



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

**TURBULANCE IN TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY  
COOPERATION: THE MOTIVES OF CONFRONTATION**

MEHMET ALKANALKA  
PROF. DR. SERHAT GÜVENÇ

PHD THESIS

ISTANBUL, 12, 2021



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TURBULANCE in TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION:  
THE MOTIVES of CONFRONTATION

**ABSTRACT**

This dissertation analyzes the motives of the confrontation in the Transatlantic Security architecture. First of all, the threat construction of the main actors must be understood, and subsequently the altered security landscape. To this end, a comparative case study was conducted on the strategic documents of the U.S., France and Germany within the time scope of 2000-2019. The documents of three states analyzed in this dissertation yield tangible data on the actors' threat perceptions, and their positions in the Alliance, and defense strategies. The balance of power and the balance of threat are two key realist concepts examined in this dissertation. The states assuming the balance of power theory reach their goals by balancing, taking distribution of power into consideration, while the states embracing the balance of threat concept balance the threats rather than power. The threat definitions of the three actors in question do not overlap. It might be deduced that although the security preferences of France and Germany are not how they used to be, they still need multilateral communication strategies and new areas of interest and influence in the Transatlantic Alliance in order to perpetuate the Alliance. The main hypothesis of this work could be summarized as follows: the global power structure and distribution lead the U.S. and the two major European Powers -France and Germany- to act together. One of this dissertation's principal findings is that the U.S. acts unrealistically while Germany and France choose a more realistic path. It could be concluded that actions concerning strategic threat assessments have never been sacred and set in stone and have always been changing.

**Keywords:** Neo-realism, balance of power, balance of threat, intention, capability, threat, European Strategic Autonomy, European Army, capability-based strategy, threat-based strategy.

# TRANSATLANTİK GÜVENLİĞİ İŞBİRLİĞİNDE TÜRBÜLANS ÇATIŞMANIN ARDINDAKİ NEDENLER

## ÖZET

Tez kapsamında, Transatlantik Güvenlik mimarisindeki çatışmaların ardındaki nedenler analiz edilecektir. Öncelikle, başlıca aktörlerin tehdit algısı, ardından değişen güvenlik yapısı anlaşılmalıdır. Bu amaçla, 2000-2019 zaman aralığında ABD, Fransa ve Almanya'nın stratejik dokümanları üzerinde karşılaştırmalı bir vaka incelemesi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu tez kapsamında; incelediğimiz üç devletin dokümanları söz konusu aktörlerin tehdit algısı, ittifaktaki duruşları ve savunma stratejilerine dair somut verileri ortaya koymaktadır. Güç dengesi ile tehdit dengesi kavramları, tez çalışması kapsamında birlikte ele alınan kilit realist kavramlardandır. Güç dengesi teorisini benimseyen devletler, güç dağıtımını dikkate alarak dengeleme yapmak suretiyle hedeflerine ulaşırken; tehdit dengesi kavramını dikkate alan devletler güçten ziyade tehditleri dengeler. Söz konusu üç aktörün tehdit tanımları örtüşmemektedir. Transatlantik İttifakını sürdürmek için, Fransa ile Almanya'nın güvenlik tercihleri eskisi kadar olmasa da, çok taraflı iletişim stratejilerine ve Transatlantik İttifakı içerisinde yeni çıkar ve nüfuz alanlarına ihtiyaç duydukları çıkarımında bulunulabilir. Bu çalışmanın ana hipotezi şu şekilde özetlenebilir: küresel güç yapısı ve dağıtımı, ABD ve Avrupa Kıtasındaki İki Güç olan Fransa ile Almanya'yı birlikte hareket etmeye yöneltmektedir. Bu tezin başlıca bulgularından birisi; ABD'nin realist okumadan uzak hareket ettiği ve Almanya ile Fransa'nın daha realist bir yol izlediğidir. Stratejik tehdit varsayımlarına dair aksiyonların hiçbir zaman kutsal ve değişmez olmadığı, aksine sürekli değiştiği sonucuna varılabilir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Neo-realizm, güç dengesi, tehdit dengesi, niyet, kabiliyet, tehdit, Avrupa Stratejik Otonomisi, Avrupa Ordusu, kabiliyete dayalı strateji, tehdiye dayalı strateji

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AC:	Active Component
BCT:	Brigade Combat Team
BMDS:	Ballistic Missile Defense Systems
CBRNE:	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
CSDP:	Common Security and Defense Policy
CVN:	Aircraft carriers nuclear-powered propulsion
CVW:	Carrier air wing
DoD:	Department of Defense
EDC:	European Defense Community
EFP:	enhanced Forward Presence
EI2:	European Intervention Initiative
ESDP:	European security and defense strategy
EU:	European Union
EUFOR:	European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUTM:	Mali European Union Training Mission in Mali
FCAS:	Future Combat Air System
FYDP:	Future Years Defense Program
GDP:	Gross domestic product
GWOT:	Global War on Terror
INDIO-PACOM:	Indo-Pacific Command

IR:	International Relations (IR)
ISIL:	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
LPM:	Loi de programmation militaire
MINUSMA:	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
NATO:	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS:	National Defense Strategy
NIS:	Newly Independent States
NMS:	National Military Strategy
NPG:	Nuclear Planning Group
NSI:	National Security Interests
NSS:	The National Security Strategy
QDR:	The Quadrennial Defense Review
RC:	Reserve Component
SFOR:	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SOF:	Special Operations Forces
SSGN:	Submersible, Ship, Guided, Nuclear
TEU:	Treaty on European Union
U.K.:	The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
U.S.:	United States
UAE:	The United Arab Emirates
USD:	United States Dollar

VEOs: Violent extremist organizations

VJTF: Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

VJTF: Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

WMD/E: Weapons of mass destruction/effects



## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### **The Background of the Research Problem**

Antonio Gramsci wrote in the prison that the crisis was about that the old was dying and the new could not be born; “in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appeared” (Gramsci, 1971) Old wine within new bottle or new wine within old bottle rhetoric might not be enough to cope with current international relations problems. It is very difficult to both define and overcome them alone for any nation, because the new requires more collaboration and alliances.

Alliance cohesion might be defined as the ability of allies to agree on their security preferences (Troutman, 2020). According to Pond, “Atlantic Partnership” is “near-dead” (Pond, 2004). Even though America’s so-called benign hegemony era seems to be over, yet Europe has been caught vastly ill prepared (Ischinger, 2018; Glasser, 2018). The Transatlantic Security Architecture maintained for a long time by the alliance members located both in the U.S. and Europe. Both pillars of the Transatlantic Alliance – simultaneously a political and a military great force – were engaged in a successful win-win process against a common external threat. Nevertheless, the removal of a common external threat and transformation of the bi-polar international structure into a unipolar one under the U.S. leadership brought forward some fundamental controversies. While the 9/11 attack led the U.S. to exert intensive military force, European members of the Alliance reacted differently to certain American military operations. A number of European countries supported the U.S.’ Iraq operation in 2003 within the framework of bandwagoning, whereas France and Germany assumed a critical stance which could be interpreted as soft balancing. The Alliance has many members and the differences of opinion and discrepancies all provide a great source of materials to analyze in an international relations dissertation. Stephen Walt implies three uniting forces between Europe and the United States: first and foremost, the Soviet threat, then the economic interest, and finally the existence of a generation of European and American elites, whose personal backgrounds and life experiences are strongly committed to the idea of an Atlantic community (Walt, 1998). At present, all three unifying forces seem to have

eroded. Therefore, this dissertation employs Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory, a strand of neorealism that examines military alliances and military build-ups.

The crisis and confidence in the Transatlantic Alliance has not come overnight, but resulted from a succession of differences. Colin Powell, as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that 'For most of the past 45 years, the primary focus of our national military strategy has been containment of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology' (Joint Chief of Staff, 1992). Forward presence was a key component of the containment policy. Powell also added that the Soviet threat's decline had basically changed the concept of threat analysis in the force structure planning (Joint Chief of Staff, 1992). The U.S. constructed former Soviet Union as a threat not only to the Western European countries' national security, but also to democratic Western ideology system. It is very reasonable to downsize the military and decrease military expenses in both France and Germany due to the elimination of the former communist Soviet threat, while the U.S. took the opposite road in the context of its Global War on Terror (GWOT).

During the Cold War, there was a consensus among the major powers of the Transatlantic Alliance. In the Cold War bipolar structure, there was a reasonable degree of match between national interests of the European powers and security agenda of multilateral security institutions of NATO. The realist containment policy was successfully implemented, and the mission must have been over. After the Cold War and decline of former Soviet Union military, the U.S. has not ended its military presence in Europe. After the Cold War, It has not been easy to determine who the enemy is and what the security means as Theodore Sorensen suggested (Sorensen, 1990). The threat perceptions on two sides of the Atlantic has changed and the anxiety stemming from it causes above-mentioned allies to look for answers for their security. The term "enemy" was replaced by the term "opponent" and threat-based contingency military plans were replaced by capability-based approaches. The nature of threat has changed and forced some adaptation of basic strategic principles (Bourantonis, Ifantis, & Tsakonas, 2008).

Even almost thirty years after the end of the Cold War, transatlantic security is still being questioned. On the one hand, as a liberal institution with supranational feature, the EU has failed to mobilize its' all members to build a regional collective defense organization.

On the other hand, the U.S. has had different security priorities and, its unilateral practices undermines the efficiency of NATO. The Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which is considered the backbone of NATO, has been used unanimously only once so far, which was in response to the 9/11 attack in Afghanistan.

The end of the Cold War has also allowed broadening the traditional security agenda focused on nation state threats to include a variety of risks and dangers posed in the Cold War context (Bourantonis, Ifantis, & Tsakonas, 2008). At the end of a calm decade in the post-Cold War era, the picture has changed stemming from American unilateral military interventions following the 9/11. The resulting contrast between the U.S. and main EU members' approaches was striking in the case of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both Germany and France strongly opposed the American military plans and actions. This opposition was harshly criticized by the U.S. administration, as can be seen in the following remarks of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in an interview on January 22, 2003, soon before the invasion: "Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe...Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem." (Defense.Gov Transcript: Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center, 2003). It can be argued that this difference in the use of military force caused a strategic fracture within the Transatlantic Alliance, with the French and German opposition to the U.S. occupation in Iraq (Paul, Wirtz, & Fortmann, 2004). It should be borne in mind that the neo-realists in the U.S. (such as Stephen Walt and Mearsheimer) regarded the war in Iraq an 'unnecessary war' (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003).

It was the first important turbulence in the Alliance in 2000s. After that turbulence, the EU released two strategy documents. The first document was composed of only 14 pages in which the threats were listed as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (Council of the European Union, 2009). It was also stated that large-scale aggression against any EU Member State became unlikely, and Europe had never been neither so secure, nor so free. The second document was released in 2016 of 51 pages length. Even the difference in page numbers of the two documents gives some idea about how things have become more complicated. The 2016 Strategy Document states that the world has become multi-polar with a different distribution of capabilities, and the EU needs a strategy. Both the distribution of power

and distribution of the threat have changed. Moreover, the distribution of interest has changed. None of the EU member states has either the strength, or the resources to address these threats alone (European External Action Service, 2017).

Western European countries, under the leadership of the U.S. and the umbrella of NATO, followed a defensive realist strategy against a possible Soviet invasion of their own countries during the Cold War. While the first decade after the Cold War passed without any major problems, the 9/11 terrorist attack created a trauma effect. The European members of the Transatlantic Alliance took part in the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, albeit with limited capabilities, alongside the U.S. However, as the invasion of Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition including the U.K. and Poland in 2003 was not approved by France and Germany, the first turbulence triggered Europe's own search for autonomy in the field of security and defense, especially in France. As a result, France and Germany began to reconsider the transatlantic security structure.

There have been two main lines of action; on the one hand, unilateral and self-referential hard power actions preferred by the U.S., and on the other, multilateral and cooperative soft power strategies preferred by France and Germany. This is very understandable, because multilateralism emphasizes the relationship based on rules and collective action rather than power alone (Bourantonis, Ifantis, & Tsakonas, 2008). Even though terrorism threats are relatively limited, the U.S. chose to exploit unipolar international structure to implement its own agenda under the name of a preemptive war against terrorism with the help of its global operational military capability. As a response, it is not surprising that the EU articulated its own Security Strategy Document which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. It was very different from George W. Bush's National Security Strategy Document in that it recalled 'effective multilateralism' (Bourantonis, Ifantis, & Tsakonas, 2008).

After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Doctrine declared an offensive strategy in military doctrine, different from the previous defensive one (Colucci, 2012). The term 'crusading realism' might be helpful to understand Bush's Doctrine conveying four main arguments as pre-emption, prevention, primacy, and democracy promotion (Colucci, 2012). Finding terrorism and replacing it with the use of communism through ambiguous Global War on Terror (GWOT) referent has complicated military power efficiency so that some

American generals such as McChrystal criticized military operations in Afghanistan. The U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have worsened the situation and harmed liberal peace promises that were nurtured with the end of the Cold War (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018). Obama's election as the President on November 4, 2008 and his multilateral approach (different from Bush's unilateral use of military force) were welcomed by France and Germany. As a matter of fact, France returned to NATO's military wing on 03 April 2009, from which it had withdrawn in 1966.

Heiko Maas stated that their certainty was shaken because Europeans and the U.S. were allies in the fight for multilateralism and a rules-based world (Munich Security Conference, 2019). According to Robert Kagan, Europe has had turned away from power by insisting on norm value order based on international laws and rules, international negotiation and cooperation (Kagan, 2002a). The EU prefers soft power rather than the traditional use of military power, emanating from its continental lessons learned heritage. According to Robert Kagan, the time pretending that Europeans and Americans shared the same worldview was over.

Kagan argued in 'Power and Weakness' that Europe's reluctance to use force derives from the lack of it, and that the United States' preference for military use of power can be explained by the fact that it has this asset in abundance (Kagan, 2002b). Robert Cooper argued that 'Europe may have chosen to neglect power politics because it is militarily weak; but it is also true that it is militarily weak because it has chosen to abandon power politics' (Cooper, 2004, p. 159). However, limited wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, which took place in the center of the Continent proved the ineffectiveness of this approach. As for the U.S., it has insisted on using power in the realist anarchical realm where real security and the defense of the liberal order depended on both the possession and use of military power. (Kagan, 2002b). Kagan also argues that post-war integration has been a "miracle" of getting the German "lion" to lie down with the French "lamb". However, the European Army discourses and political leaders of France and Germany imply to a different story.

The new turbulence, which commenced with Trump's election as President in 2016, brought the agenda of the European Army to the public by France and Germany. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier describes the world's present structure as it "is out of

joint” (Steinmeier, 2017). Ever since Emmanuel Macron’s election, the idea of a European Army repeatedly comes forward, while what this army is and how the concept of more European can be accomplished in a broader sense are still topics of debate. Angela Merkel stated that the times in which they could completely trust in others were over to a certain extent, and added that Europeans had to really take their fate themselves (as cited in Meiritz, Reimann, & Weiland, 2017). Merkel reiterated the idea shortly after in a speech at the European Parliament that they looked forward to looking at the vision of one day creating a real, true European army (as cited in Brown, 2018). She said that they had to create a European intervention unit with which Europe could take action where necessary (as cited in de la Baume & Herszenhorn, 2018). She also added that it would be complementary to NATO, not against it. French President Macron stated they needed to protect themselves – from China, Russia, and even the U.S. (as cited in Franke, 2018). He brought the argument to the surface that they could not protect themselves unless they decided to have a true European army as Europeans (Macron 2018). In response, U.S. President Trump tweeted that French President Macron just suggested that Europe build its own military in order to protect itself from the U.S., China and Russia, but Europe should first pay its fair share of NATO, which the U.S. subsidized immensely (as cited in Morin, 2018). American Defense Minister Jim Mattis made the American preference clear through a statement within his comment on the EU Army that they saw NATO as the cornerstone for the protection of Europe in the security realm and they backed nations carrying more load (as cited in Brown, 2018).

Before the U.K.’s exit from the EU and Trump’s election as President, Nathalie Tocci stated that these two possibilities could strengthen the works toward European Strategic Autonomy. (as cited in Kanter, 2020) However, she also postulated that although these possibilities did come true, it could not be realized due to the lack of action in the field of defense and security and the different approaches of the European member states. Former EU High Representative Federica Mogherini stated that both European citizens and the world needed a strong European Union like never before, (as cited in Munich Security Conference, 2017). She also argued that a common foreign policy strategy backed with sufficient military power was widely seen as a strategic necessity (as cited in Munich Security Conference, 2017). Martin Quencez, an analyst at the German Marshal Fund in Paris, said on the one hand that Europeans had to rely more on their own capabilities, the

response on how to do it was not as the same across Europe, so that some countries' preferences like Poland and Norway were to reinforce the U.S. relations (Fouquet, 2019).

As a matter of fact, the U.K.'s first applications to join the EU in 1963 and 1967—its name being European Economic Community then—were rejected by the de Gaulle government because of such irredeemable incompatibilities between worldviews. Moreover, after the third and successful application in 1973, the British political scene continued to be divided between more or less equally strong European or Atlanticist factions. At times, the anti-European view dominated the polls with quite a large margin, as was the case during Margaret Thatcher's first year as PM, when the anti/pro ratio was 65% to 26%. This fact was reflected in U.K.'s policies of not adopting the use of the Euro and not joining the Schengen Area. Finally, the differences between the U.K. and continental European powers led to the former's decision to leave the bloc altogether on 31 January 2020.

Accordingly, there are two paradigms within the bloc when it comes to a European army: the Franco-German axis and the American axis, taken into consideration by most of the Eastern European countries that consider Russia a threat and prefer to continue their bilateral relations with the U.S. in the NATO context. It can be easily inferred that different economic and security perspectives cause different consequences. France and Germany were regarded as constraining and delegitimizing America's capacity in the requirement of multilateralism, and this approach has been at the heart of the transatlantic relations (Rees, 2011). Samuel Huntington claims that the world witnesses a uni-multipolar (hybrid) system with one superpower and several major powers including the German-French condominium in Europe (Huntington, 1999). The Franco-German axis does not consider Russia a huge threat to themselves, while the neighboring countries of Russia have a different threat perception, and thus bandwagoning with the U.S. through NATO partnership. This axis has recently acquired a different threat perception from the U.S. As the U.S. brought into attention in the recent past, they are following a capability-based strategy. If there is going to be an autonomous military organization in Europe coming forward, it cannot be imagined without Germany, the most powerful state of the EU in the last decade. In particular with Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Germany remains as the most influential country regarding the political direction of the

EU. Following the Euro-crisis of 2009, Germany took the opportunity to assert herself in a leadership position and became even more indispensable member in the EU.

Some European countries differentiate from this axis. One of the more recent examples is The Three Seas Initiative (3SI). The U.S. government as well as several members of the U.S. Congress have vouched strongly for this initiative. Launched by the presidents of Croatia and Poland in 2015 to reduce dependence on Russia, 3SI aims for energy independence and infrastructure connectivity, and thus, enhancing the national security of Europe and the United States. The initiative expands over the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Adriatic Sea. As of 2020, there are twelve countries participating in this project, all of them being EU members (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). There is a deep division between eastern and southern members when it comes to security priorities: some of the EU members are historically friendly with Russia and put the problems of Mediterranean basin such as the refugee crisis and terrorism as a priority, while other members still consider Moscow a serious threat.

Trump's Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson has stressed that 'promoting values too often was "an obstacle" to advancing the U.S. interests (as cited in Piccone, 2017).' French President Macron argues that they are currently experiencing a crisis of the effectiveness and principles of the contemporary world order. (Macron, 2018). Trump and some state leaders prefer an illiberal version of Western civilization, based on history, culture, and religion rather than normative values and institutions (Munich Security Conference, 2018; The White House, 2017b).

Since the Brexit vote, some interpret a revival of Franco-German axis, looking at the defense policy of the EU. However, there are some differences and divisions in policies within this axis as well, as was also noted in the 2019 Munich Security Report. France makes efforts to reach 2% defense spending target of the GDP even with a pressure of weak economic growth, Germany on the other hand only plans to reach 1.5% of GDP by the end of 2024 –which could change- even with a surplus of budget in the last decade and serious deficiencies in the Bundeswehr's staff and equipment (von Krause, 2018).

The U.S.' traditional allies have had difficulties to get in line with the American unilateral preferences. It certainly does not mean that there are no differences between the France and Germany cases. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen carefully worded her sentences by stating that "to remain transatlantic – while also becoming more European" (Leyen, 2018a). France is confused with 'the gap between Berlin's words and actions' (Gebauer, et al., 2018). However, they mostly agree on the main issues, while disagreeing on certain technicalities. In other words, they are on the same page when it comes to the general strategic direction of the EU, while differing on their views regarding the best way to follow to reach common goals, or the timing of certain moves. That was not the case with the U.K., where there were stark disagreements regarding the core views concerning key policy issues, such as strategic autonomy. Since its emergence as a concept in 2016 Global Strategy of the EU, the U.K. never endorsed it, neither was she supportive of the European Army. In fact, European self-sustainability in terms of security, under the umbrella name of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) has become much more viable after the BREXIT, since the U.K., as its greatest opponent has decisively left the scene to its continental proponents, i.e. France and Germany.

Merkel explained her preference as cooperation first with France and then inside the EU that they were committing to a common military culture, a common defense industry, a common line on weapons exports so that they both wanted to contribute toward a European Army (as cited in Fouquet, 2019). Due to its need for resources, France is aware of the fact that it cannot accomplish this without the EU's greatest power, Germany. The European Army might only be realized with the consent of France, the sole nuclear power in the EU, and Germany, the richest country in the EU. In this context, the Treaty of Aachen signed between Germany and France in 2019 constitutes an important step. In particular, French President Macron has developed a new initiative under the name of The European Intervention Initiative. It was announced by the French President on 26 September 2017, on the grounds that the EU could not go beyond its statements of intent regarding security and defense policies. This Initiative was intended to overcome the security policy ineffectiveness within the EU. Sten Rynning mentions that France and Germany have reached a weak compromise on European security which must be reinforced in order to respond to Russia's military actions in Ukraine, Britain's EU exit and the U.S.' pivoting to Asia (Rynning, 2017). He also argues that their compromise can

be traced back to the European Council meeting of December 2013, where the EU countries agreed that past efforts concerning European security had failed, and that new momentum was needed (Rynning, 2017).

Germany and France share a set of reasons for military partnership through a European Army. Primarily, ever since becoming a rising power in the 1800s, Germany had always had a rivalry with France. This historical competition and the resulting German-Franco wars were among the reasons for the WWI and WWII. Following these devastating wars and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a new threat looming over the region, the U.S., Germany and France formed an alliance under the “functionality” principle with an eye to not engaging in another war again.

Policies aiming for a more autonomous Europe have traditionally been put forward and supported by France. Nathalie Tocci defines European strategic autonomy as “origins are certainly very French...and basically buy French and buy less American.” (Kanter, 2020). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, during its peculiar and somewhat half-hearted membership in the EU, never really supported the steps toward strategic autonomy, as espoused by France, and later also Germany. It may be argued that the historic rifts between France and the U.K. resurfaced in their respective approaches towards the future of Europe. Merkel made it clear that a European Army would be realized with the help of both Germany and France’s contributions. (Bloomberg, 2019).

Andrew Moravcsik claims that the bilateral relationship between France and Germany lies at the core of contemporary Europe, and they have been at the center of almost every European policy initiative during the past half century including defense (Moravcsik, 2014). It is suggested that both the US and the EU are tied and torn in defining transatlantic politics (European Parliament, 2020). EU Commission President Von der Leyen stressed that EU has not always agreed with U.S. Presidents’ latest decisions and they would be ready to build a new transatlantic agenda (European Commission, 2020).

It is stated that improvement in Franco-German defense and security cooperation is a key step towards European strategic autonomy, and is also suggested that the best way for that accomplishment might be a written Franco-German White Paper on Security and Defense (Kempin & Kunz, 2017). According to Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Franco-

German rapprochement is one of the founding pillars of European security construction, yet there is not full consensus on how to proceed (Deschaux-Dutard, 2019). She also argues that France and Germany have different strategic cultures and perspective on defense security, even though Brexit seems to be an emerging opportunity for the two countries' military cooperation (Deschaux-Dutard, 2019b).

Walt argues that the rest fears or hates the U.S. not only as an American unilateral dominance but also what it is doing at present (Walt, 2005) or what it might do in the future. In addition, some argue that some European countries perceive the U.S. as a potential security threat (Hofman, 2013; Posen, 2014; Art, 2010). There are sizeable indicators that 'EU foreign policy, led by Paris and Berlin, will actively seek to balance... U.S.' (Hofman, 2013).

**People see U.S. power and influence as a greater threat in the Trump era**

*U.S. power and influence is a major threat to our country*

	2013	2017	2018	'13-'18 Change
	%	%	%	
Germany	19	35	49	▲ 30
France	20	36	49	▲ 29
Mexico	38	61	64	▲ 26
Brazil	27	47	53	▲ 26
Tunisia	36	50	61	▲ 25
Spain	17	59	42	▲ 25
Canada	23	38	46	▲ 23
Nigeria	17	38	39	▲ 22
South Africa	24	35	42	▲ 18
Japan	49	62	66	▲ 17
Australia	19	35	36	▲ 17
Argentina	41	49	57	▲ 16
UK	22	35	37	▲ 15
Italy	10	20	22	▲ 12
Kenya	31	45	41	▲ 10
Indonesia	44	55	52	▲ 8
Russia	37	37	43	▲ 6
Israel	9	17	15	▲ 6

Figure 1. 1 The rest's polls on U.S. under the Trump Presidency


Source: Pew Research Center (Pew Research, 2019)

Eurobarometer survey exposes that more than three quarters of Europeans support a common European defense and security policy (Public opinion in the European Union, 2018). Former German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen also used "army of Europeans" term (Leyen, 2018b). Clausewitz argued in 'On War' that without public

support, no war could be conducted successfully (Clausewitz,1832), and thus public opinion shaped foreign policies and preferences. General popularity always brings an advantage, but the currency of international relations is power and the ambition to conduct it when necessary (Selden, 2016).

In order to understand the tendencies of nations, it would be useful to look at some polls concerning the nature of the threats. According to Pew Research Center surveys conducted in 22 nations since 2013; an increasing portion of the countries consider the U.S. power and influence as a “major threat” to their country, and these views are fortified with attitudes of President Trump (Gramlich & Devlin, 2019). Indeed, France and Germany are the two countries which have the most increase in threat perception from 2013 to 2018 Trump’s tenure.

*% who \_\_\_ that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world*



*Figure 1. 2 The Opinion on Using Military Force*

Source: Pew Research Center (Pew Research, 2019)

Figure 1.2 shows nations' opinions concerning the conduct of military operations under the pretext of maintaining the world order if necessary. According to the survey, German people disagree with the use of military power in such a case by over 50 per cent, while the U.S. citizens agree by almost 80 percent.

Strategic planning enables decision makers to set priorities and match diverse capabilities to reach ends and obtain goals (Goldgeier & Suri, 2016). In strategical hierarchy, military strategy has to support national strategy. National policy, however, is constrained by the capabilities and limitations of the military strategy (Lykeke Jr., 1989). National security strategy and defense strategy are also influenced by "the linkage between the key trajectories in the global security environment and the U.S. national interests" (Dale, 2014). Thus, they are dynamic and sensitive to other major powers' inclinations, intentions, and capabilities. Domestic politics and budget limitations are two key constraints of organizing security and military strategies (Taylor, 2018). American hyper-reactivity to threats since the beginning of the Cold War shows the opposite of strategic planning (Goldgeier & Suri, 2016).

The first time European Army Concept was about to be realized was in 1950 in the name of European Defense Community (EDC). It was intended to build a defense structure with a European Minister of Defense and a European Army of over 100.000 (Dockrill, 1991). It failed due to both France's fear of inadequately checked German rearmament, and the U.K.'s decision to stand impertinent in 1954 (Rees, 2011). In post-WWII, both sides of the Atlantic feared that there was a Soviet threat that needed to be tackled and deterred (Rees, 2011). 21<sup>st</sup> Century differs greatly from the previous one. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the political and security climate has changed. First and foremost, the major external threat, former Soviet Union, is no longer a significant threat for the Continental Europe. NATO, the most major military alliance of the Cold War era, remains despite the end of the Warsaw Pact, its nemesis. There have been non-Western rising powers such as China and a "rogue" nuclear power -North Korea- in the Pacific Region which the U.S. has deemed more important than Europe. According to Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command (Indo-Pacom), "anything but a conflict with the United States, China is now capable of securing the South China Sea." (as cited in Beech, 2018), and in a report from the U.S. Institute of Peace, some security experts warn

that “The U.S. military could suffer unacceptably high casualties and loss of major capital assets in its next conflict. It might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia.” (Gioe, 2019). Trump defined Russia and China as “revisionist powers” in the last NSS recalling the historical great power competition. In the same vein, his successor President Biden also pointed to Russia and China as growing threats to the US' national security.

The American Quadrennial Defense Review published on 30 September 2001 was different from the previous reviews. The central objective of the review was to transform the basis of defense planning from ‘threat-based’ model into ‘capabilities-based’ model which focuses on how an adversary might fight, rather than whom the opponent might be and where a war might happen (Department of Defense, 2001). There would be an investment for new capabilities if needed. Concerning Europe and Russia, it was stated that an opportunity to cooperate with Russia existed, and it did not pose a large-scale conventional military threat to NATO (Department of Defense, 2001). In this document, the U.S. declared openly that the new force-sizing construct would shape forces to: first defend the U.S., secondly deter aggression and coerce forward in critical regions, thirdly defeat aggression in major conflicts including the possibility of regime change and occupation, and finally conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations (Department of Defense, 2001). These statements are very different and interesting because it gives the signs of illiberal hegemony (Ikenberry, 2012) order through the use of force. This point might assumingly be the root cause behind the big difference in the transatlantic security calculations. Only a fraction of the American military force would be used for smaller-scale contingency operations, which indicated that there were not any important threat from any nation towards the U.S.

The U.S. grand strategy for the post-Cold War era has focused on maintaining U.S. military primacy. For instance, 2002 National Security Strategy mentions that the U.S. forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. 2010 National Security Strategy perpetuates the same vision that ensures maintaining the U.S. military power which has enabled them to secure their country and upkeep the global security. Official U.S. speeches and strategy documents are a set of broader grand

strategic arguments implying that the U.S. leadership is necessary because it facilitates to achieve American national interests and provides security to its allies. It also maps out threats by prioritizing Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the Greater Middle East, rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea, failed states or ungoverned areas such as Somalia, Yemen, and potential disruptive emergence of China and Russia.

In the 2002 American National Security Strategy Document it was stated that they welcomed a 'strong, peaceful, and prosperous China' but they had to be careful that China did not reach 'advanced military capabilities' (Walt, 2005). Walt claimed that the U.S. could reduce its commitment to Europe; as for Europe, they did not have that option, even though there were inefficient political consultations 'very often no more than a formality' (Walt, 2005). It was stated in 2005 National Defense Strategy Document that leading role in international affairs would invite an amount of resistance and also resentment. The question is whether or not this resentment will take shape in a solid and independent military structure in transatlantic security architecture. In 2017 NSS, the U.S. came back to great power politics by deeming the great power as potential threat. It seems that the U.S. will focus on China, who is the most powerful rising power, rather than Russia, but the place and force components of the strategy push France and Germany to act in a different manner.

America caught off guard with the 2008 economic crisis while roaming in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 2008 financial crisis shifted the security focus from military to economic aspect. As the U.S. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated in May 2010 that September 11th, 2001 attacks led to spending double the amount for defense in the last decade (as cited in Shanker, 2010). Admiral Michael Mullen as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that the debt was the single greatest threat to the U.S. national security (*Mullen: Debt Is Top National Security Threat - CNN.Com, 2010*). This statement comprises two important aspects. On the one hand, there is an underlying message that the U.S. does not face a considerable military threat, but on the other hand, military follows the political decision maker, the Obama Administration. This tendency is understandable. Barry Posen claims that in a world where the U.S. were not the dominant economic and technological power, it would not be the dominant military power either (Posen, 2014).

Obama rejected Bush's doctrine based on preemption, democracy promotion, and unilateralism. The American NSS released by the U.S. President Obama aimed to connect the U.S. soft power and global leadership by stressing commitment to liberal values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights (Siracusa & Warren, 2016). He referred to 'standards that govern the use-of-force' and 'rules of the road' in his Nobel's Peace Prize acceptance speech (Siracusa & Warren, 2016). He also stated that "The use of force is not, however, the only tool at our disposal, and it is not the principal means of the U.S. engagement abroad, nor always the most effective for the challenges we face" (The White House, 2015). Obama's security policy and decisions were diverging, such as drone strikes in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, the use of the Stuxnet cyber worm against Iran for the same purpose: the security of the U.S. (Kaufman & Dorman, 2014). Obama did not only change military techniques in order to avoid casualties, but also the theatre priority from Europe to Pacific. He stated before the Australian Parliament that "After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region . . . Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth—the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation" (Obama, 2011). Obama might be assumed as the first president downgrading the U.S. from biggest superpower to co-player on the world stage (Sieren, 2014). Barry Posen proposes 'restraint' strategy which dictates that the U.S. should be less engaged in the world militarily (Posen, 2014), because the distribution of power has changed.

Trump described NATO as "obsolete" in 2016 presidential campaign explaining that it was "obsolete because it wasn't taking care of terror.", but in 2017 he apparently changed his mind by stating that "I complained about that a long time ago, and they made a change — and now they do fight terrorism,...I said it was obsolete. It's no longer obsolete." (as cited in Mcardle, 2019). Macron warned European countries that they could no longer rely on America to defend NATO allies, and stated that "What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO," in an interview with *The Economist* in November 2019 (The Economist, 2019). He added that it was time Europe started thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power; otherwise they would "no longer be in control of our destiny" (Macron, 2019). In response to that statement Merkel said that she thought the state of the alliance in a less "drastic" light, and stated that "The

French president has found rather drastic words to express his views. This is not how I see the state of cooperation at NATO” (as cited in Mcardle, 2019). As a reaction to Macron’s statement, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo underlined that NATO must grow and change or risk becoming obsolete, and added that NATO needed to confront the realities of and the challenges of present (BBC News, 2019). To understand what ‘the realities and challenges of today’ were, Pompeo made it clear that Russia’s treatment of political foes and China’s methods against its people would be “horrifically familiar to former East Germans.” and added that “the West - all of us - lost our way in the afterglow of that proud moment...We thought we could divert our resources away from alliances, and our militaries. We were wrong... Today, Russia – led by a former KGB officer once stationed in Dresden – invades its neighbors and slays political opponents.” (as cited in Carrel, 2019).

While the U.S. has abandoned some institutions and treaties such as UNESCO, INF, Iran’s Nuclear Deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Paris climate accord, it also increases defense expenditures. The NSS, issued in December 2017, declares both China and Russia as autocratic adversaries. The U.S. strategic documents have focused lately on China and Russia as the two most important challengers, and many key strategic actors have also expressed this threat perception in their public speeches. There has been a threat replacement from terrorism to traditional great power threats in the last American NSS and NDS, assuming that the U.S. has missed nearly the last two decades, which caused it to be underprepared in face of the great power competition.

Status quo power dynamics have taken the lead due to particularly relative decline of the U.S. (Layne, 2009; Zakaria, 2011). Stephen Walt also argues the relative decline of American power in “The Hell of Good Intentions” (Walt, 2019). Vernon describes the U.S. as “rogue elephant” in the forest (Vernon, 1973). In fact, the U.S. has acted neither realistically nor liberally after the Cold War. G. John Ikenberry claims that the U.S., the most powerful state of the world has begun to sabotage the order which it is created through its president sitting in the Oval Office where the heart of the free world is beating (Ikenberry, 2017). The 2017 NSS and the 2018 NDS state that open relations with China and Russian Federation have become competitive and there are some explanations by

American officials that the primary focus of the U.S. foreign policy is the great-power competition (Colby & Mitchell, 2020).

Concerning the topic of the Dissertation, the turbulence in the Transatlantic Alliance stems from American fait accompli military campaigns in the 2001-2011 periods first. And, it has risen in Trump's Presidency due to differences in their areas of interest causing different threat perceptions and also different policy implementations. In the beginning of the post- Cold War era, the U.N. Security Council signed Resolution 678 stated also the permission to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq for its withdrawal from Kuwait. But, 13 years later, the U.S. ignored the U.N. and international rule of law in its invasion of Iraq in 2003.

### **The Aim of the Dissertation**

After the WWII, NATO was the reflection of political will of transatlantic partners, but at the present, according to decision makers of the U.S., France and Germany, states have been living in a different world. In this context, the military structures need to be reevaluated. The 9/11 attacks sent the Alliance in different directions. A decade after the end of the Cold War, following the 9/11, the U.S. primarily transformed its strategic vision; while the EU and mostly France were motivated to produce new strategy documents. Threats and capabilities to overcome these threats were stated in these documents which elaborated concrete data base that were examined compatible to this dissertation.

European Strategic Autonomy and European Army discourse has long been on the agenda. Therefore, it should be useful to analyze first hand strategy documents of France and Germany how they assess the world. This dissertation will investigate the motives of confrontation of selected actors to seek whether the turbulence stems from the European Autonomy dispute or other structural causes such as a possible change in the distribution of power, a change in threat perception, a change in offensive capabilities.

In the Transatlantic Alliance, it should be useful to make a comparison between the two different pillars of this architecture. It has been difficult to define the reasons for the overreliance on American military power in the post-Cold War era to the present and its foreign policy. It might be considered as a form of militarism emerging from the

combination of military force and utopian/irrational ideologies, inspired by global imperial ambitions in the name of development, democratization, human rights and liberal values (Abrahamsen, 2018) In the European setting, Germany and France, together constitute the center of gravity at high-level decision making, the former being the industrial powerhouse of the continent, and the latter being a nuclear power. One question remains though: Why not include the United Kingdom, which is also a West European state of considerable leverage in global politics? The answer lies in the inner dynamics of the European Union, which eventually resulted in the evolution of the concept known as “European Strategic Autonomy,” and United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU.

There are main differences between Transatlantic Alliance. First, the U.S. has an unparalleled military power, and thus it represents an offensive stance for the European leg which prefers to be an advocate of the status quo. Then, the former has a global interest whereas the latter has largely a regional perspective. In addition, while the U.S. takes action, the Europeans have yet to turn their intention to action. This is also another significant difference which places the U.S. as a dominant force in strategic action and security policies rather than mere words of desire and wishes. Finally, the U.S. prefers unilateral military and threat perception while the latter multilateralism and interactive process. There is a fundamental difference between constructing security as ‘a self-referential activity’ and as ‘an intersubjective process’ (Hansen, 2011).

On the strategic level, politico-military decision makers give directions to military through some real documents. In these documents, threat and risk analysis should be declared clearly to increase military preparedness, because military officers need to know exactly what the threats and risks are. To give an example, concerning American strategy documents, strategic direction is the strategy and intent of the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in pursuit of national interests according to American Military JP5-0 Document (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2021). From this definition, it could be deducted that there are three main actors in a hierarchy when it comes to defining strategy, each being responsible for preparing a written document.

Threat definition is a matter of urgency for military strategists because they need them to be well prepared and develop alternative contingency plans, in case a threat arises. In

accordance with this, there might have enough sense as to which threats and risks are written in national strategic documents. In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the trend is to publish national strategy documents or white papers (Kagan, 2013). These official documents have given directions for force planning, capacity building, and capability improvement. The 9/11 attacks seem to have fueled this trend all around the world, but in fact the reasons are not so simple. Theories of international relations enable academicians to look at international politics through different lenses. Likewise, different threat perceptions and capabilities result in a varying strategies, preferences, and official documents. The balance of power and the balance of threat concepts are good starting points for this dissertation. One of the most reasonable ways to proceed is to collect these states' strategic documents, including white papers as first-hand official evidences to elaborate on the threats first, and then their intentions and capabilities. Twenty three (18 American, 3 French, and 2 German) strategy documents have been collected and examined for the purpose of preparing this dissertation where threat definitions and perceptions as well as intentions and capabilities of the actors are elaborated. These firsthand official documents will illustrate the fundamental differences among these actors. In this study, white papers and strategic documents of the U.S., France, and Germany will first be examined in order to understand the changing trends in threat perceptions and guiding concepts in defense planning. Subsequently, the changes that have occurred concerning strategies and terminologies will be assessed.

Robert Art claims that “what a state does in international relations is determined by both purpose—the values it holds and the political choices it makes—and power—the capabilities it wields” (Art, 2010). Leaders of Europe, France and Germany in particular argued about a European Army. Thus, first of all, it should be useful to understand the international structure and the nature of the problem. Why and how do the political leaders of Germany and France bring up the issue of a European Army? Also, why has it not materialized? In order to do this, first, the elements that cause the divergence between the allies will be focused. There might be two main reasons: First, power structure of international politics has changed and second, with this change came the change in threat perceptions.

The initial inquiry of this study is as follows: What leads to different policies and strategies of these three Trans-Atlantic Allies causing a split mainly between the U.S. and the two major powers of the Continental Europe? Why do the leaders of France (Macron) and Germany (Merkel) have also revived lately in public a European Army debate while continuing to be also NATO members?

The dissertation identifies the two main motives behind the confrontation in the transatlantic security architecture first, by reference to security landscape which is based on the distribution of power and second, by reference to threat construction which is based on the 'balance of threat'. Questions such as what the existing threats are, who the emerging powers are, whether there is any change in polarity (bipolar or multipolar), how these factors impact the national strategy documents still carry importance today to understand the current security situation of the Transatlantic Alliance. The strategy documents of the three selected actors will provide the empirical evidence for comparison of their strategic choices. The dissertation aims to analyze the current situation in the Transatlantic Security Structure. The documents used in the dissertation are available to the public. Therefore, it can be seen how the governments of the three countries in question form their threats and strategies. These documents are essentially the National Security, National Defense, National Military Documents and White Papers of the U.S., France and Germany, as well as the Strategic Review Report.

During the Cold War, there was a co-dependent security formation and a conformity between the threat perception and power constellation, including nuclear forces in the Continental Europe. On the one hand, the threat was clear at that time, the Soviet Union. From the realist perspective, the balance of power concept worked efficiently to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. The international power structure was bipolar. Following the Soviet Union's dissolution and the elimination of the sole rival led the way for the U.S. to exploit its power supremacy, ignoring multilateral approach and any constraints including international norms and institutions.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Neo-Realism is a parsimonious theory which has a few assumptions. It accepts that states are the main and rational actors in international relations. Accepting there is no higher

authority in international relations, survival takes the lead in power politics. Neo-Realists first analyze the power and the distribution of it. They read the world in such a way that changes in state behaviors are considered as adaptation to the new distribution of power caused by external constraints (Wohlforth, 1994). A prominent Neo-Realist scholar, Walt describes International Relations (IR) as “the attempt to develop general propositions valid across time and space that explain the behavior of internationally consequential actors.” (UCTV, 2008). He also claims that a theorist shall not focus on a particular moment and have familiarity with history (UCTV, 2008). Walt argued that since the Soviet Union was gone, NATO’s future looked much more up in the air, because the main external threat force holding the Alliance together had gone away (Walt, 1998). He also added that realists claimed alliances were made against external threats. Ikenberry argues that the neorealist theory proposes that hegemony is a function of the distribution of capability, and that the primary reason for the advanced institutional cooperation between western powers used to be the existence of an external threat (the Soviet Union during the Cold War) (Ikenberry, 1999). Recognizing that this threat disappeared; neo-realists, expect the return of balance of power politics and the decline of alliance and cooperation among the western powers (Ikenberry, 1999). This situation also enables free-rider problem within an alliance. If some people take advantage of benefits of commonly produced items without paying costs fairly, it might be called from free rider problem (Lowe, S. C.,1996).

Rothschild writes that security is the “object of supreme desire” or “the absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends” (Rothschild, 1995). Anxiety stems from both vagueness and threat. She also argues that “the crudest purpose of principles of security is to directly influence the distribution of money and power.” (Rothschild, 1995). The distribution of money (resources) and power might shape strategies and preferences. Security is considered as “freedom from threat” (Wolfers, 1962) independent whether it is objective or not. Wolfers focused on “threats”, not on “power”. American realist Stephen Walt, bringing the balance of threat argument to international relations, defines security studies as “the studies of the threat, and use of military force” (Walt, 1991). Kenneth Waltz on the other hand argues that “...international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced with unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others...” (Waltz, 2000). Stephen Walt later argued that states do indeed

balance not in the light of power capabilities alone, but against threats. For Stephen Walt, alliances are triggered by imbalances of “threat,” rather than imbalances of “power”. He also argues that states constitute alliances mainly against threats which are a function of power, offensive capabilities, geographic proximity, and perceived intentions (Walt, 1987). From this perspective, NATO was formed originally to counter both the capabilities and threats risen by the former Soviet Union (Dowding, 2011). If the threat and capabilities do not belong to the same actor, what happens then? Unlike the concept of power, the concept of external “threat” includes “perceived state intentions” alongside more clearly realist variables like economic resources, military technology, and geography (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). Fundamental political skill should be constructed on the ability to see politics ‘realistically’, and the main force of politics must be necessity (Sutch & Elias, 2007). In the international context, security means the capability of a state to provide protection from beyond its borders and primarily the ability of its defense establishment to fight any threat if needed.

In the post-Cold War, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine labeled ‘hyper puissance’ (hyper power in English) possessed by the United States (Védrine, 2004). President George H.W. Bush welcomed this new international structure by stressing that “alone at the height of power...with the rarest opportunity to shape the world” (as cited in Walt, 2005). Along the same lines, the balance of power was contrasted with the hegemony (Little, 2007). It can be said there is no hegemon power in case more than one great power exists in a defined region, thus a regional hegemon is the only great power in a region (Snyder, G. H., 2002). Unipolarity is anarchical, and it is a result of the incomplete power preponderance of the unipole (Monteiro, 2012). In ‘Taming American Power’ Stephen Walt argues that the U.S. should preserve its military capability so that no potential rival dare to compete (Walt, 2005).

Kenneth Waltz argues on “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” that “power is a possibly useful means; sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it”, and its revision should be considered as an important factor (Waltz, 1988). Kenneth Waltz held the belief that the use of force is not excluded from international politics as a means to obtain the desired outcome. (Waltz, 1959, p. 205). The first concern of states is ‘not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 126; Sutch

& Elias, 2007). This tendency is also in accord with the security dilemma concept. An increase in one great power's defense expenditure naturally causes relative insecurity of other great powers.

Realists focus first and foremost on military power and secondly on economic power. According to neo-realism, power is the currency of international politics and states have to worry chiefly on how much power they should have (Mearsheimer, 2001). Mearsheimer focusing on the power describing it as the currency of great power politics of which military power is the most important one while analyzing states' capabilities, and claims that calculations about power is at the heart of how states imagine the world (Mearsheimer, 2014). These capabilities should be measured as a function of material military assets such as fighter planes, submarines, armored brigades, nuclear warheads etc., of the concerning states. Offensive structural realists think that the optimal policy for states to maximize their security is to maximize their relative capabilities, and the best way to guarantee their survival is to be the most powerful state in an anarchical environment. (Mearsheimer, 2001)

Balance of power is one of the popular concepts in international relations. It assumes that survival desire enables states as the main motivation (Waltz, 1967). States can implement balance of power strategy in two main ways: either by internal balancing through increasing their own power or by external balancing through forming alliances. Realist theory assumes that states as rational actors react to threats in an iterative way; first 'pass the buck', in case of failure by 'balance of power' either by seeking allies or building their own capabilities (Walt, 2018). Buck-passing means that a state will be inactive and hold back, while aiming to shift the burden to another state or the alliance of which it is also a member (Snyder, G. H., 2002). According to Mearsheimer, "buck-passing is as a more attractive strategy than balancing." (Mearsheimer, 2001) Kenneth Waltz argues that states prefer to balance against a rising power (Waltz, 1979). He wrote that "Excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state" (Waltz, 1988). Stephen Walt agreeing with Waltz on the assumption that they rarely bandwagon to power, brings a new argument different from Waltz, that they balance not against a power, but a threat (Walt, 1987).

Kenneth Waltz claims that an imbalance of power might enable states to extend to their control to dangerously adventurous activity (Waltz, 1979). He places more importance on the existing distribution of power, and great powers who have the capacity to change the international structure. Because the system is anarchic, great powers should be self-help minded and have inclinations to balancing either internally or externally against power. For structural realists, distribution of power among states plays the central role in the strategic actions in the system. Most secondary sources of realism restrict traditional realist definition of power to military strength and economic resources (Tuğtan, 2007, p. 9).

The international system is anarchic; therefore, states should obtain their goals through balancing either internally or externally. Waltz did not constrain realism only to the survival issue. "Some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival" (Waltz, 1979, p. 92). According to him, states "at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination" (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). The dissertation will utilize Neo-Realist Theory's structural analysis combining balance of power with Walt's balance of threat concepts. It argues that after the Cold War era, changes in the international politics and distribution of power have caused a divergence between the allies. Walt's 'Balance of Threat' theory and his definition of security definition are relevant to the study as 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force' (Walt, 1991) Therefore, distribution of power or comparative power analysis will give enough data to compare different strategic preferences of the alliance. The Neo-Realists argue that international structure is the most decisive factor in shaping national strategies rather than political leaders' decisions. There should be a balance between a state's intentions and its military capability.

Stephen Walt argues that states build alliances mainly to balance against threats rather than power, and he continues to describe threats as a function of perceived intentions, power, offensive capability, and geographic proximity (Walt, 1987). Walt describes alliance as a relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states (Walt, 1987). He claims that the consequences of wrong predictions in an alliance formation might be fatal, for example, Austria-Hungary preferred to remain neutral in France's battle against Prussia; quite contrary to France's assumption of entering into war

on the side of France (Walt, 1987). There are two basic phases in the life cycle of an alliance: its formation and its management. The essential factor in both phases is bargaining (Snyder, 1997).

In the formation of NATO, the Western European countries did not have any chance to bargain, but at present they might do. In the formation of EUFOR, allies with NATO heritage can bargain mainly for a new force structure, threat perception, and contingency plans. In alliances, clear threat definition and perception will contribute to multinational contingency planning and war preparedness in a whole different way than political collaborations based on international law.

Alliances preferences are not only motivated by fear and threat but also often by opportunities for gain, and this second impetus is referred to as 'jackal bandwagoning' (Schweller, 1994). Layne brings an argument that these states engaging away from the fear of being attacked might prefer 'leash-slipping' by building up their military capabilities to maximize their capacity to implement an independent foreign policy (Layne, 2006).

Walt argues that soft balancing accepts present balance of power reality, yet searches for better alternative composition within it (Walt, 2005, p. 126). According to Robert Art, soft balancing strategy was a reaction by France and Germany against American aggressive unilateral military policies (as cited in Pape, 2005). He also argues that soft balancing practices do not directly challenge U.S. military superiority while continuing to diplomatic and economic relations. In the post-Cold War period, France and Germany on the one hand accepted American supremacy, but on the other hand they tried to build a European defense capability considered as a soft balancing strategy (Walt, 2005, p. 126).

Art claims that the American military presence prevents security competition among European states (Art, 1996). Waltz argues that both polarity changes in the system and changes of weaponry did not succeed the system transformation (Waltz, 2000). In addition to this, the Franco-German bilateral defense agreement provide these two former rivals to escape security dilemma.

It should be noted that geography is still important in an era of globalization (Council of the European Union, 2009). Geographic proximity is also an important variable to consider, as it carries both strategic and geopolitical significance. It is also an attribute of the function of the threat in Stephen Walt's balance of threat concept. However, geography is not enough to understand the situation. In this vein, this dissertation will elaborate on military postures to understand political ambitions of the three countries.

Power is not the sole term from a means and ends analysis perspective; in addition, one should take a decision based on a preference to use whether and how to use this critical capability. State actors investigate possible courses of action according to both the distribution of power/capabilities and the preference of state's decision makers and domestic conditions as well. For instance: 'Today, the task of mobilizing public support for national security priorities is more complicated' (The White House, 2000). Through intentions and capabilities lenses, the states need to articulate decision makers' intentions based on public opinion to construct a military organization. And, existential threats will facilitate these decisions. Resources and money will be also needed, yet they will not be enough. Even though European states have the capacity €44.5 billion defense investment potential they are significantly behind the US and China on defence Artificial Intelligence R&D (Soare, 2020).

Some realists ignore whether the intentions are ill or good, instead, they focus on capabilities. For instance, Layne claims that others must worry about the hegemon's capabilities, not its intentions (Layne, 2006, pp. 7-41). France's and Germany's emulation of capability-based approach developed by the U.S. in 2001 has caused a strategic fracture in the Transatlantic Alliance. It seems ironic that the hegemon U.S. worries about France's and Germany's capabilities. According to Nicholas Burns, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 'one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship' is EU's security policy (as cited in Lagadec, 2012). Pond argues that the U.S.' attitude of pushing for European integration on the one hand, but restraining the ability of the EU to develop an independent military capability on the other, is very controversial (Pond, 2004). Indeed, the U.S.' reactions towards a more autonomous Europe seem to be not limited to the military realm in the classical sense, but also extend to related civilian industries such as aerospace and communications. For instance, the European counterpart

of the U.S. GPS satellite system, the Galileo, has become a matter of controversy, so that U.S. skepticism towards the project once escalated to the point of open threat, where an American official talked about shooting down Galileo satellites in case of their perceived misuse by an adversary such as China (AFP, 2004).

Also, when it comes to the issue of 'Internet governance,' despite a considerable body of shared values and vision towards the future of the Internet, it appears that European moves towards what is called 'digital sovereignty' (Madiega, 2020) might lead to increasing tensions with the U.S. (Komaitis & Sherman, 2021). A Chatham House report reveals that the most critical issue is control (Taylor & Hoffmann, 2020):

With few exceptions, a non-interventionist, private-sector led, free market approach to internet governance has had support on both sides of the Atlantic. The US approach has remained relatively consistent and has sustained bipartisan support for the past 20 years. The main topic of contention and differing approaches has been in relation to the historical US government role in the development of the DNS root (the IANA). The George W. Bush administration announced during the WSIS process that it was unwilling to give up its control over the IANA; the Obama administration triggered the process that led to the transition of the IANA to the ICANN community...The [Trump] administration has indicated hostility to the IANA transition but has not attempted to reverse it so far.

Along a similar line, the 7,500-mile undersea data cable called "Peace Cable", which was planned to connect China to Europe, evoked a warning cry from the U.S. last year, where the Secretary of State of the time, Mike Pompeo urged the international community to "ensure the undersea cables connecting our country to the global internet are not subverted for intelligence gathering by the People's Republic of China at hyper scale." (as cited in Fouquet, 2021).

## **Methodology**

Most political and social science research might be described as comparative research. Using the case study is a very prevalent method in both political science and international relations disciplines. Scientific progress should be able to employ case study, in addition to quantitative and formal methods (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004), therefore, case study can be called an effective method in the discipline of international relations. Although international relations is a relatively new discipline, case study method has been

used in this field for many years. The researcher would present the relationship between theory and methodology as an intertwined relationship. Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias also assert that "methodology can also help expand the scope of received theories." (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004, p.4). In order to suitably specify the methodology, it must provide a comprehensive and detailed mechanism for checking the theoretical assumptions that underlie the recommendations to be asserted by the researcher.

Even though case study might be pointed out as one of the principal methodologies in the international discipline, it contains some risks due to the extensive scope of employment. Bennett and Elman express the common usage of case study methods in IR practice by its ability to explain complex phenomena (Bennett & Elman, 2007). Thus, the enormous explanatory power of the case study method provides us extensive insight and regulative mechanism while merging theory and methodology. Otherwise, the consistency and explanatory power of research would be in jeopardy. Kacowicz outlines the advantages and disadvantages of case study method while employing it into the study. According to him, while implementation of variables, enriching hypothesis and testing it, "examination of causal mechanism," "constructing historical and detailed explanations of particular cases," and "analysis of complex causal relations" would be labeled as advantages of the case study method. The disadvantages of the case study include "case selection bias" and "endogeneity and tautological circles." (Kacowicz, 2004).

To avoid from disadvantages listed by Kacowicz, cases should not be selected vis-a-vis variables, just as King, Keohane, and Verba indicated (King et al., 1994, p. 137). Thus, the bias of the scholar would not affect the testing process of the hypothesis. In addition, the selection of biased cases will create the risk that the study would be affected by pre-concerted assumptions. Therefore, the objective determination of the criteria for selection cases independent by variables primarily reduces the confusing issues in the study. It is also essential for comparative case studies, which contain a bulk of cases and variables.

Lijphart, who put forward preliminary studies on this method, drew a concept about case selection within the framework of four features. First, the number of cases should be increased by expanding the analysis both geographically and historically. Secondly, variables and/or categories should be combined, thus reducing the property space of the analysis. Furthermore, the analysis should focus on comparable areas that can be found in

a cultural geographical area. Moreover, the analysis should be limited to key variables and only marginal ones should be excluded (Lijphart, 1975).

In this dissertation, cases are determined by Lijphart's suppositions. The security policies of the states belonging to the same alliance, which is considered as a case, are examined in the same period. While examining the cases, it is discussed how the policies of the mentioned states are affected by the balance of threat and power distribution variables used by neorealism. By using balance of threat and power distribution as variables, the dissertation aims to eliminate Bennett and Elman's indication on key challenge of employing comparative case study is finding similar cases "in all but one independent variable and that differ in their outcomes." (Bennett & Elman, 2007).

Achen and Snidal also refer to comparative case studies' applicable side while reaching theoretical generalizations by excluding abstraction (Achen & Snidal, 1989). In this manner, comparative case study provides solid ground for studies on international relations disciplines dealing with states and systems. Objectively, this dissertation aims to reveal the causes of the turbulence in the Transatlantic Alliance by examining and comparing the policies of the most prominent members of the alliance.

According to Kaarbo and Beasley, the comparative case study is frequently equated with cross-national comparison (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999). Kürüm argues comparative case study research emerges from the need for an explanation of phenomena and causes by comparing state systems, cultures, and political systems (Süleymanoğlu Kürüm, 2020). In this manner, this dissertation offers the US, France, and Germany as cases that would be compared for explaining the causes of the turbulence among selected members of the Alliance. During the evaluation of the cases, how the threat perception and distribution of power concepts accompanied by the neorealist research agenda penetrate states' policies within the same alliances and differ their attitudes towards the same events.

King, Keohane, and Verba indicate how statistical data is applicable to comparative case study by exemplifying the public opinion towards the Gulf War or the number of newspaper articles that criticized the government policies in the Soviet Union (King et al., 1994). IR scholars, in this manner, want to identify the trends and patterns in behavior, arguing that reactions are always conditioned either as a response to or caused

by a certain context, which can only be completely understood in relation to that context (Sutch & Elias, 2007).

Concepts might be assumed as a major focus, and the point of departure for social research (Bulmer, 1988). The Comparative Method used in this dissertation is a qualitative instrument providing a synthetic approach to comparative research that allows the holistic case study approach (Ragin, 1987). Collective case studies are also described as comparative case studies, and these multiple studies enable the whole study to be more robust (Lune & L.Berg, 2017, p. 175). According to Hartley, the case study technique consists of an investigation mostly with data over collected over a period of time within its context (Hartley, 2004). Documents are among sources of evidence while conducting that technique (Yin, 2003, pp. 85-96). Therefore, in this dissertation, a comparative case study method will be used. Comparative method is very commonplace in international relations research (Harrison L. Callan, 2013). In this vein, milestones of the study might be defined as comparative case study research, theory guided analysis, integration of the context, and integration of additional material.

With the help of the comparative case study method, similar countries can be compared and analyzed with their different approaches to the threats and rival states, which will probably lead this study to answer why turbulence emerges in Transatlantic Alliance. Methods of this research will be primarily first-hand text analysis. Information is to be obtained through National Security Strategy, Military Documents, and White Papers. The countries-entities were examined and compared as a case study element within the framework of these documents. In the sense of controlling cases our study investigates threat perception of states and the distribution of power systemically. The selection of the cases is limited with the specific time scope (2000-2019), and the states belong to the same alliance. Although there are separate studies on these documents of each country of each country in the literature, there are not any comparative studies for selected state actors. To give some examples, Crowley claimed that U.S. President Obama was elected due to his opposition of the former Republican President Bush's war of choice in Iraq (Crowley, 2016). Kugler analyzed options offered to Iran and North Korea against nuclear armament program either accepting denuclearization or isolation from the international community (Kugler, 2011). Christine E. Wormuth, deputy undersecretary of defense for

strategy, plans and force development, claimed that the QDR 2014 conveyed the strategy which “is appropriate for the United States as a global leader...” (as cited in Roulo, 2014) Mitchell argued that the backbone of the most recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy of the United States was: “[...] we are heading into an era of sustained big- power competition for which the West, collectively, is underprepared.” (Mitchell, 2018). It was stressed a shift from the prior focus on Iraq and Afghanistan to the military’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region (William, 2018).

The outline of the dissertation is presented on the Table 1.1. In the Introduction Chapter, the dissertation examines the problem and outline of our thesis in addition to the concepts, methodologies and theory. It will examine the theoretical basis of our research before moving on to the current literature.

*Table 1. 1 List of chapters*

Chapter 1	Introduction
Chapter 2	The U.S. National Security Defense and Security Strategies
Chapter 3	France National Security Defense and Security Strategies
Chapter 4	Germany National Security Defense and Security Strategies
Chapter 5	Comparative Analysis
Chapter 6	Conclusion

Other chapters will present empirical studies. Specifically, it will look at changes in threat perceptions in Transatlantic Alliance after the Cold War. It is very interesting that even the U.S. threat definitions vary according to different Presidents. Chapters 2-3-4 investigate the official documents through a reading of national strategy, security and white paper texts. This reading will elaborate on real potential threats and threat perceptions apart from speeches. From a material power stance, it will be useful to analyze military sizes and defense expenditures trends to match the threats and capability to overcome these defined threats and risks.

The easiest data to obtain, but the toughest to process and sort out was that of the U.S. As there is a great abundance of information and data regarding the U.S. military, this data in great quantity had to be filtered down and only the essence of the collected data could be used in Chapter 2. On top of the theoretical arguments made in this study, Chapter 2 also features the concrete data obtained during the study, which yielded to a basis for comparison of the three countries in focus. One of the facts detected during this study was that since the 9/11 attack, there has been a gradual increase in the number of the U.S. military personnel deployed overseas with the start of operations in Iraq. This increase continued until when Barack Obama declared the War in Iraq to be over and withdrew the U.S. soldiers.

In light of the examined data, it could also be said that despite the decrease in the number of military personnel, there is always a gradual increase in the expenditure in terms of the GDP ratio, which points to the fact that the U.S. military spends a great budget on the Research and Development of new weapons systems and technologies.

Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the same aspects of military data for France. For France, the main focus of my study was on its nuclear deterrence strategy and military expenditure regarding this strategy. The data unsurprisingly suggests, further reinforcing the theory put forth in this dissertation, that France's foremost priority regarding national strategy is keeping their nuclear arsenal.

France has never had a surge in the number of military personnel unlike the U.S. Their military expenditure also increased in 2001, only for reasons different from those of the U.S. The French Army abolished the conscription system and became a professional army. Despite these changes, the number of military personnel remains relatively stable. As for the weapons systems development, France put great emphasis on its air force and navy.

Chapter 4 focuses on Germany. Unlike France's abolition of the conscription system, Germany with its ending of the compulsory conscription of male citizens in 2011, in fact decreased the number of military personnel drastically. Its military expenditure is stable.

Chapter 5 will feature a country-based analysis and a subsequent comparison. As for the comparison of these three countries in this study, all their data pertaining to military

expenditure and military personnel was examined. This data led this study to draw conclusions regarding these countries' strategies and economic roadmaps.

Chapter 6 will present the conclusions of this study, some of which come out as follows: Germany's lack of concern for a threat enables it conduct a "free-rider" strategy within NATO, despite great criticism from the U.S.

Ultimately, this PhD Dissertation is about understanding how the U.S., France and Germany have defined threats and the accuracy of these definitions in light of the realist theory over the international structure, space, and time.

This study will analyze the military sizes, defense expenditures, and military capabilities to elaborate on any significant changes in the time scope of the dissertation. In this vein, concrete data and numbers regarding the subjects in question will be elaborated: American, French and German military data regarding:

- Military expenditure in terms of percentage of GDP and current USD,
- Number of military personnel,
- Weapons and equipment investments.

For this study, "deeper research into primary sources in order to increase factual accuracy" (Tuğtan, 2007) has been preferred to contribute to the literature in the light of the structural realism theory including both the balance of threat and the balance of power concepts. In this vein, some quantitative indicators such as military expenditures, and military personnel were selected to measure the power of any country. In order to measure the military capability, this dissertation will examine and analyze the said states' military sizes and defense expenditures.

## **Chapter 2: The U.S. National Security Defense and Security Strategies**

### **The U.S. Global Military Deployment**

James Follows defines Americans as ‘Chickenhawk Nation’ that means ‘eager to go to war, as long as someone else is going.’ (Follows, 2015) He claimed that Americans admired their military as they did no other institution. The U.S. Armed Forces is a professional armed forces, and thus its performance may be compared to gladiators’ struggle watched by the public and affected by media and politics. Confidence in the military increased after 9/11 and has remained so high that in a Gallup poll, three-quarters of the public expressed “a great deal” of confidence in armed forces in comparison with one-third in the medical system, and only 7 percent in Congress (Follows, 2015).

In ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’ Document published in January 2012 to give strategic guidance by Obama; it is stated that the U.S. has to put an end to ‘extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan’ in order to take steps to protect his nation’s economic vitality, in light of the changing geopolitical environment and their changing fiscal circumstances (DOD of USA, 2012). This statement points to an acceptance of the change, in the distribution of power and the lack of resources to provide to the military. He also stresses ‘the necessity to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region’ while mentioning the Middle East, Gulf, and Israel’s security (DOD of USA, 2012). In that resource-constrained time, they are going to work with NATO partners to create a “Smart Defense” approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as required to meet the 21st Century challenges. In expansion, the U.S. engagement with Russia remains critical, and they will proceed to construct a closer relationship in regions of shared intrigued and energize it to be a supporter over a wide extend of issues (DOD of USA, 2012).

In the last NDS (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018), it is stated that ‘long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities’. It is also said that China and Russia took strategic advantage when the U.S. first engaged in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and then in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 by improving their ‘military capabilities and a force structure explicitly designed to challenge the U.S. dominance and increase their own international stature.’ With the release of the NDS, the Department has

a single document capturing the strategic vision needed to rise to the challenge posed by the great power competition (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018). These statements are a perfect resumé of the last 19 years according to realist theory explanations. The U.S. has ignored the neo-realist balance of power concept, while China and Russia have exploited it. They recall great power competition, but it seems not an easy task due to both threat perception difference and lack of capabilities in addition to differences in strategy preferences on the two pillars of the Transatlantic Alliance. There are also some parts from NDS 2018 stressing three priorities, for overcoming these two rising powers as part of a great power competition, which are;

- 'Building a more lethal, agile, and ready Joint Force,
- Strengthening alliances,
- Reforming for greater performance'. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018)

Hence, the U.S. intends to employ both internal balancing in the way of building more capable military forces, and external balancing through strengthening alliances. When considered from the viewpoint of this dissertation, the second part is very important, because this also hints at an acceptance of the lack of power against these two rising great powers. The NDS requires adequate resources to position the United States in the great power competition. 'Adequate resources' remind us of economic power variable, and 'great power competition' implies both multilateral international structure and perceived great power threat/s.

In theory, Kant argues for the elimination of standing armies for 'the perpetual peace'; however, this is not so easy in practice. '[Standing armies] incessantly menace other states by their readiness to appear at all times prepared for war' (Kant, 1795). Standing armies' attributes such as size, budget, and deployment provide good concrete evidence for both theoretical and empirical analysis. Armies have mostly been used either to eliminate threats or to deter opponents. The question on the table is why the U.S. needs to maintain always military force even after the Cold War and the peaceful elimination of the biggest threat of that era.



*Figure 2. 1 U.S. Combatant Command's Area of Responsibility*

Source: Acq.osd.mil


U.S. Military is composed of six regional commands: USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USAFRICACOM, and USINDOPACOM. The first and most powerful Command, Indo-Pacific Command, was established on 01 January 1947 while the European Command was established on 01 August 1952. By looking at these dates, it is possible to understand that the U.S. gave the first priority to Indo-Pacific Region, but distribution of power in the Continental Europe and the Soviet threat necessitated it to be in Europe under the NATO Transatlantic Alliance umbrella to contain the Soviets in order to prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. The traditional regional description is a self-defined region to articulate its identity and interests to other actors (Fawn, 2009). The U.S. has a global presence unlike any other nation (NY Times, 2017). It can be understood from American global military posture that the area of interest and the area of influence of the U.S. is the same, the entire world. Strategy has three main components such as force/capability, time (present-future) and space (terrain). NATO's or transatlantic alliance's area of interest is Europe. However, the area of interest of the U.S. is the entire world. Capabilities should

be in accordance with the area of interest, and sizeable to overcome threats and risks. This is the first differentiation in the Transatlantic Alliance.

The distribution of power in the international structure provided a playground for the U.S. to act unilaterally as a unique hegemonic power by the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. In the absence of any existential threat, capability-based strategy first came to the fore in 2001 QDR, ignoring balance of threat concept, which is quite different when compared to the Cold War era. There was not any conventional threat against the U.S., and it dedicated a considerable military effort in Afghanistan and Iraq under the name of GWOT. There has been also a shift of wealth/power from the West to the East. At present the U.S. must take care of the rising China, in the Asia-Pacific Region where NATO does not have sizeable military capabilities except the U.S. This fact drives the U.S. to spend and invest more money and resources on defense. In addition to these strategic components; the preference might be another key attribute. For example, different American presidents prefer different strategies even though they command the same military capabilities. Crowley claimed that the U.S. President Obama was elected due to his opposition of the former Republican President Bush's war of choice in Iraq (Crowley, 2016). He also argued that Bush passed on three wars having unprecedented length and lacking popular support to his successor Obama; the war in Afghanistan as "war of necessity", Iraqi War as "war of choice", and the war on terror which was reframed by Obama against Al Qaeda and in a more limited style in contrast the Bush's policies (Crowley, 2016). The fog of war ritual reflected badly not only on American Public Opinion, but also on the relations with France and Germany, traditional transatlantic alliance partners. The question is whether or not this differentiation from the Cold War era will lead to a successful transatlantic alliance that is solved peacefully for the future. That is because the rising China requires to be handled in a very different manner from Iraq, Afghanistan or Al Qaeda issues.

Assuming that there is still space for irrational uses of armies mostly due to political decision makers' contested irrational imaginations, military expenditure and military size are two important attributes to evaluate. 2013 French White Paper stresses that the U.S. is reviewing its priorities after a decade of military engagement in order to restore its public accounts (French White Paper on Defense and National Security, 2013). Obama's

strategy was first to achieve military success in Afghanistan and then decrease the military presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This decrease was a result of the special focus on economy reflects of “butter” over the “guns”. Obama accepted the limited threats, but he still opposed to adding to dollars spent in vain, and rather preferred to invest in socio economic domains considered very important to voters. The Afghanistan and Iraq interventions caused an increase in the overseas military presence. The U.S. contingency plans foresee two main theatres: Europe and Pacific. The U.S. military engagement in first Afghanistan and then Iraq accounted for the additional “half” theater in the unipolar era.



*Figure 2. 2 U.S. Armed forces personnel (World Bank Data, 2021)*


It could be said that the 2011 decrease in the military expenditures of the U.S. is directly linked to the decrease in the number of military personnel deployed overseas shown in the Figure 2.2.

While the number of soldiers was 1 million 420 thousand in 2001, the year of the 9/11 terrorist attack, it reached the highest number of 1 million 569 thousand in 2010, having increased until 2010. The difference in numbers is 149 thousand, corresponding to a 10% increase.

In 2011, the numbers decreased following Obama’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. In 2016, for the first time since 1953, the number of soldiers deployed overseas dropped below 200,000. After 2010, the number of soldiers decreased by about 220,000 with a rate of approximately 15%.

Obama stated that he planned to end combat operations by the summer of 2010, at which point around 50,000 troops would remain in the country to train Iraqi forces. On 31 August 2010, Obama declared the end of the 7 year combat mission in Iraq. On 15 December 2011, the U.S. officially announced the end of military mission in Iraq.

Fig. 2.3. points to the fact that the number of overseas deployment of the U.S. military personnel steadily decreased from 1953 to 2001 and the tendency to decrease the numbers continued after the Obama Administration’s announcement about the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq.



Source: Pew Research Center, based on Defense Manpower Data Center<sup>12</sup>

*Figure 2. 3 U.S. Overseas Military Presence since 1953*

Source: Pew Research Center

Apart from the overseas deployment of the U.S. military personnel during active wars and campaigns, as stated in the Fig. 2.1, there are six regional commands; and the upkeep

of these commands also requires a sizeable military personnel and huge military expenditures. The investments for new and existing weapons systems programs to the total amount of the U.S. military expenditure will also be included, which will be examined along with the investments in detail below.

Since 1953, the number of U.S. military personnel stationed overseas dropped below 200,000 for the first time in 2016. The five largest host countries where the U.S. maintained military presence were Japan (38,818), Germany (34,602), South Korea (24,189), Italy (12,088), and Afghanistan (9,023) in 2016 (Bialik, 2017). As for regional distribution in Asian countries had the highest percentage of 38%, and around a third of the entire deployment was in Europe by 32% including the U.K. with 8,315 military troop presence (Bialik, 2017). The American military presence in Germany reached its peak with 274,119 in 1962, nearly eight times more than it was in 2016 (Bialik, 2017). These numbers also show the focal point of American overseas presence as South Eastern Asia and Pacific. In fact, the U.S. scaled down its military at the end of the Cold War, but the downward trend was sharply reversed to the 9/11 attack. In 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) declared plans for a large-scale reduction in its military force. The last decrease happened in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War (Lytell, et al., 2015). During that time, the military shrank by almost 37 percent, from about 2.17 million in FY 1987 to 1.37 million by FY 2000 (Rostker, 2006). The next major reductions began in the mid-2000s, but occurred only in the Navy.

Table 2. 1 U.S. Combat Forces in Europe

	1989	2001	2015
Total personnel (army, air force, navy, marine corps)	326,400	98,000	66,200
Armored brigade	10	3	0
Armored infantry brigade	4	1	0
Light infantry brigade	1	0	0
Airborne brigade	0	1	1
Mechanized cavalry regiment	0	0	1
Tactical aviation squadrons	28	8	6
Main battle tanks	5,000	657	29
Armored infantry fighting vehicles	940	887	33
Artillery	1,600	508	97
Short-range ballistic missiles	120	0	0
Tactical aviation (fighter/ground attack)	639	174	136
Attack helicopters	279	134	48


(Munich Security Report, 2015)

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The numbers of U.S. military presence in Europe have declined significantly since 1989, yet the U.S. continues to invest in ballistic missile defense infrastructure and capabilities in Europe. It is very interesting that there have been not any armored brigade which used to be one of the main assets of the ‘blitzkrieg’. Germany’s strategic importance for the U.S. is reflected by the location of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) headquarters in the southwestern city of Stuttgart, from where it serves as the coordinating structure for all European countries. In accordance with the NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, 20 nuclear weapons are estimated take kept at Germany’s Büchel Air Base in Western Germany (Munich Security Report, 2015).


## Defense Expenditures

Let us first examine the U.S.' military expenditure trajectory in the figures shown below.



*Figure 2. 4 U.S. Military Expenditure (Current USD)*

*(World Bank Data, 2021)*



*Figure 2. 5 U.S. Military Expenditure (% of GDP)*

*(World Bank Data, 2021)*

One might argue that the reason for the military expenditure decrease of the U.S. with regards to the amount of U.S. dollars spent (Fig. 2.4) might be due to the yearly inflation and economics. However, if the Figure 2.5 above is closely examined, it could clearly be

seen that the percentage of the military expenditure spent in terms of GDP has also decreased.

Figure 2.4 also shows the military expenditure of the U.S. and the increase continues up until 2011; then U.S. President Barack Obama (BBC, 2011) announced on 21 October 2011 that all U.S. soldiers would withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011. On 15 December 2011 the U.S. held a ceremony (Independent, 2011) in Iraq to formally end their operations. The end of operation in Iraq led to a decrease in the next year of the U.S. military expenditure.

From 2001, when the 9/11 terrorist attack took place, to 2011, when Obama decided to withdraw troops from Iraq, defense expenditures increased consistently and more than doubled. Although there was a decrease of 118 billion dollars in 2015, marking an increase every year following the election of Trump as President amounted to 100 billion dollars.

It could be said that the 2011 decrease in the military expenditures of the U.S. is directly linked to a decrease in the number of military personnel deployed overseas. It should be useful to examine different themes of the defense expenditures to understand the main reasons of change within the scope of this dissertation.

*Table 2. 2 Percentage devoted to Equipment expenditures*

Country	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019e
US	24.8	24.6	24.2	27	27	25.8	26	25.4	25	25.73	27	27.5

Source: NATO Information on defense expenditures (NATO, 2020)

Military expenditures on the equipment show a stable trend over the last twenty years, meaning that there has not been a radical armament investment. This trend has been very compatible in accordance with the assumption that there has been no great power threat perception except the Trump's tenure strategic documents.

Table 2. 3 Percentage devoted to Personnel expenditures

Country	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019e
US	36.1	37.1	46.7	33.0	32.1	34.4	35.5	36.6	45.0	41.5	39.7	38.9

Source: NATO Information on defense expenditures (NATO, 2020)

Regarding personnel expenditures, there is almost a regular pattern close to 40 per cent except for 2010 when the highest personnel number is observed within the time interval analyzed in this dissertation, in addition to the most overseas military operations year.





Figure 2. 6 US OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations) Expenditure Timeline  
(Joint Chief of Staff, 2018)

Figure 2.6 above indicates that the U.S.’ expenditure for Overseas Operations has reached an all-time record following Iraq and Afghanistan operations with the start of the new millennium as it has been previously discussed in this section. Non-base figure shown in gray on Fig. 2.6 indicates the expenditure for active military personnel mainly based in

Iraq and Afghanistan. It also illustrates in detail the expenditure for military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the subsequent shows the number of active military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq/Syria and other OCO related regions.

Comparing Figure 2.6 above and Figure 2.7 below, it can be deduced that despite the gradual decrease in the troop levels and OCO funding starting from the fiscal year of 2008, base budget for the U.S. Military kept rising up until 2012. The main reason for this discrepancy is U.S. Military’s decision to pay more attention to investing in the technological aspect of military force rather than human resources, as it can be observed clearly in the Figure 2.7.



<sup>1/</sup> Iraq/Syria data is for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Operation NEW DAWN (OND), OIR, and follow-on Iraq activities.  
<sup>2/</sup> Afghanistan data is for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS).  
<sup>3/</sup> Data is for the European Deterrence Initiative (formerly European Reassurance Initiative) and non-war funding, which includes Security Cooperation in FY 2017-2019, and the former Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund in FY 2015 and FY 2016.  
<sup>4/</sup> Base budget requirements funded in OCO. In FY 2017, this includes Bipartisan Budget Act compliance, congressional base-to-OCO (Title II to Title IX transfers), and congressional adds (Title X base requirements).  
 Note: Funding levels displayed are enacted amounts and do not reflect budget execution. The FY 2013 level includes a \$5 billion downward adjustment from the enacted appropriation due to sequestration.

Figure 2. 7 OCO Funding Trends and Troop Levels

(Joint Chief of Staff, 2018)

Despite the initial decrease of military operations abroad, the United States' military expenditure has stayed relatively high compared to the previous decades. The U.S. military expenditure not only covers the OCO, but also supporting European NATO Allies under the name of the European Deterrence Initiative (EID) that has begun in U.S. FY 2015 with the initial nearly one billion USD funding, which is also indicated in green in the Fig.2.7.

Table 2. 4 US Military Expenditure for Weapon Systems Investment Fiscal Years 2018-19

Weapon Systems		FY 2018*		FY 2019	
		Qty	PB Request	Qty	PB Request
<b>Aircraft</b>					
F-35	Joint Strike Fighter	70	10.8	77	10.7
KC-46A	Tanker	15	3.1	15	3.0
P-8A	Poseidon	7	1.6	10	2.2
F/A-18E/F	Super Hornet	14	1.3	24	2.0
CH-53K	King Stallion Helicopter	4	1.1	8	1.6
E-2D AHE	Advanced Hawkeye	5	1.1	4	1.2
AH-64E	Apache Helicopter	63	1.4	60	1.3
UH-60	Black Hawk Helicopter	48	1.1	68	1.4
V-22	Osprey	6	0.9	7	1.3
MQ-4	Triton Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	3	0.9	3	0.9
<b>Missile Defense/Nuclear Deterrent</b>					
BMDs	Ballistic Missile Defense System	--	9.9	--	9.9
B-21	Raider	--	2.0	--	2.3
SSBN	COLUMBIA Class Submarine	--	1.9	--	3.7
Trident II	Trident II Missile Mods	--	1.3	--	1.2
LRSO	Long Range Standoff Weapon	--	0.5	--	0.6
GBSD	Ground Based Strategic Deterrent	--	0.2	--	0.3
B61 Tailkit	B61 Mod 12 Life Extension Program	30	0.2	250	0.3
<b>Ships</b>					
SSN 774	VIRGINIA Class Submarine	2	5.5	2	7.4
DDG 51	ARLEIGH BURKE Destroyer	2	4.0	3	6.0
CVN 78	FORD Aircraft Carrier	1	4.6	--	1.8
LCS	Littoral Combat Ship	2	1.7	1	1.3
T-AO	Fleet Replenishment Oiler	1	0.5	2	1.1
ESB	Expeditionary Sea Base	--	--	1	0.7
T-ATS	Towing, Salvage, and Rescue Ship	1	0.1	1	0.1
<b>Space</b>					
EELV	Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle	3	1.9	5	2.0
GPS	Global Positioning System	--	1.1	--	1.5
SBIRS	Space Based Infrared System	--	1.5	--	0.8
<b>Ground Systems</b>					
JLTV	Joint Light Tactical Vehicle	2,777	1.1	5,113	2.0

\*FY 2018 reflects the President's Budget request +\$17.0 million Emergency Amendment: Missile Defeat and Defense Enhancements Act of 2018 (Division B, Public Law 115-96); and includes \$25.0 million OCO funds within the Defense-Wide S&T

(Joint Chief of Staff, 2018)

As mentioned in table 2.5, U.S. military expenditure also covers weapon systems investment, with the largest portion devoted to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS), and followed by the Virginia Class Submarine. These three weapon systems correspond to the Air, Land and Marine capabilities of the U.S. military respectively.

Regarding the BMDS investment, the fact that the BMD System was to be deployed in the U.S. Base in South Korea (USFK) which might point to the U.S. recognition of the growing threat of China as a potential challenger power. The same system is also suggested to be deployed in Romania and Poland as part of the NATO defense architecture in the region.

In comparison with the significant increase in military expenditures, the U.S. military was downsized. This is due to the fact that overseas operations, especially in Iraq, have wound down and a greater threat, in this case China, emerged. This necessitated more investment in military technology. This investment also reflects the contemporary military requirements and relatively lesser need for military personnel.





Figure 2. 8 Military expenditure of the U.S. and China between 2000-2019 (GDP%)  
(World Bank Data, 2021)

As it can be observed above at a first glance, there seems to be no gradual increase in the military spending of China when compared to the U.S.' military expenditure. In terms of GDP% China's military expenditure has been steady for the last two decades without the fluctuations observed in the U.S. defense spending.



*Figure 2. 9 Military Expenditure of the U.S. and China between 2000-2019 (Current USD)*  
(World Bank Data, 2021)

In terms of the current USD spent it can be seen that China's military expenditure has been gradually increasing over the last two decades. The reason behind the low GDP percentage is China's growing economy, as its economy grows despite the increasing military expenditure in terms of USD, its GDP% stays relatively the same. Only when these two figures were compared and analyzed together, one can come up with the conclusion that China has been free-rising for the last two decades on its way to become a regional hegemon.

Within this dissertation time scope, American public opinion is presented in the Figure 2.10. It should be noted that 43% demonstrates that defense spending was about the right amount in 2019, the highest number in the last 15 years. When Donald Trump proposes a nearly 5% increase in U.S. defense spending, 43% -- the highest in 15 years -- shows that it spends about the right amount. Following 9/11, the amount of 'too much' was over 40% and the percentage of 'too little' was under 20. After a steady increase during the two Bush's tenure till 2008 (the highest number of 'too much' as 44%), Obama came to office. After Obama's two tenures, there is a steady increase of 'about right' in Trump's presidency, reaching the highest point in 2019. American Public Polls figures are compatible with the actual defense budget. There is a steady increase in budget in accordance with 'about right' public percentage level.




Figure 2. 10 American Public Polls on Defense Spending

Source: GALLUP (Saad, 2019)

### American Strategy Documents Hierarchy

Strategy documents provide ample data to understand the previous and present international structure and distribution of power. For example, The Nixon–Kissinger strategy document comprised three clear components: multilateralism, strength, and negotiations, according to which the U.S. had to move away from the unilateralism and forward deployments of the prior decades, instead to collaboration with its partners (Goldgeier & Suri, 2016). At the same time, it might be deduced that strategy documents

are not sacred documents, and always changing according to the climate of the international structure mostly in accordance with the balance of power concept.

The military planners must know what the threats and risks are so as to be prepared in an adequate way institutionally and align their force structure while positioning in accordance with the new threats. Security environment and fiscal constraints are interdependent and must be reconciled with each other in written documents. Building security globally and forward military presence is the main core of the U.S. Defense Strategy. Unilateral and self-referential military campaign led by the U.S. has had negative effects and unintended consequences not only for the U.S., but also its allies and partners. The externalities created by U.S. military intervention account largely for the different security perspectives between the U.S. and the rest. The objective of the U.S. military force was stated as to achieve the destinations coordinated by the National Command Authorities. For the joint drive in the long run, this objective will be accomplished through full range of dominance-the capacity of U.S. strengths, singularly or multinational partners. (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000)

The U.S. has three main national security documents which are as follows: the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). On top of the pyramid, the NSS under the President's responsibility gives directions and objectives for U.S. national security. In guidance of these directions, the NDS under Defense Secretary's responsibility elaborates on the Defense Department's strategic aims. NDS should be presented every four years to the U.S. congressional defense committees in classified form, with an unclassified summary. The NMS explains the strategic aims of the armed services in conformity with two higher strategy documents. The hierarchy among them might be shown as NSS > NDS > NMS. In addition, The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) used to be a legislatively mandated review of the Department of Defense strategy and priorities. The QDR would set a long-term course for DOD as it assessed the threats and challenges that the nation would face and would re-balance DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats (US Department of Defence). QDR was one of the main documents elaborating on the U.S. military doctrine, on which the Department of Defense projected its security vision for the next 10-20 years. For the purpose of this dissertation,

the 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014 years QDRs will be analyzed, because National Defense Strategy (NDS) replaced QDR and the first NDS was released by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis in 2018.

### **The NSS'**

In the Title 50 (50 U.S. Code § 3043 - Annual national security strategy report), it is mandatory for the national security strategy (NSS) to address five major components such as “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives”; “foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities”; “proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power”; “adequacy of the capabilities”; and “such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States” (Lucas, 2015, p. 1). It is intended to give a framework to American institutions to implement security strategies to ensure American national interests. They are the best examples of international relations documents. They are within the framework of liberal values, realist terms, institutional assets, international political economy issues, security and strategy matters enough to analyze all over the world. For example, NSS 2002 states some strategic principles, as such U.S. should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions; and U.S. should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves (2002, p. 9). According to Section 3043 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; the president of the U.S. should submit each year a comprehensive national security strategy report to the United States Congress (Lucas, 2015, p. 1). But in practice, presidents do not obey that yearly time schedule and they mostly are satisfied with one report during their tenures. From 2000 till today, there are seven NSS Reports available to examine and analyze in this dissertation as presented below;

Table 2. 5 The NSS Documents- 2000-2019

<b>Year</b>	<b>Presidency</b>	<b>Title (<a href="http://nsarchive.us/">http://nsarchive.us/</a>, n.d.)</b>
<b>2000</b>	Bill Clinton	A National Security Strategy of the U.S. for a New Century
<b>2001</b>	Bill Clinton	A National Security Strategy of the U.S. for a Global Age
<b>2002</b>	George W. Bush	The National Security Strategy of the U.S.
<b>2006</b>	George W. Bush	The National Security Strategy of the U.S.
<b>2010</b>	Barack Obama	National Security Strategy
<b>2015</b>	Barack Obama	National Security Strategy
<b>2017</b>	Donald Trump	National Security Strategy of the U.S.

Source: National Security Strategy Archive

Table 2. 6 U.S. Presidents and Their Political Parties

2000	2001	2002	2006	2010	2015	2017
B.Clinton	B.Clinton	G.W. Bush	G.W. Bush	B.Obama	B.Obama	Trump
Democrat	Democrat	Republican	Republican	Democrat	Democrat	Republican

There are similarities between Clinton’s and Obama’s preferences which are quite different from Bush’s and Trump’s preferences. Clinton and Obama prefer a multilateral approach in defense and security matters while focusing on the economic agenda first. Bush and Trump prefer unilateral choices which have widened fractures in the Transatlantic Alliance. To put it differently, the U.S. Presidents’ choices also affect Germany’s and France’s preferences. America’s security alliance in Europe has a force multiplier effect that permits participants a secure environment which might not be possible when acting alone (Kugler, 2011). One of the main differences among the Transatlantic Alliance members is that the U.S. has many alliances and partners around the globe, so that the major European powers might be assumed some one of them.

Table 2. 7 Key Words Frequency in the NSS Documents- Year 2000-2019

Year	Key Words	Frequency
2000	Threat	115
	Capability/ies	50
2001	Threat	155
	Capability/ies	61
2002	Threat	50
	Capability/ies	18
2006	Threat	42
	Capability/ies	20
2010	Threat	82
	Capability/ies	49
2015	Threat	53
	Capability/ies	16
2017	Threat	109
	Capability/ies	57

In 2000 and 2001 NSSs, the term threat was used more in comparison with the next ones. But, these threats were not based on conventional state threats, After 9/11 attacks, with the use of ‘enemy’ instead of threat a noticeable decrease in threat usages was noticed. In the 2017 NSS, the number of defined threats increased as China and Russia perceived as the biggest threats. The frequency of capability/ies usage after 9/11 attack also increased with a sizeable level in the 2017 NSS.

### NSS 2000

It looks more liberal than realist and does not perceive any conventional threat. There are three main objectives for American National Security Strategy;

- a. ‘To enhance America’s security,
- b. To bolster America’s economic prosperity,
- c. To promote democracy and human rights abroad’. (1999, p. iii).

Those objectives are in accordance with the American Constitution as written in the preamble that ‘...provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’ It is a nice work and takes its roots from the Constitution (U.S. Const. Preamble). This Document carries liberal

values stressing economic prosperity, democracy and human rights. In the beginning of the new century, the U.S. did not worry about any real or perceived threat thanks to the unipolar international structure.

It is very important that traditional country/opponent/bloc threat was not mentioned in the document. Instead, it employed terms such as ‘potential enemies’, ‘adversaries’ both state and non-state actors and terrorists. The weapons of mass destruction were seen as the most dangerous threat (1999, p. 2). For example, it is noted that the Administration has concluded that the threat posed by a rogue state developing an ICBM capable of striking the United States is growing. Three nation states with suspected weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capabilities are openly pointed out. The Intelligence Community estimates that during the next fifteen years the United States will most likely face an ICBM threat from North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq (1999, p. 16). It was indicated the risks and spillover effects of the failed states. Failed states could also gracious wars and outcast emergencies and spill over national boundaries to destabilize a locale. (1999, p. 2) Even though these statements seem accurate in theory, in practice the U.S. acted in the opposite direction, first in Iraq and later in Syria. Stephen Walt explained this phenomenon by saying that there is a worse situation than having a bad government that is having no government at all in “The Hell of Good Intentions” (Walt, 2019). It was also noted that the errand of mobilizing open support for national security needs became more complicated (1999, p. 49).

It could be easily claimed that the main difference between Continental European Security pillar and the American pillar is the fact that the U.S. has the capability to wage alone in case its national interest required. The U.S. acts in concert with the worldwide community at whatever point conceivable, but does not hesitate to act singularly when necessary (1999, pp. 19-20). The U.S. will keep roughly 100,000 military forces in Europe to fulfill their commitments to NATO, support their crucial transoceanic ties and protect U.S. authority in NATO (1999, p. 29). The integration of Russia, Ukraine, and other Newly Independent States (NIS) with the new Europe and the international community remained a key priority (1999, p. 32). It is very obvious that Russia was not perceived as a threat, but there was still nearly 100,000 American military personnel deployed in Europe.

The 2000 NSS is a document prefaced by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Referring to the fact that the United States is an independent nation, the document also touched upon the role of the U.S as the leader of democracy in the world. Although there are more threat words in this NSS compared to other NSS, the threats are quite different from conventional threats. Considering that many international crises have been left behind during the post-cold war transition period, the focus on the future and opportunities has been underlined. Besides the fact that Russia was aided economically for development, the documents were also indicated that the defence budget was planned to increase to \$ 112 billion including the time between 2000 and 2005 for the first time in the last ten years, and that the amount needed to be used for the modernization and the needs of the defense stated. Despite the fact that the US Armed Forces are the most powerful army in the world and there is no perception of any nation state threat, it is an organization that competes with and renews itself. Due to the inability to fully identify possible future state threats, the application of technological developments to the defense industry gives the U.S. Armed Forces the advantage of the force multiplier, makes a great contribution to the country's economy, and leads to greater resource pressure on possible competitors. The capability of having the power to fight on two fronts at the same time and win wars is the most important capability of the U.S which has maintained it since the Cold War. In addition, nuclear deterrence capability, which also came from the Cold War, remains as an intimidating capability for other states around the world. The most important criterion for using military force is the threat to the U.S. national interests. In this case, if necessary, the US Armed Forces can also act alone.

Although the document contains mostly liberal concepts and strategies, a statement mentioned in the preface is quite meaningful in theoretical terms. Through the statement it is indicated that it will not be enough for the U.S. to have the most powerful army to be safe, and that military threats against the U.S. or the rest should also be limited (The White House, 1999, p.iii). According to the neo-realist theory, you have to prevent your possible opponents from gaining power while maximizing your own power. However, the document does not mention any potential military threats. It has been mentioned that some countries have the capability of threat for their neighbor countries without actually revealing the names of these countries. In addition to this, non-state threats, technological

threats, especially weapons of mass destruction technology, the failed states threat, and environmental and health threats are mentioned in the threats section.

It is mentioned that the key to being safe in the country is to follow an active strategy in the world, and after that, an offensive strategy has been identified. All elements of national power are needed to follow this strategy.

In the document, which does not specify a certain priority geographically; the entire world has been divided into sub-regions and analyzed that way. In this context, Europe and Eurasia, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East, North Africa, Southwest and South Asia were evaluated together while The Sub-Saharan Africa and the Western Hemisphere were evaluated separately.

### **NSS 2001**

The name of the NSS was 'A national security strategy for a global age' focusing on globalization, economic opportunities of international collaboration. President Clinton mentioned in the preface of NSS 2001 that while entering the new millennium there is no overriding external threats to the U.S., with the presence of the history's most powerful military ready to defend American interests around the world (2001). He addressed new national security challenges, and contemporary threats such as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, and international crime. (2001) NATO will continue to be the main asset in European security. Russia and China were defined as former adversaries and the U.S. 'must build principled, constructive, clear-eyed relations with our former adversaries Russia and China'. (2001) The U.S. has to be strategic allies with Japan to cope with post-Cold War threats. (2001)

NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative intended to incorporate both a NATO-centered and nation-centered concept advancement and experimentation program. (2001). The advance of the U.S. promoted European attempts to enhance and improve collective defense and emergency response capabilities, counting on the capacity to operate militarily under the EU while NATO as a whole is not locked in. (2001). From those statements, it can be understood that the U.S. has motivated that both France and Germany should follow the same pattern.

The Soviet threat perception was not valid for both legs of the transatlantic security architecture. At the same time, the United States was strongly supporting the efforts of its European partners to establish its own European Security and Defense Strategy (ESDP). It might be noted that cooperative tendency on global issues has been written overtly.

Among the key elements of the NSS 2001, it might be said ‘adapting our alliances’, ‘encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries’, ‘countering potential regional aggressors’, and ‘confronting new threats’.

The 2001 NSS is the last strategy document of US President Bill Clinton. It bears quite lots of similarities with the previous 2000 NSS. The note which says that attention should be paid to relations with China and Russia is interesting because it is unlike the previous NSS of 2000. Because the text is longer than the previous one, more threat and capability statements have been included in the document.

In the document, which does not specify a certain priority geographically; the entire world has been divided into sub-regions and analyzed that way. The issues of preparing for the uncertain future and focusing on science and technology have been discussed together.

## **NSS 2002**

It is a short and concise document in comparison with the previous ones. Instead of threat, the Cold War term ‘enemy’ was used. The enemy was not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology, and it was called terrorism. (2002, p. 5) In addition, a new Department of Homeland Security was founded within National Security Council apparatus after WW II.

After 9/11, the first published NSS contained many realist terms such as great powers, and balance of power. Bush claimed that the world’s great powers were on the same side against chaos and terrorist violence’s dangers. (2002, p. Preface). He said that “We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17<sup>th</sup> century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.” (2002, p. 25). The U.S. was about to form a new strategic alliance with Russia, based on the core truth of the twenty-first century: the U.S. and Russia were no longer strategic enemies (2002, p. 26).

A military designed to deter large armies of the Cold War era must be changed to concentrate more on how an enemy will fight rather than when and where a war will take place (2002, p. 29). This was a definition of capability-based approach which was also written in QDR 2001. Threats were mainly terrorism and the will to obtain WMD. Iraq was associated with WMD so that it was the new target country after Afghanistan.

The 2002 NSS was very different from the previous ones. It was like a preparatory and unprepared document to break the traditional path used in NSSs. Even though there were signals for using military power, there was also denial for unilateral action, but 'cooperative actions with the other main centers of power'. There was no priority for any specific geographic place.

### **NSS 2006**

This NSS was in the second term of President Bush. The first sentence of the NSS 2006 that 'America is at war' is very capturing and explanatory enough. While continuing the war on terror, the U.S. focused on the spread of democracy in 'Broader Middle East'. (The White House, 2006, p. Preface). President Bush stated in the document that they had two courses of action; the first one was 'the path of fear', in other words, isolationist and defensive one, and the second one was 'the path of confidence' meaning the offensive and preventive strategy; and he chose 'the path of confidence'. (The White House, 2006, p. Preface). He implied that this choice had its roots in American History like the policies of Truman and Reagan whose approach was 'idealistic about their national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.' (The White House, 2006, p. Preface). It was stated that defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and new enemy had the global reach (The White House, 2006, p. 8). It was noted that some of America's oldest and best friends were not in accordance with the U.S. policy in Iraq (The White House, 2006, p. 36). In the absence of cooperation from its allies and partners, the U.S. must be prepared to act alone if necessary. (The White House, 2006, p. 37) There was also a special relationship with the United Kingdom. (The White House, 2006, p. 39)

The goal of the NSS 2006 was to end the tyranny in the world. Stating that people living in countries like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe knew of tyranny first-hand, moreover some tyrannies

challenged the U.S.' immediate security interests in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism (The White House, 2006, p. 3). As 'front lines in the war on terror', it was mandatory to win the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq (The White House, 2006, p. 12). The Iranian regime supported terrorism, threatened Israel. (The White House, 2006, p. 20). Concerning North Korea it was stated that a serious nuclear proliferation problem was also raised by the North Korean regime. (The White House, 2006, p. 21).

By reason of geography and strength, not only in Europe and its own immediate neighborhood, but also in many other regions of vital interest to the United States, Russia had considerable influence: the larger Middle East, South and Central Asia, and East Asia (The White House, 2006, p. 39). The Department of Defense was also expanding Special Operations Forces and investing in advanced conventional capabilities' (The White House, 2006, pp. 43-44).

The 2006 NSS is the second and final security document of the U.S. President Bush. The United States' fight against terrorism has been compared to its long-standing struggle during the Cold War. The developments that took place between the previous the 2002 NSS and the 2006 NSS have been summarized and decisively stated in the document. In this context, the fact that the tyranny was overthrown in Iraq and that the Taliban tyranny was replaced by an elected administration in Afghanistan and the developments in Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have been positively explained in the name of democracy. This region is notable as the geographical region of the 'Wider Middle East' and the neighboring geography of Russia. Iran, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe, which are clearly indicated to be experiencing tyranny, can be considered as new possible target countries.

Statements of capabilities in the document have been involved as the prevention of the skills of terrorists to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, the need of Special Forces capabilities in addition to conventional capabilities, and post-transition capabilities after failed states. And with this, it can also be assumed that the priority is the fight against terrorism.

## NSS 2010

Obama, opposing Iraqi War, stated in the foreword that the U.S. ended one war in Iraq and refocused on Afghanistan. As top security priority, it is stated that there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the threat posed by violent extremists' in pursuit of nuclear weapons and their dissemination to additional states (2010, p. 4). It was stated in the NSS 2010 that the U.S. would continue to deepen its partnership on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect with other centers of power in the 21st Century, including China, India, and Russia (2010, p. 11). The NSS 2010 had 'a four-part plan:

- Guarantee good alliances,
- Establish collaboration with other centers of power of the 21st Century,
- Strengthen institutions and collaboration processes,
- Maintain broad cooperation with regard to key global challenges' (Kugler, 2011).

There were also offered options for Iran and North Korea against nuclear armament program: to accept denuclearization or isolation from the international community. (Kugler, 2011) By pursuing its interests within multilateral forums such as the United Nations, not outside them, the U.S succeeded in the post-World War II period (2010, p. 12). A dedication to renewing its economy, which serves as the wellspring of American power, was at the core of the U.S. efforts. (2010, p. 2). After the Great Depression, the American people were recovering from the most crippling recession faced by the U.S. (2010, p. 2). The U.S. was fighting two wars with several thousands of men and women deployed in harm's way by the United States, and hundreds of billions of dollars committed to supporting these conflicts. (2010, p. 8) It was also stated that in the fields that are essential to the strength of America, the U.S. is emerging from underinvestment. (2010, p. 9). Priorities like education, electricity, science and technology, and health care have not been sufficiently improved by the U.S. (2010, p. 9).

Implying his preference as multilateralism and the limits of unilateral action, he stresses avoiding acting alone. With other primary centers of influence, including China, India,

and Russia, as well as increasingly powerful nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, the United States was seeking to develop deeper and more successful partnerships (2010, p. 3).

In order to strengthen American national capacity, the U.S. military must maintain its conventional dominance and the nuclear deterrence capability of the U.S., as long as nuclear weapons remain, while seeking to increase its ability to defeat asymmetric threats (2010, p. 14). Where force is required, it will continue to do so in a manner that represents its values and enhances its legitimacy, pursuing broad international support, working with institutions such as NATO and the United Nations' Security Council (2010, p. 22). Experienced in economic crisis, he intended to focus on the domestic agenda and economic matters first, and then focus on international agenda in a cooperative manner. Obama tried to move away from the previous war climate and focused on the economy agenda at home. This tendency gave the opportunity to China to rise without any sizeable oppression and Russia to act freely in its geographical vicinity.

### **NSS 2015**

NSS 2015 was issued in the second term of Obama and it was shorter than his first NSS. It was nearly 30 pages (29 main and two foreword pages). There is a path dependency with the first one stating that the rising economic strength of America is the cornerstone of its national security and a vital source of its international power. (2015, p. Preface) NATO was the world's leading multilateral alliance, strengthened by the U.S.' historic close relations with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada. (2015, p. 7). The U.S. retained all options for achieving the goal of preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Iran (2015, p. 11). The U.S. kept its door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of mutual interests (2015, p. 25).

There is a significant risk of the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The escalating cybersecurity threats, Russia's aggression, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases gave rise to global security anxieties. There is an acceptance that the U.S. is not strong enough to overcome threats and risks by acting unilaterally.

The 2015 NSS called for "collective action" and a promotion of "international rules and

norms” to ensure security and order against threats, and rejected extensive military occupations of foreign societies and unilateral interventions aimed at regime change, nation-building, or similarly ambitious goals reacting to the failed attempts to reshape countries such as Russia, Iraq, and Afghanistan over the past 25 years. (Goldgeier & Suri, 2016) The U.S. stepped beyond the big ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that over the past decade characterized so much of the American foreign policy. Compared to the nearly 180,000 troops that the U.S. had in Iraq and Afghanistan when Obama took office, America had less than 15,000 troops stationed in those countries. It paints an image of U.S. influence as multinational and resurgent, but largely focused on free markets, democracy, and human rights. The text explicitly condemns widespread foreign-society military occupations and unilateral actions aimed at regime change, nation-building or equally ambitious objectives.

### **NSS 2017**

The 2017 NSS was different from the previous ones in that for the first time it was mentioned from great power competition. There was also a return to threat-based planning from capability-based approach. It was stated from “three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and its allies and partners”. (The White House, 2017, p. 1)

The ‘principle-based realism’ approach should be motivated by performance, not ideology. (The White House, 2017, p. 1) Unfair burden-sharing with the allies of the United States and insufficient spending in its own security called for danger from those who wished harm to the United States. (The White House, 2017, p. 1) The combination of Russian ambition and rising military capabilities create an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where there is an increasing risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation (The White House, 2017, pp. 25-6).

China, Russia, and other state and non-state actors agree that, in simplistic terms, the United States frequently portrays the world, with states either “at peace” or “at war,”

when it is truly an area of intense rivalry. To meet this challenge, the U.S. intended to upgrade its competitive game (The White House, 2017, p. 28).

In the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East, the United States must marshal the will and capacity to compete and avoid unfavorable changes. (The White House, 2017, p. 45) In order to advance required capabilities for the military, a 'domestic manufacturing sector', 'a solid defense industrial base', and 'supply chains' was defined as 'a national priority'. (The White House, 2017, p.30)

The 2017 NSS is a document that contains radical changes in comparison with the previous ones of the U.S. President Trump. In this document, it has been criticized that attempts of the U.S. to make its competitors some reliable partners by including them in the international system over the past two decades, have failed. Although the intentions of the neo-realist theory's assumptions were initially good, it has been emphasized that the potential for change and the use of power could change according to the changing new distribution of power, and as a result of this, the 'great power competition' period has been returned. Instead of approaching the competition between states on a periodic basis, it is aimed to maintain the superiority that the U.S. has on an ongoing basis. In fact, this also requires strategies that are more prone to offensive realism. It is noted that the U.S. will ensure peace only with force, but the importance of acting jointly with allies and partners, and ensuring their fair burden sharing is also emphasized. Although external balancing is an indispensable element of great power competition, there are no concrete statements about how this will show itself in Europe. It is aimed to do balancing in the Asia-Pacific region by increasing quadrennial cooperation with Japan, India and Australia. In fact, the addition of the UK to the cooperation with Australia through AUKUS has been an interesting development when it is evaluated together with BREXIT. It is mentioned that economic security is also a national security issue, and it has been noted that the U.S. will not remain silent about economic abuses from now on, and the country will give importance to economic cooperation with countries which have the same ideology.

It is also important to note that the U.S. Armed Forces have been reduced to the lowest number of personnel since 1940, and the supply of new weapons systems has been severely limited, while threats have been increasing.

Threat perception and military power conduct principles of related NSS documents are shown on two tables presented below;

*Table 2. 8 Threats defined on NSS'*

2000	<p>It is very important that traditional country/opponent/bloc treat was not mentioned in the document. Instead, it used 'potential enemies', 'adversaries' including state or non-state actors and terrorists. "Our potential enemies, whether nations or terrorists, may be more likely in the future to resort to attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States". (1999, p. 16)</p> <p>The weapons of mass destruction seem the most dangerous threat of all. "Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists and international crime organizations". (1999, p. 2)</p>
2001	<p>President Clinton mentioned in the preface of NSS 2001 that while entering the new millennium there was no overriding external threat to the U.S., with the presence of the history's most powerful military ready to defend American interests around the world (2001). He addressed new national security challenges, and "contemporary threats such as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, and international crime". (2001)</p>
2002	<p>Instead of threat, the Cold War term 'enemy' was employed. "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism." (2002, p. 5) "For a long period of time, there will be fighting on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy... Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to track down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it's not just the battlefield that the U.S. is going to fight terrorists on. With cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and throughout Asia, thousands of trained terrorists remain at large." (2002, p. 5)</p>

2006	<p>The first sentence of the 2006 NSS that ‘America is at war’ is very descriptive. There is an assessment of the NSS 2002 in the document. It is stated that defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and new enemy has the global outreach (The White House, 2006, p. 8). While continuing the war on terror, the U.S. focused on the spread of democracy in ‘Broader Middle East’. As ‘front lines in the war on terror’, it is mandatory to win the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq (The White House, 2006, p. 12).</p>
2010	<p>There was no state threat. In reverse, the search for cooperation with China, Russia, and India was welcomed. “There is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their spread to additional states”. (2010, p. 4)</p>
2015	<p>This NSS is expansive in its calls for economic, cultural, and technological openness. Globally, the U.S. has stepped beyond the big ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that over the past decade have characterized so much of American foreign policy. There is a significant risk of the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The escalating cybersecurity threats, Russia’s aggression, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases gave rise to global security anxieties.</p>
2017	<p>It was stated from “three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and its allies and partners.”</p> <p>First, great power competition returned, namely China and Russia started to reassert their regional and worldwide impact. (The White House, 2017, p.25)</p> <p>Changes in the regional balance of power had global effects and challenge the interests of the United States. Then, the most dangerous threats nearest to those were posed by North Korea and Iran related to WMD.</p>

Table 2. 9 Principles of Military Power Usage

2000	<p>“The United States must have the capacity to discourage and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border violence in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames for the near future, preferably in concert with allies. Two theaters ensure that it retains the ability and flexibility to face unknown future challenges, while continued global involvement tends to avoid those threats from being addressed”. (1999, p. 19).</p>
2001	<p>Strengthening American alliances based on shared interests ‘rather than defeating a single threat’ with Europe and Asia, while adapting them to meet new challenges will be important. NATO will continue to be main asset in European security. It is stated that Russia and China are former adversaries and on the one hand the U.S. should strengthen its alliances, on the other hand it ‘must build principled, constructive, clear-eyed relations with our former adversaries Russia and China’ (2001).</p>
2002	<p>Europe is also home to two of the world’s largest and most competent international institutions: NATO, which has been at the center of transatlantic and inter-European security since its establishment, and the EU, the partner of the United States in opening up world trade.</p> <p>The September 11 attacks were also an assault on NATO, as NATO itself admitted when, for the first time, it invoked its Article V self-defense clause. The central mission of NATO, joint defense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies, remains, but under new conditions, NATO must establish new mechanisms and capabilities to carry out that mission. NATO must cultivate the ability to field highly mobile, specially trained forces at short notice whenever appropriate to respond to a threat to any member of the Alliance (2002, p. 25).</p> <p>At the same time, the U.S. supports the efforts of its European allies to forge a greater identity with the EU in terms of foreign policy and security, and is</p>

	committed to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO. (2002, p. 26)
2006	Some of America’s oldest and best friends were not in accordance with U.S. policy in Iraq (The White House, 2006, p. 36).  In the absence of cooperation from its allies and partners, the U.S. needs to be prepared to act alone if necessary (The White House, 2006, p. 37).
2010	The right to use military force when necessary in accordance with the Rule of Law. Implying his support for multilateralism and the limits of unilateral action, he insists that acting unilaterally should not be avoided. The U.S. should reinforce old alliances to achieve this policy.
2015	The U.S. has an army with an unprecedented size, technology, and geostrategic scope in human history. Their alliances from Europe to Asia have been renewed. In order to ensure security and order against current threats, the document calls for “collective action” and the enforcement of “international rules and norms.”
2017	By 2024, the U.S. expects its European allies to increase defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product, 20% of which is dedicated to growing military capabilities. The U.S. will continue to reinforce deterrence and security on the eastern NATO flank and catalyze the efforts of frontline allies and partners to better protect themselves. It will work with NATO to enhance its integrated air and missile defense capabilities in order to counter current and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats, particularly from Iran. (The White House , 2017, pp. 47-8).

As a liberal president, Clinton underestimated realist power assumptions. He preferred to include former adversaries to the system and spread democracy because democracies do not generally fight each other. Russian Federation was weaker to oppose, or China did not have sufficient capability to resist to the Cold-War victor U.S. The U.S. was

philosophically opposed to those two countries during much of the Cold War, but they experienced important political and economic changes. They were offered to take advantages of opportunities as long as they supported democratic norms and values such as human rights, rule of law and market economy. This tendency was a liberal one in order to increase interdependence. Nevertheless, in realism, great powers might act as soon as they get enough power to enhance their national security defined as their national interests. Along the road, enemies and friends might switch places according to the distribution of power, because the structure is anarchic. 2017 NSS was different from others particularly in which it was stated that China and Russia were revisionist powers. The distribution of power has changed from 2000 to 2019 so that global security should be assured with collaboration and necessitates multilateral approaches including bargaining and defining new roles. NATO will continue to be the main asset for European security.

### **QDRs**

QDR Report used to serve as the overall strategic planning document of the Defense Department, as required by Public Law 103-62 (2001, p. 71). The QDR is a congressionally mandated (USC 10, Sec. 118 (a)) review of the Department of Defense (DoD) strategy and priorities. It is intended to set the course for the department to address current and future conflicts and threats. The Quadrennial Defense Review evaluates the likely international security environment for the next two decades and describes on how U.S. national defense strategy will meet it. The Pentagon has so far published five reviews: in 1997, 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014.

*Table 2. 10 Key Words Frequency in the QDR Documents- Year 2000-2019*

Year	Key Words	Frequency
2001	Threat	74
	Capability/ies	179
2006	Threat	75
	Capability/ies	316
2010	Threat	100
	Capability/ies	270
2014	Threat	84
	Capability/ies	127

Within time frame of this dissertation there are QDR 2001, QDR 2006, QDR 2010 and QDR 2014. The first three QDRs were mainly on GWOT, Afghanistan and Iraq military campaigns. The American Quadrennial Defense Review published on 30 September 2001 was different from the previous one. The central objective of that review was to transform the basis of defense planning from ‘threat-based’ model into ‘capability-based’ model which focuses on how an adversary might fight rather than whom the opponent might be and where a war might break out (2001, p. IV). Concerning Europe and Russia, it was stated that an opportunity to cooperate with Russia existed, and it did not pose a large-scale conventional military threat to NATO (2001, p. 4). In this document, the U.S. declared openly that the new force-sizing construct would shape forces to: first defend the U.S., secondly deter aggression and coerce forward in critical regions, thirdly defeat aggression in major conflicts including the possibility of regime change and occupation, and finally conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations (2001, p. 17). In fact, these assessments are very different and interesting because it gives the signs of hegemony order through the use of force. The force would be used for limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations meant that there had not been anymore, any important threat from any nation against the U.S.

In addition, U.S. forces had to degrade an aggressor's ability to coerce others through both conventional and asymmetric means, including CBRNE weapons (2001, p. 21). This means that this document dictates to the U.S. military to be ready for full spectrum threats and risks. From levels of analysis perspective, at the second level of analysis, the EU and the U.S. has two different entities as a supra-state organization and a state. At the first level of analysis, different politics have chosen different security policies and strategies. At the second level analysis, the distribution of power and the distribution of threats and interests have changed in comparison with the Cold War structure.

Through catching critical sentences, it might be understood the spirit of the designated strategy reflecting their era's priorities. For example, Secretary Gates urges a new air-sea battle concept, and long-range strike, space, and cyberspace assets investments (2010, p. 32). It might be deduced from a new air-sea battle concept; U.S. military intends to focus on the Pacific Region as new center of gravity. Air-sea joint capability is a mainly conventional capability aimed deterring aggressor states.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, while presenting the 2014 Review to Congress, mentioned "three pillars," such as "Protect the homeland... Build security globally... Project power and win decisively" (Hagel, 2014, p. v). He also stressed "[re]balancing for a broad spectrum of conflict," a shift from the prior focus on Iraq and Afghanistan to the military's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Obama stated that, "We are rebalancing toward Asia and the Pacific" (Obama, 2015, p. 1). There is also a return to great power politics by concentrating on China and Russia. Christine E. Wormuth, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for strategy, plans and force development, claimed that the QDR 2014 conveyed the strategy which "is appropriate for the United States as a global leader." (as cited in Claudette, 2014) She also said that "The administration had our strategic priorities pretty much right in the 2012 defense strategic guidance... we really went from the 2010 QDR, which was very focused on the two current wars at the time [in] Iraq and Afghanistan to the 2012 defense strategic guidance". (as cited in Claudette, 2014)

The department continued to make investments in capabilities (Claudette, 2014). She added that the active Army would be reduced to about 420,000 personnel; the Marine Corps to 175,000 personnel, the Navy would lose a minimum of one carrier, and the most

importantly, due to capacity challenges under continuous sequestration, taking into consideration that globally security building could be harder (Claudette, 2014).

The QDR 2014 intended to prepare for the future by rebalancing American defense activities in a reality of fiscal constraint through three strategic pillars which were;

- ‘Protecting the homeland, deterring and defeating to the U.S. threats,

- Developing global security to sustain regional stability, deter rivals, help allies and partners,

- Projecting power, disrupting and destroying terrorist networks’. (2014)

The U.S. Joint Force should be rebalanced so that it remains new, capable and ready, even though becoming smaller over time, the Department will safeguard key areas of capability, including nuclear deterrence, space, air/sea, precision strike, intelligence, counterterror and special operations (2014). These capabilities might be assumed as the full spectrum capabilities; from nuclear deterrence, air-sea conventional battle concept requirements as well as precision strike to irregular warfare capabilities such as counter terrorism and special operations.

### **QDR 2001**

The foreword of the QDR was written by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. The first paragraph of the foreword underlined the 9/11 terrorist attack; saying that “The United States came under a violent, bloody attack on September 11, 2001. Americans... died as innocent victims, not as warriors. They died not because of conventional armies carrying out traditional wars, but because of the barbaric, faceless weapons of terror... The war that the country is fighting is not America’s war of choice”. (2001, p. 3) At the end of the document, there is a four-page statement written by Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is 71 pages long in addition to the foreword.

A core aim of this review was to change the basis of defense planning from a “threat-based” paradigm that dominated thought in the past to a potential “capabilities-based” model. This model focused on capabilities and on how an enemy would fight rather than precisely who the opponent might be or where a war might occur. It admits that planning for big conventional wars in distant theaters is not enough (2001).

The U.S. does not reliably forecast what country, mix of nations, or non-state actors could pose threats to the vital interests of the United States or those of U.S. allies and friends

for decades to come (2001, p. 13). It was not foreseeable for the U.S. to face a peer competition, yet regional powers had the potential to build adequate capabilities to threaten stability in regions vital to U.S. interests. (2001, p. 3). In reality, Asia was gradually emerging as a region vulnerable to large-scale military competition (2001, p. 4). Europe was largely at peace, with the notable exception of the Balkans. (2001, p. 4). With Russia, there was a potential for cooperation, and it was not a significant conventional military threat to NATO on a wide scale (2001, p. 4). The ambiguity for the future different from the past and the unipolar international structure gave everconfidence to the U.S. And, power specifically military capabilities became ends rather than means.

This QDR was the result of the efforts of the Department of Defense’s senior civilian and military leadership, and the decisions taken on policy, powers, capabilities, and risks were very “top down” in that. (2001, p. v) This report described the crucial changes needed in the years to come to maintain the safety and security of America (2001, p. v). The U.S. military’s highest priority was to protect the country against all enemies (2001, p. 18). The U.S. would not withdraw from the world (2001, p. 11). The QDR stated that for the U.S. military, security of the U.S. homeland was the highest priority (2001, p. 67).

There were many threats, ranging from the possibility of a global war to the unimaginable threat of violence (2001, p. 1). It resembles the full spectrum force structure requirement. It was also shown that the mode of military competition and the essence of armed conflict could be revolutionized by modern military technology in ways that make military forces and the doctrines of great powers obsolete (2001, p. 3). The U.S. military would not be able to address changing threats without going through a transformation (2001, p. 16). Change is at the center of this modern strategy.

Some of critical forces are presented as follows;

‘Army Divisions (Active/National Guard) . . . . .	10/8
Enhanced Separate Brigades (National Guard) . . . . .	15
Navy Aircraft Carriers . . . . .	12
Air Wings (Active/Reserve) . . . . .	10/1

Amphibious Ready Groups . . . . .	12
Attack Submarines. . . . .	55
Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve) . . . . .	108/8
Air Force Active Fighter Squadrons . . . . .	46
Reserve Fighter Squadrons . . . . .	38
Bombers (Combat-Coded) . . . . .	112'. (2001, p. 22)

From these items and numbers, it can be understood that the organization of the armed forces is in the Cold War fashion, taking the conventional threats into consideration. It lacked special force units and ranger battalion numbers. This indicated that the U.S. military was geared to tackle more a conventional threat rather than a non-state threat.

The Department took the following decisions for each branch:

- 'The Army Secretary would speed up the deployment of forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), and in coordination with its European Allies, an IBCT should be stationed in the European Region by 2007. In addition, the Secretary of the Army would discuss ways to strengthen the capabilities of land forces in the Arabian Gulf.

- The Navy Secretary would increase the presence of aircraft carrier battlegroups in the Western Pacific and explore options for home porting in that area for an additional three to four surface combatants and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).

- The Air Force Secretary would establish plans to increase the number of contingency bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as in the Gulf of Arabia.

- The Secretary of the Navy would also create options for moving some of the pre-positioned floating equipment of the Marine Corps from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf in order to be more responsive to Middle East contingencies. The Navy Secretary would discuss the possibility for the Marine Corps of undertaking preparation for coastline warfare in the Western Pacific'. (2001, p. 27)

There were two daunting tasks to be accomplished by the 2001 Quadrennial Security Review (QDR). First, in a dangerous and changing security climate, it had to resolve serious questions about the force's near-term ability to defend and advance U.S. interests worldwide. Secondly, the president's task of upgrading the Armed Forces to address potential security threats had to be enforced. From the increase of aircraft carrier battlegroups and additional three SSGNs in the Pacific and increase in the number of contingency bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it was deduced that military force planners while focused on two major theatres, Europe and Indio-Pacific, and the priority was shifted from Europe to the latter one.

### **QDR 2006**

This document was not assumed as "a new beginning", in fact a continuum that reflected how the American Defense Department best understood of a world that changed a great deal since the end of the last century (2006, p. v). It was a continuation of QDR 2001 as the presidential continuation of President Bush. It was 92 pages long in addition to seven pages Annex and Foreword. It meant that it was almost 1.5 times longer than the previous one. The QDR was not a budget or programmatic text, instead, it represented the thinking of the Department of Defense's top civilian and military leaders. (2006, p. VI). It was stated in the document that the U.S. had been fighting a global war against violent extremists who used terrorism as their weapon of choice since the 9/11 attacks. (2006, p. v). The fight was primarily concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the U.S. would need to be prepared and coordinated for years to come to effectively protect its nation and interests around the world (2006, p. 1). Following 9/11 attacks, the U.S. changed the posture of the U.S. global military force, making long overdue changes to the U.S. base by shifting away from a static defense of outdated Cold War garrisons (2006, p. V). The U.S. must be able, with its allies and partners, to fight this war simultaneously in several ways and for many years to come (2006, p. 1). That 'long war' had two key components, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. (2006, p. 88).

Some specific decisions are presented as follows; 'the Department raise Special Operations Forces by 15 percent and increase the number of Special Forces Battalions by one-third, and it will also expand Psychological Operations and Civil Affair units by 3,700 staff, which means 33 percent, in addition the land forces of the Multipurpose Army

and Marine Corps would improve their strengths and ability to carry out unconventional warfare operations'. (2006, p. 5) The enemies of the U.S. were not national governments, but rather non-state networks that were scattered (2006, p. 9).

In any given day, the U.S. had almost 350,000 men and women military personnel abroad, and deployed or stationed in around 130 nations in order to defend and promote the interests and values of the United States (2006, p. 9). The Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America were in flux beyond Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, representing a new geostrategic crossroads. (2006, p. 28) Outside these regions, the choices of major and emerging powers, including India, Russia and China, would be key factors in deciding the 21st Century international security climate. (2006, p. 28) Among the major and emerging powers, China had the greatest potential to compete with the United States militarily and field disruptive military technology that could over time set off conventional U.S. military advantages without U.S. counter-strategies. (2006, p. 29) Instead of military threats and coercion, U.S. strategy aiming to persuade China to opt for a course of peaceful economic development and political liberalization, and to continue as an economic partner and to emerge in the world as a responsible stakeholder and force for good (2006, p. 29). This statement is both very interesting and meaningful. On the one hand, the strategy assignment duty belongs to the President, defense establishment, on the other, does not ignore the great military power capabilities and makes a note to the strategic document to express their vision.

The armed forces increased its capacity by developing modular brigades: 117 in the Regular Army (42 BCTs and 75 support brigades); 106 in the National Army Guard (28 BCTs and 78 support brigades); and 58 in the U.S. support brigades. This was equal to a 46 percent boost in military strength that was readily available. (2006, p. 43)

Where and when they were needed, the future force will leverage stealth and advanced electronic warfare capabilities, in addition for both surveillance and strike purposes, maritime aviation would require unmanned aircraft. (2006, p. 45).

In line with the global change in trade and shipping, the fleet would have a greater presence in the Pacific Ocean. (2006, p. 47) Accordingly, the Navy aims to change its force posture and base to include at least six operationally accessible and sustainable

carriers and 60% of its Pacific submarines to facilitate engagement, presence and deterrence. (2006, p. 47) The Navy increased the number of independent strike groups available from 19 to 36 by implementing dispersed operating principles, and creating a larger fleet comprising 11 Carrier Strike Groups (2006, p. 48).

Starting as of fiscal year 2007, the U.S. Strategic Command would decrease the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic missiles from 500 to 450.

The Department of Defense was the largest employer in the world, hiring more than three million individuals directly, and the Total Force of the Department-its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors- was its power and capacity for waging a war (2006, p. 75).

The U.S. did not perceive any great power as a threat. As the first priority of the U.S., the QDR adequately focused on the War on Terrorism. During the Cold War, it did not directly confront the Soviet Union, but rather led proxy wars in America, and the Middle East. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it exploited the international architecture one decade later with a Republican President following 9/11 incident. On the one hand, the U.S. got free hand to roam in the Middle East, America and Central Asia (one leg of containment policy). On the other hand, through enlargement of NATO towards Russian Federation, Russia was strategically pinned down. The U.S. mentioned from three great powers, but considered none a threat to itself. From that point, irregular warfare, Special Forces operations and non-state actors took priority in defense and force planning. It can also be noticed the differentiation on branches so that the Navy and Air Force focused on the Indo-Pacific Region. In addition, different from the President's assessment on China, American Defense Department behaved very prudent towards China.

### **QDR 2010**

This QDR was the first one issued in the term of the Democrat President Obama. In the foreword, Defense Minister stated that this QDR put further emphasis on and investment in, among other traditional and strategic modernization projects, a new air- naval combat concept, long-range attack, space and cyberspace (2010, p. i). This QDR report and the previous months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to define the main priorities of the Department, to provide background and guidance for capacity growth and

investment portfolios; and second, to convey the intent of the Secretary for the Department's next several years of work (2010, p. 4). There was a continuity in accordance with the former QDR especially focusing on low intensity conflict against insurgency/terrorism rather than conventional military threat assessment.

The rise of China, the most populous country in the world, and India, the largest democracy in the world, would continue to form an international system that was no longer easily established, one in which the U.S. remained the most powerful player; but if it were to preserve stability and peace, it must increasingly work with key allies and partners (2010, p. iii). It was accepted that distribution of power changed by stressing two rising powers; China and India. The strength and influence of the United States as a global force were closely related to the fate of the wider international system, a system of alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions that the U.S. has helped create and maintain for more than sixty years (2010, p. iii). The document indicated that large numbers of the U.S. forces would likely work in Afghanistan in the near to mid-term, and U.S. forces in Iraq would begin a prudent drawback in the near term (2010, p. v). The presence of U.S. military forces would not include all contingencies, but the Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a broad spectrum of contingencies. (2010, p. vi) To deter attacks on the United States and its allies and partners, the U.S. would maintain a healthy, stable and effective nuclear arsenal (2010, p. vi).

It was stated that a significant danger faced by the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction was a possibility (2010, p. ix). The capability of its special operations forces would continue to be increased by the United States (2010, p. x). About 400,000 U.S. military personnel are forward-stationed or rotated around the world, including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (2010, p. xiv).

Some important units of military services are listed as follows;

'Department of the Army:

18 Division headquarters

73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve Component [RC]),

21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC)

15 Patriot battalions.

Department of the Navy:

10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings

84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatants and Aegis Ashore

53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines

Department of the Air Force:

8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft)

10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing equivalent)

5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft)

6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)

Special Operations Forces:

Approximately 660 special operations teams

3 Ranger battalions'. (2010, pp. 46-7)

Taking these numbers into consideration, it is obvious that there has not been any specific changes in critical capabilities in comparison with the previous QDR, but an inclination to increase special units against irregular warfare.

It is obvious that the QDR in question is strategy-driven. It starts with an evaluation of the emerging security climate and its many aspects and continues to specify the emergence of new powers, the increasing presence of non-state actors, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other disruptive technologies, and a series of enduring

and evolving socio-economic developments which are likely pose profound challenges to the international order.

It was also stated that as part of their defiance of international standards, North Korea and Iran are aggressively testing and deploying new ballistic missile systems (2010, p. 31). Unmanned aerial vehicles and man-portable air defense systems have been purchased from Iran by non-state actors such as Hezbollah (2010, p. 32).

Even though China was producing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines armed with advanced weapons, advanced fighter aircraft, it has shared only limited details on ultimate goals of its military modernization programs, raising many suspicions over its long-term intentions (2010, p. 31).

Proliferation by Russia and others of modern surface-to-air missile systems posed increasing challenges for U.S. military operations worldwide (2010, pp. 31-2).

The U.S. retained four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters in Europe. (2010, p. 65) Since 2001, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly increased the presence of the United States in the greater Middle East and in Central and South Asia (2010, p. 67).

In conclusion, U.S. Chairman Admiral Mullen suggested that the QDR places adequate emphasis on the U.S.' mission to interrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda globally, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent it from threatening the future of America and its allies. He was also concerned about Iran and North Korea's nuclear aspirations and confrontational positions (2010, pp. 101-3). Thus, their strategy's main pillars might be assumed as in the wider Middle East and Central and South Asia, the establishment of a customized role facilitates a secure and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, and reaffirmed its commitment to NATO and Europe (2010, p. 104).

There seems an acceptance in the document of the change of the distribution of power and the international structure from unilateral structure to multilateral. Central elements of the American security policy are the continuation of established alliances and the development of new partnerships. A stable international structure alone will not maintain

the United States. Their ability to understand the concerns, expectations, and attitudes of foreign governments and populations, and the ways in which their words and behavior can affect allies and partners, will need to be improved. A strong transatlantic relationship is central to the stability of the United States, underpinned by the bilateral ties between the United States and the governments of Europe, building on the benefits of French reintegration into the military framework of NATO. France has also accepted that she could not reach her ambitions alone, and might intend to use NATO as a leverage.

### **QDR 2014**

The QDR 2014 was the second one issued in the term of Obama Administration, and it was shorter than the previous one. The 2014 edition pointed to a strategy-driven and resource-informed process to train the Defense Department for the future and coordinate its activities in the fiscal austerity era. (2014, p. 1) The 2010 QDR reflected mainly a wartime strategy, while the 2014 QDR was an expansion of the previous defense assessments of this Administration. (2014, p. 12)

It was indicated that the military goals of the 21st Century outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategy Guidelines included rebalancing the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and prosperity in the region; sustaining a firm commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East; maintaining a global approach to fighting violent extremism and terrorist attacks, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa (2014, p. v).

Economic development in Asia, ageing demographics in the United States, Europe, China, and Japan, continuing turmoil in the Middle East and Africa, and many other patterns connected dynamically in a fundamentally globalized environment (2014, p. 3). For more than a century, the U.S. became a Pacific force with strong and lasting economic and security links to the region (2014, p. 4).

The long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs of North Korea, particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons in breach of its international obligations, posed a major threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and posed a growing direct threat to the United States (2014, p. 4).

The U.S. intended to continue rebalancing the Asia-Pacific region, so that the government's attempts to modernize and strengthen its defense partnerships with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand also rebalanced the Asia-Pacific region (2014, p. 16). The U.S. embraced the emergence of India as an increasingly capable player in the region and deepened its strategic relationship, particularly through the Military Trade and Technology Initiative (2014, p. 17).

In the Middle East, Iran's other destabilizing actions continued to threaten the Middle East, especially the stability of its allies and partners in the region and around the world (2014, p. 5).

Europe would be crucial in resolving these challenges as instability and violence continue, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, but Europe was also home to the most stubborn and competent allies and partners to the U.S. (2014, p. 5).

When taking a military action, the U.S. would be principled and selective; and it will do that only when appropriate and in compliance with all relevant rules, as well as U.S. rights and principles (2014, p. 11).

Main tasks included cutting the major expenditures of the Department's offices by 20 percent and decreasing the number of direct reports to the Defense Secretary. (2014, p. xi) This would decrease the Department's operational costs over the next five years by \$5 billion and over the next decade by more than double that number (2014, p. xi).

The Air Force had to remove 80 more fighters, including the entire KC-10 tanker fleet and the Global Hawk Block 40 fleet, slow down Joint Strike Fighter acquisitions, maintained ten less Predator and Reaper 24-hour combat patrols, and take deep cuts to flying hours if sequestration-level cuts were enforced in FY2016 and beyond (2014, p. 28). It is evident an increase in aviation brigade in comparison with the last QDR, and 2-4 decrease in attack submarines.

Chairman General Dempsey claimed that 'strategy is about juggling ends, forms, and means; that is, the national priorities of the U.S., its organizational principles, and its available resources. Therefore, with the "ends" of the U.S. set and its "means"

diminishing, it is imperative that it innovate the “ways” in which it defends the country’ (2014, p. 59).

The likelihood of interstate war in East Asia to increase over the next 10 years is also reported along with an increased vulnerability of U.S. networks and bases, eroded technical advantage, continued chaos in the Middle East, and challenges to survival faced by violent extremist groups. (2014, p. 61)

### **NDS’**

The NDS issued by the U.S. Department of Defense is intended to clarify how DOD can support the President’s National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy (NDS) acts as the capstone paper of the Department. It flows from the NSS and advises the Military National Policy (Department of Defense, 2008).

*Table 2. 11 Key Words Frequency in the NDS Documents- Year 2000-2019*

Year	Key Words	Frequency
2005	Threat	38
	Capability/ies	96
2008	Threat	25
	Capability/ies	62
2018 (Summary)	Threat	32
	Capability/ies	38

### **NDS 2005**

NDS 2005 was 24 pages long, excluding the foreword and the executive summary. The term ‘long war’ was stated in the document for 41 times. It faced radically distinct problems from those encountered in the Cold War and previous eras by the American defense system (Department of Defense, 2005, p. v). The international community got the greatest opportunity since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century, as reported in the President’s National Security Strategy, to create a world where major

powers engaged in peace rather than constantly planning for war (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 5). ‘The possibility of renewed great power competition’ was underlined concerning China and Russia. (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 5). While the security challenges of the 20th Century emerged from strong states embarking on aggressive paths, the main dimensions of the 21st Century may emerge in and emanate from comparatively weak states and ungoverned regions, globalization and the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 1). North Korea, on the other hand, is presenting conventional, irregular, and devastating threats at once (Department of Defense, 2005, p.3). In the war on terrorism, a modern strategy was clear (Department of Defense, 2005, p.2). International alliances proved to be a central source of the strength of the United States so that shared values, the collective understanding of risks and the pledge to cooperation offered much more defense than could be accomplished by the U.S. alone (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 4). Concerning capabilities-based approach, it was stated that the U.S. needed to set priorities among a variety of capabilities. (Department of Defense, 2005, p. i)

It was mentioned in the document, as some of the challenges, that while the U.S. had no global peer, it would have rivals and enemies –both state and non-state; risks could be differently viewed globally, even among its closest allies, and unity would be difficult to achieve. (Department of Defense, 2005, p.6) Therefore, collective action was obviously necessary for a stable international framework (Department of Defense, 2005, p.8). It was also stressed the lack of capabilities of some allies under the ‘Vulnerabilities’ section. (Department of Defense, 2005, p.6) From those statements, it could be understood that the U.S. Department of Defense recognized the possible problems very well. U.S. troops remained based in Cold War areas into the 1990s, mainly in the Western Europe and Northeast Asia. The U.S. did not perceive any global peer rival and while remaining unparalleled in conventional military capabilities. The ‘active defense’ strategy stressed in the document recalls offensive realism.

## **NDS 2008**

There was a path dependency in order to redefine new threats. With aggressive transnational terror networks, aggressive states armed with weapons of mass destruction, increasing foreign forces, new space and cyber threats, natural and pandemic disasters,

and growing rivalry for capital, the United States, its alliances, and its partners face a variety of challenges (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 1). The findings of the 2006 Quadrennial Security Review (QDR) and lessons learnt from continuing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere are expressed in this paper (Department of Defense, 2008, p.2). New commands (integrating Space and Strategic Commands, creating Northern and Africa Commands) structures were created by the Department since 2001. The fact that the U.S. military forces are deployed as per regions at the command of the combatant commanders shows that it does not tolerate even the regional hegemony. Established a regional command center in Africa, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a caution also against China's expansion.

State actors no longer had a monopoly on the disastrous use of aggression, as reported in the 2006 QDR (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 7). Including communism and imperialism before it, the militant extremist philosophy opposed the international system's laws and institutions (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2).

It was argued that the world order was equally challenged by rogue states such as Iran and North Korea: The pursuit of nuclear technologies and enrichment capability by Iran posed a serious security threat in an area which is already fragile, and significant nuclear and missile proliferation risk for the U.S. and other responsible foreign partners was also raised by the North Korean regime. (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 3)

The risk of challenges from stronger states must also be considered by the U.S., particularly against China the U.S. needed to hedge its potential 'full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities' in addition to its conventional military capabilities. (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 3). This paragraph emphasizes the potential of China as a global opponent against the U.S. hegemony.

Russia was seeking 'renewed influence' so that it started to take a more aggressive military approach, such as renewing long-range bomber flights, withdrawing from the conventions on weapons control and force reduction, and also challenging target countries hosting future U.S. anti-missile bases. (Department of Defense, 2008, p.4)

A multilateral solution was stated as a presumption that the United States, and particularly the Department of Defense, cannot win the 'Long War' or resolve other security issues

alone successfully (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 23). China and Russia were also significant potential allies, and the U.S. seeks to establish collaborative and cooperative ties with them. (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 11) India was required to assume greater responsibilities in line with its rising commercial, military and soft power (Department of Defense, 2008, p. 14). It can be deduced that the U.S. intended to conduct containment policy with India against China at that theatre.

Even though U.S. President Bush does not identify China and Russia as threats within the 2002 NSS and the 2006 NSS, it is obvious Pentagon's warnings against China and Russia in the 2005 NDS and 2008 NDS. Pentagon also points to the risk that the great power competition period might start again. From this perspective, it can be deduced that Pentagon did not take into consideration the U.S. President's priorities, but it had to give a mandatory support, because the strategy documents of the Bush era emphasized that this transformation had been determined through a top-down approach.

### **NDS 2018**

Different from the previous ones, this NDS was published as a summary thus it was 11 pages long. The U.S. policy was articulated by this unclassified synopsis of the classified 2018 National Security Strategy, and in tandem with a strong constellation of alliances and partners, a more lethal, robust and increasingly inventive Joint Force could sustain stability by strength. (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1) Power is considered as an ends and there is also a call for sustaining alliances and partners as multilateral approach.

It was claimed that the U.S. is emerged from a time of "strategic atrophy", mindful of the depletion of its competitive military edge. (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1) States were the world's key players, but non-state actors are still disrupting the defense climate with highly advanced capabilities. (Department of Defense, 2018, p.3) New and rapid technological advancements changed the character of war forced states to compete in technology which was convertible to future wars. (Department of Defense, 2018, p.3)

The re-emergence of long-term, geopolitical rivalry rooted from what the National Security Strategy defined as revisionist powers namely China and Russia was the key threat to U.S. stability and security. (Department of Defense, p. 2) It was claimed that by seeking nuclear weapons or supporting terrorism, rogue regimes like North Korea and

Iran continued to destabilize regions, and across all aspects of influence, both revisionist forces and rogue governments are fighting (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2).

The Department intended to continue its efforts to discourage and fight rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran at the same time (Department of Defense, p. 4). While a strong focus was put on improving the NATO Trans-Atlantic Partnership, in the face of their mutual security challenges, the U.S. wanted European allies to uphold their promises to increase defense and modernization investment to strengthen the alliance (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 9). The transformation necessity was also stressed in the document, but this time in the opposite direction from action against terrorism to policies in compatible with the great power competition.

### **NMS'**

The NMS provides policy advice to the armed forces to illustrate how NDS priorities should be supported (2005).

*Table 2. 12 Key Words Frequency in the NMS Documents- Year 2000-2019*

Year	Key Words	Frequency
2004	Threat	44
	Capability/ies	156
2011	Threat	22
	Capability/ies	54
2015	Threat	20
	Capability/ies	40
2018 (Unclassified)	Threat	5
	Capability/ies	8

### **NMS 2004**

There was a call for the armed forces transformation “in stride” requiring new capabilities and operational concepts in order to fight against terrorists actively (Joint Chief of Staff, 2004, p.1) An active policy to fight transnational terrorist networks, rogue nations and hostile states possessing or working to procure weapons of mass destruction or impact

(WMD/E) was driven by the NSS. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2004, p. 1) The United States had to pursue an “active in-depth defense” that synergistically incorporated common force, interagency, international non-governmental organizations and global capabilities. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2004, p. 6) The U.S. armed forces had to preserve the capability and the capacity to fight adversaries and win in, “two overlapping military campaigns” when needed. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2004, p. 4)

The U.S. armed forces became joint forces in order to combine the capabilities of individual services, and the new structure was intended more ‘flexible’ and ‘modular’ force, and transformed armed forces aimed to combine either high-tech or low-tech capabilities (Joint Chief of Staff, 2004, p. 15). It was also stressed activities to improve partnerships between allies, partners and friends of the United States (Joint Chief of Staff, 2004, p. 1). In this document, any mentions of the traditional great power competition or any great power threat perception was not came across openly.

### **NMS 2011**

It was stated that the distribution of power changed as some growing state actors became influential. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p.2) Developments in Asia and the Middle East could threaten regional stability so that two increasing global forces and a vast number of significant regional powers occurred in Asia, and a variety of new and powerful regional forces were found in the Middle East. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p. 2) It was anticipated that China’s decades-long economic development would end up with its continuing military modernization and extension of its interests in and outside the region. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p. 2) A nuclear-armed Iran in the Middle East could set off a cascade of countries in the region pursuing nuclear parity or expanded conventional capability, contributing to regional conflicts, and the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the potentially unpredictable transfer of power posed a danger in Asia. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p. 3)

Two goals mentioned in NMS 2011 were contradictory; ‘NATO will remain the leading multilateral coalition of the United States and will continue to drive our security ties with Europe, and the geopolitical goals and ambitions of the U.S. will emanate more and more from the Asia-Pacific region.’ (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, pp. 12-13) NATO remained the

strongest military coalition, while some of its members reduced their defense spending which reductions affected the contributions of partner nations to the collective protection of the U.S. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p.3)

Strengthening foreign and regional stability needed American forces to act internationally, but centered regionally so that working to counter challenges offered a rough but adaptable agenda that had to be customized and organized across geographic seams by Combatant Commanders. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p.10: p.15) Among these challenges, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, cyber-aggression, pandemics were defined as transnational challenges. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p.15)

### **NMS 2015**

There was a come back to the traditional strategy components, defining the adversaries and the space openly. China, Russia, Iran and North Korea were criticized in the similar style with the previous documents for their breaking international rules, and ambitious intentions to increase their influence.

There was an alert in the preface of the document. The U.S. faced both state and non-state threats exploiting fast technological improvements, and the conduct of military power against a state threat was very different than against a non-state threat. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2015) The 2015 National Military Strategy reported that the need to fight revisionist states that challenged international norms in addition to violent extremist organizations (VEOs). (Joint Chief of Staff, 2015, p. 1). In confronting all revisionist states and VEOs, it must include a wide range of military options (Joint Chief of Staff, p. 3). It was underlined that without adequate support, the U.S. could not realize the aims of this 2015 National Military Strategy (Joint Chief of Staff, 2015, p. 13). The U.S. had to work with allies and collaborators to discourage, refuse and, if needed, destroy future adversaries of the state (Joint Chief of Staff, 2015, p. 1). Among ‘advanced partners’, NATO, Japan, Australia, and Korea were written, and the need for combined exercises and training was also stressed in order to increase the readiness and to enhance the interoperability. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2015, p. 10)

## **NMS 2018**

The 2018 NMS indicated from its global viewpoint, an agile and creative ‘Integrated Force’ capable of using its resources across various regions with the transition from a regional mindset and approach to a global one. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018, p.2)

With regard to NDS 2017, it was emphasized from some of the related security trends such as the reemergence of great-power competition, resilient but decreasing post-World War II order, allies and partners based solutions, the changing character of war based on technology, the assumption that homeland was not anymore a sanctuary, and the urgency of change. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018, p. 2) China and Russia were defined as the most challenging threats. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018, p. 2) The terms of ‘force development’ and ‘force design’ was defined while the former focused on present planning and force management and the latter intended to deter/defeat future adversaries in radically different ways. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018, p. 4) As another term, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) was explained as a shift to “a concept-driven, threat-informed, capability development process and provide a campaign approach”. (Joint Chief of Staff, 2018, p. 5) It seems to be a mixture of threat-based and capability-based approach. The assigned security trend concerning that the homeland was not a sanctuary recall offensive realism as well.

### **Assessment of the American Documents**

The U.S. policy makers between the years of 2000 and 2010 focused on the wrong threats, and places. There was not any existential threat against the U.S. but a limited terrorist attack. According to realist arguments, the U.S. might have weakened their potential rivalries such as China or Russia as written in the late American strategic documents.

The last NDS (NDS 2018) stated that the key goals for long-term strategic rivalry with China and Russia became main priorities. It was also argued that China and Russia exploited the competitive advantage while the U.S. was busy in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and then in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 through developing their military capabilities and a force structure specifically designed to challenge U.S. influence and increase their own international stature. The U.S. has ignored the realist balance of threat

concept, while China and Russia exploited it. The U.S. recalled the great power competition, but it was not an easy task due to both threat perception differences and lack of capabilities in addition to differences in strategy preferences in the two pillars of the Transatlantic Alliance.

It could also be argued that the U.S. had not acted strategically because it did not succeed to designate threats properly and set priorities for its military resources. When focusing on rising China, the U.S. has to bargain to delegate Russian threat perception to Europeans and open some room in their area of interest for their neighbor regions such as Northern Africa and Eastern Mediterranean.

In conclusion, it has been a grave mistake for the U.S. to underestimate the rising power of China as the biggest threat. Rather, it focused on a constructive non-state actors as the biggest threats which had actually limited effects. The economic crisis in 2008 and the election of Obama facilitated this trend and provided enough opportunities to China to further extend its influence. This trend of China might be framed as free-riser, thanks to the U.S.' "strategic atrophy" (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1).

### Chapter 3: France National Defense and Security Strategies

According to Luis Simon, France has a ‘hybrid’ persona in that partly maritime and partly continental, geopolitical configuration of which is largely delimited by its continental, Mediterranean and Atlantic flanks (Simón, 2013). It is also the only European nation state with territorial possessions on all continents except for the Arctic which means the interest area of the French foreign policy is the entire world (Kunz, 2015). This geopolitical position shapes its strategy in force (sea and air power) configuration and space. France intends to act as a global security actor, yet its means/capabilities are not compatible with its intentions. Its capability limits its strategy as defensive rather than offensive in a multilateral preference in the light of the international laws while using military power. France favors international institutions where it has the power to lead or veto such as the U.N. and EU. Concerning NATO, it does not have enough power, and thus aims to build an independent European Army where it holds one of the two influential great powers with the help of its unique nuclear capability. The ‘force de frappe’<sup>1</sup> maintains two separate nuclear deterrence capability systems (air-launched cruise missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles (Treacher, Dorman, & Kaufman, 2011). France on the one hand has overseas ambition, but on other hand lacks enough resources to fulfil its ambitions. Retired General Vincent Desportes criticized Macron with “juvenile authoritarianism” because of his general lack of understanding in the political world in addition to insufficient knowledge on what the army and military do (Chrisafis, 2017). Macron hit back by publicly slapping down the general at the annual summer military garden party, telling army generals in a speech: “I am the boss” asserting the French president’s constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Chrisafis, 2017). According to the Article 15 of the French Constitution French President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and foreign, security and defense policy are his “domaine réservé”<sup>2</sup> so that the President can single-handedly decide on French military interventions, and the Parliament needs to consent to prolonging the intervention within four months after the initial decision was taken (Kunz, 2015).

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<sup>1</sup> It means Strike Force includes French Nuclear Forces.

<sup>2</sup> English synonym is exclusive domain.

It was difficult for France to accept the loss of its former great power status in both Europe and the World. Historical lessons and learned experiences dictated France to be self-help. The failure of alliance architecture before WWI, and the following huge losses, the inefficacy of collective security architecture during interwar period pushed France to pursue self-sufficiency (Treacher, Dorman, & Kaufman, 2011, p. 96). According to veteran General and President Charles de Gaulle, France should have a global dimension in mind, and this intention should be supported by the independent French defense not only as a conventional means, but also nuclear power (Helnarska, 2013). His security vision was adapted in four pillars as;

- Independence of the military, based on its own 'force de frappe' and not participate in NATO military structures,

- Relative independence from the U.S.,

- Controlling the process of European Economic Integration,

- Maintaining the position of the first partner of the Soviet Union, while pursuing careful collaboration with the European socialist countries in the framework of European policy, based on the concept of Europe of Homelands'. (Helnarska, 2013)

With some structural changes, it can be claimed that there is a path dependency in French defense and security policies explained in successive white papers. The end of the Cold War caused some suspicions among Transatlantic Allies with the elimination of existential communist threat. Former political-military based approach had difficulties with American unilateral preferences in the face of political-economic impetus rather than military domain. The 2008 White Paper stresses that 'Industry must be European' because 'Individual European countries can no longer master every technology and capability at national level' (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 2)'' The French White Paper on defense and national security states that even the post-Cold War era is over in the statement that "In 1994, after the end of the division of Europe during the Cold War, France undertook a reappraisal of its strategy and force structure. This prepared the decision in 1996 to move to all-professional armed forces, to dismantle its surface-to-surface nuclear missiles... Some fifteen years later, the world has radically changed. The post-Cold War era is over" (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 1). It also

underscores the shift in the area of interest as ‘a priority geographical axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 2).’ At that time the U.K. used to be a member of the EU. The 2013 White Paper states that public expenditure on defense and security decisions must not only be taken account of the threats, but also the risks to the economic independence (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 9).

Félix Arteaga claims that the last French Strategic Review concentrates on the defense and armed forces of France, but not on the country’s national security (Arteaga, 2017). He argues that 2008 White Book broadened the security term, while the defense dimension took priority over the non-military aspects of security, and diplomacy or civil protection were diluted in 2013 White Book; but they disappeared in this 2017 Review, therefore it might be concluded that ‘la Défense et les Armées en sont le tout’ (‘defense and the armed forces are everything’). Military is an expensive and time-consuming asset. Macron has made a choice to maintain France among major and influential powers, but it will not be cheap, as the defense budget would need to rise from €32 billion in 2018 to €50 billion in 2025; such an investment bears the risk of leading to a growing economic and social insecurity. Autonomy is the most repeated term in the Review; rooted in the Gaullist tradition of leaving final decisions to France. This intention is similar to the U.S. acting unilaterally when needed, while maintaining present alliance and partner formations.


### **French Armed Forces**

France officially announced its full participation in the NATO Integrated Military Command Structures during the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009. As a result, France has posted nearly 750 additional officer positions within the NATO Integrated Command Structures since 2009. That decision was made under some national caveats such as; maintaining its nuclear independence: (France decided not to join the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)), and declaring that no French force was placed under permanent NATO command in times of peace (French Foreign Policy, 2020) in order to maintain its national strategic autonomy.

In 2008 White Paper; the force structure is summarized as “the main force levels proposed are as follows:

- An operational ground force (Force Opérationelle Terrestre) of 88,000 troops,
- An aircraft-carrier group,
- A joint fleet of 300 combat aircraft, regrouping the combat aircraft of both the Air Forces and the Navy (Rafale and modernized Mirage 2000-D)” (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 2)

Following the lessons learned in the Malian Case, the French Parliament’s commission on Defense and Armed Forces concluded that “for combat missions under urgent conditions, national intervention remains more efficient than European intervention”



(Kunz, 2015).

**Source:** (France Ministere de la Defense, 2016 )

*Figure 3. 1 The main strategic axis*

France’s main overseas outposts are located in the West Africa, reflecting the France’s colonial legacy dating back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, in particular with the start of the invasion of Algeria in 1830. With this move, France established a permanent French Foreign Legion on 10 March 1831 (Porch, 1991). French Foreign Legion still exists, however, the number of troops and their effective use has diminished with France’s losing its colonial rule over Africa. This outfit constitutes around 8% of French Army’s manpower. As of

2016, French Foreign Legion consists of about 7,600 personnel in 9 x Regiments located as follows:

Mainland France	6 regiments
Corsica	1 regiment
Djibouti	1 regiment
French Guyana	1 regiment and 1 detachment

You can see French overseas operations in Figure 3-2, 3-3, 3-4. They are compatible with Figure 3-1 (The main strategic axis). At the main strategic axis of France, it is important to control the roads leading to the west of Africa from the strait of Gibraltar and to the east and south via the Suez Canal. Naval forces are on duty on the waterway that extends to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the waterway of Central America towards the Atlantic Ocean. Land and air elements are deployed in the Middle East, Central Africa and in the Shel-Saharan.




Figure 3. 2 French Military Overseas Posture

Source: French DOD (France Ministere de la Defense, 2016 )

# French permanent missions / French forces (excluding overseas operations)

## • Organization intended for 2016




Figure 3. 3 French Forces Permanent Missions

Source: French DOD (France Ministere de la Defense, 2016 )




Figure 3. 4 French Military Overseas Posture-Year 2017

Source: French DOD (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017)

## Defense Expenditures

This section discusses the French defense expenditures, over the last two decades.




Figure 3. 5 France Military Expenditure (current USD)

(World Bank Data, 2021)

Defense expenditures, which were 28 billion dollars in 2000, reached their highest level in 2009 with 56 billion dollars. In 2009-2014, there was a defense budget increase due to the purchase of the Rafale aircraft. The budget increase is due to the high cost of high-tech weapons and vehicles.




Figure 3. 6 France Military Expenditure (% of GDP)

Although these are fluctuations in the defense expenditures of France in terms of GDP, the amount of dollars spent suggests the French economy growth went hand in hand with its military capability.

*Table 3. 1 Percentage devoted to Equipment expenditures*

Country	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019e
France	19.7	22.6	30.2	28.2	30.6	28.6	24.7	25	24.4	24.17	23.6	24.4

Source: NATO Information on defense expenditures (NATO, 2020)


*Table 3. 2 Percentage devoted to Personnel expenditures*

Country	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019e
France	59.6	55.7	47.6	49.4	49.1	49.2	48.5	47.7	47.9	47.9	46.9	45.81

Source: NATO Information on defense expenditures (NATO, 2020)

When Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 are taken into consideration together, nearly half of the expenditures are for the personnel with a steady annual decrease. Regarding equipment expenditures, it is obvious a rise in 2010-2014, and for the rest of the period it corresponds to almost  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the entire expenditures.

### French Armed Forces Personnel



*Figure 3. 7 France Armed Forces Personnel*

(World Bank Data, 2021)

If Figure 3.7 is analyzed, while the number of soldiers of France was 389 thousand in 2000, it went down by 20% to 307 thousand. This does not support the discourses of European Strategic Autonomy or recently the European Army.

The years between 1997 and 2001 were very pivotal for the French Army, as these were the years the conscription system was ended meant that the French Army turned into an entirely professional army. The cause of the decrease in the number of military personnel might be because of this change in the recruitment of personnel.

The number of military personnel has been on a gradual decline since the beginning of the new millennia, compared to the U.S. military, there is no peaking or surging increase in a single fiscal year, and the French military's overseas presence is not comparable to that of the U.S.

Strategic operations	2018 resources in €bn	
Total cost of salaries (12) excluding overseas operations	11.7	Total cost of salaries €11.9bn
T2 overseas operations (provisions)	0.3	
Training (AOP)	1.2	Excluding equipment €4.0bn
Running and specific activities (FAS)	2.4	
Excluding T2 overseas operations (provisions)	0.4	
Other armament operations (AOA)	1.3	
Nuclear deterrence (DIS)	4.0	Equipment €18.5bn
Support equipment (EAC)	0.9	
Armament programmes environment (EPA)	0.1	
Scheduled equipment maintenance (EPM)	3.9	
Scheduled staff management (EPP)	0.3	
Defence infrastructures (INFRA)	1.5	
Programmes with major impact (PEM)	5.5	
Projects and preparation of the future (PPA)	0.6	
Intelligence (RENS)	0.3	
"Defence" mission total excluding pensions	34.4	
Pensions	8.4	
"Defence" mission total including pensions	42.7	

*Table 3. 3 Breakdown of France Military Expenditure for FY 2018*

**Source:** (France Ministerie des Armees, 2018)

As discussed above, although the number of French military personnel has gradually decreased with the professionalization of the French Army, the expenditure has gradually increased. One reason for this is that professional armies require higher salaries compared to armies consisting of conscripts or volunteers. As could be observed in the Table 3.6, the fiscal year of 2018 was the lowest in the last two decades with regards to the military expenditure spent in terms of GDP percentage. In this year, although the total cost of salaries is €11.9 billion, overseas operations expenditure is only €300 million, which corresponds to 1/40 of the total salary expenditure.

Unlike the U.S., France's main form of global defense is not deploying soldiers all around the globe. Their main form of global defense is nuclear deterrence and their independency with regards to deployment of this tool as this is what pushed France's withdrawal from NATO in 1966 under the government of Charles de Gaulle, who excluded Germany and Italy from developing nuclear weapons along with France under the umbrella of Euratom, which was established in 1957 (Strauss, 1989). Thus, a large portion of the military budget is used for equipment and their maintenance, particularly nuclear deterrents.

### **Strategy Documents and Defense Policy**

Defense policy constitutes a part of the inter-ministerial defense and national security strategy (*Strategie de Defense*, 2019). French White Papers should be updated regularly every 6 years on planning law (loi de programmation), to give the directions of the state defense system and its possible costs (Helnarska, 2013). It is very interesting to note that France issued only one White Paper during the entire Cold War. During the time interval that this dissertation focuses on, two White Papers issues showcase the difficulty to adapt to new international structure. As stated in the 2013 White Book, France's strategic priorities and threat perceptions have evolved over time. Historically, the nuclear deterrence was the 1972 White Paper's priority. Following the end of the Cold War, the 1994 White Paper's radical decision is to professionalize the armed forces. The 2008 White Paper was influenced by the American strategy documents, and thus, covers a broader national security agenda. The 2013 White Paper makes some small corrections, but accords greater importance to the European Security road map mainly based on capability increase that would emancipate Europe from the U.S. French President Chirac's resistance to American Bush's request for more European troops in Afghanistan,

stemmed from the perception that American troops to be deployed to Iraq would further exacerbate Franco-U.S. relations (Howorth, 2010, p. 205).

*Table 3. 4 French Defense Strategic Documents- Time Period 2000-2019*

Year	Document	President
2008	White Book	Nicholas Sarkozy
2013	White Book	François Hollande
2017	'Revue Strategique'	Emmanuelle Macron

Each actor focuses on different key words, besides threat and capability. The most prominent keyword that stands out during the case study of France is autonomy.

*Table 3. 5 Key Words Frequency in Strategic Documents- Time Period 2000-2019*

Year	Key Words	Frequency
2008	Threat	31
	Capability/ies	89
	Autonomy/ous/ly	6
2013	Threat	161
	Capability	145
	Autonom/ous/ly	34
2017	Threat	103
	Capability/ies	151
	Autonomy/ous/ly	55

When Table 3.5 is examined, there has been the most increase in autonomy/ous/ly words, and then in capability/ies from 9/11 up to present. Assuming that French Army is a professional one, it is easy to conclude that investments in the defense industry will be a decisive factor on defense expenditures. As stated in the 2008 White Paper, there should be a “consistent defense effort” in both improving the modernization of the most repeatedly used equipment immediately, and starting projects on intelligence and readiness for the future (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 8). The level of threat and the climate of uncertainty that have characterized France’s international

environment since 2008 have not faded. Henceforth, three phenomena are covered in the analysis:

- “threats of strength” (the traditional use of military force or the threat of such force in relations between states);

- “risks of weakness” (the consequences of a state’s inability to exercise its sovereign responsibilities on its own territory, posing a security threat) (*Strategie de Defense*, 2019).

### **2008 The French White Paper on Defense and National Security:**

This White Paper is very different from the Cold War White Papers mainly focusing on broader contemporary security concerns. There is a statement that the French security agenda is perceived in accordance with the globalized external factors, as put in French “la mondialisation structure désormais l’ensemble des relations internationales”. (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 3)

Principal finding stated in this document is the acceptance that the world has changed deeply since the time of the 1994 White Paper, and also ‘the hierarchy of powers has changed and will continue to evolve’ (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 5). From realist perspective, this is a great finding in itself because it is one of the realist assumptions. The distribution of power concerning great powers has changed, and this trend will continue. France cannot cope alone within the new international architecture and intends to participate in NATO through external balancing to overcome this uncertainty reserving some national caveats. It could be interpreted as a kind ‘principled realism’ rooted in historical lessons learned. In terms of geographical focus strategic concept, the 2008 French White Paper prioritizes a geographic axis that spreads from the Indian Ocean, across the Persian Gulf, into the Mediterranean and over to the Atlantic (Treacher, 2014). In 1999, France made a radical change in its strategy and military force structure first by moving to all-professional armed forces, and subsequently by dismantling surface-to-surface nuclear missiles (only air and submarine second strike nuclear capability preserved), and finally creating significant force projection capability (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 3). It is also clearly and openly remarked that the post-Cold War period is over. The heart of the strategy calls for the protection of

the French population and territory in view of the new direct vulnerabilities (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 6).

The 2008 French White Paper argues that there is no competition between the EU and NATO; yet they are complementary. France re-entered the integrated military structures of NATO, which it had vacated in 1966 in accordance with de Gaulle's principles based on autonomy over full control of its nuclear and conventional forces, ruling out automatic military commitment (Grand, 2011). In comparison to the 1994 White Paper, it broadens the security interests of France, not limiting them to matters relating to military affairs only, but describes national security strategy referring to human security such as "common threats and threats that may endanger the lives of citizens" (Helnarska, 2013). President Sarkozy promised to return his country to the military structures of NATO, yet also underlining that this return would not be complete because it would not be subordinate to nuclear deterrence, which would remain under the French national exclusively command (Helnarska, 2013). The 2008 White Paper created the National Council on Security and Defense institution chaired by the President of France (Helnarska, 2013).

The document also indicates that the goal of the national security strategy is to cope with the threats/risks which might affect the life of the French Nation, and its first aim is to defend French population and territory while contributing to European and international security. From that statement, one might notice that there are three layers of security: national, European, and international. It can also be deduced that 'America first' is not a new approach, as the same approach has been declared by France in its White Paper before. This national interest approach is a very realist urge.

Coming from Continental European Security discipline, there is a statement on broader security concept, including human security and economic security. It is mentioned that the major innovation compared to the previous White paper (1994) is that the security interests should be concerned globally and concentrating not only on defense issues but also on broader security items.

The document overtly states that France's NATO participation will help the country reach a joint assessment of the new threats and better define the responsibility area 'sharing

between Americans and Europeans.’ This statement is very meaningful, both defining new threats and redefining the areas of responsibility. It recognizes the difference in threat perception on two pillars of the Transatlantic Alliance, and also includes a call to share the areas of responsibility. There is also an admission of the lack of self-sufficiency, and continued need for the NATO Alliance based on the new global distribution of power.

One may also see in the document the impacts of American unilateral military interventions especially in Iraq. The 2008 White Paper emphasizes the priority of the enhancement of multilateralism and against unilateralist use of force ignoring the central role of the United Nations Security Council. It also suggests a reform on the structure of the Council by mentioning Germany, Japan, India and Brazil and a fair representation of Africa as new permanent members (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 9). This statement affirms that France prefers multilateralism and aims to restrain unilateral use of force particularly by the U.S. The document gives a specific emphasis on Africa.

### **Threats**

There is no direct threat perception in the light of balance of threat so that it is stated that assuming that there is no threat of aggression against France, it is still mandatory to hold the capability of the freedom of action stressing the nuclear means ‘as long as nuclear weapons are necessary for its security’ (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 7).

In the ‘New Vulnerabilities’ section, the most dangerous ‘concern’ is ‘terrorism of mass destruction’ so that in case terrorist groups reach unconventional weapons, the level of ‘the threat might increase’. This argument is almost identical to the American Documents of the time. Ballistic and cruise missile threats will grow within the timeframe of the White Paper as a consequence of the proliferation of more capable missiles putting a broader range of countries within striking distance of Europe (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 3).

‘Jihadism-inspired terrorism’ is accepted as the most direct vulnerability and targeting directly both France and Europe (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 5). In conclusion, there has not been a state-based threat or even risk perception, but new vulnerabilities.

## Capabilities

In the light of new security architecture, where there has not been state-based threat and assuming only some vulnerabilities, there is an emphasis to the European ambition as a priority. Underlining the intention of the EU to be a major player in international security and crisis management as one of main tenets of the France's security policy, there is a passage stating that it aims 'Europe to be equipped with corresponding military and civilian capability' (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 7).

The White Paper suggests some concrete goals for European defense in the next years which are specifically presented below;

- Creating an all-inclusive intervention capability of 60,000 soldiers, deployable for one-year duration in a distant theatre provided with the required air and naval forces; (This statement is compatible with the The European Union's Headline Goal 1999)

- Obtaining the capability to deploy 2 or 3 peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations and several smaller scale civilian operations,

- Raising the European military and civilian planning and operational capability both, for possible interventions outside the EU;

- Creating a momentum, and reorganizing the European defense industry (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, pp. 7-8).

It must be European because of the fact that European countries can no longer lead each capability and technology at national level. France must keep its leader role focusing on the nuclear deterrence, ballistic missiles, SSNs, and cyber-security capabilities to preserve its strategic and political autonomy. Submarine capabilities, especially nuclear-powered ones, are strategically important so that France will preserve its national production capability except for other sea capabilities including conventional submarines are open to European framework collaboration (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 13). As for the other capabilities and technologies France is of the opinion that the European framework must be favored especially on combat aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, and, electronic parts.

The document also proposes formation of three main force levels that are;

- An operational ground force (Force Opérationnelle Terrestre) of 88,000 men; 5,000 soldiers on permanent alert, permitting 30,000 soldiers' force-projection capability in six months' notice;

- An aircraft-carrier group, 18 frigates, 6 SSNs and allowing the capability to mission 1/2 naval groups for the protection of coastlines or amphibious operations;

- An Air Force and a Navy (Rafale and modernized Mirage 2000-D) joint fleet of 300 combat aircraft, both under the operational command of the Chief of Staff of the armies and a single management by the Air Force permitting a 70 combat aircraft force projection capability abroad, and the permanent positioning of 5 squadrons within the national territory in addition to 10 aircraft on permanent alert.

The document also introduces a new concept of cyber-defense, and more importantly, the establishment of an offensive cyber-war capability in addition to a new space-based capability (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 12).

### **The 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security:**

There is a statement about national power components including the military power that France is extensively involved in the international arena 'through its economy, its ideas, its language, its diplomatic and military capabilities and its seat at the United Nations Security Council' in conformity with its national interests and values (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 7). In this statement there are references to both soft and hard power including normative values, economic and military power in pursuit of national interests. In the 'foundations of the strategy' section it is written that sovereignty and international legitimacy are two essential and complementary pillars, and the first one is relying on the France's autonomy both to make decisions and take action (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 19). The statement that the world has become genuinely multipolar, but also more fragmented (France Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 32)' is significant because first of all it points to an acceptance that the previous unipolar structure has ended, and secondly to a more fragmented geopolitical situation. It is also stated that the Europe continent is no longer the biggest concern of global strategic

confrontation; therefore, France has started to reduce its naval and military presence in the continent because the Asia and Pacific's strategic importance for the U.S. has increased, and in accordance with this new fact it has increased its defense budgets in that region (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 29).

Assuming that NATO and EU are two 'complementary' institutions, under the new security architecture France believes that Europe should take more responsibility because a pragmatic renovation of the European security and defense policy becomes essential (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 126).

The areas of influence and interest are clearly defined in the Chapter 4. (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 47). France's geo-strategic priorities are written as; the first priority of defense policy is to protect French territory and nationals (both in France and abroad), the second one is to contribute to guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic, the third priority is stabilizing Europe's surrounding environment, with partners and allies, mentioning namely the Mediterranean region and Africa where the 2013 White Paper gives importance, the fourth one is the Middle East and the Arabian Sea / Persian Gulf region, whereas the final priority is contributing to international security in the world, particularly in the Indian Ocean, Asia and South America (*Strategie de Defense*, 2019).

Accepting the lack of international regulation might cause chaotic situations, France approaches this new architecture as an opportunity to propose regional solutions in crisis management (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 32). France is not directly threatened by potential conflicts among Asian Powers, but it is nevertheless very directly engaged in the Region like its European partners (France Presidency de la Republique, 2008, p. 35). France sees multipolar world as an opportunity and intends to increase its market value. It plays regionally within the EU context, and globally as the sole global reach to European power with the U.S. In other words, the U.S. might turn its gaze to the theatre in the India-Pacific Region, while Europeans do their business in their area of interests.

Simon claims that the big theme of the 2013 White Paper is that while the U.S. strategically rebalances towards the Asia-Pacific region, Europeans should take the lead

in providing security in their close vicinity defined as Guinea-to-Somalia stretch, extending from the Gulf of Guinea in the west, through the Sahel-Maghreb with the Mediterranean and Red Seas onto the Gulf of Aden (Simón, 2013, pp. 38-44). The 2013 White Paper keeps the main strategic priorities (protection, awareness, prevention, deterrence, and intervention), defined also in the 2008 White Paper, while the focus on Africa has increased, while diminishing on Asia (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, September 2013). France, on the one hand, decreases its ambitions due to budget constraints, while on the other hand tries to give new momentum to European common security and defense (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, September 2013). The 2013 White Paper takes into consideration the evolution of French defense capabilities in the experience of the budgetary constraint (France Presidency de la Republique, French White Paper, 2013). It is overtly declared that France's independence is threatened if its public deficits make the country dependent on its creditors (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 9). It is suggested that France intends to seek to strengthen the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, formerly ESDP) by improving pooling and sharing and giving importance to greater EU strategic visions (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, September 2013). It implies a reduction of major capabilities by 10 to 15 per cent. For example, ground forces will have seven brigades rather than eight brigades, as declared in the 2008 White Paper (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, September 2013). In accordance with the changed geopolitical, economic and budgetary context, a more in depth approach should be implemented as the proactive development of strategic confluence among EU Members (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 22). This statement proves that cooperation requirement stems from both geopolitical change and budgetary constraints. In addition, 'strategic convergence between EU members' implies the difference of the area of responsibility with the Transatlantic Alliance. It is also noted that an intangible prerequisite for any use of force by France must be in compliance with the international law, both at national basis and within the framework of its alliances/defense agreements (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 23). Here lies another root cause of actions and tensions in the Transatlantic Security Architecture.

'France's engagement in the Transatlantic Alliance and in the European Union' topic dwelled on in the Chapter 6 is very important concerning. In the new international

structure which is both more unstable and uncertain, the document suggests three courses of action for France;

- ‘Going at it alone, but it continues with recognizing the acceptance that the scale of its interests throughout the world make this option unrealistic;

- Delegating French security to the U.S. and NATO, assuming that the Transatlantic Alliance is a pillar of the French defense policy, there is a stress on the differences of priorities that require each member to assume its own responsibility;

- The last option discussed is an integrated European defense. Even though France reaffirms its ambition for both a credible and effective European defense strategy, it cannot ignore the difficulties before implementation’. (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 59)

In conclusion, it is written that France’s defense and national security strategy intends to combine the most positive aspects of each of those three options as: the sovereignty of its decisions, full engagement in a dynamic Transatlantic Alliance, and a proactive and ambitious stance with respect to the European Union.

These courses of actions are quite significant; the first course of action is found unrealistic whereas the second one lacks France’s strategic autonomy and its global ambition and intentions. In the third course of action, there is a lack of capability in the global arena. This reality leads France to proceed in between the options 2 and 3, which might be argued to be the option 2.5 in a very realistic way. The 2013 France White Paper was criticized as “The new strategic equation proposed in the White Paper might be summed up as follows: less money, more instability and less US involvement = a more European defence system.” (Gnesotto & Margerie, 2013).

### **Threats**

The document explains that “threat” refers to any situation in which France needs to deal with a potentially hostile intent whereas the term “risk” refers to any danger that does not include any hostile intent, but which might affect the security of France, and therefore, it might be any political event in addition to natural, industrial, health and technological ones (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 10). Under ‘France a European Power

with Global Reach' title; it is stated that France no longer faces any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory for the first time in its history it has the good fortune to find itself– along with its European partners (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 13).It is mentioned that there is no immediate strategic threat, but a fast-changing and very unpredictable environment, where France should consolidate its capacity to integrate the innovative civilian or military technologies required for weapons systems and equipment (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 119).

The document cleverly underlines without openly citing Germany as a historical neighbor threat that France has to face the powers that challenge its position and pose a threat to its territory and security throughout its history, and with the help of the EU its relationship with its western neighbors is no longer based on the balance of power as a means of guaranteeing peace (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 33). In the continuing sentences, there is a reminder to the large and rapid military spending and conventional arsenal in other regions of the world, which might be threats. The rapid growth in defense budgets particularly in Asian countries confirms this potential. In addition, the numerous French military operations that took place in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Libya, and Mali has prove that military action still remains an important part of its security efforts. The risks and threats facing France are broadened from state actors to non-state concerns and explained as terrorism, cyber threats, organized crime, and the spread of conventional weapons, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the risk of pandemic and technological and natural risks, all of which were also declared in the 2008 White Paper and stated to be confirmed by the events of recent years (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 10). This statement is almost the same as what was written in the contemporary American Documents.

Even though Russia increases its economic and military power to engage in power politics with the help of its exports of raw and energy materials itself with the economic and military clout that will enable it to engage in power politics, there is uncertainty on its future ambitions, and thus the EU members' relations with Russia is mixed and complicated (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 36). Along the same lines, although the Lisbon Treaty's inclusion of collective defense and EU Member States' equal concerns by most threats, there is also an acceptance of difference in their

perceptions, strategic cultures and national ambitions so that this difference might cause a source of mutual suspicion and make any hopes of rapid integration appear ‘unrealistic’. (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 17). While the U.S. accepted Russia in addition to China as a threat in its last strategic documents there has not been a concrete policy towards Russia.

### **Capabilities**

The financial crisis pushed nations to combine their military capabilities. Assuming its most important partners are the EU members, France expects Europe to get more responsibility through a more collective strategy pooling together each members’ resources (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 9). France provides European sharing and pooling military capabilities initiatives (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 126). In the document, the ‘pooling’ term is repeated 28 times. It mentions Germany in order to develop together a European space surveillance capability while underlining the fact that France and Germany possess sufficient resources (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 44). It also indicates that the French defense industry contributes remarkably to its economy with the help of over 4000 companies as a key part of its strategic autonomy.

Nuclear deterrence is vital and protects France against any State-led aggression (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 67). This ‘strictly defensive’ capability contributes to the security of both Europe and the NATO, and it is under the responsibility of the President of the Republic (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 72). It is also ‘the ultimate guarantee of the security, protection and independence of the Nation’ being only admissible in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defense (France Presidency de la Republique, 2013, p. 73). From this statement it might be deduced that France implements a self-help strategy against any potential great power threat rooted in the lessons learned from history besides defensive realist principles in order to overcome the fear of occupation as it had happened in the WWI, and WWII.

France will keep allocating substantial resources to defense, in spite of the financial crisis so that its defense spending will amount to €364 billion (2013 value) for the next 12 years (2014-2025 period), in addition to €179 billion (2013 value) for the next military program

act covering the 2014-2019 period, in order to allow the construction of a new armed forces model that will fulfill the requirements of its strategy (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 129). This allocation will depend on France's economy. The whole defense budget has decreased by 1.7 per cent GDP to around 1.5 per cent (excluding pensions), and for the coming 2014-2019 period around 34000 defense related personnel (both civilian and military) will be fired (Simón, 2013). In detail, the France Defense Ministry was determined to reduce its manpower (with a new reduction of 23,500 men) in accordance with the urgent need to cut public spending. 18,500 posts were still kept compared with the initial decision, in addition, French President announced officially the end of French MoD manpower reductions following the 13th November attacks in Paris (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013).

French Armed Forces' Equipment on the Tables (Table 3.6- 3.10) can be seen below.

Table 3. 6 French Army Equipment 2016

EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT	EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT
<b>ARMoured VEHICLE</b>	<b>6.648</b>	<b>CONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY</b>	<b>363</b>
<i>Combat Tank</i>	200	155 mm self-propelled gun	121
Leclerc	200	VOA (Artillery observation vehicle)	89
<i>Tracked armoured vehicle</i>	<b>155</b>	120 mm mortar	140
VHM (High-Mobility Vehicle)	53	LRU (Unitary launch rocket system)	13
<i>DCL (Leclerc repair tank)</i>	18	<b>INFANTRY EQUIPMENT</b>	<b>18,552</b>
AMX 30 D	30	FELIN	18,552
EBG & SDPMAC	54	<b>ANTI - TANK WEAPON SYSTEM</b>	<b>1,184</b>
<i>Wheeled Vehicle</i>	<b>6.293</b>	Milan firing station (428), Hot (30), Eryx (650), Javelin (76)	1,184
AMX 10 RCR	248	<b>HELICOPTER</b>	<b>295</b>
ERC 90 Sagaie	90	All types of Gazelle (111), Tigre (55), Cougar (26), Puma SA 330 (77), Caracal (8), Caiman (18)	295
VBCI (Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle)	629	<b>TRAINING HELICOPTER</b>	<b>18</b>
Troop transport (all types of LAV)	2.661	Fennec	18
LAV (PVP)	1,181	<b>LIASON AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>13</b>
LAV (VBL-VB2L)	1,466	TBM 700 (8), Pilatus (5)	13
Aravis	14	<b>GROUND-TO-AIR WEAPON SYSTEM</b>	<b>221</b>
Buffalo	4	Upgraded Mistral firing station	221
		<b>UAV (DELIVERED BY AIR)</b>	<b>72</b>
		SDTI (Sperwer tactical UAV system)	24
		DRAC (Close-range reconnaissance UAV system)	48

Source: French DOD (France Ministere de la Defense, 2016 )

Table 3.7 French Naval Equipment 2016

EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT	EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT
<b>COMBAT AND SUPPORT SHIP</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>ON ROAD AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>45</b>
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine	4	French Navy Rafale	42
Nuclear-powered attack submarine	6	Hawkeye - E2C	3
Aircraft carrier	1	<b>MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>23</b>
Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD)	3	Atlantique 2	23
1st rank frigate	17	<b>MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>13</b>
Surveillance frigate	6	Falcon 50 M (8), Falcon 200 (5)	13
Offshore patrol vessel	19	<b>COMBAT AND RESCUE HELICOPTER</b>	<b>53</b>
Minehunter	11	Calman Marine (Navy) (16), Panther (16), Lynx (18), Dauphin Pedro (3)	53
France's overseas departments and territories support ship	2		
Command and replenishment ship	3		

Source: French DOD (France Ministere de la Defense, 2016 )

Table 3. 8 French Air Force Equipment 2016

EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT	EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT
<b>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>TRAINING AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>131</b>
Rafale (omnirole)	81	Epsilon(pilot's initial training)	33
Mirage 2000 N (nuclear and conventional assault)	23	Alpha Jet (fighter pilot's training)	75
Mirage 2000 D (conventional assault)	67	Xingu (transport pilot's training)	23
Mirage 2000-5 and 2000 C (air defence)	35	<b>HELICOPTER</b>	<b>79</b>
Mirage 2000 B (transformation)	6	Fennec (Air defence - air security active measures)	40
<b>TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>78</b>	Caracal (Combat Search and Rescue)	11
A340 and A310 (strategic airlift)	5	Super Puma and Puma (Transport Search and Rescue)	28
C160 Transall (tactical transport)	23	<b>UAV (DELIVERED BY AIR)</b>	<b>7</b>
C130 Hercules (tactical transport)	14	Harfang (4), Reaper (3)	7
CN235 (tactical transport light)	27	<b>GROUND-TO-AIR WEAPON SYSTEM</b>	<b>21</b>
A400M Atlas (tactical transport with strategic range)	9	Crotale NG (12), SAMP "Mamba" (9)	21
<b>SUPPORT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>20</b>		
C135FR and KC 135 (tanker aircraft)	14		
E-3FSDCA(airborne detection command and control)	4		

Source: French DOD (France Ministere de la Defense, 2016 )

Table 3. 9 French Navy Equipment 2018

EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT	EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT
<b>COMBAT AND SUPPORT SHIP</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>ON ROAD AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>45</b>
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine	4	French Navy Rafale	42
Nuclear-powered attack submarine	6	Hawkeye - E2C	3
Aircraft carrier	1	<b>MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>22</b>
Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD)	3	Atlantique 2	22
1st rank frigate	16	<b>MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>13</b>
Surveillance frigate	6	Falcon 50 M (8), Falcon 200 (5)	13
Offshore patrol vessel	20	<b>COMBAT AND RESCUE HELICOPTER</b>	<b>56</b>
Minehunter	10	Calman Marine (Navy) (21), Panther (16), Lynx (16), Dauphin Pedro (3)	56
France's overseas departments and territories support ship	3		
Command and replenishment ship	3		

(France Ministerie des Armees, 2018)

Table 3. 10 French Air Force Equipment 2018

EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT	EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT
<b>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>TRAINING AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>139</b>
Rafale (omnirole)	102	Epsilon (pilot's initial training)	32
Mirage 2000 N (nuclear and conventional assault)	16	Alphajet (fighter pilot's training)	84
Mirage 2000 D (conventional assault)	71	Xingu (transport pilot's training)	23
Mirage 2000-5 and 2000 C (air defence)	40	<b>PRESENTATION TEAM</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>78</b>	Alphajet Patrouille de France	12
A340 and A310 (strategic airlift)	5	Extra 300/330	2
C160 Transall (tactical transport)	18	<b>HELICOPTER</b>	<b>75</b>
C130 Hercules (tactical transport)	14	Fennec (Air defence – air security active measures)	40
		Caracal (Combat Search and Rescue)	10
		Super Puma and Puma (Transport, Search and Rescue)	25
CN235 (tactical transport light)	27	<b>UAV (DELIVERED BY AIR)</b>	<b>6</b>
A400M Atlas (tactical transport with strategic range)	14		
<b>TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>20</b>	Reaper	6
C135FR and KC135 (tanker aircraft)	14	<b>GROUND-TO-AIR WEAPON SYSTEM</b>	<b>20</b>
E-3F SDCA (airborne detection command and control)	4	Crotale NG	12
C160G (electromagnetic intelligence gathering)	2	SAMP "Mamba"	8

Source: (France Ministerie des Armees, 2018)

Comparing French Navy and Air Force equipment between the years 2016 – 2018, it is evident that there is an increase in the number of Rafale combat aircrafts from 81 to 102 in two years. Rafale combat aircraft were not only becoming popular within France, the aircraft has been one of the most important item of France's weapons export in the recent years, as Egypt, India and Qatar showed great interest to the aircraft between the years of 2015 and 2019. On top of this, Brazil and India are also procurers of France's submarines (Mackenzie, 2020). Another important aircraft is France's Mirage N which carries nuclear ammunition as part of France's sovereign nuclear deterrence policy. Despite an apparent decrease in the number of active Mirage N aircrafts from 2016 to 2018, Rafale aircraft multirole capability makes up for this decrease and the remaining of 16 Mirage N aircraft can still carry their nuclear loads.

Another important item of France's weapons export and their main item of nuclear deterrence policy are nuclear-powered submarines. The number of these equipment has not changed between 2016 and 2018 as these are highly expensive weapons to produce and maintain. Reportedly, France spends around €3 billion annually for the maintenance of its nuclear arsenal, this expenditure is more than %75 of France's annual €3.9 billion overall equipment maintenance expenditure (Trippe, 2019). This excludes another €4 billion spent for nuclear deterrence costs shown in Table 5.6. It is also important to note AUKUS, and letting France out of the submarine deal with Australia agreed before. From that point view, it is obvious that foreign policy and defense investments are also interrelated.

According to the SIPRI Yearbook, as of January 2020, France is the fourth largest nuclear power coming behind Russia, the U.S., and China. As the former three are considered global powers, France seems to be striving to become at least a regional power and their sovereignty policy regarding nuclear weapons also supports this idea along with the data regarding their expenditures and number of nuclear weapons (SIPRI, 2020).

France is also one of the last western countries to have stopped enriching uranium in 1996. This fact gave them the advantage over the U.K. to produce and store more nuclear weapons, as the U.K. stopped enriching uranium back in 1962. France is also the third largest stockpiler of highly enriched uranium following Russia and the U.S. 1/6<sup>th</sup> of this stock is declared to be used for civilian energy production. This is another piece of data confirming France's determination for nuclear sovereignty among nations of the world (SIPRI, 2020)

Strategic Nuclear Strike Force (Force De Frappe) consists of a submarine based element with submarine launched ballistic missiles and an air launch element with aircraft carrying the nuclear armed missile ASMP/ASMP-A (*French Armed Forces - French Army - French Navy - French Air Force*, n.d.). The French nuclear deterrence is based on two complementary components which are the marine and air ones (*Strategie de Defense*, 2019).

The French armed forces can deploy for division-level or equivalent operations with all three main force components, and it will preserve the capacity to set up command

structures for land, sea and air forces at army corps level or equivalent in the framework of a major engagement, notably within NATO (France *Presidence de la Republique*, 2013, p. 89).

The French Land Forces can provide an operational capacity of 66,000 deployable troops, supported by around 200 heavy tanks, 250 medium tanks, 2,700 multi-purpose armored and combat vehicles, 140 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters and some 30 tactical drones particularly in the military formation of seven combined brigades, two of which will be trained for first entry and coercive combat against heavily armed adversaries.

The navy has the nuclear deterrence capability with naval aviation nuclear force and through permanent nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine patrols in the force formation mainly of around our aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered attack submarines, combined force projection and command vessels (BPC), and anti-aircraft and multi-mission frigates around continental France and its overseas territories. It is particularly composed of four nuclear powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, one aircraft carrier, 15 front-line frigates, some 15 patrol boats, six surveillance frigates, three combined force projection and command vessels (BPC) (France *Presidence de la Republique*, 2013, pp. 90-1).

The air forces most notably have the capacity of 225 fighter aircraft (air and naval), together with some 50 tactical transport aircraft, seven detection and air surveillance aircraft, 12 multi-role refueling aircraft, 12 theatre surveillance drones, light surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and eight medium-range surface to air missile systems (France *Presidence de la Republique*, 2013, p. 91).

France keeps a permanent national emergency force of 5,000 men on alert able to rely on permanent naval deployment in one or two maritime regions, on its United Arab Emirates base and on several bases in Africa, and also will be able to deploy up to two combined brigades representing around 15,000 land troops, Special Forces, naval and air components. (France *Presidence de la Republique*, 2013, p. 128). These capabilities are indicators of an overseas power, however limited in accordance with the France's national interests. It means that the full capability is regional instead of global, and sees the status quo power as defensive realist.

## **2017 Strategic Review of Defense and National Security** (France Ministere de La

Defense, 2017):

Instability, uncertainty and unpredictability are three main features of the international structure. (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 17). The document implies that the international balance of power is changing rapidly while the new ambitions worsen the anxiety and uncertainty, and strategic and military emergence of several regional powers is demonstrative of the arrival of a multipolar world. This climate of general uncertainty is alerting some nations to distrust their allies and to work toward even more autonomy, while some states are fostering nationalist ambitions. In addition, the initial economic and technological competition is increasingly widening to the military arena. This competition also witnesses a rapid increase in the great, emerging, and non-state powers and their means of action (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 43). Unpredictability is the most dominant characteristic of the present strategic environment due to the dominant feature of the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 17). Following the end of the Cold War, significant decreases of European Allies on defense spending exacerbated dissatisfaction on the one hand among Europeans and Americans, and on the other hand among Europeans themselves (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 56). The world needs effective multilateralism in face of these global challenges, and in the lack of which the world might return to the spheres of influence concept (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 61). This also might cause regional and unilateral military 'fait accompli' in the light of realist anarchic assumption. One might notice a dilemma in those statements. France is, on the one hand, worried about a return to power politics implying the dangers of realpolitik term of the spheres of influence, while on the other hand is curious about how it will preserve its national interests within its own area of interest/influence.

As the second global power and Africa's first economic partner, China mainly concentrates on raw materials, while also supporting export through loans of its national banks, and facilitating the introduction of its national companies in every sector (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 25). The document points out that France has a direct

interest both in terms of security and economy in the stability of the African continent and adjacent areas (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 25).

In addition to Euro-Atlantic zone, it retains bilateral security partnerships, defense agreements, and stationary forces in the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, it has enduring and close relationships with several states in the region such as Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan in spite of the absence of formal defense agreements (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 61). In the Near East, Lebanon, affected notably by the Syrian crisis, is a priority partner, whose security capabilities must be strengthened, while in the similar vein Jordan is crucial for regional stability (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 62). As the sole European nation having a permanent military presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it points out that Arabo-Persian Gulf is a very important region, and while securing defense agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait, it has to maintain its military intervention capability and full freedom of action from Gulf to the Suez Canal (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 62). French assumes that its overseas territories are crucial assets from the crisis anticipation and military cooperation perspective, which enables France secure platforms for global power projection, and thus it is ready to offer a credible partner and ally in both the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 75). With the help of these close ties, France is aware that the strategic balance in the Region is rapidly changing so that France has participated into a major strategic partnership built on trust with India, and started to produce the next generation of the Australian submarines jointly with Australia (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 62). It also specifically mentions Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and New Zealand in different level of defense partnerships (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 63).

This Strategic Review is assertive in that it declares commitment to allocate 2% of the GDP to defense expenditures in 2025 and elaborates on the 2019-2025 Military Program Act (Loi de programmation militaire -LPM) enacted on 14 July 2018. It is stated that France's military power is at the center of its national ambition, and it needs financial and human resources in addition to a strategic vision (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 5).

## Threats

The European member states having the diversity of their strategic cultures considers threats and risks mostly in the light of geography and history (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 56). There is no existential threat but risks... It accepts that the threat of a major conflict is once more a possibility in the international arena under the fact of emerging assertive powers and authoritarian regimes (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 5). The document mentions terrorism as a threat rather than a risk; therefore, France is said to be facing 'jihadist terrorism' as the most direct threat (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 9). It is not new that French soil is endured terrorism, but the 2015 attacks proved the unprecedented severity of the threat posed by militarized jihadist terrorism hitting 'at the heart of Western societies' (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 20). 'Jihadist terrorism' exploits governance and security weaknesses, and threatens the Sahel-Sahara region, neighboring regions in the north (the Maghreb) and south (Sub-Saharan Africa) experienced in Mali, with the appearance of Daesh in 2016 and the merging of various Al-Qaeda movements. It is remarked that Boko Haram's resilience, and the emergence of new groups are also considered as part of this trend (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 21). This threat expands to new regions causing civil war, and chaos not only for France, but also for its European neighbors despite the French Armed Forces' efforts to decrease 'Daesh's territorial hold in the Levant' (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 9). EU suffered in the last ten years increasing instability in their neighborhood specified as Georgia, Libya, Syria, Sahel, Ukraine, etc. and a chain of existential crises including the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis, the 2011-2013 sovereign debt and euro crisis, the migrant crisis, the 2016 Brexit referendum, and lastly the threat of jihadist terrorist attacks reaching an abnormal level in Europe since 2015 (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 19). Terrorism, missile threats, cyber attacks, natural and health risks are among the threats.

The 'Return of the Military Rivalry' section overtly discusses the two states of Russia and China. This terminology is compatible with the last American NSS. China is portrayed as a power with global ambitions that have a very understandable approach to threat for France in its vicinity especially in Africa, with which France cannot cope alone. It is acknowledged that China has become the second world power with its rising military

capabilities, and so France must closely follow up the possible consequences in Africa (Djibouti) and in the Indian Ocean which are the new areas of interaction.

Russia has conducted ‘a policy of all-out assertion (Eastern flank, the Mediterranean Sea, Syria, the Balkans)’ in an unpredictable manner since the end of the Cold War, and attempts to undermine the transatlantic relationship and to divide the European Union by following a policy of a “sphere of influence”. It has increased its defense expenditures over GDP ratio to 3-4% from 2010 in order to modernize its military so that the modernized parts of its surface fleet and land forces are efficient and numerous for military intervention capabilities in its “near abroad” as demonstrated in Syria. This Russian power must be met with a mixed rigid response combined with dialogue, the aim of which should clarify the conditions for a constructive relationship between Europe and Russia (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, pp. 41-2).

The Mediterranean Region and especially its eastern section has been densely militarized, hinting at a return to power politics because of the permanent presence of Russian air and naval forces, the rising involvement of China in addition to the separate modern military assets acquisition of some coastal states. Libya’s fragility hinders its control over the territory and offers good opportunities for ‘jihadist groups’, and all these facts push it to cooperate closely with western countries in order to cope with converging tensions (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 22). At this statement, there is acceptance of the lack of military capability to control the Region alone, and a call for its ‘western’ allies to act together which is meaningful to observe from a perspective of realist balance of threat and power concepts.

The Indian Ocean’s sea lines are very important for the global economy because 75% of EU exports uses this maritime space where China’s growing naval presence started in 2008 and which is now permanent, and relies both on an operational base in Djibouti and a support facility in Gwadar (Pakistan), presenting a new strategic challenge (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 44). It is claimed that China’s latest activities in the region show its ambition to obtain a ‘long-term naval influence in a maritime area extending from the South China Sea to the whole Indian Ocean’, and the U.S., France, India ‘(historical stakeholder)’, and Australia have to get through these security

challenges both in the Pacific and Indian Ocean while the last two countries are listed as worrying littoral states (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 44). At this point, France calls for collaboration once more, but this time towards different region's great powers. This is very meaningful to see France's own global position and overseas strategic interests different from other EU member countries.

Asia Region is still a great concern because of the fact that the biggest defense spending in the last ten years has been made in this region, yet its security architecture is still imperfect. Therefore, the China – U.S. rivalry “The evolution of strategic dynamics in Asia” remains a major concern. The breaking of the status quo driven by the U.S. -China strategic rivalry and North Korea's uncontrollable nuclear capability could bring a call for the conditions of mutual assistance between the U.S. and its allies (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 26).

All in all, it is acknowledged that two elementary ideas come to the fore in the 2017 Review as presented below after the examination ‘all threats, risks, and opportunities for France’;

- ‘France also has global interests relating to its status within multilateral organizations and its presence and interests around the world (in particular in its overseas territories and exclusive economic zone)

- France cannot tackle all these challenges on its own because it has limited power in respect to its national autonomy vision. It necessitates ‘a clear-sighted approach to priorities based on the geographical proximity of threats’, and also European and American partners’ cooperation’ (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 14).

### **Capabilities**

France trying to be a self-sufficient country with the help of its unique nuclear capability in the continental Europe and the EU. It is noted that France's alliances have changed, and it can no longer rely on its traditional ones ‘everywhere and forever’ with absolute certainty ‘leading France to take multiple actions (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 10). In the continuation, it is pointed out that French Armed Forces should be balanced

and ready for full-spectrum operations to preserve its freedom of action and strategic autonomy (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 10). In the international scene portrayed in this review, it is obvious that the ‘demand on France’s armed forces and defense can only grow’ (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 15). Further in the document there is a specific reference to the role of nuclear forces as the ‘keystone of the Nation’s defense strategy, and ‘essential now more than ever’ (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 15).

Military intervention capability is an essential instrument for France’s ‘immediate defense, in a context of a closer geographical threat’ aiming at contributing directly to defending national interests, protecting citizens abroad, and honoring France’s obligations (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 73). These statements are very similar to the Thucydidean trinity which are self-interest, fear, and prestige.

There is not any rejection against the NATO, just the opposite, it is remarked that NATO and EU are both vital to guarantee the security of Europe (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 10). Accepting that there has been a political tension between Europe and the U.S., it is declared that Europeans try to rebuild their military forces and capabilities till the end of the year 2024 as committed by 2% of GDP on defense expenditures, and also pointed out the fundamental partner role of the U.S. (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 58).

As for the European ambition, it is written that there were unrealistic projects and empty formulas in the past; however, there should be a clarity and a determination supported by pragmatic approaches. France aims to act more intensely with Germany, and any other European volunteering country capable to advance while maintaining a powerful relation with the U.K. (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, pp. 14-5). Keeping in mind that European collective defense and unity is a long-standing goal, there have been successful initiatives such as France’s and Germany’s reviving the European defense initiative with the help of Spain and Italy in 2016, containing not only military operational agenda, but also capability based and industrial aspects. In the capability context, the European Defense Fund (EDF) is an important mechanism for Europe from both a political and an industrial perspective, because research and development on defense capabilities would

be financed by European funds for the first time to support the European common defense industry (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 57). Implying that Spain and Italy own important military capabilities for potential armament programs both for Europe and France such as frigates, surface to air missiles, drones, France remarks of these two countries' engagement together with it in the operations in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Sahel Regions (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 60).

These statements illustrate that France acts in realistic way by openly mentioning Germany, U.K., Spain, and Italy while neglecting other European countries. France also draws attention to the importance of the defense industry investments and getting resources together in this vein. This might be also called internal balancing within the EU, considering the great powers first in the Union.

In the 'A new approach to defense cooperation', it is written that from now on, cooperation is a reality for the armed forces contributing to NATO and EU, and to a variety of bilateral or multilateral organizations. There are many common tangible tools towards a common European Army and especially France needs the resources of Germany. The document mentions the French aircraft carrier group, and the integration of other Europeans resources such as frigates and helicopters in addition to bilateral partnership mechanisms, as well as pertaining to the topic of this Dissertation, the Franco-German Brigade, the C130 J Franco-German air transport unit and joint training programs (Tiger, A400M).

There is a fundamental prerequisite that Germany should take charge as a vital partner in materializing European defense and security ambitions beginning with an increase in its defense budget and commitment to the Sahel (MINUSMA, EUTM Mali, support for G5 Sahel) and the Levant (action in the anti-Daesh coalition and arms deliveries to Kurdish forces in Iraq). Franco-German cooperation is being enhanced by projects in all domains which are crucially important to the future of European defense, and France focuses its attention on supporting and facilitating Germany's this shift requiring sizable industrial and financial investments (France Ministère de La Defense, 2017, p. 59).

The document further notes that, as of 2020, Europeans must have a sizeable joint military intervention capability, effective common budget mechanisms, and a shared strategic

culture, to reach what France offers as part of the European Intervention Initiative announced by the its President on September 26th, 2017 (France Ministere de La Defense, 2017, p. 61). This is a road map on hand in order to create a more tangible European common military and security architecture.

States, like firms, tend to go bankrupt when ends are too ambitious for available means - a situation sometimes called the “Lippmann gap” (MacDonald & Parent, 2011). The Treaty of Aachen was signed by the French President and the German Federal Chancellor on 22 January 2019 in the light of the 2017 Strategic Review’s statement that Germany is a crucial partner as the leaders of two primary nations in collective European Armed Forces initiative.

“Renewed approach to defense cooperation” section mentions France’s MALE drone project with Spain and Italy, stating that bilateral cooperation should be accelerated also through concrete military capability projects (*Ministère de l’Europe et Des Affaires Étrangères*, 2019). In the same document it is stated that The European Intervention Initiative, announced by the French President on 26 September 2017, was launched on 25 June 2018 after the participating countries’ Defense Ministers signed an intention letter to contribute to a common European strategic culture (*Ministère de l’Europe et Des Affaires Étrangères*, 2019). Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (nine European countries in addition to the U.K.) have participated in this initiative, the goal of which is to construct European capacities for jointly conducting military operations, within ad hoc or multilateral frameworks such as U.N., NATO, EU for all of the crises possibly affecting European security. In order to get nations’ participation to the Initiative, France deployed its forces in 2017 and 2019 as part of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia, and Estonia joined the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) and deployed around 50 Estonian soldiers as part of Operation Barkhane in Mali (*Ministère de l’Europe et Des Affaires Étrangères*, 2019).

France considers China a security issue which is clearly stated in the document and coordinates its endeavors with the U.S. both in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. Her vision is global, but her resources are not enough to fulfill that ambition, and thus it needs to

cooperate with the U.S. At the same time, the document emphasizes France's other European partners, by fully considering their expectations and contributions with respect to European security.

In conclusion, there is a discrepancy between France's intentions and capabilities, and France tries to figure out creative ways to reach a practical strategy. In this vein, realist theory offers clear explanations. France has been disturbed by American unilateral military actions in the Middle East, but the picture seems very different in the Pacific and Africa. Geographic proximity and lessons of the history, make great senses in France's and Germany's threat perceptions in that they both successfully avoid security dilemmas. Defense cooperation with Germany, and cooperation and bargaining process with the U.S. against China should be interpreted as a convenient strategy for France. This approach seems to be perfectly in line with the tenets of defensive neorealist theory, as reflected in the words of Walt, "in a balancing world, policies that convey restraint and benevolence are best". (Walt 1987)

The 2008 White Paper has stated the fact that new powers have emerged after the cold war, and globalization have changed the economy and international relations. And also, it has been found out that the distribution of power has changed and shifted towards Asia after the Cold War, China and India have come to the fore among the new powers, the post-cold war period has ended and a new strategy is needed. It has also been mentioned that the white book published by the President of France as the Commander-in-Chief of France was discussed in the French Parliament for the first time in history, and with their approval, the preparation started..While preparing the book, the opinions of the public given on a web page were also taken into consideration. Besides these, it is stated that the defense structure of France should be prepared according to the needs of the new century, and that both the European and the international visions are important for France. It is foreseen that China will be the number one in the world in terms of both exports and imports in the future economically, and it is included in the document that Russia is not as weak as it was in the past and is identified with the return of power politics. The most dangerous scenario is the combination of a major terrorist attack in Europe and the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in this attack. From this point of view, it can be evaluated that threats are created by non-state actors and as capability-based in the most

dangerous scenario. Europe's neighborhood and the region from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean are shown as geographical priorities. Africa is often mentioned. It has been stated that China and Russia have increased their influence with significant arms sales in the Gulf States and Africa.

At the same time, multilateral approaches are preferred both in Europe and around the world. External balancing is aimed with Franco-German cooperation in Europe and NATO in the world. As NATO, the establishment of more active partnerships with Russia, Central Asian states, Japan, Korea and Australia is mentioned under the title of 'renewing NATO', and the statement "a better sharing of responsibilities among Americans and Europeans" included in it draws attention.

The 2013 White Paper indicates that to consolidate her capacity through innovative technologies in both unpredictable strategic environments even in the absence of foreseeable strategic threat seems very rationalist and realist. It prioritized geographically the same regions as the previous White Paper. NATO mission Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 when NATO facilities were used and Operation Serval in Mali in 2013 under the leadership of France highlighted the need for both NATO and advanced defense capabilities. For this reason, both the reference to NATO and the emphasis on a common European defense industry come to the fore in the document. This is a continuation of the external balancing approach. Capability-based approach stands out as it is stated that there is no state threat and that advanced defense capabilities are needed.

## Chapter 4: German National Security Defense and Security Strategies

There are different approaches to security between France and Germany. German Bundeswehrverband (The German Armed Forces Association)'s President Gertz's perfectly captures the nature of this differences referring to the French African military initiatives, he warned "We let ourselves be roped in for the special interests of third countries and now have to pull the chestnuts out of a fire others have ignited". (Kunz, September 2015)

Germany spends nearly 1.2 % of GDP on defense, which falls quite far from the desired level of 2 % of for NATO Countries. Former U.S. President Trump criticized Germany that the U.S. had a big trade deficit with Germany, arguing that it spends little than they had to on NATO also adding that this would change (Bowl, 2017). The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) released a report under 'New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German foreign (Glatz, Hansen, Kaim, & Vorrath, 2018) and security policy for a changing world (Kaim & Stelzenmueller, 2013)' title arguing that Germany should be more active in international security matters. Dr. Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House, made a speech in Berlin on 'International Expectations from Germany' stressing that Germany should not see it as a 'mid-size power' yet a 'mid-sized great power' (Niblett, 2015). Former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen made a speech at the German Marshall Fund and said that 'There is a point where you are no longer cutting fat; you are cutting into muscle, and into bone.' This statement is very relevant to this dissertation concerning Germany's armed forces. Moving from that point, German Armed Forces seem to have lost muscles and bones rather than just fat. According to a report released in 2018, less than half of Germany's Leopard tanks, 12 out of 50 Tiger helicopters and only 39 of its 128 Typhoon fighter aircraft were fit for action; moreover, a year ago, none of the country's six submarines were at sea (J.C., 2018). In the same Article, it is suggested that while West Germany had more than 5,000 battle tanks, some 500,000 personnel and was spending almost 3% of GDP on defense by 1990, the reunified Germany enjoyed the status of not being at the forefront, and defense expenditures have decreased sharply in the post- Cold War era. Moreover, Angela Merkel decided to end conscription, and replace a large standing army with a small, surgical one (today it numbers little more than 180,000) (J.C., 2018).

German troop numbers fell sharply from the 1990s 500,000 to an all time low of 168,000 in 2015. The country intends to increase the number of full-time professionals from its current level at 172,000 to 186,000 by 2025. (Buck, 2018) This is slated to be the largest the Bundeswehr ever has since 2011. (Buck, 2018) Germany can scarcely make ready even one division at present while it had 15 active and ready reserve divisions in 1988 just before the end of the Cold War (Colby & Mitchell, 2020.). It might be easier to reduce the size of the military personnel from 220,000 to 175,000–185,000 troops in comparison to 495,000 plus reserves in the old West Germany and 170,000 plus in East Germany during the Cold War (Mattox, 2011). Following 25 years of continuous downsizing, the German Ministry of Defense decided in 2016 to increase the overall number of the military personnel to 198,000 soldiers. In fact, increasing troop numbers will not automatically graduate a medium-size power to a great power status. The German Government is also committed to increasing the defense budget to 1,5 per cent of GDP by 2024 (Buck, 2018). The most difficult part lies in investing in defense industry in order to increase high technological military capabilities.

### **German Constitution- Institutionalism**

The German armed forces are often called a Parliamentary Army which differentiates it from its counterparts in the U.S. and France where the president is the commander in chief, each military mission requires the approval of the German Parliament. (Mattox, 2011, p. 40) As a member of the Government, the Minister of Defense is the commander in chief in peacetime. Thus, the minister can take decisions on all issues concerning the armed forces, including the deployment of combat units, the introduction of new weapon systems, or the closure of garrisons, and it is rare that this authority passes on to the Federal Chancellor (bmvg.de, 2019).

Historically, the first 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz/Constitution) essentially formed the framework for Germany's foreign and defense policy. Following the West/East German unification on October 3, 1990, Article 1 implies the priority of human rights and the commitment to international institutions and international law which has been critical to Germany's national security in both its constitutional and political commitment to multilateral institutions (Mattox, 2011, p. 38). In this context, it is stated in Article 24 that the Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions,


and for the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security (Mattox, 2011, p. 38). According to Article 65, the federal Chancellor, elected by the Parliament, has the responsibility for general national security issues and determines the Government's foreign and security priorities. The Minister of Defense, as stated above, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the peacetime (Mattox, 2011, p. 40). Under 'State of Defense' title of the Constitution, it is stated that state of defense ('the federal territory is under attack by armed force or imminently threatened with such an attack') shall be decided by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat (Article 115a). It continues to state that in that case 'the power of command over the Armed Forces shall pass on to the Federal Chancellor (Article 115b). German federal government can deploy its military forces abroad as part of a system of collective security if only approved by the German Parliament- Bundestag, and thus 'parliamentary army' concept is closely tied to this specific kind of operations (Glatz, Hansen, Kaim, & Vorrath, 2018).

The 1994 Constitutional Court decision constrained the use of German military separately so that it could be deployed beyond NATO territory within the context of mutual security organizations such as the EU, NATO, and the U.N. (Keohane, December 2016b). This legal constraint leads Germany to act in accordance with the rule of order and within alliances or international organizations framework in collective defense strategy rather than unilaterally when needed.

NATO was a useful security organization for Germany during the Cold War. Since the 9/11, the primary threat to the Federal Republic has been from terrorism, and official documents identify terrorism as the major threat confronting Germany. These facts broadly mirror those challenges laid out in the 2003 (updated 2008) EU National Security Strategy. Germans continue to rely on their strategy 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' (Council of the European Union, 2009) membership in NATO and the EU as two tenets for their security. Even though these two organizations form the foundation of German national security policy, NATO has remained as the most important military organization in Joseph Nye's terms as the 'hard power' while the EU mainly prefers 'soft power' (Nye, 2003). The German approach to these challenges is based on a sense of absence of an existential threat as posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today Russia is a

major energy source, and relations are formed in the context of energy and a relatively high volume of trade. The absence of a sense of threat has translated generally into smaller defense budgets falling short of the NATO commitment of a 2 percent of GDP (Mattox, 2011, p. 39).


### Military Expenditure of Germany



*Figure 4. 1 Military Expenditure of Germany (%GDP)*

(World Bank Data, 2021)

Figure 4.1 above might indicate the fact that despite rather insignificant fluctuations in Germany's military expenditure in terms of GDP percentage. Germany's military expenditure for the last two decades has been relatively stable compared to France and the U.S. The range between the lowest and the highest year is 0.3 percent. This stable expenditure is both the cause and consequence of Germany's ever-expanding economic power and stability. As discussed before, Germany does not perceive any threat in its region and focuses on its economy as a free-rider counting on the security of NATO and the eastern European countries being a buffer for an old enemy.



*Figure 4. 2 Military Expenditure of Germany (in USD)*

(World Bank Data, 2021)

When the Figure 4.2 is analyzed, while Germany's defense expenditure was 26 billion dollars in 2001, it reached 47 billion dollars in 2011 steadily increasing after 9/11. Later, this figure went down to 37 billion dollars and then recovered to 49 billion dollars with a regular increase after the election of Trump. It is considered that if the increase and potential of Germany's defense expenditures is understood within the scope of the capability-based strategy, it can continue with joint projects with France. The amount spent in dollars has increased drastically due to Germany's advantage in the exchange rate thanks to its growing economy, and stable Euro.

*Table 4. 1 Percentage devoted to Personnel expenditures*

Country	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019e
Germany	60	55.4	42.7	52.3	50.6	49.9	50.7	49.8	48.3	48.9	47.9	45.26

Source: NATO Information on defense expenditures (NATO, 2020)

*Table 4. 2 Percentage devoted to Equipment expenditures*


Country	2000-2004	2005-2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019e
Germany	14	15.6	17.6	16.4	16.5	12.7	12.9	11.9	12.2	11.7	12.3	14.6

Source: NATO Information on defense expenditures (NATO, 2020)

If both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 are evaluated together, it can be observed a steady annual decrease in the personnel expenditures which accounts nearly for half of the entire expenditures. As for equipment expenditures, they are between 10 to 15 percent which represents modest levels of spending. According to Diego Lopes da Silva from SIPRI, Germany and many other NATO members once again started to see Russia as a threat for the European region (Heinrich, 2020). However, according to the data presented in the tables above, Germany does not have to indulge in expending and expanding its own military by itself as it is a very valuable member of NATO and the U.S., despite their criticism towards Germany regarding spending much less for the military, it still supports and modernizes their NATO ally's weapons to this day (Conrad & Werkhäuser, 2020).

Germany is also a very key exporter of weapons and comparing their expenditure on military and their revenue from exports, it could be said that Germany significantly cuts their expenditure margin just by selling their arms to non-EU and non-NATO countries (Martin & Knight, 2019).

## Germany Military Personnel



*Figure 4. 3 Germany Military Personnel*

(World Bank Data, 2021)

Figure 4.3 shows that while the number of soldiers in Germany was at its highest level at 308 thousand in 2001, it decreased by 33%, corresponding to approximately 130 thousand. This data demonstrates that Germany does not act in a way to support the calls for the European Strategic Autonomy or the European Army arguments. Germany's number of military personnel saw a drastic increase in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks as Germany sent a great number of personnel to Afghanistan as a part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force Mission and later on for Resolute Support Mission in order to assist and train the Afghan Security Forces.

One may also observe that there is also a great drop in the number of German military personnel in 2011. The reason for this decrease is the suspension of conscription for men (Bundeswehr.de, n.d.).

Germany actually decreased the number of military personnel and set a minimum of active 180.000 personnel. This enabled Germany to avoid overspending its budget for

military expenditure, which drew a great criticism from the U.S. towards Germany (NY Times, 2011).

### **White Papers**

The White Paper provides the minister with a framework for defense policy (bmvg.de, 2019).

*Table 4. 3 Key Words Frequency in Strategic Documents- Year 2000-2019*

Year	Key Words	Frequency
2006	Threat/s	59
	Capability/ies	214
2016	Threat	56
	Capability/ies	119

The Table 4.3 indicates that the term ‘threat’ usages in the two documents are almost the same while the capability term is used almost twice as less. The transformation of the capability based approach is first noticed in the American strategy documents after the 9/11 incident followed by NATO. Thus, ‘capability’ term is frequently used in the 2006 German White Paper. In the 2016 White Paper, a realist tone is dominant. For example, it is stated that ‘Germany is a medium-sized country at the global level (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 23)’. In fact this statement might be considered the approval of Henry Kissinger’s quote on Germany that it is “too big for Europe, too small for the world”. (Ashburn, 2016 ) This assumption leads Germany to the balance of power concept and great power politics including regional alliances such as the EU and global one with the U.S. and other regional actors. In this regard, it is reasonable to note Leyen’s ‘deepening European integration and consolidating the transatlantic partnership’ (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 25) explanation. In expanding the EU agenda, it is also stated that ‘the German-French partnership is the driving force for deepening European integration and ensuring peace, freedom and security’ (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 80). This statements show that German Foreign and security policy is based on great power politics and limits of capabilities in a multipolar world international relations structure.

## **2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the**

### **Bundeswehr:**

#### **Threats**

The document states that the fundamental challenge and threat is international terrorism, in addition the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and its increasing proliferation has been a potential threat not only for Germany, but also for other nations (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 3). Old strategies intended to overcome traditional threats have become inadequate facing present asymmetric threats; and thus, contemporary security policy has to cover “new and increasingly complex challenges”. (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 3)

#### **Capabilities**

The document indicates that security cannot be assured with the works of either one nation internationally or armed forces nationally, and therefore, German security policy is based on an all-inclusive multilateral security concept. Along the same lines, it is stressed that the Transatlantic partnership continues to be at the foundation of both Germany’s and Europe’s common security. In the future, NATO will remain the cornerstone of Germany’s security and defense policy, and the future global challenges coming up against German security cannot be coped without an effective transatlantic alliance which is based on mutual trust among its member states.

The traditional services can be seen on the papers, but closer examination reveals that they are mere ‘paper tigers’.




Figure 4. 4 Army Command Organization

Source: White Paper (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 89)

According to Figure 4.4, the Army is composed of mainly two armored divisions with four brigades, one mechanized infantry division with two brigades, and one specialized operations division with two airborne brigades and the Special Forces command. This military power fits a traditional corps level and might conduct military operations at the operational level.




Figure 4. 5 Navy Command Organization

Source: White Paper (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 97)

The Navy has mainly two flotillas including two frigate squadrons, two minesweeper squadrons, one submarine squadron, one fast patrol boat squadron, and two naval air wings. Even though there are sufficient navy assets for an operational size military force projection, it is questionable whether they can operate effectively. For example, the German media claimed that not a single one out of 6 submarines was operational (Roblin, 2017). The Annual Report (60th Report) prepared under the ‘Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces’ title for the German Bundestag mentions a navycommander noting that the Navy are at the limit and living off its reserves so that the actual state of its material and personnel are not sufficiently balanced for meeting the demands placed on them (Annual Report 2018 (60th Report), 2019, p. 5). In Annual Report 2020, it is stated publicly that the German Navy has never been smaller

than it is at the moment, so that the 2020 fleet comprises nine (following the decommissioning of seven Type122s and commissioning of one Type 125 frigate) out of the 15 larger combat vessels on paper, and introduction of new vessels seems not to go by as planned (Annual Report 2018 (60th Report), 2019, p. 43).



Figure 4. 6 Air Force Command Organization

Source: White Paper (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 94)

The Air Force is composed mainly of three Air Divisions including three fighter wings, three fighter bomber wings, three surface-to-air missile wings, and three air transport wings. Air transport wings are compatible with the airborne brigades in order to project power behind the front lines. The Annual Report (60th Report) states that the Chief of Staff of the Federal Air Force publicly declared in the summer of 2018 that ‘The Air Force has reached a low point’ (Annual Report 2018 (60th Report), 2019, p. 5). For example, it is acknowledged that German Air Force still has problems in filling the gaps in the jet flying officers branch (target figure: 204; actual figure: 131) (Annual Report 2018 (60th Report), 2019, p. 18).

It is also reported in the same document that the operational readiness of major military equipment has been mostly unsatisfactory so that tanks, ships and aircraft in some items are operationally ready by far below 50 per cent of total stock. In detail, it gives some numbers concerning main military arms such as 12 out of 52 TIGER combat helicopters; 39 out of 128 EUROFIGHTERs; 48 out of 176 also PUMA infantry combat vehicles are operational at the end of 2018. It also mentions the VJTF 2023 for NATO as the first priority for Germany so that it might provide a modernized brigade fully resourced with its own new equipment as the Framework Nation. According to the plan agreed in the NATO summit in July 2018, it was aiming for an additional 30 combat battalions, 30 frontline squadrons and 30 ships operationally ready within 30 days NATO-wide, and Germany will provide ten per cent of them, which equals to three ships, three squadrons and three combat battalions, for example, meaning one additional Army brigade (with three combat battalions) (Annual Report 2018 (60th Report), 2019, pp. 40-1).

### **The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr**

The 144-page document replaced the 2006 Year White Paper has been a new milestone in Germany’s return to aggressive foreign and military policies (Stern J. , 2016). Ashburn concluded that there were three biggest obstacles to a successful implementation of the 2016 White Paper as an uncooperative yet influential Russia, a perceived lack of domestic support, and the need for quick action within the EU (Ashburn, 2016 ).

It is acknowledged that Germany and the Bundeswehr are facing unprecedented challenges with a scope for which they have not adequately prepared (Ashburn, 2016 , p. 137). The document underscores that Germany is no longer a frontline nation state. Following the end of the Cold War, even the “Army of Unity” after the reunification of Germany was downsized, its capabilities and equipment reduced, all of which eventually resulted in declining military spending so that it fell by more than half as a percentage of Germany’s GDP. The document further explains the widespread perception that threats to German security had diminished combined with economic challenges following German reunification, indicating that defense was no longer considered a top priority. As a consequence of this perception, the power of the Bundeswehr was reduced through a number of reforms to present force levels and its capabilities were focused on possible operations in the context of international crisis management. It is stated that Germany suspended compulsory military service leading to upper limits on commonly used major weapons systems and on personnel, irrespective of the tasks for which they were required, meaning that there was no longer a balance between tasks, forces and assets (Ashburn, 2016 , p. 137).

### **Threats**

The document does not name any existential traditional nation state threats or potential adversaries. The EU is an important asset for peace because it includes France and Germany, the two great powers of the Continental Europe. There is a dual approach towards the Russian Federation, another Continental European great power, including dialogue option on one hand, and cautious stance on the other.

### **Capabilities**

Germany seems to have increased its defense expenditures, but still prefers a European stance and capability based industrial investment which the U.S. might not fully like. It is stated that Germany’s security is based on both a strong NATO and a united European Union so that it will be capable of successfully meeting the great challenges of the era on the condition that Germany becomes more strengthened and in addition to the development of these two pillars of its foreign, security and defense policy (von der Leyen, Germany White Paper, 2016).It is acknowledged that Germany assesses that

redrawing of national borders by military power and abuse of international law in Europe in the 21st Century might not be possible. With the effect of ‘wars and conflicts’ on ‘Europe’s doorstep’, failing and fragile states give a fertile ground for ‘Islamist terrorism’ posing a direct threat against both Europe and Germany, so that Germany should bear a greater responsibility with its European and Transatlantic partners than it has done to date.

It is also stressed that Germany and the Bundeswehr allege their loyalty to their allies believing that Germany should act responsibly in order to shape the security policy together with its partners and in its alliances – ‘with a strong NATO and a capable Europe (von der Leyen, Germany White Paper, 2016)’ It is very obvious that Germany accepts that Europe has not full capability, thus needs NATO and mostly American military power. In this vein, the Transatlantic Alliance is vital to the security of Europe so that Europe can effectively defend itself against the 21st Century’s threats only together with the United States (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 49). Concerning the NATO, it is an ‘indispensable Guarantor’ of Germany, Europe and the Transatlantic Region, and remains as ‘the anchor and main framework of German security and defense policy (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 64). Germany intended to increase the visibility of European capabilities within the NATO, and projected Framework Nations Concept into NATO requiring Alliance members to pool their capabilities to form multinational capability clusters. The overall goal of the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) is first to improve the European capability on a voluntary basis between European states, and secondly to strengthen the European pillar of the Transatlantic partnership (von der Leyen, 2016, pp. 67-8).

The document also states that it is important to share burdens, specialize and interconnect armed forces, enhance standardization in the defense industry, and both develop and procure common capabilities within the limited budget resources for necessary increases in defense budgets, so that Europeans can achieve more to ensure pan-European capability planning that is also coordinated at the transatlantic level. To succeed in all these intentions, the German Government is prepared to assume a wide range of responsibilities as the framework nation, and intended to spend 2 per cent of its GDP on defense, in addition to investing 20 per cent of this amount in major equipment over the long term, and shifting the focus in NATO more towards the relationship between expenditure and performance in the areas of personnel, equipment and capability

development. To deepen European integration is in Germany's national interest, because EU represents political stability, security, and prosperity in both Germany and its members as a whole. In order to effectively shape the global order to protect European citizens' interests, a strong and united Europe is needed (von der Leyen, 2016, pp. 69-71).

The document emphasizes that Germany has more and more been regarded as Europe's key player, and has a responsibility to actively participate in shaping the global order because it has been intertwined with the rest of the world. The document further continues to state that 'this new reality' necessitates more options to wield influence, accepting that Germany will not hold its world's fourth-largest economy position due to 'emerging powers in Asia and Latin America'. The economies of them will likely take over the German economy – although not the European – GDP in the coming years. Germany is a 'medium-sized country' at the global level 'both geographically and demographically' (von der Leyen, 2016, pp. 22-3). Accepting that it is ready to offer a considerable motivation, to assume leadership, and to accept responsibility including eagerness to contribute to the handling of present and future security challenges, it is also noted that Germany is conscious of the limits of its capabilities (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 23).

Under the 'Multipolarity and the Diffusion of Power Politically' title, it is stated that "economically and militarily, the international system is moving towards a multipolar order". (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 30).

The document does not comprise any rejection of the American calls that Europeans have to take more responsibility for their security and defense. It is acknowledged that the U.S. has undertaken Europe's security and stability since the end of WWII so that Germany has had an enduring partnership with it, also mirrored by 'broad spectrum of common security policy interests'. The document further states that on one hand Europeans should get ready to take on more responsibility, while on the other their American partners should commission in 'shared decision-making' so that the collective responsibility stems from the accepted Euro-Atlantic system of values (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 31).

The assessments of the document concerning Russia is complicated and different from the American ones. It is acknowledged that Germany has worked for establishing mostly

cooperative relations with Russia and performed an important role in the adoption of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, and the foundation of the NATO-Russia Council. The document proceeds to state that Russia's present policies, such as the annexation of Crimea and the current doctrine declaring NATO a threat, 'necessitate a dual approach' which requires both a credible deterrence and defense capability as well as a willingness to engage in a dialogue (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 66). Russia has broken the international law with its unilateral power use in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, which brings far-reaching implications for security of Germany, and Europe. Therefore, Russia is denying a close partnership with the West and instead placing emphasis on strategic rivalry (von der Leyen, 2016, pp. 31-2). All in all, the document does not cite Russia as a threat. It still indicates that sustainability in and for Europe both in terms of security and prosperity cannot be guaranteed without strong cooperation with Russia. Therefore Germany should find the right balance between collective defense on the one hand, and cooperative security and sectorial cooperation on the other hand in its relations with Russia. Although it is estimated that Russia will constitute a challenge to the security of Continental Europe in the foreseeable future without a fundamental change in its policy, in Europe there is no need for the development of a new security architecture unless actors respect the accepted common rules and principles (von der Leyen, 2016, pp. 31-2).

The document explains the Bundeswehr's tasks in a 'whole-of-government approach: National and collective defense in the framework of NATO and the EU' as conducting defense tasks on German territory, as well as deterrence measures in all domains, defending against attacks on the territory of Allies, defeating terrorism, defending against hybrid threats, consolidating the transatlantic and European defense capability (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 91). It does not point to any potential adversaries. It explains the long-term goal of Germany's security policy as to create a European Security and Defense Union, and progress must be made through both capability development and 'the integration of armed forces at the European level' in order to strengthen its own multilateral orientation (von der Leyen, 2016, pp. 138-9).

Under the 'Commitment to a Rules-Based International Order' title, it is stated that "Germany is committed to help shape and refine the rules-based international order". (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 52) This statement reflects a 'utopian' stance, but all in all the

document might be evaluated in the realist light, it may be construed as an expression of a desire to gain more power through internal balancing strategy. The document states the German Government's willingness to increase military expenditures from 1,2% to 2% of Germany's GDP, yet only 34% of Germans support increasing the defense spending, whereas 64% support keeping it the same or even reducing it (Ashburn, 2016 ).

Even though there have been intentions put forth especially in the 2016 White Paper on defense allocation increase, the German Government has decided to cut defense budget from 20,3 billion USD (17,2 billion Euros) in 2020 to 18,7 billion USD (15,9 billion Euros) in 2024 (Morcos, 2020). In the similar vein, even though there are intense political efforts to improve the German Armed Forces' operational readiness, the units have not yet really noticed the "trend reversals" that have been initiated (Annual Report 2018 (60th Report), 2019, p. 5).

In fact, the problem seems not of the allocation of additional resources and funds to the military, but of defining a strategy and requirement for that action. In other words, Germany has not perceived any substantial conventional threat in the post-Cold War era, and has not preferred to invest in military, but just the opposite, it downsized its military size by taking advantage of not being a frontline country anymore. Regarding the balance of threat and balance of power theories, it makes sense that they are complementary. Germany has neither perceived any existential threat nor invested more in defense at the desired level as agreed in NATO. It can be concluded that the suspension of the compulsory military service, the reduction on military personnel, and the share of defense expenditures in relation to GDP being far short of 2 per cent as NATO required might be considered as indicators that Germany has been comfortable to allocate resources to 'butter' rather than 'guns'. The 2008 economic crisis gave an excuse and opportunity to Germany to cut its defense expenditures which were difficult to justify in the absence of any existential nation state threat. Different from the U.S.' stance, it exploited the lack of great power rivalry in the continental Europe theatre. It also knows that cooperation with first France and its European neighbors will be a more realistic way in light of the balance of power concepts. But, in the absence of any threat, there will be many years to build a really operational European Army.

All in all, Germany and France believe the countries between them and Russia provide a buffer zone, and thus, Russia doesn't pose the level of threat as it once did. With balance of threat in mind, it is clear that these two countries using a free-rider approach and they no longer consider themselves a "frontline country". However, their neighboring countries still feel very threatened by Russia, and they want to reach to an agreement with the U.S. Furthermore, they also escaped from security dilemma of being two neighboring great powers. By keeping France as a powerful neighboring ally, Germany limits its need for military expenditures and focuses more on its economy.



## Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis

This study is a comparative case study research. There are many differences in three actors' both strategic documents and military structures. It is evident that threat perceptions of the three actors were different, and this differentiation still continues. After the Cold War, even though military sizes diminished and threats became limited in capacity, the military expenditures increased as a result of high-tech and advanced weapons systems. Realist security dilemma might not only cause mutual fear and increase in armament, but also intolerable damages in economies. This situation becomes more apparent in economic crisis times. Rapidly growing states often appear as threats to their neighbors, as well as to the hegemon and its allies whatever their true intentions are (Schweller & Pu, 2011). Because the rest does not have sufficient capabilities to balance against the hegemon, they conduct complex policies including both resistance and obedience to the hegemon for each different case. In the beginning of the new millennium, American economy was as large as the next three countries combined; its defense spending was as large as that of the next fourteen countries combined; and as an important indicator of the future military armed forces, its spending on research and development, was 80 percent of the world's total (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2002). Under those circumstances, it is very understandable that American foreign policy at the time operated in the realm of choice, not necessity (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2002). "A rising power may employ a strategy of rightful resistance to improve its position within the established order. Such a state does not seek to overthrow the order, but merely to gain recognition of its rights and prestige within the system and to garner a better position for itself as a power broker at various international bargaining tables." (Scheweller & Pu, 2011) It is also argued that rightful resistance is expected that weak players first partially and temporarily to accept the legitimacy of the hegemon, and then take advantage of opportunities and authorized channels within the order to make relative gains while contesting particular behaviors of the hegemon.

The US has already been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but due to its expansionist global approach, it has also intended to establish regional hegemony both in Europe and Asia-Pacific. During the Cold War era, the US had an approach of being capable of retaining simultaneous warfare both in Europe and Asia-Pacific, and offensive

capability to win wars at the same time in these regions. On the other hand, Germany and France had a defense-based approach only concerning Europe due to the near proximity of the USSR and its imminent threat as stated in the Walt's balance of threat theory.

Following the dissolution of the USSR, a wave of complacency took over Western Europe, and both Germany and France acted in the light of balance of threat theory in their region as they had no apparent threat in their geographical proximity. France's nuclear capability might be assumed as a deterrent capability to deter any aggression as well. Meanwhile, the U.S. maintained its capability of retaining simultaneous warfare in both Europe and Asia-Pacific theatres. Until 2017, by using global war on terror agenda, the US maintained its relative superiority through its regional commands (EUCOM, PACOM and CENTCOM). There has been a continuity on mainly two possible war theatres against China and Russia from the 2000 NSS till the 2017 NSS, because the best way to survive is to be the most powerful state.

Following the Republican Party's 2017 NSS, the U.S. openly stated that it deemed Russia and China as threats. Thus, with an expansionist approach through its capability, the US kept on gathering its military power overseas without the need of an anonymous agenda to establish regional hegemony for its constant pursue of security competition as if it were in a state of war (Mearsheimer, 1994).

After the Cold War era, with the maintenance of capability-based approach the definition of threat remained anonymous, so as to include China and Russia into the liberal system. Moreover, following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush Jr. stated in the 2002 NSS that there was no more great power competition, they were all in this war on the same page. This statement also explains the U.S.' approach towards its "former threats", without any aggressive intentions. Although the U.S. deemed global terrorism a threat against which a force should be gathered, this gathering of force actually meant gathering a relative advantage of force against all threats and possible risks, including those without aggressive intentions.

There are three main elements of strategy. These are force, time and space. When it is the force, it is important to conduct a comparative power analysis of two forces: one's own forces and enemy forces. The space indicates the place where the battles will take place.

The exclusion of the concepts of force and space from the formula in threat-based strategic analysis has led to a capability-based approach. Despite the uncertainty of the future, power has now become an end rather than means. This, in turn, directly coincides with offensive realism.

In the more recent times this axis has a different threat perception from the U.S. As the U.S. has brought into attention more recently, they follow a capability-based strategy. If there is going to be an equation in Europe coming forward, it cannot be imagined without Germany, the most powerful state of the EU in the last decade. In particular with Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Germany remains as the most influential country in regards to the political direction of the EU. Following the Euro crisis of 2009, Germany seized the opportunity to assert herself in a leadership position and became an indispensable member of the EU. The 2003 European Security Strategy Document states that, on one hand, the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable, but on the other hand, they should continue to work for closer relations towards a strategic partnership with Russia, a major factor in their security and prosperity. The EU's 2016 Global Strategy Document's Security and Defense subtitle declares that, as Europeans, they must take greater responsibility for their security, and they must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect themselves against external threats...Europeans must be able to protect Europe. 'A more credible European defense is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States.' However, EU's 'Common Security and Defense Policy' does not cover the defense policy leg. Some terms such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber security, energy security, organized crime, and external border management match mostly with the security subject rather than defense, for which the military is responsible. One might observe a big difference between documents of the U.S. and the EU. Second main difference comes from the area of interest and influence. The U.S. has preferred to act from a global perspective such as 'global war against terror', whereas the EU prefers regional cooperative actions. For example, it is stated in the EU's Document that regional dynamics come to the fore, and the EU will support regional organizations in line with their interests. The EU acknowledges that managing the relationship with Russia is a key strategic challenge, accepting that the EU and Russia are interdependent.

Even with the contingency plans of the Cold War era, the U. S. prepared its military force to win two theatre wars in both Europe and the Pacific region and followed an offensive stance, while Europe followed a defensive strategy only in Europe. This is where the biggest difference in the Transatlantic Alliance originates from. With the elimination of the former Soviet Union threat in the Europe theatre, the U.S. used its military force in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration after 9/11 instead of focusing on the potential rising power China in the Pacific region. During the Presidency of Obama, the U.S. which had a positive approach to include China and Russia in the system enabled China to be a free-riser instead of seeing these two countries as a threat. During Trump's presidency, China and Russia have come to be seen as concrete threats. The fact that the opposing force in the strategy is obvious and the Pacific is a priority for the possible military action theatre has brought the threat-based strategy back to the forefront for the U.S. Due to the importance of technology in the capability-based approach, new competition is expected to be intense in the field of technology. In fact, this situation makes offensive realism where power is an end important for the U.S. The Democratic Party president Clinton referred to the fact that he was ready for possible major battles on two different fronts and had also the capabilities to win them in 2000 and 2001 NSS (National Security Strategy) documents published even when there was no 9/11 attack, a unipolar international structure or the perception of any threat. Similarly, the 2001 QDR, published after 9/11 on 30 September 2001, stressed the fact that the American Air Forces and Navy should pay attention to the Pacific region. In fact, this situation shows that there is a path dependency in strategic threat assessments in the U.S. documents. The military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq can be considered a temporary derailment in the process. These actions can also be compared to the elephant's fight against flies. In other words, although it is very difficult to get definite results in these asymmetric operations, they were tried by the American President of the period, Bush. Although it was written that the 2006 NSS, the second NSS of the Bush era, put an end to the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, what happened in 2021 revealed the opposite. In fact, what these documents clearly show us is that what happened at the Transatlantic Alliance is not a burden sharing problem, but an occurrence caused by more structural reasons. The fact that France and Germany have opposed the military action against a country such as Iraq, which is in a region that is geographically close and relatively weak to oppose military actions against

them and the UK have actively supported it, shows how they will act in a possible conflict with China which is the second largest in the world after the U.S. In this respect, AUKUS seems to be consistent in itself.

Analyzing the U.S. documents, it can be said that while large personnel increases and defense expenditures continued from the Bush era to the middle of the Obama era in the elements of irregular warfare arising from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the air and navy expenditures independent of them continued without a consistent and significant increase in themselves. While the U.S. Armed Forces are being transformed from a conventional structure into an unconventional one, the great power competition comes back, and how it will experience a transformation again and how this will affect the air and naval forces can be evaluated among the review topics of the subsequent period. Compared to irregular warfare, the need for command and control capabilities with more common operational capabilities in united operations is also an area that should be considered separately.

All the NSS of the U.S. contain issues in the world that no country can handle alone, and also the solution of problems with alliances. Therefore, although it is emphasized that external balancing, which has become a habit since the Cold War, is preferred, it is also included that the U.S. can act alone to protect its national interest if necessary in the NSS. Due to the global deployment of the U.S. Armed Forces, the whole world is included in the geographical proximity, but it is obvious that Europe and the Asia Pacific region stand out as the main priority. However, it is in the documents that the Asia Pacific region has been the primary region between Europe and Asia Pacific since the Obama era while Afghanistan and Iraq came to the fore on the Middle East axis during the Bush presidency.

In fact, the internal layered threat assessment mentioned in Trump's NSS, which is different from the others, has been indirectly included in all documents since 2000. It can be said that China, India and Russia, which are considered as great powers are in the first layer; Iran, or, rogue states located in the Middle East region and North Korea located in East Asia are in the second layer, and terrorism is in the last layer. In the documents, the threat assessment between these three groups is considered by taking different priorities into consideration. The ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to win major battles on two major and different fronts has been constantly maintained since the Cold War era. Since

the U.S. is a global power, it has best implemented external balancing with different partnerships and alliances in different regions. It can be deduced that the containment strategy continues as the U.S. try to shape the Middle East and Central Asia with military operations using the advantage of being a dominant power thanks to the unipolar structure after the Cold War and as it becomes a neighbor to Russia, which is shrinking with the expansion of NATO. Proceeding from this, we can also argue that, in fact, the U.S. strategy based on offensive realism has not changed and it has only been disguised.

American armed forces is a professional army as a tradition. France and Germany left conscription system after the Cold War period in the structure when they did not face any traditional great power threat. American and French armed forces have overseas territories/bases and military missions that prioritize air forces and navies. They also have nuclear capability differently from Germany. The German armed forces is under the command of the Minister of Defense at peacetime, while American and French commanders in chief are their presidents. The military business is expensive so that overseas missions, nuclear deterrent forces and high tech defense investments add billion dollars/euros to defense budgets.

When the three countries in question are considered, it is obvious that the elected presidents of the U.S. and France have two capacities: the number one person in charge of the government and the commander in chief as stated in their constitutions. To be able to assign military capabilities for a possible use of force, governments first make a threats/risks assessment and subsequently prepare armed forces to address those possible threats while also allocating an adequate amount of budget for defense expenditures.

It is estimated that Germany and France cannot implement offensive realism, which they did not implement even when the Soviet threat of the Cold War was on their side, but these countries might go to mixed practices despite the uncertainty in their region and around the world. With the expansion of NATO, the U.S. has successfully contained Russia under the umbrella of NATO during and after the Cold War. However, the ability and will of the two great powers of Europe, which are no longer neighbors with Russia, to act jointly against China in a conjuncture where they cannot even determine a common strategy against Russia also seems to be quite open to discussion.

The 'Return of the Military Rivalry' section (French White Paper on Defense and National Security, 2013) overtly discusses the two states of Russia and China. This terminology is compatible with the last American NSS. China is portrayed as a power with global ambitions that have a very understandable approach to threat for France in its vicinity especially in Africa, with which France cannot cope alone.

Militarism has been on the rise in many parts of the world since 9/11 (Bacevich, 2013; Shaw, 2013). By exaggerating a little, France is often viewed as an interventionist nation, where one single person can decide to go to war, and these French wars generally happen in francophone Africa. Concerning France and Germany bilateral relations, Claire Demesmay and Barbara Kunz argue that the objectives and procedures of this WTO reform are consensual within the Franco-German couple while they support preserving multilateralism (as cited in Institute Montaigne, 2019). Kunz also argues that Germans fear that French ambitions for a "Europe puissance" may be intended to serve only French purposes, for instance the prolongation of French power with European means (Kunz, 2015). Two actors are in the line of this strategy also in security and defense cooperation matters, yet they do not agree on every item and have different perspectives. Germany and France, two former great enemies in the two world wars, have so far escaped successfully from the security dilemma. Kunz shared a Körber Foundation 2019 poll while 22 percent of Germans support Germany's reliance on America's nuclear umbrella, 40 percent preferred nuclear protection from France and the UK (Kunz, 2020).

The relative decline of the U.S. has dictated different security architecture and the EU has increased European Strategic Autonomy efforts. As EU High Representative Josep Borrell puts it, European strategic autonomy is not an entirely new concept (2020). He explains it as follows:

[S]trategic autonomy is part of the agreed language of the EU since quite a long time ago. It was born in the field of defence industry and, for a long time, it was reduced to issues of defence and security. And that is part of the problem.

For quite a while, the debate was limited to a clash between those for whom strategic autonomy was a means of regaining political space vis-

à-vis the United States, and others, most of the European states, for whom it had to be avoided precisely for fear of accelerating American disengagement.

Since then, strategic autonomy has been widened to new subjects of an economic and technological nature, as revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the security dimension remains predominant and sensitive. Every time I mention “European strategic autonomy” someone raises a finger and asks, “And what about NATO”?, showing that both continue being seen as opposed.

Borrel also believes for NATO to be a more viable and efficient alliance, acquiring European strategic autonomy is vitally important (Borrell, 2020):

“[NATO] can only truly work if it behaves as an evolving relationship between consenting and equal partners. That is why I believe that European strategic autonomy is fully compatible with a stronger transatlantic bond and even a precondition for it. (...) Only a more capable, and thus more autonomous Europe, can meaningfully work with Joe Biden’s administration, to make multilateralism great again.”

The national security and strategy documents mainly try to clearly identify external threats, allocate resources toward the pursuit of the national interest, and integrate a nation’s means of power as logical-rationalist calculation of means and ends, input and output. The American Quadrennial Defense Review published on 30 September 2001 was different from the previous reviews. The central objective of that review was to transform the basis of defense planning from ‘threat-based’ model into ‘capabilities-based’ model which focuses on how an adversary might fight rather than whom the opponent might be and where a war might happen. This point is very important, because two of three components of the strategy are force and space which excluded in that new concept. In American documents, this radical change reflects offensive realist approach assuming that power is an end itself not means. Throughout this document, a “top down” approach was preferred on strategy, forces, and capabilities. Concerning Europe and Russia, it was

stated that an opportunity to cooperate with Russia existed, and it did not pose a large-scale conventional military threat to NATO. It might be assumed that this document carries the signs of hegemony order through the use of force. The fact that the force would be used for limited smaller-scale contingency operations means that there has not been any important threat from any nation towards the U.S. anymore. This point might be assumed as a big difference in transatlantic security calculations.

The election of Trump as the President of the most powerful nation in the world with an unmatched operational armed force has been a sharp turning point in the Transatlantic Security relations. ‘The knowledge of who needs to survive, be protected and from what, also supposes knowing who is sacrificed in this operation. [...] Security is also and mainly about sacrifice.’ (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008) The U.S. brings the sacrifice of others for the United States as well. And, this will awaken a simple why question in the others’ gaze. If the U.S. comes first, why would the rest sacrifice themselves for the U.S.? The United States has been in decline even after its Cold War sole rival retreated. From security dependency perspective, there have been dual threat/risk perceptions. Because the EU is dependent on the U.S., it becomes vulnerable to both Russian threats and American risks. There should be an alternative course of action to decrease these vulnerabilities by driving rather than riding the car. Is there any guarantee for the use of nuclear strike by the U.S. for the security of Europe and give the opponent to retaliate for American cities? Cuba Missile Crisis and Jupiters withdrawn from Turkey to meet American national interests and security should be kept in mind. Moreover, there have been Ukraine and Georgia wars and the false promise of liberal institutions ignoring the power concept. From structural realist perspective; the international system is a self-help system; therefore, no other state/states can be fully relied upon to defend another at the risk of its power and interest.

### **Military Expenditures**

At this point, a discussion about the correlation between the U.S., France and Germany’s military expenditure fluctuations over two decades following the new millennium, is required. The correlation will not only be examined with regard to the number of military personnel, but also with regard to the political changes, technological investments and military operations.




Figure 5. 1 Military Expenditure of the U.S., France and Germany (Current USD)

Source: World Bank Data (World Bank Data, 2021)

As shown on the figure 5.1 and figure 5.2, the U.S., France and Germany’s military expenditures have gradually increased with the start of the new millennia following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.




Figure 5. 2 Military Expenditure of the U.S., France and Germany (%GDP)

(World Bank Data, 2021)

As it has previously been discussed, although the number of French military personnel has been gradually decreased with the professionalization of the French Army, the

expenditure has gone up. One reason for this is that professional armies require more salaries compared to armies consisting of conscripts. It is obvious from the figure 5.2, fiscal year of 2018 was the lowest year in the last two decades with regards to the military expenditure French Army spent in terms of GDP percentage. In this year, although the total cost of salaries is €11.9 billion, overseas operations expenditure is only €300 million, 1/40<sup>th</sup> of the total salary expenditure.

*Table 5. 1 Cost of Strategic Operations in Billion Euros*

Strategic operations	2018 resources in €bn	
Total cost of salaries (12) excluding overseas operations	11.7	Total cost of salaries €11.9bn
T2 overseas operations (provisions)	0.3	
Training (AOP)	1.2	Excluding equipment €4.0bn
Running and specific activities (FAS)	2.4	
Excluding T2 overseas operations (provisions)	0.4	
Other armament operations (AOA)	1.3	Equipment €18.5bn
Nuclear deterrence (DIS)	4.0	
Support equipment (EAC)	0.9	
Armament programmes environment (EPA)	0.1	
Scheduled equipment maintenance (EPM)	3.9	
Scheduled staff management (EPP)	0.3	
Defence infrastructures (INFRA)	1.5	
Programmes with major impact (PEM)	5.5	
Projects and preparation of the future (PPA)	0.6	
Intelligence (RENS)	0.3	
"Defence" mission total excluding pensions	34.4	
Pensions	8.4	
"Defence" mission total including pensions	42.7	

(France Ministerie des Armees, 2018)

As unlike the U.S., France's main form of global defense is not deploying soldiers all around the globe. Their main form of global defense is nuclear deterrence and their independence with regards to deployment of this tool as this is what pushed France's withdrawal from NATO in 1966 under the government of Charles de Gaulle, who upon becoming president in 1958 excluded Germany and Italy from developing nuclear weapons along with France under the umbrella of Euratom, which was established in 1957 (Strauss, 1989). Thus, a large portion of the military budget is used for equipment and their maintenance, particularly nuclear deterrence as shown in the table 5.1.

Germany, on the other hand, despite choosing guns over butter in its distant past as Hermann Gönning said in 1936 “guns will make us powerful, butter will make us fat” (Andrews, 1996), today always chooses butter over guns in order to further strengthen its economy as it faces no apparent threat in its region and France is a good ally with plenty of guns.

Due to this dynamic France is striving to choose guns over butter as Germany can lend them the butter, but it still does not have the capacity as the U.S. does. The U.S., on the other hand, tries to balance between guns and butter, but always puts itself in a position that makes it choose the guns rather than the butter.

As mentioned above, main discrepancies regarding military expenditure of these three NATO allies are based on their perception of a threat and their need for building capability. Most expanded of these three is undoubtedly the U.S., having many bases and ongoing overseas operations around the world, and therefore, their need for up keeping and supporting these operations and bases are comparatively higher than the other two. Their main rivals Russia and China are constantly expanding their military capabilities and becoming global actors, threatening U.S.’s status quo.




Figure 5. 3 Military expenditure of the USA and China between 2000-2019 (GDP%)  
(World Bank Data, 2021)

As can be seen above, the U.S. military expenditure has seen a decrease during the Obama term and kept that trend in the recent years, on the other hand China's military expenditure has been steady for the last two decades in terms of GDP percentage.




Figure 5. 4 Military expenditure of the USA and China between 2000-2019 (current USD)  
(World Bank Data, 2021)

When the figure in terms of military spending in current USD is analyzed, it is obvious that the U.S. military expenditure has ups and downs with a trend going upwards. On the other hand, China's military expenditure has been steadily increasing in terms of current USD, but this upwards trend does not show in the GDP percentage. The reason for this is the fact that China's economy has been growing exponentially and this increasing military expenditure does not affect China's economic growth. It can be inferred from the data at hand that China has taken a huge jump after the Great Recession and the growth in GDP has become so fast and big that it can be expected China to take over the lead in GDP in the world by 2024. This makes China a potential challenger for the U.S. and understandably a potential trading partner for Germany and France. China's focus on military expenditure gets a noticeable rise in the past decade, and this also correlates with the growth in GDP of China in the first graphic as well. An economically more independent China with an ever-growing military power clearly imposes a bigger threat than Russia, which shows a downward trend in the second graphic above. In another

words, due to the neglecting of the U.S. military observation of China as a threat, China has been a free riser for the last two decades and its steady military growth has been going in an upwards trend.

As for France, a previous colonial nation that had a vast influence in the Northern and Western areas of Africa, wishes for up keeping their past influence, which urges France to expand their military and stay independent despite their cooperation with supranational entities. France's perception of threat is not based on geographical proxy but influence over their past colonies. China's gradually growing influence in the countries of Africa might be seen as a threat for France. Another threat considered by France is global terror. Although it is a threat within France's borders, their past colonies and nations in the proximity of the latter constitute a threat for France's influence over the region of Northern-Western Africa and the Middle East.

Germany as mentioned in the previous chapters has been criticized for spending much less of their GDP when compared to their counterparts in the NATO, especially the U.S. The reason for this "lack of ambition", as the U.S. states, is their lack of perception of a threat both in their geographical region and their global influence. Germany has been a free-rider since the fall of Berlin Wall and the U.S. has been supporting Germany's borders with their military personnel and arms. These facts prompted Germany to mostly rely on their economy and their economic cooperation.

According to SIPRI Data, the five top defense spenders were the U.S., China, Saudi Arabia, India and France, which together are equivalent to 60 per cent of global military spending in 2018. U.S. increased its military spending for the first time in consecutive seven years to reach \$649 billion so that the increase in U.S. military spending can be attributed to two main factors such as 2.4 per cent increase in the salaries of military personnel, in addition to the fulfillment of big and costly conventional and nuclear arms acquisition programs (SIPRI, 2019). The five largest spenders in 2019 became respectively the U.S., China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia, and two Asian states took part for the first time among the top three military spenders (SIPRI, 2020).

Our sample era is 2000-2019 and as it can be noticed that the U.S. has had a steady rise in GDP –except for the Great Recession between 2007-2009- for the past 20 years. The

chart is very striking in the sense that it describes the increase in military spending of the U.S. very clearly. The rise of expenditure in billions continued 11 years non-stop until the year of 2011. This can be easily traced back to the effects of 9/11 attacks in 2001. Meanwhile rest of the countries in our analysis shows a rather consistent graphic for nearly 8 years. Whereas compared to the U.S.; Germany, France and Russia's growth stayed constant with some slumps in between. In the more recent years, Trump's pressure on NATO members to increase their defense budget has been responded by Germany with a small increase in the last four years. However, this call doesn't seem to find a strong response from France yet. According to the research done by SIPRI, military spending by the United States grew by 5.3 per cent to a total of \$732 billion in 2019 and accounted for 38 per cent of global military spending. The spending increase alone was on the same level with Germany's entire military expenditure for 2019. Scholars comment on this as the return of rivalry between the great powers. On the other hand, Germany's military spending rose by 10 per cent in 2019, to \$49.3 billion. This was the largest increase in spending among the top 15 military spenders in 2019. One of the most important factors for the growth in German military spending can be explained with the notion of "balance of threat"; Germany and some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have a perception of an increased threat from Russia. France and Germany make a considerable amount of profit from military exports, especially France places huge importance on the arms exports. At the same time, France stays stable, however it's expected that in the future Germany and France might be working together in the area of defense.

Concerning Russia, there is still a dilemma. On one side, it states that Russia will constitute a challenge to the security of the continental Europe in the foreseeable future without a fundamental change in its policy, and on the other side, that sustainable security and prosperity in Europe cannot be ensured without strong cooperation with Russia (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 32). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov explains a 'new triad of Russian national values' as 'sovereign democracy, robust economy, and military power (Marsh & Rees, 2012, p. 86).' For military power, Russia committed nearly 200 billion USD to the modernization program including both nuclear and conventional arms such as nuclear submarines, fifth generation fighters and attack helicopters. Germany and France believe the countries between them and Russia create a buffer zone; and thus,

Russia doesn't possess the level of threat it once did. With balance of threat in mind, it can be concluded that these two countries using a free-rider approach and they no longer consider themselves a "frontline country" anymore. However, their neighboring countries still feel very threatened by Russia, and they want to reach to an agreement with the U.S. In 2019 Russia was the fourth-largest spender in the world and increased its military expenditure by 4.5 per cent to \$65.1 billion. It makes up 3.9 per cent of its GDP, which makes Russia's military spending burden one of the highest in Europe in 2019.

### Armed Forces Personnel




Figure 5. 5 Armed forces personnel, total

(World Bank Data, 2021)

As could be observed in the figure 5.5, the number of armed forces personnel seems to have gone down for all countries after the Cold War. A lot of reasons can be cited for this drop such as technology and using mercenaries in proxy wars instead of direct conflicts. As technology progressed, the need for human workforce decreased, especially thanks to surveillance technology and drones. Even though Germany and France seem to have kept a consistency in their numbers, Russia's number of army officers sees a slight rise starting with mid-2010s, which also coincides with Syrian civil war.

The development of EU foreign and security policy has been hampered by the split between member states over major global issues such as the ‘war on terror’ and the Second Gulf War/War on Iraq. These divisions have often been deeply bitter and very stark; the U.K. and Poland, for example, supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but other key EU states, such as France and Germany, most certainly did not.

There are two paradigms within the bloc when it comes to a European Army: the German axis and the U.S. axis. Most of the Eastern European countries consider Russia a threat and continue their bilateral relations with the U.S. within the framework of NATO. It can be easily inferred that different economic and security perspectives cause different consequences. The German axis doesn’t see Russia as a huge threat to themselves, however the neighboring countries of Russia have a different threat perception, and thus bandwagoning after the U.S. with NATO partnership. One of the more recent examples of this axis is the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). The U.S. government as well as several members of the U.S. Congress have vouched strongly for this initiative. Launched by the presidents of Croatia and Poland in 2015, 3SI aims for energy independence and infrastructure connectivity, and thus enhancing the national security of Europe and the United States. The initiative expands through the three seas of Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Adriatic Sea. As of 2020, there are twelve countries participating in this project, with all of them being EU members (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia).

Considering from a balance of power and balance of threat perspective, the EU does not face a great external threat and has not been able to counter existential threats. This basis is more about preference than necessity occurred after two great devastating wars. Before Brexit, there were three great Powers - the Big Three: France, Germany and the U.K.- but at present there are two great Powers while Atlanticist ‘Trojan Horse’ U.K. is outside.

Since the Brexit vote, some interpret a revival of Franco-German axis when it comes to the defense policy of the EU. However, there are some differences within this axis, which 2019 Munich Security Report also notes about in terms of policies. For instance, France wants to improve Europe’s military power so that Europe’s defense can be better integrated (p.20). Even though both countries unanimously agree on the fact that their strategic environment is deteriorating (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2016;

Ministère des Armées, 2017), their budget for defense spending tells a different story. France makes efforts to reach %2 target budget even with the pressure of weak economic growth, Germany on the other hand only plans to reach % 1.5 of GDP by the end of 2024 –which could change- even with a surplus of budget in the last decade and serious deficiencies in the Bundeswehr’s staff and equipment (von Krause, 2018). Social Democrats in Germany are vocal about their disapproval when it comes to increasing the military spending, as they consider it a potential “armament spiral” (Agence France Press, 2017). Between Germany and France, there is a multitude of reasons for a military partnership through European Army. Primarily, ever since as a rising power in the 1800s, Germany has an ongoing rivalry with France. This historical rivalry and the resulting German-Franco wars became one of the reasons for WWI and WWII. Following these devastating wars and the emergence of Soviet Union as a new threat looming over the region, the U.S., Germany and France formed an alliance under the “functionality” principle with the aim of not having another war again. *Structural functionalism*, or alternatively referred as *functionalism*, is a theory that sees society as a system made up of different parts; and to achieve stability and harmony, all the parts of this system must work together.

Respecting the common economic balance, Germany applied to a pacifying process in this partnership. Later on, the economic partnership between Germany and France which started with the European Coal and Steel Community evolved into the European Union as many other European countries joined the group as well. In this vein, it can be said that a similar approach is being used for the European Army. Germany and France each have different reasons for this project; for France, Germany is a threat with its geopolitical position and in “great power” sense, while for Germany, France is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Once again these two powerful states form an alliance in accordance with the functionalism theory.

These great powers also form a judicial Franco-German axis as well. For the establishment of a European Army, there are two main ways: the first one is to establish a common defense policy under Article 42 or 20 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which would ensure its formation within the EU framework; the second one is to establish this common defense policy outside of the EU framework. According to the Article 42(2)

of TEU, a common defense policy can only be established by the unanimous decision of the European Council, which means that each member has to arrange their institutions, regulations and have national referendums for the approval. On the other hand, Article 20 of TEU accepts at least nine member states to increase cooperation among themselves “within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences”. This aforementioned cooperation is only a last resort and can only be unanimously adopted by the Council if the objectives of the cooperation cannot be achieved by all members of the Union within a conceivable time frame. The European Intervention Initiative announced by the French President Macron in 2017 (Parly, 2017, p. 61) might be a more tangible step towards European common military and security architecture. Ever since Emmanuel Macron’s election, the idea of European Army comes forward repeatedly while the exact structure of this army and how the concept of “more European” can be accomplished in a broader sense are still open to debate. There is a deep division between eastern and southern members when it comes to security priorities: some of the EU members are historically friendly with Russia and put the problems of Mediterranean basin’s issues like refugee crisis and terrorism as a priority, while other members still consider Moscow a serious threat.

In realpolitik matters such as Georgia, Ukraine, Iran Nuclear Deal or Syrian Civil War, the EU became fairly powerless. Occupation, digging and defense are three key sequential elements of trench defense. Let me translate this sequence for the purposes of this dissertation as building the borders, deepening and selective engagement defense. In 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched to shape the relations with 16 of the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors giving importance to democracy, rule of law, economic development, migration and security. With this document, the EU declares its borders and completes the occupation phase of the defense. Nevertheless, developments in Georgia and Ukraine prove the inability of the strategy facing the realpolitik. Common Security and Foreign Policy and later trials give enough sense about the second phase (digging) defined as deepening. On the European Commission White Paper-future of Europe-2017, three priorities are indicated including deepening the future of Europe’s defense.

In the latest White Paper Document of France, the sole nuclear power in the continental Europe, French President emphasizes that first-class defense and diplomacy are critical with strong and credible armed forces. For this purpose, their nuclear deterrence strategy will guarantee their vital interests, independence and, more broadly, their freedom of decision (Parly, 2017, p. 6). He also mentions Europe's strategic autonomy and a balanced transatlantic relationship. French Defense Minister Florence Parly claims that this is a pivotal moment; and making the best possible use of these resources requires a full understanding of the threats against France and Europe (Parly, 2017, p. 9). In addition, she states that their alliances also have changed, and they could no longer rely everywhere and forever with absolute certainty on their traditional partners (Parly, 2017, p. 10). From the transatlantic perspective, the statement that 'The United States itself resorts to unilateral action' (Parly, 2017, p. 18) is very important. Those arguments sound very similar to structural realist arguments such as nuclear deterrence, anarchy, and vagueness of intentions, balance of power and the concept of the self-help. As for the second main research question of this dissertation, 'full-spectrum and balanced armed forces' terms mentioned in French Strategic Review Document are critical in a possible force structure. Concerning Russia and the Transatlantic dilemma, two statements are really interesting; 'Russia seeks to undermine the transatlantic relationship and to divide the European Union', and 'This assertion of Russian power must be met with a firm response combined with dialogue, notably on issues of common interest (Parly, 2017, pp. 41-2).'

Germany, the other pivotal actor in the EU, should strengthen the EU when it comes to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Council of the European Union, 2016). Being Europe's strongest economic power, Germany has made it clear for the first time that it is ready to take on more responsibility. Even the name of Germany's White Paper published in 2016 is intriguing: The White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. This document indicates that the international system is moving towards a multipolar order (von der Leyen, 2016, p. 30). In transatlantic security alliance the U.S. has always kept a dominant position. With that being said, American security and defense strategies cannot be easily transferred to the EU's, Germany's or France's. John Ikenberry's "other great powers have not yet responded in a way anticipated by balance-of-power theory (Ikenberry, 2002)" statement perhaps best

explains this situation. It is very understandable that the rest of the world has not had sufficient military capabilities to balance against the U.S. so far.

As elaborately explained in this dissertation, the U.S. was the one and only superpower in the system after the dissolution of the Soviets, which means that it did not have any global threats. Thus, it transformed its defense planning from a threat-based strategy into a capability-based one. France and Germany state in their white papers that there have not had any sizable threats, but only some risks. Therefore, they try to adopt a capability-based planning as the U.S. did before. Even France and Germany have different views on European Armed Forces. For example, France desires to see Germany as a security partner, while keeping the autonomy to intervene unilaterally in its area of interests, whereas Germany seeks to integrate all European hard-power into a European Army (Keohane, 2016a).

Geopolitical factors also shape the development of external policy capacity by the EU. For example, U.S.' attitude is often crucial in determining whether and how the EU develops competence in a particular issue, especially in matters of defense and security. Thus, the role of the U.S. in both pushing for European integration and seeking to restrain the ability of the EU to develop an independent military capacity which Washington could not at least co-shape, has been extremely important. This has made Washington a Janus faced factor in the evolution of EU external policy capacity; by providing Western European security during the Cold War through NATO, and with its arguable facilitation of the development of EU economic power; while on the other hand insisting on yoking the EU's small military role to NATO, which places a clear limit on the evolution of that role. In recent years, when EU–U.S. tensions, or at least tensions between the U.S. and many EU member states, have often been acute, making it difficult and controversial to maintain the role of NATO in European defense (Pond 2004). Things got even more complicated with the reliance of many in the U.S. foreign policy for the development of EU with at least some degree of independent defense/military capacity, in order for the Union to be able to deal with problems in its 'neighborhood'.

In summary, the U.S. with all its military expenditure for building capability to maintain its status quo and overseas operations for the same purpose, failed to support its economy in contrast to Germany, and caused a distrust among its allies unlike France which

established a fruitful alliance with its neighbor Germany. France, on the other hand, aims high with a limited capability that does not allow it to reach those goals yet. With a realistic strategy and partnership with the booming economy of Germany, it can expand its influence over its past colonial regions such as Northern and Western Africa and the Middle East. This will enable France to reach its goal of becoming self-help and a sovereignty in terms of military might.

As for Germany, it does not feel the urge to make military expenditures as much as other NATO allies, despite the criticism from the U.S. This situation allows Germany to focus more on its economical ambitions.



## Chapter 6: Conclusion

Trump defined in the 2017 NSS three main sets of threats as follows; the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups. The American documents issued between 2000 and 2019 include these three sets either overtly or covertly. There has been a continuity on mainly on two possible war theatres against China and Russia from the 2000 NSS till the 2017 NSS, because the best way to survive is to be the most powerful state. From to the Cold War till present day, the U.S. Armed Forces have prepared to be ready and win at two major theatres at the same time against former Soviet Union in Europe and against China in Indio-Pacific. Nevertheless American Presidents did not overtly identify China and Russia as threat until the 2017 NSS. Between the years of 2000 and 2017, even though the U.S. contingency plans foresee two main theatres: Europe and Pacific, the U.S. military engagement in first Afghanistan and then Iraq might be accepted as the additional “half” theater thanks to the advantage which the unipolar international structure provided to the U.S.

It was also deduced that military force planners while focused on two major theatres, Europe and Indio-Pacific, and the priority was shifted from Europe to the latter one. In fact, when the QDR documents are analyzed, it is evident that they contain different geopolitical priorities for different military services. For instance, in the 2001 QDR, while the Army and Marine Corps were prioritized in the Arabian Gulf with the intention of being better prepared for Middle East contingencies; the Air Forces and the Navy were given priority in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. When France and Germany are considered from this perspective, it is obvious that these states did not prioritize any military activities either in the Asia-Pacific or even the Middle East.

In this dissertation, threats are analyzed from the viewpoints of both quantity and quality. In terms of the geographical proximity attribute in Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory, France and Germany did not consider China and Russia a threat between the years of 2000 and 2019. The U.S. did not perceive the offensive intentions, another attribute in the balance of threat, against China and Russia until the Trump Era, and neither did France and Germany. The fact that China and Russia, which have recently been identified as threats by the U.S. are still not considered threats by France and Germany can be

interpreted as a structural problem. Therefore, it is consistent in terms of balance of threat that France and Germany will not have state-based threat perceptions in the near future unless they are geographically very close to France and Germany and have superior offensive capabilities. In this context, although it is meaningful that France stated the increasing influence of China and Russia in Africa and the Middle East in the 2013 France White Paper, the fact that it does not consider these two a threat could be construed as buckpassing.

Even with the contingency plans of the Cold War era, the U.S. prepared its military force to win two theatre wars in both Europe and the Pacific region and followed an offensive stance, while Europe followed a defensive strategy only in Europe. This is where the biggest difference in the Transatlantic Alliance originates. With the elimination of the threat of the former Soviet Union in the Europe theatre, the U.S. used its military force in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush administration after 9/11 instead of focusing the potential rising power China in the Pacific region. During the Presidency of Obama, the U.S. which had a positive approach to include China and Russia in the system enabled China to be a free-riser instead of seeing these two countries as a threat. During Trump's presidency, China and Russia have come to be seen as concrete threats. The fact that the opposing force in the strategy is obvious and the Pacific is a priority for the possible military action theatre has brought the threat-based strategy back to the forefront for the U.S. Due to the importance of technology in the capability-based approach, new competition is expected to be intense in the field of technology.

The fact that France and Germany have opposed the military action against a country such as Iraq, which is in a region that is geographically close and relatively weak to oppose military actions against them and the UK have actively supported it, shows how they will act in a possible conflict with China which is the second largest in the world after the U.S. In this respect, AUKUS seems to be consistent in itself.

The two main motives of turbulence in the Transatlantic Alliance are changes in the distribution of power and in the threat construction. Concerning the three actors and the reasons of the turbulence analyzed in this dissertation, the turbulence in the Transatlantic Alliance stems from American fait accompli military campaigns between 2001 and 2011 first. And, it has risen in Trump's Presidency due to differences in their areas of interest

descriptions causing different threat perceptions and also different policy implementations. It is important to note that in 2003 France and Germany assumed an opposing stance even in a unipolar environment where the U.S. was dominant. It has had mainly two contingency plans in Europe and Pacific Region, the second of which has been prioritized lately by the U.S. so that France and Germany have not reacted to this change from all components of balance of threat function. The fact that NATO collective security system worked efficiently in the Cold War era in the Continental Europe does not mean that it might work in some different time and space. The Cold War's bipolar structure has changed, and the U.S. exploited it in 2003 military intervention of Iraq. The U.S. has global military combatant commands, and it means that the entire globe is in its 'geographic proximity'. This invites all possible threats, state or non-state, and from everywhere. The unipolar structure of the post-2000 international system meant that some miscalculations of military power conduct on the part of the U.S. have gone virtually unchecked.

It is not surprising, because each of the three Transatlantic Security Architecture countries prioritize their own national interests and, by definition, these do not overlap. In principle, they are satisfied with being part of the same security structure, but their strategies greatly differ. Their threat perceptions and definitions are, as a result, different. Their capabilities are different. Their preferences on how to use military power are different. Their allocations of resources on defense expenditures and preferences are, in the same fashion, different. France and Germany accept to increase their defense/GDP ratios, but their preferences are for collective and smart investment rather than being a market for American defense products.

When the events in the time scope of the dissertation are considered together, it can be understood that many factors affect each other differently. The 9/11 terrorist attack that the U.S. was exposed to, on its own soil, had different effects on the Transatlantic Alliance. The U.S. has gone through a major transformation in its strategy and security documents. First of all, the definition of threat has been changed and while states should be considered as the main actors according to neo-realism, terrorism has been determined as a threat. Also, it was aimed to change the conventional war-based structure of the U.S. Armed Forces by switching from a threat-based planning to a capability-based approach.

The NATO alliance supported the military operation in Afghanistan by implementing Article 5 for the first time in its history. However, France and Germany opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the U.S. and some NATO countries, including the U.K. This was the first turbulence in the alliance. This turbulence triggered Europe's own search for autonomy in the field of security and defense, especially in France. Meanwhile, the European Union made an effort to create its own strategy document in this process and produced one in 2003, albeit of a small volume. The Afghanistan and Iraq operations carried out by the then U.S. President Bush, besides being highly costly, also destabilized the countries of the region in a way that would be very difficult to reverse. The economic crisis that affected the entire world in 2008 worsened the situation. With the election of Obama as the President of the U.S., a normalization process started with France and Germany. So much so that, years later, in 2009, France returned to the military wing of NATO. The U.S. has turned its priority from Europe to the Pacific Region due to the changing international power distribution. NATO's expansion strategy in Europe was blocked by Russia, first in Georgia and then in Ukraine. The U.K.'s exit from the EU with Brexit also led the EU to create a more comprehensive strategy and security document in 2016. The criticisms of Trump that he did not attach enough importance to the issue of defending France and Germany after his election as the President of the U.S., once again brought the European Army discussions to the agenda by the heads of both countries, Macron and Merkel. However, intentions need to be supported in terms of both resources and capabilities. Especially the emergence of China as a potential challenger in the world, and the current technological difference between two European major powers and the U.S. make this issue highly difficult. Therefore, it is clear that the realization of the intention of the European Strategic Autonomy in the field of defense and security is rather difficult. However, the implementation of joint defense projects in certain predetermined areas has been presented as the most rational course of action in the documents examined. As long as there is no existential threat by France and Germany, and in a security climate where China is perceived as the greatest threat by the U.S.; although all three countries produce independent strategy documents, it has been concluded that they are interdependent.

NATO, the sole surviving military from the Cold War era, still remains despite the end of the Warsaw Pact, its biggest rival. The fact that 18 of the 23 documents examined

belong to the U.S., 3 to France and 2 to Germany clearly shows that the strategic political military culture of the U.S. is by far more developed and comprehensive. The different classification of threat analysis of the actors is elaborated while analyzing the details of the state's relevant documents. These differences also designate the courses of action of the actors. While constructing threat definition, terrorism is what all states agree without having a common strategy on counter-terrorism activities. These documents differ not only in the content, but also in the lengths and frequencies.

George W. Bush's unilateral military operation in Iraq away from the necessity principle fueled the EU, France, and Germany to reassess their strategy and defense policies. Obama succeeded to overcome this differentiation through a multilateral strategy and diplomatic means preference rather than military power. Nevertheless, Trump has fanned the flame, and the new international distribution of power requires collaboration and bargaining in order to balance rising power China. It seems that, after many years, realism will lead the way one more time, and each actor should be very prudent and taking care of itself in their preferences and policies.

It could be deduced that France and Germany intend to increase their defense expenditures to pacify criticism coming from the U.S., but under their own management and under a different military institution. However, this is not an easy task because even within the EU, different countries have different preferences. Different from France's operational military capabilities, it will be useful to keep in mind that German armed forces are not ready to fight; for example, mostly its ships are not ready to sail. Due to its need for resources, France is aware that it cannot accomplish this without the EU's greatest economic power, Germany. In this context, the Treaty of Aachen was signed between Germany and France in 2019, which constitutes important data. It is very interesting that France and Germany also intend to follow capability-based approach but in a defensive realist version. A gun might be used both in an offensive or defensive purpose. The two variants of neo-realist theory is still based on the preferences of the actors.

The U.S. policy makers between 2000's and 2010's prioritized unconventional non-state threats, ignoring realist great power politics, but lost their energy and resources at the time. There wasn't a survival or direct security threat to the U.S., but a limited terrorist

attack. The last NDS (NDS 2018) states that “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities”. It is also stated that China and Russia have exploited the competitive advantage while the U.S. was busy first in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and then in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 through developing their military capabilities and a force structure specifically designed to challenge the U.S.’ influence and increasing their own international stature.

When the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, China rose to the rank of the second international prominent actor in the world while Russia had the opportunity to heal its wounds through a limited and realist strategy. It can be argued that the U.S. did not assume a strategically sustainable position because it could not define threats properly, or set priorities for its military resources. In this vein, there are two main courses of action on the table: internal balancing and external balancing. When focusing on the rising China, the U.S. must assume a bargaining position to delegate the Russian threat to Continental Europeans.

The 9/11 attack and the subsequent Afghanistan operation as well as Iraq’s invasion caused a substantial increase in the number of military troops and the defense expenditures of the U.S., peaking in 2011. The figures started to decline after Obama’s decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. Upon Trump’s taking office as the President, the U.S.’ defense expenditures and military personnel size registered a slight increase. The number of military troops of France and Germany steadily declined following the 9/11 until 2019. Their defense expenditures, on the other hand, continued to increase until 2011 in parallel to the U.S.’ defense expenditures while decreasing during Obama’s tenure and rising again after Trump took office.

EU High Representative Josep Borrell, explains that European strategic autonomy, although not a new concept entirely, recently has been widened to new subjects of an economic and technological nature, as revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the security dimension remains predominant and sensitive. He believes that for NATO to be a more viable and efficient alliance, acquiring European strategic autonomy is vitally important, contrary to the idea that autonomy would be harmful to NATO. The fact that even a project such as the Eurodrone project, which is less costly than submarine and new generation aircraft projects, cannot progress in reality, demonstrates that the

implementation of European Strategy Autonomy is not easy. At first sight, the discourses of French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel look like they intend to build an independent European Army in accordance with the predictions of the structural realist theory in a multipolar international structure; on the other hand, a closer examination of documents of the two actors, the big picture tells a different story. The German and French leaders' discourse on the European Army seems at first glance as aimed at counterbalancing the U.S. hegemony, but in fact, it is aimed to combine their military capabilities.

It is very obvious that Germany does not prefer to have a strong "Bundeswehr". France, on the other hand, coming from the Gaulist self-help vision and nuclear capability legacy continues its efforts, but there is no major strategy shift when the relevant indicators are considered. In contrast, the U.S., China and Russian Federation continue with their high military expenditures compared to the rest.

It certainly does not mean that there are no differences between France and Germany, regarding their views on European politics. However, they mostly agree on the main issues, while disagreeing on certain technicalities. In other words, they are on the same page when it comes to the general strategic direction of the EU, while differing on their views regarding the best way to follow to reach common goals, or the timing of certain moves. That was not the case with the UK, where there were stark disagreements regarding the core views concerning key policy issues, such as strategic autonomy. Since its emergence as a concept in 2016 Global Strategy of the EU, the UK never endorsed it, neither was she supportive of the European Army. In fact, European self-sustainability in terms of security, under the umbrella name of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) has become much more viable after the BREXIT, since the UK, as its greatest opponent has decisively left the scene to France and Germany.

There is also a mismatch between France's intentions and capabilities, and that is why France tries to figure out creative ways to reach a practical strategy. In the same manner, realist theory tools seem to be more helpful. France has been disturbed by American unilateral military actions in the Middle East, but the picture seems quite different in the Pacific and Africa. Geographical proximity and lessons from the history make a great sense in terms of France's and Germany's threat perceptions. They both successfully

avoid security dilemmas. Defense cooperation with Germany, and cooperation and bargaining process with the U.S. against China could be interpreted as a convenient strategy for France.

From capability analysis viewpoint, Germany and France's military sizes and expenditures do not reflect the rising power pattern as China has displayed. Thus, it may be concluded that the Continental European great powers neither counter-balance nor bandwagon so as to be independent. It could be defined these autonomous initiatives as soft balancing strategy. It may also be claimed that the delivered speeches do not fit with the capability data. As a matter of fact, the U.S. does not need to act against weak states, but it needs to take them into consideration from a global balance of power perspective. The China-Russia axis in collaboration with the EU following the Brexit might leave the U.S. weaker, and therefore, it must be careful not to make strategic mistakes that will lead to failure as in Iraq. It should be noted, however, a constellation of power against the U.S. is a remote possibility.

The security threat description is not sacred and changes according to time and space, both at the national and international levels. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Germany and France have degraded their threat perceptions significantly. Consequently, they decreased their military expenses and downsized military forces. With the rising powers in Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has concentrated on that theater, and the center of gravity has changed radically to offer France and Germany to act as free-riders in the alliance. One of the attributes of the balance of threat theory is the 'geographical proximity' allows these two actors to stay safe from those rising powers.

Actions concerning strategic threat assessments have never been sacred and set in stone. Mistakes are made and strategy is not a holy business. The responsible people define strategy in accordance with threats and risks according to varying international distribution of power. Strategy is basically to decide on allocating the resources. Intentions and false promises far away from the realities will probably hit the wall with either tolerable or intolerable damages depending on the extent of resources. The rising China and the resurrection of the Russian Federation have seriously alerted the authorities writing up the American strategy and security documents. The fact that the U.S. acts more carefully and in a more realistic way shows that the world is in transition to a multipolar

structure, and this leads nations to return to the balance of power principle. However, the differences among the three transatlantic nations in question separate them from the Cold War rhetoric.

National strategy documents may not forecast the future with a hundred percent accuracy. Germany and France believe that the countries between them and Russia create a buffer zone, and thus, Russia does not possess the level of threat it once did. With the balance of threat in mind, it can be seen these two countries using a free-rider approach and they no longer consider themselves frontline countries. However, their neighboring countries still feel threatened by Russia, and they want to reach to an agreement with the U.S. Germany and France also escaped from the security dilemma as two neighboring great powers with a long history of hostility. Moreover, with the decline of threats in the Post-Cold War world, the concept of military forces composed of nationwide conscription, is shifting towards armed forces made up of professional recruits in smaller numbers. Along the same lines, there is a tendency for reduction in personnel numbers whereas with the rising role of technology, defense spending has been increasing proportionally.

Furthermore, the threat assessments between the U.S. and France & Germany are distinct from each other. The U.S., France and Germany have different threat perceptions, areas of interest, areas of responsibility and methods defining their preferences and strategies after the Cold War. The spheres of influence and interest between the U.S., France and Germany differ from each other. Moreover, the U.S. will define its security and defense strategy both multilaterally and unilaterally as per different administrations.

The threat assessments of France and Germany are also extensively different. France and Germany also diverge in terms of military power and spending. In addition, France will define its security and defense strategy along the lines of a combination of unilateral and multilateral approaches according to different areas of interests, whereas Germany will define its security and defense strategy through multilateral action in accordance with the international rule of law after it had two WW disaster experiences/legacies. According to the Washington Consensus, Germany has the best attitude.

The U.S. has huge offensive military capability, but should take into consideration relative power dynamics as well. While a European Army remains a quite complicated

issue, France and Germany's collaboration is understandable and realistic. As for France, it has global ambitions but a lack of relevant offensive military capability. Germany has not taken any direct threat, so has not invested in military so far. As two major powers of the EU liberal institution, Germany and France act in a realistic way to contribute to European Strategic Autonomy. Germany and France, as two neighboring important powers, intend to pacify each other while maximizing their relative power in the international arena. While the U.S. loses credibility, influence, and money by focusing on overseas operations and indulging in a past and now rivalry with Russia, China has been expanding its military force and influence along with its economy, unnoticed. Threat perception from China has made France more vigilant in its quest to become a sovereign military power, while the competition with China in Africa led France to focus more on maintaining its status on the continent. However, it has neither the capability, nor the economic power to overcome such threats yet. On the other hand, Germany and France have the opportunity to focus more on their own economic and military development, respectively, without worrying about each other, their neighbors, and the least of all, Russia.

Further to this, in International Relations, the concepts of balance of power and balance of threat are supplementary. The distribution of power in the international structure at the third level from the analysis perspective is the first filter. This reality offers actors a chance to make preferences. The U.S. should accept that it lives in a multipolar world and has lost its opportunity to be effective in the global arena as self-help while facing different great powers from the Cold War era. As explained earlier in this dissertation, European major powers have been free-riders in Europe under the NATO umbrella. At present, the center of gravity from geopolitics perspective has shifted from Europe to Asia-Pacific. There seems to be two courses of action for France and Germany; one is buck passing the rising China threat to the U.S., as they did in the past concerning the Soviet threat, and the other is re-fashioning the alliance to tackle China with the U.S. It could be concluded that France's and Germany's security preferences have been the same as the past, but they require multilateral approaches while defining new areas of interests and influence among the Transatlantic Alliance. The topic is both an opportunity and a risk in terms of the global balance of power concept and restraining American power. The U.S. was one superpower left in the system after the dissolution of the Soviets, and it did

not face any global threats. It transformed its defense planning from threat-based strategy into a capability-based one. France and Germany stated in their white papers that there were no sizable threats, but some risks. As a conclusion, the practice and distribution of power have led two major powers to act together in order to compete with different emerging powers. Additionally, in the absence of threats, the use of terminologies within the realist principles of “rising power” and “great power” has a minimizing effect on the possibility of an inaccurate evaluation. If power and threat are in match, there will not be a problem. Otherwise, the problem will be very expensive and intolerable, and the threshold might have already been passed.

In the light of real-life documents and data, this dissertation has concluded that China could be defined as a free-riser and Germany a free-rider, whereas France could be interpreted as a country with great intentions, but relatively lower capabilities. China rose to be second important actor without suffering any counter realist strategy such as containment. The U.S. did not act in accordance with the realist perspective and despite not being an existential threat, invaded Iraq and suffered grave consequences. As for the U.S., it is important to note that it has violated some of the main realist assumptions. First and foremost, rising powers investing more in their military capabilities should have been taken into consideration. Terrorism might be a disturbing matter, but contrary to what is written in strategy documents, it cannot be the most dangerous threat. Armed forces, including nuclear forces and large air force fleets, cannot be easily transformed and employed against a terror threat. That is why they must design a specific response to that kind of threat, which should be constructed in a different manner from others and limited in number to avoid unintended consequences. It goes without saying that the balance of power and the balance of threat should be two complimentary concepts. The right strategy seems to lie in suboptimal solutions and conditions, facilitating some other actor’s regional power structure.

The superiority of the U.S. in the world as a military power still continues. However, distribution of power, which was unipolar after the Cold War, has evolved into a multipolar structure. Germany and France do not have a threat definition similar to the threat perception of the U.S. against China. Although the Transatlantic Alliance had turbulence in the last two decades, it seems that the three countries examined in the

dissertation are connected to each other despite their desire to be autonomous from each other.

The strategic fracture in the Transatlantic Security Architecture carry the potential of dramatically altering all aspects of relations between the concerning three countries with major political, economic and social implications. This emerging military/non-military transitivity and the rapidly evolving concept of security will also be clearly traceable in the selected strategy documents of the concerning countries. In terms of strategy implementations, the findings of this dissertation suggests that multilateral cooperation as a preference in the Transatlantic Alliance would lessen the strategic fracture stated in speeches and improve combining resources in a smart power concept by specializing in predefined capabilities such as digitalization stated in the French White Paper. (France Presidence de la Republique, 2013, p. 90) Despite some similarities, the U.S.', France's, Germany's strategy documents, indeed have broad differences, which is quite natural because they aim for different objectives. As long as the U.S. secures the international agenda, France and Germany want to keep a distance and prefer neither bandwagoning nor balancing against the U.S. They do not maximize their power as offensive realism dictates, but at the same time they do not have real existential military security problems since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

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Bachelor's Degree Education

The Turkish Military Academy - Infantry Officer 1991

Army War College - Staff officer – 2004

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### **Work Experience**

Institutions Served and Their Dates:

Turkish Special Forces

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Head of Department of Foreign Relations

Author of Karartılmış Yıldızlar

Co-author of Inonu Wars in its 100th Anniversary/ 100. Yılında İnönü Savaşları

Albanian President's Medal

Order of the Bulgarian State

USA Course Medal

EU Service Medal

Alkanalka represented IMM in National Gallery auction for portrait of Mehmed.II