

T.R.
ISTANBUL SABAHATTIN ZAIM UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE EDUCATION INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINES SINCE 2000: AN
ANALYSIS FROM MILITARY SECURITY
PERSPECTIVE

MASTER THESIS

Kübra SADIKOĞLU

Istanbul
January-2022

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Thesis Advisor
Prof. Dr. Hasan Basri YALÇIN

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THESIS APPROVAL

This study has been approved in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Master's in
Political Science and International Relations

Supervisor Prof. Dr. Hasan Basri YALÇIN

Member of jury Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erhan İÇENER

Member of jury Asst. Prof. Dr. Hakan ERDAGÖZ

Approval by

Prof. Dr. Metin TOPRAK

Director, Graduate Education Institute

DECLARATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this MA thesis dissertation titled ‘Russian Military Doctrines After 2000’s in the Framework of Security’ is my own work and I have acted according to scientific ethics and academic rules while producing it. I have collected and used all information and data according to scientific ethics and guidelines on thesis writing of İstanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. I have fully referenced, in both the text and bibliography, all direct and indirect quotations and all sources I have used in this work.

Kübra SADIKOĞLU

Istanbul,

January 2022

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The people around us, who are regardless, for every condition stand by us even if we fail, to ease it, are the true mates of our life, in that sense, I feel lucky for being surrounded with plenty of good people. That was the best thing about the process of writing the thesis. Special thanks to those people for their doubtless stance by me. Especially to my parents for hoping always for more and supporting me for more. Thanks to Dilhan, Şule, Hacer, Berrin, Merve, and Merve Dilek for countless time encouraging and helping me. Special thanks also to Hrustan for his feedbacks for the study.

Last but the most, special thanks to my supervisor Dear Prof. Dr. Hasan Basri YALÇIN, his patience and tolerance were my leverage, sincerely...

Kübra SADIKOĞLU

Istanbul,

January 2022

ABSTRACT

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINES SINCE 2000: AN ANALYSIS FROM MILITARY SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Kübra SADIKOĞLU

Master Thesis Department of Political Science and International
Relations

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Hasan Basri YALÇIN

January-2022, Page 74 + IX

This thesis presents an examination of Russian military doctrines of 21st century. The focus is to analyse the main threat perceptions, perceptions of international system and Security of the Russian Federation. With respect to that Russian Federation's perceives the international system as multipolar and defines as destabilized. While the systemic reasons are detected as determining sources for threat perceptions, Russia's search in international system is for national stability. Against threat definitions, Russian Federation emphasizes the deterrence capacity of military power, mainly nuclear power.

Key Words: Military Doctrine, Military Security, Russian Federation

ÖZET

2000 SONRASI RUS ASKERİ DOKTRİNLERİ: ASKERİ GÜVENLİK PERSPEKTİFİNDEN BİR ANALİZ

Kübra SADIKOGLU

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Hasan Basri YALÇIN

Ocak-2022, Sayfa 74 + IX

Bu tez, 21. Yüzyıl Rusya askeri doktrinlerinin bir incelemesini sunmaktadır. Odak noktası, Rusya Federasyonu'nun temel tehdit algıları, uluslararası sistem ve güvenlik algısını ve tedbirlerini araştırmaktır. Buna göre; Rusya Federasyonu'nun uluslararası sisteme yaklaşımı çok kutupluluk ve istikrarsızlıkla tanımlanmaktadır. Rusya'nın tehdit anlayışını belirleyen nedenlerin ise uluslararası sisteme bağlı sebepler olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Rusya'nın uluslararası sistemdeki arayışı ulusal istikrar ve tehditlere karşı savunma dayanağı, başta nükleer güç olmak üzere, askeri gücün caydırıcılık kapasitesidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Askeri Doktrin, Askeri Güvenlik, Rusya Federasyonu

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ABBREVIATION EXPLANATION

BRICS	: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CIS	: Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	: Collective Security Treaty Organization
EU	: European Union
UN	: United Nations
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SCO	: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Cominform	: Communist Information Bureau
OEEC	: Organization of European Economic Cooperation
NCR	: NATO- RUSSIA Council

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Russia is one of the countries that hold a hard military capacity which is considerable for Europe's security and stability. As a great power, Russia has balancing potential at a significant level. In this respect, especially at the regional level, understanding Russia's perception of military security is substantial for policymaking and maintaining peace.

The country is known for several official papers on designing national security and foreign policy. The documents are a source to infer Russia's approach towards international politics. For the sake of enlightening the military security perception of the country in the 21st century, this thesis studied a content analysis of the military doctrines of the Russian Federation.

1.1. The Aim of the Thesis

The international system is most clearly explained depending on the military capacities and military formations. Military security and the elimination of major wars are among the essential purpose of international relations discipline. However, understanding the military reactions of a state is not an easy and clear topic, yet military doctrines are among the tools to understand the perceptions. Military doctrines are officially signed documents that reflect and declare military security concepts and perceptions of states. Considering that to understand the stance of a particular state to the international system and security, examination of military doctrines has critical importance. The literature on military doctrines shows that there are multidimensional approaches to determining the causes of military doctrines. Russia is also a source of wide discussions on motivations for decision-making in military strategy from cultural and realist points of view.

Therefore, this study aims to examine the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation to figure out its military threat understanding, military security perceptions, and its approach to the international system. Thus, it is possible to explore primary impacts on Russia's policymaking and priorities of military security. Considering that to understand the current military security framework of the Russian Federation, this thesis examines the military doctrines of Russia since the year 2000.

The study also includes a review of the latest document on military security which titled 'Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence'. There are two reasons for the significance of this paper for the study. First, nuclear deterrence is one of the essential safeguarding solutions presented in all Russian Military Doctrines since 2000. Second, it is the most recent established document as a component of Russian military security.

1.2. Problem Statement

The first quarter of the 21st century has already passed and even though the power balance of the world has not dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War, there are still destabilizing impacts on a regional level. Regime changes due to civil wars, regional conflicts, and international terrorism are some examples of conflicts and sources of instability that continue to happen. Considering that the international system has new power vacuums, especially in the Middle East, there are strengthening powers at regional levels in new conflicted zones. Russia is one of them and great power. In the 21st century, in terms of understanding new dynamics of international politics, discerning the perceptions of great powers on security is an essential need.

Since the year 2000, Russia has been on the agenda due to the change in its military security approach regarding high military expenditures and energy politics, and with the claim that Russia is reassessing its security influence through Soviet space (Krickus, 2014). After the colour revolutions, the negative perception of Russia increased regarding its aggressive attitude. The discussions on Russia have only grown deeper with the Ukraine crisis and the official breakdowns in diplomatic relations with NATO (Trenin, 2021). In official documents, NATO, and the USA as the adversaries of Russia are determined to ensure their national security (Korolev, 2018). Considering the alliance formations and the deterrent role of NATO for Europe, Russia's security perception turned out as a strategic matter for Europe's stability (Frear, Kulesa, & Raynova, 2018). In these circumstances, it is acknowledged that the current trend of Russian security perception needs to be revealed. Therefore to raise awareness for the future of regional security and potential causes of conflict, it may be useful to examine military doctrines and identify whether the external threats or cultural aspects of the Russian Federation are determining factors for the country's military security approach.

1.3. Research Question

This thesis aims to understand the driving reasons for Russian military security decisions. The main question is: “Are Russian military doctrines determined by external threats or cultural aspects?” To reach the purpose of the study, the following questions are also sought to be answered:

- What are the primary threat definitions according to military doctrines of Russia, in the 21st century?
- What is the Russian perspective towards the international system and security according to its military doctrines of the 21st Century?
- Which tools are mentioned to combat threats according to military doctrines of Russia, in the 21st century?

To answer these questions, the primary source of military doctrine documents of Russia is examined.

1.4. Significance of the Thesis

Russia preserves its position as an important great power in international arena as it is a state that possesses nuclear power and weapons of mass destruction. Recently, especially with the annexation of Crimea, Russia has drawn attention in the West for being an aggressive and expansionist threat to Europe, and to world stability as it has been in the past. But in international politics, there is mostly a balance in actions and reactions. Therefore in this study, Russia’s thought on international security and threat perceptions are discussed according to its military doctrine documents. Thus, Russia’s perceptions of military security are highlighted, according to its own official sources. However, the main significance of the thesis is to contribute to the criticism of the Russian Federation’s security perception generated either by cultural aspects, or external reasons. In this sense, the study provides an explanation of the sources of aggressive policies by utilizing the way the country shapes its military doctrines. From that point of view, the study creates an identification of the root causes of the military security actions of Russia by presenting an approach for achieving regional, in particular, and international stability, in general, also for avoiding potential conflicts.

1.5. Limitations of the Thesis

Throughout the literature review, two approaches have been found for determining causes of military doctrines: systemic and cultural. However, in terms of

understanding the cultural aspect, it was not available to interview military personnel or politicians from Russia. Besides, there was not a chance to explore further inside opinion from the field. That kind of a study -which includes interviews with military officials, politicians, or academia- might give a more exclusive approach to internal military perspectives, which may clarify the root causes of perceptions in the documents.

1.6. Research Methodology

In this study, qualitative research is conducted. Therefore, first, a theoretical framework and a literature review are given on the approaches towards military doctrine. Afterward, since the primary source of the research is the content of a certain type of official documents, content analysis of the military doctrine documents are conducted and is preferred as the most suitable method for this research. The content analysis method is generally preferred for analysing texts and transcripts (Roberts, 1989, s. 147-177). This method is also widely used for discourse analysis in different fields from social and political sciences to marketing for consumer research to bring a quantitative feature to study (Kassarjian, 1977, s. 8-18). However, for this research, a statistical analysis was not preferred, only a qualitative examination of the answers to the research questions were needed depending on the context of the primary source. Therefore, among the types of content analysis, manifest content analysis was preferred and conducted. The manifest content analysis refers to the examination of the direct meaning of the content which means 'to deal with the intended meaning' rather than the 'latent'. This method aims to figure out the 'central phenomenon' and 'identification of the intentions and other characteristics' in a context (Gupta, 1982). It is in line with the aim of the study which is to infer and identify the central approaches in Russia's military doctrines to test the effects of external threats and cultural aspects.

For this purpose, the classification and definition of the following issues were examined depending on relevant phrases in the text:

1. Perception of International Conflict
2. Perception of International System
3. The Main External Threats
4. The Main Internal Threats

5. Reactions

The origin of such classification comes both from the formation of the documents itself and the research purpose. All the three military doctrine documents of Russia in 21st century mainly contain the answers to these five matters. Along with this, as an additional source, the latest published paper on “Basic Principles of State Policy of Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” has also been examined. Considering its high relevance to the military doctrine of the Russian Federation as a component of military safeguarding, this official paper has special importance for also being the latest published document on military security. Hence, for the sake of data preparation, after reviewing the military doctrine documents, a summary table has been created for each document containing concluding answers to the questions above. The table is also constituted to show the continuity of the content between the documents. Based on this final table, five discussion topics are inferred from the results of the analysis. These topics are discussed in the last chapter in accordance with interpretations of the qualitative research conducted on the aforementioned matters. This will help to drive a conclusion by a cross-check of the study. Therefore, the five discussion topics from the recurring themes that will summarise the study are as followed:

- 1) The multipolar approach of Russia to the international system
- 2) The problem of NATO enlargement
- 3) The instability approach to the international security
- 4) The problem of terrorism
- 5) The deterrent and preventive approach to military security

Another source of the study is academic articles and publications relevant to the research purpose. For qualitative examinations of the classification made by the content analysis in the research, established reports, articles, news, academic books, and internet resources are used.

In the following chapter, as it is mentioned above, a theoretical framework and a literature review are given. First, the importance of military security is discussed. The definition of military doctrine is explained along with approaches towards military doctrines. This review aims to create a basis for the main point of the study, which is to examine and figure out the determining factors of Russian military doctrines, whether determined by culture or external threats. Hence, the views of both approaches

are discussed and explained in the second chapter. As a conclusion of this part, the results of the content analysis of military doctrine are tested according to the theoretical claims of both approaches to see whether culture or external threats are the source of military doctrines of Russia after 2000.

In the third chapter, the study focuses on the position of the Russian federation in post-2000. In this respect, Russian strategic culture, and its great power status are examined to set a perspective for the reader about the perceptions on the Russian Federation. In the same chapter, Russia's importance for military security in the 21st century and also its current military capacity is highlighted. In the fourth chapter, the content analysis of military doctrines takes place starting with an overview of Russia in post-2000. The fifth chapter consists of the findings and discussions on the results of the analysis mentioned above. Lastly, the study is completed with the final chapter presenting conclusions.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, a theoretical framework is introduced. The theoretical framework includes two main approaches towards the determining causes of military doctrine. But first, the importance of military security for international politics is highlighted for the sake of clarifying why it is preferred to focus on military security rather than the whole national security concept. Understanding the military security approach of Russia is considered a priority because the balance of the world power is explained clearer due to the military power, alliances, and perceptions. So, in the following part of the chapter, the nature of international politics is discussed. After that, systemic approaches, and cultural approaches to military doctrine are emphasized respectively.

2.1. The Importance of Military Security

According to classical realist approach, states struggle for power as an end in itself, the neo-realist approach brings a revision to that view and claims that states struggle for power as the main tool to gain security (Waltz, 1988, s. 615-628). Similarly, as the protector of international security from major wars and to establish and maintain international stability, military power is claimed as a solution. ‘Power’ and ‘the use of force’ are the fundamental factors discussed for systemic explanations (Nye & Welch, 2015, s. 6). Therefore, it is understood that, among all the aspects of international relations or national security, the concept of military security gains significant importance.

Mearsheimer (2001, s. 6), in the ‘Tragedy of Great Power’ mentions why states strive for power. He claims that because of the fear for their own security they act aggressively towards each other, and he lists three explanatory underlying reasons for this.

“1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other.

2) The fact that states always have some offensive military capability.

3) The fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions.” (ibid.)

This explains how “the use of force” is a de facto of international politics, so military alliances, innovations, or any other military means are also the main source and solutions for security. Which means in any circumstance, military security and military

power stand at the heart of national security. Even how state perceptions are generated and shaped on military security is another matter of question, the rational calculations about power or potential use of force are not always apparent. Jervis (1982-83, s. 3-30) claims that there are mostly misperceptions of adversaries' intentions or the way they see the world. He claims that the perceptions are built on confidence in beliefs rather than the evidence. Likewise, he mentions the failure of statesmen to clarify their own intentions and says, "If a policy is to have the desired impact on its target, it must be perceived as it is intended" (ibid). Considering that, among all the dilemmas of International Security, understanding states' military decision-making processes and military interests with the right resources, gain importance for both national and international security. Military Doctrines are one of the main sources to build a perspective on security. In the following section, military doctrine, and the approaches towards it are discussed.

2.2. Military Doctrine

Military doctrines are identified as military recipes to handle security matters and political goals as a part of grand strategy. In one of the core studies within the literature, "The Sources of Military Doctrine", Posen (1984, s. 13) starts telling the subject by reducing it into two questions; "What means shall be employed? And how shall they be employed?" However, diverse contemplations are discussed for 'determining motivation' behind doctrines. In these terms perhaps asking why any means shall be employed at all is even a base question for understanding the determining causes of security approaches. Considering survival apprehensions, every administration reacts to situations in a certain way and so too are their grand strategy for military doctrines are shaped.

There are multi-dimensional and deep problems and plenty of matters defined as security problems from education to major wars. Recently, even more complicated threats are discussed, for example, information wars, hybrid wars, asymmetric wars, cyber-attacks, and so on. In these circumstances when it comes to conserving the coexistence of states along with their interests, several questions come to the fore; how goals are being set? How to line the order of priorities and hierarchy of needs? The fundamental question is, what is a matter of national security? Or when does any matter become a 'security problem' or turns into an issue of 'national interest' and what conditions cause the differences in these descriptions? From a greater

perspective, some realist scholars like Arnold Wolfers (1952, s. 481-502) have a critique of the perception of the term 'National Security' itself. He finds the term deceptive in the meaning because in his claim the perception of 'national interest' and 'national security' diverse to different groups or in different times. He contradicts that there is a clear material description for 'national security' and 'national interest', and asserts that, if so, there would not be any delusions on policymaking. Wolfers' remarks on security as a value that may be explained in objective and subjective ways, but he insists on the idea that it is a subjective matter of calculation in which its measures differ to different groups of people (ibid). He mentions that the subjective perception levels of threats may change, even for explicit problems of security. If so, since the threat definitions change based on perceptions, the decision-making for military actions is not as clear as it seems to be. This means even though military-related matters are perceived as a matter of material power, there is an undeniable correlation between civil life and political life with military formation. In this respect, questioning what constitutes military doctrine or what should constitute military doctrine is critical. There is multidisciplinary research ahead for studies on military doctrine which is combined with the literature of military innovation and military history. Adam Grissom (2006, s. 905-934) in literature research on military innovation, explains approaches of previous studies and divides those into four models as;

1. The Civil-Military Model of Military Innovation
2. The Inter-Service Model of Military Innovation
3. The Intra-Service Model of Military Innovation
4. The Cultural Model of Military Innovation

But then he sums up models as 'Military Innovation as a Top-Down process' and 'Evidence of Bottom-up Innovation'. According to this division of literature in 'top-down' research, there is a group of decision-makers rather than politicians or senior army personnel who force for military alteration, while contrarily in 'bottom-up' research, the underlying reason for a change in organizational needs and the impact of lower level army personnel on doctrinal change are glossed. Even though Grissom has a helpful overlook to the literature, the classification is intricate since for instance strategic priorities within top-down research is antipodal. On the contrary, it is possible to reduce the literature into two groups by a regimentation. On the one hand, realists emphasize outsider factors as a determinant on creating military doctrine, while on the

other hand culturalists, claim that military culture and internal factors are determining on military decision making (Erboğa, Yalçın, Dağdelen, İlhan, & Dilek, 2019, s. 29-35).

As it is mentioned before, military innovation and military doctrine studies are integral because military innovation is a naturally tied matter to doctrinal thinking. Decisions on innovating do not happen all of a sudden but come with a political price. Nevertheless, not only the results but also the causes of military change are on the agenda to solve. Likewise, it is necessary to explore the reasons why some innovations are successful, it is also necessary to understand the reason why military innovation was seen as necessary.

Posen's study on Military Doctrine is an example that examined the decision-making motivations behind doctrines. Unlike the series of researches examining the consequences of doctrines by criticizing and blaming offensive doctrines as the cause of the First World War, Posen (1984, s. 13-34) -even though he comes from the same school of thought- focuses on exploring, 'the sources' of doctrines. In his work, he discusses a large scale of impacts that create Military Doctrines by discussing hypotheses on the quality of military doctrines in offense, defense, and deterrence, integration-disintegration, innovation-stagnation, and on the approaches in the literature starting from military organizations and 'organization theory', political-military integration and 'balance of power theory' (Posen, 1984). However, it is hard to reach one certain conclusion by his study because he also creates some hypotheses depending on a wide variety of effects. He confesses that he is unaware of any general theoretical statement that explains how and why technology, culture, or other elements affect military doctrines. He reviews multidimensional causes of Military Doctrine and tries to determine which the most beneficial hypotheses are. Even so, it would not be wrong to say, his emphasis is on 'balance of power' theory as an explanatory approach for military decision making. This is inferred by his general explanations on the importance and necessity of military doctrine, because, to explain the importance of doctrines he scrutinizes subjects such as arms race, probability, and intensity of war, security of states, innovation, also there are comprehensive statements on the effects of offensive, defensive and deterrent doctrines on international peace. These explain international stability depending on the logic of doctrines. He advocates that offensive doctrines are increasing violence in world politics. To conclude, Posen highlights the

international system and its conditions and correlates military decision makings more with systemic explanations. These evaluations may be seen as a capacity calculation for execution and accessibility of goals since on the one hand there are purposes while on the other hand there are limits of states to reach them. Because the executive power and capacity are the main focus inside and outside of the state. Decision-making in a politically stable country must be focused on the material resources it is endowed with, though unfortunately not every state is able to make rational choices too. The reason for that is the international system itself and the dependency realm of some states to others. In a good way or a bad way, this also changes the inside politics and perceptions, and withal internal dynamics are effective on external strategy making.

Military doctrines work bilaterally. Towards international system and states security (Posen, 1984, s. 15-16). As an addition to that, military doctrines are affected by dynamics of both states and international system Furthermore innovations, stagnations, and types of military doctrines affect international political life and vice versa. The anarchic environment of international political life obliges states to take cautions for self-protection. In this sense, measures and preparations of neighbours create fear and likewise negative perceptions for others' intentions. Growth in hard power means there is a possibility to attack others, so arms races escalate to maintain the balance and prevent any offensive manoeuvres. However military innovations are not supposed to cause success, since for some cases -especially in the condition of multipolarity or arms race- it increases violence unnecessarily.

There are three main qualities of military doctrines; offense, defence and deterrence and so three types of doctrines; offensive defensive and deterrent (Posen, 1984). In Posen's approach, offensive doctrines refers to holding first strike capability with large resources. Also, it refers to an aggressive weaponry power which by others may be perceived as expansionist. Deterrent doctrines refer to the ability to make the enemy pay for their hostile intentions. Lastly, defensive doctrines intend to deprive the aggressors. Quality objectives of doctrines are related to outsider apprehensions and the quality of international political life but also there are internal motivations which feed the doctrinal thinking. To sum it up, the literature focuses on two fundamental effects: systemic effects and cultural effects. These two fundamental effects reflect the division of realists and constructivist scholars' thoughts on 'the determining causes of military doctrine' (Erboğa, Yalçın, Dağdelen, İlhan, & Dilek, 2019, s. 27).

Consequently, in the following chapters among these two extensions of the security, arguments of both approaches will be discussed.

2.3. Systemic Approaches to Military Doctrine

Military innovations are expensive productions both in political and economic terms, but still, states take over risks to improve military capacity because it is a fundamental warrant for national security. On the other hand, since the international system and military effectiveness are strongly interlinked matters, technological changes and military effectiveness impact the quality of international political life. Because intentions behind military innovation are not clear or basically malign to the others in the system (Posen, 1984), this anarchic nature of the international system and mistrust sometimes create more dangers than needed, and escalate a conflict. That is why smartly prepared security perspectives and military doctrines gain importance to avoid major problems. Thus, doctrines should be prepared in a way to respond in different conditions understanding that, all states in the international system have concerns about their power positions relative to the others (Copeland, 2001, s. 2).

The only solution for security problems is not conflict or aggression, but cooperation is also a solution to balance the power. However, cooperation is also a matter of question. In 'Cooperation under Security Dilemma' Jervis (1987, s. 168-169) mentions three problems about cooperation; first, mind change about supporting status quo depending on dissatisfaction; second, seeking control of resources or land for continuity of state's survival; and third, security dilemma, which means, an increase in one's security decreases the security of others. Thus, the lack of trust and multiple worries about survival that result in self-help understanding in the international system increase the possibility of conflict and offensive thinking towards each other.

Such that, one of the most criticized traditions in doctrines is 'the cult of the offensive'. A considerable number of scholars who support defensive realism, mention offensive thinking as the source of major wars by an interpretation of the First World War. The main claim is based on the idea that the breakdown of offense-defense balance by expansionist and offensive doctrines caused the First World War (Evera S. v., 1985). One of the best-known arguments in this area comes from Jack Snyder (Civil-Military Relations and The Cult of Offensive, 1914 and 84, 1984). According to him the

technological balance in 1914 was a model of stability but the offensive tradition of Europe caused outbreak of war.

Similar to Snyder, Stephen Van Evera in 'The Cult of Offensive and the Origins of First World War' (1991, s. 59-109) mentions how earlier in 1914, the growth of offensiveness ends up with the war in Europe. This criticized approach in defensive realism is due to the belief in the 'success of the offense', which is called 'the cult of the offensive'. The cult of the offensive refers to traditional acceptance of the advantage of offensive power which is a war plan about bringing the most powerful tools to have the first attack capacity. Against this belief defensive realists support that this ideology unnecessarily damages rooms for cooperation. Evera (1985, s. 80-117) supports that the overestimated hostility and the cult of the offensive eventually turn out as the reason for the war itself.

Another criticism to the cult of the offensive comes from Scott Sagan, however, because he finds that assessing the matter with the cult of offensive alone, falls short of explaining the whole picture. He also blames the role of offensive military doctrines of the time for being inflexible and rapid which left no time for any political solution that was awaiting disaster (Sagan, 1986). This point of view asserts that defensive realism perhaps neglects the fact that states also naturally may become eager for expansion. Even though he supports the same thought, Jervis' claims about problems for cooperation also give the same idea to us; as second trouble about cooperation, he remarks multiple demands of states outside of their possessions (Jervis, *Cooperation Under Security Dilemma*, 1987).

Hence when reading into the First World War with the perspective of defensive realism, an opposing view is expressed by Keir A. Lieber. In his article, titled 'The New History of World War 1 and What It Means to International Relations Theory' he claims that there was not a delusion or miscalculation due to the cult of the offensive but on the contrary, he says: "German leaders went to war in 1914 with eyes wide open". According to him the main aim of Germany was to gain control over Europe as a whole and expand overseas (Lieber, 2007, s. 155-191).

The relation between offensive doctrines and international security is also a matter in Posen's claims. He also supports the idea that the cult caused the war or at least made it intense (Posen, 1984). On the discussions over military innovation, he claims that

political decision makings and definitions of the enemy, cause changes in the mindsets for producing technology. But it is fair to ask, was not technology very central to international power politics? If there was a chance, why is it that not every nation got involved in the arms race? In his study, he examines the various effects on military-decision making. But there is a disconnection about the explanations. First, he claims that; international system is affected by the character of military doctrines, second, he claims military technology itself is a determining cause of international balance. If so, which one is affecting the other for a possible conflict? Since military technology is a balancer, why and how, and in what conditions does innovation take place? Which conditions cause choices between offensive or defensive weaponry or is it even a given tool to every state? So, in this scenario why offense is preferred, how it becomes preferable, and which conditions and motivations cause offensive thinking or innovation in military technology is poorly explained.

2.4. Cultural Approaches to Military Doctrine

Do soldiers from all societies from all cultures fight the same way in the time of war? Will the armies from different societies be just as good as one another if they are given the same material resources? (Rosen, 1995, s. 5-31)

On the other hand, some scholars, just like Rosen does in the quotation above, discuss the role of civilians and culture. In Rosen's approach, emphasis is on civil-military relations. According to him, even the claim of the neo-realist approach, 'states aim to survive', does not explain the social structures and reactions to military matters. His claim may be summed up as; civil-military relations and a good combination of civil-political and military life is the source for militaries to become progressive, as well as for the state. His remarks on the importance of trust between bodies of a state as the main source to catch up with the necessary developments, for them to take place, and in fact for self-help. Also, he mentions that both governments and militaries are generated by society so there must be a natural sign of a society in military organizations and he discusses how this connection is affecting military capabilities over strategic behaviour (Rosen, 1995).

From that point of view, it sounds quite logical to discuss the reactions of society to military decision-making. In the end, even innovation is actuated by the capacity and will of the people. In this regard, determining a correlation between the general manner

of society to developments and innovations, and social and political adaptation into war technologies and doctrinal thinking becomes imperative.

Kier is another scholar who studies the role of culture in military decision-making and tries to explain the cultural reasons behind why states prefer offensive or defensive doctrines. She references the approaches of offense-defense balance theory to the First World War and contradicts common approaches of the cult of offensive. She claims even though doctrines are centralizing defensive approaches, this does not necessarily end the hostility between conflicted parties. In fact, according to her, the literature on offense-defense lacks in understanding or not serving the reasons why states even chose between offensive and defensive stances. She argues that these choices are ideally explained by cultural perspectives (Kier, 1995). Her first claim is, military decision-making is dependent on the delusions of policymakers about military organizations, besides it is not realistic to read an exact international conjuncture and external threats, so she remarks that the wise choice is to focus on domestic distribution of power before international. Secondly, she underlines that the reaction of the military to political decisions depends on military organizational culture and characteristics (Ibid,1995).

Both approaches help to reconsider what states are made up of in the first place. As it was mentioned before there is an essence in a state that constitutes its body, and its society. As Waltz says, “We say that the state acts when we mean that the people in it act, just as we say that the pot boils when we mean that the water in it boils.” So, he adds, even though studying human nature, sociology or psychology does not explain everything about politics, still, a political analysis requires the need to take references from those disciplines (Waltz, Man ,the State and War , 2001). Obviously how military decision-makings are relevant to human nature is another subject of discussion, but the relevance with national identity and reactions of state or national interests of a state could be an answer for survival motivations too. When he explains the causes of international war, Dickinson mentions ‘community sense’ as a source of patriotism that people become united around. He argues that, as a source, “On the one hand, an art of weapons and of their use, of tactics and strategy was developed, on the other, a social attitude and tradition” (Dickinson, 1920). Today perhaps with acquired technologies, social and cultural motivations behind the improvement of war technologies are underestimated because we perceive them as a given (Erboğa, Yalçın,

Dağdelen, İlhan, & Dilek, 2019, s. 19-65). But considering that technologies were not given tools as some states or nations were better or are better at producing tools for the 'art of war', or at decision making about innovating in war technologies. There may be a correlation between social aspects and military thinking.

In cultural studies, it is also claimed that even a given technology does not necessarily bring success to a state. Adamsky says, "While the technological component is often an important initial condition, a true revolution depends on confluence of weaponry, concept of operations, organization, and the vision of future war" (Adamsky, 2010). This statement and similar general approaches in cultural studies argue that not only technology transfers but also state culture, organizations, and mindsets are effective on military success. Terry Terriff and Theo Farrell's (2002, s. 6) definition of the quality of military change also emphasizes a similar approach;

It is the outcome of military change that determines whether it is major or minor in character. Innovation, on the other hand, is one of three pathways whereby military change occurs, the other two being adaptation and emulation. Innovation involves developing new military technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures. Adaptation involves adjusting existing military means and methods. Adaptation can, and often does, lead to innovation when multiple adjustments over time gradually lead to the evolution of new means and methods. Last, emulation involves importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other military organizations. It is only when these new military means and methods result in new organizational goals, strategies, and structures that innovation, adaptation, and emulation lead to major military change. (ibid.)

A complex process is given above, but, Terry and Terriff speak of a similar approach to Kier's. In her argument Kier was explaining this with the intrastate distribution of power. She was claiming that civil decisions affect structural conditions and see the role of culture as an independent variable to examine which generates this (Kier, 1995). Terry and Terriff also take her references and claim that culture alone is a source to make a military change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002). But what essence is in a culture that makes it more effective on a military change and its success? On the other hand, when considering the recent developments in science and technology, accepting

culture as such a central factor may prove inadequate when interpreting the picture as a whole.

To conclude, two main approaches dominate the literature on determining causes of military doctrines. Hence while realist approaches claim military doctrines are shaped considering the systemic effects and threats, culturalists claim states determine military doctrines in accordance to the military culture which shapes the security understanding and that's why the perceptions do not change or get affected by the external reasons.

The main claims of the realist perspective highlight the external causes for military change and military security perceptions with the motivation of the balancing of external threats and transformations. This means states design military doctrines according to the possible threats caused by systemic effects like military growth or military formations against it. If this claim is right then the military doctrines of Russia must focus on external military threat definitions, search for stability, also prevention methods must show parallelism with the external threat determination.

On the contrary, the culturalist perspective claims that the adaptation of military change and military security perceptions take their roots from cultural aspects and mindsets of the states. According to this view, states have a certain way of perceiving threats and decision makings that take place with respect to their strategic culture. This means military doctrines or innovations happen without necessarily any determined external causes or threats. If this perception is right then Russian military doctrines must not be affected by external reasons like military formations, territorial claims, conflicts, or power vacuums.

Considering the claims of both approaches this thesis examines the Russian military doctrines of the 21st century and conducts tests to determine whether the doctrines are shaped according to external reasons and systemic causes or cultural aspects.

Concerning the military changes within the Russian Federation in post-2000 after, examination of the documents in the political turn of Putin since 2000 is found as a suitable basis for the purpose of the study and for comparing both approaches. For this purpose, in the following chapter, the strategic culture of the Russian Federation is discussed. Also, the position of the country in the 21st century is drawn out for the sake

of highlighting the current situation of the country for the analysis of its doctrine and the discussions to be made on it.



CHAPTER III

RUSSIA AND MILITARY SECURITY

In the previous chapters, the main approaches towards military doctrine are highlighted. But the case study of this thesis is Russia. Thus, in this chapter, a foundation for country posture and its military security is expressed. Post-Cold war Russia's national interest tried to be identified by multidimensional factors. Considering that, like there are two main approaches dominated by culturalist and realist to military doctrine studies, Russia's security perception is also widely described with the views between culture and *realpolitik*.

For this purpose, first, Russia's decision-making manner over 'The Great Power Status' and its 'strategic culture' is discussed. Secondly, since the selected period for the country is the 21st century the country's current position and military capacity are highlighted.

3.1. Russian Strategic Culture and Great Power Status

The argument is that, in a way, culture is a part of national security. According to Lantis (2002, s. 87-113), cultural theories became a tool to explain post-cold war national security choices which the balance of power theory has no answer. This may be a reason for the wide explanations on Russian National Security with strategic culture and historical ties. Valentina Feklyunina (2018, s. 5) issues constructivist approaches to Russian Foreign Policy. She notices the strong tie between constructivist theories over Russian foreign policy and thus, this approach has remarkably earned popularity in International Relations Theories after it studied post-Soviet Russia. Particularly, focusing on 'Russia's old ambitions' from the cold war era for defining new interests, especially in its near abroad, in 'post-Soviet territory', the constructivist approach was practically conducted (*ibid.*). For instance, Eithelhuber (2009, s. 1-28), explains strategic culture and ties to its imperial history and geography. Another report by Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer (2019, s. 16-17), also defines the foreign policy motivations of today's Russia with Soviet ambitions and geopolitics. There are two major factors this view is grounded on. First, Russia's ties with its near abroad throughout history, second, the inherited geopolitical ambition. This view may help clarify the national thoughts and aspects, but today how would it be possible to specifically use this approach to determine the causes of the Russian Federation's

cross-border actions? Or again, with this tool, how would we predict Russian intentions, to gain an advantage in attempts to restrain Russia? In terms of explaining the future of relations and putting the blame on Russia's old habits and ambitions would perhaps only help to glorify Russia's civilizational background and national identity.

On the other hand, by taking reference from strategic culture some different indicators are also used. Ivor Wiltenburg (2020, s. 7-12) in 'The Importance of Understanding Russian Strategic Culture' claims that the 'Great Power' vision of the Russian Federation is identified with its military strength, armed forces, and nuclear power. He highlights two features of Russian strategic culture; using the military as a tool to reach 'Great Power' status and the President's rhetoric of 'Russia is threatened' (ibid.). Through these perspectives over Russia, even though the motivations behind them diversify, it seems that the 'Great Power' aspect is excluded from examination. The question is, is it a status or an ideational ambition for Russia today.

At the beginning of this part, the connection between constructivist theories and Russian Foreign Policy is given. On the other side of the discussion, realist approaches stand. In 'Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy' while Valentina Feklyunina explains the tie between the development of constructivism and Russian Foreign Policy, Elena Kropatcheva issues the tie between the development of neo-realism and Russian Foreign Policy (Kropatcheva, 2018, s. 53). She underlines that realism is the most explanatory approach in terms of explaining the dynamics of Russian Foreign Policy (ibid.). She presents a broad and rich theoretical explanation on realist approaches pointing out that realist scholars bring multiple and in a way, separate explanations on 'power' which include different priorities in Russia's case. Accordingly, a huge list of dynamics is counted. Energy politics, changing balances and new rising power vacuums (distinctively China), effects of domestic politics, the value of prestige, and also interestingly as an instrument for realpolitik, soft power are among the tools that realists brought. Obviously, after all the instruments she mentions, she finally explains in what sense this variation of tools realist approaches bring and how they differ from the constructivist or liberal perspective. She claims the fundamental difference here is that realists, explain intangible factors as well as material and systemic tools (ibid).

Another interpretation on the ‘Great Power’ politics of Russia comes from Andrei P. Tsyganskov (2013, s. 132-158). He inspects the determining causes of Vladimir Putin’s international strategy and views that Russia’s attitude is accommodationist. According to him, the reflexes of current strategy are the same as a ‘normal great power’. By quoting from Vladimir Putin as well he claims that Russia is relying on their ‘Great Power’ status for security needs (ibid.). Tsyganskov issues three schools of thought to Russian Grand Strategy, Integrationist, Great Power Normalizers, and Great Power Balancers. He interprets that Putin’s vision of Russia is suitable to the approach of ‘Great Power Normalizers’. The main argument in this approach is that Vladimir Putin’s Great Power ideal is not balancing the USA, but it is economic modernization and pragmatic means to earn back Russia’s great power status to conserve its place and interests in world politics.

However, recent developments on the Ukraine border, the interpretations of the latest national security concept of Russia, which deems the West unfriendly, give the feeling that a ‘balancing’ attitude in the Russian security approach is undervalued (Buchanan, 2021). The interpretation of ‘Great Power Normalizers’, considering the high military expenditures of the Russian Federation, brings to mind the question of; what is actually considered necessary for economic developments? Since reforming military capability, a strong economy is needed as well. One of the indefinite matters under international relations is to decide on the others’ intention about military strengthening. In that sense it is fair to suspect, even if the first purpose where strengthening is for self-security and economic recovery, why wouldn’t they use their gained power for any further intentions like to threaten others security, or to gain dominion over others by a balancing behaviour?

Carnegie institute published a report (which is a part of a report project on Russian International Politics) called ‘Global Return of Russia’. The summary of the report’s main international goals of Russia as follows;

- *Moscow has relied on relatively inexpensive diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, trade, energy, and financial tools to wield influence and expand its global footprint.*
- *The Kremlin has capitalized on Western missteps and growing anti-establishment sentiments in Europe and North America.*

• *Russia will likely continue trying to fill global power vacuums resulting from U.S. President Donald Trump's 'America First' foreign policy* (Paul Stronski & Richard Sokolsky, 2017, s. 1)

This view on Russian Foreign Policy confirms that, even if, the first priority of Russian military strengthening for internal causes and normalization at global level, after Russia reach a certain degree of stability at domestic level, there is a high potential to focus on external interests at a pragmatic degree, depending on its external threat perceptions or expectations.

In 2021 Vladimir Putin started a military formation near the Ukraine border and annexed Crimea in 2014. This situation escalated the tension between Ukraine-NATO and Russia (Yavuz, 2021). Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Wess recently published an article on the matter. According to their claim, this is a message to both Washington and Kyiv. In the article, it is mentioned that, the Russian President has described NATO's actions and Ukraine's military growth as a danger to Russia and that he called this a 'red line' (Eugene RUMER & Andrew S. WEISS, 2021). The article also questions if this is a "pivotal moment" for invading Ukraine, referring to a treatise on Ukraine published by Putin, which means Russia announces that does not recognize Ukraine as an independent state and claims that it is used by Russian enemies as a 'weapon' against it (ibid.).

Another article which published in 2021 by former president of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Keir Gilles titled 'Europe must admit Russia is waging a War' mentions several 'hawkish' attitudes of Russia without any fear towards EU and NATO member countries. Authors claim that the EU and NATO undervalue Russian actions for a deterrent response in return (Keir Giles & Toomas Hendrik Ilves, 2021). These assumptions on Russian actions may be an exaggeration of a series of hot events but supports the idea mentioned above, that Russia does not hesitate to 'fulfil power vacuums' in its favour. Respectively, also uses opportunities to balance of power, for the benefit of its security wherever it has the upper hand or an open threat against it.

After all the interpretations given on the great power status of Russia and the current debates and perceptions, the most important question still exists: For what reasons is Russia aggressive on some matters? Why does it create a rivalry with the West? Is this only for a historical, identical agenda? Is there a strategic or realpolitik reason or some

strategic priorities behind the specific actions? Or does it blindly goes after a hysteric ambition and find itself in an opposite condition to West?

In terms of answering those sorts of questions and for understanding the driving motivations of military actions and threat perceptions of today's Russia, as is explained in the previous parts, the study focuses on theoretic approaches towards military security and military doctrines. Since the selected period of the study is the 21st century, Russia's importance for today's military security is highlighted in the following part of the chapter. Also, an overlook to the military capability of Russia is presented. The aim of giving this foundation is to give an idea of Russia's stance on military security in the 21st century. In the fourth chapter, a conceptual content analysis of the military doctrines takes place, which is the bone of the study. In the fifth chapter in accordance with the research questions, the findings of the content analysis of the military doctrines will be discussed and examined.

3.2. Why Russia Matters for Military Security in 21st Century

Today's Russia is discussed from many angles; foreign policy, domestic policy, its huge amount of spending on military power, and capacity as a dominant power in Euro-Asia (FRYE, 2021, s. 152). It is questioned if this is a 'New Russia' or an 'Old Russia' strategy. What is the source of decisions on power politics? Does its history, imperial thoughts, realpolitik, security, or Russia's revanchist, expansionist, aggressive or defensive, etc. features? To answer this, there are many factors to look into including all of the beliefs and perceptions, demonization or glorifications, multidimensional criticisms, studies or comments, news, and so on (ibid.).

Today's Russia is also associated with Putin and his role in the political turn of the country. He has been in governance since 1999 as deputy and then as president with the elections of 2000 up till now. Due to this long period of ruling, there is even a generation who does not know any political era without Putin (The Economist Newspaper , 2018). He was known as a KGB agent and a war hero (Yanatma, 2019). His vision of Russia became a matter of research, his politics of 'Greater Russia' and national security concepts draw attention (Tsygankov, 2013, s. 132-158). When he was elected for the presidency, one of the first things he did was to establish a new military doctrine, on April 21, 2000 (Arms Control Association, 2000). Even before the elections, a new national security strategy was signed on January 10, 2000 (ÖZDAL,

2021). Since then, Russia has produced a noticeable number of security papers, foreign policy papers, and military doctrines (ibid.). On June 2nd, 2020, Putin signed a principles paper on Nuclear Deterrence and renewed Russia's national security strategy on 2 July 2021.

Dimitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, comments on the document as a 'Manifesto for New Era' (Trenin, 2021). He claims that; Russia regained its power and reformed its military capacity and now in their national strategy they generally focus on internal matters, on the other hand, he says the document defines US and NATO as unfriendly (ibid.). One way or another, Russia's claims on NATO and US and the focus on military security in foreign affairs, open debates on Russia's current stance in world affairs. Considering the power balance and understanding the causes of Russia's attitudes and the reasons behind the interest clashes are important for coming up with a response toward a potential crisis since Russia is a strategic country in the west, bordering Europe so its actions and perceptions has an impact on stability at least on a regional level.

One of the most recent and open clashes of interest between the West and Russia was the annexation of Crimea. Nowadays, a military formation on the Russian border to Ukraine draws attention. According to, the CSIS satellite imagery analysis published on November 17, 2021, there is a remarkable military build-up containing military personnel and equipment in Yelnya, near Novosibirsk (Jones, Macander, & Bermudez Jr., 2021). NATO and Kiev warn Moscow against possible aggression.

We are working to give him a clear understanding - a new attack on Ukraine will be too costly, so it is better not to do it. Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kubelo (Kyiv warns Russia that any attack on Ukraine would be costly, 2021)

We call on Russia to be transparent, prevent escalation & reduce tension (Al Jazeera , 2021) NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg

Russia has not turned its back on talks with France, Germany and Ukraine about how to implement a peace deal over eastern Ukraine. Maria Zakharova, a foreign ministry spokeswoman (Kyiv warns Russia that any attack on Ukraine would be costly, 2021)

Apparently, in this thesis, it is early to speak on the future of this tension, the point here is, to draw attention to the tension itself. Rising aggressive manoeuvres of Russian

military strategy, military capability, and power politics which threatens especially Europe's stability is attracting the attention of the Western power bloc. The importance here is to understand the balance of world power, international security, and the perceptions of action-reaction logic from the Russian side (ÖZDAL, 2021).

3.3. The Military Capability of the Russian Federation

According to the GFP report of military strength, Russia is second only to the USA, among 140 countries (Global Fire Power, 2021). Russia draws attention with high military expenditures. According to the 2020 SIPRI report on military expenditures, Russia is among the first five (Aydm, 2021). While the given data implies a high offensive potential for Russia in the eyes of the international community, the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoygu, points to the decline in military expenditures, he also emphasizes that Russia's armament is a response to new threats, without the intention of participating in an arms race (Sputnik , 2021). This means, Russia, based upon its threat perceptions, takes the necessary precautions to build up its military capability.

Mikk Marran, the Director-General of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, sums the current situation of the Russian Federation's military capability in four aspects:

1. The rapid growth of the defense budget has slowed
2. Nuclear weapons remain a priority
3. The reform of conventional forces has been continuous and steady
4. Russia's main goal for the near future is to maintain local and regional dominance (Marran, 2021)

Marran says nuclear weapon capacity is still the essential military power of the Russian Federation to cope at a global level, against the US (ibid.). He also draws attention to the Iskandar ground-to-ground ballistic missile system as a strategic capacity to deal with NATO on the western border (ibid). Another strategic weapon, Marran points out, is Kalibr Cruise missiles utilized in the Baltic fleet which is advantageous in protecting Russia from NATO formations (ibid.). The third aspect he refers to is the reforms and developments made in the scope of ten years and the return of Soviet-era structure in the land forces. After mentioning the advantageous potential of the Russian military when launching operations and their strategic capacities in defense, the fourth aspect, Marran underlines, is the need for special attention on Russian military capacity which in response requires a deterrence from NATO and its allies (ibid.).

Another discourse on Russian military capacity generates over the Syrian war. Although war is not a favourable situation a conflict is the best way to understand the potential of military power. Moreover, military exercises are another way to observe military capacity in peacetime. On the other hand, considering the deterrent role of showing military power, it may cause unnecessary misperceptions too, (Lasconjarias, 2020, s. 11). However, the assumption is that; in the Syrian war, Russian military capability was witnessed in a real field of conflict (Gresh, April 2021). According to Gresh, Russian military capability has shown technical professionalism in the Syrian war which is also accepted in Western analysis. He claims that; while the Russian military's technical ability is improving, it also succeeded in generating an operational art (ibid.). From this military practice, the Russian Military also gained experience for future conflicts. For instance, according to a recently published report by Mason Clark (2021, s. 14-24) from the Institute for the Study of War, "The Russian military's main lesson from Syria is the need to ensure 'superiority of management' in future conflicts". He adds Russia perceives the experience in Syria as a command-and-control success (ibid.).

Keir Giles (2019, s. 287-303), emphasizes that the Russian military gained experience in all levels including tactical, operational, and most importantly at the strategic level. Giles draws attention to the permanence of the military culture of Russia and points out that; Russia as a threat must be considered in this respect in the future (ibid.).

In conclusion, Russia, considering all the aspects of its military capabilities that are in growth, is a significant power, with a recently tested military strength on the field conserves its position in the international system.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINES SINCE 2000'S

4.1. Introduction

This chapter consists of a conceptual content analysis of Russian military doctrines of 2000, 2010, and 2014 and the very lately published document of 'Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence' as a core document for Russia's military security concept. In this evaluation, two objectives are examined, first, primary threat definitions of the Russian Federation according to military doctrines, and second, the main perception of Russia towards international system and security. By this sort of evaluation of documents, the stance, and characteristics of the Russian Federation towards the international system and reactions are highlighted. What sort of worries possesses the documents the most, what is the approach of the Russian Federation against those risks, and what does the perception and threat-reaction balance tell us about Russian military security understanding and its main parameters?

The aim of this examination is to bring the main impacts, and motivations behind the military doctrines of Russia to the surface, together with the main priorities and perceptions of military security. Before the evaluations of the documents in the following part, an overview of Russia since the beginning of the 21st century is given.

4.2. An Overview of Russia Since 2000

The Yeltsin period of Russia was a period of structural changes, a series of reforms were made by a top-down process. There was a fast change from state domination on the economy through privatization, but this negatively affected the economy and society, and it was also hardening the democratization period. In 1994 the Chechen war erupted, but even though Chechens were only %1 of Russia, due to the situation of the army, Russia was hardly handling the war and had a serious loss and finally, Chechnya gained independence. Regardless of the condition of Russia at the time, Yeltsin won the elections thanks to his promise for normalization and stability. In 1999 another conflict with Chechenia arose. Yeltsin changed the prime minister and Putin was put on to duty. On 31st December 1999 Yeltsin declared resignation and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was now president of the country. According to the law of the

country, a president can serve only two electoral periods, so between 2008-12 Medvedev was president and Putin was serving as prime minister. After Putin won in the last elections of 2018, he resumed his position as President of the Russian Federation and has been so ever since (Riasanovsky & Steinberg , 2016). Today's Russia, for many, comes with him, he is also a very sensationalistic political figure (Ülger, 2015).

Since the 2000s, the picture of Russia completely changed from a destabilized, tired country. Especially in the first decade of the Putin era, the average per capita gross domestic product (GDP) had grown dramatically. The numbers showed 1,312 dollars in 1999, in 2007 it raised to 8,842 dollars (Oliker, Crane, Shwartz , & Yusupov, 2009). During that period the defense budget had grown tenfold (Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century , 2010). Even though the 2008 economic crisis hit this fast growth there is a clear picture of how Russia managed to revitalize its economic and political situation.

Russia, which couldn't manage the Chechens in 1994, showed great success in the case of Georgia in 2008, and in 2009 officially declared the end of counter-terrorism operations (Riasanovsky & Steinberg , 2016 ,Sapmaz, 2016). Moreover, against NATO's influence on its borders, Russia took on an aggressive and expansionist military policy. Without invasion and conventional warfare, they annexed Crimea and in the Syrian war had an active military role alongside the regime. This means Russia, as an undeniable regional power, managed to assert its national interests in military security (Shin, 2015).

The army left for Putin's presidency was known for its troubles and corruption. Among his promises, Putin made that of changing the condition of the Russian military (Riasanovsky & Steinberg , 2016). To materialize this promise Putin prepared new official documents and initiated reforms that introduced a new national security concept. The first military doctrine of his political career was signed on 21 April 2000. He was aiming to do organizational changes in the military, he coordinated with his Security Council and in doing so the planning for a professional army started (McDermott, 2003). The plan was getting support from both public academia and political parties, but it was an economic burden to complete in that period (ibid).

Meanwhile, border issues were stretching big cities. Hostage-taking from Nord-Ost musical in Moscow was an example of one dramatic issue which was considered on the Russian side as an incident like 9/11. This was seen as an excuse for a second war with Chechnya. The Russian way of dealing with these issues was getting violent under the pretext of 'counterterrorism' and this also drew attention from the international community in a negative way (Riasanovsky & Steinberg , 2016). From a human rights perspective, Russia's border security understanding and its methods of defense were creating a clash with the UN and NATO, in accordance with international law. From the Russian side, the use of force by the UN in Bosnia and Kosovo, was also seen as a threat. Army General Makhmut Garayev (Haas, 2005) was calling this a turning point for geopolitics and for Russia's national security as he claimed this was a change in NATO's security role 'from defensive to pre-emptive'. NATO was enlarging its dominion closer to Russia's borders which was seen as another threat (Haas, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century , 2010). Hence, Russia has reshaped its relations with former Soviet countries through CIS, not only because of a nostalgic vision but also for achieving a barrier between its borders and Western international alliances (Ülger, 2015).

On the other hand, Russia is no longer a superpower. Therefore, Russia is following a realpolitik focusing on conserving its borders and being a part of economic and political alliances. Also, Russia is still facing border problems which it calls 'terrorism'. According to Haas (Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century , 2010) the 'Nord-Ost' incident and 'terrorism' in general have changed the area of conflict. Counterterrorism for the Russian Federation created a focal point for military Security (ibid.). Haas also mentions a change in the manner regarding Russia's attitude toward the counterterrorism after the Beslan Hostage taking (ibid.). In 2004 in North Ossetia, a thousand people at a school were taken hostage. In the conflicts both civilians and armed personnel were killed. The change in Russia's manner which Haas mentions can be seen in Russia's asking for a provision from the UNSC for counterterrorism in the aftermath of this incident. UNSC gives the provision and the Chechen conflict is considered as international terrorism. According to Haas, these matters also were the reason for a revision of the Military Doctrine.

The second important conflict on Russian borders was with Georgia. In 2008, in the South Ossetia autonomous region, Georgia wanted to gain control over Ossetia by

putting forth Georgian existence in the area and their violated rights, while at the same time, Russia was aiming to annex southern parts of the disunited region. Georgia sent troops to the region and to counter that Russian military embarked on a rapid offensive strike and won the war gaining total control over the region also including Abkhazia (Erkan, 2015, s. 7192).

All these processes lead to a new military doctrine in the new presidential era. Combined with the military implementations carried out until 2010, two objectives were clear for Russia's military security perception, first, securing the borders, if necessary, by a conventional war against terrorism and extremism. Second, conserving its security interests against NATO and EU enlargement and preserving Russia's place in the world community as a major power that possesses nuclear weapons reminding their multi-polarity (Klein, 2015). The published document of 2010 was expressing a similar discourse by the threat definitions. However, NATO was keeping its enlargement policies alive towards Russia's close border. This interest crisis with liberal enlargement ended up with the annexation of Crimea. EU and NATO were looking to build closer relations with Ukraine but through economic pressures, Russia did not let any official engagement take place. Afterward, the pro-Russian president of the country was protested and at last, he had to take sanctuary in Russia. Ukraine established a new government but still, there was a disability in the country. Meanwhile, Russia took that chance to annex Crimea by Special Forces from inside on 27 February 2014 (The Ukrainian Crisis Resulting with the Annexation of Crimea and It's Economic Effects, 2019, s. 80-93). Unlike most explanations on the annexation of Crimea referring to Russia's nostalgic interest with former Soviet countries, Mearsheimer (2014, s. 77-89) condemns the West for not doing enough to prevent the annexation. He says, the reaction of Russia to Ukraine was not surprising, on the contrary, the strategic importance of Ukraine was mentioned in Putin's discourses but ignored by the western international community. Subsequent the developments in Crimea, the third military doctrine of Russia was established on December 25, 2014. The essence of the document was mostly in line with previous Russian military doctrines. However, in 2014 an addition draws attention. There is a complaint about the regime changes in some parts of the world due to extremism "Establishment of regimes, which policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation in the states contiguous with the Russian Federation, including by overthrowing legitimate state

administration bodies” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015). Russia’s threats and reactions in its foreign security implementations show a worry for integrity. What Vladimir Putin said in 2003 is still an apprehension for Russian state stability; “Such a country as Russia can only survive and develop within the existing borders if it stays as a great power. During all of its times of weakness ... Russia was invariably confronted with the threat of disintegration” (Tsygankov, Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power, 2005).

Russian reactions towards Georgia and Ukraine are read as ideological by some, rather being a part of Soviet holdover or even a fight between Catholicism (symbolizing Europe) and Orthodoxy (symbolizing Russia) (Matsaberidze, 2015). However, there are more rational structures of the conflict such as, on the one hand, its geopolitical nature since the establishment of NATO, on the other hand, conserving Russia’s territorial integrity from the ‘sphere of influence’ (Lazarević, 2009).

Mearsheimer (2014, s. 77-89) noted on the matter with a geopolitical perspective too; “This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less its borders”. Russia does not only worry about the containment of geopolitics but as a great power, also creates her own international area of influence (Aslanlı, 2018). Intervention in Syria is more than proof of that. The rhetoric on Russia and Russian foreign affairs is a way of underestimating Russian great power role in power politics. Since the 2000s, Russia plays gained its role back as a great power or at least create a regional impact in possible areas. Intervention in Syria and the annexation of Ukraine are the latest examples of it (Shin, 2015). Roy Allison (2013, s. 795-823) mentions several reasons for military intervention in Syria and cooperation with the regime. Even though he has several claims for the different reactions of Russia (towards the Libya case for instance), his claim of Russia’s negative stance for Western military interventions since the 2000s correlates with the military doctrines of Russia. He quotes from Lavrov’s words; “Attempts to reproduce the Libyan experience in other countries and regions such as Syria, Yemen or Bahrain is 'very dangerous'”. With energy politics or the aim to gain control over the Mediterranean, it is clear that Russia wants to create a clear path to realize its national interests in the region by carefully prioritizing the security concepts mentioned in their doctrines. As said in the 2014

military doctrine, Russia finds regime changes in countries are close to its borders dangerous.

4.3. 2000 Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

2000s Military doctrine of Russia consists of four main chapters; Military-Political Principles, Military-Strategic Principles, Military-Economic Principles, and International Military and Military-Technical Cooperation titles are given in the document.

In the introduction part of the document there is a statement which is defining the role of the document but also simply explains the condition of Russia at the time;

The Military Doctrine is a document for a transitional period—the period of the Formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the state’s military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations (Arms Control Association, 2000)

The document starts with an outlook on the international ‘military-political situation’ which is an evaluation of international political conjuncture for military security. Firstly, some determinations are mentioned, and destabilizing impacts are given. According to that, there is a decline in the possibility of a major war and nuclear threat. However, ethnic, national, and religious extremism are mentioned as a rising problem because of a power vacuum. Correspondingly, local wars, regional conflicts, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are remarked as threats. A multipolar picture is drawn, and some states are blamed as being expansionist and aggressive and acting out of the control of International Governmental Organizations and international law. An anarchic environment is emphasized due to the aforementioned factors along with terrorism, organized crimes, and weapon, and drug trafficking.

On the contrary, when it comes to military security matters, the new liberal world order is praised for international peace by the established alliance around the international institutions. Moreover, for the military-political condition, the document divides security threats into two, as external and internal threats, and among external threats national security interests as well as a strong remark on Russia’s place within. As an example, of such a discourse, this article underlines some noticeable threats; “Attempts

to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation's interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one influential centre in a multipolar world" (Arms Control Association, 2000). So, by similar markings, it is easily inferred that Russia is looking for its place and interests in this power vacuum of this 'multipolar world' as defined in the text. International terrorism, any violations against Russian citizens' rights abroad are also seen as external threats as well as any malign attempt against Russian or its alliance's military or civil existence beyond borders.

The second part of military security threats is internal threats. Acts of terrorism, extremism, organized crimes, again mentioned here as threats, and any danger to the structural integrity of the state and its organs, any parallel armed formations are also considered as a threat to military security.

Safeguarding methodology is the main matter to focus on when understanding the approach of Russia against any international matter against it. The first remark is to nuclear power. It is declared that it possesses nuclear power for defending Russia or any of its allies. To deter aggression nuclear capacity is declared. An alliance formation is given too. It is declared that Russia works together with Belarus and Union States for military defense.

Commitment to some international treaties is expressed. Collective Security Treaty with Commonwealth of Independent States Organization, partnership with UN and its member states and towards any peaceful countries who do not threaten its national interests is mentioned too. What is strongly emphasized is Russia's respect and commitment to current international peace and order of the time especially on nuclear non-proliferation.

Along with confessing the importance of possessing nuclear power for its balance in international security, it is presented as a deterring factor in hand. Because today's nature of armed conflict is found heavily destructive and violent and as a result defined as 'catastrophic' on the part of military-strategic principles. When it comes to rules and principles of use of force, there is again an emphasis on international order "...To perform missions in accordance with the Russian Federation's international treaties..." (Arms Control Association, 2000).

The role of Russia to combat against local aggressors is emphasized together with its 'aim' for 'peacekeeping' and 'restoration' operations. An important remark is that the army is worn to be ready for offensive and defensive war including the usage of weapons of mass destruction against aggression. The principles of use of force of the Russian Federation again spares a section for what is called; 'domestic armed conflicts'. According to this, the Russian army is also responsible for the elimination and liquidation of conflicting parties, as well as strengthening and protecting public order.

Military-Economic Principles are given also as some basic provisions and guidelines depending on the usage of military resources. It is expressed that in accordance with the state's capacity, innovation in military means should be organized too.

For international cooperation, as mentioned before, Russia attaches itself in an alliance with CIS countries and cooperation with Collective Security Treaty. It mentions creating one single defense area. In terms of ensuring border security and territorial integrity, Russia expands its defense line towards its near abroad.

As a result, according to the document, the main threat perception is caused by the external conditions such as the military formations, claims against territorial integrity and any destabilizing impacts on the country coming from the systemic effects like 'regional conflicts', 'armed blocs' and 'international terrorism'. Even though some internal threats are mentioned as, for instance 'Disruption of the functioning of state power', the general internal threat definitions can in fact be summed up under search for stability. The main highlighted tools for safeguarding the nation against systematic threats are nuclear power and strategic weapon capacity, yet nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction are defined as a threat for international security. It is inferred that the central focus of the document is on the current condition of military security regarding systemic threats rather than the internal matters. Thus the documents are mostly shaped by the external threat perceptions rather than the internal dynamics.

Table 4.3. Conceptual Summary Table of 2000

2000 Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

Perception of International Conflict:

- Regional & Local Wars or Conflicts
 - Destabilized International System
 - A decline in large scale of war including a Nuclear War
-

Perception of International System:

- **Multipolar**
 - **Destabilised International System**
-

Threats:**Main External Threats:**

- Expansion of military facilities and military existence close to Russian border
- Threats to territorial integrity
- International Terrorism
- Arms blocs and alliance formations against Russian Federation and its allies.
- Disruption of Russian Federation's military & nuclear capacity

Main Internal Threats:

- Violation of Constitutional Order
 - Violation of Territorial Integrity
 - Disruption of the Functioning of State Power
 - Terrorist or disruptive actions or unifications
-

Reactions:

- Military power including nuclear Deterrence
 - International Alliances & Cooperation (CIS/OSCE/SCO)
-

Definition of the safeguarding role :

-Deterrence & Prevention

4.4. 2010 Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

The 2010 document of the Russian Federation consists of four main chapters: 'General Provisions', 'The Military Dangers and Military Threats to the Russian Federation',

‘The Military Policy of Russian Federation’ and finally ‘Military- Economic Support for Defence’.

The document starts with general provisions about the quality of military doctrine and according to that, it consists of the concept of socio-economic development, national security strategy, foreign policy, and maritime doctrine through 2020 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010)

Among the provisions, there is the impression that it is a production of the president of the Russian Federation’s strategic planning on military acts.

Implementation of the Military Doctrine is achieved through the centralization of state control in the military sphere and is effected in accordance with federal legislation and statutory legal acts of the Russian Federation president, the Russian Federation Government, and federal organs of executive power. (ibid.)

This statement shows the domination of state authority on military matters. In general provisions, there is a part on definitions where the scale of wars is given, also the role of military organization and armed forces are enlightened.

Following these definitions and provisional introduction are similar to the document of 2000, again a threat picture of the world is drawn. The same worries of the 2000s document continues in the 2010s document, also a multipolar world system is mentioned depending on regional conflicts and clashes. In the 2010s document, the same discourse is more aggressive and openly highlights regional conflicts and this time the Russian Federation declares that the international mechanism is not enough to resolve these regional problems which are reaching even into Russia’s security and borders. Although again, there is no expectation of a large-scale war or nuclear war, Russia considers its security is under military danger.

Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. There is a continuing tendency towards a strong-arm resolution of these conflicts, including in regions bordering on the Russian Federation. The existing international security architecture (system), including its international-legal mechanisms, does not ensure equal security for all states. (ibid.)

In this document, likewise to the previous one, there is a part of external military threats and internal military threats. The very first article of international threats is

NATO's aim to enlarge its bloc to the Russian border. Among other threats, this statement is an obvious change considering the approach of the previous document, because in the previous one Russia was declaring an alliance formation together with the international mechanism and was defining the existence of it as a source of stability. In this document, as it is mentioned above, an open mistrust is visible about the defence mechanisms of the international community for itself. Another emphasis is on nuclear threats and increasing proliferation. The presence of conflicts reaching its borders and its allies regardless of norms of international security and the concept of international terrorism are mentioned. Terrorism is an apprehension in the previous document too, but in this document, a complaint on actively existing armed radical groups and extremism close to it or its allies' borders is more prominent. About internal dangers, only a short threat definition is made which may be summed up as malign acts against the territorial and constitutional integrity of Russia.

The main security threats are the instability, and interruptions against its nuclear and other military technological existence, and military formations close to its borders.

In this document, there is again a section on contemporary warfare qualities. An expansion of threat definition takes place, for instance, utilization of non-military resources to military aims like "information warfare", resources operating in airspace and outer space, automated command and control systems for troops and weaponry, and weaponry which is comparable to nuclear power on its effectiveness. The features of modern warfare are defined as unpredictable in respect to changing aspects of new technologies and their hybrid usage. A scenario of information warfare is pictured. According to that, to achieve political and military goals, information warfare is used first to gain legitimacy in the eye of the world, and that is how a foundation is created to act with hard power.

Repeatedly new technologic innovations about changing characteristics of warfare are remarked. The assumption in the document is that with the effective integration of new technologies, and electronic and computer systems, the sphere of the art of war is changing along with the quality and types of the conflicts. In the same part, the role of the military to deter any military conflict is also given in detail. Even though here, once again, nuclear weapons are mentioned as the source of world stability, it is also claimed that possession of nuclear capacity may lead to conventional wars turning into a nuclear conflict.

A military organizational explanation takes part in the document too. In this section, details of military organizational duties are explained including its tasks of improving material-technical, social, medical, and scientific support in the armed forces. A long list of duties is reported more like a reminder that addresses the military itself unlike the other parts of the documents which are concerned with external issues. While the first part of the document reflects on the policies and perceptions of the Russian Federation on military matters, the following section mostly refers to planning and structuring the principles of military organization. Sort of distribution of power between military and politics is discussed.

The fourth and last chapter is about military-economic support for defense. In this part, the necessary potential materials and technical endorsements to military developments are referred in detail. Also, the government's decision-making role for military use, in case of a conflict, in all strategic and operational levels is emphasized. Some of the provisions of armed forces in peacetime are delineated such as using its material resources for technical and logistical support, stockpiling in echeloned placing, conducting maintenance of reserves, the conduct of military operations for strategic needs, etc. and also similarly the conservation of resources in the wartime.

In economic support, the creation of a defense industry complex also takes place. The aim is to provide a healthy development for the needs of armed forces and combine the economic capability of the state with it. Furthermore, innovating and producing future systems to decrease the dependency of Russia and to help to conserve its 'strategic' place in the world are matters included.

The document once again ends with remarks on cooperation with the international community on military-technical and military-political levels mentioning Russia's goodwill about developing negotiations and partnerships with international organizations and mechanisms to reduce potential risks of conflict.

There is also an endnote of the document which is declaring the conditions of Russia for cooperation. The article requires Russia to grow in order to achieve that

The main areas of military-technical cooperation are defined by the relevant concepts approved by the president of the Russian Federation. The provisions of the Military Doctrine may be defined more specifically in the light of the changing nature of military dangers and military threats and tasks in the

sphere of ensuring military security and defence, and also in the light of the conditions of development of the Russian Federation. (ibid.).

To conclude, the most significant difference in the 2010 document in comparison to the previous document is the openly mentioned mistrust of the international system and also NATO's enlargement policy is clearly defined as a threat to Russia. In contrast to the previous document, the mentioning of some threats caused by the system still shows more prominence to the peacekeeping role of the international mechanism, and trust in the system is obscure.

In this sense, there is a change in definitions. The terms used for the threat definition on military formations against Russia take up a more concrete determination. Another change is on combating threat definitions mentioned in the previous document (2000 military doctrine) which was titled, 'safeguarding military security', while in the 2010 document it is titled, 'deter and prevent military conflicts' which is a transition to a more aggressive language, from defense to deterrence and prevention. Thus, as a result, this shows that while the main emphasis is on precise systemic threats, definitions of these threats differ depending on external threats which are perceived as a problem for Russia's stability with respect to the attempts at shaping its near abroad by military existence and alliance formations.

Also, for prevention against aggression, the nuclear power and military capacity of Russia are mentioned. Another significant definition is the emphasis on technology according to which, technological changes are accepted as a new threat for military security as well as the emergence of 'hybrid warfare' which is again a result of a systemic change. Therefore, in economic support, the defense industry complex is mentioned for the adaptation of new technologies and innovations. In this respect, this document again puts the focus on the external threats and the changing military security conditions which shape the responses and defense mechanisms regarding systemic threats.

Table 4.4. Conceptual Summary table of 2010

2010 Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

Perception of International Conflict:

- Regional & Local Conflicts
 - Destabilized International System
 - Not expecting a large scale of war
-

Perception of International System:

- **Multipolarity**
- **Destabilised International System**

Main External Threats:

- NATO Enlargement close to Russian Border
- Dangers to territorial integrity (Military Facilities and Military Existence)
- International Terrorism

Main Internal Threats:

- Violation of Constitutional Order
 - Violation of Territorial Integrity
 - Disruption of the Functioning of State Power
-

Reactions:

- Military power including nuclear Deterrence
 - International Alliances & Cooperation (CIS/OSCE/SCO/CSTO)
-

Definition of the safeguarding role :

-Deterrence & Prevention

4.5. 2014 Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

2014's document was the latest published doctrine among military doctrines of Russia. It consists of four main chapters which are; 'General Provisions', 'Military Dangers and Military Threats to the Russian Federation', 'The Military Policy of The Russian Federation', and 'Military-Economic Support for Defence'.

Similar to the previous documents, the first part is about the legal status and aims to set the base of the military doctrine.

The second part refers to military dangers towards Russian Federation. First of all, as it was made in the other two documents perception of international security is given. According to the description in the document, there is increasing global competition. Rivalry and tension exist in political and economic fields and it causes instability at regional and global levels. Regional conflicts which are close to Russian territories are reflected as a danger to Russia. The current international system is identified as insecure. Threats in information are again emphasized in this doctrine and utilization of it for military and political reasons is seen as a danger toward sovereignty, territorial integrity, and as a threatening factor to international security. Main external threats are listed as; NATO's attempts to enlarge its borders reaching to Russia's borders, expansion of the Western block, and its potential to act out of the permissions of international law. Creation of military blocks which is threatening Russian borders and waters or its allies. Strategic missile defense and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technology is nominated as a threat to global stability which comes from nuclear deterrence. Global extremism and international terrorism are again counted among global threats of security. The overthrow of regimes in some states and their current authorities are seen as a danger to Russian security, in terms of being a contradiction to Russian interests. Some traditional threats are also mentioned which may be disruptive to the constitutional integrity of Russia like certain examples of extremism, terrorism, and provocations.

Limitations on Russian military existence, preventions of military operations, and violations of any kinds of nuclear technology including atomic, chemical, medical, etc. are perceived among main military threats.

Changing characteristics of warfare is interpreted. According to this, a new type of warfare includes 'integrated use of military force' which consists of political, economic, informational damage, and attrition. There is apprehension for the utilization of non-military elements for military purposes. It is even mentioned that provocations and civil mobilizations can be used for producing conflict. New technologies in warfare is referred to; as hypersonic weapons, unmanned aircraft, autonomous marine vehicles, robotic weapons, and especially the centralization and automation of weapons and armies are listed. In fact, the nature of current new warfare can be simply defined as "the use of indirect and asymmetric methods of action" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

Active roles of the government are again declared as the neutralization of military threats by non-military means in alliance with the international community at different levels. International cooperation, global and regional alliance formations are mentioned as a possibility, like with BRICS, UN, CIS OSCE, and CSTO.

Traditional roles of the military organization are mentioned in this document too, similar to the previous one which refers to the main duties as well as a state of readiness of the military for this multi-dimensional and new structures of warfare, for instance, protection of forces from radiation, chemical, and biological dangers. In the previous document, a large duty and task list were described for construction and development works of the military and its role in defense is credited, likewise, this section has been added to this document.

The last section of the document talks about the military-economic support for defense, traditional support for development of military capacity, but most importantly, the cooperation of the military-industrial complex with civil and military sectors of the economy and the dual duty of military innovation is referred.

The document again ends with provisions about international cooperation with the military-technical and military-political sphere to strengthen international security and strategic stability on a global and regional level in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.

As a result of the examination of the last document, an increasing worry for international security is noticeable, considering the definition of threats and the current structure of world politics, ‘global completion’, ‘rivalry’, ‘international terrorism’, ‘regional conflicts’, and ‘regime changes’ close to Russian borders are all key terms used. These external threats are the main focus in the document which is also described more precisely in comparison to the document of 2010. Also changing military technologies are presented as a source to define new warfare and under these terms, full support for military innovation is seen as necessary. As a result, this document as well as the last document was affected and shaped mostly by the systemic changes and threats together with the mentioned responses and military mechanisms.

Table 4.5. Conceptual Summary table of 2014

2014 Military Doctrine of Russian Federation

Perception of International Conflict:

- Regional & Local Conflicts
 - Destabilized International System
 - Not expecting a large scale of war
-

Perception of International System:

- **Multipolar**
 - **Destabilised International System & Mistrust to International Security**
 - **Rising regional tensions and global completion**
-

Main External Threats:

- NATO Enlargement close to Russian Border and its' allies
- Threats to territorial integrity (Military Formation Military Facilities and Military Existence)
- International Terrorism
- Global & Regional de-stability, unresolved regional conflicts
- Expansion of Military Strategic weapons & weapons of mass destruction
- Newly established states against Russian national interest by the overthrow of the legitimate public authorities
- Use of information & communication systems for violation of state security

Main Internal Threats:

- Violation of Constitutional Order
 - Violation of Territorial Integrity
 - Disruption of the Functioning of State Power
-

Reactions:

- Military power including nuclear Deterrence
 - International Alliances & Cooperation (CIS/OSCE/SCO/BRICS)
-

Definition of the safeguarding role :

- Deterrence & Prevention
-

4.6. 'Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence'

Before starting, explaining the reason behind examining this document is beneficial for the unity of the study. As is mentioned in the previous parts of this chapter 'nuclear deterrence' is one of the main military strategy for Russian Federation. Which is repeatedly mentioned in military doctrine documents as a core principle for both international stability and as a deterrent power preventive of any dangers to the Russian Federation. Thus, it is part of a military-strategic formation. Starting from the military doctrine documents of the Russian Federation of the 2000s including 2014, the year 2020 was addressed for a new military doctrine. However, Russian Federation did not compile a new military doctrine but established a paper on nuclear deterrence. That is why as a single case, this document is also seen needed to examine as a part of a military strategic approach of the Russian Federation.

This is a short provisional paper that emphasizes the approach of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The whole document, in short, is an emphasis of the fact that, Russia has nuclear power as a deterrent object of military security, and it is also a declaration of, in necessary conditions, the potential to use nuclear power;

The guaranteed deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies is one of the highest state priorities. Deterrence of aggression is ensured by the entire military strength of the Russian Federation, including its nuclear weapons. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020)

The document emphasizes that in nature nuclear power is an object of deterrence, and Russia in that sense takes the responsibility to reduce nuclear conflicts. On the other hand, expresses that its army is ready and capable of using it in any actual case of a nuclear threat.

The document gives a list of conditions that might be a cause for nuclear protection for the Russian Federation. Risks are simply listed as;

- Nuclear adversary against Russia and its allies
- An adversary using also non-nuclear but high destructive weapons and missiles
- Uncontrolled nuclear proliferation and its delivery to non-possessing states

Conditions to use nuclear power is in short may be listed as follows;

- Declares its right to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression against it with nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or conditions of jeopardy in a conventional conflict.
- The use of nuclear force is in control of the President of Russia.
- The President if necessary, might inform the international community about the use of nuclear power on her readiness or on facts that it has been used.

In the last article of the document the responsibility of government authorities to work in accordance with the state policy and decisions of the president on the matter of nuclear deterrence is clarified.

4.7. Conclusion

Table 4.7. Conceptual Continuity Table

CONTENT CONTINUITY TABLE OF MILITARY DOCTRINES

Perception of International Conflict:

- Regional & Local Conflicts (2000,2010,2014)
 - Destabilized International System (2000,2010,2014)
 - Not expecting a large scale of war (2000,2010,2014)
-

Perception of International System:

- **Multipolar (2010,2014)**
 - **Destabilised International System (2000,2010,2014)**
-

Main External Threats:

- NATO Enlargement close to Russian Border and its' allies (2010,2014)
 - Threats to territorial integrity (2000,20210,2014)
 - Military Formation Military Facilities and Military Existence (2000,2010,2014)
 - Terrorism (2000,20210,2014)
 - Global & Regional de-stability, regional conflicts (2000,2010,2014)
 - Expansion of Military Strategic weapons & weapons of mass destruction (2000,2010,2014)
-

Main Internal Threats:

- Violation of Constitutional Order (2000,2010,2014)
 - Violation of Territorial Integrity (2000,2010,2014)
 - Disruption of the Functioning of State Power (2000,2010,2014)
-

Reactions:

- Military power including nuclear Deterrence (2000,2010,2014)
 - International Alliances & Cooperation (2000,2010,2014)
-

Definition of the safeguarding role :

-Deterrence & Prevention (2000,2010,2014)

As it is mentioned before, in this examination the research purpose is to find out whether Russian military doctrines are determined by external threats or cultural aspects. To determine these three main questions need to be answered;

- What are the primary threat definitions according to military doctrines of the Russia in the 21st century?
- What is the main perception of Russia towards the International System and Security according to its military doctrines of the 21st Century?
- Which tools are mentioned for combatting threats according to the military doctrines of Russia, in the 21st century?

In accordance with this purpose, the content analysis of the continuity table of the doctrine will be summed in correlation to the research question and will be discussed in the findings under chapter five.

- Russia defines international order as multipolar without the expectation of a large-scale war, there is a focus on instability.
- Threat definitions are mostly on terrorism, instability, and military expansions against Russia, along with regional conflicts
- Russia emphasizes n military power, mainly nuclear power as a deterrence capacity.

These evaluations are made depending on the threat definitions in the military doctrines of the years; 2000, 2010, and 2014. The results above are found as the

continuous characteristic explanations for all three documents. According to that, Russia since the 2000s remarks its place in world politics as a country possessing nuclear power. The documents are affected by the stability of the country as is mentioned in the evaluation of the first document where Russia was in a period of transition (Riasanovsky & Steinberg , 2016). The first document in that sense is defensive, for instance, the emphasis on the liberal mechanisms to conserve world stability is more visible. However, simultaneously the definition for international system is again multipolar and not unipolar. From that, it is inferred that since then, the balancing idea, at least by cooperating with different axis', was on Russia's agenda (Dibb, 2016). Second of all, even though a 'large scale war' is not expected since the document of 2000, there is an emphasis on the regional conflicts and power vacuums. The latest document is an aggressive and offensive document wherein a huge gap between the first document and the last paper on nuclear deterrence can be seen. Since the first document, it has been stated that the strategic plans of military doctrines for the period up to 2020. However, a new military doctrine was not published in 2020. But on June 8, 2020, the document named 'Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence' was published which was approved by the president on June 2, 2020 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020). In light of this document, an increase in offensive approaches towards conflicts is visible. This shows Russia has strengthened its hand since the 2000s. However, Russia's strategic priority is creating a safe zone for its interest area in the current international system and conserving territorial integrity (Karaganov & Suslov, 2019).

The major worries for national security and the view of international structure remained the same. Furthermore, the power balance in world politics and external factors were the source of threat definitions in the document. There is apprehension on stability especially with the escalation of regional conflicts and international terrorism and that is why the emphasis on nuclear deterrence has increased since the document of 2000. (ZENGİN, 2020).

As a result, in the current world order, Russia sees itself as a great power especially as regional balancing power and a pivot for this balance and considering the current power vacuum depending on regional conflicts, that vision finds a place (Dibb, 2016). In this regard, Russia shapes its military doctrines according to its place in the system and its external threat perceptions as well as the safeguarding mechanisms. It is also

visible that in the documents the main worry is loss of positions and therefore loss of stability. According to this, the determined apprehension in the document is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.



CHAPTER V

FINDINGS AND KEY DISCUSSIONS

In this chapter, the findings of the content analysis are discussed by the literature review and research questions, under five topics. Discussion topics are intentionally selected among the explanatory aspects of the doctrines, which defines a characteristic quality of Russian perception towards military security. Now the aim is to examine the results as key discussion topics through a qualitative study to find out their relevance of them with the military doctrines and to provide a crosscheck for the study. Threat perceptions and the perception of the international system are summed up under five key discussions. These are:

- 1) The multipolar approach of Russia to the international system
- 2) The problem of NATO enlargement
- 3) The instability approach to international security
- 4) The problem of terrorism
- 5) The deterrent and preventive approach to military security

5.1. The Multipolar Approach of Russia to International System

The most characteristic definition in the military doctrine documents is the approach towards the international system. Russia defines the current international system as multipolar. Since the military doctrine document of 2000, the approach to the system is the same, though it is stated that a large-scale war is not expected. However, this perception is the opposite of the common view of the international system. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the international system has been in the era of American unipolarity (Krauthammer, 1990/1991, s. 23-33). Even though there are several discussions about the current balance of the world, the general approach is that since there is still not a military power to balance the USA and not a possibility of a major war, the international system is regarded as unipolar (Nye & Welch, 2015, s. 453). It can be inferred that Russian officials partially agree on this view by not predicting a large-scale war. But then what is the reason for the persistence on the 'multipolar world' perception. There might be multiple reasons for that but according to the findings of this research, the most visible reason is, the search for a place in the system as a great power. It appears the multipolar perception of the world is a tool for emphasizing Russia's great power status. According to the military

doctrine documents, as it is mentioned in the findings part, there are two main reactionary methods of the Russian Federation. The first is military power, mainly nuclear power as a deterrent factor. Secondly, alliance formation. Russia perceives that as a growing and regional power alliance formations offer a balancing role for itself (Godement, ve diğerleri, 2016). So, in this respect, it is not about a systemic perception but as part of national interest, in all three documents, Russia defines the system as multipolar. But what are the balancing elements then? International alliances with other great powers, especially with China, might be a source for this definition. As Russia condemns NATO's enlargement policy, it sees alliance formation as a solution for conflict resolution. In the documents, some regional alliances are mentioned. BRICS, SCO, OSCE, CSTO are mentioned together with UN, EU, and NATO on a strategic level.

g) to work to increase the number of partner states and to promote cooperation with them on the basis of common interests in the area of international security in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, generally recognized norms and rules of international law, as well as international treaties of the Russian Federation, and to expand cooperation with BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa);

h) to strengthen the system of collective security in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and to build up its potential; to intensify cooperation in the area of international security in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); to cooperate with The Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia to ensure common defence and security; to maintain equitable dialogue on European security issues with the European Union and NATO; to promote creation of a new security model based on collective non-bloc principles in the Asia Pacific region; ...” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

The strategic priorities of all cooperation are specified. According to that Russia sees SCO as a partner in its conflicted areas and wants a dialogue with NATO and EU for security in Europe with an emphasis on ‘non-bloc principles’. While the relations with NATO and EU will be discussed in a separate section, the importance of other

partnerships for Russia is discussed under this title. Of course, there are core countries for alliances and China is one of them being among the SCO. Russia-China partnership is a matter discussed under the post-cold war order (Korolev, 2018) and what to expect out of this cooperation is another matter of question. To what extent would the two countries support each other? Alexander Korolev (ibid.) discusses the nature of the alliances and questions in what terms alliances actually turn out as real military cooperation. Then he claims, Russia and China are close to generating ‘a fully-fledged alliance’ (ibid.). The most remarkable comment he has on the matter is; “The two countries share a view of the United States as increasingly threatening to both China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests, civilizational identities, and domestic political regimes” (ibid.). This means the two countries have a common threat to, on some occasions, create a balance against. In another article, published by NATO Defense College, Mark Ozawa (2019) emphasizes the dissatisfaction of both countries with the unipolar system of the post-cold war period. He highlights that they both are ‘promoting for a multipolar system’ (ibid.). From today’s point of view, it is hard to predict the strategic capability of this cooperation but for now, there is a common ambition for a multipolar international system. The two countries have established cooperation in different fields of security like energy security, military exercises, and arms trade (Weitz, (2008)).

Even though has Russia established strategic partnerships, this is not alone evidence that Russia opts for a multipolar system. Another reason for that is the problem of territorial integrity and national security. Russia wants to be included in European politics as a great power and wants to have its own voice. Therefore, it keeps referring to its military power and creates alliances on a different axis. In a report published by European Council on Foreign Relations, there is a similar argument; “China and Russia are not perfect partners, but the weakness of Western Alliances creates opportunities for risk-free strategic convergence on a growing list of issues” (Godement,et. al. , 2016). Especially Russia’s border problems with western allies and regional instabilities provoke Russia to adopt a reactive great power politics (ibid.). Therefore, Russia draws attention to its status in world politics with a multipolar perception of today’s milieu.

5.2. The Problem of NATO Enlargement

NATO enlargement is among the main external threats that Russia emphasizes in the military doctrine documents. In the 2000 document, this problem is not openly indicated however, ‘the expansion of military facilities’, ‘military existence close to Russian border’, ‘armed blocs and alliance formations against Russian Federation and its allies’, ‘Disruption of Russian Federation’s military & nuclear capacity’ are counted among the external threats. Listed threat definitions can mostly cause a danger to Russia from NATO since there is also a hesitation for disruption of its nuclear capacity. As a matter of fact, in the following two documents, together with these threat definitions, the ‘NATO enlargement close to Russian borders’ is openly emphasized as a threat to military security. The negative image of NATO does not only exist in the military doctrine documents but also in the latest National Security Concept of 2021 wherein NATO again is defined as ‘unfriendly’ to Russia (Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 2021).

The nature of the relations with NATO has a background built on tension since its conception. NATO was established as an alliance after cold war tensions in 1949 to create a power balance in Western Europe against the Soviet equivalent under the Western Superpower of the time; the USA (Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, 2021). It was a successful attempt as the Soviet expansion was prevented after the establishment of NATO (Armaoğlu, 2014, s. 402). After the cold-war relations softened, in 2002 NATO-Russia Council was established for mutual relations. However, the NATO enlargements through the Baltic region and NATO’s support for coloured revolutions once again escalated tension (Oğuzlu, 2019).

After mentioning the brief background of Russia-NATO relations, a report published by European Leadership Network describes the current quality of relations as ‘deterrence instability’ (Frear, Kulesa, & Raynova, 2018). The emphasis in the report is that while it is expected that the deterrence role of NATO and Russia against each other is to prevent reactive actions, on the contrary, it creates escalation between the two sides, or negatively provokes the opponent. The report argues that one of the main causes of the deadlock in NATO and Russia relations is the threat perception itself. What NATO supports for collective security in the region turns out as a national security threat for Russia as it has also been mentioned several times in the analysis of the study. NATO’s attempts close to Russia’s borders, from the Russian perspective,

is perceived as anti-regime and disruptive against national stability (ibid.). In the military doctrine of 2014 this threat perception is openly mentioned among the military threats with the risk components;

a) build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance;

b) Destabilization of the situation in individual states and regions and undermining of global and regional stability;

c) Deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories of the state's contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters, including for exerting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation;

d) establishment and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the global strike concept, intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons;

e) Territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference in their internal affairs;

f) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies;

g) Violation of international agreements by individual states, as well as non-compliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms prohibition, limitation and reduction;

h) use of military force in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law;

i) Existence (emergence) of seats of armed conflict and escalation of such conflicts in the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies; (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

Since the Russian Federation perceives the NATO enlargement as an existential threat to National Security, their reactions increasingly shift to a state in between offensive and deterrent. The same report underlines the quality of ‘strategic deterrence’ of Russia. According to that, Russian strategic deterrence is not only for war times but also continuous in peace times (Frear, Kulesa, & Raynova, 2018). This attitude does not only pertain to the Russian side but also, since the end of the Cold War, to NATO enlargement policy which can also be determined as a ‘strategic deterrence’ method against Russia. Although in the foundation, NATO believes in sustainable peace with the systemic changes in Europe by utilizing its military formations and deterrent capacity in the region (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2019).

Russia’s near abroad policy is interrupted as an ‘ambition’ or named as ‘Resurgent Russia’. On the other hand, NATO has a similar ambition and an unchanged policy understanding. NATO overlooked both the national security understanding of Russia and its current military capability. Larsen (2020, s. 65-66) notifies a top-down change in military formation. According to him, depending on the near abroad policies for military security, a significant military change happened after the war with Georgia in 2008 (ibid.). He draws attention to the passing of a new formation in the military by the implementation of the State Armaments program from 2011 till 2020. Thus, he claims that “Russia’s military capabilities came into line with Russia’s military aspirations.” (ibid.). This means that the NATO enlargement policy, as a problem of regional and national stability and for the sake of ‘preserving status quo’ especially against territorial claims, instigated Russian military doctrines. (ibid.).

5.3. The Instability Approach to International Security

The instability approach of Russia is another continuous problem mentioned in the military doctrines as it is mentioned in the analysis section of the study. The ELN report suggests a list of factors that Moscow finds threatening which is caused by Western policies. According to that, pro-western lobbies in post-Soviet space marginalizing Russia in the international community with an informational and sociological campaign are also perceived as a threat to the regime of Russia itself. Hence Western moves on Ukraine, Colour Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and finally Arab Spring in 2010 are all coded as threats to Russia (Frear, Kulesa, & Raynova, 2018). The list of factors also fits the external threat definitions mentioned in the military doctrine of 2014. Some of these are;

l) Use of information and communication technologies for the military-political purposes to take actions which run counter to international law, being aimed against sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states and posing threat to the international peace, security, global and regional stability;

m) Establishment of regimes, which policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation in the states contiguous with the Russian Federation, including by overthrowing legitimate state administration bodies;

n) Subversive operations of special services and organizations of foreign states and their coalitions against the Russian Federation. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

First and foremost, it is important to understand the cause and nature of instability factors. The mentioned problems have a bilateral aspect for Russia more as a national stability threat. The problems mentioned above mostly have the property of affecting regional stability. In the military doctrine of 2014, a similar approach is promoted; "...Despite the fact that unleashing of a large-scale war against the Russian Federation becomes less probable, in a number of areas the military risks encountered by the Russian Federation are increasing" (ibid.). What is the risk for Russia regarding these instability factors? Russia is following a policy aiming to preserve the 'status quo' which is why it continues to act against Western support for systemic changes especially close to its borders thus reacting as a balancer. This can be identified as the main reason for clashes of interest in the near abroad for Russia. But the nature of the interest clash started to change with the Arab spring uprisings towards a broader, more complex case. Previously in the part of great power politics of the Russia it is mentioned that Russia fulfils the power vacuums. Ekaterina Stepanova (2020) argues that playing a balancing role for Russia is getting harder since, with the conflicts in the Middle East, the regional power balances are also changing. Moreover, she claims that the active role of powers like Turkey and Iran also brings the need for balance in the region. She also emphasizes that Russia uses the 'Syria Card' to show its preventive capacity of regime changes against the West (ibid.). Rising regional instabilities with Arab Uprisings are among the reasons for worries in Russia's last military doctrine. Alexander Vikiyotsky (2014, s. 41-64), argues that even though in the common view the turning point for taking an active role in Syria was to prevent a second example of

Libya, there were further reasons for taking precautions in the Syrian civil war. He claims that the underlying reason for that was to fight against religious extremism as a part of national security. He claims that Russia's real hesitation was for separatist movements that Russia has already dealt with in the North Caucasus and Central Asia to be provoked by these movements in the Middle East (ibid.). The statement that supports this view on Russia's stance against global extremism in the military doctrine of 2014 is as follows;

Existence (emergence) of seats of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions, activities of radical international armed groupings and international private military companies in areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, as well as territorial contradictions and upsurge in separatism and extremism in some regions of the world. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

Considering that this instability factor is also related to territorial integrity and national stability too, it is also possible to count this as a source for the mistrust of the current international system which is emphasized in the military doctrine of 2014 as;

10. Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. There is a continuing tendency towards their resolution with the use of force, including in regions bordering the Russian Federation. The existing international security architecture (system) does not ensure equal security for all states. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

Before getting into other reasons, the fact is, this sort of grievance, in its nature, addresses the dominant power of the system. In the previous part about the multipolar perception of world politics, the weakness of the Western alliance was emphasized as a source for Russia to turn towards a different axis. In this part, again the negative spirit of the relations with the West is seen as a result of instability in international security. One of the reasons for this is the Western support given for causes of instability in Russia's perspective. This discussion mainly progresses over 'Colour Revolutions' (Bozkurt, 2006, s. 118-138). These are asserted to be one of the sources of instability as is also mentioned above. Yulia Nikitina (2014) states some of the reasons for Moscow's opposition to the movements. In short, she claims that the hesitations were about the illegitimate ways of 'street democracy' to overthrow legal

democratic regimes, which as a result, will damage the system and consequently be the cause of 'endless conflicts'. This again supports the idea that Russia's understanding of instability is not a large-scale insurgency problem but is more about a national stability problem. Russia does not want external reasons to end up as damage to its own executive power.

a) Activities aimed at changing by force the constitutional system of the Russian Federation; destabilizing domestic political and social situation in the country; disrupting the functioning of state administration bodies, important state and military facilities, and information infrastructure of the Russian Federation (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

5.4. The Problem of Terrorism

Another threat perception that shows consistency in the documents, is terrorism. It is possible to interpret the problem of terrorism for Russia in two ways; first as a threat to national stability and territorial integrity. Second, with the recent developments in the region, it can be defined as a problem for regional stability. The dimensions of the problem change throughout the years. Since the end of the 20th century, the problem of terrorism was a domestic matter of security in connection to national stability that Russia faced in the North Caucasus. In the concept of the fight against international terrorism, the first military action of Russia took place in 2015 in Syria (Stepanova & Cragin, 2017, s. 73-81). Considering that, Russian perception of terrorism mostly consisted of separatist movements within Russia as a part of post-Soviet separatism (Dmitry Danilov, ve diğerleri, (2005)).

After 9/11 the terrorism understanding of the Russian Federation and the USA had similarities in terms of placing the terrorist actions on a religious base. According to that Russia's fight against Chechen guerrillas has earned a common ground in the eyes of the international community as a matter of counter international terrorism (Mahapatra, 2005, s. 220-243). Thus, together with the threat of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, the joint views on the matter of terrorism have changed and with the case of ISIS turned out as a common agenda against divergent groups. This, however, does not necessarily mean there is cooperation. Some of the critiques on Russia's counter-terrorism are on Russia's destructive and broad understanding of the terms 'extremism' and 'terrorism'. For instance; in the meeting of the Commission on

Security on Cooperation in Europe, the topic of ‘Russia’s counterproductive – counter terrorism’ was discussed on June 12, 2019, where Russian execution on the matter was criticized and condemned for alienating various Muslim groups which led them to join extremist organizations like ISIS or also not following a win-win path with the USA in Syria (Commission on Security on Cooperation in Europe, 2019).

To conclude, Russia’s counter-terrorism started as a national stability problem and stretched to a broader perspective into a regional stability problem after the case of Syria under the fight against international terrorism (Stepanova & Cragin, A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations, 2017).

To see the differences in definitions; the relevant article in Russia’s military doctrine of 2000 states that among ‘main internal threats’ there are, “Illegal activities by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures aimed at violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and destabilizing the domestic political situation in the country” (Arms Control Association/ Arms Control Today). The relevant article on the military-political situation goes as such; “The shaping and strengthening of regional power centres; the strengthening of national, ethnic, and religious extremism; the rise in separatism” (ibid.)

Among main external threats in the relevant article in the military doctrine of 2014 states; “the growing threat of global extremism (terrorism) and its new manifestations under the conditions of insufficiently effective international anti-terrorist cooperation...” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015)

And among internal threats;

b) Activities of terrorist organizations and individuals aimed at undermining the sovereignty and violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;

c) subversive information activities against the population, especially young citizens of the State, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the defense of the Motherland;

d) Provoking inter-ethnic and social tensions, extremism, stirring up ethnic and religious hatred or enmity. (ibid.)

The terrorism problem which is precisely defined as a domestic problem and a regional threat in the 2000’s document, is defined as a global extremism/ terrorism problem in the document of 2014.

5.5. The Deterrent and Preventive Approach to Military Security

In the military doctrine documents, Russia is continuously signaling its deterrence and preventing capacity. The official paper, 'Basic Principles of the State Policy of The Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence', earns significance under this aspect of Russia's military strategy. The emphasis on 'Nuclear Power' in the military doctrine documents is also highly persistent. Among the key drivers for deterrence, as it is said before, the NATO Enlargement policy has been the main instigator. The ELN report (Frear, Kulesa, & Raynova, 2018), defines the deterrence quality of the Russian Federation under three methods; 'Nuclear signaling', 'Brinkmanship' and 'Military exercises'. The argument is that over these three methods of signaling Russia aims to achieve; "Unpredictability, and on keeping the potential opponent off-balance through statements and actions that frequently come across as assertive or aggressive" (ibid.).

Another report by Congressional Research Service (2021), also highlights the role of military exercises in terms of creating concerns in neighbouring countries as well as for the USA. According to that, Russia's military exercises have the role of 'coercive signaling' against the international audience. It is noted that especially the large military exercises, most recently Zapad 21, created official concerns from Western Countries. Giles (2017) argues the military formation on the Ukraine border created a similar effect on the capability of the Russian military. The recent operations in Syria and Ukraine gave the Russian military practical ability for mass deployments. Some of the articles in the military doctrine of 2014 on the deterrent and preventive role of the military capacity of the Russian Federation are; "Prevention of a nuclear military conflict as well as of any other military conflict is the basis of the military policy of the Russian Federation" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2015) Another emphasis is; "To maintain global and regional stability and the nuclear deterrence potential at a sufficient level" (ibid.)

Pezard and Rhoades, summarize three key national interests as national security drivers according to that Russia's priorities are as follows;

- *Defending Russia's borders and preserving the Russian regime*
- *Maintaining influence in the near abroad (broadly defined as countries formerly in the Soviet Union, minus the Baltic States)*

- *Fulfilling the vision of Russia as a great power, which includes ensuring that it is being treated as such by other powers. (Ashley L. Rhoades & Stephane Pezard , 2020)*

Furthermore, the authors also emphasize that the materialization of these threats is due to NATO enlargement as was discussed in the previous section. But the essential point here is that the reactions match the threat perceptions of the military doctrines. But among the driving force for Russian policies, as mentioned above as the third interest, the ‘great power vision’, draws attention in terms of including political aspects such as the use of ‘deterrent and preventive capacity’.

In the thesis chapter, the part on ‘Russian strategic culture; Great Power status’, a wide discussion was presented on the ‘great power’ status of Russia. The driving motivations behind the great power status were discussed. According to that, while some scholars approach the matter from the angle of identity and culture, other groups’ assumptions were focusing on security needs. An interpretation of the perception of military technology would help to perceive the Kremlin’s approach. Jakup M. Godzimirski’s (2020), analysis on the approaches of Russia to military technology, asserts that by the developments of technology, Russia expects to avoid military security challenges and sustain political stability. Thus Russia aims to preserve national stability and existence through economic and technological power. Which also infers that Russia uses military power to sustain national security. He highlights that Russia believes the only way to conserve the country against threats, enhancing military and economic power is imperative. But also, among the reasons for initiating socio-economic and political development, is gaining a competitive advantage (ibid.). This approach to technology and the intention of becoming a deterrent military power, is the outcome of a policy, which means Russia does not intend to be in an equation where they are ignored, hence its power and capability it is used as a source to compete.

CONCLUSION

The examination of Russian military doctrines shows that Russia's military security understanding mostly depends on the external threat perceptions. Russia defines the threat perceptions according to its national security apprehensions, as well as its definition of the current stance of the international system with this respect. According to the military doctrines, this situation is defined as destabilized and multipolar. As a solution to its security problems, nuclear power is the main tool for asserting dominance regarding its deterring property, but together with the other types of arms systems, military power is the most essential element of Russia's Safeguarding methods. On the other hand, together with all the threat definitions, there is an open search for 'stability' and preserving the 'status quo' which is accepted existential for Russian national security. Therefore Russia highlights its deterrence capability and signals its balancing capacity. Hence, according to the result of this research, systemic or external causes are determining factors on Russian military doctrines. Great power status is a tool to achieve national security goals and to conserve national stability. Also, the perceptions towards the international system and threats are defined in accordance with its great power identity. Although Russia has its weaknesses, it is safe to say that the great power status it emphasizes is more than ambition or an exaggeration, but a reality. Russia is a great power with a deterrent and preventive capacity and to a certain degree, a capability of coping with the threats it identifies. In accordance with the conducted research, it is found that the reason for the military cautions of Russia is again caused by military reasons. For instance, NATO enlargement and military existence cause military signaling. Also, deterrence logic is a reason to block the road to cooperation. Russia's strategy of deterrence is not likely to change because NATO's strategy of deterrence is also unlikely to change. Since NATO aims to possess power beyond its existing territorial limits, Russia stretches its security claims beyond its borders too. Even though in the political discourses of Russia for its approach to near abroad policies, culture and identity are highlighted, according to military doctrines, the problem with near abroad is mostly explained as a threat to 'territorial integrity'.

On the other hand, the source of Russia's survival capacity is another matter of question. Considering the potential of Russia in terms of adapting to military reforms and technologies in accordance with political aims is perhaps about strategic culture.

The chain of innovations for military security and bringing success with the reforms not just for the military, but also for political means, is a source of discussion for Russian Strategic culture considering the rapid changes since the beginning of the 2000s. Even though according to the analysis, Russia's threat perceptions and approach towards the international system are mostly caused by systemic reasons, the source for adapting reforms and security policies reflects a cultural essence and reminds the culturalist approaches which examine the characteristics of military decision making. Though again, in what sense cultural approaches bring a further explanation of what is already apparent in the action and reaction balance is ambiguous. Rather it is because of the strategic culture or revanchist or expansionist logic stemming from imperial legacy. Consequently, Russian military capacity is that of great power and thus acts accordingly. On the other hand, today's strategic priorities can be explained most accurately, with respect to today's conditions.

Taking a look back to the literature, we are reminded of the discussions on 'the cult of the offensive'. In this view, offensive doctrines are proposed due to conflicting sides that do not leave room for cooperation. Another argument opposes that, states aim to go to war for political ends, so war is explained as a tool to achieve goals regardless of its foreseen destructive results. From this point of view, it is also possible to explain Russia's deterrence logic. Russia has enough military capacity to play a balancing role at a certain level and can take the risk for a possible escalation, but NATO enlargement and the competitiveness between the two sides shows that the logic is the same for both sides. But most importantly, Russia increases the emphasis on the most destructive offensive power, nuclear capacity. Besides the military exercises, nuclear signaling which is already explained under 'the deterrence and preventive approach', is noticeable in official papers, examined previously as the backbone of the study. 'Basic principles of Russian State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence' is evidentiary to the increased nuclear signaling.

Coming back to the approaches on the behaviour of Russia as a 'great power', there are almost delusional views which consist of a wide range of explanations of Russian strategic culture or foreign policy based on tangible and intangible reasons. This attitude at some point almost gives the feeling that the Kremlin is right to complain about the 'marginalization' of Russia in the international community (Makarychev, 2015). There is no need to discuss whether it is because of the intentions to marginalize

Russia or not, but, as Mearsheimer clarifies in his interpretation of the Ukraine crisis, the attitudes of Russia is also caused by the Western ignorance of its position as a great power and its realist interpretations towards the nature of international politics (Mearshiemer, 2014). The continuous emphasizes on nuclear power from Russia is a signal for its military power too.

In that sense, to deescalate the ‘deterrence instability’ and to sustain stability in Europe, it is beneficial to evaluate and treat Russia with respect to its military capacity and national security perceptions.



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CURRICULUM VITAE

Name & Surname: Kübra SADIKOĞLU

A. EDUCATION

MA: Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University / Political Science and International Relations (%30 English)

Undergraduate: International University of Sarajevo / International Relations

B. OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Sadikoğlu Furniture & Kitchen Industry Co.ltd / Executive Assistance 2015-2020 (Family Business)

Fatih Municipality / Social Cohesion Department Supervisor October 2020-?

C. INTERESTS & SKILLS

Areas of Study: Security, Migration, War, Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, Military History

Russian (Elementary) / Bosnian (pre-intermediate)/ Arabic (pre-intermediate) / English (Advance)