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DOCTORAL THESIS

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ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ DÖNEMİNDE TÜRKİYE'NİN FİLİSTİN SORUNUNA YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ KONSTRÜKTİVİZM VE POST-YAPISALCILIK ÇERÇEVESİNDE ANALİZİ

Bu tezde, Türkiye'nin Filistin politikasını analiz etmek için konstrüktivizm ve post-yapısalcılık teorileri kullanılmaktadır. Tezin temel varsayımı, Filistin meselesi hakkındaki söylemin, Türk hükümetlerinin kimliğindeki değişimle ve Türk dış politikasının Ortadoğu'ya yönelik ilkeleriyle bağlantılı olduğu yönündedir. Paylaşılan bilgiyi ve toplumsal ilişkileri üreten ve diğer eylemleri mümkün kılan diskur, aynı zamanda hem yeni kimlikleri hem de mevcut olanları yeniden belirlemektedir.

Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin ilk yıllarında, Filistin meselesine ilişkin söylemin zayıf olduğu ve Türk Dış Politikasının hâkim söyleminin Araplarla ilgili olumsuz algılarla dolu olan Batılılaşma etkisinde kaldığı varsayılmaktadır. Ancak, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde, Türkiye'nin duyarlılıkları ve Orta Doğu'ya bağlılıkları konusunda köklü bir

değişim olmuştur. Buna göre, Araplarla ilgili söylem de, Filistin yanlısı söylemin belirgin hale gelmesiyle olumsuzluktan olumluya doğru değişmiştir.

Öncelikle, geçmişten günümüze Türk dış politikasının Orta Doğu'ya yönelik kırılma noktaları, Laclau ve Mouffe'nin eşitlik ve farklılık mantığı kullanılarak irdelenecektir. Daha sonra, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi dönemi öncesi İsrail ve Filistin meselesi hakkında söylemlerin Batı kimliği ve İslam kimliği olan iki karşıt kimliğin varlığından dolayı çatıştığını göstermek için Laclau ve Mouffe'nin "hakim söylem ve karşıtlığı" teorisi kullanılacak. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde söylemlerdeki bu karşıtlık, İslam yanlısı ve Orta Doğu kimliğinin hakim hale gelmesiyle (Laclau ve Mouffe buna hegemonik söylem diyor) çözüldü.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Türk Dış Politikası, Filistin Davası, İsrail, Konstrüktivizm, Post-Yapısalcılık, Kimlik, Söylem Düzeni, Hegemonik Söylem, Antagonizma, Nodal Noktaları

ABSTRACT

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THE ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN THE JDP ERA IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

This thesis uses theories of constructivism and post-structuralism to analyze the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue. Main assumption of this thesis is that discourse about the Palestinian issue is linked to the changes of identities of Turkish governments and principles of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. **At the same time, the discourse is a factor that assigns new identities and reproduces existing identities, in addition to its function in producing shared knowledge, social relations and making other actions possible.**

It is assumed that in the early years of the Turkish Republic, the discourse about the Palestinian issue was weak, and the dominant discourse or master signifier of the Turkish foreign policy was Westernization linked with negative perceptions about Arabs. However, there has been a radical shift about Turkey's sensitivities and affiliations to the Middle East

during JDP era. Accordingly, the discourse about Arabs started to change from negative to positive, with domination of pro-Palestinian discourse.

First, nodal points of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in each era will be examined using Laclau and Mouffe's logic of equivalence and difference, then their theory of hegemon discourse and antagonism will be used to show that before JDP era, discourses about Israel and the Palestinian issue collided due to the existence of two opposing identities which are Western identity and Islamic identity. While in JDP era this antagonism in discourses dissolved through hegemonic interventions of pro-Islamic and Middle Eastern identity.

Keywords:

Turkish Foreign Policy, Palestinian Issue, Israel, Constructivism, Post-structuralism, Identity, Order of Discourse, Sediment Discourse, Hegemonic Discourse, Antagonism, Nodal Points of TFP.

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Abbreviations:

JDP: Justice and Development Party

CHP: Republican People's Party

DYP: True Path Party

EU: European Union

IHH: Humanitarian Relief Foundation

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NSP: National Salvation Party

PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party

PA: Palestinian Authority

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

TBMM: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey

TCCB: Presidency of the Republic of Turkey

UNSC: United Nation Security Council

UNCU: Unified National Command for Uprising (UNCU)

USA: United States of America

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1 FIRST CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian issue always occupies a special and important place in the Turkish foreign policy, either in the last period of the Ottoman Empire or in the new Republic of Turkey. This importance comes from the holiness of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, for most of the Turkish leaders in all governments. In that sense, Turkey always supported the Palestinian side, and condemned the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, considering it as a provocation of International law and violation of human rights. Turkey supported the Palestinian Authority and recognized the state of Palestine in the United Nations. It also advocated the two-state solution in the peace process and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on pre-1967 boundaries, with East Jerusalem as its capital. In spite of that, the nodal points and principles of Turkish foreign policy towards Arabs and the Middle East that stems from the identity of the Turkish elites were factors influenced the degree of the discourse about the Palestinian issue among the Turkish people, and its presence in the agenda of the Turkish foreign policy. So it will be shown how the Turkish discourse about Arabs in general and the Palestinian issue in particular, changed according to change of the ruling governments and their adopted principles using post-structuralist theories of Laclau and Mouffe about nodal points of foreign policy, that show how identity and subject position of Turkey is articulated through a chain of signifiers and signs. However, theories of Laclau and Mouffe are important since they used concepts of antagonism and hegemony which show that different discourses about the social world are involved in a continuous struggle with one other to achieve hegemony and to fix the meaning of language in their own way, and that thing form a challenge for identity to be fixed, and made it open to change. Then it will be focused more on analyzing the Turkish discourse towards the Palestinian issue in JDP era to show that there is nothing outside the text, it will be shown that Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue is led by two levels of discourses: the first level is discourse of the Turkish foreign policy decision-makers which is principles and nodal points of Turkish foreign policy, the second level is International discourse that is a wider domain of 'order of discourse' that influences both the discourse of Turkish foreign policy, and the rhetoric and discourse of the Turkish leaders like "discourse of war on terrorism, discourse of humanitarian intervention and

discourse of civilization", all of these discourses emerged and gained universal endorsement.

After analyzing the discourse of the Turkish leaders, constructivist analysis will be provided to show how the discursive practices of the Turkish leaders created a shared understanding and formed cultural structure about the Palestinian Israeli conflict, which guided the actions of the Turkish people. In that context, a comprehensive analysis about Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue in JDP era will be conducted through linking constructivist and post-structuralist discourse theories to show that identity and discourse play central role in directing Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue.

1.1 GENERAL THEME OF STUDY

Constructivism assumes that actor and structure are mutually constituted, it concerned on "how an action does or does not reproduce both the actor and the structure", while "the action perpetuated the international intersubjective understanding of actors which is the identity of the state,"[1] Alexander Wendt also argues that "agents and structures are produced or reproduced by what actors do,"[2] here the state define its position and identity based on the contextual background created by systemic structures[3], and these structures constituted and reconstituted as a result of repeated interaction among states which is called by constructivists "strategic and rhetorical practices". However, the logic of linking constructivism with post-structuralism in this study is based on the following explanation.

Constructivists see that in the process of social interaction and within the collective meaning in which the state is engaged, the state gain identities which are relatively stable,

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[1] Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security*, Vol.23, Issue.1, (Summer 1998), p.130.
[2] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.88, No.2, (Jun,1994), p.390.
[3] ibid, p.389.

role specific understandings and expectations about self.[4] At the same time, post-structuralists conceive of social practice as being a part of the discourse, and thus allows for the conceptualization of identity as being both discursively inscribed, spoken and enacted.[5] Critical discourse analysts argue that discourse contributes to the construction of social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and meaning.[6] Wendt also argues that the discursive practices are one of the factors that form the intersubjective structure, shared understandings, or beliefs "social representation", in addition to expectations and social knowledge. And Doty indicates that social practices have the power to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike.

So according to constructivism, it is the discursive practices that form the shared understandings or social representations, which produce knowledge and identities and make various courses of action possible. In that context, "one cannot talk about social representations as a theory of social knowledge without examining public discourses in which different dialogues between the Ego and the Alter take place and through which they generate representations."[7] This logic of analysis is shown in the following chart:



Figure 1.1-1 Role of discursive practices in creation of knowledge and identity

[4] Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it", p.397, cited in Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 4th edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.216.

[5] Martin Müller, "Doing discourse analysis in Critical Geopolitics", L'Espace Politique, *Revue en ligne de géographie politique et de géopolitique*,Vol.12, No.3, (2010), p.3.

[6] Marianne Jorgensen, Louise Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method,* London: SAGE, 2002, p.67

[7] Eleni Andreouli, "Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relations", *Papers on Social Representations, Peer Reviewed Online Journal,* Vol.19, (2010), p.61.

Constructivism argues that identity of the state is reproduced by action and social practices, and didn't give place for how these social practices or discursive practices create meaning, and how some discourses are shaped and get privilege over other discourses by relations of power and knowledge, leading to a change in identities. And it can be analyzed by using discourse theories and approaches of Laclau and Mouffe and Foucauldian-based critical discourse analysis which are covered by post-structuralists.

Critical Discourse Analysis considers written and spoken discourse as social practice, "it assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations, institutions, and social structures in which they are embedded: the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and in turn discourses influence social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it."[8]

Thus, discourse theories claim that discourse is a social action that shapes the social world. In this context, discourse theories complete the uncovered subjects by constructivism about discourse and identity. In that sense, Ruggie has defined post-modern constructivism as one variant of constructivism, as he pointed out that "the second variant other than conventional constructivism is 'postmodernist constructivism', which has intellectual roots like works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida …. here the linguistic construction of subjects is stressed, as a result of which discursive practices constitute the ontological primitives, or the foundational units of reality and analysis".[9]

In my thesis I will use constructivism with discourse approaches provided by post-structuralism to show how the Turkish foreign policy and discursive practices towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were changed in JDP era. And how that change occurred

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[8] Ruth Wodak, et. al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, p.7.

[9] John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn, 1998), p.857.

according to change in both identities of the leaders, and principles of the Turkish foreign policy, in addition to the effect of the wider social domain and dominant International discourse. Then a detailed analysis will be done for the effect of discourse of the Turkish leaders towards the Palestinian issue in JDP era on the creation of shared knowledge and making some actions possible, besides to its role in the creation and reproducing social identities.

So there are three levels of Analysis

1. Post-structural analysis for examining change in nodal points of Turkish foreign policy and subject position of Turkey towards the Middle East from early Republic to the JDP era. With examples on change of Discourse about the Middle East in general and the Palestinian issue in particular.
2. Analysis of the Turkish discourse about the Palestinian issue in the JDP era, and how it is not just affected by principles of Turkish foreign policy, but also it is legitimized by international discourses, so a macro-level analysis about International discourse will be done.
3. Analyzing the role of discourse and rhetoric of the leaders in creating meaning, shared knowledge and making other actions possible, in addition to producing and reproducing social identities.

1.2 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

- In the early years of the Turkish Republic, the discourse about the Palestinian issue was weak and Turkish foreign policy was centrally concerned with Westernization and dominated by negative perceptions about Arabs. However, there was a radical shift in Turkey's sensitivities and affiliations with the Middle East during the JDP era. Accordingly, the discourse about Arabs started to change from negative to positive.

- Before the JDP era, discourses about Israel and the Palestinian issue collided due to the existence of two opposing identities which are Western identity and Islamic identity. In the JDP era this antagonism in discourses dissolved through hegemonic interventions of pro-Islamic and Middle Eastern identity.
- Repeated discourse about the Palestinian issue by the Turkish leaders and media, consider social practice which, according to constructivism, forms shared knowledge that constitutes the identity of the state and makes other actions possible. Davos Crisis, low chair, and the rhetoric of the Turkish president Erdogan, all are discursive practices that created knowledge and influenced the discourse and actions of the Turkish people towards the Palestinian issue, like the Turkish series 'Kurtlar Vadisi', and launching of Mavi Marmara to break the Israeli blockade over Gaza.
- The discourse of Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is affected and legitimized by wider dominant international discourse and order of discourse. For example, when the liberal market dominated the international structure in the 1980s, Turkish policy towards Arabs was justified with discourse of liberal markets. When the "war on terrorism" dominated the international terrain after September 11th, the discourse of terrorism was used by the Turkish leaders in condemning the Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. After that, in Arab uprisings, the order of discourse that dominated the Turkish policy towards the Palestinian issue was driven from the order of discourse of democratization, civilization, responsibility to protect, and historical responsibility. This order of discourse was reproduced by the discourse of the Turkish leaders, parliamentarians, and discourse of the public, leading to the creation of the identity of Turkey as a regional power.
- The discourse of the JDP about the Palestinian issue and its response to the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians was occasionally affected by the change of regimes in Arab countries. For example, self-identification with the government of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 was a representational practice which constituted the reality of Islamic identity of the JDP government, and constructed thought of actors with a dichotomy of Islam/Secularism. However, its discourse and

position towards the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2012 differs from its discourse and position towards the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2014.

- The Palestinian issue is on the priority of regional issues, through which Turkey emphasized its belonging to the Islamic community, and responded to the threats facing Jerusalem in the name of its identity as a member of Organization of Islamic Conference OIC, not in the name of its identity as a NATO member.
- In JDP era ownership of the Palestinian issue and liberation of Jerusalem prevailed the order of discourse of the Turkish government in regards of the Palestinian issue.
- Media and visual representations are one of the factors that influence the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue and created the role identity of the Turkish government and its president in the Arab and Islamic world.

1.3 TOOLS OF RESEARCH

In this thesis I will use the constructivist theory which assumes that identity is constituted by social interaction and perpetuated by discourse, then I will depend on Foucauldian discourse theory that concerns in historical conditions and wider social domains that contributed in emergence of discourse, Meanwhile, for analyzing the role of discourse in fixing of meaning and articulation of identity I will draw upon Laclau and Mouffe's approach which focus on the hegemony of discourses, and identity constitution by discourse through logic of equivalence and difference. So concepts like nodal points, master signifier, and chain of equivalence and difference, will be used to show how each discourse constitutes knowledge and reality, identities and social relations. In some examples, we will focus on concepts of identity antagonism and hegemony as analytical tools. In addition to approach of Fairclough in critical discourse analysis, using his framework that shows three dimensions of any communicative event which are, dimension

of text 'like speech, visual image', dimension of discursive practice which involves the production and consumption of texts, and the dimension of social practice.[10]

The study consists of political speech of presidents of Republic of Turkey, prime ministers and members of the Turkish parliament, with more focus on speeches of the then Turkish prime minister and current Turkish president Recep Tayyep Erdogan, in addition to the columns of Turkish writers in social media such as Turkish newspapers, and columns of Arab and Western writers in different newspapers. In the study, fact numbers are abstracted from official websites like OECD, and results of conducted polls are used, besides, interviews were conducted with decision makers and academicians in Palestine and Turkey. Books and articles were used for theories of international relations and literature about the Turkish foreign policy and the Palestinian issue.

[10] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p. 68.

SECOND CHAPTER

THEORETICAL CONTEXT: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POST-SRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE THEORIES

This chapter will discuss theories of constructivism and post-structuralism, and it will be showed how these theories tied to give a comprehensive explanation for identity constitution and its relation to the discursive practices of states.

2.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism roots back to the third debate between rationalists (realists, neorealists, and neo-liberal institutionalists) and the adherents of interpretive epistemologies (post-modernists and post-structuralists) that dominated the discipline in the 1980s and emerged after rising of scholarly studies about the role of ideas in international relations and the nature of international reality and how it must be explained by scholars. The debate concentrated on "who can provide a more conceptual and sustained empirical analysis of international relations". [11]

Other factor that contributed in the emergence of constructivism was the end of the Cold War which challenged the illustrative hegemony of the dominant rationalist theories, particularly neo-realism, in addition to the "emergence of new forms of post-Cold War politics in the Third World (namely the emergence of new forms of nationalist, communalist, and ethnic conflicts).[12] Moreover, power balancing between the USA and the Soviet Union was dominating the Cold War period, nonetheless, after the end of the Cold War, the future developments of balance of power became not clear, and neorealists expected that new great power will emerge to balance the US power, but what was expected by neorealists did not occur, the thing that opened the way for constructivists to criticize neorealism as unused and materialist.[13] In that sense, constructivists assumed that

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[11] Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 3 No. 3, 1997, p.319
Andrew Bradley Phillips, "Constructivism ", In *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century, An introduction* , Martin Griffiths (ed.), New York: Routledge, 2007, p.60
- Runa Das, "Critical Social Constructivism : "Culturing" Identity, (in) Security, And The State In International Relations Theory", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.70, No.4, (2009) p.961
[12] Das, 2009, p.961
[13] Tayyar Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teoriler: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 8. Baskı, Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık, 2013, p.499.

thoughts and ideas lead to a better theory about power balancing and anarchy.[14] They also emphasized and gave weight on identities and interests in the explanation of state behavior and policy outcomes which are a product of the interaction between states in the international arena.[15]

Even the neorealism was criticized by constructivists to be materialism,[16] but materialism also is a part of constructivism, that is obvious in Wendt's definition for social structure: "social structures have three elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices."[17] In other words, the ideas and beliefs which are related to those material resources are most important.[18]

Nicholas Onuf was the first scholar who talked about constructivism, and coined the constructivism in IR[19]through his work of "The World of Our Making."[20] According to Onuf, the idea of constructivism depends on the proposition that:

> *"Social relations make or construct people-ourselves- into the kind of beings that we are. Conversely, we make the world what it is, from the raw materials that nature provides, by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other". In that context, Onuf argued that "saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is."*[21]

The other leading constructivist scholar who had significant contribution in development of constructivism was Alexander Wendt, who started his works with important article in 1987, explaining the structure agent problem depending on structuration

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[14] Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 4th edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.161.
[15] Oliver Daddow, *International Relations Theory*, London: SAGE, 2009, p.115.
[16] ibid.
[17] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics", *International Security*, Vol.20, No.1 (Summer, 1995), p.37.
[18] Jackson & Sorensen, op.cit., p.163.
[19] Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates", in *Handbook of International Relations* , ed. Thomas Risse , Beth A. Simmons Walter Carlsnaes, Vol.2, London: SAGE, 2013, p:118.
[20] Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.
[21] Nicholas Onuf , "Constructivism: A User's Manual", In *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, New York: Routledge, 2015.

theory of Giddens,[22] then he continued his writings through a number of important articles in 1992, 1994, and 1998, in addition to his book of 'Social Theory of International Relations' in 1999.[23]

Kratochwil also contributed in constructivism through his assertion on the role of rules and norms in international politics, in his paper with Rey Koslowski "Understanding Change in International Politics", he argued that "political system changes when actors through practice change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction". And they affirmed the importance of knowing "the way in which changed practices arising from new conceptions of identity and political community, are adopted by individuals, and the way in which interactions among states are thereby altered or vice versa."[24]

2.1.1 Common Features of Constructivism

The basic features of constructivism is that human interactions are directed and shaped by ideational factors not simply material factors, and the most significant ideational factors are mutual or intersubjective beliefs and attitudes.[25] The intersubjective beliefs shared by social groups are called by some scholars "social representations", such as group beliefs, attitudes and ideologies, that used by group members in different situations, and in sometimes these social beliefs are directly expressed in discourse, to explain to public what our general beliefs about specific issue, while in other times it is used as legitimating premises in arguments, for example to argue about specific issue in regards of others' behavior, politicians or leaders may express general social opinion.[26] These shared beliefs "are not reducible to individuals" moreover it "construct interests and identities of

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[22] -Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates", p.119.
-Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, Vol.41, No.3, (1987), p.337.
[23] Adler, loc.cit.
[24] Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.94.
[25] Martha Finnemore, Sikkink Kathryn, "Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics." *Annual Review of Political Science,* Vol.4*,* (2001), p.392.
[26] Teun A. Van Dijk, "Political discourse and ideology", *University of Amsterdam Universitat Pompeu Fabra*,(January 2002), p.17.

purposive actors".[27] Thus, "the social and political world is made up of shared beliefs rather than physical entities."[28] All strands of constructivism have common consensus on the ontology that represents "the social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes".[29] These characteristics let us to conclude "that the international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world,"[30] and material resources only obtain meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.[31] In that regard, Hopf argued that understanding why actors behave in specific way require to know more about the situation than about the distribution of material of power, to know the "culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and the structure a like."[32] So as Adler discussed, these features implicates that "the social world is made of intersubjective understandings, subjective knowledge, and material objects. He indicated that the world is broader, unexpected and more surprising than the world viewed by neorealists and neoliberals. It is the world where collective understanding and discourse considered main factor affecting the construction of social facts through connecting the collective knowledge to physical reality. As Adler exemplified it: "when we classify and refer to some people as 'self' and to other people as 'the other', a notion of what is in 'our' interest, as opposed to the 'other's' interest, emerges." In that context, even individuals realize in their heads where they would be, but their realization is limited, since they feel and think only in the context of dominating intersubjective knowledge and understandings include rule and language, **so it is discourses and rules that transfer individuals into agents by enabling them to act upon the world in which they live.**[33]

Moreover, most of constructivists consider the mutual constitution of agents and structures to be part of constructivism's ontology. Epistemologically, constructivists make

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[27] Ruggie, op.cit., p.857.
-Finnemore & Sikkink, op.cit, p.393.
[28] Jackson & Sorensen, op.cit, p.175.
[29] Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations", p.121.
[30] Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", p.320.
[31] Wendt, "Constructing International Politics", p.73.
[32] Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security,* (1998), Vol. 23, No.1, p.173.
[33] Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations", p.121.

interpretation an intrinsic part of social science and stresses contingent generalizations. They also concerned to know more how things became what they are rather than how things are.[34]

Wendt in his work of 'Social Theory of International Politics', summarized the shared features of constructivism remarking that there are two principles of constructivism which are accepted by most of students and scholars of international politics, the first is that **structures of human relationships are basically determined by shared and common ideas rather than material factors. The second is that identities and interests of the actors are created by these common ideas rather than being given by nature.**[35]

Moreover, constructivism gives importance for discursive power as well as material power, both of them are necessary for any understanding of world affairs. As Hopf argues, the social structure that constraints the action of states is constituted from shared understandings, and these shared understandings reproduced by social practices as it is clear in the example of U.S military intervention in Vietnam, which is interpreted by some scholars like Hopf as an action that reproduces the international shared understanding about U.S identity of great power.[36]

Constructivists also in the last thirty years led attention to language in international relations and especially metaphors. As Onuf indicated the function of language, and therefore concepts, is to represent objects, their properties and relations.[37]

2.1.2 Basic Assumptions of Constructivism

2.1.2.1 Actors and Structure Are Mutually Constituted

The first assumption of constructivism is that actors and structure are mutually

[34] ibid.
[35] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.199.
[36] Hopf, op.cit., p.177.
[37] Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in social theory and international relations*, London: Routledge, 2013, p.43.

constituted, constructivism concerned with "how an action does or does not reproduce both the actor and the structure", as Hopf pointed out, "the action perpetuated the international intersubjective understanding of actors", which is the identity of the state. Hopf gave an example of U.S policy in Vietnam, he explained that the U.S identity is known as a great power, when it engaged in military intervention in Vietnam, it took an action that reproduced its own identity of great power, here the "U.S intervention in Vietnam perpetuated the international intersubjective understanding of great powers as those states that use military power against others".[38]

In that regards, Wendt explained the agent- structure problem, as he argued that "agents and structures are produced or reproduced by what actors do", here the states define its position and identity basing on the contextual background created by systemic structures, and these structures constituted and reconstituted as a result of repeated interaction among states which he called "strategic practices", and as he indicated, the learning through interaction has its effect on actor's identity. However, in forming identity, states see themselves as the others see them, and the process of identity formation depends on the importance of the other, the more the other is important the faster this process work.[39] In other words, Wendt assumes that human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; at the same time, the society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. These assumptions led to a result that human agents and social structures are interdependent or mutually associating. In that context, understanding social relationships is an important step in analysis of an action.[40] Wendt also explained the idea of mutual constitution and relationship between actors in his work of 'Anarchy is What States Make of it', states could not change their environments on a whim, and from first time they are not categorized by enmity and egoism, rather their

[38] Hopf, op.cit., p.173.
[39] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, (Jun., 1994), p.389.
[40] Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, Vol.41, No.3, (1987), p.337.

relations develop through interaction and historical process over time, Wendt explained it by giving the following example about Alter and Ego:

> *"Two space strangers who meet for the first time, and who, through a series of gestures, determine whether the other is hostile or friendly. Each exercises an element of choice, and thus agency, in how this relationship develops. Choice is not, however, unlimited. Alter and Ego coexist in a social relationship, and their choices are partially dependent on the response of the other. The space for choice can thus be said to be mutually constituted."*[41]

So actors are not homogenously and collectively rational egoists, but they have different identities shaped by the social, political, cultural environments in which they are embedded. They always developing as they interact with each other and their environment.[42] And as Klotz conceptualized it, people live within and interact through different intersecting social groupings and collectivities such as ethnic, national, ideological and religious groupings, actors and leaders, within these groupings, people act in ways that produce, perpetuate and alter the environments in which they live. And here, the people reinforce the dominant meanings "facts or realities", to assure the existence of the structure, this reinforcement occurs through language and discourse to encourage the quest of collective goals based on religions for example, and diminishing negative practices like racism or class distinction.[43]

2.1.2.2 Anarchy as Imagined Community

Neorealists and institutional idealists treat self-interest as given, Waltz argues that anarchies are self-help systems in which states think egoistically. While Wendt claims that "an anarchy may be a self-help system, but it may also be a collective security system, which logic obtains depend on conceptions of self and other, an anarchy of friends different from one of enemies."[44]

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[41] K.M. Fierke, "Constructivism", *International Relations Theories, Discipline and Diversity*, Tim Dunn, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, (ed.), 3rd edition, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.191.
[42] ibid.
[43] Audie Klotz, Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations,* New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.8.
[44] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p.388.

Wendt in his social theory based on the principle "that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them." They act towards enemies differently than friends due to the meaning of threatening that enemies have for them. Wendt didn't ignore the effect of distribution of power on the action of the states, but he contends that they act according to the "intersubjective understanding and expectations on the distribution of knowledge that constitute their conceptions of self and other." The intersubjective knowledge creates collective meaning which makes up the structure that organizes the actions of the states.[45] In that context, Wendt explained the cultures of Anarchy, that have constitutive relations with Identity, Wendt's constructivism sees states' own identities and interests as secondary products of those system-level rules. In Hobbesian culture of anarchy, the posture is that of enemies, "threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their violence towards each other". In Lockean culture, the orientation is that of rivals, "competitors who will use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other". Finally, in Kantian culture of anarchy states share the role of friends, "allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats".[46]

2.1.2.3 Identities are Basis of Interests

While neorealism assumes that all units in global politics have only one meaningful identity, which is the self-interested states that have a single perpetual meaning, constructivism assumes that the identities of actors are a variable, which depends on the historical, cultural, political, and social context. Hopf indicated that both the constructivism and neorealism assume that interest suggests choices, but neorealism more assumes that states have the same a priori interests, while constructivists argue that "interests are the products of the social practices that mutually constitute actors and structures." According to Hopf interests are the product of identity, for example, having the identity of 'great power' suggests a particular set of interests different from those suggested by the identity of

[45] Alexander Wendt,"Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" *International Organization* , (1992), Vol.46, No.2, p.397.
[46] Maxym Alexandrov,"The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis." *Journal of International Development and Cooperation*,Vol.10, No.1, (2003), p.35.

'European Union member'.[47]

Moreover, constructivists agree with neorealists that states have a "wider array of potential choices of action, but "these choices will be constrained by social structures that are mutually created by states and structures via social practices", the choices of states are "constrained by the webs of understanding of the practices, identities, and the interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts."[48] Runa Das pointed out that identities are seen as collectivities by structural constructivists, these collectivities produced by "social process, collective norms, political actions, and power capabilities. While cognition and interpretation are playing an important role in producing these collectivities."[49]

So it is concluded that "identities suggest a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors." In other words, the state's preferences and following actions and behaviors are implied by its identity. Moreover "the state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice." The critical observation here according to Hopf is that "the producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning."[50]

Klotz and Lynch, gave more clarification for the relation between rule and norms and identities and intersubjective understanding, according to them, identities are created by norms, rules, languages, and ideologies, which all are social phenomena. However, there should be shared acceptance of these social phenomena in order for this phenomena to exist and people define themselves in reference to them, and that what is called intersubjective understanding, which cover structures and agents, for example, rules and norms establish the consistent practices and measures that we know as capitalism. The world economy

[47] Hopf, op.cit. p.175.
[48] ibid, p.174.
[49] Das, op.cit., p.964.
[50] Hopf, op.cit., p.175.

shapes how people perceive the world, the goals they desire to achieve, and the actions they take.[51]

> *"Particular meanings become stable over time, creating social orders that constructivists call structures or institutions. Rules and norms set expectations about how the world works, what types of behavior are legitimate, and which interests or identities are possible. Meanings, such as a particular definition of terrorism, provide the basis for social orders, but they can also be contested. Though some practices inevitably dominate others at particular moments, even the most stable structures evolve. .....some terms of intersubjective understanding , such as "norms," emphasize stability and imply broad acceptance whereas others, such as "representations," privilege potentially more fluid depictions and suggest greater contestation."*[52]

2.1.2.4 The Power of Practice in Constructivism

Neorealists and constructivists differ in conceptualization of power. According to neorealists and neoliberals material power either military or economic or both, is the single most important source of influence and authority in global politics, while constructivists claim that to understand the world affairs both material and discursive power are important and necessary. It is the power of knowledge, beliefs, ideas, ideologies, representations, and language which called discourse.[53]

The constructivists' belief in discursive power and its relation to material power, originally back to previous works of Michel Foucault about power and knowledge, and Antonio Gramsci's theory of ideological hegemony, in addition to Max Weber's differentiation of coercion from authority.[54]

In constructivism, social practices can reproduce meanings that establish social structures and actors similarly, Hopf gave example about American intervention in Vietnam, which came in consistence with several US identities like a great power, imperialist, ally, enemy. Some observers claim that the United States when intervened in Vietnam it does not only inferred its identity, but it also reproduced the intersubjective web

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[51] Audie Klotz and Lynch Cecelia, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, Armonk : M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.7.
[52] ibid, p.8.
[53] Hopf, op.cit., p.177.
[54] ibid.

of meaning about what exactly constituted that identity, for example, some countries already attributed an imperialist identity to the United States, and the meaning that constituted that identity was reproduced by the action of United State in its military intervention in Vietnam. [55]

Moreover, social practices have the power to produce predictability and order, since social practices reduce uncertainty among actors within a socially structured community, thus increasing confidence that what actions one takes will be followed by certain consequences and responses from others.[56]

However, the power of practice to produce intersubjective meaning within a social structure, makes it possible to understand practice as bounding, or disciplining interpretation, and making some interpretations of reality less likely to occur or prevail within a particular community, as Hopf stated:

> *"The meanings of actions of members of the community, as well as the actions of others, become fixed through practice; boundaries of understanding become well known. In this way, the ultimate power of practice is to reproduce and police an intersubjective reality. Social practices, to the extent that they authorize, discipline, and police, have the power to reproduce entire communities, including the international community, as well as the many communities of identity found therein."*[57]

The consistent actions that arise from these interpretations are often referred to as "practices," and the combination of language and techniques employed to maintain them as "discourses." Despite the emphasis on dominant understandings, this is not simply a substitution of language for material resources such as nuclear warheads. All people exercise some degree of power because their practices either reinforce or undermine meanings.[58]

So constructivism concerned with how specific practices predominate in particular contexts, for example, during the Cold War the dominant intersubjective understandings

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[55] ibid, p.178.
[56] ibid.
[57] ibid, p.179.
[58] Klotz & Lynch, op.cit., p.11.

were defining of the United States and the Soviet Union as enemies rather than allies, and that intersubjective understandings considered powerful since they constitute identities and interests of people in that period, as well as they bound the interpretations of behavior.

2.2 IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

The main argument of constructivism is that the international environment is produced and reproduced in process of interaction, and this argument depends basically on the idea that actors' identities are not externally given, rather it is developed and sustained through interaction. This claim against the rationalists who argue that actors' properties like identity are external and prior to the process of international politics.[59]

Constructivists claim that "their approaches can provide better theoretical accounts of evolution and change in international relations than rationalists".[60] In that sense, constructivism used the concept of identity to establish difference from rationalism, and that was the main theme and concentration of Alexander Wendt whose work focused on the construction of identity through interaction.[61] According to constructivists, "the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while state identities (and therefore interests) themselves are subject to change in the process of interaction."[62] Post-structuralists also focused in their works on identity formation, argue that identity formed through difference and relation between self and other, in addition to role of discourses and repeated actions of states. So, this section focuses on the constitution and role of identity in foreign policy according to constructivist and post-structuralists. First it is valuable to distinguish between two kinds of identity which are corporate and social identity, then we will talk about formation of identity, intersubjective and collective identity in addition to shared identity and alliance formation.

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[59] Zehfuss, op.cit., p.36.
[60] Alexandrov, op.cit., p.34.
[61] Zehfuss, op.cit., p.38.
[62] Alexandrov, loc.cit.

2.2.1 Corporate Identity Versus Social Identity

In social theory of constructivism, Alexander Wendt distinguished between corporate and social. Corporate identity "refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality". And these identities lead to four interests of the state which are: physical security which includes differentiation from other states, ontological security that creates the state desire for stable social identities and recognition by others as a state, in addition to economic and human development. According to Wendt, these corporate identities affected the action of state, but they do not entail self-interest, which here is shaped by what he called the social identity which makes the state to define self in relation to the other.[63] Guillauma also put forward the argument that "corporate identities are unitary, they are not compound and not complex social entities, whose properties are taken as exogenous in the sense of an ontological assumption regarding an entity's "essence", these units are constant through time and might only differ among themselves by their exogenously given properties and preferences." [64]

On the other hand, social identities are "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others". According to Wendt, "the social identity can be seen as being meaningful through the type of interaction it leads to, whether one is a friend or a foe, a great power or a revisionist state." [65]

Henri Tajfel defined the social identity as "a part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership".[66]

Klotz also distinguished between corporate identity and social identity, "corporate identity is intrinsic to the state, which corresponds to regime types or forms of states, like

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[63] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p.385.
[64] Xavier Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity- A dialogical approach,* Vol.1, New York: Routledge. 2011, p.12.
[65] Wendt, op.cit., p.385.
[66] Henri Tajfel, "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations", *Annual Review Psychos*, Vol.33, No.1, (1982), p.24.

capitalist states, fascist state or monarchical states. Forms of states are constituted by internal principles of political legitimacy."[67] "Social identities depend on culture and thus others. Whereas the characteristics that give rise to corporate identities are pre-social, social identities are not based on intrinsic properties and as such exist only in relation to others. One can have identities only by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms towards others possessing relevant counter-identities. On the other hand, one cannot enact social identities by oneself, the sharing of expectations on which social identities depend on is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions".[68]

2.2.2 Identity Formation in Constructivism.

According to the constructivist scholars, identity is a process of social construction including the choices of the agents for themselves.[69] In Wendtian or structural constructivism, identity is constituted by intersubjective understanding that creates collective meaning and relied on the cognitive characteristics of the human. The intersubjective understanding based on the principle that "people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them." So the state defines its position and identity basing on the contextual background created by systemic structures, and these structures are constituted and reconstituted as a result of repeated interaction among states. [70]

However, post-positivists used the term "representation" to signify the intersubjective understandings, while the term of norms is used by positivists. Nevertheless, the state gain identities which are "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self",[71] while post-structuralists, refer to 'order of discourse' in discourse analysis, which is arrangement of discourses to which actors draw upon in their production and consumption

[67] Klotz & Lynch, op.cit., p.226.
[68] ibid, p.227.
[69] Onuf , *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, p:75.
[70] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p.389-390.
[71] Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it", p.397.

of discourses. Moreover, discourses have a significant rule in constitution of social identities, social relations and system of shared understandings. [72]

On the other hand, post-structuralism specifies that identities are essentially relational, and only through the realization of otherness can the self be identified. Campbell states that identity has "no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality" and that "the problematic of identity/difference contains, therefore, no foundations that are prior to, or outside of its operation."[73] Moreover, according to Campbell, the identities are not fixed or given by nature, rather, they are constituted by difference. The difference also is not fixed, since it is depending on non-fixed identity,[74] it is constitutive relation between identity and difference. "The constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a self from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a foreign."[75] Once the self is defined, some elements that were originally part of identity transformed to defiling otherness," the process that maintains the border between self and other.[76]

So as Onuf concluded post-modernists view identity as a "collective delusion, an unstable symptom of alienation that comes from insisting on the otherness of others. We are nothing but the difference."[77]

Although constructivists agree on the notion that identity is dependent on a separation between "us" and "them", and thus constituted through comparisons, where the categorization also creates "in-group" that subordinates an "out-group".[78] But they differ than post-structuralism through arguing that states have pre-social or as Wendt called corporate identity, as well as social identities. Alexander Wendt argues that as the corporate

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[72] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.48.
[73] Taku Tamaki, *Deconstructing Japan's Image of South Korea,* 1st Edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.25.
[74] David Campbell, *Writing Security : United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, p.8.
[75] ibid, p.9.
[76] ibid, p.8.
[77] Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, p.75.
[78] Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p.8.

identity is "self -organizing there is no need for a particular Other to which Self is related,"[79] because 'the self-organizing hypothesis' does not deny an 'ongoing process of boundary-drawing' but only implies that this is an internally driven process which does not involve 'the agency and discourse of outsiders.'[80] Furthermore, Wendt pointed out that identity as a relational difference has to be rejected because one can distinguish between role identities and type identities, which are intrinsic to the individual actor. Collective identities in turn, are a distinct combination of role and type identities, "one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as a part of the Self".[81] However, the relationship between a Self and its Others is understood as an uni-dimensional continuum that ranges from negative to positive identification, offering the Self the possibility to perceive of the Other as an extension of the Self or as an anathema to it. Such a comprehension based on interaction between Self and Other allows the Self to act according to the issue, for example, a state may positively identify with the defense ideas of another state, but in human rights issues align itself with the ideals promoted by the UN, thus, the nature of the identification determines the boundaries of the Self".[82]

Post-structuralists focus on how identities are unstable, as Taku Tamaki observed in his study about Japan's image in Korea,[83] "various claims to self and the countervailing perception of otherness provide for the emergence of the political in which meanings are constantly challenged. This concern with difference implies that identities are inherently relational, lacking any foundational anchorage." He also argued that, "any claims to such a foundation needs to be seen as an ideological discourse, and since identity lacks a foundation, it relies on language for its ontological sustenance. In other words, identity is tantamount to performing; and when the practice ceases, identity disappears".[84]

Tamaki also put emphasis on Campbell's claims that identities are intrinsically relational and unstable, and they are disposed to change as the boundaries of self/other

[79] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.225.
[80] ibid, p.74.
[81] ibid, p.229.
[82] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p.386.
[83] Tamaki, op.cit., p.27.
[84] Tamaki, op.cit., p.87.

change. There is nothing certain about identities: any claim to the stability of identity is a political strategy to maintain status quo. According to Campbell performative constitution of identity must be understood in order to understand how the authority for political actions and community are created.[85]

The two post-structuralists Widdicombe and Wooffitt also do not see identities as fixed and determined by the inner essence of the individual, but rather as products of social interaction which are exposed to change. They argue that identities are oriented towards action, and analysis aims to identify the precise ways in which identities are created and negotiated in talk.[86]

On the other hand, Wendt criticized Campbell's explanation of state identity that lacks any notion of causality and destiny. While Campbell sees the identity as changing and challenged, Wendt sees it as a social construct, that pretending as a tool in foreign policy, Wendt's claim that identity could not be unstable came from his notion that there is internal relationship between social identity and the ideational structure of the international system which need to take in account the unintended consequences of intended actions in order for the system to change and transform. So he sees that the notion of unstable identity adopted by post-structuralists unable for accounting for this change. So as Wendt is interested in analyzing how identity causes state behavior, a reification of identity is necessary for him, rather than treating identity as mere difference/distinction.[87]

In that framework Wendt argues that in the process of social interaction and within the collective meaning in which the state is engaged, the state gain identities which are "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self,"[88] like "sovereign, leader of free world or imperial power", these identities are constituted within

[85] Tamaki, op.cit., p.26.
[86] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.26.
[87] Tamaki, op.cit., p.28.
[88] Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it", p.397.

socially constructed world, and at the same time "they constitute the structure of the social world."[89]

Rhetoric practices also affect the formation of identity and interest, as Wendt explained it, the rhetoric practices affect defining of identity and interest through "mode of communication, variously enacted as consciousness raising, dialogue, discussion and persuasion, education, ideological labor, political argument, symbolic action, and so on", even these processes have differences but they commonly "presuppose that the social world is constituted by shared meanings and significations, which are manipulable by rhetoric practices", these practices may involve power, but also they are efforts to change others' conceptions of their interests. "The goal of rhetoric practices in collective action is to create solidarity; thus they may have an important expressive function independent of their instrumental value in realizing collective goals." For example, "when the United States demonizes Saddam Hussein as "another Hitler", "states are engaging in discursive practices designed to express and or to change ideas about who "the self" of self-interested collective action is."[90]

2.2.3 Shared identity and Alliance Formation

Michael N. Barnett, showed that identity is linked to the construction of shared threat and in turn represents a potential source of alliance formation. In his claims, Barnett depends on study of Walt who for example argues that identity of Arabism and Arab nationalism led Arab states to perceive Israel as a common enemy.[91]

Barnett claims that actors who have common identity may not agree on the norms which are considered as a source and a reflection of that common identity and are to lead and govern the behavior of those actors. In that sense, the constitutive norms of an identity may be a source of conflict among actors that share that identity, he indicated that "those

[89] ibid, p.398.
[90] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p.391.
[91] Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East", in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.331.

states that share a basic identity and organize themselves into a self-constituted group are likely to construct norms that instruct them on how they are to enact their identity," that situation may become source of conflict between actors, who first may debate and contest their associated norms, and after they identify themselves in one identity, they may differ in their understanding of the norms that are related with that identity, that led to disagreement on the accepted behavior for the members of the group, and they will contest on the norms that are to control or police their relations, in this situation as Barnett indicates, actors will struggle to "present themselves as acting in a manner that is consistent with the group's norms and to portray others as acting in a manner that is inconsistent with those norms and thus potentially threatening to the group. In other words, rivalry is not over military power but rather it is over images and the presentation of self; threats, therefore, derive from a rival's attempt to portray itself as acting in a manner that violates the group's norms." Barnett gave an example of Arab leaders who are trying to show that they are acting in favor of Arab nationalism, while represent others as not working in favor of that shard identity.[92]

Accordingly, representing an actor or a state who is a member of a specific group or community as violating the norms of the group, consider a threat on the reputation and status of that member. For that as concluded by Barnett, "there is generally some positive relationship between the state's expressed identity, its membership in the group, and its behavior; the behavior cannot be totally inconsistent with the self-proclaimed identity without challenging the state's relationship to the group. Therefore, disregarding these norms that define the group can undermine the state's identity and relationship to that group."[93]

Identity is an important factor in choosing of an alliance partner.

Identity considered an important factor that makes some allies to be seen strategically more attractive than others. For example, during the times of wars democratic states in

[92] ibid, p.332.
[93] ibid.

general, cooperate with each other and do not ally against each other. Other examples are Baghdad Pact and the Gulf Cooperation Council 'GCC', through which partner states allied against a common threat. In other cases, some countries conceived as undesirable ally in eyes of group of other states that share particular common identity, for instance Israel considered by most of Arab states as undesirable strategic partner.[94]

However, perpetuation of the alliance partner depends on the mutual identification of the partners, any changing in shared identity may weaken the foundation of the alliance, since the bases upon which the partnership had been created was not just shared interest in identification of specific threat, but it was common identity that stimulates like-mindedness of the partners.

For a state to be considered as a member of specific community it should declare itself as a member of that society and hold and adopt the same values and norms that govern that community, that requires from the state to have a stable identity that capable to continue a specific narrative going. Therefore, being a part of an association of like-minded states involves having a dominant historical narrative, an identity, that is consistent with that of the community, and at the same time stems from that community. For that the states who are related to that community continuously prompt the same historical roots and a shared heritage in addition to common destiny and future. [95]

The communities that share common identities may face a big debate around what compose and constitute their national identity, so when there are opposing meanings and understandings of the shared identity that require contradictory behaviors, a conflict of identity exists. Conflict in identity can also occur if historical conditions changed and the existing collective self is no longer acceptable under the new circumstances, or if the collective identity is at contradiction with requests and essential features of the wider community.[96]

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[94] ibid, p.328.
[95] ibid, p.333.
[96] ibid.

2.3 DISCOURSE AND IDENTITY

After we gave general analysis for identity formation and its role in foreign policy, it is valuable here to go in detail about the relation between discourse and identity, since discourse is the nodal point that link constructivism with post-structuralism in this study. As Eleni Andreouli indicated "one cannot meaningfully ask the question about identity without posing the question about self and other, and one cannot talk about social representations as a theory of social knowledge without examining public discourses in which different dialogues between the Ego and the Alter take place and through which they generate representations."[97]

Adler pointed out that there are many studies done in the post-structural side about constitution of identity dialogically, "Xavier Guillaume (2010) suggests that identity is constituted dialogically in interplay between the domestic and international politics of 'alterity,' and Heather Rae (2002) argues that the sovereign identity of the state itself has been constructed through 'practices of exclusion', which has taken tremendous forms such as expulsion and genocide."[98]

Campbell talked about the 'performative' constitution of identity which is one of the basic onto-political assumption of "deconstructive thought" which "rather than viewing identity -that is an inescapable pre-requisite of being -as either given by intentional human activity or granted by natural extra-human forces, the idea of performativity draws attention to "the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names."[99]

Wendt argues that the discursive practices are one of the factors that form the intersubjective structure, shared understandings, or beliefs "social representation", expectations and social knowledge. For example, the "Cold War was fundamentally a

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[97] Andreouli, "Identity, Positioning and Self-Other Relations", p.8.
[98] Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations", p.127.
[99] David Campbell, *National deconstruction : violence, identity, and justice in Bosnia* , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p.25.

discursive, not a material structure." However, Wendtian constructivism gives place for the effect of material structures, but they argued that "intersubjective structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act."[100]

Emphasizing on the relation between discursive practices and identity, Doty suggests that structure itself is constructed along with the meanings which at the same time produce subject's identities and their positions vis-a-vis one another. Possibilities are not explained by the prior existence of structures or social actors, but rather by the continual and simultaneous production of subjects and structures.[101]

So constructivists argue that identity of actors constituted as a result of shared knowledge, the shared knowledge in return is created by social interaction and sustained by social practice, while these social practices are conceived by post-structuralists as being a part of discourse and thus allows for the conceptualization of identity as being both discursively inscribed, spoken and enacted.[102] Jorgensen and Phillips also stated that discourse contributes to the construction of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning.[103] These arguments positioned the role of discourse in creating shared knowledge and thus identities of the actors. Now it is remarkable to go in detail to concept of discourse and how these discourses are formed.

2.4 FOUCAULT AND DISCOURSE THEORIES

Discourse theories are one of important themes of post-structuralism, which emerged in France during 1960s to1970s, with the main assumption that there is nothing outside the

[100] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p:389.
[101] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), p.305.
[102] Martin Müller, "Doing discourse analysis in Critical Geopolitics", *L'Espace Politique*, Vol.12, No.3, 2010, p.14.
[103] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p. 67.

text.[104] Post-structuralism depends on Saussarian theory of language, which supposes that words mean what they do as a result of the difference between one word and another.[105]

Discourse theories were the main focus of the popular post-structuralist Michel Foucault. Foucault focused in his works on power and knowledge, in addition to the role of discourse in producing meanings in historical context.[106] Moreover, he talked about representation of knowledge and how these representations are shaped and given meaning within a specific context.[107] Foucault used and discussed the concepts of discursive practices and discursive formation in his work *Archaeology of Knowledge*,[108] through which he aimed "to engage in a pure description of discursive events, which treats the material in its original neutrality, serving as a horizon for the investigation of the unities constructed within it". [109] Archaeologically, Foucault was interested in studying the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a specific historical period.[110] In that sense, he defines the discourse as follows:

> *"We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation [...Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality".*[111]

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[104] Jenny Edkins, "Post-structuralism", *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An introduction*, Martin Griffiths (ed.), New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 69.
[105] ibid, p. 91.
[106] Thomas C. Patterson, "Post-Structuralism, Post-Modernism: Implications for Historians", *Social History*, Vol.14, No. 1 (Jan. 1989), p. 84.
-Stuart Hall, "The Work of the Representation", *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, Stuart Hall (ed.), London: SAGE Publications,1997, p. 4.
[107] Clayton J. Whisnant, "Foucault & Discourse: A Handout for HIS 389", *Wofford*, (November 9, 2012), http://webs.wofford.edu/whisnantcj/his389/foucualt_discourse.pdf , p.6.
[108] Mitchell Hobbs, "On Discourse and Representation: Reflections on Michel Foucault's Contribution to the Study of the Mass Media", *Annual Conference of the Australian Sociological Association University of Melbourne,* University of Newcastle, December 2008,.
[109] Rainer Diaz-Bone, et. al., "The Field of Foucaultian Discourse Analysis: Structures, Developments and Perspectives", *Historical Social Research*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008, p.10.
[110] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.13.
[111] Michel Foucault, *The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language,* New York: Pantheon, 1972, p.117.

Foucault also argues that discourse creates truth or truth effects, and sometimes specific discourses in specific contexts have the power to convince people to accept statements as true.[112] And he views the truth as "a system of procedures for the production, regulation, and diffusion of statements."[113]

Besides to his archeological study of truth and dominant discourse in a specific periods, Foucault provided a genealogical study of the relation between power and knowledge, according to him, power must not be seen as completely oppressive, but it must be perceived as a productive,[114] since it "induces pleasure, forms knowledge, and produces discourse".[115]

Jorgensen and Philips explained Foucault's view of power, pointing out that:

> *"Power provides the conditions of possibility for the social. it is in power that our social world is produced and objects are separated from one another and thus attain their individual characteristics and relationships to one another… power is responsible both for creating our social world and for the particular ways in which the world is formed and can be talked about ruling out alternative of being and talking. Power is thus both a productive and a constraining force."* [116]

The relation between power and knowledge has an effect on the conception of truth. Foucault argued that truth is "entrenched in, and produced by, systems of power". Because truth is unattainable, it is useless to ask whether something is true or false. Instead, the focus should be on how effects of truth are created in discourses. What is to be analyzed are the discursive processes through which discourses are constructed in ways that give the impression that they represent true or false pictures of reality".[117]

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[112] Whisnant, op.cit., p.6.
[113] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.14.
[114] ibid, p.13.
[115] Michel Foucault, "Truth and power", *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972–1977*, C. Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, p.119.
[116] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.14.
[117] ibid.

Foucault also claims that not just the truth is created by discourse, the subject also is created by discourse. In his work *archaeology of knowledge,* "Foucault abandons the notion of a sovereign subject,[118] and he sees that the subject is decentered, the view which is very different from the standard Western understanding of the subject as an autonomous and sovereign entity.[119] In defining the subject, Foucault was influenced by his teacher Louis Althusser who had a structural Marxist view of subject. Althusser claimed that "the individual becomes an ideological subject through a process of interpellation whereby discourses appeal to the individual as a subject." Interpellation means the process through which language constructs a social position for the individual who accepts it, and thus become an ideological subject. And Althusser claims that there is no chance for resistance against the ideological messages that are presented to the subject, for example capitalism was dominant in society, leaving no real scope for effective resistance. [120]

Accordingly, in his book of *discipline and punish*, Foucault showed that "it is through discourse (through knowledge) that we are created; and that discourse joins power and knowledge, and its power follows from our casual acceptance of the "reality with which we are presented".[121]

Drawing on works of Foucault, Clayton Whisnant explained number of functions for discourse proposed by Foucault, the first function is that discourse constitutes the world, and the world is built socially in our minds through interaction between experience and education, in this sense it is a virtual world full of ideas and emotions, it is not just material world shaped by atoms and energy. The second function is that the discourse also creates knowledge and truth, which is not existing separately from language, some discourses in certain situations have the power to persuade people to accept statements as true. Furthermore, Foucault expressed that discourse provides **power to the speaker to be believed, some discourses allow for the certain individuals to speak the truth,** or to be

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[118] Diaz-Bone, et.al., op.cit., p.10.
[119] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.15.
[120] ibid.
[121] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and punish*, New York: Pantheon, 1977.

believed when they speak about certain subjects, the thing that gives them authority to recommend courses of actions or ways of behavior.[122]

However, works of Foucault form a background for approaches of discourse theory, like discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, critical discourse analysis, and discursive psychology. These approaches share a common background that "our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them." So it can be said that the primary definition of a discourse is "*a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)"*. While "our knowledge and representations of the world are not reflections of the reality 'out there', but rather are products of our ways of categorizing the world, or in discursive analytical terms, products of discourse".[123] So discourse is not an objective or neutral reflection of reality. "It is rather a plan where the social world and identities acquire meanings and certain actions become possible."[124]

In that context, Miller noted that the notion of discourse in its crude form, is used to "deny that we have access to independently existing reality or world, this idea is linked with two claims the first is that discourse cannot be transparent medium that mirror the world, we cannot get outside of any discourse and gain access to anything beyond it. That is leading to the methodological premise that discourse is all that we can discuss or know. Laclau and Mouffe state that "there is not one discourse or one system of categories through which the real might speak without mediation".[125] Wodak and others, assume that there is "a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations, institutions, and social structures in which they are embedded: the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and in turn discourses influence social and

[122] Whisnant, op.cit., p.6-7.
[123] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.5.
[124] Birsen Erdogan, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse,* Maastricht: Maastricht University, 2017, p.8.
[125] Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics,* 2nd Edition, New York: Verso, 2001, p.3.

political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it."[126]

2.5 THEORY OF LACLAU AND MOUFFE IN DISCOURSE

Laclau and Mouffe are two post-structuralists, who developed their discourse theory to show that "the social field is understood as a web of processes in which meaning is created." They developed their theory by combining and modifying the social theory of Marxism and the meaning theory of Saussurian structuralism.[127]

Laclau and Mouffe agree with Saussurian structuralism in viewing the discourse as a structure within which signs are fixed through their difference from one another, but in contrast of Saussure, Laclau and Mouffe see that the fixation of meaning is not permanent, for that, the discourse is open to change and unstable. According to Laclau and Mouffe, discourses engage in continuous struggle with one another to achieve hegemony and fix their meaning and identities.[128] As Jorgensen and Phillips explained it:

> *"The Saussurian tradition is criticised by poststructuralists on the grounds that Saussurians understand structure as a totality in which all signs relate unambiguously to one another. Laclau and Mouffe replace this concept of structure with the concept of discourse that also refers to a structuring never exhausts all the possibilities for the ascription of meaning. A discourse can always be undermined by articulations that place the signs in different relations to one another. According to Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, the signs are therefore structured in relation to each other but never in a finished totality. Discourses are always only temporary and partial fixations of meaning in a fundamentally undecidable terrain."*[129]

In addition to their theory of meaning, Laclau and Mouffe developed their social theory, basing on criticizing of theory of Karl Marx of historical materialism, which

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[126] Wodak, et. al., op.cit., p.9.
[127] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.6.
[128] ibid.
[129] ibid, p.39.

differentiates between base and superstructure in description of the society.

The idea of historical materialism is that the economy and ownership of means of productions belongs to the base, while the state, education system, judicial system, and mass media are related to superstructure, the economy which is the base determines the superstructure or what people says and think. For example, in the capitalist society, there are two opposite classes which are the capitalists who own means of production, and the workers who own their work, the capitalists exploit the workers, and the workers cannot rebel since their consciousness is shaped by the superstructure "the capitalist system", which is in turn determined by the base (the economy and owner of production). "The superstructure of the capitalist system, then, supports the capitalist economy by producing an ideology that legitimates the system. And because the workers' consciousness is shaped by the capitalist ideology, they cannot see through it to their real interests. The transition to socialism and, later on, communism, will occur when the working class recognizes its true interests and engages in revolution."[130]

The Marxist theory was criticized that it does not explain "how will the working class recognize its real position in society and its true interests if its consciousness is determined by capitalist ideology." Some theorists claim that the economy is not the only determinant of the superstructure and consciousness of the people, a political struggle on the level of superstructure can also influence the consciousness of the people.[131]

The Marxism also was criticized in regard to its view towards the social class, according to Marxism, the ruling class and the working class exist objectively in the capitalist society and are determined by the economy, "these classes exist even if people are not necessarily conscious of their existence".[132]

Gramsci introduced his theory of hegemony to solve these questions, arguing that the power of the ruling class is not only explained by the economically determined ideology, he

[130] ibid, p:31.
[131] ibid, p:33.
[132] ibid.

explained the hegemonic process that takes place in the superstructure and influences the consciousness of the people. The power relation of the ruling class is naturalized by the production of meaning, and becomes part of the common- sense that cannot be questioned. In other words, while Marxism sees that the material base is the starting point and it determine the superstructure, Gramsci sees that base and superstructure are interrelated, "the conditions of the base influence superstructure, but political processes in the superstructure can also act back on the base."[133]

Laclau and Mouffe inspired their discourse theory from Gramsci, they see that the political articulations in the superstructure are the most important that determine what people say and think, and the role of economy is absent in their discourse theory.[134]

Even Gramsci entered the political element in the superstructure, but he did not opposed the historical materialism, in viewing the classes of society as objective groups to which people belong whether they know it or not. For that Laclau and Mouffe radicalized the theory of Gramsci by abolishing the objectivism, and they asserted that "there are no objective laws that divide society into particular groups, the groups that exist are always created in political, discursive processes".[135]

So Laclau and Mouffe turn away from Marxism's division of society into base and superstructure, and they consider all the social formations as a result of discursive processes, they also oppose the Marxist view of society as objectively existed and constituted by certain classes, rather it is our attempt to fix the meaning of society. And hence, social identities are not objectively determined, they are a result of contingent discursive processes and they are a part of discursive struggle. Laclau and Mouffe see that social actions derive their meaning from their relationship to other actions, and this act is a discursive sign. All social practices can thus be seen as articulations,[136] because they

[133] ibid, p:34.
[134] ibid.
[135] ibid, p:33.
[136] Laclau and Mouffe, op.cit., p.30.

reproduce or change common ascriptions of meaning.[137]

After we have provided a short explanation about the roots of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, the following sections explain their view about identity formation, using concepts of difference and equivalence, besides to their theory of hegemony and antagonism.

2.5.1 Identity According to Laclau and Mouffe

Laclau and Mouffe see that "individuals are partially structured by discourses and being a whole is a myth or not possible but individuals will strive for it."[138] They explained identities and how they are fixed or not through 'logic of equivalence' and 'logic of difference', they used the concept of master signifier used by Lacan to show how a subject establishes its nodal points of identity and may makes one of nodal point more dominant.

In some articulations identity related to its negative, for example Man is a master signifier establishes link to other signs such as rational, independent to find itself. And related to its negative which is women that is also a nodal point related to signs like emotional, motherly, dependent.[139] So the relationship of equivalence is making a certain nodal points or signs linking to each other in likeness, (man as rational, intellectual etc.) and putting this in a negative relationship with an opposition (woman as emotional, simple etc.). Such as in the case of privileged sign West, nodal points can be: developed, civilized, prosperous, peaceful and so on. But this is only meaningful in relationship to the negative, in this case East, which will have nodal points like poor, less developed, uncivilized. So identity is a nodal point at the center (or a master signifier) and cluster of signifiers around it.[140]

On the other hand, logic of difference establishes several positions, instead of one

[137] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.36.
[138] Erdogan, op.cit., p.15.
[139] ibid, p:16.
[140] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.43.

with an opposition, it also incorporates the differences within the master signifier. In this articulation, differences within the category of man are also included such as working class, young, old, rich, white and so on. This logic makes identities more fragmented or more special. At the same time, it lessens the effect of logic of equivalence, which is more polarizing as it is based on two antagonistic positions. Both logics have a dialectical relationship with each other and they go hand-in-hand. A nodal point or a key signifier has no meaning in itself, as meanings are acquired through relations of difference and equivalence."[141]

2.5.2 Hegemony and Antagonism

Laclau and Mouffe, focused in their discourse analysis on hegemony and antagonism which arise when different identities mutually exclude each other. They explained these concepts through giving an example about a person who is a Worker and has a Scot identity, in situation of war if the worker excludes or eliminate responsibilities and obligations to the country, or if the national identity requires from people to kill others whom they considered to be associate workers in other countries, then the two identities become antagonistically related to each other. So the two identities make opposing demands in relation to the same actions within a common ground, and definitely one blocks the other. Laclau explained that "the individual discourses, which represent and constitute each of the identities, are part of each other's field of discursivity, and, when an antagonism occurs, everything the individual discourse has eliminated threatens to weaken and undermine the existence of the discourse and fixity of meaning. Thus its eventuality, and the possibility of the identities it constitutes, become visible.[142]

So antagonism occurs when discourses collide with each other, and this antagonism can be dissolved through hegemonic interventions, which occur if one discourse comes to dominate alone, while other discourse demoralized from the discursive field. Moreover, the hegemonic intervention is an articulation which reconstitutes unambiguity. In the last

[141] Erdogan, op.cit., p.16.
[142] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.46.

example in the war, the reason why soldiers could be employed among the 'workers' was that the already established worker identity was suppressed through a hegemonic intervention in favor of a national identity.[143]

For example, in Turkish policy towards the Palestinian issue in JDP era, we note that Turkish anti-Israeli discourse and anti-Western discourse are more prominence, because Western identity that was dominant in the past era was suppressed through a hegemonic intervention in favor of pro-Middle Eastern and Islamic identity.

The idea of hegemony can be re-explained through existence of the concept of 'order of discourse', which suggests a group of discourses within particular domain, and these discourses can conflict or concord with one another,[144]and as Birsen Erdogan explained it, "when some signifiers are relatively fixed or stabilized, discursive hegemony is achieved. And when an order is created and meanings are fixed, certain practices called 'hegemonic practices' become dominant and power relations can be naturalized."[145]

However, when discourse became hegemon, by time people start to take it as natural and as a given reality, while the conflicted previous discourse start to be forgotten and became sedimented, as Jorgensen and Philips explained it: politics are social organizations and through discourses different actors try to promote different ways of organizing society, the audience take these discourses as natural and do not think that there is alternative, we are used to treat and understand objects and treat discourse about them as natural, but before time these objects were treated in other way and other discourses which had been forgotten, and became sediment discourse.[146]

So discourse always in conflict with other discourses "that define reality differently and set other guidelines for social action. At particular historical moments, certain discourses can seem natural and be relatively uncontested. That it is to this phenomenon

[143] ibid, p.47.
[144] ibid, p.57.
[145] Erdogan, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect*, p.21.
[146] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.36.

that the concept of objectivity refers. But the naturalized discourses are never definitively established and their moments can again become elements and thus objects for new articulations."[147]

Hegemony of Laclau and Deconstruction of Derrida

Laclau considers the concept of deconstruction that was developed by Jacques Derrida and concept of hegemony as the two sides of a one process. Hegemony is the contingent or conditional articulation of elements in an undecidable field, and deconstruction is the process that demonstrates how a hegemonic intervention is conditional in the sense that the elements could have been joint with each other differently and contrarily. Consequently, deconstruction uncover and reveals the undecidability, while the hegemonic intervention naturalizes a particular articulation.[148] From this point we can insert *deconstruction of Derrida* in discourse analysis to reach to identity demarcation.

Derrida argues that agents' thought is structured by dichotomies or polarities, such as good/evil, presence/absence, which are oppositions and antagonisms that hold a different value. In each pair the second phrase or word is considered the negative, bad, unethical, or undesirable version of the first, thus, it is hierarchical order in which the first term privileged and qualitatively had a priority. "in general, what these hierarchical oppositions do is to privilege unity, identity, immediacy, and temporal and spatial presentness over distance, difference, concealment and postponement. [149]

2.5.3 Subject position

Laclau and Mouffe pointed out that through particular ways of talking, individuals are interpellated or placed in certain positions. Like a child when he said mum for adult and this adult replied to him, the adult is interpellated with a particular identity of mother,

[147] ibid, p.37.
[148] ibid, p.48.
[149] Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination,* Translated, with an Introduction and Additional Notes, by Barbara Johnson, the Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, p.25.

linked with particular expectations about her behavior and how to act, so the subjects become positions in discursive structure. Discourses entitled positions for people to occupy, matching to these positions, there are expectations on how to act, what to say and what not to say.[150]

The subject is not only determined by one discourse, it also assigned many different positions by different discourses. And when there is conflict in discourses and they crash, the subject will overdetermined, which mean that the subject is interpellated by different conflicting discourses. And as it is argued by Laclau and Mouffe, the subject constantly overdetermined because the discourses are constantly conditional. The subject position which not conflicted with more than discourse is the outcome of hegemonic processes, where alternative possibilities have been excluded and a particular discourse has been naturalized.[151]

For example, "Identities assigned to Erdogan are: identity of member in Islamic community that require from him to act in favor of Muslims, Turkish identity that require from him to act as nationalist, and identity of Ottoman's grandson according to it he have to continue the historical responsibility of Ottomans in Muslim World".

Moreover, Miller claims that according to the proponents of the notion of discourse, the subject is equally fictitious, they claim that the subject is just a 'function' of the rules of discourse. He referred to the claim of Foucault that 'the subject is a plurality of possible positions and functions'. As Miller described it: "the subject is constituted by the rules of discourse in the same way in which the pawn is constituted by the rules of chess, and one has (allegedly) fully described the subject when one has elaborated the rules of discourse just as one has fully described the pawn when one has elaborated the rules of chess."[152]

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[150] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.41.
[151] ibid.
[152] Miller Seumas, "Foucault on Discourse and Power", *Theoria :A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, No.76 (1990), p.117.

2.6 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS "FAIRCLOUGH'S APPROACH"

According to Laclau and Mouffe, everything is contingent or conditional, all discourses and articulations and all the social aspects can be different. Thus they were criticized for overemphasizing the possibility of change, and their overlooking of structural constraints because they focus so much on contingency, everything is in instable and all possibilities are open. Critical discourse analysts like Fairclough argue that it is important to consider the structural domain within which the structures are socially created but they still inactive and difficult to change, also, they propose a conditional domain for the characteristics that can be negotiated and changed.[153] For that, it is suggested to insert the concepts of 'order of discourse', 'discursive practices' which were adopted by critical discourse analysts, especially Fairclough's theory.

Fairclough's theory depends on the notion that discourse contributes to the construction of social identity, social relationships, and systems of knowledge and meaning. The discourse has two dimensions, communicative event and order of discourse. Communicative event is an instance of language use, such as political speech, interview and film, while the order of discourse is arrangement of all discourse types, which are genres and discourses within a social field such as university, within the order of discourse there are specific discursive practices through which text like speech or visual image, are produced and consumed or interpreted.[154]

Fairclough has designed a model in discourse analysis (Figure: 2.6-1), showing that communicative event –which is a dimension of discourse- itself has three dimensions which are text, discursive practice and social practice.

[153] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.54.
[154] ibid, p.67.



Figure 2.6-1 Fairclough's model in discourse analysis

Fairclough's model aims to show that texts can only be understood in relation to networks of other texts and in relation to social context.[155] Any discourse analysis should focus on the linguistic characters of the text or speech, and discursive practice that includes the process of production and interpretation of the text, in addition to the focus on the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs.[156]

Discursive practices focus on how authors of texts draw on the already existing discourses and genres to create a text, and on how receivers of texts depend on the available discourses and genres in the consumption and interpretation of the text. Fairclough indicated that processes of text production, distribution, and consumption are affected by social factors. Texts for example are produced in specific ways in specific social contexts. The texts are collectively authored by the author, editor and newspaper, while the consumption of the texts depends on the modes of interpretations. Some texts lead to war, others to people losing or gaining jobs, others may change people's attitude, beliefs or practices.[157] Moreover, relationship between the social practice and text is mediated by discursive practices. Through discursive practices, texts form and are formed by social practice. At the same time texts influence the production and interpretation in discursive practice, analysis of communicative event includes considerations on whether the discursive practice reproduces or instead restructures the existing order of discourse and

[155] ibid, p.70.
[156] ibid, op.cit., p.68.
[157] Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, p.79.

about what consequences this has for the broader social practice.[158]

Order of Discourse

In general, discourse is defined as a fixation of meaning in specific domain, but in addition to that it is important to conceptualize the different discourses that compete in the same domain. And that can be through order of discourse, which according to critical discourse analysis means "a complex configuration of discourses and genres used within the social field or institution". Through focusing on different contesting discourses in the same domain, we can investigate where particular discourse is dominant. [159]

By studying the order of discourse we can explore what are the common-sense assumptions which are shared by all the current discourses. Besides, relationship between contingency and perpetuity within a particular domain can be investigated by studying the order of discourse. Fairclough stated that "areas where all discourses share the same common-sense assumptions are less open to change and more likely to remain stable, whereas areas where different discourses struggle to fix meaning in competing ways are unstable and more open to change."[160] Regarding the notion of common sense, Birsen Erdogan clarified that "the audience makes a sense of the knowledge embedded in discourses or language (or text, image, speech), by combining it with his/her prior knowledge and set of values. If the discourse is connected to his/her previous knowledge, it is easier for the audience to accept it without questioning its truth or reliability. Such knowledge becomes 'common sense'. The more people accept a particular discourse as true or common sense, the firmer that discourse is established. It also becomes hegemonic. As Foucault pointed out, what many share is usually considered the universal knowledge or truth. What is discarded is considered unreal or wrong, and what is left outside this community that is sharing a certain knowledge system is considered deviant".[161]

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[158] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit., p.69.
[159] Fairclough, op.cit., p.141-142.
[160] ibid, p.142.
[161] Erdogan, op.cit., p.8.

Fairclough argues that order of discourse stems from the wider social system, since it constitutes and is constituted through particular orders of language, at the same time, means of communication are restricted by the order, for that it is both structure and process. He gave example of order of discourse within the field of Health in Britain, at the beginning it was dominated with discourse of "Welfare", but in the 1980s, it has conflicted with other discourses like the discourse of neoliberal consumer, that rise up by dominating of wider discourses of marketization that controlled the performs of the public organizations.[162]

Change in Order of Discourse

Fairclough shows that there are dialectical relations between the order of discourse and communicative event, "communicative events not only reproduce orders of discourse, **but can also change them through creative language use".[163]** For example, the dominant discourse among Turkish people about Arabs that treated as given along a century is that Arabs hit Turks from their back. Through creative language, the current Turkish president Erdogan try to change this discourse replacing it with positive discourse, when he said that we should not accuse all Arabs since who hit Turks in their back were specific groups and not all Arabs.

In that context, it is argued that there is a relation between communicative event and order of discourse, "every communicative event functions as a form of social practice in reproducing or challenging the order of discourse, this means that communicative events shape, and are shaped by the wider social practice through their relationship to the order of discourse."[164]

Fairclough linked change in discourses with what he called intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality concerns with studying how texts and speeches, depend on earlier meaning and how they combine different discourses. Furthermore, it focuses on how

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[162] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p.72.
[163] ibid, p.71.
[164] ibid, p.70.

different discourses are articulated together in one specific text, or whether different discourses are combined in new articulations. Interdiscursivity is seen as an indication and a driving force of social and cultural change.[165] The change also was the focus of Laclau and Mouffe through their concept of articulation that has the same effect of intertextuality, according to them, articulation is a combination of elements that assigned to them different identities. Moreover, every discursive practice considers an articulation, because no practice is an exact repetition of previous structures. In that sense, every manifestation of reproduction contains an element of change[166]. The discursive practices contribute to reproducing social identities, social relationships, and systems of knowledge in a specific society, for that it is constitutive.[167]

2.7 ROLE OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICES, REPRESENTATIONS AND VISUAL IMAGES IN CREATING KNOWLEDGE

As mentioned before Foucault mainly focused on discourse in his book of Archeology of Knowledge, through which he concerned with explanation of relation between knowledge and power, as he talked about representation of knowledge and how these representations are shaped and given meaning within a specific context. In that domain, Foucault used and discussed the concepts of discursive practices and discursive formation.[168] He also argued that discourse creates truth or truth effects, and sometimes specific discourses in specific contexts have the power to convince people to accept statements as true.[169] Foucault also does not deny the existence of material world, but he argues that it is the people who assign meaning to things, these things may be visual images or news. From here we reach to the relation between media and discourse, media is pervaded and full of discourses, the thing that describe the media as representations.[170]

Foucault focused on discursive practices which are **"actions taken as a part of the**

[165] Fairclough, op.cit., p.139.
[166] ibid, p.140.
[167] ibid, p.65.
[168] Hobbs, op.cit., p.9.
[169] Whisnant, op.cit., p.6.
[170] Hobbs, loc.cit.

real world application of a discourse", then he explained how a "discourse is applied to the social world", within discursive formations that contain "system of thought, the rules, the institutions and the things", so he talked about 'regimes of truth', supported by discursive formations, that are made true through 'discursive practices', he gave examples on discourse in the medical field regimes of truth within "institutional settings" like hospital. From here some scholars talked about mass media within institutional and discursive formation or context like media organization and news or broadcast room.[171]

In media, journalists admit to communicate truth objectively to the public, even though they operate within framework of discourse that affects the way through which events, accidents and objects are represented by mass media, so it is argued that media texts are full of with discourses that frame and describe the events and actions that are represented, and materialized as a result of discursive practices of the journalist. So how much the journalist is committed to represent the truth, but the truth can never be obtained and represented in its pure, since the journalist is constrained with discourse.[172]

In that regards, Foucault indicated that it is discourses that communicate the truth and produce knowledge not the subject, who in his production of texts is operating within framework of discursive formation and the regime of truth, taking in consideration historical context and culture. According to this logic the discourse also produces the subject, who must submit to the rules and conventions of the discourse and hold the knowledge that the discourse creates.[173] So Foucault's focus is not on "what **people say**" but on "**what** people say", or, as he puts it, on the "things said". By this thought Foucault challenges the "idea of a sovereign subject".[174]

A line with these arguments about discourse and subject, the journalist in media organization is the subject that is created by discourse and works according to its intangible

[171] ibid, p.11.
[172] ibid.
[173] Hall, op.cit., p.45.
[174] Michel Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse", *The Foucault Effect, Studies in Governmentality*, Graham Burchel, Colin Gordin and Peter Miller (ed.), Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1991, p.57.

constraints. And he must be influential with functional tools of the media, since his discursive practices in media have the power to make the truth.[175]

Depending on Foucault's idea about creation of regimes of truth, a lot of scholars in their works concluded that "societies discursively produce, circulate, and consume representations of X, constructing what are often called 'regimes of truth' or 'knowledge.' These discourses are comprised of signifying sequences that constitute more or less coherent frameworks for what can be said and done.", for example, Edward Said in his work of 'Orientalism' showed how "the British and French societies constructed 'truth claims' about the supposed innate and inferior qualities of non-white, non- Christian, 'Oriental' people."[176] Roxanne Doty also in her work of 'Imperial Encounters (1996)' focused on historical representation through comparing the "asymmetrical encounters between Great Britain and colonial Kenya with representations of the Philippines by the United States within its own imperial project."[177]

Kevin Dunn also was interested in his work of 'historical representations' to show how names, meanings, and characteristics are attached to the world around us. He focused on the mechanism of knowledge and identity, and how they change across time and space, giving the following example:

> *"For instance, understanding that this is a 'tree,' that is a 'book,' and I am a 'man' presumes access to commonly shared structures of knowledge about objects such as trees, books, and men. But these naming practices might mean something different (or perhaps nothing at all) to people living in different cultures or historical eras. A tree might be a natural resource to be preserved, a commodity to be harvested, a living soul force to be honored, or an embodiment of the spirits of the dead to be worshipped. So it becomes important to understand that representations are historically and contextually contingent."*[178]

Dunn argues that "representations are inventions based on language, but they are not

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[175] Hobbs, op.cit., p.12.
[176] Kevin C. Dunn, "Historical Representations", *Qualitative Methods in International Relations a Pluralist Guide,* Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (ed.), 2008, p.78.
[177] Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, London: University of Minnesota, 1996, p.2.
[178] Dunn, loc.cit.

neutral or innocuous signifiers, because they enable actors to 'know' the object and to act upon what they 'know,' representations have very real political implications. Certain paths of action become possible within distinct discourses, while other paths become unthinkable."[179]

Moreover, Zehfuss mentioned that even if there were a real, we could never access to it other than through our representations. As a result, what is conceptualized as real that in turn limits our constructions, is itself an effect of representations.[180] Moreover, "reality is unknowable outside human perception, and there is never only one authority on a given subject". As Friedrich Nietzsche noted, and quoted by Dunn "there are no facts in themselves. It is always necessary to begin by introducing a meaning in order that there can be a fact".[181]

According to Roaxanne Doty, international relations are inseparably linked with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are accepted as truth. Analyzing these practices examine how certain representations stimulate the production of knowledge and identities, rather than uncovering of fundamental truths that have been hidden.[182]

So through representations media and discursive practices of the journalist challenge the international institutions to take an action in response to the truth that they communicate to the public. The aim of the media is to bring the attention of the public to the humanitarian crisis, creating debates among public which in turn encourage the policy makers to call for change. So the journalist realizes that the discourse of media in case of humanitarian disasters and violence aims to "simplify a complex international incident without trivializing human suffering while also bringing to the fore key political questions about these events", discourse also aims to present the disaster and conflict in a way that let

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[179] ibid, p.79.
[180] Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: the politics of reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.196.
[181] Dunn, op.cit., p.79.
[182] Doty, op.cit., p.5.

watcher who lives in other countries with different social and cultural backgrounds to realize that this event is up normal and requests action.[183] Thus the journalist keep these objectives and discourses in his mind when he take a photo, or write a news report.

Besides to representation, visual images can be approached from a range of theoretical positions.[184] In that regards, Gillian Rose stated that most of meaning is conveyed by visual images, which presented to us through visual technologies in form of newspaper pictures, snap-shots, "images offer views of the world; they render the world in visual terms. But this rendering, even by photographs, is never innocent. These images are never transparent windows on to the world. They interpret the world; they display it in very particular ways."[185]

Rose made distinction between vision and visuality, "vision is what the human eye is physiologically capable of seeing", while "visuality refers to way in which vision is constructed in various ways: `how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein,"[186] visual imagery occupies important place in international politics since it is one of the fundamental ways through which news from distant is brought and conveyed home.[187]

Moreover, these visual images as Edward Said argues, contributed to development of an 'imagined geography' in which the dichotomies of the West/East, civilized/barbaric, North/South, and developed/underdeveloped have been prominent.[188]

However, David Campbell asserts that interpretation is inevitable and unavoidable in post-structural approach, which maintains that through understanding the unaware and

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[183] Lynsey Chutel, "The Media as a Non-State Actor in International Relations: A case study of the *New York Times*' coverage of the Darfur conflict in 2004", (13 November 2014), p.6.
[184] David Campbell, "Post-structuralism", *International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity,* Milja Kurki, Tim Dunne and Steve Smith (ed.), 2010, p.242.
[185] Gillian Rose, *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials.* 1st edition, London: SAGE Publications, 2001, p.6.
[186] ibid.
[187] Campbell, op.cit., p.243.
[188] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 1978 , Cited in Campbell, loc.cit.

unfamiliar is rendered in the term of familiar. And accordingly "nothing outside of discourse, even though there is a material world external to thought."[189]

Dijk argues that type of discourses is controlled by representative elites and their discourses, they affect the topics and subjects, the types and amount of information, the selection of arguments and the nature of rhetorical operation. These conditions basically determine the contents and the organization of public knowledge. The hierarchies of the beliefs and the pervasiveness of the consensus which in turn are potent factors in formation and reproduction of opinion attitude and ideology.

> *"In the news this strategic control of knowledge is exercised through restricted topic selection and more generally with specific reconstruction of social and political realities. These are controlled with news values and professional ideologies about news that which happen to favor attention to and the interests of various elite, actors, persons, groups classes, institutions nations or world regions"*[190]

Furthermore, Dijk discussed the role of power in production persuasive discourse for public through media. According to him, in Media discourses such as news, reports and advertising, the agencies combine power in the production of persuasive discourse for public consumption, such news reports may reproduce social structures and stereotypes like blacks, women.[191]

So depending on the previous analysis of subject and discourse, it is concluded that Post-structuralism assumes that subject is partially constituted by discourse, there is nothing outside of discourse, and discursive practices contributes in construction of system of knowledge, social relations and social identities[192]

From here this thesis is linking between discursive practices and representations of journalists in specific issue with constitution and reproduction of social and role identity of other subjects and actors like states, leaders and non-governmental organizations. And that

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[189] Campbell, loc.cit.
[190] Teun A Van Dijk, *Discourse and Power*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.36.
[191] ibid, p.61.
[192] Jorgensen, and Phillips, op.cit, p.67.

will be discussed in the sixth chapter, about role of representations and media in Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue.

THIRD CHAPTER

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST BEFORE THE JDP

Since one of the assumptions of the research concerned with showing how the Turkish discourse about Arabs in general and the Palestinian issue in particular, changed in JDP era, it is important to go back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and understand the dominant discourse about Arabs in that period, in addition to understanding the circumstances that contributed in shaping that discourse which was circulated among Turkish people and by time became a given real about Arabs. In that context, this chapter talks about the Arab revolt through which shared knowledge about Arabs as betrayers dominated the social structure of the Turkish medium. On the other side, Ottomans were perceived by Arabs as persecutors. The discourse that was created about Arabs in the late Ottoman Empire continued in the periods after the disintegration of the empire, and still dominated the Turkish foreign policy of the new Republic of Turkey until the end of the Cold War. The discourse about Arabs was not just the only factor that influenced the Turkish relation with the Middle East, it is also affected by traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy that emphasize Western-oriented policy and non-interference in Middle East countries. While a positive discourse and awareness about Arabs and Islamic world started to shape in consistence with rising of the Islamic parties in mid of the Cold War. So in this chapter I discuss and analyze the nodal points of the Turkish foreign policy and related discourses about Arabs and Islam in the periods before JDP era.

3.1 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

The ideology of the Ottoman Empire in foreign policy was motivated by Islam rather than Turkish nationalism, and that what made it differ from the ideology of the other European Empires in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Philip Robins indicated, "the Ottoman Empire believed much more in assimilating its territories and peoples and their elites, with various parts of the empire sending representatives to the Ottoman parliament. The Ottoman elite was an evolving one based on a culture of empire, rather than on a narrow and exclusive notion of ethnicity or race". [193] Furthermore, the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire was led by a military offensive character, but this policy

[193] Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press,1991, page.18.

started to change when the empire started to decline; in the deterioration stage, the empire followed a foreign policy that aimed to preserve the status quo through military and diplomatic means.[194]

The Ottoman Empire began to change in two ways, first when the empire tried to follow more centralized and interventionist policy, through 'Tanzimate', and started to increase its penetration of the distant areas of the Empire through the development of communication and the expansion of its military existence in these areas. At the same period of 'Tanzimate' which started from the mid of nineteenth century to the beginning of twentieth century, the Arab nationalist ideas were rising among the educated and urban Arab intelligentsia. As Robins summarized, "Just as Arabs were starting to discover themselves as a nation, the Ottoman Empire was becoming increasingly less accommodating".[195]

The second change was the emergence of the young Ottoman movement, and its Committee for Union and Progress, which was concerned in promoting a racial policy of Pan-Turkism or unity of all Turkish speaking-peoples in Asia.[196] This change in the Ottoman policy from pan-Islamism to pan-Turkism influenced the Arab lands, after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the ethnic nationalism of the Turkish leaders turned out to be imperialistic. Under the millet system in the Ottoman empire, the geographic boundaries did not form the bases of individual nationality. The Ottoman Muslims defined themselves as Ottomans regardless of their ethnicity either Turks or Iraqi or Syrian. But since the pan-Ottomanism weakened and by the increased influence of the West in the Arab provinces, Arabs started to search for a new set of symbols on which to base their identity, the thing that led to intellectual instability in Middle East by the beginning of the First World War.[197]

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[194] Mustafa Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs", *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol.35, No.4, 1999, p.156.
[195] Robins, loc.cit.
[196] ibid.
[197] Roy R Andersen, Robert F Seibert, Jon G Wagner, *Politics and Change in the Middle East*, USA: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1982, p.74.

On the other side, the Empire was subject to a process of gradual territorial disintegration and ethnic cleansing after revolt broke out among the mainly Muslim Albanians in 1910.[198] In addition to the Great Arab Revolt that was declared by Sherif of Mecca in 1916. The Arab revolt as Robins wrote, "was a major strategic reverse for the Ottomans, establishing an extra front far distant from the main areas of conflict. It stretched the Ottoman military by opening up the fighting in hostile terrain where supply lines and communications were difficult to maintain".[199] William Hale argued that "the Ottoman army could normally defeat a national rebellion by a single ethnic group, since the proto-nations were mostly geographically dispersed and often mutually hostile, but it could not do so if the rebellion was supported by one or more of the major European powers, or if a number of ethnic groups or emergent nations combined against it. Hence, the Empire was subjected to a process of gradual territorial dismemberment and ethnic cleansing."[200]

3.1.1. Arab Nationality and Revolt Against the Ottoman Empire.

As mentioned above, roots of the Arab nationalism emerged before the outbreak of the First World War. In 1911 the Arabs organized a congress discussing the political situation in Turkey and the Arab rights. Although the Arabs were involved in the Turkish administration, but it was not satisfying their aspirations in backing to their past of their dominance over the region, hence their desire was political independence and complete freedom from the empire. When the First World War broke out they took advantage of the conflagration in Europe consolidating their forces to attack Turks and wrest their full liberty from them. At that time, Turkey realized that it may be faced with organized movement that will give the Arabs their former political power, for that it took quick steps to reconcile the Arab leaders, at the same time it tried to put an end to the Arab revolt through sending Jamal Pasha to Syria and Palestine to be the General of the fourth Army

[198] William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774,* 3rd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2013, p.10.
[199] Robins, op.cit, p.19.
[200] Hale, loc.cit.

Force, who worked to nip the revolt and to keep the Arab lands within the Empire, through sending the Arab leaders to the gallows and deporting their families to interior Anatolia. [201]

Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire involved in the First World War beside Germany against the Allies, who were fearing from Ottoman involvement in the war, since the Ottoman military forces were strong, and the Ottoman Empire posed a threat to them, especially to Britain that had national interests in the Suez Canal and the petrol of Persia. So the Allies were concerned on how the people in the Ottoman area will respond to the call for Jihad by Sultan Caliph, for that the Arab revolt against the Ottomans was the only way for the allies to achieve their interests in the Middle East. As Andersen, Seibert, & Wagner stated: "obviously, an Arab revolt against the Ottomans would aid the allied war effort in the Middle Eastern front. There were reasons to suppose that conditions were ripe for such a revolt. The key figure to be won over was Sharif Hussein, sheriff of Mecca and emir of the Hijaz. The British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, contacted Hussein, hoping to persuade him to sever his already strained relationship with the Ottoman Empire."[202] In 1915, an exchange of letters and negotiation correspondence started between Hussein of Mecca and British high commissioner in Egypt 'Sir Henry McMahon'. In the negotiation, the two sides agreed on a plan in which Arabs will join the Allies in their campaign of driving the Turks out of Palestine, Syria and Saudi Arabia. In return of Arab's cooperation, Britain will assist them to get their independence and promised them to establish an independent Arab State, including the Hijaz, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. But what is worth to be noted is that during the negotiations and drawing the boundaries of the Arab kingdom, Sir Henry Mc Mahon excluded west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo from the Arab State, the reason was because of France's interest in Syria.[203] The destiny of Palestine was left somewhat ambiguous, and after the war, Britain seized this ambiguity to press its claim that Palestine was not part of the agreement.[204]

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[201] Aouni Bey Abdul-Hadi, "The Balfour Declaration", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 164, (Nov., 1932), p.13.
[202] Andersen, Seibert & Wagner, op.cit, p.74-75.
[203] Abdul-Hadi, op.cit, p.14.
[204] Andersen, Seibert & Wagner, op.cit, p.76.

Nevertheless, according to this agreement Arabs declared war against Turkey and joined the allies and freed themselves from the Turkish rule.[205]

On the other hand, killing of the Arab leaders on the hands of Jamal Pasha who was called by Arabs with 'butcher', quickened the announcement of the Arab revolt by Sharif Hussein against the Turks on 5 June 1916. His announcement of the revolt came after he trusted the British promises in independence of the Arabs, and it came with the hope that the British support for Arab nation will be created in the Levant.[206] But this dream was smashed with the Sykes-Picot treaty and the French occupation of Syria. Then the Balfour declaration in 1917 added fuel to the flame,[207]combined with the mandate resolution of the League of Nations in 1922.[208]

In regard to Sykes-Picot, Britain didn't keep its promise to Arabs, and after the Hussein-McMahon correspondences, in March 1916, Britain signed an agreement with France, calling it Sykes-Picot, which excluded Palestine from the promised independent Arab States and put it under International administration. While it put the strip of coast near Haifa and Acre under the British influence.[209] According to the agreement, France was allowed to "control of the Levant coastal area and had the right to oversee the interior of Syria. While Britain was to receive what is now most of Iraq and Jordan."[210]

The agreement still secret until it was unveiled by "Trutsci" after the success of Bolshevik revolution in Moscow on 28 November 1917. It was a big embarrassment for the British government and led to secret correspondence between the king Hussein and British government, in addition to the prevailing the anger in Arab world. [211]

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[205] Abdul-Hadi, op.cit, p.14.
[206] Ali Abu Al Hasan, *Role of Britain in Judaization of Palestine, the Dirtiest Role in the History*, 2nd edition, Beirut, Lebanon: House of Arabic Union, 2001, p.183.
[207] E. G. H Joffé, "Arab Nationalism and Palestine", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.20, No.2, 1983, p.163.
[208] Jamal R. Nassar, "The Culture of Resistance: the 1967 War in the Context of Palestinian Struggle", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.3, 1997, p.78.
[209] Abdul-Hadi, loc.cit.
[210] Andersen, Seibert & Wagner, loc.cit.
[211] Abu Al Hasan, op.cit, p.180.

In apportioning the mandated territory, the terms of Sykes-Picot were carried out through the supreme council, except Palestine and Mosul. According to the Sykes-Picot, Palestine had to be put under International administration, and Mosul had to go to France. But in the mandate system, Palestine and Mosul were put under the British mandate.[212]

After Sykes-Picot, Britain issued Balfour Declaration that promised Jews people to create a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine. But before coming to explain Balfour Declaration, it is remarkable to talk about the rising of Zionism and establishment of the World Zionist Organization. Theodor Herzl was the founder of the idea of creating a special homeland for the Jewish people, he was thinking that as long as they remained a minority people, Jews would always suffer from deprivation. In 1896, Herzl published his book of 'The Jewish State', after that he called for the first World Zionist Congress, which was held in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. As a result of the congress, the World Zionist Organization was created and called for establishing a Jewish state.[213]

The World Zionist Organization organized a great wave of immigration to Palestine in the first decade of the twentieth century, by 1914 about 85,000 Jews were living in Palestine, but they still a minority with %15 of the population. At that time, Palestine still under the Ottoman Empire, and the settlers were subject to Ottoman law and administration, for example, Ottoman law didn't always allow noncitizens to own land and a complex system of third party land ownership had to be worked out. At the same time, the Russian Jews were often singled out for harsh treatment because Russia was an Ottoman enemy.[214]

With the beginning of the First World War, the Zionist leaders started to feel that they may not success in establishing their vision of an independent Jewish state, and they were not sure that supporting of the Allies would contribute in achieving of their goal. The

[212] Abdul-Hadi, loc.cit.
[213] Andersen, Seibert & Wagner, op.cit, p.78.
[214] ibid.

Allied powers, on the other hand, were facing great difficulties during the war and needed Jewish financial support.[215]

Following these developments, on 2 November 1917, Britain issued the famous Balfour Declaration, through which the fate of Palestine became unclear, and Britain promised the Jews for a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine.[216] The text of the declaration was as follows:

> *"November 2nd, 1917*
>
> *Dear Lord Rothschild,*
>
> *I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.*
>
> *"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."*
>
> *I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.*
>
> *Yours sincerely,*
>
> *Arthur James Balfour"*[217]

3.1.2. Arabs and Ottomans in The Turkish and Arab Discourse

As Robins mentioned, the Arab revolt still perceived as a monumental act of betrayal in the eye of the Turkish people.[218] Orhan kologlu, one of leftists' writers in *Milliyet*

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[215] ibid.
[216] Nassar, loc.cit.
[217] The Avalon project for documents in law, history and diplomacy, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp
[218] Robins, op.cit, p.19.

newspaper, the populist newspaper in the early era of the new Republic of Turkey, wrote that ‘Ottomans see the Arab people who were killed by Jamal Pasha as betrayals, and from the nationalist view of Ottomans those Arabs deserved to be executed, while Arabs see Jamal Pasha as a betrayal from their nationalist view’. Moreover, the writer explained why the Turkish people didn’t support Arabs in their war with Israel, his argument was as following:

> *“Arabs asking: why did you not support us in our war with Israel? we answer: in the First World War you didn’t want us, we also left you alone with your friends, but we were protecting you by pouring blood against them.”*[219]

24.05.1972, Milliyet, Sayfa 5

Arap Dünyasında
OSMANLIDAN KALANLAR

Yazan: ORHAN KOLOĞLU

Osmanlı izahına göre Cemal Paşa'nın astırdıkları satılmış kişiler, Araplara göre ise bunlar Paşa'nın ihaneti anlaşılmasın diye yokettiği mazlumlardır.

Arap'a göre Cemal Paşa, Türk'e göre Cemal Paşa...

[219] Orhan kologlu, “Osmanlidan Kalanlar”, *Milliyet*, 24 May, 1972, p.5.

24.05.1972, Milliyet, Sayfa 5

MİLLİYETÇİLİK MESELESİ

— Osmanlıya göre hain, size göre kahraman. Bir karara varmamız gerek. Ya kendilerini Osmanlıdan saymıyor, milliyetçi bir akım güdüyor, Osmanlının yüzyıllarca Doğu adına sürdürdüğü savaşı reddediyorlardı. Ve bir ayrılma hareketi kovalıyorlardı. O zaman Türkün sizi, dostunuz, ortağınız Avrupalılarla başbaşa, sorunlarınızı kendi aranızda halletmeye bırakması en ola[illegible] şeydir. Bir Filistin sorunu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için[illegible] zaman, ya da Hidivliğini ilân etmek peşindeydi. Mesele vaktinden önce yayılıp kendi kafasını tehlikede görünce ortaklarını yokederek işin içinden sıyrılmıştır. Tabii bu iş de suçu tamamen Araptan alıp bir haris Türk komutanına yüklemekten başka amaç gütmemektedir.

Cemal Paşa'nın bu suçlanmasında, Abdülhamid'e en büyük günahını işletiren «Mithat Paşa Suriye'de Hidivliğe hazırlanıyor» komplosunun bir benzerini bulmamak imkânsızdır.

Cemal Paşa yüzde yüz suçsuz mudur? Bunu iddia edecek değiliz, esasen bu konuya gelecek yazılarımızda dokunacağız. Yazı dizimizde olayların tarihçesine girişmek istemediğimiz için suçta Araplara düşen orta[illegible] zerinde dur-

Figure 3.1-1 writing in Milliyet newspaper in 1972, talks about how Arabs and Ottomans perceive each other in the late Ottoman Empire

Coming to the Arab discourse about Ottoman Empire, some of Arab scholars when talk and create a narrative about the revolt of 1916, refer it to nationalism, describing the Ottoman Empire to hold discrimination and hostile towards Arabs. In his book of the 'British role in Judaizing of Palestine', Ali Abulhasan, wrote: "the roots of Arab Revolt back to the dream of Arab nationalism and the desire in the building of developed Arab state, through which Arab contribute to human development. Moreover, it back to the "national sentiment" against the policy of "Turkization", "national persecution" and "anti-Arabism", which the Ottoman leaders and Sultans followed, especially after the coup done by the institute of "Ittihad ve Taraki" in 1908 who allied with Zionism in Palestine. As well as, Arabs called Jamal Pasha with "the Butcher" after his execution of the Arab nationalists who protested with slogans like "Taba almawtu ya arab" "Death good Arabs", the thing that forced Sharif Hussein to harry up the revolt on 5 June 1916". [220]

3.1.3. The Ottoman Empire and the Palestinian Issue

In the current speech and discourse of the Turkish leaders and elites in regard of the Palestinian issue, and in response to crisis in Jerusalem, we notice that the most used expressions are "we have historical responsibility", "Ottoman history" "Civilization", "We open our doors for Jews after they came from Spain", at the same time, there are some

[220] Abu Al Hasan, op.cit, p.182.

negative discourse and expressions circulated among the Turkish people which disturb the Palestinian people like "Palestinians sold their lands". So to understand what is meant with these expressions, we must refer to the situation of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Era and the law of land ownership by the Ottoman Empire.

In 1520-1566, Sultan Sulayman Kanuni allowed the Jewish people to live in Jerusalem after their immigration from Spain and Portages. At that time, the Jews preferred to live in Tabariya and Safad, and their population reached to 1650. [221]

In the Sultan II Abdulhamid era, the immigration of Jewish to Palestine increased, since the Ottoman Empire at that time was suffering from financial deficiency, and started to implement a policy known by "Duyunu Umummi" the general debts, to cover the foreigner debt. the Jews were ready to help the Sultan in his financial crisis, and they offered to help in covering the external debts. In that regard, the Zionism founder Theodor Herzl visited Istanbul five times in 1886-1892, but he didn't take any response neither from the Ottoman administrators nor from II Abdilhamid. After that, Newlinski and Herzl agreed to convince Sultan II Abdulhamid to approve on the establishment of settlements in Palestine, they went together to Istanbul, and offered him 20 million pounds, but II Abdulhamit didn't accept the money and said:

> *"I do not even sell a span of this land, because this land does not belong to me. It is for my people; my people have sacrificed the blood for every part of these lands ... The Turkish empire is not for me; it is related to the Turkish people. So I cannot give back any of its parts. Let the Jews keep their money for themselves. When my empire collapses they will own Palestine without paying. Our corpses can be shared, but I cannot allow any operations on a living body."*[222]
>
> *"Bu toprakların bir karışını bile satmam, çünkü bu topraklar bana değil, halkıma aittir. Halkım bu toprakların her karışı için kanını feda etmiştir… Türk imparatorluğu bana değil Türk halkına aittir. Bu yüzden onun hiçbir parçasını geri veremem. Bırakın Yahudiler paralarını kendilerine saklasınlar. İmparatorluğum çöktüğünde Filistin'e para ödemeden sahip olacaklar. Cesetlerimiz paylaşılabilir fakat yaşayan bir vücut üzerinde herhangi bir*

[221] "Buraq wall, not the Wailing Wall", *Palestinian National Information Center 'Wafa'*, http://info.wafa.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=2165, accessed on 03.04.2017.
[222] Mehnet Durmuş, "II.Abdülhamid ve Filistin Meselesi", 24.10.2017, http://muhaz.org/ii-abdulhamid-ve-filistin-meselesi-mehnet-durmus.html, accessed on 15.2.2018.

operasyon yapılmasına izin veremem".[223]

3.1.4. Laws of Lands' Ownership in Palestine in The Ottoman Era

Buying of lands by Jews in Palestine started in the Ottoman Empire, the laws of land issued by the Empire gave opportunity to Jews to be land owners in Palestine, as the Turkish Historian Mim explained in his book, there was no article in "law of lands" which was issued by Ottoman Empire in 1867, that prevent Jews from buying of lands in the holy lands. According to the second article in the law, citizens of foreign governments as same as citizens of Ottoman Empire, can use their property rights and can buy lands in the region of the empire except of Hijaz, so the foreigners have the same rights of Ottomans, and if the law was accepted in that form, the Jewish people were been able to collect lands as much as they want. But in 1883, the law was changed, the second article changed to giving right of buying and selling just to the Ottoman Jews. Other foreign nationalities or those who changed their nationality will not be able to buy without permission of Ottoman administration. But the Ottoman Jews cooperated with the Zionists and were transferring lands to them. [224]

One of the discourse about Palestinian issue that was spread among the Turkish public from the early Republic until our days, is that Palestinians sold their lands to Jews and they are responsible on what is happening to them, this discourse is taken as given reality by the Turkish people, the Palestinians respond that people who sold their lands to Jews, sold it as normal trade deal between citizens, as they were selling lands to other citizens from other religions like Christians. As well as, the Israeli state was not established at that time, and the Jews who were living in Palestinian lands were citizens who had the right given from Ottoman Empire to own lands in Palestine. It was not selling deal from state to state as the Palestinian academician Bilal Shoubaki indicated. Moreover, some of these lands were belonging to Palestinians who were living outside Palestine, some of those

[223] ibid.
[224] Mim Kemal Öke, *Siyonizm ve Filistin Sorunu (1880-1923)*, beşinci baskısı, İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2012, p.87.

people sold their lands from abroad, and others left their lands in Palestine and lived abroad, those lands that were left, is considered without owner, and there is a law of absent in Israeli state, that gives the state the right to take any land which its owner is not exist or not known for a long period.[225]

3.2 THE NEW REPUBLIC AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

After disengagement of the Ottoman Empire, Kemal Ataturk established the New Republic of Turkey in 1923. The Turkish Republic was not founded on expansionist principles, but it was a small nation state committed to the prevailing status quo. By foundation of Turkish Republic, Kemalists aimed to establish a homogeneous society, far from multi-racial and multi-religious bases, in addition to their ambition to establish and maintain a stable nation within its homeland boundaries.[226] They also tried to respond to challenges of the international system following realistically policy without risking the existence of the state.[227]

Consequently, the foreign policy of the Republic aimed to find a strong and modern state that able to defend and maintain its territorial integrity, and political independence against any external aggression, without the need for external assistance, in addition to its ambition to be a member of the European community nations. [228] In that context, it followed a pacifist, defensive, security-oriented foreign policy.[229]

In its first years, the republic's international orientation was non alignment, which

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[225] Bilal Shoubaki, "Interview about how Palestinians perceive Turkey, Hebron University", June 2018.
[226] Mustafa Aydin,"Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs." *Middle Eastern Studies* ,Vol.35, No.4, (1999), p.156.
[227] ibid.
[228] Bilge Criss, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, No. 1, (January, 1997), p.2.
[229] Cengiz Dinc, Mustafa Yetim, "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: From Non-Involvement to a Leading Role", *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.11, No.1, (2012), p.68.

was suitable to its objectives in the period after the First World War.[230] Furthermore, Turkey has turned its face to the West in order to follow idealist peace and norm based foreign policy. At that time, Turkey was not able to pursue active policy since it was surrounded with countries like Balkan and Caucasus which were controlled or supported by great powers (London, Russia and France), until the Second World War.[231]

3.2.1 Traditional Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy

The principles of the Turkish Foreign Policy can be classified into three categories: **traditional principles, new principles, and the newest principles.** Traditional principles were defended in Lausanne by Turkish delegation under the chairmanship of Ismet Inonu. According to these principles the foreign policy of the new state was formed.[232] Some of these principles stayed dominant in the 20th century until our days. Some of them were changed from first priority to second priority in the 21st century, and some of them had been eliminated. The second category which will be explained in the next chapter is the new principles of Turkish foreign policy which were adopted by the new ruling Islamic Party of Justice and Development in the first decade of the 21st century. However, after the Arab uprising took place in the Middle East countries in the second decade of the 21st century, the previous principles of Turkish foreign policy have been reevaluated, and new principles have been adopted to match the national interests according to regional changes. These principles can be categorized as the **newest principles of Turkish foreign policy**.

Coming to the traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy, it is remarkable to point out that traditional principles came as a result or were affected by external and internal factors, for example, the role of history and the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic is one element. Moreover, the security element was dominant in the Cold War era, in that context, writers defended that before the Cold War the Turkish foreign policy was shaped by the threat from the north, and after the Cold War it was

[230] Criss, loc.cit.
[231] Dinc and Yetim, loc.cit.
[232] Criss, op.cit, p.1.

replaced by a threat from the south that came from Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Another element shaped the traditional principles of the Turkish foreign policy is the ideology of the ruling elites of Kemalism, as well as the role of the military-bureaucratic elite in the Turkish foreign policy.[233]So the traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy are explained in the following points:

3.2.1.1 Modernization and Westernization

When the Ottoman Empire disengaged and the new state was established, the Kemalist military bureaucratic elites in Turkey tried to make Turkey a European state which is a part of the Western system of states known as modern civilization.[234] The European civilization was seen as a model for Turkish Republicans since they were viewing the Ottoman culture and religious and traditional values as a source of poverty, political corruption, and economic backward. In the context of these thoughts, secularism started to take its shape in the 1930s, and within the modernization project of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk the Caliphate was eliminated and institutions of laws and educations were secularized,[235] and changed according to the modern system of the western countries, as well as, the alphabet was changed to Latin instead of Arabic. In addition to embracing gender equality, European way of dressing, and the Gregorian calendar. Ataturk also encouraged the writing of a new version of the history of Turkey, that emphasizes on the pre-Islamic history, with little emphasis on the Islamic history. All of these reforms aimed to end the role of religion in the public sphere. [236]

Even in later times new domestic visions emerged rather than westernization, but they remained marginal and less popular, and the westernization still the dominant policy. By the emerging of the Cold War, Turkey was located in the position of a Western state and

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[233] Özlem Tür, Ahmet K. Han, "Aframework for Understanding the Changing Turkish Foreign Policy of the 2000s", *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* , Özden Zeynep Oktav (ed.), England: Ashgate, 2011, p.7.
[234] Tür and Han, op.cit, p.8.
[235] Ahmet Serdar Akturk, "Arabs in Kemalist Turkish Historiography", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 46, No.5, (September 2010), p.634.
[236] ibid.

strategic ally for the West due to its geostrategic location.[237]

The Western-oriented foreign policy was dominant until Özal era. Özal followed a policy mediated between East and West, and he had a different view about Islam and the Ottoman cultural system. Furthermore, Özal didn't blame Islam and Ottoman heritage as a reason of backwardness and underdevelopment, instead he saw that the reason of Turkish backwardness was the lack of liberalism and scientific thinking. According to Özal, the Turkish people are Muslim European and the European civilization is not the only civilization, there are Islamic and Turkish civilizations, and they do not need to change their attitude. As well as, Özal did not see Islam as an obstacle in front of modernization, for that he suggested a reform project that eliminates polarity between secularists and anti-secularists and make Islam more acceptable to the Western-oriented policy.[238]

3.2.1.2 Status quo/ Peace at Home Peace in the World

After Lausanne and the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey adopted a peaceful policy, aiming to achieve a friendly relation with all countries of the region and the world, especially the West.[239] Ataturk aimed to end the long hates and rivalry and wars with the West, and as Çalış notes, the Turkish ambition to become a western country had an effect on pursuing this policy, in addition to the effect of Westernization and modernization. Even Ataturk was himself an anti-imperialist, but his view shelved for the sake of status quo policy that was represented in Ataturk's motto of peace at home, peace in the World.[240]

This principle is considered as the keystone of the Turkish foreign policy, in that aspect, Criss referred to the speech of Ataturk on 1 November 1928, "it is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is the midst of fundamental

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[237] Tür and Han, loc.cit.
[238] Berdal Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-93", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), p.73.
[239] Criss, op.cit. p.2.
[240] Şaban Çalış, Hüseyin Bağcı, "Atatürk's Foreign Policy Understanding and Application", *SÜ İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi,* Vol.3, No.6, (2003), p. 201.

reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquility both at home and in the world". The Kemalist foreign policy did not leave any room for idealism other than its most valued goal of becoming an equal member of the western world of nations.[241]

Ataturk qualified his desire for peace by saying "in the formulation of our foreign policy we pay particular attention to the safety and security of our country and to our capability to protect the rights of the citizenry against any aggression." According to Criss, "while Turkey wished to live in peace with all nations and maintain friendly relations with great and small powers alike, it was always prepared to defend itself from potential aggressors."[242]

Ataturk was concerned with the independence and sovereignty of the Turkish Republic, through his motto of peace at home, peace in the world. And by this policy, he sought a cautious break with the Ottoman past in almost every aspect of life.[243] On the other side, as long as the West would respect the aspirations of the Turkish Republic in keeping its territorial integrity and freedom, Turkey in return offered a zone of peace for the West in an explosive corner of the East.[244]

This policy was challenged by Mussolini's expansionist policy in the Mediterranean, which strengthened Ataturk's determination to pursue a peaceful foreign policy. As Olson and Ince argue, "the Italian threat after 1927 spurred the Turkish quest for security at a time when international politics were becoming increasingly characterized by conflicting positions and rivalries between status quo Britain and France and revisionist axis powers Germany."[245]

Turkey's membership in the League of Nations was in the context of the principle of status quo, since Turkey was a country that believed in the importance of international

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[241] Criss, loc.cit.
[242] ibid.
[243] Aydin, loc.cit.
[244] Çalış and Bağcı, loc.cit.
[245] Robert W. Olson, Nurhan Ince, Nuhan Ince, "Turkish Foreign Policy From 1923- 1960: Kemalism and its Legacy, a Review and a Critique", *Oriente Moderno*, Vol. 57, N0. 5/6, (May-June 1977), p.229.

cooperation and of keeping peace and status quo in the World. That is observed in the remarks of the Turkish foreign minister T. Rüştü Aras, when he said that "the maintenance of peace by the League of Nations was the foundation of Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy."[246]

So as Çalış and Bağcı concluded, Turkey chose to act as an anti-revisionist country and preferred the preservation of status quo in international relations. In that context, Ankara during the period of Ataturk supported all initiatives and efforts, that aim to achieve regional and international cooperation as much as possible.[247]

3.2.1.3 Full independence and Non-interference

Full independence is another important pillar of Turkish foreign policy, through which Ataturk refused any external intervention during the forming of Turkish foreign policy and other political and national issues, in addition to his stressing on the principle of full equality with other nations.[248] Moreover, to achieve full political and diplomatic independence according to Kemalist foreign policy, it was necessary to achieve economic independence. That was through nationalizing the foreign companies that have led the economy in periods before the establishment of Republic of Turkey. Even though, Ataturk did not reject the foreign capital which accepted national control, since the national resources to develop the country were inadequate. After the economic liberalism was weakened, the Kemalist strategy characterized with the concept of 'Etatism' through which the state plays basic role in the economy, the concept also was designed to redirect the unfavorable effects of the economic depression which was destroying the main capitalist countries of the west.[249]

Non-alignment also was Turkey's International orientation during Ataturk's era, as Criss stated: "Turkey was a war-torn country in need of internal reconstruction which made

[246] Çalış and Bağcı, op.cit, p.208.
[247] ibid, p.218.
[248] Criss, loc.cit.
[249] Olson, Ince & Ince, loc.cit.

seeking peace a necessity." In that framework, at that period Turkey was aiming to establish a powerful modern state which can defend its territorial integrity and political independence against external aggression without any external assistance. At the same time, it was aiming to make Turkey a full member of the European Community.[250]

Noninterference was the main principle of Turkish foreign policy, particularly towards the Middle East. Even the relations with the countries of the region were established, but the main drive was to leave Arabs alone. One example of Turkey's noninterference in the Middle East was the Sadabat pact that was established in 1937 with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, and the Balkan Pact that was concluded in 1933 with Greece Yugoslavia and Romania.[251] Although these pacts were an example of regional cooperation but their principles based on non-interference in each other's' affairs.[252] Moreover, Ataturk's foreign policy was aiming to create a security ring through these regional pacts with the neighboring countries, in its northern and southern sides.[253]

3.2.1.4 Non Irredentism

Irredentism is one of the foreign policy approaches that were dominant during the 1930, through which a sovereign state on the basis of ethnic, economic, cultural or historical ties, claims or annexes territory or lands that are within the boundaries of another state. Regularly, irredentism has a nationalist goal that aims to liberate and recover the unfree brothers who are staying outside the boundaries of the state and imposed to foreign oppression.[254]

Jacob Landau defined irredentism as "an ideological or organizational expression of passionate interest in the well-being of an ethnic or cultural minority living outside the boundaries of the states inhabited by the same group." He also argued that, "moderate

[250] Criss, op.cit, p.3.
[251] Olson, Ince & Ince, op.cit, p.231.
[252] Criss, loc.cit.
[253] Olson, Ince & Ince, loc.cit.
[254] Seçkin Barış Gülmez, "Turkish foreign policy as an anomaly: revisionism and irredentism through diplomacy in the 1930s", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol.44, No.1, (2016), p.3.

expressions of interest or defending a group from discrimination or assimilation may not be irredentist phenomena at all; hence a more adequate definition of irredentism may be extreme expressions, ideological or organizational, aiming at joining or uniting (i.e., annexing) territories that the ethnic or cultural minority group inhabits or has inhabited at some historical date." [255]

An example of the irredentism is the expansion of Nazi Germany towards Austria, the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, which was justified by reunifying with relatives, and people who are speaking German. Moreover, irredentism was frequently used as a justification for the rising of struggles and wars in North Africa and Europe.[256]

In regard to irredentism in Turkish foreign policy, Roderic Davison argued that:

> *"Many modern nations both large and small, have succumbed to the allure of trying to annex or regain unredeemed territories currently under alien rule, the Turkish Republic under Ataturk largely avoided such irredentism. Turks never seriously thought of trying to reconstruct the old Ottoman Empire- to incorporate again Hungary, Albania, Palestine, the Yemen, Algeria, and other such lost territories Ataturk ridiculed such a multinational state".*[257]

Even there were a few lands outside the Turkish borders, like Mosul and Hatay 'Alexandaruna', but Mosul was awarded by the league of nations to the British mandated Iraq in 1921 and Turkey accepted that. While Hatay alone among the bits of unredeemed territories that had a special status for its Turkish population, and it was the only territorial acquisition of Turkish Republic, as it was joined to Turkey after a compromise arrangement with France in 1936. And that acquisition was achieved by negotiation, not military action.[258]

Davison also claims that "Irredentism that was applied to Turkish speakers who lived

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- [255] Jacob M. Landau, "The Ups and Downs of lrredentism: The Case of Turkey", *Irredentism and International Politics*, Naomi Chazan, Lynne Rienner (ed.), Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991, p.81.

[256] Gülmez, loc.cit.

[257] Roderic H. Davison, "Peaceful Foreign Relations: An Achievement of Ataturk", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Vol.36, No.1, (February 20, 2015), p.173-174.

[258] ibid.

in various Balkan countries, in nearby Russia, Iran also severely muted. Ataturk was warning against the illusion of Pan-Turanism, pointing out that professing Pan-Turanism simply created more enemies for Turkey".[259]

So Turkey defends the rights of its Turkish minority in other countries, and it does not try to interfere in the policies of these countries, but it promotes democracy to insure secure life for its people outside and didn't try to claim that these lands are related to Turkey.

3.2.1.5 Respect to International Law and Looking for Legitimation in Decisions of Foreign Policy

Turkey is referring to the international law in any behavior in its foreign policy. When it takes any decision, it returns to the international law, or international agreements, or resolutions of the UN security council. For example, when Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, first it used its right of guarantee derived from Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, and invited the UK to intervene in Cyprus together with it, in order to protect Turkish Cypriots, as it aimed to preserve the legal status quo on Cyprus, according to the 1960 Zürich-London Agreement. But when the UK declined, Turkey started a full-scale military operation on 20 July 1974. [260]

Another example of this policy was the Turkish support of the U.S-led coalition against Iraq in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which also was legitimated since it was violating the International law through attacking of one state on the sovereignty of another state. In that context, the UN Security Council approved resolution 660, which condemned the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and called for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The security council also passed resolution 661 on 6 August 1990, which imposed a comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq.[261] So the

[259] ibid.
[260] Erhan Bora, "Cyprus in International Law", *Ankara Bar Review*, No.1 (2013), p.39.
[261] Cameron S. Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, No.1, (2007), p.86.

Turkish decision to join the U.S-led coalition against Iraq was legally justified basing on resolutions of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, in the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Turkish decision not to allow the U.S to use its lands in order to invade Iraq on 1 March 2003, was also legally justified, since there was no resolution from the UN Security Council that legitimized the invasion. The UN Security Council refused to support the US-led invasion in 2003, since "the American-led coalition was not fighting to repulse an invasion of one sovereign state by another; on the contrary, in 2003, it was the coalition which was doing the invading."[262]

3.2.2 The Discourse About Islam and Arab in the Republic's Policy Before the Cold War

During the early Republic of Turkey, the discourse of republican elites based on the ideology of Nationalism and Secularism, rather than Islamic identity.[263] The privileged nodal point of the TFP was Westernization,[264] linked with European civilization, and staying far from Islam and the Arab world.[265] Accordingly, the Republicans adopted a comprehensive reform program, aimed to end the role of religion in the public sphere.[266] In other words, the Kemalist elites within the identity of nationalism and secularism, established equivalence relation with the West, which became privileged signifier in the TFP, linked with nodal points or signs, like modernization, development and prosperous. While these nodal points are only meaningful in relationship to negative opposition, [267] which in the discourse of republican elites was the Middle East, Islamic World and Arabs, related to nodal points like backwardness, less development, uncivilized, complicated in religious terms and ethnical diversity, in addition to being betrayers in the eyes of Turkish people. In that regards the Turkish writers Dince and Yetim wrote:

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[262] Brown, op.cit, p.109.
[263] Şeker Nesim, "Vision of Modernity in the Early Turkish Republic: An Overview", *Historia Actual Online*, No. 14, (2007), p.52.
[264] Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel, "Modernity, Identity and Turkey's Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey,* Vol.10, No.1 (2008), p.56.
[265] Tür and Han, loc.cit.
[266] Ahmet Serdar Akturk, "Arabs in Kemalist Turkish Historiography", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.46, No.5, (2010), p. 634.
[267] Jorgensen & Phillips, op.cit, p.43.

"The new elite Islam need to somewhat nationalized Turkicized and no longer to tie Turks to other Muslims as this tie had brought nothing but Arabization and misery to the Turkish nation. which had to make too many sacrifices in defending the Muslim world against the Christendom. In the end the Arab did not hesitate to stab the ottoman in the back during the WWI by helping the Western imperialist countries."[268]

Andrew Mango described the Turkish feelings towards Arabs and Middle East countries with ambivalence stating that:

"All Muslims are, at least in theory brothers, nationalists of neighboring countries are not. This is one reason of the ambivalence of Turkish feelings about the Middle East." [269]

Cengiz and Mustafa argued that "while the Arab nationalist discourse generally condemned the Ottoman past and saw the Arab revolt as a legitimate response to the Turkification and dictatorial policies of the time. This period also witnessed the further development of stereotypes and prejudices on each side. For the Nationalist Arab the image was the terrible Turk with his unrefined and coarse way bloodthirstiness, etc…for the Turk it was Deceitful Arab his cowardice laziness dirtiness. In contrast Islamists from both sides confirm the Islamic common bounds."[270]

While Danforth implies that not just ideological prejudices against Arabs made Turkey turn its face to the West, strategic reasons were behind this policy, since in the First World War, most of the Middle Eastern countries were under the European political control, and Turkey could not establish relations with the Middle East countries apart from its relations with Europe, for that it decided not to involve in the Arab world in order not to challenge the mandate powers. [271]

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[268] Dinc & Yetim, loc.cit.
[269] Andrew Mango, "Turkey in the Middle East", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.3. No.3 (Jul, 1968), p. 225.
[270] Dinc &Yetim, loc.cit.
[271] Nicholas Danforth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Ataturk to AKP", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.7, No.3, (Fall, 2008), p. 83.

3.3 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War period, International system characterized with bipolarity, which represented two great powers USA and USSR, with competing ideologies; capitalism and communism, each of them see the other as enemy, and that hostility divided the world into two camps: NATO which represented the West with the capitalist ideology against the WARSO pact which represented the East with communist ideology. However, Turkey took place beside the West and followed a mono-track foreign policy that was shaped by NATO's security preferences.[272] The main factor that led Turkish Republicans to choose the West was the Soviet policy towards Turkey, as Mango explained, "after 1945 the Soviet hostility towards Turkey became open. Territorial claims and claims for the control of the straits were advanced by the Soviets and rejected by Turkey".[273] Criss argues that the Turkish choice to follow a pro-Western policy and its membership in NATO came as a result of Turkish desire to maintain its credibility as a reliable partner for the west.[274]

However, as a result of its pro-Western foreign policy, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries remained limited, and Turkey avoided to be involved in the Arab affairs, and disputes like Arab-Israeli conflict,[275] even it rejected the partition of Palestine in 1947 in which it has sided with the Arab world.[276] Sabri Sayyari, argues that even Turkey was far from the Middle East but it sought to maintain cordial and friendly political and diplomatic relations with the regimes of the Arab countries, just Syria was the country that did not have good relations with Turkey due to the Turkish acquisition of Hatay in 1939. On the other hand, Turkey's involvement in the Baghdad pact led it to maintain a

[272] Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.11, No.1(2010), p. 116.
[273] Mango, op.cit, p. 231.
[274] Criss, op.cit, p. 3.
[275] Sabri Sayari, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Spring, 1997), p. 45.
[276] Dinc & Yetim, op.cit, p. 69.

non-activist and law profile position in its policy towards the Arab countries.[277]

So it can be concluded that the main features that characterized the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Cold War, as they will be explained below are: pro-Western and going a line with British and American policy, joining NATO and Baghdad Pact, equidistance policy in line with Cyprus Crisis.

3.3.1 Pro-Western and Going a Line with the British and American Policy.

Turkish pro-Western policy started with the American support to Turkey within the Truman Doctrine, which was announced by the USA in 1947, to contain the USSR spread in the region. Turkey was included in the Truman doctrine as it received financial support from America as well as Greece. In 1948, Turkey received additional support provided by Marshall aid. After that, Turkey became a member of the OEEC (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development).[278]

On 19 March 1949, Turkey was the first country in the Middle East to recognize the new state of Israel, as a step to emphasize its Western policy and its objective attitude in the area. The thing that made the relations between Turks and Arab nationalists to go from bad to worse,[279] and put Turkey and the Arabs on different sides of the strategic fence.[280]

Coming to the 1950s, the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East was derived from British and American policies in the region. Britain, after the withdrawal of its troops from the Suez Canal in 1954, directed its interest towards building a Middle Eastern defense alliance system to strengthen its position in the region and incorporate the Arab countries among whom British influence was stronger. On the other side, America was interested in the northern tier of states that bordered the Soviets, which are mainly Turkey and Iran. In

[277] Sayari, loc.cit.
[278] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 82.
[279] Mango, loc.cit.
[280] Dinc &Yetim, loc.cit.

that context, Turkey was perceived as a valuable asset for both powers, they saw it an important participant that must be involved in any project to be created in the region, since it was the strongest country militarily and politically, moreover, it was committed to the west through NATO.[281] Mango also argues that "this situation, was chosen by Britain and America to recruit Turkish help in preserving some order in the Middle East. In spite of the Republic Kemalist principle of preserving the territorial integrity and security, and its preference to avoid irrelevant Middle Eastern entanglement, Turkey had to go along some way with the wishes of its western allies."[282]

3.3.2 Joining NATO and Baghdad Pact

In the framework of its pro-Western policy, that was shaped within a security motive to secure itself from communist threat,[283] Turkey, in 1952 became a member of NATO, defining its national interest in accordance with its alliance with the West. It has followed a dependent policy with increased support from the West, and its role in the Middle East was in line with the American policy to contain USSR in the region. In that context, the leader of the Democrat party Adnan Menderes played a role in negotiating Baghdad pact which was established between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan in 1955, and aimed to prevent the spread of communism. Nonetheless, the pact disintegrated following the withdrawal of Iraq in 1959, and was renamed by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). [284] Criss added that Turkey's engagement in NATO and Baghdad Pact was also a line with its vision to become a full member of the European community. The economic situation in Turkey was also one of the factors that pulled it to the Western side, since Turkey was suffering from economic difficulties and it was in need to the external financing from the West. In that sense, Turkey's economy was dependent on the West since the 1950s.[285]

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[281] Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era.* London: Touris Academic Studies, 2007, p. 133.
- Hale, op.cit., p. 91.

[282] Mango, op.cit., p:232.
[283] Criss, loc.cit.
[284] Dinc &Yetim, loc.cit.
[285]Criss, loc.cit.

Domestically, the Democrats in Turkey considered NATO membership as a way of protecting themselves from a coup. When the Menderes government reacted to the Iraqi military coup in 1958 by trying to convince the United States to intervene in Iraq, it was partly out of a desire to discourage potential coup-makers in Turkey.[286]

So the Turkish foreign policy towards the states of the Middle East was an extension to its pro-Western policy, and a result of Turkey's attempts to prove itself to the West as a cooperative partner in the regional affairs.[287] In consequence of this pro-Western policy, Turkey's image in Arab countries was damaged, since it did not take pan-Arab concerns and aspirations in consideration; its recognizing of Israel and allowing America to use the Incirlik during the Lebanese crises of 1958, in addition to its siding with the Western powers in 1956 Suez Canal War,[288] are all an example of how Turkey has acted outside Arabs, defining Arabs as out-group and identifying itself with the West as in-group.

3.3.3 Cyprus Crisis and Equidistance Policy

In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey witnessed crisis concerning Cyprus issue like Cuba crisis and Johnson letter in 1964, in addition to the American embargo on Turkey from 1974 -1978 as a result of its peace process in Cyprus. During these crises, Arab countries sided with the Greek Cypriots, the thing that led to the Turkish isolation in the Middle East. Also, Turkey's western allies and Israel did not support Ankara's position, which led the Turkish elites to reevaluate Turkish foreign policy and follow a balanced policy between the West and the Arab world.[289] On the other side, decreasing of the negative perception of the Soviet, and the economic factors like the need for Petrol, contributed in following of this policy of equidistance, which was obvious in Turkish stance of Arab Israeli war of 1967, when Turkey sided with Arabs and rejected the Western demand to use of its

[286] ibid.
[287] ibid.
[288] Dinc & Yetim, loc.cit.
[289] ibid.

military bases in order to help Israel in the war.[290]

In spite of the Turkish pro-Arab policy, but Turkey did not support the decision of the Organization of Islamic Conference to sever all ties with Israel. In that context, Turkey maintained its neutral position between conflicting countries in the region. Nevertheless, it won a softer image in the Arab countries, and Turkish discourse contained expressions of solidarity shown by the Turkish people after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war.[291]

In the 1973 Arab Israeli war, Turkey sided with Arabs and declared that it will not allow the American forces to use the Incirlik base, whereas the Soviets used the Turkish air space to help the Arabs. Several events occurred and led Turkey to keep away from the West in the 1970s, the first was the American embargo on Turkey until 1978, because of the Turkish peace process in Cyprus, in addition to the economic ramifications of 1973 oil embargo, that increased Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East. So the economic dimension increased in Turkish foreign policy and security concerns became less important.[292]

From that time, image of Turkey in the Arab world start to change positively, especially after the Turkish voting in favor of the UN resolution which condemned Zionism as racism in 1975, and recognizing the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people, in addition to the mass protest of the Turkish people in Konya that led by National Salvation Party in leadership of Erbakan, against Israeli policies in Jerusalem in 1979.[293]

Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy still loyal to its main Western axis, "Turkey never severed its relations with Israel, even when the Arab world suspended its relations with Egypt due to Camp David agreement, Turkey declared that it supported the peace."[294]

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[290] Tayyar Ari, *Yükselen Güç, Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu*, Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık, 2010, p. 33.
[291] Dinc & Yetim, op.cit., p 70.
[292] ibid.
[293] Umut Uzer, "Turkey's Islamist movement and the Palestinian cause: the 1980 'Liberation of Jerusalem' demonstration and the 1997 'Jerusalem Night' as case studies", *Israel Affairs*, Vol.23, No.1, 2017, p. 25.
[294] Dinc & Yetim, loc.cit.

3.3.4 Discourse of Turkish Foreign Policy About Islam and Arabs in the Cold War Era.

During the Cold War, the security-oriented policy dominated the discourse of the Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbors in the East and South. The discourse shaped by secular elites and nationalist civil-military bureaucracy was mainly based on principles of integrity and sovereignty, while the hegemonic discourse about the Middle East was shaped from nodal points and signs like risk, fear, insecurity, and threat, enflamed by issues like the Kurdish problem, Cyprus crisis, and the so-called Armenian genocide, in addition to security-related issues with Iraq and Syria.[295]

Even negative discourse about Islam and the Middle East by secularist and nationalists dominated the Turkish foreign policy, but the positive discourse about Islam emerged in other parts of the society thanks to the National Outlook Movement, which is Islamist movement initiated and led by Necmittin Erbakan, who aimed to revive Turkey's Muslim identity, by emphasizing on Muslim and Ottoman affinities rather than Turkish national identity. Erbakan also rejected the cultural Westernization, but on the other side, he emphasized industrialization, since he was influenced by German industrial infrastructure, as he completed his education in Germany. Erbakan stressed on the scientific achievement of Muslims in the past, "from which, he claimed, the Western world had borrowed exponentially. Beside material development, he called for spirituality and spiritual development as it was high time for Turkey to regain its historical role of world leadership through the appropriation of its own Muslim identity".[296]

The National Salvation party was one of the three parties of the National Outlook Movement, whose foreign policy was based on the principle of close cooperation with Muslim nations, and rejecting of Turkey's membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Moreover, the movement was believing that if Turkey joins the European Union, the Turkish people will lose their real culture. For that, since 1970s

[295] Erdogan, op.cit., p. 49-50.
[296] Uzer, op.cit., p. 23.

Erbakan has called for the establishment of an Islamic Union, and an Islamic currency.[297] In that context, in the 1990s, Erbakan established the Developing 8 (D8) among Muslim nations, bought natural gas from Iran and visited Libya, and announced that he would visit the Western countries only as a representative of the Islamic world, the thing that annoyed the West and secular establishment in Turkey. [298]

In spite of the ambitions and initiatives of the leaders of the Islamic party towards the Islamic world, but the Islamic politicians were not free to express their ideas frankly, because they were under a constant threat of party closure, due to the secular nature of the Turkish constitution and punishing code. The Islamists had negative perceptions of Israel and Jews and were highly critical of the Atatürk revolution and the pro-Western elements in Kemalist ideology. Their interest in Palestine and Jerusalem stemmed from their religious beliefs given the city's central place in the Islamic faith according to their understanding."[299]

Although rising of the Islamic party was the most factor that affected on rising of positive discourse about Islam and Arab World, but at the same time, other events like oil crisis in 1973, and American Embargo and Cyprus crisis were important factors that led to positive discourse about Arab countries in the Turkish foreign policy.

However, the foreign policy that aimed to be more close to Arab countries and the Islamic world is reflected domestically through awareness campaigns by the Turkish media. For example, in 1973, in *Hurriyet* newspaper, there was a daily page with title of "Onbir Ayın Sultanı", in this page every day there was a lesson about Islamic principles and ethics, with a presentation about one of the Islamic countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt.[300] In that situation, the democratization and growing salience of Islam in electoral politics

[297] ibid, p. 24.
[298] ibid, p. 25-27.
[299] ibid.
[300] Hurriyet, "Onbir Ayın Sultanı", October, 1973.

affected the Turkish position towards the Palestinian issue.[301]

Figure 3.3-1 Daily Page in Hurriyet Newspaper with Title of "On Bir Ayın Sultanı", on 9 Oct, 1973 About Islamic Ethics and Information About One of Islamic Countries.

3.4 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE COLD WAR TO JDP ERA

After the Cold War, and following the disintegration of the USSR, Turkey reevaluated its relations with the neighbor countries which are the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Black Sea, adding to its traditional principles of foreign policy the soft-power instruments such as trade, and cultural cooperation, at the same time Turkey tried to make its Western and European aspirations compatible with increasingly diversified foreign policy priorities.[302]

Criss argues that the traditional principles of the Turkish foreign policy of non-

[301] Sayari, op.cit., p. 45.
[302] Eduard Soler i Lecha, "The Conceptual Architecture of Turkish Foreign Policy: An update in light of regional turbulence", *CIDOB,* (18 June 2012), p. 1.

interference in the domestic affairs of Middle East countries continued until the 1990s.[303] After the Cold War, two main regional issues reflect changes in traditional principles of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, these issues were Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, that challenged the Turkish principle of non-interference in Arab affairs, and the Kurdish issue that was an incentive for Turkey to sign military agreement with Israel. Furthermore, during the 1990s, it appeared to many observers that Turkey abandoned its traditional policy of strict neutrality in the Arab–Israeli dispute, by developing an entente with Israel. Nevertheless, the Turkish discourse about the Middle East changed positively, and Turkey saw itself bridge between the West and the East. These features of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East after the end of the Cold War are explained in the following paragraphs.

3.4.1 Turkey's Position Towards Gulf War of 1990

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, annexed it and declared that it is the 19th province of Iraq. The invasion and annexation of Kuwait changed the balance of power in the region in favor of Iraq, the thing that endangered both the security of oil and the economic interest of the US and the Western states in the region.[304] However, the international community perceived the invasion of Kuwait as an attack on the sovereignty of another state, and consequently, the United States led the UN Security Council to issue resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Moreover, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the occupation of Kuwait is not acceptable, and stated that the right of sovereignty for Kuwait must be returned.[305]

On 6 August 1990, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 661, imposing comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq. As it became increasingly clear

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[303] Criss, op.cit., p. 4.
[304] Tayyar Arı, *Geçmişten Günümüze, Orta Doğu: Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi*, Cilt 1, Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık, 5. Baskı, 2012, p. 460.
[305] Hüner Tuncer, *Özal'ın Dış Politikası (1983-1989)*, Arif Bingül (ed.), 1 Basım, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, Eylül 2005, p. 57.

that sanctions would not force Saddam out of Kuwait, the United States and its allies began considering the use of force to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.[306]

Due to Turkey's geographic nearness to Iraq and the already existence of bureaucratic and military infrastructure of NATO military infrastructure in Turkey near the place, it was rational to think by seeking of Turkish cooperation and involvement in the coalition. From that perspective, in the middle of September 1990, the US announced that it will open a second front from Turkey, Syria or Jordan in its expected plans for military action against Iraq. [307] Even the initial reaction of Turkey on the crisis was to implement the principle of maintaining the current status quo, by non-interference in the affairs of the two Arab countries, but Özal saw it as opportunity to prove the strategic importance and worth of Turkey as a crucial part from the western security and strategic interests, at a time when its value was not adequately appreciated by the US and Europe.[308] While most of the Turkish people refused the idea of the Turkish involvement in the US-led coalition against Iraq. The opposition came from the Turkish people who believed in Islamic solidarity that requires not to side with a non-Muslim country against Muslim country, in addition to the nationalist or leftists who were against the intervention as a form of imperialism.[309]

In spite of these debates among the Turkish mediums, Özal government agreed to be involved in the coalition, and during the crisis Turkey with UN resolutions shut down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and collected around 100,000 soldiers to the Iraqi borders, forcing Saddam to divide his forces. According to Özal's vision, this policy would develop a strategic partnership with the Americans and also strengthen Turkey's position to enter the EU. However, the outcomes were not as Özal expected and Turkey paid a high economic price for its support of the US-led coalition,[310]since it lost billions of dollars in pipeline fees and trade, and the strategic partnership with the US was never materialized

[306] Brown, op.cit., p. 86.
[307] ibid.
[308] Berdal Aral, "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-93", *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol.37, No. 1 (January 2001), p. 80.
[309] Brown, op.cit., p. 87.
[310] Dinc & Yetim, op.cit., p. 71.

and Turkey's chances at membership in the European Community hardly improved.[311]

Politically, Turkey left facing a major escalation of its Kurdish problem.[312] Before the Gulf war, Turkish relations with Iraq were on its lowest level, due to the PKK, since Iraq was supporting PKK, and the agreement between Turkey and Iraq that enable Turkey to follow the terrorists from Iraqi lands was canceled by one part in November 1989.[313] So Özal also hoped that the war would result in the fall of Saddam and his replacement with a democratic regime in Iraq that could work out a settlement with the Kurds, restore Baghdad's control in the north of the country, and thus prevent the PKK from using it as a base for its attacks in Turkey. But his hopes proved unfounded since Saddam retained his control over most of the country, and there was no internal settlement with the Kurds, moreover, the western policy effectively left a power vacuum in north-eastern Iraq that strengthened rather than weakened the PKK.[314] As Larrabee notes, the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq under Western protection gave a new motivation to the Kurdish nationalism and provided a logistical base for attacks on Turkish territory by the PKK.[315]

3.4.2 Kurdish Problem and Choices of Turkish Foreign Policy

In the 1990s, Turkey started to play a more active role in the Middle East, especially after the Gulf war. However, in that period, Turkey was facing a big challenge from the Kurdish problem that affected its relations with neighbor countries like Iraq and Syria.[316] In Iraq, PKK became more strong since they took advantage of the absence of authority in northern Iraq,[317] which resulted from no-fly-zones by the coalition forces during the Gulf war. So northern Iraq became a "safe haven" for the Kurds, the thing that increased their ambitions in establishing independent state on the borders of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and

[311] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No.4 (July- August, 2007), p. 105.
[312] ibid.
[313] Tuncer, loc.cit.
[314] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 160-162.
[315] Larrabee, op.cit., p.105.
[316] Sayari, op.cit, p. 44.
[317] ibid.

Iran.[318]This situation made Turkey to give priority of its foreign policy to preserve the unity of Iraq and reestablishment of some form of stability along the Iraqi-Turkish border in order not to achieve the Kurdish nationalist aspirations resulted from the de facto fragmentation of Iraq.[319] In that context, in September 1996, following internal Kurdish fighting which involved Saddam's forces, Ankara announced that it would establish a security zone south of its border. [320]

The Turkish Syrian relations also was affected negatively as a result of the Kurdish problem. Turkey was viewing Syria as a basic supporter for PKK's activities, by providing logistic support and a suitable environment for training. In the 1990s the activities of PKK increased and Turkey started to condemn Syria openly and ask the Syrian government to take more measures to stop the activities of PKK in its lands."[321]

These circumstances consider one of the incentives that encouraged Turkey to sign a military agreement with Israel.[322] Furthermore, in October 1998 Turkey threatened to invade Syria because of its support to PKK led by Abdullah Ocalan, the crisis was calmed only when the Syrian government agreed to expel Ocalan, who then was arrested by the Turkish paratroopers in 1999 in Kenya.[323]

3.4.3 Özalism and Turkish Discourse about Islam and Arabs

The Turkish Republicans saw the religious and traditional values and Ottoman heritage and cultural system as a source of poverty and backwardness, they aimed to change the civilization mode of the Turks and being a European secular Turkey. But for Özal the reason behind the Turkish backwardness was the lack of liberalism and scientific

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[318] Haldun Çancı and Şevket Serkan Şen, "The Gulf War and Turkey: Regional Changes and Their Domestic Effects (1991-2003)", *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March, 2011), p. 45.
[319] Sayari, op.cit., p.47.
[320] Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No.1(Winter, 1998), p. 39.
[321] Sayari, loc.cit.
[322] Hale, op.cit., p. 160.
[323] Jamal Wakim, "End of Al-Assad, or of Erdogan? Turkey and the Syrian Uprising", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Summer 2014), p. 189.

thinking. According to him the Turkish people are Muslim European, and the European civilization is not the only civilization, there are Islamic and Turkish civilizations, and they do not need to change their mentality, Özal also believed that Turkey can solve the problems due to the Ottoman past, the Ottoman heritage granted Turkey great power to control the region. in that sense, Özal did not hesitate to stress the Islamic dimension of the Turkish national identity, he considered it as an asset that contributes to the modernity of the country.[324] In line with this assessment, Özal adopted a multicultural approach that exceeded the narrow boundaries of ethnicity and national territory. He also was unique in questioning the nationalist discourse which idealized about republicanism, secularism of the French type, and state-centrism.[325]

In regard to the Turkish relations with the Middle East, Özal also didn't shy away from emphasizing Turkey's Islamic identity to develop political and economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Before the Özal era the Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Islamic world and the Middle Eastern Countries based on Kemalist principles of non-involvement and non- interference. However, in the 1980s Özal realized the importance of building connections with Arab and Islamic countries, so he started to take initiatives in the Middle East with his desire to establish an economic pact among these countries based on free trade.[326] The thing that made Turkey's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf countries to develop in a positive direction. [327] Özal also believed that development of relations with the Middle East would help for deepening the ties with the EU and the U.S. The expression of this view was the metaphor of the 'Bridge Country' by which Özal meant that Turkey ought to appropriate the best of East and West; since it knows both of them well, its position was ideal to be active in both sides and facilitate the much-needed dialogue between them and thus raise Turkey's global prestige.[328]

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[324] Aral, op.cit., p.84.
[325] ibid.
[326] ibid, p. 76.
[327] Talip Küçükcan, "Arab Image in Turkey", *SETA Research Report*, (June 2010), p. 9
[328] Dinc & Yetim, op.cit., p:71

FOURTH CHAPTER:

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE FROM 1945-2002

This chapter shows how the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue, was affected by nodal points of the Turkish foreign policy towards the West and the Middle East during the Cold War. In the first decade of the Cold War, Turkey recognized Israel in the context of its pro-Western policy, while during the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973, Turkey's position changed and it took a place beside Arabs as a part of its equidistance policy towards the Middle East. However, the discourse and awareness about the Palestinian issue and danger of Zionism started to be more prominent among the Turkish publics in parallel with rising of the National Outlook Movement in leadership of Erbakan, for that it will be referred to Konya protest of Liberation of Jerusalem that took place in 1980 against the Israeli recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel.

During Özal era, the pro-Palestinian discourse continued in consistence with Özalism philosophy that based on economic liberation and promoted discourse of 'bridge country', through which Turkey must be opened to the Middle East and get advantage from both the East and the West, in that aspect Turkey supported the Palestinians in the two intifadas. In spite of the pro-Palestinian stances that dominated the Turkish foreign policy, but the discourse about the Palestinian issue and criticizing of Israel stayed limited, and the Turkish leaders were cautious not to damage their relations with Israel and the West, since the military elites still had power on the decisions of the Turkish foreign policy, and that will be explained by discourse theories of antagonism and collision between identities of the subject, as it is shown in the last section of this chapter in case of Ecevit's criticizing of Israel as a state that acts genocide in 2002. On the other hand, this chapter will talk about the development of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its relations with Turkey that witnessed some tensions during Lebanon War in 1982 and the Gulf War in 1990.

4.1 TURKEY'S PRO-WESTERN POLICY AND ITS POSITION TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

Turkish position towards the Palestinian issue in the early decades of the Cold War was going in line with its pro-western policy. However, on 15 May 1947, the UN General Assembly formed a special committee to assess the Palestinian issue. While the Arab states

and Turkey voted against the committee, the majority of the assembly voted for the establishment of the committee. However, after the committee visited Palestine, it has submitted two plans; the majority plan and the minority plan. The majority plan proposed that Palestine must be partitioned into three parts: an independent Arab state and an independent Jewish state, by keeping the city of Jerusalem under the trusteeship. While he minority plan suggested an independent federal state, which the Arabs advocated following a three-year transitional period, with Jerusalem nominated as the capital of the federal state. At that time, Britain declared at the UN on 26 September 1947 that it would terminate its mandate on Palestine at a later date.[329] However, on 29 November 1947, Turkey was with the Arab side in voting against the UN decision of the Partition Plan of Palestine, while the majority voted with the decision under the influence of the United States, and Britain remained abstain.[330]

Turkish voting against the partition plan, and its support to the unity of Palestine, came in line with its traditional policy, to maintain the status quo in the region, since partition of Palestine will lead to chaos and instability, thereby encouraging the Soviet encroachment, since a lot of Zionist leaders in Palestine were coming from Russia, the thing that increased the Turkish concerns that the Jewish state may be turned to Soviet satellite.[331]

Even Turkey voted against the partition plan, but it started to change its policy towards Israel according to the regional changes. Mustafa Bilgin referred the change in Turkish policy towards Israel to some reasons, the first reason resulted from Arab Israeli conflict, through which Turkey became more aware of the capabilities of the Arabs against Israel, and so, it became less interested in making of alliance with the Arabs against communism. The second reason was that Turkey saw Israel as a pro-western and progressive country in the region after the moderate Mapai party came to power in 1949 elections in Israel. The third reason was that the two allies of Turkey, the US, and Britain

[329] Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era*, New York: Touris Academic Studies, 2007, p.117.
[330] ibid.
[331] ibid.

recognized Israel, and Turkey was aligned with Britain in its policy in the Middle East, at the same time Turkey was moving towards the Atlantic Pact and believed in the influence of the Jewish lobby in America. According to these considerations, Turkey accorded de facto recognition of Israel, arguing that the state of Israel is a fact that was recognized by 30 states.[332]

Some writers like Shamir Hassan ties the Turkish recognition of Israel with its concerns about the Soviet Union in that period. Hassan claims that Turkey before recognition of Israel and its side with Arabs against the partition plan came from its mistaken belief that the Zionist leadership was a proxy of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, by 1949, such uncertainties about the Israeli intentions were removed, and Ankara was convinced that Israel was a pro-Western and a potential ally against the Soviet Union.[333]

Under these conditions, Turkey established diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1950, by sending charge d'affaires Seyfullah Esin to Tel- Aviv, and by this step, Turkey affirmed its pro-Western foreign policy which would ultimately aim at achieving full NATO membership.[334]

In that context, Turkey cooperated with Israel in different fields, and sport news between Turkey and Israel covered the Turkish newspapers at that time. For example in September 1963, *Milliyet* newspaper published news about a Turkish young team who played football with Israeli young team.[335] And another news in 1965 was about the Turkish competition with Israel in International swimming competition, which was arranged by the United Nations.[336]

Moreover, during Suez Crisis in 1956, Menderes government set beside the West, and strongly condemned President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. However, it

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[332] ibid, p.133.
[333] Shamir Hassan, "Turkey's Israel Policy Since 1945", *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 69 (2008), p. 921.
[334] Hakan Yavuz, and Mujeeb R. Khan, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict:Duality and Development (1950 - 1991)", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.14, No.4 (1992), p. 73.
[335] "Israil genç milli takımı galip", *Milliyet*, 02.11.1963, p. 8.
[336] "yüzme yarışlarında İsrail önde", *Milliyet*, 15.08.1965, p. 5.

reluctantly fell in line with the US in calling for an Anglo French withdrawal from the canal zone, since America was the more powerful ally of Turkey.[337]

The four regional members of the Bagdad pact, except Britain, hold a meeting in Tehran in November 1956, through which they strongly criticized the Anglo-French invasion of the canal zone and called for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all Egyptian territories. According to Hall, Menderes was influential in persuading the other pact members not to eject Britain from the organization.[338] However, as a response to the Israeli invasion, Turkey recalled its ambassador Sevket Istinyeli from Tel Aviv, but this step didn't lead to cut of relations with Israel, as Istinyeli told the Israeli officials that the decision of downgrading the diplomatic mission just was taken to strengthen the Bagdad pact and he emphasized that such action must not interpreted as a hostile act to the state of Israel.[339]

4.2 TURKISH NEUTRALITY AND PRO-ARAB POSITION IN ARAB ISRAELI WARS OF 1967 AND 1973.

Turkey tried not to separate its regional policy from its alliance with the western powers as far as possible, it also tried to build bilateral relations with countries of the region rather than multilateral relations. In addition to its attempt not to take a side in the regional disputes, either between the states or within them. Even Turkey became more cautious in supporting USA policies, but it still committed to NATO, since the Turkish foreign policymakers couldn't commit themselves with any matter which at least not presented in its function in NATO.[340]

However, the Turkish relations with the West and US were interrupted as a result of Cyprus Crisis, and Johnson letter in 1964, which led Turkey to take a more pro-Palestinian

[337] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 93.
[338] ibid.
[339] Yavuz & Khan, op.cit., p. 74.
[340] Hale, op.cit., p. 124.

position and weakened its position towards Israel.[341]In that context, in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, that took place between the United Arab Republic 'UAR' and Israel, Turkey refused the US demand to use its bases for refueling or supply of Israel. However, the war resulted with killing of 15,000 UAR soldiers, and Israel occupied entire the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, captured the West Bank of the River of Jordan and Jerusalem from Jordan, and Syria lost Mount Hermon, and Israel forces advanced 12 miles inside Syria. So Israel occupied 26,000 square miles of Arab territory, almost four times larger than own size.[342] At that time, the Demirel government in Turkey supported UN resolution that called for Israeli withdrawal to its pre-war borders. Turkey took the same stance in the Yom Kippur war of October 1973 and did not allow for the U.S Air Forces to use the Incirlik base for anything other than routine NATO missions.[343] Most of the writers argue that the petrol crisis in 1973 was the main factor that strengthened the Turkish Arab relations, and led Turkey to take a pro-Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli war in 1973.[344] While Sabri Sayari argues that growing saliency of Islam in electoral politics was a factor that led to a pro-Palestinian position in the 1970s.[345]

4.3 TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH PLO

The establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization "PLO", came after several steps taken by the Arab leaders in the 1960s. The first was when Jamal Abdul-Nasser called for the first Arab summit in 1964, for discussing the battle of Jordan river with Israel. At the summit Abdul-Nasser said that the battle of Jordan river was part of the battle of Palestine, after that summit, the Palestine Liberation Organization was announced in 1964 in a meeting in Jerusalem, called for it the representative of Palestine in the Arab League

[341] Sayari, op.cit., p. 45.
[342] Farzana Khan, "The Arab-Israeli War", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1967), p. 274.
[343] Hale, loc.cit.
[344] Yavuz & Khan, op.cit., p. 74.
[345] Sayari, loc.cit.

Ahmad Shoukairy.[346] The PLO was representing the Palestinian interests and functioning independently of the Arab governments.[347]

At the beginning of its establishment, the PLO was not considered a military organization, but after the Israeli victory in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and the continued dispersion of more Palestinians, the Palestinian leaders started to take stance from Nasser's view of Arab nationalism and they disagreed with Nasser's motto "Unity is the Road to Palestine", favoring instead "Palestine is the Road to Unity". The outcome of the 1967 War made it clear to them that their hopes for nationhood would be dashed if they followed Nasser's proposition. As a result, in 1969 the armed Palestinian groups took over the PLO structure and Yasir Arafat of Al-Fateh became the head of the PLO. The Arab capitals thought that Arafat's successful organization would be controlled more easily if they gave him a new mantle of authority."[348] Nevertheless, the number of PLO troops increased by time, and in the 1970s the PLO had fifty thousand troops in Jordan, they were described as a conventional army than as guerilla fighters. The liberation movement in Jordan started to demand more autonomy in Jordan, in response, in September 1970, king Hussein ordered regular Jordanian troops against the PLO, killing thousands of Palestinians. The crisis called with Black September and was one factor that weakened and broke the Palestinian power in Jordan.[349]

After the events of Black September, King of Jordan Hussein was discredited as a representative of Palestinian interests, and it became essential to include the PLO in any peace negotiations, in that context in November 1973, heads of the Arab states announced the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.[350]

The period that witnessed the rising of PLO to the political arena, coincided with

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[346] Rashid Hamid, "What is the PLO?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 4, No.4 (1975), p. 93.
[347] Cheryl A Rubenberg, "The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Analysis of the PLO in Lebanon Until June 1982", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.12, No.3 (Spring, 1983), p. 55.
[348] Andersen, Seibert, & Wagner, op.cit., p. 133.
-Rubenberg, op.cit., p. 55.
[349] Andersen, Seibert, & Wagner, loc.cit.
[350] ibid.

Turkey's efforts to adopt a balance policy in the Middle East, and these attempts were clear in Turkey's policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, besides to its neutral position from Iran–Iraq war in 1980–1988. In regard to its relations with the PLO, Turkey started to adopt more pro-Palestinian shift during the 1970s, for example, in 1976 it recognized the PLO, and in 1979 it opened an office for the PLO in Ankara. However, Hale argued that "the shift was slow and hesitant, mainly because Turkey was suspicious of collaboration between the Palestinians and leftist- Kurdish terrorist movements in Turkey. Hence, Turkey was careful to limit its support to the PLO, rather than to the more radical Palestinian factions such as those headed by George Habash and Naif Hawatmeh, which were apparently supported by Greece and Syria".[351]

Erkan Ertosun explained the reasons that made the Turkish relations with PLO restricted and in sometimes it had been deteriorated.[352] The first factor was as a result of the Turkish belief that the PLO in Lebanon provided shelter for a terrorist groups of Armenian and Kurdish and some extreme leftists. On 16 June 1982, the Turkish newspaper *'Milliyet'* published news from agency THA, that Israel charge daffairres Alon Liel in Ankara said to the agency: "the Israeli Arms captured a group of Armenian and Turkish terrorists who were found in the PLO camps in Lebanon". [353]

The second reason was the Arab's position from the Turkish Greece dispute in Cyprus issue, Arabs voted in favor of Rum in the UN in 1965, and in 1970s PLO was always beside the Rum, the thing that disturbed Ankara. According to Ertosun, the reason behind this position is that some leaders of the organization were Orthodox and educated in Greece. Another event that disturbed the Turkish authorities was that in 1982 the PLO guerillas during the leaving of Lebanon to Tunisia passed from south of Cyprus and left their weapons there.[354] PLO's pro-Iraqi stance during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, was also a factor that led to some tensions in Turkish relations with PLO, as it will be

[351] Hale, op.cit, p. 125.
[352] Erkan Ertosun, *Filistin Politikamız: Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya*, 1. Basım, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2013, p. 65.
[353] "Israil: FKÖ Kamplarında Ermeni ve Teröristler Yakalandı", *Milliyet*, 16.06.1982, p. 5. http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Ara.aspx?araKelime=FKÖ%20kamplarında&isAdv=false
[354] Ertosun, op.cit., p. 64.

discussed in later sections.

4.4 NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY AND RISING OF DISCOURSE ABOUT PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN TURKISH PUBLICS

Even Turkish discourse and awareness about the Palestinian issue was created before in consequence of wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, and the developments of the wars were daily reflected in the Turkish newspapers in details, in addition to the effect of petrol crisis in 1973 that strengthened the Turkish- Arab relations, but the discourse about the importance of the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem, with anti-Israeli discourse and dangerous of Zionism was more stressed and dominant among the public mediums, in consistence with rising of Islamic movement 'The National Outlook Movement' which was initiated and led by Necmettin Erbakan, who aimed to revive Turkey's Muslim identity, by emphasizing on Muslim and Ottoman affinities rather than Turkish national identity.[355] The protest that was arranged by the National Salvation Party, against the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem as capital of Israel in 1980, was a concrete event that opened the eyes of the Turkish people on the seriousness of the Palestinian issue and status of Jerusalem. From that time, the Turkish mediums still hear the expressions about Zionism and Israel rarely used by the leader of the National Salvation Party Erbakan, who was always keen to talk about the Zionist project that aims to establish the Israeli state from the Nile to Euphrates and Turkey will be part of Israeli lands. "*Millet Gazete*" was the popular Islamic newspaper through which Erbakan wrote different subjects about Zionism, like: "Jerusalem and Zionism", "Anarchy and Zionism". Erbakan also believed that the common market which Turkey would like to enter is a part of Zionist projects.[356]

Another example on the anti-Zionist discourse, as it is shown in the news text in *Milliyet* newspaper in figure 4.4-1, in September 1979, Erbakan, during his journey by bus in election campaigns in the East of Turkey, showed to people the word of 'Zionism' written on the crocodile photo, saying that: "This is the monster that will eat you", "işte sizi

[355] Uzer, op.cit., p. 25.
[356] Bali, op.cit., p.3.

yiyen canavar". Looking at the text of the news in the following figure, we observe that the order of discourse at that period dominated by discourses of 'Communism, Capitalism and Zionism', when Erbakan warned the people from Zionism, he also warned them from the risk of Communism and Capitalism.[357] The Turkish newspapers also were taking news from the Iranian newspapers about positions of Iranian leaders from Zionism, such as saying of Humeyni that buying American drinks like coca cola strengthens the 'Zionism'. "Coca Cola Tüketimi Siyonizm'i güçlendirir". [358]

4.5 TURKEY AND ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF EAST JERUSALEM IN 1980

28.09.1979, Milliyet, Sayfa 8

Üzerinde «siyonizm» yazan timsah resmini halka gösteren Erbakan, «İşte sizi yiyen canavar» dedi

AĞRI, THA

MSP Genel Başkanı Necmettin Erbakan, Doğu gezisine iddialı çıkmıştı, fakat Erbakan'ı Doğu'da küçük gruplar karşılayınca Hoca'nın morali iyice bozuldu.

Erbakan'ı en çok sinirlendiren olaylardan biri de gezi süresince kendisine hiç kurban kesilmemesi oldu. Erbakan'dan önce, Köyişleri ve Kooperatifler Bakanı Ali Topuz, Doğu bölgelerini gezmiş, halk Ali Topuz'u gece geç vakitlerde büyük bir coşku ile karşılamıştır. MSP Lideri, KUP projesinin halk tarafından takdirle karşılandığını görünce, bir ara açılan yolları eleştirerek **"Hayret nasıl olmuş da böyle olmuş, yol böyle yapılmaz ki, yapıyorlarsa aslalt yapsınlar"** şeklinde konuştu.

● 3 gündür Doğu'da seçim gezilerini sürdüren MSP Genel Başkanı'na hiçbir yerde kurban kesilmedi

MSP Lideri, siyonizm, kapitalizm ve komünizmin kötülüklerini halka anlatmak için seçim otobüsünde bir timsah resmi taşıyordu. Otobüs her durduğu yerde, Hoca, mücahitlerine **"Getirin timsahı"** diyor gövdesinde siyonizm yazan timsahı halka göstererek **"İşte sizi yiyen canavar bu"** diye konuşmasını sürdürüyordu.

Bir ara timsah resmi otobüsün içinde bulunamadı, Erbakan da uzun uzun resimdeki hayvanı halka tanımladı.

MSP seçim otobüsü Ağrı yakınlarında, AP seçim konvoyu ile karşılaştı hatta her iki partiyi desteklemek üzere gelenler yol üzerindeki bir lokantada birbirlerine karıştılar.

Figure 4.4-1 Discourse of Erbakan about Anti-Zionism in Milliyet Newspaper, 28.09.1979, p.8

On 30 July 1980, the Israeli Knesset adopted the Jerusalem Law which officially

[357] "üzerinde Siyonizm yazan timsah resmini halka gösteren Erbakan, "işte sizi yiyen canvar" dedi," *Milliyet,* 28.09.1979, p. 8.
[358] "Coca Cola Tüketimi Siyonizm'i Güçlendirir", *Milliyet*,10.01.1995. p. 5.

annexed the pre-1967 Jordanian-controlled Eastern part of Jerusalem to Israel, and established it as the capital of Israel.[359] Turkey was strongly critical of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980,[360] and condemned the Israeli law and asked Israel to cancel it. Earlier in July, before the formal enact of the law, the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel met with the ambassadors of the Islamic countries and criticized Israel's intended action as opposing to the international law and justice. Moreover, the Islamist National Salvation Party applied a pressure on the Prime Minister to adopt a critical stance towards Israel.[361] On 26 July 1980, the vice president of national council group of National Salvation Party 'Hasan Aksay' said that: *"Throughout the history, Jerusalem is Islamic city, and will stay Islamic city". "Kudüs tarih boyunca bir İslam şehridir ve İslam şehri olarak kalacaktır",* then, he asked the states and first of them Turkey, to deport the Israeli ambassadors outside their boarders.[362]

On 1 August 1980, the representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Ankara, visited the leader of CHP Bulent Ecevit and discussed the decision of Israel to annex Jerusalem. In the meeting, the representative of PLO in the OIC 'Abu Firas', talked on behalf of the representatives of the Islamic states in the organization, and said that *"We are sure that the Grandsons of Ottomans, will take further steps to protect Jerusalem".* From his side, Bulent Ecevit replied that:

> *"Israel, with its decision, disregarded the feelings of the Muslim world, The Turkish people will not bow to this attack which is directed to our common spiritual inheritance"* [363]
> *"İsrail'in söz konusu kararla İslam aleminin duygularını hiçe saydığını bildirerek Türk halk, ortak manevi mirasımıza yöneltilen bu saldırıya boyun eğmeyecektir."*[364]

In response to the strong external and internal Islamic demands, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the closure of the Turkish Consulate General of Jerusalem on

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[359] Yael Yishai, "Israeli Annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights: Factors and Processes", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), p. 45.
[360] Hale, op.cit., p. 125.
[361] Yavuz & Khan, op.cit., p. 77.
[362] "Mısır İsraildeki Büyükelçisini Geri Çekecek", *Milliyet*, 26.07.1980, p. 3.
[363] "Ankaradaki temsilicilerini kabul etti", *Milliyet*, 01.08.1980, p. 10.
[364] ibid.

28 August 1980.[365]

At that time, the National Salvation Party in the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, was one of the active parties of the National Outlook Movement,[366] before being banned like the other political parties after the military coup of 12th September 1980. Anti-Zionism was the dominant discourse that privileged rhetoric of the leaders of the Islamic party.[367] However, on 6 September 1980, the National Salvation Party protested against Israel's decision on Jerusalem, the protest called "Liberation of Jerusalem Demonstration."[368]

In the protest, Erbakan remarked in his speech that:

> *"Jerusalem is the first kibla of Muslims, no son of the nation can say it does not matter to me", "Kudüs Müslümanların ilk kıblesi… kimse Aziz milletimizin hiçbir evladı vaki son tecavüz karşısında bana ne diyemez."*[369]

The protest was not just about Jerusalem, it was an event to promote Islam, since it contained expressions and statements calling for the implementation of Sharia, through slogans like 'The atheist state surely will demolish' (Dinsiz devlet yıkılacak elbet) and 'sharia will come, oppression will end' 'Şeriat gelecek, vahşet bitecek'[370] "hocam emir bekliyoruz" "our teacher, we wait for order"[371]

The demonstration also turned to a critical event and was one of the reasons that led to the military coup of 12 September 1980 which took place after 6 days of the protest. It was the anti-nationalist behavior of the protesters in the demonstration who sat on the ground during the reciting of the national anthem. But according to Erbakan, the army used the protest as an excuse to intervene in the political affairs.[372]

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[365] Yavuz & Khan, loc.cit.
[366] Uzer, loc.cit.
[367] Rifat N. Bali, "The image of the Jew in the Rhetoric of Political Islam in Turkey", *Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien,* Vol.28 (1999), p. 2.
[368] Uzer, op.cit., p. 28.
[369] "MSP'nin Küdüsü Kurtarma Mitingi Olaysız Geçti", *Milliyet*, 07.09.1980, p. 6.
[370] Uzer, loc.cit.
[371] "MSP'nin Küdüsü Kurtarma Mitingi Olaysız Geçti, Milliyet, 07.09.1980. p.6.
[372] Uzer, loc.cit.

Turkey Downgrades its Relations with Israel

Despite of the International and Turkish pressures, Israel has not reversed its decision of annexation of East Jerusalem. Consequently, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel to a minimum level on 3 December 1980.[373] Some Turkish writers like Yavuz and Khan, claim that Turkish motives behinds downgrading of relations with Israel was to gain credibility in the Islamic world.

> *"Turkey's downgrading of relations with Israel took place during the military regime and before the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Taif in 1981. Hoping to gain internal as well as external Islamic credibility."*[374]

In fact, the Turkish decision to downgrade its relations with Israel improved the Turkish image in the Arab World, that is obvious in the comments of Arab diplomats at that time, for example, the ambassador of Algeria in Ankara 'Mahmoud Kadri' said that *"Turkey's decision in front of the world public opinion, will once more reveal the justice of Islamic countries."* And the Jordanian ambassador remarked that *"Turkey with this decision had strengthened the Islamic world"*. While the Tunisian Ambassador said: "*the Turkish Tunisian relations will be strengthened by this decision",* and the representative of PLO in Ankara said: *"this decision strengthened the fraternal relationship between the Palestinian and the Turkish people"*.[375]

4.6 TURKISH DISCOURSE ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS DURING ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN 1982

In the 1970s the Palestinian Liberal Organization was based in Beirut, during these years Lebanon witnessed civil war. The war resulted from a clash between PLO and Christian militia 'Phalangist' because the PLO was fighting of Israel using guerilla tactics from Lebanon lands, then the fight changed to be a fight over the Lebanese state and its

[373] "Türkiye israille ilişkilerti asgari düzeye indiriyor", *Milliyet*, 03.12.1980, p. 3.
[374] Yavuz & Khan, op.cit., p. 78.
[375] "MSP'nin Küdüsü Kurtarma Mitingi Olaysız Geçti, *Milliyet*, 07.09.1980, p. 6.

political system.[376] On 3 June 1982, anti-PLO militia attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in the United Kingdom, even the PLO was not responsible for the event, but Israel invaded south of Lebanon on 6 June deploying 76,000 troops and tanks. As a result, around 17,825 Lebanese and Palestinian were killed, and PLO ejected from Lebanon and moved to Tunisia where it stayed until 1991. However, the most painful incidence during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was when the former Israeli minister of defense Ariel Sharon "allowed the 'Phalangist' militia for massacring over 800 Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps Sabra and Shatila." [377]

After the invasion on 26 September, representative of Turkey Coşkon Kırca spoke in the UN general assembly and remarked that:

> *"Israel cannot be excluded from responsibility on the last massacre, Turkey voted in favor of the UN decision that condemns the Israeli invasion on the Palestinian Camps in Lebanon, and it is time for nations to take steps to solve this problem, if it became late, it will lead to more pains and instability in the region."* [378]

During invasion of Lebanon, PLO was portrayed for the Turkish people as a supporter of the Arminian terrorist groups who were operating against Turkey.[379] At that time Turkey cooperated with the Israeli security forces who captured and gave information about the Turkish and Armenian terrorist groups to the Turkish Authorities.[380] On 12 July 1982, *Milliyet* newspaper published a news about an Israeli report that revealed cooperation between PLO and two terrorist organizations in Turkey one of them 'Turk halk kurtulus ordusu'.[381] In that sense, the Israeli initiatives in stopping activities of the Armenian terrorists came in favor of Turkey, as the Turkish writer in *Milliyet* newspaper Teomo Erel indicated "during the occupation, Israel stopped the activities of the Armenians who are

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[376] Florence Gaub, "Lebanon's civil war: seven lessons forty years on, European Union Institute for Security Studies", Vol. 21 (April 2015), p. 1.
[377] Willy, 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, *Maan news agency*, 15.07.2009, http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=212235 , accessed on 13.06.2018.
[378] "İsrail, Beyrut Katliamının Sorumluluğu Dışında Tutulamaz", *Milliyet*, 26.9.1982, p. 5.
[379] Jacob Abadi, "Israel and Turkey: From Covert to Overt Relations", *Journal of Conflict Studies,* Vol.15, No.2 (1995), p. 114.
[380] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p.125.
[381] "İsraili istihbarat yetkililerine göre, FKÖ Türkiye'deki iki ayrı terör örgütüyle ilişkili", *Milliyet,*12.07.1982, p. 11.

cooperating with PLO, the thing that makes Turkey relax." [382]

4.7 ÖZAL ERA AND THE DISCOURSE ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

During Turgut Özal era (1983-1993), the pro-Palestinian discourse continued in consistence with Özalism philosophy that based on economic liberation, and discourse of 'bridge country', by which Özal meant Turkey has to appropriate the best of East and West; since it knows both of them well, its position was ideal to be active in both sides and facilitate the much-needed dialogue between them and thus rise Turkey's global prestige.[383] In that aspect, Turkey supported the Palestinians' right of Self- determination, and Özal condemned the Israeli attack on PLO headquarter in Tunisia in 1985, through which 73 Palestinian and Tunisian were killed. In the International Day of Solidarity with Palestinians on 30 November 1986, Özal emphasized that the permanent peace in the Middle East could not be achieved without recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, he believed that the Palestinians and under the leadership of PLO will get their legitimate rights. [384]

Moreover, Turkey supported the Palestinians in their intifada that inflamed in 1987 by national groups -like Unified National Command for Uprising (UNCU)- as a result of oppressive Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, such as arresting of the PLO leaders and imposing restrictions in West Bank, like closure of universities and banning a number of newspapers. Through the uprisings, the UNCU stressed the Palestinians' demand to end the occupation and their right of self-determination.[385]

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[382] "Ermeni Terörüne İsrail'in Katkısı", *Milliyet*, 18.9.1982, p. 8.
[383] Dinc & Yetim, op.cit., p. 71.
[384] "Özal'in Filistin gunu mesaji", *Milliyet*, 30.11.1986, p. 6.
[385] Jamal R Nassar, "The Culture of Resistance: the 1967 War in the Context of Palestinian Struggle", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.3 (1997), p. 90.
-Joel Beinin, Lisa Hajjar, "Palestine, Israel, and the Arab Israeli Conflict, A Primer", *Middle East for Research and Information Project (MERP)*, (February 2014), p. 10.
-Ofra Bengio, Altercating Interests and Orientations between Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel." *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No.2 (2009), p. 45.

However, there was a Turkish sympathy among liberals and Islamist public opinion for the Palestinian intifada.[386] On 23 January 1988, the consultant of Ministry of foreign affairs, Nuzhet kandemir, called the Israeli charge d'affaires Yehuda Millo, to the ministry and said that Israel must end arbitrary acts that violate the human rights of Palestinians as soon as possible.[387] After a month Turkey was involved in a peace initiative that was suggested by the president of Egypt Husni Mubarak to find a solution for the Palestinian issue. To achieve his initiative, Mubarak visited some states among them Turkey, and that was met with happiness from the Turkish leaders, which means that Turkey is considered a key state in the eye of Arab countries. On 4 February 1988, *Milliyet* newspaper reported that "to find a solution for the Palestinian issue, Turkey is shifting to the Middle East, Turkey was happy that it has been involved in the peace process in the Middle East."[388]

On 25 December 1988, Yasser Arafat visited Ankara in the time that declaration of a Palestinian state was the dominant subject of discourse in the International and Turkish mediums, Özal welcomed Arafat and expressed his support of the idea of Declaration of Palestinian state, while Arafat mentioned that UN is arranging for International conference for Peace in the Middle East and he wished that Turkey will participate in the conference. Turkey was ready to play an active role in the peace process and it showed its readiness before seven months when it participated in a conference about peace in the Middle East in Jordan.[389]

After these developments, on 15 November 1988, and by pressure from the uprising leadership in Palestine, the Palestinian National Council met in Algeria and announced the Palestinian Declaration of Independence.[390] Özal government recognized the Palestinian State immediately at the same day, while the decision met with criticisms by local and western politicians and was described as being 'quick'; some western diplomats in Ankara claimed that the decision was taken by Özal without consultation of Ministry of Foreign

[386] Hale, loc.cit., p. 125.
[387] "Israili uyardik", *Milliyet*, 23.01.1988, p. 7.
[388] "Ankara Orta Doğa Kayıyor", *Milliyet*, 04.02. 1988, p. 7.
[389] "Arafat için Ankara'da Üçlü Zirve, Filistin İçin Destek", *Milliyet*, 25.10.1988. p. 5.
[390], "Palestinian Declaration of Independence", *Middle East Web,* http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm, accessed on 04.05.2019.

Affairs. While the Minister of foreign affairs Mesut Yilmaz replied that recognition of the Palestinian state came in the context of supporting the Palestinians' right for self-determination and the decision was the decision of all Turkish people, while the Turkish government believed that it is an important step for the achievement of permanent peace in the Middle East.[391] The scholar Erkan Ertosun argues that Özal by his quick decision in recognition of the Palestinian state cut the way in front of any possible pressures that may come from the Western countries especially America and prevent Turkey from recognition of the Palestinian State.[392] Ertosun supported his claim by a statement said by Özal on the tongue of his friend Mehmet Kececiler: "if we stayed until tomorrow, they would not let us recognize the Palestinian state."[393] That is an evidence that the western powers and military elites had an effect on decision making in Turkish foreign policy before the JDP era, and the Turkish leaders were facing antagonism and conflict between Secular and Western identity and Islamic and Middle Eastern identity.

While Özal always supported the Palestinian issue, but on the other side the Turkish–Israeli relations started to improve obviously, as the Turks began to realize the importance of winning the support of the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington to overcome their problems with the US Congress. And as William Hale argues, it was obvious that under pressure from Washington, Turkey upgraded its relations with Israel in 1986 by sending a senior diplomat, Ekrem Güvendiren, to head its legation in Tel Aviv. Moreover, initiatives of peace process and PLO's acceptance of Israel's existence and the principle of a 'two state solution' in Palestine in 1988, were one of the factors that facilitated development of Turkish Israeli relations, besides to the end of the Cold War that made it more possible for Turkey to keep relations with both the Arabs and Israelis.[394]

Even Özal government defended the Palestinians' rights, but the Turkish relations with PLO in the 1990s witnessed some deterioration and tensions, because of the PLO

[391] "Dışıleri Bakanı Mesut Yılmaz, TBMMde Konuştu, Karar Turk milletinin", *Milliyet*, 17.11.1988. p. 8.
[392] Erkan Ertosun, "Özalın Orta Doğu Barışı Perspektifi", *Turgut Özal:Değişim, Dönünüşüm,* Erkan Ertosun, Erkan Demirbaş (ed.), Ankara:Turgut Özal Üniversitesi Yayınlar, 2015, p. 197.
[393] Hale Gönültaş, *Mehmet Keçeciler: Merkez Siyasetin Perde Arkası*, İstanbul: Hayykitap, 2014, p. 205. Cited in Ertosun, loc.cit.
[394] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 125.

position from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which differed from Turkey's position. As discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey supported the U.S led invasion of Iraq to liberate Kuwait in August 1990, while the PLO was against the International campaign to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, for that it was perceived as supporter of Iraq. Because of its position, PLO found itself isolated from its financial benefactors and weekend in its International relations. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia cut off the financial support that they were providing for the PLO, the thing that limited the ability of PLO to sustain the Intifada, and led it to look for other alternatives like the peace process.[395]

However, the thing that disturbed Turkey from PLO during the Gulf war, is that before the war Arafat provided a speech in January 1991 saying that: "if the United States wants to enter the war welcome, it can enter, we are together with Iraq in the war". And position of Arafat from the war against Iraq was the same as of his stance against the Turkish peace operation in Cyprus in 1974.[396] Therefore, in the 1990s the Turkish newspapers did not hesitate to publish a negative discourses about PLO, for example, and as it is shown in figure 4.7-1, *Milliyet* newspaper reflected opinions of the Arab world towards PLO as a result of its position from Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, one of the statements written in the news is: "one of Kuwaiti insurgents said: if the Palestinians did not betray us, we would be more powerful against the occupation and we would not lose Kuwait", the news also included these statements: "hundred thousands of Palestinians who are living in Gulf states are paying the cost of Arafat's error, they were deported from Qatar, and their visas and stay permits will not be renewed, in addition to cut of financial support". [397]

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[395] -Nassar, op.cit., p. 93.
-Beinin & Hajjar, op.cit., p.9.
[396] Barry Rubin, "Misperceptions and Perfect Understanding: The United States and the PLO", 18 April 2010, cited in Ertosun, op.cit., p. 64.
[397] "Kuveytlilerin 2. Duşmanı Filistinliler", *Milliyet*, 05.10.1990, p. 14.

05.10.1990, Milliyet, Sayfa 14

leri için yeni bir vatan olduğunu söylediklerini anlattılar. Şu anda Kuveyt'te bulunan toplam yabancı nüfusun yüzde 50'sinden fazlasını Filistinlilerin oluşturduğunu belirten Kuveytliler, bu toprakların gerçek sahibi olan kendilerinin kendi vatanlarında azınlıkta kaldığını söylediler.

• "FİLİSTİNLİLERİ AFFETMEYECEĞİZ"

Hâlâ ülkede yaşamaya çalışan Kuveytliler, Filistinli gençlerin daha işgalin ilk gününde şehre giren Irak tanklarının üzerlerine çıkarak, ilk vurmaları gereken önemli askeri tesislerle, bakanlıkları ve devlet dairelerini hedef gösterdiğini söylediler. Filistinlilerin ayrıca, Irak askerlerini Kuveyt Başbakanı ile diğer bakanların ikametgâhlarına götürdüklerini, gizli polis ile istihbarat örgütünün bulunduğu adreslere ve evlere baskınlar düzenlettiklerini anlattılar.

"Biz, FKÖ kurulduğundan beri Filistin davasına en büyük parasal yardımı ve siyasi desteği sağlayan Körfez ülkelerinin başında geliyoruz" diyen Kuveytliler, sözlerine "400 bin

insanlar, kucağımızda beslediğimiz yılanlarmış" şeklinde devam ettiler. Kuveytliler, kendilerini arkadan vuran Filistinlileri, Kuveyt halkının hiçbir zaman affetmeyeceğini söylediler.

Kuveyt işgalinden bu yana Irak-Filistin dayanışmasını yakından izleyen Körfez'deki askeri uzmanlarla istihbarat kuruluşları, **Ebu Nidal** ile **Ebu Abbas** gibi aşırı uçtaki radikal gerilla liderlerinin örgütlerini, Bağdat'taki karargâhlarından Kuveyt'e taşıdıklarını belirtiyorlar. Edinilen bilgilere göre, Kuveyt'e yerleşen Filistinli gençlerden oluşan binlerce gönüllünün, ülkede kurulan kamplarda eğitilmeye başlandığı belirtiliyor.

Askeri kaynaklar, **Saddam**'ın, **Ebu Nidal** ve **Ebu Abbas**'a böyle bir olanağı sağlayarak bir taşla iki kuş vurduğunu söylüyorlar. Bunlardan birincisinin, **Saddam**'ın Arap dünyası ile İsrail işgali altında yaşayan Filistinlilerin kendisine olan destek ve sempatisini pekiştirmek amacı güttüğünü, diğerinin ise Amerikalılara elinde terörizm gibi gerektiğinde başvurabileceği başka alternatiflerin de bulundu-

Hawalli ve Cabriya bölgelerinde faaliyet göstermeye başladığını kaydediyorlar. Diğer taraftan, bölgedeki gözlemciler, Kuveyt direnişçilerinin sürdürdüğü gerilla savaşına karşı Irak askerlerinin pek başarılı olamadıklarını vurgulayarak, bu yüzden **Saddam**'ın, Kuveyt'in iç güvenliği ile genel asayişinin sorumluluğunu Filistinlilere devrettiğini söylüyorlar. **Saddam**'ın aynı zamanda da her biri gerilla savaşına göre eğitilmiş olan Filistinlileri, Kuveytlilerle karşı karşıya getirmek istediğini kaydediyorlar.

• GERİLLA SAVAŞI

Körfez'deki askeri ve siyasi gözlemciler, bu gelişmeler ışığında Kuveyt'in her geçen gün daha da karmaşık bir konuma girdiğini, Amerikalıların olası bir askeri operasyonu sonunda Irak ordusunu geri çekilmek zorunda bırakabileceğini, ancak bununla sorunun hemen bitmeyeceğini söylüyorlar.

Düzenli bir savaştan sonra geri alınan Kuveyt'in iç güvenliği istikrarının

maları ve vur-kaç tiktiği şeklinde gelişecek bir gerilla savaşının içinde bulabileceklerini belirtiyorlar.

• ARAFAT, YANLIŞ ATA OYNADI

FKÖ lideri **Arafat**'ın, Körfez krizinde açıkça **Saddam**'ın yanında yer alması, Kuveyt işgalinden sonra Arap dünyası içinde yaşanan ikinci büyük şok oldu. Başta Suudi Arabistan olmak üzere, tüm Körfez ülkeleri, FKÖ'yü cezalandırmak için Filistinlilere yaptıkları mali yardımları bir anda kestiler. Bölgede yaşayan yüz binlerce Filistinlinin, biten oturma ve çalışma izinleri yinelenmezken, Katar, ülkesindeki tüm Filistin vatandaşlarını sınırdışı etti. İşgalden sonra **Yaser Arafat**, Suudi Arabistan Kralı **Fahd** ve Kuveyt Emiri Şeyh **Cabir el Sabah**'la defalarca baş başa görüşmek istedi. Ancak **Arafat**'ın bu talepleri reddedildi. Suudi Arabistan'daki üst düzey bir diplomat, **"Arafat bu defa yanlış ata oynadı ve kumarda kaybetti"** diyerek **Arafat**'ın bu hatasının bedelini yüz binlerce Filistinlinin ödemekte olduğunu söyledi.

Görüntüleyiniz Kupür / Günlük Sınırınız: 55 / 200

Figure 4.7-1 a News in Turkish Newspaper 'Milliyet' on 05.10.1990 p.14. Talks about Arab's Attitude Towards PLO's Stance for the Gulf War

4.8 ARAB ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS AND TURKISH DÉTENTE WITH ISRAEL

In 1991, the Arab-Israeli talks were initiated, followed by the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and Palestine in September 1993.[398] Turkey was one of the strongest supporters for the peace process, since it believed in the importance of the peace in achieving regional stability, besides to its importance in increasing regional economic cooperation and creating new opportunities for trade and investment. On the other hand, the Turkish leaders expected that the Israeli-Palestinian agreement will release Turkey from the heavy difficulty of balancing between its commitment to maintaining diplomatic and political ties with Israel against its efforts to show solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world in the Arab-Israel conflict. [399] In that sense, Bulent Aras and William Hale argued that Turkey did not play a central role in the peace process of the 1990s, it was more influenced by rather than being influential in these processes, the Oslo Peace agreement in 1993 is perceived as a development that was beneficial for Turkey, since it

[398] Hale, op.cit., p. 228.
[399] Sayari, op.cit., p. 50.

has created comfort atmosphere for Ankara to create relations with Israel without severing its relations with the PLO. Accordingly, a series of visits between officials of Turkey and Israel took place, ended with signing of Military Training and Cooperation agreement in February 1996 between the two countries, in addition to the signing of the Free Trade Agreement in March 1996, which was ratified by the Turkish parliament in April 1997.[400]

Not only the peace process has created the circumstances for Turkish-Israeli cooperation, but there were other security and economic incentives that influenced the Turkish detente with Israel, some writers talked about the common interests between Israel and Turkey in opposing Syria, but the more strategic incentive for Turkey for its relation with Israel is to increase its influence in Washington through securing the support of the Jewish Lobby in the US Congress to neutralize the Greek and Armenian lobbies,[401] besides approving of Turkey's western orientation following the refusal of Turkey's application for accession to the EU.[402] Moreover, Turkish relations with Israel were important in Turkish foreign policy, since the Turkish military got advantage of access to advanced weapons and intelligence in Israel which could have been blocked in western Europe or the United States because of the Kurdish issue.[403] Also, there was a perception that the security cooperation between Israel and Turkey will help Turkey in its fight against PKK, the thing that gave the agreement additional public support.[404]

Economically, the free trade agreement has benefited the two countries, as Hale stated, the annual volume of trade between the two countries grew from $407 million in 1995 to $1.4 billion in 2002. However, the latter figure only represented around 1.6 percent of Turkey's total foreign trade. Otherwise, Turkey still more dependent on trade with Arab countries, due to its imports of oil and natural gas, in addition to the importance of Arab

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[400] Aras, op.cit., p. 59.
-Hale, op.cit., p. 228.
[401] ibid.
[402] Özhan, op.cit., p. 48.
[403] Hale, loc.cit.
[404] Sayyari, op.cit., p. 49.

states as a market for Turkish light industrial products and foods. [405]

Domestically, The Turkish-Israeli military agreement was initiated with the chiefs of Turkish armed forces, and the period in which it has been signed was witnessing the absence of effective government in Turkey when the country was under a caretaker government by Tansu Çiller. Then in 1996, the coalition government headed by Necmettin Erbakan took over. At that time, Erbakan and his party strongly denounced Israel and Turkey's relations with it. Hale argued that Erbakan once appointed in office, "he bowed to military pressure by reluctantly accepting the military cooperation and free trade agreements, he also tried to steer an independent course, by keeping Israel at arm's length and supporting militant Palestinians who opposed the peace process."[406]

Coming to the relation between civil and military in Turkey during the detente with Israel, Taha Özhan explained that the alliance with Israel was formed outside civil democratic balancing and decision-making mechanisms. This is why it was also called "the treaty of the generals". "The aspect of the alliance domestic politics was that the established elites came to have existential worries about the regime and their privileges since the Kemalist assumptions of a homogenous national identity seemed increasingly more unrealistic with the end of the cold war. The military mentality that made Israel a strategic partner 'regarded the relationship with Israel above anything that the Palestinians could possibly give to Turkey'. Similarly, it was believed by the Kemalists that just like Turkey, Israel was modern and western-oriented, had an Arab "other" and was victimized by terrorism. In short, the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership had the quality of a "secular alliance", with the Islamists, pious, Arabs as its enemies".[407]

However, the Arab states and Iran criticized the agreement, and the Arab leaders asked Turkey to reconsider it.[408] *Milliyet* newspaper conveyed the perception and criticism of the Arab leaders towards the Turkish cooperation with Israel, an example was the stance

[405] Hale, op.cit., p. 228.
[406] ibid.
[407] Özhan, loc,cit.
[408] Sayari, op.cit., p. 49.

of the Lebanon President Rafik Hariri, as it came in the following news:

> *"Rafik Hariri met our friend Vahap Yazaroglu, he said I could not understand how Turkey enter military cooperation with Israel, I was surprised when I heard that, I respect Demiral as leader of state but I am disappointed with his permission for this agreement." He added, "we didn't forget Sultan Abdilhamid you also do not forget."*[409]

4.9 TURKEY'S POSITION TOWARDS II CAMP DAVID AND THE SECOND INTIFADA OF AL-AQSA

In July 2000, U.S President Bill Clinton invited Barak and Yasser Arafat to Camp David, to conclude the negotiations between Israel and PLO on the long-overdue final status agreement. The summit took place between 11- 25 July 2000, but the two parties did not reach to agreement, since Israel confirmed that it will not withdraw from lands occupied in 1967, and insisted on its sovereignty over East Jerusalem, besides to increased settlements and its refusal to accept any legal or moral responsibility towards the Palestinian refugee problem. On the other side, the Palestinians insisted on Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands in 1967, referring to the UN security council resolution 242, in addition to the recognition of an independent state in these lands, thus, the Camp David talks failed to reach an overdue agreement between Israel and Palestine.[410]

However, Ankara didn't take a role in the negotiations and process meetings of II Camp David, and that back to two reasons, the first reason is that the Camp David peace process was initiated by the United States with the desire of Washington to lead it alone. Second, there was no demand neither from Israel nor from Palestine, from Turkey to mediate in the peace process.[411]

After not getting the expected results from Camp David, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on 26 July 2000, remarking that:

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[409] "Lübnan Başkanı Refik Hariri'yle Görüştü", *Milliyet,* 29.04.1996, p. 1.
[410] Beinin and Hajjar, op.cit., p. 11.
[411] Ertosun, op.cit., p. 240.

"Turkey regrets that the Camp David Summit which started on 11th July 2000 by the mediation of the President Bill Clinton and with the participation of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the leader of the Palestinian National Authority Yasser Arafat ended without an agreement satisfactory for both sides….Turkey considers the Middle East Peace Process as an opportunity to establish a durable and just peace in the region and welcomes the developments towards this goal. Turkey does not want the Peace Process to be delayed and wishes the process to reach a conclusion by constructive steps to be taken in the future. With this understanding Turkey desires that the parties resume their negotiations as soon as possible and solve their disputes in a peaceful manner." [412]

On 6 August 2000, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat visited Ankara and met the Turkish president Necdet Sezer, and the prime minister Bulent Ecevit in addition to the 9th president Suleyman Demirel. During the visit, Arafat asked Turkey to play a more active role in the peace process, especially in solving problem of Jerusalem, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs Ismail Cem, said that "when talking about Jerusalem we are a nation that has a responsibility over different religious people who lived together, we think that it is additional responsibility for Turkey to compromise between sides."[413]

Arafat asked Turkey to play a more active role in peace process, but Israel did not have the same desire, for example, when Israel knew that Yasser Arafat is visiting Turkey, it sent letter to Ankara through its consulate reminding them with results of Camp David and asserting that the U.S will stay the single mediator in peace process. Moreover, after visit of Yasser Arafat to Ankara, Israel sent Minister of public security Sholom Ben Ami, who also provided information and explanation about failing of Camp David. So and as one senior in the Turkish government indicated, the Turkish role in peace process was just a facilitator, to make the peace process easier and to approach the views of the two sides and eliminate the untrusty and misunderstanding between them. [414]

After the failure of Camp David talks, and within a weather full of sentiment among the Palestinian people who were living daily frustration and humiliation, on 28 September 2000, Sharon then the leader of the Israeli opposition Likud and the candidate for prime

[412] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Concerning the Camp David Summit", 26.07. 2000.
[413] "İsraili İkna Edin", *Milliyet,* 06.08.2000, p. 22.
[414] "Turkiyenin rolü kolaylaştırıcı", *Milliyet,* 10.08.2000, p. 07.

minister entered Al-Aqsa Mosque along with 1000 Israeli policemen.[415] The visit created large anger among Palestinians and triggered large Palestinian protests in Jerusalem, Israel responded by killing seven of protesters in Jerusalem, the thing that led to spread of protests in Gaza and West Bank, Israel continued using of force against unarmed Palestinian demonstrators, then the Israeli attack expanded to using of tanks and helicopters and F-16 fighter planes, the thing that inflamed the second Intifada, which was bloodier than the first Intifada, since Israel shot 1 million live bullets at the unarmed Palestinian protestors killing more than 350 Palestinian. Different International human rights organizations in addition to UN Security Council condemned the Israeli use of violence, and on 20 October the UN General Assembly approved a resolution condemning Israel. Israel, the US, and four Polynesian island nations voted with no, and a third of the assembly refrained. [416]

During the Second Intifada, Turkey stood beside the Palestinians, it has supported the mentioned UN General Assembly decision,[417] and on 26 October 2000, Ahmet Necdet Sezer in a speech in the Committee for Economic and Permanent Cooperation of Organization of Islamic Conference - ISEDAK, said:

> *"Sorumsuz kimi kışkırtmaların ardından, İslamiyet'in en kutsal yerlerinde biri olan Harem-i Şerifte 28 Eylülde Cuma namazından sonra, Filistinli kardeşlerimize karşı girişilen şiddet hareketleri İslam dünyasını derinden yaralamıştır. Her ne düşünceyle olursa olsun, kutsal yerlerde şiddete başvurulması, silah kullanılması kabul edilemez. bu elim olaydan sonra çatışmalar dalga dalga yayılmış, İsrail kuvvetlerinin aşırı güç kullanımı ne yazık ki pek çok can kaybına yol açmıştır".*[418]
>
> *"The violence movements resulted from irresponsible incitement, against our Palestinian prayers that took place after pray of Friday on 28 September in Harem-i Sharif, which is one of the most holy places of Islam, have deeply wounded the Islamic world. In any case, the use of violence and the use of weapons in holy places is unacceptable. After this*

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[415] Jeremy Pressmen, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol.23, No.2 (February 2006), p. 120.
[416] Beinin and Hajjar, op.cit., p. 11.
[417] Ertosun, op.cit., p. 243.
[418] Sezer: Kutsal yerlerde şiddet kabul edilemez, *Hurriyet*, 26.10.2000. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/sezer-kutsal-yerlerde-siddet-kabul-edilemez-39192874 accessed on 27 May 2019.

elimination, the conflicts spread, and the excessive use of force by the Israeli forces led to many casualties."[419]

4.10 HEGEMONY AND ANTAGONISM IN DISCOURSE OF 'GENOCIDE' AGAINST ISRAELI PRACTICES TOWARDS PALESTINIANS IN 2002.

After the second Intifada, Israel continued its oppressive practices towards the Palestinians, like the assassination of the Palestinian leaders, and closing the roads. Consequently, different Palestinian movements like Hamas and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine replied by conducting a series of suicide attacks killing more than 300 Israeli from the beginning of 2000 until the end of March 2002. On 27 March one Palestinian exploded himself inside a Hotel killing 30 Israeli. After the operation, Sharon gave the green light for a military operation known by 'Defensive Shield', which began on 29 March by Israeli invasion of the main Palestinian cities like Ramallah and Jenin, entering and seizing the headquarters of Palestinian Authority and arresting over 8500 Palestinians who were believed to be involved in suicide against Israel, in addition to killing more than 497 and injuring 1447 Palestinian from beginning of March until May 2002.[420] Then on 21 September 2002, the Israeli tanks surrounded the Palestinian president Yasser Arafat in his compound in Ramallah, some bodyguards surrendered but Arafat refused to leave his office saying that: "I shall either be a martyr or a martyr or a martyr…. I will not surrender".[421]

The Israeli practices towards the Palestinians specially the invasion of Jenin Camp in April 2002, created a big sentiment among the Turkish people, as Bulent Aras clarified, "there were widespread protests against Israeli expansion and violence in the Palestinian

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[419] ibid, translated.

[420] "History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *Pros and Cons Current Issues*, 22.07.2015, https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000031 accessed on 27.05. 2019.

[421] "Israeli Tanks Trap Arafat in Office", *The Guardian*, 21.09.2002, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/21/israel, accessed on 27.05.2019.

lands in March and April 2002. Different segments of the Turkish society, joined their hands and hearts for extending support to the Palestinians, in addition to the leaders of three religious traditions: Islamic, Christian and Jewish in Turkey who have jointly released a declaration entitled "Istanbul call for peace" and demanded an immediate end to the violence, which cannot be accepted by any religious tradition."[422]

During this period, many demonstrations were organized by the Turkish NGOs against Israeli actions. NGO members during these demonstrations carried banners and shouted: "Murderer Sharon, Go away from Palestine", "Murderer U.S., Murderer Israel."[423] Moreover, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey witnessed big discussions about the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, for example, a member of the 'True Path Party' Mehmet Saglam called Turkey to a take step against Israeli siege on Arafat. While representative of the 'National Salvation Party' Temel Karamollaoglu asked to call back the Israeli foreign de affairs', and to suspend the military agreements. The JDP member in the parliament Bulent Arınç criticized Israel, saying: "how we accuse Hitler by acting Holocaust, today we must see how Hitler and Sharon came together".[424] In addition to the comments of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the chairman of the newly founded Justice and Development Party, saying that: "Sharon government is in fact moving towards a state terrorism."[425]

However, the most Turkish criticism that disturbed Israel was remarks of the Turkish prime minister Bulent Ecevit on 4 April 2002 describing Israel as carrying out "genocide" against the Palestinians.[426] The speech of Ecevit was:

> *"Yalnız Arafat değil, tümüyle Filistin devleti adım adım yok edilmektedir. Filistin halkına karşı, dünyanın gözleri önünde soykırım uygulanmaktadır"* [427]

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[422] Aras, op.cit., p.120
[423] Özlem Tür, "Turkey and Israel in the 2000s—From Cooperation to Conflict", *Israel Studies* Vol.17, No.3 (2012), p. 53.
[424] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 02.04.2002, Birlesim: 81, Oturum: 1 ss:30 cited in (Tür, op.cit.) and (Ertosun, *Filistin Politikamız*, p. 246).
[425] Tür, loc.cit.
[426] Erkan Ertosun, "Türkiye'nin Filistin Politikası (1979-2009)", Doktora Tezi, 2012, p. 246.
- Tür, loc.cit.

"Not only Arafat but the entire Palestinian state is being eliminated. It is genocide against the Palestinian people in front the eyes of the world".[428]

As a response, the consultant of the Israeli minister of foreign affairs, in a meeting with *Hurriyet* in Jerusalem, said:

> *"The words of Mr. Ecevit may damage relations between the two countries that have strategic relations. Israel, who does not recognize the word "genocide" against Turkey and stayed beside Ankara in regard of this subject in USA, is very sensitive to this word due to what it had lived in the World War II".* [429]

To reduce the Israeli anger, in the immediate aftermath, Ecevit explained that the word "massacre" was mistakenly used in his speech,[430] and in a later speech he justified his criticism of Israel with the following words:

> *"I have been concerned about the grave consequences of events in the Middle East. My words reflect the worries of our country and our region from the last developments… We give much importance to our relations with Israel. I do not mean the people of Israel in recent days, However, reactions came from all over the world to the stance of the present Israeli government, and showing my sensitivity in this issue, may have caused the susceptibility."*[431]

Theoretically, Ecevit's criticism of the Israeli practices using word of 'Genocide' and then the withdrawal of his word in order not to create tensions between Turkey and Israel, is an evidence on our assumption that the Turkish discourse towards the Palestinian issue is affected by states' identity, and before JDP era, pro-Western identity was the dominant identity that affects the discourse of the Turkish leaders. In their theory of hegemony in discourse, Laclau and Mouffee argue that when discourses collide, antagonism occurs, and this antagonism can be dissolved through hegemonic interventions, which are called articulation. In that sense, term of hegemony or discourse means a fixation of elements in moments, and hegemonic intervention achieves this

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[427] "İsrail soykırım yapıyor", *Radikal*, 05.04.2002. http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/israil-soykirim-yapiyor 628905/ accessed on 22.04.2018
[428] ibid, translated.
[429] "İsrail ile 'soykırım' krizi", *Hurriyet*, 06.04.2002, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/israil-ile-soykirim-krizi-64051 , accessed on 22.04.2018
[430] Bulent Aras, *Turkey and the Greater Middle East* , Istanbul: TASAM Publications, 2004, p.121.
[431] "İsrail ile Soykırım Krizi", *Hurriyet*, 06.04.2002, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/israil-ile-soykirim-krizi-64051, accessed on 22.04.2018.

fixation across discourses that collide antagonistically. One discourse is undermined from the discursive field from which another discourse overpowers it, and in case of Ecevit's discourse, the anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian discourse collided with pro-Western discourse, and the pro-Eastern identity was oppressed through a hegemonic intervention in favor of the pro-Western identity. Discourse of genocide was re-articulated and dissolved when the Prime minister mentioned that he did not intend to accuse Israel and reversed from his speech, so the discourse of 'genocide' was not fixed or dominated, thus the relations between the two states was not affected negatively.[432]

[432] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p. 48.

5. FIFTH CHAPTER

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST IN JDP ERA

When the JDP came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy witnessed critical changes either in its vision or direction. JDP leaders who based on Islamic and socially conservative identity with liberal thought of economy adopted new principles upon which Middle East started to occupy a central place in Turkish foreign policy.[433] Scholars and Turkey-watchers used different terminologies to describe the change in directions of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, some writers used the concept of 'neo-Ottomanism', others called it with the 're-Islamization of Turkey', while others defined it with the 'Middle Easternization of Turkey'.[434] This chapter will discuss the new principles that were adopted in JDP era, in addition to discourse and nodal points of Turkish foreign policy towards Middle East, supported with events and discursive practices that consider signs and evidence on Turkish openness towards Middle East. Moreover, this chapter talks about the Turkish position towards Arab uprisings, and explains how the Turkish foreign policy has followed new principles to adapt with the changes that occurred in the region.

5.1 PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE JDP ERA

In the first decade of JDP government, the new Turkish foreign policy vision and its normative strategy, derived from Strategic Depth'-the work of Minister of Foreign Affairs and then the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu- through which he introduced and explained five new principles: balance between security and freedom; zero problems with neighbors; central state; multi-dimensional and multi-track policies, in addition to the new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility and rhythmic diplomacy.[435] However, the developments in Arab region as a result of Arab uprisings, led Turkey to follow a policy that affected on its relations with the neighbor countries and increased its enemies in the region, the thing that created debates around the efficiency of Zero problem policy, and led the policymakers to adopt a new principle of foreign policy aimed to increase friends and decrease enemies, which was suggested by the new Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. In addition to the principle of 'smart power', which most describe the Turkish policy towards the Syrian civil

[433] Dinç & Yetim, "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East", p. 71.
[434] Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges", p. 104.
[435] ibid, p. 103.

war, as it will be explained later in this section.

The first principle to be explained is '**keeping balance between security and freedoms'**. This principle aims to enlarge freedoms without sacrificing security needs, since after the 11 September events security became a priority issue in most of the world countries.[436] In that context, Turkey achieved a balance between security and freedoms through integrating the European norms into its domestic structure. Turkey also tried to improve its democratic credentials by modifying its laws.[437] For example, while Turkey was fighting against PKK terrorism, it expanded individual freedoms by giving the Kurdish people rights to get education in their mother language.[438]

Ibrahim Kalın argues that the principle of balancing between security and freedom, based on the idea that security without freedom leads to authoritarianism, and freedom without security leads to chaos and instability. Kalın gave an example on how securitization of domestic social and political issues like the Kurdish problem, Alawites and freedom of religion in Turkey during the Cold War have limited the Turkish ability to defend democracy and political freedoms. Domestically, these issues were perceived as a threat on the national security, and regionally, neighbor countries like Russia, Syria, Iran and Armenia were seen as enemies. While after the Cold War those domestic and regional issues are no longer perceived as threat on national security. And the countries who were on the list of enemies became partners in establishing a more stable regime at a home that defends fundamental freedoms. [439]

The second principle is **"Multi-dimensional policy"**, which means that Turkey's relations with different actors are complementary, and considered part of consistence policy. For example, Turkey has relations with the US, and is a member in NATO, at the

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[436] Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision:an assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey,* Vol.10, No.1 (2008), p. 9.
[437] Mehmet Şahin, and Buğra Sarı. "Turkey in the Syrian Crisis: The Limits of a Middle Power Foreign Policy." *Ortadoğu Etütleri (ORSAM)*, Vol.8, No.1, p. 12.
[438] Sözen, loc.cit.
[439] Ibrahim Kalın, "Turkish foreign policy: Framework, values, and mechanisms", *International Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 1, (December 2011), p. 15.

same time it is going in the process of accessing to the EU, in addition to its relations with Balkan and Caucasus and Middle East, all of these relations do not contradict with each other, in contrast it complete each other.[440] So, multi-dimensional foreign policy means that Turkey is not only keeping relations with its traditional allies like US and Europe, but it also keeps good relations with neighbor countries such as Russia, Iran, Central Asia and Caucasus. Turkey also is interested to establish relations with the emerging global powers such as China and India in order to balance its political and economic relations with the West.[441]

As Ahmet Sözen mentioned in his macro systemic analysis for Turkish foreign policy, "during the cold war, the Turkish foreign policy was shaped by security preferences of NATO, and was described with mono-dimensional or mono track policy. Its main concern was security which was led by the state. After the end of the cold war the international system became more dynamic and diversified. According to change in the international system, Turkey has changed its policy from mono-dimensional to multi-dimensional, its international relations was expanded in terms of trade, economic and culture"[442]. This principle also included engagement all political actors and non-state actors in difficult political environment, which considered by Ibrahim Kalın as an instrument to achieve other main principles like political justice and equality, keep balance between security and freedom, in addition to the trade and economic integration.[443] The involvement of non-state actors like powerful Turkish individuals and NGOs in the foreign affairs was beneficial for Turkish foreign policy. Some of these NGOs were like TUSIAD, which played a role in lobbying for accession of Turkey to the European Union, and the business enterprises like KOC that opened a branch in Central Asia. All these actors became ambassadors of Turkey abroad, which play a role in strengthening relations with regional

[440] Davutoglu, op.cit., p. 82.
[441] Hüseyin Işıksal, "Turkish Foreign Policy during the AKP Era", *Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millinium*, Hüseyin Işıksal, Ozan Örmeci (eds.), New York: Peter Lang Edition, 2015, p. 18.
[442] Sözen, op.cit., p. 117.
[443] Kalın, op.cit., p.17.

and global countries. [444]

The third principle is **'Central State'**. This principle was explained by Davutoglu who argued that Turkey due to its geographic location, its size and history had to be a central state that has an influence in multiple regions including the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus.[445] Turkey should not defend itself as a bridge between regions, especially between the Islamic world and the West, but it must have its own influence in these regions.[446] And does not have to play the role of presenting western values in its relation with the East and not to represent the negative Eastern attitudes in its relations with the West. It also must not be a transmission between West and East, but to be a country that can build a system due to its ability to maneuver multilaterally, it can use history, culture, and religion in the transformation of international system and building regional and global system. In other meaning, it is seen from a geopolitical not geographical perspective.[447]

The fourth principle is '**Smart Power'**, which means using soft power with hard power. Soft power is an approach of foreign policy in which countries use its economic power in establishing regional economic links and dependencies to help in securing greater regional stability.[448] While hard power is using the military power for the national security of the state.

Soft power was adopted before by Turgut Özal during his presidential period from 1989 to 1993, when he adopted the classic liberal concept that growing economic inter-dependencies between states would generate better political relations.[449] Later, in the first decade of JDP era, and before the Arab Spring, Turkey used soft power policy in the countries of the Middle East, to create mutual dependencies with countries of the region based on its principle of cultural and historical connections with the region. Through its

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[444] Sözen, op.cit., p. 117.
[445] Davutoglu, op.cit., p. 79.
[446] Işıksal, op.cit. p. 18.
[447] Murat Yeşiltaş, and Ali Balcı, "A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map", *SAM Center for Strategic Research*, No. 7 (May 2014), p. 8-9.
[448] Hale, op.cit., p. 151.
[449] ibid.

policy of soft power, Turkey was able to convince other countries to follow fair rational and pervasive policies rather than using the hard power.[450]

However, with the complication of the situation in neighboring countries in consequence of Arab uprising, Turkey found itself forced to use military power for its national security, like what has happened in case of civil war in Syria, when Turkey intervened militarily to fight the PKK. This approach is called by Turkish intellectuals Smart Power, in which according to its national interest, the country decided to use soft or military power.[451]

The fifth principle is **'Proactive Diplomacy'** which is a kind of diplomacy through which Turkey aims to take initiative in resolving all crises in its neighborhood and to develop good relations with other countries. Being one of the main principles of foreign policy in the JDP era, proactive diplomacy was accompanied by the concept of pre-emptive diplomacy. According to this latter concept, Turkey needs to adopt a foreign policy perspective that aims to prevent problems from occurring, primarily in its close geographical region, or to take a leading role in their resolution through the use of diplomatic channels before any military intervention. So as Davutoglu indicated through this policy Turkey intervenes in regional issues using International platforms and hence creates order and security in the region.[452]

The most practical results of this concept in foreign policy can be seen in Turkey's desire to mediate in the Arab-Israeli, Syrian-Israeli, Iranian -Western and Bosnian-Serbian conflicts. According to this foreign policy principle, Turkey's foreign policy can be realized not only among nation-states but also among actors and groups within the state in order to prevent crises or resolve existing ones, Turkey's attempts to make peace between Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq, and facilitating the participation of Iraqi Sunni groups in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and the policy pursued by Turkey before the 2003 war in Iraq in

[450] Yeşiltaş & Balcı, op.cit., p. 10.
[451] Tayyar Arı, *Interview*, Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 02.04. 2018.
[452] Davutoglu, op.cit., p. 83.

order to minimize its effects on the region, are clear evidence on this policy.[453]

Turkey's neighbors expected from Turkey an active involvement in the management of International conflicts because of its multiple identities, historical location, and cultural relations. These characteristics give Turkey the capability and responsibility to follow a rhythmic and proactive foreign policy and to contribute in the conflict resolution and achieving international peace and security.[454]

There is an additional principle discussed by Ibrahim Kalın, which is **the principle of Justice**, that was adopted by Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, the Balkans and other neighboring countries, it also was discussed in the framework of reforming some International organizations like the United Nations. For example, when Turkey defends the Palestinian issue, it argues that it is the responsibility of the international community to bring political justice to the people who are under the occupation.[455]

Turkey followed the previous principles in the first decade of the JDP government. However, after the Arab uprising, new challenges and regional issues emerged and contributed in shaping a new balance of power in the regional and international arena over the affected region of Middle East; great powers that were shaping the multipolar system in the cold war returned to find its allies in the Middle East. As a result of these changes Turkey's relations with some neighbors and countries of the region were affected negatively, such as its relations with Egypt and Russia, in addition to its relations with Israel that were deteriorated before Arab uprising as a result of crisis emerged due to Palestinian issue like the law chair crisis, Davos crisis and Mavi Marmara issue. In the context of these developments, Turkey reevaluated its principles of foreign policy that were adopted in the first decade of JDP era. And when the new prime minister Binali Yildirim

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[453] Yeşiltaş & Balcı, op.cit., p. 12,17.
- Meliha Altunışık, "The AKP'S Middle East Policy: Amidst Domestic and Regional Challenges", *The Uncertain Path of the 'New Turkey'*, Valeria Talbot (ed.), Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2015, p. 67.
[454] Işıksal, op.cit., p. 20.
[455] Kalın, op.cit., p. 11.

came to office, he declared the new principle in Turkish foreign policy which aims to reduce enemies and increase friends, as well, he defended the efficiency of this policy in restoring ties with countries like Egypt, Russia and Israel. That is clear in a speech for him in a meeting with the lawmakers of the JDP:

> *"Turkey has a lot of problems. We have regional problems. The conflicts taking place in our region and the EU, Cyprus, Caucasus increase the importance of our country in our region. We are aware of it. So what will we do? Very simple: We'll increase the number of our friends and we'll decrease the number of our enemies."*[456]

Nodal Points of Turkish Foreign Policy

We can summarize the nodal points of Turkish foreign policy and how some of them were deleted and others were added through the following graph.



Figure 5.1-1 Nodal points of Turkish Foreign Policy in JDP Era

[456] "New PM signals shift in foreign policy: More friends than enemies", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 24.05.2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-pm-signals-shift-in-foreign-policy-more-friends-than-enemies.aspx?pageID=238&nID=99616&NewsCatID=338, accessed on 03.11.2017.

5.2 TURKEY'S OPENNESS TO MIDDLE EAST AND SIGNS OF THAT POLICY

Since the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey, Turkish military and bureaucrat elites believed that just building relations with the West, and adopting western values and secularization is their only way for modernization and increasing prospects of becoming part of the European Community, for that they paid less attention for the Islamic values and they were not interested to build relations with Middle Eastern countries.[457] However, when JDP came to power, the discourse about Islam and Arab World changed positively, and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East became a first priority of the Turkish foreign policy, since the stability of the region contributes to Turkey's own stability and improving economic opportunities, which in turn lead to increasing of the Turkish influence in the region.[458] Some Turkish writers like Jung and Altunışık argued that the government's policy towards the Middle East stemmed from the policies of the JDP, and its political struggle against the Kemalist establishment. Using of soft power and zero problems, as well as diplomatic and economic tools, and the desecuritization of Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East, is interpreted as a strategy to achieve one of the JDP's domestic objectives, mainly to limit the role and influence of the military on domestic and international politics.[459] The American and Turkish writers in the New York Times, Charles Kubchan and Soli Özal emphasized this idea remarking that:

> *"Indeed, Erdogan has undermined the political strength of Turkey's traditional power base: the business elite and the military. The Turkish military has long had strong ties to Israel's security establishment, meaning that its diminished domestic influence has weakened one of the main institutional linkages between Turkey and Israel."*[460]

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[457] Tarik Oğuzlu "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.9, No.1 (2008), cited in (Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs", 1999, p. 13.

[458] Altunışık, op.cit., p. 68.

[459] Dietrich Jung, "The domestic context of new activism in Turkish foreign policy: Does religion matter?" *International Journal* , Vol: 67, No.1 (2011), p. 25.

- Altunışık, loc.cit.

[460] Soli Ozel and Charles A. Kubchan, "A Turkey-Israel Opening", *New York Times*, 01. 04. 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/opinion/global/a-turkey-israel-opening.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FErdogan%2C%20Recep%20Tayyip&action=click&contentC

Nevertheless, a group of events and issues took place in the JDP era, and considered signs of independence of the Turkish foreign policy from the West, and evidence on change in Turkish foreign policy from traditional principles of Westernization and non-involvement to Middle Easternization and involvement in regional issues. Some of these events were initiated by the Turkish leaders and already planned in their agenda, while other events were not expected and formed opportunities for the leaders of the party to play a significant role in the region. These events as explained by Taha Özhan and other Turkish writers are: Turkish refusal to participate in the occupation of Iraq; visit of Hamas to Turkey; Turkish initiative as a mediator between Syria and Israel; the deterioration of relations with Israel; Tehran Treaty and voting against the embargo on Iran in the UN security council; development of Turkish Sudanese relations, in addition to proactive position of Turkey towards Arab Uprisings.[461]

5.2.1 Turkish Position from US Occupation of Iraq

On 19 March 2003, US missiles struck Iraq in an attempted assassination strike against Saddam Hussein. After that, the American president George Bush declared that the US was in a war with Iraq, spreading more than 380,000 US military troops in the Persian Gulf. Within 25 days US invaded all major cities in Iraq and US Bush declared that the mission accomplished successfully.[462] US justified its invasion of Iraq in the framework of Bush doctrine and national security strategy of 'war on terrorism' which was planned in response of 9/11 attacks, and depends on the policy of 'preventive war' rather than containment policy.[463] In fact, the real reason behind US invasion of Iraq was securing the

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ollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=search&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=collection accessed on 03.07.2019.

[461] Taha Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order: From Foreign Relations to Foreign Policy,* Ankara: Okurakademi, 2015, p. 23.
-Sözen, op.cit., p. 117.
-Altunışık, op.cit., p. 69.

[462] Timothy Andrews Sayle, "US War in Iraq Since 2003", *Oxford Research Encyclopedia, American History,* (March 2019), p. 7.
https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-723?print=pdf accessed on 03.07.2019.

[463] Raymond Hinnebusch, "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences, *Perceptions*, (Spring 2007), p. 9.

American national and strategic interests in the region through its protectorate oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, but 11/9 attacks were the events that supported the US to maintain its interests, in that domain, US claimed that there were weapons of mass destructions in Iraq which were used to support terrorists.[464]

Before invasion of Iraq, the Turkish position was toward solving the problem peacefully and defended that Iraq must comply to UN. Turkey also did not agree for using of power against Iraq without UN resolution. At that time, Turkey conveyed to US who planned to invade Iraq from the north and south, that any decision in regard to supporting the US by using the Turkish lands will first be on basis of international legitimacy, and if Turkey decided to support US, its support will be limited according to a specific conditions.[465] In December 2002, US administration asked Turkey to allow it to deploy 62,000 of American troops in the Turkish lands in return of giving the Turkish government 26 billion US Dollar and allowing it to follow US troops into Iraq to help in the stabilization of north of Iraq and avoid the rise of a Kurdish state.[466]

However, on 1 March 2003, the Turkish parliament refused the bill that was suggested by the Turkish government in regard to **"giving the government authorization for sending the Turkish military forces to foreign countries and the existence of foreign military forces in Turkey".** The bill foresaw to permit the presence of 62,000 of foreign military personnel in Turkey for 6 months, and the foreign air forces must not exceed 255 aircraft and 65 helicopters. According to the memorandum, the foreign combatant forces as soon as they are deployed in the region, they would be transmitted outside Turkey.[467]

Tayyar Ari and Meltem Muftuler-Bac explained the Turkish position towards the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and why it differs from its position towards the Gulf War of 1991.

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[464] Tayyar Arı, *Yükselen Güç, Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu*, Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık, 2010, p. 61.
[465] ibid.
[466] Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey and the United States: The Impact of the War in Iraq", *International Journal,* Vol. 61, No.1 (Winter, 2005/2006), p. 69.
[467] Arı, loc.cit.

According to them, the bargaining position of the new government of JDP in 2003 was based on Turkey's experience during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Turkey was deceived by verbal commitments in the 1991 Gulf crisis, and after the war it never received economic compensation as it was promised in return of its closing the main oil pipelines 'kerkuk-yumurtalik' on Iraq. Moreover, the Turkish losses for the war as a result of the embargo on Iraq and the UN sanctions were estimated to have been in the range of 40 to 100 billion dollars annually.[468] On the other hand, the unconcerned attitude of the American Administration towards issues like PKK that emerged as a result of the authority gap in Iraq led the civil and military bureaucracy in Turkey to think twice since the cost of a mistake this time could be much heavier. [469]

Furthermore, after the 1990 Gulf war, Turkey's image deteriorated in the Islamic world and was perceived as American gendarme, so Turkey did not want to face a financial and political invoice that could not afford or handle, by giving again blind support for US policies in the region. In other words, as Tayyar Ari expressed it 'as the Turkish politicians burned their mouths with milk, they preferred to drink yogurt blowing on it'.[470]

The Turkish public opinion had a big effect on the decision of the Turkish government to reject the bill.[471] When the proposal of the bill was suggested, hundreds of thousands of protesters protested in Ankara. Public opinion polls showed that more than 90 percent of the Turkish people opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq.[472] Meltem Muftuler pointed that "When the US requested access to the military bases in Turkey, and counted upon bringing a force of 62,000, to Turkey for the invasion of Iraq, the possible deployment of such a large military force alarmed the Turkish public, the Turkish public was further alarmed when the US asked to access the civilian airports in various parts of Turkey, for the

[468] Müftüler-Bac, loc.cit.
[469] Arı, op.cit., p. 63.
[470] ibid, p. 61.
[471] ibid.
[472] ibid.

staging of air campaign in Istanbul, the public was concerned that the war zone would include Turkey if the civilian airports were allocated to US military use".[473]

Cameron Brown pointed out that there were two factors affected the Turkish decision not to participate in the occupation, which are identity and legitimation.[474]

> *"In terms of identity, over the past several years, many Turkish citizens have begun to more closely identify with Islam and the Muslim world. Not that this sentiment was non-existent before. Even in 1990–91, a significant proportion of those who opposed allying with the United States felt that Islamic solidarity required not siding with non-Muslims against a fellow Muslim country."*[475]

From legitimacy aspect, occupation of Iraq in 2003, differ from the Gulf war of 1990, since the American-led coalition was not fighting to reject an invasion of one sovereign state by another, on the contrary in 2003 it was the coalition that did the invasion.[476]

Taha Özhan indicated that the Turkish stance against USA, and its refusal to participate in the occupation, was the first confrontation between Turkey and the USA since the Cyprus operation in 1974. That event also has contributed to build the new image about Turkey in the West, especially U.S administration who already before the occupation has criticized the JDP as political Islamist party, in the aftermath of 9/11 events.[477]

5.2.2 Visit of Hamas to Ankara

One of the serious reflections of paradigm shift in the Turkish Foreign Policy towards Middle East during the JDP era, was JDP government's recognition of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine 'Hamas', as a legitimate political party, after its winning

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[473] Müftüler-Bac, loc.cit.
[474] Cameron S. Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, No.1 (2007), p. 86.
[475] ibid.
[476] ibid, p. 109.
[477] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 24.

in the Palestinian legislative elections on 25 January 2006, with 74 seats of the 132 seats, while the ruling Fatah won just 45 seats.[478]

After the elections with one day, the Turkish prime minister Erdogan remarked that the International community must respect the decision of the Palestinian people, indicating that the Islamic JDP in Turkey came to power through free elections, and that consider a model for coming of Hamas to power in Palestine.[479] However, after a month from winning of Hamas in the elections, Erdogan offered to act as a mediator between the new Palestinian Administration and Israel.[480] In that context, Erdogan invited the leader of Hamas Khaled Meshal to visit Ankara, Hamas accepted the invitation and it was the first visit of Hamas for non-Arab Muslim countries.

The news about visit of Hamas to Turkey met with sharp criticism from the West, particularly the European Union and the United States in addition to Israel. Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for the Israeli government told to a private Turkish news channel: "It is a serious mistake; this visit could have serious consequences for our links that could be hard to repair."[481]

The opposition parties in Turkey like CHP also criticized the visit and claimed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sidelined and the foreign policy has gone into inconsistency through private contacts.[482]

On the other hand, the Islamic countries supported and encouraged visit of Hamas to

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[478] Ishtiyaq Hossein and Bilal Shobaki, "Hamas in power: a Study of it Ideology and Policies", *Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas: Studies of Thought and Experience*, Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (ed.), Beirut: Al-zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2017, p.60.

[479] Soner Cagaptay, "Hamas Visit Ankara", *Washington Institution*, 16 Feb 2006, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-visits-ankara-the-akp-shifts-turkeys-role-in-the-middle-east>.

[480] "Hamas Leader in Surprise Turkey Visit", *Al-Jazeera*, 16.02.2006 https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/02/200849161241248931.html , accessed on 13.07.2018.

[481] ibid.

[482] Özhan, op.cit., p. 39.

Ankara. In the Economic Forum of Islamic Countries hold in Jedda-Saudi Arabia on 10-13 February -and by attendance of the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, and his consultant in foreign affairs Davutoglu and the Turkish Foreign Minister Gul- the representatives of the Islamic countries evaluated winning of Hamas in the elections indicating that the first visit of Hamas to world countries must be to Turkey.[483]

Moreover, the pro-Islamic newspapers like *Yeni Safak* and the center-right daily *Sabah* perceived visit of Hamas as a Turkish attempt to mediate in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. For example, a writer in *Yeni Safak* 'Hakan Albayrak' asked Ankara to "put pressure on Israel to force it to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip instead of urging Hamas to renounce violence, cooperate with Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority, and recognize Israel."[484]

In that atmosphere which was full of debates either criticizes or supports, a delegation of Hamas with its leader Khaled Mishaal visited Ankara on 16 February 2006, but after they arrived, the office of the prime minister Erdogan announced that there would be no meeting.[485] In that regards *Sabah* newspaper reported that: "the prime minister Erdogan canceled the meeting with the delegation of Hamas in response to the criticisms from EU, USA, and Israel. Instead, they met with the consultant assistant for foreign affairs 'Ahmet Uzumcu', assistant of general manager of Middle East Bozkurt Aran, and other officials who conveyed to Hamas the following points: to end violence, to leave the weapon, to be honest in quartet road map and to recognize Israel, then they went to headquarter of JDP, where they met with the minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gul and the consultant of the prime minister Davutoglu". [486]

Ozhan clarified that Ankara aimed from this visit to keep the channels for

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[483] "Meşal önce Ankara'ya sonra Tahran'a gitmeli", *Yenişafak*, 19.02.2006, https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/mesal-once-ankaraya-sonra-tahrana-gitmeli-2719129 accessed on 20.10.2018.

[484] Ely Karmon and Michael Barak, "Erdogan's Turkey and the Palestinian Issue", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol.12, No.2 (April, 2018), p. 76.

[485] "Turkey Allows Hamas Visit", *Los Angeles Times*, 17.02.2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/17/world/fg-hamas17 , accessed on 25.05.2018

[486] "Hamastan Sürpriz Ankaraya Çıkarması", *Sabah*, 17.02.2006, Arşiv, accessed in April, 2018.

communication with Hamas open, and make it ready for diplomatic process and to give advice to Hamas in order to embrace the roadmap that came as a result of the Israeli Palestinian talks, and not to open Israel's right to exist to debate to peace process, and to abstain from violence.[487]

So, invitation of Hamas came within the Turkish initiative to be a mediator in peace process and it fit with multidimensional and multi-track principle of Turkish foreign policy.[488] This initiative also came in line with the principles of crisis prevention and conflict resolution which shape its new foreign policy paradigm, Turkey worked to prevent the crisis likely to break out in the face of sanctions by the West on Hamas.[489]

Ibrahim Kalın argues that JDP's recognition and support for the new government of Hamas is an example on supporting democratic processes, which is an instrument of Turkish foreign policy, through which Turkey respected the popular elections in the Arab countries, and urged all the parties to function with legitimate context of their relevant political systems[490].

5.2.3 Development of the Turkish Sudanese Relations.

The Turkish Sudanese relations considered as a critical development in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and it is a crucial example on autonomy and independence of the Turkish foreign policy in JDP era from the West. The Turkish Sudanese relations started with invitation of the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir to Turkey twice in 2008.[491] Omar al-Bashir was accused by the International Criminal Court, for acting a genocide in Darfur,[492] and his invitation to Turkey was one of the events that

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[487] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 38.
[488] Sözen, op.cit., p. 120.
[489] Özhan, op.cit., p. 43.
[490] Kalın, op.cit., p. 17.
[491] Svante Cornell, Gerald Knaus, Manfred Scheich, "Dealing with a Rising Power: Turkey's Transformation and its Implications for the EU", *European View*, Vol.11, No.2 (December, 2012), p. 40.
[492] "Omar al-Bashir charged with Darfur genocide", *The Guardian*, 12.07.2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/bashir-charged-with-darfur-genocide, accessed on 13.06.2018.

met with International criticism and considered by some policy evaluators as indicator on transfer in Turkish foreign policy from traditional policy. While Turkish academicians like Ahmed Sözen, explained that the invitation of the Sudanese leader was coming in the national interest of Turkey that got the support of Sudan in UN security council membership.[493]

These events also were criticized by American officials and western academicians, especially after the Davos crisis. The preceding U.S Ambassador to Turkey in 1989-91 Morton Abramowitz and Henry J Barkey, described this foreign policy initiative with 'clumsy' and 'irksome'. Their criticism was as following:

> *"Erdogan criticized Shimon Peres for Israel's military campaign in Gaza, while he didn't had problem in welcoming Sudan's president, who faces indictment for war crimes, when Ankara was asked about the killings in Darfur if it is a genocide, the reply of the Turkish government invokes a cliché about the value of closed-door diplomatic undertakings on sensitive matters"*[494].

However, on 13 December 2017, the Sudanese president met with Turkish president Erdogan in his visit to Istanbul to attend the extraordinary meeting of OIC that was held to discuss the decision of American president Trump to move the American consulate to Jerusalem, and to recognizes Jerusalem as capital of Tel Aviv.[495] The meeting of the two presidents Erdogan and al-Bashir was met with wide criticism from the west, the Israel times agency in that regard wrote:

> *"Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted on charges of genocide and war crimes, attended an emergency summit of the world's main pan-Islamic group in Istanbul….. Sudan's deadly conflict in Darfur broke out in 2003 when ethnic minority groups took up arms against Bashir's Arab-dominated government, which launched a brutal counter-insurgency…..The UN says at least 300,000 people have been killed and more than 2.5 million displaced as a result of the conflict….Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and war crimes related to the conflict, charges he denies…..Erdogan had while serving as prime minister in November 2009*

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[493] Sözen, loc.cit.
[494] Morton Abramowitz, Henry J Barkey, "Turkey's Transformers: the AKP Sees Big", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.88, No.6 (November/ December 2009), p. 126.
[495] "President Erdoğan Meets with President Al-Bashir of Sudan", *TCCB,*13.12.2017. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87714/president-erdogan-meets-with-president-al-bashir-of-sudan.html

defended Bashir against the charges, saying "a Muslim could not commit genocide, he is not capable of it."[496]

The Turkish-Sudanese relations were more developed when Erdogan visited Sudan on 25 December 2017, which was the first visit from Turkish leader since the independence of Sudan, the visit ended with agreement between Turkey and Sudan, through which Turkey will reconstruct a ruined Ottoman seaport city 'Suakin', on Sudan's Red Sea coast, and construct a naval marina to maintain civilian and military vessels.[497] This step is an example on Middle Easternization of Turkish foreign policy, and interest of Turkish leaders to complete the responsibility of Ottomans in the region, the thing that strengthen the Turkish existence and its power in Middle East.

5.2.4 Turkey as a Mediator in the Syrian Israeli Conflict.

In the context of its proactive policy in the region, Turkey has entered as a mediator between Syria and Israel to start negotiations on Golan heights and peace in the region. On 26 April 2008, the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan met with the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad, discussing the initiative through which Turkey was aiming to secure peace. However, the first step was to start low level negotiations, and then to get the leaders of the two countries together. In that regard Erdogan stated that:

"I believe that the proactive peace diplomacy that we carry on will make positive contributions to (peace) in Iraq, between Syria and Israel or between Israel and the Palestinians".[498]

Following that, on 21 May 2008, Israel and Syria announced that they were conducting indirect peace talks by a Turkish mediation.[499] In the context of that initiative,

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[496] "Wanted for genocide, Sudan leader welcomed by Erdogan at Jerusalem summit", *Times of Israel*, 13.12.2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/wanted-sudan-leader-attends-turkeys-islamic-summit/, accessed on 13.04.2018

[497] "Turkey to Restore Sudanese Red Sea Port and Build Naval Dock", *Voa News*, 26.12.2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-to-restore-sudanese-red-sea-port-andbuild-naval-dock/4179600.html, accessed on 13.05.2018.

[498] **"**Turkish PM meets Assad to discuss Syrian-Israeli peace mediation", *Hurriyet*, 26.04.2008, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkish-pm-meets-assad-to-discuss-syrian-israeli-peace-mediation-8792633**,** accessed on 12.07.2018.

Turkey believed that the reconciliation between different actors in the region could take place if the conditions for negotiations were provided by an honest broker. Turkey was ready to play this role in the region and it expected that regional and international actors will act in good faith in terms of contributing to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. But in contrary to its expectation, one side of the dispute who is Israel did not act honestly, when it launched the infamous Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in the end of 2008, killing more than 1000 Palestinians and injured more than 4000, including children, the thing that disrupted the Turkish initiative as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli dispute, and deteriorated the Turkish Israeli relations, due to the toughly response of the Turkish government to the Israeli attacks on Gaza.[500]

After the attacks on Gaza, on January 30, 2009 at the world Economic Forum in Davos, a harsh discussion took place between Israeli president Shimon Peres and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in front of the eyes of the entire globe and suddenly Erdogan walked out of the meeting hall, leading to a big tension in the Turkish- Israeli relations.[501]

From that time, the Prime Minister Erdogan increased his tone of criticism against Israel both in international and domestic forums.[502] The tensions between the two countries intensified with the Israeli attack on the Turkish flotilla 'Mavi Marmara' that was taking support to Gaza during the embargo, that was the real event that terminated the Turkish relations with Israel.[503] So Erdogan's harsh criticism of Israel, without making account for the western powers, and ending the Turkish Israeli relations was a shift and a sign of independency in the Turkish foreign policy.

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[499] "Syria, Israel launch peace talks under Turkey's auspices", *Hurriyet*, 21.05.2008, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/syria-israel-launch-peace-talks-under-turkeys-auspices-8991018 , accessed on 10.07.2018.
[500] Kanat, op.cit., p. 157.
[501] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 49.
[502] Altunışık, op.cit., 198.
[503] Özhan, op.cit., p. 52.

5.2.5 Voting Against the Embargo on Iran in the UN Security Council

In consequence of crisis between Iran and the west, on the nuclear issue, that had been started since 2002, Turkey initiated a diplomatic enterprise to resolve the crisis through negotiation in order to prevent a new wave of sanctions. In that regard, the Turkish leaders, Prime Minister Erdogan and Minister of foreign affairs Davutoglu expressed that the issue can be solved through dialogue and they were against sanctions. Brazil also had the same view towards the issue, for that, Turkey and Brazil proposed to mediate in the issue. Accordingly, on 17 May 2010, the two countries signed an agreement with Iran for uranium exchange.[504] As Gulden Ayman included, "the deal involved the exchange of 1,200 kilos of Iranian low-enriched uranium, which would be temporarily stored in Turkey, for 120 kilos of nuclear fuel. However, the agreement deal was rejected by the US and its allies, who argued that it would have left enough low-enriched uranium in Iran's hands for the production of a nuclear device."[505] After that and by demand of the US, the Security Council met on 9 June 2010, for the imposition of sanctions against Iran, Turkey beside Brazil voted against the sanctions.

Addressing the voting, on 10 June 2010, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated:

> "*If we had not voted no, we would have refused our identity, we would have refused our signatures, and this would be dishonorable. We could not afford this dishonorable behaviour. We do not want to be part of this mistake. History would not forgive us.*" [506]

Davutoglu also stated that:

> *"We are the only Security Council country neighboring Iran. It is always us who has to pay the price for sanctions. We made sure with our vote no that the agreement would remain on the table"*[507]

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[504] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 57.
[505] S. Gülden Ayman, "Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 2014), p. 12.
[506] "Hayır demeseydik onursuz olurduk", *Hürriyet*, 10.06.2010, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-hayir-demeseydik-onursuzluk-olurdu-14985588, cited in Özhan, loc.cit.
[507] Cited in Özhan, loc.cit.

These two speeches indicate important point concerning Turkey's new foreign policy, that reflects Turkey's image as independent factor, since it has abandoned its traditional, pro-Western foreign policy which aimed to please its allies, specially USA.[508] As Altunışık concluded, Turkish stance from Iranian nuclear issue by the west, led to some claims in the US and EU countries that Turkey is turning to the East.[509]

Taha Özhan explained the Turkish motivations behind its initiative towards crisis of Iran from regional power and geopolitical perspectives. According to him, in domain of regional power, this issue was global issue, and the participated parties have global character, and Turkey through its involvement, showed that it was willing to employ its power on regional and global matters as well as it was ready to take initiative, and if a conflict rise between traditional powers it will remain loyal to its agenda. And that deepened the Turkish perception as an independent power. On the other hand, this issue had geopolitical basis, including security, economy and energy. The improved Turkey's relations with Iran was important factor in Turkey's involvement to solve the problem, economically, these relations increased trade from 1 billion in 2000 to 10 billion in 2010, and on the energy bases Iran is the second provider of energy after Russia. If Turkey joined the sanctions it will lose provider of 20% of energy and be dependent only on Russia. From security aspect, Turkey and Iran face the same risk from PKK and the PJAK, and have shared secret intelligence with each other.[510]

5.2.6 Turkey's Proactive Policy Towards Arab Uprisings

The Arab uprisings or 'Arab Spring' raised in the Arab World in 2010, after protest events that occurred in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, when Mohammad Bouazizi burned himself in protest of police corruption and ill-treatment. Within a year the wave of the protests swept over the other Arab countries and as a result three heads of states had been overthrown in the year of 2011, the Tunisian President Zeyn il-Abidine Ben Ali fled to

[508] Özhan, loc.cit.
[509] Altunışık, op.cit., p. 198.
[510] ibid.

Saudi Arabia, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was resigned, ending his 30-year presidency, while the Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi was killed.[511] However, the situation in Syria was different and more complicated from the other Arab countries, since it not just include a confrontation between the regime and the opposition, it also became a regional proxy battleground, including non-state actors and movements like Hizbullah which is supported by Iran and the conservatives who are supported by Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, big powers like Russia, China, and Iran confront against the United States, competing for global hegemony.[512]

The Turkish position towards the Arab uprisings was so important; since Turkey for a decade before the Arab Spring tried to play a leading role in the region through active involvement, and attempted to solve problems peacefully between the disputed countries of the region. Moreover, it was praised in the Arab public for being a country that promotes democratic values and gives priority for democratization in its government's program. [513] In that domain, Turkey behaved wisely and supported the protestors against their dictator regimes. When the uprisings took place in Tunisia, the Turkish government welcomed the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, describing its position as "being on the right side of the history", and in response to demonstrations that took place in Tahrir Square in Eygpt, Turkey has supported the people's demand for democratization and political reform, besides, it was the first country to ask Mubarak to listen to the Egyptian people and step down.[514] In regard to Libya, at the beginning, Turkey opposed the NATO intervention in the country, as Kanat argued the Turkish government believed that democracy must not be imposed from outside, it must be a domestic and indigenous process, but the Turkish position had been changed after it felt with a danger of a massacre and mass killing of opponents that may occur on the hand of authoritarian, when Qaddafi started to threaten to

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[511] Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of 2011 Arab Uprising", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring, 2013), p.186.
[512] Janis Berzins, "Civil War in Syria: Origins, Dynamics, and Possible Solutions", *Strategic Review*, No.7 (August 2013), p. 2.
[513] Kılıc Bugra Kanat, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Age of the Arab Spring", *Politics and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Kılıc Bugra Kanat, Selim Ahmet Tekelıoglu and Kadır Ustun (ed.), Ankara: SETA, 2015, p. 161.
[514] Kanat, op.cit., p. 162.

use force in oppressing the demonstrations, for that reason, Turkey removed its reservation on external intervention under the principle of responsibility to protect civilians.[515]

Uprisings in Syria was the most challenge for the JDP government, at the beginning of Syrian crisis Turkey tried to use diplomacy to persuade the Syrian government to start a reform process, but these efforts failed and Turkey started to call for change of the regime in Syria supporting the Syrian opposition. But what happened was in contrary of the Turkish calculations and Syria turned to battlefield for not just against the regime but also it became a breeding place for terrorism, and global powers involved by supporting of Iran and Russia for the Syrian regime, while the USA refused Turkey's demands for the removal of President al-Assad and a change in the Syrian regime.[516]

In his speech in the first annual conference of the association of "Parliamentarians for Al-Quds" under the theme of "Al-Quds and Its Current Challenges" in Istanbul, on 27 November 2016, the Turkish president Erdogan mentioned the Syrian issue, confirming that the Turkish intervention in Syria was not due to Turkish eyes on the Syrian lands, on the contrary, Turkey is helping the people who own lands in Syria to keep their lands. Criticizing the silence of the UN Security Council, he said:

> *"Currently the total number of the dead in Syria is said to be about 600 thousand but in my opinion nearly 1 million people have lost their lives in Syria and people are still continuing to die there …Why have we entered Syria? We don't have an eye on Syrian lands. The issue is to enable the true owners of these lands to keep their lands. We are present there to ensure justice. We have entered there in order to give an end to the rule of cruel Assad who has been waging state terror, not for any other thing."*[517]

However, Turkish foreign policymakers perceived the Arab Uprising as a regional political transition, the Turkish leaders sought to play a regional role and to be source of aspiration for democracy and reforms in the Arab countries, in that regards and as

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[515] ibid.

[516] Defne Günay,"The Roles Turkey Played in the Middle East (2002–2016)." In *Turkish Foreign Policy International Relations, Legality and Global Reach*, by Pınar Gözen Ercan. Ankara: Palgrave macmillan, 2017, p.210.

[517] "Palestinian Issue Serves as a Litmus Test for the UN Security Council", *TCCB*, 29.11.2016, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/61163/palestinian-issue-serves-as-a-litmus-test-for-the-un-security-council.html

Davutoğlu declared, the Turkish government started to study the causes of transformations and it has developed strategies to adapt with these changes.[518] In that framework, Turkey asked the new governments to strengthen the process of democratization through the formation of strong institutions and a civil society, the thing that will prevent any counter-revolutionary endeavors by different actors or institutions in these states.[519]

In a conference held by the parliament of the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in November 2011, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul described the Turkish role in Arab Spring by the following statements:

> *"There will certainly be ups and downs along the way. Each country will find its own based on its specific conditions. However, we believe that we now have a golden opportunity to end the decades-long misery of the region. We hope that the people's genuine aspirations for a life in dignity will be realized. There is no doubt that the people themselves will have to be in the driving seat on this road. But the international community has also an important role to play in helping and facilitating this outcome. This is precisely what led Turkey from the outset to support the legitimate demands and expectations of the people in those countries. We did so by encouraging and urging the leaders in power to undertake the necessary reforms and lead the change towards positive ends. When this did not work, we then increased the pressure on the regimes and took our place on the side of the people as we did in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria"* [520]

On the other hand, role of Turkey in Arab Spring was widely appraised and acknowledge by Arab public opinion, the Palestinian professor in Maryland university Shibley Telhami conducted Arab public opinion poll in 2011, which surveyed 3000 people in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Arab Emirates, about the impact of Arab uprisings and attitudes of the people towards the global and regional players, one of the results of the survey reflected the perception of Arab people towards Turkey during Arab spring as it is stated below:

> *"Turkey is the biggest winner of the Arab Spring. In the five countries polled, Turkey is seen to have played the "most constructive" role in the Arab events. Its prime minister, Recep Erdoğan, is the most admired among world leaders, and those who envision a new*

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[518] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring", *SAM Center for Strategic Reseach*, No.3, (April, 2012), p. 8.
[519] Kanat, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Age of the Arab Spring", p.163
[520] Abdullah Gul, *Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül, Diplomasinde Erdemli Güç, Dış Politika Konuşmaları,* Ankara: Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2014, p. 379.

president for Egypt want the new president to look most like Erdoğan. Egyptians want their country to look more like Turkey than any of the other Muslim, Arab and other choices provided."[521]

Even the Turkish role in the Arab Spring was critical and appraised by the Arab public opinion, but in the later years of the Arab Spring Turkey's expected role turned over it, and in some cases, changed from using diplomacy and soft power to military involvement and defensive in its boarders for its national security as happened in Syria. In addition to that, Turkey's more involvement in Arab affairs led to the deterioration of its relations with some Arab countries. For example, Turkish support of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its stance against the Military government led to the deterioration of relations with Egypt and was met with a lot of criticisms from the academicians and politicians in Egypt, Prof. Tarek Abdel-Jalil from Ein Shams university wrote in *Al-Ahram* newspaper:

"Turkey has interfered in internal affairs of Egypt without having an awareness about the Egyptian people and their relations with the military and without a study of the internal political, social and economic situation". [522]

5.3 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSE OF JDP TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST.

There is a change in Discourse of Turkish leaders towards the Middle East from the Cold War era to JDP era, the first sub-section will provide a general analysis for the hegemon discourse towards the Middle East in relation to the identity of JDP, by using the theory of Laclau and Mouffe of Difference and Equivalence. The second sub-section will talk in detail about the discourse of civilization and historical ties with the Middle East that dominated the speeches of the Turkish leaders.

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[521] Shibley Telhami, "The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll", *Brookings Institute*, 21.11.2011. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-2011-arab-public-opinion-poll/ accessed on 23.05.2018

[522] Tareq Abdel-Jalil, "The Tight Turkish Accounts", *Al-Ahram newspaper*. 17. 11. 2013 http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/243080.aspx

5.3.1 JDP's Identity in Logic of Equivalence and Difference in Relation to the Middle East

Laclau and Mouffe in their discourse theory, used the logic of equivalence and difference to show that identities are not fixed, they also used the concept of master signifier through which a subject created its nodal points of identity, while one of the nodal points is more dominant than others.[523] So according to them, discourse constitutes identity and social relations, and discourse is an "attempt to fix a web of meanings within a particular domain". Fixing of meaning can be through the constitution of nodal points, that organize the discourse around a central privileged signifier, the nodal points bind together a chain of signification.[524] In other words, the signifier is a concept that implies meaning within particular discourse, and the meaning of the signifier called signified, the signified is a sign that leads to the signifier. So discourse is an articulated signs and words interconnected together to create a meaningful set. For example, plurality of the press, political parties are signified or signs that lead us to the signifier of freedom of expression.[525]

At the first years of the JDP, the TFP was following the track of independence from the west, Turkey's rejection of participation in the U.S led invasion of Iraq in 2003, was a sign on that policy. In the following periods of the JDP era, new principles of the TFP were adopted, which opened the debate towards the openness of Turkey on the Middle East. At that time, the master signifier of the TFP became Middle Easternization and Islamization rather than Westernization and Secularization, linked with other signifiers like: center state, balance between security and freedom, justices and legitimacy, smart power, multidimensional and proactive policy, in addition to the discourse of civilization, that became more dominant during years of Arab spring. The signs that lead us to Middle Easternization signifier as discussed previously are: Turkish rejection to use its lands in

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[523] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p. 43.
[524] David Rear, "A Critical Analysis of Japanese IdentityDiscourse: Alternativesto the Hegemony of Nihonjinron", *Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia*, Vol.53, No.2, 2017, p. 6.
[525] Amir Dabirimehr and Malihe Tabatabai Fatmi, "Laclau and Mouffe's Theory of Discourse", *Journal of Novel Applied Sciences*, Vol.3, No. 11 (2014), p.1284.

invasion of Iraq in 2003, visit of Hamas to Ankara in 2006, Turkish mediation between Israel and Syria in 2007, Turkish relations with the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, and voting against the sanctions on Iran in the UN, in addition to Turkish pro-Palestinian stances in Arab-Israeli conflict.

The master signifier of 'Islamization' and Middle Easternization is only meaningful in relation to the negative other, 'Secularization', and 'Westernization', which is related to different signifiers like European Civilization, Modernization. However, in the past, the negative other of the Turkish identity was the Middle East and Arabs whose identity according to the Turkish people was formed from nodal points of 'Undeveloped', 'Betrayer', 'Petrol', 'Dictator Systems'. But in the JDP era the equation changed, and the Middle East and Arabs are no longer the negative other in the eyes of the Turkish people, it is in equivalence with the Islamic identity of the JDP.

Accordingly, JDP government, within its nodal points of Middle Easternization and Islamization, tries to change the discourse about Arabs from negative to positive, for example, the Turkish president Erdogan in TBMM meeting on 25 July 2017, called the Turkish people to leave aside the discourse that 'Arabs hit us from the back', saying that:

> *"Araplar bizi arkadan vurdu yalanını bir kenara bırakmanın zamanı gelmiştir. Bugün ülkemizde devletimize ve milletimize karşı savaşan terör örgütleri yüzünden nasıl toplumun belli kesimlerini toptan suçlayamazsak, tüm Arapları da itham edemeyiz."*[526]

> *"It is time to leave aside the lie of "Arabs struck us from the back", which had been engraved in minds for generations, since it was intentionally and wrongly involved in textbooks in the past. As we cannot blame certain parts of society because of the terrorist organizations such as PKK, FETÖ, DHKP-C and DAESH, who are fighting against the state and our nation today, we cannot accuse all Arabs because of some wrongs during World War I. Today, how terrorist organizations have provoked, supported and guided by a number of forces, there were similar situations in that period".* [527]

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[526] "Erdoğan: 'Araplar bizi arkadan vurdu'yu bırakın artık! *Yeniçağ*, 25.07.2017, https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/erdogan-araplar-bizi-arkadan-vurduyu-birakin-artik-168996h.htm accessed on 25.07.2017.

[527] "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan TBMM Grup Toplantısı'nda konuştu", *YKM Yaşlılar Koordinasyon Merkezi*, 25.07.2017, http://m.akparti.org.tr/ykm/haberler/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-tbmm-grup-toplantisinda-konustu2/91753 accessed on 25.07.2017.

The rhetoric of Erdogan is a sign that leads us to the master signifier of Middle Easternization, indicating that the negative discourse about Arabs as betrayers, will be forgotten and became sediment discourse, while new positive discourse about Arabs will be dominated and became hegemon discourse among the Turkish people.

The logic of equivalence according to Laclau and Mouffe, shows the general identity and making certain nodal points linking to each other in sameness, and putting it in a negative relationship with an opposition. The nodal point or master signifier of JDP is Islamist identity and Middle Eastern oriented identity, linked with signs and discourses of civilization, pro-active policy, responsibility to protect, humanitarian diplomacy, against the Secular-nationalist and Western-oriented identity, while coming to the **logic of difference**, it establishes several positions, instead of one with an opposition. Thus it incorporates the differences within the master signifier. In this articulation, differences within the category of Islamic identity include, Sunni, Shia, Muslim Brotherhood, as it is in the case of the Western identity that includes different groups like "leftist, conservative, rights". but there is misunderstanding in the identification of Turkish Sunni identity with Sunni identity of Islamic world, in general Turkey perceived to share the same Sunni ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, while we note that beliefs and norms of the Sunni identity of the Turkish people differ for example than beliefs of Muslim Brotherhood, for example, while JDP believes in Sufism, and temples, Muslim Brotherhoods are against Sufism and oppose building of temples which is sacred by Turkish elites of JDP. While Sufism is popular in Shia mediums like Iran, which in general against Sunni Islam. So from the ideological aspect, even Turkey considers itself Sunni with Muslim sections who are against Shia Iran, but in reality, they are more close in some ideological beliefs of Sufism with Iran more than Muslim Brotherhoods. This logic makes identities more fragmented or more special. At the same time, it lessens the effect of the logic of equivalence, which is more polarizing as it is based on two antagonistic

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-"Müslümanlar İçin Mübarek Beldelerimizi Korumak İmkân Değil, İman Meselesidir, *TCCB,* 25.07.2017 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/80036/muslumanlar-icin-mubarek-beldelerimizi-korumak-imkn-degil-iman-meselesidir, accessed on 27.07.2017.

positions.[528]

5.3.2 Discourse of Civilization and Responsibility to Protect Towards the Middle East

The second decade of the JDP government coincided with rising of the Arab Spring in the Arab countries. It is noted that Turkish elites in this period frequently used discourses of civilization and historical responsibility to legitimize their policies towards the developments in the region. However, it is valuable to refer to the historical context behind the emergence of the discourse of civilization and how its meaning changed in Turkish foreign policy.

Meaning of civilization in the Turkish foreign policy can be analyzed referring to theory of Laclau and Mouffe about the master signifier and principles of the Turkish foreign policy; before JDP era, the master signifier of the Turkish foreign policy was secular-nationalist identity with purpose of reproducing a Westphalian political unit, under which Turkey was perceived as an integral part of Western civilization, but in JDP era, concept of civilization used by Turkish elites to emphasize their ties with the Islamic world and legitimize their responsibility towards the Middle Eastern countries.[529]

As the meaning of civilization was explained, now it must refer to Foucauldian theory that focuses on studying the historical conditions and international context that led to the emergence of the discourse. In fact, the discourse of civilization passed several stages linked with discourses like clash, dialogue, alliance. First, discourse of civilization became more prominent in world politics in the post-Cold War era, after the American politician Samuel Huntington, published an article by title of "The Clash of Civilizations" in 1993, his article based on the idea that source of conflict between people is not ideological or

[528] Jackson & Sorensen, 2010, p. 43, cited in Erdogan, 2017, p. 16.
[529] Murat Yeşiltaş, "Turkey's Quest for a 'New International Order': The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration", *Perceptions*, Vol.19, No.4 (Winter 2014), p. 44.

primarily economic, but the division between humankind is cultural, and cultures of different civilizations will be the source of any conflict in the future.[530]

After these debates, world statesmen and politicians started to put forward the notion of 'dialogue between civilizations', which gained international endorsement when the UN declared the year of 2001 as the year of 'dialogue between civilizations', then antagonisms raised as a result of global debates took place between the discourses of 'dialogue' and 'clash', these antagonisms dissolved by hegemon intervention of discourse of 'Alliance of Civilization', which was initiated by Turkey and Spain in 2005, then it gained international endorsement by UN Security Council, and became UN initiative that consists of 146 members including member states and international organizations. This initiative aimed at overcoming prejudices, misperceptions and polarization between Western and Islamic societies through establishing a common political will, basing on the idea that all societies are interdependent on the matters of development, security and environment and welfare.[531] Ali Balci argues that alliance of civilization is not antagonistic to clash of civilizations, on the contrary, it is complementary, "survival and continuation of alliance of civilization depend on the existence of the clash, the more the clash threatens to spread all around the world, the more the world needs the alliance".[532]

In the context of 'Alliance of Civilizations', the political elites in the JDP promoted Turkey's integration with the EU within the 'Alliance of Civilization', ensuring that its accession to EU does not contradict with its ties with the Islamic World. In the 3rd Turkish-Spain summit press conference on 06 September 2011, the then Turkish prime minister Erdogan, said:

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[530] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order", New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 5.

[531] "The Alliance of Civilizations Initiative", *Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-alliance-of-civilizations-initiative.en.mfa accessed on 13.04.2018

[532] ALi Balci, "The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No.3 (Summer 2009), p. 103.

"*Medeniyetler İttifakı, aslında medeniyetler çatışmasını çökerten bir proje olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bundan dolayı çok büyük öneme haizdir ve bunu güçlendirerek devam ettirmekte de kararlıyız."*

"In fact, the Alliance of Civilizations has emerged as a project that collapses the clash of civilizations. Therefore, it is of great importance and we are determined to continue to strengthen it"[533]

From that time, the discourse of civilization became an integral part of rhetoric and discourse of the Turkish leaders and foreign policymakers, it also became the central topic debated by Turkish scholars and politicians. It is used to justify and legitimize the Turkish role in the transition process in the Arab world in consequence of the Arab uprisings, and the JDP government used it to show their ties with the Islamic world and it is used to prevent polarization and conflict in the Middle East.[534]

When the Turkish elites use the discourse of civilization, they link it with discourses of 'responsibility to protect', and 'historical responsibility'. It can be argued that rising of these discourses in the discourse of the Turkish foreign policy also stems from wider discourse of international doctrine of 'responsibility to protect' which was adopted and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005. In 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon explained the notion of 'Responsibility to Protect', clarifying that it is based on three pillars, "the first is responsibility of the states to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second pillar is "the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting these obligations. And the third pillar is the responsibility of member states to respond in a timely and decisive manner in accordance with the United Nations charter to help protect populations from the four listed crimes and violations. The response could involve any of the whole range of UN tools, whether pacific measures under chapter VI of the charter, coercive ones under chapter VII, and/or collaboration with regional and sub-regional arrangements under chapter VIII. The key lies in an early and flexible response, tailored to the specific needs of

[533] Abdurrahman Tığ, İsak Baydaroğlu, Sakiye Behlivan, *Recep Tayyep Erdogan ne Diyor*, 2nd Edition, Istanbul, Kim Ne Diyor Yayinlari, May 2012, p. 379.
[534] Burhanettin Duran, "Understanding the AK Party's Identity Politics: A Civilizational Discourse and its Limitations", *Insight Turkey* ,Vol.15, No.1 (2013), p. 93.

each situation".[535] So responsibility to protect means that if the state failed to protect its population from humanitarian crimes, the international community has a duty to act, not just militarily, it can use diplomacy, sanctions or prevention, and early warning. An example of responsibility to protect was the international intervention in Libya through the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory to protect the civilians from the government' s aggression and violence in 2011.[536]

So, the discourses of 'civilization' and 'responsibility to protect' raised in the international arena, then it became the prominent discourse in the Turkish foreign policy, used by Turkish elites and decision-makers to legitimize their policies in the region, and they are tools to justify the proactive policy towards the Middle East. That is an example of the Foucauldian discourse theory that nothing outside the text, as well as it supports claims of Ruth Wodak and others who assume that there is "a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations, institutions, and social structures in which they are embedded: the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and in turn, discourses influence social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes the social practice and is at the same time constituted by it."[537] Discourses of civilization and responsibility to protect became part of the international social structure after it gained endorsement by the UN, and this social context shaped and influenced the discourse of the Turkish leaders.

The Turkish president Erdogan used the discourse of civilization describing the developments in the region in the 3rd Legislative Year of the 26th Term of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), on 1 October 2017, as it is shown in his following speech:

> *"Hele bizim gibi, 2 bin 200 yıllık devlet tecrübesine, bin 400 yıllık medeniyet müktesebatına, bin yıllık coğrafya hâkimiyetine sahip bir ülke için, bu tür gelişmeler çok daha*

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[535] "Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies 'Responsibility to Protect' at Berlin Event on 'Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World'", *United Nations*, 15.07.2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm

[536] Erdogan, 2017, p. 35.

[537] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl , & Liebhar, 2009, p.30

önemli hâle gelmektedir…Tarihî, kültürel ve sosyal olarak çok yakın ilişkiler ağıyla bağlı olduğumuz bölgelerde, ülkemize yönelik büyük bir sevgi, ama aynı zamanda büyük bir umut vardır. Sevgiye sadece teşekkürle karşılık vermek mümkündür, ama umudun bize yüklediği sorumluluklar çok ağırdır. Bu sebeple, nasıl Irak'a, Suriye'ye, Kafkasya'ya, Orta Asya'ya, Balkanlara, Doğu Avrupa'ya sırtımızı dönemiyorsak, aynı şekilde Kuzey Afrika'yı, Orta Afrika'yı, Güney Asya'yı da görmezden gelme hakkımız yoktur."[538]

"Such developments are especially important for a country such as ours with a state tradition of 2,200 years, a civilization spanning 1,400 years and a geographical domination extending over a millennium, …. There is great affection as well as hope with respect to our country in regions where we have close historical, cultural and social ties. It is possible to respond to such affection with some words of thanks, but hope translates into bigger responsibilities for us. Therefore, we cannot turn our backs on Iraq, Syria, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Neither do we have the right to turn a blind eye to North Africa, Central Africa and South Asia"[539]

On the other hand, the Turkish government believes that the people of these countries built in their minds hopes and beliefs that Turkey will always support them. In return, their hopes and beliefs formed a responsibility on the Turkish leaders who are cautious not to disappoint that confidence.

In another occasion on 11 November 2017, Erdogan explained the responsibility to restore the Islamic places, especially the places that return back to the Ottoman era, as one effort to continue the Ottoman civilization, he explained that conquering is not just physical it is adding your spirit and essence on the conquered city, and it became a duty for you to protect the monument places that have a historical value in that places.

"Bir zamanlar 500 caminin olduğu söylenen şehirlerde bugün namaz kılınabilecek tek bir camiyi zar-zor bulursunuz. Ruhuyla, kokusuyla, görüntüsüyle hâlâ bizim olan nice şehirlerden hâlâ adımız kazınmaya, izlerimiz silinmeye çalışılıyor. Bunun için biz yurt dışında da kapsamlı bir restorasyon çalışması başlattık. Balkanlar'dan Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'ya, Güney Asya ve Orta Asya'dan Doğu Avrupa'ya kadar geniş bir alanda ecdadın emanetlerine sahip çıkmak çabası içindeyiz."…. Medeniyetimizin her bir eseri bizim yitik hazinemizdir, nerede bulursak orada sahip çıkacak, takipçisi olacak, fırsatını bulduğumuzda da ayağa kaldıracağız".[540]

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[538] TCCB, "The Strength We Derive from Our History and Civilization Is Our Greatest Advantage", 01.10.2017. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/84735/the-strength-we-derive-from-our-history-and-civilization-is-our-greatest-advantage.html

[539] ibid.

[540] "Bu Topraklardaki Tüm Zenginliklere Sahip Çıkıyoruz", *TCCB*, 11.11.2017.

> *"In cities where once there might have been 500 mosques, now you could hardly find even one mosque to pray in. They are trying to erase our name and our traces from many cities which still belong to us with their spirit, with their scent and with their image. Because of this, we also launched a comprehensive mobilization abroad for restoration. We strive to protect the heritage of our ancestors across a large area from Balkans to Middle East and North Africa, from South and Central Asia to Eastern Europe……. Each remnant of our civilization is our lost treasure; we shall protect, track and restore them wherever we find them at any opportunity."*[541]

As Duran concluded, one example of civilizational responsibility is the JDP's stance on the Palestinian issue and claiming that it is also Turkish issue, which affirms the Islamic identity of Turkey, it is also considered as a form of Islamic solidarity politics that aim to guard the interests of the Islamic world. In return, the Arab leaders in the Islamic world recognize the Turkish role in the region, describing Erdogan as 'the leader of the Muslim World'.[542] For example in a speech for him in Cairo University, Prime Minister Erdogan talked about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict using concepts like "the fraternity of cities" and "common civilization" and brought new life to a renewed discourse of Islamic civilization:

> *"Just as Mecca, Madina, Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Damascus, Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Ankara are each other's brothers, so, let the world know and understand that Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, Rafah, Gaza and Jerusalem are these cities' brothers and our brothers. Each drop of blood spilled in these cities is the same blood that flows in our veins. Every living soul that drops to the ground in these cities is the same life as ours. Each tear is our own tear. Let no one misinterpret the silence that dominated this region for almost a century. Let everyone know that sooner or later, the innocent children massacred in Gaza with inhumane methods shall be accounted for".* [543]

Nevertheless, Erdogan's discourse about civilizational ties with the Islamic world and leadership of the Islamic world became more powerful, when the Islamic regimes came to power in Arab countries, especially, when Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt. In that period Erdogan's criticism of Israel became tough, indicating that Israel must take into account the current situation in the region, in which the current leaders are different from

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https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/87301/bu-topraklardaki-tum-zenginliklere-sahip-cikiyoruz.html accessed on 06.07.2018.

[541] "We Protect All the Treasures on These Lands", *TCCB*, 11.11. 2017 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87302/we-protect-all-the-treasures-on-these-lands, accessed on 06.07.2018.

[542] Duran, 2013, p. 95.

[543] Duran, 2013, p. 95

the previous. As it is obvious in his following speech in response to the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2012:

> *"I'm talking to Netanyahu, we are not in 2008, we are in 2012. The conditions of 2012 are not the same as 2008's. so do your account well."*
>
> *"Netanyahu'ya sesleniyorum; şu anda 2008 yılında değiliz, 2012 yılındayız. Bilesin ki 2012'nin şartları 2008'in şatları gibi değildir. Hesabını iyi yap."*[544]

It is noted that under these conditions, the opportunity for Turkey to unify the Islamic world was more easy, by the existence of Islamic regimes that share the same ideology of the JDP. Nonetheless, that conditions were temporary and didn't continue due to the end of the Muslim Brotherhood's government in Egypt through the military coup in 2013. Even though, the JDP policy towards the Middle East and civilization discourse by its leaders continue; the Turkish president Erdogan and the officials around him, still affirming the Islamic solidarity in their speech defining themselves as Muslims that have the responsibility to support and rescue the oppressed people in Muslim and non-Muslim world, as Erdogan indicated in previously mentioned speech for him in the opening session of the 3rd Legislative Year of the TBMM on 1 October, 2017:

> *"How can we say that developments in Libya where our brothers have great affection for us in their hearts are of no concern to us? How can we disregard the events taking place in Yemen which features in our folk songs? How can we consider Afghanistan, Pakistan and India which bear the traces of our ancestors in every corner as 'others'? How can we let down the oppressed in Rakhine, Turkestan and Crimea? How can we let down our brothers in the Gulf when they face crises? When you travel to the Middle East, many of the silhouettes in that geography, for example in Jerusalem, are relics from our ancestors."*[545]

Moreover, in a meeting of the JDP in TBMM, on 9 January 2018, Erdogan stated that:

> *"Türkiye demek, Islam dünyasında yaşayan 1,7 milyar insanın semaya açılan elleri, dillerden eksik olmayan duaları demektir….Türkiye demek… tüm mazlumların,*

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[544] "Erdogan'dan İsrail'e Sert Eleştiri", *Hurriyet*, 19.11.2012. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogandan-israile-sert-elestiri-21956061 accessed on 06.08.2017.

[545] "The Strength We Derive from Our History and Civilization Is Our Greatest Advantage", *TCCB*, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/84735/the-strength-we-derive-from-our-history-and-civilization-is-our-greatest-advantage, accessed on 03.07.2017.

mağdurların..kendilerine uzannacağını bildikleri şefkat eli demektir." [546]

"Turkey means, 1.7 billion people living in the Islamic world, who are opening their hands towards the heavens, their praying is not missing from their tongues. Turkey means hand of sympathy that will extended to all oppressed people and victims." [547]

[546] "Ak Parti TBMM Grup" Toplantısı, *Pusulahaber*, 09.01.2018, https://www.pusulahaber.com.tr/ak-parti-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-764893h.htm, accessed on 03.07.2017.
[547] ibid, translated.

SIXTH CHAPTER

JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DISCOURSE TOWARDS THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT

In the JDP era, discourse played a key role in affecting and leading the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue and Turkish relations with Israel. Discourse was shaped by the identity of the leaders, in return, it has created shared knowledge, and new identities assigned to those leaders. On the other side, discourse not just shaped by the identities of the leaders, its emergence stemmed from the wider discourse of the international domain. That is discussed by Foucault in his work of power and knowledge in which he claims that discursive practices are part of implementation of discourse in society in a historical period, and the subject in his creating of discourse and knowledge is constrained with discursive framework which contains rules, institutions and organizations. In the context of this theory, this chapter will discuss how the discourse about Israeli practices towards the Palestinians had been created in the Turkish mediums, and criticism of Israel as acting terrorism is consistence with rising of International discourse about fighting terrorism in consequence of 11 September terror attacks. It will be shown how the accumulated and repeated discourses of the leaders led to other actions by non-state actors and public opinion, which in turn affected the relations between Turkey and Israel like the discursive practice of Davos Crisis, that was one factor that encouraged the action of Mavi Marmara. However, in later sections it will be explained how the discourse of Turkish foreign policy towards Israel affected by changes of regimes in the countries of the region, using wars of Gaza in 2012 and 2014 as an example.

Moreover, this chapter shows that the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue is dominated by the discourse of civilization and the continuation of historical responsibility and ownership of the Palestinian issue. These discourses also stemmed from a wider domain of discourse, as explained in the previous chapter about the discourse of civilization towards the Middle East. However, this chapter gives examples on these discourses when it talks about the Turkish position towards decision of the US government to move its Embassy to Jerusalem and its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. It will be explained how these positions emphasize the Islamic identity of Turkey using the theory of deconstruction and dichotomies of East /West, OIC/NATO.

6.1 JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE FROM 2002-2007

In the first years of the JDP government, the Turkish public opinion was busy with the Turkish foreign policy towards the invasion of Iraq, and the Palestinian issue was not presented strongly in the Turkish media. Even though, the Turkish leaders sought to play a proactive policy towards the Palestinian issue and they hoped to have an active role in the peace process, for that Turkey was interested to keep good relations with both Palestine and Israel, but the winds blow with what the ships do not desire, as the situation changed with the unexpected Israeli practices towards Palestinians like Israeli assassination of leaders of Hamas, the thing that brought again the pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli discourse to Turkish media, the JDP leaders had a big role in creating the anti-Israeli discourse among the public, while the global discourses like 'war against terrorism' gave the legitimacy for the Turkish leaders to use of these discourses, and that will be explained using post-structural discourse theory of Foucault who claims that **it is the discourse that communicates the truth and produces knowledge, not the subject, the subject is constrained with prevailed discourse, and there is nothing outside the discourse.** Then the discourse continues in consequence of successive Israeli wars on Gaza. Accordingly, in this section, I will explain the Turkish discourse in response to Israeli practices including the rhetoric of the leaders, and order of discourse in the public, in addition to explaining the role of media and non-governmental organizations in the reproduction of that discourse. Moreover, a constructivist analysis about the role of discursive practices in reproduction of identity will be used to show how these discourses accumulated from 2002 until 2007 and contributed in constitution of social identities for both Israel and Turkey, and prepared a basic ground for other actions by the Turkish people like issuing the Turkish series 'Kurtlar Vadisi' which depicted the Israeli soldiers as a killer of children, and Mavi Marmara which consider a social action by non-governmental organizations and the Turkish people, to break the Israeli blockade upon Gaza.

6.1.1 The Road Map and Turkish Ambitions to Play Regional Role

When the JDP came to power, new attempts and efforts were taking place for achieving peace in the Middle East after failure of Camp David and deterioration of the situation in Palestine with the Second Intifada. These peace efforts represented in the road map which was established in June 2002, by initiative and supervision of EU, USA, Russia and United Nations. [548]

The road map aimed to find a solution between Israel and Palestine, based on resolutions of UN Security Council, 242 and 338 issued in 1967 and 1973 consequently. In addition to the establishment of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within the recognized borders.[549]

In that context, the quartet meetings agreed on three steps to be achieved. The first step includes the end of violence and achieving political reform by the Palestinian Authority, in addition to the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories, and freezing of settlements by Israel.[550] The second step was the creation of an independent Palestinian state and an international conference on the road map. While the third step would seek a permanent end to the conflict with an agreement on final borders, the status of Jerusalem, and the fate of Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlements.[551]

Nonetheless, several events took place on the international and domestic scale and formed a barrier towards the implementation of the road map. One of these events was the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that led to suspension of the plan for one year.[552] Besides, on 5 June 2003, some Palestinian organizations killed 23 Israeli in various attacks. And as a response, Israel increased its violence in the region and harried up in the

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[548] Nathalie Tocci, "The Middle East Quartet and (In)effective Multilateralism", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 29-44 Published by: Middle East Institute, p.30
[549] ibid, p.30.
[550] Joel Beinin, and Lisa Hajjar, " Palestine, Israel, and the Arab Israeli Conflict, A Primer." *Middle East for Research and Information Project (MERP)*, February. 2014, p.12
[551] Simon Jeffery, "the Road Map to Peace", *The Guardian*, 04. 06.2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jun/04/israel.qanda, accessed on 05.08.2018
[552] Beinin and Hajjar, loc.cit.

establishment of a separation war in the West Bank, which made the life of Palestinians more difficult.[553]

After a year on 25 May 2003, the road map was accepted officially, and as a response, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its pleasure for the official agreement on the road map as it came in the press release:

> *"Turkey has welcomed the official acceptance of the Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russian Federation) roadmap on May 25, 2003, which foresees a two-state solution in which the Israelis and Palestinians can live side by side in peace and security."*[554]

Furthermore, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyeb Erdogan expressed his support for the road map, when he met the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and the Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, on 8 June 2003. In that regards, he pointed out that: *"new peace process was built on the road map, which I greatly support it"*

The efforts of the road map considered an opportunity for Turkey to play a regional role in the peace process in Middle East. In that context, the Turkish officials through their contact with the sides of the peace process, offered their desire to be involved in the peace process. That is clear in the words of the Turkish minister of foreign affairs Abdallah Gul, to his Palestinian counterpart Nabeel Shaath, on 16 July 2003, through which he indicated that: *"Turkey has spiritual and ethical liabilities towards the region, and it decided to fulfill them"*.[555]

6.1.2 Interruption of Peace Efforts and Formation the Order of Discourse about Israel

To start the mediation in the peace process, the Turkish leaders planned to visit Israel and Palestine in 2004. But Turkey's ambition and intention to be a mediator in the peace

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[553] Ertosun, *Filistin Politikamız*, p. 251.
[554] "Quartet -Yol Haritası-nın İsrail Hükümeti Tarafından Resmen Kabul Edilmesi", *Türkiye Cumhuriyet Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, 27.05.2003, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_92---27-mayis-2003_-quartet-_yol-haritasi_nin-israil-hukumeti-tarafindan-resmen-kabul-edilmesi.tr.mfa, accessed on 05.04.2017. accessed on 06.04.2017
[555] Ertosun, op.cit., p. 254.

process and its preparation for the visit was interrupted with the Israeli aggressive practices, which included the assassination of two leaders of Hamas 'Ahmed Yassin' and his follower 'Abdul-Aziz al-Rantisi' in Gaza.

It was on 22 March 2004, when Israel assassinated the leader of Hamas Ahmad Yassin by a missile attack. The event was a shock to the Turkish government and public opinion, as it was to the whole of the world. From that moment the discourse in the Turkish medium started to be formed and created, either by the rhetoric of the statesmen or the public opinion and media as it will be explained in the following sections.

6.1.2.1 Discourse and Rhetoric of the Turkish Leaders in Response to The Israeli Assassination of Ahmad Yassin

The Israeli assassination of the leader of Hamas 'Ahmad Yassin' was met by a tough response from the Turkish Government. In the same day of the event, Erdogan was in a rally in the Turkish city "Konia" and as a quick response, he condemned the Israeli attack and described the event with **"a development that raised the blood pressure",** his first response was a message to Israel that **"you did wrong**".[556] After two days on 24 March 2004, in a press interview with the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, described the event with **"terror incident",** in his speech, he indicated that a visit to Israel was planned in April, but as he stated: **"I don't know how it will be possible in this situation".** Then he continued:

> *"We need to say what kind of terrorism this falls under. If we want peace in the Middle East, if we want to solve the issues, Israel, first of all, needs to abandon this kind of attitude. To me, this approach has cast a shadow over the peace."*

When the journalist asked Erdogan about the Turkish mediation in the peace process, he said:

[556] "Suikast Dünyayı Korkuttu", *Milliyet*, 23.03.2004, sayfa: 18.

"There's nothing left to mediate. They've turned everything into a cloud of smoke... This incident has inflicted a serious wound on Middle East peace. There is nothing resembling a road map left".[557]

The assassination of Ahmed Yassin was an event that led to creation of a chain of discourses around it by different actors. Erdogan in different places, situations and times, repeated the same condemnation about the Israeli assassination of Ahmad Yassin and tried to legitimate his discourse by linking it with other international terrorist acts. For example, in an occasion when he talked about the Turkish position towards the US invasion of Iraq - which was justified by the US as an action within its policy of 'war on terrorism'- he mentioned the Israeli assassination of Ahmad Yassin, saying that:

"I will not say that we make good by not sending forces to Iraq, if we stay outside Iraq our word will not have power, over the future of this country". After that he indicated: ***"it was wrong that Israel killed Ahmed Yassin, I do not think that throwing a missile on an old man in a wheelchair will contribute to the peace in the Middle East."***[558]

Moreover, when Erdogan visited Japan on 14 April 2004, he was talking about three Japanese who were arrested in terrorist action in Iraq. Here Erdogan also mentioned the Israeli assassination of Ahmed Yassin stating that it was wrong and affected the peace process.[559]

So it can be argued that when Erdogan described Israeli assassination of Ahmad Yassin by 'terrorist act', his criticism is legitimized by the international discourse of 'war on terrorism' that was announced by the American President George Bush, who also used it to Justify US invasion of Iraq, so Erdogan wanted to convey a message that if you fight the terrorism in Iraq, you must also look at the terrorist acts by Israel.

Erdogan, by repeating of his remarks that Israel did wrong by 'assassination of a man who could not move two-third of his body', in different occasions created and fastened a

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[557] "Turkish PM: Assassination of Yassin Was an Act of Terror", *Haaretz*, 26.03.2004, https://www.haaretz.com/turkish-pm-assassination-of-yassin-was-an-act-of-terror-1.117922 , accessed on 12.06.2017.
[558] "Erdogan: Bana İkinci Özal Demeyin", *Milliyet*, 25.03.2004, p.3.
[559] "İsrail'in Yaptığı Terör", *Milliyet,* 14.04.2004, p.18.

discursive framework and shared understanding among the Turkish people about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and what is happening in Palestine.

6.1.2.2 Formation of Public Discourse

After the Israeli assassination of the leader of Hamas "Ahmad Yassin", a wave of large anger prevailed the Turkish public. The Turkish people prayed the absent prayer in Istanbul and Ankara, writing on the walls **"The road of Ahmed Yassin is our road"**, **"We all Ahmed Yassin".** Moreover, the public expressed their anger by burning Israeli and American flags.[560] As Wang Bo argued the Turkish public opinion towards Israel's practices is stronger than the government's attitude, and that was due to the strong anti-American sentiment in Turkey, which resulted from the US invasion of Iraq.[561]

The attitude of parliamentarians also reflects how the Turkish public opinion was against Israel and America. In March 2003, the Turkish parliament debated the US invasion of Iraq, the opposition parties were even against the American invasion of Iraq, and linked their opposition to America with their opposition to Israel, in that regard the CHP parliamentary Tekin Bingöl stated that:

> *"My audience is the members who acted sensitively [to reject] the March 1 motion [asking the parliament to permit US troops to access Iraq using Turkish soil in 2003]. On that day, we did not fear America, but only God. Now I am saying, don't be scared of America or Israel, but be fearful of God; listen to your conscience."*[562]

The civil and social organizations also played a role in creating the order of discourse about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On 28 March 2004, the organization of 'No to Occupation of Iraq', protested in front of the Consulate General of Israel, against the assassination of Ahmad Yassin. The organization was supported by other Turkish NGOs like 'Ozgur Der', 'Social Democratic Party', 'EMEP', and 'Union of Architecture and Engineering', and 'Organization of Human rights'. The protest included children holding

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[560] "Hamas Liderine Cenaze Namazi", *Milliyet*, 27.03.2004, p. 17.
[561] Bo Wang, "A Research on the Causes of Turkey-Israel Discord", *Middle East Studies Institute*, Vol.6, No.1 (2009), p. 45.
[562] Tekin Bingöl; "Rejection of March 1", *Turkish Grand National Assembly "TBMM"*, 02. 06. 2009.

banners with slogans of “Hepimiz Seyh Yasin” “We All Sheyh Yassin”, “Hamas’a Selam, Direnişe Devam” “Hi to Hamas, Continue Resistance”. Moreover, they used slogans against Israel and the USA. Nonetheless, the protests by children were criticized by some intellectuals who indicated that “the brains of children are washed and the enemy is created in their minds” as it is shown in news text in photo 6.1-1.[563]

28.03.2004, Milliyet, Sayfa 18

Küçük beyinlere düşman tohumu

Protesto gösterisinde çocukların yer almasını uzmanlar, "Beyinleri yıkanıyor, kafalarında düşman yaratılıyor" diye eleştirdi

Büyükleriyle aynı sloganları attılar

Şartlanma yaratılıyor

Figure 6.1-1 The Turkish newspaper ‘Milliyet’ published a news on 28.04.2004 -after assassination of Ahmad Yassin- with title of "seeds of enmity in the minds of the children"

Fairclough indicated that by studying the order of discourse we can explore what are the common-sense assumptions that are shared by all the prevailing discourses, “the areas

[563] “Küçük Beyinlere Düşman Tohumu”, *Milliyet*, 28.03.2004, p. 18.

where all discourses share the same common-sense assumptions are less open to change and more likely to remain stable, whereas areas, where different discourses struggle to fix meaning in competing ways, are unstable and more open to change."[564] In that context, we find that the prevailed discourses either by government leaders, parliamentarians, NGOs, or public opinion share the same common sense towards the US and Israel, the thing that makes this discourse to remain stable and less open to change. Anti-American and anti-Israeli discourse also stems from the public's rejection of the American invasion of Iraq, **so the International domain affected the order of discourse in Turkey towards Israel and America. And that is an example on post-structuralist assumption that there is nothing outside the text or the discourse.**

However, after a month from the assassination of Ahmad Yassin, the Israeli forces assassinated his follower Abdul-Azziz al-Rantisi by an airstrike. The event has deepened the Turkish anger, and as a response, on 20 April 2004, the Turkish prime minister Erdogan refused to meet a group of Israeli businessmen who before a day asked for an appointment.[565] On 20 April 2004, the representative of CHP in the Turkish parliament Ahmet Sirri Ozbek, described the Israeli assassination of the leader of Hamas al-Rantisi, with "yapılan soykırımdır" "acted genocide".[566]

In spite of the international criticism of the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, Israel did not make consideration to these criticisms and in May 2004, the occupation forces attacked the refugee camp in Rafah, destructing homes of Palestinians and killing civilians. In response to the Israeli attack, the United Nations on 19 May 2004 issued a decision of 1554 condemning the Israeli killing of Palestinians and destruction of their homes.[567] While Turkey harshly criticized Israel, and the Prime Minister Erdogan in his

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[564] Fairclough, 1993, p. 142.
[565] "Erdoğan`dan İsrailli İşadamlarına Ret", *Hurriyet*, 20.04.2004 , http://bigpara.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/genel-haberler/erdogan-dan-israilli-isadamlarina-ret_ID486348/ , accessed on 03.10.2017
[566] "CHPli Özbekten İsraile Büyük Öfke", *Milliyet*, 21.04.2004, p. 15.
[567] Beinin & Hajjar, 2014, p. 11

response said: "I call all the leaders to take a stance towards these incidents which were escalated to a level of state terrorism."[568]

When Erdogan condemned the Israeli practices, he also condemned the US for bombing a wedding house in Iraq. In that regard, he called the UN to accomplish its duties saying that "If we want to create a joint struggle atmosphere, I would like to call all the leaders to collaborate on this issue."[569] The president of the Turkish Parliament, Bulent Arinc also condemned the Israeli attack saying that: "Israel is doing state terror and I condemning it." "İsrail Devlet Terörü uyguluyor, Kınıyorum", besides, he mentioned that America is responsible for the event as like as Israel.[570] **It is noted here again that the discourse of the Turkish leaders about the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians is legitimated and linked with the international discourse about 'war on terrorism',** the Turkish leaders wanted to send a message that if you want to fight terrorism, the Israeli actions towards the Palestinians also must not be ignored. That is concluded when the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan responded to a question about terrorism in an interview with Israeli journalist published by *Haaretz* newspaper on 3 June 2004:

> *"It is not the problem of only one country. Terrorism is an international phenomenon. We have to establish a joint plan to fight terrorism. The intelligence agencies of various countries should be in real cooperation with each other. If a mutual platform to fight terrorism can be established, we can achieve some results….But while doing so we must never forget one thing: We have to take on this challenge, fight this struggle, within the framework of human rights and the supremacy of the law. Saying `I am the strong one, so I can name anyone I want as a terrorist and anyone I want as a criminal and just kill them and go' - that mentality is wrong…..We have to be in solidarity if we want to serve global peace. We have to go hand in hand; humanity does not want to see any more bloodshed or death."*[571]

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[568] "Erdoğan'dan İsrail ve ABD'ye kınama", *Hürriyet*, 20.05.2004, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogandan-israil-ve-abdye-kinama-38605481, accessed on 13.02.2018 .

[569] "Erdogan: Almost State Terrorism", *Hurriyet,* 21.05.2004, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-almost-state-terrorism-227297, accessed on 03.12.2017.

[570] "Arınç: İsrail Vahşetinden ABD de Sorumlu", *Hurriyet*, 21.05. 2004, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/arinc-israil-vahsetinden-abd-de-sorumlu-227358, accessed on 20.07.2017.

[571] "Turkish PM: Israel Treating Palestinians as They Were Treated", *Haaretz*, 03.06. 2004, https://www.haaretz.com/news/turkish-pm-israel-treating-palestinians-as-they-were-treated-1.124236, accessed on 20.04.2017.

6.1.3 The Effect of the Discourse and Creation of Intersubjective Knowledge Between Two States

Even the Turkish government and leaders of the JDP frequently criticized Israel and took a stance against its practices towards the Palestinians, but the Turkish government was cautious not to cut its relations with Israel, and criticism of Erdogan did not seriously harm the Turkish-Israeli relations. What has been affected was the social perception and raising of the spirit of hat between leaders and people of the two states. That can be observed when Erdogan sent two of the Turkish ministers to attend the 56th universally of the establishment of Israel on 27 April 2004. The two ministers were Cemil Cicek and Vecdi Gonulu. In the reception, the Turkish ministers received comments from the Israeli side, **"Başbakan Erdoğan'ın tavrını rağmen siz buradasınız"**, **"In spite of the attitude of Erdogan, you are here",** the minister cicek replied with "yorum yok" **"no comment",** and according to a news published in the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* "the Israeli soldiers and diplomats in the reception did not give importance for the two ministers."[572] Theoretically, that is a part of discursive practices, which are grouped with other practices forming coherence of discourse in Israel against Turkey. On the other hand, that discursive practices in Israel were created and resulted from the previous chain of discourse represented in the rhetoric of Erdogan against Israel in Turkey.

Israeli think tanks explained Erdogan's discourse about Israel as a mean used by him to gain publicity in the Islamic World, as Hanoch Marmari in Haaretz stated:

> *"Erdogan is not an adolescent who is as yet unaware of the complexity of the world. He is an experienced statesman who heads a regional power that is mired in its own problems, and for him the close relationship with Israel has become a burden. In effect, Erdogan is telling Israel: You are not taking our sensitivities into account in your flagrant actions."*[573]

These writings and discourses, are also discursive practices and kind of social interaction that created a 'shared knowledge', which in turn, shaped and reflected the

[572] "İsrail Gününe İki Bakan", *Milliyet*, 27.06.2004. p.21.
[573] Hanoch Marmari, "The Revenge of Sheikh Yasin", *Haaretz*, 04.06.2004, https://www.haaretz.com/the-revenge-of-sheikh-yassin-1.124320 accessed on 30.04.2018.

‘identity’ of Erdogan and the JDP that rules Turkey as Muslims who always are more sensitive towards the Palestinian issue, as well as, it emphasized the social identity of Turkey as a “regional power”.

6.1.4 Diplomatic Relations with Israel and Economic Efforts for Peace

In consequence of the Israeli assassination of the Palestinian leaders in 2004, Israel faced a lot of international criticisms. As a result of these criticisms, Israel announced its plan to withdraw from settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. But in September 2004 Hamas wanted to retaliate for killing of their leaders, and within 16 days 82 Israeli were killed, the thing that worsened the situation.

Then the Palestinian arena witnessed the death of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat during his medical treatment in Paris on 11 November 2004.[574] The Turkish leaders Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül attended the funeral of Yasser Arafat.[575] On 9 January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas won the elections and became the president of the Palestinian Authority.[576]

After the calm down of the situation, Turkey followed a more active policy towards the Palestinian issue, confirming its desire to act as an honest mediator between the two sides.[577] In that context, the planned visit to Israel and Palestine that was delayed for one year has been resumed, and on 4 January 2005 minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gul visited Israel and Palestine,[578] which considered the first visit on a high level from Turkey to Israel and Palestine.[579] Before his visit, Abdullah Gul said to the press “it is an advantage for us to have good relations with the two sides, Turkey will use all of its capacities and

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[574] Ertosun, *Filistin Politikamız*, p. 253.
[575] Özcan, 2008, p. 129.
[576] Ertosun, loc.cit.
[577] Cagaptay, loc.cit.
[578] Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye – İsrail İlişkilerinde Dönüşüm: Güvenliğin Ötesi Dış Politika Programı”, *Dış Politika Analiz Serisi,* (1 November 2005), 122.
[579] -Ertosun, op.cit., p. 257.
-Tür, 2012, p. 45.

efforts to contribute in the peace process, using the secretly or diplomatic ways".[580] In Tel Aviv, the Israeli press asked him about Erdogan's criticism of Israel as a "terrorist state", he replied "o günler artık geride kaldı", "those days left behind" and he indicated that Ankara wanted to develop its relations with Tel Aviv.[581]

The second visit to Israel and Palestine was by the prime minister Erdogan on 2 May 2005, as a continuation for Gül's visit, aiming at developing relations with Israel, and playing an active role in the peace process.[582]

During his visit to Palestine, Erdogan said to Abbas that Turkey wishes to play a mediator role, but it is possible with acceptance of Israel. He conveyed two messages to Sharon, the first is that al-Aqsa Mosque is a sensitive subject, and Israel must take care in its acts regard the holy places, the second is that Israel must end all of the terrorist acts in order to achieve peace process.[583]

In its efforts for peace process, Turkey has initiated the Ankara Forum that created an Industrial Project for peace, through which the Union of the Israeli Producers suggested to start projects to develop the Palestinian economics. One of these projects was the establishment of the Erez industrial zone in Gaza, which was signed during visit of Gul to Palestine on 4 January 2006.[584] However, the project was going slowly as a result of the developments in the Palestinian political arena such as the coming of Hamas to power. Moreover, the Israeli operation in Gaza led to stop of the project.[585]

6.1.5 Turkey's Recognition of Hamas

In spite of the development of the Turkish diplomatic and economic relations with Israel in 2005, but the relationship between the two countries has deteriorated, by

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[580] "Visit of Gul to Israel", *Hurriyet*, 03.01.2005.
[581] "İsrail Gül'e Umut Vermedi", *Milliyet*, 05.01.2005, p. 18.
[582] Ertosun, 2013, p. 258.
[583] "Erdogan Şahini İkna Edemedi", *Milliyet*, 03.05.2005.
[584] "Gul visit Palestine", *Hurriyet*, 05.01.2006.
[585] Ertosun, 2013, p. 260.

recognition of JDP government of Hamas as a legitimate party in Palestine after its winning in the Palestinian elections which was conducted on 25 January 2006, by 74 seats from 132. JDP also emphasized its recognition of Hamas by inviting its leader Khaled Mishaal to visit Ankara on 16 February 2006.

Hamas is a form of resistance that considered a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Palestine, its name as "Islamic Resistance Movement" became publicly known in the beginning of the first *Intifada* in December 1987.[586]

One of the principles and axioms of Hamas is not to recognize Israel's right of existence and legitimacy of occupation in any way. According to Hamas, *jihad* and armed resistance are the correct and authentic means for the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of all Palestinian rights, and if there were other means to return their rights without shedding of blood they would have taken it.[587] In the context of its vision, Hamas was against Oslo Accords that took place in 1993 and through which the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist.[588]

However, the first elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council 'PLC' since the signing of Oslo Accords were held in 1996, and then they have not been conducted until 2006. Hamas did not participate in 1996 elections and boycotted it, due to its position from the PLO and Oslo Accords, while it decided to participate in 2006 elections, which conducted on 25 January 2006, and resulted with winning of Hamas by 74 of 132 seats, against 45 seats for the PLO. [589]

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[586] Mohsen Mohammad Saleh , "The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) An Overview of Its Experience & History 1987–2005", *Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Studies of Thought & Experience*, Mohsen Mohammad (ed.), Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2017, p. 27.

[587] Khalid Mish'al, "Hamas: Milestones in Thought and Experience", *Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Studies of Thought & Experience*, Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (ed.), Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2017. P. 456.

[588] Isma'il Haniyyah, "Hamas: An Analysis of the Vision and Experience in Power", *Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Studies of Thought & Experience*, Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (ed.), Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2017, p. 474.

[589] Ishtiaq Hossain, Belal Shobaki , "Hamas in Power, A Study of Its Ideology and Policies, 2006–2012", *Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Studies of Thought & Experience*, Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (ed.), Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2017, p. 378.

During this period Turkey was emphasizing the priority of peace process and negotiations to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within this vision, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believed that it is not possible to achieve this peace without the involvement of Hamas as a key party in the peace process and negotiations. So, the victory of Hamas encouraged the Turkish government to defend the legitimacy of Hamas's participation in the peace process and in the negotiations over this process, in return for Hamas's renouncement of armed resistance.[590]

In that framework Turkey recognized Hamas, and in an interview with the Turkish prime minister Erdoğan on 2 February 2006, he said, "Hamas won the Palestinian election and we must respect the decision of the Palestinian people".[591] The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also indicated that all related parties should respect the results of the elections which had been conducted democratically. Moreover, Turkey announced that it will be against any outside attempts to impose economic measures against the Palestinian Administration to weaken the newly elected party. [592]

The declared policy of JDP was to convince Hamas to move away from violence and to recognize Israel to achieve peace in the Middle East. In that framework Turkey has accepted the visit of Hamas to Ankara which initiated from side of Hamas within its plan to visit the Muslim countries, and gain their support to counter the efforts of the Western countries, that aimed to increase the pressure on Hamas after its winning in the elections.[593] Turkey did not refuse the visit since the prime minister Erdogan was planning to be a mediator between the new Palestinian Administration and Israel.

The visit created controversy and objection in the corridors of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Erdoğan defended the visit by saying that Ankara was seeking a greater role in

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[590] Talal 'Atrissi, "Hamas and the Muslim World Case Studies of Turkey and Iran", *Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) Studies of Thought & Experience*, Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (ed.), Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 2017, p. 336.
[591] ibid, p. 337.
[592] Bülent Aras, "Turkey and the Palestinian Question", *SETA,* No.27 (January, 2009), p. 6.
[593] "Hamas Leader in Surprise Visit to Ankara", *Al Jazeera*, 16. 02. 2006. https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/02/200849161241248931.html, accessed on 24.07.2018.

the Middle East. He said that Turkey could not sit uselessly, and that the Turkish officials explained for Hamas the position of the international community regarding the need to abandon violence and recognize Israel.[594]

Sabah newspaper reported that the visit met with harsh responses from the West. The US Government said to the Turkish Ambassador Nabi Sensoy "if we met PKK, how you will perceive it." Because of these responses, the prime minister Erdogan canceled the meeting, but the minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gul met the delegation of Hamas in leadership of Khaled Meshal, in the identity of JDP not in the name of the Turkish government. During the meeting, Gul conveyed to the delegation of Hamas the messages of the international community, while Khalid Meshal said that "the advices of the Turkish government were beneficial". Before meeting with Abdallah Gul, the delegation of Hamas met with the Consultant 'Ahmet Uzumcu' who conveyed to Hamas message from the Turkish government saying to them the following points:

> *"Now you are not Hamas, you are Palestinians, make surprise to the world, leave the violence and the weapon, recognize Israel, and resume the Road Map."*[595]

Moreover, the Turkish officials indicated that if Turkey did not accept the visit of Hamas and without its intervention, Iran and Syria will be the only possible entry for Hamas. On the other side, Abdullah Gul indicated that it was not possible for Turkey to remain a watcher on the Palestinian problem while even the land registration records of Palestine remain in Turkey. And he counters the Western and Israeli criticism in giving a response that the Turkish government tries to affect Hamas to disarm, become more moderate, and to be involved effectively in the peace process and enter to the diplomatic negotiations with Israel.[596]

The Turkish intellectuals and officials indicated that the visit of Hamas to Ankara was one of the critical events that reflect the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle

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[594] 'Atrissi, 2017, p. 338.
[595] "Hamas'tan Sürpriz Ankara Çıkarması", Sabah, 17.2.2006, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/02/17/siy107.html , accessed on 20.07.20018.
[596] Aras, 2009, p. 6.

East, and was an example on the autonomy of the Turkish foreign policy from the West. In that domain, Taha Ozhan wrote:

> *"One of the most serious reflections of the Paradigm shift that occurred in the JDP-era Turkish Foreign Policy, which we have tried to describe in different aspects, on the Middle Eastern Politics was the visit paid to Ankara on February 16, 2006 by Khaled Meshal, the political office chief of Hamas, Which won 76 seats in the 136-member Palestinian Assembly in the fair and free elections of January 25, 2006 in Palestine."*[597]

However, Turkey did not refrain from its position towards Hamas as a legitimated party that won elections democratically, and still meet with its officials within the framework of its effort to find solutions for the Palestinian issue. In that aspect, the Turkish leaders still defend Hamas and refuse the claims that Hamas is a terrorist organization. That is confirmed in the following speech for the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyeb Erdogan on 4 June 2010:

> *"Bir defa Hamas'la, terör örgütü PKK'nın benzer hiç bir tarafı yoktur. Hamas, kendi topraklarını koruma mücadelesini veren direnişçilerdir, Filistinlidirler, Filistin'de seçim kazanmışlardır, seçim kazandıkları halde hala İsrail cezaevlerinde yatmaktadırlar" ...Ben bunları Amerika'nın yetkililerine de söyledim. Her yerde söyledim, 'Ben Hamas'ı terör örgütü olarak kabul etmiyorum, tanımıyorum' dedim. Bugün de böyle düşünüyorum. Düşüncem budur" diye konuştu."*[598]

> *"Once Hamas, the PKK terrorist organization has no similar side. Hamas is a resistance struggle in the struggle to protect their own land, they are Palestinians, they have won elections in Palestine, they are still in Israeli prisons, even if they have won elections.. I have said to the authorities in America. Everywhere I said, "I do not accept Hamas as a terrorist organization and I don't recognize that" I think so today. This is my thought."*[599]

Abdullah Gül also defended the Turkish policy of recognizing Hamas as a legitimate party, as reported by *Hurriyet* newspaper on 4 February 2009:

> *"Hamas must be involved in the political process. Some say this openly and some during our private meetings. Turkey has acted responsibly from the very beginning, met*

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[597] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 38.
[598] "Erdoğan: Hamas Terör Örgütü Değil", *Haberler.Com*, 04.06.2010, https://www.haberler.com/erdogan-hamas-teror-orgutu-degil-2087911-haberi/ , accessed on 04.08.2018.
[599] ibid, translated.

with Hamas on the days when they won the elections (in 2006) and warned them about the consequences when they resorted to the wrong paths."[600]

6.2 JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE (2007-2011)

In the period of 2007- 2011, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue, characterized with emergence of the hardest antagonistic Turkish rhetoric and discourse towards Israel, started by Davos crisis, which is considered as a discursive practice and social practice through which common knowledge about identities of the leaders of the two countries and their attitudes towards the Palestinian issue were articulated, at the same time, Davos crisis created a cultural structure upon which other discourses emerged like the Turkish series Kurtlar Vadisi, which in turn led to other discursive practice between Israel and Turkey like law chair crisis. All of these discursive practices stemmed from wider discourse and encouraged the Turkish people to take more real steps against the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, like launching of Mavi Marmara to break the Israeli blockade over Gaza.

6.2.1 Cast Lead Operation and Davos Crisis as a Turning Point in the Turkish Israeli Relations

Within the atmosphere of peace initiatives in the Middle East, that composed from three stands: the peace in Lebanon, Syrian and Israeli talks, and cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, Turkey found itself in a suitable period to play a role of mediator in the peace process, especially, the mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks about the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. In his first visit to Israel, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon in dinner and talked about the expected role of Turkey in achieving the peace between Syria and Israel. Erdogan remarked that "**biz arabuluculuk**

[600] "Do Not Discriminate", *Hurriyet*, 04.02.2009, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/do-not-discriminate-gul-10920085 , accessed on 04.08.2018.

için yaratılmışız", "we are created for mediation", he added that if it is required, Turkey can take the initiative for mediation. Turkey's offer to act as a mediator in the peace process was met positively by both sides, in that aspect, the visit of Shimon Peres to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at the same time as Mahmoud Abbas, and his speech boosted hope towards the establishment of regional peace.[601]

The preparations for peace talks took place between March 2007 and May 2008.[602] In April 2008, Olmert sent a message to Bashar al-Assad, through the Turkish prime minister Erdogan, expressing in it about his initial acceptance to open talks about Golan Heights.[603] Consequently, four rounds of indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli officials were held in Istanbul from May to December 2008.[604] The Turkish officials were transferring the opinions of each side to the other, and making calls with Olmert and Syrian President Bashar al -Assad, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid al Muallem.[605] The process reached a high point on 23 December 2008, at a dinner between Erdogan and Olmert, with the expectation that direct talks between Israel and Syria were in the offing.[606]

Nevertheless, these efforts were interrupted by the devastating Israeli Cast Lead operation in Gaza, started on 28 December 2008, and lasted until 18 January 2009,[607] through which Israel killed and injured thousands of Palestinians, third of them were children, and Gaza was turned to an open prison. From that time the Syrian Israeli talks collapsed, while the event was a turning point in Turkish Israeli relations, and was the first chain of events that led to closing the extraordinary period in the Turkish Israeli relations,[608] since it led to creation of harsh discourse about Israel in the Turkish mediums. Besides, it prepared the suitable environment and conditions for more actions to support the

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[601] Mensur Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar & Aybars Görgülü, "Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations", *TESEV Foreign Policy Program,* p. 3.
[602] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 230.
[603] Syria and Israel officially confirm peace talks, *The Guardian*, 21.5 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/21/israelandthepalestinians.syria, accessed on 23.05.2017
[604] Hale, op.cit., p. 230.
[605] Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe, Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2011, p. 415.
[606] Hale, loc.cit.
[607] ibid.
[608] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 48.

Palestinian issue, like Davos Crisis and Mavi Marmara.

6.2.1.1 Davos Crisis "Common Knowledge and Dominant Discourse"

The diplomatic clash with Israel exploded dramatically, when the Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan clashed during a panel discussion on Gaza at a World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 29 January 2009.[609]

In the Forum, the Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres defended Israel's role in Gaza, and he was given more time than others to talk, he criticized the ideology of Hamas and indicated that it is far from democracy. [610] The Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan wanted to respond on remarks of Peres, but the moderator shortened his response, Erdogan became angry and insisted to respond grasping the arm of the moderator saying to Peres: *"when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill."* After that, Erdogan left the hall, saying *"And so Davos is over for me from now on."*[611]

The incident which also known as "one-minute crisis", led to a rapid deterioration in the Turkish-Israeli relations, while Erdogan's popularity increased in the Arab world, as the Turkish politician and intellectual Taha Özhan argued, "relations between Turkey and the Arab world entered the liveliest period of the past century. After quite a long interval, Turkey caught the opportunity to return to the Arab streets with such a pace."[612]

Theoretically, Wendt argues that social interaction between actors creates common knowledge, which in turn constitutes 'cultural structure' according to which individuals take action.[613] As it is shown in the figure 6.2-1, it can be argued that Davos Crisis is social

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[609] Hale, loc.cit.
[610] ElderofZiyon, "Transcript of Peres Speech at World Economic Forum in Davos", 01.02.2009, http://elderofziyon.blogspot.com.tr/2009/02/transcript-of-peres-speech-at-world.html, accessed on 04.12.2017
[611] Katrin Bennhold, "Leaders of Turkey and Israel clash at Davos panel", *The New York Times*, 29.01.2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30iht-30clash.19795420.html, accessed on 05.02.2017
[612] Özhan, op.cit., p. 49.
[613] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 161.

interaction between Turkey and Israel, when Erdogan said "*when it comes to killing, you know well how to kill",* he brought and perpetuated in the minds of the audiences the common knowledge about Israel as a killer of children. This discursive practice constituted the "structure of culture", which dominated the thought of the audiences and the Turkish public, who behaved according to this culture.



Figure 6.2-1 Davos Crisis as a Discourse ' Constructivist and Post-structural Analysis'

One example on the behavior of the Turkish public is the Turkish series of 'Kurtlar Vadisi', that depicts Israel as a killer of children. The discourse about Israel in this series stemmed from wider discourses that were circulated by the speeches of the leaders and media like the discourse of Davos. So 'Kurtlar Vadisi' is a part of discursive practice which is according to Foucault, "a process of implementing discourse in a social domain".

The constructivist Emanuel Adler also framed it saying: "even individuals realize in their heads where they would be, but their realization is limited, since they feel and think only in the context of dominating intersubjective knowledge and understandings include rule and language, so it is discourses and rules that transfer individuals into agents by enabling them to act upon the world in which they live".[614]

[614] Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations", p. 121.

Audie Klotz also argued that people act in ways that produce, perpetuate and alter the environments in which they live. And here, the people reinforce the dominant meanings "facts or realities", to assure the existence of the structure, this reinforcement occurs through language and discourse to encourage the quest of collective goals based on religions for example, and diminishing negative practices like racism or class distinction.[615] Kurtar Vadisi is a discourse that reinforced the dominant meanings and realities about Israel, assuring the existence of the structure that dominates the Turkish-Israeli behavior. Kurtlar Vadisi also affected the social relations between Turkey and Israel in the sense that it has disturbed the Israeli government and created a debate among the Israeli people.

6.2.2 Low Chair Crisis

Davos crisis that was discussed above as a social practice, does not just confirm the common knowledge of the two sides about each other and constituted the cultural structure dominated the minds of agents, it also became an honor issue for Turkey.

After the Davos crisis, the atmosphere between the two countries became worse, and feelings of hat dominated the minds of the public and diplomats. In that context, Israel expressed its response to Davos not by words, but by action, through a symbolic event which disgraced the value of the Turkish Ambassador to Tel Aviv. That was one year after Davos crisis, when the Israeli deputy of the minister of foreign affairs Danny Ayalon called Turkey's ambassador Ahmet Oguz Celikkol to an urgent meeting on 11 January 2010. The meeting aimed to deliver Israel's disturbance and their complaints about the Turkish TV series "Kurtlar Vadisi" that depicts the Israeli soldiers as a killer of children.[616] In the meeting, Ayalon has publicly disgraced the Turkish ambassador Çelikkol by seating him in a lower chair than himself and only the Israeli flag was on the table.[617]

Erdogan responded to the event by stating that "biz asırlar boyu Musevilere gerekli

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[615] Klotz & Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 6.
[616] Hale, op.cit., p. 230.
-Aaron j. Klein, "Israel and Turkey: anatomy of a dissing war," *Time* , 14.01.2010 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953746,00.html , accessed on 14.05.2018
[617] Hale, op.cit.

hoşgörüyü göstermişiz", "we show tolerance for the Jews for centuries". Erdogan also declared that he would not meet the Israeli defense minister, who was planning to meet him at that time.[618] Even at the beginning, Ayalon insisted that he did the right thing but after days he wrote a formal apology to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, saying that:

> "*I had no intention to humiliate you personally and apologize for the way the démarche was handled and perceived…Please convey this to the Turkish people for whom we have great respect … although we have our differences of opinion on several issues, they should be discussed and solved only through open, reciprocal and respectful diplomatic channels between our two governments.* "[619]

The Israeli government later apologized, but at this stage, the damage was done. As Ozhan remarked, Turkish public opinion – like that of most countries – can accept setbacks, but not open insults.[620]

6.2.3 Mavi Marmara as a Result of Discourse and Reproducing Structural Properties

After Davos crisis, the Turkish Israeli relations deteriorated again in consequence of the Israeli attack on a Turkish flotilla 'Mavi Marmara' on 31 May 2010, killing nine of the Turkish activists. The flotilla was sent by non-governmental organization IHH, carrying people and humanitarian aid to break the Israeli blockade over Gaza.[621] Before the departure, the Turkish government argued the leader of IHH not to sail to Gaza. The organization promised that if they were challenged by Israeli forces, they will change the tour to the Egyptian port of al-Arish. But when they sailed to 130 kilometers from the Israeli coast, the Israeli forces asked them to change their way to the Israeli port of Ashdod. As they refused to back, the Israeli forces surrounded them and opened fire on the

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[618] "İsrail'le 'alçak koltuk' krizi", Milliyet, 13.01.2010, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/israil-le--alcak-koltuk--krizi-gundem-1185364/ , accessed on 15.05.2018.
[619] ibid.
[620] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 230.
[621] Geoffrey Palmer, et. al., "Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident", (September 2011), p. 7.

passengers.[622]

The attack met with strong protests in Turkey, the Prime Minister Erdogan, criticized Israel and described the attack as a "state terrorism in complete violation of International law", Minister of Foreign affairs also described the attack as "bullying", "birasy", and " a murder committed by Israel."[623]

In addition to the verbal criticism and condemnation, Turkey called back its ambassador from Tel Aviv, downgraded its relations with Israel into the secondary level, and canceled the joint military exercises with Israel and barred the Israeli military flights over its airspace.[624]

On Military level, the previous Turkish military advisor in 2002-2008, Metin Gurcan, indicated that:

> *"After the Mavi Marmara incident, intelligence sharing between the two countries came to an end, followed by cancelations in military training and cooperation. Some defense industry projects were halted and others became extremely cumbersome processes. For example, take the E-7T Peace Eagle Early Warning and Control aircraft manufactured by the US company Boeing and the Israeli company Elta. When relations broke down, some of those systems had already been delivered. In the end, the rest of the deliveries were completed, but Turkey's defense industry undersecretariat initiated a project to manufacture a substitute for the E-7T in Turkey…. The aerial reconnaissance capabilities of the Turkish air force suffered the most. A plan had been made to procure high-definition electro optics and radar pods to be used in RF-4E Phantom planes. When the contract was canceled, Turkey opted to fill the gap by procuring similar pods from the United States"*[625]

Although the diplomatic and military ties were severed between the two countries, but as the Washington-based Brooking Institution announced, the trade ties continued exceeding $5 billion in 2014.[626] Besides, a report written by Joe Hammoura shows that

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[622] Hale, loc.cit.
[623] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 49.
[624] Hale, op.cit., p. 231.
[625] Metin Gurcan, "What's really driving Turkish-Israeli reconciliation?", *Al-Monitor*, 01.07.2016, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2016/06/turkey-israel-normalization-military-security-cooperation.html accessed on 03.06.2017.
[626] Erin Cunningham, Ruth Eglash, , "Israel and Turkey announce deal to repair relations after six-year split", *Washington post*, 27.07.2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-turkey-announce-deal-to-repair-

Turkey is one of the 10 top trading partners for Israel and so Israel for Turkey, as shown below:

> *"In fact, despite rhetorical mud-slinging, both countries did not disrupt their multi-billion dollars worth trade exchanges. On the contrary, the volume of mutual trade showed increase and Israel continues to be one of the main exporters of Turkish goods. From approximately $2.6 billion in overall bilateral trade during 2009, trade grew to $3.3 billion in 2010 and to $4.2 billion in 2011. After a drop in 2012 (to approx. $3.9 billion) the volume of bilateral trade in 2013 for the first time crossed the $5 billion dollar mark, as Turkey became one of Israel's top 10 trading partners, and as Israel."*[627]

Legally, the UN Human Rights Council, appointed a commission of three-man fact finding, while both the Israeli and Turkish governments established separate investigation commissions. On 2 August 2010, the UN Secretary-General also established a panel of inquiry,[628] headed by the former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer and included Turkish and Israeli representatives.

In September 2010, the UN Human Rights Council report found that the Israeli forces violated international law, listing a series of alleged crimes committed by them and claiming that there was 'clear evidence to support prosecutions'. The Israeli government rejected the report describing it as 'biased, politicized and extremist'.

While the internal Turkish report took a similar line to the UN report, the Israeli internal inquiry found that both the raid on the flotilla and the blockade of Gaza were legal under international law. Furthermore, Israel's hard-line foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman claimed that it was Turkey, not Israel, that should pay compensation.[629]

In September 2011, the UN Palmer committee report found that Israel's attack on the Mavi Marmara was 'excessive and unreasonable'. While its naval blockade of the Gaza

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relations-after-six-year-split/2016/06/27/aa2399ae-3bd5-11e6-9e16-4cf01a41decb_story.html accessed on 05.06.2017.

[627] Joe Hammoura, "Turkey-Israel Relations: A Troubled Marriage", *Middle East Institute for Research and Strategic Studies)*, July, 2016. http://meirss.org/turkey-israel-relations-a-troubled-marriage / accessed on 05.06.2017.

[628] Palmer, et. al., loc.cit.

[629] Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*, p. 231.

strip was legitimate under international law.[630] The report concluded that "Israel faces a real threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza. The naval blockade was imposed as a legitimate security measure to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea and its implementation complied with the requirements of international law."[631]

The Turkish government rejected the finding of the Palmer Committee which declared that the Israeli blockade was legal. In that aspect, Turkey continued to demand an apology. On 2 September, it effectively expelled the Israeli ambassador in Ankara by reducing mutual diplomatic representation to the Second Secretary level and ending its defense cooperation agreement with Israel.[632] However, to recover its relations with Israel, Turkey demanded three conditions from the Israeli government. These conditions were: the apology of Israel, paying compensations to the families of the victims, and to lift the embargo on Gaza.[633]

Using constructivist theory in international relations, it can be argued that Mavi Marmara Crisis resulted from accumulated discourses of the leaders that created a cultural structure, according to which the Turkish people and social civil organizations and non-governmental organizations 'NGOs' took actions towards Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Giddens argues that:

> *"In reproducing structural properties to repeat a phrase used earlier, agents also reproduce the conditions that make such action possible.[634] ...The flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors, and these unintended consequences also may form unacknowledged conditions of action in a feedback fashion.*[635]

Knowledge and power serve to allow and limit certain social practices, the Turkish

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[630] Hale, loc.cit.
[631] Palmer, et. al., op.cit, p. 4.
[632] Hale, loc.cit.
[633] "Turkey, Israel reach deal to normalize ties: Israeli official", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 26.06.2016 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-israel-reach-deal-to-normalize-ties-israeli-official.aspx?PageID=238&NID=100938&NewsCatID=510 , accessed on 23.04.2017.
[634] Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration,* Oxford: Polity Press, 1984, p. 26.
[635] ibid, p. 27.

people became aware of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and sufferings of the Palestinians as a result of the Israeli practices, and Israeli blockade over Gaza after the war of 2008. This consciousness was increased and emphasized through the "cultural structure" that has dominated the Turkish environment after Davos Crisis, in which the actors as Giddens argues, reproduce the conditions that make other actions like Mavi Marmara possible. Taking the Davos crisis in consideration, the Turkish people saw the bravery of their leader Erdogan to express his feelings against Israel in Davos, as an incentive to take more initiatives towards the Palestinian issue, and the unintended consequence was "Mavi Marmara Crisis", when Israel attacked the aid flotilla "Mavi Marmara", killing nine Turkish citizens.[636] That event has seriously changed the path of Turkish Israeli relations which deteriorated severely.

Not just the Davos event created the conditions and cultural structure about Israel and Palestinians, the structure was reproduced before Davos through repeating phrases used earlier by the Turkish leaders criticizing Israel, like "Israel is doing a terrorist act" "Israel kills children". The agents who repeated and circulated these phrases were media agencies, parliamentary members, and political leaders. And so, in that process, agents reproduced the conditions that made such action possible.[637]

Even the Turkish government believes that the action was taken apart from its desire, and that was clear when Ahmet Davutoglu asked the leader of IHH not to sail, but in fact, the event is one of the consequences of the conditions the discourse of Turkish government created and prepared for its public opinion to take such action. **So that is an example of Foucauldian discourse theory which supposes that 'knowledge is put to work via discursive practices to regulate people's conduct, and the power and knowledge served to allow certain social practices.** [638]

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[636] Özhan, *Turkey and the Crisis of Sykes-Picot Order*, p. 49.
[637] Giddens, op.cit., p. 26.
[638] Graham Gibbs, "Lecture about Discourse Analysis: Part 2 Foucauldian approaches", University of Huddersfield, 06.05.2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_ffCsQx2Cg, accessed on 24.03.2019

6.2.4 Mavi Marmara "Issue of National Honor and Opportunity Towards Regional Power"

Even the Turkish decision to downgrade its relations with Israel in consequence of Mavi Marmara crisis, was a defensive action linked with self-dignity of the Turkish people and was seen as an issue of national honor, but on the other hand, it was an opportunity for Turkey to play a more significant role in the Palestinian issue; leaders of JDP government wished to take a more active role in the peace process in Arab Israeli conflict, their vision stems from their beliefs that they had a responsibility towards the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, the external constraints and Turkey's relations with the US, in addition to its membership in NATO limited its role in the Palestinian issue to the humanitarian aids, and the mediator or facilitator role in the peace process, by persuading the two sides to make some concessions. In that context, cutting relations with Israel was not included in the agenda of the Turkish foreign policy, even as a response to the Israeli attacks on Gaza and its practices towards the Palestinians that violated the International laws. Nonetheless, the Mavi Marmara gave Turkey the legitimate power to take a more serious action towards Israel, and it was an unexpected opportunity for Turkey to play a significant role towards the Palestinian issue. That is clear when the Turkish government linked its conditions to normalize its relations with Israel to the lifting of the Israeli blockade upon Gaza, and in this way, Turkey recovers its considerations, at the same time it wins the popularity in the Arab states.

6.2.5 "Self" and "Other" in Mavi Marmara

Mavi Marmara crisis between Turkey and Israel -that occurred in May 2010, in consequence of Israeli attack on human aid flotilla, killing 9 of the Turkish activists as explained previously- considered one of the representational practices that deeply contributed in the demarcation of the Turkish identity. Before the Mavi Marmara, even the Turkish public were sensitive to the Palestinian issue, but they located themselves in the position of the watcher and criticizer of the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians. In that

context, Turkey categorized itself besides Palestinians (self) against Israel (other), but the degree of "self" with Palestinians and "other" with Israel was not extremely or deep. However, by Mavi Marmara, the Turkish people became involved in the Palestinian Israeli conflict and suffered from Israel as same as the Palestinians, here the 'self' categorization with the Palestinians became more extreme and it is not just reduced to the position of the watcher and showing of sympathy with the Palestinians. Moreover, Mavi Marmara contributed to creating the enmity of the Turkish people towards Israel, by this event Israel became a common enemy for both Palestinians and Turkish People.

Such events, in which Turkish people are involved in, like Mavi Marmara, or arresting Turkish people by Israeli forces during their visits to the Palestinian lands and al-Aqsa Mosque, made Turkish people to be one of the involved actors in the Palestinian issue, besides to the conceptualization of these events in the frame of honor, all of these together provide much of impetus and legitimation for the Turkish government to downgrade its relations with Israel.

6.3 JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE (2011-2016)

In this period, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue influenced by a new element which was the Arab Uprisings in Middle East. It will be argued that during the uprisings the Turkish position towards the Arab Israeli Conflict was affected by changing of the regimes in other Arab countries like Egypt. During the Israeli war on Gaza in 2012, Muslim Brotherhood was governing Egypt, the thing that made Egypt to be a strategic ally for Turkey. At that time, JDP leaders used the same discourse of Muslim Brotherhood in warning of Israel, and Turkey was able to play an active role in the ceasefire in cooperation with Egypt and Qatar. While in Gaza war 2014, the situation changed as Egypt became under military rule, and it is no longer ally for JDP government, for that Turkey did not play an active role to end the Israeli attack on Gaza. That will be analyzed using constructivist theory of Michael Barnett about the role of identity in foreign policy and choosing of an attractive partner that share a common identity, common history,

and a common destiny. Besides, the post-structuralist discourse theories which assume that "nothing outside the text" and claim that "identity is constituted through repeated acts", will be used to show how discourse of 'Rabia' which its origins back to Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was institutionalized in Turkey through repeated acts and became a sign of JDP. This period also witnessed normalization of the Turkish-Israel relations under a new principle of the Turkish foreign policy that aims to 'increasing friends and decreasing enemies'.

6.3.1 Discourse and Subject Position of Turkey in the Israeli War on Gaza 2012 and Arab Spring

Deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations in the aftermath of Mavi Marmara Crisis, coincided with rising of Arab Uprising or Arab Spring in the Arab countries, which led to change of balance of power in the region. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in parliamentary and presidential elections after overthrowing of President Husni Mubarek. While the uprisings in Syria against the President Bashar al-Assad, affected the position of Hamas in the region, as its relations with its former supporters Syria and Iran were broken, and it became more dependent on diplomatic and financial support from countries which share the same ideology of Sunni Muslim, like Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey.[639] For instance, during the governance of Brotherhood in Egypt, visits of leaders of Hamas to the Islamic and Arab countries increased; in 2012 Ismail Haniyye made a tour to UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, which aimed to deliver a message that Hamas is independent and not loyal to any side. Moreover, in March 2012, Mishaal visited Turkey and met Abdullah Gül and discussed the developments in the Palestinian issue, and then in April 2012, Mishaal met Davutoglu in Qatar, and discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the national reconciliation. [640]

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[639] Richard Spencer, "Gaza conflict: Egypt tries to reassert itself as diplomatic leader of Arab world", *Telegraph*, Cairo, 18.11.2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/9686616/Gaza-conflict-Egypt-tries-to-reassert-itself-as-diplomatic-leader-of-Arab-world.html, accessed on 12.07.2017.

[640] Mohsen Mohammad Salih, "Palestinian issue and Islamic world 2012-2013", *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2012-2013*, Beirut: Al-Zaytuna Center, 2014, p. 5.

In regard to Turkey, Arab Spring was one of the developments that contributed to the reproduction and fostering of its Sunni Islamic identity. In that period, Turkey recognized and supported the government of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as a legitimate power that won the parliamentary elections. On the other side, coming of Muslim Brotherhood to power strengthened the role identity of Turkey in the region, since one of the big Arab countries like Egypt became governed by the Islamic party of Muslim Brotherhood, which has the same ideology of the JDP. Here the identity of Sunni Islam was the shared identity that cemented the alliance between the two governments. Under these circumstances, the two parties have the opportunity to join together to unify the Islamic world and become more independent from the West and global powers like United States and European Union.

That self-identification with government of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was a representational practice which constitutes the reality of Islamic identity of Turkey and structures thought of the actors with dichotomy of Islam/Secularism, since Turkey was seen by Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a model of Islamic party that came to power and succeed within a state that is governed by a secular regime.

Barnett argues that Identity makes some partners more attractive than others.[641] In Turkish relations with the Arab world, the importance of identity for determining who is considered as a valuable and attractive strategic partner is explored in the case of the alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, in addition to the alliance with Qatar.

Moreover, maintenance of alliance is dependent on the party's mutual identification. So the shared identity is the basis of the strategic association and, as Barnett suggests, any change in identity can undermine the alliance's foundation. Shared identity between the JDP government and Muslim Brotherhood government, led the leaders of the two states to consider themselves as members of one community, 'the Islamic community', or a part of an association of like-minded states, and according to this membership they express and

[641] Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East", p.192.

uphold the values and norms that constitute that community, while the community becomes an important source of that identity and that narrative, and those within the community frequently express similar historical roots, a common heritage, and a shared future.[642] That can be observed in the speech of the Turkish prime minister Erdogan in the Turkish-Egyptian forum for businessmen in Egypt, through which he indicated that the two nations Turks and Egyptians since one century were suffering from being far away from Islam, and at the end they came together, emphasizing that there will be no separations between the Turkish and Egyptian brothers:

> *"Mısır'da başlayan yeni dönemle birlikte biz Türkiye olarak açıkçası yeni bir sayfanın açılmasını da iki ülke arasında artık yeni bir dönemin başlatılmasını gönülden arzu ediyoruz ve bunun tohumlarının da ekildiğini gördük. Türkiye ile Mısır arasında neredeyse 1 asırlık bir hasret var. 1 asır önce bölgenin tüm ülke halklarının arasına yapay sınırlar çizildi. Bu yapay sınırlar bizi de 1 asırlık hasrete mahkum etti. Allah'a hamdolsun işte bugün kardeş ülkeler, kardeş halklar arasındaki bu yapay bariyerler tek tek ortadan kalkıyor. Bölgede kardeşler artık hasretle kucaklaşıyor, özlem gideriyor. 1 asırlık ayrılık artık sona eriyor."*[643]
>
> *"With the new period beginning in Egypt, frankly we as Turkey sincerely wish that new page will be open, and new era between the two countries will be start, and we saw that its seeds were planted. Nearly there is a century of longing between Turkey and Egypt. A century ago, artificial boundaries were drawn among the peoples of the entire country. These artificial borders convicted us for a century. Thanks to God that these artificial barriers between brother countries and brother people are diminishing one by one. Brothers in the region are now hugging with longing and enthusiasm, longing is eliminating. The century-old split ends now."*

Jorgensen and Philips indicated that discourses entitle positions for people to occupy, and in consequence to these positions, there are expectations on how to behave, what to say and not to say.[644] And Laclau and Mouffe argue that, sometimes the subject is assigned more than one position by different discourses, when there is a subject position not conflicting with other discourse the outcome is a hegemonic process, where other alternatives are excluded and a particular discourse has been naturalized, that is the situation in the period of Muslim Brotherhood government, the Islamic alliance against West and Israel dominated and became the hegemon discourse, while other identities of

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[642] ibid.
[643] "Erdoğan'dan İsrail'e sert eleştiri", *Hurriyet*, 19.11.2012, **http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogandan-israile-sert-elestiri-21956061**, accessed on 03.95.2018.
[644] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p. 41.

westernization and secularization were excluded.

6.3.1.1 Turkish Position from the Israeli War on Gaza 2012.

Turkey's situation within the new political balance that resulted from the Arab Spring in the region, was one factor that strengthened its stance towards the regional issues like the Palestinian issue. For example, by coming of Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt, Turkey showed its power to stand against the U.S in its stance towards the Arab Israeli conflict, and that is obvious in the Turkish response to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2012.

The Israeli war on Gaza occurred on 14 November 2012 until 21 November 2012, when Israel launched its largest military campaign against the Gaza Strip,[645] killing the military chief of Hamas Ahmad Al-Jabari, justifying its attack as a self-defense and a response to rocket attacks from Hamas.[646] As a result, 191 Palestinians were killed and 1526 injured among them children and women.[647] As a response, fighters from Gaza fired rockets on Israel killing 5 Israelis,[648] while Israel continued hitting targets in Gaza and closed the borders until the next year of 2013. Even though, the war ended with a great moral victory by Hamas since they prevented Israel from achieving its military targets, and the ceasefire was achieved under Egyptian sponsorship in cooperation with Turkey and Qatar.[649]

At that time, Turkey was categorized within the camp of countries with Sunni ideology "Qatar, Egypt" against the countries led by Shia powers "Iran and Syria", in that framework, in response to Gaza war 2012, Erdogan visited Egypt on 17 November 2012,

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[645] "The Gazza War of 2012", *Fanak*,15.05.2013, https://fanack.com/palestine/history-past-to-present/the-gaza-war-2012/ accessed on 24.07.2017.

[646] "The Israel Gaza Conflict, A Guide to the Major Players", *The Atlantic*, 20.11.2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-israel-gaza-conflict-a-guide-to-the-major-players/265431/ , accessed on 24.07.2017.

[647] Mohsen Mohammad Salih, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2012-2013*, Beirut: *Alzaytuna Center for Strategic Studies*, 2015, p. 100.

[648] "Israel continue shelling on Gaza", *Al-Jazeera*, 21.11.2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121120212739934900.html, accessed on 20.07.2017.

[649] Mohsen Mohammad Salih, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2012-2013*, Beirut: *Alzaytuna Center for Strategic Studies*, 2014, p. 15.

and met with the Egyptian president Mohammad Morsi and prince of Qatar, besides the leader of Hamas Khaled Mishaal. The three countries (Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar) hold a joint press conference on 18 Nov 2012, presenting the importance of their regional role in negotiations to stop the war.[650] U.S government was realizing the importance of Turkey in the diplomatic negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza. In that context, on 17 November 2012 the U.S Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilary Clinton asked Turkey after Egypt to convince Hamas not to escalate violence, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs Davutoglu replied to the U.S: "stop Israel, Israel uses excessive force and targets civilians."[651] Moreover, on 20 November 2012, Davutoglu visited Gaza, saying to one of the injured Palestinians: "your wound, is 75 million Turkey's wound. We won't leave you, we will be with the Palestinian people until they reach their freedom".[652]

Erdogan criticized Israel, United States and United Nations, saying that he does not believe in the justice of the United Nations, and that nobody can say that Israel is using its right in self-defense. Continuing his speech saying:

> "*Are we still going watch from the tribune? we will interfere either with our hands or our tongues, if we will die, let us die like a man.*"[653]
>
> *"Kimse İsrail savunma hakkını kullanıyor diyemez. İsrail terör estiriyor. Ben Birleşmiş Milletler'in adaletine inanmıyorum……Hala tribünden mi izleyeceğiz? Ya elimizle ya dilimizle müdahale edeceğiz. Öleceksek adam gibi ölelim."*[654]

So, Turkey used diplomacy in its support for Palestinians in the 2012 Israeli war, in that regard, pro-Hamas, al-Zaytuna center for studies, reported that:

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[650] "Erdoğan ve Mursi İsrail'i Uyardı", *TRT Haber*, 18.11. 2012, http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/erdogan-ve-mursi-israili-uyardi-63681.html, accessed on 20.07.2017

[651] **"**Clinton'dan Davutoğlu'na Hamas ricası", *Sabah*, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2012/11/17/clintondan-davutogluna-hamas-ricasi?paging=4 , accessed on 20.07.2017.

[652] "Davutoğlu, Gazze'de gözyaşlarını tutamadı", *Memurlar*, 20.11.2012, https://www.memurlar.net/haber/308586/davutoglu-gazze-de-gozyaslarini-tutamadi.html, accessed on 20.07.2017

[653] "Öleceksek adam gibi ölelim", *CNN Turk*, 20.11.2012 https://www.cnnturk.com/2012/guncel/11/20/oleceksek.adam.gibi.olelim/685371.0/index.html, accessed on 25/07/2017

[654] ibid.

"Turkish diplomacy was considerably active in its support for Hamas and GS during the Israeli war, 14–21/11/2012, applying pressure in regional and international venues, and in cooperation with Egypt and Qatar, to end the attack and lift the siege. As a result, the GS received broad official and public support, thus forcing the Israelis to comply with the resistance's conditions to end the assault"[655].

6.3.1.2 Order of Discourse and Common Sense in Discourse of Erdogan and Morsi in Response to Gaza War 2012

Looking at discourse of the Turkish leader Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood leader Morsi in response to the Israeli attack on Gaza, we note that they hold the same meaning, and had a common sense on one discourse against Israel, in the joint press conference that they conducted on 18 Nov 2012, Morsi defined Israel as **'occupying forces'**, and remarked that:

"Our only goal is to stop attacks on Gaza. But Israel should know very well that the countries of the region are not the former countries of the region and the leaders of the region are not the former leaders. If it takes a step, it must be ready for punishment"[656]

In the second day in his meeting in the Turkish Egyptian Forum for Businessman, with the continuous Israeli attack on Gaza, Erdogan also **warned** Israel when he said:

"Netanyahu'ya sesleniyorum; şu anda 2008 yılında değiliz, 2012 yılındayız. Bilesin ki 2012'nin şartları 2008'in şatları gibi değildir. Hesabını iyi yap"[657]

"I speak to Netanyahu; we are not in 2008 right now; we are in 2012. The conditions of the 2012 are not the same as those of 2008. Do your account well".[658]

Warning of Erdogan to Israel is similar with the past warning of the Muslim Brotherhood leader Morsi when he said that the current leaders are not the past leaders. The condition that has been changed is that the two Islamic parties now had a collective identity

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[655] Mohsen Mohammad Salih, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2012-2013*, Beirut: *Alzaytuna Center for Strategic Studies*, 2014, p. 15.

[656] "Erdoğan ve Mursi İsrail'i Uyardı", *TRT Haber*, 18.11.2012, http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/erdogan-ve-mursi-israili-uyardi-63681.html , accessed on 23.07.2017.

[657] "Erdoğan'dan İsrail'e sert eleştiri", *Hurriyet,* 19.11.2012. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogandan-israile-sert-elestiri-21956061 , accessed on 23.07.2017.

[658] ibid, translated.

which leading their interest to unify the Islamic world, and form a collective security against the outside threats from West and Israel that touch any member of the Islamic world like the Palestinians.

6.3.2 Gaza War of 2014 and Discursive Practices of the Turkish Foreign Policy

After Gaza War of 2012, Turkey continued its efforts to lift the Israeli blockade over Gaza. The existence of the Brotherhood government in Egypt was one factor that made it easy for Turkey to use diplomacy and to play an effective role in the Palestinian issue. In that context, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan planned to visit Gaza in 2013. But after the military coup in Egypt, the visit was delayed, and he did not visit Gaza after that.[659] Nonetheless, the normalization of the Turkish-Israeli relations, was also an opportunity for Turkey to do something for the Palestinians, as it requested three conditions for normalization of relations with Israel; which are Israeli apology to Turkey, lifting the Israeli blockade over Gaza, and payment compensations for families of the nine Turkish activists who were killed in the Israeli attack on Mavi Marmara. On 22 March 2013 Israel officially apologized to Turkey for killing the Turkish activists, and in regard to the Turkish demand to end the blockade over Gaza, Netanyahu said that Israel lifted some restrictions on civilians' and goods movement in Gaza and West Bank.[660]

However, these initiatives interrupted by the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2014, which occurred after Israeli settlers burned alive the Palestinian children Muhammad Abu Khudair on 2 July 2014, leading to confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli Occupation Arms started on 7 July 2014. The situation deteriorated when Israel carried a military operation in Gaza in August 2014, killing more than 2200 Palestinians in 50 days.

The Israeli attack on Gaza triggered the Turkish anger and provoked a tough response

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[659] "Turkish PM Erdoğan's Gaza visit to take place after Obama meeting", *Hurriyet*, 10.04.2013 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogans-gaza-visit-to-take-place-after-obama-meeting--44618, accessed on 25.07.2017.

[660] Annual Strategic Report 2012-2013, Beirut: *Alzaytuna Center for Strategic Studies*, p.104.

from Erdogan who sent message to Israel -in the fourth day of Israeli attack- saying: "first you will stop this persecution, as long as you do not stop, the realization of normalization between Turkey and Israel is impossible."[661] He also called both Mishaal and Abbas for cooperation towards the national unity government, saying: "the solidarity of the national unity government in Palestine is crucial in the current process."[662]

Then, after some days in a speech for him on 18 July 2014, Erdogan stated that:

> *"İsrail şu anda terör estiriyor, İsrail şu anda bir soykırım uyguluyor. İsrail, Hamas ve El Fetih arasında ulusal mutabakat hükümetinin kurulmasını arzu etmiyor. Bunu arzu etmediği gibi de, şu anda orada bu kıyımını devam ettiriyor. Bir başka adımı; malum Mısır'la olan görüşmelerinde, Hamas'ı dışlama gayretleridir. Burada taraf olan bir defa Hamas'tır, Gazze'dir, Filistin'dir. ....ama görünen gerçek o ki; İsrail dünyada barışı tehdit eden bir ülkedir, Ortadoğu barışını tehdit eden bir ülkedir.... Dolayısıyla Türkiye olarak, kendimiz, şahsen ben bu görevde bulunduğum sürece hiç bir zaman İsrail'le olumlu bir şeyi düşünemem."*[663]
>
> *"Israel is now terrorizing, and Israel is now carrying out a genocide. Israel does not want the establishment of a national reconciliation government between Hamas and Fatah. As if it did not want that, it continues this slaughter. Another step; In their talks with Egypt, they do their effort to exclude Hamas. The parties here are Hamas, Gaza, Palestine. .... But the appeared truth is that Israel is a country that threatens peace in the world, it is a country that threatens peace in the Middle East..... as long as I been in this position, I cannot think of anything positive with Israel."*[664]

In response to Erdogan's stance towards Israel, Israel perceived him as **"arguably the most virulent anti-Israel leader in the world."**[665] In 2004, Erdogan was given a prize by Jewish American group, the 'Profile of Courage Award in 2004' for working for a peaceful solution in the Middle East and for his commitment to protect Turkey's Jewish citizens. However, as a result of his criticism of Israel following the Gaza War of 2014, the group asked him to return the prize. Erdogan returned it with a message sent on his behalf

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[661] "Erdoğan'dan İsrail'e rest", *al-Jazeera*, 11.07.2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogandan-israile-rest, accessed on 10.08.2017.
[662] ibid.
[663] "Erdoğan'dan flaş İsrail açıklaması", *Sozcu*, 18 July 2014, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/erdogandan-flas-israil-aciklamasi-2-559028/, accessed on 13.08.2017 , accessed on 02.08.2017
[664] ibid, translated.
[665] "Turkey's Erdogan Returning Jewish American Peace Award", *Haaretz,* 29.07.2014. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.607850 , accessed on 02.08.2017.

by Turkey's ambassador Serdar Kilic to the president of the American Jewish Congress, Jack Rosen, in which Kilic said:

> *"Erdogan would be glad to return the award because of Israel's actions in Gaza and the regrettable stance adopted by the present leadership of the American Jewish Congress vis-a-vis the recent attacks on the innocent civilians in Gaza.….Erdogan's strong determination in fighting against terrorism, preventing all forms of extremism, bringing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through peaceful means as well as ensuring the safety and well-being of the Jewish community in Turkey still remains as strong as ever."*[666]

Israeli practices in Gaza and its killing of the Palestinian children, did not just induced the tough response of the Turkish leaders, most of the world leaders also criticized Israel, for example, president of Venezuela Nicholas Maduro, on 24 August 2014 described the Israeli prime minister with "**Herod of the Era**", who want to get rid of all the Palestinian children.[667] While the former Cuban leader Fidel Castro, described Israel's offensive in Gaza as a "**new, repugnant form of fascism**." [668]

6.3.2.1 Identity and Exclusionary Discursive Practices Against Egypt's New Government in the Turkish Position Towards Israeli War on Gaza 2014

To evaluate the Turkish stance on the war this time, Turkey's position with regional countries is no longer the same as what it was in the previous war of Gaza in 2012, when the Muslim Brotherhood was in power in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was ended by the military coup on 3 July 2013, and after a month, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, - a commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces- came to power in Egypt. The old Islamic alliance system that has supported the Palestinians and their goal of establishing a Palestinian state before has ended, and the shared identity between Turkey and Egypt was undermined, as Egypt under Sisi's

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[666] ibid.

[667] Mohsen Moh'd Saleh, "Israeli Aggression on Gaza Strip Operation the Eaten Straw 7/7/2014_26.8.2014", *Archives and Information,* Beirut: Al-Zaytuna Center, 2015, p. 474.

[668] Cuba's Castro decries 'Palestinian Holocaust' in Gaza, *The times of Israel* , 06.08.2014, https://www.timesofisrael.com/cubas-castro-decries-palestinian-holocaust-in-gaza/, acceseed on 04.08.2017.

government is no longer seen as an attractive ally for JDP government. As Barnett argues, since the definitions of collective identity are no longer acceptable under new historical conditions, conflict of identity between the two states has emerged.[669]

Erdogan's government did not recognize the new government of al-Sisi in Egypt, describing it as "Coup Government", and that can be considered as a representational practice that led to exclusion of Egypt from the old alliance with Turkey and Qatar. Moreover, the Gaza War was an event that increased the degree of exclusion, as a result of Egypt's position from the war, which has stimulated the anger of Turkey. That is clear in the following speech of Erdogan on 18 July 2014:

> *"İster Sisi'den gelsin ister İsrail'den gelsin, Sisi taraf mıdır? Sisi kendisi zalimdir çünkü darbecidir. Diğerlerinden farkı yok. Hamas'ın gıda yardım yollarını kapatan odur. Sen Mısır olarak taraf değilsin ki. Olacaksan arabulucu ol. Taraf Filistin'dir, Gazze'dir. Mısır'a meşruiyet kazandırmaya çalışıyorlar. Darbeci hükümet kendisi çaldı kendisi oynadı kendisini seçtirdi. Demokrasi bu mudur? Soruyorum size. Güdümlü demokrasi ile barışı yakalayamazsınız."* [670]
>
> *"Whether it came from Sisi or from Israel, is Sisi a part? Sisi himself is cruel, because he is a putschist. Did not differ from the others. He is the person who closes the food aid roads of Hamas. You are not a party in the name of Egypt. If you want you can be a mediator. The party is Palestine, Gaza. They are trying to give legitimacy to Egypt. The coup d'etat governed himself, played himself, chose himself. Is this Democracy? I ask you. You cannot get peace with guided democracy"*[671].

Moreover, on 20 August 2013 Erdogan stated that Israel behind the coup in Egypt, as it is shown below:

> "*Demokrasi sandık değildir', arkasında neresi var, İsrail var. Mısır'da darbenin arkasında İsrail var, elimizde belgesi var".* [672]
>
> *"It is not a democracy, what is behind it, there is Israel, Israel is behind the coup in Egypt, there is a document in our hand."*[673]

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[669] Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East", p. 193.
[670] Erdoğan "Çocukları en iyi öldürmesini bilen millet İsrail'dir", *Sozcu*, 18.07.2014, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/erdogandan-flas-israil-aciklamasi-2-559028/ accessed on 24.08.2017
[671] ibid.
[672] "Erdoğan: Mısır'da Darbenin Arkasında İsrail Var", *Radikal,* 20.08.2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan-misirda-darbenin-arkasinda-israil-var-1146951/ , accessed on 24.08.2017.
[673] ibid.

According to David Campbell, that is one of the 'exclusionary practices', differentiation or modes of exclusion that constitute Egypt's Sisi as 'other', or 'foreign' in the process of dealing with it, as it is explained below:[674]

> *"we can say that for the state identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the 'inside' are linked through a discourse of 'danger' with threats identified and located on the 'outside'. The outcome of this is that boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives marginalized."*[675]

It is also a way to express the degree of loyalty to Islamic identity, as it is suggested by Tajfel in his theory of social identity: "actors try to increase self-image through enhancing the status of the group to which they belong, and in sometimes they can increase their self-image by discriminating and holding prejudice views against the out-group that they do not belong to",[676] and in this case Sisi government is out-group which is described by JDP government as a 'coup government and oppressive'.

Coming to the discourse of Erdogan about Gaza War 2014, it differs from his discourse about Gaza war of 2012. Erdogan returned to his traditional discourse in criticizing of Israel, but this time his discourse lacks the element of regional alliance and collective identity with Muslim Brotherhood. His discourse does not just criticize Israel, it also criticizes Egypt's Sisi, and as Fareed Zakariya and Danielle Pletka, explained for CNN:

> *"It's no longer the Muslims against the Jews. Now it's the extremists -- the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah, and their backers Iran, Qatar and Turkey -- against Israel and the more moderate Muslims including Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia."....."It's a proxy war for control or dominance in the Middle East."*[677]

Under these circumstances, and in the context of the Turkish hostility to the Egyptian government, it is argued that the Turkish role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in Gaza

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[674] Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 76.
[675] ibid, p. 75.
[676] McLeod, S. A. "Social identity theory", *Simplypsychology*, 2008. www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html , accessed on 13.06.2018.
[677] Josh Levs, "This time, Gaza fighting is 'proxy war' for entire Mideast", *CNN*, 01.08. 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/31/world/meast/israel-gaza-region/index.html , accessed on 13.06.2018.

War of 2014, declined. The pro-Hamas *al-Zaytuna Center for Studies and Consultations* in Beirut, issued a report about the Palestinian issue and the Muslim World, indicating that in 2014 war the Turkish role in the Palestinian issue declined in comparison with its role in 2012 war, due to regional factors. According to the report, "the military coup in Egypt led to hostility between Turkey and Egypt, reducing ability of Turkey to influence events, in addition to deteriorating of Turkish-Israeli relations. In that situation, Turkey could not use diplomacy and exert pressure towards achieving a rapid cease-fire, as it has done during the war 2012, and was unable to put forward Turkish initiatives (or Turkish-Qatari) one for cease-fire against the Egyptian one, which was strongly weighted in favor of Israel."[678]

6.3.2.1 Discourse of 'Rabia' and JDP's Identity: Rabia from Sign of Muslim Brotherhood to Sign of JDP

During Arab Spring and when Muslim Brotherhood's government in Egypt was ended by the military coup, discourse of Rabia dominated the Turkish mediums, then it became a symbol of the JDP in Turkey. It is valuable to explain in this section how Rabia sign raised in Egypt and became a sign of JDP in Turkey.

Rabia was a sign used by Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and their supporters in the Islamic world after President Morsi was ousted from office by the military coup on 3 July 2013, and after the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces 'Abdel Fattah al-Sisi', took over the power. At that time, the army attacked a protest arranged by Muslim Brotherhood, killing more than 1,000 people on 14 August 2013, and the event was called by 'Rabia Massacre',[679] referring to Rabia who is a girl from Muslim Brotherhood participated in protests against the military coup and was killed by the military forces among other hundreds of protestors.

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[678] Mohammad Salih, "The Palestinian issue and Muslim World 2014-2015", Beirut: *Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2016,* p. 6.

[679] Bilge Nesibe Kotan, "An Overview of Turkish Egyptian Relations since the Arab Uprising", *TRT World* 27.11.2017, https://www.trtworld.com/mea/an-overview-of-turkish-egyptian-relations-since-the-arab-uprising-12658 , accessed on 13.06.2018.

From that time, the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Islamic World used the sign of Rabia to express their supporting and solidarity with Brotherhood. Consequently, by the regular repetition of the sign of Rabia, it has been institutionalized and became a sign or slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood in the world. So in the Arab World Rabia sign means Brotherhood, and the person who hold it is defining himself as Brotherhood, or supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Rabia sign also was institutionalized in Turkey by the JDP but it gained a different meaning. In the beginning, JDP leaders used the sign in their discourses and speeches that support the Muslim Brotherhood. The meaning that they wanted to share is that Turkey is against the military coup in Egypt, and according to JDP leaders, the legitimate president of Egypt is Mohammad Morsi. The JDP's defending of Rabia may not come within defining itself as Brotherhood, but it may come from the Turkish support for democracy and its support to the oppressed people in the Muslim world.

Whatever the intention and real meaning that the Turkish leaders wanted to share, the meaning of the sign in the minds of the Turkish people is linked with Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine. For that in any protest or event arranged in Turkey about Jerusalem or the Palestinian issue, we find sign of Rabia covering the protest arena.

On the other hand, the regular repetition of the sign with members and leaders of JDP drew in the mind of the public that this sign is belonging to JDP. For example, a Turkish woman was keeping the flag with sign of Rabia in her home, when I asked her 'do you know what this sign means?', she replied 'no, we see our leader Erdogan do it with his hand, and we do as he is doing'. So even some of the Turkish people are unaware of the meaning that the sign conveys, but it became a convention or rule, and it became a sign for the JDP, after years from fixing this sign in the mind of the Turkish people, leaders of the JDP reached to level that they adopted the sign in the bylaw of the party on 20 May 2017, giving the sign a new meaning which is: *one homeland; one state; one flag; one nation*, as reported in *Birgun newspaper*:

"Rabia salute, a hand gesture that has become commonly used in the Islamic world since 2013 by the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood - whose elected government led by Mohammed Morsi was ousted by an army coup in Egypt –, has now been adopted by Turkey's ruling party JDP as a new article in its bylaws with a slightly different meaning but with the same gesture….While going over the modifications of his party's bylaws, Deputy Chair of JDP, Hayati Yazıcı, mentioned that a change was made to Article 4 and the statements of 'one homeland; one state; one flag; one nation' were added to this article……A sign frequently used by Turkey's President Erdoğan at virtually all public meetings, Rabia will now have a ***'modified meaning'*** *in Turkey, where it will symbolize JDP's newly adapted 4 principles: 'one homeland; one state; one flag; one nation".*[680]

After the repetition of Rabia with its new meaning by the Turkish leaders especially Erdogan, the same woman who did not know the meaning of this sign before, after years she asked me do you know what this sign means? then she replied this sign means "one flag, one nation, one homeland, one state". That is an example of the rule of ideas in international relations and the relation between power and knowledge.

Theoretically, adopting Rabia sign in the bylaw of JDP is an example of constructivists' claims that identity leads the action and discourse of state while discursive or social practices reproduce that identity. In that aspect, Hopf argues that the identity of the state suggests its preferences and actions, as the state understands and interoperate others according to the identity it attributes to them, and instantaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice. Hopf also asserted on the point that "the producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning."[681] These acts or as Hopf called 'social practices', have the power to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike, Hopf gave example on how United States took action of intervention in Vietnam, inferring its identity as great power, at the same time its action maintained and "reproduced the intersubjective web of meaning about what precisely constituted that identity."[682] Wendt also argues that once the identities and interests formed, they shape a structure which is institutionalized and codified in formal rules and norms,

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[680] "Turkey's AK Party adopts Muslim Brotherhood's Rabia sign in its bylaws", *Birgün* 20.05.2017, https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/turkey-s-akp-adopts-muslim-brotherhood-s-rabia-sign-in-its-bylaws-160493.html , accessed on 12.06.2018.
[681] Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", p. 175.
[682] ibid, p. 178.

which have a motivational force in context of collective meaning shaped by cognitive skills of actors, "institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works".[683]Moreover, Campbell argued that reality of state constituted by act repeated regularly.[684] And the repeated act here is using Rabia sign in the political arena and discourses of the leaders of JDP.

6.3.3 Discourse of The Turkish Foreign Policy and Normalization of Relations with Israel.

The previous section discussed the Turkish stance towards the two Israeli wars on Gaza that took place in 2012 and 2014. However, during these years the relations between Turkey and Israel were broken in consequence of Mavi Marmara crisis, through which Israel attacked the Turkish flotilla that was going to break Israeli blockade over Gaza, killing 9 of Turkish activists in May 2010. Nevertheless, to recover its relations with Israel, Turkey demanded three conditions from the Israeli government, which were, the apology of Israel, paying compensations to the families of the deceased, and to lift the embargo on Gaza.[685]These conditions considered a two-edged sword for Turkey; one edge linked with returning Turkish honor through the apology from Israel, in addition to the rights of the Turkish victims through asking for compensations from Israel. While the other edge is linked with serving the Palestinian issue and rights of the Palestinians through lifting of the embargo on Gaza.

However, four years have passed with slow improvements in normalization efforts, that were going alongside with the wave of the Arab Spring that swept over the region, and the civil war that elevated in Syria. In the context of these conditions, the United States was looking at the two sides of Turkey and Israel as regional allies and desired to see them in

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[683] Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it", p.399.
[684] Campbell, *Writing Security*, p.8.
[685] "Turkey, Israel reach deal to normalize ties: Israeli official", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 26.06.2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-israel-reach-deal-to-normalize-ties-israeli-official.aspx?PageID=238&NID=100938&NewsCatID=510 , accessed on 15.07.2018.

good relations.[686] Consequently, Obama administration took the initiative to repair the relations between them. In that regard Obama said:

> *"The United States deeply values our close partnerships with both Turkey and Israel, and we attach great importance to the restoration of positive relations between them in order to advance regional peace and security."* [687]

And so, in March 2013, the American president Barak Obama coordinated a telephone call between the Israeli prime minister Netanyahu and Turkish prime minister Erdogan, and he joined the the call during his visit to Israel. [688] During the call, Netanyahu apologized for Turkey on the Israeli operational mistakes which led to the loss of Turkish lives in Mavi Marmara crisis in May 2010, while he didn't apologize for the act of stopping the ship, since Israel considered it a legitimate act of self-defense. About the compensations, Israel has also agreed to pay the compensation to the families of the victims.[689] From its side, Turkey agreed to cancel all legal measures that are related to *Mavi Marmara* against the Israeli soldiers. Moreover, the two leaders agreed to normalize relations and return their ambassadors,[690] and Israel pledged to ease the restrictions on the movement of civilians and the entry of civilian goods into the Palestinian territories, including Gaza. In return, Erdogan expressed readiness to improve the relations with Israel, and underlined that 'Turkey values its ties with Israel'.[691]

Nevertheless, the apology created debate among Israeli and Turkish mediums. For instance, the Israeli professor Ifraim Inbar, criticized the Israeli apology to Turkey and described it with mistake, as it is shown in his writing below:

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[686]" Turkey-Israel Relations: Why Animosity is Not an Option", *Fanak,* 16.03.2017, https://fanack.com/turkey/history-past-to-present/turkey-israel-relations/, accessed on 15.07.2018.

[687] Joel Greenberg and Scott Wilson, "Obama ends Israel visit by brokering end to dispute with Turkey", *Washington Post*, 22.03.2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/obama-ends-israel-visit-by-honoring-historic-figures/2013/03/22/7a489fc4-92e9-11e2-ba5b-550c7abf6384_story.html?utm_term=.e33e0194ee29 accessed on 12.07.2018

[688] Shira Efron, *The Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations*, Santa Monica: *Rand Corporation*, 2018, p. 11.

[689] "Turkey, Israel reach deal to normalize ties: Israeli official", *Hurriyet Daily News,*26.06.2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-israel-reach-deal-to-normalize-ties-israeli-official.aspx?PageID=238&NID=100938&NewsCatID=510 accessed on 06.05.2018.

[690] Efron, loc.cit.

[691] -Joe Hammoura, op.cit, p. 4.
-"Turkey, Israel reach deal to normalize ties: Israeli official", *Hurriyet Daily News,* 26.06.2016.

"Israel's apology to Turkey for "operational errors" in the Mavi Marmara incident is a diplomatic mistake both in terms of substance and timing. It is highly unlikely that we will see a reversal or turnaround in Turkey's anti-Western and anti-Israeli policies. Jerusalem's apology only enhances Turkish ambitions and weakens Israel's deterrence." [692]

The Turkish parliament debated the apology in the seat of 18 August 2016, through which the reconciliation deal with Israel offered on the parliament. The representative of CHP Eren Erdem, criticized the apology since it was not written and it was indirect through the American president. He said that there is no apology through telephone between states, how before we have sent an apology letter to Russia?

"*İkincisi değerli arkadaşlar: Özür. Ya, çok özür diliyorum arkadaşlar, bakın, burası devletin temsil edildiği bir merci. Yani sizler dedevlet memurusunuz. Devletler arası hukukta"telefonlaözür" diyebir şey yoktur arkadaşlar, yok hükmündedir, kabul edilemez. Biz Rusya' ya mektup gönderdik, değil mi? Sayın Cumhurbaşkanı mektup gönderdi. Bu işler böyle olur, telefonla olmaz."*[693]

"Secondly, dear friends: Sorry. Or, I am very sorry friends, look, here is an authority that represent the state, it means that you are dedicatory officers, in inter-state law, there is nothing like apology by "telephones" friends, no provision, cannot be accepted. We sent a letter to Russia, did not we? Mr. President sent a letter. That's how it works, not on the phone."[694]

Representative of JDP Talip Küçükcan replied that the apology was published in all world media, and if it is not an apology from Israel, Israel could say that we did not apologize:

"Bu özür meselesi, tabii, sık sık gündeme geliyor. Bununla da ilgili şu notu düşmek isterim: Bütün dünya medyasına bu özür olarak geçti arkadaşlar. İsrail'de hiçbir zaman, hiçbir İsrailli yetkili "Biz özür dilemedik." demedi. Yani, bu, artık, İngilizce tabirle herkes burada kullanıyor, ***"Common knowledge"*** *yani. Bunun artık bir ötesine gitmenin veya aramanın bir manası yok. Diyelim ki, resmî olarak bize İngilizce özür mektubu da göndermiş olsalardı, sizin istediğiniz şekilde "apologies" kelimesi kullanılarak. Bu neyi değiştirecekti? Bu anlaşmayı değiştirecek miydi, Filistinlilerin hayatını değiştirecek miydi? Ki, zaten dillendiği herkes tarafından ifade ediliyor, Obama buna şahitlik ettiğini söylüyor"*[695]

"Of course this is apology issue, it is frequently presented on the agenda. Therefore, I

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[692] Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Apology to Turkey: A Mistake", *BESA Center Perspectives*, No. 201, (24 March, 2013).
[693] "Tutanık hızmetleri başkalığı", *TBMM*, 17.08.2016, p.17.
[694] ibid, translated.
[695], Tutanak Hizmetleri BaşkanlığI, *TBMM*, 17/08/2016, p. 17.

want to say the following note: Friends this had been recognized as apology in all the world media. Never in Israel, no Israeli official said, "We did not apologize." I mean, it's now everyone uses in English statement here, "Common knowledge". There is no meaning for going and searching beyond this. Let's say that they officially sent us a letter of apology in English, using the word "apologies" as you would like. What would that change? Was it going to change this deal, changing the lives of Palestinians? It is expressed by everyone who is already spoken, Obama says he witnessed it."[696]

Despite the criticisms and oppositions from other political parties, negotiations for normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel continued, and "Turkey continued its efforts in lifting the embargo on Gaza, which was the third demand to be met by Israel as a condition to normalize the relations between the two countries." On 24 June 2016, the Turkish president Erdogan met the political chief of Hamas Khaled Mishaal, and discussed with him how to resolve the disagreements among Palestinians, in addition to the humanitarian assistance."[697]

6.3.3.1 Factors Behind the Normalization of the Turkish-Israeli Relations

There are several factors and challenges that have accelerated the normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations. Regionally, the beginning of the Arab Spring led to tensions in the Arab countries with one aim to get rid of dictator regimes and achieve democracy, Turkey in first stages was perceived as a model for Islamic country that achieves democracy, therefore its role was to help oppressed people to reach their political rights using diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring especially in Syria was the suitable environment for terrorist organizations like PKK and YPG to be strengthened and spread in the Turkish boarders, and that situation pushed Turkey to change its policy from diplomatic to military in fighting the terrorist groups, this strategy is called smart policy.[698]

In consequence of smart policy of Turkey, the Turkish relations with its neighbors affected negatively, especially its relations with Russia that deteriorated after a Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian warplane that as Turkey said has strayed into its

[696] ibid, translated.
[697] "Turkey, Israel reach deal to normalize ties: Israeli official", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 26.06.2016.
[698] Tayyar Arı, *interview*, 2018.

airspace.[699]Turkey stayed in a situation of deteriorated relations with its neighborhood like Russia, Israel and Egypt, for that Turkey revaluated its foreign policy and the new prime minister Binali Yildirim suggested new principle in April 2016 that aimed to decrease enemies and increase friends, in that regards Yildirim said:

> *"Turkey has a lot of problems. We have regional problems. The conflicts taking place in our region and the EU, Cyprus, Caucasus increase the importance of our country in our region. We are aware of it. So what will we do? Very simple: We'll increase the number of our friends and we'll decrease the number of our enemies."* [700]

Under these circumstances, Turkey saw that normalization of relations with Israel became persistent need, and that can be concluded in Erdogan's remarks on 2 January 2016 after he came back from a visit to Saudi Arabia that has "announced Islamic Military Alliance in its leadership to counter terrorism in Iraq and Levant in December 2015", remarks of Erdogan were as following:

> *"Turkey and Israel need each other,,,Israel is in need of a country like Turkey in the region. We have to admit that we also need Israel,."*[701]

After months from his remarks that the two countries need each other, in March 2016, Turkish president Erdogan received representatives of Jewish Organizations in the US. The meeting was a step from Turkey to show Jewish people that they against antisemitism, and that Turkey as Islamic country that is also facing Islamophobia, so the two countries suffer from racism which raised in the West. In that regard Erdogan said:

> *"Unfortunately, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, xenophobic movements have been shifting from the periphery to the center of politics. We have to struggle against them together."*

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[699] Neil MacFarquhar, Steven Erlanger, "NATO-Russia Tensions Rise After Turkey Downs Jet", *The New York Times*, 24.11.2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/turkey-syria-russia-military-plane.html accessed on 06.07.2018.

[700] "New PM Signals Shift in Foreign Policy: More Friends Than Enemies", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 24.05. 2016 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-pm-signals-shift-in-foreign-policy-more-friends-than-enemies-99616 accessed on 04.07.2018.

[701] "Turkey and Israel need each other, says president Erdoğan", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 02.01.2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-and-israel-need-each-other-says-president-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=93319&NewsCatID=338 accessed on 03.09.2018

During the meeting, the struggle against terror, particularly the recent terrorist attacks in Turkey and Belgium, were discussed in addition to Turkey's relations with Jews, and Israel.[702]

Other factor that may be incentive for normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel is the common stance of the two countries towards Iran; a report by *Fanak* institution indicated that indifference between Turkey and Iran on Syria, and Israeli anxious about the nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers, has contributed to rapprochement of the two countries.[703]

While the previous Turkish military adviser, Metin Gurcan, argued that the Turkish Armed Forces were one factor that encourages the normalization with Israel:

> *"pressure from the Turkish armed forces on the political echelons around its needs and projects was the key element in the recent shift in relations with Israel." it has been argued that "Ankara, because of its disturbing isolation in the region and with inadequate support from the United States and NATO, had no choice to but turn back to Israel for regional military-security cooperation".*[704]

It is also debated that what has facilitated the deal's achievement is the exclusion some of leaders of Hamas from Turkey, like the founding commander of Hamas' military wing 'Saleh al-Arouri'.[705]

In that context, in mid-2016, Ankara and Tel Aviv announced that they reached a deal to restore diplomatic relations. Turkey agreed to drop all criminal and civil claims against Israel in return of $20 million compensation from Israel to the families of the victims, while Israel agreed to loosen restrictions on the passage of aid into Gaza. the two sides start to implement the agreement, and Turkey was able to deliver around 11,000 tons of aid to the

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[702] "President Erdoğan Receives Representatives of Jewish Organizations in the US", *Presidency of the Republic Turkey 'TCCB',* 30.03.2016. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/41330/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abddeki-musevi-kuruluslarin-temsilcilerini-kabul-etti.html accessed on 20.08.2018.
[703] Fanak, "The Gazza War of 2012".
[704] Metin Gurcan, "What's Really driving Turkish Israeli Reconciliation", *Al-monitor*, 01.07.2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2016/06/turkey-israel-normalization-military-security-cooperation.html#ixzz56jbMux1G accessed on 03.07.2018.
[705] ibid.

Palestinian territory through the Israeli port of Ashdod, in July 2016 Israel opened the Erez border crossing for the first in nine years, which made it easy for Turkey to implement several infrastructure projects, including a hospital and desalination plant. At the end of the year, the diplomatic relations returned back through appointing two new ambassadors.[706]

6.3.3.2 Turkey's Cautious Policy after the Normalization of its Relations with Israel.

After normalization of relations with Israel, Turkey still cautious in its policy towards Israel, sometimes it uses mercy policy, and other times it uses reprimand policy. An instance of mercy policy is the Turkish stance by sending firefighting aircraft to Israel to combat a fire that broke out across the country on 26 November 2016.[707] As a response, the Israeli president Rivlin called the Turkish President Erdogan on 27 November 2016 and thanked him for his stance and his decision to send help to Israel when they needed it, in the same phone call Erdogan remarked that:

> *"The normalization of the relations between Turkey and Israel is of the utmost importance for the whole region," ..."I know that we can keep working together in the domain of natural gas and that the conversations between our energy ministries will bear fruit."*[708]

On the other hand, Turkey uses its anger or reprimand policy to express its dissatisfaction on Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, and Jews' attempts to change the status quo of Jerusalem. That reprimand came in form of rhetoric criticism or warning words, such as the Turkish stance from the establishment of electronic detectors in the doors of al-Aqsa Mosque by the Israeli government in July 2017. As a response, Erdogan asked the Israeli government to immediately remove the detectors. In that framework, Turkey still behaving from the stronger position, while Israel is always the needy party in the Turkish Israeli relations. As it is argued by Ofra Bengio, who is Professor in The Moshe

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[706] Fanak, "The Gazza War of 2012".
[707] "Improving ties with Israel vital: President Erdoğan", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 28.11.2016.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/improving-ties-with-israel-vital-president-erdogan-106637 , accessed on 14.05.2017.
[708] ibid.

Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies in Tel Aviv University:

> *"The asymmetry in Turkish-Israeli relations exists on a number of levels: declaratory, diplomatic and political. Israel is usually the courting partner -- the needy party, politically speaking -- and thus the one that initiates actions to maintain good relations. For Israel, relations with Turkey are a source of pride and legitimacy; for the Turkish governments, in contrast, they sometimes serve as an embarrassment or pose a dilemma."*[709]

Nonetheless**,** how much the degree of rapprochement in Turkish Israeli relations will be, it will never be as it was in the past, it will be limited since it is tied with the military influence, which was decreased in the JDP era as Larrabee stated:

> *"The domestic context in Turkey has also changed. The Turkish military was the main driver of the close defense and intelligence ties with Israel in the 1990s. At that time, the military's influence on Turkish foreign policy was quite strong, especially policy towards Israel. Since then, the military's influence on Turkish policy has visibly declined. Today, Erdoğan, not the military, has the key say on policy towards Israel. This change is likely to limit the degree of rapprochement that will occur in relations with Israel."*[710]

Nader and Larrabee argued that the Turkish policy towards Israel allowed Turkey to achieve hegemony in the Middle East, and made it hard for Iran to demonize Turkey and exploit the Palestinian issue to its benefit. As it is explained below:

> *"As long as Turkish-Israeli relations remain cool and Erdoğan continues to pursue a pro- Palestinian policy, it will be difficult for Iran to demonize Ankara and exploit the Palestinian issue to its advantage. Turkey now has an important stake in maintaining good ties to the Arab world and is likely to continue to see the Palestinian issue as an important trump card in its rivalry for regional influence with Iran."*[711]

In that context, it can be argued that Turkey is the only state that can do something for the Palestinian issue. For example, if we look at Iran's policy towards the Palestinian issue, cutting off relations with Israel did not allow the Iranians to visit Palestine and to be close to the Palestinians and sharing their suffering, while the Turkish people have this opportunity. May be Turkish government is criticized for keeping its relations with Israel,

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[709] Ofra Bengio,. "Altercating Interests and Orientations between Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel." *Insight Turkey* Vol.11, No.2 (2009), p. 50.
[710] Alireza Nader, F. Stephen Larrabee, "Israel and the Palestinian Issue", *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader (ed.), Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 2013, p. 16.
[711] ibid, p. 16.

but it follows a strategy that strengthens the spiritual ties of its citizens with al-Aqsa Mosque, and by successive visits to Jerusalem, the Turkish people will find that the place belongs to them as Muslims and their resistance spirit will increase. Consequently, the Turkish people will be a pressure instrument on the government to decrease its relations with Israel.

Nevertheless, Turkey still criticizing the effectivity of United Nations in providing solutions for the Palestinian issue, it was on 29 November 2016, when Erdogan provided a speech in the first annual conference of the association of "Parliamentarians for Al-Quds", the content of the speech was as following:

> *"Resolutions adopted so far by the United Nations are incapable of eliminating this unjust situation, because none of these resolutions can be put into action in the current global system which is prevailed not by the superiority of the law but by the law of the superior. Policies of oppression, deportation and discrimination have been increasingly continuing against our Palestinian brothers since 1948. Actually I am of the belief that the Palestinian issue serves as a litmus test for the United Nations Security Council."* [712]

Erdogan in his speech, insists that failing of these organizations in finding solution for the Palestinian issue is the reason behind rising up of the terrorist organizations, justifying his claim by stating that the discourses which are used by these organizations concerned with eliminating the Israeli occupation, and they always use slogans such as "death for America and death for Israel".

> *"This problem of trust in roof organizations like the United Nations Security Council creates areas of exploitation for deviant organizations such as DAESH. The most practical discourse used by terrorist organizations that operate under the disguise of religious concepts in many countries is the occupation and the oppression sustained by our Palestinian brothers. Peace cannot be dreamed of in the region so long as this wound in the heart of the Middle East is left untreated."* [713]

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[712] "Palestinian Issue Serves as a Litmus Test for the UN Security Council", *TCCB*, 29.11.2016 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/61163/palestinian-issue-serves-as-a-litmus-test-for-the-un-security-council.html , accessed on 04.06.2018.
[713] ibid.

6.4 TURKEY'S ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND ITS DISCOURSE IN ITS RESPONSE TO THE TENSIONS OVER JERUSALEM IN 2017-2018

In the years of 2017s and 2018s, a series of Israeli actions occurred as an attempt from the Israeli government and the US to Judaize of Jerusalem. Such actions were: preventing the call for prayer by speakers in Jerusalem, placing of electronic detectors in the gates of al-Aqsa Mosque known by al-Aqsa crisis, and the most prominent action was U.S recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the U.S embassy to Jerusalem. However, these events have stimulated the Turkish anger shaping discourse regularities and discursive practices, which showed the centrality of the Palestinian issue in the Turkish foreign policy, and reproduced the cultural structure that dominated the Turkish Palestinian relations.

The Turkish position is compared with position of other Arab countries especially position of Egypt. It is assumed that the stance of Turkey on Jerusalem crisis either in form of discourse and rhetoric of Erdogan, or in form of serious actions, has raised Turkey as a prominent power in the Islamic and Arab countries, especially among Palestinian people, in the time that Egypt followed a weak stance, prioritizing its strategic relations with US and Israel as important allies for its national security. Moreover, the effect of discourse of Erdogan towards Jerusalem on the constitution of role identity of Turkey in the region will be explained through using post-structural discourse theories, which assume that "identity is constituted through a stylized repetition of acts and discourses". Here discourse of the Turkish president Erdogan leads to demarcation of the identity through dichotomies privileging the East over West and OIC over NATO. On the other hand, speech act theory will be used to show that Erdogan's speech in regard to Jerusalem has a normative effect, either on the Turkish public or the Palestinian and Israeli sides.

6.4.1 Israeli Bill Regards Azan and The Turkish Position

As a part of its policy of Judaizing Jerusalem, Israel started to take initiatives that aim to undermine and decline the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and 1948 Palestinian lands,

which located and controlled under the sovereignty of Israel. One of these recent practices, that led to International criticism was proposing a law by Israeli Knesset on 13 November 2016, known by "Muazzen Bill", that aimed for preventing Azan by loudspeakers in the mosques located in Jerusalem and Israel. The draft of the bill was authorized for legislation by a ministerial committee, and on 8 March 2017, the two versions of the law were initially approved and were in process of final improvement by the parliament. The Israeli prime minister Netanyahu supported the bill, and justified it within the context of freedom of religion that should not harm the quality of life, as he stated that:

> *"Israel is committed to freedom for all religions, but is also responsible for protecting its citizens from noise. That's how it is in cities in Europe. I support similar legislation and enforcement in Israel."*[714]

The bill issue created a big debate among Muslim mediums, even some of Israeli officials criticized it, like Zipi livni -a leader of the center-left Zionist Union Party and a former foreign minister- who remarked that *"proud Israelis should join together in opposing legislation that would only spread hate and ignite tensions between Muslims and Jews."*[715] Arab Palestinians described the legislation as 'racist and populist'. While the Jordanian government declared that "any decision by the Israeli occupation authorities regarding the holy sites in the Old City of Jerusalem, including a ban on the call for prayer, is null and void." Abdullah Abbadi, the head of the Jerusalem Awqaf Department which is affiliated with the Awqaf Ministry, said that:

> *"The status quo in the Old City of Jerusalem should be preserved in line with international laws, which also prevent the "occupier" from taking any measures to change the occupied city's historical identity."*[716]

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[714] Lahav Harkov, "Ministers Approve Bill Muffling Muezzin's Call to Prayer", *Jerusalem Post*, 13.11.2016, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Ministers-approve-bill-muffling-muezzins-call-to-prayer-472519 , accessed on 03.09.2018.

[715] Samuel Osborn, "Israel bill to limit Muslim call to prayer passes parliamentary first reading", *Independent*, 09.03.2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-bill-mosque-call-to-prayer-muslim-islam-mosque-pass-first-reading-parliament-a7620336.html , accessed on 08.09.2018.

[716] "The government rejects the Israeli ban for call of prayer in Jerusalem", *The Jordan Times*, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gov't-rejects-israeli-move-ban-call-prayer-jerusalem , accessed on 03.09.2018.

However, other Arab governments like Egypt did not show a big interest in the issue. In contrast, the pro-government Egyptian media at that time was promoting for banning of Azan by loudspeakers in the Egyptian mosques.[717] For that when the Israeli Knesset issued the Muazzen bill, the Egyptian government did not even issue formal release condemning the Israeli Muazzen bill.

The strongest response from Muslim countries came from the Turkish government, through the tough criticism from the president Erdogan, by his speech in the international forum of al-Quds Waqf in Istanbul on 8 May 2017. In his speech he described the step as shameful, confirming that they will not allow the silencing of Azan from the heavens of Jerusalem:

> *"Ezan meselesi. Ezan bir çağrıdır, sadece Müslümanlara değil, asra bir çağrıdır. Ve camilerde sabah ezanlarının okunmasını yasaklamayı amaçlayan bir yasa tasarısı hâlen İsrail Parlamentosunda bekliyor. Böylesi bir konunun gündeme gelmesi dahi utanç vericidir. Bize her fırsatta din ve vicdan özgürlüğünden dem vuranların, bu konuda sessiz kalarak, adeta atılan bu adımı onaylaması ise ibretliktir.* ***Kudüs semalarından ezanın susturulmasına inşallah izin vermeyeceğiz.*** *Şunu bir defa bilmemiz lazım: Eğer inancınıza güveniyorsanız, inanç hürriyetinden niye korkuyorsunuz? Bak bizim böyle derdimiz yok, biz inancımıza güveniyoruz, onun için de inanç özgürlüğünden korkmuyoruz. ..... Bizim bu noktada ülkemizde yaşayan Musevi vatandaşlarımıza yönelik bu tür bir olumsuz tavır takınma, alma, böyle bir derdimiz yok. Bugüne böyle bir adım atmadık, atmayız da. .....İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Dönem Başkanı olarak meselenin takipçisi olmayı sürdüreceğiz"*[718]

> *"Azan is a call not only to the Muslims but also to the age. A bill, aimed at banning fajr adhan (call for morning prayers) in mosques, is still pending at the Israeli parliament. Even the fact that such an issue has been brought up is disgraceful. It is noteworthy that those, who preach us freedom of thought and faith at every opportunity, have virtually approved of this step by remaining silent. We will not allow Azan to be silenced in Al-Quds. Why are you afraid of the freedom of faith if you believe in your faith? Look, we do not have such problems because we believe in our faith."*[719]

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[717] "Egyptian Authorities Against Azan", *Alkhaleejonline*, 05.05. 2016, http://alkhaleejonline.net/سلطات-مجتمع/الحمير-بصوت-يشبهه-وإعلامي-الأذان-تحارب-مصر , accessed on 01.01.2019.

[718] "Kudüs Semalarında Ezanın Susturulmasına İzin Vermeyeceğiz", *TCCB,* 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/75108/kudus-semalarinda-ezanin-susturulmasina-izin-vermeyecegiz.html , accessed on 03.01.2019.

[719] "We Will Not Allow Adhan to Be Silenced in Al-Quds", *TCCB*, 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/75129/we-will-not-allow-adhan-to-be-silenced-in-al-quds, accessed on 07.06.2018.

It can be argued that the stance of Turkey and discourse of its president Erdogan had an impact on Azan issue, on 2 January 2019, the Israeli second channel announced that Israeli new mayor of Jerusalem is suggesting another plan regarding Azan, through changing of big loudspeakers in Mosques with small ones, which make the sounds fewer loud and does not disturb Israeli people.[720] That is an example that Turkey's objection on Muazzen bill and speech of Erdogan has an effect on changing Israeli plans regarding Azan.

Erdogan's Speech and Increased Turkish Visitors to Jerusalem 'Reproducing of Cultural Structure'

In the same speech of Erdogan as a response to Muazzen bill, he also invited Muslims and Turkish people to frequently visit Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque. And we find that his speech contains words which incite the hearer to act:

> *"Müslüman ülkeler arasında en fazla Türkiye'den ziyaretçi gitmiştir. Ama çok ziyaretçi gitti diye havaya girmeyelim, giden ziyaretçi sayısı ne biliyor musunuz? 26 binde kalmıştır. Ben buradan milletime çağrıda bulunuyorum; yüz binler niçin Türkiye'den Mescidi Aksa'yı ziyarete gitmesin? Hiç bahane yok, gitmeli. Bu tablonun bize yakışmadığını kabul etmeliyiz. Oradaki kardeşlerimize vereceğimiz en güçlü destek Kudüs'teki varlığımız olacaktır."*[721]
>
> *"In 2015, nearly 600 thousand Americans, 400 thousand Russians, 300 thousand French nationals visited Al-Quds. Among Muslim countries, visitors from Turkey paid the most visit to Al-Quds. However, we should not get in the mood just because the most visitors went there from Turkey. Do you know the number of visitors? 26 thousand. I would like to call on my people from here; Why should not hundreds of thousands of people from Turkey visit the Al Aqsa Mosque? There is no excuse. They should. We should admit that this picture is unbecoming of us. The strongest support we can give to our brothers and sisters there is our presence in Al-Quds. It is not possible to achieve peace and prosperity in our region without finding a fair solution to the Palestinian issue. To do that,*

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720 "Plan Regards Azan in Jerusalem", *Al-Jazeera*, 04.01.2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/alquds/2019/1/4/مآذن-القدس-الفلسطينيون-الاحتلال, accessed on 05.03.2019.

721 "Kudüs Semalarında Ezanın Susturulmasına İzin Vermeyeceğiz", *TCCB*, 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/75108/kudus-semalarinda-ezanin-susturulmasina-izin-vermeyecegiz.html , accessed on 06.05.2018.

international law and decisions taken should first be respected. No one, no country can be above the law."[722]

Erdogan behind his invitation to visit Jerusalem is aiming to reach a goal in his mind, since according to 'speech act theory', language is both representative and performative. People use words to represent deeds and can use the words also to perform deeds, and that is, as Onuf explained; the directive speech act which "presents the hearer with a speaker's intention to some act the speaker would like to have performed".[723]

Erdogan's intention can be interpreted in this way; continuous existence in al-Aqsa Mosque will deepen the Turkish ties with the place, since seeing and living in a place is different from hearing about it, when the Turkish people visit al-Aqsa in the first time, they will miss it and wanted to visit it again, so the bonds between the Turkish people and al-Aqsa will become a major concern and the spiritual ties will lead the Turkish people to feel that al-Aqsa is belonging to them, therefore they will not allow any practice against al-Aqsa Mosque, and they will become a factor that influences the Turkish government's policies towards Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Onuf stated that *"whether these speech acts really accomplish anything depends on whether others respond to what they hear",* Erdogan remarked that number of the Turkish visitors to Jerusalem in 2015 was around 26,000 and he called the Turkish people to increase their visits to al-Aqsa. According to a statistics derived from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of the Turkish visitors to Jerusalem increased from 25,000 in 2015 to 41,400 in 2017 and 39,300 in 2018, as it is shown in figure 6.4-1.

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[722] "We Will Not Allow Adhan to Be Silenced in Al-Quds", *TCCB,* 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/75129/we-will-not-allow-adhan-to-be-silenced-in-al-quds, accessed on 06.05.2018.

[723] Onuf, *World of Our Making*, p. 82.

Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, accessed on 20.09.2019

Figure 6.4-1 Number of Turkish Visitors to Jerusalem 1980-2018[724]

Erdogan's speech not only led to a response in "visiting Jerusalem", but it also led to other acts and deeds that carry normative meanings and shared knowledge. Visiting of Turkish people especially adults to Jerusalem made them share the Palestinians in their pains, and put themselves in place of the oppressed Palestinians, and made them touch the reality through defending al-Aqsa Mosque by themselves. For instance, after Trump's decision to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem in December 2017, Turkish people visited al-Aqsa, and three of them were arrested by Israeli forces. This action considers interaction that reproduces the private knowledge which the Turkish individuals have in their mind that 'al-Aqsa not just belong to Palestinians it also belongs to Turkish people and all Muslims'. In that context, the Turkish people always assert that the Palestinian issue is their issue; for example, one of the Turkish protesters in al-Aqsa Mosque said that:

"Istanbul will not be comfort until Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque are freed". [725]

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[724] Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/publications/Pages/2018/Tourism-2016.aspx, accessed on 20.09.2019.

[725] "Turkey calls on Muslims to address Jerusalem issue", *Yeni Safak*, 10.12.2017, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/turkey-calls-on-muslims-to-address-jerusalem-issue-2880272 , accessed on 28.07.2018.

These slogans derived from a cultural structure that Palestine and Turkey have the same destiny. And if the Palestinians suffer, the Turkish people also suffer. This metaphor was used before by Erdogan in a speech for him in Konya on 04 June 2010, warning Israel in consequence of Mavi Marmara crisis, when he said:

> *"Hiç kimse bizi test etmeye kalkmasın. Hiç kimse Türkiye'nin sabrını test etmesin. Hiç kimse bu ülkeye bir kabile devleti muamelesi yapmaya kalkmasın. Hani Akif diyor ya: Zulmü alkışlayamam, zalimi sevemem. Buradan, Konya'dan tüm Türkiye'ye, tüm dünyaya bir kez daha sesleniyorum:* ***Kudüs'ün kaderi İstanbul'un kaderinden ayrı değildir.*** [726]

> *"Nobody try to test us. No one should test Turkey's patience. No one tries to treat this country a tribal state treatment. Behold Akif says that: I cannot clap for the persecution; I cannot love the persecutor. Here, I appeal once again from Konya to all over Turkey, to all over the world:* ***fate of Istanbul is not separate from Jerusalem's fate."***[727]

That is evidence on how discursive practices of Erdogan reproduced and reconstructed the order of discourse about the Palestinian issue, and fixed the Islamic identity of Turkey.

Position of Arab Countries on Visiting Jerusalem Versus the Turkish Position

While the Turkish government encourages its people to visit Jerusalem, it is observed that calling to visit Jerusalem is absent in discourse of leaders of Arab countries like Egypt, who consider visiting of Jerusalem as one form of normalization with Israel, since they need to issue a visa from Israeli authorities. In that sense, Islamic preachers in al-Azhar Mosque, rejected visit of Jerusalem as long as it is under occupation. This stance is not recent, before, in 1973-1978 Sheikh al-Azhar refused to accompany the president Anwar Sadat in his visit to Jerusalem, and in 1982-1996 Sheikh Jade al-Haq issued fatwa, "That whoever goes to Jerusalem from the Muslims is a sinner, a sinner, it is prior for Muslims to deter from going to Jerusalem until it cleanses from the rape of rapists", Moreover, Mohammad Sayed Tantawi, in 1996-2010, said that any visit to Jerusalem will not take place under the Israeli occupation, and the visit that takes place in this time is considered a

[726] "Israil'e vuran sözler!", *Habervaktim*, 04.06.2010, https://www.habervaktim.com/haber/125041/israile-vuran-sozler.html , accessed on 03.06.2018.
[727] ibid.

recognition of the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation. While the current Sheikh of al-Azhar Dr. Ahmed al-Tayyeb has confirmed that "the visit, which is done by the permission of Israel is not in favor of Muslims in any way".[728]

Not just Egypt, other countries like Jordan witnessed debates that Muslims must not visit Jerusalem until it is liberated. In that context, when Jordanian chief of justices Ahmad Halil visited Jerusalem in May 2015, he was met with protests by Palestinians preventing him from delivering of Friday sermon. While when the Turkish head of religious affairs Mehmet Görmez visited Jerusalem after a week, he delivered Friday sermon with a warm welcome by the Palestinians.[729] These behaviors prove that Palestinians are aware of the Turkish support to their existence and steadiness in Jerusalem in face of the Israeli policies in judaizing of Jerusalem.

6.4.2 al-Aqsa Crisis and the Turkish Position

The tensions increased in Jerusalem in July 2017 as a result of clashes between the Israeli security forces and the Palestinians, which raised in consequence of the closing al-Aqsa Mosque in front of Friday prayers on 14 July 2017. The crisis reached its peak on 16 July 2017, when the Israeli occupation authorities installed metal detectors and metal barriers at the gates of al-Aqsa Mosque. This move was rejected by Palestinian Jerusalemites who insisted on not entering al-Aqsa Mosque as long as the metal detectors and barriers were in place. They protested for 11 days at the gates of al-Aqsa until the Israeli forces conceded and removed them. Within these days on 21 July 2017, Palestinians hold a "Day of Anger" outside al-Aqsa Mosque as they were prevented from praying for

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[728] "Invitation for visiting Jerusalem lead to discussion", *BBC*, 21.09.2018, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-45603553, accessed on 24.03.2019.

[729] "Visiting of Jerusalem Liberation or Normalization", *Al-Jazeera*, 28.05.2015, https://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions/2015/5/28 /تحرير-أم-تطبيع-القدس-زيارة, accessed on 24.03.2019

the second Friday in a row. Four Palestinians were killed and hundreds were injured in the clashes with Israeli occupying forces.[730]

Response of the Turkish government to al-Aqsa crisis represented in the speech of Erdogan on 22 July 2017, who talked in the name of term president of OIC, as following:

> *"Metal detektörler ve diğer kısıtlamalar derhal kaldırılarak statükoya dönülmelidir. Bu hassas süreçte herkesin provokasyonlara karşı dikkatli olması gerekmektedir. İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Zirve Dönem Başkanı olarak, uluslararası toplumu Harem-i Şerif'te ibadet özgürlüğünü kısıtlayan uygulamaların derhal kaldırılması için harekete geçmeye çağırıyorum."*[731]
>
> *"Metal detectors and other restrictions should be immediately lifted and returned to the status quo. Everyone should be guard against provocations at this sensitive time, As the summit term president of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], I call for the international community to act to immediate end practices that restrict freedom of worship"*[732]

And on 23 July 2017 in the airport of Atatürk before his visit to Gulf states, Erdogan said that al-Aqsa mosque is not just for Palestinians it is also for all Muslims.

> *"Mescid-i Aksa'ya karşı, özellikle son birkaç gündür sergilenen pervasızlıklar, İslam dünyasını derinden üzmektedir. Kudüs'teki Harem-i Şerif, sadece Filistinlilerin değil, 1,7 milyarlık tüm İslam âleminin onurudur, namusudur, kutsal mekânıdır. Harem-i Şerife yönelik kısıtlamalar ile Müslümanların onurlarının incitilmesi karşısında, İslam dünyasının tepkisiz kalması beklenemez…..Kudüs'te yaşanan gerilimin bir an önce nihayet bulması; Mescid-i Aksa çevresinde yeniden sükûnetin hakim olması için yoğun çaba sarf ediyoruz."*
>
> *"This heedless attitude displayed especially over the past few days towards al-Aqsa Mosque deeply saddens the Islamic world. Haram al-Sharif, located in al-Quds, is the honor, dignity and a holy site of not only the Palestinians, but of the entire Islamic world of 1.7 billion people. The Islamic world cannot be expected to remain unresponsive to the restrictions on Haram al-Sharif and to Muslims' dignity being insulted…..Acting on this understanding, we have been exerting intensive efforts for the ongoing tension in al-Quds to immediately come to an end and for tranquillity to prevail again around al-Aqsa Mosque.. As the Summit Term President of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, I hereby once*

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[730] "Timeline: Israel's attacks on al-Aqsa Mosque", *Middle East Monitor 'MEMO'*, 01.08.2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170801-israeli-attacks-on-al-aqsa-mosque/, accessed on 26.03.2019

[731] "Harem-i Şerif'in Kutsiyetine Saygı Gösterilmesi Hukuki Bir Yükümlülüktür", *TCCB*, 22.7.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/79990/harem-i-serifin-kutsiyetine-saygi-gosterilmesi-hukuki-bir-yukumluluktur.html , accessed on 25.03.2019.

[732] "Erdoğan urges international community to immediately act to end restrictions at al-Aqsa", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 22.07.2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-international-community-to-immediately-act-to-end-restrictions-at-al-aqsa--115833, accessed on 24.03.2019.

again invite Israeli administration to act in line with the recognized practices, the law and fundamental humanitarian values."[733]

Erdogan on Thursday urged his Israeli counterpart Reuven Rivlin to quickly remove the metal detectors to end the tensions. Rivlin for his part urged Erdogan to condemn the killing of the officers. Erdogan reaffirmed in the statement that the restrictions were "unacceptable" and should be removed "immediately."

"I urge the international community to immediately take action to remove practices that restrict freedom of worship at Haram al-Sharif."

Moreover, on 25 July 2017, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a meeting for the JDP in the parliament that Israel is trying to take al-Aqsa Mosque from Muslims under the excuse of efforts to fight terrorism: *"Everyone who knows Israel is aware that restrictions on al-Aqsa mosque are not due to safety concerns."* [734]

6.4.2.1 Subject Position of Turkey's Islamic Identity Versus the Position of Egypt

In his speech we find that Erdogan is positioning himself as Muslim and defends that al-Aqsa Mosque is not only for Palestinians, it is also for all Muslims, and asked Muslim countries in the identity of president of OIC, to take joint action directly. All of these practices shape the identity of Turkey as Muslim country and its property of al-Aqsa Mosque.

"As a Muslim community, we need to visit al-Aqsa Mosque often – each day that Jerusalem is under occupation is an insult to us."[735]

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[733] "Haram al-Sharif Is the Honor and Dignity of the Entire Islamic World", *TCCB,* 23.07.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/80014/haram-al-sharif-is-the-honor-and-dignity-of-the-entire-islamic-world , accessed on 04.06.2018.

[734] "Erdogan: Under Guise of Fighting Terror, Israel Trying to Take al-Aqsa Mosque From Muslims", *Haaretz*, 25.07.2017, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/erdogan-israel-trying-to-take-al-aqsa-mosque-from-muslims-1.5434601 , accessed on 04.06.2018.

[735] "Turkey's Erdogan Calls on Muslims of the World to Flock to 'AL-Aksa'", *Jerusalem Post*, 08.05.2017, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Turkeys-Erdogan-lashes-out-against-Muezzin-Bill-US-embassy-transfer-490142 , accessed on 04.06.2018.

While we find that sensitivity and self-categorization with the Islamic identity are absent in discourse of other leaders of Arab countries like president of Egypt 'Sisi' whose speech was as the following:

> *"The unfortunate events at al-Aqsa are causing an unnecessary situation…I appeal to… the Israeli people and the Israeli leadership — please, this must stop…..There's no escaping the fact that the feelings of Muslims need to be respected in relation to their holy places. al-Aqsa is… very sacred to Muslims." Addressing Egyptians, El-Sisi said: "Don't take advantage of these events to throw around exaggerated slogans and say 'we're the defenders.' We want to live side by side, and that's a shared issue that we need to protect. The Palestinians need to keep this in mind, and so do the Israelis."*[736]

The Egyptian president was criticized for using the word of 'please' in asking Israel to stop its practices in al-Aqsa mosque. Besides, his speech was described as neutral and lack of the expressions that reflect the priority of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa in the Egyptian foreign policy. Moreover, al-Sisi was criticized by the Egyptian people for his worrying about Israeli people and their national security more than Egyptians.[737] That was when he addressed the Israeli people in his speech in September 2017 in the UN, calling the Palestinians to accept co-existence with Israelis:

> *"I tell the Palestinian people it's extremely important ... to overcome the differences and not to lose opportunities and to be ready to accept co-existence with the other, with Israelis in safety and security".*[738]

He continued his speech and said:

> *"I say to the Israeli people: Stand behind your political leadership and support them." "Do not hesitate," he urged, "and do not hesitate. We are all with you for the success of this attempt and this opportunity may not present itself again." Egypt's Sisi to Israel we stand with you"*[739]

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[736] "Egypt's El-Sisi Calls on Israel not to Provoke Muslims", *Y Net News*, 25.07.2017, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4994069,00.html, accessed on 14.07.2018.

[737] "Sisi worry about Israeli's security", *Al-Jazeera*, 20.09.2017, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/trends/2017/9/20/السيسي-قلق-على-أمن-المواطن-الإسرائيلي , accessed on 04.11.2018.

[738] "Egypt's Sisi urges Palestinians to unite, co-exist with Israelis", 20.09.2017, *Middle East Monitor*, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170920-egypts-sisi-urges-palestinians-to-unite-co-exist-with-israelis/, accessed on 15.07.2018.

[739] "Egypt's Sisi to Israel: 'We stand with you'", *Middle East Monitor*, 20.09.2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170920-egypts-sisi-to-israel-we-stand-with-you/ , accessed on 15.07.2018.

In addition to the weak speech of al-Sisi, the Egyptian government did not issue formal release condemning the Israeli practices in al-Aqsa.[740] And the customary anti-Israeli protests were absent in the streets of Cairo. Moreover, the government's minister of religious endowments, Mukhtar Gumaa, called on mosque preachers to abstain from speaking about al-Aqsa Crisis in the Friday speeches and to speak only about treating foreign tourists in Egypt well.[741] These practices are an example of the decline of priority of the Palestinian issue in the Egyptian agenda.

6.4.3 Trump's Recognition of Jerusalem as Capital of Israel and Turkey's Response

A lot of Erdogan's speech was insisting not to allow to change the status quo of Jerusalem through Judaizing it. However, the most important and dangerous step by Israel and America to Judaize Jerusalem was Trump's announcement of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel on 6 December 2017 from the white house, and his plans to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem.[742] Actually, Erdogan responded to the action before it has been taken, once the initial discussions started around the possibility of moving the embassy in May 2017, Erdogan directly started to take steps towards preventing the U.S government to take the decision, for example, in his speech in front of Palestinian representatives in Istanbul on 8 May 2017 , he criticized the recent discussions to move the U.S embassy to Jerusalem saying that:

> *"Kesinlikle gündemden düşmelidir. Bu konuda gerekli uyarıları en üst düzeyde yaptık, yapıyoruz. Bu mesele bazılarına basit bir tabela değişikliği gibi gelebilir. O Kadar basit değil, böyle düşünenler, kutsal topraklardaki dengenin ne kadar hassas olduğunu, değil bir tabelayı, bir taşı dahi yerinden oynatmanın ne denli büyük etkileri olacağını görmezden*

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[740] "The crisis of al-Aqsa is absent in Saudi Arabia and sounds of normalization are increasing", *Al-Jazeera*, 17.07.2017, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/7/17/أصوات-بالسعودية-تغيب-الأقصى-محنة-ترتفع-التطبيع , accessed on 15.07.2018.

[741] Zvi Bar'el, "This Is Why the Arab States Are Conspicuously Silent on Temple Mount Crisis", *Haaretz*, 24.07.2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/why-arab-states-are-conspicuously-silent-on-temple-mount-1.5432973 , accessed on 16.01.2019.

[742] "Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital", *CNN*, 06.12.2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/06/politics/president-donald-trump-jerusalem/index.html, accessed on 04.07.2018.

geliyorlar." Bir diğer önemli konu, ilk kıblemiz Mescid-i Aksa'ya yönelik taciz ve saldırılardır. Burada çok tehlikeli bir tırmanışa şahit oluyoruz. Sadece 2016 yılında 14 binden fazla radikal İsrailli, silahlı güvenlik görevlileri eşliğinde, Mescid-i Aksa'ya girmiştir".[743]

"It must definitely be dropped off the agenda. We have made the necessary warnings on this issue at the highest level and we continue to do so. It might seem to some people as a simple change of signboard but it is not that simple. Those, who think so, ignore how huge an impact it would have to move a single rock let alone a signboard in the holy land and how delicate the balance is there. Another important matter is the harassments and assaults against the Al Aqsa Mosque, our first kiblah. We witness a very dangerous rise there. In 2016 alone, over 14 thousand radical Israelis, accompanied by armed security personnel, entered the Al Aqsa Mosque."[744]

So before Trump announces that Jerusalem is capital of Israel, the role of Erdogan was to warn that the decision must be removed from the agenda, emphasizing that al-Aqsa Mosque with 144 acres is just belonging to Muslims.

However, Erdogan and Turkish government stayed on touch with developments on the issue, and before Trump administration announced the decision with one day Erdogan announced that if the decision was taken, he as president of the OIC 'Organization of Islamic Cooperation', is calling the leaders of Islamic countries to OIC meeting in Istanbul to take suitable steps against the action. And through his speech, he conveyed a message to Trump that:

"Sayın Trump, Kudüs Müslümanların kırmızı çizgisidir. Filistin halkının yaraları kanamaya devam ederken, her gün hak ihlalleri, zulümler, baskılar sürerken İsrail'e destek mahiyetinde böyle bir kararın alınması, sadece uluslararası hukukun ihlali değil, aynı zamanda insanlık vicdanına da vurulmuş ağır bir darbedir"[745]

"Mr Trump, Jerusalem is red line of Muslims, As the wounds of the Palestinian people continue to bleed, and every day violations of rights, cruelty and oppression is

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743 "Kudüs Semalarında Ezanın Susturulmasına İzin Vermeyeceğiz", *TCCB,* 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/75108/kudus-semalarinda-ezanin-susturulmasina-izin-vermeyecegiz.html , accessed on 04.02.2018.

744 "We Will Not Allow Adhan to Be Silenced in Al-Quds", *TCCB*, 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/75129/we-will-not-allow-adhan-to-be-silenced-in-al-quds , accessed on 04.02.2018.

745 "Kudüs, Müslümanların Kırmızı Çizgisidir", *TCCB,* 05.12.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/87590/kudus-muslumanlarin-kirmizi-cizgisidir.html, accessed on 13.06.2018.

continuing, such a decision to support Israel is not only a violation of international law, but also a heavy blow to the human conscience".[746]

Erdogan also confirmed that Turkey is ready to do anything to prevent any change in the status quo of Jerusalem, even it will cost Turkey to cut off its relations with Israel, as he stated: "it may reach to cut off our diplomatic relations with Israel", "**kaldı ki bu bizim diplomatik ilişkilerimizi İsrail'le koparmaya kadar da gidebilir".**[747] And this is a big evidence that Turkey is no longer make account for the West or Israel, that is explained by constructivist theory of Alexander Wendt who stated that: "material conditions and structural constraints sometimes make some actions possible or impossible, costly or cheap, and actors who ignore these effects are likely to pay a price."[748] Moreover, the meaning of the action of moving the American Embassy to Jerusalem depends on how Turkey perceived it, it depends on the beliefs of the actors. For Turkey, like other Islamic countries, moving the American Embassy to Jerusalem means that Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque will be no longer for Muslims, it will be for Jews. And this belief makes Turkey if necessary to take serious actions like cutting of relations with Israel, to prevent Judaizing of Jerusalem, so here Turkey is acting depending on its private meaning ignoring the material conditions through privileging Islamic World on the West in general, and Palestine on Israel in particular.

After the decision of Trump, Erdogan called leaders of the Islamic Organization for an extraordinary meeting on 13 December 2017. Erdogan invited for the meeting in the name of president of OIC, here the Turkish government acted according to its identity of OIC member, not within the identity of NATO member. That is a representational practice that represents the reality in the form of dichotomy that privileges OIC over NATO and Islam over West, as Derrida argues, these are dichotomies or polarities that structure

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[746] ibid

[747] Kudüs, Müslümanların Kırmızı Çizgisidir, *TCCB*, 5.12.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/87590/kudus-muslumanlarin-kirmizi-cizgisidir.html , accessed on 13.06.2018.

[748] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 153.

thought of agents.[749]

However, in the OIC meeting, Erdogan provided speech starting with reference to the norms and rules that dominate the international structure and limit the action of agents regarding Jerusalem status. He remarked that "no nation can establish a diplomatic mission in Jerusalem, according to U.N Security Council resolution No. 478 issued in 1980".[750]

Erdogan also recalled the photos that show the Palestinian children, Fawzi al-Junaidi who was blindfolded by Israeli occupation forces, and Mohammad al-Taweel with down syndrome who being arrested and loaded into iron cages by Israeli soldiers, in addition to Ahed Al-Tamimi the girl who was beaten with the butt of a gun and forcefully taken away from her mother. In that regard, Erdogan made the following remarks:

> *"What is this if not an occupier or if not terrorist? Is it possible to justify this? Those who have humanity, who have conscience must draw the necessary lessons from these incidents."*[751]

In the capacity of the OIC Summit Chairman, President Erdogan called on the U.S. to backtrack on the extremely wrong, provocative, and unlawful step it has taken, and added that:

> "*We expect the whole international community to assume responsibility for global peace and stability in place of the U.S., which has disqualified itself from the peace process and fully lost its mediating role with the step it has taken."*[752]

Finally, Erdogan invited leaders of Muslim countries to form a joint response on Trump's decision, insisting that "Jerusalem is the red line for Muslims", in that context, Erdogan recognized East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.[753]

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[749] Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, Translated, with an Introduction and Additional Notes, by Barbara Johnson, 1983, p. 15.
[750] "Erdoğan calls on all countries to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Palestine", *Yeni Safak*, 13.12.2017, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/erdogan-calls-on-all-countries-to-recognize-jerusalem-as-capital-of-palestine-2890491 accessed on 12.06.2018.
[751] "I Call On All Countries To Recognize al-Quds as The Capital of The State of Palestine", *TCCB*, 13.12.2017 https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87719/tum-ulkeleri-kudusu-filistin-devletinin-baskenti-olarak-tanimaya-davet-ediyorum, accessed on 12.06.2018.
[752] ibid.

6.4.3.1 Normative Effect of Erdogan's Speech in the OIC

In his speech in the OIC meeting, Erdogan recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and after days in a speech to members of JDP in Karaman on 17 December 2017, he announced that Turkey is planning to open an embassy in East Jerusalem, saying:

> *"The day is close when officially, with God's permission, we will open our embassy there."*[754]

Nicholas Onuf argues that talking may create normative constraints for action or speaking. In other words, it is an activity with normative consequences.[755] The speech of Erdogan created an effect on both the Arab World and Israel. In the Arab World, popularity of Turkey increased and Arab people see Erdogan as their leader, for example, the Palestinian people were very worried and concerned with the results of the Turkish presidential elections that were conducted in June 2018, and they wrote support letters hoping that Erdogan will win the elections. According to study done by Ahmad Yusuf and published on Palestinian news agency *Samannews*:

> *"There is a consensus among the Palestinian Islamic elites and cadres that the empowerment of the Islamic-oriented party and President Erdogan, is a winning for the Palestinian cause on the one hand, and the Islamic nation on the other hand."*

He also added that:

> *"The Palestinian street, in general, is historically sympathetic to Turkey, Erdogan, And believes that their political positions stand firmly alongside our cause, And the policies of this Muslim country led by Erdogan have always denounced and condemned Israeli aggressive actions against our people, whether during the war on the Gaza Strip or the attacks on Al Aqsa Mosque."*[756]

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[753] "Erdoğan calls on all countries to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Palestine", *Yeni Safak*, 13.12.2017, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/erdogan-calls-on-all-countries-to-recognize-jerusalem-as-capital-of-palestine-2890491 , accessed on 12.06.2018.

[754] **"**Erdoğan says Turkey will open embassy in East Jerusalem", *Yeni Safak*, 17.12.2017, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/erdogan-says-turkey-will-open-embassy-in-east-jerusalem-2890809 accessed on 13.06.2018.

[755] Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, p. 77.
- Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, p. 153.

[756] Ahmad Yusuf, "Palestine Votes for Leadership of Erdogan", *Samannews*, 20.07.2018, http://samanews.ps/ar/post/340156/ ,فلسطين-تصوت-لزعامة-أردوغان-د-أحمد-يوسف , accessed on 25.12.2018.

On the other hand, Erdogan's discourse regarding Jerusalem and his announcement of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine had a normative effect on the Israeli side. That is observed when the Israeli Knesset as a response, approved a bill in January 2018, that requires a special two-thirds majority vote in the Knesset to relinquish any part of Jerusalem to the Palestinians under a future peace accord. The thing that make it much harder to divide Jerusalem, which Israel claims as its undivided capital, as it is shown in the following speech of the Israeli Knesset member Moalem-Refaeli:

> *"The Palestinians claim East Jerusalem as the capital of a future state. ...The goal of the bill is to prevent concessions as part of diplomatic deals...Jerusalem will never be on the negotiating table.....The State of Israel will not allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem.... Get it into your heads that Jerusalem was the capital of the Jewish people and will remain the capital of the Jewish people for all eternity."*[757]

Turkey responded to the Israeli law by considering it as a step that leads to the change of status quo of Jerusalem. On 4 January 2018, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu said that the adoption of the draft law is *"a step to undermine the foundations of the peace process and damage regional peace and stability....we consider Israel's steps as dangerous and reject them."*[758]

It is noted that the decision of the Israeli Knesset, reflects the worries of the Israeli government from establishing joint Islamic alliance by the leadership of Turkey, and the ability of Turkey to convince the world countries to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. That is an example of how speech of Erdogan about his intention to establish a Turkish Embassy in Jerusalem and invitation other Islamic countries to do that, has a normative effect that led Israel to take action by issuing the mentioned bill.

Moreover, response of Erdogan on Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Israel by assembling the extraordinary summit of OIC in Istanbul was a

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[757] "In late-night vote, Knesset passes law to hinder East Jerusalem withdrawal", *Times of Israel*, 02.01.2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-late-night-vote-knesset-passes-law-to-hinder-east-jerusalem-withdrawal/ , accessed on 23.07.2018

[758] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Release Regarding the Law on Jerusalem Adopted by the Israeli Parliament", 05.01.2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-5_-israil-parlamentosunda-kudus-konusunda-kabul-edilen-yasa-hk_en.en.mfa, accessed on 23.07.2018.

responsible initiative that affected the function of International institutions like UN, as the columnist Ünal Çeviköz wrote in *Hurriyet Daily News*: "This initiative was then carried to the United Nations General Assembly and resulted in a broader stance, safeguarding the principles of international law."[759]

6.4.4 Opening of the US Embassy in Jerusalem and Return Marches

On 14 May 2018, the American president Donald Trump opened the U.S Embassy in Jerusalem. The event inflamed great anger inside and outside Palestine, and the entire world stood against the U.S in this action. The *Independent*, British newspaper, reported that this step created a hostility against Christianity, especially by friends of America in the West, in addition to Russia and China.[760] Nevertheless, before the opening day of the U.S Embassy in Jerusalem, the Turkish president Erdogan specified that the U.S by insisting on its step, lost its credibility to be a broker in the peace process, and confirmed that the Turkish people will always stand beside their Palestinian brothers. Besides, he warned Israel to behave wisely in facing the expected Palestinian anger in the day of the opening in order to avoid the loss of life.[761]

But what was expected happened, and Israel opened fire against the Palestinians who were peacefully protesting in Gaza, 62 of the protestors were killed and 3,500 were injured.[762] The protests are known by "Return Marches", which started before by different Palestinian factions with the anniversary of the Land Day on 30 March 2018 and continued every Friday.

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[759] Ünal Çeviköz, "Five principles for a visionary foreign policy for Turkey", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 03.01.2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/unal-cevikoz/five-principles-for-a-visionary-foreign-policy-for-turkey-125138 accessed on 12.09.2018.

[760] "Trump moving the US embassy to Jerusalem may cause a chain reaction in the Middle East that he can't control", *Independent,*14.05.2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/us-embassy-jerusalem-netanyahu-middle-east-iran-palestine-a8351456.html , accessed on 23.07.2018.

[761] "Statement on Al-Quds", *TCCB*, 13.05.2018, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/92554/statement-on-al-quds.html, accessed on 20.07.2018.

[762] Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, *Strategic Assessment (105): The Future of Return Marches and Popular Resistance Commemorating 70 Years of Nakbah*, 16.5.2018.

As a response to the U.S and Israeli actions, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on 14 May 2018, condemned the decision of the U.S Administration to move the embassy to Jerusalem, and stated that U.S is violating the international law and the related UN resolutions. Turkey described the step as legally null and void, and against efforts of peace.[763]

Moreover, the Turkish government recalled its ambassadors to Israel and the United States, and asked the Israeli ambassador in Ankara 'Eitan Na'eh' to leave the country.[764] In his way of return in the Turkish airport of Ataturk, the Israeli ambassador underwent a strict security screening, when he required to take off his shoes, inviting Turkish press to film the spectacle. The event considered by Israel as a humiliation issue for its officials, and in return, Israel responded by inviting the Turkish charge d'affairs in Tel Aviv Umut Deniz, to a meeting with the director of the Southern Europe Department in Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, who expressed strong Israeli protest of the extreme Turkish conduct and mentioned that Israel won't tolerate such treatment of its delegates. After the meeting, the ministry spokesperson Emmanuel Nahshon remarked that "this behavior is a blatant violation of the customary diplomatic behavior code between countries".[765]

In regard to 'return marches', Turkey stood beside the Palestinians and tried to transport wounded Palestinians from Gaza to Turkey for medical treatment, but Israel and Egypt did not allow the Turkish aircraft to use their airport.[766] Besides, Turkey declared three days of national mourning in solidarity with the Palestinians, and called for an

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[763] Republic of Turkey MFA, "Press Release Regarding the Decision of the US Administration to Move Its Embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem", 14.05. 2018. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no -137 -abdnin-telaviv-buyukelciligini-kuduse-tasimasi-hk.en.mfa, accessed on 20.07.2018.

[764] "Turkey Recalls Ambassadors to Israel and United States", *Al-Jazeera*, 15.05.2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/turkey-recalls-ambassadors-israel-united-states-180514200635590.html, accessed on 03.08.2018

[765] "Turkey and Israel humiliate each others' envoys in escalating diplomatic tiff", *Times of Israel, 16.05.2018.* https://www.timesofisrael.com/expelled-israeli-ambassador-to-turkey-humiliated-at-airport/ accessed on 10.01.2019.

[766] "Israel, Egypt not allowing Turkish planes for Gaza", *Anadolu Agency*, 16.05.2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-egypt-not-allowing-turkish-planes-for-gaza/1147909, accessed on 05.12.2018.

emergency summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 'OIC', and a UN General Assembly meeting to discuss Israel's use of violence.[767]

At the OIC meeting Erdogan criticized the United States as well as Israel, by saying:

> *"Despite all warnings, the U.S surrendered to circles who feed off tension and confrontation. Instead of taking the will of the OIC and the UN into consideration, it preferred to follow Netanyahu and some radical evangelists… it has rewarded Israel which has gone beyond apartheid regimes with its occupation policies and punished the Palestinian people who want peace. With its Jerusalem decision, the U.S set the stage for Israel's massacres and has the blood of innocent Palestinians on its hands".*[768]

The summit condemned the criminal actions of the Israeli forces against the unarmed Palestinians and called for sending an international protection force to protect the Palestinian people. Also, it requested the OIC General Secretariat to form an international independent committee of experts to investigate the crimes and holocausts committed by Israel against the unarmed protestors in Gaza. Moreover, one of the results of the extraordinary summit of OIC was to "apply economic restrictions to countries, officials, parliaments, companies or individuals who recognize the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel, and follow the decision of the U.S administration to move its embassy to Jerusalem, or deal with any measures related to the consecration of Israeli colonization of the occupied Palestinian lands."[769]

Within the decision of OIC to impose an embargo on Israeli products, Erdogan stated that Turkey will reevaluate its economic relations with Israel, as he declared for a group of journalists in his return way from Bosnia- Herzegovina on 22 May 2018:

> *"I hope the OIC counties will put the decision of the embargo into practice. After all, there will be no way to get any products from them anymore. Of course, we will assess the situation as well. As Turkey, we will evaluate our ties, particularly economic and trade,*

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[767] "Turkey Recalls Ambassadors to Israel and United States", *Al-Jazeera*, 15.05.2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/turkey-recalls-ambassadors-israel-united-states-180514200635590.html, accessed on 20.01.2019.

[768] Bulent Aliriza, "Jerusalem Casts a Shadow over U.S.-Turkish Relations", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, May 18, 2018.

[769] Organization of Islamic Cooperation, "Final Communique of the Seventh Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference in Response to the Grave Developments in the State of Palestine",18.05.2018. https://www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t_id=18703&ref=10354&lan=en , accessed on 25.07.2018.

with them [Israel]. We have an upcoming election. We will take steps in this direction after the elections,".[770]

The Turkish stance led to some strains in the Turkish Israeli relations. For example, as a response to the Turkish measures on Israel, the left-side Meretz Party finds it an opportunity to submit to the Israeli Knesset the resolution of recognition of the Armenian holocaust on the hand of the Ottomans in the last century. The party suggested the issue before, but the government responded with rejection, while at this time there was no objection from the Israeli government. Moreover, the Israeli parliament discussed the issue of supporting the establishment of an independent state for Kurds in Turkish lands.[771]

6.4.5 Turkey and Position of Arab Countries Towards Trump's Step: Egypt as an Example

The leading role of Turkey in the Palestinian issue became more prominent and more appreciated by Palestinians and Muslim people when the Arab governments start taking initiatives that stimulated the anger of the Arab and Palestinian street. The most prominent event that revealed the true position of Arab governments was the absence of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain from the Islamic Summit that was held in Istanbul to discuss the steps to respond to the Trump decision.[772]

In response to the weak attendance of Arab countries, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, commented by saying:

"There were clear reactions from the Arab world, high-level responses also came. But some countries showed very low responses. It seems that some countries are afraid of the country that take the decision U.S"[773]

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[770] "Turkey to review economic, trade ties with Israel after June elections: Erdoğan", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 22.05.2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-review-economic-trade-ties-with-israel-after-june-elections-erdogan-132137, accessed on 25.07.2018.

[771] "Knesset to Debate Recognizing Armenian Genocide Amid Spat With Turkey", *Haaretz*, 23.05.2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israeli-government-won-t-object-to-armenian-genocide-recognition-1.6112673, accessed on 27.07.2018.

[772] Osama Rashidi, "characteristic of Saudi Arabian policy towards Trump's decision in regards to Jerusalem", *noon post*, 16.01.2018, https://www.noonpost.org/content/21638 accessed on 21.12.2018.

[773] "Çavuşoğlu, Gündemi Değerlendirdi", *Haberler.com*,12.12.2017, https://www.haberler.com/cavusoglu-gundemi-degerlendirdi-10339790-haberi/, accessed on 19.12.2018.

In regard to the position of Egypt towards U.S declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, it was in its lowest levels in comparison with its position from previous Israeli practices like wars of Gaza 2012 and 2014. However, before the U.S administration took the decision on 5 December 2017, the Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi warned Israel against taking measures which may undermine the peace process. He also confirmed the Egyptian position on preserving the legal status of Jerusalem within the framework of international references and relevant UN resolutions.[774] Officially, on 19 December the Egyptian government prepared a draft resolution to the UN Security Council urging the US to withdraw Trump's declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Nonetheless, the resolution was vetoed by the U.S, even it was approved by the other 14 members of the Security Council.[775]

Even the Egyptian government took such a position, but on the domestic level, it took measures that limited the public response of the Egyptian people even on the levels of protests, media, or the Friday sermons. On the level of public protests, the Interior Ministry refused to issue the necessary security permits for the protests to be held. The street protests were not allowed by the government because if the protests took place, it may turn on the regime itself. Just the protests that are in universities were allowed since it can be oppressed easily by police. While the media agencies were careful not to fuel the rising anger, decreased its focus on Trump's decision, and focused instead on "criticizing Hamas for failing to live up to its promises to defend Jerusalem." In regard to Friday sermons, the clerics were cautious not to talk about the decision of Trump; instead, they gave lessons on family values.[776]

In response on the opening of the US embassy in Jerusalem, coupled with Israeli opening fire on demonstrating Palestinians in Gaza, on 16 May 2018, the Egyptian president Al-Sisi, said in a youth conference:

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[774] "Sisi cautions Trump against 'complicating' matters in Middle East: Egyptian presidency", *Reuters*, 05.12.2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jerusalem-egypt/sisi-cautions-trump-against-complicating-matters-in-middle-east-egyptian-presidency-idUSKBN1DZ2MF, accessed on 13.03.2019.

[775] "Egypt regrets UN failure to pass Egypt-drafted resolution on Jerusalem", *Xinhuanet*, 19.12.2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-12/19/c_136835796.htm, accessed on 13.03.2019

[776] ibid.

"On the move of the U.S. Embassy, we have said this issue will have negative repercussions on Arab and Islamic public opinion and lead to a kind of dissatisfaction and some instability and will have repercussions on the Palestinian cause .... I urge the Israelis to understand that the reactions of Palestinians over this issue are legitimate and that (they) are dealt with in a way that takes great care for the lives of Palestinians."[777]

Behind Egypt's Stance on Jerusalem Crisis

Following the military coup that overthrew the Brotherhood government in 2013, Egypt's relations with Hamas deteriorated, and its strategic role in the Palestinian issue especially the national reconciliation retreated. However, in the recent years of 2016 and 2017 Egypt succeeded in recovering its relation with Hamas after a group of Hamas visited the Egyptian National Intelligence in March 2016, and searched the efforts to control the situation in Gaza, since it affected the Egyptian national security.[778] In that sense, Egypt recovered its strategic role in the Palestinian issue, keeping balance in its relations with the Palestinian parts Hamas and Fatah. Egypt also strives to keep good relations with Israel who sees Egypt as a strategic ally for its national security, especially the importance of Egypt to encounter the extremist Islamic terrorists in the Sinai Peninsula. In that domain, Egypt and Israel involved in security cooperation through which Israel conducted more than 100 strikes, helping Egyptian efforts in encountering the insurgency in Sinai. Moreover, the relations between the two states flourished in economic cooperation after Egyptian Israeli firms announced the deal to export Israeli gas through Egypt,[779] which was discussed also by al-Sisi and Netanyahu when they met in UN General Assembly in New York on 27 September 2018.[780] An Israeli journalist in *Haaretz* wrote in regard to that meeting:

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[777] "Egypt's Sisi says U.S. Embassy move to Jerusalem causes instability", *Reuters*, 16.05.2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-sisi/egypts-sisi-says-u-s-embassy-move-to-jerusalem-causes-instability-idUSKCN1IH2LK , accessed on 13.03.2019.

[778] "Will the Visit of Hamas to Egypt affect positively on Gaza", *Paltoday*, 13.03.2016, https://paltoday.ps/ar/post/265185/ غزة-سكان-على-إيجابا-لمصر-حماس-زيارة-ستنعكس-هل , accessed on 14.03.2019.

[779] "Pipeline deal brings export of Israeli gas to Egypt within sight", *Reuters*, 27.09.2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-egypt-gas/pipeline-deal-brings-export-of-israeli-gas-to-egypt-within-sight-idUSKCN1M710F, accessed on 13.03.2019.

[780] "Israel's Netanyahu and Egypt's El-Sisi discuss Gaza ceasefire, gas export deal at UN", *Arab News,* 27.09.2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1378621/middle-east, accessed on 13.03.2019.

"Netanyahu spoke appreciatively of Egypt's important role in the region and the effort it takes to fight terrorism and support peace and stability", the writer continues: "The meeting took place amid a widening rift between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and stalled attempts at a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas. Egypt plays a central role as an intermediary in both cases, particularly via its intelligence services".[781]

The position of Egypt from U.S recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a clear example of improving Egyptian Israeli relations. In that context, the Egyptian President al-Sisi avoided criticizing the Israeli practices towards Jerusalem and the Palestinian people, in order to maintain the Egyptian position in the region as a strategic ally for U.S and Israel.

In general, looking at the position of Turkey towards the Israeli practices in Jerusalem, in comparison with the position of Egypt, it is observed that discourse of the Turkish president Erdogan reflects the holiness of Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular in the Turkish Foreign Policy. Moreover, his responses to the Israeli policies are tougher and reached the level of warning to cut relations with Israel if it is needed, and that means that Turkey is taking an independent policy from the West, and economically it does not need U.S or Israel. On the contrary, Egypt is considered as a strategic ally for Israel, and the two states are engaging in security cooperation, to counter terrorism in both Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. Besides, the support of the U.S and Israel is important for the existence of the military regime in Egypt. For that, it is observed that speeches and stances of the Egyptian President al-Sisi are neutral, and lack of any expressions about the holiness of al-Aqsa mosque or Jerusalem in the Egyptian foreign policy. While the Turkish President Erdogan is talking from perspective of Islamic responsibility to defend the Islamic places and the oppressed Palestinian people, for that we always see the Turkish flags, or photos of Erdogan in Palestinian streets, while there is no any Egyptian sign in Palestinian medium, despite Egypt's engagement in internal reconciliation and its attempts to mediate in the peace process.

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[781] "Netanyahu Meets With Egypt's Sisi on Sidelines of UN Session", *Haaretz*, 27.09.2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/netanyahu-meets-with-egypt-s-sisi-on-sidelines-of-un-session-1.6511666 accessed on 13.03.2019.

6.4.6 Population Element in the Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Palestinian Issue

Some writers theorized the population and put it in place at the center of justification of war. Foucault privileged the population in his writings when he said that the "great innovation of the eighteenth century was the population as an economic and political problem."[782]

Shapiro argues that "citizens have to be encouraged to support the strategic understanding among competing states and be willing both to mobilize for war (offer their bodies) and support the mobilization (offer their political acquiescence), and we can understand the production of acquiescence by appreciating the discursive economies within which an international strategy and war are represented."[783]

It can be argued that Turkey is using the population and the Turkish opinion as a major factor in its policy towards the Palestinian issue. The Turkish government could not define Israel as an enemy with whom relations must be cut, if it did that, it would face a big opposition internally from the opposition parties, and externally from the U.S. So it left the action to its people, through continuous discourse full with criticism of Israel and the ability of the Turkish leaders to persuade the Turkish people that the Palestinian issue is Turkish issue, since it contains dispute around Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque which concern the Turkish people as Muslims.

As a result, the population themselves will support and demand policies against the Israeli practices towards al-Aqsa, the spirit of using their bodies to defend al-Aqsa is created in their mind. And here the population will be put in the place of justification for any political practice towards relations with Israel and policies towards Palestinian issue.

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[782] Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics", *International/Intertextual Relations,* Der Derian, James and Michael J Shapiro (ed.), Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1989, p. 75.

[783] ibid.

Public Opinion Reflects the Identity of the State

Public opinion practices and speeches reflect and reproduce the identity of the state they belong to. When the US government decided to move its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Turkish public met the decision with a big anger and started protesting in all the Turkish cities, since Jerusalem occupies a great place in the hearts of the Turkish people; it is part of their Islamic identity and they do not allow for anybody to touch it or change its status quo. Moreover, these reactions confirm the Islamic identity of the Turkish People, which was more revealed during JDP era. The new generation of the Turkish people is more sensitive to the Palestinian issue and defending of Jerusalem, since they did not live in the 20th century in which Turkey was far from the Islamic world. These generations born in a century in which the power of JDP affected the knowledge, and the order of discourse about the Palestinian issue is dominated by discourses of the leaders of the JDP. For example, figure 6.4-2[784] shows a Turkish man protesting in al-Aqsa Mosque against decision of Trump to move the U.S Embassy to Jerusalem and announcement of Jerusalem as capital of Israel, the protestor said that **"Istanbul will not be comfort until Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque are freed"**, and this discourse which is used by the public opinion means that 'Turkey and Palestine have the same destiny'. We also find that this discourse is consistent with the discourse of Erdogan before years after Mavi Marmara crisis when he said, "destiny of Jerusalem and Istanbul is not separated" in his following speech:

> *"Biz Yunus Emre'yi bildiğimiz kadar Dadaloğlu'nu biliriz. Hiç kimse bizi test etmeye kalkmasın. Hiç kimse Türkiye'nin sabrını test etmesin. Hiç kimse bu ülkeye bir kabile devleti muamelesi yapmaya kalkmasın. Hani Akif diyor ya: Zulmü alkışlayamam, zalimi sevemem. Buradan, Konya'dan tüm Türkiye'ye, tüm dünyaya bir kez daha sesleniyorum:* ***Kudüs'ün kaderi İstanbul'un kaderinden ayrı değildir."*** [785]

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[784] "Turkey calls on Muslims to address Jerusalem issue", *Yenisafak*, 10.12.2017, https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/turkey-calls-on-muslims-to-address-jerusalem-issue-2880272 , accessed on 13.12.2018.

[785] "Israil'e vuran sözler!", *Habervaktim*, 04.06.2010, https://www.habervaktim.com/haber/125041/israile-vuran-sozler.html, accessed on 13.12.2018.

"We know Dadaloğlu as much as we know Yunus Emre. Nobody try to test us. No one should test Turkey's patience. No one tries to treat this country a tribal state treatment. Behold Akif says that: I cannot clap for the persecution; I cannot love the persecutor. Here, I appeal once again from Konya to all over Turkey, to all over the world: ***fate of Istanbul is not separate from Jerusalem's fate."***[786]



Figure 6.4-2 Turkish protester in al-Aqsa Mosque in consequence of Trump's decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Source: Yenisafak, 10.12.2017

Moreover, in figure 6.4-3 three Turkish people visited al-Aqsa Mosque and participated in the protest, and they were arrested by Israel for their activity in al-Aqsa.[787] That is an example of how the Turkish people insisting to be beside their Palestinian brothers and to see the same destiny.



Figure 6.4-3 Three Turkish protesters were arrested by Israel in consequence to their protesting in Al- Aqsa Mosque. Source: Al-Jazeera, 24.12.2017

[786] ibid.
[787] "Israel releases Turkish trio after Jerusalem arrest", *Al-Jazeera*, 24.12. 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/israel-arrests-releases-turkish-men-jerusalem-171224095534723.html, accessed on 13.07.2018.

6.4.7 Discourse of Ownership of Palestinian Issue and Liberation of Jerusalem

In the domain of the Turkish discourse of civilization towards the Middle East, there is a common- sense among the Turkish people on the holiness of the Palestinian lands, with the necessity of continuing the historical responsibility to protect the Islamic places in Palestine, in addition to hope of the Turkish leaders to liberate Jerusalem.

In that framework, it can be observed that the Turkish President Erdogan, in some of his speeches, is affected by the personality and speeches of the historical hero Salahuddin al-Ayyubi, who liberated Jerusalem from the hand of the crusaders. In the summit of OIC on 13 December 2017, in front of Arab and Islamic leaders, Erdogan referred to wisdom said by Salahuddin al-Ayyubi, as follows:

> *"Bir kez daha ifade ediyorum ki Kudüs bizim kırmızı çizgimizdir. Harem-i Şerif, ebediyete kadar Müslümanlara ait kalacaktır… Selahaddin Eyyubi'nin altın tavsiyesi rehber olmalıdır. "Dostlarıyla uğraşanlar, hasımlarını yenemez" Henüz Filistin devletini tanımamış ülkelerin artık bu önemli adımı atmaları, bölgede aklı selimi ve adaleti ayakta tutacak dengenin sağlanabilmesi bakımından şarttır."*[788]

> *"I would like to once again underscore from here that Al-Quds is our red line. Haram al-Sharif, with a surface area of 144,000 m2 covering al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, will belong to Muslims until eternity… Salahidin, the Conqueror of Jerusalem, made the following advice for Muslims: "Those who fight with their friends cannot beat their enemies."*[789]

In another speech for him in the opening of the International forum of Jerusalem Waqf in Istanbul on 8 May 2017, he also indicated that until the liberation of Jerusalem, eyes of Salahuddin will not sleep.

> *"Bir gün Hz Memnune, 'Peygamber Efendimiz Mescidi Aksa için hüküm nedir' diye sorar. O da oraya gidin ve orada namaz kılın buyurur. Hz. Memnune gidemezsek ne*

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[788] "Dünyanın gözü İstanbul'da… Erdoğan'dan flaş çağrı", *Hurriyet*, 13.12.2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-dunyanin-gozu-istanbulda-erdogandan-ilk-mesajlar-40676682 , accessed on 26.12.2018.

[789] "I Call On All Countries to Recognize Al-Quds as the Capital of the State of Palestine", *TCCB*, 13.12.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87719/tum-ulkeleri-kudusu-filistin-devletinin-baskenti-olarak-tanimaya-davet-ediyorum , accessed on 25.12.2018.

yapalım der. Peygamberimiz de o zaman kandillerinde yakılmak üzere yağ gönderin buyurur. Kudüs tekrar özgürleşene kadar, Selahaddin Eyyubi'nin gözüne uyku girmemiştir.[790]

"One day 'Prophet Muhammad asked Prophet Memnune, what is the judgment for the Masjid Aksa? Go there and pray there, he said if we could not go, send oil to be burned in its lamps, Until Jerusalem is free again, sleep didn't come to eyes of Salahaddin Eyyubi."[791]

Erdogan and his fellows when speak about the liberation of Jerusalem, they speak from a strong belief that Turkey will be the liberator of Jerusalem, and that stems from Islamic identity and responsibility to protect and restore the Islamic places.

"Kudüs'ün yüzü elbette bir gün gülecektir. Bu kurtuluşta ne kadar çok payımız varsa, o kadar çok bahtiyar oluruz. Önce biz kendimizi her bakımdan güçlü, kuvvetli hâle getireceğiz ki, mazlumların kurtuluşuna da öncülük edebilelim, bunun için hep birlikte gece-gündüz çalışmamız gerekiyor"[792]

"The face of Jerusalem will surely laugh in one day. The more we share in this liberation, the more fortunate we become. First we will make ourselves strong, powerful in all respects, so that we can lead the liberation of the oppressed, we need to work together day and night."[793]

Other dimension of ownership of the Palestinian issue in the TFP is "***the arbitrary geographical distinctions of the reality that al-Aqsa Mosque 'Our' not 'Their'".*** Through a speech for him in response to the U.S decision to move its Embassy to Jerusalem, and its recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel on 7 May 2017, Erdogan fastened in the mind of the audience Turkish or other Muslim a geographical distinction that al-Aqsa Mosque is 'our' not for 'Israel', as it is noticed in his following words:

"Kubbet-us Sahra'nın içinde bulunduğu Harem-i Şerif, 144 dönüm alanıyla sadece Müslümanlara ait, bir bütündür ve ebediyete kadar da böyle kalacaktır. Kudüs'ün

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790 "Cumhurbaskani Erdogan konusuyor Canli," *Sabah*, 08.05.2017, https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/05/08/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-konusuyor-canli , accessed on 04.03.2018.

791 ibid translated.

792 "Kudüs'e Sırtımızı Dönmemiz, Kendimizi İnkâr Etmemiz Demektir", *TCCB*, 20.12.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/87663/kuduse-sirtimizi-donmemiz-kendimizi-inkr-etmemiz-demektir.html , accessed on 07.03.2018.

793 ibid, translated.

karakterini değiştirmeye yönelik bu tür provokasyonlara asla rıza göstermeyeceğiz".[794]

> *"The Haram Al Sharif, covering the Al Aqsa Mosque and the Qubbet as Sakhra, with its 144 dunam land, is a whole, belongs to Muslims and will remain so forever. We will never consent to such provocations, aimed at changing the characteristics of Al-Quds".*[795]

Erdogan put in the minds of the audiences the distinctive object of property of al-Aqsa, and theoretically, as Edward Said argued "some distinctive objects are made by the mind, and that these objects, while appearing to exist objectively, have only a fictional reality."[796] Erdogan is setting up boundaries include that al-Aqsa on 144 acres of land is just for Muslims and according to Said this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary.

Moreover, the geographical distinction by Erdogan of 'our' and 'their' is arbitrary, as Said argued that geographical distinction is arbitrary, because imaginative geography of the "our land—Israeli land" variety does not require that Israel acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in our own minds; "they" become "they" or "occupiers" accordingly, and "both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from "ours."

6.5 REPRESENTATIONS AND VISUAL IMAGES IN TURKISH POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE

In the theoretical part, I have discussed Foucault's arguments regards the discourse and discursive practices, Foucault argues that discursive practices are part of the real world application of discourse that occurs within a discursive formation which contains a system of thought, rules, and institutions. The subject within this discursive framework is affected

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[794] "Kudüs Semalarında Ezanın Susturulmasına İzin Vermeyeceğiz", 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/75108/kudus-semalarinda-ezanin-susturulmasina-izin-vermeyecegiz.html accessed on 07.03.2018.

[795] "We Will Not Allow Adhan to Be Silenced in Al-Quds", 08.05.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/75129/we-will-not-allow-adhan-to-be-silenced-in-al-quds, accessed on 07.03.2018.

[796] Said, Orientalism .

by the prevailed discourse in creating knowledge, and that idea can be implemented on creating of the discourse in the field of mass media, where system of thought form a boundary within which the journalist is creating discourse, which is depoliticized and consumed by societies as a truth. The journalist in media organization is the subject that is created by discourse and works according to its intangible constraints, and he must be influential with the functional tools of the media since his discursive practices in media have the power to make the truth.[797] Even the journalists try to communicate truth objectively to the public, but they operate within framework of discourse that affects the way through which events, accidents, and objects are represented by mass media, so it is argued that media texts are full of with discourses that frame and describe the events and actions that were represented, and materialized as a result of discursive practices of the Journalist.[798]

In the context of the previous theories about discourse and media, this section explains the role of discourse and representations in the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue. Three cases related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are selected as an example to show how actors, events or issues are problematized and socialized as humanitarian crisis in the world politics by the contribution of the journalist as a subject who creates truth within the discursive formations in media which implies that "any violation of human rights must be uncovered and materialized to stimulate action of states, leaders and non-governmental actors". Example on those actors and states is Turkey. Accordingly, it will be shown how representations and discursive practices are leading to actions and rising up of other discursive practices taken by the leaders of the Turkish government. On the other side, these discursive practices entitled new role identity for Turkey among the Palestinians, and the oppressed people in Islamic and neighboring countries.

Role of the Journalist in Creating Knowledge and Truth About Events in Palestine

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[797] Stuart Hall, "The Work of the Representation", *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices,* Stuart Hall (ed.), London: SAGE Publications, 1997, p.46

[798] Hobbs, "On Discourse and Representation", p. 11.

The three case studies are representations and visual images about Israeli violation of human rights towards three Palestinian young. Their pictures were taken during the tensions and protests that raised up in different Palestinian lands, as a response to the U.S decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and its recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel in the end of 2017. At the same time, another case study will be used to show how some issues face more violations of human rights by Israel, but they are not reached by media and their reality is not reflected by representations, consequently, these humanitarian cases became unknown and actions that must be taken towards them are unthinkable.

The first image as shown in figure 6.5.1, is interpreted and conveying meaning to the world embodying "the blindfolded Palestinian youth" Fawzi al-Junaidi, who was walking blindfolded by the Israeli soldiers, after catching him on 7 December 2017, in aftermath –as the Israeli soldiers claim- of his participation in protests against decision of U.S Administration to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem and its recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel, that was taken on 6 December 2017. Through this mode of representation and visual image, the event interpreted and the issue problematized, the young Palestinian became an object of discourse and a myth that embodies the 'Steadfastness of the Palestinians,'[799] after three weeks from his arresting he was released

Figure 6.5-1 Israeli forces detain Palestinian Fawzi al-Junaidi following clashes in Hebron. Source: Al-Jazeera, 15.12.2017.

[799] "Fawzi Aljunaidi icon of Jerusalem's intifada", *Aljazeera* , 15.12.2017, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/12/15/فوزي-الجنيدي-أيقونة-انتفاضة-القدس, accessed on 01.11.2018.

with security guarantee and returned back to his family on 28 December 2017.[800]

Socially, the Palestinian young Fawzi al-Junaidi became a source of inspiration for local and international artists and poets, therefore, after his arrest, his photo became a symbol of fierce Palestinian opposition to the U.S. decision of recognizing Jerusalem as capital of Israel, the thing that drew widespread condemnation and protests from across the Arab and Muslim world.[801]

The second visual image in figure 6.5-2, was the photo of an Israeli soldier arresting a Palestinian boy with Down syndrome, 'Mohamed al-Taweel', who was detained for one hour at a commercial complex in central Hebron during protests in Hebron on 8 December 2017, against Trump's decision regard Jerusalem, photos of al-Taweel's short arrest were widely shared on Arab and foreign social media, where they drew widespread condemnation.[802]

Figure 6.5-2 An Israeli soldier arrests a Palestinian boy with Down Syndrome, Mohammad al-Taweel. Source: Anadolu Agency, 14.12.2017

The third example of the role of media in politics was the story of the Palestinian young girl Ahed al-Tamimi, who became famous by a series of visual images depicted her as a hero girl and symbol of Palestinian resistance. Ahed's story started with the first image for her through which she was showing her fist for Israeli soldier, during a protest held

[800] "President Erdogan receives Palestinian teen Juneidi", *Anadolu Agency*, 17.01.2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/president-erdogan-receives-palestinian-teen-juneidi-/1034030, accessed on 03.11.2018.
[801] ibid.
[802] "Palestinian with Down syndrome abused by Israeli troops", *Anadolu Agency*, 14.12.2017, http://aa.com.tr/en/life/palestinian-with-down-syndrome-abused-by-israeli-troops/1004929, accessed on 03.11.2018.

against Israeli settlements at the Nebi Salih village, near Ramallah in Palestine in December 2012, as shown in figure 6.5-3. That picture which was taken by photo journalist who works for Turkish Anadolu Agency, has created a tremendous impression all over the world. Moreover, Ahed was invited to Turkey and received a courage award, in addition to her meeting with the Turkish prime minister then President Recep Tayyep Erdogan, who received Ahed and her mother in the hotel, spoke with them and gave gifts for the family.[803]

Figure 6.5-3 The first photo taken for Ahed Al-Tamimi showing her fist to the Israeli soldiers in December 2012. Source:ABC Net 30.07.2018.

The second visual image of Ahed al-Tamimi was in 2015, as shown in figure 6.5-4,

Figure 6.5-4 Picture of Ahed al-Tamimi when she was 14 years old biting and fighting a masked Israeli soldier who was restraining her 12 years old brother, in August 2018. Source: NBC News, 28.08 2018

[803] "West Bank Teen Ahed Tamimi Becomes Poster Child for Palestinians", *Nbc news*, 12.09.2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/palestinian-poster-child-n425581, accessed on 22.11.2018.

when she was 14 years old, "biting and hitting a masked and armed Israeli soldier who was thrusting her 12-year-old brother down onto a rock in the West Bank", on 28 August 2015.[804]

The third visual image for Ahed Tamimi, which made her an object of discourse in all over the world, was a video for her shouting at and shoving two Israeli soldiers in the driveway of her family home on 15 December 2017."[805] As a consequence of that video, Ahed was arrested by the Israeli forces after three days,[806] and after 7 months she was released on 30 July 2018.[807]

The event itself may not be a big reason for a young girl to be loaded to prison, but as an Israeli journalist reported, the Israeli people felt with humiliating seeing a young girl hitting their soldiers, and the ultra-nationalist ruling coalition demanded punishment, as it is argued by the Israeli journalist in the *Middle East Eye*:

> *"She lunged at the soldiers, trying to slap and kick them. She did little damage and the soldiers essentially tried to ignore her. There is only one reason for the soldiers' restraint. They were being videotaped. They knew that if they arrested her or retaliated it would be documented on film and the world would see. So they chose the path of least resistance. However, their refusal to act aroused a hornet's nest of anger among Israelis, who saw "their boys" as being beaten down by a mere girl. It was humiliating, and the ultra-nationalist ruling coalition demanded punishment."*[808]

These three cases still repeated by media, as they became a symbol of Jerusalem crisis narrative, "in which complex political circumstances are interpreted through an established journalistic frame of reference". The journalist here is subject by discourse of media; he created knowledge and truth through the discursive practices and images that he captured. The journalist was operating in boundaries of discourse of media, when he

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[804] ibid.

[805] "Ahed Tamimi: Palestinian viral slap video teen goes on trial", *BBC*, 13.02.2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43032411 , accessed on 23.09.2018.

[806] "Palestinian girl lauded arrested for confronting Israeli troops", *CBS News*, 21.12.2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20171230114524/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/palestinian-teen-ahed-tamimi-prosecuted-israel-attack-soldiers-nebi-saleh/ , accessed on 13.10.2018.

[807] "Ahed Tamimi, Palestinian protest icon, released from Israeli prison", *ABC*, 30.07.2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-07-29/ahed-tamimi-palestinian-who-slapped-israeli-solier-released-jail/10049390 , accessed on 23.11.2018.

[808] Richard Silverstein, "There is only one reason why Ahed al-Tamimi remains in prison", *Middle East Eye*, 28.12.2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/ahd-tamimi-palestine-israel-resistance-1529335057 accessed on 25.11.2018.

captured the photo he was aware that it will be interpreted in the category of humanitarian crisis and will stimulate the actions of international actors and social institutions. So the discursive practices of the journalist gave him the power to make truth, according to it the outsiders became aware of the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, and they came from far to dispense charity to victims of Israeli occupation who are facing these violations every day. Instead of repeating this discursive formation in detail each time, the repetition of the three iconic images of the Palestinian young, has established shared understanding of the Israeli violence over the Palestinian children in the domestic and international social structures that affects the thoughts and behavior of individuals, as well as it portrays the asymmetric Palestinian Israeli conflict.

Role of Media and Discourse in Creation of Role Identity of Turkey

In fact, most of Palestinians conceive these events as normal since they frequently face the Israeli violence every once in a while. At the same time, the rest of the world will not be aware of these incidents until they are materialized and constructed as an event through media coverage. As Campbell stated: "these media materializations and discursive formation has an effect on 'us' at the same time it gives meaning to 'them', it creates a range of identities us/them, victim/savior, and are necessary for a response to be organized. This argument is consistent with post-structuralism's reorientation of analysis from the assumption of pre-given subjects to the problematic of subjectivity because it maintains that the event (the emergency or disaster) and the identities of those involved are the effects of discursive practices through which they are brought into being."[809]

The logic of interpretation here has political consequences since it became an object in constituting the identity of actors. The media presented to the world the Palestinian issue in the identity of oppressed/violence, occupied/occupier. However, these materialized events gave a space and opportunity for the Turkish government to be a part of discourse formation, through a series of discursive practices taken by the Turkish President Recep Tayyeb Erdogan and other non-governmental actors and social institutions. That was when

[809] Campbell, "Post-structuralism", p. 244.

Erdogan invited the two Palestinian young to Turkey to show his support to the Palestinian issue, as shown in the following images:

Figure 6.5-5 Visual images led to Discursive practices by Turkish government 'the Turkish President views the image of Fawzi al-Junaidi. Source: Anadolu Agency.

Figure 6.5-6 Turkish president invites the Palestinian young 'Fawzi al-Junaidi' after seeing his image in the media. Source: Anadolu Agency, 17.01.2018

Figure 6.5-7 Turkish President Erdogan is seen as father of oppressed Palestinians. Source: Yenisafak, 22.12.2017.

Figure 6.5-8 Turkish President invites the Palestinian young Muhammad aL-Taweel. Source: TCCB, 21.12.2017.

As discussed in the theoretical part the discursive practices and representations constitute social relations, social identity and knowledge,[810] in this aspect the discursive practices and actions taken by the Turkish government specially by its president created the relational identity between Turkey and Palestine or the Turkish leader Erdogan and Palestinians in the form of savior/victim. Here, reception of Erdogan for the oppressed Palestinians is interpreted that 'Turkey always beside the oppressed Palestinians'. As a

[810] Jorgensen & Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, p. 46.

result, the Turkish president was perceived by Palestinians and people of other Arab and Muslim countries as their hero, and they assigned to him the following expressions 'Erdogan is the Leader of Muslim World' 'Erdogan is our 'Khalife'. And that recognition from the other side is necessary to social or role identity to be constituted. Since identity of self is created if the other side recognizes it, it is relational with the other; one cannot enact role identities by oneself, without sharing of expectations,[811] and here Erdogan could not define himself as leader of Muslim world if they did not recognize him as their leader. These representational practices towards the oppressed people are contributing in the construction of the Turkish identity as 'regional power'.

So we can see the effect of these representations, as David Campbell framed it:

> *"Such representations establish the conditions of possibility for state and non-state action with regard to humanitarian crises, especially as they depoliticize the issues and render them best dealt with by humanitarian aid. Significantly, this logic of interpretation encompasses a notion of causality. But, rather than claiming a direct cause–effect relationship between pictures and policy (as in some arguments about the 'CNN effect' in international politics), this focus on the conditions of possibility posits an 'emergent causality' in which elements infuse and resonate across cultural and social domains, creating real effects without being able to specify a direct, causal link"*[812]

Shared Understanding that Dominate the Social Structures Affects the Meaning and Interpretations Assigned by People to Events.

Kevin Dunn argues in his work of *historical representations*, that object or event is perceived by different actors according to the context and shared understanding that dominate the social structure, according to which they interpreted events, thus the representations are historically and contextually contingent. This argument is applied on those two cases. For example, the visual image of the young Palestinian Fawzi Al-Junaidi among Israeli soldiers, normally is seen as a photo of young boy who is taken by force to be arrested, different meaning and interpretation are assigned to this image, one of the interpretation for this photo which socially shared between publics is that this boy is a "symbol of resistance against the trump's decision", while the reality is that the young may

[811] Klotz & Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 226.
[812] Campbell, "Post-structuralism", p.243.

not intentionally participated in protest, since his father said that he went to the grocery to buy goods for the home, but he had been arrested in a day witnessed great anger against the decision of Trump to move the U.S Embassy to Jerusalem. So it is the society who assigned him the representation as "Symbol of Palestinian Resistance". For instance, it is reported in news agency of Anadolu that:

> *"After al-Juneidi's arrest, a photo of the blindfolded youth became a symbol of fierce Palestinian opposition to the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital"*[813]

On the other hand, other actors defined and interpreted the event to be an example on terrorism acted by Israel against the Palestinian children. For example, we find that selection of these pictures by Erdogan and his related discursive practices, came in consistence with the prominent and repeated discourse about Israel as terrorist state that kill and arrest children.

Accordingly, Erdogan used the images in his public meetings to support these claims against Israel. For example, in the image that appeared in figure 6.5-9, the Turkish president Erdogan, illustrates the image of the Palestinian young arrested by Israeli forces Fawzi al-Junaidi, during his speech in JDP meeting, in Sivas on 10 December 2017[814].

Figure 6.5-9 The Turkish president shows the image of the Palestinian young who was been arrested by Israeli forces during his speech in AK party meeting in Sivas on 10 .12.2017. Source: Anadolu Agency

[813] "President Erdogan receives Palestinian teen Juneidi", *Anadolu Agency*, 17.01.2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/president-erdogan-receives-palestinian-teen-juneidi-/1034030 , accessed on 03.11.2018.

[814] "Cumhurbaşkanı AA'nın simge fotoğrafını gösterdi", *Anadolu Agency*, 10.12.2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/muslumanlarin-kirmizi-cizgisi-kudus/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-aanin-simge-fotografini-gosterdi/1000347, accessed on 03.11.2018

Moreover, during the meeting of Organization of Islamic Conference, with the presidents and leaders of Muslim countries, that was held on 13 December 2017, in Istanbul to discuss the measures that must be taken against the US administration's moving of its Embassy to Jerusalem, Erdogan recalled the photos (as shown in figure 6.5-10) that show the Palestinian children, Fawzi al-junaidi, who was blindfolded by Israeli occupation forces and Mohammad al-Taweel with down syndrome who being arrested and loaded into iron cages by Israeli soldiers, in addition to Ahed al-Tamimi, the 16 years old girl who being beaten with the butt of a gun and forcefully taken away from her mother. In that regards the president Erdogan made the following remarks:

> *"What is this if not an occupier or if not terrorist? Is it possible to justify this? Those who have humanity, who have conscience must draw the necessary lessons from these incidents."*[815]

Figure 6.5-10 The Turkish president is using the image of Fawzi Al Junaidi to talk about Israeli Terrorist Acts during the meeting of OIC on 13 Dec 2017. Source: TCCB

However, using of these pictures by Erdogan to show how Israel is acting terror towards the Palestinians was criticized by the West and Israel. For example, the Israeli columnist in 'times of Israel' wrote:

> *"The power of Junaidi's image has not escaped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is taking a leading role in the global Muslim opposition to Trump's Jerusalem decision….On two occasions Erdogan has used the image as a prop when describing Israel as a "terrorist" state.The first was at a rally for his Justice and Development (AK) Party. With an image of Junaidi on a screen, he told the thousands of attendees, "Israel is a terrorist state. We will not abandon Jerusalem to the mercy of a child-murderer state." Again, at the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries in Istanbul last week, which*

[815] TCCB, "I Call On All Countries to Recognize Al-Quds as the Capital of the State of Palestine", 13.12.2017, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/87719/tum-ulkeleri-kudusu-filistin-devletinin-baskenti-olarak-tanimaya-davet-ediyorum , accessed on 2.10.2018.

was called by Erdogan to rally opposition against the US Jerusalem decision, he put Junaidi's image on a screen."[816]

So by means of visual images, the icon of Palestinian steadfastness 'Fawzi al-Junaidi', became subject of speech of the political elites and the Turkish public. Those visual images also became object used by civil organizations as a mean to show their activities in context of humanitarian responsibilities, and their support for the Palestinian issue. In the following photo in figure 6.5-11, mayor of Esenler Mehmet Tevfik Goksu in Istanbul received the Palestinian young Fawazi aL-Junaidi and met him with the Turkish public. Besides, the Turkish artists like the players of the popular Turkish TV series 'Payitaht Abdulhamid' -which depicts the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid- were happy to meet Fawazi al-Junaidi during his visit to the film set. The official Twitter account of the series shared a photo of al-Juneidi with the actors of Payitaht at the film set." As presented in Figure 6.5-12.[817]

Figure 6.5-11 Fawzi al-junaidi welcomed by the Mayor of Esenler in Istanbul. Source: getyimages.com, 16.01.2018

Figure 6.5-12 The artists who act role in the series of 2. Abdulhamit are taking photo with al-Junaidi. Source: Anadolu Agency, 17.01.2018.

Invisibility and Marginalization of Other Human Crisis in Palestine by Media

On the other hand, Even media and visual images materialize and depoliticize or socialize the human crisis and issues, and render the world in visual terms, but this

[816] Dov Lieber, "Two new symbols risk galvanizing protests over Trump's Jerusalem decision", *Times of Israel*, 18.12.2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-new-symbols-risk-galvanizing-protests-over-trumps-jerusalem-decision/ **,** accessed on 13.10.2018

[817] "President Erdogan receives Palestinian teen Juneidi", *Anadolu Agency*, 17.01.2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/president-erdogan-receives-palestinian-teen-juneidi-/1034030, accessed on 03.11.2018.

rendering even by photographs may be not innocent. As Rose indicated, these images are never transparent windows on to the world.[818] There may be more severe human crisis that are marginalized by the media, and not materialized or presented to the world through visual images and representations, the thing that can lead to incomplete knowledge. Consequently, the policies drawn upon this knowledge will be unbalanced and biased. For example, during research tour in Palestine with a Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization 'al-Risala', we visited Palestinian lands which are located next to Israeli settlement beside a village of Yatta in Hebron city, as shown in the pictures (6.5-13, 6.5-14).[819] These lands classified by Israel as 'C' area, which means that these areas are under the Israeli administration. Even though, Palestinian communities are living in these areas for decades, and some of them are living before the Israeli occupation, but after Israel defined these areas as closed areas for military training, it prevented the Palestinians from building of houses, (while it is not prohibited for the Israeli settlements as shown in figure 6.5-13), even if Palestinians have documents proving their ownership of the lands,[820] like the Palestinian old man in figure 6.5-14, who has a document for his ownership of the land, but he could not build normal home, and he built container home that was destructed 11 times by the Israeli authorities.

Figure 6.5-13 Israeli Settlement besides the Palestinian lands. Source: photo was taken by the writer

Figure 6.5-14 One of the Palestinians who is living in his land beside the settlement refuse to leave it and his home had been destructed 11 times by Israeli authorities. Source: photo was taken by the

[818] Gillian Rose, *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials*, London: Sage Publications, 2001, p. 6.
[819] The pictures were taking during research visit to Massafer Yatta, in July 2018.
[820] "Life in a "Firing Zone": The Massafer Yatta Communities", *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Case Study Report, May 2013.

The problem is that Israeli authorities is putting the Palestinians who are living there under pressure to force them to leave their lands. If Palestinians left their lands, the settlements would be expanded to these lands, and by this way illegal settlement will spread and enlarged in Palestine. For that the people who are living in these areas are subject to Israeli practices that undermine their physical security, and decrease their standard of living and increase their poverty. They lack from good services like electric, water and medical services. Israeli authorities said to them, if you move to other areas we will provide you with electric and water. But the Palestinians refuse to leave their lands and accept to live with their children in miserable conditions as shown in figure 6.5-15, 6.5-16, in order not to allow for the Israeli settlements from spreading. Therefore, those Palestinians are the real resistants who deserve support to live in good conditions at least as the other Palestinians who live comfortably in cities and benefit from good services, either roads or medical services.

Figure 6.5-15 The Palestinians who live beside settlements are living without infrastructure as electric and water. Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Palestine

Figure 6.5-16 The Israeli Civil Administration destroy homes in Masafer Yatta more than 5 times, the Palestinians still rebuild their homes again Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Palestine

So those pictures and images may not include expressive photos about violation of human rights, for that they did not reach to the world as the previous cases of three young Palestinians in Hebron city whose photos reached to hands of the Turkish president Erdogan, as well as the leaders of the whole world. If these pictures had the equal opportunity to reach to the hand of the president of Turkey for example, it would be materialized and became the target of Turkish humanitarian aid and core topic of the discourse of the Turkish leaders, and a new articulation would be constituted regarding the Turkish identity.

The previous cases are examples of how media has a power on determining the context and organization of public knowledge. Which is exercised through restricted topic selection. And some news is interpreted to favor attention to different elite, actors, persons, institutions and nations or world regions. So, those examples support Dijk's claim that the power had a role in production persuasive discourse for public through media. According to him, in media discourses such as news, reports and advertising, the agencies combine power in the production of persuasive discourse for public consumption, such news reports may reproduce social structures and stereotypes like blacks, women, or victims.[821]

In spite of the effect of media on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue, but Turkey is taking empirical initiatives through which it will become really the Islamic country that hugs the Palestinians and stands beside them. Turkey has completed 543 projects in Gaza and West Bank in educational, medical and residential areas. It also has executed projects for Palestinians on its lands, such as the opening of the Palestinian schools in Istanbul in September 2018, in cooperation with the Palestinian Ministry of Education.[822] By this policy, the Palestinians who lived outside in Arab countries and suffered from racism and discrimination will find an alternative country that supports their rights and is able to provide them with a secure and respectful life.

Turkey also was the only country from Islamic and Arab countries that accepted to hold on its lands the conference of 'Palestinians of the Outside' in February 2017. The conference brought together 5000 Palestinian for the first time, who came to confirm their inalienable national rights, especially their right to return to their historical lands in Palestine.[823]

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[821] Teun A Dijk, "Political Discourse and Ideology", *University of Amsterdam*, (January 2002), p. 61.

[822] "Palestinian school opens in Istanbul", *Daily Sabah*, 21.09.2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/education/2018/09/22/palestinian-school-opens-in-istanbul, accessed on 26.12.2018.

[823] "Palestinians hold conference in Istanbul to defend rights", *Daily Sabah*, 25.01.2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/istanbul/2017/02/25/palestinians-hold-conference-in-istanbul-to-defend-rights , accessed on 26.12.2018.

Moreover, the Turkish humanitarian aid to Palestinians reached to 40 million US dollar in 2019, as it is shown in figure 6.5.17. The graph also shows that the Turkish aid in the JDP era in comparison with the previous Turkish governments witnessed obvious jump. According to the OECD, in 1993 the Turkish aid in the development area was 40,000$, in 2004 it increased to 5 million dollars. During wars of Gaza 2008,2012,2014, aid reached to high levels (37.49 in 2009, 37.09 in 2012, 51.18 in 2014), in million dollars. [824]



Figure 6.5-17 Turkish Aid to West Bank and Gaza from 1993-2017 Source: OECD.stat, extracted on 20.09.2019

[824] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'OECD' statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/# .

SEVENTH CHAPTER

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

The Palestinian issue always occupies special and important place in the Turkish foreign policy either in the last period of Ottoman Empire or the new Republic of Turkey, this importance stems from the relation of the Palestinian issue with Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque, which considered as a redline by most of the Turkish leaders in all governments, since they are tied with the Islamic identity of the Turkish people. But in some periods the nodal points and principles of Turkish foreign policy were factors affecting the Turkish policy towards the Palestinian issue.

During the early Republic of Turkey, the discourse of republican elites based on the ideology of nationalism and secularism, rather than Islamic identity. The privileged nodal point or the master signifier of the TFP was Westernization, linked with signs of European civilization, modernization, development and prosperous, while these nodal points are only meaningful in relation to negative opposition, which in the discourse of republican elites were the Middle East, Islamic World, and Arabs who were linked to nodal points like backwardness, underdevelopment, uncivilized and betrayers. However, the discourse about Arabs and Islam by the bureaucratic elites affected the discourse of the Turkish public opinion, who also perceived Arabs as betrayers due to the Arab revolt. In the context of Westernization policy, the Turkish government recognized Israel in 1949, at that time, the Turkish media and newspapers were interested in writing news about Israel, like the economic Turkish-Israeli relations, and sport competitions with Israel, while awareness and discourse about the Palestinian issue were uncommon in the Turkish mediums.

During the Cold War, the discourse of the Turkish foreign policy was security-oriented, and shaped by secular elites and national civil-military bureaucracy who were focusing on principles of integrity and sovereignty. The hegemonic discourse about the Middle East dominated with signs like risk, fear, insecurity, and threat, related to issues like the Kurdish conflict, Cyprus crisis and security issues with Iraq and Syria. However, a positive image about Islam start to be created thanks to the rising of the Islamic National Outlook Movement in the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who was aiming to recover the Islamic identity in Turkey and unifying Muslim people through establishing Islamic Union. On the other sıde, the Patrol crisis and Cyprus crisis in the 1970s have affected positively

the attitudes of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Islamic world in general and the Palestinian issue in particular. However, at that period awareness about the Islamic world and Arab countries started to dominate the Turkish newspapers, like the daily page of "Onbir Ayın Sultanı" which was published during Ramadan month, in *Hurriyet* newspaper in which every day there was a lesson about Islamic principles and ethics, with a presentation about one of the Islamic countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt. Moreover, rising of National Outlook Movement and National Salvation Party was an important factor in raising the awareness about the Palestinian issue among the Turkish public. The discourse about danger of Zionism not only on Palestinians but also on the Turkish people was always a core topic of discourses of leaders of the National Salvation Party. Forming of discourse and increasing awareness about the Palestinian issue affected the Turkish response towards Israeli practices in some events, for example in consequence to recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel in 1980, the National Salvation party arranged a big protest in Konya showing for public the importance of Jerusalem for all Muslims, refusing any change in its status quo. Then by pressure from the public the Turkish government downgraded its relations with Israel.

The pro-Palestinian discourse continued during the Turgut Özal era, who realized that Turkish economy cannot be grow without openness to the Middle East. At that time, the openness to the Middle East was legitimized by the discourse of economic liberation that dominated the International terrain. In that context, Özal didn't shy away from emphasizing the Islamic identity in order to develop political and economic relations with Middle East countries. In that aspect, Turkey supported the Palestinians' right of self-determination, and set beside them in their intifada that inflamed in 1987, in addition, Turkey recognized the Palestinian state that was declared in Algeria in 1988.

When JDP came to power in 2003, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and Palestinian issue witnessed serious change either on level of Turkish leaders or Turkish public, and it was affected by the Islamic identity of the party, in addition to the new principles of TFP that was adopted by JDP government. At the first years of the JDP, the TFP was following the track of independence from the west, Turkey's rejection of

participation in the U.S-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, was a sign on that policy. In the following periods of the JDP era, new principles of the TFP were adopted, which opened the debate towards openness of Turkey on the Middle East. At that time, the nodal points or master signifier of the TFP became Middle Easternization rather than Westernization, linked with other signifiers like: center state, balance between security and freedom, justices and legitimacy, smart power, multidimensional and proactive policy, in addition to the discourse of civilization and responsibility to protect that became more dominant during years of the Arab spring.

However, JDP government, within its nodal points of openness to the Middle East and emphasizing its belonging to Islamic community, tries to change the discourse about Arabs from negative to positive, for example, in the previous governments, the Turkish discourse about Arabs was dominated by expressions like 'Arabs hit us from the back', and it was given as real to next generations, while the president Erdogan in his discourses says to the Turkish people 'we must forget what we wrong learned in books, that Arabs hit us from the back', affirming that if one group did that, not all Arabs are accused, comparing it with PKK practices, in the sense that they cannot accuse all of the Kurdish people because of PKK. So by this speech, the negative discourse about Arabs will be diminished and dissolved by hegemon intervention of new positive discourse about Arabs.

In the context of Middle Easternization policy, the Palestinian issue became one of the priorities of the Turkish Foreign Policy. In the first decade of JDP era, the Turkish government showed its support to Palestinian resistance in Gaza, and its leaders used the dominated international discourse of 'war on terrorism' to legitimate their criticism of Israel as a 'terror state' because of its practices towards the Palestinians. In that context, the discourse of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyeb Erdogan, was powerful and had a significant role in creating shared knowledge about the importance of the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem for the Turkish people as a part of their Islamic identity. One of his powerful and harshest discourse is represented in Davos Crisis which from the constructivist perspective formed a cultural structure about the Arab-Israeli conflict, and created boundaries within which the Turkish people behaved and other discourses were formed,

like the Turkish series 'Kurtlar Vadisi' which is a social discourse that depicted Israel as a killer of children. The discourse of the leaders also encouraged the Turkish NGOs to take serious actions towards the Palestinian issue like sending Mavi Marmara with humanitarian aid to Gaza, which ended with a humanitarian crisis and cutting off relations with Israel. These are examples of the discourse theory of Fairclough who argues that discursive practices are constitutive in both conventional and creative ways, they contribute to reproducing society (social identities, social relationships, and systems of knowledge).

The second decade of the JDP government coincided with the rise of the Arab Spring in the Arab countries. The speeches of the Turkish elites in this period contain a reference to the civilizational and historical ties with the countries of the region, which make this principle a master signifier or a dominant nodal point in the TFP towards the Middle East. According to this principle, the people of these countries built in their minds hopes and beliefs that Turkey will always support them. In return, their hopes and beliefs formed a responsibility on the Turkish leaders who are keen not to disappoint them.

However, it is argued that Erdogan's discourse about the civilizational ties with the Arab countries became more powerful when the Islamic regimes came to power in these countries during the Arab Spring. That was obvious when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt in 2012, the Sunni identity of the Muslim Brotherhood led Turkey to perceive Egypt as an attractive partner since it shares the same identity of the JDP, the thing that increased the hopes of the Turkish leaders to unify the Islamic world. That situation affected the Turkish role and its discourse towards the Palestinian issue during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2012. Turkey played more active diplomacy with Egypt to end the war, and both leaders of JDP and Muslim Brotherhood addressed the same discourse towards the Israeli practices in Gaza, warning Israel that it must take in consideration that leaders of 2012 are not the same of leaders of 2008, and the current situation in the region is not the same of the previous situation. Here the identity played role in creation of more powerful discourse against Israel, but that situation didn't continue, and what was perceived as an attractive ally by Turkey for a while, is no longer exist after overthrowing the government of Muslim Brotherhood by the military coup in Egypt in 2013, hence, in the Israeli war on

Gaza in 2014, discourse of Erdogan changed and he criticized not only Israel but also the Egyptian president al-Sisi, describing him as 'persecutor' and his government as ' a coup government'. Hence, Turkey was not able to play an active role to end the war, with the absence of the Brotherhood government in Egypt.

On the other hand, as a way of expressing loyalty to the overthrown government of Muslim Brotherhood, discourse of Rabia has dominated the order of discourse of JDP's foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and the Palestinian issue in particular. Through repetition of the sign in most of Erdogan's discourses even in the election programs, a shared knowledge was created among the Turkish public, and by the time the Turkish people linked the sign with JDP, the thing that made the party to adopt the sign in its bylaw as a slogan of the party. This is an example of the role of repeated acts and discourses in the constitution of identity, which was explained by David Campbell as a performative constitution of identity.

In 2017 and 2018, the nature of developments in the Palestinian issue made it more presented in the Turkish agenda, due to Israeli policies that targeted Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque. These practices and developments are serious since they are considered as a part of the Israeli policy to Judaize Jerusalem. Examples of these practices are: banning of call for pray by speakers in Jerusalem, placing of electronic detectors in the gates of al-Aqsa Mosque known by al-Aqsa crisis, and the most prominent action was U.S recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and moving the U.S Embassy to Jerusalem. These events have stimulated the Turkish anger shaping discourse regularities and discursive practices, which in turn led to straining of relations between Turkey and Israel as well as its relations with the U.S. For example, in response to the U.S decision to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Israel, Erdogan in the name of term president of OIC, called the OIC members for extraordinary meeting, argued U.S to refrain from its decision, and warned that it may reach to cut the Turkish relations with Israel if it is needed. That means that Turkey is taking independent policy from the West, and economically it does not need the U.S or Israel. On the other hand, Turkey is taking measures in the name of the Islamic identity of OIC, ignoring the Western identity of NATO, and these discursive practices according to

Derrida's theory of deconstruction, articulating dichotomies of East/West, OIC/NATO, Islam/Secular, in which the first term is privileged on the second term.

In that context, it is argued that the stance of Turkey on Jerusalem crisis either in the form of discourse and rhetoric of Erdogan, or in the form of serious actions, raised Turkey as a prominent power in the Islamic and Arab countries, especially among Palestinian people, in the time that other Arab countries like Egypt followed a weak stance, prioritizing their strategic relations with US and Israel, as important allies for their national security. Moreover, the Turkish government always encourages its people to visit al-Aqsa and Jerusalem, the thing that increases ties of the Turkish people with al-Aqsa, and supports the steadfastness of Palestinians, challenging the Jewish control over al-Aqsa. While Arab countries especially Egypt issues an advisory opinion 'Fatwa' through Sheikh al-Azhar that "visiting al-Aqsa while it is under occupation is a form of normalization with Israel, and it must not be visited until it is liberated."

However, we must not ignore the role of representations and visual images in communicating truth within discourse formation, and reflecting a reality to the policymakers, leading to actions and rising of other discursive practices by the leaders of the Turkish government, in turn, these discursive practices entitled new role identity for Turkey among the Palestinians, and the oppressed people in Islamic and neighbor countries. Example of these visual images are photographs of the Palestinian children like Fawzi al-Junaidy, Mohammad al-Taweel, and Ahed al-Tamimi, who exposed to Israeli violence and their photos were problematized and socialized and reached to the hand of the Turkish president Erdogan, who in turn took action by supporting them and their families, and used their photos during different meetings in shaping his discourse against Israel. These discursive practices have fixed the intersubjective meaning about the identity of the Turkish leader as the owner of the Palestinian issue. In return, the others who are Arabs and Palestinians interpreted these discursive practices and attributed identity to Turkey as 'savor of oppressed people', 'regional power', and 'unifier of the Islamic world'. So all of these discursive practices towards the Palestinian issue are examples of the main assumptions of post-structuralism that 'there is nothing outside the text', and 'discourse

allows and constrains actions, and makes other discourses possible'.

It can be concluded that the discourse is not just a tool used to express the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue, but it also a factor that constitutes identities, social relations, and shared knowledge, it led to real actions affected the Turkish-Israeli relations and deepened the Turkish solidarity with the Palestinians, and constituted the Turkish identity as a prominent regional power in the Islamic world. The discourse of the Turkish leaders does not only stem from the identity of the Turkish government, it also came in consistence of the wider domain of international discourse, which means that 'nothing outside the text'. In that domain, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue is dominated by the following discourses:

1. Discourse of anti-terrorism and anti-occupation against the Israeli practices towards the Palestinians, legitimized by the international discourse of 'war on terrorism'.
2. Discourse of civilization and historical responsibility, legitimized by the international discourses of "civilizational alliance" and 'responsibility to protect' and discourse of 'humanitarian intervention'.
3. Religious discourse, ownership of the Palestinian issue and liberation of al-Aqsa Mosque linked with the Islamic identity and beliefs of the Turkish leaders.

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