DISAPPEARING ONION PRODUCERS IN KARACABEY:

A MICRO ANALYSIS OF FARMERS AND LAND AFTER STRUCTURAL REFORM

FATMANİL DÖNER

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2013

DISAPPEARING ONION PRODUCERS IN KARACABEY:

A MICRO ANALYSIS OF FARMERS AND LAND AFTER STRUCTURAL REFORM

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Ph.D. in
Political Science and International Relations

by
Fatmanil Döner

Boğaziçi University
2013

Disappearing Onion Producers in Karacabey:

A Micro Analysis of Farmers and Land after Structural Reform

The dissertation of Fatmanil Döner

has been approved by

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Koray Çalışkan _____

(Dissertation Advisor)

Asst. Prof. Dr. Zühre Aksoy _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yüksel Taşkın _____

Prof. Dr. Fikret Adaman _____

December 2013

Dissertation Abstract

Fatmanil Döner, "Disappearing Onion Producers in Karacabey:

A Micro Analysis of Farmers and Land after Structural Reform"

In the last decade, for the first time in Anatolian history, farmers have no longer been the largest working population. The decreasing number of farmers and the shifts in their strategies for agricultural production, employment, livelihood, and market incorporation are a direct result of SAPs of the post-1980 era. This dissetation investigates the multifaceted impacts of structural adjustment reforms, as well as the hardships and the challenging processes that farming families have faced during the last three decades in Turkey. The original contribution is to show ongoing rural transformation in a micro-environment of Bursa Karacabey, by emphasizing what the SAPs mean on the ground. Surveys and statistical data reduce farmers to production units so many goods and services they generate become invisible from a neoliberal perspective. Therefore, here, the challenge is to tease out the political, social, and economic consequences of the SAPs in a micro-environment with special emphasis on the experiences of farmers who are facing impacts of structural reform one-to-one.

For the majority of small farmers, SAPs continuously diminish the level of income and farming on its own becomes unable to provide sufficient livelihood for rural dwellers. This dissertation teases out the process of easing away from a strictly agrarian existence and engaging in multiple activities by examining recent trends in rural employment, occupational shifts, changes in the main income sources, emerging economic activities, and spatial relocation in Harmanlı village. It illustrates how rural inhabitants in the village manage their subsistence and overhaul consumption patterns, gender roles, and environment in order to surmount the vicissitudes of structural reform with reference to the political dimensions of livelihood adaptation and relations with the state.

In this dissertion, the attention given to real experiences of rural producers instead of statistics enables us to investigate micro-level impacts of SAPs and what kind of coping strategies derive in Harmanlı village. Besides, a comprehensive analysis on livelihood strategies reminds us that resistance to free-market system begins with the mechanisms used by households to preserve subsistence level and social reproduction. Finally, a critical perusal of the rural-urban linkages which are useful lens for understanding the complexities of rural inhabitants' livelihoods and their coping strategies including some form of mobility, diversification of income sources and occupations, and rural dwellers' mechanisms of confrontation enriches our analysis in this dissertation.

Tez Özeti

Fatmanil Döner, “Disappearing Onion Producers in Karacabey:

A Micro Analysis of Farmers and Land after Structural Reform

Son on yılda, Anadolu tarihinde ilk defa çiftçiler çalışan nüfusun çoğunluğunu teşkil etmemektedirler. Azalan çiftçi nüfusunda ülkelerin kırsal dinamiklerine yıkıcı etkilerde bulunan ve köylüyü topraktan ve tarımsal üretimden koparan yapısal uyum programlarının etkisi büyüktür. Bu tez, makro politikaların mikro çevrede etkilerini Bursa Karacabey’in Harmanlı köyünde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın özgün katkısı süregelen kırsal dönüşümün, tabanda yapısal uyumun ne anlama geldiğine vurgu yapılarak incelenmesidir. Anketler ve istatistiksel bilgiler çiftçileri salt üretim birimlerine indirgemekte dolayısıyla onların ürettiği ürünler ve hizmetler neoliberal perspektifte görünmez hale gelmektedir. Bundan dolayı, bu tezde asıl amaç yapısal uyumun siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik sonuçlarını mikro çevrede çiftçilerin birebir yaşadıkları deneyimleri vurgulayarak incelemektir.

Küçük çiftçilerin büyük çoğunluğu için yapısal uyum programları gelir seviyesinin azalmasına neden olmakta ve tarımsal üretim tek başına beka stratejisi anlamında yeterli olamamaktadır. Bu tez, tamamen tarımsal üretime dayanan geçim stratejilerinden kopuşu ve farklı ekonomik aktivitelere geçişi kırsal istihdam trendlerini, temel gelir kaynaklarındaki değişimi, yükselen ekonomik aktiviteleri ve göç dinamiklerini inceleyerek açıklamaktadır. Bu çalışma kırsal kesimde yaşayan insanların hayatta kalma yollarını; tüketim davranışlarını, cinsiyet rollerini, çevre ile olan bağlarını geçim stratejilerinin siyasi boyutlarına ve devlet ile olan ilişkilerine vurgu yaparak incelemektedir.

Bu tezde, Harmanlı köyünde yapısal uyumun etkileri ve başa çıkma stratejileri araştırılırken odak noktası üreticilerin gerçek deneyimleridir. Bunun yanında, serbest piyasa ekonomisine direnişin hanede asgari geçim seviyesini ve yeniden üretimi sağlayan mekanizmalarla başladığını unutmamak gerekir. Son olarak değişen köy-kent ilişkileri ve kırsalda yaşayan insanların direniş manevralarının incelenmesi bu teze zenginlik katmaktadır.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Fatmanil Döner
PLACE OF BIRTH: Bursa, Turkey
DATE OF BIRTH: 29 October 1981

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

Boğaziçi University
Oxford University Department of International Development (Visiting Researcher)
İstanbul Bilgi University
Bahçeşehir University

DEGREES AWARDED:

Master of Arts in International Relations, 2005, İstanbul Bilgi University
Bachelor of Political Science and International Relations, 2003, Bahçeşehir University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Comparative Politics, International Development, Political Economy

AWARDS AND HONORS:
M.A. scholarship İstanbul Bilgi University
B.A. (High Honor Degree 3.76/4)
B.A. scholarship Bahçeşehir University

GRANTS:
-TÜBİTAK, International Conference Attendance Support (BİDEB 2224), October 2013.
-TÜBİTAK, The International Research Fellowship for PhD Students, April- August 2011.
-Visiting Study/Research Fellowship, ODID, Oxford University, April-August 2011.
-TÜBİTAK, The National Scholarship for PhD Students, October 2006-September 2010.

PUBLICATIONS:
-*Book review:* "Tarım mı dediniz!" Radikal Kitap, October 31, 2008, Year 7, No 398.
-Doner, Fatma Nil (2012). Transition under SAP and CAP: Future scenarios for agriculture in Turkey. In K. Aksu (Ed.) *Turkey and the EU: mutual impacts of the long lasting relations on political, economic and social life*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

CONFERENCE PAPERS:
-"Can Social Capital be A Remedy?", European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, August 25-27, 2008.

-“The State and Financial Crises in Turkey: Critical Reflection on Embedded Autonomy”, European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, August 25-27, 2008.
-“Making a Living: Changing Rural Livelihoods under Structural Adjustment Programs”, Bosphorus Research Centre (BRC), School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, December 10, 2011.
- “In Search for Adaptation Strategies: Land Sales and Credit Use in Karacabey, Turkey”, European Society for Rural Sociology (ESRS), 25. Congress, Florence. July 29 – August 1, 2013.
- “Understanding Local-based Rural Resilience in Turkey: Challenges and Strategies for Structural Adjustment”, Middle East Studies Association (MESA), 47. Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 10-13, 2013.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

From the very first version of research proposal to the completion of the dissertation, Koray Çalışkan contributed this dissertation greatly by reading manuscripts with customary sharp eye, giving detailed comment, and patiently discussing many issues. A great debt of gratitude goes to Koray Çalışkan who not only offered great stimulus by his works, guided this long process, and dealt administrative issues and all paperwork calmly but also encouraged and helped me to continue my studies at Oxford University as a research fellow. And the joint support of Barbara Harriss-White and Oxford Department of International Development gave a great boost to my work in the UK.

I am grateful to Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu who provided valuable insights and input for the framework of the dissertation and caught the signs of the richness of the fieldwork material in the draft form and heartened me to work on the material. Throughout the whole research and writing process, Yüksel Taşkın witnessed the challenges I faced at various stages. I am indebted to him for his gratuitous help, support, and advices. I would also like to thank Fikret Adaman and Zühre Aksoy who offered reviews of my arguments, corrections, and valuable comments. Without their comments, this dissertation would be half of what it is now.

Apart from the academia, this research would not have been possible without the help of İlhan, Zeniha, and İrem Özgel. I cannot thank them enough for their hospitality and many kindnesses they have shown me. I hope they will see this dissertation as at least an attempt to make their voice heard. In Karacabey, I followed the paths Abbasoğlu Tarık Yörür and Şaban Yalazı showed me to meet people and better reach the data.

I had the opportunity to study at Bodleian Library, Boğaziçi University Library, and İSAM library. I benefited greatly from having access to their collections and the guidance of their staff. They provided rich intellectual environment to do research in peace. I am also indebted to The Missing Bean for many cups of coffee that I drank sometimes to concentrate my mind and sometimes to relax.

I wish to express my appreciation to TÜBİTAK-BİDEB programmes for their financial assistance that enabled me to complete my PhD and took me to Oxford University. In addition to TÜBİTAK, BÜVAK and the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University also supported me to attend international conferences.

Thanks to Nick O'Gara, Ingrid Austveg Evans, and Aylin Birsen Yılmaz for their editorial efforts and contribution to reach this final form. Nick and Ingrid were the first and faithful readers of this dissertation.

I have been lucky in the colleagues and companions who have offered encouragement. I spent many days with Murat Şiviloğlu, Gülfem Pamuk, Deniz Yonucu, and Begüm Uzun talking about written and unwritten chapters of the dissertation. They helped me to formulate my ideas and make them sharper and more precise. Serda Selin Öztürk and Elif Kayhan were reassuring joy in times of despair. Besides his friendship, Gökhan Memiş was generous in his willingness to solve computer problems in any kind of emergencies even at a long-distance. My friends displayed remarkable tolerance for my ups and downs and through the end for my absence. I also owed many thanks to the Kudat, the Zümbülyuva, and the Döner families; their love and support enabled me continue and complete. I know that they rejoiced and sometimes worried as much as I did.

To Ayşegül and Basri,
who took me to the village

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
Dissertation Description and Rationale 4
Literature Review 10
The Research Design and Fieldwork 31
Plan 34

CHAPTER 2 RETHINKING AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN TURKEY: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 39
Introduction 39
State-led Planned Economy 42
Post-1980s Market-led Economy 56
Conclusion 78

CHAPTER 3 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN HARMANLI VILLAGE DURING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 83
Introduction 83
Changing Product Patterns 87
The Use of Inputs 96
Agricultural Subsidies 103
Contract Farming 108
Organic Farming 124
Productivity and Efficiency 125
Acknowledgement of Agricultural Policies 128
Conclusion 130

CHAPTER 4 COPING WITH ADJUSTMENT: LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN HARMANLI VILLAGE 132
Introduction 132
A Pattern of Deagrarianization? 133
Determinants of Income Diversification 145
Labour Market and Employment 149
Informality 150
Labour Hiring 154
Urban Rural Linkages 159
The Rising Responsibility of Women 167
Conclusion 174

CHAPTER 5 IN SEARCH OF PAYING OFF DEBTS: CREDITS AND LAND SALES 177
Introduction 177
Over-indebtedness 178
Financialization and Monetization of Social Relations 185
Rotating Debt 187
Farmers' Relations to Commercial Banks 189
The Execution of Debt 193
Farmers' Debt to Cooperatives 196
Identity and Meaning of Land 201
Land Sales 203

Land Use and Land Control 208
Conclusion 221

CHAPTER 6 THE MARKETPLACE: A PLACE FOR SMALL-SCALE PRODUCERS? 224
Introduction 224
Rural Development and Market 225
The Market Myths 227
Market and Price 230
Markets on the Ground 243
Conclusion 251

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 254
The Context of Rural Transformation 254
Findings of the Study within the Policy Context 263
The *Juggler Farmers* 269
Suggestions for Policy Options and Further Research 271

APPENDIX A LIST OF INTERVIEWS 278

APPENDIX B GUIDING QUESTIONS IN INTERVIEWS 282

APPENDIX C THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE TRANSLATED QUOTES 284

REFERENCES 302

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Fuel Oil/ Product Parity……..102

Table 2. Number of Cases on the Court of Bailiff in Karacabey……..195

Table 3. Farmers' Debt to Agricultural Credit Cooperative in Karacabey (TL)…..198

Table 4. Farmers' Debt to Irrigation Union (TL)…….200

Table 5. Land Sales in Karacabey…….204

Table 6. Hypothecation in Karacabey (Agricultural)……...…205

Fig. 1. The map of Karacabey……...4

Fig.2. The map of İstanbul-İzmir highway ……..218

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC: Agricultural Credit Cooperative

AKP: Justice and Development Party

Appx: Appendix

ARIP: Agricultural Reform Implementation Project

ASC: Agricultural Sale Cooperative

ASCU: Agricultural Sale Cooperative and Union

CAP: Common Agricultural Policies

ÇAYKUR: General Directorate of Tea Enterprises

DIS: Direct Income Support

DP: Democrat Party

DSİ: Water Supply Administration of the State

EU: European Union

GATT: General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GMO: Genetically Modified Organism

GNP: Gross National Product

IIED: International Institute for Environment and Development

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization

ISS: International Institute of Social Studies

KOTİYAK: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Building Cooperative

METİP: Seasonal Agricultural Workers Project

MST: Landless Rural Workers' Movement

MP: Motherland Party

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

NRDS: National Rural Development Strategy

NRF: National Registry of Farmers

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

RPP: Republican People's Party

SAP: Structural Adjustment Program

SEE: State Economic Enterprise

SPO: State Planning Office

TEKEL: State Monopoly of Alcohol and Tobacco Products

TFF: Turkish Federation of Farmers

TİGEM: General Directorate of Agricultural Enterprises

TL: Turkish Lira

TMO: Turkish Grain Board

TNC: Transnational Company

TOFAŞ: Turkish Automotive Company

TOKİ: Housing Development Administration of Turkey

TŞFAŞ: Turkish Sugar Factories Corporation

TUCA: Turkish Union of Chambers of Agriculture

TUCAE: Turkish Union of Chambers of Agricultural Experts

TÜİK: Turkish Statistical Institute

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association

TZDK: Turkish Agricultural Equipment Institute

TZOB: Union of the Chambers of Agriculture

US: United States

WTO: World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For the first time in Anatolian history, farmers are no longer the largest working population. The decreasing numbers of farmers and the shifts in their strategies for agricultural production, employment, livelihood, and market incorporation are a direct result of SAPs of the post-1980 era. This dissertation investigates the multifaceted impacts of structural adjustment reforms, as well as the hardships and the challenging processes that farming families have faced during the last three decades in Turkey. The studies examining the social and economic consequences of these reforms on the macro level are abundant in the literature as reviewed below. However, we still lack a comprehensive sociopolitical study of farming communities whose lives have been so dramatically affected by the structural reform programs on the micro level. What does structural adjustment mean on the ground? How are these reforms experienced and understood by the farmers, the very object of agricultural development programs? By studying in detail the impact of reform packages on farmers in the political and socioeconomic universe of the post-1980 SAPs, this dissertation provides sociopolitical and sociotechnical insights concerning agricultural transformation in Turkey with a micro-analysis of various trajectories of reconfiguration and confrontation in the countryside.

The macro-economic impacts of structural adjustment on farmers have been subject to extensive scrutiny in the literature (Edelman & Haugerud, 2005; Prendergast, 1995; Soyak, 2002; England & Ward, 2007; Lundahl & Wyzan, 2005; North & Cameron, 2003). Since the beginning of the 1980s, SAPs intending to free prices from government intervention in terms of subsidy and regulation, the

reduction of state expenditures and budget deficit, the acceleration of the privatization of state owned enterprises, and the elimination of barriers to free trade such as tariffs and quotas have been implemented in order to facilitate the transition to market-led economy in Turkey (Mohan *et al*., 2000). However, the evidence indicates that the outcome seems to be catastrophic. These series of programs annihilate small producers, threaten existing survival strategies, aggravate social differentiation, and precipitate migration under the auspices of the international financial institutions (Ploeg, 2008; Radwan *et al*., 1991; Baklanoff & Moseley, 2008; Rigg *et al*., 2008; Steward, 2007; Yaro, 2006; Bryceson, 1999; Balkan & Savran, 2003; Çalışkan, 2007a). The share of the agricultural sector in the composition of total employment in Turkey decreased to 23.7 % in 2008 from 36 % in 2000, just before the ARIP started to operate (TurkStat, Labor Force Statistics). This means that one in every three farmers lost his/her job in the eight years following the beginning of the implementation of new agricultural reforms.

Despite the importance and urgency of the topic, no systematic research has yet been conducted concerning the very interaction of reform steps on the ground with the object of reforms: farmers. For example, nobody seems to know what happened to the nearly three million farmers who lost their main source of livelihood between 2001 and 2008. The structural reforms that have undermined rural livelihood result in new survival strategies. The dissertation maps the trajectory of agricultural reforms in Turkey and studies in detail the social and political effects of these reforms in the contained universe of Bursa, Karacabey in terms of rural transformation.[1] Bursa is accepted as the *technocity* of agriculture in Turkey and Karacabey is the main plain that feeds the agroindustry with different crops such as

[1] For historical and social analysis on Karacabey see Yalazı (2009).

tomato, wheat, and corn. Therefore, analyzing ongoing transformation in the villages of Karacabey will provide us with an informed understanding of the consequences of developments relating Turkish agriculture and farmers on the ground. The following questions constitute the framework of this dissertation: What are the farmers' coping strategies? First and foremost, how is the nature of farmers' relations to land and their own labor affected? How is the deep socioeconomic transformation in the village reflected in the organization of production, employment and consumption patterns, land use and control, and rising environmental and biological degradation? A microanalysis on rural transformation informs us about farmers' direct relations to agricultural reforms on the ground. Since structural reforms omit farmers' live and learn experiences and are constructed only on the technocratic policies of the experts, a micro-level study on transforming rural livelihoods and existing power struggles provides an opportunity to create a new policy agenda including the main object: farmers.

Fig.1 The map of Karacabey
Source: http://www.karacabeyziraatodasi.org.tr/resimler/icerik/hrt.jpg

Dissertation Description and Rationale

> Today's peasantry is a population struggling for survival, clinging to control over the means of production that are increasingly unable to meet their subsistence needs, and excluded from the system that used to offer hope for development. Not aiming for an accumulation of profit, the peasants of today are instead in search of a sustainable livelihood that will ensure their survival … into the 21st century (Johnson, 2004, p. 64).

Structural adjustment is one of few options open to developing countries facing economic crisis. Economic policy reforms based on the conditionality principle for incoming loans have been launched by many developing economies struggling to overcome the economic instability arising from commodity price shocks, domestic economic mismanagement, and diminishing access to international capital flows (Koyuncu & Şenses, 2004). Such programs have had profound effects on the operation and performance of public sector institutions, including the national

agricultural sector. Most adjustment programs alter production incentives, investment levels, public sector outlays, management of public sector institutions, and demand for new technologies (Tabor, 1995).

International agencies have been demanding new structural reforms based on the liberalization of Turkey, as with other developing countries since the 1980s. The integration of Turkish agriculture into the market-led economy started with the decisions accepted on January 24th, 1980. The IMF and the World Bank played the leading role inasmuch as their global policies designed for neoliberal transformation and required structural adjustment (Alpago, 2002; Altıok, 2002). The transition from import-substitution to market-led economy was declared by the January 24th decisions. Export-oriented policies and structural adjustment, which were the conditions of lending to Turkey, altered the regulatory role of the state in Turkish agriculture. Until then the state could supervise, control, and organize agricultural production for the benefit of small and medium-size producers (Kendir, 2002). However, beginning in 1980 liberalization, openness, and privatization, the three pillars of the neoliberal economy, disallowed state planning and programming (Abay *et al*., 2005, Suiçmez, 2000). Restrictions on imports were decreased, input subsidies (chemical and machinery) were eliminated, prices of crops and inputs were adjusted according to world prices, and regulatory public institutions for agriculture were privatized or made dysfunctional.

Step by step, agricultural public enterprises, public banks, and cooperatives were privatized or projected to be privatized. The legal barrier for the monopoly of TEKEL and ÇAYKUR were removed. In 2002, the Tobacco Act, which permitted cigarette and tobacco imports, local production of foreign brands, and abandoned support purchases and intervention in prices let the conditions of sales and purchases

be directed by market (İslamoğlu, 2002; Aydın, 2005). Moreover, the Sugar Act in 2001 and the Acts of Hazelnut in 2001 and 2009 expedited the commercialization of the agricultural sector (Alexander, 2002).

Especially, the last decade has represented a definite breakdown for farmers. The letters of intent submitted to the IMF and the World Bank between 1999 and 2000 contain transforming agricultural policies (Oyan, 2002; Oyan, 2001b; Olhan, 2006; Yavuz, 2005). In 2001, the $600 million ARIP agreement was authorized by the World Bank. The ARIP aimed at eliminating all subsidies, implementing the direct income support system, reorganizing and privatizing administrative structures and cooperatives, and providing support for the adoption of alternative crops (Kendir, 2003; Yılmaz *et al*., 2006; Doğan, 2002). The result is the opening of the Turkish agricultural market to multinational companies and global agents, or in other words, to the penetration of capital (Oyan, 2009).

In consequence, trade liberalization that allows subsidized imported goods to capture the inner market and prices free from government regulation have eventuated in the reconfiguration of Turkish agriculture since the beginning of the 1980s and accelerated in the late 1990s (Günaydın, 2009). The austerity measures and SAPs that insist on subsidy and credit restrictions, limiting government expenditures, and decreasing wages bring about poverty and decline in the living standards of the rural and urban poor (Demirer, 2004). While better-off farmers are reaping the benefits of having access to land, technology, and regional political networks, small producers are facing increasing indebtedness and are alienated from the means of production such as land and agricultural equipment (Gürkan, 2008; Gürbüz, 2001). Household survival strategies such as non-farm and off-farm employment, diversification, and migration create a space for maneuvering for the existence of small producers.

Nevertheless, increasing labor input, especially by women and children, overindebtedness, and the changing composition of limited consumption deepen the effects of restructuring on rural households (Aydın, 2001; Aydın, 2002). The post-1980 period, which is identified as a rupture from earlier agricultural policies, threatens the existing survival strategies of small producers, aggravates social differentiation, and precipitates urban migration under the auspices of the international financial institutions (Oyan, 2001a). In addition, transformation in rural societies based on market-led economy form a space for confrontation and maneuvering for the farmers.

It is evident that Turkey, as a result of all this, is incapable of rooting out unexpected problems such as changing production styles and patterns, the concentration of land use and control, rising overindebtedness, and migration. The investigation of the ways that rural communities negotiate structural adjustment and its impacts and develop adaptation and maneuvering strategies addresses critical questions for the state policies and theoretical debates.

This dissertation interrogates the consequences of SAPs by addressing the real objects of the reforms: farmers. It scrutinizes different spheres of their daily life with a fieldwork research conducted in the countryside of Karacabey, Bursa. It seeks to understand 1) how the SAPs have affected political, economic, social, and environmental dynamics of rural life; 2) what kind of transformation, upheaval, and maneuvering exist in the rural societies; 3) what impacts SAPs have on the configuration of state, market, and society relations; 4) in what ways increasing affinity with global markets and agribusiness companies alter financial structure, the labor market, and land use and control; 5) what costs structural adjustment has in socioecological terms; 6) what kind of policies the state should implement to

minimize the risks of destruction for the rural economy and societies; 7) what responses and practices farmers propose against the challenges they face.

For an informed understanding of macro level developments in rural societies, micro level research in Karacabey provides an astonishing environment. First of all, Karacabey is the center of the agroindustry in Turkey when it comes to tomato paste, fruit juice, canned and frozen food, poultry, dairy, and animal food industry companies. It is accepted as the future model of Turkish agriculture. Therefore, challenges that farmers have been facing recently and the responses they are developing in Karacabey form an example for Turkish agriculture. The fieldwork was conducted in the Harmanlı village in the Karacabey province of Bursa. Karacabey has previously been known for its dry onion production; however, between 1999 and 2006 dry onion production in Karacabey drastically decreased by 47 percent. In this period, the total dry onion production in Turkey was reduced by nearly 30 percent (TurkStat). Despite the lack of regulations and legal restrictions on dry onion production, this crop, which serves as a primary ingredient in Turkish cuisine, suffered the second highest downfall in production after tobacco. The negative effects of the removal of the legal barrier for the monopoly of TEKEL and ÇAYKUR, as well as those resulting from the Acts on Tobacco, Sugar, and Hazelnut on small producers and the production of these industrial crops were rather frequently examined and raised scholarly attention. Nevertheless, the livelihoods of millions of farmers who produce non-industrial crops such as dry onion have also been affected by the structural adjustment reforms and the ARIP, despite the lack of the direct acts and regulations on these crops. Eliminating all kind of subsidies, increasing the costs of inputs, seeding technology, and transference to codified

knowledge reconfigured the form, nature, and content of the agricultural sector, and caused farmers to become estranged from conventional crops such as dry onion.

A multi-sited fieldwork in Karacabey, Bursa serves as a context in which dissolving effects of SAPs on farmers are substantiated and the dynamics of rural transformation are comprehensively investigated. The fieldwork also provides necessary information about the economic and political processes involving agribusiness and their effects on farmers. The Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Ferhat Şelli, identifies Bursa as the model *technocity* of agriculture. In Turkey, 25 percent of frozen food, 45 percent of fruit juice, and 30 percent of tomato paste are produced in Bursa.[2] From seeding to final products, agribusiness companies operate frequently in Bursa. Recently, local industrial producers in textile and automotive sectors are entering into agricultural production. New production processes such as organic farming and contract farming can also be examined in the countryside of Bursa.

In Bursa, Karacabey is the most significant plain feeding agribusiness companies with raw material. Its unique product was dry onion, and dry onion production was the main source of living in the villages of Karacabey. Karacabey was once called the "dry onion warehouse" of Turkey. Today, however, more than two thirds of the 64 villages in Karacabey do not produce dry onion. This research was conducted in the Harmanlı village. In Karacabey, Harmanlı is classified as a middle range village with approximately 700 inhabitants. It is set on the plain and the average size of agricultural enterprises in Harmanlı is approximately 50 decares. Hired labor, household family labor, and different forms of land use can be

[2] "Ferhat Şelli: Bursa, Türkiye'nin tarım 'teknokenti' konumunda" 05-Ağustos-2009 http://www.tarimmerkezi.com/haber_detay.php?hid=24958 .

examined. Farmers are still cultivating dry onion, but the amount of production is decreasing and they have been steering away from traditional methods of production because of developing seed technology and increasing production costs.

Any scholarly interest in rural transformation and development, whether in political, economic, social, or environmental aspects, should take SAPs as a focal point. In analyzing and theorizing major elements of SAPs and their impacts, some concerns should be kept in mind. SAPs need to be investigated within the context of global economy and set in various discourses and theories of development, as a form of socio-technical arrangements rather than monolithic assumptions reducing adjustment to mere economic planning. In addition, local complexities, state, market, and society reconfigurations, the existence of an alternative, and everyday forms of resistance and power struggles should be emphasized. Transitional processes related to farmers are more complex and change at a rapid rate. Therefore, comprehensive and multifaceted analyses are required. A critical analysis combining rural/urban and global/local factors and agents, discourses and narratives, the construction of codified knowledge on agriculture, law making and regulation processes contributes political and theoretical debates about rural transformation.

Literature Review

Throughout history, farmers have engaged the attention of political scientists, economists, anthropologists, and sociologists. Starting with the classical studies that touch on peasantry in its contextual relation to colonialism and the industrial revolution, analyses on peasantry have figured in social science disciplines since the 18th century. Hence, early researchers were inspired by the standpoints of the classical political economists. The scholarly interest in peasantry began with Adam

Smith. He analyzed the role of labor specialization in achieving the wealth of nations, while touching upon the issue of the peasantry tangentially. He accepted rural workers as a group, but claimed that they were inadequate to achieve labor specialization to enhance productivity (Smith, 1776). Later, Ricardo, unlike Adam Smith, experienced the industrial revolution and the tension between the landed class and the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. He also admitted the importance of labor specialization for productivity. However, contrary to Smith he argued that productivity could be improved by technological and scientific improvements (Ricardo, 1817). Marx also accepted the presence and influence of farmers in the economy, but he observed them as a 'group' which would definitely transform into one of two conflicting classes: bourgeoisie or proletariat: "…they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention" (Marx, 1852, p. 415). In addition, he claimed that the backwardness of the peasant economies, population growth, and division of land would accelerate rural decay.[3] In classical studies, nothing of significance was achieved in the investigation of the conditions and identity of the farmers because the main problematic was how to transform self-sufficient farmers into factory wage workers. The common failure of the studies of classical political economists was to accept farmers as constituting a doomed and undifferentiated population.

The identification of inner differentiation and the investigation of the political, sociological, and economic dynamics of peasantry began with Lenin, who was succeeded by Kautsky and Chayanov. Unlike the classical political economists who accepted farmers as a homogenous mass, Lenin identified the classification of

[3] For further information see Marx (1850), Mitrany (1961), Foster (2000), and Burkett (1999).

peasants according to land area, capital accumulation, and the usage of wage or family labor. Moreover, he explored the role of farmers in socialist revolutions as well as in industrialization (Lenin, 1899). While Lenin emphasized the role of farmers in revolution, Kautsky focused on parliamentary elections. In his classical book *The Agrarian Question* he investigated the ways in which capital surrounds agriculture, transforms its old production structures, and brings about new forms (Kautsky, 1899). Chayanov also contributed to peasant studies by analyzing peasantry according to its inner unique dynamics rather than accepting it as a uniform society at an earlier stage of a linear process that would lead to capitalist development (Chayanov, 1925).

In the mid-20th century, scholarly attention to farmers in the rural sociology, anthropology, and development economics literature was mainly characterized by linear development models that considered rural societies to be backward and underdeveloped compared to modern industrial societies (Rostow, 1960; Organski, 1965; Kuznets, 1959). Rural sociology and anthropology brought their different rituals, belief systems, and social structures to the foreground and development economics prepared prescriptive policy measures that promoted agricultural modernization, technology, and the green revolution (Solow, 1956; Schumpeter, 1961). These policies aimed mainly at reducing inequality and poverty in rural areas by achieving economic growth (Lewis, 1955). Although development economists had been optimistic about their recipes after World War II, the lack of marked improvement in the conditions of farmers turned their attention from economic growth policies to inner political structure of the state in the course of time (Almond, 1965; Huntington, 1968). The political uncertainty and the lack of infrastructure were claimed to be the main obstacles to economic development.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the literature was characterized by interdisciplinary critical studies combining sociological, anthropological, and political science (Scott, 1976; Popkin, 1979; Wolf, 1969; Handelman, 1975; Paige, 1975; Loveman, 1976). These studies accentuated the political activism of farmers, mainly due to their role in the resistance movements throughout the Third World, such as anticolonial struggles in Africa, the Chinese Revolution and the Vietnam War in Asia, peasant activism in Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia against the latifundio structure in Latin America. In addition, the rituals, belief systems, and social structures of rural societies were also examined. While promoting the green revolution and transforming farmers into full participants of the world markets were embodying the major motives of mainstream rural policies, dependency, center-periphery, and forms of underdevelopment theories mastered much of critical development literature considering rural communities (Frank, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974; Baran, 1957; Cardoso, 1979; Galtung, 1971; Amin, 1977). These theories explicated the existence of underdevelopment within the historical context of capitalist evolution and accepted dependency as a bounding or conditioning status. Many scholars kept discussions alive by either applying or criticizing these theories.

Despite the diversity of political, economic, and social inclinations of rural societies, in the 1980s and 1990s analytical reductionism of neoliberal theories have characterized rural transformation studies. With the outburst of the oil crisis of the 1970s and the economic slowdown of the early 1980s, Keynesian policies promoting demand management policies and state interventionism demonstrated their failure in developing remedies to the recession. This outcome brought about the end of state interventionism and the welfare state. The consequence was the re-incarnation of the (neo)liberal policies, and the downsizing of the state in the economic, political, and

social spheres turned out to be the benchmarks of the transformation. Starting from the US and the UK, these policies began to spread, first among the developed countries and then to the developing ones. This process was accentuated by new roles attributed to international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and the GATT was replaced by the WTO in 1995. With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989-1990, this transformation process increased its scope and pace and became an indispensable component of globalization.

According to the neoclassical economic theory, the market should operate on the basis of the decentralized decision making process of competing individual agents.[4] Rational individuals as decision-makers choose between alternative means for utility maximization. This theory aims at a minimal state role and intervention in the economy. The balance between supply and demand determines prices. Only the market forces should be effective in creating market solutions (De Soto, 2001; Balassa, 1989). Based mainly on individualism, rationality, political and economic competition, and a free market, this new structure was quite unfamiliar to developing countries and necessitated a transition process of moving from a centralized closed economy to a decentralized open economy. This transition became a precondition for developing countries for their integration into the world economy. Ultimately, they started to implement structural reforms to increase their potential for further economic development.

SAPs are the policies by which the IMF and the World Bank condition their loans to developing and underdeveloped countries in return for freeing markets from the intervention of the state. Essentially, it is a process that prepares the structure of the economic relations within society in order to meet the basic requirements of a

[4] Neoclassical policies can be implemented in state-led and market-led economies. In this dissertation, it refers to neoclassical policies in a market-led economy.

free market economy. In practice, three main phases of adjustment programs are price and trade liberalization, austerity programs related to public sector, and privatization. Back to Adam Smith, the advantages of a free trade and market to increase productivity and efficiency are extensively promoted for the articulation of stabilization and development. By increasing cuts in government expenditure, eliminating subsidies, deregulating the exchange rate and prices, and liberating trade such programs reorganize the operation and performance of different sectors including the agricultural sector, which is the major source of employment and production in developing countries.

In the literature, the implementation of SAPs reveals a wide gap between supporters and critics. On the one side, advocates of these market-led policies claim that reforms are the most appropriate forms of economic management (Williamson, 1990; Sachs, Warner, Aslund &Fischer, 1995; Lipton *et al.*, 1990; Bruno, Ravallion& Squire, 1998). Moreover, they also indicate that structural adjustment fulfills the requirements of the neoliberal era; that market reforms are the only way to make use of the advantages of the global economic system, to use capability to the fullest, and to achieve higher living standards for citizens. It is believed that the adjustment of domestic policies and malfunctioning institutions is necessary to overcome underdevelopment, and rural policy frameworks and investment projects will strengthen rural infrastructure and result in agricultural development. The supporters assert that the expansion of the free market economy and globalization brings about more competitive production and distribution scales, which cater to consumer demands, outface state intervention, and accommodate new technology easily (Friedman, 1982). According to their assumptions, developing countries will achieve higher productivity through free trade in the global market, welfare gains and

more goods and services at cheaper prices, leading to overall growth in the absolute level of employment.

Nevertheless, counter arguments and assertions are claiming that SAPs do not meet given premises, and even worse, that these reforms harm the environment and cause inhuman treatment (Heynen *et al*., 2007; George, 1988; Stiglitz, 2002, 2004; Klein, 2007, 2010). The critics admit that as the monopoly of agribusiness companies over food and seed intimidates farmers, global trade and industrialized agricultural production threatens rural life, traditional knowledge systems, the environment, food sovereignty, income distribution, and biodiversity (Goodman&Watts, 1997; McMichael, 1994). Gupta (1998) proves that new technology of food production alters the existing relation between the land, crops, and human health. He affirms that atomistic and reductionist reform programs are the instigator of neoliberal policies designed by technocrats, planners, and finance officials rather than being only the appropriate response of the free market to take advantage of it. In a similar vein, according to Escobar, the economists enjoy possession of the dominant discourse on development that neglects the people factor and equalizes development to GDP growth. The aim of policies of poverty is; he argues "to transform society by turning the poor into objects of knowledge and management" (Escobar, 1995, p. 23).

The agenda of rural studies that challenges neoliberal wisdom and structural adjustment ranges from area studies that focus on single issues such as poverty, household survival strategies, rural employment, land use and control, natural resource degradation, and gender, to macrolevel system analysis that inspects the organization of the economy and the markets, TNCs and food industry, scarce resource allocation and power relations which stimulate market-led agricultural reforms. The studies are overwhelmingly concentrated on two poles: area studies and

macro-level systemic analysis. In collecting and analyzing data, various methodologies such as statistical modeling, fieldwork, and surveys are implemented. Statistical modeling is applied not only to economic indicators such as income, labor, and poverty but also to conventional sociological indexes of education, household relations, and domestic labor.

In spite of the fact that advocates of SAPs are convinced of the simplicity of market logic, critics conclude that economic, ecological, social, and cultural reflections of the reforms are very complex and destructive. Critical studies on reform programs point out that structural adjustment and austerity programs accelerate the marketization of agriculture rather than finding solutions to problems such as poverty, income distribution, property relations, land tenure rights, the role of the state, immigration, the division of labor by gender, and the rights of indigenous people and ethnic minorities (Chase, 2002; Razavi, 2002; El-Tobshy, 2005). These reforms demolish existing structures and reconstitute the way that people define their relations to the state, natural resources, and other people.

Many case studies examine what actually happens in the everyday life of producers in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia when they are forced to reconfigure the existing economic and social structures (Canterbury, 2007; Murray, 2006; Kay, 2002; Raikes, 2000; Mooij, 2000; Mitchell, 2002; Bush, 2002; Helfand, 2006; Harriss-White, 2007a,b; Spoor, 1997). The strength of their arguments proceeds from empirical and specific research. In addition, the scholars espouse a common viewpoint that guides their research on the rural transformation with special emphasis on the colonial past, rural labor processes, inequality, and class struggle. These critical studies emphasize common problems by exploring the position of farmers throughout the developing world: small farmers are forced to leave their

land because of structural reforms, and their cultural and ethnic belongings in the region are ignored (Boyce, 2006). Moreover, local knowledge and practices, which are conveyed from generation to generation, are replaced by market information on the basis of technical calculations. Market-led economy attempts to dominate social relations, local culture, labor, and natural resources. The impacts of structural adjustment on agriculture are not only limited to territory, but also include reciprocal relations, common knowledge and practices, and labor. New technology, relations of production, and policies for the search for profit and competition annihilate the existing cultural heritage in rural areas.

These studies also elucidate that structural reforms are biased towards large-scale farmers who assess infrastructural facilities to produce at cheap prices and have access to larger land, resources, high technology, and capital (Stedile, 2007). According to scholars, for the majority of faceless bodies, structural adjustment means cuts in social services, moving away from land, decreasing wages, insecure labor, and the exploitation of women and child labor. They point out that reforms rearrange production and prices at the global level, dissolve local labor markets, and decrease public sector employment, subsidies, and expenditure. In consequence, critics point out that non-agricultural employment in rural areas is rising, women participation in household surviving strategies is increasing, and labor becomes informal, unprotected, and temporary both in urban and rural areas (Breman,1996). The analyses show that the austerity measures and SAPs transform welfare, social organization, coping strategies of the poor, and division of labor (Kelly, 2001). Critical studies explore how advocates of SAPs pass over three significant points directly affecting farmers: displacement of massive labor force, land loss, and

inequality as the costs fall on the poorest (Jolly, 1985; Helleiner, 1986; Chossudovsky, 2003; Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Scoones *et al.*, 2013; Ellis, 2000).

Turkish farmers have also experienced the transformation process on the basis of structural adjustment and austerity measures and shared a fate with other developing countries since the 1980s (Soyak & Eroğlu, 2008). However, there is a lack of multisided comprehensive literature on the changing dynamics of rural societies in Turkey. For the agricultural economists, the relevant discussions are embodied by two opposing positions. Either agricultural subsidies are accepted as a burden on the state budget which causes inflationary pressure and agricultural reforms are supported, or market-led economy is condemned with popular rhetoric. For the rural sociologist, the main discussion is based on food and agribusiness companies. Nevertheless, in the 1970s and 1980s the discussions were much more alive that the existing production relations and transforming social characteristics in rural societies were the significant research bases for scholars for the rural sociologists. The studies on agricultural policies, trade regimes on agriculture, mechanization, land distribution, rural employment, and gender relations contributed to the peasant literature in Turkey (Geray, 1972; Boratav, 1977; Arı, Özgüven& Tütengil, 1976; Akşit, 1982, 1988; Keyder, 1983; Sirman, 1987). In the 1980s, discussions of the previous decade on whether capitalist, in the classical sense, or small producers would dominate Turkish agriculture in the upcoming years evolved into attempts at the classification of villages due to their different transformation processes (Akşit, 1985; Keyder, 1983; Tekelioğlu, 1983, Öngel, 1981; Erdost, 1986). The studies on rural structures and farmers figured in the social science research agenda until the 1990s. In the 1990s, only a few studies on women and family contributed to the literature on farming communities. Sirman (1987, 1990), Ecevit

(1993), and Kağıtçıbaşı (1996) especially focus on the changing structure of families and investigate which models can represent transformations of family structure and gender relations.

The empirical and theoretical studies on rural transformation nearly stopped in the last decades when the burden of structural adjustment on small farmers was so harsh and scenarios of the social, political, and economic changeover were based on gray prospects. There are different causes for this, but changing academic interests in social sciences and the declining role of the rural areas in the design of development policies are coming into prominence (Keyder& Yenal, 2003). First, the post-structuralist agenda of identity, ethnicity, social movements, and globalization gains priority on other topics in the social sciences. Second, the transition to a free market economy and structural adjustment encourage scholars formulating urban-based research questions on development, identity, migration, and culture. Nevertheless, there are critical analyses on the transformation of agro-food systems in Turkey (Yenal, 2001; Yenal& Yenal, 1993; Keyder&Yenal, 2013). These studies emphasize global food regimes and the international trade of agricultural products, but do not explore the socioeconomic structure of rural societies. In addition, market studies on agricultural products are likely to become more significant on the agenda in the next few years (Çalışkan, 2005, 2007b; İslamoğlu, 2008). Çalışkan investigates which socio-technical systems constitute what is called a global market, how it functions, and how prices are formed by focusing on the networks of production and exchange organized around a single commodity, namely cotton. İslamoğlu intends to explore the effects of agricultural reforms and the processes of integration into global markets by analyzing different crops: tobacco, grape, cotton, corn, sunflower, wheat, and sugar beet. Her proposed study attempts to predicate the challenges that

agricultural producers face especially after structural reforms, but her study is identified as a market study rather than a peasant study. The main argument of these studies hinges on market formation, price, and commodity, not the real producers who have been directly threatened by the structural reforms.

The research on the effects of land distribution and irrigation projects on rural development and migration also occupies a place in the recent literature (Yıldız, 2008). In addition, economists such as Kasnakoğlu (2001), Akder (2003a, 2003b), Çakmak (1999), and Boratav (1996) investigate agricultural policies as a part of economic development policies and analyze agricultural statistics. The changing role of the state, the transition to market-led economy, economic and financial crises, the EU accession process, and the restrictions of the IMF and the WTO on agriculture and their effects on rural economic practices are the main issues for the agricultural economists (Yalçınkaya *et al*., 2006; Özkaya *et al*., 2002; Özkaya *et al*., 2001a; Özkaya *et al*., 2001b; Acar, 2006; Gülümser *et al*., 2006; Olhan, 2006; Yavuz, 2005; Ünal, 2008). These scholars prefer mathematical modeling of different indicators such as production, farming systems, and labor, survey findings, and variation-regression analysis to focusing on social and political dynamics. Finally, there are micro-level ethnographic studies which subject a single village to deep analysis or compare a few of them (Yılmaz *et al*., 2006; Karapınar, 2007; Özbudun & Başokçu, 2004). In their studies, Yılmaz, Demircan and Dernek (2006) examine the reflection of policy change after 2000 by obtaining farmers' opinions in the Isparta province. However, the statistical analysis of survey results regarding farm sizes, direct income, support income levels, and input prices outpaces farmers' perception about the consequences of agricultural reforms. Karapınar (2007) emphasizes the economic dimension of structural transformation and touches upon a subject rarely mentioned

in the literature, namely rural labor. He concludes that a new rural development policy should focus on substantial labor transfer from agricultural to non-agricultural activities, the increasing income and employment gap between rural and urban areas, and new business opportunities in rural areas. Özbudun and Başokçu (2004) derive their arguments about rural transformation from micro-level poverty analyses. Their study shows that the IMF and the World Bank policies result in economic deterioration even in a better-off rural region in Datça. It is clear that the focal point of recent literature is on the examination of economic consequences of structural reforms in rural areas (Özuğurlu, 2011). Nevertheless, the literature needs critical research on the sociopolitical consequences of structural reforms with special emphasis on farming communities as the object of the agricultural reforms.

The discussions in the literature quite often turned a blind eye to the organization of farmer unions and social movements for environmental protection, natural resource conservation, and ecological integrity.[5] For instance, Bergama and Akkuyu resistance demonstrate how ordinary farmers are organized into a coherent social movement and the inability of the state to form sustainable development policies (Arsel, 2005; Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005). Considering a number of field researches conducted for the effects of the construction of hydroelectrical power plants and state policies on water management, especially in the Northeast Black Sea region, critical studies will be provided on ecology, social movements, and rural transformation in the near future. In addition to social movements and the organization of rural dwellers, scholars should also probe into contract farming and the practices of farmers related to seed technology and GMOs because contract farming, the Seed

[5] For unique examples on the comparison of Zapatista movement and Kurdish movement through the formation of politics of space/place and peasant rebellions see Gambetti (2009) and Küçüközer (2010).

Act, and the use of GMOs supported by market-led structural policies and agribusiness companies directly threatens small farmers, traditional knowledge, biodiversity, and conventional methods of farming (Ulukan, 2009; Aksoy, 2005a, 2005b).

Since the 1990s, farmers have been disappearing from political and academic inspections. After the analytical reductionism of neoliberal policies became dominant, the illustrious body of theoretical literature on farming communities was ignored, and farmers are now analyzed as only a production unit in Turkey. Therefore, there is a gap in the literature about the dynamics of rural transformation and the impacts of SAPs on the political and socioeconomic structures of rural societies in Turkey. The theoretical challenge is to analyze the impacts of SAPs on farmers by focusing on inner dynamics, but also by exploring their relation to global markets, institutions, and the state.

Classical theories on political economy which propose the transformation of small farmers into workers or even their extinction remain invalid when it comes to understanding *The Agrarian Question* in recent times. In addition, development theories based on stages see farmer communities at their earlier stages of development. Since these theories also foresee a disappearance through the development processes, they are doomed to fail to uncover brand-new dynamics which incorporate farmers' labor, land, and commodities into a globally articulated market-led economy. Following the intellectual inheritance of Kautsky and Chayanov, some scholars try to explain rural transformation by the inner dynamics of village and peasant societies. It is not easy to point to a distinctive, independent, and undivided peasant identity when this is highly connected to global markets and capital penetrated into their market and non-market relations. Moreover, this

approach blurs the role of the state as a ‘black box’ as well as the roles of other actors in the transformation period. Postmodern approaches based on the analysis of altering relations between human beings and nature, provide valuable studies on gender, consumption, environmental pollution, and the changing conditions of local identities. However, they still remain insufficient when it comes to explaining broader and drift power networks. On the other hand, structural theories that focus on class and power struggles interrogate the processes of the expropriation of land and labor, but their methodological framework cannot analyze discourses, narratives, and sociotechnical arrangements in this process.

Despite the challenges they face, farmer communities and small scale producers have survived and show no sign of extinction (Mitchell, 1998). Besides, it is not a delay in the absolute end as proletarianization. Given the persistence of small farmers, the dissertation aims to understand the new *Agrarian Question*. The key point is that farmers are not living in isolation from wider social and economic context which is beyond their control; rather they position their livelihoods and production strategies according to changing context and a degree of contestation is achieved as well. Clearly, their integration into global chains of production, exchange, and finance has had profound implications on capital accumulation, forces and relations of production, and politics of agrarian change. In seeking to understand rural transformation in early twenty first century various positions can be identified. However, the scholarly interest in new agrarian question is mainly focused on commodification of labour, new patterns of land use and control, and capital accumulation by TNCs and agrifood industry. The investigation of conditions by which agrarian labour reproduces specifically in recent conjuncture and in some cases appearance of wage labour, and diversification into off-farm and non-farm

activities helps our understanding of the contemporary character of change in labour use (Araghi, 2009; Bernstein, 2010; Brass, 1999, 2011; Ellis, 1992; Banaji, 2003). In addition, some scholars frame key questions on the land use and control with combining different perspectives from political economy, political sociology, and political ecology. From land grabbings to the politics of biofuels complex relationship between the state, capital, and society is analyzed often specific to particular locale through class and power analysis (Akram-Lodhi, 2004; Borras Jr., 2005; Scoones, 1992; Byres, 2004; Kay, 2008; Wilkinson& Herrera, 2010; De Janvry& Sadoulet, 2001; Spoor, 2009). Finally, the studies of food regime and operations of TNCs offer a considerable amount of literature on rural transformation tangential to financialization and capital accumulation in the era of neoliberal market fundamentalism (McMichael, 2005; Goodman, 2004; Goodman &Watts, 1994; Friedmann, 2005; Fonte, 2006; Clapp& Fuchs, 2009).

In addition to situating the agrarian question mainly in the studies of labour, capital accumulation, and land control, its problematic can also be reframed in various perspectives focusing on gender, markets, environmental degradation, and resistance politics. The contribution of gendered version of new agrarian question to literature is to challenge structural adjustment and market reforms by addressing the gender dynamics of class, labour market, politics, and capital accumulation (Kapadia, 2002; Harriss-White& Gooptu, 2009; Razavi, 2003; Da Corta & Magongo, 2010; Kabeer, 2005; O'Laughlin, 2007). Besides, the use of new technologies, transgenic crops, and GMOs raise critical studies of rural transformation elaborating on the impacts on biological diversity and ecological integrity (Altieri, 2009; Altieri&Toledo, 2011; Sachs, 1996; Middendorf *et al*, 1998; Kurzer&Cooper, 2007). In addition incorporation into global trading systems and restructuring of national

economies result in profound changes in exchange relations and marketing operations. Recently, great number of producers and consumers has to rely on global markets. Therefore, market studies focusing on circulation of goods, power struggles in exchange relations, and narratives, discourses, and knowledge production on market functioning gain significance in the literature (Daviron& Ponte, 2005; Çalışkan& Callon, 2009, 2010; Çalışkan, 2010; Harriss-White, 2007b; Millo& Muniesa, 2007). Finally, the alteration of production, capital accumulation, and circulation processes and shifts in livelihood strategies are expected to have an effect on rural politics. From "everyday politics" of rural dwellers to collective peasant movements such as MST in Brazil, Chiapas in Mexico, and La Via Campesina scholars are investigating forms of rural political expression and the articulation of common interests among farmers to confront agricultural transformation (Patel, 2006; Edelman& Kay, 2008; Borras Jr, 2008; Walker, 2008; Scoones, 2008).

When the mechanisms of incorporation to market relations and diversity of strategies rural communities use to resist and adapt are investigated, this process cannot be reduced to just a commodification process. To produce for the market rather than for subsistence is not a new phenomenon for rural communities. What is new is that they are obliged to determine everything according to market prices and market fluctuations. Labor, land use and land control, financial relations, production processes, and their non-market relations are determined by market conditions. Therefore, the dissertation aims to uncover the dynamics of change triggered by the SAPs and the mechanisms of confrontation and survival of the farmer communities. At this point, Çalışkan and Callon's (2009, 2010) research program on economization and its empirical investigation on marketization constitutes the analytical framework of this dissertation. Çalışkan and Callon (2010) emphasize

three distinctive features of markets:

> 1. Markets organize the conception, production and circulation of goods, as well as the voluntary transfer of some sorts of property rights attached to them. These transfers involve a monetary compensation that seals the 'goods' attachment to their new owners.
> 2. A market is an arrangement of heterogeneous constituents that deploys the following: rules and conventions, technical devices, metrological systems, logistical infrastructures, texts, discourses and narratives (e.g., on the pros and cons of competition), technical and scientific knowledge (including social scientific methods), as well as the competencies and skills embodied in living beings.
> 3. Markets delimit and construct a space of confrontation and power struggles. Multiple contradictory definitions and valuations of goods as well as agents oppose one another in markets until the terms of the transaction are peacefully determined by pricing mechanisms. (p.3)

It is necessary to note that the dissertation is not a study of market and price formation. It rather focuses on the rural transformation on the basis of SAPs and strategies and mechanisms that farmers use to resist and adopt. Given that this transformation is based on market-led economy and the penetration of capital into the dynamics of rural life, it is necessary to uncover the functioning of the market, its sociotechnical devices, farmers' space for confrontation, and power struggles. In a similar vein, this dissertation offers a multidimensional inquiry of these socio-technical mechanisms from the state's policy making procedures to production processes and exchange relations. Based on this analytical framework, the market-state dichotomy, the commodity and producer distinction, and the society and politics tension appear to be inaccurate. As Mitchell (1998) warns "…we should take seriously the phenomenon that small rural households seem to be fixed within the categories of economic discourse. At the limits of the economy the distinctions between economic and non-economic, modern and non-modern, capitalist and non-capitalist becomes ambiguous."(p.99)

Agricultural restructuring and market-led economy have transformed the use of land and labour, reconfigured the rural production processes and the relation between producers and commodity and have profoundly impacted the scene on which agrarian question is played out. Under these conditions, various survival strategies and the mechanisms of confrontation arise in the countryside. However, farmers' ability to use collective action channels and the role of farmers' organization in the formulation of rural policies and decision-making processes have remained limited in Turkey.

According to Tarrow (1998), what brings people with different demands and interests together depends on mounting collective challenges, taking advantages of social networks, common purposes, and cultural frameworks, and constructing alliances through connective structures and collective identities. In addition, Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1998) emphasize the role of opportunity as a component of collective action. Here opportunity refers to the relation between the group and environment that sometimes creates new chances to act and sometimes endangers interests of the group. Structural approaches which link social movements to institutions, political alignments, and political struggles, have long been prominent in the studies of Tilly (1978), Tarrow (1998), McAdam (1985), Costain (1992). Meanwhile, the studies of revolution have made headway along structural analyses as seen in the historical structuralist approach of Moore (1966) and Skocpol (1979, 1994), the anthropological investigation of peasants by Wolf (1969), agrarian comparisons of Paige (1975), and statist analysis of Migdal (1974).

Social movements have been analyzed also by rationalist and culturalist perspectives. Rationalist theories surprisingly borrowed from economics assume that all individuals act rationally in order to achieve their preferences based on their

interests (Olson, 1965; Buchanan, Tollison & Tullock, 1980; Arrow, 1963). According to rationalists, collective action can be examined as the sum of strategic decisions by individuals. Primarily, the collective interest will be best constructed by the rational, unconstrained pursuit of individual interests (Macpherson, 1962). Popkin (1979) provides a model of society consisted of self-interested decision makers to explain peasant politics in Vietnam in 1960s. Briefly, he argues that peasants are striving not only to achieve their subsistence level but also to maximize their utility through investments, risk assessments, and cost-benefit analysis. Because of their insistence on the individual rationality of decisions, the aggregation of interests, and the explanation of motivation only by material incentives, the rationalist approaches fail to explain (a) that many groups of people who share common interests cannot organize a collective action in some occurences; (b) under which conditions people who do not share common interest organize and act on it.[6]

In addition to mobilizing structures and political opportunities, shared meanings, collective identities, and common values bring people together to act *en masse* (Melucci, 1988, 1989; Kertzer, 1988; Snow *et al.*, 1986; Snow& Benford, 1992). Interestingly enough, a Marxist E.P. Thompson (1966, 1971) contributes to the studies of social movements with a culturalist view. In his analysis of the 18th century English crowds as a response to the violation of interclass reciprocity culture, he stresses out that social consensus among peasants guarantees to maintain enough food in times of scarcity as the moral economy of the poor. Later, in mid 1970s Scott

[6] Apparently, rationalist view has little to say beyond the individual level of motivation and aggregation. At this point, resource mobilization theory that focuses on the forms of organization attempts to solve collective action problems of Olson's rational choice theory. McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977, 1987) emphasize the role of the significance of organizational bases, resource accumulation, and collective coordination for popular political actors. They argue that professionalization, financial support, mobilizing structures, in short professional organization of movement will limit collective action problems such as tragedy of commons and free riders (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 1997).

(1976) brought moral economy perspective from 18th century England to 20th century Southeast Asia. In his analysis of peasant politics, Scott also emphasizes subsistence ethic and reciprocity culture that reduce the threat of individual starvation. He demonstrates that rooted in the economic practices and social exchanges of peasant society, subsistence and reciprocity ethics enable peasants to live under a safety-first rather than utility maximizing principle. He argues that the violation of subsistence right as a moral norm brings about peasant rebellions in Southeast Asia. In his later studies, Scott (1985) focuses on everyday forms of resistance as peasants' individual reactions to the agricultural transformation which cover reactions from cheating to harming new machines.

It is not entirely fair to take a single tack, whether rationalist, structural, or cultural, to examine the effects of rural transformation and survival strategies and maneuverings of farmers mostly living at the edge of existence. In the rise and decline of the reactions and social movements, the intersection of different factors such as political opportunities, material interests, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames can be identified. As Cumings (1981) argues, economic interest and moral vision are both involved in politics. The true political economist should "specify both the interests that form the basis of action and the moral and human process that translates those interests into politics" (p.495). In addition, the characteristics of the state, society, and market relations and the functioning of farmers' organizations will alter the dynamics of reactions and manuverings. Therefore, the analysis based on field research will also reveal how farmers manage their production and coping strategies, when farmers can mobilize collective action, and why the ascendancy of collective tendencies over private interest cannot be achieved as a countervailing force against the SAPs and undemocratic procedures of decision-making.

The Research Design and Fieldwork

This dissertation combines various qualitative research methods in order to understand and interpret the ongoing rural transformation and the effects of the SAPs on farmers' daily life in Karacabey. It also necessitates a comprehensive analysis of reconstructed political, social, and economic processes in the post-1980 era concerning the farmers, the state, and the formation of markets. The combination of fieldwork, in-depth interviews, focus groups, oral histories, and the evaluation of statistical data on socio-economic indicators related to rural sites such as poverty, employment, the labor market, production, indebtedness, and land sales embodies the research techniques of this dissertation. In addition, the archives of the local newspaper *Meltem* provided valuable information about the real agenda on the ground.

Since the dissertation is a study of farming communities and reconfiguring political, economic, and social dynamics, it was necessary for me to gain experience in the villages to explore everyday activities. The fieldwork started in December 2009 and ended in June 2010. I conducted 79 interviews in total.[7] In the first part of the research from December 2009 to April 2010, I stayed in the Harmanlı village and conducted in-depth interviews with households that are producing dry onion and/or produced dry onion in the past. Households were selected according to the information given by the headman of the village, and the sample reflected general characteristics of the village. Especially, the time period from December 2009 to March 2010 was very efficient for the research because farming activities had not started yet. Interviews with the households were conducted in the evening. In most of them, I interviewed the male member of the household while female members

[7] Wishing to maintain confidentiality, some of the names of the farmers remain anonymous.

commented. After the male member left the home to go to the coffeehouse, we continued to talk about main problems and I took notes. I also arranged focus groups especially for women and young people. I attended the celebration of religious days, cooking activities, weddings, and religious memorial services, especially among women. I also visited the Hotanlı and Sultaniye villages and arranged focus groups in coffeehouses. This fieldwork helped me to observe in greater depth the daily lives of farmers, the organization of production and household economy, the characteristics of the labor market, diversification, the land use and control systems, and the strategies they develop for indebtedness and livelihood.

From April 2010 to June 2010, in the second part of the research I stayed in Bursa and visited Karacabey at least three times a week for the interviews conducted with parastatal agricultural organizations, commercial banks, lawyers, The Directory of Land Registry and Cadastre, The Directorate of Bailiff and Execution, The Chamber of Agriculture, and the irrigation union. I also arranged meetings in Harmalı-Der (a village society in Bursa) which changed its name to Karacabeyliler Derneği. I had the chance to explore the dynamics of urban migration through in-depth interviews with ten people who had migrated from the Harmanlı village to Bursa since the early 1980s. I investigated where and why farmers are migrating and in which sectors they are employed. I also attended a tea party in this association organized by women who also migrated from the Harmanlı village in order to investigate the increasing responsibility of women in the subsistence of the household and changing patterns of division of labor. I visited Harmanlı village and Karacabey three more times in May 2012, October 2012, and April 2013.

Quantitative data on production, land use, employment, and population mobility were collected from TurkStat, the Karacabey District Office of Agriculture,

the Karacabey Chamber of Agriculture, the Karacabey Plain Villages Irrigation Association, the Karacabey Producers Association, and the Karacabey Commercial Exchange. The patterns of land ownership and the size of agricultural enterprises were obtained from land registry. The information about new crop varieties and their distribution were examined in the reports of the Karacabey District Office of Agriculture and Karacabey Chamber of Agriculture.

In the autumn of 2006, meeting Abdullah Aysu and scholars who were interested in agricultural transformation developed my curiosity into academic interest. Since then, I have followed conferences, meetings, forums, and international organizations. Attending these events highlighted the most significant questions concerning farmer communities. In the spring of 2007, I took a research and reading course on agricultural transformation that defined the direction of research. It was clear that the impacts of structural adjustment on Turkish agriculture would constitute the main body, but the details were determined by the discussion with my advisor Koray Çalışkan, Abdullah Aysu, and the farmers in Karacabey. Later, different scholars and people who worked for various projects with the farmers in different regions of Turkey encouraged me to study the transforming dynamics of rural societies. Their observations and the stories they told supported my work and gave me new ideas about this research. After the fieldwork, during my research in the Oxford Department of International Development I had access to the extensive and varied collections of the Bodleian Social Science Library which provided huge amount of resources on international development, agricultural transformation, the international financial institutions, and the experiences of other developing countries related to the SAPs. The resources found while investigating Latin America, South

Asia, and Africa helped me to develop different viewpoints and improve the organization of my dissertation under the mentorship of Barbara Harriss-White.

In the near future, in addition to the academic contribution of the publication of the thesis and journal articles, another significant aim is to echo public discussions on farming communities. Talks and debates with politicians, journalists, local administrators, NGO activists, lawyers, farmers, and ordinary people will enhance collaboration and the communication of ideas.

Plan

The chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows:

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to provide a broad conceptual and historical outline of how rural development policies have been determined through technocratic policies in economic and political terms rather than participatory and transparent decision-making processes. Given that the state and managerial expert groups have been the main architects of rural development and agricultural policies, along with suprastate organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, this chapter offers in-depth coverage of policy variations in two periods of time: Between 1950-1980 and post-1980. The first section sketches out the development policies of state-led economy, the ascribed role of the agricultural producers in political and economic systems, and the changing dynamics of the IMF and the World Bank assistance over decades. The analysis of the profound shift in development policy in the post-1980 period, including a brief account of the SAPs and the unique policy experiment of the World Bank-promoted project in 2001 called the ARIP, and rural development plans and strategy papers that will considerably conduct the future of the country's agriculture is presented in the second section. In order to describe in a

comprehensive fashion the impacts of the SAP in a micro environment, the political and socio-technical drives behind programs and the swiftness and extent of the reforms are given. Moreover, the evaluation of the recent official strategy papers and development plans for the future of the agricultural sector affirms the insouciance of the state in dealing with the ongoing rural transformation in Turkey.

The main presumption of SAPs based on market knowledge, rationality, and innovation is that an economic system free from market-distorting effects will revitalize agricultural production, increase efficiency, and bring prosperity to rural communities. However, Chapter 3 emphasizes that standardized knowledge of the market frequently biased in favor of stronger groups, extracts elements which were once integral to the agricultural production, transforms them into industrial processes and sells them back to producers as inputs. This chapter aims to show that, with the implementation of SAP, significant trends that were not foreseen at its launch become apparent in agricultural production and producers were squeezed between tacit knowledge and market rationality. Declining subsidies, rising prices of agricultural inputs, standardization, and market knowledge that are inaccessible to the majority of the small farmers transform the style of production, the production levels, and type of crops. Hence, this chapter provides an exhaustive analysis of the new forms of production such as contract farming, the agricultural support policies, and the rising cost of production, in the Harmanlı village.

For the majority of small farmers, SAPs continuously diminish the level of income, and farming on its own becomes incapable of providing sufficient livelihood for rural dwellers. Chapter 4 teases out the process of easing away from a strictly agrarian existence and engaging in multiple activities by examining recent trends in rural employment, occupational shifts, changes in the main income sources,

emerging new economic activities, and spatial relocation in the Harmanlı village. It illustrates how rural inhabitants in the village manage their subsistence and overhaul consumption patterns, gender roles, environment, and social exclusion in order to surmount the vicissitudes of structural reform with reference to the political dimensions of livelihood adaptation and relations with the state.

This chapter aims to show that the dynamics of farmers' livelihood strategies are disregarded by macroeconomic appraisals of agrarian transformation. The diversification of income sources and coping strategies cannot be captured by the statistics because most statistics do not reveal the simultaneous relationships that small farm households tend to maintain with land, labor, and commodity markets, giving rise to multiple income sources. In a nutshell, statistics are static but farmers are dynamic. In this chapter, the attention given to real experiences of rural producers instead of statistics enables us to investigate what the SAP means on the ground and what kind of coping strategies derive from it in the Harmanlı village. Besides, a comprehensive analysis on livelihood strategies encourages us to go beyond classical discussions on the emergence of wage labor and the concentration of land for agricultural transformation, and reminds us that confrontation of the market-led system begins with the mechanisms used by households to preserve subsistence levels and social reproduction. Finally, it is important to note that this chapter would have been ineffectual without a critical perusal of the rural-urban linkages because these linkages provide a useful lens for understanding the complexities of rural inhabitants' livelihoods and their coping strategies, which usually include some form of mobility and diversification of income sources and occupations.

The phasing out of all subsidies and rising production costs have seriously distorted rural household income. Meanwhile, through drastic SAP cutbacks in

government-provided services and the dismantling of parastatal organizations, many producers to whom agriculture has still been the preeminent source of income are left to choose between either selling their assets or using credits in order to sustain production. In this vortex, enforced land evictions and/or voluntary sales lead to concentration of wealth and land in the hands of non-agricultural owners while the majority of small farmers become dispossessed in villages. In this context, the contribution of Chapter 5 to the dissertation is that of identifying the socioeconomic and political dimensions of land sales and the trajectory that compulsory means of financial credit institutions propel producers in Karacabey district. Agricultural producers are largely accepted as passive receptacles and they are not informed about basic legal rights and obligations, let alone changing production and marketing processes. Besides, the formation of new political economic structures over land use and control bring about different kind of dispossession that might facilitate companies' access to new markets and new sectors as predatory investors.

The SAPs launched since the 1980s in Turkey have focused attention on the promotion of greater reliance on market forces and the elimination of the government subsidies on credits, inputs, and prices. Hence, farmers are engaged in a broad number of simultaneous transactions in different markets, and maintain institutional linkages with several agents. Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the understanding of markets by the farmers and the significant effects of these socio-technical arrangements, the construction of knowledge, uncertainty, and power struggles on their subsistence. So far I have partly investigated farmers' relations to land, labor, financial, and input markets above. Therefore, in this chapter the emphasis is on commodity markets which are significant in Karacabey: Dry onion, tomato, wheat, and corn.

Finally, Chapter 7 as a conclusion provides a summary of research findings and offers suggestions for further research. To put it bluntly, the dichotomy of state-led versus market-led economy will not facilitate our search for an alternative. Instead, the puzzle is how markets can be best managed institutionally, to secure a progressive social agenda and priorities for the aggrieved populace. The ongoing exodus of small farmers from land and production and the onerous consequences of three decades of structural adjustment have not instigated the organization of countervailing forces against those who promote a rural development program that is merely organized by technocratic principles. Considering endemic ramifications in Karacabey district such as a falling rural population, decreasing job prospects, spatial relocation, rising credit debts, and distress land sales, the state should opt for a reassessment of democratic and accountable agricultural reforms instead of implementing the stereotypical technocratic policies of the international financial institutions and allow social mobilization and the organization of rural producers. Social mobilization and the consolidation of a web of rural organizations are required not only for rising political demands but also for developing alternative production and exchange models through cooperatives.

CHAPTER 2

RETHINKING AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN TURKEY: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

Today we are living in a world of experts. They know what is best for everyone else in their respective areas of interest from health, to finance, to art, and to agriculture. The reverberations of expert knowledge in political structures are presented in the form of technocracy which can seldom be seen as a natural, straightforward, or harmonious process. Technocracy is defended by referring to expertise which is generally independent of exogenous variables such as culture and geography. It often alludes to rationality as a global phenomenon. A great reliance on technocracy may involve the danger that knowledge will become either the only basis for the right to rule or a substitute for democratic principles dangerously distanced from their constituents. More importantly, technocracy "separates knowing from doing as well as the knowers from the doers" (Vanderburg, 1988, p.9). In a world of experts, individuals are forced to live in a network of largely impersonal relationships. On the one hand, technocratic policies promise efficiency and control especially over the economy and, in this case, development. But on the other hand, their effects on individuals are the opposite. They remove our efficiency as political and social beings. Above all, once technocratic policies combine pure market rationality, know-how policies destroy all collective structures and impede on cultural and rural heritage (Bourdieu, 1998).

In a similar vein, the experts of the international institutions defending absolute reason accordingly build legitimacy of the programs on scientific knowledge. However, this practice is anything but scientific. For instance, SAPs consist of the transition of political programs articulated in rather general terms (e.g. efficiency, productivity, sustainability) into ways of exercising authority over specific people, places, activities, and practices. In addition, statistics, a prevalent expert tool, is the representation of quantitative analysis based on the strong presumptions regarding the nature of social reality. Once declared, however, these calculations transform social life. In other words, the practical operation image of the social world becomes a political tool and later forms social facts by itself. Latour (2004, p.10) brings insightful analysis on the "imbroglio of politics, nature, and knowledge" and emphasizes the prominence of the *Science*, defined as "the politicization of the sciences through epistemology in order to render ordinary political life impotent through the threat of an incontestable nature," in order to understand the relation between politics and nature.

The trajectory of agricultural policies in Turkey experienced a sharp change in direction in 1980 with the demise of national developmentalist policies and the implementation of SAPs. The triumph of neoliberal policies over the planned economy has impelled us to evaluate the impacts of the structural reforms on the basis of the dichotomy of the state and market. However, any effort to understand the evolving dimensions of social, political, and economic life in rural areas and to make inferences concerning alternative policies would require investigation of the continuity of the technocratic and top-down execution of reform policies. This chapter argues that neither the state-led economy nor free market policies could design rural development policies geared to improve the prosperity of agricultural

producers and help them to preserve environmental resources and cultural heritage due to proceeding technocratic approaches to rural development which place no room for democratic participation and collective action.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad conceptual and historical outline of how rural development policies have been formed through technocratic policies in economic and political terms rather than participatory and transparent decision making processes. Given that the state and managerial expert groups have been the main architects of rural development and agricultural policies (along with suprastate organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank), this chapter offers in-depth coverage of policy variations in two periods of time: Between 1950-1980 and post-1980. The first section delineates the development policies of the state-led economy, the ascribed role of the agricultural producers in the political and economic systems, and the changing dynamics of the IMF and the World Bank assistance for each decade. The second section presents an analysis of the profound shift in development policy in the post-1980 period including a brief account of the SAPs and the unique policy experiment of World Bank-promoted project in 2001, called the ARIP. It also provides an analysis of rural development plans and strategy papers that will considerably affect the future of the country's agriculture. In order to comprehensively describe the impacts of the SAP in a micro environment, the political impetuses behind programs as well as the swiftness and extent of the reforms are given. The evaluation of the recent official strategy papers and development plans for the future of the agricultural sector affirms the insouciance of the state to deal with ongoing rural decay in Turkey.

State-led Planned Economy

In the 1950s, a profound shift occurred in the political and economic framework of Turkey. The general elections held in 1950 were viewed as a victory of the periphery over the center and indicated the end of one-party rule in the Turkish republic. Moreover, the 1950s witnessed the emergence and maintenance of a market economy as well as political liberalization. In the first part of the decade, the populist government carried out a new development strategy predominantly based on agrarian and primary exporting policies to foster growth.

In 1946, the state planned a land redistribution program which attempted to reduce very large properties to productive sizes by rearranging ownership rights of the immediate tillers. The bill was executed only for state-owned land until 1950 when the DP, formed by a large landowner opposition wing of the RPP, won the elections. The DP succeeded in the elections, however without a critical perusal of interplay between class structure of peasantry and economic policy, "the puzzle of how the ruling party which had improved the social and economic conditions of the country lost so decisively and irrecoverably in the first elections it allowed, remains unresolved" [8](Birtek & Keyder, 1975, p.461). The transition from subsistence farming to market production created a middle farmer class which was specialized in production and vulnerable to market changes. Therefore, political participation was achieved by middle farmers to influence economic policy changes through their

[8] In their study Birtek and Keyder (1975) investigated how the intention of RPP to implement a land reform as a strategy of new development policies resulted in the loss of elections. Their answer was that the formation of a middle class farmers whose interests were akin to large land owners determined the results of the elections. It is also important to note that İnsel (1996, 2003) argues that the development policies of the state and the governing party RPP in the Early Republican era served for the state's attempt to control and govern the masses. These policies were attempted to increase dependency of people to the state and empower the state rather than to increase wealth of people. See also Karpat (1968).

interests. When large farmers organized an alternative political movement akin to middle farmer class interests and against the policies of the ruling party, their alliance based on agricultural capitalism replaced RPP governance in the 1950 general elections.

In the 1950s, the DP's growth strategy was the reflection of the "science" of development economics. Massive flows of foreign capital, the import of experts, advisors, and technicians from abroad, rapid industrialization, accelerated capital accumulation, the construction of a great amount of the images associated with developed nations such as roads, dams, factories, and public buildings were widely understood as the signs of economic development (Simpson, 1965). A substantial amount of US financial aid and technical assistance was available for rational planning and a wise allocation of resources. In addition to political considerations and exigencies of the Cold War era, the naïve thinking here was that developing countries could learn from the historical growth experiences of developed countries in transforming their agrarian-based economies into industrial giants (Rostow, 1971). Therefore, foreign experts and advisors would provide the necessary knowledge in the development process that the DP helped to set in motion.

With their strong emphasis on economic growth, the program of the Democrats was essentially based on rapid industrialization, the construction of infrastructure, and increasing agricultural production. Although liberal economic policies as a part of a new political framework offered high incentives for private sector and foreign direct investment, it was actually the state-owned enterprises that invigorated the industrialization process. Furthermore, in the agricultural sector, the government accelerated production and investment by agricultural credits, tax exemptions, and mechanization of farm equipment. After a few years of the liberal

free trade regime of the postwar transformation, the DP *de facto* protected domestic manufacturing and controlled imports. The DP, which had highly criticized dirigiste policies of the RPP, could not actually overthrow the state control on the economy and investment. Through the end of the decade, it was understood that these policies designed to force the momentum of growth in a liberal, free trade environment did not necessarily bring economic development. Low productive capital, high consumption, and an expanding money supply resulted in high inflation. In addition, the TL was overvalued and a balance of payments problem emerged. Increasing demand for imported goods (both raw material and finished goods) could not be balanced merely by agricultural exports. Devaluation would have changed the export-import balance and facilitated anti-inflationary programs but the DP government was concerned with the short-term political consequences of increasing prices. The DP preferred to ignore existing economic problems such as decreasing wages and production levels. Deficit financing supported by international aid inevitably led to greater risks and uncertainty, which were amplified by economic and political crises at the end of the decade (Bozdogan&Kasaba, 1998; Karpat, 1964; Öniş, 1987; Simpson, 1965).

In the 1960s, the ISI strategy emerged as a response to existing balance of payments difficulties. This strategy instituted controls on imports and necessary economic regulations aimed at production for the domestic market. High rate of total protection of domestic industry, which would alienate international competition and promote growth of the internal market, was the main characteristic of the ISI. Since capital accumulation was restricted to the domestic market, foreign direct investment was not prohibited by ISI. Moreover, the import of some essential goods, intermediary inputs, and technological innovations for industrial improvement was

allowed. Carefully rationalized state planning became a distinguished feature of the economy in the 1960s due to the destructive consequences of eager economic growth without a plan in the 1950s. In addition to lessons to be learned from the careless and uncontrolled expansionism of the 1950s, the liberal free trade policies of the DP unintentionally created vital conditions for the ISI strategy. The transformation of the agricultural sector from subsistence farming to market production provided capital accumulation in private enterprises, the extension of the domestic market, and technological improvement for industrial investment.

Through SEEs, public expenditures, and the involvement of the public sector in production, the state assumed an important role in the ISI model. The ISI policies in Turkey included the regulation of the exchange and interest rates, widespread controls on imports, and foreign exchange transactions by import licenses and foreign exchange regulations. During the ISI era the functions of the state expanded to guide the trajectory of industrial development through strict controls and micro-level interventions. The establishment of the SPO as a center of technocratic administration enabled the state to coordinate investment by statistics, calculations, and five-year plans from a single institution. Moreover, the approval of the SPO was the necessary condition for the allocation of subsidized credits and foreign exchange. Therefore, it was the scene for competitive political parceling of public resources. Throughout the ISI period Turkey experienced boom bust cycles in its economy, particularly in the 1960s where high growth ratios were achieved but were followed by high inflation and a foreign exchange crisis.

The state also performed as an operator of national development policies. The design and implementation of rural development and agricultural policies by the state was intended to avoid traditional methods of agriculture and achieve mechanical,

technological, and chemical improvements. In close cooperation with international institutions, the state provided huge support for small and medium family farms, government credits, input provision, extension services, guaranteed state purchasing of the main crops, promotion of new crop varieties, price stability, and incentives for agricultural exports. The state aptly supported founding agricultural cooperatives and unions, marketing and distribution associations, and modern farms. State-led producer and marketing cooperatives, input agencies, and agricultural banks empowered the state to control directly or indirectly what to produce, under what conditions, and in what quality and quantity. The direct intervention of the state in rural development policies from input subsidization to marketing guaranteed commercialization of Turkish agriculture under state control. Indeed, it was a strategic choice to give high incentives for agricultural production for the ISI model because it provided raw material for developing industry and foreign exchange due to high export rates. In the meantime, agricultural producers also formed a considerable segment of the domestic market as consumers (Akder, 2007).

Through the end of 1970s, the balance of payments crisis signaled the end of the state-led economy and the beginning of the neoliberal era. In spite of the fact that *ex ante* growth rates of the GNP, 7 percent annually, were achieved in the period between 1963-77, the state ultimately was faced with the weaknesses of the ISI strategy (Önişş& Kirkpatrick, 1998).While the dependence of intermediate and capital goods industries on imports was increasing, the amount of export earnings was not enough to defray expenses. Indeed, the majority of the countries implementing the ISI model shared a common problem: vulnerability to external shocks and foreign exchange crises. This was due to the fact that the share of exports in the GDP remained the same but the share of imports of intermediary goods was expanding.

Oil shocks in the international arena also generated economic problems in Turkey. The strategy of the state to prolong ISI policies was to expand public investment by foreign aid which led to a high foreign deficit (Öniş & Kirkpatrick, 1998). Hence, the ISI strategy created a dilemma. A development policy to reduce the dependency of the Turkish economy on imports in return resulted in a foreign exchange crisis and high dependency on imports. Moreover, the budget deficit was magnified by increasing state activity in production, marketing, and managing income distribution. By the end of the 1970s the balance of payments crisis and declining growth rates resulted in the transition of the Turkish economy to a high inflationary stage. Until a major program was implemented on January 24, 1980 in collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank, and supported by the leading OECD countries, the few attempts at stabilization at the end of the decade remained unsuccessful.

Political System: Patronage, Populism, and Unequal Distribution

In the 1950s, along with the economic transformation, differentiated structures in the social and political systems emerged in contrast to the previous decades. The transition from a single-party regime to multiparty politics, the increasing scope of market transactions, and new policies on distribution and accumulation undermined the old elite bureaucratic structure and mutual isolation of center and periphery. Nevertheless, new forms of political behavior could not fully overcome primordial, religious, and clandestine relations of the past which would lead to rising populist and clientelistic appeals in the absence of fully institutionalized associations.

As the DP gained ascendancy over the RPP in the 1950 elections, it was clear that peripheral coalitions among different groups including landowners, peasants, the

urban mercantile class, and religious groups, which had been denied in previous decades in Turkish politics, allowed the DP to keep its prominent place in a system as a mass party (Ayata, 1996; Cizre, 2002; Rustow, 1994; Mardin, 1991; Keyman&Öniş, 2007). Ever since, the political system has undergone a significant change that could be defined as the ruralization of Turkish politics. Here, it refers to the incorporation of a heretofore excluded rural population into the system as the major electoral base. Huntington (1968) argued that the two-party electoral system and the ruralizing elections facilitated the involvement of rural masses into politics in the 1950s. At this point, however, it should be noted that under DP governance and afterwards, rural dwellers ostensibly occupied a significant role in the elections but their political demands were not incorporated into the political system in the same manner. Hence, Frey (1965) pointed out the complexity of balancing peasants' accession into the political and social systems while not letting their expectations and demands to be realized in the functioning of the system. According to him, under unique conditions of intra elite conflict between bureaucratic-military elites of the RPP and local elites of the DP, "the temptation presented opportunistic elite elements to engage in short-run pandering to nascent village expectations has proved almost impossible to resist" (Frey, 1965, p.391). Mardin, taking a much broader stance, claimed that developments in the 1950s brought about mobilization of economic growth, rural-urban migration, change in the dimensions of social space, and various facilities for education. As he stated, the upshot of all these developments was not limited to the ruralization of politics but rather also included the ruralization and pervasive de-elitization of Turkey. Through this pattern of de-elitization, Mardin (1978) asserted that ruralization of the urban life was unfolding much faster than urbanization of the peasants.

Despite the excessive emphasis of the DP governance on rural dwellers regarding the electoral vote and development policies, peasants were not equally represented in the decision-making processes. Large groups of peasants were thinly connected to the state, prevented from engaging in the political system, and left dependent on traditional forms of policy articulation. The short-lived Turkish experience with democracy in the 1950s was not based upon the reconciliation and politics of compromise that would lead to transference of organizational structure to masses. Instead, the clientelist embodiment of the rural masses, the activation of private enterprises through patronage and rent-seeking policies, and haphazard social mobilization provoked by populism emerged as political techniques to achieve electoral support in the deficiency of functioning democratic institutions. In effect, these policies did not only belong to the DP but determined the characteristics of center-right politics in Turkey since 1950.

In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, changing political balances and recent development strategies promoting ISI instated a new model of accumulation which obviously benefited the industrial bourgeoisie. According to Keyder (1987) two significant components of the new model of accumulation were the political allocation of scarce resources and the emphasis on the distribution of income to ease social distress and perpetuate a domestic market. It seemed likely that much of this newly implemented model was in effect attributed to the success of the industrial development. Resources from the agricultural sector were transferred to the industrial sector by low raw material prices and the export earnings of the agricultural sector provided foreign exchange for industrial sector. The resources were allocated by administrative institutions and the SPO five-year plans were indicative of investment decisions by private industry. Under these circumstances, bargaining for privileges

such as incentives or licenses at the top administrative levels incited rent-seeking policies. Sunar (2004, p.128) analyzed the collusion of private business and public officials and stated that "the technocrats of the planning office were less interested in accommodating business than they were in commanding it. And the business community was less interested in planned (and shared) discipline and sacrifice and more in subsidies, protections, and supports". In the functioning of planned discipline of the state and competition of the market, business groups vied for rationed credit, import licenses, and foreign exchange and did not hesitate to involve themselves in corruption due to guaranteed high profits in a remarkably protected domestic market. Moreover, the SEE sector itself appeared to be shaped more by the populist and clientelist policies of the governing parties than the principle of fair distribution.[9]

During the 1960 transformation, the organization of the political system was also designated to represent divergent groups. Since all administrative institutions were controlled by the governing party before 1960, the 1961 constitution aimed to institute a system of checks and balances through social groups. The new constitution allowed collective social bargaining through unionization and associations. Previously omitted social groups such as the urban industrial bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy gained ascendancy in the new mode of accumulation. Despite an urban bias in the new system, farmers had the strongest position for bargaining among wage worker groups due to their role in the ISI model. However, the fact was that for both wage workers and farmers, having organization and bargaining power did not mean achieving active participation in policy making. These were not acquired rights but rather bestowed by the state managers and much

[9] With regard to the issue of SEEs and employment, priority was given to the regions that needed extra encouragement to vote.

respected technicians according to the needs of the new accumulation and development model. Hence, these groups held passive status without any contribution to the determination of the policies. In other words, they were excluded from participation.

Another striking feature of the new accumulation model was the emphasis on the principle of distribution for the functioning domestic market. In practice, however, redistributive issues seemed to remain weak considering the scope of government intervention based on technocratic policies. The fact that the ISI model created a bias towards the urban-industrial sector and the transference of resources from agricultural to industrial production should not obscure the significance of agricultural supports and intrasectoral inequalities. Price settings, state purchases, and credit facilities were the main apparatuses of the government support that directly affected the level of agricultural income attained by the rural producers. Nevertheless, despite an appreciable increase in aggregate growth and production, the agricultural support policies and techno-chemical innovations such as improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and better tillage and irrigation practices did not ensure distributive success. Since land size and ownership actually defined who benefited from agricultural support, in his inquiry into whether public policy toward agriculture enhanced income inequality, Ulusan (1980) pointed out that distributive efficiency was achieved neither between the agricultural and industrial sectors nor for agricultural producers. In a similar vein, Mann (1980, p.239) argued that many developments in agricultural practices were less accessible to small farmers and "share in the benefits is [was] primarily a function of the size of the farm unit".

Indeed, distribution policies were very much influenced by the political system and the organization of interest groups. In the 1960-1980 period, interest

groups in the agricultural sector held a preeminent position. The TUCA and the TUCAE were the main organizations assigning public professionals to facilitate the guidance and management of the agricultural policies of the state. Another significant organization of the agricultural producers was the TFF which was operating in conjunction with the Farmers' Unions in various rural localities. In spite of the fact that the TFF was formed voluntarily by the producers, the driving force behind the federation was the wealthy cotton producers in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions (Ergüder, 1991; Aktan, 1966; Kıray, 1966). Concomitantly, several agricultural credit, sales, and development cooperatives were functioning under close government tutelage. However, neither chambers nor cooperatives could actively participate in the decision-making processes related to agricultural affairs. The articulation of political demands was carried out specifically by the political parties rather than the associations of the farmers. Even price policies that directly affected the income level of the peasants were determined by governing parties. On this occasion, farmers' organizations and public institutions could only propose a price for each product through cost analysis but only governing parties had absolute authority over pricing.[10] Thus, the proximity to party groups and leaders provided more political power and privileges to some groups through patron-client relations. Consequently, market-oriented large landowners dominated pressure group activity and benefited from the majority of incentives. In contrast, competitive politics and democratic participation perceived distributional aspect as an important policy consideration of development plans (Ergüder, 1980; Güven, 2009). In sum, agricultural support policies in Turkey served as political propaganda aimed at small

[10] It appeared, then, that the authority of governing party over prices necessitated political propaganda for small farmers. For instance, crop prices were increasing during crisis periods and election years. For more information about the fluctuations in agricultural prices related to political system variables see Ergüder (1980).

farmers and were adopted for the short-term stability on prices that led to temporary income security rather than fair distribution (Kazgan, 2003; Çınar & Silier, 1965; Varlıer, 1978; Stirling, 1965; Sirman-Eralp, 1988; Kıray, 1968; Kıray& Hinderink, 1970).

International Financial Institutions

Dating from the early stages of development attempts, the advice of suprastate organizations evolved through technocratic policies to facilitate market integration. The World Bank has been an especially significant actor in Turkish agriculture since the 1960s. In spite of the fact that recent policies have been composed of privatization, eliminating subsidies, minimizing the budget deficit, and limiting public expenditures, the World Bank supported interventionist policies of the state such as investments in infrastructure, cheap credits, support purchases, and input subsidies in the 1960s and 1970s. The motive behind this assistance was to hasten the integration into the world capitalist economy and to set up an infrastructure for the free market economy and transnational agribusiness companies. The World Bank programs endeavored for the promotion of modern farming techniques and technological innovations of the Green Revolution such as new seed varieties, chemical inputs, and machinery to foster the dissolution of pre-capitalist forms of agricultural production (Aydın, 2009).

The changes in the policies of the World Bank towards developing countries have directly revealed the socio-economic and political relationship as well as the international division of labor between developed countries and developing ones. In the 1960s, the World Bank imposed policies that encouraged the construction of

dams, roads, railways, power stations, and telecommunications in order to provide underpinning operations for the free movement of capital and goods. In the 1970s, the main principle, the integration of rural areas into the world market, remained the same but the World Bank altered its policy tools and invested for human capital. The World Bank embraced 'redistribution with growth' as a motto in the 1970s in order to confront rising grievances about the consequences of the World Bank-promoted Green Revolution policies and the mounting threat of communism. This motto was also intended to alleviate social distress and guerrilla warfare caused by inequality and discrimination in rural communities. Therefore, the World Bank's lending policies attempted to achieve growth, increase productivity, devise special distribution measures, and reduce poverty by integrated rural development projects. In the 1980s the World Bank lending policy altered once again because most of the rural areas were integrated into the market and their agricultural production became commercial rather than subsistence farming in the 1980s. Nevertheless, many developing countries had difficulties handling the debt crisis. Despite an unchanging rhetoric that promised increasing standards of living, the World Bank technocrats designed policies that would bring about structural adjustment which, in fact, was intended to ameliorate developing countries' ability to repay their debts including interests.

These periodical turns in the World Bank's lending policies reverberated in its relationship with Turkey. Turkey's cyclical need for foreign currency and loans since the 1950s forced many governments to sign agreements with the World Bank and other financial institutions and, far more importantly, to accept its management advice in order to get direct credit loans. Thus, the authority given by the letter of intent enabled international institutions to transform Turkish agriculture through their

global agenda and technocratic policies. In the 1960s, the World Bank provided loans for modernizing agricultural production by means of technical innovation and infrastructural investments such as the construction of power plants, roads, bridges, and dams. In the 1970s, rural development projects financed by the World Bank contributed to human capital and living standards by improving drinking water supplies, irrigation techniques, and education facilities. Finally, in return for an incremental set of conditionalities, structural adjustment loans were given by the World Bank in support of neoliberal reforms intended to shift the economy, including the agricultural sector, from inward-looking ISI policies to an outward-looking orientation encouraging export led growth in the post-1980 period.

Over the years since its inception, the IMF has also been at the center of the major economic issues in Turkey including the transition to a free market economy and the vicious circle of financial crises. In its origin, the task assigned to the IMF of ensuring global economic stability while promoting international development was considered to be the responsibility of its twin, the World Bank.[11] Hence, the IMF stand-by agreements were coping with the balance of payments crisis, external debts, and monetary and fiscal policies by short-term shock therapy programs. The World Bank, on the other hand, was focusing on long or medium-term institutional and structural reforms as well as the mobilization and allocation of resources for achieving developmental goals. However, in the post-1980 era, the IMF's stand-by agreements became rescue packages that met the imminent financial needs of the countries in crisis. Therefore, the IMF embraced the structural conditionality

[11] Keynes denominated the IMF and the World Bank as 'The Bretton Woods Twins' in a speech at the inaugural meeting of Governors in Savannah, US in March 1946. For further detail, see "Working Well with Others? The IMF as Team Player" accessed at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2012/pdf/c3.pdf.

principle just like its twin, the World Bank.[12] In the 1980s, only 20 percent of the IMF programs implemented structural measures but in the 1990s all programs required institutional and structural reforms in return for loans (Büyükcan, 2007). Considering the free market mantra of the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank worked in collaboration with each other and evolved into technocratic missionary institutions of neoliberalism.[13] In addition, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the twins' role as expert communities was reiterated by assisting in the transition to a market economy in the former Soviet Union and communist bloc countries in Europe. Consequently, the IMF and the World Bank have undertaken a more extensive and strategic role through activities such as expanding modes and regimes of capital accumulation brought forth by neoliberal policies since the1980s.[14]

Post-1980s Market-led Economy

Following the debt crisis at the end of the 1970s, Turkey underwent a substantial economic recovery program that received support from international institutions including the IMF and the World Bank. During the program, Turkey embraced policies which were intended to have positive effects on the balance of payments.

[12] For further details on the IMF's structural conditionality see "Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs" prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department, accessed at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/ .

[13] Turkey was chosen as a suitable testing ground for the implementation of a new type of World Bank-IMF cross conditionality in 1980. For the promotion of the new program in the global arena, extended technical assistance was made available to achieve success in Turkey (Öniş, 1998, p.143). Sarris (1990, p.2) described the division between the IMF and the World Bank programs as impractical and he wrote that "we shall not distinguish between an IMF type of 'stabilization' programme or a typical World Bank 'structural adjustment programme'. The former are mostly aimed at reducing external imbalances and internal disequilibria in the short term by policies aimed at bringing the economy closer to full capacity and consumption closer to available means. The latter, however, are aimed at influencing the full employment equilibrium itself by policies directed at raising efficiency and growth. However there is some overlap in the means and ends of both and the distinction is not clear".

[14] Regimes of capital accumulation refer to production and consumption systems. Modes of regulation refer to the written and unwritten laws of society that manage the regime of accumulation and determine its form. For further details on the regimes of accumulation see Jessop and Sum (2006).

The major project of the program was to pave the way for neoliberal policies stage by stage and to expedite the transition from import-substitution to a free market economy. The profound changes in economic strategy promoted by the proponents of neoliberal policies that encouraged integration into the global economy and outward-oriented development plans were declared by the decisions accepted on January 24, 1980. In return for the loans, international institutions demanded that Turkey implement extensive reforms based on SAPs in every sphere of economic life. The reforms achieved success in terms of increasing growth rates and improving the balance of payments in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, rising taxes and prices, decreasing wages, and agricultural income compounded an uneven income distribution and diminished the standard of living especially for the most vulnerable groups. The state's commitment to SAPs did not address the needs of farmers, workers, and other unprotected groups.

The 1980 coup d'état restricted the nature of the political regime in the 1980s, curtailed the practice of democratic rights and liberties made possible by the 1961 constitution, and opened up a new era in Turkish politics. Political change had not been entirely absent since the 1950s, but radical political restructuring emerged with the new methods of policy making and was remarkably compatible with the structural adjustment. This new system necessitated economic rationality in policy making which aggrandized the integration of experts into the system rather than being based upon interest group association or consensual politics (Ergüder, 1991). During the 1980s adaptation of pragmatic policies, which ensured higher levels of rationality and lower doses of politics and compromise, gained prominence in all spheres from development policies to international relations (Heper, 1994). In time, autonomous civil society engaged neither in the policy formulation nor in the

implementation process. The withdrawal of the traditional bureaucratic elites, particularly from decision making processes, was paralleled by the SAP which aimed at liberalizing the economy, privatizing SEEs, and decentralizing government. The new political elites close to the MP were surrounded by a group of technocrats inducted from outside the traditional bureaucracy-controlled decision making process.[15] Debureaucratization and reorganization of the state apparatus by the Prime Minister Turgut Özal and his entourage isolated it from politics and elements of civil society. A brand new group consisting of US-educated personal advisors to the prime minister, who were known as the "Princes", took part in making certain critical decisions including the monitoring of strategic economic agencies regarding investments, exports, marketing, and production. They were later appointed as ministers of the state or acted as shadow ministers (Heper, 1990, p.611).

From the early 1980s on, Turkish politics oriented itself towards managerial teams centered on policy issues rather than political ideology (Göle, 1994; Yalman, 2009). Since technocracy was anathema to democratic and associated politics, the technocratic policies of the MP governments that adopted an issue-specific approach limited the ability of civil society to bargain with the state and reduced the degree of its institutionalized participation. In addition, service-rendered policies projected an image of the "entrepreneurial politician who managed to get things done fairly quickly" (Göle, 1994, p.220). MP leaders were called Islamist engineers owing to their professional background and their commitment to Islamist and traditionalist values (Göle, 2004). They coined a new political lexicon including performance (*icraat*), practicality (*işbitiricilik*), innovation (*yenilikçilik*), and compatibility (*uzlaşma*) by reason of their pragmatic rationalist tendency. This synthesis enabled

[15] For further information see Öniş (1998).

new managerial policy makers to present structural reform as a technical issue with a scientific description and impeded opposition which would otherwise be an obstacle to market logic.

Through the end of the decade Turkey experienced a critical turning point for financial liberalization. In 1989, Turkey completely opened up the capital account and adopted full currency convertibility. Under the conditions of growing macroeconomic instability, premature liberalization attempts omitting the necessary institutions of financial regulation were doomed to remain as a major policy error (Öniş, 1998). Therefore, some structural shifts in Turkey's political economy became obvious following the complete capital account liberalization.[16] Haphazard capital account liberalization paved the way for populist expansionism. The cycles of populist policies and successive crises occurred frequently in an economic environment characterized by large fiscal deficits, high rates of inflation, and highly volatile short term capital flows (Keyman & Öniş, 2007).

Only a decade after the inception of neoliberal reforms, Turkey came across a fundamental defiance. In spite of the fact that Turkey was accepted as a model case for SAP, the era was characterized by growing macroeconomic instability principally based on populist patterns of policies and rent-seeking behavior. Thus, the 1990s provided a useful basis for simultaneously investigating the economic and political instability. A number of shortcomings in the functioning of the political system inevitably impinged upon macroeconomic balances and *vice versa*. In the 1990s, the

[16] Capital account liberalization without structural and legal regulations led up to 'currency substitution' or in other words 'dollarization'. Foreign currencies were regarded as tools for evasion from the negative effects of chronic high inflation because TL was losing its value continuously. Consequently, in deficiency of TL government was printing money in order to finance its deficient. As a dilemma, dollarization that was accepted as a way to escape inflationary impacts in turn resulted in hyperinflation. In addition, financial liberalization in the vacuum of legal and structural arrangements promoted making profit without producing and this in turn narrowed down productive forms of investment. Strange (1986) defined this process, which was highly vulnerable to the speculation of the short term capital flows, as *casino capitalism*.

frequency of elections and the fragile and fragmented party system determined the characteristics of the political structure. The ideologies of the political parties were not well-defined, *id est* there was no clear-cut distinction between parties. Even worse, any potential opposition was annihilated and discharged from representative rights. The political system was deprived of competing ideological platforms. Democracy was rationalized and operating via policies offering solutions to specific issues rather than political compromise.[17] To some degree, this slippery and elusive political structure instigated macroeconomic instability. The distribution policies through populist expansionism, especially in the bureaucratic structure and privatization process of SEEs, put pressure on fiscal instability. Acute distributional problems favoring a number of actors also reflected the state's inability to tax high income groups. In the absence of legal standards, strong civil society, or intermediary organizations, channels of accountability could not be generated. Besides all political and distributional deficits, the intensification of armed conflict with the PKK propelled the Turkish economy along a stringent trajectory, contributing to a higher budget deficit, fiscal instability, and lower economic growth than would otherwise have been the case.

In spite of the fact that Turkey could avoid financial crises through foreign borrowing in the 1980s, a highly tenuous economic structure resulted in successive financial crises in the 1990s and afterwards. In 1994, a balance of payments crisis and a massive depreciation of the exchange rate occurred due to a major outflow of short term capital. A reform package introduced in April 1994 in association with the IMF subsequently became a blight on the real economy. The need for government

[17] Birtek (1994) emphasizes the possibility of achieving a new consensus and a new political discourse that might be able to overcome political segmentation and institutionalize democracy as an integrative force in 1990s. However, the political agenda did not exhibit any systematic pattern seeking to exercise compromising.

revenues expedited the implementation of privatization on a large scale and increased unemployment dramatically. Through the end of the 1990s, low growth, high inequality, and high inflation syndrome appeared to be considered as the characteristic of the economic structure. Therefore, Turkey signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF in December 1999 with ambitious goals aiming to reduce inflation and exchange rates and increase growth potential, efficiency, and equitable distribution. Nevertheless, during the program Turkey went through twin crises in November 2000 and February 2001 due to a highly problematic banking system. This, in turn, raised questions about the credibility of the IMF expertise as Öniş (2003, p.12) mentioned "the fact that the crises occurred in the midst of an IMF program is in itself rather surprising, but clearly demonstrates that even in the presence of the IMF support the program failed to inspire sufficient confidence on the part of market participants". In sum, ever since the early 1990s, major stabilization programs supported financially and technically by the international institutions culminated in economic crises. The scope of the neoliberal agenda and the expertise of the institutions were extended more and more by far-reaching reform packages following the crises.

In the post-1980 era, the process of structural shift from the ISI strategy to an outward-oriented development scheme also required fundamental changes in the agricultural sector through adjustment programs. Even the IMF, although it did not assess direct agricultural loans, required conditionalities for the restructuring of agriculture and coincided with other sectors. The main reason behind the IMF's pressure on the agricultural sector was that the state subsidies for agricultural production were accepted as a burden on the budget. Hence, a strong influence was perceived on rural development policies such as a decrease in subsidies, a reduction

of prices to the level of world prices, a rearrangement of the organization of cooperatives as more autonomous units, and a removal of the existing restrictions on foreign trade. In the 1980s, reorganization of the market by the international experts and decreasing subsidies were two significant issues determining rural policies. According to neoliberal experts who aimed to incorporate small producers into the market, technical improvements and the free market rather than state control would bring efficiency in production and expedite the liberalization of foreign trade, especially for agricultural exports. Nevertheless, the expansion of exports was rather short-lived because of macroeconomic instability, and then the policies allowed imports instead of exports and imposed harsh conditions on small producers. Moreover, similar to the suppression of real wages, agricultural income drastically fell in conjunction with low price ceilings. Until the second half of the 1980s, not only the number of supported products, but also the value of support purchases decreased.

Following the transition to unrestricted party politics in 1987, the agricultural subsidies, especially price supports accepted as key contributor to rural income, were revitalized. Considering the disproportionate weight of the rural population in the elections, agricultural support policies were rearranged in favor of producers once again. First, the exhaustion of the role of the state in development policies was not an easy task to undertake with shock therapy policies. Second, persistent and increasing populist expansionism, which had probably been the most important characteristic of the political structure since the 1950s, was resuscitated for electoral concerns. Finally, the overall appearance of the political system was quite bleak in the 1990s. Taking into account political parties' inability to sustain coalition governments, epidemic rent-seeking behavior, and frequent elections, future prospects for the

political system were not promising. Hence, from the late 1980s to the financial crisis in April 1994, the populist policy instruments of Turkish governments envisaged a rather smooth process for agricultural producers.

The implementation of the April 5, 1994 decisions, in return, reiterated the reduction of the number of products supported by the state. Even more, under the pressure of a new stabilization program launched by the government in response to a deep financial crisis and the state's attempt to join the EU, Turkey prepared the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000) that compelled Turkey to restructure the agricultural sector according to the conditions put down by the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU. The plan was primarily designed for the elimination of intervention in crop prices and guaranteed crop purchases by the state and parastatal organizations, withdrawal of the input subsidies, and the introduction of alternative crops. Once the plan was implemented, guaranteed purchases and credit supports were prolonged but a reduction in input supports was achieved in 1997. Many state-owned agricultural institutions including the Milk Industry Association (Türkiye Süt Endüstrisi Kurumu), the Meat and Fish Association (Et Balık Kurumu), and the Fodder Industry (Yem Sanayi) were privatized (Aydın, 2009). In hindsight, the plan set the stage for the proliferation of agricultural TNCs in Turkey and the production of high-value inputs for the agricultural industry instead of traditional crops.

Recent Changes in Agricultural Policies

During the early 2000s, significant ruptures occurred in agricultural policies. These rapid legal and institutional changes had serious reverberations for the producers. However, the aforementioned policies implemented through the end of 1990s were

preliminary to the comprehensive restructuring of the agricultural sector during the course of the early 2000s that stipulated an extremely radical structural adjustment and a rigid timetable. Once again, a high budget deficit and chronic inflation encouraged the involvement of the IMF experts in macroeconomic policies by The Staff Monitoring Agreement that led to a stand-by agreement in December 1999. Since agricultural support policies were regarded as a major source of disequilibrium in the economy, the letter of intent to the IMF involved prospects for an agricultural restructuring as well. A letter of intent dated December 9, 1999, stated that "the medium-term objective of our reform programs to phase out existing support policies and replace them with a direct income support system targeted to poor farmers" (Article 40). The main principle was to rationalize agricultural policies by eliminating support prices and reducing the volume of purchases by the TMO. In terms of sugar beets, "this [would] allow TŞFAŞ factories to operate on a more commercial basis with greater freedom in setting prices and quantities in contracts with growers" (Article 41). Furthermore, the ASCUs expected to achieve full autonomy and a plan to reduce the total cost of a credit subsidy sustained by Ziraat Bank and Halkbank was implemented in order to leave any intervention in the market out of the account.

Yet another contributor to the restructuring process in the early 2000s was the World Bank which promised macroeconomic stability, fiscal adjustment, and structural reforms in return for loans to reduce the social costs of the stringent IMF program for vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, a letter of intent to the World Bank dated March 10, 2000, aimed to eliminate the inflationist pressure of agricultural subsidies on the budget as well as the weight of high prices on consumers rather than draw up a rural development plan that would cushion the detrimental effects on

farmers (Karapinar, Adaman & Ozertan, 2010; Oyan, 2001b, 2002; Olhan, 2006; Yavuz, 2005). The letter of intent envisaged a number of profound changes such as phasing out the state subsidies scheme which prevented private enterprises from investing in the agricultural sector, rationalizing agricultural supports by removing all indirect supports including credit and input subsidies, allowing prices to be set in the free market without any state intervention, rearranging parastatal agricultural organizations as autonomous bodies, and privatizing agricultural SEEs.[18]

A stand-by agreement with the IMF dated December 1999 was somehow unique due to the absence of a major financial or balance of payments crisis. Therefore, optimism and trust in the economic restructuring were ostensibly rising. However, rising expectations and the absence of a crisis could not provide sufficient protection. What was ironic was that Turkey experienced twin crises in November 2000 and February 2001 with costly consequences in terms of output, employment, and income distribution, while it was concurrently implementing a reform program. More crucially, despite the macroeconomic instability associated with the November 2000 crisis, no delays were acceptable in the context of agricultural reforms. In December 18, 2000, an additional letter of intent agreed upon with the IMF stated that in order "to promote greater economic efficiency of agricultural policies, and allow stricter control on their fiscal cost and better targeting to the poorest farmers" the agricultural support scheme would be transformed radically within three years. However, the Turkish economy had already collapsed. (IMF, December 2000, Article 44)

At first glance, the letter of intent to the IMF and the World Bank that trapped Turkey within the conditionalities of the international financial system held a few

[18] For the details of March 10, 2000 dated letter of intent to the World Bank see full document accessed at http://www.belgenet.com/eko/kpm_2.html.

shortcomings in terms of its agreements. Obviously, international financial institutions were giving special priority to the dismantling of the existing agricultural support systems in order to replace them with a new regime. However, the letters were focusing on the malfunctioning of the existing subsidy schemes rather than explaining the characteristics and the structure of the new system. The first deficiency, hence, was how little public and especially agricultural producers would know about the forthcoming reforms. The letters reprehended the existing direct support policies claiming that they offered speculative price signals in the market, were biased against small producers, lacked institutional coherence, and were a burden on the budget and taxpayers. The new system, in turn, was considered to be more efficient, rational, compatible to the functioning of the market, and better targeted at the poorest farmers (IMF, December 1999; World Bank, December 2000). The second deficiency was relatively unsurprising in that the letters failed to deliver effective policies regarding the burdens of transformation and the socio-economic consequences of the reform process. An influential program should have protected farmers from such a distructive process. Declining agricultural supports definitely reduced the level of income in rural areas and the share taken by agriculture in total employment which was relatively high, 36 percent in 2000.

In 2000, despite the existing deficiencies, this radical reform initiative haphazardly took the plunge for significant changes. Without proper consideration, An ASCU law dated June 2000 restructured all ASCUs as autonomous bodies including financial positions. Credit subsidies were fully phased out (IMF, December 2000). The spread of the support price for wheat over international prices was lowered to 35 percent. Foreign trade controls on cereals began to be lowered within

the same year. Finally, the support purchase prices were set in line with the targeted inflation rate as prescribed in the letters of intent.

In spite of the fact that the stable pillar of the economic reform collapsed immediately after the November 2000 and February 2001 twin crises, commitment to the SAP deepened even more. In the midst of the 2001 crisis, Kemal Derviş, the former World Bank vice president, was appointed as the minister responsible for the Treasury in the weak coalition government. In addition to his extraordinary ministerial powers, he acted as a technocrat, a figure above politics. Closely linked with the international financial institutions, Derviş facilitated a top-down and rapid restructuring and the managerial team around him gained power and autonomy as well. His role as a policy entrepreneur and mediator provided radical reform initiative a kind of legitimacy that would have been missing otherwise (Güven, 2009; Keyman & Öniş, 2007). The Economic Reform Program supervised by Derviş expedited liberalization and the restructuring of agriculture with a special emphasis on subsidies due to the assumption that direct subsidies were a burden on the budget. In the context of the series of agreements signed with the IMF and World Bank, the government carried out ARIP in 2001 to phase out existing subsidies and replace them with DIS payments. Turkey was rewarded by the World Bank with $600 million to operate ARIP designed as a hybrid adjustment-investment project. The development objective of the project was to facilitate the implementation of agricultural reform which would dramatically eliminate support policies and substitute them with a system that intended to increase productivity for the agricultural producers and agro-industry. In addition, ARIP intended to minimize the short-term adverse effects of the transition period and the new support system.

Nevertheless, the requirements of the project to be fulfilled promoted fiscal stability rather than allocative efficiency.[19]

ARIP had four components.[20] First, in lieu of subsidies for inputs, credits and support purchases which would be totally phased out, and primarily to cushion only short-term losses, a DIS system was launched. DIS would be paid on a per hectare basis and designated as independent or "decoupled" from production. The second initiative under the program was to encourage producers make the transition from overwhelmingly prevalent traditional crops to alternative crops such as oilseeds, feed crops, and corn. Third, ARIP intended to facilitate structural reform of the agricultural bureaucracy. According to fervent reformers, state intervention had alienated ASCUs from their constituents and left them heavily indebted, including high wage costs. Therefore, the privatization of agricultural SEEs and even the autonomy of local ASCs pushed ahead. Finally, the last component included a public information campaign to encourage public awareness and support.

By taking advantage of the top-down reformist tide of the twin crisis period, regulations were made and new laws were passed fairly quickly for the rationalization of the agricultural sector. The DIS system was placed at the heart of the ARIP, existing input and credit subsidies were removed and regularity was provided within two years. The TZDK and TEKEL were privatized and agricultural SEEs including ÇAYKUR and TŞFAŞ were enlisted for privatization. The TMO was restructured to remove state intervention in the market as the support price mechanism. The fiscal support to ASCUs and ACCs was also reduced in order to

---

[19] For further information see ARIP accessed at

http://www.worldbank.org.tr/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20188065~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:361712,00.html .

[20] See report on "Turkey-Agricultural Reform Implementation" accessed at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/18/000094946_00081705310273/Rendered/INDEX/multi0page.txt Report No. PID9405.

evolve parastatal institutions into "sustainable, self-financing, and dedicated to marketing" organizations (Lundell *et al.*, 2004, p. 2). Restrictions on sugar beets, hazelnuts, and tobacco limited production by the related acts and promoted the transition to alternative crops.[21] Between 1999 and 2002, agricultural income decreased by 16 percent, the real agricultural prices declined by 13 percent, but the real costs of agricultural inputs increased by 13 percent (Lundell *et al*., 2004). In seven years (2001-2008), the reform process presented tremendous hardships and challenges, particularly for small-scale commodity producers, as the share of agriculture in total employment drastically fell and two million additional dwellers added to the surplus labor category. More crucial was that despite the diversification of the rural economy after the ARIP period, the rural labor market could not absorb the excess labour that used to be small producers (Ilkkaracan& Tunalı, 2010).

The initial phase of the ARIP was DIS payments. It is important to note that the reform of the agricultural subsidy system had been planned before the ARIP, but required the expertise of the World Bank which proposed transition not as a political issue but as a technical achievement in the reformist surge of crises period. Indeed, DIS contemplated for the insulation of producers from the socially distorting consequences of the elimination of input subsidies and support prices rather than being a support system on its own. DIS supporters had attacked the existing generous support system consisting of input and credit subsidies and support purchases by claiming that the system was fiscally expensive, regressively taxed consumers, channeled resources to large agricultural enterprises, and did not contribute to rural

[21] See Aydın (2009), Aydın (2001), and Oyan (2002) for the evaluations on the legal regulations regarding sugar and tobacco.

development (Çakmak, 1999).[22] Unfortunately, DIS as a palliative scheme resulted in dismal performance. From the point of view of the pro-reformers, there were two shortcomings of the DIS that led to failure. First, despite being a component of the program, the public information campaign remained ineffective and empowered opposition. Second, the program was not implemented as it was planned at its launch. Mismanagement of the policies, inadequate and ill-timed, diluted the program which would have otherwise been successful (Akder, 2010; Çakmak & Dudu, 2010). On the other hand, those in opposition to DIS offered a more extensive analysis regarding the deficiency of the agricultural reform. First, the DIS system was decoupled from production, based on status as landowner, and open to abuse. The payments were made per hectare and only for registered land.[23] Therefore, landowners achieved support regardless of whether they were producing on the land. Under these conditions, tenant farmers and sharecroppers could not collect decoupled payments. Large enterprises were divided and registered again by the other family members to assess more support while, on the other hand, the more vulnerable small producers could not even be registered in the system due to high application fees or irresolvable disagreements about inheritance. Second, DIS payments brought about unintended consequences for the land and labor market which resulted in further land

[22] On the contrary, Oyan (2001b) argued that Ziraat Bank accounts were forged and that subsidy and credit payments were declared more than their actual cost so that the elimination of subsidies could be justified.

[23] The NRF system was a sub-component of the ARIP. The system was based on the declarations of the farmers with the titles of their land in order to achieve decoupled payments. The NRF involved information content about the personal data of farmers, type of agricultural activity, variety of products, type of payments, and regional geographic characteristics. In spite of the fact that ARIP was completed in 2008, the NRF system is still functioning for the agricultural subsidies, insurance systems, and bank credits (Yomralioglu *et al*., 2009). Under the NRF system, Turkey nearly completed its cadastre with the widest scope possible and achieved a data system of farmers. Nevertheless, technocrats and experts took the opportunity of managing, controlling, and inspecting farmers and designing 'efficient' and 'economically much more feasible' policies through remote data bases regardless of who the objects of the policies were and what they demanded.

fragmentation and speculation, especially in the land market. Third, the imposition of the alternative crop project was a technocratic attempt which would eventually present problems for producers. What the designers of the project did not take into account was that production patterns were not separated from social structure and tacit knowledge. However, experts promoted unfamiliar products to set up the market rationality instead of historically-important and regionally well-established crops.[24] To replace traditional crops with alternative ones without properly considering production patterns and socio-environmental conditions would probably lend itself to monocropping in favour of the agricultural TNCs from seeds to industrial processing (Keyder&Yenal, 2011; Aydın, 2010; Atasoy, 2013).

Ever since the 1960s ASCs and ASCUs were the significant actors in rural development policies of the state which intended to keep producer prices up through subsidies and market intervention. The governments funded support purchases by the cooperatives and unions as well as the establishment of industrial plants, storage systems, and executive offices. ASCs and ASCUs offered a variety of services for farmers such as marketing, pricing, crop processing, crop standardization, and input supplies including cheap farm machinery, tools, and credit. Furthermore, cooperatives and unions assessed communicative roles for the producers. These organizations accepted as a buffer zone were establishing relations between farmers and the state, the market, and other sectors such as industry and agricultural research institutions. However, what matters most were not the functions of the organizations but whether they delivered ‘effective’ and ‘rational’ policies according to entrepreneurial acumen. Hence, ASCs and ASCUs were highly criticized by the

[24] In a similar vein, the “Agricultural Basins Plan” designed in 2009, which divided Turkey in 30 basins, attempted to replace traditional products in each region by an *a priori* determined crop. In the name of the recent support program, an immense project for monocroping was underway through top-down and technocratic policies. For further information see http://www.tarim.gov.tr/Files/duyurular/Sunum/TarimHavzalariSunum14TEMMUZ09.ppt.

reformers who claimed that irrational policies bestowed privileges upon large enterprises.[25] The state, rather than the farmer members, gained overall control of the unions. Finally, the experts determined that ASCUs and ASCs suffered significantly from overstaffing as a consequence of the election pledges of governing parties for decades. (Lundell *et al*., 2004)

One of the main themes of the agricultural reform was to privatization and commercialization of parastatal enterprises, ASCs, and ASCUs. In June 2000, a new law that would transform existing structures into independent, autonomous, and self-managed financial and administrative systems arranged the realignment of the unions. The financial costs of restructuring as efficient and rational bodies as well as technical assistance would be defrayed by the ARIP. The reform of parastatal institutions aspired to introduce a long term business strategy to reduce expenses and eliminate overstaffing. As reported by the World Bank, "the new realities require to apply the simple business principle of purchasing only as much as can be sold and at a price which covers all the costs of ASCs/ASCUs" (Lundell *et al*., 2004, p.61). In addition to the removal of subsidies and credits, the reform of the ASCUs required privatization of the enterprises belonging to farmers' organizations. The aim of the designers of the program was to phase out overall liquidity facilities of the organizations in order to create funds for input and credit subsidies. In addition to entering a *cul de sac* of finance, it was becoming extremely difficult for the cooperatives that oscillated between the state and the market to achieve independent autonomous governance. In a similar vein, even the World Bank pointed out the inability of the reform process to remove state intervention and evolve these bodies from government-dominated cooperatives to village-level, member-owned, powerful,

[25] On the contrary, ASCs and ASCUs were notably playing a significant role in small producers' relations to the market and the state. For further discussion see Oyan (2009).

and efficient service organizations in claiming that "this situation where government has withdrawn but where farmers and their cooperatives are not yet in a position to exercise their ownership rights is very dangerous because it creates a serious governance vacuum" (Lundell *et al*., 2004, p.61).

The corollary of the inspection of the ARIP process would entail that direct involvement of the World Bank in production processes, elimination of support schemes, and privatization of farmers' organizations and SEEs exposed small producers to harsh conditions of the free market.[26] Complete elimination of state interference in the agricultural sector, reorganization of the producers' organizations and administrative structures, and the acceleration of the privatization of agricultural institutions contributed to the process of opening up agricultural markets for the full functioning of TNCs from seed to industrial processing. Until 2008, a limited number of farmers benefited from DIS payments and then a full return to price supports removed decoupled payments.[27] However, the restructuring of ASCUs and ASCs as autonomous bodies was irreversible. Since they had lost their functions, producers could not meaningfully convey their demands to the political center and follow supervised market operations. As a consequence, ARIP never received palpable societal support and was labeled as a technocratic project imposed from above (Güven, 2009).

[26] For more extensive analysis of the functioning of the market and the logic of neoliberal policies see Caliskan and Adaman (2010).

[27] The elimination of DIS was highly criticized by the EU because CAP of the EU supported decoupled payments which were highly consistent with DIS. See Doner (2012) for the possible outcomes of CAP that farming families would face through accession negotiations to the EU.

Towards 2023

In a series of laws, strategies, and development plans starting in 2000, the state has transformed the structure of the agricultural sector and, more crucially, designed future plans of rural development that have increased the vulnerability of small producers to the impingement of private sector investments and the interests of agribusiness companies in agricultural production. If one examines any of the official plans produced by the state or international financial institutions, including the NRDS (2007-2013), the Agricultural Strategy Paper (2006-2010), The Agrarian Law (2006), The Seed Law (2006), or the Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), a common characteristic is likely to be found. The question of rural development in Turkey is constantly presented as a problem of the inefficiency of Turkish agriculture due to low productivity and high rural employment. The logic of the analysis is as follows: Turkey is characterized by small scale and highly fragmented land holdings, a reluctance to comply with standards and quality, inefficient market activities and industrial integration, and insufficient capital and financial resources for agricultural production (NRDS, 2006).

According to official plans, the first strategy for rural development is achieving a competitive structure for the agriculture and food sectors. With the image of so many inefficient small enterprises, the solution already seems apparent. “The restructuring process in agriculture which means market-oriented and high competitive agriculture structure necessitates; transformation of agricultural enterprises into rational economic units, productivity increase in production, an organized agriculture sector, effective functioning of market mechanisms and its

institutions, and development of food industry sector which directly affects rural economies" (NRDS, 2006, p.14). In the name of technical strategies, "it is essential to make the rural poor withdraw from assistance demanded passive position and guiding them to become productive individuals" (NRDS, 2006, p. 21). Therefore, the economic rationality based on competition and efficiency can only be achieved through the individualization of decision-making processes which accepts any collective structure as an obstacle to free market rationality. Furthermore, the crux of the matter is also to prepare a legal framework for free market operations in the agricultural sector. According to the Agrarian Law (2006), which set urgently needed policies and arrangements to enhance rural areas and the agricultural sector in accordance with the development plans and strategies, rural development and wealth can be attained only if peasants learn to enhance production based on internal and external demand, efficiency and rationality principles, know-how research, and development projects in the competitive free market. In conjunction with the Agrarian Law, the Seeds Law (2006) prepares a groundwork for market functioning as well. It protects the intellectual property rights of seed companies that improve new varieties of registered and certified seeds, while at the same time restricting the use of traditional seeds that are the products of tacit knowledge, natural selection of seed saving methods, and centuries-old planting techniques.

The second strategy documented in the official plans is to keep agricultural producers, who are obviously affected by the dissolution of small farming, in rural areas. In the NRDS, the stated main purpose is "to improve and ensure the sustainability of living and job conditions of the rural community in their territory in harmony with urban areas, based on the utilization of local resources and potential, and the protection of environmental and cultural assets" (NRDS, 2006, p.12). Hence,

the diversification of non-agricultural economic activities in rural areas is encouraged to prevent rural unemployment. Remarkably, these plans emphasize the potential of rural tourism and the marketing of environmental and cultural assets by establishing microenterprises including e-commerce for handicrafts, traditional crafts, and local foods to reduce income disparities in rural areas. For instance, the utilization of resources through the sustainable management of forests and increasing competitiveness of wood processing industries are envisaged for ensuring development in rural settlements, especially in forest villages (Ninth Development Plan, 2006). Not only the management of forests but also marketing and privatization of land, mines, water, and fishery resources, which would lead to exploitation of natural resources and rural livelihoods, environmental pollution, and deterioration of biodiversity, are promoted for additional financial benefits.[28] The resulting arrangements, which relied on the strategy to prevent migration of young labour force from rural areas, underline the enhancement of efficiency of education, transportation, health and social security services and the fulfillment of rural infrastructural requirements. In compliance with rural development plans, the increasing adverse socio-economic problems of restructuring such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of social services are claimed to be solved by new financing methods including the contributions of NGOs, local authorities, the private sector, and the public sector as well (Ninth Development Plan, 2006).

Since the leitmotif of the development plans is constructed on managerial and technical schemes, small farmers and households appear only as production units in directorial strategies. What the schemes fail to mention is that producers' efficiency

[28] For further elaboration on the management of water see Kadirbeyoglu and Ozertan (2010) and for an analysis of the effects development policies on environment in Turkey see Adaman and Arsel (2005).

and competitiveness cannot merely be determined by the amount of the products they sell on the market. If the assumptions are limited to a cost-benefit analysis of the neoliberal economy, many goods and services, generated by agricultural producers and ranging from the economic to environmental spheres, become invisible by market rationality. In a similar vein, Vanderburg (1988, p.8) criticizes technical operations by claiming that "efficiency, cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit measures are all ratios which compare outputs with inputs without any reference to how any improvements are going to fit into the socio-cultural matrix of a society or into the ecosystem". Likewise, the existing plans and strategies accept small producers, who are actually face to face with the vicissitudes of agricultural reforms, as the main reason for structural inefficiency in the sector and maintain that "the small scale and fragmented structure of enterprises cause productivity to remain at low levels" (Ninth Development Plan, 2006, p.40). Rather than evaluating the impacts of policy setup on rural livelihoods, official plans recognize vulnerable groups as the main obstacle to the functioning of the free market.

A key point that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that these strategies are determined on the accepted premises that improved management of resources and technology through large enterprises will overcome the problem of inefficiency and the context in which Turkish agriculture operates should be rearranged according to the emerging structure with more intensified commoditization and deeper market integration. These official policies, dangerously distanced from their constituents, obviously neglect the viability of small producers grappling with the predicaments of structural reforms such as increasing indebtedness, self-exploitation, and landlessness. The alternative policy options that extend to non-agricultural job and income opportunities such as agro-tourism and the marketing of handicrafts, for

labor force excluded from agricultural production do not appear to hold much promise for the small producers because converting assets into innovative enterprises and promoting them in the external markets require a considerable amount of initial capital.[29] Taking any of the development plan as our guide, it can be said that political interest in rural development diverts from agricultural production, which is no longer considered to be a fundamental economic sector, to the marketing and management of natural resources. In this context, long-term development plans support the conversion of natural assets such as water, grassland, mines, national parks, and cultural valuables into commodities for which, consequently, indiscriminate exploitation leads to the destruction of the environment, degradation of resources, and dissipation of rent-seeking activities by ignoring the ecology and life-supporting capacity of the resources.

Conclusion

Since the 1950s, the development of Turkey has occurred within a broader framework of the market economy and political liberalization. Yet, a critical and closer perusal of the process can raise questions regarding the quality of the democratic regime and the performance of economic development. Turkey managed to achieve modest rates of economic growth and fully integrate into global markets, but significant transformation did not lead to the amelioration of unequal income distribution. Moving on to the political sphere, Turkey's democratic transition has also demonstrated vital deficiencies. The breakdown of democratic consolidation in periods of economic crisis and military interludes was rather short-lived but brought

[29] Therefore, the envisioned projects of agro-tourism and marketing local handicrafts are notably carried out by the urban dwellers.

about inadequacies in terms of achieving a plural, multi-cultural, and representative political system. Concomitantly, populist cycles and patronage-rendered political mobilization has clearly presented serious obstacles to democratic governance. There seems to be no disputing the fact that rent-seeking activities and clientelism have accelerated severe distributional conflicts among different groups seeking to acquire a higher amount of rent with easy access to public resources.

1950 signaled the attempts of Turkey to integrate its economy into the world markets which assigned Turkey to the role of producing raw material. Therefore, necessary technical improvements to increase mechanization in agricultural production were achieved with the support of the Marshall Aid Plan and the impositions and recommendations of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. During the planned economy period in the following two decades, there were multiple policies implemented in the agricultural sector such as integrated area development projects, higher support prices, input subsidies, and credit incentives for the enhancement of productivity and competitiveness. The adoption of economic planning based on the ISI model necessitated the role of the agricultural sector as the principal resource of raw material and foreign exchange for a well-protected domestic industry. Due to the role of peasants in development policies and in the political system as a massive electoral presence, the state promoted the interests of the producers through a variety of instruments including patronage policies. While this was the case for the agricultural sector, farmers received significant welfare gains in the period from 1950 to1980 (Keyman, 2010). Nevertheless, the problem lies in the fact that the transformation of political and economic structures enabled producers' accession into the political system but did not let their expectations be realized through democratic political participation.

In 1980, a profound shift occurred in Turkey concerning the role of the state in economic affairs with the demise of the national developmentalist era based on the ISI model. After decades of protection and a state-led development program, the transition to *laissez faire* policies under the auspices of international financial institutions dismantled agricultural supports and introduced a free market economy by the decisions accepted on January 24, 1980. The transformation of the Turkish economy and agricultural sector accordingly was a perfect example of top-down and externally-induced restructuring. A new managerial bureaucracy and technocratic change-teams organized around Özal and MP governance facilitated the implementation of SAP. However, at the end of 1980s, Özal discovered that neoliberal policies harmed the electoral support of rural districts. Consequently, populist policies that supported agricultural producers and deviated from the SAP reemerged in the system for a decade. In August 1989, complete capital account liberalization, a major shift in the financial system without necessary legal and structural regulations, left Turkey vulnerable to short term capital flows in the era of financial globalization. Therefore, the economic *apertura* of the 1990s was characterized by cycles of political and financial crisis. Perhaps the most striking pattern regarding rescue packages was that international financial institutions extended the scope of the structural adjustment in a systematic manner in return for loans.

In spite of the fact that the massive overhaul of the agricultural sector was planned in the late 1990s due to the excessive burden of subsidies on the budget and consumers, it was not activated until the implementation of ARIP in the reformist tide of the twin crises period. The complete elimination of state subsidies in agricultural sector, reorganization of the producers' organizations and administrative

structures as autonomous bodies, and the speeding up of the privatization of agricultural institutions and SEEs drastically affected the lives and livelihoods of agricultural producers and contributed to the operation of opening up agricultural markets for the full functioning of TNCs from seed to industrial processing. Furthermore, critical analysis of the official strategy papers for the future of the agricultural sector affirmed that these policies, dangerously distanced from their constituents, obviously neglect the viability of small producers grappling with predicaments of structural reforms such as increasing indebtedness, self-exploitation, and landlessness.

This chapter has sought to assert that just as under the ISI model, the free market economy and technocratic policies in coordination with the IMF and the World Bank blocked mass mobilization and genuine democratic participation in the Turkish countryside. Neither the neoliberal and individualist nor the statist and corporatist perspectives were able to come to terms with the idea of a representative and transparent approach to policy-making processes in Turkey. This study also asserts that major policy changes threatening livelihoods of millions of people have not been launched on the basis of broad social consensus. On the contrary, reform programs, which have been virtually unknown to the public, were implemented under external pressure. Therefore, they were referred to not only as adjustment strategies but in equally important ways as hegemonic projects. Neither the ISI model, nor the neoliberal transformation under SAP, nor any other development policy gave priority to the real constituents of the reform. However, the post-1980 period proved more conducive to the spread of market rationality and entrepreneurial spirit on an individual level, the removal of the political debate, and TNCs' growing role in shaping agricultural transformation in addition to international institutions.

What is conveniently ignored by the neoliberal approach is the fact that the separation of politics from the market and market activity from society reduces politics to the role of managing policies by technical maneuvers and further reduces society to compliant clients of the policies. In public discussions, experts' technical and scientific language, which is beyond the understanding of most citizens, is limited to how the nation will be reconciled to the discipline of austerity measures and structural adjustment (Cizre& Yeldan, 2005). With the demise of representative politics, technical know-how, whatever it is applied to, makes little or no reference to the way it would fit into the environment and leaves no place for debate and compromise as technocrats replace politicians.

The corollary of this logical result would entail that technocratic development policies from 1950's DP to 2010's AKP have condoned the depredation of nature and the exploitation of the peasantry for political and economic interests through omitting the harmful effects on the real objects of the reform. More crucially, the transition to a free market economy and the implementation of the SAPs in agriculture (and in other sectors as well) has expedited this process over the last three decades. Therefore, the task at hand can be described as the investigation of the consequences of the SAPs on agricultural producers in a micro environment who are torn between market rationality and tacit knowledge and whose livelihoods are under a significant threat by technocratic policies. The rest of this study can be considered as a modest attempt in that direction within the parameters of specific fieldwork carried out in the Karacabey region.

CHAPTER 3

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN HARMANLI VILLAGE DURING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

Introduction

The evolution of a set of SAPs has affected a growing number of producers around the world. Few farmers today can operate outside the scope of these programs. In this period, agricultural policies have become more homogenous. The various instruments of supportive state policies have been replaced by narrow policy options underlining the role of the market, free trade, and industrial production. In this sense, a group of practices and policies by the international institutions and companies has introduced new farming techniques and production patterns.

The industrialization of agricultural production, a highly complex division of labour, de-skilling and the destruction of craft knowledge have increasingly disconnected structuring elements which previously introduced specificity into agriculture. Uniform and standardized procedures of industrial production have superseded the priorities of local knowledge and local ecosystems. Initially, however, local knowledge provided a basis for the producers to practice the "art of farming" (Goodman & Redclift, 1991, p.100). Over time farmers have acquired the best knowledge about local agroecological characteristics, quality of the soil, and microclimatic conditions on their land. They have also learned to select input and crop varieties that respond well to local weather and soil conditions (Buckland, 2004). Moreover, producers have unique and diverse knowledge of their production systems, crop patterns, and the socio-economic earmarks of their communities. This

local knowledge is the essence of what is referred to as the expertise of farmers in highly varied farm situations totally different from standardized knowledge of experts of structural adjustment.

In contrast to codified or standardized knowledge, local or tacit knowledge is often based on personal experience and practice in a specific area. However, standardized knowledge is mobile, transferable, and functions independently from contexts (Morgan & Murdoch, 2000). Codified knowledge promoted by international institutions and firms is concomitantly situated in standardization which agribusiness requires in order to move from locale to locale. If a degree of trust is valued in transactions within a society, low trust and coercion will lead to codified knowledge, whereas high trust will favor tacit knowledge in networks. It is frequently assumed that farmers, the experts of local knowledge, are open to any information coming from any quarter. Modern planners, however, are far less interested in other ways of knowing (Scott, 1998).[30]

Since the Green Revolution, the paradigm of chemically improved seed, fertilizer, and pesticide has marked industrial agriculture in both developed and developing countries. This production model involved cultivation of a small number of crops, generally in monoculture stands, to increase efficiency in the use of external inputs and mechanization and maximize the flow of natural resources to harvestable products (Scherr & McNeely, 2008). Before chemical herbicides and pesticides, farmers usually had an intimate knowledge of, among other things, their land holdings and their fertility and composition through the practices of rotation and

[30] Whereas farmers were the only experts on soil and crop selection, few people were trained to teach agricultural subjects academically. These people actually belonged to departments of chemistry, botany, and zoology and had little idea how to apply industrial knowledge to local practices (Fitzgerald, 2003). In a similar vein, after giving a stunning example of local knowledge that protects the mango tree from red ants by bringing black ants rather than using pesticides, Scott (1998) argues that neither agricultural officials, nor industrial experts, who are mostly raised in town, still know about local knowledge that is achieved in the context of lifelong observation.

ploughing. In Harmanlı village, only old farmers rarely apply traditional methods and blame young farmers for not being receptive to local knowledge and to blindly following the industrial model;

> I always talk at the coffeehouse about how I harvested 870 kg of corns on sandy soil without irrigation. One of the youths told that he would not have believed it if he had not been there. I planted without irrigation. Ask me how I managed to do this. I wish my neighbor also harvested more. Why are these young people so lazy? Do you know how the young sow? In the spring when the soil is mellowed, he drives a tractor. He spreads fertilizer with a broadcaster. He sows with two machines. Then he says goodbye to the field; the crop will grow no matter what. There is no place untouched by the engine. The soil becomes like a stone. Then, aridity… and leaves of corn are twisted due to high temperature. If God sends rain, it will avail the crop. He opens the furrow, irrigates through rows. What if it doesn't work? How did I do it? I mixed the soil, I turned it over. You have to work! (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 11, 2010, Appx C, 1)

Ecologically more benign production systems based on craft knowledge have not been incorporated into the industrial model mainly for economic reasons because they are accepred as inefficient production systems. In addition, components such as seeds and fertilizers, which were previously essential to production, were taken from local producers, transformed into industrial inputs, and finally sold back to farmers. Goodman and Redclift (1991) analyze the industrialization of agriculture by using the concepts of appropriationism and substitutionism. Appropriation refers to innovation in the agrifood systems such as the replacement of animal power by tractors and organic fertilizers by synthetic chemicals. The process of substitutionism embodies the priority of non-agricultural raw materials and the invention of industrial substitutes for food and fibres by chemical engineering (Goodman & Redclift, 1991). For example, the production of tomatoes without soil and gene transfers has totally altered production processes. In short, farm commodities are being produced by non-agricultural raw materials or industrial substitutes by breaking the direct linkages between knowers and doers.

SAPs which encourage the transition to industrialized knowledge are aimed at rationalizing farm structures. New farm structures and production models, where the similarities with industrial process engineering and standardized production are strongest, are believed to have become the most efficient forms of production. The promise of structural adjustment was that the expansion of international markets would galvanize agricultural production. Nevertheless, farmers have found themselves squeezed between input suppliers and agrifood processing companies (Morgan & Murdoch, 2000).The technical treadmill thereby favours and fosters change through the larger farmers and pushes the small farmers out of agriculture (Buckland, 2004). It has placed farmers at the mercy of fluctuating world markets exposing them to forces well beyond their own control (Robinson, 2004).

This chapter intends to show that with the implementation of SAP, significant trends that were not anticipated at its launch have become apparent in agricultural production and producers were caught between the divergent forces of tacit knowledge and market rationality. Declining subsidies, rising prices of agricultural inputs, standardization, and market knowledge that is inaccessible to the majority of the small farmers transform the style of production, the production levels, and type of crops in Harmanlı village. Hence, this chapter analyzes changing product patterns, input use, agricultural support policies, and production of agricultural knowledge with special emphasis on productivity and efficiency. It also provides an exhaustive analysis on the new forms of production such as contract farming and organic farming, and the consequences of rising costs of production in Harmanlı village.

Changing Product Patterns

Having outlined the differences between the knowledge systems of small producers and those of agribusiness, it is now possible to focus more closely upon the spaces of production and changing type of crops in Harmanlı village during the three decades of structural adjustment. It can be argued that the uneven penetration of agriculture by industrial knowledge from seeding to harvesting is part of the process of integration of small-producers into market relations with the assistance of international financial institutions. Consequently, small-scale producers change their production systems with the repositioning of agricultural production within the global economy where protectionist trade barriers are gradually being dismantled, subsidies are reduced, state owned enterprises supporting farmers are privatized, and parastatal agricultural cooperatives are dismantled by the state-managed policy framework.

Each farmer in the village is familiar with each of several varieties of different crops, how to choose the best products for seeding for the next year, when to plant, how deeply to sow, how to prepare the field, when to irrigate, when to harvest, and how to protect the plants from different weather conditions. A crucial differentiating factor from industrial knowledge is that this knowledge is specific to the local area in the sense that the growing of different varieties of crops necessitates knowledge based on observation and experience about the particular conditions of weather, soil, inputs, and even the unique characteristics of each plot the farmer cultivates. Much of this knowledge is kept in the collective memory as an oral archive of local production techniques and ecological information (Scott, 1998). However, recent production systems ignore local knowledge and offer the same policies as replicas of each other in different localities including the application of

mechanization and high technology in seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers. The blind faith in agricultural experts, large scale operations, and machines dramatically replaced ordinary methods and traditional crops.

In the 1980s, when structural adjustment had just begun, dry onion and pink tomatoes were produced by household enterprises in Harmanlı village and exported to the Middle East. The cash income from dry onions and pink tomatoes was considered the main source of wealth in Harmanlı by the villagers. Farmers could afford to purchase basic necessities, meet the expenses of education and spectacular wedding ceremonies, support close relatives living in the city, and design new houses.[31] More crucially, most of the farmers had the opportunity to save and invest in production. If successful, producers soon managed to buy or rent more land, buy even more expensive inputs and technical equipments, and subsequently continue agricultural production in a larger area.

The indigenous cultivation of dry onion in Karacabey can be called a craft in the sense of the term used by van der Ploeg (1993) while examining potato production in the Andes. The producers had adapted a variety of seeds to the local ecology, gradually improved the quality, and achieved sustainable yields for decades. Since the land of the producers in Harmanlı is divided, for each plot the farmers accumulated the knowledge of the effects of humidity, soil, slope, weather conditions, and the history of the cultivation of dry onion production. Dry onion should be planted on a rotating basis once every three years, especially after legumes. For these producers, the process of successfully growing traditional dry onions takes

[31] Through the end of 1980s a new style of house became popular in Harmanlı village. Farmers who gained a considerable amount of money by the export of dry onion left the traditional design of house which was u-shaped, had one-floor with a chimney, a toilette outside, and a garden. The new design, which soon failed completely, provided prodigious storage for onions and a living area on a different floor. Since dry onion production has been almost entirely abandoned, these storage areas are empty and cause the living area to be extremely cold in winter. Therefore, the heating expenses of the households rise considerably.

three years. In the first year they plant an onion bulb called mother bulb (*analık*) which will yield black seeds (*karaca*) to sow for the next year. The cultivation of black seeds in the second year results in shallots (*arpacık*). Finally, producers sow shallots and yield dry onions in the third year. The bulb to seed production method necessitates a particular set of knowledge. First of all, selecting the onion bulb according to good size, uniform color, and freedom from disease and physical damage is an ability reliant on experience. Preparing nursery sites and seed beds, adequate spacing, frequent control of pests and diseases, knowledge of beneficial insects, and the appropriate timing of irrigation, fertilization, trimming, and cutting require a combination of merits and labour-intensive techniques. Hence, traditional onion production can be identified as a craft due to the high level of skill required of farmers over a longer period during which producers continually test new varieties and exchange knowledge with each other.

In spite of the fact that dry onion production was dramatically reduced in Karacabey, once called dry onion storage of Turkey, the high quality of shallots is still preferred by cultivators in other regions of Turkey due to the unique weather conditions, the contents of the soil, and, importantly, the expertise of the local producers in Karacabey. The proliferation of industrial tomato processing companies in the 1980s in Karacabey and the introduction of an innovative seed to onion method of cultivation posed serious problems to traditional onion production in the region.[32] Industrial tomato production as a development model for small-producers marked the appearance of contract farming and encouraged producers to quit traditional dry onion production. In addition, new dry onion seeds such as *Keş*, *Aki*,

[32] Industrial tomato cultivation contrasted sharply with local pink tomato which had been exported. In a similar vein, the seed to onion method of production was a scientific development in seeding technology which involved a completely distinct variety of seeds from traditional black seeds (*karaca*).

Alex, and *Valencia* implied a major change in crop management. In the seed to crop method, it took only six months from seeding to harvesting so that the labour-intensive production cycle of three years was eliminated. Innovation in seed technology resulted in just another variety of dry onion or a new plant which was high in efficiency, more sturdy in the field and after harvesting, cultivable in lowlands that would need light soil, loam or clay loam, good fertility, and drainage otherwise. These changes are accompanied by major shifts in the labour process and were also followed by falling costs. Declining costs are apparent in the analysis of an onion merchant in Karacabey, "when dry onion is produced, if it is cultivated by shallots, it requires 70 kilos of shallots per decare. It costs 150 million TL [150 TL]. If you produce by seed, it will be 1 kilo-700 grams per decare. It only costs 40 million TL [40 TL]" (Karacabey, Onion Market, March 19, 2010, Appx C, 2).

In contrast to this picture, innovative seeds did not consistently give high yields and quality in Karacabey. It replaced the traditional cyclical production, though. According to agricultural engineers, heavy reliance on external herbicides such as Treflan resulted in the loss of soil fertility. Recent decades have also witnessed the shift of dry onion production from Karacabey to Polatlı, Eskişehir and Ankara where the cultivation has picked up tremendous speed. Notably, large enterprises in Polatlı have irretrievably altered the style of production so much so that the ability of small-scale farmers in Karacabey to compete in the market has been eroded due to Polatlı's high yields, use of technology, and access to market information. Once transformed into an industrial activity, the traditional method of dry onion production unique to Karacabey acquired by merit and local knowledge has been vitiated. Recently, small producers in Harmanlı village rarely grow dry onion which has been highly vulnerable to price fluctuations.

The expansion of smallholder contract farming was noticeable in industrial tomato production which replaced dry onion cultivation in Harmanlı.[33] Over the last ten to fifteen years, there has been an increase in grievances about contracting schemes with companies which disregard the demands of producer's organizations. These grievances, including equal risk sharing and improvement of bargaining power of small producers, decreases in contract prices, and rising costs, have compelled farmers to search for an available alternative. Syngenta in Mustafakemalpaşa in October 2001 and Cargill in Karacabey in January 2002 organized meetings supported by the Directorate of Agriculture in Bursa to introduce new seed varieties of corn and encourage farmers to sign contracts with Cargill ("Domates üreticisi mısıra yöneliyor", 2001; "Çiftçiye mısır önerisi", 2002).[34] Arguably, the prospects of better income possibilities facilitated their decision to switch to corn production for an agribusiness giant. When the contract price of industrial tomatoes was 8 *kuruş* per kilo, Cargill offered 20 *kuruş* per kilo for corn which would be 23.5 *kuruş* per kilo including transportation costs met by the company. In addition, while increasing its capacity to 150 thousand tons of corn, Cargill promised producers would be paid within fifteen days after delivery ("Domates üreticisine Cargill piyangosu", 2002). The contract price of corn rose to 28.8 *kuruş* and then 32.2 *kuruş* in 2003 and 2004 respectively ("Çiftçiye mısır önerisi", 2003; "Mısır üreticisi perişan oldu", 2005). Nevertheless, state's declaration of the price of corn flour as 26 *kuruş* in 2005 subverted contract prices as well.

[33] Industrial tomato production under contracting schemes will be exemplified in detail below.

[34] The US giant, Cargill, known for its use of GMOs in corn starch-based sugar production, is a massive agribusiness conglomerate expanding its activities from shipping (exports-imports) to producing animal feeds. Karacabey is situated between Cargill's seed processing factory in Mustafakemalpaşa which was transferred to Monsanto in 1998 and the corn processing factory in Orhangazi Bursa.

Following the Cargill meetings, the dairy and poultry industries, for which fodder expenses were almost 70 percent of their operating costs, also demanded farmers to produce corn for silage in Karacabey.[35] Higher demand for corn seemed to provide a way out for producers who required income-generating resources. However, once dependence on the company as a contractor or a seed merchant was guaranteed and juridical infrastructure and financial support of the state was achieved by Cargill, corn prices drastically decreased and standards requirements increased. The president of the Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey, Karaca stated that broken corn kernels and non-standard high humidity, which tempted contractors to manoeuvre, more frequently resulted in cuts in payments. Accordingly, doubts about the humidity measurement differences of the same product, 19 percent in the TMO and 24 percent in the company laboratory, worried producers ("Devlete güvenip mısır ektik; mağdur olduk", 2005).While having unwavering state backing, the policies of Cargill had far-reaching consequences for producers in Karacabey.

The promotion of corn production in Karacabey and other districts, in coordination with Cargill and the state institutions including Ziraat Bank, is a stunning example of political maneuvering on the restructuring of Turkish agriculture. Notably, a corn processing factory in Orhangazi Bursa was built on 195 thousand square meters of prime agricultural land on the shore of İznik Lake. Despite environmental and legal violations as well as a juridical decision by the Bursa Second Administrative Court to cancel the building certificate, the former governor of Bursa, Oğuz Kaan Köksal now member of parliament for Kırıkkale, permitted the company to produce isoglucose (fructose, dextrose, and glucose) as a competitor for sugar. Then a series of regulations by the government enabled Cargill to exert

[35] Since sugar beet production quotas caused disengagement from production and reduced supply, the fodder industry also switched from environmentally friendly cossette to corn silage.

influence on the sugar market in Turkey. The pressure from Cargill, the IMF, and the World Bank forced Turkey to organize its sugar regime by the Sugar Law of 2001. The new law regulated the privatization of state owned sugar enterprises, the establishment of sugar prices via negotiations between private sugar factories and producers (eliminating state intervention), and the organization of imports, exports, and sugar production according to recent quotas. These regulations destroyed the production of sugar beets, a consequence that had serious implications for thousands of farmers. In Karacabey, the sugar beet quota was rapidly reduced by 10 percent in 2001. Concomitantly, increasing input prices and competition with transnational starch-based sweetener producers pushed farmers out of production. In 2011, producers in Karacabey delivered only 20 thousand tons of sugar beets, down from 130 thousand tons in 2010 ("Pancar alımları sona erdi", 2011). While the sugar beet production quota was diminishing for farmers, the starch-based sugar production quota, which had been 10 percent of the total sugar quota, rose each year by up to 50 percent at the behest of the Council of Ministers.[36] In addition, a lowering of taxes by the government accelerated the import of corn produced in Latin America, which probably included GMOs, via Bandırma harbour.[37] It is obvious that the Cargill case illustrated how the global structures of political regulation, corruption, and profit accumulation risk crop extinction and disenchantment among farmers.

The ability of farmers to transition from one crop to another crop has been limited by market reforms which caught producers in a permanent price and production squeeze. In Harmanlı, farmers have been searching for alternative crops

[36] The Cargill case is a good indication of the extent of influence of global politics on local agricultural production (Aydın, 2010). In 2004, president Bush wrote Erdoğan before his visit to the US and asked him to remove all legal barriers to the operations of Cargill in Orhangazi and rapidly increase the share of isoglucoses in sugar production ("ABD'den üç mesaj",2004).

[37] On July 12, 2011, 6,600 tons of imported GMO corn was seized in the Bandırma harbour (Çalışkan, 2011).

to dry onions, industrial tomatoes, and corn, which may reduce the vulnerability of small producers to large enterprises. Since commodity prices are not rising, farmers try to minimize compensation. At first, they stop employing seasonal and daily workers and shift from labor-intensive crops to labor-saving products. Squeezed by stagnant or declining prices, a farmer in Harmanlı village explains how they retrench expenses in production, "we plant corn and do all the work with tractors. One man can get through 80 decares of corn. For tomatoes, on the other hand, you employ 2-3 workers per decare. The costs are rising. Everybody turns to wheat and corn to reduce costs. Chickpeas need pesticides as well" (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 24, 2000, Appx C, 3). Another grower states that he keeps up with production concerns by curtailing hiring paid labour, "we use family labour and daily workers from Karacabey as well. 15-20 years ago, I was taking twenty workers everyday. However, now I cannot even afford to drive there everyday let alone employ workers. In the past, seasonal workers staying over were also employed" (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2000, Appx C, 4). Under these conditions, wheat seems sturdy in the field and also once harvested (Scott, 1998). From planting to harvesting wheat requires little effort which can be supported by technical equipments. Compared with horticultural crops like tomatoes and dry onions, it is easy to store wheat with little loss.

Yet, as shown above, a lack of planning in production not only pushes farmers onto the industrial treadmill by disregarding local knowledge and products but also endangers food security in the village. Industrial crops supplanted food crops in small enterprises within indigenous farming practices. The majority of farming activity has moved away from food staples. For instance, corn produced in Harmanlı is processed in the fodder, starch-based sugar, and seed industries. More crucially,

canola production for biodiesel has been initiated instead of the cultivation wheat, which is the only staple crop in Karacabey ("Kanolayla iki kat verim", 2006; "Kanolayı yaymak istiyoruz", 2006).

In addition to the policy of routing processing companies and meagre access to inputs, market, and credits, growers are also confronting various challenges which limit their opportunities in the effort to sustain production. First, they need to follow the production patterns of nearby geographical regions:

> A product which is removed from the region has an impact on other crops as well. For instance, cotton is out of production in Aegean region. Whereas, farmers were planting cotton, now they start to grow tomatoes. Farmers in South Marmara also produce tomato exceedingly. The bargaining power of the companies is rising. The commodity loses in value. When Aegean farmers plant tomato, we cannot grow. At this rate, tomato will become extinct and corn will also disappear in this region. (Şen, 2010, Appx C, 5)

Obviously, geographical location and weather conditions prevent the production of many alternative crops. For instance, the location of Harmanlı village precludes the cultivation of winter crops such as leeks, cauliflower, and broccoli, which would otherwise boost income. Despite the fact that excess water is collected on the lowland fields of Harmanlı every year, 80 thousand decares of land including fields of 30 villages in Karacabey submerged by water in 2004 ("Karacabey ovası sular altında", 2004). A farmer in Harmanlı village explains how state policy on water shackles producers saying "we planted wheat, the water covered the plain, and it was destroyed. You went to a cost of 700 TL per decare. All went off. Now, we will be assessed an additional charge of 100-200 TL. It is state policy to collect water here. It is our destiny that stockades were constructed and water is collected here. Otherwise, everywhere from here to Kemalpaşa would be under water" (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010, Appx C, 6).

Finally, issues regarding land registration and inheritance prevent relatively rich farmers from investing in the production of fruit and olives. They think that their investment would be vein while title or ownership rights of the land are still belonging to their parents. Under these conditions the land would be shared according to the inheritance law by their brothers and sisters, despite farmers' huge expenses of planting fruit trees.

The Use of Inputs

Research and development in biotechnology that is centered heavily on agricultural productivity, growth, and efficiency homogenizes cultivation systems and increases the dependency of producers on global markets for inputs. The inclination towards chemical fertilizers and pesticides and modified seeds is likely to accelerate but this comes with a cost. In addition, pumped irrigation and the use of mechanical power boost results in a higher cost of fuel oil. Producers are squeezed between, on the one hand, declining or stagnant prices of crops and, on the other, continuously increasing input costs which are both controlled by off-farm capital.

Instead of incorporating local conditions and arranging production accordingly, technical improvements are designed to transform local practices and inputs to be uniform with a non-local model, which would be a futile endeavor. Indeed, so many interacting variables are involved in production that scientific knowledge cannot understand. For instance, a skilled farmer can analyze the needs of the soil by the plants while agricultural engineers are offering standard prescriptions in their offices without observing the field and crops.

Seeds

Increasing control over sources of inputs and other components through global corporations largely defined the predicaments that producers face in Harmanlı village. All cultivators use hybrid seeds for tomato, wheat, and corn in the village. These seeds are produced by artificially cross-pollinated plants and cannot give next year's seed as in traditional varieties. Despite the fact that hybrid seeds are promoted with the promise of high yields, these seeds actually serve for standardization attempts that increased mechanization in production and processing necessitate. Mechanical innovations, especially in harvesting and appropriations, are fully realized with the diffusion of crop hybridization with particular characteristics. Needless to say, it is dominated by scientific knowledge systems under strict control of corporations (Pritchard & Burch, 2003). In these circumstances, increasing complaints about rising prices have little influence over pricing policies.

In Karacabey, the TNCs Campbell's soup (tomato seeds) and Pioneer (corn seeds) are the preferred brands in the village. These corporations steer cultivators away from traditional varieties.[38] Among newer varieties of imported seeds, the preferences of the farmers are mainly determined by marketing presentations by the seed companies at the coffeehouses, the advice of the Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey, and the experiences of other cultivators in the village. Although producers call the seed companies "mafia" due to their high prices, the farmers have to trust representatives of the companies as a last resort.[39] However, the lack of

[38] Pioneer is also known for being a giant in corn seeds with GMOs. In the 1980s, Monsanto developed GMO and allowed Pioneer, which is owned by DuPont, to sell it. However, the company then developed its own varieties. The seeds are called hi-bred rather than hybrid. By "hi-bred", the company emphasizes the quality of the species which will lead to higher production and higher yields.

[39] In 2010, a 25 kilo bag of corn seed was 150 TL on average. While producers had to pay 6 TL per kilo of seed, the contract price for corn was 40 *kuruş* per kilo.

control on imported seeds may result in irreversible and unforeseeable consequences. In 2000, for instance, imported corn seeds planted on 2 thousand decares of land led to an almost 90 percent loss of production in Karacabey ("Fransız mısırı çiftçiyi kavurdu", 2000).

More crucially, the procedures of seed certification and registration before the marketing of the seeds increase the vulnerability of local producers. The 2006 Seed Act prohibits farmers to grow and share their own seeds. For generations, however, women went into the fields before the harvest to select next year's seed from the best crops for production and experimentation. For the benefits of the village community, intellectual property rights were generally held in common and farmers could share both seeds and craft knowledge. Seed saving methods, planting techniques, and the improvement of traditional varieties have been traditional practices for thousands of years but patent holders are recently gaining control over them. By law, the companies assess the intellectual property rights of traditional varieties which they have modified (Goodman &Redclift, 1991). In time, the collections of traditional crop genes have become largely inaccessible to those who have developed them and have the greatest need for them (Buckland, 2004). As an example, in Harmanlı village watermelon seeds are the only accessible traditional variety. Farmers, in short, will no longer play a role in reinforcing traditional seeds by natural hybridization and conserving genetic diversity. If this happens, both farmers and humanity alike will, in the long term, be the losers.

In addition to the predicaments of intellectual property rights and the permanent dependency on companies for seeds, by the end of 1990s, the commercial availability of genetically modified and transgenic seeds has posed an even bigger

threat to genetic diversity, human health, and the livelihood of farmers.[40] Since TNCs on seeds known as "gene giants" control the market in Karacabey, farmers cannot avoid GMOs. The seeds imported and sold in the market are not labeled as GMOs but both companies and farmers know that vast majority of the seeds contain GMOs. Given the significance of these developments, it is puzzling to realize the absence of a functioning inspection mechanism on the import, production, and use of GMOs in Turkey. Although civil society organizations have also engaged in the GMO debate and even if consumers and farmers are taking sides against GMOs together, the effect of the positions of the TNCs in state institutions is immense. The committee members of the union of seed producers, which is the only institution to control, are assigned by the state rather than elected. Furthermore, state officials are inclined to indulge in corrupt practices with the gene giants.[41] Put simply, the gene revolution is strengthening corporate control on the food, agrochemical, and pharmaceutical sectors rather than enhancing the food security and well-being of the farmers.

Fertilizer and Pesticides

The best fertilizer on any farm is the footsteps of the owner.

Confucius

Commercial fertilizers, which can be called medicine for soil deficiencies, have been frequently used by the producers to improve poor soils and raise yields. However, in

[40] In *Bitter Seeds*, Peled (2011) analyzes human costs of GMO cotton agriculture in India.

[41] According to the US Securities and Exchange Commision report, Turk Deltapine Inc. which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Delta& Pine Land Company and engaging in the production and sale of cottonseed in Turkey paid bribe to the officials of The Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs, in total $43 thousand, between 2001 and 2007. These payments were made in order to obtain certificates for seed production and exports without any GMO analysis on the samples of the cottonseed. For further information on bribery see "GDO'lu pamukta rüşvetin belgesi ABD'den çıktı", 2009 and for original documents see also http://www.gidahareketi.org/Files/DELTAPINE-BRIBE-RUSVET.pdf.

the long run, the consequences are disappointing. Each year, farmers need to increase the amount of chemical fertilizers they used for the same field in order to stabilize efficiency. According to farmers in Harmanlı, chemical fertilizers also affect the beneficial organic nutrients present in the soil, and year by year the natural components of the soil are destroyed, resulting in the loss of fertility. Actually, any chemical intervention in agricultural production has often eliminated the natural origins and conditions to which scientists owe standard recipes of fertilizers and pesticides.

SAPs practically eliminate fertilizer subsidies in Turkey but chemical fertilizer has still been a principal input to increase yield. Farmers in Harmanlı have continually quarreled with fluctuating prices of chemical fertilizers. In 2010, a bag of chemical fertilizer cost 35 TL, down from 110 TL in 2009. Furthermore, dramatic price changes throughout the year disrupt the budgets of agricultural enterprises. In February, when farmers are plowing the field before planting, the price of fertilizer is at its peak. Conversely, prices are drastically reduced during harvest time, when producers need fertilizer the least.

According to Karaca, the president of Chambers of Agriculture in Karacabey, fluctuations in price are the result of the cartelization of the few fertilizer companies in Turkey ("Gübredeki sömürüyü kim durduracak?", 2001). They determine the prices together confidentially before tendering offers to cooperatives, chambers of agriculture, and other agricultural institutions. Additionally, they prevent other companies from participating in the auctions.[42] Toros Gübre, Ege Gübre, Bagfaş, and Gübretaş control the sector, creating a 72 percent dependence on imports of raw materials and finished products.

[42] For further information see judicial decisions of State Council accessed at http://www.kararevi.com/karars/806650_danistay-e-2006-4823-k-2008-3353

The use of pesticides has also undoubtedly improved yields for crops formerly damaged by insects, fungi, and weeds and helped the prevention of some diseases spread by insects. On the other hand, however, peasants have suffered from poisoning due to improper usage and storage; it has even led, in some cases, to fatal consequences via food contamination and the rise environmental pollution and subsequent extinction of many living creatures (Hough, 1998). In actuality, pest control is as old as agriculture itself since farmers have always competed with threats to the food on their fields. They advanced in some techniques such as cleaning out crop residues after harvest or rotating crops to prevent the reproduction of pests. They even appealed to magic rituals and prayed to protect their crops from the attack of pests.[43] Over millions of years, producers have coded their knowledge about the lifecycle of plants and pests to traditions, but recently producers easily employ chemical substitutes. For instance, in Sri Lanka, rice producers always located an upturned coconut branch next to their fields. This was called a "magical stick" and it was thought to defend the crops from pests. When the new generation started to use chemical pesticides, they changed the name to "ridiculous stick." New farmers preferred chemical spraying rather than the stick for protecting the field. However, the analysis showed that the magical stick actually promoted the presence of dragon flies that hunted pests. Additionally, at night, owls positioned themselves on the stick and hunted rats and mice that could harm the crops. It was not magic but rather a platform for biological control (Serageldin& Barrett, 1996, p. 14).

Much like the majority of farmers in the world, producers in Harmanlı also discount traditional knowledge and instead rely on the scientific knowledge of pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies such as Bayer, Syngenta, Novartis, and

[43] In medieval France, the Church was asked to excommunicate caterpillars and grasshoppers for the crime of destroying crops (Hough, 1998).

Hektaş, which basically leads the market by importing DuPont products. The distributors of the companies, prescriptions of the chamber of agriculture in Karacabey, and suggestions of other farmers determine the choices of producers for pesticides. These criteria fundamentally ignore the particular characteristics of the field and maintain dependency on agrochemical companies.

Fuel Oil

The increased mechanization of agricultural production has triggered the use of fuel oil in the sector. Combined with stagnant prices of crops, the rising expense of fuel oil has taken a substantial share in the costs of production. The table below shows how farmers are finding themselves in a stalemate. The listed prices are averages for Turkey which are fairly higher than contracting prices. In 2012, a liter of fuel oil costs 4.07 TL in the Karacabey region. This means a farmer needs to produce almost 9 kilos of corn to buy one liter of fuel oil.

Table 1. Fuel Oil/Product Parity

Year	Fuel oil (TL/lt)	Corn (TL/kg)	Wheat (TL/kg)	Parity (fuel oil/corn)	Parity (fuel oil/wheat)
1980	26.0	13.02	10.6	2	2.45
1990	1,455.0	504	509.5	2.88	2.85
2000	441,500.0	102,999	99,750	4.28	4.42
2010	3	0.47	0.5	6.38	6

Source: TMO and TÜİK

A farmer in the village explains that he can limit the use of fertilizers and pesticides but that producers desperately require fuel oil to work; “it is fuel oil that finishes us off. Now I limit the use of fertilizer. I dress the soil with 15 kg instead of 30 kg and I

keep the ball rolling. Nevertheless, when this tractor lacks fuel oil, it means that everything stops because you cannot go anywhere. You neither irrigate, nor plough, nor prong. The tractor will be fuelled, although you are hungry" (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 22, 2010, Appx C, 7).

Agricultural Subsidies

The core component of the ARIP started in 2001 was the design and execution of the DIS system which would abolish all the existing subsidy and support regimes for agriculture. The DIS payments, decoupled from production, were made to the landowners per decare and served as a method by which the state aimed to create a farmer registry system and cadastral regulations. This subsidy reform was proposed by an international institution and did not target policies on the alleviation of rural poverty or the promotion of rural development. The DIS instead addressed policies to ease the increased tension and instability after the rapid removal of support prices and input subsidies and to overcome some losses in the transition to alternative crops. Before analyzing the effects of the state's withdrawal from agricultural subsidies and support systems in Harmanlı village, it is important to note that during the reform process the producers and organizations that represented farmers remained outside the policy network and formulation of the DIS. The president of the TZOB, Faruk Yücel, complained in a press conference in Bursa that Gökalp, the former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, preferred discussing the agenda regarding the restructuring of agriculture with the IMF and TÜSİAD rather than with the farmers and organizations of producers ("Çiftçinin kızgınlığı sürüyor", 2000). However, the aim should have been to include all agents for a more transparent and participatory decision-making process rather than a top-down state modality.

In Harmanlı village, the effects caused by the DIS scheme did not directly benefit the farmers. Similar to country-wide experiences, landowners received DIS payments even if they did not cultivate the land. Since assets below one decare and above 20 hectares (later 50 hectares) were not eligible for DIS payments, it caused unintended land fragmentation because the owners of large enterprises above the limit tended to divide and transfer their land to their relatives to get maximum payments. On the other hand, the producers, who could attain DIS payments, were facing unfair practices.[44] The payments were calculated per decare but the executors were omitting the fact that there was a huge gap between, for instance, the cost of corn and the cost of dry onion per decare. This discrepancy encouraged farmers to produce certain kinds of crops. In addition, the lack of cadastral records created serious problems that discouraged farmers from applying for the DIS payments or prevented them from being able prove their ownership rights ("Karaca, 'DGD Türk çiftçisine ne kazandırdı?'", 2005). In some instances small farmers could not afford the expenses of document processing. Considering that sharecroppers and tenant farmers could not benefit from the support, the DIS scheme indeed excluded the most vulnerable groups in agricultural production, contrary to the goals of the scheme. A farmer in Harmanlı explains that he received payments for only one sixth of the land he cultivated:

> Your dad had a field. He passed away. However, your uncles and aunts had not shared inheritance. The field still belongs to your grandfather. You leased the field but you cannot provide official documentation for the rent. I received payments for only 19 decares of land out of 110-120 decares. I cannot get support for 100 decares. The document does not exist even in the hands of the owner of the field. For instance, Aunt Haşime. The fields are not registered to her. She is 85 years old. The fields are still registered to her father. If I asked for her signature, she would assume that I would transfer title deeds into my name. It is not an easy task to make yourself

[44] More crucially, relatively low payments were cut by the banks due to debts of producers including surety ("Doğrudan destekleme kuyruğu", 2002).

> understood to an old person. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010, Appx C, 8)

By the end of the DIS program, which was abolished in 2009, the Ministry of Agriculture was offering more crop-specific subsidy schemes; however, fuel oil and fertilizer subsidies remained land-based. In sum, after a simultaneous start DIS payments were considered an instrument of social policy rather than an agricultural support scheme. Most probably, the only achievements of the DIS policies were the regulations on the cadastral records and the construction of the baseline of the farmer registry system, itself incomplete. Lack of trust in the central authority prevented farmers from giving critical information about their assets and production patterns. This, in turn, would be used sometime later against producers regarding taxation policies and debt payments.

The design of the DIS and restructuring policies presented a vision of production patterns that would change in accordance with comparative advantage. Economic efficiency would be achieved by alternative crop programs. Following the failure of the DIS program, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs announced that Turkey would be divided in thirty regions and in each region certain kinds of crops would be supported ("Karacabey Güney Marmara'da", 2009). The basin-based support model linked agricultural support to regional specialization. In the Karacabey region, this model aimed to encourage the production of olives, ignoring local characteristics of the region. Taking into consideration the impacts of international financial institutions and TNCs on the regulations of agriculture, the list of suitable crops for the different regions obviously reflected the raw material needs of the processing industries. In Harmanlı village, a farmer complained how a recent model dismissed local problems regarding production:

> They divide the Marmara Region into three basins. They will decide on one crop. They will subsidize that crop and omit others. How will I earn money? Olives do not always yield good products. You have to sow summer crops because of winter flooding. For instance, now the plain looks like a lake. They're not doing anything to solve this problem. In order to prevent flooding in low-land villages, they designated this area as a catchment basin. The water is accumulated here so it does not damage the villages. Many farmers cannot harvest the crops which are under water. Corn, cauliflower, and wheat … they have all gone. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 4, 2010, Appx C, 9)

Recently, the most common form of state support for agriculture in Harmanlı village are fuel oil and fertilizer subsidies, which are determined according to the size of the registered land and type of crops. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Livestock declared a fuel oil subsidy of 4 TL and a fertilizer subsidy of 5 TL per decare for 2012.[45] Considering that the price of fuel oil in the Karacabey region is 4.07 TL per liter, examining production costs reveals a troubling situation: a farmer consumes 25-30 liters of fuel oil per decare just to poaching the soil before planting tomatoes, 15-20 liters to prepare the land for corn, and an additional 25-35 litres fuel oil per decare to irrigate. It is no small wonder that the state support is seen as "tea money" in the eyes of producers in Harmanlı.

Ironically, the officially-stated support policies continue to provide high incentives to large enterprises, whilst excluding the poorest producers who are most in need of support. The president of the Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey explains how the support schemes actually work;

[45] Subsidy payments are diversified under three main product groups. Accordingly, for the assets of landscaping and ornamental plants, private meadows, pasture areas, and forest land 2.7 TL for fuel oil and 3.7 TL for fertilizer; for the fields of grains, forage crops, legumes, tuber crops, vegetables, and fruits 4 TL for fuel oil and 5TL for fertilizer; and for the lands of oilseeds and industrial plants it will be 6.4 TL for fuel oil and 6.3 TL for fertilizer per decare in 2012. In Karacabey, 3,903 producers applied for fuel oil and fertilizer payments in 2011 however for DIS payments 4,868 land owners were registered in 2007 (Karacabey İlçe Tarım Müdürlüğü, retrieved from http://www.karacabeytarim.gov.tr/tarimsal_yapimiz.html).

> Large enterprises are given a lot of support and they benefit from exemptions. However, due to the lack of capital accumulation by our small farmers and cattle branders, all of the money can be given to enterprises that are transferred from non-agricultural sectors. These enterprises quit animal husbandry and leave their farms when they face a tiny crisis; because they do not want to have financial difficulty. They do not enter into this business for income but entirely to benefit from incentives. Incentives should be given to peasants who want to push forward with the development of animal husbandry but they are given to big conglomerates. An incentive that can save the life of many farmers is given to a conglomerate. These policies are very wrong. You can solve these problems in communities that include people who have real practical experience. (Karacabey, The Chamber of Agriculture, May 11, 2010, Appx C, 10)

In a similar vein, a stockbreeder in Harmanlı states the problems that small enterprises face in the distribution of payments;

> We get between one and two thousands subsidy payments per year but large enterprises always pluck it out. Nothing is left to small enterprises. Big companies, for instance, never waste time; their men go and seal the deal there. When we go they say "The feed-ear tag number is missing"; "It has not arrived to Ankara", or "It has not been approved in Bursa". They are making it hard. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 11, 2010, Appx C, 11)

Not only has the design and implementation of these policies been biased against small producers, but also the representation of agricultural support policies in the public and media have reflected a politics of numbers. Once numbers and statistics are in practical operation, farmers are well aware of the fact that the nature of social reality is irretrievably altered. In order to reiterate the image of agriculture and producers as a burden on the budget, the amount of the subsidies is announced as a total sum or strategically divided per hour rather than per decare. Farmers in Harmanlı worry that city dwellers think producers are earning too much.

When producers are asked about their preference on support policies, instead of subsidies, farmers want to know that pricing products will be worth their labour. It

has become quite challenging for producers to compete in the market in comparison with highly-subsidized EU farmers. In their view, subsidies that would be determined according to type of crops should not be decoupled from production and, moreover, producers should demand higher fuel oil subsidies similar to maritime sector incentives.

Contract Farming

In contract farming, independent farmers are linked with a central processing or exporting unit which purchases the harvests of farmers. These purchases can support or substitute for company production. The stipulations of the purchase are determined beforehand through contracts, the exact nature of which changes considerably from case to case. Contracts are generally signed at planting time and specify conditions such as the amounts of products the company will buy and the price it will pay for it. Typically, the crop purchaser provides credit, seeds, fertilizers, farm-machinery rentals, and technical advice that stipulate production methods and timing. Additionally, it always retains the right to veto non-standard applications (Glover &Kusterer, 1990). The purchasing body can be an agribusiness company, the state, or a joint venture between a firm and the state. The producer provides labor power, land, and tools while the contractor supplies inputs, takes production decisions, and holds title to the products.

According to the neoclassical view, the logic of the contract is to establish market mutuality. In a freely-entered system the contract, which determines quantity, timing, and price of commodities and specifies the sorts of crops to be cultivated, is supposed to allow producers to make better use of their assets in imperfect markets and to balance higher risks, effort and income (Watts, 1990). In addition, the

proponents of contract farming assert that it provides access to credit facilities, new technological improvements, and market information that small enterprises would not reach effortlessly otherwise (Morrissy, 1974; Grosh, 1994; Key & Runsten, 1999; Patrick, 2004).

The IMF and the World Bank also support contract farming targeting market integration, economic growth, and technical innovation. In a rather populist rhetoric, contract farming is presented as a model that puts the peasants first and promises development of small enterprises by reducing the risks of marketing. Contracting is not just a strategy of agribusiness and the international financial institutions. The state is also acting in alliance with local and foreign capital. There are a variety of motives for the state to support contract farming such as the organization of the production and the growers and the reduction of risks of marketing and pricing. Whether those expectations are actually met is a question that will be analyzed below. Given that contract farming allows TNCs to produce without possessing the land, nationalist drives of the local government go along with farming schemes which avoid foreign ownership of large tracts of land (Glover &Kusterer, 1990). Nevertheless, local governments are omitting the fact that farming schemes bring about different forms of subordination and that farmers have been pulled by the increasing demands of the corporations and the market into a web of relationships that extend beyond the farm to the national and international level.

Contract farming constitutes a vital technology of agribusiness companies that serves the dominant course in the international practices of neoliberalism. In contract farming, the three structural dimensions of intensification, concentration, and specialization are based on the rationality principle and contribute to increasing efficiency in the use of resources, raising output, and keeping down the costs for the

contractor (Robinson, 2004). In a highly competitive agricultural sector, more industrial activity, mechanization, and synthetic fertilizers facilitate greater mass production in contract farming. In spite of the fact that farming schemes encourage coordination, orderliness, and rationalization in production, the introduction of contract farming in a region should not be considered a purely technical matter. Contract farming is essentially concerned with the restructuring of local agricultural production both within the wider global food system that is now under the control of agribusiness companies from the farm gate as well as within a structure in which all restrictions to free trade will be dismantled (Robinson, 2004). Whilst organizing crop production from planting to processing, contract farming actually repositions itself at the heart of state-managed policy frameworks, strategies of international institutions and agri-food firms, and the social organization of localities.

Rather than ensuring the development of small farmers, which is repeatedly promoted in the rhetoric, contract farming serves the complex and rapidly changing profit conditions of agribusiness, the policies of structural adjustment, and the austerity measures of the international financial institutions. Contracts introduce a significant restructuring of the labour process, work routines, and new technologies from seeding to harvesting. Furthermore, they secure the ascendance of capital in the agro-industrial complex and advance different modes of labour control and appropriation by which farm inputs and services are transformed into industrial products in the commercialization process (Watts, 1990).

Contract farming represents a significant change in the organization of agricultural production. It is the most direct and the most complex form of relationship between farmers and large agribusiness companies. Although it is argued that contracting schemes mutually reduce the risks of transactions between

independent producers and independent buyers, as many examples show below, independent growers are actually drawn into the treadmills of newly settled corporate forms of institutional and social organization of agriculture under the auspices of international institutions (Clapp, 1998).

The recomposition of production processes by contract farming offers a number of remunerative benefits for the agribusiness firms. They take advantage of an unequal bargaining relationship not only on a one by one basis but also through the formation of an alliance between local businessmen and global companies that defend their interests in various circumstances. The contracting arrangements assign a high degree of control to the company over the production process that is comparable to forms of plantation. Quantities, planting and delivery dates, prices, and all standards for the production processes are preset, supplying contractors with a constant volume of products of a predetermined quality. If the firm relies on open market purchases, it will not be easy to keep raw material inflows at stable levels supporting firm's capacity continuously. Besides, the firm does not have to embark on production planning, hire labor, ameliorate land, outline storage and transportation, or manage all large scale operations from seeding to harvesting (Glover& Kusterer, 1990). Of all the benefits for the contractor, averting labor and land conflicts that undermine production processes is probably the most important. Moreover, the firms take advantage of high levels of intense labour for high-value export items which would be highly costly for the company otherwise. The contractor delegates responsibility for all stages of production to the producer. It is quite consistent with the behavior of companies that if the contract is not fulfilled, the contractor retains the right of eviction in any event of grower failure.

Contract farming attributes a dignity to the standardization and technologies that operationalize them, as old crafts give way to mechanized production and homogenous outputs that were once traditional crops. Although contract farming is presented as a mutually independent process, the emerging picture is that punishment for non-standard applications and crops makes it highly mandatory and involuntary indeed. These standards build on management discipline, primarily in the top-down control of production schemes and the introduction of control systems in various levels of the hierarchy. Before the emergence of business association standards, products were generally controlled by the state and the organizations of producers. However, standards are now ranking with global market mechanisms and neglecting consensus and transparency in decision-making. The content of the standards, the control of the conformity in products, and sanctioning are all delegated to companies. Recent contracting schemes emphasize quality controls rather than input provisioning and production oversight which were *sine qua non* in earlier contracts (Ponte, 2010). For the functioning of managerial processes in the agro-food industry, quality should also be auditable (Higgins & Hallsröm, 2007). Quality assurance and management standards may require environmental and health protections, but in contract farming these standards are actually designed for the conformity of output and the elaboration of the farmers' practices for inspection. Furthermore, payment regimes of agro-food processing companies lately have been set out according to standards.

For instance, in Karacabey a considerable amount of processed tomatoes is used for paste which is then utilized as raw material for sauces, ketchup, soups, and other food products. For the optimization of paste the only criterion is the percentage of soluble solids in the tomato, which is called degrees *brix* (Pritchard & Burch,

2003).[46] Technological improvements allow companies to measure the amount of fruit volume and determine the price of tomatoes according to the percentage of the concentrated content of the tomato fruit, not the amount of the yield *per se*. In addition, the standards of sugar beets are determined by the polarity of the sugar compound: 16 percent polar sugar content and 23 percent polar sugar content have different prices. A corn moisture-meter measures the humidity rate to achieve standards in processing. Indeed, agro-food processing companies pay only for the *processable* contents of the product and attempt to reduce costs as much as possible. Accordingly, the practice of contract farming becomes entrenched ever more deeply within standards supported by agri-scientific knowledge systems.

Several issues are raised by contract farming and the standards are indeed becoming more demanding and numerous. Small-scale producers transform their production processes and try to keep up with the various kinds of enforced requirements. The gaps between the conditions accepted on contracts and what is actually applied in practice entail problems both for the producer and processor. Under these circumstances, small farmers are either being excluded from contract farming because of obstacles related to compliance with standards. Some find creative ways to stay in production like adding stones to yields to increase the weight or selling excess products to outsider buyers at a higher price (Ponte, 2010).

The out-growers schemes coexist with an apparent social inequality between land-rich capitalist producers who employ wage labour and smallholders who may see surpluses but are highly dependent on household labour (Watts, 1990). In tomato production, for instance, aggregate demand for processed tomato products is higher than ever but tomatoes are being produced by an ever smaller number of growers

[46] Brix has been used as a standard for tomato purchases in factories in Karacabey since 2009.

every year (Pritchard & Burch, 2003). In a similar vein, in Karacabey, where 64 percent of Turkey's industrial tomatoes are produced, large enterprises take advantage of mechanized harvesting associated with a shift to larger decares and a tendency towards specialization and monoculture production ("Tarıma meclis merceği", 2006). For example, large landowners in Sultaniye and Hotanlı villages can afford to invest in tomato harvesting machinery, rent fertile soils from TİGEM, and employ seasonal workers. Whilst airing grievances about his debts, a large landowner in Sultaniye declared that in the summer of 2009 he employed 220 wage-labourers and paid 120 thousand TL for seasonal workers who were migrating from Eastern Anatolia for one and a half or two months (Karacabey, Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010).

Since agricultural contracting in a competitive world market is extremely volatile and subject to wide price swings and overproduction or underproduction, risks for all farmers are substantial (Vorley, Fearne, &Ray, 2007). However, small-scale producers cannot respond to these risks and share in the benefits of contracting such as access to credits and new technology. Small-scale producers face problems relating to volume, consistency, quality, food integrity, and safety. As a consequence, small producers are cautious with contract farming because of problems with logistics, risk, services, and compliance (Vorley, Fearne, & Ray, 2007). As agro-food companies are processing high-quality crops with secured volumes while simultaneously transmitting all risks to the farmers, the only way to create an opportunity for small producers is to achieve appropriate support, flexibility in contracts, and the cooperation between the small enterprises and large landowners rather than being at odds.

What Problems Do Producers Most Frequently Face In Contract Farming?

The contract clearly represents a form of subordination. Once farmers sign a contract, legal title to crops, inputs, and temporary labour and land rights are assigned to the company. The contracting schemes are signed by illiterate peasants and frequently misunderstood. Farmers unfortunately learn the nature of contract farming in its subsequent application. The capacity to expel, fine or discipline belongs to the company and, what's more, the company does not accept any legal or penal responsibility for fluctuations in the amount of delivery due to climatic or territorial conditions, plant illnesses, and transportation deficiencies (Watts, 1990). Farmers in Harmanlı village are constantly on the lookout for lower cost alternatives to raise income without losing their assets. Although contract farming is introduced as a profitable form of production, a farmer explains how they learn from bitter experiences about contracting schemes, legal agreements, and credit laws.

> Even if you draw up a contract, contracts are not on our side but on the side of the factories'. There is a lot of fine print. We don't have enough time to read it. You sign it but contracts are always one-sided. Even if I have not had trouble, the people around me have. Tomato growers had a lot. When tomato prices rose, for instance, they sold to outside buyers. The company brought them to trial. 7 billion [thousand] TL compensation for each. It happened many times in the lowland villages. Everybody should come together and go to the Chambers of Agriculture. The Chambers of Agriculture will make an appeal on our behalf. They will determine how much land will be cultivated in each village based on household. Unfortunately that we do not have, it is our fault. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 11, 2010, Appx C, 12)

The contracts require producers to strictly follow the companies' instructions about seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and technical assistance. At the same time, they absolve the firm of responsibility for unintended consequences. Not only are risks are transmitted to the producers, but also the company prevents rising costs due to fluctuations in production. The contracts of tomato paste factories in Karacabey

allow factories to reject up to 25 percent of the delivery without any reservation. One sugar beet producer in Harmanlı village exemplifies how quota restrictions and low prices for excess production brought about a bottleneck for the farmers:

> We sowed 3 decares of land. I had a quota of 16 tons. I harvested 23,780 kilos. I sold them at 22.5 TL, instead of 100 TL. They paid one fourth of 90 TL, 22.5 TL. 7 or 7.5 tons of sugar beets were worth 100 TL. I cannot even have it picked for that much money. A man calculates that he will sow 10 decares of tomato and will harvest 100 tons. If he harvests 120 tons, for the remaining 20 tons the factory will pay 20 TL per ton instead of 100 TL. You cannot sell to outsiders because of the contract, you will be fined. You sign indenture. Why do we serve for sugar beet? To achieve more products and to gain more money. We irrigated once more and harvested late due to weather conditions. A ton of sugar beet excesses 100-150 kg in a week because of rain. If 10 tons of beets stay under soil, it will rise up to 11 tons. You cannot confirm quota. If the weather is torrid, it will make 8 tons instead of 10. If it rains, it will be 12 tons. If you have 100 tons quota, 20 tons become waste. That is why we quitted.[47]
> (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010, Appx C, 13)

Wide swings between contract and market prices, manipulation of quality controls to regulate the supply, and late payments create gross instabilities in income and limited economic security for producers. In 2012, the declared contract price for industrial tomatoes per kg is 18-20 *kuruş* in Karacabey, equal to the average price received by producers in Turkey in 2001. ("Karacabey 170 bin ton salça ihraç edecek", 2012). [48] It is also common for the local market to see arbitrary fluctuations in prices, which sometimes even exceed contract prices, until the harvest has been completed. In 2002, tomato producers signed contracts at 8 *kuruş* per kg. During the peak harvest time, when tomato was abundant and available, the price decreased to 5 *kuruş* in the local market. At the end of harvest, however merchants offered 10 *kuruş* per kg

[47] 100TL/ton: market price, 90 TL/ton: contract price, 22.5 TL/ton: over quota price.

[48] For instance, in 1998 the contract price of industrial tomato in Karacabey per ton was 110 dollars, in 1999 price decreased to 90 dollars, and in 2000 it was only 66 dollars. ("'Domates ekmeyebiliriz'", 2000) According to Turkish Central Bank exchange rates the contract prices were only 3 *kuruş*, 4 *kuruş*, 4 *kuruş* per kg respectively (1 dollar equals to 0.26 TL in 1998, 0.42 TL in 1999, and 0.62 TL in 2000; http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr).

("Domateste köşe kapmaca", 2002). In cases where the market price is lower or production exceeds the requirements of the company, the firm implements quality controls and delays delivery to prevent production surpluses. As an example, In Karacabey, long queues at the tomato factory gates may be a manipulative way to increase evaporation or fermentation under the sun, thereby eliminating excess products' or simply a result of a lack of coordination at the factory. The company may surreptitiously limit purchases in various ways like imposing low quotas for daily purchases. One such quota in 2000 limited sugar beet producers to 3 tons daily. They forced producers to sleep in the queue and eventually rejected their deliveries under accusations that producers had harvested too early without the permission of the factory. They went so far as to declare that the company was out of cans to package the tomato paste ("Pancar üreticilerinin bitmeyen sıkıntısı", 2000). Conversely, when the product is in short supply and the local market price is higher than the contract price, the contractor exercises various forms of direct and indirect control through company fieldmen (*çavuş*) and punishes growers for the goods and services that have not been delivered yet. Therefore, problems of enforcement arise between producers and contractors. The fieldmen do not allow any violation of contract by the growers' including any attempt to sell to outsider buyers.[49] In addition, the company may charge producers by claiming they fail to transfer products by a specific date, quantities, etc.

Another way to sabotage contracts is to delay payments. In Karacabey, delays of up to two years have been recorded and in the 1990s high inflation gradually erased the debt owed to the growers every year. In fact, firms determine different prices for payments in cash and deferred payments throughout the year by the

[49] In Kenya in the 1970s, for instance, a contracting company even hired policemen to inspect whether the outgoing carrots were the same type grown for the company under contract (Francis, 2000).

contract. A contract signed in June 2004, as an example, set per-kilo tomato prices in Karacabey at 80 thousand TL [8 *kuruş*], 90 thousand TL [9 *kuruş*], and 100 thousand TL [10 *kuruş*], respectively, for payments in October 2004, January 2005, and March 2005 ("Karaca'dan domates fabrikalarına tepki", 2004). Producers, however, are forced to accept the lowest prices for the processed final products such as oil for sunflowers, tomato paste for tomatoes, and sugar for sugar beets for late payments.[50] In August 1999, a firm signed a contract for tomato production at 27 thousand TL [2.7 *kuruş*] per kilo cash on delivery but the growers did not receive any payments for six months. In February 2001, one and a half years later, the firm declared that the producers could take tomato paste or pursue legal action. In total, Karacabey growers delivered 700 thousand tons of tomatoes in the summer of 1999 but factories only paid half of the 20 trillion TL [million] total payment due ("Üretici Vatan'a ateş püskürüyor", 2000; "Vatan 3. senet yolunda", 2001). A farmer in Harmanlı village shared his grievances about late payments:

> We delivered tomatoes thinking that we would get money in advance but we did not. When we went in to be paid, the manager, Mr. Süleyman, was there. We went there early in the morning. The manager was holding a *simit* (ring shaped bread covered with sesame seeds) in his hand as we came in. We said that we had come for the money. He said that there was no money and he could not pay. I said that I would call the press and he replied in a reckless way, "do what you want". I knew a journalist, İbrahim Bursalı, and he came in 15 minutes. We stood in front of the factory. The manager came out and made a promise. The peasants received their payments in a week… They look down on farmers. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 9, 2010, Appx C, 14)

Although pricing policies are crucial in determining the survival of farming enterprises, the price in contract farming has been lower than the expected price each

[50] The contractor may also offer tomato sward and pesticides against liability ("Karaca'dan domates fabrikalarına tepki", 2004).

year. Furthermore, in recent years the growers have rarely received any other services such as technical advice or input services. Obviously, the role of the firm as a buyer of the product is crucial in the contract; other criteria are likely to have little impact. As an example, tomato swards, which were previously distributed by the firms, are no longer included in the contract as an input service. The growers are well aware of the fact that their products become more valuable once they are processed. While the firms reap the benefits of contracting, efforts by the growers to defend their interests remain ineffective. In February 2000, the Karacabey Chamber of Agriculture organized a reconciliation meeting between tomato paste firms and the producers' union to discuss the problems of contract farming. Nevertheless, the firms refused to have a dialogue by sending unauthorized representatives who were continuously repeating that they could not infringe the contract. Despite the chamber's insistent invitation to the firms' general directors to hold another meeting, the firms were unfortunately not responsive to the concerns of the producers ("Fabrikalarla üreticilerin toplantısında 'fiyasko'", 2000).

Presumably, if legal problems arise in an agribusiness contracting scheme and efforts by the growers to defend their interests become ineffective, government involvement to solve the conflict would be expected. This expectation envisions a governmental body responsive to the concerns and attempts at resolution by small farmers. Unfortunately, this premise rarely holds (Glover & Kusterer,1990). Supporting export-oriented companies rather than growers is a political and strategic choice due to the greater political influence exerted by the agribusiness firms. An old farmer in Harmanlı village explains the bias of the state towards the firms rather than towards the victimized small farmers in the late 1980s:

> I produced more than 300 tons of tomatoes for Vatan. They had an agreement with Italians, and then we fell afoul of the company. Once you

> have a signed document, you can gather the tomatoes. I went there to get the document. He told me that he would send a watchman (*çavuş*) to bring it to me. In order not to pass the harvesting time, we gathered the tomatoes. He told me that I had harvested without the document and he rejected the tomatoes. Then I went to Beytaş. He told me that there were no cans. The tomatoes were to be sold by consignment to Çanakkale so we agreed on 10 *kuruş* below the market price. The following day, we had an argument so I took the tomatoes to an empty field in Çingençeşme. While I was passing in front of Vatan, I heard noises of whistling and tooting. I entered, they asked me how much tomatoes I still had. I said "over 100 tons". They asked me if I had delivered them. I said "Yes". They told me that I would get a payment later. Then, I saw, it was written on the scale that the payments had been completed. Now what? I wrote a letter to Kenan Evren. They sent it to the Ministry of Industry. They replied that Vatan was the fairest company in Karacabey and that money would be paid as soon as possible. However, there hasn't been any payment in two years. That money has disappeared because of inflation. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 2, 2010, Appx C, 15)

The political, legal and ideological conditions required to maintain this contractual form of dependency in agricultural production is apparently promoted by class inequality and state policies. Large processing firms operate in dense networks of patronage and personal ties to governing body to sustain accumulation. Furthermore, large enterprises as growers respond to the opportunities of contract farming rather than its challenges of the schemes due to clientelistic ties. The owners of the large enterprises only engage in the management, organization, and control of production processes whilst employing high levels of wage labour. The large landowners have face to face meetings with the general managers of the agribusiness firms in which bargaining power, availability of alternatives, and access to information bring about unique conditions for the price, delivery, and payments (Ulukan, 2009).

For small producers, on the other hand, entering a relationship with a firm is still likely to be riskier.[51] A corn producer in Harmanlı village complains that the

[51] There is only one contrary example on behalf of producers. A factory from Çanakkale signed contracts for onion production and delivered shallots and needed fertilizer. However, the company neither asked about products, nor demanded money back in harvest time (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 13, 2010).

firm determines the price, delivery date, quantity, and humidity and he desperately asks, "what is my role (title), a producer as a worker?" [52](Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010). In recognition of these challenges, the small-scale producers need to act in a strategic and organized way. The capacity of agribusiness firms to respond the particular organized acts of the producers is very limited because alternative business models is not a choice for the firms. What is clear is that farmers can opt for alternative products but the tomato paste factories cannot function without tomatoes. Therefore, oppositional energies and popular struggle generated from the disproportionate share of risk should bring a wider policy arena in which producers act together and in dialogue. Nevertheless, the tendency to increase income nullifies the attempts at unity among farmers. A farmer in Harmanlı village illustrates how some producers adhere neither to the contracts with the firms, nor to the common decisions of the chamber:

> Factories wrote and drew something up. We poor farmers signed on the dotted line. It's one-sided… Factories sit down with the chamber on the negotiation table. The chamber arbitrated but the factories cancelled and told us not to plant. We, farmers, are ignorant. They [farmers] sold to outsiders through the backdoor. Some awoke the watchman of the factory (*çavuş*) in the middle of the night and signed the contract. There is no unity, the devil take the hindmost. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010, Appx C, 16)

The Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey has struggled to improve the harsh conditions in the contracts and encouraged the producers to unite. In May 2000, the chamber decided to boycott four tomato paste firms in Karacabey due to late payments ("Üreticiden 4 fabrikaya boykot kararı", 2000). The chamber declared that backroom contracts would be punished by terminating membership. However, an

[52] "Benim sıfatım ne? İşçi sıfatı üretici olarak"

urban dweller who migrated from Harmanlı village explains how some producers intended to take advantage of high prices rather than sticking to the agreement.

> We went to the factory for a conference and a price was declared. That day, they said 75 thousand [7.5 *kuruş* per kg]. We left; the Chamber of Agriculture collectively decided that we would not plant tomatoes. Around the Chamber it was said that there were owners of large enterprises who would go bankrupt that day: The Kazars in Hotanlı and the Altıparmaks in Sultaniye. They said that they would not plant and that nobody would plant. We agreed, OK. When the factories came with contracts to the coffeehouse, everybody turned their back but watched others at the same time to see whether they would have an opportunity to sign contracts if others left. They knew that nobody would plant so tomatoes would be expensive. (Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 14, 2010, Appx C, 17)

In contract farming non-farm forces define the dimensions of agricultural change; therefore decisions formerly made by growers are assigned to the contractor firms. The capability of farmers in autonomous decision-making is strictly constrained (Pritchard & Burch, 2003). For instance, in the case of tomato processing seed choice, agri-chemical usage, product transfer, and harvest timing are totally regulated by the contractor. In order to improve the conditions of contracts more attention should be given to the endogenous perceptions and attitudes of actors which were previously involved in decision-making processes (Robinson, 2004). Despite both the refusal of farmers who know their soil and vital needs such as fertilizers and pesticides, the contractor forces them to use certain kinds of inputs. The initial answer to one-dimensional policy making is to respect the plurality of views and the representation of diverse farmer communities in the production process.[53]

[53] Contract farming potentially affects women and constrains their capacity to take part in the decision-making process. In many cases, women's work increases greatly in production in order to avoid hiring wage labor. Importantly, in small enterprises the burden of labor is transmitted from a paid labour force to women. Although labour time of women in the farm and in the house is greatly increased, the contracts are signed by the male members of the household and income is brought in through the male.

The non-farm sector has control over not only the nature of products but also the choice of producers. Neither contractors nor large enterprises can reach a point to recognize small producers and respect their views to facilitate production. Even if contracts are perfectly designed for the firms and producers, many disagreements are likely to arise. According to firms, it is no easy task to benefit from working with small producers; therefore growers need to find different strategies. In many cases, the strategy is to divide the risk by producing different crops. Ideally, a contract crop should be the second or third cash crop. The contract crop should only be seen as an additional or seasonal income source rather than the only source of income. The subsistence of growers should not depend on mono-cultural schemes. Huacuja, (2001) in her research on vegetable production in Mexico, and Daddieh (1994), in his studies on palm oil producers in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, both found that growers should reserve their land for products other than contract crops. Nevertheless, adding new crops to existing farming activities is costly for small farmers in Karacabey and producers might be subjected to contracting schemes that constitute more than half of their income. Contract scheme tomato, corn, and sugar beet production in Karacabey is still the principal livelihood of farmers.

In consequence, small-scale producers neither achieve appropriate support nor respond to the demands of contractors. To the extent that grievances are aired, contracts aggravate poor living and working conditions for growers. Under these circumstances farmers in Harmanlı village, who learn to keep their own accounts, hesitate to produce under contract. Having learned from bitter experiences with contracts, legal agreements, and credit laws, they are constantly on the lookout for lower cost alternatives. Although entering a contractual relationship with an agribusiness firm is highly risky for small producers, the lack of alternatives forces

producers to continue production for processing firms all while distrusting the company (Glover &Kusterer, 1990). In order not to be exposed by a giant firm, an alternative, though uncommon scenario, would be that flexibility in prices in contracts may improve the income level of producers and growers' increasing organization can strengthen the bargaining power of the peasants. In any event, the risk must be distributed equally between contractors and growers.

Organic Farming

In changing production patterns it would be wrong, however, to dismiss the promotion of organic farming presented as a broad evolutionary technique. Fresh, organic, and green, might well be standard objectives in farming practices, though recently they cater more to the "aestheticisation of consumption" rather than farmers' and consumers' well-being (Robinson, 2004, p.54). For decades, industrial agricultural practices have restricted the reproduction of comparable craft knowledge. Therefore, what was natural has been removed from production processes and replaced by widely used chemical substitutes. Organic methods of production can stimulate craft knowledge and practical know-how and reevaluate farmers as knowing agents but physical and financial constraints prevent producers from engaging in organic production.

In Harmanlı village, when producers are asked about organic farming, especially old farmers think that it is related to technological development in farming practices such as drip irrigation. Others, who are aware of the conditions of organic farming, believe that it may not be a viable option for producers in the village. For decades, pesticides and chemical fertilizers have been destroying the natural components of the soil in Karacabey. Furthermore, conventional farming practices,

which are widely preferred in the non-organic neighboring fields, increase the probability of contamination. In short, the soil biology in Harmanlı is still being exposed to intensive farming activities and cannot comply with the requirements of organic production. More crucially, the process of certification and standardization would bring an extra financial burden on the producers who are trying to pay credit debts. Under these conditions, off-farm capital controls organic production and marketing by also benefitting from additional government incentives.

In the producers' view, if they are engaged in organic farming, they will become dependent upon external directorates for certification, standardization, seeds, and marketing that would risk the role which farmers would play. An agricultural technician in Karacabey elucidates his reaction to organic farming:

> Organic agriculture, ok but why are people who were using imported seeds looking for local seeds now? That is so much deception. I am not against organic farming. It hurts me that foreigners are trying to sell to us. Seeing that you say organic farming, then, why are Israelis collecting our local wheat seeds? They paid nobody; they just asked for a cap of wheat. They took them to their seed banks and sold them as if they were their own varieties for organic farming. That is why I resent this. They are selling us to us. (Karacabey, January 6, 2010, Appx C, 18)

Productivity and Efficiency

It is difficult to imagine structural adjustment occurring in the agricultural sector without its emphasis on productivity and efficiency. Although structural adjustment, in fact, has political, social, economic, and environmental dimensions, such complicated problems are transformed into technical issues by international institutions. Farming practices based on local knowledge are presented as inefficient. In their place, new technological packages of high yielding varieties including chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides amenable to scientific management are submitted. In addition mechanization with high technology and standardization of

tools and products carries forward the efforts of rationalization in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the insistence on capital intensive technologies results in a financial bottleneck for farmers and, more crucially, destroys local species and practices.

> They got flurried on high efficiency and depleted soil… Farmers were on their own in keeping up with the new system. They were isolated in technical matters. Technology is not only to get more efficiency, to fertilize more, or to irrigate more. There, very serious mistakes were made. …The values unique to our region were forgotten immediately and traditional values were ignored. New technologies and imported goods were seen as the savior. A rapid transformation occurred without thinking about infrastructure. Today, no products are left that were uniquely produced in Karacabey. (Karacabey, January 6, 2010, Appx C, 19)

In this regard, the farm is transformed into an industrial plant (Fitzgerald, 2003). Considering labour, machinery, and capital invested; farmers should maximize output with a minimum waste of labour and input. A farmer in Hotanlı village criticizes the emphasis of international agencies on maximizing output

> They came up with a lie as if we had problems in productivity. I am one of the people who revealed this lie first. They thought that if 10 tons of tomato yield per decare were raised to 15 tons, wealth would increase. Indeed, it was a big bubble, it burst, many people declared bankruptcy. When a society which is not organized (undemocratic, no civil society) produces more, it loses. In return for high production, you will put a high amount of the commodity on the market. In this instance, the price of the commodity you produce decreases. (Karacabey, Hotanlı village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 20)

Evaluating agricultural policies on the basis of farming efficiency empowers the logic of a microeconomic analysis of the farm as a firm (Scott, 1998). This view necessarily simplifies assumptions about costs, inputs, labour, and prices and intends to show how efficient or inefficient it might be to produce a particular crop. In spite of the fact that discussions about agricultural enterprises and production centered on an emerging notion of efficiency, its meaning is slippery and flexible. What exactly

does it mean for the scientific experts and for the farmers? It was difficult to give a definition because the work that farmers do is so variable. Efficiency is affected by many factors including soil, weather conditions, farmers' skills, and irrigation. The experts do not actually go into the field or barn to analyze the local characteristics but rely instead on standard models and laboratory calculations. According to the president of the chamber, however, policy makers should understand their unique agro-ecological and socio-economic situation;

> It is necessary to deal with Turkey on its own terms. The models that are applied in Germany and France cannot be carried out in Turkey because the biggest contribution of agriculture is to create employment in Turkey. Now, it says that optimal size of enterprises for animal husbandry is 120 heads of livestock in France. However, there is no need such a calculation here. A woman who breeds even 2-3 cows can look after her children and subsist. It is necessary to look at the issue from this standpoint. (Karacabey, The Chamber of Agriculture, May 11, 2010, Appx C, 21)

Efficiency is also a favorite topic of the agricultural policies of the state. Efficiency considered as optimizing output sharply limits a farmer's ability to recognize and incorporate knowledge created outside the hegemony of experts and their institutions. Under these conditions, the result is rising production with declining employment in the agricultural sector and the marginalization of poor farmers. These policies seem more concerned with redesigning rural life and production from above than with fostering rural well-being. According to farmers, it is not just a strategy of production but it is a strategy for the justification of rural decay;

> In my opinion Tayyip found the way to reduce the number of farmers. Did they say griddle? They are being thrown on a griddle. The ones that fall down will be eliminated. If you tell a man to quit farming, he will demand another job, right? However, do you know what they will say when you fall down from the griddle? He could not get efficiency in tomatoes; he could not get efficiency in corn. (Karacabey, Hotanlı village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 22)

Acknowledgement of Agricultural Policies

The principles of efficiency, managerial oversight and planning, reliance on experts, mechanization, and large scale operations under contracts have generated concern among farmers. As it is shown above, farming practices from seeding to processing have been increasingly confined by technologies, knowledge, power, and capital held outside the farm. Farmers themselves cannot fully comprehend what is happening and how structural adjustment would affect producers and their position in society. They follow management directions and provide labour, but exercise little judgment or decision making. Outsiders, on the other hand, who have not had any practice whatsoever in farming feel perfectly competent to tell farmers how to do their business. An agricultural technician in Karacabey conveys his disappointment over "skilled experts" of tomato paste giving a presentation:

> Once I went to Ankara and had a public fight. There was a meeting on the export of tomato paste. One man came to the stage and read statistics for a half an hour. Numbers… I squinted and I fell asleep. I told him that he actually made me sleep and asked why he invited me. I also said "You are talking about the numbers; you have never talked about reality". I had already become irritated to one that was so cool. I asked him what brix meant, since tomato paste was being analyzed. He shuffled; he did not know. I said that he was talking about tomato paste but he did not know these things and I refused to talk to him. (Karacabey, January 6, 2010, Appx C, 23)

Although structural change has occurred gradually across the country, farmers have not been supervised by state agencies or agricultural engineers. Farmers expect state agencies to identify problems and to make recommendations but officials offer uniform technical solutions as replicas of each other. It is the agricultural engineers working in the offices who arrange policy changes in the sector without any field research. Producers in Karacabey complain that ministry officials frequently spend their holidays in TİGEM but do not even visit their fields. The straightforward view

of experts in identifying problems reduces the chance of dialogue between farmers and officials. Universal techniques and principles in agricultural production omit local dimensions (such as history, social and economic conditions, and people) and create essentially interchangeable solutions.

To promote the exchange of knowledge and information, conferences and symposiums, which aim to provide a discussion space for participants, are organized by The Chamber of Commerce in Karacabey. However, farmers as businessmen are favored by the experts and officials who monopolize of information. Therefore, small enterprises cannot incorporate knowledge created from above. Producers demand that officials visit their villages to interact face to face regarding the predicaments in agricultural production and to share a common language.

While producers, especially small enterprises, are being left alone in this process and their farming practices are presented as traditional, unscientific, and inefficient, the industrial approach to agriculture disseminates the belief that farming is becoming too complex for farmers (Fitzgerald, 2003). This powerful idea causes major shifts in the way that most people think about agriculture and rural life. Especially urban dwellers believe that agricultural subsidies are a burden on the state's budget and producers are not hard-working or capable enough to adapt to structural adjustment. Besides, this idea strengthens the belief that agricultural enterprises need management experts. The multiple and complex ways in which these narratives are understood and what form they take in the context of these forces are also reflected in the construction of an image of the ideal producer. It is concerned with creating productive male peasants tied to the land, preferably as wage workers in large enterprises, and good women tied to the home (Carruyo, 2008).

Conclusion

Craft knowledge of producers is actually underpinning farming and rural livelihoods. This local knowledge is based on personal experience, transmitted from generation to generation, and enables farmers to practice their art. In this accumulated knowledge system, over time farmers learn weather and soil conditions, production systems, and crop patterns suitable to their fields and tastes. In addition, biological diversity is enhanced by reproducing activities of farmers for the varieties of crops and livestock.

Nevertheless, agricultural reforms, improving modern farming technologies from seeding to harvest, and international institutions' and agribusiness companies' insistence on high productivity and efficiency in agricultural sector are eroding farmer's capacity to use their craft knowledge. Unfortunately, the expertise of farmers is replaced by experts of structural adjustment and rationalization of farm structure, which is well beyond their own control.

A farm response developed by producers, which is rather compulsory, is to shift from traditional staples such as dry onion in Karacabey case to new industrial crops such as tomato and corn. Moreover, producers have recently been limited to animal feed crops being wheat and corn silage because of declining subsidies and rising costs of inputs and labour. Worsening position of traditional crops in Karacabey shows how global structures of political regulation and profit accumulation endanger crop extinction and disenchantment among farmers.

In addition to changing type of crops, spaces of production and styles of production are also altered by the reforms. The observations suggest contract farming leads to different distribution of income and risks among the actors involved. This becomes very clear in tomato production where all risks are transmitted to the producers, prices are determined by the firms, and unfortunately capacity to expel,

fine, and discipline belongs to the company. Another striking pattern of production is organic farming. Ironically, after dismantling the belief accepting farmers as knowing agents for decades, organic farming actually based on craft knowledge is presented as a brand-new technique. In Karacabey, since small producers cannot afford certification and standardization costs, organic farming is not a popular practice.

Consequently, what SAPs aim to form a uniform and codified knowledge system and uniform producers who are acting on the basis of rationality, efficiency, and productivity. Besides in uniform structure, products should be standardized for marketization processes. These standards are built on management discipline, primarily in the top-down control of production schemes and the introduction of control systems in various levels of the hierarchy. Under these restrictions rural livelihood strategies are reconfiguring. The following chapter specifically discusses the ways in which men and women in Harmanlı engage with structural adjustment, work toward well-being, and recreate their livelihood.

CHAPTER 4

COPING WITH ADJUSTMENT: LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN HARMANLI VILLAGE

Introduction

For the majority of small farmers, SAPs continuously diminish the level of income, and farming on its own becomes incapable of providing sufficient livelihood for rural dwellers. This chapter teases out the process of easing away from a strictly agrarian existence and engaging in multiple activities by examining recent trends in rural employment, occupational shifts, changes in the main income sources, emerging new economic activities, and spatial relocation in the Harmanlı village. It illustrates how rural inhabitants in the village manage their subsistence and overhaul consumption patterns, gender roles, environment, and social exclusion in order to surmount the vicissitudes of structural reform with reference to the political dimensions of livelihood adaptation and relations with the state.

This chapter aims to show that the dynamics of farmers' livelihood strategies are disregarded by macroeconomic appraisals of agrarian transformation. The diversification of income sources and coping strategies cannot be captured by the statistics because most statistics do not reveal the simultaneous relationships that small farm households tend to maintain with land, labor, and commodity markets, giving rise to multiple income sources. In a nutshell, statistics are static but farmers are dynamic. In this chapter, the attention given to real experiences of rural producers instead of statistics enables us to investigate what the SAP means on the ground and what kind of coping strategies derive from it in the Harmanlı village. Besides, a

comprehensive analysis on livelihood strategies encourages us to go beyond classical discussions on the emergence of wage labor and the concentration of land for agricultural transformation, and reminds us that confrontation of the market-led system begins with the mechanisms used by households to preserve subsistence levels and social reproduction. Finally, it is important to note that this chapter would have been ineffectual without a critical perusal of the rural-urban linkages because these linkages provide a useful lens for understanding the complexities of rural inhabitants' livelihoods and their coping strategies, which usually include some form of mobility and diversification of income sources and occupations.

A Pattern of Deagrarianization?

SAPs, which refer to monetary constraints, controls over government expenditures, market-determined exchange rates and free markets, are fundamentally macro in character. Therefore, keeping solely in the macroeconomic sphere, relatively little work has been done about micro level outcomes of SAPs in rural areas. However, the economic reform process has instead produced micro-level consequences that result in increasing livelihood diversification in rural areas as households struggle to reduce risks and vulnerability with growing dependency on nonfarm and off-farm activities.[54] Macro-level studies, which say little about the plight of the small

[54] There are definitional problems and dissonances in the literature about the concepts of "off-farm" and "nonfarm". Scholars are much more consistent on the definition of nonfarm activities which brought about income derived from wage paying activities and self-employment out of farming such as commerce, manufacturing, and other services including agroprocessing, distribution and the provision of farm inputs. However, the definition of off-farm activities varies slightly. The first group of definitions is more inclusive but slippier, accepting nonfarm activities as a subset of off-farm activities. According to this view, "off-farm" refers to activities undertaken away from the household's own farm. It may include agricultural wage employment, self-employment in commerce, mining, manufacturing, construction, transport, and services sector. The second group of definitions including Ellis (1998) offers clear boundaries: "off-farm" typically refers to wage or exchange labour on other farms within agriculture. In this study, off-farm is used in parallel to second definition. For

farmers, may not reflect the heterogeneity of the livelihood strategies of many households that engage in diverse activities across sectors (Sen, 2005). Macro-level studies encompass the elements of stabilization concerned primarily with balance of payments deficit, budget deficit, and the rate of inflation and adjustment focused on efficiency, productivity, institutional change, and price liberalization. Hence, particular dynamics of peasants' income sources, livelihood responses, and social relations have generally been neglected in most macroeconomic appraisals of structural adjustment (Ruben & Bastiaensen, 2000). Besides, macro-level data, which is acquired from country's statistical institutions, can be biased with respect to unemployment, growth, and inflation rates or limited considering the inability of censuses to obtain information about the diversification income sources as they usually only record people's primary economic activity. Taking into account these caveats it seems that the attention given to macro level studies without linking macro policies to micro level outcomes is unlikely to offer promising perspectives and policies for rural development.

The other point worth elucidating is that policy prescriptions of structural reform almost entirely see peasantry as a problem or an obstacle to be overcome. The adjustment policies pursue a strategy to eliminate peasant agriculture as a mass form of economic activity. The aim is to transform agriculture into a modern commercial sector of economic activity based on the same economic imperatives of market rationality and profit maximization that operate in modern industry. Such an effort attempts to set forth an efficient structure in the agricultural sector which is demographically small-scale but highly productive, commercial, and competitive. So the question is: Who can compete in rural areas? Farmers are expected to be

---

further information see D'Exelle and Bastiansen (2000), Ellis (1998), Gordon and Craig (2001), and Baker (2006).

economically rational, evaluate costs and benefits in all decisions regarding production and consumption, be technically efficient in order to achieve maximum output through different combinations of input and technological innovations, and seek to improve quality of crops for higher standardization.

The policy prescriptions of structural reform and how producers respond to impacts of changes should not be evaluated regardless of what type of farmers SAPs promote. It is apparent that in a context where market forces are allowed to rule freely, farmers have to have initial capital in order to sustain agricultural production. Since they are not suddenly transformed into efficient, rational, and profit maximizing entrepreneurs after structural reforms, to achieve chemical inputs, machinery services, credits, and market information farmers require some amount of cash account and risk-aversion assets (Spoor, 1997). A farmer details how he manages to increase a household's cash income by carrying on only agricultural production while many peasants are being strangled by the debts.

> Fortunately, we work on capital… For example, now fertilizer costs 35 TL per bag, I bought four tons, which makes two hundred bags at 31 TL. I made five TL profit per bag so I profited 1,000 TL when I was just purchasing fertilizer. Purchasing fuel oil in cash also brings benefits. Unless you have money, you buy on credit. You pay 3,300 TL for the fuel oil that costs 3,000 TL, I pay 2,900 TL. What happens is that I make 400 TL profit, for 3 tons of fuel oil it makes 1,200 TL. I profit 1,000 TL for fertilizer and 1,000 TL for fuel oil. I can also benefit from purchasing pesticides and herbicides in cash. What happens is that the benefit of working in cash returns as almost 10 percent profit. I recently carried 25-27 tons of wheat. It was 40 *kuruş* but it is 57 *kuruş* now. 17 *kuruş* makes 1,700 TL for 10 tons of wheat. It is more or less 4,000 TL for 25 tons. The other sold at 40 *kuruş* during harvest for his debt but I profited 4,000 TL. I also profited 2,000 TL from corn and other crops. In sum, it made 6,000-7,000 TL. Including fertilizer, fuel oil, and pesticides, I profited 10,000 TL in total. Assume that we turn over 30,000 TL, I have already gained 10,000 TL. 10,000 TL is worth 25 tons of wheat in harvest. Irrigation costs 45-55 TL. The union says that if I pay in cash, it will give me 20 percent discount. I paid 44 TL, 11 TL less, but others paid 55 TL. If you go deeper in the debt, it will be 65 TL. One is 45 TL, the other is 65 TL. The difference is 20 TL, or a third. It makes 1,000 TL in 3,000 TL. It means that if I pay 3,000, you will pay 4,000 TL. You always gain in this way.

> You cannot earn, unless you own initial capital. You will be finished when you eat up your capital. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010, Appx C, 24)

In their struggle against the forces of structural adjustment most have never been so lucky. The truth is that small farmers are very unlikely to flourish as a result of being exposed to competitive pressures. Miserable economic performance, declining subsidies, and dramatically rising input prices may make their best efforts irrelevant (Bienefield, 1994). Whereas once they could save, small farmers are now desperately thinking about subsisting in winter with scarce available resources, as this farmer in Harmanlı village

> I earned money until 2005. I bought my car in 2005. In the 2000s when I was paying for a house in Ankara, three decares of tomato covered the annual payments of the house. So where were corn and others? I was making good money and comfortable. Since 2005, it has completely changed. I was cultivating, harvesting, and earmarking for the next year but now we cannot make it through the winter. Inputs are very expensive, crops are very cheap. Fuel oil is three TL and corn has stayed at 30 *kuruş* since 2000. Ten years ago, I bought fuel oil at 70 *kuruş*. Sugar beet was 50 *kuruş* and a bag of fertilizer cost six TL or 10 TL. Now a bag of fertilizer is 50 TL and sugar beet is 80 *kuruş*. So where are wages for workers and irrigation payments? You marked up the price of fuel oil to three TL; mark up, mark up to four TL but also increase the price of my crop to one TL. But how does it happen that mine is 10 *kuruş*, fuel oil is three TL? How will this balance be achieved? (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 22, 2010, Appx C, 25)

SAPs launched since 1980s focus attention on the liberalization of the external and domestic markets, reduction of government expenses, and privatization of state enterprises and services. Far less attention has been paid to impacts of reforms on rural societies (Ruben & Bastiaensen, 2000). Nevertheless, it is understood that ‘getting prices right’ policies force small farmers to seek productive alternatives in order to subsist, with the exception of those farmers reaping the benefits of markets. Although small farmers are accepted as nonmarket oriented and resistant to change,

in their interaction with the market they learn to improve local adaptive maneuverings and to make decisions about how to create subsistence and well-being. Their livelihood strategies reflect multiple and complex ways in which structural adjustment is understood and how they take form in the context of rural transformation.

The apparent truth about the process of rural transformation and livelihood strategies is that rural dwellers, one way or another, are easing away from a strictly agrarian existence. Bryceson (1997) defines deagrarianisation as a long process of occupational reorganization, subsistence reorientation, social transformation, and residential chance or avoidance of peasant modes of livelihood. Data from censuses, which reveal a declining rural population, can effortlessly catch inclination to urban migration. In addition, decreasing sectoral share of agriculture in employment indicated in national statistics has exposed occupational adjustment and movement away from peasant modes of subsistence. However, statistical analysis cannot convey all the aspects of income diversification and sociopolitical changes in rural areas. In a similar vein, Christiansen (2010) suggests that "… the economic calculus and the weighing up of risks were palpably only the seeds of livelihood strategy and reflections of the conditions available through the market and policy. The full scope of livelihood strategy can only be understood within its social and cultural dimensions" (p.141).

According to Ellis (2000) rural livelihood diversification is "the process by which households construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities for survival and in order to improve their standard of living" (pp.231-232). A closer analysis on farmers' tendency to engage in a variety of activities such as diversified agricultural production, nonfarm employment, and migration reveals

that villages, households, and even families differ considerably in their degree of heterogeneity and capability of diversification. Two farmers may respond differently to the same provocative condition. Likewise, similar reflexes may arise from different circumstances.

Within the diversification framework, natural or economic risk factors are leading motives behind livelihood strategies. Risk spreading activities result in diversification by necessity or choice despite this distinction being blurred in practice. When assured earnings of the household are threatened and replaced by indefinite outcomes in relation to income, the household expands its economic activities and develops new tactics to anticipate and ameliorate impending hazards. In other words, farmers that confront the probability of income failure do not "put all their eggs into one basket" (Ellis, 2000, p.60). A growing number of farmers engage in various auxiliary strategies over a wide spectrum to support their main source of income.

In Harmanlı village, diversified agricultural production combining mixed cropping and field fragmentation is the fundamental risk management strategy.[55] Since most income is earned by selling agricultural products, farmers need to minimize any possible risks of price fluctuations, weather conditions, and hazards of contract farming. In the village, farmers acquire scattered plots and their land assets consist of a full range of land types with a broad range of ecological and agroclimatic features. They own land at different altitudes and slopes both on the hills and on the plain. By planting different crops on a variety of land types, farmers participate in "vertical cultivation" which is a classic strategy but promise greater security

[55] According to Ellis (2000) the time sequence of responses to crisis determines the difference between risk management strategies and coping strategies. Risk management strategies are *ex ante* planned actions to any possible crisis affecting household well-being in the future but coping strategies are *ex post* and spontaneous tactics to unexpected threats to household subsistence.

(Zoomers &Zoomers, 1999, pp.26-27). According to the varying states of the plots, farmers cultivate chickpeas and shallots on the hills and wheat, corn, sugar beet, and tomato on the plain in Harmanlı village. Farmers consider multi-tasking as a way to achieve optimum benefits from the available channels:

> Peasants subsist as such: How much did I sell the corn for? I sold it at 35-36 *kuruş*. Since I sold corn, it did not mean that I transferred (saved) 100 TL from one pocket to another. Why? I eked it out. Money from wheat covers irrigation costs. Shallot makes a little money that I try to make last through winter. Otherwise, if shallot also remained at 20 *kuruş*, we would think of something else. You need to do something if your children are going to school. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 22, 2010, Appx C, 26)

On-farm diversification that includes different crops and plots of land procures a degree of insurance. On the other hand, in comparison to a large enterprise with homogenous land characteristics, the heterogeneity of these scattered plots in Harmanlı results in dramatic rises in labour and fuel oil requirements, so that a larger area can be planted with the same costs. Based on the experiences of farmers, multi-tasking requires sufficient income to cover at least labour and input costs. Otherwise, farmers who cannot afford on-farm diversification reduce the number of cultivated plots or quit farming as a last resort. Closer analysis also reveals another caveat. Despite the determination of crops and plot according to different agroclimatic characteristics, under similar risks, protection remains only partial. For instance in extreme conditions such as drought or flood, all products will be inauspiciously affected.

In Harmanlı village agriculture is viewed as the main activity while farmers are searching for different ways of saving in agricultural production. This results in similar product portfolios consisted of corn and wheat. The production process of wheat and corn is highly mechanized and requires minimum labour. Compared to

labour intensive crops such as shallot and tomato, farmers can refrain from high labour costs in wheat and corn production. In addition, many farmers reduce the ratio of cultivated land by complaining that the more they cultivate the more they fall into a debt trap. The president of the Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey states that in 2002, 20 percent of 400 thousand decares of irrigated land could not be cultivated because of high input prices and irrigation costs ("Çiftçi dibe vurdu.", 2002). An old farmer shares his memories on production and laments that declining or stagnating crop prices also discourage farmers from cultivating: "At night, you would think the field was a city. Tractors were working for irrigation at night. When the crop makes good money, it encourages society. Farmers work even at night." (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 11, 2010, Appx C, 27)

Although cropping has still been a major livelihood strategy for decades, for many households in Harmanlı, farming on its own is incapable of providing sufficient livelihood. Off-farm wage labour and nonfarm industrial and service occupations are depicted as ancillary activities. Since the rural population quitting agricultural production cannot be absorbed in nonfarm and off-farm employment, remittances and retirement pensions also generate sufficient income for households in the village. Due to a scarcity of labour and capital rural dwellers often need to migrate to Karacabey district and the closest city center, Bursa, which offers more productive urban industrial and service occupations.

The headman of the village asserts that according to the 2010 general census, Harmanlı village had a total of 340 households and a population of 737, including workers at the poultry processing plant. Considering the high number of households, population is relatively low because 70 people are old widows living alone. The number of households reached 500 in 1990s. Now, just under 600 people are living

in the village excluding non-resident children. The president of the Development Cooperative in Harmanlı explains why the village cannot attract and retain population:

> Migration out of villages, especially from our village, started in 1985. Rural dwellers who engaged in agricultural production and animal husbandry, and who were living together with their sisters and brothers in a household, were taken by someone who promised them employment at TOFAŞ. It is not clear how long it lasted. Due to economic crises and a high rate of absenteeism they were fired… Nobody has stayed in the village since 1985. I was born in 1975. We were 16 boys at school, forget about girls. Only I stayed in the village. There are only three people who were born in 1976. Nobody left who was born between 1976 and 1984. Among people who were born in 1984, only one person stayed in the village. Households consist of people who are between 60 and 75 years old. Even some of them are living alone. In sum, people, whether they want it or not, are not getting involved in a business that does not make money. They don't want their children to be involved either (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 30, 2009, Appx C, 28).

The decline in village population which is rather invisible for nonresidents but still omnipresent, is apparently reflected in the collective memories of interviewees when asked about daily life in Harmanlı. To understand properly, for instance, registration to tailoring courses and admissions to military service and primary school provides stunning examples of patterns of rural decay. A 55-year-old farmer complains that "there are five people of my age living in the village. But while we were going to military service there were 28 of us young men."[56] (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 10, 2010). A group discussion with women in Harmanlı revealed similar observations. As they discussed how tailoring courses were seen as the only educational and beneficial social activity for young women in the village, they also referred to population indicators indirectly. They noted that, since young women were all expected to participate, 30 women were registered for tailoring courses each

[56] "Benim yaşımda 5 kişi 55 yaşında. Askere giderken 28 kişiydik."

year and 3 women were sitting on one desk in the past. However currently, the population of young women is not sufficient to sustain these courses. In another case, a woman asserted that in 1988 22 children were registered for the first year of primary school in Harmanlı with her daughter. In 2010, the school was closed and the total number of the students attending mobile education at primary school in Taşlık village and high schools in Karacabey was only 17.[57] (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 2, 2010)

In light of the drastic changes described here, what does the future hold for agriculture and rural households in Harmanlı village? Rising debts in agricultural production, economic hardship, and lack of local employment opportunities have pushed large number of rural dwellers to migrate in recent decades. A farmer corroborates that migration is no longer a temporary solution but has involved into a permanent, systematic, and planned activity:

> If we are stuck in a difficult situation, we will think. Suppose that we sell our field and our house; what are we going to do? Where will we go? We will settle in our children's house. There are so many people migrating, aren't there? The houses on the left, the right, and opposite are empty. The residents all migrated. There is nobody left on this street. I was born in 1955; there are few people younger than me living in the village. Before our generation if a man had two children, one of them would stay in the village. However, in next generation everybody is leaving the village, for either study or work. If agriculture yields good money, they will stay. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010, Appx C, 29)

The changes in demographic processes and the rural and urban linkages have precipitated profound transformation in the understanding of how people make a living and of nonfarm employment. Although rural livelihood strategies and agriculture are accepted as very similar in most cases, the linkage has recently

[57] In 2012-2013 academic year, primary school in Harmanlı village restarted education with 12 students. Here Kurdish families that migrated to the village have a significant role considering their high birth rates.

become weaker due to the process of nonfarm diversification. Delinking agriculture and rural livelihoods in theory and incorporating observations on nonfarm rural economy invalidate the limited explanatory power of existing agrarian change theories which fail to decipher mobility and diversification of income sources and occupations in rural areas (Rigg, 2006, p.81). The changes in context of rural employment also require extensive policy evaluation and result in distinct implications for rural development policy and practice.

According to Keyder and Yenal (2010) existing policies that were designed for the rural dynamics of the past fail to understand new trends of transformation in rural areas. Their main argument is that since farmers are not solely dependent on agricultural production and subsidized crops, existing agricultural support policies will not significantly endow household income. Therefore, they claim that rural development policies should be more responsive to complex factors and occupational diversification rather than highlighting merely agricultural production. In fact, in parallel to Keyder and Yenal's findings, although many rural dwellers may maintain an agricultural presence, production alone does not have the capacity to meet rising needs of households and aspirations of new generation. While the importance of agriculture in terms of contribution to GDP and household income has been declining, rural change cannot be understood and effective policies cannot be constructed by focusing on production relations in agriculture and omitting the relevance of nonfarm rural economy and diversification. However, one needs to exercise caution when examining nonfarm occupations because policy offerings can be misunderstood as governmental agencies focusing on the rural nonfarm economy rather than on agriculture. This wisdom is purely economic and brings about many caveats. Foremost, promotional strategy in the nonfarm economy for rural

development may bring with it the risk of abandoning farming, especially by small farmers who can already hardly subsist in agricultural production with the existing support policies. It seems reasonable to argue that rural livelihoods are not purely agricultural and the relation between nonfarm work and agriculture has become heterogeneous. In some instances nonfarm work and pursuing multiple occupations may embrace farmers' presence in agricultural production when it contributes to higher income, but on other occasions farmers may construct livelihoods by avoiding agriculture. These ramifications for the rural households need to be investigated within the context in which these changes are occurring and by mapping out local existence in on the wider picture.

While agriculture is a vital element in rural economies, nonfarm income accounts for 35 to 50 percent of rural household incomes across the developing world (Haggblade, Hazell& Reardon, 2007, p.381). Whereas farmers in more secure and rapidly growing rural regions adopt a range of diversification strategies and benefit from many opportunities, including mainly service and commerce, poverty-prone settlements in sluggish rural regions rely on agricultural production to improve the welfare and economic viability of the household. Therefore, focusing solely on the rural nonfarm sector for achieving well-being would worsen the poorest group in rural areas: small farmers. Contrary to Keyder and Yenal's argument, as the fieldwork in Harmanlı village hints, both rural dwellers and farmers who migrated to urban areas repeatedly emphasize that if the government policies allow farmers to generate sufficient income, they will definitely carry out agricultural production as the sole income activity. Besides, further analysis shows that despite lower impact of the nonfarm sector on agricultural earnings, "agricultural growth linkages generate between 30 and 80 cents in rural nonfarm income for each dollar of gain in direct

farm earnings."[58] (Haggblade, Hazell& Reardon, 2007, p.386; Haggblade, Hazell&Drosh, 2007) In conclusion, the dynamics of diversification should be investigated in particular rural region and development agencies should not neglect agricultural production, which has still played a key role in rural economies.

Determinants of Income Diversification

In Turkey, rural livelihoods have conveyed an impression of passive and inert populations, like Marx's well-known portraiture "sack of potatoes", rather than economically and socially mobile groups. Further, due to the growing trend of decreasing shares of the agricultural sector in the total workforce and GDP, dynamics of rural life are virtually ignored.[59] However a clear understanding of the phenomenon of occupational diversification addresses the idea that farmers' lives are highly dynamic and entail numerous kinds of changes. They experience varying levels of wealth and their lifestyles differ according to their objectives and priorities. Indeed, the nature of diversification in the case of those pursuing conventional income activities presents a picture of their struggle against the forces of structural adjustment and change (Shylendra& Rani, 2005).

[58] The aftereffects on local activities from the spending of rising farm incomes are called "agricultural growth linkages," and they were accepted being as the key element in the creation of rural industry (Delgado, Hopkins &Kelly, 1998, p.xi). Agriculture has much higher returns than thought considering growth linkages.

[59] According to TÜİK data, the share of the agricultural sector in the total workforce has been increasing in Turkey since 2007. Keyder (2013) claims that in addition to rising living expenses and decreasing employment opportunities in the city, amelioration of the agricultural policies brings about repeasantization (See also van der Ploeg, 2008). However, a significant change in agricultural policies that encourages agricultural employment and precipitates repeasantisation in that level has not been experienced in Turkey. Moreover, dramatic increase in absolute number of peasants is not supported by other necessary conditions such as rising production levels, input use, sectoral share in added value in GDP, and technological improvement. Finally, interior and exterior inconsistencies about TÜİK data on employment should compel scholars and TÜİK researchers to consider enormous rise in agricultural employment in recent years more cautiously (See also Gürsel, İmamoğlu and Zeydanlı, 2010).

Concomitantly as structural adjustment is forcing poorer households to resort to nonfarm and off-farm activities, it is also decreasing the profitability of existing opportunities due to austerity measures. Decreasing agricultural income among medium and large-scale farmers in turn has resulted in a decline of employment prospects in off-farm activities. Rural and urban formal sectors are being eroded and many formal enterprises hire workers under informal employment relations that are not legally regulated or protected such as part-time workers, temporary workers, and home-based workers. The result is an increasing concentration of farmers, who find themselves in a financial bottleneck, in low-income nonfarm activities where profits and wages are low but competition is equivalently great.

Considering livelihood strategies, every household has a different starting point. While some households attempt to achieve subsistence level, some are grateful to their limited resources, and some are planning accumulation and investment. The path of development and wealth are not unilinear as many assume. Often poor households are assumed to experience further hardship and better-off households are expected to evaluate dynamic processes of change. The fieldwork in Karacabey shows that in many cases this is not valid. Structural adjustment has affected even some large landowners in Karacabey who used to be rich and specialized on monocultural tomato production but are now in search of alternatives such as off-farm wage employment, and migration as a last resort. However, for those wealthy rural dwellers who survive in the struggle with adjustment, diversification may bring accumulation. Therefore, driving forces behind diversification and many different strategies must be understood. Farmers have diversified either to cope with crisis and to substitute for losses in their primary or traditional occupations or to take advantage of opportunities for economic consolidation (Shylendra&Rani, 2005). In a similar

vein, what better-off households need is prestige, profit maximization, and avoidance of financial problems whereas middle and small farmers require risk minimizing and income stabilization strategies (Bryceson, 1997). Consequently, as the factors of diversification oscillate between necessity and choice, households' assets and endowments, access to markets, social networks, and connection with financial and credit institutions are likely to determine the relationship between diversification, prosperity, and poverty (Kabeer &Tran, 2002).

In order to gain more insights into the nature and impact of the process of diversification in Harmanlı village, the experiences of two households that belong to different socio-economic classes will be described to capture distinctive facets. Ali is a landless farmer around the age of 50. He cultivates almost 120 decares of land on lease. He also repairs horse drawn carriages and carries out other welding jobs whenever available within the village. Not totally happy with his household income, he believes that the state should renovate agricultural support policies decoupled from production. His wife could only register 10 decares of land, the sole asset inherited from her father, to the development cooperative and the chamber of agriculture in order to draw upon input price and payment advantages. Unfortunately, since he does not own land, he cannot benefit from state subsidies. Instead, the owner of the land receives input payments. To minimize his production costs, he relies on non-paid family labour performed by his sister, his wife, and his children who are studying at the university out of town but helping him during harvest in the summer. Being landless and uneducated under present conditions, this farmer has only a very limited opportunity for relief from these burdens:

> It is a wonder I survive but my wife works for daytime childcare to add to the family budget. If we earn money, there will be no need to do this.

> These are the ways to subsist. There is a welding machine downstairs that is enough to do my business. It covers my tea and coffee costs. There is not enough space in my garden for animal husbandry. The state has not given a nail to me yet. In this country, hardworking people are being punished. Idle people lay their back on the state. But conditions are so harsh. We educated children. We invested in children and in education instead of land. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 30)

On the other hand, for a household achieving already a secured livelihood, diversification has emerged as an opportunity to accumulate and consolidate socio-economic position by opening up a new avenue of earning. This is the experience of Ahmet, who owns about 150 decares of land he inherited from his father and diversified into nonfarm activities. He is engaged in commerce and transportation businesses and owns a gas station on the Bursa Karacabey highway, catering especially to the fuel oil needs of farmers. He was elected as headman of the village in 1997 and was reelected at the insistence of villagers in 2004. He is 47 years old and has a daughter who is a university graduate preparing for marriage. He built a new house for the family in the village as a sign of improved prosperity. Being a landed family, he has also invested in technological equipment, irrigation, and improved varieties of crops for yield enhancement. The diversification has helped the family primarily by reducing the share of agriculture in income portfolio but Ahmet and his family face another dilemma:

> We have a number of additional income sources but we post a loss in farming. Even if we earn money through other businesses, we spend that money on agriculture. We keep on farming; we have a tractor and land inherited from my father. We cultivate mostly because of the opinions of others. They will say "Look! Such and such cannot afford to sow the land and leave the fields empty." I am doing other businesses; if I rent out fields to others, villagers will gossip about me. Since we engage in alternatives, we should not work on the land, whether at a profit or loss. After all, we lose money in agriculture. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 3, 2010, Appx C, 31)

Labour Market and Employment

In Harmanlı village and the Karacabey district, labour has evolved into more casualized form, a trend in parallel to the rest of the country including other sectors (Deshingkar& Farrington, 2006). Casual farm work is the main occupation of the poor for both women and men who quit agricultural production. Rising debts because of the risks of contract farming and monocultural tomato production compel many poor farmers to search for a casual work in their own village, especially in the villages of Sultaniye and Hotanlı. The chances of employment in these villages as casual farm worker is higher than farmers in Harmanlı due to the existence of larger enterprises in Sultaniye and their need for workers, especially during harvest time. The uncertainty of finding work, the lack of a formal system of social security or insurance, and the possibility of being unable to secure payments from employers at times of crisis have already resulted in many shortcomings. The poor farmers in Harmanlı displaced from agricultural production tend to search for different options in nonfarm sectors. Besides, the average size of land and the limited amount of production do not allow farmers to employ off-farm wage workers. In the case of Harmanlı, off-farm occupations, both casual and permanent, by no means offer viable employment opportunities for the rural poor. Therefore, there is much commuting by men from Harmanlı to Karacabey to work in the nonfarm sector as shop assistants, bus drivers, and butchers. Young women from the village commute to nearby food processing, dairy, and poultry factories such as Kerevitaş, Penguen, Sütaş, and Hastavuk for salaried workers. Additionally, women also engage in childcare, housecare, and daily cleaning activities in Karacabey.

Informality

These new patterns of employment have created an increase in informal and unregulated work with limited institutional protection against risk and insecurity. From wage work to contract to new variations of indentured labour, employers are more inclined to convert formal jobs into informal jobs to reduce labour costs in order to remain competitive in the market (Kritzinger, 2006). Although it is assumed that formal-informal distinction is restricted to urban employment, recently increased diversification in the rural economy makes it impossible to neglect different occupational patterns in evaluating the concept of the informal sector (Breman, 1996). For over thirty years drastic SAP cutbacks in government budget and social services, the dismantling of parastatal agricultural enterprises, marketing boards, and cooperatives have erased government-provided services and diminished formal employment opportunities. Bryceson (1997) argues that "the informal sector has filled this vacuum" (p.14).

Compared to the earlier definition that only focused on the legal regulations of enterprises, the new, expanded definition of the informal economy additionally emphasizes illegal, unprotected, and unregulated employment relationships. In short, many researchers, activists, and policy makers in international development circles thoughtfully construct their arguments on the nature of employment and the characteristics of enterprises while considering the informal economy. According to Chen (2007), self-employment in unregistered or incorporated enterprises and wage employment in formal or informal jobs without social protection are the main segments of the informal economy. This segmentation captures the fact that informality is not confined to the urban economy and that formal enterprises may

employ workers under informal employment relations through contracting and sub-contracting arrangements as part-time workers, casual workers, and homeworkers.

Not only employment as daily labourers and seasonal workers but also flexible and insecure labour relations in the rural nonfarm sector even in formal firms favour informality. Many formal enterprises in Karacabey, including the parastatal institution TİGEM have decided to shift from permanent employment to outsourcing and sub-contracting. TİGEM in Karacabey, indeed, offers opportunity to the educated young workforce through permanent wage-work. However, political patronage and privatization attempts have reorganized labour relations in TİGEM through informality since early 2000 ("Tarım-İş'ten TİGEM'e sitem", 2000). Subcontracting decreases the labour costs and the threat of rising wages and unionization becomes limited. To precipitate privatization of TİGEM, the number of workers and the amount of production have been deliberately reduced. Moreover, while many rural dwellers in Karacabey are seeking employment, TİGEM, which enjoys the benefits of informality, relies on subcontracting and migrant labourers who are employed as a result of political pressure and clientelistic policies. In this process, reformers attempt to bring efficiency by reducing labour costs and promoting transition from agricultural production to animal husbandry. In 2003, 35 clerks and 180 workers were employed by TİGEM Karacabey while these numbers were 39 and 786 respectively in 2001 (Candemir& Deliktaş, 2006).

Under these conditions many workers in rural districts tend not to be protected by social policies, labour law, or collective bargaining agreements. They are deprived of secure work, worker's benefits, social protection, representation, and voice. But, more fundamentally, the lack of payment of insurance premiums endangers their future as well. Therefore, obtaining a formal wage with secure

contracts and social protection is vital for the future of rural livelihoods because the decreasing income of agricultural production does not allow farmers to appropriate funds for social security. For instance Ayşe, who is 57 years old, got a formal job in Hastavuk poultry processing plant situated in Harmanlı along with eight other women living in the village. She emphasizes that the only reason to quit farming and to engage in wage-work is to pay social insurance premiums. Ayşe and her husband, who is also employed in the poultry plant as a service driver, recieve 1,600 TL in total every month. They complain that they could not earn money and secure their future by continuing in agricultural production. Her husband explains that they are achieving regular income and social security benefits rather than going into debt in agricultural production:

> You become indebted to the cooperative for credits and then you cannot get rid of it. Once you defer and accumulate debt, you cannot clear it without selling land. Farmers are working under harsh conditions. I quit. All fields are empty. If I cultivate, I will post a loss. The job of minibus servicing appeared in Hastavuk where my wife has been employed. It has been two to three years since I quit farming. I planted again and again but I could not earn money. Anyway, we just cultivated wheat and shallot. My wife is also working at the factory, so who will farm? I lease the fields to my son-in-law. I do not care if they are not cultivated. If you are in debt, it is not worth your labour and effort. The price of wheat has still been the same since Ecevit's time. It is declining instead of rising. Farming is impossible. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 17, 2010, Appx C, 32)

Keeping the uniqueness of this case in mind, it still remains true that both men and women are now increasingly drawn into insecure and precarious employment. Vulnerability, uncertainty, and deprivation among the poor generate greater concerns in rural areas. In Turkey, the state has a relatively limited capacity to provide social security for agricultural workers, especially for seasonal and daily workers. The Law No. 2925 on the social insurance of agricultural workers regulates conditions of

social security for agricultural labourers. In addition, The Law No. 6111 Supplementary Item No.5 determines prerequisites for the insurance of seasonal agricultural workers. Since agricultural labour contracts for casual farm workers are verbal, they face tremendous problems in social security system. On the other hand, assuming that their enterprises would always remain economically viable and highly profitable, many rich farmers in Harmanlı also opted out of the social security system. However, as they get older and agricultural income cannot cover their increasing health expenses, many farmers recently attempted to enter the social security system. Although they are subject to voluntary insurance, higher insurance premiums lead them to get involved in maneuverings. They prefer agricultural workers insurance for which farmers need to certify that they do not own any asset and any other income.[60] Therefore, farmers transfer their assets to their wives' accounts so that at least one of the couples will be in social security system for future retirement payments and recent family health expenses.

Existing empirical evidence shows that retirement payments offer more to aging rural dweller's livelihoods in Harmanlı than agricultural production. In addition, almost all middle-aged farmers are planning to quit farming when they receive retirement payments. They believe that retirement payments will cover their limited living expenses in the village after their children move away to form their own independent households. Since the average age of the village population is high, rural dwellers in Harmanlı also achieve old-age and widow pensions. In accordance with the Law No. 2022, a person above 65 years old who does not receive social security payments, has an income below indigence level (poverty line), and has no one under obligation to care for him/her can be paid an old-age pension. For the first

[60] Agricultural workers insurance is known as hoer insurance (*çapacı sigortası*) among farmers.

half of 2012, the payment was 340 TL for three months. Furthermore, widowed women who are living alone and were not covered under the social security system have been paid a pension of 250 TL per month since April 2012. What is better for these women is that if they demand, they will be able to receive both old-age and widow pensions by the court decision. In Harmanlı, a picture emerges of radical change in the structure of rural households whereby agricultural income will be totally displaced by retirement payments, widow payments, old-age pensions, and migrant remittances in the near future. As the population gets older, farmers will leave their fields but not the village.

Labour Hiring

Given that livelihood diversification and employment strategies have been very complicated in the rural areas, the household members may engage in off-farm or nonfarm wage employment, migrate to urban areas, or be dependent to extraneous income such as remittances, retirement payments, old-age and widow pensions. Labour-hiring activities in agricultural production are also far from being uniform. On the one hand, small and middle farmers need to minimize labour costs to subsist in agriculture so they reduce demand for daily and seasonal labour. On the other hand, larger and richer farmers, the only ones possessing the necessary transportation facilities, social contacts, and high level of production, are required to hire seasonal and daily labour during peak-season harvesting operations. Nevertheless, hiring labour within the village becomes much more difficult because rural dwellers prefer permanent nonfarm wage employment or migration.

Labour exchange was a common phenomenon especially among small farmers cultivating small plots of land in Harmanlı. Exchange arrangements usually

took place among tightly-knit groups such as family, neighbors, and friends. They could complete different urgent tasks together during peak season without hiring labour. However, recently labour exchange through reciprocity relations has been very limited in Harmanlı village. By increasing mechanization, declining production levels, and changing crop patterns, farmers reduce their labour demand to minimize costs; in the meantime employment of young women, especially those exchanging labour, as nonfarm wage workers in poultry and dairy industries cut down labour supply for agriculture within the village. In addition, the field evidence shows that many farmers who could afford to hire daily and seasonal workers now were dependent on non-paid family labour. An onion producer in Harmanlı village complains that "before we were hiring between 20 and 30 workers everyday. Now even if I sell the land I cannot pay their wages; let alone other costs" (Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010).[61]

Those farmers who can afford to hire daily workers tend to save on labour costs as well. A better- off farmer in Harmanlı mentions the benefits of being in cooperation with other farmers in different processes of production by saying, "we form a group of 25 farmers and plant tomato. We are acting together and making contracts at the same price. We deal together for a group of daily workers. They work three days for you and five days for me to harvest tomato. We also do the same for sugar beet harvest. It is more advantageous." (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 14, 2010, Appx C, 33)

[61] "Hergün 20-30 işçi alıyorduk; şimdi tarlayı satsak o işçinin parasını ödeyemeyiz, bırak diğer masrafları."

Seasonal Labour

A seasonal farm worker is usually expected to work a thirteen hour day with an hour for lunch.[62] Payment is in cash but daily wages may change according to product, gender, and localition. In Sultaniye, for example, daily wage rates for tomato harvesting have been higher than in other villages. Productivity of the fields, farmers' dependency on monocultural production, the length of the harvest period, and the value of the crop have an important effect on wage rates via an increasing demand for seasonal labour for a short time period. Besides, women never receive the same wage as men and this is justified on the grounds that their work is lighter. According to TÜİK data, the average daily wage rates for seasonal labourers in 2011 was 28.52 TL for women and 38.41 TL for men *id est*, women receive at least 26 percent less than men for identical tasks, while the range of work they are allowed to perform is already much more limited.[63] Children are even paid approximately half as much as men. They are preferred for their small hands to pick delicate fruits that can be easily damaged during harvest such as strawberry, raspberry, and mulberry.

Every year six thousand seasonal workers migrate to Bursa from South Eastern Anatolia to work in the fields for the summer. 2,850 workers are positioned in Karacabey especially by tomato producers in Sultaniye, Hotanlı, and Bakırköy. In 2012, daily wages of seasonal workers were 20 TL for women and 35 TL for men. The seasonal labor market in Karacabey is segmented between Kurdish seasonal workers who migrated from the South East and workers from Çanakkale and

[62] During tomato harvest in summer, seasonal workers are expected to wake up before sunrise and work until sunset. They should wake up until 5 am, be ready on the field until 6 am, and work until 8 pm. For further information about local times of sunrise and sunset see http://www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/astronomy/dogus-batis/Bursa.htm. To prevent excuses for tardiness, each family was given an alarm clock.

[63] For further information on wages of seasonal agricultural labourers in Turkey see http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10806 .

Balıkesir (Manyas). Although their wages are the same, the move towards Kurdish workers is an attractive option for tomato producers in that farmers not only delay payments for Kurds until they depart but also avoid additional expenses for living conditions of Kurds. A farmer in Sultaniye explains general trend of externalization of labour and why producers rely on outside contractors from South Eastern Anatolia:

> In the summer, almost 3,000 people make their living here. I am a middle farmer, I pay a total wage between 150 and 200 thousand TL. It is almost equal to the amount that an enterprise with up to 10 employees pays its workers annually. But they [policy makers] try to annihilate us. In the past, seasonal workers were coming from Çanakkale and Balıkesir but there has been a considerable number of workers from the Eastern Anatolia for four to five years. They are preferred because they do not demand immediate payment. They come in May and depart in October. In this period, they do not ask for a lump sum payment. For workers here, you need to make an agreement and pay deposit immediately. Seasonal labourers coming from Manyas stay in workers' houses, empty houses, and vacant properties. Besides, every farmer has one or two rooms in their garden. I needed great number of workers so I housed them in huts on the field that had access to electricity and water. (Karacabey, Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 34)

Not all landowners are willing to assist workers with their housing and financial problems. This form of employment is not only highly precarious but also offers limited institutional protection against risk and livelihood deprivation. Unlike permanent wage workers, seasonal agricultural workers do not have employment security as their labour relations rely on only verbal agreement. In 2011, a shift to written contracts for seasonal workers was planned in Karacabey. However a *dayıbaşı* states that producers do not accept written contracts because of the increasing financial burden needed to avoid informality ("Mevsimlik işçiler sözleşmeli olacak", 2011). In addition to insecure employment, seasonal workers are subject to health and other risks such as physical threats and even sexual abuse. They

are exposed to parasites, poisonous insects, infectious disease, toxic plants, and chemicals. Those living in huts usually have no access to electricity, outside lights, indoor running water, clean toilets, and bath facilities. For instance, in 2010 only one sink was available for 200 migrant families in Bakırköy ("Bakırköy kan ağlıyor", 2010). Although accommodation and health care arrangements are planned by the authorities since migrant workers are illiterate, extremely poor, disconnected from social networks, and poorly informed they are not in a better bargaining position.[64] Moreover, large land owners may block other work opportunities and government benefits such as loans and projects by using their political and social power.

While the employment of seasonal workers under the lowest conditions minimizes the costs and commitments of the employer, there are also caveats involved for farmers as well. Producers are now unable to control the skills and expertise of workers. While local workers are highly experienced in onion and tomato cultivation, migrant workers cannot stay long enough to develop skills. Therefore, farmers are complaining that the lack of skills of seasonal workers increases labour costs because they need to employ more workers for the same amount of work. In addition the shift to seasonal labour prevents rural dwellers from benefiting from agricultural growth linkages to other sectors in Karacabey:

> Do you know how many seasonal labourers are working in this village? In the past all the fields were cultivated but the whole village was working. 50 or 60 people were coming as migrant labourers. Now, 1,500 seasonal workers are employed. They take all added value provided in this village

[64] In 2012, METİP was implemented to improve the infrastructure and sanitation of migrant agricultural workers' settlements. This project was designed to improve toilet and bath facilities, provide access to indoor and outdoor running water, and collect garbage regularly ("Mevsimlik işçilere büyük destek", 2012; "Mevsimlik işçiler rahat edecek", 2012). Local authorities in Karacabey were warned by the governor of Bursa that separatist components might arise with seasonal workers and security officers should be kept equipped for any rebellious act. In other words, Kurdish migrant workers are seen as a threat to the unity and security of the region ("Vali Harput: Mevsimlik işçiler arasına sızacak bölücü unsurlara dikkat edilmeli", 2012).

> and depart at the end of the season. We employ others but we cannot create jobs for ourselves. What is it all about? When the level of wealth rises, you allow your children to study out of town. Our daughters are so vulnerable. They are not physically fit to work in the field, they do not aspire farming, their models of living do not suit agricultural models, and you cannot bring them to the field. Your sons either. What happens then? Since there are not enough people to work in agriculture, seasonal labourers from South Eastern Anatolia, who are not familiar with our work, take away all added value… You bring them and confine 8 or 10 people in a hut which does not have a shower or even water. How much does he help you on the field? You evaluate it. This is the scene. (Karacabey, Hotanlı village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 35)

Urban Rural Linkages

In the search for new means of survival, both farm and nonfarm sectors in the rural districts offer limited local employment opportunities. Neither large enterprises, nor small scale agriculture is able to absorb the labour surplus as off-farm wage employers. Even if labour is hired for agricultural operations as discussed above, it is only for very limited operations both casual and insecure. The drastic decline in employment in the agricultural sector results in the growing significance of non-agricultural work and income earned outside of the village. However, the lack of necessary skill to be employed by the well known companies in Karacabey such as Nestle and Sütaş, and the shortage of capital to construct their own business prevent farmers from achieving permanent and secure jobs. Given the limited earnings from agriculture and the unlikelihood of appealing to local nonfarm job opportunities, migration is seen the only potential way to meet subsistence requirements and cash income.

Similar observations have been noted in Bursa where migrants from Harmanlı village all spoke of declining income from farming and a scarcity of cash earning activities in their home district. Their motive for migration is driven by the opportunities and better prospects in the city. In other words, they move to the city

because they expect a higher income in Bursa. Further, in some instances, urban migration is obviously closely linked to fragmentation of land holdings. When a household is crowded and owns limited land assets that are unable to support the growing needs of its members, younger household members in particular become more inclined to migrate to the city in order not to put household under further stress.

Many young women and men in the village were encouraged to expect more from life and not to emulate their farmer parents because of the attractiveness of the possibility for higher income as well as their own changing aspirations and expectations (Rigg, 2006). Young people in Harmanlı find rural life dull and unstimulating (Kitching, 2003). An increasing pattern of higher education, changing life styles, and interaction with global trends through media and the internet has tempted the rural young to migrate in order to avoid the perceived drudgery of farming and low social status (Rigg, 2006). For the young, in the mean time, migration means independence and an escape from obligations and control from elders, something they otherwise cannot achieve in the village by working as non-paid family labourers on the field.

The destination of those farmers who left or who were pushed out of agriculture is the nearest district Karacabey or the closest city, Bursa. It is obvious that those who have skills, education, capital, and contacts will go the farthest and be the most successful. On the other hand, is it surprising that the group most vulnerable to poverty - the old and landless rural dwellers- have no chance even to apply for a work? A farmer explains that there is little sign of any substantial improvement in the living standards of old migrants: “Peasants, who quit farming, migrate to Karacabey and Bursa. You are over the hill now. You can neither work there nor get a job at factory. Suppose that you peddle on the street, you cannot deign to do it. You

waste away, there is no alternative. Or you are employed as an off-farm wage worker in the village" (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 4, 2010, Appx C, 36).

Karacabey has some advantages such as low living expenses and proximity to Harmanlı village. Even some migrants may continue cultivating corn and wheat while they are employed and settled in Karacabey. Moreover, nonfarm sectors in Karacabey except a few well known agro-processing companies, demand little in the way of skills but then charge much lower fees and are rated as less promotable. Bursa, on the contrary, requires workers with high educational levels and skills. There is a tremendous glut in the market for metal, automotive, and textile-related activities. Therefore, studying at vocational high schools and technical colleges in Karacabey to qualify for formal sector employment in Bursa is very popular among the new generation. Urban employment provides an opportunity for upward mobility and higher incomes, especially for younger migrants. However, the labour landscape in the city consists of diverse occupations usually based on unregulated and insecure employment relations including extremely irregular and long working hours. In Bursa, those with the skills, economic means, and networks could achieve a more rapid incorporation into the labour market while poorer migrants who cannot develop technical skills, physical strength, or the ability to adapt to distinct types of work are relegated to the status of temporary settlers with limited chances for socio-economic inclusion.

Although migrants are diversifying into different economic activities, one can observe the dominance of occupations in the textile and automotive sectors. Within the context of the highly competitive labour market in Bursa, kinship and personal networks play crucial role in finding jobs and accommodation and minimizing the risk of moving out of the village (Carrillo, 2011). All of eight rural-to-urban migrants

interviewed in Bursa accessed employment and sheltering either through family, relatives, friends, or personal relations. The existence of family and kinship ties and other linkages may prevent migrants from falling into absolute poverty but relative poverty will still exist. As Kalaycıoğlu (2006) argues, the need to rely on these linkages is itself an indicator of relative poverty.

Not all migrants are representative of the poor. Considering the effects of structural adjustment on migrants, there is a clear difference between the first group of migrants who left Harmanlı village in 1980s and the second group of migrants that has been facing the destructive effects of agricultural reforms and migrating to Bursa or Karacabey since the late 1990s. Findings in fieldwork support the results of other studies on rural-urban migration claiming that latecomers are not successful in finding residence and formal occupation, securing livelihood of the household, and achieving a moderate level of well-being (Işık&Pınarcıoğlu, 2001; Kalaycıoğlu, 1996, 2006). Interviews held with migrants in Bursa confirm that in the 1980s access to employment was easier even for job seekers who had no formal education or industrial experience. They assert that the representatives of the companies that were seeking employees regularly visited villages in Karacabey to invite farmers to work for their industrial enterprises in Bursa. One of those migrants who had the opportunity to take advantage of such job invitations states that he could engage in regular, secure, and well-paid work but that now monthly wages are not even equal to his weekly wage in the 1980s (Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, May 5, 2010).

A drastic change has occurred in employment trends in urban labour markets. Urban wages have declined and formal sector wage earners have become the minority.[65] In other words, a transition from field to factory does not guarantee a

[65] Similar change was noted for sub-Saharan Africa by Jamal (1994).

share of the benefits of secure employment for rural migrants because of unprotected and unorganized labour relations. Hence, a second group of migrants is forced to put up with dismal living and working conditions in the city. A farmer reports that, although the informal sector in Bursa is a jungle where everybody struggles for his or her own subsistence, urban migration has accelerated in recent years: "around 60 to 70 youths migrated from our village. Some are working for minimum wage, some are employed monthly, and some are working daily whenever asked. In Bursa, they live 3 to 5 people together in a room. They are all single, they cannot even get married" (Karacabey, Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 37).

Whether in a crowded family or alone, a migrant's use of space is limited to a few square meters in low income housing areas due to rising rents. Their livelihood is mainly dependent on irregular, temporary, or casual activities. Even in the case they engage in permanent employment, they need ancillary jobs for greater expenses such as rent and their children's education. As one migrant tells, since his wage cannot cover living costs, he has required additional income sources for four to five years. He is a waiter in the refectory of TOFAŞ but he also works for different organizations on weekends at events such as weddings and dinner parties (Harmanlı-der, April 28, 2010). However, unless a migrant is educated or skilled, his work opportunities may include unsafe and hazardous conditions. Hüseyin first migrated to Karacabey with his family and started to work as a shop assistant. After three years he moved to Bursa where he worked at various factories but did not succeed. He has been a real estate agent in Bursa for 15 years. In 2003-2004 he went bankrupt and his relatives in Bursa offered him different options. When he did not accept heavy conditions of these jobs, they accused him of being lazy and footloose. For instance, once they suggested he work as a truck driver in a textile company. The job

description included driving 10 times a day to a dyeing plant and loading and unloading fabric by himself. The weekly wage was 100 TL and did not include social security benefits. The working hours were harsh: from 8 am to whenever the job was completed (Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 28, 2010). Under these conditions, being formally employed and earning moderate income are really challenging in the urban labour market, especially for the second group migrants in the city. Because of this, household members strictly control their consumption patterns in order to subsist. Metin is an old farmer. He has three sons and a daughter living in Bursa. One of his sons is looking for a job and benefiting from unemployment payments but his other children are employed. They pool the incomes of all the household members, whether married or single, and Metin, as the head of household, manages family budget. He even shops *en masse* for them at the weekly bazaar and then distributes the groceries among his children to minimize alimentary expenses (Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 21, 2010).

As noted above, a majority of migrants confront socioeconomic hardships in urban areas. Another challenging key variable which represents the transition process is identity. Migrants keep in close touch with their region of origin or aim to settle in their home village at a later stage especially after retirement. Some of them even continue cultivating non-labour intensive crops such as wheat and corn. Migrants, either studying or working in nonfarm sectors still take their annual vacations during the summer harvest season so that they will be available to help on the farm and actualize their self-image of being a peasant. The high proportion of remittances in overall rural household incomes plays an important role in reducing vulnerability to poverty and improving food security especially for old farmers. In turn, linkages with the home village contribute to well-being of the household in the city through better

nutrition during economic crises. The same applies in Bursa. Migrants want to live in the midst of their community in a particular neighborhood in the Vatan district rather than in the social vacuum of the city. Migrants also keep social and cultural linkages tied to the land by attending religious fests, spring festivals, and wedding ceremonies in the village.[66]

Those who achieve regular income as wage workers and social security benefits in the urban sector are relatively successful in coping strategies. However growing costs of living in the city, dismal working conditions, fear and suspicion of the great cities, and social exclusion create a feeling of dejection among migrants, forcing them to return to their villages. The living conditions worsen further, especially for those who depend on work outside the formal sector, since urban residents pay higher prices for housing, transportation, food, water and sanitation services. However, recently, migrants returning to their villages can enjoy some benefits from city life and the urban sector by way of improved transportation and communication facilities without having the major disadvantages associated with living in the city, that is, higher living costs.

A complex set of factors from dismal living conditions to identity problems, which fall in both the economic and non-economic spheres of livelihood, are found to be accelerating the phenomenon of return migration. The difficulties experienced by migrants in integrating into the urban habitat are all the more noticeable in view of out of work migrants moving back in with aging parents or returning to ancestral

[66] Whereas migrants have a strong emotional and cultural attachment to the land and village, the majority of migrants, however, regard farmers as miserable, idle, and enviers of urban lifestyle. Although migrants themselves moved to urban areas due to the scarcity of income-generating opportunities in rural areas, they now accuse poor rural dwellers of being lazy. According to migrants in Bursa, farmers are uneducated, lack management skills, and invest in luxury items rather than agricultural production. Therefore, they are capable of neither following nor using innovation in technical equipment. This expert discourse on poverty based on pathological and philanthropic theories reduces the causes of poverty to individual characteristics rather than offering systemic analysis.

villages. For six years, Mehmet worked in Bursa as a taxi (*dolmush*) driver. Now, the 41-year-old spends his days preparing the land for corn and wheat cultivation and helping his parents with animal husbandry in Harmanlı village. Unable to cover the living costs of his family in Bursa, Mehmet felt he had little choice but to return to his birthplace and try to subsist on what he could reap from his parents' land and livestock. The problem of exploitation of labour by employers, especially in the informal sector, as well as dismal living conditions are the main caveats of city life. However, livelihood strategies in the village cannot drastically alleviate the distressing conditions in migrant households. According to Mehmet, the urban population views the villagers as idle people and assumes they work only half the year. Mehmet emphasizes that he and his family work day and night for six months in extreme weather conditions, which is equivalent to a year of work. As an example, when his 15-year-old son arrives home from school, he puts on his boots and goes directly to the cowshed [67] (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 11, 2010). Neither Mehmet, nor his family are entitled to annual leave, overtime, weekend vacations, or social security benefits as workers are in formal urban employment. He is well aware of the fact that although they deserve better living and working conditions, farmers' very substantial economic performance is made invisible by urban dwellers' perception of the countryside and villagers.

[67] In farming families, there is not a rigid separation between work and a child's education. The children are seen as learning the skills that they will need as adults by helping their parents in their work. It is therefore taken for granted that, insofar as their strength and skill permits, children will take part in the normal production processes as an unpaid family labourer (Crehan, 1992).

The Rising Responsibility of Women

Through the 30 years of structural adjustment experience, women have become fully enmeshed in the growing responsibility and obligations for family livelihoods in the countryside of Turkey similar to Ghana and India (Brydon, 2011; Mies, 2008). The main problem with the structural adjustment is not the assumption that women are outside of market and need to be brought in but that structural adjustment is actually grounded in gender biases that are deeply and fundamentally exploitative of women's time, labour, and sexuality, both at home and at work (Reed, 1996). Whether they are migrants or rural dwellers, they are discriminated against in markets and they lack control over resources and income. Considering households living in poverty, selling the labour power of female members unconditionally, to any extent possible, and for prices which are generally much lower than those paid to men is a significant survival strategy experienced by many households (Breman, 1996).

Agriculture and Environment

The active role of women in agricultural production is prominent in the village. The majority of women are involved in all agricultural tasks except mechanized activities and marketing practices. Women spend many hours in different aspects of crop production such as weeding, harvesting, sacking, storage, and (before hybrid seeds) reserving the best seed varieties for the following year's cultivation. Their working time is also devoted to post-harvest activities such as threshing, sorting, and grading. Men, on the other hand, carry out mechanized activities for land preparation like sowing seeds, spreading fertilizers and pesticides, and irrigation. In addition

marketing activities are heavily biased toward male farmers.[68] Not only is there a clear division of labour between men and women in agricultural production tasks but also there are some crops which are primarily grown by women. As an example, men have control over the mechanized production of wheat and corn, leaving women the more labour-intensive, time-consuming, and non-mechanized crops such as shallots and chickpeas.

The practice of gender segregation in rural tasks confines women to activities accomplished around homestead, especially in animal husbandry. If a household owns a herd fed by shepherd in the meadows of the village, it is the male's responsibility to control the herd twice a day, early in the morning and in the afternoon. Such visits are, in principle, a male responsibility. In practice, however, female members of the family prepare meals for the shepherd everyday. Women care for livestock, small ruminants, and chickens on homestead plots. Chickens in particular are more likely to be seen as women's property, though they usually have limited numbers. In the daily struggle for survival, livestock is an asset that can be quickly exchanged in market during climatic shocks or for sudden expenditures such as medical care, school fees or to meet marriage expenses. Moreover, women milk animals, process milk products, and gather eggs to sell in order to establish even the most basic levels of financial autonomy and restrict complete reliance on their husbands.[69] In Harmanlı village, fishing as an outside activity is primarily a men's task. In winter, river flooding in the fields brings many fish to the plain. Therefore,

[68] For further information on gender-based discrepancies in agricultural production in Egypt and Vietnam see El-Tobshy (2005) and Kabeer and Tran (2002).

[69] Dairy farming and rearing poultry effectively set up the financial situation of women. However, caring for animals and milking livestock imposes a rigid structure on the daily work rhythms of females. As personal needs, vacation, and household activities such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry become tied to daily the milking schedule, women are confined to the homestead. For further analysis on the effects of dairy farming and potato cultivation on women's household labour and farm work in Canada see Machum (2006).

by using a net, men can easily haul in fish, which contributes significantly to the daily nutrition needs of the household members in winter without any extra expense.

In spite of the fact that women participate extensively in the processes of agricultural production and animal husbandry, they lack influence over strategic decisions and control over resources, crop patterns, marketing, and the distribution of income. Gender relations in rural areas and the hegemony of patriarchal authority have been questioned but women are still defined as subordinate to men. In Harmanlı unless a woman is widow and her single son continues agricultural production, she can hardly have a say over the crop cultivation, spending and sources of income. In a household, the husband and father-in-law are the primary agents in restricting women's well-being and involvement in strategic decisions. It is clear that women have not only been made practically invisible in the debate concerning agricultural production but also remain hidden in aggregated statistical approaches of census reports and other official documents because they are performing as unpaid family labourer (Baumeister, 2001).

A considerable number of rural women fall into the category of poor and very poor and are disadvantaged in terms of access to land, labour, equipment, and credits. In addition to gender inequality, financial constraints do not allow rural women to purchase land and inputs or to hire labour. This pattern of relative female disadvantage underpins women's vulnerability and economic marginalization especially for widows. If we consider land ownership by a woman in Harmanlı village, it is important to note that her husband's land usually passes down to their sons or her husband sells land before his death to pay for medical costs. Although a woman may have inherited land from her own family or from husband and owns the

title deeds, in practice, her sons cultivate the land and control strategic decisions about the property.

Along with the gender division of responsibilities for agricultural production and livelihood strategies, women are embracing certain values about the land and environment. According to women, since they are more attuned to the family needs, secure access to land is a major household resource to preserve a basis of agricultural subsistence. They accept land not only as an economic resource but also a social asset (Walker, 2002). Therefore, women farmers are more likely than other producers to use traditional agricultural practices, and less likely than male farmers to use pesticides, chemical fertilizer, GMOs, and hormones for animal (Sachs, 2006). Overall, rural women in Harmanlı present themselves as being more interested than men in the protection of agricultural production, resource conservation, and the preservation of local biodiversity including the genetic diversity of seeds (Aksoy, 2005a; Rajbhandari, 2006). The statement of an old female farmer proves the strength of women's analysis and their full awareness of the land and environment: "foreigners brought harmful fertilizers, and then our fields died"[70] (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 2, 2010).

Livelihood Strategies and Consumption

The trends in female labour force participation are highly connected with the outcomes of SAPs including the commercialization of agriculture, mechanization,

[70] "Pis gavur pis gübreleri getirdi, topraklar kirlendi…Yeni gübre tarlaları öldürdü." In Karacabey, improper use of pesticides and fertilizers has been decreasing the quality and efficiency of the land by increasing the pH of the soil. See "Toprak bozuluyor", (2005) for degradation of soil in Karacabey lowlands and Reed (1996) for the environmental dimension of SAP.

and changing crop patterns.[71] For many households in Harmanlı village, the replacement of seasonal and daily employment with the unpaid provision of services by female members in families is the main strategy to reduce labour costs in agricultural production. Available evidence suggests that this strategy raises the amount of time spent on the field for women in households until labour-intensive crops are replaced by mechanized crops such as wheat and corn or the household totally quits agricultural production. Eventually, women detached from agricultural production face two scenarios: they are isolated from economic and social life in rural areas by being confined to the home or they are thrown into the pool of informal employment providing cheap and flexible wage labour for rural-urban labour markets.

In this context, there are not many alternatives for women at home. Unless they qualify for retirement payments or remittances, they need to engage in low-wage work conducted in their own houses. In Harmanlı village, women prepare jams, sun-dried, preserved, and canned food, and process milk products (previously made for household consumption) for the market as home-based labourers. In addition, tatting and sewing for home-textile companies are also preferred by women as home-based work. Rather than being directly in contact with buyers, women work through agents to sell both handicrafts and prepared foods. Since it is assumed that home-based work might free up women's time, it remains important to highlight that home-based labour actually constraints women's ability to move freely in the outside world and decreases presence of women in areas formerly open to them such as roads, fields, and bazaars. From the perspectives of male members of household,

[71] In a similar vein Harriss-White (2007a) in her research on the rice market in India argues that new technology especially the mechanization of post-harvest systems for rice and commercialization of labour relations in post-harvest processing destroy livelihoods and push women out to under-paid jobs.

home becomes a more desirable and actively controlled place of work for women. The "housewifization" of work provides benefits for companies as well such as eliminating costs which otherwise be covered by the companies themselves (Staples, 2007, p.22). The home becomes an external department of a company in which the total atomization of hidden workers minimizes the legal responsibilities of employers. In sum, home-based labour blurs the borders of public and private, life and work, and formal and informal. It redefines the boundaries of economy in general as home-based sites of structural adjustment, casualization, and exploitation.

It is also evident that home based work does not reduce the amount of time rural women spend on housework and livelihood activities; rather they end up doing more housework than they ever did before.[72] By stretching out scarce resources, women, whether they are employed or not, bear a growing responsibility for subsistence and food security during economic hardship. In Harmanlı village, women prepare sun-dried and bottled food, tomato paste, pasta, and jam for winter. They clean house and paint walls regularly. They grow tomato, eggplant, pepper, beans, and black-eyed peas. They rear poultry in their homesteads, supply firewood, collect wild plants and edible roots, and nurture neighbourhood networks with an intensive use of skills of borrowing (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 13, 2010).

Nonfarm Female Employment in Karacabey

Historically, women constituted a substantial proportion of casual workers for agricultural production as paid workers or unpaid family labourers. But when crop

[72] Structural adjustment not only intensifies women labour but also hinders their efforts to live and prosper. In Harmanlı village, the attempts of rural women at subsistence are denied and since they are not actively involved in the production processes on the field, it is assumed that their laziness brings about poverty. This tendency is exacerbated especially in times of crisis by misleading, inappropriate policies and poor governance.

patterns and methods of production change, women tend to gravitate to home-based work and nonfarm employment in rural areas. The circumstances of the structural adjustment have affected households' income and forced their members to seek alternative jobs in order to be able to subsist. In particular, selling the labour power of female members and children, sometimes combined with urban migration has been an increasing trend for income generation in villages.

In Harmanlı village women, who work outside the home, undertake low-paying informal jobs. Although men have priority in the job queue with a stronger claim on jobs as the rightful breadwinners, women's contributions in Karacabey increase livelihood choices. They engage in daily and domestic care and participate in paid work in the agrofood industry including poultry and dairy sectors. [73] All women face gender discrimination in agricultural production and nonfarm employment but lower wages and poor endowments of land or livestock do not prevent the feminization of responsibility and their obligation to the household. In some cases young, educated, and skilled rural women have moved into nonfarm activities to become independent of their fathers, husbands, and other household control. While young women may realize their aspirations, illnesses, loneliness, and old age in particular increase rural women's vulnerability to poverty.

The findings show that women are also responsible for the household's nutrition needs and diversity of diet. Despite men's grievances about growing expenditures, women have to enter the market and bazaar in Karacabey to purchase needed calories.[74] As cheaper foodstuffs become available at supermarkets and rural

[73] For further analysis on gender differences in unemployment and male breadwinner bias specifically, see Elson (2007).

[74] A number of findings are worth further comment. Their diet is usually supplemented with vegetables, eggs, rice, and pasta. The frequency of meat consumption is very low as an old farmer states that 80 percent of the peasants can eat meat only at the feast of Sacrifice (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 28, 2009). Despite women and children's contribution to household incomes,

women are engaged in paid employment, they have to rely on the market for a greater part of their food. Items for household consumption that were previously made at home by the women are now available in the supermarkets. Nevertheless, there is a disagreement between male members of the family who want food to be made in the traditional way at home and female members who prefer the labor saving market option to increase time devoted to paid labour.

Through mixed farm operations, home-based work, nonfarm wage employment, and intensified self-employment women are doing more than simply assisting the household by selling their labour force. They are actively maintaining family's subsistence. Rather than being passive, dependent targets for assistance, they are bearing on growing responsibility for livelihood strategies.

Conclusion

Currently, probably the most important effects of structural adjustment on the livelihood strategies of rural dwellers are the fundamental shifts in agricultural production, employment, and marketization process. These influences can be traced by interrogating labour use, consumption patterns, spatial relocation, changing gender roles, and environmental degradation. Although agricultural production continues to support a majority of population living in Karacabey, the evidence shows that farmers are easing away from strictly agrarian existence and engaging in

---

families can hardly save any money for housing, furniture, or clothing. An old farmer became angry when he was asked whether he could pare down expenses: "Do you know how old these sofas that you are sitting are? Look, I bought those ones this year. I sold shallots that remained from last year when the price rose to 3.5 TL. We could buy only two sofas that have recently arrived but I could not afford to buy third one" (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 7, 2010, Appx C, 38). The limited extent to which households have disposable income after meeting basic needs has impact on other exchange relations in Karacabey. Although the range of consumer items have expanded in Karacabey, declining agricultural income is also likely to reduce tradesmen' (artisans) well-being. For further information see "Çiftçi ürettiği için cezalandırılıyor" (2006).

casualized form of labour. The declining contribution of agriculture to GDP and decreasing rural population can be followed through statistical data but statistical analysis cannot convey dynamics of diversification, maneuverings, and responses in rural areas.

Farmers recent experience in Harmanlı and in near villages suggests that Karacabey acts as a shock observer for producers who quit agricultural production. In order to break out, the options for farmers in rural and urban casual labour markets are not spectacular. It is clear that there is much commuting by men from Harmanlı to Karacabey to work in the non-farm sector as shop assistants, bus drivers, and butchers. On the other hand, young women from the village are employed in food processing, dairy, and poultry sectors. In addition, women also engage in childcare, housecare, and daily cleaning activities in Karacabey. Rural dwellers' diversified economic activities prove that farming communities are not inert populations rather they are dynamic, mobile, and reconfiguring their livelihoods. The arrangements in livelihood strategies and economic activities can differ according to socioeconomic classes. For instance, as research shows that better-off farmers are diversified into various activities as an opportunity to accumulate and consolidate their socioeconomic position. On the other side, poorer groups diversify to subsist.

Farmers not only have to arrange their own labour use and activities but also limit their labour costs in order to continue agricultural production. This results in the declining use of daily and seasonal labour. Those whether employed as casual labourers daily or seasonal, or engaged in non-farm jobs are facing uninsurable risks because mechanisms of social protection such as insurance against injury and sickness do not exist. More fundamentally, the lack of payment of insurance premiums endangers their future as well. Bearing in mind that informality is not

confined to urban areas, the overall outcome will be positive if social policies and regulations reflect dynamic characteristics of rural labour market.

According to the observations in Karacabey and Bursa, migration is seen the only potential way to meet subsistence requirements and cash income. The motive for migration is driven by the better prospects in the city. In addition to declining earning from agricultural production, an increasing pattern of higher education, changing life styles, and interaction with global trends through media and the internet has tempted especially the rural young to migrate. Karacabey offers lower costs of living but also limited opportunities in labour market and lower wages. On the other hand, labour market in Bursa is more competitive and requires higher educational levels and skills. If migrants can develop technical skills, physical strength, ability to adapt to distinct type of work and living conditions, they can achieve a more rapid incorporation into the urban life.

Women are more vulnerable in labour market because their domestic labour is omitted, if they work outside the village as a casual worker they cannot get work everyday, and even when they do, they are rarely paid statutory minimum wages. This is largely due to the fact that despite the inquiry of the hegemony of patriarchal authority in rural communities, women are still defined as subordinate to men. Whether they are migrants or rural dwellers, they are discriminated against in markets and they lack control over resources and income. However considering their involvement in all agricultural tasks, home-based work, non-farm wage employment, and their care for land and environment women are doing more than supporting families' livelihood, they are actually maintaining subsistence by bearing on growing responsibility.

CHAPTER 5

IN SEARCH OF PAYING OFF DEBTS: CREDITS AND LAND SALES

Introduction

For some time, indebtedness and land sales in rural areas have drawn significant attention considering the accelerated rate at which indebtedness through both formal and informal institutions has grown and the ownership and control of land have been transferred to non-agricultural agents. In addition to expanded commodification of labour in farmers' off-farm and non-farm diversification activities analyzed in the previous chapter, marketization and adjustment processes also result in commodification of land and money in rural sites. Notably, commercialization of credit markets and financialization oblige farmers to adjust to the often chaotic and speculative movement of capital around the world. Agricultural production and its financing should not be examined in isolation but as a part of complex structure including socio-technical arrangements. The first part of the chapter will uncover how farmers perceive debt and how indebtedness affects farmers' relation to other producers and institutions. In addition it will analyze different dimensions of indebtedness which involve inquiry of parastatal credit institutions, commercial banks, and informal and formal finance practices in Karacabey.

Agricultural settings have been changed by various developments in the adjustment process such as deagrarianization, migration, consolidation, expropriation, rural development projects, infrastructure projects, and

repeasantization. These processes alter the forms of land use and control, labour use, crop patterns, and livelihood strategies in rural sites. As it is well known, overindebtedness leads to voluntary and involuntary transfer of ownership of material assets, especially the land. Levien (2013) interrogates dispossession as an array of socio-political struggles of regimes which are specific arrangements of governance structures, economic logics linked to class interest, and ideological justifications that regulate duration, success, and object of expropriation. Therefore, in different sociological and historical settings patterns of dispossession can bring about different consequences. In current settings in Karacabey, the problem is not only the scale of distress land sales, but also emerging new actors, new plans on agricultural land, new crops, and new subjects. The second part of the chapter will investigate contexts and dynamics of struggles on land especially focusing on new legal and political instruments to challenge farmers and facilitate expropriation of agricultural land. In other words, it aims to unpack distress sales and how rural development and infrastructural projects of the state and rent-seeking coalitions are shaping land use and control in Karacabey.

Over-indebtedness

As examined in the previous chapter, in the diversified context of livelihood strategies in Harmanlı village characterized by irregularity and scarcity of income, many households inevitably face various forms of indebtedness. Incomes are incompatible with multiplying cash needs, especially for inputs, renovation of production equipment, and irrigation. These pressures are coincident with the desire to imitate the consumption patterns and urban lifestyles of others as well as education and marriage expenses of the children. Growing debt mainly results from a mismatch

between monetary income and cash needs. Since revenue is highly irregular, the timing of expenditures apart from daily routines is as important as the level of income in determining conditions of financial necessity. Vulnerable households need to manage their budgets on a day-to-day or weekly basis and go into debt, which is not a new phenomenon, to solve sudden cash flow difficulties. However, repeated borrowing can be a sign of growing addiction to credit which leads to impoverishment through debt. Household over-indebtedness and a sharp rise in social inequality stem from this contradiction. Private banking, cooperative credits, and informal finance may relieve households in their struggle to meet basic expenses and urgent payments but chronic over-indebtedness, material loss, and humiliation begin to emerge when farmers are unable to repay contracted debt or a part of borrowed capital.

High level of indebtedness among rural households in Karacabey has been a matter of great concern for a decade. In February 2010, the president of Commerce of Agriculture in Karacabey declared that the total amount of farmers' debt to commercial banks and agricultural cooperatives was 75 million TL, excluding debts to individuals and firms ("Yağışlarla ilgili kamuoyuna açıklama", 2010). However, farmers' debt to individuals and firms in order to meet daily needs and to sustain agricultural production is as high as their debt to banks and parastatal institutions. Cemal, both a farmer and grocer in the village, warns that "total receivables from customers in the grocery store reach 15 thousand TL and one man can have 3 thousand TL debt. Farmers are crippled by debt. Some of them have debt even to coffeehouses." (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 29, 2009, Appx C, 39)

The need for money to meet debt payments and production costs subsequently forces household into selling assets and this can later be followed by

further sales to meet living costs. In extremely constrained financial conditions, trying to preserve one asset endangers another (Da Corta, 2010). For instance, in order to secure land and livestock, indebted farmers sell their vehicles. Those who lack sufficient assets to craft a path out of debt cut general expenditures and risk their health by eating less overworking, all of which deepen the pauperization of farmers. However, Harmanlı village is reversing the trend in terms of not cutting education expenses of children so that families prevent the loss of children's education assets. In other words, despite being in frequent crises and chronic debt, poor farmers hesitate to withdraw children from school to work. This may result in children becoming educated and employed in higher-paid work and hence the intergenerational transmission of poverty and indebtedness can be broken. Therefore, spending on education, especially for undergraduate studies, has structured parental economic responsibility.

Many farmers try to cope with livelihood deprivation and unfortunately end up being trapped in a spiral of indebtedness from which they struggle to escape. Interviews held with farmers confirmed borrowers' complaints especially about credit debt causing sleepless nights and panic attacks. Increasing costs of cultivation, risks ultimately shifted onto growers, repeated crop failures, sharp rises in debt, asset sales, and continuous uncertainties expose farmers to fatigue and psychological problems. In accordance with the household's financial risks, farmers usually pursue several goals simultaneously. Although producers are aware of the fact that they have little chance to obtain funds for relief and alleviate household distress to break out of the debt cycle, their behavior is associated with depression if their objectives are not met. Changing priorities and livelihood responsibility under the conditions of structural adjustment bring about guilt-prone farmers who are more likely to focus

inward for the cause of deterioration (Tipton, 2013). In Harmanlı village, farmers reproach themselves for their inability to farm successfully, to follow large price swings, and to give ideal responses to different circumstances. An excessive sense of debt responsibility leads to self defeating defenses of shame-like depression and over-anxiety. Compounding debt and financial stress can also result in divorce. In addition to shrinking livelihoods, obsessive thoughts about how to get rid of debt and ranges of feeling varying from regret to frustration create distance and arguments between couples. If one spouse is hiding debt, an insurmountable feeling of self-reproach arises. Spouses are more likely to get divorced unless they move in a positive direction by omitting blame and criticism. In a totally different context, divorce can contribute to indebted farmers obtaining the optimum maneuvering space in their livelihood. In some cases, as the president of the Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey indicates, couples are currently running through fraudulent transfers of assets and fake divorce to protect assets from one spouse's debt.

These developments have been driving indebted farmers to desperation but only recently have the psychological costs imposed by indebtedness started to be recognized. Tragic cases of Indian farmers (especially in bt cotton producers) being condemned to despair and sometimes suicide over insurmountable debts and various forms of scarcities are well known in the literature (Mohanty, 2005, 2013; Sengupta& Gruere, 2011; Shah, 2012; Vasavi, 2008, 2012; Reddy&Mishra, 2009; Taylor, 2012). The suicide rates in Karacabey are not comparable to areas of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, India, where one farmer committed suicide in every 30 minutes in 2009. But farmers' plight also leads to a few dramatic consequences in the field (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011; "Köylü ipotek altında", 2009; "Borcu yüzünden intihar etti", 2008). Farmers have ready access to guns and

lethal means such as pesticides.[75] In addition to the widespread availability of pesticides in rural areas, it is not easy to differentiate whether these acts are suicidal intents associated with pesticide ingestion or unplanned farm accidents. On many occasion, pesticide poisoning is reported as farm accidents in hospital admission records as in other developing countries (Gunnell&Eddleston, 2003). Suicides are related to the ongoing restructuring of Turkish agriculture resulting in newer forms of scarcities regarding ecology and technology and its psychological consequences. The sense of futurelessness, impoverishment, and fear of humiliation and abandonment arising from endemic debt influence the path farmers take (Shah, 2012). In the restructuring process, farmers are expected to act as managers or entrepreneurs. Failing to stay afloat in an economy that embodies pride in a farmer's capacity to accumulate wealth initiates the loss of self-esteem, self-dignity, and self-worth (Ramirez-Ferrero, 2005). In particular, losing the family land that is passed from generation to generation paves the way for an ultimate loss.

Even if overstress does not always result in psychiatric morbidity, as is now being seen in farmer population in Karacabey, it leads to the widespread belief that their life is not worth living. This situation does not necessarily lead to dramatic consequences like death but farmers need to deal with psychological problems on their own and concomitantly manage socioeconomic vulnerability. The fact that material loss coincides with different forms of impoverishment, humiliation, social exclusion, and the loss of self-respect has often been overlooked (Buvinic, 2004; Oakley, 2004; Geremek 1994; Sen 1999). Considering social relations in rural areas,

[75] Ironically, many farmers ended their lives by ingesting pesticides that they went into debt to purchase. A number of studies have shown that long-term occupational exposure to pesticides results in clinical depression even in the absence of intentional ingestion of pesticides (Beseler *et al.*, 2008). Over-stress and exposure to pesticides engender similar neurologic disorders in the human body by decreasing cholinesterase level. For further discussion on the effects of pesticide exposure on the neural system and neurodevelopment of infants, see Beard *et al.* (2011), Eskenazi *et al.* (2010), and Quandt *et al.* (2010).

when farmers face extreme dependency on debt, they become socially isolated through pressing social concerns and longstanding inequalities. As a basic example, poor farmers' hesitation to attend ceremonies in Harmanlı village due to the inability to provide gifts or counter-gifts reflects what happens to a person's dignity and pride under such conditions. Even worse, overindebtedness is not only evaluated on an individual level but it affects reputation of the entire household and constrains their right to life and right to have an adequate standard of living.

Closer analysis reveals the fact that, despite farmers' effort to protect sense of dignity and to cope with pauperization, poor and overindebted farmers are widely accepted as bad money managers who are unable to calculate, save, and spend according to their budget. However, there exist various forms of local financial relations and reasoning behind indebtedness. The probability of becoming poor varies significantly and it cannot easily be attributed to a distinct social class, behavioral pattern, or bad luck. Analysis of the data obtained from interviews indicates that the wealthiest households engage in market debt as much as poor farmers in Karacabey. Assets and credits notwithstanding, large landowners especially in Sultaniye and Hotanlı villages also go into bankruptcy. Whereas farming requires a larger investment than in the past, farmers are highly criticized for their patterns of consumption, especially for agricultural equipment such as tomato harvesting machines and tractors.

In truth, the culture of consumerism and the perception of efficiency lead farmers' consumption patterns and drive them into costly market debt. Massive advertising campaigns for farmers from mobile phone companies to agricultural equipment and proliferation of communication facilities such as television and internet perpetuate culture of consumerism in rural areas and rising competition

between households. In rural societies the consumption of food and clothing from a household's own production is dramatically declining. There is an exacerbation of cash needs in households managed through a desire to imitate consumption patterns of others. Households' willingness to follow these trends without having adequate means results in extremely vulnerable financial situations. Additionally, farmers' debt burden is highly related to farmers' perception of efficiency supported by the state, World Bank, and the IMF. While farmers are buying a new tractor through credit or debt, they assume that higher technology and intensification would contribute to raising output and maximizing profit, which would later alleviate credit payments. However, many of them are evaluated as failed economic investments. Still, conclusions should only be drawn with caution. Dramatically changing production systems, contract farming (an extra burden to farmers already in financial bottleneck), and interest rates have linked household debt to global markets when considering prices of products and inputs and accumulation driven by finance. Therefore, over-indebtedness and selling assets to compensate for exponential income growth for a decade in Karacabey should be investigated as an issue in terms of socioeconomic and political change rather than a simple financial need or a consequence of aspirations. This aligns with observations made by Harriss (2007) who argues that if poverty and overindebtedness are attributed to failures in personality, individual choice, and strategies, there emerges the depolitization of poverty by omitting unequal relations in markets.

Financialization and Monetization of Social Relations

With monetization and financialization, a new and wild form of the commodification of money appears. As Polanyi warned in *The Great Transformation* written in 1944, these turn money from a medium of exchange into a tool of profit based in futures, options, securitization, and hedge funds (Burawoy, 2010). The process of monetization and financialization cannot be reduced to the expansion of financial markets. In this new system, indebted farmers need to adjust to the often chaotic and irrational movement of speculative finance around the world. While speculators are trying to make their bets - especially on emerging markets - the balance of payments imbalances are growing and unmanageable debt mountains are being created on many fronts simultaneously (Bienefeld, 2007). Endemic financial instability increases social and human insecurity in rural areas as well. Speculation in currency and credit instruments destabilizes the money supply, causes fluctuations in the value of money, wipes out savings, discourages investment, and finally deprives farmers' of ability to plan for the future (Fraser, 2012).

Crucially, the conception of humans as rational economic individuals in a market economy underestimates farmers' responses to indebtedness through their own calculative action and causal models (Lang, 2013). Indeed, how actors behave in market situations is highly variable in this economy of debt (Zelizer, 2011). Financial transactions do not originate solely from mutual payments between individuals, cooperatives, and firms in which each party guarantees delivery of money on time for their daily expenses. Lack of access to complete information and processes of feedback requires maneuverings shown in daily indebtedness. It is clear that besides formal credit institutions such as banks and cooperatives, farmers resort to many other forms of organizations and dynamic debt practices to finance their living

expenses, which are as diverse as the contexts in which they evolve (Servet& Saiag, 2013).

First, according to a buyer's reputation, a shopkeeper's discretion may provide credits or reductions for buying daily food or other necessary items. This practice enables the circulation of goods and secures consumer loyalty for the shopkeeper while the other agent, the customer, gains extra time to obtain liquid cash assets (Morvant-Roux, 2013). Shopkeepers may offer cash or in-kind advances, extend credits, and often lend money in concordance with varying harvest times. In these transactions, a grocer, pharmacist, or coffee house owner, for instance, may allow a consumer to pay what he or she already owed and then pay recent expenses. Second, it is quite commonplace in Harmanlı village to ask for loans with no interest for the short term or at least lower interest rates than those offered by commercial banks. On the base of the principle of reciprocity, relatives and neighbors may provide loans for the indebted farmers, which is less costly than market debt. Third, despite the difficulty in practice, saving enables liquidity in household expenses. In particular, raising small animals such as chickens by female members of the household makes a substantial contribution to future marriage expenses of the children and events such as sudden illness or death. Fourth, farmers rely on the financial services of informal lenders as a last resort. Pawnbrokers may offer financial services without costly buildings, staff, and paperwork but the possibility of applying extralegal forms of sanctions and higher interest rates keeps farmers out of pawnbroking (Bouman, 1990; Bouman& Houtman, 1988; Christensen, 1993). In Karacabey, informal money lenders usually focus on smaller transactions and serve poorer farmers who are old and living in remote areas such as mountain villages ("Bursa'da yakalanan tefecilerden 4'ü tutuklandı", 2012). These occurrences

recorded in the field indicate that debt management is spontaneously conducted in close informal circles but overindebtedness also requires loans from formal credit institutions such as commercial banks and credit cooperatives which cause real tragedies for farmers in Karacabey. [76]

Rotating Debt

Thousands of farmers have become trapped in vicious circles of cross-debt from various commercial bank which has led to worrying problems of extreme financial vulnerability in Karacabey. Debt does not only have a monetary dimension but rather its social meaning includes a set of rights and obligations that link debtors, creditors, and guarantors. In *The Great Transformation,* Polanyi (1944) examines the market-view of society, which assumes that individuals enter contractual relations as free and independent actors who are in nobody's debt. Nevertheless, as this study indicates, exchanges and transactions in an unregulated market result in a rural society in which everybody is actually in everybody's debt (Frerichs, 2013). Not only do households and individuals rotate several loans simultaneously, but they are also involved in various chains of debt and guarantorship. Although the amount of debt may change, farmers seek loans from diverse sources that are also indebted to other commercial banks or individuals.

At this point it is significant to note that guarantorship as an obligation for credit use in cooperatives and commercial banks presents an opportunity to illustrate the monetization of social relations while household debt has grown at an increasing

[76] More recently, rising indebtedness and urgent needs for cash have led some farmers into treasure hunting despite the fact that it is condemned by the state. Encouraged by the legends, some farmers are acting as if billions are just waiting to be discovered (Interview with the headman of the village Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 14, 2010; "Jandarma göz açtırmadı!", 2009; "Karacabey'de tarihi eser operasyonu", 2009; "Tarih yağmacısı yakalandı", 2007; "Bakkal'daki tarihi sikkelere operasyon", 2009; "Jandarma'dan tarihi eser operasyonu", 2010).

rate in rural districts. Considering guarantorship and the inclusion of the rural poor in financial markets, trust still continues to be a matter of contention. The guarantors who enter into obligation not only face the probability of taking on an extra financial burden of another farmer's credit in the case that the borrower's fails to repay, but they are also prevented from using other credit facilities until the farmer to whom they have provided surety has repaid the loan.

> I am afraid that someone will call me and ask for surety when I am walking on the street in Karacabey and I will lose my assets because of his inability to repay the loan. The system of guarantorship should be restructured. Although the indebted farmer owns property, the assets of the guarantors are confiscated by the banks or credit cooperatives. Suppose that you assess tractors and land and I am your guarantor. The executive officers foreclose my tractor if you cannot repay. Now, farmers are forming groups in the village with their immediate surroundings and do not let untrusted people enter…When you are asking for surety you say that it is for coal and only 200 TL. However, before we sign the agreement in the cooperative, you add seed and fertilizer. 200 TL becomes 2,000 TL. If I decline, you blame me for not considering the needs of my friends, despite your misleading actions. That's why everybody is terrified by surety and looks the other way. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010, Appx C, 40)

Beyond its contractual characteristics (amount, duration, and interest rate), it is necessary to analyze the underlying economic but especially social logic and consequences of surety at group and individual levels. At an individual level, lack of trust and reciprocity describes farmers' reactions to practices observed among them considering indebtedness and guarantorship in Karacabey. For instance, especially old farmers benefiting from retirement payments were vulnerable as guarantors in contracts where borrowers defaulted on loans or input credits. Attitudes towards these kinds of transactions aroused great concern as these examples illustrate. As a cheated guarantor, Fuat had to pay 6 thousand TL (half the price of a tractor) to avoid imprisonment (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 23, 2010). In another case,

although Cemil had never used any bank credit, due to guarantorship obligations his retirement payments were cut over 19 months, rising from 129 TL to 162 TL per month and finishing just before a new law was issued to prohibit any cuts from retirement payments except alimony (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 10, 2010). However, there still remain a few strategies for borrowers to escape from the legal restrictions of debt. An example of this includes the transfer of the title deeds of a borrower to third parties in secrecy which subsequently shifts all financial and legal responsibility to his guarantors fraudulently. However, the group level solution is joint surety. To challenge variegated forms of fraud in surety, farmers act according to the principle of reciprocity in small groups in which a farmer accepts the role of guarantor for the debts of other members in return for their guarantorship for his debts. Therefore, the whole group undertakes joint responsibility for the debts of each member and an equitable share of risk. In other words, the responsibility for repayment is achieved through social control (Rajasekhar, 1996). Nevertheless, one false step means a total loss for the group. Since the chain of guarantorship has been blocked in Karacabey due to high indebtedness, farmers have recently preferred to work with leasing companies, which rarely demand guarantors to rent agricultural equipment but still employ legal sanctions such as foreclosure or imprisonment in the case of default.

Farmers' Relations to Commercial Banks

In the Karacabey district, The Ziraat Bank and branches of various commercial banks have provided credit for farmers on the condition that the whole amount including interest is repaid over decades. The farmers are legally bound to repay as they provide personal guarantors or security in the form of land collateral to the credit

institution. According to bank policies, if a farmer needs more than 10 thousand TL in credit, he must provide both personal guarantors and land collateral as security on the basis of market value. The duration of agricultural credit is one year. In the case of agricultural equipment, however, credit taken can be repaid over the course of five years in three or six month installments arranged according to harvest time. It has normally been observed that the repayment trend has not been entirely satisfactory for agricultural credit. Despite the policy differences among commercial banks in the Karacabey district, Sadettin Kanalp, costumer representative at the department of agricultural banking in Denizbank, declared that the ratio of dead loans has recently decreased to 5 percent, dropping from around 15 percent in 2008 (Karacabey, June 24, 2010). In the case of failure to repay, credit-providing institutions like banks or credit cooperatives take legal actions against borrowers which result in the confiscation and auction of the collateral land or agricultural equipment such as tractors.

Although credit-scoring models can differ from one bank to another, their aim is to counter uncertainty and risk. Most of them predict the consumer's ability to pay by evaluating the amount of current indebtedness, regular income, previous payment history including late payments and bankruptcies, and current occupation. In addition, the ownership of assets and the duration that he or she has spent in current residence and vocation are criteria for *ex post* sanctioning and consumer accountability (Guseva& Rona-Tas, 2001). The commercial banks should have shown concern for defaulting consumers by selecting borrowers carefully before lending money and applying costly punishment procedures in cases of nonpayment. Nevertheless, while the focus is on entrenching credit markets and enabling customers to become dependent on commercial banks, bank policies provide great

convenience for credit but appalling conditions for delinquency. Until financial literacy improves through the experiences of borrowers and other farmers, they will suffer the consequences of breaches of their "voluntarily" obligations (Veitch, 2013).

Actually, credit is a form of debt whether you are looking at borrower's or lender's perspective. The difference is that while one word implies a positive connotation, the other does not (Buckley, 1997). However, there is aggressive competition between credit providers for campaigns and between borrowers to get credit. This phenomenon is in line with the view of Keyder and Yenal (2013) who submit that farmers are increasingly engaging in credit contracts with commercial banks whose advertisement campaigns are presenting special offers for greenhouse construction in Kumluca, Antalya despite high interest rates in comparison to Ziraat Bank. Similar occurrences are also recorded in Karacabey, where one interviewee says

> We are making the banks rich. All of us become servants for the banks. We cram in at the entrance of the banks to receive credit. The queues are for getting a loan but payments are made by enforcement. That's because we cannot get any benefit from what we produce. Companies render payments. We save the day by borrowing from one bank to repay contracted debt from another commercial bank. We have to. We become experts of inter-bank transfers. We need to because if we cannot repay credit debt, it will damage our future chance of obtaining credit. (Şen, 2010, Appx C, 41)

The locking up of real property, especially the land for the liquidation of the debts or security for loans, results in the extreme dependency of farmers on commercial banks. While commercial banks are taking advantage of their position by increasing profits, farmers are not even informed about the terms and conditions of the loan repayments. The neoliberal economy conceives of the self as a rational and self-determining agent who can make autonomous choices about whether to enter an

agreement and draw up a contract by considering individual utility (Veitch, 2013). As a consequence of financial reasoning farmers seek low interest rates, flexibility and evaluate repayment modalities and duration. However farmers' decisions are not always based on consent. In many occasions, such as juggling to rotate debt, if farmers wish to obtain benefits from the credit, they have little option but to accept the conditions of the bank.

In addition to the vast inequality in the bargaining power between farmers and banks, there is a significant level of discrimination among customers in which the poorest farmers are not treated as valued customers in commercial banks. The bank staff prefers to provide credit to influential farmers whose investment on animal husbandry and agricultural equipments can create new business opportunities for banks. While small farmers are evaluating their credit needs in order to rotate debt or meet expenses for ceremonies, the preference of large agricultural enterprises (such as using investment credits) transfers the uncertainties of lending into calculable risks for banks. Therefore, large enterprises avail themselves of tailor-made contracts suiting their preference on interest rates, duration, and payment schedule. An analysis of the bias against small farmers in rural credit markets reveals that the impersonality and anonymity accorded to money is illusory (Maurer, 2006; Hutchinson, Mellor&Olsen, 2002; Zelizer, 1989, 1994; Elyachar, 2002). Although money is supposed to be a unit of calculation and a standardized means of payment, the calculation of the value of money, here the interest rate, is actually dependent on social relations and a complex web of meaning and action. These unfair conditions in rural finance, which set forth higher interest rates and the most expensive forms of loans for small farmers, result in hierarchisation and segmentation in the credit market (Ducourant, 2013). In a similar vein, The General Manager of Ziraat Bank in

Karacabey and a large land owner in Hamidiye village assert in our interview that the state policy should differentiate between peasants and farmers. The manager complains that there are many bosses in Karacabey with only 10 decares of land despite the fact that the investment and expenses of 1,000 decares of land and 10 decares of land are not comparable (Karacabey, Ziraat Bank, June 21, 2010).

It is important to note that rural credit needs are not only for agricultural production and equipment but also for other expenses such as food, education, marriage, death, medical needs, and construction. The introduction of the farmer credit card in Karacabey in the last decade is one example of a financial service product that recognizes consumption requirements and non-farm requirements as part of the aggregate credit needs of farmers (Jones, 2008). However, as a marketing strategy, banks have distributed credit cards with 20 thousand TL limits even to small farmers with less than 10 decares of land. The combination of high credit card expenses with already existing debts exacerbated the risky environment and financial vulnerability of farmers. Unfortunately, these tensions culminate in court where commercial banks bring cases for the recovery of money owed to them.

The Execution of Debt

Essentially, depending on the severity and frequency of confiscation cases in Karacabey, the immense threat of the application of financial sanctions for contractual breaches constrains farmers' daily activities. For example, when a man in a suit, a yellow cab, or an official state car appears in the village square populated with coffeehouses, indebted farmers leave their drinks and look for a place to hide (Şen, 2010). What is crucial in the ideological aspect of lending is that you must suffer the consequences of your breaches of contract. However, the outcome of a

series of breakdowns jeopardizes the continuity of agricultural production and impoverishes rural households. To ask a lawyer about the difficulties farmers face clears up some points regarding the enforcement of debt such as consumerism, the inclusion of commercial banks in agricultural credit market, and high incentives for agricultural equipment credit.

> In a village in Karacabey, a farmer bought a tractor at 65,000 TL to be paid in 5 years. He offered his old tractor Massey Ferguson 265, which was worth 12,000 TL, in advance but ultimately he could not pay the installments. Finally, the new tractor was sold by the bailiff office for only 18,000 TL. In total, the old and new tractors barely amounted to 30,000 TL but there was still 35,000 TL in debt to be repaid with interest. His old tractor was also of good quality but the persuasion of tractor companies and commercial banks and the uncertainty of commodity prices caused this tragedy. (Bursa, April 11, 2013, Appx C, 42)

Another example reveals the use of uncivilized methods in the collection of debt including harassment and confiscation of household goods, which is leading to desperation of women in indebted families. A group of men including bailiff officials, gendarmes, village guards, and a locksmith came to Ayşe's house in order to collect debts owed to the Irrigation Union. They demanded cash but when she said that there was no money, they entered the house by force. They listed all the household goods, including a computer for which installments had not yet been completed. They wanted her to find the money by the time they finished visiting 17 other households in the same village for debt recovery and they threatened to break into the house if she locked the door. Her husband was out so she borrowed money from her father who also lived in the same village.[77]

[77] Kin relations and social networks are often crucial in providing financial protection for women but there is possibility of even sexual harassment in informal social security systems which involve costs for especially young widows in return for food and cash payments (Kabeer, 1991; Keyes, 1984; Razavi, 2002, 2003; Kapadia, 1995).

> How could I have known? If they came right now I would not let them list any stuff. I would not even let them in. Later I learn that they are not allowed to enter. If there are vehicles in the garden, they should not walk into the house. I have water and pesticide engines outside. They would take a trailer and go. I was afraid because I did not know anything…That night, we received sugar beet payments but it did not matter. If I recieve my payments in time, I will recover my debt in time. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010, Appx C, 43)

Table 2. Number of Cases on the Court of Bailiff in Karacabey

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013*
Cases opened within a year	855	292	116	243	236	100
Total number of cases	1,272	757	670	683	714	517
Closed-cases	527	152	46	56	101	17

*As of April 2013
Source: Karacabey, The Office of Bailiff and Execution

As indicated above, the highest number of cases opened on the court of bailiff in Karacabey occurred in 2008 despite the fact that the average number is 20 cases per month under normal conditions. Importantly, 2008 was a challenging year for farmers due to the global crisis and climatic fluctuations such as cycles of drought and flood. Besides, the restructuring of the debt of Ziraat Bank and the cooperatives in 2007 delayed repayments of loans for one year, which overloaded the bailiff office in 2008. After the calamitous year in 2008, farmers have developed some financial skills in preventing opening a case or confiscation of assets. Every year before planting season starts in March, indebted farmers negotiate with commercial banks, unions, and cooperatives to withdraw the cases of debt execution in order to have access to new credits. In addition, Ziraat Bank and the cooperatives postponed payments and restructured loans for longer terms in 2010 and 2012 in Turkey. Therefore, the number of cases declined drastically in the following years. However, the bailiff officials are expecting that the year 2013 will be as challenging as 2008 if

one considers the fact that one hundred cases were opened only in the first quarter of the year.

As far as legal enforcement is concerned, indebted farmers endeavor to maintain creditworthiness for as long as possible, which implies rotating debt and juggling between various banks (Morvant-Roux, 2013). The continuing circulation of money and the eligibility for further loans are more important than the amount of debt or paying off debts for household budgets. Farmers' ability to access credit enables them to juggle money. However, once they appear on a bank's blacklist as nonpaying customers and their credit documents are rejected, farmers cannot engage in rotating practices because the credit-scoring models of the banks also evaluate previous payment history including late payments and bankruptcies to analyze consumers' ability to repay the loan. Therefore creditworthiness requires strengthening one's reputation continuously (Guseva& Rona-Tas, 2001). No matter how much debt they owe, farmers also try to maintain creditworthiness at the group level. For instance, Sultaniye village is known for its monocultural tomato production in large enterprises with contract farming and their overindebtednesss to commercial banks, cooperatives, and unions in Karacabey. When their complaints appeared on a television program on a local channel in Bursa, some farmers got really anxious about it because of a foreground image on the program calling Sultaniye a "bankrupt village."

Farmers' Debt to Cooperatives

Together with commercial banks, the investment credit and working capital requirements of rural people are also covered quite impressively by the network of credit cooperatives and producer's unions (See Table 3 & 4). ACCs in Turkey were

established to perform the tasks of providing short term financial support (given for a year in kind and in cash to provide the needs of its members such as seed, fertilizer, fuel oil, pesticides, animal feed, labour and machinery costs), long term financial support (up to five years for investment in animal husbandry, equipment and tools), product processing and marketing, training, banking and insurance services (Tanrıvermiş&Demir, 2005). Although credit cooperatives and Ziraat Bank met more than 70 percent of the credit needs of farmers in Turkey up until 2000, structural reforms in the agricultural sector stipulated an autonomous independent structure for cooperatives in order to achieve economically productive operations, competitiveness, and performance sustainability. In 2002 and 2003, Ziraat Bank did not provide any new credits to cooperatives to reduce state dependency or promote self-financing of the institutions by the management of their own assets and loan repayment. Within the last decade, financial dependency between credit cooperatives and Ziraat Bank has not been totally dismantled but the projection of autonomy for the cooperatives is highly related to the attempts to privatize Ziraat Bank and to establish independent cooperative banks that will be managed by their members in the future ("Tarım Kredi 2023 Strateji Belgesi ve Eylem Planı kamuoyuyla paylaşıldı", 2011).[78]

[78] Despite high corruption rates in Ziraat Bank, the reason for the budget deficit of the bank was attributed to agricultural subsidies and incentives in early 2000. This paved the way for rapid privatization of agricultural credit markets and the reduction of linkages between Ziraat Bank and small farmers ("Bankaların zararı çiftçiye yıkılamaz", 2000)

Table 3. Farmers' Debt to Agricultural Credit Cooperative in Karacabey (TL)

Year	Amount of credit	Uncollectible accounts	Ratio %
2000	380,000	62,000	16.3
2001	440,000	64,000	14.5
2002	207,000	52,000	25.1
2003	240,000	75,000	31.2
2004	542,000	72,000	13.3
2005	879,000	264,000	30.0
2006	1,545,000	83,000	5.4
2007	3,320,000	168,000	5.1
2008	6,500,000	370,000	5.7
2009	12,000,000	1,000,000	8.3

Source: Karacabey Agricultural Credit Cooperative

As shown above, the amount of credit used in Karacabey provided by the credit cooperatives saw a 30-fold increase in a decade. However, the decision to bring financial autonomy to the cooperatives rose following complaints of skyrocketing interest rates and alleged corruption against their officials. Upon the withdrawal of state support, these institutions found themselves uninformed as to how to compete with the private sector in market conditions including technical matters. In the transition period, fluctuating credit supplies of cooperatives from public banks and the formation of a semi-autonomous financial structure lead to commercial aggressiveness, restraints on calculability, and untraceable interest rates.

> Nobody is good at interest rates of the credit cooperative, nobody can calculate them. Suppose I borrowed 3 TL and the cooperative demanded 6 TL repayment. OK, I am uneducated but not even a teacher could solve it. The Irrigation Union payments are clearly determined: 70 TL per decare. If you're late on a payment, it will increase 5 TL each month, 75 TL in October, 80 TL in November. We cannot make a forecast for the interest

> rates of credit cooperatives. The cooperative overcharged a farmer one thousand TL, which he noticed after long calculations. What if I cannot catch such a mistake? It is not clear who disseises the money. Farmers gave up working with the credit cooperative. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 22, 2010, Appx C, 44)

In another case, a large landowner claims that both ACCs and the Irrigation Union in Karacabey have the capacity to pauperize farmers. In particular, the transition to a more autonomous structure independent from the DSİ has paved the way for higher interest rates, low repayment ratios (see Table 4), and the expedition of the process of judicial enforcement of debt drawn in from 1 year to 2 months in the Union (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 3, 2010). Besides, it is obvious that the quality of services has not improved since irrigation water has still been contaminated by chemical pollutants. Farmers complain that they cannot even breathe during irrigation and even develop wounds on their hands. ("Ova Köyleri Sulama Birliği'ne tepki", 2005)

> Farmers' own institutions brought more trouble on us than the state. Cooperatives are growing enormously with shareholders' contribution. 8 years ago, ACCs were arranging meetings with farmers to decide how to evaluate profit shares together. They no longer ask about it. Revenues are being collected at headquarters to construct luxurious offices. Let's look at the operations of the Irrigation Union in Karacabey. It levies compulsory execution, confiscates my fields and tractors, and blocks my bank accounts. The total debt is 5.5 million TL but the principal amount is only 1.8 million. The rest is interest. Now decide who leads us to bankruptcy, the government or farmers' institutions? (Karacabey, Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 45)

Table 4. Farmers' Debt to Irrigation Union (TL)

Year	Total debt	Non-paid	Ratio/NP
2000	407,693	201,709	49.50
2001	687,044	363,059	52.80
2002	1,101,983	612,581	55.60
2003	1,709,997	1,119,421	65.50
2004	2,074,769	1,450,422	69.90
2005	2,581,057	1,675,062	64.90
2006	2,561,222	1,600,264	62.50
2007	1,051,403	564,626	53.70
2008	2,500,985	1,825,661	73.00
2009	2,643,344	1,826,301	69.00

Source: Karacabey Plain Villages Irrigation Union

During transition periods, poorly resourced and ill-coordinated unions and cooperatives fail to prevent a governance vacuum and corruption peaks at the initial stages of financial autonomy. Poor internal governance, which can also lead to lack of trust in their own elected officials and managers, empowers manager hierarchy and encourages rent-seeking activities of corrupt board members. In the interest of fostering a viable executive and financial structure, the governance of the farmers' institutions should be open to promote transparency and accountability.

> The performance of the credit cooperative has been better for the last 4-5 years. Early on, I repaid a loan with 180 percent interest. The managers were raking it in. I will settle accounts with him on Judgment Day. I would call the inspector and have it checked. However, the manager hosted 40 people for dinner. Who is keeping track? To whom could you complain? (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 10, 2010, Appx C, 46)

An agricultural engineer employed in the Harmanlı Credit Cooperative highlights the main problem as restructuring without flexibility. The board of members has

oscillated between the old governance style and the new structure. He accepts that in the early 2000s, 120 and 180 percent interest rates were demanded for debt loans. Now it is only 9.75 percent annually. He also adds that it is not easy to change the minds of farmers about corrupt officials despite widespread use of computers to keep an account of all transactions. (Harmanlı village, Credit Cooperative, March 10, 2010). Indeed, restructuring should have offer not complete withdrawal of the state but an institutional framework in which the state provides regulation and a wide range of technical knowledge and financial support. In addition, farmers should be treated not as borrowers or clients but equal members who are actively involved in the decision-making processes of the unions and cooperatives, which are jointly owned and democratically controlled.

To sum up, the evaluation of debt is highly subjective but this study shows that overindebtedness results in impoverishment in rural districts despite farmers' advanced juggling skills. The regulation of the privatization and marketization of agricultural credit institutions by recreating financial systems that are arranged for public interest and evaluated not by their profitability and growth but by their ability to support equitable allocation of real economic growth will relieve adaptation strategies (Bienefeld, 2007).

Identity and Meaning of Land

The need for money to meet debt payments and production costs subsequently forces households to sell assets and this can later be followed by further sales to meet living costs and compensate for the loss of income. In extremely constrained financial conditions, trying to preserve one asset endangers another (Da Corta, 2010). Since it is the land on which every burden of a farmer is finally thrown, "we might as well

imagine his being born without hands and feet as carrying on his life without land" (Polanyi, 1957 [1944], p.17). For these farmers, especially those who are more incorporated into the market, the ownership of land may secure livelihood of a household and provide a degree of autonomy for them (Akram- Lodhi, 2007; Borras Jr, Kay& Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Akram-Lodhi, Kay & Borras Jr., 2009). Considering that farmers have been losing their land, their ability to provide a livelihood for themselves and their families is uncertain as their main safety nets have been taken away. In addition, land ownership in the village is also a protective umbrella for rural migrants living in Bursa and Karacabey. Although it does not guarantee subsistence, land ownership is kept as an opportunity to have an alternative to the existing mode of survival strategies in the city. In a similar vein, according to Keyder and Yenal (2013), the main drive behind repeasantization attempts of city dwellers, especially in the case of default in urban areas or retirement, is to already be in possession of a parcel of land or a house in the original village.

For those whose livelihoods are dramatically changed by the loss of agricultural land, dispossession does not only mean impoverishment due to depletion of economic security but also deprivation of social status and dignity. It must be stressed that a farmer gains recognition through being an identity constructed by territorial claims. Losing one's land means losing one's status. Land ownership is inexorably connected to social and historical structures. Therefore, access to land is conceived as the fulfillment of heritage and the self for a farmer.

The social relations and struggles surrounding land are shaped by distribution of property, accumulation processes, financialization, and rent-seeking policies. Although techniques of expanded commodification under agrarian restructuring reduces land to the statues of mere economic asset, changes in the current context

regarding land use and land control bring about the loss of control of labour processes, selling labour power and assets, and surplus transference to dominant classes, all of which will in turn impinge on a set of social, political, cultural, and ecological relations (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). As Polanyi (1957, [1944]) similarly argued "what we call land is an element of nature inextricably interwoven with man's institutions. To isolate it and form a market out of it was the weirdest of all undertakings of our ancestors." He critically added "to separate land from man and organize society in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of a real-estate market was a vital part of the utopian concept of a market economy" (p.178). An alternative understanding of land requires investigation into the implications for the people who live and work on the land covering all dimensions from ecology to law, rather than analyzing land solely as a commodity.

Land Sales

From the perspective of a farmer who is being dispossessed, the character of land sales and the process of expanded commodification are explained as follows:

> Farmers are head over heels in debt so they have to sell their land. 7-8 years ago, before this government came to power, land sales were not so high. It is sold at 2,500 TL per decare. Farmers cannot buy land. Land is for sale but I cannot afford it. An outsider real estate agent may come and purchase it. The rich are investing in land. They expect land will rise in value. Some are gardening, some are ranching. Farmers cannot afford to purchase land. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010, Appx C, 47)

Distress Sales

The rationale for why farmers sell their land varies. Sometimes they have to sell land obligatorily to cover a debt due to a failed crop, agricultural investment, or guarantorship. Other times, farmers need cash for living expenses and financing the medical needs of a family member, a child's university education, and marriage. Only an exceptional few plan a land sale to exit agricultural production to migrate to Karacabey and Bursa. The table below shows the scale and significance of land sales in Karacabey.

Table 5. Land sales in Karacabey

Year	Number of operations	Value in TL
2008	2,773	36,975,494
2009	2,855	54,980,930
2010	3,121	75,838,167
2011*	Not applicable	Not applicable
2012	5,226	119,391,387

Source: The Offices of Land Registry and Cadastre in Karacabey and in Bursa

If a farmer decides to sell land, he typically keeps it secret and does not discuss with others, as selling land is considered humiliating. This secrecy expedites land transactions because land brokers are aware of the fact that selling land due to overindebtedness is considered a failure among farmers. Before the financial bottleneck hit rural areas, a farmer often offered his land to his neighbors before anyone else as they always had precedence. However, since he knows that his neighbors cannot afford to buy the land now, he hesitates to ask and later sells it to land dealer in secrecy. In most instances, farmers lose the title of the land but pursue

a *de facto* use of the plots as tenants although other farmers continue to believe they are the land owners. This situation in turn facilitates the exploitation of farmers' labour power by new land owners who are commonly characterized as mafia by rural dwellers. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010)

Bank Policies

The case study demonstrates that indebted farmers cannot withstand the sales and mortgage of land to a wide array of non-agricultural companies, banks, urban financiers and traders while the influence of commercial banks on agricultural credit is dramatically increasing in Karacabey. As a response to large-scale credit debt, the title of hypothecated land assets is transferred to commercial banks by court decisions or farmers involuntarily sell their agricultural land to repay bank loans. Table 6 summarizes the scale of hypothecation of agricultural land in Karacabey. The magnitude of change in values shows the magnitude of financial responsibility farmers must shoulder to sustain livelihoods and agricultural production.

Table 6. Hypothecation in Karacabey (Agricultural)

Year	Number of operations	Value in TL
2008	826	65,964,617
2009	578	63,788,300
2010	413	107,240,400
2011	704	157,297,000
2012	434	132,608,000

Source: The Offices of Land Registry and Cadastre in Karacabey and in Bursa

In the case of default, banks confiscate the land and assets of the farmers originally offered as guarantee for the credit loan. Yapı Kredi Bank, Halkbank, Garanti Bank, Denizbank, and Türkiye İş Bank are actually participating in tenders to purchase agricultural land where hypothecated assets are auctioned off by The Office of the Bailiff and Execution in Karacabey (Karacabey, The Office of Bailiff and Execution, June 17, 2010). Many of these commercial banks are also beneficiaries of transactions including the option to purchase the asset at half price and exemption from taxes and fees, which are equal to approximately 30 percent of the real value, up to two years.[79]

Intriguingly, commodification of land is legitimized by financial systems operating as if advancing a loan is the first step in the eventual dispossession of agricultural land (Nazir, 2000). Under conditions such as financial vulnerability, high interest rates, lack of access to market knowledge, endemic indebtedness, and large scale hypothecation, it is almost impossible for farmers to redeem credit debt and this process inevitably results in the alienation of land to lenders. According to lawyers, the solution is to prohibit agricultural land hypothecation for credit loans from commercial banks (Karacabey, May 11, 2010; Bursa, April 11, 2013).

In the scene, land deals are being shaped by various actors: agribusiness companies, local elites, government, commercial banks, and land brokers who are performing a complicated dance to get more profit out of farmers' despair. Since farmers are trying to cover their credit debt as soon as possible by selling land, they do not have an opportunity to inquiry the monetary resource. The scale of land sales

[79] According to law, an asset cannot be sold at less than 50 percent of the real price, which was 60 percent and 40 percent with respect to two rounds of the tender before recent changes in 2012 (Karacabey, The Office of Bailiff and Execution, June 17, 2010). For further details on changes see Law Number 6352.

to outsiders raises nationalistic concerns among farmers as echoed in a statement of local opinion:

> I mean, whoever you are, it does not matter if you are Greek or Jewish and for whom you are working. For example, last year we were talking to a man in the Karacabey industrial area. He told me he was wondering about a land sale in Tiranlar village near Bandırma and he searched on the internet. He checked the website of the company. The headquarters were in İstanbul but it appeared to belong to another company. I mean, İstanbul was only a branch office. When he clicked on the address for the main office, Greece popped up. It was a state-owned enterprise in Greece like DSİ in Turkey. It opened a branch in İstanbul and then this branch purchased land here. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 30, 2009, Appx C, 48)

Insights into sovereignty erosion, the depletion of autonomy, and the ability of authorities to govern in a classical sense force us to reconsider the problem. According to this narrow definition, land transfers to companies and banks with overseas partners are accepted as falling into the hands of foreigners (Dwyer, 2013). On the other hand, land purchases of local companies such as Sütaş and Özdilek are promoted by the headman of the village and many local elites as if they were saving farmers from falling into the clutches of the strangers. It is necessary to bring an alternative view of the loss of sovereignty via land sales and see transactions - whether to outsiders or local companies - as leading to more trajectories than were traditionally understood by nationalistic perspectives. Therefore, it makes more sense to think of sovereignty in terms of "the ability of people in a given community to control their own fate whether through localized resources or the capacity to access state resources that buffer persons from risk" in order to organize social outcry for land sales (Wolford *et al.*, 2013).

It is clear that the results of structural adjustment like declining production levels, changing product patterns, and rising overindebtedness in Karacabey force many farmers to abandon or begin to sell their land. As a next step, the government,

representatives of agribusiness, and local elites secretly plan development policies with the guarantee of government subsidies and project financing while small farmers have little recourse and limited assistance from local officials and organizations. Faced with these problems of dispossession, exclusion, and adverse incorporation, farmers are being drawn into new property, labour, and accumulation regimes.

Land Use and Land Control

Land sales do not mean productive land use. Many plots have not been put into use by the investors. If they are in use, operation strategies are benefiting some people and displacing others especially in labour use and agricultural production. Many of these transactions, of course, are made by non-agrarian participants. Powerful state-linked actors, especially companies and land brokers, are more inclined to control land sales in Karacabey.[80] In asking how these actors benefit land purchase - in other words why the land becomes more valuable - it makes sense to analyze how new relations of land use have been established. There are three key processes through which actors accomplish the shared goal of achieving more financial offers. First, companies may use the land documents to get bank loans with the land serving as

[80] This section does not draw systematically on the literature on land grabbing in other areas of key contemporary development, particularly in Latin America, South Africa, and East Asia. Land grabbing refers to large scale land acquisition or the purchase or lease of hundreds of thousands of hectares by TNCs, especially for the production biofuel, feed, and export crops. Over the last five years the scale and consequences of land grabbing are reviving debates on land use and land control by media coverage, NGO and civil society involvement. Oxfam, Action Aid, IIED, GRAIN, Land Deal Politics Initiative, and ISS published reports on this issue. Additionally, development academics in particular contribute to special issues in the *Journal of Peasant Studies, Development and Change, The Journal of Agrarian Studies, Canadian Journal of Development Studies* . According to Scoones *et al.* (2013) this land rush has come with a rapid literature rush. Therefore, they argue that there is a profound confusion about what is actually being measured and how academic research can be improved. Without doubt, in such a new and challenging process of research, a critical dialogue among different actors is needed to reach transparent and grounded methodology from sampling to information updating.

collateral. Even outside the agricultural sector, automotive and textile companies are trying to guarantee credibility by increasing corporate property. Second, as a corporate strategy, the use of purchased land both for the cultivation of export crops such as olive, walnut, and hazelnut as well as for animal husbandry in large plots creates an opportunity to access government subsidies and credit incentives for the investments of large enterprises. In such cases, companies ostensibly engage in agricultural production as a sub-sector activity and then transfer capital to other fields of operation. Finally, many companies keep large-scale land investment futile to position it in the next industrial expansion or land consolidation schemes. Holding land in this strategic area is a profitable endeavor, especially in light of recent land price increases and new rural projects analyzed in the following section. However, if a land investor plans to launch an agro-processing industry with technological equipment in large plots, this strategy will also be in line with official expectations about what modern farming should look like. In addition to systematic land purchases, speculative free sales in the short term serve land dealers and land brokers in the form of rent. As one merchant stresses, buyers do not know how to cultivate but they know how much the value of land will rise. (Karacabey, April 8, 2013). Potentially, these transactions also open the way to money-laundering.

Actually, the transfer of land from small farmers to large land owners and the collectivization of land-holdings have a long history. The British enclosure movement is the best-known example in Europe. In addition, the dispossession of native people in North America and Australasia, socialist collectivizations, and land deals of colonial powers throughout the 19th century are all historical experiences of land capture and loss of rights of local populations on their assets. According to Marx's stunning analyses in *Capital*, the English enclosure movement from the 15th

century to the 19th century catalyzed dispossession, commodification of land, concentration of land ownership, and proletarianization of peasantry. As he put it, "they conquered the field for capitalist agriculture, incorporated the soil into capital, and created for the urban industries the necessary supplies of free and rightless proletarians" (Marx, 1986, [1867], p.895). It can be argued that similar tragedies of land loss have been seen at a global scale, where farmers have been weakened by three decades of structural adjustment and directly exposed to neoliberal doctrine, market forces, and overindebtedness. Supported by the political discourse of the productive use of land and agricultural modernization in large enterprises, land sales precipitated farmers' move out of agriculture. It is obvious that the effect of land sales is not solely the dispossession and proletarianization of small farmers but also the establishment of a highly speculative land market and the concentration of ownership in fewer and fewer hands. Although the British government introduced taxes on large landowners even in 19th century enclosures, recently small farmers face the challenge of new mechanisms of land control, legitimization and justification alliances, and new affiliations in the political and economic context of neoliberalism on their own (Peluso& Lund, 2011). In order to shed light on how different actors carry out land control and territorial claims by excluding small farmers and to achieve a relational understanding of power, the motivations of these actors and the capacity of governments to shape appropriate land use from policy to practice should be analyzed.

Articulation of different kinds of powers to carry out land control is also used to turn small farmers into bounded, unfree, and tied labour even on their own territory. Although farmers remain in possession of land without transferring title, new relations of land use and land control suggest ruptures in processes of

ownership. Contract farming is one such process that often combines with new sorts of actors, unfamiliar practices, and global linkages (Akram-Lodhi, 2007). In addition to large-land owners, new global actors and non-agricultural capital owners less known personally to producers are highly powerful acquirers of land and engage in contract farming in which farmers indirectly transfer their rights to the land to companies. This has serious implications for farmers formerly used to being the decision makers about the organization of production processes and land use, who now see their land tied up for longer times. Firms and state institutions benefit from this process of long distance land control.

When firms and large landowners decide to invest directly in land, these transactions are taking place in silence via agents as one rural immigrant in Bursa explains:

> We also sold land. A farmer living in a nearby village bought the land. Then, we learned that someone was purchasing in the name of somebody else. These dealers are actually the mediators of the backroom boys. They do not make purchases with their own money. Later, land is transferred behind the scenes. Those already engaged in politics are the principal buyers. They take the advantage of state incentives. They get loans and then use them in different sectors. Before they purchase, bureaucrats and politicians follow land plans from Ankara and guide their actions. If condemnation occurs in the future, the land, which was purchased for 1 TL, will be bought by the state at 3 TL, and they will make 2 TL profit. (Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 14, 2010, Appx C, 49)

Considering land sales in the Office of Land Registry and Cadastre in Karacabey, companies are hardly part of the deals, which means that they rarely appear during negotiations. During our interview, the Director of the Office, İbrahim Küçük, was really confused and showing identity cards of land dealers, one part was from Erzurum and one part was from İzmir. At the same time, he was continuously asking what these men were doing with the land in Karacabey. The transaction was

probably one of many shady sales occurring more and more in the Piştikoz area[81] (Karacabey, July 1, 2010). In a similar vein, insight into some of the land use and control dynamics reveals that new landowners' accumulation processes are invisible, their strategies for managing labour are invisible, and their relations to the state and larger global actors are invisible (Da Corta, 2010).

Opportunities and benefit flows are created unequally for different groups. The drive among the local elites and the wealthiest people to use their political power through personal connections and law is also striking. By laundering power as legitimate authority and by taking possession of land as property through government instruments of law and policy, local elites and agribusiness are establishing immutable hegemonic positions of land control (Peluso&Lund, 2011). As one dispossessed smallholder witnesses, those able to take control of this increasingly valuable land exclude one another from land use and government incentives:

> They sold land to factories. All of it is gone. For instance, the son of the former Minister of Finance, Abdullah Unakıtan purchased arid land on time. He paid 5 TL for land that was actually worth 1 TL. However, he got a 250 TL subsidy to cultivate olives. I also intended to grow olives but had no access to incentives. What happened? The value of land increased exponentially . Imagine that you have tens of thousands decares of land like this…Matlı and Unakıtan are both supported by the state. They can own the Marmara Region together. (Karacabey, Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 50)

Here there is a slippage. Although enclosures and evictions are prohibited by law and possession of land is sanctioned by titles, emerging forms of hegemony over the land are also arranged by new biased regulations in the law. Both regulators and rent seekers are in intimate collaboration with companies, local elites, and international

[81] The North of Uluabat Lake from Harmanlı to İkizce village is called Piştikoz area in Karacabey. See Fig.1.

institutions in order to take a slice of the terrestrial pie and to formalize, legalize, and legitimize their actions through law. As an example, Unakıtan is engaged in mining and agribusiness investments in the Karacabey district including the input and poultry sectors. He works in cooperation with local elite and member of parliament Önder Matlı to use agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes via special regulations in the laws ("AB Gıda, 'Karadağ'dan çıkmam' diyor!", 2008).

According to Althusser, perplexity between law and politics is one of the main problems in bourgeois legal ideology (De Sutter, 2013). In other words, to accept law as a simple application of politics paves the way for the reconfiguration of this strategic and rich lowland territory for the benefit of local elites and political coalitions. Althusser does not avert the role of law as a repressive state apparatus based on force and violence, but his writings on law as an ideological state apparatus enable us to analyze vigorously contested efforts of new power assemblages on land use and land control in Karacabey. The logic of changes in municipal law that reorganize the use of common land in villages by restricting the rights of rural dwellers in addition to a law on the sale of 2B land in 2012 is not simply to plan land use but to depoliticize land use and control for the farmers.[82] In a similar vein, E.P. Thompson (1975) argues that disputes over land in the forests, parks, and commons of seventeenth century England were not over only land use, but rather over power and property right.

Meanwhile, the ongoing projects for special economic zones, entertainment parks, tourism operations, accumulation strategies based on what Lefebvre calls "the consumption of space" (Lefebvre, 1991; 2009), and the construction of an İstanbul-

[82] For the changes in municipality law see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/12/20121206-1.htm and for regulations on the sale of 2B land see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/04/20120426-1.htm.

İzmir highway on the most fertile and richest soil of Karacabey not only give rise to socioeconomic and environmental concerns but also result in speculation in the land market. These projects result in the dispossession of farmers, the exclusion of certain users from land use rights, and control and inclusion of powerful bodies for accumulation.

The underlying rationale of these projects is the same: to promote the efficient use of land by converting agricultural land into "valuable" and "performing" assets, which actually refers to more profit (Baka, 2013). Technocratic rationality based on productivity obscures the diversity of agricultural land by constructing new spaces available for state and private sector land projects. In his research on Special Economic Zones in India, Levien (2013) defines the role of the state as one that facilitates the transfer of agricultural land from farmers to firms in the new regime of land for the market, as "land broker". Current controversies on land use in Karacabey and the transfer of resources through the state apparatus can be analyzed by starting from the KOTİYAK industrial zone project. In 2004, in the uplands of Seyran, Subaşı, and Cambaz villages, pasture commons were transferred to the treasury.[83] Rural dwellers were offered incentives such as shares in profits and labour opportunities not to organize an opposition. Then, nearly 4,000 decares of land, actually worth 15 million TL, was fraudulently sold at less than 50 thousand TL to 75. Anniversary Small and Middle Sized Enterprises Building Cooperative attempted to construct an industrial zone in the region ("Karacabey'de asırlık soygun" , 2004).[84]

[83] Here it is important to note that Kemal Unakıtan was the Minister of Finance. While the Ministry was confiscating agricultural land in Karacabey, his son Abdullah Unakıtan was also engaging in many businesses in the region with state dispensation.

[84] See also official records in the plenary session of Grand National Assembly of Turkey held in March 8, 2005, retrieved from

The project was opposed by farmers, environmental NGOs, and the Karacabey Bar Association because of the unique characteristics of the land in the region ("Komik satışa tepkiler büyüyor", 2004; "Karacabey peşkeşe karşı", 2004; "Şaibeli satışa bir dava da Baro'dan", 2004). This area is located on the north of Uluabat Lake which is listed as one of 23 Living Lakes in the world and one of 13 RAMSAR sites in Turkey. It is also known as a future water resource for Bursa as well as a breeding ground for migratory and resident birds. The court ruled against the building cooperative according to the signed RAMSAR convention but government authorities ignored the accepted RAMSAR stipulations and drastically reduced the protective limits of the sites from 5 km to 2.5 km. Plans for the industrial zone were delayed for years until recently with a proposed project to construct an amusement park in the region by the Metropolitan Municipality of Bursa. An industrial zone plan with the involvement of TOKİ was redirected towards the east of Karacabey to the İkizce, Taşpınar, and Orhaniye villages near Bursa. [85](See Fig.2, region no.5)

The logic of the plans remains essentially unchanged despite their new names. Any business opportunity that can generate more income than the land use of small agricultural enterprises is given precedence by government officials. Therefore, the main idea is to assemble, develop, and subdivide agricultural land to be sold for multiple industrial and tourism projects in order to attract large corporate investment.[86] It is clear that in Karacabey, agricultural areas stopped being

---

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=13885&P5=B&page1=84&page2=84.

[85] See the decision of the Metropolitan Municipal Council at http://www.bursa.bel.tr/meclis-toplantilari/sayfa/102/?tur=gundem&meclis_id=112, "Kotiyak yerine Disneyland projesi" 2012; and for the disputes over the construction of industrial zone in İkizce, Taşpınar, Orhaniye villages see "KOTİYAK'a kötü haber" 2013.

[86] For some selected case studies in the form of personal narratives of the villagers affected by land acquisition for private industries see Guha (2007).

exclusively agricultural. Instead, new projects are designed on the most fertile soil of the region for tourism, industry, and the real estate sector. With the commodification of land, the construction of luxury housing, hotel, golf courses or water and amusement parks will expedite capital accumulation for wealthy and politically influential classes.

The Karaçay and Kocadere Park projects intend to turn Uluabat Lake into an eco-tourism area. These projects include an eco-marina on Uluabat Lake, hotels, golf courses, and a number of thematic eco-tourism parks where visitors can take boat tours on the river, participate in archeological tours, taste traditional food in the local restaurants, ride horses, have a picnic, and go to the zoo or swimming pool.[87] According to the regional development plans the lakeshore will be one of the city's finest tourist attractions and draw visitors from both Bursa and beyond. In consequence, agricultural land has become an outlet for speculative sales. Since overindebtedness results in voluntary and involuntary sales in the region, buyers have incentive to maximize their holdings as much as their profit.

The formation of new political economic structures over land use and control and even sometimes the forcible expropriation of land from farmers bring about different forms of dispossession similar to Marx's analysis on the primitive accumulation process, which eventually leads to capitalist development. Considering the dramatic rise in land sales and the scale of projects for the non-agricultural use of assets, Harvey's concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' offers a more useful

[87] Projects related to Uluabat Lake also include the construction of the first archeopark of Turkey at the Aktopraklık Mound, which is situated on the eastern shore of the lake, 25 km away from the Bursa city center. Ironically, farmers who need to quit agricultural production due to high costs are employed in the excavations that shed light on livelihood practices of the first farmers of Marmara region dated to 6000-5000 BC. Karkiner (2012) analyzes how Aktopraklık Mound itself became an object of discursive formation through the archeopark project and affected the construction of archeological knowledge. In addition to archeological analysis, it is clear that the political and socio-economic effects of Uluabat Lake projects on rural sites - like the archeopark - need further academic attention.

analysis in the inquiry into the transformation of low-cost assets into profitable use by the over-accumulated capitalists. This process creates new outlets for global capital (Harvey, 2005). Harvey's conception provides an insight into broader structural forces at play but remains weak on the analysis of governance processes and the state. At this point, what Levien (2013) contributes to Harvey's framework is to offer a theory that also includes the political role of the state in organizing dispossession and in the subsequent implementation. In other words, while Harvey's conception is focused mainly on economic concerns, Levien also emphasizes extra-economic forces such as political-ideological factors and state force, which can be understood as a regime of dispossession (Levien, 2012, 2013; Wolford *et al.*, 2013). In Karacabey, new regimes of dispossession bring about the transfer of land to local elites and business groups encouraged by the government to profit from non-agricultural development projects. Along with this, the state's efforts to formalize, legalize, and legitimize its actions are not based on force but rather on the exercise of domination through political legitimacy. As Gramsci (1992) argues, the state's goals are supported by the hegemonic false consciousness generated by law and that emerging forms of hegemony on land depend on more than law. In this context, the expropriation of agricultural land appears legitimate to the masses by way of the state's ideological power to generate consent via various methods.

Fig. 2 The map of İstanbul-İzmir highway
Source: http://www.bursa.bel.tr/istanbul-izmir-otoyolu-konsey-gundeminde/haber/8457.

With a projected budget of 11 billion TL in public-private partnership, the government is presenting the İstanbul-İzmir highway as one of the world's leading infrastructure projects with the inclusion of the world's third longest bridge (4.2 km). Government planners assume that road and infrastructure projects will bring economic growth in the same manner stated by Rostow's classical take-off theory in 1960. As seen in the map, the İstanbul-İzmir highway passes through the lowland territory of Karacabey. Despite the confirmation of the original plans, which found the highway passing through the south of Uluabat Lake, the route drastically changed to the north of the lake, a shift which provoked opposition due to the area's fertile soil and rural dweller's concerns about their assets ("Otoyol Karacabey'i bitirir!"). A grain merchant in Karacabey warns that the highway will not bring rural development:

> It is a giant massacre of agricultural land. The İstanbul- İzmir highway will not bring anything other than pollution. There will be high levels of exhaust fumes. People will drink water and throw out their plastic bottles. People will throw diapers and napkins. People will flick cigarette butts, which may start fires. There is no benefit but pollution. Whether highway is elevated or horizontal, it will harm all that agricultural land. Tomatoes grown around the highway will carry whatever their skins absorb from the polluted air and soil. (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 51)

Similar to other juridical processes on the use of land, at first the court decided to halt construction of the highway. Soon after, a law that awards megaprojects exemption from environmental impact assessment reports, even in their planning stages, was enacted ("'Çılgın Projeler'e çevre ayarı", 2013).

It is clear that overindebtedness and rent-seeking policies lead to land speculation, the dispossession of small farmers, and a rapidly rising curve of land values, especially along highways and near projects. The rotation of land is very fast but properties located in strategic areas alongside the highway and the Kocadere river shape demand. Local elites and national elites exploit their political connections to acquire strategic locations before anyone has an opportunity to inspect upcoming projects. For instance, the land purchases of Özdilek in the arid upperlands of Harmanlı village seemed irrational to rural dwellers 20 years ago. Now, it has become clear that Özdilek will construct roadside restaurants and a shopping mall near the highway like in Afyon, Yalova, and İzmir. These companies have consulting agencies in multiple state institutions in Ankara, Bursa, and Karacabey that share insider knowledge and documents. Local elites have also ensured more coordination with officials at lower technical levels. Since there are a number of actors and limited rent, the hierarchy of connections determines profit. As soon as highway plans were presented, speculators invested in land in Karacabey without knowing the exact route. Short-term rent seekers cannot get compensation from the government for the

land at the rate they expect because the government, not routinely, chooses to make payment in-kind. This means that land owners of the parcels on the route of the highway will be given property in the highland of the villages with an almost 10 percent reduction of property size. On the other hand, those who invested in land on the sides of highway have doubled their profit. At this point, the hierarchy of connections facilitates an understanding of the highly variable land market and taking position according to available knowledge. Key players are aware of the fact that the highway will benefit the industrial, real estate, and tourism sectors on the route but not the agriculture sector.

To connect the highway with the sea route in Karacabey, a 30 km long canal that will link Uluabat Lake and the Marmara Sea is in the works and will allow containers to be transferred from trucks to shipping vessels throughout the Marmara and Black Seas. Actually, the Kocadere River, which had been used by small ships particularly in the dry onion trade of Harmanlı village until the 1950s, naturally lies between Uluabat Lake and Marmara Sea. This new project will see the river cleaned and enlarged (Uluabat Gölü Marmara ile birleşecek, December 9, 2010; Uluabat Gölü Marmara Denizi ile birleşiyor, December 19, 2010). Other miscellaneous linkages are designed to connect sea and highway routes with major cities, economic zones, and tourist attractions. In addition, these routes are intended to facilitate corporate investment in energy and infrastructure projects in the North Aegean region regarding mining, hydroelectric power plants, and electrical transmission and distribution systems.

Farmers sell their land to speculators and elites as a last resort because they cannot cope with rising debt to commercial banks and the agribusiness companies considering contract farming. What is doubly ironic is that on the very same land

new projects are planned that might facilitate companies' access to new markets and new sectors as predatory investors. However, it is clear that infrastructure projects are also necessary for rural areas. As Grandia (2013) argues, smaller and strategic infrastructural projects designed for local producers by democratic decision-making processes can protect small producers from the tragedies of ongoing social and economic transition and generate livelihoods in rural areas by moving beyond megaprojects.

Conclusion

The uncertainty of revenue and cash-generating activities results in reallocation of rural labour between domestic and outside activities and asset adjustments which diversify household income. Urgent sales of movable assets such as livestock, tractors, and cars and then fixed assets as land, which are easily converted into cash increase livelihood options open to households. Under these conditions farmers also recourse to cash loans in the form of credits from informal and formal institutions. In Karacabey, commercial banks, cooperatives, and informal finance provide temporary relief for households for their struggle to meet basic expenses and urgent payments but chronic overindebtedness, material loss, and humiliation begin to emerge in case of default. As a consequence of rising problems of dispossession and exclusion, farmers are ultimately being drawn into new property, finance, and accumulation regimes.

Overindebtedness of farmers has been raised as a concern in the debates on economy but rural studies need a different approach which interrogates debt not only as a financial issue but also as a form of complex relations combining meaning, processes, and practices. The observations in Karacabey show that besides material

loss of assets and capital, impoverishment through debt appears as downward social mobility, exclusion, humiliation, and even suicide. Considering different dimensions of overindebtedness in rural sites, obviously debt means more than statistics, charts, and numbers for a farmer. Another point that needs elucidating is the embeddedness of debt into complex social relations. Farmers are engaging in informal and formal debt relations. Their interactions to debtors and guarantors challenge and reconfigure their market and non-market relations and personal reputations.

By analyzing multiple facets of over-indebtedness which includes inquiry of ownership, credit institutions, financial practices, and commodification of money this chapter presented that indebted farmers are acting beyond accepted financial rationality and calculations capabilities. They are recognized as financially illiterate due to their rising debts but they are actually revealing extraordinary juggling practices to meet multiplying cash needs and to rotate their debt to commercial banks, farmers' institutions, and individuals.

Whereas these developments have been driving indebted farmers in desperation, loss of major means of production and multifaceted relations in the finance and land markets turn land into a commodity in rural districts. In Karacabey, there are two pillars of transforming land control. First, the appropriation of land by commercial banks and credit cooperatives in case of default and the second, new projects on agricultural land legitimized by legal manipulations have led to land speculations, small farmers' dispossession, and rising curve of land values. Transition of ownership from farmers to land dealers remains very important but efforts to legitimize state expropriation on land by law can strengthen inequalities and ignore the rights of farmers. Besides, articulation of different kinds of powers to

carry out land control through political affirmation of law and legal manipulations has not made land control less violent than English enclosures.

CHAPTER 6

THE MARKETPLACE: A PLACE FOR SMALL-SCALE PRODUCERS?

Introduction

Transition to market-led economy imposed by outward oriented development strategy has major implications for structural adjustment in agricultural sector. A new structure free from state intervention, regulated prices, protective tariff and quotas, incentives and inducements intends to expedite market integration of farmers and entails them learning how to respond to radically changing market conditions. According to market principles, rational acts of farmers in response to price signals in a competitive market will bring efficiency, productivity, and profit maximization. Here question is raised; whether all the actions of farmers were irrational before structural adjustment. Or did they become rational and profit maximizing entrepreneurs after agricultural reforms?

Given the inconsistencies in market formation, this chapter challenges widely accepted norms of mainstream economics such as perfect competition and information, spontaneous order, and invisible hand, which all refer to self-regulating market. While markets have been presented as highly uniform and egalitarian structures, they are actually hierarchical and unaccountable. Transactions and price formation is open to speculative actions. Besides, markets are diversified and complex entities that also include socio-technical arrangements, risks, uncertainties, and spaces for struggle (Çalışkan&Callon, 2010). A complex process of market

agents and their interactions ensure linkages between commodity, agency, narratives, structures, and processes.

> From an empirical point of view, the most visible and well-known forces that set markets in motion are firms, trades unions, state services, banks, hedge funds, pension funds, individual consumers and consumer unions and NGOs. To be more complete we could also mention the public- and private-sector research centres that prepare new products and processes, the international monetary or financial institutions, the regulatory or standardization agencies (whether they concern hard technologies or social technologies such as accounting rules and practices), as well as experts, lawyers, economists, think-tanks and other spin doctors. There is no standard list. Part of the analysis would involve drawing up an inventory for each and every case. (Çalışkan& Callon, 2010, p.8)

This chapter provides detailed analysis of the understanding of markets by the farmers, how they respond to erratic conditions of markets, and the effects of the complex relations from production to processing on farmers' linkages to markets. It also inquires how markets work on the ground by interrogating the role of merchants, agribusiness companies, women, cooperatives, storage practices, and international trade in Karacabey. By tracing sociotechnical arrangements and farmers' reactions on the ground, penetration of capital into all aspects of productive processes, livelihood strategies and capabilities, and also environmental assets will be better understood.

Rural Development and Market

For decades, the success of rural development strategy has been reduced to the level of engagement in market exchange. Competitiveness and improved marketing networks in trade, transportation, storage, and processing facilities are required to expedite market liberalization processes. Structural adjustment focusing attention on

the reform of price policies, the elimination of subsidies, and the reduction of government expenses has been launched to improve market inclusion of farmers. The liberalization of markets prohibits state intervention in agricultural prices and removes restrictions on import and export. The expectation has been that through markets, global chains, and regional trade farmers can sustain their livelihood and even prosper. While recent conditions in markets are certainly benefiting some groups, there exist further limitations in market structure, especially for small producers. Even the World Bank admits that "market-friendly reforms have also sometimes hurt the rural poor …when reform leaves an institutional vacuum, performance suffers. As with other reforms agricultural market liberalization without the proper institutional framework will not deliver the expected results and could have serious consequences for poor people" (World Bank 2000/2001, pp.68-69). Drawing farmers into markets by omitting dynamics of rural structure and downplaying other major social and political imperatives creates a biased and segmented market structure and influences the evolution of exchange relations. Equally important, small farmers are already engaging in different markets from input to credits and complex exchange relations simultaneously. However, the 'getting prices right' strategy is not enough to ensure agrarian transformation and rural development, seeing that small farmers cannot reap the benefits of the market and institutional linkages equally.

The integration of farmers into the markets through the outward-oriented adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank led to a similar situation of crisis in developing countries. Unilateral policies of the international financial institutions transform these countries from a provider of agricultural products to an importer of food crops and inputs from developed countries. On the

one hand, the IMF and the World Bank are encouraging developing countries to liberalize their markets by limiting all kinds of protection, but on the other hand supported and protected foreign agribusiness companies have strengthened their position during structural adjustment under conditions of unfair competition. The cultivation of traditional export products is heavily reduced, and eventually the producers of basic food crops cannot cope with the subsidized prices of agrarian producers from the US and the EU. Therefore, many farmers prefer cultivating feed crops, which require less labor and input costs. This structural crisis in the countryside increases not only vulnerability to food insecurity, but also dependency on agribusiness in the rural sites of developing countries. In addition to trade liberalization, privatization of agricultural state enterprises and parastatal institutions engaged in storage, processing, commerce, and banking leave no other option to small scale agricultural producers than that of accepting the heavy conditions of agribusiness companies from seeding to storing. Even credit facilities and technical assistance activities which have been under state guarantee for decades have recently been coordinated by market institutions. Considering the ongoing debt relations and potential or actual asset loss investigated in the previous chapter, financial services of the market become inaccessible to many small farmers, or force them to cope with overindebtedness by challenging juggling practices.

The Market Myths

In a market society where individuals are self-interested and free from social constraints, how do the exchange relations of large numbers of people lead to order instead of chaos? According to neoclassical economics, perfect information and perfect competition prevent market players from acting dishonestly. This assumption

presupposes the condition of total transparency for the whole system and the totality of its agents. Market order is attainable effortlessly if all participants are well informed about each other.[88] According to Harriss-White (1999), "the theory of perfect competition requires perfect ease of entry and exit, full availability of information, no agent being able to exert influence over any other, and completely flexible factor mobility" (p.268). Therefore, only then is the coordination problem eliminated and the invisible hand operates benevolently by the help of a considerable amount of knowledge (Platteau, 1994a). In addition, fervent believers in free markets argue that competition will result in efficiency. In competitive markets, no single actor (including consumers and producers) is able to direct market outcome. Unregulated prices will act as indicators and ultimately producers will respond to these signals by reducing or increasing production (Buckland, 2004). Producers who cannot manage to deal with these signals will be eliminated from the system. These statements indicate that competition will lead to efficiency as regards both the level of production and number of players in the market.

In fact, these conditions are largely unmet in the real world. On the one hand, there are large-scale farmers who are well integrated into the commercial trade system despite high levels of risks and uncertainties, and on the other hand there are small farmers trying to adapt themselves to the market conditions and make a living. However, market theorists and experts, including the official perspectives of the state and international financial institutions, assume that all farmers are facing uniform conditions within commodity, inputs, credit, land, and labor markets. There is very

[88] The contribution of game theory and modeling to the analysis of achieving cooperation and equilibrium through competition is to make people believe that the logical outcomes of the strategic behaviors of the agents will produce perfect competition and cooperative equilibrium allocations spontaneously. Since these conditions are largely unmet in real markets, game theorists can only achieve these results by models. For further information on models uncovering perfect competition see Shapley and Shubik (1971), Kuhn (1953) and for an edited volume of classical studies in game theory and equilibrium see Kuhn (1997).

strong field evidence on changing product patterns, labor use, overindebtedness, and concentration of land use and control in the villages under study in Karacabey indicating that such a framework is highly problematic. Admittedly, even only asymmetrical distribution of information is vehement enough to prove that markets are segmented. Limited or lacking access to information networks prevents many farmers from taking full advantage of markets in rural areas.

The reality is that markets function far away from the abstractions of perfect competition. Under the conditions of lack of information, limited infrastructure, high levels of uncertainty and risk, and weak institutions, such a framework for the functioning of markets is tenuous. To achieve perfect information, market agents should voluntarily engage in exchange practices without the influence of any other actor. Besides, actors need flexible mobility in the market for their free exit and entrance. Unlike the neoclassical paradigm, no transaction is costless. Therefore, the extent to which market agents can act in a free and voluntary manner is debatable. In markets, knowing the identity of actors, or in other words who the actors are and which networks they are involved in, is essential for the conditions of market transactions, including the best possible outcome for the producer and consumer. Similar occurrences were recorded in the fieldwork showing that while better-off farmers, traders, and large land owners have better access to information networks and political agendas, possible risks in transactions are higher for some groups than others. A small farmer who migrated to Bursa inquiries his ex-position in commodity markets:

> The merchant sees my product on the trailer; he turns up his nose and reduces the price. On the other side, large-scale farmers keep the crops at storages. This time, the merchant asks them the price. The difference is 50 *kuruş* per kg. Large-scale farmers have bargaining power. I am indebted as

> soon as I cultivate. I have to sell wheat even before the harvest. This is the peasants' situation. (Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 28, 2010, Appx C, 52)

In a similar vein, Spoor (1997) focuses on the role of diversification and political networks for better-off farmers:

> The rich man has a job, political appointments and contracts, is involved in transport and trading, has different farms scattered around. He is often a politician or member of committees giving him access to resources and influence and he may be a respected local leader, involved in much of what goes on in local politics. If so he will have all the requirements for intensifying farming, except the time to get around to it. Lower down the scale, rich peasants diversifying into transport and trading, often mixed with political maneuvering. (p.62)

Market and Price

At the level of policy and projects, agents in markets employ various means to increase their share in benefits and income and to reduce risks. Attention to the practices and processes of market formation contradicts the neoclassical assumption that markets are institutions in which all participants are equal. Despite the concrete possibilities in support of more inclusive policies, markets generate a distinct process of differentiation. Admittedly, to interrogate widely accepted premises of markets such as "in well-functioning markets people meet as equals to mutually and voluntarily agree a price upon which to exchange a commodity, an exchange that is equally beneficial to both if it is based upon comparative advantage and specialization" will offer an insight into how the 'invisible hand' actually operates (Akram-Lodhi, 2007, p. 1440).

As mentioned above, the segmented structure of markets limits the degree of equality and volunteering in exchange relations in many circumstances. Under the

caveats of segmentation, different groups of people engage in market transactions for goods and services on very different terms. These terms can be influenced by political and socioeconomic characteristics such as asset ownership, skills, and access to local and regional networks. Therefore, prices may not include all the necessary information for buyers and sellers. In other words, the proposed price may fail to reflect adequate signals about an asset, product, or service due to asymmetrical information considering qualities and meanings attached to these items.[89] Moreover, contrary to neoclassical arguments, marginal cost and marginal revenue for the producer and marginal benefit for the customer may not achieve a general equilibrium if prices are not regulated. Rather, asymmetrical distribution of information necessitates a regulatory and coordinative role for non-market institutions, especially regarding resource allocation, in order for markets to operate.

By challenging widely accepted assumptions of mainstream economics that define the market "as an autonomous and flexible mechanism of exchange based on choice, a mechanism by which prices are formed as the result of supply and demand, and through which scarce resources are valued and allocated", Harriss-White (2007b, p.19) has made notable and distinctive contributions to the understanding of exchange and the relations between markets and production. Contrary to ahistorical and abstract analysis of markets, her research points to the historical dynamism and institutional diversity of real markets. Harriss-White (2007b) therefore arrives at quite different principles governing how markets actually function. The analytically significant point is that a market is in reality far more complex than an exchange relation in which buyers and sellers respond to price signals. First of all, since markets link production and consumption, any developments in markets have direct

[89] For further information on how markets with asymmetric information operate see the classical study on the used car market by Akerlof (1970).

consequences on the stages of production, product patterns, and labor use. If market activities are reduced only to transactions between market agents, uneven consequences of these operations, comprising on the one hand the exploitation of labor, expropriation of land, and overindebtedness, and on the other hand accumulation, diversification, and transformation, remain unproblematized or blurred.

Second, not only does the market include many processes from production to processing, but market actors themselves undertake different roles simultaneously inside the complex agribusiness marketing system. Especially, commercial firms are rarely pure traders and many merchants in Karacabey are also involved in production and storing activities. As an example, the agribusiness company Matlı, the strongest buyer of wheat and corn in Karacabey, employs various methods of driving surplus from processing to trading.[90] In addition to their complex roles in the market, agribusiness companies tend to invest inside the firm from storage facilities to transportation and benefit from their proximity to finance and political-administrative linkages as much as possible. The president of a development cooperative in the Harmanlı village criticizes investment policies, credit facilities, and the state incentives for the agribusiness firms:

> He goes and says that "I am a businessman, I own a company, and I will get a state credit". What are you going to do with the credit? "I will create employment for people". How nice… But then you see that if he constructs two buildings, he will also import via ships by the state credit. He says "I am doing import and I will use it for export", and ultimately he gets state credit again. If you make getting credit that much easier, these people inevitably use it for rent without considering the effects on the state

[90] Despite the existence of multiple roles in the markets, the evidence from the interviews conducted with Matlı and Banvit for the exchange practices in feed industry proved that when companies were asked about their transactions with farmers, they always tended to think farmers as "consumers" for the animal feed rather than "producers" of corn.

> budget or on ordinary people. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 30, 2009, Appx C, 53)

In actual marketing operations, market agency is not restricted to price formation, transactions, and contracts. It is therefore necessary to investigate markets not as a stage of exchange but as "systems of circulation" including market-forming institutions (Harriss-White, 2007b, p.23). These systems are interrogated by following the circulation of commodity after production. In a broader sense, the research combining the circulation of money including any payments for labor, land, and input, also payments in kind, and finally the system of circulation regarding buying and selling, processing, transport, and storage helps to understand some key characteristics of markets. These systems of circulation indicate commodification of land, labor, and money and ultimately link circulation to production.

Since the marketplace cannot be defined by only exchange relations in that it also involves many other activities, contractual agreements combining money and commodity can take various forms. According to the neoclassical view, no agent is able to exert influence on other agents or on market order. Nevertheless, a mass body of economic literature criticizes imperfect competition and power relations inside market structures.[91] In theory, it is only within a monopolistic and oligopolistic organization of the market that firms have the capacity to set prices through market power. Yet critics and market agents recognize that monopoly behavior is achievable even when there is more than one firm in the market. Concentrated market power and

[91] New Institutional Economics, a growing literature combining many disciplines such as law, sociology, economy, anthropology that investigates institutions of markets by modifying, criticizing, and extending classical assumptions on competition. See Ostrom (2005), Williamson (2000), Harriss, Hunter and Lewis, (1995). In addition, inspired by Polanyi's embeddedness concept, substantivists and also structuralists denounce caveats of free market. See Granovetter (1985), Flingstein (2002), Kripner (2001), Lapavitsas (2004), and Uzzi and Lancaster (2004). For critical approaches based on the cultural and social natures of the market, see Zelizer (1981), Alexander and Alexander (1991), Zafirovski (2000). See also Murphy (2006) for a study on agents' ability to affect price, reduce competition and set standards for a sector of economic activity.

control in agricultural markets from input providers to processors and to retailers enable companies to set prices, to reduce competition, and to determine standards. For example, in Karacabey the poultry sector and tomato processing companies inevitably reap the benefits of market power. Compared to the number of farmers, milk and tomato processors are very few. Since the organization of farmers by unions and making collective decisions on production is an onerous project, farmers individually cannot affect formation of prices. In addition, considering that it is not possible to store some products such as milk and tomatoes, urgent sales exacerbate the market power of agribusiness companies.

In 2003, the Karacabey cattle breeding cooperative initiated a tender for milk processing of 25 villages. Four firms in Karacabey, which were acting as a cartel, offered no more than 40.2 *kuruş* while cattle raisers were expecting at least 50 *kuruş* per liter of milk. The firms left no room for negotiation by quitting the meeting as soon as they had declared the price. The president of the cooperative, Mehmet Erdem, complains about the concentrated market power of poultry firms:

> To be honest, dairy firms are playing the game according to their own rules and they are playing very well. We are producing but they are setting the price. We have no restrictions on them. What remains to producers is to acquiesce in their decision. We suffered a big disappointment. A price offer at the level of 40.2 *kuruş* is beyond ruthlessness. We are at a loss. I am thinking of negotiating with the firms again. A permanent solution can be reached only if producers organized by cooperatives construct their own processing units. ("Süt üreticisinde hayal kırıklığı", 2003, Appx C, 54)

Harriss-White (1999) traces the role of power in the functioning of agricultural markets and argues that "markets are, first and foremost, sites of relationships of control over people" (p.271). In a similar vein, according to Ellis (1992), the functioning principle of markets is the subordination of producers to other social

classes and the state. It is necessary to note that setting prices is not the only site of power. In a broader perspective Harriss-White claims that power can be detectable at every stage of any transaction in complex ways. In addition to the enforcement at the point of exchange, by the control of assets and labor and access to resources from input to credit, power is reproduced in the markets through political and socioeconomic instruments.

The assumption that markets are regulated by dominant classes has, however, been around for a long time. Compared to neoclassical and institutionalist theories, Marxist theory offers a more intellectualized structural analysis of markets based on class struggle. Marxist literature contributes the study of transformation of agricultural markets by its valuable analysis, especially of the global agribusiness and food systems, the concentration of land ownership, and control of labor processes (Crow, 2003; Bernstein, 1994; McMichael, 1994; Araghi, 2000; Wood, 2000). Following a long intellectual tradition, Harriss-White focuses her studies on agricultural markets in India on class relations and social hierarchies based on the caste system. However, her inclination to link production and exchange, to analyze circulation in a complex structure, and her focus on the role of power rather than class in investigating market order gives her studies a distinctive characteristic. Nevertheless, Harriss-White in particular and structuralist theories on the functioning of the market in general cannot elaborate on how the market actually works on the ground locally, the socio-technical aspects of market making, the constitutive role of uncertainty, and cognitive and discursive processes pertaining to markets (Akrich, 1992; Latour, 2005; Callon, 2007; Callon, Millo&Muniesa, 2007).

In response to this, Çalışkan and Callon (2009, 2010) sketch out a research program regarding markets on the basis of the processes of economization that

makes a substantial contribution to economic sociology and anthropology.[92] Their unique position derives from questioning the role of economics on the formation and operations of economy, or in other words, interrogating the role of the science in the construction of its research subject. Their empirical investigation of economization is based on only one modality of the processes, namely marketization. Marketization is defined as the aggregate attempts to investigate, define, and make comprehensible the construction, form, and directions of a market socio-technical arrangement as described below. Çalışkan and Callon (2010) describe markets as socio-technical arrangements or assemblages (agencements) that have three characteristics:

> 1. Markets organize the conception, production and circulation of goods, as well as the voluntary transfer of some sorts of property rights attached to them. These transfers involve a monetary compensation that seals the 'goods' attachment to their new owners.
> 2. A market is an arrangement of heterogeneous constituents that deploys the following: rules and conventions, technical devices, metrological systems, logistical infrastructures, texts, discourses and narratives (e.g., on the pros and cons of competition), technical and scientific knowledge (including social scientific methods), as well as the competencies and skills embodied in living beings.
> 3. Markets delimit and construct a space of confrontation and power struggles. Multiple contradictory definitions and valuations of goods as well as agents oppose one another in markets until the terms of the transaction are peacefully determined by pricing mechanisms. (p.3)

This definition highlights some distinctive points, such as the diversity of markets and socio-technical agencements.[93] It should be noted that the existence of similar tools of marketization process does not lead to uniform market structure. On the

[92] Economization is a complex process of identifying bodies that have been "economized" (Callon, 1998). In other words, this term designates the series of actions which "constitute the behaviors, organizations, institutions and, more generally, the objects in a particular society which are tentatively and often controversially qualified, by scholars and/or lay people, as 'economic'"(Çalışkan&Callon, 2009, p.370).

[93] *Agencement* is a French word that has a meaning very close to that of arrangement and assemblage in English. Çalışkan and Callon (2010) deliberatively prefer to use this word to emphasize the link between those who are arranging and things that are arranged. It refers to the complexity of forces, whether they include human beings, materials, or textual components.

contrary, the diversity of markets in different localities is underlined as an expected outcome. Besides, despite having been investigated by economists and sociologists recurrently in the literature, the analysis on technicalities is different from standard approaches. Çalışkan and Callon (2010) emphasize the methods of social sciences, knowledge and skills developed by market agents, which Callon (2007) designates as 'economics at large', including both academic economics and know-how *id est* knowledge and skills developed by non-market actors. Within this context, the potential diversity of markets and their transformation and onward development can be explored in a novel way.

The Formation of Prices

In actual market operations, different agents are buying and selling through different channels on different terms of exchange. Despite the rising grievances about the inability of the market mechanism to function adequately, markets are still in the stages of valuation and calculation. However, this does not mean that prices are the only communication and coordination mechanisms which give responses to supply and demand and assure growth and development in perfect functioning markets without any state intervention (Hayek 1945[1948]). Such an approach views the market in essence as self-regulating and assumes that the order of market society arises spontaneously through decentralized mechanisms. Besides, price setting is reduced to the only relation between producers and consumers.

Considering the emerging literature on price and market formation combining various disciplines, there seems to be a growing awareness today that different types of social relations are traceable among non-market and market agents. Setting prices

is highly related to struggles among actors, deliberation, socio-technical mechanisms, evaluation, and calculation. More precisely, the struggles and transition of value into monetary price reproduce asymmetries and uncertainties in markets.

Viewed in this perspective, Çalışkan emphasizes the multiplicity of prices in markets at a given point in time for a commodity (Çalışkan, 2007c, 2009, 2010). These prices are not only used for transactions, but also for calculating other prices. Based on his ethnographic research on cotton markets, he argues that, surprisingly, before demand and supply levels are known, prices in various forms are circulated in the market. By bringing out the concept of *prosthesis* prices, he opens a novel way of seeing market anthropology (Çalışkan, 2010). Prosthesis prices are devices for agencies to multiply their price reserve, to calculate and evaluate actual prices. In addition to other material, social, and rhetorical parameters, prosthetic price as a heterodox form of price elucidates the process of price formation.

To know prices and values is not enough to understand the functioning of markets. Another central concept that characterizes market operations is uncertainty. The analytical framework of market studies is constructed on uncertainty, which defines the nature of relations between agents, commodities, services, and institutions. Uncertainty can be about prices, weather and environmental conditions, formal and informal relations, networking, contracting, and state and company policies.[94] Uncertainty in markets gives agents a chance to avoid risks, quantify probabilities, and forecast and predict obscure components. Different studies even in conflicting schools of thoughts tend to accept uncertainties as a given, as a *sine qua non* of market structure. However, it needs to be investigated as a concept of its own

[94] For environmental uncertainties and their effect on agricultural production see Backus *et al.* (1997), Sumner *et al.* (1998) Saha *et al.* (1994), Williams *et al.* (1990). For critical studies on established uncertainties see Marris (1996), Callon *et al.* (2009), Renn *et al.* (2000), and Wan (2001). And finally for the role of political uncertainty in the formation of the hazelnut market in Turkey see Bilbil (2012).

in the process of market formation, which creates, manipulates, and manages uncertainties as a part of its constituents. As this farmer complains, imperfections in the market are attributable to supply-demand imbalance without questioning the role of uncertainties:

> A farmer does not know at what price he is going to sell, especially non-industrial crops. As an example, consumer durables seller adds all costs (rent, wages etc.) to the price of a refrigerator, and ultimately he adds profit. But I cultivate cauliflower. The southwest wind blows, the price decreases. Then, it appears that cauliflower is overplanted, price decreases again. I have a 5 TL cost per decare. Who cares? What I am told is that it is a supply-demand issue. (Karacabey, Hotanlı village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 55)

Obviously, on the one hand, uncertainties in the agricultural market force farmers to improve their ability to maneuver. On the other hand, uncertainties are accepted as a scapegoat by policy makers and institutions that are responsible for agricultural markets. Therefore, it is reconstructed by manipulation, misinformation, rhetorical devices, speculations on statistical data, academic knowledge, and even rumors.

Attention to the micro processes of market operations helps us analyze market relations and their implications for the farmers. In Karacabey, what happens in markets, especially the formation of price, is seen as crucially determined by the speculative activities of effective market players. Considering the corn market, these players are firms in the poultry sector that are generally considered to be key actors, insofar as they are both buyers and importers of corn for animal food. A merchant indicates the existing hierarchy in the market and cooperation among poultry companies considering price formation:

> When they are purchasing crops they act as a cartel, they call each other. They warn others not to descend or ascend on prices. If they cannot control increasing prices, they cooperate with importers, they pull out of the market altogether. This is what we experience in the corn market. Suppose

> that there are four merchants collecting corn, we are only dealers, we just buy at 5 and sell at 5.5. We cannot be effective on prices because there are companies above us. For instance the poultry sector, they are processing corn in the highest volumes. Who are they? Banvit, Keskinoğlu, Şekerpiliç. They have regular meetings every week to determine corn prices. (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 56)

Despite larger firms' power to control prices, trading opportunities, production and supply conditions through contract farming, and state interventions and expectations, unexpected price fluctuations can be experienced. Global developments exacerbate existing uncertainties:

> Last year the corn price rose up to 730 TL for a month. Approximately, it was the end of May or June. Then, suddenly the price decreased to 550 TL. Imported corn had not been able to arrive. Import contracts had been approved lately. Therefore, the price had skyrocketed. Global markets are so important. We are also following. When a ship puts in at the harbor, prices decrease 100 TL all at once.[95] (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 57)

Other crops such as wheat, which is significant for the market in Karacabey, are also imported in the same way. Turkey consumes over 1 million tons of wheat per month. Nevertheless, between October 2012 and April 2013, the Konya Mercantile Exchange received only 300 tons of wheat from farmers daily. Given the lack of supply, the price was only 730 TL per ton and did not increase because of imported wheat from Russia. In Karacabey, Dramalı and Matlı are two significant players in the wheat market. Matlı is also an importer of wheat. An old farmer points out companies' power to create uncertainties through speculation and rumor: "If they import 100 tons, they will talk as if it were 500 tons. They make farmers afraid and purchase their crops immediately. Farmers do not know anything about it." (Karacabey, April 8, 2013; Harmanlı village, February 25, 2010, Appx C, 58)

[95] Prices are per ton.

The configuration of new market exchange shapes farmers' opportunities and constraints. It lets the market allocate resources wherever possible, providing an enabling environment for the private sector while reducing the role of state institutions despite their *de facto* existence. For example, the TMO revised prices in Turkey for decades until the advent of agricultural reforms. Recently, it has only contributed to the multiplicity of prices in the market:

> Crops are imported and the market regulates itself. From time to time, the TMO appears in purchases and declares a price but it is not functional. As an example it declares a price of 620 TL for corn but it does not purchase to regulate the market. Who buys? The market buys but it does not buy at 620 TL. Two years ago, the TMO declared a floor price for corn between 590 and 620 TL. However, we purchased at 530 TL. Whose price was this? Actually, farmers asked if we would buy corn at 530 TL. It was the farmers' price, not the merchants'. (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 59)

The decreasing role played by state institutions in purchases and price setting makes it more difficult for small-scale farmers as they struggle with their lack of bargaining power and the scale of operations such as the volume of the sales or the logistics services that this requires.

Still, a range of regulatory instruments, including rhetorical devices, is available for the state as a non-market institution at different stages of restructuring the market. Rhetorical apparatuses are technical facets of the politics of market formation. Public demonstrations, polls, conferences, parliamentary debates, electoral rolls etc… can influence price formation, administrative regulations, and agents' positions (Barry, 2002).

> Ten days ago, it was told that GMO corn would not be imported. The price of corn rose from 44 to 48 *kurus*. Yesterday evening on the news, it was declared that GMO corn would be accepted, then the price of corn decreased again. This is politics, already. How can I calculate my costs? According to a word from the state. if it was said that corn would not be imported, corn would rise to 60 *kurus*. Here you are, a play on words.

> There should absolutely be a rent for somebody, they set the game.
> (Karacabey, Hotanlı village, January 21, 2010, Appx C, 60)

This is an issue that emerges in most of the villages in Turkey, but in some instances farmers learn to live with it and adapt their production and marketing strategies.

In addition to rhetorical devices, the state's regulatory activities involve incentives, discipline, and coordination.[96] The state incentives combine infrastructural services such as transportation and communication facilities and subsidies for investment and trade. Disciplinary operations on the base of the imposition of norms of public interest regulate the establishment of private property rights, a legal framework for financial transactions, bankruptcy, contracts, and competition laws, liberties, and the freedom to trade and choose jobs (Platteau, 1994a). What influences Karacabey grain market is the state's incentives for agribusiness companies to import wheat and corn, such as cheap credit and exemptions from customs duties. In addition to the private sector individual initiatives for import, the TMO also provides tenders with the initiative to import grain. Russia has the highest ranking for wheat imports to Turkey, and for corn the highest volumes are imported from Argentina, the EU, and Ukraine.

A grain merchant in Karacabey points out the need to probe state policies. He tells that until the day before they were buying corn from local farmers for Sütaş and Tarfaş at 675 TL. Suddenly, they received a phone call telling them to stop. Companies reduced the price to 620 TL because a new lot of corn at 600 TL had arrived in Bandırma harbor. He asks "why should I buy corn at 675 TL and pay extra commission and transportation costs? Companies turn to imported corn so I offer farmers 620 TL. How much is the loss? 60 TL. Who lost? Farmers. Who caused the

[96] For methodological and theoretical analysis on how to study state intervention in agricultural markets see Mooij (1999).

loss? The importer. But who allowed for imports? The government" (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 61).

Markets on the Ground

Harvest and Storage

How market relations are operated on the ground is not a well-known phenomenon. Fieldwork in Karacabey revealed that it is important to unveil the appearance of these transactions. Exchange relations take place on the basis of market price, but even so prices paid and terms of payment can differ. In commodity markets, personal relations with merchants in turn might provide advantages, but for contract farming in the production of corn and tomato conditions can be much heavier. In the labor market, for instance, payment can be in the character of gift, reciprocal obligations, or a sense of loyalty (Johnson, 2000). Discussions with informants show that debt relations and interlocked contracts as determining structural characteristics of Karacabey's agriculture oblige farmers to sell their crops immediately after the harvest under highly disadvantageous conditions. In Bhaduri's (1986) words "forced commerce", a term which highlights the connection between financial and commodity markets, is vital for paying back debts and meeting the need for cash for other expenses. Worse still, contract farming and informal debt relations can result in the disposal of the commodity even before production as pre-harvest sale.[97]

[97] Contract farming is a dominant feature of agricultural production in Karacabey. Contracts inure farmers to transfer their control on land, commodity, and financial resources to agribusiness companies. For further analysis on contract farming see Chapter 3 on changing production patterns in Karacabey.

Obviously, forced commerce coincides with normal trade. Better-off farmers can devote more time to the exchanging and marketing of agricultural products to benefit from market opportunities (Banvit, December 4, 2013). At this point storage facilities gain significance, where the commodity is kept before it is sold or processed. Transportation facilities and processing can change the nature of the commodity and turn it into a more salable item (Cronon, 1991). In addition, storage prevents the commodity from changing its natural form, which would be deteriorated otherwise. Therefore, Harriss-White (1999) defines this process in some way as a productive process. Storage facilities are more developed in places where trade volumes are high. Once dry onion production was transmitted from Karacabey to Polatlı, storehouses were also moved to Polatlı. Moreover, farmers in Polatlı also take advantage of technology both in terms of seed and storage conditions. A farmer compares Karacabey and Polatlı in the following manner: "They are cultivating thicker skinned onion for storage. The base of stem is so small that it can totally get dry. Then it cannot come up in the storehouse. Not like ours. Now they are using electric heaters in storehouses to prevent dry onions from freezing. Farmers cannot afford to use them at home but they are using them in storehouses." (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 4, 2010, Appx C, 62)

Changes in technology and communication facilities have created chances for merchants as well. The dynamics of trade has altered, as this merchant says: "For instance I have corn in Adana. It was cheaper there. I have friends there who are also merchants. I transfer money through banks. He invoices, while he is buying for the others, he is also buying for me. He keeps the corn at his storehouse. When I say sell, he sells." (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 63)

An Integration into Global Markets?

The enforcement of international financial institutions of trade liberalization and their insistence on SAPs to encourage competitiveness and efficiency in agricultural markets gives rise to questions about farmers' behavior in markets. Were the decisions of farmers before the adjustment process irrational or inefficient? Were they less integrated in international markets? Contrary to expectations, what is evident from the fieldwork is that before the SAPs were implemented, small farmers in Karacabey were better integrated in international markets. Many rural dwellers, even those in their late twenties, have memories of dry onion and pink tomato exports, especially on long queues of trucks and in the village square as a theatrical stage for them:

> Formerly there were exports. Merchants were coming from Greece. Crops were sold like at an auction. One merchant was going, another was coming for tomatoes, watermelons etc. They were coming to the fields and buying dry onions at the field. Market trends could be predictable from the merchants' behavior. Now they are not coming to the village, you should condescend to visit personally. Tomatoes were being packaged continuously. People were yelling in front of the coffeehouse. "Tomato rose to 30 TL, 40TL, 50 TL". Like an auction. Now farmers have turned to factories. Dry onions and pink tomatoes have gone. Farming is over. (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 10, 2010, Appx C, 64)

Evidence also shows that in the very nature of agricultural production until the mid-1990s farmers believe that crops of the Karacabey plain were enough to feed not only Turkey but also the Middle East. Yet recently the introduction of new crop varieties as an alternative to traditional crops, changes in the land use and production patterns, new seeding methods, declining state subsidies, and rising costs have had serious consequences for exchange relationships and trade between different zones.

The adjustment process in the agricultural sector regulating trade liberalization is a double-edged sword. It is clear that the state encourages international trade and provides opportunities and incentives, especially for large-scale producers. However, on the one side there is a risk that imported goods will capture internal markets, omitting local supply bases within the country. On the other hand, exporters cannot achieve the kind of scale economies necessary to compete in global markets, which is essential for their survival. According to a merchant in Karacabey, farmers need planned cultivation and new markets for exports:

> I tried two months to market dry onion. I found the largest suppliers in Turkey and the supplier of Bim supermarket. I called a merchant in Mardin to ask if we could sell onion to Syria. He replied that he had already had 200 thousand decars of dry onion and he himself was trying to sell. Here is the importance of planning in agriculture. Crops needs be exported, such as tomato for the Middle East. For instance, the problem with tomato paste. We cannot cope with China. They are producing one ton of tomato paste at $350 but here it costs $700. What now? (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 65)

How Do Merchants Work?

In actual marketing relations, despite the penetration of contract farming in production and exchange relations, merchants are still significant figures in Karacabey. The production of tomato, corn for silage, and green pea is controlled by agribusiness companies through binding contracts. However, the marketing of traditional products such as dry onion and grain is coordinated by a handful of merchants in Karacabey. Moreover, during price fluctuations and decrease in supply merchants also procure processing companies for tomato and corn.

In the field, it is evident that the appearances and realities of exchange relations combine both market and non-market elements. On the one hand,

transactions with merchants take place on the basis of knowledge of market prices. On the other hand, reciprocity, personal agreements, reputation, and trust can alter prices paid. These relations also constructed a part of market exchange. Each part in the exchange can expect the other to be honest about the value of the commodity, to be flexible in prices and credits, and to give information about market trends when it is needed (Moore, 1994). Here it is significant to note that trust and reputation, which arise in time with the repetition of transactions, are necessary in relations between merchant and farmers. According to Platteau (1994a) "within the dense network of small communities, this informational condition is easily satisfied with the result that transactors can use a set of credible strategies whereby they refuse to deal with someone who has cheated any other member of the community in the past" (p.548).[98] If members of the community can be kept informed about others' past in transactions, honesty will serve as an effective bond because there are still fraudulent transactions in Karacabey in which especially small farmers are deceived by the use of famous company names such as Matlı (Karacabey, Matlı, April 8, 2013).

As mentioned above, merchants in Karacabey are hardly only traders. They are also producers in order to have volume consistency and quality in their supplies. What stands out from the fieldwork is that merchants such as dry onion producers are transferring their production from Karacabey to Polatlı where labor costs are low, efficiency is high, and fields are large and consolidated. Mobility of production appears as a kind of maneuvering for merchants. They prefer seeds to cultivate onion rather than the traditional methods of production. During the harvest, dry onion

[98] Platteau (1994a,b) attempts to explain market order through the role of trust, morality, and state institutions. His focus on the social conditions of the market system and the extension of the perception of the market has an intellectual importance. Nevertheless, the role of public and private order institutions and moral norms remains weak when it comes to understanding socio-technical devices of market order. This perspective also accepts state as a black box. For more analytical critique on Platteau see Moore (1994).

merchants buy commodities by estimation, which can be accepted as a part of uncertainty in market formation. The traders and middlemen go to the fields and directly purchase onion at the farm. A dry onion merchant in Karacabey explains how transaction occurs: "Suppose that here is 20 decares. We have it measured. According to our own experience, we guess how much yield will be achieved. Early on, you are mistaken, of course. According to the quality of the crop, it is 4 or 5 tons. Producers also know the yield now. There is no surprise." (Karacabey, March 19, 2010, Appx C, 66). In other words, this type of exchange is the valuation of uncertainty. During their purchases and price formation, merchants are reaping the benefits of technology. They are all the time connected to stock exchanges, mercantile exchanges, and other traders in different regions of Turkey and abroad via the internet.[99] Therefore transaction costs for access to information are reduced in this way for merchants and they enlarge their operation fields on the basis of a smart phone.

Gender Roles in the Market

Developing a network of relations gives access to information, resources, and assurance when it is needed. These social relations of marketing are marked by patron-client linkages, connected to political structures and local elites, and highly constructed on the ideology of patriarchy (Harriss-White, 1999; Spoor, 1997). Not notably egalitarian, the ideological power of patriarchy on both women and men has reconstructed agricultural markets. By marriage and inheritance, control over women

[99] Technological developments not only create opportunities to access information and other regions but also encourage market concentration and control in various fields, such as genetics in seeding, biotechnology, genomics, and nanotechnology. See Çalışkan and Callon (2010) and Buckland (2004).

and resources is transmitted to subsequent generations. Patriarchal structure is as important as material shortcomings to explaining the exclusion of women from exchange relations. Although female labor is concentrated on a variety of different tasks of farming from production to harvesting, physically no woman is present in transactions. Worse still, they are not even allowed to decide on product patterns, timing of sales, and other strategic issues. The only marketplace organized by women is that of lacing and handicrafts. From lacing yarn sellers to agents between rural women and shop owners, all attendants are women.

An Example of a Better-off Farmer

The claim that the space left by the retreat of the state will be filled by an efficient network of market players offers limited insights into market operations. Given power and information asymmetries and the segmented structure of the market, only those farmers who have control over resources, information, and capital will have leverage on markets. In the Harmanlı village, Emre has access to a wider range of opportunities in market operations than those farmers drawn into indebtedness. The split structure of the market determines farmers' access to land, labor, credit, and other commodities. Yet, none of this means that poor farmers do not respond to changes in the market. Juggling practices in financial markets, diversification in livelihood strategies, changing production patterns, and migration proves that they are accustomed to market signals. However, better-off farmers, especially those who have access to initial capital, generate higher returns. Emre emphasizes the role of timing and his access to information in achieving profit or at least not being indebted. In order for it to be advantageous, farmers need to harvest dry onion in early June,

between harvests in Adana and Polatlı that constitute the new hubs of dry onion production. He is following the dry onion market through the web and merchants in the dry onion bazaar in Karacabey to obtain information about new seed varieties, their yields, weather conditions, production scales of the previous year including other regions, and developments in global markets. In addition, his initial capital allows him to buy technical equipment for irrigation and seeding to improve production (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 4, 2010).

Is There an Alternative?

An innovative modern non-market governance structure such as an agricultural cooperative can provide an alternative to inadequate exchange relations, and can find its justification and motivation in its potential saving opportunities, access to information, and declining transaction costs (Ruben&Bastiansen, 2000). As the president of the Agricultural Development Cooperative declared in 2009, one thousand tons of corn produced in Harmanlı village was sold to Matlı through the cooperative. In total, farmers gained an extra 5,000 TL. The president stresses their need to have an educated staff to follow financial transactions and invoices. Then, cooperatives can create more benefits for farmers (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 30, 2009). Cooperatives can absorb marketing risks and perform other services such as bulk purchases of inputs at low prices in addition to product sales (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January10, 2010).

According to an old farmer, the agricultural development cooperative in the Harmanlı village encounters particular problems and has the possibility of using their own machinery, which many farmers cannot afford to purchase (Spoor, 1997). To

integrate themselves in markets, farmers can find new ways of using their economies. Just as the state enterprises had served previously, cooperatives can provide machinery and processing services: “The state does not support you, that is clear. What does this village produce, is it wheat? What is needed to make it a comestible good? I’d construct a mill and launch it as flour to the market... Are you cultivating tomato? Do you need a factory? I’d found a small enterprise to process the products of this village. For instance, buy a grain dryer for corn.” (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 2, 2010, Appx C, 67).

Conclusion

This chapter documented how markets are actually working for the farmers on the ground. In Karacabey, producers are squeezed between declining commodity prices and limited access to markets. This means that efficient market and comparative advantage stories do not enhance wealth for farming societies; even more serious concerns appear because agriculture is no longer considered as a fundamental economic sector.

The promises of markets have not been kept. The assumption that the space left by the state will be filled by efficient market institutions did not work very well. The liberalization of prices, deregulation of parastatal institutions, and opening towards external markets through structural adjustment have been launched to promote market-led economy. Nevertheless, the imports (from inputs to commodities) capture inner markets, where small producers can hardly find a place. Despite all the rhetoric, these policies have deepened the gap between large scale producers and small farmers.

As the observations in Karacabey proved that dynamic conditions of commodity production and exchange are different for small farmers and large scale producers. Given power and information asymmetries and the segmented structure of the market, only those farmers who have control over resources, information, and capital have leverage on markets. Drawing farmers into markets by omitting dynamics of rural structure and downplaying other major social and political imperatives creates a biased and segmented market structure and influences the evolution of exchange relations.

Farmers have to deal with a complex set of factors that have pushed them into markets from commodity to land which they cannot control but try to contrive a living out of it. In this path they are facing with challenges including fluctuating prices, uncertainties, and market conditions that favor the better-off producers. Markets at some level and scale can be useful (Buckland, 2004). The question is whether unlimited markets will foster a system. Evidence from this fieldwork suggests that it is implausible. Unless there is an awareness of the inequalities in the context of markets, it will be difficult to develop policies and organizations that small producers can be involved in decision-making processes.

To reduce risks especially for small producers, regulatory bodies require knowing how small farmers are participating in market operations, in which market and non-market relations they are involved for their livelihood strategy, and how they struggle in the market. By organizing markets in a democratic way and reconfiguring policy making more participatory, transparent, and accountable, small farmers should be incorporated into decision-making processes. Recently, existing processes lead to a Janus faced policy in which policies are considered as democratic but decision making in the policy field is effectively authoritarian, that is made

behind closed doors, insulated from public debate and scrutiny. Nevertheless, collective action among farmers can improve willingness and capabilities of many producers to play an active role in decision-making processes. At this point, cooperatives both for the organization and political mobilization of the farmers and creating alternative marketing opportunities can facilitate participation and make markets more accessible to small producers. The recognition and respect of farmer's rights will improve their conditions. The organization of cooperatives in a bottom-up way challenges existing power relations in the market. Effective and well-functioning cooperatives and other farmers' networks can solve socioeconomic, political, and environmental problems of agricultural reforms and marketization and encourage producers for being involved in the formulation of rural policies. Besides their effects on the formation of collective action and democratization attempts, cooperatives and growers' institutions offer various benefits for farmers. Learning processes take place in cooperatives and agriculture can be included in the top of political agenda by the efforts of farmers' unions. These institutions provide alternative marketing channels for the commodities and inputs, support the formation of public awareness regarding rural problems in urban areas, promote saving plans and credit programmes for farmers, make producers less dependent on agribusiness companies in the market, and revitalize indigenous handcrafts, traditions, and working collectively.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter is to draw together some of the main issues and arguments from the previous six chapters, and evidence from the fieldwork to deliberate long term prospects and policy responses for the future trajectory of rural transformation in Turkey.

The Context of Rural Transformation

The dissertation aimed to show that the underpinnings of rural transformation through SAPs in Turkey are dominated by five premises:

- Dichotomy of state-led versus market-led economy
- Aggrandization of codified knowledge and experts
- Reducing farmers to a unit of production by programs and statistics
- Commodification of land and money
- Deepening marketization and capital penetration

Dichotomy of state-led versus market-led economy: This sixty-year-period, from 1950s onward, can be divided into two sub-periods, clearly marked by the roles of the state and the market in development policies. The first period, which can be called state-led economy, can be dated from 1950 to 1980. The second period, market-led economy, began with the January 24th decisions in 1980 and continues to the present.

In the state-led economy period, the state acted as an operator of national development policies. Like other sectors, agriculture was directly and indirectly controlled by the state during the first period. The design and implementation of rural development and agricultural policies by the state was intended to avoid traditional methods of agriculture and achieve mechanical, technological, and chemical improvements. In close cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, the state provided huge subsidies for small producers, government credits, input provision, extension services, credits, price stability, and incentives for agricultural exports. In fact, this was a strategic choice for the state, as the agricultural sector provided raw material for developing the industry and foreign exchange through exports in the ISI development model. In addition, producers were also accepted as consumers for the enlarging domestic market. Considering political developments in this period, especially after the 1960 coup d'état, the clientelistic embodiment of the rural masses, the activation of private enterprises through patronage and rent seeking policies, and haphazard social mobilization provoked by populism emerged as techniques to achieve electoral support in the absence of fully institutionalized associations. These developments in the political and economic system resulted in the inclusion of farmers into the system but did not permit their demands and expectations to be realized in this scheme.

Before the second period, in the late 1970s Turkey inevitably experienced a balance of payment crisis due to the ISI model. Turkey underwent a substantial economic recovery program with the support of the IMF and the World Bank which in return obliged Turkey to implement SAPs for the transition to a market-led economy. Outward-oriented development plans for the integration to the global economy were declared by the decisions accepted on January 24th, 1980. The new

system accepted structural adjustment as a technical issue, necessitated economic rationality, competition, and injection of experts into the state institutions. In the 1980s, the reconfiguration of the market by the international experts and decreasing subsidies were two significant issues for the producers. Experts were focusing on bringing efficiency to the agricultural sector and expediting trade liberalization for the import of agricultural products. Even the IMF, despite the lack of direct agricultural loans, demanded conditionalities for the structural adjustment of agriculture. However, the inheritance of populist policy-making instruments of Turkish governments envisaged a rather smooth transition process for farmers.

The new scenario in early 2000 prepared a radical shift for the agricultural policies. Under the pressure of twin crises, Turkey implemented policies to restructure the agricultural sector according to conditions put down by the IMF and the World Bank. $600 million projected by the ARIP facilitated the implementation of agricultural reform which would dramatically eliminate support policies, launch a new DIS system, offer the cultivation of alternative crops, and expedite the privatization of SEEs and agricultural cooperatives. These policies drastically affected the livelihoods of agricultural producers and contributed to the opening up of domestic markets to global agents from seed to industrial processing.

In consequence, as Chapter 2 showed, despite the dichotomy of state-led versus market- led models, both the ISI scheme and free market policies are distanced from their constituents, block mass mobilization and democratic participation in the Turkish countryside. Building policy options on this dichotomy is a vain attempt because overall neither the neoliberal and individualist nor the statist and corporatist perspectives are able to come to terms with the idea of a representative, accountable, and transparent approach to policy-making processes.

Aggrandization of codified knowledge and experts: From the foregoing analysis in Chapter 3 it is clear that SAPs, which offer narrow policy options underlining the role of the market, free trade, and industrial production, threaten local knowledge and ecosystems which previously introduced specificity into agriculture. Craft knowledge of farmers has unique characteristics according to their production systems, crop patterns, weather conditions, and soil quality. Nevertheless, the production model of codified knowledge based on chemically improved seed, fertilizer, and pesticide supported by the international institutions and TNCs replaced traditional forms of farming techniques. Recently, commodities have been produced by non-agricultural inputs or industrial and chemical substitutes by breaking the direct linkages between knowers and doers.

Besides, the emphasis of SAPs on productivity and efficiency reduced agricultural transformation to a technical issue by omitting its socioeconomic, political, and environmental dimensions. The principles of efficiency, productivity, managerial oversight and planning, reliance on experts, mechanization, dependency on technology, and large scale operations generate concerns over farmers. Farming practices from seeding to processing are controlled by technologies, knowledge, and capital outside the farm through skilled experts. The experts are claiming absolute reason, and accordingly build new policies on scientific knowledge. However, based on the evidence from the experience of farmers, structural adjustment is anything but scientific.

Here the problem is the emergence and promotion of an industrial rationale as an ideal in agricultural production. Industrial practices from seeding to processing took over farmers' craft knowledge and replaced existing inputs with synthetic chemical ingredients especially in new production patterns. In addition to

technological and scientific developments in agricultural production, the use and control of land, the management of transportation and storage facilities, and the evaluation of credit opportunities are also being constructed on new sorts of technical expertise. Innovations in agricultural production have created and sustained change in technical, socioeconomic, and political relations. For example, when a farmer buys hybrid seeds instead of traditional seeds naturally reproduced every year, he enters a new network of relationships. He has to engage in financial relation with the branch office of seed company. High input costs may direct him to a bank official that can loan him the cash money for his purchases with financial obligations. This transaction requires financial literacy for credit use in order not to lose hypothecated land in case of default. Moreover, the use of new varieties of seed may demand new fertilizers or pesticides that make the expertise of agricultural engineer necessary. The agents of industrialization and modernizing agricultural production are, not surprisingly economists, academics, agribusiness company managers, insurance companies, bank officials, and the policy makers. Rationalization, mechanization, and industrial management techniques applied to farming are traversing rural spaces and result in new frames of rural change.

Reducing farmers to a unit of production by programs and statistics: SAPs consist of the transition policies based on efficiency, productivity, and sustainability, exercising authority over targeted people, places, practices, and activities. Three main pillars of these policies are liberalization, openness, and privatization, which are all fundamentally macro in character. Therefore, the efforts to build an academic knowledge on structural adjustment are unlikely to offer promising micro perspectives on the dynamics of rural communities. The unique characteristics of farming societies and their livelihood strategies have been neglected by

macroeconomic assessment of agricultural reforms. Macrolevel data based on statistics reduce farmers to a unit of production with an efficiency, productivity, and sustainability that can be programmed and calculated from a distance by experts. Under these conditions, the diversification, mobility, and heterogeneity of livelihood strategies of many rural households cannot be caught by statistical methods. Ultimately, the policies produced by the macro statistical data hardly respond to the actual needs of rural societies, from agricultural support policies to social policies.

Accepting farmers as a unit of production promotes a uniform type of farmer who can adapt economic imperatives of market rationality, competitiveness, and profit maximization. Since the farmers cannot appear as efficient, rational, and profit maximizing entrepreneurs in terms of market values, the type of farmers that SAPs promote should have initial capital, in cash account and risk-aversion assets. Others, or in the words of one farmer, those that fall from the griddle, will be eliminated.

As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 examined, our understanding of what happened to farmers and agricultural production has been formed by several lines of reasoning based on market economy. In this framework, farmers are accepted as abstract producers inside a quantitative frame. They are expected to become more like businessmen and evaluate land size, scale of production, labour use, cost- benefit analysis, and market conditions through the lenses of economists. Rationalization in agricultural production requires capability to analyze and forecast rather than ability to farm. Therefore, it necessitates managerial expertise rather than craft knowledge. Thomas D. Campbell, president of the Campbell Farming Corporation revealed in 1928 “modern farming is 90 percent engineering and 10 percent agriculture.” The economic notions of efficiency including both more efficient use of labour and machinery also consider nature as an obstacle. Since weather conditions,

uncertainties in the yield, water drainage, and geographical characteristics of land influence the equation of maximum output for minimum input; market economy intends to achieve manageable and profitable conditions regarding nature. In other words, structural reforms promoting efficiency harm idiosyncratic relation between nature and producers.

In a similar vein, agricultural reforms are delinking agents and things, here farmers and products, by quantifying commodities. From a technical point of view, standardization in production process and products brings about advantages as shown in Chapter 3. In a totally integrated agribusiness processes, making everything in a given category in the same quality ensures first of all the continuation from production to processing. In this process, one lot can be substituted for another and marketing becomes more manageable by routinizing all tasks. The best way to rationalize agricultural production is to reconfigure its operations as predictable, reliable, and controllable from a distance. Henceforth, agricultural techniques and principles change into global and transferable methods. According to experts if weather conditions and technical equipments are the same, know-how of tomato production in San Marzano, Italy can be applicable to Karacabey, Bursa. Moreover, if the production model has its greatest success for chicken breeding in poultry sector, it is expected that the same results will be achievable for raising sheep with the same techniques. As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 captured, the direction that expert knowledge leads agriculture is more about products, production processes, and technologies; less about farmers and their problems. With these technical tools, different dimensions of production such as sociopolitical and historical conditions become irrelevant. Standardization determines conditions of labour and land use for the farmers, but leaves no room for judgement and decision-making by farmers.

Commodification of money and land: The phasing out of subsidies, rising costs of agricultural production, fluctuating prices, and the desire to imitate consumption patterns of others create a heavy burden on households' budgets. Due to the irregularity and scarcity of income, farmers inevitably have recourse to various forms of indebtedness. The uncertainty of farm income and cash-generating activities end up being trapped in a spiral indebtedness from which they struggle to escape. Thousands of farmers have become trapped in vicious circles of cross-debt from various commercial banks and informal actors as well. Besides, dramatically changing production systems, contract farming, which is an extra burden to farmers already in financial bottleneck, and interest rates have linked household debt to global markets considering prices of products and inputs and accumulation driven by finance. This financialization and monetization process, which is a ferocious form of commodification of money according to Polanyi (1944), obliges farmers to adjust themselves to the often chaotic and irrational movement of speculative finance around the world.

The need for money to meet debt payments and production costs ultimately leads households into the hypothecation of land in order to obtain loans from commercial banks, and this can later be followed by the expropriation of land by commercial banks and even distress sales. It is clear that the effect of land sales is not solely the dispossession and proletarianization of small farmers, but also the establishment of a highly speculative land market and the concentration of ownership in fewer and fewer hands. The evidence from the fieldwork analyzed in Chapter 5 proved that multifaceted relations in the land market and recent reforms and giant projects turn land into a commodity in rural districts. Nevertheless, for many rural people a meaning of land is constructed within an array of ecological, cultural, and

socioeconomic relations. What is new in structural reforms is to commodify land and to transfer land into capital by reducing land assets to mere economic spaces.

Deepening marketization and capital penetration: Structural adjustment is accepted to be almost synonymous with the engagement in markets. The promotion of competitiveness, market production, and technical and financial assistance to producers in order to develop marketing chains in trade, transportation, storage, and processing target the injection of farmers into markets. The attention is focused on the prices free from any regulation and the liberalization of trade in internal and external markets. In this sense, the functioning of the market is attributed to an order of self-regulating and self-optimizing system:

> The great 'neoclassical edifice' rested on two basic assumptions: perfect competition and perfect rationality. Perfect and universal knowledge ensured that existing resources would be optimally utilized, guaranteeing full employment. 'Economic man' could go about his business in peace because he could be confident that there was a corpus of theory, namely, marginal utility and general equilibrium, which, because it had recourse to a perfect knowledge of things would provide him with the information he needed to maximize the use of his scarce resources. (Escobar, 1995, p.66)

The IMF and the World Bank programs echo the "neoclassical edifice" in terms of neoliberal policies and promote the belief in the possibility of a formation of a self-regulating and self-ordering market. However, perfect competition and information, spontaneity, and price formation on the basis of the supply-demand balance are lagging well behind the rhetoric. First of all, markets are highly diversified due to institutional, political, and socio-cultural contexts. They are not only based on exchange relations, but also include a web of relations between market and non-market agents, from production to processing. Power struggles, uncertainty, and risk in market formation conditions people's opportunities and impose limits concomitantly. Based on their research program on the process of economization,

Çalışkan and Callon (2010) define marketization as the aggregate attempts to investigate, define, and make comprehensible the construction, form, and directions of a market socio-technical arrangement. This definition permits the understanding of market formation by accounting for the diversity of market and nonmarket agents, the *agencement* of sociotechnical devices, and improving challenges, uncertainties, and responses.

Capital that comes from outside of the local community with the integration to global markets and trade liberalization has major consequences for the rural dwellers in Karacabey. Before structural reforms, money could circulate among local enterprises but now it leaves the rural community immediately. Giant seed companies like Cargill and other food processing companies with foreign partners control from production to marketing processes. If these agribusiness companies are connected to foreign brands, profits are probably invested in any other place in the world. Moreover, the ultimate political power that these corporations whether TNCs or local companies have is so vital in their operations. This dissertation provides a good picture of the collusion of the state and agribusiness companies, corruption, cartelization, and the networks of patronage and personal ties in Karacabey. Even worse, while farmers are becoming more and more dependent to agribusiness companies from seed to processing; these companies legitimize their fraudulent actions through law.

Findings of the Study within the Policy Context

A central question posed at the start of the dissertation was how the *Agrarian Question* can be understood in recent times. Farmers are here to stay. Despite the challenges from changing state policies to sociotechnical arrangements faced by

them, agriculture still offers more to rural dwellers' livelihoods than has hitherto been thought. Neither classical theories which propose the transformation of small farmers into workers or even their extinction nor development theories that see farming communities at their earlier stages of development can offer analysis to uncover recent dynamics which incorporate farmer's labour, land, and commodities into globally articulated market-led economy. In addition it is not easy to point to a distinctive, independent, and undivided peasant identity as claimed by Kautsky and Chayanov, when they are highly connected to global markets and capital penetrated into their market and non-market relations. Postmodern studies on the other hand provide valuable studies on gender, consumption environmental pollution, and the changing conditions of local identities but they still remain insufficient when it comes to explaining broader power networks and the role of the state. Structural theories interrogate the processes of the expropriation of land and labour but their methodological framework cannot analyze discources, narratives, and sociotechnical arrangements. The contribution of this dissertation is to uncover the dynamics of change triggered by the SAPs and the mechanisms of confrontation and survival of the farmer communities by a multidimensional inquiry of these socio-technical mechanisms from the state's policy making procedures to production process and to exchange relations.

Small-scale producers change their production systems with the repositioning of agricultural production within the global economy, where protectionist trade barriers are gradually being dismantled, subsidies are reduced, state-owned enterprises supporting farmers are privatized, and parastatal agricultural cooperatives are dismantled by the state-managed policy framework.

The cultivation of dry onion, which can be called a craft, was threatened by high labor costs, the proliferation of industrial tomato processing companies in the 1980s in Karacabey and the introduction of an innovative seed to onion method of cultivation completely different from the traditional production of dry onion that requires a higher level of skill and a longer period. Karacabey was once called the warehouse of dry onion, but recently the production of dry onion has shifted to Polatlı and Eskişehir. Even the merchants in Karacabey prefer to cultivate dry onion in these places. The evidence from the field showed that when the production of dry onion was converted into an industrial activity, the traditional method of dry onion production unique to Karacabey, acquired by merit and local knowledge, was annihilated.

Instead of dry onion cultivation, the expansion of contract farming in tomato was noticeable in Karacabey, which was replaced by corn production later. As an alternative production style, contract farming offers numerous benefits for the firms. To put it simply, however, while the companies are taking advantage of high levels of intense labor for high value export items, they delegate the responsibility for all stages of production to the farmers. Any failure of the latter will result in even the eviction of producers from their own land.

As shown, the problems in contract farming, the seed technology, and the lack of state planning and subsidies push farmers onto the industrial treadmill by vitiating local knowledge and traditional products, but also by endangering food security. The majority of farming activity has moved from food staples to feed staples such as corn and wheat for silage.

Clearly, although the agricultural production continues to support the livelihoods of rural dwellers, fundamental shifts occur in the structure of agricultural

production, employment, and consumption patterns. For instance, by planting different crops on a variety of land types, farmers participate in “vertical cultivation”, which is a classic strategy but promises greater security (Zoomers &Zoomers, 1999, pp.26-27).

Farmers are easing away from a strictly agrarian existence to diversification. The opportunities presented by the non-farm sector are not impressive in the villages. Therefore, rural dwellers often need to migrate to the Karacabey district and the closest city center, Bursa, which offers more productive urban industrial and service occupations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state should phase out all subsidies and eliminate support policies. Both rural dwellers and farmers who migrated to urban areas repeatedly emphasize that if the government policies would allow farmers to generate sufficient income, they would definitely carry out agricultural production as their sole income activity.

Casual farm work is the main economic activity of the poor for both women and men who quit agricultural production. Although it is assumed that the formal-informal distinction is restricted to urban areas, new patterns of employment in rural districts have created an increase in informal and unregulated work with limited institutional protection against risk and insecurity. Given that rural dwellers can engage in diversified occupations, migration, or living dependent on external income such as remittances and retirement payments; labor hiring activities, both seasonal and daily, might be irregular in order to decrease labor costs. Considering the dynamics of informality and new trends in employment, a clear distinction between urban and rural sites needs to be challenged due to high mobility and linkages in the markets. Therefore, the inclination towards deagrarianization or reagrarianization can change according to time and region.

Bearing in mind that SAPs are constructed on gender biases which are deeply and fundamentally exploitative of women's time, labor, and sexuality, women responsibility inside and outside the household is increasing. They are both actively involved in maintaining the household's subsistence and sustaining nutritional needs and a diversity of diet. In addition to their contribution to the household budget as an off-farm or a non-farm worker, rural women in the Harmanlı village present themselves as being more interested than men in the protection of the traditional methods of agricultural production, resource conservation, and the preservation of local biodiversity, including the genetic diversity of seeds.

Farmers' indebtedness and the high ratio of land sales are widely known. Unfortunately, overindebtedness and distress sales result in downward trajectories through dispossession. It is worth emphasizing that overindebtedness and land sales do not appear as mere economic and financial transactions. Given the examples from the field, the Chapter 5 proves that they affect farmers' relation to other farmers and institutions. Cycles of indebtedness are not easy to break out of, but farmers do not evaluate their debts to formal and informal lenders with accepted financial rationality. In other words, how farmers experience and perceive debt is not based on the scale of the debt. First of all, there are manageable and unmanageable debts. Despite the high amount of debt, a farmer might rotate several loans simultaneously by engaging several debt chains. In other words, in the Harmanlı village everybody is in everybody's debt. Obviously, structural adjustment insistence on the privatization and marketization of agricultural credit institutions by reconfiguring the market bring about the rise in the severity and frequency of confiscation cases.

In Karacabey, new regimes of dispossession result in the transfer of land to local elites and business groups encouraged by the government to profit

from non-agricultural rural development projects. Along with this, the state's efforts to formalize, legalize and legitimize its action are not based on force, but on the exercise of domination through political legitimacy and law. With double irony, farmers are obliged to sell their land to speculators as a last resort due to overindebtedness, and on that very same land new projects are designed to facilitate companies' access to new markets and new sectors as predatory financiers. A merchant summarizes in the following way the tragedies faced by farmers:

> It would be better if they did not farm. But there is also the fact that farmers have been assimilated and it is accelerated now. When Bursa started to develop westward, land in the Pištikoz district increased in value. It rose to 15-20 thousand TL while fields in the plain are worth only 3 to 5 thousand TL. Let me tell you this: If these farmers did not cultivate in the last ten years, kept their titles in a safe, were employed as wage workers, and survived without any debt, they would be much richer. We sold in the past at one or two thousand TL, now it is 10-15 thousand TL. They worked so much for the land, but in working they became extinct. (Karacabey, April 8, 2013, Appx C, 68)

However, none of this means that farmers do not react or respond to ongoing transformation. Their engagement in diversification, migration, and other maneuvering activities provide clear evidence that farmers are accommodating their strategies to new dynamics. In other words, exclusion from some practices, the intertwining of others, and high risks and uncertainty both limit their opportunities and create new spaces of activities in new locations. Farmers are maneuvering at different stages of production. For instance, they try to grow their own seeds, reduce the amount of input use, and grow small ruminants and chicken to meet some expenses. In addition, by combining informal and formal methods they juggle to rotate debt and meet the expenses of agricultural production with remittances and

retirement payment. They sell their land in secrecy because of overindebtedness, but rent it and continue cultivating as if it were their own land. Or in another example, farmers may violate the conditions of contract farming and sell the crop to an outsider at a higher price.

Consequently, as Spoor (1997) emphasizes, “the combination of multiple activities in personal and household strategies, with the interpenetration at all levels of political, social, and economic transactions means that real markets work very differently from the markets of textbooks and adjustment plans” (p.63). Inevitably, there are numerous possibilities, but recently law and standard setting and implementation restrict farmers’ maneuvering practices. On the one hand, actions that constrain rural livelihoods and especially farmers’ use and control of land are legitimized by the law. Here the linkages between local elites, bureaucracy, and the government create a network of rent. On the other hand, standardization, which is a key factor to achieving consistency in the quality, variety, and volume of the crop by strict measures, prevents farmers’ juggling practices by limiting the space for maneuvering.

The *Juggler Farmers*

Agricultural reforms have reconfigured how farmers manage their relations with the other producers, their resources and assets, and the state. Market-led economy celebrates competition, specialization, and efficiency. Farmers are expected to act like entrepreneurs in a new system free from state regulation and intervention to prices. According to experts, farming becomes too complex to manage for ordinary farmers who lack financial literacy and ultimately they need to quit agricultural production. Nevertheless, this dissertation proved that the effects of structural

reforms on agriculture and farmers are far from a simple set of inevitable outcomes. Reforms on agriculture are identified by twist and turns, threats and opportunities, and possibilities for change rather than definite consequences.

Three decades of structural adjustment in agriculture while coincident with the increasing reliance on the family as a workforce, a high degree of flexibility, intensification of domestic work, and tendency towards outsourcing and informality, have also displayed an era of struggle in farmers' daily life. Despite enhancing responsiveness of producers to macroeconomic policies and market operations, the promises of structural adjustment remain unfulfilled for the farmers. Daily routine activities and individual responses to economic difficulties are crucial to understand reactions of farmers to structural adjustment. They not only confront the existing power structures in the region but also challenge the very process of reforms and transformation. The impacts of the structural reforms such as increasing stress and conflicts within the household is leaving women and children vulnerable but opportunities are also emerging depending on the creativity, vision, and capacity of the farmers dealing with the financial bottleneck.

So far, wide-ranging effects of SAPs on rural sites and how these policies are carried on the ground were examined in this dissertation. In what follows, it is intended to entitle producers who are engaging in survival strategies to ameliorate their livelihood. As shown in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, coping strategies of the farmers varied depending on the impact of the reforms on their locality, as well as the gender and socioeconomic and political conditions. However, based on the evidence from the fieldwork in Karacabey, here it is preferred to call farmers as *juggler farmers*.[100] They are specifying existing patterns and discovering new skills

[100] The term *juggler farmers* can be translated into Turkish as *cambaz çiftçiler*.

as well, adapt their production styles to new knowledge systems and techniques, substitute one thing for another, rotate debts, and continue their lives in rural areas with their limited resources. Once they face challenges, they are trying to find a way out of it and usually learn maneuvering by experience. It is clear that the debt sways of farmers in an economic hardship are not easier than the siteswaps of jugglers.

The strength of the concept is that it goes beyond the analysis which accepts rural dwellers as inert and immobile population. Actually, producers are seeking ways to supplement livelihood strategies and household finance by using their creativity and rationality. Changing consumption patterns, decreasing input and labour use, vertical cultivation of land, non-farm and off-farm diversification, migration, rotating debt, and forming a group of guarantors have created a space for maneuvering for livelihood strategies and impacted how farmers think of an alternative. The functionality of the concept may also include informal activities and parallel economy. When farmers face contradiction, for instance they try to reproduce new varieties of seeds rather than buying from seed company, rotate debt by consulting pawnbrokers, and engage in outsider sales in contract farming if the price is higher. These are some examples of multiple-modes survival strategies and they are continuously being expanded. Finally, the concept also contributes to explain the existence of farmers despite the insistence of classical theories on the disappearance of the peasantry. These farmers are here to exist because they are struggling and reconfiguring their survival strategies as a juggler.

Suggestions for Policy Options and Further Research

The changes in the production processes and new dynamics of labour, land, financial, and commodity markets triggered by SAPs are expected to have an impact on rural

politics. However, compared to rising rural political struggles in an era of neoliberal globalization in Asia, Africa, and most explicitly in Latin America, collective action for the political implications and possibilities often remains limited in Turkey (Akram-Lodhi& Kay, 2009; Otero, 2004). This dissertation showed that rural politics can be defined by highly individualistic and formal and informal norms and activities of *juggler farmers* from production to exchange as everyday forms of struggle. But, still some examples of collective action were reported in Karacabey such as dealing together as a group of farmers for daily workers to reduce labour costs, organizing demonstrations to get their payments in contract farming, and marketing their products through development cooperative in the village. Here, the focal point is why everyday politics of *juggler farmers* cannot be mobilized into organized collective action to confront challenges they face, to develop alliances, to rise their political demands, and to alter terms and conditions governing agricultural sector.

The reason why collective action for political demands remains limited has to do with the nature of the state, society, and market relations, the political culture, and also farmers' ability to engage in collective action. At the individual level, producers' capacities and willingness to join into collective action have been diminished by the impacts of neoliberal policies that exaggerate individualism, competition, and profit. As Offe (1985) argues "from then on, they learn their lesson about rational modes of individual behaviour, not from a shared doctrine about the nature of society, but from the market" (p.213). In addition, farmers' experience to guarantorship disputes and failed attempts to act collectively to solve contract farming problems results in the loss of trust among rural dwellers in Karacabey. In consequence, farmers tend to "trust each other little and they usually fear being perceived as trusting each other too much", which remains as an obstacle to

collective action (Pieth, 2012, p.11). Finally, farmers' advanced age and lack of experience led to decrease in their motivation to be involved as decision-makers.

Meanwhile, the state and governing political parties have used their political power to control political struggles and mobilization coercively and their restrictions on the activities of opposition can be named authoritarian in Turkey. The hegemony of the state in most instances does not allow appearance of political space and opposition movement for the farmers as well. In many cases, the vertical relations and disputes between growers' unions and the government prove the continuation of traditional methods of policy making. By the way, any attempt to organize collective action for political demands has still been labeled as communist even by producers. In these circumstances, the nature of political culture and political authority keeps the possibility of the formation of collective action in rural politics limited.

As observed in this dissertation, rural transformation also brings about rent-seeking policies and new alliances between the state, local elites, and agribusiness companies especially for the control of production processes, import of commodities and inputs, and land use. The collusion of the state and corporations, corruption, networks of patronage and personal ties including global actors seem unlikely to allow local farmers to engage in conflictual struggles. Since the basic requirements for democratic system such as transparency, accountability, and legitimacy are absent in the relations between governing and the governed, the accession of farmers' demands into political system through negotiating cannot be realized.

At this point, an originative non-market governance structure such as an agricultural cooperative can provide an alternative to inadequate market relations, and can find its justification and motivation in its potential role both for democratic decision-making processes and transparent and accountable exchange relations. In

terms of wider governance conditions, farmers need more direct linkages, participation, and representation. Those responsible for monitoring the conduct of politics turn a blind eye to farmer communities, especially after structural reforms. Therefore as analysis shows "to make their voice heard will become more important as the impacts of economic reforms and globalization make themselves felt even in the most remote villages." (Deshingkar & Farrington, 2006, p.83)

What is clear is that an effective structure of the organization of cooperatives can meet the demands of social, economic, and political change. Simply, cooperatives can do more than defining parameters of survival and creating a sense of identity; such as encouraging collective action, organizing community, conveying political demands, and facilitating marketing process. However, there are many structural problems remaining as obstacles to improve organizational capacity of cooperatives. First, after structural reforms the cooperatives become incapacitated from supports and incentives which had previously been provided by the state. In addition to losing access to many state services because of increasing budget constraints, cooperatives are expected to compete in the global markets and perform as financially autonomous institutions.

Second, farmers' organizations including cooperatives, chambers of commerce and agriculture are designed in a top-down way and controlled by the local elites. The decisions are affected by agribusiness companies and farmer's institutions rarely attempt to initiate new forms of collective action. In addition, policies of structural adjustment and political constraints are imposed on the organizations by the state to prevent recurring tensions. Despite the low number of demonstrations organized by the Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey, the president of the chamber, who is a large-scale farmer, is threatened by the government by

sending tax inspectors to his enterprises after any sign of uprising (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010; Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010).

Third, farmers' past experience with corrupt cooperative officials especially during the governance vacuum in the transition period to autonomous structure results in prejudices about malfunctioning of cooperatives and farmers' institutions. Finally, producers' lack of experience in administrative procedures and managing cooperatives enables ineffective mechanisms for legal and financial frameworks. According to the president of Development Cooperative in Harmanlı, farmers would double their profit in previous year, if the cooperative officials were capable of making out an invoice (Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December, 30, 2009).

Current practices fall well short of standards of democratic governance and decision-making. Nevertheless, if farmer-led initiatives and coordination practices that put concerns of farmers at the center of their agenda and actions can be strengthened, growers' institutions can fortify their positions with collective action against the consequences of structural reforms. The examples of collective action should be shared by farmers through media to show the ability of collective action to solve socioeconomic, political, and environmental problems. This may trigger mobilization among farmers and especially encourage the formation of new institutions that support collective action to rise political demands. Farmers need to be collectively involved into decision making processes for the policies of agricultural production and rural development. Moreover, farmers' institutions can develop alliances with the non-farmer groups such as the urban working class, ecologists, women's group, and NGOs. This call for dynamic and democratic approach to rural politics can empower farmers' ability to contest the state policies by collective action rather than individual juggling practices.

Despite the fact that greater efforts need to be made to ensure the functioning of democracy for the farming communities in Karacabey, Callon *et al.* (2009) offer a dialogic democracy model which goes well beyond representative democracy.[101] As mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, in agricultural policy-making processes only experts and politicians are actively involved and the existence of the reforms' objects is ignored. Nevertheless, Callon *et al.* (2009) argue that accountable and transparent hybrid forums which are formed by experts, non-experts, ordinary citizens, and politicians are the leitmotiv of this democratization process. In rural sites, growers' organizations would provide a place for organizing forums. By the functioning of forums, scholars emphasize the importance of the process, not the decision as a finality. Until now, democracy has promoted the decision as an end, but the dialogic democracy model gives priority to confrontation, risks, uncertainties, and opposition as constructive processes in decision making.

The contribution to rural transformation literature can be to open up a new way to other researches that will go beyond conventional studies on farmers and rural societies. Micro studies in other regions of the country will enlighten dynamics of rural transformation in Turkey. There are a great many related issues that need to be investigated. The most essential one is the formation of new political economic structures over land use and control. There is a growing trend of using agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes and it is supported by the state attempts to transform illegitimate actions into legitimate ones. Therefore, the projects around Uluabat Lake combining the plan to construct a canal between the lake and the Marmara Sea, a part of the İstanbul-İzmir highway, and a complex of archeopark, amusement parks, and touristic enterprises and their effects on rural societies need to

[101] For further analysis on the functioning of democracy in Turkey and AKP's conservative democracy project see Taşkın (2008, 2013).

be interrogated.[102] In addition, the disappearance of the rural-urban divide and its reflections on the labor market, rural development plans, and social policy making is also a significant issue. Finally, new political spaces and forms of resistance emerging through NGOs and social movements can be traced in the Karacabey district. A comprehensive analysis of the changing dynamics of rural societies on the ground that involves market and non-marker actors, local and global dynamics will enlighten missing points.

[102] For an example of critical study on power relations and collective action at the Uluabat Lake, see Soylu (2010).

APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview 1: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 28, 2009.

Interview 2: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 29, 2009.

Interview 3: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, December 30, 2009 (with the president of the Harmanlı Village Agricultural Development Cooperative).

Interview 4: Karacabey, January 6, 2010 (with an agricultural technician working in The Chamber of Agriculture in Karacabey).

Interview 5: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 7, 2010.

Interview 6: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 10, 2010.

Interview 7: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 11, 2010.

Interview 8: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 11, 2010.

Interview 9: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010.

Interview 10: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010.

Interview 11: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 12, 2010.

Interview 12: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 13, 2010.

Interview 13: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 13, 2010 (with a group of women).

Interview 14: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 14, 2010 (with the headman of the village, Hüseyin Lafçı).

Interview 15: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 14, 2010.

Interview 16: Karacabey, Sultaniye village, January 21, 2010 (with a group of farmers).

Interview 17: Karacabey, Hotanlı village, January 21, 2010 (with a group of farmers).

Interview 18: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 21, 2010.

Interview 19: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, January 22, 2010.

Interview 20: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 2, 2010.

Interview 21: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 4, 2010.

Interview 22: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 4, 2010.

Interview 23: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 9, 2010.

Interview 24: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010.

Interview 25: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 10, 2010.

Interview 26: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 11, 2010.

Interview 27: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 23, 2010.

Interview 28: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 24, 2010 (with a group of farmers).

Interview 29: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 24, 2010.

Interview 30: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, February 25, 2010.

Interview 31: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 2, 2010.

Interview 32: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 3, 2010.

Interview 33: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 3, 2010.

Interview 34: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 3, 2010.

Interview 35: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 3, 2010.

Interview 36: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 4, 2010.

Interview 37: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 9, 2010.

Interview 38: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 10, 2010 (with a group of officials in the Harmanlı village Agricultural Credit Cooperative).

Interview 39: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 10, 2010.

Interview 40: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 10, 2010.

Interview 41: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 16, 2010.

Interview 42: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 17, 2010.

Interview 43: Karacabey, March 18, 2010 (with a group of migrants from Harmanlı village).

Interview 44: Karacabey, March 19, 2010 (with a dry onion merchant).

Interview 45: Karacabey, March 23, 2010 (with the president of Karacabey Plain Villages Irrigation Union and the headman of Hotanlı village Sami Özseçen).

Interview 46: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 24, 2010 (with a group of farmers).

Interview 47: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, March 24, 2010 (with a real estate agent).

Interview 48: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 14, 2010 (with two migrants).

Interview 49: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 21, 2010.

Interview 50: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 21, 2010.

Interview 51: Bursa, April 28, 2010.

Interview 52: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 28, 2010.

Interview 53: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, April 28, 2010.

Interview 54: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, May 5, 2010.

Interview 55: Bursa, Harmanlı-Der, May 8, 2010 (with a group of migrant women)

Interview 56: Karacabey, May 11, 2010 (with the former president of the Karacabey Chamber of Agriculture, Nuri Karaca).

Interview 57: Karacabey, May 11, 2010 (with a lawyer).

Interview 58: Karacabey, June 1, 2010 (with an official in Karacabey Agricultural Credit Cooperative).

Interview 59: Karacabey, June 17, 2010 (with a group of officials and lawyers in Karacabey Directorate of Bailiff and Execution).

Interview 60: Karacabey, June 21,2010 (with the General Manager of Ziraat Bank and a large-scale farmer).

Interview 61: Karacabey, The Office of Land Registry and Cadastre, June 21, 2010.

Interview 62: Karacabey, Denizbank, June 24, 2010.

Interview 63: Karacabey, Yapı Kredi Bank, June 24, 2010.

Interview 64: Karacabey, Garanti Bank, June 25, 2010.

Interview 65: Karacabey, Halk Bank, June 25, 2010.

Interview 66: Karacabey, Şeker Bank, June 25, 2010.

Interview 67: Karacabey, İş Bank, June 25, 2010.

Interview 68: Karacabey, The Office of Land Registry and Cadastre, June 30, 2010.

Interview 69: Karacabey, The Office of Land Registry and Cadastre, July 1, 2010.

Interview 70: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, May, 2012.

Interview 71: Karacabey, Harmanlı village, October 7, 2012 (with a group of women).

Interview 72: Karacabey, April 8, 2013 (with a grain merchant).

Interview 73: Karacabey, Matlı Company, April 8, 2013.

Interview 74: Bursa, April 11, 2013 (with a lawyer).

Interview 75: Bursa, Court House, The Office of Chief Executive, April 11, 2013.

Interview 76: Karacabey, The Directorate of Bailiff and Execution, April 12, 2013

Interview 77: Karacabey, The Office of Land Registry and Cadastre, April 12, 2013.

Interview 78: Bursa, The Office of Land Registry and Cadastre , April 12, 2013.

Interview 79: Bandırma, Banvit Company, December 4, 2013 (via e-mail).

APPENDIX B

GUIDING QUESTIONS IN INTERVIEWS

1- How long have you been living in this village?

2- Is there any family member living outside the village? If yes, where?

3- What are your sources of income?

4- How many decares of land are you cultivating? Do you own the land or rent?

5- Do you produce for your own consumption?

6- What do you think about state support policies?

7- What are your new livelihood strategies?

8- Why did dry onion production reduce dramatically in Karacabey?

9- Was dry onion produced also for export markets?

10- Have you ever engaged in contract farming? If yes, have you ever had problems?

11- Did you sell your land? What do you think about increasing land sales in Karacabey?

12- What is the most significant problem in agricultural production?

13- What are the consumption strategies of the household?

14- How do changing agricultural policies affect inequalities between poor and rich farmers?

15- Have you ever launch for credit from commercial banks? Can you meet financial obligations?

16- Can you save money?

17- Do you employ daily and seasonal workers?

18- What kind of seeds do you prefer?

19- What is the role of the Chamber of Agriculture in social mobilization and political organization of the farmers?

20- Is there any example of collective action in the village?

21- What do you think about Kurdish migrants in the village? How are your relations?

22- Do rural dwellers help for the poor people living in the village?

23- Do new production methods increase environmental pollution?

24- What do you think about the agricultural policies of the state? What kind of policies do you expect?

APPENDIX C

THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE TRANSLATED QUOTES

1. “Kahvede anlatırım, 870 kg susuz mısır aldım, kumlu yerden. Gencin birisi ‘Biçilirken ben orada olmasaydım, inanmazdım’ dedi. Ben susuz ekmişim, ‘Nasıl yaptın amca?’ de. Benim gönlüm ister komşum da üç beş fazla ürün alsın. Neden bu gençler bu kadar gevşek? Gençler nasıl yapıyor biliyor musun? Baharda toprak tavlanıyor, alıyor traktörü. Pırpırla gübreyi atıyor. İki makine ekiyor. Hadi bana Allahaısmarladık. Nasıl olursa olsun. Bırakıyor. Motorun ayak basmadığı yer kalmıyor. Toprak taş gibi oluyor. Sonra bir kuraklık… Mısırın yaprağı buruluyor kuraktan, sıcaktan. Allah yağmur verirse [ericek] mahsule faydalı olacak. Karık çeker, sular. Fayda ederse. Ben nasıl yaptım. Toprağı karıştırdım, alt üst yaptım. Çalışacaksın!”

2. “Soğan ekerken arpacıktan ekiliyorsa dönümüne 70 kg arpacık tohumu. 150 milyon [150 TL]tohum bedeli. Tohumdan ekersen 1kg-700gr dönümüne. Bunun da maliyeti 40 milyon [40 TL].”

3. “Mısır ekiyoruz, bütün işi traktörle yapıyoruz. Bir kişi 80 dönüm mısırla baş edebilir. Ama domatese gelince dönümüne 2-3 kişi koyuyorsun. Maliyet yükseliyor. Maliyeti düşürmek için herkes döndü buğdaya, mısıra. Nohut da zirai araçla ilaçla yetişir.”

4. “Aile işçiliği ve gündelik işçi de çalışıyor. Karacabey’den. Bundan 15-20 sene önce her gün 20 kişi işçi getiriyordum. Ama şimdi oraya ben gidip gelemem her gün, işçi almayı bırak. Eskiden mevsimlik kalmaya da işçi geliyordu.”

5. “Bölgeden kalkan bir ürünün başka ürünlere de yansıması oluyor. Mesela pamuk bitti, Ege Bölgesi pamuk ekerken hadi onlar başladı domates ekmeye. Bu bölgenin

de çok. Fabrikaların pazarlık etme şansı yükseliyor. Beyaz köpeğin pamuk pazarına zararı oluyor. Onlar ekti mi biz ekemiyoruz. Bu gidişle domates de biter, mısır da biter."

6. "Buğday ektik; su çıktı ovaya; onlar bozuldu. 700 lira dönüme masraf yapıyorsun. Onlar gitti. 100-200 lira daha masraf yapacağız şimdi. Suyu burada toplamak devletin politikası. Setler yapıldı; su burada toplanıyor bizim kaderimize. Yoksa Kemalpaşa'ya kadar her yer sular altında kalırdı."

7. "Bizi bitiren mazot. Ben artık gübreyi de bir kenara çekiyorum. 30 [atçağıma] 15 atarım. İşi götürürüm. Lakin şu traktörün mazotu olmadığı zaman her şey durdu demektir. Çünkü traktöründe mazot olmadığı zaman hiçbir yere gidemezsin. Ne sulayabilirsin, ne sürersin, ne ızgara yapabilirsin. Kendin aç da olsan traktörün karnı doyacak."

8. "Babanızın yeri var. Baban rahmetli olmuş. Fakat amcanlarla, halanlarla, dayınlarla paylaşılmamış yer. Dedenin üzerine gözüküyor, sen icara veriyorsun, sen bana icar şeyi veremiyorsun. 110-120 dönüme karşı 19 dönümden alıyorum. 100 dönümden alamıyorum. Alacağın kişinin kendinde dahi yok. Haşime Yenge mesela, Haşime Yenge'nin üzerine değil yerler. Karı 85 yaşında. Babasının üzerine yerler. Bir de 'Yenge imza ver' desem, 'Bu benim tarlaları mı üzerine geçirecek?' der. Yaşlı insana dert anlatmak çok zor."

9. "Marmara Bölgesini üçe ayırmışlar. Bir ürün belirleyecekmiş. Ona destek verecek diğerlerine destek vermeyecek. Nasıl [kazanıcam] ben? Zeytin her zaman düzgün ürün vermiyor ki. Ovayı su basıyor, mecbursun yazlık ürün ekmeye. Şimdi mesela ova göl gibi oldu. Bunun için bir şey yapmıyorlar. Ova köylerine su baskını olur diye burasını su havzası olarak belirlemişler. Su burada birikiyor. Burada köylere bir zarar

vermediği için. Çok kişinin su içinde malını alamadı. Mısır, karnabahar, buğday hepsi gitti."

10. "Tarımda büyük işletmelere çok büyük destekler veriliyor; muafiyetlerden istifade ediyorlar. Fakat bizim çiftçimizin ve hayvancımızın birikimi olmadığı için bu paraların hepsi bizim sektör dışından gelen dövizciye, üçkağıtçıya verilebiliyor. Bunlar sıkıntı çekmek istemedikleri için ufacık bir krizde kapatıyorlar ağılları, çiftlikleri terk ediyorlar. Kazanç amaçlı girmiyorlar. Tamamen teşviklerden yararlanmak amaçlı giriyorlar. Hayvancılık işini ilerletmek isteyenlere verilsin. Ama büyük holdinglere veriliyor. Çiftçinin hayatını kurtaracak destek bir tane holdinge veriliyor. Bunlar çok yanlış politikalar. Bu işleri uygulamadan gelen insanların bulunduğu topluluklarda çözebilirsiniz."

11. "Senede1-2 milyar destek alıyoruz ama hep de büyükler kapar işi. Küçüklere kalmıyor. Büyük şirketler mesela hiç kendi uğraşmaz; adamları gider, orada işi bitirir. Biz gidince 'Senin' diyor; 'Yem kulak numarası noksan' diyor; 'Ankara'ya gitmemiş' diyor; 'Bursa'da onaylamamışlar' diyor. Bir sürü şeyler çıkarıyorlar."

12. "Ne kadar sözleşme yapsan da sözleşmeler bizden yana değil fabrikalardan yana olur. Uzun uzadıya yazılar vardır küçük harfle. Bunu okumaya bizim zamanımız elverişli değildir. İmzalarsın fakat sözleşmeler hep tek taraflı. Sorun yaşamasam da çevredekiler yaşar. Domates ekenler çok yaşadı. Domatesin çok para yaptığı dönemde mesela dışarıya verdiler. Fabrika bunları mahkemeye verdi. 7 şer milyar tazminat. Ova köylerinde çok oldu. Ziraat odalarına herkes toplanıp gidecek. Ziraat odaları bizim adımıza taahhüt verecek. Her köyün ne kadar alan ekmesini belirleyecek, hane başına hesaplayacak, Bizde maalesef bu yok hata bizde."

13. "3 dönüm yer ektik. 16 ton kotam vardı. 23 780 kilo yaptı. 100 liraya vereceğime 22, 5 liraya verdim. 90 lirada 4 te 1 ödediler, 22,5 lira. 7 ton 7,5 ton pancar benim

100 bin liraya [100 TL] geldi. 100 bin liraya [100 TL] o pancarı ben söktüremem. Adam 10 dönüm domates [ekecem] diyor; 100 ton yapar diyor. 120 ton yaparsa 20 tona 100 lira yerine 20 lira ödüyor. Sözleşmeli olduğun için başka yere veremiyorsun, ceza yiyiyorsun. Senet imzalıyorsun karşıya. Pancara herkes neden hizmet ediyoruz çok olsun çok para kazanalım diye. 1 kere fazla suladık, hava şartlarından dolayı geç söküm yaptık. 1 ton pancar yağıştan dolayı 1 haftada 100 ton [kg] 150 ton [kg] fark yapıyor. 10 ton bir hafta toprakta durursa 11 tona çıkıyor. Kotayı tespit [edemiyon]. Hava kurak olursa 10 ton [yapçağına] 8 ton yapıyor. Yağış olursa 12 ton oluyor. 100 ton kotan varsa 20 ton boşuna gidiyor. Ondan bıraktık."

14. "Peşin para diye verdik domatesleri alamadık. Almaya gittik müdür vardı Süleyman Bey. Sabah erkenden gittik. Adam almış simidini eline geliyor. Dedik 'Para almaya geldik'. 'Yok' dedi 'Para veremem'. Dedim 'Basını çağıracağım', 'Git' dedi 'Ne yaparsan yap', laubali bir şekilde. Ben de bir gazeteciyi tanıyordum İbrahim Bursalı. 15 dakikada geldi. Fabrikanın önüne dikildik. Müdür çıktı, söz verdi. Bir hafta içinde köylü parasını aldı. Hemen herkesi içeri topladılar. Kura çektiler, her köyün parasını 1 haftada ödediler. Çiftçiyi zayıf görüyorlar."

15. "300 tondan fazla domates ürettim Vatan'a. İtalyanlarla anlaşma yapmış, sonra ters düştük. Oradan imzalı kağıt verecek öyle topluyorsun. Ben kağıdı istemeye gittim. 'Çavuşu [göndericem], o size getirir' dedi. Zamanı geçmesin diye topladık. 'Yok', dedi 'Sen kağıtsız toplamışsın', almadı. Gittim Beytaş'a. O da 'Kutu yok' dedi. Çanakkale'ye domates sevkiyatı yapılacaktı; piyasadan 10 *kuruş* eksik anlaştık. Ertesi gün tartışma oldu Karacabeylilerle. Aldım domatesi Çingençeşme'ye dökerim diye Vatan'ın önünden geçerken baktım ıslık sesleri düdük sesleri. Girdim. 'Ne kadar domatesin var daha?', '100 tondan fazla var' dedim. 'Döker misin?', 'Dökerim' dedim. 'Sonra ödemeyi peşin alırsın', dediler. Bir baktım kantarın üzerinde ödemeler

bitmiştir diyor. Ne olacak şimdi? Kenen Evren'e mektup yazdım oradan Sanayi Bakanlığı'na gitmiş. Cevap geldi: Karacabey'de en adil konserve Vatan. En yakın zamanda ödenecek. Halbuki ödediği yok. 2 sene ödenmedi; o parayı da enflasyon yedi."

16. "Fabrikalar yazdılar çizdiler, biz çiftçiler zavallı bastık imzayı. Tek taraflı. Fabrikalar odalarla birlikte oturur. Oda arabuluculuk yaptı. Fakat fabrikalar iptal etti, 'Ekmeyin' dedi. Biz cahiliz çiftçiler. Arka kapıdan başkalarına sattılar. Kimi gitti gece çavuşu yatağından kaldırdı, 'Ben de [ekicem]', dedi. Birlik yok, altta kalanın canı çıksın."

17. "Fabrikaya gitmiştik konferans vardı fiyat açıklandı. O gün 75 bin lira demişlerdi. Dışarı çıkıldı Ziraat odaları biz ekmiyoruz dedi toplu karar alındı. Ziraat odası çevresindekilerin hepsi büyük çiftçi bugün batan çiftçiler. Hotanlı Kazarlar, Sultaniye Altıparmaklar. Bunlar 'Biz ekmiyoruz' dediler. 'Kimse de ekmesin' dediler. Ekmiyoruz tamam. Oradan sonra fabrikalar taahhüt almaya geldiler. Kahvede konuşulan ben ekmiyorum sen de ekme o da ekmesin. Taahhüt almaya gelince herkes arkasını döndü bir yandan da diğerlerini kolluyor. İnsanlar gitse de taahhüt versin diye. Kimse ekmeyecek pahalı olacak çünkü."

18. "Organik, organik tarım da niye madem ithal kullananlar şimdi yerli tohum arıyorlar? O kadar aldatmaca ki. Ben organik tarıma karşı değilim. Yabancılar bize satmaya çalışıyor bu zoruma gidiyor benim. Madem organik tarım diyorsun ki neden o zaman İsrailliler bizim yerli buğday tohumlarını topluyor. Kimseye para vermediler, '[Bi] kapak buğday verir misin?' dediler. Aldılar onları tohum bankalarına kendi çeşitleri gibi organik tarım için sattılar. Bu zoruma gidiyor benim. Bize bizi satıyorlar."

19. “Çok verim alma telaşına girdiler, toprağa çok yüklendiler. Yeni sisteme de ayak uydurmada da çiftçi yalnız kaldı. Teknik yönden yalnız kaldı. Teknoloji yalnız çok verim almak, çok gübre atmak, çok sulamak değil. Orada çok büyük yanlışlıklar yapıldı. Oradaki sorunların ilk başlangıcı yeni teknolojiye ayak uydurulamaması. Bölgemize has değerler hemen unutulup eski değerler yok sayıldı; yeni teknolojilere, yabancı menşeli ürünlere bir kurtarıcı gözüyle bakıldı. Hızlı bir geçiş yapıldı, alt yapısı düşünülmeden yapıldı. Bugün Karacabey’de üretilen Karacabey’e has bir ürünümüz kalmadı.”

20. “Sanki bizim üretim sorunumuz varmış gibi bir yalan ortaya attılar. Bu yalanı ilk çözen insanlardan biriyimdir. Domates dönümüne 10 tonluk verimi 15 tona çıkarınca refahın artacağını düşündüler. Aslında büyük bir balondu; patladı; iflasa götürdü insanları. Örgütlenmemiş bir toplumu (demokratik değil, sivil toplum yok) fazla üretim yaptırırsanız size patlar. Çok fazla üretim karşılığında mal sürüyorsunuz piyasaya bu sefer kendi ürettiğiniz malın fiyatı düşüyor.”

21. “Optimum, optimal işletme büyüklükleri. Ama Türkiye’yi kendi şartlarında ele almak lazım. Bir Almanya’da Fransa’da uygulanan modeller Türkiye’de uygulanamaz. Çünkü Türkiye’de tarımın en büyük katkısı istihdam yaratması. Şimdi Fransa’da optimum işletme sayısı 120 baş diyor. Ama bizde böyle bir şeye ihtiyaç yok. Evde 2-3 inek bakan kadın bile çoluk çocuğuna bakabiliyor, geçiniyor. Bu açıdan bakmak lazım.”

22. “Çiftçinin azaltmanın yolunu bence Tayyip bulmuş. Elek mi diyorlar, eleğe atıyor aşağı düşecekler düşecek. Adama sen çiftçiliği bırak desen bana başka bir iş ver der değil mi? Ama elekten düşünce ne diyecekler biliyor musun domatesten iyi verim alamamış, mısırdan iyi verim alamamış.”

23. “Ben bir kere Ankara’ya gittim, resmen kavga ettim. Salça ihracatı üzerine toplantı var. Adam çıktı; yarım saattir istatistik, istatistik okuyor. Rakamlar, artık şaşı oldum; resmen uykum geldi, uyudum. Dedim ‘Valla beni çok güzel uyuttunuz, beni ne yapmaya çağırdınız?’. Siz rakamlarla konuşuyorsunuz, gerçekleri hiç konuşmadınız. Bir tanesine zaten takıldım çok havalı. Dedim ‘Ben bir şey [sorucam]. Briks ne demek?’, salça ile ilgili konuşuluyor. Adam kem küm etti, bilmiyor. Dedim ‘Salçadan konuşuyorsunuz bunları bilmiyorsunuz’. ‘Ben sizinle konuşmam’ dedim.”

24. “Bereket sermayeli çalışıyoruz… Örnek veriyim şu anda gübre 35 lira, ben aldım 31 liraya 4 ton. 200 torba yapar. 5 lira torba başına kar yaptım. 1 milyar hemen gübreden alırken. Mazotu da aynı şekilde. Paran yoksa vadeli alıyorsun. 3 bin liralık mazota, 3300 ödüyorsun. Ben 3 bin liralık mazotu 2900’e alıyorum. Ne oluyor, 400 lira kar ediyorum, 3 ton mazotta 1 milyar 200 [1200 TL]. 1 milyar [1000 TL]gübreden yaptım, 1 milyar [1000 TL] mazottan. Gübre ve ilaçtan da yapabilirim. Ne oluyor aşağı yukarı %10 bize yansıyor peşin çalışmamızın şeyi. 25-27 ton buğday var elde. Bu 400 bin liraydı [40 *kuruş*]. Şu anda 570 lira [57 *kuruş*]. 170 lira [17 *kuruş*] 10 tonda 1 milyar 700 [1700 TL]. 25 tonda aşağı yukarı 4 milyar [4000 TL]. Öbürkü harmanda sattı 400 liraya [40 *kuruş*] gücü yok. Borcu için. Ben 4 milyar [4000 TL] buğdaydan kazandım. 2 milyar [2000 TL] da mısırdan diğer mahsullerden kazandım. 6-7 milyar [6000-7000 TL]. Gübre, mazot, ilaç… 10 milyar [10 000 TL] kazandım. Zaten 30 milyar [30 000 TL]ciro yapsak 10 milyarı [10 000 TL] kazandım. 10 milyar [10 000 TL]da 25 ton buğday eder hasatta. 45 lira, 55 lira sulaması. Parayı peşin verirsen %20 iskonto yaparım, diyor. 11 lira az ödedim. 44 lira diğerleri 55’ten ödedi. Daha ödeyemezsen 65 lira. Biri 45 lira biri 65. Fark 20 lira 3’te bir. 3 milyar [3000 TL] parada 1 milyar [1000 TL] eder. Ben 3 milyar [3000

TL] ödüyorsam sen 4 milyar [4000TL] ödüyorsun demektir. Hep oradan kazanıyorsun. Sermaye yoksa kazanamazsın… Sermayeyi sıfırladın mı bittin."

25. "Ben 2005'e kadar para kazandım. Arabayı 2005'te aldım. 2000lerde Ankara'da ev öderken üç dönüm domates evin bir senelik ödeme parasını çıkardı. Hani bunun mısırı şeyi? Çok güzel para kazanıyordum, rahattım. 2005'ten bu yana hepten bitti. Ekip dikiyordum, seneye param da kalıyordu, şimdi kışı çıkamıyoruz. Bizim girdiler çok pahalı, sattığımız ürün çok ucuz. Mazot 3 milyon [3 TL], mısır hala 300 [30 *kuruş*] 2000'den beri. Ben 10 sene önce mazotu 700 bin [70 *kuruş*] liraya yakıyordum. Pancar 50 *kuruş*, gübrenin torbası 6 lira 10 liraydı. Şimdi bir torba gübre 50 milyon [50 TL], pancar 80 *kuruş*. Hani bunun işçisi artı bir de sulama parası? Mazot 3 milyon [3 TL] yaptın yap, 4 yap, benim malımı da 1 milyon [1 TL] yap. Ama nasıl oluyor, benim ki 100 *kuruş* [10 *kuruş*] onunki 3 lira? Bu denge nasıl sağlanacak?"

26. "Köylü şöyle ayakta duruyor: Ben şimdi mısırı kaça sattım, 350-360 [35-36 *kuruş*]'a sattım. Ben mısır sattım diye 100 lirayı o cepten bu cebe koymuş değilim. Neden? Fite fit geldi. Buğday parası yaz sulamasına gidiyor. Arpacık biraz para yaptı; te onla kışı çıkmaya uğraşıyorum. Yoksa arpacık da 200 lira [20 *kuruş*] yapsaydı bir şeyler [düşüncektik]. Çoluk çocuk okuyorsa bir şeyler yapmak zorundasın."

27. "Geceleyin arazi zannedersin bir şehir. Traktörlerle sulamada gece çalışıyordu. Ürün para yaptığı zaman teşvik oluyor topluma. Gece dahi çalışır."

28. "Köylerden göç, özellikle bizim köyümüzden 1985'te başladı. O tarihlerde çobanlık yapan veya çiftçilikle meşgul olan, ailede iki kardeş, üç kardeş bir arada olan insanlar TOFAŞ'ta çalışacağız diye birileri onları buradan aldılar götürdüler. Nereye kadar sürdü belli değil. Krizler nedeniyle, bazıları devamsızlık yüzünden

işten çıktı…1985'ten bu yana kimse kalmıyor. 75 doğumluyum, biz okula giderken 16 kişi erkektik, kızları bırak, bir ben kaldım. 76'lılardan üç kişi var. Bizden sonra hiç yok, taa 84'e kadar. 84 doğumlulardan bir kişi. 60-75 yaş insanlar hane dolduran insanlar. Onların da bazıları yalnız yaşıyor. Sonuçta insanlar istese de istemese de kazanmadığı bir işi yapmıyorlar. Çocuklarına da yaptırmak istemiyorlar."

29. "Zor durumda kalırsak düşünürüz. Tarlamızı sattık, evimizi sattık, ne yaparız? Nereye [gidecez]? Çocuklarımızın yanlarına gideriz. Çok fazla göç eden var, olmaz mı? Şu evde bizim sağımız solumuz karşımız boş. Hepsi göçtü. Bu arada kimse kalmadı. Ben 1955 doğumluyum bizden sonra köyde kalan çok az. Bizden önce adamın iki evladı varsa biri kalıyordu. Ama bizden sonra herkes kaçıyor. Ama okuyor, ama çalışıyor. Para getirse kalırlar."

30. "Benim yaşamam mucize ama eşim aile bütçesine katkıda bulunmak için gündüz çocuk bakıyor. Para kazansak buna gerek olmayacak. Bunlar ayakta kalmanın yolları. Kendi işimi yapacak kadar kaynak makinem var aşağıda. Çay, kahve paramı çıkarır. Hayvan bakma yerim müsait değil. Devlet bana bir çivi vermedi daha. Çalışan ceza görüyor bu memlekette. Çalışmayan devlete sırtını yaslar. Ama koşullar çok [ağar]. Çocukları okuttuk. Toprağa yatırım yapacağına çocuklara yatırım yaptık, eğitime yatırım yaptık."

31. "Ek birkaç gelirimiz var ama çiftçilikten zarar ediyoruz. Öbür yaptığımız işlerden 3 kuruş kazansak da, o da buraya gidiyor. Ekmeye devam ediyoruz, babadan kalma toprak var, traktör var. Daha çok insanlardan sıkıldığımız için de ekiyoruz. 'Bak, bak! Falanca yerlerini ekemedi; boş kaldı.' diyecek diye. Başka iş yapıyorum, tarlaları kiraya versem köylü bana çeşitli şeyler söyler. Her düzenimiz var; bunlar varken de çalışmamız lazım, ama kar ama zarar. Sonuç olarak çiftçilikten zarar ediyoruz."

32. “Alıyorsun kooperatiften borçlanıyorsun, ödeyemiyorsun. Bir takla attırdın mı, bir daha tarla satmadan olmuyor. Köylünün işi çok kötü. Ben bıraktım, yerlerin hepsi boş. Eksem zarar [edicem]. Servis işi çıktı, Hastavuk’ a. Yengen de Hastavuk’ta. 2-3 sene oldu bırakalı. Ektim, ektim bir şey kazanamadım. Zaten buğday, arpacık; o kadar ekiyorduk. Yengen de çalışıyor kim yapacak? Kimi yerleri icara verdim damada. Kalsın isterse hepsi boş. Borçlandıktan sonra kıymeti yok. Buğday Ecevit’in zamanından beri aynı. [Artçağına] düşüyor. Yapılacak gibi değil çiftçilik.”

33. “Domates ekiyoruz, grup kuruyoruz, 25 kişi. Beraber hareket ediyoruz. Aynı taahhüdü veriyoruz. Toplu işçi getiriyoruz. Üç gün senin, beş gün benim domatesi topluyor. Pancarda da aynısını yapıyoruz. Daha faydalı.”

34. “Yazın 2500-3000 kişi buradan ekmek yiyor. Ben orta halli çiftçiyim 150-200 milyar [bin TL] işçi parası veriyorum. Bir fabrikanın yıllık işçiye ödediği paraya yakın, 5-10 kişi çalıştıran bir fabrikanın. Bunlar bizi yok etmeye uğraşıyorlar. Balıkesir, Çanakkale [ağarlıklıydı], şimdi 4-5 senedir Doğu’dan daha çok var. Doğu’dan gelenler tercih ediliyor çünkü parayı hemen istemezler. Mayıs ayında bir geliyorlar, Ekim ayında kaçıyorlar. Bu süre içinde toplu para istemiyorlar. Buradakiler şimdiden anlaşacaksın kaporayı vereceksin. Manyaslılar işçi evinde kalır, fazlalık boş evlerde. Ayrıca herkesin bahçesinde bir iki oda vardır. Ben fazla getirdim, araziye koydum. Elektrik, suyu var.”

35. “Bu köyde kaç tane işçi çalışıyor biliyor musun? O zaman bu toprakların yine hepsi ekilirdi, ama tüm köy çalışırdı. Yabancı işçi 50-60 kişi gelirdi. Şimdi 1500 tane işçi geliyor dışarıdan. Bu köyde üretilen tüm katma değeri alıp gidiyor sezon sonu. Başkasına iş sağlıyoruz kendimize iş yaratamıyoruz. Bu da neyle ilgili? Sosyal refah seviyesi artınca çocukları dışarıya okumaya gönderiyorsun, kızlarımız narin oluyor tarlada çalışmaya uygun değil, tarıma heveslenmiyorlar, yaşam modelleri tarımla

ilgili yaşam modellerine uymuyor, tarlaya getiremiyorsun, delikanlıyı da getiremiyoruz. Bu sefer ne yapıyor? Tarımda çalışacak insan olmadığı için bizim yaptığımız işi çok iyi bilmeyen Güneydoğu'dan gelen işçiler katma değeri alıyor… Onu getiriyorsun bir çadırın içine kapatıyorsun, 8-10 kişi bir arada. Duşu yok, suyu muyu yok. O sana ne kadar tarlada faydalı olur, onun hesabını sen yap. Manzara bu."

36. "Çiftçiliği bırakanlar Karacabey'e gidiyor, Bursa'ya gidiyor. Orada da bir şey yapamıyorsun, yaş gitmiş artık. Fabrikaya giremezsin. Orada burada seyyar satıcılık yapsan onu yapamıyorsun. Ziyan zebil oluyor başka bir yolu yok. Yahut da köyde adam çalıştıranlara yevmiye ile gidiyor."

37. "60 -70 tane çocuğumuz köyden gitti. Kimi asgari ücret çalışıyor, kimi iş buldu, kimi günlük çalışıyor, iş bulursa gidiyor. Bursa'da üç kişi beş kişi odalarda yaşıyor. Hepsi bekar, evlenen bile yok içlerinde…"

38. "Oturduğun çekyatlar kaç senelik haberin var mı? Bu sene aldım bak bunları. Geçen seneden biraz arpacık kaldı; 3,5 TL olunca arpacık sattım. İki tane aldık. Bunlar yeni geldi. Üçüncüyü yapamadım."

39. "Bakkalda 15 milyar [bin] alacak var, tek şahısta 3 milyar [bin] alacak var. Köylü borç batağında bazı vatandaşlarda kahve borcu bile var. "

40. "Ödüm kopuyor Karacabey'de gezerken biri çağırır kefil yaparsa, ödeyemezse, benim malım giderse diye. Kefillik sisteminin değişmesi lazım. Borcu olan adamın malı var, borcu ödemiyor, kefilin malına el konuluyor. Senin traktörün var, tarlan var. Ben sana kefil olmuşum, benim traktörümü alıyor. Köyde de gruplaşma oldu. Kendi aranda 1. dereceden yakına güveniyorsan kefil olursun, başkasını almazsın. … Sen çağırıyorsun kömüre kefil olur musun diyorsun. Ama oraya gidince imzayı atınca gübre de çıkıyor, tohum da çıkıyor. 200 lira oluyor 2 bin. Kabul etmeyince de

‘200 TL kömür için de mi hatırım yok?’, diyor. Oradan da millet korkuyor, sonra da kafasını çeviriyor.”

41. “Bankaları zengin ediyoruz. Hizmetkar olduk hepimiz bankalara. Kapıda birbirimizi çiğniyoruz bankalara girerken. Kuyruk, kredi kuyruğu. Ödeme [icralan]. Alamıyoruz ki ürettiğimizin karşılığını daha fabrikalarda alacağımız duruyor. Günü kurtarmak için o bankadan alıp diğer bankaya yatırıyoruz. Mecburuz. Bankalar arası transfer uzmanı olduk mecburen. Çünkü borcumuzu ödeyemediğimiz zaman ertesi sene bankayla bir işin oldu mu kırmızı kalem yediğinde bankadan da kredi [alamıcan].”

42. “Yine Karacabey’in bir köyünde 65 bin liraya alınan bir traktör. Vadeli 5 yıl. Peşinat 265 model Massey Ferguson verilerek, sonunda da taksitleri ödeyemeyerek 18 bin liraya Karacabey İcra Dairesi’nde traktör satıldı. 18 bin TL. 12 bin eski traktör diyelim, 18 bin de bu, 30 bin lira. Geriye 35 bin lira daha borcu kaldı. Hala borcu ödenmedi, faiz de devam ediyor. İlk peşinat olarak verdiği traktör normalde çok kaliteli bir traktör, fakat ikna etme traktör bayilerinin ve fabrikalarının, artı 65 bin lirayı ödeyecek bir ürün çıkaramama…”

43. “Ben ne bileyim ama ben şu anda gelse bir tane eşya bile çıkarttırmam, içeri dahi sokmam. Ama girmezlermiş, dışarıda alacak şey varsa içeri giremezlermiş. Benim dışarıda ilaç makinaları var, su motoru var. Römorku alsınlar gitsinler. Ama ben bilmediğim için ben korktum zaten…O gece pancar parası geldi ama kıymeti yok. Ver benim pancar paralarımı zamanında ben de kapatayım borçlarımı.”

44. “Faizlerinden de kimse bir şey anlamıyor, hesap yapamıyor. Ben 3 lira almışım, 6 lira öde diyor. Hadi ben cahilim, öğretmen dahi hesabını yapamıyor. Sulama Birliğinin hadi belli, ilk baştan diyor ki dönümü 70 [milyon] TL. Ekim 75 TL, Kasım 80 TL; beş beş artar. Kooperatifi hesaplayamıyoruz. Birinden [bir milyar] 1000 TL

fazla para almış. Hesap, hesap adam [bir milyar] 1000TL fazla ödediğini bulmuş. Fark edemezsem ne olacak? Bu parayı kim yiyor hiç belli değil. Millet bıraktı orasını."

45. "Çiftçinin kuruluşları bize devletten daha fazla dert açtı. Kooperatifler bizden aldığı katılım paylarıyla büyüyor dev oluyor… 8 yıl önce tarım krediler kazandığı parayı halka toplantı yapıyor döndürelim bu karı. Yüzde oranında ya da çalıştığı oranda kar payı dağıtalım mı diyordu. Artık bunu kimse sormuyor toplanıyor paralar, genel merkezde inşaat yapılıyor… Gelin Sulama Birliği'nin Karacabey'de yaptığı işlere bakın. Beni icraya veriyor, traktörleri alıyor, tarlaları alıyor, bankalarda hesapları bloke ediyor. 5,5 [trilyon] milyon alacak, 1,8 [trilyon] milyonu anapara, kalanı faiz. Şimdi bakın bizi hükümet mi batırmış bunlar mı batırmış."

46. "Çalışmalar 4-5 senedir iyi. Öncesinde %180'le borç ödedim. Yöneticilerin vurgunu. Elim iki yakasında. Çağıracaktın müfettişi kontrol ettirecektin. 40 kişiye yemek verdi. Kim rapor tutacak, nasıl şikayet edeceksin?"

47. "Borç içinde satmak zorunda. 7-8 yıl önce bu iktidardan önce toprak satışı bu kadar fazla değildi. 2,5 milyara [2500 TL] dönümü tarla satılıyor. Çiftçi bunu alamıyor. Yer satılıyor, ben alamıyorum, gücüm yok. Geliyor bir emlakçı alıyor, dışarıdan alıyor. Zenginler alıyor. Acaba para eder mi diye bekletiyorlar. Kimi bahçe yapıyor, kimi hayvancılık. Tarımla uğraşan alamıyor."

48. "Yani sen kim olursan ol. Sen Yunanlı mısın, İsrailli misin veya sen kimin adına çalışıyorsun hiç önemli değil yani. Mesela geçen yıl Karacabey sanayisinde konuşuyoruz bir abiyle. İnternette merak ettim diyor. Bizim Bandırmaya doğru giderken Tiranlar köyü var. Orada bir şirket arazi aldı. Şirketin diyor adresine girdim. Şirketin ilk adresi İstanbul. İstanbul ama yine de İstanbul'daki şirketin bağlı olduğu bir şirket daha var. Yani orası bir şube. Esas ana şirkete gitmeye tekrar adrese girdim

Yunanistan çıktı karşıma. Yunanistan'da bir şirket devlete bağlı, nasıl bir DSİ gibi veya buna benzer bir KİT anlamında bir şirkete bağlı. Buraya bir şube açmış. Şube de gelmiş burada yer alıyor."

49. "Biz de toprak sattık. Yakın köyden biri aldı, ziraatla uğraşan. Sonradan öğrendik ki; birileri tarafından birilerine alınıyormuş. Bu alan kişiler, kendileri perde arkasında kalıp onla muhatap olacak aracı gibi birileri. Kendi paraları olup da alanlar değil. Sonradan onlara devrediliyor. Siyasetle uğraşan politikayla içli dışlı olanlar alıyor. Devletin sağladığı avantajlardan yararlanıyor. Kredi alıp farklı birimlerde kullanıyorlar. Almadan önce Ankara'dan toprakla ilgili planları takip edip bürokratlar siyasetçiler yönlendiriliyor. Kamulaştırma olursa yarın öbür gün 1 liraya aldığını 3 liraya devlet alıyor; 2 lira kar yapıyor."

50. "Fabrikalara verdiler gitti yerler. Mesela Unakıtan zamanında kurak arazileri topladı. 1 liralık araziyi 5 liraya aldı. 250 lira destek aldı, zeytin ekti. Benim niyetim vardı zeytin ekmek için, ben o desteği alamadım. Ne oldu bir de arazi değerlendi. Öyle 10 bin-20 bin-30 bin dönüm arazi… Matlı. Hep devletin destekledikleri. Unakıtan'ın çocuğuyla bunlar Marmara'ya sahip olurlar."

51. "Tarım arazilerinde müthiş bir katliam. Gelecek olan İzmir yolu bunların oraya pislikten başka hiçbir şey bırakmayacak. Muazzam derecede egzoz, adam suyunu içecek onu atacak, çocuğun bezini değiştirecek onu atacak, sigarasını [bi] atacak belki yangına sebebiyet verecek, pislikten başka hiçbir faydası olmayacak. O kadar tarım arazisine de ama direkler üzerinde ama yatay zarar verecek. Onun etrafında yetişen domatesi çünkü havadan ve topraktan ne alırsa bitki onu taşıyor üstünde."

52. "Tüccar benim malımı römorkta görüyor, beğenmiyor fiyatı düşürüyor. Büyük çiftçi koyuyor depoya, tüccar adama diyor: Abi ne istiyorsun? Arada 500 lira fark

oluyor. Pazarlık şansı var. Ben ektiğim gibi borçluyum. Daha kıştan buğdayımı satıyorum. Köylünün durumu bu."

53. "Devlet kanalıyla adam gidiyor ben diyor iş adamıyım, şirketim var; ben diyor kredi alacam devletten. Ne yapacaksın bu krediyle, işte insanlara istihdam [yaratacam]. Ne kadar güzel bir gözlem ama bir bakıyorsun ki iki tane bina dikiyorsa iki tane de gemi getiriyor ve yine devletten kredi alıyor. Ben diyor devletten ithalat yapıyorum diyor. Bunun dönüşte ihracata döndüreceğim diyor yine kredi alıyor. Bu krediyi böyle kolaylaştırırsanız doğal olarak bu insanlar da bu işi yapar ve devletin parasıyla kendi alın teri hiç olmadan devletin batmasına çıkmasına neden olacağı halkın ne olacağı hiç önemli değil."

54. "Doğrusunu söylemek gerekirse süt firmaları oyunlarını kendi kurallarına göre çok iyi oynuyorlar. Biz üretiyoruz ama fiyatı onlar belirliyor. Hiçbir yaptırımımız yok. Hem çalıyorlar, hem oynuyorlar. Üreticiye yalnızca boyun eğmek kalıyor. Büyük bir hayal kırıklığı yaşadık. [402 bin lira] verilmesi insafsızlıktan öte bir rakamdır. Ne yapacağımızı şaşırdık. Firmalarla yeniden görüşmeyi düşünüyorum. Ancak kalıcı çözüm süt üreticilerinin kooperatifte bütünleşerek kendi imalathanelerini oluşturmasıyla gerçekleşir."

55. "Özellikle sanayi olmayan mallarda çiftçi kaça satacağını bilmiyor. Şimdi bir beyaz eşyacı bir buzdolabı alıyor, masrafları üzerine koyuyor (kira, maaş vs.), bir de bunu üzerine kar koyuyor. Ama ben şimdi [karnabahar] ekiyorum; buradan lodos esiyor karnabahar fiyatı düşüyor. Fazla ekim olmuş, benim haberim yok, bir bakıyorum fiyatlar düşüyor. Dönümüne 5 lira masrafım var benim. Bana ne diyor? Arz-talep meselesi."

56. "Mal alırken kartelleşiyorlar, telefonlaşıyorlar. [Burdan] yukarı çıkma, buradan aşağı inme diyorlar. Arz talep meselesine bakıyorlar. Eğer çok sıkıntı varsa kontrol

edemiyorlarsa yükselmeyi, o zaman ithalatçıya gidiyorlar. Piyasadan birden çekiliyorlar. İşte bu mısırda yaşadığımız olay. Dört kişi varsa mısır toplayan, biz tüccarız, kaç paraysa ondan alıp satarız. 5'e alırız, 5,5' a satarız. Biz çok fazla aktif olamıyoruz. Çünkü bizim üstümüzde olan insanlar var. Şimdi beyaz et üreticileri, en çok mısırı kullanan onlar. Kimler Banvit, Keskinoğlu, Şekerpiliç. Onlar kendi aralarında her hafta toplantı yapıyorlar mısır fiyatları bu hafta böyle olacak diye."

57. "Geçen sene 730 liraya kadar mısır çıktı 1 aylığına. Mayıs sonu, Haziran gibi. Sonra birden 550 liraya kadar düştü. Bir anda ithal mal gelmedi. İthalatçıların kontratları geçe kalmış. Fiyatlar yükselmiş. Tabi dış dünya piyasaları çok önemli. Biz de izliyoruz. Gemi yanaştı mı 100 lira birden aşağı düşer."

58. "100 ton gelirse 500 ton derler. Milleti bir korkutuyorlar, malı alırlar elinden. Çiftçinin haberi yok bir şeyden."

59. "İthalatçılar getiriyor, piyasa kendi kendine regule ediyor. Serbest piyasa. Dönem dönem TMO fiyat olarak alışlarda ortaya çıkıyor ama işlevsel olarak çıkmıyor. Nasıl işlevsel, mesela mısır 620 lira diyor ama almıyor. Kim alıyor piyasa alıyor ama 620 liradan almıyor. Geçen yıl değil, evvel ki yıl yaşadığım olayı anlatayım: TMO 590-620 buğdayda taban fiyat açıkladı. Biz çıktık 530 liradan buğday aldık. Kimin fiyatıydı bu? Köylü dedi, 530 liradan buğday versem alır mısın dedi. Biz de gittik aldık, yani tüccarın fiyatı da değil."

60. "10 gün önce GDO'lu mısır geni gelmeyecek dendi. Mısır 440'dan 480'e çıktı. Akşam haberlerde GDO'lu alınacak dendi yine mısır fiyatı düştü. Bunlar siyaset işte. Ben kime göre maliyetimi yapacağım, ayarlayacağım? Devletin bir kelimesine göre. Akşam deseydi dışarıdan mısır alınmayacak benim mısırım belki 600 bine çıkacak. Al işte bir kelime oyunu. Birisine mutlaka bir rantı var onlar oyunu kurmuşlar."

61. “Ben niye alıyım 675 liradan mısır, hem komisyon veriyim, hem nakliye veriyim? Bu sefer döndüler ithale. Ben de döndüm çiftçiye, kardeşim 620 lira. Ne kadar kayıp var? 60 lira. Kim kaybetti? Çiftçi. Kim etkiledi bunu? İthalatçı. İthalata kim izin verdi? Hükümet. Yani bu politikaların baştan sona irdelenmesi lazım.”

62. “Onlar kalın kabuklu depo soğanı ekiyorlar. Kabuk sert. Depo özelliği. Sapının olduğu yer çok küçük, iyice kuruyor, depoda uyanamıyor. Bizimkiler gibi değil. Şu an depoda adamlar ufo yakıyor, soğanlar donmasın diye. Adam evinde yakmıyor depoda yakıyor.”

63. “Mesela Adana’da benim mısırım var. Orada daha ucuzdu. Orada tüccar arkadaşlarım var. Buradan parayı havale yapıyorum. O faturasını kesiyor. Herkese mal alırken bana da mal alıyor. Deposuna koyuyor orada duruyor. Sat dediğim zaman satıyor oradan.”

64. “Eskiden ihracat vardı. Yunanistan’dan gelirdi tüccarlar. Sanki açık arttırmayla satılırdı. Soğan tüccarları biri gelirdi, biri giderdi. Domatese, karpuza... Soğanı tarladan alırdı. Tüccarlardan belliydi soğanın hareketlendiği. Hepsi kasar satmaz. Şimdi buraya gelmiyor. Sen ayaklarına gidiyorsun. Domatesler sürekli sarılıyordu. Kahvenin önünde sürekli bağırıyorlardı. Domates 30 lira, 40 lira, 50 lira oldu diye. Açık arttırma gibi. Şimdi hepsi fabrikaya döndü. Soğan bitti, pembe domates bitti. Çiftçilik bitti.”

65. “Soğanı pazarlamak için 2 ay uğraştım. Türkiye’nin en büyük tedarikçilerini, Bim’e bile mal yapan adamı buldum. Mardin’i aradım, Suriye’ye mal satar mıyız diye. 200 bin donum bizde soğan var, biz satmaya çalışıyoruz, dedi. Bu da planlamayı doğuruyor. Üretilen malın da dışarıya çıkması gerek. Araplara domates. Salçada yaşanan olay, bir Çin’le baş edemiyoruz. Adam tonu 350 dolara salça satıyor. Biz mal ediyoruz 700 dolara. Ne olacak bu iş?”

66. “Burası 20 dönüm. Ölçtürüyoruz. Kendi tecrübemizle oradan ne kadar mal çıkacağını tahmin ediyoruz. İlk zamanlarda yanılıyorsun tabi. Malın durumuna göre 4-5 ton. Üretici de artık ne yapacağını biliyor. Sürpriz yok.”

67. “Devlet sana destek olmuyor. Bu köy ne çıkarıyor, buğday mı? Bunun sanayiye girmesi için ne lazım, değirmen mi? Kurarım bir değirmen, un olarak piyasaya sürerim... Domates mi ekiyorsun? Ne lazım, fabrika mı? Ufak bir işletme yap. Bu köyün ürününü işlesin. Mısıra kurutma makinası al.”

68. “Hiç çalışmasalardı daha iyiydi. Ama şu var tarım çalışanları asimilasyona uğradı… Çok hızlandı. … Bursa batıya doğru açılınca Piştikoz bölgesi değerlendi. 15-20 liraya çıktı. Ova 3 lira, 5 lira. Yani şunu anlatayım. Bunlar 10 senedir hiç çalışmasaydılar; tarlaların tapularını da koysalardı kasaya; kilitleselerdi; kendileri de gidip bir yerde yevmiyeci olarak çalışsaydı 800-900 liraya; borçlanmadan gelseydi; şimdi bunlar çok daha zengindi. O zaman sattık 1 -2 liraya tarlanın dönümünü şimdi 10 lira, 15 lira. Ne emeklerle yapıldı onlar, çalışarak yok oldular.”

REFERENCES

Abay, C., Olhan, E., Uysal,Y.,Yavuz, F.& Türkekul, B. (2005). Türkiye'de tarım politikalarında değişim. Türkiye Ziraat Mühendisliği VI. Teknik Kongresi 3-7 Ocak 2005, Ankara.

Acar, M. (2006). *DTÖ ve AB ışığında Türk tarımının geleceği*. Ankara: Orion Yayınevi.

Adaman, F. & Arsel, M. (Eds.) (2005). *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between democracy and development?*. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Akder, H. (2003a). Türkiye tarım politikasında 'destekleme reformu'. *ASOMEDYA*, www.arip.org.tr/documents/raporlar_makaleler/asomedya.doc .

Akder, H. (2003b). Rural women and poverty. In F. Acar (Ed.) *Bridging the gender gap in Turkey. A milestone towards faster socioeconomic development and poverty*. World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPGENDER/Resources/TurkeyCGA.pdf .

Akder, H. (2007). Policy formation in the process of implementing agricultural reform in Turkey. *Int. J. Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology*, Vol. 6, Nos. 4/5.

Akder, H. (2010). How to dilute an agricultural reform: Direct income subsidy experience in Turkey (2001-2008). In F. Adaman, B. Karapinar & G. Ozertan (Eds.) *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy* (pp.47-61). New York: Nova Publishers.

Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for "lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol.84 No. 3, pp.488-500.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. (2004). Are "Landlords taking back the land"? An essay on the agrarian transition in Vietnam. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 16(4), pp.757-789.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. (2007). Land, markets and neoliberal enclosure: An agrarian political economy perspective. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.28 No.8, pp. 1437-1456.

Akram-Lodhi, A. H. & Kay, C. (2009). Neoliberal globalization, the traits of rural accumulation and rural politics: The agrarian question in the twenty-first century. In A. H. Akram-Lodhi& C. Kay (Eds.) *Peasants and globalization*. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Akram-Lodhi, A.H., Kay, C. & Borras Jr., S.M. (2009). The political economy of land and the agrarian question in an era of neoliberal globalization. In A. H. Akram-Lodhi& C. Kay (Eds.) *Peasants and globalization*. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Akrich, M. (1992). The de-scription of technical objects. In W. Bijker& J. Law (Eds.) *Shaping technology/ building society*. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.

Aksoy, Z. (2005a). The conservation of crop genetic diversity in Turkey: An analysis of the linkages between local, national and international levels. Electronic Doctoral Dissertations for UMass Amherst. Paper AAI3163646. Retrieved from http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3163646.

Aksoy, Z. (2005b). Biodiversity and biotechnology in the agriculture sector. In F. Adaman& M. Arsel (Eds.) *Environmentalism in Turkey between democracy and development*. England: Ashgate.

Akşit, B. (1982). Kırsal dönüşüm araştırmalarında bazı yöntem sorunları. *İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi*, 1, 173-180.

Akşit, B. (1985). *Köy, kasaba ve kentlerde toplumsal değişme*. Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi.

Akşit, B. (1988). Kırsal dönüşüm ve köy araştırmaları. In Ş. Pamuk& Z. Toprak (Eds.) *Türkiye'de tarımsal yapılar*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları.

Aktan, R. (1966). Problems of land reform in Turkey. *Middle East Journal*, 20(3), 317-334.

Alexander, C. (2002). *Personal states making connections between people and bureaucracy in Turkey*. Oxford University Press.

Alexander, J., & Alexander, P. (1991). What's a fair price? Price-setting and trading partnerships in Javanese markets. *Man*, 26(3), pp. 493-512.

Almond, G. A. (1965). A developmental approach to political systems. *World Politics*, Vol. 17:2.

Alpago, H. (2002). *IMF Türkiye ilişkileri*. İstanbul: Ötüken Yayını.

Altıok, M. (2002). Yeni liberal istikrar ve yapısal uyum programları: Türkiye ekonomisinde sermaye birikimi ve kriz. *Praksis*, 5: 77-130.

Altieri, M. A. (2009). Agroecology, small farms, and food sovereignty. *Monthly Review*, 61(3), pp. 102-113.

Altieri, M. A., & Toledo, V. M. (2011). The agroecological revolution in Latin America: Rescuing nature, ensuring food sovereignty and empowering peasants. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(3), pp.587-612.

Amin, S. (1977). *Imperialism and unequal development*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Araghi, F. (2000). The great global enclosure of our times: peasants and the agrarian question at the end of the twentieth century. *Hungry for profit: The agribusiness threat to farmers, food, and the environment*. New York: Monthly Review Press, pp.145-160.

Araghi, F. (2009). The invisible hand and the visible foot: Peasants, dispossession and globalization. In A. H. Akram-Lodhi& C. Kay (Eds.) *Peasants and globalization*. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Arı, O.,Özgüven, A.,& Tütengil, C.O. (1976). Türkiye'de köykent sorunu. *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 2, Ankara, pp.59-66.

Arrow, K. J. (1963). *Social choice and individual values*. New York: Wiley.

Arsel, M. (2005). The Bergama imbroglio. In F. Adaman & M. Arsel (Eds.), *Environmentalism in Turkey between democracy and development*, England:Ashgate.

Atasoy, Y. (2013). Supermarket expansion in Turkey: Shifting relations of food provisioning. *Journal of Agrarian Change*.13 (4), pp.547-570.

Aumann, R. J. & Maschler, M. (1964). The bargaining set for cooperative games. In M. Dresher & R. J. Aumann (Eds.) *Advances in game theory*. Princeton University Press, pp.443-477.

Ayata, S. (1996). Patronage, party, and state: The politicization of Islam in Turkey. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.50, No.1, pp. 40-56.

Aydın, Z. (2001). Yapısal uyum politikaları ve kırsal alanda beka stratejilerinin özelleştirilmesi: Söke'nin Tuzburgazı ve Sivrihisar'ın Kınık köyleri örneği. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 88: 11-31.

Aydın, Z. (2002). The new right, structural adjustment and Turkish agriculture: Rural responses and survival strategies. *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 14, No.2.

Aydın, Z. (2005). Agrarian crisis. In *The political economy of Turkey*. Pluto Press.

Aydın, Z. (2009). De-agrarianization and depeasantization: Dilemmas of restructuring in Turkish agriculture. In Z. Öniş & F. Şenses (Eds.), *Turkey and the global economy : Neo-liberal restructuring and integration in the post-crisis era* (223-241). London, New York : Routledge.

Aydin, Z. (2010). Neo-Liberal transformation of Turkish agriculture. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 10(2), pp. 149-187.

Backus, G. B. C. & Eidman, V. R. & Dijkhuizen, A. A. (1997). Farm decision making under risk and uncertainty. *Netherlands Journal of Agricultural Science*. 45, pp.307-328.

Baka, J. (2013). The political construction of wasteland: Governmentality, land acquisition and social inequality in South India. *Development& Change*, Vol.44, 2.

Baker J. (2006). Survival and accumulation strategies at the rural-urban interface in North-West Tanzania. In C. Tacoli (Ed.) *The Earthscan Reader in Rural-Urban Linkages*. London, Sterling VA: EarthScan pp.41-55.

Baklanoff, E. N.& Moseley, E. (2008). *Yucatan in an era of globalization*. The University of Alabama Press.

Balassa, B. A. (1989). *New directions in the world economy*. Washington Square, N.Y. : New York University Press.

Balkan, N.& Savran, S. (Eds.) (2003) *Neoliberalizmin tahribatı: Türkiye'de toplum, ekonomi ve cinsiyet*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Banaji, J. (2003). The fictions of free labour: Contract, coercion, and so-called unfree labour. *Historical Materialism*, *11*(3), pp.69-95.

Baran, P. A. (1957). *Political economy of growth*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Barry, A. (2002). The anti-political economy. *Economy and Society*, 31 (2), pp.268-

284.

Baumeister, E. (2001). Peasant initiatives in land reform in Central America. In K. B. Ghimire (Ed.) *Land reform and peasant livelihoods: The social Dynamics of rural poverty and agrarian reform in developing countries*. Colchester: ITDG Publishing.

Baydar, O. (Ed.) (1999). *75 yılda köylerden şehirlere.* İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları.

Beard, J.D., Umbach, D. M., Hoppin, J. A., Richards, M., Alavanja, M.C.R., Blair, A., … Kamel, F. (2011). Suicide and pesticide use among pesticide applicators and their spouses in the agricultural health study. *Environmental Health Perspectives*, Vol.119, No.11.

Bernstein, H. (1994). Agrarian classes in capitalist development. *Capitalism and Development*, London: Routledge, pp. 40-71.

Bernstein, H. (2010). Rural livelihoods and agrarian change: Bringing class back in. In N. Long, Y. Jingzhong & W. Yihuan (Eds.) *Rural transformations and development- China in context: The everyday lives of policies and people*. US, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Beseler,C.L., Stallones, L., Hoppin, J. A., Alavanja, M.C.R., Blair, A., Keefe, T., & Kamel, F. (2008). Depression and pesticide exposures among private pesticide applicators enrolled in the agricultural health study. *Environmental Health Perspectives*, Vol.116, No.12.

Bhaduri, A. (1986). Forced commerce and agrarian growth. *World Development*, Vol. 14, Issue 2, pp 267-272.

Bienefield, M. (1994). Structural adjustment and Tanzania's Peasantry. In V. Jamal (Ed.) *Structural adjustment and rural labour markets in Africa*. Houndmills: Macmillan Series of ILO studies.

Bienefeld, M. A. (2007). Suppressing the double movement to secure the dictatorship of finance. In A. Buğra & K. Ağartan (Eds.) *Reading Karl Polanyi for the twenty-first century: Market economy as a political project*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bilbil, E. T. (2012). The politics of uncertainty in a global market: the hazelnut exchange and its production. PhD Thesis: Bogazici University Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences.

Birtek, F. (1994). Prospects for a new center or the temporary rise of the peripheral *asabiyah*?. In M. Heper & A. Evin (Eds.), *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (223-228). Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press.

Birtek, F. & Keyder, C. (1975). Agriculture and the state: An inquiry into agricultural differentiation and political alliances: The case of Turkey. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.2, Issue 4, pp. 446-467.

Boratav, K.(1977). Categories of income distribution in primary commodities exported by developing countries: Some conceptual and methodological problems. Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı, pp.28-47.

Boratav, K, Türel, O.& Yeldan A.E. (1996). Dilemmas of structural adjustment and environmental policies under instability: Post-1980 Turkey. *World Development*, Vol.24, No.2.

Borras Jr, S. (2005). Can redistributive reform be achieved via market-based voluntary land transfer schemes? Evidence and lessons from the Philippines. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 41(1), pp.90-134.

Borras Jr, S. M. (2008). La Vía Campesina and its global campaign for agrarian reform. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 8(2-3).

Borras Jr, S.M., Kay, C.& Akram-Lodhi, A.H. (2007). Agrarian reform and rural development: Historical overview and current issues. In A.H. Akram-Lodhi, S. M. Borras Jr. & C. Kay (Eds.). *Land, poverty and livelihoods in an era of globalization: Perspectives from developing and transition countries*, London, New York: Routledge.

Bouman, F. J. A. (1990). Informal rural finance: An Aladdin's lamp of information. *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol.XXX, No.2.

Bouman, F. J. A. &Houtman R. (1988). Pawnbroking as an instrument of rural banking in the Third World. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.37, No.1

Bourdieu, P. (1998). The essence of neoliberalism. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1998. Retrieved April 27, 2012, from http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu

Boyce, J. K. (2006). A future for small farms? Biodiversity and sustainable agriculture. In J. K. Boyce *et al*. (Eds.) *Human development in the era of globalization essays in honor of Keith B. Griffin*. Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Bozdogan, S. & Kasaba, R. (1998). Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey. *American Historical Review*, 103.

Brass, T. (1999). *Towards a comparative political economy of unfree labour: case studies and debates*. London: Frank Cass.

Brass, T. (2011). *Labour regime change in the twenty-first century: Unfreedom, capitalism and primitive accumulation*. The Netherlands: Brill.

Breman, J. (1996). *Footloose labour working in India's informal economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Bruno, M., Ravallion, M., & Squire, L. (1998). Equity and growth in developing countries: old and new perspectives on the policy issues. In *Income distribution and high-quality growth*, pp.117-146.

Bryceson, D. F. (1997). De-agrarianisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Acknowledging the inevitable. In Bryceson D.F.& Jamal V. (Eds.) *Farewells to farms: De-agrarianisation and employment in Africa.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bryceson, D. (1999). African rural labour, income diversification & livelihood approaches: A long term development perspective. *Review of African Political Economy*, No: 80.

Bryceson, D., Kay, C., & Mooij, J. (Eds.) (2000). *Disappearing peasantries? : Rural labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Brydon, L. (2011). Post-adjustment, post-mitigation, 'post-poverty'? The feminization of family responsibility in contemporary Ghana. In S. Chant (Ed.) *The international handbook of gender and poverty concepts research policy*, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., & Tullock, G. (1980). *Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society*. Texas A & M University Press.

Buckland, J. (2004). *Ploughing up the farm: Neoliberalism, modern technology and the state of the world's farmers*. Black Point, N.S.: Fernwood Pub., London, New York: Zed Books, New York: Distributed in the United States by Palgrave.

Buckley, G. (1997). Microfinance in Africa: Is it either the problem or the solution?. *World Development*, Vol.25, No.7, 1081-1093.

Burawoy, M. (2010). From Polanyi to Pollyanna: The false optimism of global labor studies. *Global Labour Journal*, Vol.1, Issue 2.

Burkett, P. (1999). *Marx and nature: A red and green perspective*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bush, R. (2002). *Counter revolution in Egypt's countryside: Land and farmers in the era of economic reform*. London, New York: Zed Books.

Buvinic, M. (2004). Introduction: Social inclusion in Latin America. In M. Buvinic, J. Mazza, & R. Deutsch (Eds.) *Social Inclusion and Economic Development in Latin America*. Inter-American Development Bank.

Büyükcan, T. (2007). *IMF destekli yapısal uyum programları ile ilişkili olarak Türkiye'de gerçekleştirilen yasal düzenlemeler (1999-2004)*. Ankara : TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu.

Byres, T. J. (2004). Introduction: contextualizing and interrogating the GKI case for redistributive land reform. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, *4*(1-2), pp.1-16.

Cakmak, E. H. & Dudu, H. (2010). Agricultural policy reform in Turkey: Sectoral and micro implications. In F. Adaman, B. Karapinar & G. Ozertan (Eds.), *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy* (pp.63-85). New York: Nova Publishers.

Caliskan K. & Adaman F. (2010). The logic of neo-liberal agricultural reform in Turkey: Perspectives, consequences and alternatives. In F. Adaman, B. Karapinar & G. Ozertan (Eds.), *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy* (pp.87-103). New York: Nova Publishers.

Callon, M.(1998). The embeddedness of economic markets in economics. In M. Callon (Ed.) *The laws of the markets*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Callon, M. (2007). What does it mean to say that economics is performative? In D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa & L. Siu (Eds.), *How economists make markets: The performativity of economics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Callon, M. & Lascoumes, P. & Barthe, Y. (Eds.) (2001)[2009]. *Acting in an uncertain world: An essay on technical democracy.* Translated by G. Burchell. USA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Callon, M., Millo,Y. & Muniesa, F. (Eds.) (2007). *Market devices*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Candemir, M.& Deliktaş, E. (2006). TİGEM İşletmelerinde Teknik Etkinlik, Ölçek Etkinliği, Teknik İlerleme, Etkinlikteki Değişme ve Verimlilik Analizi: 1999-2003, retrieved from http://www.tepge.gov.tr/Dosyalar/Yayinlar/5a810508f2ca441d9601d9a1daded858.pdf

Canterbury, D. (2007). Caribbean agriculture under three regimes: Colonialism, nationalism and neoliberalism in Guyana. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 34, Issue 1.

Cardoso, F. H. (1979). *Dependency and development in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Carrillo, B. (2011). *Small town China: Rural labour and social inclusion*. London New York: Routledge.

Carruyo, L. (2008). *Producing knowledge, protecting forests: Rural encounters with gender, ecotourism, and international aid in the Dominican Republic*. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2011). *Every Thirty Minutes:Farmer Suicides, Human Rights, and the Agrarian Crisis in India*. New York: NYU School of Law, retrieved from http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/every30min.pdf .

Chase, J. (Ed.) (2002). *The spaces of neoliberalism: Land, place and family in Latin America*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Chayanov, A.V. (1925)[1966]. *The theory of the peasant economy*. D. Thorner, B. Kerblay & R.E.F. Smith (Eds.) Homewood, IL: R. D. Irwin.

Chen, M.A. (2007). Rethinking informal economy: Linkages with the formal economy and the formal regulatory environment. In J. A. Ocampo& Jomo K. S. (Eds.) *Towards full and decent employment*, New York: UN Publications.

Chossudovsky, M. (2003) *The Globalization of poverty and the New World Order*. Canada: Global Outlook.

Christensen, G. (1993) The limits to informal financial intermediation. *World Development* 21, (5): 721-731.

Christiansen, F. (2010) Building livelihoods: How Chinese peasants deal with state regulation of opportunity and risk. In N. Long, Y. Jingzhong& W. Yihnan (Eds.) *Rural transformations and development China in context everyday lives of policies and people*. UK, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Cizre, Ü. (2002). From ruler to pariah: The life and times of the True Parth Party. In B. Rubin & M. Heper (Eds.) *Political parties in Turkey*. London, Portland: Frank Cass.

Cizre, Ü. & Yeldan, E. (2005). The Turkish encounter with neo-liberalism: Economics and politics in the 2000/2001 crises. *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 387-408.

Clapp, R. A. (1988). Representing reciprocity, reproducing domination: Ideology and the labour process in Latin American contract farming. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.16 No 1.

Clapp, R. A. (1994). The moral economy of the contract. In P. D. Little & M.J. Watts (Eds.) *Living under contract* (pp.78-94). London: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Costain, A. N. (1992). *Inviting women's rebellion: A political process interpretation of the women's movement*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Crehan, K. (1992) Rural households survival and change. In H. Bernstein, B. Crow& H. Johnson (Eds.) *Rural livelihoods crises and responses*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Cronon, W. (1992). *Nature's metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. New York: WW Norton & Company.

Crow, B. (2003) *Markets, class and social change: Trading networks and poverty in rural south Asia.* New York: Palgrave.

Cumings, B. (1981). Interest and ideology in the study of agrarian politics. *Politics& Society*, Vol.10, No.4.

Çakmak, E. H., Kasnakoğlu, H. & Akder, A. H. (1999). *Tarım politikalarında yeni denge arayışları ve Türkiye*. İstanbul : Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği.

Çakmak, E.& Akder, H. (1999). Dünya Ticaret Örgütü-Tarım anlaşması'nın yeni görüşme dönemi ve Türkiye: Olanaklar, kısıtlar ve stratejiler, TEAE, Yayın No:34.

Çalışkan, K. (2005). *Making a global commodity: The production of markets and cotton in Egypt, Turkey, and the United States*. New York: New York University.

Çalışkan, K. (2007a). Markets and fields: The ethnography of cotton exchange and production in a Turkish Village. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No: 37, Fall 2007, pp. 115-146.

Çalışkan, K. (2007b). Neo-liberal piyasa nasıl işler? : Pamuk, iktidar ve fiyat. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 108.

Çalışkan, K. (2007c). Price as a market device: cotton trading in Izmir Mercantile Exchange. *Sociological Review*, 55 (2), pp.241-260.

Çalışkan, K. (2010). *Market threads: How cotton farmers and traders create a global commodity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Çalışkan, K. (2011, December 27). GDO artık soframızda. *Radikal*. Retrieved from http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1073685&Yazar=KORAY-CALISKAN&CategoryID=97.

Çalışkan, K. & Callon, M. (2009). Economization, part 1: Shifting attention from the economy towards processes of economization. *Economy and Society*, 38:3, pp.369-398.

Çalışkan, K. & Callon, M. (2010). Economization, part 2: A research programme for the study of markets. *Economy and Society*, 39:1, pp. 1-32.

Çınar, M. & Silier, O. (1979). *Türkiye tarımında işletmeler arası farklılaşma*. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi yayınları.

Çolak, Ö. F. (2002). *Kriz ve IMF politikaları*. İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi.

D'Exelle B.& Bastiaensen J. (2000). Property rights, missing markets, and agricultural diversification: Consolidation of agrarian reform in Masaya, Nicaragua. in R. Ruben & J. Bastiaensen (Eds.) *Rural development in Central America: Markets, livelihoods, and local governance*. London: Macmillan Press.

Da Corta, L. (2010). The political economy of agrarian change: Dinosaur or phoenix? In B. Harriss-White& J. Heyer (Eds.) *The comparative political economy of development Africa and South Asia*. London: Routledge.

Da Corta, L., & Magongo, J. (2010). Evolution of gender and poverty dynamics in Tanzania. CPRC Working Paper 203. Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC).

Daddieh, C.K. (1994). Contract farming and palm oil production in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. In P.D. Little & M. Watts (Eds.) *Living under contract* (pp.188-215) London: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Daviron, B., & Ponte, S. (2005). *The coffee paradox: Global markets, commodity trade and the elusive promise of development*. Zed books.

De Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2001). *Access to land and land policy reforms*. Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research.

De Sutter, L. (2013). Introduction. In L. De Sutter (Ed.) *Althusser and law*. UK, Oxon: Routledge.

Delgado C. L., Hopkins, J. &Kelly, V.A (with Hazell P., McKenna, A.A., Gruhn, P., Hojjati, B., Sil, J.& Courbois,C.) (1998). *Agricultural growth linkages in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute

Dellal, İ. (2004). Ortak tarım politikasında reform, DTÖ ve Türkiye. TEAE *Bakış*, Sayı 7, Nüsha 4.

Demirer, T. (2004). Türkiye'de 'Tarımın Çöküşü'. In S. Özbudun *et al.* "*Yeni düzen(sizlik)"den başkaldırıya*. Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi.

Deshingkar, P.&Farrington , J. (2006). Agricultural livelihoods in an era of economic reform and globalization. In J. Farrington, P. Deshingkar, C. Johnson & D. Start (Eds.) *Policy windows and livelihoods future prospects for poverty reduction in rural India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Doğan, S. (2002). Dünya tarım ürünleri ticaretinin liberalleşmesine yönelik düzenlemelerin Türk tarımına yansımaları. *Muğla Üniversitesi SBE Dergisi*, Sayı 7.

Doner, F. N. (2012). Transition under SAP and CAP: Future scenarios for agriculture in Turkey. In K. Aksu (Ed.) *Turkey and the EU: mutual impacts of the long lasting relations on political, economic and social life*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Ducourant, H. (2013). Why the poor pay more for their credit? The segmentation and hierarchisation of the french credit market. In I. Guérin, S. Morvant-Roux & M. Villareal (Eds.) *Microfinance, debt and over-indebtedness: Juggling with money*. Oxon: Routledge Studies in Development Economics.

Dwyer, M. B. (2013). Building the politics machine: Tools for 'resolving'the global land grab. *Development& Change*, Vol.44, 2.

Ecevit, M. (1993). Rural women and the small peasant economy. *Turkish Public Administration Annual*, Ankara.

Edelman, M.& Haugerud, A. (2005). *The anthropology of development and globalization: From classical political economy to contemporary neoliberalism*. Blackwell Publishing.

Edelman, M., & Kay, C. (Eds.). (2008). *Transnational agrarian movements confronting globalization*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Ekonomi Muhabirleri Derneği, Uçsuz bucaksız sorunlar sektörü: Tarım, http://www.emd.org.tr/eks8_dos, 1998.

Ellis, F. (1992). *Peasant economics: Farm households and agrarian development*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, F. (1998). Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 35:1, 1-38.

Ellis, F. (2000). *Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Elson, D. (2007). Macroeconomic Policy, employment, unemployment and gender equality. In J.A. Ocampo& Jomo K.S. (Eds.). New York: UN Publications.

El-Tobshy, Z. (2005). Gender and agriculture in Egypt. In P. Motzafi-Haller (Ed.) *Women in agriculture in the Middle East*, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Elyachar, J. (2002). Empowerment money: The World Bank, non-governmental organizations, and the value of culture in Egypt. *Public Culture*, 14 (3), 493-513.

England, K.& Ward, K. (Eds.) (2007). *Neoliberalization: States, networks, peoples*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

Ercan, F. (2002). Çelişkili bir süreklilik olarak sermaye birikimi (1), Türkiye'de kapitalizmin gelişme dinamiklerinin anlaşılması için Marksist bir çerçeve denemesi, *Praksis*, 5: 25-75.

Erdost, M. İ. (1986). Sermayenin ilkel birikimi ve küçük köylülük. *Bilim ve Sanat*, pp.32-34.

Ergüder, Ü. (1980). Politics of agricultural price policy in Turkey. In E. Özbudun & A. Ulusan (Eds.) *The political economy of income distribution in Turkey* (169-195). New York: Holmes-Meier Publishers.

Ergüder, Ü. (1991). Agriculture : The forgotten sector. In M. Heper (Ed.) *Strong state and economic interest groups : The post-1980 Turkish experience* (71-78). Berlin ; New York : Walter de Gruyter.

Escobar, A. (1995). *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Eskenazi, B., Huen, K., Marks, A., Harley,K.G., Bradman,A., Barr, D.B., & Holland, N. (2010). PON1 and Neurodevelopment in Children from the CHAMACOS Study Exposed to Organophosphate Pesticides in *Utero, Environmental Health Perspectives*, Vol.118, No.12.

Ferguson, J. (1994). *The anti-politics machine: "Development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ferguson, J. (2006). *Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order*. Durham [N.C.] : Duke University Press.

Fitzgerald, D.K. (2003). *Every farm a factory: the industrial ideal in American agriculture*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fligstein, N. (2002). *The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of twenty-first-century capitalist societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fonte, M. (2006). Slow food's presidia: what do small producers do with big retailers?. *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, 12, pp.203-240.

Foster, J. B. (2000). *Marx's ecology materialism and nature*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Foucault, M. (1991). *Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Francis, E. (2000). *Making a living: Changing livelihoods in rural Africa*. London, New York: Routledge.

Frank, A. G. (1969). *Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical studies of Chile and Brazil*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Fraser, N. (2012). Can society be commodities all the way down? Polanyian reflections on capitalist crisis, Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme, Working Paper 18.

Frerichs, S. (2013). From credit to crisis: Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, and the other side of the coin. *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 40, No.1.

Frey, F. W. (1965). *The Turkish political elite*. Massachusetts : The MIT Press.

Friedman, M. (1982). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedmann, H. (2005). From colonialism to green capitalism: Social movements and emergence of food regimes. *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*,11, pp.227-264.

Clapp, J. A., & Fuchs, D. A. (Eds.). (2009). *Corporate power in global agrifood governance*. The MIT Press.

Galtung, J. (1971). A structural theory of imperialism, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 13, No. 2.

Gambetti, Z. (2009). Politics of place/space: The spatial dynamics of the Kurdish and Zapatista movements. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, *41*, 43-87.

George, S. (1988). *A fate worse than debt*. New York: Grove Press.

Geray, C.(1972). Toplum kalkınması ve köy araştırmaları. Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Dergisi, 1-2, pp.3-49.

Geremek, B. (1994). *Poverty: A history*.Oxford: Blackwell Publishers

Glover D. & Kusterer K. (1990). *Small farmers, big business: Contract farming and rural development*. US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Goodman, D. (2004). Rural Europe redux? Reflections on alternative agro-food networks and paradigm change. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 44(1), pp.3-16.

Goodman D. &Redclift, M. R. (1991). *Refashioning nature: food, ecology, and culture*. London, New York: Routledge.

Goodman, D., & Watts, M. (1994). Reconfiguring the rural or fording the divide?: Capitalist restructuring and the global agro-food system. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 22(1), pp. 1-49.

Goodman, D., & Watts, M. (Eds.). (1997). *Globalising food: agrarian questions and global restructuring*. London, New York: Routledge.

Gordon, A. & Craig, C. (2001). *Rural nonfarm activities and poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Policy Series 14. Chatham, UK: Natural Resources Institute.

Göle, N. (1994). Toward an autonomization of politics and civil society. In M. Heper & A. Evin (Eds.) *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (213-222). Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press.

Göle, N. (2004). *Mühendisler ve ideoloji: ünlü devrimcilerden yenilikçi seçkinlere*. İstanbul : Metis Yayınları.

Gramsci, A. (1992). *Prison notebooks*. J.A. Buttigieg (Ed.), New York: Columbia University Press.

Grandia, L. (2013). Road mapping: Megaprojects and land grabs in the Northern Guatemalan Lowlands. *Development& Change*, Vol.44, 2.

Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic-action and social-structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), pp.481-510.

Grosh, B. (1994). Contract farming in Africa: An application of the new institutional economics. *Journal of African* Economies, 3 (2): 231–261.

Guha, A. (2007). *Land, law and the left: The saga of disempowerment of peasantry in the era of globalization*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

Gunnell, D. & Eddleston, M. (2003). Suicide by intentional ingestion of pesticides: a continuing tragedy in developing countries. *International Journal of Epidemiology*, Vol.32, No.6.

Gupta, A. (1998). *Postcolonial developments agri-culture in the making of modern India*. Duke University Press.

Guseva, A.& Rona-Tas, A. (2001). Uncertainty, risk, and trust: Russian and American credit card markets compared. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 66, No. 5, pp. 623-646.

Gülümser, A. A., Baycan-Levent, T. & Nijkamp, P. (2006). Turkey's Rurality: A comparative analysis at the EU level, 46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean 30 August- 3 September 2006, Volos, Greece.

Günaydın, G. (2009). Türkiye tarım politikalarında 'Yapısal Uyum': 2000'li yıllar. *Mülkiye*, Vol. 33, No. 262.

Gürbüz, M. (2001). Türkiye ve tarım: 'Bir özet tanım'. *İktisat Dergisi*, 412 (Nisan): 25-26.

Gürkan, H. (2008). Tarımda büyüme fakirleşme mi?, *İzmir Ticaret Borsası Dergisi*.

Gürsel, S., İmamoğlu, Z.& Zeydanlı, T. (2010). Tarımda istihdam bilmecesi. BETAM Araştıma Notu 10/95, retrieved from http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/ArastirmaNotu095.pdf.

Güven, A. B. (2009). Reforming sticky institutions: Persistence and change in Turkish agriculture. *St Comp Int Dev*, 44, 162-187.

Haggblade, S., Hazell, P.B.R.& Dorosh, P.A. (2007). Sectoral growth linkages between agriculture and the rural nonfarm economy. In S. Haggblade, P.B.R. Hazell & T. Reardon (Eds.) *Transforming the rural nonfarm economy: opportunities and threats in the developing world*, The International Food Policy Research Institute, The John Hopkins University Press.

Haggblade, S., Hazell, P.B.R.& Reardon, T. (2007). Research perspectives and prospectives on the rural nonfarm economy. In S. Haggblade, P.B.R. Hazell & T. Reardon (Eds.) *Transforming the rural nonfarm economy: opportunities and threats in the developing world*, The International Food Policy Research Institute, The John Hopkins University Press.

Handelman, H. (1975). *Struggle in the Andes: Peasant political mobilization in Peru*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Harriss, J. (2007). Bringing politics back into poverty analysis: Why understanding social relations matters more from policy on chronic policy than measurement. Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper, 77.

Harriss, J. H., J. & Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, pp.481-510.

Harriss-White, B. (1999). Power in peasant markets. In B. Harriss-White (Ed.) *Agricultural markets from theory to practice: field experience in developing countries*. US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.261-286.

Harriss-White, B. (2007a). Commercialization, commodification, and gender relations in post-harvest systems for rice in South Asia. In M. Krishnaraj (Ed.) *Gender Food Security and Rural Livelihoods*, Kolkata:STREE.

Harriss-White, B. (2007b). *Rural commercial capital: Agricultural markets in West Bengal*. Oxford Universty Press.

Harriss-White, B., & Gooptu, N. (2009). Mapping India's world of unorganized labour. *Socialist Register*, (37).

Harvey, D. (2005). *The New Imperialism*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1948). *Individualism and economic order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Helfand, S. M.& Levine E.S.(2006). The impact of policy reforms on rural poverty in Brazil: Evidence from three states in the 1990s In J. K. Boyce *et al*. (Eds.) *Human development in the era of globalization essays in honor of Keith B. Griffin*, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA,USA: Edward Elgar.

Helleiner, G. K. (1986). Stabilization and adjustment policies and global poverty: Agenda for change. In *Stabilization, adjustment and poverty*, International Labor Office: Geneva.

Heper, M. (1990). The state and debureaucratization: The case of Turkey. *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.42, 126, pp.605-615.

Heper, M. (1994). Trials and tribulations of democracy in the Third Turkish Republic. In M. Heper & A. Evin (Eds.), *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (231-251). Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press.

Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S., & Robbins, P. (Eds.) (2007). *Neoliberal environments false promises and unnatural consequences*. Oxon: Routledge

Higgins, W. & Hallström, K.T. (2007). Standardization, globalization and rationalities of government. *Organization*, Vol. 4 (5): 685-704.

Hough, P. (1998). *The Global politics of pesticides: forging consensus from conflicting interests*. UK: Earthscan.

Huacuja, F. E. (2001). Working under contract for the vegetable agroindustry in Mexico: A means of survival. *Culture&Agriculture*, Vol.23 No.3, pp.13-23.

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hutchinson, F., Mellor, M., & Olsen, W. K. (2002). *The politics of money: towards sustainability and economic democracy.* Pluto Press.

Ilkkaracan I.& Tunali I. (2010). Agricultural transformation and the rural labor market in Turkey. In B. Karapinar, F. Adaman & G. Ozertan (Eds.), *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy* (pp.105-148). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.

IMF (International Monetary Fund) (1999). Letter of Intent. December 9. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/120999.HTM

IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2000). Letter of Intent. December 18. *http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/tur/03/index.htm*

IMF (International Monetary Fund) Working well with others? The IMF as team player. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2012/pdf/c3.pdf.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). Conditionality in fund-supported programs. Policy Development and Review Department. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/ .

Işık,O. &Pınarcıoğlu M. M. (2001). *Nöbetleşe yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli Örneği*. İstanbul: İletişim.

İnsel, A. (1996). *Düzen ve kalkınma kıskacında Türkiye: Kalkınma sürecinde devletin rolü*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.

İnsel, A. (2003). *Türkiye toplumunun bunalımı*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları.

İslamoğlu, H. (2002). Yeni düzenlemeler ve ekonomi politik: IMF kaynaklı kurumsal reformlar ve Tütün Yasası. *Birikim*, 158: 20-27.

İslamoğlu, H. (2008). *Türkiye'de tarımda dönüşüm ve küresel piyasalarla bütünleşme süreçleri* (TÜBİTAK Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Grubu SOBAG Proje No. SOBAG 106K137).

Jamal, V. (1994). Adjustment programmes and adjustment. In V. Jamal (Ed.) *Structural adjustment and rural labour markets in Africa*. Houndmills: Macmillan.

Jessop, B. & Sum, N. (2006). *Beyond the regulation approach: Putting capitalist economies in their place*. UK, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Johnson, H. (2000). Exchange relations and food security: maize and markets in Honduras. In R. Ruben & J. Bastiaensen (Eds.) *Rural development in Central America: markets, livelihoods and local governance*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 21-38.

Johnson, H. (2004). Subsistence and control: The persistence of the peasantry in the developing world. *Undercurrent*, Vol.1, No.1.

Jolly, R. (1995). Adjustment with a human face, 18th SID Conference, Rome.

Jones, H.M. (2008). Livelihood diversification and moneylending in a Rajasthan village: What lessons for rural financial services?. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 20:3, 507-518.

Kabeer, N. (1991). Gender dimensions of rural poverty: analysis from Bangladesh. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 18(2), pp.241-262.

Kabeer, N. (2005). Gender equality and women's empowerment: A critical analysis of the third millennium development goal 1. *Gender & Development*,13(1), pp.13-24.

Kabeer, N., & Tran, T. A. (2002). Leaving the rice fields, but not the countryside. In S. Razavi (Ed.) *Shifting burdens: Gender and agrarian change under neoliberalism*. US, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, pp.109-150.

Kadirbeyoglu, Z. & Ozertan, G. (2010). Water in Turkey: Neoliberal policies, challenges and the road ahead. In B. Karapinar, F. Adaman & G. Ozertan (Eds.), *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy* (pp.169-187). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.

Kadirbeyoğlu, Z. (2005). Assessing the efficacy of transnational advocacy networks. In F. Adaman & M. Arsel (Eds) *Environmentalism in Turkey between democracy and development*. England: Ashgate.

Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1996). *Family and human development across cultures: A view from otherside*, Mahwah, N.J. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Kalaycıoğlu, S. (1996). Göçmenlerde sosyal hareketlilik ile ilgili beklentilerin din görüşü ve cinsiyetlere göre farklılaşması: Ankara'dan bir örneklem. In *Toplum ve Göç*, 2nd National Congress of Sociologists, Mersin: Sosyoloji Derneği Yayını.

Kalaycıoğlu, S. (2006). Dynamics of poverty in Turkey: Gender, rural/urban poverty, social networks and reciprocal survival strategies. In M. Petmesidou& C. Papatheodorou (Eds.), *Poverty and social deprivation in the Mediterranean: Trends, policies and welfare prospects in the new millennium*. London, New York: Zed Books.

Kapadia, K. (1995). The profitability of bonded labour: The gem-cutting industry in rural South India. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 22(3), pp.446-483.

Kapadia, K. (Ed.). (2002). *The violence of development: The political economy of gender*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Karapinar, B. (2007). Rural transformation in Turkey 1980-2004: Case studies from three regions. *International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology*, Vol.6, No.4-5.

Karapinar, B., Adaman, F. & Ozertan, G. (Eds.) (2010). *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy*. New York: Nova Publishers.

Karkiner, N. (2012). The "unity of statement" as the interpretation of space: The case of archeo-park in Turkey. *Human Geographies- Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography*, 6.2, pp.23-32.

Karpat, K. (1964). Society, economics, and politics in contemporary Turkey. *World Politics*, 17(1), pp.50-74.

Karpat, K. (1968). *Türk demokrasi tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası.

Kasnakoğlu, H. & Çakmak, E (2001). *Ulusal ve uluslararası gelişmeler ışığında etkin tarım politikaları*. Ankara Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi.

Kasnakoğlu, H., Akder, H., Gürkan, A., Ekinci, N.,& Ecevit, M. (1988). *The social and economic aspects of decision making related to labour utilisation and choice of technology: A case study of a Turkish village – KINIK*, Report on Agricultural Labour and Technological Change, ICARDA, Aleppo.

Kay, C. (2002). Agrarian reform and the neoliberal counter reform in Latin America. In J. Chase (Ed.) *The spaces of neoliberalism land, place and family in Latin America*. Conneticut: Kumarian Press.

Kay, C. (2008). Reflections on Latin American rural studies in the neoliberal globalization period: a new rurality?. *Development and Change*, 39(6), pp. 915-943.

Kazgan, G. (2003). *Tarım ve gelişme*. İstanbul : İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Kelly, T. J. (2001). Neoliberal reforms and rural poverty. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 28, No. 3.

Kendir, H. (2002). Türkiye'de tarım sektörü yönetiminde devletin 'küçülen rolü' ve yapısal uyum politikaları. In A.A. Dikmen (Ed.) *Küreselleşme, emek süreçleri ve yapısal uyum*, Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, 7. Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi (21-23 Kasım 2001), Ankara: İmaj Yayıncılık, 2002, 217-270.

Kendir, H. (2003). Küreselleşen tarım ve Türkiye'de tarım reformu. *Praksis*, 9: 277-300.

Kertzer, D. (1988). *Ritual, politics and power*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Key, N. & Runsten D. (1999). Contract farming, smallholders, and rural development in Latin America: The organization of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower production. *World Development* 27 (2): 381–401.

Keyder, Ç. (1983). Paths of rural transformation in Turkey. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.11, No1.

Keyder, Ç. (1987). *State and class in Turkey: A study in capitalist development*. London, New York: Verso.

Keyder, Ç. (2013). 2000'lerde devlet ve tarım, In Ç. Keyder& Z. Yenal, *Bildiğimiz tarımın sonu küresel iktidar ve köylülük*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Keyder, Ç.& Yenal, Z. (2003). Kalkınmacılık sonrası dönemde Türkiye'de kırsal dönüşüm eğilimleri ve sosyal politika. In A. H. Köse, F. Şenses & E. Yeldan (Eds.) *İktisat üzerine yazılar I küresel düzen: Birikim, devlet ve sınıflar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Keyder, Ç.&Yenal, Z. (2010). Rural transformation trends and social policies in Turkey in the post-developmentalist era In B. Karapinar, F. Adaman, & G. Ozertan (Eds.) *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy*. New York: Nova Publishers.

Keyder, Ç., & Yenal, Z. (2011). Agrarian change under globalization: markets and insecurity in Turkish agriculture. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 11(1), pp. 60-86.

Keyder, Ç.& Yenal, Z. (2013). *Bildiğimiz tarımın sonu: Küresel iktidar ve köylülük*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Keyes, C. F. (1984). Mother or mistress but never a monk: Buddhist notions of female gender in rural Thailand. *American Ethnologist*, 11(2), 223-241.

Keyman, F. (2010). Modernization, globalization and development: The state problem in Turkey. In B. Karapinar, F. Adaman & G. Ozertan (Eds.) *Rethinking structural reform in Turkish agriculture: Beyond the World Bank's strategy* (pp.29-46). New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc.

Keyman, E.F. & Öniş,Z. (2007). *Turkish politics in a changing world global dynamics and domestic transformations.* İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press.

Kıray, M. (1966). Interdependencies between agro-economic development and social change: A comparative study in Çukurova. Abant (Bolu) Sempozyumu.

Kıray, M. (1968). Values, social stratification and development. *Journal of Social Issues*, C.XXIV, No.2,ss.87-100.

Kıray, M. & Hinderink, S. (1970). *Social stratification as an obstacle to development*. Praeger.

Kitching, G. (2003). *Seeking social justice through globalization: Escaping a nationalist perspective*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Klein, N. (2007). *The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

Klein, N. (2010). *Fences and windows: Dispatches from the front lines of the globalization debate*. USA:Picador.

Koyuncu, M.& Şenses, F. (2004) Kısa dönem krizlerin sosyoekonomik etkileri: Türkiye, Endonezya ve Arjantin deneyimleri. *Çalışma ve Toplum* 2004/3.

Krippner, G.R. (2001). The elusive market: Embeddedness and the paradigm of economic sociology. *Theory & Society* 30, pp.775-810.

Kritzinger, A. (2006). The informalization of farm employment. In B. Bock & S. Shortall (Eds.) *Rural gender relations: Issues and case studies*. UK, USA: CABI Publishing.

Kuhn, H. W. (1953). Extensive games and the problem of information. *Contribution to the Theory of Games*, Vol. II, pp.193-216.

Kuhn, H. W. (Ed.). (1997). *Classics in game theory*. Princeton University Press.

Kurzer, P., & Cooper, A. (2007). What's for dinner? European farming and food traditions confront American biotechnology. *Comparative Political Studies*,40(9), pp.1035-1058.

Kuznets, S. (1959). *Six lectures on economic growth*. New York: Free Press.

Küçüközer, M. (2010). Peasant rebellion in the age of globalization: The Zapatistas of Mexico and the Kurds of Turkey. Ph.D. thesis, City University of New York.

Lang, A.T.F. (2013). The legal construction of economic rationalities?. *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 40, No. 1.

Lapavitsas, C. (2004). Commodities and gifts: Why commodities represent more than market relations. *Science and Society* 68 (1), pp.33 – 56.

Latour, B. (2004). *Politics of nature: How to bring the sciences into democracy*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor network theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The production of space*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Lefebvre, H. (2009). *State, space, world: selected essays*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lenin, V.I. (1899). The development of capitalism in Russia, *Lenin Collected Works Vol.3*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, (1960) 5th Edition.

Levien, M. (2012). The land question: Special economic zones and the political economy of dispossession in India. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.39, 3-4.

Levien, M. (2013). Regimes of dispossession: From steel towns to special economic zones. *Development& Change*, Vol.44, 2.

Lewis, C. M. (Ed.) (1995). *The new institutional economics and Third World development*. London: Routledge.

Lewis, W. A. (1955). *The theory of economic growth*. Homewood, Ill. : R.D. Irwing.

Lipton, D., Sachs, J., Fischer, S., & Kornai, J. (1990). Creating a market economy in Eastern Europe: The case of Poland. *Brookings papers on economic activity*,(1), pp.75-147.

Loveman, B. (1976). *Struggle in the countryside: Politics and rural labor in Chile, 1919-1973*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lundahl, M.& Wyzan, M. L. (2005). *The political economy of reform failure*. London, New York: Routledge.

Lundell, M., Lampietti, J., Pertev, R., Pohlmeier, L., Akder, H., Ocek, E. & Jha, S. (2004). Turkey: A review of the impact of the reform of agricultural sector subsidisation. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit Europe and Central Asia Region. Working Paper, Report No. 34641. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Machum, S. (2006). Commodity production and farm women's work. In B. Bock & S. Shortall (Eds.) *Rural gender relations: Issues and case studies*. UK, USA: CABI Publishing.

Macpherson, C.B. (1962). *The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mann, C.K. (1980). The effects of government policy on income distribution: A case study of wheat production in Turkey since World War II. In E. Özbudun & A. Ulusan (Eds.), *The political economy of income distribution in Turkey* (197-245). New York: Holmes-Meier Publishers.

Mardin, Ş. (1978). Youth and violence in Turkey. *Archives of European Sociology*, XIX, pp.229-254.

Mardin, Ş. (1991). Türk siyasasını açıklayabilecek bir anahtar: Merkez-çevre ilişkileri. In M. Türköne & T. Önder (Eds) *Türkiye'de toplum ve siyaset makaleler I*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Marris, P. (1996). *The politics of uncertainty: Attachment in private and public life*. London: Routledge.

Marx, K. (1850). The class struggles in France 1848-1850 in *Karl Marx Selected Works, Volume II*. V. Adoratsky (Ed.), (1936), Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.

Marx, K. (1852). The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in *Karl Marx Selected Works, Volume II*. V. Adoratsky (Ed.), (1936), Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.

Marx, K. (1986) [1867]. *Capital*. Volume I, Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Maurer, B. (2006). The anthropology of money. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol.35.

McAdam, D. (1985). *Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. & Tilly, C. (1997). Toward an integrated perspective on social movements and revolution. In M. I. Lichbach & A. S. Zuckerman (Eds.). *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*. UK, USA: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, J.& Zald, M.N. (1973). *The trend of social movements in America: Professionalization and resource mobilization*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corporation.

McCarthy, J. & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82, pp. 1212-1241.

McCarthy, J. & Zald, M. N. (Eds.) (1987). *Social movements in an organizational society: Collected essays*. New Brunswick, Oxford: Transaction Press.

McMichael, P. (Ed.). (1994). *The global restructuring of agro-food systems*. Cornell University Press.

McMichael, P. (2005). Global development and the corporate food regime. *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, 11, pp.265-299.

Melucci, A. (1988). Getting involved. In B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. G. Tarrow (Eds.) *From structure to action: Comparing social movement research across cultures*. International Social Movement Research. Greenwich, CT: Jai Press.

Melucci, A. (1989). *Nomads of the present: Social movements and individual need in contemporary society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Middendorf, G., Skladany, M., Ransom, E., & Busch, L. (1998). New agricultural biotechnologies: The struggle for democratic choice. *Monthly Review*, 50(3), pp.85-96.

Mies, M. (2008). Kapitalist gelişme ve geçimlik üretim: Hindistan'da kırsal kesim kadınları. In M. Mies, V. Bennholdt-Thomsen & C. Von Werlhof (Eds.) *Son sömürge: Kadınlar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Migdal, J. (1974). *Peasants, politics, and revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Husbandry. Agricultural Basins Plan. http://www.tarim.gov.tr/Files/duyurular/Sunum/TarimHavzalariSunum14TEMMUZ09.ppt

Mitchell, T. (1998). Fixing the economy. *Cultural Studies*, 12 (1), pp.88-101.

Mitchell, T. (2002). *Rule of experts: Egypt, techno-politics, modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mitrany, D. (1961). *Marx against the peasant: A study in social dogmatism*. New York: Collier Books.

Mohan, G., Brown, E., *et al.* (2000). *Structural adjustment theory, practice and impacts*. London and New York: Routledge.

Mohanty, B.B. (2005). 'We are Like the Living Dead': Farmer Suicides in Maharashtra. Western India, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.32, 2.

Mohanty, B. B. (2013). Farmers suicides in India. *Economic&Political Weekly*, May 25.

Mooij, J. (1999). The black box of the state: Studying the politics of food distribution policy. In B. Harriss-White (Ed.). *Agricultural markets from theory to practice: field experience in developing countries*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Mooij, J. (2000). Changing Peasantries in Asia. In D. Bryceson, C. Kay, &J. Mooij (Eds.) *Disappearing peasantries? : Rural labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, , London: IT Publications.

Moore, B. (1966). *The social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the modern world*. Boston: Beacon.

Moore, M. (1994). How difficult is it to construct market relations? A commentary on Platteau. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.30, No.3, pp.818-830.

Morgan K. & Murdoch J. (2000). Organic vs. conventional agriculture: knowledge, power and innovation in the food chain. *Geoforum*, Vol. 31, No 2, pp. 159-173(15).

Morrissy, J.D. (1974). *Agricultural modernization through production contracting: The role of the fruit and vegetable processor in Mexico and Central America.* New York: Praeger.

Morvant-Roux, S.(2013). International migration and over-indebtedness in Rural Mexico. In I. Guérin, S. Morvant-Roux, & M. Villareal (Eds.) *Microfinance, debt and over-indebtedness: Juggling with money*. Oxon: Routledge Studies in Development Economics.

Murphy, S. (2006). Concentrated market power and agricultural trade. EcoFair Trade Dialogue Discussion Paper No. 1, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), retrieved from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=56471.

Murray, W. E. (2006). Neo-feudalism in Latin America? Globalisation, agribusiness, and land re-concentration in Chile. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 33, Issue 4.

National Rural Development Strategy. (2006). TR Prime Ministry State Planning Organization. www.kalkinma.gov.tr/.../8051/kirsal-i.pdf

Nazir, P. (2000). Origins of debt, mortgage and alienation of land in early modern Punjab. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*,27:3, 55-91.

Ninth Development Plan 2007-2013. (2006). TR Prime Ministry State Planning Organization. http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/ix/9developmentplan.pdf

North, L. L., Cameron, J. D.(Eds.) (2003). *Rural progress, rural decay: Neoliberal adjustment policies and local initiatives*. Bloomfield, CT : Kumarian Press.

Oakley, P. (2004). European origins of social exclusion: Application to developing countries. In M. Buvinic, J. Mazza, & R. Deutsch (Eds.) *Social Inclusion and Economic Development in Latin America*, Inter-American Development Bank.

Offe, C. (1985). *Disorganized capitalism: contemporary transformations of work and politics*. J. Keane (Ed.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

O'Laughlin, B. (2007). A bigger piece of a very small pie: Intrahousehold resource allocation and poverty reduction in Africa. *Development and Change*,38(1), pp.21-44.

Olhan, E. (2006). The impact of the reforms: Impoverished Turkish agriculture. 96th EAAE Seminar "Causes and Impacts of Agricultural Structures" at Taenikon, Switzerland.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Organski, A.F.K. (1965). *The stages of political development*. New York: Knopf.

Ostrom, E. (2008). Doing institutional analysis: Digging deeper than markets and hierarchies. In C. Mâenard, & M.M.Shirley (Eds.). *Handbook of new institutional economics*, Springer Berlin Heidelberg. pp. 819-848.

Otero, G. (Ed.) (2004). *Mexico in transition: Neoliberal globalism, the state and civil society*. London, New York: Zed Books.

Oyan, O. (2001a). Tarımda yapısal uyarlama ve Türkiye'nin çıkarları. *İktisat Dergisi*, İstanbul, Sayı 412.

Oyan, O. (2001b). 2000 ve 2001 programlarında ulusal tarım politikalarının tasfiyesi. *Mülkiye*, Cilt 25, Sayı:228.

Oyan, O. (2002). From agricultural policies to an agriculture without policies. In N. Balkan & S. Savran (Eds.), *The ravages of neo-liberalism: Economy, society, and gender in Turkey*. Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science.

Oyan, O. (2009). IMF ve Dünya Bankası'nın tarım reformu uygulama projesinin bilançosu. *Mülkiye*, Vol.33, No.262, pp.237-254.

Öngel, E. (1981). Türkiye'nin tarımsal yapısının değişen nitelikleri. *Ekonomik Yaklaşım*, 5, pp.163-186.

Öniş, Z. (1987). Inflation and importing industrialization: An interpretation of the Turkish case. *Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies*, Vol.1, No.1.

Öniş, Z. (1998). *State and market the political economy of Turkey in comparative perspective*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.

Öniş, Z. (2003). Domestic politics versus global dynamics: Towards a political economy of the 2000 and 2001 financial crises in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 4:2, 1-30.

Öniş, Z. & Kirkpatrick C. (1998). Turkey and the World Bank: Aid and power. *State and market the political economy of Turkey in comparative perspective*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.

Özbudun, S, Başokçu E. K. (2004). 'Bizim köyde yoksulluk yok ki!' ya da yoksunluktan yoksulluğa Türkiye kırsalı üzerine notlar. *Toplum ve Hekim*, Cilt 17, Sayı 5.

Özkaya, T.,Oyan,O., Işın, F. & Uzmay, A. (2001a). Türkiye tarım ekonomisi nereye götürülüyor?. *İktisat Dergisi*, 412 (Nisan): 47-58.

Özkaya T., Oyan, O., Işın, F.& Uzmay, A. (2001b). Türkiye'de tarımsal destekleme politikaları, dünü-bugünü-geleceği. TUSES, Ankara.

Özkaya, T., Uzmay, A. & Adanacıoğlu, H. (2002). Türkiye tarım ekonomisinin 1980-2002 dönemindeki gelişimi, Ankara Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası, http://www.zmo.org.tr/etkinlikler/ktts02/08.pdf .

Özuğurlu, M. (2011). *Küçük köylülüğe sermaye kapanı: Türkiye'de tarım çalışmaları ve köylülük üzerine gözlemler*. Ankara: Nota Bene.

Paige, J. M. (1975). *Agrarian revolution: Social movement and export agriculture in the underdeveloped world.* New York: The Free Press.

Patel, R. (2006). International agrarian restructuring and the practical ethics of peasant movement solidarity. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 41(1-2), pp.71-93.

Patrick, I. (2004). Contract farming in Indonesia: Smallholders and agribusiness working together. *ACIAR Technical Reports*, No. 54 Canberra: University of New England.

Peled, M. X. (director) (2011). *Bitter seeds* (Documentary) Teddy Bear Films Inc.

Peluso, N.L.& Lund, C. (2011). New frontiers of land control: Introduction. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38:4.

Pieth, M. (2012). Collective action and corruption. Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper 13.

Platteau, J.P. (1994a). Behind the market stage where real societies exist- Part I: The role of public and private order institutions. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.30 No.3, pp.533-577.

Platteau, J.P. (1994b). Behind the market stage where real societies exist- Part II: The role of moral norms. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.30 No.3, pp.753-817.

Polanyi, K. (1957) [1944]. *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Ponte, S. (2010). Conclusion. In P.Gibbon, S. Ponte, & E. Lazaro (Eds.) *Global agro-food trade and standards: Challenges for Africa*. US, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.232-243.

Popkin, S. L. (1979). *The rational peasants*. University of California Press.

Prendergast, R.& Stewart, F. (Eds.) (1995). *Piyasa güçleri ve küresel kalkınma*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Pritchard W. & Burch D. (2003).*Agri-food globalization in perspective: International restructuring in the processing tomato industry*. Ashgate.

Quandt,S.A., Chen, H., Grzywacz, J.G., Vallejos, Q.M., Galvan, L., & Arcury, T.A. (2010). Cholinesterase depression and its association with pesticide exposure across the agricultural season among Latino farmworkers in North Carolina. *Environmental Health Perspectives*, Vol.118, No.5.

Radwan, S., Jamal, V.& Ghose, A. (1991). *Tunisia rural labour & structural transformation*. London, New York: Routledge.

Raikes, P. (2000). Modernization and adjustment in African peasant agriculture, in D. Bryceson, C. Kay & J. Mooij (Eds.), *Disappearing peasantries? : Rural labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London: IT Publications.

Rajasekhar, D. (1996). Problems and prospects of group lending in NGO credit progammes in India. *Savings and Development*, Vol. 20, No.1.

Rajbhandari, B. (2006). Sustainable livelihood and rural development in South Asia: Issue, concerns and general application. In M.C. Behera (Ed.) *Globalizing rural development: Competing paradigms and emerging realities*. Sage.

Ramirez-Ferrero, E. (2005). *Troubled fields: Men, emotions, and the crisis in American farming*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Razavi, S. (Ed.). (2002). *Shifting burdens: Gender and agrarian change under neoliberalism*. US, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Razavi, S. (Ed.). (2003). *Agrarian change, gender and land rights*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Razavi, S. (2003). Introduction: agrarian change, gender and land rights. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3(1-2), pp.2-32.

Reddy, D.N. & Mishra, S. (Eds.) (2009). *Agrarian Crisis in India*. New Delhi: Oxford.

Reed, D. (1996). An instrument of global economic policy. In D. Reed (Ed.) *Structural adjustment, the environment and sustainable development*. London, Sterling: Earthscan.

Renn, O. & Jaeger, C.C. & Rosa, E.A. & Webler, T. (2000). The Rational actor paradigm in risk theories: Analysis and critique. In M. J. Cohen (Ed.). *Risk in the modern age: Social theory, science and environmental decision- making*. London: MacMillan Press, pp. 35-61.

Ricardo, D. (1817) *Principles of political economy and taxation*. Kitchener, Ont. : Batoche, [2001].

Rigg, J. (2006). Evolving rural-urban relations and livelihoods in Southeast Asia. In C. Tacoli (Ed.) The Earthscan Reader in *Rural urban linkages*. London, Sterling: Earthscan pp.68-87.

Rigg, J., Veeravongs, S., Veeravongs, L. & Rohitarachoon, P. (2008). Reconfiguring rural spaces and remaking rural lives in Central Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 39(3).

Robinson, G. M. (2004). *Geographies of agriculture: Globalization restructuring and sustainability*. Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Rostow, W. W. (1960). *The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto*. UK:Cambridge University Press.

Ruben, R.& Bastiaensen, J. (2000). Introduction. In R. Ruben & J. Bastiaensen (Eds.) *Rural development in Central America: markets, livelihoods and local governance.*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 1-20.

Rustow, D.A. (1994). Turkish democracy in historical and comparative perspective. In M. Heper & A. Evin (Eds.) *Politics in the third Turkish Republic*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press.

Sachs, C. (1996). *Gendered fields: rural women, agriculture, and environment*. Westview Press, Inc..

Sachs, C. (2006). Rural women and the environment. In B.B. Bock & S. Shortall (Eds.) *Rural gender relations: issues and case studies*, US, UK: CABI publishing.

Sachs, J. D., Warner, A., Åslund, A., & Fischer, S. (1995). Economic reform and the process of global integration. *Brookings papers on economic activity*,(1), pp.1-118.

Saha, A. & Love, H.A. & Schwart, R. (1994). Adoption of emerging technologies under output uncertainty. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 76 (4), pp.836-846.

Sahu, G.B., Madheswaran, S. & Rajasekhar, D. (2004). Credit constraints and distress sales in rural India: Evidence from Kalahandi district, Orissa. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 31:2, 210-241.

Samoggia, A., Maccani, P., Michetti, M., Ergüder, C.,Topcu, C.& Tansug, Z.S. (2008). Turkey beyond CAP: Agro-food commercial relations with Emiliaromagna. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/44851/2/Samoggia.pdf.

Sarris, A. H. (1990). Guidelines for monitoring the impact of structural adjustment programmes on the agricultural sector. FAO Economic and Social Development Paper 95.

Scherr S.J. & McNeely J. A. (2008). Biodiversity conservation and agricultural sustainability: towards a new paradigm of 'ecoagriculture' landscapes. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* 363, pp.477-494.

Schumpeter, J. A (1961). *The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Scoones, I. (1992). Land degradation and livestock production in Zimbabwe's communal areas. *Land Degradation & Development*, 3(2), pp. 99-113.

Scoones, I. (2008). Mobilizing against GM crops in India, South Africa and Brazil. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 8(2-3), pp.315-344.

Scoones, I., Hall, R., Borras Jr, S. M., White, B.& Wolford, W. (2013). The politics of evidence: Methodologies for understanding the global land rush. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 40:3.

Scott, J. C. (1976). *The moral economy of the peasant: Rebellion and subsistence in southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. C. (1985). *Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. C. (1998). *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. New York: Alfred Knopf.

Sen, K. (2005). Economic reform and rural livelihood diversification: Malawi, Tanzania. In F. Ellis& H.A. Freeman (Eds.) *Rural livelihoods and poverty reduction policies*, Routledge.

Sengupta, D.& Gruère, G. (2011). Bt cotton and farmer suicides in India: an evidence-based assessment. *The Journal of Development Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, pp. 316 – 337.

Serageldin, İ. & Barrett, R. (Eds.) (1996). *Ethics and spiritual values: promoting environmentally sustainable development*. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction.

Servet, J-M.& Saiag, H.(2013). Household over-indebtedness in Northern and Southern Countries: A macro-perspective. In I. Guérin, S. Morvant-Roux & M. Villareal (Eds.) *Microfinance, debt and over-indebtedness: Juggling with money*. Oxon: Routledge Studies in Development Economics.

Shah, E. (2012). 'A life wasted making dust': affective histories of dearth, death, debt and farmers' suicides in India. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Volume 39, Issue 5, pp. 1159 – 1179.

Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1971). The assignment game I: The core. *International Journal of Game Theory*, *1*(1), pp.111-130.

Shylendra H.S. & Rani U. (2005). *Diversification and sustainable rural livelihood: A study in semi-arid villages of Western India*. New Delhi : Concept Pub.

Sikor, T. & Tuong Vi, P.T. (2005). The dynamics of commoditization in a Vietnamese uplands village, 1980-2000. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, No.3.

Simpson, D. J. (1965). Development as a process: The Menderes phase in Turkey. *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 141-152.

Sirman, N. (1987). Pamuk Üretiminde Aile İşletmeleri, in *Türkiye'de tarımsal yapıların gelişimi 1923-1987*. Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği Sempozyumu.

Sirman, N. (1990). State, village, and gender in Western Turkey. In A. Finkel & N. Sirman (Eds.) *Turkish state, Turkish society*, London: Routedge.

Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, T. (1994). *Social revolutions in the modern world*. New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. (1776). *The wealth of nations*. A. Skinner (Ed.) (1970) Pelican Classics.

Snow, D. A. & Benford, R.D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.D. Morris & C.M Mueller (Eds.) *Frontiers in social movement theory*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Snow, D.A., Rochford Jr., E.B., Worden, S.K. & Benford, R.D. (1986). Frame alignment processes: Micromobilization and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51, pp.464-481.

Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 70.

Soto, H. de (2001). *The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else*. London: Black Swan Books.

Soyak, A.(Ed.) (2002). *Küreselleşme: İktisadi yönelimler ve sosyopolitik karşıtlıklar*. İstanbul: Om Yayınevi.

Soyak, A.& Eroğlu, N. (2008). The role of IMF-World Bank structural adjustment policies in the transformation of Turkey's development perception. MPRA Paper No:11466, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11466/.

Soylu, C. (2010) Contested commons: Power relations and collective action at the Uluabat Lake, Turkey. PhD Dissertation, University of Siena.

Spoor, M . (Ed.) (1997). *The 'market panacea': Agrarian transformation in developing countries and former socialist economies*. Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd (ITP).

Spoor, M. (1997). Agrarian transformation in Nicaragua: Market liberalization and peasant rationality. In M. Spoor (Ed.) *The 'Market Panacea': Agrarian transformation in developing countries and former socialist economies*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Spoor, M. (Ed.). (2009). *The political economy of rural livelihoods in transition economies: Land, peasants and rural poverty in transition*. London, New York: Routledge.

Staples, D. (2007). *No place like home: Organizing home-based labor in the era of structural adjustment*. New York, London: Routledge.

Stedile, J. P. (2007). The neoliberal agrarian model in Brazil. *Monthly Review*, Vol. 58, No.8.

Steward, A. (2007). Nobody farms here anymore: Livelihood diversification in the Amazonian community of Carvao, a historical perspective. *Agriculture and Human Values* 24:75–92.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). *Globalization and its discontents*. New York, London: W.W. Norton& Company.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2004). Capital-market liberalization, globalization, and the IMF. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, *20*(1), pp.57-71.

Stirling, P. (1965). *Turkish village*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Strange, S. (1986). *Casino capitalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Suiçmez, B. R. (2000). Küreselleşme ve toprak politikamız. *Kamu Yönetimi Dünyası Dergisi*, Sayı 1, Mayıs.

Sumner, D. A. & Hallstrom, D. G. & Lee, H. (1998). Trade policy and the effects of climate forecast on agricultural markets. *American Journal of Agriculture*, 80(5), pp.1102-1108.

Sunar, İ. (2004). *State, society and democracy in Turkey*. İstanbul: Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Şen, Ş.(Producer) (2010, January 20). *Halk Meydanı*. [Television broadcast] Bursa: Olay TV.

T.C. Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı (2009). *Türkiye tarım havzaları üretim ve destekleme modeli*. http://www.tarim.gov.tr/Files/duyurular/Sunum/TarimHavzalariSunum14TEMMUZ09.ppt .

Tabor, S. R. (Ed.) (1995). *Agricultural research in an era of adjustment policies, institutions, and progress*. EDI Seminar Series, Washington: IBRD, The World Bank.

Tanrıvermiş, H. & Demir, E. (2005). A research on credit problems of agriculture, credit cooperatives and restructuring needs in Turkey XXVIII. International Turkish Cooperative Congress retrieved from http://www.koopkur.org.tr/pdf/2005kongreing.pdf#page=135 .

Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Taşkın, Y. (2008). AKP's Move to "Conquer" the Center-Right: Its Prospects and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process. *Turkish Studies*, *9*(1), 53-72.

Taşkın, Y. (2013). Hegemonizing conservative democracy and the problems of democratization in Turkey: Conservatism without democrats?. *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, Iss. 2.

Taylor, M. (2012). The antinomies of 'financial inclusion': Debt, distress and the workings of Indian microfinance, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.12, Issue. 4.

Tekelioğlu, Y. (1983). Tarımda yapısal gelişmeler ve tarıma dayalı endüstriler sorunu. *TC Ziraat Bankası Dergisi*, 19, pp16-21.

Thompson, E.P. (1966). *The making of the English working class*. New York: Vintage Books.

Thompson, E.P. (1971). The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteeenth century. *Past and Present*. 50, pp. 76-136.

Thompson, E.P. (1975). *Whigs and hunters*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. US: McGraw-Hill.

Tipton, D. (2013). *Professionalism, work, and clinical responsibility in pharmacy*. US: Jones & Bartlett Learning.

Ulukan, U. (2009). *Türkiye tarımında yapısal dönüşüm ve sözleşmeli çiftçilik: Bursa örneği.* İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı.

Ulusan, A. (1980). Public policy toward agriculture and its redistributive implications. In E. Özbudun & A. Ulusan (Eds.), *The political economy of income distribution in Turkey* (125-167). New York: Holmes-Meier Publishers.

Uluslararası Tarımsal İlişkiler ve Avrupa Birliği'ne Uyum Komisyonu Çalışma Belgesi (2004) II. Tarım Şurası, Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı.

Uzzi, B. & Lancaster, R.(2004). Embeddedness and price formation in the corporate law market. *American Sociological Review*, 69(3): 26.

Ünal, F. G. (2008). Small Is beautiful: Evidence of an inverse relationship between farm size and yield in Turkey. The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 551.

Van der Ploeg, J. D. (1993). Potatoes and knowledge. In M. Hobart (Ed.) *An anthropological critique of development* (pp.209-227). London: Routledge.

Van der Ploeg, J. D. (2008). *The new peasantries: Struggles for autonomy and sustainability in an era of empire and globalization*. Earthscan.

Vanderburg, W.H. (1988). Political imagination in a technical age. In R. B. Day, R. Beiner & J. Masciulli (Eds.), *Democratic theory and technological society* (pp. 3-35). Armonk, New York: M. E Sharpe, Inc.

Vasavi, A.R. (2008). *Suicides and the making of India's agrarian crisis.* Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies.

Vasavi, A. R. (2012). *Shadow space: Suicides and the predicament of rural India*. Harayana, India: Three Essays Collective.

Veitch, K. (2013). Law, social policy, and the constitution of markets and profit making. *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 40, No.1.

Vorley, B., Fearne, A., & Ray, D. (2007). Restructuring of agri-food systems and prospects for small producers. In B. Vorley, A. Fearne, & D. Ray (Eds.), *Regoverning markets: A place for small-scale producers in modern agrifood chains?*, Gower IEDD, 193-211.

Walker, C. (2002). Land reform and the empowerment of rural women in post-apartheid South Africa. In S. Razavi (Ed.) *Shifting burdens: Gender and agrarian change under neoliberalism*. US, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Walker, K. L. M. (2008). From covert to overt: everyday peasant politics in China and the implications for transnational agrarian movements. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 8(2-3), pp.462-488.

Wallerstein, I. M. (1974). *The modern world system*. New York: Academic Press.

Wan, M.T. (2001). Secrets of success: Uncertainty, profits and prosperity in the Gari economy of Ibadan, 1992-94. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 71 (2), pp.225-252.

Watts, M. (1990). Peasants under contract: Agro-food complexes in the Third World. In H. Bernstein, B. Crow, M. Mackintosh, & C. Martin (Eds.), *The food question: Profit versus people?*. London: Earthscan Pub. (pp.149-162).

Wilkinson, J., & Herrera, S. (2010). Biofuels in Brazil: Debates and impacts.*The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *37*(4), pp.749-768.

Williams, J. R.; Llewelyn, R. V.; Barnaby, G. A. (1990). Risk analysis of tillage alternatives with government programs. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 8, pp.72-181.

Williamson, J. (1990). What Washington means by policy reform. In J. Williamson, (Ed.), *Latin American adjustment: How much has happened?* Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Williamson, O.E. (2000). The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38(3), pp. 595-613.

Wolf, E. R. (1969). *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*. New York: Harper & Row.

Wolford, W., Borras Jr, S.M., Hall, R., Scoones, I.& White, B. (2013). Governing global land deals: The role of the state in the rush for land. *Development & Change*, vol. 44.2.

Wood, E. M. (2000). The agrarian origins of capitalism. *Hungry for profit: The agribusiness threat to farmers, food, and the environment*. New York: Monthly Review Press, pp.23-41.

World Bank (2000/2001). World Development Report.

World Bank. (2000). Loan agreement. Privatization Social Support Project. December 21. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/ECA/2004/12/15/713C52B219CEBA1E85256F0300169DFE/1_0/Rendered/PDF/713C52B219CEBA1E85256F0300169DFE.pdf

World Bank. (2000). Türkiye ekonomik reform kredisi kalkınma politikası mektubu. March 10. http://www.belgenet.com/eko/kpm_2.html

World Bank. Agricultural Reform Implementation (ARIP). http://www.worldbank.org.tr/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEYEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20188065~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:361712,00.html .

World Bank. Turkey- Agricultural Reform Implementation. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/08/18/000094946_00081705310273/Rendered/INDEX/multi0page.txt Report No. PID9405.

Yalazı, Ş. (2009). *Karacabey*. 2. Edition, İstanbul:Özal Matbaası.

Yalçınkaya, N., Yalçınkaya M.H.& Çılbant C. (2006). Avrupa Birliği'ne yönelik düzenlemeler Çerçevesinde Türk tarım politikaları ve sektörün geleceği üzerine etkisi, *Yönetim ve Ekonomi*, Cilt.13, Sayı.2, http://www.bayar.edu.tr/~iibf/dergi/pdf/C13S22006/NYHYCC.pdf .

Yalman, G.L. (2009). *Transition to neoliberalism the case of Turkey in the 1980s*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press.

Yaro, J. A. (2006). Is deagrarianisation real? A study of livelihood activities in rural Northern Ghana. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44,1.

Yavuz, F. (Ed.) (2005). *Türkiye'de tarım*. Ankara: Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı.

Yenal, D.& Yenal, Z. (1993). The changing world food order: The case of Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*. 9.

Yenal, N. Z. (2001). Türkiye'de tarım ve gıda üretiminin yeniden yapılanması ve uluslararasılaşması. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 88 (Bahar): 32-54.

Yıldız, Ö. (2008). GAP illerinde sosyal ve ekonomik dönüşüm. *Ege Akademik Bakış*, 8 (1).

Yılmaz, H., Demircan, V.& Dernek, Z. (2006). Türkiye'de 2000 yılı sonrası uygulanan tarım politikalarının yansımalarına ilişkin üretici görüşleri üzerine bir araştırma. *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Ziraat Fakültesi Dergisi,* 1(2):60-70.

Yomralioglu, T., Inan, H. I., Aydinoglu, A.C. & Uzun, B. (2009). Evaluation of initiatives for spatial information system to support Turkish agricultural policy. *Scientific Research and Essay*, Vol.4 (12), 1523-1530.

Zafirovski, M. Z. (2000). An alternative sociological perspective on economic value: Price formation as a social process. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, *14*(2), pp.265-295.

Zelizer, V. A. (1981). The price and value of children: The case of children's insurance. *American Journal of Sociology*, pp.1036-1056.

Zelizer, V. (1989). The social meaning of money: Special monies. *American Journal of Sociology*, 7, 342-77.

Zelizer, V. (1994).*The social meaning of money*. New York: Basic Books.

Zelizer, V. (2011). *Economic lives: How culture shapes the economy*. Princeton University Press.

Zoomers, E. B. & Zoomers, A. (1999). *Linking livelihood strategies to development: Experiences from the Bolivian Andes*. Koninklijk Instituut Voor de Tropen.

NEWSPAPERS

AB Gıda, "Karadağ'dan çıkmam" diyor!. (2008, May 7). *Meltem*, retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/2221- .

ABD'den üç mesaj. (2004, January 7). *Milliyet*, retrieved from http://www.milliyet.com.tr/abdden--uc-mesaj/dunya/haberdetayarsiv/07.01.2004/22941/default.htm.

Bakırköy kan ağlıyor. (2010, August 16). *Meltem*, retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/7290- .

Bakkaldaki tarihi sikkelere operasyon. (2009, January 19). retrieved from www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/3684

Bankaların zararı çiftçiye yıkılamaz. (2000, November 23). *Meltem*, p.1.

Borcu yüzünden intihar etti. (2008, July 12). *Meltem*, retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/2619- .

Bursa'da yakalanan tefecilerden 4'ü tutuklandı. (2012, October 4). retrieved from http://www.haber3.com/bursada-yakalanan-tefecilerden-4u-tutuklandi-1541219h.htm#ixzz2NFC9XLNK .

'Çılgın Projeler'e çevre ayarı. (2013, April 6). retrieved from http://haber.gazetevatan.com/cilgin-projelere-cevre-ayari/527816/2/ekonomi

Çiftçi dibe vurdu. (2002, April 18). *Meltem*, p.1.

Çiftçi ürettiği için cezalandırılıyor. (2006, March 23). *Meltem*, p.1.

Çiftçinin kızgınlığı sürüyor. (2000, June 29). *Meltem*, p.3.

Çiftçiye mısır önerisi. (2002, February 14). *Meltem*, p.5.

Çiftçiye mısır önerisi. (2003, April 3). *Meltem*, p.5.

Devlete güvenip mısır ektik; mağdur olduk. (2005,December 5). *Meltem*, p.9.

Doğrudan destekleme kuyruğu. (2002, February 28). *Meltem*, p.1.

Domates ekmeyebiliriz. (2000, January 17). *Meltem*, p.2.

Domates üreticisi mısıra yöneliyor. (2001, October 22). *Meltem*, p.1.

Domates üreticisine Cargill piyangosu. (2002, April 29). *Meltem*, p.5.

Domateste köşe kapmaca. (2002, October 3). *Meltem*, p.1

Fabrikalarla üreticilerin toplantısında "fiyasko". (2000, February 21). *Meltem*, p.1.

Ferhat Şelli: Bursa,Türkiye'nin tarım 'teknokenti' konumunda. (2009, August 5). http://www.tarimmerkezi.com/haber_detay.php?hid=24958.

Fransız mısırı çiftçiyi kavurdu. (2000, September 25). *Meltem*, p.1.

GDO'lu pamukta rüşvetin belgesi ABD'den çıktı. (2009, November 19). *Habertürk*, p.6.

Gübredeki sömürüyü kim durduracak. (2001, March 19). *Meltem*, p.1.

Jandarma göz açtırmadı! (2009, August 22). retrieved from www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/5064-

Jandarma'dan tarihi eser operasyonu. (2010, April 20). retrieved from www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/6586

Kanolayı yaymak istiyoruz. (2006, September 6). *Meltem*, p.1.

Kanolayla iki kat verim. (2006, July 31). *Meltem*, p.1.

Karaca, "DGD Türk çiftçisine ne kazandırdı?". (2005, March 3). *Meltem*, p.9.

Karaca'dan domates fabrikalarına tepki. (2004, April 11). *Meltem*, p.7.

Karacabey 170 bin ton salça ihraç edecek. (2012, June 27). Retrieved from http://www.gidavitrini.com.tr/haber/karacabey-170-bin-ton-salca-ihrac-edecek-4209.html.

Karacabey Güney Marmara'da. (2009, July 29). *Meltem*, Retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/4935-

Karacabey ovası sular altında. (2004, January 29). *Meltem*, p.1.

Karacabey peşkeşe karşı. (2004, August 16). *Meltem*, p.1.

Karacabey'de asırlık soygun. (2004, July 24). *Meltem,* pp.1-7.

Karacabey'de tarihi eser operasyonu.(2009, August 8) retrieved from www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/4961

Komik satışa tepkiler büyüyor. (2004, July 19). *Meltem,* p.1.

Kotiyak yerine Disneyland projesi. (2012, August 10). retrieved from http://www.karacabeyblog.com/?p=43583.

KOTİYAK'a kötü haber. (2013, May 28). retrieved from http://www.bursadabugun.com/haber/kotiyak-a-kotu-haber-ozel-haber-229436.html.

Köylü ipotek altında. (2009, August 27). *Meltem,* retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/5089- .

Mevsimlik işçiler rahat edecek. (2012, May 16). *Meltem,* retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/10900-mevsimlik-isciler-rahat-edecek.

Mevsimlik işçiler sözleşmeli olacak. (2011, July 28). *Meltem,* retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/9238-.

Mevsimlik işçilere büyük destek. (2012, January 14). *Meltem,* retrieved from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/10128-mevsimlik-iscilere-buyuk-destek.

Mısır üreticisi perişan oldu. (2005, November 28). *Meltem,* p.1

Otoyol Karacabey'i bitirir!. retrieved from http://www.cesnigirkoyu.com/?Syf=18&Hbr=229485 .

Ova Köyleri Sulama Birliği'ne tepki. (2005, April 28). *Meltem,* pp.1-11.

Pancar alımları sona erdi. (2011, December 3). *Meltem.* Retrived from http://www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/9886-pancar-alimlari-sona-erdi

Pancar üreticilerinin bitmeyen sıkıntısı. (2000, October 5). *Meltem,* p.1

Süt üreticisinde hayal kırıklığı. (2003, January 2). *Meltem,* p.5.

Şaibeli satışa bir dava da Baro'dan. (2004, September 20). *Meltem,* p.1.

Tarım Kredi 2023 Strateji Belgesi ve Eylem Planı kamuoyuyla paylaşıldı. (2011). retrieved from http://www.tareksav.org.tr/index.php/haberler/1-son-haberler/120-tarim-kredi-2023-strateji-belgesi-ve-eylem-plani-kamuoyuyla-paylasildi.

Tarıma meclis merceği. (2006, 5 June). *Meltem,* p.1

Tarım-İş'ten TİGEM'e sitem. (2000, March 9). *Meltem,* p.1.

Tarih yağmacısı yakalandı. (2007, November 15). retrieved from www.meltemgazetesi.com/haber/1327

Toprak bozuluyor. (2005, May 2). *Meltem,* pp.1-2.

Uluabat Gölü Marmara Denizi ile birleşiyor. (2010, December 19). retrieved from http://www.denizhaber.com.tr/deniz-kulturu/31712/wwf-turkiye-su-kaynak-uluabat-golu-proje-otoyol-marmara-denizi.html .

Uluabat Gölü Marmara ile birleşecek. (2010, December 9). *Milliyet*, retrieved from http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ulubat-golu-marmara-ile-birlesecek/turkiye/sondakika/09.12.2010/1324318/default.htm .

Üretici Vatan'a ateş püskürüyor. (2000,February 3). *Meltem*, p.1.

Üreticiden 4 fabrikaya boykot kararı. (2000, May 4). *Meltem*, p.1.

Vali Harput: Mevsimlik işçiler arasına sızacak bölücü unsurlara dikkat edilmeli. (2012, May 14). retrieved from http://www.e-haberajansi.com/vali-harput-mevsimlik-isciler-arasina-sizacak-bolucu-unsurlara-dikkat-edilmeli-83875.html.

Vatan 3. senet yolunda. (2001, February 5). *Meltem*, p.1.

Yağışlarla ilgili kamuoyuna açıklama. (2010, February 8). retrieved from http://www.karacabeyziraatodasi.org.tr/yagislarla-ilgili-kamuoyuna-aciklama.html.