

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INTELLECTUALS IN 1980s TURKISH CINEMA

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

BY

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**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES**

SEPTEMBER 2014

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ABSTRACT

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE INTELLECTUALS IN 1980s TURKISH CINEMA

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September 2014, 256 pages

This study aims to analyze the representations of the intellectual identity in 1980s Turkish Cinema in the context of the socio-political transformation that took place during this period. Employing a thematic analysis based on the common and distinctive themes regarding the representations of intellectual figure, this study examines the mental states and political orientations of the protagonists in a group of films that are exclusively about the lives of intellectual characters. What this study offers is that the cinematic representations of intellectual in the 1980s are charged with decisive depoliticization and emotional/intellectual depression with only exceptional cases where intellectuals take critical stances to the military coup and socio-political transformation that took place afterwards.

Keywords: intellectual, turkish cinema, the 1980s in turkey, thematic analysis, representation

ÖZ

1980'LER TÜRKİYE SİNEMASINDA ENTELEKTÜELLERİN TEMSİLLERİ

Ertem, Yiğitalp

Yüksek Lisans, Medya ve Kültürel Çalışmalar

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan

Eylül 2014, 256 sayfa

Bu çalışma, 1980'ler Türkiye sinemasındaki entelektüel karakterlerin temsillerini, dönemin toplumsal ve siyasi dönüşümleri bağlamında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Entelektüel figürüne dair ortak ve ayırt edici temalar üzerine kurulan bir tematik analiz vasıtasıyla, bu çalışma, özellikle entelektüel karakterlerin hayatını konu eden bir grup filmdeki ana karakterlerin ruh hallerini ve politik yönelimlerini incelemektedir. Çalışmanın iddiası, 1980'lerdeki entelektüel temsillerinin, askeri darbeye ve sonrasındaki sosyo-politik dönüşüme eleştirel yaklaşım geliştiren istisnai birkaç örnek dışında, yoğun bir depolitizasyon ve duygusal/düşünsel bunalım ile yüklü olduklarıdır.

Anahtar kelimeler: entelektüel, türkiye sineması, türkiye'de 1980'ler, tematik analiz, temsil

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am sincerely grateful to my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan and exceptional scholars of my department Prof. Dr. Raşit Kaya and Barış Çakmur for their gentle criticisms, inspiring teachings and enriching contributions.

I would like to present my special gratefulness to Dr. Özgür Avcı for his invaluable supervision, critique, guidance and moral support from the very beginning of this study until its finalization. His knowledge and meticulous approach to the academic research inspired me more than anyone.

Sincere thanks go to Dr. Deniz Özçetin and Şükrü Argın for their substantial comments on the thesis especially during my ideational crises.

I would like to express my gratitude to my dear friends, İsmail, Murat, Hüseyincan, Kadir, Recep and Müslüm for their support, especially during the long hours we spent in the METU library. While writing this thesis, each of them helped me in different aspects of my life. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have these friends.

Very special thanks go to Görsev who patiently listened to me when I was lost and always kindly encouraged me.

My mother, Alev Ertem, deserve ultimate thanks for her life-long efforts to stand by me against all challenges.

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ABBREVIATIONS

IsF

The Intellectual's Films

[tm]

translations mine

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to analyze the representations of the political identities of intellectual characters in Turkish Cinema in the late 1980s. The 1980s is an utterly unique era in terms of the (i) socio-political transformations that took place after the coup d'état in September 12, 1980, (ii) transition to economic neoliberalization, (iii) transformations in cultural production, (iv) suppression and retreat of leftist/socialist movement and (v) financial and artistic reconstruction of cinema in Turkey. In the field of filmic production, this period witnessed the condensation of a set of films having intellectual figures as protagonists. Being called as “the intellectual’s films”, (hereafter, IsF) by the film critics, these films depicted the private lives of a group of intellectuals such as writers, filmmakers, professors, artists, journalists etc. More than half of these characters were people who were politicized in socialist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Both these formerly politicized intellectuals and others whose relationship with radical political movements remain rather ambiguous in the stories share several common characteristics. In order to reveal these characteristics, this study aims to thematically analyze IsF in terms the mental states and the political orientations of the protagonists. What I will argue is that, in IsF, aside from few cases that are critical about the military coup and the socio-political changes following it, the intellectual figure is represented as a depoliticized and mentally/intellectually depressed individual who primarily focuses on his/her own private life. To that end, I will first clarify which social functions or

qualities are actually intended when the term ‘intellectual’ is used in this thesis.

How can one define the term ‘intellectual’? There are too many scholars who discuss about intellectual identity that giving a brief, exact and limited definition about this subject is “notoriously difficult” (Bauman, 1992: 81) and also dangerous since it has consequences that affects the subsequent analysis (Coser, 1965: vii). Different presuppositions lead to various examinations of intellectual identity that prioritize particular periods, eras, roles or characteristics. In this study, I will avoid taking a solid definition for granted and try to draw the major contours that constitute the intellectual identity and develop an analytical perspective to examine the political functions of intellectuals with the help of accumulated literature on the subject. To that end, in the second chapter, I will discuss the historical and theoretical debates about intellectuals from historical roots of the figure to the recent categorizations.

There are broadly three major perspectives that analyze the intellectuals; “class-in-themselves, that is, as having interests that distinguish them from other groups in society . . . classless, that is, able to transcend their group of origin to pursue their own ideals . . . class-bound, that is, representatives of their group of origin” (Kurzman & Owens: 2002: 63). Amongst these perspectives, Gramscian analysis, which evaluates the social and political functions of the intellectuals in terms of the rising social classes that intellectuals take sides with, offers the less moralistic and most operable analysis for studying the intellectuals, particularly, the ones in Turkey. Although, I will also benefit from the other approaches when necessary.

As Gramsci (1992: 8) states intellectual has to be analyzed through “ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities have their place within the general complex of social relations” instead of searching a “criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities”. Thus I will primarily focus on the social relations that intellectuals are located in during the 1980s. The state’s suppression of class movements and

intellectuals, intellectuals' position in the division of labor, their social relationships with the rest of the society and the pressures of neoliberalization on the intellectuals' production are the major points of consideration in order to understand their place in the general complex of social relations.

What were the major social and political influences of the circumstances in 1980s Turkey on intellectuals? Regarding the social, political and cultural history, the 1980s was a period when Turkish society experienced a big transformation. In the late 1970s, due to the armed conflicts between the left-wing and right-wing groups, collapse of parliamentary democracy, worker and student upheavals together with the deep economic crisis, the possibility of an intervention by the army increased. Eventually, the third and most influential military coup in the history of Modern Turkey which aimed a total transformation of society took place on September 12, 1980. The coup and the subsequent new right policies that tried to solve the hegemony crisis were the key events that marked this period. Backed up by the military regime, the new right government "aimed at the mobilization of the popular sections of society under the banner of a national program" by excluding and suppressing the socialist groups and ideologies (Tünay, 1993: 26). By coding "left as guilty" and "intellectuals as harmful", the military power played a significant role in defeating the leftist ideological efficacy which had been established in the previous decade and in discrediting the intellectuals (Laçiner, 1995: 97). Thousands of people were arrested, tortured and lost under custody. With the structural change in the form of power, the state constantly employed new strategies against oppositional ideas/movements both physically and ideologically. Turkey went through a big socio-cultural transformation in the 1980s including a heightened hegemony of the private capital and the idea of free enterprise as well as empowerment of conservative groups, identities and forms of thought.

In the cultural sphere, this era witnessed a new kind of modernization and a new form of power where state's 'repression' and 'pledge for liberation' took place interchangeably (Gürbilek, 2011: 13-4). While the most of the dissidents were imprisoned, the society started to face and discuss some old taboos such as women's sexuality, homosexuality, other tastes and desires of the individuals which animated the mass media such as magazines and newspapers. The main theme of the majority of discussions was the 'individual' in this new "Me Age". Some hot topics included: one's control of his/her own emotions, health and appearance, condemnation of cooperation and collectivity, stories of success and getting rich (Belge, 1996: 826-30). Meanwhile, since even talking about politics was highly dangerous and previously politicized people were mostly either in prison or struggling with their defeat under exhaustive conditions, intellectuals commented a lot rather on the culture of daily life with an aim to hint at some political perspectives in culture/art magazines which proved to be thoroughly ineffective in terms of affecting people and resisting against the depoliticization (Kozanoğlu, 2000: 42).

There were significant effects of these changes on the cinema in Turkey. However, there is a gap in the literature¹ about the relationship between cinema (the rise of IsF in particular) and these political and cultural transformations. Hence, in one section of the third chapter which focuses on the socio-political and cultural transformations in Turkey in the 1980s, I am also going to focus on the research by some eminent scholars who wrote about the influences of the 1980s on the literature and literary protagonists² – which also helped me figure out which methodology, approaches and concepts will be most helpful in this study. More specifically, considering

¹ The main texts that I will benefit from, which focuses specifically on 1980s Turkish Cinema in the context of socio-political and cultural atmosphere of Turkey, are the ones written by Arslan (2010), Abisel (2005), Arslan (2010), Atam (2011), Dorsay (1995), Esen (2000), Maktav (2000a, 2000b), Scognamiglio (1998). However, apart from Maktav's articles, none of these texts analyze the IsF in detail. They either examine some of the films individually or give brief statements about the general characteristics of some groupings of these films.

² Primarily, I will base my inferences on Ecevit's (2006), Moran's (1998) and Türkeş's (2001; 2005) works.

Argın's argument that "the literature had supported the September 12 military coup by heart" (2007 [tm]), I will try to examine whether a similar attitude holds true for the intellectual figures in IsF made in the same period.

Many film scholars and critics refer to the 1980s as the death of Yeşilçam due to the proliferation of video films in houses and of Hollywood film in movie theaters, the rise of new cinematic expressions, and the significant decrease in the number of cinema audience (particularly families). Under these adverse conditions, next to the comedies, arabesk, adventure and women's films, a psychological cinema dealing with individuals' problems emerged in the late 1980s – which is composed of the films I will analyze in this study. This individual-centered cinema discusses the perceptions, experiences and emotions of individuals in a heavy emotional way instead of developing a stance of socio-political criticism. Troubled, depressive, conflicted, marginal and uncommunicative individuals trying to get over the trauma of the September 12 and its aftermath are the main themes in these films (Scognamillo, 1998: 429). These films present a rich environment of intellectual life that is represented by cinematic apparatus via numerous intellectual characters as protagonists. Investigating the main factors that inclined the filmmakers to shooting these films about the lives of intellectuals may be another significant point of inquiry. Why, particularly in the 1980s, the intellectuals, who work as filmmakers or writers, had took an interest in narrating stories about themselves or people who live similarly to them?

The intellectual characters in these films constantly struggle for an individual existence in the face of social pressures and their inner conflicts. Mostly, films give no information about the pre-coup period –the 1960s and the 1970s when these characters were politicized– and instead focus on their current psychological situations. Both the former and present social and political events remain rather ambiguous in the films since the films are largely focalized on their protagonists' private lives and present limited information about the outside world. Here, the image of these characters is

drawn as, I will argue, depoliticized, mentally/intellectually depressed, and self-centered.

I have a major question and some minor questions regarding the cinematic representation of intellectuals and cultural atmosphere of the 1980s. Basically, I ask how the political identities of the intellectual protagonists are depicted in IsF. I will try to discuss this main problem in consideration with the following questions. How the political identities of the intellectuals can be defined and analyzed in order to reach an accurate examination in the context of Turkey? How the socio-political and cultural environment of Turkey was shaped after the military coup in 1980 which also affected the representations of intellectual figure in cinema? What are the main tendencies in intellectuals' political orientations and their mental states in IsF and what are the relations between these two aspects of intellectual identity?

Why does it matter to study the representations of a particular social type in a cultural text? What does analyzing the representations of intellectual figure in cinema tell us about the figure itself or the social relations that s/he interacts with? In order to answer these questions, the nature of the representative act must be questioned. Claiming that media is a privileged sign of late modern culture, Hall, subverts the previous discussions on the accurateness of "representation", by defining it as an essential act "by which the meaning is produced and exchanged" (1997: 15). In this constructionist approach against reflective and intentional ones, the representation both stands in the place *of* and *for* the things, concepts and conceptual maps. By acknowledging representation's constructive nature, we can reveal "how meaning is made differently in different media texts, and therefore what different ways of seeing and thinking tend to be found there" (Matheson, 2005: 2). Departing from this perspective, Ferro (1988) evaluates film as 'history', independently from being realistic or not. Why the film was made in a particular viewpoint, how it reconstructs the actual events and people and which particularities it include or exclude give the film its historical

value. Thus I will evaluate IsF as the witnesses and participants of the culture of the 1980s.

In IsF, the stories of intellectual figures are narrated mainly from the point-of-view perspectives of the protagonists. The films delve into the thoughts, psychologies and actions of the main characters. In these protagonist-focalized films, the social, political and cultural environment is narrated through the perception of the protagonist which leads to the “inevitable subjectivization of film space” (Branigan, 1984: 130 as cited in Stam et. al., 2005: 87) since it restricts the narrative information with the protagonist’s cognitive, emotive and ideological orientation (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983: 71). Thus, unless a different motivation of the filmmaker is obvious, I will make use of the visual regimes of the films in order to reveal protagonists’ psychological moods and their apprehension of the outer world.

I will investigate the representations of the intellectual figures via thematic analysis under two main titles: mental states and political orientations. The mental states cover the general tendencies in protagonists’ emotional, psychological and intellectual moods stemming from their relationship with their lovers, friends and family. In this part I will primarily focus on the private lives of the characters since almost all of the films’ builds their narratives on the private lives of the protagonists. The characters are mainly framed inside their houses with their lovers or alone, strolling around solitarily or in gatherings with their families and friends. The themes that I will trace in this section are professional discontent, isolation and uncommunicativeness, romanticism, the charm of depression, cheating and betrayal. The accumulated image stemming from the representations of these themes offers a general emotional and intellectual depression for the characters. I will primarily try to relate the mental states of intellectuals with their political orientations. The linkages that attach these two facets of intellectual identity are their experiences in the past, the transformation of society that obtained a different attitude towards the intellectuals and decline of radical/critical thought in intellectual/popular ranks of the society. My main

goal will be to uncover whether there are principally political reasons or not that leads the intellectual characters to depression. If so, I will try to analyze how intellectuals in IsF respond to these political influences.

In the section dealing with the political orientations of the intellectuals, the themes that I will employ are escapism, political consciousness, cynicism, individual resistance, women's movement, critique of the coup, political pessimism and emotional optimism. In this part, I will mainly deal with how intellectuals approach to political thought and action. There are various intellectual figures in the films who were politicized in the 1960s and 1970s, artists who used to have leftist/socialist worldviews and intellectuals whose political orientations are not stated explicitly in the films. Departing from intellectuals' remarks about political struggle, attachments to the political ideologies, comments on politicized people in general or their former involvements in leftist movement, I will inspect the political stances of the characters. In IsF, intellectuals largely prefer to keep their distance from stating their political opinion and involving in a political movement. In certain cases, there is no other option for them because of the traumas they lived during the military coup as a result of personal sufferings and smashing of political organizations. However, apart from state's repression, are there any other factors that affected intellectuals' relationship with political thought and action? How do these intellectual figures approach to the military coup and neoliberalization of the society in the 1980s? Did they silently accepted the new political order and continue to their lives ordinarily, if not, how did they interpret and respond to the rapidly changing socio-political atmosphere of Turkey? A critical inquiry of these questions would lead to a more apprehensive understanding about the political identities of intellectuals that are exposed to anti-intellectualism and state oppression, which is also a relevant situation in current political atmosphere. In addition, the analysis of the representations of intellectual figure may reveal how the filmmakers, i.e. intellectuals, perceive themselves and their immediate environment. In terms of cinematic imagination, the analysis of IsF would provide a conceptual map

and historical background for the further investigations about Turkish Cinema which still problematizes the intellectual identity in the present day.

I will mention the recurring story patterns, cultural codes and political ideologies that are conveyed through the intellectual figures by employing series of themes which are manifested in the films. The specification of the themes is handled with regards to the dominant similarities amongst the film stories. The observational technique in carving out the themes from the films is largely based on Ryan and Bernard's (2003: 89-94) criteria. I compiled themes based on the common (i) events that protagonists encounter, (ii) actions and conversations (inner speeches, monologues, dialogues, film narrators etc.) of intellectual figures about certain emotions, ideas and beliefs and (iii) narrative preferences (visual regime of the film that includes the employment of sound, music, images, editing etc.) of the filmmakers in constructing the scenes. In other words, a theme may be an action, an idea, an emotion of a character in the story, or it can be a narrative choice of the filmmaker.

After clarifying what is a theme and what is not according to the criteria above, I specified the themes in IsF by considering (i) repetitiveness of the actions, thoughts or emotions of the protagonists in several films, (ii) exclusiveness of the themes which differs the protagonists from other characters, (iii) missing data or common lack of representations in the films (state violence, depiction of protagonists' past etc.) and (iv) theory-related materials covering the debates about intellectuals and the Turkey of 1980s. The picking of the themes also imply a parallelism with the topics I have discussed in the previous chapters since "[t]hemes come both from the data and from the investigator's prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study" (Ryan & Bernard, 2003: 88). Thus, the debated issues about both the intellectuals and socio-political atmosphere in Turkey in previous chapters are indicative for the selection of these themes.

1.1. Significance

Despite the aforementioned theoretical difficulties, why is it particularly important to study the intellectual identity? There are countless studies aiming to understand the intellectual figure, to locate it in a social structure, to analyze its relationship with social classes, ruminating about its duty in modern society or explaining the historical circumstances that gave birth to and transformed it. The main motive behind this appetite is twofold, according to Garnham:

For social theorists in general, such an analysis is the unavoidable basis for the analysis of the social conditions of their own practice. For media scholars in particular, their object of study itself is one of the historically developed forms which intellectual practice takes place. (1995: 359)

Garnham's particular reference to the media scholars puts forth the significance of studying the intellectuals whose products are in constant circulation around the media spheres. Moreover, as Bourdieu (1993) shows, the intellectual field, as other fields he defines –having its own independent laws together with its correlations with politics and economy- has its dispositions, power struggles, historical norms, complexities and possibilities for rupture. Thus, the multifaceted historical and social relations behind the creation of the cultural products can be revealed with the help of a particular emphasis on the intellectual field. Accordingly, studying the political identities of intellectuals in cinema would help to reveal the cinematic imagination of intellectual identity; prominent propositions about intellectuals; ‘intellectual’ filmmakers’ ideology in creating these representations about intellectuals including, at least in part, themselves.

Why is it particularly important to study the representations of the intellectual figure in the movies? The studies dealing with the issue of “representation” are numerous both in the field of the film studies and also in cultural studies. However, as O’Farrell notes, “such discussions of representation are curiously absent when it comes to examining those who actually produce such writings –namely intellectuals” (2000: 197). She claims that there is not any sustained research about the representations of the

intellectuals in film. Her study is also constituted from an arbitrary set of films with an aim to reveal some main contours by touching upon the surface of some questions about the representation of the “body” of the intellectuals. O’Farrell notes the representations of intellectual (i) as a “pure brain without a body” in sub-culture films, (ii) as scientific creator who saves the body and keeps it alive in high culture films and (iii) as “unattractive and sexually incompetent” individuals in mainstream cinema (2000: 203). Apart from her study, only source I found was Köse’s (2007) article about the criminal intellectuals in recent Hollywood films which is not directly related with the subject of this thesis. Despite the weighty literature on the ethical, political and social functions, roles and positions of the intellectuals there is a lack in the field of the studies about the representations of these figures in literary and artistic products.

I have already stated the significance of studying the “intellectual” as a topic in the first chapter. The reasons about analyzing the IsF are various. First, the films narrating the lives of intellectuals were conspicuous in the second half of the 1980s which let even the film critics and scholars to calling it as a sub-genre in Turkish cinema of that particular period. Accordingly, these films have so many themes in common with respect to how their main characters were portrayed. Second, together with the social transformation, intellectuals experienced a great change in the 1980s regarding their political thoughts and personal objectives as mentioned in the previous chapter. Their filmic representations would give significant clues about their counterparts in real life. Third, these intellectuals are partially people who were politicized within the socialist movement in the 1970s. How the filmmakers see their past would reveal their subjective assessment of Turkey’s recent past and the political struggles that took place here. Ultimately, elaborating on the representations of intellectuals regarding political ideologies in films made in 1980s may give us a clearer understanding of how political retreat of the intellectuals were projected to film screen as stories of losing; how their political inabilities affected their own personal lives; and more importantly,

since the creators of these films were also intellectuals, what sorts of artistic and political intents they had while making these films.

1.2. Method of Analysis

Film, as Marc Ferro (1988) notes, is both a source and an agent of the history. In this chapter, by drawing on this idea, I will attempt at examining the representations of the intellectual figure in 1980s cinema in Turkey with two primary purposes: first, to reveal the images of intellectual as a political identity peculiar to the mentioned films; second, to develop a closer understanding of the political attitudes of the intellectuals in the mentioned era. The first premise also gives hand to the second premise since the films are political, cultural and intellectual artifacts that are produced by the intellectuals. The ideologies in the films are important signifiers for political attitudes as well. The complex “system of representation” makes both the reflective and refractive construction of reality simultaneously. Representation is a constructionist act; as Hall (1997: 24) states, it neither solely reflects the material world nor imposes a unique meaning unbounded from the already existing world. This approach “recognizes [the] public, social character of language” for him (1997: 25). The system of representation

. . . ‘rules in’ certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write, or conduct oneself, so also, by definition, it ‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it. (Hall, 1997: 44)

Thus, the representations of the intellectual figures in films have significant influence on how to conceptualize both the intellectuals and the recent history in our minds today. Complemented with the theoretical and historical discussions about intellectuals mentioned in Chapter II and the socio-political analysis history of post-1980 Turkey mentioned in Chapter III, the examination of the films in terms of their intellectual protagonists would reveal the continuities and breaks in the cinematographic imagination of these figures in relation with these historical and theoretical analyses.

A clear, coherent and comprehensive analysis of the films with all their features is very difficult, even impossible in many cases. “The ‘language’ of the cinema appears unintelligible. Like that of dreams, its interpretation is uncertain” (Ferro, 1988: 23). Thus, I will not analyze the films as a whole with an emphasis on all their plot elements, narrative structures or stylistic preferences. Instead, my analysis will be mostly based on the intellectual protagonists’ actions, emotions and their ways of experiencing the material world throughout the films. While analyzing these films which are narrated from the perspectives of one or more intellectual protagonists, I will aim to reveal the ‘focalized’ representations of both the characters and the fictional world. Focalization here refers, as Genette coins the term, the restriction of the field (1983: 189) in which the material world is represented. This restriction is not only peculiar to the novels with God-like narrators, but it also works in the films constructed around the protagonists. While the internal focalization stands for one’s conscious recounting of a story with inner monologues and first person narrations of the plot or the feelings of the character; the external narration refers to the unawareness of the protagonists about the story that is being told about them which can be seen as the classical cinematic and literary narration. The films in this list cover both cases and their admixtures as well.

While Genette’s theorization of focalization is a handy tool for the analysis of the film, he problematizes primarily the optical and formal aspects of the narrative structure such as the point of view of the character, external and internal narration and the spatial relationships between the character, narrator, place and other objects. However, Rimmon-Kenan (2005: 83) underlines the ideological facet of focalization which sets “the norms of the text” in the protagonist-focalized films. In character-based films, she states,

[t]he ideology of the narrator-focalizer is usually taken as authoritative, and all other ideologies in the text are evaluated from this ‘higher’ position. (2005: 84)

Thus, with a reference to Rimmon-Kenan, I will argue that the intellectual character “may represent an ideological position through his [or her] way of

seeing the world or his [or her] behavior in it" (2005: 84). She excludes some films –or other linguistic devices– which stay out of this singularly ideological schema referring to Bakhtin's 'polyphonic' reading of Dostoyevsky where the ideology of the texts is a juxtaposition of several different characters. However, the films in this thesis are strongly based on the intellectual characters' ways of making sense of the world and themselves. There are hardly any secondary characters which are able to contribute to the ideology of the films which renders Rimmon-Kenan's evaluation fruitful throughout the analysis of the ideological messages in the films via the protagonists. I will try to state the presence of the minor characters as a few exceptional cases in the films. Thus, I will attempt at an analysis that prioritizes the representations of the characters at first (external focalization), then their appreciations of the external world (internal focalization) in terms of their relationships with the political thought and action.

Through the eyes of the intellectuals in the films, several significant landmarks in the history of Turkey are made subjectively visible –and also largely invisible– as a result of the plot choices in the films. The politicization in the 1960s and 1970s, the military intervention in September 12, 1980 and the transformation of the society in the 1980s can be counted as the major phenomena. While representing these events, the optical, acoustic, memorial, historical, emotional and inevitably ideological preferences are made by the filmmakers through the control of the protagonists. What they remember about the past, how they approach to the society, what does it mean to involve in politics and several other problems and questions are answered via the characters' attitudes. However, these representations not only show but also hide some social and cultural aspects of material world. As Ferro states,

Film is valuable, not only because of what it reveals but also because of the sociohistorical approach that it justifies. Thus, the analyses will not necessarily concern the totality of a work. . . Nor will they be limited to the film itself. They will integrate the film into the world that surrounds it and with which it necessarily communicates. (29-30)

Therefore, the social, cultural and political atmosphere that is represented in the films also justifies a particular ideology via the intellectuals' political opinions.

1.3. Method of Sampling

For the analysis of the representations of intellectual in Turkish cinema, I made an archival research in order to generate a film list. In this research, I examined the plots of the films that are made between 1980 and 1995. The decade that followed the military coup was my main focus because of the concurrent transformations in both socio-political structure and in Turkish Cinema. However, I also checked on the films in the first half of the 1990s in order not to miss films which may be relevant to my study. Since Turkish Cinema has entered a new period after 1996 both structurally and regarding to the themes in the films, post-1996 period is excluded³. The fundamental criterion for the films to be included is having a protagonist who is an intellectual according to the widest definition of the term; "people with advanced educations, producers or transmitters of ideas, or people who engage in public issues" (Kurzman & Owens, 2002:63). The films which have intellectual character(s) in supporting roles are not included. In light of these criteria, I have examined the synopses and plots of the films made in this era using two online Turkish Cinema databases which are <http://www.sinematurk.com> and <http://www.sinemalar.com>, the website of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism archive and in addition, the only printed dictionary of Turkish Cinema, written by Agah Özgüç (1998), which covers largest corpus of feature films made in Turkey. When the information about the films was not enough in these primary sources, I searched on the web to find additional information from newspapers, magazines and online dictionaries.

³ The years following 1996 are labeled as "New Cinema of Turkey" which implies both quantitative and qualitative shifts which I have mentioned in previous chapter dealing with Turkish Cinema. Under this title, New Cinema of Turkey is studied in detail by several scholars such as Arslan (2010), Atam (2011), Dönmez-Colin (2008) and Suner (2006).

At the end of this first phase of my research, I singled out 125 films which have an intellectual leading character. Since the analysis of 125 films would be practically impossible within the confines of my study, I added additional restrictions to come up with a manageable sample of films to analyze. About half of the original list –67 films– were shot in the second part of the 1980s –between 1986 and 1990, when the films of intellectuals were fully recognized in the texts written by the film critics and scholars⁴. Hence, I restricted myself to the period of these five years when the production of 'films of intellectuals' was much higher than any other period in the history of Turkish Cinema. Then, I went even further, and, within these 67 films, I picked the ones that met the additional criteria below.

- Having a focus on the ideas and practices of the intellectual character: for example, the crime/thriller films which narrate a story of a journalist chasing the drug dealers were excluded since they do not concentrate on its character's ideas, psychology and daily practices.
- Featuring 'characters' instead of 'types: for example, the comedy films aiming satire or farce are excluded since these films mostly depends on caricatured types instead of in-depth characters.
- If one director had made more than two films that meet the research criteria, I picked at most two of them.
- Availability: the availability of the movies was a significant constraint. I checked several university and cinema club archives, and could not manage to reach some of the films.

My final list of films to be analyzed includes a list of 23 films which were all made in the late 1980s –a period of Turkish Cinema which is mostly ignored or understudied both by scholars and film critics/historians. The list of the films can be found in Appendix A. Hence, other than providing a critical understanding of the cinematic constructions of intellectuals in Turkey, my study may throw some light on a recent yet obscure period of Turkish cinema.

⁴ See Dorsay (1995: 21), Esen (2000: 224) and Maktav (2000a: 88).

	<u>Figures</u>	<u>Work</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>
Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim (<i>A Season in Hakkari</i>)	Unnamed Man	Writer/teacher	Leftist
Sen Türkülerini Söyle (<i>You Sing Your Songs</i>)	Hayri	Looking for job	Leftist (former inmate)
	His friends(Tunca, Şerif)	Director(advertisement, film)	Leftist before
Su da Yanar (<i>Water Also Burns</i>)	Unnamed	Director (film)	Leftist(former inmate)
Prenses (<i>Princess</i>)	Selim	Photographer	Liberal
	Tarık	Not known	Leftist
Ses (<i>The Voice</i>)	Unnamed	Not working	Leftist (former inmate)
Dikenli Yol (<i>The Thorny Way</i>)	Hüseyin	Not working, finds job at the end	Leftist (former inmate)
Gece Yolculuğu (<i>Night Journey</i>)	Ali	Director (film)	No sign
Biri ve Diğerleri (<i>One and the Others</i>)	Barış	Not known	No sign
Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce (<i>After Yesterday, Before Tomorrow</i>)	Gül	Director (film)	Leftist
	Bülent	Director (advertisement)	No sign
	Pelin	Intern director	No sign
Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç (<i>Open Space For Love in Your Heart</i>)	Ali İhsan	Lawyer, politician	Leftist (social democrat)
Bir Avuç Gökyüzü (<i>A Handful of Sky</i>)	Ahmet	Not working	Leftist (former inmate)
	Neşe	Painter	No sign
Gece Dansı Tutsakları (<i>Captives of Night Dance</i>)	Haluk	Journalist (chief editor)	Leftist
	Zeynep	Writer and journalist	No sign
Ada (<i>Island</i>)	Unnamed	Painter	Leftist
Av Zamanı (<i>Hunting Time</i>)	Unnamed man	Writer	Leftist
Umut Yarına Kaldı (<i>Hope Stayed For Tomorrow</i>)	Unnamed man	Director (film)	Leftist
	Two unnamed women	Pianist and dancer	No sign
Kimlik (<i>Identity</i>)	Unnamed man	Writer and shipping clerk	Leftist
	Unnamed woman	Pharmacy	Leftist
Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı (<i>All the Doors Were Closed</i>)	Nil	Looks for job, works in an office, gets fired	Leftist (former inmate)
	Ateş	Architect	No sign
Büyük Yalnızlık (<i>Great Loneliness</i>)	Unnamed man	No sign	No sign
	Unnamed woman	No sign	No sign
İkili Oyunlar (<i>Duel Games</i>)	Erol	Academic	Leftist
	Nur	Not working	Leftist
	Taner and İlhan	Businessman/politician	Leftist
Melodram (<i>Melodrama</i>)	Esra	Writer	No sign
	Behzat	Hotel owner and antiquarian	No sign
Camdan Kalp (<i>A Heart of Glass</i>)	Kirpi	Film director	Leftist
Raziye (<i>Raziye</i>)	Ali	Student	Leftist (fugitive)
	Unnamed man	Does several village work	Leftist (may be former inmate)
Bekle Dedim Gölgeye (<i>I Asked the Shadow to Wait</i>)	Esra	Working	Leftist (former inmate)
	Ersin	Not working	Leftist (former inmate)
	Erdal	Writer	Leftist

Table 1: Intellectual Figures in the Films

In the above table, there is the list of films together with the intellectual protagonists who take part in them. The list stands mostly for the practical purposes during the reading of this text and also for showing the various professions and political orientations of the characters all together. While being an intellectual is a matter of profession (such as artists, writers and scholars) for some characters, it is more of a political characteristic for others who are unemployed or working in regular jobs. The political stances of the characters are written roughly in the table according to the signifiers in the films which covers all sorts of signs from the statements of the characters to the name of the books in their libraries. The characters that seem to have leftist/socialist political orientations in one part of their lives are marked as leftist in the table. The films which shelter no signs about their protagonists as being a socialist or leftist depict their characters further from all sorts of political debates. I will elaborate on the data presented in this table in the upcoming sections. The reader may also want to look back to the table whenever they need to quickly recall the films and protagonists.

Lastly, despite the majority of the films take place in the 1980s, there are exceptions that take place in the 1960s and 1970s as well. *İkili Oyunlar* is divided into three parallel stories narrating the protagonists' particular days in 1968, 1978 and 1988. Similarly, *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye* narrates the twenty-years spanning story of four revolutionary friends that starts in late 1960s and ends in the 1980s. *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*, *Prenses* and *Av Zamanı* specifically tell the intellectual and militant characters in 1970s. However, the intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s are not particularly different from each other in IsF which is not the actual case in reality. The great similarities about the representations of intellectual characters of 1970s and 1980s reveal the role of the socio-political and cinematic environment that gave birth to these images of intellectual figures. For instance, if *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*, which is also a famous novel about March, 12 1971 military coup, was made in the 1970s, would it be same as it was filmed in the late 1980s? The socio-political and

cultural environment of the 1980s has a significant influence on the representations of intellectuals in IsF. The representations of protagonists partially reflect and rebuild the dominant ideology of the 1980s about the intellectuals.

CHAPTER II

“INTELLECTUAL” IN THE MIRROR OF THE INTELLECTUALS

This chapter seeks to explore the fundamental characteristics of intellectual figure within the wide corpus of texts written about the sociology of intellectuals. First, I will mention the theoretical approaches aiming for an analytical conception of the intellectuals. In this section, after giving a brief outline about the definition and early classification of the intellectual figures, I will discuss the three major perspectives about the intellectuals’ relationship with social classes in order to locate and analyze the intellectual identity in socio-historical formation that they belong. These perspectives are ‘intellectuals as a separate class’, “intellectuals as classless” and “intellectuals as class-bound”. I will conclude this first part with the context of the intellectual figure where I have derived these debates. Second, I will present the historical trajectory of intellectual figures in Turkey. Starting from the late Ottoman Era, I will refer to the texts analyzing the political identity of the intellectuals in Turkey. This chapter aims to lay the groundwork for analyzing the intellectual identity in the films by revealing the dominant contours about the debates about the intellectuals in theory and practice.

2.1. Theoretical Approaches to Intellectual

The hardship of finding out a definition of the intellectual reveals itself in almost all texts written about the subject. The author of the “Men of Ideas”, a vast historical categorization of intellectuals starting from 18th century, Lewis Coser (1965: vii) underlines the impreciseness of the concept and argues that the process of defining the intellectual, “far from being neutral,

have consequences”, i.e. directly affects the rest of the analysis. Lipset and Dobson (1972: 137-8) who particularly worked on the scholarly circles of the U.S. mention the diversity of the meanings attached to this ambiguous concept. In another sense, Nettl (1969: 55) prioritizes the problem of definition with an aim to build a new one and asks “Is the intellectual an institution, a collectivity, a role, a type of person, or what? The failure to surmount the definitional hurdle produces as many explanations as there are implied definitions”. Ultimately, Zygmunt Bauman emphasizes the self-definition aspect of corpus, stating the efforts of the authors on drawing boundaries between intellectuals and their own identity despite belonging to the same species per se (1989: 8). All these writers, who wrote extensively on the subject, claim that giving a single, exact and inclusive definition about the intellectual is nearly impossible.

The combination of the wide and diverse interest to the concept and the abovementioned hurdles of defining it eventually lead to a disarrayed corpus about the intellectuals, where each author prioritizes different features, spatio-temporalities, motivations and methodologies. For example, two famous studies on the intellectuals, Benda’s (1955) and Gouldner’s (1979) works, are fundamentally different and divergent in terms of theorizing the intellectuals. For example, while Julien Benda’s conceptualization of intellectual –‘clerk’ in his own terms– points to a privileged small group who guards the ideal values, Alvin Gouldner’s historical assignment about the intellectuals implies a ‘new class’ based on their technical knowledge covering almost all white-collar workers. These two approaches to the intellectuals have almost no common points about the research subject. As Li (2010: 9) cites from Charles Kadushin, “There are almost as many works about intellectuals as there are intellectuals”. Therefore, an analytical categorization of the literature is required for a coherent understanding of the concept.

For this purpose, I am going to start with the historical emergence of both intellectuals and the studies about the intellectuals. First I will briefly

give an historical background by mentioning the pre-Enlightenment and Enlightenment intellectuals. Second, I will discuss the three major perspectives on intellectuals in terms of the class relations for several reasons. Prioritizing the problematic of class while analyzing the intellectual tradition is an effort to “overcome the normative and/or analytical transcendentalism” via the usage of the social formation that intellectuals belong, (Yetiş; 2002: 52 [tm]). Also as Brym (2001: 7632) and Kurzman and Owens (2002: 63) states, the three different class-based approaches adopts fundamentally distinct approaches to the sociology of intellectuals. This well-accepted categorization presents particularly fruitful concepts in order to analyze the representations of intellectual in Turkey where the political identity of intellectuals varies widely in terms of their relationship, roles and positions with regards to class-based politics. My aim is not to pick one certain approach, but to discuss the different approaches which may procure insights while analyzing the figures in the films. Hence, at the end of this analytical investigation, I am going to explain the context to be used while approaching to the concept throughout the films. Lastly in this chapter, I am going to make an attempt at historicizing the dominant conceptions and representations of the intellectual figure from the Late Ottoman Empire to 1980s in Turkey, with an aim to inquire the historical continuity and deviance of the intellectual figures we see in the films of the post-1980 era.

2.1.1. The Early Appearances of Intellectual

From philosophers to fortune tellers, various types of people can be regarded as intellectuals. However, it is evident that, before 17th or even 18th centuries, the societies were unable to provide sufficient environment for the intellectuals to exist and be influential in the ‘modern’ sense of the term. Coser (1965: 3-7) puts forward two fundamental conditions that are essential to render the modern intellectual vocation: first, an audience is needed that the intellectual will refer, gain recognition and get economical and psychological return; second, a communicational environment with the fellow

intellectuals to debate and promote their ideas and methods is needed⁵. Fulfillment of these needs with an institutional setting, leads to the operation of the intellectuals. Despite the scholars point out several different roots for the rise of the intellectuals, it is largely agreed that modern intellectual is a product of Enlightenment (Kristeva, 2007: 219; Laçiner, 1995: 98). Modern intellectual took its name with the shift from religious thought to rational human/social sciences and the formation of academy and media circles (Kristeva, 2007: 219-20). Thus, rationality, education and audience are definitive concepts for modern intellectuals.

The earliest antecedents of the modern intellectuals are occasionally referred as The Sophists –which means ‘the people, who have wisdom’– in ancient Greece (Coser, 1965: x-xi) who gives education about rhetoric, politics and philosophy to the nobles in exchange for money. Regarding the disrepute of The Sophists, Steve Fuller (2005: 7) claims that

Most intellectuals would take the characterization of their activities as ‘sophistic’ to be an insult, or at least a challenge to the integrity of their thought. Nevertheless, the sophists were the original intellectuals and continue to have much of value to teach the budding intellectual – that is, once we give a more balanced account of their activities.

Denying the common interpretation of the Sophists as ‘idea merchants’, Fuller argues that Sophists were offering skills and tools to nobles and their main aim was “to help clients win lawsuits and sway public opinion, to take greater control of their fate, as befits citizens in a democracy” (2005: 9). By making a parallelization between the Sophists and the people nowadays who conduct management seminars or the authors of the popular self-help books in the philosophy sections of the bookstores, Fuller puts forward the contemporaneity of Sophist tradition (2005: 9-10). On the other hand, Cemil Meriç sees the novelties that Sophists brought almost equal with the

⁵ Randall Collins (2002), in his massive *Sociology of Philosophies*, traces the Western, Indian and Asian philosophies through the social and conceptual networks between the philosophers. One of the finding of the book is the stirring and augmentation of the intellectual production in the intersection of concurrent intellectual debates in metropolises involving direct communication and rivalry (Kurzman & Owens, 2002: 74).

Enlightenment since they relieved culture from the monopoly of the small groups, articulated criticism and pragmatism to extent to the philosophy and science. Additively, Meriç claims that ‘individualism’ owes its victory to Sophists who prioritized “human” in all sorts of research, which influenced Socrates and his followers. Consequently, “the intellectual is the grandchild of the Sophists via its craziness, shamelessness and passion” (1997: 27-8 [tm]).

In the course of and following the Ancient Greece, the early examples of modern intellectuals are characterized as “axial-age intellectuals” by Giesen (2011) and “medieval literati” afterwards. Starting with the shamans, diviners and truth tellers in the archaic societies who were “specialists of the sacred”, Giesen traces the ascetic attitude of the Buddhists, Muslim Ulema, and Christian monks to the unholy world where “gesture of contempt and devaluation becomes a typical feature of new intellectual traditions” (2011: 292). In the case of the medieval literati, i.e. the clergy who are able to read, write and are technically specialized in some areas, the main aim is to transmit the religious values to mass and next generations, maintaining the law and reminding the tradition (Mardin, 1993: 257-8; as cited in Genç, 2006: 16). Unlike the post-Enlightenment intellectuals, these people were primarily scholastic, religious and mostly predetermined as a caste. Mannheim (1960: 9-10) claims that this medieval clergy had a monopoly over the common sense of the people, characterized by two major features: scholasticism and “remoteness from the open conflicts of everyday life”. This remoteness stemmed from the lack of direct communication between the clergy and the public since clerks were counted on only by other clerks and ruling elites.

In other respects, Jacques Le Goff, in his influential book “Intellectuals in the Middle Ages”, mostly avoids the terms such as clerks and philosophers and puts the birth of the intellectual as the 12th century where towns were sprung and university education developed. Starting from the 12th and 13th century, according to Goff, guild schools in the towns led to the advancements in artisanship and trading where organic intellectuals –in

Gramscian usage, which I will refer to later on— served more and more to the Church and the state (Goff, 1993). Similarly, Bottomore (1964: 71) remarks the significance of the universities in Medieval Europe as follows:

The origins of the modern intellectuals have generally been placed in the universities of medieval Europe. The growth of the universities, associated with the spread of humanistic learning, made possible the formation of an intellectual class which was not a priestly caste, whose members were recruited from diverse social milieu, and which was in some measure detached from the ruling classes and ruling doctrines of feudal society. This intellectual class produced the thinkers of the Enlightenment, and in France particularly, the intellectuals established themselves as critics of society by their opposition to the ruling class and to the Church of the ancient régime.

This basic reciprocal debate about whether acknowledging the clergy or the critical educated individuals as the predecessor of the modern intellectuals, reflects on the contemporary debates about the subject as well. Both approaches evaluate the intellectual with different terms, former with the ability to rule and conserve the society and latter with the critical position that is detached from the power holders. This dichotomy will be analyzed thoroughly in the context of the discourses about the modern intellectual in the 20th century.

Towards the end of the Middle Ages, as the commerce improved and bourgeoisie gained strength against the church and aristocracy, the clergy started to lose its power also in intellectual field. Meriç, dwelling on Sartre, argues that the 18th century Encyclopédistes from particular areas such as writers like Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau; lawmen like Montesquieu or mathematicians like d'Alembert were the practical and secular knowledge experts that helped the rising bourgeoisie in building their own ideology (1997: 35). On the other hand, interventions of these philosophers in significant public issues, such as Voltaire's defense of Jean Calas in "Calas Affair"⁶, led referring them as functionaries "of abstract justice and were

⁶ In France, Protestant merchant Jean Calas' son was found dead in the family's house and despite the evidences about the suicide, Jean Calas was accused of murder by the Catholic court. According to the claims, the son was planning to convert to Catholicism and his father killed his own son after learning that. Calas was tried, sentenced to death and killed by torturing in 1762. Meanwhile, Voltaire struggled for a fair trial and overturning the sentence

sullied with no passion for a worldly object” (Benda, 1955: 36). Alongside Benda, Sartre (1988: 252) also epitomizes the Calas Affair, to claim the intellectuals’ and writers’ responsibility of taking position in public affairs which does not directly concern them. Following similar examples, he also deems Flaubert and Goncourt brothers responsible for not writing about the brutal suppression of the Paris Commune. In these examples, the intellectuals are defined with their power and interest to intervene the public events.

Having its roots in the Encyclopédistes, scientific revolutions and Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment drew the ground contours of the ‘modern intellectual’, as mentioned by Giesen:

The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century differed profoundly from the ascetic attitude of the medieval intellectuals. Both were based on a strong tension between the principled order of the transcendental realm and the disparate mundane reality of this world. However, unlike medieval intellectuals, the Enlightenment intellectuals pursued the active transformation of this world in the name of the transcendental principles, such as progress in the name of reason, the education of the people to enable them to leave behind their dumbness, the inclusion of as many as possible in the public discourse, the spreading of the gospel of living *comme* [like] *philosophe*. (2011: 295)

The key concepts of the Enlightenment such as “universality”, “progress”, “reason”, “education” and “participation” also forms the duty of the Enlightenment intellectuals which spread the knowledge that they built through their reasoning to the masses in order to let them be the philosophers of their own life. They were legislators, form-givers, designers or gardeners in Bauman’s (1992: 83-4) famous terms, i.e. “as carriers/practitioners of society’s supreme values and destiny” seeing the world “the shapeless virgin expanse to be cultivated and given form”. Despite their critical views about the social order, Bauman evaluates the Enlightenment intellectuals as educated classes in a “constitutive affinity”

by claiming that the son committed suicide because of personal problems. Finally, Louis XV who were the king of the era, accepted the family, reopened the case by another court, canceled the sentence, fired the judge of the first case, acquitted Jean Calas from all charges, paid his family 2 years after the execution.

instead of “perpetual contention” with the political rulers, where the former is the guardian of truth and goodness and the latter guards the law (1992: 91). Bauman’s approach to Enlightenment intellectual is seen as a “negative narrative” of the historical role of the intellectuals by Garnham (1995: 370), which is also linked to the sequential debates that are based on the criticism of the intellectuals.

As the vanguards of the Enlightenment, intellectuals had this legitimacy and authority in the Western thought throughout 18th and 19th century, in a similar sense to the Plato’s “philosopher kings”:

Their roots lie deep in the Western philosophical tradition and have, over the past few centuries, been sustained by the Enlightenment project. It is this that has allowed the intellectual to claim some special insight into human affairs and to assert that it is from afar, and from the vantage point of abstract and universal values, that society must be judged. (Jennings & Kemp-Welch, 2003: 15-6)

Enlightenment intellectuals were substantially organic intellectuals of bourgeoisie this time and with “a belief in the universality of man by contrast with feudal particularism” which is named by Sartre (2008: 236) as “bourgeois humanism”. They brought the ideology of bourgeoisie to light with emphasis on universalist rationality. Abandonment of collective myths and the rise of “individualism” was the great outcome of this transformation. As Mannheim (1960: 31-2) points out, the Enlightenment intellectuals argued that “it is always necessary for the individuals to free [their] judgments from those of others and to think through certain issues in a rational way from the point of view of [their] own interests” excluding the peasants and workers who still were “regulated to a certain extent on the basis of myths, traditions or mass-faith in a leader” (Mannheim, 1960: 31-2). However, in practice, one’s taking the full initiative and judgment of his/her life through individualistic and rationalistic way of living did not materialize in the society of “division of labor and functional differentiation” (Mannheim, 1960: 33). It stayed as the dream of the Enlightenment and its intellectuals. However, only after this rise of the modern intellectuals, these figures started to be called “intellectuals” in both political and academic circles.

2.1.2. Denomination of Intellectuals

Prior to the usage of the term 'intellectual', 'intelligentsia' started to be used in Russia referring to "self-conscious elite of the well-educated characterized by critical tendencies toward the status quo" in 1860s⁷ (Gouldner, 1979: 57). Mainly, the Russian intelligentsia back then

(1) had a deep concern for matters of public interest; (2) had a sense of personal responsibility for the state; (3) tended to view political and social issues as moral ones; (4) felt obligated to seek ultimate logical conclusions; and (5) were convinced that something went wrong and needed to be fixed. (Li, 2010: 3)

Dissent and responsibility became prominent for defining the intelligentsia as a result of the socio-political context of Russia and left a lasting impression on the concept. They "saw themselves as the heirs of the Enlightenment, leading the common people out of the darkness of Tsarist political repression and cultural obscurantism" (Garnham, 1995: 365). However, this emergence of the intelligentsia revealed the passivity of the common people and bisected the society as "intelligentsia" and "people" where:

The people were the inert clay to the intelligentsia's active zeal, the slothful against the energetic, the superstitious against the educated, the benighted against the enlightened, the ignorant against the knowledgeable; in short, the backward against the progressive. The people were as yet unformed, ready to receive in any shape the well-informed, skillful action which the intelligentsia may bestow; and they would never reach such shape were the intelligentsia to fail in its mission. (Bauman, 1992: 85)

This historical division and marginalization shows itself in the distance between the intelligentsia and people in various countries as a regulatory principle of the communication between these two parties, which will be scrutinized in the section concerning Turkey. On the other hand, some scholars do not see this process in Russia as negatively as Bauman. Jennings and Kemp-Welch (2003: 7-8) treats intelligentsia as a rootless

⁷ While almost all authors relate the usage of the term 'intelligentsia' with 1860s Russia, Robert Brym mentions an earlier usage by Hegel in 1816 referring to Prussia as "state of intelligentsia" with an elitist connotation in which he sees the intellectual minds as the "driving force of the history" (2001: 7634). In addition, Raymond Williams also shortly mentions an unfavorable and sarcastic usage of "intellectual" with a quote from Lord Byron in 1813: "I wish I may be well enough to listen to these intellectuals" (1983: 169).

writer-critic bloc “caught in a limbo between state and society”, critical to both but lacking authority to judge or convict, also trying to be a “custodian of cultural and ethical values against the infringements of the State”. They also evaluate the tradition of intelligentsia as a significant factor in the process that led to the Russian Revolution.

Russian intelligentsia was a self-conscious group however they were not making declarations or taking actions directly under this collective identity. It was at the dawn of the 20th century in France during the Dreyfus Affair when the intellectuals appealed authorities for the first time with the noun: “We, intellectuals”⁸. The interference of Zola, a naturalist novelist, in this political incident became the symbol and milestone of the Sartrean responsibility of the intellectual who meddles in cases that are not his/her business without having the power of sanction. Just a day after Zola’s letter, several artists, writers, scientists, lawyers, engineers, academics and philosophers signed petitions in support of Zola and wrote “The Manifesto of Intellectuals” demanding the revision of the trial. With Durkheim’s and other writer/scholars’ essays in the early 20th century, “sociology of intellectuals” became a topic of study and intellectuals had started trying to explain the meaning of the concept vehemently, lasting until today.

The politicization of the Dreyfusard intellectuals was triggered by an extraordinary court-martialed case. Coser (1965: 143) claims that during the major junctures in the politics such as Dreyfus Affair “this type of intellectual appears on the scene as spokesman for sets of abstract ideas and ideals that are endangered by the men of power”. Bourdieu (1991: 658) finds an exemplary value in their actions that affirms artistic or scientific authority. After the movement itself, this engagement started to be counted as a

⁸ In 1894, a Jewish military officer Alfred Dreyfus was convicted for treason and put into prison, however two years later, evidences indicating his innocence showed up. The military spoiled the evidence and he was charged with even more guilt. The case became a public issue following the Émile Zola’s (1898) open letter to the president of France in the front page of *L’Aurore* on January 13, named “J’Accuse...” in which he accused the president of not intervening to this anti-Semitic and unfair adjudication.

responsibility of the “intellectual”, a collective noun that covers various occupations, where “intellect” plays a central role.

Bauman (1989: 21) evaluated this common ground as dismissive for non-intellectuals:

Shared intimacy with the intellect not only set such men and women apart from the rest of the population, but also determined a certain similarity in their rights and duties. Most importantly, it gave the incumbents of intellectual roles a right (and a duty) to address the nation on behalf of Reason, standing above partisan divisions and earth-bound sectarian interests. It also attached to their pronouncement the exclusive veracity and moral authority which only such a spokespersonship may bestow.

Yet “this shared intimacy with the intellect” still provides only a vague ground and is not always helpful to draw the definitional boundaries of being an intellectual. In order to call someone intellectual, which features have been considered essential, sufficient or improper in the West from the 20th century onwards? Are they special and scarce people or a technical group? In the following section, I am going to discuss the approaches which have slightly different answers to these questions and adopt an analytical definition using some of the authors, which will help the study during the analysis part.

2.1.3. Categorization of Different Perspectives

The literature concerning sociology of knowledge or intellectual history is massive. Nevertheless, the large part of this literature suffers from its ultra-normative/moralistic approach and limited/narrow context when it comes to analytical examination of the subject, which is the identity of the intellectual. This, of course, does not depreciate their significance since by means of these texts –that are written by the intellectuals– the meaning of the “intellectual” differentiates as well.

To illustrate, a cornerstone in the literature, Edward Said’s 1993 *Reith Lectures on “Representations of Intellectual”* should be seen not –at least, primarily– as a text that directly analyzes the concept theoretically but as a polemical call to potential intellectuals to disentangle from professionalism and state-dependency and to evoke and rebuild the role of the intellectual as

an exilic outsider who speaks “truth” to the power. Said dashes into a vast corpus about the intellectuals covering pivotal texts of Benda, Gramsci, Sartre, Debray etc.; literary works of Joyce, Turgenev and Flaubert not with an aim to compare or dispute them up against each other but to promote his argument about the intellectual role and duty. Herein, I do not criticize the subjectivity of Said with an ideal of the completely objective study, which does not exist. However, while constructing the theoretical framework, I am going to prefer theoretical/analytical texts to moral/normative ones. In other words, I will utilize the approaches that try to understand functions, roles and positions of the intellectuals in the social relations instead of the ones that offer ethical, political and cultural tasks to the intellectuals.

Here, my aim is firstly to make a categorization of the corpus in order to discuss all major aspects of the existence of the intellectuals in a clear-headed trajectory. Currently, there is no analytical approach that is postulated by all scholars, since various authors make their literature reviews in terms of different parameters such as spatio-temporal scenery of intellectuals⁹, their relations with ideas and ideology¹⁰ or class relations¹¹. Among these classifications, the most common and practical one is the “three theoretical models” claimed by Kurzman and Owens (2002), Li (2010), Brym (2001), Yetiş (2002) regarding the relationship between intellectual and class, which I am also going to focus on.

⁹ Coser (1965) examines French (Rococo Salon, Saint Simonians, Ideologues of Napoleon, and Dreyfusards etc.), English (coffeehouses in 18th century, literary figures in late 18th and early 19th century, literary bohemia in Greenwich, Fabian Society etc.) and American (Abolitionists, mid-20th century bureaucrats, scientists, academics, culture industry servants etc.) intellectuals in different times and places. Bottomore (1964) also investigates each of these countries and Eastern societies separately.

¹⁰ Genç’s (2006) thesis aims to classify the intellectual conceptualizations methodologically and her conclusion differentiates the approaches as essentialist, functionalist, both essentialist and functionalist, epistemologically particularistic and lastly multidimensional and holistic together with a special emphasis on the social roles. Nettl (1969) also criticizes the complexity and disorganization of the literature and proposes to analyze the intellectuals in terms of the relationships they established with the ‘dissent’.

¹¹ Garnham (1995: 360-1) finds three ways of defining intellectuals: as a class whose symbolic power comes from their cultural capital, as information workers who has a special position in division of labor, or normatively as a vocation which represents a universal and critical tradition.

Following the affirmation and popularization of the intellectuals during the Dreyfus affair, they lost this reputation in the course of the First World War. Implying the interwar period, Kurzman and Owens (2001: 64) mentions the birth of the “sociology of intellectuals” with a three class-related approaches as follows:

At this low point in the collective history of the intellectuals, the sociology of intellectuals emerged out of the long tradition of speculation on the subject. Three approaches developed at this time, each distinguished by its consideration of intellectuals as a class: one, pioneered by Antonio Gramsci, viewed intellectuals as bound to their class of origin; a second, associated with Karl Mannheim, treated intellectuals as potentially class-less; a third, popularized by Julien Benda, proposed that intellectuals form a class in themselves.

Naturally, not all writers studying the subject can easily be placed in one of these three theoretical models. Some never use the conceptual tools of class relations, some stand in between the two approaches and some directly criticizes the class-related explanations. However, these authors can also be included in one of these three models according to their insight regarding the social relations within which they locate the intellectuals.

2.1.3.1. Intellectuals as Class-in-Themselves, New Class and Professional-Managerial Class (PMC)

The evaluation of the intellectuals as a separate class that has its own interests and occupies a distinct position in the division of labor owes its genesis to French philosopher Julien Benda’s classic *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals* (1955). Calling the intellectual as “clerk”, Benda makes a distinction between laymen and clerks. Laymen “whose whole function consists essentially in the pursuit of material interests”, may be bourgeois, proletarian or king and does what is expected from them in a realist manner (1955: 29). In contrast to laymen, clerks are

. . . essentially a distinct humanity, which to a certain extent acted as a check upon the former. I mean that class of men whom I shall designate ‘the clerks’, by which term I mean all those whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science of meta-physical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages,

and hence in a certain manner say: 'My kingdom is not of this world.' Indeed, throughout history, for more than two thousand years until modern times, I see an uninterrupted series of philosophers, men of religion, men of literature, artists, men of learning (one might say almost all during the period), whose influence, whose life, were in direct opposition to the realism of multitudes. (1955: 30-1)

Clerks' indifference to the practical and material passions –mainly, politics– and striving for theoretical, abstract and transcendental moral values are what separate them from the laymen. However, by “betrayal”, Benda criticizes contemporaneous clerks –mostly Anti-Dreyfusards' reactionary attitudes and Dreyfusards' politicization afterwards– with “the thirst for immediate results, the exclusive preoccupation with the desired end, the scorn for the argument, the excess, the hatred, the fixed ideas” (1955: 32). Moreover, he criticizes clerks' struggle for their own class, ideology, nation and race¹² as follows: “The ‘clerks’ have played the game of political passions by their doctrines” (1955: 60), and they praise attachment to the particular and practical and denounce the feeling of universal and spiritual (1955: 81).

Dreyfusards' self-representation illustrated Benda's vision of clerks as a separate class in the clearest sense. They spoke for themselves, risked their interests for independent judgment and most of them were not politicians –at least at the beginning. Benda's emphasis on the detachment of the clerk, as in the cult example of the “ivory tower”, is always criticized by two main poles of the politics,

The Left usually characterize this detachment as an ivory-towered and unworldly elitism that leads at best to irrelevance and a passive acquiescence in the oppression of their fellow citizens, and at worst to a spurious legitimation of that oppression as part of the way of the world. The Right, not dissimilarly, typically accuse intellectuals of being snobbish and antipopulist. Even the self-styled friends of the people are said to dislike the popular culture of the masses, which they seek to displace through sinister programmes of re-education. (Bellamy, 2003: 25)

¹² Benda perpetually mentions superiority of the transcendental values that can be applied universally to the national interests. However, what he argues as universal is actually the European and Western understanding, which is clear in his examples, which include only Europeans –except Jesus– according to Said (1996: 30).

As summarized by Bellamy, by contrast with Benda's defense, 'disengagement' is largely evaluated with pejorative terms in the literature about the intellectuals. However, various sorts of dissociations are also seen as significant strategies for intellectuals to gain autonomy, which will be discussed afterwards.

Coser's above-cited book *Men of Ideas* (1965) is largely counted in a similar vein with Benda in terms of evaluating the intellectuals as a "self-conscious group", having a class-like solidarity and concerning with ideas that exceed the practical interests. Intellectuals are 'men of ideas' according to Coser. He (1965: 136) offers six modalities regarding the men of ideas in terms of their relations with power: intellectuals who (i) hold power, (ii) direct and advise men of power, (iii) legitimize and provide ideological justifications for men of power, (iv) act as critics of power by holding up absolute standards of moral righteousness or (v) despair of exercising influence at home and (vi) turn to political systems abroad that seem more nearly to embody the image of their desire. This wide range spans a great space from the philosopher-kings to the exilic intellectuals. Actually, Coser recedes from his point of departure at this point, where the intellectuals are no longer measured by the dichotomy between action and idea. This premise of taking actions and ideas as separate categories both obscures some historical exceptions (Reformation, French Revolution and above all, Marxist praxis) and portrays the intellectuals as an ideal, almost conceptual, non-existent figure in some statements of both Benda and Coser (Nettl, 1969: 61).

Starting in 1960s and advancing in 1970s, the most dominating current in class-in-themselves approach was the "New Class" theories¹³. Mostly based on the bureaucratic and technocratic class debates of the mid-twentieth century, several authors such as Daniel Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Alvin Gouldner, George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi claimed that a new intellectual/intelligentsia class is emerging in this stage of the capitalism.

¹³ As a universal class, "new class" is used in the context of both Western capitalism and Soviet-type state socialism in different manners. Here I will only refer to its usage in capitalist countries.

Bell (1976) argued that the post-industrial –or information– society is characterized by knowledge and information that may have given birth to a knowledge class that has a great influence on the society. According to Bell, as the theoretical knowledge becomes central for production, its effect in social and economic change increases, hence this “scientific-technological intelligentsia gains great prominence, prestige, and power” (Lipset & Dobson, 1972: 175). However, Bell was hesitant about calling these knowledge-workers as a self-conscious class who has collective political passion or ideology, thus he settled with the argument that they are liberating from other classes’ interests thanks to their significant position in production.

In the late 1970s, new class debates became a hot topic in Marxist cadres. Alvin Gouldner, in his controversial “The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class” (1979), proclaimed the twofold emergence of a “structurally differentiated and (relatively) autonomous” class¹⁴ comprised of intellectuals and technical intelligentsia that struggles against the existing power holders in 20th century. The circumstances that ripened this class are numerous. Primarily, the secularization of the education which de-sacralized authority claims; rise of diverse vernacular languages and pulling through of Latin language; breakdown of the patriarchal family system and patronage relationships with the old elite; expansion of market of the new class’ which led to a less control over their work; higher education opportunities; developments in communication systems were all effective in the emergence of the new class (1979: 2-5). He defines the new class as a “flawed universal class” –emancipatory albeit elitist:

¹⁴ Gouldner claims that his definition of New Class is Marxist, in terms of the definition of this group with having same relations with means of production which is cultural/human capital. New Class is neither old proletariat nor bourgeoisie; it cannot be covered by these two elder concepts. Dwelling on Communist Manifesto, he states this “historically diverse grouping” can constitute a new class in a Marxist sense (1979: 8). Despite living through wage system like working class, new class has control over “content of its work and its work environment, rather than surrendering these in favor of getting the best wage bargain it can negotiate”. Its class consciousness is not “economistic” but cultural – i.e. “producing worthy objects and services and to the development of the skills requisite for these” (1979: 20-1). Of course, this optimism –assumption of new class having great control and independence over their work– of Gouldner is seriously criticized since there are several examples indicating the exact opposite in the context of the capitalist cultural production.

The New Class is elitist and self-seeking and uses its special knowledge to advance its own interests and power, and to control its own work situation. Yet the New Class may also be the best card that history has presently given us to play. The power of the New Class is growing (1979: 7).

Differentiated by its cultural capital, new class has a revolutionary potential according to Gouldner. They have both capacity and quality to compete for power because of their considerable leverage in the mode of production. Both economically and politically “blocked ascendance” produces a political consciousness and radicalization for new class together with alienation.

[H]ow do we account for the alienation of intellectuals and intelligentsia? In terms of: (a) the culture of critical discourse (CCD), which does not focus on what intellectuals think about but on how they think; (b) the blockage of their opportunities for upward mobility; (c) the disparity between their income and power, on the one side, and their cultural capital and self-regard, on the other; (d) their commitment to the social totality; (e) the contradictions of the technical, especially the blockage of their technical interests. In important part, the culture of critical discourse constitutes the characterizing values of the New Class; the other considerations (b-e) bear on the question of whether and how far the New Class will adhere to the CCD. (1979: 58-9)

Finally, Gouldner points out two distinct groups in the new class: (humanistic) intellectuals and technical intelligentsia. While intelligentsia’s interests are primarily technical, intellectuals’ interests are more critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and political. Both struggles against the bourgeoisie and adopts CCD. Technical intelligentsia’s “social mission” is to revolutionize technology, break the traditional solidarities and culture by using their mastery in the symbolic space of their occupation¹⁵. Humanist intellectuals aimed more normative, non-specialized and large-scale criticism about the society. (1979: 47-50).

In retrospect, Gouldner’s optimistic expectation from the new class is evaluated as one of the “most dramatic failed prophecies of the late twentieth century” since the following years was marked with the ascendancy of new

¹⁵ Gouldner’s “technical intelligentsia” and Foucault’s “specific intellectual” have a lot in common in terms of using their occupational knowledge for a revolutionary politics. However, Foucault rejects a new-class position and does not claim that all the educated-technical workers are specific intellectuals, which I will expand in class-bound approach.

right that “launched an all-out attack on the educated morality of the intellectuals” (Schryer, 2007: 663-4). Schryer’s explanation is in the context of USA and Reaganism but England and Turkey experienced similar processes. Neither the technical intelligentsia nor the intellectuals built a significant oppositional and competitive force against the bourgeoisie.

In a similar vein with new class, again in the late 1970s, Barbara and John Ehrenrich (1979) refers to the Professional-Managerial Class (PMC) dwelling on E. P. Thompson’s and Poulantzas’ definitions of the petty bourgeoisie or middle class’ position in Marxist class relations.

We will argue that the “middle class” category of workers which has concerned Marxist analysis for the last two decades-the technical workers, managerial workers, “culture” producers, etc.-must be understood as comprising a distinct class in monopoly capitalist society. The Professional-Managerial Class (“PMC”), as we will define it, cannot be considered a stratum of a broader “class” of “workers” because it exists in an objectively antagonistic relationship to another class of wage earners (whom we shall simply call the “working class”). Nor can it be considered to be a “residual” class like the petty bourgeoisie; it is a formation specific to the monopoly stage of capitalism. It is only in the light of this analysis, we believe, that it is possible to understand the role of technical, professional and managerial workers in advanced capitalist society and in the radical movements. (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1979: 9-10)

The authors evaluate PMC neither as a minority in nor an appendage/ally of the working class but as a mass constituency that is enough for itself. PMC consists of “salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations”, i.e. teachers, social workers, psychologists, entertainers, middle-level administrators, managers, engineers, scientists and so on (1979: 12). Their main function is to reproduce –in Althusserian sense– the capitalist relations and division of labor as educated and professional workers of capitalists. Like working class, they also sell their labor but their interests are mutually contradictory with working class. On the other hand, PMC is not petty-bourgeoisie –artisans, shopkeepers, self-employed professionals and independent farmers– in the classical Marxist sense since unlike petty-

bourgeoisie it is directly employed by the capitalist class and works for wage. (1979: 16-8). For the authors, the PMC has a political radicalism and this ideology stems from their aim to extend their hegemony over the working class, which increases the hostility between the two parties, namely the intellectuals and the people.

Although Ehrenrichs do not use the word 'intellectual' directly on behalf of PMC or vice versa, their theory is interpreted also as an approach to the intellectuals. Wayne (2003: 13-6) adjoins Ehrenrichs' analysis with Marx's and Mandel's separation between mental/intellectual and manual labor and argues that for the knowledge workers there is a higher possibility for becoming independent. However, despite all the differences both classes struggle against the same socio-economical force which is capital. In terms of reproducing the mode of production, intellectuals' role is twofold:

From the point of view of the impact of their symbolic products, they may be engaged in reproduction (producing ideas and values, otherwise known as ideology, which legitimise the dominant social order); but, viewed from the point of view of production, it is clear that they produce commodities which realise surplus value for media capital, and, indeed, cultural goods as commodities have become increasingly important for capital investments and profits. There is, however, no necessary fit between the economic imperative and cultural values and, indeed, there are good reasons why they often diverge. (Wayne, 2003: 21)

As a result, intellectuals are "contradictorily located" between labor and capital. Cultural privileges, relative independence and partial integration into capital on the one side, exploitation and proletarianization on the other side; intellectuals commonly follow particular paths to fight against these conflicts: depoliticization during the production and dissemination of the ideas, professionalism in order to rise nearby the capital and hiding behind rationality and objectivity. However, even under these circumstances, there are times that intellectuals take stand with labor "when the irrationality and partiality of capital has become too acute to ignore" (2003: 23-4). Wright also mentions the ambiguous position of intellectuals in Marxist theory together with mentioning both their contribution to the social struggles and

revolutionary movements as theoreticians, polemicists and leaders on the one hand and their privileged position next to the bourgeoisie on the other (1979: 191-2). Wright, as a socialist, primarily strives for the potential political strategies that can link the various intellectuals to socialist movement and argues that, first, this contradictory location –in both economical and ideological levels– of the intellectuals has to be acknowledged; only after that, their role can be questioned (1979: 206-11).

Lastly, I will mention Bauman's functional approach emphasizing the diminution of the intellectual affectivity: a transition from being legislators to interpreters. His analysis of intellectuals, who constitute a "social nebula" with tenuous borders (1989: 81-2), follows the shift between modernity and post-modernity as the major socio-political context in which the intellectuals' roles and functions are performed. Regarding the modern legislator role, Bauman remarks:

It consists of making authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct and binding. The authority to arbitrate is in this case legitimized by superior (*objective*) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better access than the non-intellectual part of society. (1989: 4-5)

Scientists, philosophers and writers –i.e. enlighteners– who own the knowledge are separated from the masses, and also they are differentiated from each other since they have no inner-coalitions or interdependence. They are the guardians of law, order, truth and goodness with an ambivalent relationship with the state. Both an attraction to the power and a tendency towards the criticality may lead intellectuals to the dissent at times (1992: 91-3). However, for Bauman, in the late 20th century, the postmodern intellectual is characterized as an interpreter:

It consists of translating statements, made within one communally based tradition, so that they can be understood within the system of knowledge based on another tradition. Instead of being orientated towards selecting the best social order, this strategy is aimed at facilitating communication between autonomous (sovereign) participants. It is concerned with preventing the distortion of meaning in the process of communication. (1989: 5)

Bauman cautiously emphasizes that this tendency is not the elimination but the continuation of the modern tradition. It precludes the universalistic intentions and focuses on more local, autonomous, fragmented and specialized practices¹⁶. The postmodern era is not appropriate for the intellectuals to perform their traditional roles as legislators: “what appears to our consciousness as the crisis of civilization, or the failure of a certain historical project” that led the intellectuals to a pessimistic and defensive mood as a result of the deprivation of their legislative functions (1989: 122).

The artistic, scientific or literary production of the intellectual is increasingly dependent on the market proportional with its potential as a commodity. Market adopts the “role of the judge, the opinion-maker, the verifier of values. Intellectuals have been expropriated again” (1989: 124). It has the greatest force on the constitution of the audience and the themes of the intellectuals’ production. Additionally, grounding his theory with the exploding consumerism, Bauman mentions that not only the intellectual lost its former attraction but also his/her audience lost their belief in the overarching utopian or rational projects (1989: 192-4). This decadent view of intellectuals explains the large part of the operation of the intellectual activity in late 20th century by revealing the substantial tendencies that are empirically verifiable. Instead of analyzing the intellectual in relation with the social classes, Bauman uses modernity-post-modernity transformation which does not have much to say about the class relations¹⁷. This ‘consumption based’ analysis that permeates his overall text obscures the mode of production underlying the intellectual activities and intellectuals’ political orientations shaped by the class relations they have with the rest of the society. Bauman’s conception of the liquid-modern society as a collection of extremely atomized and individualized consumers whose identities are constructed through their consumption instead of their relations in division of

¹⁶ Bauman’s “interpreter” has several common points with Foucault’s “specific intellectual”, which will be mentioned and discussed together in the following section.

¹⁷ For a critical review of Bauman’s conception of class as a narrow tool which needs to be avoided, see Atkinson (2008).

labor and author's renouncement of Marxism after the 1980s present a salient example of the self-proclaimed transformation of the intellectuals in a political sense.

In sum, the class-in-themselves model is not a homogenous approach carrying several opponent views. But the main argument is the evaluation of intellectuals as a separate class, group or strata in terms of their worldviews, intrinsic qualities, relations in the division of labor or internal relationships inside their own collectivity. While Benda writes with the idea of the sublime intellectual, the Marxist scholars of the 1970s carries an aim to analyze the rising educated white-collar labor. The former does not provide useful insights for my analysis; however, the latter has some applicable points to the case of Turkey which I am going to discuss in the last part of this chapter.

2.1.3.2. Intellectuals as Classless

Standing between the class-bound and class-in-themselves approaches, there is a theoretical model which evaluates intellectuals as relatively independent from the existing classes and having heterogeneous features that does not allow them to constitute a class of their own. Karl Mannheim is the leading proponent of this approach which proceeds principally with Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, Seymour Martin Lipset and Randall Collins.

Mannheim associates rise of free intelligentsia with the decreasing power of church and hierarchical organization coupled with the individualization of the society in capitalism (1960: 28-9). In this manner, he mentions the intellectuals as people who provide interpretations about the world based on the "rationally justifiable system of ideas" emerged in the course of the Age of Enlightenment (1960: 33). However, using Alfred Weber's "socially unattached intelligentsia" and the term 'free-floating', Mannheim rejects the two views which claim that "the intellectuals constitute either a class or at least an appendage to a class" and argues that this approach may never explain the "essential quality of the whole" (1960: 137-

8). Despite generally being close to the bourgeoisie in socio-economical respect, intellectuals are extremely heterogeneous and differentiated from bourgeoisie, working class and other intellectuals. The only “unifying sociological bond” between the intellectuals is education according to Mannheim, a heritage which “progressively tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual educated people” and “subjects him [intellectual] to the influence of opposing tendencies in social reality” instead of directly absorbing the ideological¹⁸ distortions (1960: 138-9).

This unattached nature of intellectuals triggers a twofold behavior for intellectuals: voluntary affiliation with one of the antagonistic classes or “scrutiny of their own social moorings and the quest for the fulfillment of their mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole”¹⁹ (1960: 140). Since they are the rare examples who can transcend their original class-bounds, for them adaptation to and affiliation with other classes –which also are in need of the intellectuals for their functions in knowledge production– is possible. Hence, for sociology, Mannheim asserts, (i) the acquiescence of intellectuals’ ambivalent position, (ii) analysis of the particular time/spaces in which the intellectuals change sides and (iii) how intellectuals derive the ideas about the antagonistic classes in certain cases have great significance (1960: 204-5). What Mannheim offers as the mission of the intellectuals from his liberal position is encouraging mutual understanding between the classes via their broader view of society. However, these heterogeneous collective of intellectuals may be in various positions of political spectrum: conservatives, proletariat or liberal

¹⁸ Mannheim uses “ideology” analogous with Marx, in a negative manner which conceals the real relations. He claims “in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it” (1960: 36). He puts “political knowledge” against the false ideology and claims that intellectuals’ role is to promote the former against the latter.

¹⁹ This distinction is well suited to the large portion of the intellectuals in Turkey who were at first politicized in the socialist movement ranking next to the working class but after the military coup’s smashing of political left, returned to their own social moorings and individual interests.

bourgeoisie (Karabel, 1996: 227). Furthermore, according to Mannheim, intellectuals transform the “conflicts of interests into conflicts of ideas” that increase the self-knowledge of the society. As in Plato, he also longs for the intellectual elites “to put their hands on the tiller of the state” (Coser, 1965: 136-7).

The classless approach’s subsequent theoretician was Talcott Parsons who argued that the major characteristic of intellectuals is putting cultural consideration ahead of social ones:

I should like to speak of the intellectual as a person who, though as a member of a society in the nature of the case he performs a complex of social roles, is in his principal role-capacity expected –an expectation normally shared by himself- to put cultural considerations above social in defining the commitments by virtue of which his primary role and position are significant as contributions to valued outcomes of his action. (1969: 4)

As in Benda, this preclusion of societal, practical and material needs relocates intellectual out of his/her original social class. But unlike Benda, Parsons does not mention the striving with the sacred, universal and ideal problems, instead, he uses cultural realm as “the patterning of meaning in symbolic systems” where intellectuals evaluate the society normatively to some degree (1969: 3). Right after, he mentions that the cultural systems, far from being undifferentiated or monolithic, are highly heterogeneous and complex systems –especially after the development of written language and philosophical breakthroughs such as secularization of philosophy and universities. Largely standing “in the upper ranges of the scale of social stratification”, intellectuals’ significance mounts up day by day as the applied fields of the intellectual disciplines increase in number, hence, this gives them “a concern that is expressed both in a sense of responsibility and in the assertion of a ‘right to be heard,’ to exert ‘influence’” (1969: 19-21).

The differentiation of the culture in which intellectuals make their symbolic production is backed up with “end of ideology” thesis of Bell in Parson’s account of the intellectuals, where the radical political struggles such as Marxism is ostracized (Bell, 1969: 23). Accordingly, Parson’s

intellectuals act as dedicated professionals, who are allies with bourgeoisie, trying to “forge a new, genteel elite continuous with but better than the past” (Gouldner, 1979: 6-7). Also, Parsons also grounds his approach regarding the influence of intellectuals with “actor’s prestige”. Academic or otherwise, highly regarded intellectuals’ messages may be understood by few circles but appreciated widely, therefore, becomes more persuasive independently of its content, respected and deferred by large masses²⁰ (Lipset & Dobson, 1972: 177-8).

The tradition of “classless intellectuals” reached its climax with Edward Shils’ studies in the field in which he gave a charismatic, widely-quoted definition of the concept:

In every society, however, there are some persons with an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society. There is in every society a *minority* of persons who, more than the ordinary run of their fellow men, are inquiring, and desirous of being in *frequent communion with symbols* which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life and remote in their reference in both time and space. (1972: 3) [emphasis added]

At the same time, in all societies there are people who demand this intellectual –religious or secular; mostly artistic, literary and scientific– production; hence intellectuals from different strata in the social structure produce their works from different ideological positions²¹. Their efforts contribute to the sense of community via the shared history, emotions and ideas (1972: 4-5). However, despite being largely supportive with regards to the legitimation of the rulers through their creation of the orderliness, solidarity, coherence and stability or playing active role in the administration, they may be critical or even revolutionary at times.

By defining intellectuals as “those who create, distribute, and apply culture –the symbolic world of man, including art, science, and religion”

²⁰ Surely, this estimation precludes a prevailing phenomenon called “anti-intellectualism” which dominates several societies especially during the tyrannical governings in which the credibility, reputability and notability of the intellectuals are diminished.

²¹ In terms of their tensions with the power, Shils (1972: 18-21) specifies five intellectual traditions: scientific, romantic, revolutionary/apocalyptic, populist and anti-intellectualist currents.

Seymour Martin Lipset also argues that “they do not constitute a distinct class or community”, however, he contends that their capacity of creativity and criticism makes them transcend their class origin (1959: 460). Lipset (1959; with Dobson 1972; 1979) largely works on the intellectuals in the American universities in order to analyze their political orientations. Essentially, he questions the myth about the academic staff’s being mostly liberal, left-leaning and even radical. However, his findings demonstrate that the political inclination of the academics is nearly balanced between liberal/left and right. The myth suggests professors to be more liberal and radical than any other strata and that there is a higher ratio of leftist/liberal professors among the prestigious and productive scholars (1979: 32-3). According to Lipset, however, while social and some of the natural sciences staff are more liberal or leftist, the business and agriculture schools are widely conservative and right-wing²². His researches stand as evidences against the romantic and stereotypical conceptions of the intellectuals about being critical, progressive and radical. He shows that high education and knowledgeableness does not bring the critical stance concomitantly.

From the anti-communist wing, Raymond Aron (1962), in his cold-war classic ‘The Opium of the Intellectuals’, made similar remarks to Shils or Lipset in defining the intellectuals as non-manual workers –scribes, experts, men of letters with respect to their professions. They produce and transmit culture²³, work as advisor, counselor and specialists. While leaving some room for social origin as a factor for the political attitudes of the intellectuals,

²² While it is not reasonable to reach any conclusions about the societies other state other than U.S. with their data, different political positionings stemming from different academic disciplines cannot be disclaimed, (e.g., the work of the engineers is more dependent to the capital compared to the philosophers) Yet, there can be many other factors influencing the political orientations of the university staff such as educational policies of the country, institutionalization of universities, contemporary political atmosphere etc.

²³ The critical culture of intellectuals can be categorized in three steps according to Aron: technical, moral and ideological/historical criticism. Technical criticism covers immediate and practical political propositions; moral criticism is denunciative of the present notions of the society against intellectual’s ideational plans without a need to have an idea about the consequences or solutions afterwards; ideological or historical criticism is the attack against the present society and “sketches out the blueprint of a radically different order”, i.e. socialism (1962: 210-1). Aron attributes priority to moral criticism by locating it as the source of the others.

he also argues that different professions, countries, institutional settings have their own political traditions (1962: 213-18). Starting from this, Aron, who was a Marxist once and had a close and tense friendship with Sartre, offers a harsh criticism of the –largely French– intellectuals and Marxism of his era. He evaluates Marxism as the opium –or more pejoratively, disease– of the intellectuals who are divorced from action, constraints and responsibilities of actual politics and gratified by utopian speculative, abstract, literary and dogmatic ideas (Garland, 2007: 69-70). The prestige of the left, revolution and proletariat has a “hypnotic power” over the significant portion of the French intellectuals according to Aron, which causes them to find reforms as boring and prosaic, however, revolution as exciting and poetic (Brombert, 1955: 14-5). In addition, as other critics of the Soviets, Aron maintains the view that degrades the practical applications of socialism in terms of state economy and lack of freedom. Conclusively, he discusses the “end of the ideological age” thesis with socialist regimes all over the world and declares the Western welfare state combined with free market as superior to others and gets through with the hopes from intellectuals to abolish leftist fanaticism²⁴ (1962, 305-24).

Thomas Molnar (1958: 33) also scorns radical leftist intellectuals but unlike Aron, he thinks they are minority: “the classless society has become an empty slogan. Only a few credulous Western intellectuals still take it seriously”. Molnar’s thesis (1961) concerning “the decline of the intellectual” on the one hand voices criticism about the integration of the universities to the capitalist market relations, i.e. instead of raising intellectuals with an aim to learn comprehensively and think and act independently, these institutions started to produce social engineers who are under the command of capital. The critical intellectuals are stuck in the universities, trying to build their utopias dissociated from the society. However, on the other hand, he also announces the end of ideologies, in an early post-modern manner, and

²⁴ Aron’s critique of leftist intellectuals because of their attachment to their ideologies can equally be turned back to Aron himself in terms of his strong support for anti-communism.

relates –mostly communist– intellectuals’ decline with the loss of classless society utopias. For him, in substitution for the intellectuals who struggle along with working class, now bureaucrats, experts and social engineers seized the power to organize the society, with more realistic terms (1958: 36). Molnar proceeds and celebrates the loss of ideology and heroic roles:

Speaking generally, the intellectual is free for the first time since the wars of religion to use his conscience independently, without submitting it to the dictates and censorship of ideologies and partisan interests. He may now explore the human condition and the future without donning the distorting lenses of a class, and without “ulterior motives.” His political and social views will profit by this change of optics. For he now has the possibility of a personal choice; instead of asserting himself by denying others, as Marxist dialectics obliged him to do, he may appraise the value of openness and charity toward his fellow man. (1958: 38)

Molnar and Aron were the spearhead examples of the anti-Marxist current in the intellectual studies at a time when the universities were surrounded with the leftist and socialist ideas that did not successfully resolve into a political action.

One of the most brightest and avid scholar in the classlessness approach was C. Wright Mills. Mills, in his classical study “White Collar”, evaluated intellectuals as the most far-flung, heterogeneous and scattered group in middle-class that they are “relatively classless” (1956: 142). Also he argued that they cannot be defined as a single social unit, hence, they have to be defined regarding their functions and their subjective characteristics, similar to Gramsci. Despite Mills’ emphasis on the middle class, white collar and classlessness, his analysis of political intellectuals shares several commonalities with Gramsci in terms of the ideological function: “they create, facilitate, and criticize the beliefs and ideas that support or attack ruling classes, institutions and policies; or they divert attention from these structures of power” (1956: 143). Led away from orthodox Marxism, he argued that intellectuals have significant role for the success of a revolutionary movement.

Mills also traces the radical and critical intellectuals until the mid-twentieth century, and like several other scholars, his conclusion is a bleak one which implies “a loss of political will and even of moral hope” (1956: 145). The intellectuals are transformed from Leninist vanguard radicals to the technicians except some silent, marginal and ineffective groups still staying at the left-side of the political spectrum. For Mills, it is a malady of the intellectuals having more and more knowledge while their influence is decreasing. That leads to frustration, “a tragic sense of life”, staying as a detached spectator that articulates to the organized irresponsibility of the modern society (Mills: 2008: 14-6). However, what he offers –and represents, while being aware of and accepting his own powerlessness– is the exact opposite of this irresponsibility, i.e. “to resist and to fight the stereotyping and consequent death of genuinely living things” with an involvement in political struggle against mass-art and mass-thought (Mills, 1963: 299; as cited in Said, 1992: 21).

After the 1970s, the classlessness approach lost altitude, apart from aforementioned book of Randall Collins (2002) and Ahmad Sadri’s (1992) book discussing the Weberian understanding of the intellectual. This approach is mostly pleaded by liberal and conservative authors except Mills, with an emphasis on the education as a factor for transcending the class belonging. They attribute a meaning to the intellectuals for the socio-political change. The authors are mostly persistent about the ideational autonomy and social disconnectedness of the intellectuals. Hence, similar to the former approach, they “minimize the significance of social influences on the shaping of ideas” (Brym, 2001: 7632).

2.1.3.3. Intellectuals as Class-Bound

The last –and arguably the most influential– theoretical model for understanding the intellectuals’ position in the society was propounded by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who argued that each social class has its own intellectuals “which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own

function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (1992: 5). For him, there is neither a separate and self-conscious class of intellectuals nor a classlessness in which the intellectuals may transcend the class-related attachments. On the contrary, intellectuals represent the interests of classes that took shape throughout the history. The capitalist class has its own technically capable and specialized “organic” intellectuals who exercise hegemony throughout society, handle the technical necessities for production and organize the new culture. Apart from organic intellectuals, Gramsci also mentions a second group called “traditional” intellectuals who have a historical continuity independently from the radical changes in the social and political form of the society (1992: 7). Crystallized in ecclesiastics, traditional intellectuals such as literary people, teachers, scientists seem and act as if they are autonomous from dominant groups, but essentially this serves to purpose of concealing their class attachments (1992: 7-8). On the other side, the groups "developing towards dominance . . . struggle to assimilate and to conquer ideologically the traditional intellectuals" (1992: 10).

In the matter of distinguishing whether a person is intellectual or not, Gramsci states:

All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals. When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non--intellectuals, one is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is, one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort . . . Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a “philosopher”, an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought. (1992: 9)

In this lengthy quote, Gramsci both mentions his original idea of evaluating people as philosophers who actively participates in the production of

culture²⁵ and also differentiates intellectuals from masses in terms of their function about presenting an ideology. This designation of the intellectual function is established through technical and intellectual education. The conventional usage of intellectual referring to men of letter, philosophers and artists are challenged in the modern world as the people having technical education increased. Hence, both qualitatively and quantitatively, new roles emerged for the intellectuals. Thus, unlike fundamental social classes the production of the intellectuals are not direct and may not be material, but they function in terms of their degree of connection with the classes. Gramsci makes a distinction between two superstructural levels: civil society where the hegemony of the dominant group is exercised; political society where state employs its direct domination. At large, the spontaneous consent of the masses is gained by the historical prestige of the ruling class. If not, the state coercive power purveys the discipline in its legal way. In this setting, the intellectuals operate as "dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" (1992: 12). However, there are also times of opposition amongst the intellectuals which Gramsci indicates as follows:

Indeed, intellectual activity must also be distinguished in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, according to levels which in moments of extreme opposition represent a real qualitative difference-at the highest level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., at the lowest the most humble "administrators" and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual wealth. (1992: 13)

The linkage of the -urban- intellectuals to the capitalist class and its properties makes these intellectuals dependent on the capitalists. In their production, they lack autonomy and the majority of these intellectuals are mostly standardized, controlling elementary stages of work. As they advance the stairs of the industry they are increasingly identified with the capitalists.

²⁵ Gramsci attacks to the elitist and ivory-tower conceptualization of philosophy that only some gifted people are able to do. Intellectuals do not necessarily have higher intelligence in their intrinsic nature. "Thus everyone implicitly holds a philosophy, as seen in their general belief systems, opinions, and also their 'common sense' and 'good sense', that is their everyday sense of practical issues" (Ives, 2004: 73-4).

However, Gramsci also attracts substantial attention to the significance of the intellectuals who produce counter-hegemonic ideology, 'philosophy of praxis', with an organic connection with the lower class, that builds a "higher conception of life" over the "primitive philosophy of common sense" without discarding the latter (1992: 332-3). At this point, he argues for an intellectual production that affects the thoughts and political actions of masses which is far more "philosophical" than the discoveries made and stayed in the small circles of elite intellectuals²⁶.

Wright (1979: 194-6) finds "considerable merit of emphasizing the dynamic rather than static nature of class relation" in Gramsci's approach as regards realizing class not in terms of a structure of positions but class struggle. However, he also criticizes Gramsci with minimizing the "objective antagonism between many of these intellectuals and the bourgeoisie". As in the example of teachers, who can be classified as organic intellectuals of bourgeoisie or traditional intellectuals who are conquered by bourgeoisie, it is also evident that they are frequently oppressed, not members of the bourgeoisie and may also be politically against them. Gramsci's functional and structural class mapping obscures the "concrete social relations within which intellectual labor is performed" according to Wright. Hence, Wright incorporates Ehrenrichs' aforementioned PMC which takes into consideration the significance of the intellectual wage-labor and argues that some of the intellectuals' positions can be seen as "torn between classes" including contradictory character within these social class relations (1979: 202-3).

Jerome Karabel –with an aim to transform the debates about the relationship between intellectuals and politics from moralist approaches to realist ones– denies the ethical notions such as being a critic, advocating the

²⁶ Through his "philosophy of praxis" Gramsci presents an eloquent critic of the idealistic separation of philosophical and political activity. Besides, he also constructs a moral-intellectual path for revolutionary movement –not just a social movement but an entire cultural formation associated with it (Said, 1996: 3-4) – which I am not going to elaborate here since beyond the analysis of the intellectual function, these statements discuss the ways "how" may the intellectual behave. For Gramsci's views regarding the tasks that organic intellectual need to adopt, see Gramsci (1992: 320-65), Boggs (1976: 74-84), Sassoon (2000: 27-41) and Bellamy (2003: 26-41).

truth or opposing the power as the descriptors of an intellectual (1996: 206-7). Following a similar remark to Lipset, he also defines intellectuals as producer, transmitter and operator of culture in which they have knowledge and authority. But also in this cultural realm –Karabel dwells on Bourdieu and Bauman– they are also dominated and subordinated by the dominant class so they have an ambivalent relationship with the power that is mostly supportive of the economical-political elite (1996: 208-9). Karabel's original analytical contribution to the field is the categorization of the circumstances that would likely lead to the political radicalization of the intellectuals when they exist concomitantly: (i) existence of other subordinate groups such as working class; (ii) the lack of powerful business class; (iii) collective employment of intellectuals in big companies; (iv) existence of a repressive but not yet competent regime; (v) inner problems and dissociations in rulers; (vi) state's inadequacy in protecting people economic, political or even military attacks from outside; (vii) presence of sharp boundaries amongst social groups; presence of an insurgent cultural heritage. The association of some these circumstances not guarantees but forces intellectuals to radicalize and oppose the existing social order (1996: 211-4). This seemingly determinist remark is actually a retroactive deduction about the radicalization of the intellectuals. Additionally, it is also useful for a case analysis since it is comprehensive, flexible, easily testable and verifiable.

Michel Foucault, who shares Gramsci's emphasis on the unity of theory and practice, contests overarching understanding of intellectual as the spokesman of the universal. For him, the intellectual as the conscious bearer of the universal truth and justice was only an idea and is now obsolete. Instead, he mentions the born of specific intellectual after WWII, who affiliates with working class even more because of proletarianization:

Intellectuals have got used to working, not in the modality of the 'universal', the 'exemplary', the 'just-and-true-for-all', but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual relations). This has undoubtedly given them a much more immediate and concrete awareness of struggles. (1980: 126)

In Foucault's schema, while the intellectual par excellence derived from writer, jurist or notable is disappearing, the specific intellectual derived from the savant or expert who is able to apply the knowledge s/he has in a political manner –in terms of the production of the knowledge– is rising because of the extensive politicization of social and cultural life (1980: 127-9)²⁷. However, the specific intellectual also is not free from obstacles and dangers. Mentioning the risks of (i) staying affluently local and conjunctural; (ii) not getting sufficient support from other intellectuals and masses to develop a struggle; (iii) and being exposed to institutional and political pressures in the working environment, Foucault argues that the ground in which the function of the specific intellectual is established needs a reconsideration. He avoids the resuscitation of the old conception of the intellectual as the bearer of universal values, and proposes the specific intellectual who actively takes part in the construction of the regime of 'truth'. In Foucault's terms, truth is a political construction, "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements" and it is "linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it" (1980: 133). Regarding the specific intellectual, he claims that,

. . . his position can take on a general significance and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectoral. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. There is a battle 'for truth', or at least 'around truth'. . . (1980: 132)

Foucault's approach to the intellectuals is mostly derived from his interviews. His famous conversation with Gilles Deleuze is a fundamental text that caused several further debates. Again rooted in the relationship

²⁷ Foucault gives the physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who struggled for the confinement of the usage of hydrogen bomb, as an example of the 20th century specific intellectual. He also traces its roots from Darwin and other evolutionists as biologists who significantly intervene in political, sociological, psychiatric issues with an engagement to their own expertise (1980: 129-30).

between theory and practice, this conversation recapitulates Foucault's views on intellectuals in his other texts, with an overtly normative mission:

The Intellectual's role is no longer to place himself "somewhat ahead and to the side" in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its objects and instrument in the sphere of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse." (1977: 207-8)

In this struggling against power, theory does not back up the practical applications; instead, theory itself is a part of the practice. Intellectual does not and should not "speak for others" in order to awaken consciousness but s/he should try to sap and take power. Also regarding the political preferences, Foucault (2000: 316-7) states that he does not adopt the lecture-giver role of the intellectual. Alternatively, the researches, analyses, behaviors or reactions of the intellectuals have capacity to illuminate a social field or particular situations such as penal law or problem of justice. In this manner, Foucault believes that intellectuals may help significantly to the perception and criticism of the world.

Lastly, I am going to mention Pierre Bourdieu's approach which consists of extensive research on intellectual and cultural field/capital with author's idiosyncratic conceptual settings before drawing the conclusive remarks about the theoretical framework of the intellectuals. Despite being categorized in class-in-themselves approach by Kurzman and Owens (2002) and Li (2010) –because of his overt rejection of Mannheim's and Gramsci's approaches and his emphasis on 'universality' similarly with Benda– or "shifting network of class and other group affiliations" by Brym (2001: 7632), Bourdieu's distinctive conceptualization of social classes and his emphasis on the position of the intellectual within the relations of domination and various sorts of capital accumulation makes him more akin to the authors of class-based approach more than the former two.

Avoiding a restrictive and determinant definition with a claim of objectivity, Bourdieu above all mentions that giving out a definition of intellectual is applying a symbolic power in the course of the struggle in the cultural field,

Despite the aura of objectivity they like to assume, neither the 'sociology of the intellectuals', which is traditionally the business of 'right-wing intellectuals', nor the critique of 'right-wing thought', the traditional specialty of 'left-wing intellectuals', is anything more than a series of symbolic aggressions which take on additional force when they dress themselves up in the impeccable neutrality of science. (1984: 12)

Thus, he claims that his own contribution to the theory "in the service of symbolic action (of a political type)" is an effort for the intervention of intellectuals in political life. Throughout his investigation of the possible means and ends of collective intellectual action, Bourdieu aims an analysis "which seeks to be as realistic as possible, of what an intellectual is and what he could be" (1991: 655-6). Compatible with his thesis of self-reflexivity, he mentions that the sociology of intellectuals must involve author's self-analysis and questioning of his/her own position as an intellectual. Together with all the troubles it carries, a constructive thinking process about intellectuals is possible and necessary both for adopting their own existence in social world and arming against the accusations (Çeğin, 2007: 504).

The main involvement of the intellectuals in the cultural and intellectual fields happens through their struggle for various forms of power by means of their possessions of social, economic and cultural capital leading to diverse sets and combinations of values, tastes and ideas. The particular political orientations and different levels and sorts of power of intellectuals are the social products of their distinct habitus.

The major claim of Bourdieu about the intellectuals touches on their interrelated position of being paradoxical and bidimensional:

The intellectual is a bidimensional being. To be entitled to the name of intellectual, a cultural producer must fulfill two conditions: on the one hand, he must belong to an autonomous intellectual world (*a field*), that is, independent from religious, political, and economic powers (*and so on*), and must respect its specific laws; on the other hand, he must invest the competence and authority he has acquired in the intellectual field in a political action, which is in any case carried out outside the intellectual field proper. (1991: 656)

Then, Bourdieu mentions the paradox of trying to reinforce autonomy from temporal political and economic powers²⁸ on the one hand, and their need to free themselves from the ivory towers and intervene politically with the help of organizations or other types of collective mechanisms (1991: 660). These two reciprocal thrusts constitute the repetitive history of the intellectuals' oscillation between political engagement and retreat. Bourdieu criticizes intellectuals of not struggling collectively to defend their specific interests and autonomy against the institutions promoting dependence.

This paradoxical position is accompanied with a contradictory condition for intellectuals in terms of class relations epitomized by Bourdieu as being "dominated among the dominant",

. . . dominated within the field of power, which leads them to make common cause with the dominated tout court-and this without their ceasing to participate in the dominant order, as possessors of one of the major principles of domination, cultural capital. (1991: 668)

Intellectuals' association with the other dominated classes stems from their own relationships with the power; nevertheless they also belong to the dominant class. Wayne (2003: 17-8), drawing on Bourdieu, summarizes the activity of the intellectuals in course of the reproduction of class relations as follows:

Under capitalism, the elaboration and dissemination of ideas become specialised within a particular category of people who monopolise premium modes of knowledge (formally accredited in educational institutions) and augment their advantages with social capital (personal networks, 'knowing the right people') and what Bourdieu calls cultural capital, the socially determined acquisition of competences and preferences which make up cultural tastes and further help to reproduce class differences.

This reproduction is largely undertaken by the intellectuals who work in political and administrative establishment and who are designated by Bourdieu as the worse fraction of the two evils –next to the disinterested and irresponsible intellectuals. The intellectuals who produce knowledge that

²⁸ The two main pressures over the intellectuals are firstly the hostility and censorship of the state and secondly the economic enterprises that engender a great subordination to the market (1991: 663-4).

propagates orthodoxy and power as “technicians of opinion” are referred to as “doxosophers” in Bourdieu’s terminology (1992). Doxa means the practical knowledge that the audience accepts without knowing, promoted by intellectuals like social scientists, technocrats, journalists, pollsters or marketing analysts (1991: 665-6). However, Bourdieu persistently emphasizes the need for critical intellectuals against the ideologists of power who monopolize the public debate. His insight for critical intellectual is neither the total-prophetic nor the specific. According to Bourdieu, as a result of the progress of knowledge and specialization, the total intellectual lost its credibility, but Foucault’s specific intellectual is also exceedingly restrictive attributing the intellectual to his/her own expertise. Thus, he suggests inventing new models of organization “which would give voice to a great collective intellectual, combining the qualifications and talents of all specific intellectuals²⁹” (1991: 667). Like several others, Bourdieu also claims that there is a great collapse for oppositional intellectuals in the 20th century in accordance with the transforming internal rules of intellectual field such as the rise of the new modes of communication, management science, devaluation of commitments, decline of intellectual craftsmanship, increasing market dependence and birth of several semi-intellectual occupations based merely on appearance (1984: 152).

The authors categorized in the class-bound model present incisive explanations about the social relations in which the intellectual activity takes place. They mostly do not have a romantic attribution to the intellectuals like calling them as the historical subjects –as in Gouldner–, instead, they underline the broad range of cultural and political functions that intellectuals may serve: from being the ideologues of the bourgeoisie to being allies of the lower classes. However, their societal function is the result of neither an arbitrary nor a completely deterministic process where a complex set of

²⁹ Bourdieu himself is the example of the public and universal intellectual figure he suggests. His call for corporatist intellectual organization that creates its own audience without comprising to the neoliberal pressures about producing privileges goes hand in hand with his sociological practice that renders him as “the most mediatic of all anti-mediatics” (Çeğin, 2007: 500).

social relations take place. In this complexity, the mediation between the mode of production and the intellectuals has twofold significance, (i) the contradictory relations that intellectuals have with other classes and (ii) the ideological outcomes of their labor in terms of ideological reproduction. In consideration of the above-mentioned perspectives, I attempt to build the theoretical framework of my analysis in the following section.

2.1.4. How to Think of Intellectuals in the Context of the Current Study

Although the corpus about the intellectuals is much deeper and more diverse than the abovementioned texts³⁰, I tried to highlight the major perspectives about their role and function and existence within the class relations. It is clear that giving out definite borders and predetermined features while defining the intellectual is risky since it settles the rest of the study significantly. However, in order to make a practical distinction –i.e. who to call intellectual– for the rest of the study, fundamental lines had to be drawn according to the object of study –the figures in the films– with non-normative claims as far as possible.

The whole process of tracing intellectuals' spatio-temporal roots, naming or categorizing them in the previous sections present some implications that wither some stereotypes about the intellectuals. Amongst the three major class-based approaches, the class-bound approach is the one that allows the most fruitful analysis of the relationship between the intellectuals and the society. The former two approaches attribute total or relative autonomy to intellectuals that leave social relations aside to varying degrees. However, by taking the class relations and the political struggles

³⁰ I haven't discussed the philosophical roots of the problematization of consciousness and knowledge which would require unaffordable space and time for this thesis. Likewise, there are utterly different debates about the functions of the intellectuals in the Soviets –mostly throughout their downfall– which stays out of the scope of this study. Lastly, another significant portion of the debates are the ones that theorize the intellectuals regarding regions or states such as Chinese intellectuals, Middle-Eastern intellectuals etc. which are not directly relevant. However, in the following section, I will give out a brief history of the intellectual tradition in late Ottoman Empire and Turkey which would be useful while analyzing the representations in the films of 1980s.

that are based on these relations into consideration, the positioning and political function of the intellectuals can be understood more incisively. This leads me to follow primarily the Gramscian class-bound approach that defines the intellectuals “with their contributions on the production and reproduction of the ideational/cultural knowledge in terms of political and class-based references” (Bora, 2010: 189 [tm]). Especially in the history Turkey, the political orientations and mental states of the intellectuals bound tightly to the social classes whom they take side with in the political arena, which will be mentioned in the next chapter in detail.

The classless approach’s evaluation of intellectuals as individuals who are free floating through the class relations by virtue of their education may shelter rightfulness for a liberated society that intellectuals are able to do their vocation freely from any political, economic and cultural pressures. However, intellectuals are in a constant pressure and power struggle both in the intellectual and the cultural environments they produce their works. One may think of political repression over the intellectuals, economic pressures in market that leads them to produce in accordance with the laws of the market etc. Also, the political alliances that intellectuals establish also leave them a limited area to move freely from the parties, ideologies, classes or identities they attach. In Turkey, where the intellectuals are primarily summoned with their ideological identities such as “leftist”, “Islamist-conservative”, “liberal” etc. the chance for intellectuals to rupture from class-bound dependencies is very low.

Targeting intellectuals as a class of their own has several different currents that marks different periods and places where the intellectuals economically and socially rise, establish associations with each other or differentiate from the remainder of the society. The new class, professional-managerial class, middle-class or white collar theorizations all express some significant deviations of particular intellectuals from other people in different eras. This approach, when used by Marxist leaning authors such as Ehrenrichs, Mills or Gouldner, converges to class-bound approach that takes

into consideration the moods of production and intellectuals' positions in these relations. However, these authors determine some factors –such as economic autonomy, knowledge, nature of their labor– that transcends class-bound nature of the analysis of the intellectuals. However, the autonomy and political potential that class-in-themselves theorists attribute to the intellectuals does not comply with the socio-political and economical structures in Turkey as much as class-bound approach does. The educated middle class professionals or technical intelligentsia have not entered in a collective struggle for their sole interests or significantly differentiated from rest of the society via their skills in Turkey in the analyzed era. How the political interests and functions of these intellectuals will be mentioned in the section dealing with the intellectuals in the history of Turkey.

The aforementioned literature review about the intellectuals reveals some major tendencies in intellectuals' political identities and changes in the circumstances that they live in that are largely shared by all three different analytical models. The modern intellectuals were born with ideal roles that will spread ideas to society about rational thought. Their knowledge mostly had an authority over the state rule. But over time, they gradually lost their power to directly affect the legislative matters and the sanction of their words over the society. Modern intellectual alone today does not have political power as much as when s/he was conceptualized as an ideal Enlightenment figure unless s/he ranks among the higher state administration levels. This situation of intellectuals invalidates the analyses that attribute intellectuals the role of being an historical subject that initiate social change.

In order for intellectuals to operate, they need a social setting that they can make themselves heard by an audience and communicate with fellow intellectuals. When the intellectuals become distant to their audience or they lose the means of communication with other intellectuals, it will be impossible for them to realize their intellectual vocations. Thus, the repression above the intellectuals to reach their public or to communicate with other intellectuals diminishes intellectual activity. These circumstances can easily be traced in

1980 Turkey where intellectuals are imprisoned, lost their means of communication with people and their fellow friends and exposed to economic pressures.

Intellectuals' relationship with critical thought has several historical examples that can lead to myths implying that intellectuals are figures who manifest critical and oppositional ideas or struggle against the power. However there are several other examples where intellectuals take side power, capital and upper classes. The intellectual figures cover a wide range of particular examples from the radical leftist militants to the think-tanks of dominant ideology. Thus, it can be argued that 'being critical' is not a natural feature of the intellectual but it is a moral attribution to him/her by particular authors. So, I will not take these sorts of features as founder or definitive elements for intellectual figures but these widely discussed subjects such as 'being critical', 'dissent' or 'marginalization' will be parameters that I will evaluate while analyzing the intellectual figures in the films. Individuals need not to adopt these features to be counted as intellectuals; however, intellectuals' relationships with these situations may help us to understand their political orientations.

The debates about the political identities of intellectuals mostly attribute roles and responsibilities to the intellectuals. In some texts, it springs as a radical, oppositional and critical role. This adversary side of intellectual may work both in specific and particular fields as in Foucault's claims, or it may pursue universal and objective apprehension of the world as in Benda's. There are other texts who exemplify intellectual production as supporter and promoter of bourgeoisie's interests. The class-bound perspective can clarify these seemingly conflicting formations of intellectuals with the relations they have with the social classes in the contemporary socio-political formation of the state they inhabit. In Gramscian sense, intellectuals may be the ones that builds and expands the hegemony of bourgeoisie or they may be the producers and supporters of the counter-hegemony.

This study aims to analyze the films having the intellectual figures as protagonists in the 1980s Turkish Cinema. Regarding the sampling methodology, I did not start out with a certain definition of intellectual and pick the films according to such a definition. Rather, the major films falling within the scope of my research interest were already listed in a few journal articles and film reviews. So there was already a set of films categorized together with reference to their similar intellectual protagonists. Hence, I tried to examine the theoretical literature to see in what ways different points of view on intellectuals can help make sense of these texts known as the intellectual's films of the 1980s. That is to say, in this study, theory does not directly determine the object of analysis but provide insights about how to evaluate the findings of data analysis.

The “intellectual's films”³¹ of the 1980s, include two sets of characters which we can call intellectuals considering their professions. First there are those who are film directors, novelists, actors, painters, politicians, journalists and academicians. Second there are the ones whose jobs are not particularly indicated or who are unemployed. But from their attitudes derived from the conversational topics, flashbacks, their relationships with other intellectuals, politicization in the past, it is clear that they are educated and have significant cultural capital. In order to bring together these different characters, I adopt a definition of intellectual in the widest sense as “people with advanced educations, producers or transmitters of ideas, or people who engage in public issues” (Kurzman & Owens, 2002: 63).

Secondly, I will avoid the “ideal” construction of the intellectual that separates it from social relations and attributes intrinsic qualities to this figure. Such an approach attributes extreme self-competence and responsibility to the intellectual and devalues other parties in the process of knowledge production or administration. Instead, the intellectuals should be

³¹ This label was given by the film critics and scholars who wrote about certain films of the era in film journals back then or in books and periodicals afterwards. Not every film analyzed in this study is mentioned in these writings. There are those which the authors commonly refer but on the other hand, there are also lesser known films that are hard to find in these writings.

understood in terms of the social, cultural, economic, political and also the intellectual world which they enter into struggle with, make a living out of, produce, dominate or are dominated by. Even the secluded ivory-tower figure has a reciprocal relationship with the social environment which at times calls him/her into action and sometimes wards him/her off.

Thirdly, I am going to investigate the function of the intellectual in terms of political engagement in relation with social classes –construction and preservation of the hegemony or the constitution of the counter-hegemony in the selected films. My aim is to map the shifting positions of the intellectuals in the cultural and political spectrum between being ideologues of power and ferocious critics of the established order. Hence, playing either an oppositional or collaborative role vis-a-vis the power elite is not an a priori characteristic of the intellectual; political attitudes may oscillate between these two poles depending on the social context which I will pay a particular attention in my analyses.

Lastly, my final aim will be to examine the common mental states of the intellectuals. By mental state, I mean the psychological conditions such as loneliness, depression and melancholy, and predominant social challenges such as marginalization, alienation and exile. I will elaborate deeply on these concepts during the film analysis chapter.

CHAPTER III

CINEMA AND SOCIETY IN THE 1980S: A BIG TRANSFORMATION

This chapter is devoted to understand the socio-political and cultural atmosphere of Turkey in the 1980s together with the analysis of the political identities of intellectuals and cinema in Turkey during this period. The 1980s, which started with the coup of September 12 installing a three-year military regime followed by the civilian rule of Turgut Özal's Motherland Party brought irrevocable changes to almost all aspects of life in Turkey. In this chapter, I will examine the new socio-political structure shaped by the forces of neoliberalism and new-right policies. Although this process was economic and political in its origins, and was also related to international political dynamics, it brought about significant changes in socio-cultural life. Thus I will first mention the socio-political transformation by dividing the period into two stages as 'the military regime' and 'the new right government' to reveal the continuities and changes in the political strategies employed during the 1980s. Second, I will examine the declining and rising values in the cultural realm in the context of the structural transformation of media. Third, I will specifically mention the major critiques about the literature in the 1980s and present the changing principles in this particular field of culture. Fourth, I will discuss the political identity of the intellectual tradition in Turkey starting from the early 20th century until the 1980s. Last, I will analyze the cinema in Turkey in the 1980s in terms of its financial circumstances, prevalent themes and audiences which will arrive in IsF in the end of the chapter.

3.1. Sociopolitical Transformation in Turkey

3.1.1. The Repressive Years of Military Rule

Using the collapse of economy, political radicalization/violence and deadlock of the parliament in the late 1970s as a pretext, the military staged a coup d'état on September 12, 1980. The alleged aims of National Security Council (hereafter, *NSC*), were to safeguard the unity of the country, rights and freedoms of the people (Ahmad, 2000: 181), i.e., saving democracy from the politicians of the time (Zürcher, 2004: 278). However, the analyses which focus on the historical background of the class conflicts and the structural crises of economy in the 1960s and 1970s identify this intervention as a reconfiguration of the political sphere to put an end to class-based politics in the course of the global capitalist crisis (Yalman & Bedirhanoğlu, 2010: 107). The inability of the right-wing political parties in serving the interests of the bourgeoisie implied a hegemonic crisis in the late 1970s (Tünay, 1993: 19). To that end, 24 January decisions³² were the first step of economic neoliberalization but the government was devoid of the means to put them into practice; so, the military handled the situation through its monopoly on coercion or the use of legitimate violence.

Dissolution of the parliament, suspension of the constitution, closing down of the political parties as well as trade union confederations³³ were amongst the first acts of the junta (Ahmad, 2000: 182). In the subsequent three years, with its centralized power, NSC established strict control

³² Boratav (2006: 147-9) evaluates 24 January 1980 decisions as a structural adjustment with two major strategic aims in accordance with the demands of IMF and World Bank; firstly the freedom of the market inside the country, secondly the consolidation of [inter]national capital against labor. Ercan (2004: 20-2) also states that these decisions paved the way for a new capital accumulation strategy enabling big capital's desire/obligation to be integrated into the capitalist system.

³³ The trade union confederation with a radical socialist orientation, DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) was a vanguard and symbol of class based politics in Turkey in the 1970s whose demands were regarded, by the right-wing governments, as incompatible with a democratic regime (Yalman, 2009: 299). The organized struggle of the working class in this decade, through strikes and other forms of resistance, aimed to keep the bourgeoisie from appropriating the surplus value; junta removed this obstacle widely by convicting the leaders of DİSK, banning strikes and shifting the wage settings from collective bargaining to High Board of Arbitration (Boratav, 2006: 146-50).

mechanisms and institutional transformation over legislation, jurisdiction, education, press and labor. This period of oppression also claimed the lives of many, mostly leftist, people. In fact, with the new constitution of 1982 abolishing the socio-economic and political rights previously gained through hard struggles, the junta heavily impacted the country's future for years to come.

The number of arrests reached a massive amount of 120,000 in just one year after the intervention. Most of those arrested were either the people who had participated in the political activities of extremist (mostly leftist) organizations or the intellectuals (university professors, trade unionists, journalists, lawyers etc.) known to be leftist. Physical and symbolic violence became a habitual practice of the court and the security forces during all phases of trials and imprisonment (Zürcher, 2004: 279-80). Çulhaoğlu (2002: 184-90) states that these pervasive shocks caused by the junta, which sent the activists to dungeons and workers to their homes, tore apart the ties among the leftists and that the left in Turkey could not put up a resistance to these attacks. Because all these were deeply traumatic not only for the immediate victims but for the society as a whole, many works of art and literature, including the films I analyze in this study, focused on these events in the subsequent years.

In addition to the judicial repression of the academic staff and students, NSC took over the administrative control of the universities, through several regulations with the purpose of depoliticizing these institutions. The new Law on Higher Education was the first step towards “purging all adherents of the centre-left and placing education in the hand of the ‘nationalist-conservatives’, the guardians of ideological purity in the 12 September regime” (Ahmad, 2000: 185). Following this law and with the help of the hegemonizing discourses of “national integrity” and “anti-communism”, the establishment of Yükseköğretim Kurulu (YÖK, The Council of Higher Education) was in line with the aim of having the youth educated in such a

way as to make sure that they would be unable and unwilling to develop any critical, progressive and radical ideas (Boratav, 2006: 157-8).

Once the potential opposition was eliminated, a new constitution was discussed about, drafted and then put to referendum in 1982 under highly undemocratic conditions where all sorts of criticism were forbidden³⁴. The new constitution endowed the president and NSC with enormous powers from vetoing the legislation to appointing high-level state executives; the restrictions on the press, universities, trade unions, labor wages became legalized; repressive state apparatuses got intensified; fundamental rights and freedoms were preserved –as long as they did not pose a threat to the national interest and public order (Ahmad, 2000: 186-8; Zürcher, 2004: 280-1). On the whole, Yalman (2009: 298) claims that the constitution, together with other activities of junta, implies a change not only in the political regime, but also in the form of the state which has lasted beyond the military rule.

The return to the parliamentary system occurred after these major incidents, again in an oppressive atmosphere where the former political leaders were still banned and only the parties approved by the NSC were able to participate in the elections. Thus, neo-conservative Motherland Party (hereafter, *MP*) with its leader Turgut Özal, who had been the architect of economic neoliberalization, came into power in order to further the mission of restructuring Turkey along neoliberal lines.

3.1.2. Motherland Party Years: Genesis of the New Right in Turkey

Following the three years of repressive military rule, MP took over the reins of Turkey and remained in power throughout the 1980s. These years, also known as the “Özal Years”, witnessed a hegemony attempt of the ‘new right’, bearing strong resemblance to Reaganism in the U.S. and Thatcherism in Britain, in economic, political and ideological aspects. Tünay

³⁴ Ahmad (2000: 187-8) interprets the 91.3% ‘yes’ votes in the referendum of the constitution with the desire of people for passing to a civilian rule. Early on, junta had enunciated that they would leave the power only after the guarantee that country won’t return to pre-1980s. Under these conditions, the authoritarian constitution, which could not be issued ordinarily, had been accepted with a great majority.

(1993) and Özkazanç (2007) evaluate MP government in depth with the new right conceptualization grounding on (neo-) Gramscian state and hegemony approaches. Here, in order to explicate the concept 'new right', I will firstly, albeit shortly, propound Jessop et. al. and Hall's debate³⁵ on conceptualizing new right in the context of Thatcherite Britain, later on, I will focus on new right's attempt at establishing hegemony in Turkey.

The emergence of the new right –in Europe and the U.S– towards the end of the 1970s is explained initially by the collapse of Keynesian welfare state³⁶ and its social democratic character, together with the rise of neo-liberal political economy aiming to solve economic recession in favor of capitalists and irrefutable 'swing to the right' (Hall, 1990: 40-7). Certainly having ties with prior movements and themes of the (radical) right, this new political stance deserves a separate inquisition. Hall renders its complexity in the context of Thatcherism as follows:

Thatcherite populism is a particularly rich mix. It combines the resonant themes of organic Toryism –nation, family, duty, authority, standards, traditionalism– with the aggressive themes of a revived neo-liberalism –self-interest, competitive individualism, anti-statism. . . . 'Freedom/free market' is once again in the foreground of the conservative ideological repertoire. 'Free market-strong state': around this contradictory point where neo-liberal political economy fused with organic Toryism, the authentic language of 'Thatcherism' has condensed. (1990: 48)

This rich and conflictive mix is often conceptualized as 'authoritarian populism' by Hall, where state's central educative and repressive role from above is 'authoritarian' and power bloc's ideological eclecticism operating on popular groundswell from below is populism (1985: 116). Hall accounts the

³⁵ Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques' analysis of Thatcherism had been criticized by Jessop et. al. (1984) in *New Left Review*, Hall (1985) replied and Jessop et. al. (1985) re-replied. Hall (1990) compiled his writings later on. These reciprocal criticisms regarding the new right analyses –herewith the crisis of the left in Britain– offers a lot on the interaction between ideological, political and economic sides of the state analysis. For an extensive bibliography on the new right, see Tünay (1993: 27).

³⁶ Welfare state is the set of economic and socio-cultural practices, which arose in Europe in the post-war era and was dissolved in the 1970s. Marked by social democracy, welfare state aims to articulate the interests of capitalists primarily with the organized working class and middle classes. For a general emphasis on the rise and fall of welfare state, see Özkazanç (2007: 16-41).

hinge points of Thatcherism's success as; its close encounters with common sense; its capabilities in leaking into traditional constituents of working class and petty-bourgeoisie; and its eclecticism of neglected and conflicting ideologies (1990: 141-3).

However, Jessop et. al. find Hall's concept 'authoritarian populism' unclear and ambiguous, albeit useful if it would be reconsidered. Firstly, they criticize Hall for neglecting the political and institutional context –ideologism, in their words–, i.e., focusing largely on mass media and ideological production therefore mystifying the real sources of support. Secondly, they argue that Hall exaggerates new right's ideological success by mounting it as monstrous, successful and insuperable although it was not even able to be hegemonic and that he lists the discontents in society (1984: 32-55). Alternatively, Jessop et. al. offer that Thatcherism is a limited 'two nations'³⁷ hegemonic project, which conserves the interests of good citizens, hard workers, great portion of finance circles and industry from the subordinate nation composed of non-skilled working class, ethnic minorities, trade unions and other oppositions (1984: 49-51).

At this juncture, the discussion between Jessop et. al. and Hall implies the British left's strategic struggle for producing alternatives against new right's domination of the society. As Hall himself states (1985: 120-2), he studies on the political/ideological level with a more delimited aim, using 'authoritarian populism' as a tactical tool for unraveling Thatcherism's "neglected and reductively treated" sides. On the other hand, Jessop et. al. presents a more comprehensive outlook on the relations and structural transformations of the economic, institutional and political aspects of new right. Following these argumentations and conceptualizations as toolbox for

³⁷ 'Two nations' is a type of hegemonic project aiming to mobilize and gain the support of strategically significant sectors of the society, meanwhile excluding, charging, repressing – nevertheless trying to contain– the 'other nation'. It is mostly employed during the crisis or when 'one nation' hegemony is not possible to be established. Besides, like other hegemonic projects, it is "concerned with 'national-popular' and not simply with class relations" (Jessop, 1990: 208-11).

analyzing the emergence of the new right in Turkey, will reinforce the basis of inquiry.

As mentioned above, MP came into power in 1983 with glad tidings of civilian rule, despite owing a lot to junta's efforts on smashing the former politicians and political practices. With the leadership of Turgut Özal, the party appealed mainly to the industrialized bourgeoisie, fragments of conservatives, nationalists and Islamists, small scale businessman and commercial circles (Zürcher, 2004:283). Starting with the triumphant election results in 1983-84, MP gradually lost its supporters towards late 1980s. Nevertheless, Özal and his 'princes' preserved their chairs by mobilizing and exploiting the advantages of being the ruling party³⁸. Hence, several transformations having their roots in military intervention were performed, especially in economics.

Neoliberal agenda was perpetuated by the deregulations enabling the market forces to become free. Liberation in finance, economic growth along with an increase in foreign debts and free export policies led to the birth of a greedy commercial bourgeoisie. Complemented with the restrictions on wages, disregarding of poor peasants, putting the trade unions out of commission and populism towards lower classes³⁹, the consequences of these policies were the decline in the lower class incomes and the erosion of the newly originating class consciousness and culture –mostly in the cities (Boratav, 2006: 152-61; Timur, 2004: 52-9). In this environment where rich got richer and poor got poorer, high inflation dealt another major blow on working class, which let them eventually to go out in the streets and “demanding the restoration of democracy as well as higher wages and better working conditions” in the spring of 1989 (Ahmad, 2000: 211). In the same year at the finance front, with the Decree No. 32, a great step was taken

³⁸ Ahmad (2000: 190, 197) notes MP's cheats in elections such as manipulating the election law into its advantage, restricting participation of other parties and robbing opposition time by setting early election dates.

³⁹ Some practices of this populism can be listed as municipalities' subsidies, land title distributions to squatters, rebate of taxes to wage earners and several funds –'fak-fuk-fon' as the most renowned (Boratav, 2006: 153).

towards globalization and neoliberalization. Turkish Lira became fully convertible, thus the economy spun out of the national control and got into the mainstream of foreign capital (Timur, 2004: 63).

These economic measures articulated with the political and cultural processes imply structural changes both in the form of the state and in its relations with the society. This new form of the state –which still persists– was defined with several similar concepts such as “neoliberal authoritarianism” (Bedirhanoglu & Yalman, 2010: 109-10; Özkazanç, 2007: 91) and “authoritarian individualism” (Yalman, 2009: 312)⁴⁰. Just like in Thatcherite Britain, under this state authority, a complex and conflictive mix of neoliberalism and early phases of globalism in economy articulated with nationalist, conservative and Islamist elements were the general characteristic of the new right. With an aim of harmonizing these contradictory elements in its ideology called ‘conservative nationalism’, MP attempted at establishing an expansive hegemony⁴¹ at first, though changed its strategy to passive revolution⁴² and lastly to two nations project, nevertheless failed to reach all of its goals. The major setback of this hegemony attempt was “inability of the Turkish new right to provide benefits for the first nation” (Tünay, 1993: 21-5), Turkish bourgeoisie made great profit but earned less than they expected due to the instabilities⁴³ in economy.

Despite new right’s ideological stress on its economic plan, which presents it as an objective, scientific and dominant factor of social life, Timur

⁴⁰ These concepts present the similarities between Turkey and Britain in terms of the transformation of the state in 1980s. Although Özkazanç (2007: 92-3) discerns the ‘authoritarian’ side of this new state peculiar to Turkey antithetical to West, Hall’s term ‘authoritarian populism’ underlines similar mentality in Britain.

⁴¹ Jessop (1990: 211-2) uses ‘expansive hegemony’ synonymous with ‘one-nation’ project where “the support of the entire population is mobilized through material concessions and symbolic rewards”.

⁴² In ‘passive revolution’, restructuring is aimed by the state by containing or shattering the popular initiatives. But unlike ‘expansive hegemony’ which is based on consensual program of the national popular, passive revolution aims to change popular interests in favor of dominant classes through war of positions (Jessop, 1990: 213).

⁴³ Regarding the economic problems, Tünay (1993: 23) notes, “[i]n short, the new right government completely identified itself with the fight against inflation, which soon account to a great extent for its economic failure”.

points out that (2004: 51), economy was the major weakness of new right in consequence of the fallacious policies they implemented. Borrowing the slogan 'TINA' (There Is No Alternative)⁴⁴ from Thatcher, Özal aimed to spread the bourgeois ideology to the vast majority of public through a set of assistive mottos and gained a considerable success (Boratav, 2006: 156). Complemented with the oppressive depoliticization, TINA shattered and leaked into the discourses of the people including several intellectuals.

Together with TINA, Özal used another populist rhetoric '*ortadirek*' – meaning the central pillar of society– “to reinforce the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie by de-emphasizing the class divisions in the society” (Yalman, 2009: 311). With '*ortadirek*', Özal appealed to and flattered peasants, squatters, small traders and other self-employed –with the dreams of 'turning the corner' and getting rich– in order to provide political support (Zürcher, 2004: 283). However, the economic inequalities between lower and upper classes were constantly increasing, hence, like any other economic transformation period; new riches were born in this era. Firstly, the entrepreneurs had made fortunes with the help of the new neoliberal policies and their ties with government (Zürcher, 2004: 311). Secondly, herewith the growth and condensation of the capital, a highly educated new middle class arose and started to be employed in new financial or commercial sectors (Timur, 2004: 35). Without having the means of production, these managers mastered the knowledge of capital administration and became influential in socio-cultural spheres as think-tanks or trend-setters.

As mentioned above, blessing of the 'individualism' –albeit, primarily in its economic content– is one of the key tendencies in the transformation from welfare state to new right's neoliberalism. In this vision, society is made up primarily from economic individuals, who aim to make more money, consume excessively and administrate their personal identities in a narcissist manner. Hence, entrepreneurship becomes the organizing principle of the society

⁴⁴ This slogan denotes a faith in eternal victory of free market economy and global capitalism against all other modern economic and political systems –foremost; socialism, communism and even social democracy.

where the 'self' becomes a human capital (Özkazanç, 2007: 89-90)⁴⁵. Contradictorily, while this competitive individualism was emerging, the nationalist/conservative wing in the new right attempted at establishing a national unity with the help of traditional and religious elements. New politicians and bourgeoisie who had been educated in the West, carefully aimed at protecting their cultural values (Ahmad, 2000: 208) and imposed them to the public in order to create a sense of community detached from its political core (Özkazanç, 2007: 92-3).

The organic intellectuals of the new right started to be formed in media, universities and other intellectual spheres for disseminating knowledge exalting the new order of Turkey. Apart from Western roots of new right, Özal and his party was also influenced by the ideas Aydınlar Ocağı (Hearths of the Enlightened), the rightist organization which was constituted to struggle against the domination of left in intellectual sites in the 1970s⁴⁶ (Zürcher, 2004: 288). In the 1980s, Turkish left lost its effectiveness not only on political and organizational fields but also in the intellectual context. The war against the intelligentsia had begun with the 12 September had persisted in a less repressive but more ideological manner. Military regime played a significant role on loss of the leftist ideological/intellectual hegemony by coding "left as guilty" and "intellectuals as harmful" (Laçiner, 1995: 97). New right prolonged this 'anti-intellectualism' authoritatively thanks to the new constitution and institutions. Özal and his team skillfully represented this anti-intellectualism with their lifestyles and by giving precedence to –mostly economic– acts over intellectual activities in their statements.

The most powerful dissidence from the intellectuals –more than thousand people led mostly by artists, scholars and writers– was presenting

⁴⁵ Since this issue of cultural capital is directly related with the condition of the intellectuals, the rise of this new individuality will be analyzed in depth in the next section with the cultural terms.

⁴⁶ Bora (1995) notes that the right intelligentsia had gained an identity with the 1980s parallel with new right's domination and playing significant role on reproducing its ideology. They gained a relative autonomy from official the ideology in the late 1980s and became apparent in the press, publishing and universities in the 1990s.

a petition called ‘aydın dilekçesi’. They criticized the anti-democratic practices of government, which created an atmosphere of opposition – together with the investigations conducted against the signatories– in an instant but did not last long⁴⁷. Furthermore, among the leftist intellectuals, apart from the pacification and depoliticization; a noticeable ‘swing to the right’ took place. Bedirhanoğlu and Yalman (2010: 119) relate this shift to the replacement of ‘class-based politics’ with ‘identity-based politics’ in the context of post-1980 political atmosphere. Not only had the pressures from outside, but also the debates inside the leftist intelligentsia procreated new sects. “Liberal left” and “civil-societism” was the most significant ones claiming that the bourgeoisie represents liberal and democratic values against the repressive and authoritative state (Boratav, 2006: 157). Moreover, in the wake of capital’s counterstrike, “a number of despairing intellectuals have succumbed to the philosophy of consumerism and joined the corporate sector which they had previously criticized” (Ahmad, 2000: 210-1).

Eventually, apart from the intellectual life, the above mentioned sociopolitical transformation influenced several areas of culture –namely art, media, human relations, daily life and so on. Investigating the cultural atmosphere of the era will give tangible clues before passing on to the analysis of the cinematic representations of the intellectuals –in the context of the complex cultural production.

3.2. Cultural Atmosphere

Gürbilek conceptualizes the cultural climate –term belonging to her– of the 1980s with two antonym words, suppression and liberation:

On the one hand, the 80s was an era whose frame was drawn with oppression, prohibition and state violence. On the other hand, in these years, a form of power which the society was not familiar with and presenting itself as a non-institution was effective. It was a power which was formative instead of

⁴⁷ See (Laçiner, 1995: 100-1) for excerpts from the petition which touches upon several issues which had been examined this section.

prohibitive, instigator and comprising (...) –the prohibitive discourse of the state and more modern and civil discourse full of emancipatory promises." (Gürbilek, 2011: 13-4 [tm])

In this context, she evaluates the prevailing themes and tendencies -many of them will be referred throughout this section- of the era. Kozanoğlu's (2000: 8) conceptualization of the era traces the gap between reality and images with an aim of revealing the hidden social intentions behind these images. Bali's (2011: 17-8) work analyzes the purported dynamism and colorfulness of the 1980s through the cultural representations of the bourgeoisie and the rising new middle class. Lastly, Ahiska and Yenal (2006: 5-6) reads the era with the elements of popular culture in relation to the economic and political transformation. The greatest common divisor of these four studies and several other works regarding to the cultural sphere of the 1980s is the effect of the great political and economic transformation following the 24 January decisions, military coup and political authority of new right government. I will firstly introduce the transformation of media structures in the 1980s and then evaluate the cultural environment essentially drawing upon these studies.

Turkey passed to a more information-based economy which required large amount of investment in communication technologies in the 1980s. As a result, mass media –especially printed press, television and radio– made significant progress in terms of quantity. Nevertheless, the economic deregulation policy in the 1980s had two main outcomes on media sector: the concentration of ownership and an inclination to more sensational content. Three major press groups were dominating the 90% of the press outcome in the second half of the 1980s (Kaya, 1994: 383-9). Video, which entered the Turkish market in the late 1970s, peaked in usage in 1984 – same year the first color TV started to broadcast. TV broadcasting was a public sector monopoly in the 1980s until the first private TV channel Star1 in 1990; however Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) started programming with five channels with a specialized content in 1986, reaching the 96% of the total population (Kaya, 1994: 391-2).

As in the example of British new right⁴⁸ where mass media was primary source of gaining legitimacy; also in Turkey “press, TV and radio which fell under the influence of big capital played significant role on placing the ideological attitude of the capital” (Boratav, 2006: 156). Timur (2004: 50-1) evaluates this media monopoly as the creation of the “new media” by “new bourgeoisie” which presents itself as “modern journalism despite copying the Western tabloid press”. In this context, in conjunction with the trauma of the “September 12”, the culture and daily life of the society was transformed considerably in the 1980s. Henceforth, I will point out the main tendencies of the cultural life. However, the following statements do not imply homogeneity; while some of them belong only to particular groups or classes, others have their oppositions as well.

Throughout the thesis, the year 1980 may seem like a milestone for a variety of changes; however that does not mean a sudden rupture, instead, with the alteration of the political powers, 1980s were the years when the long-termed transformation started. In this sense, mentioning a new born cultural form or value does not mean that it had not existed before in the society but means that it became primary or central in the given period. Identically, the cultural forms and values of the pre-1980 were still existent in the 1980s but they became secondary or avoided in the process of time. Williams (1977: 121-7) mentions that apart from the dominant culture there are also residual –part of the past but still effective in the present– and emergent –new meanings, values, practices and relationships– elements that are involved in general cultural dynamics. I will try to mention both the residual, dominant and emergent elements of the 1980s with an aim to analyze “how these relate to the whole cultural process rather than only to the selected and abstracted dominant system” (1977: 121). However, it can

⁴⁸ Although claiming that Hall exaggerates the impact of media in new right’s hegemony attempt, even Jessop et. al. (1985: 95) agree that Thatcherism “address[es] and mobilize[s] the people through the mass media and ideological discourse rather than through party-political organization and corporatist channels”.

be said that regarding the 1980s, the emergent elements, mostly defined as the “rising values”, became dominant in a short span of time.

Neoliberal new-right government's capital accumulation strategies both needed and provoked a new kind of individualism starting from the 1980s. After the suppression and violence had already shivered the organized struggle to a great extent with the help of the military coup, now it was time to urge people, in order to articulate them into the new economic system faithfully. All advocates of the “new order” and “rising values” primarily placed the “individual” into their expressions. As a result, the shift from the "utopias of freedom and equality", to the "utopias of fortune through financial pragmatism" commenced with the 1980s (Kozanoğlu, 2000: 7, 121). Belge (1996: 828 [tm]) exemplifies the renouncement of solidarity with an old Turkish idiom “every tub must stand on its own bottom” which means “every man for himself” and elucidates:

If the idioms are old, it can be asked that whether these tendencies always existed or not. Certainly they did. After all, “self-interest” was not invented by this era. But in this era, self-interest earned a legitimacy which it never had; became a norm; and it rendered being different as “idiocy” or at least a childish “credulity”.

This desire of individualism took its rage from its belatedness in Turkey according to Gürbilek (2011: 10). However, despite the personal needs were being expressed unconstrained, their content became subordinated to the market. Main subcomponents -which are deeply interrelated- of this individualism were the desire and dream of getting rich, the boom in consumerism, depoliticization and endless debates on the tension between the private and public lives of the people.

The aspiration for getting rich, was characterizing the era of new right government according to Bali (2011: 33), where the prime minister was constantly over praising the riches and people who had climbed the social ladder by edging in to the power-i.e. the people who struck it rich⁴⁹. On the one hand, the images of these new rich were being pumped through the

⁴⁹ With the 1980s, several Turkish phrases referring to 'getting rich easily, without effort' emerged such as 'yirtmak' (getting off) or 'köşeyi dönmek' (turning the corner).

media, on the other hand the aforementioned 'banker' event, high inflation and diminished wages were smashing the people. "It was an era which was bereft of emotions, dominated by relentless managers and where every single minute or second was equal to money" (Bali, 2011: 57 [tm]). However, the image of the bourgeoisie was transforming rapidly in a positive way, with their high efforts. The image of the "heartless comprador bourgeoisie" who try to avoid being visible in public space in the 1970s was challenged with the new business men who deliver opinions on all the social, cultural and political issues, showing up in advertisements and become role models for the society (Bali: 2011: 35-7). Despite the fact that, bourgeois culture is itself a minority culture; starting from the 1980s and peaking in the 1990s, new rich constantly aimed to convey their cultural values to society⁵⁰.

Meanwhile, as a result of free import policies, several new goods entered to the country and "consumption frenzy" outcropped. The brands of food, beverage, cigarette, clothing etc., which were only obtainable from street smugglers in the 1970s, filled the display windows. "In Turkey, shop windows have never been that rich and the purchasing power of the people have never been that low" (Gürbilek, 2011: 39 [tm]). However, according to Bali (2011: 27), even the people who could not afford buying new products were delighted since they at least had the chance to watch the abundance from the shop windows for free. Besides, the commodities which were released to the market were not restricted with these basic goods. Convenient to the all customer profiles from workers to the new business elites, a great consumption and entertainment industry were born. Media also played significant role on inseminating the consumption to society and

⁵⁰ It can be derived from what Marx and Engels' explanation of class interest in which they argue that the ruling class "has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones" (1998: 68). This statement which was raised for all capitalist societies was particularly convenient for Turkey in the 1980s regarding not only "ideas" but also "culture" and "lifestyle".

passion for a superior lifestyle⁵¹. Hence, daily life transformed significantly, in Bali's words,

[E]verybody -notably the youngsters and white collars- aimed acquiring the better, after acquiring it, spending more, consuming, using the products of high quality, spending time in most qualified places and going on touristic trips abroad. (2011: 57-61 [tm]).

In this environment, consumption became the pivotal symbol of being urbanite and gaining social status. With the help of the images in the advertisements, how products diversify the individuals became the major motivation of shopping and therewith being an individual (Kozanoğlu, 2000: 124). Gürbilek (2010: 24 [tm]) evaluates the society's demand for 'consuming freely' in the 1980s in relation with the political intents of the 1970s. According to her,

The demand of the 70s, left its place to the demand of freedom in the 80s, since it was not very fair, imposed restrictions to individual liberties, filed people's request for happiness and maybe most significantly was defeated against the power.

In this sense, she claims that this freedom demand was not that free, was made up only of a freedom to consume and resulted in new forms of captivities.

As mentioned in the previous section, depoliticization of the society was a major target of the military coup and to that end; all sorts of political activities were suppressed with violence following the September, 12. Following these direct prohibitions and punishments, the depoliticization program was "carried out with the plan of alienating people from politics and creating an apathy towards the relations of governance in general" (Çubukçu, 2001: 270) during and after the military rule⁵². With the

⁵¹ Regarding the function of the media, Oktay (1996c: 822) argues that television also enhanced the sense of criticism mostly in the urban poor involuntarily. The diversity of product and services on the screens expanded horizon of the expectations of the people and raised the emotion of insufficiency.

⁵² At this point, Kayıran (2005: 102-3) finds the success of the depoliticization in a point where the will of the military coup and the tendency of the people meets. He argues -with reference to the debates in left/socialist journal Birikim of the 1979 and 1980- that depoliticization became a matter of fact in the late 1970s, when particular events caused people to see socialists as incredulous. Additionally, Laçiner (2005), in his discussion about

contribution of TINA discourse, society became unresponsive, i.e. the regular, working people were forced to accept that they have no capability to intervene to social life. 'End of history/ideology' theses which were propounded in early 1990s by Western 'New World Order' theorists, was imposed in Turkey starting from early 1980s, as a practical reality (Çubukçu, 2001: 271). In spite of the economic, political and social problems of the existing order, the relationship with the alternative political projects such as socialism was evaluated in terms of being outdated and primal. As Kozanoğlu (2000: 123) endorses, "people were saying 'We become individuals, we refuse the old patterns' and they wanted to live in better conditions", but without political paths. The phantasms of wealth and consumption were direct replacement for collective liberation efforts and the remaining space was filled with cultural images of the "new individuals". The cultural identities were able to express themselves without a mediation of politics; however the general public was in a total indifference so that there left no sphere for interactive relation and struggle (Gürbilek, 2011: 9). Thus, lower classes who were bereft of the right to strike, stayed out of democratic means of struggle and became not only the customer but also the players of the "show biz" (Oktay, 2003: ix).

As the mass communication developed more than ever, the "private life industry" created its own language and images. With Gürbilek's (2011: 23 [tm]) expression,

What was experienced in Turkey in the 1980s was the verbalization of private life -sexuality being in the first place- independently from the authorities and within the discourse of liberation and individualization".

The expressions which were secluded once about sexuality, health, emotions became primary topics which started to be discussed, categorized and judged in the newspapers and magazines. Belge (1996: 827-8) exemplifies this tendency with the new interest in the individuals about quality living and

the discourses on the pre-1980 period, argues that the decline of left started in the late 1970s.

being attractive, with the help of healthy foods, sports and protection of the body from harmful effects. Similar to the physical level, measures were taken in the field of emotions about sterilization and protections of the self. According to Belge, crystallized with the great emphasis on "(my) orgasm" in the magazines, all these orientations were about individual's living on and for his/her own by graying and instrumentalizing 'the other'.

Although the concerns of private/daily life found a great sphere of discussion, this sphere became more spectacular than ever. Giving name to Kozanoğlu's (2000) book "Age of the Polished Image", the distance between the reality and the image, in a Debordian sense⁵³, was widened significantly in the 1980s. He recapitulates the camouflage of the reality with the help of the images, several times in his book (2000: 8-9, 58, 119, and 123). Furthermore, Gürbilek mentions the criticisms of the photographs about 'kid with a fly on his face' which imply poverty; and the usage of 'squeezed lemon' photo by social democrats before 1989 elections, symbolizing the effects of Özal's economy-politics on people. According to her,

the life which the second one encodes is wiped away, annihilated from now on. The image of the "lemon" does not make reference to what is lived; the image which is established in order to depict privation, poverty or exhaustion has created its own world and built its own acquaintance now" (2011: 51 [tm]).

After 1980, the quantitative representation of the poverty in the media decreased dramatically and its qualitative features changed as in the example above. The connection between the spectacle and the individualism reveals itself in this lower and upper class division. As depicted above, starting with the mid-1980s and multiplying in the 1990s, the screens and magazines started to give place to advertisements together with the consumer images of the products; popular singers and business man implying individual success and wealth; emotional, sexual, lifestyle, health-related etc. problems about private life. However, despite being the

⁵³ Here, I refer to the autonomous image and the distance mentioned by Debord, as in "[s]eparation is itself an integral part of the unity of the world, of a *global social practice split into reality and image*. The social practice confronted by an autonomous spectacle is at the same time the real totality which contains that spectacle" [emphasis added] (2002: 7).

hegemonic images of the media, these subjects are related with the upper-class culture at the first stage. At this point, Erdoğan argues that, following the Özalist neoliberal politics, social exclusion and marginalization processes took new forms. Apart from political and economic ones, he also claims that new cultural practices were implemented "to transform Turkey into a society of the spectacle which is mediatic-televisual centered and hypermarket-minded and to naturalize the social-class hierarchies" (2002: 21-2 [tm]).

In sum, the military coup and the subsequent neoliberal policies had a big impact on transforming the cultural sphere both structurally and ideologically. The media sector as a whole grew larger by the commencing privatizations and condensations. New values emerged for the society such as individualism against collective action, disinterestedness to politics, and dreams of easily getting rich, new urges for expressing the personal preferences and tastes and consumerism. These changes of course had impacts on the artistic products such as films or literature. Mentalities of both the creators and the receivers of cultural products were transforming. Before mentioning the condition of the cinematic production in the 1980s, I will briefly point out the new tendencies in literature during this period.

3.3. New Tendencies in Literature

In the most general sense, the 20th century Turkish literature – originally novel and short story– followed a realist line, with an emphasis on social issues until the 1970s, unlike West which had an individual centered literature in 20th century (Ecevit: 2006: 83). Until the 1950s, modernization and the polarization between East and West was the major problematic of novel. In the last quarter of the century, along with the elevation of leftist views both in society and in literature, the main theme of literature evolved into the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. It is also argued that, formalism and individualism were almost seen as crime in literary world until the 1970s (Ecevit: 2006: 83-4). The majority of the writers

were basically left-leaning intellectuals who had a political view that offers solutions for exploitation, and they cultivated their political view in literature.

Until the 1960s, the antagonism between rich and poor was mentioned in a literary movement called “village/Anatolian novels”, which was written with a shallow Marxist views, according to Türkeş (2001: 143). In these novels, where the writers were inserting their ideas to the story with the help of a heroic villager or an intellectual character in the plot; the intellectual figures stand with the poor folk against the rich and political power. Starting with the 1960s and lasting until the 1970s, the exploited villagers were replaced with general public of Turkey and exploiter landlords were replaced with the capitalist bourgeoisie (Moran, 2003: 11-2). By means of the translations from Lukács, classical realism started to be seen insufficient and the writers adopted social realism.

The military coup in March 12, 1971, brought about a sub-genre in Turkish literature called the “12 March novels”. These novels manifested violence, torture and martial law inside police stations, prisons etc. via political prisoner protagonists⁵⁴. Türkeş (2001: 147 [tm]) claims:

“12 March Novel”, which is written with social concerns, is predominantly realist, however in most cases reality changes place with political views. While reading these novels, we always coincide with political determinism in the final stage. For the authors, the main aim is not the life in squatters, newly produced cultural forms and family relationships, but questioning the legitimacy of the system which led people to live in these places.

This sub-genre engaged attention of the readers in the 1970s owing to its inquiry of unknown, hidden and closed world of revolutionaries, plus its shocking and striking atmosphere. However, the common point of all these novels is that, the imprisoned protagonists were enduring the hardships and staying ‘passive’ against the omnipotent political power. Their previous revolutionary life was not mentioned or just slid over shortly; instead the

⁵⁴ Leading 12 March novels and their writers are Yaralısın (Erdal Öz, 1974), Bir Avuç Gökyüzü (Çetin Altan 1974), 47'liler (Füruzan, 1974), Gün Doğdu (Tarık Dursun K., 1974), Şafak (Sevgi Soysal, 1975), Tartışma (Samim Kocagöz, 1976), Bir Düşün Gecesi (Adalet Ağaoğlu, 1979) (Moran, 2003: 13).

period after their defeat was narrated (Moran, 2003: 11-4). Nevertheless, in times while left was yet powerful both inside and outside of Turkey, Moran claims that these novels were still in a revolutionary line, despite having limited subject and disregarding aesthetic value (2003: 50-1).

On the other side, Turkish novel witnessed the inception of modernism which Western literature experienced in early 20th century, both in form and content. In these examples of Turkish avant-garde⁵⁵; seeking solution to the social issues left its place to more subjective and individualist approaches.

In seventies, when Turkish novel started to produce its first avant-garde texts, Western avant-garde had already started to act freely in postmodern platform. Therefore, it was out of question that Turkish novel would develop with the order of modern and then postmodern. First avant-garde Turkish novels carry modern and postmodern features to our literature together, in a single text. (Ecevit, 2006: 85-6 [tm])

However, as any other avant-garde, there were few writers following this modernist line; the directly political and social realist novels were still dominating the literary field.

Ultimately, both the content and the mentality of the novel changed dramatically in the 1980s, depending upon socio-political and literary reasons (Moran, 2003: 49). In the previous two sections, the socio-political changes and their fundamental effects on culture in general were mentioned. As for literature; the smashing of left, the hegemony of the market over culture, transformation of the social virtues and rising individualism had an impact mostly in the content of the novel. Türkeş (2001: 150-2) summarizes the transformation with the catch-phrase “goodbye poverty, hello life” and argues that the exclusion of economic life and poverty in novels while economic inequalities were increasing was a result of the cultural division that took place as a result of economic, political, social and ideological configuration following the September 12.

Similar to Türkeş, Moran (2003: 53-4) points the key issue of post-1980 novel as escaping from reality and abandoning realism as a literary

⁵⁵ Oğuz Atay was the leading writer of Turkish avant-garde novel in the 1970s, together with Ferit Edgü and Yusuf Atılgan (Ecevit, 2006: 88).

form⁵⁶. As a result, texts started to look at themselves and became 'self-enclosed'. Writers were not directly political actors anymore in the 1980s; instead they were the creators who aim to build their own world. In Esen's (1995: 428) words, "story and novel of the 1980s were an adventure lived between the writer and his/her text". In this respect, these novels shares similarities with the set of films⁵⁷ produced in the same period in terms of using metafiction as a narrative style, i.e. narrating the process of making a film or writing a novel. They mainly mention the struggles of the intellectual protagonist during his/her depressive production process in a self-reflexive manner.

Evidently, the writers of this era⁵⁸ attached extra importance to the formal features of the text. Immediately after the coup, the formalism in literature was also meant a tactical tool against the censorship; however the aforementioned new tendencies in the literature showed that the concern on form was not limited with censorship. Türkeş (2005: 95 [tm]) claims,

Hereby, we are witnessing the development of a literature which is alienated to life and history, and transformed it into a literary game, artistic creation and which regards form as more significant than the content. In 25-year period of Turkey after the relationship between literature and politics was ruptured both the literary products differentiate and no one questions the ideologies reflected from literary works. All the people pursue a salient story or few good sentences, as the literature gets wide its interpretation with regards of social commitment liberates.

Ecevit (2006: 89) directly associates the increase in formalist inclinations with the post-coup socio-political structure where political parties were closed and society was depoliticized. Additionally, she claims that the worldwide rise of formalism and individualism in literature as a result of the indications

⁵⁶ This doubt and break from the reality is not exclusive to Turkey of course, takes its roots from Western politics, literature and linguistics. The structural linguistics played a significant role by reversing the relationship between language and reality by showing that language not only reflects but also constitutes the reality. (Moran, 2003: 54-5)

⁵⁷ The films that problematize filmmaking are Su da Yanar (1986), Gece Yolculuğu (1987) and Umut Yarına Kaldı (1988); besides Gece Dansı Tutsakları (1988) and Melodram (1989) narrates the women writers' adventure of writing a novel –which will be analyzed in the fourth chapter.

⁵⁸ The novelists of the 1980s that characterize the era and whom I refer here are mainly Latife Tekin, Ahmet Altan, Orhan Pamuk, Bilge Karasu, Nazlı Eray, Pınar Kür.

regarding the fall of Marxist state systems also had an influence in Turkey (2006: 89).

The formal and structural novelties in this era were covering a whole new set of literary components. By using meta-fiction, science-fiction and magical realism, combining several sorts of texts such as news articles, poems, advertisement mottos etc. and denying artistic consistency or aesthetic integrity, the writers transformed the subject of novel into the inspection of novel itself, according to Moran (2003: 56-7). He refers to these writers who abandoned realism as 'postmodernist writers' and claims that these writers aim to proclaim that 'text is a fiction which does not reflect the real world' and adds that although a "crisis of reality" was not lived in Turkey unlike West, postmodernism showed a solution to the authors when a new kind of literature was needed. Esen (1995: 428) also states that dream world and fantasy became key notions for the writers whose texts were mysterious, fabulous, occasionally unreasonable and making reference to archetypal phenomena.

With all its features, the 'new novel'⁵⁹ was a hot debate in intellectual and literary sites. While one side was criticizing the new tendencies because of collaborating with the political authorities and playing to the market, others were praising it for the novelties it brought to Turkish literature. As of the harshest criticism, Küçük (1988), in his cause célèbre book "Küfür Romanları" (Novels of Insult)⁶⁰, argues that these new forms cannot be regarded as 'novel'. He denominates two new novelists of the post-coup period -Ahmet Altan and Latife Tekin- as "Eylülist" (literally "September-ist,"

⁵⁹ By "new novel" I refer to both the new forms of novel in Turkey originated in the 1980s and Robbe-Grillet's original term which is "merely a convenient label applicable to all those seeking new forms for the novel, forms capable of expressing (or of creating) new relations between man and the world, to all those who have determined to invent the novel, in other words, to invent man" (1965: 9). Robbe-Grillet employed the term in order to explain different developments in Western novel in the 1960s which bear resemblance to Turkish novel of the post-1980 era such as the absence of character or event in novels.

⁶⁰ Küçük was and is still being criticized about this book. Apart from Gürbilek, Alev Alatlı (2002) wrote a response book accusing Küçük with "intellectual despotism" by analyzing Küfür Romanları sentence by sentence. Broadly, Alatlı claims that Küçük, in order to justify his thesis, perverts Tekin's novel and aims to disallow the novelties with a conservative attitude.

an allusion to the coup of September 12) because of sustaining the ideology of the military coup by victimizing left –with an organic relationship with Turkish reactionism–, erasing the memories of pre-1980 and their propagation of religiosity (1988: 12). On the other side, Gürbilek (2011: 82-3) counts Küçük’s book as a joke, a shallow copy of Lukács in terms of healthy/unhealthy art conceptualization. Since Küçük is not an authority of literature to set criterions of novel and his critique is not the single truth for either interpreting Lukács or literature criticism, I do not share his overall assessments, however I agree with some of his detections regarding the relationships between authors and post-coup ideology. Küçük (1988: 18) claims that the coup’s greatest and easiest success was in changing the main problematic, style, content, production process and leading figures of art and literature.

Just as the “12 March novels”, even though not as popular as them, “12 September novels”⁶¹ were also written which have imprisoned revolutionaries and ex-leftist characters as protagonists. The main contextual difference is, while the former was elegizing imprisoned, tortured and killed revolutionaries, the latter mostly attacks them (Naci, 2007: xxxvii). For example, Pınar Kür, who is one of the famous novelists of the 1980s, says “it looked like an insensible massacre . . . none of us could have approached fondly to the people inside these events . . . a person cannot write good novel about the people whom s/he doesn’t like” about the pre-1980 incidents (as cited in Naci, 2002: 125-6 [tm]).

Latife Tekin’s novel *Gece Dersleri* was –with the support of press– one of the most popular and controversial novels when it was published in 1986. The novel narrates the pre-1980 revolutionary years of Gülfidan in a semi-autobiographical fiction by “nested and consecutive usage of inner monologue, inner dialogue, stream of consciousness and flattened narration” (Akatlı, 1994: 37 [tm]). It starts with her attendance into a leftist organization

⁶¹ The major “12 September novels” written in the 1980s are; *Gece Dersleri* (1986, Latife Tekin), *Sudaki İz* (1985, Ahmet Altan), *Hoşça Kal Umut* (1987, Ayla Kutlu), *Dar Zamanlar III: Hayır...* (1987, Adalet Ağaoğlu), *Dünyanın En Pis Sokağı* (1989, Tarık Buğra).

and ends with completion of the book itself by the protagonist –also the author. Küçük argues that Tekin demonizes leftist organizers and presents them as people who cause only trouble with the help of a protagonist who has abandoned her leftist ideas and quitted the organization (1988: 90-3). Akatlı (1994: 38 [tm]) claims,

More than the half of Gece Dersleri is an imitation of deliria. If not the epitome of it! But it is not. Because, some causalities are built, some images which are used so blatantly that cannot be real are gathered from secondhand Freud and “in the last instance”, the “rightfulness” of former militant who has liberated and swimmingly attained her individuality is thickly underlined.

On the other hand, Parla (2011: 222-3 [tm]) evaluates the novel as the transfiguration of the marginal, incapable and defeated intellectual protagonist who “aims to resist to revolutionary language to build private language” and “expresses her rage against the times she spent in the organization”.

Another novel whose arguments overlap with the dominant ideology of the 1980s is *Sudaki İz*, written by Ahmet Altan in 1985. Altan narrates the faith, conflicts and dead ends of pre-1980 intellectual who is squeezed between the responsibilities of a revolutionary intellectual and the pains of being an individual with wide range of characters and events (Esen, 1995: 434). The novel presents a schematic look towards left using completely hung-up characters and condemns it with this look instead of constructive criticism (Küçük, 1988: 139-42). Petty-bourgeois revolutionaries’ outlook on the squatter life involves repulsion and they flee towards the life they desire in the novel (Türkeş, 2001: 150-1). Naci criticizes the schematism as follows,

I have never read another novel that despises the reader prudence, humiliates the youth of his generation, and recklessly portrays the “revolutionary prototypes” (i.e. the lads who are villager, lonely and greedy, disdained and unable to communicate with the girls or the rich rascals, who are spoiled, smarty and suppose that being angry to their parents is revolting against society and ultimately return to their class when the adventure is over), that sovereigns try to impose upon the society, as if they are “revolutionary youth” (2007: xxxvii [tm]) .

On the other side, at the time it was published, *Sudaki İz* was withdrawn from the market by censorship⁶² based upon its sexual content. Afterwards, the book was published again by striking through the censored sentences. Altan's book was one of the extreme examples of the "explosion of sexuality" that I mentioned in previous section referring to Gürbilek (2001: 23). Even though presentation of sexuality was seen less harmful than political implications and even as a "safety valve" by the political authority in the 1980s (Oktay, 1997: 128), *Sudaki İz* was an example which crossed the line.

Before ending the section, I would also like to mention the transformation of poetry in the 1980s, since, as a way of expression poetry was very widespread and significant for socialist youth and intellectuals in the 1960s and the 1970s. Regarding the relationship between poetry and society, Oktay (1995a: 436) claims that, only the social/economic/political phenomena may not explain the form and content of poetry, however, they indicate the palpable basis where post-1980 poetry gained legitimacy. In addition, these changes allow us to build the factual basis that poetic imagery connects to reality. Similarly, Kayıran (2005: 100-2) recognizes that political and social changes do not affect poetry directly or immediately since poetry needs longer time to digest and verbalize these changes. However, he adds, as the poetry had epistemic rather than ontic character in the 1970s and even characterized with an ideological jargon the coup created of a 'momentum' in poetry. The poetry itself was not a threat or a target at all for the military, yet the poets -who consider themselves as leftist, realist or revolutionary- lost their political base and belief, together with their public according to Kayıran. Regarding the poetry of the 1980s, he argues that, poets were not able to find a language to depict "September 12"; the bonds of acquaintance between the history and the poet was ruptured; "a swing to the right" showing itself in the hierarchical mentor/ protégé relationship between the poets became widespread (2005: 103-5).

⁶² In the 1980s, headlines about the recalling of the publications from the market or the destruction of tones of books were frequent in the newspapers. For some examples, see Ceyhun (1995: 71-2).

According to Oktay (1995a: 436), the poetry carries both clear and tacit effects of "12 September", moreover, it was formed in the context of cultural/political/psychological imposition and motivation of the order of pressure. The major inclinations in the poetry are suicide, escape, and esotericism as a result of intolerableness of social order, collapse of individual hopes, lack of communication, alienation and reification. The proliferation of aestheticism and intellectualism can be seen as an expression of the individual, who was isolated, lost his/her social aim and togetherness, trying to build a different and liberated world. Dramatic artistic language reduced to only 'form', opposed to reducing the poetry to singular meanings. Nevertheless, the two common themes in poetry, which are suicide and escapism, process in two different metaphorical axes according to Oktay: both a sign of the pessimism of coup period or camouflage/affirmation of real conditions and an attitude of denial against pressure or negation of it (1995a: 437).

Hereby, it is clear that Turkish literature, starting from the 1980s, is in a continuous direction reciprocally with the depoliticized society. Regarding the criticisms made throughout this section about the escapism from reality and politics, Türkeş claims,

People who voice these criticisms are accused of taking literature away to old village novels, being Lukácsian and making ideological and political criticism. However, inclining the realities of the society we live does not mean expressing what is lived with a undeviating naturalist method, producing similar texts to social-realist translation novels of the 1970s or being obliged to the classical realist style. Social and individual life can also be treated using the formal fertility of novel, with allegory, fantasy and irony, breaking the circularity of time and introducing consciousness and dreams. It is clear that the inner reality of the individual cannot be mentioned without considering the outer reality and vice versa. Hence, a midway must be found between the past novels committed to politics and outer reality with passion and today's novels withdrawn into inner world and helpless to the current reality. (2005: 90 [tm]).

The literary production in terms of both the subjects that are mentioned in literature and writers' ideological approaches to these subjects had undergone a big transformation in the 1980s. The ideas and styles

behind the novels of the 1960s and the 1970s were largely abandoned while new literary styles were emerging and general emphasis were shifting from social problems to exclusive problems of particular individuals. Literature had largely turned its face away from the lower classes. While the literature following the March 12, 1971 still had a revolutionary motivation despite its artistic problems, the post-1980 literature adopted a derogatory if not disinterested perspective to the formerly politicized people and socialist ideology in general by settling on with the new political atmosphere. This transformation is also a result of the defeat of the cultural hegemony of the left which I will discuss in the next section.

3.4. Trajectory of Intellectuals in Turkey

A famous Ottoman historian and journalist, after being addressed as an intellectual in an interview, gets angry and rejects this appellation: “I’m not an intellectual or so; I hate the intellectuals. There are none in Turkey”. Upon the persistence of the interviewer about him being an intellectual, he answers:

“No I’m not, not a bit, it’s an insult to me. There are so many counterfeiters who pass themselves off as intellectuals. In here, whenever you curse to the values, religion, faith of your country, you become an intellectual. I’m not an intellectual; I’m not cursing those values. I can say that I am cultured. (Bardakçı, 2006)

Remembering Bourdieu’s remark on the process of defining the intellectual as a matter of symbolic power which includes some groups and excludes others, Bardakçı’s words can be seen as the clearest example showing that defining the concept –or indicating its misuse by using an opposite meaning as the right one– implies an ideological struggle. When he argues that there are no intellectuals in Turkey, he is not exactly arguing that there is none since he proceeds with the critique of the existing ones. What Bardakçı calls as “curse” can be seen as “criticism” and it forms significant part of being intellectual, for some authors. On the other hand, Mardin (1984: 18) argues that “[i]n Turkey, there are no intellectuals, there is only literati”, since he does not find anyone qualified enough to be an intellectual but sees them

as only as cultured. While the former uses the concept pejoratively, latter attributes a noble meaning to it, however both authors analyzes the group which is non-existent for them.

Being aware of the aforementioned troubles and the significance of the perspective of the author while speculating on intellectual, I am going to discuss the major characteristics of the dominant intellectual type in Turkey who found its roots in Tanzimat and diversified in the following 150 years until the 1980s. It is impossible to write the history of “the intellectual⁶³” in Turkey since there are several distinct, opposite or intersecting intellectual typologies which can be politically classified according to their orientations as Occidentalists, Ottomanists, nationalists, Islamists, liberals, socialists and so on. In each period, their struggles, ideas, actions and power fluctuate in different directions. However, it is possible and helpful to describe the dominant currents throughout the history of Turkey that can relate to the intellectual figures in the films. By this means, the continuities and ruptures in the attitudes of these figures can be analyzed in more depth with respect to their political struggles, relations with popular classes, mental states and cultural mediations.

Dating from the 19th century, Ottomans entered in a rationalist lane together with the formation of a new individual different from the Ottoman *kul* (man, slave, servant). Naturally, this transformation hasn’t been lived as an instantaneous disengagement, but on the contrary it carried –in fact, still carries– accumulations of the previous cultural codes. However, it was

⁶³ The Ottoman Turkish and Turkish words that correspond are multiple: *münevver*, *aydın*, *entelektüel*. Their usage and meanings are also polemical depending on the political side that uses it. Saybaşı (1995: 158-9) claims that ‘*entelektüel*’ is mostly used for people who see themselves as the representative of the West, ‘*münevver*’ is in Ottoman Turkish and carries traditional and religious connotations and lastly, ‘*aydın*’ involves previous two words but s/he is the intellectual who sees the problem of Western, Ottoman and republican thought from a critical perspective pursuing the problems that the community encounters. Citing Ülgener, he claims that in the West, the intellectual means the men of ideas/letters, but in Turkey, the *aydın* implies a mixture between literate and bureaucrat. He both knows better than the rest of the society and affords anything in the realm of authority and application. Kılıçbay (1995: 175) argues that *entelektüel* comes from “intellectual” implying an effort of creating and examining the ideas; *aydın* and its Ottoman Turkish counterpart *münevver* come from French adjective “*éclairé*” implying the obtaining of the existent knowledge. Therefore, he argues that while *entelektüel* is a producer, *aydın* is a consumer.

always the “change” that is the principal element of the intellectual activity following the Tanzimat era: creation of new life, morality, economy, aesthetics, law and politics (Toprak, 1995: 60). And the “new”, which bracketed almost every single point of the social, political and cultural life, was implying a simple but also extremely complex idea: the West. The major actors of this Westernization were the intellectuals⁶⁴ who were mostly sent to the West for education or grew up in the new Western educational institutes that raise staff for modernization.

By the last century of the Ottoman Era, an idiosyncratic modernization rooted in the transformation of economy and social life had started off through the agency of the administrative level. The main criticism against Westernization and its intellectuals emphasizes the top-down, compelling and unsocial aspects of the process. Especially the traditionalist and nationalist authors accuse the Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat intellectuals of not understanding the West sufficiently with its all components, making several mistakes while trying to adapt it directly to Ottomans and disregarding the governed people and established culture. Karakoyunlu (1995: 103-4) states that the Tanzimat intellectuals and rulers tried to articulate the Western culture with an insufficient understanding of its economy that was the basis of this culture. Besides, the society was not able to apprehend this top-down modernization due to its lack of knowledge and experience, according to him. Although the regulations were in favor of the people, several groups had objected to these new organizations with reproach and taken sides with the theocratic rule (1995: 110).

However, saying that the reforms were all top-down would be a mistake –at least until the republic– since there were several demands by the modernizing groups who were urbanized, entered into new economical

⁶⁴ In almost all texts about the intellectuals in Ottomans, the genesis is put as 19th century with an exposition of the past. Shortly, before the 19th century, “knowledge and ideology was monopolized by *ulema* who takes his authority from religion” similar to medieval Europe. There were also the artists and writers who ranked in either religious *tekke* or under the patronage of palace. The secularization of knowledge, its liberation from religious authorities as in Enlightenment started in the 19th century of Ottoman Empire (Belge, 1983: 123 [tm]).

spheres of activity and called for the judiciary and institutional framework (Keyder, 1995: 151). Westernization was not a result of arbitrary or comfortable preference of the Ottomans; this transformation was inevitable for them in order to preserve their political existence. So the decisions were taken in indispensable historical circumstances and also desperately (Tezel, 1995: 144). Hence, the reasons of the Ottoman modernization cannot be reduced to the fancifulness of the intellectuals discarding both the inner and outer pressures. Economic and political crisis, rebellions of the non-Muslim groups, the winds of French Revolution and import of free market ideology played significant role in this process. Ottomans was a complex state in terms of both ethnicity and religion in 19th century and they entered into relations with economically boosting capitalism of the West. Hence, it was impossible to stay out the liberalism –both economically and politically– while there was an aim of defending the state and preventing the disruption (Keyder, 1995: 152). Tanzimat, Islâhat, 1st and 2nd Constitutional Eras took place on behalf of this transformation.

However, with proclamation of the republic, the state's ability of representing the population was reinforced; political and economic liberalism was replaced with the state intervention. Likewise, the spontaneous demands from the people for the sake of modernization were drained away. After the republic, the modernization project was maintained by state and its intellectuals. There were enough positions for all intellectuals in the state after the republic since an educated staff was desperately needed for the administration of the society and realization of the reforms. Hence intellectuals settled in the state as noble or reserve staff which led to the incontestability of the privileged position of the state. Consequently, the new political struggles started to be formed between the rival statist fractions instead of different world views.

The employment of the intellectuals by the state decreased the intellectual autonomy along with the radicalism. The chances for living without the support of the state were minimal. Thus, the intellectuals had

reconciliation with the state and order by working in state levels and benefiting from its political felicities (Naci, 1995: 184). Accordingly, they were the legislators who were not always in agreement with the public most of the time. Kılıçbay (1995: 176-7) argues that the civilizing mission that was undertaken by the intellectuals traumatized the people leading to the intellectual-people conflict. The intellectual, who had self-confidence in both himself and his ideas, blamed the people for not being able to understand the truths, hence, they defended the order against the people. However, this charge did not retain the intellectual from his mission of being savior “for the people, despite them” in a road that is not drawn by the popular classes. As a result, the perpetual contradictions between the people and the intellectuals –or at least the disinterestedness of the people in their efforts– caused intellectual to feel betrayed and paranoiac.

The search of a national identity in the early 20th century brought up a populist corporatist social model which rejects class struggle and seeks the common national values of peasantry. Populism (*halkçılık*) was the major characteristic of 2nd Meşrutiyet intellectuals until it was replaced with a discourse of democracy in the multi-party era after mid-1940s. Toprak (1995: 39) mentions the evolutionary positivist understanding of sociology (*ictimaiyyat*) in this intellectual realm whose main aim is to reach out the people -similar to the Russian narodnik movement⁶⁵. This "sociology for people" movement had swung between socialism and solidarism for a little while and ended up with solidarism⁶⁶ -also conceptualized as corporatism–

⁶⁵ In Ottomans and Russia, the progress of the intellectuals share several similarities: (i) they were showed up relating to West; (ii) it was a result of a need in both states to learn something from West in order to stop the decline, i.e. Westernization was a pragmatic necessity; (iii) their position against the Western world; (iv) both states had despotic/autocratic power structures; (v) the popular classes in both states were excluded from the politics for long and they were in a state of disinterestedness and ignorance; (vi) intellectuals were into politics as a result of the autocratic governance; (vii) intellectuals were locating inside the state, outside there were no place to settle (Belge, 1995: 123-8). Belge shows that Russia was significantly more prosperous in terms of the development of the intellectuals both qualitatively and quantitatively compared to Ottomans.

⁶⁶ For Late Ottoman and early republican intellectuals of Republican People's Party, “solidarism” was a midway doctrine between socialism and liberalism that resolves the problems stemming from both by accommodating justice and freedom together. Their

which put forward the following as a motto: going towards the people in villages and understanding, educating and transforming them with the help of public lectures, appointments, newspapers, magazines and national literature (1995: 40-4). However, the scope of “people” also changed in years. Until the World War I, it was referring to the lowest strata such as low-income groups, landless peasants, day laborers and little artisans but following the war these groups had left out of the discourse that steered for the middle classes with an aim to melt economic and cultural aims in the same pot (1995: 48-51).

The widest criticism about the intellectuals in Turkey –for some examples, see Erksan (1995), Meriç (1983, 1997), Mardin (1984), Küçük (1983)– is that they do not create or build ideas but only transfer and implement the ideas with their bureaucratic or professional identity. Some authors argue that because of their lack of creating new knowledge they cannot be entitled as intellectuals. From politics to literature, sociology to economy intellectuals have translated the Western concepts and adapted to their own society. Kılıçbay (1995: 176-7) argues that intellectuals, who live either inside the state or living by it, born as missionaries and functionaries. Missionary implies their way of seeing their act as holy and religious with a faith to the invariable order. They were also functionary because of their legislative roles.

For Keyder, intellectuals’ main crisis of identity lies here, in their problematic modernization project stemming from the restrictive and sublime state conception that does not let individuals think and decide on their own while the “liberation of the individual from the repressive sect relations” was indispensable principle of Western modernization (Keyder, 1995: 154-5). However, this was not completely a conscious choice of the intellectuals because there was no significant response from the people to their acts apart from the exact oppositional groups such as the Islamists or Ottomanists. And by using the state power, these rebellions were being repressed and irritating

solidarism suggests state intervention in economics, guards workers and poors, rejects class struggle in social life and adopts social justice, cooperation, laicist education and reconciliation instead of contradiction (Toprak, 1995: 52).

larger portions of people. Tanzimat, post-Tanzimat, bureaucrat and also 1960s and 1970s' leftist intellectuals were not very successful in terms of interrelating with the public. It can easily be seen from the inner debates of these movements focusing on the ways of relating with the people. The first two was not able to go out of palace and *Bâb-ı Âli* which would let them to establish a dialogue with people outside of the ones in their level. Ülgener (2006: 101-2) explains the alienation of the intellectuals to the people with their bureaucrat identities, which was not the case in West. In Turkey, they were high level state officials such as inspectors, governors, ambassadors etc. which kept them at bay, far from the ordinary citizens.

The rupture between the intellectuals and the people also created a relationship based on despise for both sides. From the ordinary prejudices of the everyday life to the studies that claim to be scientific, an exclusionary attitude was mostly common in the relationship between the intellectuals and the people shaped by the progressive-regressive dichotomy. Cemil Oktay (1995: 13) explains it with cultural egocentrism and "evolutionist drunkenness" of intellectuals inherited from 19th century since progressivism -*terakkiyât* in Ottoman Turkish- was a major imperative as mentioned above. Furthermore, due to being missionaries, they purported that the truths in their minds were universal and absolute. Özlem (1995: 210) uses the metaphor of "dressing up the society" for the efforts of the intellectuals and claims that whenever the people did not want to wear their clothes, intellectuals blamed the people, not the clothes or themselves. Being a teacher was one of the popular professions in early republican era due to the great necessity. With the role of teaching the Truth to the illiterate peasants, they acted as if they retrieved the universal Truth that others had no chance of access without the help of the intellectuals (Bilgin, 1995: 195). Belge (1983: 126-7) argues that the teachers strived for changing the traditional ideology left from Ottomans and propagating the new regime. It was both an educational and political job for the teachers to represent the state.

The problems of intellectuals were not always stemming from their relationship with power or people; there were also cultural adversities intellectuals' minds. One major point of crisis of the –mostly artistic and literary–intellectuals is the trauma of staying constantly between the new and old according to Özkırımlı (1995). He finds a crisis of values and misidentification in the cultural and political actions of the literary intellectuals palpably manifested in Divan literature but followed both in Tanzimat and early republican period. Their works are either rootless or taken from outside their culture, which constantly lead them to experience a disassociation and re-articulation. During and after Tanzimat, it was West and East, new and old which kept intellectuals hanging in midair. This is the greatest drama of the intellectuals, "perpetually being in a pursuit... society's constant loss of memories... lacking coherence and synthesis" (1995: 21).

Throughout late 19th and early 20th century, both intellectuals took on an interest in literature and the literary products particularly novels, as an implication of Westernization. The main problematic of the intellectuals in novels⁶⁷ was Westernization and its discontents. Through the figures that reflect both the authors' views and the opposite ones, the reactionary and conservative approach highlighted the themes like loosening of the social relations that were once based on consistency and cooperation, provocation of the individualism, splitting of the traditions and intergenerational bonds, laicism's depredation of religion and cultural corruption (Oktay, 1995: 267). On the other hand there are characters who praise the modernization, who struggle between Western and Eastern identities, who suffer and who endeavor for a compromise. Moran (1983: 19) shows through his detailed analysis of the novels until the 1950s that there is always a cultural dichotomy between the new and old in terms of morals, family, manners and tastes which inclined also the intellectuals in a position where it is hard to find

⁶⁷ Some prominent examples of the novels based on intellectuals and Westernization are Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem's *Araba Sevdası*, Karaosmanoğlu's *Panorama*, *Ankara* and *Yaban*, Tanpınar's *Huzur*, Buğra's *Küçük Ağa*, Ahmet Mithat's *Felâatun Bey ile Râkım Efendi*.

a balance. Mardin (1991) presents the notion of “excessive Westernization” in some of these novels where the intellectual figures lack character and roots, are westernized in a shallow sense, arrogant, bored, snobbish⁶⁸ and object of derision by lower strata people and traditionalists. He interprets this tendency as a response to the socio-cultural transformation in Ottoman Empire. Gürbilek links this characterization to the subsequent figures in art, literature and daily life rooted in *züppe*, proceeded with “*tatlı su frengi* (freshwater French) or *salon sosyalisti* (living-room socialist) and last reached to the “entel” figure in the 1980s which I am going to mention in the next chapter (2003: 609).

Towards the end of the single-party era, non-bureaucratic and local intellectuals emerged. They advocated politically decentralized, economically liberal and entrepreneur, culturally traditional state. These new self-employed, doctor, lawyer etc. intellectuals assisted Democratic Party’s proliferation in the rural areas⁶⁹ (Belge, 1983: 126). However, the 1960s and 1970s were the years in which the leftist intellectuals came into prominence and constituted the majority amongst the intellectuals with the representation of a social and political mass in an increasingly politicizing society (Laçiner, 1995: 97). The increasing autonomy of the intellectuals, who have found different institutions for working and pulled away from the state, was a significant parameter enabling this sort of radicalization.

But while liberating from state, other pressures came to the light. One of them was the market economy which on the one hand presented a wide range of opportunities for intellectuals to reach the public via the developing mass media, and demanded a quick, standardized, marketable and politically harmless content on the other. Ülgener (2006: 105-8) discusses the dissatisfaction of the intellectuals because of low business opportunities and

⁶⁸ Gürbilek gives a clear definition of the concept in her analysis of the same case as follows: “Snobbism is defined as something excessive. The snob is not someone who imitates, but someone who imitates excessively, not someone who borrows, but someone who borrows beyond measure, not someone who desires the other’s desire, but someone who exaggerates that desire” (2003: 608).

⁶⁹ Since the intellectuals of Turkish right are not directly in the scope of the thesis and they are not represented in the films, I am not going to discuss them in detail.

proletarianization of the highly educated classes⁷⁰ due to market pressures and explains the increase of the anti-capitalist intellectuals with these two major reasons. However, this evaluation also lacks some other significant factors. The worldwide proliferation of socialist ideology, the escalation of the translations from Marxist classics, the relatively democratic environment as a result of the 1961 constitution were also affirmative in rendering intellectuals more into leftist and socialist ideology.

Following the 1960s different sorts of socialist struggles such as the parliamentary representation⁷¹, youth movement, unionization of the working class and the civil servants, urban guerillas –more in the 1970s– were extremely influential in the political realm. Both the mass movement and the intellectuals had distinctive interpretations of left nourished from Kemalism, nationalism, populism, Maoism, Stalinism etc. These various approaches were discussed lengthily around particular journals, ‘idea clubs’ or the proclamations of the organizations; however they were all under the umbrella of left. Therefore, the 1960s are evaluated as the most fruitful years in terms of the intellectual richness and productivity of socialist thinking.

However, leaving aside the fact that many people in the second half of the 1970s identified their political orientation as “leftist”, the period of 1975-1980 was less fruitful in terms of creative thinking and analysis. The splits of the late 1960s further deepened during this period, along with more extreme localization of debates. (Çulhaoğlu, 2002: 180).

The military intervention in March 12, 1971 dealt a major blow to leftist organizations, murdered, tortured and imprisoned the revolutionary young cadres and intellectuals. However, unlike European left which receded after 1968, in Turkey, socialist movement gained its strength back in the mid-1970s. However, while it was being nourished by the revolutionary 1960s, inner conflicts increased, theoretical developments slowed down, armed

⁷⁰ Mannheim (1960) explains the proletarianization of the intellectuals with the asymmetric development of educational opportunities and qualified job opportunities which creates educated people who are surplus to requirement.

⁷¹ The first meeting between the working class and intellectuals took place in Workers Party of Turkey’s call to the intellectuals to join the party in 1962. Many public intellectuals had joined. In 1965 elections, 14 members of the party were elected to the parliament.

conflicts against the right-wing groups mounted and state's repression and sedition advanced. The political parties insufficient about representing the people and political polarizations were at its extreme. The Republican People's Party defined itself as a "left-of-center" populist party; on the opposite side coalitions between the rightist parties were made under the name of National Front against the leftist and socialist movement. However, none of the governments were able to remain in power for long and generate solutions to the problems such as economic crisis, political corruption and urban violence. In this setting, January 24 Decisions were made and the military staged September 12 coup d'état.

Some of the leftist and socialist intellectuals were members of legal or illegal parties and factions between 1960 and 1980. Çulhaoğlu (2007: 70) underlines that the concept "Marxist intellectuals" in Turkey should be used in the widest sense to involve "traditional intellectuals, middle-class intellectuals, academicians and students who adopted Marxism". The roles of these intellectuals were rather writing articles in the journals, training youth, giving speeches to workers and peasants in order to organize them. The leftist intellectuals showed parallelism and some contrasts with the intellectual figure rooted in Tanzimat⁷². The missionary and vanguard role was common in the socialist intellectuals. Their efforts in interrelating with the people were also limited, albeit more successful than the Tanzimat and early republican intellectuals.

Ülgener, in his article on the sociology of the intellectuals criticized the large scaled appropriation of Marxist views inside the intellectual cadres, dwelling on the major liberal writers such as Hayek or Schumpeter. For him, average intellectuals took shelter in Marxism's pretense of being scientific and remained limited in terms of intellect. According to him, those

⁷² Non-leftist authors have the tendency to evaluate the socialist movement greatly and only as a "natural outcome" of the Westernization which started with Tanzimat. Meriç (1997: 229-32), similar to Aron's remarks in France, evaluates the socialist wave of the 1960s and 1970s as a religion that accepted without questioning for the secularized and rationalized young generations who lost their faith. However, this approach is highly reductionist in terms of precluding all the inner-left debates about the adaptation of the socialist ideas, organization and development models of Marxism whenever the circumstances allow.

intellectuals explained the political events dwelling on some half-measure and hearsay premises of Marxist ideology without learning the theory in depth. He also tells that one major function of these intellectuals was to produce slangs and slogans for the movement that also provides a conceptual set for the people to explain their political stances easily, without even thinking (2006: 114-22). The reason why I cited Ülgener's evaluation is that he wrote from outside of the Marxist political movement, where the history of left in 1960s and 1970s is largely written by the insiders or other left-wing scholars. However, Ülgener's views represent the prevailing considerations of the socialist left in outer circles. Some bold discourses on these intellectuals are also present in films such as evaluating them as mistaken and misled youth, dreamy petit-bourgeois, mercenary etc.

Furthermore, non-leftist authors also have rightful insights about the history of left. Some of the inner debates in the socialist left also share Ülgener's⁷³ and others' comments. Apart from that, the self-criticisms of the organizations, leaders and parties during or after this period are very diverse since each figure lines up with different interpretations of socialism that are impossible to cover here. Fortunately, the critiques coming outside of the left are mostly flat and similar to one another. On the other hand, the socialist corpus is complex and heterogeneous as mentioned above. At this point, I am going to continue with discussing the socio-political and cultural atmosphere of the 1980s in Turkey with a special emphasis on cinema and literature in the next chapter. Furthermore, I am going to try to give a more detailed description of the intellectuals in this particular period which will let me reach to the part where I analyze the films.

⁷³ Başkaya (2007: 73), similar to Ülgener, discusses on the socialist movement's ideological and practical background when it first showed up in the 1960s. He sees it as a result of the decline of the socialist movement/theory worldwide and the workers movement's lack of heritage.

3.5. Retreat of the Left and (Its) Intellectuals

As mentioned in Chapter II, the intellectual sphere of the 1960s and the 1970s were marked with the hegemony of leftist –particularly Marxist– intellectuals. However, following the military coup in 1980, this hegemony was lost abruptly as a result of both the anti-intellectual and anti-leftist activities of political authorities and the global depression of Marxism. Ömer Laçiner, in his article “Crisis of Leftist Intelligentsia”, states that by coding leftist/Marxist intellectuals as guilty and intellectual –categorically– as harmful, “12 September regime” played significant role on defeating the hegemony of the left (1995: 97). Ceyhun (1995: 8 [tm]) cites his fear as an intellectual in the early 1980s as follows:

The generals of the September 12 obscured the borders of the concept which was already inside the penal system “crime that denigrates Turkishness” and also increased the penalties a number of times. Accordingly, during those days could it be possible not to be restless while intending to discuss our national identity and social structure?

Unlike the military coup in March 12, 1971, the primary addressee of the military violence was not the intellectuals in the early 1980s; in fact the majority of the academician, artist and the authors who are not directly engaged with politics were exempted from the direct violence and punishment (Toker, 2005: 52). Nevertheless, thousands of young militant intellectuals were imprisoned, engaged academicians were sent away from the universities and even mentioning an idea became a crime. Additionally, in an environment where the parties and organizations were banned or overthrown, it was very hard for the intellectuals to establish or protect the existent relationships with the opponent groups.

On the other side, perceived in the 1980s and lasted until nowadays, Marxist intelligentsia in general fell into a depression both in the Western advanced capitalist countries and also in the underdeveloped ones. While the activities of the intellectuals were tarnishing, the mobility from younger generations were also diminished as a result of the lack in implementing the ideas into the society and the new interpretations that do not fit to “working

class" emphasis of classical Marxism (Laçiner, 1995: 97-8). This situation, of course, has its roots in the crisis of left in general, starting from the late 1960s. As Hall (1990: 39-42) points, an ignorable "swing to the right" took place in Europe, together with the strikethrough of the revolutionary ferment of 1968 and the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state that delegitimized social democrats. In the 1970s, socialist/communist left critically lost its former power across the globe, although it was still powerful –even more than ever– in Turkey in terms of organizational capability and had not yet lost its productivity in socialist thinking and political strategies (Çulhaoğlu, 2002).

Specific to Turkey, Saraçoğlu and Akdeniz (2005: 108-9) identify three main current in the political strategies of left in the 1980s. First, a defensive strategy that aimed to protect the existence of their organization implied a pull back and self-enclosed policies. Second, a pragmatism that aimed to gain legitimacy and incorporation of left to do politics in the given borders, evaluated the coup as progressive move of nationalists and Motherland Party as a subject who took upon a positive restoration. Third, the minority group which argued that left needed a complete revision, produced a lot on the condition of left and its understanding of democracy with a pretention that the defeat is related with problems of democratization in left. All in all, at the top of left's agenda there was the problem of rights and basic freedoms unlike the pre-1980s where the greatest separations have been about revolution strategies.

Öngider (2007: 999) sums up the abovementioned (inter-)national incidents as a call for left to do a self-criticism and to pick up. Oktay (1998: 55-6) refers to the 1980s as "inner settlement" that majority of the problems were articulated with cultural issues and past was re-evaluated with the contemporary theories with a retreat, nostalgia and therapy. Similarly, Çulhaoğlu after arraying the shock of the junta and the neoliberal demarche, claims that they "led the Turkish left of this period to become not only inquisitive but also skeptical", however he adds that since this process of questioning was not based on systematic thought, it did not enable an

intellectual resurrection (2002: 180). It was also the duty of the leftist intellectuals to settle accounts with the global and local defeat. However, they could not resist to political authority, as Toker (2005: 51-2 [tm]) claims,

It seems that the essential structural transformation which September 12 substantiated in society also structurally transformed the intellectuals and they fed their mind, intuitions and creativity with fear and violence. . . . It is unavoidable for a coup as violent as September 12 to cause an enclosure in all parts of society somehow. Nevertheless it is also clear that the motives of an intellectual such as independent comprehension, cognition, imagination etc. must have a power to resist this feeling of enclosure.

Toker argues that the intellectuals had the chance to keep the dynamism alive that could prevent both the society from sinking into oblivion and left from turning in upon itself and sticking into a cyclical temporality but they missed it to a great extent. The general tendencies of the post-1980 intellectuals were cynicism, individualism, indifference, nostalgia and becoming ordinary.

Tanıl Bora (2010), in a series of articles compiled in “Left, Cynicism and Pragmatism”, examines the post-1980 Turkish left and intelligentsia around the term ‘cynicism’ referring to Sloterdijk’s (2001: 5) definition of the term which is,

Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness. It is that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has labored both successfully and in vain. It has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was *not able to, put them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time* [emphasis added]. . .

According to Bora, after September 12, this sort of pessimist and almost decadent cynicism is dominant in left which is futilely realist, unable to do what it devises and compensating its unhappiness with disdain. For left and “intelligentsia open to left”, the usage of social criticism and analysis widely means distancing, separating or refining the analyst and the subject that is analyzed. With a “defeated language”, leftist intellectuals display their comments on society reluctantly but does not even astonish or get angry about their own observations (2010: 26). In the source of this “post-traumatic political failure”, Bora finds a strong feeling of impotence, a feeling that it is

opposed to a power which it cannot effect and loss of the capacity of “being a subject” –which reminds Nietzsche’s psychic mechanism of “ressentiment”⁷⁴. At this point of not feeling as a political subject, the interplay between the middle classes and the leftist intelligentsia is of vital importance:

The lettered middle classes whose social status and reputation are eroded live this change as an extensive defeat: beyond the total social consequences, they perceive it as injustice against them and the qualities and values they carry. In the reproduction of that kind of setback and damnification, *leftist intelligentsia which largely leans on the class at stake* [emphasis added] represents the intergenerational denominational consciousness of continuity. Besides, in this community, denominational loss of reputation and activity intertwine with the loss of reputation and activity of leftism –it is perceived as so. (2010: 29 [tm])

Bora immediately notes that this landscape is limited for people who experienced the pre-coup era one way or another and the opinion leaders of the left. Nevertheless, these generations reproduce a consciousness of defeat, suppression and a comparison between old and the new days based on their conceptualizations. Erdoğan (2010 [tm]) also mentions a kind of “cynical-pseudo leftist” personality in relation with the debates between the former leftists as follows:

A sub type of this cynical-pseudo leftist is the personality who “did leftist activities” in the past but whose politicization today is limited with the conversations about the critique of left’s past and today and even about its damnification. The genealogy of this personality reaches out the criticisms expressed in the mid-1980 such as “lack of individuality”, “no private space in collectivity”, “feudal ethics” and “refusal of sexuality and ‘sister’ relationship”.

⁷⁴ Nietzsche, in his text “Good and Evil, Good and Bad” where he discusses the emergence of the moral values, defines “ressentiment” as the slavish morality against a “hostile external world” i.e. authorities. While noble morality that contains a “triumphant affirmation of itself” does not accommodate this emotion, the sphere “that of common man, of the lower orders” carry this as a powerlessness, frustration, turning inwards, squinted soul and incapability of taking its enemies (1989: 36-8). Deleuze (1983: 116) evaluates the pain, hatred and the pressure of memory of this emotion as follows, “[t]he man of ressentiment in himself is a being full of pain: the sclerosis or hardening of his consciousness, the rapidity with which every excitation sets and freezes within him, the weight of the traces that invade him are so many cruel sufferings. And, more deeply, the memory of traces is full of hatred in itself and by itself”. I will delve into this term more during the analysis of the intellectual figures in the fourth chapter.

All these criticisms go hand in hand with the cultural transformation of the values in the 1980s. Erdoğan argues that even if these statements are individually right, they serve for a distancing from the left –albeit in a subconscious way. In a similar vein but with a different –i.e. postmodern– terminology, Akay (1995: 425-6) uses the term ‘schizophrenic’ in order to express the post-1980 intellectuals who turn their back on all conventions, live in the margins and chaotic situations, compel the norms, prefer micro-politics to macro-politics, defend depoliticization, opt for minority lifestyle and present the problems in a de-territorialized way. However, this was not a lifelong condition; a part of these intellectuals were articulated to market economy by taking charge in private companies with the help of their intellectual capital.

In this manner, as Bora states, cynicism becomes a psycho-ideological state that is sustained, even gives pleasure and creates its own aesthetics⁷⁵ so that it provides comfort. It can be said that, not only the terrorizing enforcements of the state, but also the increasing operation of identity politics, sovereignty of neoliberal rationale and globalization process restricted the political activity opportunities of left and intellectuals at all hands starting from the 1980s (2010: 29-31).

After all, together with the cultural transformations mentioned above, in the eyes of middle classes, socialist left lost its prestige in the 1980s. In this setting, a new rank of liberal middle class intellectuals aimed to gain space by heavily criticizing the social engineering and determinism of left and defending neoliberal determinism. This, not always a doctrinally or profoundly theoretical but an ordinary and daily, liberalism of the young white-collar liberal intellectuals was prosperous to a great extent during its war against left. In this part of intelligentsia once occupied greatly by socialist left, there was a rigorous struggle between liberal and socialist left, together with the newly-emerging nationalist conservatives (2010: 63-6). Bora formulates a

⁷⁵ By its aesthetic value, in addition to Bora, I mean the literary and artistic products having cynical characters, implications and narrative structures, including the films that will be analyzed in this thesis as well.

question for left regarding the loosening bonds between left and middle classes to conclude this transformation as follows:

Are we going to assume receding of the smart kids –of nice families who studied in good schools– from left and bestowing favors on liberal tendencies as ‘natural events’ and rest, or assume it as a sign of the fading of left and worry about it? (2010: 67 [tm])

Nilgün Toker’s (2000; 2005) analysis of the post-1980 intellectuals is a bit more harsh and pessimistic, since unlike Bora, she examines the more general outlook of the intellectuals and the ones that are more loosely affiliated with politics. Primarily, she relates the “retreat” and “liberation” of the intellectuals at the junction of “subjective interests”:

I think, today, we can comprehend why the retreat of the post-September 12 intellectuals is read as liberation today. September 12 is the milestone of individualism and rising of subjectiveness. The great gap, which manifested itself as decadence, elevated on the discovery of subjectiveness. It is the gap between the society withdrawn and buried into oblivion and the people who could not forget. In this gap, there is lack of judgment. (2005: 53 [tm])

According to Toker, since the intellectuals are the ones who have capacity to watch, evaluate and judge, their main duty is to judge the country inside their minds while the courts were dominated by violence. However, starting with a keeping to themselves, they abandoned the process of judging and accepted becoming ordinary. Their will for liberation replaced the ability of reconsideration and at the end they became banalized since pursuing the subjective interests is the common divisor for all individuals in a neoliberal society where intellectuals have no specialty in this regard (2005: 54-5)⁷⁶.

One aspect of intellectuals’ becoming ordinary is also related with the structural change of the circulation of information with the mid-1980s in Turkey together with intellectuals’ own attitude, socialist left’s crisis and anti-intellectualism. The increase in the material supplied by media changed the average of the intellectual and general knowledge. It lead a two sided call for

⁷⁶ ‘Subjective interests’ is also the main theme of Ömer Türkeş’s (2005) above-cited article on devaluation of the writer and the novel with the post-1980. With a parallelization between writer and intellectual, he also argues that intellectuals tend to incline their own interests, lives and individual matters. In addition, as mentioned above, he associates this liberation of writer from politics also with the low or no expectation from the public.

intellectuals: specialization in constantly fragmented knowledge or the joy of intervening infinitely widened words, images and subjects of actuality (Bora, 2010: 186-7)⁷⁷. Gürbilek's (2010: 16) aforementioned remark on the outbreak of the voices, remarks and images in the 1980s is meant to be thought of as parallel with intellectuals' intervention to the everyday life. The debates regarding the everyday life in art and culture magazines appealed a lot to the intellectuals at first since talking about politics was intensely dangerous. However, following the end of the junta period, when the compulsions were relatively decreased, these debates did not ease down. On the contrary, with the help of the developing technologies, the discussions of everyday life increased more and more and started to be thought as recklessly being passed over for years, but these debates were hardly politicized. Herein, Kozanoğlu (2000: 100-1) indicates that these debates were mostly seen as alternative ways to leftist political awareness. Likewise, Maktav states,

In this period, "culture and art" served as a social dissidence due to the closeness of the political channels on the one hand, and took its place in the market as an effective commodity that made the people elite when it is "used", served them to have a better social status and contributed pragmatically to their private lives. (2002: 225 [tm])

While the ideological attitudes and interests of the intellectuals were transforming, their reputation in the society underwent a radical change. A new pejorative word 'entel' which is an abbreviation of the word 'entelektüel' –that means 'intellectual' in Turkish– entered to colloquial speech after mid-1980s and became very popular in newspapers, cartoon strips⁷⁸, novels and everyday life. In brief, the term was –and is still being– used in order to "despise, insult and revile the intellectuals" (Naci, 1995: 181). The online

⁷⁷ In his article "Remark on 'Defter'", Bora discusses the intellectual production after the 1980s by using the quotes from another text –the farewell text in the last issue of the periodical Defter, which published for 45 issues between 1987 and 2002. The essays in Defter constitutes significant portion of the corpus about the struggle against the anti-intellectualism in Turkey after 1980.

⁷⁸ Öperli (2006) analyzes 'the entel' as a degenerated intellectual figure in cartoon strips in terms of iconography, gender and life style using the cartoons published between 1986 and 1992.

dictionary of Turkish Language Association defines the adjective word ‘entel’ as “(the one) who aspires to be an intellectual but has not yet gained the essential quality”⁷⁹. The term was also used as a slang verb ‘entel takılmak’ that means trying to hang out like an ‘entel’. In addition, several new places called as ‘entel bars’ sprung up where group of ‘entel’s hang out together. Entel bars, that were largely associated with nostalgia of old-Beyoğlu and passed years, inhabited intellectuals who got bored of the “increasingly Arabesk environment” of the big city (Ayvazoğlu, 1995: 832-3). In other words, a distinctive lifestyle was formed around this image. Gürbilek evaluates entel as a significant figure of the post-1980s and finds a parallelism and continuity between ‘entel’ and the aforementioned ‘züppe’ as follows:

The entel figure . . . was the main target of Turkish humor and especially of Turkish caricature in the 1980s and 1990s, and the word entel has a popular usage today designating people torn away from life and, of course, from manly virtues, people occupied with insignificant details, excessively sophisticated and rather effeminate. Hence züppe designates both the imitating snob and the effeminate dandy (2003: 609).

The alienation from the society is the major constituent of the figure. In this regard, the rise of the term bears a criticism and mockery of the transforming intellectuals of the era in terms of becoming ordinary and impotent. On the other hand, its popularization was also in connection with the anti-intellectualism of the era which was insidious about despising the intellectual activity. In the 1980s, the debates on intelligentsia generally touched upon the image of ‘entel’ one way or another. While Ceyhun (1995: 9) were interpreting the nascence of such an adverse conception in series of newspaper articles as a result of the corruption by September 12, İlhan (2004: 137) criticized the contemporary intellectuals for laying down the law on current issues in ‘entel bar’s or five-star hotel lobbies by hearsay information and without serious research and knowledge. Ultimately, ‘entel’

⁷⁹ Retrieved from Türk Dil Kurumu: <http://www.tdk.gov.tr/>

became the marker signifying the loss of prestige of the intellectuals in the late 1980s.

3.6. Turkish Cinema in its Historical Context

There is no single and well-accepted periodization of Turkish Cinema and it is a controversial topic of discussion in Turkish film studies but there are a few major lines of analyses that differ on some aspects. Between the ones which cover the 1980s, the most widespread and accepted systematic periodization is Özön's evaluation (1995)⁸⁰ which names the post-1970 period as "Young/New Cinema Era" without further detailing. Scognamillo (1998) divides the post-1960 era into two as the years between 1960-1986 and 1986-1997 according to his book's new editions and prefers to analyze these two era year by year, hence his book lacks any sort of periodization – he does not even give names the periods– as well. Similarly film historian and archivist Özgüç (1998) who wrote the most comprehensive encyclopedia on Turkish cinema divides the volumes of his book according to the years of new editions too. Teksoy (2008) also does not mind the issue of chronological periodization in his research; instead he follows the directors' biographies. However he evaluates Yılmaz Güney's *Umut* (Hope, 1970) as the pioneer film for other new directors and approaches which opened a new era and 1990s as the years of new directions.

These four authors' studies involves the most general and informative resource of the film history of Turkey, but they largely avoid dividing the film history in the context of genres, movements or socio-political factors. In addition, none of these four authors are academics. As Atam (2011: 3) noted, by 2011, there were no scholarly published systematic approach covering the

⁸⁰ For the critique of Özön's film and director based linear study and its usage as an unquestionable source for variety of studies about Turkish cinema, see Özen (2009) who proposes film scholars to "get rid of Özön's overcoat" without disclaiming his significance.

conceptual, historical or aesthetical aspects of Turkish cinema from its origin up to the present⁸¹.

Even so, there are several small scaled works emphasizing the heydays of Yeşilçam⁸² and post-1995 period of Turkish cinema in detail, usually lacking the analysis of the 1980s. Esen (2000) specifically analyzes the 1980s in a categorical regarding the set of issues which she defines such as internal and external migration, women's films and films aiming social criticism. Evren's (1990) and Dorsay's (1995) books, which are compiled of their film reviews, periodize the 1980s as the years of new directors, new themes, new styles. In this regard, both Esen and Dorsay –whose book is entitled as "September 12 Years and Our Cinema"– attach primary importance to the socio-political transformation and aim at evaluating the films in this context. On the other hand, Ayça (1989) and Erdoğan and Göktürk (2001) evaluate the post-1980 era -particularly after the mid-1980s- arguably with the term "New Turkish Cinema" based on three major reasons: the socio-political transformation of Turkey and its influence on cinema; new directors' entrance to the film sector; rise of the individual style of expression which considerably opposed to the conventions of Yeşilçam⁸³.

However, the term "New Turkish Cinema" lately started to be used by other critics and scholars for marking the post-1995 era⁸⁴. Hence, in order to

⁸¹ Savaş Arslan (2011), in book entitled as "Cinema of Turkey: A New Critical History", attempts "to examine various movements, exchanges, and transformations as a staple of cultural production" in cinema of Turkey from the origins with a specific attention to stand apart from national identity emphasis of "Turkish cinema". In his periodization, all different eras are defined in reference to Yeşilçam such as pre-, early, high, late and post-Yeşilçam.

⁸² Yeşilçam –green pine– is the name of a street in İstanbul where several film companies were located. The word is used interchangeably with 'Turkish cinema' or 'popular cinema' – as in the relationship between Hollywood and films of the US. "It also denotes a specific system of production-distribution-exhibition that dominated the Turkish cinema between the late 1950s and mid-1980s" (Erdoğan, 2006: 158).

⁸³ The MS and PhD theses particularly examining the 1980s Turkish cinema that are worth-mentioning for this study are as follows: Türker's (2006) analysis of the political criticism in the satiric comedies, Hıdıroğlu's (2010) casting of the post-1980 cinema policies and finally Yazıcı's (2008) analysis of the middle class habitus in the 1980s "depression cinema".

⁸⁴ Mostly originated with the both cinematographic and commercial success of the *Eşkiya* (The Bandit, 1996, Yavuz Turgul) in popular cinema and low-budget, several international award-winning *Tabutta Rövaşata* (Somersault in a Coffin, 1996, Derviş Zaim) in art house cinema, "New Cinema of Turkey" or "New Turkish Cinema" is used to indicate post-1995 period of Turkish cinema. Following the 2000s, this contemporary period of cinema became

avoid ambiguity, I will not use this term however I will claim that both the popular and art cinema⁸⁵, as other sectors of art and media, transformed significantly and concomitantly with the changing socio-political atmosphere.

In order to historicize and conceptualize the cinematic environment which “films of intellectuals” are located in, I will firstly present the dominant filmmaking practices in Yeşilçam from 1960s until the 1980. At this point I will refer to the debates between the intellectuals in Cinemathèque and the Yeşilçam directors with the intent of tracing the roots of the art cinema envisagement in Turkey. Secondly, I will emphasize the 1980s Turkish cinema regarding the demise of Yeşilçam, changes in the production and distribution of films, new genres, new formal and contextual approaches and the rise of ‘serious’ or ‘auteur’ films.

3.6.1. Social Realism, Yeşilçam and Critics until the 1980

Related with the lack of a systematic periodization, there is an ambiguous era⁸⁶ in Turkish cinema between the 1960 and 1966 when

a hot debate in festival and academic circles with screenings, awards, panels, articles and books. This period is mostly characterized by increasing audience compared to early 1990s, technical developments, changes in the funding strategies, rise of the internationally acclaimed auteurs such as Zeki Demirkubuz, Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Derviş Zaim, Reha Erdem, Semih Kaplanoğlu etc. For a broad discussion and problematization of the term “New Cinema of Turkey” about the debates on its novelties and its key features both in popular and art cinema, see Suner (2010), Atam (2011) and Dönmez-Colin (2008).

⁸⁵ Being a debated topic in films studies, art (house) cinema/film primarily covers the films of high aesthetic and intellectual content that reside out of the commercial, popular and mainstream cinema. The usage of the term dates back early cinema and German Expressionism however it becomes frequent after 1950s with Italian neo-realism and French new-wave. Bordwell (1999: 717-9) defines it as a “mode of film practice” and arrays the features such as realism, authorial expressivity, oppositeness to cause-effect linkage, psychologically complex and inconsistent characters. These narrative delimitations of Bordwell and his claim of “coherence” in between art films are also criticized with the examples of divergent films and directors by Andrews (2000) who aims to construct an institutional theory of art cinema in relation with art houses, film festivals and film studies.

⁸⁶ The reason of the ambiguity is the lack of agreement about the period whether to call it as a “social realist” movement/current/wave or not. While Scognamiglio (1998), Özön (1995) and Teksoy (2008) does not see the films eligible to call as a movement, Daldal (2003), Arslan (1997) evaluates the era as the first respectable cinematic movement in Turkish Cinema. The scholar works about the period generally takes the standpoint of a particular author neglecting the controversial opinions. For a detailed debate, see also Özen (1999) where the author discusses the former conceptualizations of the era and tries to build an alternative theoretical model for inspection.

several films⁸⁷ were made by the directors such as Metin Erksan, Halit Refiğ, Ertem Göreç and Duygu Sağıroğlu with social realist intentions. In the relatively liberated, swiftly industrializing and gradually politicizing environment following the 1961 constitution, these politically engaged directors made films that aimed at the critique of capitalism and bourgeoisie via regular people's problems covered by social issues such as strikes, migration or new laws with a new aesthetical pursuit (Daldal, 2003: 110-1). However, on the other hand, these directors were also making more commercial films –i.e. classical Yeşilçam melodramas– in order to survive which got harsh reactions from the critics. Including the aforementioned two significant figures Özön and Scognamillo, the intellectuals of the era who are interested in cinema despised and disregarded this movement by comparing with the Italian Neo-Realism and French New Wave⁸⁸. These attitudes and opposing dialogues mounted up following the establishment of Turkish Cinemathèque Association and its magazine Yeni Sinema which, according to Daldal, led to an “intellectual polarization” (2003: 105-6).

Whimsically, the directors who made these films abandoned social realism later on and they also made a self-criticism and claimed their past as mistake. Halit Refiğ tried to construct a theory started as “folk cinema” and transformed into “national cinema” based on Kemal Tahir's evaluation of Marxian ‘Asian Mode of Production’ claiming that,

[T]urkish cinema was not established by national capital it was not a bourgeois cinema. It was indeed a populist cinema since it was born out of the need of common folk to watch films. It was thus an

⁸⁷ Metin Erksan's *Gecelerin Ötesi* (Beyond the Nights, 1960), *Yılanların Öcü* (Revenge of the Snakes, 1962), *Susuz Yaz* (Dry Summer, 1964), *Suçlular Aramızda* (The Guilty Ones Are Among Us, 1964); Halit Refiğ's *Şehirdeki Yabancı*, (Stranger in The City, 1963), *Gurbet Kuşları* (Birds of Exile, 1964), *Harem'de Dört Kadın* (Four Women in the Harem, 1965); Ertem Göreç's *Otobüs Yolcuları* (Bus Passangers, 1961), *Karanlıkta Uyananlar* (Those Who Wake Up in the Dark, 1965); and Duygu Sağıroğlu's *Bitmeyen Yol* (Road Without End, 1965). Daldal (2003: 109-10) includes these 10 films as the basis films and claims that there are others which stand at the intersection of social realism and commercial/popular cinema. Teksoy (2008: 52) includes Lütfi Akad's *Hudutların Kanunu* (The Law of the Border, 1966) in which Yılmaz Güney starred and co-wrote the screenplay with Akad.

⁸⁸ For an example of the harsh criticisms of the filmmakers from Cinemathèque circle, see Akerson (1968) where he calls the contemporary films as “freak”, directors as having “middle age crosspatch” and alleges that European-like cinema movement will rise in Turkey in a short span of time.

inherently people's endeavor that relied not on capital but on labor.
(Refiğ, as cited in Teksoy, 2008: 56)

Refiğ, together with Metin Erksan, Memduh Ün, Atıf Yılmaz, Osman F. Seden and Ömer Lütfi Akad continued producing popular films –largely melodramas– that include themes of Turkish folk culture and sharing the view of national cinema, however these films varied significantly from one another. Kıracı (2008: 45) notes that these directors were constantly leaguering together and exchanging ideas regarding the cinema, mainly with an aim “to resist the excessively mercantile propensities of the market and produce self-respecting films”. Meanwhile, the Cinemathèque circle constantly criticized Yeşilçam by interpreting it as a crisis and protesting its inner debates such as “national cinema” on the hand, and presented European art cinema as an alternative to popular cinema. Arslan (1997) analyzes this “art cinema discourse in the criticism of Yeşilçam” through citations from the critics and argues that modernist criticism normalized art cinema as the ultimate truth for Turkish cinema and excluded other forms of representation, primarily Yeşilçam⁸⁹. Furthermore, he argues that this discourse had effect on the diminishing of the Yeşilçam films after the 1980s, evanescing of the “unforgettable directors of the love films” and art films’ gaining wide currency hence detracted some values from Turkish cinema (1997: 46). I will refer and extend this debate on the relationship between the intellectuals and popular cinema in terms of despise, art emphasis, infatuation with Western cinema in the part where I discuss the “intellectual films” in the 1980s.

Despite the criticisms of the intellectuals, the late 1960s and early 1970s were the hey-day of popular Turkish Cinema –i.e. Yeşilçam– with regards to the amount of the audiences, movie theaters and the number of the films made. Erdoğan and Göktürk (2001: 535) states:

⁸⁹ Regarding the opposition between popular cinema and art cinema, critics were partially sharing the views of the state about treating filmmakers as “infant traders” (Kıracı, 2008: 43) right along the origin of Turkish cinema, and not as artistic creators. This glance started to change with the rise of auteurs following the 1980s and restoration of the honor of some celebrated Yeşilçam filmmakers.

Continually increasing demand from the audience caused a rapid expansion of the film business. While the film directors were at pains to reconcile the rules of commercial success and personal style, film production increased enormously.

In these years, the most common genre in Yeşilçam –in addition to the historical action movies and slapstick comedies– was the melodrama. Ayça (1996: 146) briefly defines the Turkish melodramas as “a commercial, popular and populist cinema that both articulates in and integrates with the oral culture”. The priority of the verbal expression in the melodramas is mostly explained with two reasons: the oral narrative tradition in Turkey and the economically/artistically underdeveloped cinema industry which led the filmmakers to avoid using images to develop the stories. However, despite the lack of cinematographic competence, Yeşilçam melodramas were very successful in persuading the audiences. Abisel (2005: 220) explains this success with the tight bonds of the films with the societal experiences.

The narrative world of the Yeşilçam melodramas is based on a stereotypical, simple, straightforward and impermeable poor/rich dichotomy in which the poverty is constantly used a melodramatic factor. As Erdoğan schematized (1995: 185-7) and Yeşil (2004: 61-94) analyzed in detail, the main contrasts in these films were built between the Eastern and traditional lower classes bearing the traces of local culture and the urbanite, Westernized-Modernized upper classes. Almost in all Turkish melodramas, there are more or less fixed signifiers which represent these two major groups. On the one hand, American cars, residences, bawdy clothes, blonde women, crazy parties, alcohol –champagne and whisky–, degenerate relationships, social irresponsibility, European languages, piano, dandyism, laziness, weakness and pretentiously politeness are major signs of upper classes. On the other hand, simplicity, pure beauty, honesty, loyalty, strength, alcohol –rakı–, fighting, humaneness and warmth belongs to the lower classes.

The 1970s are also frequently pronounced as the “years of hope” in Turkish cinema based upon Yılmaz Güney’s film *Umut* (Hope, 1970) that

made way for other directors such as Ömer Lütfi Akad, Atif Yılmaz, Ali Özgentürk, Şerif Gören, Zeki Ökten, Ömer Kavur, Erden Kıral and Tunç Okan to make left-wing cinema (Maktav, 2002: 225). Despite sharing melodramatic and conventional cinema elements, many of the Güney's films are definitive examples of political and revolutionary cinema –mostly ruminated with Glauber Rocha's cinema that is “desperate for social and cultural justice” and Third Cinema whose term is coined by Fernando Solanas and Octavia Gettino (Wayne, 5-6). Furthermore, Wayne states,

Third Cinema is a theory and a practice; as the latter it has involved intellectuals in concrete political struggles where their lives and liberty have often been at risk. And Third Cinema as a theory and practice has demonstrated a remarkable self-reflexivity about its own class roots; interrogating the intellectual's position *vis-à-vis* both the culture of the imperial metropolis and the masses below them. (2001: 23)

Both Yılmaz Güney's personal life –he was imprisoned twice and then expatriated– and self-reflexivity in his films –praised as “artist of the people” that makes art by virtue of his own experiences– correspond efficaciously to the Wayne's Third Cinema praxis. In his films, the political consciousness permeates in all the areas of social life of the ordinary people and agitates the audience with piece by piece shocks (Baker).

Another aspect or subgenre of these melodramas was the Arabesk movies started to be made in the 1970s and continued with formal and contextual changes in the 1980s. As in other melodramas, Arabesk films of the 1970s also are principally based on the poor/rich opposition, addressing primarily the subordinate classes providing “the expression of the mental and emotional world of the audience” (Avcı, 2004: 94-5). Melodramas, until the late 1970s when they lost their audiences, dominated the cinema industry whereas Arabesk films were still popular in the 1980s.

Beginning from the mid-1970s, both the number of audiences and the films made went into a decline⁹⁰. The three main reasons of this decline were; firstly the increasing politicization and violence on the streets; secondly

⁹⁰ While 225 films were made in 1975, the numbers decrease to 164 in 1976, 124 in 1977, 126 in 1978 and 193 in 1979. The salient increase in 1979 takes its source from the 131 sex films which were made that particular year (Scognamillo, 1998: 191-2).

the entrance of the TVs to the home usage; and lastly the depression in Yeşilçam film production as a result of the combination of increasing costs that color film brought and the economic crisis (Abisel, 2005: 109; Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001: 537-8). The families which constituted the majority of the audience departed from the movie theaters preferring to watch TV in their houses which led the movie theaters to get closed one after the other. In the late 1970s this crisis was aimed to be overcome with the help of erotic comedies –and lately, even pornographic movies–, appealing to male/lumpen audience until the military coup's censorship in 1980.

3.6.2. 1980s: Fall of Yeşilçam and New Quests

In the 1980s, Yeşilçam decreasingly continued to make melodramas, arabesk, adventure films -this time, mostly for video. Under the pressure of military rule, erotic comedies, arabesk films and films having political criticism were struggling against the harsh censorship in the early 1980s. The novelties that this new decade brought to the Turkish cinema were the social satires, women's films, intellectual films and military coup films where the last three groups occasionally intersect at several different degrees. Likewise the literature, cinema also became a much more individualized art from the subjects and stories of the films to the stylistic preferences of the directors that gave rise to the 'auteur' debates. In addition, many –mostly unsuccessful European cinema imitations– pursuits for new cinematographic forms were introduced to Turkish cinema. Cinema started to benefit more from the contemporary novels and short stories. The films themselves were used as self-reflexive media for questioning the changing Turkish cinema and the process of 'making a film' in particular. However, according to Kayalı (1996: 1190) there were no significant attempts for combining the intellectual accumulation with the former cinema thoughts and practices, instead "Yeşilçam is dead, long live the Turkish cinema" was the first thing coming to mind especially for the intellectuals (Scognamiglio, 1998: 478). On the other hand,

... [A] grand dispute like "Is Turkish cinema dying?" came up in the process of depoliticization of the '80 coup and it was including some finance and film theater problems, however it was fundamentally a debate concerning the moral values of the cinema. Our cinema was experiencing an inner debate about the loss of value or the trade of the 'new' values with the old ones, to say more clearly. Turkish cinema use to have . . . enhanced and successful socialist and populist characteristics in terms of the features of the films combined under the title 'art films', until the '80s." (Gündoğdu, 1997: 9-10 [tm])

The films made per year strikes the bottom in 1980 with 68 films. Together with the unfeasibility of the sex films, the only remedy for commercial cinema in the early 1980s seemed as making Arabesk films. Yeşilçam "went into an even greater crisis, with an enormous decrease in both ticket sales and the number of films made" (Arslan, 2010: 201). However in these years, one of the major events of the Turkish Cinema was –both with its benefits and damages on the film industry and aesthetics– the entrance of the video technology to the market. Abisel evaluates the 'video phenomenon' as a miracle rescuing the film economy in Turkey for couple of years by providing hot money flow –under favor of the new import regime– to the industry:

Among the Turks living abroad, video device sales were increasing as from the 1978. Video was emerged as a vanishing point for the introverted lives of Turkish workers. This population constituted a good demand for Turkish film. In a short span of time, the companies which were organized to distribute cassettes, records and even films captured the market. They were mostly organized in Germany. The representatives of these companies came to Turkey and aspired to the old movies that producers have. For the producers who were on the verge of bankruptcy, this was a miracle (2005: 116 [tm]).

The process which started as buying the old movies to sell abroad, initiated a procedure of making movies with the advances of video operators. In a few years, several new production companies were established and they made hastily written and shot, low-budget –leading to low audio-visual quality– films with semi-professional techniques. Since the audience were not very selective, at least at the beginning, these sloppy video films brought in a lot of money to the producers for a while (Abisel, 2005: 117-8). While the main

target market of the video films was the working-class Turks⁹¹ living abroad, the secondary consumers were the middle-class people in Turkey who were affording the VCRs. The black and white broadcast of state channel TV and the lack of the new good and popular movies inclined the audience to watching video versions of Turkish, European and especially Hollywood films (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001: 538). Arslan also states that the domestic market was “dominated by Hollywood films, further decreasing Yeşilçam’s income and leading to its eventual crisis in the late 1980s.” (2010: 207).

The popularization of the video cannot be evaluated only in terms of its industrial influences. Apart from these, this popularization influenced the already ill-conditioned movie theaters adversely for two main reasons. First, video films were still shot on mostly 16mm or 35mm, but unlike before, they weren’t screened in movie theaters, rather released to video for home usage. However, owing to the lack of regulatory laws, the coffee/tea houses were constantly screening the movies without permission. Secondly, now that was easy to copy the video cassettes, a whole new sector of piracy was born that supplies the movies to consumers with low prices. As a result, the amount of the few movie theaters decreased even further⁹².

As Yeşilçam’s other short-term solutions against the crises, video also lost its profitableness in the late 1980s. The audience started to complain about the low-quality and repetitiveness of the movies and demanded better quality films; this made the video companies –largely the ones rooted in Germany– unwilling about paying for new advances; which broke the chains of the money flow and dramatically reduced the whole video-targeted film production (Abisel, 2005: 124).

⁹¹ Claiming that Arabesk always had class-based roots in Turkey, Görücü and Atam (1995: 22) makes a distinction between the Arabesk films made in the 1980s distinguishing the video films made for the immigrants living in Germany. According to them, the films produced for this purposes mostly contains broad sexuality, absolute fatalism, reactionary human/society mentality and helped conservative ideology to rise in the cinema. Authors see this case as the production of a sense of cinema as a result of the changes in sociological structure of the audiences and consumption patterns.

⁹² While there were 938 movie theaters in 1980, they were decreased to 767 in 1985 and approximately 300 in 1990 (Arslan, 2010: 207).

Another phenomenon that has central significance in order to understand cinema of the 1980s is censorship. It had always been one of the primary problems of the Turkish cinema from its very beginning. Films were censored even in scripting phase, screenplays were written with aliases, awards were taken by police officers, directors were accompanied by state officials during shooting, several films were clipped before screenings and some were completely banned (Yılmaz & Ak, 1994). Although the 1961 constitution had lifted the censorship in media, it did not secure the films; hence censorship arbitrarily continued also in the 1960s and 1970s until the all-inclusive censorship regulations in the 1977 by the National Front government (Kayalı, 1994: 29). After the September 12 coup, censorship increased dramatically and the scope of this regulation extended with 1982 constitution's 26th by-law lifting the obstacles for applying inspection to the film, TV and radio. (Hıdıroğlu, 2010: 172). However, starting from the late 1980s, censorship executions relaxed gradually –albeit not completely disappeared– as a result of the affiliation with Eurimages, Hollywood films' toleration to sexuality and ending of the Cold War.

The post-1980 censorship is mostly identified with the exceptional filmmaker Yılmaz Güney's expatriation and prohibition of all his films because of his socialist worldview. Güney's films were collectively destroyed and state issued calls for people to grant the films they owned. The 1981 film, *Yol* (The Road) which was written and co-directed by Güney was the first film that mentioned the September 12 coup and the martial law afterwards. It took five years to shoot the other "September 12 films"⁹³. Esen

⁹³ By September 12 films, I mean the "films dealing with September 12 coup one way or another, mentioning the process leading to the coup, trying to locate its protagonists upon this process, addressing the effects of the coup on its protagonists" (Görücü, 2007: 28). It can also be argued that all the films that made following the coup bears its affects, but this definition prioritizes the motivation of the film(maker) with regards to a particular concern regarding the coup as a political event. The M.S. theses particularly dealing with this film set are Altınay's (2007) analysis of the presentation of the violence in September 12 films, Boztepe's (2007) comparative study about the relationship between political cinema and military coups in Turkey. Apart from the articles in periodicals and magazines, a recent book by Kara (2013) takes almost all the September 12 films examines individually in 2-3 pages long articles.

(2000: 175) evaluates the official censorship, the self-censorship caused by it and the censorship as a result of the economic pressures as the major obstacles in front of the political films that has real social settlements. However, Maktav while accepting the dimension related to censorship, sees the lack of films that deal with the state, regime, politicians and real events as an “issue of vision and mentality” (2000a: 87-8).

The action/detective and arabesk films of were mostly shot for video release in the 1980s. The content and style of the Arabesk music/films significantly changed vis-à-vis the ones made in the 1970s. The audience of the arabesk widened from squatters and popular classes to the middle and even upper classes (Özbek, 2012: 181). In parallel with this, the villains transformed from being factory/land owners to the mafia figures (Avcı, 2004: 152). In other words, likewise Arabesk music, Arabesk films articulated considerably with the post-1980 socio-political transformation. Mafia relationships were also preferred in action/detective films following the classic superhero formulas like the charismatic and strong male protagonists liberate the captive women from mafia. These low quality video films were “deeply conservative and compatible with the elements of new right discourse, such as law, order, family and authority” (Türker, 2006: 49).

The social-realist cinema tradition of the 1960s and 1970s continued in another form, as satiric comedies⁹⁴ in the 1980s. As distinct from the usual Yeşilçam comedies of the era, these films made economic and political criticism about the individualist mindset and violent competition brought with the 1980s and pulled through the censorship since they were not taken too seriously due to their comedy form (Maktav, 2001: 182-3). Türker shows, in her analysis of narrative characteristics of these satiric comedies, that the films use exaggerated stereotypes as ‘honourable’ and ‘swindler’ in order to

⁹⁴ The films that Türker (2006) analyzes in her thesis on the satiric comedies are; Banker Bilo (1980), Zübük (1980), Davaro (1981), Çiçek Abbas (1982), Dolap Beygiri (1982), Şekerpare (1983), Şalvar Davası (1983), Namuslu (1984), Postacı (1984), Züğürt Ağa (1985), Çıplak Vatandaş (1985), Değirmen (1986), Milyarder (1986), Deli Deli Küpeli (1986), Yoksul (1986), Davacı (1986), Muhsin Bey (1986), Kiracı (1987), Selamsız Bandosu (1987), Arabesk (1988), Koltuk Belası (1990), Aşk Filmlerinin Unutulmaz Yönetmeni (1990).

criticize the degeneration of order and “to represent the decline of such social values as solidarity, collectivism and philanthropy and rise of new ones like individualism, competitiveness and self-reliance” (2006: 107-8).

A new born theme in 1980s Turkish Cinema was the ‘women’s films’ directed both by male directors such as Atıf Yılmaz –who is the pioneer director of this subgenre in Turkey– and Şerif Gören and by female directors such as Bilge Olgaç, Nisan Akman and Mahinur Ergun. As mentioned before, in the 1980s a political and cultural women’s movement emerged which reflected also in the cinema. Gürbilek mentions that, there were significant attempts by the women to construct their own language and resistance but at the same time, ‘being a woman’ was besieged by media and coded as a new sphere of discovery in the 1980s (2011: 14). Under these circumstances, woman films were also a part of women targeted media production of the era like the newly arising magazines which both articulate with feminism at certain points and transmitting content about beauty, health and sexuality (Ahıska & Yenal, 2006: 10).

These films problematized the representation of the women as passive, dependent and objectified and aimed to build active, self-sufficient and personalized woman characters that have their own desires. They were both welcomed and criticized by feminist writers and critics. Gündoğdu (1997: 12 [tm]) states:

. . . [H]ere, instead of the woman questing for her liberation in social relations, the woman problem was reflected as woman building her own ‘individual’ in a confined space where she is oppressed. Those were the women who went to another woman when they are unhappy in their relationships with men; the problem was political however the women were not even trying to solve their problems by doing politics. Women films unfortunately stayed at the level of the urban women’s pursuit of sexual liberation and free woman was degraded to marginal woman.

The symbol of these women films was Müjde Ar⁹⁵, an actress who didn’t beware of getting undressed or making love unlike the other actresses of

⁹⁵ Other actresses of the era who performed newly rising women characters are Şahika Tekand, Aslı Altan, Hülya Avşar and Zuhal Olcay. Kırac (2008: 28-9) finds a sign of

Turkish Cinema. Ar was the major figure of the transformation of actresses and films in which some of them were criticized because of using sexuality as a commercial exhibitionism and others were celebrated for their courage in stepping in taboos with a realistic style. The major advancement that those films brought was the transformation of the women from stereotypes of morality or evil to the living characters (Görücü & Atam, 1995: 23). *Mine* (Mine, 1982, Atıf Yılmaz) is the first example of the subgenre, tells the story of a beautiful and unhappy villager woman cheating on her vicious husband with a writer who arrives to the town; in *Gizli Duygular* (Hidden Emotions, Şerif Gören, 1984) a hidebound laboratory worker Ayşen struggles with her repressed sexual urges together with a process of transforming to a cultured person; in *Adı Vasfiye* (Her Name is Vasfiye, 1985, Atıf Yılmaz), Vasfiye is narrated by four men's quite different stories to a screenwriter who wonders and wants to identify the woman⁹⁶. A part of these women films have intellectual or leftist woman protagonists that makes them intersect with the intellectual films which will be examined in the next chapter⁹⁷.

Experimental and self-referential films problematizing the shooting process of a film, struggle with the censorship, voyeuristic gaze of the director, painful experience of the artistic creation and the director's loss of faith in cinema which were also intersecting with the intellectual films were produced frequently in the 1980s. This inclination in cinema had several characteristics in common with the aforementioned new literary approaches narrating the process of writing a novel, reading a book or semi-fictional-autobiographical stories which can be collected under the title 'metafiction'.

continuity in the transformation of characters performed by Müjde Ar in the early 1980s to Zuhâl Olcay in the late 1980s and 1990s parallel to the change in the women's societal position from the women who are tried to be wasted to the women who are conscious, intellectual and aim not to bring their sexuality to the fore.

⁹⁶ In parallel with the women's films, men started to lose their potency in cinema. Unlike Yeşilçam's handsome, powerful and passionate juvenile leads, there are women who revolts against their passive husbands and several portrayals of spoony, depressed, (sexually) impotent, molester and alcoholic male figures in 1980s cinema. For a detailed account of "crisis of manhood" in post-1980 Turkish cinema, see Ulusay (2004).

⁹⁷ These films are *Aaahh Belinda*, *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*, *Gece Dansı Tutsakları* and *Melodram*.

Hayallerim, Aşkım ve Sen (My Dreams, My Love and You, 1987, Atıf Yılmaz) tells the story of a young man writing a screenplay for the actress whom he had dreamt of since his childhood and his disappointment becoming acquainted with her and the film industry, again with phantasmal sequences; in *Üçüncü Göz* (Third Eye, 1988, Orhan Oğuz) the director's depressive struggle with the protagonist he imagined for his film was mentioned through fantastic elements; in *Filim Bitti*⁹⁸ (Film is Over, 1989, Yavuz Özkan) a divorced couple acts in a movie together where the actor has an affair with another actress that drives the woman crazy and causes to the crises both for these three people and the director; *Aşk Filmlerinin Unutulmaz Yönetmeni* (Unforgettable Director of the Love Films, 1990, Yavuz Turgul) traces a director's pains in order to become a 'serious' and intellectual filmmaker who touches upon the social issues –claiming them as 'entel'– with a semi-critical and semi-nostalgic look towards the Turkish Cinema⁹⁹.

Unlike Yeşilçam tradition, directors started to give more importance to the style instead of the content, as Kayalı (1994: 24 [tm]) remarks,

In other words, what is to be told were not a problem anymore, the problem started to be 'how to tell'. Hence, incorrectly, it was argued that there cannot be anonymous styles of the directors and it is the time for individual style. Naturally, when the content is emptied, expression became significantly prominent. Cinema's formal issues were aimed to be understood and resolved.

Kayalı advocates the idea that a director does not need to have an individual style and presents the form and content of a film as if they are two distinct and opposite elements. The relationship between the form and the content is not that divergent or straightforward¹⁰⁰, however Kayalı adverts a significant

⁹⁸ Arslan (2010: 208) evaluates *Filim Bitti* as a symbolic demise of Yeşilçam as follows, "Finally, an "individualist," "self-reflexive" auteur film, *Filim Bitti* portrays the ends of Yeşilçam, its filmic and narrational style, and its relation to a history of filmmaking that was based not only on a coexistence of the traditional to the modern, from a Karagöz-style, two-dimensional, and oral narration to a more perspectival, modern capitalist culture, despite its low-budget aesthetics and discontinuous film language".

⁹⁹ Other films which have self-reflexive elements in the context of cinema are *Su da Yanar*, *Gece Yolculuğu*, *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*, and *Umut Yarına Kaldı*. These films and their intellectual protagonists will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter.

¹⁰⁰ Some of the major debates on cinema are on the differences between form and the content, which lead to discrepant artistic choices and even movements such as realism and

point within the context of the artistic tendencies in the 1980s –the point that Türkeş (2001; 2005) mentions for the novels and Gürbilek (2011: 26) mentions for press and advertisements. It is the devaluation of the content. Alper and Atam (1994: 35), while evaluating Ömer Kavur’s film *Gizli Yüz* (The Secret Face, 1991) which is adapted from Orhan Pamuk’s screenplay, claim that “when the explosion of the images is added to the loss of content, it becomes a garbage dump of images and symbols alienated from their social and historical meanings”.

Even though Metin Erksan, who made his first films in the 1950s, is largely considered as the first auteur¹⁰¹ of Turkish Cinema, the director’s creative vision were not seen as the primary identifier of the films neither in Yeşilçam nor in the social realist films per se. Especially Yeşilçam was basically “exploiting generic templates” (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001: 536), however,

[t]he directors of the post-1980 period were at pains to formulate their individual style of expression. For the first time in Turkish cinema, the marketing campaigns conceived and introduced the director as an auteur . . . Lighting, colour, editing and camerawork gave films a European look, different from the genre cinema of both Hollywood and Yeşilçam. (Erdoğan & Göktürk, 2001: 538)

As with the auteur and trying-to-be-auteur directors, Turkish art cinema entered in a more individualized direction. Nevertheless, it was still largely

formalism. While content means the subject of the film, form is how that subject is expressed in the most general sense.

¹⁰¹ The term ‘auteur’ –i.e. author– was coined by postwar French cinema critics, namely Alexandre Astruc’s ‘la camera-stylo’ claiming “serious artists who would use film to express their ideas and feelings” in 1948; André Bazin, François Truffaut and other members of ‘Cahier du cinéma’ and ‘Positif’ in 1950s and 1960s; later on by Andrew Sarris and the members of ‘Movie’ in U.S. in the 1960s. The films of the European Art Cinema directors such as Jean Renoir, Robert Bresson, Jean Cocteau, Federico Fellini etc. and Hollywood directors –some of them, who does not even have right to change the screenplay– like John Ford, Alfred Hitchcock, Orson Welles etc. were examined via the auteur theory and their directors were evaluated as the main source of the film’s value who reflect their view of life to the film. While the art cinema was flourishing in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, the directors who wrote their own scripts and shot their films with a distinctive style started to be praised and honored by film festivals and recognized in foreign markets. Afterwards, ‘auteur theory’ evolved to both an academic discipline and a genre of film criticism in journals and magazines (Thompson & Bordwell, 2003: 415-7).

copyist, in this instance, from European Cinema¹⁰². Arslan (2010: 207) puts together the main tendencies of the auteur filmmakers as follows:

On the other hand, the auteurist aspects of some of these also inscribed a shift from political reality toward an increasing state of fantasy within cinema. In this respect, the hayal [phantasy] aspect of Yeşilçam was carried to another dimension, where various characters of the 1980s cinema, through their dreams, escaped from the realities of daily life that offered a harsh and violent past and helplessness in the present. Thus, films dealing with the military intervention were characterized by themes including depression and amnesia, as well as daydreaming and fantasy.

The major theme of these directors' films were the lives of the intellectual(s) which is always a favorite theme for European art house cinema¹⁰³ however reflected quite differently in late 1980s Turkish cinema.

3.6.3. The Intellectual's Films

Named as "intellectual nuisance" by Gündoğdu (1997:12), "private life films" by Gürbilek (2011: 66) and "intellectual films" by Maktav (2000a: 88) and several others who write on cinema, a new intense cinematic production on the private lives of the intellectuals became prominent after the mid-1980s. Sometimes intersected with the women's films, self-reflexive films and mostly with the "September 12 films", a new figure of intellectual stepped in the Turkish cinema. Parallel with the intellectuals of the era and rising individualism debates, these characters were dealing with their subjective interests, reckoning with their past, struggling with their desires and expressing an extreme tiredness of living. Maktav (2000a: 88) elaborates these films as follows:

¹⁰² Erdoğan (1995: 178) cites a Sight and Sound magazine critic John Gillett's evaluation of the movies he saw in 1992 İstanbul Film Festival as "lots of ludicrous melodramas and wannabe allegories influenced by Buñuel or Bergman".

¹⁰³ Elsaesser and Hagener (2010: 72-4) notes that in the 1960s, the "modernist self-reflexivity" is a common denominator of the films of the famous European art cinema directors. Authors exemplify the screenwriter in *Le Mépris* (Contempt, 1963, Jean-Luc Godard), actress in *Persona* (1966, Ingmar Bergman), photographer in *Blow-up* (1966, Michelangelo Antonioni) and the film director in *8½* (1963, Federico Fellini) where the characters "face a creative crisis that revolves around the relationships to their means of artistic expression and to the world".

The protagonists of the post-1980 September 12 films intellectual films (in this era, there was an explosion of films having intellectual characters and narrating the problems and depressions of these intellectuals) are generally in a situation of self-accounting and they constantly remember the past.

The past of the intellectuals –partly the former militants– is composed of the '68 political movement, March 12 coup d'état, rising politicization in the 1970s, pre-1980 violence, September 12 coup d'état and the years of imprisonment. The films diversely touch upon the memories of the characters: sometimes with dreams and nightmares, sometimes with short glances of past and mostly with obscure insinuations that audience cannot understand what the protagonist lived in the past. The main characteristics of the intellectual protagonists in these films are summarized by Scognamillo (as translated and cited in Türker, 2006: 51) as follows:

In the 1980s, it is as if the old theories and practices became upside down; a series of problematic, depressed, conflicting, marginal, uncommunicative characters were presented to the audience which was said to be displeased with psychological analyses and straight stories. The basic audience of Turkish cinema . . . encountered people who act indecisively between opposite thoughts, search and interrogate their identities, experience the shock of 12 September and its afterwards, criticize the atmosphere, order and their own worlds, manhandle their own art, and who are not easily, even sometimes never analyzed, sometimes extremely political, sometimes very much desiring to become a bourgeois, sometimes nostalgic.

These characters and the films can be divided into two major groups: first, the intellectuals who were politicized before September 12; second, have petty-bourgeois intellectuals from variety of artistic professions such as painter, director, author, advertiser who have creative labor. The films in the former group have leftist –or at least, used-to-be leftist– and occasionally imprisoned protagonists. In brief, they narrate the problems of the intellectuals' accommodation to the changed social life, despair of the characters, unforgettable and traumatic events that characters lived in prison, loss of the hope and the socialist ideas. Films criticize torture in prisons which are against human rights, consumption and money oriented new order, the violence of pre-1980 political polarization. However the ex-leftist

characters see their past in a nostalgic way, as a youth delusion, an obligation of the circumstances, as a mistake –or the audience cannot even learn how they see their past. The second film corpus narrates the intellectuals who are obsessed with their own identity, desires, problems, love affairs, jealousy, individual freedom etc. Throughout the films, the characters constantly struggle with these issues and they are mostly unable to solve them. Main problems are uncommunicativeness, love triangles, crisis of artistic production, inconceivable nuisance, unrealized dreams, loneliness, loss of faith to the society. I will attempt to analyze psychological and emotional conditions and political/ideological attitudes of these figures in detail in the following chapter.

The audience of these films was mostly well-educated urban middle class and university youth seeking artistic taste in the cinema. As a part of intellectuals' growing interest on art –substantially as a result of the detachment from the politics– in the 1980s, cinema received its share as well as a social status enhancement instrument. While Kayalı (1994: 24) interprets the increasing relationship between the intellectuals and cinema positively and affirmatively, Scognamillo (1998: 428 [tm]) evaluates it pejoratively in relation with the foreign films:

Intellectuals and 'entel's who are their bad copies were the last one who discovered the Turkish cinema when the Turkish cinema abandoned the Yeşilçam templates and cared to narrate and probe the individualist, new and unattempted different problems, situations, relationships and personalities. But this last audience was also variant . . . and not enough or ambitious to support a rebirth. Besides, when they don't find the products of Turkish cinema appropriate for their taste and expectation, they turn to the foreign cinema that they never split, with a sniff.

I think Kozanoğlu's (2000: 80) remark summarizes the intellectual-cinema-people triangle at this juncture: "[t]he film about the 'ordinary people' was loved a lot by the intellectuals, films for the ordinary people disappeared". The main points of criticisms of these films were about the choices that filmmakers made while choosing their characters and themes. While Turkey was experiencing a serious neoliberalization that suffered the lower classes

and several liberties were melted away with anti-democratic implementations, the films dealing with the personal lives of intellectuals also drew reaction. Oskay (1996: 107 [tm]) claims,

The problems that society lives and needs to understand can be pushed aside while, in a social environment composed by these problems, the shallow worlds, the so-called ghettos and catacomb worlds of the entels', who have nothing to do apart from wandering from one bar to another, can be mentioned with a justification. The ailing and sloppy worlds of the types who are ready to endure everything in order to enter the system and gain a seat are treated like they are the most significant problems led by the modernization process.

However, as mentioned above, this tendency was not only in the sphere of cinema. As a matter of fact, the whole artistic and cultural production, literature being in the first place, started to narrate the private lives and the ones who appealed to the intellectual audience mentioned their problems since the majority of the intellectuals were ruptured from the social problems and headed towards their own selfhoods.

CHAPTER IV

THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL FIGURES

This chapter aims to analyze the representations of intellectual as a political identity in the 1980s Turkish Cinema. By political identity, I mean the political consciousness, orientations and actions of intellectuals in the films, who were largely categorized as leftists in the 1970s (Maktav, 2000a: 87). I will locate these intellectual figures in the socio-political atmosphere of the 1980s, which is discussed in detail in the previous chapter, in order to reveal their conflicts, problems, longings and motivations in a culturally and ideologically transforming society.

I will thematically examine the protagonists of a group of movies known as 'the intellectual's films' (henceforth, IsF) in Turkish Cinema, which emerged in the late 1980s. I will investigate IsF in the context of the aforementioned debates about the theoretical and historical conceptions of intellectuals and the socio-political transformation of Turkey in this period. The protagonists of IsF will be analyzed in this chapter regarding the shifts in their political orientations and their mental states. What I mean by the shifts in political roles is related to how far the intellectual figure deviates in these films from the previously hegemonic perception of their political identity as leftist-socialist. Through the analysis of the mental states of intellectual figures, I would like to see if there is a tendency in the filmic representations of the intellectual figure to depressive, uncommunicative, individualized and victimized ones. Private, occupational and emotional lives, protagonists' relationship with political thoughts and actions will be considered in detail via the utilization of a set of themes, respectively.

The dominant themes in the films can be grouped in two separate but interrelated entities. First there are the ones which are about the mental states of the intellectuals, and second, the themes about their political orientations. The themes about the mental states cover the discontent of intellectuals in the context of their intellectual activities, the uncommunicativeness in their personal relations, conflicts in their love life and the depressive moods of the characters. On the other hand, the main signs about intellectuals' political attitudes can be compiled as individualism, escapism, depoliticization, apathy and cynicism in the films. Furthermore, I will also mention the oppositional tendencies in the films such as the critique of the coup and different sorts of the individual resistances against the hegemonic order of the post-coup years.

In my analysis, first, I will delve into the personal and emotional lives of the intellectual protagonists as shown in the films. The reason for investigating the personal and emotional lives originates from the films' overemphasis on the private lives of the intellectuals. Film makers' attention on the private lives of their 'intellectual' protagonists is part of a broader interest in private lives in the cultural atmosphere of the 1980s, which is expressed by Gürbilek as the "verbalization of private life within a discourse of personal liberation and individualization" (2011: 23 [tm]). This section deals with the private lives of the intellectuals in terms of their most dominant concerns in the films. These concerns cover a set of major themes mostly related with romantic affairs and personal dissatisfactions as mentioned above. The themes are gathered under the title 'mental states', which implies a psychological perspective instead of a political one. In this part, I would like to analyze the ideas, emotions and actions of the characters with a greater emphasis on their personal affairs and journeys. The themes such as discontent, depressiveness, isolation, romanticism and betrayal will be examined under the title of mental states. On the one hand, these personal feelings, ideas and actions are outcomes of their political experiences, trauma and beliefs. On the other hand, these experiences of the intellectuals

affect their political orientations profoundly. These two main reasons necessitate an analysis of the mental states of the intellectuals in this study which is primarily focusing on the intellectuals as political identities.

Second, I will try to steer for a more dominantly political realm where I will directly examine the political consciousness of the intellectuals through their direct expressions and arguments. In the light of the discussions in the various aspects of the political roles, functions and positions of the intellectual in previous chapters, I will try to locate the signs about political thoughts and actions of the intellectuals in the films. I argue that the dominant characteristics about intellectuals' political attitudes are escapism, depoliticization, cynicism and loss of power despite some minor representations of women's movement and peculiar examples of intellectuals' socio-political oppositions and criticisms. Even in the cases in which the filmmakers aim political criticism –such as the critique of state oppression, anti-democratic laws and violence in prisons–, the films do it mostly via the narration of the depoliticized intellectual characters.

4.1. Mental States

The IsF offer several dominant themes according to the ideas, emotions and actions of their intellectual protagonists, specifically related with their private lives. The mental state here refers to this set of personal or psychological states of being of the intellectuals which are common in several films. Throughout these themes, I will attempt at understanding the protagonists not only as political/intellectual identities but also as individuals who experience several difficulties, problems and longings in their private lives. Unlike the general reception of the intellectual figure who is a public individual and known with his/her ideas instead of their emotions, the films offer lot more information about the private lives of the characters and lot less about their intellectual/political attitudes and actions. These representations signify the distancing of intellectuals from politics and their tendency to struggle with their private and individual lives. However, this over-emphasis

on private lives opens up a great space for representing the relationships of intellectuals with their family, friends, lovers and also their own ideas. In this part, I will analyze the figures in IsF by the following themes: professional discontent, isolation and communicativeness, romanticism, charm of depression, cheating and betrayal.

The most recurrent and widespread theme about the protagonists' private lives can be put as 'depression'. Depressiveness has even been coined as a term in the 1980s by the film critics and historians to imply particularly the films with intellectual protagonists, as "films of intellectual depression" (Scognamillo, 1998: 429; Maktav, 2000a: 88; Arslan, 1997: 45-6).¹⁰⁴ The characters are often in unhappy, restless and bored conditions in these films. Their problems are primarily related with their love life (*Raziye*, *Büyük Yalnızlık*), intellectual/work life (*Umut Yarına Kaldı*, *Su da Yanar*, and *Gece Yolculuğu*), relationships with their friends (*Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*) or a mixture of all.

In section 4.3, I will refer to depression as a dominant mood in IsF in relation to the political actions and dispositions of the intellectual characters. In this section, my aim is to unveil the underlying themes of this depressive state in terms of the private lives of intellectuals. First, I will talk about the discontent of intellectuals with regards to their working life. Then, I will move on to the field of personal relations of intellectuals with their close environment and analyze the problems of uncommunicativeness and isolation. Third, I will focus on the dominance of love affairs in the lives of intellectuals where the majority of events are structured around love affairs. Fourth, I will inspect the attraction of other people towards depressive characters which implies and dignification of boredom and carelessness of the intellectual protagonists. Last, I will refer to the frequent cheating and betrayal acts of intellectuals in the films which are represented as the ultimate overcome of their depressive moods.

¹⁰⁴ These films are known as "films of depression" [bunalım filmleri] and intellectual depression [aydın bunalımı] which are categorized like that in several newspaper and magazine articles at their time.

4.1.1. Professional Discontent

Almost all of the protagonists in the films are unhappy with their work life. A significant part of the film plots narrates the intellectual protagonists' dealing with their discontent about their professional and occupational lives. The protagonists relate with working life in two main directions. First, there are stories of intellectuals who are trying to find jobs or already working in jobs that they do not want to do; second, there are artistic, petit-bourgeois intellectuals who deal with literature, filmmaking, art, advertisement etc. with a constant struggle and discontent towards their own artistic production. In both cases, the intellectuals expose a lack of faith, disinterestedness, individualism and depoliticized attitude in their work life. In this section, I will attempt at revealing how the mental states of intellectuals are represented in the films via their distressed relationships with their work and intellectual production.

Some protagonists in the films try hard to find jobs while others work in jobs that they do not like. Hayri, in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, tries to find a job and accommodate himself to the life outside the prison. But throughout the film, he fails to find a job that he can work. He rejects to work as an employee of his former friends. Similarly, the unnamed character in *Ses* settles in a country seaside and does nothing but wandering around in his first days, then starts working next to a fisherman in his boat. He is depicted as a cultured and smart person; however he has no intent for intellectual production. Hüseyin, in *Dikenli Yol*, hits back to the village where his family lives and tries to make it up with his family. He does not look for a job until the end of the film. Finally, he leaves the village with his new wife to set up a business in İstanbul. Nil in *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı* tries so hard to find a job after she is released from the prison. However, due to her prison records, no one employs her. She finds a regular office job but gets fired after her manager learns that she was an ex-prisoner. While she is working she constantly demonstrates that she is bored from her job. Three different figures can be found in *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye* where Esra works in a high-

level company and hates her job and her colleagues; Ersin is an unemployed ex-prisoner and Erdal is a writer. The subject of Erdal's writings and whether he writes for earning money or not is not stated in the film. These characters largely have unwillingness for working. Their intellectual production is largely in a stagnation phase where the authors are not able to write and filmmakers are not able to shoot films.

The other ex-militants in the films which were not imprisoned also try to put their life in order after they remain separate from the political involvement. The unnamed couple in *Kimlik* starts working as clerks with a great despising of their jobs. The man works in a shipping office while the woman works in a pharmacy. In *İkili Oyunlar*, in the scenes telling the year 1988, Erol is an academician, his wife Nur works in an unspecified office job. In *Raziye*, Ali is an art student who escapes from the city because of political reasons and lives without working. In all these examples, the protagonists either do not work or they work in jobs they do not want to do. The jobs they are doing either do not have any intellectual content or this content is not depicted in the films. In these films, (*Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Ses*, *Dikenli Yol*, *Kimlik*, *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, *Kimlik*, *İkili Oyunlar* and *Raziye*) the intellectual impotence, lack of power in intervening the ideas or actions of the people and protagonists' reluctance in intellectual activity is portrayed explicitly. The protagonists who are doing jobs that are not primarily depending on intellectual labor are distanced from intellectual activity to a great degree.

The writer, film/advertisement director and other artist figures in the films have serious problems about their intellectual production and their jobs. There are basically four thematic modalities regarding their relationships with their work; (i) struggling with writer's –or more generally, artist's– block, (ii) renunciation of their intellectual occupation, (iii) experiencing the oppression by state and capital, and finally (iv) discomfort caused by the articulation and integration to the new socio-political order. These four closely related themes also intersect in some of the films.

Firstly, some artist intellectuals who are portrayed during a production phase are depressed about not being able to create the artworks they desire. The journalist Zeynep in *Gece Dansı Tutsakları* tries to write short stories, but sweats a lot during her attempts. Finally she finishes the book; however, her book is published only by the help of her lover/manager Haluk's connections in media. Esra in *Melodram* is the most hardworking character for writing a novel within all the films. She tries to write an auto-biographical novel about her ex-lover and ex-lover's uncle Behzat who is also in love with her. Throughout her efforts, she stays up all night to write, but she always tears the papers she writes and cannot achieve what she desires. Her desire is portrayed as writing a very good book in the film. In another example, the filmmaker protagonist of *Camdan Kalp* wants to make more 'intellectual' films that do not have only entertainment value but contain philosophical, social and political messages. However, his problem is lack of knowledge for making these sorts of films. After struggling with some philosophy books and art films, he understands that it may not be possible for him to make such films and he leaves of these efforts. In these examples, the characters are in a mood of unproductivity which inclines them to stress, misery and boredom in their personal lives.

Secondly, the renunciation of the artistic quest is also common amongst the intellectuals in the films. The film director in *Gece Yolculuğu* goes to a trip with his associate screenwriter to find shooting locations for their latest film. He is extremely disinterested during the tour, he does not answer the questions his colleague asks and questions his purpose in making films. Later in the film, he leaves his colleague and starts to live in an abandoned church, all alone which leads to his suicide. The writer/teacher character in *Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim* gradually decides that both writing and even teaching is meaningless for an intellectual during his exile in an Eastern village. After the experiences he has in the village, he starts to believe that his ideas and actions about the people living in these villages have no meaning or sanction. He explicitly renounces from the commonly attributed

role of the intellectual who enlightens people and intervenes in social matters. However, he feels the discomfort of this retreat throughout the film. The writer in *Av Zamanı*, the painter in *Ada* and the director in *Umut Yarına Kaldı* all give up their artistic production with common reasons. All three characters think that producing literature or art is nonsensical in a country where there is so much violence, anti-democratic actions and injustice. The character in *Av Zamanı* is frightened that he will also be the object of this violence while the latter two characters are largely angry to this political atmosphere. All three characters question their artistic and intellectual conditions; they are depressed about these circumstances and they wait until these problems are solved without taking an action.

Thirdly, the artistic intellectuals experience a depression also because of the oppression of society, state and capital. As mentioned above, the writer in *Av Zamanı* is so fearful about the street violence that targets the intellectuals that he stops writing and hides in an island. The film director in *Su da Yanar* has both personal conflicts about how to make a film about famous poet Nazım Hikmet, but, he is also scared about the state censorship even if he succeeds to finish his film. He occasionally remembers his experiences when he was taken into custody. Moreover, the character visits his revolutionary friends in prisons which also promote his fears. The main pressure on the filmmaker in *Camdan Kalp* is money related. His producer wants him to direct simple, easy-to-shoot and stupid adaptations of classical films. But the director wants to make auteur films that are constantly rejected by his producer. His wife also forces him to make films that his producer wants since they are broke. His intellectual blockage, together with these financial problems, makes him more depressive day by day. As a last example in, *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*, the story of a writer who has to stay in prison for a week shows the state oppression on the politically active intellectuals.

Lastly, the intellectuals feel guilty about betraying their political ideology that lingers in the past. In *İkili Oyunlar*, the ex-revolutionary economy professor Erol first rejects then accepts the job offer by his friend

who owns a holding company. His work in the university is depicted only through this instance and a pair of socks which he bought to her student assistant from Soviets where he went for an economy conference. The ex-comrades of the protagonist Hayri in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle* work as advertisement directors and company managers. They either tease or try to forget their revolutionary past and try to get rid of these memories. In a sequence where Hayri reminds them about a raid in the student residence, his friends react in an embarrassed and denialist way. Lastly, another advertisement director Bülent in *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* also works as an artist who is integrated to capital and scorns the films that are made with socialist motivation. In these films being an advertisement director explicitly implies the articulation to the post-1980 economical order and serving to this newly rising neoliberal economy which brought a great emphasis on consumption culture.

The ones who work do not refer to any exploitative relationships in their workplaces, neither for themselves nor for the other workers. They live as if they have no idea or they do not care about the main objectives of the socialist movement in which they were engaged in the past. Furthermore, there is also not any figurative example in the films similar to Foucault's "specific intellectuals" or Gouldner's "intelligentsia". No intellectual character tries to build local oppositional sites in their workplaces or intervenes in public in the name of a local scientific truth as Bauman (1992: 94) suggests. Working itself is an ordinary obligation that does not need to be questioned for these intellectuals. The workplace is never represented as a site of economic exploitation in the films. The relationships between employers and employees are not problematized in majority of the films. Only in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle* and *Biri ve Diğerleri*, we see a working environment where workers (a prostitute's home in the former, kitchen of a restaurant in the latter) having economic problems. The protagonists only become sad when they see it but they are not willing and unable to intervene in these situations.

The hardest part is finding a job for some characters as in *Kimlik*, *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, and *Dikenli Yol*. The ex-prisoner characters do not have expertise in any professions because of their former occupations with socialist movement. In these films, the protagonists mainly try to integrate to the regular working life which leaves no room for political involvement or any other sort of opposition in their agenda.

Since the protagonists whom are called ‘intellectual’ are largely distanced from or experiencing problems about intellectual activity, calling them as ‘intellectual’ may seem problematical at first glance. As I have mentioned earlier, I prefer not to assert a solid definition or a set of criteria that would determine who is an intellectual and who is not. The protagonists are intellectuals because (i) they are involved in intellectual/political activities before, (ii) they are largely regarded as intellectuals by the public, (iii) they are located in intellectual circles via their acquaintances, friends and former connections, and (iv) even though they are not very interested in politics or transmitting their views to public, they are in a constant struggle about thinking, speculating and arguing about their own private/individual lives.

In sum, the intellectuals have several problems in their intellectual and professional work lives which adversely impact their mental health. Some of them do not work and carries no motivation for intellectual activities. The protagonists, who are searching for jobs, try to find a job only for earning money since they have no professional or intellectual interests. The employed intellectuals experience variety of problems in their work life which leads them to feel depressed. The unproductivity, losing faith to their intellectual activities and articulation to the institutions they once reject and the severe oppression of the state and society lead the intellectual characters a depressive mood.

4.1.2. Isolation and Uncommunicativeness

Isolation and uncommunicativeness are some of the key concepts in this film corpus where almost all the protagonists in the films experience and

express in one moment or another. These themes are also definitive for the films of intellectuals in late 1980s since the film critics and historians often use these terms to imply this particular set of films (Scognamillo, 1998: 424; Arslan, 2010: 205-6; Maktav, 2000b: 82-4). The political implications of this isolation and uncommunicativeness will be examined in further sections, specifically in the part about escapism. Here, I would like to refer only to the alienation of intellectuals in their social lives such from their friends, lovers and immediate environment.

As mentioned above, the intellectual characters in the films are largely in a depressive mood which causes their relationships with other people to be problematic. The past experiences of the characters are not explained in the majority of the films, but these obscure memories seem to be the source of the discontent of them together with their dissatisfaction about the existing social circumstances. Ultimately, the characters are both unwilling and also unable to communicate in their social relationships. The theme of isolation is represented mostly in romantic affairs but also in the conversations with protagonists' friends or in internal monologues.

'To understand someone', be it a lover, friend or the society in general, is one of the major problem for the intellectual protagonists in the films. In several films, there are variations of the phrase "You/I cannot understand" with different nouns. Bülent, in *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*, cannot comprehend why his wife wants to work despite after their lengthy conversation. Eser in *Ada* cannot make sense of her husband who stops selling his pictures and moves to an island. Throughout the film, she repeats the phrase "I cannot understand you". The young socialist art student in *Raziye* is unable to understand the actions of the villager girl whom he falls in love with. In his monologue, he claims that his main motivation in life is "to understand" but he confesses that he fails to understand the girl. Nebahat in *Kimlik* tells her ex-comrade that she is unable to understand the people around after the military coup and the dissolution of their political organization. In the film, when she analyzes her politicized years, she sees

herself as isolated from real life while she was politicized which leads to a lack of understanding about personal and social matters. She states that she gained a wider perspective about life as soon as she is distanced from political struggle. There are many other examples from different films but lastly, Nesrin's break-up talk with her film director husband in *Gece Yolculuğu* is exemplary in terms of the uncommunicativeness in romantic affairs in the films.

Nesrin: I'm leaving now. How did we end up like this? I cannot understand why all that happened. But it happened. The worst part of all this is; I know that the love between us is not dead. But you are not sharing anything with me anymore. You didn't let me understand or realize anything. Just a look, a little bit of interest, a humanely warmth would have been enough of me. You are looking at walls all the time. Is that so hard to communicate with me? . . . I tried to understand you a lot. Why did you hide yourself from me?¹⁰⁵

In these films, understanding a person is a very hard act, where the thoughts of the intellectuals about the people around them are blurred, unclear and hidden.

The intellectuals are often in isolated conditions both physically and mentally. The recurring shots in the films framing the intellectuals as single person in the cadre imply the isolation of the characters from the outer world. The protagonists frequently stand still, sit or walk alone while they watch other people, the landscapes, urban life or the walls of their rooms. They are in an inquiry of their personal thoughts, memories, pains and longings in these moments. But the sentences that they make during or after these scenes are almost all the time about themselves. They are in a constant process of self-evaluation. Especially, the artist and writer intellectuals are isolated from the people around while they struggle with their own conflictive ideas about the value of their work, their lack of motivations or their

¹⁰⁵ Nesrin: Gidiyorum artık. Nasıl bu duruma geldik? Niye böyle oldu anlamıyorum. Ama oldu işte. En acısı da aramızdaki sevginin ölmediğini bilmek... Ama hiçbir şeyini paylaşmaz oldun benimle. Bir şey anlamama, bilmeme fırsat vermedin. Sadece bir bakış, bir ilgi, insanca bir sıcaklık yetecekti benim için. Duvarlara bakıp duruyorsun hep. Benimle iletişim kurmak o kadar mı zor? . . . Anlamaya o kadar çalıştım ki... Niye kapattın kendini bana?

intellectual insufficiencies. All the problems that intellectuals have in their mind isolate them more and more to the outer world.

4.1.3. Romanticism

Love affairs occupy great place in the plots of IsF. The intellectual protagonists are largely kept apart from political and intellectual journeys. They struggle with the problems in their marriages and love affairs. However in these love affairs, there are several signs about the cultural expansions of intellectuals' political orientations. Because they are deprived from the tools, methods and opportunities of politicization, the intellectuals express and dispute on their political ideas in their romantic relationships. The political disagreement turns out to be the source of the problems amongst the couples in several films. In some examples, the characters, who suffered from their former experiences during their politicized years, turn into romantic affairs and sexual pleasures. Of course, these acts are by no means conflictive with being an intellectual. However, the intellectuals abandon their political and intellectual interests during this process as well. They adapt motivations such as finding the true love (*Raziye*, *Umut Yarına Kaldı*), living happily ever after (*Dikenli Yol*) or preserving a regular and stable marriage (*Kimlik*, *Büyük Yalnızlık*). In sum, the intellectual protagonists undergo a transformation from being politicized, public and radical figures to individualized, withdrawn and melancholic ones.

Some of the characters (*Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Dikenli Yol*) search for and try to get together with their ex-lovers. There are ones who (*Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, *Ses*) meet with new people and fall in love with them. Others struggle with their existing love life such as marriage problems (*Kimlik*, *İkili Oyunlar*) or with love triangles (*Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*). Clearly, these films cannot be categorized as "love stories" primarily; however, love affairs take up a lot of room in their plots. While, the experience of love does not carry any traces about the political ideals of the intellectuals in some films (as in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Bütün Kapılar*

Kapalıydı, Büyük Yalnızlık, Melodram, Ses), in others the political views of the characters are the main sources that generate the tension between the couples (as in *İkili Oyunlar, Kimlik, Prenses, Camdan Kalp, Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce, Ada*).¹⁰⁶ Especially in the films that narrate the post-prison life of intellectuals the political views of the characters are not mentioned neither in the context with their lovers, nor in other realms of their social life. However, in other films, the characters question their relationships heavily in terms of their political views. Main points of the conflicts amongst the couples in this second group of films are the pressure of settling for bourgeois tastes, the gender inequality in their relationships and the criticisms of one side to the other, regarding the intellectual roles. Even these debates alone reflect the nuisance of being stayed out of the political/organized life. Thus, a detailed examination, I would argue, may reveal the individualization of the political thoughts of the intellectuals on the one hand; and the entrapment of socialist ideology inside the personal relationships on the other.

The leftist-socialist political views are articulated through debates on love relationships in several films. In *Kimlik*, there is a scene that takes place in the late 1970s in a leftist organization house. The members of the organization argue about the marriage of socialist individuals. The lengthy debate in the organization house after the wedding constitutes the basis of the tension between marriage and socialist views as follows,

Woman 1: While we were planning to find a house to show an address, it ended up to a marriage.

Woman 2: That's what legality is. Once gave your hand, it is impossible to take it back. You would swing like crops waving with the breeze. So, you have to know where you turn your back before lying down. (Married couple comes) . . .

Woman 3: Well, master; you've already signed a contract with bourgeoisie.

Man 1: I hope it doesn't infect us. Marriage obliges the people to conform as what the regime wants from them.

¹⁰⁶ In addition, *Prenses* is a film directly built on the tension between socialism and liberalism, symbolized by two men struggling to be with a woman. The woman is socialist and in love with the socialist man at first. However, as she experiences both sides –socialist-minded life in a terrible way, the liberal-minded life as a dream– she prefers the liberal man. I will examine this film in detail in the further sections by allocating a wider space for it, since it has the most different representation of the intellectuals amongst all the films.

Married Man: We reject the reactionary aspects of marriage.
Man 2: You are detaining our sister from the politics, master.
Married Man: Marriage is sub-unit of whole. It's a core made up of steel.
Man 1: A core that is surrendered to the regime.
Man 3: Do not be that much strict. It may happen to all of us one day.
Man 1: What really disturbs me is your timing. Please do not forget the negative examples in our ranks.
Married Woman: We have started a needless discussion again. Marriage cannot be the source of negativities. I believe that it will be beneficial.
Woman 3: You are so sentimental. That may cause looseness. And its consequences would not be good.¹⁰⁷

The critical remarks of their friends aim to put together the socialist left's views on emotional relationships¹⁰⁸. The socialist ideology is represented at its coldest, most senseless and strictest form here. The members of the organization accept a marriage only if it is profitable for the movement. The wedding scene is contrasted with the former scene of murder and violence is also added to the formula of the representation of socialist people. The debates continue with reciprocal blames in the group about pacifism and immediate political action. While there is not one single positive sign about the socialist people; their austerity, aggressiveness and insensitive book-like speaking depict the socialists in a very pejorative manner. Here, the representation may refer to the certain ideas of the members involved in socialist movement. However, such restricted representations of the socialist

¹⁰⁷ *Kadın 1*: Ev bulalım, yer gösterelim, adres belli olsun derken yolun ucu evliliğe çıktı.
Kadın 2: Legalite böyledir. Elini verirsen kolunu kurtaramazsın. Yol kenarındaki ekinler gibi rüzgâra göre bir sağa bir sola yatarsın. Onun için ne yana yatacağını önceden bilmek gerek. (Evlenenler geliyor.) . . .
Kadın 3: Eee hoca, sen de burjuvaziyle kontratı imzaladın.
Adam 1: Umarım hastalık bulaşmaz. Evlilik düzene ayak uydurmaya zorlar insanı.
Tarık: Biz de evliliğin geriletici yönünü reddediyoruz.
Adam 2: Bacımızı siyasetten koparıyorsun hoca.
Tarık: Evlilik yan alt birim. Çelik bir çekirdek.
Adam 1: Öyle bir çekirdek ki, düzene teslim olmuş.
Adam 3: Bu kadar katı olma, bir gün hepimizin başına gelebilir.
Adam 1: Beni esas olarak zamanlama rahatsız ediyor. Saflarımızdaki olumsuz örnekleri unutmayalım.
Nebahat: Gene gereksiz bir tartışmaya girdik. Evlilik olumsuzlukların kaynağı olamaz. Ben yararlı olacağına inanıyorum. . . .
Kadın 3: Çok duygusalsınız, bu bir gevşekliğe yol açabilir. Bunun sonuçları da iyi olmaz.
¹⁰⁸ But as in this dialogue, the majority of the dialogues and monologues in the film raise some observations on the leftist perspectives in a vulgar and shallow manner.

left remain far from a deeper understanding of the debates in these circles; as a result, the films have the effect of reproducing the stock ideas about the left at those times. After these debates, the married couple goes on a trip in Anatolia where they try to organize the workers which is equally problematic. There are not any realistic shots during their meeting with the workers. The scenes are backed with a soundtrack and edited like a video clip that only alludes that they are giving speeches to the people they meet. Neither the things they say, nor the reactions of the workers are aimed to be shown.¹⁰⁹ Shortly, in *Kimlik*, both socialist people's views on emotional situations and their political actions –i.e. their inner and outer speech– is represented with a shallow and negative form based on the stereotypical opinions about the socialists. An example of this representation can be found in the debate of the married couple below,

Woman: I have never lived with and for only myself, until today. Namely, I didn't see myself as an individual. I have never thought of such an idea.

Man: We lived collectively, thought collectively. We leaned our back to the collectivity. We maintained our balance according to collectivity. Now, when we fell apart from it, our lives became unstable. It won't be easy to set all over again.

Woman: We should look for a job. Working would be helpful for us to catch a balance again.

Man: We have never developed our expertise though.

Woman: I got degree in pharmacy, but, I could not even tell Asprin from Gripin.

Man: I studied economics but I have never shown an interest in bourgeois economy.

Woman: Do we have another option? ¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ However, these initial scenes of *Kimlik* are rare examples amongst the films which mostly do not portray the pre-1980 era political life directly. The other films mostly refer to pre-September 12 days only by personal dreams or nightmares of the characters or the violence in the street. Apart from that, they simply do not refer at all.

¹¹⁰ *Kadın*: Bugüne kadar kendi başıma, kendime yönelik hiç yaşamadım. Yani bir birey olarak görmedim kendimi. Düşünmedim.

Adam: Kolektif yaşadık, kolektif düşündük. Kolektife dayadık sırtımızı. Dengemizi kolektife göre kurduk. Şimdi kolektiften kopunca hayat dengemiz sarsıldı. Yeniden denge kurmak zor olacak.

Kadın: İş aramalıyız. Çalışmak yeni bir denge kurmamıza yardımcı olur.

Adam: Uzmanlığımız hiç gelişmedi ki.

Kadın: Eczacılık diplomam var ama aspirinle gripini bile ayıramam.

Adam: Gerçi ben de iktisadı bitirdim. Fakat burjuva iktisadıyla hiç ilgim olmadı.

Kadın: Başka çaremiz var mı?

This rapid transformation of the couple purports the impossibility of preserving the political consciousness after the coup. Here the coup is represented as the sudden, ultimate and immediate transformer for the characters. After the coup, the couple experiences difficulties in living as an ordinary married couple. Their life firstly becomes routine with problems such as trying to buy furniture on installment. Later, they start to question themselves as individuals participating in social life and as a couple having a domination relationship. The woman's struggle against her husband's patriarchal thoughts and actions will be mentioned in the section dealing with women's movement in the films.

In several other films, the political and intellectual problems of the protagonists are portrayed through their romantic affairs. Their conversations with their lovers are the only fields that their ideas are expressed. The intellectual characters have no contact with the people apart from their lovers. They largely find no place for conveying, discussing or debating their ideas. The characters seem like they are stuck in their houses or at most their small communities. The iconic example of this situation is *Büyük Yalnızlık* which tells the story of a couple who recently divorced. They spend a night after their divorce. The film spans the long dispute of the couple which starts at night and continues till the morning. There are no characters in the film apart from this couple, and the furthest place that they are able to go is their car outside the house. They are represented as being attached to their private sphere which is the house and no matter how hard they try; they cannot break away from the house, from each other and from their depressed mood. Throughout the film, they argue about their disappointments, lifetime longings and even political ideas mostly by accusing each other about their failures and hypocrisies.

To sum up, the ongoing relationships and marriages are full of problems accumulated from the past. Some of the ex-militants in the films are also ex-lovers (*Kimlik, İkili Oyunlar, Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç*, and nearly, *Prences*) who cannot put up with each other anymore. Their

political defeat and articulation to the new social order is reflected on their personal relationships as well. They try to substitute their former political intentions with their domestic relationships; however this causes conflicts in their relationships as well. The following remarks by the intellectual characters in different films show the points of convergence and divergence between their political ideas and private lives:

Erdal, in *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, writes a letter comparing his and his leftist friends' personal lives with their political struggle,

Erdal: Our personal histories started to resemble to the history of socialist movement. Its history, too, is like a museum of disappointments. And, there is no other feeling as much powerful as the possibility of being disappointed which ties the one's hands and retains him from living.¹¹¹

Erol, in *İkili Oyunlar*, answers his ex-wife's self-recriminations about being hypocrite, skeptical, indecisive and unreliable as follows,

Erol: Honey, do you know what the main problem is? We confused our personal problems with the societal ones.¹¹²

Nevres, in *Prences*, rejects the love of the man, who does not share her political views,

Nevres: We are the people of different thoughts.¹¹³ [This expression alludes to famous Yeşilçam phrase marking the economic and cultural difference between the two lovers: "We are the people of different worlds". In the films of intellectuals, this gap is now political and intellectual.]

Similarly, the man in *Ada* explains the separation of him with his wife with the ideas that they do not share,

Eser: Apart from me, everyone is sweet, everyone is nice for you.
Man: You are nice too. The way of life and the thought are what separate us.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Erdal: Kişisel tarihlerimiz, sosyalist hareketin tarihine benzemeye başladı. Onun tarihi de bir hayalkırıklıkları müzesi gibi. Ve hayalkırıklığına uğrayabilirim hissi kadar, insanın elini kolunu bağlayan, onu yaşamaktan alıkoyan, bu derece güçlü başka bir şey yok.

¹¹² Erol: Asıl sorun ne biliyor musun tonton? Toplumsal sorunlarla kişisel sorunlarımızı iyice birbirine karıştırdık biz.

¹¹³ Nevres: Biz ayrı düşüncelerin insanlarıyız.

¹¹⁴ Eser: Benden başka herkes tatlı, herkes iyi senin için.

Man: Sen de iyisin. Yaşam biçimi, düşünceler ayırıyor bizi.

Lastly, Nur justifies her reason for divorce with both political and personal transformation of his husband in *İkili Oyunlar*. Furthermore she presents a criticism of the family as an institution of capitalism,

Nur: Once upon a time, each step that I have taken has honored me. I warn you for the sake of the memories of these days. You are developing a new kind of rightist behavior. And I do not want to be with you both because of my personal and my social concerns. Who will apply to the court . . . I'm not afraid of the outside. I would spit in the holy unions of families that are built to save the people from the dangers that come from outside!¹¹⁵

In all these examples the differences about the political views of the characters are the reasons of the problems between their relationships and marriages. However, despite giving special significance to the compatibility of their ideas with their emotional relationships, the characters are not in political struggle in any ways. For them, the political consciousness is only about ideas –which they usually do not explicitly express. These intellectual characters try to apply their ideas to their romantic lives since they do not apply them in political action. The most they can do is to criticize their spouses. In IsF, the romantic relationships constrict the political ideas and acts inside the private lives which can be read as a representation of the depoliticization in real life.

These affairs are mostly problematic because of the inconsistencies about the ideas of the two sides. The intellectuals struggle with these love affairs instead of their political objectives which linger in the past. At the utmost, they substitute their political ideas with their romantic affairs. These main love-related themes in the films reveal the depoliticized intellectual figures who struggle not in the political but in a personal and individual realm.

¹¹⁵ Nur: Bir zamanlar senle birlikte attığım her adım onur verdi bana. Onun hatırı için uyarıyorum seni. Yeni bir sağcılık geliştiriyorsun sen. Ve ben hem toplumsal hem de kişisel meselem olarak seninle birlikte olmak istemiyorum artık. Hangimiz başvuruyor mahkemeye? . . . Dışarıdan korkmuyorum ben! Dışarıdan gelecek tehlikelere karşı kurulmuş kutsal aile birliklerinin içine tüküreyim ben!

4.1.4. The Charm of Depression

In some of IsF, the intellectual protagonists appeal others via their depressive moods. Primarily consisting of men, with some women exceptions, the problematic, uncommunicative and bored intellectuals attract others. Regarding the nature of these attractions there are two main variations. First, there are people who fall in love with suffered, impotent, introverted and mysterious intellectuals with a motivation to help, remediate and understand them. In the films which narrate the stories of intellectuals who enter new environments (by getting out of prison or moving to a new place) the introverted intellectuals are mysterious figures and they become the objects of interest and desire all of a sudden. Second, in some films, the attraction occurs between two intellectuals who experienced similar sufferings in the past. The nuisance becomes a special characteristic inherent to intellectual identity in these films which even measures the quality of intellectuality. Through these two ways of dignifying intellectual depressiveness I will examine the positive reception of the intellectual suffering.

In the early scenes of *Prenses*, the young girl is excited by the cold, impolite and distant behavior of the leftist character. There are many examples in other films. The similar plot works also for opposite genders, for example in *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*. Nil, who recently got out of prison, tries to ward off Ateş whom she meets at a dinner in her friends' house. Ateş frankly states that he is charmed by her "depressive mood". He makes several attempts to meet her. The common point of all these films is making the disinterested, secretive and uncommunicative characters, who used to have an explicit political identity but who are now completely depoliticized, an object of desire. These largely male intellectual figures are center of attraction for women they meet, the women who are not as knowledgeable, cultivated, and politicized –in the 1970s– as them. Moreover, this situation is instilled more deeply in the petit bourgeois intellectual films where the intellectuals also adopt the "teacher role" for the younger women. Eventually,

in these cases, intellectual's being is reduced to a certain mood, a surface appearance or a mere image, stripped off its socio-political essence. Regarding the bonds between intellectuality and depression, Erol in *İkili Oyunlar* tells that "Still you are ahead of me. As the doctor said, the most depressive one is the greatest intellectual amongst us".¹¹⁶ This quote explains the affirmation of being depressed and disinterested towards the outer world as a sign of intellectuality and appeal.

Ali İhsan in *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç* is another example of intellectual who is an object of desire in the eyes of other people in the film. He is a lawyer and politician who come back to town after some time and he sees his wife there. They are not divorced however they had not seen each other for a long time. Ali İhsan cheats on her with a young woman he meets. Moreover, he is famous in town with his seductiveness. In the opening scenes of the film, we see the townsmen talking about him, one says: "He screwed countless German chicks around here. He cannot resist a beautiful woman when he sees one".¹¹⁷ His wife Aytaç is an intellectual, writer woman who is generally depressed, discontent with Ali İhsan's behaviors. However, apart from writing on her diary about her love for Ali İhsan –about her loneliness and Ali İhsan's carelessness for her–, she does nothing else in the film. In a lengthy discussion between the two, Aytaç criticizes Ali İhsan for living his own life without caring about her, dating with other women and involving in a useless political struggle which is mainstream social democrat politics. Ali İhsan talks as if he is giving a lecture to her and does not accept anything she says. Their debate is cut to the lovemaking scenes of Ali İhsan with the young woman with whom he has a summer love affair. Right after, the scene is cut to another debate between him and Aytaç that ends with lovemaking, this time with his wife. Ali İhsan's character is drawn as an Alpha male; loved and appreciated by all the people around him. And the great portion of the story follows two women's love and infatuation with Ali İhsan.

¹¹⁶ Gene de benden ileridesin. Doktorun dediğine göre içimizde en bunalan en entelektüel çünkü

¹¹⁷ Az Alman kızı götürmedi buralarda. Güzel kadın gördü mü, dayanamaz.

He is portrayed as a different, -as expressed in the film, “a new type of”– politician that will be analyzed in further sections. However, regarding his affairs with two women the film’s main topics can be summed up in love, cheating and rascality more than the political connotations.

Being a depressed individual is hardly tied to being an intellectual in these examples. And this depression, discontent and boredom are the sources of both many problems in the personal relationships and the attraction of the people who encounter with these intellectuals. This representation of intellectuality deprives the intellectual characters from the intellectual activity and locates them in love affairs where they play the role of pitiful but charismatic objects of desire.

4.1.5. Cheating and Betrayal

Cheating is a recurring theme in the selected films either as an outcome of the problematic relationships between the couples or as soothing activities for the protagonists who are in an unhappy condition because of personal problems. The characters’ seeking for emotional or sexual pleasures are represented so frequently in the films that cheating becomes a primary concern for intellectuals’ private lives.

In some of the films in the corpus, love life and sexuality have indispensable position in the plot. Also, in these films, love and sexuality is also mostly juxtaposed with the cheating affairs of the protagonists. In the majority of the films, the intellectual characters cheat on their lovers. In *Su da Yanar*, the film director cheats on his wife with his French producer. In *Biri ve Diğerleri*, the man flirts with a married woman in a bar. In *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*, the advertisement director cheats on his film director wife with his young, femme-fatale assistant. In *Gece Dansı Tutsakları* the chief editor of the newspaper, first dates and proposes to his employee and writer; however he becomes lover with the woman’s young housemate, a beautiful dancer. In *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, the ballerina woman cheats on her husband with her neighbor, a film director. In *Melodram*, there is again a love triangle

between older antiquarian man, younger writer woman and a young painter man. Despite largely narrating the stories of the intellectuals' artistic lives such as writing a book or shooting a film, these films emphasize the cheating related issues and ideational conflicts about love life between the couples to a great extent.

Ali İhsan in *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç* is another example of intellectual who is an object of desire in the eyes of other people in the film. He is a lawyer/politician and famous in the town with his seductiveness. In the opening scenes of the film, we see the townsmen talking about him, one says: "He screwed countless German chicks around here. He cannot resist a beautiful woman when he sees one".¹¹⁸ Apart from the tourists, he is also the center of attraction for his intellectual ex-wife and a young model in town. Regarding his affairs with two women, the film's main plot is more related with love, cheating and rascality than any sort of political connotations.

In Turkish Cinema love affairs are always the primary topics of the films, especially melodramas. However, discontents amongst the lovers stemming from problems such as uncommunicativeness, depressiveness or unhappiness with no explicitly stated reasons and cheating as a result of these sorts of situations became very widespread as a plot element only after the cinema of the 1980s, especially in the stories of middle and upper classes. The representations of love affairs in IsF are by no means lead to or relate with political involvements. On the contrary, the intensity of representations about love affairs of intellectuals indicates the distancing from the political field. After examining the mental states of intellectual protagonists by giving examples from their private lives, now I will move on to the analysis of the political orientations of the protagonists.

4.2. Political Orientations

In this section, I will analyze the themes concerning the political orientations of the intellectuals. I will attempt at analytical inquiry of the

¹¹⁸ Az Alman kızı götürmedi buralarda. Güzel kadın gördü mü, dayanamaz.

dominant tendencies in intellectuals' political consciousness and ideology. The social and historical forces that are effective in the formation of the political identities of intellectuals are mentioned in the previous chapters. While the umbrella term concerning the mental states of intellectuals was 'depression' in the previous section, it is 'depoliticization' when one focuses of the political life of the intellectuals in the films. As I have already mentioned, depoliticization became a major tendency both for the intellectuals and the masses in the 1980s. There are only few intellectual protagonists in the films who are directly engaged in political activity which will be mentioned further in this chapter. The great majority of the characters do not have a political engagement despite being represented as having a leftist/socialist past. They are drawn as ex-militants who mostly just got released from prison (*Sen Türkülerini Söyle, Ses, Dikenli Yol, Bir Avuç Gökyüzü, Kimlik, Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı, İkili Oyunlar, Bekle Dedim Gölgeye, Raziye*); artists with socialist intentions (*Su da Yanar, Ada, Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce, Camdan Kalp*) or highly cultured people with no overt political interests (*Prenses, Gece Yolculuğu, Gece Dansı Tutsakları, Umut Yarına Kaldı, Büyük Yalnızlık, Melodram*). These different types of intellectuals are highly depoliticized in different types of modalities.

Abandoning politics is mostly expressed as an inevitable process by the intellectual figures in films. The film plots almost never include elements directly related with the political struggle, opposition or engagement. It is clear that most of the figures were radical leftist and dissident in their pasts but the present time is not an appropriate time to be as they were before. They were unable to continue with their political struggle in the 1980s. The reasons of this were mentioned in the previous chapter while mentioning state's oppression together with the coup and the socio-political transformation. The dissolution of the political parties and worker's unions together with the imprisonment, murdering or oppression of all potentially politicized people hindered the political struggle to a great extent. The

intellectuals in the films are these people who had been left out of political field of struggle.

Here, I use the term political in its narrowest sense which implies entering into a struggle or at least carrying a belief in intervening political matters. Indeed, withdrawing from a radical struggle is itself a great political turn. Likewise, the cultural production within which the ideology functions is immensely and unarguably political. However, the term 'depoliticization' implies the shift in the conscious acts, beliefs and preferences of intellectuals in comparison with their past. In the films, both the figures who had actively participated in socialist movement before the 1980s and the petty-bourgeois intellectuals make either slight or no effort for political struggle. Majority of these characters were struggling in political organizations in the past but they lost their hope about a counter-hegemonic struggle in the 1980s. I will aim to analyze the images about the intellectuals who failed to develop a counter-hegemonic, oppositional or critical practice in the 1980s.

The representations of the intellectuals' depoliticization take several different modalities. First, I will examine the case of escapism, which is one of the major tendencies for the intellectual life in the films where the characters, by force or by their own will, fall apart from the political struggle. Second, I will examine the political consciousness of the characters who frankly express that their days of politicization are over. They contrast their past activities with their contemporary thoughts and preferences which brings them in a state of the rejection of political struggle. Third, the cynical and despising attitudes of the characters to all sorts of political and ideological actions will be mentioned. Fourth, I will give the exceptional examples from the films regarding the representations of women's movements rooted in intellectuals' lives. In the fifth title, I will focus on the particular and individual political actions of the intellectuals that share motivations of resistance to the social, cultural and political order. Sixth, I will focus on how the protagonists and the filmmakers (through their protagonists) evaluate the effects of military coup and its ruining of the organized people. Lastly, I will try to reveal

the motivations and projections of intellectual characters about future by employing an analysis of the film endings.

4.2.1. Mandatory and Voluntary Escapism

One major portrayal of intellectuals' political orientations is escapism of the protagonists in the films, both spatially and socially. The characters run away, hide, drift apart or seclude themselves for different reasons. Some are obliged to do this because of the state oppression such as threat of being arrested or being on exile. Others are constantly in a state of escape without a comprehensible reason or they try to avoid their painful past. There are figures who evaluate their escapism as a resistance to the new order in a non-compromising manner. Lastly, and to a great extent, the escapism of the intellectuals is a personal preference to pay attention to their personal/individual indulgence. Different sorts of exile is represented as a factor that depoliticizes the intellectuals unlike Said's affirmation of the term implying "restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others" (1996: 53). For the protagonists of *IsF*, exile means falling apart from others and feeling excluded. Said interprets the exile as a positive factor for intellectuals which separates them from the order and gives them ability to criticize the order without having interests in them. However, the intellectuals' exile conditions in the films are silent, inactive and ineffectual. With their escapism, the intellectual figures are stayed out of politics that were once part of their lives one way or another. They are in a state of political withdrawal, voluntarily or not. Plus, their retreat from politicization is definite that they do not plan to involve in any kind of political struggle in almost all of the films. The rare examples in which the intellectuals try to politicize will be mentioned in further sections.

Hayri, in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, gets out of prison at the beginning of the film. His mother cherishes him but his father is furious with his son's political involvement, so he does not talk with Hayri. During his days out, Hayri also comes across with a friend from his prison days. They have a

warm conversation but he also does not see this friend afterwards. This friend represents the politicized past of him that he cannot get back to. Hayri tries to come together with his old friends however he cannot orient himself to their new lifestyles and personalities. He sees that his friends changed a lot. They have got richer, started working as advertisement directors or finance workers who now view the world only from the aspects of their joy and luxury. As Dorsay (1995: 230 [tm]) avers, while with his friends, Hayri “finds himself included in meaningless, aimless and shallow relationships”. Thus, despite meeting with them a couple of times, he renounces them in the end. While leaving them, he makes a figurative gun with his hands and pretends to shoot at them. He leaves his old friends as a choice of not intervening in their petit-bourgeois lifestyle. Hayri chooses to go into self-exile. He leaves his family and goes to Konya to work. There are some scenes in the film that underline Hayri’s wishes to walk off: his lonesome standing in the disco while the loud music plays; his unaccustomed and irritated look to his family during a get-togethers in house when women are talking about buying new stuff, men are talking about business relationships and the TV shows the advertisements. In Figure 1 below, the scenes in which Hayri feels uncomfortable and wishes to pull away are shown. In all these frames Hayri seems that he does not want to be in the place that he is in. He wants to leave his friends, family gatherings and the women he encounters. As Evren (1990: 94 [tm]) states, he observes his friends or relatives “with a sardonic repulsion”. However, he cannot find a way. He also does nothing in opposition. He just acknowledges the transformation of both society and his acquaintances. As a result, he willingly moves forward to his exile which he where he spends two years. He is a figure who does not affirm the new social and cultural aspects of society but has nothing to do but running away from this new order.



Figure 1: Hayri's isolation in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*

There is a different form of exile in *Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim* and in *Raziye* where the characters go to a village and stay distant from the urban life. In *Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim*, the writer/teacher character is exiled to a Kurdish village in Eastern Turkey as a teacher in the village school. The reason of his exile is not mentioned directly however it is clear that it is because of political reasons. However the character does not get involved in any social and political matters there while he stays in village; he only tries to teach the students, recognize the environment and listens to the stories of villagers. Only, towards the end of the film, he rounds on the village headman because of his inability to find medicine for the sick children. However he also cannot be helpful about bringing a doctor to the village. As an intellectual, he does not carry the early republican or socialist savior mission. Dorsay (1995: 189) explains and character's journey as,

He did not give hope to these people; he did not tell big words or propose solutions for their problems. Merely, he came, saw, lived and

identified. He left as he arrived. He was neither more hopeful nor more hopeless than his first arrival... He was searching for himself; really, there were many questions on his mind.

This representation of the intellectual as a figure who “searches for himself” is a very prevalent theme in IsF. This author/teacher protagonist writes sardonic letters to his lover about her orientalist views about East and villages, but he does not even post them. He criticizes her urban envisagement of the village/East and primarily tries to understand the real sentiment of living in a place like that. He overtly does not believe in a political power of an intellectual like him to make a change in a village like that. This is evident in his last speech to the students telling them to forget everything he taught. He does not even have faith in the meaningfulness of the lessons he teaches to the students in the village school. He is unable to help to any problems in village during his stay. Instead of making a change or at least affecting the uneducated people and the life cycle in the village, he only becomes more skeptical about his own ideas throughout his journey. All in all, the film narrates the affectless, self-skeptical and puzzled intellectual's life in an underdeveloped village and proposes that he can only learn from the life that takes place there, but not teach its people or transform it.

Another case of the exiled intellectual can be found in *Av Zamani*, where the once-famous writer runs away to an island and hides there. The film takes place in the late 1970s when the armed conflicts increased a lot. A friend of this unnamed writer gets murdered and the man runs away from the city because of his own fear to be killed. He decides to stop writing since he thinks that intellectual production is meaningless in this kind of period. He listens to the news about murders and thinks about his own ideas, grief and fears. He does not think about doing anything but hiding and waiting. In one of his inner monologues he says,

Why did you return to this island? This island where you cannot escape when you wish... In order to escape... Have you been escaped when you come here? Yes I am. So live in here. Why not? Did you escape here since you are not able to write? Yes, since I am not able to write and I fear. Maybe you cannot write since you fear? Maybe I fear, since I cannot write. Then, do not write and do not fear.

I will do it. Be one of the ordinary people who live here. I will try. Marry with the woman who comes to your home, make kids. Try this once.¹¹⁹

This passage reveals his political and intellectual retreat as a result of fears and his plans for liberating from these fears. It is, as in other films, depoliticization and liberation from the imagined intellectual responsibilities. In another scene he states his wishes about “trying to enjoy the life” by stopping writing. The film is concluded with the death of the writer which justifies his stagnation throughout the film because of his personal and social trauma. The meaninglessness of writing and involving in political struggle is proved in a sense in this final act. The intellectual fails to be even an ordinary person, let alone maintaining his intellectual activities.

In *Raziye*, the young art student Ali escapes from city in order to avoid arrestment and shelters in his uncle’s house in a village. He stays there until the end of the film and turns back to city after the declaration of the general amnesty. His uncle reads the news about remission –in a way that ridicules his nephew’s politicization– of the generals’ and tells his nephew that he is free at last. In the course of his stay, Ali does not even speak a word about his political views or actions. In one scene his uncle says that the organization of the villagers is more important for socialist struggle than the organization of urban workers. But Ali does not respond to his opinions, he stays expressionless during this conversation. Throughout the film, he only draws pictures about nature at some point and falls in love with his uncle’s step daughter Bedia. His love for Bedia carries traces from the classical novel *Yaban* of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. Ali is a cultivated and rationalist urban intellectual but Bedia is simple-minded and emotional village girl who acts purely with her instincts and feelings. Similar to teacher’s difficulties in

¹¹⁹ Niçin döndün bu adaya? Çevresi sularla çevrili, dilediğin zaman kaçamayacağın bu adaya? Kaçmak için. Buraya geldiğinde kaçmış mı oluyorsun? Kaçmış oluyorum. Öyleyse hep burada yaşa. Neden olmasın? Yazamadığın için mi kaçtın buraya? Yazamadığım ve korktuğum için. Belki de korktuğun için yazamıyorsun? Ya da yazamadığım için korkuyorum. Öyleyse yazma ve korkma. Öyle yapacağım. Bu adada yaşayanlardan herhangi biri ol. Deneyeceğim. Evine gelen kadınla evlen, çocuk yap. Bir de bunu dene. O kadar uzun boylu değil.

understanding the villagers in *Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim*, Ali also tries but cannot make sense of Bedia's and other villagers' acts. After he makes love with Bedia, Ali becomes suspicious about Bedia's relationship with a villager fisherman. He cannot quite get in the possibility that Bedia may prefer the fisherman to him (i.e., Ali). In an inner-monologue, Ali confesses himself that he may never be able to understand or transform Bedia's ideas. It is a reflection of his views about the political struggle in general as well. In sum, he has no political aims that are implied in the film and he even fails to comprehend the reality of the village life and villagers' acts. Ali is another example of muddled intellectual figure that has no belief in any sort of change.

In *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*, one week of an inmate is narrated after he is released from prison. At the end of the week he has to go back to prison for another political case. Why he was put in prison specifically is not mentioned in the film but it is clear that the reason was political –the guardian calls him a “political convict”. During the week out, knowing that he will be back behind bars soon, the man spends his time with drinking, cheating on his wife with an artist woman –who owns a luxurious house– and looking for ways to escape from prison. The government officers try to deceive him with false hopes about the escape, in order to charge him with more crime. It is conceivable for the character to not to engage in any political action in a week-long freedom. However, also in this film, he does not even speak a word about his political views. He also does not have even a single friend from any leftist organization or from any other political movement. We see only his wife's friends whom he has conversation with. In a scene, they ask questions as if they had no idea about his life. They ask how he spends his time in prison and why he forced “them” (implying the police). He does not give serious answers but only makes a mockery of the women. For example, when the women ask questions about how he and his friends spend their time in jail. He states that they are imagining naked women. His political views remain hidden in this scene as well.

In *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*, there are no other signs about the protagonist's past life apart from the books in his library, written by socialist authors such as Antonio Gramsci. In his single quote about socialists, he mentions the author of the "Prison Notebooks" who wrote his book while in a prison and died right after he was released. The character's acts have no explicit sign about being a political prisoner. In Evren's words,

...The distinctive features of this era are not mentioned in the film. Moreover, the reasons why these higher-level government officers are attacking against a writer who goes back and forth between the rakı glasses and his mistress are not addressed at all. They are afraid of the author to talk but he does not talk apart from his idiocratic jokes. (1990: 117 [tm])

The lack of knowledge about the past experiences of the protagonist is related with his escapism. In the film, the main problems, concerns and desires of the intellectual character are shown. But among these, the political ideas/actions are not shown in the film.

It is possible to draw parallels between the murdering of the protagonist in *Av Zamanı* and the imprisoning of the main character in *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü* in terms of the intellectual characters' staying away from the people in the streets. The protagonist in *Av Zamanı* hides from the people who want to murder him throughout the film. One of his close friends is murdered at the beginning of the film as well. However, the reasons why these assassins chase this intellectual are never mentioned. It is clear that it has to do with some political issues. But the exact content of the protagonist's political ideas remains unclear. He is only afraid of the blood bath that the society heads for. Apart from this humanistic concern, the writer's views about the society do not hold any place in the film. The lack of information about the protagonists' political views is the cause and effect of their escapist tendencies. When the characters are in an escapist mood from their past and their political identities, films also do not show much about the memories, past and ideas of the characters.

There are also symbolic moments of escape in the movies, be it from their own past, from a mysterious stranger or from the people in general.

They are not completely overt signifiers about the plot or characters however they also can be read as small details or symptoms manifested through the flow of the films. For example the man who will go back to the prison in *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü* has a suspicion about the street sellers. He suspects that he is being followed and stalked. Although the reality is never revealed in the film, the man's suspicion can be read a sign of the insecurity and distrustfulness to the masses. Film shows the secret police pretending to be street sellers, but the exaggeration of the protagonist's fears also implies a general distrust of the people. Even in his house, he hides behind the curtains and he tries to hide from these sellers while he wanders around his house. Another example of a mysterious instance of scampering can be found in *Melodram*. The antiquarian Behzat, in his nightmares, runs away from an armed man. The identity of the man or the relationship between them is not revealed in the film however this anxious escape of Behzat also alludes to the hesitations of Behzat, most probably about his memories.

The “voluntary exile” –term belonging to Eser, painter's wife– of the painter in *Ada* is an attitude of the character as a reaction to the political atmosphere in Turkey. He leaves the city and moves to an island as mentioned above. As he indicates, he only waits and not participates to the existing order. Her wife criticizes the painting he made,

Eser: There is a void in all of them. There are no people.

Man: A waiting. I am living that void. So do you, so do all of us.¹²⁰

Such is the character's description of his state of mind. He waits for the “unconditioned democracy” in his daughter's words. However, he simply does nothing but staying in his villa and renting out some rooms to other artists. He is a figure who is very angry and disturbed by the oppressive and anti-democratic political atmosphere of the 1980s. He waits for this order to end in order to leave his isolated life in an island and turn back to the city life.

In *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, the film director who was famous, award-winning film director stops making films. He explains this decision as a

¹²⁰ Eser: Bir boşluk var hepsinde. Hiç insan yok.

Adam: Bir bekleyiş. O boşluğu yaşıyorum ben, sen, hepimiz.

reaction to the corrupted film industry and society. Like the character in *Ada*, he also lives comfortably in a house in the seaside with intellectual neighbors without any economic difficulties. Unlike *Ada*, in *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, the resentment of the director to the world is left behind when he falls in love. He stops making the film about his suicide and starts traveling and enjoying his time with the ballerina woman. His seclusion stops and so is his –so called– resistance since his discontent about the society ends with this event.

The film director Ali goes on a trip to the desolated villages with the screenwriter Yavuz in *Gece Yolculuğu*. During their trip, he hardly speaks with Yavuz and act like he does not want to shoot the film. He is an “introverted figure that has difficulties about communicating with people around him” (Evren, 1990: 122 [tm]). After some time, he asks Yavuz to leave him alone for some time. After Yavuz’s departure, he starts staying in an abandoned church with a table and bed provided by the villagers who live nearby. He lives in a total isolation, having conversations only with a child. In flashbacks, his past life is shown as fragments. He mourns for his politicized brother who was killed. Also, we see that he had an uncommunicative marriage with his wife who left him in the end. In all his time, he writes with a typewriter and thinks about himself and his past.

Ali: (Writes on a typewriter.) Is it the fear that makes you run away?
Or is it not being able to stand up to the fear? For how long can you
escape?¹²¹

After the child invites Ali to a wedding in the village, Ali promises to come at first. But later, he decides not to go. During the wedding, he looks at the village from far away and his inner voice says,

Ali: (Inner voice) Can one live on the edge of the life? How long will
this journey last?¹²²

The character escapes from his past, his loss of a brother, his colleagues, his wife and all the other people he meets during his journey. As Dorsay (1995: 180 [tm]) states, the film narrates the “personal depression, subjective and

¹²¹ Ali: (Daktiloda yazı yazıyor.) Seni kaçırın korku mu? Korkuyu göğüsleyememek mi yoksa? Daha ne kadar kaçabilirsin ki?

¹²² Ali: (İç ses.) Hayatın kıyısında yaşanır mı? Bu yolculuk daha ne kadar sürecek?

individual problems of the intellectual” who is not concerned about the society. Kırış (2008: 105) also criticizes films’ aim to enter the world of an intellectual by skipping over the ideological and political portrayals of the post-coup era. Kırış makes a parallel between the protagonist’s and Ömer Kavur’s stand, which is: “searching for the truth by running away from the experiences”. In sum, ultimately the protagonist’s escapism transforms into a suicide in the end with the inability of the character to deal with his self-interrogation. By throwing off the screenplay he wrote in a forest and committing suicide, the character leaves everything behind with his last breakout.

In *Camdan Kalp*, film director’s abandonment of his wife and home is for a particular reason. He tries to help the maid who works in their house. However, before he goes out for this journey, he is in a depressed situation. He wants to stop making films like the ones he has been doing, similar to the character in *Umut Yarına Kaldı*. He tries hard to read Wittgenstein and other philosophers, but cannot manage to get into these books he reads. His producer does not like the screenplay he brings to him. His wife is worried about his “intellectual quest” which retains him from earning money. That is because, they have a luxurious lifestyle which can be seen from the decoration of their home and so they need money. In this period of unemployment, he undertakes the mission of helping the woman who is exposed to violence. First he goes to her house in slums and then he goes to her village in the eastern part of Turkey. However, he fails in this mission which leads to his death. Similar to the character in *Hakkari’de Bir Mevsim*, he has difficulty in understanding the intentions of the villagers he encounters with. And in the end, he understands that he cannot help anyone or make a change in the places he goes. He is killed by the villagers during his attempts to help the maid. Unlike the previous characters, he at least makes an effort for someone other than himself. However, the misadventures he experienced look like almost a mockery of the mission he undertakes as a savior. The

bottom-line of the film is again the impossibility of intellectual's intervention in social and political life.

There are several other intellectual characters that either particularly try to stand apart from other people or exiled as a result of their past activities. As in the examples above, they are mostly shown in the films as writing diaries, having dreams, speaking through their inner voice, or just smoking alone—which is one of the most dominant images in this corpus of films. In this escapist state of mind, the characters do not participate in any political activity either via direct action or at least by standing up for their views. They do not criticize or comment on the acts of government, military, media or their own struggle in general. The social and cultural change is only something that they need to go along with or try to escape from, but not a power that they can resist or challenge via intervening to it politically. Thus, I will attempt to examine the political consciousness of the intellectual characters, in the next section.

4.2.2. Political Consciousness

The scarcity of the signs about the characters' involvement in political struggle and their political consciousness is the first and most noteworthy point I make in this section. Because of this lack, which is important in and of itself, I am going to refer largely to the films having characters who participated in socialist struggle before the 1980s. The political experience of these characters is mainly twofold: politicized past and depoliticized present. Here I aim to point out and compare the representations of the foregone political intentions of the intellectuals and their political positioning (or lack thereof) in the 1980s. However, the films present so limited information about both the ideas and practices of the characters in political field. Thus, my analysis of the political conscious in this section will mostly stay as the analysis of a lack.

As I have already mentioned, there are ex-leftist characters in the films whose past is almost never mentioned in the films. In *Ses*, the

protagonist has nightmares about him being tortured in prison and tells a memory from the prison about the guardian handing him a cigarette. Apart from this, there are no clues in the film about his past. The film's main point is his encounter with his tormentor. The film provides very few and obscure clues about the character being a political prisoner. That the character served six to seven years in prison and then was released like many political prisoners in the same period makes one think that he was also a political convict¹²³. Also, his physical appearance resembles other leftists. Yet, no particular crime is mentioned about him in the film. These are the only signs about him being a leftist before. As Dorsay (1995: 233 [tm]) states, "the unnamed protagonist who meddled in revolutionary movement in the past, experiences a love adventure in the two thirds of the film which includes no political connotations". During the film, there is only one scene during his conversation with Serap, whom he met in the village he recently moved, that implicitly hints to his sympathy for the villagers. Serap talks unfavorably about the villagers and he asks her "Don't you like them?", and then tells the story about the guardian who gives him the cigarette. In this scene, character's gratitude and affinity to the guardian and 'people' in general is underlined. But this is the only scene in the movie, which does not tell much about the character's political views. In the context of political consciousness, the protagonist only presents a mere sympathy to lower classes. The political orientation of the intellectual figure is represented ambiguously in the film.

Hüseyin's involvement in socialist movement is narrated as a compulsion and mistake which led to disasters for his family in *Dikenli Yol*. His brother dies while helping one of his friends to hide from the soldiers. The film builds a great sorrow upon this event. His family blames Hüseyin for two

¹²³ In the 1986 and 1987 several political prisoners were excused and set free with the amnesty and the expiration of their conviction periods. The high number of films depicting the post-imprisonment years of intellectuals is also indicative about the representations of politicized characters in relation with state's repression.

reasons: because of being an anarchist¹²⁴ and causing his brother's death. As a result, his wife is widowed and their child is left an orphan and constantly mocked by his friends saying,

A kid: Why is your uncle in jail? Your uncle is an anarchist. Anarchist! He is a murderer. He killed your father. Boo!¹²⁵

The reason why Hüseyin engages in the socialist movement is explained by his friend Yadigar as follows,

Yadigar: ... I don't think I can stand being in prison. In two days, my dead body will be out, you know. Now, you will say "why did you involve then, if you already knew all these from the very beginning". You are right. But, do you really think that it happened with my own will? They don't let us to decide. "You are either from this side or the other side" they said. We could not afford being in the middle. I also made Hüseyin to involve in these. I know, I am ashamed of all, brother.¹²⁶

This narrative pictures the organized people of the left as the pawns of greater forces that the leftists themselves were not able to control or manipulate but they were forced to be involved in the organizations. In one scene the socialist struggle is associated with a "game that is played with real guns". When being a socialist in the past is regarded as the burden of circumstances, the depoliticization or even anti-socialism of the characters make perfect sense. In *Dikenli Yol*, Hüseyin suffers from his mistakes and misfortune of being a socialist in the past. But at the end of the film, he gets together with his ex-girlfriend, takes his nephew with him and goes to İstanbul for working and living with his family. The happy ending of the film suggests depoliticization and starting a family as a solution for an ex-leftist character. In this protagonist's story, political act is something to be avoided in order to make a good life for oneself.

¹²⁴ In the films, as in the colloquial language, the leftist, anarchist and socialist characters who participate in organized struggle are called as "anarchists" –"anarşist" or "anarşik" in Turkish.

¹²⁵ Amcan niye hapiste senin? Anarşist senin amcan, anarşist. Katil senin amcan. Babanı amcan öldürdü. Yuuhh...

¹²⁶ Yadigar: ... dayanamam içeriye. İki günde cesedim çıkar. Biliyorsun. "Bunu biliyordun da ne diye bulaştın" diyeceksin abi. Haklısın. Gönülümle mi oldu bu işler sanırsın. Bizi bize bırakmadılar ki abi. Ya ondan ya bundan dediler. Arada kalamazdık tabi. Hüseyini de ben bulaştırdım bu işlere. Biliyorum, utanıyorum abi sizden.

The politicization process of the protagonists is not mentioned also in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Raziye* and *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*. In *Raziye*, where the character never speaks about his views, but only thinks about his relationship with villager girl, Bedia. In other two films, there are flashbacks to the characters' prison memories. These memories will be mentioned in section dealing with the trauma of the coup, since they share several similarities about showing the torture and abasement in the prisons. However, apart from these scenes, the times of their struggle in streets, activities in organizations and political parties, relationships with their comrades are not mentioned. In *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, there is only one scene while Hayri talks with his old friends about a raid in their student dormitory. One of his friends does not even remember it and tries to slide over the subject. There is not another memory about the past regarding their political involvement. In another conversation with his friends about the past, they mention a girl that one of them loves but she goes out with another. While they talk about the women in a rude way, one of Hayri's friends criticizes Hayri about his political involvement in the past,

Tunca: (Kisses a woman who is an advertisement model) My dear, you are the prettiest. These are our beautiful babies which we create and exterminate in thirty seconds. They go to screen, stay as we desire, then they disappear. So, they are workmates of us. But you, Hayri, you spent all those years for nothing. Tell me, for what reason? I know. Now, you'll say "Be respectful to those women. Don't see them as a tradable commodity". But, you spent all those years for nothing, nothing really... For what sake, huh, Hayri?¹²⁷

Hayri does not respond to Tunca's question because he does not believe that Tunca can understand him after that much time. Here, the audience understands that Hayri does not agree with Tunca. However, he can only remain silent when he encounters with ideas that are against his views. Unlike his friends, Hayri does not prefer the life of the new order, defined by

¹²⁷ Tunca: (Reklam modeli olan kadını öpüyor.) Yavrum, en güzel sensin. Bunlar bizim 30 saniyede bir gösterip bir yok ettiğimiz güzel bebeklerimiz. Ekrana giderler, istediğimiz süre kalırlar ve yok olurlar. Yani onlar bizim çalışma arkadaşlarımız. Sense o kadar yılı boşu boşuna harcadın be Hayri. Anlatsana ulan ne uğruna? Biliyorum. Sen şimdi diyeceksin ki 'kadınlarımıza saygılı davran. Onları alıp satılan bir mal gibi görme. Ulan sense o kadar yılı boşu boşuna harcadın. Ne uğruna be Hayri?'

Gürbilek (2011) as “living in the shop window”, and Hayri does not want to be one of the builders of these shop windows like advertisement directors or finance workers. However, all he can do is to leave his friends and go his exile in Konya at the end of the film. Hayri is a character who still have leftist political ideas but unable to verbalize or actuate them. In *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Raziye* and *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, the political orientations of the characters also remain ambiguous due to the lack of information about the characters’ past and present ideas. Instead of criticizing the coup, new political order or even their mistakes in the past, the characters are only able to try to accommodate themselves to the new life outside.

Nil, in *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, also has dreams about past, mostly related with prison. There are also remembrances of her about her ex-husband, a close friend and her daughter. She talks about marriage with her ex-husband. With her friend, she talks about her break from İstanbul to hide from the police. Her friend, Hayriye, only tells her to be careful in her actions since the police officers are constantly following them up. Again, there is no scene about the political views of the character or how and why she got politicized in the past.

As the other protagonists of September 12 films, Nil’s personality and story is also full of mysteries. She is given a leftist identity but this identity could not be fulfilled. The only signifier of her being a leftist is the couple of books that the police find in her house. (Maktav, 2000b: 82)

After she comes out of prison, she tries to reach her daughter –who actually does not exist; it is just a dream of her. Nil does not get in contact with the people, does not even try to adapt to the life outside. Because of her hallucination, she stays in a mental institution for a while and at the end she commits suicide. Nil is an example of the most pessimistic portrayal of young ex-leftist intellectual in this corpus of films. Her troubles are personal more than political. She longs for her imaginary daughter and her deceased best friend throughout the film. In a dialogue with her lover Ateş, she mentions the great difficulty she has about settling the new order,

Nil: Everything has changed so much.

Ateş: Does this change upset you?

Nil: Not experiencing the change upsets me.

Ateş: It seems to me, nothing could change easily in this country. The appearance may change, but, everything is so deeply built upon the traditional structures.

Nil: You are wrong, it is changing... Furthermore, it changes so fast that our consciousness experience difficulties to settle with it.¹²⁸

In this dialogue as well, Nil fails to make sense of the change she sees. The change is not something that she can fight against, understand or criticize. She just tries to articulate to it first, but commits suicide when she realizes that she cannot be part of it because of her harshly damaged psychology.

In *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, *Kimlik* and *İkili Oyunlar*, there are scenes showing the acts of the characters during their politicization before the September, 12. In all three films, there is a great contrast between the attitudes of the characters in past and present. Similar to the ones mentioned above, the intellectuals in these films try to adapt the post-1980 life by forsaking their socialist views in the past. The rapid transformation in *Kimlik* is already mentioned where the married couple tries to integrate in social life and is occupied with their domestic problems. *İkili Oyunlar* is similar since it is based on the tension between the married couple, who constantly argue about their political failures, cowardliness and collaboration with the new order. An example about it is given in the conversation of Erol, the ex-militant academician in *İkili Oyunlar*, with one his friends who work in a conglomerate company. Erol is an economy professor in a university and is hired by his friend Taner to work for the financial affairs of Taner's company. Taner and his friend talk while they exercise in a luxurious gym near the pool,

Taner: It is good that I took him as an employee; he comes in handy. At first, you know how he resisted. "I would not be a professor of holding company". (Laughs out loud)

İlhan: (Laughs) As if I do not know Erol.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Nil: Her şey ne kadar da değişmiş.

Ateş: Değişim hüzünlendiriyor mu seni?

Nil: Değişimi yaşamamış olmak hüzünlendiriyor.

Ateş: Bana da bu ülkede hiçbir şey kolay kolay değişmezmiş gibi geliyor. Belki görüntü değişiyor ama her şey öylesine geleneksel yapılar üzerine kurulu ki.

Nil: (For rent ilanını görüyor.) Yanılıyorsun, değişiyor oysa. Üstelik öylesine hızla değişiyor ki, çoğu kez bilincimiz zorlanıyor değişime uymakta.

As can be seen, the ex-leftist Erol starts to work for a holding company like his friends. This situation refers to a widespread opinion about the ex-leftists that criticizes their involvement in financial institutions, factories or other companies as administrators or bosses. Erol becomes one of them like his friends. Nevertheless, both he and his wife Nur have several critical political remarks throughout the film both about their own attitudes and society in general. However, these views find place only at the level of dispute in their conversations and cannot be materialized.

In *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, there are some flashbacks about the four main characters participating in a strike, staging a play to the workers, discussing about “power relations” in the university cafeteria and printing leaflets.¹³⁰ Together with *Kimlik* and *İkili Oyunlar*, *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye* is a film that has a lot of scenes about the 1970s. It is explicit in the film that, all four main characters were involved in the leftist political organizations in these years. But the film’s depiction of these characters in 1980s is very dark and sorrowful. Erdiñ, who did not see other three since their university days works in a big newspaper. He does not have any ties about his past and lives as if he never participated in political struggle. Esra, Erdal and Ersin are concerned with the love affair between them. They are stayed out of any political movement which makes them unrestful. After the mysterious death of Erdal, Ersin is arrested for murder. When he gets out of jail, he commits suicide. Esra goes into depression and she commits suicide as well. Right before her suicide, she tells her experience as a socialist to the journalist Erdiñ,

Esra: They don’t give me pain. Isn’t its equivalent ‘defeat’ in the terminology? Defeat... No, it’s not pain. Humiliation, perhaps... We

¹²⁹ Taner: İyi oldu yanıma aldığım canım, baya işe yarıyor kerata. Önceleri biliyorsun nasıl da direndi, “Ben holding profesörü olmam!” diye. (Kahkaha atıyor)

İlhan: (Gülerek) Erol’u bilmez miyim...

¹³⁰ The film is based a book which was written by an insider of the leftist movement in the 1970s, Ümit Kıvanç. With exceptions, most of the films lack an intimate look to the socialists’ past since they are written and directed by people who are not directly inside the socialist struggle. This makes difficult for them to compose scenes about characters’ past. Whenever they do, they do it mostly with the help of the dominant mediatic images and second-hand information constructed in 1980s.

were fighting for our dreams. Sorcery... Alchemy... Yes. Erdal also said 'humiliation'. Ersin had agreed with him. It is utterly shameful that huge ice mountain melted down and converged into the water. Betrayal, they say. I missed Ersin. You said you are journalist, right? You can do a lot of things. Well... Yes, we are simply defeated. I hope you would win.¹³¹

The subject, 'you', in the last sentence implies the journalist and people like him who got integrated to the order after leaving their socialist worldview behind. Maktav (2000b: 82) argues that the film is based so heavily on the symbols and so densely tackles with the problems such as alienation and uncommunicativeness that it becomes a story of 'disconnectus erectus'. This narrative of "defeat" is also very common in the films which will be examined more in depth later in this chapter. Here, I would like to refer only to Esra's absolute resignation from the struggle. She, as her friends, evaluates the past years as something that has been lived and closed down. Apart from speaking with Erdal about throwing their TV from the window, the intellectual characters do not think that they are capable of doing anything.

The most atypical representation of a socialist figure is in *Prenses*. In Maktav's words,

Prenses, which describes left with creepy images of an organization house and identifies it with caricaturized militant characters, is a film that looks to the left with hatred and supports the politics that demonize it. In Tarık's personality, the left is defined in its most rigid form and shown as 'an ideology against life'. (Maktav, 2000b: 80-1 [tm])

With its heavy formalist elements, *Prenses* visualizes the socialists in an extremely pejorative way. Even Dorsay (1995: 236-7 [tm]), who appreciates the courage of the film, acknowledges that it is "an artificial film to the utmost; people, situations and the dramatic progress is created only for explaining and justifying a thesis, a view". This thesis of the director Sinan Çetin is proving the superiority of depoliticization against devoted politicization. Inside

¹³¹ Esra: Acı vermiyorlar bana. Bunun adı terminolojide 'yenilgi' değil mi? Yenilgi. Acı değil yok. Onur kırıklığı belki. Rüyalarımız için savaşıyorduk biz. Büyücülük. Simya. Evet. Erdal da onur kırıklığı dedi. Ersin de onaylıyordu. Buz dağının eriyip sulara karışması düpedüz ayıpmış. İhanetmiş. Ersin'i özledim. Ersin'i... Gazeteciyim demiştin değil mi sen? Çok şeyler yapabilirsin. İyi iyi... Evet. Basbayağı yenildik biz. Siz kazanırsınız inşallah.

a dark and smoke-filled room, the irritable members of an illegal socialist organization deliver speeches to Nevres who is the young and beautiful girl who recently joined to the organization. While the characters are speaking, their sound is mixed with the gun bursts as if their words are the bullets murdering people. Even the lens choice, framing and editing of the scenes imply a hostile look to the socialist characters. They are framed with extreme close-ups from below with rigid lighting that renders them look angrier and monstrous. In addition, the scenes are edited with fast jump-cuts that supported by a tense sound tape. In the image below there are some examples about the shots of the characters.



Figure 2: Imperious leftist characters in Prenses

The majority of the sentences that leftist characters utter are taken from the books and pronounced in a harsh and commanding way. Tarik constantly gets angry to Nevres because of her irresponsibility and impose bans on her acts. He interprets her love to him as a “profitable element for the organization”. Even when Nevres kisses Tarik tenderly, he acts so roughly

and their lovemaking is shot almost like a rape scene. Evren (1990: 172) criticizes the films' approach about representing the socialist militants as,

... people that are caricaturized in a stroke, brainwashed, do not hesitate to leave someone dead even if s/he is someone they love, in fact find a pleasure in it, negate everything that are lively . . .

There are so many dialogues in the film to cite here that may show this sinister representation of the leftist characters. But only the following conversation between Tarık and Nevres is enough to show the reductionist and malevolent approach in portraying the character,

Tarık: Yes. We have holy and scientific worldview the whole world.

Nevres: May a holy thing be scientific?

Tarık: (Hesitates) It is a wrong question. How do you come up with such questions?¹³²

After Tarık runs away from his execution by his own organization, he turns back to his family. His ex-leftist father tells him about his own memories in 1970s,

Father: I was also captivated to the glamour of "saving the society". I don't know how this saviorist mission was imputed on us. While we weren't even aware of ourselves, we started to see ourselves as the people who are appointed to solve the problems of the country. Our friends had died, our friends started to kill each other . . . As the value of our lives fall, the value of the death increased. While living was almost becoming a sort of guilt, death was being applauded. We, who were trying to save the society, built another society. We constructed moral values inside us. Dying, suffering, imprisoning and lack of money became the greatest virtues. What were we thinking while trying to save a society which did not demand to be rescued? And at last, we realized that we had no respect for the society we were trying to save.¹³³

¹³² Tarık: Evet. Bizim bütün dünyayı kucaklayan çok kutsal ve bilimsel bir dünya görüşümüz var. Nevres: Kutsal bir şey bilimsel olabilir mi? Tarık: (Duraksıyor.) Bu yanlış soru. Nereden buluyorsun böyle soruları?

¹³³ Baba: Bütün bir toplumu kurtarma büyüsüne ben de katıldım. Bu kurtarıcılık görevi hangi nedenle üstümüze yüklenmişti bilmiyorum. Biz kendimizi bile doğru dürüst tanımazken, bir anda ülkenin sorunlarını çözmekle görevlendirilmiş insanlar olarak görmeye başladık. Arkadaşlarımız öldüler, arkadaşlarımız birbirilerini öldürmeye başladılar. . . . Hayatımızın değeri düştükçe ölümün değeri yükseldi. Yaşamak neredeyse suç haline gelirken, ölüm alkışlanıyordu. . . . Toplumu kurtarmak isteyen bizler de bir başka toplum oluşturduk. Kendi aramızda ahlaki değerler yarattık. Ölmek, acı çekmek, sürünmek, hapishaneler, parasızlık en büyük erdem haline geldi.. . . Biz kim oluyoruz da bizden kurtarılmayı talep etmeyen bu toplumu kurtarmaya çalışıyoruz? Ve kurtarmaya çalıştığımız topluma hiç saygı duymadığımızı anladık.

The contrary figure of the leftists is photographer Selim, a fervent defender of individualism. He is despised by his leftist ex-wife and by Nevres because of being “shifty”, “purposeless” and “irresponsible”. However, as the film proceeds, Selim gradually persuades Nevres during their question and answer sessions that his views are more reasonable. Selim asks questions that Nevres cannot answer about her ideology. In return, he answers all of her questions with an emphasis on individual freedom and meaningless of struggling for people apart from one’s own. He expresses his own will as living an “individual and free life”. He interprets his wife’s politicization as a character weakness and

Selim: You are fooling yourself by saying that you are interested in problems of society.

Wife: Yes, what’s wrong with that? Is it a kind of crime?

Selim: I really wonder, what the people like you will do when people will run out of the problems?

Wife: What do you mean by ‘people like us’?

Selim: People who cannot even build their own lives, but trying to save others’.¹³⁴

Furthermore, while they wander in a grassplot, Selim shows Nevres that life is full of liveliness. He advises her to enjoy the life by seeing its details and diversity of life instead of letting more powerful people to poison them with their ideas, by which he implies the socialists. After the lengthy speech he gives to Nevres, she tries to criticize him but fails,

Nevres: You are living, but you have no faith or aim.

Selim: Just living by itself, is not enough? I live. I am making effort to accomplish a free and individual life for myself.

Nevres: Do you always live only for yourself? What about the others who are dying for their beliefs.

Selim: No idea would worth to die for. Life is going on. The ideas that we accept to die for today, might seem meaningless for us tomorrow. Whom we will call to account for the loss of that life then?¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Selim: Sen de toplum sorunlarıyla ilgileniyorum diye kendini tatmin ediyorsun.

Karısı: Evet, ne var bunda? Suç mu?

Selim: Merak ediyorum, insanların hiç sorunu kalmayınca, sizin gibiler ne yapacak diye.

Karısı: Ne demek bizim gibiler?

Selim: Kendi hayatını bile kuramayıp, başkalarının hayatını kurtarmakla uğraşanlar.

¹³⁵ Nevres: Yaşıyorsun ama hiçbir amacın, hiçbir inancın yok.

Selim: Sadece yaşamak yetmiyor mu? Yaşıyorum. Şahsi ve özgür bir hayat kurmaya çalışıyorum.

Nevres: Peki hep kendin için mi yaşarsın? Ya inançları uğruna ölenler?

He mocks Nevres about trying to save the country. He calls her as a “princess” and stages a theatrical play with his friend about cutting off one’s head for the princess referring to the armed conflicts between leftists and rightists. Here, Selim’s use of the princess figure underlines the patriarchal vision pervading the film. Indeed, the whole film narrates issues of politicization and depoliticization through two male figures and presents a beautiful woman who does not have a character of her own but is forced to choose which is better just by inputs she takes from the male characters. And finally in the happy ending, she picks the photographer Selim. *Prenses* stands out as the most anomalistic film in this study in terms of representation of leftist characters and its insults to the socialist struggle.

The film director in *Su da Yanar* strives for making a film about the famous communist poet Nazım Hikmet throughout the film¹³⁶. He is also an ex-leftist intellectual as shown in his flashbacks: he stages the play, “Waiting for Godot” for the workers, visits his comrades in prisons and gets arrested because of his film about a worker’s child. However, he is in a great crisis about shooting the film. Both his acts and the metaphorical scenes in the film –mothers holding photos of their revolutionary children, bats and scattered clothes on the streets, people walking with candles in the night– express a requiem for the people lost, murdered, imprisoned and tortured because of their political activities. The unnamed intellectual character tries to make the film about Nazım but he cannot do it because of censorship and his own personal depression. He cannot decide whether it is meaningful or not and how to shoot the film. He claims that he wants to instill hope to the people by making this film. But he does nothing but floundering about his confusions throughout the film. Dorsay (1995: 278-9 [tm]) evaluates the film as an

Selim: Hiçbir düşünce, uğruna ölmeye değmez. Hayat devam ediyor. Bugün uğruna ölmeyi göze aldığımız düşünce, yarın bize çok saçma gelebilir. O zaman kocaman bir hayatın hesabını kimden soracağız.

¹³⁶ *Su da Yanar* is a semi-autobiographical film of Ali Özgentürk that tries to cover several other issues in the history of Turkey such as urban-rural and Eastern-Western contrast, pre-27 May incidents, and May 1968 protests in France. Not in detail but as fragments, these issues take place in the film. But here, I will only touch upon the issues directly related with the intellectual character.

example of European-like films where “the intellectual character pursues individualistic quests and yearnings”. The dream sequence towards the end shows the failure of this individual quest where he stands amidst the burning film strips in a field. He tries to save the film strips at first but realizes that he cannot do it. Thus, as the fire grows up, his only chance is to save himself. He abandons making a film about Nazım, instead makes a film about himself, about his failure in making the film: which is the film itself. As in other films, political disbelief is strongly attached to the intellectual figure. Even though he wants to do a political film about an exiled communist poet, he cannot accomplish it.

In the films that do not have ex-leftist figures, the political views of the intellectuals are very rarely mentioned. Their primary occupations are the problems with their lovers, problems about creativity in their art and psychological issues such as loneliness, uncommunicativeness or discontent. In *Melodram*, Esra tries to prove herself by writing an autobiographical novel; the drug addict painter Koray tries to recover and break away from the father figure Behzat and be in with Esra; Behzat lives alone and mistrustfully and patronizes Esra and Koray to endure him. *Camdan Kalp*’s film director agonizes to be a true intellectual on the one hand, wishes to redeem his maid on the other; however he fails in both his missions. *Büyük Yalnızlık*’s married couple settle accounts with each other by arguing about jealousy, loneliness, incivility and degeneration. *Umut Yarına Kaldı*’s film director is full of hatred to society and its institutions at first which may lead to his suicide but he revives with love and starts to enjoy the life with his girlfriend. The two artist women in *Umut Yarına Kaldı* are completely apolitical in the film since they avoid commenting on the film director protagonist’s arguments in all conversations and they are in no action apart from their artistic occupations such as dancing and playing piano. In *Gece Dansı Tutsakları*, the main motivation of the intellectual couple is traveling around the world and writing a successful book. As mentioned above, more powerful women in *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*

and *Kimlik* struggle for their rights as women and try to involve in women's movement, which will be analyzed in a separate section below.

The IsF represents the intellectuals' relationship with political action either as an ambiguous or as a negative way. 'Being organized in a radical political movement' is depicted as an almost forgotten vague memory or a mistake in the past. Kürkçü (1990: 10), while mentioning *Sen Türkülerini Söyle* and *Kimlik*, claims that these films reach an agreement with the political regime of September, 12 by representing the intellectuals and militants relationship with the radical left via lack of information or pejorative representation. As Arslan (2010: 207) states, the depression and amnesia are two common themes in films dealing with the military coup. While the depression in the films partly reveals the violence of coup and its power on passivizing the intellectuals, the amnesia conceals and makes the audience forget the substance of leftist/socialist political movement in IsF.

In sum, the ex-leftist figures are in a state where they abandon their old political views because of different reasons. Some think that it is not possible for them to be leftist in the new socio-political atmosphere. Others take a critical stance against left and their own past by interpreting their involvement in socialist struggle as a mistake or a necessary outcome of the circumstances. Another group of intellectuals try to conserve their political consciousness but rather than pursuing strictly socialist ideals of the former decade they shift into the other fields of political action such as women's movement which arose in the 1980s Turkey. The artists and writers almost never have clear political identities who are concerned mostly with their own art and private life. This disbelief and recklessness can be examined in detail, I would argue, in the context of cynicism.

4.2.3. Cynicism of Intellectuals: Loss of Meaning, Inability and Despise

Both in the evaluations of the intellectuals about the leftist politics in their statements about their own lives, meaninglessness of political struggle are a common ground in different films. Mostly rooted in their inability for

creating a difference or any sort of interference in political life, the characters interpret any sort of political struggle as meaningless or insignificant in *İsF*. Not only the political action, but also the artistic and social involvements are seen as useless in the statements of the characters.

In *İkili Oyunlar*, Nur remembers the past with a nostalgic tone and explains the transformation that they –the leftist intellectuals– experience accordingly. She complains about her own retreat from political intentions. Her husband agrees and argues that this must be the case for grownups. Being a hopeful revolutionary is a temporary pursuit for him. In the long term, intellectuals should not play the game of “revolutionism”.

Nur: In fact, what have we dreamt of during the university years? How big words... How we thought to devote ourselves to our people. In the end, we ended up devoting ourselves just to our own lives.

Erol: The universities come to an end in four or let's say six years. I cannot play “revolutionism” anymore. The people in our age should see the issues in a cooler manner.¹³⁷

This cynical attitude towards the political involvement is immediately justified through various arguments by the intellectuals. Erol mentions the excessive power of military and impossibility to resist. He cites lines from Eugene Ionesco, a writer of absurd theater, about the death of Marx –which is one of the several references to the absurd theater in the film which uses the cynicism of absurd characters as plot elements. Furthermore, Erol criticizes and despises the working class because of their selfishness. For him, they do not deserve revolution because they did not suffer enough. Lastly, he claims that the intellectuals are the scapegoats and insults his wife with stupidity since she defends that there are also intellectuals who still carry on the fight.

Erol: Look, there is a text here. I want to translate it word by word when we are back in town. "God is dead. Marx is dead. And I am not feeling too well myself". It means "Tanrı öldü. Marx öldü ve ben de kendimi iyi hissetmiyorum". What can I do, for god's sake? Do I have a cannonball or rifle? As long as these people are not different from a

¹³⁷ Nur: Oysa neler düşledikti üniversite yıllarında... Ne büyük laflar... Nasıl adayacaktık kendimizi halkımıza. Kendimizi kendimize adamakta karar kıldık sonuçta.

Erol: Yüksek okullar 4 bilemedin 6 yılda biter kızım. Ben hala devrimcilik oynayamam. Bizim yaşımızdakiler çok daha soğuk bakmak mecburiyetindeler meselelere.

sheep herd... They did not suffer enough. Class consciousness, class struggle... They are laughing at us! They only care about collective bargaining or severance pay. The rest is not an issue for them. Am I the credulous guy?

Nur: Mr. Erol, Mr. Erol... While you were fishing from the Diogenes' barrel for nine years, some people were being tortured in this country. And they still are.

Erol: Well, tell me who they are. While the people are just thinking about climbing the social ladders, the real sufferers, the hanged ones, the exiled ones have always been the intellectuals on behalf of them.

Nur: You are right, even you were arrested once. Do not take it personally, it was a general notice.

Erol: At this rate, the stupid leftists like you will make me apolitical¹³⁸

Making a discussion on the political acts and attitudes of the working class during the socialist struggle in Turkey or the intellectuals' and other organized people's decisions and mistakes in the leftist movement exceeds the limits of this thesis. What I am interested in Erol's words is that, I would argue, there is a search for legitimizing his depoliticization. He believes that even if he makes efforts for socialist movement it will be useless. He does not want to suffer from this engagement, so he propounds that the exploited people deserve this exploitation because of their self-seeking actions. Here, Erol's critique of society serves only to justify his own depoliticization. In Maktav's (2000a: 88 [tm]) words, the message of the film is "the necessity of the acknowledgement that the left is dead even if we like it or not". The intellectual characters in the other films mostly share Erol's skeptical perspective and his lack of belief in political action.

¹³⁸ Erol: Bak burada bir yazı var. Şehre dönüşte bunu sana olduğu gibi çevirmek istiyorum. "God is dead. Marx is dead. And I'm not feeling too well myself." Yani "Tanrı öldü, Marx öldü ve ben de kendimi iyi hissetmiyorum" diyor. Yahu ben ne yapabilirim allah aşkına? Topum tüfeğim mi var benim ha? Bu halk koyun sürüsünden beter olduktan sonra ... Bu toplum fazla bir şey çekmedi. Sınıf mücadelesi, sınıf bilinci ... Herifler burnumuza gülüyor be! Toplu sözleşme, kıdem tazminatı derdinde hepsi. Gerisi umurlarında bile değil. Elin enayisi ben miyim be?

Nur: Erol bey, Erol bey... Siz 9 yıldır diyojenin fıçısında balık avlarken, bu memlekette bazı insanlar işkence görüyorlardı. Hala da görüyorlar.

Erol: İyi ya, kim onlar söylesene bana. Halk sınıf atlama telaşındayken, onlar adına itilip kakılan, asılıp sürülen, hep bu memleketin aydını oldu.

Nur: Haklısın, seni bile içeri aldılar bir ara. Ama boşuna üstüne alınma, genel bir ihbardı o.

Erol: Zaten senin gibi aptal solcular apolitik yapacaklar beni bu gidişle.

The meaninglessness and rejection of political struggle is built on and presented as an inevitable result of the transformation that the society has gone through. As mentioned before, the leftist intellectuals, who were once so sure about their political determinations, becomes suspicious about their own ideas. They decide that the society has changed and their “old” and “defeated” views do not apply to the new order. In *Kimlik* for instance, the woman talks with an ex-comrade of hers about the military coup and their reaction towards is as follows,

Woman 1: It was as if a sweet dream has ended, and the goals that link us together have disappeared.

Woman 2: I guess the master [husband of Woman 1] must have been surprised a lot.

Woman 1: Of course. His savoir and superior attitude has transformed into an attitude of inferiority. That man who was once above everyone has fallen below all these people. He just couldn't accept being an ordinary person in any ways

Woman 2: Being ordinary is the hardest thing.

Woman 1: When we walked out in the streets, people were talking but when were not able to understand. The master was surprised each time we he encountered with his friends from the school because of their survival skills. In short, we understood that there is a big world out there to discover.¹³⁹

Here we see the abandonment of the intellectual saviorism which was rooted in İttihat intellectuals and carried on to the early republican intellectuals and lastly the socialist ones of the 60s and 70s. The attitude which the woman mentions as heroic and superior is dumped up and also ridiculed. Erdoğan (2010) finds a similar mockery in film director's (Kirpi) journey to help the maid in *Camdan Kalp*. Kirpi “understands that he cannot change others’

¹³⁹ Nebahat: Sanki pembe bir düşünce sona ermiş, bizi birbirimize bağlayan amaç birliği ortadan kalkıvermişti.

Kadın: Herhalde hoca çok şaşırmıştır.

Nebahat: Elbette! Herkesten üstün süper kurtarıcı tavrı, müthiş bir aşağılık duygusuna dönüştü. O herkesin üstündeki adam sanki herkesin altına düştü. Bir türlü sıradan biri olmayı kabul edemedi.

Kadın: En zor şey sıradan insan olmak.

Nebahat: Sokağa çıktığımızda insanlar konuşuyorlardı ama biz anlayamıyorduk. Hoca eski okul arkadaşlarına rastladıkça onların hayattaki tutunma becerilerine şaşırp kalıyordu. Kısacası, bir süre sonra dışımızda keşfedilmesi gereken kocaman bir dünya olduğunu kavradık.

lives” in the film that presents the “critique (even mockery) of narodnic way of ‘going to the people’”.

In the same vein, the ex-leftist character recites the past as follows in *Su da Yanar*,

Godot! Please come now. In our early youth, we thought that all our actions would save the country. The country that we tried to save, the villagers we tried to save. . .¹⁴⁰

He uses the metaphor of Godot from “Waiting for Godot” implying the never coming socialist order.

Hakkari’de Bir Mevsim is another example on intellectual inability that is also mentioned above. The writer works as a teacher in a Kurdish village for a season as an exile. At first he tries to teach the children but right before he leaves the village, he realizes that the knowledge he tried to share means nothing. He confesses that he has not much to teach to the children living there. And he leaves.

Right now, I am asking you a favor at this last moment. Forget all about that I taught to you. Yes, the world is turning around, but maybe here, out in the bush, it is better not to know that. I taught you about science of life, but you will learn the life yourself in this village, in the middle of nowhere, during your military service in the cities far away, in prisons. Remember that it is not always true what is written in the books. What is right for me may not be right for you. What is real for me may not be real for you. Forgive me if most of the things I have taught so far are like that. Because, I come from somewhere else. And I am leaving as the snow has melted.¹⁴¹

In all these instances, the intellectuals awaken to their inability to make a change. They stop making an effort for political struggle because such efforts make no sense anymore for them.

¹⁴⁰ Godot! Gel artık. İlk gençliğimizde yaptığımız şeylerin ertesi gün memleketi kurtaracağını zannederdik. Kurtarmaya çalıştığımız memleket, kurtarmaya çalıştığımız köylüler...

¹⁴¹ Ben şimdi sizden giderayak bir şey istiyorum. Bütün öğrettiklerimi unutun. Dünya dönüyor evet, ama belki de burada, bu dağ başında, dönmemesini bilmek daha doğrudur. Size hayat bilgisi dersleri verdim, ama siz hayatın gerçek bilgisini kendiniz, burada bu dağ başındaki köyünüzde, sonra, uzak kentlerdeki askerliğinizde, mahpusluklarınızda öğreneceksiniz. Unutmayın ki, kitapların yazdığı her zaman doğru değildir. Benim için doğru olan, sizin için doğru değildir. Benim için gerçek olan sizin için gerçek değildir. Öğrettiklerimin çoğu böyleyse bağışlayın beni. Çünkü ben, başka bir yerden geliyorum. Karların erimesiyle de gidiyorum işte

There are some main routes in the films regarding the cynical and scornful remarks of the intellectuals about their environment and themselves: The despising of women in general; an arrogant interpretation of the people and the events; undervaluing both their own and others' activities; a scornful approach to the past experiences; despising of intellectual activities including their own lives and artistic productions.

The characters make derogatory comments against people they encounter. It is firstly the women whom they tease when it comes to speaking about politics or socialist struggle. The character in *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü* is questioned about his political involvement by his wife's friends in a conversation. Both he and the women speak in a contemptuous mode about the socialists,

Woman I: What was the reason for stirring up that much trouble? You pushed them a lot.

Ahmet: If you were there, I would push you. (Chuckling) But since you were not around, I pushed them.

Woman II: How one usually spends time there?

Ahmet: We usually spend time by thinking women with their pants down.

Woman III: I can't understand why they are bullying you so much.

Ahmet: Why don't they ever bully you?¹⁴²

He either does not take the women seriously or does not have a good explanation about his politicization so the conversation about state's repression and socialist struggle is vitiated by sexual imagery of him.

In *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, there are several insults of the film director against his two female admirers. Each time the women talk, the man answers with sardonic statements. When a woman asks why he attacks on them like that, he claims that she is resentful and says "If I pay a compliment, then it won't be a problem". In one scene, he, the two women and the landlord are having a picnic. The landlord is called Rantiye in the film which

¹⁴² Kadın 1: Ne vardı bu kadar ortalığı kızdıracak? Siz de çok gittiniz onların üzerine.

Ahmet: Seni bulsam senin üzerine gelirdim. (Gülüşmeler.) Ama sen ortalıkta olmayınca onların üzerine gittim. . . .

Kadın 2: Genellikle nasıl vakit geçiriliyor?

Ahmet: Genellikle karıları dolsuz düşünerek vakit geçiririz. . .

Kadın 3: Niye bu kadar çok yüklendiler size anlayamıyorum.

Ahmet: Peki sizlere neden hiç yüklenmiyorlar?

means “rentier” in Turkish, a term signifying the bourgeoisie. While they are laughing out loud, they start shouting with fun,

Rantiye: (Stands up and shouts) But we are powerful, they cannot destroy us!

Director: Against the capital, rentiers!¹⁴³

They make the mockery of the socialists by using their slogans in a teasing manner with a cynical amusement.

In the opening scene of the same movie, the protagonist who is a film director explains what he loathes most,

Wherever I look at, I see people that got dirty with their own vomit. People who deny themselves... Everything has become the slave of shallowness, ignorance, insincerity, rudeness. Yes, from now on, the words are afraid of love. That's why I decided to shoot this movie. Its director is me, script is mine. Director of photography, director of light, actors... These are all my jobs. Only music does not belong to me. I registered Debussy, Liszt and Tchaikovsky to write it. It will be an interesting movie. I will shoot my own death. Yes. I will make a movie of my own death.¹⁴⁴

Unlike the intellectuals that cannot make meaning of the new order and the transformation, the director in *Umut Yarına Kaldı* acts as if he has a total understanding. He looks down on the people, expresses his hatred and plans a suicide as an artwork. However, as I have already mentioned, when he falls in love with a woman he stops making the film and he leaves these adverse attitudes.

A dispute between the married intellectual couple of *Büyük Yalnızlık* presents the hatred towards society and the mockery of political terminologies.

Man: Yes, honey, I am determined tonight. I will show no reaction to ignorance, insensitivity and banality. Let's dance, huh? (He tries to hug the woman)

¹⁴³ Rantiye: (Ayağa kalkıp bağıırıyor) Ama biz güçlüyüz, bizi yok edemezler.

Yönetmen: Sermayeye karşı, Rantiye!

¹⁴⁴ Ne yana baksam, kendi kusmuğuna bulanmış insanlar görüyorum. Kendini reddeden insanlar... Sağlığın, cahilliğin, ikiyüzlülüğün, kabalığın kölesi olmuş her şey. Evet, sözcükler sevgiden ürküyorlar artık. Bu yüzden çekmeye karar verdim bu filmi (evin dibinden vapor geçiyor). Yönetmeni benim, senaryo benim, görüntü yönetmeni, ışık şefi, oyuncusu benim. Yalnız müzik benim değil. Debussy, Lizst, Tchaikovsky'e yazdırdım müziği. İlginç bir film olacak. Kendi ölümümü çekeceğim. Evet. Kendi ölümümün filmi çekeceğim.

Woman: Leave it, for God's sake. You set your eyes on my flesh again... (They talk)

Man: Stop the nonsense. (Tries to hold her) Come on; come close to me a little. You, grumpy... Look, you would be a feminist after now, wouldn't you? (They laugh)

Woman: And you will be a masculinist! (They laugh more)¹⁴⁵

Feminism and women's movement in general is scorned in some films. In *Kimlik* and *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç* as well, there are similar dialogues that male characters despise the women for their feminist views. Their views on women's movement mostly involve despise but not in a hostile way. Rather, they extenuate women's action by seeing it as a transient fashion and pointless effort. The scriptwriter in *Gece Yolculuğu* complains about his woman producer because of her insistence on the screenplay to include a repressed woman. Nur, in *İkili Oyunlar*, also despises a woman who mentions her intent about involving in environmentalist or women's movement. The devaluation and underestimation of politics is at stake for all sites of political struggle.

The socialist past of the characters becomes a source of entertainment in some films. We see the commercialization of the socialist heritage in a dialogue between the professor and his assistant in *İkili Oyunlar*. They discuss about attending to a party in a bar,

Erol: You say that it's a bar where the '68 generation hangs out, huh?

Gonca: Yeah, I was supposed to make a splash there with my socks. Sir, did you really buy these from the Soviets?¹⁴⁶

The bar has a replica of Robert Kommer's (a former US ambassador of Ankara) car that was set on fire by the socialist students in 1969. All the ex-leftists and their kids dance in front of this decor joyfully. Erol's friend Taner who works as a manager in a holding company has a horse named after

¹⁴⁵ Ferhan: Hıı canım kararlıyım. Bu gece cehalete, duyarsızlığa, banallığa karşı hiçbir tepki göstermeyeceğim. Hadi gel en iyisi dans edelim ha? (Kadına sarılmaya çalışıyor.)

Sezen: Bırak Allah aşkına. Gene etime göz diktin. (Konuşuyorlar)

Ferhan: Bırak safsatayı. (Tutmaya çalışıyor.) Hadi bana yaklaş biraz. Huysuz. Bana bak, sen feminist de olursun artık değil mi? (Karşılıklı gülüyorlar.)

Sezen: Sen de maskülinist. (Kahkaha atıyorlar.)

¹⁴⁶ Erol: Demek '68 kuşağının takıldığı bir bar diyorsun ha. . . .

Gonca: Ama çoraplarımla çok sükse yapacaktım orada. Gerçekten bunları Sovyetler'den mi aldınız hocam?

Lach Walesa, famous Polish trade union leader. There are other cultural elements in the film loaded with politico-symbolic references that are used in a cynical way such as the new generation kids' dance with Nike-branded shoes in their hands or the toasting of characters in a dinner to the "developments in Eastern bloc". They even make fun of their own intellectuality. When his wife says that she is hungry, Erol answers "Congratulations. Finally, you realized that the intellectuality does not fill you up". In these examples, the political past of the intellectuals and socialist worldview become a point of hilarity in the small talks.

The characters –mostly the artists– find the products of their own work and their lives in general meaningless in many films. Either there are other people who degrade their work and personality or it is the intellectuals themselves who do self-criticism. In one of the dream sequences in *Su da Yanar*, the director encounters a woman he does not know and is harshly criticized by her.

Woman: Everything is a tool for you, isn't it? The people like you do everything for their own good. Others' concerns or pains do not bother you. You think you are a god, don't you? You are a poor, pitiful god. You all are similar. You are afraid to question your own conformity which comes from your fame. You are hypocrites. You always look different from what you really are. Being strong; it's your only concern. You can make a movie out of them! Movie about hypocrisy and dishonesty... Do you want to have sex with me? Come on. Come on, take your clothes off and do it.¹⁴⁷

The main points of this critique are the selfishness, cowardice and indifference of the intellectuals. The film in general also shares this critique towards its protagonist seen in this dialogue. The character is not entirely disinterested; he wants to make a film about Nazım Hikmet and feels sorrow about his friends' imprisonments. However, he does not go into action in any sort apart from complaining throughout the film.

¹⁴⁷ Kadın: Her şey senin için bir malzeme değil mi? Siz ne yaparsanız önemli adam olmak için yaparsınız. Başkalarının acıları, kaygıları seni hiç ilgilendirmez. Kendini tanrı gibi görüyorsun değil mi? Zavallı, acınacak bir tanrısin. Sizler böylesiniz. Ününüzün size sunduğu konformist yapıyı sorgulamaktan korkarsınız. İkiyüzlüsünüz. Hep olduğundan başka görünür. Kuvvetli olmak, meseleniz bu! Bak bunların filmi çekilir işte. İkiyüzlülüğün, sahtekarlığın filmi. Benimle sevişmek ister misin? Hadi. Hadi soyun ve işini gör.

Nil, in *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, sits in the basement of her family house and looks at the paintings she had done before she was imprisoned. Her architect boyfriend Ateş sees them and tells her that she must continue painting since the pictures are great. Nil answers, “They do not have any meaning for me anymore”¹⁴⁸. The writer in *Av Zamanı* states the meaninglessness of writing and associates the process of authoring with “one’s speaking on his own”. He refers to the books he wrote –that brought him awards– as the books he was not able to write as he wished. In *Büyük Yalnızlık*, the man reads one of the poems he wrote to his wife but she starts laughing out loud and responds “Forgive me. It just seemed so meaningless all of a sudden. Funny! (Laughs). My darling is very touchy, isn’t he? Ok, read, I promise I won’t laugh”¹⁴⁹. In *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*, a lengthy conversation about the film sector in Turkey takes place during a party between film and advertisement directors, a university professor of fine arts and a young girl who just graduated from a famous film school. The professor finishes the debate with “What art? I don’t believe that there is art in film”¹⁵⁰ and everybody enjoys his comment. In *Kimlik*, even the furniture inside the house that they built together seems meaningless to the man who recently got divorced. He claims that their belongings lost their meanings with the loss of love and their free labor. In *Raziye*, the intellectual reasoning is criticized in the long monologue of Ali. He claims that Bedia –the villager girl– does not try to understand but she only feels and lives. He decides that he can understand neither how she feels and interprets the world nor his own. He says: “She was like life, which we cannot understand even in our last breath but are tied with our blood and spirit”.¹⁵¹ In sum, in all these films, the characters either acknowledge the meaninglessness of the outer world or they notice that the meaning is beyond their comprehension.

¹⁴⁸ Nil: Artık benim için bir anlamı yok.

¹⁴⁹ Kadın: Afedersin. Çok anlamsız geldi birden. Komik! (Kahkaha.) Pek de alıngandır şekerim. Hadi oku, gülmeyeceğim söz.

¹⁵⁰ Profesör: Ooo, ne sanatı canım? Ben filmde sanat olduğuna inanmıyorum.

¹⁵¹ Yaşam gibiydi o. Son soluğumuzda bile anlayamayacağımız... Fakat kanımızla, canımızla bağlı olduğumuz.

Lastly, in *Dikenli Yol*, there is one ironic scene where the character that recently got out of prison is travelling by bus. There is music in the background with lyrics as follows,

The day comes, day comes, day comes; you stay alone in the crowd,
You say something, they don't understand,
And they say something, you don't understand,
Silence is no option, you have to fight for it, you have to tell¹⁵²

Despite the character is in a total loneliness, he never struggles to explain his actions and worldview in the past in contrast with the last line of the song. He just wishes that his family and ex-girlfriend forgive him because of his mistakes in the past. For this, he does not even try to do anything. He just waits silently and they forgive him in the end. The contentious expressions in the song are not represented by any character in the film; they are only music in the background.

The dissolution of meaning hits the top in the metafiction of *Melodram* where the film “narrates all the distinct features of ‘not being able to narrate’ and ‘not being able to be comprehended’” (Evren, 1990: 174 [tm]). Several other filmmakers agree on this intangibility of the film such as Dorsay (1995: 310 [tm]) who argues that it is hard to tell what the film narrates. The following quote from Dorsay shows the obscurity of the film in the context of “intellectual films”,

... the protagonists who look like they come straight out of a New-Wave or Antonioni-like “depression film” are ungenerous in terms of taking others in their problems and inner worlds. *Melodram* is an “intellectual film” experiment that the Westerners refer in a contemptuous manner. A sort of “intellectual masturbation” film...

The three main intellectual characters sit around the table at the end of the film to discuss their personalities and destinies as if they look to their film characters outside from the story. They conclude their story by arguing that it is incomprehensible for the audience,

Behzat: We are driven by serene emotions just like expected from us
Esra: Yes. I am afraid that nobody will understand it, except us.

¹⁵² Gün gelir, gün gelir, gün gelir, kalabalıklar ortasında, yalnız kalırsın,
Laf edersin, anlamazlar, laf ederler, anlamazsın,
Çare değildir susmak, savaşmak, derdini anlatmak zorundasın

Koray: Yes. Nobody will get it but us.¹⁵³

Scognamillo (1998: 429) also refers to the “unrealizable despair” of the intellectual characters in these films. The loss of meaning is something that characters experience, but in some instances, it also defines the whole film according to the critics. Eventually, one way or another, the dissipation of the meaning surrounds majority of the films in all these mentioned instances. Together with this meaninglessness, intellectuals’ inabilities, their exhaustions about the past and their aims of articulation to the new order result in as a great cynical attitude in most of the films.

4.2.4. Individual Resistance

Amongst the films in the list, there is one intellectual protagonist (Ali İhsan in *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç*) who is actually a politician at the party level. He defines himself as the “result of the broken organizations that cannot keep up with the times”¹⁵⁴. He states that he is relatively autonomous from all political organizations despite being a member of a particular one. He mentions the dissolution of political structures with the coup as a reason for his new way of politics. “Nationalism” is one of his major fields of struggle, an ideology which he tries to overhaul and “liberate from the monopoly of certain people” namely the political right. However, he is criticized by his – seemingly more radical– wife as collaborationist because of taking role in the mainstream politics, his constant celebration of democrat identity and individual centered political involvement. Ali İhsan has some oppositional ideas such as rejecting the 1982 constitution and criticizing several issues such as the political atmosphere of the country, state violence and the operations of the media. His declamation to the people of his town and to the cameras at the end of the film perfectly explains his political character,

¹⁵³ Behzat: Hepimiz, herkesin bizden beklediği gibi yüce duygularla hareket ediyoruz.

Esra: Evet. Korkarım bunu bizden başka hiç kimse anlamayacak.

Koray: Evet. Bunu bizden başka hiç kimse anlamayacak.

¹⁵⁴ Ali İhsan: Ben zamana uymayan politik örgütlenmelerin bir sonucuyum.

Ali İhsan: Until our people become able to use their democratic rights and freedom; to make human rights, democratic principles, constitutional state prevail and as long as the republic lives, our struggle will last. Firstly we'll begin handling the grieves. We will turn our mothers', fathers', wives' and sisters' grieves into love. We say “stop” to all those tortures, pressures and executions. We want Turkey to be a land where people listen to each other. We love our homeland, our flag and our nation. I have love and respect in my heart. You should open your heart to love too.¹⁵⁵

After this speech he goes to play football with the youngsters of the town, which is a sign of his sympathy towards the people. Ali İhsan is an example of the critique of the depoliticized, pessimist and secluded intellectuals, represented in the film by Ali İhsan's wife Aytaç. Both in their debates and Ali İhsan's other speeches several dichotomies are presented by him. He privileges action against lamentation to his wife and says “Do the things that you say. But please, do”. What he offers is living the life with joy and transparency –in his case, it is mostly dating with beautiful women– instead of seclusion and boredom; individual political participation against problematic organizations and depoliticization. Despite having oppositional stance on several issues as mentioned above, he is not exactly a radical intellectual who have adversary views about society but more of a typical populist character who offers love as a method of political struggle. In accordance with the general atmosphere of the film, he is not a very a dedicated political figure who occupies himself with his wife and his new young girlfriend throughout the film. Nevertheless, he stands out among the other representations, which is important to mention.

Another character who believes in political change in IsF is Ali's unnamed uncle in *Raziye*. He moves from one village to another and tries to influence the villagers by raising their awareness and guiding them to undertake agricultural production on their own. He even takes Yusuf, the

¹⁵⁵ Ali İhsan: Halkımız demokratik hak ve özgürlüklerini kullanıncaya kadar. İnsan haklarını, demokratik prensipleri, hukuk devleti esaslarını hakim kılmak için, cumhuriyet yaşadıkça mücadelemiz sürecektir. Bunun için önce acılardan başlayacağız. Analarımız ve babalarımızın, karılarımız ve çocuklarımızın acılarını sevgiye dönüştüreceğiz. İşkenceye, baskılara, idamlara son diyoruz. Konuşan Türkiye diyoruz. Biz vatanımızı milletimizi bayrağımızı seviyoruz. Benim yüreğimde sevgi var, saygı var. *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç!*

village idiot, serious and struggles against his ideas. Yusuf claims that he is able to fly. After some time, villagers start to believe Yusuf and see him as a holy person. Ali's uncle fights against these unearthly ideas. Because he thinks that, a phenomenon that is largely believed by the public has great significance. It is also an opportunity for fighting against superstitions and illiteracy. He is the only character in all the films analyzed here who still adopts the maxim of "going to the people". However, he does this with a great despise against the villagers. He constantly calls them ignorant and indolent. He is also annoyed whenever his step-daughter speaks with a villager dialect –and he homeschools her by teaching how to play violin and speak French. He tries to let his daughter –and the villagers– listen to classical music. Unlike his nephew, he struggles for the transformation of the villagers. His nephew, Ali, was involved in student movement –it is not directly shown in the film, however it is stated that he is political fugitive and waits for an amnesty. In one scene, the uncle argues that his practice is a more significant method for revolutionary movement instead of urban student movement. Ali has no answer for his uncle's arguments. The film ends with people's belief in Yusuf's flight and uncle's intellectual defeat. As mentioned earlier, for both Ali and his uncle, the conclusive remark of the film is their awakening to the impossibility of understanding and making a change for the "others", the ordinary people.

Another form of individual resistance is the rejection of intellectuals to participate in the new social and political order. The "voluntary exile" which is already mentioned in this chapter is another way of resistance for the intellectuals. In *Ada* and *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, the isolation and intentional non-participation of the artist intellectuals is shown as a reaction to the corrupted social, cultural and political life by the characters. Also in *Ses*, *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı* and *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, the protagonists are not willing to join into the transformed life of 1980s. These characters mostly have friends who became successful in their jobs, got rich and articulated to the new order with a rejection of their past. The

protagonists are not like them; they carry the pain and sadness of their political defeat and state violence that is exerted upon them. Both because of their inability after their imprisonments and also with their resentment against society, they do not easily adapt to the transforming life outside. However, they are mostly uneasy –albeit not in a constructive or critical manner– with their ex-comrades’ rejection of the past and alienation from their political ideals.

In sum, although there are, exceptionally, politicized intellectual figures in the films their political activities are largely individualistic. These comparatively dedicated intellectuals stand apart the political organizations and try to make a political action on their own individual efforts. Being organized in a leftist movement is either represented or shown as with pejorative terms in the films. Similar to other actions of protagonists, the rare examples of politicization are also depicted as personal choices and tedious paths that have to be lived alone by the dedicated intellectuals.

4.2.5. Feminism and Women’s Movement

As mentioned before, 1980s were the years of the birth of a sub-genre called “women's films”. Mostly directed by men, these films narrate the “women’s discovery of their sexuality and reconstructing their identities” (Öztürk, 2003: 197 [tm]). In the film list of this thesis, they are not included unless they include intellectual protagonists and meet the criteria that I have stated early in this chapter. Thus, within the corpus of women films, only *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* and *Gece Dansı Tutsakları* are included since they tell general stories about intellectuals’ ideas, emotions and actions. However, also in some films that do not fall in this subgenre of these women’s films, women’s movement is a theme that comes up as a significant part of the political struggle in the 1980s.

Struggles at home against husbands and getting organized in feminist groups are modes of politicization that some intellectual characters in the films engage in. Some characters in IsF who despise and deride; and some

others support and involve in the women's movement. *Kimlik* and *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* are major examples showing politicized women. In the former, the woman character joins in a feminist organization. In the latter, Gül shoots a documentary film about domestic violence. In *Camdan Kalp*, a film director undertakes a journey to prevent a woman from male violence. In these three films, the Source of the female characters' critical stance is their discontent about domestic life such as the patriarchal roles and duties that are loaded on the shoulders of women.

In *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* and *Camdan Kalp*, the intellectuals become aware of the domestic violence through noticing the maids who work in their houses. As discussed before, in both cases, the intellectual characters are unemployed, distressed and at loose ends. The idea of noticing and deciding help the woman who works in their house occurs to them partly as a means to get rid of their boredom, and also as an opportunity to prove that they can actually do something meaningful. They both fail in their missions, however, they are exceptional cases among the other intellectual characters as these two at least try to have an impact on oppressed people, even if they fail and pay a heavy price in the end. *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*'s female protagonist does not manage to save the maid or succeed in anything managing her documentary about domestic violence; she also loses her husband to a younger femme-fatale character but she at least earns her personal liberties.

In *Camdan Kalp*, the filmmaker protagonist tries to save his maid who is being forced into marriage by her brothers. The male protagonist's efforts for saving the woman is sharply rejected by her, and his insistent efforts for saving the woman who does not want to be saved ends with the murdering of men by the brothers of the woman. In sum, these two films represent support for women's emancipation from an individual perspective which ends in neutral or negative conclusions for women's liberation.

In the stories about cheating, the women are cheated on by their husbands as a result of their struggles against the male hegemony at home.

In all these films, as mentioned before, the ones who cheat are mostly the men who are the leading characters of the film¹⁵⁶. Although the protagonists are mostly male intellectuals there are also some films where the main characters are female such as *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*. In this film, the protagonist is an intellectual woman who is being cheated on and constantly despised by her husband. The reason for man's cheating on his wife is presented as his wife's working hard in her job and not sparing enough time for him. Whenever her husband Bülent comes home at night, Gül is out working, partly as a reaction to Bülent's disinterested behaviors and partly because of the nature of her job which is film directing. Consequently, Bülent could not resist the enticing attitude of his assistant Pelin who is an admirer of him and leaves his wife in order to live with this young woman. In the end, Gül is abandoned by her husband. Gül's struggle for gaining back her individual liberties from her careless husband in *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* is criticized by certain film critics. The main reason for that is the lack of connections between Gül's struggle against her husband and her sudden involvement in a documentary for the women who are exposed to violence. Evren (1990: 139 [tm]) finds shallowness in Gül's effort and argues that these efforts are "grotesque longing for feminism". When Gül first complains about Bülent's fixation with his job, Bülent answers,

Bülent: Gül! What's important is not the money. It's not 'doing all sorts of jobs'. I have to do the job which I want. I have to do the job which I like. Otherwise, I cannot exist. Nobody can. . .

Gül: You are right.¹⁵⁷

However, when Gül starts working as her husband does, that annoys Bülent. She defends herself,

Gül: I'm making the preparations for a program about women who are exposed to violence [Says it with a smile]. Today I've talked with Melih, he accepted my project. I'll start shooting in a month. [The

¹⁵⁶ Amongst the 23 films, 13 films have male intellectuals as leading roles, leading roles are shared by male and female intellectuals in 7 films and only 3 films focus primarily on female intellectuals as the protagonists.

¹⁵⁷ Bülent: Gül! Önemli olan para değil. Her işi yapmak da değil. İstediğim işi yapmalıyım. Sevdiğim işi yapmalıyım. Yoksa ben varolamam. Kimse varolamaz.
Gül: Haklısın.

man gets angry and leaves] Bülent, please stop, we need to talk. You've said it. I must do the job that I like. Otherwise I cannot exist. Nobody can. . .
Bülent: I thought that we were living together.¹⁵⁸

Gül's effort for making a documentary is presented as a reaction to Bülent who "lacks love and compassion but expresses a spectacular selfishness and egocentrism" (Dorsay, 1995: 356 [tm]).

Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce presents a liberation story of a woman, similar to *Kimlik*. The women's movement of the 1980s is both reflected in these films and the films participated to some extent in this political movement by producing images and stories about women's individual liberation. Both *Kimlik* and *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* start with the scenes about uncommunicativeness between the married couple and move on to the female protagonists' struggle of being an independent individual and their attempts at organizing other oppressed women. From this aspect, these two films stand out among the other films in terms of intellectuals' roles and responsibilities.

In one scene of *Kimlik*, the man gets angry with the woman because of coming home late and then she wears her apron and starts cooking. The following night, their inner-voices are heard while they are lying back to back,

Woman: (Inner voice) The women in the organization club are telling the truth. I won't play the role of suffering woman which is dictated by men.

Man: (Inner voice) A war has started in all areas of my life. Life is getting harder, when you have to be an individual. If the hopes start to die out, that means this marriage will end.¹⁵⁹

She interprets the problems in her relationship with her husband from a political point of view and engages in women's movement. While the man is

¹⁵⁸ Gül: Dayak yiyen kadınlarla ilgili bir programın hazırlıklarını yapıyorum. (Gülerek söylüyor.) Bugün Melih'le görüştüm, projemi kabul etti. 1 ay içinde çekimlere başlıyorum. (Adam sinirleniyor, tepki vermeden içeri gidiyor.) Bülent lütfen dur, konuşmamız lazım. Sen söyledin. Sevdığım işi yapmalıyım. Yoksa varolamam. Kimse varolamaz.

Bülent: Beraber yaşadığımızı sanıyordum.

¹⁵⁹ Kadın: (İç ses.) Dernekteki kadınlar doğru söylüyor. Erkeklerin baskısıyla, zorla kabul ettirdiği ezilmiş kadın rolünü oynamayacağım.

Adam: (İç ses.) Hayatımın her alanında bir savaş başladı. Hayat bireysel olunca daha da zorlaşıyormuş. Umutlar tükenmeye başlarsa bu evlilik bitecek demektir.

suddenly and completely estranged from his political ideas, the woman continues her struggle against the power; but this time, it's not a class struggle, but a struggle against male hegemony. The re-politicization of the woman is a result of the socio-political circumstances of 1980s. She was a member of a radical leftist organization in the 1970s, but all her bonds with her comrades have been dissolved with the military coup. After losing the experience of collective and organized life, she starts to live with her husband which causes several problems at home. For her, with the coup the political paradigm has completely changed; their socialist worldview does not apply to the new social life which is transformed from being a "collective" life to an "individualist" one. Instead of questioning this individualism, both characters naturally acknowledge the ultimate reality of individual-centered thinking and living. They try to discover and learn to live with their personal needs, desires and potentials. Main problematic of their lives becomes the maintenance of a marriage despite the differences between them as individuals. In short, the so-called socialists, who undertook the mission of organizing masses, could not even succeed in a marriage that is about organization of two people. The woman tries to substitute her former political consciousness with the struggle for women's rights; the man withdraws completely into himself dealing with his personal concerns.

The example of a woman who is trying to become independent is not peculiar to these two films. The intellectual women's representation is very different from the classical representation of the women in Turkish cinema. Unlike one dimensional, stereotypical and subservient woman figures, the intellectual women struggle for their rights, economic independence and personal desires which is in line with the feminist socio-political consciousness that rises in the 1980s. However, some of these intellectual women are still tied to older and wiser intellectual men in a relationship in which male figures occupy a more potent position. The journalist-writer Zeynep in *Gece Dansı Tutsakları*, for example, is the employee of Haluk at the beginning of the film. Haluk gives her some orders in a coarse way which

she tries to resist at first. But then she becomes his lover but is cheated on with her housemate Hayal. Haluk helps Zeynep to publish her book and then makes Hayal a celebrity model and actress with his connections in the media community. *Gece Dansı Tutsakları* also mainly deals with the efforts of the intellectual women to liberate from male-dominated life with individual struggle. But, the depressed film director in *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, first mocks and scorns the ballerina woman and then gets intimate with her. Both the ballerina and her pianist friend, also a woman, are fascinated by him. They try to learn his views about life; want to watch him while shooting a film and put up with all his rude attitudes. Again in this film, the anti-social and secluded male intellectual figure is presented as an object of desire for the women.

The women's struggle for liberation is a movement that is represented in several films. Both male and female intellectuals try to initiate change for women who are exposed to violence. There are intellectuals taking political responsibility for women's rights either by joining to the political organizations (*Kimlik, İkili Oyunlar*) or by taking initiative themselves such as helping a sufferer woman (*Camdan Kalp*), making documentary films (*Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*) and being in solidarity with other women (*Umut Yarına Kaldı*). However the efforts of the intellectuals come to nothing in several films. As in films which represent the failures, pessimism and depression of intellectuals, the protagonists of the films analyzed in this section lacks political optimism, are impotent in terms of triggering transformation for people and partly reproduces the patriarchal roles in social relationships.

4.2.6. Critique of the Coup: Ruination of Personal Lives

In this section, I will analyze the primary effects of military coup on the intellectuals' lives, together with an analysis of the films' visualization of society in general. Since the main problematic of the thesis is not analyzing the films as a whole but the representations of the intellectual figure, I limit myself with examining the elements directly related to the intellectuals' ideas,

emotions and actions. This choice involves discarding the aims of the filmmakers while making these films and constructing these characters.¹⁶⁰ For example, some characters are symbolic figures that, apparently, the filmmakers aim to criticize in the films. There are also others that are constructed in a self-reflexive manner that express filmmakers' own experiences¹⁶¹. Thus, I prefer to examine the representation of the intellectual characters independently of the reasons why they are created.

In this and following two sections I will examine (i) how the films visualize the military coup and its prosecution, (ii) the films' overall motivation or motivated meanings in coming out of their portrayal of the intellectuals (iii) and the messages encoded in the films' ending sequences. These points of analysis also depart from the representations of intellectual figures; however they require the examination of the films in more general terms by accounting for some other factors apart from the individual characterizations.

The coup's effects –either direct or indirect– are substantial on all characters' lives in the films. On the one hand there are the ones who are imprisoned, agonized and exiled by the repressive apparatuses of the state; on the other hand all the characters live in the post-coup years of 1980s in a society going through a big transformation. The characters in the first group experience the similar problems of the second group's as well. As Gündoğdu () states, the intellectuals tried to isolate from the commodification, violence, transformation

The main points of criticism in IsF are related to the state violence in prisons which are visualized and narrated through the intellectual characters'

¹⁶⁰ I use the term filmmaker to refer to the producers of the film as a whole but mainly the scriptwriters and directors. A detailed debate about 'auteurism' exceeds the limits of this thesis.

¹⁶¹ As Kayalı (1994: 27) remarks *Su da Yanar*, *Gece Yolculuğu* and *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce* are self-reflexive films that narrate the directors' own self-interrogation about filmmaking through their film director protagonist and their struggles. Erdoğan and Göktürk (2001: 539) adds *Camdan Kalp* to these films as well where the writer/director of the film tells the story of a filmmaker while thinking self-reflexively on the production process of cinema and pleasures of voyeurism. The director of *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, Şerif Gören, takes a role in his film as an advertisement director together with other filmmakers and tells the story of the people in film industry apparently through his own vision and memories.

memories and dreams. Nearly all the characters who were imprisoned before are damaged by the violence in prisons, one way or another. The years of imprisonment are narrated in a traumatic manner. There are memories that have relentless effects on the characters. *Ses*, a film directly dealing with the violence in the prisons, depicts the torture with nightmares, metaphorical manifestations and through a man who is presumed to be a torturer by the protagonist. The unnamed character of the film has nightmares having noisy boot steps of soldiers and wakes up in a sweat a couple of times. Also, he cannot move his one arm since it was injured during a torture session. In some scenes, he sees a fisherman trying to kill an octopus slamming it against the floor and fish gets caught, which remind him the tortures in prison. Here, softening of the octopus in order to prepare it for serving is correlated with the softening of intellectuals in prisons. Lastly, he hears a voice in a restaurant that sounds familiar to the man who tortured him. He starts secretly following the man and see that the man is treats his wife and children very badly as well. Then he gets the man in a desolate place. He undresses, ties and interrogates the man however he realizes that this man may not be his torturer. In the film, whether the man is a torturer or not remains unclear like the past of the protagonist. The –hypothetical– torturer character symbolizes the violent state that tormented many people, in different ways. It shows that the common people with their indifference may well be responsible for the tortures in prisons. The film questions whether the torturers of early 1980s are having an ordinary life just as everybody else. The way the torturer character is displayed as a man who is violent against his children also builds a metaphor between the state and its violence on the politicized youth. However, as Maktav (2000b: 81 [tm]) remarks “systematic torture used by the state as a political tool remains limited in the film and it does not evolve into a political criticism”. All in all, the film depicts the wounds that the coup had raised through a mysterious character’s personal trauma, in a symbolic more than a realist form.

The nightmares about the torture in prisons appear also some in other films. In *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, for instance, Hayri can't sleep at nights. His nightmares include screams from the prison cells and blindfolded prisoners who are dragged by the guardians. Nil's nightmares which drive her mad are very traumatic in *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*. She has memories about sexual harassment by the guardians. She sees herself naked and blindfolded, standing in the corner of the cell. When her mother rubs her in the bath, she holds her breasts and recalls the voice of the guardian in the prison saying: "Girl, you have such beautiful breasts"¹⁶². Again, in *Su da Yanar*, when the protagonist is arrested due to making a film about a worker's son, he is put in a dungeon-like place full of blindfolded prisoners. A verbal narration of the torture in the prisons can be found in the lengthy dialogue between the journalist Erdinç and ex-prisoner Esra's conversation. She conveys her memories as follows,

Esra: Ersin was so different, hot blooded. He was from this land. I believe that he was able to bear those tortures because of his anger. He swore until he fainted, until his voice had gone. He sent those bastards up the wall. Do you know that we haven't had sex for two years since those days? We were like sister and brother... I remember that the pain was unbearable. It is always like that, you tell yourself that that's it, I can't take it anymore, and afterwards you bear it too. Afterwards you open your eyes in the cell. I almost got used to it. I was waiting to pass out. Fainting does not occur, I can't faint. I felt an unbelievable pain. A terrible pain... I must have resisted. The strip on my eyes slipped down and I saw the face of man stooping over me. I was so disgusted... I think I looked down to the room... I saw my body, swollen, motionless and my wounded feet not belonging to me anymore. Shattered lips... It was as if I was looking down from the ceiling, I was so surprised. I could not explain what was going on. The men spoke an incoherent language; one of them went out and came back with a man, then checking my pulse by holding the wrist in my devastated body... And then two of them lifted me by holding the arms, what they thought a dead body. They climbed up the stairs dragging my body. They waited beside the stair rail for a while.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Gardiyan: Kız, memelerin de pek güzelmiş senin.

163 Esra: Ersin çok farklıydı, öfkeliydi, beradandı. Bu kadar işkenceye öfkesi yüzünden dayanabilirdi galiba. Bayılıncaya kadar sesi yok oluncaya kadar sövdü, kudurttu herifleri. Sonra iki yıl birbirimize elimize sürmedik biliyor musun? Kardeş kardeş yaşadık. . . . Acının dayanılmaz bir hal aldığıını hatırlıyorum. Hep öyle olur, artık bundan fazlasına dayanılmaz dersin, yine dayanırsın. Sonra hücrede açarsın gözünü. Alışmıştım neredeyse, bayılmayı

A counter-example about the representations of the prisons in the film can be found in *Dikenli Yol* where the character's memories do not involve any scenes of torture. This protagonist also has nightmares, but this time only about going up the stairs in prison, being counted by the guardians and eating with other prisoners. As I already mentioned, in *Dikenli Yol*, the politicization is seen as a mistake and an outcome of the compulsion coming from some of dark and conspirator figures. Prisons are not places where the state exerts power in *Dikenli Yol*, which is very logical when the film's anti-socialist imagery is considered.

In general, the films about the ex-prisoners dared to speak of this violence in prisons since military government had ended at their time. Films mention, visualize, and focus on the long-term effects of the violence on the tortured characters. However, they do not inquire or show issues like with whose orders these tortures took place, what the torturers expect from the prisoners to confess and what was the impact of this violence against politicized people on the general transformation of the society. These more social and political aspects of the torture are not questioned in the films.

Imprisonment, however, is a significant and very prevalent theme in the films in terms its visual depiction. Both the ex-prisoners and other intellectuals are frequently represented as captives even in their houses or in the streets. Shooting the characters behind window bars, stair bars, razor wires or other geometrical shapes that allude to jail bars is a widespread

bekliyorum. Bayılma gelmiyor, bayılamıyorum. Birden akıl almaz bir yorgunluk hissettim. Korkutucu bir yorgunluk. Çırpınmış olmalıyım. Gözümdeki bant kaydı ve üstüme eğilmiş herifin yüzünü gördüm. Çok öğrendim. . . . Galiba yukarıdan, tavana yakın bir yerlerden odayı... kendi gövdeyi gördüm. Hareketsiz, benim olmayan, şiş, altı patlayan kocaman ayaklar. Paramparça olmuş dudaklar. Şaşarak, yapılanlara bir anlam veremeyerek, tavandan olanları seyrettim. Adamların aralarında anlamadığım bir dilde konuştuklarını, birinin çıkıp dışarıdan başka biriyle geldiğini, parçalanmış gövdeyi bileğini tutup nabzını saydıklarını... Sonra ikisi herhalde ceset sandıkları şeyi koltuk altlarından tutup kaldırdılar. Sürüklenerek koridorları geçtik, bir merdiven çıktık. Korkuluğun yanında biraz beklediler.

cinematic technique in the films –a technique that was frequently used in early Alfred Hitchcock films. Some examples can be seen below¹⁶⁴.




Figure 3: Intellectuals behind the bars

The image of “being behind the bars” is one of the most common features of the characters in the films. The scenes in which the characters are framed from behind the bars imply isolation, captivity and confinement. While some of the scenes the bars really are of a prison cell, in others they visually emphasize the separation of the characters from outer world. These bars simply signify the trapped intellectual figures, both physically and psychologically.

¹⁶⁴ The stills are from the following films respectively: (1) *Umut Yarına Kaldı*, (2) *Bekle Dedim Gölgeye*, (3) *Melodram*, (4) *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*, (5-12) *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, (6-11) *Su da Yanar*, (7) *Büyük Yalnızlık*, (8) *Camdan Kalp*, (9) *Melodram*, (10) *Prences*.

4.2.7. Prologues of Intellectuals: Political Pessimism and Emotional Optimism

An interesting issue about the films is their endings in terms of characters' last experiences or the audio-visual signifiers in the final sequences. Mostly, the intellectuals' problems throughout the film are not solved in the end. In majority of the films, some new or bigger problems come up for them. Unlike classical Yeşilçam films, these films do not have happy endings. Whenever they do, in few cases such as *Dikenli Yol*, *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç* and *Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce*, the endings of the films lack plausibility since the events at the end happen abruptly and inconsistent with the rest of the story. The catastrophic atmosphere of the films can be interpreted as a criticism of both the intellectuals and the socio-political atmosphere that led them to this point.

Bekle Dedim Gölgeye has the most painful and deadly atmosphere for the intellectuals. Erdal is murdered –either by his comrade or by the dark forces of state–, Ersin dies from overdose and Esra commits suicide. In *Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı*, *Gece Yolculuğu* and *Camdan Kalp*, the characters also die in the end. In the first two films, Nil and the film director commit suicide after a heavy depression, respectively. Kirpi of *Camdan Kalp* is murdered by the villagers while he is trying to help the maid who was working in his house. The protagonist of *Av Zamanı* is murdered by the armed and members of a rival political group whose identity remains unclear in the film. *Melodram* has a symbolic –the event does not actually takes place, we see it as a dream– ending that also implies suicide and death where the three protagonists of the film sit in a cottage which explodes with the command of Esra that says “now”. The accumulation of these examples indicates the generality of death and desperation in the films.

In *Ada* and *Büyük Yalnızlık*, the film deals with the problems between married couples who are separated. In the end, the couples do not agree on getting back together. In both films, the couples fail to solve their problems and they break up. Also in *Biri ve Diğerleri*, the lonesome intellectual who

searches for love is left by the woman he just met, and he turns back to his isolated life in the end. The film presents a “mosaic of loneliness, desolation, love and unhappiness” according to Evren (1990: 141 [tm]).

There are also films with endings full of hope about future, as in *Dikenli Yol*, *Sen Türkülerini Söyle*, *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç*, *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü*. The images that imply a hope and optimism are slightly out of context and independent of the events that took place throughout the films. Only, *Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç* –as its name also implies– has a positive and optimistic protagonist and atmosphere in general. Ali İhsan believes in him about making a political change by his own individual efforts. The people in his town believe in him as well. At the end of the film, first he makes a rousing speech about optimism about future and compassion, and then he goes to play soccer with his friends in a lively atmosphere. However, the other three films narrate largely the despair of their protagonists throughout the film. Additionally, Ahmet in *Bir Avuç Gökyüzü* goes back in the prison while Hayri in *Sen Türkülerini Söyle* is obliged to leave his family because of his exile at the end of the film. But all these three films end with references about a positive future –in political terms. Last words of Ahmet to his wife are “Do you know, all these tortures are not for nothing. The future generations will be able to understand it better”. Hayri says “Always walk tall. Your son did not do anything to be ashamed of” to his family and leaves the house. While walking on the street he sees a kid and they smile each other mutually. The image of the smiling kid, together with the soundtrack that says “love will blossom” signifies hope at the end of the film. Maktav (2000b: 84 [tm]) interprets, Şerif Gören’s (the director of the film) intention in ending his film this way as follows,

Gören, despite all the failures and hopelessness, tries to preserve for the left the right to be hopeful. However, this hope is so dim in the rest of the film that it does not evoke a struggle that will be won in the future. It may only be a bittersweet reference to the hopes of the past.

Similarly, the song at the end of *Dikenli Yol* says “There are beautiful days, beautiful days to come”. The interesting point about all these endings is

the gaps that they create. There is not any prior sign on which of this optimism in the films can be grounded; neither about the characters' own lives nor about the society that is portrayed. These elements in the endings are examples of "deus ex machina"¹⁶⁵ in terms of their inconsistencies with the ongoing atmosphere of the films. "[P]revious conflicts in the narrative seem to have been suddenly forgotten or to dissolve, rather than to resolve" in examples of deus ex machina (Branigan, 2006: 30). Such a state of 'hopefulness' is artificial, forced and far from being convincing that just seems a reflection of wishful thinking on the part of the filmmakers. However, these optimist messages are not supported by the rest of the narrative that precedes the finale in these films. Therefore, I would argue that, even the films with seemingly happy ending fail to create an alternative and positive imagination of the intellectual figure of the post-1980 era.

4.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, by thematically analyzing the representations of the intellectual figures as political identities in 1980s Turkish Cinema, I have tried to reveal how the protagonists' relationship with politics is depicted in IsF. With this aim, I analyzed the political orientations and the mental states of the intellectuals in the context of the socio-political atmosphere of Turkey in the 1980s. At the end of this analysis, I would claim that, despite the intellectuals are partly critical of the socio-political transformation of Turkey in the 1980s; the great majority of them share depoliticization and individualism as dominant tendencies.

The chapter was organized as having three main sections. In the first section, I have suggested the main framework of the analysis that I employed later on in the chapter. In this part, I pointed to the reconstructive nature of representation in cinema that picks up figures and events from real life and

¹⁶⁵ Deus ex machina refers to the sudden usage of an implausible plotline, concept or character in narratives. In Branigan's (2006: 30) definition, it's an example of anticlimax that "frustrates our expectations for a decisive end to the series of conflicts by emphasizing an action that seems only to be a digression or else is banal, irrelevant, unmotivated, or much less important than the preceding actions".

rebuilds these with the filmmakers' own vision. Thus, the figures in the films are both referential to the intellectuals of Turkey in the 1980s and moreover, these representative figures are building images about the abstract notion which is 'the intellectual'. To inspect these images, I suggested a thematic analysis that gives a chance to analyze the fragmental but interrelated aspects of various intellectual figures' political orientations and mental states in common grounds. Also, I have given a detailed explanation about the classification of the films about intellectual figures in the post-1980s Turkish Cinema and presented the criteria that qualified the final film list to be examined in this study.

The two following sections are dedicated to the thematic analysis of the films. In the second section, the intellectual figures are analyzed through a set of themes gathered under the title 'mental states'. Here, the intellectual's personal emotions, longings and problems are analyzed with a motivation to link these themes with their political identities. The professional discontent, isolation and uncommunicativeness, romanticism, the charm of depression, cheating and betrayal are the main themes regarding the intellectuals' mental states.

In their private lives, the protagonists are largely in a depressive mood stemming from their problems about intellectual production, romantic affairs and social relationships. The professional discontent is experienced by the characters as not being able to produce cultural/intellectual artifacts what they desire to or supposed to produce. Working in jobs they do not desire to work, not having faith in the meaning of intellectual activity and undergoing crises of creativity are main moods of characters' discontent with their intellectuality. All these moods imply boredom and self-interrogation for the characters in their private lives. In this crisis of intellectuality, characters become more and more isolated from other people including their lovers, friends and people whom they may enter into dialogue about their ideas. They have trouble with their wives, husbands, lovers, friends, colleagues and their own. The reasons of depression vary from problematic love affairs to

stucked intellectuality, from loneliness to burden of past memories. In sum, the intellectual characters suffer from the individual problems that affect their political identities to a great extent.

The third section is devoted to the analysis of the political orientations of the protagonists. In this section, the main themes are mandatory and voluntary escapism, depoliticization, cynicism, individual resistance, feminism, criticism of coup via individual ruinations, political pessimism and emotional optimism. The intellectuals in IsF largely keep their distance from political thought and action. Their escapist tendencies are various that cover physical distancing from people and social events by moving to desolate places or ideational retraction from their former leftist/socialist political identities. The moods of depoliticization are depicted with the cynical remarks and actions by the intellectuals. They are scornful about their or others' former and present political involvements. Their remarks about politicization are charged with loss of motivation and meaning. Even in the exceptional cases where characters have a motivation and attribute meaning to political action they are unable to have an influence because of their intellectual/political inadequacies, state's repression or the socio-political atmosphere that devaluated intellectuals' ideas. Only in few cases, there are intellectuals struggling on their own for political change and become partially effective such as women's movement. Some intellectuals who are able to interrelate with their immediate environment become aware of the gender inequalities and take action. In brief, apart from exceptional cases, intellectuals are depoliticized and impotent in terms of their political identities in IsF.

The depressive private lives and political retreat of the intellectual characters are deeply interrelated in IsF. For the intellectuals, closing down to their individual problems is lived as an expression and result of their political impotency. In several films, the root of the characters' problems with their private life stem from their political traumas such as defeat of their leftist/socialist ideology, their losses (friends, lovers and families) during the

military coup and their imprisoned years. Even if they still try to preserve their political ideologies, the rapidly transforming society, ideological and institutional decline of leftist/socialist ideology and their lack of motivation and impotency does not allow them for politicization again. These circumstances drag the intellectuals more and more to their personal lives together with the miseries of not being able to realize their ideas.

The intellectuals experience uncommunicativeness, isolation, loneliness in both their public and private lives. The representation of intellectuals as an isolated figure is a bi-directional process for the protagonists in IsF. Once they lost their public audience –i.e. their readers, comrades, students etc. – and political beliefs they start to regard their personal relationships and artistic concerns as meaningless and tedious. On the other hand, since the narratives of the films focus largely on protagonists' individual problems in their romantic affairs and personal boredom, the characters are depicted as loner intellectuals who do not make any effort for things that are not directly related with their individual lives. Shortly, the great majority of protagonists either do not intervene in any political/intellectual process or they express their intellectuality –contemplate on matters, share their ideas, take a political stance– in their constricted private lives towards their lovers, friends and family.

The rare cases where protagonists or other characters state their ideas about political involvement include cynic and derogative remarks. Politicization is regarded as a dream of youth, stillborn effort or dangerous activity in the films. The leftist/socialist involvements of intellectuals are seized upon as mistakes that have been done in the past due to society's political polarization before 1980 and characters' youth delusions. The radical political ideas and actions are largely regarded as old-fashioned by intellectuals. Instead main problematic of their lives are the struggles with their individual problems that concern primarily their private lives. As *Kimlik*'s protagonist states, they are the individuals who are detached from collectivity

and collective action. Thus, the intellectuals primarily deal with their personal problems instead of social and political ones in IsF.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this study, I attempted to analyze the representations of the intellectuals' political identities in 1980s Turkish Cinema in the context of the socio-political transformation that took place during this period. Employing a thematic analysis based on the common and distinctive themes regarding the representations of intellectual figure, I have examined the mental states and political orientations of the protagonists. Basically, I argue that the cinematic representations of intellectual in the 1980s are charged with decisive depoliticization and emotional/intellectual depression with only exceptional cases where intellectuals take critical stances to the military coup and socio-political transformation that took place afterwards.

By means of an extensive literature review on intellectuals, I have first attempted to draw the major junctions at which intellectual activity is questioned and debated. There are roughly three distinct approaches on how to conceptualize the sociology of intellectuals, that are "class-in-themselves", "classless" and "class-bound" perspectives. Among these, the class-bound perspective, which is pioneered by Gramsci, offers the most analytically lucid theory that becomes distanced to the moralistic remarks about intellectuals and evaluates the political identity of intellectuals in terms of the social and historical relations. A social class "creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields" (Gramsci, 1992: 5). This perspective is highly applicable to intellectual tradition in Turkey from 1960s onwards when the intellectuals'

political orientations were widely dependent on the class struggle and rising social classes of their eras.

The restrictive nature of giving a definition of the intellectual leads scholars to avoid clear-cut definitions and to use flexible concepts before starting the analysis of political identity of the intellectuals. I have adopted Kurzman and Owens' inclusive definition of intellectuals as "persons with advanced educations, producers or transmitters of culture and ideas, or members of either category who engage in public issues" (Kurzman & Owens, 2002: 63) as a vantage point since it does not include *a priori* judgments about the subject yet is adequate for underlining the distinctive features of the intellectuals. As major producers and reproducers of cultural artifacts, intellectuals have significant prerogatives in the preservation and also challenging of the hegemony with regards to their ideological interplay with the political struggles.

Intellectuals may be the spokesmen of critical thought and dissent in the society. However, they may also be the prominent ideologues of the bourgeoisie or any power blocs. While there are intellectuals who are positioned in the state levels or in newspapers as think-tanks of capital, there are also others located in the universities or working relatively independent as artists and writers. They take active roles in the production and transmission of cultural/political ideas, mostly in terms of their specializations. Being a supporter of status quo or adopting radical ideas does not determine whether a person is intellectual or not; there are intellectuals ranking in between these two opposed political poles. The relationships of the intellectuals (i) with the hegemony attempts of the social classes and state, society's general attitudes towards the intellectuals and the positions of intellectuals in the relations of production are the key factors that constitute the political orientations and mental states of the intellectuals.

In the Turkish Cinema of the late 1980s, there was made several films having intellectual protagonists that led the film scholars and critics to use the phrase "intellectual's films" in order to refer to this phenomenon. There were

always films having the intellectuals as protagonists in Turkish Cinema and the political orientations of intellectuals was always a hot debate in Turkey, however, 1980s were the years that their production of IsF exploded. It was not only the cinema that focused on this identity, but in several fields of cultural production such as novels, newspaper and magazine articles or cartoon strips, the lives of the intellectuals were hungrily depicted. Both reflecting the lives of actual intellectuals –occasionally in a self-reflexive manner– and constructing cultural images about the intellectual figure in general, these texts problematized the intellectual identity of their era.

Against the socio-political, cultural and cinematic background, I have attempted at showing that despite there are exceptional critical and politically motivated intellectual figures in IsF, the common image about the intellectuals' identity is a depoliticized, individualized and depressive figure which denotes a submission to post-coup dominant ideology. In order to reveal these dominant tendencies of the protagonists, I employed thematic analysis built upon the common, prevalent and distinctive characteristics of intellectual figures in the films. Under the two main titles 'mental states' and 'political orientations', I analyzed the protagonists' apprehensions of their own private lives and their relationship with the political thought and action via a set of themes.

Under the 'mental states' topic, I covered the professional discontent, isolation and uncommunicativeness, romanticism, the charm of depression, cheating and betrayal as prominent themes. The intellectuals have a distressed relationship with their professional occupations and intellectual production. Some of them work in jobs that they loathe in order to make a living; some are reluctant in starting a job; some look for but cannot find jobs; others fail utterly in their jobs. The intellectual and political existence of the protagonists is squeezed under their professional discontent. For the ex-leftist intellectuals, who are working in jobs that are not based highly on intellectual labor like clerkship or secretariat, there are no means for intellectual production. The days that they were reading, debating and

engaging are represented either as adolescence dreams in the history, mistaken acts, nostalgic good old days or not depicted at all. There are only partial and blurred references to the intellectuals' former political activities such as books, some letters or vague dreams. As for the writers, filmmakers or artists, they lost their faith in their artistic occupation, repressed by economic and political pressures or having crisis of creativity and production. The films frame the political and cultural environment that pushes intellectuals to produce repetitive, ideologically obedient and marketable products. Intellectual figures are impotent and demotivated with regards to resisting against state and market both artistically and politically.

In terms of their interpersonal relationships, the intellectual characters experience severe isolation from other people both physically and mentally. There are loads of dialogues that protagonists have in the films where they complain about people's lack of understanding. Also, there are significant amount of shots in the films that the characters are framed alone, estranged to the other people –occasionally supported with their inner monologues. The intellectuals think that their lovers, friends, family and their audiences are unable to understand their inner problems, traumatic memories and their ideas. The differences of opinions about politics, love or work do not lead to ideational debates in the films. On the contrary, the intellectuals choose to become distant and spend their time alone which is intricately related with the political escapism of intellectuals as well. The characters too bored and exhausted to make themselves understood and they act in a sardonic way against people around them. These behaviors lead them to become more and more isolated in the films.

Amongst the cases of uncommunicativeness, love affairs rank the first where the intellectuals are having several problems with their lovers. Romantic affairs are the primary subject in the majority of the films, and they reserve substantial place in the film stories. The problems are various including jealousy, cheating, ideational differences, apathy and personal problems of a particular side. In the politically oppressive years of 1980s, the

different ideological perspectives of lovers also lead to the conflicts for the couples. Even though they mostly avoid debating on these ideas, they occasionally criticize one another by insinuating or scornful remarks. For the intellectuals, political thought and action is stuck in the private life where they are only able to state their views to their lovers but in a contemptuous and cynical way. The lack or impossibility of intellectual and political activity leads the intellectuals to feel being trapped in a cynical discontent in which they are able to critically analyze both the society and themselves but they are unable to take action. In Bora's (2010: 25) words, this cynicism produces a "pessimism that is close to decadence". Some of the film stories' development towards suicides, deaths or intellectuals' complete loss of faith to themselves depicts this decadence visually. In the films, these mental states are narrated from a romantic and individualist perspective with a great emphasis on the love affairs having intense emotional burdens and characters seeking for personal satisfactions.

The accumulation of these three themes that are professional discontent, isolation and problematic romantic affairs is a solid depressive mental state for the intellectual depression that leaves them disinterested, withdrawn and overwhelmed. Depression is so prevalent in the protagonists' moods that it becomes a definitive adjective of intellectual identity. In other people's remarks about the intellectual figures, being in a depressive state of mind is regarded as a qualitative measurement of intellectuality. The problematic love affairs become more complicated with the interference of third person who is charmed by the depressive, sophisticated and moony appearances of the intellectual characters. The characters also flirt with these people in order to wander away from their boredom and conflicting thoughts. They mostly do not take these relationships too seriously and look down on the people who are impressed by them. These relationships are mostly built on classical intellectual pairings such as teacher-student, elder guy-young girl, urban-villager and wise-ignorant couples. While the

intellectual characters indulge in their depressiveness others are charmed by it in the films which present depression as a norm for intellectualism.

In the second part of my analyses, I looked at the political orientations of the intellectuals under the themes that I call escapism, political consciousness, cynicism, individual resistance, women's movement, critique of the coup, emotional optimism and political pessimism. The intellectuals in IsF are largely depoliticized figures who are unwilling or unable to express their political ideas or take political action. They are ex-leftist militants, artists with supposedly socialist intentions or writers/artists who are disinterested in social events. Independently from belonging to any of these subgroups, the protagonists stay out of political thought and action. There are some exceptional cases where the characters involve in individual struggle, articulate in women's movement or present critical views about the coup. However, generally, intellectuals are disinterested, negative or resentful to politicization in IsF.

Escapism is a general tendency or necessity for intellectuals. Some of them are exiled to villages and small towns by the hand of the state or the political threats. Others choose to move away and become distant from their environment to islands, villages, seashores, their hometowns or inside their houses. They aim to leave behind their years of political movement largely because of its traumatic memories and failures. Both their views and their past experiences remain ambiguous in the films and the intellectuals are in a constant escape from political realm. The scenes in which they remember their past represents the political activity as something to be avoided or as something that had to last after some time. When these years are over and the state captured the political realm the intellectuals try to leave their past behind, physically and mentally pull away from their former ideas and actions. They either aim to be a part of the new order or to suffer alone with their political inabilities. During this escape, their inabilities push them towards an acute cynicism.

Cynicism in IsF has three main modalities that are the loss of meaning, inability and despise. Intellectual figures' actions and words serves to the purpose to let others acknowledge that any radical political movement, largely socialist one, is dead and it's the time for settling with the new social order. Here, settling does not mean finding new political strategies –apart from the aforementioned examples– but to adapt and find their way in transforming society or simply trying to stay out of it sedentarily. Their melancholy stems from the loss of their former beliefs, utopias and collective political power. In the 1980s, the intellectuals sense that their entire political and intellectual struggle had come to nothing. The great gap between their diminishing political ideas and the new socio-political atmosphere of the society they live in makes them to speak less about their views. When they make statements, such as criticizing a particular person, themselves or the society in general, their tone includes a dense despise and dark humor that renders their speech as righteous and others' as piteous. In terms of Sloterdijk's (2001: 92) difference between two reflections of cynicism where the first is 'kynical-offensive' that is "humanistic, emancipative reflection and an objectivistic"; and the second is 'master-cynical' that "derides the striving for freedom of others in the style of a functionalist ideology critique", the intellectuals are in the second group who even fails the ideology critique as well because of their political and theoretical exhaustion.

The rare examples of representations of political action in the films are twofold. There are a couple of characters who intervene in women's movement and a character doing politics in a political party but claims that he is working on his own. The characters who support women's movement becomes conscious about the inequalities and male violence that women are being exposed via a set of events such as noticing their maid's problems or the gatherings of feminist women. The intellectuals try to be articulated to the women's political struggle which mostly ends with inefficacy in terms of their action –which varies from their inability to help others to their death on this mission. However these efforts are reflections of the political agenda of the

1980s where feminism has been started to be discussed and women started to strive for their rights and liberties collectively. Still, even the films where intellectuals are politicized in women's movement depicts these figures as experiencing intellectual crisis, at least until they start to involve in these movements. These are the writers who are unable to write, the directors unable to shoot a film that they desire or women who lost their political bonds and organization.

The endings of the films are definitive in terms of how the political identities and private lives of the intellectuals are imagined by the filmmakers. The films put forth the aforementioned problematic sides of intellectuals' lives. They are oppressed in terms of their political ideas and actions which led them to turn in upon their private lives and individual problems. The two main modalities of the films' endings are emotional optimism and political pessimism. First, there are sudden and incoherent events in the endings that offer a bright future for the characters such as finding a job, starting their artistic production, falling in love or positive audio-visual signs that sweep away the depression of intellectuals and imply that their problems may be solved if they stop putting distance between themselves and life. Second, there are poignant, cynical and allegoric endings where intellectuals die, commits suicide, make comments that their state of being will stay the same or go worse in dreamy or realistic sequences. In either way, the films are incapable of constructing politically and emotionally affirmative representations of the intellectual figure.

The substitution of socio-political phenomena with the private lives of the intellectuals serves the purpose of concealing the problems that the post-coup society lives and tries to understand, according to Oskay (1996: 107). He mentions that these representations of the depressed and exhausted intellectuals renders their problems as the most significant problems of modernizing society and pushes the real problems aside. The protagonists are unable to comprehend and resolve their own problems as well which makes it harder for them to produce artistic, intellectual and political thought

and product, in the film. The romanticism and the depiction of private life stories are regarded as examples affected by melodramatic form instead of political cinema by Maktav (2000b: 8) where he claims that the intellectual characters “live their drama as a destiny where they are convicted to lose”.

The representations of intellectual figures in IsF validate Gramsci's (1992: 5) remark about intellectuals that each social class that rises creates the “organisers of a new culture” alongside with itself. With the military coup and transition to neoliberalism “what has actually been smashed was the organised working class and those sections of the intelligentsia considered as organic intellectuals of that class by the military” (Yalman, 2009: 301). This hegemony attempt of Turkish bourgeoisie in the 1980s was effective in suppressing and transforming the intellectuals. The critical, oppositional and radical leftist intellectuals of 1960s and 1970s were transformed into withdrawn individuals who stay out of intellectual and political activity. Toker (2005: 54-55) evaluates it as a choice of intellectuals where they accept to be regular people by depriving their intellectual qualities in order to save themselves from further violence, but this choice led them to become banal which also caused intellectual discontent. However, it must be noted that this situation cannot be laid as a burden only on the intellectuals since it is also a consequence of the serious state violence and depoliticization of the society as a whole. As Toker (2000: 110 [tm]) reminds in another text,

In a society which had lost its sense of opposition, it is clear that the oppositional ones will become isolated and this isolation will cause a surrender. The transformation of many sufferers' memories of September, 12 to a personal 'bitter memory' is a consequence of this loneliness. Besides, they were the only ones who are called to account or pay the heavy prices. And under this heavy burden, they were neither able to face themselves or call others to account. They either kept quiet, tried to settle on or just surrendered.

This quote underlines that intellectuals are not ideal or separate figures from the social structure but they are deeply affected by it. Furthermore, in order to understand them, one needs to analyze both the social structure and intellectuals' historical positioning in it.

Turkish Cinema was able to reflect the political and emotional aspects of intellectuals in the 1980s but it was unable to depict alternative imaginations for the political identities of these intellectuals. Some films try to caricaturize the intellectual characters in order to present a critique of them; some have self-reflexive intentions in which the filmmakers problematize themselves; and there are others who just narrate a series of events via the mediation of intellectual characters. In all cases, the motto of new right, TINA –there is no alternative–, is applicable for the cinematic representations of intellectual figure. Both the intellectual filmmakers and the protagonists they portrayed are unable to present a distanced political critique of the military coup and socio-political transformation. Instead, when we evaluate these films and the protagonists after thirty years from their shooting, we can see the transformative influence of the political power and the burden it stacked over the intellectuals.

The representations of the intellectuals in IsF mark reconciliation with the dominant political ideology of the era. The characters lack power and motivation for political criticism, opposition of struggle for alternative political projects. When read along with texts about intellectuals' political conditions in Turkey in the 1980s, the figures in IsF have some reflexive characteristics regarding the existing intelligentsia of the era in terms of being defeated, withdrawn and individualized. But the films are mostly unable or unwilling to problematize or criticize this identity or inspect the socio-political atmosphere that rendered these figures. The very existence of IsF represents the smashing of filmmakers, intellectuals and cinema by the politically oppressive and transformative power of the military coup. The heavy censorship acts of the 1980s are one of the main reasons that formed IsF which led filmmakers to walk on thin ice while writing and shooting the films. Also, the intellectuals who made these films also experience a transformation in the 1980s which directly affected the ideological character of their cinema.

The political orientations of the filmmakers differentiate from one another to a great extent. It is hard to find common features between Sinan

Çetin, an ex-leftist film/advertisement director who tries to criticize and struggle against socialist ideas on every occasion, and Şerif Gören, who stands close to social realism in some of his films and is moderate towards the left-leaning ideas. On the other hand, Atıf Yılmaz and Yavuz Özkan mark two very diverse realms in terms of their filmmaking practices, themes of their general cinematic production and how they approach to their films. When analyzed in detail, each director's films in the 1980s differ widely from the ones they made in the 1970s. For this reason, the intellectual figures in their films and how the filmmakers approach to these characters are, of course, not always very similar. However, together with the deviations, there is a cumulated dominant image regarding the intellectual identity in IsF which I find significant to denote. A detailed analysis of the differentiations between the films in terms of the intellectuals' representations, deviations between the original texts and films which are adapted from literary works or detailed analysis of the films as a whole including all their narrative elements would be subjects of further research.

Both in literature and in cinema, the stories of intellectuals have always been a topic of interest in Turkey. Starting from the early novels, the ways that intellectuals evaluate the society or their own life are problematized in several cultural artifacts. The main paradigms that have prior significance had changed in the course of time but intellectual protagonists remained in the artistic stage. The last prominent example of this tendency is Nuri Bilge Ceylan's latest film *Kış Uykusu* (Winter Sleep) that won the Palme d'Or in Cannes Film Festival. The intellectual protagonist of the film, named Aydın which means 'intellectual' in Turkish, is again an actor/writer whose intellectuality is constantly being questioned by people around him. Unlike his fellows in the 1980s, he is a wealthy and powerful man whose intellectuality is criticized by his wife and sister and whose political views are challenged by his relationship with his tenants and butler. The individualism of Aydın exceeds all the protagonists of IsF where he does anything he can in order to secure his economic and social power. However, he is in great accordance

with the intellectual protagonists of IsF in terms of being depoliticized and depressed which renders the representation of 'intellectual identity' as a sustained problematic in the cultural history of Turkey. This presence calls for the significance of the further analyses about the intellectual protagonists in cinema of the 1990s and 2000s onwards.

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APPENDIX A

LIST AND SYNOPSISES OF THE FILMS

1. Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim (A Season in Hakkari)
2. Sen Türkülerini Söyle (You Sing Your Songs)
3. Su da Yanar (Water Also Burns)
4. Prenses (Princess)
5. Ses (The Voice)
6. Dikenli Yol (The Thorny Way)
7. Gece Yolculuğu (Night Journey)
8. Biri ve Diğerleri (One and the Others)
9. Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce (After Yesterday, Before Tomorrow)
10. Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç (Open Space For Love in Your Heart)
11. Gece Dansı Tutsakları (Captives of Night Dance)
12. Av Zamanı (Hunting Time)
13. Bir Avuç Gökyüzü (A Handful of Sky)
14. Ada (Island)
15. Umut Yarına Kaldı (Hope Stayed For Tomorrow)
16. Kimlik (Identity)
17. Melodram (Melodrama)
18. Büyük Yalnızlık (Great Loneliness)
19. İkili Oyunlar (Duel Games)
20. Camdan Kalp (A Heart of Glass)
21. Raziye (Raziye)
22. Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı (All the Doors Were Closed)
23. Bekle Dedim Gölgeye (I Asked the Shadow to Wait)

Film: Hakkari'de Bir Mevsim

Year: 1985

Director: Erden Kıral

Scriptwriter: Onat Kutlar, Ferit Edgü (novel)

Cast: Genco Erkal, Erkan Yücel, Şerif Sezer, Rana Cabbar

Runtime: 105 min.

Plot Summary:

An author/teacher middle-aged man is exiled in a village in the Eastern Turkey due to his former political activities. During his exile, he teaches in the village school and meets with the villagers. He corresponds with his wife, has nightmares at night and thinks about his own existence in this distant village. Some villagers try to affiliate with him and ask help and advices from him about their problems. He tries to help some of them, but acknowledges his inability to help the villagers as a foreigner. When his exile ends, the teacher leaves the village after telling the children to forget the things that he taught to them and instead suggests that they would better learn about life by themselves.

Film: Sen Türkülerini Söyle

Year: 1986

Director: Şerif Gören

Scriptwriter: Şerif Gören

Cast: Kadir İnanır, Sibel Turnagöl, Şerif Gören, Tunca Yönder

Runtime:

Plot Summary:

An ex-leftist prisoner Hayri comes out prison after six years and returns to his home. While his mother is compassionate about his return, his father blames him of his former political activities. Hayri meets with his old friends but he notices that his friends have been changed while he was inside. Hayri is disturbed by his friends' new lifestyles and their words about his imprisonment. When he tries to get together with his ex-lover, she denies

being with him. He is mostly disappointed about the life outside because of his relationship with his family, friends and women. After spending some time outside, he leaves his friends and his family for his exile in Konya.

Film: Su da Yanar

Year: 1987

Director: Ali Özgentürk

Scriptwriter: Işıl Özgentürk

Cast: Tarık Akan, Şahika Tekand, Natalie Douverne

Runtime: 112 min.

Plot Summary:

A film director tries to shoot a film about famous poet Nazım Hikmet's life. He struggles to find both financial support and ideas to make his film. Also, he is threatened by the state with censorship. Meanwhile, he experiences problems in his marriage and lives a secret love affair with his French producer. He decides to take a trip to his hometown to visit his family and his old friends and to recall his youth memories.

Film: Prenses

Year: 1986

Director: Sinan Çetin

Scriptwriter: Sinan Çetin

Cast: Serpil Çakmaklı, Mahmut Hekimoğlu, Tunç Okan

Runtime: 82 min.

Plot Summary:

Nevres comes to İstanbul from her hometown to involve in a radical leftist political movement. She is in love with Tarık, who is also a member of this group. They live together in a house where Tarık gives lectures to Nevres about the socialist thought and action. Meanwhile, Nevres meets with a photographer, Selim, who has a character that is politically opposite of Tarık. She becomes friends with him and after some time Selim falls in love with

Nevres. When Nevres is called for a political duty, she becomes confused about her political views. She decides to abandon her political involvement and be with Selim.

Film: Ses

Year: 1986

Director: Zeki Ökten

Scriptwriter: Fehmi Yaşar

Cast: Tarık Akan, Nur Sürer, Kamuran Usluer, Güler Ökten

Runtime: 84 min.

Plot Summary:

A political prisoner man goes to a seaside village to spend some time after his release. He works as an assistant to the fishermen and apart from that, he mostly spends his time alone sitting in cafes and wandering around. He sees nightmares at his sleep about the tortures in prison that disabled his one arm. He becomes friends with a young woman which leads to a love affair. One day, he hears a man's voice and relates it to the voice of his tormentor in prison. He follows the man for a few days and then blindfolds and kidnaps the man. In a desolated ruin, the man tries to take his revenge from the tormenter.

Film: Dikenli Yol

Year: 1986

Director: Zeki Alasya

Scriptwriter: Çetin Öner

Cast: Kadir İnanır, Hülya Koçyiğit, Eşref Kolçak, Muadelet Tibet

Runtime: 81 min.

Plot Summary:

Hüseyin is a political convict who just got released from the prison. He returns to his family's home in a village. The atmosphere in the home is very tense since his sister and mother are both accusing and disappointed about

him. His sister blames him of her husbands' death and his mother is resentful about his involvement in political events. Hüseyin has it rough outside because of his relatives' behaviors and his traumatic memories in the prison. He tries to make his peace with his family and to adapt the life outside. To that end, he gets together with his ex-fiancée and moves to the city together to start a new life.

Film: Gece Yolculuğu

Year: 1987

Director: Ömer Kavur

Scriptwriter: Ömer Kavur

Cast: Aytaş Arman, Macit Koper, Şahika Tekand, Zuhal Olcay

Runtime: 100 min.

Plot Summary:

Ali is a screenwriter/director in search of a filming location which will spur his imagination. He is traveling around the countryside looking for a site with his fellow scriptwriter Yavuz, who apparently does most of the duo's negotiating with movie-business types. Eventually, they find a spot on the coast, an abandoned village. This sets Ali's creative juices going, and he moves into the village's abandoned church and begins writing at an amazing rate, while he sends Yavuz off in search of producers and a director for the film they see taking shape¹⁶⁶. During his stay, he communicates with the villagers including a small kid, a movie house owner and an old man who tells stories about the history of the desolated village nearby. Meanwhile, he recalls his memories about his wife and brother and continues writing his last story.

Film: Biri ve Diğerleri

Year: 1987

Director: Tunç Başaran

Scriptwriter: Tunç Başaran

¹⁶⁶ Taken from <http://worldscinema.org/2013/07/omer-kavur-gece-yolculugu-aka-night-journey-1987/>

Cast: Aytaş Arman, Meral Oğuz, Sharon Sinclair, Mücap Ofloğlu

Runtime: 80 min.

Plot Summary:

In a rainy night, Barış, a middle-aged lonely man enters into a bar. There, he starts watching people coming and going. People from different segments of society come to the bar while Barış mostly spends his time alone just watching people and waiting for an imaginary woman. In the meantime, a woman called Gülin sits next to him and they start having a conversation. As the night goes by, the couple starts knowing each other. The woman whom Barış waits does not come, but he occasionally dreams about her. In the end of the night, Gülin leaves the bar when her husband comes and leaves Barış alone again.

Film: Dünden Sonra Yarından Önce

Year: 1987

Director: Nisan Akman

Scriptwriter: Eriş Akman

Cast: Zuhal Olcay, Eriş Akman, Sedef Ecer, Güzin Özyağcılar

Runtime: 96 min.

Plot Summary:

A married couple, Gül and Bülent, has problems about not spending enough time together. Gül is a filmmaker who mostly shoots documentaries and Bülent is an advertisement director. Since they both work late, Bülent wants Gül to quit her job and to start an easier, less time consuming job. Gül resigns and opens an antiquarian store. In the meantime, Bülent hires a new young and attractive assistant Pelin. Gül notices that his husband becomes more intimate with Pelin day after day. Because of her dissatisfaction and boredom in her new job, she starts thinking about going back to filmmaking. One day, she learns that the cleaning lady who works in their home is exposed to violence by her husband. Gül decides to help to her maid and other women who are exposed to male violence by shooting a documentary

about them. While Gül starts shooting the film, Bülent starts cheating on her with Pelin.

Film: Sen de Yüreğinde Sevgiye Yer Aç

Year: 1987

Director: Şerif Gören

Scriptwriter: Hüseyin Kuzu

Cast: Kadir İnanır, Sibel Turnagöl, Erdal Özyağcılar, Aytaç Öztüna

Runtime: 84 min.

Plot Summary:

Ali İhsan is politically active lawyer who is regarded as a threat to the state arrives to his former hometown. In this coastal town, he has many friends that have respect for him. He spends time with them while seeking to rest some time and to collect his thoughts about his political activities. His melancholic ex-wife Aytaç also lives in this town and tries to get together with Ali İhsan again. At first, Ali İhsan is confused about returning to Aytaç, but soon after, he meets with a young fashion model Su and starts hanging out with her. Meanwhile, Ali İhsan is being followed by some mysterious people who are trying to putting him to shame publicly. When his relationship with the young woman is leaked to media, Ali İhsan tries to defend himself and his ideas.

Film: Gece Dansı Tutsakları

Year: 1987

Director: Mahinur Ergun

Scriptwriter: Mahinur Ergun

Cast: Hülya Koçyiğit, Cihan Ünal, Amanda Jane Grant

Runtime: 88 min.

Plot Summary:

Zeynep is a middle-aged journalist and struggling writer who lives alone and seeks a renter. Hayal, a teenager who wants to be a dancer comes to

Zeynep's house and they start living together. In the meantime, Zeynep starts to go out with his new boss, Haluk. He is a dominant and charismatic man who behaves adversely to Zeynep at first, but they after some time they become lovers. When Haluk meets with Zeynep's renter Hayal, he decides to flirt with her as well. Within this period, two women and the man will contend for reaching their desires.

Film: Av Zamanı

Year: 1987

Director: Erden Kıral

Scriptwriter: Ferit Edgü

Cast: Aytaç Arman, Şerif Sezer, Zihni Küçümen

Runtime: 92 min.

Plot Summary:

After one of his friends' assassination, a writer moves to an uninhabited village where his father lives. He is horrified about the bloodshed in the country and tries to hide from the political hitmen. In this isolated village house, he questions writing, politics and his fears. He tries to talk with his father but they are unable to communicate about the problems of the writer. Soon after, his father employs a divorced woman, Zühre, to help him in housework. The writer tries to communicate with Zühre, spends time with his old friend Ali and does garden work. He tries to accommodate to his new life in this house. However, when he witnesses a murder in the garden, his fears revive again.

Film: Bir Avuç Gökyüzü

Year: 1988

Director: Ümit Elçi

Scriptwriter: Çetin Altan (novel), Ümit Elçi

Cast: Aytaç Arman, Zühal Olcay, Şahika Tekand

Runtime: 74 min.

Plot Summary:

Ahmet is a political prisoner who gets out for a week between his two sentences. He gets out of prison and spends this time with his sorrowful wife. A few times, he also meets with his secret painter lover who is the exact opposite of his wife: young, artistic and rich. While he goes back and forth between his wife and lover with a heavy distress about going back to prison, some secretive guys offer him ways to escape from his next sentence. He has hard time to decide whether to trust the guys and escape or to go back in. When the date comes near, Ahmet decides to go back to the prison.

Film: Ada

Year: 1988

Director: Süreyya Duru

Scriptwriter: Macit Koper

Cast: TüRKan Şoray, Rutkay Aziz, Nilüfer Açıkalın

Runtime: 92 min.

Plot Summary:

Eser is a divorced woman who lives with her daughter in the city. Her ex-husband is a painter who decided to move to an island that is isolated from the concerns of city life. He is decided about not going back to the city until the political atmosphere is changed in a good way. He continues painting but rejects to show his work to other people. When Eser's daughter decides to go conservatory, Eser tries to convince her not to do it but she fails. As a last chance, she decides to go to the island where her ex-husband lives to talk with him about their daughter. When the couple meets, they recall the past and discuss about their different worldviews, parenthood, old memories and love.

Film: Umut Yarına Kaldı

Year: 1988

Director: Yavuz Özkan

Scriptwriter: Yavuz Özkan

Cast: Lale Mansur, Yavuz Özkan, Duygu Asena, Mustafa Göçmen

Runtime: 93 min.

Plot Summary:

A film director plans to shoot his suicide as his last film. While he is shooting the film alone in his house his neighbor and her friend visit him and interrupt his suicide. His neighbor is a pianist and her friend is a ballet dancer on the verge of divorce with her husband. In time, the film director and dancer get close and become lovers. The director pulls through from his intense depression and hatred against the society and starts spending good time with his neighbors and his daughter from his ex-wife. But in the end, the woman breaks up with him and he stays alone again. This time, it is hard for him to endure the loneliness he experiences.

Film: Kimlik

Year: 1988

Director: Melih Gülgen

Scriptwriter: Haşmet Zeybek

Cast: Tarık Akan, Nebahat Çehre, Mahmut Tezcan

Runtime: 80 min.

Plot Summary:

A couple who is involved in radical political involvement gets married. This marriage is criticized by others in their political organization because of their integration to the state's laws. When they are on a trip to organize the workers the military coup takes place and their political life comes to an end. After the coup, the couple tries to build a new life where they work on regular jobs and make a living for themselves. With the transformation of their collective lifestyle, new problems arise for the couple like sharing of the domestic responsibilities, financial difficulties and jealousy. These problems bring them to the edge of a divorce.

Film: Melodram

Year: 1989

Director: İrfan Tözüm

Scriptwriter: Macit Koper

Cast: Hülya Avşar, Macit Koper, Yalçın Dümer

Runtime: 82 min.

Plot Summary:

Esra and Koray have a troubled marriage. Koray is addicted to drugs and he is unable to quit despite Esra's efforts. One day, Esra reports him to police and delivers him to hospital. Esra decides to write a novel about her memories after this event. In order to recollect her memories, she moves to the Koray's uncle Behzat's hotel. Behzat is an old friend of her father who witnessed to the childhood memories of Esra. Esra spends some time in the hotel, tries to talk with Behzat but he is discreet about telling the stories of her father and her childhood. When Koray returns to hotel, the tension between them increases and they start to play small games to each other. In the meantime, Esra starts to learn things that she does not know about her past.

Film: Büyük Yalnızlık

Year: 1989

Director: Yavuz Özkan

Scriptwriter: Yavuz Özkan

Cast: Sezen Aksu, Ferhan Şensoy

Runtime: 78 min.

Plot Summary:

A divorced couple gets together one night in their former house. The woman's plan is to pack her belongings and leave as soon as possible. When the rain starts, she decides to wait for some time before leaving. As the time passes by, the former couple starts talking about their memories, problems and feelings. Their conversations get emotional or aggressive in

some moments throughout the night. When the sun rises they are still undecided about splitting up or not.

Film: İkili Oyunlar

Year: 1990

Director: İrfan Tözüm

Scriptwriter: Bilgesu Erenus (play)

Cast: Tarık Akan, Zeliha Berksoz, Muhteşem Tözüm, Erol Demiröz, Şahin Şahan

Runtime: 94 min.

Plot Summary:

Erol and Nur are radical leftist youngsters in the late 1960s. They participate in the protests and struggle for their ideals. Ten years later, they are married and they have a small child. Erol spends his time at home desperately working on his writings. Nur is exhausted because of her job at bank, loaded housework and taking care of their son. They both go to psychological treatment to feel better but they constantly argue about any subject. In the 1980s, they are divorced and their son is a teenager. Erol works as a university professor who gives consultations to his friends' holding companies. Nur continues her job at the bank and seems adapted to her life. One night, Nur, Erol, their son and their old friends from the 1960s get together in a party. Their main subject is their past and how it transformed their lives.

Film: Camdan Kalp

Year: 1990

Director: Fehmi Yaşar

Scriptwriter: Fehmi Yaşar

Cast: Genco Erkal, Şerif Sezer, Deniz Gökçer, Füsun Demirel

Runtime: 98 min.

Plot Summary:

Kirpi is a film director who wants to stop making the same old same movies and to shoot a new film that that will be meaningful for him and the audience. He struggles with the philosophical books to carve out ideas for his next screenplay but he has hard time during this process. His producer wants him to continue making films that he is accustomed to and he is unwilling to support Kirpi's arthouse film drafts. His wife is upset and angry about his dreams. One day, while spending his day at home, Kirpi notices the bruises on Kiraz's, the cleaning lady, face. He talks with her and learns that her husband beats her. Kirpi decides to help her. He sets out on a journey to Kiraz's village where her parents live, to inform them about her situation. However, when he goes there, he realizes that the things do not work out as he imagines.

Film: Raziye

Year: 1990

Director: Yusuf Kurçenli

Scriptwriter: Melih Cevdet Anday (novel), Yusuf Kurçenli

Cast: Kamran Usluer, Oğuz Tunç, Yasemin Öymen, Ahmet Fuat Onan

Runtime: 75 min.

Plot Summary:

Ali is an art student in the university who is also politicized and in need of hiding from the state officials. He moves to his uncle's village house to spend some time. There, he meets with Bedia (also called Raziye) and falls in love with her. Bedia is the adoptive daughter of his uncle who was raised in the village with city-like traditions such as learning foreign languages, playing instruments and diction lessons. However, she adapts the villager behavior at times which annoys her father. Ali's uncle is an educated man who tries to organize the villagers to take control of their production. He also struggles against Yusuf who is regarded as a holy person amongst the villagers. During his stay, Ali recognizes the village life, how villagers' opinions

differentiate from urbanized. The greatest factor in this learning process is Bedia's attitudes towards him.

Film: Bütün Kapılar Kapalıydı

Year: 1990

Director: Memduh Ün

Scriptwriter: Süheyla Acar Kalyoncu

Cast: Aslı Altan, Uğur Polat, Nalan Örgüt

Runtime: 87 min

Plot Summary:

Nil, a political prisoner, goes to her aunt's home after her release from the prison. In this house, where she had spent her childhood, the heaviness of her memories and her family's behaviors disturb her. She constantly feels depressed and decides to move to İstanbul in order to find her daughter. She occasionally dreams about the rejoining with her daughter. One day, while she is staying in her friends' house, he meets with Ateş who is quickly charmed by her. First, Nil does not take an interest in him but in due course they become lovers. However, Nil's miseries are not over since she is unable to find her beloved daughter. After a psychological crisis that Nil experiences, she spends some time in hospital and Ateş figures out that her daughter is imaginary. Nil admits that she had recovered her psychological illness and gets out of hospital. But her depression grabs her again while they are on a vacation.

Film: Bekle Dedim Gölgeye

Year: 1990

Director: Atıf Yılmaz

Scriptwriter: Ümit Kıvanç (novel), Barış Pirhasan

Cast: Hale Soygazi, Aytaç Arman, Cüneyt Çalışkur, Metin Belgin, Füsün Demirel

Runtime: 90 min.

Plot Summary:

Erdal, Ersin and Esra are three close friends that are politicized in the late 1960s. They organize protests and attend to debates in the university together. Ersin is sent to prison because of his political activities. After his release, Erdal is murdered. The police and media investigate the case with an emphasis to the bonds between these three close friends. A journalist, Erdinç that is a friend of them from the university years, starts working on this case and reveals some facts about the murder. However, despite being shown as a political assassination, the main reason behind the murder remains hidden. Meanwhile, Esra mourns for her friends and herself while Erdinç is questioning the transformation in his life.

APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı :
Adı :
Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: