IBN HALDUN UNIVERSITY
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MASTER THESIS

FROM PARTISAN INTERVENTIONS TO MEDIATION: THE CHANGING ROLES IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

ENES YALMAN

THESIS SUPERVISOR
PROF. DR. TALHA KÖSE

ISTANBUL, 2022

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FROM PARTISAN INTERVENTIONS TO MEDIATION: THE CHANGING ROLES IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

BY
ENES YALMAN

A thesis submitted to the Alliance of Civilizations Institute in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Civilization Studies

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ISTANBUL, 2022

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Civilization Studies

Thesis Jury Members

Title - Name Surname	Opinion	Signature
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This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Alliance of Civilizations Institute of Ibn Haldun University.

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ÖZ

Bu tez, çatışmalara müdahale eden üçüncü tarafların hem partizan hem de partizan olmayan (arabulucu) rolleri oynayıp oynayamayacağını değerlendirmeyi ve küresel çatışmalarda her iki rolü de oynamanın etkilerini sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Tez nitel bir içerik analizi yaklaşımını benimser. Bu araştırma yöntemi, son yıllarda Uluslararası İlişkiler araştırmalarında yaygın bir şekilde kullanılmaya başlandı ve yorumlayıcı analizlerden katı metinsel incelemelere kadar uzanan bir dizi analitik yaklaşımı tanımlıyor. Üçüncü taraf çatışma müdahalesi ve bunun uluslararası ve bölgesel siyaset üzerindeki etkisi ile ilgili olan bu çalışma, üçüncü taraf bir aktör olarak, Türkiye'nin rolünün, Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenlik çıkarlarına ve belirli çatışmalara müdahale eden diğer büyük aktörlerin güç projeksiyonlarına bağlı olarak partizan veya arabulucu olarak değiştiğini tartışmaktadır. Üçüncü taraf çatışma müdahalesini açıklamak ve anlamak için dört vaka test edildi ve tartışıldı; Birincisi, Türkiye, Libya Ulusal Mutabakat Hükümeti'ni Libya Ulusal Ordusu'na karşı mücadelesinde desteklemek için askeri güçler konuşlandırarak sürmekte olan Libya çatışmasında partizan bir rol oynuyor. İkinci ve üçüncü olarak, Türkiye, Suriye ve Irak'taki askeri harekâtlarına muhalefet etmesine rağmen, PKK ve ona bağlı YPG'ye karşı askeri güç konuşlandırarak iki çatışmada da partizan rol oynamaya devam ediyor. Son olarak, Türkiye, çatışmaların olası bir şekilde durdurulması ve müzakere masasına dönülmesi de dahil olmak üzere çok çeşitli konularda arabuluculuk yapmayı teklif ederek, Rusya ile Ukrayna arasındaki çatışmada tarafsız bir rol oynamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: (Arabuluculuk, Partizan Roller, Partizan Olmayan Roller, Üçüncü Taraf Çatışma Müdahaleleri)

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to assess whether third parties intervening in conflicts can play both partisan and non-partisan (mediator) roles, and interrogate the effects of playing both roles in global conflicts. The thesis adopts a qualitative content analysis approach. This research method has come into wide usage in International Relations research in recent years and describes a constellation of analytical approaches ranging from interpretive analyses to strict textual examinations. The study is related to third-party conflict intervention and its impact on international and regional politics. As a third-party actor, this thesis argues that the role of Türkiye has been changing as partisan or mediator depending on Türkiye's national security interests and the power projection of the other major actors which intervene in the specific conflicts. To explain and understand third-party conflict intervention, there are four cases have been tested and discussed; First, Türkiye plays a partisan role in the ongoing Libyan conflict by deploying military forces to support the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in its fight against the Libyan National Army (LNA). Secondly and thirdly, despite facing opposition to its military incursions in Syria and Iraq, Türkiye continues to play partisan roles in the two conflicts by deploying military forces against the PKK and its affiliate, the YPG. Finally, Türkiye plays a non-partisan role in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine by offering to serve as a mediator on a wide range of issues, including a possible cessation of hostilities and a return to the negotiating table.

Keywords: (Mediation, Partisan Roles, Non-Partisan Roles, Third-Party Conflict Interventions)

Table of Contents

APPROVAL PAGE iii
ACADEMIC HONESTY ATTESTATION iv
ÖZ iv
ABSTRACT v
Table of Contents vi
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS vii
CHAPTER I 1
INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Thesis Topic and Research Questions 1
1.2 The Rationale of the Study 3
1.3 Research Aims 6
1.4 Research Questions 7
CHAPTER II 8
CONCEPTUALIZATION A OF THE STUDY 8
2.1 The Concept of Intervention 8
2.2 The Concept, Causes, and Effects of Third-Party Interventions 10
CHAPTER III 15
THEORETICAL DEBATES AND FRAMEWORK 15
3.1 Theoretical Debates 15
3.2 Methodological Framework 20
3.3 Data Collection 24
CHAPTER IV 26
TEST RESULTS 26
4.1 Results of the Analysis of Foreign Policy Information Obtained from Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website 29
4.2 Results of the Identification of News Articles via the Al-Jazeera Website 30
CHAPTER V 44
CASE STUDIES 44
5.1 Turkish Partisan Intervention in the Libyan Conflict 44
5.2 Türkiye's Threat of an Incursion in Syria and its Regional Ambitions 45
5.3 Türkiye's Partisan Military Intervention in Iraq as a Strategy to Counter Iran's Growing Influence in the Country 46
5.4 Türkiye's Role in Mediating Global Conflicts as a Reflection of its Desire to Maintain a Strategic Global Balance of Power 48
CHAPTER VI 53
CONCLUSION 53
REFERENCES 56
CURRICULUM VITAE 66

LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

GNA	Libyan Government of National Accord
IR	International Relations
LNA	Libyan National Army
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party, an internationally listed as a terrorist organization
PRISMA	Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses
UN	United Nations
YPG	People's Defense Units, a terrorist organization closely associated with (PKK)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Thesis Topic and Research Questions

This thesis seeks to assess whether third parties intervening in conflicts can play both partisan and non-partisan (mediator) roles, and interrogate the effects of playing the both roles in global conflicts.

The thesis adopts a qualitative content analysis approach. This method has become widely used in International Relations research in recent years and describes a constellation of analytical approaches ranging from interpretive analyses to strict textual examinations. This methodology is adopted in the thesis mainly because of its flexibility, which allows variations over time, given the theoretical and substantive interests of the researcher.

The study relates to third-party conflict intervention and its impact on international and regional politics. To explain and understand third-party conflict intervention, there are four cases to study. First, Türkiye plays a partisan role in the ongoing Libyan conflict by deploying military forces to support the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in its fight against General Khalifa Haftar's LNA. Secondly, despite facing opposition to its military incursions in Syria and Iraq, Türkiye continues to play partisan roles in the two conflicts by deploying military forces against the PKK and its affiliate, the YPG. Finally, Türkiye plays a non-partisan role in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine by offering to serve as a mediator on a wide range of issues, including a possible cessation of hostilities and a return to the negotiating table. It is evident that by playing an intermediary role, Türkiye intends to position itself as a friend of Russia and the West.

Several research questions attempt to answer the thesis. First, does the third party decide to remain neutral? Are there situations where partisanship is not an option? In such cases, which of the conflicting parties supports and why? Which approach is effective when direct

intervention is required? Does the country impose economic sanctions or apply diplomatic pressure? Does it use force in conflicts in which it involves? Without a doubt, these questions have continuously been asked in Türkiye and other countries worldwide. Against this backdrop, the core objective of this thesis is to propose robust answers to these critical foreign policy questions and examine the process through which states decide to become involved in conflicts between countries. This thesis will further cognizance that countries have always taken sides in other states' conflicts by using a broad range of military and non-military interventions. Various theories of conflict intervention have been developed to explain how such important policy decisions are made. The challenge, however, is that most of these theories fail to identify how states determine their preferred intervention. The study will further address previously unexplored concerns about Türkiye's behavior in foreign conflicts.

It is vital to emphasize that conflicts have always been inherent in human relations over various issues such as values, identity, the unequal distribution of resources, or even the quest for self-determination. Indeed, conflicts are bound to occur when specific fundamental human needs and desires are unmet. In the epoch before the Cold War, the world was defined by a focus on interstate wars, power relations, and political differences (Newman, 2004). However, the realities of the Cold War ushered in the realization that conflicts within and between states destabilized the nations involved and threatened overall international peace and security (Newman, 2004). By way of demonstration, there remains an intricate connection between conflicts and the environment and natural resources. That is why conflicts between states often lead to power struggles to either retain or acquire control over these resources (Ross, 2004).

Additionally, the outbreak of any conflict is often quickly followed by incredible human suffering and loss of life, as well as the forced displacement of people across state borders (Stevens et al., 2013). At the economic level, conflicts within and between countries discourage investments since resources that could be primarily used for social and economic development

are diverted. On this basis, today's global conflict intervention efforts are geared towards reducing the violence that characterizes international conflicts, significantly lowering the chances of international conflicts resulting in violence or establishing and reinforcing various institutions that can allow the peaceful expression of differences (Hegre, 2014). The other critical point is that significant transportation and information technology developments have defined the decades following World War II. Such innovations have dramatically increased the chances of a third state intervening, even in geographically remote conflicts (Siqueira, 2003). The bottom line is that all countries -large and small- cannot run away from having to constantly confront the choice of whether to intervene in other states' confrontations.

1.2 The Rationale of the Study

International conflict interventions have primarily been characterized by two approaches: partisan interventions and non-partisan forms of intervention (Mitchell, 1981). For this study, partisan interventions will be determined as any intervention in an international military dispute where the intervening nation sides with one of the disputants to help the said disputant prevail in the conflict (Sinno, 2015). It bears a stark contrast from non-partisan forms of intervention where the intervening state engages in behavior geared towards resolving the conflict without taking sides with any disputant (Fisher, 2007). An examination of Türkiye's past military interventions reveals that it has engaged in both partisan and intermediary behavior in recent global conflicts. In the Libyan conflict, for instance, Ankara had earlier cautioned against NATO-led intervention primarily because of its promising trade relations with Tripoli in the years leading to the Arab Spring (Bagci & Erdurmaz, 2017). However, when Gaddafi's fall appeared inevitable following the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and NATO’s leading states, the United States and France, decided to make military operations in the country, Prime Minister Erdogan changed his mind and supported the idea of military intervention, resulting in Türkiye's role in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime (Bagci &

Erdurmaz, 2017). However, following Gaddafi's death, attempts to rebuild the country failed, resulting in a new Civil War between rival governments.

On the one hand, in this Civil War has been the Tripoli administration was known as the Government of National Accord (GNA) (Qamar, 2020). However, the hand has been the administration of the Libyan National Army (LNA) based in Tobruk and led by Khalifa Haftar (Qamar, 2020). Between 2014 and 2019, Ankara's focus in Libya was to negotiate a ceasefire between the GNA and the LNA (Qamar, 2020). However, when Haftar refused to sign a ceasefire agreement brokered in early 2020 by Türkiye and Russia, Ankara intensified its military and logistical support to the GNA (Qamar, 2020). As a result of Türkiye's partisan approach to the Libyan intervention, the GNA has regained control over strategic swathes of Libya.

There are, nevertheless, international conflicts where Türkiye has taken the position of a non-partisan intervener. A case in point is the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It is important to note that non-partisan interventions occur differently. One such form is good offices, where a third party helps the key parties to the conflict to re-initiate negotiations while at the same time ensuring that it has minimal involvement in the content of the dispute. Towards the end of July 2022, for instance, Türkiye re-initiated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, culminating in an agreement guaranteeing the safe passage of commercial ships from Odesa and other Ukrainian ports that had been cut off by a Russian naval blockade (Fahim, 2022). Pointedly, Russia and Ukraine are among the world's top producers and exporters of grain. In 2021 alone, Ukraine accounted for over 10% of the total global wheat exports (Fahim, 2022). Thus, this deal came against the backdrop of global concerns that the conflict, which resulted in over 20 million tons of grain stuck in Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, would cause worldwide shortages and worsening global economic hardships (Fahim, 2022). Türkiye's non-partisan intervention in the Russia-Ukrainian war has also taken the posture of mediation and

conciliation, which involves a third party actively participating in resolving a conflict between other parties. While the critical objective and mediation and conciliation are to propose a solution that the parties to the conflict can both find acceptable, they differ slightly in the sense that a single third party often constitutes mediation.

In contrast, conciliation may involve the constitution of a commission. In the months leading to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Turkish President Erdogan had made it clear that his country was ready to mediate between the two conflicting countries (Al Jazeera, 2022). Furthermore, President Erdogan reiterated that Ankara was interested in peace and stability in the Black Sea Region. In the months following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Türkiye has repeatedly confirmed its willingness to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiating table (Al Jazeera, 2022). In early September 2022, for example, President Erdogan offered to mediate in the stand-off between Russia and Ukraine over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (Al Jazeera, 2022). Amid growing alarm over the continued shelling in the power plant area, stoking fears of an atomic disaster, President Erdogan warned both Russian and Ukrainian leaders of the dangers of a nuclear disaster if an agreement was not reached (Al Jazeera, 2022). However, while Kyiv has not objected to Türkiye's mediation efforts, Moscow has made it clear that it would welcome Türkiye's efforts only if they emphasized the fulfillment of existing agreements and commitments under the Minsk Accords.

It would be inaccurate to assert that Türkiye's intervention in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been entirely non-partisan. Although Ankara enjoys close ties with Moscow, it heavily criticized the latter's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, it declared its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity in the face of the separatist conflicts that had been ongoing in Eastern Ukraine over the last decade (Associated Press, 2020). At the same time, Türkiye was among the 93 nations that voted in April 2022 to suspend Russia from the United National Human Rights Council at the UN General Assembly following reports of human rights

violations by Russian troops in Ukraine (Cook, 2022). Recently, Türkiye joined its NATO allies in condemning Russia's annexation of four Ukrainian provinces, making it clear that the decision by Moscow was a grave violation of international law (Person, 2022). Finally, it is worth noting that Erdogan had ignited anger in Moscow by providing military drones to Ukraine and backing what appears to be NATO's current strategy to expand its presence in the Black Sea region (Cook, 2022). This apparent lack of decisiveness has left Türkiye's allies wondering how long Türkiye will continue playing both sides of the conflict.

The main objective of the thesis is to investigate under what conditions mid-range states intervening in conflicts can play both non-partisan and partisan roles. In Türkiye's case, it will assess why the country finds it necessary to provide military support to a party to a conflict while at the same time taking the posture of a mediator and how such decisions are made. Specifically, the thesis will examine the factors that shape the decision of mid-range countries, like Türkiye, to resort to and implement both militarized and non-militarized forms of intervention in international conflicts. Moreover, this study will also assess the impact of Türkiye’s playing both partisan and non-partisan roles in global conflicts. Finally, this study will interrogate why Türkiye plays both partisan and non-partisan roles in various conflicts worldwide. There is no doubt that the outcome of this thesis will bring some insights into the usefulness of diverse methodological approaches to resolving conflicts.

1.3 Research Aims

This study will pursue the following research aims:

1. Assess whether parties intervening in conflicts can play both partisan and non-partisan roles.
2. Interrogate the effects of playing both partisan and non-partisan roles in global conflicts.

1.4 Research Questions

The pursuit of the research aims mentioned above will play a role in answering the following core research question:

- Why does Türkiye play, in some cases, a partisan and, in other cases, a non-partisan role in different conflicts in which Türkiye intervenes?

The other research questions are:

- Can Türkiye select which conflicts with remaining a third-party non-partisan actor or not?
- Are there circumstances for Türkiye when non-partisanship is not an option? In such circumstances, which side of the conflict part/parties does Türkiye side?
- Which conflict does Türkiye apply diplomatic pressure to the conflicting parties?
- Which conflict does Türkiye engage as a partisan third-party actor?

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUALIZATION A OF THE STUDY

2.1 The Concept of Intervention

Undoubtedly, one of the most high-profile topics in the years following the Cold War has been that of intervention. Indeed, some authors argue that the reason the topic has occupied such an exalted position in foreign policy debates lies in the fact that the last three decades have been defined by a high frequency of military interventions and a significant expansion in the range of global challenges to which various interventions have been applied (Grigoryan, 2010). To properly conceptualize the concept of intervention, it is vital first to note that intervention assists to established international order, a systemic configuration of political authority, even under the anarchical international system (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Within this international order lies multiple units of political authority, each enjoying a distinct realm of jurisdiction and organized around certain principles of differentiation (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Against this backdrop, an international intervention can be conceived as a transgression of a unit's realm of jurisdiction by the actions of other units within the international system (Grigoryan, 2010). Based on this understanding, it is evident that the concept of intervention is intricately linked to that of sovereignty. There is consensus in almost all the foundational theories of international relations that entities recognized as states within international law possess jurisdictional sovereignty recognized by other states (And & Williams, 2006). This jurisdictional sovereignty confers on states an exalted juridical status, including the right to make laws and enforce them in determining its affairs (And & Williams, 2006). Scholars have, however, pointed out that the supreme juridical status states enjoy should not be confused with the international relations principle of political autonomy, which denotes the practical ability of any state within the international legal order to operate without concern for external influences (And & Williams, 2006). Despite the sacrosanct nature of jurisdictional sovereignty, there are instances where

states can voluntarily elect to curb their juridical status by pooling sovereignty into a supranational entity.

The concept of intervention is, undoubtedly, not new. Indeed, governments have often taken a keen interest in the affairs of other states, mainly if such affairs are of consequence to them (Delcourt, 2006). Thus, some scholars point out that one of the reasons why the term remains a contentious issue within the broad discipline of international relations is because of its exception to the exalted role of non-intervention (Hayman & Williams, 2006). In international law, the doctrine of non-intervention has been used to prohibit using force against another state's territorial integrity or political independence (Havercroft, 2012).

However, international law limits third-party interference but lacks consensus on its rationale and scope for exceptional situations and remains uncertain about these issues. For instance, the debate about to what extent economic, political, and diplomatic measures constitute unlawful intervention has not yet been settled (Aloupi, 2015).

This issue is crucial in a global environment where states and international organizations are furthering the practice of sanction adoption, often outside the mandate entrusted to the UN Security Council (Schmidt, 2022). In the past, sanctions were a practice associated with the West, usually with the US leading the way. In recent days, however, they have been adopted by other countries, including the Arab nations of Egypt, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, which imposed sanctions against Qatar in 2017 (Kerr, 2017). This proliferation has, without a doubt, prompted some scholars to question the lawfulness of sanctions under the principle of non-intervention (Schmidt, 2022). However, the bottom line is that international law has continued to give the doctrine of non-intervention a privileged status, given its role in securing jurisdictional sovereignty and political autonomy, which remain the foundational principles of the international legal order.

With the reach of international law constantly evolving, there have been concerns that the line between what is and what is not prohibited under the doctrine of non-intervention is also getting blurred each day. Indeed, it appears that the international legal order has already ushered in what can be characterized as the "Age of Intervention," which is characterized by the increased legitimization of forcible interference in the internal affairs of other nations (Aloupi, 2015). This shift has been met with two different reactions from scholars. On the one hand, some argue that the world is seeing a normative evolution in inter-state behavior and the rules governing those behaviors (Vincent, 2016). Nevertheless, on the other hand, within these evolving international law frameworks, the impetus for intervention seems to mainly arise from the powerful states within the international legal order or regional hegemons (Vincent, 2016). For that matter, interventions reflect the structures of inequality inherent in the international legal system. Moreover, the intervening actors often deal with the manifestations of regional and global problems that result from their dominance of the global economy (Vincent, 2016).

However, on the other hand, it is a school of thought which appears to advance the notion that the idea that states have historically enjoyed jurisdictional autonomy within their territorial domains is a myth (Havercroft, 2012). According to the proponents of this school of thought, states have long accepted that there are limits to their autonomy across a wide array of issues, including sovereign debt, human and minority rights, and even constitutional structures, among others (Havercroft, 2012). Within this typology, sovereign statehood is not synonymous with political autonomy over affairs within a country's territorial domain. As such, the conceptualization of the international law doctrine of non-intervention contends that today's states recognize intervention as a socially meaningful action and practice.

2.2 The Concept, Causes, and Effects of Third-Party Interventions

The intervention can be defined as the interference by a state or group of states in the domestic affairs of other states. From this definition, it is accurate to assert that any policy

behavior can constitute an intervention under a set of conditions (Grigoryan, 2010). By way of example, the use of either diplomatic measures or military force to influence one or both sides in a dispute constitutes an intervention. On the same basis, even foreign policy behavior, such as the use of sanctions and withdrawal of economic aid, can constitute an intervention, provided that the measure in question is intended to either discourage specific actions by one or both disputants or affect how the dispute evolves and is resolved (Grigoryan, 2010). In dealing with the generality of the concept of intervention, researchers have categorized the range of behavior in which third parties to a conflict can engage into two broad classifications. The first of these classes is referred to as non-partisan interventions. It involves those instances where interventions are conceived as efforts by the third party to, most importantly, bring an end to the hostilities between the disputants and subsequently orchestrate a negotiated settlement (Beber, 2012). Under this classification, the typical roles played by the third parties are as mediators, arbitrators, or guarantors of the settlements negotiated by the disputing parties (Beber, 2012). Given the defining characteristics of this class of intervention that have been mentioned before, it is worth reiterating that the behavior of third parties under this category is not partisan but reflective of the desire to persuade the disputants to bring the conflict to an end by accepting and abiding by the terms of the negotiated settlement (Carment, 1998).

Further studies have suggested the behaviors in which third parties should engage to accelerate the process of the disputants accepting the negotiated settlements and ending the conflict. They include developing creative and innovative compromise situations, facilitating robust communication between the disputants, and enhancing the willingness of the disputing parties to make compromises and agree to the negotiated settlements (Toft, 2010). Overall, this class of interventions encompasses conflict prevention and conflict resolution techniques such as mediation, preventive diplomacy, and peaceful settlements.

Studies on non-partisan intervention have identified mediation as one of the most common approaches. Thus, mediation can be referred to as a process of international conflict management that is related to but distinct from the conflicting parties' negotiations and where the parties in question either seek the assistance of a third party or accept an offer of help from a third party to change their perceptions and behavior concerning the ongoing conflict, and to do so without invoking the authority of the law or using physical force (Toft, 2010). Against this backdrop, specific characteristics make mediation incredibly attractive to the parties engaged in an intractable conflict. The first of these attributes is that mediation represents an extension of the parties' efforts to manage an ongoing conflict (Toft, 2010). In other words, the conflicting parties only turn to a mediator where they have failed. Secondly, mediation is non-coercive, non-violent, and ultimately non-binding on the parties to the conflict (Toft, 2010). Third, when mediators enter a conflict, be it national or international, their overriding objective is to reduce violence and achieve a peaceful settlement. Finally, mediation as a non-partisan approach to solving intractable conflicts between parties is appealing because it is voluntary. In other words, the parties decide whether to begin or continue the mediation efforts. At the same time, the parties retain the freedom to accept or reject certain aspects of the ultimate agreement (Toft, 2010). The bottom line is that the non-coercive and voluntary nature of mediation, which ultimately makes it less threatening to the conflicting parties, accords it the status of one of the most sought-after international conflict management tools worldwide.

The second class of intervention behaviors developed by experts includes those that enjoin third parties as additional participants in conflicts within the international order. Under this category, third parties go beyond persuading the principal parties to the dispute to accept a negotiated settlement and actively apply coercion to realize certain determining outcomes (Beber, 2012). Studies have identified a wide array of potential partisan approaches third parties have historically adopted as they intervene in conflicts. They include the use of

economic interventions by international financial institutions that often leave disputing parties with no choice but to end the conflict in question (Beber, 2012). Others include the exertion of economic power by a state, which constitutes a subtle but effective way of intervening in a disputant's domestic jurisdiction without using military force (Beber, 2012). According to some scholars, however, there is an insignificant difference between military and non-military coercion since non-military interventions still amount to structural violence (Allen, 2008). In practice, however, coercion means third parties giving the disputants options, albeit limited. Out of the Partisan behaviors in which third parties can engage as they intervene in international conflicts, there is no denying that military force carries the most pronounced legal implications. Some studies have even characterized the use of military force by third parties intervening in international conflicts as a prime indicator of a normative and structural evolution in respect of the principle of sovereignty (Bellamy, 2008). On this basis, military intervention by a third party encompasses the use of armed force; encroaching into the jurisdiction of another state, including its airspace; the presence of the third party in a sovereign state without the complete and consistent consent of that state; and any attempt by the third party to, among other objectives, disrupt and re-organize the authority structure of the intervened state (Bellamy, 2008). From the foregoing, military interventions are considered by most international relations scholars as dramatic and abnormal changes in the relations between states and where the intervenors violate the jurisdictional sovereignty of states to realize political goals that often fall short of all-out conflicts.

Before delving into some of the causes of third-party interventions in international conflicts, it is vital to highlight the following issues. First, interventions, especially those of a Partisan nature, are not the preserve of major powers (Carvalho & Lima, 2020). While existing evidence shows that the world's major powers are the most common interveners in global

conflicts, a substantial number of smaller nations also undertake partisan and persuasive interventions (Carvalho & Lima, 2020).

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL DEBATES AND FRAMEWORK

3.1 Theoretical Debates

Scholars and policy makers who analyzed world events through a Cold War prism for decades now see a world where third-party interventions have become one of the primary research topics. The main reason for this interest in third-party intervention is relatively simple: the perception that there has been a global resurgence of international and regional conflicts in which third-party involved either through partisan or non-partisan involvement after the end of the Cold War. The confrontation of the Cold War era was between the great powers with ideological differences and contradictory political and economic interests. As a result, they used the tactic of military deterrence against each other. However, the disappearance of ideological and political differences made the Cold War also end.

Scholars of IR conceptualize the third party in two primary ways: the first is to understand the political role of third parties as what contributes to conflict management or resolution, and the second is to investigate the political and military role of third parties during an actual conflict. How do third parties react to conflict? Do they align with one side over another or attempt to frustrate both sides? Why so? These questions are often dealt with by scholars who study the balance of power and alliances in world politics (McGowan and Rood, 1975; Walt, 1985; Wohlforth, 2007). The definition of intervention is, according to John R. Vincent, “an action taken by a state, groups of state, or an international organization that interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state” (Vincent, 1974, 3).

Oran R. Young defines the terms of third party and intervention.

“The discussion of various problems in which the parties to a crisis may become involved in the course of their efforts to reach an accommodation leads directly to the possibilities of third-party intervention. In fact, intervention will be defined here as any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself. The term “intervention” has, of course been used on some

occasions to refer to entry into a situation for the purposes of self-interested manipulation. The term is used here, however, in reference to the regulation and termination of crisis and conflict situations" (Young, 1967, 34-35).

Looking at International Relations Theory prism, realists regard conflict as existing in a world where realpolitik dominates international relationships. Power is the ultimate determinate of the actions that a state takes. A common similarity is made with a billiard ball table: each billiard ball represents a state, and when one hits another, the ball with the most power has the most effect. However, while the collision may cause the balls to move, the inside of each ball is not affected. For the realist, this is a world without morality, a 'State of nature' where states apply their power and influence over states in pursuit of their national interest. Therefore, the nature of such relations often conflicts between the status quo powers and the revisionist powers, the winner of which will then underpin the following status quo. This is the world of the realist, a space where conflict arises from the manipulation or application of threats in order to prevent a change to the status quo. States are the primary actors as they control all resources, and their relationships are based on coercion. Therefore, the realist is not too involved in resolving conflict in the liberalist sense of the word, as in understanding and explaining wars as interstate phenomena. In effect, the word "peace" to a realist signal no more than the absence of physical violence brought about by the balance of power. This absence of violence will not survive that balance of power: change to the balance means conflict. This condition is called a "negative peace" situation (Galtung, 1969).

Thus, only parties with substantial power relative to combatants can mediate successfully and exploit any asymmetries in the balance of power. The common acceptance of the position is that some mediators tend to bring their own interests to bear in a conflict. Such a discussion of balancing leads the analysis to conclude that balance of power, like bandwagoning, is essentially a realist concept.

Therefore, one of the causes of third-party interventions is the need to either "balance" by teaming up with the weaker disputant in an ongoing conflict or "bandwagon" by joining the stronger side. Thus, one can claim that concepts of balance and bandwagoning link intervention with the leading International Relations theories, such realist balance of power theory. Remarkably, both partisan and non-partisan third-party actors' involvement can be derived from the balance of power theory, which posits that states can guarantee their survival by preventing any one state from acquiring enough military power that positions it to dominate others (Wu, 2017). In understanding the balance of power theory, it is critical to note that the theory makes two key assumptions. The first assumption is that the international order is generally anarchic and lacks a system-wide formal authority that can be enforced on its agents (Wu, 2017). Put differently, the international order functions on a self-help basis, meaning that world governments have nobody to resort to in situations where they face danger (Wu, 2017). They can only try to enhance their capabilities relative to those of other nations through internal strategies of self-strengthening or external measures of aligning and re-aligning themselves with other countries (Wu, 2017). The balance of power theory's second assumption is that states are the principal players within the international order. They are obligated to monopolize the legitimate use of force within their territorial domains, set the terms of intercourse with other nations, and conduct foreign policy initiatives that advance their interests (Wu, 2017). Therefore, states can be considered unitary actors within the international system. With these assumptions in mind, the Balance of power proposition can be condensed to an outcome variable reflective of the interaction between anarchy and power distribution within the international system.

When applying the balance of power theory to the tendency of states to intervene in conflicts, it is worth emphasizing that in an anarchic international order where the sole prerogative of each state is survival, then each member within the system is incentivized to

keenly assess the military power wielded by other states and take measures aimed at preventing the said powers from being too powerful to the extent of dominating others (Nexon, 2009). If a state becomes incredibly powerful, other nations must ally themselves with it for survival (Nexon, 2009). Although some scholars question whether the Balance of power plays any role in preventing armed conflicts, it is clear from existing literature that there is a general tendency for powerful nations to come to the aid of weaker ones in the event of a conflict (Kai He, 2008).

An interesting observation that some studies have made and are critical to point out is that revisionist states have a greater tendency to intervene in external interstate conflicts (Miller, 2009). For this thesis, a revisionist state can be characterized as a nation whose core objective is to bring the existing international order to an end (Miller, 2009). In other words, these are states that are not satisfied with the status quo, hence willing to align themselves with actors representing an alternative center of power. In this regard, states will generally avoid participating in hostilities between other countries because they are, first and foremost, only interested in their survival. Indeed, it is only in circumstances where this survival is threatened that third parties are likely to intervene in external conflicts (Kai He, 2008). Even then, the balance of power theory concludes that third parties will most likely side with the weaker disputants to balance the power of the strongest contender.

In the case of balance of power, if great powers have vital interests and are involved, the balance between the conflicting parties' changes. In this case, it is seen that the medium-range actors do not take the side of the weaker party in international conflicts but instead take the side of the strongest side. On this basis, the motivations for bandwagoning can be explained using two main arguments. The first of these arguments is that the chief external motivation for bandwagoning in international conflicts is to appease the strongest disputant (Kang, 2009). In this regard, studies show that weaker states are more likely to bandwagon compared to stronger states (Kang, 2009). The second argument around the motivations of bandwagoning

is that domestic political factors are likely to have profound implications on the circumstances under which third parties may bandwagon with the strongest disputants in a conflict by providing the political leaders of these third parties with incentives to bandwagon in the hope that such decisions may fend off those who pose internal challenges to their regimes (Kang, 2009). That is usually the case for states with weak domestic institutions, especially in the third world.

Apart from maintaining the balance of power or bandwagoning, the other reason for third parties to intervene in ongoing struggles is the desire to take advantage of the opportunity. (Beckley, 2015). For example, military and political alliances and geographic proximity create interaction opportunities that are vital ingredients in the recipe for the diffusion of war over time (Beckley, 2015). At the same time, interactions between a disputant in a large-scale conflict and nations at peace increase the chances of such nations potentially becoming new war participants. In other words, if a nation is waging war with close ties to a third party, such ties may likely alter the probability of the third party joining the initial war.

The final issue that has been the focus of a vast body of literature regards the effects of third-party intervention in an international conflict. On this basis, studies have observed that the entrance of a third party has the potential to alter the probable outcome of the conflict in question by impacting the willingness of one or both disputants to fight, thus re-organizing the strategies of the actors involved as well as the likely outcome (Beardsley & Lo, 2013). Apart from examining the effects of third parties joining an international conflict and taking the side of one of the disputants, studies have also assessed the implications of third parties threatening to intervene in an international conflict, both militarily and otherwise (Haesebrouck, 2019). Such scenarios bring to life the concept of extended-immediate deterrence, where third parties to an international conflict attempt to deter one of the disputants from attacking another disputant through threats or displays of military force (Signorino & Tarar, 2006). Even then,

studies have further noted that extended-immediate deterrence is often a function of the distribution of military resources among the two disputing states and the third party (Signorino & Tarar, 2006). That is because the availability of military resources, especially on the part of the third party, determines the degree to which the said party can guarantee the immediate and short-term balance of military power in favor of the disputant whose side they have adopted (Signorino & Tarar, 2006). The ultimate point that is critical to note, particularly within the context of Türkiye's position as an essential member of NATO, is that alliances, particularly those of a military or political nature, are the strongest indicator of a third party's willingness to intervene in an international dispute. Scholars have advanced two key arguments to buttress this point. The first is that the pre-war coordination of military and foreign policy allows the members of various alliances to specialize their forces, thus increasing their ability to fight alongside each other if a conflict erupts (Beckley, 2015). Secondly, the reliability of alliances between states has been found to decrease the chances of a potential aggressor using force against a member of the said alliance (Beckley, 2015). The bottom line is that alliances determine the likelihood of a third party fighting on behalf of one of the disputants, ultimately acting as a deterrence against aggressors.

3.2 Methodological Framework

Notably, this study will adopt an interpretive approach in assessing Türkiye's partisan and non-partisan interventions in various conflicts worldwide. It is essential to point out that, unlike other theoretical approaches in International Relations, interpretivism is unique in the sense that its core objective is not to necessarily explains trends and events within the discipline but to explore the social meanings that are embedded within international politics (Bevir & Rhodes, 2012). In other words, interpretive approaches are confined to unpacking fundamental assumptions that inform conventional beliefs within International Relations. In recent years, there has been a shift in International Relations research toward empirical epistemological

positions. However, some researchers have cautioned against this approach, arguing that there is no value in limiting acceptable knowledge within the broader field of International Relations to empirical observation, which, after all, often fails to interrogate the underlying social and power structures that define international politics (Bevir & Rhodes, 2012). The voices questioning the relevance of epistemological empiricism in International Relations research further assume that this approach creates a distinction between the researcher and their social world, hence counterproductive (Bevir & Rhodes, 2012). Against this backdrop, interpretive research has various unique advantages that could benefit this study. First, it is well-suited for exploring the hidden meanings behind various complex, intertwined, and multi-faceted processes, where quantitative evidence may either be inaccurate or difficult to obtain (Bevir & Daddow, 2015). Secondly, this approach is instrumental in circumstances with insufficient prior theory, thus necessitating the construction of novel theoretical approaches (Bevir & Daddow, 2015). Third, interpretive approaches are well-suited for analyzing context-specific and unique events or processes. Suffice it to say that this approach is beneficial in the sense that it plays a critical role in uncovering relevant issues that may be the subject of follow-up research. Despite these benefits, various challenges associated with interpretive research are vital to note. Among them is that it requires researchers who are well-versed in interpreting complex social phenomena and reconciling the diverse perspectives acquired in conducting research without injecting personal preferences into the results (Bevir & Daddow, 2015). Overall, interpretive theoretical frameworks require reliable data sources to produce credible results.

Having outlined the theoretical framework upon which this research will be anchored, it is equally critical to highlight that the thesis will employ qualitative approaches in collecting and analyzing data. In International Relations research, qualitative approaches have been instrumental in allowing researchers to obtain context-specific information regarding the

peculiarities of various research subjects (Wiener, 2009). Put differently, the value of qualitative research lies in the fact that it identifies a wide array of intangible factors, such as normative standards, whose role in the broader research may not be readily apparent. However, the researcher must never forget that acquiring a rich and complex understanding of specific social contexts or phenomena often precedes the need to elicit data generalizable to other study populations and contexts (Wiener, 2009). Two main reasons informed the researcher's decision to utilize qualitative research approaches. First, the researcher required a framework to facilitate a holistic understanding of the research problem. Qualitative designs were preferable since they encompass many epistemological viewpoints, research approaches, and even interpretive techniques for understanding specific contextual experiences (Wiener, 2009). Secondly, the researcher was keen on understanding how different contextual interactions shape meanings to obtain deep insights into the phenomena under study. Be as it may, qualitative approaches in International Relations are associated with various limitations to which the researcher will pay attention, especially in data collection and analysis. The first of these limitations is that qualitative designs sometimes leave out contextual sensitivities during research and instead focus more on meanings and experience. For that matter, the researcher will make certain that contextual experiences are always considered during the pendency of the data collection and analysis process. The second limitation the researcher noticed is that quantitative orientation appears more prominent than qualitative designs in International Relations research. Thus, the researcher will pay attention to the social and cultural constructions of the variables to be studied in this thesis to enhance the overall credibility of the results. Finally, and as mentioned previously, data interpretation and analysis are particularly challenging in qualitative research. Indeed, International Relations researchers have noted that other than the data analysis and interpretation problem, developing undeveloped questions into researchable forms is challenging when using qualitative

approaches (Wiener, 2009). In curing this shortcoming, the researcher will focus on thematic and contextual analyses of the examined variables.

Out of the plethora of qualitative research approaches available in International Relations research, this thesis will employ a content analysis approach. It is worth noting that content analysis is a research method that has come into wide usage in International Relations research in recent years. It describes a constellation of analytical approaches that range from interpretive analyses to strict textual examinations (Elo et al., 2014). One of the reasons behind its widespread usage in International Relations research in the recent past is its flexibility, which means that the specific approach chosen by the researcher can vary from time to time given the theoretical and substantive interests of the researcher and the extent to which these interests fluctuate throughout their study (Elo et al., 2014). Nevertheless, this attribute of flexibility has made valuable content analysis for various International Relations research that has also limited its application, primarily due to the perception that it lacks a firm definition and clearly outlined procedures (Elo et al., 2014). International Relations Research has identified three approaches to qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed, and summative. This thesis will employ the summative approach, which begins with identifying specific content within a text to determine its contextual use (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). A point worth emphasizing is that the summative approach to content analysis is not to explore meaning but to assess usage and the context of usage (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Critical to summative content analysis is a concept referred to as latent examination, where the researcher interrogates the underlying meaning of the content they have uncovered (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In adopting this approach, the researcher will witness various advantages, including that this methodology is a non-reactive and unobtrusive way to study research phenomena (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Additionally, this approach has been associated with guaranteed credibility

and internal consistency, thus ensuring that the textual evidence is aligned with the overall interpretation.

3.3 Data Collection

This thesis will employ a two-pronged content analysis approach. In the first phase, the researcher will analyze official foreign policy information obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website and published in the last five years. Then, using the existing research framework, the researcher will examine the documents for content related to partisan and mediation interventions in international conflicts. While examining the foreign policy documents, the researcher will highlight any text that fits within the research as mentioned earlier framework and code it accordingly. Subsequently, the researcher will categorize all the excerpts associated with codes to determine whether they validate or invalidate the initial theoretical construction. Finally, the researcher will identify the relationship between the data collected and the initial research framework, ensuring that they elaborate on discoveries that build upon the overarching research framework. The second phase of the content analysis will examine online news content.

In this regard, the data collection exercise will be conducted on the Al-Jazeera English website. Notably, Al Jazeera is a Qatari state-owned international media organization. Based in Doha, Al-Jazeera prides itself as a reputable media network committed to delivering accurate and impartial information with the highest degree of professionalism and objectivity. Since its formation, Al-Jazeera has provided extensive coverage of various conflicts worldwide, including Operation Desert Fox in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, among others. In specificity, the researcher will key the phrases "Turkey Conflict Mediation," "Turkey Imposes Sanctions," and "Turkey Military Intervention" into the Al-Jazeera English website. Then, using the articles identified in the search process, the researcher will examine the titles and exclude those not relevant to the research framework.

Further textual analyses will then be conducted to determine relevance to the research aims and objectives and identify whether the articles satisfy the inclusion criteria. For the articles that meet the inclusion criteria, the researcher will undertake a full-text analysis, highlighting and appropriately coding texts that fit within the developed research framework and answering the identified research questions. Finally, the codes will be categorized as themes that will form the basis of further analysis. It is vital to clarify that the inclusion criteria based on the research framework will be the following:

- Articles published between 2005 and 2022.
- Articles specifically mention Türkiye's military or mediation roles in international conflicts.
- Articles interrogating Türkiye's foreign policy approaches to regional and international conflicts.
- Articles examining Türkiye's diplomatic posture in the international community.

CHAPTER IV

TEST RESULTS

On the 19th of March 2011, as a multi-state, NATO-led coalition executed its first air strike in Libya, marking the beginning of military intervention against the Muammar Gaddafi regime under the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, Türkiye found itself in a delicate situation. On the one hand, Türkiye and Libya had hitherto enjoyed a long and historic friendship dating back to the Ottoman epoch. When Türkiye intervened militarily in Cyprus in 1974, an action that drew widespread international condemnation, Libya was among the few countries supporting Ankara (Helal, 2020). At the same time, Tripoli proved to be a lucrative destination for Turkish businesses, especially those in the construction and energy sectors (Polat, 2019). By the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, Türkiye and Libya had established familiar accords to keep their relationships open and focused on development (Polat, 2019). This development was witnessed in January 2009 when the Turkish Minister of State Zafer Çağlayan visited Libya. This trip saw the two countries sign various agreements on trade, investment, and construction (Dünya Gazetesi, 2009). In 2010, A Libyan delegation under the leadership of Gamal Al Lamushe, then President of the Libyan Privatization and Investment Board, visited Türkiye to discuss establishing and operationalizing free trade zones between the two countries (Bagci & Erdurmaz, 2017). This visit would later culminate into an investment forum bringing together companies from the two countries willing to form associations. It is worth noting that in November of 2009, then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan also visited Tripoli, where the two countries signed various memoranda of understanding on a wide array of issues, including visa exemptions, co-investments in Africa, and cooperation in the agriculture, banking, and transportation sectors (Dünya Gazetesi, 2009). Considering these issues, there is no doubt that Türkiye and Libya enjoyed close cooperation during the Gaddafi era.

On the other hand, Türkiye prided itself as one of NATO's oldest members and with a strong legacy, having acted as a bulwark against communism during the Cold War and playing a leading role in the NATO-involved conflicts that emerged years later, including in Iraq and Syria. At the beginning of the 21st century, Türkiye had developed formidable military capabilities, expanded its expeditionary prowess, and grown its defense industry, making it a formidable member of NATO (Güvenç & Özel, 2012). Türkiye has also derived considerable benefits from its membership in NATO, a reality that is often lost on NATO critics in the country. By way of demonstration, Türkiye's position as a regional actor before, during, and after the Cold War had constantly been augmented by the fact that it was a member of NATO (Güvenç & Özel, 2012). Additionally, being embedded within NATO's security framework kept Türkiye safe by bolstering its defensive and deterrence mechanisms (Güvenç & Özel, 2012). That is not to say that relationships between Türkiye and its allies within NATO were also robust. In the aftermath of 9-11, for instance, Türkiye gave the US limited access to key airspace and bases, perhaps out of the desire to avoid giving the Muslim world the impression that it was actively aiding the West (Oğuzlu, 2013).

Moreover, Türkiye had always expressed anger toward the US for supporting Kurdish militia fighters that Ankara considered an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) militants fighting within Türkiye (Oğuzlu, 2013). It is vital to highlight that out of the 30 member countries in NATO, Türkiye has always been considered the most volatile. Ankara had consistently been accused of human rights violations, silencing of dissent, ethnic persecution of the Turkish Kurds, and hostilities towards Greece (Rumelili, 2011). Despite these thorns in Türkiye's relationship with its NATO allies, it remained acutely aware of the strategic value of being a member of the world's most significant military alliance.

Once the UN Security Council had issued Resolution 1973, Türkiye found itself in the middle of a conflict between NATO, the world's largest military alliance whose membership it

enjoyed, and Tripoli, a valuable partner in North Africa. In the second week of March 2011, Türkiye opposed the calls from its NATO allies to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, arguing that such an operation would be unhelpful and fraught with risk (Yackley, 2011). As the US insisted that the decision to impose a no-fly zone was a matter under the sole determination of the UN, then Prime Minister Erdogan contended that foreign interventions, particularly those of a military nature, had in the past only deepened the challenges faced by the countries in conflict (Yackley, 2011). In Prime Minister Erdogan's view, it was critical to give the Libyan people an opportunity to chart their course (Yackley, 2011). Keen to avoid a conflict and protect the over $15 billion worth of projects it had in Libya at that time, Prime Minister Erdogan made personal appeals to President Gaddafi, beseeching him to name a successor with widespread support from the Libyan people to end the crisis (Yackley, 2011). When the personal appeals to Gaddafi failed to bear fruit, the Turkish Parliament later reluctantly approved sending a naval force consisting of a submarine, four frigates, and an auxiliary ship to Libya to bolster NATO's patrol missions intended to enforce a UN arms embargo against the Gaddafi regime (Wires, 2011). Although interested in a peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis, Türkiye weighed its options and concluded that participating in the conflict alongside its NATO partners was inevitable. On the 20th of August 2011, Tripoli fell to rebel forces that had enjoyed the support of Türkiye and the NATO alliance.

It is critical to realize that the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya was not the only time Türkiye had found itself in a foreign policy dilemma of such magnitude. However, how Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish government elected to act is challenging and complex. Remarkably, the problem of what action to take when other states are engaged in hostilities goes beyond the 2011 Libyan Civil War. Indeed, it is a dilemma that has remained pervasive in international politics for decades. At some point in history, any country within the international order must consider what to do when conflict erupts between other nations.

4.1 Results of the Analysis of Foreign Policy Information Obtained from Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website

An in-depth analysis of Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for official foreign policy information revealed a document titled "Turkiye's Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy." Markedly, the document used the word "Mediation" six times, highlighting Türkiye's leading role in conflict resolution worldwide. Specifically, the document emphasized that Türkiye was the only country in the world to have simultaneously co-chaired the Friends of Mediation Groups at the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Moreover, the document mentioned that Türkiye continued to host the Istanbul Mediation Conferences, geared at making conceptual contributions to the field of mediation and prioritizing capacity-building. Finally, although the document did not mention the term "Intervention," it is interesting to note that "Terrorism" was used four times. Veritably, the document was explicit that terrorism and other forms of extremism had reached a menacing intensity worldwide and that Türkiye was playing a leading role in countering terrorism unleashed by whichever organization and under whatever pretext.

Moreover, the word "Peace" was recorded ten times in the document and different contexts. The document clarified that Türkiye was committed to achieving peace, prosperity, and stability worldwide. To achieve this objective, foreign policy would be used as an instrument to protect Türkiye's interests in a regional and global environment that is highly volatile. Be as it may, the document was also quick to observe that unpredictability, crises, and conflicts were threatening regional peace and leading to the erosion of multilateralism and universal values. However, by and large, the document positioned Türkiye as a nation that had always been guided by the desire to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in its region and worldwide.

4.2 Results of the Identification of News Articles via the Al-Jazeera Website

The execution of the search strategy discussed in the Methodology yielded 119 results. However, a quick examination of their titles revealed 37 duplicate records that were removed before the screening process. The remaining 82 news articles were assessed for eligibility in a process involving their full-text examination. The process revealed 17 articles that did not mention Türkiye's mediation and military roles in international conflicts. Another 29 articles were concerned with issues unrelated to Türkiye’s diplomatic posture in the international community. Finally, 26 articles addressed the core research questions but took a prejudiced and unbalanced view of Türkiye. The ten articles were appraised for their value and incorporated into the thesis.

Figure 1: PRISMA Flowchart Showing the Process of News Articles Identification



Figure 2: Description of Articles Obtained from the Al-Jazeera Website Search

Author(s)	**Title**	**Summary**
Al Jazeera (2008)	Turkey PM in Syria on Peace Mission	This article covered the conflict between Syria and Israel that began in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and culminated in Israel's annexation of a strategically important plateau from Syria in 1981. The article reports that tensions between the two countries reached an all-time high after Syria accused Israel of bombing a military facility in September 2007. With senior Israeli defense officials cautioning that Syria would retaliate against Israel in some way following this attack, the then Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan visited Damascus and conveyed to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad Türkiye's desire to mediate a peace agreement between Damascus and Tel-Aviv based on existing international resolutions. Consequently, Al-Jazeera's Jerusalem corresponded reported that third-party contacts between Türkiye and Israel had been underway for a couple of months. Ankara focused on a deal that would see the entirety of the Golan heights returned to Syria. The article concluded that whereas attempts by the international

		community to have Syria and Israel resume peace talks had faltered in the previous years, the Türkiye-mediated negotiations could yield concrete results since Ankara was committed to making such contacts in public.
Al Jazeera (2020)	Turkey Warns Haftar against Attacking its Forces in Libya	This article focused on Türkiye's military intervention in Libya in the ongoing conflict between the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by rebel General Khalifa Haftar and the United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Before the visit to Libya by Türkiye's Minister of Defense in November 2020, the GNA, with Ankara's support, had repelled a 14-month offensive against the capital Tripoli by Haftar and his forces. During the visit, the defense minister described General Haftar and his forces as criminals and murderers who would be considered legitimate targets by Türkiye in the event of any attacks on Turkish troops. The article reported that this warning from Türkiye's Defense Minister came only a few days after General Haftar stated that the LNA was prepared to drive out Türkiye -which it considered an occupier- by faith, will, and weapons. Furthermore, the Minister reiterated

		that while Türkiye was committed to political talks aimed at brokering an end to the conflict, the LNA would not find a place to flee if they attacked Turkish troops that were preparing a deadly offensive against them alongside the GNA.
Al Jazeera (2022)	Turkey Launches New Offensive against Kurdish Rebels in Iraq	This article reported Türkiye's cooperation with Iraq's Autonomous Kurdish Region and its offensive against the Kurdistan Workers Party hideouts in Northern Iraq. Following a visit to Türkiye by Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of Iraq's Kurdish Region, that focused on expanding cooperation and promoting peace and stability between the two nations, Ankara announced a new air and ground offensive against the PKK in the Northern Iraqi regions of Metina, Zap, and Avashin-Basyan. The article further reported that the Kurdistan Regional Government had an uneasy relationship with the PKK, whose presence in the region complicated lucrative trade ties with Ankara. Moreover, Türkiye and its Western allies had designated the PKK as a terrorist group because it had been waging a rebellion against the Turkish state since 1984. Consequently, Türkiye conducted

		frequent attacks against the PKK that had bases and training camps in the Northern Iraqi region of Sinjar and along the mountainous border Ankara shared with Baghdad. Be as it may, Türkiye's military intervention in Northern Iraq had strained its relationship with the central government in Baghdad and accused Ankara of failing to respect Iraq's territorial integrity.
Al Jazeera (2022)	Turkey Plans Syria Operation if Threat Remains: Erdogan	This article focused on Türkiye's intervention in the conflict between The Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria and the Kurdish People's Protection Unit (YPG). To Ankara, the YPG was a terrorist organization and an extension of the outlawed PKK. To the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria, the YPG was a terror group used by Bashar Al-Asad to suppress Syrian Kurds who spoke against his regime. Specifically, the article reported that Assad had used the PKK and the YPG to create a wedge between the revolutionary forces that took up arms against his government, effectively countering the growing clout of the Syrian opposition. However, the article further noted that Türkiye's military intervention against the YPG in Syria was not as clear-cut as it seemed.

		For starters, the YPG was a strategic ally of the US in its fight against ISIS in Syria. For that reason, Erdogan viewed the US, its NATO partner, as supporting a terrorist group and demanded an end to Washington's training of YPG/PKK forces. At the same time, Türkiye's allies in Syria -Iran, and Russia- had warned Ankara against military operations against the YPG and instead called for a diplomatic solution to the Syrian situation. Despite these concerns, President Erdogan was adamant that his plans for a new offensive against the YPG in Syria would remain on the agenda until Türkiye's security concerns were adequately addressed.
Farooq (2022)	Why is Turkey Trying to Mediate the Ukraine-Russia Crisis?	In this article, Farooq (2022) explored Türkiye's attempts to mediate in the Ukrain-Russia crisis before Moscow sent troops into Ukraine in what it called a special military operation. The article reported that Türkiye, by its economic, security, and defense interests, had a stake in the tensions brewing between Kyiv and Moscow. The report also stated that Türkiye had invested significantly in the Ukrainian defense industry, as evidenced by its sale of the Bayraktar TB2 drones to Kyiv in 2019, drones those Ukrainian

		forces had deployed as it attacked Pro-Russian forces in the Donbas. This use of Turkish drones attracted a sharp rebuke from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who made it clear to President Erdogan that Türkiye was involved in subversive and destructive activities. Further, Farooq contended that being the second-largest army in NATO, Ankara understood that it would be on the frontline if the alliance entered a protracted conflict with Moscow. The article concluded that it was in Türkiye's best interest to ensure that it was not put in a position where it had to choose between Russia and Ukraine.
Farooq (2022)	In New Syrian Operation, Turkey Faces a Gordian Knot	In this article exploring Türkiye's operations against the YPG in Syria, Farooq (2022) reported that although an operation in Northern Syria by Ankara was inevitable, the presence of US and Russian forces in the region would delay any offensive. That is because any Turkish operation in the region was likely to draw a reaction from both Russia and the US. Farooq (2022) further reported on the overlapping geopolitical interests in the region. For instance, Türkiye entered Syria in 2016 with the support of Turkish-based Syrian fighters, including the

		Free Syrian Army, to wage war against the outlawed PKK. At the same time, Washington was spending hundreds of millions of dollars training and arming the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People's Protection Units (YPG), its main allies in the fight against ISIS in Syria. On its part, Russia had reneged on its commitment to Ankara to disarm Kurdish fighters in Kobane, a region along the Turkish border with symbolic importance to Kurdish fighters. Despite these conflicting geopolitical interests, Türkiye vowed to do whatever it took to eliminate the Kurdish threats along its border.
Koseoglu (2020)	Analysis: Turkey is Winning in Libya, but Challenges Remain	In this article, Koseoglu (2020) reported on Türkiye's military intervention in the Libyan conflict between the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Khalifa Haftar-led Libyan National Army, recognized by Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report outlined that in the initial years of the war, Türkiye was focused on brokering a ceasefire between the GNA and the LNA. However, when Haftar refused to sign a ceasefire agreement negotiated

		by Ankara and Moscow, the former ceased convincing the LNA to lay down its weapons and seek a political solution. Instead, it intensified its logistical and military support to the UN-recognized GNA. Consequently, the GNA made significant gains against the LNA's Eastern-based forces, forcing Haftar to return to the negotiating table. The article further reported that although Türkiye was offering military support to the GNA, it had intensified talks with other NATO partners over the future of Libya. Specifically, Türkiye worked closely with Italy, one of the GNA's strongest supporters in NATO, to implement a political settlement without wasting time with ceasefire negotiations. The article concluded that Türkiye was focused on realizing most of its goals in Libya, hence prepared to use both conventional warfare and political negotiations to bring the conflict to an end.
Motamedi (2022)	Turkey's Erdogan Renews Case for Syria Operation at Tehran Talks	In this news article, Motamedi (2022) reported on Türkiye's military intervention against the YPG in Syria and the opposition from Russia and Iran, its allies in the region. In a meeting with Iranian and Russian leaders in Tehran,

		Türkiye's President Erdogan renewed his warning of an impending military offensive in Northern Syria, targeting PKK fighters in Tal Rifaat and Manbij. While Türkiye admitted that it needed help from Moscow and Tehran to fight these groups it had labeled terrorist organizations, President Erdogan quickly asserted that Türkiye could continue the fight without help. In response to Türkiye's warnings against Syria, the article reported that the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cautioned against such an operation. These sentiments were shared with Moscow, with President Putin opposing a new Turkish incursion. Russia and Iran further emphasized that it was important for the Syrian government to control the country and for Syria's future to be determined by Syrians without any external influence. At the end of the meeting, christened the Astana Format Trilateral Dialogue, the three leaders of Türkiye, Iran, and Russia issued a joint statement expressing a determination to continue working together in the future to maintain Syria's sovereignty while combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The

		article concluded that Russia and Iran's intersecting geopolitical interests in Syria would be a stumbling block to Ankara's planned intervention.
Osterlund (2022)	Turkey, a Mediator in Ukraine, Mends its own Ties with Neighbours	In this article, Osterlund (2022) reported on Türkiye's balancing act in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. According to the article, Türkiye's efforts to negotiate a peace agreement between the two warring nations emerged from a desire to achieve regional stability, with the full realization that a different outcome would mean financial hardship for Ankara and the rest of the world. Osterlund (2022) further noted that Türkiye's President Erdogan had been cast aside as an international pariah for the last few years. In major international summits, Erdogan cast the image of a lonely figure. Nonetheless, the Russian-Ukraine conflict had offered Türkiye an opportunity to posture itself as a non-partisan actor respected by both parties and interested in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. If Russia refrained from crossing any serious red lines, the article observed that Türkiye would continue with this balancing act and not participate in

		implementing sanctions against Moscow. Apart from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Osterlund (2022) reported that there had been a fundamental shift in Russia's foreign policy in the region, occasioned by what he termed the collapse of Türkiye's revisionist agenda in the last decade. Moving into the future, the article predicted that Türkiye would embody a forward-deployed diplomatic posture to deal with the new security threats emerging in its neighborhood.
Yuan (2022)	Turkey's Military Operation Causes Controversy, Division in Iraq	In this news article, Yuan (2022) reported Iraq's response to Türkiye's military operation against the PKK in its Northern regions. While the Kurdistan Regional Government supported these incursions, their regular occurrence caused a sense of discomfort for the central government in Baghdad. Yuan (2022) reported that before launching the recent military operation in Northern Iraq dubbed "Claw-Lock," Turkish President Erdogan had met with the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, who expressed his support for the operation. However, the authorities in Baghdad strongly condemned this operation, summoning

		the Turkish Ambassador to the country to register its opposition. According to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, the actions by Türkiye constituted continuous violations of the sovereignty of Iraq that were not based on any legal agreement between the two countries. Furthermore, while Iraq noted that Türkiye had invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter for self-defense, the provision could not be implemented without official approval from the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, Yuan (2022) noted that it was less likely that the response from Baghdad would sway Türkiye. In any case, it was possible that Türkiye would intensify its offensive against the PKK even further. The article concluded that it was difficult to predict the future of Northern Iraq's geopolitical landscape. Be that as it may, Türkiye's future relations with Iran and Russia and its internal politics would offer a glimpse into the next phase of the conflict.

CHAPTER V

CASE STUDIES

5.1 Turkish Partisan Intervention in the Libyan Conflict

Four broad themes emerged from the full-text analysis of the ten news articles extracted from the search strategy executed on the Al-Jazeera website. The first theme is that Türkiye's partisan intervention in Libya aims to advance its regional geopolitical agenda. Al-Jazeera (2020) and Koseoglu (2020) all report that in the two years leading to General Haftar's offensive against the Tripoli-based GNA, interference by Türkiye in Libya had diminished. The Turkish state neither had a working policy approach for Libya nor a possible point of entry. However, the frontal assault by Haftar and the LNA change every possible dimension of the conflict. Al-Jazeera (2020) and Koseoglu (2020) report that Haftar and the LNA had enjoyed the recognition of, among other countries, Egypt, and the UAE. Following this 2019 offensive, the UAE executed significant airstrikes in the Tripoli area against the UN-recognized GNA.

When Türkiye realized that no meaningful global institution was willing to condemn the UAE's offensive against the GNA and in support of the LNA, it chose to enter the conflict in support of the former. In the initial days, Türkiye deployed its Bayraktar TB2 drones on the battlefield against Haftar's forces. However, Türkiye would later roll out much more comprehensive and overt military operations alongside the GNA and against the LNA. From the preceding, there is no doubt that the primary drive behind Türkiye's partisan intervention in Libya and its willingness to ensure the success of the UN-recognized GNA government is to advance its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. This view is supported by various scholars who have argued that Ankara is committed to the strategic survival of the GNA government, which it views as friendly to the Turkish state (Qamar, 2020). The challenge that the same scholars have noted, however, is that Türkiye's proclivity for hard power in Libya and its focus on maintaining a permanent military mission in the country could potentially

compromise the objectives of the UN and those of other NATO allies also operating in Libya (Qamar, 2020). The bottom line, however, is that there is an understanding among Turkish leaders that by securing and maintaining a footprint in Libya, Ankara will slowly obtain a passageway first into the Sahel, then to the rest of Africa. Indeed, Africa's markets will be critical to Türkiye in the coming decades, particularly its construction and export-oriented industries. From the preceding, it is evident that Türkiye plays a partisan role in the ongoing Libyan conflict through the deployment of military force. Specifically, Türkiye has deployed hundreds of its soldiers and thousands of Syrian fighters to support the Libyan Government of National Accord in its fights against General Khalifa Haftar's forces, backed by both Russian and Sudanese mercenaries. Ankara believes that its presence in Libya is legitimate since it is in the North African country under the invitation of an internationally recognized government.

5.2 Türkiye's Threat of an Incursion in Syria and its Regional Ambitions

Al Jazeera (2022), Farooq (2022), and Motamedi (2022) all report Türkiye's President Erdogan's plan for a major operation in Syria to push back Syrian Kurdish fighters and create a buffer zone in the border area, despite significant opposition from its partners in the region, including Iran and Russia. This threat of a partisan intervention against the YPG in Syria appears intended to assert Turkish ambition to be perceived as a regional powerhouse. It is important to note that President Erdogan has always intended to create a buffer zone along its border with Syria. In 2016, news articles reported that Türkiye launched three major military operations from inside Syria targeting the YPG, which it considers a military organization and an extension of the PKK that it has outlawed. Indeed, the PKK has waged decades of insurgency against Ankara from within Türkiye. The problem, however, is that the YPG formed the backbone of the US-led forces in the fight against ISIS and is, therefore, a proven US ally in Syria. For Türkiye, creating a buffer zone along the border with Syria and controlling significant parts of Syria's territory allows it to pursue the plan to build thousands of housing

units in the area, which will guarantee the voluntary return of some of the millions of Syrian refugees presently domiciled in Türkiye. A critical question is why Erdogan is increasing the intensity of these threats of incursion, especially when the world is fixated on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In this respect, various scholars have pointed out that Türkiye's foreign policy approach, especially towards the West, has always been using any opportunity it can acquire to get concessions (Güvenç & Özel, 2012). As such, it makes sense that the timing of President Erdogan's threats of an incursion in Syria in the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is meant to get concessions from the West, which has always been opposed to Ankara's military forays in the region. Türkiye recently used its ability as a NATO member to veto Finland and Sweden's proposed membership as leverage to get concessions from its allies in the Syrian conflict. Moving into the future, the West will have no choice but to begin recognizing Ankara's legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG in Syria. Overall, Türkiye plays a partisan role in the conflict in Syria through the deployment of Turkish armed forces as a direct military intervention targeting the PKK and its affiliate, the YPG. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Türkiye has thus far conducted three major military operations in the country and threatens another military incursion if its security concerns are not addressed.

5.3 Türkiye's Partisan Military Intervention in Iraq as a Strategy to Counter Iran's Growing Influence in the Country

The articles by AL Jazeera (2022) and Yuan (2022) report that Türkiye has been intensifying its military operations in Northern Iraq to wipe out the outlawed PKK. The news articles further mention that since the collapse of the peace talks between Türkiye and the PKK in 2015, 1,200 members of the Turkish military, 2,750 PKK militants, and 490 civilians have lost their lives. However, it appears that Türkiye is pursuing even broader goals in Iraq. According to Yuan (2022), the partisan military intervention by Türkiye against the PKK also seems geared toward countering Iran's growing influence in Iraq and the broader region. The

article mentions, for instance, that the alliance between Iran and the PKK runs against the interests of Türkiye. Granted, the guiding principles of Türkiye's foreign policy include strengthening regional and international peace, securing the stability and prosperity of the Turkish state, and resolving regional and global conflicts through peaceful means. However, by increasing its military field of action in Iraq and, by extension, Syria, Türkiye is indicating that its foreign policy has evolved and now pursues more ambitious objectives, including the geopolitical branding of Ankara in regional relations, maintaining, and consolidating Türkiye's position in the region and around the world, and projecting Türkiye's position as an independent regional power, capable of asserting itself into neighborhood conflicts. Soon, there is no doubt that Türkiye's military forays in Iraq will only intensify, especially considering that both the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region are mired in unending domestic crises with no political settlement in sight. The consequence is that neither Baghdad nor Erbil is currently able to push back against Türkiye's incursion into Iraqi territory. The other point is that Türkiye may harbor potential commercial interests in Iraq. According to Yuan (2022), there have been claims by the Central government in Baghdad that Türkiye intends to seize gas production in the Kurdistan Region while working closely with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Suppose there is any truth to these alleged plans. In that case, there is no doubt that such cooperation would make Türkiye the only gateway for oil and gas exports from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and at prices set by Ankara that meet its commercial interests. A permanent Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq would render the authorities in Baghdad unable to respond to these potential developments. Like the conflicts in Syria and Libya, Türkiye plays a partisan role in the Iraqi crisis by deploying military power against PKK forces in the North of the country. Türkiye accomplishes this role through the acquiescence of the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, it is unclear whether this Iraq military strategy is producing the intended results since Ankara's belligerence appears to give pro-Iranian

militias equally operating in the country an opportunity to portray themselves as the true defenders of the Iraqi people.

5.4 Türkiye's Role in Mediating Global Conflicts as a Reflection of its Desire to Maintain a Strategic Global Balance of Power

The news article by Al Jazeera (2008) demonstrates Türkiye's proclivity to position itself as a mediator in global conflicts. It reports that Türkiye demonstrated its willingness to act as a mediator in the conflict between Israel and Syria and to guarantee the return of the entirety of the Golan heights back to Damascus. The articles by Farooq (2022) and Osterlund (2022) further report on Türkiye's posture as a non-partisan party to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. To understand Türkiye's goals as a mediator in global conflicts, it is essential to point out that scholars like Bercovitch and Gartner (2008) argue that throughout history, the bluntest and most transparent projection of power has involved the use of military force. However, other forms of power, including soft power, have gained prominence in recent years. Bercovitch (2011) holds a similar position, positing that the ability to convince other nations to acquiesce to a country's will is gaining more popularity as an alternative to traditional military power. On this basis, Ankara has realized that the pivot to moderation is almost always inevitable when dealing with conflicts involving major military powers, such as Russia. Türkiye further understands that a full-blown conflict between Russia and other countries within the NATO alliance can be incredibly devastating to its fragile economy, which is just recovering from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moving forward, there is no doubt that Ankara will be weighing various considerations as it sustains the delicate balance in the Russia-Ukraine War. The first of these considerations is the geopolitical reality that Türkiye needs Ukraine to remain independent. That is because a Russia that can annex parts of Ukraine or even the country in its entirety poses significant security risks to Ankara. At the same time, Türkiye's President Erdogan understands that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is intricately

linked to the war in Syria. That is because Ankara needs Moscow's continued tolerance as it pursues the YPG in the Syrian landscape and the possibility of Ankara finally being able to resettle the millions of Syrian refugees currently domiciled within its borders. Finally, Erdogan recognizes Türkiye's dependence on Russian gas and, with an election next year, is reluctant to antagonize President Putin in a manner that may lead to disruptions in gas supplies. By and large, Türkiye plays a non-partisan role in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine by offering to serve as a mediator on a wide range of issues, including a possible cessation of hostilities and a return to the negotiating table. By playing the role of an intermediary, there is no doubt that Türkiye is positioning itself as a friend of both Russia and the West.

Thus, among International Relations theories, realism, which emphasizes the role of states, power, and national security interests (especially survival instinct and power projection capabilities of major powers as well as mid-range power to defend their national security interests), is the most suitable theory to test the cases which mentioned in this study. Finally, to summarize and test the hypothesis for different cases, we can reach different conclusions:

The first case, in Libya, at the beginning of the conflict when the United States and France led the NATO coalition started a military operation against the Qaddafi regime, Türkiye first attempted to play a mediator role between the Qaddafi regime and the coalition forces. When Turkish leaders realized that the United States and French governments would not change their objectives to overthrow the Qaddafi regime, Türkiye joined the coalition. However, after the Qaddafi regime was overthrown and the "pro-Haftar coalition's Libya objectives as part of a broader strategy of excluding Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean, both materially and in terms of geopolitical competition" (Köse and Öztürk, 2020, 121) then Türkiye considered Haftar's offensive as a threat to Türkiye main national security interests in Eastern Mediterranean Sea. At this time, major powers, the United States and Russia did not consider Libya their primary interest and left other middle-level actors (Egypt, UAE, and others)

playing their own game in Libya. The United States did not send military forces on the ground, and Russia officially did not involve in the conflict, only through Wagner militias. Therefore, these two major powers had played low profile in Libya. Thus, Türkiye took a partisan position.

Figure 3: Testing Hypothesis of the Türkiye's intervention roles in Libya.

Case/Hypothesis	Independent Variables		Dependent Variable
Variables	Türkiye's National Security Interests (High/Low)	Power Projection of the other major actors in the conflict in which Türkiye intervenes in (High/Low)	Results: Third-Party Intervention (Partisan/Non-Partisan (Mediator))
Libya	High	Low	Partisan

In the second case, in Syria, again, at the beginning of the conflict, Türkiye attempted to mediate between the Assad regime and opposition groups. When Turkish leaders realized that the Assad regime would not change its stand against the Syrian opposition and massacre its own people, Türkiye began to support the Syrian opposition. Türkiye considered unstable Syria as a threat to Türkiye's main national security interests in its southern border and especially when PKK/PYD dominated Syria's north-eastern region (Köse and Öztürk, 2020, 124). The United States and Russia were directly involved in Syria after 2015. The objectives of the United States were, at least officially, to fight against DAESH, and Russia was defending Russia's naval and airbases and supporting the Assad regime. These objectives are not the paramount national security of these major states. On the other hand, for Türkiye, the unstable condition in Syria is one of the greatest national security threats, so Türkiye took a partisan position.

Figure 4: Testing Hypothesis of the Türkiye's intervention roles in Syria.

Case/Hypothesis	Independent Variables		Dependent Variable
Variables	Türkiye's National Security	Power Projection of the other major actors in the conflict in	Results: Third-Party Intervention

	Interests (High/Low)	which Türkiye intervenes in (High/Low)	(Partisan / Non-Partisan (Mediator))
Syria	High	Low	Partisan

In the third case, in Iraq, Türkiye considered unstable Iraq a threat to Türkiye's primary national security interests in its southern border, especially when PKK/PYD presence in Northern Iraq is a vital threat to Türkiye. Russia was never directly involved Iraqi conflict. The United States withdrew its forces from Iraq and left the Iraqi government to deal with the DAESH and the other militant groups. Therefore, they do not consider Iraq as their national security interest. However, for Türkiye, an unstable condition in Iraq and PKK presence in Iraq are vital national security concerns, so Türkiye took a partisan position.

Figure 5: Testing Hypothesis of the Türkiye's intervention roles in Iraq.

Case/Hypothesis	Independent Variables		Dependent Variable
Variables	Türkiye's National Security Interests (High/Low)	Power Projection of the other major actors in the conflict in which Türkiye intervenes in (High/Low)	Results: Third-Party Intervention (Partisan / Non-Partisan (Mediator))
Iraq	High	Low	Partisan

In the fourth case, Türkiye has been balancing in Ukraine. When Turkish leaders realized that Russia's aggression towards Ukraine was based on how Russia defended its national security interest and Western involvement in the conflict, it made Türkiye more cautious. The United States was directly involved in the war in Ukraine by supplying weapons, logistics, intelligence, and other tools. The United States' objectives prevent Russia from being the dominant power in Eastern Europe and the northern part of the Black Sea. On the other hand, for Russia western-oriented Ukraine is one of Russia's most significant national security threats. Because of the high national security interests of one of the major powers, Russia, and the relatively less national security threat to Türkiye, Türkiye took a non-partisan (mediator) third-party role in Ukraine's case.

Figure 6: Testing Hypothesis of the Türkiye's intervention roles in Ukraine.

Case/Hypothesis	Independent Variables		Dependent Variable
Variables	Türkiye's National Security Interests (High/Low)	Power Projection of the other major actors in the conflict in which Türkiye intervenes in (High/Low)	Results: Third-Party Intervention (Partisan / Non-Partisan (Mediator))
Ukraine	Low	High	Non-Partisan (Mediator)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis accomplishes three main goals. First, the phenomenon of partisan and non-partisan third parties' intervention in international conflicts was discussed, and different theoretical frameworks were examined. In addition, an evaluation was made on the conditions under which the third parties involved in the conflicts played a partisan or non-partisan role. Finally, the effects of the roles played were also questioned.

This thesis examines the role of third parties in international conflicts through Türkiye's conflicts in the last 13 years. In the study, primary sources and media examined Türkiye's third-party intervention in the conflicts and its impact on international and regional politics. Four case studies are analyzed to explain and understand Türkiye's conflict response as a third party. First, Türkiye continues to play a partisan role in the ongoing Libyan conflict by deploying military forces to support the Libyan Government of National Accord in its fight against the Libyan National Army, i.e., it supports the government in Tripoli. Second and third, Türkiye continues to play a partisan role in the two conflicts by deploying military forces in Syria and Iraq against the terrorist organization PKK and its affiliate YPG. Furthermore, Türkiye plays an impartial mediator in the war between Russia and Ukraine, offering to mediate on many issues, including ending the war, establishing peace in Ukraine, and returning to the negotiating table.

As the hypothesis of the thesis, depending on Türkiye's role as a third-party actor, Türkiye's vital national security interests, and the power projections of other major actors who see it as vital for themselves in these conflicts, Türkiye's intervention as a third party may vary from partisan or non-partisan. Therefore, the research question of this study is: Why does Türkiye play a partisan role in some cases and neutral in others in different conflicts in which it is involved? Thus, this study evaluated Türkiye's partisan and non-partisan roles in global

conflicts and their practical consequences on the balance of power in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa (MENA).

The thesis has its own limitations. One of them is the period and the cases we study. Therefore, there should be more studies on mid-range states as the third-party actor in international conflicts. All other limitations of the thesis it accomplishes to explain Türkiye's recent intervention in the specific cases.

Over the past decade, Türkiye has become an active player in regions that Türkiye considers vital, such as East Mediterranean and Caucasus. Moreover, when European economic power declined, Türkiye boasted of one of the fastest-growing global economies, occupying the position of a dynamic inspiration for young Arab reformers. However, Türkiye's rising position on the global stage also means that it has taken an increasingly prominent role in global conflicts. This thesis set out to examine Türkiye's partisan and non-partisan roles in global crises around the world. Focusing on the conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine, the thesis has reached four fundamental conclusions. The first is that Türkiye has acted proactively on the regional scene because it can engage militarily. Thus, the partisan military interventions in Libya, Syria, and Iraq are geared towards positioning Ankara at the center of international politics and global diplomacy. Secondly, Ankara desires regional dominance, particularly in a neighborhood characterized by aggressive expansionist states like Iran. Thus, the partisan military interventions, especially in Syria, are calculated to compete for regional political access with Tehran. The third conclusion is that Türkiye is engaging in mediation efforts to preserve the pragmatic and multipolar approach that defines its foreign policy, particularly in the Ukrainian conflict.

On the one hand, Türkiye understands that its NATO commitments mean it cannot remain on the sidelines in the Ukrainian conflict. On the other hand, it is keen not to degrade its relations with Moscow by joining the Western-led sanctions. Moving into the future,

Türkiye will continue its assumption of the role of chief mediator between Ukraine and Russia, allowing it to achieve its desired global position. Finally, Türkiye's foreign policy aims will continually be anchored on the need to advance and protect its varied interests in a region and a globe that is becoming increasingly volatile.

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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/28/turkish-military-operation-causes-controversy-division-in-iraq

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information:

Name/Surname: Enes Yalman
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Education:

- M.A. in Civilization Studies (Political Science and International Relations), IHU
- M.Sc. in Computer Information Engineering (CIE), IIUM
- UG in Computer-Communication Engineering, MUC

Languages:

- Turkish Very good- Native language
- English Very Good- Native like
- Arabic Very Good- Native like
- Malay Good - Speaking

Work Experiences:

- Director of International Office, Ibn Haldun University 2017- ongoing
- IIFSO Secretary General (federation of 750 NGOs in 64 countries) 2019-ongoing
- Istanbul Representative of the Young Academics Union of Turkey 2020-ongoing
- President of the IIUM Alumni Association, 2019-2022
- Coaching (Leadership, Creative Thinking, Time Management, Strategic Planning)
- FSMV University International Relations Coordinator 2015-2017
- Secretary of FSMVÜ Ottoman-Malay World Studies Center 2015-2017
- Washington DC, International Young Leaders Assembly Ambassador 2015- 2018
- President of IIUM Turkish Student Association, 2011–2013
- International Student Organizations Consultancy

Certificates:

- "CISCO" Certificate from the world-renowned network technology company
- "Personal approaches to teaching English" Certificate from Oxford University
- World Islamic Youth Assembly, WAMY, Author and Reader Certificate
- "Public Speaking" competition first prize, IIUM
- "KAZAN YOUTH SUMMIT" Certificate, Russia
- "IYONS: NGOs symposium", India, Chennai Leadership certificate
- Many others will be provided if needed.

Books and Articles:

- Book Translation (into Arabic): “An Introduction to the History of Islam-Western Relations, İbrahim Kalın”

http://www.asp.com.lb/books/bookpage.aspx?id=367260-363487

- Author, Daily Sabah (Some articles)

https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/01/28/responses-to-mainstream-critics-on-turkey-and-its-president

https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2019/03/30/turkish-local-elections-the-people-must-come-first

- Author, Arabi 21 (Some articles)

https://arabi21.com/authors/1970/0/0/%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B3-%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86

- Author, Arabi Aljadeed (Some articles)

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/search?search_api_fulltext=+%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86&field_publish_date%5Bmin%5D=&field_publish_date%5Bmax%5D=&sort_by=search_api_relevance

Organization and Conferences:

- Founder of "I can feed the poor" project.
- - Islamic Cooperation Organization Model Organization International Relations Officer (MOIC), (2011–2013).
- Participant, WIEF World Islamic Economic Forum Conference (2012), Malaysia
- International conference on "Leadership and Social Change in the Islamic World", (IIUM), Malaysia
- Speaker, “Be productive, be different” conference, (2012), Malaysia
- International conference on "Islamic Solutions to Current Problems in the World" (IIUM), Malaysia, Promotion and Promotion Coordinator.
- Speaker, “New Somalia” seminar, (2013), Malaysia
- Delegate, 3rd International Model OIC World Summit, (2013), Malaysia
- Delegate, "Muslim youth, contemporary life, shaping the future" conference, (2013), Malaysia
- T.R. Committee member at the "Hand in Hand" event organized by the Prime Ministry Public Diplomacy Coordinator, (2013), Turkey
- Speaker "International women's day" conference (2014), Malaysia
- Program Coordinator, Honorary Doctorate Award Ceremony to Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2014), Malaysia
- Speaker, “International Association of Young NGOs” Conference, Chennai, India
- As a young leader without any political position, First Speaker from the Middle East in the History of the United Nations, UN Headquarters, New York, USA.
- Organizer / Speaker, 100s of conferences and organizations, will provide if needed.

TV Programs:

Participating in programs as a guest on Türkiye's current political issues and foreign policy, comments and analyzes:

Al Jazeera TV, TRT Arabi and World, France24, BBC, ALHADATH, HIWAR, AlHurra Tv, ….

- The TV show I prepared and hosted;

“Turkey Through the Eyes of the Arabs”

https://fb.watch/8TAM13Gcpa/.

- Some of the programs I attended as a guest:

https://fb.watch/8TAbrUEKGn/

https://youtu.be/w8_KrigF0wI

https://youtu.be/925iEHmskFk

https://youtu.be/qvSvHxa8VHY

https://www.facebook.com/100006276520617/posts/2665599650325893/?d=n

https://www.facebook.com/100006276520617/posts/1872579089627957/?d=n

https://www.facebook.com/100006276520617/posts/2659929380892920/?d=n

https://youtu.be/uMFi0InxnC4

https://youtu.be/KZ9RWD7ofZs

https://fb.watch/8TAoSik7W8/

https://youtu.be/xd9hwwf_15M