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WOMEN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN ALGERIA DURING BLACK DECADE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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Master's Thesis

Supervisor
Asst. Prof. Dr. Eylem AKDENİZ GÖKER

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The thesis titled “WOMEN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN ALGERIA DURING THE BLACK DECQDE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS” prepared by “Hasna BOUCHAKOUR” and submitted on 09/04/2024 has been **accepted unanimously** for the degree of Master of Arts in Political science and International Relation.

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I hereby declare that this thesis meets all format and submission requirements of master’s thesis.

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Signature

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my loving parents, who have always motivated, inspired, and supported me in my pursuit of success. They have also provided me with several forms of assistance in achieving my master's degree objective. I really appreciate their efforts and thoughtfulness.

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ABSTRACT

WOMEN RIGHTS VIOLATION IN ALGERIA DURING BLACK DECADE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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Algeria has pursued republican, Islamic, and nationalist identities since independence. Multiple crises occurred under an authoritarian system with ambiguity between Algeria's independence and the civil war. October 1988 ended the dictatorship's seeming liberalization and four years later, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) interrupted elections, plunging Algeria into the Black Decade, a latent civil war. Civil conflict in the 1990s between the government and Islamist insurgents was violent, dividing the army and society via guerilla warfare. During the 1990s Algerian civil conflict (the Dark Decade), violence against women fueled huge feminization of migration. This study explores the salient aspects of fundamentalism and violence against women during the concerned chapter of Algerian history by undercovering the mechanisms that boosted women’s movement against fundamentalism. The evidence within the study is based on in-depth interviews with unveiled and professional women who appeared to be the main targets of the terror. The thesis delineates the mechanisms of survival and resistance displayed by highly skilled Algerian secular women against the oppression bound fundamentalism.

Keywords: Black Decade, Women Rights, Oppression, Islamic Salvation Front, Civil War.

ÖZET

CEZAYİR'DE KARA ON YIL BOYUNCA KADIN HAKLARI İHLALLERİ: TARİHSEL BİR ANALİZ

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Cezayir bağımsızlığını kazanmasından bu güne dek İslamcı, milliyetçi ve cumhuriyetçi kimliklerin varlık bulduğu bir ülke oldu. Cezayir'in bağımsızlığı ve iç savaş dönemi arasındaki süreçteki belirsizlik ortamındaki otoriter sistem altinda çok sayıda kriz meydana geldi. Ekim 1988 tarihiyle diktatörlüğün görünüşteki liberalleşmesi son buldu ve dört yıl sonra İslami Selamet Cephesi (FIS) seçimleri kesintiye uğratarak Cezayir'i gizli bir iç savaş olan Kara On Yıl'a sürükledi. 1990'larda 1990'larda hükümet ile isyancılar arasındaki şiddet yüklü çatışmalar gerilla savaşı aracılığıyla orduyu ve toplumu ikiye böldü. Cezayir'in bu iç çatışma sürecinde (Kara On Yıl), kadına yönelik şiddet, göçün büyük ölçüde feminizasyonunu beraberinde getirdi. Bu çalışma, kökten dinciliğe karşı kadın hareketini güçlendiren mekanizmaları açığa çıkararak, Cezayir tarihinin söz konusu döneminde kadınlara yönelik köktencilik ve şiddetin öne çıkan boyutlarını irdelemektedir. Çalışmanın bulguları, terörün ana hedefi olarak görülen saçını kapatmayı reddeden ve meslek sahibi kadınlarla yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelere dayanmaktadır. Bu tez, yüksek vasıflı Cezayirli laik kadınların baskıya bağlı kökten dinciliğe karşı sergilediği hayatta kalma ve direniş mekanizmalarını serimlemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kara On Yıl, Kadın Hakları, Baskı, İslami Kurtuluş Cephesi, İç Savaş.

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ABBREVIATION

ALN	:	National Liberation Army
AQIM	:	Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
DGSN	:	General Direction of the National Security
FIS	:	Islamic Salvation Front
FLN	:	National Liberation Front
GIA	:	Armed Islamic Group
GSPC	:	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
IOM	:	International Organization for Migration
IR	:	International Relations
NGOs	:	Non-Governmental Organization
NUWO	:	National Union Of Algerian Women
PAGS	:	Socialist Vanguard Party
PWO	:	Progressive Women's Organization
UGTA	:	General Union of Workers
UN	:	United Nations
UNFA	:	Federation of Algerian Women
UNFPA	:	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNPA	:	Union of Algerian Peasants

1. NTRODUCTION

Algeria like many countries throughout the world, has been suffering with the horrible repercussions of deliberate collective trauma that has affected every facet of society for more than a decade. The traumas are replicated through the implementation of rigorous tactics, including assassinations, abductions, torture, and assaults all orchestrated by Islamist terrorist organizations.

Women played important parts in Algeria's history during the "Black Decade" (1992–2002). They were very active in many fights, such as the civil war and the fight against violent religious radicals. Islamist insurgents first targeted women because they taught, ran businesses, drove, and did not cover their faces or hair. Algerian women showed strength by taking part in protests and movements for freedom, open government, and an end to corruption, even though they faced severe problems. The fight for women's rights in Algeria reached a turning point when these women took part in these events. During this time, women were active in a variety of ways, including fighting back against Islamist attacks, changing the law, and using cultural activities to show their reaction. It was notable that there were not many Islamists involved. Algerian women have made important contributions to the country's past and are still active in many social and political movements. These efforts have been key to the country's growth and change. Consequent persecution of women is noticeably harsher and harmful because Islamist militants misuse sacred themes. Moreover, these women were subjected to mistreatment, persecution, arbitrary detentions, and police harassment. The ruling authority has implemented a strategy reminiscent of the terrorists: the use of repression and violence against women, especially that modern middle class and intellectual women. The acts of violence perpetrated by both terrorists and representatives of the order have given rise to a genuine collective psychopathology. This is because, in addition to instilling terror in the groupings, it has contributed to their disintegration by creating a theme/us societal division (Ottaway, 2015).

The Algerian government, Islamist rebel groups, and different armed gangs were the major groups in the war. Islamic rebels were led by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which later changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). As part of the government's reaction to the uprising, state security forces were often used to kill people without a reason and violate people's rights. A rough

estimate of 200,000 Algerians died, which changed the country's politics and society for a long time (Ottaway, 2015).

In order to bring up the topic of Algerian women's resistance and endurance during the Black Decade, we first have to explore deeply that period of time, including how and why it started and what its purpose was. We intend to conduct an in-depth interview with seven women. The interview with these brave women was chosen to help us understand more about their challenging times. The interview was successful in gathering the accounts of these survivors, women who witnessed past genocides, and war victims in the 1990s. Some of the women I interviewed were survivors of a massacre that occurred during the black decade. The ladies I chose to interview were the primary targets; I interviewed those who were not obedient, did not quit the country, and suffered horror from beginning to end.

During the Black Decade, a huge number of women fled Algeria to avoid the violence and discrimination based on gender that the civil war had exacerbated. Women tried to avoid from harassment or intimidation that was caused by abduction. The practices of abduction were intended to make women more fearful and obedient. Sexual assault and violent rape were utilized as weapons of war at large. Besides, women who reported or complained about domestic abuse were frequently abused and ridiculed and even stigmatized and labelled by the state authorities and the society. Throughout the Algerian Black Decade, these types of violence were part of a larger pattern of terrorizing and repressing people. While the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) was going on, women's roles and situations were criticized more by the rest of the world. Women's work during the French Algerian War was praised, and their involvement was seen as a sign of support for the nationalist cause. Women's rights did not get much better after independence, though, and their efforts were often ignored or pushed to the side. On the contrary, women's experiences were not subject to as much international recognition or discourse during the Algerian Black Decade. This could potentially be attributed to the limited media coverage of the conflict and the diminished attention of the international community towards the situation in Algeria compared to the period of the independence war.

Furthermore, in comparison to subsequent decades, the international community's attention towards women's rights was comparatively limited during this period (Diwakar, n.d.). In addition, during the Algerian Black Decade, the international community frequently concentrated on the military and political aspects of the conflict, rather than on the

experiences of women. This does not imply that the experiences of women were not noteworthy or that they were not the subject of discourse; instead, their recognition and discussion in the international community were not as extensive as they had been throughout the Algerian War of Independence (Turshen, 2002).

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

The primary objective of this thesis is to expose and reiterate the human rights violations, particularly those inflicted upon Algerian women during the 1990s through oppression and terror. The study aims to elucidate the mechanisms of resistance employed by Algerian women during this period. Given that this oppression is closely linked to the terror perpetrated by radical fundamentalist Islamist groups, the research question of the thesis necessitates a focused examination of the roots and evolution of radical Islam within the context of Algerian history. Additionally, the thesis seeks to unveil the factors contributing to Algeria's tumultuous period and its direct ramifications on Algerian women. This endeavor entails probing into the causes and origins of Islamist radicalism and violence in Algeria, as well as the implications of Islamist restrictions on the freedoms of Algerian women. Furthermore, the government's efforts to address the challenges faced by women will be critically scrutinized.

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY

I chose this topic for various reasons; some are more subjective than others objective, I'd I would like to expose and denounce the violence and the tragedies in Algeria during this period which were committed in total silence, no one in the world has spoken about it and there are practically no theses, research, not even articles in English on this subject. Some examples of serious human rights violations, such as the violation of women's and children's rights in Algeria during the 1990s, include all-night killings and the eventual extinction of entire families. Yet, within the confines of the study, I shall pay special attention to violations of women's rights.

It should be clearly stated at the outset that this study does not intend to paint an entirely negative or pessimistic picture of the Algerian framework. It should be noted that this violence lasted ten years, and while Islamism no longer directly harms women, it continues to have an indirect impact on society and, particularly on women. Instead, the scarcity of English-language academic literature on women's persecution during Algeria's Black

Decade encouraged me to write my thesis on the subject. Furthermore, the research attempts to illuminate the gender-specific oppression experienced by women, which was intensified by the conflict, extremism, and terrorism and the mechanisms they have created to overcome it. The study aims to investigate the variables that contributed to women's forced migration, including violence directed against educated or high-profile women, women's legal status, and the oppression they face in their families and community. The study highlights the need of recognizing and dealing with the gender-based violence and persecution experienced by women during the Black Decade, which was frequently overlooked by national asylum systems.

The study also focuses on the impacts of the Algerian Family Code, which institutionalized gender inequality and bias against women, as well as the obstacles encountered by highly qualified women who left Algeria during and after the Black Decade. The study also examines the presence of transnational networks of highly skilled and educated Algerian women and their capacity to participate in political initiatives for promoting positive social transformation.

The recapitulate, this study aims to offer a thorough insight into the gender-specific persecution and intricate experiences of Algerian women during the Black Decade. It focuses on the factors affecting their forced migration, the challenges they faced in seeking international protection, and rebuilding their lives in other countries. Several challenges develop and are experienced in relation to this topic throughout the processes of reading, making interviews with the principal victims who neither fled, nor submitted, nor were murdered, and thesis writing.

It is important to ensure precision while identifying the most suitable terminology and ideas in the thesis. Therefore, particular ideas, concepts and notions will be clarified within the section devoted to conceptual clarification. There have been intellectual contributions that have not always been adequately generalized or comprehended, resulting in a multitude of misconceptions. As we all know, it is important to learn the meanings ascribed by certain societal dynamics to certain ideas and concepts may display diverse diversity due to the contextual framework. That is why, while intending to analyze women’s position against the oppression and violence by radical and fundamentalist groups, I will attempt to delineate the meanings created by the women themselves.

Women raising their voice against the impositions of the fundamentalist groups have never had prominence in media and none of the international organizations have deserved attention to their cause. Such sort of underestimation and disregard were also prevalent in the academic world. That is why there exists limited data and information on this tragic event. Throughout my research I experienced severe problems due to the lack of reliable data and of course reaching at the already existing data was another part of the problem. First and foremost, figures concerning the women victims of the Dark Decade vary across different sources and official documents. In addition to the lack of reliable data, reaching the interviewers was extremely difficult. It's important to note that women rights violation in Algeria during the black decade is a complex topic because of various factors, including social, and political. In order to overcome the difficulties arising from the very nature of the research problem and the subject, I have attempted to look over and compare different official records and sources prepared by different perspectives. Reaching the interviewers appeared to be a rather smooth process when I realized that I, myself, as a researcher is an inside observer.

1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The interviews collection process required to conduct the study as well as the research design and structure of the thesis are discussed in this section. This thesis will employ a qualitative approach to "gather data on different versions of reality" and examine the temporal dynamics of complexity. This research will provide a full understanding of women's rights violations throughout the Algerian Black Decade, as well as women's oppression and its greater implications for women's rights in Algeria.

1.4 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Several sources were used in the data collecting for the study. First of all, I attended every significant gathering that took place among the women who experienced the trauma of the Black Decade. I interacted with the members of these groups on a personal level. I saw the conversations among the women firsthand because I come from a family whose members were also directly targeted by the oppressions against women during the Black Decade. In addition, I was actively engaged in the field and personally involved in the process. I included personal experiences and notes in my thesis, giving it an ethno-ethnographic aspect. Being an activist from a young age and engaging with participants has both perks and cons.

Being a young woman who stands against the fundamentalist impositions, I understand the potential impact on my study. I've attempted to balance the benefits and drawbacks of my subjective viewpoints. I reflected on my position and sought feedback from advisors to avoid misrepresenting the research problem. I also remained open to alternating perspectives.

Secondly, I have carried out interviews with seven women to fully represent their perspectives. I have carried out ten interviews with leading members in total. All seven were professional middle class women, a doctor, dentist, hairdresser, student, geologist, senior manager, and a French language teacher. They have been chosen according to their duration in the resistance movement and their determination in pursuing their studies and work despite the risks, their refusal to cover their headwear, and their refusal to flee the country. During the interviews I have asked open-ended interview questions to capture all the different positions and let the interviewee express themselves.

Finally, I have also utilized secondary data and internet sources provided by the groups resisting the impositions of the fundamentalists. During my study for developing the interviews and questions, I used “The Content Analysis Guidebook” of Kimberly Neuendorf (Neuendorf, 2002) and “Qualitative Inquiry& Research Design” of John Creswell (Creswell, 2013) and I used “Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences” of Catherine Riessman (Riessman, 2008) as a tool for analyzing the data that I had collected.

As an active participant, I gained access to valuable insights into the experiences of young Algerian women in women's networks in Algeria. It can be difficult for non-Algerian outsiders to access a closed social group, like women in Algeria. However, I understand that taking on an insider role may raise worries about my standing as a researcher. Even though, as a researcher, I had full member status during the study's data collection phase, I purposefully removed myself from the participants by being passive. I gave the utmost emphasis to upholding my position as an objective researcher, which calls for remaining impartial toward the participants and preserving a distance from the issue. However, I am completely aware that my role as a community member may limit the participants by mistakenly or purposely stifling criticism or unfavorable remarks. I am completely aware that the thesis has autoethnographic elements because of my positionality. In contrast, autoethnography draws on the experiences of others to gain a deeper understanding of the self by using the self as a lens through which to view a larger culture. As a result, I admit that although I deliberately utilized autoethnography as the research method, I also gained a

deeper understanding of myself during the study and came to conclusions that I then used my activist role to challenge.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The present master thesis is structured into five chapters in order to provide a thorough and complete comprehension of the subject matter. The first chapter of the study introduces the subject matter and provides an overview of the methodology, research design, research objectives, and limitations. This is followed by a comprehensive discussion on the primary research question, and hypotheses of the study. The second chapter of this research encompasses the literature review, in order to understand the historical background and the events that conducted to the tragedy of civil war in 1990s. Actually, these tragic events did not happen overnight. By providing a thorough study of the historical context, we will be able to comprehend the reasons behind them, particularly with regard to the status of women, the courage and perseverance of Algerian women throughout history, and the reasons why they became a target for terrorists.

The third chapter examines the conditions and terror experienced by Algerian women and their resistance during the black decade by interviewing them. The last chapter, which is the conclusion, will conclude with the summary of all the research and the update of the current situation of Algerian women's rights. The thesis employs the theoretical framework of "women rights" practices as an analytical tool for the investigation.

2. HISTORICAL BACKDROP: ALGERIA IN BETWEEN POLITICS AND TERROR

The complex conditions that preceded Algeria's civil war in the 1990s included internal tensions, economic inequalities, governmental instability, and colonialism's legacy. Algerian society is still impacted by the wounds from this war, which have an impact on how people view the government and security. One of the most significant movements that encompassed all political parties in Algeria during the war of independence against France was the FLN (National Liberation Front), which played a crucial role in maintaining Algeria's authority during the Black Decade as well. Through the use of a variety of strategies, this party played a significant role in the history of Algeria during both the war and the Black Decade, leading the country's struggle for independence from France. The FLN was perceived as the main representative of Algerian nationalism even in the face of the rise of radical organizations like the FIS (Islamic Salvation Group).

The FLN used a combination of military strategies, social assistance initiatives, and political outreach to hold onto power and influence. The FLN was able to maintain its key role in Algerian politics and shape the country's course while facing challenges from rival factions and internal strife. The war that began in 1992 is sometimes referred to as an "ethnic/religious/identity conflict," however it is unclear how the conflict can be understood in this perspective (UN Refugee Agency, 1995).

The rebel groups in Algeria (FIS) made a superficial claim to a religious agenda when they discussed the relevance of religion in government, examined the condition of affairs in Algeria through the prism of religion, and used the term Islam in the titles of their organizations. It's unclear how much of the fight centered on religious involvement.

Even insurgent supporters who emphasized the importance of the organizations' religious stance expressed why they supported the insurgents in terms of the improvements they wish to see in the regime's administration style and current economic distributional systems. It does not follow that the conflict was largely religious, even though the language used to express this stance happened to be religious, and even these supporters (UN Refugee Agency, 1995).

A time in the Algerian Civil War when 150,001 people were killed, 7,000 were missing, and about one million were forced to move within their own country. The vast majority of whom

were civilians. This was one of the reasons for the impact that migration, death, or involvement in the war had on the social networks of the victims, immigrants, or participants. To recapitulate, as there were Islamist themes to the protests that started in 1988, and they turned into a civil war with guns between the Algerian government and different Islamist rebel groups. At first, President Chadli Bendjedid's government made things worse by violently putting down the protests. But then, the government started making changes, like writing a new constitution in 1989 which says that Citizens are equal in Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), under the law, without any discrimination because of birth, race, sex, or any other condition or circumstance, whether personal or social." (Amrane-Minne & Abu-Haidar, 1999).

This is the same as what the 1963 Constitution stated. Freedom of speech, including freedom of the press, the right to form new political parties, and the freedom to create the clubs and groups that make up a healthy civil society were some of the changes that were made (Turshen, 2002).

The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was one of the new political parties that came up. In the May 1990 local elections, it got 54% of the vote. In January 1992, President Bendjedid was removed from office, and the government quickly called off the second round of elections because it was afraid that opposition groups like the FIS would gain power. Even though the new constitution gave people the right to start political groups, the FIS was shut down by the new government, which was led by President Mohamed Boudiaf, in March 1992. This didn't help much, however, because President Boudiaf was killed in June 1992. During the next ten years, there was a lot of fighting, and between 80,000 and 100,000 people were killed as terrorist groups tried to take over the government (Turshen, 2002).

Even though the civil war touched the whole country of Algeria, it was the women who lived through the worst of it. Within a short time, women were "targets and pawns in the power struggles between the Islamists and the government." During a march on the government in April 1990, the FIS called for the Sharia to be followed. By letting male cousins have more say in marriage, allowing polygamy, and making it harder for women to get divorced, this code would severely restrict the rights of women. The FIS also tried to get women to stay home and not work outside the home, and they pushed for women and men to have their own beaches and public transportation. "Women do not have the right to work outside the

home, become political leaders, or play sports," says the FIS. They shouldn't wear perfume, makeup, or tight clothes, and they shouldn't hang out with guys (Ennaji & Sadiqi, (Eds.) 2011).

Fundamentalist groups like the FIS saw the free woman as a symbol of modernity and the fall of the patriarchal order. This was made faster by the constitution's passage in 1989, which said that women "have access to all the professions and with equal rights to work, they deserve to benefit from equal pay." Algerian women were making a lot of social progress, but traditional groups like the FIS saw this as a threat to the security of the country and society. The 1990s were a time of change, and it was a very important era for women where they tore between progress and traditionalism (UN Refugee Agency, 1995; Zhang, 2023).

In fact, Women in Algeria faced immense difficulties during the 1990s civil conflict. Women experienced a number of major challenges, including violence and terror, with many falling victim to attacks by hardline Islamist organizations. They also suffered restrictions on their rights. Indeed, Sharia-based family laws continued to limit women's freedoms and opportunities, as well as gender roles, and despite women's active participation in the independence movement, traditional gender roles persisted in society, with women frequently assigned household responsibilities. Another abuse that women suffered was one of the most awful mistreatments: sexual violence. Throughout the conflict, there were reports of rape, various sorts of abuse against women, and exploitation. Despite these difficulties, Algerian women actively fought the civil war and sought recognition and enforcement of their legal rights, which enhanced their social standing by Western standards (UN Refugee Agency, 1995).

2.1 COMMENCEMENT OF THE ALGERIAN WAR OF LIBERATION FROM FRENCH COLONIAL RULE: 1954-1962

2.1.1 National Liberation Front Background

The National Liberation Front (FLN) ruled in Algeria from 1962 to 1989. The party continued the work of the rebel group that led Algeria's war of independence against France from 1954 to 1962. Fourteen young Algerian rebels formed the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA) in March 1954. They were the ones who started the FLN. The CRUA tried to bring together the different nationalist groups that were at odds with each other and to fight the French colonial government in Algeria. By the middle of 1956, almost

all of Algeria's nationalist groups had joined the FLN. The group was then remade to look like a temporary government, with a five-person governing body and a legislative body made up of all the district heads. When Algeria was fighting for its freedom, the National Liberation Army (ALN), which was led by Col. Houari Boumedienne, was the FLN's military branch. The ALN's outside forces helped ALN troops inside the country with supplies and weapons from camps set up behind the borders of Tunisia and Morocco. The FLN started a military war against France and asked the UN to recognize them as an independent state so that Algeria could become its own country. Algerian fighters were active in the countryside, especially near the country's borders. However, the most serious fighting happened in and around Algiers, where FLN fighters began a series of deadly strikes on cities that became known as the Battle of Algiers (1956–57). French forces (which had grown to 500,000) were able to take back control, but only after using brutal tactics (Boukharouba, 2024).

It is well knowledge that the FLN was founded as a liberation struggle against the colonial authority in response to the many setbacks experienced by the different national struggle groups since 1954, rather than as a political organization, particularly with regard to the hopes of liberation outlined in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the winds of emancipation that picked up toward the end of World War II, these factions had made repeated, albeit fruitless, attempts, either individually or collectively, to persuade the occupation authorities to alter their treatment of the Algerian people.

However, these hopes were ultimately dashed by the Cold War. The war for freedom went on until March 18, 1962, when the French finally stopped fighting with the FLN at Évian-les-Bains. They also agreed to work together in the future on economic and social issues. Algerians easily chose self-determination and agreed to the Evian Agreement in a vote on July 1, 1962. Algeria declared its independence on July 3, 1962. Right away, there was a power battle within the FLN. Along with Boumedienne and Muhammad Khidr, Ahmed Ben Bella formed the Political Bureau of the FLN in July 1962 to fight Belkacem Krim. It gained a lot of support through its Socialist-Islamic ideas and successful propaganda, which helped Ben Bella become prime minister in May 1963. Boumedienne removed Ben Bella from power in 1965 and maintained tight control over the party and government until his death in December 1978. The FLN party mainly served as an ideological tool during his rule (1965–78), with Boumedienne and his Council of Revolution holding the real power. Even though

the FLN held several meetings in the 1980s, Col. Chadli Bendjedid's leadership did not greatly expand the group's responsibilities. The country got rid of its communist ideas and one-party political system when a new constitution was passed in February 1989. Later, many new parties popped up, and the Islamic Salvation Front (Islamic Salvation Front, or FIS) was one of them (Boukharouba, 2024).

The FLN has evolved into the driving force behind the so-called "Presidential Alliance" and an entity that almost certainly assigns roles in the country's political system (Hennad, n.d). As such, it is no longer satisfied to secure the majority of seats in the Algerian parliament, municipal councils, and provincial councils.

The organization's strong ties to Algeria's political system, which has existed since the country's independence in 1962, further supported the interest in it. In fact, these ties have grown almost like a power stake. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the National Liberation Front's development including the potential for "putting it in the museum of history," as many have called for since the country's adoption of political pluralism remains significantly linked to the destiny of Algeria's political life and the intended democratic transition.

The FLN after taking independence from France, was inspired by three key ideas in order to lessen the socioeconomic difficulties of the Algerian people and to solidify its identity. (a) to form a coalition with other non-aligned governments in order to construct a proud and independent Algeria that will be free from foreign domination (both from the East and the West). (b) forgo pluralism and create a state headed by a single party. (c) to uphold secularism while also advancing Algeria's Islamic culture (Ottaway, 2021).

Following Algeria's independence, the FLN believed that the only path to stability in the country was to impose order under the direction of a powerful central authority. In fact, many later ethno nationalist insurgency operations, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC), were heavily influenced by what Algeria had taught them.

This section provides a general perspective on the Algerian War of Independence from France, which lasted from 1954 to 1962.We began by discussing the fight and then examine some of the key strengths and weaknesses of the rebel and government forces on the ground. The section focuses on the critical political side of counterinsurgency. It demonstrates that,

while significant military efforts might severely degrade an insurgent movement's operational capabilities, they are unable to accomplish a full victory if the political context is unfavorable. A group of 300 rebels as mentioned above (The FLN) began its uprising early in the morning of November 1954, these rebels attacked French security force installations, police posts, warehouses, communication centers, and public services. They were armed with a variety of old weapons left over from World War II. The FLN explained the attacks by saying they were part of a legal fight for freedom from France and the colonial settlers, or "colos". Nationalist parties had been around for a while, but when they saw that peaceful tactics would not accomplish their objectives, they grew more extreme. Messali Hadj had created the Party of the Algerian People before World War II. The Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) took up the party's position in the mid-1940s after it was outlawed in the late 1930s (Algerian War, 2024). Constructed about the same time as the more extreme paramilitary group, the Special Organization (OS) was uncovered by the colonial police in 1950 and several of its leaders were put in jail.

On October 31, 1954, late at night, war broke out. In a pamphlet, the movement headed by the recently established FLN expressed its desire to establish an independent Algerian state once more. It promoted equal citizenship for all Algerian people and social democracy within an Islamic context. Algeria had lagged behind other Arab republics in terms of social and national freedom, but a prologue asserted that this might be changed via a challenging and protracted battle. Guerrilla warfare at home and diplomatic work abroad, especially at the United Nations (UN), would be the two weapons employed.

Despite being militarily weak, the armed rebellion quickly grew more intense and widespread, impacting bigger swaths of the nation. Notably, the northeastern sections of Little Kabylia and the Aurès Mountains developed into guerrilla strongholds that were outside of French rule. Over the process of the war, France drafted almost two million conscripts as it become more involved in the fighting (Wills, 2023; Médard, n.d.).

2.1.2 Women Movement in the Algerian Anti-Colonial Struggle

The position of women at that period of time was crucial. During the Algerian War of Independence Algerian women took active role in getting rid of French rule and occupation. Because they were fighting for freedom, they focused closely on the developments both in

their own country and around the world. In a way, their choice to fight in the war, which was traditionally a male domain in Algeria, freed them from their typical roles.

In traditional cultures, like Algeria, women were meant to protect social and cultural values, but the occupying power attacked these values on purpose. At both the national and international levels, women, who were thought to be the backbone of nation-building, were a threat to male power (Cooke, 1989).

When we talk about manhood, we're talking about the set of traits, behaviors, social norms, and roles that men in a certain society have generally been expected to have. When men are expected to defend their country or look out for women, these male norms often have a big impact on how society works and on nationalist ideas. The term "manly nationalism" was chosen because it refers to how nationalist speech is often dominated by patriarchal ideals and male-centered points of view. This idea emphasizes the gendered factors that shape the path of nationalist groups, idealistically excluding women from political issues related to war.

It might seem like the Algerian war of independence was a problem only for men, but it actually made was for Algerian women and had a big impact on their future. The colonialists were mostly interested in the Algerian woman and the veil, which had been the sign of faith and national identity (Cooke,1989). According to Franz Fanon's work from 1961, the colonial government knew that the only way to colonize Algeria was to use armed force to control the women, because they knew that women could help with opposition and preserving cultural heritage. Because of this, bringing women into line with foreign cultural norms and removing them from their social roles were important ways to stop male pushback to colonialism. To put differently, having control over women would mean having real control over men and getting a way to break down Algerian society. Thousands of women volunteered to serve the National Liberation Front (FLN) in a variety of capacities, such as fundraising, cooking, nursing, paramilitary combatants, and logistical support for the National Liberation Army (ALN) (Jacobs, 2018).

Among the famous women who fought with men are Djamila Bouhired, Djamila Boubache, and Baya Hocine (Wilson,2018; Bendimerad, 2020). These women were jailed and tortured, among other bad things, but their bravery made people all over the world admire them and criticize French colonial policy. But it is important to highlight that even though women played important parts in the war, it did not immediately lead to more equal rights for men

and women. Even after the country got its freedom, women still had trouble getting an education, finding work, and having their voices heard in politics. Still, the Algerian War changed the way women participated in politics and society, paving the way for future fights for equal rights between men and women in Algeria.

Algerians started their fight for independence in 1954, after living under French colonialism for almost 130 years and being ruled by a violent and oppressive government. There were deaths of almost a million people, breaking of customs that went back hundreds of years, and the country was irreparably damaged.

Some people have also said that the Algerian war was a time when religious, racial, and female identities were tested. Algerian culture and the French colonial government at the time had very strong ideas about what women should do and their rights. What's most important is how the war changed the roles of women in Algerian society. During the conflict, both groups used women to represent a bigger cause and used their images to tell a certain story about what happened. During the war, Algerian men and the French colonial government used idealized ideas about gender to present a certain picture of women's social and political roles that helped them but didn't really help the women themselves. Even though a lot of women died and went through a lot of pain in the war against French rule, their help in winning the war did not help them get equal rights when Algeria became independent in 1962. From a historical point of view, as this study attempts to contend, Algerian women were still pushed to the edges of society after the country became independent, even though they had been involved in the fight for freedom.

The French colonized Algeria in 1830 for mostly economic and political reasons, but they did it under the guise of "la mission civilisatrice," or "civilizing mission." This was because the French thought Algerian culture was backwards and underdeveloped, especially in how they treated and behaved toward women. Compared to some Middle Eastern countries in the late 1800s that had growing feminist movements, Algeria was less open to women's rights. Based on a type of Islamic rule that supported the male family line, Algerian society in the late 1800s was traditional and male-centered.

Following the settlement, French residents known as "pieds-noirs" slowly took over Algeria's land, government, business, and culture, changing them to fit French standards. Algerian women were seen as "oppressed of the oppressed" However, despite this attitude, French policies toward Algerian women's rights were unclear and never got much better

while the country was a colony. By 1954, when the war started, women had no place in public life at all. Only a small minority could read and write, very few had jobs or went to school, and they couldn't vote.

In the late 1950s, the drive for freedom started to gain steam, and violence kept getting worse. Concerned about stories of women joining the National Liberation Front (FLN), the main freedom group, the French government and army came up with a "counter-strategy to win hearts and minds."

Under the "statut personnel" (personal status law) of the colonial regime, the French showed their power by not giving Algerians the same rights as French citizens. In exchange, the colonial government promised to protect Islamic law in the important areas of marriage and family law, making these areas "reserved" from western values and secular French ways of life. Even though there was an agreement, the French government tried to get Algerians to back them in 1959 by passing a set of "reformist, liberal emancipation measures" that limited women's rights in marriage, family law, and schooling. They wanted to keep "French Algeria" by putting an end to the uprising by modernizing the economy and making social changes that supported women's education, voting rights, health care, jobs, and movements for women's rights. (Leonhardt, 2013).

The French thought that giving women more rights would break up the drive for independence because women were seen as symbols of Algerian culture and national identity. On the other hand, the FLN was stuck in a situation where they couldn't support women's rights without being seen as supporting the colonial state's changes as a good thing. For Algerians, becoming more conservative was a way to fight back against what they saw as a foreign power violating their culture. This happened as the revolution gained steam. The FLN was fighting for Algeria's national identity, and the traditional picture of women came to represent that identity.

The Algerian government had different views on women who fought in the war depending on which side they were on. People who supported the FLN were seen as heroes, but the French government saw Algerian women as tools to be used or as security risks. After Algeria got its freedom, its government didn't do enough to protect women's rights. This kept gender inequality going and slowed down progress toward full equality. Women’s rights campaigners and conservatives are still fighting, which shows how complicated gender roles are in Algeria.

2.1.3 Algeria Gains Independence from France: 1962

The first Algerian administration, led by Ahmed Ben Bella, pushed dramatically to the left following independence in July 1962, owing in large part to the influence of French and Algerian communists and Trotskyites who arrived in Algiers to spearhead the emerging socialist revolution. Through their own Workers' Party, Algerian communists and left-leaning labor union activists continue to be politically active. The establishment of the religious organization al Qiyam, which stands for "Islamic values," in 1964 worked to restore Islamic values, but was banned in 1966 and then dissolved in 1970. Three Islamists, Soltani, Sahnoun, and Abbasi Madani, headed it. The latter would be crucial to the Islamists' initial attempt to seize control from 1988 to 1992 (Ottaway, 2015).

Colonel Houari Boumediene's Algerian military overthrew Ben Bella after just three years of independence, drove out foreign communists, and pledged a "return to the sources." Educated exclusively in Arab nations, Boumediene worked to advance Arabic education, Islamic principles, and Arabic culture with the aid of thousands of imported Egyptian instructors, many of whom were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he pressed for strict governmental supervision of the Islamization process. Additionally, he substituted state socialism with military support with socialist inspirations. Al Qiyam leaders soon had a falling out with Boumediene, particularly over their opposition to his land reform program. He banned their activities in 1966 and their organization four years later (Boukharouba, 2024).

Boumediene’s death in 1978 sparked a new phase of Islamic activism. His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, tolerated the Islamists’ campaign against foreign ways, whether communism, the French language, alcohol, or Western dress for women. But the strategy soon backfired, especially on university campuses. Young Arabic-speaking Islamists found it difficult to obtain jobs because they did not speak French. Algiers even witnessed violent student clashes pitting Arabic speakers against French speakers (Tao, 2022; Ottaway, 2015).

2.2 BLACK DECADE: MULTIPARTYISM AND ISLAMISM TENSIONS (1988-1992)

In order to understand the role of women in Algerian politics, the many challenges that Algeria faced during the short years 1988–1992, including democratization, the fall of communism, the rise of Islamism, and the escalation of a civil war should well be examined. During the civil war communists were among the first victims. By looking at the Socialist

Vanguard Party (PAGS) history during this time, we can better comprehend Algeria's ongoing division between Islamists and secularists on the one hand, and between those non-Islamists who, in the name of democracy, believed that all Islamists were the enemy that needed to be destroyed at all costs and those who, on the other hand, did not (Bouguedra & Magreb, 2021; Boukharouba, 2024).

Algeria has been democratizing since October of 1988. The National Liberation Front (FNL) is no longer the sole political party, and democratic elections are held. Around this period, the government officially established a political party named the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front). This organization aims to construct an Islamic Republic and rejects democracy, which they view as an illness borrowed from period when the country was the colony of France (Bouguedra & Magreb, 2021; Boukharouba, 2024).

2.2.1 October 1988 Incidents and The Communist Experience

On October 4–5, 1988, in the evening, tensions grew in Algiers' working-class Bab El-Oued neighborhood. On October 5, juvenile groups gathered and attacked public buildings, most famously the state-owned Souq Al-Fallah open market.

Rioting also occurred in several neighborhoods around the nation, including Bab el-Oued, el-Biar, Kouba, Ben Aknoun, Chéraga, and Belcourt. In the early hours of the morning, a bus in the heart of Algiers (the capital) was attacked, along with private establishments like the Blue Note bar, the Lufthansa offices, and the Polisario information center. This whole thing took place in a euphoric mood. Through the dramatic style of the riots, political sentiments were conveyed, such as allusions to FLN leaders Chadli Bendjedid and demands for the late president Boumediene to return. Rioters moved to Riadh al-Fath (The monument of the capital), a brand-new commercial district, where they broke windows and looted stores (Hussain, 2018). They also attacked various localities' police stations. The classic rioter, for instance, was a simple guy in an overcrowded flat between the ages of 15 and 20 who was either still in school or unemployed and unskilled. Even if he had no affiliation with any underground party or youth group, such as PAGS, he had no sympathy for the Islamist movement. President Chadli proclaimed a state of siege on October 6, opening the door for the army to intervene with firearms and tanks. The first victims who were reported to have perished had no flag, catchphrase, or anyone to take credit for initiating the riots before them. Islamist chants were first heard Friday, October 7, during a protest of six to eight thousand people after the mosque. The violence intensified after General Khaled Nezzar took

command of the armed forces. On October 10, 20,000 protestors led by a faction of the Islamist leadership marched from Belcourt to Bab el-Oued, where they were confronted by gunfire from the police in front of the General direction of the national security, the DGSN. An official total of 169 people was murdered throughout the entire series of events, making it a very deadly episode.

The dissolution of the social compact terrified many people, as did the Popular Army's shooting and consequent murders of the country's youth during the riots. In his speech on October 10, the day before the firefight, President Chadli announced a new set of political changes, including revising the constitution (Hussain, 2018).

There was debate concerning the origin of the riots and the proper interpretation of them in the immediate aftermath of the event. The significance of October emerged from two opposing approaches: Authorities denied that the disturbances had a political motive and accused the teens of vandalism, while the Western media portrayed the rioters as starving people based on the cliché of bread riots, to which much political contestation in the Arab world was reduced in previous years.

After the October PAGS interaction, a number of questions were raised. The most troubling aspect is probably the fact that a number of PAGS activists were arrested before the demonstrations. The Polytechnic school of architecture and town planning (EPAU) workers from El Harrach suburbs, including demographer Kamel Kateb, were among those detained. A lot of people suffered torture. so, A National Comity Against Torture was established by academics shortly after the October riots, and writer Anouar Benmalek served as its secretary general (Benmalek, 2008).

The October Black Notebook (which is very famous), a booklet published by Comity in 1989, contained accounts of arrests and torture. (Benmalek, 2008). The director of a state-owned enterprise, Hacène Benazzouz, 35, for example, says he was tortured after being seized on October 4, 1989, at 5:30 p.m. in the Algiers center and constantly questioned about his membership in the PAGS. On October 5th and October 7th, the party responded by releasing a statement detailing the arrests and calling on "workers, patriots, citizens" to cease the persecution and support the victims. Another statement, released on October 9, specifically addressed army officials and troops, and condemned "arbitrary arrests" with the phrase "do not fire on the sons of the people, your brothers" (Benmalek, 2008).

Former PAGS members discussed the riots' potential sparked by the police, questioned their spontaneity, and emphasized the ongoing tensions and socioeconomic context that have existed since the summer of 1988 in the wake of these events. Chadli Bendjedid's economy saw several adjustments when he was elected president of the republic in 1979, succeeding Houari Boumediene. He abandoned communist corporate management and stopped making investments in heavy industries in favor of growing the private sector. Popular humor changed Chadli's motto from (for a better life) to (for a better life, someplace) (Childs, 2012). The country's economy suffered during the 1986 financial crisis as the US dollar's depreciation was made worse by the drop in oil prices.

Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the industrial public sector was to be divided into smaller companies. The government finally acknowledged the housing crisis in the summer of 1988, but the drought-related agricultural disaster caused food prices to soar. Numerous strikes occurred in public enterprises. The General Secretary of the Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), connected to the FLN (Allouche, 2016).

Historian Hugh Roberts has highlighted how fragile this viewpoint is by pointing out that the president's speech on October 10th, which announced that economic liberalization policies will be implemented, put an end to the rioting. In this background, it is tempting to see October as simply another reaction to the economic crisis and changes (Roberts, 2003: 107).

As a result, many ex-pagsistes developed their own theories. According to NA, a former member of the Party's Political Bureau, the PAGS posed a significant threat in 1988 because economic reform was on the horizon. It had not been accomplished as of 1988. The PAGS was the only force capable of opposing it and causing difficulties in the economic liberalization process.

Since the FIS won the local and regional elections in June 1990, some individuals have found this speech more rational. However, the first legislative elections the following year were marred by violence against the voting system, which the FIS backed. There was a lockdown, and polls were postponed. Nonetheless, the FIS won the first round by 188 seats to the FLN's. It's crucial to note, however, that 42% of voters did not vote. Because the army still controlled the government, it refused to cooperate with the FIS and chose to remove the Prime Minister. The elections were thus postponed, and Mohamed Boudiaf, a key figure in

Algeria's independence, was appointed to chair a new governing body known as the High State Committee. The latter banned the FIS and declared a state of emergency on February 9, 1992. Boudiaf was assassinated in June 1992, and he was the first to face the horror that these steps produced.

Some of the armed groups that back the FIS were becoming more extreme at the same time that the government is cracking down on and arresting a lot of Islamist party leaders. The Algerian problem was partially solved when Bouteflika was elected president in April 1999 and the country's civil harmony policy was approved in a vote; however, prior to that, on February 23, 1989, during the beginning of the black decade following the October riot, a new constitution was adopted, paving the way for a multiparty system and establishing democratic freedom. The legislation on political parties was soon to follow, with a law on multipartyism voted on 5 July 1989 (Allouche, 2016; Ottaway, 2015).

According to Article 3 of the new law, a 'legal political association' should contribute to the consolidation of national independence, territorial integrity, and national unity, as well as work for cultural and social prosperity. It should not, however, be based on religion, language, or regionalism, and its goals should not violate Islamic norms. All political organizations had to seek permission from the Ministry of Interior. The first political party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), was inaugurated on 9-10 February and was not greeted with political persecution, affirming the state's bright future (Ottaway, 2021). Within the Islamist movement, the decision to organize a party was made at the last minute in reaction to the new opportunities created by the changes. Competition amongst several figures of the political Islam movement (including Mahfoud Nahnah, leader of the Algerian branch of the Muslim brotherhood, and Ahmed Sahnoun, neither of whom joined the FIS) encouraged a group of younger leaders (including Ali Benhadj and the somewhat older Abassi Madani) to announce the formation of the FIS on 18 February at the As-Sunna Mosque in Algiers (Human Right Watch, 2014).

The only question for the PAGS, which had always considered itself a vanguard party, was whether or not to get legal. After more than two decades of underground operations, this was not a straightforward thing, and not everyone agreed. In September, the Salle Ibn Khaldun (the capital's conference room) hosted the party's first public assembly, known as [the emergence from clandestine meeting]. NA recalls the danger he sensed in such a drastic

action, tying it in his story with the massacres that would commence in 1992 (Ottaway, 2021).

2.2.2 The Main Incidents of Black Decade

The FIS' victory in the first round of Algeria's legislative elections in December 1991 prompted the government to cancel the second round, preventing this group from taking power. The imposition of a state of emergency on February 29 signals the beginning of a horrific civil war that will murder over 200,000 people. The FIS' win in the legislative elections of December 1991 triggered a wave of turmoil in Algeria. The army rises up because people were frightened the FIS would seize control of Parliament. On January 11, 1992, President Chadli Benjedid was asked to resign down. Mohamed Boudiaf, who succeeded him as president, cancels the second legislative tour (Ottaway 2015).

Afterward, a 12-month state of emergency was announced on February 29. Both the freedom of assembly and speech as well as all political parties, including the FIS, were outlawed. Likewise, in situations involving national security, a state of emergency permits the military to violate human rights laws. It has been extended indefinitely after a year. For instance, the government established anti-terrorism courts in December 1992 after issuing an anti-terrorism edict in October of the same year. Meanwhile, the order warriors are conducting a combing: over nine thousand individuals detained by the FIS were either put on trial in military courts or had their cases transferred to anti-terrorist courts (Allouche, 2017).

According to a report from the U.S. Department of State, these steps help the Algerian government better oversee the legal process. So, in 1992, one hundred FIS members were sentenced to death, and another hundred were roughly put to death. And There is a response from the FIS by starting a war of resurrection. After President Boudiaf was killed in June 1992, Ali Kafi became president. He was replaced by a five-person grand council before Liamine Zéroual, who was the minister of defense, took over as president in 1995 (The CNN Wire Staff, 2011). Even though Algeria promised to bring back democracy, it was in the middle of a bloody civil war that killed over 200,000 people in about 15 years (Amnesty international, 1993).

There are various explanations for why the Algerian civil war, which began in 1992, has gained notoriety. It started out as a multiparty tension that ended abruptly and involved the horrifying and surprisingly widespread killing of civilians. The government received strong

support from outsiders despite accusations of several transgressions in its handling of the conflict; many of these individuals saw Algeria as a possible future country of "radical Islam" (Ryan, 2010).

Numerous, seemingly incompatible theories regarding the reasons for the war's occurrence and its proper conduct have been generated by research into the conflict. This is partially due to the fact that analysts frequently decide to investigate puzzles associated with one or more of these intriguing features. It is feasible to synthesize the findings of earlier study and gain a comprehensive understanding of the conflict by viewing Algeria through the prism of preceding civil wars (Zeraoulia, 2020). Enhancing understanding of the Black decade may be achieved by closely examining the details of the Algerian civil war. In addition to structural considerations, it is crucial to consider the duration of war resulting from the relationship between governments and insurgents, the importance of diaspora communities defined by factors other than national identity, and the type of opportunity costs connected to war (Naceur, 2022).

All of this began when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won Algeria's municipal elections in 1990, seizing 854 (55%) of the 1,541 community (municipal) meetings. This victory established the FIS as the most powerful resistance force and the primary danger to President Chadli Benjedid's presidency. The FIS also won 32 of the 48 provincial governments, while the FLN only got 14. Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba were just a few of the big towns that the FIS took over. Even in areas with a lot of money, like Hydra and El Biar, where many FLN leaders reside, the FIS won easily. On May 25, 1991, the FIS called for a general strike and demanded changes to the constitution, the immediate implementation of the Sharia law, the removal of the president, and presidential elections. On June 5, Bendjedid declared a state of emergency and told the military to bring order back to the country. The state of emergency had to be lifted and legislative elections had to be announced on September 29, 1991. The results of the second election, held on December 26, gave the FIS 188 seats out of a possible 231. This puts them in a good position to gain the majority in the second round. However, the High Council of Security (HCS), which is made up of Ahmed Ghozali and the country's top officials, said that the election results were invalid and that the second round would not take place. The HSC arrests the leaders of the FIS, which leads to a backlash from fundamentalists against the police. The FIS political party was banned in Algeria on February 23 this leaded to a terrible civil war that ended in 2002 and killed about

200,000 people. Because of this terrible civil war, Islamists were pushed to the edges of Algeria's politics, and they didn't have many chances to get back in power (Ottaway, 2015; Allouche, 2016; Allouche, 2017).

Women at the time suffered the effects of this political conflict, and the Civil War concluded with a significant impact on women's rights. Hundreds of FIS members were sent to camps in the Sahara without a trial (Allouche, 2016; Allouche, 2017). Torture evolved as a systematic procedure. Following that, killing people, torturing them, going missing, and annihilating entire communities were all considered normal. Not-veiled women and academics were the target of the now mostly forgotten Movement for the Islamic State (MEI, near the FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), two terrorist groups that have since been freed and joined by those who have managed to escape. In addition to all this terror the general public after initially attacking the army and police in 1993, claiming that they are supporters of the dictatorship which aimed to lose many intellectual people, and women (Allouche, 2017).

The assassination of President Boudiaf has to be mentioned to examine the ongoing conjuncture. Mohammed Boudiaf had fought in the French army during World War II, and by 1950 he was one of the most important people in the drive against France led by nationalists. He joined the FLN ruling council in 1954, replacing Ahmed Ben Bella. From 1956 until 1962, the French imprisoned and detained Boudiaf and Ben Bella. Following their release, they installed a provisional administration led by Boudiaf as deputy minister in the recently independent Algeria. That being said, he disapproved of President Ben Bella's stringent decree. He was imprisoned for a few months before leaving for Morocco in 1964 to operate a brick company and expose the FLN's increasing corruption. He was called back to lead a military-backed council of state in January 1992, shortly before Islamic radicals were about to win the legislative elections. Although he appeared to have gained support for the changes he had called for, he was shot and killed during a speech. It was claimed that the president's bodyguard, Deputy Lieutenant Lambarek Boumaarafi, had killed him. It was alleged that this was because he was an Islamist. On June 29, 1992, the president was assassinated in Annaba, Alabama, while delivering a live speech. The assassination was considered a significant event in Algerian history and sparked intense shock and discussion for many years in the nation (Boukharouba, 2024).

Boudiaf's death was assumed to be related to his efforts to combat corruption in the Algerian military, as well as the fact that he discharged several high-ranking military personnel. There are theories that some military personnel arranged the assassination because Boudiaf was attempting to make changes and question their authority.

2.2.3 Towards The End of Political Instability

There was no formal agreement to justify President Zeroual's sudden resignation in September 1998, even though some semblance of peace had been restored. Because neither party was eager to make any concessions, the negotiations were difficult and drawn out. Due to the divide within the Islamist side, the Italian town of Sant'Egidio's attempts at mediation in 1995 were largely fruitless. Sant'Egidio was well known for his extraordinary mediation abilities, especially in Mozambique. The leaders of the FIS and the AIS were willing to have discussions, but the GIA continued to be more interested in conducting military operations than in reaching a political settlement. There was considerable calm, but no formal deal had been achieved when Zeroual unexpectedly resigned as president in September 1998 (Ghanem-Yazbeck & Center, 2018).

April 1999 witnessed new presidential elections under Abdelaziz Bouteflika. After all other candidates withdrew, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister and FLN leader, was elected president without a challenge. The established political class won. After serving in the Liberation War, he was appointed foreign minister in 1963. He was employed there till Boumediene's passing in 1979. After that, he lived outside of Algeria for a while. As soon as he got back to Algeria in 1987, he joined the FLN Central Committee.

Bouteflika would do anything to end the crisis. He pardoned everyone who handed over their firearms, resolving all concerns of guilt and accountability for Islamist extremists and security personnel. Immediately following the election, he submitted a "civil harmony" legislation to parliament. He described it as the political embodiment of the Algerian military-AIS/FIS pact. Proper approval was granted. A vote was held on the law. The administration claimed that 98.6% of voters approved it, with 85 percent participating.

The numbers were excessive, yet the legislation was popular. Given their culpability for the violence and abuse against the people, the security forces and AIS/FIS enjoyed a great deal of freedom. Human rights and transitional justice advocates slammed the measure. They wanted the violent perpetrators prosecuted or the government to initiate a "truth and

reconciliation" process to acknowledge the atrocities. This writer does not know which option would have ended the conflict rather than prolonged it.

Algerians were originally unable to move on from the struggle of independence and the military-civilian elite that took power after Bouteflika's election. When Boumediene died and Benjedid exposed politics to parties and procedures, he took the first step toward eradicating that legacy from politics. Following horrific carnage and warfare, peace was restored, and Bouteflika represented the previous military-civilian regime. Both attempts failed the second time (Ghanem-Yazbeck & Center, 2018).

April 1999 witnessed new presidential elections under Abdelaziz Bouteflika. After all other candidates withdrew, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister and FLN leader, was elected president without a challenge. The established political class won. After serving in the Liberation War, he was appointed foreign minister in 1963. He was employed there till Boumediene's passing in 1979. After that, he lived outside of Algeria for a while. As soon as he got back to Algeria in 1987, he joined the FLN Central Committee.

Bouteflika would stop at nothing to avert a confrontation. He absolved all those who turned in their firearms, putting an end to any questions about accountability or guilt for security personnel and Islamist militants. Shortly after the election, he brought a "civil harmony" legislation to parliament. He referred to it as the Algerian military-AIS/FIS accord's political expression. Appropriate approval was given. The law was decided on through an election. The administration claimed that 98.6% of voters approved it, with 85% participating. Despite the large numbers, the measure was widely supported. Given their involvement in the violence and abuse against the people, the security forces and AIS/FIS were given a lot of leeway. Human rights and transitional justice advocates vehemently opposed the plan.

They wanted the violent perpetrators prosecuted or the government to launch a "truth and reconciliation" process to acknowledge the atrocities. This writer is unsure which option would have resolved the problem rather than prolonging it. Algerians were originally unable to move on from the war of independence and the military-civilian elite that ruled after Bouteflika's election. When Boumediene died and Benjedid exposed politics to parties and procedures, he took the first step toward erasing that legacy from politics. Following horrific carnage and fighting, peace was restored, and Bouteflika served as a symbol of the previous military-civilian rule. Both efforts failed the second time (Terranova, 2011; Ottaway, 2015)

2.3 DEMOCRACY AND WOMEN RIGHTS DURING THE BLACK DECADE IN ALGERIA

The current political climate in Algeria has its origins in the past, particularly during the French colonial era, according to Turshen (2002) and Şentürk (2023). Islam and culture are two essential components of democracy that currently have a significant influence on Algeria. The threat posed by Islamic terrorism, which originates domestically and is highly active outside of the nation's capital, Algiers, is another issue the government must handle. Even though Algeria forbids political organizations with a religious basis, ISIS poses a political as well as a physical threat. As a result, the "black decade" was made unlivable by assaults and assassinations carried out by heavily armed Islamist organizations. Terrorists have primarily targeted philosophers, artists, human rights activists, and, of course, women. Algerian women suffered greatly for opposing Islamist extremism during the 1990s rule. Because they refused to give up their careers, wear the veil, hand over their children to the maquis, embrace violence and obscurantism, or stop being political and community champions, they were subjected to sexual assaults, kidnappings, torture, and death. The people's resistance eventually destroyed the armed organizations, but the seeds of regression had already been planted. Former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika oversaw national unity laws that ignored extremist assaults of women. Let us begin by simply reviewing the national movement. We want to understand the importance of the woman issue to important leaders and participants in the national movement.

There were three groups of women before the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962):

a. The Union of Algerian Women,
b. The Association of Muslim Women of Algeria
c. The women's section of the Algerian People's Party (PPA). These groups were formed between 1934 and 1947. Because of this, political groups were the main way that women got involved in politics.

When women joined these organizations, they were required to follow the political parties' plans. These programs were mostly about fighting for workers' rights (for women's groups affiliated with the Communist Algerian Party, or PCA) or against colonialism (for women affiliated with the PPA). These groups might be thought of as political parties' "satellites" spreading their ideals to women's communities. When it came to the woman question, the Algerian political organizations took one of two approaches:

a. The issue of women is not important.
b. Women earn their rights by fighting for national freedom.

Several nationalist leaders took this attitude, and it was also stated in the manifesto that sparked the battle for national independence. Women's issues were not prioritized in the initial formula. Instead, people's freedom and independence were prioritized. Nationalist leaders had to ensure that this massive undertaking remained on track. Everyone had to support it, including the women, who had to concur with this male perspective. Members of the Algerian martyrs who fought in the national liberation war claim that their membership in the national movement and later the National Liberation Front (FLN) had nothing to do with women's freedom.

The liberation of their nation was the sole objective of these ladies who battled for freedom. It's also critical to recognize that women's political voice did not support them. During the conflict, men controlled the media for the FLN. As we already stated The Algerian people have endured many horrific events since October 1988, such as everyday acts of terrorism and brutality from fundamentalists who are also exact Islamist fundamentalists (Wilson, 2018; Cooke, 1989; Diwakar, n.d.).

The fact that the history of the national struggle is still not fully understood currently irritates a lot of intellectuals as well as occasionally ordinary people. In this instance, concerns regarding the actual actions of women during the independence war are being voiced. First of all, it's noteworthy that women typically placed second or third. There is no evidence that any women had assumed leadership positions or participated in decision-making; instead, they were imprisoned, subjected to torture, and given death sentences for their actions as contact agents and maquisards in combat zones. The women continued to work at lesser levels.

In uprisings, this is a common pattern: the leaders, who are usually men, set the goals and force their views on the women who join them. Sometimes this view is stated directly, but more often it's implied that the main goal of freeing the country or ending class struggles will lead to other freedoms, such as women's freedom. Women are also supposed to have gained all of their rights by joining the liberation fight. Society appears to have altered dramatically; the mentalities and social structures that underpin the patriarchal system appear to have been shaken up so much that women now have a different status than what custom has long said they should have (Turshen, 2002).

Numerous women's organizations resisted being quiet and persisted in organizing around demands for justice and an end to the impunity of those who had murdered, sexually assaulted, and caused harm to others throughout the Black Decade. Families of those who vanished during the civil war and women victims are still protesting and demanding answers. The officials frequently beat them. Additionally, they were detained because they refused to get permission to protest, believing that their actions are lawful and should not need permission. For instance, on March 8, International Women's Day, 2017, activists from the Tharwa Fadhma N'Soumer and Djazairouna associations were detained while demonstrating in front of the Grande Poste in Algiers to condemn social injustice in the country and pay tribute to the women who lost their lives in the 1990s Algerian civil war.

Algerian culture has been permanently shaped by the challenges posed by orthodox Islamists for years. Combating Islamist extremist influences through everyday culture warfare has become a third method of mobilization (Şentürk, 2023).

Women's rights activists have been at the front lines of the fight against Islamic terrorism, and they have a reason to keep up the fight. To keep these forces in check, the fight for women's rights is very important. They will be some of the most important people in any truth and healing committee that is set up. Finally, the fight for women's rights is important to make sure that half of the people can return to being full citizens (de la Perrière, 2005).

Furthermore, Islamists imposed the 1976 draft constitution's omission of Islam as the national religion. They used this blunder to demonstrate the regime's disregard to Islam and Marxist and communist influence. The Monotheists urged the ‘adoption of Islam as a way of life and as the basis of the legislative, economic, and political structures in society’. Women’s rights were protected by the constitution, contrary to the norm of the time when women could not marry non-Muslims and needed marital guardians. In response, women's groups, generally led by liberation war veterans, demanded constitution implementation. Islamists demanded Shari'a after these accusations. Islamists then targeted women who violated Shari'a (Bouatta, 1997).

Some Islamists think that women who don't follow the Islamic dress code, which includes the hidjab, are not Islamic and can be threatened, harassed, or even killed. For example, on February 28, 1994, a 17-year-old girl was killed in Blida by people they thought were armed Islamists for leaving her head uncovered. Two more were killed in the Blida area at the

beginning of November 1994, likely because they turned down a "temporary marriage" or "pleasure marriage."

Shiite Muslims don't agree with the "pleasure marriage," which is an illegal marriage that can last from a few hours to a few months (AFP, November 7, 1994). with members of armed Islamist groups (AFP 7 November 1994; The Independent 14 November 1994); young women are often forced to get married by Islamist fighters (AFP 7 November 1994; Le Nouvel Observateur 19-25 January 1995, 31).

As one source put it, other women face a "double threat" because they are women and work (FLW Women Mar. 1995, 1). Armed Islamists go after women professionals, like journalists, teachers, lawyers, and human rights activists, who criticize the FIS or other Islamist groups or are thought to support the government (The Globe and Mail, February 13, 1995; AFP, February 15, 1995). Fatma-Zohra Ourais was a French teacher who ran unopposed in the national election in December 1991. She was killed by Islamists on February 11, 1995. Women's group head Nabila Djahnine was killed by people who were thought to be armed Islamists in Tizi Ouzou, Kabylia, on February 15, 1995 (The Globe and Mail, February 16, 1995; AFP, March 7, 1995; ibid., February 15, 1995). Furthermore, armed groups have attacked the wives and children of both targeted professionals and security forces personnel. In 1993 and 1994, armed Islamists killed and raped an estimated 215 women. It was reported that almost 300 women had been killed by the beginning of March 1995 (AFP, March 7, 1995). A 15-year-old girl was one of the women attacked by Islamists since they allegedly set a March 9, 1995, deadline for the release of female Islamists from jail (The Independent, March 14, 1995). People from Algerian feminist groups held a fake hearing on March 27, 1995, where they sentenced Islamist leaders to death as a way of showing their anger. As a result, the GIA killed nine young women because the deadline was not met and as a way of showing their anger (UN Refugee Agency, 1995).

2.3.1 Rise of Salafism in Algeria

The Algerian government's inability to transform and then to eliminate the radical Islamist influence of the 1990s by political means, followed by democratic measures, resulted in a disavowal of politics represented by Da'wa Salafism. This, in turn, led to the use of jihadi violence as a means of political bargaining. The existence of the three Salafi factions - political, Jihadi, and Da'wa - highlights an enduring and deeply rooted dilemma that extends beyond the realm of political Islam such as imposing sharia even with violence, and that is

a considerable oppression towards women especially, indeed part of the sharia has been imposed until today as the family code which is the most important and controversial part of gender politics in Algeria.

Women's rights campaigners have been working for decades to change the Code's sexist laws, but they still treat women unfairly when they are in court. Because of this, the Algerian women's movement is still centered on the fight against the Family Code. The Family Code discussion is based on two competing points of view: Islamists' support for Muslim identity and feminists' and women's groups' support for equality. When the Family Code is brought up in Algeria, Algerian feminists want to get rid of it, while Islamist women fight to keep it in place and even make it stronger.

When it became law in 1984, the Algerian Family Code made sexism a part of all family issues. This Code says that women are not adults in the eyes of the law because it only recognizes them as daughters, mothers, or wives. In Article 8 of the Family Code, it is legal for men to marry up to four wives, which is called polygamy. It is the law in Algeria for women to follow their husbands (Article 39). Article 11 says that women can't make their own marriage contracts unless they have a matrimonial guardian to help them (Hadjadj, 2023; Kebsi, 2022).

According to the Algerian Family Code, mothers and wives who have been split do not have the right to the family home. Instead, the husband automatically gets it. A child's most basic wants must be met with the father's permission and agreement. This includes registering the child in school and letting them take part in school events. Feminists thought that when Abdul Aziz Bouteflika was elected president of Algeria in 1999, it would make a big difference in the way women were treated politically.

Even though women and well-known feminists like Khalida Messaoudi backed him, the new government made big deals with Islamist groups and didn't recognize the problems women were facing because of the racist Family Code. In March 2004, groups of women started a movement to stop the Family Code from being in effect for another twenty years. Five groups that support equal rights for men and women led the "20 ans—Barakat!" movement, which in Algerian means "20 years—enough!" In a letter to the president in July 2004, the group 20 ans—Barakat claim the women rights. Bouteflika announced in 2005 that changes would be made to the Code. Even so, these changes did not change the fact that the 1984 Code still had biased rules. One example is polygamy, which has been kept up. It's still hard for women

to get a divorce, they also can't get married without a parent being there. brothers take two shares of inheritance while sisters take only one share, so they don't have equal property rights. With the 2005 revisions, the wife no longer had to obey her husband, and the minimum age for both men and women to get married was raised to nineteen. Algerian women, on the other hand, have been put in the care of men. Algerian feminists were let down because they didn't see these changes as real steps toward equality (Kebsi, 2022).

Both the secular groups and the legitimate Islamist opposition are weak, which makes it difficult for the political ruling class to be revitalized through elections. Although the nonviolent democratic opposition's discontent and ineffectiveness are the main causes of Salafism's emergence, it is not a realistic alternative for democratizing the Algerian system. The historical development of Salafism demonstrates its incapacity to acknowledge its presence within a diverse system, which it refutes by advocating for the establishment of an Islamic state, resorting to violence, or rejecting political engagement.

Therefore, the promotion of democracy should primarily concentrate on strengthening a non-religious government, persuading radical Islamists to alter their perspectives on democracy, and promoting elections while emphasizing the need for political parties to adhere to democratic principles. However, it is the exclusion of extremist individuals from contemporary governmental organizations and the absence of political awareness among the general population that facilitated the rise of different Salafi movements initially.

However, the fact that Salafi organizations exist in Algeria shows how important it is for the world community to reevaluate and take action against the views of radical Islamist movements. Western observers frequently view the FIS and other extreme Islamists' political involvement—as well as their resistance to a secular and democratic government—as the main reason behind Algeria's recent history of violent confrontations. Furthermore, radicals as exclusive and marginalized factions must be distinguished from radicalism as a style of action in the war against terrorism. It would be wise to invite the preaching Salafi members—especially the younger ones—to take part in foreign-led projects aimed at promoting democracy in order to take advantage of their anti-violence stance.

The government has gotten strong support for its efforts to foster unity and has occasionally stopped the expansion of extremist Islamic politics by allowing the Da'wa Salafi doctrine to flourish. However, Da'wa Salafism's religious extremism, along with its disdain for widely held societal beliefs and reluctance to live in harmony with the wider community, could

present problems in the future, particularly if the living conditions of the youth do not improve quickly.

Many commentators note that, Algerian policy makers should endeavor to include these individuals into inclusive, democratic institutions and foster a sense of inclusion and complete citizenship among them. Revitalizing peaceful and nonviolent methods of political engagement seems to be a significant obstacle for political Salafism and the previous participants of the FIS.

As it is well known, political Salafism is a flexible ideology that can adapt to different political systems provided by the state. It may include several political orientations, including Islamic nationalism, jihadism, and support for national reconciliation. It is also has been underlined that political Salafism has well realized that its outdated demand for an Islamic state must disappear, and that its new focus should be on building coalitions with the ruling classes in order to restore political clout. It was necessary to temper the outdated FIS utopian ideal by taking on real political difficulties that reflect Algerians' everyday lives. Instead of providing a pre-existing model of protest ideology in a situation when Algerian population are being excluded from political participation, it was seen as it would be more beneficial to encourage former FIS supporters to join democratic political parties and focus on cultivating practical political abilities. Many argued that they should learn about conventional politics and political pluralism, and they should disassociate themselves from a binary relationship with the state.

The transformation of Jihadi Salafism groups such as the GIA and GSPC into an organization like AQIM has brought an international aspect to the conflict in Algeria and has enhanced the state's military efficiency. Nevertheless, the proliferation of Jihadi Salafi ideology on a worldwide scale also indicates the government's inability to provide genuine security, which led to an increase in overall criminal activity and the rapid growth of organized crime. The lack of genuine possibilities for the Algerian people to participate in a conversation including civic, political, and military activities poses a threat to social stability and national cohesiveness. Algerian versions of Salafism demonstrate a strong desire to transition from security-focused politics, which have been in place for sixteen years, to new forms of participatory politics, reflecting their unique relation with the state. The legacy of the civil war was solidified by many manifestations of Salafism and its distinct political orientations. It was imperative to revive political discourse and collaboration among all stakeholders in

post-conflict Algeria. In order to successfully reconstruct the country, the Algerian state must develop its post conflict political institutions, since this is a crucial prerequisite for finding foreign partners to support the necessary economic transformation. Ensuring the stability of the nation relies heavily on the replacement of the current political leaders with a new elite, as well as the active and peaceful participation of the younger generation who have grown up in the aftermath of terrorist activities. Over the previous two decades, the emergence of Algerian political elites has mostly relied on the use of violence. This transition occurred from a colonial system characterized by excessive violence to the post-independence dominance of the FLN "revolutionary family," and ultimately to the adoption of the jihadi ideology of Salafism. There is a need to build models of citizenship-based involvement and political negotiation in today's Algeria that are based on professional abilities and are completely apart from any kind of jihadi or violent legitimacy.

According to the social scientists focusing on this topic, the Algerian government should continue its efforts to aid the victims of terrorism and enhance the capabilities of civil society organizations in their fight against violence.

Reducing the possibility of former extremists reverting to their former extremist ways and strengthening the capacities of the remaining armed terrorist groups would be made possible by improving the transparency of the reconciliation process and taking on the criminal and corrupt elements of the national economy that facilitate the existence of terrorist organizations.

Nevertheless, the persistent violence in the nation has resulted in the ongoing enforcement of a state of emergency, which continues to govern and restrict the Algerian political sphere. The security measures have been ineffective in completely eradicating terrorism but have imposed a significant financial burden on civil society. Various manifestations according to the fact of integrating Salafists were emerging in this setting, devoid of any specific ideological structure (Boubekeur, 2008).

2.3.2 The Movement of Protestation ‘’Hirak” As A Feminism Opportunity

President Ahmed Bouteflika announced his reelection in February 2019. The "straw that broke the camel's back" for the public. Bouteflika's campaign was bizarre. He hadn't been seen in two years and was in a wheelchair as his condition deteriorated. He was also certain

to win the election, just like the previous four. He commanded a powerful political and military elite that governed the country. People went outside this time.

The "Hirak" movement, which means "movement" in Arabic, differed from 2011 Arab uprisings began with a clear and achievable political goal: to prevent Bouteflika from standing for president.

The participants of the Hirak began their protestation with Friday marches for citizens and Tuesday for students. This rally gave feminists a chance to assert equality. Thus, the populace maintained high participation for months. Their cause couldn't attract trustworthy, because they received another painful lesson in 2011, they tried but failed (Ghebouli, 2020).

Algeria tried twice to reform its government. On the first attempt, a ten-year, horrific conflict concluded in the 1990s. Thousands of people took to the streets weekly for the second, peaceful effort in 2019. They first protested President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's fifth-term bid. Later, they fought for free elections to give the opposition a chance. The campaign, known as "Hirak," prevented Bouteflika from running again but failed to remove the military-civilian administration that has ruled Algeria since 1962. Many organizations developed during the political reform movement, but no new leadership or authority exists. It’s important to mention that also in the Hirak the democratic and feminist efforts intertwine even if the feminism is still a minority movement in Algeria, and neither the government nor the Hirak-led opposition endorse it. Feminists are frequently accused of division in democratic calls.

This brief section of the thesis shows the link between the Hirak and feminism and suggests they may be one movement with the same purpose. To clarify, the hirak is closely related to the Black Decade since it was a revolt in 2019 that broke the system and mediocrity of the time, and by "Black Decade" we meant the sabotage that women faced. Feminism and democratic struggles have converged historically. Democratic modernist, secular, and left-wing currents continue to debate the feminist question. Public declarations that support undercut the opposition's sacred unity, encompassing all beliefs, so their influence is less overt. Feminist activists struggle to promote their agenda even among their supporters, despite their common conviction in social progress, reformists and revolutionaries face political players that oppose them regardless of their party membership or independence. Hirak lets us observe these conflicts more closely (Haddag, 2021).

As mentioned above the feminism is seen as a minority movement in Algeria, thus the regime and opposition forces in Hirak appear uninterested in regaining it. The State uses clientelism to balance progressive and pro-power Islamist elites. Thus, the State avoids discussing feminists and instead stresses the "place of women in society," frequently from a social integration perspective. It would need legislative revisions to address feminist concerns, which would be opposed by Parliament and conservatives. Hirak seems to follow this argument for opportunistic reasons. Feminism's divisive demands would weaken the power-against accord. Unlike identity and societal issues, the dictatorship has not exploited this part of feminism, and this created a limited, in another term to create a strategic alliance in Hirak was also difficult.

At this point, some clarity is required: we will differentiate between women who participate in popular mobilization and those who mobilize as feminists in addition to denouncing the governing system. The latter group, either in a "feminist square" or throughout the crowd, seeks legal principles and gender equality in citizenship. Despite women's increased representation, Hirak feminist slogans remain rare. This first remark helps us avoid premature optimism and avoid uncertainty between feminist activists and female protestors. Others want to create a competitive environment between these two entities, rather than symbolically opposing them. The phrase "co-presence" has been utilized to describe the multiple female pathways and feminists in the manifestations (Haddag, 2021).

Most activists are legalists who want to overturn the unconstitutional Family Code. As mentioned before, which was established in 1984 under the single-party FLN and revised by presidential decree in 2005, it is seen as a personal status code that relegates Algerian women to “minors for her entire life”. This clarifies the underlying confusion between secularization supporters and religious protectors of family law. Feminists are involved in the fight to change the Code because it questions the law order that was made based on biological differences between men and women. Algerian scholar Feriel Lalami, on the other hand, said that the female leaders in this movement didn't call themselves feminists because they were afraid of being accused of Westernization if they did (Haddag, 2021).

At the same time some people who work for women's rights joined these pro-democracy rallies. A lot of people were happy to be feminists and tried to connect the fight against the government to the fight for equality. These feminists said over and over that Algeria can't be free or democracy if women aren't respected. They set up a "feminist square" where female

organizers could meet and work together. It was clear from the signs that these feminists wanted to get rid of the Family Code, which keeps women and men from being equal. As soon as the Family Law was passed, the first groups for women got together. Even though those who wanted to completely get rid of it and those who wanted to make changes had different ideas, their main goal was to get rid of it.

Women's rights were not very different between what political groups did and what the government did. Most parties didn't put much stock in women's rights; instead, they focused on the fight for party diversity, which was especially important since many of them worked behind closed doors. Feminists were told again that women's rights could not be a priority in party platforms when party diversity was recognized in 1989. They were given reasons like the unique purpose of society is to solve the political and economic problems the country was going through (Hadjadj, 2023; Kebsi, 2022).

For many who have worked in the field for decades and witnessed women's advancement, this rhetoric appears out of date. Given the growing number of women in universities and the workforce, which improves their material circumstances and promotes social change. This fear about its repeal stems more from a widening gap between the legal processes of this code and the advancements in society than it does from the failure of the first feminist wave to adapt to new challenges facing women. Feminists also favor increased funding for law enforcement and a larger toolkit of legal defenses for women (Haddag, 2021).

It's a straightforward equation: gender equality is a prerequisite for collective freedom. Legal measures discriminate against women even though the Algerian constitution provides legal equality in the personal and domestic sphere. One such policy is the installation of a legal guardian who subordinates the woman. Today's global feminisms question gender heteronormativity as well as nation-states. In comparison to Tunisia, Lebanon, and Palestine, Algerian feminists' demands seem modest. Simple questions on the Family Code spark powerful street reactions. Anonymous attacks similar to black decade era and online disparaging campaigns have plagued the feminist movement since March 29, 2019. As an example, a London-based Algerian man demands to throw away acid on feminist in a video from social media, which was a common act in black decade, as it was mentioned on the interviews I had. Activists face threats and placard destruction. Hence conservative opponents who openly oppose women's rights reform and others who try to reconcile feminist and Hirakist ideas make the matter political (Khelifi, 2021; Haddag, 2021).

Feminists have realized the limits of the hierarchical political demands that developed simultaneously during Hirak. They refused to emphasize freedom above other change recommendations due to their strong dedication to independence. Hirak views feminists' commitment as a political lesson (Haddag, 2021; Şentürk, 2023).

Thus, democratizing feminism requires communication, relationships, and resource mobilization outside northern metropolitan areas. This would be done by strengthening local, regional, and global feminist solidarity. The passive postures that urge feminists to disconnect from the crowd are comparable to those of Algerian leaders who pushed activists to be patient to get independence. New national state construction, paternalism and respectability standards go beyond feminist activists. Due to its trans-ideological and transclass character, male domination expects all women to maintain their patriarchal status. But the Hirak and feminism teaches us that the Algerian feminist movement, damaged by the past, is no longer lured by discourses that conditioned societal needs (Haddag, 2021).

3. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: WOMEN RESISTING AGAINST OPPRESSION

During the Black Decade (1991-2002) a high number of civilians, particularly the women were either killed or mistreated by Islamist militia and in some instances even government soldiers. A civil war broke out as a result of the country's opening to multipartyism and the Islamic Salvation Front's (FIS) electoral victories, which the government was unable to accept. As a result, the FIS was shut down and elections were held again. Women were specifically targeted by jihadists during the Black Decade and were thereafter one of the primary forces in opposing Islamist extremist influence. Though their significance and participation in the post-Islamist movement have not received much attention, women's rights activists played a crucial role in opposing Islamic extremism in Algeria because they saw it as completely at odds with their civil rights and even with their very self-existence. Fundamentalists maintained particular attitudes around gender and social roles. They believed that establishing a unified, transcultural, and unhistorical Muslim identity would be the foundation of an unchanging Islamic societal framework. Based on gender disparities, the allocation of roles based on natural or divine order would maintain societal order, according to the fundamentalist ideal. The idea that women could be potential sources of fitna in society ran parallel to their beliefs.

The only way out of all these possible risks that the women would cause was to propose stringent control over the women. The foundation of the Islamic social structure would be embodied by veiled women in this way. During the Black decade women who follow lives believed to be outside of Islam were being harshly attacked, intimidated, or assassinated. According to this interpretation of Islam, it was not appropriate for women to pursue a career or work in a job that paid them a living, regardless of how common it was. It was also forbidden for women to smoke or engage in any activity that made them feel relaxed. Even women's attempts to dress up or put on make-up transformed them into sinners deserving of death or attack in the view of fundamentalists. Fundamentalists targeted women based on their desire for liberty. It could even be argued that a woman's effort to survive and stand on her own feet was sufficient to designate her an enemy of Islam. Fundamentalists saw women battling to survive on their own and caring for their children as a threat since they could survive without the help of men.

Indeed, Algerian women, particularly during the anticolonial fight, actively participated in the military battle and became politically active subjects. They gained valuable knowledge and experience during this period. When the country was a French colony, urban women with a secular education joined guerrilla forces fighting in the highlands, becoming key characters in the anti-colonial battle. Algerian women's very existence was at jeopardy in the war against Islamists. Their desire and resistance to continue this struggle stemmed not only from their stubbornness to survive, but also from the culture of struggle they inherited from the generations before them.

After Algeria gained independence in 1962, women were given the right to work, equal access to coeducation and free healthcare, and citizenship. Women became more influential and visible in a variety of jobs and social settings. By actively participating in the independence struggle, they had raised future generations' political consciousness. Nonetheless, it is critical to recognize a group of women who primarily benefited from the entitlements gained during the decades following independence. In other words, in addition to the political experience gained during the anticolonial struggle, the advances and rights obtained after independence were identified as strongholds that needed to be safeguarded for women. In short, Algerian women were clearly aware of their rights.

This section of the study focuses on fieldwork with Algerian urban and educated women who fought to safeguard their rights and survive as women throughout the “Black Decade.” Seven women who refused to flee Algeria and instead chose to work, study, cover their heads, and refuse to accept Islamism were interviewed in a semi-structured manner. We'll look into the terror and resistance they experienced. The goal of the interviews was to learn about the challenges they encountered at that period. Purposive sampling was used in the process to choose the participants, considering their social status and place as women in the Islamic wave. To ensure consistency amongst participants, semi-structured interview manuals were used during the course of two months to conduct interviews. Throughout the data collecting process, ethical principles including informed consent and confidentiality were rigorously upheld. They have different position, but they all lived the same king of oppression for being rebellious, independent women. A total of seven interviews were conducted, each lasting approximately twenty minutes to thirty minutes. To protect the identities of those I questioned during the field research, I gave them all the same Algerian female name and separated them with a number, like Hassiba1 (66 years old), Hassiba 2,

Hassiba 3 and so forth. Fictitious name *Hassiba* has been used for all interviewees since they wished to remain anonymous. Using the name Hassiba, which is numbered for all respondents, is a deliberate choice to pay tribute to Hassiba Ben Bouali (1938-1957) the brave woman of the Algerian war of independence. Throughout the field research, I was extremely careful to maintain confidentiality and adhere to privacy regulations.

The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis. Concerning the Data Analysis, the thematic analysis was employed to identify key themes and patterns within the interview data, then I got the results the analysis revealed three main themes: *liberties (freedom) safety, and the impact of the 90's upon contemporary Algeria.*

The problems with the research might be outlined as follows: Despite legal protections, there is nevertheless a lack of official support, administrative obstacles, and societal resistance. The public should be educated about women's rights, laws should be in line with human rights principles, and CEDAW objections should be removed. To increase women's independence, security, and autonomy, family law reform and extremism prevention are crucial. Enacting housing and employment laws, educating the public about women's rights, and empowering more women to lead development projects are all essential.

Algeria has achieved progress in promoting gender equality for women in a number of professions; nonetheless, additional assistance is needed to get over societal and occupational barriers. Through laws and public awareness campaigns, the nation must improve women's rights and shield them from prejudice.

The women I have interviewed who rejected Islamism during terrorist actions may have chosen to carry on working and attending school without covering their hair as a form of rebellion against repressive ideas. These actions could be seen as these women expressing their independence, autonomy, and rejection to the limiting norms upheld by radical groups. These women challenge the traditional gender norms and expectations that are supported by Islamist radicals by pursuing their educational and professional goals while not dressing according to the rules. They show a subtle rebellion against the limitations imposed by radical ideologies through their work, education, and individual decision-making. This is the best example of their determination, persistence, and will to protect their distinct identities and legal rights in the face of difficult conditions. These women represent a powerful and personal kind of resistance, and their brave actions serve as an example of their disobedience against unjust forces.

Women resist Islamism in a number of ways by opposing the oppressive norms and limitations imposed by extreme ideology. This resistance takes the shape of pursuing jobs, education, and personal liberties in defiance of social demands to conform. In some situations, women may choose not to cover their hair as a way to display their individuality and resistance. Through this kind of clandestine rebellion against constrictive gender stereotypes and expectations, they show their strength and commitment to defend their rights and independence.

Activist women within Islamist movements who advocate for the rights of women may also constitute a form of resistance against Islamism. They exert significant influence over the discourse and advocate for gender equality within Islamist movements through active participation in women's organizing and activism. By contesting conventional perspectives on the role of women and potentially impacting societal norms and values within conservative frameworks, this activism has the capacity to influence a wider audience.

In their communities and societies at large, women resist Islamism in their own way, the contestation of stereotypes, and the promotion of gender equality, which was the case of these Algerian women resistance toward the black decade, we aim to take a closer look of their resistance during that dark period of Islamism and terrorism, and also to see the today's impacts I have to precise that in Algeria due to the fact that the society impose some Islamic laws (not all) such as : fasting in Ramadan , prohibition for an unmarried couple to rent an apartment or even a hotel room, polygamy for men, and the discriminatory laws of inheritance which are half for women compared to men.

The findings suggest that even if the government was able to solve the terrorism problem in Algeria, there are still question about the method that it undertook which a part of the population was against and also the consequences that wasn't taken into a consideration by the government, we discuss also after the interviews the challenges that need to be addressed to ensure successful implementation of women rights in Algeria independently from Islamic rules. In fact, in 2024, a woman is always seen as an infant under guardianship. Whether she is thirty or forty years old, if she is caught cuddling her boyfriend on the street, the police will arrest her, and her father will be called and humiliated, much like a child who has misbehaved in school. The candidates' lives have become so evidently genuine to them that they have grown oblivious to the bizarre ideology that permeates their environment. It's as though they have grown accustomed to all of these oppressions and are simply attempting

to depart in peace as unveiled women. That is, the interviews indicate how terrorism, brutality, and Islamism traumatized women throughout this time period, and how, despite their resistance, they left behind aftereffects and traumas, as evidenced by some of their responses.

Almost all of the women I interviewed highlighted the difficulties they encountered while refusing to wear the headscarf. Their refusal to cover their heads wasn't the only issue they had in this regard, of course. They were oppressed and humiliated in part because they failed to cover their heads correctly. For instance, Hassiba1, a 66-year-old dentist shares her experiences when she did not follow the obligation to wear a headscarf. She adds that she lives in a place where academicians reside and thus does not meet severe challenges in her own environment, but that she feels intensely pressured when she goes to work. In her own words,

> *"Working in a clinic where the majority of employees where pro Islamist and adding the journey I was taking to go to work so there, there was a lot of contempt, very unpleasant reflections, and insolence everywhere, on the street and at work. Thus it was a daily pressure that obliged me even if I didn't wear the scarf to watch the way I dress, to wear (stuttering) loose clothing, i was covered (stuttering) completely, and i couldn't wear makeup, so no makeup, and in addition, we had to watch the way we speak, we couldn't say what we think, in one word we had to be hidden the way we are, the way we think and yes we had to be fake otherwise we are accused of naked women, disbelieved and this kind of labels"*

Hassiba 1 has stated that if she had been veiled, she would have been less verbally abused, received fewer negative comments. Women who were veiled at work, for example, were handled right in comparison to them; the Islamic population spoke to them with greater respect, both as employees and patients. Although she indicated that she believed she would not have endured the slander and humiliation she had if she had covered her head, she felt compelled to clarify that she did not regret her decision despite this social pressure. While the headscarf permits women to move more freely in public areas, she claims that not wearing one severely restricts women's mobility. As she states,

> *"In addition, if I was covered, I would have moved around more freely, I would not have spent ten years just making only the destination of; work- home house- work. Even the open markets I couldn't go to, no, the open markets problem were general*

anyways, it wasn't just because I didn't wear the veil but there were bombs issues too"(Hassiba 1, 66 years old).

Hassiba 2, a geologist in her fifties, relates her experience with the process as follows:

"What I noticed is that the fact that when a woman puts on the veil she becomes a very respected woman, it's incredible, they were seen as example and well raised, and a woman without a veil means that she does not come from a good family, that's the meaning at the time, well no even until now. It's as if a woman who puts on the veil will have more value, and they like that, so she is peaceful, so no one bothers her, although she can do whatever she wants, basically."

Hassiba 2 states that she was a university student who lived with her seven sisters in a house where a poor father was struggling to make ends meet. She does not shy away from discussing the open acts of violence that occurred at this time. One of the most terrible instances of open violence she mentioned was acid attacks on women who did not dress adequately for hijab. Hassiba 2 perfectly captures the mood of fear during that time period, describing how the acid assaults terrified her father for the sake of his daughters, all of whom were university students. Such acts of intimidation and harassment of women appear to have aimed to control and intimidate families and parents. In many respects, her response to the question, "What would have happened if you had not refused to cover your head?" amply illustrates the horror they went through. In her own words,

"If we were veiled, firstly my father, would have been quiet more or less, and my mother too, especially my mother, my brothers too and ourselves, we would have had more security yes more security I would say security. Why? because at that time, that's it, if you are not veiled you are targeted, targeted, so the veil will allow you to be safe more or less and again, but it would have given the desired image by others, it means you submit to what they want, and do it for society unfortunately."(Hassiba 2, 55 years old).

Another woman, a hairdresser with three kids, Hassiba 3, states same kind of trauma and She states that she was a high school student during that dark period and was categorized as an atheist or an unbeliever because she refused to cover her head. Hassiba 3 adds that when these pressures grew unbearable, she dropped out of high school and began working as a hairdresser. She also claims that most of the young women around her felt compelled to cover up as murders and assassinations suddenly began in the country. She delivers this very

clear response to a question of what would have happened if she had agreed to cover her head:

> *"If I had put on the veil I don't see a big difference to be honest. I find comfort in the fact of not having worn it and that's all. Even the women who put it on that period of time, now they are now taking it off." (Hassiba 3, 50 years old).*

It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that Hassiba 3 talked about the fear and suffering she went through when she had to travel to the capital to get training in order to advance in her career as a hairdresser. She expresses in the following words that she cannot leave the city she lives in and that she is deprived of opportunities for self-improvement:

> *"so the effects were that they suffocated us by this oppression, they buried us alive, we could neither go out nor do internships, nor leave the country, we just remained in this suffocated Islamist environment" (Hassiba 3, 50 years old).*

Similar intimidation and fear are expressed by Hassiba 4, a 62-year-old doctor, another woman who refused to cover her head during that time. She talks about the challenges she had during the Black Decade as a woman who was not covered up. She claims that harsh and terrible circumstances prevailed during the start of the Black Decade, which also happened to be her professional career's start. She claims that at first, she laughed off these threats and didn't even consider them to be real. As she puts it, "not being aware of the real danger" or not taking threats seriously prevented her from experiencing the intimidation that fear would inevitably bring for a while.

> *"this unconsciousness that I spoke of at the beginning; this unconsciousness of not listening to people, not even seeing them, of not giving in to threats etc....it was ultimately a resistance, now I can define it as an unconscious resistance, but it was a resistance" (Hassiba 4, 62 years old)*

Having two children, Hassiba 5 is a 55-year-old Algerian woman who works as a senior executive in social security. She said that the two worst things that plagued them throughout the Black Decade were moral harassment and the continual worry of being blown to bits or killed by a bomb in their houses, on the street, in a vehicle, or even in class. It was an omnipotent fear. She tells her that if she had agreed to cover her head, she would have been less conspicuous in society, and hence no longer a target. She claims that being covered creates a sense of security in this regard and might alleviate potential fears and anxiety. As she puts,

"If I had veiled myself, I would surely have faded into the crowd, with certainly give a certain security, I mean a feeling of safety but also a lot of remorse, the feeling of being reduced to a piece of cloth which without it, my life could end abruptly at any moment." (Hassiba 5, 55 years old).

The same themes of "fear" and "anxiety" are echoed by Hassiba 6, a 55-year-old activist woman with two children, who emphasizes how fear is used as a political instrument to incite terror and intimidation in society.

Besides threats to their life and security, all of the respondents reiterated the obstacles they faced during their education and/or career throughout Algerian dark years. Hassiba 1 states as such: "If I could tell in detail how the administrative procedure which blocked and prevented people from working, (sigh) in a word: mediocrity." All interviewees described how fear, as a tactic of political intimidation, pushed them to be beneath average in their workplaces and careers. Hassiba 5 mentioned about the difficulties commonly experienced. The libraries were closed due to Islamist attacks. Young people were reluctant to leave their houses due to the regular bomb strikes on buses and urban transportation vehicles. This was a significant barrier to accessing socializing networks that could help you succeed academically. As Hassiba 5 puts,

"During the FIS strike of 1991, it was the exam period for us, and Islamist militants prevented students from taking them by blocking the rooms. Personally, I couldn't afford to take a retake course; because I had to finish and to return to Cherchell (which is a city close to Algiers) to find my family, so i decided, despite the threats, to enter the classroom and take my exam. There were only three of us that day, two girls and a boy."

Only one of the interviewees (Hassiba 6) claimed that the problems she had during this time had no bearing on her academic pursuits or professional career. However, she emphasizes that she had to make certain sacrifices in order to carry out her tasks successfully:

"It was very, very scary. I had a knot in my stomach every time I went out and, in the morning, to go to study".

All respondents emphasized that throughout the Black decade, this period, they were deprived of their most basic liberties and tried to survive in a universe where freedom did not exist. They all emphasized that they were stranded at home and were unable to go wherever they pleased, not even to see friends immediately next door. Sometimes the parents

made them wear veils because they felt it was too dangerous to go out in public without them. Some contended that they had received letters imposing parents to force their daughters to cover their heads. Hassiba 2 was one of the many who received such letters. More to the point, there were dangerous consequences associated with even the most basic freedom—that is, walking bare-headed a short distance from your house and from place to place.

Almost all respondents acknowledged that the wounds of this time of oppression and terror still affected them today, that they occasionally experienced anxiety when traveling years after the event, and that they occasionally experienced anxiety when they were by themselves. As Hassiba 5 states,

> *"The dark decade left an indelible mark on our mind, a form of psychological trauma. We no longer have the same relation to life, to leisure or even to freedom. Death has become commonplace; terror is a daily occurrence and the constant fear of seeing it happen again. As an example of what this trauma was, there is the fear of going out alone, of going hiking in the mountains, of going to the beach alone or at late hours. For many years since then, it's like ghosts haunting places and denying access".*

People may prefer to leave their country during times of terror and bloodshed, which is not surprising given previous examples. Dissidents, activists, and journalists may experience persecution, censorship, or threats to their personal safety, forcing many to seek asylum or a safer life elsewhere. It is completely natural that the country's oppressive and violent atmosphere causes brain drain. Many cases have shown that the major factor for many refugees leaving their homes was bound to insecurity. Therefore, it was understandable for young women who had found themselves in the middle of an atmosphere of Islamic fundamentalism threatening their lives to think over options of leaving their homeland. Yet those women who rejected to cover their heads had never attempted to leave their country. Throughout the darkest period of Algeria, due to the oppression and violence related to FIS, young secular urban women could have fled the country to protect themselves from the brutality of the ongoing civil war. Hassiba 1, explained at length why she never thought about leaving Algeria. She underlined that she had opportunities to move abroad. She claims that the prospect of abruptly leaving her opportunities in Algeria and moving in another nation discouraged her. In her own word:

"I knew that it was very difficult to be able to bear the fact that I was mistreated and not welcomed among foreigners, so I preferred to endure the threat of death that after all we ended up accepting, because we were living it every day." (Hassiba 1).

Hassiba 1, mentioned Doctor Jean-Paul Grangaud, who lived her entire life in Algeria despite the violence and never once considered leaving, when explaining why she was resolved to stay:

"Even after being asked, "Why don't you leave Algeria?" he never left the country (because to his French heritage), and considering that he was a pediatrician who mentored a cohort of Algerian pediatricians, the following questions were posed to him during the terrorist period: Why don't you just go? In response, he stated that he would rather die once in Algeria than slowly pass away somewhere in France…. I looked at my beautiful country, its sun, its sun that I adore, never elsewhere, yet it is the same sun, but it has never warmed me like the sun of my country." (Hassiba 1).

Not only do the women demonstrated that they possessed the strength to resist, but they also emphasized that it gave them strength to know that other sisters were fighting for the same cause. According to them, realizing that they are not alone helps them believe that it was unacceptable to give up when others exhibited comparable resistance. Hassiba 1 indicated that she never gave up because she was well aware that there were others who were resisting; in her own words, "(there were others resisting) who sowed the seeds of a different Algeria" (Hassiba 1).

There were those who, in the face of so much violence and injustice, occasionally considered leaving the country but quickly disregarded the idea. Hassiba 2 was one of them. She brought up how difficult it could be for certain social classes to move, pointing out that she herself was a student and that she had heard of how challenging it could be to abandon one's studies in the middle of a course of study and begin a new one from zero. Hassiba 3 tried to explain the reasons for staying in the lands which she called as the "country that killed her alive." She clarifies that while she considered leaving the country, she was unable to do so for an unknown reason that she could not even explain to herself. Hassiba 4 provided an explanation for why these women, who sometimes thought about leaving their home countries, never did, despite all the threats and dangers: hope. As she states:

"yes many young Algerians thought about fleeing the country, leaving Algeria, I honestly was one of those who wanted to go abroad, but we didn't really know what

was going to happen to us abroad in arriving there but it was necessary, it was absolutely necessary to leave this environment, this unhealthy environment, this environment of horror, this environment of violence, yes, I think that many thought of fleeing during this time. But being human is extra ordinary, this fear began to subside, to lighten, to transform into something else: it was hope, yes, we began to have hope (silence) we believed in it, we believed in it yes, it couldn't continue like that, nothing could make us change our minds, we had no choice above all, we had no choice, we had to face things, and what should happen will happen, that's what, what happened, people started to organize themselves by group, by association etc... and started to give each other hope, that's it, to exchange beautiful ideas, good vibrations, hope , glimmers of hope, this is what allowed us to move forward and no longer think about going abroad again."(Hassiba 4)

Then, what was the driving force behind these women's survival and determination to resist? We emphasized in previous lines of our research that this resistance, which cannot be defined solely by hope, has historical roots. Hope makes resistance possible in the first place, but as we all know, resistance also makes hope possible. What were the forms of resistance that led these women to hope? According to Hassiba 1, sellers in their neighborhood periodically refused to sell to these young women just because they were not veiled, mocked, and humiliated them, and she stated that it would be impossible to preserve hope when all of these insults and intimidation became a part of daily life. According to Hassiba 1, memories of the Algerians' anti-colonial struggle, in which they battled the French colonialists, were still vivid. But this time, the attack was carried out by Algerians themselves. It was hard to tell who was an enemy and who wasn't in a situation when people were killing each other. Interviewees also discussed times when they gave up hope and lost all hope. They argued that knowing that assassinations and massacres, in particular, aim to destroy hope does not bind people to utter pessimism. Hassiba 5 states that,

"The two events that marked me the most during this period were the assassination of my teacher, the rector of the university in 1993 or 1994 as well as the assassination of the President of the Republic Mohamed Boudiaf. (long silence). Those days, we lost all hope."

Yet, those women preferred to insist on their opposition to the veil since they knew that the veil symbolized a fundamentalist attack to their well-being and very existence. According to

them, the Islamic vision of fundamentalists condemned women to the status of minors, subject to the laws of their husbands or fathers, and foresaw the unique blend of nationalism and Islamism that secularists referred to as *le fascisme vert (green fascism)* much later. Women are also killed simply because they are women—working women, unveiled women, and women participating in social and political groups, all of which share characteristics in common. Fundamentalists had issued an official warning that any woman seen on the street without a veil could be killed. Even travel by train was prohibited since men and women shared cabins. Primary and secondary school pupils and teachers were threatened unless Islamic education principles were followed, including the separation of boys and girls, the veiling of female professors and students, and the banning of gymnastics. Young women were receiving threats that they would die unless they wore the *hijab*. Even women's limited usage of public space was considered as a danger to Islamist social order. Unveiled women were not permitted to walk out, the FIS controlled all spaces, and women were rigorously supervised.

Algerian women tended to be forceful. They participated in acts of resistance while refusing to wear hijab. Because of the atmosphere Black decade had produced, women were particularly vulnerable to harassment, assault, and even murder no matter what they did. The threat to women's lives and future hopes had given rise to a nascent clandestine movement modeled after that of female militants in the independence movement.

4. CONCLUSION

The FIS was getting ready to unseat the National Liberation Front (FLN), which had been in power in Algeria, in the 1991 legislative elections. However, the government canceled the elections and outlawed the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) following the first round of polling. Not long after, Islamist rebel groups and the government were engaged in a civil war. The "Black Decade" claimed the lives of almost 200,000 Algerians. In 1990 13, the FIS won both local and regional elections. In December 1991, the FIS won the first round of national legislative elections and established a special commission. Among the goals of the commission four were significant. The first one underlined eliminating coeducation and mixed groups in schools, lunchrooms, administrative services, public transportation, and beaches. The second goal enlisted by the commission abandoned bilingualism in schools and official documents in favor of Arabic only. The commission had furthermore opted for consolidating relationships with Arab and Islamic countries and decreasing those with others. Scholarships for study abroad in Western countries were reassigned to selected Middle Eastern countries. Additionally, women were discouraged from working outside the home. This was an open restriction against women. When the FIS announced their intentions, women in Algeria and the Arab world rallied and galvanized their support. The lives of Algerian women were drastically affected by these events, and many highly educated and competent women were compelled to leave the country. All in all, Algeria's 'Black Decade', also referred to as the Algerian 'Dark Decade', the years of bloody internal conflict during the 1990s, epitomized a particularly strong example of the exacerbated political violence and conflict during which women were the main targets. During this time, many educated or well-known women experienced targeted, gender-based threats and acts of violence; as a result, several of them considered fleeing the country. In addition, women's domination of social and familial ties, as well as their inferior civil and legal standing, had an impact on their desire to escape the horror and its aftermath. Yet there were others who preferred to resist and stayed in their homeland.

By examining the factors that supported the women's movement against fundamentalism, this study has examined the prominent features of fundamentalism and violence against women during the relevant period of Algerian history. In-depth interviews with professional,

unveiled women who seemed to be the primary targets of the terror provided the basis for the evidence in the study. The thesis outlines the strategies of survival and resistance employed by highly competent Algerian secular women in opposition to fundamentalism that was enslaving them.
The findings of the research display that with the triumph of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) unveiled, French-speaking professional women and working women faced increased social discrimination.

Because of the ways that men and women experience conflict differently, it can take years for a woman fleeing her hometown during violent times. Women typically have fewer financial resources and less mobility control. In the Algerian context, this was especially true. Rebuilding their jobs and lives was fraught with difficulties for many women. Regaining their lost sense of identity was one of the main reasons for many of them to re-establish their academic or prominent careers. In addition, women would have to regain the lifestyle they had before going into exile. Did this, then, provide you enough justification to stay in Algeria? Due to the fact that in Algeria, deciding to live one's life without covering one's head meant that one would always be in close proximity to death. FIS leaders and militants targeted women because of their yearning for liberty. It could even be claimed that a woman's desire to live and stand on her own two feet is enough to label her an enemy of Islam. They viewed women striving to exist on themselves and taking care of their kids as an imminent danger since they were capable of survival without the backing of men.

Especially during the anticolonial struggle, Algerian women were politically involved and actively participated in military warfare. They gained a lot of knowledge and experience throughout this time. During the French colonial era, many educated urban women joined guerrilla forces that fought in the highlands. Many of these women went on to become significant players in the anti-colonial movement. The lives of Algerian women were in danger due to fighting Islamists. Their ambition and refusal to give up were not only motivated by their will to live a stubborn life, but they also carried with them the battle-culture of the generations that had come before them.

The research demonstrates that the strong resistance movement that Algerian women have inherited from the anti-colonial struggle may account for these women's resolve to resist. Since those women understood that the veil represented a fundamentalist attack on their very existence and well-being, they chose to be adamant in their resistance to the veil. They claimed that the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam reduced women to the status of children, obligated to follow their husbands' or fathers' laws. In addition to showcasing their ability to resist, the women stressed that knowing that their other sisters were fighting for the same cause provided them strength. They stated that it was unacceptable to surrender when their sisters showed similar resistance because it let them know they were not alone.

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