



**T.C.
YEDİTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**CONCEPT OF EPIGENESIS ON THE HORIZON OF
TRANSCANDANTEL PHILOSOPHY
AND
PHENOMENOLOGY OF HEIDEGGER**

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**Concept of Epigenesis on the Horizon of Transcendental Philosophy
and Phenomenology of Heidegger**

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ABSTRACT

In the present thesis, we study on concept of “epigenesis” which appears on the ground of Kant’s ontology.

Thesis has two main parts. First part can be understood as the transcendental part of the thesis and second part can be understood as the phenomenological part of the thesis.

First part is not an analysis of Kant’s critique because Kant does not criticize this concept. From this perspective, our study is an effort to show the reasons not to deal with concept of epigenesis in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy.

Second part is an effort to show a possibility to deal with “epigenesis” in the boundaries of phenomenology.

Keywords: Kant, Heidegger, Transcandantel Philosophy, Phenomenology, Epigenesis

ÖZET

Bu tezde Kant'ın ontolojisinin zemininde beliren “epigenesis” kavramı üzerine çalıştık.

Tezin iki ana bölümü var. İlk bölüm tezin transcandantel bölümü olarak, ikinci bölüm ise fenomenolojik bölümü olarak anlaşılabilir.

İlk bölüm, Kant'ın eleştirisinin bir analizi değil çünkü Kant bu kavramın eleştirisini yapmıyor. Bu açıdan, çalışmamız epigenesis kavramı ile transcandantel felsefenin sınırlarında uğraşamamanın nedenleri üzerine bir çaba.

İkinci bölüm ise “epigenesis” ile fenomenolojinin sınırlarında uğraşabilmenin olanağını gösterme çabası.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Kant, Heidegger, Transcandantel Philosophy, Phenomenology, Epigenesis

TEŞEKKÜR

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A.) Introduction

That thesis deals with philosophy of Kant as ontology. Surely, when we have a look to the presentation of Kant his philosophy we face with a philosophical effort of him to reach the synthetic a priori knowledge. “Kant reduces the problem of possibility of ontology to question: ‘how are a priori synthetic judgements possible?’ ”¹ However is this purpose of his philosophy sufficient to deal with philosophy of Kant as an epistemology. If we deal with philosophy of Kant just from that perspective that means we loose the ontological approach in his philosophy. Because it should be seen that even if his philosophy is directed to the knowledge, in its own Kant’s philosophy is a research on the ontological ground of the epistemological. “What Kant wants to examine is the fundamental problem of the possibility of science of beings and not a so-called epistemology.”² From that perspective, we are going to deal with philosophy of Kant as an ontological research, to reach the ontological ground of the epistemological.

The purpose of this thesis is to work on a concept, which appears in the philosophy of Kant as a limit of his philosophy. This concept is namely “epigenesis” appears in the chapter of “Critique of pure reason”, which is titled as “transcendental deduction”.

Concept of epigenesis appears as one of the possible answers to the question of necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects. At the beginning of the discussion, Kant suggests two possible ways; either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make the experience possible. First possibility is unacceptable according to the transcendental philosophy. We are going to show the reasons of that in the following chapters.

¹ Heidegger, M. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997, pg 9

² Heidegger, M. Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997, pg. 30

In his research on the ontological ground of knowledge, Kant achieves the transcendental elements as the necessary ground. Transcendental ground means the ontological ground that provides the possibility of experience but itself cannot be experienced. However, it stands every sort of knowledge as what is a priori.

The method of Kant in this research can be named as analytical a posteriori method. This means it is directed to the a posteriori by means of analytical work. The term analytical refers here, an effort to distinguish what is provided from experience and what stands already on the transcendental ground.

Kant tries to reach the ontological ground of the categories. At that part, the question of “agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects” arises. Kant answers that question in a negative way. Kant gives three possible answers- empirical explanation, epigenesis and pre-formation system- to that question and he reasons why two of these answers are not possible. At that point, “epigenesis” remains as the possible answer of that question. On the other hand, he does not criticize that concept in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy.

We are questioning the reasons of that situation in the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy.

For this task, firstly we are going to make a presentation of concept of epigenesis in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy. In this way, we are going to try to posit the concept of epigenesis in the Kant’s philosophy.

Secondly, we are going to try to make a meta-critique of concept of epigenesis. In this way we are planning to give an answer to the question of “Why does not the transcendental philosophy deal with concept of epigenesis”.

This part of the thesis can be understood as the transcendental part of the thesis. In that part of the thesis, above all we are planning to push the transcendental philosophy to its limits.

It can be asserted that concept of epigenesis services us in this task to reach to the uncanny (unheimlich) of the philosophy of Kant.

The thesis is going to say just a few sentences in its essence and these sentences are going to appear on the horizon of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology of Heidegger.

It can be asserted that the phenomenology of Heidegger opened a new way to thinking beyond the “whatness” of the objects of philosophy he offered the meaning of the phenomenon. In the content of his philosophy that issue is appeared as “the meaning of the question of Being”. In its most general sense it can be argued that philosophy of Heidegger suggested to us not only in the boundaries of the philosophy but on the limits of it. That assertion is going to be tried to be grounded in the second main chapter of the thesis. We are going to try to present the phenomenology of Heidegger not as an arbitrary wish of him but as a philosophical approach which stands on valid ground.

According to our assertion that limit is not only the limit of transcendental philosophy but also it appears as a horizon of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology.

The second main part is going to work on that horizon. This part of thesis can be named as the phenomenological part of the thesis. Here we mean not the phenomenology general but the phenomenology of Heidegger.

We are going to try to abstract the thematic parts of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this way we are going to appeal to the service of phenomenology of Heidegger as a method.

B.I.) The Transition from the Ontic to the Ontological

The faculty of sensibility is the meeting point of the ontic³ and the ontological. The term “the ontic,” refers to the thing which does not have a representation in the human logos. In the terminology of Kant, the ontic is the “thing in itself” whereas the term “ontological” refers to every kind of representation as representations of things in themselves in the human soul and as the ground of representations, which is already a pure representation.

In terms of sensation, the “thing in itself” is the ontic correlate of our empirical representations, which are ontological. Thus, we can say that, this ontic correlate is the empirical source of our appearances.

Appearance is an ontological representation of what is ontic. By abidance of the ontic to the laws of human reason, - to clarify the usage of the terms of ontic and ontological, we can prefer the ancient Greek term “logos” to refer “law” and “reason” at the same time- the ontic is represented as appearances on the transcendental ground of human reason. “Appearances are only representations of things that exist without cognition of what they might be in themselves”.⁴ According to Kant there are two components of appearances, first component is the material of the appearance [*die Materie der Erscheinung*] and second is the form of appearance [*die Form der Erscheinung*]. Material of appearance is provided by sensibility, and its form is provided by the two transcendental elements of sensibility i.e. space and time. The form of appearance is at the same time the transcendental ground of appearances. The presupposition of appearances is a transcendental ground to appear on. Therefore, that transcendental ground does not involve experience as it is a priori but nevertheless creates the possibility of experience. That transcendental ground lies ready in the

³ Here we use a terminology, which is not used by Kant. We prefer to use that terminology to highlight the ontological discussion. In addition, it should be said that, Heidegger uses “ontic” term in a different sense.

⁴ Kant Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, (1998), Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press 2005, B 164

mind a priori and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation. The transcendental element of sensation cannot be getting from sensation.

Sensibility is the faculty of human soul that performs the ontological transition from “the ontic” to “the ontological” by its receptivity. The transition from the ontic to the ontological is made possible only by way of the receptivity of sensibility. Appearance is the representation of “thing in itself” according to the laws of human reason. In that sense, it is present without represented as itself. It is at this point that the question as to why Kant did not just found his ontology on appearances but instead preferred to talk about a “thing” that is out of human cognition gains importance and needs to be dealt with carefully. Other wise the metaphysical necessity of “thing in self” in his metaphysics may not be grasped in its totality. This is also important to understand Kant’s ontology as a system that is founded on necessary grounds and not just an arbitrary philosophical system.

The metaphysics of Kant is the metaphysics of “representations” [*Vorstellung*]. Representations are possible only as an outcome of an act that is “to represent” [*vor-stellen*]. The verb “to represent” presupposes a thing as its accusative object, which is a thing represented [*wird vorgestellt*]. The thing that is represented must be present [*dar-stellen*]. In that sense, presence of a “thing” is logically prior to its “representation”. That simple reasoning leads us to think a “thing” that is logically prior to its representations. This rule applies not only to the empirical representations in the context of the faculty of sensation but to the whole of the metaphysics of Kant.

In our discussion about “sensibility”, it needs to be mentioned that a parallel reasoning is possible and more essential for appearances since appearances are more directly the subject matter of the faculty of sensation. On the other hand as we have already mentioned our reasoning about the representations applies to the whole of metaphysics of Kant. Then reasoning for the relation of appearances and “thing in itself” follows accordingly, in other

words; if we talk about an appearance [*eine Er-scheinung*], it is clear that we presuppose an act that is “to appear” [*erscheint*] and its object as, “that is appeared” [*wird erscheinend*]. From that, we can say that “something that appears” [*erscheint*] is prior to its “appearance”. Similarly, the correlate of representations requires a correlate of appearances. Again that correlate is the thing in itself and this time as the thing which appears.

In those two reasoning we refer to thing-in-itself in two different ways but this is not the expression of the same idea. As we have just mentioned, Kant’s metaphysics is the metaphysics of representations and in that sense, it cannot be reduced down to what appears on the transcendental ground of reason as it is the transcendental ground as well as its representation. It should be noted here that this ground itself is still a representation but not an appearance. Therefore, it could be said that every appearance is a representation but every representation is not an appearance. What is meant by the representations as transcendental ground and the question “what are those representations represent?” will be explored in a more explicit fashion as we proceed to discuss the constitution of self as a representation. Both of the reasoning are essential and necessary to grasp the crucial point of transcendental philosophy and in terms of faculty of sensation these two reasoning are totally identical. Having said that, it should be noted that considered in the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy first reasoning is more exhausting.

In that chapter, we are going deal with representations just as empirical representations, which can be used in a parallel sense with appearances. We will limit ourselves to pure representation of space and time as the a priori form of sensibility. We are not going to put the question “What do they represent” to test yet.

In the context of empirical representations, Kant explicitly argues why do we need to think a “thing in itself”. He writes; “... even if we cannot cognize [*erkennen*] these same objects [*Gegenstände*] as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think [*denken*]

them as in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance [*Er-scheinung*] without anything that appears (erscheint).”⁵ The concepts of “to cognize” and “to think” is going to be more deeply analysed in the following chapter but for now, we should mention that we understand the cooperation of “intuition” [*Anschauung*] and “concept” [*Begriff*] by the term of “cognition” whereas thinking as a boundless faculty of soul can be employed without intuitions.

In our exposition of the faculty of sensibility, it is important to mention that appearances are defined as the undetermined object [*der unbestimmte Gegenstand*] of an empirical intuition [*die empirische Anschauung*]. “An intuition is a representation of the sort, which would depend immediately on the presence of an object.”⁶ As we mentioned before, appearances are the first correlate of thing in itself in the ontological ground of soul. However, that ontological element namely appearances is still not a definite object of the sensibility. It includes the formal and material possibilities that are included in it. The possibility of the material of appearance is provided by sensation and its form “lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind”⁷ as pure forms of intuition, namely space and time.

From the perspective of transcendental philosophy, this togetherness of those two elements is not relevant to the discussion the transcendental. The point should be discussed is how one of those elements [*die Form der Erscheinung*] is the transcendental ground for the other die [*Materie der Erscheinung*].

Appearances are ontologically ready “to be intuited in certain relations” [*in gewissen Verhältnissen angeschäuet wird*]⁸ by the employment of pure forms of sensible intuition; space

⁵ Ibid. , B XXVI

⁶ Kant, I. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics with Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and Edited By Gary Hatfield , Cambridge University Press, 2004, pg. 33

⁷ Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, (1998), Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press 2005
, A 20-B 34

⁸ Ibid. , A20 B34

and time as “pure intuitions”. Therefore, before answering the previous question of how is the form of appearance is the transcendental ground for its matter we should focus on the sense of “intuition” and “pure intuition”.

Kant uses the term intuition in two different senses. In its first sense it is the space of representations as pure representation and in its second sense, it is a definite type of representation.

If we put these senses of the term intuition in an ontological necessity order, intuition as pure representation comes before intuition as a definite sort of representation. The ontological necessity takes ground from the logical priority of the space of representation to the representation itself. Every act occurring in the mind requires a space to occur because it is absurd to talk about an act occurring nowhere. In addition, it is clear that a transcendental element, which creates the possibility of experience, cannot be provided from experience.

As is already mentioned, pure intuitions are space and time and Kant gives two expositions of these, which are “metaphysical exposition” and “transcendental exposition”. Metaphysical exposition “exhibits the concepts as given a priori”⁹ and transcendental exposition is “the explanation of a concept as a principle”¹⁰.

The point that impossibility of deriving space and time from experience shows us that space and time are *a priori* and more importantly space and time are transcendental. They lie under all possible outer and inner sense and without those transcendental elements human soul cannot acquire any sensible intuition.

At that point, it seems like the transcendental conditions of appearance of the ontic on the ontological ground of human reason as intuitions by means of the pure forms of sensibility - which are also “pure intuitions”- is completed. On the other hand, it should be mentioned

⁹ Ibid. , B38-A23

¹⁰ Ibid. , B40

that this is still not a completed mission for Kant. To explain this incomplete mission we should point the critical remark of Kant about “time” as one of the pure form of sensibility;

“Wherever our representations may arise, ... as modifications of mind of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense, and such as all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations.”¹¹

That means all of our representations, which are provided by space and time, must be in a temporal continuity for the succession of representations to be possible and that itself is provided by the “time” as a pure representation. The crucial point here is that, this succession for appearances cannot be provided for the pure representation in the same way. Space and time are transcendental elements of sensibility and by means of them representation of “thing in itself” is possible. On the one hand the succession of appearances as representations of “thing in itself” is provided by pure form of time, on the other hand as pure form of time itself as a representation. Time as pure form of representation must also be “continuous” so as to provide the succession of appearances. It is clear that, time cannot provide its own succession. That is impossible in terms of transcendental logical. Here we may leave this critical point as a question mark. The question put more directly is what provides the succession of pure forms of sensibility.

We need to highlight one more crucial point in the transcendental philosophy. The a priori forms of sensibility are just forms but not concepts. We underline that point to avert a possible confusion about the employment of faculties of thinking and sensibility. In the framework of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, we must understand the notion of “concept” as general representation, which cooperate with intuitions that are provided by sensibility. In other words, the addressee of concepts must be intuitions. Consequently, it is clear that if the a

¹¹ Ibid. A98-A99

priori forms of sensibility obtain the intuitions, their addressee could not be intuitions. The pure forms of sensibility obtain the intuitions therefore those forms posit pre-intuition. Forms of sensibility directed toward the thing in itself to obtain the intuitions which are ontological. Concepts on the other hand are directed toward those intuitions to obtain the object as an ontological being.

B.II.) Transition from the Ontological to the Ontological Being

In the previous chapter, we have concentrated on the transition from the ontic to the ontological. The major aim of this chapter will be to understand and explore the transition from the ontological to the ontological being.

Through the receptivity of our mind by means of pure forms of sensibility, we get the intuitions as an ontological representation of the ontic. Nevertheless, that ontological representation is still not an “ontological being” because it is still a manifold, which exists as an ontological mass, but not as separated or unified unity, which is to say that it is not “this” or “that” thing but a manifold. It is the potential “being” which is devoid from all of the essential properties of ontological being except “space and time”. In the terminology of Kant, that ontological representation is named as intuition.

In the framework of transition from the ontological to the ontological being, we should clarify the meaning of intuition and *Gegenstand*, to see another crucial aspect of the ontology of Kant.

At the onset of the chapter titled as “Transcendental Logic”, Kant gives a brief summary of the relation of two main faculties of soul and writes,

“Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object (*einen Gegenstand*) by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us (*durch die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben*), through the later it is thought in relation to that representation (*as a mere determination of the mind*).”¹²

¹² Ibid. A50/B74

Although intuitions are the matter for understanding as was mentioned before, Kant does not prefer to use the term of “intuition” as what is cognized by understanding and as what is given by sensibility. Instead of the term of “intuition”, he prefers [*Gegenstand*].

The term of [*Gegenstand*] refers to the ontological correlate of the ontological being, which is constructed by the synthetic act of understanding. Intuition refers to the ontological product of sensibility, which is produced by means of pure forms of sensibility. That ontological product is not necessarily the matter of understanding.

The concept of *Gegenstand* does not exhaust the concept of intuition. In the legitimate usage of understanding, *Gegenstand* is totally intuition but intuition cannot totally be *Gegenstand*.

Now we can have a look to how understanding produces ontological being [*Objekt*] from *Gegenstand*. We should provide a general survey of Understanding, to clarify the activity of the faculty of understanding.

Understanding is like a sub faculty of thinking. “Understanding” and “reason” perform the activities of faculty of thinking. None of these activities can be reduced down to the other. Because the objects of those faculties are different and thinking is the faculty that includes both of these faculties and more. The faculty of understanding deals with *Gegenstand* and constitutes the objects, which appears in a **judgment**. On the other hand, reason is the faculty, which deals with judgment without any synthetic act and it organizes them in a unity.

It can be asserted that thinking is the limitless faculty of the soul with just one exception. Self-contradiction is the only limit for thinking because “...I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself”.¹³ Surely, that limitless activity actualizes by the cooperation of “imagination” like all the other activities of faculty of thinking. We are going to deal with thinking in the following chapter but at that point we should mention that we do

¹³ Ibid., B XXVI

not just mean the imaginary objects of the thinking, instead, all of the objects of thinking (not only in its legitimate usage but also in its illegitimate usage) are provided by the cooperation of imagination.

The faculty of thinking and imagination are going to be more thoroughly analyzed in the following chapters where we will concentrate on not only the constitution of object but also the constitution of “pure I”. Now it is better to return to our present subject matter for which we need to as the question how faculty of understanding synthesizes the ontological being from the ontological.

In its broadest sense, understanding could be understood as the faculty of soul which synthesizes the representations. In this definition, the term “representation” appears in a broader sense, which includes the meanings of “singular representations”, “general representations”, and also “pure representations” as the transcendental element of faculty of understanding. The synthesis of representations occurs in the judgment and only in this way the mediate relation of concept and Gegenstand occurs. We must always keep in mind that crucial point; “no representations pertains to the object (Gegenstand) immediately except intuition alone”¹⁴. “Object”(Objekt) is the product of understanding which appears as a synthesis of representations and it appears mediately just in the judgment.

Kant defines the employment of understanding in contrast to sensibility with those words; “If we call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding.”¹⁵ In addition, we can add to that definition of the employment of understanding that, in contrast to the “pure forms” of sensibility, understanding has “pure concepts”. We have already clarified the difference between what is meant by the notion of “form” and the notion of “concept”

¹⁴Ibid. , A68/B93

¹⁵ Ibid. A51/B75

therefore we can directly say that understanding is directed to the intuition, which are obtained by the sensibility.

Understanding is directed to the ontological to constitute the ontological being that synthetic act of understanding occurred by means of its transcendental elements. In the space of intuition, the Gegenstand is a sort of ontological mass that means it is a manifold on the other hand by the employment of understanding that ontological representation appears as an “ontological being”. Surely that “ontological being” namely object (Objekt) is also a representation but the mode of its representation is different from its mode of representation in the space of intuition.

The object is the ontological representation, which is represented by means of categories, appears in the “judgment”. From that point Kant gives two possible deductions of the categories namely “transcendental deduction” and “metaphysical deduction”. In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the a priori categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking, in the transcendental deduction, however, their possibility as a priori cognitions of objects (Erkenntnisse a priori von Gegenstände) of an intuition in general was exhibited¹⁶. Former deduction is based on the appearance of the object in judgment and next is based on the preconditions of the appearance of object’s own. In other words; metaphysical deduction is concentrates on the judgments in which the categories visible.

It must be clarified what is meant by appearance of object in judgment. As we have mentioned that concepts are never immediately related to objects but always related to other representation. That is why Kant calls concepts as “on functions”.¹⁷ From that perspective, if the construction of object on that function is the immediate cognition of the object then

¹⁶ Ibid. B159

¹⁷ Ibid. , A68/ B93

“judgment is the mediate cognition of an object”.¹⁸ From that mediate cognition, Kant goes to the immediate one.

Kant uses the table of judgments, which can be understood as the types of mediate cognition and from that he moves to the table of categories as the transcendental elements of the immediate cognition. Kant’s this method from mediate to the immediate named as “metaphysical deduction”. On the other hand, transcendental deduction focuses on how and on which ground are those categories constitute an object by act of cognition. The transcendental deduction of concepts is more deeply analyzed later. However, for now we are going to deal with just metaphysical deduction of the concepts.

Kant derives the categories from different types of judgments because as mentioned before every act of understanding can be reduced to judgments. He clearly explains the relation of judgments and categories in this way: “We can however trace all actions of understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging”.¹⁹ Therefore, if all the acts of understanding are occurred by means of categories then there should be a definite sort of category, which corresponds to the definite sort of judgments. In that sense, the addressee of metaphysical deduction of the categories are the judgments, Kant analyzes that object analytically and discovers what is a priori in it, that is the “analytic of concepts”.

We are not going the deal with the categories in its details, the crucial point for us is the constitution of the “object” by means of them, and their place in the philosophy of Kant as a transcendental ground for the representation and constitution of the ontological being. Consequently, we are going to give just a very brief summary of the categories.

Kant briefly explains the “If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attended to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking

¹⁸ Ibid. , A68/ B93

¹⁹ Ibid. , A69/ B94

in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under it self three moments”²⁰. At that moment, we should call the previous assertion of Kant about the “concepts” and “functions”. We have already mentioned that, according to Kant “concepts are on functions” (Begriffe auf Funktionen) and also we have already what Kant understands by terms of function; it is the “unity of action of ordering different representations under a common one”.²¹ Consequently, if when we abstract all the content of judgments still we have functions of thinking that means there must be concepts on these functions. These concepts on these functions are the pure concepts of understanding, namely categories. These are the fundamental functions of the faculty of understanding which cannot be achieved by abstraction from the experience but which creates the possibility of experience.

After the metaphysical deduction of the categories, it seems like all of the transcendental conditions for the constitution of ontological being by means of the categories of understanding is completed. On the other hand, can we surely assert that the mission is completed? Very similar to the faculty of sensation, there is something uncompleted, in terms of understanding. That uncompleted point is succession of thought, which we can call consciousness. “Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain.”²²

According to the main assumptions of transcendental philosophy, it is obvious that, that succession of the faculty of understanding requires a unity of it. In addition, it is also obvious that this unity could not be provided by its own. Therefore, there must something else which provides the unity of understanding. One more time we leave a question to answer it later, our question is “what provides the unity of understanding”.

²⁰ Ibid. A75/ B95

²¹ Ibid. A68/ B93

²² Ibid. , A103

We have presented the faculty of understanding as a sub faculty of “thinking”, the other sub-faculty of thinking is the “reason” now we should have look to the employment of reason.

As mentioned, ontological being is constituted in judgment, by means of categories, in that sense the faculty of understanding is “the faculty of unity of the appearances by means of rules”²³ so “it is the faculty of rules”²⁴. On the other hand, if we look at the human knowledge it is obvious that it is something more than the recognition of objects by means of categories. Human being is not just a machine which perceives intuitions and later recognizes them by means of categories but instead of that it makes inferences in a unity.

Human cognition is not limited by cognitions of “this is that” but more than that human cognition also asserts “all these are that”. It is clear that these universal propositions cannot be abstracted from the experience, it is also clear that in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy that kind of universal judgments cannot be explained by the “custom and habit” of human. According to Kant that kind of judgments are only possible by means of ideas of reason. While the cognitions, which are not derived from experience forces the empiricist to drivel, those non-empirical judgments carry Kant to the transcendental elements. These ideas are not a posteriori concepts of reason but instead of that, they are the transcendental elements of reason, which provide the possibility of experience. More directly, they are the elements of reason that provide the totality of experience. Ideas are not a result of human habit, but they are the ground of human cognition and totality of experience.

In that sense, the employment of reason, which is directed, to the material which is provided by understanding is to keep the rules of understanding under “principles”. In that sense it never applies to experience or any object but instead applies to the understanding, in

²³ Ibid. , A302/ B359

²⁴ Ibid. , A299/ B356

order to give unity a priori to through concepts to the to the understanding's manifold cognitions".²⁵

Kant gives the steps of human cognition as that; "All our cognition starts from senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it under the highest unity of thinking."²⁶ Consequently, what is the employment of that highest faculty?

According to Kant, reason has two main uses, which are logical and real uses of the reason.

In its logical use, reason uses the material (judgments), which is provided by understanding. Kant's philosophical method for the derivation of the ideas or pure concepts of reason is very similar his derivation of the pure concepts of the understanding. He derives the categories from different sort of judgments and parallel to that he derives the ideas from different sort of inferences (syllogisms).

The explanation of the real use of reason requires a transcendental deduction of the ideas to reach the "unconditioned". On the other hand, Kant clearly explains why is that impossible; "No objective deduction of these transcendental ideas is really possible, such we could provide for the categories. For just because they are ideas, they have in fact no relation to any object that could be given congruent to them"²⁷. Theoretically, we can just assert the necessity of "unconditional" but speaking on it is totally against to the essence of transcendental philosophy. The real use of reason defined in a way as the "ascending to the unconditioned", but never explained what that means. However, we can certainly assert that this is not a mistake in the philosophy of Kant. The responsibility of thinking an "unconditioned" is a result of principles of human thinking, but it is not fare to object Kant

²⁵ Ibid. , A 302/ B 359

²⁶ Ibid. , A298/ B355

²⁷ Ibid. , A336/ B393

because of that dark point of his philosophy. These dark points of human reason have its source not in the philosophy of Kant but in the nature of human reason.

We can assert that philosophy of Kant points the necessary darkness of reason and wisdom of transcendental philosophy is not to light that darkness but the ability of philosophizing without the illusion of lightening the darkness of reason.

B.III.) Transition as an Act of Synthesis by the Faculty Imagination

In the previous two chapters we have focused on firstly, the questions of how does the sensibility provide intuitions and secondly, on the question of how does the understanding constitutes the object through those intuitions. In that chapter, we are going to deal with the faculty, which provides those two faculties in both objective and subjective sense.

According to Kant, cognition is possible only by a harmonious cooperation of receptivity of the faculty of sensibility and spontaneity of the faculty of understanding. And that harmonious cooperation is “ the ground a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily found in all cognitions: that namely, of the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the imagination; of their recognition in the concept”²⁸. From that perspective faculty of imagination posits in a position between the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding.

According to Kant, there are two different kinds of imagination, productive and reproductive imagination.

Reproductive imagination is directed toward the representations to put them together and very similarly, productive imaginations also an act which is can be understood as an act to put together but this time it is directed toward encompassing the other two faculties.

As we know that, in the faculty of understanding what we put under concepts are not representations own but a synthesis of them. The reproductive imagination is the faculty, which performs that act of synthesis. Now we should clarify what is meant by the term of “synthesis” in terms of imagination.

Kant defines the term of synthesis in its broadest sense as “the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in

²⁸ Ibid. , A97

one cognition.”²⁹ That genius definition touches to both sort of imagination and both sort of synthesis in once. The crucial point here is that he mentions that imagination puts different “representations” together. He does not use the terms of “intuition” or “appearance” but the “representation”. In that quotation, the term of representation is used in its broadest sense. Now if we remember our remarks on the difference between the terms of, “intuition”, “appearance” and “representation” we can easily see that crucial point. We have already mentioned that Kant’s metaphysics is the metaphysics of the representations. In that sense, not only what appears on the transcendental ground of reason but also the transcendental ground itself is a representation. However it is not an appearance. From that remark, we have also mentioned that every appearance is a representation but every representation is not an appearance.

Consequently, the quotation above points not only its employment directed toward appearance as representation of thing in itself but also directed toward the transcendental ground as a pure representation. These two employments of that faculty is the ground of two different sorts of imagination, reproductive imagination, and productive imagination.

In that chapter we are dealing with the transition of the ontological therefore our subject matter is reproductive imagination, therefore in that chapter we are going to just touch productive imagination but later a more detailed analyze of that transcendental use of imagination and its transcendental synthesis is going to be presented.

Productive imagination is directed toward the pure representations as the transcendental ground of soul and reproductive imagination is directed toward the representations as the appearances and representations of “thing in itself” which is intuition.

²⁹ Ibid. , A77 B103

Both of those employments of imagination assume a very essential role in the transcendental philosophy that is why Kant states imagination as a faculty “without which we would have no cognition at all but of which we are seldom even conscious”³⁰.

Parallel to the distinction of two different employment of imagination there are two sorts of act of synthesis occurred by imagination. The synthesis of pure representations as the transcendental ground of soul is pure synthesis and synthesis of the representations as the appearances and representations of “thing in itself” is the empirical synthesis. It is obviously clear that why the synthesis of appearances is empirical. However, it is required to be a clarified the question of “why is the synthesis of pure representation named as pure synthesis”. The transcendental faculties of soul cannot be derived from experience they provide the necessary conditions for the occurrence of experience. Therefore, the transcendental act of the faculty of imagination cannot contain anything from experience because we cannot talk about any act of experience before the providence of the necessary conditions of experience. Synthesis is in that sense transcendental which grounds the possibility of other cognition a priori³¹. That is why the synthesis of pure representations named as “pure synthesis”

The transition of the ontological from the faculty of sensibility to the faculty of understanding is only possible by the cooperation of reproductive imagination. “...since every appearance contains a manifold thus different perceptions by themselves are encountered dispersed and separate in the mind, a combination of them, which they cannot have in sense itself, is therefore necessary. There is thus an active faculty of synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination”³². Therefore, the reproductive imagination is a synthetic act of

³⁰ Ibid. , A78

³¹ Ibid. , B 151

³² Ibid. , A120

reproducing appearances by combining common appearances together and to make it ready to be cognized by the faculty of understanding.

At that point, it seems like the transcendental conditions of transition of the ontological from sensibility to understanding by means of the synthetic act of reproductive imagination, is completed. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that, parallel to our remark on the problem of succession of appearances in the sensibility, appears in a very similar way for the reproductive imagination. The succession problem is like that;

According to Kant, there must be a constant rule of reproduction and according to that rule which representations that often followed or accompanied one another and which of them associated with each other could be decided. Other wise I must always have to loose my thought. It is better to have a look to the Kant's own examples; in the situations of drawing a line in thought or think of time from one noon to the next, or representing a certain number to my self, "I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts"³³. Only in this way I can be able to not to loose first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the successively represented units. Therefore according to Kant very parallel to the faculties of sensibility and understanding, there must be something which provides this succession of the faculty of reproductive imagination. In addition, it is obvious that reproductive imagination could not be that which provides its own unity. We leave that subject matter as a question mark; what provides the unity of reproductive imagination.

³³ Ibid. , A102

B.IV.) Logos

In that chapter, we are going to deal with many questions, which were already appeared in the previous chapters. Firstly, we are going to give a brief summary of these questions to posit all of them in one fundamental question, which touches to our main subject matter.

Question concerning succession of the faculty of sensibility

In the chapter that is titled as “transition from the ontic to the ontological”, we gave the subjective source for appearance of the ontic on the ontological ground of human reason as intuitions (so as the ontological) by means of the pure forms of sensibility, which are also “pure intuitions”. In contrast, we also mentioned that this is still an uncompleted mission for Kant. We can title the uncompleted mission as a problem about the succession of intuitions in its broadest sense. Space and time are transcendental elements of sensibility and by means of them representation of the ontic is possible. Succession of the ontological is provided on the ontological ground of sensibility by means of time. On the other hand, that ontological ground itself, as a representation, also must have “continuity” to provide the succession of appearances. If “time” cannot provide its own succession (this is impossible in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy) then there must be a transcendental element (ground), which provides the unity (succession) of the sensibility.

Secondly, question concerning succession of understanding

In the chapter that is titled as “transition from the ontological to the ontological being”, we gave the subjective source for the constitution of ontological being by means of the categories of understanding. In addition, we declared that, very similar to the faculty of sensibility, there is something uncompleted in understanding. That uncompleted point was named as the problem of unity of thinking, which we can call consciousness. “Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before,

all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain.”³⁴ Briefly, according to the main assumptions of transcendental philosophy, it is obvious that, the succession of the faculty of understanding requires a unity of understanding. In addition, it is also obvious that understanding could not provide its own unity. More over, in contrast to the sensibility, there is already no transcendental element of understanding, which can provide that succession.

Surely, we cannot pass over easily that question by asserting that pure forms of sensibility namely “time” provides that succession. Since we know that faculties cannot affect each other in this way and it is obvious, that faculty of understanding does not always simultaneously work with sensibility. We can also think and understand in the absence of intuitions by the help of reproductive imagination.

The question concerning the succession of imagination

In the chapter that is titled as “transition” we gave the subjective source for transition of the ontological from sensibility to understanding by means of the synthetic act of reproductive imagination. However, we pointed the necessity of a transcendental element (ground), which provides the succession of the faculty of reproductive imagination. In addition, we underlined that, very similar to the other transcendental faculties, it is impossible to be continuous by itself. Consequently, there must be a transcendental unity of reproductive imagination.

Those three unanswered question directs us to the problematic point about the three subjective sources of cognition. The crucial point here is to grasp the transcendental discussion. The posited question is not about an **epistemological** element which can provides harmonious functions of the transcendental elements but instead of that here we are dealing with an **ontological** ground which creates the possibility of these faculties, so that is transcendental.

³⁴ Ibid. , A103

These three main faculties, in their employment directed to the constitution of object is “ground of a threefold synthesis which is necessarily found in all cognition: that namely, of the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept.”³⁵ The problematic point is the necessity of an objective validity of subjective conditions of thinking and it is mainly a problem of an ontological ground of all of these faculties. According to Kant, such validity can be found only by a philosophical investigation, which is called as “transcendental deduction” that must be distinguished from the empirical deduction. Kant defines the transcendental deduction as “ the explanation of way in which concepts relate to objects a priori”³⁶ while empirical deduction “shows how concepts is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen” ³⁷.

In terms of understanding, the first remark should be kept in mind is that; the understanding is the faculty of cognition, and cognition is possible only by means of the concepts (in pure and empirical sense). However, the existence of the “concepts” are not sufficient to constitute the object even if understanding has the intuitions as the material of the cognition, we are going to show the consequences of a possible cognition of understanding without its unity. The necessary condition (in the transcendental sense) of cognition is the “unity” of understanding. According to Kant, “this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the transcendental apperception.”³⁸

At that point, we are going to draw a theoretical picture of our cognition without the transcendental apperception to show the necessity of it in the transcendental sense. If we follow the line from sensibility to that point, which is cognition in the understanding, we can

³⁵ Ibid. , A97

³⁶ Ibid. , A85

³⁷ Ibid. , A85

³⁸ Ibid. , A107

rightly argue that sensibility is the faculty, which provides the empirical material as intuition for the understanding. That means the representations, which are used as material to constitute the object has an empirical correlate on the other hand it is obvious that these representations which “cannot be intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object=x”³⁹. We should never forget that the faculties can never be reduced to each other and can never do the function of the other. In that sense, understanding can never intuit. From that point, it can be argued that; “the relation to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reality of our empirical cognition, rests on the transcendental law that all appearances, insofar as objects are given to us through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity”⁴⁰. The act that provides that synthetic unity is the transcendental apperception. Kant describes that impossible situation as a “blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream.”⁴¹

That complicated argumentation of Kant was mostly changed in the second edition of “Critique of pure reason” however before the presentation of that subject matter in the second edition. That complicated argumentation of Kant can be easily understandable by the help of his famous phrase, which is “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”⁴². If we do not presuppose that there is a pre- established unity of the faculties (this is impossible in the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy), then “transcendental object=x” is an empty thought because of the absence of content. It can be asserted by interpretation that the “transcendental object=x” is a transcendental concept, it is concept of “object” in its broadest sense, so that transcendental concept is empty without intuitions. Surely, not only the absence of the content but also its potentiality to be an ontological object makes it “transcendental object=x”. From that perspective “transcendental object=x” appears

³⁹ Ibid. , A109

⁴⁰ Ibid. , A109/ A110

⁴¹ Ibid. , A112

⁴² Ibid. , A51 B75

as a ground, that is the point forces Kant to name it as “transcendental”. It “lies at the ground of all our appearances”⁴³. By a possible unity of the faculties, it can be actually this or that object. For the togetherness of the content and concept, there must be the togetherness (unity) of faculties, which is possible only by means of the transcendental apperception.

The same idea appears in the second edition of critique of pure reason in a much more simplified but at the same time deep way, which makes it open to misunderstandings. It is based on fundamental assertion of Kant, that is; “The I think must be able to accompany to all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which as much as to say that the representations either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me”⁴⁴. In the second edition, Kant did not talk about the transcendental object= x , so we can assert that not the conclusion but the structure of the argumentation a little bit changed, we are also going to analyze the conclusion of both editions.

In the first edition, Kant was offering a theoretical picture of understanding without the apperception and later he was justifying the necessity of apperception on the other hand in the second edition Kant immediately asserts that no cognition is possible without the synthetic act of apperception.

That remark is very crucial for our ontological discussion in the philosophy of Kant. As already mentioned, both of the argumentations are aimed to present a transcendental deduction, namely the necessity of the synthetic unity of faculties, in different ways. If we properly understand the crucial point in the argumentation of “I think” we can see in which way the first and the second editions became closer. As we mentioned, most significant difference of two editions are based on the conceptual ground of the argumentations. In the first edition Kant uses the term of “transcendental object= x ” on the other hand in the second

⁴³ Ibid. , A614-B642

⁴⁴ Ibid. , B131-132

edition we see his argumentation on “I think”. Now, our question is both of these argumentations touches to each other in a way or not if they touch to each other in a way then in which way?

The point in which both of the argumentations become closer appears just with our concentration on a simple question, which invites to think on the difference of “I” and “I think”. The “I think” argumentation of Kant cannot be understood as a simple habit that taken over from Descartes. We must properly deal with what is meant by the proposition that is “I think”. That proper concentration is possible only by distinguishing “I” and “I think”.

Kant does not simply argue that, “ “I” must be able to accompany to all my representations” but instead of that he says, “ “**I think**” must be able to accompany to all my representations”. This is the most important point to see the possibility of the assertion of objective validity of transcendental idealism and to see why is the philosophy of Kant named as transcendental idealism but not “idealism”. We have already deal with the “I think” argumentation of Kant in our discussion about the “transcendental object=x”, now it is time to combine those two issues. The constitution of “I” and the constitution of the “transcendental object=x” are the two main original acts in the philosophy of Kant.

The question of the logical necessity order (in the transcendental sense) of the transcendental elements is the point distinguishes the difference of “I” and “I think”. As we mentioned the metaphysics of Kant appears as the metaphysics of the representations and as we mentioned many times a representation presupposes its ground of representing. Other wise, if “to represent” is an act then we must assert that an act occurred in anywhere and we have already showed the impossibility of that assertion. The significant point of that argumentation, it seems like in an infinite regress problem appears because if the main assertion is the necessity of an ontological ground of ontological representations and if that ontological ground’s own is also an ontological representation, then rightly we must question

of possibility of that ontological ground. Is that ontological ground in its broadest sense can be the “I”(subject). The question could be answered as “yes” but very attentively. Our attention must be on the question of about how appears that “I” in the transcendental philosophy. “I”, namely subject can never appear as a lonely transcendental element but instead of that it appears as “I think”. Thinking is the act of subject. This act includes the idea of “something” is thought. This thing must be the object. In the philosophy of Kant, it cannot be argued that the subject is constituted by the act of apperception and than that subject constitutes the objects on its transcendental ground. Instead of that, apperception must be an act of constitution of subject and object in a parallel way. That parallelism is the ground of Kant on the objective validity of transcendental sources of cognition.

In the boundaries of Kant’s ontology, it cannot be argued that subject stands as the ground of ontology but instead the duality of subject and object stands on the ontological ground. Subject and object are not the transcendental elements which creates the possibility of one another but instead of that they are the transcendental elements so that both of them creates the possibility of each other in a parallel way. From that perspective now we must clarify the problem of “constitution of subject”. If we use that term properly then we can talk about the constitution of subject on the other hand surely in the transcendental philosophy it is better to talk about constitution of “I think” which includes the “subject” and “object” at the same time. The possibility of subject is the possibility of object also vice versa. On that ground following phrase going to be understandable;

“The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori”⁴⁵ The state of belonging of subject and object to each other provides the objective validity of subjective sources.

⁴⁵ Ibid. , A 158/ B197

After those clarifications, we arrive to the deepest and at the same time one of the darkest points of Kant's philosophy. That darkest point, according to our assertion, the reason of the biggest change of first and second editions of "critique of pure reason", namely appearance of the notion of "epigenesis".

In the following chapter we are going to present a critique of notion of "epigenesis" in the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy. For now we are presenting just an introduction to the subject matter and we are going to deal with the appearance of that notion in transcendental deduction. . Firstly, we should have a look appearance of "epigenesis" in the Critique of Pure Reason.

"... no a priori cognition is possible for us except solely of objects of possible experience.

But this cognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience, is not on that account all borrowed from experience; rather, with regard to pure intuitions as well as the pure concepts of the understanding, there are elements of cognition that are to be encountered in us a priori. Now there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make the experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (not with pure sensible intuition); for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*). Consequently only the second way remains (as it were a system of epigenesis of pure reason): namely that the categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding."⁴⁶

The problem of agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects seems like already solved from the perspective of transcendental philosophy. It is obvious that the

⁴⁶ B166 B167

empirical explanation necessarily must be denied. According to the main assumption of transcendental philosophy, the transcendental elements cannot be provided from experience because transcendental elements create the possibility of experience. That means logically the existence of experience presupposes the transcendental elements.

The main assumption of transcendental philosophy easily rejects the empirical explanation. On the other hand, the posited question must be properly understood; here we are asking what stands behind the concepts of understanding. By means of transcendental logic, we can easily deny the empirical explanation on the other hand according to us the problem is not about the empirical explanation but the problem is what is the meaning of the explanation, which remains at the point we reject the empirical explanation. What does it mean the agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects? According to us if Kant did not suddenly jump to a “biological research” while he was asking that question, then that means the question concerning a point which stands on logically behind both transcendental ground of experience and experience itself.

Surely, we do not know what was Kant asking in reality because the quotation above is the only part Kant uses the term of “epigenesis”. At that point, we should mention that the present thesis does not ask the question of; “what was Kant thinking while he was writing those sentences” but our purpose is positing that concept in the transcendental philosophy by means of transcendental logic and interpretation.

After presenting those two possibilities Kant also mentions a third middle way which is absolutely unsuggestible in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy. “If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither self thought a priori first principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but rather subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of

nature along which experience runs (a kind of pre-formation system of pure reason) then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories lack necessity that is essential to their concept.”

When we insert the third possibility in our presentation of the epigenesis, we can assert that Kant arrives to the concept of epigenesis in a negative way. He shows in which ways a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects cannot be asserted; in this way, he ignores the empirical explanation and pre-formation system. From that perspective, epigenesis is the explanation, which remains but it is not criticized in the transcendental philosophy.

Notion of “epigenesis” appears as a concept by which Kant tries to name the source of the “agreement of experience with its objects”⁴⁷. Previously we have already presented the source of that agreement by references to both of the editions, by combining two separated argumentations of Kant. We also have presented some differences of two editions and we have mentioned that the heart of the difference is on the notion of epigenesis. The question must be asked is in which way and why is that difference occurred.

Kant uses the term of “epigenesis” only in the second edition. It has to be mentioned that, he uses the term in a very attentive way. We are going to deal with the reasons of that attention in the critique of epigenesis but for now, we must posit the notion of epigenesis in the transcendental philosophy.

In the first edition of “critique of pure reason” in a way, we find the appearance of the idea of epigenesis without need of its name. On the other hand, in the second edition we find just the name of it, and a hidden presentation of the notion in the argumentation of Kant the

⁴⁷ Ibid. , B167

proposition of “I think”. At any rate, idea of epigenesis appears at the very ground of the transcendental philosophy. It is the name of the state of belonging of subject and object to each other in the transcendental sense. It is the name of the transition from ontic to the ontological, but this time not only as ontological appearances of the ontic but also ontological representations as the ground of ontological representations. From that perspective, epigenesis appears as the name of the synthetic act that provides the possibility of every sort of representations (not only as appearances but also pure representations) as the ground of the ontological namely, logos.

A.V.) Critique of “Epigenesis” in the Boundaries of Transcendental Philosophy

In that chapter of the thesis, we are going to discuss the reasons that stopped Kant to deal with concept of “epigenesis”. Our question is why did not Kant give an answer to the question of what provides the agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects. We are going to present the reasons not to deal with concept of epigenesis in the transcendental philosophy as a critique of concept of “epigenesis” in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy.

In addition to its appearance in the previous chapters, transcendental philosophy, as a critique of previous metaphysics, is an effort to draw the limits of reason. From that perspective, transcendental philosophy can be defined in both negative and positive senses. In the positive sense, we define transcendental philosophy as a research on the transcendental conditions of human cognition. Therefore, in the positive sense transcendental philosophy is a research on the one of the biggest questions of human that is “ What can I know? ”. On the other hand, in the negative sense, we can define transcendental philosophy also as a limit-drawing act to the reason. Transcendental philosophy defines the boundaries of human cognition in negative way so it is also an effort to answer the question of “What can not I know? ”.

In that appearance of transcendental philosophy, the term of “transcendental dialectic” appears which defines the transcendental philosophy in that sense; “ Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with uncovering the illusion in transcendental judgments, while at the same time protecting us from being deceived by it; but it can never bring it about and cease to be an illusion.”⁴⁸

If here we are questioning why did not Kant deal with concept of “epigenesis” then that means we should choose the transcendental philosophy as a standpoint in the negative

⁴⁸ Ibid. , A297 B354

sense. That means we are going to discuss it in the framework of “transcendental dialectic”. From beginning to now, we have dealt with transcendental philosophy, in a way, in the positive sense but now we are going to discuss the concept of epigenesis in the opposite direction we have followed until now.

In that negative definition of the transcendental philosophy, we face with one of the fundamental concept of transcendental philosophy that is “transcendental Schein”. It seems like to present a critique of epigenesis in terms of “transcendental Schein” is reasonable without discussing; is it a transcendental Schein or not, at the beginning. Therefore, the first question we should ask is what is “transcendental Schein”.

“*Schein*” is the German world, which means light, flash, appearance...

According to use of Kant that world, we understand that he uses that world in the sense of “appearance” in the sense of a kind of “illusion” or may be it is better to say that it is an appearance but something is wrong about that appearance. “Still less may we take appearance and illusion (*Schein*) for one and the same. For truth and illusion are not in the, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought”⁴⁹

Before discussing epigenesis as a transcendental Schein, we want to make a very brief presentation of transcendental Schein.

According to Kant, transcendental Schein is one of the types of Schein and others are; empirical and logical Schein. It is very clear what Kant means by empirical and logical Schein, former is called also as optical Schein by Kant it is clear that Kant refers to the illusions of sensibility and second one means a mistake in the logical reasoning of mind which “arises solely from a failure of attentiveness to the logical rule”⁵⁰. According to Kant, first two are easily correctable on the other hand the third “transcendental Schein” is not. To correct the transcendental Schein in a way refers to correct the history of philosophy. From that

⁴⁹ Ibid. , A293 B350

⁵⁰ Ibid. , A296 B353

perspective, “Critique of pure reason” can be understood as an effort to correct that kind of Schein, which appeared in the history of philosophy.

In three types of *Schein*, reason is faced with a kind of appearance but something is wrong about them. In the first two types of Schein, falsehood appears in the sensation and reasoning but what does it mean “transcendental Schein”. The world “*Schein*” tell us a kind of appearance but what does the term of “transcendental” mean here. Term of “transcendental” indicates here what appears as a Schein. That means the transcendental elements, which are employed to create the possibility of experience, appear as they are the objects of experience. From that perspective, appearance of every single transcendental element in non-transcendental sense is a transcendental Schein. That means every philosophy which as the questions of, “What is time”, “What is substance”, “What is soul?” and tries deal with those as they are substances (in non-transcendental sense) is in Schein. From that perspective, if we have a look of history of philosophy we face with philosophies, which are dealing with transcendental elements as they are substances (in non-transcendental sense).

According to Kant, “principles of pure understanding... should be only of empirical use and not of transcendental use”⁵¹. The faculty of understanding deals with intuitions by means of the categories and constitutes the objects, which appears in a **judgment**. In that sense, object is the product of understanding that appears as a synthesis of representations. Here we use the term of representation in two senses general representations as concepts and singular representations as empirical intuitions. That kind of transcendental Schein takes root from the illegitimate usage of the faculty of understanding.

Kant more necessarily discusses the transcendental illusion, which is based on the illegitimate usage of principles of reason. At that point, we should distinguish the understanding and reason to see the illegitimate usage of reason. Kant defines the

⁵¹ Ibid. , A294 B351

understanding as the faculty of rules but “here we will distinguish reason from understanding by calling reason the faculty of principles”.⁵²

At that point, we should properly understand what is transcendental Schein in contrast to the other types of Schein. Others refer to a falsity but in its essence, transcendental Schein is not a falsity it is just an illegitimate usage. In its broadest sense as we have just mentioned, understanding is the faculty which synthesis the representations and in its legitimate usage it is employed to synthesis the general representations with singular representations. In this way, it produces an object that has its empirical content by means of the singular representations and form by means of the concept (pure and/or empirical). It can be said that legitimate usage of understanding is possible only by the synthesis of what is general and what is singular.

In illegitimate usage, understanding synthezes the representations without any empirical content much better to say that it synthesis the general representations in the judgment in this way appears a so-called object of thinking which has no empirical correlate. At that point, we should also refer to the dialectical use of reason. Till now the Schein we have presented is related to the illegitimate usage of the categories of understanding. In addition to that, type of Schein, there is a type of Schein, which is occurred by illegitimate usage of pure ideas of reason. However, we are not going to discuss that kind of transcendental Schein. According to us it is clear that concept of epigenesis does not posit in the framework of the pure ideas.

Kant mentions that, “... all Schein in the taking of a subjective condition of thinking for cognition of an object”⁵³. We have already discussed what is meant by “subjective conditions of thinking”; they are the transcendental elements of reason and in their legitimate usage, provide the constitution of object. Now what is a Schein, we can say that Schein is a self reflection of subject. Schein is what is cognized by subject when it tries to cognize the

⁵² A298 B355

⁵³ Ibid. , A396

subjective conditions of cognition as objects. It is a self-cognition in the illusion of objectivity.

At that point, our question is can we assert that, the reason, which stopped Kant to discuss the epigenesis, does that subject matter appear as a transcendental Schein. Our answer is no. Epigenesis is something deeper than a transcendental Schein. Transcendental Schein is in a way appearance it is false it is a product of illegitimate usage but still it is an appearance. It is the false appearance of what belongs to the ground but it is still an appearance. On the other hand, “epigenesis” is a non-appearance in the transcendental sense. Transcendental Schein refers to the appearance (as Schein) of transcendental elements, as they are the objects of experience. At that point it is important to see that precondition of a transcendental Schein is the existence of a transcendental element. There must be a transcendental element to appear as a Schein on the other hand it must be said that epigenesis cannot appear as a transcendental element or as a transcendental Schein. In its essence it can be said that transcendental Schein is the objectification of what belongs to subject. However, epigenesis appears on the absence of subject and object.

According to our assertion, that was the reason stopped Kant to deal with “epigenesis”. “Epigenesis” appeared in the philosophy of Kant as a transcendent point; which cannot be cognized in the transcendental sense. Epigenesis is completely unfamiliar for philosophy because as we mentioned before it appears only by the absence of subject and object duality. It stands on the boundary of philosophizing because it stands on the absence of the subject and object, which are the instruments of philosophizing.

In following main part of that thesis, we are going to discuss the possibility of philosophizing (or it is better to say thinking in Heideggerian sense) in the absence of subject and object.

B.) Heidegger Part

B.I.) On the Possibility of a Phenomenological Study on “Epigenesis”

At the beginning of our discussion on the possibility of a phenomenological study on “epigenesis”, we should deal with some basic differences of phenomenology of Heidegger and transcendental philosophy, in order to make epigenesis worth reviewing phenomenologically throughout this discussion.

According to our promise in the introduction of this thesis, we are going to open a discussion on the possibility of dealing with epigenesis in the boundaries of phenomenology. Before that work, we must mention that, the purpose of this thesis is not a phenomenological analysis of epigenesis but to lay out such a possibility. Although realizing that possibility is beyond the boundaries of this thesis, it is nevertheless among the aims of this thesis to posit epigenesis as a new phenomenon which could serve the “question of meaning of being” from a totally opposite direction.

To show that possibility and to explain why that possibility does not appear in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy, we should have a surrounding idea on transcendental philosophy and phenomenology of Heidegger.

Transcendental philosophy attempts at making explicit the transcendental ground of the ontological. “Ontological ground” appears as “Subject” in the transcendental philosophy at first sight. That ontological ground, namely the “subject” is already an ontological element. In the previous chapters, we argued for the impossibility of finding an element which is given in the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy. That is why we needed to look at the constitution of subject which lead us to the concept of “epigenesis”. In the constitution of “subject”, we saw the relation of “transcendental subject” and “transcendental object” as the

constitutive elements of transcendental philosophy. From that perspective, we argued for the impossibility of asserting that, subject is the ontological ground of the ontological but instead of that we presented that ontological ground as a composite transcendental element in the relation of transcendental subject and transcendental object. Consequently, from that, we arrived at the concept of epigenesis as a transcendent point of transcendental subject and transcendental object, which are standing beyond the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy.

We have already clarified why the concept of epigenesis is beyond the boundaries of transcendental philosophy, therefore transcendent. Simply we attempted to demonstrate in what sense transcendental subject and transcendental object are the transcendent elements of the transcendental philosophy, and how epigenesis is the transcendent act of them.

The main point about the transcendental philosophy is that epigenesis does not appear as a “phenomena” and it could not appear as a theoretical element of the transcendental philosophy. The reason for the former is the absence of the intuition and for the latter, the absence of the necessity, in other words, the contingent character of epigenesis. Epigenesis is suggested by Kant only as the most possible ground of the constitution but being “possible” is not enough for transcendental philosophy as it must also be “necessary” in the transcendental sense.

At that point, our assertion is that epigenesis could be a subject matter of phenomenology, provided its appearance as a phenomenon (in the phenomenological sense) could be secured. Surely, our guiding question is to do with the ground we base this assertion. Is this just an arbitrary wish of ours or could there really be such a philosophical ground?

The first task of ours is to show the significant difference of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology, which already stands there on the horizon of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy. The assertion of that thesis can be simply but also properly summarized as an assertion on epigenesis, which goes; “epigenesis, which manifests itself philosophically in our discussion on phenomenology and transcendental philosophy stands on the horizon of subject and Dasein, as if also to stand on the horizon of the two philosophical methods that we have been dealing with.

B.II.) On the Phenomenology of Heidegger in Contrast to the Transcendental Philosophy

Heidegger explains the meaning of the term “phenomenology” at the very beginning of “Being and Time”. We are going to try to find our way in the phenomenology with the help of some remarks of Heidegger’s on phenomenology which will involve locking out the thematic parts of Heidegger’s philosophy. This is the basic structure of the exploration of Heideggerian phenomenology within the limits of this thesis. In this way Heidegger’s method will be our guiding tread more than his general philosophy. However this should not be understood as an attempt to overcome the impossibility of distinguishing his method from the content of his philosophy. Our assumption takes its ground from Heidegger’s own words; “The expression phenomenology signifies primarily a *methodological* conception. This expression does not characterize the *what* of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the *how* of that research.”⁵⁴ However, what is significant about that methodological conception of phenomenology is the way it can open to us a new way in our dealing with “epigenesis”. In the frame work of what of the philosophy of Heidegger we already know that he did not work on concept of epigenesis, but how of his research is going to open us a new way on the possibility of a research on epigenesis.

If we look at the how and what of the research of transcendental philosophy in the context of epigenesis, we will see that both how and what of the research of transcendental philosophy does not arrive at the concept of the epigenesis. It can be argued that how of the research limits what of the transcendental philosophy. That is why we are not trying to deal with epigenesis in the boundaries of transcendental philosophy. Our assertion is that, a certain

⁵⁴ Heidegger Martin, Being and Time, (1962), Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harpersanfransisco, 7 th edition 27

kind of dealing can be possible in the way of phenomenology. Nevertheless, we first need to explore what is phenomenology, and what distinguishes it from transcendental philosophy.

Heidegger explains the meaning of phenomenology not by referring to the first usage of it in the Wolffian school (“The history of the world itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian school, is here of no significance.”⁵⁵) or by referring to Husserl but by referring to its ancient Greek etymological origins, as a composite word, which consists of ancient Greek words “phenomenon” and “logos”. At first sight it appears as the “science of phenomena” which did not satisfy Heidegger. A deeper analysis of the ancient Greek word “phenomenon” is required not just for the aims of Heidegger but also for this thesis. Heidegger pushes the meaning of the term to its limits and in a sense what we are trying to do here in terms of the horizon of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy resembles that.

Phenomenon is the ancient Greek word, which originally “signifies that which shows itself in itself, manifest”⁵⁶.

If our discussion is on the appearance of “epigenesis” as a phenomenon in the philosophy of Kant and on the possible appearance by the philosophical method of Heidegger, then we should distinguish what is meant by phenomenon according to Heidegger and according to Kant. Heidegger gives a negative definition of phenomenon in “Being and Time” by referring to the meaning of phenomenon in the philosophy of Kant. That negative definition is going to be a valid starting point for us to show the difference of phenomenon of phenomenology and phenomenon of transcendental philosophy;

“If by “that which shows itself” we understand those entities which are accessible through the empirical “intuition” in the Kantian sense, then the formal conception of

⁵⁵ Ibid. , 28

⁵⁶ Ibid. , 28

“phenomenon” will indeed be legitimately employed. In this usage “phenomenon” has the signification of the ordinary conception of phenomenon. But this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception.”⁵⁷

Firstly, we are going to deal with what is meant by phenomenon in the sense of “showing itself in itself, manifest”. From the perspective of Kant, we know that, that kind of appearance of something is totally impossible, not only impossible but also totally against the main assertions of the transcendental philosophy. In that content, transcendental philosophy can be defined as a research on the rule of mediate appearance of phenomenon. We know that meaning of phenomenon appears as “representation” in the transcendental philosophy. We have mentioned many times that, transcendental philosophy is the metaphysics of the representations and in all possible senses it deals with the representations. Here we use the concept of representation in its all-possible senses within the boundaries of transcendental philosophy; in the sense of appearance, which appears on the transcendental ground of the subject, and in the sense of the transcendental ground itself on which the appearances appear. Every appearance in the transcendental philosophy is a mediation, but in a way, the assertion of phenomenology presents it self as dealing with immediate phenomenon. Transcendental philosophy deals with mediate appearances to achieve the immediate ground of it, which we call the transcendental ground. At that point, we must mention that, fundamental difference is not an arbitrary philosophical difference but rather it is the most fundamental difference of the transcendental philosophy and phenomenology as the horizon of those two philosophical methods. We can name that differences as the difference of the objects of the philosophical methods but here we are using the term of “object” in a big attention. If we name object of the

⁵⁷ Ibid. , 31

transcendental philosophy as object then we should name the object of phenomenology as the “immediate object”. At that point, we keep the question of what is meant by “immediate object”, and seek answer in the difference between subject and Dasein.

The difference of “object” and “immediate object” manifests the necessity of “Dasein”. Phenomenon of phenomenology is the immediate appearance of the things; whereas in the subject and object duality of transcendental philosophy, we could talk about only mediate appearances of phenomenon. Consequently, at that point we must make our first and most important remark on the differences created by phenomenology of Heidegger that must be kept in mind in every following step of us; “Dasein is not a Subject”.

“If being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein, and one in which Dasein operates not only in general but pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness, then it must also be something which has always been experienced ontically. It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view, especially since Dasein has its disposal an understanding of its own Being, no matter how indefinitely this understanding may function. But no sooner was the “phenomenon of knowing the world” grasped than it got interpreted in a superficial formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of setting up knowing as a relation between subject and Object- a procedure in which there lurks as much “truth” as vacuity. But subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world.”⁵⁸

At first sight, it seems like Heidegger is suggesting a new kind of duality which are not subject and object but Dasein and the world. If we try to translate the philosophy of Heidegger to pre-Heideggerean metaphysics, surely we are losing our path to the philosophy

⁵⁸ Ibid. , 59-60

of Heidegger. Instead of following that absolute misinterpretation, the suggested architecture must be discussed in our framework of discussion on “epigenesis”.

Heidegger calls attention to the “phenomenon of knowing the world” in terms of opposition of “subject object” and “Dasein and the world”. The significant point for us at the beginning is not the opposition but the distance of those two philosophical elements (subject and object). In the pre-Heidegger philosophy we face with a philosophical methodological tradition that also defines “what is philosophy”. That philosophical method appears on the distance between object and subject. We observe that also in the transcendental philosophy but with a significant difference. In the metaphysical parts of transcendental philosophy, it can be asserted that Kant tries to distinguish what belongs to subject in the object. That is the part where Kant tries to create the distance between subject, and object which we have already called as the analytic a posteriori method of transcendental philosophy. It is a research on the a posteriori analytical way to distinguish what is a priori on the ground of it. On the other hand, the significant point is that philosophy of Kant cannot be understood only on that distance of subject and object, his philosophy also makes closer the subject and object to the point the difference disappears as a transcendent point, which is “epigenesis”. These parts of the critique of pure reason is named “transcendental”, we have already distinguished what is metaphysical and what is transcendental. In the particular case of “deduction”, if we have looked at the architecture of the deduction, we may encounter two symmetrical parts in the metaphysical part where Kant opens the distance of subject and object extremely and on that distance categories appear as the ontological elements of the subject. On the other hand, in terms of the transcendental deduction, Kant pulls the categories to side of the subject but in doing that he arrives at the point where subject and object cannot be distinguished anymore.

At that point, it should be mentioned that in the transcendental philosophy, we should distinguish ordinary knowing and philosophical cognition. Ordinary cognition rightly could be grasped as a certain type of relation of subject and object whereas the philosophical cognition cannot be understood in this way since it is more to do with the conditions (in the transcendental sense) of the relation than the relation itself. Even though Heidegger's assertion is open to discussion in the terms Kant, we suggest tolerating his assertion because it is still acceptable that the transcendental philosophy works on the subject and object duality. Transcendental philosophy could be understood as a philosophical research on the subjective conditions of possibility of object in an objective validity.

In contrast to the subject and object duality Heidegger suggests dealing with Dasein with "the world" in a phenomenological way. That is the phenomenological ground of "dealing with" beyond a duality.

1. "world" is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can present-at-hand within the world.

2. "World" functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities which we have just mentioned. And indeed "world" can become a term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities: for instance, when one talks of the "world" of a mathematician, "world" signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics.

3. "World" can be understood in another ontical sense- not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world,

but rather as that “wherein” a factual Dasein as such can be said to “live”. “World” has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here again there are different possibilities: “world” may stand for the “public” we-world, or one’s closest (domestic) environment.

4. Finally, “world” designates the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special “worlds” may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special “worlds” may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of worldhood in general. We shall reserve the expression “world” as a term for our third signification.⁵⁹

So called duality of “Dasein and the world” refers to the worldhood of Dasein and it can be argued that it is beyond a duality and is a “oneness”. Dasein does not stand in front of the world... World is the worldhood of Dasein; Dasein and its worldhood do not define each other in opposition. Subject and object define each other in circularity; subject is what stands against the object and vice versa. On the other hand world is the worldhood of Dasein.

That fundamental difference is based on more essentially on a structural difference of assumptions of those two philosophical methods. We tried to show the ontological assumption of transcendental philosophy; but we also have to be aware of the epistemological motivation of Kant’s behind his ontological effort. At that point, we can define transcendental philosophy once more in our content; transcendental philosophy is a research to find the ontological ground of the epistemological (synthetic a priori). The difference of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology of Heidegger is based on the relation of method and “truth”.

If we can define philosophy as an attempt to get in contact with truth in a way, then we have to recognize the difference between transcendental philosophy and phenomenology

⁵⁹ Ibid. , 64-65

of Heidegger as a difference based most essentially their grasp of “truth”. Truth as a concept in the terms of ontology and as a concept defined in the terms of epistemology. We are going to deal with “truth” in its appearance in terms of ontology. Epistemological appearance of truth shows itself in the duality of subject and object although according to Heidegger its ontological appearance shows itself in oneness of the worldhood of Dasein.

It is not denied by Heidegger the existence of Dasein in a duality on the other hand as a philosophical standpoint, phenomenological movement is not based on that duality but instead it moves from the point the boundary of duality disappears, and phenomena manifest themselves. At that point, the suggested structure by Heidegger cannot be understood by a look to the structure’s own. We must have a look at the philosophical ground of the structure.

According to Heidegger, in the history of philosophy “subject and object duality” is suggested as a the only possible way of philosophizing. On the other hand, according to Heidegger at the beginning of philosophy there was another way of philosophizing that is concealed to us, at that point he refers to the primordial thinkers and ancient Greek “correlate” of “truth” which is “Aletheia”. “From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth and Being”.⁶⁰ According to Heidegger, in its contemporary conception, “truth” appears, as a definite type of relation of subject and object and “truth” is the adequacy of knowledge of subject to its object. That is the epistemological appearance of truth. At this point, we have to have a brief look at its ontological appearance by the primordial thinkers in its ancient Greek essence.

⁶⁰ Ibid. , 212

B.III.) Truth as Aletheia in the Philosophy of Heidegger

In the history of “philosophy”, the concept of truth appears as just a concept of epistemology on the other hand according to Heidegger in its ancient Greek essence, truth includes more essentially ontological meaning. That ontological essence is a path to follow to an ontological research on the question of meaning of Being. It can be argued that in the history of philosophy the ontological is reduced down to the epistemological. From that perspective, the subject and object duality in the service of epistemology conceals the ontological senses of “truth”. Consequently, to understand the philosophical effort of Heidegger we have to have a brief look to his presentation of the “truth” to establish the ontological appearance of truth in the philosophy of Heidegger. Surely, it can be asked that why do we dealing with concept of truth while we have already posit our question concerning “epigenesis”. The reason of dealing with concept of truth is to show the necessary ground of the phenomenology of Heidegger, the structure suggested by him is not a contingent structure but only possible way of establishing his phenomenology. In addition, according to us, the possible difference that can be created by phenomenology of Heidegger is based on a necessary ground. That necessary ground is surely also about the theme of his philosophy but more essentially, it is about the method of his philosophy, which is namely phenomenology.

According to us, Heidegger’s assumption on the question of meaning of Being is more than the content of his philosophy it touches to the methodological essence of his phenomenology. The appearance of “truth” in the service of epistemology requires the duality of subject and object. In other words, truth of epistemology can be defined only as a certain type of relation of subject and object. Since, it is a pre-defined concept in the relation of subject and object. In the boundaries of epistemology, truth appears as the agreement of subject’s knowledge to its object on the other hand in the assumption of Heidegger to the

question of meaning of Being the truth doctrine of him does not appear as a question posited in epistemology but on the ground of every possible epistemology that is ontology.

In the contemporary appearance of concept of truth, it is impossible to talk about truth that is beyond the subject and object duality since it appears just as the concept of epistemology. On the other hand, according to Heidegger concept of “truth” appears in a different sense in its primordial essence. That primordial essence is concealed in the history of philosophy. At that point one of the important themes of “Being and Time” appears which is titled as the “The task of destroying the history of philosophy”. Heidegger clearly explains what he understands from the term of destruction: “Destruction does not mean destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy. Destruction means--to open our ears, to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in tradition and the Being of being. By listening to this interpellation we attain the correspondence.”⁶¹

From that perspective, it can be argued that the main purpose of destruction is to find the un-thought or concealment in the philosophy and make, it unconcealed in accordance with our meditations on the ancient essence of “truth”. Therefore, destruction is the method of presenting the “truth”, not in its modern sense but in its ancient sense, which is named as ἀλήθεια. Truth assertion of phenomenology is based on the primordial essence of truth. We should have look to that primordial essence. According to Heidegger, that ancient word opens three ways for us to follow. Three ways that are opened by the ancient Greek name of truth serve to our endeavor to explore the space of meaning of the primordial essence. Heidegger does not deeply analyze that ancient Greek essence of truth in the “Being and Time” but to arrive to the truth assertion of phenomenology we should have look to the other works of

⁶¹ Heidegger Martin, What is Philosophy?(1956), Trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. New York: Twayne, 1958, paragraf 39

Heidegger. Only in this way, we can grasp the difference, which is based on the philosophical grounds of the phenomenology and transcendental philosophy. Other wise we cannot present the truth assertion of phenomenology properly, and its possible dealing with concept of “epigenesis” becomes nothing more than a wish of us. Truth assertion of phenomenology cannot be understood in its traditional sense; our assertion is phenomenology is the way of un-concealment of manifest of “epigenesis”. It points the “truth” of Being in the possible phenomenological experience of Dasein. However, what do we understand by the term of truth of Being?

If we translate ἀλήθεια world by world it is not “truth” but “un-concealedness” or “un-hiddenness”. In that literal translation, we are still far from the understanding of primordial thinkers but it gives us a clue to understand the primordial space of meaning of that term.

Ἀ-λήθεια is the word that takes the prefix of α-, which is named as “*alpha privativum*” in ancient Greek grammar. “*Alpha privativum*” gives the meaning of to be taken away, canceled; evicted, or banned therefore ἄ-λήθεια is taken away and/or canceled and/or evicted and/or banned of “λήθεια”. We recognize the stem of “λήθ” and some of the words from that stem are λήθη, λανθάνομαι. In every ancient Greek word from the stem of “λήθ”, we found a sense of concealment.

According to Heidegger when we begin our research on the primordial essence of “truth” from its primordial name, which is ἀλήθεια, that ancient word opens three ways for us to follow.

First way to follow from the literal translation of ἀλήθεια as unconcealment;

According to Heidegger, *alpha privativum* does not give a meaning of complete negation of the meaning. Previous meaning, the meaning that is before the *alpha privativum*, stays there as a way to follow.

The English or German translation of the word of “truth” does not give us any clue about the essence of the term on the other hand its ancient Greek Ἀλήθεια forces us to think on its un-negated mode which is λήθη. It is strange that Ἀλήθεια does not force us to think on its opposite which can probably be ancient Greek word of “ψεῦδος”. Πσεῦδος is the ancient Greek word for “false”. In the modern binary opposition “truth” forces us to think on “false” on the other hand its primordial essence which is named as Ἀλήθεια etymologically forces us to think on λήθη and in addition we do not lose its modern opposition; the ancient Greek word pseudo stays there for our research as the probable opposite of ἀλήθεια. The “λήθη” is the direct opposite of “ἀλήθεια” and also which does not refer to “false” but “concealed” or “forgotten”. From that perspective, it can be argued that, “every endeavor to think “ἀλήθεια” in a some what suitable manner, even if only from afar an idle affair as long as we do not venture to think the λήθη to which, presumably, Ἀλήθεια refers back.”⁶² That formal difference of translation of Ἀλήθεια and its Ancient Greek essence gives us a clue about difference of primordial essence of truth and its modern essence.

Ancient Greek experience of ἀλήθεια saves the “λήθεια” in its essence. Therefore according to Heidegger, “First, “un-concealment” refers to concealment. Concealment hence permeates the primordial essence of truth.”⁶³

When we utter unconcealment or unhiddenness, that means concealment or hiddenness must have occurred as a precondition of ἀλήθεια. Existence of un-concealedness presupposes the existence of concealedness. According to the Ancient Greek thinking, concealedness occurred before the occurrence of un-concealedness. Occurrence of concealment has a priority to unconcealment logically and chronologically. According to Heidegger, possible reason of concealment is, “because the things themselves and their

⁶² Heidegger Martin, “Parmenides” (1982), Trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojewicz, Indiana University Press 1992, page 11

⁶³ Ibid, page 26

connections hide themselves from us and for us, or because we ourselves bring about concealments, perform and allow them, or because both concealing of “things” and a concealing of this concealing occur in an interplay through us.”⁶⁴

Second way to follow from the literal translation of ἀλήθεια as unconcealment:

“Secondly, un-concealedness indicates that truth is wrenched from concealment and is in conflict with it. The primordial essence of truth is conflictual.”⁶⁵ That conflictual essence should be understood in accordance with the first determination of us on the essence of ἀλήθεια. Ἄ-λήθεια is a cancellation of “λήθεια”. Λήθεια is what is available but ἀλήθεια must be wrested from it. According to Heidegger the conflictual essence of ἀλήθεια one of the most difficult to understand aspect of the essence of ἀλήθεια for modern minds. The English word “truth” seems to be available itself. “The unhidden must be torn away from a hiddenness; it must in a sense be stolen from hiddenness. Originally for the Greeks hiddenness, as an act of self-hiding, permeated the essence of being and thus also determined beings in their presentness and accessibility (“truth”); and that is why the Greek word for what the Romans call “*veritas*” and for what we call “truth” was distinguished by the *alpha privativum*.”⁶⁶ Greek word ἀλήθεια has a meaning of a cancellation or annihilation of something else, which is concealment. From that perspective, it can be argued that, “truth for the Greeks is something “negative”. Thereby an odd state of affairs comes to light, to our negation-less word “truth” (as well as *veritas* and *verite*) bars every way.”⁶⁷ English words of negative and negation are from the Latin word of “*negativus*” and it is from the Latin verb “*negare*” which means “to deny”. In contrast, concealment is “positive”. The English word “positive” is not originally English it is taken from the French word, which is “*positif*”. But

⁶⁴ Ibid, page 16

⁶⁵ Ibid, page 26

⁶⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, page 223

⁶⁷ Heidegger Martin, “Parmenides” (1982), Trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojewicz, Indiana University Press 1992, page 16

we are still far from the historical essence of the word, because it is not French too. French word “*positif*” is from Latin that is “*positivus*” from the stem of “*posit-*” in a sense of “placed”. As we mentioned, the available itself, what is “placed” is “concealment” so concealment is “*positivus*”. And in contrast, unconcealment is the denied of concealment. It is the negative of what is placed.

English word “truth” and Latin word “*veritas*” gives a positive sense to the modern essence of truth but its primordial essence shows its negativity etymologically. The English word truth seems to make itself available in contrast to its primordial essence that invites us to a conflict between its positive, concealment and truth.

Third Way to Follow from the Literal Translation of Ἀλήθεια as Unconcealment:

“Thirdly, un-concealedness, in accordance with just-mentioned characterizations, refers to a realm of “oppositions” in which truth stands.”⁶⁸ The English term “truth” or its Latin “*veritas*” has a static sense. Those terms symbolize a kind of availability or just the thing gained. Modern essence of truth is what is gained by the knowing subject. On the other hand ancient Greek term ἀλήθεια has a dynamic sense; it is the interrelation of concealment and unconcealment. Neither unconcealment nor concealment alone consumes the essence of ἀλήθεια but instead their togetherness and belonging to each other opens the essence of ἀλήθεια.

Un-concealment does not refer only to a conflict with concealment but also un-concealedness is conflictual too because it saves the concealment in its essence as we mentioned. “The conflictual essence of truth has already been alien to us and Western thought for a long time. For us “truth” means the opposite: that which is beyond all conflict

⁶⁸ Ibid, page26

therefore must be non conflictual.”⁶⁹ The epistemological must be non-conflictual but the ontological is conflictual.

By those three ways, which are opened by the ancient Greek essence of “truth”, philosophy of Heidegger founds a valid ground to speak beyond the subject and object duality. Dasein is the philosophical actor, which deals with truth in its ontological senses.

If we return to our discussion on “epigenesis”, we can pose another question; how does the ontological appearance of truth serve for the purposes of this thesis?

We remember the reasons why the concept of epigenesis could not appear as a subject matter of transcendental philosophy. We posited two reasons for that; first was the absence of the intuition and second was the absence of the necessity. Do these two criteria belong to the essence of truth or are they the enforcement of the epistemological appearance of it on the ontological appearance? More directly, in terms of Heidegger we should translate the question as “does the epistemological appearance cover the ontological appearance of truth?”

What does the absence of the “intuition” mean? This is the question we must deal with. If we concentrate on intuition, we can easily recognize it, in its most essential sense, as the content of an object. In addition, that content is provided by the empirical. From that perspective, absence of intuition refers to the absence of the empirical correlate. However we have already shown that the absence of the empirical is not where transcendental philosophy stops. Instead it can be asserted that it is where transcendental philosophy starts because the term “transcendental” already refers to the non-empirical which creates the possibility of the empirical. It can be asserted that what is cognized by means of transcendental philosophy is non-empirical, on the other hand appearance of the objects of transcendental philosophy - transcendental elements- takes its ground from the empirical. Briefly, it can be asserted that,

⁶⁹ Ibid, page18

transcendental philosophy is an attempt of the empirical to reach the non-empirical elements, which are the ground for the empirical.

The crucial point here is that, the horizon of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology of Heidegger becomes visible by the appearance of the concept of “experience”. The concept of experience appears not only as a definite type of relation of subject and object but as the experience -in the phenomenological sense - of Dasein. At that point, it is difficult to explain that subject matter without referring to the thematic parts of the Heidegger’s phenomenology and every attempt remains insufficient with no reference to the content of his philosophy. Because of that reason we are going to present a clear example from the philosophy of Heidegger which demonstrates the appearance of experience in the philosophy of Heidegger.

Experience of anxiety and fear provides us a good example to see what “experience” is in the philosophy of Heidegger.

Both experience of fear and anxiety gives us a clue for two different possibilities of experience. In our framework, fear points at a mood of Dasein which appears on the duality of subject and object whereas “anxiety” as an authentic mood of Dasein appears as a basic mood of Dasein. In its essence, experience of fear appears on the subject and object duality. Fear is always the fear of something. On the other hand anxiety appears in the absence of the objects. Anxiety is not anxiety of or for this or that but it is the basic mood of Dasein.

Heidegger very clearly explains the difference of fear and anxiety in *Being and Time*; “Fear is anxiety, fallen into the world, inauthentic, and such, hidden from itself”⁷⁰. Fear is a mood, which appears in the everydayness of Dasein on the other hand anxiety is an authentic mood in which Being manifests itself as the Being of Dasein. In the everydayness of Dasein, fear conceals the anxiety. This presentation of the moods of Dasein is parallel to our

⁷⁰ Heidegger Martin, *Being and Time*, (1962), Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harpersanfransisco, 7 th edition pg189

presentation of epistemological and ontological appearance of truth. Fear is a mood in which Dasein in a way knows what to be afraid of whereas in the mood of anxiety, Dasein is faced with “nothing” in the absence of “object”.

Fear and anxiety as the moods of Dasein, shows us the two fundamental states of Dasein in its authenticity and inauthenticity. The different configurations of fear and anxiety it is a good example to see the how they function in terms of Heidegger’s phenomenology. While every sort of philosophy requires philosophizing on the duality of subject and object Heidegger suggests philosophizing in the absence of this duality. From that perspective, our suggestion is to invite the concept of “epigenesis” in our thinking in the sense of thinking of Being.

At that point, the question arises what distinguishes epigenesis in its essence from other transcendental elements and posits it not as a transcendental element but as a transcendent point.

At that point, we have to have a powerful vision on the philosophy of Kant to recognize how the epistemological limits the ontological. Every transcendental element posits it self in a legitimate position in the epistemological sense on the other hand epigenesis that is the deepest point of Kant’s philosophy cannot be posited epistemologically. It stands as a transcendent point of Kant’s ontology, which provides the existence of the ontological ground. Transcendental philosophy analytically separates the ontological and doing so tries to achieve what is transcendental. On the other hand, epigenesis is the transcendent act which “probably” stands on the ground of the transcendental. We have already defined the “transcendental” as the ontological ground; at this point, we face with the ground (as an act) of the ground.

C.) Conclusion

In the present thesis, we tried to present a journey in the philosophy of Kant, we started our journey from the sensibility, and step-by-step we moved towards the boundaries of the transcendental philosophy. We can call it an ontological journey in the philosophy of Kant. The journey took place in two opposite directions, parallel to Kant's philosophy.

We began from the meeting point of the ontic and the ontological, and parallel to the transitions of the ontic, we presented the transcendental elements of reason which are directed to the constitution of the object. We can call our this presentation of the transcendental philosophy an object centered presentation.

In the following part we tried to present the transcendental deduction. In its essence, that part could have been named as a subject centered presentation of Kant's philosophy because in that part independent from the constitution of the objects, we were dealing with the constitution of the subject itself. From that perspective, it can be argued that transcendental deduction is directed to the constitution of subject.

At the end of deduction we reach the very ground of the transcendental philosophy. In this way, we arrived at the point in where we could not move anymore. Ironically that is the point, which we cannot call it subjective or objective any more. It is the point where we loose the boundary of subject and object. We named that point the transcendent point of the transcendental philosophy, namely epigenesis. It is where we reach to the pre-subject and pre-object. Epigenesis appear as the name of a relation, namely the relation of transcendental subject=x and transcendental object=x. We tried to show how transcendental philosophy loses its ontological elements, which are subject and object, on the limit of transcendental and transcendent, these elements cannot be distinguished anymore.

The grounding aim of this thesis is to present the crash of Kant's philosophy and to experience that crash like it was ours. We tried to crash to the limit of transcendental philosophy, which is "epigenesis".

The question was; "what is going to be the attitude of the philosopher on that crash point on that limit". We know that, transcendental deduction chapter was the most difficult part for Kant and he changed the whole chapter in the second edition of the "critique of pure reason". The concept of "epigenesis" did not appear in the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason". However it cannot be asserted that, Kant dealt with that concept. Epigenesis appears just as a limit of transcendental philosophy in the negative sense. In a way, he kept silent on that darkest point of his philosophy. He just uttered the word "epigenesis" as limit of the transcendental philosophy.

What was our suggestion by the phenomenology of Heidegger? That point must be understood to see our great regard to the Kant's philosophy. Our purpose is not to present a critique of the transcendental philosophy, it was an interpretation (in the phenomenological sense) of that transcendent point.

We have mentioned that that thesis works on the crash point of the transcendental philosophy. However, what does it mean? We did not try to prevent that crash, or we do not try to produce a solution by calling Heidegger's phenomenology for help. We suggested a phenomenological assumption for that crash which might serve in terms of the question of the meaning of Being.

Kant may have presented the greatest work on the architectonic of human understanding, and his value in the history of philosophy discussed by "the way he walked" but this thesis tried to discuss his philosophy at the exact point where he could not move any more. That thesis showed that not only the way which is walked by the philosopher but also the point in which he could not move anymore is valuable. We do not try to open a meta

philosophical discussion but it should be mentioned that, this thesis works only by the understanding of philosophy as the ability of standing on the problem. As we have just mentioned we do not try to answer what is philosophy, we just determine the position of this thesis as a particular example. By the phenomenological assumption we tried to stand on the problem of epigenesis. In that sense, we deal with transcendental philosophy on its limit.

We can express that situation like that; the way that is walked by Kant serves for **philosophizing** but by that thesis we are suggesting the service of the point he stopped (epigenesis) to **think**. We are using the terms of philosophizing and thinking without any value judgment. We are just distinguishing those two possibilities of Dasein.

In first main part of the thesis, we tried to present the reasons of impossibility of dealing with concept of epigenesis in the “philosophy” and in the second main chapter. Our effort was not discussing in the boundaries but pushing the philosophy to its limit. In this way, we pushed the transcendental philosophy to its limit; to the point transcendental philosophy loses its instruments. In the absence of these instruments, we point to the phenomenology of Heidegger. That was not an arbitrary choice of us. Because of the difference of the philosophical instruments of phenomenology of Heidegger, it provides opportunity to deal with epigenesis.

We tried to present epigenesis as a subject matter of thinking of Dasein. That critical assertion does not mean that Kant was not thinking just philosophizing instead of that his philosophy’s one of the deepest points is the epigenesis. That deepest point stands under the whole philosophy of Kant. It should be recognize that his philosophy is a product of a deep thinking. At that point, we can refer to his own words;

“I am acquainted with no investigation more important for getting to the bottom of that faculty we call the understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use, than those I have undertaken in the second chapter of the

transcendental Analytic, under the title Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the most, but I hope not unrewarded, effort.”⁷¹

Hopefully we showed that most effort of Kant is not unrewarded.

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