

The Path to Hegemonic Leadership: Determinants of the Success in Turkey and Failure in Egypt



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Abstract

The counterhegemonic momentum created by political Islamists in Turkey and Egypt resulted in very different outcomes, with definitive success for the former and only partial success, followed by complete failure, for the latter. This research evaluates the causes of the diverging course of political Islamist movements whilst pursuing permanent success for their hegemonic leadership. By employing Gramscian analysis as an analytical framework, the study involves examining the effectiveness of political Islam as a counterhegemonic project. In this context, counterhegemonic leadership formulated as a definitive leadership, which has acquired the necessary consciousness and skills to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure to be able to constitute a new socio-economic bloc, alongside a new class alliance to deliver a stable economic growth and development. Accordingly, it is argued that the formation of thriving historical bloc should have its basis from a decisive nucleus of economic activity. The investigation for the study was conducted through in-depth interviews with high level politicians, including the president of Turkey, ministers, bureaucrats, civil society leaders and a range of experts. The findings of the thesis are such that in contrast to the Turkish experience, the failure of the political Islamist counterhegemonic project in Egypt was owing to their inability to possess a leadership in the decisive nucleus of economic activity.

Acknowledgement

Read! In the name of your Lord, who created:
Created man from a clot [of blood].
Read! Your Lord is the Most Bountiful One
Who taught by the pen,
Taught man what he did not know.
Quran, 96: 1-5

It was the dream in the night of a sublime day that convinced me to take this journey in which I dedicated five years of my life. It was again this dream which strengthened me at every step of this journey. During this journey, I encountered many life changing moments that defined me today. The most beautiful one out of all was the moment that I met my wife Miray. Like the night of that sublime dream she was the magic that changed the course of my life. Our daughters Nura Naz and Liva Su are the fruits of the eternal love that glowed upon the process of this research. Therefore, this piece of work is dedicated to them.

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Abbreviations

ASU	Arab Socialist Union
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
CA	Constituent Assembly in Egypt
CSIS	Center for Strategic & International Studies
DISK	Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
DLP	Democrat Left Party
DP	Democrat Party
EASP	Egyptian Arab Socialist Party
EBDA	The Egyptian Business Development Association
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EOI	Export Oriented Industrialisation
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme
ESB	Egyptian Society of Businesses
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
FP	Felicity Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HAK-IS	Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Türkiye Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
HTP	Health Transition Programme
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JP	Justice Party
Mazlumder	Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği)
MP	Motherland Party
MTTB	National Turkish Student Association (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği)
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
NAC	National Association for Change
NDP	National Democrat Party
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party
NOP	National Order Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
NWP	Nationalist Work Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OOP	Out-of-Pocket Payment
PAM	Political Research Centre (Politika Arastirma Merkezi)
PC	Policies Committee in Egypt
RDP	Reformist Democrat Party
RPP	Republic People's Party
SAP	Structural Adjustment Party
SCAF	The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SETA	The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Arařtırmaları Vakfı)
SLP	Socialist Labour Party
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SPO	State Planning Organisation
TESK	Confederation of Tradesmen and Handicrafts (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu)
TIS	Turkish Islamic Synthesis
TISK	Turkish Confederation of Employers Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
TOBB	Union of Turkish Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birlięi)
TPP	True Path Party
TSI	Turkish Statistics Institute
TTPSE	Turkey's Transition Programme for Strengthening the Economy (Türkiye Güçlü Ekonomiye Geçiř Programı)
TURK-IS	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
TUSIAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneęi)
UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VP	Virtue Party
WP	Welfare Party

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Chapter 1

Introduction

When young Egyptians from different political and socioeconomic backgrounds filled the streets of Cairo and various other cities in Egypt in the winter of 2011, they were endlessly chanting the song “*bread, freedom and social justice*” to achieve a permanent and successful revolution in the country. With absolute focus, they had two missions in mind: one was to seek socioeconomic prosperity and equality, whilst the other was to push the despotic boundaries of the old and crippling regime that had lost touch with the majority of the nation's young, progressive and dynamic generation. Their persistent cries and determination for two months in the 2011 winter were much more powerful and complex in comparison to the previous events that took place in the first decade of the new millennium. The collective resistance and determination of the youth and discontented middle classes pushed the regime into a cathartic moment, which led to Hosni Mubarak resigning from his post, thus end his 30-year-rule.

The Turkish political economic scene in the early 2000s was not too different from that of Egypt's. The country was governed by a coalition government consisting of social democrats (Democratic Left Party), a nationalist right wing party (Nationalist Movement Party) and neoliberals (Motherland Party) until the resignation of the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, in 2001. This resignation came after a scandalous meeting at the National Security Council in February 2001, which former PM Ecevit said was the most shameful and shocking moment of his political career. At the news conference, Bulent Ecevit declared his resignation stating that the President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, threw the book of constitutional laws at him and that he would not tolerate this humiliating act as the Prime Minister of the state. Immediately following the announcement Bulent Ecevit's resignation, the Turkish economy buckled and fell into what can be described as a historically deep recession. This was to the extent that 11 banks went bankrupt, overnight interest rates on loans reached 7,500%, and the Turkish lira lost half of its value through a domino effect. As a result, thousands of businesses went bankrupt and millions of people joined the army of the unemployed. The hegemonic structure of secularist Turkish state was in crisis and this last incident

between the head of the state and the government led to the country experiencing a cathartic moment, which eventually allowed political Islamists to articulate decisive momentum for their counter hegemonic project based upon the support of discontented middle and lower classes.

According to Gramsci *“The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”* (Gramsci 1971, p276). Despite the crisis of the hegemonic state in Turkey and Egypt being experienced in different decades, the subsequent events have proven that these crises were caused by rather similar aspirations and social forces shaped by the intra-class struggle. In other words, these crises were the reflection of the marginalised middle and lower classes, which were eager to re-establish a new order by forcing the existing power structures to rupture and dissolve. Political Islamist parties in both Egypt and Turkey set themselves the aim of fulfilling the needs of these socioeconomic groups, but the experiences of both these parties differed substantially from each other. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt failed to consolidate these socioeconomic groups that overthrew the authoritarian Mubarak regime to form its own historical bloc. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AK parti, AKP or JDP) in Turkey, on the other hand, managed to satisfy the emerging conservative bourgeoisie and the middle class associated with them. In contrast to the Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-'Adala) in Egypt, they were able to constitute such a consensus among the businessmen with their commitment to the EU membership process and IMF standby plan signed with the previous government. The JDP repeatedly rejected the political Islamist identity in their early years in the government, being determined to pursue full necessary reformation to join the European Union under a new identity, which it claimed as being similar to the conservative democratic parties in Europe. As a result, in contrast to the Egyptian experience, the first JDP government was able to enjoy sustainable economic growth and socioeconomic reform despite harsh criticism by the secularist hegemonic bloc.

1.1 Argument in a Nutshell

This study develops a theoretical perspective from Gramscian literature to explain how counterhegemonic movements can lead to a success or failure to achieve regime change. The main theme of this research focuses on the composition of the emergent hegemonic groups within the civil society organisations. It focuses on their experience while transforming in their leadership strategies to lead or absorb intellectuals operating within the realms of the economic, political and moral & intellectual strata. In my reading of Gramsci's notebooks from the prison, I noticed that he articulates the idea that conscious and aspiring leadership in the economic, political, intellectual & moral aspects of society are necessary for the counter hegemonic forces to achieve and maintain state power over the declining hegemony. Gramsci does not use the term "counter-hegemony," precisely in anywhere of his writings, but he has a clear reference points in which he reflects the notion that he does not distinguish between the state of being "counter" or "hegemonic." For him these two norms are instead dialectically intertwined. This proposition is articulated from an understanding that one cannot be counter-hegemonic without participating within the hegemonic system. At the same time, the hegemonic system is never one hundred percent hegemonic because it is never complete. While the chapter two will outline this proposition in more details, the path to hegemonic leadership in this study conceptualised through three steps. First, the leading group develops a self-awareness of interests and ideal aspirations; second, it builds alliances for a new socioeconomic bloc through the acquisition of skills and experiences, enabling them to synthesise political theory and practice, masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure; and third, it reaches out to broader classes with the help of this new socioeconomic bloc and capture their support by ensuring economic growth and development. Counterhegemonic leadership, in this study, therefore, formulated as a definitive leadership, which has acquired the necessary consciousness and skills to synthesise political theory and practice, masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure to be able to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc, alongside a new class alliance that will guarantee a stable economic growth and development.

To test this theoretical perspective, I chose to compare the two largest Muslim populated countries of the Mediterranean region, which are Turkey and Egypt. I

contend that in both countries political Islamists exercised power over the civil society organisations to target the state power. However, the counterhegemonic momentum created by political Islamists in these two countries resulted in very different outcomes, with definitive success for the former and only partial success, followed by complete failure for the latter. More specifically, when both countries, in terms of their population size, strategic locations in the world, and their influence and history with other countries in the region are compared, there are similarities. Whilst, the size of the two economies differ substantially from each other now, such that the Turkish one is nearly double the size of its Egyptian counterpart, whilst in the early 1980s, Egypt and Turkey shared similar economic profiles and niches in the global economy.

The economic structure of both countries has been heavily dependent on raw material exports, tourism and foreign direct investment. As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, both adopted Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 1980 and 1990, respectively, with these reforms benefiting the Turkish economy substantially, whereas as in Egypt only a small circle of business people close to the regime reaped the rewards. The success of these reforms led the emergence of a new “pious” capitalist class in Turkey, which constituted the backbone of a political Islamist hegemonic project in the country. My contention is that political Islamists or any other class segments, not too close to the regime in Egypt, did not have similar flexibility/freedom to articulate such an economic influence in support of their counterhegemonic strategies. Though, they could access to prominent civil society organisations to articulate political power, but this was only in a limited sense. Therefore, when they had the opportunity take over the government after the uprising in 2011, this was not enough to guarantee economic prosperity that would have benefited the broader segments.

This study is aimed at addressing the following two research questions: To what extent did political Islamist counterhegemonic projects in Turkey and Egypt converge in terms of synthesising political theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure to constitute a new socio-economic bloc, or a new class alliance? Why did the Egyptian political Islamists, in contrast to their Turkish counterparts, fail to create a consensus among the Egyptian lower and middle classes, thereby achieving a hegemonic success? The following theoretical questions are

articulated to constitute a theoretical framework compatible with Egypt and Turkey: Do counterhegemonic forces from Gramsci's perspective require a special type of intellectual associated with the economic sphere to achieve a cohesion between political and civil society? Why does the success of a hegemonic project, according to Gramsci, depend upon the decisive function exercised by its leading group's decisiveness in the nucleus of economic activity? For addressing these questions, Gramscian analysis engaged with by adopting a distinctive perspective, as outlined in the theoretical chapter. With the purpose of conducting the research guided by these questions, the following hypothesis and analytical framework: a) that the success of political Islamist counterhegemonic projects depended on the leading group's ability to constitute decisive leadership as a nucleus of the economic activity; b) in order to construct a hegemonic leadership, the leading group should, first, develop a self-awareness of interests and ideal aspirations; second, build alliances through the acquisition of skills that will enable it to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure; and third, it must reach out to broader classes with the help of this new socioeconomic bloc and capture their support by ensuring economic growth and development.

Through this perspective, the aim is to contribute to the general comprehension of the underlying causes and factors that led to the rise and subsequent rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, by, as abovementioned, referring to Gramscian notions that will be identified in the theoretical chapter. Detailed comparison will be made regarding the counterhegemonic momentum that these two prominent political Islamist parties gained in their countries. This will facilitate a better understanding of the Egyptian and Turkish political canvas between the 1950s and 2014. My approach will involve careful manoeuvring within the existing literature to provide a coherent and reliable analytical study that highlights the key notions of the political and economic transformations in these countries. Specifically, the literature review will involve critically analysis and discussion on the weaknesses of the extant approaches and the key qualities that my approach employs to overcome these shortfalls. I will deploy a very distinctively studied analysis from a Gramscian perspective to present the causal relationships that exist between the economy, intellectuals, civil and political society and most importantly, counterhegemonic strategies.

1.2 Position of This Study in the Literature

Political Islam as a counterhegemonic force in Turkey and Egypt have been studied by a few Gramscian scholars to assess and provide analysis for their evolution (Butko 2004; Tugal 2009; Atasoy 2009; Kandil 2011; Roccu 2012; Morton 2012; De Smet 2014; Talani 2014). These scholars have reflected on a very important fact that political Islamists in these influential and densely populated Muslim-dominated countries in the Mediterranean region, have been actively engaging in hegemonic struggles with the dominant secular ideology. Their contribution to literature from the Gramscian perspective signifies the existence of a strong incentive from political Islamist intellectuals and civil society organisations to redefine and reconfigure the state, its societal identity and political society, which paved the way for their access to privileges of the state power. Moreover, other investigations have revealed that the coercive approach by the secular bloc against the political Islamist groups can lead to the latter's moderation over the long run, which can strengthen their political positioning in the eyes of the masses at times of prolonged social and economic crises (Tezcur 2010 p70; Gumuscu 2010 p836; Atasoy 2009 p248).

Political Islamists I shall argue throughout this research is a counterhegemonic movement which synthesises the activities of modern politics with the norms of religion. This is in a sense that politics and religion becomes subservient to leading group's aspirations, and all its counterhegemonic activities aim at manufacturing consent from subordinate groups. These activities mainly targeted institutions such as education, worship, social welfare and family which have been incorporated to varying degrees within the regulatory apparatuses of the modernizing state. From such a perspective, issues such as headscarf and religious education are two well-known cases advocated by political Islamists in Turkey and Egypt. Therefore, I contend that as the modern politics and the forms of power it has dictated restricted conservative force's ability to cultivate religious virtue within the boundaries of legal and administrative structures linked to the existing hegemonic state, the religious virtues which these forces advocated had to be part of the causes of political sphere as a new form of counterhegemonic strategy if it is to succeed.

However, my emphasis here does not mean that the religiously conservative elements of Muslim dominated nations are in a pursue of a political agenda to articulate a new Islamic state, rather it is a mutual relationship with the political actors to cultivate solutions for the everyday problems of marginalised lower and middle classes. Hence, acting as a leading group which has given up from the certain elements of their fundamental believes to synthesise its economic and political interest with the interest of other subordinate groups. As this will allow them to constitute a bloc of alliance that can positively contribute to the needs of broader segments of the society in path to achieving a consensus that every hegemonic leadership requires from masses. As the following chapters will illustrate the politics of JDP in Turkey has a chameleon like gelatinous form and it does not hesitate to change its opinion on fundamental causes that it advocates to maintain and promote its political power. In sum, this research will address the notion of political Islam as the reflection of dynamic relationship between religiously conservative elements operating within the realm of civil society and political sphere to articulate the power of modern state to achieve the privileges of hegemonic leadership.

My intention throughout this research is not to dwell on the changes in the ideological orientation of these religious groups or the influence of social hierarchies of the international system over the nation state's behavior in the international society including their domestic politics but to fill the gap where other studies have failed to explain the complexity regarding how a new counter hegemonic movement emerge and succeed in consolidating a new historical bloc by becoming the "decisive nucleus of economic activity" (Gramsci 1971, p161). I contend that the role of intellectuals and their operating identity in civil society in the form of business associations are two important concepts, which can facilitate a better understanding why there can be a successful counter hegemony rather than an aborted one. In this respect, the ways in which economic liberalisation affected the behaviour of intellectuals and civil society operating in Turkey and Egypt, complement the existing explanations of the evolution of Islamism and its counterhegemonic strategies in these countries.

1.2.1 The case of Turkey

To tackle my research objective and situate my approach among the existing body of literature, I contend that investigation on the nature of intellectuals, particularly their operation and evolution within the entrepreneur and capitalist classes, offers a better explanatory perspective on the rise of political Islam. My review on other Gramscian scholars work reveals that they offer good insights into the counterhegemonic projects of the Islamists, but they fail to address adequately the underlining reason for their success or failure. Cihan Tugal's book, titled *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, focuses on how the JDP's backbone of Islamists in Turkey transitioned through a process of absorption into the existing power structures. In this book, Tugal (2009) argued that the absorption of a radical movement in Turkey was not simply the definitive outcome of an inevitable world-historical trend, but the outcome of the contingent struggles between the pro-secularist Kemalist bloc and the conservative Islamist one. He highlighted how the Islamist counterhegemonic response against the crisis of Kemalist hegemony found its ground through effective "*political leadership, authority structures, visions of unity, everyday life, social use of space and relations to the economy*" (Tugal 2009, p42). Moreover, the principles of hegemonic vision of the first JDP government entailed "*support for unfettered markets, integration with the international business community, deregulation, privatization, and emphasis on a conservative morality*" (Tugal 2009, p8).

However, my assessment of Tugal's book is that, while it has the signs of a compelling analysis, it equally lacks a strong Gramscian perspective, which undermines its potential. For instance, Tugal (2009) noted that he conceptualised his application of passive revolution and the rise of Islamist hegemony through Gramsci's prison writings. However, throughout his entire book, he makes no direct textual reference to this work. He claimed in his book, that he can offer a "*better conceptualisation*" of hegemony, but without any direct reference to Gramsci's writings his claim appears as nothing but vague (Tugal 2009, p24). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Morton (2012) sketched a journal article in response to Tugal's study on Turkey with the title "The Limits of Sociological Marxism?". He noted that he has concerns with Tugal's work, which "*all too infrequently offers the opportunity to explore an interpretative understanding of hegemony and its points of contact and difference with passive*

revolution. More pointedly, Tugal's disquisition on hegemony and passive revolution is lacking a large degree of textual engagement and exegetical clarity" (Morton 2012, p133). In his study, Tugal (2009) did not articulate coherent and analytically engaging analysis that addresses the key notions that Gramsci formulated in his prison notebooks. For instance, he neglected to discuss the importance of intellectuals and their function in diffusing and strengthening the rising counterhegemonic momentum. I argue that the success for counterhegemonic movements is contingent upon not just how these movements define and reconfigure political society, for it also depends on how they can manage and communicate with intellectuals, who are the true labourers of hegemonic construction.

Drawing on Morton's (2012) response to the Tugal's study, I also contend that while his ethnographic study, from a sociological Marxist perspective, uncovers important aspects relating to the rise of political Islamists in Turkey, it cannot fully explain why they were successful in terms of developing counter strategies cohesively against all necessary front lines, i.e. civil society, political society and the state. The reason for such a contention is that Tugal's approach to hegemony, and the way he reconceptualised political society, civil society and the state, has shortcomings and as it contains these spheres in what Morton terms "*a relationship of ontological exteriority*" (Morton 2012, p133). In other words, first, Tugal treats the notions of political society, civil society and the state as the autonomous spheres and then claims that they are interacting realms. From this perspective, he overlooks the reality of the state led economic reforms and intellectuals in the economic moment. I, on the other hand, treat these notions in cohesive unity, thus organically linking them to provide a better analytical understanding of the phenomena. Hence, from such a perspective, I intend to follow the core of Gramsci's reconnaissance of the terrain of the state and its unifying relationship with other key notions relating to intellectuals, their function in the economy as well as civil and political society. In accordance with the ideas of Gramsci, my contention is that the JDP has been able to mobilise "*new integral and totalitarian intelligentsias and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place*" (Gramsci 1971, p335). That is to say that the JDP constituted a new socioeconomic or historical bloc for its hegemonic aspirations based on a pro-business agenda blended with political Islam.

Karasipahi (2009) claims that the crisis of the Kemalist modernisation process paved the way for the emergence of a new kind of intellectual class in Turkey. These intellectuals were more favourable towards Islamists in their stance and rhetoric compared to the usual Kemalist, secular or leftist intellectual elite. She states that “*the inherent peculiarities and paradoxes of Turkish modernity and the subsequent breakdown of its reliability and legitimacy constitute the main grounds for Muslim Intellectuals’ critical discourse*” (Karasipahi 2009, p1). Her claim is based on the idea that Kemalist ideology and its top-down modernisation project, together with the domestic and international social, political and economic developments in the 1950s and 1980s, forced this ideological legacy and hegemony to lose its attraction for certain types of intellectuals. In order to explain the authoritarian, forced and top down manner of the Kemalist modernisation project, Karasipahi (2009) claims that she is drawing upon Gramsci’s theory of subordination and hegemony. Then, Karasipahi (2009) makes a reductionist assumption by casting Turkish modernity as the “*blind imitation of the West, disregarding the indigenous characteristics of Turkish society*” (p191). Moreover, Karasipahi’s (2009) work is not sufficient in explaining how these intellectuals later created an organic relationship with the rising conservative business class, particularly the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD).

It is important to underscore the emergent socioeconomic realities in Turkey following the shift to export-led policies from the 1980s onwards. The mass privatisation phase started with Turgut Ozal’s government in late 1980s creating many new opportunities for the Anatolian bourgeoisie class. This type of capitalist class in Turkey, who usually owned a large farm in the east of the country, saw themselves as more pious Muslims than their counterparts in the West of Turkey and with the help of neoliberal policies initiated by the Ozal government, started to emerge as a global capitalist class. The JDP’s policy approach towards this emergent bourgeoisie class differentiated from previous Islamists projects. For instance, the ‘Just Order’ programme of the “*Milli Gorus*” (National View) highlighted social justice, redistribution, and heavy state intervention through economic measures, but it alienated the emerging devout bourgeoisie, by not meeting their actual needs and desires. When the JDP’s political and economic projects are investigated, it revealed that the party singled out itself from Turkey’s other neo-liberal and religiously

conservative parties. It articulated the necessary socioeconomic linkages with broader segments of Turkish society to transform their attitudes towards the marketisation of the economy. In other words, the JDP was successful in weakening the resistance to neo-liberalism and pushed forward broader acceptance of the realities of the free market system among the popular sectors.

As the theoretical chapter will discuss in more detail, drawing from Gramsci's notes on intellectuals and their place in the different segments of society, I emphasise entrepreneurs as the highest level of social synthesis, who should be regarded as the driving force for full counterhegemonic success. I contend that emergent pious entrepreneurs in Turkey could be treated as the intellectuals of political Islamist in Turkey. The reason for such a claim, stems from Gramsci's notes, where it is noted that *"the capitalist entrepreneur, whether emergent or existent, creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organizers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc."* (Gramsci 1971, p5). Furthermore, he quoted:

"the entrepreneur himself represents a higher level of social elaboration, already characterised by a certain directive [dirigente] and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity: he must have a certain technical capacity, not only in the limited sphere of his activity and initiative but in other spheres as well, at least in those which are closest to economic production." (Gramsci 1971, p5)

The function of entrepreneurs, in this case the emergent pious capitalist class in Turkey, did not just have decisiveness as an economic agent limited to its structural level, it began to spread among all levels of state and society, i.e. the superstructure. To clarify my argument further through the use of Gramsci's notes, he stated that entrepreneurs *"must be an organizer of masses of men"* (Gramsci 1971, p5). Accordingly, I argue that entrepreneurs perform a function, which can develop and sustain mental images, technologies and organisations to bind together the members of a class and historic bloc under a common identity. The formation of a historical bloc, therefore, must have an organic relationship with the economic groups which, is the *"decisive nucleus of economic activity"* (Gramsci 1971, p161).

Atasoy (2009), on the other hand, has studied how an Islamic social change programme is being attached to the EU's neoliberal discursive framework. She explored the links between policies related to Turkey's EU membership process and its effects on the production of moral claims, discursive orientations, and symbolic attachments. Regarding which, she has argued that these policies have been used to suppress the military's involvement in the key decision making processes for many matters in the country. Atasoy (2009) has claimed that these links are contingently centred on the organisation of a neoliberal market-based political economy and have thus, led the Turkish state to evolving towards religious conservatism that would oppose military involvement in politics, but with a full neoliberal economic agenda. Elsewhere, she tried to identify the reasons that led Islamists to situate themselves and their politics within the political context of Turkey and the general conditions of global transformation. She noted, "*Islamic politics must be understood in terms of the material relations of global capitalism, the reorganisation of states, political alliances, and cultures (Atasoy 2005, p15)*". She placed her core argument on the understanding that these historically significant factors were driving a reinterpretation of Islam and in turn, the reconfiguration of Islamic politics. She claimed that "*local and global relations are mutually constitutive*" and hence, when we look at the counterhegemonic strategies of political Islamists, "*we should examine the complexity that emerges from the dynamics of Islamist incorporation of Western ways into specific political projects*" (Atasoy 2005, p15).

Whilst Atasoy (2009, 2005) has demonstrated a good understanding of the emergence of political Islamists in Turkey, she has not fully presented the real causal relationships between different segments of society in Turkey. These have been impacting on society at all levels owing to mass internal migration to urban cities in Turkey over the last half century. Atasoy (2009) constructed her work by mainly referring to Karl Polanyi's ground-breaking study "*Great Transformation*" and whilst she does give a robust account of the phenomenon, she still overlooked at the case of JDP from a perspective which identified the constantly shifting attitudes, interests and identities of this party. Her conclusions in terms of the historical blocs present in Turkey that have been absorbed and transformed into the JDP's ideological spectrum do not properly identify and explore the true picture of the case. For instance, she claimed that Islamic politics constitutes a reworking of the Kemalist state - that it

initiates “*state transformation*” by coupling “*new knowledge cultures*” (Islamism) and “*globalized frames*” (neo-liberalism). However, she did not carefully define these concepts, and there are no parameters provided to identify or measure when and how they transform, which is precisely what is needed to assess the true situation of modern Turkey under the JDP.

Henceforth, the debate over civil society and its function has grown gradually since the late 1980s and early 1990s in Turkey. These debates predominantly conceptualised civil society as a notion that yields its political power from society without any constraints. From such a perspective, the concept of civil society emerged as a discourse, which emphasised the norm of democracy against the military’s persistence in politics (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009). Dikici-Bilgin (2009) highlight that ‘civil’ society, as opposed to the ‘military’, and, thus, to the ‘state’, appeared for the first time in the publications of the Turkish left. However, as Atasoy (2009) has argued, later this discourse was taken up by liberals, liberal leftists, neo-conservatives and Islamists. Before, the discourse on civil society streamed from the Turkish left opposed to the military, now it was Islamists who organised its oppositional position within civil society against the military. Such a transformation was visible with the power of political Islamist’s discourse in the media and amongst the intelligentsia in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

In this interplay, Gramscian scholar, Dikici-Bilgin (2009), claimed that the interactions within civil society in Turkey would lead to a better democratisation process. However, she rejected the idea that civil society can act as a counter-hegemonic force, which will lead to further democratisation in Turkey. She argued that “*civil society is, rather, a site for hegemonic struggles and that these struggles determine the outcome, which might not necessarily result in any further democratisation of domestic politics. (Dikici-Bilgin 2009, p107)*”. Her article promises to present the state tradition and emergence of civil society in Turkey in its historical context, but she overlooks crucial points that reflect the true story that exists between the two. For instance, Both Dikici-Bilgin (2009) and Atasoy (2009) neglects to illustrate the true picture of the relationship that exists between political society and civil society organisations that are operating on behalf of entrepreneurs, particularly business associations. She does not show how these entrepreneurs, acting as civil

society organisations, reflect their interests and worldviews as emergent counterhegemonic political forces (i.e. political Islam).

Usenmez (2007), on the other hand, argued that the reason for the success and effectiveness of political Islam in Turkish civil society since the 1970s was derived from capitalism's historically specific evolution through the Fordist mode of production. That is, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, this scholar claimed that globalised production stimulated new and more pragmatic historical blocs within the Middle East and Turkey. In other words, he proposed the idea that the articulation of the neoliberal economic policies in these countries culminated in the creation of a new hegemonic bloc (i.e. transnational liberalism). Most importantly, the study highlighted how the ideology of this newly emergent hegemonic bloc is based on its religiously conservative norms and values. Ultimately, Usenmez (2007) contended that the political struggle of the Islamists over the common sense of the Turkish people, was backed by an emergent Anatolian bourgeoisie and the military-civilian bureaucracy. However, his study fell in short in explaining how the emergent Islamist counter hegemony in Turkey operated cohesively at all three levels of society, i.e. economic, moral and intellectual and political spheres. That is, he failed to uncover the crucial link that binds these three elements of hegemonic leadership for successful counterhegemonic projects.

Oncu (2003) studied Turkey with Gramsci's profound theoretical perspective on hegemony. He applied Gramsci's formulation of the state as the dictatorship plus hegemony in his case study. He argued that this approach would allow him to elucidate the role of the state and its organic links with dominant social classes. Particularly, his study attempted to expose the driving forces behind the hegemony of the dominant class within both state and society in Turkey. He contended that the state in Turkey does not have autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant classes and groups. He placed his study opposite to the state autonomy tradition in literature, stating:

I will strive to contribute to a better understanding of the dependence of the modern capitalist state on the dynamics of civil society and class conflicts. By emphasising the importance of society and classes, I join in the movement away from the state autonomy tradition. (Oncu 2003, p305)

In his study, he claimed that long years of hegemonic crisis in the state had reached a climax in the 1970s, especially after the March 12, 1999 military coup. He contended that these crises were driven by the internal divisions amongst the existing ruling classes, noting that:

This deepening hegemonic crisis and the deepening participation of the working class and other dominated groups and classes in the struggle against the relations of power and domination in society seem to be associated phenomena. (Oncu 2003, p305)

Oncu's (2003) work can be regarded as the best version of the Gramscian concept of hegemony applied on Turkey. However, it is very limited in its scope of the overall socioeconomic transformations in that country. It is a strong study that effectively explains how the Kemalist state was in crisis, but it has nothing to say about the rise of political Islamists as an alternative hegemonic project in Turkey. The study also failed to explain how intellectuals in hegemonic interplay have a dominant role.

Lastly, Gumuscu (2010) approached the diverging experiences of political Islamists in Turkey and Egypt from the perspective of moderation theory. She argued that the diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt have led to political Islamist constituencies in these two countries to experience a different evolution. Rightly, she noted that economic liberalisation has played both a constitutive and a causal role in the transformation of political Islam in Turkey, by facilitating the growth of a strong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy. With the growing support of this rising devout bourgeoisie, the Turkish political Islamist leadership moderated their position into a democratic conservative party, whereas regarding Egypt, Gumuscu (2010) outlined the way the state implemented economic reform prevented the formation of a strong and independent devout bourgeoisie that could be assertive in political Islam. Instead, she argued the lower-middle-class professionals and losers from the reforms, populated the Islamist constituency and entrenched Islamism into ideological positions rather than engaging with the pragmatic style that their counterparts in Turkey had adopted.

Despite Gumuscu's (2010) study being a significant contribution to the literature from a comparative perspective, which discusses the differentiated economic reform process and its effects on the aspirations of political Islam, the work has its shortcomings in terms of locating and conceptualising the counterhegemonic potential of both Turkish and Egyptian political Islamists. For instance, regarding the difference, she argued that in contrast to the Egyptian case, there were more opportunities for the Turkish political Islamists to reap the benefits of economic reforms in Turkey. However, she did not clearly identify the distinctive relationship that the political Islamist in both countries articulated within the realm of civil society. Hence, in the case of Turkish political Islamists and their gelatinous ideological form did not only depend on their economic base, for it also involved collaboration with the other central right as well as left wing politicians, intellectuals and media patrons. Hence, the composition of the political parties that the political Islamists founded in these countries differ from each other.

1.2.2 The case of Egypt

Gramscian literature applied to the Egyptian case offers a much better perspective than in the Turkish case. The scholars would appear to have a better conceptualisation and interpretation of Gramsci's notion when it comes to its application to that nation. Yet again, they do not provide true insights into the counterhegemonic strategies of the political Islamists, which can explain their success and failure. In particular, Kandil's (2011) journal article titled *Islamizing Egypt? Testing the limits of Gramscian counterhegemonic strategies*, presents a great flow of discussion and application of Gramsci's notion of counterhegemonic strategies in relation to the Islamists in Egypt. He investigated how the strong and gradually growing cultural power of the Islamists between 1982 and 2007 accumulated strategic oppositional power. He argued that such a convincing political strategy, based on cultural aspects, triggered sharp state repression from the existing hegemonic power bloc, which ultimately prevented the Islamists from realizing any political authority. Ultimately, Kandil (2011) claimed that the coercive capacity of modern states provided the opportunity for the dominant power bloc to reserve its domination, even though it had lost its cultural hegemony.

However, Kandil's (2011) work was published just before the Egyptian revolution and did not consider that the Islamists could actually achieve government despite the state repression. In spite of the fact that they were forced out from the state power they had striven for decades, their strategies had worked in that they had been able to present themselves as an alternative to the existing hegemony in Egypt. Their short lived experienced proved two points in my view: one that the Muslim Brotherhood has robust solidarity networks between the lower and middle classes as well as within them. Second, they still do not possess the necessary economical, social and political skills and capital that can harmonise different interests and demands from civil society groups that are domestically and internationally recognised and active.

Nevertheless, Kandil (2011) presents a powerful analysis from the Gramscian perspective of counterhegemonic strategies. His work has a strong in-depth analysis, which shows how cultural counterhegemonic strategies can be articulated for political leadership. I concur with his most fundamental argument that control over the organs of repression is the final arbiter of political power, but this only holds if the potential counterhegemonic movement has no means of special skills in economic management and intellectual capacity to converge different interest groups and ideologies. The Turkish case illustrates that despite the highest coercive power of the state, i.e. military general staff released a statement in 2007, known as the e-memorandum, in which they saw the future of the state's secular system as being at stake. Subsequent to this, ruling hegemonic power staged mass rallies in the same year which is known as the Republic Protests, yet the Justice and Development party successfully held their ground against the regime's coercive manoeuvres. Therefore, Kandil's (2011) statement of conclusion that his analysis has the potential to "*be generalized beyond the Egyptian case*" does not hold ultimately (p40).

Although it has its limits, De Smet's (2014) application of Gramsci's notions and theoretical framework to Egypt offers another outstanding analysis from a Gramscian perspective. His journal article titled *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt* seeks to find the key reasons for the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its counterrevolution by the military in 2013. Drawing upon Gramscian notions of the historical bloc, passive revolution, and Caesarism, De Smet (2014) claims that the January 25th uprising and its counter-revolution in summer 2014 are alternating

moments of the same process. Behind such logic, he holds that the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses in Egypt, before and after Mubarak regime, should be regarded as an intersected phenomena, where on the one hand, the hegemonic relations between the ruling and subaltern groups interacted and reacted, whilst on the other, political and socioeconomic struggle separate from this interaction took place through political activists, intellectuals, and subaltern groups under their discrete political projects.

Consequently, De Smet (2014) denounces the “*revolutionary*” and “*counter-revolutionary*” approach “*as a complete analytical framework to understand the complex patchwork of political projects and alliances in Egypt today*” (p13). He highlights that “*in order to understand the unfolding process of post-insurrectionary transformation in Egypt, it is necessary to grasp precisely why certain political powers are able to exert leadership over the masses*” (De Smet 2014, p13). His deployment of Gramscian notions of historical bloc, passive revolution, and Caesarism, provided him the necessary platform to present a historically flowing in-depth analysis from three dimensions: first, the post-colonial state formation; second, its reconfiguration and third, the local implementation of global neoliberal accumulation strategies and their consequences. Then, De Smet (2014) based his argument on such a perspective to analyse the specific Caesarist role that the armed forces played during the revolutionary process. Most importantly, he stresses that Gramscian notions provided him the strong explanatory instruments, which allow him to expose the current historical revolutionary moments as neither a “*victorious revolution*”, nor a “*triumphant restoration*” (p13). However, his work does not present a critical conclusion, which addresses the strategies that the political Islamists pursued and articulated through their presence in the political, intellectual and moral, and economic spheres of Egyptian society.

Ayubi (1995) focuses on the political economy of the Arab world in general. He constructs his analytical framework relying heavily on Gramsci and his ideas on state and hegemonic articulation. He claims that the mode of production in Arab states was historically tributary, resulting in an elevation of the importance of the political factor in Arab societies. In modern times, on the other hand, such a tributary mode has been subject to an encroaching capitalist mode leading to the creation of “*a ‘circulationist’*”

type of system, whereby the ruling caste is fairly autonomous from the production process and the social classes" (p25). Hence, the author argues that it is not possible to identify distinctive class groups, as this system features a *"dispersed and fluid class map"*, with many intermediate class strata, but no class structurally capable of assuming hegemony (p28). Thus, Ayubi (1995) contends that there are different class groupings that exist in Arab world, and, they are *"excessively dependent on the state"*, whilst the state itself is *"often excessively dependent on the outside world"* (p25). Ayubi (1995) contends that those who attempt and succeed in capturing the state in Middle East tend to adopt one of two types of corporatism to maintain power. The first is community-based, or the consociational type, found in the countries of the Arab Peninsula, and the second being interest-group-based politics and social engineering, which Ayubi applies especially to Egypt (p25).

Ultimately, relying heavily on the Gramsci's notions, Ayubi (1995) pushes forward the idea that the domination of a country in the Arab world is only possible if the emergent class is able to develop a political philosophy that is *"diffused by agencies of ideological control and socialization into every area of daily life to the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses to become part of their common sense"* (p8). He introduces the concept of articulation, in which he seeks to frame the reasons for hegemonic domination. Taking different modes of production as the base, Ayubi (1994), argues that the concept of articulation allows him to account for situations in which two or more modes of production coexist and interlink (p28). He contends that a theory of articulation allows him to assess how ideological elements come under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse and a way of investigating how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects. However, despite this approach describing the political, social and economic development and its effects upon the transformation of the Arab states, it misses out the reality of how specifically counterhegemonic classes emerge and consolidate power despite the "hard" or "strong" state characteristics that exist among them. That is, the explicit focus on the regional dimension, limits this study's ability to provide a better analysis, one which accounts for international perspectives, such as with respect to the globalising tendencies of capital accumulation and the specific policies adopted by social groups and institutions active on the international scale.

Following from the same line as with the articulation approach, but with an extension to include an international political economy view, Roccu (2012) seeks to examine the unfolding of neoliberal economic reforms in Egypt between 1991 and 2010. The study claims that hegemony is “*a combination of coercion and consent emerging from the articulation on three overlapping dimensions, respectively involving the interaction of the economic and the political, the international and the national, the material and the ideational*” (Roccu 2012). These three dimensions, when applied to Egypt's case, Roccu (2012) contends, allow him at first instance a critical assessment of how the interaction of economic and political factors leads to a neoliberal authoritarian regime. Then, this perspective provides him with a platform for drawing the conclusion that the Mubarak regime, prior to the 2012 Revolution, articulated neoliberal reforms across different spatial scales, which led to a passive revolution, enforced by the state without broadening political participation. In other words, Roccu (2012) highlights the regime through neoliberal reforms reconfigured economic and social policymaking in favour of the established capitalist elite.

Roccu's (2012) concludes his thesis with the contention that the neoliberal reforms only benefited a small number of business groups and people that were close to the regime. Subsequently, this concentrated wealth distribution distressed the relations of force, both within the ruling bloc and society at large. As a result, the post-Nasserite social pact dissolved and Mubarak's economic reforms against the global economic crisis were revealed as an ineffective and coming from a self-centric agenda to protect only small circle of businessmen. Effectively, Roccu's (2012) work identifies the reasons why revolution was inevitable through an in-depth analysis of the economic coalitions in Egypt as well as the significance of ill-managed neoliberal economic and social reforms. He contends that reliance on a self-centric neoliberal hegemony, which had its basis heavily on strong ties with the international capital, eventually underpinned the authoritarian regime. However, Roccu's (2012) work is weak in relation to providing explanation of the mechanisms that led to the rise of political Islam and the subsequent failure of Mubarak's regime. The author has nothing to say about how competing counterhegemonic projects convinced the masses to break away from imposed “*common sense*”. Perhaps most importantly, the study does not account for counterhegemonic strategies and their associated manoeuvres aimed at weakening

the regime, eventually effectively exposing its limits despite its harsh and long lasting authority.

Talani (2014), on the other hand, argues that globalisation fuelled the state crisis in the Arab world, which set the necessary conditions for the emergence of a new socioeconomic historical bloc striving to become hegemonic (Talani 2014, p91). Islam, as an alternative ideology in this interregnum, found itself an opportunity to press forward its counterhegemonic project, which promised a better deal for marginalised middle and lower classes (Talani 2014, p92). Such a marginalised attitude, according to Talani (2014), was the result of the policy approach that the statist regimes dictated over the political, socioeconomic and cultural spheres. For instance, economic liberalisation in Egypt favoured the financial and commercial sectors over manufacturing and the other essential sectors. It targeted large corporations rather than small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Moreover, it did not have any interest in integrating the Islamic businesses with the markets or addressing the issues of the middle and lower classes. Eventually, these classes and sectors of the society became marginalised and fell away from the regime's hegemony. The Islamists approached these marginalised classes through the notion of civil society and became their point of reference. In the words of Talani (2014: 91), *"Islam increasingly came to represent their main ideology, as well as the basis of their identity and, whenever possible, of their social relations and networks. In other words, it became the source of their social capital."*

Henceforward, I agree with Talani's (2014) main argument that civil societies associated with the middle and lower classes in Egypt and the Middle East in general, experienced the progressive re-Islamisation. This has happened, as she outlines, first, through ideological weakness of the existing hegemony and second, through the impact of globalisation on civil society. The main point of her argument is that political Islamists found the necessary space to appeal to civil society organisations, who comprised the losers of Mubarak's self-centric neoliberal restructuring. They used "Islam" or the religion, in other words, "in the name of the God", to approach the oppressed and disadvantaged parts of Egyptian society. Economic reforms that Mubarak implemented during his era certainly failed to satisfy the interest of broader segments of Egyptian society, and deepened the marginalisation of socioeconomic

classes in the country. Acknowledging Talani (2014), Gumuscu (2010) and Ayubi's (1991) contentions that the changes in socioeconomic structure are important factors that should be taken in account when seeking better understanding of the counterhegemonic aspirations of political Islam, this study involves adopting a Gramscian perspective, one focusing on the socioeconomic structure of political Islamist parties in Turkey and Egypt.

1.3 Research Design and Methodology

As a research strategy, a case study approach was deployed to gain a deeper understanding of the hegemonic process in Muslim dominated countries to uncover the relations among its constituent parts. This perspective provided a robust investigative and analytical structure for evaluating the reasons of the political Islamists' counterhegemonic successes and failures. Hence, comparing the case study results of two nations, namely Turkey and Egypt, has helped me to identify common characteristics and broader trends, thus creating the opportunity for future theorising. The study did not consider other Muslim dominated nations in the region such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Gulf nations as these countries did not share similar socioeconomic characteristics as much as Turkey and Egypt had with each other. More importantly, the implementation of neoliberal reforms as in the form of structural adjustments, these countries did not share the same background as the way Turkish and Egyptian states did with each other. Whilst the scope of applicability of this research to other cases is limited as it involved only investigating the two focal countries, it still provides a robust basis for future theory development owing to the depth in which the work was pursued and including further nations would have diluted the findings, given the limitations prescribed for thesis work. In sum, the investigation conducted in this study, pertains to comparing and critically evaluating the formation of counterhegemonic leaderships in Turkey and Egypt to test the theoretical framework articulated from a Gramscian perspective.

Throughout the study, I utilise the form of historical narratives to identify and explore the mechanisms that generate counterhegemonic strategies. Historical analysis provides an effective way to understand the historical evolution of the counterhegemonic struggles by tracing changing social relations of production, the

emergence of international-oriented social forces, changing interests, ideas, social struggles, alliances and the shifting common sense among Turkish and Egyptian people over the years. For the originality of the investigation and analysis, primary data using qualitative research methods were collected. More specifically, 33 in-depth elite interviews were conducted with various sources in Turkey and Egypt. Most of the interviews took place in Turkey and England, as conducting political study on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is highly sensitive. The interviewees for the Turkish case greatly helped to put the researcher in touch with the Freedom and Justice Party members living exile in Turkey. Three months were spent in Ankara and Istanbul to conduct the interviews. Moreover, opportunities arose to meet and interview various Turkish politicians, civil society leaders, bureaucrats, journalists, political consultants and academicians. Most of the interviews took place in the interviewee's offices and lasted one hour or more. Whilst majority of my interviewees for Turkish case were approached directly, this was not so for the Egyptian interviewees, as there needed to be a strict referral, before being able to talk to them.

Some of the questions directed to interviewees for the both case studies as follows: What was the key factors in building consent in Egypt or Turkey? To what extent do you think the Muslim Brotherhood or the leadership cadre of JDP's core ideas and intellectual thinking converged with different groups before they came to power? What kind of activities were they engaging to create a consciousness or awareness in Egyptian/ Turkish people against the existing regime? Were they effective on masses? What extent do you think the Muslim Brotherhood or the JDP leadership cadre were aware of their own interests as well as their limits in developing pragmatic ideal aspirations for political, economical, moral and intellectual leadership? Do you think the political Islamists could manage to create a suitable political discourse and party ideology with the Freedom and Justice Party or the Justice and Development Party to work with other political and civil groups for strong and stable alliance? What kind of role do you think the large capital and small medium size business owners played in the change of regime? How did these groups respond to new leadership in Turkey or Egypt? Who is Egyptian or Turkish businessmen from your perspective? Can you categorise them as an intellectual or politicians? How much influence do business associations or civil society groups associated with capital have in Egypt or Turkey?

Furthermore, to ensure the quality of the information obtained from the interviewees, the information from other interviews was cross-checked for validation purposes along with consultation of primary and secondary printed sources. This was necessary for both the Egyptian and Turkish cases for two reasons. First, I used a translator for the interview process for the Egyptian case and second, all of interviewees were in forced exile or representative of political parties and civil society or think tanks associated with them, so perhaps unsurprisingly, some had the tendency to exaggerate the true state of affairs, as became apparent through this cross-checking. Nevertheless, it was possible to get hold of variety of primary resources, such election manifestoes, official statements and declarations etc., published by the Muslim Brotherhood official website 'ikhwanweb.com' or other official sources before and after they formed the Freedom and Justice Party. Additionally, academic articles, research papers and/or books of organic intellectuals that had organised and/or led the political and civil platforms of political Islam in Turkey and Egypt were reviewed.

1.4 Thesis Structure

Organisationally, this dissertation is divided into an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter one has provided the theoretical framework for the study. The second chapter will present a new reading on the key notions of Antonio Gramsci. That is, I will formulise a new theoretical framework which can tackle the comparative aspects of political Islam with the required sensitivity and analytical utility in the contexts of the Turkey and Egypt. Chapters three and four explain the socioeconomic basis of Egyptian and Turkish political Islamists, respectively. The key moments and reforms that transformed the relationship between the economic structure and superstructure of these countries. From such a perspective, these chapters investigate the political and economic struggle that political Islamists engaged in against the existing hegemonic forces. Moreover, light is shed on the restrictions that these forces imposed on political Islamists to contain them in both contexts such that they did not endanger their rule. Chapter five examines the reasons that led to the political Islamists taking diverging paths in Turkey and Egypt after the 1980s. How Turkish political Islam contrasted with the Egyptian case, in that it managed to consolidate power within both the civil and political realms at all levels of Turkish society, is explained. The investigation in this chapter also aims to identify

both the positive and negative implications of neoliberal policies implemented during these years for political Islamists in both countries. The chapter will reveal that unlike the Turkish case, the neoliberal policies did not improve the economic and social status of the conservative rural bourgeoisie and middle classes in Egypt, but instead, led the Egyptian economic and political arena becoming stagnated around the same ruling bloc.

The next four chapters are focused on the genesis of the Justice and Development Party and Freedom and Justice Party in Turkey and Egypt, respectively. In these chapters, in the light of information gathered during the field work, the analysis is devoted to determining how and why did the JDP and FJP come to terms with their political Islamist identity. What kind of cathartic moments socioeconomic basis of these parties experienced before assuming power in their countries. In particular, chapters are focused on the junction of intellectuals within economic realm in forming consensus between themselves and the masses. In accordance with the ideas of Gramsci, it is argued that in contrast to the first political Islamist party, the FJP in Egypt, the JDP in Turkey succeeded in elaborating *“new integral and totalitarian intelligentsias and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place”* (Gramsci 1971, p135). In other words, these chapters explain how the JDP leadership strongly embraced the emerging neoliberalist ideas by splitting from their core group National View movement, in return for acknowledgement and a broad alliance with the global and domestic capitalist groups. In sum, these chapters comparatively examine and evaluate the process that led to the JDP governments in Turkey constituting a new historical bloc for its hegemonic aspirations based on a pro-business agenda blended in political Islam and why their Egyptian counterparts failed to do so.

The thesis will end with a conclusion, in which the main findings of the individual chapters will be drawn upon to address the research questions, the limitations will be discussed and proposals for future research put forward.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

The most commonly referred to concept of Antonio Gramsci is hegemony, which is a well acknowledged reference point for many scholars seeking to bridge the analysis of economic structure and ideational superstructures. In a general sense, Gramsci used the term hegemony to signify the predominance of one social class over others. This is not only in terms of political and economic leadership, but also the ability of the dominant class to reflect its own ideology and understanding of the world on others, such that those who are subordinated to it, accept this imposed “common sense” as unquestionable truths and reality. Gramsci managed to advance this concept despite the difficulties he had to face during his years in a fascist prison.

Gramsci was one of the founding members and leaders of the Communist Party of Italy. However, the Italian Fascist regime sent him to a prison for 14 years for the political activities that he was engaging against the regime. Mussolini, who once commented that Gramsci had *"an unquestionably powerful brain"* (Cammett 1967, p138), thought that his intellect and political ideas were a threat to his dictatorship. In 1928, when he was sent off to prison, the words of the public prosecutor echoed in everyone's ears: *"For twenty years we must stop this brain from functioning"* (Cammett 1967, p138). Nevertheless, this unfair political punishment did not completely stop Gramsci from writing and thinking. During his prison years between 1929 and 1935, although it was restricted in many aspects, he still found the space to write notes of more than three thousand pages on European history and its political analysis. His focus was to theorise the failure of Italy's two revolutions: the liberal revolution born out of the Risorgimento, and the aborted socialist revolution of the *biennio rosso*, to explain the success of fascism over both democracy and socialism in Italy (Giglioli 2013, p201).

Gramsci discussed in his prison writings that these revolutions had failed, because they did not have sufficient awareness of the values and practices of the general public. His argument was based upon his understanding that in the wake of modernity

and the breakdown of traditional communal ties, the masses had transformed into a prominent political force and being able to appeal to their consent had become the most fundamental aspect to gaining access to political power (Kandil 2011, 40p; Fontana 2008, p80). Ultimately, Gramsci's study during his prison years pushed back the boundaries of the Marxist concept of class struggle and built upon the perspective of emphasising that winning the consent of the masses is not just determined by the economic sphere, but also lies in the realm of ideas and morality (Kandil 2011 40p; Howson 2008 p27). Effectively, Gramsci formulated his key concepts, such as cultural hegemony, intellectuals, integral state, civil society, historical bloc and passive revolution, to theorise how the capitalist bourgeoisie and its subordinates dominate the masses, by holding them together and reorganising them during conjectural crises, by imposing their consciousness under the illusionary "*common sense*" (Gramsci 1971, p348).

In this chapter, these notions are evaluated and discussed to create a theoretical framework with focus being on the following two theoretical questions: "Do counterhegemonic forces, from Gramsci's perspective, require a special type of intellectuals associated with the economic sphere to achieve a cohesion between political and civil society?" and "Why does the success of a hegemonic project, according to Gramsci, depend upon the decisive function exercised by its leading group's decisiveness in the nucleus of economic activity?". Addressing these questions, will allow for the conducting of robust analysis of Gramsci's political and economic perspectives, while demonstrating a better understanding of his concepts with an active cross-examination and presentation from various different scholars. I argue that the successful counterhegemonic projects should involve engaging with prevalent civil society organisations and achieve a hegemonic leadership through the following three steps. The first of these is that the emerging hegemonic group should have perfect awareness for its own interests and develop pragmatic ideal aspirations. The second, is that it must convince others and build alliances through suitable ideological means, with the third being that in order to strengthen its hegemony, the emergent leadership should be capable of extending its promises and ideological approach to a broader audience by synthesising theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure for a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance that can guarantee them stable economic growth and development.

2.2 Common Sense: The Nuclei of Cultural Hegemony

Gramsci's most notable concept from his Prison Notebooks, is the cultural hegemony of the dominant class. With this notion, he proposes a multi-layered analysis of society to provide a better understanding of the various elements that are shaping, defining and forming its behaviour. His argument is based on thinking that the ruling class ideas always has an effect on the true consciousness of individuals in society. This illusionary effect, Gramsci argued, is achieved through many aspects of social life, such as education, civil society organisations and the social relations formed within the family, neighbourhood, village, etc. (Gramsci 1971, p35). Hence, these individuals are fundamentally influenced by the ideas of the ruling hegemonic group and they only have limited ability to notice such an imposition.

Moreover, Gramsci argued that the ruling hegemon promotes a certain common sense, which belongs to one class, but appeals to many so as to prevent the masses from realising their true consciousness and hence, their own fundamental interests. Gramsci used the concept of "*common sense*" to elucidate that how ideas of the particular hegemonic ideology are generated in an insidious way to acquire the consent of the masses to its rule. He notes that the notion of "*common sense*" should never be understood as something given by universal values or an unquestioned truth, but rather, should be studied as the imposed ideas and the way of living daily life, which should be confronted (Gramsci 1971, p421). To be more precise, Gramsci noted that: "*common sense is an ambiguous, contradictory, and multiform concept, and that to refer to common sense as a confirmation of truth is nonsense*" (Gramsci 1971, p423).

This proposition leads Gramsci towards a perspective, which he argues that exposing these supposed universal truths, and convincing the individual to reject the "*common sense*" imposed by dominant groups, creates the space for an alternative hegemony (Gramsci 1971, p331-332). In other words, being aware of the "*common sense*" of the existing hegemony and resisting its dominance allows agents to constitute a new way of thinking (Butko 2010, p43). The emergent hegemony should always consist of conscious leadership classes that are aware of their own and other class interests, free from those of the existing dominant hegemonic groups. Most importantly, the main aim of the counterhegemonic project should be based on a strategy that can

foster paradoxical relationships between the hegemonic ideology of rulers and that of the ruled, in order to polarise “*huge masses*” into camps and mobilise them to “*put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, but add up to a revolution*” (Gramsci 1971, p210).

From such a perspective, Gramsci designed his concept of the cultural hegemony of the dominant class and how to counter such a political and social force. Whilst he did not provide a precise definition for the concept of hegemony, he did state the following regarding it: “*the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production*” (Gramsci 1971, p12).

Notably, consent and force are the two most important aspects of hegemony in Gramsci’s formulation. Building his argument upon Machiavelli’s famous metaphor of the Centaur Prince – half animal and half beast, Gramsci argued that these two crucial dimensions of political power always coexist together; yet one or the other will predominate at any given moment. Gramsci then used this profound perspective to explain how the ruling groups impose a direction on social life by passively engineering the subordinates, or the general society, into accepting the “*dominant fundamentals*” expressed by the ruling groups (Lears 1985, p568).

He constructed his notes accordingly, to highlight the moments where these ruling groups do not just maintain their hegemony with coercion, for they also give their domination an aura of moral authority through the creation and perpetuation of legitimising symbols to win the consent of the subordinate groups under the existing social order. The reason for such a belief is that these subordinate groups operate unconsciously through the existing hegemonic manifestation of common sense. Regarding which, Gramsci explained that hegemony imposes powerful propaganda on the masses to accept the morality, the customs, and the institutionalised rules of behaviour as absolute truths and obligations that cannot or should not be questioned (Gramsci 1971, p195). Ultimately, such a powerful imposition enables the hegemonic

class and its subordinates to manipulate the general interests of society, in favour of their own narrow and selfish ones (Butko 2010, p43).

In line with Gramsci's prison notes, therefore, I argue that winning the consent of subordinates is one of the most crucial aspects of successful hegemony. To build such a consent, however, should begin with capturing crucial components in society, such as the values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, sentiments and prejudices that are constantly manipulated and preserved with a frequent injection of existing common sense. These ideological aspects are so decisive that they constitute the definitive support to define and strengthen the relations of production, which is necessary for an emergent hegemonic movement's survival. For this reason, I interpret Gramsci's notes as describing the alliance of different classes not being merely driven by its self interest in the mode of production, for it also seeks ideological convergence and successful cohesion at the intellectual and moral levels. It is thus important for an emergent hegemony to redefine and renegotiate the existing distribution of goods, the institutions that decide how this distribution occurs, and reach a permissible range of agreements about those processes with a common intellectual and moral thinking (Lears 1985, p569).

2.3 Collective Will: The Construction of Hegemony

Furthermore, the general accepted definition by scholars for Gramsci's fundamental notion of hegemony, is that "*the political, moral and intellectual leadership*", which is exercised by a political ideology that absorbs and unites different subordinate and political movements under one dominant ideological roof (Gramsci 1971 p212, Anderson 1976 p21; Mouffe 1979 p10; Thomas 2009 p438; Howson 2011 p172; Morera 2011 p265). His approach to hegemony involves the creation of a "*higher synthesis*", so that all its elements fuse in a "*collective will*" that becomes the new protagonist of political action (Gramsci 1971 p57; Mouffe 1979 p184). The reason for this, is that any emergent political movement, for Gramsci, should be able to drive its power from a "collective will" articulated throughout the lifespan of struggle among the subaltern groups (Gramsci 1971, p53). Gramsci highlighted that Jacobinism is the best example of this sort of revolution and ultimate hegemony. He quoted following:

The Modern Prince must have a part devoted to Jacobinism (in the integral sense which this notion has had historically, and must have conceptually), as an exemplification of the concrete formation and operation of a collective will which, at least in some aspects, was an original, ex novo creation. And a definition must be given of collective will, and of political will in general, in the modern sense: will as operative awareness of historical necessity, as protagonist of a real and effective historical drama. (Gramsci 1971, p130)

From such a perspective, Gramsci emphasises the national popular collective will as a dynamic source of power within society to create new moments in history. These moments are crucial for the permanent success of the emergent hegemony in that only through succeeding in generating such historical moments, will this allow them to push society to move beyond the boundaries of the dominant ideological burden that exist. In other words, Gramsci contended that these are the perfect moments to counter the delusion of the existing hegemonic “*common sense*”, because this newly functioning “*collective will*”, which finds its form as the emergent protagonist of political action, will empower a new momentum to surge as a progressive movement and defeat the debilitated and ill-powered structure (Mouffe 1979 p184; Gramsci 1971 p328).

Ultimately, the potential counterhegemonic group for Gramsci should be in a position to exercise this critical notion to develop a self-understanding or ideology. In this way, the emergent group has the potential to define and embrace the real interests of the general society with a new form of “*collective will*” (Gramsci 1971, p325). Gramsci's justification for this is based on the idea that the existence of the collective will depends on the creation of ideological unity that serves, by this reference, as a “*cement*” for the consent of many subordinate groups (Mouffe 1979 p184; Gramsci 1971 p130).


Accordingly, different groups of individuals from diverse parts of society function to utilise special forms of tasks to support this emergent collective will. These given tasks generally require a degree of intellectual and creative ability, but some individuals will be expected to perform tasks or functions that are explicitly

intellectual (Ransome 1992, p198). These intellectuals organise the individuals in the form of groups to impose the given or emergent collective will. Hence, this way of thinking allowed Gramsci to construct his analysis based upon the argument that a change in individual consciousness is only possible with the help of these emergent intellectuals. This is because he believed that agents articulate new ideas and free their positions from the pseudo “*common sense*” of the existing hegemonic structure through their interaction with vanguard intellectual and moral social groups. Gramsci noted that:

An historical act can only be performed by ‘collective man’ and this presupposes the attainment of a ‘cultural—social unity’ through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world. (Gramsci 1971, p349)

Subsequently, the concept of “*collective will*” plays a novel role in determining the success of any emergent hegemony. Gramsci described this as when a new concrete relationship is forged between intellectuals and the rest of society; between the leaders and the led; the elites and their acquaintances; and between the rulers and the ruled (Gramsci 1971, p418). That is, the relationship between general society and the emergent hegemonic leadership is intensified and unified through consciousness that intellectuals impose on the masses (Boothman 2008, p43).

Figure 1: Formation of Counterhegemonic Movement



Source: The Researcher

Finally, the most fundamental aspect of Gramsci’s cultural hegemonic “*common sense*”, as appears in the above diagram in figure one, is constituted upon classes which are constituted with the alliances of individuals with both property/capital and propertylessness. As it will be discussed in more details in the following sections of this chapter, the fragments of these classes are represented in the form of civil society. In line with the Gramsci’s writings, therefore, I argue that the party of the emergent counterhegemonic group should have the necessary consciousness and skills to

articulate strategies to win the consent and support of these groups. In particular, these strategies should base upon effective leadership, which is capable of enacting economic, political, intellectual & moral reforms. In other words, the leading group should be able to excel and advance itself within all these three dimensions to spark a strong, consistent and progressive movement against the exploitative state apparatus. Yet, their first primitive role is to inform and educate individuals through intellectuals, who are disenchanted with the dominant socioeconomic structure. This is a crucial task for the new hegemonic leadership, because individuals and by extension, groups and then classes related with both property and propertylessness but sharing the same perception of repression, exclusion, and marginalisation, should be unified in their understanding of each other's struggle in order to emerge as the new members of a counter-hegemonic bloc. Intellectuals play an essential role in this struggle, by seeking to transform the relations of production that the society is eager to transform so as to deliver economic prosperity. Consequently, in this study, intellectuals are considered as being those who are capable of operating at the political, intellectual and moral sections of the society, being novel protagonists of the political theatre where hegemonic blocs compete for the leadership of the nation.

2.4 The Role of Intellectuals

Gramsci wrote on intellectuals for the first time in his pre-prison writing, *The Southern Question*, and later developed this concept further in his Prison Notebooks. Intellectuals, for Gramsci, play a decisively important role in mobilising and integrating individuals and groups towards a common goal. My argument is based on this perspective, whereby the integral function of the intellectual in political leadership is to prepare appropriate conditions for a counterhegemonic strategy. In this section, I highlight the important function that intellectuals, who are organically attached to the economic activities, have regarding the success of the emergent hegemonic leadership. This is because, as Gramsci argued, "*though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*" (Gramsci 1971, p161). It is, thus, important to investigate the types of intellectuals and their function in the counterhegemonic projects.

Gramsci argued that the formation of the “*collective will*” and the exercise of “*political leadership*” are involved in an indissoluble unity insofar as their critical function depends on the very existence of intellectual and moral leadership (Gramsci 1971, p130). According to Texier (1979, p63), it is important to acknowledge that this way of approaching the content of cultural hegemony makes it possible to recognise immediately the historical class character of all superstructural activities, in particular, intellectual and moral activities, the relation of which to political government is often secondary. From such a perspective, intellectuals always have a direct link to leading social groups and thus, to the sphere of production. They become attached to the political apparatus and economic sphere to provide a non-coercive element of consent in political domination that the state cannot fulfil on its own (Green 2002, p71). In other words, intellectuals, for Gramsci, function as a non-coercive reinforcement of the state and consolidate its power, in particular, by legitimising the authority of dominant groups. Consequently, the term intellectual, from a Gramscian perspective, should not be seen just as a notion that relates to a social stratum that is traditionally termed intellectuals. Rather, it should be viewed from a wider perspective, as it consists of a whole social mass that performs the functions of organisation in the broad sense; in the realms of production, culture or public administration (Gramsci in Buttigieg 1992 p133; Thomas 2007 p75).

On a parallel track, I have noticed that Gramsci’s famous criterion that “*all men are intellectual... but not all men have the function of intellectuals in society*” (Gramsci 1971, p9) needs further explanation. I contend that Gramsci’s conceptualisation of intellectuals in the sense of methodological positioning differs from those specifically concentrated and grouped in the case of Bourdieu’s understanding, or Edward Said’s secularist intellectuals. Gramsci’s intellectuals, as he noted, are considered as “all men” in society. He argued that whilst some do not or cannot utilise their full function in society owing to other hegemonic impositions (false consciousness), most can be found at any place in the social structures. Bourdieu and Edward Said’s intellectuals, on the other hand, specifically operate in the realm of ideology, consciousness or discursive formations of power/knowledge (San Juan 2007, p104). They specify and bind intellectuals only in these positions and cannot present the dialectical link between structure and superstructure. In contrast, I contend that Gramscian intellectuals emanate from these debates and can appear anywhere and everywhere in

society. As rightly explained by San Juan (2007), Gramsci defined intellectuals by *"their position in the social relations of production, their social function in the division of labor - that is the distinct types of economic, cultural or state apparatuses in which they are located - and their historical trajectories"* (p104). Such an analytical distinction can be found in the works of other scholars in the literature (Buci-Glucksmann 1980; Sassoon 1987; Fontana 1993).

2.5 The Cohesion Between Intellectuals, Entrepreneurs and Praxis

Moreover, intellectuals play a significant role regarding Praxis, which is another profound notion of Gramsci's, whereby he emphasised the material and institutional nature of ideological practice. Gramsci argued that this group of agents oversees the tasks such as elaborating and spreading organic ideologies, while also being the ones to realise moral and intellectual reform (Mouffe 1979, p187). The real philosopher, for Gramsci, should not just function as a thinker or critic, for he/she must also have the characteristics of *"the politician, the active man who modifies the environment, understanding by environment the ensemble of relations which each of us enters to take part in"* (Gramsci 1971, p352). Hence, if these intellectuals are aware of the practical reality of their influence over the masses, then they can *"acquire consciousness of these relations and to modify one's own personality means to modify the ensemble of these relations"* (Gramsci 1971, p352).

This is a critical argument, as these intellectuals, according to Gramsci, once they establish their relationship with the dominant class or are created by the class associated with them, they will organise their cultural hegemony such that they are able to maintain their domination at the level of the state. As clearly underlined by Thomas (2006), their role is to operate *"the consensus given by the prestige of their function in the productive world and the apparatus of coercion for those groups which neither actively nor passively "consent", or for those moments of crisis of command and of leadership in which spontaneous consent suffers a crisis"* (p75).

Furthermore, Gramsci saw intellectuals as not just a distinct and relatively classless social stratum, but rather, as being organically connected with a social class (Cox 1993, p57). From this perspective, Gramsci distinguished two types of intellectuals:

“organic” and “traditional”. He noted that *“every social group, born on the terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, organically creates at the same time one or more ranks of intellectuals”* (Gramsci 1971, p5). This is a crucial perspective on intellectuals from Gramsci, whereby those that are born with the emergent hegemony or created by the dominant class gain their *“homogeneity and an awareness of their own function”* – that is, being attached to the new class not just economically, but also socially and politically to a form unity in an organic sense (Gramsci 1971, p5).

However, Gramsci also stressed that these intellectuals, who were organically linked to their class of origin at one time, are usually absorbed by an already existing intellectual order and become the object of the dominant ideology and its existing hegemony (Thomas 2009, p79). This type of intellectual is thus known as ‘traditional’ intellectuals. The reason for this conceptualisation is that Gramsci noted:

“Every “essential” social group which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, has found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seemed indeed to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms” (Gramsci 1971, p7).

The traditional intellectuals, from such a perspective, can be seen as the representatives of the organic intellectuals of a previously emergent hegemony. Their task is to support the dominant social class, which requires constant moral and intellectual consent to preserve the domination that they possess. Consequently, when a new social class emerges, this group of agents becomes a force of resistance, because they have become attached too deeply to dominant class and are unable to recognise their continuing political function. In order to combat these forceful ideological and moral impositions, the primary political task of the organic intellectuals of an emergent social group should be to take *“a position to contest the prestige enjoyed by the traditional intellectuals who project their image as that of the intellectuals tout court”* (Gramsci 1971 p15; Thomas 2009 p80).

Gramsci illustrated his argument on intellectuals by noting that *“the capitalist entrepreneur, whether emergent or existent, creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organizers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc.”* (Gramsci 1971, p5) Gramsci contended that entrepreneurs themselves represent a higher level of social synthesis (Gramsci 1971, p5), whereby they can perform the same function of organic intellectuals, such as developing and sustaining mental images as well as creating technologies and organisations that can bind together the members of a class and historic bloc under a common identity (Cox 1993, p57). He noted that, an entrepreneur, *“already characterised by a certain directive [dirigente] and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity: he must have a certain technical capacity, not only in the limited sphere of his activity and initiative but in other spheres as well, at least in those which are closest to economic production”* (Gramsci 1971, p5).

In other words, I postulate that Gramsci placed entrepreneurs in a category of intellectuals operating and influencing all aspects of social and political life. He stated that entrepreneurs *“must be an organiser of masses of men; he must be an organiser of the “confidence” of investors in his business, of the customers for his product, etc.”* (Gramsci 1971, p5). Consequently, in this thesis, I contended that, in order to articulate political and social power through new alliances, the emergent hegemonic class must convince these types of intellectuals whose consciousness is free from the existing hegemony. To signify the importance of such an alliance, Gramsci further went on noting:

“If not all entrepreneurs, at least an élite amongst them must have the capacity to be an organiser of society in general, including all its complex organism of services, right up to the state organism, because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class; or at the least they must possess the capacity to choose the deputies (specialised employees) to whom to entrust this activity of organising the general system of relationships external to the business itself” (Gramsci 1971, p5 - p6).

In sum, I argue that any given hegemonic power, which is discussed in later sections, finds its form through its superior skills and knowledge to determine when and how to use force and consent in the line of perfect balance. Intellectuals at this interplay

constitute the source of consent needed for the emergent hegemony to ensure that legitimate conditions exist for their domination. This thesis underlines the most crucial aspect of intellectuals, that is, every social group that is functioning in the world of economic production “*creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields*” (Gramsci 1971, p5). However, these agents appear in two different forms to utilise their function within the state through three key hegemonic dimensions: economic, political, moral & intellectual. Their spheres of operation can be in both civil and political society, which can be manipulated to form an “integral state”.

2.6 The Function of the State in the Integral Sense

The state for Gramsci is not a single, monolithic entity, but rather, is composed of two distinctive, interdependent components. Gramsci defined the following well-known formula in his notebooks: “*State = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion*” (Gramsci 1971, p263). His key intention with this formulation is to construct the idea of a state that functions in the integral sense (dictatorship + hegemony) (Gramsci 1971, p239). In other words, the state for Gramsci is a form of structure, which reflects the entire complex of political and theoretical activity of the ruling classes that is not only justified and maintained by domination, but also successful in obtaining the active consent of the governed (Gramsci 1971, p53).

Consequently, to differentiate and divide the power structure within the state, Gramsci formulated the state in a form that consists of both political and civil society. Political society, on the one hand, appears as the “state”, comprising the elements of what might be considered the limited notion of the state, or the idea of a juridical-administrative state, i.e. government, the military, the police, the judiciary, and so on (Green 2011, p72). Civil society, on the other hand, pertains to the voluntary organisations within society, “*that is, the ensemble of organisms commonly called private,*” such as trade unions, schools, churches, the entire media and even architecture as well as the name of the streets (Gramsci 1971 p12; Green 2011 p72). In this sense, Gramsci constructed the theory of state on these premises to signify its

function as a definitive and decisive ensemble of apparatuses. He argued that the emergent class projects should therefore be based on strategies that can identify the ideological position of a dominant class from these two dimensions of state, i.e. civil and political society.

Moreover, this way of modelling the state allowed Gramsci to reveal the superstructure where ideology is produced and diffused as civil society (Mouffe 1979, p187). He noted that *“The state was just a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements”* (Gramsci in Buttigieg 2007, p169). The proper terrain of hegemony, Gramsci thought, should have strong roots within civil society rather than the state/political society. The reason behind such thinking was that he viewed the opposition of consent and coercion as qualitatively distinct political practices, which *“were reproduced in spatial terms in as much as each has its own respective sovereign zone within any given social formation”* (Thomas, 2009 p167).

Accordingly, Gramsci highlighted that while the state and civil society are intricately interconnected by a set of common aims and shared beliefs, it is only by initially winning over the consent of civil society that an attempt can be made to seize state power (Butko 2010, p46). However, it should also be noted that this condition is only possible within a country where these private entities, i.e. civil society organisations, have the necessary flexibility and freedom to articulate lobbying power to counter the state that is in the hands of the existing hegemony. Hence, achieving state power does not signify a successful hegemony but rather, represents just another phase within the process. To be more precise, Gramsci noted the following:

“To the economico-corporate phase, to the phase of struggle for hegemony in civil society and to the phase of State power there correspond specific intellectual activities which cannot be arbitrarily improvised or anticipated. In the phase of struggle for hegemony it is the science of politics which is developed; in the State phase all the superstructures must be developed, if one is not to risk the dissolution of the State” (Gramsci 1971, p404).

Gramsci contended that great skills and strong will from the emergent leadership class are required to articulate popular political and social programmes impress the masses,

first through endeavour in civil society and subsequently, in the political realm. Accordingly, Gramsci describing civil society as private organisms, pointed out that these represented a crucial class apparatus that should be targeted as a potential leading group for shaping the productive apparatus with a new direction and rules and then moving on to dominate society as a whole. To him, these private organisms and the state apparatuses, could merge together as an integral whole, functioning in an organic relationship within the sphere of the economy. However, Gramsci contended that it would be a theoretical error to transform this “*methodological distinction*” into an “*organic distinction*”, when the actual reality of civil society and the state are one and the same (Gramsci 1971, p160). He was of the view that the relations of production and its forces are rapidly evolving and constantly interacting within the whole of society through civil society organisations. For instance, the forces of production, i.e. business associations, chambers of commerce etc., when portraying themselves as civil society organisations, can have a great influence over political society in terms of strengthening their position for reliable *laissez faire* conditions (Gramsci 1971, p160).

2.7 Civil Society as a Source of Internal Power Structure

The modern state, in the Gramscian sense, stands out as a type of power structure that exercises minimum coercion and instead, emphasises the power of ideology or the conception of the world (consent). The state and its fundamental organs, for this reason, it is argued here, function as an “*educative and formative*” structure that empowers rulers to force their subjects to not only to accept, but also, to internalise the ruling worldview (Gramsci 1971, p502). Thus, the modern rulers, from Gramsci’s perspective, have become hegemonic by securing consensus within civil society and creating a balance between coercion and consent. I contend that, in order to achieve such a consensus and conquer civil society, the emergent hegemony should have strong ties with the intellectuals who run and constitute civil society. This is an important proposition, regarding which in this study I will demonstrate that counterhegemonic projects need more than just political leaders, for their success depends on “*the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people “specialised” in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas*” (Gramsci 1971, p643). The reason for this is that these groups appear as the

non-coercive force of the power structure and have tremendous control over the state in most countries in the 21st century. Hence, a potential hegemonic leadership will need to have a strong presence 'within the system' to deploy a well-managed balance of consent and coercion in the given state, before any attempt 'change the system' for their hegemonic aspirations.

For this reason, Gramsci's notes on the concept of civil society are another great addition to Marxist literature to expose how a potential counterhegemonic movement can succeed by articulating momentum within this sphere. His new approach develops from the Marxist perspective that hegemonic control is contingent upon the relationship between the structure (economic base) and the superstructure (ideological and moral base) (Butko 2004, p46). Gramsci advanced this thinking by theorising that the relationship between these two structures is part of a dialectic in which economic factors (the forces of production) and cultural forces (the realm of ideas) reinforce one another and combine to form an "*organic relationship*", which he defined as a "*historical bloc*" (Gramsci 1971, p366). Crucially, Gramsci demonstrated that the sole purpose of this relationship is to preserve and protect the power of the dominant class over the subjugated masses, and that the concept of civil society plays the leading role in determining this outcome (Gramsci 1971, p12). Civil society, for Gramsci, is a locus where the transition from necessity to freedom takes place and ideologies, which have their historical roots in civil society, free themselves from their limited position of power, which has been historically enforced by material conditions (Bobbio 1979, p30). Gramsci, thus, theorised in his prison writings that civil society is an essential notion, which combines forces that are capable of creating a new history. That is, it serves a crucial function in terms of setting up the conditions for the collaboration of emergent social and economic forces to form a new hegemony.

Most importantly, civil society in Gramsci's mind does not belong to the structural base, but rather, to the superstructural one. Gramsci wrote the following lines in the Prison Notebooks to elaborate upon this perspective:

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private ', and that of 'political society' or 'the State '. These two levels correspond on

the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government. (Gramsci 1971, p12)

Gramsci illustrated his approach to the concept of civil society with a perceptive historical example, noting that in the Middle Ages, the church took on this role as the hegemonic apparatus for the ruling group (Bobbio 1979 p30; Gramsci 1971 p270). Such a perspective reveals that the hegemonic state did not have its own apparatus, i.e. it did not have its own cultural and intellectual organisation, but rather, regarded the universal ecclesiastical organisation as serving such a role (Gramsci 1971, p262). This leads to the argument that civil society strengthens the notion of hegemony to enrich its content with the roots that it has from the ideological cultural relations as well as spiritual and intellectual life.

2.8 The Dynamics of Gramsci's Civil Society: Debate with Hegel and Marx

From such a framework of thinking, it was possible for Gramsci to study civil society and connote a different approach to its function that distinguished his work from both Hegel and Marx. Hegel, for instance, designated civil society as the sphere of economic relations, whereas Gramsci acknowledged the economic structure as the underlying form of both political and civil society. That is, whilst Gramsci held onto the idea that economic relations are structural and political and civil society are superstructural, he reformulated a new perspective on their relationship to provide a distinctive analytical tool, which emphasised the nature of the superstructure as being composed of both economic and political forces that are organically interconnected.

Gramsci contended that political and civil societies are not two separate spheres that function at the different dimensions of power structures, whereby they comprise an organic unity (Gramsci 1971, p177 – p185). However, he also noted elsewhere that *“the distinction [between political society and civil society] is purely methodological, and that is to say that it cannot therefore be organic, as concrete historical life, political society and civil society are a single entity”* (Gramsci in Buttigieg 1996, p182). The reason for this contradiction, as illustrated in the previous section about the components of the state, is that Gramsci saw that in concrete life, political society

and civil society both exist, but the degree of their impact on society as a whole can vary greatly, i.e. in relation to politics of West and East during his time. Consequently, whilst these notions represent two different aspects of one social organisation in both these regions, the state, in the latter case appears as the only entity that has significant control over the development and organisation of civil society. However, this does not mean that other sectors, such as political society and intellectuals, through their instruments, i.e. the political party, have limited ability to contain and construct counterhegemonic projects that can succeed in achieving overall control of society at large. Regarding which, he noted:

The political party, for all groups, is precisely the mechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the State carries out, more synthetically and over a larger scale, in political society. In other words, it is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given group—the dominant one—and the traditional intellectuals. The party carries out this function in strict dependence on its basic function, which is that of elaborating its own component parts—those elements of a social group which has been born and developed as an “economic” group—and of turning them into qualified political intellectuals, leaders [dirigenti] and organisers of all the activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political. (Gramsci 1971, p15 – p16)

Furthermore, while Gramsci acknowledged that Hegel observed this situation with his doctrine of parties and associations as the “private” apparatus of the State, however, his observations Gramsci claimed that were mostly historically driven by the political experiences of the French Revolution and these instances can only be generalizable when giving a more concrete character to constitutionalism than being concerned with civil society and its function for the nature of political leadership (Gramsci 1971, p259). He argued that Hegel’s study sheds a light on important aspect as such how governments, with the permission of the governed, come into existence through “educated” consent in elections (Gramsci 1971, p259 – p260). Gramsci noted in his prison writings that: *The State does have and requests consent, but it also “educates” this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class. Hegel, in a certain*

sense, thus already transcended pure constitutionalism and theorised the parliamentary State with its party system (Gramsci 1971, p259).

To elaborate upon this argument further, I noticed that Gramsci criticised both Hegel and Marx for their approach when analysing the function of the civil society in his prison notebooks. Gramsci argued that civil society is not just private organisms left to the private initiative of the ruling class, as Hegel thought, for it can also function and move beyond the economic sphere (Gramsci 1971, p259). He argued that Hegel, with his concept of associations, lacked the perspective to establish an adequate representation of civil society and thus, fell short of establishing analysis that would shed light on the important that could play in challenging for the hegemonic leadership (Gramsci 1971, p259). Accordingly, he wrote: *“his conception of association could not help still being vague and primitive, halfway between the political and the economic; it was in accordance with the historical experience of the time, which was very limited and offered only one perfected example of organisation—the “corporative” (a politics grafted directly on to the economy)”* (Gramsci 1971, p259).

As with his criticism of Hegel, Gramsci also made the following critique of Marx in relation to his approach towards the role of civil society. He argued that, whilst Marx had a better experience of the masses through his journalistic and agitational activities than what Hegel had in his time, this should have led to more accurate observation of the function of civil society for the ruling class, but he was unable to define the concept any better than Hegel. The reason for this being, as Gramsci wrote, *“Marx’s concept of organisation remains entangled amid the following elements: craft organisation; Jacobin clubs; secret conspiracies by small groups; journalistic organisation”* (Gramsci 1971, p259). Gramsci, on the other hand, studied civil society not simply within the base of the structure, as in the case of Marx and Hegel, but rather, in the that of the superstructure. That is, civil society for Gramsci is built upon the idea that it does not merely comprise *“the complex of material relations”*, but rather, the whole of ideologico-cultural relations; not simply the *“complex of commercial and industrial life,”* for it also cover the whole of spiritual and intellectual life (Bobbio 1979, p31). It is important to reiterate again that this does not mean that civil society, from Gramsci’s perspective, is not economic at all; it has strong and

complex roots in the economy for redefining the borders of the state power for its own interest and can rearticulate this power on an ongoing basis to ensure the groups identified as its allies in the economic structure can have their interests met.

Through development of this multi-faceted analysis, it is argued that Gramsci's approach to civil society stands out as a means of explaining the stages of an emergent hegemony better than that Marx and Hegel's respective arguments of 'society minus the state'. In this thesis, civil society is presented as the source of an independent power structure residing between the economic structure and the state, with its power of legislation and physical coercive force. It is identified as the key to uniting different forces that are competing to engage and win over both the economic as well as state power, to be able constitute a balanced flow of political participation. Hence, civil society is a set of institutions through which the masses organise and represent themselves autonomously from the state. Accordingly, the notion of civil society from Gramsci's perspective is not only limited to the economic sphere, as proposed by Hegel and Marx, for it also consists of other key institutions, i.e. churches, parties, professional associations, educational and cultural bodies. Hence, it is important to underscore the conceptualisation from the perspective of Gramsci, that civil society is the reflection of the economic sphere, which takes a collective ideologico-cultural and intellectual form. As quoted in his prison writings:

"Civil Society operates without 'sanctions' or compulsory 'obligations,' but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc." (Gramsci 1971, p242)

Moreover, the initial idea of Gramsci, in my point of view, is that he sets a form of reasoning where he can associate the function of state with the norms of civil society. I agree with Gramsci that the nature of counter hegemony might differ between the East and West and hence, the location of the frontal attack might differ too. Gramsci lived at a time when the Internet, social media and other means of mass communication technologies did not exist. The technologies in this century allow the masses to become informed, share and meet people with common interest and ideas, get organised in large numbers and be able to react and pressure governments

collectively. I argue that in this century the separation between East and West for civil society groups is not as wide as in Gramsci's time; they are everywhere and anywhere as long as the masses have the necessary means to access these technologies. Consequently, I believe that any successful hegemony will always invest in winning the consent of civil society to support the leadership authority over political society. However, this doesn't mean that the importance of political society for a successful hegemony is dispensed with.

The power of juridical apparatuses, which always have direct links with the existing hegemonic political society, is always a factor that an emergent counter hegemon needs to be aware of when it comes to its interests. This power can function as the defence system of the existing dominant group's hegemony within civil society through coercive measures. For instance, the coercive apparatuses of political society, such as the law, courts, and police, can discipline groups that no longer "*consent, either passively or actively*" to the ruling group's power and hegemony, who are being targeted by the leading group in the counter hegemony (Gramsci 1971, p12). Hence, law is used as a coercive instrument to chasten civil society at times in order to sustain and generate the consent it needs "*to create a social conformism which is useful to the ruling group's line of development*" (Gramsci 1971, p195). However, a prolonged oppression of civil society, which impacts on all levels of society at large, can lead to the prevailing hegemony experiencing a series of crises. Gramsci wrote that, "*no social form is ever willing to confess that it has been superseded*" (Gramsci 1971, p177 - p178) and thus, these immanent crises might last a long time, which will cause "*a great variety of morbid symptoms to appear*" (Gramsci 1971, p279). Such a moment, from Gramsci's point of view, can be seen as the "*organic crisis*" of hegemony, where the existing order is breaking down in terms of both its structure and superstructure (Gramsci 1971, p177 - p178).

In this thesis, I consider the relationship between civil and political society as reciprocal such that they support and reinforce each other. In a moment of organic crisis, however, civil society is the decisive terrain, where agents develop hegemonic projects and attempt to capture state power. I argue that the counterhegemonic projects, which are discussed in more detail in the next section, engage with prevalent civil society organisations and evolve their leadership process through the following

three steps. The first is that the emerging hegemonic group should have perfect awareness for its own interests and develop pragmatic ideal aspirations. The second is that it must convince others and build alliances through suitable ideological means. The third being that in order to strengthen its hegemony, the emergent leadership should be capable of extending its promises and ideological approach to a broader audience by synthesising theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure for a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance that guarantees them stable economic growth and development.

2.9 The Path to Hegemony in this Study

The Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic constitutes the baseline for the approach Gramsci used in his study for the Prison Notebooks. He, from a Marxist perspective, differentiated his approach from Hegelian abstraction by applying it to the historical reality of everyday life (Howson 2011, p169). He was able to enrich the dialectical approach from such a perspective of social logic, which allowed him to break away from the economic determinism of the Marxist perspective of the time. Consequently, Gramsci found himself engaging in a debate with Benedetto Croce, who was one of the most influential intellectuals of his time. Gramsci, working from prison, to expose the weakness of his intellectual archenemy Croce's work, improved upon the social logic of the dialectic proposed by the latter, for whom in the "dialectic of distincts", the "distincts" represented "the radical antagonists of the thesis" (Gramsci 1971, p137 – p139, Howson 2011, p169). Gramsci noted that the disarticulation process of Croce's approach could only ever produce a programme that "*tends to enervate the antithesis*" and thus, produce reformism (Howson 2011, p169). Conversely, the logic of the Gramscian dialectic presents a scenario where consensus and coercion will always operate together through definitive leadership. Gramsci noted the following:

The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following: that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate", or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already

exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well” (Gramsci 1971, p57 – p58).

Notably, Gramsci contended that the potential counterhegemonic movement should also experience a “*catharsis*”, a term discussed in the Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 1971, p366 – p367), before achieving a consciousness for such a leadership role. This is a unique suggestion put forward by him who considered that the ideology is a psychological experience as much as a political one (Gramsci 1971, p376). He argued that counterhegemonic forces reach a level of required self-awareness for hegemonic projects in moments of rare intensity, which lead to counterhegemonic forces revising their political and ethical position to form a rational and inclusive leadership. As Gramsci noted: “*To establish the “cathartic” moment becomes therefore, it seems to me, the starting-point for all the philosophy of praxis, and the cathartic process coincides with the chain of syntheses which have resulted from the evolution of the dialectic*” (Gramsci 1971, p367). That is to say that through these cathartic moments the subject of the process comes to the understanding that his or her economic and political demands are not enough in themselves and that they must, instead, be inscribed within a wider and more encompassing political project.

Moreover, Gramsci distinguished between two types of hegemonic leadership (Gramsci 1971, p57), which I argue could only be reached through experiencing the cathartic moment. For the purpose of illustrating these two types of leadership, Gramsci used Machiavelli’s image of the Centaur, half-man and half-beast, yielding an explicit set of oppositions between coercion and consent, domination and hegemony, violence and civilization, as the starting-point to explain his idea on power (Gramsci 1971, p169 – p170). He contended that leadership based on “*domination*” is a power without critical or reflective consent from the governed, whereas that in the form of “*ethical hegemony*” is based on the consent given by the masses, who only desire “*intellectual and moral direction*” (Anderson 1976 p19; Gramsci 1971 p258; Talani 2014, p70). Hence, in order to win the consensus and construct a successful hegemonic project based upon these values, it is pertinent to determine whether that hegemony is a form of domination or ethically approved leadership. However, the

reality of politics often proves that the operation of force and consensus has no radical separation and that these two forms of rule are mutually supportive, often being combined in ambiguous ways (Talani 2014, p70). Consequently, it is important that the balance between coercion and consensus should be well managed and practised as any significant deviation towards coercion in this vital criterion for leadership can lead to a “*crisis of authority*” (Gramsci 1971, p210), which will engender dissent and struggle amongst subaltern groups (Laclau 2000, p48).

According to Gramsci, the consolidation of the two power structures, namely, 'coercion' and 'consent', are exercised at three levels of society. The first is the structural level, i.e. the level of economic structure, followed by two superstructural levels, with 'civil society' representing the social actors from the private sector and 'political society' representing the state's institutional and public actors (Talani 2014, p70). The structural level consists of what the current mode of production is made up of, i.e. a map of the key players within the relations of production and the distribution of means of production among them. It is important to reiterate here that Gramsci liberated the concept of the 'state' from the limited sense of a governmental apparatus representing only one aspect of superstructural activities.

This new perspective regarding structure and superstructure allowed Gramsci to articulate a level of analysis that parallels the mode of production with that of the social formation in the notion of “*the historical bloc*” (Gramsci 1971 p366; Mouffe 1979 p10). He argued that “*structures and superstructures form an “historical bloc”*. *That is, to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production*” (Gramsci 1971, p366). In other words, the notion of historical bloc represents the idea of a counterhegemonic project linked to economic activity, which the potential leading group should aspire to form itself. Whilst the counterhegemonic project should have a strong base in an ethical-political sense, Gramsci meant that “*the creation of the historical block* would be possible when there is “*an organic cohesion*” in “*the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled*” (Gramsci 1971, p418). He also argued that this project “*must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*”

(Gramsci 1971, p161). He underlined the fact that successful historical blocs are always aware of these two basic points: *“the formation of a national-popular collective will, of which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organiser and the active, operative expression; and intellectual and moral reform—should structure the entire work”* (Gramsci 1971, p133).

In line with Gramsci’s notes, I argue that a successful hegemonic project should possess superior skills for operating effectively in civil society. Such prominent skills will enable the emergent hegemonic project to form a collective will, which can engage and reach out to the masses as a new political subject. Moreover, I argue that the form of superstructural activities—for which civil and political society are the places where they are enacted—may well function as an ideological apparatus, but their content is economic and social, and the struggle to win these two aspects is necessarily a struggle for power. In the light of this theoretic background, I contend that the emergent hegemonic leadership, which will flourish from such an inclusive approach, should not stop there, but rather, should acquire the capacity to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals as well as structure and superstructure to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance that will guarantee it stable economic growth and development.

Accordingly, the path to hegemony comprises three fundamental steps. Firstly, it is important that all members of a potentially hegemonic group attain self-awareness of the economic and political roles they play. Critical self-awareness means, historically and politically, the creation of intellectual elites. These active intellectuals will organise, educate and lead the masses by putting theory into practice. Above all, they will present their distinctive and well-defined approach of intellectual capacity as a new source of intellectual movement. These intellectuals will also be representatives of the emergent hegemony’s business class/entrepreneurs. The reason for such a claim is that these groups of agents, i.e. entrepreneurs, reflect the highest level of social synthesis, since they are motivated by a cause and characterised by a technical or intellectual capacity (Gramsci 1971, p5). These agents, under the form of civil society organisation, have an integral function for achieving a successful hegemony. The reason for this, according to Gramsci, is that *“the content of the political hegemony of the new social group which has founded a new type of State for their hegemonic*

interest must be predominantly of an economic order” (Gramsci 1971, p263). That is, their counterhegemonic project should involve a process which has synthesised theoretical and practical objectives to achieve *“the reorganisation of the structure and the real relations between men on the one hand and the world of the economy or of production on the other”* (Gramsci 1971, p263). Hence, if the potential counterhegemonic group is seeking to obtain the consent of other subordinate social groups, this leading group must first be an essential force in society, which means having the capability to occupy a place and fulfil a decisive function in the sphere of production (Texier 1979, p64). This power should also foster in this leading group the ability to perform revolutionary economic reforms, because *“intellectual and moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform—indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself”* (Gramsci 1971, p133).

Concomitantly, I argue that the leading agents of the emerging counterhegemonic movement should possess the necessary skills and motivation to transform the economic base to provide more efficient and diversified relations of production. Such competencies, in return, will permit the development of new productive forces that will ensure that they can stand against all sorts of struggles. This counterhegemonic movement should also experience a cathartic moment and reach to a level of consciousness such that it can define and sketch out its own socioeconomic interests in such a way that it can convince other major subordinate groups that their needs will also be fulfilled.

Secondly, on the basis of this critical self-understanding and these revolutionary skills in economic management, the potential hegemonic group will be able to move forward to make alliances, taking a step beyond defending its economic-corporate interests by linking itself to other groups that are involved in society’s political struggles. In order to achieve such leadership and unity, the emergent social class will need to seek and find equilibrium between its own fundamental interests and those of secondary social groups. This is an important step forward for any successful hegemony to create alliances and construct its leadership of diverse interest groups and other large segments of society. Clear understanding of the needs of others, compromising economic interests and showing determination for an economic

alliance, based on the equal self-awareness in political terms, will lead to bonding of the 'subordinate' groups and the 'dominant' group under the rule of the latter (Texier, 1979, p64).

Henceforth, such junctures become purely political and lead to the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures. Regarding which, Gramsci pointed out that *“previously germinated ideologies merge as a “party” and come into confrontation and conflict until only one of them, or at least a combination of them, tends to prevail and propagate throughout society”* (Gramsci 1971, p181). This prevailing class, for Gramsci, must not only propagate a counterhegemonic project based on objectives that seek *“a unison of economic and political aims, but also work upon intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a universal plane”* (Gramsci 1971, p181 – p182). Such a stand will ensure its hegemony in relation to the political, intellectual and moral aspects will satisfy subordinate groups that are accepting its leadership (Anderson 1976 p19; Gramsci 1971 p405 – p406).

Lastly, in order to strengthen and maintain the solidarity of its immediate allies further, thereby securing the leadership of the masses, the potential hegemonic group must ensure economic growth and development. Moreover, it must satisfy the narrower interests of its allies and those of subaltern classes, by promising real improvements in their socioeconomic lives. This is an important step that allows the hegemonic project leaders to secure an alliance with other groups, thereby constituting a new political bloc. However, it should not be forgotten that before the emergent class can win its 'struggle for hegemony', and gain both structural and superstructural power, it must also be able to isolate the dominant class, politically and ideologically. The most appropriate time for such a frontal and successive attack, from Gramsci's perspective, is after the emerging hegemonic class has gone through the experience of catharsis. In the light of these three important steps, I argue that since every form of political rule is hegemonic, the path to such a leadership is only possible when the political, economic and ideological aspects function in unity and the leading group has reached a level consciousness such that it is able to create a socioeconomic bloc that can overcome the difference between theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals as well as guaranteeing sustainable economic growth and development.

2.10 Conclusion

To summarise, as it has been explained in this chapter to constitute hegemonic leadership, intellectuals function as a group of agents that is responsible for spreading and maintaining hegemonic ideology within the realms of production, culture and political administration. This study involves placing these intellectuals in two important operating contexts, namely, political and civil society, so as to assess their influence and role in the success or failure of hegemonic projects. Attention is given to civil societies representing capitalist groups, because in the thesis it is contended that the success of the hegemonic project depends on its decisiveness in relation to economic activity. It is hypothesised that in order to construct a hegemonic leadership, the leading group should, first, develop a self-awareness of interests and ideal aspirations; second, build alliances through the acquisition of skills that will enable it to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure; and third, it must reach out to broader classes with the help of this new socioeconomic.

Chapter 3

Setting the Scene for the Success of the Counterhegemonic Project: The Origins of Turkish Political Islam

“For though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity.”

(Gramsci 1971, p161)

Taking as a cue the above lines from Gramsci, in this chapter I investigate the rise of political Islamist parties and their counterhegemonic projects in the years between 1960 and 1990 in Turkey. I outline the socioeconomic context of Turkish political scene and its reconfiguration during this era to create a basis for political Islamist parties. In particular, I examine the degree of decisiveness that the political Islamists played at the time for the Turkish political economy. To achieve this, I reveal the reasons that led the political Islamists in Turkey to become aware of their political, economic and intellectual potential to articulate counterhegemonic projects. I argue that whilst Turkish political Islamists, together with the support of the provincial bourgeoisie, formulated their first hegemonic agenda during this era, they had not yet formed into a distinct class nor were they capable of establishing hegemonic control based on “*the nucleus of economic activity*” in Turkey (Gramsci 1971, p161). Finally, building upon this perspective I investigate the economic and intellectual reforms that the junta and Ozal government dictated after the 1980 coup d'etat. Attention will be given in particular to the question on how did these neoliberal economic reforms elevate the role of the pious bourgeois in the Turkish socioeconomic context?

3.1 New Era with Multiparty System: Resisting Hegemonic leadership of the Kemalist Military-Bureaucratic Elite

Turkish politics became a highly competitive platform for ruling military-bureaucratic elite represented by Republic People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) once the multiparty system was adopted in 1946. This was to such an extent that it led to a turbulent history, ridden with ideological polarization and factionalisation of political

parties and interest groups, periods of social and political unrest, and four military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2016 (Yesilada 2002, p62). The military-bureaucratic elite found the Turkish Republic in 1923 and implemented a series of revolutionary reforms in pursuit of building a new modern nation state from the ashes of multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire. To create such a nation which can compete with the civilized nations of the West, the Republic was constructed on the basis of secular nationalism, and Islam was targeted as the obstacle to development (Balkan Sahin 2010, p45). Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's ideas and goals conceptualized into six principles; republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, etatism and reformism. These principles which is also known as six arrows of Kemalism considered as the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic. Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite attributed great importance to secularism as they consider religion as the responsible factor for the backwardness in the Ottoman Empire (Balkan Sahin 2010, p45). This strict interpretation of secularism that left no space for Islam in public life was challenged when the Democrat party found by Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar in 1946. As the main opposition party, the DP positioned their politics based on three important themes which were the freedom of enterprise, democracy, and freedom of religion (Keyder 1987 p117; Cakar 2006 p3).

In ensuing years, the Democratic Party gained the support of peasants, merchants, religious conservatives, and the urban poor and came to power in 1950 by attaining 53.4 percent of the votes and 408 seats in the Parliament (Atasoy 1998, p200). The economic program that the DP governments implement throughout 1950s did not focus on state-led industrialisation as it was the case for the RPP governments since the founding of the Turkish Republic. Instead, they committed to centralize agriculture as the main source of economic development (Balkan Sahin 2010, p57). The reason for this, unlike the military-bureaucrats and large industrialists who benefited the most from *etatist* policies implemented in years between 1930-1939, the large portion of the population who were still working in agricultural sector suffered a lot (Keyder 1987, p118). The DP aimed at integrating this large portion of the population which was excluded from the political and economic spheres for many years. However, as these groups got incorporated into the national economy, this had led to Islamic beliefs and practices to found more flexibility in public life and thus provided the historical basis for the emergence of Islamic capital in later years (Atasoy

1998 p121; Usenmez 2007 p143). For instance, in an attempt to attract the support of the Islamist voters, the DP implemented policies that reversed some of the Kemalists' bans on Islamic practices like the call for prayer in Turkish and the ban on Quran schools (Yesilada 2002, p63). This point is important to highlight because the Democratic Party coupled economic liberalization process with religious populism. As this thesis will demonstrate in below chapters that political Islam emerged as the third dimension of the hegemonic struggle in the Turkish political arena and challenged the dominant position of both Kemalism and the centre right doctrine in Turkey. This crucial alliance between political Islamists and centre right politicians rested upon the mutual understanding that if both parties convene a socio-political and economic bloc together, this move would allow them to form a stronghold for resisting the hegemonic leadership of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite (Tugal 2007 p19; Taskin 2008 p56-57; Yavuz 2009 p92).

In this respect, the DP united the market-oriented landed class, urban merchants, small peasantry and religious communities for its own hegemonic aspirations (Tugal 2009, p38). However, the reaction from the Kemalist bloc was relentless, with the republican leaders and intellectuals accusing them of attempting to revive Islamic law and the Islamic regime. Hence, it is important to highlight the fact that it was the "Islamic threat," as republican cadres perceived it, which had to be controlled, if the country was going to be governed with full inclusive democracy (Toprak 2005, p170). They were committed to such a belief that the whole democratic reform process had to be carefully controlled from above and hence, designed to preserve their hegemonic interest. More importantly, although that the Kemalist bloc had not always been successful in mobilising people on its side during this period and failed to hold on to its political power in parliament, it still succeeded in infusing their specific take on "the Islamic threat" as a common perspective amongst the people (Tugal 2009, p38).

The DP's rule of 11 years was tragically ended by a coup d'état organised by young officers on 27th May 1960. Adnan Menderes was arrested along with all the leading DP members and they were accused of violating the constitution as well as misusing money from state funds. They were put on trial by a military court on the island of Yassiada in the Marmara Sea. Following the court's verdict, Menderes was sentenced to death and executed by the junta on the island of Imrali. Fatih Rustu Zorlu and Hasan

Polatkan, who were the Foreign Affairs Minister and Finance Minister, respectively, in the last Menderes administration, were also convicted with the imposition of death sentence and hanged by the junta in 1961.

3.2 Articulation of the New Eco-Corporatist Stage: Rapid Capital Accumulation in 1960s

As indicated in the previous section, before Necmettin Erbakan found the National Order and National Salvation parties in 1970s, the Islamists fulfilled their 'eco-corporatist' demands by subordinating themselves to the centre right parties. Nevertheless, whilst these groups did not pursue a dogmatic agenda with the aim of promoting their own interests ahead of each other in the 1960s, it became evident that the pro-corporate oriented policies of the Justice Party led by Suleyman Demirel were too narrow to satisfy the interest of conservative segment of Turkish society. Suleyman Demirel's humble and well educated background, after having been born and raised in a small village in Isparta, gained him great popularity among the rural masses (Toprak 1981, p92). Unlike the military disciplined, secular, bureaucratic and urban elite, which dominated the political arena of the time, he had practical solutions and an approachable political charisma. These attributes allowed him to gather strong electoral support, but this was still not enough as he had to find imminent solutions for a series of conflicting demands. He had to devise policy within his own party that would satisfy the entrepreneurial, business and professional groups' demands for political security and stability, which was necessary for the effective implementation of the investment and economic development plan that his party advocated (Karpas 2004, p56). However, Demirel had to achieve this inclusive and flexible political strategy without alienating the right wing and Islamists, as well as those desiring to restore the political prestige and power of Democrats that had been harshly overthrown through the military coup (Karpas 2004, p56). Effectively, following in the footsteps of Democrat Party, the Justice party articulated its electoral base from the business community, agrarian interests, with supplementary support from rural masses, notably conservative segments of bourgeoisie, rural notables and the peasantry, who expected the Justice Party to follow the Democratic Party's policies (Sunar & Toprak 1983, p432-433).

In the shadow of these political demands and expectations, Demirel had another challenge as the first civilian leader after 1960 coup d'état. He had to achieve control of the government and acquire the political charisma that represents the power derived from the state against the military and secular elite. However, the coup leaders changed the capital accumulation strategy from agricultural based to industrial development by laying down the framework of economic planning and an Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy (Onder 1999, p15). Moreover, The State Planning Organisation (SPO) was established with a strong nationalist message which emphasized that the goods that were previously imported would be produced domestically as a major step towards economic independence (Barkey 1990, p9). After it was established, the SPO, under the control of successive governments, prepared four five-year plans in the period 1963 to 1982, of which the fourth was scrapped in the turmoil of the economic crisis that set in in 1977. The scope of these plans was not only limited to the industrial sector as it was the case for the *etatist* period of the 1930s but encompassed the whole range of economic and social activities (Taylan 1983, p16). As rightly put by Taylan (1983), however, these five-years plans did not bore any resemblance to socialist planning in the context of socialised means of production, as they were 'imperative' only for the public sector, but 'indicative' for the private. More importantly, through their influence over the SPO, Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite attempted to create the conditions for a consensus within society by blending ISI economic model with nationalist rhetoric and restructuring the relations between the state and civil society (Balkan Sahin 2010, p63).

In this course, the constitution was rewritten in 1961 to support the consensus that the military sought to create amongst the bureaucratic elites, big business circles, the intelligentsia, peasantry, and organized labor (Balkan Sahin 2010, p64). Effectively, when the Justice Party in the leadership of Suleyman Demirel came to power, they had to curb the power of Kemalist bloc over the ISI model. The party achieved this by toppling the Inonu cabinet through the rejection of the budget law in 1965 (Karpas 2004, p57). After that Demirel's governments pursued economic policies with the aim of fostering national industries, which marked a critical change in the respective shares of industry and agriculture within total production (Taylan 1984). Following in line with SPO's instructions, Demirel government executed an import-substitution

economic policies through three interrelated programs: 1) import restrictions and high tariffs to protect home-grown industries; 2) fixed exchange rates to keep the Turkish lira artificially high and to encourage Turkish companies to borrow dollars from the state to import raw materials; 3) subsidies for farmers and above-market-value wages for industrial labour (Yavuz 2009, p42).

With the effects of these economic initiatives, the sixties and the seventies were a period of rapid capital accumulation in Turkey. To illustrate this statistically, the overall growth rate of the economy, which was approximately 5.6% in the 1926-39 period and fell to 0.7% under the impact of second world war between 1939-50, rose again to 5-6% in the fifties under Democrat party led by Adnan Menderes, though this period was particularly unstable with large deviations from year to year (as cited in Taylan 1984, p15). Contrary to that period, the study by Taylan (1984) highlights that the growth rate fluctuated between the 6-7% range in years between 1960 and 1977. This growth rate was coupled with 9-11% growth in the industrial sector (Kepenek 1983, p175). Consequently, there was a shift in Turkish economic structure to become more industrial base and less agricultural economy. Moreover, when this composition investigated in years between 1938 and 1953, the agricultural production represented approximately one half of GNP while industry's share was around 12% but this composition changed during Democrat party era, as agriculture fell to 45% while industry rose to 16% (Taylan 1983, p16). Though, the most significant shift in this composition took place in the 1960s and the 1970s. In contrast to its share two decades ago, the share of the industry nearly doubled up in 1977 and reach to a share of 24% in total production, while the share of agriculture had declined to a mere 22% (Kepenek 1983 p353; Hershlag 1968 p167).

Throughout 1960s, the rapid accumulation of capital benefited a small group of rich industrialists such as Vehbi Koc and Sakip Sabanci specializing in manufacturing automotive, textiles and consumer durables through joint ventures deals they made with foreign companies (Usenmez 2007 p232; Eligur 2010 p65; Sahin Balkan 2010 p64). Thus, it was during this era, when the first big monopolies and large holding companies started to control most markets and have a disproportionate influence on economic and political life in Turkey (Taylan 1983, p16). When the growth rate started to drop from late 1960s onwards, however, the Anatolian petty bourgeoisie

which was mainly composed of religious artisans, craftsmen and small businessmen started to criticize this process as it did not improve their status as much as it was improving the big industrialists mostly located in Istanbul who had closed ties with the bureaucratic elites and Demirel's governments (Eligür 2010, p65). More importantly, the conservative petty bourgeoisie became aware that their political and economic power had started to diminish as they found it difficult to survive the competition against big businesses. They sought a political platform that would articulate solutions for their political, economic and cultural demands (Eligür 2010 p65; Balkan Sahin 2010 p74-75).

A group of political Islamists and intellectuals responded to this growing new expectations from the conservative segment of society and started to convene a political party representing political Islam. This was the first cycle of the economic-corporatist stage in which political Islamists reacted in defence of their core interests in a way that was directly linked to their economic activity. Forced into a defensive position and relying upon their organic relationship with the aspiring and pious petty bourgeoisie, the leaders of the Islamist movement founded their first political party, National Order (*Millî Nizam Partisi*, MNP) in 26 January 1970 (Ozbudun 2009, p544). The core members of the new political Islamist party were JP parliamentarians known for their Islamist credentials, Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, Hasan Aksay, and Arif Hikmet Güner; New Turkey Party parliamentarian Suleyman Arif Emre; and Professor Nevzat Yalcintas, chair of the Intellectuals' Hearth (Yesilada 2002 p64-65; Eligür 2010, p66). Most importantly, the leader of this new political base was Necmettin Erbakan, who was then general secretary of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In his short time as the chairman of the largest business association in the country, Erbakan was known as the defender of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie in Central and Eastern parts of Turkey against the big industrialists and traders in big cities, generally in the west side of the country (Yavuz 2009 p43; Eligür 2010, p66). His support for the small and medium businesses was to such an extent that Erbakan was removed from his post by the JP Minister of Trade when the party was faced with a fierce criticism from large corporatists in Istanbul and Izmir (Eligür 2010, p66). Erbakan was not an unknown figure in the central right spectrum, therefore he sought a parliamentary candidacy from Justice Party but this was vetoed by Suleyman Demirel (Yesilada 2002, p64). Nevertheless, he run in the elections as

an independent candidate from the province of Konya and became an independent parliamentarian (Ozbudun 2006, p544). Soon after his election he became the leader of other political Islamists who became dissatisfied with Justice Party's cultural and economic platform by forming the National Order and National Salvation parties (Yavuz 2009, p43).

3.3 Turkish Political Islam: Self-Realisation for a Political and Economic Role

By the end of the 1960s, the clash between left and nationalists in Turkish politics reached its peak and led to political violence including murders, kidnappings, bank robberies, and bombings (Ozbudun 2000, p33). The Turkish military was also experiencing such a polarization within its ranks, that led to the second military intervention on March 12, 1971 (Eligur 2010, p67). Following the military intervention in 1971, the Constitutional Court closed down the NOP for advocating anti-secular political views and thus, opposing the Republic (Sunar & Toprak 1983, p432). In this interregnum, Necmettin Erbakan left for Switzerland, began publishing the Sole Order (*Tek Nizam*) newspaper and established the National View (*Milli Görüş*) organisation (Yesilada 2002, p65). This organisation he found during his time in exile became the most important movement behind the future political Islamist parties in Turkey. This happened because the flow of remittances to Turkey from Europe constituted a significant source of foreign currency in Turkey. For instance, after Turkey reached to a bilateral agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961, the number of Turkish workers in Europe multiplied reaching 528,474 workers only in Germany by 1973 (Cepni 2003, p35). Erbakan and the conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs under his political leadership were successful in attracting the savings of these workers in Europe for the counterhegemonic project of political Islam in Turkey. These remittances later helped some of the political Islamist entrepreneurs to establish large joint ventures in the form of multi-share holding companies such as Kombassan, Buyuk Anadolu Holding, Yimpas, Endustri, Sayha, Ittifak, and Jet-Pa in Anatolian cities like Konya, Yozgat, Kayseri, Corum, and Aksaray and thus constituted an important source for capital accumulation in Anatolia (Demir et al 2004 p168; Jang 2005 p214; Balkan-Sahin 2010, p104).

With this perspective in mind, Erbakan (1975), in his book titled 'The National View', formulated the strategy of the movement as the defence of small provincial entrepreneurs against the state's industrial policies. For Necmettin Erbakan the ISI economic model was beneficial only to the interest of the Kemalist bureaucratic cadres and the industrial bourgeoisie and it led to the economic marginalisation of the provincial bourgeoisie (Yavuz 2009, p49). Moreover, Yavuz (2009) argued that the political project of the Turkish political Islamists was a class- based rebellion against the policies of the secularist-Kemalist state. They claimed that the system of governance under secularist-Kemalist state was alien and alienating since it lacked the moral values of the Anatolian bourgeoisie (Yavuz 2009, p49). More importantly, although Erbakan criticized both cultural and economic policies of Kemalist state, the alternative project he proposed was never anti-modern or anti-free market (Yavuz 2009, p49). The socioeconomic objectives of Erbakan, thus, were based on the idea of conservative modernization, that is, becoming modern with Islam. What Erbakan meant by modern according to Yavuz (2009) was industrialisation, advance health care and technology, better standard of life through the incorporation of Turko-Islamic values.

However, it is also important to highlight that the founder of National View movement of Erbakan and the subsequent political Islamist parties, were heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology (Rubin 2010, p154). Throughout his political career, Erbakan had close contact with Muslim Brotherhood officials in the Arab world, wanting to create common political, economic and intellectual platforms for Muslims all around the world. Aligned with the doctrine of Hassan al-Banna for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the National View movement regarded the Westernisation project of Kemalism as a historic mistake and the source of all the ills in Turkish society. The movement propagated that their doctrine of "national (Islamic) order" would put an end to the process of Westernisation which it considered was not compatible with Muslim society (Dagi 2005, p24). In this perspective, political Islamist under the leadership of Erbakan defended the economic nationalism which gave priority to conservative segments of the economic sector over the big Istanbul-based industrialists who had closed ties with international capitalist groups. In other words, the political objective of the first Islamist political party and the movement

was to deliver a new economic and social order based on “national” (can be interpreted as Islamic) principles (Eligür 2010, p66-67).

Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks, noted that: “*every relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed* (Gramsci 1971, p350). Gramsci asserts that the key to the hegemonic reproduction is the educational relationship between the leading group and led (Gramsci 1971, p350). In this study, from such a perspective I argue that the creation of the National View movement provided the civil platform whereby Erbakan and the leadership cadre could communicate and interact with various groups and individuals, which they would otherwise not have been able to reach. Hence, in the Gramscian sense, National View platform provided the ground for educational relationship between political Islamist intellectuals and broader sections of the population; those suppressed by the Kemalist regime and ambitious to thrive for political freedom, and those stuck in the clash between the left and right. In other words, the first supporters of this movement were based on the segments that were staunchly pious communities, which found the centre right parties too secular and modern, while at the other end of the spectrum, many intellectuals, publishers and clerics wanted an Islamic line independent from the state (Tugal 2016, p65). Ali Sahin, the deputy of the EU minister from the JDP made following remarks:

Maybe some people argue that the Felicity Party inherited the political ideology of the ‘National View’ movement. But if you ask me, I would say the JDP is the only political party with power that represents the continuity of the ‘National View’ and the legacy of Erbakan today. JDP is the articulation of the National Order, National Salvation, Welfare and Virtue parties.

(A. Sahin, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Once the restriction on political parties was lifted by the army and after the short-lived experience with the NOP, the Islamists formed another political party, the National Salvation (NSP) in 1972. In contrast to their first political party experience with the NOP, the NSP became an important political actor in Turkish politics, achieving third place in the 1973 and 1977 elections, with 12% and 9% of the votes, respectively (TSI, General Elections 1923-2011, p25). The electoral base of the new Islamist party

relative to the previous one consisted of a larger coalition of the different Islamic and conservative groups. As the party became a partner in a series of coalition governments in the 1970s, it had the opportunity to expand its socioeconomic base. Political Islamists in this era extended their socioeconomic base to include the homogeneous Sunni-Muslim base of farmers and the conservative petty bourgeoisie of shopkeepers, small merchants, artisans and people of low income in the semi- and underdeveloped central and eastern Anatolian provinces (Landau 1973 p20; Yavuz 2009 p49; Eligur 2010 p70). Erbakan deployed tight political control over these factions and successfully managed to fuse Islam and Turkish nationalism as a party ideology, which allowed his party to gain a niche perspective in a country that was sharply polarised into left and right camps. Regarding which, Ayse Karabat, Author and Editor of Al Jazeera Turkey explained:

The debates and confrontations around the secularism and the role of Islam for the relationship between the state and society continued, but when we consider Turkish society in general, then it would be right to acknowledge the fact that conservative culture is more dominant in Turkey. This was what the politicians from the National View movement realised and effectively used for their political ambitions.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

In this research it is argued that Turkish political Islamists, in order to differentiate their place among the dominant spectrum and yet, ensure compatibility with it, articulated a counterhegemonic project based on an ‘ethical-political’ plane that blended the principles of a free market economy and Islam within and against a state-led national economic development. Accordingly, the ‘ethical-political’ project of Turkish political Islam presented in this era constituted a universalistic outlook that took into account the complex interrelations of its own interests with the demands and aspirations of the other groups in society. Nevertheless, political Islam still failed to forge a full relationship with extended groups such as urban middle class, state elites and intelligentsia that could stand as their formidable auxiliary to put them into a hegemonic position (see chapter 2 for detailed discussion on this matter). The reason for such weak relations, I would argue, is based on the fact that Turkish Islamists, together with the provincial bourgeoisie, had not yet formed into a new class for itself, or a class capable of establishing hegemonic control based on “*the nucleus of*

economic activity”, as Gramsci might have put it (Gramsci 1971, p161). In this context, the class which I am referring is the new conservative middle class that have gained substantial disposable income and have experienced substantial lifestyle changes since the market liberalization reforms which commenced in the 1980s.

The following chapters will demonstrate that only in the late 1980s and 1990s, did political Islam find the means to articulate a bond with the new capitalist class that was rapidly flourishing through neoliberal reforms, as dictated by Ozal’s governments. Hence, it is important to note that political Islam was only capable of developing the ideological and organisational capacity for a proper counterhegemonic action against entrenched state elites when it successfully articulated their political and moral leadership, a pious bourgeoisie capable of putting them into hegemonic position. Nevertheless, the era between 1973 and 1980 proved to be influential for the transformation of the Islamic movement, as the National View cadres accumulated considerable political experience by entering into number of coalition governments, both with the secularist/social-democrat RPP and parties of the right, including the JP and the Turkish nationalist NMP. Taking part in these coalitions had a huge positive impact on their political popularity and legitimacy in Turkish politics. As Kanra (2013) argued, the impact of their participation in the parliamentary system softened some of their radical views on the modern state and showed how they accepted some of the realities of the system. Hence, Atacan (2007) contended that the NSP did not completely reject the idea of secularism, and instead, supported it within the framework of freedom of thought and belief to gain legitimacy for counterhegemonic position. Political Islamist advocated that the concept of secularism became an ideological and social engineering programme used by the bureaucratic elites to suppress people who wished to exercise their basic rights (Atacan 2007, p188).

Accordingly, whilst the Turkish economy experienced high growth rate through the ISI model in years between 1963 and 1977 (Onis 1998, p126), this model has also lead to a structural crisis in the late 1970s, manifesting itself mainly in the form of severe balance of payment difficulties, high inflation and shortage in foreign currencies (Barkey 1990 p11-13; Onder 1998 p45). Aware of the reasons which led to the failure of the ISI policies, Erbakan criticized his opponents that “moral development” was the only way to advance the Turkish economy (Atacan 2007,

p188). Hence, he argued that his opponents failed to articulate political leadership for the interest of Turkish people in general. He accused them of serving the interest of international institutions i.e. International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and big capital owners i.e. the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD). The reason for this was that the alliances of these two forces dictated that Turkey should open its economy to international competition, encourage foreign capital, liberalize trade, foreign-exchange regimes, and financial markets, and scale back the public sector (Onder 1998, p46). In other words, the main assumption of the supporters of these policies such as TUSIAD that in the long run, opening up the economy would mean new sources of capital and joint ventures with transnational corporations within the context of the restructuring of the global economy, and in the short run, meeting the IMF and World Bank conditions would mean immediate inflow of urgently needed credits and foreign exchange (Onder 1998, p46). However, Erbakan as always being the strong supporter of small and medium size businesses disapproved the neoliberal policy proposals of the IMF and World Bank by debating that they only serve in the interest of transnational corporations and their network of businesses in Turkey.

In contrast to political Islam in Egypt, the National View movement under the leadership of Erbakan had a more pragmatic attitude towards the limits of what the movement could demand from the secular system. For instance, the NSP became the coalition partner of pro-secular RPP in January 1974 (Yavuz 2009, p50). Although, their coalition lasted only 14 months and ended in March 1975, this was a unique opportunity for political Islamist to demonstrate that they are willing to take part in the parliamentary system within the boundaries of secularism, thus demonstrate that they had the political and economic means to articulate counterhegemonic projects. Effectively, Erbakan became deputy prime minister, and his party took charge of the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Trade, Food and Agriculture, and Industry and Technology, along with the State Ministry of Religious Affairs (Eligür 2010, p70). In addition to their first coalition partnership, political Islam in Turkey later found two more opportunities in 1970s to infiltrate into the state bureaucracy when they participated in the first and second Nationalist Front governments with Demirel's Justice party in years between March 1975 and January 1978 (Yavuz 2009 p50; Eligür 2010 p71).

Concluding, political Islam in Turkey as discussed above noticed the fragmented nature of Turkish politics and economy at the time and articulated a political project for the economic demands of the subaltern groups. Islamists became aware of their economic function in the Turkish economy and started to convene alliances to support their counterhegemonic project. In the Gramscian sense, however, the economic activities of political Islam in Turkey did not have a decisive function within the economy yet (Gramsci 1971, p161). As the hegemonic leadership of Kemalism, which put strong emphasis on national unity and state-led modernization started to lose its unitary role in late 1970s, the military ended its strong resistance against Islam under a new cultural policy, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) that aimed at combining Turkish nationalism with Islam (Kurt 2010, p122-123). After the coup in September 1980, the military aimed at using religion as an effective instrument for containing radical left and right wing groups (Eligür 2010, p93-94). More importantly, Islam became a powerful notion for the coup leaders to buffer the negative effects of the process of neo-liberal restructuring of Turkish economy, and thus created the necessary consensus for their economic policies that shifted the economic model based on import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) to an export oriented free market economy. By doing this as it will be discussed in the rest of this study, the military provided the ground for a political articulation of opposition which linked economic demands of the society with issues of Islam and nationalism.

3.4 Reconfiguration of the Socioeconomic Context in Turkey

On 12th of September 1980, military intervention took place in Turkey for the third time in 20 years. Unlike the previous two attempts, which were mostly directed towards reconfiguration of power at the top of the state, the impact of the coup in 1980 was felt by almost every individual in Turkish society. As outlined in the previous section, in the period of the 1970s the Turkish political structure experienced ever shifting political alliances and constant political tensions over economic policy in terms of the path of industrial development. The tension in the country was to the extent that it led to a series of political crises, the decay of parliamentary democracy, labor militancy, student revolts, armed struggle between extreme right and leftist groups. As rightly argued by Yalman (2009) and Tunay (1993), this situation has led

the hegemonic structure to experience crisis by the end of 1970s. Therefore, their studies contend that the military acting as a hegemonic force crashed all oppositional forces in the country to reconfigure the socioeconomic context of Turkey to strengthen their hegemonic position. In Gramscian sense, the military conducted a “passive revolution” by engineering the new socio-political and economic context of the country without including the masses in the process.

When the coup leader, Kenan Evren, declared the seizure of all democratic institutions and political power by Turkish Armed Forces on 12th of September 1980, he explained the reasons for the intervention on national TV and listed a number of steps that the army would take in the following days. The punch line of his speech was when he said:

The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of a civil war and internecine struggle, to reestablish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order (Cited in Eligur 2010, p90).

The Turkish military argued that the state and the civil society were polarised to the extent of potential complete destruction. The battle for state power between political and civil groups had never captured the momentum for revolution of the state apparatus, but, instead, had led to violence on the streets and a series of economic and political crises. The military and bureaucratic ruling class subverted these counter movements by seizing the function of the entire civil and political societies and most importantly recalibrating their hegemonic position with the coup d'état. From the political side of the state, the army dissolved parliament, lifted the legal immunity of MPs and all political parties, dismissed all mayors and municipal councils as well as taking over full control of the bureaucracy (Eligur 2010, p89). Alongside the political structures, civil society entities, including trade union confederations (the socialist DİSK and the ultranationalist MİSK), the press, academia, the management of the universities, NGOs and chambers of commerce were all suspended Onder 1998, p49).

By cracking down on the leftist movement, and by severely curtailing civil rights and freedoms, the military junta did not leave much scope for opposition groups to be part of the new politico-economic model. From September 1980 until November 1983, the council appointed a mixture of a civilian-military cabinet and required it to provide only advice and execute orders (Eligur 2010, p89). Especially, the management of the economy was entrusted to a small team of neoliberal technocrats headed by Turgut Ozal. It is important note at this point that Ozal was the principal architect of the January 24 Package in his position as the undersecretary to the prime minister under the JP government just prior to the military coup and he was once again appointed by the military government as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs after the coup. (Onder 1998, p50).

Accordingly, the military leaders declared the end of the ISI model and took charge of the stabilization program known as the '24 January decisions' drafted by the last Demirel government and international institutions in 1980 (Onder 1998, p49). Objectives of the program went beyond standard stabilisation and it became the first generation of neoliberal reforms in the country. It sought a structural adjustment by changing Turkey's development strategy which it followed for several decades (Bedirhanoglu & Yalman 2010, p111). The long-term objectives of this new strategy were to restructure Turkish economy to make it more competitive in export-oriented trade and become a more market-directed system of resource allocation (Bedirhanoglu & Yalman 2010, p111). Therefore, in the shadow of the cold war era and the structural shift that was taking place in the world economy from demand-side Keynesian policies to supply-side monetarism in the early 1980s, the Turkish military restructured the relationship between the state and the whole of political and civil society via use of coercion, as Gramsci had predicted in the Prison Notebooks. However, the ruling military class were also aware the fact that their exercise of coercive power, without critical or reflective consent from the governed, would be an unethical domination in the long run. Consequently, as the Sadat and Mubarak regimes had initiated in Egypt, the Turkish military also sought to ease the state's relations with Islamists so as to provide the means that would allow them to win the consensus among masses and redefine their hegemonic rule. As rightly put by Gramsci in below quotation:

Intellectual and moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform—indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself.

(Gramsci 1971, p133)

When the military dictatorship ended with the first democratic elections held in 1983, there was a new course of political and economy destiny for Turkish political Islamist. In this election, previously a technocrat, Turgut Ozal and his Motherland party won the majority in parliament. In the absence of other centre right parties and left wing activism, Ozal, a leader with strong ties to Islamist sects, yet with a strong commitment to capitalism and the market economy, took the country into a new era of neoliberalism (Yesilada 2002 p77-79; Yavuz 2009 p51; Ozzano 2014 p598). In this work it is argued that, Turgut Ozal, with the support of the army and the secular intelligentsia executed “*intellectual and moral reform that had its link with a programme of economic reform*”, as anticipated by Gramsci in the above quote from his Prison Notebooks (p133). The neoliberal economic programme executed by Ozal governments in the 1980s unleashed and coalesced the economic and religious forces of Anatolia to create a “new form” of bourgeoisie and counterhegemonic political project (Taskin 2008 p56; Yavuz 2009 p51). Particularly, the following section will demonstrate how did the economic policies of Ozal governments accelerate the grow of this newly emerging group of capitalists with their conservative background and lifestyles. This is an important task as I argue in this thesis that it was this new form of socioeconomic group which provided the fertile ground for the political and cultural transformation of the Turkish political Islamists which later found the Justice and Development Party.

3.5 A Leap for a Neoliberal Political Economy in the Ozal era

Starting from this era, the top cadres of the JDP sought to try and learn how to blend values of Islam and the principles of the market economy so as to deliver the successful hegemony they still enjoy today. Moreover, the neoliberal economic policies implemented in this era redefined and reinforced the interaction and relations between major actors in politics, economics, education and the media (Gole 1997 p47; Yavuz 2009, p51). Concomitantly, the struggle counterhegemonic forces engaged in

against the state establishment and then, against each other both civil and political society led to a series of political and social crises throughout the 1990s. For an explanation regarding how the military leadership engineered Turkish political society after they voluntarily left the political scene, it would appear to be sufficient to consider the background of the Motherland party. In relation to which, Tahsin Akti at interview said:

Turgut Ozal's the Motherland party after the 80s coup consisted of many different people from across the Turkish political spectrum.

(T. Akti, personal communication, July 7, 2015)

The Motherland party did not claim to descend from any of the old parties; in fact, Ozal proudly claimed that his party represented all four main pillars of Turkish political tendencies. He insisted that his party incorporated: the liberal right, Islamists, nationalist right and democratic left (Sarfati 2014, p94). Whilst MPs' political and economic base still largely depended on the centre right tradition, Ozal recruited politicians from the four main pre-coup political parties, which represented different ideological agendas, namely, the centre left RPP, the centre right JP, the nationalist NMP and the Islamists NSP. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this was a fairly easy task for Ozal to carry out, because the military regime banned four major political figures Bulent Ecevit (democratic left), Suleyman Demirel (centre right), Alparslan Turkes (nationalist) and Erbakan (Islamists) from politics until 1987. As Bilgehan Ozturk from SETA explained:

There are similarities between the success of the JDP and Ozal's Motherland party. This is because when Turgut Ozal found the Motherland party in 1983, similar to the JDP in 2002, it promised to bring freedom, progressiveness and improvement in people's lives. When you look at the background of Motherland party, it is also possible to notice that it is an alliance of multiple political and civil society factions that survived after 1980 coup. MPs recruited people from the social democrats, nationalist and people who were much attracted to Islam and its way of life. Hence, various political figures who were part of the political tradition that started in the Menderes era continued their political life under Demirel's leadership.

(B. Ozturk, personal communication, August 2, 2015)

The military regime did not only commit itself to reforms aimed at restructuring the political, economic and intellectual spectrum, it has also set up a secure ground for an intersection that synthesised neoliberalism and socio-political context. To this end, the Ozal governments formulated an election manifesto, which promised “the silent Muslim majority” that they would be the active agents and winners of the ongoing political, economic and intellectual transformation of the 1980s (Taskin 2008, p56). Similar to Demirel’s success story in 1960s, Ozal displayed a remarkable case of upward mobility being the son of a low-ranking civil servant from the eastern province of Malatya, who ascended quickly to top of the bureaucracy then to country’s political leadership (Taskin 2008, p55). He thrived on being known as an ideologue and practitioner of neoliberal policies, having started his career at State Planning Organisation and then working for the World Bank and private companies. Subsequently, he entered the political scene, first as an undersecretary to the prime minister Demirel in the JP government before the coup and later as the deputy prime minister responsible for the economy during the military government. Ozal’s background helped him to establish close ties with large Turkish capitalists, Islamists and centre right parties, given his credentials as a follower of the Naqshbandi Brotherhood as well as a supporter of the US administration, and international institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank. He won a majority government in the first democratic election held in 1983 and was prime minister between 1983 and 1989. Regarding which, Dr. Hazem Kandil stated that:

Unlike Egyptian Islamists, in the Turkish case, after the military coup in 1980, we see the rise of Turgut Ozal and his neoliberal block, which was created by the military and then the JDP with an Islamist identity coming in to take over this block.

(H. Kandil, personal communication, February 24, 2016)

Demonstrating a similar approach to Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in UK during 80s, Turgut Ozal popularised neoliberalism in Turkey. He enthusiastically promoted the values of private entrepreneurship based on competition, maximisation of self-interest, risk-taking, and sublimated the merits of the free-market economy (Sen 2010, p69). He did this mostly through his populist political agenda, which was an imitation of the Reagan-Thatcher combination of

democracy and conservatism. Hence, the political and economic model of Turgut Ozal's governments promoted the idea that the intervention of the state in economic issues on behalf of the working class and economic protectionism as meaningless, irrational, and harmful to the economy as well as society (Sen 2010, p69). However, Ozal could not have achieved his project without the support of the military and secular intelligentsia, who held the upper hand in the Turkish political economy after the coup in 1980. The key reason for their support for market oriented capitalism is that, as discussed in the previous section, they needed this approach to consolidate a new form of consensus for their legitimacy. This unique synthesis, which sought to combine "economistic" liberalism with conservatism based on an Islamist socio-political agenda, allowed them passively to transform various socioeconomic groups into granting it their consent (Sen 2010, p65). In other words, the argument here is that the adoption of this formula provided the context for the creation of a new type of community in the 1980s, which would absorb the political, economic and intellectual spaces that were left vacant after the coup. That is, having eliminated the vast majority of left and right political activism, this set the agenda for the rise of political Islamist groups. Therefore, these new agents of change represented the move of political Islam from the periphery of the system to its centre, and yet were themselves a product of that centre, of its educational institutions, its urban life and more importantly its impact on economic model (Gole 1997, p54).

Further, when the political economic scene of Turkey is investigated just before the coup in 1980 as part of this hegemonic reorientation, it is possible to see how the neoliberal policies of the Ozal governments throughout 1980s had already been introduced into Turkey's political-economic agenda by the Justice Party government, just a few months before the coup. The key aspect to highlight here that Turgut Ozal was the undersecretary of the Minister for Economic affairs when the Justice Party government on 24th of January 1980 attempted to implement, the "structural adjustment and stabilisation programme", which was backed by the IMF and the World Bank. The objective of the programme was to demand a major change in industrialisation strategy, which meant a transition from import- substitution to export-oriented industrialisation. Accordingly, the military regime after the coup between 1980 and 1983, for which Turgut Ozal was the deputy prime minister responsible for the economy, did not hesitate brutally to repress labour and leftist

movements, freeze wages and salaries by limiting activities of trade unions, encourage exports by introducing various incentives and to make major changes in the public finance, banking and exchange regimes (Sen 2010, p68). The Kemalist hegemonic structure generated Ozalism, which consisted of politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and intellectuals committed to the authoritarian policies of the military regime, but actively pursuing strong neoliberal policies, promoting religious-conservative values in politics and culture and enlarging the religious field (Sen 2010, Taskin 2008, Atasoy 2005). For instance, as Ayse Karabat explained:

The Motherland party under Turgut Ozal's leadership and with the help of the military regime dictated the Turkish political and economic arena. That is, it reinforced full economic transformation during 1980s to redefine and reorganise the relationship between the state and economy, the state and society, and society and the economy on behalf of national and international capital.


(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

The era of the Motherland Party under Ozal's leadership represents a new phase of conservative populism embedded in neoliberalism in Turkey. In the following chapters, it will be seen how this kind of political approach was eventually taken to another level by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party. Political Islamists eager to create and sustain the large consensus they desperately needed to achieve ruling power in Turkey will give up their National View identity and embraced the neoliberalist perspective with a more system oriented approach (chapter six). Ozal's governments, from this perspective, become increasingly important in that they were originally engineered by the military as an attempt to consolidate nearly all the political spectra under one party to eliminate the destructive polarization which was created between left and right wing spectrums in the country. However, it is also important to consider that the characteristics of the Turkish electorate were rapidly changing in this era as there were a mass migration of people from rural areas to big urban cities. Effectively, the peripheral sectors were no longer isolated in the rural areas, but located in the city centres and they quickly became the target of populist parties (Gole 1997 p52-53; Taskin 2008 p56).

Alongside Ozal's neoliberal restructuring, therefore, I argue that Turkish Islamists had the opportunity to experience new phase of eco-corporate realisation, in which they began to articulate a new discourse of economism, which attempted to surpass the modernist bourgeoisie and make new allies within the newly rising middle classes. Most importantly, the economic reform process that Turgut Ozal led with the support of the military and secular intelligentsia groups in Turkish civil society created opportunities for upward mobility that Islamists had not had since the national development phase. In contrast to political Islamists in Egypt, which are discussed in the following section, the Turkish Islamic capital class gained momentum and power as it found more freedom and flexibility to compete with the huge monopolies created by the republican bureaucracy during the Ozal era.

The figure two below demonstrates the impact of the reform initiative by Ozal governments on different income levels. Income share held by highest % 20 dropped from % 50.03 in 1987 to % 47.68 in 1994. However, income share held by the next three income groups representing total of % 60 of the total income share improved by almost % 1 or more. Unlike what was the case for their Egyptian counterparts, this increased rate in the income levels of middle segments of the Turkish society indicated that the benefits of the neoliberal economy had a slightly positive impact on the middle classes in general. Therefore, as rightly remarked by Taskin (2008, p56) *“the new economic policies not only weakened the traditional privileges of a state-affiliated bourgeoisie and intelligentsia but also opened up new opportunities for upward mobility for those societal actors who had long been left outside of the dominant power alliance of the national development phase”*. Thus, paving way for the transformation of attitudes mostly within political Islamist intellectual circles for the market economy.

Figure 2: Income Share by Quintiles in Turkey for Years in 1987 & 1994



(Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts)

As it will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the change of the political Islamist discourse, which mainly emphasised the need for the unity of believers against the secularist bourgeoisie at home and Western capital abroad to a more inclusive and market oriented one, helped them to articulate a bond among the rising Islamic capitalists and newly rising middle classes for their counterhegemonic project. Clearly, it is important to acknowledge that the neoliberal restructuring during the Ozal governments contributed significantly to the rise of the new economic, political and cultural counter-elites, who were distinguished by their peripheral origins as well as by their Muslim identities (Taskin 2008, p56). The companies belonging to these provincial elites and Islamists quickly flourished as small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), with some becoming part of the second biggest business association, namely, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association, MUSIAD (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*). Eventually, this association will play significant role in making of the Justice and Development party in Turkey. Chapters four and five will provide more details about this crucial role that MUSIAD

played as the most influential representative of this emerging conservative bourgeoisie in Turkish civil society.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the rise of political Islamist parties and their relationship with socioeconomic groups in Turkey. To achieve this, the chapter outlined the historical perspective of Turkish political economy and located the socioeconomic groups from which support for the political Islamists in Turkey comes. In particular, there has been examination of the degree of decisiveness that the political Islamists has exercised over the Turkish political economy since the beginning of the multiparty era. It has also discussed the background of the 1960, 1970 and 1980 coups and outlined the socioeconomic context that each of these coups altered in Turkey. In sum, this chapter has addressed the question of how did Turkish political Islamists become aware of their political, economic and intellectual potential to articulate counterhegemonic project for the first time?

I also argued that political Islam failed to forge a full relationship with wider groups, such as the urban middle class, state elites and the intelligentsia, that could stand as their formidable auxiliary to put them into a hegemonic position. Consequently, I contend that in the 1970s and 1980s, political Islam was still in its eco-corporate state, which restricted it from articulating more effective political and economic leadership. However, the implementation of neoliberal policies in Ozal's era and the flexible approach by the military regime towards Islamist groups created a new form of private entrepreneurship. As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, unlike the Egyptian regime at the time, which restricted the benefits of these economic policies to only a small number of businessmen close to the state, these reforms helped the devout Turkish bourgeoisie to expand their economic activities and become a decisive pillar of Turkish political economy.

Chapter 4

Free Officers' Egyptian State: the Muslim Brotherhood at the Bay

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.

(Gramsci 1971, p5)

This chapter provides a brief historical background of Egyptian political economy between the period of 1952-1990. The aim of the chapter is to evaluate critically the transformation that the Egyptian political economy underwent during this period and to demonstrate the struggles that the Muslim Brotherhood had to face to align itself with this changing economic structure. To achieve this, the chapter starts with an analysis of the social relations of production and alliances that were formed during the earlier decades of the Republic of Egypt. In the first part, the emphasis is given to the analysis of the Egyptian socioeconomic context, which was reengineered by the Free Officers and their leader Gamal Nasser. This makes it easier to identify the material and ideational limits of the possible counterhegemonic movements and thus, provides the basis for understanding how the contemporary socioeconomic and political structures evolved over the years. Subsequently, in the second and third parts, there is investigation into the socioeconomic basis of the Muslim Brotherhood in the new Egyptian state. These parts stress the struggle that the Brotherhood waged against the regime forces and its weakness in consolidating new alliances. Part four deals with the movement's failure to have a decisive function in Egyptian economic activity by taking advantage of the neoliberal policies of Sadat's leadership. The last part, focuses on the development of new economic actors or socioeconomic groups, which the *Infitah* (Open Door) policies generated and how carefully it kept political Islam at the limits of articulating itself a decisive economic role to strengthen its counterhegemonic potential. The chapter concludes with its emphasis on the *Infitah* policies, where it is argued that these did not improve the economic and social status of the rural working and middle classes in Egypt, but instead, led to the Egyptian economic and political arena stagnating around the groups within the same ruling bloc.

4.1 Understanding the Basis of the Egyptian Socioeconomic Context: The Birth of the New Egyptian State

A crisis cannot give the attacking forces the ability to organise with lightning speed in time and in space; still less can it endow them with fighting spirit. Similarly, the defenders are not demoralised, nor do they abandon their positions, even among the ruins, nor do they lose faith in their own strength or their own future.

(Gramsci 1971, p235)

Consistent with the above note by Gramsci, after a heavy defeat by General Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood did not lose its faith in coming back to the Egyptian political scene. In Nasserist prisons, the Brothers kept their spirits high with the belief that they would become rejuvenated again for the Egypt and its beloved people. Nevertheless, they were also aware that for such a vision to become a reality they had to formulate a new political survival strategy within the dimensions installed by the Nasserist regime after the coup. Accordingly, the movement sought a way to transcend their political and social interests away from its economic-corporate demands, towards a new ethical-political phase functioning within the new hegemonic state as a political subject. Dr. Kandil explained these new political and economic dimensions in Egypt as:

The historical block of the Nasserist regime and others that followed, built very scientifically in the 50s and the 60s, after the Brotherhood were all sent to jail. And so, this block was a block of businessmen, village notables and so on. The problem for the Muslim brotherhood started when they got out of prison in the 70s.

(H. Kandil, personal communication, February 24, 2016)

The reason for this was that the Free Army Officers' coup d'état of 23 July 1952 revolutionised all aspects of Egyptian social life, including the role of the state and the economic structure in Egypt. The hegemonic bloc underpinning Nasser's power was composed of a socio-political coalition of three social classes: the middle petite bourgeoisie, the urban working class, and the rural poor (Ibrahim 2002, p117). The hegemonic vision of the Free Officers was based on the desire for a democratic and fairer society in terms of land reform, which Nasser initiated, but also restricted and forced society to accept the hegemonic bloc he erected, including the military and

other national security institutions. This bloc that Nasser engineered and led, had a particular elitist methodology in its mind aimed at implementing a political–economic transition programme towards capitalist modernity and an industrialised economy (Kandil 2012, p202). Effectively, in order to gain support from broader segments of the Egyptian society against the royalist regime and landed bourgeoisie, which had been perceived by most Egyptians as alien, corrupt, and decadent (Ibrahim 2002, p137), the new ruler of the Egyptian state after the July Revolution, as it came to be called, implemented profound Agricultural Reform Law, on 9 September 1952 (Kandil 2012, p202).

This series of land reform laws during the period from 1952 to 1969 allowed Nasser and his colleagues to redistribute agricultural wealth to the regime's new social base of small and medium landowners, which in return empowered and expanded the new rural middle class that Nasser was so keen upon being part of his hegemonic bloc (Kandil 2012, p203). Furthermore, these agrarian reforms also allowed Nasser to push rural capitalists to invest in the newly emerging heavy industrial sector (Shaan 2014 p110; Whidden 2005 p21-22). Between 1957 and 1958, Nasser received loans from the Soviet Union to finance his Five-Year Plan and other grand infrastructure projects, such as the Aswan Dam (El Fadl 2005, p49). The Implementation of the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model was at the core of this economic programme. Nasser announced another two Five Year Plans in 1961, but these were not as successful as the first one. The objective of the first phase of this plan was to achieve a sustainable economic growth rate coupled with the distribution of incomes in favour of the low income social categories (Roccu 2012, p103). Over the ten years between 1955 and 1965, Nasser's economic and political reforms provided Egypt with an impressive rate of investment, averaging 17 percent, and an equally remarkable growth rate, averaging about 7 per cent a year, before slowing down to about 3 per cent a year in the following ten years (Ibrahim 2002 p137; Ikram 2006 p85-88).

This was a critical achievement for his hegemonic leadership as he was able to couple this increasing rate of growth with the development of welfare measures well beyond regional standards (Roccu 2012, p103). However, as was the case for Turkey pursuing import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), these improvements in macroeconomic indicators came at the price of a staggering growth in the stock of external debt (El

Fadl 2005, p49). What eventually became apparent for the Free Officers was that their core revolutionary objective, which were to achieve both growth and equality at the same time, was unsustainable and it created dysfunctional economy without the support of either the United States or Soviet Union (Roccu 2012, p104). The reforms that kept the balance between these objectives led to an increase in imports and borrowing from external sources, which meant that both the balance of trade and the balance of payments suffered substantial deficits (Amin 1995 p2-5; Ikram 2006 p117-23; Roccu 2012 p103-104). Furthermore, as rightly noted by Kandil (2012, p202), despite the capitalist-friendly attitudes of the Nasser's leadership, such as brutal suppression of the first workers' strike following the coup (the Kafr al-Dawar Strike) on 13 August 1952, lower taxes on commercial and industrial profits and export driven policies, Nasser failed to encourage industrialists and wealthy merchants to increase their investments in sectors that could benefit the economy with the actual production of goods and services. Instead, these capitalist groups decided to freeze their assets in real estate, which consumed three-quarters of all private investments in 1956 (Kandil 2012, p202). Effectively, this meant for the Egyptian economy that out of an estimated 45 million Egyptian pounds (LE) directed away from agriculture in the first five years following the coup, over 85 per cent went to real estate, with only 13 per cent being directed at industry (Kandil 2012, p203). Dissatisfied by this situation and in order to attract more assistance from the Soviet bloc, Nasser came to understand that he had to nationalise banking, foreign trade as well as parts of internal trade and industry, which did in 1961 (El Fadl 2005, p47).

In the two years following the coup, the leaders of the new ruling bloc further expanded their hegemonic control over the Egyptian state by dissolving political parties, abolishing the monarchy and its constitutional power, rewriting the constitution and declaring a new form of state governing based on a republic. Furthermore, they reached an agreement with the British forces for their withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, and began implementing a series of state-led investment projects to strengthen their economic base. The new Egyptian state under the Nasserist leadership went through a top down modernisation process aimed at creating the terrain of a modern civil society with mass trade unions, professional syndicates, public companies, universities and schools as well as women, youth, and children's organisations, cultural clubs, peasant associations, etc. (De Smet 2014, p18). It was

transformed through these reforms, thus allowing the majority of its population to take on an active role in these newly created civil society institutions. However, as rightly noted by other scholars, the new hegemonic state that Nasserist formed did not intend to use the new terrain of civil society for the sake of a liberal and democratic Egypt, but rather, placate the Egyptian people through these institutions, thereby gaining their consent (De Smet 2014 p19, Bayat 1993 p66). Hence, most of the time, this consent was delivered through coercion, as the experience of the Brotherhood under the new regime, as a civil or political subject, demonstrated. In terms of the economic bloc that the Nasserist regime created at the time, which is still the dominant factor in the Egyptian economy today, Dr. Kandil noted at interview that:

You have the old regime elements and this is the network of people who have been together in the same political economic block since the time of Nasser. So, they were together under Nasser, under what was called the Arab Socialist Union, but then it was renamed as many things and then it became the National Democratic Party under Sadat and Mubarak and now it doesn't have a name or label, but the same block; the same political economic block is there. They have a very strong presence in the countryside, in popular neighbourhoods (sic), the judiciary, media as well as the state bureaucracy and they are fighting to keep their power.

(H. Kandil, personal communication, February 24, 2016)

The new regime in Egypt slowly but surely absorbed the activities of domestic entrepreneurs and western financial actors, who at first hesitated to be part of the state's industrialisation schemes. Later, these capitalists had no choice but give their consent, because of the increasing pressure from the regime forces. In particular, the pressure on these actors heighten with the proclamation of the Socialist Laws of July 1961, which paved the way for nationalisation of dozens of banks and private companies, confiscation of the properties of hundreds of capitalists and imprisonment of 40 prominent investors on charges of subversion (as cited Kandil 2012, p203). The extent of the nationalisation programme included almost all sectors in Egypt. A study by McDermott (1988, p121-122) indicates that the whole Egyptian economy was run by the Supreme Council for Public Organisations through 48 public organisations, which in turn supervised 382 affiliates in 1967. Most importantly, this process was also coupled up with another land reform, further reducing maximum ownership from

two hundred to one hundred *feddans* of land for each family, instituted urban housing rent control as well as providing free education and health services (Ibrahim 2002, p137).

Consequently, these measures restricted the function of capitalists, the landed bourgeoisie, merchants, intellectuals and independent minded professionals, exhibiting vast redistributive effects in favour of the middle and lower classes in urban and rural areas alike (Ibrahim 2002 p137; Kandil 2012 p203). The Nasserist leadership expanded and absorbed subaltern groups as well as the communist and Islamist opposition, to a certain degree, through consecutive waves of coercion and integration. De Smet (2015, p162) argued that Free Officers' had three interconnected goals based on expropriation, land reform, and rent control: (1) they sought to articulate a new economic power structure for their leadership by eliminating the capital structure of the monarchy and the feudal landlords; (2) they aimed to increase the level of productivity in agriculture and free capital for industrial development; (3) these policies allowed them to gather support from the peasant class to achieve legitimate hegemony. Moreover, along with the destruction of the other existing loci of political power, the Egyptian left and political Islamists, who were the part of the movement that led the uprising for the July Revolution at the time, were also severely crushed by Nasserite forces (Kandil 2011, p45). The intention of Nasser was to detach all other political forces, except himself, from the subaltern groups such as workers, students, farmers and lower middle class groups that had supported the July Revolution (De Smet 2014, p19). Consequently, when the political Islamists and leftists rearticulated strategies to take control of the new Egyptian state engineered by Nasser, they struggled to formulate counterhegemonic projects that would appeal to the class nature of the Free Officers and their societal transformations (Kandil 2011 p48-49; De Smet 2014 p19-20).

4.2 Muslim Brothers: Recalibrating their Socioeconomic Base after Nasser

When investigating the socioeconomic background of the Muslim Brothers before the 1950s, it has been elicited that they were predominantly from the middle and lower middle classes, i.e. civil servants, teachers, white collar workers, small merchants, businessmen, a few artisans and students (Mitchell 1969 p330; Ayubi 1991, p61).

More importantly, the Brotherhood members in general sense were part of the social classes that had supported the 'July Revolution'. Hence, after the coup the Brotherhood established good relations with the new rulers of Egypt, especially with the first president Mohammed Naguib. However, when Gamal Abdel Nasser forced Mohammed Naguib to resign from his post, this was an indication that this relationship would not last very long. Eventually, the Brotherhood was dissolved by Nasser after an assassination attempt by a member of the movement on 26 October 1954, only two years after the coup. According to Ayubi's (1991) study, based on a list of 'wanted' Brothers published by the government in 1954, most of the Brotherhood members were part of certain fractions of the lower middle class that included recently-urbanised employees and clerks on the one hand, and relatively well-to-do artisans and technicians on the other. The typical occupations of these members were civil servants, teachers, clerks, workers and craftsmen, professionals, a few police and army officers and, as the largest single group, students and the unemployed (Ayubi 1991, p61).

After the revolution, however, the biggest gains from the Nasserite reforms were made by the middle class, which was composed of top state bureaucrats, technocrats, managers of the public sector as well as small and medium landed bourgeoisie representing the new rural middle class in Egypt (Ibrahim 2002 p123; Kandil 2012 p204). Ibrahim (2002) observed that it became apparent to this upper slice of the new middle class in the late 1960s that they could not gain more than what they had from the state's socialist orientation (p123). Consequently, he argued that two other groups from the same class with similar aspirations for the direction of the Egyptian political economy started to support the emerging neoliberal bloc engineered by Sadat. The first group was composed of medium- sized private contractors, suppliers, and distributors to whom the expanding public sector had farmed out numerous subcontracts (Ibrahim 2002, p123). Their eagerness to be part of bigger projects grew over the time and some of these enterprises were run by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had managed, partly, to stave off the heavy hand of the nationalising authority. The most famous and the most important of these entrepreneurs was 'Uthman Ahmad', who was a contractor-engineer whose vast company played a large role in the construction of the Aswan High Dam, among other projects (Ayubi 1991, p142). These companies had a network of firms in various Arab

countries, and most of them recruited members of the Muslim Brotherhood to run their activities, thus allowing them to accumulate some respectable funds and constitute a bridge between their economic activities abroad and Egypt.

The second group was Egyptian migrants, who with their Islamists credentials were working abroad, especially in the oil-rich Arab countries (De Smet 2015, p180). Effectively, starting from the 1970s with Anwar Sadat's era, as it will be demonstrated in the rest of this chapter and the next, these two additional groups would come to force the upper slice of the new middle class, composed of the rural middle class and its urban offshoot in the bureaucracy, to share the spoils of state patronage with them (Kandil 2012, p204). Thus, in this era the role of the Brotherhood in the Egyptian political economy would gain momentum after the heavy repression under Nasser's leadership. However, the movement's counterhegemonic power would be constrained within the limits set by the ruling bloc composed of the bureaucratic elite and rural middle classes engineered by Nasser and the new business elite, created by Sadat's leadership.

4.3 Emergence of Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian Political Scene

The above discussion articulated a basis to identify the changes in the socioeconomic structure of the Muslim Brotherhood during and after Nasser's prison as this will provide the backdrop to analysing the political, economic and intellectual evolution of the movement during this era and the next. The Muslim Brothers (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), were established in the port-city of Ismailia on the Suez Canal in 1928 by a primary school teacher, Hasan al-Banna. The movement gained tremendously fast recognition and new followers in Egypt in the 1920s and 1940s. Starting from this period, the Muslim Brothers rapidly expanded their activities under the charismatic and effective leadership of Hasan al Banna, as a movement committed to elevating the spiritual wellbeing of Egyptian society. In the late 1930s, however, the Brotherhood found itself dragged into the battleground of politics and developed new strategies to be part of the political structure based on revolutionary national-democratic demands, such as land reform, state-led development, and nationalisation of the Suez Canal (De Smet 2015, p180). By the late 1940s, the ranks of the Brotherhood had grown to encompass an alleged two million supporters, which

represented 10% of the population (Mitchell 1963, p328; Kandil 2012, p91). The 1940s was the decade during which the Brotherhood enjoyed its greatest expansion and organisational strength. Multiple major events, including the second world war, increasing influx of foreign troops, soaring migration from rural areas to serve the war efforts of the Allies, rising inflation, immediate post war unemployment, all contributed to widespread social discontent (Ibrahim 2002, p25). The Brotherhood became the most effective organisation in terms of responding to the needs of the middle and lower-middle classes, who were most affected by these events (Mitchell 1969 p328 - 331; Ibrahim 2002, p25).

During this period of change and uncertainty, aware of the fact that the Brotherhood had grown so large and had become a notable organisational power, Al-Banna sought alliances with other political parties as well as with the Palace so as to be part of the political infrastructure in Egypt. However, the self-awareness of political existence did not mean that the movement was going to be able to articulate a party programme and establish a new political party to advance the movement in its mission. The reason for this was that al Banna strictly rejected the idea of political parties, as he thought a political system based on parties that compete against each other creates divisions, which undermine the unity of the Islamic community (*Ummah*) and consequently, make it vulnerable to foreign powers (Tadros 2012, p70). Nevertheless, even though al Banna rejected the idea of the party system, he did not deny constitutional life in Egypt, but rather, he initiated a strategy to reform it by working from within the political system. Regarding which, on multiple occasions he cooperated with Ismail Siddiqi, the Prime Minister and allied with Nationalist party, on the state of affairs inside Egypt (Mitchell 1969, p42).

Moreover, the movement had direct relations with the royal family, such as in 1936 when the Muslim Brothers participated in the coronation of King Farouq (Zahid 2010, p75). Eventually, at the group's sixth general conference in 1941, the movement decided to participate in the next parliamentary election. Seventeen Brotherhood candidates ran in the elections, with al-Banna himself as a candidate for the district of Ismailia, but he was subsequently summoned by the Wafdist government and pressurised into withdrawing from the race (Wickham 2013, p26). In 1945, al-Banna and the other Brothers attempted again to take part in elections so as to be part of the

system, however, the Prime Minister, Ahmad Maher, insisted on excluding them through the falsification of the election results and as a result of this, one more time, all the candidates that contested seats, including Hasan al Banna himself, were defeated (Mitchell 1963, p33). This was a setback for the movement, which nevertheless continued its political activism, but high scale levels corruption, cast in the form of denunciations of parties, partyism, and anything related, deepened the Brotherhood's alienation from the formal political order and reinforced its "anti-system" orientation (Mitchell 1963 p309; Wickham 2013 p26).

Consequently, whilst the movement aspired to become a political power and act like a political entity by participating in elections to win office in parliament and making alliances with political parties to influence the politics in the country, they still rejected the idea of the party system and parliamentary institutions. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood was conscious of their significance in Egyptian society at the time. They were constantly present in the political arena despite harsh treatment, such as imprisonment, prohibition and confiscation of the organisation's assets. They still held on to the cause (dawa) and sought to revolutionise the state and society based on Islamic principles. However, their stance on eliminating political parties and establishing a higher Islamic entity within Egyptian society did not address how certain existing political identities, namely, the leftist and secular forces would fit within such an entity (Tadros 2012, p71). That is, they were struggling to formulate a comprehensive political approach to tackling the existing political system. Having an Islamic perspective was extremely effective in gathering large numbers of people for social and religious services, but political activism required a new set of skills and vision, if the Muslim Brothers wanted to succeed in their counterhegemonic aspirations.

4.4 Years of Repression and the Split from the Brotherhood

After the devastating crack down by Nasser, the Brotherhood members remained in prison and never found a chance reconcile with him to be part of his authoritarian regime. This was a great burden on the movement, as thousands of Brotherhood members languished in desert prison camps, where many were deprived of basic necessities and repeatedly subjected to brutal acts of torture, while those not caught

up in the regime's security net, sought exile in other countries or stayed underground (Wickham 2013, p27). It is important to point out that such a harsh crackdown on them also led to the deepening hatred that some members had for the regime (Kandil 2011, p45). They reached the conclusion that the coercive regime led by Nasser and his officers did not abide with the ethical norms of Islam and caused enormous suffering to people working in the name of Islam, thereby being subject to a challenge through the force of arms (Soage & Frangonillo 2010, p42).

This particular group was inspired by the works of Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who spent much of his life in jail, where he wrote the majority of his works, including the most influential Signposts on the Road (*Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq*), published in 1964. In the book, he advocated that if the Brothers were to fulfil their goals, they would have to take over the powerful institutions of the modern state and bring a system of governance based on the teaching of Quran and the prophet (Wickham 2013, p28). The justification for his proposition was based on arguments stating that modern Muslim societies with governing systems based on man-made laws, whatever their orientation, should be regarded within the category of *jahiliyya* (from *jahl*, ignorance) and he included the democratic systems of the West (Wickham 2013, p28). Accordingly, Qutb's writings supported the idea of *jihad* (holy war) as the only solution, to depose the corrupt rulers of the Muslim world and their Western counterparts, who were an obstacle in the way of the restitution of an Islamic order (Soage & Frangonillo 2010, p42). Through these writings, Qutb became an influential leader and eventually caused a split within the Islamist movement. In terms of socioeconomic background, this group recruited their members mostly from within the lower middle classes, such as artisans, bazaris and clerks, who were economically humble, but paid a great deal of attention to literacy, mobility and political consciousness (Ayubi 1991, p63).

The main branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which will be discussed in chapter six, eight and nine in more details, however, pertained as a civil society organisation with great interest in political activities. According to Kandil (2011), the Brotherhood articulated a series of counterhegemonic strategies, which allowed them to be a decisive player decades between 1980 and 2010. The author argued that the movement targeted what Gramsci referred to as the "*multiplicity of private*

associations (which are of two kinds: natural, and contractual or voluntary) one or more predominates relatively or absolutely—constituting the hegemonic apparatus of one social group over the rest of the population (Gramsci 1971, p264)” that constitute civil society: political parties, associations, educational and religious institutions, the media, and the courts (Kandil 2011 p49; Fontana 2008 p93). Whilst the activities of the Brotherhood within these structures were also targeted and most of the time blocked by the regime every time it sensed the growing influence of the movement against their hegemony, the Muslim Brothers still managed to capture an almost forgotten form of ‘social movement’ Islamism in the 2000s and beyond that had its historical roots in the pre-Nasserist national-popular bloc (De Smet 2015, p160). The reason for this was that the Brotherhood not only expanded its counterhegemonic activities through its members, but also made various alliances, absorbing and engaging with a loosely affiliated body of activists comprised of different social movements, informal networks, and intellectuals, who were willing to subscribe to Islamism or at least to cooperate with it against state corruption and inefficiency in Egypt (Kandil 2011, p49).

The next section will be devoted to how the political Islamists failed to penetrate the economic structure of Egypt and thus, become a decisive function in Egyptian economic activity. However, before moving on to this, it is worth mentioning what happened during the last years of Nasser’s leadership. While the Brothers were serving their prison sentences under very harsh conditions, in 1967, a coalition of Arab countries suffered a crushing defeat in the Six Day War. At the end of the war, Nasserism and its Pan-Arab ideology suffered a fatal blow, as Egypt lost the Sinai Peninsula, a section of the country which was an important source of revenue (Ranko 2012, p51). As a consequence, the Egyptian economy tipped into recession as it lost most of its oil fields in occupied Sinai, the Suez Canal was closed, and tourism was disrupted (El Fadl 2005, p49). The religious leaders attributed this defeat as being God’s punishment for the regime’s departure from religion and its persecution of the Islamists (Soage & Frangonillo 2010, p42). The outcry from public with religious sensitivities was so effective that Nasser sought to curry favour with his critics by encouraging religious activities, thus displaying his Muslim credentials (Al Awadi 2004 p35; Soage & Frangonillo 2010 p42). However, in 1970 he died without finding solutions to the major problems that erupted in Egypt after the Six Day War.

4.5 The Muslim Brothers' Comeback Under Anwar Sadat's Leadership

The man that replaced Gamal Abdel Nasser was his Vice President, Anwar al-Sadat, who was well known for his Muslim credentials (Rubin 1990 p16; al-Awadi 2004 p82; Zahid 2010 p82). For instance, he was the person who made the first contact with Hasan al-Banna, as one of the discontented army officials in the 1940s and who later came together with others to become the 'Free Officers', the backbone of the revolution (Mitchell 1969, p96). The first task of Sadat during his early years in power was to reconfigure the class alliances within the authoritarian national-popular bloc that Nasser had engineered (De Smet 2015, p178). To this end, Sadat's strategy was to embrace religion, a neoliberal market economy, democratisation, alliance with the West and reconciliation with Israel (Rubin 1990 p16; Ibrahim 2002 p37; Zahid 2010 p81; Tugal 2016 p49).

The underlying reason for such a decision was not merely based on his own lifestyle and religious background, but also, a strategic choice to tackle the strong opposition that was likely come from the Nasserist political superstructure, which was composed of leftists along with a group of politicians headed by his Vice-President, Ali Sabri, and his Interior Minister, Sharawi Gomaa, who were loyal to the former president's political, economic and cultural vision (Awadi 2004 p39; Ibrahim 2002 p71; De Sment 2015 p177-178). Sadat's subsequent decision to free political prisoners, including the Muslim Brothers, and allowing opposition parties to operate from 1976 onwards allowed him to forge closer ties with Western countries that praised principles of democracy, liberty and most, a neoliberal economy. The new historical bloc that Sadat intended to create for his hegemonic leadership was composed of an alliance between military generals, state bureaucrats, public sector managers, powerful landlords, subcontractors, new layers of the private commercial and financial bourgeoisie, Islamic students, foreign capitalist investors, and the USA (De Smet 2015, p177-178).

Effectively, under Sadat's leadership the Brotherhood found itself the space and freedom to rebuild a new organisational structure and to re-establish its influence (Rubin 1990, p31). The movement distanced itself from activities of radical

ideological and violent groups (Ibrahim 2002 p39; Wickham 2013 p30). The supreme guide in this process, who redefined the movement's structure and worked delicately towards adapting operations to the new socioeconomic and political forces of the Egyptian state was Umar al-Tilimsani, a lawyer by training, a member of the Brotherhood since the early 1930s, and a close associate of the founder, Hasan al-Banna (Rubin 1990, p29). However, his job was not easy, because many members who had suffered long prison sentences were unable to articulate an effective strategy for bringing back the huge popularity they had experienced under al-Banna's leadership in the late 1930s and 1940s, over a short period, as was required at the time. Hence, the leaders of the movement devoted all their efforts to recruiting new loyal members and overcoming the serious organisational problems it had encountered through the heavy repression it had had to face under Nasser's regime (Wickham 2002 p113; De Smet 2015 p197). In particular, as the movement distanced itself from the strategy of violent struggle, they became more attractive to the educated middle classes for recruitment (De Smet 2015, p197).

To achieve this aim, instead of targeting economic groups such as small and medium size business and concentrating more on economic issues in the same way Erbakan did in Turkey, the Brotherhood's first strategy was to target universities, which were deemed the best places to recruit a new generation of Brothers (Zahid 2010, p81). These strategies were achieved and the movement injected new blood in terms of new recruits into the organisation from a new social base (Naguib 2009, p164). Notably, some of these recruits were 'Abd al-Mon'iem Abou al-Fotouh, Essam al-Erian, and Abou al-Ela Madi along with those who preferred to work independently after renouncing violence, such as Muntasir al-Zayat (Kandil 2011, p45). Subsequently, these new recruits, who were mainly student leaders and rich Brothers who were in exile in Gulf countries, but returned or frequently visited the country for investment opportunities, established and ran various charity foundations, study clubs, clinics and other civil society activities (Ibrahim 2002, p60- 61). In particular, the withdrawal of the state from public services with Sadat's economic policies to encourage a free market economy created new possibilities for these new recruits to expand the Brotherhood's influence among the urban poor and impoverished middle classes (De Smet 2015, p186).

As a result of these initiatives, the Islamic bourgeoisie was able to establish the patron-client relations with various segments of the society, such as layers of the lower-middle classes, the 'lumpen intelligentsia', and the sub proletariat (De Smet 2015, p186). Hence, this relationship allowed them to mobilise these groups and articulate both political and intellectual influence in Egypt again. However, as is discussed in more detail in the following sections and chapters, this achievement did not lead to the movement constituting a similar alliance that the political Islamists in Turkey achieved with the rising middle class and new business elite. The key reason for this difference was that, despite the fact that both countries shared the similar economic profiles and niches in the global economy in 1980s, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) adopted by them both in this era benefited the Turkish economy more evenly and effectively when compared to Egypt, whereby only a small circle of business people close to the regime gained financially (Gumuscu 2010 p855, Adly 2012 p2).

The concordat between the Brotherhood and leadership of Sadat in Egypt, however, did not last very long. Egyptian Islamists became very disappointed with the terms of the peace initiative that Sadat agreed with Israel in 1977 (Wickham 2013, p32). The Brothers, through the movement's official magazine *al-Dawa*, launched the most vehement of attacks on Sadat's "peace initiatives" (Ibrahim 2002, p36) and they extended their attacks to all of the regime's major policies over the next four years. For instance, whilst Sadat had allowed the Brothers to participate in drafting sections of his new constitution, when the final version did not address what Islamists in Egypt had asked for years once more, they were disappointed with their arrangement with Sadat's regime (Rubin 1990, p17). However, whilst the content of the new constitution was not based on "the principles of the Islamic Sharia being a principal source of legislation" as the Brothers had hoped for (Aulus 1976, p348), it was still far more favourable to Islamic principles than the previous one designed by the Nasserists had been, which virtually ignored the religion (Rubin 1990, p17). Perhaps most importantly, the issue of Islamic law being the sole source of the legislature of the Egyptian state remained controversial until, a year before his assassination, Sadat initiated a historic constitutional reform process towards the Islamisation of Egyptian law in April 1980. The government of the time approved the amendment of Article 2 of the constitution to define "the principles of Islamic Sharia as the chief source of

legislation". On May 22nd of 1980 the bill was ratified and made into law (Lombardi 2006 p133; Wickham 2013 p32).

Upon this constitutional change, the movement redefined their strategy to one of demanding a legal system that guarded and ensured that the government never strayed from Islam and its laws (Tugal 2016, p88). However, this strategy, as was the case in the era of al-Banna's leadership, clashed with the movement's active will of being part of political society, whilst at same time rejecting being an official agent of politics by becoming a political party. Consequently, despite the religio-cultural stance of the Brotherhood being transformed in this era from the fight for a radical Islamic caliphate to an Islamic law-focused movement (Tugal 2016, p88), they were still unable to shift from an eco-corporate to an ethical-political phase.

The road to hegemonic leadership for political Islam in Egypt was much rockier than in Turkey, and the leadership skills in relation to political, cultural and most importantly neoliberal economic aspects remained much less developed (Tugal 2016, p88). The diverging paths of the political Islamists in Turkey and Egypt will be discussed in the next chapter, but when they are compared in the 1950s and 1970s, the Egyptian case proves that political Islam in that country was more rigid in terms of piety as well as having a more solid focus on implementing Islamic law, rather than the economic programme. In contrast, given Erbakan's special interest and intellectual leanings, he encouraged Turkish political Islamists to articulate economic programmes and policies intended to protect small and medium size businesses. He was keenly aware of clear separation in the Turkish economic structure between the capitalists based in the major industrialist cities in the west of the country verses conservative capitalists based in the central and eastern parts. This was never the case for the political Islamists in Egypt as their socioeconomic base was far less well defined and successful. Nazih Ayubi (1991) made the following observation in terms of social profile of Islamists entrepreneurs at the time:

They come mainly from a lower middle class background, with a limited level of higher education and with little previous experience in financial or economic matters. Practically all of them, however, have worked or lived abroad, usually in the Gulf, but sometimes also in Europe, where they started building up contacts with expatriate

Egyptians working there and offering them services, such as changing currency or helping with various purchases and investments in Egypt. Whilst several of the owners seem to have rather daring, adventurous personalities, they have on the whole had no previous political inclinations or activities until they started their flirtation with the Islamic movements in the mid-eighties (Ayubi 1991, p145).

In the thesis, I place these entrepreneurs with their links to the Brotherhood's mission in a category of intellectuals operating and influencing all aspects of social and political life in Egypt. However, as I will demonstrate in the following section, their influence in Egyptian political and economic life was always kept within the boundaries of both Sadat and the Mubarak regime's interests. The basis of my argument stems from Gramsci's perspective on the entrepreneurs, who he noted "*must be an organiser of masses of men; he must be an organiser of the "confidence" of investors in his business, of the customers for his product, etc.*" (Gramsci 1971, p135). However, whilst these Islamist entrepreneurs came to constitute the backbone of the Islamic bourgeoisie, starting from the *Infitah* process Sadat initiated (De Smet 2015, p160), I would contend that in next decades they could not articulate political, economic and intellectual leadership through the alliances they made that would be a real challenge to the regime. Instead, these Islamic entrepreneurs became the agents of Sadat and Mubarak's leadership to build consensus for their neoliberal projects (Ayubi 1991, p142-143). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to form itself a historical bloc or be part of it. As explained in chapter two, the formation of a historical bloc is a prerequisite for every successful counterhegemonic project, being a "*decisive nucleus of economic activity*" (Gramsci 1971, p161).

4.6 Limits of the Brotherhood's Economic Activities in 1970s

This study reveals how the Brothers in this era could not effectively eliminate the rigid ideas that the top leadership cadre, especially the old guard, had had for decades. Their assertion was that the first tactical principle of the Muslim Brotherhood should be based on the objective of "*consciousness-raising of the Muslim masses and advice to "Muslim" rulers*" (Ibrahim 2002, p39). As a result, it could not articulate a counterhegemonic strategy based on an economic programme in the same way that Erbakan and later, Erdogan were able to do in Turkey. As it will be discussed in more

details in the following section, one of the key reasons for this, was that the movement was stuck between favouring a free market and planned economy. On the one hand, many members who had escaped abroad after Nasser's repression became wealthy through Sadat's *Infitah* economic policies when they returned, as they had enough capital for business opportunities with the petrodollars they brought with them (De Smet 2015, p180). On the other, the Brothers as a grassroots movement felt responsible in economic terms to all segments of the society, especially the lower-middle classes, when they noticed the disparate impact of the *Infitah* (Ibrahim 2002, p36). This dilemma created a blurred image of the movement's hegemonic mission in the eyes of various subaltern groups. That is, whilst the movement was appealing to losers of the open market economy through their civil society activities, at the same time they were perceived to be reaping the benefits of this process by becoming free market entrepreneurs.


According to a study by Springborg (1988, p47) for example, it is estimated that between 1974 and 1984, about one million Egyptians invested in Islamic investment companies, which were associated with the Muslim Brothers. Another study highlighted that the *Infitah* also had a direct impact on those merchants, petty-traders, artisans, rich peasants, and landlords, who had association with the Brotherhood, but had stayed in Egypt (Ates 2005, p137–139). Hence, it is argued that this new economic environment changed the Brothers' attitude towards favouring a liberal economy and ditching their allegiance to 'socialism' (De Smet 2015 p180; Tugal 2016, p88).

In contrast, when the Brothers' criticism for Sadat's socioeconomic policy and alternative solutions they put forward after the riots in 1977 are investigated, it is possible to see a huge similarity with those of the secular left at the time (Ibrahim 2002, p41). Both political Islam and the secular left argued that the Egyptian economy should not have its strength from a market economy, but rather, from self-reliance based on nationalised major utilities and production enterprises as well as taxation of the wealthy through *zakat* for welfare subsidy of the poor's basic needs (Ibrahim 2002, p41). However, whilst the Brotherhood's leadership demanded the eradication of usury (cited in Ibrahim 2002, p41) some members were taking advantage of the *Infitah* and accumulating wealth which they would not otherwise have. As a result, the scope

of the activities of these members remained under control by Sadat, hence not becoming “*the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*” (Gramsci 1971, p161).

In this respect, the Brotherhood affiliated businessmen’s expansion was limited to the finance industry instead of the tourism and construction sectors, which became the backbone of the Egyptian economy after the export of natural resources and income from the Suez channel. I argue that the reason behind Sadat’s choice to lead the Brothers to focus much on the finance industry is that many of these members were working in Libya and the Gulf countries and their remittances at the time were a major source of capital for the Egyptian economy. Regarding which, the numbers of Egyptian migrants in these countries increased in number from about 10,000 in 1968 to 1.2 million in 1985 (Ibrahim 1982 p63; Fergany 1991). The figure three below illustrates the personal remittances received in Egypt as a percentage of GDP and it shows that personal accounted for 6 % in 1977 and 12 % in 1978, 1979, 1980. It slightly decreased in 1981 and 1982, possibly due to uncertainty after Sadat’s assassination, but it peaked again at 13 % in 1983 and 1984.

Figure 3: Personal Remittances Received in Egypt



Source: World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates

Some of these remittances were captured as capital for the Islamic banks and investment companies that were established under the new investment laws of *infatih* (Wickham 2013, p96). However, the role of these investment companies remained within the limits set by Sadat and later Mubarak for two major reasons: (1) they were useful in attracting the flow of petrodollars into the country; (2) Islam was a powerful “instrument to suppress or mediate the class struggle, and a cultural framework for capital accumulation” (De Smet 2015, p188). Sadat initiated a debate in both Egyptian civil and political society over what was described as the ‘Islamic economy’, suggesting that Islam should respect individual ownership and a person’s endeavour to earn and capitalise upon economic power before political change (al-Awadi 2004 p37; Zahid 2010 p82). However, the resolution of this debate has never been conclusive for Muslim Brothers in Egypt, who believed that their first and foremost aim was a total change of society and achievement of an Islamic state, where there was no separation between religion and the state (Ibrahim 2002, p35). Hence, I contend that Sadat’s intention to consolidate the Islamic movement with bourgeois democracy as the new ideological form was rejected and did not lead to the mobilisation of the masses for the new ethico-political dimension he was so keen on to build the Egyptian state.

4.7 Recalibration of the Egyptian Socio-political Scene Under Sadat

Whilst the *Infatih* process endorsed a new flexible political and economic environment in Egypt, which led the Brothers to reinforce their capability to reach out to the grassroots again, Sadat was still very aware of the potential counterhegemonic strength of the Brotherhood and therefore, he took care in limiting the movement’s ability to articulate its political strength within the borders of his regime’s interests (al-Awadi 2004, p37). To elaborate further on this, it is important to note that Sadat reformed the one-party system based on the Arab Socialist Union that he inherited from Nasser and introduced a restricted form of pluralism (al-Awadi 2004, p36). His move towards democracy was restricted in the sense that he only restructured political society in Egypt to accommodate three political platforms: The National Progressive Unionist Party or Rally Party (*Hizb al-Tagammu*), representing the left; the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (*Hizb Misr Al-'Arabi Al-Ishtiraki*), representing the centre; and

the Liberal Party (*al-Ahrar*), representing the centre-right. Moreover, whilst two additional parties were given legal permits, namely, the Socialist Labour Party (*Hizb Al- 'Amal Al-Ittirākī*), and the New Wafd Party (*Hizb Al-Wafd Al-Jadīd*) in 1977, Sadat also founded the National Democratic Party (*Al-Hizb Al-Waṭanī Ad-Dīmūqrāṭī*) in the same year, which became, after its forced merger with EASP, the de facto ruling party of Egypt (Ibrahim 2002 p206; De Smet 2015 p178).

Whilst Sadat's attempted to redefine the rules of the political game for the legitimacy of his own rule in Egypt, these reforms also allowed him to attract political support and investment from Western countries (Ibrahim 2002, p37-38). In this interplay, he also offered the Muslim Brotherhood the option of participating in parliament through a coalition with any of the three political spectra that he had engineered through the reforms that dissolved the Arab Socialist Union (*Hizb Misr Al-'Arabi Al-Ishtiraki*) in 1976 (Zahid 2010, p92). However, al-Tilmisani refused Sadat's offer, perceiving that any form of coalition with the secular political opposition would damage the Muslim Brotherhood's public image, which was rooted in the minds of many as the defender of Islamic principles as the source of rule in the state (Zahid 2010, p92). The decision of al-Tilmisani to opt out of the movement involving the new dimensions of Egyptian politics can be explained by the strong opposition put up by the old guard, who viewed the secular parties with disdain, in the same way that al-Banna had. In any case, the movement was not strong enough to be able to compete with anybody in terms of its organisational capability, as it was heavily depleted after the crackdown led by Nasser and would need more time to recover. Thus, al-Tilmisani and the old guard were aware of the fact that what Sadat was offering for them was restricted in the sense that they could be trapped within the boundaries of political game, which was designed to serve the interests of the latter's hegemonic bloc (Rubin 1990 p30; Zahid 2010 p92).

Hence, the economic reform process initiated by Sadat in this era, as discussed in this thesis, was not inclusive and accessible enough to be able to convince the Islamists to accept the norms of the system that was proposed. Despite this situation, the Brotherhood continued to avoid getting into a clash with Sadat and remained passive towards his reform process, because their priority lay in opposing the leftists, whose secularism conflicted fundamentally with its Islamic orientation (Rubin 1990, p16) and secondly, this approach was necessary as their movement still needed time before

it could experience a full recovery. However, some of the Brotherhood members in business and trading, particularly from among former emigres to the pious Persian Gulf states, noticed the opportunities that the reform initiative held for them and supported Sadat's *Infitah* (Rubin 1990, p16). In addition, despite the Brothers not having equivalent opportunities to those that the Islamists in Turkey were enjoying, the economic reforms between 1973 and 1990, as discussed in the following section and chapter five in more detail, acted in their favour, whereby there was the emergence of 'Islamic investment companies', and 'Islamic banks' close to the Brotherhood (Haddad 1987 p255; Ayubi 1991 p135-151; Al Awadi 2004 p71-p76).

Despite their expansion as an alternative economic force always remaining within the limits of the boundaries set by the Sadat and never being allowed to become a part of "*the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*" (Gramsci 1971, p161), the Brothers continued to increase their influence in both Egyptian civil and political society through their activities in universities, trade unions and their charity work in the 1970s and 1980s. These activities allowed them to articulate a distinct Islamic social capital, binding both the middle and the poorer strata of society more closely to constitute a new socioeconomic historical bloc (Talani 2014, p102). However, as the following sections and chapters demonstrate, the counterhegemonic vision based on this socioeconomic alliance would not be as successful in achieving political Islamist hegemonic leadership as their Turkish counterparts by, first, becoming a decisive economic function in the Egyptian economy.

4.8 The Open-Door Policy of Sadat and His Heir Mubarak in Egypt: *Infitah* in the Years between 1973 and 1980

The keystone factor that strengthened Sadat's leadership came after the victory in the October 1973 war (Yom Kippur War). After the humiliating defeat in the Six Day War, Egyptians felt that their national honour had been restored and Sadat was praised to the heavens for his effective leadership. From this perspective, it is not misleading to consider the October War as Sadat's Suez, as it boosted his status at home, allowing him to pursue a bolder path than would have otherwise been the case (Roccu 2012, p105). Since Sadat had acquired legitimate popularity for his leadership, as discussed in the previous section, his next challenge was to revive the Egyptian economy. He

announced the *Infitah* (opening), an economic reform policy, which found its official elaboration in the October Paper of 1974 (Talani 2014, p178). The main objective of this reform process was based on the following three pillars: create platforms and legal codes, which allow the Egyptian economy to reintegrate into the global markets; attract foreign direct investment and acquire access to hitherto inaccessible Western technology (Roccu 2012, p106). Regarding the second, the adaptation of the ‘Old Egyptian Investment Law’ in 1974 (Law no. 43, ‘On Arab and Foreign Investment and Free zones’, which was reformed again in 1989 as Investment Law no.230) was aimed at attracting foreign investment into Egypt, such as the emerging glut of Arab petrodollars, either solely by external parties or in association with Egyptian business (Talani 2014, p178).

Table 1: FDI by Sectors in Egypt (average in % of total private investment), 1972–1979

FDI by Sectors in Egypt (Average in % of Total Private Investment), 1972–1979							
Manufacturing	Agriculture	Finance	Tourism	Construction	ICT	Other Services	Total FDI
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
22.6	27.6	32	40	30.6	0.8	20.1	27.6

Source: Shima’s (2015) calculations based on GAFI data.

Nevertheless, the implementation of the *Infitah* was very sluggish and unlike the case of the Turkish economy at the time, it was not embedded in the broader institutional settings aimed at the restructuring and expanding of exports (Adly 2012, p10). Most importantly, it was quickly revealed that despite the swift approval of a series of projects, only a limited number were effectively completed, in sectors such as tourism, construction and housing, having, as a consequence, only a limited long-term developmental impact (Roccu 2012 p106, Baker 1978 p145). The above table shows the average total private investment by sector in the years between 1972 and 1979. According to these data, throughout these years the FDI targeted the abovementioned sectors mostly through joint ventures and various incentive programmes that the regime put in place for these firms. The average total private investment as FDI in tourism, finance and construction was 40%, 32% and 30.6%, respectively. Hence, in contrast to the initial aim of the reform process, the scope of *Infitah* was reduced to

expanding the public sector through these joint ventures, which favoured the capital class close to the state elites, directly or indirectly.

The reason for this, as Adly (2012) highlighted in his study, was that these reforms did not allow the labour-intensive and low value-added sectors, such as the construction, textiles and clothing industries, to become as competitive and globally integrated as with Turkey at the time. Perhaps more importantly, what also became apparent during this reform process was that only a small proportion of domestic private capital had survived nationalisation, whereas the benefits of the reform process, such as investment incentive schemes for export oriented capital owners, were more equally distributed in Turkey, especially from the 1980s onwards (Adly 2012, p83-91). One of the key reasons for this outcome in Egypt, as highlighted by Gumuscu (2010), was that regulations implemented in this era, such as those concerned with joint ventures between public companies and private investors, which initially appeared to be back door privatisation, were in fact another route for the government to take control of the emerging private sector for their own political interest. To back this claim up, when the years between 1973 and 1982 are investigated, it is notable how the public sector expanded over 3.5% per annum within this period (Shafik 1994, p13), thus paving the way for the creation of a new business elite loyal to regime.

Hence, whilst in the Turkish case liberalisation policies had a positive impact on the conservative bourgeoisie from the Anatolian region of Turkey, the policies of the *Infatih* process in Egypt revived two types of bourgeoisie. According to a study by Waterbury (1991), one of this group comprised the “state bourgeoisie,” composed of managers, technocrats, and high-level bureaucrats, who were in close contact with foreign and private capital. Whilst the other group benefiting from this reform process was the old liberal bourgeoisie side-lined by Nasser, who became involved in the creation of a new business class heavily reliant on the state for its survival, thereby fitting into the category of crony capitalists (Roccu 2012, p107). Accordingly, it was mostly the public-sector employees and big business in joint ventures with foreign companies, especially with the Americans, that benefited from the economic reform process initiated by the *Infatih* programme and its scope never spread to the interests of the Egyptian SMEs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as the below chart in figure 4

demonstrates that imports of goods and services increased from 19% of GDP in 1973 to 49% of GDP in 1981.

Figure 4: Imports of Goods and Services Between 1972 and 1987



(Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts)

The United State was the biggest beneficiary of this process and did not hesitate to take the lion's share from this growing dependence on imports. Regarding which, the total amount of imports from the US between 1974 and 1984 was estimated at \$2.8 billion, which was equivalent to over a third of all Egyptians imports, while American non-oil imports from Egypt were worth \$5 million (as cited in Kandil, 2003 p205). Moreover, during the first five years of the *infitah* process, American investors, especially those who were interested in the oil business, expanded their influence in the country. These firms acquired 70 per cent of the profits made in the Egyptian oil business in this period (Kandil 2012, p205). As a result, there was a boom in the number of American Banks, which had never operated before in Egypt, drawing \$9.9 billion worth of foreign currency deposits (Kandil 2012, p205). When Sadat tried to respond to the growing trade deficit by reducing public subsidies, including on some basic food items, this led to a series of riots in all the major urban areas (Ibrahim 2002, p205). Whilst he suppressed these riots through his influence in the army, he still had to find another solution if he wanted to carry on with *Infitah*. He opted for continuation of the programme through a more gradual phasing out of subsidies and by external borrowing. However, this resulted in a vast increase in Egypt's external debt, from

less than \$1.5 billion, when he first assumed to power in 1971, to around \$29 billion, when he was assassinated in 1981 (Ibrahim 2002, p205).

4.9 Marginalisation of Egyptian Middle and Lower Classes: Emergence of New Capitalist Elites

Infitah was a project of international capitalist groups who intended to achieve unlimited access to Egyptian resources, which was forbidden to many of them during Nasser's presidency. Hence, it helped to revive the old Egyptian landed-bourgeoisie, the nouveau riche associated with the regime forces, Egyptians living abroad (some two million by the late 1970s), and actual or potential Arab investors in the country (Ibrahim 2002, p205). The strategy of Sadat in this interplay, was based on the objective of nurturing new capitalists, who would be entirely invested in his regime. This new business elite that Sadat relied on was composed of the two middle-class fragments from before: middling landowners and bureaucrats (Kandil 2012, p206). This specific group of capitalists later advanced themselves under Mubarak's regime and constituted the economic bloc that supported the political leadership in exchange for lucrative deals. Regarding which, when I asked Yahya Hamid, Minister of Investment in Morsi's government about the Freedom and Justice Party's approach to liberal economic policies, he explained to me that the privatisation process in Egypt had always benefited a few people close to the regime. As he put it:

We wanted to work towards a law with the aim of resolving the huge debate over privatisation of profitable public sector companies. The privatisation process did not start with Mubarak, of course, for it was ongoing process since Sadat's time. However, Mubarak's latest privatisation process included the most profitable public sector companies and was not welcomed by many people in Egypt. Mubarak's regime sold these companies for almost nothing to its closest allies, with the aim of monopolising the Egyptian economy.

(Y. Hamid, personal communication, September 1, 2015)

As to one of the pillars mentioned above, the evidence suggests that the aim of an 'Open Door' (*Infitah*) policy between 1973 and 1990 was to increase foreign direct investment. To meet this objective, the ruling bloc of Sadat and later Mubarak consolidated its relationship with international capital. However, this attempt did not

enjoy the full support of the local middle classes and risked breaking up the progressive moment that had been associated with their historical bloc since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. That is, it quickly became apparent that *Infitah* presented a cynical process of socioeconomic restoration that excluded the demands of subaltern allies, such as professionals and workers representing the middle classes (Talani 2014 p178, De Smet 2014 p24). It was seen simply as a new accumulation strategy of the existing hegemonic bloc, which sought to reorient the domestic economic structure of Egypt towards neoliberal changes in the global economy for its own interests (De Smet 2015, p179). For instance, according to Talani (2014), the way that liberalisation reforms were implemented in practice was unfavourable to the middle and low classes, thus exacerbating their progressive marginalisation from the levers of power that had already provoked their discontent. Particularly, it became apparent that the state fell under the control of the bureaucratic elite and *Infitah* bourgeoisie, eventually constituted the historical bloc that supported Sadat and Mubarak's regimes.

To summarise, the *Infitah* policies allowed the Egyptian bourgeoisie to make a spectacular comeback after twenty years (1952-72) of total eclipse under Nasser's leadership (Ibrahim 2002, p129). It achieved this with the help of Arab and foreign investment from Western countries. These international capital groups still play a decisive role in the survival of the economic structure dominating the Egyptian state. However, it is important to point out that it was during 1970s that this historical bloc was formed. One of the key representatives of this returning bourgeoisie class in Egyptian civil society was the Egyptian Society of Businessmen (ESB), which was established in 1979, again with the blessing of the late President Sadat (Ibrahim 2002, p128). This is a pro-business association and its membership is confined to Egyptian citizens who are part of the old landed-aristocracy or new bourgeois families. The ESB had an important profile in public debates on socioeconomic-political issues and most of the time its annual meetings became the functional equivalent of parliamentary hearings (Ibrahim 2002, p128). The meetings and debates that the ESB organised promoted privatisation processes, and other liberal laws for investment and taxation (Ibrahim 2002, p128). As the following chapters will demonstrate, in contrast to the Turkish case, in which the economic and social status of the rural working and middle classes was upgraded and became a decisive function in Turkish economy, the

Egyptian economic and political arena stagnated around the groups within the same ruling bloc.

4.10 Conclusion

In this chapter, the changing nature of the socioeconomic groups and their connection with the ruling group as well as counterhegemonic movements in Egypt between 1952 and 1980 has been examined. It has been argued that changes in the economic model were aimed at pursuing restructured socioeconomic groups within the national economic space. Nasserism served to bring different sectors or groups together around the objective of national development. In particular, it created a political alliance composed of the bureaucracy, big industrial groups, and organised labour through rising wages and protection from international competition. Nevertheless, the ideational foundation of the political consensus constructed through Nasserism was shattered with the emergence of socioeconomic groups in the 1970s, whose interests no longer lay in an inward-looking economy. Sadat's leadership and his ambition to implement neoliberal policies with an intention to integrate Egypt into the global economy served the interests of this emerging business elite. The chapter has also demonstrated that the *Infitah* economic programme was an expression of a global movement represented by the globalisation of production and trade, which was heavily promoted by the international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, it has been pointed out that, whilst the Brotherhood found a more flexible environment under Sadat's regime and expanded its activities in both economic and political terms, it was still confined to the limits of the boundaries set by the Sadat regime. Particularly, as the Brothers became more active in both Egyptian civil and political society through their activities in universities, trade unions and charity work in the 1970s and 1980s, they found the means to articulate a distinct Islamic social capital, binding both the middle and poorer strata of society more closely to constitute a new socioeconomic historical bloc. However, it has been concluded that this process was strictly controlled by the regime forces to keep the Muslim Brotherhood members away from becoming "*the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*" (Gramsci 1971, p161).

Chapter 5

Diverging Paths of the Political Islamists in Turkey and Egypt

The State is the instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure, but it is necessary for the State to 'be willing' to do this; i.e. for the representatives of the change that has taken place in the economic structure to be in control of the State. To expect that civil society will conform to the new structure as a result of propaganda and persuasion, or that the old homo economicus will disappear without being buried with all the honours it deserves, is a new form of economic rhetoric, a new form of empty and inconclusive economic moralism." Here civil society is in effect equated with "the mode of economic behaviour".

(Gramsci 1971, p208)

The aim of the hegemonic military leadership was that by unleashing political Islam in both countries, this would rule out the threat that ultra nationalist and leftist movements of the time posed against their authority. However, giving political Islamists a chance to flourish in civil and political society did not mean that the military ruling class was totally renouncing secularism in both countries. Whilst the ruling cadres in both focal countries did not hesitate to punish political Islamists each time they felt threatened by their emerging power, but the evolution of political Islam in the two contexts diverged from the 1980s onwards. Specifically, the factions of political Islamists found more opportunities in the economic sector in Turkey than their counterparts in Egypt. That is, the junta formed after the 1980 coup reckoned that if they blended Islamism with a neoliberal market economy, they could integrate Turkish political, economic and intellectual society into the global system. This was a weak attempt by the Turkish Military class to revolutionise the masses with the anticipation that they would support their legitimacy in long run. As the above quotation by Gramsci alludes to, that they did not envisage the possibility of political Islamists gaining professional experience and popularity in both civil and political society that would eventually led them to gain an affinity with the political setting and redefine "the mode of economic behaviour" by drawing the key disciples of the centre right parties and capital groups associated with them into their hegemonic project. In this chapter, building on this perspective I will investigate the diverging paths of the political Islamist movements in Turkey and Egypt after the 1980s.

5.1 The Emergence of the Pious Bourgeoisie and Its Relationship with Turkish Political Islam

In line with the New Right approach of the time, particularly in US and UK, the Turkish military regime together with Ozal's Motherland party promoted the vigorous virtues of individualism and the necessity of a strong state as a guarantor of economic individualism. Whilst this new form of representation helped the Turkish bourgeoisie to consolidate the material and intellectual power necessary to maintain their hegemonic position, it also escalated the counterhegemonic struggle between Western oriented large capital owners and the emerging pious capital class from the Anatolian region. Consequently, it is important to shed a light on what extent did these companies organized themselves to articulate a civil and political influence since the 1980s. As outlined in the previous chapter, the last Turkish government before the 1980 coup had abandoned the import substitution industrialisation model and switched to an export-led perspective in January 1980. The goal was to reinstate a balance in the current account and normalise the markets, which were constantly failing to respond to the effects of the oil shocks in the 1970s (Rodrik 1999, p80). To achieve this goal, there were number of measures taken, e.g. key relative prices; the real exchange rate, real wages, and interest rates were deregulated (Gumuscu 2010, p841).

Figure 5: Net Global Export of Goods and Services over Turkish Exports (% of GDP)



Source: World Bank

As a result of the above outlined initiatives, the Turkish economy experienced a large expansion of the export-oriented private sector. The chart above in figure five shows the positive impact that the new export oriented policies had on the Turkish economy. During the years between 1960 and 1980, there was no noteworthy improvement in the Turkish current account, balance but exports significantly increased from 3.2% of GDP in 1979 to 18.6% in 1988. In other words, whereas the total value of exports was a mere \$2.3 billion in 1979, this figure had risen to \$13 billion by 1990 (Turkish Statistical Institute, Foreign Trade Statistics). However, it's important to note that the Turkish Lira was substantially devalued by 100% between 1980 and 1988 and a number of other policies, such as tax rebates, credit subsidies and duty-free imports for exportable production were implemented to achieve the abovementioned performance (Celasun & Rodrik, 1989, p668). As the Turkish economic structure was transformed to become more export oriented it also diversified with the flourishing of many new SMEs located in the regions with a more conservative outlook that were seeking new markets. Dr. Asik stated that:

The export driven economic reforms in this era were highly successful in creating new economic opportunities for SMEs, especially for the so called Anatolian Tigers.

(G. Asik, personal communication, July 10, 2015)

In particular, after the fall of Berlin wall, Turkish SMEs specialising in labour-intensive consumer goods, such as textiles, houseware, furniture and construction services targeted markets in the Middle East and the former USSR countries. As these countries became more accessible to trade, the share of the manufactured goods in relation to total exports increased even more so as the table above indicates. As these companies grew in number and became integrated with the global chains of production through subcontracting offered by the multinational companies, they grew in size and strength, thus seeking more opportunities from the political leaders for integration in the global markets (Gumuscu 2010, p841). Hence, it is important to highlight that it was during this period that the Turkish economy began to become integrated into the global post-Fordist production system. Many of these rapidly flourishing SMEs were organically linked to political Islam and their owners became transformed from the ranks of the traditional provincial petty bourgeoisie into medium and large-size entrepreneurs. In fact, one of the most prominent developments of this

era was the emergence of a new type of businessman who was loyal, albeit in different ways and degrees, to the counterhegemonic project of Turkish political Islam. Regarding which, Erdem Dokur from MUSIAD in an interview for this research said:

The ideology of our association is based on conservatism, which is a blend of the core values of Islam and nationalism.

(E. Dokur, personal communication, July 13, 2015)

In today's Turkey, the establishment of the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD) represents a majority of these emergent SMEs based in Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces. In the interview with the Ankara representative, I was told that the group has an ideological and political attachment to the religious and traditional values of Turkish society, but that the doors of their organisation were open to everyone from any background. He explained that MUSIAD serves as a civil society organisation that helps businesses to integrate into world markets. In particular, they support provincial entrepreneurs by facilitating networking events, exhibitions, private meetings and business trips in countries in Europe, Central Asia, East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Specifically, they organise platforms, such as international fairs, where MUSIAD members can establish new connections with actors in the global market. Moreover, they regularly publish and circulate booklets and journals on a wide range of issues pertaining to macro- and microeconomic developments.

Whilst these types of activities by MUSIAD are designed to help emergent devout businesses to reduce the cost of information and ease their integration into global markets, the main function of the association is to seek and protect the interest of these businessmen during the allocation of the government's new budget and other policy making stages. Consequently, the organic relationship between these businessmen under the umbrella of MUSIAD and political Islamists under the leadership of Erbakan and later Recep Tayyip Erdogan have come to define the new rules for the ongoing hegemonic struggle between political Islamists and the agents of the pro-secular state elites and the capital groups close to their leadership. In sum, this emerging pious bourgeoisie class represents the economic base that Turkish political Islamists have been aiming to consolidate as its historical bloc to achieve hegemonic success. The following chapter six will explore this relationship in more details.

5.2 The Failed Counterhegemonic Project of the Islamists: The Welfare Party Testing the Limits of the Pro-Secular Ruling Elite

The experience that the political Islamists from participating in three different coalition governments in 1970s allowed them to develop extensive networks within the state and the society. Despite the National Salvation Party being closed down and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, like other political leaders, being arrested and having to serve 11 months in prison by the orders of the junta after the coup in 1980, the political Islamists did not shy away from their political ambition and founded the Welfare party once the ban on political parties was lifted in 1983. The founder and the first chairman of the Welfare party was Ahmet Tekdal. Necmettin Erbakan was only able to take over the leadership of the party when his ban from politics along with that of all other political leaders before the coup was lifted through a general referendum in September 1987. Whilst Erbakan hoped to create a new form of leadership strategy based on the objective of seeking a unified, strong, and stable state and society, his political campaigns with his new Welfare Party sent out an ambiguous message. For instance, Erbakan argued that the Welfare party appealed to democratic principles aimed at reaching a realistic end to the “felicitous order” (*Saadet Nizami*), however, this perspective created a dilemma and confusion among many people (Atacan 2007, p188). This is because Erbakan was arguing, on the one hand, that his movement was not against secularism, whilst at the same time giving the impression that he was against secularism, because it was oppressing people through the means of the establishment. As Professor Burhanettin Duran, General Coordinator of SETA explained:

When we consider the ‘Nationalist View’ from a narrow perspective it does not represent political Islam. However, if we consider it from a broader perspective, the movement, indeed, heavily emphasised the values and principles of Islam in society. Nevertheless, it has never called for the implementation of Sharia law, but rather, has declared its loyalty to the secularist state establishment and has stayed within the boundary of democratic principles. Therefore, we can call them Islamists within the political spectra in Turkey but it can only be the softest Islamists among all when you compare them with other political Islamists in the region.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Consequently, like it was the case with the previous political Islamists parties in 1970s, the Welfare Party was also formed upon a political ideology based on “National Consciousness” (*Milli Şuur*), which emphasised two important factors: spiritual development based on Islam and material development based on industrialisation (Eligur 2010, p145). Erbakan continued to advocate that if Turkish people could achieve these two, in return, they could execute a foreign policy independent of Western influence. This showed how the National View movement was still alive and constituted the core principles of political struggle for Islamists in Turkey. Further, Eligur (2010) highlighted that Erbakan’s rhetoric based on “National Consciousness” demonstrates that the religious elements still dominated the party, and served to critique the pro-secular and Kemalist ruling elite and their attempts for Westernisation of Turkey during the past two centuries. She further argued that the political Islamists projected two types of political perspectives in the country, the National View movement represented by the Welfare Party and all the other political parties and movements, which they described as imitators of the West (Eligur 2010, p145). The Welfare party positioned their counterhegemonic project based on a programme around the one key argument that material development would be incomplete without the prior achievement of spiritual development. That is, like its predecessor parties, it formulated a counterhegemonic political and economic project based on criticism of the Western world, especially the EU and Israel and their political imitators or followers as they were called in Turkish politics.

Nevertheless, the party promoted an economic model called “Just Order” to consolidate political power from electorates that were both losers and winners from the neoliberal reforms carried out throughout 1980s. Whilst it called for an equal distribution of wealth among citizens, for the protection of the national resources, which was defined as the essence of the nation and for restructuring educational institutions in a way that would lead to the spiritual development of the country (Eligur 2010, p145), the party also supported the principles of a free-market system to attract the emerging pious capital class. However, this mixed approach created further confusion among socioeconomic groups that the movement sought to attract.


In particular, the Just Order did not have defined lines in its approach towards capitalism or free market principles, as it also aimed to consolidate the emerging pious bourgeoisie by satisfying their interests. Nevertheless, despite the “Just Order” economic programme not becoming a popular electoral option because of these blurred lines, Turkish political Islamists’ criticism of the Western political powers and capital created an anti-capitalist ideological atmosphere that facilitated their proposing a popular manifesto covering a wide range of problems. This did not just address the problems of a broad range of social groups, for it also created a platform on which they formulated counterhegemonic political and intellectual projects that transcended the rival political parties. Just Order emphasised the necessity of an independent foreign policy, Muslim unity, democratisation, clean politics, freedom of faith, fair trials and human rights. These objectives were important for the creation of counterhegemonic common sense that political Islamists in Turkey sought to achieve. Most importantly, the growing presence of political Islamists within the educational system and the media helped them to disseminate a populist version of their counterhegemonic projects to the masses. However, it is also important to note that the interplay that the Islamists had with pro and anti-capitalist political appeal later pushed them into a vicious cycle such that they could not garner the necessary support from broader segments of society.

5.3 Erbakan’s Success in Making Alliances and Building Consent

At the first general election in which the Welfare Party took part in 1987, it could not pass the minimum threshold of 10% for parliamentary representation, as set by the new constitution. In the following election, in 1991, however, they formed an alliance with two other Turkish nationalist parties, the Nationalist Work Party (NWP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (RDP, a mixture of the WP and the NWP) and beat the 10% threshold, which was particularly designed to keep marginal parties with an affiliation to political Islam, nationalism or socialism out of the parliament. In fact, the Welfare party became the fourth party, winning 16.88% of the votes and 62 seats in the parliament (Turkish Statistical Institute, General Elections 1923-2011, p93). This was a significantly important victory for the political Islamists in Turkey, the reason being that the popularity of Welfare Party continued to increase from this election onwards. It is also important to underline that the alliance that the political

Islamists made with the nationalist leaders Alparslan Turkes and Aykut Edabali boosted their popularity among many groups that supported centre right parties. However, Kurdish electors which the movement attracted with their conservative outlook was upset after this alliance. Nevertheless, the uneasy alliance between the WP, the NWP and the RDP came to an end in the aftermath of the election and the Welfare Party articulated better relations with the subaltern groups, such as the Kurdish population.

Figure 6: Elections Results in Turkey Between 1983 and 1999



(Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, General Elections 1923-2011)

The figure six above demonstrates the performance of the competing parties in Turkish political society in the years between 1983 and 1999. Support for the leading party, Ozal's Motherland, declined rapidly from 45.14%, 36.3%, 24%, 19.6% to 13.2% in 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, respectively. Whilst a key factor for this significant decline of the Motherland party was due to increasing competition in Turkish political society after the referendum in 1987 which lifted the political ban on former leaders, Ozal's election to presidential office and his replacement of Mesut Yilmaz's weak leadership also played an important role. Moreover, the crisis in the Turkish economy, and other social problems, such as extensive police surveillance, torture and an expanded prison system on the other after the 1980 coup, meant the Turkish state was experiencing a great deal of volatility. In addition, the resurgence

of Kurdish militancy was also fuelling instability and tension between civil and political society as well as the state and the society as a whole. Regarding which, at interview, Abdullah Gul made the following comment about this era:

The decade of 1990s was a lost decade for Turkey. The major two centre right parties were in a really bad shape having been involved in a series of scandals and corruption cases. Later, all these coalition governments had a similar fate and collapsed one after another. The good will of the coalition government of the Welfare and True Path party was also compromised and it was forced to resign. The 28th February process dealt a huge blow to liberal values and democratic principles. Together, given all of these issues, the economy was managed very badly. For instance, the economic crises revealed much unethical dealing in the banking sector. Consequently, the state of the Turkish Republic was in a terrible shape in terms of the economic, social and political management of the country. It was a very hopeless era before we took over in 2002.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

More specifically, the forming of the coalition government between the Social Democrat Populist Party and the True Path Party after the general elections held in 1991, further deepened the effects of the neo-liberalisation process. Their attempt to restructure the Turkish economy through public finance exacerbated the deficit that was accumulating over the years, especially between 1993 and 1994 and resulted in negative economic growth, worsened the distribution of income and most importantly hit the balance of payments badly, thus leading to the currency crisis of 1994 (Celasun 1998, p23-24). This crisis was a massive blow to the Turkish economy, which led to output falling by 6 percent and inflation rising to a three-digit level, the Central Bank lost half of its reserves and the exchange rate (against the US dollar) depreciated by more than half in the first three months of the year (Celasun 1998, p2).

Figure 7: Exports of Goods and Services in Turkey Between 1978 & 2014



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts.

At the same time, however, Turkish SMEs which were thriving since the first wave liberalization process in the 1980s find another boost to expand their activities during this era. The introduction of the customs union with the European Union in 1996 and the adoption of the EU's common external tariffs for manufactured goods were major steps that triggered a sharp reduction in tariff barriers and greatly altered the competitive environment in the favour of Turkish SMEs (OECD 2004, p35). As the figure seven above indicates, the share of exports of goods and services increased nearly four folds from 4.1% to 15.6% in years between 1978 and 1987 but after a short decline in late 1980s and early 1990s, it had peaked up again to 21.5% in mid 1990s. Moreover, the share of foreign trade has risen sharply, and the sum of imports and exports represented about 50% of GDP, with a large increase in the share of manufactured products in 1996 (OECD 2004, p35). As a consequence, the political Islamists started to have more decisive function within Turkish political economy since they had organic relationship with the emerging SMEs. Thus, it is important to highlight that the political Islamist Welfare Party performed much better in both the local and general elections in 1990s than the other emerging parties, such as the

Nationalist Movement and Democratic Left parties. However, their rise was cut short by the military after a coup attempt, which will be explained in detail in next chapter.

Nevertheless, this intervention by the military did not result in the complete destruction of political Islam in Turkey and the political cadre continued to attract strong support from a range of different groups. Ayse Karabat in an interview argued that:

The debate over secular principles and the state has always been there and it has been debated over and over again. But if we really look at Turkish society in more general terms, it is then possible to see that a culture based on conservatism, i.e. religious and nationalist values is more dominant than a secular or liberal one.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

From this point of view, therefore, the emerging presence of political Islam in Turkish political society in the 1990s is based on its success in reaching out to broader segments. More specifically, the party sought to achieve this success by reformulating their traditional propaganda style by addressing the essential needs of all segments of the society through their active presence in civil society. These segments varied from secular people to workers, the unemployed, the retired, intellectuals suffering from human rights abuses and Islamist women demanding more freedom of faith. Ultimately, as the centre left and centre right parties lost their support from the working and middle classes due the corruption scandals and socioeconomic crisis, they became more of a party for the secular professionals, bureaucratic elite and worker aristocracy (Tugal 2007, p14). Together with these classes and a small part of the emerging small and medium size businesses which traditionally were supporters of the centre right spectrum, the political Islamists succeeded in winning the political support from broader segments for their counterhegemonic project. This meant that their project was effectively gaining recognition and consent from different classes so as to become a serious contender for ousting the pro-secular hegemonic authority.

5.4 The Municipal Elections of 1994 and the Striving Role of Civil Society Organisations

Almost every person interviewed in this research referred to the municipal elections held on 26th of March 1994 at some point to emphasise their importance for political Islam in Turkey. For instance, Professor Burhanettin Duran, the general coordinator of SETA stated:

There are several reasons why the JDP succeeded so fast, but one of the most important among all is based on their political experience in municipal elections, especially, their victory in 1994. In this election, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected as the Mayor of Istanbul and he has shown a remarkable performance in managing the city. Such a performance allowed him to be perceived as a person who can be trusted in executing a high standard leadership.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Further, Professor Yasin Aktay, the chief spokesperson of the JDP said:

Behind the success story of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the JDP, what we see is that Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had an extraordinary performance during his mayorship in Istanbul. He was a pragmatic mayor who tackled the many chronic problems in Istanbul, including pollution, water shortages and traffic. Of course, he had an ideology but people did not choose him only based on his ideological preference, for they recognised him as a pragmatic person who could execute practical solutions for Turkey's urgent issues.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 6, 2015)

Despite the political tensions due to the increasing political influence of the political Islamists, they emerged as the leading party in the 1994 municipal elections, taking over the administration of most of the key cities, including Istanbul and Ankara. These municipalities and civil society organisations channeled more services to poorer districts and distributed free coal, food and clothes. In return, these activities reinforced their recognition among the masses and consolidated much of the electorate's trust and relations. In other words, these social welfare and charity base

activities carried out by the Welfare Party officials helped them to incorporate the notion of ‘civil society’ into their discourse in a culturally specific manner (Navaro-Yashin 2002, p138 - p140). This process was achieved in such a manner that the activists of political Islam positioned themselves not as representatives of ‘the state,’ or ‘political society,’ but of ‘civil society’. That is, it is important to grasp how their counterhegemonic strategy meant political Islam was being articulated in the form of an organic relationship based on the activities of these civil society organisations with the long-term aim of gaining the political leadership of the country. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, this aim was achieved through reaching out to socioeconomic groups that had been left disadvantaged owing to the ongoing neoliberal economic reforms and the terror that pro-Kurdish groups initiated against the state. At interview, Abdullah Gul stated in relation to this:

The independent civil society organisations that share similar values and principles with the actors in political society have helped these actors to find their definitive role as a political party. Our experience with the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party, indeed, proves this connection.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Furthermore, in an interview for Ceylan (1996), Erbakan emphasised the strategic role of civil society organisations as follows:

“Civil society is an expression of our core ideology’s aspiration (özlem).”

(Erbakan as cited in Ceylan, 1996)

Conclusively, political Islamists, under the banner of the National View and their political representation in the form of the Welfare Party kept their distance from the post-1980 environment by providing better services than their predecessors once they won political leadership at the municipal level. Regarding which, many of the interviewees mentioned how the core cadre of the JDP in the 2002 election won the hearts and the minds of the voters through their extraordinarily hard work dedicated to improving public services in this period. Ali Sahin, Deputy EU minister of Turkey, in an interview for this research, stated that:

The Welfare Party during this period fought against corruption and nepotism in their municipalities. They achieved a notable improvement in the quality of urban services and always acted more professionally than the other parties on the left and right. In particular, a new cadre of politicians, such as the then Mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated great progressiveness and pragmatism.

(A. Sahin, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Notably, Recep Tayyip Erdogan had gained great knowledge and experience from the activities of civil society organisations by having been part of the National View movement since his teenage years. He was always aware of the important link between civil society and successful political leadership, as he elaborated in the following points made during an interview for the magazine of the Welfare Party Istanbul City Organisation (No. 3), on 15th December 1993:

Other parties (referring to secular parties) have already gained a great deal of support from the media and facilities of the political system, as they are part of it. These are against us. To overcome this disadvantage, we must work much harder than any other party and that is what we are doing. Our party works like a central nervous system. A new member immediately becomes an activist and tries to make others join the movement. On these grounds, we constitute an organic wholeness.

Turkish political Islam was expanding throughout civil society with their activities, such as charities that fund the poor, free food services, preparation classes for university entry, dormitories for students with poorer backgrounds, health care services etc. As it grew in size and reached more people with need its popularity rose, especially among the working classes and emerging pious middle classes. Their effective organisational skills in civil society facilitated their being able to transfer this popular power from civil to political society. The extraordinary success which the political Islamists had together with Welfare Party in the 1994 local elections was the first important sign of their strongly growing popularity amongst the grassroots of Turkish society.

5.5 The Welfare Party in Government: Failure to Articulate Political, Economic and Intellectual Leadership Compatible with Broader Segments

The total share of the vote that the Welfare Party won in the local elections was 19.7%, which was the highest proportion that the political Islamists had achieved up to that date (Yerelnet, Local Elections 1994). This significant victory meant that political Islamist mayors took control of 28 out of the 76 provinces in Turkey (Taspinar 2004, p151). More importantly, the municipalities the WP won, as aforementioned, included Istanbul and Ankara, two of the Turkey's six greater municipalities at the time, simultaneously placing the country's most cosmopolitan city and its national capital, both symbols of the secular order, in the hands of a religious conservative party. In fact, this great achievement in local elections also meant that the WP municipalities were going to be responsible for the local affairs of two thirds of the population, some 50 million people (Taspinar 2004, p151). The Welfare Party was clearly aware of this great opportunity for their future endeavours in Turkish politics and strove diligently to demonstrate successful mayorship services than their predecessors, which resulted in them becoming the leading party in the next general election held on the 24th of December 1995. In this election, the WP won 21.4% of the total votes (TSI, General Elections 1923-2011, p94). This significant victory certainly stemmed from the strong and active political engagement of political Islamist networks in civil society, such as the Sufi orders, Islamist foundations, and charity organisations along with successful leadership of the municipalities since the last local elections.

The success of the political Islamists in two consecutive elections alarmed the secularist media and political-military establishment, so it was not long before they intervened to stop the WP from forming the first political Islamist premiership. That is, under pressure from the military, the pro-Western Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) and the media forced President Suleyman Demirel not to give priority to forming a coalition government with the WP. Instead, this opportunity was offered to Tansu Ciller from the True Path party, who had to convince her long-time political rival Mesut Yilmaz from the Motherland Party to join in. Nevertheless, these two centre right parties could not form a government with the number of MPs they had amongst them. The TPP controlled 135 seats and the MP had 132, giving the government only 267, but they needed 276 (TSI, General

Elections 1923-2011, p94). Consequently, their coalition required the support of another political party, the Democratic Left Party (DLP), which held 76 seats in parliament. Once this party provided the necessary support, these two arch rivals had their chance and formed the “Mother-Path” coalition government.

Nevertheless, this coalition government did not last very long and in fact, ended just three and a half months later. Erbakan and the WP were then asked to form a coalition government with the True Path. This was a turning point in Turkish parliamentary history, because for the first-time a pro-Islamist political leader, who openly exercised religion and referred to religious principles on their political agendas became the prime minister of Turkey. However, Erbakan tried to tone down his rigid rhetoric on many areas, such as regarding the EU and EU-Turkey relations, to ease some of the pressure that was building against his party from the pro-secular establishment (Usul 2008, p177). Nevertheless, the first political Islamist-led coalition in Turkey had begun to implement joint policies and one of the first and most important decisions they made was to implement a policy that enforced the highest minimum wage increase since 1980 and limited the profits from loans by capping interest rates (Tugal 2007, p15). Furthermore, in the municipalities, once the Welfare party led coalition took over the government, the activities and events that Islamists were offering to the poor and disadvantaged experienced a dramatic increase (Tugal 2007, p15). Despite this, the increasing pressure from the pro-secular hegemonic structure did not end, which eventually forced Erbakan to sign a historic military cooperation agreement with Israel and to dismiss a large number of Islamist sympathisers from the military (Mecham 2017, p147). This type of rigid demand from the pro-secular establishment was pushing the boundaries of the increasingly compromised ideological position of the WP government, such that many of the Erbakan’s natural allies in religious civil society began to show their dissatisfaction and threatened to withdraw their support (Mecham 2017, p147). Ayse Karabat, the editor of the Al-Jazeera Turk, explained:

Let’s not forget that political parties or ideological movements that are in opposition can certainly defend their position very strongly, but once they get elected into government, they have to ease some of the strict and narrow politics they used to pursue as an opposition. They must be able to embrace larger groups and different segments of the society. In the period of Erbakan’s prime ministry, the National View

movement and its political representation, the Welfare Party, failed to do this. Consequently, he (Erbakan) and the WP could not achieve a full exercising of power over the country when prime minister and forming the government.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

The Welfare Party could not extend its political power by occupying the office of prime ministry. The reason for this, as stressed in Ayse Karabat's above quotation, is that whilst the WP achieved their long enduring ambition to lead the country by getting someone elected to the prime minister's office what appeared after that was the most important step. Effectively, due to pressure from secular hegemonic bloc and the great responsibilities of holding the prime ministry office, they were stuck between delivering their actual promises and those were expected from them. Therefore, their direction in terms of expanding their policies was confusing one. For instance, they fell into a trap, whereby instead of using governmental power to fight corruption, they decided to cover the back of their coalition partner, the True Path, who were deeply immersed in both political and economic graft and corruption scandals. Consequently, despite the WP aiming to establish an Islamist political order in Turkey as they promised in their election manifesto the "Just Order", the WP-TTP coalition government's programme did not differ much from that of the previous centre-right coalition (Eligur 2010, p217). In fact, there was hardly any mention of the key features of the "Just Order" programme. As a result of the failure to deliver this programme many WP members became disillusioned with the coalition and started to defect from its ranks. Eventually, as Tugal (2007) pointed out in his study, "*the course of effective and honest campaigning that the religious communities and civil society organisations were pursuing lost its credibility as most turned their attention to reaping the fruits of office (p15)*". Further, this author argued that it was very clear in this era that "*the Islamists seemed to be integrating themselves into the neoliberal system (p15)*", which later revealed itself in the form of the Justice and Development Party. During this research, I came across similar observations, such as the following by Professor Duran, who explained:

The Justice and Development Party had to challenge the third world perspective of both the Welfare party and National View and had to seek to restore new relations with the Western world not based on ideology but on mutual interest and benefits.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Many of the other interviewees offered similar sentiments to that by Professor Burhanettin Duran above during my field work. Consequently, in the light of these perspectives and other sources, such as Tugal's study (2007), I argue that Erbakan, as prime minister, was unable to communicate with wider segments of society and to address their growing concerns over economic problems. He also aroused the anger of the traditional pro-secular ruling bloc, which still exerted effective influence over the state and civil society. Their anger grew each time Erbakan talked about the need to open more Imam-Hatip schools (High Schools for Imams and Preachers) or suggested that the ban on female students and civil servants wearing an Islamic headscarf should be lifted. It is important at this point to note that neither Erbakan nor the JDP under Erdogan and Gul's leadership changed their position on these two demands. Nevertheless, it was Necmettin Erbakan who formulated the view and constantly advocated it on every platform that one of the core aims of the movement was to achieve flexible platforms for students who wished to take up religious studies and then engage in public employment, especially in the midlevel bureaucracy in Turkey. For instance, he succeeded in relaxing the pressure on religious based schools when he was a coalition partner in 1970s. Subsequently, the many students and graduates from these schools, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Numan Kurtulmus, became the main activists and leaders in the movement over the next decades.

Nevertheless, Erbakan during his prime ministership, continued without restraint with few signs of any moderation of his political position by holding a number of critical events and visits that fanned the flames of criticism of the pro-secular state elites towards his leadership. For instance, in January 1997, Erbakan hosted a prime-ministerial dinner for prominent mystic sheikhs and the leaders of the Islamic brotherhood (Tugal 2007, p15). Erbakan also attempted to shift Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy towards a greater engagement with the Muslim world. Accordingly, he paid his first visit as prime minister to Iran, where he signed a \$23 billion gas and oil agreement (Lippman, 1996). Moreover, he hosted representatives of Palestinian Hamas, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front at the Welfare Party political convention after becoming prime minister. However, Erbakan faced unexpected diplomatic treatment during his visit to Libya. Specifically,

Muammar Qaddafi criticised him and Turkey for being too pro-Western and oppressing the Kurds (Kinzer, 1996). The meeting with the sheikhs at the prime ministerial level and the developments in international relations of Turkey topped the list of the secularist ruling elite's growing concerns and most of the hardliners interpreted the coalition government, which was led by pro Islamists, as a return to the boundaries of the backward thinking old state that they had fought to change since the early Kemalist reforms.

Ultimately, the reaction of pro secular civil society intensified owing to many of the above events and other initiatives of Erbakan during his time in the prime minister's office, which also provoked the military. On 28th of February 1997 the military which considered itself the guardian of Turkish secularism, intervened in Turkish politics by sending tanks into an Islamist town near Ankara. However, this time the military restricted itself to only giving "recommendations" to the coalition government, instead of disbanding the parliament as it did in 1980. It demanded that the government increased obligatory secular education from five to eight years, restrict Quran and Imam-Hatip schools and control the religious orders. The military's attempt to intervene in democratic process was supported by all the major institutions of industrialists, i.e. tradesmen (Turkish Confederation of Employers Associations, TISK; Union of Turkish Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, TOBB; Confederation of Tradesmen and Handicrafts, TESK) and the labour unions (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, TURK-IS; Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions, DISK) (Atacan 2005, p193). This was a unique initiative, as these civil society organisations, who represented both employers and the trade unions, for the first time in Turkish history came together and developed an action plan against a political leadership in Turkey, whilst also being supported by a coercive power, the army.

Conclusively, the growing achievements of political Islamists in the municipalities and the general elections during 1990s helped their counterhegemonic project in the long run. Their civil society activities and engagements which were mainly focused on domestic and educational needs of the many, indeed, helped them to integrate and constitute a link between political Islam and the masses. However, their steady emergence into the political arena caused great alarm among the pro secular elite and

the army. The decline of the hegemonic influence of pro secular Kemalist ideology was evident in endless corruption scandals talked about in the media, economic crises, the rise of Kurdish Turkish arm conflict and the emergence the political Islamists. Regarding which, as Gramsci once noted: *“As soon as the dominant social group has exhausted its function, the ideological bloc tends to crumble away; then “spontaneity” may be replaced by “constraint” in ever less disguised and indirect forms, culminating in outright police measures and coups d’état”* (Gramsci 1971, p60 – p61). The respond of this still dominant group was exactly as Gramsci had predicted. Yet, the counterhegemonic attempt of political Islamists did not have the strength to restore their democratic legitimacy.

5.6 The Rise of Mubarak’s Era and the Muslim Brotherhood

While political Islam was slowly, but more confidently, a growing influence in Turkish political and civil society, their counterparts in Egypt were still struggling to overcome the limits of the military dominated Egyptian political and civil society. Their attempt to articulate counterhegemonic projects to galvanise some momentum in these terrains were more problematic and complex than for their counterparts in Turkey. For instance, as explained in the previous chapter, despite the Brotherhood having begun to criticise some aspects of Sadat’s leadership in the late 1970s, more specifically after ‘Bread Riots’ and Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979, being aware of their limitation, continue to keep their hostility with the regime in check to avoid any serious confrontation. Moreover, while the movement sought to achieve legal status for their activities in both civil and political society in working towards achieving their hegemonic objectives, their attempt to form political party was rejected by Sadat and instead, the movement was advised to register their activities as an association under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs (Wickham 2013, p31). However, this offer was rejected by the Supreme Guide al-Tilmisani, with the reason being that it would diminish the scope of the Brotherhood’s activities to the narrow domain of social and charitable work as well as compromising its independence (Baker 1990, p245). This rejection is an evidence itself that groups always consider itself as a political subject and aspired to achieve a hegemonic leadership in the country.

Yet, the tactical alliance with Sadat's regime allowed them to strengthen their politico-religious influence in the country through journals, magazines and charity works without any formal recognition in this era. Their main political motivation was to make Islamic law or Sharia the principle source of legislation in the Egyptian constitution. They continuously lobbied the government to be included in the parliamentary process to achieve this goal throughout 1970s (Wickham 2013, p31). In fact, their political demand that all Egypt's laws should base on Islamic law enjoyed broad popularity among the public and even elements in the regime (Rubin 1990, p17). This was to such an extent that it was continually debated in the press and Parliament, becoming the main issue and slogan of the Brotherhood throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the tension between the regime and the Brotherhood having heightened in the late 1970s, as indicated above regarding the group's increasingly strident criticism of Sadat's economic and foreign policies, a year before his assassination he initiated a historic constitutional reform process toward the Islamisation of Egyptian law.

On 30th of April 1980, the government, which dominated parliament, made the following amendment to Article 2 of the constitution that promoted: "the principles of Islamic Sharia as the chief source of legislation" (Lombardi 2006, p133). After this bill was ratified and made into law on 22nd of May 1980 (Lombardi 2006, p133), this change indeed had great impact on the way in which the Brotherhood challenged the regime for decades to come. For instance, from this point forward the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood in relation to the legitimacy of the Egyptian constitution changed, whereby their confrontational stance in both the civil and political terrains ceased. Instead, it redefined its oppositional stance by arguing that the revision of existing laws to conform with Sharia mandates was in fact demanded by the constitution itself (Wickham 2013, p32). The assassination of Sadat in 1980 was another positive turning point for the movement, because his successor, Hosni Mubarak, vowed to carry on with his predecessor's political and economic liberalisation programme as well as his friendly relationship with Israel and the West lasted, a situation that lasted for a further 30 years.

Although it was not in the extent of Turkish political Islamists during this era, the Brothers still found flexibility in both civil and political society to strengthen their

counterhegemonic activities. The new president was cautious about any change that could endanger his leadership and he represented the new face of authoritarian rule that Nasser and Sadat engineered after the revolution of Free Officers in 1952. His relationship with political Islamists trod a very thin line between repression and freedom, whilst the latter increased their references to the world-wide norms of democracy and human rights to challenge the regime, which sought to achieve greater integration and respectability from the global political economy.

The period between 1980s and 2011 saw regular—if flawed—multiparty elections, a greater degree of press freedom and the release of political prisoners, including the Muslim Brothers (Soage & Franganillo 2010, p43), but at the same time, there was repression and limitations on the political and economic activities of Islamists. Throughout the Mubarak era, the 1970s generation succeeded in turning the organisation into a major counterhegemonic force, which eventually got into power, but as the remaining sections of this chapter will illustrate this experience was short lived. Political Islamists in Egypt could not articulate the same success as their counterparts in Turkey, namely, the National View in relation to any of the four counterhegemonic arenas, the: economic, political, intellectual and moral aspects of society. Notably, the movement could not demonstrate a similar evolution in their counterhegemonic activities in terms of articulating a definitive hegemonic leadership, which could synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance that could guarantee stable economic growth and social equality.

5.7 The Revival of the Muslim Brothers in the Political and Civil Terrains: The Wafd Party, Islamic Alliance and Political Repression in the 1980s and 1990s

The early years of Mubarak's leadership were mostly problem free than expected, as he softened the coercive dimension of the regime for moderate political factions in Egypt. His intention was to reconcile as many groups as possible to constitute a legitimate consensus for his leadership. Following on from his predecessor Sadat, he released political prisoners, reinstated civil rights, such as freedom of the press and association in a limited degree and the first parliamentary elections were held in 1984 (Hassan 2010, p322). Mubarak sought to demonstrate a new political and economic

leadership aimed at a style somewhere in between Nasser and Sadat (Ibrahim 2002, p141). In the 1980s, particularly, the strategy of Mubarak's leadership did not aim to achieve a democratization from above, rather it was a tactical retreat from use of state's coercive forces against its opposition, leaving limited spaces open in civil and political society for contentious politics that remained subordinated to the interests of the state (De Smet 2015, p195). To achieve this aim, his most preferred choice of tool for safeguarding his domination over the political opposition was the declaration of State Emergency Law, which effectively banned all possible strikes, demonstrations, parties and newspapers critical of his regime (De Smet 2015, p195). Consequently, Mubarak's commitment to political pluralism and his liberal approach, especially during his early years in power, was a strategic decision with an objective to consolidate a ruling bloc that neutered opposition parties, such as the leftist al-Tagammu and the liberal al-Wafd, and to a lesser extent, the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Awadi 2004, p77-79).

Unlike the Islamists in Turkey at the time, who founded their first political party under Erbakan's leadership, the Brotherhood did not have the same opportunities in the 1970s. They spend most of their time reconsolidating the organisational and networking capabilities in both civil and political society, which they had lost when thrown into Nasser's prisons. Nevertheless, despite the movement not having the same experience as their Turkish counterparts, this did not mean they were totally absent from Egyptian political society, as they were represented in the parliament through independent members. For instance, in the elections of 1976, six independent candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood won seats in parliament, among them Hasan al-Jamal and Sheikh Salah Abu Ismail, who played a leading role in promoting Sharia-based initiatives within the assembly (Rubin 1990 p23, Wickham 2013 p31). The struggle between the regime forces and emerging influence of political Islam in Egypt continuously presented itself at all levels of Egyptian society such that neither Sadat nor Mubarak's leadership could completely undermine it. Consequently, under Mubarak, the Brotherhood had similar freedom and flexible environment to exercise their activities throughout 1980s in exchange for their support for the legitimacy of his leadership.

With the limited influence in political society that they had consolidated under Sadat's leadership, the Brotherhood attempted to get the best out of the opportunities that were available for them under that of Mubarak leadership. After three years of calm and a non-confrontational stance towards Mubarak's leadership, the Brotherhood's first attempt to enter the political arena was to form a tactical alliance with the secular nationalist Wafd party in the May 1984 elections. The Brotherhood knew that since their fundamental argument that the Egyptian constitution should recognise Islam as the main source of legislation had been achieved, the only way to facilitate a guardianship that put the Egyptian state on track in accordance with the principles of Islam as its constitution stated, was to find a way to be the part of the system. Consequently, al-Tilimsani made a radical decision and reached an agreement in 1984 with his secular opponent Fuad Siraj-al-Din, leader of the Wafd party, that the Muslim Brothers would be put onto its list in exchange for the votes of their supporters (Rubin 1990, p21). Despite this decision facing opposition from the old guard, which was still clinging to al-Banna's rejection of the multiparty system, al-Tilmisani and the new guard still managed to maintain discipline and did not show any sign of deviation from the chief mission of the movement (*dawa*).

The deal between two parties was successful and their alliance obtained just over 15% of the vote, representing 58 seats, of which eight went to the society's candidates (Wickham 2013, p47). The Brothers, by becoming the junior partner of the Wafd party, gained the legal status in political arena for the first time that they had been so eagerly fighting for decades. That is, they made the first crucial step forward to being part of the political process in Egypt. However, the alliance with the Wafd party did not last very long and three years later in the next parliamentary election of April 1987, the Brotherhood joined with the Socialist Labour Party and Liberal Party to form the Islamic Alliance (*al-Tahaluf al-Islami*) under the banner "*Islam Is the Solution*" (Wickham 2013, p53). When the ballot boxes opened and all the votes had been counted, it was evident that pro-Islamist – Islamic Alliance had gained a huge victory by winning 17% of the overall votes or 56 seats in the parliament, out of which 36 were occupied by Muslim Brothers (Soage & Frangonillo 2010 p45, Wickham 2013 p47).

This was a great achievement, as with this victory the Brotherhood demonstrated that they were capable of reviving the effective popularity they had enjoyed at the time of Hasan al-Banna's leadership. Ayubi (1991) noted that this success had parallels with the increase in activities of the Islamic banks, and more specifically the so-called 'Islamic Investment Companies' (sometimes known as Money Utilization Companies) (Ayubi 1991, p65). As it will be discussed in the following section that shortly after the elections, the regime which sensed the growing influence and support that these Islamic enterprises provided to their opposition, namely the Brotherhood, have implemented measures and limited their activities in the Egyptian political economy. Nevertheless, the election results boosted the confidence levels of younger members of the Brotherhood who had been recruited mainly in the 1970s from university campuses. The political experience these members gained during this era was important, as many of them would later take up senior and strategic posts in the 2000s.

The Brotherhood, unlike, their alliance with the Wafd party, had clear dominance in the Islamic Alliance, as both the chief architect of its electoral programme and its prime magnet for support (Wickham 2013 p42, Springborg 1989 p184). Despite not representing themselves as the main body of the Alliance to avoid any confrontation with the ruling elites and president Mubarak, their emerging political power did not go unnoticed by the secular intellectuals and state bureaucrats (Rubin 1990, p26). After 1987 election, as the following sections will illustrate the State began to neuter the economic and political activities of Muslim Brothers to regain the hegemonic position that the military and its crony big bourgeoisie. As the country began to feel the effects severe economic problems at the end of 1980s, the hegemonic bloc that Mubarak was heading did not hesitate to find a scapegoat for its economic failure.

Subsequently, the political and economic pressure increased towards the alliance that the Brothers formed which became the largest opposition bloc in parliament for being heavily concentrated on the religio-cultural perspective. Nevertheless, whilst the society's leaders were generally not allowed to organise series of events, put out publications or appear on television or radio by the government (Rubin 1990, p26), they still found inventive ways to exercise their civil and political activities to articulate socio-political influence. As was the case for their counterparts in Turkey

at the time, the Brotherhood did not evolve their activities in relation to the political process only, they were also gaining strength and influence in Egyptian civil society. That is, they became popular in civil society organisations, such as trade unions, universities and religious charities. This attempt was significant for revival of the movement as it aimed to maintain the non-elitist character of the movement and reach out primarily to the lower-middle class and working class but at the same time recruit members from the educated and professional middle classes.

5.8 Re-emerging Influence of the Brotherhood in Egyptian Civil society

In 1980s, the Brotherhood's memorable slogan "*Islam is the Solution*" penetrated the feelings of many Egyptian people, most of whom were very religious and become disenchanted with the political projects of successive regimes over the years (Makram-Ebeid 1989, p433). Mubarak's commitment to Sadat's Open Door policy and restricted distribution of capital accumulation throughout the 1980s did not ease their pain and hence, increased their desire for a credible alternative. The Brotherhood candidates for parliament in this impasse gained popularity through their effective access to the Egyptian civil society, an area much neglected by the government (Rubin 1990, p45). In particular, there was their active role in charities that provided free medical care, education and other welfare services which allowed them to build closer and more intimate links with the people at the grass-roots level (Ayubi 1991 p150; Ibrahim 2002 p60 - p61). Effectively, Islamic social services provided the platform for the Brotherhood members to articulate relationship with people who use the same religious vocabulary but belong to very different social classes and speak different political languages (Ayubi 1991, p150). Therefore, even though the Brothers were keen on avoiding a direct confrontation with the regime and gained a considerable degree of influence and presence in Egyptian civil society during 1980s, this was not enough to overcome the coercive barriers erected by the state. By the end of the 1980s, the tacit agreement between the Brothers and the regime ended and the former were not given any more tolerance towards their expansion in civil and especially, political society.

Mubarak used the time he had throughout 1980s to consolidate a new ruling bloc, which abided by his leadership. At the very least, his intention was to freeze the economic structure Sadat had put in place, whereby state-nurtured businessmen would remain under the control of the ruling party (Kandil 2012, p207). This was such a delicate task that if he could not take the charge of the state and the party, he thought that it was going to be colonized by the bourgeoisie (Springborg 1989, p137). The threat came from a select group of monopoly capitalists, who had no intention of limiting themselves to the subsidiary role they have been cast into by previous regime and wanted to move up the political ladder, to bend the regime to their purposes rather than being manipulated by it (Kandil 2012, p207).

The survival of the regime and the ruling classes it had represented required a new political reconfiguration to revive its post-populist bloc. This request found its form as a new and aggressive accumulation strategy based on terms that excluded subaltern forces, the absorption of new allies, and the subduing of fractions of the capitalist class (Roccu 2012, p16). In particular, when Egypt's high import bill led to a crippling drop in foreign currency reserves, and the ensuing debt crisis forced the government to declare its bankruptcy in 1989 (De Smet 2014, p27). At this point, Mubarak had no choice but adopt International Monetary Fund (IMF)-tailored Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) in 1991 to forcing his ruling bloc to adopt offensive socio-economic positioning to achieve a passive revolution (Farah 2009 p41; De Smet 2014 p27). This reform programme aimed to contain and decrease foreign debt and inflation, by cutting state subsidies on consumer goods, but more importantly privatizing public companies, liberalizing markets and prices, freezing wages, commercializing agricultural lands and implementing a flat tax (Kandil 2012 p208; De Smet 2014 p27).

As the consequent of worsening economic condition in the country, the following three years (1991-94) witnessed a steady erosion in the support of regime and increase in the popularity of opposition groups i.e. Muslim Brotherhood (Ibrahim 2002, p165 – p167). This growing popularity found its form not as counterhegemonic political party but the form of force within Egyptian civil society, namely professional associations, or as they are called in Egypt, syndicates (*al-niqabat al-mihaniya*) (Ibrahim 2002, p166). Regarding which, the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood

grow in extent that by 1993, six of the seven biggest and most important were controlled by them; the Bar Association, Engineers, Doctors, Pharmacists, Dentists, and Commerce syndicates (Ibrahim 2002, 166). And more importantly, the Brotherhood's superior ability to provide lower middle class constituencies with social services that the government could not provide because of austerity measures, allowed them to consolidate support from broader segments of Egyptian society (Al Awadi 2004, p111). However, as was the case with Mubarak's predecessors, he also did not hesitate to become more assertive against the Brotherhood when he felt their emerging power was beginning to threaten the privileges his ruling bloc enjoyed. The implementation of ERSAP was the force behind that changed the ruling classes' war of position back to an offensive passive revolution (Farah 2009 p41; De Smet 2014 p27). Dr. Ashraf Mishrif at interview explained these years as:

I think they understood very well the desire of lower middle class and poorer sections of society. The need for employment, the need for job creation, the need for developing small businesses and enterprises. They provided for a large part of the poorer sections of society, who were unable to have access to health care, unable to have access to education, unable to pay their fees and meet their living conditions, and all this has put them in direct contact with them. So, the grass root support was translated at a later stage into direct membership of the Muslim Brotherhood or sympathy for them and to some extent, if it is not physical support, it is moral support for the organisation at some level. This is how the organisation managed after the demise of Sadat's regime to emerge very quickly on the surface and to establish itself as a key political force in Egyptian politics after 1981.

(A. Mishrif, personal communication, June 17, 2015)

However, when the Brothers fortunes are compared with those of Turkish case in the same era, I have noted how the political Islamists in Egypt were not as successful as their Turkish counterparts in terms of adapting their political appeal to include the beneficiaries of neoliberal reforms. In other words, the economic base that the Brothers organically linked did not benefit from this process to the extent that it did for their Turkish counterparts. The Turkish political Islamists coupled their political strategy with the needs and demands of emerging conservative capitalist groups under the umbrella of business associations, such as MUSIAD, whereas the Brothers in

Egypt did not focus on overcoming the economic-corporatist stance of the regime by appealing to similar groups. Consequently, regardless of the regime not allowing any capitalist groups to gain strength in the Egyptian economy without its consent, the evidence shows that the Brothers were still too focused on countering the regime and its institutions by articulating a counterhegemonic perspective based on their incompatibility to Sharia mandates. Ultimately, their activities operated only within the boundaries of the welfare and religious sectors, which were neglected by the regime to a degree that was not sufficient for the political Islamists to articulate a serious counterhegemonic challenge in the same way as their counterparts had succeeded in doing in Turkey.

5.9 The Dilemma for Egyptian Political Islamists: Whether or Not to Accept a Neoliberal Economy

The case study on Turkey has demonstrated that the political Islamists articulated a very effective relationship with the emerging conservative capitalist groups from the Anatolian region. As a result, their influence increased with the emerging power of conservative bourgeoisie as these capital owners sought greater expectations from the political leadership. From this perspective, the 'Just Order' economic programme was aimed at capturing the support of these emerging capitalist groups as well as appealing to discontented groups affected by the neoliberal reforms of the centre right governments. As with the Turkish political Islamists, their equivalent in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, had also demonstrated very effective leadership in welfare based civil society organisations. Like their Turkish counterparts, their popularity among masses increased as they fulfilled the many needs that the state in both countries failed to meet for the poor and disadvantaged people after their neoliberal turn.

Nevertheless, despite political Islamists in both countries having similar increasing influence in these types of civil society organisations, their effectiveness in political society differed in terms of beneficiaries of these reforms such as emerging SMEs. For instance, the Brotherhood in Egypt indeed had proven their political strength in 1980s elections such that they could be an alternative to the existing political leadership, but the movement was unable to articulate an effective counter strategy

that had the potential to surpass the state's authoritarian rule. Whereas the Turkish Islamists took charge of many of the key municipalities, in particular, managing to elect Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the mayor of Istanbul. As mentioned previously, this experience for the Turkish case was one of the most fundamental aspects of the success of the political Islamists in Turkey. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, did not have the same opportunity in municipality elections. Regarding which, when I asked the senior Brotherhood member Rida Fehmi about his experience in municipality elections in 1990s, he explained:

I began my political career with the municipality elections held in 1992. I was a candidate for Shubra district in the northern part of Cairo. We were 12 people running for the Brotherhood, but we were all listed as independent candidates, because the Brothers were not allowed to form their own party. However, whilst the regime allowed us to run in general elections in a limited sense, they did not give us the chance to gain any political role in governing the municipalities. Because the Mubarak regime knew that if we had any means of control in the municipalities we would be able grow our strength better and faster. Secondly, the people who governed these positions, they were mainly from Mubarak's National Democratic party and they were very scared to lose out on the privileges that they had from these positions.

(R. Fehmi, personal communication, September 7, 2016)

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that despite the Brothers in Egypt did not show similar success in municipality elections, they still had very effective political role in the country due to their successful leadership in the trade unions and associations. Their active engagement in political and civil society of Egypt in the 1980s allowed many Brotherhood deputies to gain new sets of political leadership discourses and skills. For instance, towards the end of that decade Brotherhood members who were leading the political function of the movement began to justify their efforts to secure a larger role in the political system, as well as to expedite the application of Sharia, by referring to the principles of democracy, citizenship, and the rule of law (Wickham 2013, p56).

Moreover, the Brothers committed their political activities to address procedural issues in the parliamentary system, such as the rules governing the conduct of

elections, the formation of parties, and the conduct of regime officials (Abed-Kotob 1994, p325-326). Ultimately, the Brothers greatly enhanced their confidence with two elections results in 1980s and they began to believe that if they could articulate stronger political leverage in political society by mending the system, they would indeed have a better chance of accomplishing their hegemonic aspirations. Nevertheless, this process was not as easy as simply adopting a political discourse and activities to correct the parliamentary and election system. The reason for this, as has been previously highlighted, is that the Brothers in Egypt failed to constitute themselves into a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance made up of a new conservative bourgeoisie and rural middle class, as it was the case for political Islamists in Turkey.

Instead, the Brotherhood's political project was based on a loose and community based welfare system, which involved resisting the integration of Islamism with neoliberalism. Whilst the Brothers supported policies that downsized the public sector to make their platform notably different and often stated that they respected private property, their economic framework was considered as being ostensibly comparable to that of socialism (Abed-Kotob 1994, p326). The leadership cadre of political Islamists in Turkey, however was much more successful in accommodating market-oriented practices (Tugal 2012, p32). This transformation revealed itself with the founding of the Justice and Development Party, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In contrast, when the economic programme of the political deputies of the Muslim Brothers in the 1980s and 1990s is investigated, it is very evident that their key focus was on three main charitable activity areas: the narrowing of class gaps through equal standards of education and training; providing healthcare; and social security for all citizens by taking care of their basic needs (Tugal 2016, p175). Regarding which, Dr. Hazem Kandil at interview addressed the nature of civil society groups that the Muslim Brothers run in Egypt, stating that:

You know the network of charities that the Muslim Brothers run in Egypt; they are types of schools for Islam, orphanages for Islam, clinics for Muslim doctors and patients. You know, you go to these clinics and first thing is "Okay, fine, what do you have? You have a cold? Okay, take this medicine. Why are you wearing jeans? You know, here's a brochure that says it is very bad for women to be wearing jeans and so

on. Maybe you should cover yourself and it's a win-win situation. Look, I'm giving you medicine for your cold but I'm also giving you advice and getting a reward". Every single one of these charity and social networking scenarios is a site for missionary work.

(H. Kandil, personal communication, February 24, 2016)

Against this backdrop, the Brotherhood had thus accommodated itself to working within the established system, which did not mean from their perspective that they acknowledged the inherent virtues of the system, but rather, they had the hope of gradually enlightening the masses so that eventually the Islamic nation would be formed based on their hegemonic leadership. Consequently, its counterhegemonic strategy represented more than just mere participation in civil society. Their activities were strongly attached to idea that the very essence of Islam, as a comprehensive system, starts with the spiritual elevation of the masses and goes beyond governing material aspects. This approach aligns with the political ideology of the National View movement, which Erbakan formulated and advocated throughout his life time, that "National Consciousness" (*Milli Şuur*), should be elevated through two important factors: spiritual development based on Islam and material development based on industrialisation (Eligür 2010, p145). However, the two groups diverged from each other as the National View Movement in Turkey found better opportunities and pragmatic solutions which allowed them to integrate their approach with neoliberalist ideas, thus attracting the support of the emerging pious bourgeoisie for their counterhegemonic project.

In particular, Erbakan's Just Order economic programme in the 1980s and 1990s was an attempt to bridge neoliberal policies with social justice. Whereas, when the economic programme for the 1987 election is investigated, the Islamic alliance (Muslim Brotherhood, Labour, and Liberal parties) in which the Brothers were in the leading role, is found to have supported the following policies for economic development: (1) promotion of alms giving; (2) a non-interest-bearing banking system; (3) advancement of the private sector; (4) cutting government bureaucracy and the public sector; (5) sustaining independence from foreign economic intervention; and (6) comprehensive government regulation and strategic planning of the economy (Lesch 1992 p201, Abed-Kotob 1995 p327). Consequently, despite the

economic programme of the Muslim Brothers containing some aspects of the market economy (i.e. items 3, 4 and 5), it was still heavily influenced by the economic thought of planned economy.

It is, therefore, important to note that alliance with the Labour Party and activities in civil society, especially in the Trade Unions, had a great impact on shaping this programme and the discourse of the movement when criticising Mubarak in these years. For instance, Utvik (2006) highlighted in his study that when the movement was asked to explain their perspective on social justice, they specifically emphasised that it was not about the abolition of classes, but rather, a balance between them and the eradication of extreme poverty. Notably, the dilemma regarding whether or not to embrace a neoliberal economy was still present, which was evident in interviews about their perspective on this. That is, most of the senior Brothers gave conflicting responses within the same discourse, such as when Yahya Hamid, the Minister of Investment under the presidency of Muhammed Morsi stated that:

Our policies were more towards the neoliberal approach and free market principles.

But then he added following:

The party wanted to empower the SMEs. We wanted to target a real reduction in the high level of youth unemployment. Everything aside, the party focused on fighting against corruption in the economy and its end result, inequality.

(Y. Hamid, personal communication, September 1, 2015)

As a result, it is difficult to assess the commitment of the Brotherhood towards neoliberal economy or what type of economic framework they would have implemented without observing them at work. From this perspective, the short-lived Brotherhood presidency and political leadership after the 25th of January Uprising will be analysed in more detail in the following chapters eight and nine. However, it is important to point out that the neoliberal tendencies of the Brotherhood government were considerably tempered by their need to remain within the orbit of capital classes close to them. These businessmen, however, did not have the same weight of importance for the Egyptian economy as their counterparts have had in Turkey. For instance, there is no significant evidence any business association, which was

organically linked to Egyptian political Islamists in the same way as MUSIAD had functioned with the Turkish political Islamists during the 1980s and 1990s.

At the same time, it is strongly evident that the number of *Infitah* bourgeoisie linked to the state bureaucracy and the ruling National Democratic party increased and began to dominate the People's Assembly in Egypt. To exemplify this, according to a study by Ibrahim (1994), after the last election in which the Brotherhood took part before the millennium, in 1987, there were more than 80 members of the Infitah bourgeoisie in the Assembly, compared to fewer than 20 in 1976. Hence, the percentage of businessmen in cabinet appointments increased from 2.4 in 1970 to 14.7 in 1981 and to 20 in 1990 (Ibrahim 1994, p36). Hence, in the context of worsening economic conditions, the essence of the Brotherhood's counterhegemonic ambitions did not possess pragmatism and straightforwardness, but rather, was stuck between whether to base their hegemonic leadership on the market economy, or just upon the political support of the middle and lower classes, which were seeking social justice and the balance of power in the state. Together with this dilemma and the weakness of the capital groups linked to the Brotherhood, I argue that the counterhegemonic project of the political Islamists in Egypt could not convey an effective leadership strategy which synthesised structure and superstructure to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance that guaranteed stable economic growth and development.

5.10 Neutering of the Brotherhood's Political and Economic Activities

The successive election victories that the Muslim Brotherhood had in the 1980s demonstrate that despite the movement not having legal status to run in elections under the banner of their own political party, they were still capable of engaging in Egyptian politics as a very influential counterhegemonic force. It is important to underscore that political participation was crucial to the Brotherhood, as it provided them a mode of communication which promoted awareness at the societal level, thus aiding the creation of the Islamic society at the core of the Brotherhood's long term ambitions (Abed-Kotob 1995, p331). In fact, their active engagement in political society was seen by the movement's leader as the most powerful method to monitor and intervene in the decisions of the ruler in accordance with the Islamic principles

and ensure that the rulers were answerable both to God and to the people (Abed-Kotob 1995, p332). Nevertheless, the political project of the Egyptian political Islamists did not go beyond the limits that the regime forces set up against them. Regarding which, the movement had many constraints in the economic and political arenas imposed on them. When the winners of the Infitah are investigated further, it is evident that this provided devout businessmen with opportunities for expansion as well. For instance, in the 1980s the Islamic financial sector emerged and developed as Islamic banks and Islamic investment companies, finding a degree of freedom to operate their activities without any pressure from the regime (Gumuscu 2010, p849). The most well-known examples of Islamic banks that gained popularity and accumulation of capital in this period were: the Faisal Islamic Bank and the International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development (Ayubi 1991, p185). In addition to these banking services, Islamic investment companies also flourished in the same period; their number reached over 50 in the 1980s and they operated services for the largest share of workers' remittances (Moore 1990, p249).

Nevertheless, in parallel with the increasing state repression of the opposition political parties, especially towards the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, expansion of the devout bourgeoisie in the finance sector in the 1980s was interrupted. The new regulatory structure and reporting requirements that the government introduced for the Islamic funds in June 1988 triggered numerous bankruptcies (Moore 1990 p252-253; Ayubi 1991 p146). Consequently, when the confrontation between the State and these Islamic investment companies in favour of political Islamist government reached its peak at the end of 1980s, it resulted in latter defeat and loss of economic and political power in Egypt. This pressure was then passed onto the Islamic banks which were already losing their significance for Egyptian economy as their major clientele migrant workers and their income shrank as a result of the recession in the Gulf at the time (Gumuscu 2010, p849).

Furthermore, unlike the approach taken by Turkish Islamic investment companies towards the manufacturing sector, their counterparts in Egypt did not support this sector, because of the greater risks and lower returns owing to the regime forces monitoring and monopolising it for their own hegemonic interest. SMEs, particularly those within the manufacturing sector, did not receive any assistance from the state or

the secular and Islamic financial institutions during *Infitah*, if their business ventures did not rest on strategic relationships with the bureaucracy or the political elite. Owing to these obstacles and the state's reluctance to pursue an export-oriented growth strategy as successfully as the Turkish state, as discussed in the previous chapter, SMEs in Egypt had to rely on their own resources for capital accumulation. This situation made them and their political representation in Egyptian political society vulnerable to arbitrary and frequent destructive interventions by the bureaucracy as they aspired to accumulate their business activities by having the same opportunities as their Turkish counterparts had in the international markets (Springborg 1989 p78-80; Gumuscu 2010 p849). Given that there was no organised group apart from the Brotherhood and their activities in political society that could defend their collective interests, these emerging SMEs never reached a position, in which they could constitute an alternative economic structure for any counterhegemonic project. Regarding which, I would argue that this achievement was necessary for the success of Egyptian political Islamists, as it had proven to be the key for the hegemonic success of their counterparts in Turkey. As a result, the Brotherhood's counterhegemonic initiative in Egypt struggled to pass beyond the eco-corporate stage with the proposal of a master plan from an ethical-political perspective, which had the purpose of synthesising the elements of structure and superstructure so as to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc.

Aware of the emerging counterhegemonic strength of the political Islamists, Mubarak intensified his oppressive rule and targeted both the economic and political structures to weakened them. This led to a division between the Brotherhood's young and old divisions regarding how best respond to this increasing repression of their activities. Specifically, the younger leaders' objectives and strategies diverged after the death of al-Tilmisani, but the old guard's perspective continued to dominate the Brotherhood's vision. In particular, the election of Abu al-Nasr and following him, Mustafa Mashhur, as the general guide for the movement between 1986 and 2002, restricted the Muslim Brothers in articulating comprehensive economic policies that could reach out all levels of Egyptian society. The tension grew further between the young brothers that joined the movement in 1970s and the old guard. For instance, some of the reformist brothers led by Abou Elela Madi departed from the movement and founded the al-Wasat Party in 1996. Even though this party could not gain formal political status

until the resignation of Mubarak, their split from the Muslim Brothers was very controversial and a significant incident.

Henceforth, what began as a series of small scale arrests in the early 1990s against the Brotherhood members that protested the alliance that Mubarak formed with the Western powers in Iraq, intensified in 1995 and thereupon, hundreds of Brotherhood members were arrested (Soage & Frangonillo 2010, p46). The regime, particularly, targeted prominent figures of the young generation, such as Essam el-Erian, Khairat el-Shater, Muhammad Habib, and Aboul Fotouh, who had direct responsibility for the Brotherhood's activities in the professional associations, as well as the faculty clubs and student groups on university campuses (Wickham 2013 p79, Soage & Frangonillo 2010 p48). In contrast to the crackdown on Turkish political Islamists in 1997, it is very important to underscore that the Egyptian military regime did not arrest or ban the old guard of the movement from activities in civil and political society, but rather, they aimed to destroy the work of the middle-generation activists, who had spearheaded the dramatic expansion of the group's involvement in these arenas since the 1970s. The Brothers' political functioning became so deeply fragmented and lacking in the professionalism found in the Turkish context could never articulate a full-scale counterhegemonic potential in the way the latter were able to. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the Brotherhood's activities in charities aimed at supporting the poor and disadvantaged in this era were very effective and won them a great deal of prestige in the hearts of many, especially, their quick response to an earthquake that hit Cairo in October 1992 (Soage & Frangonillo 2010 p46). Despite this, the movement still lacked the necessary professionalism political arena and failed to articulate links with the decisive agents in Egyptian economic structure, which would have allowed them to mobilise the masses and guarantee victory against the existing hegemony.

5.11 Conclusion

In the 1990s, Turkish political Islamists became masters at mobilising the masses for political gain through the various civil society activities they ran. Hence, they were aware of the danger they could face from the secular state and decided to challenge it by combining the aspirations of emerging conservative capital and losers of the liberal economic order in their programme. For instance, there was the economic programme “Just Order”, formulated by Erbakan as a solution to bridge the vision of business associations like MUSIAD and the charities that they ran in the name of Islam. However, when the political Islamists in Egypt are investigated regarding the same era, it is very hard to find any evidence that they successfully articulated a counterhegemonic strategy, which would synthesise the emergent Egyptian economic structure and superstructure to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance. Instead, the Brothers preferred to delegitimise the Mubarak regime by boycotting the elections in 1990. From then onwards, Mubarak and his military apparatus, along with other hegemonic structures, such as Algeria in 1992 and Turkey in 1996, who sensed the emerging danger against their hegemonic leadership, carried out a series of prosecutions and if not, deployed very harsh security measures against political Islamists without any distinction between radicals and moderates. In this thesis, it is argued that the decision to boycott the election of 1990 along with other major opposition parties was a mistake for the Muslim Brothers’ political arm, because the regime took the advantage of increasing tension in the region at the time, due the First Gulf War and the Algerian Civil War, to intensify its coercion towards all the major opposition groups that it saw as threatening the stability of Egypt. The decision to counter the hegemonic state led by Mubarak and the military elite by delegitimising their rule, proved very costly for political Islam in Egypt, for it took 15 years for them to return as a viable political force again in 2005. Meanwhile, Turkish political Islam used a similar time frame to consolidate more civil and political powers at all levels of Turkish society. It also reformed itself into being an advocate of the emerging neoliberalist ideas, in return for acknowledgement and a broad alliance with the global and domestic capitalist groups.

Chapter 6

The Genesis of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey

The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well.

(Gramsci 1971, p57 – p58)

Accordingly, in line with Gramsci's above note from the Prison Notebooks, this chapter focuses on the anatomies of the intellectual and moral leadership that empowered the JDP leadership during their first tenure in government. This is a crucial investigation as it reveals the counterhegemonic strength of the Turkish political Islamists with their new party and leadership, which their Egyptian counterparts lacked. In this chapter, in light of the information I gathered during my field work, I discuss and analyse how and why did the Justice and Development party come to terms with their political Islamist identity. What kind of cathartic moment did the party's leaders experience after the 28th February coup attempt, which ousted the first political Islamist led government in Turkey. I also focus on the differentiated leadership characteristics of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, which I argue as being the key source of the JDP's success in creating consensus between the masses and intellectuals. I then study the formation of the rest of the party members and their backgrounds. In particular, I analyse the intellectual relationship between these groups of politicians and the emerging conservative bourgeoisie in the making of the Justice and Development party. In accordance with the ideas of Gramsci, I contend that the JDP has been able to elaborate “*new integral and totalitarian intelligentsias and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place*” (Gramsci 1971, p335). That is to say, the JDP constituted a new socioeconomic or historical bloc for its hegemonic aspirations based on a pro-business agenda blended with political Islam.

6.1 28th February Process and the Split of the National View Movement in Turkey

The experience that political Islamists have had with the Virtue Party until it was closed down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001 changed many parameters that the movement articulated as their counterhegemonic strategies to appeal to the masses. The young generation of political Islamists, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, Abdullatif Sener, were the driving force who strove to steer the party towards a leadership strategy. They advocated that the party should rearticulate its approach towards many fundamental issues, particularly democracy, human rights, and relations with the West (Yesilada 2002, p68). Consequently, they openly challenged the old guard led by Recai Kutan, then leader of the Virtue Party. However, it was quite clear that Erbakan, although banned from politics for five years, continued to dominate the movement and his weight in every decision-making process meant there was little room for the reformists to realise their leadership strategies (Yesilada 2002, p68). Nevertheless, this internal debate was eventually reflected in the platform of the Virtue Party. Reformists pushed the party towards a strategy which projected a more moderate image, as if it had moved to the centre-right (Eligur 2010, p235). Unlike the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party was much softer in its criticism of the West and Westernisation, such as with regards to Turkish membership of the European Union (Eligur, p236). For instance, the Virtue Party's decision to take the Welfare Party's closure case and Erbakan's ban from politics to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) demonstrates that the political Islamists, including the traditionalist faction, began to lessen their rhetoric against Europe as being unjust, exploitative, and imperialistic (Dagi 2004, p142). In short, the new generation of political Islamists started to become more influential in changing the discourse of the movement that was based on an anti-Western agenda to make it more appealing to the demands of the both the domestic and global systems.

Consequently, it is important to investigate how did the reformist faction of the National View movement break away from the leadership of Erbakan and form a new leadership movement, which could convince the majority of the influential members of the movement to followed it. Gramsci noted the following:

The function of hegemony or political leadership exercised by parties can be estimated from the evolution of the internal life of the parties themselves.

(Gramsci 1971, p267)

The split into reformist and traditionalist camps brought new dynamics to the political Islamists' internal politics. In accordance with Gramsci's observation above, the new generation of political Islamists within the reformist faction became aware of the "coercive and punitive force of juridical regulation" that the secular state could impose upon them (p67). So, they advocated an alternative route to hegemony based on the current system by accepting its regulative and coercive power (Gramsci 1971, p267). Hence, in their conflict with the traditionalist faction began to "show (that) in their specific internal life that they (the movement) have assimilated as principles of moral conduct those rules which in the State are legal obligations (Gramsci 1971, p267 – emphasis added). It is thus the case that the February 28th process not only had a huge impact on the growing success of political Islam in Turkey, for it also opened up an internal debate which challenged the traditional way of politics in the search for a new and more comprehensive strategy that would deliver permanent success. The reformists acknowledged the fact that a direct, head-on attempt to push forward an overt Islamic agenda could not succeed and would generate strong opposition from the secularists, especially the military. Consequently, many members of the Islamist movement concluded that the only way the Islamists could succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and deemphasising the religious agenda. For instance, Professor Burhanettin Duran at interview stated that:

The experience that the Islamists had during the 28th February process taught them very important lessons, especially the leaders of reformist faction, who later found the JDP. They acknowledged the fact that if they wanted to achieve permanent success they must reconsider their political position from a much wider perspective. Basically, the process allowed the Islamists to be more vigilant in their actions in the Kemalist system and yet, willing to compromise to a greater degree.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Nevertheless, the incumbent authorities remained mistrustful of what the political Islamist offered through the Virtue Party in terms of its potential threat to the pro-

secular system. Eventually, the process moved on to Merve Kavakci, a Virtue Party MP from Istanbul, walking into the Turkish parliament with her headscarf on, which led to the closing down of the party in June 2001 (Kinzer 1999; Yesilada 2002, p69). The pro-secular establishment considered this act to be a head-on challenge to the Kemalist state's founding principles (Atasoy 2009, p179). Whilst the Islamists claimed that it was women MPs' right to present themselves in whatever way they wanted and that any restrictions on religious identity violated the values of freedom of expression and the human rights, in general (Atasoy 2009, p185). Merve Kavakci's case was a symbol of all other religious women in the country, who had been banned from entering schools, universities and working for public institutions of the state with their headscarf on since the measures taken after the 28th February process. The chief advisor to president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a founding member of the JDP, Professor Burhan Kuzu stated during interview:

Together with the political Islamists many religious families in Turkey felt aggrieved by the measures taken after the 28th February military memorandum. This situation led to members of the National View movement becoming even more tightly knitted together to overcome the difficult conditions that targeted their daily activities. They were really victimised from the after effects of the 28th February process. Therefore, this was a very important factor which made the movement become self-conscious and to seek an alternative strategy and agenda. Of course, they were not just tight-knit with each other because they suffered from the coup attempt, for they also shared the same religious sensitivities and life style.

(B. Kuzu, personal communication, August 7, 2015)

The political Islamist movement, the National View, formally split into two groups after the Virtue Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court. The traditionalists established the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), under the formal leadership of Recai Kutan, with Erbakan continuing to exert the real leadership behind the scenes. The modernists founded a new party, the JDP, with Erdogan as party chairman on 14th of August 2001 ("Justice and Development" 2001). The split was inevitable since the reformist group had supported the leadership nomination of Abdullah Gul at the first general congress of the Virtue Party against the traditionalist Recai Kutan. Despite that the reformist Abdullah Gul lost the leadership race (521 votes for Gul and 633

for Kutan), this was only by a narrow margin and thus, indicated that the reformist faction was growing in popularity and strength within the movement (Taskin 2008, p63). Perhaps most importantly, the after effects of the 28th February process allowed the political Islamists to become self-conscious about their political position within the both national and international political, economic and intellectual system. This led to them reformulating their political strategy by rebranding and reorganising themselves under a new party, the Justice and Development Party, so as to appeal to and satisfy the needs of wider segments of society.

6.2 Hopelessness and Insecurity: The Desire for a New Political Leadership

During interview, Abdullah Gul made the following statement explaining the state of the Turkish economy and politics before they took over:

The political, economic and moral setting in the country was so devastating that people hoped for a new political party, which could just end the turmoil the country was suffering from. At this juncture, we looked just like the political movement that could fulfil that hope as the reformist faction of the National View movement. Maybe, I could not win the leadership contest in the first general congress of the Virtue party, but we gained great respect from the majority of our party members and the general public with our progressive and rational political and economic party agenda.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Most of the interviewees during my fieldwork made similar comments to the above statements by Abdullah Gul, when they were asked to explain one key reason for the JDP's success at its first-time election. They indicated that the current state of the Turkish economy at the time and its weak reputation in the world as the key reasons for the electorate seeking alternative leaders, who could respond to this issues with pragmatism and vision (personal communication in 2015). Clearly, it is important to set out in some detail the political and economic atmosphere before the JDP was founded and its extraordinary success in only its first general election. Between 1991 and 2002, there were nine coalition governments in Turkey (please see the table two below). Such instability in the political leadership of the country exhausted the economy and the people, in general. Throughout this decade, nearly all the key

political figures and parties took a part in the leadership of the country at some point or other. However, none of them could sustain a stable economic, social and political atmosphere. Like a game of trial and error, the Turkish electorate was trying to find the leadership cadre that could provide the necessary prosperity and stability.

Table 2: Coalition Governments Formed in Turkey

Coalition Governments in Turkey For Years Between November 1991 – November 2002			
Suleyman Demirel	Truth Path Party	Social Democratic People's Party	20 November 1991 – 16 May 1993
Tansu Ciller (I)	Truth Path Party	Social Democratic People's Party	25 June 1993 - 5 October 1995
Tansu Ciller (II)	Truth Path Party	(Temporary)	5 October 1995 – 30 October 1995
Tansu Ciller (III)	Truth Path Party	Republic's People Party	30 October 1995 - 6 March 1996
Mesut Yilmaz	Motherland Party	Truth Path Party	6 March 1996 – 28 June 1996
Necmettin Erbakan	Welfare Party	Truth Path Party	28 June 1996 - 30 June 1997
Mesut Yilmaz	Motherland Party	Democratic Left & Democrat Turkey Parties	30 June 1997 - 11 January 1999
Bulent Ecevit	Democratic Left Party	(Temporary)	11 January 1999- 28 May 1999
Bulent Ecevit	Democratic Left Party	Motherland & Nationalist People Parties	28 May 1999 - 18 November 2002

(Source: Official Page of Turkish Prime Minister Office)

Together with the problem of instable coalition governments, Turkey was also facing a Kurdish insurgency. The arm struggle between the state and the PKK (Kurdistan People's Party) had huge socio-political and economic cost to country, in general (Mutlu 2008, p63-65). Eventually, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Nairobi, Kenya, and brought back to Turkey on 15th of February 1999 (Weiner, 1999). This event worked favourably for the temporary government led by social democrat Bulent Ecevit, who was working in a close relationship with the pro-secularist state. For, after the next general election on 18th of April 1999, they became the first party and formed a coalition government with nationalist Devlet Bahceli and the centre right Mesut Yilmaz (Official Page of Turkish Prime Minister Office). However, the instability of the Turkish political and economic scene did not look like it was going to end even after this election. A major blow to the Turkish economy and the newly elected coalition government came in the form of a natural disaster: the August 1999 earthquake (Ewing et al 2004, p6-p9). The earthquake took place in the most industrialised region of Turkey, namely, along the southeast of Marmara Sea coast. Its scale was so severe that over 17 thousand people lost their lives, 50 thousand people were injured and more than half a million people were made homeless (Sezen 2001, p14). The government was very slow to respond to the ensuing human suffering, being unprepared to tackle such a devastating natural disaster. Hence, the majority of the general public noticed the reality that the new coalition government was actually too incompetent to move the country forward from the such a catastrophic situation. Professor Burhan Kuzu at interview added:

The Turkish political and economic scene was already in a very terrible state, because of the unstable coalition governments... then there was the earthquake of 17th August 1999. The state did not have much money in its reserves, it was so devastating that the government had to pay the salaries of the civil servants with the emergency fund from the UN. The government had no money at all.

(B. Kuzu, personal communication, August 7, 2015)

Nevertheless, the quake created a new bond of friendship and a relationship with Turkey's long rival and neighbour, Greece, as well as the EU. This international – European – sympathy translated into the decision at the Helsinki summit in December

1999 to give EU candidate status to Turkey. Hence, the decision raised hopes and expectations in the Ecevit government of restoring a new locus of political change within the Copenhagen criteria. However, these high hopes were not going to last very long as the coalition government and the new president Necdet Sezer would soon clash with each other, resulting in the biggest economic crisis in Turkey's history. Contestation between the pro-secular former chief judge, the 10th president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the government was revealed after the National Security Council. The 72-year-old prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, announced at a press conference that he had left the meeting as he could not tolerate disrespectful and immodest behaviour from the president Necdet Sezer, who threw the constitutional booklet that was on his desk at the meeting at him (Press Conference on 19th February 2001, Bulent Ecevit).

Immediately after this announcement, the already vulnerable Turkish economy collapsed so severely that it was equivalent to a financial earthquake, which it was not able to recover from for several years. The result was that nearly the entire Turkish banking sector collapsed, many major banks had to be rescued by the state, while the national currency, the lira lost 54% of its value (Yavuz 2009, p70). Moreover, interest rates sky-rocketed and 4,146 firms were closed in the first three months of the crisis with the loss of 3 million jobs in 2001 (Eligur 2010, p243). Gross national product (GNP) per capita declined from \$3,255 in 1998 to \$2,986 in 2000, an 8.3 percent decline, and to \$2,143 in 2001, a 28.2 percent decline (Eligur 2010, p243). The distribution of wealth became even more unequal, as 40 percent of the population shared only 16 percent of the annual GNP (Eligur 2010, p243). Moreover, while they were not as effective as those in Argentina, there were large-scale demonstrations against the government in many cities, affecting production, commerce, trade, communication, and law and order across the country.

As pointed out above, the 2001 economic crisis was the deepest crisis in the history of the Turkish Republic. It adversely affected everyone in Turkish society without excluding any segment either rich or poor as well as skilled or unskilled. While highly educated and skilled employees lost their jobs in large numbers, many small- and medium-sized businesses went bankrupt (Eligur 2010, p243). To handle the situation, the prime minister of the time, Bulent Ecevit, invited Kemal Dervis, Vice-Director of the World Bank to "fix and restructure" the Turkish economy (Yavuz 2009, p71).

After being made the new state minister responsible for the economy, Kemal Dervis, with the support of the US, persuaded the IMF and the World Bank to provide \$10 billion in additional loans to the Turkish government, resulting in a total package of \$17.5 billion (“The Turkey and the IMF: take ten billion”, 2000). With this new line of credit to help stabilise the economy, Dervis shifted to the management of the Turkish economy, now increasingly dependent on international financial institutions. The 11th President of the Republic of Turkey and co-founder of the JDP, Abdullah Gul, explained:

The catastrophic earthquake, the 2001 economic crisis, a series of corruption cases in which most of the political elites were involved, the Kurdish issue and once again another party closure by the constitutional court against us... All these added up and resulted in a great hopelessness and insecurity amongst the masses. I repeat again, people were really feeling despairing and insecure about their future. Therefore, they looked for a new political party and leadership which had the leadership team and strategy to take the country out of the pessimistic atmosphere.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

A newly formed party, the JDP of Erdogan, Gul and other political Islamist key figures, such as Bulent Arinc and Abdullatif Sener, became the most popular party in the public mind. A major reason behind their enormous success was that their struggle with the pro-secular system had not made them weak and disappear, but it had forced them to rethink and reorganise their political platform. Consequently, the reformist faction of the National View movement succeeded in attracting the interest of large numbers of people from the marginalised, low and middle social classes, who were feeling dissatisfied and angry about the way successive governments had handled the economy and the country throughout the 1990s (Onis 2006, p211-212). Thus, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the February 2001 crisis not only fuelled the bonfire of social discontent in Turkey, for it also provided the necessary impetus for the JDP’s electoral victory. The reformist faction of the political Islamist movement was pragmatic and well prepared for mobilising the despondent and insecure masses to their political advantage.

6.3 Coming to Terms with the Past: Hegemonic Consciousness Through Catharsis

According to Gramsci, the “*consciousness of being part of a hegemonic force is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be one*” (Gramsci 1971, p333). In this study, it is argued that the achievements of the reformist faction by splitting from their core ideological perspective and forming a hegemonic party that won hegemonic leadership in Turkey, was the result of this group of politicians becoming self-conscious about their hegemonic potential and articulation of definitive leadership based on a combination of theory and practice, as Gramsci elucidated. For instance, Abdullah Gul stated at interview that:

Before we found the JDP, we self-criticised ourselves, we did this purely within the boundaries of moral and ethical principles of the movement. We did not seek any personal interest through this self-criticism, therefore, we did not attempt to hide away the mistakes we made in the past. Consequently, unlike when this sort of self-criticism used to stay within the movement, this time we shared this internal debate and self-criticism with the general public and all our party members. This created huge hope for everyone who were searching for new political leadership, which was inclusive and multidimensional in its political appeal.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

The impact of the 28th February process was more positive than negative for the future of the Islamists in Turkey. The Kemalist system could not breed another form of ethical political leadership to replace the growing influence of the Islamists’ leadership potential in both political and civil society, which led to a rapidly increasing self-awareness by the progressive political Islamists that their time had come for moving into government. The reformist faction, under the leadership of Erdogan and Gul, believed that political Islamists should widen their horizon by redefining their objectives so as to take into account the needs of wider segments of society (Yavuz 2009, p215). They recognised the hegemonic potential of the movement, but they also saw that this was only possible by transforming their counterhegemonic perspective away from Erbakan’s strong anti-West and anti-system politics (Rabasa & Larrabee 2008, p43-44). Consequently, this thesis argues

that they reached a level of consciousness in which they concluded that the defeat of the pro-secular hegemonic structure would only be possible through a consensus based on intellectuals and politicians from wider segments of society. Especially, in this thesis I highlight the important decision that leaders of the reformist faction of the political Islam in Turkey made, which allowed them to realise that the defeat of the existing hegemonic structure only possible by implementing new set of counterhegemonic leadership strategies that were more inclusive and rational; ones that would not neglect the majority of subordinate groups, but rather, respond to their needs and concerns with positive leadership.

For instance, during interview, Professor Burhanettin Duran, described the process of self-awareness and self-criticism that the JDP's leadership cadre made with their political Islamist identity as "*coming to terms with the past*". He noted:

When I say that the JDP political cadre came to terms with their past, what I mean is they were faced with unfavourable aspects of the National View movement. Basically, they abandoned Erbakan's strong emphasis of the Third World idea. They concluded that their relationship with the West was not based on ideology but mutual interest. Therefore, they staged the EU membership process as a political strategy.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

The leadership cadre of the JDP became self-aware of their hegemonic potential and then they realised that the only way to achieve permanent success would be in coming to terms with their mistakes of the past and rejuvenating their political strategy based on the new realities and a political dynamism that was needed at the time. Erdogan and Gul's new reformist party was showing signs of a complete transformation away from their previous identity, to such an extent that the former said: "*I took the shirt off I wear for the National View. Forget the past, we are a continuation of the Democratic Party*" ("Milli Gorus Elbisesini Cikardik" 2003, Milliyet). That is, Tayyip Erdogan completely publicly denounced his connection with the Islamist movement, the National View, in the past. However, whilst the party leadership and members in general did not identify themselves as part of a political Islamist movement, they advocated that they were politicians with sensitivities towards cultural, moral and ethical principles (Hale & Ozbudun 2010, p25). The identity of

the JDP protagonists during their first term in government will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter, but before that it is important to outline the process that brought the party into a position of power.

To detail this process further, I spoke with the chairman of the prominent human rights organisations, Mazlumder (Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed). What's unique about this NGO is that it was founded in 1991 by a group of 54 Islamic and nationalist individuals as an alternative to the left-leaning, secular human rights organisations as they did not welcome critical issues such as the women who were facing the headscarf pressures in Turkey at the time (Kadioglu 2005 p34; Atasoy 2009 p189). Ahmet Faruk Unsal, the president of Mazlumder at the time of being interviewed and a former MP for the JDP, whose wife is also in the list of founders of the JDP, said that:

The JDP chose to formulate a political appeal at the time which was not too bold and cornered as the policies of Erbakan and the National View, but instead, offering a soft and round perspective. Basically, they changed the system with its own instruments. They used the tools of the system that were available to them. For instance, this was reforming the Turkish state to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. In other words, the JDP used a political formula based on the principles of the European Union. This was a very important political instrument for solving the problems of Islamists and strengthen their political power in Turkey without raising concerns in the world. Therefore, the JDP became successful for solving their own problems as well as other groups' by changing the system within the system with its own tools and instruments.

(F. Unsal, personal communication, August 11, 2015)

As Faruk Unsal's above statement indicates, the JDP was a party of politicians who came to terms with the system that they were very much against for decades. In particular, the JDP consisted of politicians who were conscious that the Kemalist hegemonic system had reached deadlock and they believed that with a large consensus and pragmatic political leadership they could counter it efficaciously. With no sustained support coming from the Muslim world, the JDP's leadership came to terms with the reality that the only way to achieve a permanent success would be by

changing their approach towards the current system and using its tools to establish their hegemony. Hence, they did this through the reforms that were required for the EU accession process. Whilst they advocated that the reforms were essential for the membership process, their implementation meant that they were normalising civil military relations as well as expanding human rights and liberty in Turkey. As a result, the JDP began to gain the support, if not respect, from various groups, such as Kurdish people who had suffered a lot from narrow-minded nationalism.

Consequently, it is contended here that the JDP constituted a party of reformist political Islamists, who became conscious of their hegemonic potential through a catharsis, a term discussed by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 1971, p366). This is a unique suggestion put forward by Gramsci, who sees this change as a psychological as much as political. He argues that counterhegemonic forces reach a level of required self-awareness for hegemonic projects in moments of rare intensity. These intense rare moments lead to counterhegemonic forces revising their political and ethical position to form a rational and inclusive leadership. As Gramsci noted: *“To establish the “cathartic” moment becomes therefore, it seems to me, the starting-point for all the philosophy of praxis, and the cathartic process coincides with the chain of syntheses which have resulted from the evolution of the dialectic”* (Gramsci 1971, p367). In other words, through these cathartic moments the subject of the process comes to understand that his or her economic demands are not enough in themselves and that they must instead be inscribed within a wider and more encompassing political project.

With this backdrop regarding the theoretical perspective, the experience of the political Islamists in Turkey represents the cathartic process that Gramsci describes before they established a hegemonic party and politics. Those that formed the JDP abandoned the anti-Western and the anti-globalisation discourse that had characterised their movement for decades. They also came to terms with the fact that if they deviated from the programme of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had involved drawing up a way out plan after the onset of the 2001 economic crisis, they knew they would fail to establish a sustainable path towards their long term ambitions. They acknowledged the growing economic power of the pious

business elite mainly from the Anatolia and promoted liberal market policies, which were designed to integrate them more closely into the global economy. Nevertheless, whilst the JDP political cadre became aware of their hegemonic potential and that the only way to realise this potential was through a conscious and well-prepared counterhegemonic election programme, they still had to convince a great number of intellectuals and politicians of their cause. This was an important step as it was going to allow them to mobilise masses without a populist undeliverable agenda and hence, keep them on side until the reform process they had initiated bore the fruits of economic and political stability. Regarding which, Abdullah Gul explained how they constructed and debated many of these policy ideas at the Political Research Centre (*Politik Arastirma Merkezi*, PAM) he had founded three or four years before they established the JDP. He noted the following:

We found the PAM during the Virtue Party period; it was open for 3 – 4 years. At PAM, we held many meetings, seminars, workshops and conferences. We actually formulated the core objectives and the vision of the future party at these meetings. When we found the party based on these objectives and the vision, we also designed our election campaign there. This election campaign was one of its kind in the history of Turkish politics, because we prepared this campaign in such a way that our election manifesto was more than a list of claims, for it was implementable straightaway. The underlying reason for this election manifesto and campaign was that we knew we were going to be the first party and form the next government. This was very evident.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

It can be seen here how in the new phase, the political Islamists were consciously developing a master plan, one that also recognised desires and interests of other groups. This was only possible through their experience in the process of self-consciousness of their counterhegemonic potential and the realities of both the domestic and international hegemonic system. Hence, the transformation of the economic structure of Turkey between the 1980s and 2000s led to the decisive passage of the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructure in Gramsci's sense and finally, constituted a new form of political and economic elite (Gramsci 1971, p181). The fierce political and ideological conflict between all major political forces continued until only one of them, or at least a combination of them gained a decisive

victory in this battle through superior political, economic and intellectual leadership (Gramsci 1971, p181). This prevailing class not only had the aim of bringing about a unity of economic and political ambitions, for it also worked on the intellectual and moral leadership, by posing all the questions around which the struggle was raging not just on a corporate, but also on a “universal plane” (Gramsci 1971, p182). Such a stand would ensure that its hegemony in relation to its political, intellectual and moral aspects would satisfy subordinate groups regarding its leadership (Anderson 1976 p19; Gramsci 1971 p182).

A process of catharsis from Gramsci’s perspective, therefore, highlights the critical transformation that the counterhegemonic party of the political Islamists made in Turkey. It articulated the necessary contradictory consciousness, first and later, acquired a political consciousness, which enabled it to redefine and reorganise its counterhegemonic force as a revolutionary common sense. This promised to deliver stability and economic growth through the party’s rational, pragmatic and progressive leadership. Accordingly, they seized the opportunity of meeting the critical desire of the popular classes, who were desperate for such a leadership model after a series of political and economic crisis throughout the 1990s. Moreover, the 28th February process which transformed the political Islamists into becoming more self-conscious about their political leadership also allowed them to develop a self-awareness in relation to creating a rational and inclusive election programme. However, such a self-awareness of the historical character of the social forms they represented led to them combining intellectuals, previous politicians and civil society leaders, by providing them with the right skills and attitudes for implementing their new form of hegemonic leadership. In the next section, I will consider these issues and analyse the political experience, skills and background of the JDP leadership cadre.

6.4 Formation of the New Political and Economic Elite: Machiavelli’s Centaur

Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks, contends that the political party should have competence in combining both force and consent in a dialectical unity. He uses the representation of Machiavelli’s Centaur - half animal and half human - to discuss these two levels power. Gramsci claims that the political party of the counterhegemonic movement should lead a political leadership based on these two

faces of a centaur to achieve success. Accordingly, Gramsci sought to theorise the unity of the two perspectives “*of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation, of the individual moment and of the universal moment, of agitation and of propaganda, of tactics and of strategy*” (Gramsci 1971, p170). From this dual perspective, I argue that both Erdogan and Gul created a political party platform and leadership, which constituted combining these two levels of power. These two complemented each other in a such a perfect balance that most of the time their good cop, bad cop, tactics paid off. They overcame many critical situations together, such as when Abdullah Gul became the first prime minister of the party, because chairman Erdogan was still suspended from politics. Nevertheless, Gul handed him the office once his political ban was lifted. This exchange was repeated one more time during the next presidential election in which there was such huge opposition to Erdogan’s presidency from secular groups that Abdullah Gul was nominated for the position. Their collaborative political leadership is one of its kind in Turkish politics, as both leaders had the means to form their own governments or take separate paths, they chose not to do so, but rather, value their mutual support, which has been the mainstay of their political success. This thesis argues that Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his team was the dynamic force that provided the charisma and organisational strength of the party, whilst Abdullah Gul and his team was the face of consent ensuring a tactical and strategic vision for the party.

6.4.1 Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Charisma and Physical Strength

From the perspective of Gramsci’s notion of the centaur, I would contend that Erdogan represents the form of “force”, with his charismatic physical appearance and exceptional rhetorical skills. It is, therefore, important to investigate his influence over the party and his background. Whilst his family was from the city of Rize in the Black Sea region, he was born in Istanbul in 1954 and raised in the rough neighbourhood of Kasimpasa, where he attended a religion based Imam-Hatip school and played semi-professional football. Alongside his interest in football, he was a very active youth leader and was often involved in grassroots work of the political Islamist movement as an activist and organiser. It was during these years that Erdogan developed effective leadership charisma and a dedication for politics. He has a unique leadership style based on his physical attributes and energy, which are striking when compared to

other politicians. A further attribute which contributes to his extraordinary personality are his oratory skills. Moreover, he is a hard-core pragmatist; not a leader who creates big ideas and deep vision, but rather, he relies on feelings and mass emotion in order to project and magnify his power (Yavuz 2009, p130). Erdogan may have predominantly relied and respected decisions made by consensus, particularly in the early years of the party. However, this was changed as he became a more confident team leader later in his career, where he was highly successful in guiding others through his charisma towards his aspirations without earning critical scrutiny from his supporters. What distinguished him most from other political leaders was his personal background and experience in party politics at a local level. Ayse Karabat made the following remarks:

When I say, people opened up credit for the newly found JDP, what I mean is people really liked Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The party was very successful just because of him. Turkish people have always seen politicians who were looking at them from high up, who distanced themselves from them. Maybe, Suleyman Demirel from central right spectrum, who had similar characteristics to Erdogan, because of his upbringing, but they were not same as each other at all. Suleyman Demirel could only be a son of a neighbour in the next building on the same street, but Erdogan was part of the family. He lived like us, he looked and talked like us. He had the same ambitious, thoughts and dreams like us. He also wanted to jump up a class. He was our son and our brother. He just looked so much like ordinary Turkish people.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

Furthermore, almost all the interviewees mentioned Erdogan's experience as a mayor of Istanbul and all argued that this was the most pivotal point of his political career. His election to Istanbul's top seat was a clear sign of his growing popularity among the masses, as the population of Istanbul represents a microcosm of the whole of Turkey in terms of its regional and ethnic diversity. However, like all other mayors with political Islamist backgrounds at the time, Erdogan also caught the attention of the pro-secular media and state elite. His mayoralty was under close scrutiny and eventually in 1997 he became the target of an investigation as a part of the February 28 process. He was charged with inciting religious hatred and calling for the overthrow of the government on the basis of reading out a poem in 1997, which it was

claimed stirred up religious feeling, in the south-eastern city of Siirt (Yavuz 2009, p373). Subsequently, Erdogan was found guilty and convicted by the state security court on 21st of April 1998, receiving; a ten-month prison term (Kramer 2001, p76). The court decision also ended his office as mayor and barred him from standing for elected office. His conviction was part of a plan that sought to end his political career, but it had the opposite effect in that it had a positive effect on his popularity at home and abroad. Abdullah Gul at interview explained:

We were taking so many election polls before we came to power. We were working with Besir Atalay's ANAR research centre. All the findings were showing we would be the first party in the election. This is because my group in Ankara, as a reformist faction of the movement, merged with Mr. Tayyip in Istanbul. He suffered a lot from the system. It was very unfair that he was convicted and served a prison sentence. This injustice caused a great reaction from the people. Consequently, all this came together and constituted a great synergy that made us move forward.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Recep Tayyip Erdogan's leadership attributes, his political background as well as his personal story were all critical elements that pushed his new party towards success. He was victimised by an alliance of the military and the secularist business association as well as its media – a hegemonic machine that only cared about defending the interests of a few. Another interviewee, Professor Aktay added:

The story of Recep Tayyip Erdogan was very effective on the masses. He was also a victim of the establishment like many of them. His story was actually reflecting many people's day to day suffering. He was successful and hardworking, but he was unfairly pushed out of the system. This situation really affected many people's conscience and then, it was like a domino effect that out of the movement began to emerge with an unstoppable power.

(Y. Aktay, personal communication, August 6, 2015)

Conclusively, the masses recognised Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the victim of a corrupt political system and mobilised their support for him (Yavuz 2009, p81). Erdogan had been a very well-motivated party activist since the time of his youth and he has remained so throughout his political leadership. He was the force that disciplined

people into holding the party line, but despite this, he needed intellectual guidance and a partner to collaborate with so as to be able to utilise his charisma and physical dynamism in the most intelligent way. This was important for Erdogan and the party, because it needed a platform with a vision that had the means of protecting them from short term adversity. It constituted a pathway for them to become capable of increasing their power and eventually substituting the prevailing hegemony with their own. The evidence suggests that an important protagonist of this project was Abdullah Gul, for he tempered the explosively energetic and rigid leadership power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, thereby keeping the JPD electable in the eyes of the masses (Edelman et al 2015, p43). Consequently, it is possible to argue that without the alliance with Gul and his team of politicians, Erdogan's party on its own, at the time, would only have had limited authority over of the disciples of National View movement and limited claim to its heritage.

6.4.1 Abdullah Gul: A Politician of Vision and Intellect

Here, it is argued that Abdullah Gul complemented Recep Tayyip Erdogan's highly demanding leadership style with his professionalism and intellectual vision. Gul was born on October 29, 1950 in Kayseri, attended high school in this city and went to Istanbul University to study economics. He later completed his PhD at the same university and became an assistant professor at Sakarya University. In between his university studies, he had the opportunity to study a master's degree and spent two years in London and Exeter. These two years, in particular, had a huge impact on his intellectual development and he culturally became more conscious (Maclean 2014, p182). Specifically, this was his period of consciousness formation that allowed him to forge a bridge between the pragmatic vision of the West and the culturally more traditional East. Nevertheless, he gave up his academic position in 1981 to become an advisor at the Islamic Development Bank, where he worked until 1991. His years in Jeddah, as an advisor at the Islamic Development Bank, gave him another angle in relation to developing his consciousness. Through his career at the Bank, he became deeply aware of the problems in the Muslim world, and was always uneasy about the prevailing socio-political conditions and their impact on millions of innocent people (Maclean 2014, p244-245). In the interview, he explained his perspective as follows:

Another very important issue for both national and international politics is dignity. You must definitely pay attention to the dignity of everyone including your opposition as well as other nations. You do not need to do much for this if you believe in it, everyone will see and feel that you care about their dignity. Therefore, if you act in this way all conflicts will be minimised. There won't be very many new problems and many of the existing problems will stop being a major issue. There will be a compromise from everyone to build constructive relations for mutual interest. This is of course all to do with leaders' backgrounds, their vision and aspirations.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

When working at the bank in Jeddah, he was convinced by his family and friends to give up his position to become a member of parliament for his home town, in the province of Kayseri, in the 1991 election (Maclean 2014, p276). Subsequently, he worked very close with Erbakan, who made him Deputy Chairman of International Affairs of the Welfare Party (Dagi 2006, p90). He became a very crucial figure in the party, representing them at many international conferences and other equally vital platforms (Maclean 2014, p289-p303). In the 1995 election, he was re-elected as an MP for Kayseri and became the Minister of State in the 54th government, which was very short lived, because of the 28th February process (Maclean 2014, p320). He lived through this experience from first hand as he was the spokesman of the government. However, his political career was not much affected by the process and he got re-elected in the 1999 general election. Unlike Erdogan, Gul's political life evolved at the strategic level of the party. He became one-time minister of state, prime minister and an MP four times before Erdogan entered politics at the parliamentary level (Maclean 2014). Thereby, it is evident from the strategic positions that Abdullah Gul held in the party, in contrary to Erdogan, he was Erbakan's favourite disciple, having the same attitude and attention to detail in social and economic programmes, but differing in terms his realist and pragmatic vision towards political economy of the West. Gul was the partner that Erdogan needed, for whilst he had superior skills at the micro level of politics, he lacked the social capital and skills at the strategic level. Regarding which, Gul said:

I was leading the PAM research centre in Ankara. We agreed with Erdogan that he would actively travel to different places around the country to consolidate support

and we would undertake the strategically important intellectual work in Ankara. As a team, I believe we sketched out the most effective election manifesto in Turkish history. It was appreciated by everyone when we announced it. Then, I was quite sure from the reaction of people towards our party programme that we would definitely win the election and I thought we should realistically be prepared for the days when we would be in power.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

In this interview, Abdullah Gul repeatedly highlighted the importance of a realist approach to politics. He deplored any populist political agenda and defended the view that political leaders should always pay attention to the realities of the socio-political and economic circumstances of their countries (A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015). Unsurprisingly, he was the first to rebel against the Erbakan-dominated leadership of the Virtue Party (Yavuz 2009, p141-142). The ‘reformist’ movement, which started within the ranks of the Virtue Party under his leadership, specifically raised the opinion at the first convention of the party in 2000 that political Islam with a strong tone was doomed to failure and that the party should take a more system oriented stance that would at least give them a chance of solving major issues in the long run (Taskin 2008, p63). Eventually, after intense debates and discussions during his time at the PAM research centre, he led a party programme for the JDP that reflected a pro-European Union agenda that defended democracy as well as the free market economy (A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015). Accordingly, all new or former JDP members including Abdullah Gul interviewed for this thesis contended that the party reflected a realist approach in its first election manifesto and refrained from endorsing a clear ideology (personal communication with JDP parliamentarians, Ankara, July & August 2015). For instance, the JDP’s 2002 election programme states that:

Our Party is one that aims to offer original and permanent solutions to our country’s problems, parallel to the world’s realities, with the accumulation of the past and tradition, making public service its basic purpose, conducting political activities on the platform of contemporary democratic values, rather than ideological platforms. The JDP is not and shall not be a party forcing ideologies or distributing favours. The most important aspect of this programme is that it does not include rhetoric, which

cannot be converted to action. Its correctness; realism and applicability are the salient characteristics of our Party's policies.

(The JDP election manifesto in 2002, p3)

Nonetheless, Abdullah Gul's intellectual transformation shows that he had adapted himself to the political and ideological circumstances in pursuit of a successful political career. He is a good example in representing organic intellectuals behind the hegemonic project of Turkish political Islam at the time. As his above quotation indicates that he stresses realism in politics, however, he also believes in a perspective in which one should always keep in mind the fundamental norms and customs of culture when adapting to new circumstances (A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015). What I noticed, like Erdogan, Gul is pragmatic and dynamic, but he is more of a man of intellect and vision. The reason behind is that, whilst they are both the product of Turkish Islamic Synthesis and share the similar patterns of ideological evolution during their years at *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* – MTTB (National Turkish Student Association), Gul is more professional in his leadership approach due to his further educational and career background (Maclean 2014, p147- 155). They complement each other perfectly and perhaps the party would not be able to achieve the current success without their lifelong respectful partnership. Moreover, Erdogan maybe have had great political prestige and a social network in one of the largest cosmopolitan cities of Europe in Istanbul, but Gul equally has had rich social capital and networks among the rising Anatolian capital class and in the international arena (Yavuz 2009, p141). Gul's political career has parallels with the evolution of the new economic actors of Turkey in Anatolia, as he represented Kayseri in parliament since 1991 which was a major city where most of the emerging business elites had their bases (Yavuz 2009, p142). Gul described his perspective on the governing party as follows:

The ruling party should definitely be a realist; what I mean by this is they must always take account realities of current circumstances. They should do this in such a clever and competent way that they are always capable of addressing the populist expectations of the masses without losing their sight of the right path. If they divert from this righteous path, they will never succeed even though they look like they are

the winner. Therefore, regarding the economic agenda, it is important that it should be able to deliver realistic goals that satisfy many.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Gul was fully aware that since Ozal's neoliberal reforms there was a critical transformation that took place in Anatolia and allied himself with this newly emerging economic elite (Yavuz 2009, p141). He understood that they had growing expectations in relation to the political elite and did not hesitate to challenge even his own leader and the party to provide grounds for these expectations. Especially, after 28th February process, this new class did not want to have a confrontation with the state based on cultural values and norms, nor did it want to get into an ideological battle with the rest of the world but they were only interested in a political leadership that could provide them with an economic platform based on growth-oriented economic policies (Atasoy 2009, p117-120). Moreover, they wanted to be supported by the state through policies such as subsidies, lower tariffs and open borders for trade, whilst also seeking little intervention by the state in their economic activities (Yavuz 2009, p141). They wanted to have free and easy access to international markets and do business with large multinational companies, seeing the EU accession process as an instrument that could actually provide them with such opportunities (Onis 2004, p19). Gul and his team were the key architects of the economic policies of the government and they successfully managed to implement the policies of Kemal Dervis (Yavuz 2009, p142), who was the minister of economy for the previous government and has designed an economic reform programme together with IMF to rescue Turkish economy from the crisis.

Erdogan in Istanbul and Gul in Anatolia combined their political powers to articulate a new form of politics based on aspirations of these emerging conservative business elites who did not actually want to cause trouble with the system, but rather, sought to take it over and use it for their own interests. Thus, this new bourgeoisie was fully aware that their economic well-being required better relations with the forces of state and a pro-EU policy. Consequently, they forced Erdogan and Gul to become united and form a new leadership that represented a break with the National View Movement by supporting the EU and maintaining closer ties with the US regarding Middle East

policy. The Justice and Development Party was their agent in political society, which surged to power within 14 months of its establishment in August 2001. Immediately after the election, the declarations of Erdogan and Gul, that their party was a conservative, but modern, party of Muslim Democrats was a good indication that the reformist faction of the National View Movement had moved away from the perspective of old guard under the leadership of Erbakan that had dominated Turkish political Islam over three decades. These two leaders represented the characteristics of organic intellectuals that constituted the new face of political Islam and its hegemonic leadership in Turkey. However, they needed more than just political leaders, for they required “a group of people ‘specialised’ in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas” that supported these two leaders, who were an excellent representation of the “theory-practice nexus” (Gramsci 1971, p334).

6.5 Formation of the Remaining Hegemonic Cadre

Along with the compatible leadership styles of Gul and Erdogan, in contrast to previous parties associated with National Vision movement, there was a completely new type of leadership cadre occupying the top positions in the JDP. This new political and economic elite were more technocratically oriented and moderate people, who mostly came from the centre right and right-wing nationalist political parties (Tugal 2009, p151). Hence, their political outlook when they come together were representing the idea of political party that the military regime previously had sought through the intellectual doctrine, the Turkish Islamic Synthesis, against left wing political activism being successful in Turkey (please refer chapter three). According to the study by Aydin & Dalmis (2008) most of the JDP deputies were involved in politics before they were elected to Parliament in 2002. They observed that when these deputies asked to tell which political party, identity or movement they had felt close to when they first started to deal with politics, although majority associated themselves with the political parties of National Vision movement, there were still a large percentage of deputies who either started their political careers at different political parties or felt close to other political identities and movements. For instance, the study revealed that about 11 percent of the deputies who got elected for the JDP in 2002 election came from the Motherland Party, other 6.2 percent with the National Action party, 5.7 percent with the Justice Party and 4.7 percent with the TPP (Aydin

& Dalmis 2008, p216-217). Notably, the Justice and Development party was a coalition of political Islamists, the centre right, and nationalists as most of the political parties representing the latter two perspectives had lost their credibility in the public eye, because of the series of corruption scandals as well as economic and political crises that hurt many of them throughout 1990s. Hence, the multi- dimensional face of the JDP was not a facade to trick the mass media and the public, for it had strong backing and support from people at all levels. Regarding which, Can Acun, from SETA, the strategic think-tank closed to the JDP, referred to this fact when saying:

The JDP were able break away from their past and its narrowly focused political customs. When we compare the National View with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, they share somehow similar traits, such as the leadership customs of a tight religious community. However, political Islamists under the leadership of Erdogan found a way to break away from this religious community type of politics and became a mass party. This is because they concluded that maybe they had to give up some of the beliefs and principles they had strongly advocated for decades, but in the long run they believed they would be able to achieve a greater good for people.

(C. Acun, personal communication, August 3, 2015)

This was indeed true, because the cofounders of the party were not only the members of previously banned pro-Islamist “Welfare Party”, for they also consisted of members of other political spectrums, such as Cemil Cicek, Abdulkadir Aksu, Murat Basesgioglu, Ali, Coskun, Vahit Erdem and Erkan Mumcu who had been close to Turgut Ozal and came from the social conservative background of the Motherland Party. Huseyin Celik and Koksal Toptan have their political roots in the Turkish Democratic Party, while Sadik Yakut and Kursat Tuzmen came from the nationalist movement and Ertugrul Gunay had a centre-left background. Moreover, the party had also drawn in many people from civil society organisations, such as MUSIAD members Ali Babacan, Ali Ihsan Arslan, Ibrahim Caglar, Muammer Kaki, Ibrahim Ozal and Murat Yalcintas. In addition, technocrats and academicians, such as Vecdi Gonul, Besir Atalay, Hilmi Guler, Abdullatif Sener, Mehmet Aydin and Reha Denemec came on board, thereby giving the impression of a mass consensus. Abdullah Gul described what happened as follows:

Regarding the case of building a team of MPs, we did not give ourselves any restrictions based on people's life styles. What we looked for from people was that they should not be enemies of our country's values and principles, but respect them. They should be open minded and liberal, but with a good character and peaceful mind. As a matter of fact, we chose many people with these characteristics to become MPs, ministers and for many other roles. Hence, we had a great opportunity to come together and form a great team that yielded a synergy in a most productive way.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Like the Motherland Party's leadership discussed in chapter three which was a combination of people from a wide spectrum of political beliefs formed after the coup in 1980, the JDP's political cadre also consisted of many people from different backgrounds. Whilst the top cadre was mainly from the National View movement, the party showed a special interest in including as many people as possible to achieve a very wide spectrum of political and economic representation (Dagi 2006, p91). As this was necessary to create a strategy and tactics altogether more complex and long-term aimed at achieving hegemonic synergy between masses and the party. It is widely accepted that Erdogan was not a very dominant figure during the JDP's first term in power (Edelman et al 2015, p43). He did not hesitate to advocate a diversity at the party leadership, thereby, achieving support of broader segments of the society. For instance, when Aydin & Dalmis (2008) examined the socio-political identities favoured by the JDP deputies based on the findings of the Pollmark Research Company (Pollmark) in 2005, they revealed the following the identities and the percentage of deputies who found them as suitable to define themselves: Democrat 83.5, Muslim 81.2, conservative 76.9, religious 65.6, republican 64.6, nationalist 52.3, liberal 49.5, secular 47.2, Atatürkist 46.2, Islamist 42.5, rightist 34.9, Kemalist 12.2, social democrat 12.3, *ulkucu* (idealist) 8.1, feminist 2.4, leftist 0.9, and socialist 1.4 (Aydin & Dalmis 2008, 217).

Accordingly, peaceful internal party politics at the time was essential as the party needed to forge collective effort and synergy with the people from a broad spectrum in order, firstly, to counter the harsh criticism of the pro-secular hegemonic and secondly, to transform people's attitudes towards the marketisation of the economy (Tugal 2007, p22). The latter goal was immensely important for the future of the JDP

as it was much more committed to neo-liberal reforms than any of its predecessors in Turkey. This is because the JDP's leadership were aware of the aspirations and needs of the market-oriented actors that had helped them to grow their political and economic power, especially from the 1980s onwards. The next section will give more details about the link between the leaders of JDP and the emerging pious bourgeoisie before they assumed governmental power.

To summarise, the hegemonic cadre of the JDP converged around this one important objective, for they believed that economic liberalisation would allow them to articulate a successful counterhegemonic power, as they could use this process as an instrument to dismantle the hegemony of the pro-secular Kemalist state. While striving towards this objective, the party was strongly supported by the market-oriented civil society organisations, bureaucrats, capital groups, and the mainstream media, which established a consensus on the need to restructure the Turkish state and economy along market principles (Balkan-Sahin 2010, p130). Their dedicated efforts marginalised the resistance coming from the anti-EU circles, such as the statist elites (some parts of the military and bureaucracy), the trade unions, and the nationalist groups (Balkan-Sahin 2010, p130). Hence, they had an excellent instrument to justify and propagate their stance on these reforms. The JDP, as the political representation of these multi-dimensional actors, created a 'common sense' based on neo-liberal principles blended with Islamic values to gain legitimacy for their hegemonic leadership. This process was achieved by convincing the masses to believe that these changes were necessary for both the EU criteria and the IMF stand-by agreements, being crucial for Turkish modernisation or Europeanisation. The main agents spearheading such a common sense was the emerging devout bourgeoisie and their activities in both civil and political society.

6.6 Emerging Devout Bourgeoisie as the Intellectual Agents of the Political Islamist Hegemony

The interconnection between the emergent pious capital groups and political Islam shows where the support base of the JDP government lies. However, it should be noted that it is not only this group who supported the JDP, but also, other segments of society such as big business, certain NGOs, mainstream media circles as well as

liberal and liberal-leftist intellectuals, who considered the free market economy and EU membership as essential to political freedom and democracy in Turkey (Balkan-Sahin 2010, p129). Hence, it is important to recognise that these agents worked together to pave the way for the counterhegemonic project of the JDP to succeed in establishing a neoliberal state blended with Islamic values and life style. The most telling evidence of the organic relationship between the newly rising business interests from Anatolia and the JDP was the election of 21 members of MUSIAD to the National Assembly from the ranks of the JDP in 2002 (Taskin 2008, p63). Moreover, the election of the second biggest labour confederation HAK-IS's (Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions) former general secretary Agah Kafkas and deputy secretary general Huseyin Tanriverdi to parliament from the JDP in 2002 was also an indication of the significance attached to the emerging pious middle class and the JDP. Erdem Dokur, the representative of MUSIAD's Ankara branch said:

After the '80s coup, the military regime closed down all the labour unions except TURK-IS (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) and HAK-IS (Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions). HAK-IS is known as the conservative people's labour union. Therefore, no one can deny or argue against their organic relationship.

(E. Dokur, personal communication, July 13, 2015)

Furthermore, the interviewee Erdem Dokur was a good example demonstrating the link between the pious capital group representatives in the form of MUSIAD and the labour confederation, HAK-IS in that worked for the latter for five years before he started working for MUSIAD. He told me at the interview that many people who work for these organisations aspire to become a politician one day and hence, they always keep a close relationship with political parties not only in the interests of the organisation, also but for their own futures (E. Dokur, personal communication, July 13, 2015). Mehmet Erdogan, MP for the JDP from Gaziantep in an interview with me also said that he was a representative of MUSIAD's Gaziantep branch for many years before he got elected as an MP. He said being part of MUSIAD and his active role as a city councillor allowed him to gain significant experience and to develop a network of influential friends in the politics and business worlds (M. Erdogan, personal communication, July 8, 2015). In fact, it was he who arranged my meeting with a

MUSIAD representative, which proves the relationship between MUSIAD and the JDP once again.

In this thesis, I contend that at the lower rank of the party, people like Erdem Dokur from MUSIAD and Mehmet Erdogan MP for Gaziantep represent the background of intellectuals, who constituted the link between political society, civil society and the masses. In other words, I contend that the emerging devout bourgeoisie and their representatives in various civil society organisations acted as agents of the intellectuals for political Islamist hegemony. This is also self-evident in the rejection of the political Islamist identity, which will be discussed in the next chapter in more details. The leaders of the JDP moved in a more moderate manner and committed themselves to a market economy in order to create a consensus, which they thought was required for their counterhegemonic success (Onis 2004, p8). However, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to understand that this process evolved through the rise of new economic elites and a middle class with cultural and religious sensitivities. This process is identified by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks, when states:

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.

(Gramsci 1971, p5)

Accordingly, as discussed in chapters three, the coup in 1980 gave unquestionable authority to the military and later Ozal governments to spread the seeds of ideological hegemony of economic liberalization in Turkey. Effectively, the Turkish economy has undergone a radical transformation in the context of neo-liberal restructuring, with its export-promotion-based model of industrialisation, its increasing exposure to the global market and its unquestioned internalization of the rationality of free trade (Keyman & Onis 2007, p212). These reforms, unlike in neighbouring countries, such as Egypt, where the benefits of these policies were shared only amongst the few, transformed the Turkish economy to the extent that it bred a new type of economic elite (Gumuscu 2010, p839). These newly emerging capital groups were mainly based in the centre and eastern side of Turkey with a religious mindset and visible

sensitivities for Islamic values and lifestyles. In effect, throughout the '90s cultural articulation of these groups within the state structure intensified as their economic activities grew and they became more ambitious in relation to accessing global markets. Whilst the destructive conflict between two centre right parties and the third world perspective of the political Islamist leader of Erbakan led to these emerging business interests seeking an alternative political leadership.

To this end, the conservative bourgeoisie established civil and political platforms aimed restructuring the Turkish state in line with their hegemonic interest (Keyman & Icduygu 2003, p222-223; Yildiz 2008 p50- 51). The articulation of this hegemonic interest by the emerging devout bourgeoisie constituted a special type of politician and intellectual group that joined the ranks of the JDP (Atasoy 2009, p116). I would thus contend that the JDP set out to support the counterhegemonic project of these specific capitalist entrepreneurs. More specifically, these people delivered very substantial financial, human, and political resources to this newly found political Islamist party, so that it could thrive as a political force to serve their hegemonic interest (Gumuscu & Sert 2009, p964). For instance, in terms of financial support, the Albayrak Group, a MUSIAD member company, was the chief financial supporter of the party and it did not hesitate to promote the party explicitly through its media outlets, such as Yeni Safak (Cakir and Calmuk 2001, p151). At interview, Abdullah Gul acknowledged the significance of these businessmen for the party's counterhegemonic success and said:

Not all, but some, businessmen have the advanced intellectual skills and personal character to be a part of the political and economic leadership of the country. Their contribution to the political parties is very considerable. Because they represent the people who can successfully blend theory and pragmatism. They have the skills for rational decision making and experience from their business ventures to know whether a political or economic project can succeed or not. Therefore, they have the ultimate tendency to be a realist for political activities.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

The fact that the devout bourgeoisie was part of the JDP is even more evident when considering the backgrounds of the MPs who joined the reformist faction after the

Virtue Party closed down by the Constitutional Court. Twenty eight of the 31 former Virtue Party MPs were businessmen, who joined the reformist faction of political Islam and its new political party, the JDP (Gumuscu & Sert 2009, p964). Besides, the contribution of MUSIAD to the JDP went beyond the support of its members in the form of financial or social capital. That is, the organic relationship between the emerging devout bourgeoisie was so far reaching that it had the party's ear when it came to policy recommendations. According to Ali Bayramoglu, the second president of MUSIAD, their organisation equipped the JDP with innovative ideas and formed the basis of JDP policies (In an interview for Gumuscu & Sert 2009, p964). Close scrutiny of the JDP election manifesto in 2002 reveals significant similarities with MUSIAD's economic and political reports of the time. For instance, when the MUSIAD report on Democratisation and Constitutional Reform published in 2000 is investigated, it is quite evident that there are similarities with the JDP election program in 2002 (Atasoy 2009, p118). In this report, MUSIAD demanded four major things: a more civil and democratic constitution, extension of human rights and freedoms, decentralisation of administration and greater compliance with the EU Copenhagen Criteria. All these critical points were incorporated into the JDP's political and economic policies, which further proves the link between the intellectuals of the emerging devout bourgeoisie and the new political party. Abdullah Gul in the interview highlighted the intellectual interconnection between these businessmen and the party:

Yes, indeed there is a connection between intellectuals with an entrepreneurial background and the party. For instance, Ali Babacan falls into this framework. That is to say, he has a very good educational background, experience and effective vision. However, he had his first working experience in his father's business in "çıkırıkcılar yokuşu" in Ankara. Then, he set up his own company and had first-hand experience in entrepreneurship. Consequently, he had an excellent understanding of the ethical norms and principles of the business world. For instance, he knew what it means to promise someone in business and how important is loyalty for creditors and most importantly he had the understanding of how to create trustworthiness and to maintain it. He had all the attributes of a successful businessman. And all these are very important qualities and we had many people with similar backgrounds in our party who contributed our political success, without a doubt. They were active at

every stage of the party from local provinces to villages; they helped the party to gain trust and prestige.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Ali Babacan was only 35 years old and the youngest minister in Turkish parliamentary history when he was appointed as the minister of economic affairs. He is also one of the co-founders of the JDP and unlike other ministers, such as Bulent Arinc, he keeps a low profile and does not like to engage in upfront political conflict. However, he has been of equally significance to Arinc and behind decisions for every key economic reform taken since the party came to power. After serving as the Minister for Economic Affairs between 2002 and 2007, he became the chief negotiator for Turkish accession to the European Union and Foreign Minister between 2007 and 2009. He also acted as the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs between 2009 and 2015. He was the master mind and the most predominant figure in Turkish economy until recently and he has been present at every stage of the hegemonic progression of the JDP. His background, as explained by Abdullah Gul, has helped him hugely to transform the Turkish economy which was essential for the hegemonic success of the JDP. Hence, his educational background, which involved attending the best schools in Turkey and later the USA along with his religious life style have made him accessible to both the devout and pro-secular bourgeoisies. Thereby, this thesis argues that Ali Babacan along with Abdullah Gul and other similar political figures at the party represent the epitome of pious bourgeoisie, who have the vision of being in the charge of the economy and the country.

Taken together, these insights and the economic reforms that the JDP initiated right after it came to power in 2002 demonstrate that it is indeed a party of businessmen. The party consists of pragmatic and charismatic leaders that have placed emphasis on macroeconomic stability, economic growth and the expansion of private investment from day one in power, thus making it quite clear that it represents the interests of an economic elite. According to Ozbudun (2006, p547) the socioeconomic base that the JDP consolidated during their first term consisted of much of the rural population, artisans and small traders in the cities, urban slum-dwellers, and the rapidly rising Islamist bourgeoisie. On the other hand, Insel (2003, p297–299), argued that the JDP stood as “the political representative of the new middle class” composed of provincial

artisans and traders, small and mid-range entrepreneurs, young business executives, as well as the good portion of the working class. Effectively, when other scholars studies also considered, the core electoral base of JDP at their first and later at the second general elections they took part in 2007, consist of voters from rural areas, the newly urbanized poor, important fractions of the police force, much of the liberal, left-leaning intelligentsia and most notably, the rapidly emerging Islamist bourgeoisie from Central and Eastern regions that favours a free market economy, defending integration with the neoliberal global order (Bugra 1998 p528; Onis 2006 p208; Tugal 2007 p5; Duran 2008 p82; Dalacoura 2016 p66).

To consolidate electoral power from such a political base, therefore, I noticed that the JDP has pursued a culturally conservative and economically liberal counterhegemonic agenda, which was aimed at bridging Islamic cultural values with a modern economy. From Gramsci's perspective, I posit that the JDP is an '*elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of the world*' of the time, that is to say, was the enforcer of a neoliberal market economy within a globalist system. The party leaders articulated this process by "*working out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their historical laboratory*" (Gramsci 1971, p335). Moreover, the party has recruited individuals outside of the business world, politicians from different parties, those in the media, artists, and members of academia, where "*the selection is made on practical and theoretical criteria at the same time*" (Gramsci 1971, p335). That is, the JDP leaders have sought to consolidate a consensus amongst people from different backgrounds and with different worldviews to use their experience and skill sets for to fulfil their hegemonic aspirations. Hence, they have pursued this based on a rationale that Gramsci predicted: "*the relation between theory and practice becomes even closer the more the conception is vitally and radically innovatory and opposed to old ways of thinking*" (Gramsci 1971, p335). For this reason and in accordance with the ideas of Gramsci, I argue that the JDP has been able to elaborate "*new integral and totalitarian intelligentsias and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place*" (Gramsci 1971, p335). As the investigation of this research concludes this was what exactly the JDP achieved in Turkey. It has constructed a new pro-business party with a political identity blended in political Islam, allowing them to consolidate broader alliances and capturing the support of the conservative democrats of the nation.

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have identified the reasons for the split that took place in National Vision movement. I have contended that after 28th February, the Turkish military memorandum ousted the first political Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan and led to closure of two political Islamist parties the Welfare and Virtue parties, the reformist faction of this movement experienced a cathartic moment. This experience enabled them to come to terms with their political Islamist identities based on the strictly defined politics of Necmettin Erbakan. Together with the hopeless and insecurity that Turkish society experienced due to political and economic turmoil in the country, the Justice and Development party and its young and energetic leadership cadre found fertile ground for their counterhegemonic ambition. Consequently, here it is argued that the reformist faction of the political Islamists in Turkey under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, with their distinctive leadership approaches, constituted a definitive counterhegemonic leadership, which synthesised theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals as well as the structure and superstructure to achieve a hegemonic success. Their partnership was a combination of coerciveness and consent making, through which they strove to form a new socioeconomic bloc. Now, the party was composed of politicians, civil society leaders, bureaucrats and members of intelligentsia representing various ideological, economic and ethnic segments of Turkish society. In particular, this chapter has emphasised the party's commitment to neoliberal economy and its rigorous plan to integrate the Turkish economy to global markets. The driving force behind this commitment was the emerging conservative capitalist class eager to take their share from lucrative government projects and get access to global markets. In this chapter I have demonstrated the crucial link between the conservative bourgeoisie and the political Islamist counterhegemonic project. I have argued that this critical link encouraged the JDP's leaders to adopt a culturally conservative and economically liberal counterhegemonic agenda, which was aimed at bridging Islamic cultural values with a modern economy. In the following chapter, I will be shedding a light on this specific political, economic and moral mixture and will analyse the JDP's intellectual and moral leadership. This gave them the chance to expand their counterhegemonic project to the broader segments of society by ensuring economic and social stability along with prosperity.

Chapter 7

The Path to Hegemonic Success: Justice and Development Party in Turkey

Intellectual and moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform—indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself.

(Gramsci 1971, p133)

The above quote from the Prison Notebooks demonstrates how a programme of economic reform of the potential hegemonic group should have links with intellectual and moral reform. To achieve this aim, the JDP in Turkey gave up from their previous ideology of the National Vision movement. That is, the party, as this chapter will demonstrate, rejected its past in political Islam and presented itself with a new identity of conservative democrats. Along with the information I gather during my field work and the key qualitative indicators I examine the political, economic and moral mixture that the JDP formulated as a conservative democracy. In particular, I analyse the economic performance of Turkey in years between 2002 and 2007 under the JDP in order to uncover how it secured the leadership of the masses. I then move on to examining the nature of the counterhegemonic socio-political vision that the JDP promoted during their first term in Turkey. Finally, I demonstrate the dynamic nature of the JDP's political identity, whereby through successful economic leadership, it was able to extend its hegemonic leadership to broader segments of society.

7.1 Construction of the New Socio-political Vision: Conservative Democracy and Beyond

Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the following statement at the party conference in Antalya on 16th of May 2003:

We all took the shirt that we wear to represent the Islamist National View off from our body. We left it outside and we found the JDP. We are not a continuation of our past or any other movement. We are a new conservative democratic party of Turkey.

(“*Milli Gorus Elbisesini Cikardik*” 2003, Milliyet)

After the reformist faction led by Abdullah Gul failed to take over the existing party structure at a Virtue Party congress in 2000, Gul and Erdogan established their own political organisation, the Justice and Development Party (JDP). Whilst they claimed, as illustrated in the above quote, that they based their political and economic vision on a completely different perspective to their previous political attachment of the National View or having an Islamist background, pro-secular elites still challenged them about their past and hence, the origin of their politics. Consequently, in the early years of the party, Erdogan and Gul moved quickly to reassure the military and media establishment that religion would not be used for political purposes and that the JDP would not attempt to reform the secular state. They used pro-European political discourse and said: *"the priority of the government is to turn Turkey into a country of freedoms in line with the highest standards of the EU"* (Erdogan 2002, December 9 at the CSIS Statesmen's Forum).

It was clear from its statements as well as regular meetings with world leaders and key civil society organisations that the JDP leadership was trying to reclaim the territory of the centre-right in Turkish politics (Tugal 2015, p111). This was considered crucial for two reasons, firstly, it was necessary so as to gain legitimacy and recognition for their changed political and economic perspective (Dagi 2006, p89). Secondly, this was essential for the JDP leadership to be able to construct its hegemonic leadership based on the alliance of conservative businessmen, intellectuals and the state bureaucracy (Tugal 2015, p111). This alliance could also strengthen the hand of the neo-liberal and export-oriented sectors of Turkish capital that sought to expand their share in global markets they were so eager to access for decades (Madi-Siman 2017, p47-50). More importantly, large numbers of centre-right politicians, intellectuals and supporters favoured the inclusive and reformist perspective proposed by the JDP (Taskin 2008, p60-61). As Professor Aktay from the JDP explained:

The JDP has its origins in the traditions of the Welfare Party. It had a serious political presence within society, but could not capitalise on such a power. It also involved part of the emerging conservative middle class and capital groups from Anatolia. The base of the Turkish centre-right politics changed as these new socioeconomic actors emerged and the political elite from centre right could not adapt to this changing socioeconomic environment. (Y. Aktay, personal communication, August 6, 2015)

On the other hand, the secular centre-right intelligentsia played a crucial role in making this new alliance bound and work effectively (Tugal 2007, p19). The Daily Hurriyet, the most effective media establishment of the secular-modernist elite and middle class supported the formation of the JDP as an antidote to the Islamists and the shrinking political centre (Tugal 2007, p19; Taskin 2012, p295). This was an important change, as this media outlet was in favour of the military in the past, especially their coup attempt and the 28th February process against the Welfare Party. Tugal (2007) observed that the support of this media outlet was noticeable in the writings of columnists and editorials in which they emphasised how the new party called itself ‘conservative democrat’, rather than ‘Muslim democrat’, with the latter option having been discussed between 1999 and 2000, but it was decided not to use it after high-level consultation. Ayse Karabat stated that:

Because the JDP put forward very clear objectives with a strong desire for a EU membership process and an economic programme designed by the IMF and World Bank, the large capital groups in Turkey and their media outlets, such as Hurriyet, Milliyet etc. – even though they had an organic relationship with the ‘old Turkey’ – did not protest or take up strong opposition against the JDP’s first term in government. They kept their oppositional perspective at a bare minimum, for instance, around some aspects of secularism, but did not show any strong opposition, especially towards economic reforms. We all know that the pro-secular media magnet Aydin Dogan once said to Erdogan ‘I made the most money in the era of the JDP’. Much later, these alliances dissolved, but in the early years of the JDP government they offered mutual benefit and worked in the interests of everyone involved.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

Moreover, the JDP in its early years not only received support from the media establishment, for they were also encouraged by the liberal and democratic socialist intelligentsia. They favoured the JDP from the perspective that in contrast to the proximity of the established parties to the state bureaucracy, this new party with a background in a self-motivated political activism and roots in a civil society movement stood out as an exception. They received them as dedicated politicians, who could really translate the voice of the people in need and embrace as wide a

spectrum of people as possible from different segments of society. Regarding which, Faruk Unsal, the chairman of Mazlumder stated that:

In its first term the JDP had a very inclusive approach to building relationships with other segments of the society. For instance, the liberal and democratic socialist intelligentsia were also supporting them. This is because they felt the need to distance themselves from the other main parties, such as the Republic Peoples Party, which had supported 28th February process and continued to use the same arguments for very long time. The JDP, however, did not do politics based on identities and ideologies. They emphasised more technical aspects of politics, such as action and results in relation to political activity. For this reason, they engaged in a reform process geared towards obtaining EU membership and adapted their political discourse accordingly, which made them look more inclusive and action oriented.

(F. Unsal, personal communication, August 11, 2015)

Furthermore, the authoritarian aspects of the Turkish liberal and democratic socialist intelligentsia eased, with political Islam no longer being seen as a threat to individual liberties (Tugal 2007, p19), given the evidence from the JDP's leadership cadre of repeated reassurances that civil liberties would not be compromised in their speeches and interviews. As they were also aware that making promises is different to getting actual results, to convince others, the JDP pushed forward a real reform process to integrate Turkey into a liberalising and democratising world, with the primary goal of getting the country into the EU. The political reform process started with the previous coalition government with the constitutional reform package passed on 3rd of October 2001. However, the progress made by the JDP governments post-2002 in comparison was most remarkable. They passed six reform packages that changed the constitution and renewed the Turkish penal code to accelerate the Europeanisation process further and to fulfil the EU's Copenhagen criteria as required (Muftuler Bac 2005, p21- p28). The table three below demonstrates the reform packages that were passed by the Turkish parliament between 2001 and 2004.

Table 3: Political Reforms in Turkey in Years Between 2001 and 2004

Political Reforms in Turkey in Years Between 2001 and 2004		
Date	Type	Major Changes
3 rd of October 2001	1 st Constitutional Package	34 Amendments to the 1982 Constitution
November 20001	New Civil Code	Gender equality in marriage
February/ March 2002	2 nd Constitutional Package	Constitutional amendments
2 nd August 2002	3 rd Constitutional Package	Abolition of the death penalty/ revised anti-terror law; allowed broadcasting in languages other than Turkish
3 rd December 2002	4 th Constitutional Package	Operationalising previous reforms/ revising the Penal Code for torture
4 th December 2002	5 th Constitutional Package	Retrial of all cases decided in State Security courts
May 2003	6 th Constitutional Package	Adopting Protocol 6 of the ECHR; converting all death sentences to life imprisonment Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law
July 2003	7 th Constitutional Package	Revise the nature of the National Security Council
7 th May 2004	8 th Constitutional Package	Ten amendments to the Constitution; freedom of the press; priority given to supranational treaties over domestic law; abolition of the State Security courts

24 th June 2004	9 th Constitutional Package	Change to Article 46 of the Penal code; revision of the Higher Education Board
25 th – 25 th September 2004	New Turkish Penal Code	Revision to laws on violence against women and children; changing the penalties for various offences and redefining offences

(Source: Muftuler Bac 2005, p23)

The dedication of the JDP leadership to the EU membership process and to building a strong relationship with the West through appreciating their principles and showing a strong will to become part of the system was spoken about many times. One week after the general election in November 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Washington and in his speech at the CSIS he said:


"I appreciate the importance of pluralism, variety and tolerance. As a requirement of my beliefs, I have set my political ideals as democracy, freedoms, tolerance, basic human rights, secularism and political participation and I know that we have to go hand in hand with other countries of the world in furthering both technologic advance and democratic values."

(Erdogan 2002, December 9 at the CSIS Statesmen's Forum)

As a consequence of this and other comments, the JDP's reformist and progressive stance became noticed and voiced not only by the liberal and centre-right intelligentsia and their media, but also by the international media, western political elites and social scientists from top universities, whereby it had become common sense to see the former political Islamists as the new reformist and progressive face of Turkey and the Islamic world. The reason for this, as demonstrated in the above table, is that the JDP government was able to pass major political reform packages in their first two years in government, which played a major role in the decision of the European Union in December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey. However, it should be

noted that some of the momentum for these reforms was a legacy from the previous government. That is, the JDP government inherited the economic reforms and packages designed by Kemal Dervis, minister of economics in the previous government, in 2001 (Pinto, 2015). Their commitment to these reforms was critical as these packages fundamentally restructured the Turkish economy and their positive results were beneficial to the JDP government's performance.


Figure 8: Average Annual Real GDP Growth (%) 2002 - 2011



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2012, Turkish Statistical Institute


Accordingly, as a result of these reforms which strengthened the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country, the economy under the JDP government grew with an average annual real GDP growth rate of %5.2 over the past nine years between 2002 and 2011 (Please refer to figure eight above). The GDP levels more than tripled to \$951 billion in 2012, up from \$312 billion in 2002, thus GDP per capita soared to \$11,720, up from USD 4,719 in the given period (Please refer to figure nine and 10 below). Such a performance was a significant achievement for the party and the leadership cadre were aware of this success. Thereby, they did not hesitate to constitute parallels with this economic performance and their counterhegemonic performance to consolidated support from the broader segments of society.

Figure 9: GDP of Turkey in Years between 2000 and 2015



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files


Figure 10: GDP per capita in Turkey (Current US \$)



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts files

Furthermore, together with IMF imposed contractionary monetary policy and the JDP's commitment to accelerate EU membership have led Turkey to show great attention to its public finance. Subsequently, while inflation came down from around 70% to 12%, Turkey managed to decrease its public deficit significantly and it has been meeting the %60 EU Maastricht criteria for public debt stock since 2004 (Yendi et al 2012, p48-50). To investors around the world, Turkey appeared fresh and profitable with its economic reforms. This new image of Turkey attracted the foreign investment that had never seen before, contributing to its steady economic revival (Onis 2006, p225). As the bar chart below in figure 11 demonstrates, the net FDI inflows to Turkey increased from one billion dollars in 2002 to 10 billion dollars in just three years' time in 2005. From then onwards, 20 billion in 2006, 22 billion in 2007 and 19 billion in 2008. From then onwards, 20 billion in 2006, 22 billion in 2007 and 19 billion in 2008. 2009 saw a sharp decline to 8.5 billion, followed by a recovery to 9 billion in 2010, 16 billion in 2011, 13.6 billion in 2012 and 12.9 billion in 2013.

Figure 11: Turkey Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows (\$ 000,000)




Source: IMF, Balance of Payments database

One of the key reason for the significant increase in FDI net inflows to Turkey was that the first JDP government adopted the Turkish Privatization Strategy Plan on 18th of May 2003. According to study conducted by Balkan-Sahin (2010), more than 70

percent of all privatization concluded in Turkey since the mid-1980s was realized during the JDP's first term in government between 2002 and 2006. For instance, while the revenue from privatization of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) between 1986 and 2002 was \$8 billion, the figure reached to almost \$18 billion between the periods, 2002-2006 (Balkan-Sahin 2010, p174). The reason for such a significant value of transaction was that the JDP government during this period privatized the highly profit making, strategically important SOEs such as TUPRAS oil refinery, the steel and iron producer ERDEMIR, and Turk Telekom (Atiyas 2009, p103). Effectively, after the implementation of the Turkish Privatization Strategy Plan by the JDP in this period, the value added of the SOEs in GDP decreased from % 6.24 in 1985 to % 1.89 in 2006 (Balkan-Sahin 2010, 175).

Figure 12: Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)




Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Nevertheless, the above chart in figure 12 demonstrates that in contrary to decline in the role of SOE for the Turkish economy, there was also a rise in gross capital formation in Turkey from % 18.14 to % 29.57, between 2001 and 2006. Gross capital formation (also known as gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy such as land improvements, machinery, the

construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, and commercial and industrial buildings, plus net changes in the level of inventories (definition from world bank database). The reason for this, the influx of FDIs and funds available from the privatization process meant that the country now had resources to take steps to rebuild its infrastructure. Over the following years, the investment on the total inland infrastructure increased €864 million in 2003 to €7 billions in 2013 (please refer to figure 13 below). The highway system grew significantly and became the symbol of success for the JDP governments which repeatedly bragged about by the JDP politicians at every election campaign. Especially, the construction of the dual carriage ways in state and provincial roads accelerated after 2003, the total length of dual carriage ways reached 9,441 km in 2005 with an increase of 5,576 km (“Ninth development plan” 2006).

Figure 13: Total Inland Transport Infrastructure Investment (€ 000, 000)



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Moreover, healthcare reforms were put in place by the first JDP government also quickly had a direct impact on people daily lives. Turkish healthcare system was characterized by its highly complex and fragmented provision and financing systems as well as inequalities in access to healthcare. This situation was highly important political issue criticised by almost all political leaders throughout 1990s but has never been tackled completely. In the year 2003, the JDP government started to implement Health Transition Program (HTP) to develop easily accessible, high-quality, efficient, and effective healthcare services for the population, which was also for the sake of pairing its healthcare system with the health regulations of the European Union (EU) and OECD countries (Jadoo et al 2014, p1). In other words, the programme aimed achieve Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Turkey, to comply with one of the core objective of World Health Organisation (Akdag 2014, p3). Effectively, as the gross domestic product (GDP) increased fourfold between 2000 and 2008, the total expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP took its share from this success and it has risen from 4.9% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2008 (Jadoo et al 2014, p2). The effect of these reforms on people's lives were very significant and there was a decrease in the share of out of pocket (OOP) payments from 27.6 percent of total healthcare expenditure in 2000 to 17.4% in 2008 (Tatar et al 2011 p53; Akdag 2014 p4). According to study by Jadoo et al (2014) on people's satisfaction by the new healthcare system in Turkey, more than two third of the population believes that the changes have had positive effects on the health system. Much of respondents (77.6%) in their study said that they will prefer the current health care system than the past (Jadoo et al 2014 p2). This is because a clear majority of respondents (82.0%) in this study believed that there was an increase in accessibility, 73.7% thought more availability of health resources, 72.6% alleged improved quality of care, and 72.6% believed better attitude of politician/mass media due to the changes in the last 10 years (Jadoo et al 2014 p2).

Consequently, the outstanding performance of the Turkish economy during the first and later the second terms of JDP governments, the above mentioned infrastructural developments, especially in transportation and healthcare led to a significant betterment of lower-to-middle class lives around the country, garnering significant JDP support from these communities who had been suffering the hardest from the previous economic instability. Hence, the political appeal based on free market

principles as a previously political Islamist politicians, not only enabled the JDP to seem modern and international but also respond to its own base of electoral support that had roots in MUSİAD and other outward oriented capital groups. They counter the Kemalist emphasis on public intervention as a means for economic growth and public involvement in private economic decision-making, as the main cause of the inefficiency and market distortions in Turkish economy. They managed to change the common sense of the masses in Turkey from state-led development towards market-based one (Balkan-Sahin 2010, p177). Thereby, their successful alliances with outward oriented national capital and international organisations such as IMF and World Bank, enabled the first term JDP government to perform better in management of the economy and reflect a reformist outlook. Abdullah Gul recalled the following at interview:

Not only were we successful in economic terms, but we also had become a great reformist party. In fact, I will never forget this, there was one time where there was a headline in the New York Times titled that Turkey had become a grand reformist country. I took this newspaper to the cabinet meeting and said do you see this headline in the New York Times; our family background and identity is known to all, we are all religious people. However, they went that far and called us reformists. That means they are giving us positive credit. Why because what we achieved so far is very positive and rational, so that we created lots of hope in Turkey, and also gained lots of prestige and respect outside of Turkey. At that time, Turkey truly became a source of inspiration.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

Concomitantly, the international intelligentsia and capital groups, along with like-minded people in Turkey, worked systematically to legitimise not only leadership of Erdogan and the JDP but also what came to be their trademark: ‘conservative democracy’ rather than ‘political Islamist’ (Tugal 2007, p19). The JDP was given credit by the majority of civil society organisations at home and abroad as they expressed their will to work in the interests of many against the hegemonic state controlled by a few. The JDP became an expression of civil society that had the objective of delivering a positive change to people’s lives without seeking to satisfy any narrow interests. As explained in the previous section, the background of

leadership cadre, especially Erdogan and Gul's, led the JDP leadership cadre to retain the support of the millions who saw them as people who spoke their language and understood their problems. In sum, all the major classes in Turkey and interest groups abroad could see something for themselves in the JDP; this was, in the classical sense, a hegemonic capitalist project which had the means to combine all the necessary skill sets and characteristics of successful intellectual and moral leadership.

7.2 Rejection of Political Islamist Identity and Formation of New Intellectual and Moral Leadership

Despite the leaders of the party having always strongly opposed this proposition, the JDP was labelled as political Islamists right from the beginning of their political reign. They claimed that their political stance had changed and that they accepted the realities of the existing system. In order to clarify this proposition, I asked all my interviewees the question as to whether they saw the JDP as a political Islamist party. Almost all of the interviewees argued that the JDP did not represent political Islam in Turkey when they emerged in 2002. Instead, they all identified the party as one of "conservative democrats" similar to those in Europe, where they believe that religion and democratic values can be blended to constitute comprehensive political appeal. In fact, the majority of interviewees put much more emphasis on the JDP's neoliberal and reformist identity than its standing for political Islam or conservative democracy. For instance, Ayse Karabat said:

If you are asking me particularly about the origin of the JDP as a political party and movement. To be honest, I cannot categorise them as political Islamist. For me, the JDP can only ever be categorised as a pro-business party with some sensitivities for Islam.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

Another interviewee, Professor Burhanettin Duran explained:

I do not think it represents political Islam. Because when you consider political Islam as a concept, you are then talking about a project of Islamisation by overthrowing the existing state. I do not think that the JDP ever aimed to achieve this. They explained

their position many times again and again that they do not have any intention of Islamising the society. So, this is just a perception of the opposition at home and abroad that the JDP will Islamise Turkish society.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

My contention is that the JDP chose to become involved in a political ‘manoeuvre’ in their struggle against the pro-secular and military hegemonic state rather than engaging in ‘frontal attack’. Erbakan’s leadership was based on constant criticism and direct confrontation with the existing hegemonic state. As a consequence, the JDP as the political platform of the emerging pious political and economic elite renounced their past and focused on economic and political reforms to gain legitimacy for their newly founded party. They offered practical and flexible solutions for dealing with the chronic problems of Turkey at the time. Likewise, Demirel’s central right parties in the past, they avoided to deal with many critical issues, such as the wearing of the headscarf that had led to their previous parties being closed down by the constitutional court until they consolidate enough power (Taskin 2012, p295). They focused on objectives such as implementation of full scale neoliberal reforms and accelerating the EU accession process, which they believed would weaken the power of the military and the pro-secular establishment.

Furthermore, their political identity and positioning was also extremely important for the global powers, given the power of the JDP, which was considered at the time of having its roots in political Islam. In fact, they came to power just a year after the attack by extremists on the World Trade Centre and hence, it was important for countries, such the, USA to be reassured of their political orientation towards Western values (Dagi 2005, p21-22). In order to clarify their new political identity, the leaders of the JDP made various visits to Western countries to hold meetings with high level bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen. They also attended various strategic international conferences and gave interviews to major international media outlets. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002, at a conference for CSIS in Washington said:

My political views have always been in a state of constant evolution. Naturally, I have been profoundly influenced by those that have preceded me... Our party is the product of the continuity of the Turkish national existence. In some western newspapers and publications, my party described as “an Islamic party” or as “Muslim Democrats”. These characterizations are not correct. This is not because we are not Muslim or democrat, but because we believe the two need to be considered in two different contexts... Turkey wishes to take its “political Magna Carta”, which rests on a synthesis between its Muslim identity and modern values, much further by becoming an active leader of the system of modern values, and thus to provide the world with a new “renaissance” perspective which can be a new source of inspirations.

(Erdogan 2002, December 9 at the CSIS Statesmen’s Forum)

As the above quote from Recep Tayyip Erdogan illustrates, the JDP rejected the notion that it represented political Islam or Islam, in general. They appeared to be a flexible party that avoided ‘frontal attack’, whilst acknowledging the realities of the political, economic and intellectual hegemonic system in the current era. Especially, whenever the party confronted with complicated political issues pursued by contentious actors, it made a tactical move by taking refuge in the centre-right’s consoling legacy of procrastination or escape from politics (Taskin 2012, p295). This approach they believed would yield legitimacy for their emerging hegemony and would constitute a political base that would allow them to succeed in the long term. Accordingly, in the beginning, the JDP did not base their politics on a very strictly defined ideology (Tepe 2006, p118-120). They redefined their political leadership and vision by coming to terms with their past rooted in the National View movement, by proposing that they would embrace everyone. They claimed that they would do this by respecting the religious and cultural sentiments of all people, whilst integrating them onto the global political, economic and intellectual system represented by the European Union (F. Unsal, personal communication, August 11, 2015). However, whilst the interviewees claimed that the JDP is not a political Islamist entity they could not separate the JDP’s politics from Islam altogether. For instance, Professor Yasin Aktay from the JDP said:

The Justice and Development party never called itself political Islamist. Moreover, it never labelled the party as an Islamist movement. However, it is true that most of the leadership cadre in our party have a conservative background and they are people who embrace the values and principles of Islam and reflect them in their politics, but this is only up to a certain point. What I mean by this is to say that our party's perspective on a fair justice system, human rights, liberty and life with dignity, they are all linked to the core ideas of Islam. Islam clearly teaches that you shall not force people. Therefore, our understanding of liberty comes from this particular notion of Islam, which gives people freedom of choice in their lives. Our party adopted Islam in such a way that it bases its politics on these notions, but at the same time it constitutes a political representation that does not have any serious conflict with the global value system.

(Y. Aktay, personal communication, August 6, 2015)

Another interviewee, Ali Sahin, stated:

There should be no race to see who represents Islam in the best possible way. Islam is a religion that has an organic relationship with the entire society and people have strong bonds with that such that it does not need to be represented by any political party. Therefore, we can say that the JDP is a conservative democrat party, which has genes link to Islam and its conservative tradition. We are a democratic party with conservative values.

(A. Sahin, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

The JDP's relationship with Islam was embedded in its political activities, but it was not as noticeable as it was for the Welfare Party. Consequently, I contend that the JDP initially denied being a representative of political Islam in their discourse by accepting the realities of the global hegemonic order and economic system, but at the same time could not distinguished themselves from religion altogether and pursued a flexible political agenda based on their special political interest. The JDP was the new form of political Islamic synthesis in Turkey, which sought, based on its political identity, a practical and dynamic understanding of Islam and politics. This was indeed quite different to the previous political parties under Erbakan's leadership or other political Islamist movements in the region. Regarding which, in order to clarify my

interviewees position on political Islam in Turkey I asked them a follow up question as to whether they saw the Welfare or Virtue Party as political Islamist. Their response was very carefully articulated, but generally affirmative. For instance, Professor Burhanettin Duran said:

When we consider the Nationalist View from a narrow perspective it does not represent political Islam. However, if we consider it from a broader perspective, the movement indeed heavily emphasised the values and principles of Islam in society. Nevertheless, it never called for implementation of Sharia law, thus it declared its loyalty for the secularist state establishment and staying within the boundary of democratic principles. Consequently, we can classify them as Islamists within the political spectrum in Turkey, but it only as the softest Islamists among all when you compare them with other political Islamists in the region.

(B. Duran, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

Ali Sahin stated:

We can say that the Welfare Party under Erbakan's leadership emphasised Islamism more than our party, therefore, through such a distinctive and bold approach we can maybe say that they are Islamist. However, the identity of the JDP is conservative democrat which has its roots and genes in Islam. As a matter of fact, we are all Muslim, therefore, all our common principles, norms, values and cultural beliefs comes from Islam. The difference is how much you use that discourse in your political activities. The JDP had a leadership system and style which enforced our party to avoid problems that could rise from a specific political position.

(A. Sahin, personal communication, August 5, 2015)

The JDP's eager to stay neutral against all political perspectives when they found the party and governed the country for the first time was a conscious decision to eliminate the danger that can come from existing hegemonic forces. However, this was not the only reason as I demonstrated in the previous chapter the leadership cadre of JDP as the conservative political and economic bloc representing lower and emerging middle classes in Turkey experienced a cathartic moment after two political parties they were associated as a political Islamist banned by the existing hegemonic forces. Thereby, from Gramsci's point of view I argue that these experiences and changes in socio-

economic structure of Turkey in 80' and 90' forced the faction of the political Islamist in Turkey to transcend their corporate limits and became aware of the interests of other subordinate groups too. This was a political phase in a sense led this group of politicians to reject their previous identity and form a new intellectual and moral leadership to achieve hegemonic leadership based on support of broader segments of the society. As rightly put by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks:

This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become “party”, come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society— bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a “universal” plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion.

(Gramsci 1971, p182)

The JDP presented itself “as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the “national” energies” (Gramsci 1971, p182). Their commitment to neoliberal economic reform linked with the counterhegemonic project based European Union membership process allowed them to concretely coordinate their hegemonic aspirations with the general interests of the subordinate groups during their first term in government. According to Hale (2006, p66 - 83) the JDP’s reference point for their conservative democrat identity had sufficient similarities Christian Democrats of Europe, particularly Christian Democrat Union in Germany. Therefore, this reference point itself is a strong evidence which shows that the party strongly avoided itself from political Islamist perspective which was widely associated with the Middle Eastern political spectrum. However, this has also led the party leadership to struggle in defining clear ideological mission and forced them to adopt a gelatinous form, and eventually give up from the fundamental causes that it advocated for its political and economic mission time to time.

7.3 The Dynamic Character of the JDP: The Political Chameleon

When political Islam is conceptualised as a comparative model and applied to Muslim dominant countries, the Turkish context differentiates from many of them, especially in relation to the politics of Arab world. However, whilst the JDP's leadership performance in years between 2002 and 2007 differed substantially from many of the countries in the Middle East, the process that led this party to evolve as a mass party in Turkey deserves investigation from a comparative perspective. The reason for this at the micro level when political movements in the region analysed it was evident that they all had the similar networks of partisans, activities in civil society and leadership backgrounds. In fact, when the political Islamist parties under Necmettin Erbakan's leadership are considered in terms of their use of religious aspects for their political activities and discourse, they had more common features with political Islam in the Middle East than the JDP (Yahya Hamid, Personal Communication, September 1, 2015). Thus, the political Islamist parties in Turkey, including the Felicity Party, tended to have more common characteristics with other political Islamist groups in the region by having their political platform based on the dominant model of the Sufi brotherhoods (Zarcone 2004 cited in Yavuz 2006, p41). This research contents that whilst the reformist faction of political Islam in Turkey changed their politics from the more exclusive brotherhood model to the more inclusive and ideologically vague concept of the JDP during its early years in government, they still preserved their organic relationship with political Islam as it has become clear from their activities since they gained power. The JDP under Erdogan's leadership has had very flexible boundaries such that it has been able to change its approach and to adopt a new identity for itself, depending on the circumstances, thus acting like a political chameleon. That is, it has taken whatever steps were necessary to gain and retain political leverage over the state. Ayse Karabat stated that:

The identity of the JDP, I see it this way. Which form of the JDP are we referring to? We have seen so many different identities and forms of the JDP over 15 years. It was completely different party in 2002, then we witnessed another version after 2007 and 2011. And what we have now is completely opposite form to that in 2002. The JDP is an organism which has multi forms. From this perspective, perhaps, it is one of the

most dynamic political parties in the world. The JDP is like a chameleon. It can adapt, shape and change itself, according to any political and economic circumstances.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

Most interviewees, like Ayse Karabat with the above statement, agreed that the JDP does not constraint itself to very definitive ideological boundaries. For this reason, they argued that the party could make alliances with people from various backgrounds, such as liberals, social democrats and nationalists, amongst others. They all also agreed that in 2002 the JDP leadership appealed to people with a conservative democratic identity and never claimed to be a party of particular ideology, such as Islamist or nationalist. The party programme was inclusive and flexible to address the needs and interests of wider segments of society. The interviewees also agreed that the JDP saw itself as a party of duty, with a mission of serving the country and its people. However, whilst they rejected classifying the JDP as a political Islamist party and were extremely careful regarding how they associated the JDP's political identity with religion, they did not completely deny influence of religion for the party's vision and purpose. For instance, the vice president of Turkish parliament, Ahmet Aydin stated at interview that:


I do not only see the JDP as a political party. Alongside its political identity and function, it also represents a 'dava' (the case/ cause); it's a movement of mission. I personally approach my politics from a perspective that our party has principles and values, which attribute to this movement a soul that seeks a greater purpose. That is to say that, yes, we are a political party, but our belief for "the dava" (the cause) for greater purpose differentiate us from others. The "dava" is about people who were outcast, alienated and oppressed for a very long time and hence, for those people who could not find the means to express their political rights.

(A. Aydin, personal communication, July 14, 2015)

Concomitantly, the JDP leadership managed to produce a conservative version of democracy and minimised its critical discourse of the pro-secular establishment. They avoided direct confrontation with the so-called guardians of the Turkish state, namely 'the Military or secular elite', until their power was curbed through reforms initiated for the sake of the EU membership process and economic reforms that would restructure the Turkish economy along neoliberal lines. To achieve this aim, the

evidence in this chapter shows that the JDP leadership, especially Erdogan, repeatedly denied their ideological connection with religion based politics. This is because they understood that such a framing in the short run would make it easier for them to control the distribution of resources and in time reallocate them for the interests of the new counter conservative elite determined to foster their economic, political and cultural networks (Taskin 2012, p293). No political party in Turkey has, so far, acted similarly to the JDP in dismantling the state's considerable powers by creating and advancing a novel rich elite, whilst implicitly or explicitly making the old wealthy elite comply with their regime (Taskin 2012, p293). As the figure 14 demonstrates in below, the wealth share of the richest % 1 in Turkey increased from % 39.4 in 2002 to % 54.3 in 2014. This is a crucial statistic which indicates over the 14 years of JDP rule in the country almost % 15 of the wealth in Turkey shifted to the top % 1 of Turkish society, making them control more than half of the nation's wealth. This meant that the JDP's counterhegemonic project strengthened as the profit hungry Turkish bourgeoisie regarded the party not as an ideologically but rather one of businessmen.

Figure 14: Wealth Share of the Richest % 1 in Turkey



Source: Global Wealth Databook 2014, Credit Suisse Research Institute.

Whilst all the interviewees stated that the JDP represents 'conservative democracy' in Turkey, their position on how to interpret the concept differed from one another. Some of them, such as Ali Sahin, Yasin Aktay and Ahmet Aydin, associated Islam

with democracy, arguing that the two are compatible (personal communication, 2015). As illustrated in the previous quote from Ahmet Aydin, to him, the JDP is linked to the Islamic ‘dava’ concept. However, it is questionable whether Ahmet Aydin would have been as explicit in his view during the first two terms of the JDP’s political reign in terms of linking ‘dava’ with the JDP, given Erdogan strong avoidance of being associated with political Islam during that period. Burhanettin Duran, Ayse Karabat and Faruk Unsal emphasised the flexibility and pragmatism of the leadership cadre of the JDP in contrast to ideological restriction (personal communication, 2015). Accordingly, they categorised the JDP in its early years as a conservative democratic party, rooted not in religion, but rather pragmatic with driven politicians with sensitivities to tradition and culture. Regarding which, Ayse Karabat explained:

The political identity of the JDP was kind of similar to ‘Calvinists’ in the mediaeval Europe. In fact, a type of Protestant. I think that Max Weber’s protestant ethic philosophy resonated very much with the JDP, especially in the beginning. That is to say, alright we are all religious, that’s fine, we possess a belief and we pray, too. However, we also consider how to make money. In other words, a religiously introvert life does not hold us away from the world’s business.

(A. Karabat, personal communication, July 15, 2015)

Notably, Abdullah Gul also did not deny his or the party’s connection with religion, arguing that it was not possible to avoid the role of religion in as Muslim dominant society:

I want to make this point very clear. Our values and principles are very evident. We are trying our best to be religious, but how much we are devout persons is a matter of God’s own judgement. It is true that our Islamic identity is very well known and the most spoken about aspect of our political background, but we were only seeing this matter through the norms and principles of society. The role of the religion and its significance for people is a very evident matter for Muslim dominant countries and if you want to do politics in these countries you must know how to compromise Islam with other aspects of democracy.

(A. Gul, personal communication, October 27, 2015)

From Gramscian perspective, I would argue that the counterhegemonic identity of the JDP, which was formulated as conservative democratic, was a form of “*national-popular collective will*” that sought to capture the support of broader segments of Turkish society (Gramsci 1971, p130). During this process, the JDP leadership redefined its political and economic ideologies to be accepted by the majority. In this sense, the JDP was “*the organiser and the active, operative expression*” of the new counterhegemonic project in Turkey (Gramsci 1971, p133). It was the agent of a hegemonic process based on “*intellectual and moral reform linked with a programme of economic reform*” (Gramsci 1971, p133). In sum, the JDP managed to capture the support of the masses and consolidate them as a single bloc, which promoted the same “*national-popular collective will*” that the centre right parties dominated for many years. They associated their counterhegemonic project with the rule of the pious majority, who were seeking democratic rights and freedom. However, they did not restrict themselves to within the boundaries of a single entity or ideology, but rather, moved beyond their self-interest and constituted a political platform where the legacies of political Islam and the centre-right parties were combined. With this perspective, the rejection of a political Islamist identity and the embracing of conservative democracy allowed them to be constituted itself at the top of a new broad-based movement binding together a variety of social groups, including the poor and destitute in both rural and urban areas as well as intellectuals, professionals and businesspeople, who had felt excluded from the dominant power basis in society.

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to provide an analysis of Turkish political economy during the first term of the JDP government. This was a crucial investigation to explain the crucial link between intellectual and moral leadership and the economic one. The JDP leadership rejected their political Islamist identity and argued that they represented the new face of the central right spectrum, which they called conservative democracy. This was important for them as the party sought to include as many people from different perspectives and avoid direct confrontation with the secular state. This was necessary, as their previous experience had taught them that with such confrontation with the secular elite without broad based social support, their hegemonic project was doomed to fail. Hence, the party as discussed in the previous chapter, forged an

organic relationship with emerging capitalist groups, who were in support of the party so long as it was aiming to be instrumental in embedding Turkey within the world wide neoliberal project.

To achieve this aim, the first JDP government promoted a neoliberal pro-membership project and advocated that it was for competitiveness and democratisation. Accordingly, this chapter has highlighted how as the economic reform process initiated by the previous government and representatives of the IMF and World Bank started to bear its fruits, the JDP did not hesitate to carry on with the same reform strategy in order to strengthen and maintain the solidarity of its immediate allies. Regarding which, this chapter has demonstrated that the economy under the JDP government grew with an average annual real GDP growth rate of 5.2% over the nine years between 2002 and 2011. The GDP levels more than tripled to \$951 billion in 2012, up from \$312 billion in 2002, accompanied by GDP per capita soaring up to \$11,720, up from \$4,719 in the given period. This was a significant achievement for the party, which meant it had promoted the interests of its allies further and those of subaltern classes, by making real improvements in their socioeconomic lives.

Moreover, in this chapter I have demonstrated that conservative democracy as a political identity allowed the JDP to combine the ideological elements of religion, democracy and a neoliberal economic order to create a counterhegemonic momentum to achieve hegemonic success without violent confrontation with the military and secular elite. The reason for this, based on the information from the interviews, was that the JDP's leadership were aware of the heterogeneity of influential political actors in Turkey and accepted that a specific political approach could not defeat the existing hegemonic order before they came to power. The JDP moved towards the centre right spectrum away from a political Islamist position in order to sustain an alliance between multiple actors and to overcome particularism. Nevertheless, when the JDP governments are investigated closer, it was possible to observe that whilst the party's political ideology was close to the centre right spectrum at the beginning of its political reign, later, it reverted to a liberal, political Islamist and nationalist persuasion. As such, the party has a gelatinous form, for it has not hesitated to give up on fundamental causes that it advocated previously to promote its political and economic mission at certain times.

Chapter 8

The New Face of the Brotherhood and the Tragedy of Gamal Mubarak

At all events, the fact that the State/government, conceived as an autonomous force, should reflect back its prestige upon the class upon which it is based, is of the greatest practical and theoretical importance, and deserves to be analysed fully if one wants a more realistic concept of the State itself. Moreover, this phenomenon is not something exceptional, or characteristic of one kind of State only. It can, it seems, be incorporated into the function of élites or vanguards, i.e. of parties, in relation to the class which they represent.

(Gramsci 1971, p269)

The hegemonic bloc that underpinned the Nasserist revolution was composed of a socio-political coalition of three social classes: the middle class, the urban working class, and the rural poor (Ibrahim 2002, p117). The social force of these classes continued to shape the political, intellectual and economic scenes in Egypt, but the big bourgeoisie connected to the military bureaucratic elites and international capital, who were mostly created during the Sadat era through the infitah reform process, dominated the state decision making mechanism, which led to the marginalization of these classes (Bayat 1998 p157; Clark 2004 p5; Kandil 2012 p211-212; Roccu 2012 p153; Talani 2014 p102). The regime did not hesitate to use coercion and repression, whereby an emergency decree had allowed them to contain any possible dissent from these classes for decades. However, they finally gained a forceful momentum with the uprising in Tahrir square, overthrowing the president Hosni Mubarak and his cronies who had led the country for 30 years. In this chapter, I investigate how the Egyptian middle and lower classes at last reached the necessary consciousness and confidence as a protest movement to stand up against Hosni Mubarak and his heir Gamal Mubarak. I take on the case of Muslim Brothers as the largest and the most organised opposition movement in the country to analyse their role in the protest movement, which began to generate among the fragments of the Egyptian middle class at the beginning of the new millennium. I discuss the experience of the Muslim Brothers' political branch in the 1990s and 2000s to illustrate how the new generation of its candidates gained their first electoral experience by participating in professional

syndicates or municipal assemblies. Moreover, I evaluate their approaches to adopting a new counterhegemonic strategy to be part of the emerging political reform momentum and reach an embryonic alliance with discontent subaltern groups that constituted to the backbone of this movement.

8.1 The Brothers Return to Parliamentary Politics and their Alliance with the Protest Movement

Though the regime has never fully given up using repression and systematically hampered the Muslim Brothers' electoral campaign through arrest of its candidates, the Brothers managed to return to parliament and to the professional syndicates in 2000 (el-Ghobashy 2005 p387; Antar 2006 p9). President Hosni Mubarak approved the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling which called for judicial supervision of the elections in 1999 (Antar 2006, p9). In effect, this decision gave a relative credibility to the parliamentary elections in 2000 as it was the first election supervised by judges. Though the impact of Mubarak's political liberation process in the early years of 2000 was limited, within just a few years, the Muslim Brothers achieved spectacular electoral successes and advanced to become the Egypt's strongest organised oppositional force (Ranko 2012, p158-159). The parliamentary elections of 2000 were the first in which the members of the movement took part and gained seats in the Egyptian parliament since 1987 elections, but this was only possible because of their very cautious approach in the elections aimed at avoiding any direct confrontation with the regime (el-Ghobashy 2005, p388). For instance, the Brotherhood decided to run for only 75 of the 444 seats open to contestation, which meant that many of the high-profile names would not be able participate in this election (Wickham 2013, p97).

After a decade of repression towards their political activities, the Brotherhood made their comeback to Egyptian politics by securing 17 seats in this election (Fisher & Lunn 2003 p306; el-Ghobashy 2005 p387). More importantly, within just few months, the Muslim Brothers emerged victorious in another important electoral arena. In February 2001, in the first elections at the bar association since Law 100/1993, a national slate put together by the Muslim Brotherhood won the elections and its board made of eight of Muslim Brothers, four NDP members and a Copt (El-Ghobashy

2005, p377). The parliamentary and bar elections were a promising achievement for the movement as after these victories the Brotherhood started to regain a momentum for their counter hegemonic ambitions.

Whilst the Brothers gradually expanded their influence within several other influential syndicates and regained influence over Egyptian politics in the following years, they remained cautious so as not to provoke the regime (Ranko 2012, p158). Their new approach was based on a strategy that sought less confrontation with the system that Mubarak and the military strictly controlled. Thereby, they focused on building relationship which allowed them to reach broader socioeconomic segments represented by different political and interest groups in Egypt. The idea was that if the Brotherhood recalibrated their counterhegemonic activities with the demands of changing international and domestic politics, they had a better chance of achieving greater influence in Egypt and the region (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015).

Upon this background, I argue that the new strategy of the Brothers was not based on their self-awareness of the possible state coercion if they continued with the old strategy, but rather, was related to the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, and their tactical alliances with other opposition groups were aimed at protesting against the fast spreading violence in the region. The key events, such as the second Intifada between Palestinians and the authorities of Israel after Ariel Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa mosque in September 2002 and the interventionist foreign policy approach of the Western bloc under the American leadership in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre influenced the perception of the Egyptian people and created a national consensus among political groups with different ideological backgrounds (Ranko 2012, p160). More importantly, these civil–democratic movements were also entwined with the “economic” protests and the struggles of workers, farmers, slum-dwellers, and villagers against the violent accumulation strategy dictated by the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) and similar reform packages (De Smet 2014, p28). For instance, from this perspective when I asked the senior Brotherhood member Rida Fehmi in an interview about the Society's approach in the early 2000, he explained:

I was one of the leading people in the 2000 and 2005 political campaigns for independent candidates. Whenever the Ikhwan was participating in coalition with another party I was always elected as a coordinator. I was responsible for the dialogue between all other sections and political parties of Egypt and the ikhwan. Therefore, I can answer this question very well. We worked with NGOs and civil society organisations from many different groups. These groups were from many different backgrounds such as Nasserist, the church, businessmen etc. In early 2000s, especially after the 2003 invasion of Iraqi by the US and its allies we organised many conferences and campaigns to which we invited various scholars, civil society and community leaders from all around the world to Egypt to discuss the impact that this War in Iraq would have in the Middle East. This conference series took about seven years.

(R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015)

Starting with the second Infitah, then the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, heightened the tension in the region. Similar to the early 1990s, the Muslim Brothers took this opportunity to take part on platforms where most of the opposition actors came together to discuss and find solutions for the problems of Muslims around the world and across the region. For instance, De Smet (2015) in his study highlighted that *“the political basis for a front between Islamists and Leftists was anti-imperialism – even though they often had a different view on the content of the concept – and the struggle for civil and human rights. The ‘anti-imperialism’ of the Ikhwan was not framed as a political- economic critique, but as a cultural-religious clash of civilizations between Islam and the West (p223).”* Nonetheless, it was these platforms which provided the Brothers with the opportunity to coordinate and organise joint workshops and conferences with non-Islamist oppositional forces to create a common sense or sense of national unity against the state repression and the foreign power behind this aggression (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015).

In these series of conferences, therefore, the Brotherhood not only focused on the problems of Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, for they were also critical of pro-Western Arab states, such as the Egyptian one under the Mubarak leadership, which subordinated Arab interests to Western interests in the region (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015). Nevertheless, the

approaches that the Brothers and other oppositional forces that came together to raise awareness to create national consensus against the status quo were not limited to these conferences (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015). They also organised and most importantly generated a nascent culture of protest movements, in which groups of people with different political leanings came together to express their discontent publicly, and increasingly through demonstrations (De Sment 2015, p224). Whilst these protests in early 2000s were not as effective as those that would take place in later years, they represented the first signs of the consensus subsequently achieved amongst discontented groups against the regime's heavy handed approach. More importantly, they represented the first seeds of the relentless and ambitious protest movement, which would eventually overthrow the regime led by Mubarak and his cronies in 2011. The Brotherhood, particularly, as the largest opposition movement in the country, articulated a new political program stemming from the ideas of the young generation of Brothers who emphasized principles of democracy more confidently and shared common grounds with the other liberal opposition groups and activists in the streets (Antar 2006, p10). In the next section, I will discuss the nature of this transformation that the Brothers political branch experience and illustrate that how did this new generation of candidates who had gained their first electoral experience by participating in syndicates or municipal assemblies adopted a new counterhegemonic strategy to be the part of the emerging political reform momentum and form an embryonic alliance with dispossessed and discontented classes in Egypt.

8.2 The Brotherhood's Democratic and Reformist Manoeuvre for the General Election in 2005

Furthermore, while the Brothers kept their political ambition and activities with a relatively low profile in the early 2000s, this was going to change with the sudden political liberalisation process dictated by the Western powers such as "Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative" (BMENA) which was discussed and approved at the G-8 summit in June 2004 (Wickham 2013, p104). This project particularly forced the Mubarak regime to ease their authoritarian practices towards all sectors of the opposition in Egypt, including the Muslim Brotherhood (Wickham 2013, p104). The initiative encouraged oppositional groups, such as the Brotherhood, to reformulate an election strategy with the hope of firmly reasserting themselves in

Egyptian politics. For instance, the reform programme that the Brothers announced on the 3rd of March 2004 with the title “The Muslim Brotherhood's Initiative as a Reform Program” listed number of reforms that the Mubarak regime could implement to satisfy the growing demands of the Egyptian people (Al-Qumni 2004; “*Muslim Brotherhood Initiatives*” 2007). This new approach, which had stronger emphasis on democratic and liberal values, allowed the political Islamists to position their politics among the other groups with different political leanings that also asked for democratic reforms. The below statement from the Brotherhood’s Reform Programme in 2004 can be regarded as an example for this change:

We, the Muslim Brotherhood, stress our commitment to the regime as a democratic, constitutional, parliamentary, presidential one, in the framework of Islamic principles. We also believe in the individual’s right to effective political participation as a cornerstone for the independence political decision locally and on the international level... All these sides of comprehensive reform, and other sides as well, could not be achieved but through the application of democracy, which we believe in and are committed to its bases (“Muslim Brotherhood Initiatives”, 2007).

Nevertheless, whilst in this reform programme the Brotherhood avoided mentioning the principles of Islam and rule of Sharia heavily, their approach changed once again in the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2005. The election manifesto for the Brotherhood affiliated independence candidates stated that:

The Sharia specifies the individual, collective and social duties and represents perfection for man, a system for the ruling, a fort for the community and an authority that follows the restrictive ordinance of the Almighty. Islam requires a state to practice and protect it and to follow its method, just like the liberal solution also requires the same (“The Muslim Brotherhood’s Programme”, 2007).

Then it argues:

*Concerning the authority of the governor, it is according to the social contract between the governor and the people; established by the nation, which improves its civil institutions. Civilisation denies the holiness and priesthood of the country and keeps its legitimate Islamic reference, as Islam places limits and rights. **It is a state***

that combines both religion and the state. So, the nation has the right to appoint the ruler, control him, and depose him if its benefit requires that, for he is a civil governor and it is a civil state (“*The Muslim Brotherhood’s Programme*”, 2007).

As the statements above illustrate, the Brotherhood’s political platform still possessed an ideological vagueness that urged other opposition groups in the country to question the so-called grey zones that created doubts whether the Brothers might be advocating democracy for purely strategic or instrumental reasons. At the same time, these grey zones gave the contemporaneous authoritarian regime an excuse to limit the political activities of Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the above text also indicates that the Brotherhood sides with the rising democratic and progressive movements at the time by emphasizing the role that religion plays for democratic and fairer society and state. For the next general election, the Brotherhood articulated an election programme with the same reformist and democratic agendas and through these perspectives it sought to appeal broader segments of society. Thus, the programme’s heavy emphasis on civil, democratic and reformist agenda let the Brotherhood dominant Egyptian political Islamists to display an outlook and aspirations which was similar to what other oppositional groups, especially leftist activists, expressed at the time (El-Ghobashy 2005, p389). Therefore, the programme intended to attract popular support from several audiences: the Egyptian government; opposition parties and independent intellectuals; and all-important foreign parties demanding Arab reform, principally the Bush administration and its "Greater Middle East Initiative" (El-Ghobashy 2005, p390).

As a result, the Brothers indirectly constituted a pact with this specific left leaning movements such as “*Kefaya*” (Enough) which allowed them to draw a popular support from workers, peasants, and broad layers of the urban middle classes and subproletariat (De Smet 2015, p226). The “*Kefaya*” movement was one of the most known and perhaps most effective social movement in recent Egyptian political trajectory. According to Abdelrahman (2015) it represents a landmark in modern Egyptian history as it introduced new forms of opposition politics fundamentally different in strategy and tactics from traditional opposition groups. The leaders of the “*Kefaya*” movement were a loose network of individual activists, intellectuals and public figures with many of them having roots in the Arab nationalist and leftist

opposition (Wickham 2013 p107; Abdelrahman 2015 p37). The core focus of the “*Kefaya*” movement was democratic change in Egypt. They organized a series of highly visible demonstrations which broke the taboo against criticising Mubarak and cronies of his family (Abdelrahman 2015 p37). This is because before the “*Kefaya*” movement was established as a unitary movement on 21 February 2005, the street activists, including Brotherhood members, were careful not to cross the red line of directly criticising the Mubarak regime (De Sment 2015, p220). However, their growing popularity among the Egyptian people gave oppositions groups in Egypt the ability to become more confident day after day in terms of their criticism about the failings of the regime.

8.3 Kefaya and The Brotherhood

To achieve a democratic change in Egypt, “*Kefaya*” had two major demands: first, Mubarak should not ask for another mandate in the next election and second, he should not pass the office of presidency to his son (Antar 2006 p10; Abdelrahman 2015 p36). Apart from these two demands, *Kefaya*’s manifesto stated that the government should end the emergency law, overturn all laws which constrain collective and individual freedom, ensure unsanctioned freedom of association and remove the state sequestration then imposed on syndicates (Antar 2006 p26, Abdelrahman 2015 p37). Most importantly, *Kefaya* movement demanded that state should prepare genuine election conditions under the supervision of the Supreme Judicial Council and State Council to give several candidates a fair chance to run for president and vice-president offices (Abdelrahman 2015, p36). Effectively, these kinds of openly challenging demands against Mubarak and his cronies strengthen the tacit consensus amongst the Brotherhood members and the activists calling for democratic political reform (De Sment 2015 p220-221; Abdelrahman 2015 p110-111).

Accordingly, the core election theme of the Brotherhood’s manifesto for 2005 elections, mostly focused on *Kefaya*’s demands and based a strategy which ask for democratic change in Egypt. As outlined in the table four below, the election manifesto repeatedly stated that the absence of democracy in Egypt had resulted in a weakening the political, economic, cultural and most importantly national security

aspects of the Egyptian state. This new political language that the Brotherhood formulated for the 2005 general election was important for the movement if it wished to be part of the broad consensus emerging in Egyptian streets for democratic reforms. As it will be further explained in the following sections, whilst “*Kefaya*” movement did not achieve its full objectives but it has also led to a more confident and organized opposition movement in the Egyptian streets.

Table 4: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Programme for the Parliamentary Elections of 2005

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Programme for the Parliamentary Elections of 2005		
Realising Political Liberty	Supporting Civil Society	The Economic Reform
The Muslim Brotherhood sees that Egypt has suffered for a long time from the absence of democracy , the monopoly of wealth and authority, the rising of corruption, the abundance of laws and clauses that oppose public freedoms and human rights, the increasing number of the political detainees and the various types of torture.	The Muslim Brotherhood considers that the absence of democracy , the imposition of the emergency law since Oct. 1981 up until now, and other obstacles which limit the freedoms, have resulted in individuals abstaining from participating in general work that would lead to a better future. Whatever the efficiency of the government may be, it cannot alone develop society and achieve a good standard of living for the people.	The Muslim Brotherhood watches the local and the international development, and sees that the absence of democracy , and the imposition of the emergency law since October 1981 up until now has led to the monopoly of wealth and power by a few persons; consequently, corruption has spread everywhere.

The National Security

The national security is a basic axis for the governing system and a prop for the institutional state. It is based on the stability of the internal bloc and the power of the external bloc. Thus, sound rule is based internally on the satisfaction and the interconnection between the regime and the people, and peace making between the government and the nation. **It is based on freedom, especially the nation's freedom to choose its rulers and representatives. The mutual consultation is the basis, and democracy is the acceptable mechanism in the modern state.** The peaceful circulation of power asserts that the nation is the source of all power and the ruler is the nation's employee. Economic stability, respecting the values and the culture of society, and the independence of its identity and reference will lead to the internal stability of the nation. This stability will unite and present a strong internal front that has the ability to protect its geographic borders from all kinds of foreign invasion, Westernisation, threats, and aggression.

(*"The Muslim Brotherhood's Program"*, 2007)

De Smet (2015) argues that *Kefaya* movement was too focused on political demands of the civil-democratic subject and it failed to offer the subaltern classes the means of overcoming their economic problems. De Smet (2015) studied that although the *Kefaya* movement disintegrated from the main cause of street movement, the workers strike in *El Mahalla* in December 2006 led by some of the *Kefaya* associates brought a strong momentum for a change in Egyptian political and economic leadership. His study concluded that *"the saliency of the Mahalla strikes led to a re-appreciation of the workers' movement as a force of societal change, and called a number of traditional intellectuals 'back to class'"* (De Smet 2015, p258). It is, therefore, important to highlight that it was the demands of the *Kefaya* movement such as freedom, democracy and social justice which first provided the platform for an embryonic alliance between dispossessed and discontented classes but it was the *Mahalla* movement which pushed the regime and the masses to engage in a final blow of war of position. Roccu (2012) described the agents of the dispossessed class as farmers or rural poor thrown out of their land after the implementation of Law 96 of 1992, industrial workers dismissed after privatisation or still working but with lower real wages and crippled rights, informal labourers, and increasingly proletarianised sections of public sector employees. And the other group represented as discontented

middle class as self-employed professionals and relatively well-off private sector workers who were not among the losers of neoliberal reforms, but were increasingly dissatisfied with the political regime (Roccu 2012, p231). In this latter group, Roccu (2012) also included the army officials who also perceived the rise of the capitalist oligarchy led by Mubarak's son Gamal as a threat to their status. This is a vital consideration as it signifies the growing power of the crony capitalist who did not only hesitate to crash all opposition groups i.e. the political Islamists and leftists, they also had the courage to expand their influence over the existing power structure.

In this interplay, therefore, this study contends that the Brothers firmly presented themselves as an alternative political leadership and appealed to supporters of the opposition groups as well as others who were indecisive to act against this transition. Together with their active role in the civil society organisations in Egyptian welfare sector, the new generation of Brotherhood members articulated a more comprehensive election strategy in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2005, which enabled them to achieve a landslide electoral victory. Accordingly, there are four important factors contributed to the success of the Muslim Brothers in this election: building a societal basis by working in the welfare sector, political strategies and tactics, organisational capacity and the religious factor (Antar 2006, p12). Of the 170 independent candidates that the Brothers had registered, a stunning 88 made it into parliament and gained 20 per cent of the total parliamentary seats, which was more than the number won by any opposition party since the 1952 revolution (Wickham 2013, p118). This was a spectacular success, especially when considering that the Brothers did not run as a legal political party, but instead fielded all their candidates as independent contenders. This important achievement once again allowed the Brothers to rise to the top of Egypt's opposition spectrum.

Given their strong performance, unlike in the past, the Brothers in this election did not form an official electoral coalition with opposition political parties. Henceforth, I argue at this point that this was a strategic choice and it provides evidence that the Brothers were self-confident regarding their political leadership in both civil and political arenas and that they were aware of the emerging power of dissent against the regime under Mubarak's leadership. It is concluded here, that in contrast to the 1987 election, there was a crucial new factor that enabled the Brotherhood to gain political

momentum in 2005, which was that society, especially the young generation, had taken to the streets against the oppression of the regime together with other groups from various ideologies (El Houdaiby 2013, p7). As this section demonstrated, and as further discussed in the following pages of this study, the new political and economic initiatives that the Brotherhood had taken in this era provided them a political platform in which they constituted a new broad-based alliance. They achieved this by demanding democratic reforms in support of economic prosperity and social equality.

8.4 The Rise of Gamal Mubarak's Neoliberal Bloc and the Failings of the Egyptian Political Economy

In his study, Kandil (2012) argues that the most dangerous aspect of the new stratum of businessmen who turned into politicians was their eagerness for independent organisation. Throughout the 1990s, these particular businessmen were active in Egyptian civil society to enhance their influence in the key decision making process. Henceforth, these predatory capitalists did not only infiltrate the chambers of commerce and industry, and created lobbies and associations to maintain their influence, but they also began to encroach on the ruling party itself (Kandil 2012, p209). In Gramscian sense, this was an attempt by the capitalist entrepreneur to consolidate itself a position which allows him to be "*the organiser of masses of men*" and "*the organiser of the "confidence" of investors in his business, of the customers for his product, etc.*" (Gramsci 1971, p5). To achieve this objective, the group developed a critical relationship with a strategic asset: the president's son Gamal Mubarak who started his career as an investment broker in the city of London ("Rise of Mubarak's son", 2002). Hence, they convinced Gamal to form his own civil platform to promote his political ambitions (Kandil 2012, p209). Gamal acted upon this advice and formed the Future Generation Foundation (FGF), and then he was appointed as the head of the ruling party's Youth and Development Committee which made him an active political figure in Egypt ("Rise of Mubarak's son" 2002; Kandil 2012 p209).


The extent of Gamal Mubarak's political and economic power became a very evident matter when he and his business cronies and self- styled neo-liberal intellectuals or so-called "PhD technocrats", formed a new apparatus within the ruling party (Naguib,

2011). This ambition found its form as the Policies Committee (PC) which had a strong influence on the nature of the entire Egyptian political and economic apparatus (Kandil 2012, p209). Gamal Mubarak's and his mostly British and American-educated cronies grew their political and economic influence as they removed the veteran party leaders such as NDP heavyweights Youssef Waly and Safwat-al-Sherif, Vice President and Secretary General of the party who hold influential ministerial portfolios, deputy prime minister/minister of agriculture and minister of information, respectively for two decades (Abaza 2006, p2). Thereafter, Gamal Mubarak and his cronies consolidated superior powers in the decision-making mechanism of the country by being the majority in the next cabinet led by Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif in the summer of 2004 (Antar 2006, p9). It was an acceleration of the neoliberal program which was favoured by the new government. They did not hesitate to put up everything for sale, such as factories, agricultural land, airports and public transport. Furthermore, the top rate for taxation was reduced from 42 percent to 20 percent (Naguib, 2011). As consequence of these tax reforms, for instance, the billionaires and multinational companies started to pay exactly the similar proportion of their income tax as small shop owners. This situation further heightened the tension between the super-rich and middle classes.

For a short while, these neoliberal reforms had a relatively positive impact on Egyptian economy. Such as change in the labour law in 2003 attracted the attention of foreign direct investment and made Egypt one of the top three Mediterranean country of receipts of FDI in years between 2000 and 2008 (Mishrif 2010 p135; Pfeifer 2012 p218). However, it was soon revealed that these reforms also created a self-interested economic environment which alienated of almost all middle-class fragments (Kandil 2012, p210). As the below chart in figure 15 demonstrates that in years between 2002 and 2008, GDP growth rate in Egypt increased consequently for six years from % 2.4 to % 7.2 per annum. Thus, the following figure 16 shows that exports of goods and services increased from 18.3 % of GDP to 33 % of GDP per annum, indicating that Egyptian production levels was also on rise. As the next chart in figure 17 shows that one of the key reason for this successful performance was the net inflows of foreign direct investment from the world at large but mainly from Arab Gulf countries to Egypt have also risen from 0.7 % of GDP in 2002 to peak 9.3 % of GDP in 2006 before it fell to 5.8 % in 2008 and alarming figure -0.2 in 2011. At the


same time, however, the charts in figures 18 and 19 illustrate that these policies pushed the prices up and had no much effect on unemployment levels in Egypt. The inflation rose from 3.2 % in 2002 to double digit 12.2 % in 2008 and the unemployment fell only by 1.3 % from 10 % in 2002 to 8.7 % in 2008 before it increased to 12 % in 2011. Thereby, whilst the policies pursued by this parasitic bourgeoisie, who made their way up in the ranks of upper-class capitalists under Hosni Mubarak, had been able to hide the hegemonic crisis and keep it latent for some time but this situation started to change with the crisis of the neoliberal model on the global scale. The impact of the great recession remobilised social strata that the regime had become used to consider as passive subjects (Roccu 2012, p230).

Figure 15: GDP Growth Rate in Egypt in Years between 1999 and 2016



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 16: Exports of Goods and Services in Egypt (% of GDP)




Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 17: Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt, Net Inflows (% of GDP)




Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 18: Inflation Rate in Egypt, GDP Deflator (Annual %)



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 19: Unemployment Rate in Egypt, (% of Total Labour Force)



Source: International Labour Organisation, ILOSTAT database

8.5 The Brotherhood in Parliament and their Last Struggle Against Mubarak in 2010

The unexpected victory of the Brotherhood in Egyptian parliamentary politics interrupted Mubarak and his plans for his son Gamal Mubarak as the next leader of Egypt. When investigated further, it was evident that Mubarak, who was frightened to give up more leverage to the Brotherhood, began to reverse the flexibility it had deployed with its opposition groups. The regime security forces under his control hastened to resort to measures of intimidation and repression against them (Wickham 2013, p123-124). More importantly, Mubarak formally proposed thirty-four amendments to the constitution on 26th of December 2006 and campaigned that these changes will aim at responding the demands of opposition groups like *Kefaya* (Shehata & Stacher 2012, p173). Instead, the amendments, which were subsequently approved by Parliament and ratified on 26th of March 2007 in a national referendum, did not achieve any of the goodwill it had initially promised to deliver but further solidified the legal underpinnings of authoritarianism in Egypt (Shehata & Stacher 2012, p173). Especially, when Articles 5, 62, 88, 136 and 179 took their final form, all segments of the opposition called for a boycott of the national referendum (Shehata & Stacher 2012, p174). This is because these changes barred any political activity with religious reference or character (Article 5); paved the way for the reversion to a strict party-list system or a hybrid system in which only a limited number of seats would be reserved for independents (Article 62); eliminated the system of Judicial Supervision of elections that began in 2000, replacing it with an “electoral commission” composed of sitting and retired judges, mostly chosen by the regime (Article 88); gave the president the right to dissolve parliament without a public referendum (Article 136); and empowered him to refer cases to military and exceptional courts, and allowed national security forces i.e. the police, to search homes and conduct surveillance without warrants (Article 179) (Ranko 2012 p165; Shehata & Stacher 2012 p173; Wickham 2013 p123). Overall, the Mubarak regime went further than the usual electoral engineering with this constitutional referendum, it has created legal grounds to mould the electoral law to its liking and eradicate the any serious challenge that could come from oppositional groups i.e. the Brotherhood.

Intensified repression notwithstanding, the bloc of Brotherhood MPs in parliament continued their activities and trained themselves up in seminars and workshops as well as through the debates they had with the NDP members in the parliament (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015). Hence, their active and official presence in the parliament increased their visibility in the wider social sphere such that their popularity increased in both the national and international arenas. Most importantly, the Brotherhood indirectly became the voice of the protest movement that had emerged within Egyptian civil society. The Brotherhood affiliated MPs in the Parliament between 2005 – 2010 fought for higher wages, supported strikes, resisted privatisation process, and campaigned against the Emergency Law and corruption in Egyptian bureaucracy (Shehata & Stacher 2012 p176; Tugal 2016 p177). The demands of the protest movement from the regime did not wither away with the increasing state-repression, but they urgently needed to be represented within the formal political system and the evidences show that the Brotherhood, as the largest opposition group in parliament, used this opportunity to create a broader alliance and political platform for its own success. In an interview with the Guardian in 2006, Second Deputy General Guide Khairat Al-Shater commented:

The success of the Muslim Brotherhood should not frighten anybody: we respect the rights of all religious and political groups. So much damage has been inflicted on the country over the past century, because of despotism and corruption, that it would be impossible to embark on wider political reform and economic development without first repairing the damage to our basic institutions. Free and fair democratic elections are the first step along the path of reform toward a better future for Egypt and the entire region. We simply have no choice today but to reform.

(“No need to be afraid of us.”, 2006)

However, the regime was well aware of the emerging political power of the Brothers and did not hesitate to exercise all available coercive force that they had to restraint them. The regime did not tolerate any protest movement led by the Brothers and harshly punished them each time they attempted to challenge it. For instance, a protest sparked by the Brotherhood students at the Alzarh University on 10th of December 2006 against government interference in student union elections was sufficient for the both state controlled and secular media to portray the Brothers as a threat against the

principles of the Egyptian state (Ranko 2012, p177). In particular, the regime intensified the coercion on many senior members prior to next two elections, for the Shura Council (the upper house of parliament) in June 2007 and the municipal elections in April 2008 (Wickham 2013, p122). The wave of arrests targeted key figures in the leadership cadre, especially to those who had led the Brotherhood to win the general election in 2006. These senior Brothers, included such as Essam al-Erian, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, Hasan Malik and Khairat Al-Shater (Ranko 2012, p165). Most importantly, the regime's objective with their trials was to eliminate the most influential financiers of the Brotherhood and to confiscate their assets. Shehata & Stacher (2012) noted that the nature of the regime's sanctions were the severe financial measures aimed at the Brothers' ability to provide social services, which were regarded by many as the backbone of the Brothers' popular support. The Brotherhood was in a great danger once again to consolidate itself as a historical bloc as the regime forces targeted their economic activities to stop them becoming a decisive function in Egyptian economy.

As discussed previously, the Brotherhood since their release from the harsh Nasserist prison went back to what they did the best, running charities and civil society organisations to provide support for poor and disadvantaged people in Egyptian society. However, along with these activities they also actively took part in professional unions and intermittently in general elections, i.e. when allowed to do so. These initiatives invariably strengthened and expanded their network and influence in impoverished Egyptian middle classes (Bayat 1998 p157; Clark 2004). The Egyptian middle class were the product of Nasser's welfare-state boom but they became the losers of Sadat's *infitah* policy which were also impended in the era of Mubarak too. It was their high expectations, an outcome of their high education and thus social status, which made them frustrated as there were only few prospects for economic success (Bayat 1998, p157). Consequently, the experience the Brotherhood gained as a counterhegemonic force in civil society and partially in political society in past decades provided the fertile ground for them to build a relationship with the multiple different opposition groups and activists (al-Ghobashy 2005, p387). Their tacit alliance with the "*Kefaya*" movement and other activists in the late years of the Mubarak regime was also indicative of such a tactical alliance (Schwedler and Clark 2006 p10; Abdelrahman 2015 p111). Hungry for success in political society and

defiant against the regime's repressive response, the Brotherhood members were willing to take sides with the new-generation activists by crossing ideological barriers (Abdelrahman 2015, p101-105). Consequently, such a pragmatic approach by the new leadership team of the Brotherhood towards political parties and organisations of different political persuasions provided them with the necessary flexibility and robustness when countering the regime's political forces. That is, the shifting nature of the Muslim Brothers generally made it difficult for the regime to overcome its growing socio-political influence (al-Ghobashy 2005, p387-339)

In particular, the activities of the young generation of Brothers, such as their active use of the internet and social media during the period of the Supreme Guide Mahdi Akif, allowed the senior members of the Society to engage with the activists in protest movement and to boost the movement's social and political power (El Houdaiby 2013, p5). For instance, the Brothers from the young generation launched and managed its websites and these were such as Ikhwan Online, Ikhwanweb and the discussion platform Multaqi al-Ikhwan (Ranko 2014, p170). In addition to official platforms and independent from the organisation's leadership, many personal blogs belonging to Brotherhood members sprang up, making strong arguments against the authoritarian and corrupted nature of the regime. The young generation of Brothers that had advance skills in social media became an active part of the evolving youth movement and was, for example, involved in the "6th of April" and "We are all Khaled Said" groups (Ranko 2014, p170). Effectively, with the political and social role that the Muslim Brothers had developed for themselves in Egypt, through participation in the parliament, syndicates, social media and through forming alliances with protest movements (both political and civil), it became a powerful opposition movement, which put the government on the back foot. That is, the Brothers caught the regime at a time in which it was struggling to overcome the growing socioeconomic crisis and the process of political succession in Egypt. The senior Muslim Brother member Muhammed Soudan put it:

I think the final battle between Mubarak and us happened in the parliamentary election of 2010. He did not allow anyone from us to be a candidate in this parliament. As you know, he already attempted to block our growing influence with the referendum on March 26, 2007. The amended version of Article 5 and 62 blocked us

forming a political party and limited us to run as independent candidates in the elections. He also severely constrained the judges' supervision of elections with article 88 and you know, they arrested many of our important people. So, they attempted to do everything to stop us and cancelled all the application of the Muslim brotherhood and because of all of this only one from twenty-five candidates got elected in 2010, which was down from the 88 members we used to have in the parliament. Then they blocked it and that upset us. We did not boycott the elections, but rather, they cancelled all the applications for the candidates belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. They wanted to see a unique type of Brotherhood member in the parliament, who would just sign and accept all the new constitutional changes and laws... the reason for this as you know Mubarak wanted to implement his dynasty and let his son to be the next President. So, he needed a parliament that would accept all his decisions to change the constitution for this process. This injustice created so much anger among us as well as for all the Egyptian people. They did not accept this kind of heritage. So, when the incident of killing the guy whose name is Khaled Said and this is very important mention that he is my nephew, and his killing is my heritage. When they killed him in the streets in front of all the people that also created huge anger for the majority of the people who live in Arismari, especially the young people. So, all of these major incidents put together plus the popular wave that El-Baradei and his project created, made the regime very frustrated and they could no longer control and politically lead the country.

(M. Soudan, personal communication, January 4, 2016)

As Mohammed Soudan explained, the Brotherhood along with the protest movement formed around the popular opposition bloc the National Association for Change (NAC) that Nobel Laureate and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Muhammad El-Baradei, led. This crucial decision to unite around the internationally recognised name of El-Baradei and forming a single opposition bloc, boosted the capability of the resistance movement to a degree that despite all the relentless intimidation, political repression and other coercive means of the hegemonic state that Mubarak deployed against, these tools no longer acted as deterrence for them. The bloc published a seven-point manifesto, which demanded the implementation of democratic reforms and an end to the oppressive state. This manifesto quickly went viral and gained the signature of over a million Egyptian

people (Ranko 2014, p169). Most notably, this important success was only made possible by the participation of the Brotherhood, which had thrown its weight behind the manifesto and managed – through its organisational skills and large grass-roots support base – to collect “more than 80 per cent of the one million signatures” (Ranko 2014, p170). In an interview with Dr. Ashraf Mishrif from the Middle Eastern studies at King’s College London, he explained that:

I think the success of Muslim Brothers in Egypt, depended very much on their ability to have supporters across all levels. Meaning they managed to integrate with the people within the rural areas and deprived areas in urban Egypt in smaller cities and they managed to provide charitable work, they managed to provide social services that were supposed to be provided by the state. They managed to touch on the livelihood of many people, particularly those living below the poverty line and their ability to develop social infrastructure on education, on health and on social security indirectly have enabled them to take over part of the jobs that the government was supposed to do during the 1990’s and 2000’s. This is what enabled them to succeed when they formed the Freedom and Justice Party and this is not to say only the party, but also the Muslim brotherhood at large, has a strong grass roots within Egyptian society.

(A. Mishrif, personal communication, June 17, 2015)

In the spite of all the developing tension between the regime and the oppositional movements, Mubarak stayed adamant to resist the growing popularity of the opposition against him and did not show any sign of leverage for a democratic transition until 18-day-long- protests sparked by the young generation of Brothers, together with the social media based group called “We are all Khaled Said” and the “6th of April” group, in Tahrir square in January 2011. The momentum of this protest was completely different from many others that had taken place since the first mass demonstration held in 2003 against the war in Iraq. As it will be discussed in more details in the following section, the force of this protest movement in Tahrir Square was so severe that it eventually cornered Mubarak into giving up the state power he had held for 30 years. During this interim period, the Brothers, as the most organised socio-political movement with the largest network of followers, when compared with the other counterhegemonic forces from leftist, liberal or secular perspectives, shone

out as being the best alternative that could replace the vacant position that Mubarak had left behind (al-Ghobashy 2005, p389). Their highly ambitious and determined activities within civil society organisations for decades had allowed them to spread the influence of the movement across many different segments of Egyptian society, which helped them to articulate a significantly important counterhegemonic presence that could appeal to the broader masses. However, as was the case with the JDP in Turkey, the Muslim Brothers as a Freedom and Justice party from this point onwards, were given a very critical test by the existing secular and liberal forces connected to the hegemonic structure of the military. The destiny of the Muslim Brotherhood as a governing party after it formed the Freedom and Justice Party, depended on its ability to become a *“decisive function exercised as a leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity”* (Gramsci 1971, p161).

8.6 The Cathartic Moment in the Tahrir Square

The increasing momentum of the resistance against the leadership of Mubarak peaked as the force he deployed, aimed at making his son succeed as the next president of Egypt, sharpened. The activities of the protest groups on the ground as well as through the social media sites, such as Facebook groups, created a fast spreading awareness the revolt geared towards stopping this process. The main groups that gathered in Tahrir Square starting from the 25th of January were the same people who had openly resisted the regime since the first mass anti-Mubarak regime organised by the *“Kefaya”* movement. The leftist groups, 6th of April, We are all Khaled Said, Muslim Brothers and the groups behind the al-Baradie’s initiative, amongst others, participated in the mass gatherings that demanded equal opportunities and democratic reform. One of the most popular themes of the movement was to demand *“bread (jobs), freedom, social justice and human dignity”* (Khatib, 2015). These demands had been many times spoken aloud on different occasions before (*“Egyptians Riot Over Bread”*, 2008), however, the momentum this time that protestors gained was much different than at other times. In Gramscian sense, I argue that the uprising in the Tahrir square displayed characteristics of a cathartic moment, indicating that masses mainly composed of Egyptian middle classes found a passage to transform themselves from *“objective to subjective”* and from *“necessity to freedom”* (Gramsci 1971, p367).


These protestors were the fragments of Egyptian low and middle-classes which were alienated from the new wave of liberalization process led by Mubarak's son and his cronies in 2000s (Roccu 2012, p212). As already noted in the previous chapters, the liberalization process under Sadat's leadership was a strategy based on an alliance between Egyptian state and international capital which in a way violated the social contract that underwrote the July 1952 regime from its very beginning. The Egyptian middle classes which resisted the implementation of these policies at the time were convinced to exchange their political rights for social benefits in the form of subsidies, free education and healthcare, cheap housing and services, etc. (Kandil 2012, p210). Yet, when a similar bloc of capitalists attempted to restructure the Egyptian economy along neo-liberal lines, by ignoring the country's severe problems such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, deteriorating public services, urban congestion and pollution etc. (Kandil 2012, p210), this time they exacerbated the marginalisation of these classes in a such extent that they were mobilized as a protest movement to force at least the leaders of this hegemonic bloc to give up the power.

The below chart in figure 20 demonstrates that GDP annual growth rate in Egypt averaged 4.76 percent from 1999 until 2011, reaching an all-time high of 7.16 percent in 2008 and a record low of 1.78 percent in 2011. In the same period, Turkey's GDP annual growth rate is 4.3 percent and the table 8.7 indicates that GDP per capital in Turkey grew much faster than the Egyptian: \$4,108 in 1999 to \$12,127 in 2011, \$1,322 to \$3,328 respectively (Please refer figure 21). One reason for this could be the much faster growing population rate in Egypt but as the figures 22 and 23 indicates the growing inequality between richest and the rest of the population deteriorated at much faster rate. Especially, figure 23 shows that the percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines has upward trend line in Egypt and increased from 19.6 percent in 2004 to 26.3 in 2012. Whereas, the trend line for the Turkish case is downwards and it has reduced substantial from 20.9 percent in 2004 to 2.3 percent in 2012. Hence, the chart in figure 24 illustrates that there was also no substantial change in income share held by quintiles in Egypt. The evidence shows that the last decade of the Mubarak's leadership, therefore, did not offer much to lower and middle classes. In fact, it has led them to become stagnated or lost much of the rights that the regime offered them. As noticed by Kandil (2012):

“Whatever surplus the state could use to fulfil urgent social needs was being sucked into their pockets, thus straining the legitimacy of the political apparatus to the limit, and eroding its social base”.


(Kandil 2012, p210)

Figure 20: GDP Growth Rate for Turkey and Egypt



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 21: GDP per capita for Turkey and Egypt, (Current US\$)




Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 22: Wealth Share of the Richest % 1 in Egypt




Source: Global Wealth Databook 2014, Credit Suisse Research Institute.

Figure 23: Poverty Headcount Ratio at the National Poverty Lines



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Figure 24: Income Share by Quintiles in Egypt



Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

The last decade of Mubarak's rule did not go beyond a rhetoric of management, financial soundness, and market forces (Mitchell 2002, p230). The regime basically used this discourse to depoliticize the country's economic troubles and 'transformed questions of social inequality and powerlessness into issues of efficiency and control' (Mitchell 2002 p230; Kandil 2012, p210). In other words, the intensification of the neoliberal reform process after 2006, mostly benefiting the cronies of Mubarak's family, powered the ongoing socio-economic protest in Egypt between 2005 and 2010, setting the scene for the January 2011 uprising in Tahrir square. The Brotherhood as the most organised and largest opposition group in Egypt, with its historical creditability within Egyptian marginalized and educated middle classes, strove among other protest groups to lead these groups. Particularly, it was their activities in civil society organisations, such as charities, schools and health care, unions etc. which paved them the way to become part of the broad-based socio-political transformation. Their active engagement and involvement with the protest movements such as the second Infitah, the War in Iraq, *Kefaya* and the *Al-Mahalla*

Al- Kubra also provided the grounding for them to articulate a relationship with other groups, mainly left wing activists. However, their success once Mubarak was ousted depended on the political and economic strategy that the Brotherhood crafted against the hegemonic structure of the military class, which was still intact.

8.7 Weakness of the Alliance the Between Protest Movement and the Brotherhood

After 30 years of political reign, Hosni Mubarak resigned from his post on 11th February 2011. Whilst his resignation raised hopes for democratic transition and increase in economic prosperity in the country, the first democratically elected president of Egypt, Muhammed Morsi, was also ousted by his Minister of Defence General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi via a coup d'état on 3rd of July 2013. In this study, I demonstrate that the protestors who pushed the button for a democratic transition process in Tahrir Square did not have the capability or intention in a Gramscian sense to transform this cathartic moment *“into a means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new initiatives”* which could complete the counterhegemonic process against the military dominated state structure (Gramsci 1971, p367). This because when I investigated the Muslim Brothers’ involvement in the protest movement in Tahrir Square, it was evident that their youth cadres were present and supporting the protestors, but there was no official involvement from the Guidance Office. However, the destiny of the Muslim Brotherhood as a governing party or revolutionary movement after it was formed the Freedom and Justice Party, depended on its ability to become a *“decisive function exercised as a leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity”* (Gramsci 1971 p161, emphasis added).

In contrast to the Turkish political Islamist, the Brotherhood did not possess a strong relationship with the neither emerging nor existing dominant capitalist class. The regime, perhaps aware of the growing socioeconomic influence as a counterhegemonic movement of the MB, launched an unprecedented crackdown against them in 2006. The regime detained and sentenced thousands of Brotherhood members but their main target was high-ranking members with background in economic activities such as Khayrat Al-Shatir, Essam Al-Erian and Abdulmoneim Aboulfotouh (Adly 2013, p212). Overall, the regime targeted and arrested 39

businessmen, shut down 25-30 companies, and confiscated 100 million dollars under allegations of money laundering and supporting an outlawed political organisation (Adly 2013 p212). The impact of the crackdown on the movement between 2006 and 2010 was so severe that out of ten thousand Brotherhood candidates not a single one got elected during the 2008 municipal elections and not a single member made it to parliament in 2010 (Kandil 2011, p55). It would be an important point to acknowledge here again that as it was the case for the Justice and Development Party, the Brotherhood members who constituted the top leadership cadre of the Freedom and Justice party also had a background and experience in entrepreneurship. However, it was also evident that what was missing for the Brotherhood that the characteristics of this cadre did not have the same influence and stability as their Turkish counterparts. The party lacked the necessary formation in order to synthesise the economic structure they have consolidated with the superstructure that they envisioned for Egyptian state.

Nevertheless, despite of the fact that the regime intensified its security oriented management of the socioeconomic protests in which the Brothers were also part of, later it could not find a way to consolidate support from the broader strata of Egyptian society. On the other hand, the Brotherhood articulated itself a support and recognition among the discontented middle classes and the dispossessed poor (Talani 2014, p102). As discussed in the previous section, their participation in *Kefaya* which was an urban based and primarily middle class political movement that vocally opposed Mubarak's plan to remain in power as well as his ambition to prepare his son Gamal as his successor, has allowed the Brotherhood political platform to be more accessible. Especially, alongside the leftist movement they became reference point for urban poor who were believed to have triggered the 6 April riots at the industrial centre of *Al-Mahalla Al- Kubra* in 2007 (Adly 2013, p211). However, there was a still tension between Muslim Brothers and other opposition groups such as Nasserist and Leftist which were the leading actors of these protest movements. The core dilemma was that, whilst most of the opposition parties recognised that the 30-year rule of Mubarak had to come to an end and the means to achieve such a transition should be on the streets of Egypt, they did not share ideological or organisational unity and hence, were unable to coalesce into a political platform that would revolutionise the Egyptian state (Abdelrahman 2015, p107 – 111).

Here, it is contended that their loose partnership with the activists in Tahrir square acted as the legitimate link for their recognition in the international arena. The Brothers with their superior skills in organising and mobilising masses quickly became the protagonist of the protest. This was evident in most of the answers given by the interviewees for this study when they were asked about the nature of the protest movement in Tahrir Square. For instance, Professor Tariq Ramadan from University of Oxford stated that:

I disagree with the fact that these were revolutions, but if you want to call them revolutions, that's fine. I'm calling them uprisings and I don't see that there was a revolution either in Egypt or in Tunisia. But now if you want to call them uprisings, they (the Brothers) were not involved, for it came from cyber dissidence from people who were working at the social level on the socioeconomic levels. They had nothing to do with this. The Muslim brothers decided to be involved only a few days before. Therefore, their contribution was a late contribution and then they were in the movement and trying to structure something afterwards. But I don't see that they were contributing except that the young people were involved and connecting their movements with the young activists at the grass roots levels. So, it was mainly the young section of the Muslim Brotherhood and then the older leadership came to it afterwards.

(T. Ramadan, personal communication, March 10, 2016)

Rida Fehmi, a Muslim Brotherhood member of the Egyptian Shura Council comments below, confirming Professor Ramadan's perspective:

Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood's political faction kept its distance from the protestors, because nobody including the protestors themselves knew that this call for activism in Tahrir Square was going to be a revolution. No one could foresee that, but this does not mean the Brothers were not represented at all. There were other factions, such as the youth set of factions in the Muslim Brotherhood took part in the initial process, as well as some of the, let's say, middle members and not the top members. So, the Brotherhood was not there officially but some of these groups associated with the movement were among the protestors in Tahrir Square. They declared that they would take part in the protest even if their seniors or leaders did not want to take part in the protest. Then, on the 28th of January, there was an order

from the Muslim Brotherhood for all the members to take part in the protest as well. So, like you say the snow balling effect increased momentum and then became bigger and bigger and to the point that we all found ourselves in what we knew to be a revolution at that time. So, all of us became part of the revolution something that none of us planned for and it took us all by surprise and not only us, but also all other parts of Egyptian society.

(R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015)

Effectively, when the masses took hold of Tahrir square and other places in Egypt, the Brothers leading cadre was in a dilemma whether to be part of this protest movement officially or stay away from it. Indeed, they have always been the part of such a protest movement, directly or indirectly in the past, but, as one of the most experienced opposition movement in terms of the regime's ruthless crackdowns in the country, they also knew very well that they would face severe punishment by the regime forces, if protestors fail to achieve any of their legitimate demands. Yet, it would be completely unfair and false to claim that the Muslim Brothers were not present in the demonstrations from day one. Many bloggers affiliated with the Brotherhood, such as Sheriff Abdel-Hamid Heshmat from "Bloggers against Abu Hasira group", were actively engaged with the protest movement by organising the youth faction of the Society. According to IkhwanWeb, they were also accompanied by the member of the MB Executive Bureau, Abd al-Rahman al-Barr ("MB Youth, January 25 Activists Hope", 2011). Moreover, almost all the interviewees pointed out that neither the protestors nor Mubarak himself predicted that the outcome of the protest movement in Tahrir Square on the National Day for the Police Forces was going to lead a change in the country's leadership. Nevertheless, as it will be further elaborated in the following chapter, despite of Mubarak's departure, the military dominated state mechanism he was leading continued to stay intact and did not intend to give up any more leverage to any other political leadership and economic structure that did not have their consent. The struggle between military dominated regime and the Brotherhood continued to be the key factor shaping the political life in Egypt. Muslim Brothers as the largest opposition movement in Egypt formed their first legal political party and achieved a stunning election victory in the first general elections held after Mubarak was ousted. However, the faith of the first political party of Muslim Brothers depended on their ability to synthesise theory and practice, the

masses and intellectuals, the structure and superstructure to achieve a new socioeconomic bloc that can sustain the marginalized Egyptian middle class protesting in Tahrir square.

8.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been reported that after a decade of exclusion and coercion, for the first time, the representatives of the Muslim Brothers were returned to the Egyptian parliament in the general elections of 2000 as independent candidates. Alongside their return, there was also the emergence of protest movements against the regime. In particular, there was the Kefaya movement, which was composed of a loose network of individual activists, intellectuals and public figures, with many of them having roots in the Arab nationalist and leftist opposition. As these protest groups came to articulate a closer relationship with the marginalised Egyptian middle and lower classes to stop the succession process from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal Mubarak, the tension between the regime's forces and the masses increased. Regarding this interplay, in this chapter, it has been explained that the Brotherhood articulated a tacit alliance with these factions to gain momentum for their political project. To tighten up this relationship, it has been argued that the Brotherhood made a democratic and reformist manoeuvre for the general election in 2005, which allowed it to gain a significant victory in this election. However, their success did not last very long, for Mubarak and his cronies were aware of the growing popularity of the political Islamist and other opposition movements and thus, increased the repression against them. Nonetheless, the dissent against the regime did not stall, as the neoliberal policies of Mubarak continued to hurt the Egyptian middle and lower classes. In the chapter, it has been shown how these policies mostly helped capitalist groups, who had close ties with Mubarak and his family. Even though the Brothers never played the leading role in the growing protest movement, they still had a substantial part to play in these protests through their charity and religiously inspired civil activities. These activities allowed them to engage and notably, constitute a special relationship with deprived segments of Egyptian society. Highlighting the close relationship between the protest movement and the Brotherhood, has provided an explanation for the increasing tension between these groups and the forces of the state, which resulted in a cathartic moment in Tahrir Square. This momentum for a

change left the Brothers with no choice but to take the initiative of offering themselves as alternative leadership. However, as discussed in this chapter, the Muslim Brothers, as the Freedom and Justice Party from this point onwards, were given a very critical test by the existing economic, secular and liberal forces, who were connected to the hegemonic structure of the military. Hence, the destiny of the Muslim Brotherhood as a governing party after it formed its first political party depended on its ability to show the character of a hegemonic leadership. Relating to this, in this thesis it has been argued that to be able to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, the structure and superstructure to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc that guarantees stable economic prosperity, the Brothers had to become “*a leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*” (Gramsci 1971, p161). In the following chapter, this aspect will be considered in more detail and, in particular, whether the FJP had the same structural influence in the Egyptian economy as the JDP in Turkey when they came to power is assessed.

Chapter 9

The Path to Failure: Freedom and Justice Party

When the “subaltern” becomes directive and responsible for the economic activity of the masses, the mechanism at a certain point becomes an imminent danger and a revision must take place in modes of thinking because a change has taken place in the social mode of existence. The boundaries and the dominion of the “force of circumstance” become restricted. But why? Because, basically, if yesterday the subaltern element was a thing, today it is no longer a thing but an historical person, a protagonist; if yesterday it was not responsible, because “resisting” a will external to itself, now it feels itself to be responsible because it is no longer resisting but an agent, necessarily active and taking the initiative (Gramsci 1971, p336-p337)

The above note from Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks is probably one of the best statements explaining the hegemonic process that the counterhegemonic movement should experience before assuming power. As explained in the chapters about the JDP in Turkey, this party manifested itself as the agent responsible for taking the ‘initiative’ to deliver political and economic stability that the subaltern groups had sought for many years. To achieve success in this initiative and to create a mass consensus, the leadership of the JDP denied their identity in political Islam and did not hesitate to give up their previous ideals and principles. Moreover, their political approach to meet the demands of the emerging conservative bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and other subaltern groups like themselves, who were seeking immediate solutions to their problems, enabled them to resist the attacks that came from the secular hegemonic bloc. Taking this case as a comparative benchmark, in this chapter I investigate the experience of the first democratically elected political Islamist party (FJP) in Egypt and the country’s first president with political Islamist credentials. Through drawing on various in depth interviews, the focus is on how Egyptian political Islamists assumed power after the 25th January uprising and then, why did they fail to remain in power. In particular, the interest lies in the reasons why the Brotherhood’s first political party failed to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, the structure and superstructure to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc that guaranteed stable economic growth and strong effective leadership, which the political Islamists in Turkey managed to do.

9.1 Failing to Change the System Within the System: Missing the Link Between Theory and Practice

After the fall of Mubarak, the Brotherhood, as the largest opposition movement in Egypt, became the leading political entity. However, this situation has also put them in the spot light as the regime did not only deploy repression against them for years, but it has also disseminated a tarnishing image of the group in the media in order to discredit their organisation in the public eye (Ranko 2012, p26). Therefore, despite the leadership cadre were conscious of the Brotherhood's potential as the largest opposition movement in the country, they were also perfectly aware of the threat the Supreme Council of the Armed (SCAF) posed against them, if they happened to be on the wrong side of the power struggle. The reason for this, when the SCAF was forced by the protestors in the Tahrir square to remove Mubarak from his office and take over power directly, they knew that it had to tread very carefully between concessions to the people and protecting the interests of the ruling class that was still intact at the core of the regime (Naguib, 2011). In this power struggle, the Brothers had to demonstrate leadership in all three account: economic, political and intellectual, in order to achieve permanent success. With this in mind, the movement cautiously limited their involvement with protestors and supported a soft coup, calling upon the protesters to leave the square and start negotiations with the SCAF. The underlining reason for such a decision was that the Brotherhood wanted to win the trust of the state apparatus despite this approach would upset many groups, such as radical liberals, socialists, and nationalists (Kandil 2015, p229).

The SCAF suspended the NDP dominated parliament and announced that they would call for new general elections in coming months (Gebaly 2012, p3). In this interplay, the Brotherhood had to make a decision on how it was going to take part in the evolving political paradigm in Egypt. According to Kandil (2015) the impact of the uprising in the Tahrir square had redistributed power within the country's ruling 'power triangle': the tension ridden partnership between the military, security, and political institutions. Once Mubarak was removed from his office, the security forces lost their overriding dominance of the ruling bloc, and were now forced to share power with the once-marginalized military (Kandil 2015, p228). Therefore, Kandil (2015) argues that within the changing nature of power relations in Egypt, it was the political

institution which was open for negotiation. The Brotherhood with their extensive network within the middle class and poorer sections of the country, strived as the only organised political force, when the civil activists who collectively led the revolt were in a state of utter chaos. However, their success as the leading political force in the country depended on their ability to implement the economic programme which was the core reason of the uprising.

On 21st of February 2011, the Supreme Guide Muhammed Badei announced that the Brothers would form a political party ("MB Announces Political", 2011). Even though the movement, in principle, when the teachings of Hasan al-Banna are considered, has always been reluctant when it comes to engaging party politics, when their growing popularity in the civil and political arenas was taken into account, they felt they could no longer resist not being included in Egyptian political society as one of its official agents. In particular, when they found the necessary freedom and flexibility to run in the elections, such as in the 1980s and later in 2005, when they gained a significant number of seats in parliament, they became more confident in being part of the system and forming a political party (please refer chapters 4 and 5). However, they could never find the necessary way out from the excessive repression to form such a party and counter the regime forces within the means of democratic system up until the collapse of the Mubarak leadership. Egyptian political society was in a vacuum after the uprisings, which neither the SCAF nor the existing opposition parties could fill immediately (Landolt & Kubicek 2013, p997). In this interplay, the Brotherhood found itself a space of opportunity to form its first official party platform, the Justice and Development Party. However, it was not their propositions for economic change or their extensively growing economic power in the country that brought about their electoral successes. Although this does not mean that the Brotherhood did not articulate an economic agenda, since they had far-reaching intellectual and moral significance, they portrayed themselves as the morally righteous politicians who they would be able to deliver better governance (Dalacoura 2016, p69). In his study, Masoud (2014) also supported this argument and stated that in contrast to their leftist rivals, the Brotherhood succeeded in the polls because the Egyptian electorate, particularly from the poorer segments, considered that they would redistribute wealth.

Nevertheless, forming a political party brought many issues and questions that the movement had to overcome. The main debate revolved around the difference between the party membership and the Brotherhood. The leaders of the party repeatedly had to reassure the liberal and secular media outlets that they were a civil party, which was how they had been referring themselves since the draft party platform they announced in 2007 (Brown & Hamzawy, 2008). At a press conference (“Egypt’s Islamists Form”, 2011), Mohammed Morsi who was appointed as the head of the Freedom and Justice Party said:

“The FJP is not an Islamist party in the old understanding, it is not theocratic, it is a civil party.”

(“Egypt’s Islamists Form”, 2011)

However, as was the case for the JDP in Turkey, the existing hegemonic groups were never satisfied with these comments and remained suspicious of the Brotherhood’s activities. In order to overcome these claims, two months after the party was officially announced, the FJP allied with the Wafd and several smaller secular parties to form the Democratic Alliance. In its first statement, the Alliance declared that it sought to *“mobilise political forces that are committed to the principles of democracy and a civil state”* and to *“secure a representative parliament that will lead to a government of national unity”* (“Democratic Alliance”, 2011). In the beginning, the momentum that the Democratic Alliance created was exceptional and it successfully attracted more than forty parties across the ideological spectrum, ranging from secular democrats to conservative Salafi Islamists (Wickham 2013, p249). However, in the next four months, the Alliance experienced multiple defections, and as of late October just before the first round of the elections, it comprised just eleven parties. The FJP, again, dominated the Alliance. Most importantly, the parties and civil society groups that had joined the Alliance defected to the Egyptian Bloc, a rival coalition of secular parties formed in August.

In order to investigate the reasons for the confusing relationship between the FJP and the other major opposition groups that first joined the Democratic Alliance and later broke away, I asked my interviewees about their thoughts regarding to this outcome. The majority pointed to the ambiguous relationship between the Brotherhood as an

Islamist movement and Freedom and Justice Party, which claimed not to be an Islamist, but a civil party. For instance, Professor Ramadan stated that:

FJP converged with other groups to form a political party, but the problem was that they needed to do a reassessment of their understanding of how the real politics function; hence understand how to do a sustainable deal with other political groups. So, the political discourse and party ideology that they sought to create was not enough. They were in a hurry to create the party and it was enough? Of course not! Therefore, it was openness and inclusiveness what was missing for the Muslim Brotherhood's political party. Inclusiveness and more openness towards the other actors! In other words, the separation between the party and the organisation was not clear in the Muslim brotherhood so all this had to be reformed.

(T. Ramadan, personal communication, March 10, 2016)

Another interviewee, Christopher de Bellaigue who worked and presented a documentary for BBC on the FJP and Morsi's leadership in Egypt said:

On the political level, they were not good at discussing and finding out what other people thought and wanted. They had a... they were a bit arrogant and they sensed that power was their birth right, and that they needed to come to power and everything else would work itself out. But if you remember there was a very strong Salafi movement at the same time, which was making demands from that side of the FJP, and then there was a strong secular movement on the other side that was making demands on that side. And one of the criticisms that was levelled against them was that they didn't reach out, and that they didn't include people enough in their kind of cooperative national project to build Egypt, and in fact it was a Brotherhood project; it wasn't a national project.

(C. de Bellaigue, personal communication, June 16, 2015)

To confirm these statements, Rida Fehmi who said that he was present at almost all the meetings with the opposition groups, stated that:

If I be honest with you, theoretically we know what each ideological and social group demanded in Egypt very well, but we did not know nor had any experience to deal with these demands in practice. Because Ikhwan never had any experience in government nor involvement in its process as a coalition partner. When we were in power we realised it was something different than theoretical understanding to deal with different political groups. It was so hard. So Hard! Practically to negotiate with other parties. For instance, during the discussion over the budget in 2012 it was extremely difficult to communicate with other groups. We simply did not have the practical experience at that level.

(R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015)

Table 5: Results of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections in 2012

Results of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections in 2012		
Party	Seats	% of the vote
Freedom and Justice Party	235	47.2
Nour Party	121	24.3
New Wafd Party	38	7.6
Egyptian Bloc	34	6.8
Al-Wasat Party	10	2
Reform and Development Party	9	1.8
Revolution Continues	7	1.4
Other parties	18	3.6
Independents	26	5.2
Seats appointed by military council	10	

Source BBC News Online

However, despite the Brotherhood dominated alliance going through such a rocky relationship with other groups and not possessing the necessary skills for making alliances work, it still did not lose the momentum it had as the largest opposition group in the country. After three rounds of elections, the Freedom and Justice Party won the

47.2% of the votes and gained 235 seats in the Egyptian parliament (Please refer the table 5 above). It had been expected that the Brotherhood's party would perform, but such a staggering victory was unexpected for the secular democracy activists. What was more alarming for the secularists was that the Islamic alliance, a coalition of three hard-line Salafist parties led by the al-Nour party, came in second with 24.3% of votes. After that in third and fourth places were the Wafd party and the Egyptian Bloc (a coalition of three secular parties: the Tagammu' party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Free Egyptians), with 38 (7.6%) and 34 (6.8%) seats, respectively.

The results of 2012 parliamentary elections confirmed that the Egyptian political scene would be dominated by Islamists after the fall of Mubarak. Whilst the FJP had its own problems in terms of articulating an inclusive and well defined political ideology or agenda, the leftist, liberal and secular parties were in no better position in a country where "liberalism" continues to have a negative connotation (De Sment 2016, p367). Hence, the majority of the liberal opposition often appeared to stand for little more than not being Islamist, opting to stoke public fear in relation to the impending theocracy. Given this situation, in the first Egyptian democratic and free parliamentary elections, the FJP smartly positioned itself as a voice for the poor through its years of activities in civil society. Hence, similar to the JDP in Turkey, they also sought to establish a relationship with foreign investors and the international community by a designed free market oriented economic platform. Moreover, they refrained from using the controversial election slogan "Islam is the Solution", but rather, branded their campaign with "We bear good for all of Egypt" to ease tension with the secular groups (Wickham 2013, p250). Concomitantly, the Brotherhood's superior organisational and networking skills were very useful for the FJP in terms of reaching out to the masses and converting their sympathy for the movement into votes. For instance, Dr. Ashraf Mishrif, observed:

I think they understood very well the desire of the lower middle class and poorer section of society. The need for employment, the need for job creation, the need for developing small businesses and enterprises. They provided a larger part of the poorer section of society, who were unable to have access to health care, unable to have access to education, unable to pay their fees and meet their living conditions, and all this has put them in direct contact with them. So, the grass roots support was

translated at a later stage in the direct membership for the Muslim Brotherhood or sympathy for them and to some extent, if it is not physical support, it is moral support for the organisation at some level. This is how the organisation managed after the demise of Mubarak's regime to emerge very quickly on the surface and to establish itself as a key political force in Egyptian politics after 2011.

(A. Mishrif, personal communication, June 17, 2015)

Given these perspectives, therefore, it is possible to argue that the Brotherhood's first official political party, the FJP, indeed struggled to adopt a political strategy for itself that successfully combined the theory and the practice of making an alliance and thus, constituting a broad-based political leadership after the uprising. However, despite this, it is evident that they managed to articulate a better election campaign and strategy when compared to the other opposition groups. Moreover, the success of the Brothers political party in their first-time election was not simply based on their Islamist background and appeal to religious sentiments of the Egyptian people, for was also rooted in their long-standing experience and struggle as a counterhegemonic force in both civil and political society. As rightly noticed by Talani (2014) when globalisation induced economic restructuring, especially in the last decade of Mubarak's 30 years of rule, restricted the ability of the Egyptian state to protect the poor and the middle classes, this allowed political Islam to foster social capital and develop well-established solidarity networks both between lower and middle classes as well as within them. Therefore, despite the movement never having the flexibility to build up a political relationship with the masses, when they had their chance, such as in parliamentary politics in 1984 and 1987, and later in 2000, and more significantly in 2005 as independent candidates, they have proven themselves as being a formidable counterhegemonic force in Egypt. In other words, the success of political Islam in these elections demonstrated that Islamism as a counterhegemonic project had a strong basis in the middle and poor strata of Egyptian society to build a new socio-economic alliance, or as Gramsci would note it, a new socio-economic historical bloc (Gramsci 1971 p182; Talani 2014 p102).

Concluding, their achievement in the first democratic and free elections of Egypt after Mubarak was ousted by the protesters in Tahrir square, was a result of their long run aspiration to govern Egypt. Long term success in government, as has been the case

for the Justice and Development Party, came into being through the establishment of relations with the forces of the both national and international systems. These including liberalisation of the economy and application join the EU, amongst other things (Adly 2013, p223). In contrast, victory in the elections in Egypt did not represent the beginning of a new era for the Egyptian people and the Muslim Brothers, for it was just the start of a political game played between the new political leadership of Egypt and the state and economic structure that was still run by the military. The Brothers, in this interplay, as was the case for the JDP in Turkey, had to act in a pragmatic and professional manner to constitute and lead a new class alliance that could overcome the resistance of the existing hegemonic forces, but unlike their Turkish counterparts, failed to do so.

9.2 The Chess Game Between the SCAF and the Brotherhood: The Trenches of the Egyptian State

The first important job of the Islamists dominating the new Egyptian parliament was to write a new constitution. This was a very delicate task that required a very well balanced 100-member Constituent Assembly (CA) across all the ideological perspectives. The FJP claimed that Islamist had 48 seats on the CA consisting of 36 members from the parliament and other 12 comprised of constitutional law experts and representatives of various civil society groups (“Egypt court suspends”, 2012). When this composition of the CA was approved by parliament on 25th March 2012, secular and liberal deputies in parliament cried foul, noting that 66 of the CA’s members were associated with the Islamist trend, while other sectors of opinion were conspicuously underrepresented (Rashwan 2012, Wickham 2013, p253). The FJP, as the largest parliamentary bloc had to overcome these concerns and lead everyone in a united manner for the purpose of creating Egypt’s first democratic constitution. However, the reality of the party’s lack of experience in building large consensus with the other political forces of Egypt quickly surfaced. The FJP found itself in the midst of the irreversible truth that it was impossible to create the necessary consensus by satisfying everyone. To an extent, it was a power struggle, as rightly put by Rida Fehmi at interview, with the movement being “*theoretically*” very well aware of what “*each ideological and social groups demanded in Egypt*”, but they did not have the

experience of dealing with these demands in “*practice*” (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015).

It was very important for the FJP, as the leading party in the newly elected Egyptian parliament, to find the necessary consensus for the CA. This is because finding the perfect balance of power in terms of satisfying the needs and demands of the major political forces during this process would eventually allow them to gain legitimacy from the broader segments of Egyptian society. This was especially important for their political leadership in the coming years. As the tension between the Islamist and secular groups increased, a group of lawyers and political activists filed a suit with the Higher Administrative Court asserting that the assembly was unrepresentative and demanding that it should be dissolved (Wickham 2013, p254).

The Brotherhood’s first official political party, the FJP was struggling to gain a legitimate authority to lead Egyptian political society as the largest parliamentary bloc. Eventually, their next task of forming Egypt’s first democratically elected government was blocked on 14th June 2012 by the decision of the High Constitutional Court (De Sment 2016, p367). The SCAF stated that, according to the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration, the new government could only be formed by the new president (Hearst & Hussein, 2012). In other words, this decision meant that the SCAF would stay in charge of cabinet appointments up until the election of the new president. The FJP was challenged one more time in its path to power and the only way to get over these hurdles was to play the political game at its best. Dr. Wael Haddara explained his experience during this process at interview as follows:

From my own experience, what I saw and I would contend is that the Brotherhood did not have a vision for taking on state hegemony. I would also contend that the military also did not have a clear vision on restoring it. Thereby, what was truly evolving in 2011 and 2012... it was like a chess game there was a general end game that people had in mind to win, but it wasn't a very well-played chess game, it was very reactive. So, I think that the constitutional court was retaining a tool of control that everyone broadly understood that if there was an elective legislative authority that things would become messy and very difficult. So, they knew that they just needed to make sure that

that didn't happen. How that plays specifically into your bigger strategy, I think I contend in 2011 it was unclear to 'Ikhwan' they just knew they had to do that.

(W. Haddara, personal communication, February 22, 2016)

As rightly put by Dr. Haddara, the FJP found itself playing a very reactive chess game against the forces of the military regime. The next phase of this game was the election of the president. In the presidential elections, the Brothers clearly were not as keen as they were for the parliamentary elections. This was very evident from the number of statements by the leaders of both the movement and the political party. For instance, Essam El-Erian, vice president of the FJP reported in a news statement that the party was not intending to field a candidate for the presidency and, furthermore, would not support anyone from the party who chose to do so ("Muslim Brotherhood's Political Party", 2011). A similar statement was also made by the Supreme Guide, Mohammed Badie. He said: *"The Muslim Brotherhood will not support (former member) Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh or any candidate who has an Islamic reference in the presidential elections. They will seek to reach an agreement with all national powers on the qualifications of the upcoming president"* ("Brotherhood Will Not Run", 2012). Evidently, the Brothers were playing the safe option at the beginning and did not want to provoke the military. However, when they were blocked by the constitutional court in forming a government, they had to make a choice between staying as outsiders and facing accusations of not taking up the gauntlet in a time of opportunity and becoming part of the political game, which could have had devastating repercussions for the future of the movement. As Tariq Ramadan, a professor at the University of Oxford and grandson of Hasan al-Banna observed:

One day before the deadline for submitting a candidate for the presidential election what happened in the Egypt Muslim Brotherhood was it was still undecided about what to do. In fact, when I was analysing what was happening that time in the appendixes, I noticed that there were more than five trends in the Muslim Brotherhood. Remember brothers who said we should go for the election... They said no! They were fired! Other people were saying we should not go for the election, but we should create a political party and continue to strengthen it! Some raised their voice for a political party, some said no to political party and presidential elections! The young people were calling to the old generation you should follow the

revolutionary in the street! They said no! They took the decision just one day BEFORE! Just one day BEFORE!

(T. Ramadan, personal communication, March 10, 2016)

In response to the SCAF's decision, which blocked the possibility of the first Islamist government under the leadership of the FJP, the Brotherhood had to reconsider their position for the next presidential elections. Yet, as Professor Ramadan observed the decision process for the Guidance Office and FJP to field a presidential candidate created a great deal of division and conflict within the party. Consequently, in order to take such a critical decision with a consensus, the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood, the highest decision-making body that usually meets twice a year, unexpectedly met twice in one week. According to Esam Al-Amin (2012), in the first meeting there was a heated discussion in which 52 of the 65 members objected to proposing a candidate in the election. Their concern was that possibly a candidate for the presidential election would erode the Brotherhood's credibility with the public, because they pledged that they would not run any candidate. However, Al-Amin (2012) also observed that just a few days later in the next meeting, 43 more members attended and all voted in favour of fielding a candidate, thus hiking the final count from 13 to 56 against 52. The internal debates prove that the Brothers were very well aware of the fact that the military and to a larger extent secular groups in the country, would not want to see that the Brotherhood taking control of the Egyptian political leadership. However, they did not have too much choice as this was the first in the movement's history, when they had actually come close to leading the Egyptian state and society.

The presidential candidate that the Shura Council decided upon in the second meeting was the Deputy Supreme Guide, Khairat Al-Shater, an engineer by education and a businessman by profession. His was a very well-known name to both national and international capitals as he controlled the most important components within the group, including organisation, finance and media. The decision on Al-Shater as a presidential candidate was also welcomed by the many members of the medium and lower sections of the movement. Al-Shater was not only a charismatic leader with his physical and effective rhetoric that attracted big crowds around him, he was also in charge of the so-called Renaissance Project, which was the master plan of the Muslim

Brothers for advancing the political economy of Egypt. However, as was expected, the Brothers' decision to run in the presidential elections received very harsh criticism from other opposition groups. The Brotherhood was quickly denounced by them for taking advantage of the situation and attempting to grab more power. In particular, they were accused of violating their promise expressed through slogans such as, "participation without domination". In response to these criticisms, the chairman of the FJP, Mohamed Morsi said:

"We decided that Egypt now needs a candidate from us to bear this responsibility, and we have no desire at all to monopolise power."

(As cited in Kirkpatrick, 2012)

Nevertheless, on April 5th 2012, the Presidential Committee evaluated the applications of the candidates, disqualifying 10 out of the declared 23 (Al-Amin, 2012). The brotherhood's candidate, multimillionaire businessmen Al-Shater, was also among the disqualified candidates. The committee eliminated them on the pretext that they were convicted of crimes during the Mubarak regime. He had been arrested and imprisoned twice, first in 1995 and again in 2007. Al-Shater served a total of 10 years in prison and his trials were condemned widely as political shows. The reason for his disqualification was that, according to Egyptian law, a convict loses his political rights unless restored through full presidential pardon or by the courts. Despite SCAF having issued a pardon to Al-Shater, the committee claimed that he still lacked the requirement of having his political rights restored, which could only be granted by the courts six years after the pardon was issued or by the invalidation of the charges. Whilst the committee allowed the candidates to appeal its decisions, it eventually rejected all appeals and reaffirmed its disqualification of their candidacies.

Naturally the Muslim Brothers and Al-Shater were outraged and had to respond to the move made by the SCAF. Al Amin (2012) highlighted that the Brotherhood sensed that the candidacy of Mubarak's intelligence chief and most loyal underling former vice president Omar Mahmoud Suleiman, who was also disqualified together with Al-Shater, was a ruse, a farce, and a clumsy attempt by the SCAF to disqualify the Brotherhood official candidate without causing public outrage, since the public would feel relief after the disqualification of Suleiman. Notably, the Brothers had seen the

real SCAF candidates, who were Mubarak's last prime minister Ahmed Shafiq and a former foreign minister Amr Mousa; both being allowed to contest the elections. Consequently, in this interplay, not to be out-manoeuvred, the Muslim Brotherhood fearing that their official candidate, Al-Shater, would be disqualified, on the last day of the nominations fielded a back-up candidate, the FJP chairman, Dr. Muhammad Morsi. This new candidate was equally very well educated and an experienced man in politics. He received a PhD in 1982 in engineering from the University of Southern California, and worked as an academic in the U.S. and later in Egypt, for decades, before getting elected to serve on the Guidance Bureau in 2000. Moreover, he was head of the Brotherhood's bloc in parliament from 2000 to 2005. Like Al-Shater, Morsi also had a pragmatic attitude towards politics, but he lacked the power base and commanding presence that Al-Shater could articulate in the organisation (Wickham 2013, p256). Nevertheless, Morsi with his own special position in the movement represented the middle ground between reformist and the old guard. For instance, he played a leading role in drafting the controversial 2007 party platform that the Brotherhood later shelved in the face of public criticism.

The Brothers found themselves in a chess game like political struggle with the SCAF after the uprisings. They were eager to hold on to the political power they could articulate through their years of civil and political activities on the ground. Their immense organisational and networking skills allowed them to gain advantage over other opposition groups as well as the state machinery. However, the game of politics was not played on the ground anymore, but rather, at the highest levels of the state function. As was the case regarding the success of the JDP in Turkey, when the Brothers demonstrated that they had the support of the masses from the below via their decisive victory in the general elections, their political success depended on their experience and skills at the strategic level when they assumed ruling power. Consequently, despite Al-Shater being disqualified from the presidential elections, he remained an important figure alongside the new candidate, Muhammed Morsi. Subsequently, Morsi won the presidential elections with 13.2 million votes, or 51.7% of the valid ballot papers, against 12.3 million, or 48.3%, for Shafiq ("Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed", 2012). However, it was very evident from the first few days of Morsi's leadership that the SCAF was not going to give the new president much space to work in. For instance, on the second day of the presidential race the

SCAF intervened and announced additional sections to the Constitutional Declaration of March 2011. These new sections targeted the authority of the new president over matters such as national defence and security. The SCAF mandated that until a new constitution was written, it would retain full authority over the armed forces, including control of the Ministry of Defence and all military appointments and promotions. Most importantly, the committee gained extra powers in relation to the details of the new constitution and the Constituent Assembly. For instance, according to Wickham (2013) this abrupt declaration stated that both the head of the SCAF and the president of the Supreme Judicial Authorities Council could require the Constituent Assembly to reconsider any provisions that “*contradict the goals and basic principles of the revolution, by which the higher interests of the country are accomplished, or the principles which have been set in previous constitutions*” (Wickham 2013, p264).

Concluding, under these restricted circumstances, the Brotherhood leadership had to embrace each other stronger than any other time previously. This is because they were about to wage a power struggle against the regime at the state level which was something they never experience before. From this perspective, their success as had been the case for the JDP in Turkey, depended on their skills in forming a leadership cadre and socioeconomic agenda that had the means of blending the interests of different subaltern groups. In particular, as it was demonstrated in this thesis, the success of the Brotherhood depended on their ability to articulate a definitive hegemonic leadership, which could synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals as well as the structure and superstructure. However, the Brotherhood struggled to constitute such a leadership to achieve a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance which could guaranteed them a stable economic growth and social equality.

9.3 The Short-Lived Brotherhood Leadership: A Weak Hegemonic Presence

The experience that Muslim Brotherhood leaders went through after they formed the movement’s first ever political party, the FJP, and getting its chairman Dr Muhammad Morsi elected as the first civilian president of the Republic of Egypt, was nothing like they could ever have expected. At the end of their short-lived experience in the presidential office, the military carried out another devastating crackdown as the same

way Nasser took his rage against the movement in 1960s. On 3rd July 2013, the head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi claimed that the president Mohammed Morsi had failed to respond adequately enough to the demands of the protesters in Tahrir Square during the 30th of June Demonstration. His statement, announcing the overthrow of President Morsi, read:

As we have closely monitored the current crisis, the command of the EAF met with the president on June 2nd, where it presented the opinion of the AF on the state of (the country) and (relayed) the cause of the masses and Egyptian people. Hopes were all pinned on national conciliation. Yet, the address of the president yesterday and before the expiry of the 48-hour ultimatum did not meet the demands of the people.

(“Transcript: Egypt's army statement”, 2013)

The declaration legitimised the process of the military coup that al-Sisi initiated, with the constitution being suspended and the presidency of Morsi annulled. He was replaced by the chief justice of the constitutional court, Adly Mansour, who coordinated the interim period until a new constitution for Egypt was written and new elections for the presidency and parliament were held again. Whilst the coup was appreciated by some of the protestors in Tahrir square, the reactionary group, who were mostly the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, gathered together in al-Nahda Square and a larger demonstration in Rabaa al-Adawiya Square. Despite many of the protestors against the president in Tahrir square leaving after he was ousted, his supporters continued to protest and vowed to remain in their location until he was reinstated. The military did not back track or show any flexibility in the position they took against the Brotherhood’s legitimate leadership, thus regarding protestors as a threat to the Egyptian national security (Beach, 2003). On 14 August 2013, the police and the army attempted to clear the six-week-old sit-ins in both squares, but this action ended up being one of the world’s largest massacring of demonstrators in a single day in recent history. After a year of investigation, Human Rights Watch released a report on the massacre carried out in Rabaa square. According to the report the number of people who lost their lives on that day alone was a minimum of 817 and more likely at least 1,000 (“Human Rights Watch”, 2014). The unrest that this incident caused spread all around the country and increased the tension that was already there, but the

security forces under the rule of a state of emergency issued by al-Sisi did not hesitate to respond to these protestors with equal or stronger force.

The massacre carried out by the Egyptian security forces in Rabaa square was a big blow to the morale and integrity of the Brotherhood, but the crackdown that followed was the worst for the organisation since it was founded in 1928. On the same day as the bloodshed in Rabaa square, the military declared a month-long state of emergency in response to the chaotic state that was left over from their brutal action. According to WikiThawra, an initiative run by the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social rights, within one year after the Military coup that overthrew Muhammed Morsi, at least 80 people had died in custody and more than 40,000 people were detained or indicted between July 2013 and mid-May 2014 (Abdullah, 2014). Moreover, according to information studied by Amnesty International, in the following year alone Egypt's criminal justice system recommended the death penalty for 1,247 men, pending the Grand Mufti's religious opinion, and upheld death sentences against 247 individuals ("Egypt: Rampant torture", 2014). Most importantly, in following year in 2015, the majority of the Brotherhood leaders, including Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie and Muhammed Morsi, was sentenced to death. Whilst the regime has not carried out any of these death sentences yet, the scale of the crackdown was well beyond anybody's expectation and broke down the effective networking and organisational capability that the Brotherhood articulated after they were released from prison by Anwar Sadat in the 1970s (H. Kandil, personal communication, February 24, 2016).

Under this perspective, when I investigated and asked the question as to 'why did the Brotherhood leadership fail in such a short time in Egypt?' most interviewees emphasised that the Brotherhood political leadership lacked the necessary experience in politics, such as building alliances with various different political as well as capitalist groups. For instance, Christopher de Bellaigue in an interview compared the experience of the JDP in Turkey with the Brotherhood's political party, and highlighted how the Brothers had a very well defined organisational and networking capability as an opposition in Egypt, but they failed to show similar success when they were in the position of leading political society. He stated that:

Well, the Brotherhood was very organised, they were highly disciplined. But those are the qualities you need as an opposition. When you come to power you have to broaden your appeal and you have to convince people who aren't just in the democratic market place. That's what the JDP in Turkey has done. They haven't counted on anyone's vote and said, "You are definitely going to vote for us." They've gone and won though, won these people's votes, and they've convinced people, and they've been rhetorically very good, and they've delivered on their promises, and they've done certain things that politicians do, and that the FJP didn't do. So, what the FJP did inherit from the old days was this very strong organisation, but I don't think that organisation allowed them to expand, and to grow, and to attract people from other sections of Egyptian society. There was always that sense of distrust of the FJP.

(C. de Bellaigue, personal communication, June 16, 2015)

Moreover, Dr Wael Haddara, senior advisor to Muhamed Morsi during his presidency, acknowledged at interview that the Brotherhood was not ready to lead the Egyptian state and they were only reacting to the events that were evolving at the time. He said that:

I suspect from what I saw at the time and what I have come to know since, that the Brotherhood didn't have a real plan based on an actual, I won't say theoretic framework, because that sounds a little bit too fancy for a social movement, but they didn't have a vision of how they would actually break up this status quo situation that was truly overwhelming. So, introducing a candidate for a president was an attempt to react to the events that were evolving rather than a principled approach based on a long-term vision of how to help transform Egyptian society.

(W. Haddara, personal communication, February 22, 2016)

However, Dr. Haddara also contended that despite the Brothers not having a long-term strategy for tackling the hegemonic structure that Mubarak left behind, they were still in a much better shape than any other opposition faction to lead the country. For instance, he argued that:

My contention is that, as certainly as of March or April 2013, there were a lot of people who were unwilling to build consensus with the president, because they felt

that the army was coming any moment now and so there was no point in hitching your wagon to a falling star. So, we went through this arc from he has no power, he has too much power, he is not going to be in power for very much longer, and the reaction to each of those steps was to say, "I am better off in opposition than I am in government."

(W. Haddara, personal communication, February 22, 2016)

It is true that other opposition groups hesitated to support the Brotherhood leadership, but as the case of the JDP in Turkey demonstrated, it was the responsibility or the ability of the leading opposition, in the form of the Brothers, to convince other factions to join their potential hegemonic leadership. Hence, in comparison with the JDP in Turkey, the Brotherhood's political leadership in Egypt was not hegemonic enough to create and sustain the broad-based alliance necessary for their success. From such a perspective, Christopher de Bellaigue made the following remarks:

They failed through inexperience, naivety. They failed because they were, they didn't understand the nature of the opposition, which was the state opposition. It was the police and the army, and they were unable to build trust with those institutions. I think that was the most important thing. They needed to build the relationship with cooperation with the army and the police, and they failed to do that. Now whether that was their fault, or whether it was the army, and the police's fault is another matter. But that was something they couldn't... you can't run Egypt without having the cooperation and the good will of the security forces, and they never had that good will. However, I do think that their failure was a tragedy for Egypt, a big tragedy.

(C. de Bellaigue, personal communication, June 16, 2015)

Concomitantly, it is important to introduce Gramscian concepts to be able to compare and understand the reasons behind the Brotherhood's failure to secure legitimacy for their leadership. If the political Islamists under the leadership of the Brotherhood had been sufficiently hegemonic as much as their counterparts in Turkey, they could have articulated all of the appropriate institutions into their historic bloc, and then weeded out those that were unnecessary or threatened their interests. For instance, the JDP did not seriously challenge these institutions during their first term in government. They slowly curbed their power throughout the EU accession period and claimed that they

were making the necessary amendments in the constitution for this process. The FJP did not have similar political leverage and when they brought the new constitution forward, they were charged immediately by the existing hegemonic forces, who were very aware of the fact that once they gave, not only the Brotherhood but any other counterhegemonic force, the opportunity to dominate and reconstitute the balance of power in Egyptian state, they would eventually be weakened and excluded from the position of power they currently held.

Furthermore, Dr Hazem Kandil from the University of Cambridge in an interview for this thesis argued that the Brotherhood leadership did not have the same professionalism as their counterparts in Turkey developed over three decades before they came to power. He said:

When you consider the core activities of the Brotherhood, you immediately recall things like preaching, right? I've seen this first hand. You have schools, you go into a lesson on geography, a lesson on Arabic, lesson goes on for 45 minutes, after 15 minutes it suddenly turns into something about religion. So, it's all about preaching the cultural message. And they're not the most effective in providing these things. They do it but they do it as kind of a religious sense. They do not know how to do it like professional politicians, such as it was the case for JDP in Turkey. They had much longer experience in the political system, therefore, they managed to become professional politicians. They know how to get the vote out, you know! Muslim brothers are preachers dressed up as politicians. That's it.

(H. Kandil, personal communication, February 24, 2016)

Whilst Kandil's comments may have been slightly over-exaggerated regarding the limited ability of the Brotherhood in Egyptian political society when categorising them as effective preachers only. However, he was right to highlight the weaknesses of the Brothers in terms of Realpolitik. As rightly admitted by Rida Fehmi, a senior Muslim Brotherhood member who said that he was present to almost all the meetings with the opposition groups in an interview for this thesis in Istanbul, the Brotherhood “theoretically knew very well what each ideological and social groups demanded in Egypt, but they did not know or had any experience in dealing with these demands in practice” (R. Fehmi, personal communication, August 7, 2015). Consequently, the

leadership of FJP government could not seize the ruling power by confronting the authority of the SCAF through alliances with broader segments of the Egyptian society. The Brothers have been for a very long time a clandestine organisation due to constant suppression by the state and when they were suddenly being thrust forward as a legitimate political party after the uprisings in Tahrir Square, the movement struggled to win consensus for their political leadership. Whilst the Brothers were self-aware of their political significance and demonstrated their counterhegemonic potential, they failed to articulate pragmatic and comprehensive party politics, as the JDP did in Turkey to consolidate broader alliance for their leadership. More importantly, the Brotherhood failed to intensify their emerging power with an economic base. In other words, the Brothers' political party could not extend their political and economic objectives to a broader audience and form a new socioeconomic bloc that guaranteed a stable economic growth and social equality.

9.4 Failure to Guarantee Stable Economic Growth and Social Equality

Another important factor that was missing in the short-lived leadership of the Brothers in Egypt was that they did not have as strong and influential relationship with the devout bourgeoisie as their counterparts had when they came to power in Turkey. The Brothers were indeed successful in articulating counterhegemonic momentum based on ethical-political sense through their superior skills in religious discourse and activities, however, the historical bloc that was necessary for the stability of their hegemonic power, *"must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity"* (Gramsci 1971, p161). Whilst the Brothers were aware of this weakness and attempted to consolidate more hegemonic potential in this dimension by bringing pragmatic leaders like Khariat Al-Shater to the forefront of the party, and supporting the establishment of business associations close to their activities, such as the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA), it was still not enough to create the momentum of confidence that was urgently needed for the revival of the Egyptian economy. For instance, in an interview for this thesis, when Dr. Mohamed al-Fiqi, the former Chairman of the Committee of Finance and Economics in the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood was asked to explain the reasons for the weakness in their economic management, he stated:

There were so many obstacles and challenges that stopped us leading effectively. The first biggest challenge we faced at the time was that we were the first elected body after the uprising in Tahrir square. So, during this transitional period people had so much expectation and urgent demands of us. However, it was impossible to match people's dreams with the reality so quickly because it was the transitional period and just because of this reason, there was so many limitations and restrictions on us. The second important challenge we faced was that the sovereign institutions of the state; the main institutions of the state were acting against the revolution and its outcomes. The third challenge of the main challenges that we were facing was the lack of cooperation and support, regional and international support, for the newly elected government, because we were Islamist.

(Mohamed al-Fiqi, personal communication, August 7, 2015)

However, these were challenges not only the Brotherhood leadership had faced when they came to power, for so to had their counterparts the JDP in Turkey. The difference between the two parties was that the devout bourgeoisie in Turkey were much more organised and developed than the capital class supporting the Brothers in Egypt. As discussed in the previous chapters, the way the Egyptian state pursued the economic liberalisation process, especially between the 1970s and 1990s, had significant implications for the political Islam in Egypt. Unlike for the JDP in Turkey, the Brotherhood associated SMEs did not benefit from the economic liberalisation programmes and hence, the Brothers were not as significantly influential and experience as their Turkish counter parts in relation to economic activity. Whilst the regime did not only exclude the Brothers from the liberalisation process, they closely scrutinised and most of the time limited the activity of devout bourgeoisie associated with the movement. Above all, the counterhegemonic project of Egyptian political Islamist never had the chance of constituting an organic tie with a socio-economic group equivalent to a conservative middle class in Turkey. The reason being that the nature of Egyptian middle class, and especially the fragment that could match with the entrepreneurial spirit that led the political Islamists to succeed in Turkey, did not exist in Egypt.

Brotherhood leadership struggled to become a decisive function within the Egyptian economic structure. The high cost of being associated with the Brothers and operating large-scale business activity was very evident from the experience that Khariat Al-Shater had been through, as a prominent leader of the brotherhood and one of the most influential businessmen of the movement. For instance, according to Abd Almonem (2009), Al-Shater was first imprisoned during the era of President Mubarak in the early 90's in the so-called "*Salsabil*" case, where he was sentenced to two-year imprisonment. Two years later he was presented for the first time before Military Court, where he was again sentenced to five-year imprisonment which ended in 2000 during a time when tension was rising high between the Muslim Brotherhood group and the government in light of the preparations for the legislative elections, when he was arrested once again for a third time, this time to spend another year behind bars. In December 2006, he was arrested again along with 12 other Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the so-called case of "Al-Azhar Militia" and sentenced to 10 years in prison (Abd almonem, 2009).

Acemoglu, Hassan & Tahoun (2014) study also showed that the Brotherhood connected firms had no significant impact for the Egyptian economy. Their study on Egypt's Arab Spring aimed at determining the role that popular mobilisation and protests played in restricting the ability of connected firms to capture excess rents under weak institutions, sought to identify firms connected to the Muslim Brotherhood by collecting the names of prominent members from various sources and cross-referencing them with the names of principal owners and board members of listed firms. Subsequently, they reported that despite having committed significant resources to this identification, they could not identify no more than just one firm connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. The evidence thus suggests that they did not manage to penetrate listed firms in the Mubarak era and therefore, their counterhegemonic potential when they came to power had no real significance for the Egyptian economic activity.

Whilst the FJP leadership was aware of this weakness and quickly set up and supported organisations such as The Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA), which was supposed to be the equivalent of MUSIAD in Turkey, these businessmen did not have the economic capacity and ability when compared with the

emerging Turkish devout bourgeoisie at the time of JDP in its early years. In contrast to EBDA, which was only founded after the uprisings in March 2012, MUSIAD had been active since 1990 and political Islam in Turkey had had close ties with economic activity related to civil society organisations for a long time, such as The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), for which Necmettin Erbakan was president in the late 1960s for a short period of time. It is evident that the FJP was trying to model the relationship between MUSIAD and the JDP in Turkey for its relationship with EBDA. After Morsi was elected as the president, for instance, similarly to MUSIAD, many members of EBDA found themselves in positions in government and started to accompany Morsi on his trips to countries such as China, France, Italy, Turkey and Qatar (Awad, 2012). Hence, the founder of EBDA, Hassan Malek, who was also a former business partner of Al-Shater and had spent time in prison with him in 1990s, was appointed by Morsi as the chair of the new business development council for advising the president on attracting international investment (Awad, 2012).

However, these attempts were not enough to enable the FJP to articulate the same momentum that the JDP had created for managing the economy when they came to power. The crucial explanation for this outcome was that despite the JDP government having outlined a vision for 2023, they did not attempt to revolutionise the economic system in the same way that the FJP had through mega projects, like the Renaissance (Nahda) in their early years. Turkish political Islamists acted in a much more pragmatic way and embraced the pro-EU agenda as a political vision as well as the economic programmes of the previous coalition government, which was composed of social democrats, nationalists and liberal conservatives. For instance, the JDP, without any hesitation followed through Turkey's Transition Programme for Strengthening the Economy (TTPSE), which was designed by the vice president of World Bank, Kemal Dervis, who had left his position after a call from the Turkish prime minister of the time Bulent Ecevit and became appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs. Hence, the JDP also acknowledged the seriousness of the IMF programme and managed to strike a deal with it, whereas Morsi and the FJP government in Egypt could not achieve such deals and establish a strong relationship with international capital. One reason for this could be whilst that the Brotherhood leadership repeatedly claimed that they were supporting the idea of a free market as

much as they advocated democratic principles, they were cautious about not upsetting the activists that had led the 25th January uprisings by fully committing themselves to the neoliberal state, as the JDP had done in Turkey.

This hesitation created much confusion amongst the secular liberal, nationalist, and ‘old’ leftist opposition as well as undermining the creditability of the Brotherhood leadership. This occurred in such a way as to make it difficult for them to create a path that ensured that neo-liberalisation gained the consent of as broad strata as possible, in the same way that their counterparts had achieved in Turkey. Regarding which, the statement below by Dr Abdullah Khattab, a member of the Freedom and Justice Party’s (FJP) Economic Affairs Committee in an interview for the Ikhwan Web, illustrates the various ideologies that the Brothers attempted to blend together for their economic approach:

“The economic vision of the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood claimed to be the essential balance between the capitalist and the socialist-oriented market systems, within a moral framework, and Islamic reference.”

(“Khattab: Muslim Brotherhood Economic Programme”, 2012)

Ultimately, the economic leadership model that the FJP proposed to achieve in Egypt encountered strong opposition from its critics, from both theoretical to theocratic perspectives. For instance, the activists who led the protest movement that toppled the Mubarak regime were not convinced that the economic model that the Morsi government pledged could solve the immediate needs of the people of Egypt. The Islamic identity of the movement behind the party were the foremost concern of mainly secular and leftist activists. Moreover, the party even found itself in a big debate with and subject to severe criticism from fellow Islamists at parliament, in the form of the Al Nour Party members, when the FJP leadership pledged that they were willing to implement the neoliberal policies demanded by the IMF package. In fact, the Al Nour party as fellow Islamists and the second biggest party after the FJP in parliament, fought militantly to stop the IMF programme. Moreover, Morsi was also in a dilemma about whether to negotiate the delivery of a \$4.8 billion facility with the IMF as this fund would have entailed the end of many important subsidies (Dalacoura 2016, p73). That is, food and fuel subsidies, which constituted roughly a quarter of

the country's budget at the time, were the most pressing economic policy problem that confronted the Morsi presidency.

President Morsi and the FJP leadership found themselves in a struggle against the resistance of the hegemonic structure which was still intact despite Mubarak's fall and that continuously tried to block deal with the IMF. This structure was composed of military officials, top bureaucratic elites and monopoly capitalists who made their fortunes because of their special relationship with the first two groups. More importantly, this structure constituted a special relationship with Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait and it was not surprising that about a week after the coup, on July 9 and 10, 2013 each announced aid packages to Egypt with a total volume of US \$12 billion (Tansey et al. 2017, p1244). On the side, the movement were confronted by the uprising's popular demands for social justice and the public's aversion to neoliberal policies. Deteriorating economic conditions and its dominant position in political society provided the military leadership the opportunity to stoke the fear of the secular liberal, nationalist, and 'old' leftist opposition forces about the danger of the imminent Islamisation of society (De Sment 2016, p367). In this interplay, therefore, it became evident that the national-popular subject, which was necessary for the success of the counterhegemonic project that the Muslim Brotherhood led, was failing to bond the people from the broadest social strata together.

9.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, much of the focus has been on the particularities of the political experience that the Brotherhood went through when they assumed the power in Egypt for the first time. In the absence of support from other opposition groups that gathered in Tahrir square, the Brotherhood affiliated Freedom and Justice Party won the first democratic general election through being supported by the largest opposition movement in the country. Shortly after the election, however, the constitutional court decided to withhold the parliament and cabinet appointments until the presidential elections. The SCAF remained in charge of the country and the Brotherhood like other opposition groups ponder upon their next moves to obtain a place for themselves in the changing power relations within the Egyptian state. Despite playing this political

game being beyond the abilities of the Brotherhood, they were eager not to miss any chance to fulfil their long-time ambition of getting hold of power in the Egyptian state. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, unlike the political Islamists in Turkey, the Brotherhood failed to be part of the current ruling system by infiltrating the key or at least mid-level bureaucratic positions before assuming political power. Moreover, the decisiveness of the Brotherhood for the Egyptian economy was not as forthcoming as it was with the political Islamists in Turkey. In this chapter, it was established that the Brothers got stuck in a political chess game with the existing hegemonic structure led by the military officers. Despite the movement having an extensive network and organisational abilities among the Egyptian masses, this was not enough for them to articulate an effective counterhegemonic force to get their project through the trenches of the Egyptian state. It has been demonstrated how the first political party of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt failed to forge a relationship with the extended socioeconomic groups, such as the urban middle class, some parts of the state elites and the intelligentsia. Making alliances with these groups was an important factor, which would have strengthened its counterhegemonic project, as they could stand as a formidable auxiliary for putting them into a hegemonic position. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood did not possess the crucial prerequisite for a historical bloc, which was to become the decisive nucleus of economic activity. Hence, it is concluded that political Islam in Egypt could not succeed as a counterhegemonic force whilst remaining in its eco-corporate state, which restricted it from articulating more effective political and economic leadership.

Chapter Ten

Conclusion and Findings

The final aim of this study was to address the following two research question, which analysed and evaluated the success and failure of counterhegemonic projects of political Islamists in Turkey and Egypt: To what extent did political Islamist counterhegemonic projects in Turkey and Egypt converge in terms of synthesising political theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure to constitute a new socio-economic bloc, or a new class alliance? Why did the Egyptian political Islamists, in contrast to their Turkish counterparts, fail to create a consensus among the Egyptian lower and middle classes, thereby achieving a hegemonic success? In order to address these questions, this research has employed Gramscian analysis by adopting the distinctive perspective, as outlined in the theoretical chapter and the following hypotheses and analytical framework were developed: a) that the success of political Islamist counterhegemonic projects depended on the leading group's ability to constitute decisive leadership as a nucleus of the economic activity; b) in order to construct a hegemonic leadership, the leading group should, first, develop a self-awareness of interests and ideal aspirations. Second, it should build alliances through the acquisition of skills that will enable it to synthesise theory and practice, the masses and intellectuals, structure and superstructure; and third, it must reach out to broader classes with the help of this new socioeconomic bloc and capture their support by ensuring economic growth and development. In the light of these above research objectives and design, the main findings of this research have demonstrated that in contrast to the failure of the Egyptian political Islamists, the counterhegemonic project of the Turkish political Islam succeeded in being able to constitute a new socio-economic bloc.

Composition of the Socioeconomic Background of Political Islam

The role of religion has been undeniably well rooted in the politics of emerging counterhegemonic movements in Turkey and Egypt. However, the paths that these movements took as they evolved themselves into an effective opposition group vastly differed from each other. In this study, it has been shown that for the case of Turkey,

Kemalism sought to establish a secular society, which was the project of the military cadre that won the independence war after WWI. In the case of Egypt, however, secular society was a reflection of British colonial rule and its effect over the political, economic and intellectual spheres of society. Unlike the Turkish case, which has never been a colonial state, in this study, it has argued that Egypt's past as a colonial state was the cause of the wide extent of feudalist society and uneven socioeconomic structure in the country, which led to the creation of a hegemonic system before Nasser's rule that undermined the welfare of the lower and middle classes. As discussed in detail in chapter four, the frustration that the Egyptian people had with the hegemonic apparatuses that Britain controlled in the shadows, diverted their energy towards rising religious, anti-imperialist and nationalist movements, which eventually found their form as the Muslim Brothers and Free Officers movement. The main claim of the founder and ideological architect of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna, was that national independence and a solution to the serious socioeconomic problems of Egypt could only be achieved through moral reform and strict adherence to Islam. Necmettin Erbakan, as the long serving political leader and one of the main ideologues of the National View movement in Turkey shared a similar perspective to Al-Banna, advocating that Islamic moral principles should be the guiding values when attempt to achieve economic, social and political stability, prosperity and development.

Henceforth, the role of Islam in Turkish political society began to form itself a socioeconomic and political basis against the norms of strict rule of secular culture, as enforced by the Kemalist cadres at all levels. This study has illustrated that this was a political, economic and moral resistance mainly by conservative elements of the Turkish bureaucracy, middle classes in rural regions, petty-bourgeoisie and provincial notables, who continued to believe in the role of religion in society. In a like manner, chapter four revealed that the supporters of the Brotherhood movement were from the middle and lower middle classes, i.e. civil servants, teachers, white collar workers, small merchants, a few artisans and students. It has also been explained that the evolution of political Islam in Egypt suffered a great set back when General Abdel Gamal Nasser imprisoned almost everyone associated with the Muslim Brothers for two decades. Hence, when comparing the experience of the Brotherhood under the Nasser leadership in this era with its counterparts in Turkey, the political Islamists in

the latter had a better political and social environment to constitute their movement into one of socio-political influence. In contrast to the Egyptian case, it has been shown in this work that the Turkish political Islamists, still fearing state oppression against their politics, reached a self-realisation of their own potential to articulate a pragmatic but system oriented counterhegemonic approach.

Transformation of the Political Islamists' Counterhegemonic Projects

In chapters three and four, it was concluded that the 1970s was a turning point for the political Islamist movements in both countries. Turkish political Islam advanced its political initiative and started taking part in general elections as a political party. This was a strategic choice to become incorporated into the mainstream political system rather than remaining as a radical opposition movement on the fringes. The Brothers in Egypt, on the other hand, were still searching for the ways and means to protect their religio-cultural identity and a role in Egyptian society without being part of political system. Consequently, I have demonstrated in this study that in contrast to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the shift between eco-corporate to ethical-political phases for the Turkish political Islamists was completed in this era. Nevertheless, I have also provided evidence that the ethical-political stage the Turkish political Islamists experienced in this era was still immature in terms of binding different segments of the socioeconomic groups together. However, they were still able to be part of coalition governments, including one with an ideological opponent, the pro-secular Republic People Party, in 1974. One of the main reasons for this underdeveloped ethica-political position was that political Islam in Turkey was still in its early stages as a counterhegemonic movement aiming to fuse itself with a conservative socioeconomic base to achieve hegemonic success. As Gramsci held, hegemonic power *“must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity”* (Gramsci 1971, p161).

The Muslim Brothers, on the other, failed to articulate such a perspective of self-realisation to become a decisive actor in Egyptian political economy. Whilst this study has shown that the Muslim Brothers were given some flexibility in the economic, political and civil spheres of Egyptian society during the 1970s and 1980s, the

movement still struggled to articulate a political identity, such as constituting their own political party. Instead, they chose to stay within the limits of civil society organisations, such as trade unions, professional syndicates, universities and schools as well as women, youth, and children's organisations. Whilst the introduction of *Infitah* (Open Door) economic reform policies allowed them to find a degree of freedom to articulate a distinct Islamic social capital to bind both the middle and poorer strata of society more closely to form a new socioeconomic bloc, this study has demonstrated that this process was strictly controlled by the regime forces dictated by Sadat and later Mubarak aimed at inhibiting the Muslim Brotherhood members from becoming "*the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*" (Gramsci 1971, p161). Effectively, the impact of the neoliberal economic reforms was preserved within the limits of Sadat and Mubarak's regime in Egypt, but the same reform initiative led by Turgut Ozal and supported by the military after the 1980 *coup d'état* in Turkey, unleashed and coalesced the economic and religious forces of the Anatolian region to create a "new form" of bourgeoisie and counterhegemonic political project. The analysis of this study has been focused on formation of this new class structure and it was found that it was this new form of socioeconomic and political class that provided the fertile ground for the political and cultural transformation in Turkey and led to the creation of the Justice and Development party.

Diverging Paths of the Political Islamists in Egypt and Turkey

In chapter five, it was revealed how and what extent political Islamists in both countries began to diverge. This chapter illustrated that the intellectuals of political Islam in both countries started to expand their operations as the active agents of civil and political society. It was evident that their popularity increased as they organised themselves around their own religious and non-religious establishments, including publishing houses, media outlets, private schools, medical centres, syndicates, student societies and private companies. These civil activities attracted the support of various socioeconomic groups, especially, the segments who were the losers from the neoliberal reforms, which took place in both countries. However, unlike for their Egyptian counter parts, these economic reforms had some positive impact on Turkish political Islam. In the chapter, it was demonstrated that these reforms led to the emergence of pious businessmen from Anatolia, who were organised under the

businessmen's association, named MUSIAD. These businessmen played an important role in transforming Turkish civil, political and economic structures. It has been argued that as these businessmen increased their share of market capital in Turkey and gained recognition in the world markets, they became more eager to articulate their own hegemonic state. It was demonstrated that whilst the central right parties dominated a specific group of bourgeoisies up until 1980s, this has gradually changed in favour of political Islamist leadership as the fierce competition between the central right parties led to a series of economic and political crises. In contrast to the existing Istanbul-based hegemonic bourgeoisie, who driven their social position as having a close alliance with the secular Kemalist state, the emergent Anatolian-based capital class sought to consolidate a hegemonic status by transforming the attitudes of Turkish political Islamists towards a free market economy and reformist agenda. Chapter six explained the crucial link between these businessmen and the next line of political Islamist leadership in Turkey. Regarding which, it was stated in this chapter that there were 21 MUSIAD members who got elected as a member of parliament from the ranks of the JDP in the first general elections. It was then argued that from a Gramscian perspective, the counterhegemonic leadership of the political Islamists in Turkey went on to achieve the crucial link between the emerging economic structure and superstructure to constitute a historical bloc for their counterhegemonic project.

In contrast to the Turkish case, it has been contended in this work that Egyptian political Islam could not articulate similar alliances with the emerging business elites. The *Infithar* economic reform process was too tightly controlled by the regime and did not share the benefits of this economic programme with any socioeconomic group that did not favour its rule. The main support for the Brotherhood's both civil and political activities came from the migrants who worked and live abroad. Because of the remittances from these people, the finance industry which grew to process them provided the opportunity for the Brotherhood to forge organic links with the emerging capitalists operating in this industry. However, there is no strong evidence that the Brotherhood had organic ties with the emerging SMEs, as was the case for the Turkish case study. In fact, the stages of economic development of both case study countries began to diverge from 1980s onwards, whereby the Turkish case became more complex with a faster growing economy than in the Egyptian case. Turkey was much more successful in adopting export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) than Egypt. In

effect, the SMEs who shared mainly threads of the pious lifestyle in Turkey became more integrated into global economy and sought political and economic order which they thought would give them the chance of exploring broader markets. This was never the case for the Egyptian SMEs as the regime tightly controlled the beneficiaries of the economic reforms.

Whilst the Brotherhood never founded a political party up until the Freedom and Justice party in 2011, they still had a degree of political significance in elections. For instance, in chapter five it was demonstrated that when the movement made alliances with the New Wafd party in the general elections of 1984 and 1987, it displayed a credible influence as a counterhegemonic power. However, the movement lost such political influence once it decided to boycott the elections and resisted transforming itself into a political agent, as was not the case for in Turkey, where the National View movement was formed. This thesis has shown how Turkish political Islamists enjoyed being part of the electoral system and used it for its own long term ambitions. For instance, chapter five and six demonstrated that in 1990s, the decline of the secular Kemalist ideology and the centre right parties were speeded up through endless corruption scandals, economic crises, the rise of Kurdish vs Turkish armed conflict, all of which were covered extensively in the media. This gave the political Islamist Welfare Party the chance to increased their popularity through their activities and engagements in civil society organisations. This, thus allowed them to articulate the necessary counterhegemonic activities in both the civil and political structures, thereby forging a crucial link between political Islam and the masses. More specifically, Turkish political Islamists under Necmettin Erbakan's leadership reformulated their Just Order economic and political programme by addressing the essential needs of all segments of the society. These segments varied from secular people to workers, the unemployed, the retired, intellectuals suffering from human rights abuses, women wearing headscarves demanding more freedom of faith and emerging conservative businessmen.

Whilst, the Brotherhood struggled to execute a counterhegemonic influence as a political party as its Turkish counterpart, the National View, was able to do, in both case studies it has been demonstrated that they still shared similar popularity and success in civil society activities, such as charity work for poor and marginalised

segments. In the local elections of 1994, the Welfare Party won the municipalities of both Istanbul and Ankara. The mayor of Istanbul was Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who quickly became the centre of attention from both secular and conservative groups for being the first mayor of Istanbul with political Islamist affiliation. Furthermore, in the thesis, it has been demonstrated that in the municipalities, once the Welfare Party led coalition took over the government, the activities and events that Islamists were offering to the poor and disadvantaged experienced a substantial increase. Hence, this paved the way for further electoral success in the next general election in 1995. The Welfare Party became the leading party at these elections and formed a coalition government with the True Path Party. Despite this government not lasting more than one year, as the first political Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan was forced to resign by the secular forces backed by military, in contrast to the Egyptian case, political Islamists in Turkey had a much longer experience in democratic politics. They were more confident and self-sufficient with their counterhegemonic position in making alliances and consolidating their leadership.

In this thesis, it has been shown that in contrast to the Egyptian case, political Islamists in Turkey were much more effective in linking their network and activities to political and civil society. In chapter five, it was concluded that the Brotherhood could not reach a moment of counterhegemonic consciousness to form a political party. Instead, it concentrated heavily on civil society activities, such as charity work, to help poor and disadvantage groups who were suffering the most from the weakening economy. Professional associations were the other important civil society area that the Brotherhood was strongly active in. It was explained in chapter five that the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood grew to the extent that by 1993, six of the seven biggest professional associations were controlled by them. Hence, the Brotherhood had the ability to formulate a counterhegemonic momentum in the political structure in terms of its networking and organisation capabilities, but failed to form a political party. This failure, as it has been demonstrated in thesis, was not just related to the coercive nature of the regime against groups that threatened their hegemonic position, for the Brothers also struggled to create a socio-political vision and identity at the executive level. In relation to this, it has been observed in this study that the Brotherhood also failed to infiltrate the state bureaucracy to consolidate its counterhegemonic influence, for unlike the Turkish political Islamists, they were not given any opportunities in

political structure to do so. Instead, it preferred to delegitimise the Mubarak regime by boycotting the elections in 1990. In this thesis, it has been demonstrated how the decision to boycott the general elections set back the Brotherhood's activities in political society for over a decade. This is because the regime took advantage of the increasing tension in the region at the time, due to the First Gulf War and the Algerian Civil War, to intensify its coercion towards all the major opposition groups that it saw as threatening the stability of Egypt.

Whilst the activities of the Brotherhood continued in the field of civil society, the regime did not hesitate to use its coercive power over these institutions as well when it felt they had breached their line of authority. The crackdown on the Brotherhood was not as forceful as in the time of Nasser, but the regime under Mubarak's leadership targeted selective activities of the movement to contain and limit their counterhegemonic potential. In particular, the regime did not allow the political Islamists to become the decisive nucleus of the Egyptian political economy. Islamic finance and banking institutions, which flourished rapidly in the 1970s, were taken under strict government supervision at the end of the 1980s. Likewise, the regime confiscated the assets and businesses of Brotherhood affiliated members through prosecution cases, such as *Salsabil* in the 1990s. The active presence of the Brotherhood in professional syndicates and student unions was also targeted and neutered in this period. Their counterparts in Turkey, on the other hand, used it to consolidate stronger and more effective civil and political influences at all levels of Turkish society. In this study, it has been demonstrated that despite the political Islamists being severely punished by the secular state in the late 1990s, they still succeeded in constituting the crucial link with the emerging capital groups and becoming a decisive function within the Turkish economy. To achieve this essential nexus and articulate recognition from global capital groups and their intelligentsia, the Turkish political Islamists acknowledged the realities of the market economy and transformed their position to execute neoliberal political economy. In other words, the reformist segment of the political Islamists in Turkey who had been advocating a 'Just Order' economic programme and opposing the EU membership process for decades, gave up their strict opposition to neoliberal social order and became part of the neoliberal hegemonic system.

The Limits of Political Islamist Counterhegemonic Projects

This study has demonstrated that, in contrast to the Turkish case, the Egyptian political Islamist counterhegemonic project failed to form itself a historical bloc by first becoming “*the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity*” (Gramsci 1971, p161). Moreover, it has been argued that the first political party of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt failed to forge a relationship with other socioeconomic groups, such as the urban middle class and some elements of the state elites and intelligentsia. The reformist wing of the political Islamists led by Erdogan and Gul, on the other hand, formed a new political party in 2001 to consolidate this important alliance to create hegemonic leadership. They succeeded in winning the consent of these groups, which eventually became the formidable auxiliary of the counterhegemonic project of the political Islamists against the existing hegemonic structure in Turkey. To achieve this alliance; however, as has been argued in this work, the intellectuals of the political Islamist leadership transformed themselves by advocating a new political identity, namely ‘conservative democracy’, and rejected their past labelling as political Islamists. In order to achieve a counterhegemonic momentum without a direct confrontation with the military and secular elite, the JDP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, articulated a political and economic programme aimed at combining the ideological elements of religion, democracy and a neoliberal economic order. Furthermore, based on the information from interviews, this study has demonstrated that the JDP’s leadership were aware of the heterogeneity of influential political actors in Turkey, which led them accept the realities of socio-political and economic issues at the time. Thus, chapter seven revealed how the JDP had a gelatinous form of political identity, and did not hesitate to give up fundamental causes that it advocated in pursuit of its political and economic mission from time to time. For instance, further investigation on the party programme and political discourse of the JDP during their first term in government, elicited that the reformist wing of the political Islamists moved towards the centre right spectrum and thereafter, did not hesitate to adopt gelatinous political and economic positions.

In chapters six and seven, how the reformist faction of the political Islamists in Turkey under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, with their

distinctive leadership approaches, constituted a definitive counterhegemonic leadership, was explained. It was argued that their partnership was a combination of coerciveness and consensus building, through which they strove to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc. Effectively, the alliance between these two, with their reputation among the emerging conservative bourgeoisie and international capital, allowed them to synthesise the masses and intellectuals at both the economic structure and superstructure levels. They pledged their commitment to a neoliberal economy and implemented rigorous reforms to integrate the Turkish economy to global markets. The organic relationship with emerging capitalist groups transformed political Islam in Turkey to such a degree that the JDP used the EU membership process and IMF imposed privatisation reforms as a political instrument to strengthen the solidarity of its immediate allies. This resulted in real improvements in their socioeconomic lives, at least in the short run. From this perspective, in this thesis, it has been demonstrated that the JDP's leaders rejected their political Islamist identity when they assumed power for the first time, and instead, adopted a culturally conservative and economically liberal counterhegemonic agenda, which aimed at bridging Islam and the global political economy.

In the case of the Egyptian political Islamist counterhegemonic project, on the other hand, it has been concluded in this thesis, that unlike the Turkish case, they failed to infiltrate the key, or at least, mid-level bureaucratic positions, before assuming political power. The Brotherhood did not possess the same practical political skills and flexible political identity as their Turkish counterparts, which was essential for forging a strong link between civil and political society. Most importantly, the short-lived presidency of the Brotherhood member, Muhammed Morsi, in Egypt, showed that the political Islamists could not articulate their hegemonic potential as effectively as their Turkish counterparts. This was due to their failure to reach a moment of counterhegemonic consciousness, which was necessary for them to synthesise the masses in Tahrir square and their intellectuals at both the structural and super-structural levels. Henceforth, by highlighting the intense but equally complicated relationship between the protest movement and the Brotherhood, this thesis provided an analysis of what led to the cathartic moment in the Tahrir Square. It was concluded that the momentum for a change in this struggle between the regime and the protestors did not give much choice to the Brothers, but to take the initiative to offer themselves

as an alternative leadership. The Brotherhood's success depended on its ability to constitute a new socioeconomic bloc, or a new class alliance, which had the qualities of guaranteeing stable economic growth and social equality. Ultimately, its leadership remained predominantly an organisation of the educated lower-middle classes and professionals with strong sensitivities towards religious principles and values. In contrast to the Islamists in Turkey, their absence from business associations and weak presence in the economic structure, demonstrates how the movement failed to articulate the essential bridge between the discontented middle classes and capital, which was the key for the success of the JDP in Turkey. In the words of Gramsci, the counterhegemonic project of the Brotherhood failed because: *"though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity"* (Gramsci 1971, p161). In sum, the Brotherhood's attempt to hold onto the political power of the Egyptian state failed because they were unable to exert economic influence, which was essential for restructuring the Egyptian economy, whereas their Turkish counterparts had succeeded in doing so.

List of Interviews

1. Abdullah Gül, 11th President of Republic of Turkey, London, 27/10/2015
2. Ahmet Aydin, Deputy Speakers of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, JDP MP for Adiyaman in Parliament, Ankara, 14/07/2015
3. Faruk Unsal, Founding member of JDP, Ankara, 11/08/2015
4. Burhan Kuzu, Chief Advisor to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Founding member of JDP, Ankara, 07/08/2015
5. Yasin Aktay, Head of Foreign Relations of JDP (at the time of interview), Ankara, 06/08/2015
6. Ali Sahin, Deputy EU Minister, Deputy Foreign Relations Officer at the time of interview for JDP, Ankara, 05/08/2015
7. Burhanettin Duran, Head of SETA, Ankara, 05/08/2015
8. Dr. Wael Haddara, Senior advisor to Muhammed Morsi, Skype Interview, 22/ 02/2016
9. Dr. Hazem Kandil, Author of Inside the Brotherhood, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, 24/ 02/ 2016
10. Professor Tariq Ramadan, University of Oxford, Skype Interview, 10/ 03/ 2016
11. Can Acun, Middle East Specialist at SETA, Ankara, 03/08/2015
12. Dr. Rida Fahmi, Chairman of the Committee on Defence and National Security in the Shura Council, Istanbul, 07/09/2015
13. Dr. Mohamed al-Fiqi, Chairman of the Committee of Finance and Economics in the Shura Council during Morsi's presidency, Istanbul, 07/09/2015
14. Dr. Yahya Hamid, Minister of Investment during Morsi's presidency, Istanbul, 01/09/2015
15. Muhammed Soudan, the Foreign Relations Secretary, he is also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Arbitration Committee, a five-man body that mediates and resolves disputes amongst MB members at all levels of the movement. During President Morsi's brief tenure (June 2012-June 2013) Soudan acted as the chief consultant engineer to the governor of Alexandria. London, 04/01/2015
16. Mehmet Erdogan, JDP MP for Gaziantep, Ankara, 08/07/2015

17. Tahsin Akti, Media Adviser of former Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay, Ankara, 07/07/2015
18. Ayse Karabat, Journalist at Al-Jazeera Turkey, Ankara, 15/07/2015
19. Omer Aslan, Expert in Turkey and Investment Specialist at the Islamic Development Bank, Skype Interview, 06/06/2015
20. Erkut Ayvaz, Civil Military Relations at SETA, Ankara, 03/08/2015
21. Yunus Sahbaz, Domestic Policy at SETA, Ankara, 03/08/2015
22. Mehmet Kizilkaya, Economist at SETA, Ankara, 03/08/2015
23. Erdal Tanas Karagol, Head of Economy Department of SETA, Ankara, 03/08/2015
24. Bilgehan Ozturk, Security Specialist at SETA, Ankara, 02/08/2015
25. Nedim Sevinc, Representative of ASKON Ankara Branch, 15/07/2015
26. Cigdem Kogar, Representative of Turkish Central Bank in London, 07/03/2016
27. Halil Ibrahim Firat, JDP MP for Adiyaman, Ankara, 14/07/2015
28. Erdem Dokur, Representative of MUSIAD Ankara Branch, 13/07/2015
29. Gunes Asik, Economist at TEPAV and TOBB University, Ankara, 10/07/2015
30. Dr. Ashraf Mishrif, Lecturer at Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, King's College London, 17/06/2015
31. Christopher de Bellaigue: Freelance Journalist and Researcher, London, 16/06/2015
32. Mahmoud A. Ibrahim; Journalist – National Union of Journalist, London, 11/06/2015

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