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PAX AMERICANA OR US AGAINST THE WORLD? A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Adem DURMUŞ

MASTER THESIS

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ONAY

Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne,

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Adem DURMUŞ

ABSTRACT

PAX AMERICANA OR US AGAINST THE WORLD?
A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Adem DURMUŞ

Master Thesis, Department Of International Relations
Supervisor: Assist Prof. Dr. Marella BODUR ÜN
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The future of the liberal international order is one of the most discussed topics in International Relations (IR). The world has been witnessing one of the most peaceful and prosperous eras in any time in history. Yet, numerous factors such as China's rise as a great power and rising right-wing populist authoritarianism around the globe have pushed scholars to question the future of the liberal international order. This thesis focuses on the characteristics of the liberal international order, threats against it and the future of world politics. Moreover, it analyzes role of the U.S. in the international system and American foreign policy after the Cold War through the point of power politics since the U.S. is the strongest state in the world. Traditional American foreign policy choices such as providing security to its European and Asian allies are examined within the framework of structural realism. This thesis argues that the liberal international order already collapsed and it predicts that great power politics will be the focal point of the new era.

Keywords: Liberal International Order, U.S Foreign Policy, Great Power Politics, Structural Realism, Strategic Studies.

ÖZET

AMERİKAN BARIŞI MI AMERİKA DÜNYAYA KARŞI MI? SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI AMERİKAN DIŞ POLİTİKASININ KAPSAMLI ANALİZİ

Adem DURMUŞ

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı
Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Marella BODUR ÜN
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Liberal Uluslararası Düzen'in geleceği, Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) alanındaki en önemli gündem maddelerinden birisi konumundadır. Dünya, bir süredir, tarihteki en barışçıl ve müreffeh dönemlerden birisine tanıklık etmektedir. Ancak, Çin'in büyük bir güç olarak yükselişi ve sağ-popülist otoriter yönetimlerin dünyanın her yerinde görülmeye başlanması gibi faktörler, Uİ alanında çalışanları Liberal Uluslararası Düzen'in geleceğini sorgulamaya yöneltti. Bu tezde, Liberal Uluslararası Düzen'in karakteristik özellikleri, bu düzene yönelik tehditler ve düzenin geleceği gibi konular teorik düzlemde tartışılacaktır. Dahası, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri(ABD) en güçlü devlet olduğu için; ABD'nin sistemdeki rolü ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası ABD Dış Politikası, güç politikası üzerinden değerlendirilecektir. Ayrıca, Avrupa ve Asyalı müttefiklerine güvenlik sağlama gibi bazı geleneksel ABD politikaları, yapısal realizm perspektifinden ele alınacaktır. Dolayısıyla, bu tez çalışması bir bakıma Amerikan Dış Politikası ve Stratejisi çalışması olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberal Uluslararası Düzen, Amerikan Dış Politikası, Güç Politikası, Yapısal Realizm, Strateji Çalışmaları.

PREFACE

Main motivation that drives me into International Relations came out of curiosity. War and peace have always been crucial topics throughout the history. I have always had a passion and enthusiasm to find out the reasons behind wars. This was my personal motivation to start graduate studies. Yet, no individual is capable of writing scientific papers without the help of people who have experience. I sincerely want to thank Dr. Marella Bodur Ün for supervising my thesis and also for believing in me. She has become a role-model for me since the day one. Because, she is not only an academic but also an individual who keeps fighting for a better world everyday. I want to thank Prof. Harun Arikan for his precious advice to be as critical as possible of everything. I also want to thank Dr. Asli Ilgit for her wise advices on literature and valuable information for a possible academic career. I also want to thank jury members for their time. Finally, I want to thank my family for supporting me through this process. I hope that I made a contribution to the field of IR with my work. I also hope that science and knowledge will be the only guides for the human race.

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PAX AMERICANA OR U.S. AGAINST THE WORLD?

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFD : Alternative Für Deutschland
AKP : Justice and Development Party
BPM : Bureaucratic Politics Model
CDB : China Development Bank
CFR : Council on Foreign Relations
CIA : Central Intelligence Agency
EU : European Union
FPA : Foreign Policy Analysis
GATT : General Agreements of Trade and Tariffs
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
IMF : International Monetary Fund
INF : Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
IR : International Relations
ISIS : The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA : Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
NAFTA : North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO : Non-Governmental Organization
NSSR : National Security Strategy Report
PRC : People's Republic of China
RF : Russia Federation
SDF : Syrian Democratic Forces
SU : Soviet Union
TPP : Trans-Pacific Partnership
U.S. : The United States of America
UDHR : Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK : The United Kingdom
UN : The United Nations
UNSC : The United Nations Security Council
USAF : The United States Air Force
WTO : World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Problem

The problems that the United States of America (US) faces as a superpower and its reflections throughout the world will be the focal point of the research. How did the U.S. become superpower after the World War II? What kind of policies did the U.S. adopt to maintain its power and the problems the country has been facing are the main questions raised in the thesis.

U.S has become the single superpower after the Cold War and today the country has some problems. The increasing effects of the globalization in the 1990s alongside with the neoliberal financial policies started to slow down after the 9/11 attacks in New York City. After 9/11, security concerns have become the main subject for both U.S and for the rest of the world. Also, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) increased their power and effectiveness in both regional and global issues.

After Donald Trump became the U.S. President, global hegemony of the U.S. has started to be questioned. The main question is whether the US will continue to become the protector of the liberal international order or not. Meanwhile, main allies of the U.S. including the member states of the European Union (EU) have started to have economic and social problems. The Syrian Civil War caused a refugee crisis which has affected European countries. Also, horrible terrorist attacks in cities such as Paris and London put security concerns at the forefront for European countries. As a result, liberal values such as empowering democracies, preventing human rights violations, maintaining open border policy are under pressure today. Also, the United Kingdom (UK) decided to leave the EU through Brexit. Annexation of Crimea by the RF, Ukraine Crisis which was triggered by the pro-Russia separatists surely increased the tension between the U.S. and RF. Furthermore, authoritarian and populist regimes in countries such as Hungary and Poland in Europe are considered to be one of the biggest threats to the liberal international order.

Reactions of the U.S. to these developments as the ''leader of the free world'' are highly anticipated. In this thesis, the liberal international order and the position of the U.S. in this system are examined through the theoretical framework informed by realism in the discipline of International Relations (IR).

1.2. Purpose of the Research

There was a bipolar system during the Cold War era and the US and the Soviet Union (SU) were the two superpowers. There was a ruthless competition between the U.S. led Western Alliance and the SU led Eastern bloc. When the Cold War ended with a decisive victory of US-led Western bloc, the U.S. became the sole superpower.

In this thesis, behaviours, policies and the values of the U.S. as the sole superpower from the past to present are reviewed. Also, current power competitions and their reflections through the rest of the world are examined. In other words, the connection between the existing liberal international order and the U.S. hegemony will be evaluated. Also, the current competition between the US and China is also one of the main focal points of this work as China has been one of the rising powers and it is considered to be the next possible superpower according to many scholars and policy makers. The main aim of the thesis is to explore if the liberal international order and its norms are being contested/rejected or not.

1.3. Importance of the Research

Most MA theses, written at Turkish universities (e.g. Üstündağ, 2013; Özata, 2011; Taşkın, 2010; Onuk, 2019) on the U.S. analyze Turkish – American relations and they mainly focus on security-related issues. The US is still maintaining its position as the single superpower in the international system and also there is American hegemony in the discipline of IR. So, the U.S. has a great importance for this field. Moreover, the U.S. sits around the table as one of the most important actors while discussing regional and/or global issues. The U.S. hegemony and the current power competition, thus, are at the core of the agenda of IR. The hegemonic theories of IR -structural realism and neoliberalism- have been increasingly discussing the position of the US in the international system and the future of the liberal international order recently (Ikenberry, 2017; Allıson, 2018). Especially the competition between the US and China gets a great deal of scholarly attention (Ikenberry, 2015; Medeiros, 2019). In Turkey, however, this topic is not widely discussed. By virtue of the fact that the competition between the US and China - especially the economic competition- is one of the most important issues of international relations, this thesis, by focusing on this issue, aims to make a contribution to the existing IR literature.

1.4. Limitations of the Research

One of the most restrictive factors of this research is the possibility of subjectivity. Also I don't speak Chinese and I have used articles and books written as English, which might also affect assessments made in the thesis.

1.5. Research Methodology

There are several methods to analyze a state's foreign policy such as ''the rational actor model'', ''the bureaucratic policy model'' and etc. Domestic political features are incredibly important to foreign policy analysis. I believe that structural factors have greater influence on states' foreign policy including the U.S. Hence, I examine American foreign policy within a neo-realist perspective and hence positivist methods are used. Moreover, the first two chapters are written within a theoretical perspective by discussing many IR theories in detail.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND IR THEORIES

This chapter starts with a brief summary of the history of foreign policy. Then, it discusses IR theories and how they analyze foreign policy. Lastly, it determines which IR theory is best to analyze foreign policy by giving examples from different cases including the ongoing civil war in Syria.

2.1. History of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is a set of policies of a state to deal with other states to safeguard its national interests. A more comprehensive definition also takes non-state actors and transnational actors into account. Foreign policy analysis is a field which aims to understand the decisions and behaviors of governments. Its roots can be found in three paradigmatic studies. These are "Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics'' by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954: reprinted in 2002), ''Pre-theories and theories of Foreign Policy'' by James Rosenau (1966) and ''Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics'' by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) (Hudson, 2012, p.14).

First study focuses on the decision making process itself rather than the policies (Snyder et al, 1963). Snyder accepts nation states as the main actors for making foreign policy. Hence, his approach is centered on decision making process which is affected by both internal and external forces. (Snyder et al, 2002).

James Rosenau argues that foreign policy analysis does not include comprehensive, testable generalizations (Rosenau, 1966 as cited in Hudson, 2012, p.16). Thus, he developed a theory which includes leaders, the international system and anything else related to foreign policy. For him, this is the only way to understand and explain international relations. In other words, to develop a theory which only explains the Cold War could never be a comprehensive theory of foreign policy analysis. A theory must include different kind of social science methods and knowledge (Rosenau,1966, p.99). Harold Margaret Sprout focuses on the psycho-milieu of the decision makers as the international system can be perceived differently by those who make foreign policy decisions.

To sum up, decision-making process and the people who make decisions are extremely important for these three approaches. In other words, the first generation foreign policy analysis examined the decision-making process by focusing on small groups, personality of a leader, domestic policies and national characteristics. Scholars in the second generation of foreign policy analysis studied decision making in the small groups, bureaucratic politics, comparative foreign policy, psychological effects on decision-making, and the social milieu (Harold and Margaret Sprout, 1965 as cited in Hudson, 2012, p.19).

Small group dynamics has its intellectual roots in the work of Snyder and basically focuses on the decision-making process (Snyder et al, 2002). Comparative Foreign Policy aims to develop one single method to explain the foreign policy of all states and this approach was used in the light of Rosenau's work. Psychological effects and social milieu are both important for whose who think micro analysis lies at the center of international politics. This approach is based on a crucial premise: foreign policy analysis is different from International Relations as foreign policy analysis cannot exclude the role of decision-makers (Hermann and Kegley, 1994 as cited in Hudson, 2012, p.23).

In the second generation of foreign policy analysis, there are two interesting works. First is Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) in which Waltz argued that the anarchical structure of international politics explains state behavior. He also claimed that ''International politics is not a foreign policy theory'' in response to his critics (Waltz,1986). Second is Michael Doyle's *The Democratic Peace Theory* (Doyle; 1983a, 1983b). Doyle claims that democratic states are less likely to engage in a war with each other. In other words, a regime type is important to explain a state's foreign policy behavior. These two works were essentially different from other foreign policy analysis approaches. Because (for Foreign Policy Analysis) it was not possible to explain behavior in the system with a systematic approach because the system is same for everyone. This has always been the main difference between International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis (Hudson, 2012, p.27).

Since there is no agreement on how to analyze foreign policy among IR theories, I focus on mainstream IR theories and their ways to analyze foreign policy in order to decide which theory explains foreign policy better than others. Another important point is that most of the work for foreign policy analysis have been conducted by American and European scholars. Americans tend to use quantitative methods while Europeans

mostly focus on historical processes. Also, Americans use more examples about the United States. Lastly, while American scholars use mostly realist and liberal theories, Europeans mostly prefer critical theories to explain foreign policy (Hadfield and Hudson, 2011 as cited in Hudson, 2012).

2.2. Realism and Foreign Policy

Realism is the most prominent IR theory which aims to develop a general political theory. In other words, the main goal of political realism is to create a theory which can be applied to all possible scenarios (Wohlforth, 2012, p.36).

When it comes to foreign policy analysis, realism focuses on three basic factors. First, it focuses on groups and the biggest (and most important) groups are the states. Thus, for realists, states are the main actors. Secondly, realism points to "selfishness", arguing that states can never fully be sure about the intentions of other states. Hence, a realist statesman's priority must be its own state's interests. Lastly, realists focus on power. What realists mean by power is material resources. This is the combination of military power, economic power, geographical features and so on.

There is a very important distinction between IR theories. Some theories choose to see the world as it is and other theories choose to see the world as it should be. As I mentioned before, Realism aims to explain what is going on around the globe as a theory. To do so, a realist always sees the world as it is.

Realism (and its variations) in IR is an adaptation of this thinking to international politics.

Neorealism or structural realism is different from classical realism advanced by Hans Morgenthau (1948). While classical realism takes the role of leaders into account, structural realism focuses on international system. Waltz, the main proponent of structural realism, argued that international system is anarchical. Anarchy means that there is no overarching authority over sovereign states (Waltz, 1979). States are the main actors and their behavior is shaped by international system. Power is the key factor and security is the main concern of states. Realists developed concepts such as balance of power, balance of threat, and security dilemma in order to explain international politics better.

It is important to note that there are variations of structural realism. Defensive realism argues that the main goal of the state is to survive. So, prudence is the keyword

for states and they aim to defend their interests and can act peacefully. Nuclear deterrence is a perfect example for defensive realism. If a state has nuclear power, it is not very open to a possible attack. If two states have nuclear power, they will more likely to solve a problem among themselves in a different way rather than going into a full scale war. For instance, a war between major powers did not take place in the Cold War era (also after the Cold War). Mostly because both the U.S. and the SU had nuclear weapons. Even though there were major disagreements between Washington and Moscow, they had never gone into war among themselves.

Another crucial point is that there are different views even between the scholars who think similarly. For instance, realist scholars offer different conceptualizations of balance of power. For most realists, weak states combine an alliance against the super power(s) in order to balance its power. This is a valid argument for many cases but in some cases weaker states choose to side with a super power. Stephen Walt (1987) came up with this idea and called it ‘’balance of threat’’. The reason for such behavior is the perception of threat. Walt uses the rivalry between the U.S. and the SU to explain his theory. Even though the U.S. was far more superior, Western European countries sided with Washington, because, they perceived communist ideology and a possible Soviet invasion as bigger threats.

Offensive realism is essentially similar with defensive realism. Yet, offensive realists think there is no reason and power to stop the states to pursue an offensive agenda (Mearsheimer, 2001). States can develop new weapons with the help of technology in order to eliminate the difficulties to invade other countries. Since states do not feel secure in an anarchic system, they can choose to fight far from home to defend their interests. The U.S. invaded Iraq for security concerns related to Al-Qaeda. Washington used the B-2 stealth bomber to destroy Iraqi air defense systems. To sum up, states tend to strengthen themselves and/or weaken others in order to survive in the long term (Wohlforth, 2012, p.39).

John Mearsheimer, the main proponent of offensive realism, argued that “power maximization” is the motive of super powers in order to provide needed security for themselves. So, in contrast to defensive realism, offensive realism claims that a great power (or a hegemon) aims to increase its power when it sees an opportunity (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Peter Toft and Glenn Snyder both argued that Mearsheimer’s offensive realism makes an important contribution to structural realism. Especially, Mearsheimer’s effort

to predict behavior of states is what distinguishes his view from Kenneth Waltz's standpoint (Toft, 2005; Snyder, 2002). Yet, Toft and Snyder also criticize offensive realism, arguing that Mearsheimer is too pessimistic about the intentions of major powers without adequate empirical evidence (see Snyder, 2002). Regardless, he thinks that, Mearsheimer's version of structural realism still is a valuable contribution to foreign policy analysis. Waltz explicitly claimed that international politics is not foreign policy (Waltz, 1996). Mearsheimer explains how states behave in order to gain power or how they maximize their powers (Mearsheimer, 2001). Hence, he gives us a perspective to understand or even predict possible foreign policy decisions of states in the future.

No single theory is perfect. Also, one theory can not explain everything (Walt, 1998). Questions like what we work on and how we think determine which theory we can use to explain international events. Walt also argues that the discipline of international relations is a combination of valuable work of scholars who use different theories (Walt, 1998).

I argue that realism with its variations is the most successful theory for Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), because the core assumptions of structural realism still stands in the post-Cold War era. Firstly, the international system is anarchical. Since, there is not a ''world government'', system is still anarchical. Secondly, states can never be sure about the intentions of other states. There is no single reason to think differently. Thirdly, survival is the primary goal of the states. It can be argued that states have different goals, capacities, cultures etc. But, for all these states survival is still a priority. Fourthly, states are the main and rational actors (Mearsheimer, 1995). This also has not changed at least until now. When some scholars criticized realism for being outdated, Waltz responded that any changes that have taken place so far are within the system (Waltz, 2000). The system itself has not changed. He made this argument in response to critics which claimed that bipolarity ended after the SU collapsed.

Realism claims to explain international politics. We simply need empirical evidences to prove that claim. One of the most important features of realism is that it is interested in what actually is going on rather than how it should be. We live in an anarchical structure and this is a reality. There has never been an authority which is superior to states. The strongest counter argument against this very notion is that international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) can play such a role. For instance, John Ikenberry, one of the leading scholars in the field, claim that liberal order can be pursued even without Washington's leadership (Ikenberry, 2011). He defends his

argument by pointing out the importance of the role of organizations. In reality, these organizations play limited role. There are several examples. The failure to stop the Syrian Civil War is the most recent example. Five permanent member states have a veto right and this will always restrict the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take action. Ikenberry is right that these organizations can be useful to spread liberal ideals and norms but when it comes to security issues, no state gives up on its sovereignty.

Russia's annexation of Crimea is a remarkable example to highlight the importance of realism. Realist scholars warned that the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is dangerous (Waltz, 2000). There is no doubt that Russia has become an authoritarian state under Vladimir Putin, but when NATO reached such a distant geography, the alarm bells have rung in Moscow. One of the golden rules of realism is that states can never be completely sure about the intentions of other states. As a result, Moscow has made a move to secure its own borders.

Furthermore, the North Korea situation is also a good example why we should see the world as it is. North Korea has nuclear weapons and that's the main source of the shared fear of the United States, South Korea and Japan. There are heavy sanctions on the shoulders of Pyongyang but they do not seem to affect North Korea's behavior on nuclear capabilities.[1] North Korea's nuclear weapons and its several missile tests provided Pyongyang a place on the desk with the U.S. President Donald Trump. If North Korea did not have nuclear weapons, it would have been only a matter of time to be destroyed by the U.S. military. The U.S. would not want such an operation because there is a risk that North Korea can bomb a U.S military base or even a place in American mainland.

Realism argues that if both sides have nuclear weapons, the risk for a full scale war decreases dramatically (Waltz, 1981). Realists also remind us that to explain international politics one must focus on the structure of international system rather than the personality of leaders or human nature (Waltz, 1979). Donald Trump and Barack Obama are quite different leaders but this does not really affect the way they handled the situation in North Korea. They can use different methods and arguments but their policy (to denuclearize North Korea) towards North Korea remains the same.

For realism, states are the main actors in the system. If we miss this point, we can not analyze and explain international politics correctly. Other players including

[1] Sanctions are usually not effective in order to change a state's behaviour. This will is discussed in detail in another chapter as part of economic deterrence

NGOs, international organizations and terrorist groups have a role to play in the international system, too. However, states haven't lost their influence yet. When these NGOs violate sovereignty, they are being fined by governments. Even giant tech companies can not avoid this reality. These giant companies can not take any step forward when an authoritarian state like China does not allow them to operate within its borders. Also, in the age of globalization, nationalism is on the rise almost everywhere. Economic problems caused by globalization have strengthened the nationalist agenda. Robert Keohane also made this point after Donald Trump took the Office (Colgan & Keohane, 2017).[2]

State survival is one of the most important issues highlighted by realism. The phrase ''survival of the fittest'' which originated from Darwinian evolutionary theory can be applied to international politics. Since the international system is anarchical and the states as the main actors hold the power, states do not have another option but to be selfish and strong. After the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the governments of Syria and Iran started an insurgence because they knew that their existence was in danger and they had to be active on the field. Also, they could not be sure about the intentions of the U.S. (next move by Washington in that case) So, they have become even more hostile to the U.S.

2.3. Liberalism and Foreign Policy

Liberalism is one of the most important ideologies. The main tenet of liberalism is freedom and freedom related concepts such as freedom of religion, freedom of expression, property rights and individual rights. These ideas are being protected with the rule of law in a liberal democracy. Social, economic and political life are organized with the rules based on liberal values under such regimes.

For liberal internationalism, international politics must be shaped in accordance with liberal values. Multinational and multilateral relations are also essential for liberal internationalism. Michael Doyle, for instance, claims that liberal states restrain themselves and form alliances. NATO is a very successful alliance and U.S also formed other alliances such as the one with Japan. Hence, peace among the states can be

[2] R. Keohane and J. Colgan suggested focusing on domestic politics in order to better understand issues about global order. They argue that the problems about globalization such as income inequality made people believe less in the current international order. For further explanation, see: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-04-17/liberal-order-rigged

preserved without establishing a world government (Doyle, 2012, p.59). John Ikenberry (2018) claims that liberal order will survive even if the U.S. denies its leadership in the system.

Michael Doyle, in his work ‘’Democratic Peace Theory’’ (1983) argued that liberal states do not fight among themselves. He also claimed that liberal France and Britain formed an alliance against illiberal Germany (Doyle, 1983). This is a very controversial argument. Waltz (2000) for instance, argued that regime types or the relative peaceful relations among democracies can only decrease the possibility of war. At this point, I argue –like many other realists- that the war between Britain and Germany (which later called as World War I) was about power. Germany was the rising power and challenged the hegemony of Britain. I don't know if it was possible to make a transition without a war but a leading scholar, Graham Allison worked on this issue and he argued that the situation has ended with a war in 12 times out of 16 when a rising power confronted the ruling one. He explained his approach with the term ‘’Thucydides Trap’’ (Allison, 2015).

Michael Doyle also himself argued that liberal states started twenty four of fifty six wars between 1816 and 1980 (2012, p.60). This means that more than forty percent of the wars were initiated by the liberal states. Furthermore, Doyle himself also argues that liberal regimes have always been quite aggressive towards others.

The transformation of Germany and Japan after the World War II is fascinating but to claim that liberalism was the main force for such changes is illusory. It was the war itself that changed these two countries and the rest of the world. The war indeed would have been less disastrous without the Nazi regime and Imperial Japan but to argue that there would not have been such a big war if there were no illiberal states is an argument that no one can prove.

Liberals are fundamentally different than realists. While liberals agree that international system is anarchical, they do not claim that anarchy makes states vulnerable. Self-defense, being prudent, survival and security dilemma are key concepts for realists (Waltz, 1979). Liberals do not think that conflicts are inevitable. Also liberal states can trust other liberal states (Doyle, 2012). Hence, the international system does not have to be based on distrust. Liberal states see many opportunities in the very same system such as cooperation in many areas. It is true that realism ignored the importance of economy but this does not mean good economic relations would definitely prevent a possibility of a war. Russia's annexation of Crimea is a good example. Russia had way

better economy before it seized Crimea than it has right now. Both the U.S. and the EU sanctioned Russia heavily. Furthermore, the crisis in Ukraine is still waiting for a solution. Moscow took its financial interests at risk in order to obtain geopolitical power. This is a clear proof that political and military power was (and still is) more important for Russia than selling natural gas.

Liberal arguments on the international system have their roots in John Locke such as the importance of the freedoms of individuals and the protection of property rights. Indeed these are very important and valuable ideas but they are not as important as security at the international level for structural reasons. States are biased and international institutions are weak (Doyle, 2012). As long as anarchy continues in the international system, it is impossible to surpass the nature of international politics. Although international institutions are important for liberals, they also accept that the states are the central actors in the system (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

However, the capitalist economic system and its features such as free trade are vital for all states simply because states need to sell their products and removing barriers are good for all parties in liberalism. In other words, even authoritarian states such as China and Russia benefit from the capitalist economic system. Having capitalist economy does not make them liberal states. Even more interestingly, there may be times that security concerns are more urgent for states than to protect liberal values. For instance, the capitalist system was under the threat of Nazi Germany and ironically Wehrmacht's marching was stopped by the socialist SU on the eastern front. The SU was in a ruthless competition with the capitalist United States for long time during the Cold War and was finally defeated. In today's world, even the communist China has been pursuing a capitalist economy outside its borders and owes its incredible growth to capitalism. So, capitalism is not at risk today and there is not an economic war in the system based on ideology. Therefore, there is no need to fight a war against a non existent enemy.

Another important concept for liberals is military intervention. When a liberal state decides to fight a war to spread democracy, it often ends with a failure. Because, failure is inevitable if a state tries to make another state "more liberal" especially with the help of military force. Doyle claims that liberals should not start a democracy jihad (Doyle, 2012, p.69). It is enough to take a look at the consequences of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We should also remember that the SU also tried to change regimes. The Soviet soldiers marched into Czechoslovakia alongside with the Soviet tanks in

1968 to stop the “Prague Spring”. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention strengthened the authority of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the short run. But, Czechs managed to create a democratic state only two decades after the Soviet invasion. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was also a major failure for the Soviets. The Soviet Afghanistan’s repressive nature caused a series of bloody events. Then, the SU deployed its army to protect Afghanistan’s Communist Party. Eventually the Soviets lost the war and communism lost its affection in the region.

Military intervention and external oppression such as economic sanctions and threats are not the only foreign policy options that liberalism can offer. A liberal state can be envied by others because a finely established liberal state often has strong institutions, democratic society, rule of law, usually developed economy and good quality of infrastructure. At this point, it is important to refer to the concept of ‘’soft power’’ introduced by Joseph Nye. He argued that if the U.S. uses its soft power to attempt to change the behavior of other states, it might be more successful (Nye, 1990). While it is not possible to use this method everywhere around the globe, I believe that it still is a good approach. Even if this does not work on states like China, Russia or North Korea, it may still be quite effective on other states. Nye has made a major contribution to the field because all states have foreign policies to change others’ behaviors. There are some empirical evidences which prove Nye’s point as well. The U.S. helped Europe to rebuild itself after the Second World War through the Marshall Plan. Washington used its economic power and even cultural influence to have better relations with old enemies like Germany and Italy.

As I mentioned above, the war itself was the main reason why states like Germany and Japan changed. But, we should never forget that the U.S. did not act the way that France and Britain did after the World War I. The U.S. helped to rebuild Europe after the war instead of signing treaties which could have destroyed Germany. Also, the ancestors of the today’s U.S citizens came from Europe. So, it is not very surprising that Americans and Europeans share the same values. However, using soft power via cultural influence, sports, education etc. is what Europeans could not do a century ago.

2.4. Constructivism and Foreign Policy

As argued in the previous section, liberalism is fundamentally different than

realism because it argues that cooperation is possible between states. Yet, neo-liberalism agrees with realism that the states are central actors in the anarchical international system.

It is important to note that both realism and liberalism (especially the neo versions) failed to explain and predict the ending of the Cold War (Walt, 1998). Furthermore, the two dominant theories -in Walt's own words- had serious troubles to explain this failure. In such an atmosphere, Alexander Wendt promoted social constructivism by publishing his well-known article named ''Anarchy is What States Make of It''. As the title implies, Wendt argued that anarchical structure is not a self-formed situation (Wendt, 1992).

Indeed, it was a revolutionary moment in the history of the discipline of IR. For Wendt, anarchy is not necessarily about conflicts and self help. Our perception of reality is based on our own knowledge and subjective norms (Flockhart, 2012, p.82). Thus, constructivism offers a different (different than both realism and liberalism) perspective to understand foreign policy.

Social constructivism also argues that international norms are constructed by states, international organizations and social movements. Thus, Wendt asks everyone to question these norms. For instance, while North Korean nuclear weapons are perceived as bad, dangerous and threatening, the nuclear weapons of France or Britain are not viewed as posing a threat. Constructivism argues that identity determines friends and enemies (Hopf, 1998). This argument may be useful for evaluating contemporary American foreign policy. But structural realism does not aim to explain American foreign policy. In fact, for Kenneth Waltz, theory of international politics is not a theory of foreign policy. Structural realism is a systemic theory and provides a system-level analysis rather than focusing on whose nuclear weapons should be perceived as a threat for one particular state.

In other words, constructivists think that it is identity that determines the interests, not the other way around. NATO alliance is what constructivists use as an example to make their point. For them, NATO is more than a security alliance. It is argued that the NATO provides its members a new identity beyond national borders via collective defense strategy. So, NATO members act the way they were supposed to (Flockhart, 2012, p.91). I disagree with this view for two reasons.

First, being a member of NATO does not require democratic development or any other criteria other than an agreement between the members. If all states agree, then

another state can join to club. Even more importantly, when a state does not behave in accordance with the alliance, it still is not possible to kick it out unless that state wants to quit the alliance itself, because there is not an article for member states on how to leave.

Second, state identities do not determine membership of NATO. Turkey for example joined NATO in 1952. It is impossible to claim that Turkey was a democratic state back in 1952 and shared the same values with other members of NATO. Turkey joined the alliance because of its geopolitical position against the SU. Even though there is not an official leader of NATO, the U.S. has a secretarial role. (See articles 10,11 and 13 of NATO) Also the American army is by far the strongest one in NATO. So, it is not wrong to think that the continuation of the organization is only possible if Washington wants to do so.

The 1974 crisis between Turkey and Greece did not lead Turkey to leave NATO because Ankara was under the security umbrella of NATO. Not a single state was able to invade Turkey and Turkey also has never been threatened by another state after being a member of NATO. Ankara chose to be sided with the Western block and did not have good relations with the SU during the Cold War. Also, even though there were a number of military coups in Turkey, Ankara still had the chance to practice democracy during the Cold War while today's democracies in Eastern Europe were unable to do so. More importantly, all these are compatible with realism. Majority of Turkey's population is Muslim and it is still not a full democracy today in contrast to other member states of NATO. Its army though, is one of the strongest ones among the NATO members. Furthermore, the trade between Turkey and the U.S. was worth around 20 billion US dollars in 2018. Obviously, the military alliance between the U.S. and Turkey did not lead strong economic partnership between the two states. So, it can be argued that NATO is a security/military alliance rather than a democratic/economic one as some scholars such as McCalla (1996) and Jackson (2003) argued.

Another example of interests and power, rather than identities, determining foreign policy decisions is the German foreign policy after the World War II. The Nazi Germany was one of the strongest military power at the time. Yet, Berlin fell and the war was lost for the Nazi regime. Things would never be the same for Germany after the war. Yes, that's true that Germany's identity changed and this transformation was mainly caused by the loss of war. Also, German reunification was not possible until the SU collapsed.

Even today, Germany has the strongest economy in Europe and the fourth strongest economy in the world. In contrast to Berlin's economic power and its political influence over Europe, the same thing cannot be claimed for the German army. Germany is under the security umbrella of Washington and also NATO. In other words, it's not the "German identity" that drives Berlin to have a weak army; it's the power distribution in the international system after the World War II. The U.S. has provided a secure environment for Europeans to live in peace and prosperity. In return, Washington has had the chance to have military bases in Europe including Germany and hence gained serious geopolitical advantage. This argument is also valid for Japan. The new Japanese constitution was written under Washington's pressure and Japan was officially banned to start a war. (See Article 9 of Japanese Constitution). Another example for the debate between identity and interests would be the EU. Even though, the EU was established to bring a sustainable peace in Europe over the long term, one of the main goals was to create a peace between France and Germany. Indeed, Franco-German relations improved over the years. But we should not forget that Europeans restored the balance of power with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 too. The reason for such a congress (and a peace) was the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, one of the goals of creating the EU was to create a European identity above national identities. Considering recent development such as Brexit, I think that, this goal might no longer be reachable.

My third example is a historic one, the Peloponnesian War. It is a great example to assess the importance of balance of power. Athens was the dominant power (hegemon in other words) back then and Spartans created a strong alliance against Athens to balance its power. At the end of the war, Spartan-led alliance was the successful side. Regardless of the result, it would not be accurate to claim that identity related issues was at the heart of the war. The nature of the international system has always been anarchical and power has always been at the core of international relations. I think, this great example from the fifth century BC is more than enough to emphasize the importance of the structure.

In conclusion, I do not think that constructivism successfully explains foreign policy of states. Constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf made important contributions to the field. Actually, to start a debate over the norms, identity and anarchy clearly shows the power of constructivism.

2.5. Positivism - Post-Positivism Debate

One of the great debates in IR is the positivism - post-positivism debate. It is also labelled as debate between rationalism and reflectivism. It emerged as an epistemological and metatheoretical debate. Realists and liberals were on one side as rationalists who are positivists. The other side consisted of reflectivists who reject positivism.

Realism and liberalism were already discussed in previous subsections. So, reflectivist theories especially post-structuralism will be briefly summarized in this subsection. Reflectivist theories in IR include "alternative theories" such as postmodernism, feminism and critical theory. Post-structuralism mainly focuses on discourse in politics. Discourses do not only reflect what is going on around, they also construct norms and policies. For instance, President Reagan defined the SU as "evil empire" and hence created a foundation for American foreign policy (Hansen, 2012, p.95).

Also, taking assumptions such as "state as a main actor" for granted is problematic from a post-structuralist perspective. David Campbell, (1992) for instance, claims that such assumptions have been continuously practiced rather than questioned and thus, they were legitimized. As Cox (1981) famously argued "theory is always for someone and for some purpose". This point brings us to critical theory. In Hoffman's words, "central characteristic of critical theory is the recognition of the connection between knowledge and interest" (Hoffman, 1987, p.232). Another crucial point is that critical theory does not accept prevailing ideas and order as unchanging/unchangeable (Hoffman, 1987, p.233). Feminism sees issues in IR through women's perspectives. For instance, Cynthia Enloe (1990) asked the question "Where are the women?". Feminism in international politics has variations such as "liberal", "socialist" and "postmodern".

In conclusion, it is not practical to try to explain everything in international politics from different perspectives. This thesis explores the liberal international order and American foreign policy from a neorealist perspective.

CHAPTER III

ANALYZING FOREIGN POLICY

After discussing the history of foreign policy and summarizing IR theories in the second chapter, this chapter focuses on the ways to analyze foreign policy within a theoretical framework. It also discusses what to analyze in foreign policy by focusing on what matters more such as national security, military intervention and economic statecraft in light of structural realism.

3.1. How to Analyze Foreign Policy

The discipline of IR has been dominated by the United States, mostly because, the U.S. and its allies triumphed over axis powers at the end of the World War II. After the war, foreign policy has become a central focus for both the US government and the academy. The US decided to restore Europe and provided financial aid for achieving this goal. That was a historical decision which shaped the post-World War II political environment. It was also a foreign policy decision of the U.S. which had a significant impact over Europe and elsewhere.

The Cold War dominated world politics for more than four decades. It was also the time that Hans Morgenthau introduced his theory of political realism (Morgenthau, 1948). He believed that a universal explanation for foreign policies of states is possible by putting ‘‘power’’ at the heart of international politics (Carlsnaes, 2012, p.115).

So, what should we look at to analyze foreign policies of states? There are two main approaches for foreign policy analysis. These are structural approaches and actor-based approaches. Structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism are the most dominant structural approaches. The actor-based approaches focus on individuals and groups. Our perspective and the lenses we choose to look at the world help us to identify the actors and factors that affect and shape foreign policy decisions and acts. Structural realism is different than Morgenthau’s political realism. While human nature is important for the latter, the structure of international politics matters the most for the former (Morgenthau, 2005. pp.4-16). Even though Kenneth Waltz claimed that international politics is not foreign policy, Structural realism is still one of the strongest theory in the field to analyze foreign policy. Structural realism is a parsimonious theory. Once you decide to use its lenses, it is clear what you should focus on for foreign policy

analysis. I have already discussed the core principles of structural realism above and have explained why it is a better theory to analyze foreign policy than others. Here, I will focus on examples to compare structural realism with actor-based approaches.

Neoliberalism accepts the states as central actors of an anarchical international system. So, both structural realism and neoliberalism accept anarchy and they both claim that states are rational actors that make decisions in a restricted environment (Carlsnaes, 2012, p.121). Neoliberalism differs from structural realism because it points to the importance of cooperation. It also argues that creating strong international organizations could make a difference in international politics (Stein, 2008).

Those who choose to focus on actors rather than structures look at the individuals' leadership features, motivations and also how those leaders interact with others. Basically, they believe that characteristics of individuals are the most important factor for foreign policy analysis.

To compare and contrast these different approaches to FPA, I will first look at Putin's Russia. Moscow went into a war with Georgia, annexed Crimea, backed up dictator Bashar al-Assad in Syrian Civil War, and backed up Ukrainian separatists in regions of Kharkiv and Donetsk. It can be argued that Putin has always had an aggressive foreign policy agenda. It is an easy way to view him as the main reason of all these conflicts. If I focus on his personality, I see that he is a former Soviet spy who worked in several places including Dresden, Germany. Also he claims sovereignty in some territories or at least he seems to defend pro-Russia separatists in many places such as Georgia and Ukraine. Maybe, -as a former servant- he wants to recreate the SU which collapsed in 1991 or he may seek to regain political power in former Soviet regions.

I think, however, that it is better to focus on the structure of the international system. In an anarchical system, it would be better for Russia (or any other state) to respond to NATO's expansion. NATO is probably the strongest military alliance in history. Also, there's a fresh history between NATO and the SU. NATO was founded to confront the SU during the Cold War. But, the Cold War ended and for Moscow, expanding NATO is a provocative act. So, it is not shocking for realists to see Russia's response to this expansion to secure its borders. I do not claim that Russia was right to act in this way, but it was the most logical move. Because, structural realism tells us there is no place for ethical values in international politics.

My second example is the Syrian Civil War. It is a great example to look at as it is an ongoing war for 8 years and there has been many presidents, ministers of foreign affairs, and diplomats who were and still have been affiliated with the war. There are so many actors, supporters and critics on all sides. It is almost impossible to focus on all actors that have been part of the war. The Syrian government, the Syrian opposition, Turkey, Iran, the U.S., Russia, France, the UK, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and so on. These are some of those who actively have fought in the war.

I will analyze the Syrian civil war with a structural approach. As the international system is anarchical, power is always at the heart of this anarchical environment. Turkey made a huge mistake to try to topple a foreign leader/government. Ankara apparently thought that it had enough power to reach this goal. But they should have calculated a possible Russian intervention. The result of Ankara's foreign policy is disastrous. Assad still sits on his chair, many terrorist attacks have been staged on Turkish soil and Turkey now hosts Syrian refugees more than any other state. This may give us an idea about possible outcome of what happens if a state tries to reach a goal with inadequate capacity.

As far as the US foreign policy toward Syria is concerned, the US had to ignore its own red line, which was set by President Obama himself in August, 2012 in reference to use of chemical weapons in Syria (Wordsworth, 2013). Walt (2013) argued that the use of chemical weapons should not affect the foreign policy of the U.S. Washington actually did not start an assault against the Assad regime, because, Washington had no desire to go into another war in Middle East. In other words, I think drawing "red line" is very inconsistent and peculiar while claiming "retrenchment policy" towards Middle East and hence Dueck (2015) argued that the Obama administration did not really implement retrenchment policy at all. I will analyze U.S. foreign policy in the last chapter in more detail. To sum up, the result would have been terrible for the U.S. if it got involved directly with the war in Syria. Obama administration ignored its own red line and established a coalition force against the Islamic State. Still, the support that Obama administration provided to Turkey to topple the Assad regime has eventually led to worsening relations between Ankara and Washington.

The U.S. stopped supporting Turkey in Ankara's struggle for a regime change in Syria when ISIS danger arised. Turkey got disappointed with Washington's backing off to support Turkey to topple the Assad regime. After Russia's involvement in the war,

the situation has changed in favor of the Assad regime. Turkey then conducted a number of military operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Eventually, Ankara, Moscow, and Tehran managed to sit on the table to solve the crisis. However, Turkey already paid the price for its unrealistic policies. Supporting Turkey in this war also did not end up well for the U.S. either. Turkey is now in close relations with Moscow and Washington can not come up with a solution.

Structural realism analyzes power related issues such as balance of power and security dilemma rather than focusing on actors. To secure the balance of power in the Middle East has always been a priority for the U.S. Thus, supporting Turkey to gain more power is not really in Washington's interest. In other words, the U.S. does not want a regional hegemon in Middle East (or elsewhere). Obama administration first worked with Erdoğan's Turkey to destroy the Assad regime. But Washington then started to fight against ISIS with the help of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Because ISIS clearly was a far bigger threat for the U.S. than Assad regime ever could be. But the U.S. should also have calculated such an act could make Turkey unpleasant for two reasons.

Firstly, Turkey's main foreign policy goal was to change regime in Syria. Secondly, SDF consists of Kurdish militias and hence Turkey perceives SDF as a threat to its national security. But, one should never forget that neither SDF nor so-called caliphate of ISIS existed before the Syrian Civil War started. The

U.S. could not handle ISIS and the Assad regime, and Turkey could not handle SDF and the Assad regime at the same time. Also, Kadercan (2018) argued that the U.S. has found itself in a position which requires to manage relations with Both Turkey and SDF. In short, Washington has created another over- commitment case with no logical explanation. Hence, priorities of Turkey and the U.S. have changed and now Syrian Civil War is a war which everyone seems to forget why it started in the very first place. To sum up, miscalculations, unrealistic goals and policies of both Ankara and Washington created problems which remain unsolved.

Russia's direct involvement in the war on the battlefield and its help to secure Assad's chair changed the situation in both Syria and Turkey so far. Turkey now has close ties with Russia and this also is not in Washington's interest. So, this liberal hegemonic agenda of Turkey and the U.S. eventually pushed Ankara into the arms of illiberal Moscow. Basically, ignoring the reality is only helpful for the most illiberal side of the rivalry. It was part of a liberal agenda. Because Syrian Civil War started as

part of the Arab Spring. In fact, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu claimed that "recent historical events" show that sweeping changes are required in Syria and explicitly supported Syrian "rebels" against Assad regime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2012). It was a liberal hegemonic standpoint because Turkey, back then, claimed that Ankara supports a democratic governance in Syria (MFA, 2012). I, however argue that Turkey does not set an example of a democratic state to "warn" other states in terms of democratic reforms. Tol (2019) interestingly argued that Turkey's policy towards Syria actually has always been a gateway for President Erdoğan to empower himself in terms of domestic politics.

France also made the very same mistake to pursue liberal dreams in the anarchical structure. France should have known that it had no place in a sectarian war between the shia regime and a sunni opposition. The French foreign policy in Syria did not end up well as well. Horrible terror attacks were staged in Paris in 2015 and for the first time in the French Republic, the candidates of two traditional parties from right and left lost to Emmanuel Macron in general elections in 2017 (Briançon, 2017).

The EU had to face one of the biggest immigration waves since the World War II. This situation exacerbated the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. The EU had to sign an agreement with Turkey over the immigrants and refugees. In other words, going into a liberal crusade eventually led Europe to sign an agreement to push back immigrants and refugees. I use the term "liberal crusade" in reference to the EU's support for a regime change in Syria for Brussel's democracy related concerns. Even though the EU member states are far more democratic than Turkey, it still does not set a ground to change another state's regime. Furthermore, Turkey has the chance to threaten Europe to open its borders to send the foreigners into the European mainland even though it is not very likely to do so due to its fragile economy. Erdoğan's Turkey has witnessed the most serious economic crisis in 2018 since current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. The value of the Turkish Lira plunged. Also Turkish economy experienced the historic high inflation rate in October, 2018 (Central Bank of Turkey [TCMB], 2018). Under these circumstances, I think that President Erdoğan may not be the game- decider.

The characteristics of individuals did not change the nature of the international system. Russia defended a client state of the SU as expected by realism. The future of the relations between the U.S. and Turkey is at risk. In fact, the Russian S400 missile defense system has been deployed in Turkish soil. Russia used the arms sales to

strengthen its ties with a long time U.S ally and a NATO member. In other words, Turkey started to balance American power in the region. The whole process is perfectly compatible with the core principles of structural realism.

States are the main actors in international politics. The UN could not prevent or stop the war due to Russia's veto in the UNSC. Also, non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch could not do much but to publish reports about human rights violations in Syria. None of these changed the situation in Syria simply because there is not a superior authority in international politics.

3.2. Bureaucratic Politics Model

This approach was developed by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin. It is one of the most important models that criticizes the mainstream approaches. Structural realism focuses on the anarchical nature of international system. Bureaucratic politics model (BPM), however, recommends a different approach.

Allison and Halperin argue that the tendency which neglects to see the role of individuals in the governments restrains our understanding and hence limits our capabilities to analyze foreign policy (Allison and Halperin, 1972, p.42). BPM (Model II as they label it) sees the politics as the bargaining process among players in the government (Allison and Halperin, 1972, p.43). This is a crucial point. Because, structural approaches, structural realism for instance, accepts the state as the central actor. However, the interactions among the government officials are neglected.

Bureaucratic Politics Model is interested in what is going on inside the government while structural realism focuses on an outcome of a specific action of any state. The importance of BPM is buried within its systematic approach. First step is to explain the foreign policy event. Second step is to predict the actions of the government. Third and the final step is planning the actions (Allison and Halperin, 1972, p.45).

Allison and Halperin masterfully use the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example for BPM. The president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the joint chief of staff and advisors were all included in the decision-making process. The crucial point is that they defended different ideas such as blockade and invasion. It perfectly makes sense since they all represented different institutions and positions as well as interests. Furthermore, they all had to think about their personal and institutional political future and responsibilities towards those institutions.

The way BPM analyzes the Cuban Missile Crisis is quite systematic. The SU deployed missiles in Cuba. American planes took photos of these missiles. The possibility of being hit by the Soviet missiles was a serious issue for Washington. The second step of BPM started; the officials of the American government tried to predict the next phase. Different ideas were put forward. For instance, how would have Moscow reacted if the U.S. were to invade Cuba, or did Kremlin and the rest of the world think that the U.S. was hesitant to take serious actions? Naturally, officials thought in accordance with their own career. So, as for the final step of BPM, they made decisions after meetings (Allison and Halperin, 1972).

BPM is a very valuable contribution to the literature for a few reasons. First, it provides a systematic approach and a method. Second, it gives us an alternative explanation of foreign policy analysis rather than being just critical. Furthermore, it does not reject the assumptions and arguments of structural realism. Moreover, Allison and Halperin argue that both Model I (i.e. realism) and Model II (BPM) can be used to analyze different international events (Allison and Halperin, 1972, p.58).

3.3. Rationality and Foreign Policy

Those who make foreign policy decisions are expected to be rational. However, this brings a new question. According to basic logic, there should not be any problem if everyone acts rationally. This may be true in natural sciences, but the result is not the same in politics.

Real life situations are not necessarily compatible with theories. Being rational, simple and convenient is not always possible. A leader may be right about the importance of human rights, but if the leader (and his/her country) does not have enough power to intervene, being right means nothing. Furthermore, even if a state has enough power, the results may not be matched with the expectations. Also, one simply cannot always calculate everything accurately in politics. Economists can calculate inflation rates in 5 years, but even with the right kind of information, it may not be possible to calculate the possible terrorist attacks in five years (Gross Stein, 2012, p.137).

Both realism and liberalism view states as rational actors. Waltz as the founder of structural realism actually leaves rationality out of the theory. As his theory emphasizes the importance of the international system, the behaviour of states do not

matter from a Waltzian perspective. John Mearsheimer (2001) is the one who claimed that states are rational. He argues that states behave either strategically or foolishly. It's more likely for them to be strategic and smart to survive in an anarchical system (Mearsheimer, 2001).

For Robert Keohane, states are rational actors. In an anarchical system, they calculate the costs of their actions carefully (Keohane, 1986, p.164). He argues that in such uncertainty, states think about all possible options. Actually this is why Keohane and other neoliberals think that cooperation among states is possible. Because neoliberals think that anarchical structure does not necessarily lead states to conflicts (Evera, 1999).

I think that the difference between Waltz and Mearsheimer deserves and requires more attention and detail. Mearsheimer (2009) criticises Waltz for rejecting "rational actor assumption" for a few reasons. Firstly, Mearsheimer (2008, p.245) claims that Waltz rejects that states do not act in a rational way. Because Waltz's theory does not aim to explain state behaviour. Mearsheimer (2008, p.246) also argues that realists do not need a seperate foreign policy theory to explain state behavior and hence realists build their theories with rational actor assumption. In other words, leaving rationality out of the room limits the explanatory power of theory (Mearsheimer, 2009, p.247).

Mearsheimer also argues that "since wars are result of decisions and actions taken by individual states", Waltz's theory cannot explain state's behavior. Hence, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* fails to explain one of the major issues in international politics (Mearsheimer, 2009, p.249). I, however, think that Waltz successfully explains the system even though Mearsheimer can be right about the importance of "explanatory power" of the theory. To be fair to both scholars, Mearsheimer himself argues that Waltz claim that states usually pay a price when they act in a non-strategic way (Mearsheimer, 2009, p.245).

In my opinion, Waltz already explained why Napoleonic France, Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany failed. Even Mearsheimer used Waltz's own words, "Smart states will not be utterly ambitious and hence they will seek appropriate amount of power" (Mearsheimer, 2009, p.243; Waltz, 1988, p.616). In other words, Waltz explains what happens when states aim to gain more power than they need. Also, Waltz explains the outcomes of those excessively ambitious states' actions from a more systemic perspective rather than adopting a unit- level analysis.

3.4. The Role of the Media

Does the media really have an impact on foreign policy making? It is not an easy question to answer. Gabriel Almond claimed that the American people did not have enough information about foreign policy. Hence, it was not likely for them to make really meaningful comments on foreign policy (Almond, 1950; Robinson, 2012, p.170). Obviously, lots of things have changed over the decades. We have witnessed the significant technological developments in many fields so far. Media (both the traditional and modern) is no exception.

Those who study foreign policy adopt different theoretical lenses. Since they use different lenses to explain and understand world politics, it is not surprising to see that they view the role of the media differently.

Realists explain international politics by focusing on power distribution among states. Domestic policies do not really matter to explain international relations. Hence, role of the media and public opinion are not on the radar of realism. In other words, media related topics are not included in a realist foreign policy analysis.

In contrast to realism, the role of the media is important for liberalism. Liberal theories such as democratic peace theory and complex interdependence can become more prevalent with the help of media tools such as internet. Almost 50 percent of the world's population have an access to internet (World Bank, 2018). In other words, more people get the opportunity to reach news and ideas on a global scale. Other than that, the dissemination of social media gave people a chance to discuss ideas and organize social movements on internet (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).[3] Also, media can play a role to get the public attention to make a difference on real life policies. For instance, it was argued that the media's pressure has played a very important role to make Kyoto as well as "The Landmine Conference" possible with the help of NGOs (Keohane and Nye, 1998).

Critical approaches have a different view of the media's role in foreign policy making. It has been argued that liberal states ignore their own evil actions to legitimize themselves. For instance, the American media focused on the human rights violations of communist states but ignored America's violations (Robinson 2012, p.183). So, critical approaches argue that the media serves in favor of the state. In other words, foreign policy elites use the media in accordance with their own agenda.

[3] Tufekci (2017), in her work titled *Twitter and Tear gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest,* analyzed the connection between the role of social media and the social movements. She explored how governments act against the social media in the book.

I think that the media has a limited role in foreign policy if there is any. Indeed, the technology is incredibly advanced today. The media shows us shocking footage from all over the world including war, many types of violence and so on. Also, it is easier to access almost everything for thanks to the internet. However, how can we claim that this has an impact on the foreign policy making process? I think, there is not enough empirical evidence to make such a claim.

So far, I have explained how mainstream theories explain international politics and how they analyze foreign policy. I have discussed the different ways to analyze foreign policy making process. Lastly, I have examined the way existing IR theories view the media's role in terms of foreign policy making. Starting from the next subsection, I'll examine the three main foreign policy issues identified by Steve Smith et al. (2012). These are national security, economic statecraft and military intervention

3.5. National Security

One of the main goals of foreign policy is to provide national security. National security is mostly affiliated with securing the physical existence of the state but it also can be associated with different meanings (Schmidt, 2012, p.188). There is one world but there are many theories to explain international politics (Walt, 1998). Similarly, there are different views on national security. In this section I will focus on some of these views to better explore the concept of national security.

For realists, national security is closely linked to military security because in the anarchical international system, survival is the number one priority of states. In other words, states need to secure their borders. What do states need to provide national security? Barry Buzan (1991) answers this question by highlighting four points: physical structure such as population and the soil, the idea of state (nationalism and other related ideologies), institutions of state such as government, and security of the state itself.

One of the most important features of state is sovereignty. A state provides security within its borders since it has sovereignty. How does the state provide national security in an anarchical international system? The answer given to this question differs for two main variations of structural realism. Defensive structural realism claims that the main purpose of state is to maximize security (Waltz, 1979). To do so, alliances can be made to balance the strong states' power. However, John Mearsheimer (2001) -as an

offensive neo-realist- claims that states constantly search for the ways and opportunities to maximize their power.

Apart from this difference, the main tool for national security for both defensive and offensive realism is the military power. In an anarchical structure, all states have a chance to conduct military operations to an extent. Also, a state can never be fully sure about the intentions of other states. So, having a strong military as much as possible is essential for realists.

However, no single state is strong enough to solve all problems with the help of its military. Also, when a state increases its military power, it may pose a threat to another state, which may be forced to increase its military capability to protect its sovereignty. Such a situation is called as security dilemma. For instance, when Turkey deploys an advanced missile and air defence system, Greece can perceive it as a threat to its national security. Reality is all states can have different weapons to provide national security for themselves. Since there is not a police force you can call when a conflict occurs and since international alliances may provide security to a degree, you have to take care of yourself. Taking care of yourself in realist school is called “the principle of self-help”.

For liberal institutionalists, international organizations such as the UN are powerful actors providing security and collaboration (Keohane and Martin, 1995). They focus mainly on the structure of the international system after World War II. Reality is that the UN does not have power to prevent a nuclear attack. Another strong regional supranational organization, the EU, does not even have an army and Britain is now leaving the Union. Keohane and Martin (1995) argued that Mearsheimer’s comments and predictions about NATO and the EU were wrong by pointing out that these two organizations actually increased their power. I disagree with their claim, because, EU is in serious trouble with the Brexit process and democracy in general is in decline over the Europe.

However, there is another perspective in security studies. This third way claims that the security of state is not the only security form. The term “security” was too narrowly founded and hence a broader understanding is a necessity (Buzan, 1991, p.14). Human security and environmental security matter too. This school of thought has its roots in critical thinking. It rejects state-centric view of mainstream IR theory. Copenhagen School’s "securitization” approach basically argues that national security is not naturally given but it is the product of decision-makers (Buzan, Wæver and De

Wilde, 1998). In other words, they argued that human beings should also be considered as key actor in terms of security. These ideas were developed by highlighting the end of Cold War. This means, Buzan, Wæver and other constructivists formed their arguments in light of real events. Buzan then already had started to develop constructivist ideas in 1980s. I also argue that Copenhagen School made major contribution to IR by focusing on individuals and by broadening security studies. For instance, it would not have been possible to discuss environmental security without "securitization" approach..

Another alternative perspective to security is provided by feminists. For instance, Sweden pursues a feminist foreign policy.[4] At the government's official website, it is stated that ''equality between men and women is a fundamental aim of Swedish Foreign Policy… for reaching Sweden's broader foreign policy goals on peace, security and sustainable development'' (Swedish Government Webpage). Indeed this is a remarkable development. A sovereign state claims to establish a foreign policy that is based on a feminist perspective. The Swedish government claims that it contributes to many issues by adopting feminist foreign policy. It declares that Stockholm's feminist foreign policy has contributed to increase participation of women in peace efforts in places like Mali and Syria. It also claims that the government contributed to increase focus on women, peace and security in the UNSC. The Swedish government also implemented a legislation prohibiting the purchase of sexual services.

Furthermore, I think that feminist security and foreign policy approach is fundamentally very important because it attacks the core principles of realism. Feminist IR theory champions non-state actors, transnational forces, individual human beings and ethical values (Aggestam, Rosamond, Kronsell, 2018). Yet, I do not agree with these assumptions and I do not think there are enough empirical evidence to back them. Even though I share the same values with the current Swedish government, I think, what they claim is beyond dreams. At least, that's the reality at the moment. I'll explain this with a few examples.

First, the Swedish government claims that their feminist foreign policy has led to major accomplishments. One of these is a legislation prohibiting the purchase of the sexual services. Their example countries to this are France, Ireland and the region of

[4]The current government of Sweden actively pursues a "feminist foreign policy" focusing on gender equality. Stockholm claims that the policies of the government are being implemented to make a contribution to increase gender equality globally. For further information, check the government's website.https://www.government.se/information-material/2017/10/swedens-feminist-foreign-policy--examples-from- three-years-of-implementation/

Northern Ireland. If there were only four countries in the world, that would be a great accomplishment. Furthermore, I don't see which problem can be solved with this legislation even if all states agreed on that. Also, I do not recommend to the Swedish government to have a crisis with Germany and Netherlands for allowing the purchase of sexual services. Because, it is legal in regions "Rotlicht" area in Hamburg and "Red Light District" in Amsterdam.

Second, the Swedish government claim that they established a leadership program for women leaders in Saudi Arabian business sector. It is their bilateral relations. The last time they provoked Saudi Arabia, the king of Sweden personally apologized from the King of Saudi Arabia, because, power determines and restricts the actions of states in the world we live in.

There are also environmental issues such as global warming and climate change which affect all countries. However, there is not a force/authority over the states. The most responsible states for these problems are the -almost- untouchable ones. For instance, the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration. There is nothing that other states can do about it. Once again, the ruthless reality is out there.

3.6. Economic Statecraft

Economic power follows the military power as another important feature of statecraft. It's obvious how states use military power in order to implement their foreign policy choices. Economic tools are a bit more complex than the military power.

International economic system can be characterized as a capitalist market economy. States have mutual benefits in this system. Nazi Germany occupied France for years in the World War II but now there are strong economic ties between Germany and France. Having strong economy provides a secure position for states. However, a conflict may occur if one side violates the sovereignty of another state. For instance, North Korea and Russia have been affected by heavy international sanctions.

Basically, there are two general ways to implement economic goals as part of foreign policy. These are economic incentives and economic punishment with sanctions and/or embargo. When Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014, sanctions were implemented on Moscow. Russia violated the international law by ignoring the sovereignty of Ukraine. In conclusion, Russia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

decreased to 1.36 trillion U.S dollars in 2015 from 2.29 trillion U.S dollars in 2013 (World Bank, 2013). However, Moscow did not change its foreign policy choices.

North Korea has been under heavy economic sanctions for a long time but there is no significant change in Pyongyang's choices. In fact, they even managed to sit down around the table with the U.S. under Trump administration. Sanctions did not work. Actually, this situation might probably encourage others to have (or develop) nuclear weapons rather than giving up on them.

The U.S. also started to implement sanctions on Iran. Washington even warned its long time allies to cut their economic ties with Tehran or they would be sanctioned too. So far, Iran has shot down an American drone and there is not any indicator that Iran will give up on its policies for no reason.

The possible success rate of economic sanctions is usually quite low for two reasons. First, sanctions do not really have a big impact on governments and leaders. Instead, sanctions affect the daily life of ordinary people. Second, governments who are sanctioned get a chance to create a national solidarity. Also, possible ineffectiveness of sanctions may encourage some sort of revolutionary groups (Barber, 1979). American sanctions on Cuba helped to bolster Castro's position unintentionally (Schreiber, 1973).

Possibly the greatest example for economic incentives is the Marshall Plan. Even though the main goal of the plan was to help states against communism, it still is one of the biggest economic supports in modern history. When the war ended, Europe was exhausted, devastated and millions of lives were lost. The decision to help restore Europe was critical. This decision helped to create one of the strongest alliances between the U.S. and European countries.

3.7. Military Intervention

According to liberalism, states -just like individuals- have responsibility to protect others. Liberals believe that everybody is equal and free. Also, all human beings have a right to pursue happiness on their own way. Liberal internationalism also defends cosmopolitanism which makes liberal values universally valid.

At the international level, liberal internationalism claims that liberal states must defend the rights of people who are not able to do so (Hoffmann, 1995). This is one of the most important disagreements between realism and liberalism in international relations. Realism argues that we live in a world where the states are sovereign actors

meaning that they are free to do whatever they want to. The limit, for realism, though is not determined by moral values. It's the international system and the power that restricts the actions of states.

I think that intervention to other states is problematic for a few reasons. First, the interventionist state is most likely to be labeled as imperialist or colonialist by other states even if its intentions are good. To be clear, I don't claim that states always have good intentions to intervene. The U.S. does not possess the oil sources of Iraq for instance but the image of the U.S. since Iraq War only got worsened according to a survey published in 2007 (Pew Research, 2007). Furthermore, Iraq did not become a better place at all. Also, ISIS was born from the ashes of Saddam's army. When we do the math, costs are much higher than the benefits.

Second, nation-state building takes long time and mostly the efforts are not worth to make. Great powers' policies, wars, and interventions in the Middle East set a good example on this matter. Interventions of a number of powers including France, Britain, Ottoman Empire and Turkey, the U.S. did not make the region better or more stable. Furthermore, all of these powers lost money and many soldiers and civilians lost their lives. Recently, the Syrian Civil War is also a perfect example.

Third, there is not a single liberal democratic state in the world which gained its current status with an external push. The Americans fought their independence war on their own against British Empire; French proclaimed the Republic on their own; modern Turkey was founded against the British support to the Caliphate. The point is clear. A state can change only if its own people wish to do so. To be clear, while I share the liberal values in domestic politics, I do not think it is a good idea to try to change the world in accordance with our own image.

I discussed about how to analyze foreign policy and what should be taken into account to do that in this chapter. I argued that some topics are more important compared to others from a structural realist perspective. Hence I discussed national security, military intervention and economic statecraft. I join one of the hottest debates in IR environment in the next chapter by discussing about the liberal international order.

CHAPTER IV

PAX AMERICANA OR U.S. AGAINST THE WORLD?

In this chapter I examine the threats against the liberal international order. First, I define the characteristics of the liberal international order. Then I discuss both liberal and realist perspectives of the international order including the accuracy of the term itself. After that, I explore the threats against the liberal order. I aim to contribute to the existing literature by focusing on different views on the liberal international order. Also, I aim to determine whether the order works or not.

4.1. What Does the Liberal World Order Mean?

Pax Americana is the Latin term that means ‘’American Peace’’ which refers to the peace among great powers after the end of World War II. ‘’Post-war order’’ and ‘’Liberal World Order’’ are the other terms used to refer to this era. During the Cold War there was a bipolar system. American-led Western Block became the victorious side after the SU collapsed. The Western Bloc was the defender of democratic regimes and the human rights. The US has become the single great power after the SU collapsed. Hence the international order became unipolar. Realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz (2000) and Stephen Walt (2018a) argued that it was a “unipolar moment” rather than a unipolar order. This was seen as the victory of liberal democracies against communism. Francis Fukuyama even called it ‘’...the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution’’ (Fukuyama, 1989). The U.S. president Bill Clinton delivered a speech during his campaign and said that ‘’Freedom not tyranny is on the march and pure power politics is ill-suited to a new era’’ (*New York Times*, 1992).

From a liberal perspective, trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, environmental protection, and human rights are the core issues for the global order (Ikenberry, 2017). Also, weaker states had earned a chance to make their voices heard through international organizations such as the UN (Nye, 2017). It was the U.S. that established this order. For instance, Truman administration provided economic aid to European countries after the World War II and also the U.S. supported democratic governance in countries such as Turkey and Greece with the help of Marshall Plan. The U.S. also created the NATO to protect the peace in Europe and elsewhere. These are the main characteristics of the liberal World order. Ikenberry also claims that it was this

liberal order that provided peace for seven decades (Ikenberry, 2017).

In the discipline of IR, one of the hottest topics is whether the liberal order is in danger or not. Before discussing this important question, I briefly mention other claims about the liberal order. From the perspective of structural realism, it was not the liberal order that created a relatively peaceful era. It was the balance of power between the US and SU during the Cold War (Allison, 2018). Graham Allison also called it as a myth and an imagined past. Another realist, Stephen Walt also claims that bipolarity and the existence of nuclear weapons contributed more to peace than international organizations (Walt, 2018a).

So, I believe that the characteristics and even the accuracy of the name (liberal world order) should be examined first to find an answer whether it is in danger or not. First, it is not accurate to call it a global order. Even after the Cold War, it is only a small number of countries who defend liberal values. Second, is the system really based on liberal values? To protect and strengthen free market capitalism, to value human rights and to support democratic regimes are the core values of the liberal world order. On the one hand, the main principles of the post-war order were the liberal values. On the other hand, even the liberal states did or supported some illiberal actions and regimes. The EU reached an agreement with the Turkish government to prevent migration from Syria and other countries. EU promised to make a payment to Ankara if they help to stop the migration to Europe. U.S supported President Sisi who is the leader of a military coup in Egypt. Third, indeed it was a relatively peaceful era after the World War II but just because there was no war among great powers, it does not mean there was no war at all. There was the Korean War, Vietnam War, Bosnian War, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, NATO intervention in Libya,and the Syrian Civil War.

4.2. Realism and the World Order

Realism and liberalism are two mainstream theories to examine the world order. The conceptualization of “Liberal World Order” can be found in liberal institutionalism and interdependence theory but it is not clear how these liberal approaches define international institutions. Keohane (1988) suggests that ‘’it could refer to a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement.’’ He also claims that there are considerable benefits of the mutual agreements such as trade agreements.

The first problem with this approach is that it is not clear what happens when countries do not or can not find mutual benefits. Also, the approach is criticized for ignoring the security issues and only focusing on economic ones (Mearsheimer, 1995). Second problem is that international organizations, such as NATO, are seen as the servant of the hegemon. The U.S. has been using NATO as a key part of its foreign policy by having overseas military bases outside of its own soil (Mearsheimer, 1995). Third problem is the issue of asymmetric interdependence. One state may gain more while others gaining less and this can create problems (Waltz, 2000). Waltz (2000) took a step further and claimed that the U.S. uses interdependence as an ideology was a camouflage to strengthen its leverage in international politics.

At this point, it is useful to take a look at the core assumptions of structural realism. First of all, nature of the international system is anarchical. This means that there is no police force over the states and international institutions play only a limited role. For instance, the UNSC has five permanent members and each of them has veto power. During the Syrian Civil War, for instance, Russia blocked any attempts to end the war. Second, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Waltz (2000) argued that anything can cause a war. From this perspective states can never be completely sure about others' possible acts. Another assumption is that the most important motive of states is to survive. Realism has some different variants but they agree on these core assumptions (Mearsheimer, 1995).

Mearsheimer (1995, p.12) also claims that states try to take advantage of others and they also want to be sure that others do not take advantage of them.

The Trump Administration accused other states of taking advantage of the U.S. several times. Trump did not even make an exception for long time U.S allies. The Trump administration also imposed additional tariffs on other states and called them to make new trade agreements. This is a clear proof that Mearsheimer is right. Even the most powerful state (the U.S. in today's world) and threatens other states to cancel the existing trade deals.

Also Chinese economy grew rapidly after joining World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China became a part of free trade and enjoyed this position to speed up its economy but never took a step to establish a more democratic regime. In fact, under the leadership of president Xi Jinping, China became even more authoritarian. The Chinese Communist Party declared that President Xi is lifelong leader. China also built many overseas military bases. Moreover, Beijing declared that they will start the

modern silk road project which will have a great impact on international trade. The American authorities have perceived China as a threat to the U.S. power. Now, it is not a secret that China is the most serious threat to challenge American leadership as the next possible global leader.

Ikenberry claims that the U.S. is a "user-friendly" superpower. He claims that the U.S. has more advantages in this system. For him, the U.S. obviously gives some leverages to its allies but gains more in return. For instance, the U.S. provides security to Europe, Japan and South Korea and gets a very important geopolitical access in return (Ikenberry, 2017). Actually the whole post-war system was established on this principle. The U.S. provides security to European and Asian allies and give them access to the American market. It is a win/win situation for all sides. However, this can be explained with the classic balance of power theory rather than the liberal order. Japan and South Korea are Washington's allies because the U.S. is the strongest actor in international politics.

Ikenberry (2017) also thinks that the policies of the Trump administration is the greatest threat to this system. Realists disagree with this idea (Allison, 2018) but before discussing this, I want to start with the basics. Since even the defenders of a liberal order agree that there are serious problems about the order, I will examine the power politics first.

4.3. Power Politics

Joseph Nye (1990) once wrote that "power like love, easier to experience than to define or measure". If we look at the world through realist lenses, we can easily say that power is all about capacity in military, economy, geography and the ability to use them. For Nye, these are related to hard power. There is also soft power to consider (Nye, 2014, pp-107-115). Nye thinks that the U.S. gets its strength equally from hard and soft power.

The U.S. has been enjoying its position as the global hegemon since the ending of the Cold War. The U.S. military has been unrivaled for a long time. Since, the U.S. is way stronger than others, the other states create alliances. Balancing is to create an alliance with others against the prevailing threat (Walt, 1987). It is easy to see how states act in a bipolar system, because in such a system each great power has to confront the other (Mearsheimer, 2010). The Cold War era is a great example. States were

divided into two blocks. The Western bloc was led by the U.S. and the states in the Western bloc had no choice but to bandwagon the U.S. Same can be said about the Eastern bloc. After the SU had collapsed, the international system became unipolar and the U.S. has been the global hegemon ever since. The U.S. has enjoyed an unprecedented power. It has the strongest military and the greatest economy. It did not even have a rival since the end of the Cold War. Japan for instance has become a rival to the U.S. in economy but they did not have a strong military in 1990s. Also, Japan had this economic growth under the security umbrella of the U.S. However, if we go back a century ago, we see that it ended up very badly between Germany and Britain in terms of power politics.

Furthermore, in 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has challenged the hegemonic power, the result has been a bloodshed (Allison, 2015). Allison analyzed the historical cases and predicted that a war between the U.S. and China is most likely to happen. Indeed, China had an unprecedented rapid economic growth in the last three decades. Beijing also started to increase its military capacity in recent years. The phenomenon of Thucydides Trap suggests the same because, it was the rise of Athens and the fear of Sparta that brought them into the battlefield (Allison, 2015).

Also, it is important to see that the power of China is not at the same level as Japan's power had at the end of 1980s and in the beginning of 1990s. China is already the second largest economy in terms of GDP nominal and and the largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. Also the population of China is roughly 1.3 billion. Allison thinks that this is not a problem to be fixed but a chronic condition which requires to be managed over a generation. Moreover, he argues that this is the rise of a nation with five thousand years of civilization and with 1.3 billion people population (Allison, 2015).

Nye disagrees with this assessment because the purchasing power parity is used to measure for comparing welfares (Nye, 2019). He also claims that the relations between the U.S. and China are different than the relations between the U.S. and the SU during the Cold War. Because there was almost no trade between the U.S. and the SU at that time and there has been a massive trade between the U.S. and China for many years. For this reason he chooses to call the relations between the U.S. and China as "cooperative rivalry" (Nye, 2019).

However Nye's argument seems very optimistic. The U.S. was almost in the same situation that China is in right now when the U.S. first raised as a great power in

the western hemisphere. Washington first seized the power in the American continent and used that power to be the global hegemon when the time was right. Today, China seems to use the same strategy. Beijing is looking for opportunity in the Asia first. In other words, China is building power at home. Also, China seems confident enough to offer a mega project named ‘’The Belt and Road Initiative’’ which can change the world trade balance in favor of Beijing. So, China obviously is trying to push dominance in global order. This, for sure, is a serious threat to the liberal international order.

4.4. The World Order

A number of IR scholars have explored the characteristics of world order. Hedley Bull used the term world order in order to explain the structure of arms control between the US and the SU. In his own words, ‘’The problem with the world order is not that of how to move beyond the states system but that of how to make it work’’ (1976, p.8). He, then, focuses on the necessity of the consensus among states for common interests, institutions and rules (Bull, 1976, p.9). Another important point he made is that no order can be adequate without involving the Third World. In other words, he did not think that there was a truly global order.

Anne-Marie Slaughter (2005) defines the world order as a system of global governance that institutionalizes cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict. In other words, she thinks the world order should involve successful/effective institutions which help states for cooperation and of course the order should be global. Richard Haass (2019) argues that the world order requires a stable distribution of power and broad acceptance of the rules that govern the conduct of international relations. Like others, Haass focuses on the rules as well. However, he also underlines the importance of power distribution. ‘’A stable distribution of power’’ explicitly is part of the balance of power theory. Haass also argues that a world order rarely is successful and comes to an end inevitably. In other words, the rules of international relations have always been determined by power.

Ikenberry (2001) defines the world order as governing arrangements among a group of states including its fundamental rules, principles and institutions. He focuses mainly on rules and institutions.

It is also important to focus on terms such as liberal international order and rules-based order. As Graham Allison (2018) rightfully noted, the first decades of the

liberal international order was actually the Cold War era. There were no wars between the great powers but there were regional wars such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Also, there was a tension between the two superpowers and sometimes even a crisis such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The two great powers almost started a nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis which could have destroyed the world. Thus, I think that it is not a very accurate assessment that the world enjoyed a very peaceful era during the Cold War.

Only the U.S. and its Western allies (also Japan in the Asia) were liberal democracies at the time. The Marshall Plan helped Europe to rebuild itself and NATO made the western hemisphere secure. General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) set the rules for economics. Allison (2018) claimed that all of these policies and institutions were the direct result of the rivalry between the U.S. and the SU.

Furthermore, it is very problematic to refer to a rules-based order when it is not clear what the rules are. One can say that spreading of liberal democracies and free market economy were the main rules but the truth is these rules have never been accepted by more than half of the World during the Cold War. Only after the Cold War, Eastern European countries embraced the free market economics and democratic governments. Even after the Cold War, Russia did not lean into a democratic governance and China has always been an authoritarian state. To be more specific, Russia has become more and more authoritarian after Putin took the office. In other words, The SU is dead but it seems like its governance style is alive in Putin's Russia. Today, two of the three great powers; Russia and China remain as authoritarian states.

Liberalism is in retreat and democracies are feeling the effects of populism everywhere (Haass, 2018). The UK voted for leaving the EU. The UK is the main ally of the U.S. There is a "special relationship" between the two states and UK helped the U.S. to create the liberal order after World War II. It should also be noted that the UK always sided with the U.S. in almost all wars such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the War on Terror. The main goal of the EU was to create the European identity over the states. After the UK voted to leave the Union and the decline of democracy in some Eastern European democracies such as Hungary and Poland, things will be more difficult for the EU. It is not a "shocking news" as decline as Eastern European countries were Soviet allies and they were also members of Warsaw Pact not so long ago. To sum up, these events could lead the U.S. and the UK to be isolationist, protectionist states and EU member states may be in a danger to be less democratic.

4.5. Global IR

Acharya and Buzan in their article, “Why is There no Non-Western IR Theory?” (2007, p.2) first criticized the discipline of IR for being Western- centered, for assuming that Western history is world history. Secondly, they argue that “they acknowledge the possibility of progress and transformation for both in Western and in non-Western world”. Thirdly, they claim that they embrace a “pluralist” approach. They use “pluralist approach” as being both positivist and reflectivist at the same time. In their own words:

We are happy to take a pluralist view of theory that embraces both the harder, positivist, rationalist, materialist and quantitative understandings on one end of the theory spectrum, and the more reflective, social, constructivist, and the postmodern on the other. (p.4)

Fourthly, they claim that IR is deeply rooted in European history (p.7). Fifthly, they argue that language sets a barrier for those whose first language is not English (p.10).

Acharya and Buzan also recently published a book titled *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary*. They described a “Post Western World Order” term by developing “deep pluralism” idea. They argue that “Post-Western World Order” is a world without a hegemon. (Acharya and Buzan, 2019, p.265).

In my opinion, the term “Global IR” has many flaws. Firstly, a “pluralist” approach which include both positivism and reflectivism cannot be developed since they are the exact opposites of each other ontologically and epistemologically. Secondly, they use power and wealth to set a ground for their ideas. In their own words: “We will focus on Asia, because it is the only place that can be compared to Western world” (Acharya and Buzan, 2007, p.3).

Thirdly, the criticism about European history is perceived as world history is not practical. I do not understand why someone would spend time and funding if there is no use of it. Realists for instance use historical events such as Peloponnesian War, Napoleonic Wars, Ottoman-Habsburg Wars and World Wars to understand and explain the nature of power politics. I think, those who defend the need of making global IR should demonstrate empirical evidences from the history of non-Western world and why it is important for IR.

Fourthly, I do not understand why language sets barriers for those who do not speak English as a first language. I think, an idea does not face a barrier if it really good to be recognized. Thinkers like Kant, Rousseau and Marx have never written in English. Yet, each of them is among the most influential thinkers.

Lastly, focusing on the countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Turkey poses a serious threat to academia. Freedom of expression is at stake in these countries. How can an academic in these countries develop a new theory which is independent from the influence of authoritarian regimes? As a realist, I think it is peculiar to discuss about things which have not taken place yet.

4.6. Threats and Problems

Nationalism, populism and protectionism are on the rise. Also, the relations between Europe and the U.S. are not at the best level. President Trump have criticized US' European allies repeatedly and publicly for not paying their fair share for NATO. Beyond that, President Trump attacked media and law- enforcement institutions. Most importantly, he declared that ''America First'' will be his main policy. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

International organizations were ineffective in places such as Syria and Yemen. Also, one of the most important features of the liberal order was to fight against human rights violations. There has been more violations than the actions to stop them. Even after a Saudi journalist (a U.S resident) was killed in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, the Trump administration did not do much about it. In contrast, Trump said that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a very important ally for the U.S. This means that human rights violations, even the death of a journalist, can be tolerated to maintain the bilateral relationships. As Haass noted, the U.S. is not just an ordinary country. It is the architect and the principal backer of the liberal order. If Washington decides to abandon its role, there will be consequences for the whole world (Haass, 2018).

One of the most important characteristics of international politics is the sovereignty of states. Russia violated this principle by annexing Crimea. Economic sanctions against Russia did not change Moscow's behaviour. If the rules of the rules-based system were effective, Russia could not have done this. This is also another proof that great power politics is back in contrast to liberal arguments. Fukuyama (1992)

argued that liberal democracy is the possible final governance form of mankind. Realists such as Allison claims that power politics always have been around. He also claims that the ending of the Cold War did not create a unipolar system, it created a "unipolar moment" (Allison, 2018). Russia's actions after its resurgence suggests this opinion. In other words, Russia annexed Crimea and supported pro-Russia separatists in Ukraine, defended its client state Syria under President Putin.

Populism's rise is also very important threat to the liberal order. Populist leaders claim that they defend the rights of the ordinary citizens and try to incapacitate or demolish the institutions such as judiciaries and press (Keohane and Colgan, 2017). Keohane claims that neoliberal agenda since the early 1980s has damaged people's belief in the system. Free market economics is the crucial for the liberal order but if the economic institutions work in favor of elites instead of ordinary people, the system is rigged (Keohane and Colgan, 2017).

Human rights violations are another crucial problem. The Article I of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (UDHR) states that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. This is one of the most important things in liberal philosophy. President Trump has declared his administration's policy with the slogan of ''America First''. This slogan may be powerful in domestic politics but the U.S. is the architect of the liberal order. Liberal order is not all about free market economics or establishing democratic governments. If the U.S. ignores the importance of human rights around the globe, the order will not only be non-international but also illiberal.

Another important part of the liberal order is multilateral cooperation. When President Reagan shook hands with President Gorbachev to sign the INF Treaty in 1987, the whole world had such a relief. Indeed it was a great success in terms of nuclear disarmament. The Trump administration withdrew from the INF and then Putin's Russia followed the same path. The architect of the liberal international order withdrew also from TPP and the Paris Climate Agreement. The U.S. withdrawal from these agreements does not necessarily mean that there will be a nuclear war or a trade war but such acts mean that Washington want to do whatever it wants without asking its allies, partners or adversaries. This unilateralism is the opposite of multilateralism.

Another example is the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium. This was a very important agreement because it was meant to protect the Middle East from a possible nuclear disaster and also Iran had a chance to reach free

market economics. Tehran started to make business with countries such as France and Italy after the agreement. Basically it was a win/win for everyone but the Trump administration claimed that Iran did not keep its promises and then Washington withdrew from the JCPOA. So, this is another proof that the multilateral cooperation is not the number one priority of Washington.

As stated before liberal international order is in danger and it has never been fully liberal or international or orderly. The whole world started to become more illiberal. Populism and nationalism are on the rise and international institutions do not work effectively as they were meant to be. But, most importantly, the U.S. has started to become protectionist and started to lose its influence around the globe. If the architect of the order starts to act alone, what would we expect to see from others?

At this point, it is important to take a look at what Ikenberry thinks about the future of the liberal international order. Ikenberry (2018) claims that the liberal order will survive regardless of the status of the U.S. Because he thinks that this order is a very complex one. It is rules-based, multilayered, and multifaceted. He also claims that the liberal order does not necessarily need the U.S. leadership or another hegemon. Because there are several states in this system and for instance Germany and Japan found their roles and positions in the system. Both Germany and Japan are liberal democratic states and both countries have strong economy. Neither of them have strong military which can pose a threat to the world. Both Germany and Japan have access to the U.S. market and Washington provides a security umbrella to these countries.

He even claims that rising states, especially China, accept some of the rules of the order. For instance, China found the opportunity to have an access to other markets by joining the WTO. Also, this order offers a chance for leadership to every states by giving examples of the structure of organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and G20.

Ikenberry (2018) also thinks that economic gain is widely shared and also claims that the order gives opportunities to alternative economic models other than American capitalism such as European social democracies and Asian developmentalist systems. He is especially right on China. Beijing had an unprecedented economic growth especially after joining the WTO. This means that liberal order really gave a chance to China to develop within the system.

Yet, there are some problems with his assessments. First, when China started to develop economically, Washington immediately started to take some actions. President

Trump imposed additional tariffs to Chinese export to the U.S. He even threatened Germany by imposing additional tariffs to German cars. Right now, the future of the international trade is ambiguous. Second, international institutions such as the WTO or IMF were founded by American leadership. The argument that the order does not need a hegemonic leader is not accurate for the very same reason. How can we think about NATO without the American Army or can we imagine WTO without the U.S. while Washington is the biggest stakeholder?

Third, the role of Germany and Japan has been decided by the U.S. In other words, they did not find their positions in the international system on their own. Even the Japanese constitution after the war was written with American influence and pressure. One of the most famous articles of this new constitution is the Article 9 which forbids Japan to wage a war again. Germany was divided into two parts and West Germany was controlled by the U.S. for decades and even today there are many American military bases in Germany. In other words, both Germany and Japan are under the security umbrella of Washington and this has nothing to do with liberalism. This is the direct result of the World War II.

Fourth, it is not clear how international institutions play a role in international politics. Is that really important that the G20 summits are hosted by different countries every year? Even the UN is not very effective. In 2018, the UN General Assembly voted against Israel to make Jerusalem its official capital. In spite of this decision, the U.S. recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital. This is a clear proof that it is a world of power politics. Also what did the rules-based order do to prevent Russia from annexing Crimea apart from putting sanctions? It was the most aggressive act in recent years. Hence, most of the points made by Ikenberry are directly related to the American leadership. If Washington decides to change its position, then there will not be a liberal international order anymore, if it ever existed.

However, I agree with Ikenberry about the alternative order. So far, China did not offer an alternative order or ideas and norms. We do not know what Beijing has in its pocket for a possible new order. What we know is that China does not care about authoritarian regimes or the violations of human rights. It would be ironic if China was a defender of democracy while being governed by one-party system for decades and the President Xi has become a lifetime leader. So far, Beijing seeks to enhance its influence in South China Sea and in Asia in general. Apart from military and economic power, what does China have to influence its neighbours and countries overseas? China is a

country which uses a social credit system to score its own citizens. It is almost like an episode from a famous sci-fi show Black Mirror (2016). Even if the U.S. power decreases dramatically, it does not seem possible for China to mandate its authority over Europe in a cultural or philosophical way.

Another indicator that the liberal international order is in danger is the relations between the U.S. and its European allies. President Trump criticized Germany's Merkel for not paying its share to NATO and asked her to increase defense budget (Reuters, 2017). After that tension, President Macron of France tried to have a direct diplomatic tie between President Trump and himself. President Macron delivered a speech in the U.S. congress and emphasized the importance of multilateralism, cooperation and shared liberal values between the U.S. and Europe (BBC, 2018).

Even though the two leaders had successful meetings, President Trump decided to withdraw from the JCPOA in spite of Macron's objections. There are serious disagreements between the U.S. and Europe now. Chancellor Merkel even said that her country can not rely on American for its security anymore. Also both Merkel and Macron publicly declared that there is a need for a European Army (Kentish, 2017).

The two leaders may have that vision, but Macron does not even seem secured at his job after the demonstrations in Paris which started in 2018 and Merkel left her position as the party leader and declared that she will not run for being chancellor again. While the two European defenders of the liberal international order are having difficult times at home, how can they lead others to save the order? British politics is in a chaos since they decided to leave EU. Europe's and EU's future right now is vague. It is impossible to know whether this is a temporary situation or not. Since Trump changed many traditional American policies, the same can happen in France or Germany as well.

Another important issue is the growing number of countries that position themselves against immigrants. The UK voted to leave the EU due to the immigration crisis and London's desire to enhance its sovereignty. Poland and Hungary have anti-immigrant governments. In Germany, far-right party "Alternative Fur Deutschland" (AFD) had a big success in the elections and now Macron's seat is in danger. Even the US, a state which is also known as the country of immigrants, now has a president who wants to build a wall to prevent people to come to the U.S. from its southern border. He also tried to ban people from specific countries to enter to the U.S. but the federal court ruled against his decision.

President Trump could not build the Wall so far even though the Republican Party has the majority in the Senate. This is also why the US is not just another country. Washington has the strongest political institutions in terms of checks and balances. It is also the only great power which always has been a democracy since its foundation. The Declaration of Independence starts with ‘’all men are created equal’’ and they use the words life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to describe the unalienable rights of individuals. The U.S. is a very exceptional country from the very beginning but it can be debated whether it is still the same or not now. The truth is, it is almost impossible to change the US constitution and the President has limited power.

America’s image is unusual. Washington has never faced a serious threat such as authoritarianism and never really was afraid of being invaded by a foreign country. But, this does not necessarily give the U.S. a legitimacy to make efforts to change other states’ regimes. Stephen Walt, a realist like Allison, also chooses to use the term unipolar moment instead of unipolar system (Walt, 2018a). He criticizes the pursuit of liberal hegemony after the Cold War. First he claims that the U.S. should have left the European security to the Europeans after the Cold War. He also argues that this grand strategy (liberal hegemony) made the U.S. to be tied with a lot of places and events unnecessarily.

This strategy cost the U.S. trillions of dollars and also gave the U.S. a bad reputation. He claims that if Washington used that money to create better conditions for Americans at home, it would have made America look better than it is today. Other countries could have embraced the American values (Walt, 2018a). This means that the U.S. could have had greater influence on other countries if it did not fight endless wars. After almost three decades, what did the U.S. gain from its wars in the post-Cold War era? The reality is that the Islamic State was founded partly on the remnants of the Iraq War. This situation created a chain of serious problems for both the U.S. and Europe.

The number of extremists increased and the Islamic State gained territory in both Iraq and Syria. Then the Syrian civil war started and this created millions of refugees. This helped far-right movements in Europe to be even more xenophobic and in return extremists became even more radical. Walt also criticizes NATO’s expansion towards Eastern Europe, which made Russia felt threatened. As realists argue states can never be sure about the intentions of others and to survive in an anarchical system is crucial. The U.S. is also right from the very same perspective. Because Washington has a long history with Moscow and rightfully fears to have the same problems again. There was

no guarantee that Moscow would not attack Georgia or seize Crimea if the NATO did not expand.

To be fair, Russia today does not pose a big threat to the U.S. Russia's economy is roughly larger than Spain's in terms of GDP (World Bank, 2018). This is why the strategy called ''pass the buck'' could be more useful for Washington in Europe. It was indeed necessary to protect Europe against the SU after the World War II but now Europe is wealthier than Russia and able to defend itself.

It is also important to note that there has not been a rivalry between European countries after World War II. This is mostly because NATO's and hundreds of American troops' existence in the continent. If the U.S. withdraws from Europe, it is not clear what would happen. A united European army could make sense on paper but it is a very hard thing to do in practice. Europe is more peaceful and prosperous compared to any other time in history.

However, 70 years is a very short period of time in history. Europeans have forgotten rivalry among themselves but things can change. There also was a relatively peaceful term between 1815 and the beginning of World War I. If the US decides to leave Europe, European countries may need to increase their defense budgets and invest on military industry. Germany, France and the UK already have advanced technology and industrial capacity. In such an environment, these countries might have strong militaries and even start a war within time. UK already decided to leave the EU. So, it is not clear how alliances could take place in that scenario. Also, the UK and France have nuclear weapons. So, it is not an easy decision for the US to leave Europe.

As Walt (2019a) rightfully argues, states can be overcommitted when they reach a certain amount of power that others do not. This is what happened to the U.S. after the Cold War. Washington did not have a peer competitor at that time and found itself making unnecessary commitments all around the globe. During the Cold War, democratic western countries sided with the U.S. even though Washington was the stronger side. They did not balance the American power by bandwagoning/allying to the SU. Because the SU was the one who posed more threats to Europe. Ironically, the SU also believed that their ideology was universal and tried to spread their ideology as much as possible. It tried to protect like-minded countries and was in an arms race with Washington. As a result, the SU collapsed. The US tried to build nations in both Iraq and Afghanistan and this strategy clearly did not work. There are extremists everywhere today who hate the U.S. Also, for them, Washington was responsible for destruction of

their countries. As a result of the liberal hegemony strategy, Washington lost trillions of dollars, created enemies, lost influence and even have some problems at home now (Walt, 2019a).

Toppling another state's government has always been one the most debated issues in international relations. The issue is debated in the US as well. There are two main views on this issue. First one is provided by liberal internationalism. In the U.S. case, it is hawkish neocons and liberal hegemonists who are the defenders of the idea of regime change. They believe that it is a good thing to topple a foreign regime/leader for their own security and to make the world a better place. The roots of this notion can be traced back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Michael Doyle discussed these ideas and claimed that democracies are very unlikely to fight each other (Doyle, 2005 pp.19-33). This is actually true but the tricky part is the difficulty to make all countries (or as many as possible) democratic states. Also it is not a good idea to try to make this happen in an anarchical system. Even if a state has an agenda to spread democracy, best way to do it, I think, is to set an example at home for the others.

The second view is provided by realism. If a state uses its military force to make others embrace its values and ideas, the others will most likely team up against the interventionist state. First of all, surviving in an anarchical system for a state is the most crucial thing. If a regime or a leader is toppled by foreigners, other states become alarmed immediately. Moreover, if a state's attempt to change a regime fails, not only others become alarmed but also the interventionist state loses credibility and influence.

Furthermore, history shows us that there are more failures than successes about regime changes. Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria are the most dramatic examples for Washington. They all became hostile to the U.S. Of course it is understandable for a country which was founded on liberal principles to make such attempts and it is not always a bad thing. The U.S. and the NATO did the right thing in Bosnia for instance. The U.S. did not go there for only its own interest or to topple a regime or a leader for only its own foreign policy purposes. It was a humanitarian intervention and ended the war.

However, Washington or the UN did not stop the war on Yemen despite of civilian deaths and hunger crisis. Also, the U.S. supported Saudi Arabia for intervention. Destroying or toppling a regime or leader may be the easy part of the job. That is where the hard work begins (Walt, 2018b). For instance, defeating Saddam's army in 2003 was not difficult for the U.S. army but to establish an order which is based

on liberal values were incredibly hard. Eventually it turned out to be a complete catastrophe in the long run. In conclusion, interventionist war can only be rightful if it serves peace by preventing an ethnic cleansing or a genocide. Also an international and institutional (if possible) consensus for intervention would definitely be better in terms of legitimacy.

4.7. Security Issues and Legitimacy Problems

For a long time, security issues arguably have been the focal point of international politics, especially after 9/11 attacks. That was a shocking moment for the U.S. and the rest of the world. The Bush administration determined that the fight against terrorism would be the main goal of the U.S. security (National Security Strategy [NSS],2002). The U.S. first started a military operation in Afghanistan with the support of its allies, because the Taliban refused to turn over Bin Laden. So, it made sense to start a military campaign against Afghanistan. Then, the Bush administration accused Saddam's Iraq for having weapons of mass destruction and also Washington claimed that Saddam Hussein had links to Al-Qaeda and therefore was responsible for September 11. Basically 9/11 attacks changed the world entirely.

9/11 created a very intense fear in the Western world. Terrorism is a violent act which pursues a political goal. This is the main difference between an ordinary gun-related violence and a terrorist attack. Terrorism has four waves and the fourth wave is the religious wave (Rapoport, 2002). According to Rapoport, Islam is at the heart of the fourth wave terrorism for many reasons. First, one Islamic traditional belief is that a savior (Mahdi) will rule the world before the end. Second, another Islamic tradition of the belief to a one Islamic state under sharia (Rapoport, 2002).

However, these beliefs are not shared by the whole Muslim world. Francis Fukuyama thinks that such a distinction between radicals, Islamists and ordinary Muslims should be made. Therefore, the terminology is important (Fukuyama, 2006). Apart from these debates, terrorism is one of the most important issues for both politics and academia. There can be a terrorist attack at anytime, anywhere and hence this frightens everyone. Especially the suicide- bombing is a very dangerous and an effective tactic of terrorists. Suicide bombing is mostly identified with the radical Islamic terrorists but the truth is it was the Tamil Tigers who used suicide bombings more than all other terrorist organizations combined (Rapoport, 2002).

Since the U.S. is the most powerful state in the world, the 9/11 attacks needed to be responded. The war in Iraq did not make the situation better though. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the ISIS was founded in the very same region. Ever since the Iraq War started, there has been endless wars in the Middle East. Also the terrible attacks took place in Paris. As Rapoport (2002) pointed out, the future of the fourth wave terrorism is uncertain. Yet, one thing is clear. The way states deal with terrorism is not very effective. Radical terrorists even managed to proclaim a so-called caliphate. Also, viewing Iraq responsible for terrorism made things even worse. It was revealed that Saddam had no direct links to al-Qaeda (Weisman, 2006). False claims about Saddam's regime made the U.S. less credible in the region.

The Bush administration argued that Saddam Hussein was a terrible dictator and the people of Iraq needed to be liberated. Another important point is that the Patriot Act made it possible for the U.S. intelligence agencies to listen private phones, search homes and properties of citizens in case of suspicion. Once again, the goal of liberating another country created illiberalism at home. To be fair, this was actually the result of the 9/11. But, we should not miss the bigger picture. The 9/11 attackers were not the U.S. citizens. Enabling American government institutions to spy on its own people did not make America a safer place. The U.S. military presence in Iraq still continues and also the war in Afghanistan still goes on. To sum up, liberal hegemony has caused the U.S. trillions of dollars, endless wars and illiberal actions at home.

Another problem is legitimacy. Washington acted alone in Iraq unlike its multilateral acts/choices in Bosnia and Kosovo crisis. This was a clear proof that the states could undermine international institutions when they think they have a threat to face. This also means that the core assumptions of realism are still very important. Also, Mearsheimer claims that one problem with the U.S. foreign policy is inconsistency. He argues that the actions of Washington were realist but the discourses were liberal (Mearsheimer, 2018). The answer of Washington to 9/11 attacks can be reasonable when we think about the power and status of the U.S. It was and still is the most crucial attack in the American soil. However, it also proved that the liberal international order was ostensible. Mearsheimer's argument can be explained with the bureaucratic politics model on this occasion as I explained in the third chapter. People in the U.S. government has different views, ideas and discourse. Many people work in contemporary American foreign policy making. Each individual may pursue different goals and hence individuals can choose different career paths. Also, American political

system allows individuals to be paid by foreign people. Given that, an American can deliver a speech publicly on behalf of a foreign country. In other words, America's national interests can be both violated and manipulated.

The UN, one of the most important institutions in the liberal order, is in the center of legitimacy problem. The two of the permanent members of the UNSC are governed by authoritarian regimes. In such a system, how can liberal democracy be spread throughout the world? As China increases its power, Beijing may encourage others to be authoritarian. For instance, China Development Bank gives loans to other states and acts like an alternative to IMF. But, there is a big difference between these two institutions. China Development Bank (CDB) unlike IMF, never demands political reforms from these countries (CDB Annual Report, 2018). Hence, states that have authoritarian tendencies might feel more comfortable to work with Beijing. The liberal order cannot only be based on free market economics. The system can never work out fully without political reforms. Otherwise, it will only create states with crony-capitalism.

Another very important problem for the liberal international order is the issues which are related to the digital age. There is no additional fees for the access to most websites like Facebook apart from the usual internet fee. Their business model is based on using information of users and share them with other companies. This is a very big problem, because, those who have malicious intentions can easily manipulate this for their own interests. There has an ongoing debate for a while in the U.S. about an alleged Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election in the U.S. It turned out that a private company (Cambridge Analytica) used Facebook to manipulate people's political choices by channeling personalized ads. The founder of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, testified in the U.S. Congress about this issue (*New York Times*, 2018).

While this situation has vital importance for the future of democracy, undemocratic countries do not face such a threat. In such regimes, most of the media companies are sponsored by the state. China - the peer competitor of the U.S.- does not even allow companies such as Facebook and Twitter to perform in China (Reuters, 2019). One of the most important features of democracy is transparency. Hence, creating chaos with the help of fake news is only in favor of authoritarian regimes. We live in a very dynamic world. Many people are busy enough to check the truth of news they see or read. Therefore, one or two fake news can change a person's political opinion easily.

Russia, for instance, may be as powerful as it was before. However, they use hybrid-war tactics. According to *New York Times*, the state-sponsored media agency Sputnik has been engaged with disinformation regularly (Rutenberg, 2017). In conclusion, fake news (disinformation) and social media- based problems and their effects on politics will be analyzed in detail in the future.

Also, liberalism is a philosophy which is based on individualism. Its roots can be found in the work of Immanuel Kant and John Locke. Kant argued that if the number of the republican states (liberal democracy today) increases, the possibility of war would decrease (Doyle, 2005, pp.19-33). This is the philosophy behind liberal internationalism. Kenneth Waltz disagrees with this view claiming that ‘’democratic peace theory’’ is not a theory, it is a thesis. For Waltz (2000), liberal democracy will only eliminate one cause. More importantly, Waltz argues that even if every states become democratic, the structure of the system would remain the same.

The international system is anarchical, not hierarchical. In other words, states can not find an external authority for help when they feel themselves in danger. Indeed, approaches like complex interdependence play a role in international politics but the system does not change. For Waltz (2000), that any change which actually does not change the system itself, must be evaluated as the change within the system.

When states realize that they might not be able to get the help they need in case of emergency, then they have to be realistic. Waltz also argues that there is no guarantee that the today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy (Waltz, 2000). This is also one of the core assumptions of structural realism which is directly related to the anarchical system because in such a system, states will never be sure about the intentions of other states. Thus they have to adopt a strategy by creating alliances against the powerful states which is called the balance of power. Also, for the very same reason, great powers eventually will try to maximize their power for their hegemonic and ambitious foreign policy purposes (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Another point is that structural realism is more accurate to predict the future of politics compared to its liberal counterparts. Stephen Walt argued that the SU posed more threat to the security of Eurasia more than the U.S. did. So, as expected, European countries sided with Washington against Moscow (Walt, 1987). He also claimed that it would be more difficult for Washington to adopt new policies after the Cold War while Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy would be the final form of human government and so it might end the great power politics even in an anarchical structure (Fukuyama,

1989). As time goes by, Walt's and realism's assessment turned out to be more accurate.

For Walt and for many realist, alliance is one of the most important things in international politics. Walt (1987) defines the alliance as a form of formal or informal security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. States form alliances or take part in an existing one to secure themselves. This is very important for policy makers. History proved that those states who could not see the possible alliances failed many times. Nazi Germany and Japan, for instance, believed that their alliance would prevent the US to enter the war (Walt, 1987). In the end, Japan's aggression in the Pacific Sea forced Washington to enter the war and changed the history forever. Japan faced on the most brutal and clearest answers in history.

This issue brings us back to the question posed at the beginning. Was it the liberal international order or the bipolar system which prevented a major war? For liberals, it was surely the liberal order and for realists it was the latter one. We clearly see that there was power politics for more than four decades after the World War II. There were many forms of alliances, nuclear weapons, military interventions and so on. In such a political climate and system, how could one claim that there was a rules-based order?

Liberal internationalist scholars were right on a few things though. The economic interdependence between the states increased. Also there was no wars or war signal among Western liberal democracies but this did not change the anarchical structure. Also, liberal institutionalists exaggerated the importance of institutions. NATO, for instance, was built on a security treaty among the democratic countries but most of the security was provided by the US. In other words, it always has been the security umbrella of Washington that made western hemisphere more secure. This does not make the international system rules-based or liberal. In contrast, it makes the system even more dependent on power relations, because European countries have always been the powerful states and that dominated international politics. They also dominated the western hemisphere and the world in general culturally, politically and philosophically. The US has only become the leader of the system after 1945.

At this point, it is useful to refer to Walt's balance of threat theory. Walt (1987) argued that states balance not only against the most powerful state but also against threats, which created a more favorable position for Washington. Western European countries allied with the U.S. against the Soviet threat instead of forming an alliance

with the SU to balance American power. After almost three decades since the Cold War ended, actually the situation is still the same. Even though there are some disagreements between Washington and Brussels, the number of these disagreements are not more than the number of disagreements between Europe and China or between Europe and Russia. Hence, the Europeans are most likely going to side with Washington against Beijing when things get more serious, because, the United States is able to offer more compared to other states.

The U.S. remain as the leader in terms of foreign investment. Because people know that their investment will be way more secure in the U.S. due to its governance style. Europeans and Asians do business in the United States and make a lot of profits. Especially the member states of the EU and Japan have access to American markets. This is a point where the defenders of liberal internationalists are right. Economic interdependence within these countries definitely increased. John Ikenberry (2018) claimed that there is no need for the Washington's leadership to keep the liberal order working for this very reason.

Once again this does not seem very accurate, because, the peer competitor of the U.S. is China. China now has a very important place in international economy. Any system which does not involve China can not be an international system at all. To be fair, Ikenberry claims that China has adopted many policies (especially economic) which are compatible with the liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2018). The same China is being governed by a one-party system for a long time. Beijing never cared about human rights violations and did not hesitate to crush the protestors in the Tiananmen square. It seems like China only cares about its economic growth and waits for the right moment to be the global leader. Beijing already offered ''One Belt One Road'' project which can change the future of the global trade. This only means that Beijing is not happy with its status right now and seeks for the leadership. Hence, current Chinese government can never be compatible with liberal international order or even liberal values. However, a long as China attacks the system alongside with other problems that I have mentioned before, liberal international order is in serious danger.

4.8. The Future of the Liberal World Order

Ikenberry thinks that the order will survive, because it is multilateral and multifaceted. Also the liberal international order does not depend on the leadership of

the U.S. (Ikenberry, 2018). The Trump administration proved that the U.S. can withdraw from international agreements unilaterally. President Trump stated that ‘’America First’’ would be Washington’s new policy. He made this speech in the General Assembly of the UN. In a world that the U.S. is not deeply interested about other states, it will not be possible to call it a liberal international order, because liberalism itself is a universalist ideology. Ikenberry may be right about American leadership but I disagree with him about his view of leadership. There must be a state that leads others and also lets them play in the same league with the rules. If Washington has decided to be protectionist or even isolationist, we can write the obituary for the liberal international order.

I do not agree with liberal thinkers that President Trump is the most important threat to the liberal order, because the situation with China would be the same if someone else was elected. In other words, the number one priority of Washington would have been China as well if Hillary Clinton got elected. Because Sino-American relations is not as same as it was when Barack Obama, George W. Bush or Bill Clinton took office. Also changes within the system and in the US already started before Donald Trump got elected as the president. President Obama promised to withdraw American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan during his campaign. He also tried to do it but eventually he sent additional troops to Afghanistan. In short, the distribution of power in the world has changed and hence the world order can not be the same as it was.

The U.S. did not start a war against Syria, even though the Assad regime used chemical weapons to kill its own people. Obama administration clearly stated that this was the red line for Washington but did not react when its own red line was crossed. Also UN confirmed the use of chemical weapons and the Assad regime used chemical weapons repeatedly. Assad is still sitting in his chair. Indeed, he owes his position to the help of Moscow and Tehran. Syrian Civil War showed us that great power politics is back. The U.S, the UN, and the EU together could not stop the war in Syria. To be fair, especially Washington and Brussels supported the rebels to finish the war. In other words, an attempt to topple a foreign regime once again failed.

Moreover, the war in Syria created millions of refugees which caused serious problems in Europe. Nationalism and populism are on the rise. So, liberal dreams created illiberalism at home for Western democracies. Also, we saw that international institutions, including the UN, are not effective. The UN reported the use of chemical weapons but it did not change anything in the battlefield.

Furthermore, Russia vetoed all resolutions about Syria, because, Moscow backed the Assad regime. What will happen if China decides to attack Taiwan in the future? What if he U.S, the UK or France demand an emergency meeting? China will obviously veto it in the Security Council.

Realists do not believe in the liberal order in the very first place. They argued that it was the bipolar system during the Cold War and nuclear deterrence that prevented a war between the US and the SU. More importantly, realists argued that it was only a unipolar moment when the Cold War ended with the victory of Washington.

The U.S. surely is still the greatest power on earth right now in terms of military, economic and political power. However, the gap between the U.S. and others is not too huge anymore. China's economy keep growing and has a chance to catch the American economy in terms of GDP nominal. Russia's economy is not strong at all but their military is still promising. Moscow also has been very close with Beijing. If Russia forms an alliance with China (or vice versa) to balance America's power, we do not know if the U.S. will be able to defeat them both. Basically, the great power politics is on the stage now with the rise of China and resurgence of Russia. Hence, realists focus on this and the future of liberal international order is something they are not interested in.

I argue that the liberal international order has no future. I am not even optimistic about the existence or the structure of institutions such as the EU and the UN. It is the President of the U.S. himself who questioned the role of NATO for his country many times publicly. It has been commonly argued that all empires rise and fall and the U.S. is no exception. This can happen one day but not in a near future for a few reasons.

The U.S. is really an exceptional country in many ways. First, it is the only country that has been a democracy since the very first day it has been founded. Second, the U.S. has a great influence on other states. The U.S. leads the world in technology and this makes things easier and faster for Washington. Movies, Tv Shows, documentaries, commercials, etc. All have impact on the U.S' power of influence. The only competitor of the U.S. in terms of power of influence is European countries. Third, apart from being an influencer country and a liberal democratic state, the U.S. still has the largest economy in the world. Washington has this leverage over almost all states in all regions. Fourth, the U.S. has the strongest army. Even if this is debatable, it is strong enough to protect the homeland. Fifth one is its geographical advantage. There is no danger in southern or northern border for the U.S. Also the U.S. army has air superiority

and has a great naval power. The U.S. also has many overseas military bases. Thus, I do not think the U.S. will fall anytime soon, but we might witness the brutality of international politics.

To sum up, the term ‘’Liberal international order’’ is a debatable one. Liberal scholars think that it is the liberal order that created peace and prosperity for seven decades. Scholars from realist school think that it was the bipolar system that prevented a war between major powers. They also claim that it has never fully been liberal or international or orderly (Haass, 2018). Apart from this debate, the system clearly is in danger for many reasons. Populism and nationalism are on the rise, the number of the authoritarian regimes have increased, the international institutions are not effective, global terrorism still remains as one of the most important problems and finally the digital age also creates many problems. So, the liberal order is obviously under threat.

Liberals think that the order can be saved,because it does not completely depend on the leadership of the U.S. They also claim that many countries depend on each other more than ever. The order is multilateral and multifaceted. So, the necessary thing to do is to update international institutions and to fight against illiberal movements (Ikenberry, 2018). Also, managing to fix the problems caused by globalization without considering the benefits of ordinary citizens is not a good idea and hence economic inequality should be solved in favor of middle class (Keohane and Colgan, 2017).

For realists, the liberal order has always been a myth. It was the bipolar system and nuclear deterrence that helped to keep peace. Also, it was not the unipolar order after the SU collapsed. It was only a unipolar moment. It is now obviously the continuum of great power politics after China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence. Realists think that the future will be shaped by the relations between China and the U.S. They also offer to Washington to adopt a more realistic strategy. In conclusion, the liberal order is in danger. What we don’t know is whether the U.S. will leave its position as the defender of the order or not. In other words, the post-Trumpian era will show us if Washington is going to pursue its foreign policy based on liberal hegemony.

CHAPTER V

THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

So far, I have focused on foreign policy analysis and its connection with international relations (IR) theories in second chapter and I have analyzed the current international political order and the role of the U.S. in the system. Also, I have explored the major problems and threats for the liberal international order. In this chapter, my main aim is to analyze American foreign policy after the Cold War by focusing on selected major foreign policy events of the Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump administrations to make a connection between American leadership and the liberal world order.

5.1. The Clinton Administration (1993-2001)

The forty second president of the U.S, Bill Clinton on a campaign speech for 1992 presidential elections claimed that the era of great power politics passed. He thought the U.S. was the preeminent power and more importantly freedom was on the march instead of tyranny (*New York Times*, 1992). Indeed, the U.S. was the one and only great power when Bill Clinton was inaugurated as the president of the U.S. This means that the Clinton administration had a lot of space to maneuver in terms of foreign policy.

The most important international economic policy of the Clinton administration was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA created a trilateral trade bloc among the U.S, Canada and Mexico and created one of the largest trade blocs in history in terms of gross domestic product. The main goal of signing the NAFTA was to eliminate or at least to reduce the barriers in trade. The Clinton administration advocated the free trade at an international level. It was a smart move by Washington because neither Canada nor Mexico ever posed a military or political threat against the U.S. Hence, it was a beneficial agreement between neighbours after all.

There were several military operations during Clinton's presidency. The first one is the Battle of Mogadishu. The U.S. decided to intervene when the situation of the Somali Civil War got worsened. Humanitarian aid was the purpose of the intervention. However, the outcome was not the same with intentions. It was a failure for both the UN and the U.S. The death of American soldiers during the operation and also the

images of some soldiers being dragged through the streets were completely catastrophic for the Clinton administration. President immediately ordered to stop the operation right after these horrible incidents occurred. So, the Americans went into an unnecessary battle for themselves, lost their lives, witnessed insulting acts by the locals and lost prestige. The operations ended with a decisive failure even if the intentions were good. This can be considered as the first battle between realism and liberal hegemony in Clinton era.

The second event was the Bosnian War. As part of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a referendum for independence. It was a multi-ethnic republic of Serbs, Croatians, and Bosnians. The problem started with the boycott of the referendum by the Bosnian Serbs. Then the Serbs started an offensive inside Bosnia. As a realist, I view this as a territorial and political dispute between the Bosnians and the Serbs and I would not defend an intervention by the U.S. under these conditions. However, the Serbs led by Radovan Karadzic committed war crimes against all humanity with ethnic cleansing and systematic mass rape. It was the first genocide in the Europe since the World War II. NATO forces, led by the U.S, conducted airstrikes against Serb-held territories. This was the first ever airstrike of NATO. NATO forces defeated Serbs easily and provided peace. The Clinton administration did the right thing. How can a superpower legitimize its status if it allows a genocide in the middle of Europe? Also, that would have been viewed as a signal of America's weakness if Washington had not intervened. My only criticism would be the timing of the intervention. I think it could have taken place earlier. Another important point is that the intervention was in America's national interests. After the successful intervention, the U.S. stopped a possible destabilization in Europe and also gained geopolitical advantage against Russia in the Balkans.

Another major event was the Kosovo War. Again, Serbs committed crimes against humanity with the ethnic cleansing of Albanians. This posed a serious threat of destabilization of the region. NATO forces conducted operations. This time NATO used military force without the approval of the UN Security Council. At this point, it is important to see the warfare strategy of NATO because it was a large-scale air campaign. The United States Air Force (USAF) showed how advanced its technological capacity is in terms of air superiority (Ellen and Robertson, 2000).Bombardments were capable of destroying enemy's heart for a few reasons. First, NATO forces were much stronger than a small Balkan state like Serbia. Second, Serbia was unable to defend its

territory against the NATO's air superiority. It was a victory for both moral reasons and for the core values of realism. The result was a decisive victory for the strong and smart NATO side and a defeat for the weak Serbs and it also led to the indictment of the Serbian leader Milosevic as a war criminal (Human RIghts Watch Report, 2006).

However, the legitimacy of NATO bombings were questioned and criticised in the media (Steele, 2000). Serbia filed a complaint against NATO members. Belgrade believed that NATO violated Serbia's sovereignty. The bombings were also criticized for targeting non-military elements such as bridges. The General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan, also criticized NATO for unilateral actions despite his support of the actions in principle. Russia perceived NATO's intervention as a threat against itself. Indeed, the bombings can be seen as an illegitimate act. However, reality is not necessarily compatible with the law. Also, it does not make sense to me to criticize NATO for attacking a state which attempted a genocide. Obviously, the acts of Serbia were illegitimate at the very beginning, because they started a military offensive. Furthermore, those who criticized NATO should have also criticized the U.S. and allies for their intervention in the World War II. Normandy landings were staged in France by the American led forces against the Nazi troops. In short, there may be times when the necessity of war comes first. For realism, the most important thing is to survive in the anarchical international system. Also, if the Bosnians and the Albanians were strong enough to defend themselves, there would have been no need for NATO's help.

In terms of conducting military operations, the Clinton administration was successful. In his administration's first National Security Strategy Report (NSSR,1994), President Clinton argued that the future of Russia was uncertain and China kept maintaining its repressive regime. In other words, he was well aware of the structure of international politics. Bill Clinton was cautious about Russia and China even though he claimed that freedom is on the march instead of tyranny (Mearsheimer, 1995, p.5). Freedom was really on march in countries like Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechia back then. Bill Clinton was elected as the president only three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The US under his presidency acted as a global hegemon, because there was not a peer competitor (neither regional nor global) for Washington.

Let me take a look at the power distribution when Bill Clinton became president. The SU was gone, Germany was just reunified, the GDP of the U.S. was larger than Germany, France and the UK combined. The closest power to the U.S. was Japan (Nye, 1990b). However, Japan was in competition with the U.S. only economically. The

biggest and strongest military power was Russia, yet its future was quite uncertain. China's GDP was smaller than 0.5 trillion US dollars back then. Shortly, there was no military or economic power which could have challenged the position of Washington. Under such circumstances, the U.S. was in a comfortable situation for developing hegemonic policies.

However, being active everywhere created problems. The United States- China Relations Act of 2000 for instance was not convenient with the nature of power politics. It was President Clinton who argued that China kept maintaining its repressive regime in NSSR 1994. So, it is hard to understand what changed between 1994 and 2000. China had no interest in becoming a democratic state. On the contrary, China alongside with Russia threatened to veto in the UNSC against a possible NATO bombing in Kosovo. China's GDP was 1.2 U.S trillion dollars (IMF) while the GDP of the U.S. was larger than 10 trillion U.S dollars in 2000 (Statista, 2000). The decision to ease trade barriers for China was a big mistake. What is the point to help an authoritarian state to strengthen its economy by enjoying free trade economics after all? I think, this decision was part of promoting democracy worldwide by the Clinton administration. The idea that the states become eventually more democratic if they have better economy is proven to be wrong in the Chinese case. In other words, the U.S. helped its today's strongest adversary with its own hands.

In conclusion, the Clinton administration was successful in terms of managing international crisis in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, the administration believed that the future of American foreign policy would be based on liberal internationalism, because Washington did not hesitate to intervene in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia and also emphasized the importance of human rights. In other words, the Clinton administration was the defendant of humanitarian intervention. It may be a good idea to pursue or at least try to go into some adventures to pursue a hegemonic agenda, but it may eventually create a mass that you may not handle over time.

5.2. The Bush Administration (2001-2009)

September 11 attacks in New York City was without a doubt a major turning point for both the history of the US and the rest of the world. It was the very first attacks on American soil in modern times even though there were some attacks against American forces and embassies before. What happened after that date is obviously closely related to those attacks.

The first response of Washington was the invasion of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization were in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime refused to hand Bin Laden over. So, American and British forces initiated bombing for invasion. Washington's decision to go into war in Afghanistan was inevitable for a few reasons. First, a superpower cannot allow another state to protect terrorists that conducted the biggest terrorist attack in history. Second, if a superpower fails to act quickly, the others, especially the adversaries, may underrate the superpower's capacity. Third, that would make the U.S. look weak if Washington fails to attack terrorists in a region other than the American homeland.

The Invasion of Afghanistan was compatible with the explanations of defensive realism. States act selfishly to protect themselves. In other words, security comes first. How could the U.S. claim to be the strongest state on earth while Washington was unable to protect its own soil and citizens? Indeed some methods and decisions of the Bush administration can be criticized for being illiberal and/or undemocratic such as tortures in Guantanamo Bay, committed war crimes etc. Yet, whatever happened after September 11 shows that states can ignore even their own values when the security risks are at the high level.

The invasion of Iraq was completely a different page for the Bush administration. On one hand, it was important and necessary to respond to a state which protected the terrorists who conducted the 9/11 attacks. On the other hand, that was ill-advised, unnecessary, high-cost thing to invade another state without a reliable proof in case of the invasion of Iraq. The false accusations of the Bush administration against Saddam Hossein for supporting Al-Qaeda created a very serious threat for Washington. Why (and how) other states risk their soldiers and citizens' life for the U.S. if Washington lies to them? So, both the legitimacy and reliability of the U.S. has been questioned ever since.

Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq damaged the image of the U.S. It showed the whole world that the U.S. was a country which sees viewed as a legitimate actor who could bring democracy to other places with the use of military force in order to secure itself even though it was not the real intention. It can be argued that the invasion of Iraq was a failure in terms of foreign policy from the realist perspective. However, it can be understood and explained with offensive realism. Mearsheimer (2001) argued that superpowers can exercise their power far from home to increase their power and influence. At this moment, it is crucial to state that invading other countries is not

something that realism (offensive realism in this case) recommends. It is just an explanation of the behaviour of a superpower that acts selfishly. A realist would know that the efforts to spread liberal democracy in Middle East was a terrible idea.

America's priorities in the Middle East are to secure international oil trade and prevent a single state to be a regional hegemon. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein was a ruthless dictator who did terrible things. However, it was not a wise decision to topple Saddam Hussein, which destabilized the region. The U.S's foreign policy behavior helped Iran to increase its power in the region and it made Syria more hostile to Washington. To declare Syria as part of the evil of axis was not a helpful strategy at all. Also, ignoring sovereignty of states as part of preemptive strike provided a opportunity space for other states such as Turkey to act in the same way. Turkey has conducted numerous military operations within the borders of Iraq since the U.S. invaded Iraq. No state including the U.S. can blame Turkey for doing so. Also, policies of the Bush administration led to Anti-Americanism in the region. It showed us why states should not pursue liberal dreams in a realist world (Mearsheimer, 2018). In conclusion, invading Iraq was not in America's best interests at all.

Allowing China's entrance to the WTO was an unfortunate move of the Bush administration from a structural realist perspective. It was wise to establish good relations with China during the Cold War as part of containment policy towards the SU. However, to help China to have a chance to strengthen its economy in 2001 was unnecessary. It was not a wise policy to help China to open up its economy into the international markets widely without performing serious political reforms. The U.S. was (and still is) the side who holds the cards in the table when it comes to negotiating trade. Also, why would the U.S. help China to be stronger at a time when there was no major peer-competitor? Again, it was a wise policy to have closer ties with Beijing while competing with the SU. However, no country including Russia, Germany, Japan, Britain or France was able to compete with Washington in 2001. China's GDP was 1.3 trillion U.S dollars in 2001 (World Bank, 2001). Beijing has reached to 4.59 trillion U.S dollars in 2008 thanks to the Bush Administration. In the same period, the GDP of the U.S. went from 10.6 trillion U.S dollars to 14.7 trillion U.S dollars (World Bank, 2008).

In conclusion, the Bush administration implemented many debatable policies in terms of foreign policy. The biggest political mistake was to invade Iraq. Because, it created numerous problems for Washington and cost was way higher than the benefits. The most striking mistake in international economics was to allow China to enter the WTO, because, the U.S. gave a great advantage to a potential adversary.

5.3. The Obama Administration (2009-2017)

According to a Pew Research survey (2007), the image of the U.S. was not really inspiring or impressive for the rest of the world when Barack Obama took the Office as the President of the US. The ongoing costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan weakened the American economy. On the top of it, the mortgage crisis created a depressive political climate in the most powerful country on earth. Obama was seen as a source of hope for a fresh start. The Obama administration presented a number of new policies for America's role in the international system.

Obama promised to bring the American soldiers back home during his campaign as part of "Retrenchment Policy". What he actually did, however, was completely the opposite. His administration sent additional troops to Afghanistan. Also, the U.S. had to fight with ISIS during his presidency. This was partly because America's war on Iraq. In other words, the Obama Administration inherited Iraq War. After toppling the Saddam regime, Washington failed in terms of nation-state building in Iraq. Taking Saddam down was an easy task for the strongest army on earth. What happened next created a complete catastrophe for Washington. The remnants of Saddam's army created the Islamic State with the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Surpassing the Sunnis in the new Iraqi government created a space that Iran can move freely in the region. Syria and Iran became even more hostile to the U.S. as realism expected, because, no state can be sure about the intentions of others in an anarchical international system (Mearsheimer, 2001). Syria and Iran understandably became even more suspicious for a possible future attack by the U.S. against themselves.

Indeed, that would not be fair to put all the burden on the Obama administration. What Obama offered as a new approach is ''A New Beginning'' regarding the Middle East. When President Obama delivered his speech in Cairo, he hoped to rebuild the image of America. The Bush administration directly or indirectly helped to spread Islamophobia almost everywhere even if that was not intended. It was a sensible thing to tell Muslim leaders and all Muslims around the world that America is not their enemy. President Obama also visited Ankara and delivered a speech in the Turkish Parliament. This was also a good move for the sake of regional policies of Washington. The relations between the U.S. and Turkey were tense during the Bush administration mostly because Turkey's decision not to help Washington in the invasion of Iraq.

However, the Obama administration chose to use of force like the previous administration when it helped topple Muammar al-Gaddafi regime in Libya. The U.S. once again destabilized the region with no logical explanation. The U.S. indeed is strong enough to topple regimes in most regions. The two administrations (Bush and Obama) were different in many ways but both made the same mistakes in their foreign policies. Today, Libya is completely in a mess. The situation is ironically but expectedly even worse than dictator Qaddafi's era.

Another questionable decision of the Obama administration was to back up the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen. The UK and France also were the supporters of the Saudi intervention with the arms sale to Saudi Arabia and for their logistic support. Stephen Walt (2015), argued that the U.S. intervention in any Arab or Muslim country did not make situation any better if not worse. He also claims that foreign leaders manipulate Washington to get the support they need in their own fights (Walt, 2015). This is a very important point. Actually, it should be the U.S. who uses ''passing the buck'' as a strategy, not the opposite. Instead, local leaders/governments get aid from Washington for an unnecessary fight/war for the U.S. The situation in Yemen is disastrous after four years of intervention and the future is not clear.

The approach of the Obama administration towards Russia is the "reset policy". Improving bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow was the main purpose behind this policy. The good thing that the Obama administration did is the deal reached with Russia to reduce nuclear arsenal. It is not a secret that at least some foreign policy establishment members in Washington do not like Russia and so they do not want closer ties with Moscow. The reality is the U.S. does not need tense relations with Russia at all. Russia is not a major superpower as it used to be during the Cold War by any means. As of 2019, the nominal GDP of Russia is smaller than Italy's (World Bank,2019). More importantly, Russian economy relies heavily on gas and oil. In other words, Russian economy is not diverse at all and Russia is nowhere close to becoming a major power. Also, their future after Vladimir Putin is not certain. It is not hard to guess that an authoritarian leader like Putin does not want strong people around him. In other words, Russia's influence is limited with regional acts. Furthermore, the US helped the SU to beat the Nazi Germany in the World War II and the U.S. established official bilateral relations the communist China to restrain the SU's power during the Cold War. Hence, the same can be done again against China in the future. Being hostile to Russia is not a helpful strategy for a possible alliance.

To conclude, I think that the foreign policy performance of the Obama administration was weak. In my analysis, I do not focus on the intentions of administrations and personal characteristics of presidents for a few reasons. First, I think that international relations can be better understood and explained with a systemic approach. Global power distribution has been changing over time. The U.S. was in a very advantageous and also unique position when the World War II ended. Washington also found itself in a similar position when the Cold War ended. However, China has become a major power and this happened dramatically. The economic growth of China over the last three decades is unprecedented. GDP of China was 360 billion US dollars in 1990 (World Bank, 2018). Now, it is around 14 trillion US dollars. It is larger than Germany's, the UK's, France's and Russia's combined. Also, Beijing has been increasing its defense budget gradually for years. As of 2019, it can be confidently said that China is a major power and also the possible peer competitor of the U.S. In other words, not everything is dependent on the performance, interests, ideas and values (and so on) of Americans anymore.

Second, both George W. Bush and Obama implemented similar policies as I explained in this chapter even though they have different personalities. Also, the political parties they were affiliated with were different. We have witnessed that Republicans and Democrats are not so different when it comes to foreign interventions and starting or continuing endless, unnecessary wars. George W. Bush was a president who defended abortion and Barack Obama was a president who defended same sex marriage. However, these kind of differences between the two presidents were on the domestic scale. Both presidents did not hesitate to exercise military power far from homeland. It can be argued that Obama took the Office in tougher conditions as there was an economic crisis. However, President Bush also found himself in the middle of one of strongest crisis of the American history. 9/11 was (and still is) possibly the toughest thing that any president had to deal with.

5.4. The Trump Administration (2017-)

Donald Trump has won the presidential election in 2016. It definitely was an unexpected result. Trump had no background in politics before he announced his nomination for the presidency. He started his campaign with his already infamous slogan ''make America great again''. He accused media representatives many times

since he took the office. He keeps accusing the media for being the real enemy of the American people and he labels them as the source of "fake news".

It is not an easy task to analyze American foreign policy since Trump became president. It has been slightly more than two and a half years since he took the office. I do not focus on his characteristic features as power determines the fate of international relations rather than Trump's tweets or gulf skills. As I mentioned before, China was already a major power when Trump became president. So, the future of the current international politics (and political order) has to be examined regardless who the president is.

Also, there is an ongoing cold war between the president and the media. It is quite normal for the media to pay attention to the president. Naturally, there is no other public figure better than Trump to provide better ratings for the media companies. President Trump is very well aware of this situation. He can easily tweet about something which has not happened and then use it as a weapon against the media anytime he wants.

When it comes to foreign policy, the Trump administration did not create a catastrophe and did not start a war so far. Also, the administration did not achieve any meaningful success either. The U.S. withdrew from the Paris Agreement, TPP, the INF Treaty and JCPOA. It is not clear what the Trump administration aims to achieve by withdrawing from these agreements. For instance, JCPOA was a good agreement for the U.S. and other western countries to keep Iran away to develop nuclear weapons. Iran also had the opportunity to make business with Western countries by promising not to develop nuclear weapons. So, it was basically a win for all parties. The Trump administration declared that Iran is a rogue regime and Tehran supports terrorism. Washington even threatened Iran with an intervention. This made Iran even more hostile to the U.S. As I mentioned before it would be a huge mistake if the U.S. goes to war with Iran.

Also, the Trump administration started to talk with North Korea's Kim Jong Un to reach a deal. This is obviously odd, because, the same administration withdrew from JCPOA claiming that it is bad for the U.S. Then, there is no point to think positively about a state that already has nuclear weapons. Tehran will probably also not give up on nuclear power after seeing North Korean dictator sits around the same desk with the President of the US. Furthermore, it is not clear who determines these policies in Washington. The first secretary of the state of the Trump administration, Rex Tillerson,

was replaced with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Mike Pompeo. The national security advisor position is even more confusing for Trump's presidency so far. The first advisor was Michael Flynn and he resigned for his alleged ties with Russia (Miller & Rucker, 2017). Herbert Raymond McMaster became the next adviser but he later resigned (BBC, 2018). So, three different men became advisor in 15 months. Moreover, it will not be possible for us to know the reasons with details why officials in the government resigned, at least for a while. So, it does not make sense to try to analyze the foreign policy views of bureaucrats at the moment.

The Trump administration and President Trump criticized European countries - long time allies- repeatedly since day one. Trump publicly criticized Germany on chancellor Merkel's first visit to Washington for not paying Berlin's share to the NATO budget. To be fair, almost all American officials criticized Europeans for the same reason but it can be argued that it was not the best way to do it publicly at a time when China seems ready to replace the U.S. as the new hegemon. Also, the U.S. benefits more in this order in terms of strategic missions. The U.S. has been using the European cities and ports as military bases for decades and these bases (and also the European support) have been crucial to win the Cold War. So, once again it is not clear what the Trump administration aims to achieve with such attempts. Endorsing countries like Russia, China, Brazil, and Turkey while criticizing countries like Germany, France and even Canada is not what leaders and foreign policy elites did in the last seven decades.

In the U.S, the Trump administration seems determined to focus on China. The problem is Washington's approach towards China is not different than it is towards Germany or France. Trump seems to personalize international politics. For instance, he declared sanctions to Mexico claiming that Mexico is the source of illegal immigrants coming to the U.S. Then, he argued that the U.S. and Mexico made a deal to solve the problem. Yet, you can not walk with pride like a victorious commander after solving a crisis which you actually created a few months ago. Trump creates a crisis then he claims to solve it. In my opinion, he does everything in order to get re-elected next year.

Relations with China should be handled masterfully. Graham Allison (2015) argued that twelve situation out of sixteen when a rising power challenges the current hegemon in history actually ends up with a war. China already started to make attempts in international stage. Beijing declared a major policy about the new modern silk road. China aims to build a new trade routes which can challenge the U.S. economy and it

also can change the global trade. It's not clear how successful China can be but one thing is clear. China started to make moves to be a hegemon. Former Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, claimed in 2005 that China is the responsible stakeholder. Political elites in Washington back then probably did not predict China would attempt to replace the US as the global hegemon. To predict what China will seek to do with its power may be easier now than it is a decade ago. I expect Beijing to try to eliminate the U.S. in Asia for the very same reason the U.S. did the same thing after the World War II. Washington did not want any single European country to rise as a regional hegemon in Europe after the war. What Trump did so far was to put extra tariffs to Chinese exports to the U.S. In a critical time like this, the President of the US should consider more than tariff rates.

5.5. Overall Assessment

Ending of the Cold War surely marked an unprecedented moment in history. The US found itself in a remarkably favorable position in the international system as there was no peer competitor, no possible geopolitical adversary in any region. No other country came even close to the American power in terms of military and economic power and capacity. Hence, the U.S. adopted a hegemonic foreign policy approach. Back in 1992, it probably did not seem as a very wrong idea at all. However, there was not a real debate in foreign policy establishment for the future of American power and how to use it. The president, secretary of state, national security advisor, analysts and diplomats are the main actors who are responsible for policy making. Also, non-governmental organizations such as Brookings Institute, Cato Institute, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) always have an impact on foreign policy. Finally, academia is the last element of the foreign policy making process. However, most of these groups or institutions were in favor of hegemonic power and liberal hegemony to be precise. Realist scholars are critical of this approach but their views have mostly been neglected. For instance, many scholars published an op-ed that opposed the invasion of Iraq, arguing that the invasion was not in America's national interests.[5] The Bush administration decided to invade Iraq anyway.

Another problem with the foreign policy establishment is the similarity between the neoconservatives and democrats. They defended the supremacy of the U.S. when it

[5] Stephen M. Walt wrote a column in Foreign Policy about this op-ed and used a direct link of the published op-ed. It is an accessible document online.

comes to foreign policy even though they were quite different on domestic issues. Also no one really was held accountable for their mistakes even though the U.S. has always been democracy since it was established. On the contrary, a hawkish neocon, John Bolton, who actually defended the invasion of Iraq became the national security adviser of Donald Trump. Hillary Clinton also approved the invasion of Iraq and then she became the presidential candidate of Democratic Party in the 2016 elections. Political elites like Richard Haass (President of CFR), Francis Fukuyama (a neoliberal scholar), George W. Bush (a Republican president), John Bolton (a hawkish neoconservative diplomat) and Bill Clinton (a democratic president) were all on the same page even though they had quite different views on international politics. In other words, there was a bipartisan consensus over the role of the U.S. in terms of foreign affairs after the Cold War.

There is also one more reason why the U.S. could not adopt a more sophisticated foreign policy approach is the American political system itself. Presidents get elected for a four-years term. In practice, it is a three-years term, because the final year of the presidency will be accompanied by the election process. The main goal of any president obviously is to be re-elected. Hence, three years may not be long enough for creating a healthy environment for a debate among the foreign policy elites.

Another important thing is the extremely advantageous geographic position of the US. Neighbours of the U.S, Canada and Mexico have never posed a geopolitical threat to the U.S. Furthermore, Washington has never let any Latin American country to create a serious problem for the U.S. Washington has never allowed another country to intervene into Latin American politics with the exception of Cuba. The SU had close relationship with Cuba during the Cold War but the U.S. imposed serious sanctions on Cuba. Hence Cuba has become weaker day by day.

Being unchallenged geopolitically also gave Washington numerous chances to act without thinking thoroughly sometimes. The U.S. made questionable moves such as going into war in places like Vietnam and Iraq. Did these policies make the U.S. weaker militarily and economically? The answer is simply no. Furthermore, the U.S. is engaged in almost all regions in different parts of the world. As most scholars and politicians accept, China is the only possible great power that can challenge America's power. On one hand, China ranks at second position economically. On the other hand, almost every Asian countries including strong states such as Japan and South Korea are America's allies. The top priorities for China in the region is the status of Taiwan and

Hong Kong. At least for the moment, both regions seem closer to the U.S. than they are to China. Ongoing demonstrations in Hong Kong is an important example that the people of Hong Kong do not want to be oppressed by China.

I think that foreign policy performance of all of the American administrations were weak from a realist perspective and as our empirical evidences have shown. Despite these weak performances, the U.S. still is in remarkably favorable position in both Western hemisphere and international politics. So, the

U.S. might remain as the strongest country on earth unless Washington makes even biggest mistakes such as going into war with China. Because, power of states has not changed significantly with an exception of China. However, even China is far from challenging the U.S. in terms of military power. As I explained before, China firstly needs to make America leave South China Sea and Asia in general. Also, China needs to control Taiwan and Hong Kong if Beijing wants to become a hegemon. Furthermore, the future of the Chinese economy is not certain for a few reasons. First, Chinese population is aging, so, it will be more difficult for Beijing to sustain the current economic growth. Second, other countries such as Vietnam can provide cheap labor force as well. Third, high capacity for manufacturing will cause even more troubles for environment in China.

Europe's future is even more uncertain. The EU has helped Europe to become more democratic especially after the Cold War, because, Eastern and Central European countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary became more democratic within time. However, the rise of the right wing populism poses threat to European democracies. Britain's decision to leave the EU is another problem and the future of the relations between Germany, France and Britain is quite uncertain. European history is full of wars with European great powers. I agree with Kenneth Waltz (2000) that anything can cause a war in an anarchical, uncertain world. Also, aging population is a serious problem for almost all European countries. I do not know how European countries can be strong against China in terms of political influence and international trade if they do not stand together. Also, we are living at a time that the role of NATO and the role of the U.S. in the international politics are being questioned and the current administration of the U.S. adopted ''America First'' policy.

Finally, the strength of nationalism is also one of the reasons why I think liberal internationalism is born to fail. From a realist perspective, I defend the argument that almost all people tend to identify themselves within a group. In international politics,

the biggest groups are the nation states. A European identity could not be established even so many years after the foundation of the EU. Indeed, free travel within the Schengen area provided many advantages such as learning more about the culture of other countries. This bring countries and people closer to each other. However, the euro crisis, economic stagnation, migration crisis, and sovereignty problems within the countries are far more important issues in today's Europe. This is the direct result of the power of nationalism. There is no single country on earth that can afford to lose money, influence and its own national identity to make others more profitable by any means.

Today, it is even more difficult to help others. The U.S. has spent five percent of its GDP as part of the Marshall Plan to help European countries to restore. It is not hard to imagine what would happen if Washington decides to do the same thing today in Latin America, Middle East or Africa. Five percent of the U.S. GDP is almost around a trillion U.S dollars while the entire US GDP was around a quarter-trillion U.S dollars in 1947 (Yuskavage & Nader, 2005).

On one hand, international politics became even more complicated within time. On the other hand, we can find our path to be more accurate to analyze foreign policy if we do not forget the core features of the nature of the international politics. One should never forget that most of the wars directly violate the sovereignty of states. We do not know about how far states can go to protect their own interests. However, we know that states can and will do everything that they can for their own interests and purposes. Stephen Walt recently wrote a provocative column. He asked how far states can go to protect Amazon rainforests (Walt, 2019b). Indeed, there is not much that Brazil can do in order to protect itself if major powers agree to intervene Brazil to save the Amazon rainforest. Actually agreement between major powers is not even necessary. What would China or Russia do if the U.S. decides to intervene? Can they go to war with the U.S? What would happen if European powers support Washington too? Can China and Russia or others go all the way in for Brazil? There is no chance for any of us to answer these questions right now. However, one thing is clear. Anything can happen in an anarchical system. There is no police station that you can call in case of emergency. This cruel nature of the international politics has not changed and does not seem to change any time soon. Hence, we do not have much choice to do rather than to think like a realist.

CONCLUSION

In the first chapter, I discussed different analyses of foreign policy making. To do so, I also explained International Relations (IR) theories and how we use them to analyze foreign policy behavior of states in the international system. At the end, I have found that structural realism is the best theory for foreign policy analysis even though there are other theories which we can use to analyze foreign policy to some extent in some cases. However, no theory can explain everything just like Stephen Walt (1998) explained. What matters to analysts and students of foreign policy analysis is determined by the topic that they analyze. For instance, structural realism can not be useful if someone analyzes women's role in UN peacekeeping operations.

In second chapter, I have focused on how to analyze foreign policy cases within a theoretical framework. I have found out that there is a difference between structure-based theories and actor-based theories in. As a conclusion, I argued that structure-based theories are more useful for a better explanation of foreign policy cases. I have used the ongoing civil war in Syria as an example to strengthen my argument. There is a better chance for those who are interested in foreign policy analysis to understand and explain what actually happened in Syria if they analyze the structure of system rather than focusing on actors and/or emotions. Also, one should simply never forget that miscalculation is always possible in an anarchical system. That's why focusing on structure is better than focusing on specific actors.

Then, I have discussed the most important topics in foreign policy such as national security, military intervention and economic statecraft. I have discussed these three topics because Smith et al. (2012) picked these topics as the most important ones in foreign policy. Also, these topics matter the most for a realist like me. Because, my aim was to discuss about the liberal international order within a structural realist approach. Hence I have ignored the alternative theories and approaches such as critical theory and post structuralism.

In the third chapter, I examined the structure of the international order. Firstly, I have defined the characteristics of the American-led liberal international order which was formed after the World War II. Secondly, I have defined what the order means. Thirdly, I have compared arguments and debates between realism and liberalism. Fourthly, I have questioned the role of the U.S. in the system. Fifthly, I have discussed the security issues since the 9/11 attacks. Lastly, I have examined the future of liberal

international order by focusing on the threats to the order.

As conclusion, I found out that the term ‘’Liberal International Order’’ itself is not accurate. It was the power distribution and nuclear deterrence that prevented major powers to go into a full scale war against each other. So, my conclusion is that arguments of structural realism are stronger to explain international politics. Moreover, the U.S. is by far still the strongest state in the world and it seems unlikely to change any time soon. Lastly, there is no future for the so-called liberal international order. I think we will witness an even more competitive world for a few reasons.

First, the power distribution has changed dramatically in the last two decades. China’s unprecedented rapid economic growth has changed the focal point of international politics. Asia is now located in the heart of international relations in terms of both economy and politics. Everyone had to pay attention to Europe because of the Cold War for almost four decades. Now, European countries are more stable and prosperous than they ever were as we commemorated 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall this year. It seems like Brexit is what keeps people busy in Europe these days. I think, however, this is nothing but the domestic politics of the UK, because the UK will not be governed by an authoritarian regime just because they leave the EU.

The biggest problem in Europe is the right-wing populism. The fear for a more authoritarian Europe (and rest of the world) is understandable. But, today’s Europe is far stronger against authoritarianism compared to the Nazi era. Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain are free and democratic states without a question (Freedom House, 2019). I would love to remind everyone of the fact that there was the Nazi regime until 1945 in Germany, fascism in Italy under Mussolini and a dictatorship in Spain under Franco until his death in 1975. In short, Europe is not heading towards “bad old days”.

I call today’s problem in politics on a global scale as the fight between globalism and nationalism. Globalism was popular everywhere from Asia to America. It was actually the direct result of the Cold War’s ending which created an illusion as if every single problem was solved in the world. Colgan and Keohane (2017) argued that Donald Trump got elected as the president because of negative effects of the globalization. Moreover, the whole system is rigged in favor of the ruling elites to harm the working class. Hence, Colgan and Keohane (2017) concluded that “America First” was a strong slogan and helped Trump to win the elections. I also argue that nationalism has always been the stronger ideology. Globalism was only popular for a short time. As Walt (2019d) argued, it is almost impossible to defeat nationalism. Anderson (1983) claimed

that nations are the “imagined communities”. Walt (2019d) sees this as a reality. Because we -human beings- belong to a society. State is the strongest group in society. Consequently, nationalism will remain as the strongest ideology in the world we live in.

In the fourth chapter, I have analyzed American foreign policy after the Cold War, focusing on major events during the Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump administrations. I have concluded that the grand strategy of Washington since the ending of Cold War was liberal hegemony. In accordance with my realist perspective, I found evidence that the U.S. has made serious mistakes during that time by adopting liberal hegemony as the grand strategy. Finally, I think that Washington needs to focus on China and Asia for a better foreign policy for a few reasons.

First, China is the single possible peer-competitor to Washington. A powerful China poses a serious threat to the U.S. Xi Jinping is the strongest leader of PRC since Mao Zedong. China is a state which is being governed by a single political party and President Xi is now legally the president until the end of his days. A powerful China may seek more power in Asia by forming alliances. There may be a major crisis for Washington if China offers more to Asian countries more than the U.S. does. Given the fact that most Asian countries are not democratic at all, It may be easier to form alliances for Beijing in Asia compared to the U.S. (Freedom House, 2019).

Beijing has already closer ties with Moscow (Liu, 2019). This is another proof that China under President Xi is an ambitious state. In other words, alarm bells are ringing in Washington. However, the U.S. is the one who holds the cards. Russia has seen what can go wrong if it annexes lands. Moscow has been under heavy sanctions by the U.S. and the EU since the annexation of Crimea. Also, strong and wealthy states such Japan and South Korea are the U.S. allies in Asia. However, Washington should always be cautious about Sino-Russian relations since it is impossible to know the intentions of states in anarchical system. Washington should give extra attention to the importance of alliances with Asian countries since China seems ready to form new alliances with them.

As Walt (2019c) discussed, some alliances are more important than others. What Washington should do, in my opinion is to give less attention to Middle East and Africa while focusing heavily on Asia. The U.S. can do many things in its relation with Asian countries. Washington should not act unilaterally and selfishly towards Asian allies even though the U.S. is the stronger side of any bilateral relation. In other words, Washington can help Asian states for better economy with establishing multilateral

trade partnership such as TPP, the one Washington withdrew unilaterally for no reason. Moreover, Washington can help Asian states to improve democracy. We live in a peaceful time right now. So, it is exactly the right time to set an example for others in terms of democracy and freedom. Otherwise, the U.S. will inevitably find itself in dangerous wars with China including a possible armed conflict.

Lastly, most of the IR and Political Science scholars focus on Trump since he got elected as president. He is a very unusual president without a doubt. However, he is not "A New HItler". The U.S. keeps being one of the most free and democratic states in the world (Freedom House, 2019). The Trump administration did not annex anywhere (Putin's Russia did), President Trump did not proclaim himself as lifetime leader (President Xi did). Also, a man who has to leave the office in 2024 at latest should not be the 'worst guy' around in my opinion.

We are heading towards a new period which we will witness a fierce competition between the U.S. and China for structural reasons. It actually already started with the "trade war". Competition between two great powers can also start "Cold War 2.0". I intend to focus on power politics rather than discussing about effects of populism or Brexit. The third most powerful actor in world also seems ready for new era. The incoming EU Commission Head, Ursula von der Leyen, recently stated that "Europe should learn the language of power" (DW, 2019). Furthermore, President Macron of France recently stated that "NATO is experiencing brain death because of Trump" (Erlanger, 2019). This reminded me of France's withdrawal of its troops from NATO forces during De Gaulle era. France might be seeking more independent foreign policy again. This may lead to the possibility of a new ''power game'' in Europe after a long time.

It is not possible to know about possible "winners" and "losers" since I am not a forecaster. I, however, do know that states will be selfish, unpredictable actors whose intentions can never be known completely. The system will be remained anarchical and survival will be the main goal of states. As Mearsheimer (1995, p.11) argued, states will keep operating in a "self-help" system. Final answer to the question that was asked in the title of this thesis is that the new era will be "the U.S. against the world". In fact, it is possible to say that it will be "everyone against everyone" as it has always been.

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EDUCATION

Bachelor: Istanbul University, Turkish Language and Literature. Graduated in July, 2015

Master's: Cukurova University. International Relations. Started in February, 2017. Currently writing my thesis. I will be graduated by February, 2020.
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LANGUAGE SKILLS

TOEFL IBT: 103 (Reading;25, Listening:26, Speaking:24, Writing:28. Test Taken: December, 2019)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

I have written and presented numerous papers as part of my Mater's education various topics including security, terrorism, international relations theory and social movements. I have also conducted a research on the current status quo and the future of the liberal world order as part of my exchange study in Germany.