power.

The electronic state can be regarded as an outcome of this intelligence. It is no doubt the inevitable final effect of computer technology. It has certain historical and material roots, which have been coming from the past. When the current political and economic realities and the desire of power to legitimize its position come together in the context of today's historical conditions, science may easily turn into

an ideological tool of power. The emergence of the electronic state and population registration systems is accepted as the effects of objective scientific events. The legitimacy of the electronic state and registration systems is further reinforced by the flexibility and efficiency of these mechanisms. As a result, the electronic state as a scientifically flexible and efficient machine becomes very difficult to oppose.

The growth of national registration systems and electronic states must be analyzed with reference to global power interactions. They take on crucial functions so that power can preserve globally its conditions of existence. Surveillance must be considered as one of their most imperative functions on this account. The applications of surveillance are also computerized in the age of information technology. This is actually a must for power since life, too, is highly computerized. There is a cyberspace in addition to the real world. These two are mixed into one another. They are not independent from each other and exist together in the contemporary era.

The individual obtains an incredibly large area in order to build up different personalities. Because information and communication technologies destroy the boundaries between the disciplinary institutions, the self-actualization opportunities increase considerably for the individual. Cyberspace is the example for the life sphere in which the individual can take any personality without being subject to any boundary. If life is described as a never-ending movement, it is contemporary society that gives life its real meaning. Yet, the contemporary age comes together with

renewed surveillance practices, which have new meanings and inclinations to control the ever-changing life.

In the societies of control, surveillance can spread and reach every point via information technology. Like the multiple complex personalities that can act freely, surveillance -power in general- can move freely. The realm of power extends as well as that of the individual. In effect, it extends throughout the world. The borders are demolished for both power and the individual. There are benefits for both sides. Nevertheless, power appears as the predominant beneficiary at the final stage.

In the phase of disciplinary societies, the individual passes from one institution to another. There are different normalization practices in these different disciplinary mechanisms. The boundaries are certain and clearly defined. Contrary to these societies, control societies can give the individual more than one identity at a given time. He may be a prisoner, a student, a soldier and a patient at the same time. That is, everywhere may be a prison, a school, a barracks and a hospital. The area of coverage of a disciplinary institution includes that of others also. They share the world as the common sphere of their normalization practices. In this schizophrenic process of individual constitution, there emerges the problem to control the complexity of the individual.

Power creates a solution with the help of population registration systems. It constructs a surveillance structure that operates on the basis of a one-number arrangement. Each individual has an identity number. This number can be regarded as the numeric name of the individual. This is not so strange, in fact, taking into

consideration the domination of numbers in the computer era. With his numeric name, the individual becomes more easily controllable. Power imprisons the complexity of the individual into one number and through this number, it is able to reach his every possible personality. The one-number system provides power with the ability to fit the individual into any personality it wants. Namely, though the individual has access to a good number of dissimilar and various identities, it is power that determines his definition in the end.

The flexibility feature of the age of information and communication, in the real sense of the word, is valid for power rather than the individual. Since the individual can be defined via a simple number, his flexibility is damaged to a great extent. In spite of the fact that he can develop different personalties at a given time, power has the capacity to differentiate these personalities and to use the suitable one in its production activities. From this, it may be claimed that the flexibility of the individual also seems to be greater. However, what is more flexible -compared to the case in societies of discipline- are the transitions among the fixed personalities of the individual. In societies of control, the individual can more easily alter his identity. Yet, this does not change the very fact that the identities of the individual are nothing but predetermined fixations constituted by power. The transition and consequently the flexibility of the individual take place under the control of power, which benefits from the one-number registration system. The simultaneous increase in the fixed identities of the individual and the transition between these fixations provide

incredible contribution to power. From this point on, the control and surveillance ability of power shows an apparent improvement.

The abundant and dissimilar number of the individual's identities seems to harm the individual himself. While it is logical that the vast number of his identities is preferable for the individual, it appears more useful and exploitable for power. The reason is that the individual cannot take advantage of his own complexities properly. First of all, this stems from the fact that the identities of the individual are defined as fixations. Power destroys the flexible essence of identities of the individual whereas it remains highly flexible. The individual is not able to struggle against the flexibility of power with his all fixed identities. The characteristics of his identities are determined by power. Power builds up the framework. It forms the rules of the game. In this context, it is extremely difficult for the individual to constitute an autonomous complex of identities. The problem of the individual is that although he can experience flexibility in transition practices, he cannot live this within one identity. That is to say, he is incapable of realizing an inner change in one particular identity. He loses his ability to transform and reconstruct himself. Power monopolizes the initiative to modify and reorganize the conditions of identities' existence. Power emerges as more flexible than the individual. It appears as the leading figure of change. The individual is alienated in this situation since he has to go trough a fixation in each metamorphosis of his identity. Accordingly, he encounters a loss rather than a gain.

The importance of identity fixations can be easily observed considering the issue of security, one of the major concerns of power. Power operates with an ideology of security along with those of flexibility and efficiency. It constructs a police state via information and communication technology. The issue of security is primarily related to the security of production. This means that power is interested in its own security much more than that of the individual. Actually, by establishing worldwide surveillance procedures, power admits in a way that it sees all individuals as possible deviants. The individual as the subject/object of the system is regarded as a threat by power to itself. Identity fixation is the way to keep this threat under control. It also provides the opportunity for power to turn the threat into a productive activity in a secure controlled realm.

If the individual's security is a problem for power, it is so because the continuity of the production process may be in danger without it. Power provides a secure production environment for the individual. The point that must be questioned is that security here is defined again by power. The security of the individual is formed within the framework of power's interests. Consequently, power can apply its policies by claiming their legitimacy on the basis of general public security. Yet, in reality it functions in line with its own benefits and security under the name of the public good.

It is essential to examine MERNIS in this context. MERNIS is primarily the contemporary tool for inclusion of the individual within the production machines of power. It is more than a population registration system. On the other hand, it is not

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simply a surveillance instrument, either. MERNIS cannot be regarded solely as an efficient, flexible and scientific mechanism developed in order to be able to articulate with the global dynamics. Nor is it only a tool of policing the individual and his life conditions. MERNIS includes all these functions and goes beyond them. First and foremost, MERNIS is a production machine like any other be(com)ing. It produces citizen machines, which will produce power. In accordance with the dominant logic of control societies, MERNIS does this production through information and communication technologies.

But, power in Turkey should confront the fact that MERNIS does not operate unlike the effective systems of some other countries, such as Sweden and Norway. This situation can be considered as a pain of transition period that Turkey has been experiencing. It is possible to argue that Turkey has not entered the period of control societies. Yet, it can be also claimed that Turkey has not been able to complete MERNIS. What's at stake is incapability, in this regard. There is a serious and strong resistance against MERNIS within the state. Though some state bureaucrats see MERNIS as absolutely necessary, some others cannot even conceive its meaning for the country. MERNIS is simply regarded as a registration system. The state does not give so much importance to its citizenship-production functions. MERNIS can produce a contemporary citizenship for contemporary citizens. Nevertheless, power in Turkey cannot produce the necessary rationality to carry out and complete MERNIS. Power is afraid of losing its traditional authority to new

dynamics. This meaningless fear prevents power from comprehending the significance of MERNIS for its own interest.

In the light of these facts, resistance seems easier in Turkey. But, the different properties of Turkey may make the fight as hard as in other parts of the world. The crucial point is to be able to understand MERNIS and other power practices within the global context without ignoring their peculiarities. The political economy of power should be questioned with all consequences. The individual should unquestionably grasp his position before power and the position of power before himself. Moreover, it is vital to create an autonomous becoming and resistance strategy. Finally, resistance is not so meaningful without an organized counter-power practice. The basis of resistance has to be a self-organized autonomous revolutionary act framed in a power-free consciousness.

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APPENDIX

The fundamental aim of this study was to examine the tension between the individual and power in the contemporary historical context. I have focused on the developments of information and communication technologies and their effects on this tension. I have analyzed the surveillance exercises that have increased in scale and importance with the emergence of computer technology. I have studied in some detail the case of MERNIS. I have chosen this system especially because it is an ongoing surveillance application in our country. I have followed a historical materialist path during my analysis. I have determined a place for MERNIS in accordance with present historical material conditions. I examined it by taking into consideration its interactions with global social, economic and political dynamics. In this respect, I have tried to disclose the political economy of MERNIS.

I started the thesis with a literature review. I searched through a considerable number of written resources in order to constitute an outline. Of the figures I studied, four contemporary thinkers have been especially effective in the construction of the theoretical basis of my thesis. These figures are Foucault, Deleuze, Hardt and

Negri[62]. Yet, I can say that I primarily make my analysis with reference to Deleuze. I have made use of foreign sources to examine the relation between the individual and power. Regarding MERNIS, I cannot say that I could obtain a satisfactory number of written sources. To discover resources about MERNIS was very difficult since there were few to be found. Nevertheless, I obtained an information booklet on MERNIS from the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs. It was the newest booklet about MERNIS; but it was dated in 1998. The other few written sources on MERNIS that I could obtain were from the State Institute of Statistics, the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University and from the Internet.

I also conducted interviews in several public institutions to get actual information about MERNIS. These institutions were the State Institute of Statistics, the State Planning Organization, the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, the Department of Computer Engineering and the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University. I asked questions about the present situation of MERNIS, its objects, its advantages and disadvantages and the importance of this project for Turkey in the era of globalization. I also tried to learn the opinions of the interviewees on matters of privacy of the individual and security of individual's information, security of citizens and security of the state. One of my main concerns

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[62] I should mention that my analysis has a kind of eurocentric character because I rely heavily on western thinkers. But, I still think that the theories of these thinkers are applicable and useful, to a considerable extent if we are to comprehend MERNIS. They are particularly essential to give a large picture of MERNIS taking into consideration the global character of power and the inevitable relation of local dynamics with this power. In my opinion, MERNIS is an inseparable part of the global system. The work of Deleuze is especially useful in that he offers a very powerful analysis of this system. Therefore, I do not feel uneasy about using Deleuze and western thinkers though I am

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was to discover with what kind of perspective MERNIS has been carried out. Finally, I asked questions about the technological infrastructure of MERNIS to learn whether the state is really technologically sufficient to be able to apply the project.

During the interviews, I used unstructured questions. I formed the first party of questions with the help of my literature review. Then I added new questions after each interview. I realized two interviews with every interviewee in each institution except the State Planning Organization. The second interviews were made with new questions that I had formed after I listened to the opinions of the interviewees in the first interviews. The interviews were in-depth ones. Although there were predetermined questions, I sometimes asked new questions at the very moments in which interviews were made so as to get more satisfying information.

I used the information that I collected from written and unwritten sources in an effort to study the matter of surveillance. I analyzed MERNIS with this (surveillance) perspective. In this process, I realized that the issue of surveillance was generally dealt with under other sociological topics, such as social control, deviancy, criminology, population studies and political sociology. That is, surveillance seems to be an interdisciplinary subject of study. Yet, it can be said that there is a strong sociological sub-field that focuses on surveillance concerns. There is a necessity for the academic world to constitute an area of study whose focal point is the sociology of surveillance.

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perfectly willing to admit the importance of local peculiarities. In this study, however, I cannot offer a sufficient analysis of these local peculiarities. This will be the subject of a further research project.

This need also shows itself in the new conceptualizations of contemporary society. A growing number of people call the society of this era "Surveillance Society". This is a very important point that should be questioned. Today's world is shaped under the effects of contemporary powers and forces, including information technology. This reformation inevitably imposes surveillance applications in a much more effective and diffused way compared to previous times. Consequently, surveillance has a crucial role in constituting the individual, power and the interactions between them.

It is a well-known fact that surveillance has not emerged in this age. It has a long history. An analysis of surveillance will be incomplete if the examinations of other historical partners of surveillance are ignored. In this regard, surveillance must be studied from a historical perspective. It is essential to work on the material political and economic issues that bring surveillance into its present position. If such a study is realized under the name of the sociology of surveillance, it can be easier for academicians and other people to reach more correct and concrete information about the matter of surveillance. This information is important for all citizens as well. This attempt can help us to better comprehend the significance of surveillance for the contemporary age and society.

Power in this era uses practices of surveillance via scientific discourses. Information technology, which goes hand in hand with science, provides power with the means to apply surveillance in a more legitimate way. As a result, surveillance exercises cannot be questioned easily. The sociology of surveillance, as a separate

sub-field, can challenge us to ask questions about the legitimacy of surveillance and the scientism behind it. It is necessary to understand the ideological standpoint of surveillance if we want to confront the secret face of power. Though surveillance seems to be a necessity for this age, the point is to comprehend for whom this necessity emerges.

In my opinion, a separate sociological study of surveillance can open a wider area of questions, examinations and analysis for us compared to the present situation, in which the issue of surveillance is examined under several different subjects of study. A complete analysis of surveillance does not seem so possible in these circumstances. The important point is to be able to join the different aspects of surveillance under one composite field. Considering the contemporary global dynamics, this seems inevitable.