Arabs in Visual Rhetoric and the Emergence of Turkish National Identity, 1908-1939

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by

Ilkim Buke

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev

June 17, 2015

Beer-Sheva

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Approved by the advisor:

Approved by the Dean of the Kreitman School of Advanced Graduate Studies:

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This work was carried out under the supervision of:
Dr. Avi Rubin

In the Department: Middle Eastern Studies

Faculty: Humanities and Social Sciences

Research-Student's Affidavit when Submitting the Doctoral Thesis for Judgment

I, Ilkim Buke, whose signature appears below, hereby declare that
(Please mark the appropriate statements):

_x_ I have written this Thesis by myself, except for the help and guidance offered by my Thesis Advisors.

_x_ The scientific materials included in this Thesis are products of my own research, culled from the period during which I was a research student.

___ This Thesis incorporates research materials produced in cooperation with others, excluding the technical help commonly received during experimental work. Therefore, I am attaching another affidavit stating the contributions made by myself and the other participants in this research, which has been approved by them and submitted with their approval.

Date: June 17, 2015 Student's name: Ilkim Buke Signature:



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Acknowledgments

"The most perfect caricature is that which, on a small surface, with the simplest means, most accurately exaggerates, to the highest point, the peculiarities of a human being, at his most characteristic moment in the most beautiful manner." These are the words of Max Beerbohm, a famous Victorian caricaturist, which inspired me writing probably the most difficult section of the dissertation.

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Abstract

Arabs in Visual Rhetoric and the Emergence of Turkish National Identity, 1908-1939
Submitted by: Ilkim Buke
Advisor: Dr. Avi Rubin

With the emergence of Turkish nationalism prior to World War I, various ethnic, religious and cultural stereotypes started to serve as rationalizations for underlying ethnic prejudices linking the notion of the Other to the concept of national identity. Alterity is an essential part of the nationalist doctrine itself. For nationalist discourse, the existence of one's own nation presupposes the existence of other nations as well

This study explores the reproduction of nationalist discourse in late Ottoman and early Republican political cartoons, which became a discursive weapon of power. It aims to understand how Turks perceived and imagined Arabs, who since the early 16th century had formed a major sector of Ottoman society. Ultimately figments of the imagination, such perceptions reside in individual human psyches and it is never easy to tease them out completely in historical research. These figments are constituted from social and intellectual inputs that become available through means of various persuasions, and they produce an enduring synthesis in decoding our surroundings. Perceptions are transferred through "the concepts by which the experience is organized, communicated and proceed from the received cultural scheme" and continuously reproduce its cultural codes. In order to trace the historical formation of the Arab image in Ottoman popular culture, and later in the Republican period, the dissertation explores the first visual appearances of Arab stereotypes in Ottoman public culture as manifested in Karagöz Shadow Theater. The Arab figures of the Karagöz plays found a new form of representation when the naissance and formation of cartoon culture in the empire emerged as part of the print culture. The employment of visual metaphors in the developing cartoon space brought with it a new visual language and a new

baggage of Orientalist views, first in Europe and later in the Ottoman Empire, to be used as a means of political critique. In the beginning of the century Turks were caught up in the web of the Orientalist discourse where they were trying to define themselves against the other "Orientals," namely the Arabs. As the colonized or provoked local actors of the drama, the Arab image developed in an intricate form in the perception of the Ottoman intellectuals. It was only during and after the trauma of the Great War that a more complex and symbolically laden image of the Arabs emerged in Ottoman and early Republican cartoons. The negative sentiments about Arabs were transferred to the new republic through its founding political elite. The anti-Arab spirit of the new Turkish nationalism, hitched to the process of creating a new, "civilized" Turkish identity, expressed itself openly and violently in the cartoons of the early Republican period. Images and visual rhetoric played an important role in conveying the messages to the public. Thus they became a significant tool in the process of nation formation and the emergence of collective identities. The formation of the Turkish Republic was embedded in a dynamic political and socio-cultural paradigm that came to be a pillar of national identity and a key component of the new state, not least through creation of the "Other" in the common Turkish culture. In the period covered by this dissertation, namely 1908-1939, political cartoons came to be accepted as popular expressions of nationalist rhetoric that define, construct, and frame the national community by devising explicit and implicit messages through the manipulation of public opinion over the image of the Other. The dissertation aims to demonstrate how this image of the Arab persisted in Turkish perception, serving as the ultimate "Other," and how this transformation of the Arab image and its deviation to a hybrid form was reflected in the cartoon space in the service of social propaganda. The dissertation displays and analyzes a wide collection of Ottoman and Turkish political cartoons where the Arab Other was represented in various discourses and historical contexts.

This study addresses questions such as: How was the image of the Arab altered in the visual rhetoric from the nineteenth century to the late 1930s? What were the reasons behind these transformations? In what ways did stereotypical images of Arabs serve the project of nation formation? How were such images

constructed in the minds of people? This study advances the argument that a process of essentializing and othering "the Arab" through symbols, signs, and narratives was a key component in the emergence of the new Turkish national identity.

The nation as a social construct is contingent on a continuous construction of national identity. The latter consists of organized perceptions of basic human behaviors in an effort to group together collectives who are willing to accept various set of values and particular positions.[1] Political elites that lead projects of nation construction tend to emphasize emotional attachment to the nation and its territory while blurring or even negating the territorial or political claims of other groups. At the same time, the effort of nation construction often involves an intense effort of othering.

According to Baumann, "the self" itself makes sense only in juxtaposition to "the Other." Identity and alterity mirror each other by determining the profile of the Other and are in return determined by it. Nationalism emerged as a hegemonic ideology in colonial and non-colonial contexts in the nineteenth century and brought with it the awareness of groupings as national collectives. The latter was defined in terms of territory, ethnicity, religion, language, history, and tradition. Within the definition of self as a nation, each of these groups (ethnic, religious, or territorial) was characteristically typecast or themed as the Other. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I examine initial representations of Arab characters in their capacity as the Other in Ottoman visual rhetoric. The four-hundred-year-old Karagöz shadow plays demonstrate the multi-ethnic makeup of the Ottoman Empire. Exhibiting powerful images set against assumed and often stereotypical backgrounds, Karagöz figures constituted probably the first visual illustrations of the various typecasts within the Ottoman public. Arab characters were among these characters. Within the figures they were depicted as and in the humor they contained, they served as perception builders for their audience. The attributes and qualities of these characters that were used repeatedly in *Karagöz* plays created a

[1] Zygmunt Bauman and Tim May. *Thinking Sociologically* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).

set of almost standard generalizations about the ethnic traits of Arabs. Ethnic stereotypes were fixed firmly through this popular artistic genre.

It is clear that in the pre-Republican Ottoman imagination there were two distinct characters referred to as Arabs. One was the *Ak Arap* ("white" Arab), and the other was the *kara Arap* ("black" Arab) or simply *Arap.* They represented two different stereotypes that were almost opposed to each other. One was pale-skinned, long-nosed, smart but cunning, wily and untrustworthy, while the other was dark-skinned, curly-haired, loyal, and honest, but sometimes stupid. While the *ak Arap* represented merchants with heavy accents, his darker-skinned counterpart was often a representation of local household slaves and servants. These two stereotypes of Arabs in Karagöz plays not only contributed to the newly developing cartoon industry in the Ottoman print by providing typecasts, but they also set the basis for building another "Other" constructed through ridicule as a contrast to the emerging image of the Turk.

In Chapter 2 I introduce the transition from the shadow theater to the lithographic realm, demonstrating the introduction of Karagöz characters to the print media. I analyze the Ottoman lithographic cartoons of the late nineteenth century, which were instrumental in the context of the passage to modernity. Echoing European Orientalist practices, Ottoman cartoonists imagined the modern "self" by contrasting it with an assumed backwardness within their realm. They associated the notion of "pre-modern" or "backward" with the Arab provinces of the empire, which signified the ultimate backwardness. The cartoons selected in this chapter illustrate the technical and symbolic resemblances between the European cartoonists and their Ottoman contemporaries in imagining their Ottoman Orient.

After the declaration of the second Constitution following the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the satirical press flourished. Enjoying a certain level of freedom at home, cartoonists turned their attention to the mounting threat from Europe. Thus, the political cartoons of the Second Constitutional era were preoccupied with the European powers and their intrigues in the Middle East and Balkans. The colonized or provoked local actors of the drama would be lowered

in depiction only to symbolic references represented through geographical symbols or cultural attributes in the graphic imagery of the cartoonists.

At this point, nationalism was a fuzzy concept, meaning quite different things to different groups and individuals. As yet lacking clear definitions of nation and homeland, cartoonists found themselves in a quandary: how to portray those who were outsiders and insiders at the same time – part of the empire, but not quite part of the nation.

Cartoons in this period were multi-layered, imbued with geopolitical signs, and highlighting particular politico-administrative boundaries, territories, and territorial visions. The cartoon genre provides a vivid illustration of the ideological experiments of the day at a time when ideological experiments such as Westernization, Ottomanism, and Islamism, in line with currently emerging ideas of nationalism and Turkism, were competing against one other.

The stormy period of Yemenite insurgencies, the Libyan war, the Balkan wars, and finally the epic Great War could be defined as a time of "occultation" or "gestation" for the Ottoman cartoon sphere with regards to Arab stereotypes. After the heroic interlude of the Arabs in North Africa during the Libyan War, the Arab as a human figure no longer accorded with any of the recognizable stereotypes. The visual archetype of the Arab was trapped in limbo: neither insider nor outsider, neither friend nor foe. On the one hand it signified rapid internal changes and confusion in the imperial center about identity issues, and on the other, external developments: Arab nationalism, collusion with the imperial powers, a sense of betrayal. The one significant feature of the Arab image that remained intact, either as ally or enemy, was their assumed uncivilized nature. This feature served as an echo of a former, less developed state of one's own civilization. Cartoonists, in their capacity as the new codifiers of the idea of a "modern" nation based on Turkishness, understood that the new formation under the Committee of Union and Progress sought to bury its "near distant" with its "uncivilized" past in order to retain the solidarity of the empire. The Arabs would rather be situated as the Other.

It was only during and after the trauma of the Great War that a more complex and symbolically laden image of the Arabs emerged in Ottoman and early Republican cartoons. Therefore, the rest of the dissertation is dedicated to demonstrating how this image of the Arab persisted in Turkish perception, serving as the ultimate "Other," and how this transformation of the Arab image and its unification in a hybrid form was reflected in the cartoon space in the service of social propaganda.

The anti-Arab spirit of the new Turkish nationalism, hitched to the process of creating a new, "civilized' Turkish identity, expressed itself openly and violently in the cartoons of the early Republican period. In the process of building the nation, intellectuals turned away from Ottomanism and Islamism and began to search for ways to define and promote Turkishness through every possible means. The process of cultural transformation as a political strategy aimed at elevating the new state to the level of "civilized nations." It included the appropriation and reinvention of meanings and definitions in Turkish cultural memory and transforming their structure.

Apparently, the two previous archetypes of the Arab from Karagöz plays, Ak Arab and Kara Arab, merged to become a single ultimate Other. The historical imagery of the Arab Other in the cartoons was incorporated as a hybrid image, denoting the mixture of races that signified the antithesis of national "purity." In cartoons that include historical imagery, whether as a reference in the depiction of current events or as full portrayal of an historical event, all three sorts of images – images of people, space, and time – worked together to form the perception of and reaction to Arab stereotypes of Turkish audiences.

The reservoir of stereotypes of Arab behavior and appearance that had developed along with the emergence of Turkish national identity surfaced as a persona in which the real and fictional physiognomic and characteristic features seamlessly blended together to form an ultimate Other. This image represented everything the new Turk did not want to associate himself with. So that by bringing together all of these qualities identified with both races of *Ak* Arabs of the Middle East and the Black Arabs of Sub-Saharan Africa, in the pursuit of a

national identity, a hyper-reality of the Arab Other was imagined in the early Republican cartoon space.

This dissertation aims to show the re-emergence of the Arab image during the formative years of the republic, until 1939, when the nation-building process was at its peak. The large number of cartoons used in the dissertation with reference to the related period may seem somewhat overwhelming, yet this multitude demonstrates the power of symbolic representations to form a shared imagination of national self and its other.

Key Words: Nation; nationalism; national identity; “other,” nation building; late Ottoman Empire; Turkey; Early Republican period; Arab; *Ak* Arab; *kara* Arab; racial theory; stereotype; image; visual rhetoric; cartoon satire; Turkish political cartoons.

Introduction

Inventing the Arab Other: Scope, Major Themes, and Sources

Since its foundation in 1924 by Yunus Nadi, the *Cumhuriyet* daily newspaper was physically entwined in the new Turkish Republic's efforts to take its place among the "civilized" nations.[2] Its first home was an old wooden mansion known as the *Kırmızı Köşk* (Red Mansion), now partially turned into a hotel, which used to house the headquarters of the reformist *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress) during the Great War. The office of *Cumhuriyet* was located across the street from the *Istanbul Erkek Lisesi* (Istanbul Boys' High School), the former *Düyun-u Umumiye* (Council of Ottoman Revenues and Debts Administration) in Istanbul's *Cağaloğlu* press district. On November 18, 1943, any layperson perusing daily *Cumhuriyet* might start turning its black-and-white pages one by one, trying to get the grasp of the day's news. But when the readers reached page four, they would undoubtedly be stricken by Cemal Nadir's colorful cartoon that covered the entire top half of the page.[3] One can assume that these busy laypeople with their worldly cares would be better reached by the clichés of the colorful cartoon than by printed lines of type.[4]

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[2] *Cumhuriyet* daily was the new Republic's most important source for the news. It had the widest distribution of any newspaper, yet its daily distribution was limited to Istanbul. It was distributed nationally by subscription, but went out only weekly. Since the day it first went to press, *Cumhuriyet*'s stable of writers embodied the Republican era's intellectual elite, including *Ziya Gökalp, Aka Gündüz, Hasan Bedreddin, Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Ahmet Rasim, Peyami Safa, Ahmet Refik, İsmail Habip, Abidin Daver, Cenap Şahabettin, Vedat Nedim, Halit Ziya, Cevat Fehmi Başkut, Mümtaz Faik, Fuad Köprülü, Halit Fahri, Zekeriya Sertel, Yakup Kadri, Abidin Daver, M. Nermi,* and *Şükrü Kaya*.

[3] Ferit Öngören. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı Ve Hicvi* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1983). Cemal Nadir was widely acknowledged as one of the most important political cartoonists of his period. His cartoons were published in *Cumhuriyet* along with prominent cartoonists like Ramiz Gökçe. Starting in 1928, Nadir's cartoons were published on the newspaper's front page. However, with the economic downturn of the Second World War, the newspaper cut its page count from eight to four and moved Nadir's space to page four.

[4] Lawrence H. Streicher. "On a Theory of Political Caricature." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9, No. 4 (1967): 434.

Figure 1

What happens to the buffalo (mandate)!

The above page four cartoon is a panoramic depiction of the political situation in North Africa and the Middle East. If we read this cartoon beyond its immediate context, namely mid-November 1943, we will be able to identify a motif that was quite familiar to Turkish audiences. The various illustrations of Arabs seen in Nadir's cartoons functioned as visual reference points laying the groundwork for the evocation of a variety of themes and subjects concerning the images of Arabs as embedded in post-Ottoman, and early Republican, Turkish public opinion.

Nadir's cartoon is titled "*Manda'nın başına gelenler*" (What happened to the buffalo!), accented by a literary form of exclamation commonly used when

telling a story.[5] Similar to a story well told (that can make us laugh, weep, swell with pride, or fill with indignation), Nadir employs all the racially and culturally specific subject positions to produce the image of the Arab as the colonial Other. He sets his story on the shores of Arabian deserts where the Mediterranean's blue meets the yellow of desert cartoons. The exact geographical location is unclear, but the symbolic colors accentuate the scenery as "Arab" lands. At the center of the rectangular cartoon we see a giant *manda* (buffalo) with unusual big blue eyes lying on its side. It alternately huffs and puffs from its nostrils the contradictory words *tavzih* (evidence), and *tekzip* (denial). To underline the buffalo's French identity, Nadir draws a tricolor flower on its head. Assaulting the *manda* from all sides are various Arab characters of similar physiognomies, eager to butcher it. The ethnicity of each figure can be surmised not by his physical features, but only by the slightly differentiating symbols in their attire such as traditional robes and headgear (*fezes* for the Syrians and Egyptians – the latter also with a flag on his robe – and *keffiyeh* and turbans for the North Africans of Morocco and Tunisia, the Arabs of Iraq, and the Saudis of the Arabian deserts). The physiognomy in the portrayal of the Arabs is employed to form a biological reference to race and criminality.[6] Nadir merely reproduces the archetype of Arabs, which had evolved through decades of visual representations. He represents them as vicious savages, running barefoot towards the *manda*, swinging their swords in the air with rage, some already shredding the animal's flesh with their knives and guns. With their fleshy red lips and white teeth of black Africans, rounded, sneaky eyes, black, thin moustaches, chunky body forms, and dark skin combinations of North African and Middle Eastern Arabs, Nadir's own Arab figures are portrayed as ape-like little monsters. The cartoon stresses the familiar rationalizations of post-Ottoman Arabs with the irrational conviction that the Arabs, as an inferior species, are by nature incapable of self-governance and unfit to benefit from national independence.

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[5] *Manda* has a dual meaning in Turkish. The most common is "buffalo," but its secondary meaning as "mandate" was added to Turkish as part of the post-war discourse. In the cartoon, Nadir ridicules France by comparing it to a buffalo symbolizing the entire mandate system.

[6] Sandy Sufian, "Anatomy of the 1936-1939 Revolt: Images of the Body in Political Cartoons of Mandatory Palestine." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 37, no 2 (Winter 2008): 24.

Other stereotypes are also depicted in the cartoon. A Jew with his hooknose and moneybag worriedly watches the Arabs from the bottom corner. A British man can be seen in the upper left gripping the buffalo's tail from across the sea to aid in its slaughter. Next to him a German's head with his *pickelhaube* helmet peeks out to spy the scene from between the British and Turkish fronts.[7] Finally to his right we see a sturdy, well-equipped Turkish soldier manning the armed ramparts along the frontier pointing towards the main scene, the Middle East, where the slaughter is taking place. Nadir transmits the dynamic relationship between visual metaphors, its audience, and the historical theme of post-Ottoman Arabia. This representation is sustained by the Turks' collective memory.

In the nineteenth century, the word "Arab" came to signify the antithesis of "civilization." Alterity and misrepresentation of the Arabs was embedded in the contexts of European expansionism and "the Eastern Question" in the beginning of the century. Distorting representations of reality and their degrading impact made up a major theme in the colonial literature, serving imperial governance. Orientalization, in its Saidian sense, constituted the self and Other through negative mirror imaging, structuring the perception of "what is good in us is lacking in them," and at the same time adding a subordinate reversal of "what is lacking in us is present in them." In this structural framework of representations, the Arab became the "ultimate" Other in the definition of the West versus the East. Later on, the new elite of the Ottoman Empire adopted this reified image as a means of defining its self-perception. When the new republic was established, the Arab Other served as an important component in the rhetoric over the new Turkish identity, set against the undesired and the pitiful. The objective of this study is to follow a deconstructive and critical analysis of the "graphic" or "visual" rhetoric of Imperial and, later, national characterisation of the Arabs in the process of nation-building from 1908 to 1939.

[7] The *Pickelhaube,* a general word for "headgear" in German, was a spiked helmet worn in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by German military. It became a symbol of militaristic Germans in nineteenth and early- to mid-twentieth century political and war cartoons.

Nadir used images that were familiar to his Turkish readers. The image of the Arab as "a dishonest, back-stabbing savage" was part of the post-war narrative heavily employed as of the early 1920s, following the 1916 revolt of Sherif Hussein against Ottoman Rule. While embedded in concrete historical circumstances, images of Arabs have a long history, going back to visual representations of the Arab as a bagger or a carpet-seller in sixteenth-century Ottoman Karagöz shadow plays. Nevertheless, these images were context-dependent. Ottoman expansionism started to alter the socially created typology of the Arab in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but the critical turning points in the process of social, political, and intellectual transition occurred during World War I, when the empire lost its territories in North Africa and the Middle East. This final époque of Ottoman history was symbolized by the irrevocable collapse of the multi-ethnic empire and the rise of the territorially limited, nationalist Republic of Turkey, alongside other nation-states that emerged in the twentieth century. The ambivalent feelings of the Turkish elite towards Arabs were molded by the heroic Arab resistance to the colonial powers in North Africa, and by their betrayal of the Ottomans in the Middle East. These grievances embedded in the Ottoman collective memory found manifestation in every possible discourse, including the cartoon space.

The nature and intensity of this transition call for investigation of the myriad of ideas which blossomed during the years preceding and following the collapse of 1918. The present study is focused, however, on the production of the image of Arabs during the transition of the empire to nation. It will examine how one of the most prominent sectors of the new post-Ottoman Turkish intellectual elite, cartoonists, refashioned stereotypical images of the Arab in the context of the emerging Turkish national identity.

The dissolution of the empire brought with it new frameworks of identification. The pro-nationalist reformist group known as *Kemalists,* which included military officers, bureaucrats, journalists, and intellectuals, shaped and coordinated the national resistance that eventually led to the creation of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalist elite took up a massive project of social

engineering, which was part and parcel of the establishment of the new republic. It required the amplification of Turkishness, rendering it the founding concept of the new nation-state, an effort that had been initiated within the Ottoman Reformist movement of the late nineteenth century. Akin to other projects of nation formation, the definition of the Turkish nation was shaped by, among other things, the construction of various Others, and in many ways, the Arabs in their *keffiyeh* and garb constituted the ultimate "Other."

Since the initiation of *Tanzimat* reforms, the dilemma of the achievement of a balance between the materiality, in another word, "modernity" of Europe and the inefficacy of the Ottoman governmental system fostered the need to compete with the Europeans while staying close to them. They were the ones to whom Turks compared themselves, and against whom they created their national image. Arabs, on the other hand, represented everything that the Ottoman Empire in its demise, and later the new republic in its birth, would want to seclude itself from in its journey to become a *muasır medeniyet* (contemporary civilization).

Yet cutting ties with one of the empire's major ethnic and religious components on the eve of building a new nation required more than a regime change. As defined by Oliver Zimmer, the term "national identity relates to the process whereby 'the nation' is reconstructed over time." As Anthony Smith argued, this was not the case for the European nations where all the necessary "intents and purposes" were already in place before the nation's foundation.[8] National identity, thus understood, is a "public project rather than a fixed state of mind" where the development and crystallization of new cultural settings requires the internal transformation of these societies. The capacity for such internal transformation is manifested in structural frameworks or cultural symbols that allow the development of a national identity without necessarily destroying the existing symbols. The new Turkish regime sought identification with "advanced civilizations" through a set of reforms. Each reform, within its own context, was to sever the link with the Ottoman past in order to create a new sense of Turkish nationhood. In such national projects, where the concept of "identity" becomes

[8] Anthony D. Smith. *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 100.

something of an obsession, the image of the Other becomes quite instrumental, yet at the same time making one wonder if these images of the Other are essential or fictional by nature. This is one of the aspects that my research explores. Cartoons are usually mirrors of public opinion. Besides their public impact, their importance lies in the way they reflect popular views.

Historically, images have played an important role in developing political and social consciousness. We learn who we are as private individuals and public citizens by seeing ourselves reflected in images, and we learn who we can become by transporting ourselves into images.[9] The concrete meaning of the image is an underlying question addressed in this study.

Images and visual rhetoric in the service of creating national identities or symbols were nothing new to the Ottomans. Starting with the long tradition of *Karagöz* shadow theatre as early as the sixteenth century, criticism of the authorities through visual satire had been part of Ottoman culture. Karagöz plays, with their stereotypes, formed a genre of Ottoman satire, and actually one of the most crucial venues for expressing political and social criticism through ridicule. Scholarly interest in visual representations has grown with the emerging recognition that such metaphors provides access to a range of human experiences not always available through the study of verbal discourse. As Jean Y. Audigier explains, "[H]uman experiences that are spatially oriented, non-linear, multidimensional, and dynamic often can be communicated only through visual imagery or other non-discursive symbols."[10] To understand and articulate such experiences requires attention to visual metaphors where they were employed; the cartoon space begs for such an analysis.

Cartoons, as examples of such visual metaphors, form the illustrated version of satire, typically dealing with human vices and follies in order to ridicule people, ethnic groups, or whole nations. Cartoons are two-dimensional images

[9] In Marguerit Helmers and Charles A. Hills (eds.), *Defining Visual Rhetorics* (New Jersey, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2004), 1.
[10] ibid. 303.

designed to confound time, space, language, and perceived reality.[11] They aim to alter reality in order to invoke a perceived reality. They employ narratives and images of characters along with utitlising symbols where the stereotypes are created or become apparent. Ottoman visual satire culture existed in public places and coffeehouses through the plays of *Karagöz and Hacivad*, which contained a wide range of stereotypes and symbols. Almost simultaneously with the introduction of print technology in the Ottoman capital, publishers' adoption of lithography, and its popularization through the spread of print culture via newspapers and magazines, the illustrated commentaries became a perfect source for the nurturing of cartoon culture. Cartoons became a site for representation and resistance, first as an alternative to traditional Karagöz shows, and later as one of the major public commentary media in the Ottoman capital. Stereotypes as symbols of human traits that are used to identify related groups constitute the basic of lithographic illustrations in delivering messages in a limited space. These typologies and symbols had existed in traditional shadow plays, and went on to fuel the blossoming Ottoman cartooning which would later be transferred to the Republican cartoon space.

Here I would like to clarify why I prefer the term "cartoon" to "caricature." Few historians have ventured theoretical discussions over the usage of cartoons as historical sources. For Streicher, a caricature is a pictorial image of a person, nation, social issue, or a group of them.[12] The caricature's main characteristic lies in its presentation of its subject's features in an exaggerated manner and it is always negative, while cartoons by contrast are value neutral. For Kemnitz the caricature is a technique of cartooning, and thus the term cartoon is more inclusive than caricature. I will use the words cartoon and cartoonist when referring to my primary source materials.

Kemnitz categorized cartoons in two major groups: cartoons of opinions (political cartoons), and cartoon of ridicule (social cartoons). While the latter is

[11] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000),18-19.
[12] Streicher, "On a Theory of Political Caricature," 427-445.

used only to convey humor, opinion cartoons, or political cartoons, are not necessarily designed to ridicule. Humor may be present in them but their main purpose is to offer commentaries, or "summing up" situations, for their audiences.[13] Political cartoons, which are separated from social cartoons in terms of context, produce negative images of their objects. The main characteristic of political cartoons as debunking and denigrating makes them the right tool for propaganda against the unwanted Other. They bring to the surface the negative public perceptions, thus they have been used extensively since the nineteenth century for political propaganda in Europe.

The character of the Arab emerged in the traditional *Karagöz* plays in the context of social ridicule. Arab characters, either as a carpet seller from Damascus, or a black Arab maid helping her mistress in her daily chores, were perceived as part of the capital's cosmopolitanism. They were ridiculed for their commercial habits, language mistakes, and provincial manners, and attributed features accordingly. However, the emergence of national discourses in the late nineteenth century, changing political structures, and occurrences of national conflicts in the early twentieth century brought to the fore new images of "the Arab." The space of the political cartoon provided vivid manifestations of a process of othering. These images had a lasting impact; as Joep Leerssen argues, stereotypes, or images constructed over time, succeed in sticking to the deeper strata of consciousness while political conflicts and even wars sink into oblivion.[14] In times of political tension, conflict, or national endeavours, these images are called up from the collective unconsciousness. Turkish cartoonists who spent time in Europe internalized ideas of Orientalism, nationalism, racism and modernity, and often projected them onto Arabs, representing them as their Others. Thus, they were not only reflecting an image but also creating and refashioning one.

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[13] Thomas Milton Kemnitz, "Cartoons as a Historical Source." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4, No. 1, The Historian and the Arts (Summer 1973): 81-93.
[14] Manferd Beller, "Perception, Image, Imagology." *Imagology: The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters*, eds. Joep Leerssen and Manfred Beller. (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), 3-16.

Returning to Nadir's cartoon, my work seeks to address such questions as: how was the image of the Arab altered in the visual rhetoric from the nineteenth century to the 1930s? What were the reasons for these transformations? What ways did stereotypical images of Arabs serve the project of nation formation? And how were such images constructed in the minds of people? These questions will guide me in examining the cultural construct of the "Arab other" in order to reconstruct imperialistic and nationalistic currents behind it in a period when a mass public culture began to emerge as a result of rapid growth in printing and publishing. For this purpose, I aim to follow a deconstructive and critical analysis of the cartoons as "graphic" or "visual" rhetoric of imperial and, later, national characterization of the Arabs in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods.

Cartoons provide insights into the popular attitudes that form public opinion, insights that may be more difficult to glean from written texts. Like any other historical resource, cartoons have their own specific limitations as well, yet they reflect an important fragment of past political, social, and cultural experiences. By exploring the above questions, I seek to follow and detect the signs and symbols that were used in the process of stereotyping the Arab in Turkish national discourse.

One should keep in mind that that the satire culture, or cartoon "industry," was limited to the imperial capital, and even after the establishment of the republic, was not present elsewhere in the country before the 1930s. Cartoonists were political figures and members of the intellectual elite, playing a major role in the development of Turkish intellectual life. The latter represents only a section of the entire population, yet a most influential one. After all, one did not have to be literate to absorb messages transmitted by visual images!

Methodology

This dissertation addresses the convoluted topic of perceptions. Ultimately figments of our imagination, such perceptions reside in people's individual psyches, and it is never easy to tease them out completely in historical research. These figments are constituted from social and intellectual inputs that become

available through means of various persuasions, and they produce an enduring synthesis in decoding our surroundings. Perceptions are transferred through "the concepts by which experience is organized and communicated proceed[ing] from the received cultural scheme" and continuously reproduce its cultural codes.[15] These concepts are manifested in different kinds of discourses, including graphic or visual discourse, where symbolic forms of representation have repeatedly produced the cultural codes. Among the available means of graphic persuasion, political cartooning has been a powerful one ever since it was employed as part of news commentary in early nineteenth century Europe. Both the volume edited by Charles A. Hill and Marguerite Helmers[16] and the taxonomic study of Martin J. Medhurst and Michael A. De Sousa provide powerful illustrations of the important role played by political cartoons in establishing the connection between visual images and persuasion.[17] As Foucault argued and Rajchman commented, the "art of seeing" constitutes an essential part of constructing knowledge, and the way people "act and react is linked to a way of thinking where thinking is related to the transferred cultural codes":

> In the 'Archeology of Knowledge' Foucault discusses "enunciative modalities" as properties of discourse. But in his histories he also discusses "modalities of seeing" as properties of visual intelligence: who sees what or whom and where are integral features of the visual thinking of a period and not an independent fact about its contexts. And this visual thought is rooted in a specific sort of "material existence" -the spaces in which it is exercised (such as hospital, prison, museum or home), and the techniques through which its images are reproduced and circulated (such as printing, markets, and so forth).

Based on this theoretical concept originally offered by Foucault, my dissertation utilizes visual rhetoric in deciphering the image of the Arab in the process of constructing national identity. The political cartoons are "built-up" and "debunking" techniques of graphic presentation of the actors on the human stage that are engaged in power struggles with the Other.[18] In the study of national identities where the Other become the reciprocal definition of the self, stereotypes

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[15] Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 151-152.
[16] Charles A. Hill and Marguerite Helmers, eds. *Defining Visual Rhetorics*. (London: Routledge, 2012).
[17] Martin J. Medhurst and Michael A. Desousa, "Political Cartoons as Rhetorical Form: A Taxonomy of Graphic Discourse," *Communication Monographs* 48 (Sep. 1981): 197-236.
[18] Streicher, "On a Theory of Political Caricature," 431-432.

are created as the fixed pictures of their assigned groups. Cartoons in this sense serve as a powerful medium. These stereotypes of the Other are reinforced through visual representations of racial traits using exaggerations, or repetition of clichés and gestures.[19] Manfred Beller and Joep Leerssen's edited volume on imagology informed the present study in conceptualizing the emergence of national stereotypes and to what extent they are determined by historical or ideological circumstances, or else by cultural, literary, or discursive conventions.[20] Dominick LaCapra in his book *Rethinking Intellectual History* demonstrates how

> Hegel attacks the dogmatic advocacy of the common sense with its ready stereotypes and naturalized concepts. In the example Hegel adduces, the murderer is seen in the light of common sense purely and simply as a murderer. This perception converts the murderer into an abstract "other" in a manner that denies both his humanity and more pointedly, one's own degree of complicity with him.[21]

Although stereotypes of the Other existed in traditional forms of visual arts such as *Karagöz* plays, their utilization as part of a long-term national strategy or as political propaganda occurred in postcolonial discourse, as described by Said.[22] Ussama Makdisi's extensive work on Said's *Orientalism* helped me to decode how Ottoman cartoonists constituted their own Other. The Ottomans adopted colonial modes of representing their others, but their circumstances, which were quite different from those of the European powers, dictated particular objectives that were not identical with those of European colonialism. In Makdisi's words, the Ottomans diverged from Europeans in representing their own Arab periphery. For the Ottomans, the Arabs were "an integral part of their engagement with, explicit resistance to, but also implicit acceptance of, Western representations of the indolent Ottoman East."[23] Ottoman cartoonists who were part of the intellectual elite portrayed Arabs the same way Europeans portrayed the

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[19] W.A. Coupe, "Observations on a Theory of Caricature," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, no. 1 (January 1969): 79-95.
[20] Beller, "Perception, Image, Imagology," 3-16.
[21] Dominick LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual History: Text, Context, Language* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).
[22] Edward Said. *Orientalism* (London: Vintage, 1974).
[23] Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism." *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 768-796.

Ottomans, namely as a "brooding non-Western despotism incapable of progress."[24] Selim Deringil's work on the legitimization of power in the late Ottoman period offers important insights on Ottoman responses and resistance to degrading portrayals by Europeans. Resistance was expressed through the employment of legitimizing devices such as "music, coats of arms, the Friday prayer, the Caliphate, education, propaganda wars against foreign missionaries, proselytization among its own subjects/citizens, and world's fairs," while attributing to the Arabs the same traits that Europeans attributed to the Ottomans, namely savages in need of civilization.[25] The latter perceptions found expression in many of the cartoons of the period where the Arab stereotype is depicted as the Other.

In this sense, political cartoons may be read as historical "evidence" embedded in a strategy of power adopted by governments in the process of nation-building.[26] Cartoons do not provide a theme in the manner of a motif, but do serve as a reference point for other themes. The image functions as a visual reference point that form the basis of arguments about related subjects. My reading of political cartoons as a historical "statement" or "evidence" based on the works of Thomas Milton Kemnitz, who discussed the pros and cons of using political cartoons as historical sources; Lawrence H. Streicher, who expanded the theory of political cartoons following Victor Alba's article on the Mexican Revolution and political cartoons; and W. A. Coupe, who contributed to the maturation of political cartooning theory from historiographical and sociological perspectives.[27]

Following Turkey's national struggle and War of Independence, the effort to build a common Turkish culture and identity became a top priority for the

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[24] ibid.
[25] Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998).
[26] John Rajchman, "Foucault's Art of Seeing." *October* 44 (Spring 1988): 88-117. "Visual rhetoric developed in political cartoons as the representation of a certain time in one's imagination of the given moment in history holds the power to carry a certain form of knowledge which become intrumentalized in the construction of public's mind."
[27] Kemnitz, "Cartoons as a Historical Source." 81-93. Streicher, "On a Theory of Political Caricature," 431-432. Coupe, "Observations on a Theory of Caricature," 79-95.

ruling elite. The invention of a new national identity was meant to sustain all the components conceived of as essential for a modern state. At the same time, this endeavour constructed the otherness of the Arab as part of social coding. These cultural codes were constructed through means of literary, political, or public "statements," allowing a new perception of the Arabs.

The first step in exploring the emergence of new Turkish perceptions of the Arab would be to identify the "prose" of the early republican period, which contextualized Arabs in occasions where both identities encountered each other either to dominate the other or to define one's self as superior to the other. I will then deconstruct the Arabness in a Foucaultian way and attempt "an archaeology of knowledge" in the political cartoons of the period.

The understanding of perception and defining the constitutive Other requires a sociological, political and cultural understanding of "self" apart from "Other." As Haarman emphasizes, if these norms that define one social group as opposed to another group remain constant over a certain period, they become legitimized and "regarded as the mirrors of historical reality."[28] In *Thinking Sociologically*, Bauman and May follow deconstructive theory to explain the interaction of Self with Other within society. Thus, Bauman and May help to define the association of the conditions that construct the Other within the collective culture and how these norms draw the borders between cultures and nations.

This "archaeology of knowledge" also requires some clarification regarding the use of language in social theory. The "statements" which are fragments of a constructed knowledge are communicated through language. The latter is understood as a learned process, formed from a "set of dispositions" which generates unconscious "perceptions, attitudes, and practices." This approach developed by Bourdieu as part of his concept of "habitus" will assist in analyzing perceptions of the Arab by breaking down arbitrarily formed utterances used in

[28] Ulrich W. Haarmann, "Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turk from the Abbasids to Modern Egypt." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, no. 2 (May 1988): 175-196

political cartoons. It will also help me to comprehend the symbols as a form of visual language of power.

Since perception of the Other was such a major component of building a national culture in the new Turkish Republic, understanding nationalism and the role of the political elite carries significant importance in the present study. When depicting the development of Turkish nationalism, I will be following Anderson's thesis on the constructed nature of national culture, and Ernest Gellner's insights regarding the formation of a modern, industrialized nation. Although in general terms I see Turkish nationalism (and most other national movements) as a modern construct, I am also indebted to some of the ideas presented by Anthony D. Smith in terms of explaining the fundamentals of Turkish nationalism that drove Arab culture out of the unifying concept of the new republic by defining the nation as "a named population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members."[29]

The content of Turkish nationalism and the constructed definition of the Arabs within this context were to a large extent formed by a resolute political elite, which took it upon itself to establish a new common culture and identity (while presenting this identity as primordial, obviously). Despite the fact that Bengali nationalism emerged in a purely colonial environment, Partha Chatterjee's discussion of its emergence is highly relevant to the Turkish case; it provides a theoretical framework for understanding the role played by cartoonists in their capacity as a component of the intellectual elite that was responsible for the construction of national identity.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, racial categorization of human beings emerged in Europe, which worked as a facilitator for the creation of nation-states.[30] There is a rich literature on the racist tendencies of Turkish

[29] Smith, *National Identity*, 43.
[30] Howard Winant, "Race and Race Theory." *Annual Review of Sociology* (2000): 169-185.

nationalism in defining national identity.[31] Parla and Davidson argue that Kemalist conceptions of national identity not only convey civic national meanings but also other supremacy-oriented ethnic and racist elements as well.[32] Yet what my study intends to show is that racist tendencies were not limited to the Kemalist regime and its elite but in fact already existed in society.

Relevant Literature

To date no scholarly attention has been paid to representations of Arabs in Ottoman and early Republican cartoons.

Elizabeth C. Childs offered one of the significant works on cartoons and othering in public opinion. In her book *Daumier and Exoticism: Satirizing the French and the Foreign*, she analyzes the narrative and cartoons of the "exotic" published by the famous French cartoonist Daumier.[33] Her analysis of the cartoons on the Orient shows how the French perceived the colonial world situated in their distant with national perspectives, thereby creating their own Other. Palmira Brumett's groundbreaking *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* similarly offers a comprehensive analysis of Ottoman cartoons published in 1908-1911.[34] Her work demonstrates a different perspective on the political, economic, and cultural transformation of the Ottoman population, which was in need of redefining its identity against Europe. Tobias Heinzelmann's study the *Balkan Question in Ottoman Caricatures, 1908-1914*

[31] Howard Eissenstat, "Metaphors of Race and Discourse of Nation: Racial Theory and the Beginnings of Nationalism in the Turkish Republic" ed. Paul Spickard, *Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World* (New York: Routhledge, 2005).
Nazan Maksudyan, "The Turkish review of anthropology and the racist face of Turkish nationalism*." Cultural Dynamics* 17, no. 3 (2005): 291-322.
[32] Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004).
[33] Elizabeth C. Childs, *Daumier and Exotism: Satirizing the French and the Foreign* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004).
[34] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press: 1908-1911* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).

examines seventy-seven Ottoman cartoons and weaves the narrative and images on Ottoman-European relations as reflected in the major satirical journals.[35]

Semih Balcıoğlu's work on cartoons in the Turkish Republican period, Ferit Öngören's study of Turkish satire and humour, and finally Turgut Ceviker's great three-volume series on Ottoman and Turkish cartoons are essential sources.[36] They provide many details on the historical background of cartoon production from its emergence in the empire to the present (especially Turgut Ceviker's work), including detailed information on the cartoonists, the publishers, and the magazines themselves. However, none of these works uses discourse or context analysis.

The lion's share of scholarship on modern Turkish history focuses on nation-building and the creation of a common identity in relation to European ideas of nation and state. However, it leaves out the parts where the definition of national identity also requires the construction of an Other, in this case the Arabs. Systematic works on Turkish perceptions of Arabs in the formative years of the Turkish Republic are absent from this body of literature.

Historians of the late Ottoman period and Young Turk era did pay attention to images of Arabs, usually framing their interest in general terms, in the spirit of, "How did Turks view Arabs in various times and places?" Prominent historians like Şerif Mardin and Şükrü Hanioğlu referred to the Arabs within the context of analyzing the ideas of leading Young Turk intellectuals who played an important part in the formation of *Kemalist* thought and national identity. Hanioğlu, in his article "The Young Turks and Arabs before the Revolution of 1908," provides a closer look at the strong nationalist tendencies of the CPU leaders and their

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[35] Tobias Heinzelmann, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu 1908-1914* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004).
[36] Semih Balcıoğlu, *Türk Karikatürü* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1987).
Turgut Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü I: Tanzimat ve İstibdat Dönemi, 1876-1908*. (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986).
Turgut Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü II: Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908-1918*. (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986).
Turgut Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü III: Kurtuluş Savaşı Dönemi, 1918-1923*. (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986).

profound attitude of "superiority towards Arabs'.[37] Hasan Kayalı argued that the emergence of Arab nationalism was based to some extent on the pragmatism of Young Turks' policies towards the Arabs. He claimed that the Young Turks' Turkification attempt aimed to make the state and the Ottoman nation more cohesive. These efforts, implemented through "new language policies and the exclusion of non-Turks from positions of power," awakened a sentiment of "Arabness" and triggered Arab nationalism.

Selim Deringil, on the other hand, pointed to the Ottoman Empire's campaign to redefine its image by inventing traditions and public representation and how this image was used as a tool to "pacify and civilize Arabia."[38] His work led scholars like Ussama Makdisi to carry studies on evaluating Ottoman rule through the discourse of Orientalism.[39] Makdisi's article "Ottoman Orientalism" referred to the civilizing mission of the empire based on the principle of ruling and reforming its "less advanced" subjects such as Arabs.

The above studies discuss the perception of the Arabs by Ottoman and later Young Turk intellectuals who became the new elites of the Turkish Republic. Modern Turkish history, however, limits its studies to the political framework of Turkish-Arab relations. Some important studies of this period include the works of historians such as Kemal Karpat, who analyzed the construction of "identity, republicanism and Turkishness" within the areas of politics, foreign affairs, and literature with minor reference to the Arabs.[40]

Political and cultural trends are well represented in Turkish literature, manifested in the works of the nationalizing literary intellectuals who were at the same time part of the ruling political elite. These works contain references to

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[37] Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Syracuse University Press, 2000.
Şükrü M. Hanioglu, "The Young Turks and the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908." *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (1991): 31-49.
Sükrü M. Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
Aykut Kansu, *The revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1997).
[38] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains.*
[39] Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism."
[40] Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

images of the Other. Such literary works were crucial in catching the public perception since they played a significant role in the formation of the Arab image for the new republic. The works of Falih Rıfkı Atay, for instance, a prominent intellectual of the early Republican period, presented derisive descriptions of both Arabs and Arab lands.[41] The works of other intellectuals such as Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Refik Halid Karay, and Kemal Tahir also echoed these images of Arabs.

In addition, scholars from various disciplines published articles on topics related to Arab culture and its relation to Turks and Turkishness throughout the nationalization and modernization period of the Turkish Republic. Serdar Akturk's article "*Arabs in Kemalist Turkish Historiography"* examines official publications other than the Kemalist history textbooks of the 1930s, arguing that the image of Arabs and Islam is not as coherent as has been presented in the existing scholarship.[42] Lawrence Raw's article "*T. E. Lawrence, the Turks, and the Arab Revolt in the Cinema: Anglo-American and Turkish Representations*" analyses representation of Arabs in Turkish films.[43]

An approach that touches briefly on the image of Arabs can be found in the unpublished master's thesis of Süheyla Nil Moustafa, which provides an elaborate and nuanced understanding of the concept of national identity through an exploration of the cultural identities of the Arab communities in Batman and the consolidation of Arab communal identity with Turkish national identity.[44] In her study, Moustafa claims that "the Arabs challenge the totality of Turkish national identity in national narratives by adding up the Arab identity into the definition of

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[41] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytindağı* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1964).
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Bir Sürgün* (Istanbul:Iletişim, 1983).
Refik Halid Karay, *Sürgün* (Istanbul: Inkılap ve Aka Kitapevi, 1964). *Gurbet Hikayeleri* (Istanbul: Semih Lütfü Kitapevi, 1940).
Kemal Tahir, *Yorgun Savaşçı* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968).
[42] Ahmet Serdar Akturk, "Arabs in Kemalist Turkish Historiography." *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 5 (2010): 633-653.
[43] Laurence Raw, "T.E. Lawrence, the Turks, and the Arab Revolt in the Cinema: Anglo-American and Turkish Representations." *Literature/Film Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2005): 252.
[44] Suheyla Nil Moustafa, "Re-Articulation of the Sign of Turkish National Identity Through the Discursive Performances of the Arab 'Other': The Case of Arabs in Batman" (MA thesis unpublished, Bogazici University, 2006).

national identity." With respect to the latter argument, after the process of the localization and Ottomanization of the Arab elites (the process described by scholars such as Toledano and Hathaway), they became Ottoman Arabs.[45] Just as there was no "Ottoman people," there was also no "Arab people." Even as late as the years of the Great War, most Arabs saw in the Ottoman sultan their natural protector (See Dawn, Khalidi, Tamari).[46]

In this regard, my research intends to fill the gap that was left by contemporary historians in understanding the socio-cultural reflection of the Arabs in Turkish imagination throughout its journey to become a young republic and as part of building a national identity and a common culture within the modernization process. The paucity of research on this subject matter, as opposed to the limited range of studies done on the Arab perception of Turks, suggests that much remains to be done, and I hope this research will contribute to the formation of an interdisciplinary approach to the concept of Arabs as "Other."

Above and beyond its specific theme, I hope my study will contribute to the literature on the construction of the "Other" as an essential ingredient in self-determination and identity creation. The study will attempt to show that this construction is multi-layered and dynamic.

Thirty Years of Arabs in Cartoons: Building the Case

From the nineteenth century to the emergence of Kemalist Turkey in the early 1930s, a great deal happened to Turkish-Arab relations and more than that, a

[45] Ehud R. Toledano, *Slavery and abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1998).
Ehud Toledano, *As if silent and absent: Bonds of enslavement in the Islamic Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
Jane Hathaway, *The Arab lands under Ottoman rule, 1516-1800* (New York: Pearson Education, 2008).
[46] C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the origins of Arab nationalism* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973).
Rashid Khalidi, ed. *The origins of Arab nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
Salim Tamari and Ihsan Salih Turjman, ed. *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman Past* (Berkeley, Los Angles: University of California Press, 2011).

great deal happened to the Arab image. While thinking about how to structure my dissertation, I wondered what my own very first memory of Arabs was. Visiting my childhood in a time capsule, I remembered the illustrated texts of the Karagöz shadow plays that my father used to read to my sister and me before we went to bed. The two cronies of the traditional satire, Karagöz and Hacıvad, would enchant our nights with their colourful stories entwined around various stereotypes of their neighbourhood, representing a window into reality.

I believe that any argument about Turkish perceptions of the "Other" should begin with the Karagöz plays, which contain a whole world of human types. The Arab characters of the Karagöz plays sometimes presented themselves as a foreigner, sometimes as a visitor, sometimes racially white, and sometimes as the "archetypical" black.

Chapter 1, therefore, deals with the historical traces of the image of the Arab in Ottoman popular culture, namely Karagöz shadow theatre. In this main source of Ottoman satire, the ridicule was produced while critiques of the rulers were mocked. Stereotypes were presented, exhibiting the experience of the cosmopolitan capital. Karagöz shadow plays are the place where a regular Ottoman would encounter stereotypical images either as a child during Ramadan festivities, or as an adult enjoying free time in a coffee house. The Arab figure would appear there as part of the human stage. The chapter shows and analyzes the Arab characters of the Karagöz plays as the first space for producing the Arab image.

Chapter 2 follows the footsteps of lithographic illustrations in the empire's emerging print culture beginning in the mid-nineteenth century to the constitutional revolution of 1908. This period may be viewed as the *naissance* and formation of cartoon culture in the empire. The first section of the chapter provides a descriptive background on the printing, publishing, and satirical press in the empire. It elaborates on the employment of visual metaphors in the developing cartoon culture, which brought with it a new visual language and new baggage of Orientalist views, first in Europe and later in the Ottoman Empire, to be used as a means for political critique. I will show how the cartoon space

developed, and how the humor or the ridicule was slowly transferred from the cotton curtains of the Karagöz play to Egyptian paper towards the end of the nineteenth century. Throughout this transformation, our Arab characters of the Karagöz plays became noticeable as symbols representing the outcome of Ottoman expansionism; namely, the Arab became the prototype of the "uncivilized" Other, who lives in the distant provinces of the empire. However, during the long Hamidian era, with its autocratic practices, Ottoman cartoons and satire as well as other forms of oppositional voices took a pause. Editors and artists either fled or were exiled to Europe where they regenerated themselves, combining Western aesthetics and technologies with Ottoman traditions, both artistically and intellectually. Through examples from the prominent cartoon magazines of Europe like *Punch (1841-1992), Le Caricature (1830-1843)*, and *Le Charivari (1832-1937)*, this chapter demonstrates how the exiled cartoonists became both "Orientals" and "Orientalizers" of the Arabs. They used Orientalist visual metaphors and symbols to illustrate their imagined uncivilized neighbours.[47]

Chapter 3 depicts and analyzes the development of the complex image of the Arab as the Turks who were caught up in the web of the Orientalist discourse were trying to define themselves against the other "Orientals," namely the Arabs. This chapter covers the decade of the Committee of Union and Progress rule, which started with the proclamation of the Second Constitution in 1908 and ended with the ending of the Great War in 1918. Until the end of the war Turkification increased, and with it Arabs' political and cultural alienation. At the beginning of this stormy century, a new generation of Ottoman cartoonists steered the development of a repertoire that blended the stereotypes of the Karagöz shadow

[47] In order to demonstrate these arguments, I went through two sets of primary sources. One consisted of cartoons published in Europe's most prominent cartoon magazines, Paris' *Le Charivari* and London's *Punch*, in the years 1850-1908 in order to demonstrate the technical and conceptual representations of the Orient from Europeans' perspective. The second set of sources comes from the Ottoman cartoons published in various cartoon magazines (*Istanbul* 1867, *Diyojen* 1870, *Terakki Eğlencesi* 1871, *Hayal* 1873, *Caylak* 1876, and *Kalem* 1908) printed either secretly in Europe, or in Istanbul, if they could avoid censorship. This comparison gave me the opportunity to show the similarities between the Ottoman cartoonists and their European counterparts in adopting similar visual metaphors as symbols in illustrating their Orient.

theatre with the complex imagery of the Ottoman Arabs. The language of cartoons crafted comparisons with the Arab "Other" as based on recognizable Karagöz cultural types. Yet they were pictured as either friends or foes according to the current political circumstances. Through an extended analysis of the cartoons published in major cartoon magazines, the chapter examines representations of the Arab subjects of the empire as part of the political propaganda during the time of the Great War. Uncertainty and mixed feelings over the concepts of identity and nation created a slippery ground for Ottoman cartoonists, who were having trouble positioning Arabs as the ultimate Other. This period of transformation was significantly differentiated in the cartoon space where references to the Arabs or the lands they inhabited as part of the Ottoman Empire were pictured mostly through geographic symbolism such as deserts, palm trees, and pyramids, instead of direct grotesques of Arab figures.

Chapter 4, the final chapter, constitutes the core argument of the dissertation. It describes and analyses representations of Arabs in cartoons as a means of manipulating public opinion throughout the early Republican period. This chapter focuses on the period 1918-1939, when the republic's final border issues were finally settled. The discussion weaves through major historical events such as the Mosul dispute, the end of the mandate in Syria, and the Hatay question. Such events served as focal points in the political discourse of the day. Obviously, it is difficult to measure the effect of the cartoons on their audience, which was limited to Istanbul. Nevertheless, the cartoons constituted a major part of the information and symbolism which served the construction of one's imagery of the others of the nation. The Arab Other itself became the ultimate symbol, actually the ultimate visual metaphor of the uncivilized and untrustworthy in the eyes of the new republic. The Kemalist elite made efforts to position its new state among the "civilized" nations of the world. The conceptions of "Arabness" were never static in Ottoman and later Turkish imagery. After the establishment of Turkey as a republic, and when galvanizing Turkish identity, Arabs were consistently positioned in a manner that stressed Arab inferiority and Turkish superiority. The negative qualities of "the Arabs" came along with dehumanized,

demonized, and carnivalesque notions to create a hybrid image of the black and white Arab as the ultimate Other.

Chapter I

Karagöz and the Late-Ottoman Origins of Turkish Ethnic Imagination: White and Black Arabs

Introduction

With the emergence of Turkish nationalism prior to World War I, various ethnic, religious, and cultural stereotypes started to serve as rationalizations for underlying ethnic prejudices. Yet the stereotypes themselves were not a new phenomenon in the social life of the empire. In fact they developed over centuries of interaction between the various peoples and cultures of the empire, being a necessary outcome of daily life in multi-ethnic spaces. Images embedded over the long-durée accumulated to produce certain traits and qualities that became symbolic.[48] Visual representations such as miniatures, drawings, and figurines of the shadow theatre had an important role in constructing and transferring perceptions through the underlining of the signifying characteristics, and provided both amusement and food for thought. They retained their significance in the period under discussion, forming national images and stereotypes. The early image of the Arab, in this sense, was no different.[49]

One of the most important sources for common images of Arabs, with their accustomed mannerisms and attributes, were the characters of the famous Ottoman shadow theatre, *Karagöz*. Traditional shadow theatre served as the basis for the political cartoons that emerged as a significant medium of social critique as of the late nineteenth century. Until that time, most of the empire's population was illiterate, and even if they could read, they had little access to books.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that visual mediums such as the Ottoman shadow theatre played their part in the formation of stereotypes in the Ottoman populace,

[48] Haarmann, "Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turk from the Abbasids to Modern Egypt," 175-196.
[49] Janis L. Edwards and Carol K. Winkler, "Representative Form and the Visual Ideograph: The Iwo Jima Image in Editorial Cartoons," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 83 (1993): 289-310.
[50] Dror Ze'evi, *Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500-1900* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 127.

and they should be considered a historical resource without being overrated. The present chapter will focus on the formation of Arab stereotypes in the *Karagöz* manuscripts of the traditional plays, which made a major contribution to the way the Arab stereotype evolved on Turkey's journey from being the seat of an empire to an independent nation.

Karagöz Shadow Theatre

Sources

Karagöz (Black Eye) was the name of the traditional shadow theatre that was the main type of Ottoman folk drama. First described in detail by the famous Ottoman Turkish traveler Evliya Çelebi's "Book of Travels" (*Seyâhatnâme*),[51] historians have appreciated *Karagöz* plays as a valuable resource for studying the religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the Ottoman Empire while emphasizing the satirical dimension of this art. From the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, foreign travellers who visited Ottoman lands managed to collect an impressive number of traditional shadow theatre plays that would later serve as valuable resources for scholars of the field. Pioneering studies of Karagöz tradition started to appear in twentieth century European literature. Hungarian Turkologist and folklorist Ignac Kunos, whose interest was in Ottoman folklore culture, was among the pioneers. Georg Jacob wrote about the *Karagöz* tradition in his book *Geschichte des Schattentheatres*. Helmut Ritter compiled the largest collection of plays, recorded originally from oral narrations of the palace's former *Karagöz* performer Nazif Bey along with other performers and puppet-masters like Memduh, Sefer Mehmet, and Küçük Ali. He published them in his famous *Karagöz: Türkische Schattenspiele*. Andreas Tietze[52] catalogued a great collection

[51] Cevdet Kudret, *Karagöz*. (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013).
[52] Talat S. Halman, "Review: The Turkish Shadow Theatre and Puppet Collection of the L.A. Mayer Memorial Foundation by Andreas Tietze." *The Turkish Muse: Views and Reviews, 1960 1990s* (2006), 261-265. He was considered an important scholar of the Turkish language.

of *Karagöz* illustrations and probably published the best transliterations of the plays to date.[53]

In Turkey, after the heyday of the formation of the republic, the literature on *Karagöz* became a subject of research in its own right. For instance, Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil studied the psychological and sensual aspects emphasized by earlier German scholars of the shadow theatre. Finally, our contemporary Metin And did research on the history of theatre and popular entertainment in Turkey, published in both 1963 and 1975, focusing on *Karagöz* being a major genre in this tradition.[54]

Turkish intellectuals' interest in the Karagöz tradition came later. In terms of collecting and publishing the plays in their original language, Cevdet Kudret gathered the most inclusive annotated collection, based on the works of Kunos and Ritter. He was a Turkish poet and writer whose research focused on the history of Turkish literature, especially short stories and novels. His greatest accomplishments included *Karagöz* (3 volumes) and *Ortaoyunu* (2 volumes), in which he gathered collections of most traditional forms of popular entertainment in Turkish culture.[55]

His *Karagöz* collection includes 39 plays and 19 sections of *muhâvere* (dialogues between *Karagöz* and his best friend *Hacivat*, which often precede the play itself, as a way of drawing spectators into the story), and 112 illustrations, along with a comprehensive introduction to the history and technique of the traditional shadow theatre, and to the construction, themes, and characters of the plays. The collection also offers a full bibliography of the pieces published up to that time. His work is one of the most important milestones in the study of traditional Turkish Shadow Theatre.

These works, of course, are complex for the purpose of methodological discussions related to the plays as a source of historical analysis, yet they cannot

[53] Metin And, "Karagöz, Helmut Ritter and Andreas Tietze," *Torn is the Curtain, Shattered is the Screen, the Stage is all in Ruins* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Karagöz Collection, 2004), 133.
[54] A prominent scholar known for his wealth of contributions to the Turkish theatre scene, he dedicated himself to Turkish culture and its development.
[55] Kudret. *Karagöz*.

be disregarded.[56] The Karagöz plays were an oral tradition that was written down as late as the nineteenth century, and they tend to reflect the contemporary matters of the given time and place. However, certain characters such as the Arab typologies remained faithful to their originals.

The Origin of *Karagöz* plays

In the conventional wisdom, Karagöz is considered a form of "*hâyâl*" (imagination, shadow, or mirror), and according to Siyavuşgil, its origins rested in Eastern mysticism.[57] Philosophically, the stage of the *hâyâl* represented the universe, while all existing things were just a shadow or reflection on that stage universe. Siyavuşgil's work, engaging with studies by early foreign scholars such as Jacob (1925) and Kunos (1925), claims that the first forms of shadow theatre were witnessed in Java, in modern-day Indonesia, during the fourth and fifth centuries, and traveled from there to China and to India.[58] More recently, Metin And argues that in the tenth and eleventh centuries Roma (Gypsies) from south-east India traced a path across Asia and to Europe and stopped in Asia Minor.[59] During this constant immigration, And claims, they passed along the shadow theatre tradition to the Turkish tribes that immigrated to Anatolia due to Mongolian raids. Simultaneously, the Karagöz tradition passed onto the rest of the Muslim world through Turkish Mamluks who took this practice along with them to Egypt.[60]

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[56] Ze'evi, *Producing Desire,* 124-125.
[57] Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941), 22.
[58] Siyavuşgil's book is probably one of the earliest analytical studies done by a Turkish scholar on Karagöz, bringing together, along with his own archival research, the work of foreign scholars. In explaining the origin of Karagöz plays he refers extensively to the works of Georg Jacob, *Geschichte des Schattentheatres* (Hannover: 1925) and Ignac Kunos, *Türk Halk Edebiyatı.* (Istanbul: 1925).
[59] Metin And, *Karagöz: Turkish Shadow Theatre* (Ankara: Dost Yayınları, 1975), 22. And carries the discussions forward on the origin of the Karagöz shadow theatre based on the works of George Jacob (1925) and German Indologist and art historian Dr. Richard Pischel. Richard Pischel, *Die Heimat des Puppenspiele* (Halle: 1900).
[60] Siyavusgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme,* 24.

Shadow theatre in its currently recognized form became known in the capital of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I conquered Egypt and brought a group of shadow players along with him to the palace.[61] From then on, the spectacle of shadows had a considerable presence in Ottoman literature, where it was referred to as *lu'ub al-hâyâl* (display composed of images/shadows) or *zıll-i hâyâl* (the shadow of the image); however, among the common people it was always referred to as *Karagöz.*[62]

The Technique

A precursor of modern cinema, the *Karagöz* theatre stage was separated from the audience by a frame holding a white translucent sheet, preferably made of fine Egyptian muslin. The canvas was stretched firmly on a frame of usually two to two-and-a-half meters. The operator, *"hâyâli,"* stood behind the screen, holding the figurines against the canvas lit from behind by a flickering oil lamp as a light source just below the screen, which gave the figurines a more lifelike appearance.[63]

Karagöz figurines were called *tasvir.*[64] They were made of very finely processed leather (preferably camel hide) using a special technique aimed at producing transparent figurines. They were painted with Indian ink or route dyes in vivid colors. When the screen diffused the light and it shone through the multi-colored transparent material, the *tasvir*s reflected on the canvas like colorful silhouettes. The *hâyâli* controlled the puppets by holding them against the screen with rods attached horizontally to them. By giving the rods the proper angle, experienced *hâyâli* succeeded in offering the right reflections of the shadows on the stage canvas. The mastery of the *hâyâli* lays in the ability to hold and move the figures while narrating the plays orally, adjusting one's voice for the linguistic

[61] And, *Karagöz: Turkish Shadow Theatre*, 22.
[62] Siyavusgil, 30-31. Kudret, *Karagöz*, 10-11.
[63] And, 42-51.
[64] See the definition of "Tasvir" as an effigy, likeness, design, or picture, also forming or giving shape and form, in *Turkish and English Lexicon*, ed. Sir James W. Redhouse, Third Edition (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 2006), 554.

and communicative differences among the characters. Each *hâyâli* had an assistant who was responsible for the musical performance and handing over the figurines in the right order to the *hâyâli.*[65]

Shadow theatre was the main source of entertainment for the month of Ramadan, and it would be set in public gathering places like coffee houses, or in special events like circumcision festivals, providing amusement to its audience (Figure 1.1).[66]

The Stereotypes in Karagöz Plays

Four hundred years of Karagöz shadow theatre played an important role in Ottoman social, cultural, and political life through humor, ridicule, and criticism. The way that the imperial elite saw Karagöz plays as a naïve form of entertainment was probably responsible for its connotation as the common people's means of entertainment. This denigration and disdain of the upper echelons helped Karagöz plays evade the palace's censorship policies and offer poignant political and social satire.

Employing a wide range of characters, *Karagöz* was an artistic space in which contradictions, differences, and relations typical of an extremely diverse society found vivid expression.[67] Although this tradition was originally imported to the empire, most of the characters were created, and later evolved in Ottoman contexts, bearing the imprints of Ottoman social and cultural experiences spreading over three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa.

According to Siyavuşgil, the *Karagöz* stage represented the *mahalle* (quarter/neighbourhood) of the capital. In Ottoman social culture the centre of social and economic life was the *mahalle* (neighbourhood). In *mahalle*s, which were separated from each other by ethnic boundaries, there was, to a certain

[65] And, *Karagöz: Turkish Shadow Theatre*. 44-46. Kudret, 33-34.
[66] And, 46.
[67] And, 51.

extent, an independent control over everyday happenings, community solidarity, and many informal ways to regulate and direct the public morality.[68]

This observation makes sense considering the *mahalle*'s significance in urban daily life, being the smallest cohesive unit of the city, which contained the different and heterogeneous texture of society and provided a framework for communal solidarity. With its symbolic realism, the stage embraced both the basic similarities and the differences between people living together. The plots were reflections of typical events that took place in the streets of the capital, and the characters were images of stereotypes that lived in the city.

The scholars who collected and studied *Karagöz* shadow theatre classified the characters of the plays in several different groupings. For Jacob, there were four main types:

Along with Karagöz and his best friend Hacivat, the main characters of the play were Tuzsuz Deli Bekir (translated as Saltless Crazy Bekir), the bogeyman of the *mahalle*, dressed like a janissary; Beberuhi, the stupid dwarf of the *mahalle;* and *Çelebi,* one of the oldest-known characters of the plays besides the leads, a young man seeking happiness through love or fortune. Characters that represented the accents/dialects were Persian, Arab, Jewish, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, European, Kastamonu/Laz (referring to the Black Sea region), Albanian, and Zeibek (irregular militia and guerrilla fighter from the Aegean region). Pathological characters of the *mahalle* were *Kekeme* (Stammerer), *Tiryaki* (Opium addict), *Sarhoş* (Drunk), *Deli* (Crazy), and *Köçek* (Dancer). For a final category, Jabob lists women (*zenne*) and children.

Siyavuşgil's grouping was wider in range.[69] He divides the characters into two main groups: The *mahalle*'s locals and the outsiders who passed through the *mahalle*. These outsiders are also divided into two: Turks from the provinces (*Rumelili, Kastamonulu, Bolulu,* and *Tatar*), and other inhabitants of the empire

[68] Alan Duben, and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[69] Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme,* 143. Kudret, *Karagöz*, 24-25.

(Persian, Arab, Albanian, Jewish, Armenian, Greek, and European).[70] Metin And's breakdown of the characters is similar to Siyavuşgil's, yet he offers more detailed subgroups based on their dialects, gender, clothing, behavioral tendencies, whether they are earthly or unearthly, ethnicities, and religion.[71] For both Siyavuşgil and And, however, the stage and the plays reflected a complex social context, diversity, and the culture of the *mahalle*, which they conceived of as a microcosm representing the capital and the entire empire at the same time. Masters and Eldem's volume on the Ottoman city contains some relevant insights in this regard. As the writers argued, Istanbul became synonymous with the central state and its power, and in regions as far afield as Bosnia and Syria, "Stambuli" (Istanbulite) simply meant "Ottoman."[72]

The *tasvir*s (characters) of the *Karagöz* plots who lived in the *mahalle* or passed through it were rooted in the culture of the capital. As in real life, in *hâyâl* the characters were attached to their social surroundings, signifying them through their facial features, hairstyles, outfits, dialects, communication skills, and behavioural patterns. Each technical detail, from top to toe, would embody these characteristics, thereby sustaining and further developing common stereotypes. The main plot of most plays was constructed around ridicule and humour derived mainly from linguistic, communicative, or behavioural alterations among the various ethnic, religious, and social groups that formed Ottoman society.[73]

While the "external" (foreign) characters would reveal these diversities in society, the "internal" (local) inhabitants of the *mahalle*, mainly *Karagöz* and *Hacıvat,* being totally opposed characters like the flip sides of a coin, would be the voices of the general public. The two main protagonists would always be in conflict, perhaps echoing the differences of social groups living in proximity, trapped within the same environment. *Karagöz* represented the ordinary simple man in an Ottoman context. He used common spoken language, often amusingly

[70] Siyavusgil, 144-145.
[71] And, "*An Important Cultural Heritage: Karagöz,"* 38-39.
[72] Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 208.
Ze'evi, *Producing Desire,* 140.
[73] Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme,* 138-141.

vulgar; was an ignorant man and occasionally devious; liked to tease the strangers he encountered and make fun of their deficiencies; and was usually unemployed, and always concerned about making a living for his family, but his attempts to find a job were fruitless. Many of the plays were tailored around *Karagöz* getting a new job opportunity, but he always ended up deceiving the people who provided this opportunity by misbehaving, and finally getting fired. He normally resorted to violence when he felt he was ensnared, beating up *Hacivat* or other characters. He was not respected in the neighborhood due to his crudity and sarcasm.

On the other hand *Hacıvat*, *Karagöz's* best friend, was a slightly more educated figure, yet also unemployed. His language was richer and flowing compared to *Karagöz*'s street talk, and he had a good knowledge of poetry and music, yet he seemed superficial, snobbish, and even opportunistic, and his arrogance would be defeated by *Karagöz*'s naïve benevolence, and expressive power in his common language. *Karagöz* would easily fool *Hacıvat,* despite the latter's pragmatism. Unlike *Karagöz*'s impulsive behaviour, *Hacıvat*'s actions were well calculated. He usually offered advice and aid to the residents of his neighbourhood, which assured his position there as a highly respected character.

The contrasts and tensions between the two main characters, and their relations with the other characters in the plays, provided the context of endless comical episodes on the *Karagöz* stage. The contentions and identifications between the characters also performed for relieving clues about the personalities of the characters. In the plays, the naming of the personas was based on the social and ethnic groups they represented, and they would carry the supposedly distinctive features of the culture they were defined in as imagined by the public. The characteristics were never introduced individually; instead they were represented generically, as the identifiers of "stock types."[74]

The identifying features of these types would be emphasized in the plays and *tasvir*s through the repetition of physical and moral attributes assigned to them. Physical characterizations included facial traits such as skin tone, the size

[74] And, *Karagöz: Turkish Shadow Theatre*, 51

and the shape of the eyes, lips, and nose, and (for men) the shape of the moustache and beard. The costume was also important. The hat was probably the most determining part of the attire in pinpointing a character's ethnic or religious background (reflecting the importance of the hat as a social signifier in Ottoman society). The musical instruments and weapons (pistol, knife, stick) that the characters carried, as well as the professions they occupied, were also associated in the minds of society with these "stock types." Also, besides the physical characteristics, there was always a repetitive personality trait that would emerge within the context of the plays, and create a certain behavioural pattern for these types.[75]

For example, Turks from the provinces, according to Siyavuşgil's categorization, were criticized by the locals for their rude and improper manners and were held in contempt for their stupidity. At the same time, they were perceived as naïve personalities, with good manners. One of the major characters representing the provinces was a Turk (*Baba Himmet*), a woodcutter from the Anatolian province of Kastamonu who always carried an axe on his shoulder. He was big and tall and *Karagöz* usually used a ladder to talk to him due to his size. His immediately recognizable character used rough language, wore a fez, and sometimes carried a knife in his wide, rounded belt.

Rumelili (*Mestan Ağa*) was another character from the provinces. He was a Turkish immigrant from the Balkans who enjoyed talking about his home village. He was a wrestler and liked to boast about it. He wore a skullcap with a shawl-like garment around it, and was cheerful most of the time, but could easily grow angry.

Laz (*Hayrettin*) was a native of the coastal Black Sea region from the Trabzon district. He had a strong accent and was very talkative. Most of the time he talked to himself, and was incapable of listening to others. In the plays, *Karagöz* would forcefully close Laz's mouth in order to get a word in. He was usually a boatman, or sometimes a tinsmith or wool-beater. He wore customary

[75] Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme,* 138-199.

headwear called "*sargı,*" a cap encircled by a thick rope with tassels hanging down, made from the same material as his sloppy pants and short jacket. He carried a knife in his belt and played a *kemençe*, a musical instrument in a bottle-shaped bowed lute that is associated with the Black Sea region.

Kurd (*Harputlu*) was a night watchman from Harput, a city in Eastern Anatolia whose speech mixed Turkish and Kurdish words. He was well respected in the *mahalle* and was the only character that *Karagöz* was afraid of. He wore a tall conical cap and carried a long stick.

Zeybek represented an archetype from Western Anatolia. He was known for his strength and roughness. He was able to stand up against outside threats all by himself and protect the *mahalle* from them. He was well respected and feared at the same time. He had good common sense but was slow on the uptake, with a little difficulty understanding the situation at first. *Karagöz* used this defect to sarcastically make fun of him. He was armed with a rifle and long knife, and wore a tall fez wrapped with a wired scarf.

The gender aspects of the plays are underlined with the main female character *zenna/zenne,* a general term used to refer women in the Persian and Ottoman Empires. Unlike the individually distinguished men, *Zenne* lumps all the women of the Karagöz plays under one term. They are women of all ages, colours, and customs. They can be the wives, dancers, sorceresses, procuresses, and black servants of the *mahalle*. In the earliest plays, *Zenne*s are portrayed as cunning and shameless while also being independent, respected, and opinionated.[76] The first appearance of the women characters in the plays can be traced back to the seventeenth century. One of the plays was even named after the authentic woman character Nigar, Çelebi's official lover, who was also known as Bloody Nigar (also the name of the play) for throwing men out her front door, completely naked, after accepting them inside her house and causing all kinds of scandals in the *mahalle*.

[76] Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme*, 161-162. Ze'evi, *Producing Desire*,136.

Moving from characters close to home to those who came from more distant provinces, *Karagöz* and *Hacıvat* also encountered outsiders who were passing through the *mahalle* to sell goods, find work, or perform their craft.[77] The characters of the *Karagöz* plays, both those who were ridiculed and those who were praised, were chosen from among the inhabitants of the city that most commonly interacted with the locals. Yet, unlike provincial Turks, the "imperial outsiders" – those coming from the outlying provinces – displayed more problematic personalities in their relations with the inhabitants of the *mahalle*. In the satirical spirit of *Karagöz* plays, the criticisms of the outsiders by the capital's natives can easily be traced to their stupidity, and untrustworthiness was painted as a common feature of outsiders.

The Persian/Acem (*Ali Ekber*) was actually a Turk from Azerbaijan who would constantly recite poetry. He would usually appear as a rich carpet dealer from Tehran, yet his business interactions would conclude in exchanging small sums. Women usually appreciated his artistic taste. His typical outfit included a high black lambskin hat and a long gown that reached the floor.

The Albanian was either a *boza*[78] seller or a gardener. He tried to act as one of the locals by speaking politely, but he was unable to hide his Albanian accent. He was stupid, and always singing an inane song about vegetables, yet would leave a humorous impression on the audience. He was an amiable and congenial man but would easily get angry. He wore the traditional Albanian headgear called "*qeleshe,*" a white cone-shaped skullcap with a tassel hanging from the top. He dressed in short baggy pants, a short jacket, and high boots, and had a pistol in his belt.

The Armenian (*Serkiz*) was the trusted *kahya* (majordomo) of an elite household. He carried the strong accent of Armenians from modern-day Turkey's eastern Van province. He had a sense of humor, but when it came to his work his attitude was serious. Known for his limited intelligence, he would get offended if he couldn't understand what somebody said. He tried hard to be a gentleman but

[77] ibid., 173-188. And, *Karagöz: Turkish Shadow Theatre*, 42-51.
[78] A special drink made out of fermented millet.

his efforts were always in vain. *Karagöz* constantly teased him. He appeared with a basket in his arm or on his back and wore a fez.

The Greek or Frank (*Balama* or Levantin) was the most Europeanized character in the *Karagöz* plays, his presence demonstrating the growing impact of Europeans in nineteenth-century Ottoman society. By profession he was a doctor, tailor, or merchant. He spoke either Greek or French and used the worst Turkish among all the characters in *Karagöz*. He would constantly curse in Greek. He exhibited a cowardly and arrogant personality and was an unlikeable character that would wear either a European-style hat or no headwear at all. It is interesting to note that the representative of the Greek community, one of the biggest and most powerful in Istanbul at the time, is frequently depicted as a total outsider, closely associated with the "Franks" of Western Europe.

The Jew (*Yahudi or Çıfıt*) was probably one of the most commonly seen characters in the *Karagöz* plots. His most distinctive feature was his long, double-ended beard. He was usually a moneylender or a dealer in secondhand merchandize. He also had a very strong accent resembling that of the Franks. Hiding behind his communication missteps, he would twist words and make fun of *Karagöz* and make him angry. He was mean and rude and liked to exaggerate his reactions. When *Karagöz* would get angry and come towards him, he would become fussy and rave, showing exaggerated reactions. Known as a penny-pincher and haggler, he would appear on the stage with a big sack on his back and usually wore a black hat with a blue turban.

The Arab Characters in *Karagöz* Plays

It is worth mentioning that the following depictions of Arab figures are based on printed materials that were produced in the nineteenth century, surely exhibiting contemporary world views shaped by contemporary experiences. We can safely assume that common images of Arabs had not remained static in the three centuries since the conquest of Arab lands, and they probably changed over space as well, depending on the nature of local encounters.

The Arabs in Karagöz plays were tricky figures. The common portrait of the characters was more complex and elaborate than that of the other characters in Karagöz such as the Albanian (Arnavut), Persian (Acem), or Greek (Rum). They did not have one specific mode of depiction. After all, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Arabs were as much part of the Ottoman world as Kurds, Turks, Armenians, etc. Although the word Arab itself was mainly used to signify sub-Saharan Africans in Turkish folk language, the figures in Karagöz were portrayed within two different sets of images and in two totally different typologies. Emphasizing this difference, the characters are separated based on their skin tone: on the one hand, the *Ak* Arap (white Arab), who was a provincial figure who visited the *mahalle*, and on the other, the unqualified term "Arap," which referred to a *zenci* African Arab who was a local figure as part of the household. Among the thirty-nine plays compiled in Cevdet Kudret's Karagöz, Arab characters appeared in fifteen of the plots. Within these fifteen, the *Ak* Arap and *Arap/Zenci* never appeared in the same drama and displayed very different personalities, almost in total contrast to each other, yet both having the common feature of being stupid.

The White Arab (*Ak Arap)*

The *Ak Arap* was considered one of the earliest figures in *Karagöz* plays. The first representations of this character were seen in Evliya Çelebi's writings of the *Karagöz* scenes during the seventeenth century.[79] Based on the largest collection of the plays, compiled by Cevdet Kudret, we see that with his *keffiyeh* around his head, the *Ak Arab* participated in nine of the thirty-nine plays as *Hacı Kandil* (Hajji Oil Lamp), and other times as *Hacı Fitil* (Hajji Candlewick) or *Hacı Şamandıra* (Hajji Pontoon).[80] He would either be a beggar, a sweets merchant, or

[79] Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Psiko-sosyolojik bir Deneme,* 180.
[80] Kudret, *Karagöz.* The plays are: "Ağalık" (Landlording), "Abdal Bekçi" (The Foolish Night Watchman), "Çeşme" or "Kütahya" (The Fountain, or Kütahya), "Hamam" (The Turkish Bath), "Kayık" (The Boat), "Orman" (The Forest), "Sahte Esirci" (The Fake Slave Trader), "Şairlik" (Poetry), and "Tahmis" (Coffee Grinding).

a coffee grinder, a type that one often encounters on the streets of the capital.[81] He was depicted with light-colored skin, yet he would have a dark mustache and pointed beard. His nose was also sharp, and his eyes and thick eyebrows were black. His *keffiyeh* would sometimes be rolled as a turban, and the coloring of his clothing was dominated by red and brown.[82] He would usually travel from Egypt, Beirut, or Damascus to Istanbul, and his speech would carry the accent of these regions (Figures 1.2 & 1.3).

As in every *Karagöz* character, the names were part of the personality and represented a generalized perception of their owner. By deciphering the names and their hidden meanings, we can get a better sense of the image they represented in the minds of the *hayalis* and their audiences. In the case of the *Ak Arap*, the appellation "*Hacı*" signified the character's religious association as a Muslim who had successfully completed the pilgrimage to Mecca. In folk language, doing the pilgrimage was also associated with one's social status and indicated a person of advanced age (to have the time and money needed to travel to Mecca, a person needed to be financially established and secure). *Kandil*, on the other hand, in a simple dictionary, is defined as "an oil lamp, usually composed of two parts: the pontoon (body, oil float) and candlewick."[83] However, historical and colloquial language dictionaries show that the word *Kandil* was used in the vernacular to refer to a "sharp, pointy nose."[84]

Typical of *Karagöz* plays, which used names to refer to both physical and personality attributes, *Hacı Kandil* with his pointy nose and *keffiyeh* struck the audience as unreliable, hypocritical, opportunistic, rapacious, and insincere yet stupid, much like the other imperial/provincial figures. He would enter the scene

[81] On the social life in sixteenth century Istanbul, see also Ahmet Refik's *Eski İstanbul* (Kanaat Kütüphanesi, İstanbul: 1931), which speaks of Arab beggars harassing and begging passers-by on the street for money. "Divanı Hümayun dilencilik mes'elesile de meşgul olurdu. Araplardan ve sair kişilerden bir çokları 'kar ve kisbe kadirler esvak ve mehalatta süale çıkubibrami galiz ve cerri sakileylemekle ehli ırz olanları rencide' ederlerdi." Ahmet Refik. *Eski Istanbul* (Kanaat Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: 1931), 54. Siyavuşgil, 127-128.
[82] Yapı Kredi Karagöz Collection and Metin And Karagöz Collection.
[83] "Kandil: İçinde sıvı bir yağ ve fitil bulunan kaptan oluşmuş aydınlatma aracı." *Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*. Türk Dil Kurumu.
[84] "Kandil (1): sivri burun." *Türkiye Halk Ağzından Derleme Sözlüğü* (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu 1975).

always with the same cheerful *gazel* (a classic poem style typical of *Karagöz* plays' traditional construction) deeply laced with Arabic words and poetic style, talking about the gifts he had brought for women so they would accept him into their homes and beds.[85]

> Hey, girls! I bring wool fabrics and silk drapes for you! Open the door for me and let me in tonight. Believe that when the eyes fall asleep, the lover will fall asleep as well. A lover, my children, is piteous, do not hurt him. Open the door for me, and say: "The light of my eye, welcome!" Furnished with peacock-feather pillows and velvet quilts, let me go out to the balcony, and light the candles for me.[86]

Hacı Kandil had the habit of exploiting his title as *Haci* at every possible opportunity to avoid paying his debts, or to get out of an uncomfortable situation. In the play "Kayık" (The Boat), both Karagöz and Hacıvat decide to make money by using Hacıvat's boat to ferry customers from one side of the city to the other. One of their first customers is Hacı Kandil. He approaches the boat to ask the route for the boat trip and yells at the boat riders. Karagöz replies by calling him "bonehead," referring to his bony facial structure (Karagöz: "What do you what, bonehead?"). The Arab returns to Karagöz, and asks the price of the trip as an eager merchant. As soon as he learns the fare, he uses his religious title to get a discount. Karagöz and Hacıvat are impressed by his being a pilgrim, and offer to carry him across for half price in return for a prayer. But instead of praying, *Haci* starts singing a *gazel.* As the singing goes on, they hit another boat. The incident leaves the two foolish protagonists with an added loss. As soon as the song is over, they dock the boat. The Arab pays half price as agreed and leaves the boat without saying any prayers.[87]

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[85] The gazel the Arab sings entering the plot later stayed in Turkish slang to refer to telling lies: "maval okumak." Maval is translated into English as an Arab ballad, a lie (in slang). Vahid A. Moran, *Büyük İngilizce-Türkçe Sözlük (A Turkish-English Dictionary)* (Istanbul: Adam Yayınlar, 1985).

[86] "Befta hindî, Befta hindî, şâş harîr, yâ benât
Veftehû lî yâ sabâyâ, li-ecli abât.
Küllemâ nâmet uyûni bittihsib-ül-âşık-melâm.
Ve-l-âşık mugrem, sabâyâ, lem ale-l-âşık melâm.
Fetahat lî vekaalat lî: Hûş, yâ nûr aynî, nâm!
Fereşet lî min kâtîfa ve-l-mihadda rîş naâm;
Talla'atnî kasr âlî vekadatli-ş-şem'dan."

[87] Kudret, "Kayıkçı," *Karagöz,* 624-625.
Ak Arap enters the scene with a song:
"Ak Arap: Bene bakın, kayikji babalar! (Look at me! Boat riders)

Once more, in *Ağalık* (Becoming an Agha) the Haci Kandil character appears as a crippled beggar instead of a stingy merchant. The play opens with the beggar greeting Karagöz and asking for money. Karagöz gives him money by stuffing it in his mouth, and asks Hacı Kandil to convey his good wishes and prayers for him. Instead, Hacı Kandil starts praying in an incomprehensible language usually composed of "disguised curses."[88]At first fooled by his title, Karagöz usually discovers Hacı Kandil's intentions and lies later, after affirming the prayers by saying "amen," and then beats him and sends him away.[89]

Another of the Ak Arab character's weakness is that he is easy prey for women. The *Karagöz* plays have altered sets of balance in presenting gender concepts.[90] It is actually common in the essence of the plays that the men are as promiscuous as the women. In this context, the *Ak* Arab is no different. He gets to be seduced easily by the woman character in the plot. In "*Abdal Bekçi*" (the Foolish Night Watchman), the *Ak* Arab is fooled by the Zenne, who rented a house in the neighborhood in order to secretly receive her lovers.[91] The scene

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Karagöz: Ne var? Ne istersin kuru kafalar? (What do you want, you boneheads?)
Ak Arap: Kabataşağim onunda Sikimderiye bir vapur osurdu mu?
Karagöz: Hacıvat, buyurun bakalım Arap ne diyor?
Hacıvat: Ne diyor?
Karagöz: İşitmedin mi, ulan? "Kaba taşağım önünde sikim. deriye bir vapur osurdu mu?"
Hacıvat: Öyle değil! Kabataş önünde İskenderiye'ye giden bir vapur'u soruyor.
Karagöz: Gelen müşterilerin hepsine bir tercüman lazım ! Hiç lakırdıları anlaşılmıyor.
Hacıvat: Gel götürelim Hacı Baba!
Ak Arap: Gaş kuruj verejek?
Karagöz: Yirmi kuruj.
Ak Arab: O şok, gamin!
Hacıvat: On kuruş ver, Hacı Baba!
Ak Arap: Peki yanaş!
Hacıvat: Karagöz, siya! (Karagöz docks the boat and they pick up the Ak Arab).
Hacıvat: Aman Hacı, bir şeyler oku!
Ak Arap: Başim ustunda.
Karagöz: Başının üstünde birşey mi var?
Hacıvat: "Başüstüne" diyecek.
(The Arab sings a gazel, and they hit another ship).
Hacıvat: Geldik!
Ak Arap: Geldik mi, gamin?
Karagöz: Geldik, geldik!
Ak Arap: Al Para!" (He pays and leaves)
[88] Kudret. "Ağalık," *Karagöz*, 97. Siyavuşgil, 180-181.
[89] ibid., 98-99.
[90] Ze'evi, *Producing Desire*, 141.
[91] Kudret, "Abdal Bekçi," *Karagöz,* 63.

starts as the *Ak Arap* enters the *mahalle* with the usual *gazel* and starts a conversation with the Zenne in the hopes that she will give him the secret password to invite him inside her house. He is so anxious for the invitation that he answers her before she asks her. But Karagöz is hiding under the window, trying to hear the Zenne telling the password. Eavesdropping from from his hiding place, Karagöz makes fun of the Arab character by repeating and distorting his words.[92]

In *Sahte Esirci* (The Fake Slave Merchant), the *Ak Arap* typecast appears as a plotter or robber, this time named *Hacı Fitil* (Hajji Candlewick). In the scene, Hacıvat is supposed to find a house and a servant for local newlyweds. He finds the house and recommends the job to Karagöz. The latter accepts and promises to watch the house and the wife while the husband is away. Meanwhile, Karagöz realizes that he can't do the job by himself and asks Hacıvat to buy a slave girl. Karagöz goes to the slave merchant *Hacı Fitil* and takes a woman slave named Sünbül. He starts bargaining with the merchant, who presents himself as a poor man.[93] In the end, it turns out that Sünbül is actually a man in drag, the accomplice of *Haci Fitil*, who is also working for burglars (*harami*) and using Sünbül to help enter the premises of Karagöz's boss.

With all the Arab characters in the plays, the conversations usually consist of repetitive questions. This is caused not only by the *Ak Arap*'s stupidity but also from misunderstandings due to his Egyptian or Damascene accent. *Karagöz*

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[92] ibid.
"Ak Arap: Gele gele geldik burda, agab bizim hanumlar nerede?
Zenne: (she enters the scene) Vay, Hacı Kandil, Safa Geldin!
Karagöz: (Looking from the window) Vay, Haci Kandil, safa geldin! Hani senin şamandıran, fitilin, yağın? Yağ da pahalı.
Ak Arap: Biz burada değildik; dışarı gittim: Haleb,
Zenne: Çok tan beri gözüktüğünüz yok.
Ak Arap: Biz burada değildik; dışarı gittim: Haleb, Bağdat, Basra, Şam.
Zenne: İş zımnında mı gittiniz?
Ak Arap: Evet, gamin, gene gideğim Şam'a.
Zenne: Bizi burda bırakacak mısınız?
Karagöz: Hanımefendi, sen de Arap'ın arkasından ta Şağ(m)ıma kadar git.
Ak Arap: Biz geldi şimdi sen işeri alajak?
Karagöz: İçeri almazsa dışarda kalacak.
Zenne: Parola: "mürdüm eriği." Ben gidiyorum yarım saat sonra gelin. (Then she leaves the scene)"

[93] When Karagöz asks who's at the door, Hacı Fitil answers, 'İftah-ül-bâb, ena miskîn' (open the door, I'm a poor man).

constantly misunderstands the *Ak Arap*, and the dialogue repeats and repeats, leading to increasingly ridiculous discussions while slowly revealing the true character of the Arab to the suspecting audience.

As with many other Karagöz figures, the common characteristics associated with ethnic and religious features were portrayed and even caricatured on the shadow theatre's curtain. The *Ak Arap,* like many other strangers visiting or living in the capital, was one such character, representing a frequently met social stereotype which was at the same time recognized as different, thus creating a sense of "us" and "them." The archetype of *Haci Kandil,* in general the *Ak Arap,* was widely imagined not only through his pictorial existence but also through the production of proverbs and idioms derived from these illustrated types, represented and portrayed on the Karagöz stage. Phrases like "*Kırk Arabın aklı bir incir çekirdeğini doldurmaz*" (the minds of forty Arabs are not enough to fill up one fig seed)[94] or *"ne Şam'ın şekeri, ne Arabın yüzü"* (Neither Damascus' candy, nor an Arab's face),[95] or expressions such as "*Medine dilencisi*" (Medina's beggar, an idiom meaning a poorly dressed, down at the heels person), or "*maval okuma*" (singing an Arab ballad, a reference to someone who lies to get out of an unpleasant situation) contributed to the construction of the stereotype that we will again encounter in the early periods of the republic.

The Black Arab (*Zenci/Kara Arap*)

The *Zenci*, or black Arab, was usually presented as a dark-skinned African and was referred to simply as *Arap* with no accompanying adjective.[96] The *Arap* figures emerge in seven out of thirty-nine plays collected in Kudret's *Karagöz*. His distinctiveness is defined by being the only figure indigenous to the *mahalle* yet at the same time yet with origins from the provinces, mainly from North

[94] "Kırk Arabın aklı bir incir çekirdeğini doldurmaz" is a proverb used for a group of people who are acting stupidly.
[95] "Ne Şam'ın şekeri, ne Arab'ın yüzü" is used for people whose help is not welcome due to that person's previous misdeeds.
[96] The word "Arab" also means black or dark in Turkish and usually refers to the Arabs of North Africa.

Africa.[97] Much like Shakespeare's "Othello," where the "Moor" was described as black in color, and there were no clear distinctions differentiating Arabs from black people of Sub-Saharan Africa, or Muslim inhabitants of Andalusia, in an Istanbul *mahalle* people were accustomed to seeing these various dark-skinned people and failing to distinguish them.[98]

For the Ottomans in the capital, both the Arabic-speaking inhabitants of Arab lands and slaves usually coming from Africa through the Sudan and Egypt (who may have spoken Arabic as well) were somehow "*Arap*" or "*Zenci*" (Figure 1.4) The category was not linguistic or racial, but signified mainly the place of provenance and a tendency to have darker skin. Black slaves were thus considered the quintessential Arabs, while the others needed to be qualified with a special adjective: "*Ak*" (white).

In the traditional *Karagöz* plots*,* generally speaking, the *Arap* was featured as *lâla* (a male slave or manservant looking after a child)[99] or a *dadı* (female version of *lâla*),[100] and sometimes as a musician, a *kabakcı* (gourd player), or *tefci* (tambourine player)[101] (Figure 1.5). Although the *Arap lâla* appears as an important figure in some of the plays, none of the aforementioned scholars studied them as part of the character set of *Karagöz* scenes. Siyavuşgil is the only one who discusses the differences when describing the *Ak Arap*, emphasizing that the two Arabs, white and black, should not be confused with each other. For Siyavuşgil, the *Arap* is a typical caricature of the eunuch who appears sometimes as *Hacıvat*'s slave, *Çelebi*'s *lâla,* or *Kabakcı Arap*, but nothing more. However, contrary to *lâla,* the female *dadı* figure that usually appears as the servant of the main woman character (*zenne*) is not taken into consideration at all in the works

[97] Faroqhi, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire,* 597-598.
[98] Phylis Natalie Braxton, "Othello: The Moor and the Metaphor," *South Atlantic Review* 55, no 4 (November 1990): 1-17.
[99] See Kudret's *Karagöz* for the plays "Balık" (The Fish), "Çeşme" (The Fountain), and "Kanlı Nigar" (Bloody Nigar), which include the Arap Lâla.
[100] See Kudret's *Karagöz* for the plays "Leyla ile Mecnun," "Tahir ile Zühre," and "Yazıcı," which are the only three scripts with the female Arab character.
[101] Kudret, "Şairlik-Aşıklık," *Karagöz,* 983-984. Kabakcı Arap is a musitian and a foolish poet at the same time. He plays his *kabak* (musical instrument), but he confuses the lyrics all the time.

of Siyavuşgil and other scholars.[102] One reason might be that both characters exhibit similar behavioural patterns in the roles they play. However, I believe it is still important to look at the two figures separately.

The *lâla* – or, as he is most commonly known, Mercan Ağa – has a strong, manly physical figure; however, with his soft, effeminate accent, he betrays a masculinity problem in his speech. With his funny accent, idiocy, and funny compassion so out of sync with his grand figure, he evokes in the minds of his audience the eunuch of the harem (harem ağası). It is worth mentioning that the harem ağası, the chief eunuch (who was black since the sixteenth century), was nothing like this representation. This figure was actually one of the most powerful individuals in the court, and the state in general. As in each Karagöz play, the ridicule surrounding the Arab type is created by these contrasts and contradictions (Figure 1.6).

Unlike the *Ak Arap*, he enjoys wearing the Ottoman traditional hat, *tarboosh* or *fez*.[103] This traditional Ottoman outfit of the *Arap* also symbolizes his deeper connection to his Ottoman household and shows a form of acceptance by society, from which he was an insider. This is not a very unexpected situation since black slaves were mainly employed in elite households (*kapılar*), serving as eunuchs and slaves of concubines and officials in the harem together with low-ranking chamber maidens. Thus, even after the formal abolition of slavery in the late nineteenth century, the presence of these slaves continued as loyal servants in the palaces and later in the houses of the elites.[104] His loyal, trustworthy presence in the house always gives him a sense of self-esteem and an air of nouveau-riche importance.[105] It is important to keep in mind that when the plays were

[102] In the Karagöz plays, the female characters are generally presented under the name Zenne, which means woman without regard for age, ethnicity, or customs. This definition is also used for the female Arab servants. This racial reference is usually done in the introductory part of the plays when the characters are introduced to the audience.
[103] The fez is a type of headgear that only became popular in the nineteenth century, and when first introduced, it was opposed by the ulema on the grounds that it was an irreligious innovation.
[104] Ehud Tolenado, "Late Ottoman Concepts of Slavery." *Poetics Today* 14, no.3, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Modern Period I, (Autumn 1993): 477-506.
Sermet Muhtar. "Masal Olanlar: Eski Haremağaları," *Akşam Gazetesi*, June 11, 1932, 8.
[105] Kudret, "Balık," *Karaköz*, 192-212. "Çeşme," 334-335. The Arab character in the both plays is described as a stupid, snobbish character. He often gets beaten up or mocked by Karagöz.

systematically collected edited and printed for the first time, these images of the black Arab were shaped as nineteenth/early twentieth century realities. Namely, these texts produced in the seventeenth or eighteenth century bore the imprint of those times, but also modern cosmologies reflecting the complexities of a period marked by unprecedented change, for a modern audience.

Mercan Ağa's aspect as a newcomer to economic freedom is subject to even greater scrutiny from his lack of social prestige as seen through the play *Kanlı Nigar* (Bloody Nigar). In the play, he is the dark-skinned *lâla* of Çelebi, the flamboyant young lover of the *Karagöz* scenes. It is worth noting that the title Çelebi originally meant a prince in the imperial household, yet it was also commonly used for an upper-class gentleman. The social context in this scene is full of class-related norms and tensions, and the play challenges these norms. In the plot, Çelebi's lovers wait in Bloody Nigar's house in order to get their revenge on Çelebi and his friends. The women are angry with Çelebi for flirting with all of them at the same time, and so they set a trap at Nigar's house to punish him. Nigar calls Çelebi inside and the other women ambush him and beat him up. Then they strip him and throw him back onto the street. They do the same to Karagöz, who is convinced by the naked Çelebi to bring his clothes from inside the house. The same pattern is repeated when Hacıvat tries to help them, and finally all three men end up outside the house, naked. Finally, Mercan Ağa enters the scene looking for Çelebi. Instead he finds the naked Karagöz and Hacıvat and asks them if they have seen his master's younger son, Çelebi. Karagöz tries to hide the young Çelebi, who is mortifed by the situation, but Hacıvat can't hold his tongue and so tells him where Çelebi is. Mercan Ağa, shocked by what he sees, decides to help his master and the two other naked men by going into Kanlı Nigar's house to get their clothes back, fully believing he will succeed, but he ends up facing the same fate as his "*küçünü bey*," Hacıvat, and Karagöz.[106]

The black women of the *Karagöz* plays is the *Arap dadı* of the Ottoman household or, as she is sometimes called, the *Arap Halayık.* She is not as prominent or forthcoming as a strong figure. In the plays, she is mainly a

[106] Kudret. "Kanlı Nigar," *Karagöz*, 580-582.

messenger between her *hanım* (female mistress) and the mistress' male companions. Within this defined role, she is perceived as a devoted and trusted servant of the house. Her affiliation with a noble household gives her a snobbish air that especially emerges when she meets Karagöz. Somehow she never trusts Karagöz, and always approaches him as a potential liar, a Roma, and tries to protect the good name of her mistress by trying to sabotage their dialogue. The same social class discourse that we encounter with the Mercan Aga figure holds for Arap Halayık as well. This dislike turns into a constant struggle between the *Arap Halayık* and *Karagöz,* which produces comic moments. With her unseemly arrogance and an accent similar to her male counterpart, the *Arap Halayık* is presented as simultaneously insider and outsider. She enjoys the privileges of belonging to a higher-class household. In the *tasvir*s of the plots, she is usually accessorized with a fan and parasol, and as she retains a social status similar to her master's, and pretends to be one of them. She keeps the moral equilibrium between Karagöz's deviousness and the household's reputation as the way she keeps her native background and her current status in balance.[107] In the *Karagöz* play *Yazıcı* (the Scribe), her name is Zarafet, which means elegance.[108] Typical of Karagöz plays, her name signifies her social profile as the wannabe of the *mahalle*. She is, in a way, more perceptive and quick-witted than *lâla.* She is a trustworthy housekeeper who dispenses advice. Her character produces a sense of sympathy and familiarity in the audience (Figure 1.7).

The traditional piece *Tahir ve Zühre* is one of the plays where the Arab Halayık's character divulge herself the righteous maid of her naive mistress. In the play, a young couple, Tahrir and Zühre, decides to get married, but first they need their families' consent. After a challenging process, Tahrir finally gets the approval of his fiancee's father. Excited to deliver the news to his new wife-to-be, Tahrir tells Zühre that he will visit her to tell her both of his love and the good news. However, he is overcome by his desire to go hunting before the visit and he asks Karagöz, who is working as the house's butler, to keep this a secret and not

[107] ibid. "Tahir ve Zühre," 997-1037. Zühre's servant (Arap Zenne) gets angry with Karagöz and lectures him harshly.
[108] ibid. "Yazıcı," 1150. The hanım calls the Arap Halayık from inside: "Kız, Zarafet!"

tell Zühre anything. But Zühre gets anxious when *Tahir* doesn't show up on time, and she goes to see *Karagöz* to find out what he knows, accompanied by her *Arap halayık*. Throughout the dialogue between the three, the Arab halayık tries to pry the truth about Tahrir from Karagöz, not believing his answers to Zühre's questions.[109] She is aware of Karagöz's character and tries to show her mistress her awareness of the situation while showing herself as a woman of morals.

Much like the general characterization of the other female types in the plays, the female black Arab characters are portrayed as more independent, enjoying a certain level of authority, as opposed to their male versions. Compared to Mercan Ağa, the Arab halayık is shown as clever. She is more practical in solving problems. She's not as easily deceived by Karagöz's jokes as Mercan Ağa. Yet the one common feature both Arab characters share is the way they are taken by the color red. In almost all the *tasvir*s, both Arab characters are attached to the color red. There is no clear reason why red predominates the characters, but we see traces of the color at almost every possible occasion, from the pictorial perspective to the naming of the character. The red fleshy lips of the figures shine out on their dark skin as a distinguishing feature. But when it comes to personality, we perceive that the male character, Mercan Ağa, as emphasized in the meaning of his name "red coral," is fonder of the colour red than the woman Arap Halayık. In the scripts, we read nothing about her loving red outfits, but we definitely see Mercan Ağa's attraction to it.

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[109] ibid. "Tahir ve Zühre," 1014. Zühre and Arap Halayık approach Karagöz:
"Zühre: Karagöz, Tahir Bey nerede?
Karagöz: Bilmem efendim nerede olduğundan mağlumatım yok.
Arap Halayık: Nişun bilmiyorsun?
Karagöz: Benim de buna canım sıkılıyor, herşeye karışıyor.
Arap Halayık: Mundar, muskin, musubat Şingana!
Zühre: Karagöz, ne dedi?
Karagöz: "-kitapları sıkıştırmak için içeride mengen." diyor.
Zühre: Tahir bey acaba nereye gitti?
Arap Halayık: Galiba gezmeye gitti.
Zühre: Ne dedi, Karagöz?
Karagöz: "-Galiba ağabeyine gitti." diyor.
Arap Halayık: Her lakirdiya birşey uyduruyorsun.
Karagöz: "-Akşam sabah yiyip yiyip kuduruyorsun." diyor. –Sen kuduruyorsun, köpoğlu!
Arap Halayık: Ağzını topla! Ben adamın ağzını yırtarım.
Karagöz: "-Mayısda ot otla, ben labada toplarım" diyor.
Arap Halayık: (laughing) ne tuhaf adam! Ben gidiyorum."

This distinguishing characteristic of the Ottoman Arabs being fond of red must be very noticeable, since it took root in the *Karagöz* plays. Moreover, this same affection gave birth to a commonly used idiom in Turkish: *"Arabın derdi kırmızı pabuç,"* meaning, "The only worry the Arab has is red shoes," referring to people who are preoccupied with unnecessary details, oblivious to the seriousness of a situation.

Balık (The Fish) is the play where this aspect of the Arab character is emphasized in creating the stereotype. *Balık* centres around Çelebi's plan to go fishing after a talk he has with Hacıvat while visiting his sick brother. He decides to take Mercan Ağa with him to row the boat and promises to buy him a pair of red shoes, a red *fez*, and red *şalvar* (baggy trousers) if they get a good haul of fish. Mercan Ağa gets very excited at this news, in what may be considered effeminate joy or a class marker of wanting to get new redclothes. In order to get the present from Çelebi, he needs to row the boat slowly and silently so as not to scare the fish. But Mercan Ağa can't contain his joy and so each time a fish approaches the hook, he loudly reaffirms his master's promise to him, thinking of the red shoes he will get. After the third fish flees, Çelebi gets annoyed and they go back home, with Mercan Ağa feeling disappointed and sad at not getting the shoes he had dreamed of (Figure 1.8).

Conclusion

The characters of *Karagöz* plays are inseparable from the sketches. They are generated and located within the context of the play. They do not, most of the time, reflect an immediate reality of the current time. Yet they are usually associated in the shared public consciousness with their ethnic or social backgrounds. Thus, the characters carry their ethnic origins or social backgrounds as differentiating tags rather than actual names: Anatolian Turk (Baba Himmet) is a woodcutter, the Jew is a secondhand dealer or money lender, Laz from the Black Sea region is a tinsmith, Tiryaki is an opium addict (Tiryaki means opium), Rumelili is an immigrant from the Balkans (Rumelia), the Armenian is a caretaker

in a large house, the Greek or Frank is a European physician, and Acem (Persian) is a carpet dealer.

Through the centuries, the attributes and qualities of the characters that are used repeatedly in different plays created a set of almost standard generalizations about ethnic traits, which transformed each character from just being a cartoon symbol into an ethnic stereotype. Since the early twentieth century, these ethnic stereotypes increasingly assumed a nationalistic tint. Each ethnic or national character uses a different dialect, with a certain choice of words, accents, and errors that make it unique to him or her. Since each of these characters is given the generic name of their ethnicity – Arab, Armenian, Turk, etc. – by attributing these traits to them, *Karagöz* plays actually serve as perception-builders for their audiences.

It is clear that in the pre-Republican Ottoman imagination there were two distinct characters referred to as Arabs. One was the *Ak Arap*, the other was simply referred to as *Arap.* They represented two different stereotypes that were almost opposed to each other. One was pale-skinned, long-nosed, and smart but cunning, wily, and untrustworthy, while the other was dark, curly haired, loyal, and honest but sometimes stupid.

In the next chapters I will follow the transformations and unification of these two stereotypes into a common understanding or perception solidified with the development of satirical magazines and cartoons in building the image of the Arab as the "Other." I intend to examine how this image of the Arab Other was constructed through ridicule as a contrast to the emerging image of the Turk.

Figure 1.1

Karagöz Shadow Theater

Salih Erimez,
Tarihden Çizgiler, 1941

Figure 1.2

Arab Beggar, *also Ak Arap* is one of the oldest characters in Karagöz plays.

Yapı Kredi, *Karagöz* Collection,
Istanbul

Figure 1.3

Ak Arap as *Hacı Kandil*

Various representations of *Ak Arap* figures in Karagoz plays.

Yapı Kredi *Karagöz* Collection and Metin And Collection,
Istanbul

Figure 1.4

Kara Arap or *Zenci*

Various representations of *zenci* (black Arab) figures in Karagoz plays.

Yapı Kredi *Karagöz* Collection,
Istanbul

Figure 1.5

Kabakçı Arap

Various representations of *Kabakcı Arap* figures in Karagoz plays as one of the black Arab characters.

Yapı Kredi *Karagöz* Collection and Metin The And Collection,
Istanbul

Figure 1.6

Arap Lala or *Mercan Ağa*

Various representations of *Arap Lala* (black servant) figures in Karagoz plays.

Yapı Kredi *Karagöz* Collection and Metin And Collection,
Istanbul

Figure 1.7

Arap Bacı or *Arap Halayık*

With her fan and parasol as symbols of elegance, Arap Bacı enjoys the privileges of belonging to a higher-class household.

Yapı Kredi *Karagöz* Collection,
Istanbul

Figure 1.8

Çelebi and *Mercan Ağa*
"Balık" (The Fish)

Yapı Kredi *Karagöz* Collection and Metin And Collection,
Istanbul

Chapter II

Shadow Puppet to Paper Image: The Transformation of Satire from Karagöz to Print

Introduction

Long after their first appearance on an Egyptian cotton screen, the adventure of Karagöz characters continued in the empire's capital city. From the mid-nineteenth century, however, the main stage was no longer a theatrical performance, but instead was paper. The age-old theatrical satire was gradually replaced by a printed one. Karagöz *tasvirs* (shadow puppets), stylistically similar to the cartoon characters, became an indispensable element of satirical gazettes, which found an enthusiastic Ottoman audience through the century.

From the outset of the Tanzimat reforms (accepted to have been inaugurated in 1839), the Ottoman Empire experienced multifaceted political, socio-cultural, and socioeconomic challenges within its borders. A series of military defeats in the Balkans starting near the end of the eighteenth century made clear the necessity for reorganizing the empire, as it had fallen behind in the pace of progress against its Western European counterparts, which had already gone through the phases of the French Revolution and parliamentary monarchy and had even started industrialization. The nineteenth century was a stimulating period for the empire, as it weathered radical transformations in matters of the state, society, and economy. These social and political developments were also reflected in the printing and publishing not only of books, but also in the publishing of newspapers and illustrated journals including satirical gazettes, whose printing became possible with new technologies introduced to the empire. Newspapers, constructing an "imagined world" that "seeps quietly and continuously into reality," were the perfect agents for mass communication. They created "that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is a

hallmark of modern society."[110] The same "imagined world" also transported the space for political and social critique from social gathering places to homes, from shadow stages to print.

This chapter aims to explore the link between the traditional Karagöz plays as part of Ottoman ridicule and its transformation into visual satire culture following the emergence of print culture. I will argue that this linkage generated a set of attributes that became the foundation for stereotypes of Arabs. This unique combination of a purely Ottoman satirical visual art form and another imported from Europe formed the basis for a cartoon culture in which Arabs were imagined and perceived in their satirical depictions in early Republican cartoons.

The journey of visual satire after the integration of the print industry follows a twisted non-linear path from its first appearance in the Ottoman public. It crosses an era of censorship and interruption and finally re-blossoms with the revolution. Foreshadowed by Karagöz as one of the main mediums of expression, cartoons, dynamic in nature, exhibited the changing political circumstances. Thus, this chapter will set a framework for the subsequent discussion on the Republican era by tracing the emergence of the cartoon as a powerful component of mass media in the late nineteenth century, first in Europe and later in the Ottoman Empire. This historical background to the Young Turk period will show how, along with adopting the Western art of cartooning, the Ottomans, and later Turks, also adopted some of its Orientalist images of Arabs and "easterners" in general.

A Brief Exposition on Printing, Publishing and the Satire Press in the Empire

It is commonly stated in Ottoman historiography that upon learning of the invention of the printing press in the 1480s, Sultan Bayezid II strongly opposed this new technology.[111] According to Göçek, his refusal to adopt the new invention was caused by the social disturbances generated by print technology in

[110] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 35-36.
[111] F. Muge Göçek. *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 112.

Europe, especially in religious matters, and its possible subversive effects on the public.[112] Consequently, the sultan issued a law in 1485 (several decades after the appearance of Gütenberg's first book published in Germany, around 1439), banning the printing of Ottoman Turkish texts. Renewed in 1515 by Sultan Selim I, the decree stated that "occupying oneself with the science of printing" was punishable by death.[113] This decree officially banning the printing press with such a strong sanction thus supposedly showed the severity of the Ottoman reaction to the new technology. It also limited the press to the use of non-Muslim minorities, especially to Jews, Greek Orthodox, and Armenians.[114] Such bans were relaxed and altered in the 18th century by a political elite that was gradually losing confidence in the military and economic supremacy of its empire, especially vis-à-vis the European powers.

As part of the growing interest in European countries, Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmet Efendi was an early envoy sent to Paris in 1720 by Sultan Ahmet III to observe European advances. This was an important phase for the empire, which was curious about the Western social and cultural developments that had been seen as the source of progress in the context of civilization. In his book about print culture in the early Turkish Republic, Akçura describes how impressed Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmet Efendi was by the publishing houses and printing industry he observed during his visits to Paris.[115] For him, publishing was one of the major instruments on the path to a more civilized society. This observation paved the way for the establishment of the empire's first printing house using Arabic lettersby Ibrahim Müteferrika in 1721, two centuries after the first printing presses were founded in Istanbul by non-Muslim minorities.[116] Müteferrika's

[112] ibid. 113-115.
[113] ibid. 112.
[114] Gökhan Akçura, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye Matbacılık Tarihi* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2012), 37.
[115] ibid. 37.
[116] Naim Güleryüz, "Osmanlıda ilk basımevi: Yahudi Matbacılığı," *Toplumsal Tarih,* no 156, (December 2006). The first printing attempt in the Ottoman Empire can be traced back to the sixteenth century to Samuel Halicz, a Polish-origin Jew. Naim Güleryüz's research on the history of the Jewish press in the Ottoman Empire states that Halicz established his printing house in Istanbul in 1530. Other non-Muslim groups such as the Armenians and Greeks established their

modest publishing house could not go beyond publishing limited amounts in limited subjects such as dictionaries and grammar books, due to the sultanate's serious restrictions on publishing with religious content.[117] Following an intermittent presence in the eighteenth century, during which only 33 books were published, the Ottoman press did not show a significant leap forward until the second half of the nineteenth century.

The invention of lithography around 1800 in Germany made it possible to produce an extraordinarily large number of prints from a single drawing executed on a block of stone.[118] Ottoman publishing houses were not late in adopting the lithographic press soon after its introduction in Germany and used it in the following decades to print the first official newspaper, *Takvimhane-i Âmire* in 1831.[119] Thus, the age of newspapers, or "one day best-sellers" as Anderson puts it, began in the empire as a government initiative.[120] The print industry grew quickly afterwards.

The crucial period for the development of printing, publishing, and the distribution of printed work in the Ottoman Empire was the 1860s. Along with facilitating the printing of large amounts from a single copy, the invention of lithography also allowed the printing of graphic art alongside the text, thereby initiating a new epoch in publishing newspapers and journals. The lithographic illustrations, serving as a simple form of graphic art in reference to the accompanying text, became an effective agent in delivering the political and social message of the news, aiming to reach mass reading publics. It became a unique visual communication device providing political editorials and socio-cultural commentaries to shape public opinion by using a variety of artistic and cultural techniques, including symbolism, hyperbolic suggestions, labeling,

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own printing press mainly for publishing religious books, and documents in their original languages (Arabic, Greek, Armenian, or Hebrew).

[117] Gökhan Akçura, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye Matbacılık Tarihi.*

[118] Joseph Pennel, *Lithography and Lithographers* (London:T.Fisher Unwin Publisher, 1915), 9.

[119] Gökhan Akçura. 48. The name of the first newspaper in Arabic script was given by Sultan Mahmut II himself. After its first year, the two different locations where the newspaper was prepared for print and actually printed were merged, and the name was changed to *Takvim-i Vekâyihâne-i Âmire.*

[120] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 35-36.

analogy, and irony. But, most often, they used sarcastic metaphors, satirical comparisons, and over-the-top descriptions of reality to simplify complex political events so that the general public could comprehend their significance, from a particular perspective. This new illustrative style formed the roots for political cartoons.

Originating in late nineteenth-century Europe, the political cartoon began as a mutually beneficial partnership between publishers and their audience. Publishers hoped to capitalize on the cartoon's attraction or popularity to increase papers' revenues and daily circulation, while the audience shared a medium that expressed a common stand on the issues of the day and the hegemony of the state, one which undermined the legitimacy of the authority through shaping public perceptions.

It was in 1829 that Charles Philipon introduced the first illustrated satirical journal, *La Silhouette*, and distributed it on an industrial scale on the streets of Paris, Europe's culture capital. *La Silhouette* was the prototype for the highly successful *Le Caricature* (1830) and later the daily *Le Charivari* (1832), which nurtured the most prominent cartoonists of the time like Grandville, Cham, Aubert, Gustave Doré, Emmanuel Poiré, and Honoré Daumier in its roster of illustrators.[121] Following these French successes, Punch Magazine (1841,) established by Henry Mayhew and Ebenezer Landells in London, pursued a similar format in delivering a daily-illustrated journal. Over the century, cartoons in their lithographic illustration form became an important, perhaps indispensable, component of the daily commentaries. As Grove puts it, "their capacity to grab attention immediately meant that the journals could not have survived on text alone."[122]

Ottoman publishers were quick to identify the strong effects of illustrated political cartoons, not only as a form of political protest but also as a social-engineering tool for modernization and Westernization. The influence of the non-

[121] Laurence Grove, *Comics in French: The Bande Dessinée in Context* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 97.
[122] ibid. 104.

Muslim minorities who had a wider access to European publications thus far was of course undeniable in transmitting this new medium to the Ottoman public. These combined influences led to the early formation of printed Ottoman popular culture.[123] Non-Muslim intellectuals such as Teodor Kasap, Agop Baronyan, and Zakariya Beykozluyan can be counted among the important publishers of early Ottoman satirical publications.[124] The changing social life of the public throughout the Tanzimat period was the major theme of these gazettes and their cartoons. Very similar to how the *Karagöz* plays poignantly satirized the social and political commentaries of their time, illustrated satire also created a platform for daily critiques on diverse subjects, from gender relations to the economy, and, to a certain extent, to the politics of the Sultanate.

The Audience: A New Generation of Readers

The structural reforms that were undertaken throughout the "long nineteenth century" contributed to state centralization, exhibiting a radical deviation from the earlier Ottoman instinct of reinforcing traditional institutions (as was the practice in earlier reform efforts).[125] The reformers intended to extend the scope of reforms beyond the traditional boundaries attempted so far in the empire, and carry them to all aspects of life, including education, the economy, and citizenship. There was no "public education" before the nineteenth century (also not in Europe). The concept of mass education being a responsibility of the state was a revolution. The effects of educational reform had an impact on

[123] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü I: Tanzimat ve İstibdat Dönemi,* 21-31. The non-Muslim minorities' long domination of the printing industry due to their special status within the empire gave them easier access to closely follow developments in Europe. Besides having their own print shops, non-Muslim communities of the empire were supplied by foreign publications. For example, most of the religious books for Armenians, Greeks, Jewish or Arab Christians were printed in Europe. Rome and Paris especially played a significant role in this respect in sustaining a literary non-Muslim public in the Ottoman capital.

[124] ibid., 24.

[125] Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial classroom: Islam, the state, and education in the late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Selcuk Akşin Somel, *The modernization of public education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, autocracy, and discipline.* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2001).
Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw. *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, Volume II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 55.

printing and publishing as well, since they fed into each other. They provided the necessary audience for an expanded press and contributed to the growth of the reading public. These transformations paved the way for the emergence of a new middle class that gained access to Western ideologies and literature as a substitute for traditional Ottoman teachings.[126]

One of the means that facilitated this process was the introduction of European languages to the education system. French in particular attained a privileged status in the Ottoman education system. As Johann Strauss claims in "Who was reading what in the Ottoman Empire," French was considered a semi-official language and "one of communication between the educated speakers of different linguistic communities."[127] According to Deringil, the Sultanate's emphasis on teaching French in the newly introduced educational system was an important means for attaining a "civilized" Empire:[128]

> In the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire came into its own as an 'educator state' with a systematic program of education/indoctrination for subjects it intended to mold into citizens. Together with the Russian, Austrian, French, British, German and Japanese empires, the Ottoman Empire set about creating what Hobsbawm has called 'a captive audience available for indoctrination in the education system', in a 'citizen mobilizing and citizen influencing state'. Education had always been an integral part of the Ottoman statesman's 'mission civilisatrice' since the Tanzimat reforms early in the century; but in the Hamidian era mass education was extended to the primary school level. As in other imperial states, the main aim was to produce a population, which was obedient, but also trained into espousing the values of the center as its own. In this sense legitimist monarchies were definitely adopting the road taken by their ideological enemy, the French Revolution. As Eugen Weber pointed out in his pathbreaking book 'teaching the people French was an important way of "civilizing" them'.[129]

In Shaw's terms, the new education system was designed to include the teaching of Western languages, especially French, humanities, and social sciences in the curriculum, to a certain extent, as a way of "liberation for the hearts and minds from the restrictions imposed by the old order."[130] During this intense educational reformation period, the state schooling system expanded rapidly while

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[126] French was usually the preferable second language taught in secular schools.
[127] Johann Strauss, "Who read what in the Ottoman Empire (19th-20th Centuries)?" *Arabic Middle Eastern Literatures* 6, no.1, (2003): 40-44.
[128] Eric J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk's Turkey* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 73-74.
[129] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains,* 93-94.
[130] Shaw & Shaw, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey*, 106.

keeping the traditional Muslim *Mekteps* as an alternative option to the reformed state education. The number of state schools more than doubled between 1867 and 1895. Primary schooling became mandatory, middle and high schools were improved, and schools for girls were founded.[131] As part of the new education system, the Ottoman-Turkish language was also clarified and simplified. Higher education institutions such as military engineering and medical schools were included and promoted through the establishment of universities. The formation of higher education facilitated the configuration of an audience profile that was eager to read in foreign languages, follow developments in Europe, and more importantly have access to foreign ideas.[132]

The output of this intellectual formation was a new intelligentsia ("the enlightened" or *münevver* in Turkish) who rejected indiscriminate borrowing of European institutions and ideas and instead advocated a profound change based on a true understanding of Western ideas.[133] Liberal concepts such as "freedom," "civilization," and "the rights of man" were new for the Ottomans. Illustrated satirical gazettes were a perfect medium for the young intellectuals who tried to introduce such concepts to wider circles through denigrating the "image" of the ruling autocratic bureaucrats. The print industry was essential in delivering these ideas to the intellectually flourishing group of readers and, to a certain extent, to the public in general.

Presenting "Cartoons" to Ottoman Popular Culture

Teodor Kasap's *Diyojen* (1870) is commonly known as the first satirical magazine in the Ottoman Empire.[134] The journal's logo was a lithographic illustration of the philosopher Diogenes speaking to Alexander the Great (Figure

[131] ibid., 112-113. During *Tanzimat*, the number of schools in secular education rose significantly, covering ninety percent of school-age boys, and over a third of school-age girls.
[132] Berkes. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 173-188. The opening of *Dar-ul-funûn* was agreed upon during the reign of Abdulaziz in 1845, and the first class was taught in 1863.
[133] Zürcher. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk's Turkey*, 68.
[134] Öngoren. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı ve Hicvi*, 73.
Hamdi Özdiş. *Osmanlı Basınında Batılaşma ve Siyaset (1870-1877)* (Istanbul: Libra Yayınları, 2012), 81.

2.1). The young king, thrilled to meet the famous philosopher who lived in a barrel, asked if there was anything he could do for him, and the old man replied that the only thing he wanted was for Alexander to stop blocking his light. This illustration makes clear Teodor Kasap's intention: to let the public bask in the light of knowledge while criticizing the governing elite. However, the logo was removed from the cover after the sixty-first issue, most probably due to government restrictions.

From the vantage point of style and humour, *Diyojen* could be considered a harbinger of the Republican period's satire press, yet such an assumption would be baseless as far as the illustrations are concerned. Historians have largely ignored the fact that out of 183 issues published by Teodor Kasap over two years, only three included cartoons. The rest of the published issues contained only written satire and no additional illustrative commentaries. Hence, despite its rich cast of writers and its place as the leading satire magazine in nineteenth century Ottoman popular culture, *Diyojen* was not very influential in terms of cartoons and cartoonists.[135]

Even before the publication of *Diyojen*'s first issue, cartoons had already made their debut in several gazettes as a complement to the printed news. The first examples of picture illustrations as an integral part of the bulletin were seen in *Ayine-i Vatan*, which was printed by Mehmet Arif at *Matbaa-yı Amire* in 1867.[136] The newspaper was closed down the same year, after its tenth issue, due to financial problems. However, following his short-lived *Ayine-i Vatan,* the same year Mehmet Arif published another newspaper called *Istanbul*.[137] He must have been aware of the impact of the illustration on the audience, since this time he devoted almost half of the gazette space to lithographs stylistically similar to

[135] *Diyojen.* 1870-1873 (183 issues). National Library, Catalogue for periodicals in Ottoman Turkish. Turgut Çeviker. *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü I: Tanzimat ve İstibdat Dönemi, 1876-1908*, 119-120. Diyojen was published not only in Turkish but also in French, Greek, and Armenian. Among its writers were prominent intelectuals of the period such as Namık Kemal and Ebuzziya Tevfik.
[136] *Ayin-i Vatan,* 1867 (10 issues). National Library, Catalogue for periodicals in Ottoman Turkish.
[137] Turgut Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü I: Tanzimat ve İstibdat Dönemi, 1876-1908*, 20.

cartoons.[138] That was the first time the cartoon, along with other visual illustrations in their broader sense, appeared in newspapers in the Ottoman press as part of delivering journalistic commentary (Figure 2.2). Highlighting the imperial capital for being the center of all political and social dynamics, *Istanbul* became very inspirational for satirists and publishers alike. They all realized the benefit of delivering commentary in a humorous fashion. *Istanbul* was printed for two years, first weekly, and later biweekly, in twenty-three issues. It was printed over four pages, with the first and last devoted to illustrations.[139]

In October 1870 Ali Raşid and Filip Efendiler published the first known satirical magazine, *Terakki* (Progress), which was entirely dedicated to the illustrated and written ridicule of the Ottoman press commentaries published in the daily newspapers.[140] This was how the cartoons came to be purely part of a journal. *Terakki* was actually delivered as a supplement to a newspaper of the same name published since 1868.[141] At the beginning of its weekly publication, *Terraki* was a four-page publication just like its predecessor *Istanbul,* and included printed satire only (Figure 2.3). However, a few months after its appearance its name was changed to *Terakki Eğlencesi* (Progress Entertainment), and two more pages were added, expanding the magazine to six pages, one of which was reserved for cartoons (Figure 2.4). [142]

By looking closely at the newspaper's logo, one can get a general perception of the journal's target audience. *Terakki* was published for the wider public, both middle and upper-middle class, consisting of various social and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, it reflected the viewpoints of the new intelligentsia. These various groups can be differentiated based on their headwear (fezes, turbans, and European-style hats), outfits (tailcoats, hooded cloaks, and entari), facial features (the nose and the beard), their position in the logo (the modern-

[138] This is an assumption I made following an analysis of all the available issues exhibited in the National Library.
[139] *Istanbul,* 1867-1869 (23 issues). National Library, Catalogue for periodicals in Ottoman Turkish.
[140] Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 2003), 30. Turgut Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü I: Tanzimat ve İstibdad Dönemi*, 21.
[141] ibid.
[142] *Terakki* and *Terakki Eğlencesi,* National Library, Catalogue for periodicals in Ottoman Turkish.

looking Ottoman intellectual in front, the turbaned religious-looking man in the back), and the way they hold the gazette, all symbolizing variety within a homogenous modernity, yet all reading the same journal (Figure 2.5).

Visual representations of satirical commentaries became more noticeable in subsequent publications of satirical gazettes in the capital, but their bite was soon tempered. Indeed, during the reign of Abdülhamid II, newspapers were little more than official organs of the state, acting as the sultan's image-builder. In this regard, the illustrated satirical gazettes had to find their way around state censorship to convey their anti-government critiques or views. The trio of gazettes mentioned above – *Istanbul* (1867), *Terakki* (1871), and *Diyojen* (1872) – were all forced to close down when new regulations governing the newspaper press were enacted in 1864. The new law introduced strict regulations and censorship of the newspapers, including the satirical gazettes, now perceived as damaging to the sultan's "image."

In 1877, the law was amended to enable the state to completely shut down newspapers that engaged in satire. In debate over this law, lawyers representing Halep, Manok, and Sebuh Efendiler criticized the officials who had described satire as buffoonery and approved its prohibition. In his defense of the satirical journals, Manok Efendi characterized both visual and narrative satire as art forms, claiming that if buffoonery was sufficient reason for banning an art form, the *Karagöz* plays should be outlawed as well, since they indulge in a similar form of visual satire.[143]

All these initiatives paved the way for the cartoons and cartoonists who became forerunners of the Republican period's visual satire. Yet the publishing history of the cartoon and the satirical gazettes at the end of the nineteenth century was not a simple linear projection and did not show sustainable persistence due to the challenges imposed by the state's censorship policies until the beginning of the twentieth century.

[143] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü I: Tanzimat ve İstibdad Dönemi,* 79-86. The full text for the Parliament meeting, session twenty-five, May 8, 1877.

Thirty Years of Despotism and its Influence on the Ottoman Intelligentsia

Only towards the end of the nineteenth century, both as an outcome of the modernization reforms and also as an expression of changing intellectual and cultural trends, did the print industry succeed in gathering pace and autonomy. However, with the enactment of the *Kararnâme-i Âlî*, the imperial rescript, which authorized state officials to close down newspapers perceived as a danger to the regime, the short-lived adventure of gazettes and magazines, especially the publication of the satirical magazines, came to a temporary halt. Despite the fact that the literacy rate rose during Abdülhamid's reign, and that Ottoman presses published thousands of books, newspapers, and journals, severe censorship policies locked the flourishing satire publishing culture behind dark walls.[144]

The period of *İstibdat* (despotism) lasted 30 years, until the declaration of *ikinci Meşrutiyet* (the second constitutional era) in 1908 by the Committee of Union and Progress, following the Young Turk revolution. The outburst in printed political satire that erupted at the beginning of the twentieth century should be understood against the "incubation" stage during the Hamidian era.

The hub of this spike in satire was the city of Istanbul. According to Duben and Behar, "Istanbul was the major political, administrative, economic and cultural center of the Empire."[145] It was also the primary focal point for the processes of development. So it was very natural for political satire to be nourished around Istanbul, at the heart of the empire, which also represented a microcosm of the empire in general. It is also important to remember that the imperial capital boasted state-of-the-art printing presses and techniques capable of producing visual satire on paper, thereby conveying the political, social, and cultural critique of the emerging intelligentsia.

The abolition of the Parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) in 1877 was the opening shot in Abdülhamid's increasingly autocratic rule. Historical studies

[144] Shaw and Shaw, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey*, 251. Fatmagül Demirel, *II: Abdülhamid Döneminde Sansür* (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007).
[145] Alan Duben & Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households* (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991), 25-26.

suggest that the new sultan perceived the parliamentary system (and the representative system in general) as a main cause of the fundamental failures of the Ottoman-Russian War. Yet the aftershocks of Parliament's closure only started to be felt in the 1880s, when the political atmosphere went into great turmoil, largely affected by significant territorial losses. In North Africa, the French occupied Tunisia in 1881, and the British seized Egypt in 1882. The Balkans' Eastern Rumelia was annexed to Bulgaria in 1885. All these military and political failures served to legitimize Abdülhamid's intense censorship, which led to heavy interrogations, arrests, convictions, and exile orders. Most of the intellectuals who advocated readopting the constitution and reopening Parliament were either banished or fled from the empire, mainly to Paris, London, and Geneva and, after the British occupation, to Egypt. These liberal intellectuals gradually came together in a loosely formed coalition called "Young Turks" throughout Europe. The members of the movement had different backgrounds and expressed their opposition in different ways. Most were educated in the Imperial Lycée of Galata Saray, the Imperial War Academy, and the Civil Service Academy, and the Army Medical School, all with excellent command of French as their primary foreign language.[146] Carrying their activities outside the empire, these liberal intellectuals were strongly opinionated and influenced by a mixture of secularist, Westernized, and anti-imperialistic ideas. Another thing they had in common was a disdain for Abdülhamid's pan-Islamic approach.

Abdülhamid, as the recognized caliph of all Muslims both inside and outside the empire, utilized his position of influence over the Muslim world to the maximum in terms of his centralizing policies.[147]

> Sultan Abdulhamid continued the extension of Ottoman authority into Arabia and surpassed his predecessors in expanding communications. The Arab provinces were now designated as first rank and listed ahead of European or Anatolian provinces in official registers, and their governors were granted higher salaries. The sultan built the Hijaz Railway, which connected the holy city of Medina with Damascus, and extended telegraphic communication parallel to the railway, ensuring the organization of the pilgrimage under his close supervision and thus adding to his prestige as leader of Islam.

[146] Shaw and Shaw, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey*, 255-256.
[147] The extent of his actual influence over Muslim populations worldwide is questionable. To be sure, Hamidian pan-Islamism turned out a failure, yielding no significant political actions.

> The flourishing diplomatic connection with Germany, to which the sultan had turned to provide a counterweight to the neo-imperialist aggressiveness of Britain and France, induced further attention to the East. The Istanbul-Baghdad railway scheme, prompted by Germany's economic and strategic interests, fit in with Abdulhamid's policy of leading a more active policy near the Persian Gulf, especially now that Britain was acquiring footholds in the area.[148]

Appeals were made in Indonesia, China, Africa, and central Asia in the name of the "Caliph and Commander of the Believers," Abdülhamid.[149] His pan-Islamic approach was meant to obstruct British influence in the Muslim world. The British Empire perceived this activity as a threat to its interests in the region, especially in India, which was its main source of raw materials.[150] In addition, there was considerable discontent in British public opinion following the Batak massacre in Bulgaria. Britain, therefore, started a propaganda campaign throughout Europe against Abdülhamid, which harshly criticized his policies and tarnished his public image through published documents and illustrated gazettes.[151] *Punch,* the British weekly magazine of humour and satire, also known as *London Charivari*, published a poignant cartoon of Abdülhamid II by famed *Alice in Wonderland* illustrator Sir John Tenniel in 1877. The cartoon depicted him sitting cross-legged on a carpeted floor wearing a fez and Ottoman slippers (Figure 2.6).[152] His big belly is hidden underneath his *kaftan*. His eyes are focused on the water pipe (*nargile*), showing how strongly he is trying to exhale to make smoke bubbles. They read from foreground to background, "Constitution, 1877" (referring to the 1876 Constitution formally promulgated by the sultan a year later); "*Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu,* 1856" (the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856, which reinforced the *Tanzimat* reforms that promised equality in education, government appointments, and administration of justice to all); "*Hatt-ı Sheriff*, 1839" (The Imperial edict for the restructuring of the empire, also known as *Tanzimat Fermanı*); and "*Iradé,*" "*iradé,*" "*iradé*" ("imperial rescript" referring to previous

[148] Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 32-33.
[149] Karpat, *The Politisization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, 83-88.
[150] ibid.
[151] British formal hostility towards Abdülhamid was not only a matter of realpolitik, but also an outcome of a widespread discontent in British public opinion following the Battak massacre in Bulgaria.
[152] *Punch* online catalogue. Cartoon under the name: Victorian-Cartoons-Punch-1877.01.06.301.

reform acts). The framework (indicated by the sign behind Abdülhamid saying "CONFERENCE") refers to the international Constantinople Conference where all the great powers (Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) met in the wake of the 1876 Balkan crisis. What the cartoon indicated to its (in this case) British reader was that the sultan's recent attempt to enact a constitution would abort like the previous reformist attempts, as ephemeral as bubbles. This idea is made explicit by the position of the sultan: sitting on the floor, dressed in an early traditional Ottoman outfit, thus resisting the modern and unable to be part of the civilized great powers.

In the following years, especially after Abdülhamid's repeal of the *Kanun-i Esasi* and dissolution of the Parliament, anti-Ottoman propaganda in Europe, Britain especially, grew correspondingly. In European lithographic illustrations Abdülhamid was described as an oppressor, tyrant, and dictator, whereas his subjects were depicted as downtrodden, backward, and primitive.

The image of government and empire projected abroad was central to the sultan's policies. As Deringil put it, one of the main reasons that the Hamidian regime intensified pressure over its "enlightened" intellectuals, the *münevvers,* who had strong intellectual interaction with Europe, was to secure this image.[153] It was essential as a tool for the legitimization of his power not only within the borders of the empire but most importantly in the West.

> For most, the position of the Ottomans was characterized around the unclear phenomenon of the 'exotic.' In the Western imagination the margins for where 'Turks' dwell was in between a 'bastion of bloodthirsty tyrants, at worst, or, a decadent fleshpot of Oriental vice, at best'. The presentation of the Ottoman Empire as a savage place was a theme frequently echoed in the foreign press. Especially the illustrated drawings in the press generated an unwanted condition for the Empire that desired to reconstruct and project a civilized image. Thus, Ottoman statesmen pressured by the Sultan, tried desperately to make the case that they were a Great Power recognized by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 by containing the damage done by incessant pejorative publications in the international print media, while suppressing what was printed inside the Empire.[154]

Cartoon and satirical journals were of course at the forefront of such suppression and they were the most affected by the censorship policies of the

[153] Deringil*, The Well-Protected Domains*, 139-140.
[154] ibid. 140.

Sultanate. A prominent cartoonist of the second constitutional era, Sedat Nuri Ileri, remarked cynically, "drawing a cartoon during Abdülhamid's reign? Oh my God! What a way to commit suicide."[155]

Many of the Ottoman satirists and caricaturists of the period were exiled, or fled, sharing the same fate as their colleagues who had already found room to cultivate their activities against the Sultanate outside the empire. These subversive authors continued publishing and distributing their works in cities like Paris, London, and Cairo, meeting a demand from members and supporters of the Young Turk movement both in Europe and in the empire. Honoré Daumier's 1859 cartoon in *Le Charivari* stands as a good demonstration of how the new generation of Ottoman intelligentsia had been perceived as the struggling representatives of Western ideas against the old, traditional Sultanate (Figure 2.7). Despite the fact that this was an earlier depiction of the perceived image of the Ottoman Empire, the cartoon stressed the assumed oppositions of East ("the sultan") and West ("man in tuxedo").

As a form of representation, political cartoons during a time of social and political discontent tend to question the accepted institutional norms. As Streicher puts it, political cartoons are "understood to deal with the ridicule, debunking or exposure of persons, groups or organizations engaged in power struggle in society."[156] They unmask and ridicule the powerful. Thus, for the cartoonists working in the Hamidian period, distorting the image of the Sultan and representing his ministers and officers as incompetent was a frequent practice. Although one should not underestimate the historical reality of Abdülhamid's being a despotic leader, he was a competent and intelligent one as well, as were many of his officials. Some of the reforms that started in the Tanzimat came to fruition during his reign.[157] The predominance in satirical content of grotesque illustrations of the sultan would only change after the end of Abdülhamid's reign

[155] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü*, 271
[156] Streicher, "On a Theory of Political Caricature," 431.
[157] Karpat, *The Politisization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State.*

and the beginning of the second constitutional era in 1908, when other social and political issues started to lead the new Parliament's and the public's agenda.

The satirical journals in the Hamidian period were very limited in number and the cartoons mostly unsigned. Unfortunately little is known about the cartoonists of the period. Most kept their identities secret, anxious about personal persecution. Their relocation to outside the empire did not provide protection from the sultan's revenge, or at least that was their subjective impression. Indeed, agents of the sultan could still exert a certain level of pressure on these *münevvers* through the official bureaus of the related governments.[158]

The most popular gazettes published by the exiled satirists were *Bébérouhi* (1898), *Tokmak* (1901), and *Davoul* (1900). *Bébérouhi* and *Tokmak* were published in Geneva, but *Davoul*'s home base remains uncertain. Some sources believe that it was printed in Brussels, while others argue for Paris.[159]

The Amalgamation of Karagöz and Cartoons

The exiled Ottoman caricaturists were part of the Young Turk movement in Europe. With their access to foreign cultures and stimulation by ideas of freedom, civil rights, and "civilization," they perceived themselves as advocates of the oppressed Ottoman public, aspiring to "enlighten" it without giving up on traditional notions as they perceived them. Thus, some exceptions notwithstanding, they adhered to traditional public images and symbols of Ottoman popular culture in transmitting their illustrative or written satire.[160] It was only natural that *Karagöz* Shadow Theatre, the foremost instrument of Ottoman visual satire, would become one of the major sources for cartoonists. It was mined both for the rich depository of symbols embedded in society's mind

[158] According to Çeviker, Abdülhamid was extremely irritated when he saw the first issue of *Davoul* that was smuggled into Istanbul. He forced the ambassador to contact the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a demand to find the authors of the journal and stop its publication. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*.
[159] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü*, 272.
[160] Some journals of the *Istibdat* period and later during the second constitutional era were published under names similar or directly translated to their European equivalents, e.g. *Le Rire* (Kahkaha) and *Charivari* (Şarivari).

over the centuries, and for the richness of its visual representations, which was stylistically close to cartoons. The deeds and misdeeds of the traditional past were engaged in the present through political cartoons to gather the needed support and secure solidarity with the Ottoman public. The characters of the traditional shadow theatre had been widely perceived as "the voice of the people." As was made clear in the previous chapter, this voice was sometimes restricted to a critique of the neighbourhood, the "*mahalle*" with its social elements; at other times it would extend to the level of government. During the *Istibdat* period, it was directly directed at the sultan himself.

The symbolic titles of these journals were borrowed from traditional Karagöz plays, which for many centuries, had been considered untouchable commentators and critics of the Sultanate. *Bébérouhi* (Beberuhi in modern Turkish) was named after one of the main characters on the set – the older but unwise and fussy dwarf of the "*mahalle.*" This character became a symbol of the public's voice, noisy and disorganized but also penetrating. *Davoul,* (davul) a loud drum, was the traditional instrument used during the fasting holy month of *Ramazan* as a kind of an alarm clock used to wake up the residents of the "*mahalle"* for their pre-dawn meal. The *davoul* was also one of the main musical instruments used in Karagöz plays. Finally, *Tokmak* was the wooden drumstick used to beat the *davoul,* and also a common name for a door knocker. In both cases tokmaks were used to make a loud sound. All these titles formulated by the Young Turk satirists and caricaturists were metaphors alluding to the same idea: an instrument for awakening society and its ruling elite, including the sultan himself. *Beberuhi*, *davoul*, and *tokmak* were all traditional symbols used to emphasize a sound that was strong enough to make a difference in an ongoing state. Even though they saw themselves as part of an emerging European culture and as the vanguard of a new technology and era, it made sense for the Young Turk caricaturists abroad to regenerate these local symbols and stereotypes to maintain the organic connection between them and the Ottoman public. Although their importance gradually declined, these elements of the traditional shadow theatre maintained their significance in late Ottoman and early Republican cartoons for decades.

In the empire itself, the age of *Istibdat* was a barren period for the Ottoman cartoon. Visual and graphic satire took a pause and went to regenerate in Europe, uniting Western aesthetics and technologies with Ottoman traditions, both artistically and intellectually. These cartoonists in exile successfully embraced illustrated satire as an effective tool for political commentary hidden behind humor, and their efforts to preserve Ottoman satire paved the way for coming generations to carry the Ottoman cartoon further as the main tool for political criticism.

With the declaration of the second constitutional era after the Young Turk revolution in August 1908, and the reimplementation of the *Kanun-i Esasi* (the Constitution, "fundamental law"), the exiled Ottoman satirists came back to Istanbul. Satire was greeted with great excitement. A couple of days after the declaration, hundreds of newspapers and satirical journals were re-registered for publishing. In his book *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı ve Hicvi,* Ferit Öngeren compared these gazettes and journals to the hundreds of Ottoman *feze*s tossed into the air with joy to celebrate the restoration of the Constitution and revival of Parliament.[161]

European Influence in Ottoman Cartoons

Many historians consider 1908 the turning point for Ottoman satire publishing. Starting in this period, the number of registered satirical magazines rose significantly. According to Turgut Ceviker, there are 92 known satirical publications belonging to that period. Some of these journals managed to survive longer, and others were short-lived, but there was a great of circulation for the illustrated satirical gazettes in the capital, to the extent that they became the main commentaries on major social and political events.

With its long-established roots in Ottoman culture, *Karagöz* shadow theatre provided Ottoman cartoonists with a great resource of indigenous symbols. Being the most abstract form of a sign, symbols depend on their almost automatic

[161] Öngoren, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı ve Hicvi,* 75

interpretive setting, "the mental representation in the mind's eye." Symbolic image, similar to a metaphor, holds a conventional relationship to its object that is not contingent on resemblance.[162] After the 1908 revolution, besides holding onto traditional symbols, Ottoman cartoonists also tried to implant concepts such as freedom, civilization, and civil rights in the minds of readers through using symbols associated with liberal concepts of the day. As Ceviker demonstrated in his book *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü* (The Evolution Process of Turkish Cartoons), following the 1908 Revolution the exploding arena of graphic satire developed a second cluster of satirical journals in addition to the traditional one. This new cluster relied mainly on Western-style artistic and literary aspects in caricaturing political and social daily commentaries, yet it too based itself on the connotations formed in the minds of readers by older artistic forms such as Karagöz.[163]

For Brummett, though "the Ottoman Empire, unlike India, has never been subjected to colonial rule, it had been colonized, nonetheless, by European, especially, French culture."[164] Childs' description of the cultural movements as "colonization" may be problematic since selective adaptation of styles from various Eurasian cultures had been part of the Ottoman elite culture long before the nineteenth century. However, in the case of the Ottoman cartoons and cartoonists, they were not successful in going further than being representatives of the French art of satire. The illustration techniques they used in late nineteenth and early twentieth century cartoons were simple imitations of the techniques used in contemporary Europe. The Ottoman cartoonists were not innovators; they

[162] Hill and Helmers, *Defining Visual Rhetorics*, 16.
[163] Çeviker grouped the satirical journals that were published between 1908-1918 in two main clusters: Traditional satirical journals that were the continuation of the Tanzimat period journals – *Karagöz* (1908), *Nekregu* (1908), *Zuhuri* (1908), *Tasvir-i Hayal* (1908), *Hacıvat* (1908), *İbiş* (1909), *Geveze* (1908), *Eşref* (1909), *Hayal-i Cedid* (1910), *Cadaloz* (1911), *Köylü* (1913*), Feylesof* 1914), and *Nasreddin Hoca* (unknown) – and Western (Modern)-style satire journals that were influenced by European cartoon culture. The latter were considered the outcome of the revolutionary satire: *Kalem* (1908), *Cem* (1912), *Boşboğaz ile Güllabi* (1908), *Davul* (1908), *Laklak* (1909) *Kartal* (1909) *Kara Sinan* (1911), *Karikatür* (1914), *Hande* (1916), *Diken* (1918). Among these gazettes and journals, *Karagöz*, *Kalem*, *Cem*, *Karikatür*, and *Diken* were the most impressive.
[164] Palmira Brummett, "Dogs, Women, Cholera, and Other Menaces in the Streets: Cartoon Satire in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no 4 (Nov. 1995): 434.

modeled themselves on the works of their counterparts in Europe, especially French cartoons and cartoonists. The interaction of Ottoman cartoonists with their European contemporaries did not cease after the 1908 revolution. Most of the prominent cartoonists continued their education in Europe or at least traveled often. France, especially Paris, was an intellectual Mecca for Ottoman caricaturists.[165] The French press in the Ottoman Empire also had its share in the transmission of Western literature and in influencing the literary taste of the Ottoman reading public.[166] A good example of such an exchange in terms of illustrative influence, to the degree of replication, can be found in A. Rigopulos' cartoon portrait of Interior Minister Halil Menteşe published in *Kalem* in 1911 (Figure 2.9).[167] The idea of comparing the face of a government official to a pear was imitated from the famous French caricaturist Honoré Daumier's depiction of Louis Philippe's portrait published in *Le Charivari*, 1835 (Figure 2.8). Both cartoons were titled "Poires" (pears).[168] Although the latter example was an extraordinary application, it is important in demonstrating how French cartoons heavily influenced Ottoman satire both literally and figuratively.

The key objectives of the Ottoman political elite following the revolution may be summarized as follows: recovering from Abdülhamid's despotism, liberating itself from European political domination while adhering to liberal ideals, and transforming the state into a socially and politically "civilized" Empire. Modernization was at the center of the social agenda, while a critique of Western colonialism dominated the political one. European-style symbolic representations became instrumental in conveying the contradictory contexts of these Western ideologies for many Ottoman cartoonists. Once the association

[165] According to Ceviker's comprehensive work on Ottoman and Turkish cartoon history, prominent cartoonists of the second constitutional era such as Cemil Cem, Sedat Simavi, Halit Naci, Damat Fahir, Sedat Nuri, Ali Dino, and Ali Sami Boyar were trained and published in major European cultural centers, particlularly Paris and Brussels.
[166] Strauss, "Who read what in the Ottoman Empire," 42.
[167] There is little information available on A. Rigopulos. It is known that he was a foreigner leaving in Istanbul who worked with Cemil Cem, and his cartoons appear mainly in *Cem* and *Latife*.
[168] Halil Menteşe was one of the leading members of Committee of Union and Progress. He filled the interior and justice minister posts during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. After the signing of the Armistice of Monduros in 1918, and with the occupation of Istanbul, he was captured and exiled to Malta by the British.

between a particular image and a value was created and internalized, the image became a symbol for the abstract value and could be used to trigger its associated emotions.[169] The new school of Ottoman cartoonists observed the emotional reaction that could be arose by these abstract symbols.

Especially with the beginning of the twentieth century, Ottoman cartoons engaged in this type of political and social symbolism, which would become very common later in Republican cartoons, serving as an alternative to the earlier generation. Symbols deeply associated with liberalism were frequently used. A common example was a young girl or woman conveying the idea of liberty, based on the depiction of *Libertas*, the Roman goddess of freedom who would sometimes carry a torch or have angel wings. Broken chains were another symbol of freedom. Snakes, lizards, and dragons would represent backwardness, or a common enemy.[170] A good example of these symbolic features can be seen by looking at two cartoons published within two years of each other, depicting the 1908 Revolution with similar symbols. The first is a cartoon by L. Andres, published in the famous Ottoman satirical journal *Kalem,* which depicts a Young Turk officer holding a young girl in Western-style clothes, looking terrified at the lizard-shaped monster standing in front of her. The sleeve of her dress is labeled "*Hürriyet*" (freedom). The lizard carries two heads, one on each side of its snake-like body. One is big like a dragon's, and the other is small like a snake's. The bigger head is labeled "*irtica*" (backwardness). The sword of the officer threatening the lizard is labeled "*ordu*" (army). In the background we see the Bosphorus, with the silhouette of the Ottoman Navy. The legend says: "Army: (to Freedom) Don't be afraid, my child. I'm here. My sword is sharp" (Figure 2.10). A second cartoon was published in *Hayal-i Cedid* in 1910 by an unknown artist. The drawing is centered on *Libertas* with her angel wings entering Istanbul riding a horse, wearing a light Romanesque dress, with a crescent and wheat crown on her head in markedly European style. She wears a warm smile on her face and is followed by proudly walking Ottoman soldiers. The obelisk in the back of the

[169] Hill and Helmers, *Defining Visual Rhetorics,* 48.
[170] These specific symbols would be employed numerous times in cartoons of later periods. Therefore, I find it significant to highlight them here.

drawing indicates the site of the scene as Istanbul's *At Meydanı* (hippodrome), where the palace stands. On the left side of the cartoon, one sees the Young Turk officers guarding a dragon (probably symbolizing the reactionary nature of the Sultanate), which is chained to the walls of the palace (Figure 2.11).

Associating Western symbols repeatedly as in the above cartoons helped the Ottoman reader develop a common visual language enriched by European motives, in a way aligning the European and Ottoman readers around a new "imagined community."[171]

Where is the Orient: Illustrating the Ottoman Orient

The core of my dissertation revolves around the image of the Arab as the "other" in the early Republican period cartoons. The very symbols, however, that were used in constructing a common stereotype of "the Arab" should be sought within the depth of the late Ottoman satire production that experienced such a shift in relation to Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. As mentioned above, booming satire production was inspired by European visual satire's artistic and perceptional representations. Alba stated that "the use of signs and symbols in cartoons were particularly common in societies of lesser [literary] refinement because they were less prone to the danger of 'erroneous interpretations'."[172] Although it is difficult to clarify the distinction between the cultural levels, some kind of "construct of the 'language of the cartoon' that would point to the various types and particular kinds of items which are employed in graphic imagery and used for particular purposes of persuasion" would be required for the reader who is not too sophisticated to build up an attachment to visual satire.[173] Of course the people who read newspapers and cartoon magazines were already literate, but

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[171] Palmira Brummett's comprehensive *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press: 1908-1911* provides an insightful analysis of these social and political symbols adopted from European culture by Ottoman cartoonists.
[172] Victor Alba, "The Mexican Revolution and the Cartoon," *Comparitive Studies in Society and History* 9, no.2 (1967): 122.
[173] Streicher, "On a theory of political caricature," 428.

again the adoption of cartoons would facilitate the transfer of information to the audience, who would just skip from page to page.

In a relatively short time the Ottoman cartoonists managed to establish a common visual language that was transmitted across the field of cartoon production through combining their own stereotypes with similar European sets of symbols, thereby creating a syncretic mode of expression. Cartooning in the Ottoman Orient was not too different in this respect. Deringil observes, "[I]n a strange paradox, the Ottomans were viewing 'their Arab subjects through the very same prism through which the Europeans viewed them.' Inadvertently, the Ottoman self-image adopted much of the same value system as that of the West."[174] Satire was indeed part of that paradoxical view.

Historical circumstances laid the groundwork for European expansion and exploration around the Mediterranean during the nineteenth century. The geographical scope of the Orient included North Africa and the Middle East, and the European expansion edged ever closer to the heart of the Ottoman Empire. Military engagement became more violent on the one hand, while cultural interactions became ever more intense. The attraction of the Orient as an exotic alternative universe fired up the European imagination through paintings, pictures, and travel writing. French artists such as Eugène Delacroix, Jean-Léon Gérôme, and Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres painted many works depicting the Middle East and North Africa. Writers like Montesquieu, Gustave Flaubert, Victor Hugo, and Pierre Loti produced significant literary works with Oriental themes. As Europe slowly invaded larger parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the encounter between the familiar and the unfamiliar formulated the essence of Orientalism. In Edward Said's formulation, the Orient became the imagined Other.

> In the system of knowledge about the Orient, the Orient is less a place than a *topos*, a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone's work on the Orient, or some bit of previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these. Direct observation or circumstantial

[174] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 165.

> descriptions of the Orient are fictions presented by writing on the Orient, yet invariably these are totally secondary to systematic tasks of another sort.[175]

The Ottomans were not avid travellers, nor painters. In his essay on Ottoman travel in the late nineteenth century Ahmet Midhat Efendi, an Ottoman *münevver*, claimed there were no travelogues composed in the empire except for one or two containing diplomatic reports. Although the volume of travel literature grew over time in the empire with the blooming of press and publications, Ahmet Mithat Efendi's critical essay remained somewhat relevant for travel writing.[176] Similarly, painting as an artistic discipline was taught starting in 1883, a year after the opening of the Ottoman school of fine arts, *Mekteb-i Sanayi-i Nefise-i Şahane*. In the minds of Ottoman cartoonists, the Middle East and North Africa, which were in fact the Ottomans' Orient, were not fictionalized through Ottoman travellers' experiences, pictures, depictions, or travel writings. Instead, they were perceived through Europeans' published works on the Orient. In terms of experiencing the Orient second-hand, the Ottoman audience was no different from the readers of *Le Charivari* in Paris, or *Punch* in London. As Elizabeth Childs observes, these European readers were ordinary people, with no specific desire or financial capabilities for foreign traveling.[177] Even the satire producers themselves would seldom travel. In the world of satirical gazettes, the grotesque images of the Orient were mostly produced by non-traveling artists for a domestic audience who possessed limited second-hand knowledge of the world beyond their own.[178]

European engagement in political and economic expansion and the effects of colonialism on Western ways of representation brings to the forefront the question of Otherness within the context of the Orient. Oriental stereotypes, as abstract forms of the imagined unfamiliar, were illustrated based on their perceived cultural and physical attributes. In the context of visual satire, these attributes were the necessary ingredients of humour production.[179]

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[175] Said, *Orientalism*, 177.
[176] Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika. "Orientalism *Alla Turca*: Late 19th/Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages Into The Muslim 'Outback'" *Die Welt Islams* 40, no. 2 (2000): 139-195.
[177] Childs, *Daumier and Exoticism,* 61.
[178] ibid.
[179] ibid.

> The artists concentrate on those physical features which separate their foreign subjects from the European. Telling contrasts emerge in the study of cartoons of foreigners, such as the depiction of a Frenchman and a non-French European, or between a "civilized" European and a "barbaric" non-European – in general, the distinctions artists make between the familiar and the "other.[180]

The Orient, for both Europeans and Ottomans, was the same imagined – not to say "imaginary" – space. Yet, we can identify a certain tension between their definitions and portrayals of that unfamiliar Orientalized other. Using easily recognizable markers of exoticism, cartoons formed an effective medium in creating the "Oriental Other" in the minds of ordinary Europeans. The Orientalist imagination shaped mainly around the colonialist projects of France and Britain established the contours of political cartoons in Europe throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet French cartoons' dominance of European satire was undeniable. Top *Le Charivari* cartoonist Honoré Daumier created the most impressive examples of French satire. An early Daumier cartoon published in *Le Charivari* in 1853 effectively demonstrates how the French depicted the colonial world around them (Figure 2.12). The cartoon is titled "*La Fluidomanie*," and it reads, "*A quoi sont occupés présentement les différens peuples de la terre*." (This is what the different peoples of the earth are busy doing right now). "*Fluidomanie*" apparently refers to the spiritual séance-like table games that were popular in Europe at the time. The cartoon depicts, in hybrid form, the four continents placed on the globe. The way the continents are placed signifies the level of political importance of these continents from France's perspective –Europe, Africa, Asia, and America. Asia and America stand closer to Europe, located in front of the cartoon, while Africa holds a more central location in the middle. On each continent, Daumier portrays the ruler (on the right) and the ruled (on the left) sitting across a round table, obsessively playing a table game. From the physical aspects, stereotypical features, and details of their costumes, one can easily identify the ethnicity of the rulers and the ruled, along with their perceived level of civilization. At the forefront (bottom) is Britain vs. India in Europe; to their right, Russian Cossacks vs. the Chinese in Asia; to their left, America with Americans of European descent vs. Native Americans; and finally

[180] ibid. 59.

above Europe, in Africa, the Ottomans vs. the Arabs. The colonized nations in America and Asia wear a savage expression on their faces, while the Arabs of Africa and Indians of Europe seem to have more obedient expressions, as their colonial rulers seem ambitious and eager. Interestingly, in Daumier's view, the Ottomans are part of the colonizing world, just like the British or the French, and the Ottomans themselves also shared this same view at the time.

Notwithstanding Daumier's depiction of the Ottomans as the colonizer, the presentation of the Ottoman Empire as a savage place was an oft-used premise in the European press. The Ottoman-Russian challenge in the East was one of the themes in which the European press found an illustrative opportunity to "pontificate on the two 'barbaric' empires."[181] In Daumier's illustration of Turkish-Russian relations as a seesaw on top of the Paris stock exchange (*Bourse*), both personas appear similarly uncivilized and savage looking, compared to their slim-sharp European equivalents (Figure 2.13). A nineteenth century William Heath cartoon referring to Ottoman-Russian relations is another example, with the giant savage head of a Turk at left, biting off the coattails of a Russian officer trying to flee (Figure 2.14).[182]

What should draw our attention in these cartoons, more than the events depicted, is how the Ottoman, or Turk, was imagined, how this imagery found shape through simple contours, and finally how the mind's eyes read them, and how they were perceived. It should be kept in mind that for many Europeans, mainly North Africa represented "the Orient," and Orientals were imagined as the dark-skinned North African Arabs, with their *kefiye* (keffiyeh) and sometimes with their *turban*, similar to Daumier's imaginaries. On the other hand, the Arabs of the Middle East, excluding Egypt, were associated with the Ottoman Empire. The "white Arab" of Karagöz that came to the capital from Damascus and Beirut was just another figure in the empire. In Western cartoons, such nuance was

[181] Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains*, 144-146.
[182] William Heath (1794–1840) was a British cartoonist. He was best known for his published engravings, which included caricatures, political cartoons, and commentary on contemporary life. He published his work in *McLean's Monthly.* Thomas McLean was a print publisher of a wide range of genres in London. Prints published are signed as "Repository of Wit & Humour."

nonexistent. Similarly, the Ottoman cartoonists, finding themselves as both "Orientals" and "Orientalizers" of the Arabs, used the very same features and symbols to illustrate their imagined uncivilized neighbors to the east, or savage nomads. The outcome was nothing but Ottoman Orientalism, or in Makdisi's words,

> A complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be present theatre of backwardness. I am using the term Ottoman orientalism for two interrelated reasons. First, because from the outset of the nineteenth-century Ottoman reform, Ottomans recognized and responded to the power of Western Orientalism by embracing the latter's underlying logic of time and progress, while resisting its political and colonialist implications... Ottoman orientalism was not inadvertent but a pervasive and defining facet of Ottoman modernity. Just as Ottoman Orientalism was based on an opposition between the Christian West and the Islamic Orient, the Ottomans believed that there were some essential differences that distinguished them from the West – especially a notion of Islam... Second, through efforts to study, discipline, and improve imperial subjects, Ottoman reform created a notion of pre-modern within the empire in a manner akin to the way European colonial administrators represented their colonial subjects. This process culminated in the articulation of the Ottoman Turkish nation that had to lead the empire's other putatively stagnant ethnic and national groups into an Ottoman modernity.[183]

Conclusion

Ottoman lithographic cartoons of the late nineteenth century were instrumental in creating a sense of Ottoman modernity, and one of their main tools was the depiction of the backwardness within their Orient. The young, educated new intelligentsia of the empire found its way in Europe as result of Abdulhamid's despotism. Most of the cartoonists who used their pens to criticize the sultan's regime were among this group of intellectuals. They interacted with their European counterparts, and learned from them. They adopted the European vision of the Orient and applied it to their own. The notion of "pre-modern" or "backwards" was mostly shaped in relation to the Arab provinces of the empire during this time. The latter signified the ultimate backwardness. Yet, until the Italian-Turkish Tripolitanian war, representations of Arabs did not occupy a significant portion of the Ottoman cartoon sphere. Among the satirical journals I

[183] Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 769.

examined, only *Istanbul* published pictorial depictions referring to various locations and civilizations, stereotyping the prototypical Arab (Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16) by connecting him to the nomad traditions of the Arabian desert or to sub-Saharan Africa.[184]

As we shall see in the next chapter, it was only during and after the trauma of the Great War that a more complex and symbolically laden image of the Arabs emerged in Ottoman and early Republican cartoons.

[184] Figure 2.15 is an example from issue 21 of *Istanbul* (1870), where the illustrator pictured the Arab as a nomad, traveling on a camel in the deserts of Damascus and Tripoli in his traditional savage-looking outfit. In issue no. 4 (1868), the "king of Habesh" is depicted as a black-skinned savage surrounded by his women, food, and wild animals that were about to be colonized by the Europeans.



Figure 2.1

[At the bottom of the cartoon it reads] -*Only stand out of my light!*

First issue
Diyojen, 25 November 1870

Figure 2.2

Istanbul, first newspaper that used cartoons as complimentary. The paper would spear four of its eight pages for illustrations.

Istanbul, 21 October 1867

Figure 2.3

Terakki Eğlencesi started to be published in 1870 as the supplement of *Terakki* newspaper in four pages without cartoons.

Terakki Eğlencesi, first issue, 4 Aralık 1870

Figure 2.4

Terakki Eğlencesi's publishing was revised as 6 pages after a year, reserving one whole page for cartoons.

Terakki Eğlencesi, Şubat 1871

Figure 2.5

Terakki
Eğlence ve Uzhukeye dair gazete

Terakki
*G*azette for Amusement and Ridicule

Figure 2.6

Bubbles read (from left to the right):
Iradé…
Iradé…
Iradé…
Iradé…
Hatt-ı Sheriff 1839
Hatt-ı Humayoun 1856
Constitution 1877

Sir John Tenniel,
Punch, 1877

Figure 2.7

-A difficult position- Pulled between the civilization and retrograde party

B.B.
Le Charivari, 5 November 1859

Figure 2.8

"Pears"
Portrait of Lois Philip by the famous cartoonist of *Le Charivari*, Honoré Daumier

Honoré Daumier,
Le Charivari, 1835

Figure 2.9

A. Rigopulos' portrait cartoon of the internal affairs minister Halil Menteşe

A. Rigopulos,
Kalem, 1911

Figure 2.10

The writings in Ottoman on:
the girl reads *Freedom*,
the dragon reads *Backwardness,*
the sword reads *Ordu*

[French] *Army- Don't be afraid, I'm there!*

[Ottoman] *Army- (to Freedom), don't be afraid my child. I'm here. My sword is sharp!*

L. Andres,
Kalem, 1909

Figure 2.11

Cover page of *Hayal-i Cedid*

Hayal-i Cedid, 23 July 1910

Figure 2.12

"La Fludomanie"

[French] *This is what the different peoples of the earth are presently busy doing*

Honoré Daumier
Le Charivari, 1853



Figure 2.13

"*News*"
Turkish-Russian Balance - New game where Mr. Gogo pays all costs!

Honoré Daumier,
Le Charivari, 3 February 1854

Figure 2.14

"Russian"

William Heath,
McLean's Monthly, 1828



Figure 2.15

It is the picture of the Arab Haci that travels with his camel in the deserts of Damascus and Tripoliana.

Whitney Dol,
Istanbul, 22 May 1870



Figure 2.16

"It is the picture of the Ethiopian King"

Istanbul, 22 November 1868

Chapter Three

Friends or Foes: Arabs and *Arabistan* in Revolutionary Cartoons, from the Second Constitution to WWI

Introduction

The previous chapter defined the political cartoon as a chief source of critical spirit throughout Ottoman print history. It followed the effect that lithographic rhetoric had on the production of the political and cultural Other, during a period of European expansion to the Orient while the Ottoman state slowly disintegrated politically and geographically. The nature of the political cartoon and its strength as a medium for creating a broader social construction of reality enabled its readers to walk around in an imagined world where the unfamiliar became familiar. One of the chief mechanisms used was attributing specific and easily recognizable characteristics to various societies and races. The pattern of political and social behaviours through which these societies and races articulated their collective experiences created and defined their individual characteristics as groups. In other words, the "received knowledge" and common consensus on the attributes of each particular society or race formed a set of recognizable stereotypes and images, and hence made the international political arena intelligible to the Ottoman public.[185] The Ottoman Empire was not exempted from this kind of stereotyping. While an uncivilized, backwards image was attributed to the Ottoman Orient in the late nineteenth century; Europe was visualized and represented in a dual nature as being both a beacon of progress and a political and military rival threatening Ottoman sovereignty. Throughout these visualizations and definitions, the Orient was represented as the "red apple," the contested territories for all the parties' colonial efforts.

[185] Leerssen, "Imagology: History and Method," 17-32.

At the beginning of the century a new generation of Ottoman cartoonists steered the development of a repertoire, which transformed the stereotypes of the Karagöz shadow theatre. As in Karagöz, in the language of cartooning the crafting of comparisons with the "Other" depends on recognizable cultural types, or stereotypes.[186] Arabs were, naturally, high on the list of such political and social stereotypes. But throughout the dissolution of Ottoman rule over the Arab provinces, starting in the late nineteenth century, the political roles of the Arab Karagöz stereotypes became much more complex: they were despised internally, while at the same time they were appreciated as heroes in the battle against the infidel aggressors. They were pictured either as friend or as foe according to the surrounding political circumstances. This chapter attempts to trace and analyze how the Arab subjects of the empire in the contested territories of North Africa and the Middle East were depicted in political cartoons up until the end of the Great War. This new type of depiction later became instrumental in defining and conveying the Arab stereotypes that would contribute to carving out the Turkish national identity.

As emphasized by Childs, the study of any group of cartoons poses questions about the relationship between text and image, and that between artist and publisher. These "technical and historical relationships emerge not as determining factors in the creation of art, but rather as essential circumstances, which affected the process of artistic conception and execution of an image."[187] Therefore, this chapter begins by describing the cartoon sphere during the second constitutional period, and how the space for cartoonists, as the visionaries of the constructed image, was developed following thirty years of censorship. This will later be followed by an analysis of the historical context surrounding the satirical space. The final section will describe how cartoonists translated current events, with an emphasis on Arabs and *Arabistan*, into intelligible visual images.

[186] Childs, *Daumier and Exotism,* 59.
[187] ibid., 15.

Throughout this work, divisions of chapters follow major historical turning points, but in this particular case I chose 1918 as the closing of the chapter's timeframe. Inspired by Ceviker's categorization of Ottoman Turkish cartoons, I believe the cartoons and cartoonists of the last years of the empire, starting in 1918, should be looked at in connection with the Republican period. There is an uninterrrupted continuum between them, in terms of both format and context. Therefore, I intend to omit the War of Independence period of Ottoman cartooning from the scope of this chapter, instead leaving it to the next.

The Construction of Public Consciousness: Technical and Ideational Revolutions in the Cartoon Sphere

As noted in the previous chapter, the press emerged as a political force in the early 1870s in the empire to become "the medium for opinion making, political indoctrination, and (lastly) the dissemination of news," which was highly censored during the reign of Abdulhamid.[188] The revolution of 1908 temporarily put a stop to Abdulhamid's manipulation of the press, opening room for expansion in the print media. The publishers who were also the intelligentsia of the current regime embraced caricatures/cartoons as part of a system of communication that was already familiar to the public. They used it for pitching the components of constitutionalism and freedom against the old regime's tyranny, constantly comparing one with the other. In that sense, the 1908 Revolution should be seen as the turning point for Ottoman illustrated satire both artistically and contextually.[189]

Political cartoons tend to make things visible and to proclaim them publicly through the critique of authority. However, the revolutionary cartoon press evolved mainly around the general critique of the old regime, "the elite, the sultan, and the palace's power brokers, rather than the new government, political parties, the parliament, and the new Europeanized bourgeoisie."[190] Thus, in the

[188] Karpat, *The Politization of Islam,* 195-197.
[189] Öngoren, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı ve Hicvi*, 75-78.
[190] Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary,* 133.

empire's struggle for survival, satire shaped the field of political play through two means. First, by giving voice to the overwhelming majority of people disenfranchised by the old regime and claiming the right of the people to use ridicule to redefine themselves as active citizens; and secondly, and more importantly, by playing a vital role in spreading news of current political debates and educating the public on ideas about advancement, civilization, and liberty. Thus, Ottoman satire and cartoon production during the second constitutional era was shaped around these two main approaches while employing both modern and traditional formats in conveying messages to the readers. This outburst in freedom of cartoon production also resulted in producing the very first groups of republican cartoonists.[191]

As a form of visual representation, cartoons are not simply images of what is happening. They underline how things were made visible, how things were given to be seen, and how knowledge was constructed in the public's mind.[192] Thus the techniques utilized by cartoonists in making things visible are instrumental in creating the visual thinking of the given period. For the purposes of this research, emphasis should be put on technical currents employed by the revolutionary cartoonists. As argued in the previous chapter, the later Ottoman cartoons produced by the exiled Young Turk cartoonists were highly influenced through the use of European forms and symbols while synthesizing them with earlier concepts. These techniques of amalgamation of the European impact, later in the second constitutional era, created two main approaches in Ottoman cartooning, which Turgut Çeviker categorized as Westernized modernist caricature (*Batılı modern karikatür*) and traditional-descriptive caricature (*Geleneksel tasvirci karikatür*). [193] However, in order to avoid the old modernization narrative with its usual reifications, I rather call these categories "contemporary" versus "classical" caricature.

[191] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü II*, 20-40.
[192] Rajchman, "Foucault's Art of Seeing," 88-117.
[193] ibid., Çeviker, 17-40.

The contemporary satirical publications were presented to the Ottoman public by prominent cartoonists such as Cemil Cem, Sedat Nuri Ileri, and Damat Ferit Bey. They were published in Salah Cimcoz and Celal Esat (Arseven)'s *Kalem* (1908-1911), followed by Hasan Vasaf's *Davul* (1908-1909), and Cemil Cem's *Djem* (1910-1912), all published bilingually, (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2), in French and Ottoman Turkish.[194] Besides the Turkish artists, *Kalem* and *Djem* also employed cartoonists from Europe. Turgut Ceviker offers a detailed list of these European cartoonists in his study of Ottoman and Turkish caricature.[195] Ion, A. Scarcelli, A. Rigopulos, L. Andres, N. Fléchs, and Pahatrekas can be counted as the most significant ones. The modern European-style satirical gazettes tended to follow similar formats. *Kalem* was the most noteworthy, followed after its closure by *Djem*. Some idea of their impact can be gleaned from Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil's description of *Kalem* in a journal article.

> Here is the gift of Thursday mornings, and on these pages I caress only the deep and chosen art of humor. I caress it with pure, soft and gentle touches, without harming it, tearing it apart, or making it bleed. I do this while a shiver comes over me that is solely caused by a feeling of peace and comfort. The source of all this is my sudden awareness of the incipience of the idea behind the event. I come to this realization through a kind, good-humored, small, but criticizing pen, which first manifests an attractive, delightful and subtle smile and then unleashes its criticism. A criticism that does not irritate or get on one's nerves, but one that touches the gentle soul with lightness of a feather by appealing the junctures of ideas with an air of gentle nudge and carefreeness. I also found the two brothers of ideas and conscience [Salah Cimcoz and Celal Esat], who held the curtain of art open just enough for me to emerge onto the center stage. I also told them, with a subtle smile on my face, 'Oh, how wonderful, how wonderful! Congratulations. Thank you for these beauties, for these delightful things.'[196]

Kalem was 16 pages and was published weekly (Figure 3.1). The first page would appear in Ottoman and the last in French, both pages including the headline cartoons of the week. The following ten pages would contain political essays by one of the editors, reporting and commentaries on weekly events in Ottoman, and featured cartoons subtitled in both Ottoman and French. The French commentaries and essays would appear only in the last four pages of the journal. *Djem*, on the other hand, would come weekly in twenty-two pages divided evenly

[194] Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show both sides of the satire gazettes published bilingually.
[195] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü II*, 101-208.
[196] ibid. Halit Ziya was one of the prominent intellectuals of the time. His writings were published in various newspapers. This paragraph that I translated is from his column in *Sabah* newspaper, published on September 19, 1908 under the title *"Mizahta Hikmet"* (Philosophy in Satire).

into Ottoman and French (Figure 3.2). The journal would have two covers, on the front and back, one in Ottoman and the other in French. The second page for each side would contain cartoons. The interior pages would be evenly distributed between political essays, commentaries, and commercial advertisements in Ottoman and French.

Forerunners of the contemporary cartoon sphere showed significant artistic flair in using "modern" lines that were much less ornate compared to traditional nineteenth century cartoons, and more persuasive in conveying critiques of political and social issues in a refined format. For Ottoman cartonists, formation was shaped around their longtime exposure to Western art, strengthened by teaching painting and sculpture according to classical Western style at the *Sanayi-i Nefise* (fine arts) Academy.[197] Western artistic tradition positioned the subject in a perspectival tradition of viewing as if looking through the object towards something beyond.[198] This feeling of depth within simplicity could easily be distinguished in the drawings of the modernist cartoonists. Their cartoons tended to focus mostly on human figures whose total forms were distorted and obscured while including minimum details of their surroundings. Ahmet Haşim, an influential Ottoman poet and Arab-origin intellectual, described Cem's "artistic eye" in observing and transmitting his art. His description underlines the stress on human figures.[199]

> What Cem asserted is the pure self of reality. Our form as human is tricky and incorrect. A human, unlike fruit, is a constructed being. The sweetest flesh is outside, while the inner flesh is untouchable. A smile, a laugh, and a cry are the curtain that covers the ridiculous and disgusting soul, which sits crouched, and observes the distorted and timid

[197] The *Sanayi-i Nefise* (Imperial Academy of Fine Arts), Istanbul's first art school, was opened in 1883 by Abdulhamid. Osman Hamdi Bey was assigned president of the academy.
[198] Wendy Shaw, "Museums and narratives on Display From the Late Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic." *Muqarnas* 24, History and Ideology: Architectural Heritage of the "Lands of Rum," (2007): 253-279.
Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü II,* 32.
[199] The article was referred to in Münir Süleman Çapanoğlu, *Basın Tarihimizde Mizah*, (Istanbul: Garanti Matbaası, 1970), 31-33. This description that I translated from Haşim's article illustrates Cem's visioning and depicting the grotesque in political cartooning and helps to decipher the messages he delivered.

> life with anxious eyes behind that curtain. Cem's eye is the face that negates the tricks and cheats hidden behind the curtain with the sharpest observations.[200]

In the best cartoons, the meaning embedded in the images transcends the related circumstantial details and carries multiple levels of meaning. Both cartoons published in *Kalem* (published on May 18, 1911) and *Djem* (December 16, 1910) by A. Rigopulos and N. Fléchs are good examples of such techniques.[201] They dispense with long, detailed captions to convey the intended messages; instead, the targeted subject is referred to either within the lines of exchanged dialogue, or in a simple sentence, sometimes a single word. The effectiveness of the cartoon depends on the reader's ability and participation just as much as on artistic creativity and talent. The reader must decode the message, which requires knowledge of the political context that surrounds it. Their work, sophisticated in both style and context, however, limited their audience to the existing intelligentsia.

Followers of the classical line (*gelenekci-tasvirci*), on the other hand, were not so integrated into the new artistic currents, but they were just as effective in transmitting the revolution's spirit both for criticizing the old regime and honouring the new Parliament and the Committee of Union and Progress. They did it through the adaptation of an old-style descriptive technique with wide use of symbolism and legend. Artistically, they positioned themselves as the continuation of their earlier peers employed during the Tanzimat period by Theodor Kasap's *Diyojen* (1870) and *Hayal* (1873). The most prominent cartoonists of this line were probably Halit Naci, the main cartoonist of Sedat Simavi and Ali Fuat's *Karagöz* (1908-1950) and Mehmet Rauf's *Hayal-i Cedid* (1910), followed by Mehmet Baha and Münir Osman. According to Ceviker, classical cartoonists had limited knowledge of Western culture compared to their contemporary counterparts.[202] Their exposure was limited to local sources and

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[200] Ahmet Haşim, *Dergah Mecmuası*, no 11 (1921).

[201] In both cartoons, the cartoonists illustrated various critiques of *Ibrahim Hakkı Pasha,* who served as the empire's grand vizier from January 1910 to September 1911.

[202] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü II,* 101-131. As Çeviker mentioned, we have few resources on the lives of that period's cartoonists. One exception is Halit Naci. Various sources say that Halit Naci was a military officer and later, a student at the *Sanayi-i Nefise*. We do not

illegal publications. After the revolution, they aimed to produce cartoons not just for the intellectual elite, but also for the larger public in order to boost public awareness of current political and social events. In their graphic rhetoric, they also relied to a great degree on unspoken premises, which invited the reader to respond in accordance with their set of traditional values and beliefs.

This modernization process defined a new relationship to Europe, and created a bipolarity of the artistic and contextual discourse between the existing forms and the new approaches, and in that sense, the classicalists bound to the old forms did not make a significant contribution to the artistic development of modern Turkish cartooning.[203] However, their cartoons worked, because they knew how to utilize the beliefs and values of their readers, and they successfully managed to be the voice of the majority.

In this regard, it can be argued that Ahmet Fuat's *Karagöz* was one of the most influential and longest-lasting satirical newspapers of the revolutionary cartoon production. It played a vital role in communicating the political debates and shaping the public's imagery. In doing so, *Karagöz* carried the old shadow theatre's famous penchant for criticism and its fictional characters to the realm of satire, and opened the doors for followers such as *Hayal-i Cedid, Baba Himmet,* and *Yeni Geveze*, which adopted similar mascots, but none lasted as long as *Karagöz* itself.[204]

Karagöz continued to perform its mission of delivering political and cultural critiques throughout the revolutionary satirical press in weekly publications, and adapted its traditional cultural symbols, amalgamating them with imported ones as the voice of the "everyman." The format gave readers the same feeling as a puppet-show curtain, and the commentaries were composed as

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known much about Mehmet Baha besides his military background, and his talent in imagining and depicting people's daily lives. Ceviker managed to collect very limited information on Münir Osman from various newspaper posts of the time, but little about his background.

[203] ibid., 20-40.

[204] Among the successors of Karagöz (1908-1950), Ceviker includes: *Nekregû* (1908), *Zuhurî* (1908), *Tasvir-i Hayal* (1908), whose title refers to shadow theatre, *Hacıvad* (1908) one of the main characters in Karagöz shadow theatre, *Ibiş* (1908), *Nekregû ve Pişekâr* (1909), Eşref (1909), *Hayal-i Cedid* (1910), *Yeni Geveze* (1910-1912), *Cadaloz* ("Old Nag") (1911), *Baba Himmet* (a famous folk figure) (1911), and *Köylü* ("Villager") (1913), etc.

*muhavvere*s (dialogues) between Karagöz and Hacivad. The journal was published in four pages, with the lithographic cartoons always on the first and last pages. The critiques in the legend, explaining the lithograph, would take place as dialogues between two main figures of the shadow theatre: *Karagöz* and *Hacivad*, giving voice to the direct views of the gazette's editor (Figure 3.3). Occasionally there would be a third cartoon, similar in format, on the inner two pages that contained mainly essays and commentaries. Gradually, other characters and other graphic styles were also introduced. *Karagöz* deserves special attention for its long dominance of satire production. With its format, coverage, and language, it managed to continue printing and keep its readers' interest for over two decades, throughout the most turbulent years of the empire and later of the nascent republic.[205]

The dominance of satire press by these two distinct types of cartoon production, contemporary and classical (*batılı-modern* and *tasvirci-geleneksel*), transformed into a more hybrid form towards the end of World War I. One of the main reasons for this fusion was that most of the publications could not weather the economic difficulties caused by the war, and had to close down. The cartoonists were shifting between the few satirical journals that were left in the market, sometimes publishing their own short-lived ones, and compromising their artistic techniques.

Historical and Political Dynamics

The years following the 1908 Revolution proved to be a devastating challenge for the Young Turks, and for the empire. Karpat defined the period between the Young Turks (later Committee of Union and Progress) Revolution of 1908 and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)'s proclamation of the republic in 1923 as a "period of transition," which concluded in a total reformulation of socio-political

[205] *Karagöz* published a total of 2,803 issues between August 10, 1908 and January 26,1935. The publication restarted on February 14,1935, resumed with its original numbering, and lasted till its closure in 1950.

and intellectual life in Republican Turkey.[206] He collocated the major events paving the way for this immense transformation that hewed the empire into a series of monarchies and republics in six phases as follows: the shift of the ruling elite from the sultan to a newly formed nationalist military; the loss of territory and influence in the Balkans, North Africa, and the Arab regions; the defeat in World War I; the occupation of the empire by the allied powers; the success of the War of Independence in 1922; and finally, the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate.[207]

Although the Young Turks brought back the Constitution and Parliament in 1908, they were divided within their constitutional tendencies. A liberal wing was established by one of the important Young Turk figures, Prince Sabahattin as *Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti,* where he argued the need for some measures of decentralization and autonomy for religious and ethnic minorities.[208] The main tendency, on the other hand, sought unity around a more centralized authority with Turkish domination.[209] The representatives of the latter formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Their primary challenge was to restore order to the empire and reinstate the Constitution, which was modified in order to limit the power of the sultan and the Porte in relation to Parliament. The new Constitution was designed to provide the rights that were suppressed by Abdulhamid's bureaucracy.

Meanwhile, the ambition for regional expansion among the European powers, especially in the lands of the Ottoman Empire, only grew in terms of "raison d'être" and audacity.[210] The 1877 Ottoman defeat by Russia triggered a

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[206] Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays*. (Leiden, London: Brill, 2004), 421.
[207] ibid. 421-422.
[208] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 310-312. According to Sabahaddin, the Abdulhamid tyranny was not the cause of Turkish grievances, but it was the product of certain features in the society. The real need was to change the society itself. He formulated an ideology around the teachings of Demonins, who argued that societies belonged to two major social types: one based on *formation communitaire*, and the other on *formation particulariste*. Based on this, Sabahaddin proposed the formation of a decentralized government and administration, with extended local governments to the villages, along with a new education system.
[209] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 214.
[210] Holland J. Ross, "Great Britain and the Eastern Question," *The Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (January 1922): 307-319.

change in the balance of powers which favored British, French, and Russian ambitions in North Africa and the Middle East in a "domino effect," and left the Ottomans with a bitter taste of disgrace. Britain, especially, turned the Eastern question into a debate against the Ottomans, and supported its campaign with a media onslaught against the Ottoman Empire over uprisings in the Balkans and the preceeding war with Russia.[211] Opinion in England no longer held that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire served British interests. There was a storm of moral anger among the European public against the Ottomans, provoked by the European press describing the Ottomans as the "the most cruel and mischievous despotism on Earth'.[212] In consequence, Europe, and mainly Britain and France, cooled down their political relations with the empire. The conquests Algeria by France in 1830s and Egypt by Britain in the early 1880s gave a clear manifestation of these trends. After 1878, Sultan Abdulhamid was facing complex diplomatic situations and was confined in the international arena, while facing at home the political and social tension created by the new elite and intelligentsia, which concluded with the Young Turk revolution.

The 1908 Revolution had meandering echoes in foreign relations with European powers. The British and French who favored the members of the Young Turks in their struggle against Abdulhamid took a short break from their quest to protect their Muslim subjects in the colonies from the sultan's call for unity among Muslims. In the initial phases the new regime in the empire under the CUP developed a pro-British policy, and undermined relations with Germany, which had intensified during Abdulhamid's reign. There were only a few officers, notably Enver Pasha, who favored a German alliance. The Austro-German-Ottoman rapprochement orchestrated by Abdulhamid endangered Britain's interest in the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf, while threatening the French trade

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Dror Ze'evi, "Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the Middle East," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19, no.1 (June 2004): 73–94.
Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 324.

[211] Paul Auchterlonie, "From the Eastern Question to the Death of General Gordon: Representations of the Middle East in the Victorian Periodical Press, 1876-1885." *British Journal of the Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no 1 (May 2001): 10. Propaganda in Europe, namely Britain, followed the harsh measures taken by the Ottoman government to crush the uprisings.

[212] ibid., 11.

routes in Syrian ports. On the eastern front it enraged the Russians, who feared they would lose control of the Straits as its access to the Mediterranean.[213] The rise of the CUP seemed to allay all those fears, but soon the trend began to change. The influence of the revolution's success (and of its constitutional, pluralistic, and democratic slogans) on public opinion in British-controlled Egypt, and potentially on freedom of movement in India, created a major menace to the British.[214] So now the assumed context of the Ottoman threat was transformed from a religious to an ideological one. Meanwhile, the governmental jurisdictions were changing in Balkan provinces. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared independence, and the Cretan deputies unilaterally declared union with Greece.

In 1909 all these growing external challenges gave Abdulhamid and his supporters the chance to launch a counter-revolution, to put an end to the emerging second constitutional era of the empire and to the CUP's newly established influence, in order to re-affirm the sultan's position as absolute monarch. The counter-revolution was suppressed shortly afterwards by special army forces (*Hareket Ordusu*) established by the CUP. Sultan Abdulhamid II himself was deposed and sent to exile in Thessalonica, and was replaced by his brother Mehmet Reşad (Mehmet V), who became a puppet sultan.

The inner political struggle of the government in Istanbul, agitated by the failing policies in *Trablusgarb* and *Benghazi* at the end of 1910, was depicted by two prominent cartoonists of the time, one commenting on the other. The cartoons were published separately within few days from each other. On November 11, Cem published on its cover a single portrait of an Ottoman politician, illustrated as a monkey in a suit holding a walking stick (Figure 3.4). Typical of his technique, he associated the stereotypical monkey figure (an unreliable animal who will try to play tricks at every opportunity) with the character of the Ottoman politician without further explanation, leaving the comments to the reader. Two

[213] Ross, "Great Britain and the Eastern Question," 310.
[214] Feroz Ahmad, *From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume 1* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2008), 141-152.
Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press,* 154-155.

days after the publication of Cem's publication, on November 20, Scarcelli, in *Kalem*, published another cartoon alluding to Cem's, in an attempt to decipher it (Figure 3.4).[215] The cartoon presents the various faces of the Ottoman political atmosphere by portraying each stereotype that is involved in government affairs. The title is *"Maimon!! Ceux que j'ai été!!"* (Monkey!! Those I was!!) and the legend in Ottoman is *"Maymunun muhtelif çehreleri"* (Monkey's various faces!). In a way supporting Cem's critique, he exhibits the multi-faced, opportunistic political atmosphere in Istanbul. The illustrated "Ottoman officer" represented these various influences embedded in him, and he seemed like they could easily trick him. Arabs here, both the Yemeni Arab with his keffiyeh, and the Egyptian Arab with his fez, are illustrated as central figures next to the representatives of the Western world. Yet Scarcelli takes the argument a step further and adds a positive level by drawing the portrait of a man, separated from the other figures and seen on the face of a medallion that says "*ce que je suis*" (who I am), a new political face emerging from all the others, as if he is giving credit to the new CUP government.

Between these external and internal challenges, the CUP had little opportunity to develop a concentrated program in Parliament for implementing the new legislation. With the outbreak of the Albanian revolt in 1911, followed by the Tripolitianian Italian-Turkish War, the CUP leaders were spending most of their time on political and military manoeuvering against the insurgencies in the Balkans and European claims in North Africa.

The political drama of the Middle East throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century defined the regional challenges and their actors as subservient to those of the great powers of Europe (Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Germany). This view sometimes blinds us to other developments, more regional in nature. The powers competing for influence over the regions that slipped from Ottoman control would either work together or, more frequently, in rivalry with each other, using local actors to achieve

[215] These assumptions are based on my interview with Turgut Çeviker.

supremacy.[216] Within this regional chaos, the empire managed to retain the commitment of its Arab subjects to some extent until the beginning of World War I, despite losing territories in the Balkans and North Africa. For the Ottoman governing elite it could be said that the Middle East became the contested land, and "white" Arabs became the pawns of rival forces for political dominance.

Where is the homeland? Where is the nation?

On October 8, 1908, a contemporary political satirical gazette *Boş Boğaz ve Güllabi* published a dialogue titled "*İki Çocuk Arasında*" (between two children).[217] Children, the symbol of a "certain public naiveté in the face of social and political changes," were trying to make sense of words such as "homeland," "freedom," and "justice" that were bandied about as part of the discourse of the 1908 revolution.[218] These words would be the ones that would shape the empire's destiny throughout the War of Independence all the way to the republic:

> *Iki çocuk arasında:* (Between two kids): -*Vatan nedir?* (What is a homeland?); -*Tiyatro oyunu.* (A play, with reference to Namık Kemal's play "*Vatan or Silistria"*);[219]-*Hürriyet nedir?* (What is freedom?) -*Gazete ismi* (The name of a gazette that was published by the Young Turks in London during the Istibdat period from 1893 to 1896); -*Uhuvvet nedir?* (What is brotherhood?) -*Daha görmedim ki bileyim…*(I can't know since I haven't seen it…); -*Adalet?* (Justice?) -*Teyzemin kızının adı.* (The name of my aunt's daughter).

The Turkish terms *vatan* (homeland), and *millet* (nation) in relation to well-defined and objective criteria such as territory and sovereignty were blurry even among the intelligentsia of the time. The feeling and full meaning of these words were in a state of flux. The concept of sovereignty was not associated with territorial boundaries.

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[216] Alain Silvera, "The Classical Eastern Question," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no.4 (October 2000): 179-188.

[217] *Boş Boğaz ve Güllabi* was one of the first satirical gazettes published bi-weekly right after the 1908 revolution. It was published by Hüseyin Rahmi (Gürpınar), one of the most prominent writers of the late Ottoman and early Republican period. Among its writers, it included other important intellectuals like Ahmet Rasim and Mithat Cemal (Kuntay). In the years to come, these intellectuals would be counted among the forerunners of *Turkism*. "*Iki Çocuk Arasında,*" also referred by Palmira Brumette, 52, was published on October 8, 1908 (25 Eylul 1324), no. 18, 3.

[218] Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press*, 52

[219] Namık Kemal's "*Vayan yahut Silistre*" is the first play written in Western style and performed in 1873. The main theme of the play was to encourage the love of homeland.

The word *vatan* originated from the Arabic, where it meant "place of birth."[220] The word was redefined to reflect the meaning of the French word *patrie* only in the nineteenth century with a purely European influence. Similarly, *millet*, from the Arabic word *milla,* was used to identify a religious community. Over the course of its political history, the Ottomans used this word to designate the religious communities within the empire such as Greeks, Jews, Armenians, or in a larger sense, the Muslims of the empire, but did not use it with ethnic reference as a Turkish or Kurdish *millet*.[221] This reassignment of terminology, which kept the old meanings beside the new ones, gave birth to a confused sense of identity. The sentiments for *vatan* as birthplace and as national homeland coexisted and built upon each other,[222] yet it was not clearly defined in the minds of the people. It seemed that for Ottoman Turkish Muslims, the *vatan* and *millet* could be an empire that would embrace most of the heartlands of Islam in the Middle East.

Namık Kemal was the first intellectual to popularize the terms *vatan* (homeland), *hürriyet* (liberty), and *millet* (nation) close to their European meanings. Yet none of these terms were internalized in their European sense. Most of the time they carried a romantic understanding rather than a well-defined notion, as a "sacred idea that sprung from the union of many lofty sentiments such as nation, freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth…"[223] Indeed, for a soldier the word "homeland" (*vatan*) was no more than a village square, it was a focus of sentiment, of affection, of nostalgia, but not of loyalty and only to a limited extent

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[220] Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, Selected Essays* trans. and ed. Niyazi Berkes (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959), 76-78.
Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 334.
[221] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 334-336. Karpat, *Politization of Islam*, 328-336.
[222] In her *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards,* Afsaneh Najmabadi offers a brilliant discussion on the changing meanings of "vatan." Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 97-131.
[223] From Namık Kemal's article in *İbret*, March 22, 1873, quoted by Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 337.

of identity.[224] It had more religious reference than ethnic, and was never territorial.[225]

The boundaries between *vatan* in its old deep-rooted Ottoman sense, and the idea of an ethnic nation with its imported notions defined by language, culture, and real or imagined origin, were not clear for the Young Turks. The latter used the concepts of *vatan* and *millet* (nation) more in a nationalistic ideology not too far from an imperial discourse to sustain the empire's territorial integrity against the rising nationalist movements first in the Balkans and later in the Middle East and Anatolia.[226] The fact that the Ottoman officers ran a guerrilla campaign in North Africa from the outbreak of the Italian-Turkish war of 1911 until 1914 even though they officially lost the battle in Tripolitania could be explained through this nostalgia for "imagined" *vatan*.[227] Yet Ottomans who had encountered European intellectual life might have felt that such an ideology could serve to bind together the diverse groups of the empire in a common loyalty to their homeland and the Ottoman State.[228] As Niyazi Berkes distinguished, for the Ottoman Empire, ideas like "nation," imported from Europe, were not enough to arouse a full-scale nationalist movement. The ideas would start to mean something only when "certain sociological conditions come into existence; even then the imported ideas serve only as a raw material for a nationalistic doctrine."[229]

A cartoon by L'Andres in *Alem*, 1909, exhibited the struggle between *Fırka-ı Ahrar* (Liberal Union) and *Ittihat ve Terakki* (the Committee of Union and

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[224] From Ahmet Cevdet Pasha's deposition to a special commission, quoted by Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 338. "If we were to adapt the word homeland now, and if, in the course of time, it were to establish itself in men's minds and acquire the power that it has in Europe, even then it would not be as potent as religious zeal, nor could it take its place. Even then it would take a long time, and in the mean time our armies would be left without spirit."
[225] Bernard Lewis. "Watan." *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 3/4, The Impact of Western Nationalisms: Essays Dedicated to Walter Z. Laqueur on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday (September 1991): 531. Karpat, *The Politization of Islam,* 329-335.
[226] Behlül Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey*, (New Jersey: Yale University Press, 2012), 3.
[227] Lewis, "Watan," 523-533.
[228] Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years* (New York: Scribner, 2003), 328.
[229] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 313-314.

Progress), the two rival parties among the Young Turk exiles after the revolution (Figure 3.5). The focal point of the cartoon is two Young Turk figures shown fighting in a medallion labeled "*Istanbul*" in Ottoman Turkish and "*Constantinople*" in French. The one on the left, "*union liberale*" (liberal union), resists the other figure representing the "*union progress*" (CPU), who is trying to push him out of the scene. The struggle is about keeping the territories of the empire unified, starting with the capital. Eight different scenes circle the central medallion, all representing the tribulations and devastations of the empire that the new CUP government has to overcome. Starting clockwise from the top, the first scene is called "*Girit,*" illustrating the island of Crete pulled apart between the Ottomans and the Greeks. The second is about "Religions" seen as a threat to forming a nation. For some CUP intellectuals, forming a nation out of the empire would be possible only through the disintegration of the Ottoman *millet system*, and decline of the idea of *ümmet*, (the nation of Islam) and *Islamic din-u-devlet*.[230] The scene depicts an Arab in traditional dress, carrying the sword of Islam, and other religious groups running away from it, while one figure cries out for help. The third section demonstrates Anatolia in starvation. From there, the scene moves to Armenia, where a slaughtered naked woman with her child is shown, with two *Bashi-Bazouk* figures (militia soldiers, differentiated by their headgear) standing behind, putting their swords back into their scabbards.[231] The fifth scene represents the fight between the Balkan nations and the Ottomans, each hiding behind a rock, shooting at each other. Arabia, next, is little different, with ongoing inter-tribal struggles in Arab provinces ("Arabie," titled in Ottoman, "the Arab tribes") shown by two Arabs in traditional dress engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Meanwhile, in the seventh section, the newly appointed King Ferdinand of Bulgaria sits on the floor, holding a crying figure of freedom. The final section is about Bosnia and Herzegovina being carried off by Austria. The caption of the cartoon in Ottoman Turkish summarizes the current situation in the Second Constitutional period as "*Meşrutiyetimizin son levhası!*" (The last page of our Constitution), while the French caption signifies what the CUP intends to

[230] ibid. 318.
[231] *Bashi Bazouks* were irregular soldiers of the Ottoman army, known for their ruthlessness.

accomplish by saying, "*Unissons-nous! Unisson-nous!*" (Let's unite! Let's unite!). The sentiment reflected by the cartoon is very chaotic. It shows the shattering of the peace in all the empire's provinces through either nationalist or religious tendencies empowered by foreign ideas such as the puppet of "liberty" held by Prince Ferdinand. The only land left without conflict seems like Anatolia, yet it is challenged by starvation. The young Turks still believe in the unification of the Ottoman Empire, against all odds, but they are arguing among themselves over how. Neither the idea of *vatan* nor a *vatan* where a nation could emerge existed clearly.

The Ottoman Empire's introduction to nationalism was trapped within the scope of these conceptions, ideologies, and political and social turmoil. Over the course of a decade, the quest for the right mold to form the basis of a nation in its European definition shifted from Ottomanism, to Islamism, then to "Turanism," and finally settled on Turkism.[232] These concepts were fiercely debated among intellectuals such as Namık Kemal and later, Yusuf Akçura. The quest was to find a common denominator, an amalgam, to keep the empire united. Ottomanism, which was promoted by the writings of Namık Kemal, was challenged by competing arguments of Islamism and Turkism as forwarded by Yusuf Akçura in his article *Üç Tarzı Siyaset*.[233]

Akcura examined Islamism as an ideology for the merger of the empire that was considered especially by Abdulhamid under Pan-Islamism, which, after the failure of the First Constitutional era, gained an opportunity to spread wider as an alternative to Ottomanism. Pan-Islamism aimed at the unification of the Muslim world and promotion of the welfare of Islamic inhabitants without abolishing citizenship for all. As Lewis put it, "In [Arab lands] lived a population of many millions, speaking a separate language, and feeling themselves to belong to a separate race. But the Arabs were bound to the Empire by Islamic brotherhood and allegiance to the Caliphate, and their separation was not to be

[232] Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset,* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu publications, volume VII, no 73, 1976).
[233] ibid.

feared."[234] Although this idea, in a nutshell, gave a sense of security to the empire in order to assure its ownership of lands in the Middle East, while it was losing its territories in the Balkans and North Africa, this notion of togetherness through Islam did not constitute a sustainable ground as these groups demanded rights and freedoms that were limited under the centralized government. For Akcura, and for the new governors of the empire as well, such unification would alienate the non-Muslim population within the empire. A Turkish national policy based on the Turkish race was another prospect suggested by Akçura's article as an alternative to Ottomanism, which was doomed to fail, and Islamism, which had its own complications.[235] Turkism, as Akçura called it, was another prospect of unification. The idea of a Turkish nation based on the political and economic interests of the Turks became quickly popular, and was adopted widely by the new intelligentsia under the CUP, which, with the 1908 Revolution saw an alternative through the alienation of non-Turkic parts of the empire including the Arabs that were perceived as "backward and uncivilized."[236]

It was the Albanian revolt of 1910 which convinced the Young Turks and the CUP that it would be difficult to hold onto such wide supra-national interests while trying to keep the empire unified. Anthony Smith defined nationalism as "a doctrine of culture and symbolic language and consciousness aiming to create a world of collective cultural identities or cultural nations."[237] He explained how the process of nationalism was more or less an unintended consequence for Europe, while for non-Western entities it was the result of nationalist movements created

[234] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 216-7.
[235] ibid. Regarding Ottomanism, Lewis referred to British Ambassador Sir Gerald Lowther's remarks after participating in Talat Pasha's speech to the Thessalonica branch of the CUP as follows: "That the CUP have given up any idea of Ottomanizing all the non-Turkish elements by sympathetic and constitutional ways has long been manifest. To them, 'Ottoman' evidently means 'Turk,' and their present policy of 'Ottomanization' is one of pounding the non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar'." In addition, most importantly, neither Turks, nor Muslims or non-Muslim and Turkish communities were willing to be incorporated under an Ottoman nation.
[236] ibid., 341. According to Lewis, the Ottomans had a strong sense of superiority over the Arab lands and Africa as places that needed to be enlightened with "the light of the Ottomans." Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains,*147-148.
[237] Smith, *National Identity*, 99.

by design.[238] For the Ottomans too, who lacked a set and clear idea of nation in mind, it was a process of trial and error.

Between 1910 and 1918, the Ottomans lost their territory in the Balkans, and North Africa, on the Aegean Sea, and in the Middle East. The CUP was left with nothing but Anatolia as the only piece of territory to be called homeland (*vatan*) and to be secured at all costs. Ziya Gökalp, a prominent sociologist, writer, poet, and political activist of the time and the leading defender of Turkism, as opposed to Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, prompted the notion that Anatolia is the hearth of the Turkish people, and it represents the "true" culture and values of the Turks rather than the "Byzantine and Arab high cultures of the Ottoman."[239] These nationalist ideals led to the de-identification of Ottoman Turkey with its nearby neighbors, especially with Arabs.

> Arab opinion continued to favour unity under the Islamic Ottoman Empire and was averse to centrifugal influences in the direction of autonomy or separatism. However, toward the end of 1909 an adversarial relationship began to take shape between the Unionists and those Arab leaders who had failed to find immediate rewards under the increasingly more CUP-dominated constitutional regime.[240]

This approach found immediate reflection in cartoons showing Arab lands, creating a simultaneous sense of nostalgia for *vatan,* while zooming in their problematic nature united within a huge imperial body. An impressive April 6, 1911 cartoon by *Kalem*'s prominent European cartoonist A. Scarselli with the title "The Interior Minister's interior" ("*Le ministre de son Intérieur!"* in French/ *"Dahiliyenin dahili"* in Ottoman) shows the corpulent Interior Minister Halil Mentese Pasha standing and holding the skin of his torso open on both sides, laying bare his inner organs. He is naked save for striped socks and a fez on his head representing the empire under the CUP government (Figure 3.6). Each of his vital organs is numbered according to its importance starting from 1, the heart, labeled Albania; 2, the lungs, Baghdad; 3, the liver, Yemen; and, 4, the intestines, Syria. The cartoon is an explicit demonstration of how the Middle East was still

[238] ibid. 100
[239] Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 120.
[240] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young,* 32-33.

considered an interior matter similar to the Balkans, yet with the same sense of alienation.

Before the revolution, Albania was one of the important centers for the Young Turk movement. The Albanians, strongly influenced by European nationalism, were ambitious about ideas of individual freedoms and privileges that could only be provided through constitutionalism. However, the Ottomanism that was immediately adopted by the revolutionary Young Turks after 1908 aimed at cooperation in a united empire, as opposed to what the Albanian nationalists envisioned: autonomy, development of the Albanian language, and the appointment of Albanians to key positions in the government. These demands in many ways were little different than those of the Arab nationalists.[241] For the Arabs as well, one of the main points of resentment was the CUP's intense effort to Turkify through education and language.

> The growing emphasis on education and the proliferation of published material—ushered in by enhanced freedom of expression—highlighted the question of language. The enforcement of the state language, namely, Ottoman Turkish, in all spheres of public life was integral to the Unionist program of centralization. As Armenians and Greeks asked for their respective languages to be accepted as state languages, Arabs, too, became interested in promoting Arabic in an official capacity. The first and most persistent challenge to Young Turk centralization from the Arabs was thus to emerge as the issue of language. The position Arabic would assume in the public sphere in the Arab provinces turned into an increasingly politicized bone of contention between Arabs and Young Turks.[242]

Some Arabs were also convinced that they had been victimized by the CUP's cultural and linguistic discrimination. For them, "it was Islam that held the empire together for many centuries, […] whether they were Turk or Arab, the Muslim subjects of the Sultan were brothers by faith."[243] This feeling agitated the Arab notables in major Arab provinces and initiated a struggle for autonomy in the empire.

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[241] Even as late as the end of the Great War, their ideas about a post-Ottoman reality remained diverse and at times rather obscure. Also, it appears that they did not manage to recruit mass support before the 1920s. Salim Tamari's *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman Past* provides a good demonstration of this.

[242] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks,* 79-80.

[243] Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61-62.

In April 1911, Muslim and Catholic Albanians, joining forces, had already begun their rebellion for "liberty, justice, and autonomy."[244] As often happens, cartoons foresaw the future threat that would result from these provinces breaking away from the empire. In the cartoon showing the interior minister's internal organs (Figure 3.6), the "heart," the most vital organ, of the empire, Albania, was already on the verge of failure. Baghdad represented the lungs, the respiratory system, the way in and out to the body of the empire, the critical province in terms of free access to the Port of Basra on the Persian Gulf, through the Baghdad Railway (and in that period perhaps also in terms of oil production). The province squirmed with unrest initiated by local notables aiming to establish an independent Arab kingdom.[245]

Faraway Yemen, the liver, had been an important port for the empire to the Red Sea and east Africa. The province was a region with local insurgencies between the tribes of the highlands and with the Ottomans over control of the region. In 1910-1911, concurrently with the Albanian revolt, another rebellion emerged in Yemen. Although the Ottomans managed to get the revolt under control, they had to cede the north of the province to the local Zaydi leader in return for his entering into alliance with the Ottoman sultan.[246]

In a cartoon published by *Djem* in 1911, Cem drew two Ottoman officers talking to each other, dressed in their Ottoman uniforms, but topped by their traditional Arab *kefiye* (keffiyeh) headwear. Apparently they are not meant to represent Arabs, and have put on the headgear to adapt to the geographic conditions of the region (Figure 3.7). In the background stand tents representing Ottoman forces. The title of the cartoon in Ottoman Turkish is: "*On the road to Sana, following a new election*," and in French it reads "*For an assignment-election, the gates of Sana*," referring to the Ottoman army once again assigned to Yemen.[247] The dialogue printed in both Ottoman and French is as follows: "-

[244] Shaw and Shaw, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic,* 288-289.
[245] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 47.
[246] Karpat, *Politization of Islam*, 206.
[247] The word in Ottoman Turkish is "*intihab,*" which means "a carrying away plunder." Redhouse, *Turkish and English Lexicon,* 211.

What do you figure? - I wonder how many lieutenants' salaries are equivalent to two hundred pounds."

In this cartoon the question of Ottoman-Turkish-Muslim identity is raised once again in a very subtle way. Cem's cartoon, thus, added an economic aspect to it by referring to the low compensation the officers get for such tough missions as opposed to their British colleagues. Maybe one of the questions that Cem intended to plant in the public mind was, "Do they really need to go there?" By then Yemen already had a reputation in Ottoman folk songs as a place where heroism and patriotism would lack any meaning. The Ottoman elite were accustomed to imagining Yemen as the abode of *vahşiyet*, more than any other place.[248] Yemen meant exile, a place of hopelessness and doom.[249] This feeling of resentment was not only restricted to Yemen, as Zürcher noted. It was shared by troops serving in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia as well.

The satirical magazines continued to expose Middle Eastern provinces' challenging aspects as a burden on the empire. In two other cartoons published by A. Rigopoulos in *Kalem* in February and April of the same year, he depicted the difficult predicaments the empire faced while trying to control unrest in these provinces. The caption of the first cartoon in Ottoman (Figure 3.8) reads: "*The commanders who will go farther apart to keep looking left and right all the time*"; while the French explanation reads: "*A minister who will soon be affected by a double divergent cross-eyed situation will have to look to both sides at once*." The frame contains just three figures. In the middle stands Mahmut Sevket Pasha, facing the readers. He is shown in his military uniform with his dominating beard and mustache.[250] By looking at the funny expression on his face, one realizes that his eyes are not properly aligned with each other, with one looking left and the other right. To his left stands an Albanian commander in his traditional military

[248] Thomas Kühn, "Shaping and re-shaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1919," *Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East,* 27 (2007): 315-331.
[249] Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building,* 187.
[250] Mahmut Sevket Pasha was an Ottoman general and statesman of Arab descent. He served as the minister of the military during the last years of Abdulhamid II's reign, and was later appointed *sadrazam*.

uniform, facing the other side, with one eye gazing at Mahmut Sevket Pasha, in a way signaling a possible dialogue. To his left is a Yemeni tribal chief, standing barefoot with his *kefiye* (keffiyeh) and robe, and drawn with his back turned to the reader, holding a rifle. He also gazes with one eye at Mahmut Sevket Pasha, but since his back is turned, there is no eye contact at all. The position of the two rebels indicates, perhaps, that Rigopoulos believed there is a chance of mending fences with the Albanians, but not with the Yemenis.

Similarly, in the next cartoon published in April, Rigopoulos draws Mahmut Sevket Pasha once again, this time with a facial expression resigned over trying to suppress rebels in two far-flung corners of the empire, Albania and Yemen (Figure 3.9). The legend in Ottoman says, "*It's too much, one each on the right and left,*" which expressed in French reads: *"What is this fate that always drags my shoes on the rocks of Albania and the sands of Yemen?"*

The challenges the Albanian and Yemeni revolts posed to the CUP and their critical consequences in terms of the growing necessity for a clearer definition of the concept of *vatan* was more apparent among Western-style cartoonists. Traditionalist cartoonists were more optimistic about the chances of keeping these distant Ottoman territories part of the empire. *Karagöz* depicted the same issue of the Albanian and Yemeni revolts in a more optimistic commentary. In his August 1911 cartoon titled *"For the revolts of Malisor and Yemen,"* Halit Naci seems confident that the problems in Albania and Yemen are temporary and will be solved (Figure 3.10). In the cartoon Karagöz and Hacıvad are crossing the sea in a boat with three other people on board: an Albanian, a Yemeni, and a third person of unclear descent. Hacıvad is sitting in the back of the dingy while Karagöz rows the boat, called *Ittihat ve Terakki* (CUP). The three figures in the background represent Greek King Georgios, Nikola of Montenegro, and Austria-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph. They are standing behind a rock on the shore, anxiously watching the boat passing by. The caption reads, "Look Hacıvad! They will start quarrelling with each other as soon as they realize we're taking them safely to shore."

Retuning to the first cartoon by Scarcelli – the internal organs of the interior minister – major uprisings against the government's centralization attempts were also taking place in Syria, depicted as the minster's intestines. Similar to other regions in the Middle East, the "Syrian uprisings were triggered by the implementation of a government policy that appeared to threaten the local leaders' established privileges."[251] As Benedict Anderson noted, the Ottomans came to be hated by Turkish speakers as apostates, and by non-Turkish speakers as Turkifiers.[252] Although Scarcelli might not have wented to go into much detail while depicting the situation in the Middle East and Balkans, he was actually reflecting an elitist consensus on the situation the CUP was facing, implying that the empire's territories were dissolving one by one. These provinces were the vital organs of the empire, and cutting them off would mean the empire's very death. Yet, with the situation they were bound to leave the empire, and thus the CUP, with the Anatolian homeland determined as the only *vatan*, and Turks as the new *millet*.

A Turkish nation or homeland in a territorial sense was not set explicitly in the minds of the revolutionary ruling elite during the years preceding the War of Independence. They could not even imagine a world without an Ottoman Empire in it. The adaptation and spread of Turkism within the empire's heartland was more an outcome than a designed process, and the educational centralization and Turkification of language were processes through which "the nation came to be imagined, and once imagined, modelled, adapted, and transformed" not as a Turkish nation, which was beyond imagination, but as reformed empire.[253]

The revolutionary satirical press evolved in two separate directions on the question of empire vs. Turkish homeland, along the same lines as the CUP leadership. It is interesting that the lines were drawn in parallel to the style of cartooning. The classical cartoonists adopted an optimistic attitude, and still favoured the resolution of the unrest in the empire's provinces and keeping the

[251] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 68-69.
[252] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 85.
[253] ibid. 141.

empire united, while their contemporaries were more in favour of shedding the problematic regions and concentrating on the heartland, with the empire still being the predominant political unit.

The perception of the Arab as the Other was not a clear idea for the CUP. Yet it would not be an easy mission to hold these provinces under the flag of either Ottomanism, or Islamism, and definitely not under Turkism. The Arabs were still perceived as part of the *vatan* in a romantic sense, whether or not they cooperated with the enemy or were insurgents in the farthest territories, but were also seen as the poor, primitive relatives who spoke a different language and belonged to a different culture.[254] The feeling of misfortune in colonized North Africa or in the manipulated Middle East was significant in the messages these cartoons carried, but between the lines there was always a reference to the backwardness of the region and its people. Articles and cartoons tried to show how European aggressors expanded their colonial aims to the underdeveloped, uncivilized, once-Ottoman Arab lands and manipulated those provinces that had long belonged to the *vatan.*

A January 1911 cartoon by C.P. in *Kalem*, titled in Ottoman Turkish "*Foreign Languages in Egypt*," shows an Egyptian Arab in his *kefiye* (keffiyeh) and traditional robe with three tongues coming out of his mouth, labeled separately in French "*Française, Anglaise, Allemande*" (Figure 3.11). He holds a fourth tongue in his hand reading "*Maternelle*" ("Mother tongue "). The sizes of the tongues represent the frequency of the languages used. The caption underneath the illustration in Ottoman says *"Egypt - "I ended up without a tongue!"* and the French caption complementary to the Ottoman asks: *"So, what should I do with this one?"*

C.P.'s illustration refers to the socio-political domination of the colonizer over the colonized in a very conspicuous way.[255] The cartoon in one way shows how easily the Egyptians surrendered their own basic attributes to the

[254] The vast majority of Arabs did not buy the nationalist agenda that was part of the CUP to begin with.
[255] It reproduces the assumed colonizer/colonized dichotomy (which is no longer accepted in post-colonial scholarship).

expansionist powers, perhaps with a little resentment for not even considering Ottoman Turkish. Language as the elementary feature of self-agency was lost in Egypt, leaving it without a voice, without an identity. Revolutionary cartoonists used this technique of exemplifying what happened to once-Ottoman provinces to convince their reader of the necessity for a strong nation. Ironically, the policies adopted by the CUP during the same periods for unifying what was left over from the empire under Turkification produced a not altogether different result than the imperial powers.

The Arabs of North Africa, and the Libyan War

The new CUP regime was left face to face with internal dissents reflected in the European interests in the empire. Dissent in Crete, Yemen, and Libya followed the domino effect of the breakdown of the Balkan provinces that started with the Albanian revolt. Each struggle over the provinces would become an international matter involving the Great Powers striving to retain their power balance in the region or to shift it in their favour. *Hayal-i Cedid*'s cartoons published in July 1910, drawn by Papagalu, demonstrated the general Ottoman public perception of the European menaces that threatened the unity of the empire. Especially the traditional-style cartoon magazines positioning themselves closer to the capital would offer a harsh critique of the European powers. The cartoon depicts the mindset of European powers as the major actors of the new world order taking shape, and the Balkans as their subordinates in claiming the empire's territories. For further references, this cartoon particularly plays an important role in decoding how both the empire and CUP politically perceived the foreign threats, and the power games and how they fostered (through the eyes of the cartoonist) a feeling of distrust towards foreign powers, which later will be further resolved in the matters regarding the Arabs.

Besides being a key to further analysis of the various ethnic stereotypes, and symbolic references to the European and Balkan powers, Papagalu's cartoons could be considered a guide to power balances in the region. The cartoon interprets the geopolitical ambitions of the surrounding actors amid the current

political situation and the Crete crisis of 1910. The long caption under the cartoon describes the symbolic references in the cartoon space. The first impression is of various people of different ethnic backgrounds gathered around a huge watch, where each hour labels the figure next to it, with Papagalu at the center as the narrator. The caption starts by describing the hill that appears behind the hour circle, which represents the island of Crete itself. The teeterboard (see-saw) symbolizes the political attraction of the situation to the other actors. In the middle of the teeterboard stands a Cretan dressed as a traditional Cretan villager. The Ottoman officer with his *fez,* holding an Ottoman flag, sits on the upper part of the board, symbolizing the Ottoman government, while a Greek, depicted as a woman in her traditional outfit trying to fly a kite, sits in the lower corner. The fact that she weighs down the seesaw emphasizes the strength and weight of freedom, which is symbolized by the kite itself, one string held by a Greek and the other by a Cretan. All the actors in the game are shown around an hour circle with their military uniforms, each manifesting their aspirations in the situation. This cartoon has the immediate effect of demonstrating not only the political fragility of the Ottoman Empire and hollowness of the promises made by the Great Powers to guarantee its integrity, but also the impossibility of holding the empire unified against the multi-leveled Balkan nationalism.

Within this complex political environment, Italian foreign policy saw the opportunity to pursue the goal of extending its influence over *Trablusgarb* and *Benghazi* (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), the Ottomans' last territories in North Africa. The belief that it was essential to control a share of the African coast on the Mediterranean was based on the idea among the other European powers of the "Mediterranean balance of power."[256] Libya was seen as the backyard of the Ottoman Empire. Especially during the reign of Abdulhamid, it was used as a place for exiling his political opponents. Thus, towards the Italian ambition of gaining the status of "great power," the expansion of a colonial empire to these neglected territories proved a perfect opportunity. The Italian Foreign Ministry

[256] Luca Micheletta and Andrea Ungari, *Libian War 1911-1912.* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 17.

had already imposed this policy with respect to Ottoman territories in North Africa in early 1905, yet pursued cautious and prudent steps, relying more on economic advances than on warlike measures, preserving the empire's integrity in the region. C.P.'s November 1910 cartoon in *Kalem* brought the issue of Italy's interest in Tripolitania for the first time to Ottoman public consideration (Figure 3.13). The cartoon depicts a cheese block labeled "*Tripolitaine*" (Tripolitania) resting on Italy's most popular newspaper, *Corriere della sera*, dated December 19, 1910. There are three rats around the cheese representing Italian statesmen.[257] The caption in Ottoman Turkish, *"Rats go after cheese left out in the open!"* and the French version *"Cheese that tempts the rodents well,"* both imply that Tripolitania's disregarded status by the empire and CUP government opened the way for European integration.

With the French protectorate of Morocco in the Mediterranean, Italy's economically limited policy over Tripolitania transformed. The new policy was to detach Libya from the empire in order to preserve the power balance; after all, if they did not, another great power would claim the province. Unfortunately, the CUP failed to take adequate preparations against the Italian threat. The Turkification policies they employed elsewhere in the empire were applied to Tripolitania as well. The language issues and religious reforms caused opposition to the Ottoman government, and created a power vacuum among the Tripolitanian elite, which asked for the reformation of economic development instead in order to stimulate the province's defence against European influence.[258] The limited Ottoman rule, with weak garrisons, and a poor economic situation, was almost an open invitation to Italian invasion in 1911.

While the modernist cartoons were more critical of the government for not taking necessary measures to protect the territory (Figure 3.13), the classical

[257] The characters represented in the cartoon are: on top, with the moustache and already starting to nibble the cheese, then Prime Minister Sidney Sonnino; on the left, with the cigar, Foreign Minister Antonino di San Giuliano; and finally, Giovanni Giolitti the former prime minister who was succeeded by Sonnino.
[258] Lisa Anderson, "The development of Nationalist Sentiment in Libya, 1908-1922," *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, eds. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammed Muslih, Reeva S. Simon. (New York: Colombia University Press, 1991), 226-227.

approach pioneered by *Karagöz* formulated the event around the public's common understanding of European colonialism, accusing the Europeans of being the bad guys. The classical cartoon press had already constructed the imagery of Europeans as colonizers of the once-Ottoman territories (Figure 3.14). In one of many examples, a cartoon in the traditional journal *Musavver Papagan* on the struggle between European forces, especially Germany and France, for the protectorate of Morocco, very clearly demonstrated this perception of Europe as the exploiter of the Orient's richness (Figure 3.14). Without going into too much detail, the cartoon illustrates how the great powers fought over the fruits of the Orient, in this particular case, Morocco, but also true of the rest of North Africa and the Middle East.

Contemporary style satirical gazettes were impartial over the annexation of the empire's last territories in North Africa, which they probably saw as a liability, not an asset. The matter found more coverage in the traditional cartoon press, which was instrumental in constructing the public's sense of attachment to these distant places as part of the Ottoman homeland. Europeans as the destroyers and consumers of the Orient's richness was an oft-used theme by traditional cartoonists. In September 1911, the war against Italy was declared. *Karagöz* brought this new development to its cover page. Halit Naci's cover cartoon shows an Italian officer on top of a palm tree (Figure 3.15), a common sybol of the exotic and the Orient in nineteenth and twentieth century Ottoman and European cartoons. North Africa, in its Orientalized image, was identified with the palm trees within these cartoons. A bunch of dates hanging from the tree implies the richness of the Orient. Underneath the tree, Karagöz and Hacıvad, the two traditional protagonists, work hard to cut down the tree with a crosscut saw, each holding it from one side, to get the Italian down from the tree before he reaches the dates. The caption reads: *"Karagöz: We won't let you eat even one of the dates, keep moving, and you'll learn your lesson!"* Karagöz, the symbol of the Ottoman public, offers an optimistic perspective on the conflict with Italy. By cutting the palm tree from its root to force the Italian down, he gives the sense that Ottoman forces would overcome the Italian menace in the empire's North African territories.

In another cartoon published a month later in *Karagöz*, Tripolitania was once more illustrated in the idiom of "stolen richness." The cartoon was again on the cover page of the gazette (Figure 3.16). This time it shows Hacivad, looking out from a window at Karagöz, who is trying to catch a dog in Italian feathered headgear that is running away with a big chunk of meat labelled *Trablus* (Tripolitania). Hacıvad, with his fist in the air, encourages Karagöz by directing him to hit the dog on the head. The caption reads in Ottoman "*Karagöz, hit it on the head so it staggers and drops it! Look at the dog! It's got the best part!"*

The war in Libya and the resistance of the inland Bedouin tribes created sympathy in the Ottoman public towards the Arabs who displayed profound fidelity to the faltering empire during an Ottoman confrontation with the major European powers. The Bedouin tribes that controlled the inlands of *Trablusgarb* and *Benghazi* under *Sanussiya* leadership saw themselves as attached to the empire in the context of Islamic civilization. The Muslims were bitter and intolerant toward Europeans.[259] Many Arab intellectuals saw the war in Libya as a clear sign that the European imperial powers had ambitions that included them, and they consequently stiffened their determination to resist them. They reacted to that reality by supporting the Ottoman Empire as the last chance to save their provinces from European occupation.[260] When the regular Ottoman forces were unable to reach the provinces that were controlled by the Italians in the Mediterranean, and the British in Egypt, a group of CUP officers known as *teşkilat-ı mahsusa* (including, Enver, Fethi, and Mustafa Kemal) came together to organize a guerilla war in *Trablus* and *Benghazi* with the support of the local notables and *Sanussiya* leaders, who called for a "Holy War" against the infidesl.

These developments were reflected in a Cevat Nuri cartoon published in *Baba Himmet*, a traditional satirical gazette. Nuri praised the loyalty of the Arab tribes in resisting the European powers, including Italy, and supporting the empire with their underdeveloped armaments (Figure 3.17). In the middle of the cartoon

[259] Edmund Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912," *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 1 (1972): 100.
[260] Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 214-215.

stands a big Ottoman figure personifying Baba Himmet, the invincible Anatolian woodcutter figure from the traditional shadow theatre. Adapted to the modern day, he is dressed in an Ottoman suit. Baba Himmet was known for the contrast between his size and his calm character, yet he could not stop himself from using crude language. Cevat Nuri employs his giant size as the central feature in his cartoon. Visualized at twice the size of Karagöz on the curtain, in the cartoon space as well, he is depicted as a giant figure, looking from atop at the situation in Tripolitania. The scene shows a group of North African Arabs in their traditional white robes. They are holding sticks in their hands, in a pitiful show of resistance against the European cannons, rifles, and swords that surround them in a circle. In the caption the narrator asks:

> -Babahimmet, do you think the Tripolitanians could resist these modern guns and arms? – If the local government agrees to support and give aid, the modern power won't mean much, will it? And if the Tripolitanians take the strength of their loyalty power from such sticks, then they can overcome anything.

In the following months of October and November 1911, *Karagöz* published three more cartoons regarding the situation in *Trablus* and *Benghazi*. In depicting the Ottoman-Italian war in Tripolitania, Halit Naci refrained from criticizing the CUP government, and the relations with the Great Powers. Instead, he zooms in on the positive image of the North African Arabs fighting together with their Turkish Muslim defenders in taking the province back from the Italians (Figure 3.18). However, the Arabs depicted with their heroic acts are also portrayed as uncivilized and backward. In a cartoon from the end of October 1911, Naci draws an Arab fighter, probably a member of the *Sanussiya* tribe, holding an Italian soldier hanging from the tip of his rifle. The dialogue between Karagöz and the Tripolitanian goes as follows:

"Karagöz: What is that filthy thing at the tip of your hunting rifle? Tripolitanian: A carcass? Karagöz: If that's a carcass, don't wait, quickly throw the filthy thing away!"[261] Unlike the previous cartoon by Nuri, where the North African Arabs were presented as physically small and weak, Naci depicted them

[261] There is a pun here. The word "*leş*" in spoken Arabic means "why," so the Arab is asking "why (are you asking)?" but Karagöz interprets it in Turkish, where "*leş*" means "carcass."

as strong and fearless. Karagöz's indication of "*av tüfeği*" (hunting rifle), referring to the gun the Arab is holding, implies the successful guerilla war the *Sanussies* were conducting against the Italians. In a way, they were hunting the Italians.

The next cartoon came on November 11 (Figure 3.19), a week after Italy officially proclaimed its annexation of both *Trablus* and *Benghazi*. Naci drew the courageous and proud Arabs of Libya once more, continuing their effective resistance from the interior. This time both Karagöz and Hacıvad are helping the Arabs push the Italians back to the sea, where they came from. In the far corner of the cartoon, the ship that would take the Italians back home is ready with steam coming out of its smokestack. Again the Arabs are depicted as backwards. They do not even have sandals to wear on their feet. Yet they are strong enough to get rid of the minuscule Italians. The caption reads in Ottoman *"C'mon, Hacıvad, there's still some trash left down here, let's sweep it away!"* Karagöz and Hacıvad, as the voice of the public, symbolized the Ottomans' support for the Arabs' struggle against the Great Powers of Europe. Hasan Kayalı's work describes the support of the other Arab provinces under Ottoman rule as:

> The Italian crisis had a unifying effect at the beginning. The unwarranted aggression galvanized Muslim Ottoman public opinion and rallied Muslims to the defence of the caliphate. The Revue du Monde Musulman reported that the Arabs were the first ones to forget their hatred of the Turks and that the CUP was actually able to profit from the war to maintain its position of power at a time of mounting opposition within Parliament and outside. The expression of support from around the empire was overwhelming. From Iraqi and Syrian tribes to a retired brigadier in Aleppo, from Kurdish leader Seyyid Abdülkadir to Algerian and Tunisian immigrants in Syria, thousands of Ottomans volunteered to actively join the fight. In Baghdad large crowds gathered in front of the town hall while leading religious scholars pledged material support by forming commissions to recruit volunteers and to raise funds. There were donation drives in Acre and Tripoli (Syria). Pro-government Druze chief Shakib Arslan's patriotic appeals echoed in the poetic rhetoric on Islamic bonds among the people of Kirkuk in Kurdish Iraq. A telegram of support and sympathy from Baghdad decried the unseemly attack at a time when all were striving in the path of civilization irrespective of nationality or religion.

The CUP's initial inability to protect *Trablus* and *Benghazi* had immediate effects on the government in Istanbul. The Cabinet dissolved under strong pressure from the opposition. However, the CUP was aware that the European threat was stronger than the Ottoman dislike, and used this to its advantage to emerge even stronger in the Parliament in Istanbul, emphasizing the importance of

centralization to unite the territories still under Ottoman control.[262] With the CUP's realization that they could resist Libya militarily, the Italians encountered an unexpected Arab confrontation under Ottoman guidance.[263]

The attempt to reconstruct trust in the CUP with the establishment of the new Parliament and hopes of resolving the Libyan question found cartoon space only in the issue of traditional *Yeni Geveze* dated April 1912, once again employing the easily recognized concept of the seesaw (Figure 3.20). The cartoon, titled "*sulh etrafinda*" (around peace), shows the newly appointed head of the Cabinet, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, standing on a teeterboard along with the goddess of peace, personified as a women dressed in a European outfit, and the Italian commander. Ahmed Muhtar stands on the lower side of the teeterboard, representing his stronger position in the balance of power with the Libyan *mujahedeen* at his back, holding their primitive weapons ready to fight as loyal soldiers. Yet the goddess of peace, both hands open at her sides, looks like she is questioning the Italian officer's next move in such an unbalanced situation, where the Italian clearly weighs less. The legend elucidates the unexpected Libyan challenge along with the hopes raised by the newly appointed CUP Cabinet, while despising the enemy: *"Hey, senior! You're too light when you're alone. Watch out, you'll roll down… I recommend that you ask help from the one standing in the middle, but it seems she's turned away from you as well!"*

The cartoon was drawn with reference to the peace negotiations between the Italians and the CUP government that took place in April 1912. Ahmed Muhtar declared that the empire would/not begin peace talks unless the Italians renounced the sovereignty condition. However, the Italian government persisted in dictating their terms to the Ottomans who, they perceived, were still a long way from defeating them. The latter situation ruled out any possible peace solution anytime soon between the Ottomans and Italians.[264] The European powers put

[262] Ahmad, *From Empire to Republic*, 163-164. Mahmut Sevket Pasha resigned from the Ministry of War, followed by Sait Pasha, and a new Cabinet was formed under Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.
[263] Lewis, *The Middle East*, 337.
[264] David Herrmann, "The Paralysis of Italian Strategy in the Italian-Turkish War, 1911-1912." *English Historical Review* 104, no 411 (April 1989): 345.

serious pressure on Italy to come to terms with the Ottoman Empire rather than declare outright sovereignty.[265]

However, in order to shift the attention of the CPU government in Istanbul and weaken the resistance in *Trablus*, in April 1912 Italian warships bombarded the Dardanelles, and in May went on to occupy the Dodecanese Islands, while supporting the Albanians with military equipment. The unrest stimulated in the Balkans with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia worsened the situation. The CUP was hardly in a position to fight in all of its surrounding provinces at once. At the end of 1912, therefore, Istanbul had little choice but to abandon the Libyans to their own fate as the states in the Balkans were rallying their forces on the empire's land borders. In October, determined to settle the war with Italy, the CUP agreed in the Treaty of Ouchy (near Lausanne) to formally admit the loss of the Ottoman provinces of *Trablus* and *Benghazi*. The rebellion against the Italian occupation did not cease. Even after the start of World War I, Ottoman and German officers continued to support the rebellion secretly from *Benghazi*. Even after the end of the war, the rebellion was not completely suppressed, not until 1931.

The Arabs of the Middle East in World War I and the Arab Revolt

Abdulhamid's Islamization policies privileging the Arab provinces were designed to extend to eastern Arabia, Yemen, and the rest of the Arab peninsula, where he wanted to create a web of religious loyalty against the European threat.[266] The sultan believed that "the idea of an ethnic 'nation' and 'race' was preached by the English in order to divide the Turks and Arabs and incite uprisings in Arabia, Albania, and possibly Syria."[267] Thus, he applied policies to strengthen the Arab presence at the governmental level. According to Kayalı, "the Arab provinces were now designated as first rank and listed ahead of European or Anatolian provinces in official registers, and their governors were granted higher

[265] ibid.
[266] Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration," 98.
[267] Karpat, *Politization of Islam,* 177.

salaries."[268] The region was also integrated through a stretched communication line to the capital with the building of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Hejaz Railway, which connected the holy city of Medina with Damascus, and extended telegraphic communication parallel to the railway, ensuring the organization of the pilgrimage under his close supervision.[269] The Islamic unity promoted by Abdulhamid best served the interests of an emerging pan-Arab movement, for he feared that without the Ottoman military and political shield the Arabs would be fragmented into a variety of groups and be occupied by foreign powers.

Arab-Ottoman alienation was not apparent immediately after the 1908 Revolution. On the contrary, the months that followed it witnessed euphoric demonstrations of unity. Yet the CUP's policies for holding the empire together were intensified with the popular current of nationalism mainly constructed around language issues, which distanced the Arabs from the capital. The latter issues were modified with the increased European influence in the Arab provinces where Ottoman rule was destabilized, until the ultimate disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

This period of turbulent detachment from the empire, which overlapped with the CUP's reflexive alienation policies to protect the empire's integrity, created a vague sense of distrust against the Arabs among the Ottoman public. This was mostly covered in the classical Ottoman cartoon sphere, where Arabs had been depicted without being ethnically differentiated. Their symbolic representation would not classify them based on the groups they belonged to, but instead, with their *keffiyeh* and garb, they were the pawns of the Great Powers, particularly the British, in seeking their national aims, yet incapable of pursuing them.

The revolts in Yemen by the *Zaydi* tribes in 1904-1911 were especially damaging to the Ottomans and became one of the major problems for the CUP that had recently established the new government in Istanbul and had to deal with Macedonia and Albania at the same time, all requiring military inventions. Yemen

[268] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 27.
[269] ibid.

carried a strategic importance against the British expansion from India to the Red Sea and Arabia. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 strengthened the Ottoman decision to hold onto Yemen to counter a possible intervention from Egypt, which was under heavy British influence.

The rebellious Arabs of Yemen found space in Ottoman cartoons for the first time on the cover of a short-lived Western-style cartoon journal called *Alem,* in its seventh issue (Figure 3.21). Printed in both Ottoman Turkish and French, the cartoon's caption cartoon reads: *"Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid ad-Din: Please notify… Orders with the status of Emir… I claim the Zaydi territories"* and, *"Go and tell the Grand Vezir I do not want to be subservient because I am the master here."* Muhammad bin Yahya Hamid ad-Din was the zaydi imam of Yemen who led the resistance against the Ottoman occupation. Istanbul's extortions and maladministration discredited the Ottomans' popularity in the province, opening space for bin Yahya to expand his sphere of influence. The image of the Arab, however, was once more painted as uncivilized and backwards. The Emir of Yemen, with great regional influence, was illustrated in his traditional but crude outfit. The emphasis of backwardness was made even stronger in the depiction of his servants, who dressed in worn-out clothes and went barefoot.

Egypt under British control had a continuing connection and powerful sense of allegiance to the Ottoman Empire based on their long-established links embodied through many centuries of relationships, from the Mamluk to the Ottoman period.[270] However, much to the ire of the CUP government, Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, the last khedive of Egypt and Sudan, reportedly established secret contact with various Arab notables, including Sherif Husayn in the Hejaz, the Sanussis in Libya, and the Idrisis in Asir, to support the nationalist factions in order to proclaim their sovereignty.[271] Moreover, the British paid close attention

[270] James Jankowski, "Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism, 1908-1922." *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* eds. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammed Muslih, Reeva S. Simon (New York: Colombia University Press, 1991), 244-246.
[271] Donald M. McKale, "Influence without Power: The Last Khedive of Egypt and the Great Powers, 1914-18," *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 1 (January 1997): 21.

to Abbas's secretly run Arab and Islamic activities promoting an Arab nationalist movement in Egypt. Although influenced by the Young Turk revolution, such trends endangered the continuing relationships between Istanbul and its Arab provinces.

Papagalu's cartoons in *Hayal-i Cedid* were instrumental in deciphering the political complexities of current events through commonly accepted visual images to create a common perception. Thus, they deserve special attention. In this regard, his *Punch*-style cartoon published in May 1910 titled "*Mısır siyaset hazırası*" (Egypt's current politics) showed the actors that would determine political developments in Egypt, which would have a direct effect on the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent and the empire (Figure 3.22). Therefore, I find it important to analyze it before continuing with cartoons that depict Arabs or symbols related to Arabs.

The cartoon's background contains a pyramid and the sphinx as Egyptian cultural landmarks, and a mountain with palm trees on the opposite side as the landscape features. At the center of the cartoon an imperial carriage is pulled by an alligator, carrying the khedive of Egypt and Sudan, Abbas Hilmi II. The carriage represents Egypt, and the well-known alligator of the Nile, pulling the carriage, represents the people of Egypt. The alligator is chained to the car and the chariot driver holds its reins. The poorly dressed driver is a bandit, presumably symbolizing the nationalists, revolutionaries, trying to ride the alligator on a rugged road. On top of the carriage sits a woman in traditional dress, also chained to the car by her foot, embodying the longstanding elite families of Egypt. Next to her is her servant looking ahead to the ancient ruins. A figure representing the British is riding on the back of the carriage and trying to convince the woman of the advantages of British policies. At the same time a soldier representing British forces is grabbing the carriage by its back wheel and trying to prevent it from being taken by bandits. A character in a white cloak and hood (Papagalu?) is forcing the front wheel in the opposite direction, towards where the bandits are driving, and away from the European direction. Next to the car, on the ground, an

ibid. Jankowski, 247-248.

Egyptian cavalry officer (Abbas Hilmi?) rides his turtle, instead of a horse, heading away from the problems at his back.

Papagalu's mise-en-scene in regard to European politics was a significant example of Britain's longstanding policy over Arabia, which was still under the Ottoman rule. Fear of Russia controlling the Straits; the Ottomans' reliance on Germany as its European ally; and the empire's pan-Islamist position played an important role in Britain's development of its strategy in the region. Egypt and the Suez Canal were seen as a lifeline to India for the British, and they believed that the only way to secure these lay in taking a strong British stand in the Arab provinces and Fertile Crescent. On the eve of World War I, this stimulated British strategy in the Arab provinces of the empire in Hejaz. Britain developed contacts and negotiations with provincial leaders of the Arab peninsula and the Fertile Crescent who were familiar with the intellectual discourse of cultural nationalism. Arab leaders who were clear on the impact of the empire's failure saw the opportunity for a possible independent Arab monarchy through the support of the British. In addition, Ottoman defeats produced a rapprochement between the Syrian and Egyptian political elites as an alternative to the Ottomans.[272] Throughout the spring of 1915, rumors of the disloyalty of the Arab leader, the sherif of Mecca, and his ties to Britain had been spread publicly.[273] This was of course, part of the contingent circumstances of the war, which had not been known for certain before the war. However, this did not prevent cartoonists from making their satirical illustrations.

Karagöz commented on these political developments concerning the empire's Arab provinces in its May 1, 1915 issue, with a cartoon series by Halit Naci published on page three. The first cartoon depicts a lion frightening away a group of people who by their outfits seem to represent the various Muslim tribes of the Arab provinces. The figure wearing the Ottoman-style quilted turban represents, I suppose, the *şeyhülislam* as the supreme authority on issues of Islam, whose authority was undermined by the CUP throughout the secularization

[272] ibid. 20-39.
[273] ibid.

reforms.[274] As in many other cartoons, the lion represents the British, but in this cartoon, if one looks closely, in fact it is merely a lion's hide on the body of a donkey or ass. Halit Naci accuses the Muslims of being scared of a British paper tiger. His cartoon claims that the Arabs' or the Muslim world's fear was stimulated by British policies to such a degree that they wanted to run away and hide. In the background of the cartoon, the glorious Ottoman Army is nearing to chase the British away and save the Arabs, who are still seen as part of the *millet*. Naci believed that the Turkish army would be able to solve this situation in the near future. Karagöz and Hacıvad, watching the situation, enlighten the reader: "*Hacıvad-Kikiriki böyle aslan kılığında görüyorda, alem-i Islam senelerden beri büyük bir korku içinde kaçışıyor.*" (Hacıvad behind the hill: Seeing the scrawny thing in a lion suit like this, for years the Muslim world ran away from it out of fear).

In the second cartoon, the crowd symbolizing the Islamic world is positioned behind a hill, guarding themselves in fear and astonishment, looking at a Turkish officer taking the lion's hide off to expose a very weak, sickly looking donkey. He shows the donkey's guise to the crowd to assure them that there's nothing left to be afraid of. Karagöz in the legend replies to Hacıvad: "*Here is the Turkish hero taking the lion disguise off the scrawny thing! Come on, come on! Come and see the state of the donkey that made you tremble for years.*"[275]

Slowly the depiction of Arabs shifted. The cartoons demonstrate the contingent nature of historical developments, actually inviting us to reconsider linear and anachronistic narratives of this history. The heroic and fearless *Sanussiya* Arabs of North Africa who fought against the Great Powers, including the Italians and British that we encountered in previous cartoons, are now depicted as cowardly characters that run in fear from the same threat. The image of the Arabs thus gives its first signs of deterioration from being the loyal citizens of the empire to the politically influenced and unreliable subjects of an empire run by Turks.

[274] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 306.
[275] The cartoon uses the Ottoman Turkish word "*Kikirik,*" meaning scrawny and weak.

In the following cartoons where the Arabs or Arab territories were the subject, the image of the Arab, highly influenced by Orientalist notions, is depicted either as a camel or as a date tree in the desert, forming the background, to stress its backwards, uncivilized, and colonized/dominated nature, while the main powers would be portrayed physically in their appropriate military uniforms or cultural outfits.

With the start of World War I, scenes with reference to Arabs or *Arabistan* were altered in the way cartoonists formulated their cartoon space and symbolic indications. The struggle of the empire against its Arab citizens or provinces was now part of a bigger stage, in which the actors were the Great Powers. Thus, from the spring of 1914, most cartoons referred to the political or military events around Arabs shaped over the propagandas of Great Powers, where the traditional symbols of Arabia – palm trees, sands, tents, camels and such – become the only association between them and the Arabs.

As Medhurst and De Sousa claim, symbolism is the heartbeat of caricature, and condensation and displacement play a central role in the production and interpretation of political cartoons.[276] Symbols like visual images refer to something that is essential within them; therefore, they tend to carry their own significance, they substitute for the signified.

The graphic disposition of the symbols in terms of their compression played a significant role in the interpretation of political cartoons throughout their evaluation. It was the cartoonist's challenge to employ the proper techniques and symbolism to create the intended effect. At the beginning of the twentieth century, cartoonists were already experimenting with the basic principles of arrangement to have the most impact on readers. That issue was referred to in the first part of this chapter, where I tried to elaborate the technical and artistic differences that separated traditional Ottoman cartoonists from modern ones. As European cartoonists, the major method the Ottoman cartoonists used to convey their messages at a single glance and in a single frame were the contrast they created

[276] Medhurst and De Sousa, "Political Cartoons as Rhetorical Form, 198.

between competing ideologies, the contrast between the civilized and uncivilized, or the contrast between modern and traditional. These contrasts could be reflected in visual forms, between images and their captions, or between commonly accepted forms and the cartoonist's perception. These visual rhetorical forms would merge into symbolic forms in constructing the world of perceptions, and ideas.

Of course, symbols and their meanings tend to be modified as social values and experiences change. Cultural features or social behaviors may lose power or significance and can be discarded, modified, or replaced by the new ones. Thus, the old symbols of the Tanzimat period were redefined during the empire's political transition from despotism to constitutionalism, and a new set of symbols amalgamated with European political, social, and cultural notions was adopted. For the Ottoman reader, as Brummett mentioned, a symbol's effectiveness relied more on the level of the reader's familiarity than on its uniqueness.[277] This familiarity would be provided through repetition of the related attributes of the specific idea or quality that would later become the signifying image of that notion, and thus the latter would turn out to be an image that stood for or suggested something else by reason of relationship or association, "a visible sign of something invisible."[278]

In cases where the contested Arab provinces in the Middle East were the subjects of the cartoon, references were designed mainly around the geographic aspects, landmarks, and cultural landscapes, with little relation to physical human features.[279] Halit Naci's cartoon in Karagöz on the eve of WWI, dated March 23,

[277] Brummett*, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press*, 18-21.
[278] Definition under "Symbol." *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.*
[279] Among the cartoons studied that were subject to this chapter, most of them referring to the Arabs and Arab lands were illustrated symbolically through landmarks or cultural objects that would suddenly recall Arab imagery in the mind's eye. For Chapter 3, I examined 15 satirical magazines between 1908 and 1918. Four of them – *Kalem, Djem, Davul,* and *Alem* – were Western/European-style, while 12 – including *Karagöz, Hayal-i Cedid, BabaHimmet, Cadaloz,* and *Yeni Geveze* – were traditional-style gazettes. Among the 4,000 cartoons I looked at, only 36 referred to *Ak* Arabs. 25 of them were published in traditional-style satire journals, while only 11 were published in Western/European-style. For the traditional cartoons: 15 cartoons were published in *Karagöz*, 6 in *Hayal-i Cedid*, and 1 each in *Papagan*, *Baba Himmet*, *Cadaloz*, and *Yeni Geveze*. In Western/European cartoons: 9 cartoons were published in *Kalem*, and 2 were in *Djem*.

1914, represented the Ottoman Empire's German ally dressed in his military uniform trying to stand still and control a fully loaded camel that was irritated by a Russian officer (Figure 3.24). The camel represented the Arabs, most probably the *Sanussiya* resistance in *Trablus* that was uncontainable by the Great Powers. Karagöz, depicted next to the camel's head possibly symbolizing the Ottomans' long dominance of those lands, comments: *"Ah dear! How well you know how to irritate the camel!.. But you shouldn't forget that once the camel is irritated, it won't know its right from its left, and you'll end up getting the fiercest of the camel's kick."*

Another cartoon published in *Karagöz* in September 1915 shows the Ottoman aim to regain its lost North African territories from the Italians (Figure 3.25).[280] The North African Arabs of *Trablus* are illustrated here once more as a camel kicking the Italian figure back to the sea. The background of the cartoon is a desert with palm trees and a couple of North African-style domes in the far distance. The legend renders the situation thusly: *"You see Hacıvad? When Trablus kicks, the prankster can't survive here anymore!"* The heroic *Sanussi* Arab resistance, which had a human face in previous years, is now represented as an animal figure, a camel, instead of a full portrait with the strong physical features of the *Sanussiya* rebels.

In November 1915, a cartoon published in *Karagöz* addressed the campaign against the British for regaining Ottoman authority as part of their war strategy (Figure 3.26). The caption reads: *"You buffoon! Didn't I tell you not to raise your eyes for Egypt? Do you see what happens now, 42 will take you down so bad that you won't have a piece of Egypt left!"* German air attacks on the British Isles increased in 1915, raising the hopes of its allies, particularly the Ottomans, of reclaiming the lost territories of the empire. In the cartoon, Halit Naci draws a German officer straddling a 42cm barrel as if riding his horse towards the British protectorate of Egypt, symbolized through its historical landmarks, the pyramid

[280] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 311.

and the sphinx.[281] The cartoonist uses both figures as if he wants to be clear about the message he is delivering. Especially he clarifies the symbols by textually telling the reader what they stand for: "*Mısır*" (Egypt), to construct the connection between the symbol and the public's mind.

In a continuum, the same pyramids appear again in two more cartoons published during the following months in *Karagöz* (Figure 3.27 and Figure 3.28). Supporting and cheering the Ottoman struggle in the war, the cartoonist magnifies the Central Powers' attacks on the allies by depicting enemy powers as gravestones, symbolizing their defeat (Figure 3.27). The statues read from left to right*: Karabağ, Sırb, Belçika* (Montenegro, Serbia, Belgium). With the help of Karagöz (representing the Ottomans), the allied German officer buries them. The eyes then focus on the British officer in the background who holds his hand as if wiping tears from his eyes while walking away from the set of pyramids in the back of the cartoon space along with palm trees. In the caption, Karagöz clarifies the situation: *"These who were glorious! We erected their statues! Now let's go and finish up that bean pole over there, it's his turn!"*

As we have seen before (Figure 3.24), Halit Naci praised the Ottoman army's struggle against its enemies. The use of European symbolism was strongly influential in delivering these messages. In a February 1916 cartoon, the narrator magnifies the exaltation of Turks and the Turkish Army (Figure 3.28). A heroic Turkish soldier sits on top of a lion holding a spear as if he were a knight in a duel, symbolizing his courage and strength. He is challenging the newly appointed sultan of Egypt, who hides behind a British figure. Both of the latter are sitting on top of Papagalu's alligator of the Nile, symbolizing the people of Egypt bridled by the British, while the pyramids in the background indicate Egypt itself. The Turkish soldier approaches from the other side of a stream signifying the Suez Canal. The caption describes the scene as, *"Look son, do you think that a filthy scrawny thing like him and the man hiding behind him can resist the attacks of two such roaring lions? Don't you see how they are cowed?"* The position of

[281] 42cm written on the barrel represents "Big Bertha," the nickname of a super-heavy mortar developed by German arms maker Krupp on the eve of World War I.

Karagöz and Hacivad behind the pyramids indicates the cartoonist's possible belief that Egypt feels like it belongs to the imaginary Ottoman *vatan*.

As argued by Jankowski, the overall Egyptian attitude during the early years of World War I was to support the German-Ottoman cause in the hope that a possible Ottoman German victory would entail Egyptian liberation from British occupation.[282] With the war's outbreak, Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, who supported the Arab nationalism inspired by the Young Turks, sided with the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, the British declared Egypt a protectorate (which meant formally adding a territory to British sovereignty under a subordinate ruler), deposed Abbas Hilmi as the khedive of Egypt and Sudan, and appointed his uncle Hussein Kamal the new sultan of Egypt, who declared annulment of Egypt and Sudan's nominal ties to the Ottoman Empire. The cartoon positions the Ottoman (Turkish) army as the savior of the Egyptians from the expansionist ambitions of the Great Powers, bringing forward the revolutionary spirit of the Young Turks to fight the despotism of the rulers.

We encounter only one more cartoon in April 1916 touching on the Arabs and the issues facing them (Figure 3.29). The cartoon emphasizes the Egyptian campaign where Turkish soldiers are using the bayonets of their rifles to poke a British officer on top of a palm tree. In the caption, Karagöz asks the British: *"Didn't you ask for the song called: 'Didn't I tell you not to climb this wall?' What are you doing here without considering your miserable condition?"* Once more, the British are represented as the aggressor in Arabia. The Ottoman Army, on the other hand, is the savior. The Arabs are represented by the traditional palm tree, which has almost been captured by the British officer. The point here, as in the previous cartoons, is that the Arabs, with their personified physical features, do not appear. They are represented by the attributes of the landmarks. From seeing the pyramids, the palm trees, and an alligator, the reader reflexively perceives the scene through the "mind's eye" as Egypt. Here especially there are no Arab soldiers fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with the Turks, but the cartoon creates the impression that there are.

[282] Jankowski, "Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism," 253.

Karagöz, the main mouthpiece of the traditionalist cartoonists, was the only major satirical journal that continued its publication uninterrupted throughout the war years. It is mainly here that we encounter cartoons touching on the Arabs and Arab territories. Unfortunately, modernist satire production was suspended with the closure of their forerunners *Djem* and *Kalem*, and we do not see any contribution to the visual construction of the Arab image through modernist symbolism. *Karagöz* supported the war effort and the unity of the empire throughout the period, even when the Ottoman army faced major setbacks. Neither the Arab revolt of 1916 nor the issues over Arab nationalist movements found space in *Karagöz* or its followers.

Fighting shoulder-to-shoulder against the initial threats of the European powers strengthened the bonds between Turks and Arabs before the Great War. This bond was shaken when these wars were lost. The defeat of Ottoman forces in North Africa and the Balkans directly affected the Arabs' status. Their perception for being part of the Ottoman Empire's imaginary *vatan* weakened while their aspirations for Arab nationalism strenghten. But despite this, and regardless of the debates over language issues that highlighted the distinctions between Arabs and Turks, bringing concepts of Arab nationalism to the forefront, the *ak* Arabs of the Middle East were loyal to the empire at the beginning of WWI.

Yet this would change in the subsequent years. The changing war conditions created a feeling of uncertainty among Arab leaders, who saw an opportunity in the shifting political order. Thus, they adopted cautious war policies that caused the Ottomans to take harsh measures in the Arab provinces. Cemal Pasha, one of the main figures in the CUP (along with Talat and Enver Pashas), was appointed to Damascus to lead the Egyptian offensive against the British. His failure to achieve this goal set off a wide range of executions among the Arab intellectuals whom he believed cooperated with the British. His violent reaction strengthened the idea of a free Arab nation among some Arab leaders, especially Sherif Husayn of Mecca and his son Faisal, who initiated the Arab Revolt in 1916. After the Arab nationalist movement was triggered, Arab provinces fell in quick succession, one after the other.

> In 1914 imperial and international political circumstances led Sherif Husayn to pursue opportunities other than those emanating from a close identification with Istanbul that would enhance his personal power and prestige. Aided by the Ottoman government's fateful entanglement in the hostilities of the World War, this pursuit culminated in a revolt in the Hejaz in June 1916 that weakened Ottoman resistance to Allied incursions and raised hopes for independence and nationhood among the Arabs of the empire. Insofar as the collapse of Ottoman power was the strongest factor in the growth of political Arab nationalism, Sherif Husayn was one of its heroes for having led the revolt that facilitated the British invasion of Syria and Palestine.[283]

Conclusion

The cartoons of the Second Constitutional era depicting Arabs were shaped around the struggle with the European powers, rather than the dissolving provinces of the empire, or the government itself. European powers and their aggression and hypocrisy in gaining control of the former Ottoman provinces constituted the central point of the cartoons. The colonized or provoked local actors of the drama, at first depicted with human faces in local dress, were later represented by cartoonists through symbolic forms such as landmarks, animals, or cultural attributes in graphic imagery.

The semiotic attributes connected to political powers made landscape symbolism one of the primary tools of persuasive technique and propaganda among the Second Constitutional period's cartoonists. Not settled with clear definitions of nation and homeland, they found themselves in a quandary: how to portray those who were outsiders and insiders at the same time – part of the empire, but not quite part of the nation – in multi-layered cartoons in a manner that crystallized geopolitical signs, highlighting particular politico-administrative boundaries, territories, and territorial visions at a time when ideological experiments such as Westernization, Ottomanism, and Islamism, in line with currently emerging ideas of nationalism and Turkism, were competing with one other.

The period of Yemenite insurgencies to the Libyan war to the Balkan wars and finally to the end of WWI could be defined as a time of "occultation" or "gestation" for the Ottoman cartoon sphere with regards to Arab stereotypes. After

[283] Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks,* 187-203.

a heroic interlude during the pre-war years, the Arab as a human figure disappears from view, and is replaced by the attributes of the land. The reason is, precisely, that the Arab no longer fits any of the recognizable stereotypes. He is in limbo: neither an insider nor an outsider, neither an ally nor an enemy. This reflects on the one hand the internal changes and confusion in the imperial center about identity issues, and on the other external developments – Arab nationalism, collusion with the imperial powers, a sense of betrayal. The one aspect that did not change, whether they were friend or foe, is the continuous depiction of Arabs in uncivilized costumes representing both a cultural opposite that exists in the same empire geographically, and a cultural self, an echo of a former, less developed state of one's own civilization. Cartoonists as the new codifiers of the idea of a nation based on Turkishness understood that the new formation under the CUP sought to bury its "near distant" in an uncivilized past to serve the solidarity of the empire, where the Arabs would rather be situated as the Other. They, of course, did not intend to create the "Other," and most probably did not think in these terms. They were merely interpreting their reality, which was chaotic to them as much as any reality is chaotic to its contemporaries. Yet this is what cultivated the perception of the Arab as the Other for the coming decades.



Figure 3.1

Front and Back cover pages of *Kalem*

Kalem, 19 May 1911



Figure 3.2

First pages from both sides, Ottoman and French sections, *Djem*

Djem, 18 January 1910

Figure 3.3

The general view of popular *Karagöz* magazine.

Karagöz, 14 December 1910

Cemil Cem,
Cem, 11 November 1910



Scarcelli,
Kalem, 20 November 1910

Figure 3.4

Figure 3.5

[In Ottoman] *The last page of our constitution!*
[In French] *Let's unite! Let's unite!*

Alem, 18 March 1909

Figure 3.6

"Interior Minister's interior"

A. Scarcelli,
Kalem, 6 April 1911

Figure 3.7

On the road to Sana, following a new rebellion
-What do you calculate?
-I wonder how many lieutenant's salaries are equivalent to two hundred pounds.

Cemil Cem,
Djem, 8 April 1911

Figure 3.8

The commander who will go farther apart to keep looking left and right all the time.

A. Rigopoulos,
Kalem, 9 February 1911

Figure 3.9

[In Ottoman] It is being too much, one each to the right and left.
[In French] What is this fate that always drags my shoes on the rocks of Albania and on the sands of Yemen?

A. Rigopoulos,
Kalem, 6 April 1911

Figure 3.10

For the revolts of Malisor and Yemen
Karagöz- Look Hacıvad! they will start quarreling with each other as soon as they realize, we are taking them safely to the shore

Halit Naci
Karagöz, 9 August 1911

Figure 3.11

Foreign Languages in Egypt
Egypt [Ottoman]- I ended up without a tongue!
Egypt [French]- So, what should I do with this one?

C.P.
Kalem, 19 January 1911

Figure 3.12

"Bulgare: en fourbe je connu l'heure propice et je me creai le petit czar" (Bulgarian: By deceit I knew the favorable moment and I declaired myself small czar),
"Serbe: Si je puisse devenir puissant je veux embrasser mes belle ravies." (Serbian: If I can become powerful I want to embrace my delighted beauties.)
"Montenegrin: Je m'appuyé aux grand parentes qui ne fairaient Roi." (Montenegrin: I applied to the grandparents who will make me king?)
"Italien: Malgré ceux qui ne le croient pas j'embrasserais mes freres non-redimés." (Italian: In spite of those who do not believe I would embrace my unredeemed brothers.)
"Roumain: L'espere de la voir bien claire pour la division de l'empire et de la Madgyre." (Romanian: The hope of seeing her clearly for the division of the empire and Hungary.)
"Polonais: Je priai toujours et à rien ce valut priez à present vous pour moi." (Poles: I always prayed and nothing was worth it now you should pray for me.)
"Hongrois: Je suis orguielleux de moi faire un roi." (Hungarian: I'm proud to make myself a king.)
"Espagnol: Je pense que abandonnai l'ile de cub et à present ne se prend plus de tabac." (Spanish: I think abandoned Cuban island And at present will take no more tobacco?"
"Russe: Plus payé de retour à double, le knut sera le repas de l'ours."(Russian: More paid back double, the Knut would be the meal of the bear.)
"Français: Je compte des amis en paix et en guerre en elles m'attende la vie en commun." (French: I count on friends in peace and war as they wait for me in a life together.)
"Anglais: Roi de tous les mers. Je tende au vigilant pussan de la terre la main." (English: King of all seas. I extend my hand to the vigiland powers on land. "
"Allemand: Je somme les heures et l'arme d'une guerre fatale." (German: I count the hours and the weapons for a fatal war.)

Papagalu,
Hayal-i Cedid, 13 July 1910

Figure 3.13

[Ottoman] -Rats pour on cheese left in the open!
[French] -Cheese that temps the rodents well

C.P.,
Kalem, 29 November 1910



Figure 3.14

Musavver Papaghan, 17 October 1911



Figure 3.15

Karagöz- We won't let you eat even one of the dates, keep moving, and you'll get your lesson!

Halit Naci,
Karagöz, 13 September 1911

Figure 3.16

Hacivad- Karagöz, hit it on the head so it staggers and drops it! Look at the dog! it grabs the best part! (It reads 'Trablus' (Tripolitania) on the meat]

Karagöz, 4 October 1911

Figure 3.17

-Babahimmet, do you think Tripolitanians could resist against these modern guns and arms? –If the local government agrees on supporting and aiding, the modern power won't mean much would it? And if the Tripolitanians take the strength of their loyalty power from such sticks, then they can overcome anything.

Cevat Nuri,
Baba Himmet, 25 September1911

Figure 3.18

Karagöz- what is that filthy thing at the tip of your hunting rifle?
Tripolitanian- Carcass?
Karagöz- if it is a carcass, don't you wait and throw away the filthy thing quickly!

Halit Naci
Karagöz, 18 October 1911

Figure 3.19

Karagöz- C'mon Hacıvad, there is still some more litter left down here, lets sweep them away!

Halit Naci
Karagöz, 11 November 1911

Figure 3.20

"Around peace!"
Karagöz- Hey senior! You are too light when you are alone. Watch out, you'll roll down… I would recommend you to ask help from the one who stands in the middle, but seems like she turned her face away from you as well!

Yeni Geveze, 29 April 1912

Figure 3.21

[In Ottoman]Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid ad Din- Please notify… Orders with the status of Emir… I claim for the Zaydi territories!

[In French]- Go and tell the Grand Vezir I do not want to be subservient because I am the master here.

Alem, 3 April 1909

Figure 3.22

Egypt's political assembly!

Papagalu
Hayal-i Cedid, 18 May 1910

Figure 3.23

Hacıvad [behind the hill] - Seeing the scrawny in a lion suit like this, the world of Islam runs away from it with fear for years…

Karagöz- Here is the Turkish hero taking the lion's costume off the scrawny! Come on, come on! Come and see the state of the donkey that made you tremble for years!

Halit Naci
Karagöz, 1 May 1915

Figure 3.24

Karagöz- Ah dear! How well you know how to irritate the camel!..However, you shouldn't forget that once the camel is irritated, it won't know its right from its left, and you'll end up having the heaviest of the camel's kick!

Karagöz, 23 March 1914



Figure 3.25

Karagöz- You see Hacıvad? When Trablus kicks, the prankster cannot survive here anymore!

Karagöz, 1 September 1915

Figure 3.26

Karagöz- You buffoon! Didn't I tell you not to raise eyes for Egypt? Do you see what happens now, 42 will take you down in such a way you won't have a piece of Egypt!

Halit Naci
Karagöz, 3 November 1915



Figure 3.27

Karagöz [to German ally]- These who were glorious! We erected their statues! Now, let's go and finish that bean pole over there, it is his turn!)

Karagöz, 4 December 1915

Figure 3.28

Karagöz [to British]- Look son, do you think that a filthy scrawny like him and the man hiding behind can resist the attacks of two such roaring lions? Don't you see how they are baffled?

Karagöz, 2 February 1916

Figure 3.29

Karagöz [to Brit]- Didn't you ask for the song named: 'Didn't I tell you not to climb this wall?' What are you doing here without considering your miserable condition?

Karagöz, 26 April 1915

Chapter Four

Empire to Republic: Re-Shaping the Image of the Arab

Introduction

The Ottoman revolution of 1908 was largely inspired by the liberal ideas of representative government that undermined the principles of dynastic absolutism. Yet nationalism and nation-building, which had become the survival strategy for the old empire, threatened the delicate configuration among its polyglot subjects.[284] The exiled young officers and intellectuals that would form the political elite of the coming decades were filled with patriotic terms such as *millet* (nation) that acquired new meanings. Unlike the traditional Ottoman ruling class who would use the term *Turk* for the peasants of Anatolia, they defined themselves as Young Turks, a name foisted on them by their European hosts. Their goal was the transformation of the crumbling Empire into a modern state based on a shared sense of commitment among its citizens and with sufficient military and political strength to halt the encroachments of European powers. Very shortly after their takeover, however, the ensuing struggle between the centralist and federalist factions of the Young Turks set the stage for a party dictatorship of the centralist group known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The ideal of common citizenship was soon undermined as the CUP attempted to conceptualize Ottomanism with Turkish nationalism, and also by the secessionist leanings of non-Turkish groups such as the Arab nationalists following the British-supported Arab revolt in 1916.[285]

The Turkism-centered politics of the CUP found their manifestation in the cartoon sphere as well. Starting with the war against Italy in *Trablus* and

[284] Stephen Berger & Aleksey Miller, "Nation-building and regional integration, c. 1800-1914: the role of empires," *European Review of History-Revue Européen d'Histoire* 15, no 3 (June 2008): 317-330.
[285] Some sources would argue that the revolt was a response to the repression of the Arabs. See Eliezer Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I* (London: Frank Cass Publication, 1993). Kral Abdullah, *Biz Osmanlıya Neden İhanet Ettik?* (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2006).

Benghazi (modern Libya), cartoonists faced a characteristic dilemma between continuing to antagonize society and criticize the government engaged in crucial wars or uphold the empire and attenuate their critique against its government. What we have labeled “the modernist wing” carried on the main responsibility of cartoonists as critics of the government, while "the traditionalists” preferred to support the empire’s war policies. They decided to put their pens and brushes at the service of the CUP government and to fight the enemy in their own way. Their main purpose was to prove the superiority of the Ottoman Empire in a war, which was conceived not only as a battle of arms, but also as a war of ideologies, a war between modern and backwards, civilized and uncivilized. Yet, this definitely did not mean the modernists were not defending the empire’s interests; they were just sticking to the artistic and ideological credentials of cartooning for the sake of satire. The stereotypes of the empire started to be re-imagined through the pens of cartoonists around these definitions.

The emerging “Arab” stereotype was blurrier than that of other ethnic groups throughout World War I. Until the end of the war, Arabs were being gradually excluded from the Ottoman collective as it turned into a Turkish collective. Yet the empire’s territorial claim over the Arab lands persisted for some time. Perhaps as a result of the unclear status of the Arabs, throughout this time, cartoonists tended to shelve and set aside the ethnic rifts of the Arab stereotype in favor of an assumed unity necessitated by the Great War. Therefore, I believe it would make more sense to look at the re-emergence of the Arab stereotype through the pens of Turkish cartoonists in the post-Ottoman Middle East at a slightly later period, during the construction of the Turkish Republic. Although it is necessary to give a brief background of the cartoon space during the War of Independence, I believe the real focus in the re-creation of the Arab stereotype lies in the making of a new nation and the creation of its collective memory. As the new Turkish nation defined its borders that partially included prior Ottoman Arab lands, once-suppressed Arab stereotypes, such as those depicted in the *Karagöz* and *Hacıvat* shadow theatre, reappeared on stage, but this time in a more hybrid form. The new Arab image resurfaced around the rhetoric surrounding the final border settlements of once-Ottoman lands.

Political and Military Turmoil from the end of World War I

As WWI drew to a close, the empire found itself in the middle of a national struggle and a war for its very survival. Arabs' detachment from the Ottoman world and its sultan/caliph fueled their desire for independence.[286] The idea was given impetus by the rival imperial forces, especially Britain, which was looking for a possible opportunity to implement its long-term goal of dominating the region.[287] These objectives of parceling out the Ottoman lands in the post-war Middle East were reflected in a secret agreement among British and French government representatives in June 1916, with the blessing of imperial Russia. This agreement was named after its signatories, Mark Sykes of the Arab Bureau (Cairo) of Britain and French diplomat François Georges Picot. The agreement gave France the coastal areas of Syria (including Lebanon) and an exclusive zone of influence in inland Syria up to and including the oil-rich Ottoman province of Mosul. Britain was to be given the provinces of Baghdad and Basra, with an adjacent zone of influence to the west and Mediterranean outlets at Acre and Jaffa. Palestine was to be internationalized except for these two ports, but how it would be administered was left vague. The inland areas were to be handed over to an Arab kingdom (or kingdoms), which would coincide partially with the zones of influence of France and Britain, leaving imperial Russia with eastern Anatolia, including Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, Bitlis and a large part of the northern Kurdish area from Muş and Siirt to the Iranian border.[288] The agreement remained secret until the post-Russian Revolution Bolshevik government, which had no interest in keeping Czarist Russia's secrets, made it public.

The main reason for the secrecy, it seems, was the agreement's contradiction of promises made earlier by the British (by Sir Henry McMahon,

[286] Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism*, 72.
[287] Rashid Rida, in his memoirs, refers to the CUP's betrayal of Arabs and Islam, and he commends Sharif Hussein for revolting against the CUP and France and Britain for providing safe routes for the transportation of *hadjis* to Mecca. Reşid Rıza, *Ittihad-i Osmani'den Arap İsyanına* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2007), 246.
[288] David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Comp, 2009), 194-196. Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 320-322. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building,* 143-144.

British high commissioner in Cairo) to the Arab leaders (mainly to Sharif Hussein of Hejaz, and to Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud).[289] Unaware of these empty promises, Mecca's Sharif Hussein revolted against Ottoman rule in 1916 with the support of the British. Despite the fact that the Ottoman military under Cemal Pasha's rule was taking harsh measures against the Arabs around Hejaz, and that Sharif Hussein of Mecca was agitating the surrounding population for an Arab nation, it appears that most of the Arab population kept their loyalty to the Ottoman government.

> A British Intelligence memorandum based on interviews with captured Arabic-speaking officers in prisoner-of-war camps reported that most of the officers actually supported the Young Turks, and that even the minority who did not were "unable to square their consciences with a military revolt in the face of the enemy."[290]

Be that as it may, the Arab Revolt of Sharif Hussein ended up being the major constitutive event in the construction of the Republican period's Turkish perception of Arabs.

The Great War ended with the downfall of the Central Powers. The Mondros Treaty was signed with the British government in 1918, surrendering remaining Ottoman garrisons outside Anatolia, allowing the Allies the right to control the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and granting them the right to occupy "in case of disorder" any Ottoman territory. The Ottoman Army was completely demobilized, and all ports, railways, and other strategic points were made available for the use of the Allies. Following the disarmament of the defeated powers, a peace conference took place in Paris in 1919 to set the terms for the Central Powers. By 1920, with the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, the Ottoman Empire was officially declared a defeated power, stripped of its Arab provinces, with its territories occupied by British, French, Italian, and Greek

[289] In the famous correspondence between Sir McMahon and King Hussein, known as the McMahon Letters, McMahon divides Arabia into four parts among the Arab chiefs, including both Hussein and ibn Saud. "That left only Arabia, which at the time was divided among a number of leaders, of whom Hussein was one. Britain at the time enjoyed treaty relationships with other Arabian chiefs, including Hussein's rival, Ibn Saud. In his letter, McMahon pointed out that he could not promise anything to Hussein that would prejudice Britain's relationships with other Arab chiefs. By process of elimination, therefore, Britain did not bind herself to support Hussein's claims anywhere at all." Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace,* 183-184.
[290] ibid., Fromkin, 210.

armies. The Ottoman sultan was allowed to keep his title and seat in Istanbul, while in the interior lands of Anatolia a War of Independence raged. Mustafa Kemal, as the leader of the Turkish national movement, proclaimed the new borders of the new Turkish Republic that denounced the Treaty of Sevres and the Ottoman government in Istanbul. A Grand National Assembly (Parliament) headed by Mustafa Kemal adhered and organized resistance throughout the post-war lost territories. From 1919 to 1923, the national struggle succeeded through a War of Independence (*İstiklâl Savaşı*) against an array of Greek and Western forces, and finally drew six hundred years of Ottoman rule to its official end.

The new state had limited power and prestige not only domestically but internationally as well. The borders declared by the *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact) in 1920 determined, *mutatis mutandis*, the confines of the new nation that were recognized internationally by the end of 1923.[291] Kemal had two main arguments in setting the national borders. Firstly, the borders had to include the area fought for and defended by the Ottoman Army at the time of the armistice. This border defined the part of the mainland inhabited by Turks and Kurds, leaving the Arab provinces to the south of the frontier.[292] Secondly, parting with the Arab provinces did not seem to be a priority issue for Kemal and for the national struggle's leading members, who wanted the new nation to take its place among the civilized nations. The bad memories of the war fought in *Arabistan* were still fresh in the minds of many intellectuals like Falih Rıfkı Atay. These memories created a sense of sacrifice by the Ottoman government among its officers. These very same memories kept these young officers, who became the rulers of a new nation, from trying to claim *Arabistan* when establishing the new nation.[293] Experiences of Arabs as hostile and untrustworthy were also echoed in the works of other intellectuals who had first-hand familiarity with the situation in the south-

[291] Kemal H. Karpat. *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), 4.
[292] Zücher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building*, 227-228.
[293] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytindağı* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1938). Falih Rıfkı Atay, "İştah." *Eski Saat* (Istanbul: Akşam Matbası, 1933), 50-51. In his story, he draws a demonic and highly sexualized image of the Arab as "a glossy dark and greasy appetite that drinks water from one morning to the next, sweats from all of his hair, and his lust coils up like a snake on his female lizard, and relaxes."

eastern front, such as Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Refik Halid Karay, Reşat Nuri Gültekin, and Kemal Tahir.[294]

With the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the international community recognized the Turkish government and Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its president. The new nationalist ruling elite, ideologically committed to carrying the new Turkish society to the level of modern civilizations, to use the terminology of the period, set to work to construct Turkey's "own high culture and state, against the pre-existing imperial center."[295] The future of the Arab populations in the frontier provinces was left for later resolution. Mustafa Kemal and his associates were aware of the fact that the society they inherited from the Ottoman Empire was in effect a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic body, a fact that formed a challenge in the process of nation-building. At the same time, the strong Islamic texture of the society would not easily permit the cutting of its ties with traditions adapted from Arab-Islamic culture and, accordingly, would not willingly let a new "modern" perception of statehood take shape.

This confusion about the character of the new state – its relation to its Ottoman antecedents and to Islam – is perfectly illustrated by *Resimli Gazete* (Gazette Photographic) in its fourth issue (29 Eylul 1339; September 29, 1923). On the cover the gazette offers a collage of the participants of Treaty of Lausanne. Mustafa Kemal's portrait as the savior of the Turkish people and founder of the Turkish Republic is placed squarely at the top center, with two Turkish soldiers proudly standing on each side, one representing the land forces, the other the naval forces. The way the portrait is placed suppresses the other figures illustrated in the composition, as if taking over. Below Kemal's portrait stands a depiction of the Suleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul as the second-largest image, representing the religious nature of the former empire. Just beneath the mosque, on Kemal's opposite side, Sultan Vahdettin is portrayed in a slightly smaller size. The

[294] Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Bir Sürgün* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1945). Refik Halid Karay, *Sürgün* (Istanbul: Inkılap ve Aka Kitapevi, 1964). Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Gurbet Hikayeleri* (Istanbul: Semih Lütfü Kitapevi, 1940). Reşat Nuri Güntekin, *Çalıkuşu* (Istanbul: Inkılap Kitapevi, 1963). Kemal Tahir, *Yorgun Savaşçı* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968).
[295] Ahmad. *The Making of Modern Turkey,* 53. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 67.

portraits of the eight other participants are aligned with him and on both sides of the mosque in small frames (Figure 4.1). The title of the illustrated article is “The first grand chief of the Turkish Republic.” On page three of the same newspaper, Emir Abdullah, the son of Sharif Hussein of Hejaz, is criticized for his betrayal, yet not of the Ottoman government, but of Islam (Figure 4.2). The article “Abdullah’s crown is shaking” has the sub-heading, “An emir punished for betraying Islam: Abdullah.”

During this constructive period, Mustafa Kemal belittled the concepts of multi-ethnicity and religion that constituted the basis of Ottoman rule, and emphasized "Turkishness" as the cornerstone of the new republic. After all, “Turk” was the term used by the majority of Western society for the once-exiled ambitious young intellectuals and officers of the empire (along with its other meanings, including Ottoman and Muslim). This attempt to adapt Turkey to the norms of Western nation-states and to construct a sense of homogeneous nationhood required the exclusion of non-Turkish cultural elements woven into society and their replacement by the values of a single ethnicity and the secular West.

Starting in 1923, the new government introduced a series of political, cultural, social, and economic reforms under *Kemalist* ideology that aspired to solidify the construction of the new Republic and to substitute the notions of an inclusive Islamic identity and Ottomanism with ones of a modern, secular nation-state.[296] The first modification towards this aim was the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 by the Grand National Assembly and the acceptance of a secular constitution instead. These were the opening shots of a grand project of social engineering starting with the creation of a new generation from scratch, which conceived of itself as a “nation” and seemed to have left the religious and non-

[296] “Kemalist ideology represented the six fundamental and unchanging principles of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionism. These principles became the six arrows of the People’s Republic Party [a.k.a. Republican People’s Party], the symbol in its emblem.” Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey,* 63.

Turkish values out of the context of "Turkishness."[297] Thus, each step taken towards the construction of a new Turkish identity would make the line separating Turks from Arabs bolder.[298]

Adoption of the Roman alphabet and the continuous process of stripping the language of its Arabic and Farsi components crowned the crucial stage of the reforms. Arabic – script and language – was embedded in every level of Ottoman culture that passed through the sieve of Islam and tied the two cultures together during the preceding centuries.[299] Thus, the new Turkish leadership felt that without reforming the language, a complete transformation of society could not be achieved and a common national identity would not be built. In 1928, the Grand National Assembly voted in favor of accepting the new Roman alphabet and started a mass educational mobilization campaign.[300]

Such reforms meant to separate Turkishness from its attachments to Islam and Ottomanism found an even clearer expression in the way relations were conducted across the new borders. Past Ottoman provinces were now fighting to win their independence from the mandate powers and transforming themselves into nations within their own set boundaries. The Ottoman *vilayet*s of Damascus and Aleppo became Syria, while the Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad *vilayet*s became Iraq, both neighbors of Turkey. The intermittent resistance of the Arabs in Palestine against British rule and Jewish settlements continued, while in

[297] Mustafa Kemal defined "nation" as "the body of people who live together on the same piece of land, with the unity of same ethics and language and who comply with the same set of laws." Seyfettin Turan. "Millet." *Atatürk'de Konular Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul:Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 384. *Atatük Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. VI, 338-346: "Millet, aynı toprak parçası üzerinde oturan, aynı yasalara tabii, ahlak ve dil birliği halinde yaşayan insan topluluğuna denir." Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society*, 4.

[298] Steps such as abolition of the Caliphate, changes in attire and headwear, conversion to the Gregorian calendar and time system, acceptance of the civil code, and the closure of sufi lodges and orders *(tekke ve tarikât)*.

[299] Arabic had a mystical and sometimes even esoteric relationship as well as religious connection with the traditions and beliefs of the Ottoman public. Mehmet Akif Ersoy's father called him "Ragıyf," pointing to the year he was born according to the *Ebced Hesabı* (esoteric numerology system based on the numerical values of the Arabic alphabet). Mehmet Akif Ersoy, *Sahafat* ed. Ertuğrul Düzdağ (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 2006), 23.

[300] M. Şakir Ülkütaşır, *Atatürk ve Harf Devrimi* (Ankara: Atatürk Türk Dil ve Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1973), 64-65.

Transjordan the Hashemite dynasty founded a new kingdom.[301] As an actor of the international order itself, the government of Turkey, which controlled the country from 1923 to 1945 under the single-party rule of the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party, or RPP), remained neutral, almost oblivious to developments occurring in neighboring Arab nations, and limited its relations to the diplomatic minimum.

All the inimical pre-war memories depicting the Arabs as a barrier to progress were thus transferred to the Republican period in a more radical form. The word Arab came to be perceived as a pejorative for tradition and even betrayal among the Turkish-speaking public, worn out by a hard and unremitting war for survival.302 Thus, by conscious policy from above and by popular sentiment from below, in literature and politics, in popular culture and in the media, "the Arab" was being constructed as the ultimate "Other."[303]

The Cartoon Space from Empire to Republic

The war years were disastrous for the Ottoman Empire. The land loss was enormous, and the human loss was even more painful, of which Ottoman Muslim casualties were only part of the story. The satirical space was devastated as well; it was directly damaged under the financial woes of the war. Most of the journals ceased publishing. Only one satirical paper, *Karagöz* (1908-1935), was published during the Great War period (1914-1918). It was a well-established journal with a wide circle of distribution limited to Istanbul like the rest of the print media, addressing middle-class readership and claiming an unbiased (or, to be more precise, uncritical) account of current affairs. This latency period in the cartoon

[301] 1936-1939 Arab Revolt.
[302] I use the word "tradition" here as a connection or reminder of the pre-Republican period. The meaning does not refer to the long continuing daily habits of Turkish social life.
[303] The painful memories of Arab revolt during World War I can be traced in Turkish folk music. *Yemen Türküsü* is one of them. The song is an anonymous folk song, which tells how tough Yemeni soil was and how those who went to Yemen never came back. It makes reference to *Huş Kalesi* (a castle located on the hills of Yemen's Mt. Huş) as the final line of defense of the Ottoman Army, where many soldiers died in battle with Arabs.

space ended with the publishing of *Diken* (as the successor to the long-shuttered *Djem* and *Kalem*) following the armistice of Mundros, in 1918, saving *Karagöz* from its loneliness. It can be said that all the other cartoon journals published throughout that period, including *Diken,* published in a style deliberately similar to *Karagöz*. The resemblences created a sense of continuation between these journals. This was partially caused due to the financial concerns of the limited number of cartoonists in the capital, who sometimes worked for more than one journal, alongside *Karagöz.*[304] In the complex transition to another political period, shifting from empire to nation, the two main lines of cartoonists and cartoon magazines remained the same. *Karagöz* continued its populist, traditionalist, and largely pro-government rhetoric until the early 1950s with almost the same group of cartoonists. Whereas the line that connected *Diken* to *Güleryüz*, to *Aydede*, and finally to *Akbaba,* however, carried a cluster of prominent cartoonists that travelled from one journal to another, representing a Western-influenced artistic and literary discourse conveying their messages.

During this period, around twenty-two satirical journals were published. The most prominent were *Karagöz* (1908-1950), *Diken* (1918-1919), *Güleryüz* (1921-1923), *Aydede* (1922), *Âyine* (1921-1923), *Akbaba* (1922-1977), *Zümrdüanka* (1923-1925), *Kelebek* (1923-1924), and *Karikatür* (1936-1948).

The design of all of these magazines was similar – they were politically and socially motivated satires, although the humor they contained was fairly lowbrow. The body of each magazine was based around three main content types: short articles, poems, and black-cut illustrations – small prints which accompanied puns either in the text or underneath. *Karagöz*, unlike the others, used a particular authorial voice, a kind of text-over, using Karagöz and Hacıvad as symbols of society, and as detached watchers of the process of history. All of the magazines, "traditional " as well as "Westernized," offered a satirical voice on political affairs, and hoped that whichever government they supported would fulfill the promises of an imagined nation, whether an Ottoman or Turkish one.

[304] Refik Halit Karay, "Teşebbüsü Şahsi mi? Heyhat!" *Kirpinin Dedikleri* (Istanbul: Semih Lütfü Kitapevi, 1940), 12.

For most of the period from 1918 to 1923, the truncated Ottoman Empire had a dual governmental structure: A government in collaboration with occupying forces in Istanbul, and a revolutionary government with a land army in Ankara. This duality was transferred to the press as well. Two opposing groups were formed based on their attitude towards the occupation, and later towards the National Forces (*Kuvayi Milliye*). The press war in satirical publications began towards the end of this transition period.

Refik Halit published the leading political satire magazine of the time, *Aydede,* which made its first appearance on January 2, 1922. The journal supported the government in Istanbul and stood in opposition to the National Struggle in Anatolia, while its rival, Sedat Simavi's *Güleryüz,* promoted it. *Aydede* had the largest staff of writers and cartoonists of the time, including editorial contributor Yusuf Ziya Ortaç and Ramiz Gökçe as its main cartoonist. With the collapse of the government in Istanbul at the end of 1922, *Aydede* closed down. Yet almost its entire staff found a new home at *Akbaba*, initiated in November 1922 by the same Yusuf Ziya Ortaç. *Akbaba* had the same structure and format as *Aydede*, but this time professing loyalty to the new government of the Turkish Republic. No doubt the cartoonists of *Aydede* did not change their political views from one night to the next as they started illustrating for *Akbaba*.

The Arab returned as a subject of illustration only after the heydays of the National Struggle. Until then, they were neither portrayed nor illustrated as a stereotype. With the end of the War of Independence and the signing of Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, the state of war between the allied powers was officially terminated. The Arab type re-emerged as part of the ensuing disputes with the signatories of the treaty, especially with Britain and France. Following 1923, around the emerging British goals in Mosul, followed by the conflict in Palestine, Spain's ambitions in Morocco, Italy's desires in Ethiopia, and France's goals in Syria, it was the Arab who found expression in the Turkish press as the "detested" other. The brushes of prominent Turkish cartoonists such as Halit Naci, Mehmet Baha, Cemal Nadir, Necmi Rıza, Orhan Ural, and Ramiz Gökce characterized the

"Arab" of the new Republican era.[305] In their illustrations, the image of the Arab re-emerged from its totality of significance of the reality they saw in front of them to create a hyper-reality of the Arab Other. Thus it was their observation of popular perception that circulated back to the public in building a common image of the "Arab."

Leading Satirical Magazines and Cartoonists

Representation of the "Arab" found expression in major satirical magazines such as *Karagöz, Aydede, Akbaba*, and *Karikatür*. Before we go on to analyze the image of Arabs that emerges from these, we should acquaint ourselves with the publications and their political perspectives. For present purposes, I shall focus on the genesis and activities of these selected journals rather than doing a wider analysis of the entire set of magazines published within that period.[306]

Karagöz continued to be one of the most influential cartoon magazines of the time. It was published twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays, and continued to be distributed until 1935. Style-wise, *Karagöz* abandoned its descriptive illustrative commentary on the margins of cartoons during its journey throughout the National Struggle. Starting in the early 1920s, it embraced a more concrete style in its published cartoons, which helped the journal maintain its reputation as one of the most popular satirical journals. The magazine remained loyal to its original roster of cartoonists lead by Halit Naci, Mehmet Baha, and Ratip Tahir. However, in a shift from earlier policy, following the National Struggle , the cartoons of these artists were published unsigned. Turgut Çeviker believes that the unsigned cartoons in 1918-1923 were actually mainly the work

[305] Halit Naci and Mehmet Baha were the political cartoonists for *Karagöz* from 1908 to 1927. Ramiz Gözçe's satire career had been more undulating, moving from one journal to another, sometimes working for more than one cartoon magazine. He had been illustrating for *Aydede, Zümrüdüanka*, *Akbaba,* and *Karikatür.* For the purposse of this study, I will only refer to his work in *Akbaba* and *Karikatür*. I encountered his depiction of Arabs mostly in these journals.

[306] In 1918-1923, twenty-one satirical journals were published. Most of these lasted no more than a few issues. In the early Republican period, from 1923 to 1939, this number shrank to less than ten magazines; *Akbaba,* and later in 1936, *Karikatür* led the market, and another line of journals, *Zümrüdü Anka* (1923), *Kelebek* (1923), *Papağan* (1924), *Guguk* (1924), and *Cem* (1927), tried to survive the competition. All of these journals were published in Istanbul. Öngören. *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı ve Hicvi*, 89-95.

of Mehmet Baha.[307] Although it might seem pointless at first glance to give detailed information on the cartoonists and their publishers, they carry a special importance for being the leading intellectuals of their time. The cartoon space was largely dominated by intellectuals that were either directly or indirectly connected to the republic's new ruling elite.

Aydede was launched in January 1922 by Refik Halit Karay and lasted for the whole year, publishing only 90 issues. It was published every Monday and Thursday. The journal holds a special place in the history of Turkish satire for its unique design. In this sense it can be considered the last complementary link in the line of *Djem* and *Kalem*. All the magazines that would be published later followed its path.[308] *Aydede* featured a prominent roster of satirists and cartoonists that would constitute the building blocks of the early Republican period cartoon. These contributors were primarily educated or experienced in Europe and carried on similar techniques in producing both textual satire and cartoons.[309]

Aydede deserves attention for being the only satirical journal that supported the government in Istanbul and the occupying forces against Mustafa Kemal and the struggle in Anatolia during the War of Independence. Sedat Simavi's *Güleryüz* remained its main competitor, conducting a full campaign on behalf of Mustafa Kemal and the War of Independence. Although *Aydede* positioned itself as a supporter of the government in Istanbul, direct criticisms of Mustafa Kemal and Ankara can only be observed in the cartoons of Ahmet Rıfkı and Munif Fehmi. In its 90 issues, none of the other cartoonists drew material opposed to the struggle. The journal had to be closed down when the Turkish Army entered Istanbul. Both Refik Halit and Ahmet Rıftkı fled abroad in September 1922.[310]

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[307] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü,* 140-141. After the magazine's original owner Ali Fuat Bey, the journal was owned and run by various other prominent intellectuals of the time such as Burhan Cahid, (1927-1930), Orhan Seyfi Orhon (1928-1932), and Sedat Simavi (1932-1935).
[308] ibid. 176-178.
[309] The list of contributors includes eminent intellectuals such as Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, Orhan Seyfi Orhon, and Reşat Nuri Güntekin, and cartoonists such as Ahmet Rıfkı, Ahmet Münif Fehim, Ramiz Gökçe, Ratip Tahir Burak, Hasan Fahrettin, and Cemil Cem.
[310] Mustafa Apaydın, *Türk Mizah Tarihinde Bir Dönüm Noktası: Aydede* (Adana: Karahan yayınevi, 2007), 42-51.

Akbaba effectively replaced *Aydede* within a few months. In December of the same year, and with almost exactly the same group of writers and cartoonists, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç and Orhan Seyfi Orhon launched *Akbaba*. Exactly like its predecessors, the journal was published biweekly. With its talent roster inherited from *Aydede*, *Akbaba* holds a special place in the Turkish cartoon space for having published consecutively for fifty-five years. Ramiz Gökce endured as the magazine's main political cartoonist, contributing to the building of a visual rhetoric around the dazzling political circumstances of early Republican Turkey.[311]

Until 1936, *Akbaba* remained the only satirical journal next to *Karagöz*. After the deaths of *Karagöz*'s main cartoonists, Halit Naci in 1927 and Mehmet Baha in 1928, the journal gradually lost its influence. Although Sedat Simavi bought the rights to the magazine, he could not prevent its closure. In 1936, Sedat Simavi launched another satirical publication called *Karikatür*. The latter adopted largely the same format as *Akbaba,* abandoning almost completely the traditional style of *Karagöz*. *Karikatür* continued to be circulated until 1948 once a week, alongside *Akbaba*, and even sharing the same cartoonist, Ramiz Gökçe, as their primary political illustrator. However, both magazines lacked critical commentary as the real essence of their satire/humor, because they operated in a period when such criticism was widely seen as an impediment to national interests.[312]

Ramiz Gökçe was a prominent young cartoonist who contributed to the development of illustrated political satire in the years following the National Struggle. In Ramiz's words, as a student he was highly influenced by *Karagöz's* Halit Naci and Mehmet Baha as the leading cartoonists of those years. He drew Karagöz and Hacıvad over and over in his notebooks at *Istanbul Muallim Mektebi* (Istanbul Teacher's College). He was so good that his teachers, impressed by his talent, insisted on sending him to Europe for a higher education in the fine arts.[313] Ramiz, influenced by contemporary artistic elements and political tendencies,

[311] Çeviker, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü III*, 185-192.
[312] Öngören, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Mizahı ve Hicvi*, 89-95.
[313] ibid. Çeviker, 104.

drew almost all of the political cartoons in *Akbaba* and *Karikatür*, which served to stereotype Arabs in the process of building the national identity of the Turk.

By 1924, striving for the level of "Western civilization" became a founding obsession of the Kemalist regime. As part of this effort, from August 1928 on, the *öz Türkce* ("pure Turkish") movement became officially linked to the revolutionary secularizing and modernization policy of Mustafa Kemal's regime, pushing forward the Roman alphabet to replace the Arabic one, and simultaneously mirroring the nationalist spirit rampant in other academic fields, particularly in history (Turkish historical thesis), and marching in step with the political and social reforms of the new state. Thus the committee to romanize the alphabet was set up in June 1928, at the same time as Mehmet Fuat Köprülü suggested that the language of prayer should also be changed from Arabic to Turkish.[314] Both of the leading satire magazines, *Karagöz* and *Akbaba,* with the rest of the printed media, converted to the new alphabet gradually as of July 1928. During this period, *Karagöz* printed its issues in both the Arabic and Roman alphabets. Starting in January 1929, the magazine was published exclusively in Roman characters.[315]

"Neither Damascus' sweets, nor an Arab's face": The Arab in Early Republican Cartoons[316]

During the period from 1923 to 1939, Turks encountered Arabs once again, in various circumstances. For Turkey this was a time of nation-building. For most of the Arabs, it was the mandate period, where they were both trying to define their borders and shake off colonial rule. This time both parties were searching for a clearer ethnic and national definition.

This series of encounters, some of them hostile, some of them more congenial, occurred simultaneously in many parts of the Middle East, including

[314] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turke,* 473-478.
[315] ibid. Çeviker, 140-141.
[316] *"Neither Damascus' sweets, nor an Arab's face:"* the proverb is used in Turkish for people who have benefits to offer which one would rather not engage with. It is worth noting that Damascus is known for its baklava.

modern-day Iraq, Syria, and Morocco. For analytic purposes I will look at each of these encounters separately, but one should bear in mind that there was a temporal overlap between them, that they contributed to the emergence of a Turkish group spirit, and that all these graphic images, taken together, contributed to the creation of a complex new image of the Arabs.

From 1916 on, the main focus of Middle Eastern affairs, apart from the military campaigns, was the continued dispute between Britain and France over the interpretation of borders set by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The French demanded "greater Syria," as promised, while the British were determined to impose their supremacy in the region, especially in oil-rich Mosul near the Turkish border. Turkey mostly sat on the sidelines, observing the developments within its old territories of the Middle East and North Africa, except in two cases which directly concerned its borders: Mosul and *Hatay* (Alexandretta). These two disputes, where Turkey had encountered the Great Powers of Europe (the British over the Mosul question, and the French over *Hatay*), became instrumental for articulating in the public's mind Turkey's new position as a "strong nation" within the power balance of the new regional order. Representations of Arab images as the Other were contextualized around the grievances of the Great War and the Arabs' struggle against the mandate regime. The image of the Arab came to epitomize the distinction from the uncivilized past carried out by the Ottoman heritage.

My work will try to examine the cartoons where Arabs were depicted within two time frames constituted from partially overlapping clusters. The first will be the years 1923-1927, where the cartoonists as observers and contributors to the nation-building process drew Arabs who were engaged in a similar project: seeking national recognition against their mandate rulers. Within this timeframe, I will look at the Mosul question (1923-1926); the struggle between King Hussein and ibn Saud over Hejaz (1924); the Yazidi rebellion of 1926 near the Turkish border; the Syrian revolt against the mandatory French government (1925-1926); and the Moroccan revolt in North Africa. The second timeframe is from 1936 to 1939, when the Turkish nation-building project reached its peak, an exclusively

Turkish nation was imagined, and identity-building through Othering became even more apparent. The depiction of Arabs had been used in between these years with regard to the invasion of *Habeş* (Ethiopia, 1936) and the reappearance of blacks (previously understood to be a type of Arab, as shown in previous chapters), this time as colonized Africans; the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936); and finally the *Hatay* (Alexandretta) dispute between France and Turkey (1936-1939).

The Mosul Question and Turkey's Challenge in the International Community, 1923-1926

In major satirical journals, cartoons on the proceedings of the Mosul dispute dominated the headlines and cover pages starting in late 1923. Depictions of the diplomatic negotiations on Mosul by the cartoonists were contextualized around the disputes with Britain, and harkened to the bad memories of colonial powers as the exploiters of former Ottoman lands. The Arab reappeared once more in the pages of *Karagöz* and *Akbaba*.

Mosul was one of the most important administrative centers of the Ottoman Empire en route to Baghdad. In the northwest part of the district, the Kurdish families had been recognized by the Ottoman authorities as local governors or tax collectors and were entrusted with the task of securing the Iranian frontier.[317] The Mosul district was a subject of conflict between France and Britain following the dissolution of the empire at the end of the First World War. Under the borders set by the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, Mosul was included in the French sphere of influence. During the negotiations by two Great Powers at the end of the war, however, the French ceded Mosul to British occupation in exchange for a share of Mosul's oil.[318] Yet when Britain's position as the mandatory power in Iraq was still debated, the fate of Mosul remained uncertain. In 1921, Britain crowned Emir

[317] Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 2005), 227. Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no 2 (1972): 123-139.
[318] Sarah Shields, "Mosul, the Ottoman legacy and the League of Nations," *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies* 3, no 2 (2009): 219.

Faisal king of Iraq. The Turkish government perceived him as the puppet ruler of the northeast region of the Fertile Crescent including Mosul. Concurrently, the Turkish Great Assembly's *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact) also integrated Mosul within the frontiers of Turkey, thus creating critical border issues that involved not only Britain and Turkey, but the League of Nations as well. The government in Ankara was determined to restore Mosul to Turkey on ethnic, political, economic, historical, geographic, and strategic grounds.[319]

The question first came up at the 1923 Lausanne Conference. Throughout the negotiations, Great Britain insisted on the inclusion of Mosul district within Iraq's mandate territory, while Turkey strongly refused to accede to this arrangement, taking the bilateral discussions to a dead end.[320] The question was then taken to the League of Nations, and discussed as of September 1924, concluding its decision as a bounding one. Meanwhile, a frontier treaty known as the Brussels Line was signed in October 1924 in order to establish a temporary border between Turkey and British-ruled Iraq.[321] Britain's economic interest based on oil resources in the region was no secret to the international community.[322] However, during the negotiations, it was overshadowed by Britain's presentation of the problem as a simple frontier question. Both Turkey and Great Britain insisted on the principles of nationality and self-determination and tried to counter the other's argument.[323] Britain imposed a Hashemite

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[319] Fahir Armaoğlu. *Lozan Konferansı ve Musul Sorunu: Misak-ı Milli ve Türk Dış Politikasında Musul Sorunu* (Ankara:Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1998), 111-154.

[320] Nevin Coşar and Sevtap Demirci, "The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic: Before and After the Frontier Treaty, 1926," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no 1 (January 2006): 123-132.

[321] ibid.
Hasan Ersel, Ahmet Kuyaş, Ahmet Oktay & Mete Tuncay, eds. "Musul Sorunu ve Nasturi Ayaklanması," *Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi, Cilt 1, 1923-1940* (Istanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 48.

[322] Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 35-39. Coşar and Demirci, "The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic," 123-132. Edward Peter Fitzgerald, "France's Middle Eastern Ambitions. The Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918," *The Journal of Modern History* 66, no 4 (December 1994): 697-725.

[323] In the post-war negotiations, US President Woodrow Wilson defined the view that the Middle East should not be divided among the victorious powers. His famous Fourteen Points principles included self-determination (not in the text, added later), saying that "every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states." Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace,* 258-259.

monarchy on Iraq and defined its territorial limits without taking into account the complicated politics owing to the country's ethnic and religious diversity. Major complications derived from the fact that the Kurds formed the majority of the population in the area and the Christian Assyrians in the north.[324] Emir Faisal wanted to integrate both ethnic groups as a way of balancing out the Shiite population that was open to Iran's manipulation. Faisal launched a propaganda campaign in the Mosul province, making the argument that Turkey's expansionist intentions were similar to those of its Ottoman predecessor, adding that including Mosul within its borders would safeguard Iraq against such a threat.[325] Britain used both the Kurdish objectives and Faisal's desire for a united Iraq in order to keep control over the region.[326] Mosul's strategic importance and valuable oil fields made its addition to Iraq's mandate necessary, yet the Kurdish tribes in the district, which constituted a majority, were reluctant to accept an Arab ruler.[327]

The investigation and decision-making process of the League of Nations lasted until 1926.[328] The conclusion was on behalf of Great Britain. Deciding not to launch a further military operation, Turkey concluded the Mosul question by signing the treaty that made the previous settlement permanent, while recognizing Mosul's inclusion into an independent Iraq.[329][330]

As negotiations were continuing on the international level, the cartoon magazines at home played their part in informing the Istanbul audience about the

[324] Eliezer Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq* (London:Frank Cass, 1995).
[325] Shields, "Mosul, the Ottoman legacy and the League of Nations," 220.
[326] Quincy Write, "The Mosul Dispute," *The American Journal of International Law* 20, no. 3 (July 1926): 455.
[327] Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace,* 450.
[328] Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 200-201.
[329] ibid., Wright, 453-464. The new treaty was promptly negotiated, was approved by the British Parliament on Feb.18, 1926, and the disputed territory was awarded to Great Britain by the Council on March 11, 1926. Great Britain then began negotiations with Turkey, which resulted in the signature of an agreement on June 5, 1926, whereby Turkey recognized the boundary with slight rectifications in return for 10% of Iraq oil royalties and neutralisation of the frontier. Iraq's minister of war signed the agreement, as did plenipotentiaries from Great Britain and Turkey.
[330] ibid. "The League of Nations' consideration of the Mosul question proceeded in three stages. At Geneva, in September 1924, it authorized a technical commission to investigate the facts of the disputed area on the spot (M. Wirsen, Swede, chairman; Count Teleki, Hungarian; Col. Paulis, Belgian) and at Brussels, in October, it appointed a Council committee to attempt mediation and report on the question (Sweden, rapporteur, Spain, Uruguay), and fixed a provisional frontier line slightly south of the northern boundary of the Turkish vilayet of Mosul defining the military status quo."

pace of ongoing developments. The propaganda generated by the media against Britain in the context of Mosul found expression in both *Karagöz* and *Akbaba* with similar messages. *Karagöz* sustained its traditional inclinations and detailed depictions of the current situation to communicate to its middle-class readers, while Ramiz of *Akbaba* adopted more simplistic techniques to convey his critiques to its more distinctive audience. From October 1923 to June 1926, a total of twenty-one cartoons were published on the Mosul question.[331]

After a long pause, in October 1923 *Akbaba* portrayed a presumably Arab figure crushed under the boot of a British officer like a cockroach. This strong illustration of the current situation between the British and the Middle Easterner exhibited Britain's ambition to rule the Middle East through defeating even their one-time ally. Probably influenced by the ongoing media propaganda against the British and their Middle Eastern allies who had been disloyal to the Turks, Ramiz's cartoon carried a certain feeling of satisfaction to the audience by showing that the deceived people of the once-Ottoman lands will not have any better than the bombings and boots of the mandate powers (Figure 4.3).

The legend of the cartoon refers to the British bombings of Sulaimaniyah, a small town on the southeast of the Mosul district. The cartoon depicts Sheikh Mahmud, the most influential tribal leader in southern Kurdistan and the governor of Sulaimaniyah under the earlier Ottoman administration, who held an anti-British stance, formulating plans for a general insurrection in Iraq. Mahmud was suspected of maintaining contacts both with the Shia leaders of Najaf and Karbala, and the Kemalists who still claimed the Mosul province. During the summer of 1923, Sheikh Mahmud, who had fled to Persia following the arrival of a British unit, returned to Sulaimaniyah and proclaimed himself king of Kurdistan. In response, the British Royal Air Force bombed Sulaimaniyah.[332]

The cartoon is titled: "*British planes bombard Sulaimaniyah!*." Then at the bottom: "*The British – We announce to the entire world that we are here only for*

[331] In presenting my case over the Mosul dispute, I used only few of the cartoons among the many I collected during my research.
[332] Jordi Gorgas Tejel, "Urban Mobilization in Iraqi Kurdistan during the British Mandate: Sulaimaniya 1918–30," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 4 (July 2008): 540-541.

the population's well-being!" In the cartoon, it is impossible to determine if the man portrayed with his *keffiyeh* and cotton robe is an Arab or a Kurd. For Ramiz, and therefore for his audience, he is first and foremost a Middle Easterner. While transmitting the news, he refers to the various ethnic groups of the region without making any distinction among them. The quote that Ramiz sarcastically uses – probably from a speech of a British representative explaining their aims in the region to the League of Nations – is also noticeable. Ramiz's British character delivers a peaceful message to the people of the Middle East while forcefully trying to control the local public. The local public (the Kurds in this case) are personified as the Middle Easterner crushed under the boots of the British officer. Size-wise he is bigger, yet he is crushed under the boots of the Brit. His facial expressions indicate anger, along with desperation and helplessness. He looks like a wild animal that is being tamed.

A later issue of *Akbaba* on May, 29 1924 pictured the Mosul dispute once more (Figure 4.4). The cartoon depicts a Turkish soldier, walking happily on the hills, holding a string attached to a well-fed sheep in one hand and a bundle of hay in the other. The sheep, labeled "Mosul," is putting its mouth on the hay while a figure to the lower-right, a fat man wearing a hat with the Union Jack, is stealing the sheep's milk by suckling from her nipple. To make its point, the cartoon simply asks the audience (represented by the question mark) to guess who is entitled to Mosul. It read: "*? -Mosul is mine!...*"

The prospect of oil in the area increased the eagerness of each party to possess it. British designs on controlling the oil-rich region of Mosul were no secret, and this became one of the main themes in the illustrated propaganda of the months that followed. In his illustration, Ramiz depicted the British in an infantile form, sucking the oil out of Mosul, and feeding on it, using the sheep's symbolic stand as sustenance. The sheep represents the easily influenced and directed, in a way domesticated people of the Mosul district. They are the people

who lend ideologies their whole-hearted support but without fully understanding them. So they need the guidance and support of another.[333]

In Ramiz's cartoons, the British were normally depicted as a fat man in a suit wearing a hat with a Union Jack. With a special-style beard, chubby and sagged cheeks, and big red nose, he looks almost monstrous. He is fat because he is feeding on his colonies and is insatiable. In a cartoon published a week later on June 2, 1924, Ramiz symbolized Mosul as a vulnerable, beautiful naked woman, her mouth gagged and her hands chained (Figure 4.5). The woman seems as though she is being raped by the half-dressed British figure. The latter, resembling a buffalo, is sitting on the woman, crushing her with his full weight. The woman is struggling under the giant man and trying to escape. The cartoon is titled, "*British mandate over Mosul!"* with a single comment underneath: *"She's so content under my mandate, she doesn't even open her mouth to complain!"* Ramiz here puns on the word "*Manda,*" which means both buffalo and mandate, thus referring to Britain as a buffalo, which is an insult in Turkish. On many occasions Ramiz highlighted Britain's colonial ambitions by painting it as a creature or organism that feeds on other nations' resources (Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8). Depicted with devilish features, the British cannibal is shown to be satisfied with his prey, Mosul's oil.[334] On the other hand, the victimized Mosul is repeatedly represented in the Ottoman cartoon space with the body of a naked young maiden. Nakedness here also represents a lack of civilization, and thus defenselessness. Yet she is a desirable woman with natural resources, as Mosul contains oil under its skin, making it desirable to the mandate powers. The figure of the woman with

[333] The Turk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association) dictionary describes sheep's metaphorical meaning as a person who lacks self-determination.

[334] In Figure 4.8 as well, the man with half of his cranium cut open is identified (but it is unclear if he is an Arab or Kurd) by the chain around his neck reading "Mosul." His round eyes are closed and expressionless, giving the impression that he senses nothing. Ramiz's portrayal of the man's mouth with fairly thick lips, a big pointy nose, and arched eyebrows reveals his Middle Eastern origin, without ethnic specification. The combination of his facial features creates a numb yet irritated expression. Inside the skull is labeled petrol (oil). The Brit is depicted in his usual black suit and brimmed hat. This time he resembles a flea or a mosquito, but as he lacks any special appendage for sucking blood, instead he uses a straw stuck to his fleshy lips. He sits on top of Mosul's nose, holding the skull on both sides. Size-wise, he is much smaller than the head. (Note that there is a play on words. "Spoiling pleasure" is just the transliteration for "*burnumdan getirmek,*" which is an idiom used to express exasperation.)

her helplessness and vulnerability at the hands of a giant beast manipulated Ottoman public opinion also to ensure its security.

For the whole year, Turkey eagerly tried to prove Mosul's historical and social attachment to the Anatolian homeland.[335] By the time the League of Nations was called in to decide the fate of the province in July 1925, British institutions had already begun to transform Mosul.[336] The naked chained woman had no choice but to settle with Britain.

There were no references to the Mosul question in the Turkish cartoon space for almost a year. Except for *Karagöz*'s few cartoons regarding Arabs' struggle against the mandate powers, cartoonists neglected the eastern borders of Turkey. *Karagöz* was more distant from the Mosul dispute than *Akbaba*. It did cover the problem in a few of its issues, including the one of May 28, 1924. But even then, their take did not focus on the actors directly, and highlighted instead the international power balance. The scenery of the cartoon is set in a desert-like geography where the send meets the sea (Figure 4.7). To the left, we see an orange tree with a carving on its trunk saying: *Antalya* (one of the major Mediterranean cities within the borders of *Misak-ı Milli*). It symbolically represents the glory of the National Struggle that saved the city from Italian invasion, while reminding the audience of the injustices of *Trablus*. A Turkish soldier guards the tree. He is fully equipped with what seem like naval mines next to him; he is resting his back on the trunk and is looking towards the palm trees at the far end of the desert, where a man in a suit and hat sits on a box with his arms enclosing his legs. He is alone, and looks segregated in the desert. The box is labeled "*Mosul*." In the bottom-right corner, near the shore, a man in a feathered hat in a boat representing Italians is praying, while above him a man in a tubular hat representing the French clenches his fist angrily towards the Turk. Karagöz, standing behind the Turkish soldier, explains the dispute to the audience in terms

[335] The British held no claim to Mosul at the Monduros armistice, but over the post-war years the British government severed Mosul's relations with Anatolia and Syria and began redirecting Mosul's society and economy toward the British official mandate, which included Basra and Baghdad. Shields, "Mosul, the Ottoman legacy and the League of Nations," 217.
[336] ibid. 217-230.

of international relations: *"Hey my dear senior pasta-man, the oranges you fancied from faraway aren't like the ones from Trablus. Since you have coal and electricity in your own country, you don't need Mosul's oil. We still burn kindling to provide light. Why don't you kindly leave these shores? Let's not fight."* Karagöz brings the greediness of European powers to the Turkish public eye by recalling their colonial ambitions in the once-Ottoman lands of North Africa. The Italians do not need any more resources. They already get what they need from their colonies. The Turkish soldier who is guarding the borders sends the message to Italy and France to stay away from Mosul, isolating Britain from the rest of its wartime allies.

The province of Mosul, which Turkey claimed but Britain occupied, remained part of Iraq based on a decision by the League of Nations. This was not a big surprise for the Turkish political elite, which was aware of Britain's stronghold over the League of Nations.[337] After extensive consultations among the province's various ethnic groups that had inhabited this contested crossroads for centuries, the League's Commission of Inquiry authoritatively concluded its report on July 16, 1925, deciding in favor of the British.[338]

> The Turks apparently recognized the propriety of these principles [nationality and self-determination] in demanding a plebiscite but the British said a plebiscite would be impracticable in view of the social and educational conditions of the people and would add nothing to the information already available on their national character and wishes. In this the Wirsen commission after investigation agreed with the British and found that ethnologically the Kurds who were the dominant element were neither Arabs not Turks, but an Aryan people, and that they preferred to remain with Iraq, provided they could count on the security and cultural autonomy assured by continuance of the British mandate. The Arabs in the region who favored Iraq were more numerous than the Turks. The Christians, Yezidas [Yazidis], and Jews also favored Iraq, but, like the Kurds, wished continuance of the British mandate."[339]

The Turkish government strongly opposed the formal attachment of the Mosul Vilayet to Iraq, citing notably both its "Turkish and Kurdish *inhabitants' right to self-determination* as well as historical and conventional rights" and that

[337]Coşar and Demirci, "The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic," 127.
[338] League's Commission of Inquiry of July 16, 1925. "Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq" C.400. M.147. Issues 11, 12, 13, and 14.
[339] League of Nations Commission of Inquiry of 16 July 1925. "Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq," C.400. M.147, 24-29, 58-60, 84-85. Write, "The Mosul Question," 455.

Turkey never formally renounced its claims to the Mosul Vilayet. At the end of the day, it was considered an integral province of its national territory. Meanwhile, Iraq's King Faisal was seeking the support of the inhabitants of the province. Cited from British official C.J. Edmonds' memoirs by Shields,

> [He] was making a grand tour of the northern liwas with a view to rallying sentiment before the arrival of the League Commission.' When the Commissioners arrived, they received a long note from the King, in which he articulated the role he claimed for Mosul in the life of his country. For Faisal, as for the British, Mosul had already become part of Iraq; a decision in favor of Turkey would be overturning what they considered an existing reality.[340]

King Faisal became the target of the Turkish satirical media with a rhetoric of "swindling the naive people of Mosul" to serve his financial and personal ambitions. Ramiz's cartoon in *Akbaba* varied from his previous ones by including a depiction of Faisal in his traditional Arabic outlook directly in the composition (Figure 4.9). We should note that, from the start of the dispute, Ramiz did not illustrate Arabs as one of the main actors. Mosul was one body, usually a woman's one, representing its various ethnic groups, which included Kurds, Arabs, Turks, and Christians. However, the final developments in the region positioned Iraq's King Faisal (assigned by the British, who had been kicked out of Syria by the French) as another card in the game, and Ramiz was eager to expose this to the public eye. The cartoon depicts Faisal with his *kefiyyeh*, drawn as half human, half donkey. He is herded by the British, whom Ramiz repeatedly characterizes as a *yam yam* (cannibal). Faisal's head is turned back towards the British *yam yam,* who raises his arm holding a whip. But the whip is of no concern to Faisal, who is instead staring at a bulging sack of money carried by the Brit, complete with a dollar sign. The latter is an allusion to United States support for Britain. The heading comments on Faisal's propaganda to gain the upper hand in the region: *"The British dispatch King Faisal to the League of Nations in order to steal our Mosul!."* The legend underneath reads *"Perjurer!"* Faisal in the cartoon represents not only his personal ambitions but also the greediness and untrustworthiness of Arabs in general in the eyes of the Turkish public.

[340] Shields, "Mosul, the Ottoman legacy and the League of Nations," 220.

For its part, the Council of the League decided the Turkish-Iraqi border matter as of December 16, 1925, temporarily in favor of the so-called "Brussels line" which would become definitive in March 1926. Turkey eventually accepted the border with Iraq as stipulated by the Council of the League, and signed the agreement in 1926. The satire society of Istanbul was disappointed by the league's decision. This was especially a blow for *Karagöz*, which drew a different reality for its audience. *Karagöz* started to publish cartoons decrying the settlement between Turkey and Great Britain, criticizing Turkey for signing the agreement in return for 10 percent on all royalties it would receive over the next twenty-five years (Figure 4.11).[341]

Akbaba presented the conclusion of the Mosul case with Ramiz's June 7, 1926 cartoon titled *"The Mosul dispute is hushed up!"* The cartoon shows Iraq's King Faisal and a British politician burying a man alive in a coffin labeled *Musul Meselesi* (The Mosul Dispute). The man in the coffin says: *"Mr. John Bull, you can make sure that I will be raised from the dead one day!"*[342] Another man in the background is walking away unnoticed, a smile on his face, a big sack of money on his back. He is Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, walking away with his 10 percent share of the Iraqi oil, and he looks satisfied with the deal.

Just like the cartoonists of *Karagöz*, Ramiz was upset with the final agreement on Mosul. For *Akbaba* and *Karagöz*, at least in Ramiz, Baha, and Naci's brushes, giving up the district in return for oil shares failed to fulfill the expectations of their audience, who believed that Turkey was justified in its claim to include Mosul in the borders of the National Pact. In Ramiz's depiction of the burial of Mosul, King Faisal, again in his typical dress, is one of the two main figures next to the British. He looks traumatized when he sees the dead body trying to rise up from the coffin and remind them that this is not the end. The man in the coffin is actually the voice of the Turkish public, displeased with the

[341] As explained by Cosar and Demirci, governments in the Middle East receive payments from oil companies (mainly British) in the form of royalties and income taxes on profits. The royalties are usually taken in cash, though in Iraq and Iran the governments are entitled to take them in kind, meaning crude oil. Coşar and Demirci, "The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic," 128.
[342] John Bull as a personification of Great Britain or England dates back to the 1700s, and accordingly, *Cunbul* in old Turkish slang means "British."

conclusion and trying to intimidate his regional rivals, the Arabs and their British allies, as an omen for the future of the province.

It is significant to note that in many of the cartoons that represent the Arabs, they are not shown directly. Instead, the disputed territories are presented as a naked damsel in distress, as distant as can be from connotations of Arabs in the collective consciousness. Yet such cartoons are crucial for understanding the dilemmas created by these disputes: On the one hand these territories included many Arabs. On the other they were claimed to be "Turkish," and thus the cartoonists presented them as a young woman, devoid of any ethnic marking. In visual space this choice would leave an open slot for depicting the Arabs as evil in later periods.

Memories of the Arab Revolt and the People of Contested Lands, 1923-1927

Turkey's public rhetoric was already full of images of the colonial powers, namely Britain, France and Italy, depicting their desire (assumed or not) to occupy once-Ottoman, now Turkish lands. They were represented as the real evil behind the betrayal of the Arabs, who were incapable of conducting such rebellions by themselves. Sharif Hussein was promised an Arab kingdom in Hejaz and the Fertile Crescent, and proclaimed himself the "king of the Arab countries" after the great Arab Revolt of 1916, hoping to realize his ambitions in post-Ottoman Arab lands, Syria, and Iraq with the support of the British.[343] Ibd Saud of Eastern Arabia also gained British support to control the sheikdoms on the Persian Gulf and was anxious to gain control of the Red Sea region of Hejaz, especially the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After the end of the war, the British were anxious to settle their alliance with King Hussein and his Hashemite family, while they needed the Saudi family's strong fighting force in Eastern Arabia.[344] Sharif

[343] Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs: A History* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 175-183.
[344] ibid. 175-183. Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence, Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*, 278. On the Arab Revolt, also see Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace;* J. Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia*; Matthew Hughes, A*llenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917–1919*; M. E. Yapp, *Making of the Modern Near East, 1792–1923*; Albert Hourani, E*mergence of the Modern Middle East*; John Fisher, *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle*

Hussein felt betrayed by his British allies, who passed over his aims to rule an Arab kingdom, but instead recognized him as king of Hejaz and sharif of Mecca, and enjoyed treaty relationships with other Arab chiefs, including Hussein's rival, Ibn Saud.

On top of this, when Sharif Hussein proclaimed himself the new caliph of the Muslim world following the Turkish government's abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924, tension grew even worse with the Saudi ruler.[345] Thus, both sides, boosted by British weaponry, engaged in armed conflict in July 1924. The result was disastrous for Sharif Hussein. Having lost his dominance in Syria to the French, who drove his son, King Faisal, out of Damascus in 1920, he now ended up resigning from his throne as king of Hejaz and being exiled from Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah. Hejaz as a whole was brought under Ibn Saud's rule.[346]

The Turkish cartoon space zoomed to the situation in the Middle East, putting Sharif Hussein and Kind Faisal in the middle of the dartboard. Unlike *Akbaba, Karagöz* was eager to bring up the old grievances of Arab betrayal throughout the formative years of the republic.[347] Thus, the depictions of Arab betrayal were more visible in the cartoons published by *Karagöz*. In its September and October 1924 issues, its cartoonist referred to the power struggle between the two Arab leaders (Figure 4.13). In one of the cartoon scenes, the composition focuses on a man with a rifle chasing another man. The one in front is Sharif Hussein in his traditional robe. He is running for his life, his expression traumatized. His hands reach for help towards a man in a British suit standing at a distance, his arms also open. The man who is chasing Sharif Hussein is Ibn Saud with his *Ikhwan* warriors behind him drawn as ghosts. His men are dressed in traditional *aqqal* and *kefiye* (keffiyeh) similar to his own. His physical features represent an intrinsic violent tendency. His eyes are wide open, engrossed in the

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East: 1916–19; Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921*.

[345] Muharram Feyzi, "Says İcmal: Arap Çöllerinde bir mülakat," *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi,* January 24, 1930, 2. Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence,* 278.

[346] ibid. Seale, 278.

[347] Mary C. Wilson. "The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism." *The Origins of Arab Nationalism,* 204-224.

chase, and his mouth wears a savage smile. This cartoon is the first depiction of the "Arab betrayal," as Turks saw the Arab Revolt of 1916. Interestingly, for eight years after the war we do not see any commentary regarding the Arab betrayal in the work of the cartoonists. Until the settlement of the National Pact's borders, the harsh circumstances of the National Struggle and the priorities of the time did not allow the eyes of satire to turn towards Arab lands. When that was the case in Mosul, or for Syrian border disputes, cartoonists like Baha, Naci, and Ramiz scratched open scars that had not yet healed. Even the title itself conveys the sense of the humiliation of Sharif Hussein's position, emphasizing the verb "to run," which portrays him, and thus the Arabs siding with him, as a coward: *"When King Hussein runs away from Mecca."* The cartoon's subtitle says: *"King Hussein - Save me, oh English! Karagöz - You are aspiring for kingdom and Caliphate while even [being] sharif is too much for you, huh? It's so unfortunate for Islam that he who betrayed it is running to the arms of the British, just like Vahdettin once did."*

Interestingly, in the next issue, the battle between Ibn Saud and King Hussein was depicted in relation to the Mosul dispute (Figure 4.14). This tribal conflict gave the cartoonist the opportunity to convey an even more negative impressions of the Arabs. The sour feelings of the Ottomans' betrayal by the Arabs are already revealed in the title of the cartoon: *"While natives clash with each other!"* The word "*yerli*" is the term used for natives with an accent of savageness. It is used to bring forward the Arab image as the uncivilized Other, in contrast with the Turks who were able to snatch back their freedoms from the allied powers. The cartoon also visually explain the word *"yerli,"* giving its meaning through the depiction of a group of Arab fighters on camels and horses, chasing another group on foot while slaughtering its members. The latter group represents the *Ikhwan*, the Saudi fighters.[348] The bunches of people who try to escape the spears of *Ikwan* are the Hashemites, led by King Hussein. In the corner of the scene the British figure, who encourages the Saudis by giving them false

[348] In King Hussein's words, the *Ikhwan*, also known as the "Wahhabi fighters, were anxious to attain Paradaise which, according to their faith, they would enter if killed." Eugene Rogan. *The Arabs: A History*. 180.

promises, as they did with Sharif Hussein and the Hashemites, stands and watches the massacre with a terrified face. He carries a trunk on his back with the word "Mosul" on it.

The repeated form of attributions continued throughout the year in subsequent issues of *Karagöz*. In another cartoon, the Arabs were symbolized only by *kefiyes* hung on a wooden fence to be used as scarecrows.[349] For Turkish cartoonists, Arabs were just a deception within the politics of the Middle East that was guarding the real enemy behind (Figure 4.15).[350]

By illustrating the dispute between the Hashemite family and Saudis, both sponsored by the British, *Karagöz* advanced propaganda against Britain, trying to provoke the public to remember their deception. In doing so, he repeatedly illustrated Sharif Hussein's defeat. In an October 29, 1924 cartoon, Sharif was fictionalized as a captive, chained to his British master (Figure 4.16). In the scene, Mecca is depicted in the background. Sharif Hussein carries a big trunk and a suitcase, indicating that his departure from his home city is for good. Saud's army is following him from a distance, holding its position as a constant threat. The cartoon reflects the anger of its maker at both British policies and the sharif, who was persuaded by them. The cartoonist's personal feelings most probably can be observed through the gestures of Karagöz, who holds his fists up towards the sharif and the Brit, showing a strong expression of rage fortified with precatory words of *"... you deserve to have this chain on you, make sure it stays there until you go to hell."*

[349] Between 1921 and 1925, the Royal Air Force played a crucial role in defending, supporting, and consolidating mandatory rule in new state of Iraq. Air power became a crucial tool to legitimize British rule in the northern provinces of post-Ottoman Iraq, which until 1925 was challenged by the newly established Turkish government. The fear of a possible Turkish military penetration to claim Mosul prompted the British to deploy an RAF squadron at the border district. Nelida Fuccaro, *The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq* (NewYork: I.B. Tauris & Co.Ltd, 1999). Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[350] *Karagöz*, October 15, 1924, no. 1730. The legend: "*Karagöz- Nafile tahta perdenin arkasına gizlenme kikirik efendi. Şapkanı görüyorum. Ben Irak Krallığına ateş ederken sen güme gidersin, karışmam!*" (Karagöz - Hiding behind the wooden fence won't help you! I see your "hat" - there is a wordplay here, by saying see your hat, he means I see what you are after. While I shoot at the Iraqi Kingdom, you might get shot as well!).

As the post-war settlements reshaped relations between the Great Powers and their local allies, King Hussein felt betrayed by the British. Not only because the British failed to fulfill their promise to him and to the Hashemite family to secure an Arab kingdom for him, but also because of their collaboration with the French on the expulsion of King Faisal from Damascus and the decision to assign him as king to the British mandate of Iraq.[351] The Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed between Britain and Iraq in 1922 and incorporated many of the articles of the mandate. The treaty, ratified in 1924, gave a great deal of influence to the British in governing Iraq, and caused King Faisal to lose his public support.

Turkish satirists used these developments to demonstrate to the public how the Arabs, who had chosen the British over the Turks for the illusion of false kingdoms, are now doomed to be kicked out of those dreams (Figure 4.17). The legend of the cartoon reflects the Turkish memories through the voices of the "false-Kings" complaining. Karagöz, the narrator of the scene and voice of the Turkish public, expressed his opinion like so: "*Karagöz - Seeing you both like this in the hands of the British, I breathe a sigh of relief! How is it? Do you miss the old times?*"

The dominant personality in the Turkish narrative of Arab betrayal was King Faisal, the mastermind behind the 1916 Arab Revolt in Hejaz. The struggle between the Ottoman Army and the Arab tribes under Emir Faisal's command lasted until 1918, when Faisal entered Damascus and later Aleppo. Emir Faisal's hopes of forming an Arab kingdom along with his father Sharif Hussein in the aftermath of the Great War were short-lived.[352] The 1920 treaty of San Remo reassigned these post-Ottoman lands to the League of Nations' mandated

[351] Rogan, *The Arabs*, 162-163. "The British and French refused to recognize the Syrian declaration of independence. The British looked the other way as the French prepared to occupy Damascus and unseat their wartime ally Amir – now King – Faysal." Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 152-155.

[352] The correspondence between McMahon and Sharif Hussein. Starting in 1915, as indicated by an exchange of letters with British High Commissioner Henry McMahon, Sharif Hussein seized the opportunity and demanded recognition of an Arab nation that included the Hejaz and other adjacent territories as well as approval for the proclamation of an Arab caliphate of Islam. McMahon accepted and assured him that his assistance would be rewarded by an Arab empire and in the aftermath of the war, the sons of Hussein were made the kings of Transjordan (later Jordan) as well as Syria and Iraq under the assistance of mandate rule of France and the United Kingdom.

territories, to be administered either by Britain or France as agreed to in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. Only a few boundary exceptions were left for further debate.[353] Sharif Hussein was expelled and driven out of Arabia by the Saudis and forced to flee to Cyprus, while Emir Faisal, after being kicked out of French Syria, was assigned by the Brits to the Kingdom of Iraq.[354] Nothing turned out the way Sharif Hussein had hoped. From a British standpoint, Faisal's appointment was intended "to establish a "national government" which would attract genuine Iraqi support and deflect anti-British feelings, but would nevertheless be subservient to British interests."[355] Mosul posed a serious complication between Turkey and Britain, and thus for Faisal, who was determined to include it in the borders of new Iraq and seek direct British support to achieve this.

With reference to the Mosul case, yet raising the specter of Arab betrayal, Karagöz depicted King Faisal for the last time in October 1925 as the slave of the British in the customary Middle Eastern background (Figure 4.18). The joke underlined the unspeakable relationship between the Brits and the Arabs mentioning their mutual benefits over the post-Ottoman lands.

In the cartoons of the 1920s, ethnic differences do not emerge as one of the major defining features. The post-Ottoman Arab lands were home to all kinds of ethnic and religious groups, most of whom spoke Arabic and dressed in local Arab attire. Therefore, cartoonists depicting the people of Arab lands represented them as a generic, homogeneous group, without considering their ethnic diversity. If considered necessary by the cartoonist, allusions to such diversity would be given in the cartoon's legend. Yet the audience would first be struck by the image, seeing that the cartoon is about post-Ottoman Arabia, and then, if interested, would continue and read the legend to get more information. This bit of information would usually serve to build the perception of the Arab, rather than

[353] The case of Mosul was one of these boundary questions between France and Britain, as was the question of Palestine.
[354] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 152-155.
[355] D. K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 90-92.

any specific ethnicity. A case in point is the Yazidis of Mosul, who were also branded betrayers of the Turks.[356]

Karagöz published two successive cartoons in its two issues of March 1926 that involved Yazidis captured along Turkey's northern Iraqi border. The context for the cartoons is not entirely clear, as there is no clear indication of any specific rebellion on the Turkish border in 1926 involving the Yazidi tribes. However, as mentioned by Fuccaro, in the mid-1920s the British tried to recruit Yazidi irregulars from local tribes to strengthen the defense of the northern frontier of Iraq against Turkey, which posed a serious threat to British and Iraqi administrations with respect to the Mosul dispute.[357] These irregulars were more interested in their inter-tribal struggles than in protecting the borders for a governmental cause, and some even rebelled against the Iraqi government itself in a recorded revolt of 1925. As far as the two cartoons on Iraq's Yazidis, it is worth noting that the main theme is the Turkish soldiers' heroism as opposed to a magnified characteristic of the Arabs as betrayers (the pun reads "*This is how the rebellion of the Yazidis ended!"*) (Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20).

Of course, satire not only functions to express aggression but also serves to strengthen the morale of those who use it and undermine the morale of those at who it is aimed. The Arab betrayal and its actors were a perfect medium for the cartoonists, who were manipulating the public's memory of the old grievances by creating a hyper reality through the repetition and fictionalization of attributes such as "betrayer" and "backstabber" attributed to Arabs.

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[356] The Yazidis (or Yezidis, a religio-ethnic group with a syncretic religion, known in popular Turkish lore as devil worshippers) are one of the indigenous peoples of Jabal Sinjar, which had been part of the Mosul vilayet since the Ottoman conquest, and was occupied by British forces after the armistice. The Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar constituted the majority of Iraq's Yazidis, the second-largest non-Muslim community and the largest heterodox Kurdish group in the Mosul province. Control of this area had become strategically and politically vital for the Iraqi administration in order to safeguard and guarantee its position in the new regional order created by the colonial powers after 1918. See H. I. Llyod, "The Geography of the Mosul Boundary," *The Geographical Journal* 68, no. 2 (August 1926): 106. Nelida Fuccaro, "Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997): 559-580.

[357] ibid. Fuccaro, 568. It is important to note that according to Fuccaro, Yazidi tribesmen only occasionally took up arms, either against the government, as happened in 1925 during the revolt of Yazidi chief Dawud al-Dawud, or in the course of their frequent inter-tribal quarrels.

British-French Rivalry and the Emerging Arab Policy in Syria

The sense of deep-rooted suspicion, and an atmosphere of conspiracy and betrayal, characterized and dominated the view of the new Turkish elite of their Arab neighbours, which can easily be seen in the early Turkish cartoons. Decades of Western intrusion nurtured mistrust of the intentions of European states as well, in particular with regard to their influence on the "backwards" post-Ottoman provinces.

Turkish cartoonists used the Arab struggle in North Africa, especially in Morocco, in comparison to the Syrian struggle in the Middle East, in which both cases the Arabs were fighting against the French mandate. The Arabs' resistance in North Africa was already a well-know narrative for Turks. Thus, the cartoonists seized the opportunity to strengthen the Turkish case against the expansionism of the mandate powers in post-Ottoman lands. This was also important in terms of creating a stronger public awareness and support for pressing the unresolved border issues with Syria, especially the inclusion of Alexandretta as declared in the National Pact.[358] We see that, simultaneously with the Mosul question in Iraq, and the Syrian struggle with the French mandate that aimed to hold Alexandretta within its borders, Turkish media led an expansive campaign against Britain and France's mandate powers from 1923 to 1927.

Part of this propaganda covered the French position in Morocco against the local rebellions, and also against Spain's colonial ambitions. The message was clear: the Great Powers can be defeated and moved out.[359] Thereby echoing the success story of the Turkish National Struggle, the Arab struggle in the Middle East was deemed illegitimate and anti-Turkish in essence. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish experience in North Africa was remembered in romantic terms. Namely, the Turkish officers who went to *Trablusgarb* and *Benghazi* as volunteers (*fedai*) to galvanize Arab resistance, which had already started under the leadership of the *Sanusiya* tribe, successfully harassed the

[358] Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk: Vesikalar ve Belgeler*, 1735.
[359] See Figures 4.28 and 4.29.

Italians and prevented them from making much headway inland. This creates a crucial difference between the attitude towards the Arabs of the Mashriq, and those of the Maghrib. For the Turkish readership, the Maghrib represented a story of affectionate cooperation against the common enemy. *Karagöz* uses this nostalgia when criticizing the mandate powers for their expansionism, and by the same token contributing to patriotism.[360] Yet, even with this affection felt for the North Africans, the image of the Arab – dressed in traditional garb, wild, and brandishing a sword – remains the same.

The participation plans of the post-Ottoman Arab provinces created their own collisions between the allied forces of the Great War, while triggering local resistances that were centered mainly in Syria. In addition, some parts of the Syrian political elite were clear on having their own constitutional monarchy led by King Faisal.[361] They favored a "loose" British mandate over an old-school French imperialism, which the Syrians felt had established an illegal French presence in the region.[362] The French, on the other hand, believed that the British were seeking ways to undermine the French position in the Middle East, mainly in Syria. They were convinced that they already made concessions on the Mosul case, and had no intention of giving up more.[363] Amid this complex political scene, the French mandate in Syria lurched from one crisis and confrontation to another, starting with the Druze Rebellion or Great Syrian Revolt (1925-1926) and continuing with the frustration of France ceding Alexandretta (*Hatay*) to Turkey in 1939. For the purposes of this sub-section, I intend to look at Syrian-French-British relations during the post-war Middle East struggle and their reflections in the Turkish cartoon space and how, within this context, the once-fellow Ottoman citizens were presented to the Turkish public. I believe that due to its direct relation to the Turkish political position in the Middle East, the Alexandretta question should be discussed as a separate subsection.

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360 "*Büyümek ve taşmak arzusu*" is how the Turkish audience would describe the expansionism of the mandate powers.

[361] Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace,* 174-180. Eugene Rogan. *The Arabs: A History.* 151, 162. Also see, Tauber, "The Emergence of the Arab Movements" and "The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq."

[362] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 182, 190.

[363] ibid. Fromkin, 562-563.

With respect to the Great Syrian Revolt, *Karagöz* dominated the cartoon space in the mid-1920s. Throughout Syria's struggle against the French mandate from 1925 to 1926, there were a total of twelve cartoons published, eleven of them in *Karagöz*, with only one depicting an Arab stereotype in *Akbaba*. The Arab struggle against the French in Syria gave *Karagöz* the opportunity to continue its campaign against the Arabs.

On January 24, 1925, *Karagöz* published on its cover a scene of the first signs of the Syrian revolt (Figure 4.21). The cartoon depicts the Arabs' leader dressed like a sultan. He wears a turban with a feather on top that resembles the Ottoman sultan's quilted turban, which was symbolic of Sultan Al-Atrash,[364] who was the central figure of the Syrian revolt in 1925 against the French and the British. The title of the cartoon – *"The Brits are panicked!"* – reveals the British concern about the upcoming insurgency.

During the spring of 1925, British officials in the region had already assessed that the French would abandon Syria.[365] The fact that British officials received such confidences reinfored public suspicions of a persistent French notion of British and Hashemite intrigues and anti-French treachery against the French mandate.[366] The Turks, already struggling with British policies in the Middle East over the Mosul dispute, shared French suspicions about British conspiracies. Thus, the anti-British propaganda over this rhetoric became instrumental in Turkish political cartoons of the time (Figure 4.22).

For another six months, Turkish satire media stayed away from the Syrian dispute and returned to the Mosul question as part of its domestic problem. Only at the beginning of November did the Great Syrian Revolt return to the pages of the cartoon journals. The issue dated November 7, 1925 covered the insurgency with a vulgar cartoon on its fourth page (Figure 4.23). In the cartoon, an Arab is

[364] Al-Atrash was known to the Turkish public for organizing local rebellions against the Turks in Hawran and Jabal Druze during the Arab Revolt of 1916. Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 190.
[365] Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 80.
[366] ibid.

scalping a French officer under the title: *"The French position detonates in Damascus!"* The Arab in the cartoon is in his traditional dress. He is wielding a sword in one hand and holding the French officer by the hair in the other, with a palm tree in the background. The sword is clearly poised to swing and scalp the officer. The violent and sensationalistic act of scalping is considered a barbaric practice associated with tribal societies, and so while having fun at the French mandate's expense, the cartoon is also used to decry the Arabs' uncivilized nature in contrast with the noble Turkish behavior (Figure 4.21).

The legend under the cartoon spells out the Arab's ethnicity as Druze. In the late summer of 1925, Al-Atrash's Druze tribesmen, who ambushed and routed the French garrison in Suwadya, a Druze town southeast of Damascus, went on to attack the French wherever they could find them. In these raids, the Druze captured lots of French supplies and weaponry that would ease the course of the insurgency. By the fall of the same year, the revolt spread to Damascus, where the daring notion that France could be defeated and driven out became the driving force.[367] The Syrian nationalists joined the revolt, escalating the insurgency a great deal. The protests and agitation continued to spread gradually and spread to all the cities of mandate Syria.[368]

In the cartoon, Karagöz verbally attacks the Druze and their supporting countrymen over the old memories of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans: "*Druze – Hey dear, hey Christian! Give me my money or I swear I'll slaughter you!*"[369]; *"Karagöz – Gosh! When I was in Damascus, you kept longing for each other. Now, as soon as you found each other, you started fighting. Anyhow, let's*

[367] ibid. 52-55. Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence,* 190.
[368] "Al-Aṭrash sent various letters to villages and towns all over the countryside in the name of 'independence, liberty, fraternity, and equality,' declaring that all Druze, Sunnîs, Alawîs, Shîîs, and Christians were sons of the Syrian Arab nation. As there was no difference between them, there was only one enemy before them: the unjust military authority and the foreign colonizer. As leader of the Syrian Arab revolutionary army, he asked all to help." Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism,* 87-88.
[369] "Nasrani" is a term meaning "Christian," probably derived from Nazareth, the hometown of Jesus. Nasranis, also known as Saint Thomas Christians, are a small, ancient Christian community located in eastern Syria. Another note should be made of the cartoon's text saying *atın-ı mali*, a phrase likely known to those who watched the "Arap" in Karagöz plays, which amounts to "give me my money."

watch how you fight each other." The cartoonist magnifies the Turkish public's satisfaction at the flattering of the French through the facial expression of Karagöz as narrator. He is watching his betrayers fight each other as once they were the collaborators of the Turks. I believe the cartoon also subtly refers to the killings of Turkish soldiers by the "uncivilized" Arabs, who collaborated with the imperial powers in Syria and Palestine throughout the Great War.[370]

Although the Great Syrian Revolt that started in the spring of 1925 lasted more than two years and ended with the slow and inevitable reassertion of French control over the region by 1927, for Karagöz it was already losing ground before the end of 1925. The French use of heavy bombardment to defeat the revolt in Damascus was crucial in suppressing the rebellion. In its November 18, 1925 issue, *Karagöz* illustrated Arab insurgents taken hostage by French officers and chained to cannons (Figure 4.24). The cartoon's title already announces the end of the rebellions: "*The End of the Arab Revolt."* Once more, the cartoonist harkened to the Arab betrayal of World War I, in which Arab tribesmen killed many Turkish soldiers. The legend serves to open up the fresh wounds of Turkish memory: *"Karagöz – Hey, once-loyal Arab warriors/volunteers (fedailer)! I feel sorry for the consequences you're facing today, but I forget this once I remember what you did to the Turkish soldiers ('mehmetçikler,' an affectionate term for soldiers, like British 'Johnnies') during their withdrawal from Syria, how you shot them dead and stripped them, how you killed the wounded and dragged them on the ground."* One cannot escape the sense of *schadenfreude* in this and similar cartoons.

Akbaba had a single cartoon by Ramiz regarding the Syrian Revolt, in which he presented France's claims against Turkey to support the rebellions. The French believed that the insurgents were collaborating with and receiving supplies from various sources, including Turks, along with the British.[371] Ramiz quoted the news from French souces, saying, *"French newspapers say that Turks are*

[370] Scott Anderson, *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Atlantic books, 2013), 470-472.
[371] Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism,* 66.

encouraging the Syrian Revolt." The cartoon was published on page four on November 23, 1925, the heyday of the revolt (Figure 4.25). In his illustration Ramiz draws a French officer strangling a rope-bound Arab insurgent, one hand around his throat, the other holding a riding crop horsewhip. The Arab insurgent in his traditional white robe looks to be drawing his last breath. The French officer is looking towards a Turkish soldier sitting on a closer chair. The composition is very simple. The Arab character depicted by Ramiz is Syria, as revealed in the cartoon's legend, *"Syria – Oh my God! Oh my God! Frenchman – (to the Turk) He's yelling because you're encouraging him!"*

The Syrian revolt continued for another eight months. French intelligence reports recorded continued escalation of rebel pressure through the winter and into the spring of 1926, yet the events found little coverage in Turkish satire. In July 1926, *Karagöz* published a cartoon that depicted the demolition of Damascus, the heart of Arab civilization, after the bombardment of the French, who were afraid the insurgents might drive them out (Figure 4.26).[372] The heavy shelling of the city destroyed many invaluable examples of art and domestic architecture, while seriously damaging the Syrian Revolt.[373] *Karagöz* spoke of the Arab insurgency through the lenses of the Turkish narrative of the role played by Arabs in the Great War. The commentary especially reveals some nostalgia for the post-Ottoman Arab provinces. The cartoon's legend exposes a sarcastic approach to the situation, meant to scorn the part Arabs played in the Great War by siding with the imperial forces in exchange for the peace they had enjoyed under Turkish administration.

Another strikingly monstrous mockery of Arabs can be seen in *Karagöz* in December 1927 (Figure 4.27). The setting is framed by French and Italian officers, and standing in between, the monstrous Arab, dressed in his traditional

[372] *Karagöz*, 31 July 1926, numero 1917.
[373] ibid. Provence, 116-127. Quincy Wright, "The Bombardment of Damascus," *The American Journal of International Law* 20, no. 2 (April 1926): 263-280. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East,* 277-291.

robe. The Arab is portrayed as a savage, and a barbaric insurgent.[374] His image in the cartoon is identified with mandate Syria, and decorated with weapons symbolizing the insurgency. He holds a sword between his teeth, is clutching a long dagger tucked into his belt, and finally a rifle is slung on his back. He has a dark, hairy body. His facial features are devilish. His nose is prominent and his eyes are large and menancing. Behind the principal three figures stands a hill with Karagöz on one side and a British man on the other watching the negotiations between the two officers. The Frenchman, who has the upper hand, is shown as taller than the Italian. The cartoon's theme centers around persistent reports that the French were receiving for Italy's serious effort to obtain the Syrian mandate in return for its claims in Tunisia.[375] The pun ridicules France for seeking a way to get rid of Syria, where it faced a serious rebellion against its mandate. The insurgents, who appear as Arabs (the cartoonist does not identify them as Druzes or any other ethnic group), are described as "bloody, armed trouble," or savages: *"Frenchman – Dear friend, I'm giving you Syria, which cost me a few thousand lives. Use it happily ever after! Karagöz – Give it away, dear friend, so that this bloody, armed trouble will wipe out the expanding and overflowing obsessions of those located next to Mosul."*[376]

The image of the Arab in the mainstream cartoon magazines until the late 1920s was characterized mainly around the Arabs' collaboration with the imperial forces and their betrayal of the Turks during World War I. In the cartoons they were presented as savage nomads with devilish – or even monstrous – looks. Yet, these depictions also included more realistic features, despite being indifferent to the ethnic and religious diversity of Middle Eastern populations (Figure 4.37).

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[374] I encountered an interesting article written by Elbridge Colby, a captain in the United States Army in 1927, which made a moral judgement on fighting against the "savage tribes." The article developed an argument, based on Prof. Quincy Wright's article, "The Bombardment of Damascus." The latter describes the Syrian insurgents as uncivilized and savage, arguing that special war techniques should be used against these savages where international law cannot be applied (since these "savage" tribes did not know understand such law). Elbridge Colby, "How to Fight Savage Tribes," *The American Journal of International Law* 21, no. 2 (April 1927): 279-288.

[375] Yücel Güçlü, "The Controversy over the Delimitation of the Turco-Syrian Frontier in the Period between the Two World Wars," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 4 (July 2006): 648.

[376] *Kibrit suyu ekmek/dökmek* means to wipe something off the map, to destroy.

The cartoonist appropriated the romantic tradition of the violent, barbaric savage to use it in an overtly open political context, transforming it into a critique of the Arabs of the Middle East, who chose to betray the Turks instead of siding with them. He stokes the nationalistic feelings of his audience, while making a point about the lack of honor and decency of the Arab Other, who is unable to take a strong stand against expansionist Europe.

It seems like the satirical journals of the time served as self-appointed media, as the mouthpiece of the Kemalist regime, to promote the values of the new nation. For *Karagöz*, as the representative of the new "civilized" Turkish state, civilization constitutes the primary component of an independent statehood. Although the Moroccans of North Africa were praised for fighting the Great Powers on their uncivilized stage in the Turkish public sphere (Figure 4.29), for *Karagöz*, they are destined to lose in the end. In making this statement, *Karagöz* also uses the almost unreflective attributes of "backwards" and "uncivilized" and identifies them with Arabs in general.

The Re-emergence of the Arab Other, 1936-1939

The Black Arabs of Ethiopia and the Italian invasion

The Turkish public was already familiar with the *Zenci/Kara Arap* (Black Arab) stereotype from the cast of the Karagöz shadow theatre. He would appear in the plays as part of the household, or *mahalle*, as a loyal servant of the household. When the figures in the plays were transferred to the print media in the early twentieth century, and inspired printed satire, the black Arab of the Ottoman house became visible in the cartoons as well.[377] Maintaining their stereotype as identified in traditional Karagöz plays, they were originally sub-Saharan African slaves traded through Tripoli and Cairo to the Ottoman Empire. In addition to their known image as loyal but naive and foolish, in some of the early cartoons

[377] With the promulgation of the Second Constitution in 1908, the number of Karagöz plays from the classical repertoire that started to be published some time prior to the period was expanded and enriched, and even lending their name to the satirical, humorous journal *Karagöz*. Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil, *Karagöz: Its history, its characters, and satirical spirit* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1961), 12.

they were portrayed as part of Ottoman expansionist propaganda, in a form adapted from European Orientalism, as savage tribal groups that needed civilizing.[378]

> The construction of the colonial subject in discourse, and the exercise of colonial power through discourse, demands an articulation of forms, of difference – racial and sexual. Such an articulation becomes crucial if it is held that the body is always simultaneously (if conflictually) inscribed in both the economy of pleasure and desire and the economy of discourse, domination and power.[379]

The colonial narrative exercises its authority through the figures of the farce. However, this tendency to ridicule the colonized extended to the époque of nations as well. For scholars of nationalism, a nation is defined as a linguistic group, a cultural body, a race, or a collective with common history.[380] Race in most cases became a common denominator and was employed as a concept in the building of national identity. The visual appearance of the black Arab of the Ottoman era as the colonized noble *Zenci* savages of Africa resurfaced with the Italian incursion into Ethiopia in 1935 as part of a broad propaganda campaign adopted by Turkish satirists against the mandate powers.

Ethiopia's independence was shattered in October 1935 when Mussolini ordered the invasion of the country from Italian-held Eritrea and Somaliland, thinking that he would easily crush a poorly equipped and unprepared Ethiopian army as part of his colonial ambitions for keeping the balance of power in the Red Sea. In the face of widespread condemnation from the League of Nations, the Italians started a military campaign in Ethiopia. In his article trying to identify Europeans' fundamental perceptions of the images of Ethiopia as barbaric and uncivilized, Tibebu cites Italy's rational justification for occupying Ethiopia through the words of English novelist Evelyn Waugh:

> Abbyssinia could not claim recognition on equal terms by the civilized nations and the same time maintain her barbarous isolation; she must put her natural resources at the

[378] See Chp. 2.
[379] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Psychology Press, 1994), 67.
[380] Nazan Maksudyan, "The Turkish Review of Anthropology and the Racist Face of Turkish Nationalism," *Cultural Dynamics* 17, no. 3 (2005): 291-322.

> disposal of the world; since she was obviously unable to develop them by herself, it must be done for her, to their mutual benefit, by a more advanced power [such as Italy].[381]

The Italian invasion found widespread reverberations in Turkish satirical media. The campaign against the mandate powers of Britain, France and Italy found another venue through the Turkish public's memories of post-Ottoman Africa. The cartoon magazines became highly instrumental in this mission as a supplement to the newspapers.[382] On July 13, 1935 *Akbaba* published a cartoon by Cemal Nadir on its cover depicting the situation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital (Figure 4.30).[383] The one-liner was "*Mussolini – Come, if you want to get comfortable, get under my mandate!"* In the cartoon, Nadir puns on "manda" as buffalo to stress the ridicule.

Turkish cartoonists, strongly influenced by their European counterparts like Daumier, frequently made the black Arabs look more like apes than human beings (Figure 4.31).[384] In most of their cartoons, Turkish cartoonists delineated black Arabs with noses wider and flatter than those of both Europeans and Turks. Lips were exaggerated and pictured so that the mouth became a visually prominent key physiognomic sign of race.[385] The aim was to form in the audience's chain of perceptions the uncivilized characteristics of Black Arabs through magnifying the physical analogy between man and ape.

Another distinctive feature of the illustrations of black Arabs by Turkish cartoonists was the special significance they assigned to hair. Black Arabs were presented with thick, black, curly hair as a marker of their "savage"

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[381] Teshale Tibebu, "Ethiopia: The 'Anomaly' and 'Paradox' of Africa," *Journal of Black Studies*, 26, no 4 (March 1996): 421. The persistent depiction of colonial black Other as apes was echoed in British cartoons as well as French. This stereotyping and racism underlines the notion of dehumanization through employing the "savage" nature of the Black Arabs.

[382] Tan Gazetesi (daily Tan newspaper).

[383] Cemal Nadir Güler is probably one of the most important cartoonists in early Republican Turkish cartoon history. He was the creator of major characters such as Amca Bey and Salamon. His cartoons were mainly published in daily *Akşam*, but he did work for *Akbaba* as well.

[384] Childs, *Daumier and Exoticism*, 72.
Also, in the June 14, 1924 *Resimli Gazete* (Illustrated Newspaper), issue 41, the entire cover depicted a racist "evolutionary descent" of black Africans from apes. The central figure was an ape bearing the legend "*orman adamı*" (jungle man). The left side of the cover referred to the Black Congress, titled "*zenci kongresi,*" visually making the racist argument for a direct connection between black Africans and apes.

[385] ibid., Childs.

characteristics. This feature of black Arab hairdos had been a subject in Turkish satire long enough to create an idiom, "*Arap saçı*" (Arab's hair), denoting a complex, tangled situation (Figure 32 and Figure 33). The nature of the black Arab was typically expressed as naive to the degree of stupidity, simple-minded, unruly, and ignorant, yet with dignity, similar to his fellows that were part of the Ottoman household.

Two cartoons published in *Karikatür* magazine by Ramiz Gökçe (Figure 4.32) and Orhan Ural (Figure 4.33) on the Ethiopian incursion constitute strong examples of "black Arab" stereotyping in early Turkish satire. Both cartoons contribute to the correspondence between the moral character of black Arabs and physical appearance extended to the nature of hair, pointing to the complicatedness of given circumstances. In Figure 4.32, the cartoon titled *"The State of the World"* stresses the effective participation of Ethiopia in the European scramble for Africa through the depiction of a shaky game played with flying balloons by two dictators, Mussolini and Hitler. The balloons are portrayed as the heads of black Arabs. They are attached to strings made out of their curly, frizzy hair signifying the various uncertainties of colonization in Africa, in this case Ethiopia, and both dictators are trying hard not to get their balloon strings tangled up. Mussolini warns Hitler: "Adolf, you'd better watch out, at the end of the day, it's hair!" In Figure 4.33, Orhan Ural, another prominent Turkish cartoonist for *Akbaba* and *Karikatür* magazines, depicted the black Arab of Ethiopia using the same stereotypical characteristics as Ramiz's black Arabs. In the cartoon titled *"Arab hair,"* he refers to the Ethiopian question that was taken to the League of Nations. As usual, the ethnic characteristics as opposed to racial ones are not well defined in the cartoons. We see that Ramiz and his fellow cartoonists were depicting all the blacks of Africa indifferently, even attributing to them round facial feature as a symbol of foolishness and naivety.

Ural, who also did cartoons for one of the major opposition newspapers, *Son Posta,* identified with Ramiz in merging the physical features of blacks with their "natural" character as "uncivilized savages" (Figure 4.34). We do not know if they were greatly influenced by each other, or if that was the common image of

blacks in Turkish public opinion, but all these cartoons presented black Arabs as the binary opposite of civilized nations: civilized/savage, attacker/attacked, white/black. The pun in Ural's August 22, 1935 cartoon makes a clear statement comparing the twentieth century's "civilized" man, a highly equipped soldier wearing a black, round-eyed gas mask, with the "savage" man. The title of the cartoon comes from a Mussolini speech: "*We will create a civilization in Ethiopia!*."

Pity was another sentiment found in cartoons centered around black Arabs. Although the Turkish perception of the Blacks focused on their "savage" nature, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, the "civilized" world, including Turkey, pitied the conquered nation. This feeling of pity for Ethiopia, which was exposed by European injustice, was presented in many Ramiz cartoons, one of which, published on February 29, 1936, serves as a good example. The cartoon is titled "Victim of civilization," where Ethiopia (*Habeş*) is illustrated as a curly-fleeced black sheep holding an olive branch peace offering in its mouth. It is victimized by a civilization represented by a fully equipped Italian soldier (Figure 4.35).[386] Just as once we encountered a white sheep symbolizing Mosul, now we see the same sheep in black. Its loaded meaning is not too different, since in both cases they are naive, innocent, soft victims of expansionist civilization. The scene depicted by Ramiz resembles the famous story from Genesis, also told in the Koran, when Abraham/Ibrahim, just about to sacrifice his son Ismail as commanded by God, was stayed by an angel who offered him a ram as a substitute sacrifice. However, this time no alternative for Ethiopia's salvation was offered either by the League of Nations or heavenly angels.

At the same time as the illustrations of Ethiopian struggle were embodied in the Turkish cartoon space through exaggerated depictions of their racial features, a connection was built between the black Arabs of the post-Ottoman era and their African heritage through the employment and revitalization of characters in

[386] In both cartoons by Orhan Ural and Ramiz Gokce, the Italian soldiers are depicted wearing gas masks for protection against the chemical weapons they themselves used in Ethiopia. *Tan Gazetesi*, "Italyanlar Zehirli Gaz Kullanıyorlar." March 23, 1936, Monday.

Karagöz plays. Racial conceptions were the twisted products of the new scientific reasoning that developed in the nineteenth century. By then, "the concept of 'race' and that of 'nation' were coming to be widely agreed upon signposts of peoples's intellectual world: race and nation had become facts."[387] The racist tendencies of Turkish nationalism in defining national identity had been a part of a rich literature. Yet what my study hopes to show is that these tendencies were not limited to Kemalists but in fact already existed in society.

Karikatür magazine in its October 10, 1936 issue depicted one of the Black Arab characters of *Karagöz* shadow theatre known as *Kabakcı Arap* in a distorted fashion (Figure 4.36). The title of the cartoon was "*Tarihden Çizgiler: Kabakcı Arap*" (Sketches from the Past: the Musician Arab). The cartoonist, Salih Erimez, used visual metaphor in his illustration to underscore Black Arabs as inferior to civilized Turks. The character in the cartoon looks foolish, and the way his tongue dangles highlights his silliness to the degree of ludicrous folly. He is dressed in threadbare Ottoman attire, in a way symbolizing the unpleasant Ottoman past. The way his body is depicted through a series of common features (general physical appearance, plus some striking details of the appearance and some behavioral features) immediately links him in the imagination to a dancing monkey. The text in his speech bubble justifies his monkey-like movements with a famous attribute of fictional monkeys: stealing. The cartoonist reveals this attribute through *Kabakcı Arap*'s words translated as, "Our women don't commit sins, they just go to the *hamam* and steal bags!"[388]

To sum up the way Turkish satire controlled and manipulated the public opinion with respect to the blacks of Africa (or as in Karagöz plays' *Zenci Arap)*, one can argue that they were constantly positioned in a manner that stressed black inferiority and Turkish (white) superiority both physically and in terms of

[387] Howard Eissenstat, "Metaphors of Race and Discourse of Nation: Racial Theory and the Beginnings of Nationalism in the Turkish Republic," ed. Paul Spickard, *Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World* (New York: Routhledge, 2005).
[388] The original reads: "*Bizim bacı haram yemez! Hamama gider bohça çalar!*"

manners.[389] Although the conception of blacks was never stable, the negative attributes were inherent, almost unavoidable, and were produced by their "uncivilized," "savage" nature. For the cartoonists of the period it seems that they adopted the racial theory of the nineteenth century, projecting it onto Arabs in relation to the Turks. Namely the Turks played the role of the "Aryan races," standing at the top of the imagined pyramid, while the lowest rank belonged to the black Arabs, playing the African type, supposedly closer to apes than humans.

The Arab Revolt of 1936, the Alexandretta Dispute, and the Birth of the Hybrid Arab in Turkish Cartoons

All the previous examples of cartoons that depicted the colonized Black Arabs of Africa and reconnected to old *Karagöz* plays also claimed that humor that perpetuate ethnic groups as negative stereotypes and integrate the ethnicity of the Middle Eastern *Ak Arap* (White Arab) with black racial stereotypes, creating a new form for an hybrid Arab image. It was colonialism and the fight of non-Western nations against it that was instrumental in reconnecting the "white" Arabs and the "black" ones. The adoption of colonial rhetoric with its related typologies and classifications was a common practice by groups that had colonial encounters. The "hybrid" was a common colonial theme, reflecting anxieties about crossing ethnic and cultural boundaries.[390] After a short period in which the images of the Arab were drawn apart, they were reunited in the imagery. Both

[389] Turkey's print media placed the new nation among the civilized European nations. This was one of the major pieces of national propaganda. In cartoons concerning blacks, the emphasis on civilized Turkey sometimes is made through mirror images of Europe. When we analyze cartoons depicting Turkish soldiers, for example, we can easily observe the similarities between them and European soldiers as attributes of civilization. European-style attire, women's hairstyles, etc. are other links used to depict civilized Turks as being like their European counterparts.

[390] For more on the theory of "hybridity," see Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (London, New York: Routledge, 2013). Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28 (1984): 125-133. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Psychology Press, 1994). Paul Gilroy, *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* (London, New York: Routhledge, 2004). Floya Anthias, "Diasporic Hybridity and Transcending Racisms: Problems and Potential," *Rethinking anti-racisms: From theory to practice* (London and New York: Routhledge, 2002), 1-20.

were depicted as brave anti-colonialists, but at the same time as savage, barbaric, and traditional. Ethiopia and Syria were thus fused together again in the Turkish mind.

This new 1930s form of representing the Arab was evident in most Republican cartoons whenever the subject of Arabs came up in Turkish political life. The depiction of the unappreciated Other as an animal-like or beastly figure had already been used for ridicule as early as nineteenth century Ottoman satire mostly to discredit the European and later mandate powers. On the other hand, until the 1930s, the Arabs of the Middle East and North Africa were depicted in cartoons in stereotypical outfits (with *kefiye*s and garb), ethnically indistinguishable. One would be unable to differentiate between the Middle East's various cultural or ethnic groups just by looking at the illustrations without reading the titles or commentaries. Besides their traditional looks, the one common aspect of all these types was their barbaric and disloyal features for allying with European forces against the Ottoman Empire (Figure 4.37).

The Arab of the Middle East, in the new imagery of the Turkish Republic after its establishment, appeared in the cartoon scene through two contemporaneous events: the Arab Revolt of 1936, also known as the Palestinian revolt, and the Alexandretta dispute (1936-1939). Although these situations arose independently from each other, they were represented at the same time in Turkish cartoon magazines.

The cartoonists' perception of the new foreign policy during the early years of the republic was characterized as cautious, realistic, and generally aimed at preserving the status quo and the hard-won victory of 1923. The period from 1923 to the 1930s was dominated by the power struggle between Turkey and the Great Powers mainly over border issues, with Iraq over Mosul and with Syria over *Hatay sanjak* (the Alexandretta district).[391] The feeling of distrust towards the

[391] The Alexandretta district or *Hatay Sancak* was a province located in southern Turkey, on the Mediterranean coast. The administrative capital of the district was *Antakya* (Antioch), and the other major city in the province was the port city of *Iskenderun* (Alexandretta). It was part of the Ottoman Empire until the Great War. Under the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, Syria, Lebanon, and the northern Levant, including Alexandretta, were given to the French. It officially went under

West was still rife. Yet, over the course of the national construction years, Turkey's relations showed a gradual improvement with its neighbors, mainly with the powers on its south-east borders, Britain and France. After the resolution of the Mosul dispute with Britain in 1926, the one issue Turkey and France clashed over in the 1930s was the *sanjak* of Alexandretta. Meanwhile, Turkey stood on the sidelines as a mere spectator to the Arab Revolt that was taking place in Palestine and Syria.

When the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936 (simultaneously against the British and the Zionists) echoed in the Turkish newspapers, Ramiz depicted the incident by alluding to the ancient Roman gladiatorial fights with the title "*Isyan*" (Revolt) (Figure 4.38).[392] As in earlier periods, revolt stood as the major theme in the 1930s Turkish cartoon, and was seen as the major attribute of the Arab Other. In Ramiz's cartoon as well, the European power, depicted as an old, beaten-up gladiator, holds his bloody sword against the Arab Revolt, represented as a giant beast. The giant's dark, hairy skin constitutes a binary opposition to his fleshy, swollen red lips, exaggerated to signify foolishness, as with cartoons of Africans. Cartoon artists developed an interest in deformed and misshapen monstrosity as a form of pictorial representation, a symbol of the negative. Monsters, aberrations, and anomalies symbolized grotesque and dehumanized subjects, and were often used to construct opposing stereotypes. The shape of the monster was a combination of characteristics attributed to create negative images of the persona. In this cartoon, the monstrous image of the "Arab Revolt" reflects the notions of dehumanization and the sense of the psychological enemy. It also shows ethnic classification or even generalization of Arabs as a constant threat to the former Ottomans, and in this case, to the mandatory governments, mainly Britain and France.

French mandatory government after 1919, bordering Turkey to the south. The province was designated part of the National Pact of 1920 by Mustafa Kemal, and it held its significant status until its inclusion within the Turkish Republic's borders.

[392] *Tan Gazetesi*. "Filistinde Kanlı Hadiseler: Tel Aviv ve Hayfa'da örfi idare ilan edildi." 21April 1936, Tuesday; "Filistinde vaziyet vahim: Araplar ve Yahudiler arasında yeniden kanlı hadiseler oldu." Wednesday, April 22, 1936; *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, "Filistin Yahudileri Kudüse iltica ediyorlar." Saturday, April 25, 1936.

Cartoons published subsequently in both *Akbaba* and *Karikatür* depicted the Arab Revolt in Palestine in the context of the Arab struggle against the Zionists. The scene of a confrontation with Zionism, Palestine became the key issue between the Great Powers and Arabs during the post-war years. Aiming to change the British policies in Palestine and prevent its partition between Arabs and Jews, the Arab Revolt took place in 1936-1939, with two major uprisings in 1936 and 1937.[393] Syria extensively supported the Palestinian cause when the rebels in Palestine revolted in 1936 for two years. The situation was reflected as a far-off event in the Turkish media. On May 2, 1936, *Akbaba* commented on a newspaper item regarding the Arabs of Haifa, who set over a thousand Jewish homes on fire. The cartoon is titled: "*From the newspapers: The Arabs are killing the Jews in Palestine!*" The subtext hints at the Jewish fondness for money, with the Jewish man trying to sell matches to the Arab, saying: *"Haci sir, since you're burning down Jewish villages, why don't you buy the matches from us!"*[394] The Arab's typical behavioral attribute of barbarism is emphasized in the cartoon, in which he looks like an assassin as opposed to the civil but money-mad Jewish character, both of them ethnically portrayed (Figure 4.39). Interestingly in this cartoon, the principle is not the contrast but instead the similarity in their physiognomy. The linkage between the Jewish money-grubber stereotype and the disloyal Arab runs through the text. The Palestinian Arab's bony facial structure, not yet merged into a hybrid form, is combined with a hook nose and thick lips, which are commonly facial stereotypes for Jews as well.

Syria was the common denominator in Turkey's dispute with France over Alexandretta and the Palestinian Arab Revolt. When France's mandatory government promised full independence to Syria including the Alexandretta province in 1936, Turkey decided to claim the province for its own, arguing that it was part of the National Pact of 1920. Turkey's claim over the Alexandretta

[393] Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular, were uncomfortable with the Zionist movement, which was growing rapidly with the aim of establishing a Jewish national home and an independent state, whereas the Arabs felt left behind and in danger of losing their homeland. Philip S. Khoury, "Divided Loyalties? Syria and the Question of Palestine, 1919-1939," *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no 3 (July 1985): 327-328.

[394] *Tan Gazetesi*. "Filistin Halkı Dehşet içinde: Hayfa Arapları 1000 kadar yahudi evini ateşe verdi." Thursday April 23, 1936.

region of north-east Syria continued in the League of Nations while conducting considerable media propaganda, from 1936 to 1937. Syria, on the other hand, along with Lebanon, which was under French mandatory rule, provided popular support to the revolt in Palestine until it became actively involved.[395] The cartoonists were more interested in Syria's involvement in the revolt than in the Palestinian cause. The "revolt" theme attracted the attention of the cartoonists, who launched a serious propaganda campaign against the Syrian Arabs, tending to comply with the government's policies. In two cartoons published in *Karikatür* by Ramiz four months apart, one on December 5, 1936 and the other on April 17, 1937, the rebellions in Syria were visually communicated through the depiction of Arab figures, focusing on their facial expressions, fashioned with symbols of "*isyan*" (revolt). In Figure 4.40, Ramiz depicts an Arab drowning in an open sea. With half of his torso above the water surface, he is struggling to be saved. His hands are reaching towards the sky as if begging for help. He is wearing a *fez*, a felt hat with a tassel on top that was commonly worn during Ottoman times.[396] The ethnicity of the Arab is clarified in the legend that reads, *"Rebellions emerged in Tripoli and Beirut!"* The mouth and teeth of the Arab are exaggerated in the cartoon to emphasize the cry for help. Meanwhile, the combination of other features of the face, like the eyes, hook nose, and thin moustache, as attributes of the Arab, amalgamated the visual negative image that the artist wanted to relate to his audience. The sea is labeled "*isyan*," and the Arab is drowning in it as if there is no hope for help, and hence for survival.

A similar depiction of the Arab, this time a Syrian, is shown in Figure 4.42. The scene is simpler than the previous one, yet with the same impact. The cartoon is titled, "*The revolt in Syria is growing."* This time the Syrian Arab is wearing a *keffiyeh* instead of a *fez*.[397] The cord that holds it, the "*aqqal*," is a snake, a

[395] Khoury, "Divided Loyalties," 327-328.
[396] While Turkey discarded the fez with its republican reforms, the Arab public under mandate control kept using it as part of their daily attire. Thus, its illustration suggests the regions of Syria and Lebanon personified through physical features. Ahmet Emin Yalman. "Lübnan istiklali ve Antakya." *Tan Gazetesi,* November 1, 1936, 1.
[397] In the early decades of the Kemalist regime, the *fez* became a symbol of backwardness, associated with Ottoman backwardness, contrasted with Kemalist secular and Western-facing enlightenment.

common symbol of evil and deception. Its mouth is open, ready to bite. The snake is labeled "*isyan*" (revolt). The Arab's facial features are again overstated. His eyes roll upward in desperation as if he is trying to see the snake that is coiled around his *keffiyeh*. His lips are full and fleshy, and open halfway, showing white teeth that contrast with his darker skin. He is wearing an earring, giving him a gypsy- or pirate-like look.[398] By using physical features combined with behavioural qualities, Ramiz underlines the Arab Revolt's failure in the legend like so: "*Revolt – I coiled this rope around my own head.*" Syrian politics were haunted by their participation in the revolt that emerged in the French mandate provinces of Syria and Lebanon. On the eve of the *Hatay* dispute with France and Syria, Ramiz uses the failure of the Arab Revolt to reassert the image of the Arabs as uncivilized betrayers in Turkish cultural consciousness.

The inclusion of the *Hatay* Province into Turkey's national borders held a special importance for Mustafa Kemal. *Hatay* was ceded to France's mandate at the end of the Great War, but it was claimed in the National Pact as part of Turkey's national borders. With the signing of 1921 Ankara Agreement between France and Turkey, France accepted the terms for governing the *Hatay* area, which had a significant Turkish population. The agreement had a special article that would keep Turkish as the main language.[399] However, when the French government undertook a consensus with the Syrian representatives in 1936 to

[398] Interestingly, during the fascist wave of the 1930s, Roma (gypsies) were also described as having physiognomies similar to African blacks, which accompanied their dark skin combination, white teeth, and large lips as qualities of an inferior race. Ian Hancock, "The 'Gypsy' stereotype and the sexualization of Romani women," *Gypsies in Literature and Culture* (April 2007). Hancock recounts in his article various "inaccurate" comparisons made between Roma and blacks: "Ozanne wrote that the Romani slaves in Wallachia had 'crisp hair and thick lips, with a very dark complexion, [and …] a strong resemblance to the negro physiognomy and character' (1878: 62, 65); St. John wrote that 'the men are generally of lofty stature, robust and sinewy. Their skin is black or copper-coloured; their hair, thick and woolly; their lips are of negro heaviness, and their teeth white as pearls; the nose is considerably flattened, and the whole countenance is illumined, as it were, by lively, rolling eyes' (1853: 140). An anonymous writer three years later wrote 'on a heap of straw in the middle, in the full heat of the blazing sun, lay four gipsies asleep. They were all four tall, powerful men, with coal-black hair as coarse as rope, streaming over faces of African blackness' (Anon., 1856: 273)."

[399] On the Sanjak of Alexandretta, Article 7 of the 1921 Ankara Agreement stipulated: "A special administrative regime shall be established for the district of Alexandretta. The Turkish inhabitants of this district shall enjoy facility for their cultural development. The Turkish language shall have official recognition." The agreement was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne and became part of the general peace settlement with Turkey.

relinquish the mandate and acknowledge Syria's independence within its borders, including the *Hatay* district, Turkey decided to claim the region, which had a separate regulation under the French mandate. Kemal Ataturk referred to Alexandretta case during his speech inaugurating Parliament on November 1, 1936, in the following terms:

> The important topic of the day, which is absorbing the whole attention of the Turkish people, is the fate of the district of Alexandretta, Antioch and its dependencies, which in point of fact belongs to the purest Turkish element. We are obliged to take up this matter seriously and firmly.[400]

The situation was taken to the League of Nations, where a new arrangement was made to define the *Hatay* district as a demilitarized independent entity. This decision outraged nationalists in Syria who were already struggling with two main challenges: providing support for the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and countering the practices of the mandatory government of France in Syria to establish a unified Arab nation. A separated entity in Alexandretta would be another blow to their aims in the region. They felt deprived, and refused to recognize any special status that might assign the district to Turkey in the future.[401] In order to keep the status quo and prevent the district from being tied to Syria, Turkey came into contact with the local population through intense propaganda. Yet the Arabs of Alexandretta who were opposed to the Kemalist regime also worked to support the Arab nationalist cause.[402] The district was given partial independence by the League of Nations in November 1937 by staying attached to the French mandate of Syria on the diplomatic level, but engaged to both France and Turkey in military matters. On September 2, 1938, Turkey managed to ensure the creation of the Republic of Hatay. The republic lasted one year. In order to meet the conditions of the National Pact, Turkey's increased pressure on France by

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[400] Hamdi Selçuk, *Bütün Yönleri ile Hatay'ın O Günleri* (Istanbul: 1972), 79. Majid Khadduri, "The Alexandretta Dispute," *The American Journal of International Law* 39, no. 3 (July 1945): 410. *Tan Gazetesi.* "Atatürk Millet meclisini açarken çok mühim bir nutuk söyledi: Antakya davamıza da büyük bir ehemmiyetle temas etti." November 2, 1936, 1. *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*. "Atatürkün Millete Hitabı." November 2, 1936, 1.

[401] Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*, 351.

[402] Keith D. Watenpaugh, " 'Creating Phantoms': Zaki Al-Arsuzi, the Alexandretta Crisis, and the Formation of Modern Arab Nationalism in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 03 (1996): 363-89.

denouncing its 1926 friendship treaty led Turkey and France to agree in favor of a Franco-Turkish protectorate. The latter would determine the fate of the province.[403] A popular referendum was held in June 1939. A Turkish majority was reached, and *Hatay* was ceded to Turkey.[404]

Turkish cartoon media in Istanbul started an intense campaign against the Syrian Arabs. The latter had been targeted by the cartoonists for long enough to recall visual metaphors as a means of creating public support. All the attributes that were employed in generating the negative Other were merged in the new, "hybrid" image of the Syrian Arab. This new hybrid Arab of the Turkish hyperreality found visual expression via three prominent cartoonists of the time: Ramiz Gökçe of *Karikatür,* and Cemal Nadir and Necmi Rıza of *Akbaba*.[405] When the conflict over *Hatay* broke out in the fall of 1936, both of the leading magazines covered the dispute on their front pages.

On October 3, 1936, Ramiz depicted the developments in the province in a cartoon titled: "*Lârahate fissancak!*" (a quasi-Arabic expression meaning "No rest in the sanjak"). The cartoon depicted an Arab man poked by the tip of the Turkish flagpole (Figure 4.42). The "Syria" label on his *fez* indicates the Arab's personification. The latter's representation seems particularly derogatory by being portrayed as fat, and too large. The weight here is not an indication of size but rather of overindulgence. His attire is a combination of a *fez*, a striped robe used in prison uniforms, a long coat, and slippers that barely cover the feet, all indicating his old-fashioned uncivilized nature. He is resistant to the developments and changes in the world surrounding him. Turkey keeps itself in a dominant position, while Syria is ridiculed, showing a sign of sudden fear when poked by the tip of the flagpole. His facial features resemble those of Black Arabs as attributes of inferiority (his dark skin, in contrast with his white teeth, visible in

[403] France needed Turkey's potential support against the growing threat of Germany.
[404] Shaw and Shaw. *Reform, Revolution, and Republic*, 376-377. Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London: John Murray Publications, 2002), 506-511. Seale, *The Struggle for Arab Independence,* 351.
[405] Necmi Rıza Ayça was a prominent Turkish cartoonist born in 1914. He first started to draw in *Cumhuriyet* daily in 1928, and in the late 1930s he moved to *Akbaba*. After 1936, he was *Akbaba's* head political cartoonist, while Ramiz was illustrating mainly for *Karikatür* instead of both.

between the red fleshy lips). His eyes are rounded with fear and shock, looking towards the Turkish flag. The one-liner underneath says: "*Syria – It is very difficult to rest on the Turkish flag (district)!"*[406] punning on "sanjak," which in Turkish means both "flag" and "district."

That same October, Necmi Rıza produced two cartoons just weeks apart in *Akbaba* (October 3 and 17). In the cartoons, he depicted the Syrian Arab as a dark-skinned, swarthy, villainous barbarian lurking at the gates of civilization (Figure 4.43 Figure 4.44). The characters were, in a way, carrying the traces of the Karagöz plays' *Ak Arap* typecast as he appeared in the plot of *Sahte Esirci* (The Fake Slave Merchant), as a plotter and slave merchant.[407] Both cartoons referred to the French agreement that promised Syria its independence with the inclusion of *Antakya* (Antioch) and *Iskenderun* (Alexandretta) within its borders. In the cartoons, the Arab's monstrous look was decorated with the same ornaments as Ramiz's Arab character: a red *fez* with a pendulous tassel, a long striped robe, a short coat, and slippers. Both cartoonists used the same symbolic attributes to create the visual metaphor of the hybrid Arab in the minds of the Turkish audience. In the first cartoon (Figure 4.43), titled "*Slavery in the twentieth century*," the Arab is presented as the potential buyer for a slave being sold by the French. The reference to the twentieth century stresses the uncivilized character of the Arabs. The label on the Arab figure's belt identifies him as Syria, and the women slaves are labeled on their ripped skirts as *Antakya* and *Iskenderun*. France is depicted as a cruel slave master holding a whip, in the middle of negotiations with the vicious slave buyer while holding the chains of the two beautiful women representing the *Hatay* district's two major cities. Necmi Rıza also highlighted geographical symbols such as palm trees, and a vast yellow valley, symbolizing the desert, thus the habitat of the savage Arabs, who have nothing in common with civilization. In Figure 4.44, the same Arab is forcefully holding a beautiful woman (depicted similar to previous ones) against her will. Her European-style

[406] *"Suriye- Turk snack üzerinde oturmak şok zor!"* Here there are a couple of plays on words. One is the word "*sanjak,"* which in Turkish means both "flag" and "district." Also, the cartoonist deliberately misspells the quantitative adverb "çok" as "şok" to cruelly mock the Syrian Arab's dialect.
[407] see p.37.

looks as contrasted with the Arab's backwardness compose a contradiction of the civilized versus the savage. The Arab's viciousness is amplified by his drooling like an enraged animal. The woman is tied tight to him through a coiled snake labeled *"France-Syria concord."* The woman's skirt is again labeled *"Antakya/Iskenderun."* The Arab says to the woman: *"Look, darling! We're bound together!"*

In the same week of October 1936, Akbaba's cover page published Cemal Nadir's cartoon bringing the hybrid image of the Arab to its peak in terms of visual illustration. The page is dominated by the large face of an overweight French woman symbolizing the "French motherland" gorging on her colonies and mandates. She holds the last bite between her teeth before swallowing it (Figure 4.45). The bite is Syria in its traditional outfit with the keffiyeh around his head. Nadir's cartoon depicts the Syrian Arab as almost similar to Africans, demonstrating almost no physical characteristics that resemble the Ak Arap of the Middle East. His very dark rather than fair complexion, wide nose instead of hooked, big mouth with full fleshy lips instead of thin ones, and big hands with long, pointy, devilish nails portray the savage African mired in barbarity instead of the disloyal denizen of Arabia. And while the French woman eats him alive, all he does is crave Iskenderun and Antakya. This image is an excellent example of the hybrid Arab that evolved in the last years of the 1930s, where cartoonists recreated their victim's persona by assigning them a character that included all the negativity in one body: inferior, savage, and barbaric.

Conclusion

The anti-Arab secularist spirit of the new Turkish nationalism in the process of creating a new identity was imagined in terms of the nineteenth century concept of "civilization." It expressed itself openly and violently in the cartoons of the early Republican period. In the process of nation-building, intellectuals turned away from Ottomanism and Islamism and began to seek ways to define and promote Turkishness through every possible means. They deemed cultural transformation a political strategy necessary for what they believed to be a

progression towards inclusion in the “family of civilized nations.” This process included appropriation and adaptation of the meanings and definitions in Turkish cultural memory and transforming its structure through utilizing related discourses in order to maintain a favourable position. Political cartoon space provided an alternative ground for the implementation of such discourses, especially employing the image of the Arab Other inscribed in Turkish national memory and modifying it.

The historical imagery of the Arab Other in the cartoons could be sorted out into images of people, particularly in illustrations that depict aspects of the character of Arab people; images of space, particularly in illustrations that depict the region's physical landscape and its cultural features; and images of time, particularly in the temporal intersection that occurs in an illustration when the past meets the present, and also in those illustrations where the cartoonist employs images that provide the viewer with a glimpse of the unpleasant past. In cartoons that include historical imagery, whether as a reference in a current event’s depiction or as full portrayal of an historical event, all three sorts of images work in concert to orchestrate the audience's perception of and reaction to the Arab stereotype.

In addition to these aspects, in the case of the Republic of Turkey, there were racial components in the national versus Arab picture. While racism endures, a distinctive understanding of identity does emerge from serious consideration of the dense, hybrid, and multiple formations of postcolonial culture in which the image of the black Arab is simultaneously both unremarkably routine and charged with an essential ethical significance

Out of the multiple stereotypes of Arab behaviour as demonstrated throughout the chapter, four emerged to dominate the representation of Arabs in the Turkish cartoon sphere: The fiercely violent and cruel behaviour of Arabs, especially the puppet leaders of post-Ottoman Arab provinces; the physical and mental sloth and indolence of the Arab; the uncivilized nature of Arabs and their struggle with progress over the forces of barbarism; and the greed, or heightened aspiration for financial gain. In later versions of the Turkish cartoon, these four

magnified features were attached to the physiognomy of black Arabs, which had been attributed to and identified with uncivilized savages that resemble monstrous ape-like creatures, menacing law, order, and civilized values. Adopting the racial theories of colonial discourse, the cartoonist projected a hybrid image of the Arab in relation to the Turks. Namely, the Turks played the role of the "pure race" standing at the top of the pyramid, in opposition to white Arabs, which held the role of the Semitic races, and the black Arabs, of the "African type," which held the lowest rank (Figure 4.31). All the negative components of the Ethiopian *zenci* Arab as a savage, inferior race were pictured to create a dehumanizing and isolating effect on the hated Syrian Arab, who emerged as the enemy, and the ultimate Other. Its recombinant form is indebted to its "parent" cultures but remains assertively and insubordinately a bastard. It reproduces neither of the supposedly anterior purities that gave rise to it in anything like unmodified form.[408]

The real and fictional physiognomic and characteristic features are seamlessly blended together in the persona of the Arab Other, so that there is no clear distinction between where one ends and the other begins. By bringing all of the identified qualities of both races – the *Ak* Arab of the Middle East, and the Black Arab of Sub-Saharan Africa – together, cartoonists served as the opinion manipulators, and even mouthpieces of the Kemalist regime in pursuit of creating a nation, and thus a national identity, a hyper-reality of the Arab Other.

[408] Paul Gilroy, *Between Camps: Nations, Culture and the Allure of Race* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 117.

Figure 4.1

"The first grand Chief of the Turkish Republic" [Ottoman]

Resimli Gazete, 29 September 1929

Figure 4.2

The portrait of Amir Abdullah published on the third page.

Resimli Gazete, 29 September 1929

Figure 4.3

"British planes bombarded Suleymaniah!"
British – We announce to the entire world that we are here only for the well being of its population!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 29 October 1923

Figure 4.4

"?-Mosul is mine!…"

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 29 May 1924

Figure 4.5

"British mandate over Mosul!"
British-She is so satisfied under my mandate, she doesn't even open her mouth to complain!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 2 June 1924

Figure 4.6

"Procedings in Ankara, pressure in Mosul!"
Cannibal-Lets get settled!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 31 May 1925

Figure 4.7

Karagöz-Hey my dear senior pasta-man, the oranges you fancied from faraway are not like the ones from Trablus. Since you have this forest, and coal and electricity in your own country, you don't need Mosul's oil. We still burn kindle to have light. Why don't you leave these shores with your manners, so we don't contravene!

Karagöz, 28 May 1924

Figure 4.8

"League of Nations will be opened in September and the Mosul Question will be discussed."

British-If they don't spoil my pleasure, I will be present at League of Nations' September hearing with full stomach!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 25 July 1925

Figure 4.9

"British are dispatching King Faisal to the League of Nations in order to steal our Mosul!"
-Perjurer!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 28 Ağustos 1924

Figure 4.10

"Will there be a security agreement in Iraq? "
Karagöz-Our Foreign Minister- Arab
neighbor, British gentleman, Iranian neighbor, let's be friends!
British- We consent!
Karagoz-Then, move away from the gate. Let everyone go back to their own homes!

[It reads *Mosul* on the gate]

Karagöz, 19 September 1925

Figure 4.11

"This is how the Mosul dispute wormed its way through!"
Karagöz- As it is understood gentlemen, the skinny guy is holding the tap, and he will deliver the oil to you drop by drop. You understand now why he puts both the League of Nations and you in a cage!

[It reads *Mosul* on the fountain]

Karagöz, 5 June 1925

Figure 4.12

"Mosul dispute is hushed up!"
-Mr. John Bull, you can make sure that I will be raised from death one day!..

[It reads *Mosul Question* on the coffin]

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 5 June 1926

Figure 4.13

"When King Hussein runs away from Mecca"
King Hussein -Save me, oh English!.
Karagöz - You are getting attired for kingdom and caliphate while even [the position of] sharif is too much for you, huh? It is so unfortunate for Islam that he who betrayed it is running to the arms of the British just like Vahdettin once did!

Karagöz, 4 September 1924

Figure 4.14

"While natives clash with each other!"
British- Com'on Saudi, com'on! run, clash, and break! All is yours, the caliphate, the kingdom and the sultanate!
Karagöz- Run to the rabbit, catch the hounds! You can play off each other but you can't do monkey business to me. Empty that trunk of yours, or I will do it myself with a single shot!

Karagöz, 7 October 1924



Figure 4.15

"Who is behind the wooden fence?"
Karagöz- [to the British] Don't hide behind the wooden fence skinny man, I see your hat. To let you know, you might go down the grain while I shoot the Kingdom of Iraq."

Karagöz, 15 October 1924

Figure 4.16

"As King of Hejaz Hussein escapes!"
Karagöz- Hey the fake king hey! Once you used to rob the hadjis who came to visit the Kaaba, now you are robbing the Kaaba itself while you are running away, huh! you deserve to have this chain on you. Make sure it stays there till you go to hell!

Karagöz, 29 October 1924

Figure 4.17

Your previous kingdoms are gone with the wind now!
The old king of Hejaz- Ah sir! he took my crown, he took my throne, he kicked me out the door!
His son, King Faysal of Iraq- Ah sir, he betrayed me, he replaced me, he let me down!
Karagöz- Seeing you both like this in the hands of the British I give a sigh of relief! How is it? Do you miss the old times?

[It reads *Hejaz Kingdom* on big throne, and *Iraq Kingdom* on the small one]

Karagöz, 8 August 1925

Figure 4.18

"*He has an agreement with 'Faysal'"*
British- Sirs, I have an agreement with this gentleman, even I leave Mosul, he won't leave me!
Karagöz- For God's sake, You benefit so much from each other that
you've become inseparable.

Karagöz, 12 October 1924

Figure 4.19

What is happening on the southern border?
Yezidis- We surrender, oh Turk, we surrender!
Turkish soldier- Impious, faithless buggers, we don't take prisoners! Those who threaten us with British weapons, we take their lives!

Karagöz, 27 March 1926

Figure 4.20

"This is how the rebels of the Yezidis ended!"
Turkish soldier- From inside or outside, whoever wants to harm this country, I will kill them screaming with my bayonet. Make sure everyone learns that!
Karagöz- Let God give power to your wrist, force to your heart, and power to your weapon! May you live long!

Karagöz, 3 April 1926

Figure 4.21

"The Brits are panicked! "

British- My dear Frenchman, I don't understand anything about these Eastern circumstances. I feel that there will be some kind of a rebellion soon in the Orient against the Europeans!

Karagöz- Karagöz- Don't be afraid sir, don't be afraid! I don't know about the others but we don't pull guns to those who don't attack us, you know this well.

Karagöz, 24 January 1925

Figure 4.22

"Where is the devil's finger in this?"

Karagöz [to the French officer]- *My dear Frenchman, watch out for your back and front. There might be a devil's finger in the way you are surrounded!*

Karagöz, 30 May 1925

Figure 4.23

"French position detonates in Damascus!"
Druze- Hey beloved, hey Christian! give me my money or I swear I will slaughter you!
Karagöz- Gosh! When I was in Damascus, you kept longing for each other. Now, as soon as you found each other, you started fighting. Anyhow, let's watch how you fight each other.

Karagöz, 7 November 1925

Figure 4.24

"End of the Arab Revolt"

Karagöz- Hey once- loyal Arab warriors [volunteered] *hey! I feel sorry for the consequences you are facing today, however, I forget my sorrow as soon as I remember what you have done to the Turkish soldiers* [here 'mehmetçikler, something like 'Johnnies'] *during their withdrawal from Syria, how you shot them dead and undressed them, how you killed the wounded and dragged them on the ground.*

Karagöz, 18 November 1925

Figure 4.25

"French newspapers say that Turks are encouraging the Syrian Revolt"
Syria- Oh my God! Oh my God!
French- [to the Turk] He yells because of your encouragements!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Akbaba, 18 November 1925

Figure 4.26

"What happened to Damascus in the Arab-French conflict?"
Karagöz- Go ahead, go ahead! You ruin not Damascus only, but whole of Syria, thus the entire world will understand how secure the Ottoman rule was for this country!

Karagöz, 31 July 1926

Figure 4.27

"Final political news: France is giving Syria to Italy!"
France- Dear friend, I'm giving you Syria that cost me a few thousand lives. Use it happily ever after!
Karagöz- Give it away dear friend, so that this bloody, and armed trouble will wipe out the expanding and overflowing obsessions of those located next to Mosul

Karagöz, 24 December 1927

Figure 4.28

"After the Moroccans cleaned up the Spanish!"
Hacıvad- like the Greeks, Spanish are on their way to the sea
Karagöz- You see Hacıvad, the weak nations that have not entered among the civilized nations are destined to fight one enemy after the other. Don't you believe that living free and independent by accepting civilization is better than fighting a new enemy every other day?

Karagöz, 13 May 1925

Figure 4.29

"The French gave up in Morocco like the Spanish!"
Hacıvad- The French boasted about the planes and soldiers they sent over to Morocco, yet at the end, they surrendered to the Moroccans.
Karagöz- If the nations whose liberty and independence had been violated, joined together, they could challenge the entire world; as long as those nations have a strong vein of honor and decency similar to the one we obtain.

Karagöz, 25 July 1925

Figure 4.30

Mussolini- Come, if you want to be comfortable get under my mandate!

Cemal Nadir,
Akbaba, 13 July 1935

رسملی غزته

Figure 4.31

Resimli Gazete, 14 June 1924

Figure 4.32

"The State of the World"
Mussolini- Adolf, you'd better watch out, at the end of the day, it is hair!

Ramiz Gökçe,
Karikatür, 4 April 1936

Figure 4.33

"Ethiopia-Italian Question in League of Nations"
- Arab's hair!...

Orhan Ural,
Karikatür, 1936

Figure 4.34
"We will create a civilization in Ethiopia!"
-From Mussolini's Speech
-The savage man against the twentieth century's civilized man!

Orhan Ural
Son Posta, 22 August 1935

Figure 4.35

"Victim of Civilization!"

[It reads 'Ethiopia' on the sheep]

Ramiz Gökçe,
Karikatür, 29 February 1936

Figure 4.36

"Sketches from the Past: the Musician Arab"
-Our women do not live unlawfully, they just go to the hamam and steal the bags!

Salih Erimez,
Karikatür, 10 October 1936

Figure 4.37

Figure 4.38

Revolt- Old man you must be tired in last six years… Give the sword to me!

Necmi Rıza
Akbaba, 1936

Figure 4.39

"From the News papers: The Arabs are killing the Jews in Palestine!"
- Haci sir, since you are burning down the Jewish villages, why don't you buy the matches from us!

Akbaba, 2 May 1936

Figure 4.40

"*Rebellions emerged in Tripoli and Beirut…*"

Ramiz Gökçe,
Karikatür, 5 December 1937

Figure 4.41

The rebellion in Syria is expanding...
I coiled this rope around my own head

Ramiz Gökçe,

Figure 4.42

"No rest in the province!"
Syria- It is very difficult to rest on the Turkish flag!

[This is a play on words. The word 'sanjak' in Turkish means both 'flag' and 'district]

Ramiz Gökçe
Karikatür, 3 October 1936

Figure 4.43

"Slavery in the twentieth century!"

[It reads 'Syria' on the man's belt, 'Antioch', and 'Alexandretta' on the women skirts]

Necmi Rıza,
Akbaba, 3 October 1936

Figure 4.44

-Look my darling, we are one body!..

[It reads 'French-Syrian Concordat' on the snake,
and 'Antioch-Alexandretta' on the woman's skirt.]

Necmi Rıza,
Akbaba, 17 October 1936

Figure 4.45

Syrian- Antioch!... Alexandretta!...

Necmi Rıza,
Akbaba, 1936

Conclusion

The nation as a social construct is contingent on a continuous construction of national identity. The latter consists of organized perceptions of basic human behaviors in an effort to group together collectives who are willing to accept various set of values and particular positions.[409] Political elites that lead projects of nation-building tend to emphasize emotional attachment to the nation and its territory while blurring or even negating the territorial or political claims of other groups. At the same time, the effort of nation-building often involves an intense effort of othering. If we take as our ending point Cemal Nadir's 1943 cartoon in *Cumhuriyet* (Figure 1), where the multiple images of Arab alterity found expression in the creation of one ultimate view of the Middle East, this study has traced the transformation of the Arab image as the Other over the last two decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first two decades of the new Turkish Republic until that point.

According to Baumann, "The self itself makes sense only in juxtaposition to Other." Identity and alterity mirror each other by determining the profile of the other and in return are determined by it. Nationalism emerged as a hegemonic ideology in colonial and non-colonial contexts in the nineteenth century, bringing with it the awareness of grouping as national collectives. The latter was defined in terms of territory, ethnicity, religion, language, history, and tradition. Within the definition of self as a nation, each of these groups (ethnic, religious, or territorial) was characteristically typecast or themed as the Other. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I examined initial representations of Arab characters in their capacity as the Other in Ottoman visual rhetoric. The four-hundred-year-old Karagöz shadow plays demonstrate the multi-ethnic makeup of the Ottoman Empire. Exhibiting powerful images set against assumed and often stereotypical backgrounds, Karagöz figures constituted probably the first visual illustrations of the various typecasts within the Ottoman public. Arab characters were among these characters. Within the figures they were depicted as and the humor they

[409] Bauman and May, *Thinking Sociologically*.

contained, they served as perception-builders for their audience. The attributes and qualities of these characters, which were used repeatedly in *Karagöz* plays, created a set of almost standard generalizations about the ethnic traits of Arabs. Ethnic stereotypes were fixed firmly through this popular artistic genre.

It is clear that in the pre-Republican Ottoman imagination, there were two distinct characters referred to as Arabs. One was the *Ak Arap* ("white" Arab), and the other was referred to as kara Arap ("black" Arab) or simply *Arap.* They represented two different stereotypes that were almost opposed to each other. One was pale-skinned, long-nosed, smart but cunning, wily and untrustworthy, while the other was dark-skinned, curly-haired, loyal and honest, but sometimes stupid. While the ak Arap represented merchants with heavy accents, his darker-skinned counterpart was often a representation of local household slaves and servants. These two stereotypes of Arabs in Karagöz plays not only contributed to the newly developing cartoon industry in the Ottoman print by providing typecasts, but also set the basis for building another "Other" constructed through ridicule as a contrast to the emerging image of the Turk.

In Chapter 2 I introduced the transition from the shadow theater to the lithographic realm, demonstrating the entrance of the Karagöz characters into the print media. I analyzed the Ottoman lithographic cartoons of the late nineteenth century, which were instrumental in the context of the passage to modernity. Echoing European Orientalist practices, Ottoman cartoonists imagined the modern "self" by contrasting it with an assumed backwardness within their realm. They associated the notion of "pre-modern" or "backwards" with the Arab provinces of the empire, which signified the ultimate backwardness. The cartoons selected in this chapter illustrated the technical and symbolic resemblances between the European cartoonists and their Ottoman contemporaries in imagining their Ottoman Orient.

After the declaration of the second Constitution following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the satirical press flourished. Enjoying a certain level of freedom at home, cartoonists turned their attention to the mounting threat from Europe. Thus, the political cartoons of the Second Constitutional era were

preoccupied with the European powers and their intrigues in the Middle East and Balkans. The colonized or provoked local actors of the drama would be lowered in depiction to mere symbolic references represented through geographical symbols or cultural attributes in the graphic imagery of the cartoonist.

At this point in time, nationalism was a fuzzy concept, meaning quite different things for different groups and individuals. As yet lacking clear definitions of nation and homeland, cartoonists found themselves in a quandary: how to portray those who were outsiders and insiders at the same time – part of the empire, but not quite part of the nation.

Cartoons in this period were multi-layered, imbued with geopolitical signs, highlighting particular politico-administrative boundaries, territories, and territorial visions. The cartoon genre provides a vivid illustration of the ideological experiments of the day at a time when ideological experiments such as Westernization, Ottomanism, and Islamism, in line with currently emerging ideas of nationalism and Turkism, were competing with one other.

The stormy period of Yemenite insurgencies, the Libyan war, the Balkan wars, and finally the epic Great War could be defined as a time of "occultation" or "gestation" for the Ottoman cartoon sphere with regard to the Arab stereotype. After a heroic interlude of the Arabs in North Africa during the pre-war years, the Arab as a human figure no longer accorded with any of the recognizable stereotypes. The visual archetype of the Arab was trapped in limbo: neither an insider nor an outsider, neither a friend nor foe. On the one hand it signified rapid internal changes and confusion in the imperial center about identity issues, and on the other external developments – Arab nationalism, collusion with the imperial powers, a sense of betrayal. The one significant feature of the Arab image that remained intact, either as ally or enemy, was their assumed uncivilized nature. This feature served as an echo of a former, less developed state of one's own civilization. Cartoonists, in their capacity as the new codifiers of the idea of a "modern" nation based on Turkishness, understood that the new formation under the Committee of Union and Progress was seeking to bury its "near distant" past

with its uncivilized past in the process of retaining the solidarity of the empire. The Arabs would rather be situated as the Other.

It was only during and after the trauma of the Great War that a more complex and symbolically laden image of the Arabs emerged in Ottoman and early Republican cartoons. Therefore, the rest of the dissertation was dedicated to demonstrating how this image of the Arab persisted in Turkish perception, serving as the ultimate "Other," and how this transformation of the Arab image and its unification in a hybrid form were reflected in cartoon space in the service of social propaganda.

The negative sentiments of the Arabs were transferred to the new republic through its founding political elite. The anti-Arab spirit of the new Turkish nationalism, hitched to the process of creating a new, "civilized" Turkish identity, expressed itself openly and violently in the cartoons of the early Republican period. In the process of building the nation, intellectuals turned away from Ottomanism and Islamism and began to search for ways to define and promote Turkishness through every possible means. As cited by William Pfaff from an article published by Michael Ignatieff, "[N]ationalism was: the dream that a whole nation could be like a congregation — singing the same hymns, listening to the same gospel, sharing the same emotions, linked not only to each other but those buried beneath their feet."[410]

The process of cultural transformation as a political strategy aimed at elevating the new state to the level of "civilized nations" included the appropriation and reinvention of meanings and definitions in Turkish cultural memory and transforming its structure. Political cartoon space was an effective component in the emerging discourse of Turkish nationalism, especially in digging up the image of the Arab Other buried in Turkish national memory and modifying it.

Apparently, the two previous archetypes of the Arab of Karagöz plays, Ak Arab and Kara Arab, merged to become a single ultimate Other. The historical

[410] Pfaff, William. "Nationalism and Identity." *The Way* 34.1 (1994): 6-16.

imagery of the Arab Other in the cartoons was incorporated as a hybrid image, denoting a mixture of races that signified the antithesis of national "purity." In cartoons that included historical imagery, whether as a reference in the illustration of current events or as full portrayal of an historical event, all three sorts of images – images of people, space, and time – worked together to form the perception of and reaction to the Arab stereotype of the Turkish audience.

In conclusion, as in Nadir's cartoon (Figure 1), the reservoir of stereotypes of Arab behavior and appearance that developed before the nation thus later emerged as a persona in which the real and fictional physiognomic and characteristic features seamlessly blended together to form an ultimate Other. This image represented everything the new Turk did not want to associate himself with. So that by bringing all of these qualities identified with both races of the *Ak* Arabs of the Middle East and the Black Arabs of Sub-Sahara together, in the pursuit of a national identity, a hyper-reality of the Arab Other was imagined in early Republican cartoon space.

This dissertation aimed to show the re-emergence of the Arab image during the formative years of the republic, until 1939, when the nation-building process was at its peak. The number of cartoons used in the dissertation with reference to the related period may seem a bit overwhelming, yet this multitude demonstrates the power of symbolic representations to form a shared imagination of national self and its other.

Perceptions are the products of our minds, and they need to be studied from various disciplinary perspectives. They are the cumulative and at the same time contingent outcome of multiple inputs in all spheres of human activity, from literature, to folk culture, to history textbooks. Visual rhetoric is only one of these inputs, where the visual image constitutes and is employed as the most basic form of transmitting information.

Bibliography

Satirical and Cartoon Gazettes

Europe and the Orient in Cartoons

Journal Name	Years Scanned/Published
Le Charivari	1832-1908/1937
Punch	1841-1908/2002

Ottomans and their Orient in Early Ottoman Cartoons

Journal Name	Years Scanned/Published
Istanbul	1867-1869/1869
Diyojen	1870-1872/1872
Terakki	1870-1871/1871
Terakki Eğlencesi	1871-1871/1871
Şarivari	1871-1871/1871
Çıngıraklı Tatar	1873-1873/1873
Hayal	1873-1877/1877
Şarivari Medeniyet	1874-1874/1874
Kahkaha	1875-1875/1875
Caylak	1876-1878/1878
Beberuhi	1898-1908/1898

Young Turks and Arabs in Ottoman Cartoons:

Journal Name	Years Scanned/Published
Boşboğaz ile Güllabi	1908-1908/1908
Kalem	1908-1911/1911
El-Üfürük	1908-1908/1908
Dalkavuk	1908-1909/1909
Musavver Papağan	1908-1909/1909
Davul	1908-1909/1909
Geveze	1908-1909/1909
Alem	1909-1909/1909

Hayal-i Cedid	1910-1910/1910
Cem	1910-1912/1912
Şaka	1910-1911/1911
Cadaloz	1911-1911/1911
Yeni Geveze	1910-1912/1912
Baba Himmet	1911-1911/1911
Karikatür	1914-1914/1914
Diken	1918-1920/1920
Güleryüz	1921-1923/1923
Ayine	1921-1923/1923
Kahkaha	1922-1924/1924
Aydede	1922-1922/1922

Early Republican Cartoons and their Arab Neighbors:

Journal Name	Years Scanned/Published
Karagöz	1908-1935/1935
Zümrüdü Anka	1923-1925/1925
Kelebek	1923-1924/1924
Akbaba	1922-1939/1977
Papağan	1924-1924/1924
Guguk	1924-1924/1924
Karikatür	1936-1939/1948

Newspapers

Newspaper Name	Years Scanned/Published
Resimli Gazete	1881-1889/1889
Cumhuriyet	1924-1948/Present
Resimli Ay	1924-1931/1931
Tan Gazetesi	1926-1935/1935
Son Posta	1930-1939/1960

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ייצוגים/ויזואליים/של/ערבים/והתגבשותה/של/זהות/לאומית/תורכית,/1908-1939

מחקר/לשם/מילוי/חלקי/של/הדרישות/לקבלת/תואר/"דוקטור/לפילוסופיה"

מאת

אילקים בוקה

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באר/שבע

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
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תאריך/29.06.2015/שם/התלמיד/ה/Buke/Ilkim/חתימה _____

נושא/התזה:/ייצוגים/ויזואליים/של/ערבים/והתגבשותה/של/זהות/לאומית/תורכית,/-1908
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שם/הסטודנטית:/אילקים/בוקה

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ומלאכת/שחזורם/במסגרת/מחקר/היסטורי/אינה/קלה./המצאות/אלה/ניזונות/מתשומות/
חברתיות/ואינטלקטואליות/באמצעות/אמונות/שונות,/והן/מייצרות/סינתזות/מאריכות/ימים/
של/פרשנות/תרבותית./

במטרה/לעקוב/אחר/היווצרות/דמויו/של/"הערבי"/בתרבות/הפופולרית/העוסמאנית/ומאוחר/
יותר/בתקופה/הרפובליקנית,/מחקר/זה/עוקב/אחר/הייצוגים/הויזואליים/הראשונים/של/
סטראוטיפים/ביחס/לערבים/במסגרת/התרבות/הפופולרית./ייצוגים/אלה/רווחים/בתיאטרון/
הצלליות/העוסמאני,/הקראגוז./הדמויות/שייצגו/ערבים/במחזות/הקראקוז/זכו/לביטוי/
מחודש/בסוגת/הקריקטורות/שהתפתחה/בשלהי/התקופה/העוסמאנית,/כחלק/מתרבות/
הדפוס/החדשה./השימוש/במטאפורות/ויזואליות/במסגרת/מרחב/הקריקטורות,/שהתפתח/
בתקופה/זו,/היה/מעוגן/בשפה/ויזואלית/חדשה/ובמערך/חדש/של/תפיסות/אוריינטליסטיות,/
תחילה/באירופה/ובהמשך/באימפריה/העוסמאנית./מטאפורות/אלה/נפוצו/בשיח/של/בקורת/
פוליטית./בתחילת/המאה/העשרים,/תורכים/נקלעו/אל/אל/סבך/השיח/האוריינטליסטי,/עת/

כמה/מאנשי/האליטה/העוסמאנים תורכים/ניסו/להגדיר/את/עצמם/כנגד/"אוריינטלים"/
אחרים,/כלומר/הערבים./

רק/במהלך/מלחמת/העולם/הראשונה/ולאחריה/התפתח/דמוי/מורכב/יותר/ורווי/סמלים/של/
"הערבי",/במסגרת/סוגת/הקריקטורות/בעתונות/העוסמאנית/והרפובליקנית./התחושות/
השליליות/ביחס/לערבים,/שהוצדקו/לאור/"הבגידה/הגדולה"/של/כמה/סיעות/פוליטיות/
ערביות/במהלך/המלחמה,/מצאו/דרכן/אל/הרפובליקה/החדשה/באמצעות/האליטה/
הפוליטית/המייסדת./המגמות/האנטי ערביות/שאיפיינו/את/הלאומיות/התורכית,/שגוייסו/
לצורך/בניית/זהות/תורכית/חדשה/שזוהתה/עם/"הציביליזציה",/באו/לידי/ביטוי/באופן/גלוי/
ואף/אלים/בקריקטורות/שהתפרסמו/בתקופה/הרפובליקנית/המוקדמת./לתמונות/וייצוגים/
ויזואליים/היה/תפקיד/חשוב/בהעברת/מסרים/לציבור/הרחב./בכך/הן/הפכו/לכלי/מרכזי/
בתהליך/בניית/הלאום/ויצירתן/של/זהויות/קולקטיביות/חדשות.

תהליך/ההקמה/של/הרפובליקה/התורכית/היה/מעוגן/בפרדיגמה/פוליטית/וחברתית
תרבותית/דינאמית/שהפכה/לאבן/יסוד/של/הזהות/הלאומית/ומרכיב/מפתח/במדינה/
החדשה./במסגרת/פרדיגמה/זו/התפתח/עיסוק/אינטנסיבי/ב"אחר"/ובמקומו/בתרבות/
התורכית./במהלך/התקופה/שמכסה/מחקר/זה,/כלומר/בין/השנים/1908-1939,/קריקטורות/
פוליטיות/התקבלו/כביטוי/פופולרי/של/שיח/לאומי/אשר/הגדיר/והבנה/את/הקהילה/
הלאומית/באמצעות/הנחלת/מסרים/סמויים/וגלויים./זה/נעשה/באמצעות/מניפולציה/של/
דעת/הקהל/בכל/הקשור/לדימויו/של/האחר./

דיסרטציה/זו/מבקשת/להדגים/כיצד/דימויים/אלה/של/"הערבים"/קנו/שביתה/בתפיסות/
עולם/בתקופה/הרפובליקנית/תוך/שהם/מסמנים/את/האחר/האולטימטיבי./באותה/עת,/
המחקר/מבקש/להראות/איך/שינויים/שחלו/בדימויים/אלה,/והתגבשותם/לכדי/נוסחה/
היברידית,/באו/לידי/ביטוי/בשיח/הקריקטורות./הדיסרטציה/מציגה/ומנתחת/מבחר/גדול/של/
קריקטורות/פוליטיות/מהתקופות/העוסמאנית/והתורכית,/בהן/האחר/הערבי/יוצג/במסגרת/
שדות/שיח/שונים/ומסגרות/הקשר/שונות./

בדרך/זו,/המחקר/מבקש/לבחון/שאלות/כמו:/מה/היה/אופי/השינוי/שחל/בדימוי/של/"הערבי"/
ברטוריקה/ויזואלית/משלהי/המאה/התשע/עשרה/ועד/לשנות/השלושים/של/המאה/
העשרים?/מה/היו/הסיבות/לשינוי/זה?/באילו/אופנים/דימויים/סטריאוטיפיים/של/ערבים/

שירתו/את/פרוייקט/בניית/הלאום/התורכי?/איך/דימויים/אלה/הובנו/(constructed)/
בתודעתם/של/הקוראים?/אחת/מטענות/המפתח/של/מחקר/זה/היא/שתהליך/של/הזרה/של/
וייחוס/מהות/(essentialization)/ל"הערבי"/באמצעות/סמלים,/סימנים/ונראטיבים,/היה/
מרכיב/מרכזי/בהתגבשותה/של/הזהות/התורכית/הלאומית/החדשה./

מילות/מפתח:/אומה;/לאומיות;/בניית/לאום;/לאומיות/תורכית;/האימפריה/העוסמאנית/
המאוחרת;/תורכיה;/הרפובליקה/התורכית/המוקדמת;/ערבים;/תיאורית/גזעית;/רטוריקה/
ויזואלית;/סטירה;/קריקטורות;/קריקטורות/פוליטיות/בתורכיה.