

**A NON-EGOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S
PHENOMENOLOGY**

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**A NON-EGOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S
PHENOMENOLOGY**

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ABSTRACT

A NON-EGOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

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In this thesis, I defend a non-egologic pure consciousness which is the initial position of Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*. There is anti transcendental ego argumentations in which I claim that self alienation of the “transcendental ego”, incomplete reduction, the presence of the pre-reflective transcendental ego are the reasons to leave the claim about the existence of the “transcendental ego”. I also claim that the possible solution of the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the “transcendental ego” in the frame of phenomenology. I defend the non-egologic pure consciousness which is not identical and reducible to whatever is material, including brain. *Qualia*, intentionality, intuition, philosophizing, constitution acts of pure consciousness are used to support the claim about immaterial nature of non-egologic pure consciousness.

Keywords: Transcendental Ego, Transcendental Reduction, Self Alienation, Pure Consciousness.

ÖZ

EGOSUZ BİR HUSSERL FENOMENOLOJİSİ YORUMU

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Bu tezde Husserl'in *Mantıksal Araştırmalar* kitabında savunduğı gibi egosuz bir saf bilincin varlığı savunulmaktadır. Aşkın egonun varlığına karşı iddialar yer almaktadır. Aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşması, eksik aşkınsal indirgeme ve yönelim öncesi bulunan aşkın ego nedenleriyle aşkın ego iddiasından vazgeçilmelidir. Fenomenoloji çerçevesi içinde, ruh beden ayrımının mümkün olan çözümü de aşkın egonun kabul edilmemesine bağlıdır. Maddi olana, beyin de dahil olarak, indirgenemeyen ve maddi olanla özdeş olmayan egosuz bir saf bilinç savunulmaktadır. Fenomenal özellikler (*qualia*), yönelim, sezgi, felsefe yapma, saf bilincin aktiviteleri maddi olmayan egosuz saf bilinç iddiasını desteklemek için kullanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Aşkın Ego, Aşkın İndirgeme, Kendine Yabancılaşma, Saf Bilinç.

To Şahin Yeğın and Fatma Yeğın

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Purpose of the Thesis

The purpose of the thesis is to show that to accept the “pure ego”¹ in *Ideas*, “transcendental ego”² in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* causes many problems and paradoxes which are “transcendancy within immanency” in the former and the identity of the “psychological ego” with the “transcendental ego” in the later. The embodied soul within the body in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* also leads to the mind-body problem. To solve these problems, paradoxes and the mind-body problem, the best way is to leave the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” as in the initial position of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. This thesis involves some certain steps on which one reaches the conclusion which is the denial of the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. I show that the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”, incomplete “transcendental reduction”, “pre-reflective” nature of the “transcendental ego” and its unconscious nature, cognitive presuppositions of phenomenology, objectification of the

¹ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 57, p. 173.

² Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1970, § 57, p. 202.

“transcendental ego”, the presence of the paradoxes are the reasons to leave the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. Husserl accepts that there is non-egologic pure consciousness in his initial position in *Logical Investigations*. In fact, to accept the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” is incompatible with the definition of consciousness and scientific rigorous spirit of phenomenology. Pure consciousness should be purified from all transcendences. Some of the commentators who are David Bell, Cornelis A. van Peursen and David Carr define these paradoxes. However, they do not formulate and solve these paradoxes, especially the paradox of the identity relation between “psychological” and “transcendental ego”. The solution of these paradoxes is the first contribution of the thesis. These paradoxes are defined and solved in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section which is the main part of the thesis. I claim that “transcendental ego” involves the self alienation as the second contribution of the thesis. I show the similarities among these paradoxes. Furthermore, I show that “transcendental ego” is the result of the category mistake which can be realized by means of part-whole analysis as the original part and the third contribution of the thesis. One thinks and talks about moments as if they are pieces as a result of abstraction which causes category mistakes. Different forms of category mistakes cause the claim about the existence of the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. The denial of the “pure ego” and the “transcendental ego” causes the purification of the consciousness. To solve the mind-body problem, I return the initial position of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. The embodied soul in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* causes the mind-body problem which can be solved by showing the difference between first and third person perspectives. Transcendent

“ego body”³ is phenomenologically constituted as the intentional object of intentional experiences to solve the mind-body problem. To deny the “pure ego” and the “transcendental ego” causes the problem of personal identity, this is commonly discussed in the frame of analytic philosophy. To solve this problem, I support the mental continuity theory. I use memory to show the mental continuity and the sense of personal identity, despite of the absence of the persisting ego. This is the fourth contribution of the thesis. In fact, I also use some thought experiments to avoid the presuppositions of the common sense. I also use the Kafka’s *Transformation* to support my claim about the personal identity as the fifth original contribution of the thesis. I also try to show “what is irreducible” by presenting the special abilities of the non-egologic pure consciousness such as *qualia*, intentionality, constitution, abstraction, etc.

In Chapter 1, in the *Epochē* and Presuppositionless Philosophy section, I start with *epochē* which lets to “shift” the attitude from “natural attitude” to the “transcendental attitude”. In other words, there is the necessity to change the third person perspective to the first person one. To constitute a presuppositionless philosophy is the Husserlian ideal, but there are still some ontological, formal and cognitive presuppositions in the philosophy of Husserl. However, *epochē* lets just a few presuppositions, especially cognitive presuppositions. Phenomenology deals with what is given to consciousness or what appears to consciousness, due to the “principle of all principles”. To start with *epochē* is the pre-condition of phenomenology which involves the change of the definition of consciousness. In this section, I show that there is the “shift” of the perspective from the third person perspective

³ Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (New York: The Humanities Press), Vol. 2, 1970, Investigation V, § 3, p. 541.

to the first person one. This “shift” of the perspective will be used in the solution of the mind-body problem. It also shows the difference of phenomenology from the natural sciences to explain the conscious events.

In Chapter 2, I examine the concepts, mental acts, self, body and their relationship in *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas* and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl claims that “empirical ego” is the totality of “ego body” and “purely mental ego” or “phenomenologically reduced ego”. Husserl “cuts out” the “ego body” from the “empirical ego”. Phenomenologically reduced ego” is the “unified sum total of content” as “contemporary bundle of experiences”. Husserl clearly denies the existence of “pure ego”. In *Ideas*, Human being (empirical ego) includes ego body and phenomenological ego. After *epochē*, “empirical ego” is excluded and “pure ego” is retained as a “transcendental residuum”. However, there is the “transcendence within immanence” of the “pure ego”. In *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*, one realizes the paradoxical identity relation between “human ego” (psychological ego) and “transcendental ego” as a result of the “transcendental reduction”. Furthermore, the embodied soul causes the mind-body problem. To compare and contrast the first person perspective of phenomenology with the third perspective of natural sciences which is the “natural attitude”, I explain the third person perspective and materialist theories of mind. To compare and contrast the explanations of Sartre, Gabriel Marcel and David Bell, I use their explanations in the Arguments of Sartre Against Transcendental Ego, Being and Having Distinction in Gabriel Marcel and The Comments of David Bell sections.

To deny the “pure ego” and the “transcendental ego”, I need firm grounds. Then, I defend the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”. There are two kinds of self alienation. One of them is the self alienation of the “transcendental ego” from its mental acts, because of the isolation from all “world-apperceptions” and “human self-apperceptions” via “transcendental reduction”. This causes a self alienated “transcendental ego” from its experiences. This self alienation of the “transcendental ego” is used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. The other form of alienation is one’s ignorance of the change of individuals in the world. In the thought experiment, the person cuts his whole relation with the world. So, there will not be internal time consciousness any more. This person turns into a little god. Unlike the eternal and glorious knowledge of God, there is the problem to know the change of the individuals for human being. So, he is still ignorant about the change of the particulars. Similarly, there is the problem of solipsism after *epochē* which turns everything into a phenomenon for consciousness. Solipsism is also re-examined and used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section to defend the non-egologic pure consciousness.

I use the concepts which are “reflective” and “non-reflective consciousness” to show the different ontological status of “transcendental ego” and its conscious acts in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations. There is a self-identical “pure ego” and its coming or going processes in *Ideas*. There is an ontological difference among them, due to the “transcendence within immanence”. Unlike its experiences, self-identical “pure ego” shows a “peculiar” kind of transcendence and difference. When pure consciousness “intentionally related” to the “pure ego” as if it is an object, there will be a distinction between what directs toward and what is directed. It leads to the

ontological difference among them. There will be a “pure ego” which is unaware of its experiences, due to the ontological differences. Similarly, “transcendental ego” is realized via “transcendental reduction” which is attended to bring into the focus in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Attention is also a kind of intentionality and there will be a distinction between what directs toward and what is directed as “reflective” and “non-reflective consciousness”. In fact, this distinction also leads to the objectification of the “non-intentional consciousness” which becomes the “object ego” of the “subject ego”. Sartre also realizes the ontological difference of the “transcendental ego” from “each *erlebnisse*”. In other words, there is also an ontological difference between “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego” as a result of this distinction.

In this section, I defend the non-egologic pure consciousness as the initial position of the Husserlian philosophy. To examine the arguments to support the non-egologic consciousness, it is necessary to understand the thesis in detail.

1- Argument from the solution of the paradoxical identity relation: There is a “difficult” and “paradoxical” identity relation between “human ego”, “psychological ego” or “empirical ego” and “transcendental ego”. “Apodictic ego” or “transcendental ego” is the subject of intentional experiences or acts of consciousness as being identical, despite of the alteration of experiences. There is a mind which is embodied within the consciousness. Whether there is an enduring self, “I” or “transcendental ego” or not? To solve this paradox, one has to accept one of them as the simple solution of the paradox. “Transcendental ego” can be an immediate state of consciousness which can be experienced immediately, directly and privately as any other state of consciousness. The other possibility is that it can be something other than a state of

consciousness which one cannot immediately experience. This “I” unifies all momentary states of consciousness and makes a unified being. If it is the former, it cannot unify the momentary states of consciousness. If it is the later, it cannot be conscious of the momentary mental states, due to the ontological difference.

The famous commentators of Husserl realize this paradoxical identity relation. However, there is no formulation and solution of the paradox. I try to define and solve the paradox as the main contribution of the thesis. My suggestion to solve the paradox is the acceptance of the non-egologic pure consciousness or the denial of the self, “I” or “transcendental ego”.

2- Argument from the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”: “Transcendental ego” has the capacity of self alienation from its “psychic experiences” (*Erlebnisse*). It can “lift” itself from all “world apperceptions”, “human self-apperceptions” by isolating itself. This self alienation of the “transcendental ego” shows that there are contents in my consciousness and I am unaware of these contents. There is a “consciousness of which I am unaware”. There is a continuity and unity of the stream of consciousness. However, self alienation minimizes the sense of this continuity and unity. The isolation of the person after *epochē* leads to the problem of solipsism. Self alienation of the “transcendental ego”, solipsism and the minimal awareness of the acts of consciousness are used in this section. I re-define the “transcendental ego” which can isolate and alienate itself from its mental acts.

3- Argument from the epistemological presuppositions of phenomenology: I show that phenomenology lets just a few presuppositions, especially the cognitive presuppositions after the

usage of *epochē*. Fully transparent nature of consciousness, potential or actual conscious nature of all mental phenomena are among these presuppositions. "Pure ego" and "Transcendental ego" are contrary to these presuppositions. Since, they cannot be known adequately as the phenomenon of pure consciousness, to leave the "pure ego" and "transcendental ego" can be the suitable solution of this problem.

4- Argument from the paradoxical concept, "unconscious consciousness": There is the presence of the "pre-reflective" "transcendental ego" which can be accessed by means of the further usage of "transcendental reduction" on "human ego" or "psychological ego".

In the cases of psychotherapy, one sees the unconscious mental events. Similarly, there is the presence of unconscious, preconscious, "pre-reflective" "transcendental ego". In the structure *ego cogito cogitatum*, *cogito* is the changing experiences. However, *ego* is the identical ego-pole. To realize the "transcendental ego", one applies the "transcendental reduction" to "human" or "psychological ego". So, there is no identity relation among them on the basis of Leibniz' law, due to these ontological differences. One can easily realize the "human" or "psychological ego". However, "transcendental ego" is completely different from the "psychological ego" and to leave the claim about the "transcendental ego" can be the suitable solution of these problems. Furthermore, the pre-reflective "transcendental ego" causes the presence of "unconscious consciousness" as a paradox. "Transcendental reduction" also leads to the constituted psychic ego and the constituting "transcendental ego" division.

5- Argument from the incomplete "transcendental reduction": One applies the "transcendental reduction" to "human" or "psychological

ego". Unlike "human" or "psychological ego", "transcendental ego" never turns into a phenomenon for consciousness which causes incompleteness of "transcendental reduction". To avoid the deficiency in the method, it is better to leave the "transcendental ego" as a solution of the problem.

6- Argument from the "pre-reflective" "transcendental ego": Attention is always intentional. One brings the "transcendental ego" into focus by means of "transcendental reduction". I examine that whether the knowledge of it comes from inner experience or inference. The "pre-reflective" "transcendental ego" shows that there can be some mental content which one is unaware. I make a connection between the "pre-reflective" "transcendental ego" and the potential unconscious mental content. Then, I defend that there can be some "logical fallacies" which one uses certain logical laws and syllogisms unconsciously. By this way, one reaches the conclusion about the presence of the "transcendental ego" as a category mistake which is also an original claim of the thesis.

7. Argument from the claim which is reflected "transcendental ego" as the object of the knowing "subject ego" turns into an intentional object as the known "object ego": Attention is always intentional which causes the separation between reflecting, intentional consciousness and reflected, "non-intentional" and "pre-reflective" consciousness. Phenomenological reflection always reduces the reflected consciousness into an intentional object as "object ego". There is the objectification of the "transcendental ego" by the "subject ego". There is also an incomplete "transcendental reduction". It is either the direct consciousness of the particular mental acts or a transcending unity which has all of these particular mental acts. If "transcendental ego" is the former, to explain the transcendence of it from its mental acts will be

impossible. If “transcendental ego” is the latter, it will not be conscious of its own mental acts, due to the ontological differences.

8- Argument from the unity and continuity of the stream or flow of consciousness: One can claim that “transcendental ego” provides the sense of the continuity and the unity of the stream of consciousness. However, self alienation causes the disunity and discontinuity of experiences. If one does not accept the “transcendental ego”, self identity will be a matter of degree. It merely depends on the recollection of the old perceptions, without an identical “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. This claim will be re-examined in the frame of the personal identity problem as the original part of the thesis.

9- Argument from the problems of the “pure ego” in *Ideas*: The self-identical “pure ego” has some problems such as “transcendence within immanence” in *Ideas*. *Epochē* and “transcendental reduction” excludes whatever is transcendent, except for the “pure ego”. To gain a homogeneous pure consciousness, to leave the “transcendental ego” and to accept the non-egologic pure consciousness will be the suitable way to solve the problems in *Ideas*.

10- Argument from introspection: Descartes, Hume and Husserl can agree with the introspection which provides direct, immediate and private access to the mental states, despite of the failure to recognize the immaterial substance and “pure ego” via introspection. Hume claims that introspection does not give the knowledge of the immaterial substance. I use the same claim for the “pure ego” and the “transcendental ego” as one of the original claims of the thesis.

11- Argument from solipsism: *Epochē* causes the problem of solipsism in which one can know the content of consciousness, despite

of the ignorance of the outside world. I also use the definitions of David Bell about solipsism. The person in the thought experiment turns into a little god, due to the "disconnexion" from the "fact world" after *epochē*. One should reach the content of his consciousness in solipsism. Eidetic reduction, *epochē* and "transcendental reduction" purify the pure consciousness. However, "pure ego" still shows a "peculiar" kind of transcendence. To leave the claim about the existence of the "transcendental ego" can be a suitable way to solve these problems.

12- Argument from the "shift" of the definition of consciousness after *epochē*: Before *epochē*, every *cogitatio* (thought) has the form of *cogito* or "I think". However, *epochē* provides the "shift" of the attitude. *Cogito* involves "I have consciousness of something". This provides the "shift" of the definition of consciousness. Don Welton also stresses this "shift" of the definition. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, there is the further "shift" of the definition of consciousness. He repeats the structure, *ego cogito cogitatum*. One accesses the "transcendental ego" via "transcendental reduction". However, one cannot define what "transcendental ego" is. Because, "transcendental ego" is the identical, "ultimate ego pole", the definition is mere negation of the *cogito*. Now, one can ask that whether negation gives information or not. "Transcendence within immanence" causes a partial self alienation of the ego. In fact, it cannot be known adequately. So, to define it properly seems as a problem in *Ideas*.

13- Argument from the definition of consciousness in the frame of phenomenology: After *epochē*, "pure ego" and its ego life remain in the domain of consciousness. There are two different kinds of essences which are Nature and Consciousness for human being in the claim of David Woodruff Smith in "Mind and Body" in *The Cambridge*

Companion to Husserl. Body, brain, neural activities are the instantiation of the essence, Nature. They should be “set aside” to open the domain of phenomenology. Phenomenology deals with the conscious events as the instantiation of essence, Consciousness. Natural sciences depend on the third person perspective, but phenomenology depends on the first person perspective. Unlike the mental acts of consciousness which can be accessed from the first person perspective, one cannot access the “pure ego” as being incompatible with the definition of consciousness. So, to leave the “pure ego” is the suitable way for the rigorous spirit of phenomenology.

In this thesis, I want to show that there are Cartesian style category mistakes in the Husserlian philosophy in the Cartesian Category Mistake section. Pure consciousness is able to think and talk abstractly. So, pure consciousness can consider a moment as if it is a piece. Pure consciousness can turn the *abstractum* into a *concretum* which causes the category mistake. One can access his mental states directly, immediately and privately, not the immaterial substance or “transcendental ego”. Human being can experience these mental states and “what is immaterial” from these experiences by means of the first person perspective. However, one claims the immaterial substance in the philosophy of Descartes and “transcendental ego” in the philosophy of Husserl as a result of the abstraction and objectification of “what is immaterial” as if it is a piece, not a moment as the source of the category mistake. The other forms of category mistake belong to sciences. To “equalize” the body with the mind is the category mistake of sciences which has the Cartesian origin.

One can solve the mind-body problem after the denial of the “transcendental ego” as in the initial position of Husserl. Transcendent “ego body” is phenomenologically constituted as the intentional object

of the intentional experiences in The Dissolution of the Mind-body Problem in Husserl section. Transcendent body is phenomenologically reduced to be an immanent object of mind. The relation between an immanent mind and transcendent body is dissolved by means of the phenomenological reduction of the transcendent “ego body”.

After the denial of the identical and persisting “transcendental ego”, there is the problem of personal identity. Since, there is no immaterial substance or persisting ego as a result of the defense of the disembodied non-egologic pure consciousness, I deny the strict personal identity which is a matter of degree. I show the relationship between personal identity and memory which is the re-collection of the old perceptions in the Problem of Personal Identity section. In fact, to show how the sense of personal identity still continues is necessary, after the denial of the “transcendental ego”. One can realize the old selves by means of the recollection of old perceptions. To support these claims, Kafka’s novel *Transformation* and the hero of the novel, Gregor Samsa is used as the example of the new body scenario in the Personal Identity in the New Body Scenario section. In this example, I show the connection between personal identity and memory. I also show the dynamic nature of the constitution of the personal identity.

In Chapter 3, I ask that why we do not prefer the third person perspective and the explanations of the sciences. Different nature of conscious events in the frame of phenomenology on the basis of the Leibniz’ law can be used to answer this question. There is the irreducibility of conscious events, due to the special abilities of pure consciousness such as constitution, intuition, *qualia*, intentionality, special acts of pure consciousness, etc.

In the General Comments on Husserl section, I compare and contrast my claims with the claims of Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, David Bell, David Carr, etc. Sartre also claims the "error of substance" in his analysis of the "pre-reflective *cogito*" in *Being and Nothingness*. I also claim that there is a category mistake which causes the acceptance of the immaterial substance in the philosophy of Descartes, but I also claim that "pure ego" and "transcendental ego" also arise as a result of the category mistake in the philosophy of Husserl. The originality of my claim is that the denial of the "pure ego" and "transcendental ego" depends on the detailed analysis of the paradoxes and their simple solution in the frame of phenomenology. David Bell claims that there is an identity relation between psychology and transcendental phenomenology. However, he does not formulate the paradoxical identity relation between "psychological ego" and "transcendental ego" and there is no solution of the paradox. Peursen in *Phenomenology and Reality* also questions this identity relation. He also does not formulate the paradox. However, his tendency is to deny the "transcendental ego" by claiming that it is "a linguistic fiction". Similarly, David Bell, who also denies the ego, suggests that it just has an "explanatory task". Like Sartre, Aron Gurwitsch defends non-egologic pure consciousness in the frame of analytic philosophy. I also deny the "transcendental ego". However, I make a part-whole analysis to show how moments turn into pieces as a result of the abstraction of moments. Human being can think and talk about moments independently as if they are pieces, as a result of the abstraction and isolation of pure consciousness. Then, "pure ego" and "transcendental ego" gain ontologically independent status. Besides the category mistake claim, there is an ontological difference between "transcendental ego" and its mental acts. I use the Sartre's concept, "pre-reflective" to show that "transcendental ego" cannot be accessed without "transcendental reduction". Unlike *cogito*,

"transcendental ego" is the identical "ultimate ego pole" which is ontologically different from its mental acts. Gabriel Marcel also defines the "specialization", "specification" and "partial alienation" of the self in *Being and Having*. I also show the self alienation of "transcendental ego" which is also a reason to leave the "transcendental ego" as one of the original claims of the thesis. To deny the "transcendental ego" is the suitable way to solve the mind-body problem. Because, I suggest the initial position of Husserl in which he denies the "pure ego". If one cuts the "ego-body" from the "empirical ego", "transcendentally reduced ego" will remain. The relationship between the mind and body is that transcendent "ego body" is phenomenologically constituted as the intentional object of some intentional experiences. So, the solution of the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the "pure ego" in *Ideas* and "transcendental ego" in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Similarly, Marcel also claims that "what we have" obviously presents an appearance of external reality to ourselves. But it is not an absolute externality. Furthermore, he defends the presence of "what is irreducible". Like Marcel, I also try to show the irreducible nature of whatever is mental. To claim the psycho-physical identity on the basis of Leibniz' law is impossible. Because, there are different mental capacities such as intentionality, constitution, *qualia*, etc., I also support the claims of Marcel who considers that to realize and to show "what is irreducible" is the "task".

Briefly, phenomenology is the suitable way to examine the pure consciousness adequately. The old philosophical problems can be re-examined in the frame of phenomenology. In this thesis, there is the re-examination of the old philosophical problems such as mind-body and personal identity problems. I also examine the nature of consciousness in the frame of phenomenology.

To solve these old problems of the philosophy, I followed certain steps. First of all, I show that there are still certain presuppositions in the phenomenology, especially, epistemological presuppositions which makes the phenomenology possible, inspite of the usage of *epochē* in the Chapter 1.

In Chapter 2, I examine the concept of consciousness in *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas* and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. I show that there is no “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. To deny the “transcendental ego” is necessary to solve the mind-body problem. I claim that “transcendental ego” is a category mistake. Then, I try to present the possible solution of the mind-body problem in the frame of phenomenology. I also show the solution of the problem of personal identity without an ego. To support my claim, I use Kafka’s *Transformation* in which Gregor Samsa has a new insect body.

In Chapter 3, I also answer the question which is why phenomenology is the suitable way to examine the real nature of consciousness, instead of sciences. I show the special abilities of non-egologic pure consciousness such as *qualia*, intentionality and constitution to show the necessity of phenomenology which depends on the first person perspective, not the third person one.

1.2 *Epochē* and Presuppositionless Philosophy

The main question is that whether there is the possibility of presuppositionless philosophy or not? The success of *epochē* depends

on the constitution of the presuppositionless⁴ philosophy in which one should overcome “the hidden but already felt naïveté of earlier philosophizing.”⁵ To answer this question, one should compare and contrast the Cartesian and the Husserlian philosophies. In fact, there is also a Cartesian ideal in which artificially isolated mediator tries to reach a presuppositionless philosophy by means of the method of doubt. Before the examination of this question, one should answer the questions, what *epochē* is and why it is used again after the systematic usage of the method of doubt in the Cartesian philosophy. The other possible question is about the success of *epochē* for the “shift” of the attitude from the third person perspective of the sciences in the “natural attitude” to the first person one in phenomenology to change the definition of consciousness.

Husserl tries to constitute the most radical philosophy, which is presuppositionless. *Epochē* shows that how one, who lives in the “natural attitude” unconsciously accepts the absolute belief about the existence of the world⁶ without justifying this belief or clarifying its foundation. In fact, one should re-discover this world which is “constituted” in each individual pure consciousness by keeping its objectivity via intersubjectivity. In fact, *epochē* means “...to rediscover the intentional constitution of world.”⁷ In the history of philosophy, Descartes uses the method of doubt at the beginning. It is not a way of

⁴ To be scientific, a science must satisfy “the principle of freedom from presuppositions” as the claim of Husserl Edmund. See Husserl Edmund, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*, (London: Routledge), § 7, 1997, p. 97.

⁵ Ibid., § 2, p. 6.

⁶ Husserl who questions the “naïve acceptance of a world” follows Hume. See Murphy, Richard T., *Husserl and Hume* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 1980, p. 13.

⁷ Breda, H. L. van, “A note on Reduction and Authenticity According to Husserl” in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals* (edited by Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick), (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press), 1977, p. 124.

philosophical life as Greek skeptics in the Cartesian philosophy. *Epochē* is a method which can be used whenever one wants, not only at the beginning of the philosophizing. In fact, its frequent usage may be healthier for the “constitution” of presuppositionless philosophy. The usage of *epochē* provides the immediate and evident access to the data of consciousness. Husserl tries to constitute a presuppositionless philosophy in which he neither denies the existence of the outside world as sophists nor doubts it as skeptics by means of *epochē*.

If I do this, as I am fully free to do, I do *not* then *deny* this “world”, as though I were a sophist, *I do not doubt that it is there* as though I were a skeptic; but I use the phenomenological *epochē*, which *completely bears me from using only judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein)*.⁸

Husserl as a follower of Descartes has a procedure to start from consciousness, its contents and the experiences. In fact, one should not take any authority or one should not accept cultural, scientific tradition, scientific theories and metaphysical explanations as presuppositions in phenomenology. Positive sciences accept the existence of the outside world. Especially, physics which depends on the empirical knowledge also accepts the existence of the outside world and the causal relations among facts in the “fact world”. Empirical knowledge is a probabilistic knowledge which can be refuted by means of observation and experiment. So, there must be an “Archimedean point” which does not presuppose any uncertainty.⁹ To describe what is given or what

⁸ Ibid., § 32, pp. 110-111.

⁹ Husserl's goal is the “radically unprejudiced knowledge” which depends on the separation of *epistēmè*, true knowledge from *doxa* or opinion. See Held, Claus,

appears to consciousness, there is no need for the presuppositions of sciences, including the presupposition about the existence of the outside world. The Greek word, "*phainomenon*" means appearance which is the subject matter of phenomenology. Evidence of immanent data is used as the only source of knowledge for phenomenology which is means to access the consciousness in order to analyze it. So, the "task" of *epochē* is to let the analysis of how things are given or appear to consciousness as phenomenon without any kind of presupposition. "Our phenomenology should be a theory of essential Being, dealing not with real, but with transcendently reduced phenomena."¹⁰

There is still need for the further analysis of the term, presupposition. According to Brentano, "presuppositionless" means to be "free from prejudice" or from "prejudgments"¹¹. In spite of the ambiguity of the term, presupposition, it literally means "posited as holding or as existing in advance".¹² If one considers the term, presupposition in its broadest meaning, it can refer to any kind of supposition or assumption. This assumption can be material, a realm of existence, a process of experience, a system of knowledge, ideal domain, formal principles which can be "...either in the sense of arbitrary assumptions or logically necessary principles".¹³

There are different kinds of presuppositions on the basis of the acceptance of different entities.

"Husserl's Phenomenological Method" in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p. 7.

¹⁰ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, p. 44 (in the 6th printing).

¹¹ West, David, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, (U.S.A: Polity Press), 1996, p. 20.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

1. "There are material presuppositions, which are either physical in their reference, or relate to domains of abstract things."¹⁴ For example, the world of experience, its continuity as an existence in time, the independence of the existence of the world from the human being, causal uniformity and infinite extension can be given as the examples of material presuppositions on the basis of physical reference.

2. Cognitive presuppositions are reliability of perception, memory and validity of knowledge. They may not be considered as assumptions. However, the achieved truths depend on such kind of cognitive presuppositions. "Our ability to know reality truly does not have to be assumed if all known evidence overwhelmingly verifies it."¹⁵ In spite of *epochē*, there are still some cognitive presuppositions such as the "principle of all principles", power of intuition, potential conscious nature of all kinds of conscious events, transparent nature of consciousness, etc. These cognitive presuppositions make the phenomenology possible. To have a presuppositionless philosophy is an ideal. Phenomenology tries to reach this goal. However, absolute presuppositionless philosophy seems difficult, even for phenomenology. These cognitive presuppositions will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

3. There is the possibility of formal assumptions in a special system to use for deduction. The whole system of logic shows the nature of a special system which has its own laws as a structure. The principles of the traditional logic as the "laws of thought" can be considered as theorems in the system of logic. It is clear that all sets of logical propositions do not show the same level of deductive power.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

Since they are deductively more powerful than other sets of logical propositions, these “laws of thought” can be considered as logically prior. *De facto* sciences which are formal depend on the apodictic truths in the philosophy of Husserl. I will show the unconscious usage of these privileged logical laws and syllogisms in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. Unlike the contingent nature of sense intuition, Husserl claims the apodictic nature of laws of logic. I will show them as the evidence of the irreducible nature of non-egologic pure consciousness in the Irreducibility of *Qualia* section.

For the complete analysis of the concept, presupposition, one can examine the other usages of the term which includes motivation, influence of society, term, beliefs of the term, world-view assumptions, prejudgments, cultural tradition or all kinds of traditions and their assumptions, etc.

There is the possible philosophical naïvety and dogmatism, due to the unquestioned presuppositions of natural sciences and their dominance in the philosophy. Descartes also tries to overcome the presuppositions by the method of doubt in the history of philosophy.

Some year ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my child hood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them.¹⁶

¹⁶Descartes, Rene, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (translated by John Cottingham), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996, p. 12.

Descartes also tries to knock down all kinds of given truths which are called as “preconceived opinions”. One sees the systematic usage of the method of doubt to reach the indubitable, clearly and distinctly perceived truths of reason. Similarly, Husserl also tries to constitute a presuppositionless philosophy in which Cartesian philosophy is accepted as a “prototype”¹⁷ for his philosophy.

I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.¹⁸

Like the presuppositions of the “natural attitude” which causes philosophical naïvety and dogmatism in Husserl, there is the influence of the “preconceived opinions” in Descartes. There is the influence of the authorities, especially Aristotle, teachers, the influence of the senses etc. All of these undesired elements can be considered as “the given” which can be cultural and scientific tradition. In fact, we see the influence of the cultural factors on the members of the community in the *Lebenswelt* in the later Husserl.

Epochē lets one to know that what one knows is our “constitution” in our consciousness and what one just knows what appears to our consciousness as it appears. By this way, there is the “shift” of the attitude from “natural attitude” to “transcendental attitude”, due the change of the attitude toward this “fact world” and individuals in

¹⁷ Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations* (translated by Dorion Cairns), (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff), 1973, § 1, p. 2 (in the 5th printing).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, § 1, p. 1 (in the 5th printing).

it. In other words, the person who "...excluded from every connexion within the "real world",¹⁹ can direct his regard to his pure consciousness. If just pure experiences and its intentional objects remain as they are, there can be the danger of solipsism which is derived from the Latin, *solus ipse*. Husserl claims that "...the ego carries on a kind of solipsistic philosophizing".²⁰

"In fact, the principle of freedom from presuppositions has been called the greatest presupposition."²¹ Like the Cartesian method of doubt, Husserl introduces the method, *epochē*. Descartes opens consciousness as being a secure area via introspection which provides direct, immediate and private access to one's own mental states, due to the transparent nature of consciousness. In this secure area of consciousness; one sees the clear and distinct perception of simple ideas in Descartes.

To accept the pure, transparent consciousness without any proof is the main presupposition of the Husserlian phenomenology. Furthermore, there is a stream of consciousness which fluxes. According to Husserl, every single experience of an individual has a beginning and end, due to its duration. "But the stream of experience cannot begin and end"²² which is also a presupposition in Husserl.

The presupposition about the subsistence of *eidos* in the eidetic world depends on the acceptance of "common element" in many. It is

¹⁹ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), p. 45 (in the 5th printing).

²⁰ Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations*, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff), 1973, § 1, p. 3 (in the 5th printing).

²¹ Farber, Marvin, *The Aims of Phenomenology*, (U.S.A: Harper Torchbooks), 1996, p. 18.

²² Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 81, p. 236 (in the 6th printing).

necessary to avoid the claim that intuitive experience of *eidos* is just a mystical experience without the acceptance of the intersubjective world of *eidos* in individual consciousness. One will get into real trouble by falling into subjective idealism or just mystical experiences for each individual. So, such kind of hidden ontological presuppositions are necessary for phenomenology. Now, one should examine that whether there are cognitive presuppositions in the Husserlian philosophy about the reliability of perception, memory, intuition and the validity of knowledge or not. Now, one can use the Cartesian evil demon as a mean to check whether phenomenology is immune to skepticism at the maximal level and intensity or not. Evil demon suddenly arises to use his deceptive power again. Evil demon uses all of its energy to deceive all of us about the subsistence of “essences” and their intersubjective nature. So, there is no *eidos* and all of the descriptions of *eidos* are just the descriptions of our “common illusions” which cause an illusory intersubjectivity.

In other words, intersubjectivity is the result of the “common illusion”, because of the evil demon and all of its energy which is used to deceive all of us. However, phenomenological analysis and descriptions are still true.

In the Husserlian philosophy, Husserl uses the concepts, “illusion” and “hallucination”. He also realizes their deceptive nature. Even if everything is just a fiction, phenomenological analysis is still true. Phenomenology just deals with something which is given to consciousness as being the data of consciousness. “The only thing absolutely true is what appears as a datum, something given to my consciousness.”²³ There is the possibility that things may not be as they

²³ Ibid., p. 43.

appear to us, but I just know the appearance as the only well known thing for me. The perceived tree may be just a “hallucination” as an objectless non-veridical perception, but the appearance of the tree is always true for me. If phenomenological method merely depends on the description of how things appear to us and all other things are mere speculation, then evil demon and its deception are meaningless for phenomenology. In fact, phenomenological method is just to describe how things appear to us. Even if everything is just a “common illusion”, due to the deceptive nature of evil demon, everything which appears to me, to my consciousness will be true. So, the deceptive nature of evil demon does not influence phenomenology. If one takes drug which causes “hallucination”, there will still be the possibility of phenomenology which deals with what appears to the consciousness regardless of its origin.

It is clear that Husserl has a hidden presupposition about the power of consciousness, intuitions, especially “essential insight” or “ideation” which gives the knowledge of “truth-in-itself” as the knowledge of essences. All intentional acts have the moment of presentation and there are two different kinds of experiences or presentations. The first one is the originary presentation which is intuition. An intuition presents an object directly, originally. The subjective characteristic of this experience is spontaneity. There are two kinds of intuition, empirical and eidetic. Sensuous object is given via empirical intuition at the level of contingency, due to the changing nature of sensuous object. “Essential insight” or “ideation” is means by which the essence or eidetic structure of an object is given

originally. "The intuition of essences is a spontaneous experience, not a creative experience as the empiricist believes dogmatically."²⁴

The second type of intuition is arbitrary intuition by which the object is given directly but, by means of an arbitrary activity. It is production or creation of our own mental activity. One is conscious of this production. Unlike the intuition of essences, one experiences that they are constructions. One sees that Husserl relies on the cognitive ability of each individual consciousness as a presupposition. Unlike sense intuition, eidetic intuition gives the knowledge of necessary or apodictic knowledge at the level of necessity. Furthermore, human consciousness realizes that arbitrary presentations are merely constructions as being the creation of our mental activity. Husserl accepts that "essential insight" or "ideation" gives the knowledge of what is valid, in spite of the changing nature of a sensuous object and empirical intuition. Phenomenology is possible at the level of necessary and valid knowledge of essences.

Like Descartes, Husserl deals with consciousness and avoids unconscious elements. Husserlian philosophy introduces some hidden cognitive presuppositions. However, if some unconscious elements influence the consciousness and its working, phenomenology and eidetic descriptions can be full of unconscious elements. Furthermore, how can one be sure that there are no unconscious elements at the level of consciousness which is accepted as absolutely pure and simple? One cannot be sure about unconscious elements. In fact, whoever is aware of what is unconscious; it reaches the level of consciousness. Are there unconscious elements in the descriptions of *eidōs*? Furthermore, if evil demon sends all of its energy to mix unconscious

²⁴ Ibid., p. 54.

elements with conscious one without letting us to know it, phenomenology can mix up with all unconscious elements. In fact, the influence of the unconscious factors will be examined in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. In the famous novel of Balzac, *Lilly in the Valley*, one sees the Oedipus complex and the influence of the unconscious elements in the second valley descriptions of Felix as the possible problem for phenomenological descriptions. In Marxism, consciousness is determined by the social class of individuals. If phenomenologist does not provide the proper "disconnexion" and proper isolation from the "fact world", the phenomenological descriptions can be under the influence of the social classes as in the claim of Marx, cultural elements as in the claim of Wittgenstein. Even the gender dependent perspective of the phenomenologist is possible for phenomenological descriptions. To escape from all of these influences, one should cut his total relation with this world to direct toward his own consciousness, but this total "disconnexion" will cause the problem of solipsism which will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

If Chomsky is right about his claim that every language has an innate mechanism which is "S is p" structure as a species specific mechanism of human being, he can use this innate, "S is p" structure for the descriptions of *eidos* and their eidetic relationships. Even this structure can cause a linguistic presupposition of an immaterial Cartesian substance in Descartes, "pure ego" and "transcendental ego" in Husserl, due to the form of "I think". "I" may be presupposed as a linguistic presupposition.

To constitute a presuppositionless philosophy seems quite difficult, but it is also necessary to take the first person perspective to examine the genuine nature of consciousness. Sciences such as neurology,

cognitive sciences can examine the brain, neurons without understanding phenomenal qualities of the subjective experiences. The other main and unavoidable problem of the application of *epochē* is the old Cartesian problem of solipsism. If one is just certain about the content of his consciousness, the problems of solipsism is unavoidable. Furthermore, there are also old philosophical problems, which need the fresh formulations such as the problem of personal identity, re-definition of the human being, nature of consciousness and its re-definition, etc. To answer these old problems is the "task" of the phenomenology. Despite of these mentioned problems of *epochē*, it is the only way for the "shift of the attitude" in which one leaves the third person perspective of sciences and takes the first person perspective for phenomenology. Furthermore, the first person point of view, which is provided by the method of doubt in the philosophy of Descartes and the *epochē* in the philosophy of Husserl, is the unique way to examine the genuine nature of consciousness. *Epochē* changes our attitude toward what reality is and what consciousness is. Instead of the reality of the external world, there is the reality of the experiences. *Epochē* turns everything into a phenomenon for consciousness. What one certainly knows is what is carried to the "phenomenological residuum" by means of *epochē*, instead of the "fact world". There is the destruction of the common sense beliefs about the existence of the "fact world". Briefly, *epochē* is very successful for the "shift" of the attitude". After this change, one realizes that the only available and legitimate source of knowledge is what is given to consciousness which is available from the first person perspective in the frame of phenomenology. *Epochē* is the suitable means to overcome and re-examine the common sense beliefs and to direct one's regard to the pure consciousness and its experiences as the genuine reality. In spite of the presuppositions in the phenomenology, they are still minimal. In phenomenology, intuition

which is the only source of knowledge in the consciousness is still epistemologically prior to all kinds of theories. Husserl accepts “the principle of all principles”, which is the title of 24th section in *Ideas*.

But enough of such topsy-turvy theories! No theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the *principle of all principles: that every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself “intuition” in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.*²⁵

“Principle of all principles” shows that every originary intuitive presentation is the legitimizing source of knowledge. “The principle of all principles” implies that there is the absolute evidence of what is given in intuition. This totally changes our definition about the reality and consciousness. These cognitive presuppositions are the basic of phenomenology. These presuppositions such as the transparency of consciousness, power of intuition, “principle of all principles”, and potential conscious nature of all kinds of mental events provide a foundation for phenomenology. These presuppositions will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. I also show that how *epochē* causes the problem of solipsism which also will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. I also show how the world of *eidos* which can be intuited via eidetic intuition or ideation is constituted in the consciousness. In this section, I show the “shift of the attitude” and the “shift” of the perspective from the first person

²⁵ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1969, § 99, p. 90 (in the 5th printing).

perspective to the third person one. This “shift” of the perspective will be used to solve the mind-body problem. I will also defend the necessity of the phenomenology to examine consciousness from the first person perspective.

Now, we can examine the concepts, self, mental acts, body and their relations in *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas* and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, after the “shift” of the attitude and perspective in the frame of phenomenology.

CHAPTER 2

EXAMINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

2.1 Consciousness in *Logical Investigations*

In the 13th section of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl needs to fix his own terminology to eliminate the “conflicting assumptions” and “confusing ambiguities”.²⁶ Husserl uses the term, “intentional experiences”, instead of “psychical phenomenon” for better “accuracy”.²⁷ Husserl stresses that experience must be understood in the “phenomenological sense”.

The qualifying adjective ‘intentional’ names the essence common to the class of experiences we wish to mark off, the peculiarity of *intending*, of referring to what is objective, in a presentative or other analogous fashion.²⁸

Intending is defined in the “sense of especially noticing” or “attending to something”.²⁹ “The term ‘intention’ hits off the peculiarity of

²⁶ Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (New York: The Humanities Press), Vol. 2, 1970, Investigation V, § 13, p. 562.

²⁷ Ibid., Investigation V, § 13, p. 562.

²⁸ Ibid., Investigation V, § 13, p. 562.

²⁹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 13, p. 562.

acts by imagining them to aim at something, and so fits the numerous cases that are naturally and understandably ranked as cases of theoretical aiming.”³⁰ After the explanation of the term, intentionality, Husserl introduces the term, “intentional object”. *“An intentional object need not, however, always be noticed or attended to.”*³¹

Husserl realizes the “varied ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’”.³² Meanwhile, Husserl uses the concepts which are “conscious contents” and “conscious experiences”. Husserl analyzes the three concepts of consciousness.

1. Consciousness as the entire, real (*reelle*) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness.
2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences.
3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for “mental acts”, or “intentional experiences”, of all sorts.³³

Husserl explains that modern psychology defines itself as the science of “psychic individuals”³⁴ which can be considered “as concrete conscious unities.”³⁵ However, the analysis of the consciousness

³⁰ Ibid., Investigation V, § 13, p. 563.

³¹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 13, p. 562.

³² Ibid., Investigation V, § 1, p. 535.

³³ Ibid., Investigation V, § 1, p. 535.

³⁴ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 536.

³⁵ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 536.

depends on the further analysis of the terms which are “experience” and “content” in Husserl.

These latter terms, ‘experience’ and ‘content’, mean for the modern psychologist the real occurrences (Wundt rightly calls them ‘events’) which, in flux from one moment to the next, and interconnected and interpenetrating in manifold ways, compose the real unity – of – consciousness of the individual mind.³⁶

Perceptions, acts of conceptual thinking, imaginative and pictorial presentations, joys, beliefs, hopes, wishes, fear, acts of will, doubting arise in the consciousness as “experiences” or “content of consciousness”. “And, with these experiences in their total and concrete fullness, their component parts and abstract aspects are also *experienced*: they are real contents of consciousness.”³⁷

In the second section of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl claims that the concept, consciousness can be seen in a purely phenomenological manner via cutting out all relation with the empirically real existence such as persons or animals in the nature. In the same section, Husserl explains the outer perception of the sensory aspect of colour as the “experienced” or conscious content of “the full perceptual appearing of the coloured object.”³⁸

³⁶ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 536.

³⁷ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 536.

³⁸ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 537.

The sense – aspect of colour, e.g., which in outer perception forms a real constituent of my concrete seeing (in the phenomenological sense of a visual perceiving or appearing) is as much an ‘experienced’ or ‘conscious’ content, as is the character of perceiving, or as the full perceptual appearing of the coloured object.³⁹

One is aware of the colour sensation. Furthermore, one is also aware of “the object’s objective colouring”.⁴⁰ Of course, Husserl stresses the subjective elements such as “different standpoint”, “different interest” of the outer perception. During the outer perception, an object presents itself as such or an object appears as such. This appearing is experienced and “interpreted” or “apperceived” via the “animating interpretation of sensation.”⁴¹ Husserl emphasizes the “unity of consciousness” or “phenomenologically unified stream of consciousness of an “empirical ego”.”⁴² In this quotation, Husserl clearly accepts the “empirical ego”, in spite of the denial of the “pure ego”.

This merely means that certain contents help to constitute a unity of consciousness of an empirical ego. This itself is a real whole, in reality made up of manifold parts, each of which may be said to be ‘experienced’. It is in this sense that what the ego or conscious experiences, are its experience: there is no difference between the experience or conscious content and the experience itself. What is sensed is, e.g., no different from the sensation.⁴³

³⁹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 537.

⁴⁰ Ibid., Investigation V, § 2, p. 537.

⁴¹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 3, p. 539.

⁴² Ibid., Investigation V, § 3, p. 540.

⁴³ Ibid., Investigation V, § 3, p. 540.

There are the mere experiences in which one cannot separate what experiences and what is experienced and there is the “empirical ego” which is the totality of these experiences which constitute a unity of experiences.

There is an “empirical ego” which is the totality of “ego body” and “purely mental ego” or “phenomenologically reduced ego”. Husserl needs further phenomenological investigation and reflection on consciousness by separating the “ego body” from the “empirical ego”.

If we cut out the ego-body from the empirical ego, and limit the purely mental ego to its phenomenological content, the latter reduces to a unity of consciousness, to a real experiential complex, which we (i.e. each man for his own ego) find in part evidently present, and for the rest postulate on good grounds.⁴⁴

Husserl “cuts out” the “ego body” from the “empirical ego”. The “purely mental ego” as the totality of the phenomenological content succeeds each other in the unity of consciousness.

The phenomenologically reduced ego is therefore nothing “peculiar”, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity. In the nature of its contents, and the laws they obey, certain forms of connection are grounded.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Ibid., Investigation V, § 3, p. 541.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Investigation V, § 3, p. 541.

The “phenomenologically reduced ego” is nothing more than its experiences. The “phenomenologically reduced ego” is simply identical with these experiences in this interconnected unity. In other words, “phenomenologically reduced ego” is the “unified sum total of content”.⁴⁶

They run in diverse fashions from content to content, from complex of contents to complex of contents, till in the end a unified sum total of content is constituted, which does not differ from the phenomenologically reduced ego itself.⁴⁷

In the *Logical Investigations*, “consciousness”, “experience” and “content” are the key words to explain the concept, consciousness. Meanwhile, Husserl mentions about the “inner consciousness” and its special ability of “inner perception”. The “self-evidence” is attributed to the inner perception as adequate the perception.

An object is intuitively presented or given as a real (*reell*) part of the perceptual experience. In fact, adequate perception can only be the inner perception. Inner perception is the perception of one’s own experiences as adequate or evident perception.

Every perception is characterized by the intention of grasping its object as present, and *in propria persona*. To this intention perception corresponds with complete perception, achieves *adequacy*, if the object in it is itself actually present, and in the strict sense present *in propria persona*, is exhaustively

⁴⁶ Ibid., Investigation V, § 3, p. 541.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Investigation V, § 4, p. 541.

apprehended as that which it is, and is therefore itself a real (reell) factor in our perceiving of it.⁴⁸

Husserl stresses that presentations of the content of experiences are also important. Since, all acts are intentional experiences which “direct toward” its objects; there is a need for the phenomenology of presentations.

Mental acts are often called ‘activities of consciousness’, ‘relations of consciousness to a content (object)’, and ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, at times defined as a comprehensive expressing covering mental acts of all sorts.⁴⁹

The nature of consciousness is identified with all kind of mental acts and its relation to its consciousness. Meanwhile, Husserl accepts the ideality of not only species, but also meanings. Meanings have to be present in meaning-intention which has a certain relation with intuition. “We have often spoken of the *fulfillment* of a meaning – intention through a corresponding intuition, and have said that the highest form of such fulfillment was that of self – evidence.”⁵⁰

It is quite surprising that Husserl clearly denies the existence of “pure ego” as a doctrine in some passages of *Logical Investigations*.

⁴⁸ Ibid., *Investigations V*, § 5, p. 542.

⁴⁹ Ibid., *Investigations V*, § 5, p. 534.

⁵⁰ Ibid., *Investigations V*, § 5, p. 533.

These contents have, as contents generally have, their own law-bound ways of coming together, of losing themselves in more comprehensive unities, and, in so far as they thus become and are one, the phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness is already constituted, without need of an additional, peculiar ego-principle which supports all contents and unites them all once again. Here as elsewhere it is not clear what such a principle would effect.⁵¹

Husserl denies the "pure ego". In fact, "empirical ego" is identified with the "psychic subject."⁵² "Phenomenologically reduced ego" remains after the reduction. Phenomenological reduction causes the "self-enclosed"⁵³ and "temporally growing unity of the stream of experience".⁵⁴ In this stream of experience, one experiences the phenomenon or "psychic phenomenon" which is defined as "appearing object as such."⁵⁵ The object is defined by giving its essential nature. Among these definitions, one can mention that "the object is a conscious datum", the object "is in consciousness" or it "is immanent to consciousness."⁵⁶

In the ego definition of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*, ego is not more than the "conscious unity" or the "contemporary bundle of experiences". These explanations remind the bundle theory of mind in which mind is defined as the perceptual content on the basis of the denial of the Cartesian ego in the philosophy of Hume.

⁵¹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 4, pp. 541-542.

⁵² Ibid., Investigation V, § 6, p. 545.

⁵³ Ibid., Investigation V, § 6, p. 545.

⁵⁴ Ibid., Investigation V, § 6, p. 545.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Investigation V, § 11, p. 557.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Investigation V, § 12, p. 560.

This is quite obvious since the ego is either no more than the 'conscious unity', or 'contemporary bundle', of experiences, or, in a more natural empirically – real (*realer*) perspective, the continuous thing – like unity, constituted in the unity of consciousness as the personal subject of our experiences, the ego whose mental states these experiences are, that performs the intention, percept, or judgment in question.⁵⁷

Briefly, Husserl accepts that he is not able to find a primitive ego as the "necessary center of relations". The only thing he finds is the "empirical ego" and "its empirical relations to its own experiences".

I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary center of relations. The only thing I can take note of, and therefore perceive, are the empirical ego and its empirical relations to its own experiences, or to such external objects as are receiving special attention at the moment, while much remains, whether 'without' or 'within', which has no such relation to the ego.⁵⁸

One is aware of the "empirical ego" in his daily experiences. Since, one does not get any difficulty to understand the "empirical ego"; he perceives the "empirical ego" as the perception of external things. "Self-perception of the "empirical ego" is, however, a daily business, which involves no difficulty for understanding. We perceive the ego, just as we perceive on external thing."⁵⁹ Husserl tries to constitute a presuppositionless philosophy. There is the demand of a "psychology without a soul" by leaving all metaphysical presuppositions about soul.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Investigation V, § 12, p. 561.

⁵⁸ Ibid., Investigation V, § 8, p. 550.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 8, p. 551.

Husserl mentions about two group philosophers. One group of philosophers is Hobbes, Descartes and Locke. The other group of philosophers is Berkeley and Hume.

The doctrine of Berkeley and Hume, which reduces phenomenal bodies to bundles of ideas, fails to do justice to the fact that, even if the elementary ideas in these bundles are psychically realizable, the bundle itself, the intended complexes of element, are never present in real fashion (*Reell gegenwärtig*) in any human consciousness and never will be.⁶⁰

These theories are called as “phenomenalistic theories” in which one does not make a distinction between “appearance” (*Erscheinung*) as intentional experience and the apparent object.

It is the fundamental defect of phenomenalistic theories that they draw no distinction between appearance (*Erscheinung*) as intentional experience, and the apparent object (the subject of the objective predicates), and therefore identify the experienced complex of sensation with the complex of objective features.⁶¹

Despite of some differences in the philosophy of Hume and Husserl, there are some similarities in the philosophy of Husserl in *Logical Investigations* with the bundle theory of mind in the philosophy of Hume. Bundle theory of mind owes its name from the philosophy of

⁶⁰ Ibid., Investigation V, § 7, p. 546.

⁶¹ Ibid., Investigation V, § 7, p. 546.

Hume who describes the self as nothing more than a bundle or collection of different perceptions. This bundle or collection of different perceptions succeeds each other with an inconceivable rapidity in a perpetual flux and movement. In fact, Hume defines this theory against the second *Mediation* of the Cartesian philosophy in which Descartes defines that experiences belong to an immaterial substance. Hume is clearly against the existence and continuity of the self. Hume considers that if one accesses his mental states via introspection, he can merely find thoughts, sensations, emotions and nothing more than them, not an immaterial substance. Hume also considers that Cartesian self is a mere myth.

Hume claims that Cartesian philosophy gives an independent ontological status to the ego as immaterial thinking substance which does not have an independent ontological status in reality. There is a category mistake in which soul gains an independent ontological status. Hume gives the famous example of France to show the Cartesian category mistake.

Hume claims that all kind of reasoning about matter of fact depends on the relation between cause and effect. By means of this relation, one can go beyond the evidence of his memory and senses.

If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent, for instance that his friend is in the country, or FRANCE; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises.⁶²

⁶² Hume, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (edited with an introduction by Charles W. Hendel), 1955, (U.S.A: The Liberal Arts Press), § IV, p. 24.

By using mind and France analogy, Hume claims that there is no France as independent from land, its citizens. Similarly, there is no mind or ego which is more or different from perceptions. In fact, all of these reasoning go beyond the evidence of perception and memory. Briefly, Husserl clearly denies the existence of the “pure ego” in his initial position. In *Ideas*, he will accept the “pure ego” as a result of the further phenomenological reflections. These explanations about pure consciousness will be re-examined and used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

2.2 Consciousness in *Ideas*

In *Ideas*, Husserl defines two kinds of pure consciousness. One of these definitions is that “pure consciousnesses” is the “residuum” of the “transcendental attitude”. The other is that “pure consciousness” of the “natural attitude” is the worldly attitude of scientists. This pure consciousness is “interwoven” with the natural world in the consciousness of some *man* or *beast*.

Individual consciousness is interwoven with the *natural world* in a *twofold* way: it is some man’s consciousness, or that of some *man* or *beast*, and in large number at least of its particularizations it is a consciousness of this world, what is meant by saying that consciousness has an essence “*of its own*” that with other consciousness it constitutes a self-contained *connexion determined purely through this, its own essence, the connexion determined purely through this,*

its own essence, the connexion, namely, of the stream of consciousness.⁶³

Epochē excludes or brackets the real world and such kind of reduction opens a clean and pure “transcendental residuum” which is pure consciousness. The objects of the world are *real*. However, pure consciousness includes pure experiences which are *reel*. The world is constituted or re-constituted as the intentional object of experiences. Unlike feelings and sensations which are non-intentional experiences, other experiences such as perceptions, thoughts, etc are intentional experiences.

Epochē provides the “phenomenological disconnexion” through which absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected as it is. Pure consciousness is a “phenomenological residuum” which opens a field of new science which is the science of phenomenology. In this “phenomenological residuum”, the world is constituted or re-constituted as it is without destruction.

In these studies we go so far as needed to furnish the full insight at which we have been aiming, to wit, that consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnexion.⁶⁴

⁶³ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 39, p. 126.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, § 33, p. 113.

All experiences, constituted intentional objects and meanings are immanent. However, the objects of the world which is outside the consciousness are transcendent.

Self as “pure ego” in *Ideas*: Human being (empirical ego) includes ego body and phenomenological ego. Before *epochē*, every experience or *cogito* presupposes the existence of the phenomenological ego. *Epochē* opens a pure clean area or pure consciousness as a “residuum” in which “empirical ego” is excluded. One can ask that whether “pure ego” is also excluded or retained within the “transcendental residuum” or not. “*For what can remain over when the whole world is bracketed, including ourselves and all our thinking (cogitare)?*”⁶⁵ Husserl clearly answers this question by retaining “pure ego” which involves the paradox, “transcendence within immanence”.

If as residuum of phenomenological suspension of the world and the empirical subjectivity that belongs to it there remains a “pure ego” (a fundamentally different one, then, for each separate stream of experiences), a *quite peculiar* transcendence simultaneously presents itself – a non-constituted transcendence – a *transcendence in immanence*.⁶⁶

The “pure ego” is retained as a “residuum” which is not an experience. It neither arises nor disappears with the experience. Before *epochē*, every experience in the form of *cogitatio* (thought) has the

⁶⁵ Ibid., § 33, p. 112.

⁶⁶ Ibid., § 57, p. 173.

form of *cogito* which is “I think” which presupposes the existence of the phenomenological ego.

Let us reduce till we reach the stream of pure consciousness. In reflexion every *cogitatio* on being carried out takes the explicit form *cogito*. Does it lose this form when we make use of a transcendental reduction.⁶⁷

Despite of *epochē*, “pure ego” is preserved as a “residuum” which is in and beyond the flux of manifold experiences. “Pure ego” survives as a “transcendental residuum”.

So much is clear from the outset, that after carrying this reduction through, we shall never stumble across the “pure ego” as an experience among others within the flux of manifold experiences which survives as transcendental residuum; nor shall we meet it as a constitutive bit of experience appearing with the experience of which it is an integral part and again disappearing.⁶⁸

The “pure ego” is defined as self-identical, despite of the changes of experiences. “This visual ray changes with every *cogito*, shooting forth a fresh with each new one as it comes and disappearing with it. But the ego remains self-identical.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid., § 57, p. 172.

⁶⁸ Ibid., § 57, p. 172.

⁶⁹ Ibid., § 57, p. 172.

According to Husserl, every *cogitatio* can change, can come and go in principle. "Pure ego" is absolutely self identical and it is "necessarily" and "permanently" there as a "transcendental residuum".

"Pure ego" is fundamentally different from the stream of experience as a "transcendental residuum". There is a quite "peculiar" transcendence of the "pure ego". Briefly, transcendental reduction excludes the "empirical ego" without eliminating "pure ego" which is self-identical as a "phenomenological residuum". The "pure ego" belongs to each experience and vice-versa. "Pure ego" consists of pure experiences within the immanency. However, it is still transcendent in a "peculiar" sense. It is neither an experience nor a part of it.

Briefly, Husserl accepts "pure ego" in *Ideas*. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, he accepts the "transcendental ego" as a result of the constant and further usage of "transcendental reduction". The examination of the "pure ego" and the paradox, "transcendence within immanence" will be used among the reasons to deny the "pure ego" in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. Now, I will examine the concepts, mental acts, self and body in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

2.3 Consciousness in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*

One of the main "tasks" of phenomenology is to answer what the genuine nature of human being is. Husserl separates the attitudes as the attitude focused upon nature and "personalistic attitude" to answer this question in the Appendix III.

Attitude toward nature, which is not naturalistic: If we now speak of different experiential attitude on the ground of natural world, we must distinguish: (1) the attitude focused upon nature, in this case experienced nature, upon mere things, or abstractly upon animals' bodies or cultural objects as mere things (2) personalistic attitude: attitude focused upon persons or upon human beings as persons.⁷⁰

In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, one uses the "transcendental reduction" on the human being to abstract the moments of the human being. If one uses the Husserlian terminology, there is the awareness of the "transcendental ego" "at the highest self-reflection"⁷¹. There is a "constant reflexivity"⁷² by which human being applies the "transcendental reduction" to him constantly. "[The awareness] that this is the case itself belongs to the domain of philosophical knowledge at the level of highest self-reflection. Only through this constant reflexivity is a philosophy universal knowledge."⁷³

One of the great "transcendental discoveries" is the realization of the "transcendental ego" (apodictic ego) as a result of the "transcendental reduction". The other important "transcendental discovery" is that the "empirical ego" or "human ego" as "previously naive ego" is identical with the "transcendental ego" in the "mode of naive hiddenness".⁷⁴ In other words, "empirical ego" and "human ego" is

⁷⁰ Ibid., Appendix III, p. 326.

⁷¹ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 291.

⁷² Ibid., Appendix I, p. 291.

⁷³ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 291.

⁷⁴ The concept, "naïve hiddenness" is deliberately used by Husserl to show that psychological and "transcendental ego" is identical, one and the same, but to realize it depends on the "transcendental reduction" on the human being. See Husserl Edmund in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental*

identical with the “transcendental ego”. However, this identity relation can be realized by means of “transcendental reduction”.

According to Husserl, the transcendental philosophy depends on the proper self-understanding of the human being. There is the necessity for a clear and genuine sense of “transcendental turn” which is possible with the “transcendental reduction”. There are no self-evident and apodictic truths in the form of unquestioned, supposedly quite obvious presuppositions. Therefore, “...what is supposedly obvious is questioned, the theories are criticized for this, and this creates the stimulus for new attempts.”⁷⁵ It is clear that transcendental theories have difficulties to explain the human being. So, there must be a change in the “common sense” perspective.

...Transcendental theories imply corresponding difficulties of understanding and that people are too lazy to overcome them. So much is correct, that any transcendental philosophy must, and with essential necessity, create extraordinary difficulties for the natural man’s understanding-for “common sense” – and thus for all of us, since we cannot avoid having to rise from the natural ground to the transcendental region⁷⁶.

Husserlian “psychophysical dualism”⁷⁷ depends on a rich phenomenology of our awareness of body and mind. In fact, human soul or *psyche* is embodied within a body which can be called as “psychophysical dualism”. So, consciousness and body are the two

Phenomenology (translated by David Carr), (Evanston Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 59, p. 210.

⁷⁵ Ibid., § 57, p. 198.

⁷⁶ Ibid., § 57, p. 200.

⁷⁷ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 202.

aspects of one and the same human being. There is numerically one and the same person who has got various aspects. According to Husserl, there must be a transcendental philosophy which must be freed from all “paradoxes”. There is a “difficult”,⁷⁸ even “paradoxical”⁷⁹ relation between psychology and transcendental philosophy, because of the “paradoxical” identity relation between “psychological ego” (empirical ego) and “transcendental ego”. In fact, the history of psychology is merely the history of crisis which is the basic thesis of the Husserlian philosophy in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Husserl tries to constitute a “universal transcendental philosophy” or phenomenology “through the deepest sort of reflection upon itself”.⁸⁰ For the radical and genuine transcendental philosophy, one should avoid from all kind of “paradoxes”. During the investigation of the origin of the crisis in psychology, Husserl examines the “task” and the origin of the psychology. “The task set for modern psychology, and taken over by it, was to be a science of psychophysical realities, of men and animals as unitary beings, through divided into two real strata.”⁸¹

Psychology which is the science of “psychophysical realities” suppose that the aspects of the soul as objective, “true being-in-itself”⁸² are already known or it will be known like all kinds of theoretical thinking and natural sciences.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 203.

⁷⁹ This paradoxical relationship is emphasized at the beginning of the 58th section. See Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, p. 203.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 204.

⁸¹ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 204.

⁸² Ibid., Appendix I, p. 204.

Here all theoretical moves on the ground of the taken-for-granted, pregiven world of experience, the world of natural life; and theoretical interest is simply directed as a special case to one of the real aspects of it, the souls, while the other aspect is supposed to be already known, or is yet to be known, by the exact natural sciences according to its objective, true being-in-itself.⁸³

"[A]dmired model,"⁸⁴ natural sciences, especially physics cause that psychology is "burdened" with its "tasks" as being parallel to physics. Husserl claims that such kind of parallelization is "absurd".⁸⁵

Thus psychology was burdened in advance with the task of being a science parallel [to physics] and with the conception that the soul – its subject matter – was something real in a sense similar to corporeal nature, the subject matter of natural science.⁸⁶

In the Husserlian philosophy, the bodily aspect is divided into two aspects which are called as "physical body" (*Körper*) and the "living body"⁸⁷ (*Leib*). Whatever is material can be perceived one sidedly, inadequately as "what and how of the manners of givenness" from the third person perspective. However, one reflects on himself in the

⁸³ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 204.

⁸⁴ Natural sciences are accepted as "admired model" of psychology which does not fulfill its "task" to deal with *psyche*, due to this admiration. See Husserl, Edmund in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 60, p. 212.

⁸⁵ Ibid., § 62, p. 215.

⁸⁶ Ibid., § 60, p. 212.

⁸⁷ Ibid., § 60, pp. 211-212.

“manner of ego-centeredness”⁸⁸ by means of “transcendental reduction” from the first person perspective. Husserl claims that “[e]veryone experiences the embodiment of souls in original fashion only in his own case.”⁸⁹

As I, philosophizing, reflect in pure consistency upon myself as the constantly functioning ego throughout the alteration of experiences and the arising out of them, as the ego having consciousness of the world and dealing with the world consciously through these experiences...⁹⁰

One is consciously aware of the life world with all its chancing representational contents (*Vorstellungsgehalten*). Meanwhile, one realizes the identity between “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. In fact, human being is a “transcendental ego, but he is not conscious of this in a particular attitude which is the naïve attitude or “natural attitude” as “one-sided”, closed perspective which depends on the certain habitual one-sidedness of the “natural attitude”. Once before, there was an “unbroken naïveté”.⁹¹ However, this naïvety is broken through the method of “transcendental reduction” and its constant application. In fact, “pure ego” was hidden, due to this naïveté. Meanwhile, one realizes that psychological ego and “transcendental ego” is identical as two dependent aspects of one and the same person. “I know through my phenomenological studies that I, the previously

⁸⁸ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 204.

⁸⁹ Ibid., § 62, p. 217.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 204.

⁹¹ Ibid., § 50, p. 209.

naïve ego, was none other than the transcendental ego in the mode of naïve hidings...⁹²

This unavoidable identity between “psychological ego” and “pure ego” is “paradoxical” and “difficult” to understand. In fact, it is “incomprehensible”.⁹³

Nevertheless, psychology and transcendental philosophy are allied with each other in a peculiar and inseparable way, namely, in virtue of the alliance of difference and identity-which is no longer an enigma for us, but has been clarified-between the psychological ego (the “human ego”, that is, made worldly in the spatiotemporal world) and the transcendental ego, its ego-life, and its accomplishment.⁹⁴

There is a “difference and identity” relation between “psychological ego” and “pure ego” as the cause of the “paradox” which must be solved in the frame of phenomenology. During the “constant reflexivity” on a person, he will realize that “psychological ego”, “human ego” and “pure ego” are aspects of the numerically one and the same person. There is an attitude change of the person toward himself. There are “continuing acquisitions” of the “transcendental ego”. Meanwhile, Husserl examines the essence of the mind. He explains that this essence cannot refer to a “mystical ‘metaphysical’ essence”.⁹⁵ This

⁹² Ibid., § 59, p. 210.

⁹³ Incomprehensibility of this identity is deliberately claimed to show the necessity of the “transcendental reduction”. See Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 57, p. 202.

⁹⁴ Ibid., Appendix I, p. 205.

⁹⁵ Ibid, § 60, p. 213.

essence refers to "...one's own being-in-oneself and for-oneself which, after all, is accessible to the inquiring, reflecting ego through so-called 'inner' or 'self-perception'".⁹⁶

An original reflective question is now directed toward what and how souls – first of all human souls – are in the world, the life world, i.e., how they "animate" physical living bodies, how they are localized in space – time, how each one "lives" psychically in having "consciousness" of the world in which it lives and is conscious of living; how each one experiences "its" physical body, not merely in general, as a particular physical body, but in a quite peculiar way as "living body" as a system of its "organs" which it moves as an ego (in holding sway over them); how it thus "takes a hand" in its consciously given surrounding world as "I strike" "I push", "I lift" this and that, etc.⁹⁷

Souls are embodied within bodies in the life-world as being "localized in space-time" by showing the qualities of the spatio-temporal material things such as causality, being influenced from gravity, etc. Soul or *psyche* "animates" the body which becomes a living body (*Leib*), instead of physical body (*Körper*). The soul of the human being is not "*res extansae*",⁹⁸ but it is still real in the sense of bodies, due to their relatedness to the bodies. By this way, the "animated" physical body turns into living body which has some special abilities. The living body (*Leib*) is defined by intentional attributes, volition and kinesthesia,

⁹⁶ Ibid, § 60, p. 213.

⁹⁷ Ibid., § 60, pp. 211-212.

⁹⁸ This concept is deliberately used to show that soul, *res cogitans* is completely different from *res extensa* by showing some immaterial, irreducible qualities by Husserl, Edmund in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 61, p. 215.

besides the material attributes. Living body can be moved by will and one can be aware of its movement kinestically. All of these explanations show that how souls are pre-given in the life-world and how one experiences what the essence of the soul is as a result of the "transcendental reduction".

"Husserl claims that "[I] myself, as transcendental ego "constitutes" the world, and at the same time, as soul, I am a human ego in the world."⁹⁹ "Transcendental ego" defines itself as the "ultimate ego-pole".¹⁰⁰

"Transcendental ego" "lifts" itself from its all kinds of "self-apprehension" such as its "human self-apperception", "world apperceptions". In fact, physical body, living body, even "psychological ego", "*psyche*" or "soul"¹⁰¹ is "over and against" the "transcendental ego".

"Transcendental ego" is still somehow transcendent to its acts and objects, due to its ontological difference. "Transcendental ego" can be defined as the subject of all kinds of intentional acts.

"Transcendental ego" defines itself as constituting and philosophizing ego who constantly applies to the "transcendental reduction". During the "constant reflexivity", there is the highest level of self-reflection or maximal intensity of the "transcendental reduction" which lets us to now not only the "transcendental ego", but also its paradoxical identity relation with the "empirical" or "psychological ego". All of these "transcendent acquisitions" are important for the "proper

⁹⁹ Ibid., § 57, p. 202.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., § 58, p. 206.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., § 60, p. 211.

understanding” of the human being in phenomenology. These explanations will be re-analyzed and used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

2.4 The Third Person Perspective

Introspection lets one to access his own mental states or processes directly, immediately and privately. It depends on the observation of mental processes from the first person perspective which is the only possible and proper way to understand mental processes. In *Logical Investigations* or the initial position of Husserl, pure consciousness is disembodied and non-egologic. It is accessible through reflective introspection and the first person perspective, not the third person one. In the initial position of Husserl, mind consists of the totality of one’s mental processes which can be known by means of reflective introspection as a subjective method. However, sciences prefer the third person perspective to explain the real nature of mental processes in an objective way. This objective method depends on the publicly observable circumstances from the third person perspective. There is the intersubjective agreement in the third person perspective.

2.5 Materialist Theories of Mind

There are different materialist theories of mind. Logical behaviorism is the first theory of mind which ignores, even denies the inner aspect or *qualia* of our mental states. For example; to have a pain is not merely a matter of being inclined to moan, to wince, to take an aspirin, etc. In fact, pain has an intrinsic qualitative nature which can be

accessed by means of introspection. In fact, this theory depends on the publicly observable circumstances and behavior.

One of the materialist theories is the identity theory or reductive materialism which claims that mental states are the physical states of the brain. In other words, all kinds of mental processes or mental states are identical with some type of physical states or processes within the brain or central nervous system. Identity theory is a reductionist tendency in which one claims the identity of mental states with brain states.

Eliminative materialism denies the existence of consciousness and all kinds of mental processes or conscious experiences which are kinds (types) such as belief, desire, pain, perception and instances of these kinds.

Understanding these mental kinds depends on consciousness. To understand the pain, one should realize the pain consciously. It is certain that materialist theories are unable to explain the phenomenal qualities of mental states. This is the problem of *qualia* which can be used to criticize all kinds of materialist theories. Eliminative materialism merely denies the existence of *qualia* to overcome the problem. However, phenomenal qualities or *qualia* are undeniable. The knowledge of *qualia* depend on the first person perspective as subjective method. Functionalism also claims that mental states can be shared by physically dissimilar systems such as human being, computers, Martians. All kinds of materialist theories depend on the third person perspective or objective method. However, phenomenology is a suitable way to explain such kind of conscious events which cannot be explained by materialist theories.

2.6 Arguments of Sartre against Transcendental Ego

Sartre considers that Descartes makes the “error of substance”¹⁰² in his analysis of “the pre-reflective *cogito*”.¹⁰³ He claims that “[n]ow the *cogito* never gives out anything other than what we ask of it.”¹⁰⁴ He continues that “Descartes questioned it concerning its functional aspect-‘*I doubt, I think.*’ And because he wished to pass without a conducting thread from this functional aspect to existential dialectic, he fell into the error of substance.”¹⁰⁵

There cannot be a “transcendental ego”. I am a state of consciousness (a *pour soi* rather than an *en soi*). “It is often said that the act of reflection alters the fact of consciousness on which it is directed.”¹⁰⁶ Sartre makes a distinction between “reflective” and “non-reflective consciousness.”¹⁰⁷ “Transcendental ego” causes an ontological difference from “each *erlebnis*”¹⁰⁸, because of this “reflective” and “non-reflective consciousness” distinction. Sartre claims that the first condition of all reflection is “the pre-reflective *cogito*”. He also claims that “[t]his *cogito*, to be sure, does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness.”¹⁰⁹ He also stresses the epistemological priority of “reflective consciousness”. “But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective *cogito* since it appears as the first necessity for non-

¹⁰² Sartre, Paul, *Being and Nothingness* (translated by Hazel E. Barnes), (New York: Routledge), 1989, p. 73.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 74.

reflective consciousness to be seen by itself.”¹¹⁰ “The law of being of *for-itself*, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be itself in the form of presence to itself.”¹¹¹

As a conclusion, he denies the “transcendental ego” on the basis of these claims about consciousness. The success of Sartre depends on the usage of certain concepts which are “pre-reflective *cogito*” which shows the Cartesian form of “I think”, before the reflection. The other important concept is the “reflective consciousness” and “non-reflective consciousness” distinction which causes ontological difference among them. These concepts will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

2.7 Being and Having Distinction in Gabriel Marcel

In *Being and Having*, Gabriel Marcel makes a distinction between “being” and “having” (having-as-possession). Human being combines “being” and “having” intimately in his own reality. Unlike other bodily things, my own body is not an instance of “having”. It belongs to my being and it helps to constitute what I am distinct from what I have. Marcel makes a distinction between “what we have” and “what we are”.¹¹² “What we *have* obviously presents an appearance of external reality to ourselves. But it is not an absolute externality.”¹¹³ When we

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 74.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 77.

¹¹² Marcel, Gabriel, *Being and Having*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), 1965, p. 155.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 155.

commit suicide,¹¹⁴ we kill ourselves as if they are something which we have or as if they are things. However, who refuses to kill himself does not recognize a right to do so. According to Marcel, he does not belong to himself. This person knows the mysterious relation between the self and ourself. At this level, one recognizes what is irreducible which changes the attitude toward consciousness.

He also claims that what we have are things in principle as being "exterior" to its possessor, "independent of me".¹¹⁵ Is my body something which I have? "In the first place, can my body as such be called a thing?"¹¹⁶ The answer of this question is quite complicated. In fact, "if I treat it as a thing, what is this 'I' which so treats it?"¹¹⁷ As a conclusion, he claims that "we end up with the formula: My body is (an object), I am Nothing."¹¹⁸ In other words, "[i]dealism has one further source: it can declare that I am the act which posits the objective reality of my body."¹¹⁹ Therefore, "[t]he difference between this sort of idealism and pure materialism amounts almost nothing."¹²⁰

"I have a body" means "I am conscious of my body" and "something exists which can be called my body". He claims that "[I] can only express myself in so far as I can become someone else to myself."¹²¹ We can only express ourselves in terms of "having". He also

¹¹⁴ This example is given by Marcel. See Marcel, Gabriel, *Being and Having*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), 1965, p. 155.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 155.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 155.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 156.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 156.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 156.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 156.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 161.

continues that "[t]he statement 'I have' can only be made over against *another* which is felt to be other."¹²² The duality of possessor and possessed is lost in a living reality. In other words, I consider myself from the point of view of another as having certain characteristics, "but I do not separate myself from this other except after having first implicitly identified myself with him."¹²³ There is a tension between "Same" and the "Other" which is in the world of "having". There is the "specialization", "specification" and "partial alienation" of the self. The desirable position is "a manner to have without having".¹²⁴

This position can be called as a situation in which "I conceive myself as having in myself."¹²⁵ So, the distinction between externality and internality seems difficult.¹²⁶

There is the recognition of an irreducible. There is also the recognition of something which is beyond this irreducible. Such kind of duality belongs to the "nature of man's metaphysical condition".¹²⁷ Fallen human being cannot properly define and explain what this irreducible is. "This deficiency is essentially a kind of inertia, but apt to turn into a sort of negative activity, and it cannot be eliminated."¹²⁸ However, to recognize what is irreducible is our task. For human being, one can mention the presence of the mystery as the foundation of his being, apart from his nothingness as the subject matter of religion, art

¹²² Ibid., p. 161.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 161.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 162.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 161.

¹²⁶ This is one of the main claims of Marcel. See Marcel, Gabriel, *Being and Having*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), 1965, p. 161.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 174.

and metaphysics. The subject of the Cartesian *cogito* is the epistemological subject. The self is “simply presupposed”.¹²⁹ As a conclusion, he claims that “I am recognizing that the whole reflexive process remains within a certain assertion which I am-rather than which I pronounce-an assertion of which I am the place, and not the subject.”¹³⁰

The success of Marcel is the realization of what is irreducible. He also claims that to realize what is irreducible is the “task”. In fact, this realization totally changes the definition of consciousness and human being. One of the main claims of the thesis is also to show the importance of this realization and to define it as a “task”. Marcel also realizes the “partial alienation” of the self with a great success. I also explain the self alienation of the “transcendental ego” as a result of the abstraction of the “transcendental ego” and the alienation of the human being from the outside world as a result of *epochē* which also causes solipsism in the frame of Husserlian phenomenology. The possible solution of mind-body distinction depends on solipsism from the first person perspective, not third person one in the frame of phenomenology. These claims will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

2.8 The Comments of David Bell

David Bell defines the concept, solipsism on the basis of the “priority”, “independence”¹³¹ of mental acts, states of individuals in the

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 171.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 171.

¹³¹ Bell, David, *Husserl*, (New York: Routledge), 1991, p. 156.

weak sense. He also defines solipsism as the claim "I alone exist or am known to exist."¹³² So, there are no other minds in the strong sense.

Since, solipsistic idealism depends on the "singular or of the first person pronoun" such as "I", "me" and "what is mine", Bell claims that Husserl's *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental phenomenology* and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* depend on "non-solipsistic, transcendental idealism".¹³³ It is clear that "non-solipsistic idealism" depends on the usage of "us", "ours" and "we" in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* and *Philosophical Investigations*.

The other successful comment of Bell depends on the realization of the paradoxical relation between psychology and transcendental phenomenology. During the "performance of the reduction",¹³⁴ one must bracket all judgments and beliefs about the physical world which is studied by natural sciences, including psychology. Psychology deals with "conscious beings", "minds", "mental events" and "conscious states". The difficulty and paradox is that the existence of conscious states, contents of consciousness should be "set aside" as the subject matter of psychology. Then, Bell claims that ego and its ego-life remain as they are. He claims that there is an apparent "contradiction".¹³⁵ Bell claims that "we are told that reference to our own mental acts is forbidden, but also that it is manotory."¹³⁶ The only possible resolution of the contradiction is to accept either 1 or 2 of the following claims. If 1 is true, 2 is false and vice-versa.

¹³² Ibid., p. 156.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 156.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 167.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 167.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 167.

1- Reference to myself, my mental acts and their contents is outlawed by the transcendental reduction,

2- Reference to myself, my mental acts and their contents is *all* that is allowed by the transcendental reduction.¹³⁷

Bell realizes that “transcendental ego” is not a part of the world. “Empirical ego” is also not a part of the “transcendental world”. Bell denies the “transcendental ego” which is the name of “...some entity distinct from the “empirical ego””.¹³⁸ “[T]ranscendental ego is merely the “empirical ego”, or mind which is viewed transcendently.”¹³⁹ Besides their “explanatory task”,¹⁴⁰ “transcendental ego” and “pure ego” “perform no work”.¹⁴¹ Bell also shows the development of Husserl’s thought in which he denies the existence of the “pure ego”, then he accepts its existence. Bell claims that this change is nominal, not substantial. He claims that “...Husserl does not posit the existence of any substance or individual that is distinct from, but the owner or subject of, mental acts.”¹⁴² He considers that “the transcendental ego is indistinguishable from ‘the processes making up his life’”.¹⁴³ Briefly, Bell defends “no-ownership”, “no-subject” doctrines of the self. There is no subject, bearer or owner of mental acts different from the acts themselves.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 168.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 170.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 204.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 204.

Bell is very successful about the paradoxical identity relation among psychology and phenomenology. However, there is the problem in the definition of psychology. He also cannot realize and solve the problem of paradoxical identity relation between "psychological ego" and "transcendental ego".

2.9 Noema and Noesis

First of all, one should examine the formulation of the problem about identity on the basis of the distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). When one utters an identity sentence, "Venus is the morning star", one wishes to express that both "Venus" and "the morning star" name the same thing, a certain celestial object. However, when one accepts meaning of an expression as its reference, a paradox arises. It is quite obvious that these sentences " $a = a$ " and " $a = b$ " have different meanings. For example, "The morning star is identical with the morning star" is the instance of " $a = a$ ". It is analytic and truism. However, "The morning star is identical with evening star" is an instance of " $a = b$ ". It is synthetic and it provides a valuable extension of our knowledge. If a and b are the same object, it will be quite difficult to explain how these two sentences have different cognitive content or meaning.

Frege concludes that one must make a distinction between the meaning (*Sinn*) of a term and its reference (*Bedeutung*). The signs which are "the morning star" and "the evening star" denote the same referent which is the planet Venus. However, these two expressions have different meaning, sense (*Sinn*) or connotation. When one utters that "The evening star is identical with the morning star", it gives new

information about the identity of “the evening star” and “the morning star”. However, “The morning star is identical with the morning star” is analytic and uninformative. Both of these expressions not only denote the same object (Venus), but also the same sense or meaning. Frege rejects the principle that two expressions are synonymous if and only if they denote the same object. Similarly, to say something about noema is to say something about noesis in language which focuses on meaning rather than the act on the basis of the distinction between reference (*Bedeutung*) and meaning (*Sinn*). In fact, this distinction is useful to explain the non-veridical perception.

Naïve realism which is compatible with the common sense as the perspective of the “man in the street” claims that what we directly perceive is the physical things and real aspects, not a sense datum. However, this claim cannot explain the non-veridical perceptions such as illusions, hallucinations and dreams which are the examples of objectless perception. In fact, Cartesian dream argument shows that what is seen in the dream is indistinguishable from the external objects. All of these problems need the phenomenological analysis of the mental act of perception. To explain the outer perception, I organize a thought experiment in which there is an infant and he lives in an isolated surrounding world and he is owner of a cube toy which will be used to explain “the way we see”¹⁴⁴ in this world.

A cube toy will be used to show the perception of a material, three dimensional spatio-temporal object in the “fact world”. The infant can just see the cube from a certain angle, perspective or angle, not all

¹⁴⁴ Husserl’s description of perception depends on the analysis of what we see, the way we see and how we see. The first one is the object of perception as public things. In this respect, Husserl is naïve realist. The way we see is the perceptual content. See Mulligan, Kevin, “Perception” in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl* (Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith), 1998, p. 169.

sides at once. He also intends the sides that are hidden as being potentially visible but actually absent sides. Objectively, what is given to infant is the mixture of the present and absent sides of the cube. Subjectively, the perception of the infant is full of filled and empty intentions. There are presence and the absence of the sides, filled and empty intending in accordance with them. Whenever infant turns the cube, the potentially perceived becomes the actually perceived and the actually perceived slips into absence as objective part of the activity of perception. If one considers the subjective side of the perception, the empty intentions become filled and the filled become empty.

During the perception of the cube, sides, aspects and profiles are the main elements. There are six sides of the cube and each of these sides can be given from a certain perspective, angle at a certain time. If the infant holds a side directly before him, it will be presented as a square. If the infant turns the cube slightly, it will look more like a trapezoid, etc.

There is a manifold of temporally different appearances in which identity of one and the same object is given. The momentary and individuated presentation of an object can be called as the profile of the aspect. Aspects, sides are all intersubjective. However, profile is not only subjective and relative, but also private. In these sides, aspects and profiles, one and the same cube is presented and its identity is given in and through them. The identity which is beyond its manifolds never presents itself in a side, aspect or profile.

To explain the conscious acts and their objects, Husserl introduces the terminology which are noema¹⁴⁵ (what is thought) and

¹⁴⁵The "object-in-the-how-of-its-giveness" is called as noema which corresponds to noesis. The appearances, manners of givenness are the "phenomena",

noesis (the act of thinking). The experienced is the noema and the experiencing is the noesis. The mentioned perceptual presentation is the noema. One single aspect or perspective of the intentional object can be accessed. The thing perceived or the intentional object is a system of noemata or full noema. In other words, the intentional object is the system of noemata. However, some of these noemata are immediately grasped, but the rest of them are apperceived. This apperceived object is the object for consciousness. When one looks at the tree, he sees sizes, shapes, groups and patterns of colors as *hyletic* data of consciousness. The intentional object is a meaningful whole which is the synthesized data. One is conscious of the tree, the apperceived tree. One apprehends the complete tree on the basis of the one-sided, single perspective noema. The system of noemata is the meaningful object. Husserl claims that noema is “the *perceived as such*”. “Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of this it’s perceptual meaning, that is, the perceived as such.”¹⁴⁶ Husserl gives the example which is “a blossoming apple-tree”¹⁴⁷ in the garden. From the natural standpoint, the apple tree exists in the transcendent reality of time and space. From the phenomenological standpoint, even if it is a “mere hallucination”, it is still there, in spite of its absence in the “real” objective world. Transcendent reality of space, subject’s perspectival experience and the perceived external object have already been bracketed. There is just the perception which can be objectless¹⁴⁸ as in

appearances as being compatible with the “*principle of all principles*” which claims that philosophy is possible on the basis of the “*originary, given*” intuition. See Held, Claudi, “Husserl’s Phenomenological Method” in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p. 10-11.

¹⁴⁶ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1969, § 88, p. 258 (in the 5th printing).

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, § 88, p. 58.

¹⁴⁸ Illusion and hallucination are the examples of non-veridical and objectless perception. See Grünberg, David, “On the Structure of Husserl’s Perceptual

the example of hallucination. Other aspects of full noema or other possible perspectives are the experiences of as-seen, as-hallucinated, as-remembered, as-imagined, as-feared, etc. One of the main claims of Husserl is intentionality. "The peculiarity of intentional experience is in its general form easily indicated; we all understand the expression "consciousness of something, especially in the illustrations which we make for ourselves."¹⁴⁹ The Husserlian claim "perceived as such"¹⁵⁰ also supports the intentional nature of experiences. Except sensory data and feelings, all experiences are intentional.

The things in nature are spatio-temporal and real. The acts of consciousness, experiences, event of consciousness are temporal, but not spatial. To be consciousness of something does not imply the spatiality. So, they are *reel*. This will cause the distinction between "inner time" and "outer time" which is also bracketed as a part of the world. These concepts will be used in the process of the self alienation of the "transcendental ego". These explanations will be used in the Self Alienation of the Transcendental Ego section.

The detailed analysis of the perception will be used to show the relation between perception and memory in the Problem of Personal Identity section. In this section, I will also show the similarities between the perceptions of an object and to realize its identity when one remembers it and the re-collection of old perceptions and the realization

Noema and the object of Perception" in *Analecta Husserliana* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), (Dodrecht: Kluwer), 2005, Vol. 88, p. 181.

¹⁴⁹ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 87, p. 255.

¹⁵⁰ Aron Gurwitsch also support that perceptual noema is the perceived as such on the basis of the concepts, perception, perspective as being contrary to the claim of Follesdal. See, Solomon Robert C., "Husserl's Concept of Noema" in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame), 1977, pp.168-171.

of one's own identity as a result of the re-collection of these perceptions via memory.

2.10 Self Alienation of the Transcendental Ego

In this section, I claim that there are two kinds of self alienation. The first one is the alienation of the "transcendental ego" from its mental acts. The other is the one's ignorance of the changes of the individuals in this world, due to the total "disconnexion" from the changing world. These claims about the self alienation of the "transcendental ego" and solipsism will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

Before the "transcendental reduction", to realize the "transcendental ego" is impossible. "Transcendental reduction" is mere abstraction and isolation of the distinct, dependent moments of one and the same person. There is a relation between the "transcendental ego" and self alienation. "Transcendental ego" "lifts" itself from all "world-apperceptions" and "human self-apperceptions" in the "transcendental attitude".¹⁵¹ The isolation and such kind of self alienation of the "transcendental ego" lead to the ignorant or unconscious "transcendental ego" which is unaware of its own mental acts or experiences in the stream of consciousness, including all world and "human self-apperceptions". The isolation of the "transcendental ego" also causes that it is unaware the changes in the life world. To constitute the inner time, the perception of the external world is the necessary pre-condition. Otherwise, "transcendental ego" and all of its

¹⁵¹ Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 58, p. 206.

atemporal intentional objects remain as they are. To show the self alienation, I organize a thought experiment in which the invented machine is used to contact with the consciousness directly by isolating all kind of brain and neural activities. This thought experiment is organized to show that to accept the “transcendental ego” causes the problem of self alienation from its mental acts and the outside world. In the thought experiment, one stops the stream of consciousness by means of cutting the whole relation with the world. A person is isolated from the world as if he is a little god in the thought experiment. For God who is eternal and glorious, to know particulars and the change of the life world is not a problem. However, it can cause some problems for the human being. To eliminate the “transcendental ego” is a way to overcome the problem of self alienation. In fact, this claim will be used among the anti “transcendental ego” argumentations.

One should examine appearing time and appearing duration as such in the flux of consciousness. Phenomenology avoids the assumption about the existence of the world and its world time. The appearing time and duration can be regarded as absolutely given. “In contrast to physical objects, which can exist regardless of whether or not they *de facto* appear for a subject, experiences are essentially characterized by their subjective givenness, by the fact that there is a subjective feel to them.”¹⁵² For the “shift of the attitude”, *epochē* is already used as a method to bracket whatever is in the world in *Ideas*. “Objective space and time, and the world of real things and events, are transcendent entities which are “bracketed” in order to make possible a

¹⁵² Zahavi, Dan, in “Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness” in *The New Husserl* (edited by Don Welton), (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p.160.

descriptive science of pure immanence.”¹⁵³ So, whatever is immanent should be analyzed to reflect just as they appear in experience. “According to Husserl, our acts are tacitly self-aware, but they are also accessible for reflection.”¹⁵⁴ All of our mental acts can be reflected upon and by this way; it can be brought to attention or “focus” potentially. Phenomenology shows the phenomenological origin of time. There is a distinction between objective or world time which is the time of clocks and calendars and inner or subjective time.¹⁵⁵ In fact, such kind of time belongs to processes and events of the world. Space and time of the world are not only public, but also verifiable. However, there is also an internal, immanent or subjective time. This kind of time belongs to the duration, sequence of mental acts or experiences which follow one another in the flux of consciousness. The basic characteristic of the particular temporal object which is transcendent to consciousness such as trees, houses is duration in the stream of consciousness. The acts of perceiving trees, houses are immanent to consciousness as immanent sensory content. “There are different perceptions of one and the same individual from the “alteration of *perspectives*”, “manifolds of exhibitings, appearances”.¹⁵⁶ In other words, there is the perception of the same object “...in the changing course of seeing I see it now from this “side”,

¹⁵³ Farber, Marvin, *The Aims of Phenomenology*, (New York: Harper Torchbooks), 1966, p. 84.

¹⁵⁴ Zahavi, Dan, in “Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness” in *The New Husserl* (edited by Don Welton), (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p.163.

¹⁵⁵ Sartre claims that consciousness unifies itself via time-consciousness. There is no need for the external, unifying principle. The claims of Sartre are used to support the non-egologic arguments by Carr, David, “Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity” in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p. 194.

¹⁵⁶ Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 45, p.157.

now from that, continuously perceiving it from ever differing sides.”¹⁵⁷ The essential characteristic of temporal objects is duration. The perspective is the mode or manner of appearing as the way in which it presents itself. Besides temporal objects, there can be atemporal objects which are mathematical propositions, ideal values such as Pythagorean Theorem, beauty as an ideal value as atemporal ideal objects which lack spatio-temporal nature. They do not endure in the stream of consciousness. They do not begin and end. However, the act of intention to them, the act of judging to them, etc. endure in the stream of consciousness. They begin and end. For the constitution¹⁵⁸ of the internal time consciousness, temporal objects play an important role. They appear in a certain way and we are conscious of them in a specific temporal mode, which involves not only now, but also past and future as dark horizon or dependent moments of the temporal appearance. There is the consciousness of the succession of now points in the stream of consciousness. Each now point as a temporal mode of appearance enjoys a privileged status in the temporal horizon. Now, past and future are relative to one another. Now point slips into the past and replaced by a new now point. In the flow of time, now point continuously replaced by new now points. Non-flowing absolutely fixed, identical, objective time is constituted. “But this fixed objective time will be given to us only through the perpetually changing temporal modes of appearance: now, past, future.”¹⁵⁹ There is a series of now points or

¹⁵⁷ Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 45, p.157.

¹⁵⁸ Constitutive functioning of consciousness and the constitution of the subjective time are the main claims. See Russell, Matheson, *Husserl: A Guide For The Perplexed*, (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group), 2006, p. 140.

¹⁵⁹ Brough, John, “Husserl’s Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness” in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook* (edited by J.H. Monath & William R. McKenna), (Washington: University Press of America), 1989, p. 264.

"*primordial succession of hyletic data*".¹⁶⁰ Husserl mentions about the retention and protention of the now points in the stream of consciousness. "In the continuous alteration of seeing, the side just seen ceases being actually seen, but it is 'retained' and 'taken' together with those retained from before; and thus I 'get to know' the thing."¹⁶¹ In this quotation, Husserl explains how retention happens. Similarly, Husserl also explains the process of protention in some of the passages.

This happens not as a blending of externals; rather, as bearers of 'sense' in each phase, as meaning something, the perspectives combine in an advancing enrichment of meaning and a continuing development of meaning, such that the prior meaning, such that the prior meaning which anticipates a continuous flow, the expectation of 'what is to come', is straightway fulfilled and more closely determined.¹⁶²

There are three dependent intentional moments through which we are conscious of the extended temporal objects. These intentional moments are primal impression, retention and protention which need further analysis. Husserl makes a connection between perception and "unity of internal consciousness". "This present, actual, enduring lived experience is, as we can discover through a change in our regard, after

¹⁶⁰ Rodemeyer, Lanci, "Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press), 2003, p. 140.

¹⁶¹ Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 45, p.158.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, § 45, p. 158.

all a 'unity of internal consciousness', of time-consciousness, and this is precisely a consciousness of perception."¹⁶³

1. Primal Impression: Husserl defines primal impression as the absolutely originary consciousness as the primal source of all consciousness and as a way of being conscious. This primal impression and its status are called as "primal sensation" by Husserl. In fact, he sometimes calls impression in general as sensation. The moment of intentionality is that it presents an object and a new time-point as now. It is the first and original consciousness of the "now". There is the new time-point as "now" and it is the new appearance which presents itself as being the new and present "now" of the stream of consciousness. Consciousness intends the new now point as such. In fact, this primal impression is the "primal creation". There is also a direct access to the new now point. Consciousness intends the "now" as "primal impression" which is abstract and originary representation.

2. Retention: Retention is "primary" or "fresh" memory. It can be defined as the impressional consciousness of the just past "now" of the spatio-temporal object. Husserl distinguishes ordinary memory or "secondary" memory from the retention or "fresh memory". Retention does not re-present the passed "now" as "secondary" memory which involves the original consciousness of the past. The essential nature of this memory is the perception of what has "just seen". Briefly, one can give the short definition of the retention by claiming that it is the perception of the past, perceived duration or perceived succession of the temporal location. If perception or primary impression is the originary presentation, then retention is the "originary consciousness of what is past". Impressional consciousness constitutes the object

¹⁶³ Husserl, Edmund, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (edited by Martin Heidegger), (London: Indiana University Press), 1964, pp. 175-176.

originally and gives it as there itself. However, representational consciousness cannot do it. Husserl clearly separates the retention or primary memory from the secondary memory. Retention gives originally, but recollection gives it again. In retention, "one sees what is past". In the secondary memory, one can only re-present it. Retention is the impressional consciousness of the past. In retention the past is constituted not "representatively", but "presentatively". Retention is consciousness of the past "now". Whatever is retentional is not about the present but, it is about the "primarily remembered". What retention retains is not "now" or is not given as "now". It is past, really past. In fact, retention is the consciousness of the past. There is the originary consciousness of what is past which is sinking back into the past or "passing away". What is retained is still living, dynamic and not yet finished and it implies the continuous change.

3. Protention: Protention is a form of impressional time-consciousness. According to Husserl, every originally constituting process is animated by protentions. What is intended in protention appears as not yet now, but as future. It is clear that retention is primary memory. Protention emptily constitute what is coming as coming. So, what is future is intended via protention. In other words, it is intended or given as future. Protention is the impressional presentation of what is future by implying what will come. Unlike the privileged position of now, retention and protention belong to the dark horizon. Briefly, there is the succession of consciousness and consciousness of succession. If one examines the time object as a pure sense-datum, it will begin and stop in the stream of consciousness. An appearance of the object lasts and it has its own time, due to its duration and temporal location in the continuous stream of consciousness. An object is given or it is known via now points. There is the time-duration of the now-point which will be known as duration of the previous now point via retention. During the

whole stream of consciousness, one and the same object can be known as such. Briefly, the immanent temporal object “appears” in a continuous stream as being what is given to consciousness, appearance. These experiences are immanent to consciousness. “They too begin, endure for a while, and end.”¹⁶⁴ Sensory contents which depend on the experience of temporal objects are immanent to consciousness such as tones, colors. They are perceived in the “temporal horizon”. Husserlian phenomenology of time depends on sensory content which is immanent to consciousness. Appearing world is intended in various temporal modes of appearance through time-constituting acts of consciousness.

If one accepts the “transcendental ego”, there will be a sharp distinction between the “transcendental ego” and its counter pole. Here, one sees that how “transcendental ego” constitutes its object via duration or temporal location on the basis of the mode of an appearance of an object or what is given to consciousness as an appearance of the object in the continuous stream of consciousness. Now, one can use the machine or evil demon scenario to stop the continuity of the stream of consciousness. If there is no continuous flux of consciousness with the appearances of the spatio-temporal objects, there will not be any time-horizon and the constitution of the internal time consciousness, due to the absence of the now point and possible new now points. In such a situation, just consciousness and its ideal coexistent worlds such as the world of mathematics, world of *eidos*, etc remain as they are. The timeless intentional objects of consciousness remain, after the usage of the machine to stop the continuous stream of consciousness. The person in

¹⁶⁴ Brough, John, “Husserl’s Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness” in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook* (edited by J. H. Monath & William R. McKenna), (Washington: University Press of America), 1989, p. 281.

this thought experiment turns into a little god. There is a pure consciousness which just reflectively “directs toward” itself and its timeless objects. So, the person in the thought experiment loses all his own “connexions” with the particulars, individuals in the world. The particulars, individuals of this world always change, due to its contingent nature. However, one never knows not only this world, but also the change of individuals in this world any more. So, “transcendental ego” will be unaware of not only its mental acts, but also the outside world.

All these explanations remind the arguments of the medieval age on God’s knowledge which is eternal and glorious. The formulated problem about God’s knowledge is about the knowledge of particulars in Averroes. “[*The problem: How can God be aware of a change in reality without a corresponding change occurring in His eternal Knowledge?*]”¹⁶⁵

Knowledge of God is glorious in which all these things are in the knowledge of God before they existed. However, the knowledge of God should change as a result of the change of the particulars. If the particulars in this world change, the knowledge of them must also change on the basis of the change of the particulars. Otherwise, it cannot be known by God. Now, alternatives are that either the eternal knowledge of God varies in itself or the things come into existence are not known by God. However, both alternatives are impossible for God who is glorious. However, one cannot deny that knowledge of God must necessarily change, when the object which is known changes. However, the eternal knowledge of God cannot change. So, eternal knowledge of God does not let to comprehend particulars. In such a situation, hell and paradise will be impossible, due to the God’s ignorance of particulars.

¹⁶⁵ Averroes, “On God’s Knowledge” in *Medieval Philosophy* (edited by John F. Wippel & Allan B. Walter, O. F. M.), (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers), 1969, p. 235.

Aristotle also emphasizes that God does not intellect anything outside its own essence like this person who loses his entire "connexion" with this world by leaving pure consciousness and all of its eternal objects as they are.

[Aristotle] means: Because of its not intellecting anything outside its own essence (since it is simple), its intellection of its own essence is something which can be subject to no mutation through all eternity; no can there be any doubt regarding the fact that it is not subject therein to any weariness such as is the case in our intellection.¹⁶⁶

According to Aristotle, God is not intellecting anything outside its own essence, due to its simplicity. There is just the intellection of its essence. Similarly, he is just intellecting its own essence and timeless objects like a little god. God is ignorant what there is and what changes in this world. So, the situation of the person is similar to God, after the usage of the machine to stop the flux of consciousness. There are opposite claims about the knowledge of God who knows what there is through a universal knowledge, not through a particular knowledge. God understands its own essence, nothing besides his own essence. For example; God knows the nature of heat *qua* heat, not the knowledge of the heat which is present in hot things. God knows the nature of the existent *qua* existent which is his essence in an absolute way. One also claims that such kind of knowledge includes past, present and future, due to its eternity. Similarly, there is a temporal horizon which involves now, past and future in the philosophy of

¹⁶⁶ Averroes, "On God's Knowledge" in *Medieval Philosophy* (edited by John F. Wippel & Allan B. Walter, O. F. M.), (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers), 1969, p. 239.

Husserl. Furthermore, the eidetic intuition, ideation and grasping the essences also remind the knowledge of God.

If one stops the continuous stream of consciousness via this machine, this person will really turn into a little god. In other words, just pure consciousness and its eternal objects remain as they are. The person reflectively "directs toward" himself as in the example of God who is a thinking thing which continuously intellects its own essence. However, the knowledge of particulars and their change for the person is still a real problem, after the usage of the machine. Despite of the similarities between the knowledge of the person and God, there is the maximum level of solipsism in which this person just knows the content of the mind. It is clear that the knowledge of him cannot reach the knowledge of God.

Epochē causes solipsism in which "transcendental ego" is aware of the mental content, in spite of the ignorance of the world and the change of the particulars in this world. "Transcendental reduction" causes the self alienation of the "transcendental ego", due to the minimal awareness of the mental states as a result of the isolation from "world" and "human self apperceptions" as a kind of self alienation. Analogously, "transcendental ego" "lifts" itself for the isolation which causes that it is unaware of its own mental acts or experiences in the stream of consciousness as a result of this self alienation.

Sartre also realizes the problem which is "transcendental ego" causes an ontological difference from "each *erlebnisse*". On the other hand, he does not realize the origin of this ontological difference. "Transcendental ego" "has the capacity to isolate itself from its all "world-apperceptions" and "human self-apperceptions". This isolation can be considered as a kind of self alienation of the "transcendental ego". This

is an important part of my claim to deny the existence of the “transcendental ego”. Furthermore, I also show the similarities of the paradoxes which are “transcendancy within immanency” and identity of the “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. Both of them cause the problems such as transcendences in the pure consciousness, alienation from its mental acts, the certain problems about the relationship between the changing mental acts and *something* unchanging, etc.

Briefly, there is the “transcendental ego” which is unaware of its mental acts as a result of this self alienation. Without internal time consciousness, one is unaware of the change of world and individuals in it. Similarly, the total “disconnexion” from the world causes the problem of solipsism. All of these claims will be used in the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section.

2.11 Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations

In the philosophy of Husserl, the self alienated “transcendental ego” which is “pre-reflective”, before the “transcendental reduction” leads to many problems. So, there will be the defense of the *cogito cogitatum*, instead of *ego cogito cogitatum*¹⁶⁷ as a result of the elimination of the *ego*. Moreover, self-identical “pure ego” is directed as if it is an object for consciousness. However, it cannot be grasped adequately, due to the “transcendancy within immanency”. To leave the “pure ego” can be a suitable way to avoid such kind of problems by

¹⁶⁷ *Ego* is the identical ultimate ego pole, *cogito* is the mental acts, conscious experiences and *cogitatum* is the intentional objects as the repeated structure in the philosophy of Husserl. See Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1970, § 50, p. 170.

defending non-egologic pure consciousness which is the initial position of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*.

1. Argument from the solution of the paradoxical identity relation:

In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, Husserl claims a “difficult” and “paradoxical” identity relationship between “human”, “psychological” or “empirical ego” and “transcendental ego”.

The difference between empirical and transcendental subjectivity remained unavoidable, but also incomprehensible, was their identity. I myself, as transcendental ego, “constitute” the world, and at the same time, as soul, I am a human ego in the world.¹⁶⁸

This paradoxical identity relationship between human or “empirical ego” and “transcendental ego”¹⁶⁹ is stressed by Husserl in different sections of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

¹⁶⁸ Husserl Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1970, § 57, p. 202.

¹⁶⁹ Roman Ingarden formulates the problem of identity in which he asks that how one and the same ego can be both constituting or pure ego and the constituted real “I”. In fact, Husserl says that I am both “psychological” and “transcendental ego”, but I do not know this until I perform the phenomenological reduction. Ingarden questions the identity of them and Persuen examines this problem from his perspective. Then, Persuen tries to solve the problem by denying the “transcendental ego”. He claims that it is “a linguistic fiction”. To formulate the problem of identity, Ingardens’ claims are used. See Persuen, Cornelis A. van., *Phenomenology and Reality*, (U.S.A: Duquesne University), 1972, pp. 53-54.

Nevertheless, psychology and transcendental philosophy are allied with each other in a peculiar and inseparable way, namely, in virtue of the alliance of difference and identity – which is no longer an enigma for us, but has been clarified – between the psychological ego (the human ego, that is, made worldly in the spatiotemporal world) and the transcendental ego, its ego-life, and its accomplishment.¹⁷⁰

“Apodictic ego” or “transcendental ego”¹⁷¹ is the subject of intentional experiences or acts of consciousness as being identical ego pole, despite of the alteration of experiences. In other words, there is a mind which is embodied within an egologic consciousness. One should answer the question, whether there is an enduring self, “I” or “transcendental ego” as an existing entity which persists through time, despite of the change of experiences, change of one state of consciousness to the other or there is no enduring self, “I” or “transcendental ego” as in the claim of the Husserl’s initial position in *Logical Investigations* in which Husserl defines non-egologic pure consciousness. Similarly, Hume also claims that the stream of consciousness is a loosely connected ontologically distinct state of consciousness without any relation with an enduring conscious entity in the bundle theory of mind.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., § 58, p. 205.

¹⁷¹ “Transcendental ego” is the “identical substrate of habitualities”. The substrate does not change. It remains stable as the identical pole of the given experiences. There are two important discovery of Husserl. One of them is that the ego is enduring. The other is the changing nature of the ego. The ego never presents itself as completed and fixed entity. It always presents itself as becoming. However, the problems of the enduring and changing ego are not realized by Byers. See Byers, Damian, *Intentionality and Transcendence*, (U.S.A: Noesis Press), 2002, pp. 195-196.

If there is a self as transcending the limitations of the immediately and directly gained present state of consciousness, this self will be the “transcendental ego” of the Husserlian philosophy.

Husserl claims that there is a paradoxical relationship between “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. To solve the paradox, it must be formulated that there is either “human”, “psychological ego” or “transcendental ego”, instead of the Husserlian formulation in which there is both “human” and “transcendental ego” as being identical to each other. This ego can exist as one of the two things: we can formulate the solution of the paradox like this;

1. There is either “psychological ego” (human ego) or “transcendental ego”.
2. There is “psychological ego”.
3. Therefore; there is not “transcendental ego”.

This simple solution of the paradox needs further examination in which “transcendental ego” can only be one of these things:

1. An immediate state of consciousness which is experienceable immediately, directly and privately as any other state of consciousness.
2. Something other than a state of consciousness which cannot be immediately experienced. This “I” unifies all momentary states of consciousness which constitute the consciousness and make it a unified being.

If “I” am a state of consciousness, then “I” cannot unify all state of consciousness in the stream. In fact, “I” will be merely one of these states and other states are also waiting to be unified.

If “I” is something different than a state of consciousness by unifying all states of consciousness into one coherent entity, then “I” will not be conscious. In fact, all of the states of consciousness will be ontologically different from what “I” am. This will contradict with our experience of ourselves as having the status of conscious being. We have the direct and immediate experience of all kinds of experiences as being conscious beings. However, “transcendental ego” cannot be experienced directly and immediately. Even, it cannot be realized without the further application of “transcendental reduction” to the “human” or “psychological ego”. This implies the ontological difference of the “transcendental ego”.

The acceptance of the “transcendental ego” causes many problems about the ontological status of such an ego and the relationship between experience and the ego, self or “I”, because of the ontological difference between human or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. The suitable solution of the paradox is to leave the claim about the existence of the “transcendental ego”.

Some of the commentators of Husserl realize this paradoxical identity relationship. For example; Persuen defines this paradoxical relationship without formulating and solving it in *Phenomenology and Reality*. He merely denies the “transcendental ego” claiming that it is the result of “a linguistic fiction” without enough satisfactory reason to support this claim. Bell also realizes the identity relationship between psychology and transcendental phenomenology. However, he does not formulate the identity relationship between “psychological” and “transcendental ego”. Unlike the clear formulation of the paradox, “transcendence within immanence”, there is no clear formulation and solution of this paradox. One of the important contributions of the thesis is the clear formulation and solution of the paradox. I also show the

similarities of these paradoxes which cause self alienation, transcendences in pure consciousness and difficulties to explain the change of the conscious acts, in spite of the presence of *something* identical. Without solving these paradoxes, phenomenology cannot fulfill its functions which is the examination of pure consciousness in its purity. To avoid the possible paradoxes, one should accept that pure consciousness is not embodied within an ego. To solve the paradox, one can defend the non-egologic pure consciousness.

Disjunctive syllogism shows the simple solution of the paradox. I consider that one of the main “tasks” of the phenomenology is to show that what is supposedly known as true involves some unnoticed problems, because of its simplicity. In fact, to accept the “transcendental ego” does not have firm foundations. However, to deny the existence of the “transcendental ego” has reasonable and firm foundations which will be examined in the following arguments.

2. Argument from the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”:

“Transcendental ego” has the capacity of alienation from its “psychic experiences” (*Erlebnisse*). In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, “transcendental ego” can automatically alienate itself from its own “psychic experiences”.

If I myself affect the transcendental attitude as a way of lifting myself above all world-apperceptions and my human self-apperception – purely for the purpose of studying the transcendental accomplishment in and through which I “have” the world, then I must also find this accomplishment again, later, in a psychological internal analysis – though in this case it would have passed again into an apperception, i.e., it would be apperceived as something belonging to the

real soul [als Realseelisches] as related in reality to the real living body.¹⁷²

In this quotation, “transcendental ego” can be defined on the basis of its essential capacity to be alienated from itself. The realization of this alienation and re-definition of the “transcendental ego” is the one of the main contributions of the thesis. “Transcendental ego” automatically alienates itself from its own “psychic experiences” or lower order states of consciousness. Sartre also realizes the ontological difference between “transcendental ego” and “each *erlebnisse*”. However, he does not use the concept which is alienation. I claim that “transcendental ego” can “lift” itself from all kind of apperceptions. There is the isolation and differentiation from its experiences. I also consider that isolation, abstraction and alienation are the essential aspects of the “transcendental ego”. “Transcendental ego” is not a content of consciousness as being completely experienceable like any other conscious experiences. Similarly, it is possible to say that there are contents in my consciousness and I am unaware of these contents, due to this alienation. To explain the “consciousness of which I am unaware”¹⁷³ is a quite difficult phenomenon for phenomenology. There is a unity and continuity of the stream of consciousness. However, this self alienation also minimizes the direct consciousness of the unity within the stream of consciousness.

As a result of this self alienation, “transcendental ego” is unaware of its “psychic experiences” (*Erlebnisse*). Similarly, one turns into a little god who is also unaware of the changes of the individuals in this world

¹⁷² Ibid, § 58, p. 206.

¹⁷³ Ellis Ralph, *An Ontology of Consciousness*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 1986, p. 14.

as a result of the self alienation of the human being from the world. Unlike human being, it will not be a problem for God whose knowledge is eternal. There is the self alienation of the “transcendental ego” from its “psychic experiences”. Second, there is a person who is unaware of the changes of the individuals in this world as a result of the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”.

The word “I” refer to partially transcendent “transcendental ego” which can be unaware of its experiences. So, to give up the “transcendental ego” will be a suitable way to avoid the problems of self alienation.

3. Argument from the epistemological presuppositions of phenomenology:

In *Epochē* and Presuppositionless Philosophy section, I show that *epochē* still lets a few presupposition, especially the cognitive presuppositions such as transparent, pure nature of consciousness, “principle of all principles”, etc. One of the main epistemological presuppositions of the phenomenology is that consciousness is fully transparent and all kinds of mental phenomena are either actually or potentially conscious. If one turns his attention to an unconscious or subconscious phenomenon, it can turn into a conscious phenomenon, at least in principle. If there is a consciousness which is mine, the true nature or content of this consciousness should be transparent to me. Marcel claims that the fallen human being cannot explain “what is irreducible” properly. However, phenomenology depends on the power of pure consciousness to experience the mental events as a cognitive presupposition. However, “I” is not defined numerically identical with each conscious state in the stream of experiences. This ego can be defined as transcendental or “pure ego”

which is not a part of the experiences. Mental acts are manifold and varied such as perception, thinking, remembering, but the “pure ego” shows itself in these acts as identical. There is a “transcendence” in the “immanent”. One can experience *cogito cogitatum* in its various modes. However, one cannot experience the *ego* in a similar way.

The ego can appear to itself, during the self-reflection. Now, one should explain the meaning of “appearing to itself”.¹⁷⁴ It is essential that the ego identifies itself in every “now-point” of mental acts in the stream of time. Furthermore, there is the re-collection of these old perceptions as they are to provide the continuity of the self. However, the “pure ego” presents itself in a “not-now” in this temporalization. This presentation in a “not-now” is called as “de-presentation” (*Entgegenwärtigung*) by Husserl. “Pure ego” is in and beyond these manifolds and varied mental acts or experiences. Since, the self-identification of the ego is “not-now” in the stream of time, to accept a higher ego as the ego of all kind of acts of conscious experiences is a problem in phenomenology. In every momentary now point, there is no possibility to grasp the essential nature of the “pure ego”. This causes a kind of alienation of the self which continuously presents itself as “not-now” in the stream of time, despite of the epistemological presuppositions about the transparency of conscious experiences which appears to itself, the potential conscious nature of all kinds of mental events, etc.

If one considers the transparent and potentially conscious nature of all kinds of mental phenomena, there will be the necessity to replace the repeated structure which is *ego cogito cogitatum* by *cogito cogitatum*, as a result of the elimination of the “pure ego”. In fact, “pure ego” does not let to reduce itself to grasp as other conscious acts or

¹⁷⁴ Persuen, Cornelis A. Van, *Phenomenology and Reality*, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press), 1972, p. 63.

consciousness. *Cogito cogitatum* can be grasped as the basic structure via reflection. Phenomenology aims at clear and distinct description of phenomena, just as they present themselves in experience. To remember is the re-collection or re-presentation of the originary apperception which occurs in momentary perception in every now. It is clear that the re-presentation or re-collection of the momentary perception in every now, not “not-now” is enough to explain the relationship between memory and self-identity. To explain this relation, “pure ego” seems as an unnecessary hypothetical entity.

4. Argument from the paradoxical concept, “unconscious consciousness”:

For phenomenology, one of the problems is the phenomena of unconscious and “pre-reflective”¹⁷⁵ consciousness which is incompatible with the rigorous scientific spirit and the cognitive presuppositions of phenomenology. The process of psychotherapy lets one to realize that one has some thoughts and feelings which he is unaware. The person suddenly realizes that he has already thought or felt something without knowing it. This phenomenon causes a conceptual paradox which can be formulated like this: how it is possible for a person to be unconscious of his own consciousness. The person is ignorant of his consciousness until he suddenly realizes it. In other words, there is the presence of preconscious, unconscious or “pre-reflective” consciousness. “Unconscious consciousness”¹⁷⁶ also includes a paradoxical relationship between conscious and unconscious.

¹⁷⁵ The distinction between “pre-reflective” and “reflective” awareness is made to show the distinction between conscious and unconscious events. See Moran, Dermot, *Edmund Husserl*, (Cambridge: Polity Press), 2005, pp. 144-149.

¹⁷⁶ This concept is used in the discussion of the Freudian question about the status of the unconscious “in” consciousness. See Bernet, Rudolf, “Unconscious

Similarly, there is a “pre-reflective” “transcendental ego”. However, one cannot realize it before the application of the “transcendental reduction” to “human” or “psychological ego”. In other words, there is the presence of the pre-reflective “transcendental ego” which can be realized via the application of “transcendental reduction” to “human” or “psychological ego”. Furthermore, the division between the constituted psychic ego and the constituting “transcendental ego” division causes the multiplicity of ego in one and the same person after the “transcendental reduction”.

I know through my phenomenological studies that I, the previously naïve ego was none other than the transcendental ego in the mode of naïve hiddenness: I know that to me, as the ego again straightforwardly perceived as a human being, there ego again straightforwardly perceived as a human being, there belongs inseparably a reverse side which constitutes and thus really first produces my full concreteness; I know of this whole dimension of transcendental functions, interwoven with one another throughout and extending to the infinite.¹⁷⁷

“Transcendental reduction” is used as a method to overcome the naïve hiddenness of the “transcendental ego”. Furthermore, one realizes that the previously naïve ego which is “human ego” or “psychological ego” is identical with “transcendental ego”. To be in a “one-sided”, “closed”, “natural attitude” as a particular attitude causes

Consciousness in Husserl and Freud” in *The New Husserl* (edited by Don Welton), (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p. 201.

¹⁷⁷ Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1970, § 59, p. 210.

that one cannot be conscious of the “transcendental ego”. Husserl explains how one is not conscious of the “transcendental ego”.

In truth, of course, I am a transcendental ego, but I am not conscious of this; being in a particular attitude, the natural attitude, I am completely given over to the object-poles, completely bound by interests and tasks which are exclusively directed toward them.¹⁷⁸

One is not conscious of the “transcendental ego” and the paradoxical identity relation of “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. To claim the paradoxical identity relation between “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego” is a problem for phenomenology. Furthermore, there is a “pre-reflective” “transcendental ego” which cannot be realized without the usage of the further “transcendental reduction” on “human” or “psychological ego” which has already realized.

This to us rather obvious consideration, which is nevertheless still in need of a deeper grounding, could of course not be accessible prior to the transcendental reduction; but was not the alliance between psychology and transcendental philosophy always strongly noticeable, in spite of all obscurity?¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., § 58, p. 205.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., § 58, p. 207.

Husserl realizes the “transcendental ego” as the “ultimate ego-pole”. “I can investigate transcendently this total accomplishment of which I myself, as the “ego”, am the ultimate ego-pole, and I can pursue its intentional structure of meaning and validity.”¹⁸⁰

“Transcendental ego” is defined as the “ultimate ego-pole” of *cogito* which involves alteration of experiences, changing representational contents (*Vorstellungsgehalten*) of life-world. In the repeated structure which is *ego cogito cogitatum*. *Ego* is the identical ego-pole of all kinds of *cogito*, mental acts or experiences.

As I, philosophizing, reflect in pure consistency upon myself as the constantly functioning ego throughout the alteration of experiences and the opinions arising out of them, as the ego having consciousness of the world and dealing with the world consciously through these experiences, as I inquire consistently on all sides into the *what* and the *how* of the manners of givenness and the modes of validity, and the manner of ego-centeredness, I become aware that this conscious life is through and through an intentionally accomplishing life through which the life-world, with all its changing representational contents [*Vorstellungsgehalten*], in part attains new and in part has already attained its meaning and validity.¹⁸¹

It is clear that *cogito* which is mental acts or experiences are manifold and varied such as alteration of experiences, changing representational contents of the life-world. However, “transcendental ego” or “apodictic ego” is the identical ego-pole of all kinds of mental acts or experiences. The distinction between unchanging, identical ego

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., § 58, pp. 205-206.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., § 58, p. 204.

pole and its changing mental acts, experiences or *cogito* causes the ontological separation. So, “pure ego” gains a different ontological status which is different from its acts or experiences. Some similar ontological differences between “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego” are also emphasized by Husserl.

But did this make it seriously a psychology, a science in which one learned something about the mind's [Geist] own essence? (I emphasize once again that this refers not to a mystical “metaphysical” essence but to one's own being-in-oneself and for-oneself which, after all, is accessible to the inquiring, reflecting ego through so called “inner” or “self-perception.”)¹⁸²

Being-for-oneself is accessible for the inquiring, reflecting ego via inner or self-perception. However, “transcendental ego”, being-in-itself cannot be accessible, even if one applies the “transcendental reduction” to “human” or “psychological ego”. “Transcendental ego” as an identical “ultimate ego-pole” escapes from the complete reduction to be a mere phenomenon for consciousness as other mental acts or experiences. In such a position, there is a clear ontological difference between self, ego or “I” and its experiences. If one considers the Leibniz’ law, one cannot claim the identity of “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”, due to these different properties. The main problem of this ontological difference is that how “transcendental ego” can be really conscious of these experiences or mental acts, because of the different ontological status. Self-alienated “transcendental ego” is unconscious, unaware of its mental acts or experiences as being contrary to the

¹⁸² Ibid., § 60, p. 213.

rigorous scientific spirit of phenomenology. In fact, “transcendental ego” which is able to alienate itself from its mental acts is not an immanent content of consciousness as being experienceable like any other mental acts. To accept the “transcendental ego” means to accept an ego which is unaware of its *cogito*, due to the ontological differences.¹⁸³ There is a self alienation within the “transcendental ego”. There is a self alienation in the stream of consciousness in which ego interrelates in such a way that the subject of experience can alienate itself from its experiences and it can be unaware of these experiences, due to the self alienation. Ontological differences between “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego” also cause that “transcendental ego” can be unaware of its experiences partially or fully. Phenomenology should answer the detailed questions about what kind of entity is it? And where is it? To define the “transcendental ego” which is in and beyond the experiences causes the problem, which is about the relationship between experience and ego, self or “I”. The “pure ego” is a type of consciousness, whose ontological status is a higher than the other kinds of conscious experiences. To solve these ontological problems, to accept that consciousness is a kind of process in which there are ontologically distinct states of consciousness without any essential relation to an enduring conscious entity seems unavoidable. In other words, ego, self or “I” simply refers to my present state of consciousness at a certain time when I use the word without an enduring “I” as an existing entity which persists through time.

5. Argument from the incomplete “transcendental reduction”:

¹⁸³ The distinction between the real and merely phenomenal subject leads to two distinct egos with different features and metaphysical status. Like Sartre, it is also realized that there is an ontological difference among these egos. See Carr, David, “Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity” in *The New Husserl* (edited by Don Welton), (Indiana: Indianapolis University), 2003, p. 184.

In the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section, I claim that “transcendental ego” is not an object *for* and content *in* consciousness. This pure and disinterested ego remains as a questionable presupposition. Despite of the “transcendental reduction” on “human” or “psychological ego”, “transcendental ego” is still not reduced to a mere phenomenon for consciousness. However, *epochē* and “transcendental reduction” are means to exclude whatever is transcendent in the domain of pure consciousness. Everything becomes a phenomenon for consciousness, except for the “transcendental ego”. The essential nature and identity of the ego seems still uncertain, despite of the application of “transcendental reduction”. Everything, including “psychological ego” can become a mere phenomenon for consciousness and one can be aware of them. So, there is an imperfect “transcendental reduction” on the “transcendental ego”. This “transcendental ego” is both transcendental and an ego which is not reducible to be a mere succession of mental acts or experiences in the stream of consciousness. Its immediate, direct grasping or intuition like other conscious phenomenon is impossible. This causes deficiency of the method, “transcendental reduction” as being contrary to the clarity and certainty of phenomenology as a rigorous science. One claims the identity of “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. “Psychological ego” is reduced to be a mere phenomenon for consciousness, but “transcendental ego” is phenomenon in itself as the *noumenon* of the Kantian philosophy. “Transcendental reduction”¹⁸⁴ brings the “transcendental ego” from “pre-reflective” awareness into reflective awareness. However, “transcendental reduction” is still incomplete

¹⁸⁴ The way which is reflection permits the ego to experience itself. See Landgrebe, Ludwig, “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism” in *The Phenomenology of Husserl* (edited, translated by R. O. Elventon), (Chicago: Quadrangle Books), 1970, pp. 289-290

reduction which cannot turn the “transcendental ego” into a mere phenomenon for consciousness.

6. Argument from the “pre-reflective”¹⁸⁵ “transcendental ego”:

In the second volume of the Fifth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl claims that the process of attention is always intentional.

Nothing has so hindered right views in this field as the by-passing of the fact that *attention is an emphatic function which belongs among acts in the above defined sense of intentional experiences*, and which is not descriptively graspable as long as “being experienced”, in the sense of the mere existence of a content in consciousness, is confused with intentional objectivity.¹⁸⁶

It means that consciousness always intends or posits some object *over against* itself. “Transcendental ego” is something which is always pre-reflexively conscious until I suddenly choose to attend it. There is a selective attention or selective inattention to see certain things and ignore others. There is the possibility of such phenomena as “pre-reflective” consciousness as a result of the absence of the direct and immediate realization of the “transcendental ego”. Unlike “pre-reflective” “transcendental ego”, one can realize the changing, even conflicting mental acts from the first person perspective. Then, one can reach the conclusion about presence of *something* unchanging and

¹⁸⁵ I borrow this concept from Sartre to show that “transcendental ego” cannot be accessed before the reflection. This concept is used as “pre-reflective *cogito*”. See Sartre, Jean P., *Being and Nothingness*, (New York: Routledge), 1989, p. 73.

¹⁸⁶ Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1970, Vol. 2, Investigation V, § 19, pp. 584-585.

identical. Here, the first premise is false and falsity is preserved in the conclusion.

If there is change, then *something* must change

There is change

Therefore; *something* must change

There is the possibility that one uses such kind of syllogisms without realizing it as a “pre-reflective” phenomenon. Furthermore, this “transcendental ego” is considered as self identical which may come from the unconscious application of the principle of identity. There is the application of laws of logic on “transcendental ego” unconsciously. In other words, I ask that whether “transcendental ego” can be realized as a result of the inner experience or unconscious application of certain laws of logic and syllogisms. This question and its answer is also one of the contributions of the thesis.

For example, I know a name, but I cannot remember this name at that moment. To accept the possibility of “pre-reflective” “transcendental ego” lets one to claim the possibility of all kinds of “pre-reflective” conscious phenomenon. Similarly, I can make logical inferences without realizing that I am doing so. It causes “logical fallacies”.¹⁸⁷ If one accepts the possibility of “pre-reflective” consciousness, there is the possibility of the presence of content in consciousness to which I am not attending at this moment. There is the possibility of the application of logic, especially on the “transcendental ego” which is similar to the *noumena* of the Kantian philosophy. One

¹⁸⁷ There is the possibility of making logical inferences without realizing it. The possible reason of some of the logical inferences is this “logical fallacy”. See Ellis, Ralph, *An Ontology of Consciousness*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 1986, p. 83.

can experience that there are manifold and varied mental acts, experiences or *cogito*. These manifold and varied mental acts can be experienced directly, immediately without realizing “transcendental ego” in a similar way. In fact, one can just experience “what is irreducible” from the first person perspective, not an immaterial substance or “pure ego”. “We must refuse to turn activities, like thinking, into substantives and finally into substances (*res cogitans*).”¹⁸⁸ Aron Gurwitsch claims that the egological consciousness itself gets substantialized and becomes like a monad.¹⁸⁹ He also claims that Husserl criticizes Descartes’ views. However, his egologic consciousness is also open to the same critiques.

I claim that the presence of the “transcendental ego” is a category mistake which is absent in reality. “Transcendental ego” is claimed as a result of the unaware usage of certain syllogisms and logical laws.

7. Argument from the claim that the reflected “transcendental ego” as the object of the knowing “subject ego” turns into an intentional object as the known “object ego”:

Husserl claims that attention is always intentional. The “pre-reflective”, “non-intentional” “transcendental ego” causes the possibility of content in consciousness which is not attending at this moment. If there is content in consciousness which is not focused is present as “pre-reflective”, it will cause many problems. If attention is always

¹⁸⁸ Persuen, Cornelis, A. van, “The Concept of the Body” in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), (New York: Humanities Press), Vol. 1, 1971, p. 134.

¹⁸⁹ Gurwitsch, Aron, “a Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 1, 1941, p. 329.

intentional, it causes a division¹⁹⁰ between reflecting and intentional consciousness as the knowing “subject ego” and reflected, “non-intentional” and “prereflective” consciousness as the known “object ego”.¹⁹¹ Aron Gurwitsch who supports the non-egologic pure consciousness and the claims of Sartre in the analytic frame defends that “...the ego in question is that of the grasped, not of the grasping act.”¹⁹² In other words, there is the distinction between the “grasped” and the “grasping” consciousness. Furthermore, he adds that “[r]eflection gives rise to a new object-the ego-which appears only if this attitude is adopted.”¹⁹³

Here, “transcendental ego” is present as “non-intentional” and “pre-reflective” ego. Then, “transcendental ego” becomes an object of consciousness rather than an immanent noetic content within the subjective dimension of the stream of consciousness. If attention is always intentional as in the claim of Husserl, any consciousness which is not intentional or which does not posit an object over against itself, it will gain the status of unreflected, “pre-reflective” intentional object. If attention is intentional, the “transcendental ego” which is already there turns into an intentional object of this attentive awareness. If one is attentively aware of a “non-intentional consciousness” such as the non-positional self-consciousness of the “transcendental ego”, it will not be a

¹⁹⁰ This division is made as “original” *reflecting* ego and an *objectified* pure ego. See Kockelmans, Joseph J., “Husserl and Kant on the Pure Ego” in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 1977, p. 273.

¹⁹¹ The reflecting ego is performing an act which makes the previously latent ego an intentional object or object of an act of reflection. Then, the performing ego becomes the “subject ego” who knows itself to be identical with the “object ego” or the object of its reflection. See Landgrebe Ludwig, “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism” in *The Phenomenology of Husserl* (edited, translated by R. O. Elveton), (Chicago: Quadrangle Books), 1970, pp. 289-290.

¹⁹² Gurwitsch, Aron, “A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 43, 1941, p. 331.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

content of consciousness and it will be a mere object of consciousness. "Transcendental ego" cannot be a proper part of the flux or stream of consciousness in which there is a continuous succession of now-points. Phenomenological reflection always reduces the reflected consciousness into an intentional object.¹⁹⁴ Husserl also claims that consciousness can be directly and non-intentionally conscious of itself in the flux or stream of consciousness. However, "transcendental ego" is reflected via intentional attention as a result of its "pre-reflective" nature. One intentionally directs toward the "transcendental ego" as if it is an object. Then, it becomes the known "object ego" which causes the incomplete "transcendental reduction". Furthermore, there is ontological difference between reflecting consciousness as the knowing "subject ego" and reflected, "non-intentional", "pre-reflective" consciousness as the known "object ego". If one accepts the transcending unity across each conscious act in the stream of consciousness, "transcendental ego" will be either the direct consciousness of the particular conscious acts or a transcending unity which has all of these particular mental acts.

If "transcendental ego" is the former, to explain what binds the mental states will be difficult. However, if "transcendental ego" is the latter, it will not be conscious of its own mental acts, due to the ontological differences. So, to leave the "transcendental ego" can be a suitable solution of the problems.

8. Argument from the unity and continuity of the stream or flow of consciousness:

¹⁹⁴ The ego cannot be the content of consciousness. It is also claimed that it cannot be described properly. See Kockelmans, Joseph J., "Husserl and Kant on the Pure Ego" in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 1977, p. 271.

Since, it has the ability of self alienation which influences the direction of the flow of experiences, to accept the “transcendental ego” causes problems. Therefore, it can indirectly influence the content of experience. How this influence happens can be examined in detail like this:

1. There is a unity and continuity of the flow of consciousness.
2. Self is experienceable as a kind of consciousness which provides the unity throughout the stream of experience.
3. Self-alienation minimizes the direct consciousness of this type of unity and continuity within the stream of experiences or flow of consciousness. What the ontological status of the “transcendental ego” is and what the relationship between these concrete, conscious experiences and the self is must be analyzed at this level. “Transcendental ego” provides unity and continuity of these concrete experiences. If one claims the necessity to accept the “transcendental ego” for the unity and continuity of experiences, there will be a serious problem which is the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”. Self alienation of the “transcendental ego” causes the disunity and discontinuity of experiences.

Instead of the acceptance of the “transcendental ego” for the continuity and unity of the experiences, I can claim the plurality of selves which succeed each other as many distinct “I”. I can claim the regular replacement of the retained old now point by the new now point. Pure consciousness can experience itself in a continuous and unified way by means of the successive replacement of the new now points and the retention of the old now points. The continuity of the self also does not depend on the continuity and identity of the “transcendental

ego”; it depends on the re-collection or re-presentation of perceptions in which present self realizes old selves through the re-collection of these perceptions via memory. In other words, to claim that a person is the same person at two different times in the history is only a matter of degree. So, there is no need for the continuity of the persisting ego. “Transcendental ego” is the mere the fiction of the mind, due to the certain category mistakes which will be examined in detail in the Cartesian category mistake section.

9. Argument from the problems of the “pure ego” in *Ideas*:

The claim which is “transcendancy within immanency”¹⁹⁵ of the “pure ego” is quite paradoxical which can be solved by accepting either transcendency or immanency of the “pure ego”. To leave the claim about the transcendence of the “pure ego” can solve the problem. “Pure ego” is both transcendent and immanent simultaneously and it is contrary to the logical law, non-contradiction principle. In a disjunctive syllogism, one can solve the paradox. “Pure ego” is either transcendent or immanent, where ‘or’ is interpreted in “exclusive” sense: “pure ego” is not totally immanent, due to its “peculiar” kind of transcendence in *Ideas*. So, to leave the transcendent “pure ego” will be the suitable solution of the problem. In fact, to accept the transcendence of the “pure ego” is incompatible with the ontology of radically immanent transcendental

¹⁹⁵ Levinas makes a distinction wakeful and sleeping ego which is the re-formulation of the problem, “transcendancy within immanency”. The underlying life of the ego is forgotten or putting that life into a state of sleep, “the *possibility of awakening* already makes the heart of the ego-of the troubled, living inside, ‘transcendent in immanence’-beat”. There is also claim about the “awakening within wakefulness” which signifies the “de-fecion” of the identity. See Levinas, Emmanuel, *Discovering Existence with Husserl* (Translated by Richard A. Cohen), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1998, pp.162-168.

phenomenology¹⁹⁶ which consists of purely immanent realm of beings such as pure experiences, their meanings and intentional objects.

Furthermore, “pure ego” gains a different ontological status from the purely immanent entities. The paradoxical claim, “transcendence within immanence” is also one of the main reasons to leave the claim about transcendent “pure ego” to solve the paradox. The better position is to claim that pure consciousness is non-egologic which is free from the transcendental subject of thoughts. Pure consciousness must be totally homogeneous which does not involve anything, besides immanent entities. Therefore, what remains is the “transcendental residuum” of the “transcendental reduction” or *epochē* as being disembodied, singular and continuous. There is the radical purification of all transcendences, including one’s own body, other persons, “pure ego”, etc. One should exclude every sort of transcendence to clean the pure consciousness to be compatible with the definition of the “transcendental phenomenology”.¹⁹⁷

10. Argument from introspection:

One considers that there is an intimate connection between consciousness and introspection.¹⁹⁸ One can be consciously, directly

¹⁹⁶ Husserl characterizes the “pure ego” as “a non-constituted transcendence—a transcendence in immanence”—which is “a special entity”. However, this special entity is not bracketed. It is situated within the domain of transcendently purified consciousness as being incompatible with the purification of consciousness. See Gurwitsch, Aron, “A non-egologic Conception of Consciousness” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 1, 1941, p. 327.

¹⁹⁷ Phenomenology should exclude every sort of transcendence to be compatible with the definition of “transcendental phenomenology”. See Kockelmas, Joseph, *Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology*, (Indiana: Purdue University Press), 1994, p. 203.

¹⁹⁸ Hume claims that what he gets is the knowledge of perception from the first person perspective. He cannot catch the self. There is the denial of the introspective accessibility of the self. Then he concludes that “the self can be nothing but a

aware of his own mental states via introspection.¹⁹⁹ "Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light – for example that from the fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist, and so on – cannot in any way be open to doubt."²⁰⁰ Descartes reaches a mental state, to doubt as one of the mode of thinking via introspection in the evil demon scenario. Then, he concludes that there is a thinking thing as a substance.²⁰¹ By means of the methodic doubt, Descartes reaches the *cogito*, after doubting the existence of the world, including his own body. Like Husserl, the thinking ego is responsible to build up clear and distinct *corpus* of knowledge. However, Cartesian *cogito* is too wide that he conceives it as a substance which has an immaterial, indivisible and independent ontological status as a piece of reality. Descartes claims that thoughts (mental processes) do not independently exist as attributes. He claims that thoughts are merely attributes of a thinking thing or immaterial substance which provides the unity of thoughts (mental processes). This unity is called as self or "I".

Descartes claims that the existence of the self in this famous expression, *cogito, ergo sum* or "I think, therefore I am". "I think" part depends on the immediate, direct and private access of a certain

bundle of perceptions". See Noon, Harold W., *Hume on Knowledge*, (New York: Routledge), 1999, p. 200.

¹⁹⁹ Direct, introspective acquaintance of sensation and its intrinsic character is explained, despite of the intersubjective nature of sense words. See Goldstein, Irin, "Intersubjective Properties by which we specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States" in *Philosophy* (edited by Anthony O'Hear), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2000, Vol. 75, p. 89.

²⁰⁰ Descartes, Rene, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (translated by John Cottingham), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996, p. 27.

²⁰¹ If one accepts that experiences, thoughts, ideas as the properties of the self, how do they relate to the objects and the world they are about? This question is asked as a problem of the Cartesian philosophy. See Carr, David, "Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity" in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p.183.

mental state which is to think. *Sum* is translated as "I am" or "I exist" which is a thinking thing as a substance.

From the perspective of the Husserlian phenomenology, consciousness is consciousness of something, because of its intentional nature. Therefore, it also includes the *cogitatum*. However, Cartesian *cogito* is too wide that he conceives it as a substance. Thinking thing as a substance still survives and it is not bracketed by the method of doubt. However, Husserl has bracketed the totality of reality, including psycho-physical ego to claim the presence of "transcendental ego" as the identical, ultimate ego pole of all kinds of mental acts or *cogito*. In the bundle theory of Hume, self or person is assumed to be the mind. Mind is assumed as nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, perpetual flux and movement. Hume defines the non-egologic pure consciousness and he is against the Cartesian immaterial thinking thing as a substance. "We have no perfect idea of anything but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have therefore no idea of a substance."²⁰² In *A Treatise of Human Nature*, the final decision of Hume is that "soul is absolutely unintelligible."²⁰³ The root of Hume's bundle theory is against the illusion about the personal identity. If there is a self, it should be experienceable. The existence of self cannot be inferred from any kind of experience. Whenever I introspect, I can find thoughts, sensations, emotions, not the thing which has them. There is a Cartesian myth in which one claims the existence of an immaterial substance as an underlying unity.

²⁰² Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.), 1961, p. 223.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

Hume denies the category of mental substance²⁰⁴ to which experiences are attributed. He cannot find the necessary owner which is something other than the rest of the bundle. Hume denies the category of mental substance which one attributes the experiences. Similarly, he also denies the necessity of a material owner. So, there must be a *disembodied*, non-egologic pure consciousness in which different perceptions succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity in a perpetual flux and movement. There are two important claims of Hume.

1- Introspection reveals the presence and certainty of thoughts, perceptions without revealing an immaterial thinking thing as substance. Similarly, he also avoids a material owner of these thoughts, perceptions, etc.

2- Introspection also reveals a *disembodied* consciousness.

It is clear that I cannot experience myself as anything other than the experience itself through introspection.

In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, there are two different bodies which are physical body (*Körper*) and living body (*Leib*).²⁰⁵ Physical body can be considered as my body for others which are the objective body as being the object of experience and scientific inquiry. However, living body is felt by me as

²⁰⁴ Hume, who claims that self is a fiction as the opposite claim of Kant, denies the immortal soul. Then, it is called as "Hume's fictionalism" in which self is defined as "non-existent". However, Carr accepts the "transcendental ego". See Carr, David, "Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity" in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, pp. 189-190.

²⁰⁵ The distinction between "living body" and "physical body" is made by Husserl. See Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis in European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1970, § 60, p. 212.

being my body for me. When there is a pain in my leg, I can access its knowledge via introspection which lets me to know it immediately directly and privately as the token of the pain type. Our faculty of inner observation or introspection does not let us to know our pain, hope and beliefs in a neural network. Introspection which lets us to get the perfect access of our mental states is not sufficient to reveal such kind of neural system. What one can introspectively know is thoughts, beliefs, hopes, not an immaterial underlying substance, a neural network or some kind of bodily substance. In other words, introspection lets us to realize a disembodied pure consciousness. Both Descartes and Hume agree the reliability and validity of knowledge which come from introspection, despite of the denial of Hume about the existence of an immaterial underlying entity which binds these mental states together.

It is already explained that the "transcendancy within immanency" of the "pure ego" is that "pure ego" which is within the immanency consists of totality of pure experiences. Since, it is neither an experience nor a part of it; it is still not totally immanent. Each coming and going mental process can be experienced immediately, directly, despite of the transcendence of the "pure ego" in *Ideas*.

All mental acts or *cogito* can be known immediately and directly. Like Descartes and Hume, Husserl also agrees with the direct, immediate access of all mental phenomena, despite of the failure of the immediate access to the immaterial substance, "pure ego" and "transcendental ego".

All of these arguments support the disembodied non-egologic pure consciousness which is free from a transcendental subject of thoughts. There is a direct, immediate and private access to the mental states or acts of consciousness or *cogito*, despite of the failure to

access an immaterial soul as a substance in the claim of the Cartesian philosophy, “pure ego” in *Ideas*, and “transcendental ego” in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The first person perspective is the inevitable and unavoidable position to understand and explain all kinds of mental phenomenon.

11. Argument from solipsism:

*Epochē*²⁰⁶ turns the whole world and all of the individuals into a mere phenomenon for consciousness, including the empirical body. In solipsism,²⁰⁷ one can just know whatever is in his own mind. I use solipsism as “priority”, “independence” of mental acts, states of individuals in the weak sense and “I alone exist or am known to exist,” and there are no other minds in the strong sense as in the definitions of David Bell. So, the world of *eidos*, mathematics and natural world remain as they are in the consciousness to be focused or to be directed. Even if one totally disconnects himself from the “fact world”, it is still potentially there to be focused. Epistemologically, these contents of consciousness have a privileged status to access. Unlike one’s knowledge of his own consciousness, he is ignorant about the change of the particulars in this world as a result of the “disconnexion” of *epochē* like a little god.

Now, one needs to explain the notions which are immanent and transcendent. In fact, one can find several levels of transcendence and

²⁰⁶ The world is retained in the consciousness, not as a real world, but as a *cogitata*, as that to which consciousness is oriented. See Persuen, Cornellis A. van., *Phenomenology and Reality*, (U.S.A: Duquesne University), 1972, p. 59.

²⁰⁷ There is the Husserl’s “first person singular account of experience” in *Logical Investigations*. There is a methodologically solipsistic account of experience. There is also the suspending belief in the existence of the outside world and other minds to explain how external objects and other minds are to be understood by each of us individually. See Keller Pierre, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1999, p. 39.

immanence. In the side of the noema or intentional object, one should distinguish different experiences:

1. What is immediately given to consciousness.
2. What is given in the succession of time, but is implied in what is immediately given.
3. The thing in itself, which is given partially or one sided as in the case of sides, aspects and profiles.

One can distinguish three levels of immanence and the corresponding transcendence.²⁰⁸ In other words, there are different and relative degree of transcendence and immanence.

1. Immanence as noesis and transcendence as noema. The intentional act or noesis and its ingredients are in the area of immanence. However, everything which belongs to the noema is transcendent to consciousness. For example, the intentional act of perceiving a tree is immanent. However, the intentional object tree is transcendent. Here, the criteria to distinguish what is immanent and transcendent depends on the question whether something is an integral part of the act of consciousness or not. It is clear that the intentional object is not an integral part of the act of consciousness. So, it is transcendent to consciousness.

2. Immanence as noesis and what is immediately given in the noema, and transcendence as what is not immediately given in the noema. The intentional act of perceiving a tree and the *eidos* of the tree is immanent. However, future and past of the tree are only implications

²⁰⁸ Three levels of immanence and the corresponding transcendence is given by Mayol. See Mayol, V. Valerde, *On Husserl*, (U.S.A. Wadsworth), 2000, p. 64.

of it. The past and future are not given originally and immediately. So, they are transcendent. The criteria of immanence and transcendence is what is originally and immediately given to consciousness and what is not originally and immediately given to consciousness.

3. Immanent is what is immediately given in the noema and its implications (the past and the future). For example, the intentional act of perception of a tree, the intentional object tree, its past and future are immanent to consciousness. However, the real or extra-mental tree in the natural world is transcendent to consciousness. The criteria to distinguish the immanence and transcendence is what is given in some way and what is not given in any way.

Epochē, “transcendental reduction” and eidetic reduction provide the purification of consciousness. However, self-identical “pure ego”, which shows the nature of a “peculiar” kind of transcendence, is retained after *epochē*. It must be eliminated for the purification of the consciousness from all kinds of transcendences. In solipsism, one must be aware of whatever is in the domain of consciousness, at least as potential. Unlike the experience of the individuals in the “fact world”, the content of consciousness should be known in a certain way after *epochē*. So, to leave the “pure ego” seems a suitable way to avoid all kinds of transcendences.

12- Argument from the “shift” of the definition of consciousness after *epochē*:

Before the application of *epochē*,²⁰⁹ every experience in the sense of *cogitatio*²¹⁰ or thought has the form of *cogito* (I think). Don Welton also claims that “[a]s the starting point, we take consciousness in a pregnant sense and one which offers itself first, which we can designate most simply by the Cartesian term, *cogito*, by the phrase ‘I think’.”²¹¹ *Cogito* in the Cartesian philosophy is so wide that it involves “I perceive”, “I remember”, “I judge”, “I feel”, etc. However, *epochē* provides the “shift” of the definition of consciousness.²¹² Husserl claims that “...the pregnant meaning of the expression ‘*cogito*’, ‘I have consciousness of something’, ‘I perform an act of consciousness’.”²¹³ This successful definition involves the special ability of intentionality as the special ability of pure consciousness. After *epochē*,²¹⁴ “I have

²⁰⁹ Before *epochē*, “the phenomenologizing I” is already there to open to itself in a mode of self-consciousness (of being-for-itself). Human consciousness of the “I” or self is also already there, before the “reflection” as *preknown* and *pregiven* sense. See Fink, Eugen, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 1998, pp.13-19.

²¹⁰ The “*cogitatio*” or lived experience is really *reell* and immanent in consciousness. Due to the pure immanence of “*cogitations*”, they are given absolutely. Unlike transcendent world which turns into an intentional correlate after *epochē*, consciousness is absolute. See Kern, Iso, “The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals* (edited with introduction by Frederick A. Elloston & Peter Mc Cormick), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 1977, pp. 127-129.

²¹¹ Welton, Don, *The Essential Husserl*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press), 1999, § 34, p. 68.

²¹² *Epochē* also shows that this world is contingent, but consciousness is necessary. The essential feature of the “thing world” is existence which is not necessarily guaranteed by its givenness to consciousness. See Berger, Gaston, *The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1972, p. XXI.

²¹³ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 35, p. 118.

²¹⁴ After securing the ego as the “residuum”, the world is mere a “phenomenon” for this ego. The “*cogito*” bears intentionally to the whole world as a *cogitatum* after *epochē*. See Kern, Iso, “The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl” in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals* (edited with introduction by Frederick A. Elloston and Peter Mc Cormick), (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 1977, pp. 127, 129.

conscious of something.” Then, there is the *cogito cogitatum*. However, *cogito* involves the “pure ego” and its ego life. Unlike the success of the definition of consciousness, there is the failure of the “transcendence within immanency” in the frame of the definition of consciousness. It is clear that one cannot be conscious of the “pure ego” which has a “peculiar” transcendence, in spite of the immanence of the mental acts in the stream of consciousness. So, “pure ego” is contrary to the formulated definition of consciousness. Something cannot be simultaneously immanent and transcendent at the same time. So, to leave the “pure ego” is the suitable solution of the problem in the frame of phenomenology.

There is the “shift” of the definition of consciousness. However, there is no further examination of the definition of ego in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. In fact, there is the repeated structure which is *ego cogito cogitatum*.²¹⁵ *Ego* is accessed through further usage of “transcendental reduction” as the “transcendental ego”. However, *ego* is simply the negation of *cogito* which is changing, accessible, etc. *Ego* is unchanging, identical and beyond the accessibility as the “ultimate ego pole”. One can ask that what this *ego* is. It is clear that one cannot know the *ego* properly. So, the negation of *cogito* is a way to explain what *ego* is without its immediate access. One can also ask a question that whether negation gives information or not? It is clear that negation does not give any information. So, to leave the *ego* of the *cogito cogitatum* is the suitable solution of the problem.

²¹⁵ The true sense of the ego, in the formula “*ego-cogito-cogitatum*” will only be revealed through the further reduction, the transcendental *epochē*. See MacDonald, Paul S., *Descartes and Husserl*, (Albany: State University of New York), 2000, p. 174.

13- Argument from the definition of consciousness in the frame of phenomenology:

To start phenomenology, *epochē* means to “set aside” whatever is physical. “Pure ego” as irreducible “transcendental residuum” and its “ego life” remain as a result of the application of *epochē*.

There are two regions which are Nature and Consciousness.²¹⁶ They are instantiated in a person as body and mind, which are distinct dependent moments of one and the same individual. One “sets aside” whatever is physical which involves body, brain, neural activities. They are the concern of the sciences from the third person perspective which provides the probabilistic empirical generalizations. However, the other distinct dependent aspect is irreducible and purely mental from the first person perspective. “That is, consciousness is a word that describes intentional acts, not a thing.”²¹⁷ Person A is the owner of a consciousness in which there is the totality of mental processes as the stream of consciousness. Potential or actual conscious of all kind of mental processes should be the basic characteristic of conscious events. One gets the disembodied pure consciousness, not “pure ego” from the first person perspective. Husserl accepts “pure ego” and “transcendence within immanence” in *Ideas*. However, he also confess that “...in respect of intentionality, is a quite fundamental distinction, namely, that between the *proper components* of the intentional experiences, and their *intentional correlates*, or the components of

²¹⁶ The two region distinction as Nature and Consciousness is made. See Smith, David Woodruff, “Mind and Body” in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl* (edited by Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998, p. 335.

²¹⁷ Hermberg, Kevin, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, (London: International Publishing Group), 2006, pp. 19-20.

them.”²¹⁸ After *epochē*, pure consciousness remains. However, it must be eliminated, due to the definition of consciousness. In the definition of consciousness, Husserl also claims the intentionality of conscious acts. Unlike “pure ego”, mental acts, experiences are experienceable and they are quite compatible with the definition of consciousness.

Body, brain and neural activities are the instantiation of the region, Nature as the domain of natural sciences. However, pure consciousness is the instantiation of the region, Consciousness in which everything should be actually or potentially available to be compatible with the scientific rigorous spirit of phenomenology. So, to leave the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” will purify the consciousness to be compatible with the definition of consciousness in the philosophy of Husserl.

Briefly, the proper way to avoid the problems which are the self alienation of the “transcendental ego”, “pre-reflective” nature of the “transcendental ego” and transcendence of the “pure ego”, one should return the initial position of Husserl in which he denies the existence of the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. All kinds of transcendences in the consciousness should be excluded as in the initial position of Husserl. Furthermore, to deny the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” will be used as means to solve the mind-body problem. It is clear that whenever I deny the existence of the persisting, identical “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”, the problem of personal identity becomes a serious problem which will be examined and solved in the frame of phenomenology. In fact, this problem is commonly discussed in the frame of analytic philosophy, but I will try to answer the possible

²¹⁸ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 88, p. 257 (in the 6th printing).

questions about the problem of personal identity in the frame of phenomenology.

2.12 Cartesian Category Mistake

Husserl realizes the “transcendental ego” as a result of the reflective transcendental inquiries. In this section, my aim is to show that the immaterial substance of the Cartesian philosophy and the “transcendental ego” of the Husserlian philosophy arise as a result of the category mistakes which can depend on the misinterpretation of sciences or on the abstraction of the non-egologic pure consciousness, not on the inner experience as a result of the special methods such as the “method of doubt” in the philosophy of Descartes and “transcendental reduction” in the philosophy of Husserl. Hume considers that Cartesian immaterial substance is the result of the category mistake. If we use the terminology of Sartre, we can claim that there is an “error of substance”. However, there is no clear claim about the category mistake of the “transcendental ego” in the philosophy of Sartre. In fact, it also arises as a result of the category mistake as in the example of the Cartesian immaterial substance. To show these category mistakes, the part-whole analysis, by which one can show what piece is and what moment is in reality, is necessary. Then, one should show how persons think and talk about moments abstractly as if they are pieces. Pure consciousness turns an *abstractum* into a *concretum*. Then, one concludes about the existence of immaterial substance in the philosophy of Descartes and “transcendental ego” in the philosophy of Husserl, as a result of this abstraction. One of the main contributions of the thesis is to show that there is a category mistake which causes the claim about the existence of the

“transcendental ego”. The other main part of the claim is that this category mistake can be shown by means of the part-whole analysis. In fact, phenomenology let to examine what is supposedly known as true by overcoming the confusions and misinterpretations. In reality, one merely experiences “what is irreducible” from his own case or first person perspective, not an immaterial substance and “transcendental ego”. Since, pure consciousness gives an independent ontological status to them as a result of its special capacity of abstraction; this experience is the source of the category mistake.

“Transcendental ego” methodically reflects itself for the purification of consciousness from all kinds of apperceptions of the “subjective-relative” appearances of the life world and human self. There is a self alienation of the “transcendental ego” from its “ego life”.²¹⁹ Then, one can access the “transcendental ego”. The artificially isolated mediator of Descartes, who also isolates himself via the “method of meditation”,²²⁰ is a “prototype” for Husserl. One can be certainly, directly and immediately aware of his mental acts, experiences or *cogito* in the philosophy of Husserl and mental states in the philosophy of Descartes by means of introspection, not an immaterial substance, “pure ego” or “transcendental ego”. One can claim that “[t]he proposition “I am” depends on the “true principle of all principles.”²²¹ There is the immediate, direct and private access to the present mental states which are doubting, thinking by means of

²¹⁹ Pure ego alienates itself, due to its isolation and abstraction. See Ellis, Ralph, *An Ontology of Consciousness*, (Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 1986, pp. 13.

²²⁰ Like meditation, subject totally isolates himself from everything and this method is called as the method of meditation. See Lauer, Quentin, *Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect*, (New York: Fordham University Press), 1958, p. 46.

²²¹ Longgrebe, Ludwing, “Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism” in *The Phenomenology of Husserl* (edited, translated and with an introduction by R. O. Elventon), (Chicago: Quadrangle books), 1970, p. 273.

introspection. However, the certainty of these introspected mental states cannot presuppose the existence of "I" in the "I think". "I am" cannot depend on the "true principle of all principles". Similarly, there is the immediate, direct and originary access to the mental acts, experiences or *cogito* in Husserl. However, there is no such kind of immediate, direct and originary access to the "transcendental ego" which needs further "transcendental reduction" and reflection. There is the certainty of *cogito cogitatum*, not *ego cogito cogitatum*. The origin of these unfounded claims is the category mistake.

By means of "transcendental reduction", one is able to access the "transcendental ego" as the identical, "ultimate ego-pole". There is one and the same person who has different moments such as living body, physical body, "psychological ego", "human ego" which are abstracted to access the "transcendental ego". Husserl also claims that there are some personal properties of a person. "[I]t is a person, substrate of personal properties, of original or acquired psychic dispositions (faculties, habits)."²²² This quotation shows that Husserl has a tendency to accept the "transcendental ego" as the substrate of personal properties as if it is the immaterial soul of the Cartesian philosophy.

One of the main category mistakes belongs to sciences, including psychology which takes physics as a model.

THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE of wanting to view men and animals seriously as double realities, as combinations of two different sorts of realities which are to be equated in the sense of their reality, and accordingly the desire to

²²² Ibid., § 67, p. 230.

investigate souls also through the method of the science of bodies, i.e., souls as existing within natural causality, in space-time, like bodies-this gave rise to the supposed obviousness of a method to be formed as on analogue to natural science²²³.

The attempt to “equate” physical bodily reality with soul is a category mistake. In fact, the “equalization” of completely two different sorts of entities causes the examination of soul by means of the method of natural sciences, as if it is something which obeys the laws of “natural causality” in the space and time like bodies of the natural world. This “equalization” of body with soul and the “equalization” of “natural-scientific method” and “new psychological method”²²⁴ cause the false parallelism of “inner” and “outer” experience. Unlike scientific claims, phenomenology shows that whatever comes from the empirical intuition of the appearances of the *Lebenswelt*²²⁵ are mere “subjective-relative” and contingent. “...; [natural] science is supposed to be based on outer, psychology on inner, experience. In the former, physical nature is given; and in the latter, psychic being, that of the soul.”²²⁶ In some of the passages of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl clearly blames the Cartesian dualism about the failure of psychology. “Cartesian dualism requires the parallelization of *mens* and *corpus*, together with the naturalization of psychic being implied in this parallelization, and hence also requires the parallelization of the required methods.”²²⁷ Husserl clearly states that there is the

²²³ Ibid., § 63, p. 219.

²²⁴ Ibid., § 63, p. 219.

²²⁵ Ibid., § 64, p. 221.

²²⁶ Ibid., § 63, p. 219.

²²⁷ Ibid., § 64, p. 221.

necessity to separate the experience of bodies from the experience of the spirit. Otherwise, some “paradoxical difficulties”²²⁸ are unavoidable. Since, body and all kind of bodily activities, including brain and neural activities depend on the third person perspective of the probabilistic sciences; one can access all kinds of mental acts directly, immediately and privately from the first person perspective.²²⁹

Husserl also finds many problems in the Cartesian dualism. To examine these problems, one needs to analyze the concepts of phenomenology. Wholes can be analyzed into two different kinds of parts which are pieces and moments.²³⁰

When I say ‘cohered continuously with it in unity’, I refer to the unity of the concrete phenomenological whole, whose parts are either *abstract aspects*, mutually founded upon, and requiring each other in their coexistence, or pieces from whose nature spring forms of coexistent unity, forms which actually contribute to the content of the whole as real indwelling aspects.²³¹

²²⁸ Ibid., § 65, p. 225.

²²⁹ There are two different subjects as real and phenomenal subjects with different features and metaphysical status. This differentiation depends on the first person point of view, a point of view I share, by definition, with no one else. The empirical subject is experienced by others as the public “me”. See Carr, David, “Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity” in *The New Husserl* (edited by Don Welton), (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, pp. 184, 186.

²³⁰ Moment is used as a concept which means quality or aspect. See Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (New York: The Humanities Press), Vol. 2, 1970, Investigation V, § 52, p. 800.

²³¹ Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (New York: The Humanities Press), Vol. 2, 1970, Investigation V, § 6, p. 545.

Pieces are parts which can subsist and be presented, apart from the whole. Pieces can also be called as independent part. For example, a branch of a tree is an independent part which can be separated from the tree. In fact, it cannot function as a living branch of the tree any longer. It is presented as an independent thing, apart from its whole. Therefore, pieces are parts which can turn into an independent whole. Unlike pieces, “moments” are parts which cannot subsist independently apart from the whole as dependent parts. One of the examples of moments is the colors which cannot occur apart from some surface or spatial expanse.²³²

To examine the concepts is necessary for the terminological clarity. A whole can be called as *concrete* which exists and presents itself as a concrete individual. They can also be experienced as a concrete individual. Since, a piece can become a *concretum*, it is an independent part. Unlike pieces, moments cannot become *concrete*. Moments can exist and can be experienced with other complementary moments and it's whole.

In the Husserlian phenomenology, there is an “exploding” perception of the numerically one and the same individual. Like a cube, a human being is also experienced step by step to discover different aspects, moments of the numerically one and the same person. There is only one substratum as an individual person which has two aspects as the instantiation of two regions, Nature and Consciousness. There are bodily and mental moments of the one and the same person. Descartes claims a dualism of substances (mind versus body) and attributes (thought versus extension). Cartesian dualism depends on

²³² “[C]olor cannot be exemplified in something separately from extension”. See Willard, Dallas, “Theory of Wholes and Parts” in *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*, (Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers), Vol. 48, 2003, p. 169.

the incompatibility between two substances. Bodies are essentially divisible, due to its extension in space. However, souls are essentially indivisible, due to the absence of the extension in space.

Husserl claims that *psychic* can be found in the world only in connection with bodies.²³³ In other words, physical body is animated by soul or *psyche* by turning it into a living body. Souls are embodied within body by being responsible from the willful actions of the person and kinestically awareness of all kinds of action. Like Descartes, Husserl questions the spatio-temporal nature of souls. "But do souls have spatiotemporality in the true sense, in existence in his form, as do bodies? It has always been noted that psychic being in and for it has no spatial extension and location."²³⁴ The "uniqueness" of the "transcendental ego" is emphasized by Husserl. For the "transcendental ego", space and time are not the principles of individuation. Like the Cartesian soul as a thinking substance, soul or *psyche* of Husserl also violates all of the laws of natural sciences such as gravity, "natural causality", etc. Both of these soul definitions claim that the mass of the soul is zero by violating all of the known rules.

In phenomenology, the distinction between pieces and moments is very important for philosophical analysis. One can take something as a piece, but it is a moment in reality by separating it from its wider whole and other parts. The "task" of phenomenology is to show that something is a dependent moment, not a piece. One knows that whatever is the instantiation of consciousness is totally immaterial, without any

²³³ Human being is not only object, but also subject. Human being can experience himself "as worldly in the dual sense". See Zaner, Richard M., "The sense of Phenomenology" in *The Way of Phenomenology*, (New York: Pegasus), 1970, p. 120.

²³⁴ Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (translated by David Carr), (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1973, § 62, p. 216

extension and spatio-temporality. In spite of the different nature of soul, it is the mere moment of the one and the same person, not a piece. Both body and the soul are two different, distinct and dependent aspects of one and the same person. In the history of philosophy, soul is often separated from the brain and the body as if it is a piece, not a moment. One separates what is inseparable by turning the *abstractum* into a *concretum*. Descartes also separates soul from the body as totally different kinds of substance. To formulate soul as a substance which is an independent category leads to a category mistake. This mistake is called as *metabasis eis allo genos* which is the change of the genus in Greek, category mistake in the terminology of Gilbert Ryle or "region" mistake in the terminology of Husserl.

Husserl claims that "...the psychic can be found in the world only in connection with bodies".²³⁵ Husserl continues like this; "[w]e had first to help empirical inquiry toward an understanding of itself; we had to make visible, through reflection, its anonymous accomplishment, namely, the 'abstraction' we described."²³⁶ Our immaterial conscious experiences and their "abstraction"²³⁷ cause the acceptance of soul as an independent existence, *concretum* as a piece, not a moment. "...[T]he last residuum of the Cartesian theory of two substances is defeated simply because *abstracta* are not 'substances'." ²³⁸ Analogously, one experiences immaterial conscious experiences which changes continuously, then one concludes about the existence of an immaterial "apodictic ego" which is identical, "ultimate ego-pole" of these experiences.

²³⁵ Ibid., § 66, p. 229.

²³⁶ Ibid., § 66, p. 229.

²³⁷ Ibid., § 66, p. 229.

²³⁸ Ibid., § 66, p. 229.

Now, one needs for the further analysis of the concept, *abstracta*. If one considers moments independently without any dependence of them, they will be *abstracta*, due to the abstraction from its whole. Language lets us to engage with a moment apart from its necessary complementary moments and its whole. To think and speak about moments abstractly cause philosophical confusions and category mistakes. One starts to think that moment can exist independently and it can be a *concretum*. Briefly, the origin of the category mistake is that one turns moment into a piece or an *abstractum* into a *concretum*. The soul is a moment which has an essential relation with a body and it is founded upon the body as being “animated bodies”. Soul turns into a piece as a vital force or a thing that can exist independently. It is also presented apart from its organic base. Even it can pre-exist as being independent from the body as a result of the category mistake. Since, the claim about the existence of the “transcendental ego” is also a category mistake, there is no such kind of ontologically different “transcendental ego”. However, pure consciousness gives an ontologically different status to the “transcendental ego”, as a result of the abstraction by means of the further usage of the “transcendental reduction”. Meanwhile, one sees that soul is completely different and alienated from the natural world in the philosophy of Descartes. So, how mind can get outside itself to understand what is going on in the world is a problem. In fact, the mind belongs to the world, due to its bodily nature. Consciousness is essentially correlated with its objects. Consciousness intentionally “directs toward” its objects as its content. The whole world is carried to the consciousness as the intentional correlate of the acts of consciousness. “[T]ranscendental consciousness together with the natural world as its intentional

correlate”²³⁹ remain for transcendental phenomenology, after *epochē*. In spite of the absence of the material nature of a tree, there is a perceived tree as such and it does not burn up like an extraspsychic tree. There is an attempt to overcome the problem of knowledge about the external world and the problem about how to get the knowledge of the extraspsychic reality. Mind is not a piece which can be separated from the whole. However, mind is often separated from the brain and the body, as if it is a piece, not a moment of one and the same person. The “mind-brain” problem should be treated as an instance of such kind of confusions which depend on the misinterpretation of part and whole relationship.

The misinterpretation of part and whole relation leads to the category mistakes in which one gives an independent ontological status to the immaterial substance in Descartes. When one talks about persons, one uses the language of things, objects, individuals, entities. Plato, Descartes and Christian tradition also use such kind of language in which it expresses a certain kind of ontology. The most famous expression of this ontology is Descartes’ *res cogitans* or “thinking thing” which is the most certain truth. Human mind can rationally find the conclusion that I am a thing which thinks. *Cogito* of Descartes has a form which is “I think”. There is a grammatical structure which is “S is p” in different languages. The acceptance of “I” in the philosophy of Descartes, “pure ego” in *Ideas*, “transcendental ego” in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* depend on the “grammatical hypotization”.²⁴⁰ The ability of the pure consciousness

²³⁹ Philipse, Herman, “Transcendental Idealism” in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl* (edited by Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998, p. 254.

²⁴⁰ Ideas and experiences are set up as objects and “true being” which can be grasped through intuition, “just in case of empirical realities”. However, there is the “Platonic hypostatization” in the claims of “Platonizing realists”. Empiricist philosophers claim

which is “abstraction” lets one to give an independent ontological status which is also harmonious with our language structure. “What lies before us, in fact, can be only the empirically real mental products of ‘abstraction’, which tack themselves on to experiences or presentations in their natural reality.”²⁴¹ It is clear that one of the rational ability is to use language and to say “I”. One uses “I” in a particular language to refer to the disembodied pure consciousness which is the agent of truth by making inferences, constructing hypothesis, etc. The “I” can say “I think this or that”; “I intend to do this or that”. However, this “I” merely depends on the abstraction of pure consciousness which lets to think and speak as if it is an ontologically independent entity or as if it is a *concretum*, not *abstractum* apart from its whole. Other persons call this “I” as “you”. This “you” is recognized as one and the same person in different situations by other persons. However, they cannot reach the conscious acts from the third person perspective. In fact, from the third person perspective, other person is necessarily embodied within the body, but one gets the knowledge of the disembodied consciousness from the first person perspective.

There is the creation of the ontologically different “transcendental ego” as a category mistake in Husserl, as a result of the abstraction of the moments from its whole. One also thinks and talks about moments in an abstract way. This section is a continuation of the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. I try to explain the

that “there cannot be any such thing as essence and intuition of essence (ideation). So, they are the mere creation of the “grammatical hypostatization”. Husserl claims that ideas or essences are “mental constructions”, “products of abstractions”. However, these claims should not lead to the conclusion that “essence”, “idea” or “eidos” are “philosophical names for “sober psychological facts”. I use the concept, “grammatical hypostatization” to show that “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” depend on merely “grammatical hypostatization”. See Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 22, p. 89 (in the 6th printing).

²⁴¹ Ibid., § 22, p. 89.

reasons of the category mistakes which involve the claims about Cartesian immaterial substance, “pure ego” in *Ideas* “transcendental ego” in Husserl in *The Crisis in the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The elimination of “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” will let to solve the mind-body problem in the frame of phenomenology.

2.13 The Dissolution of the Mind – Body Problem in Husserl

To dissolve the mind-body problem in the frame of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology is the “task” of the phenomenology. The relation among body, mental acts and the self should be re-examined to dissolve the problem. The ontological status of mental acts or experiences (*Erlebnisse*) and their relationship with the self and body should be analyzed as the first step of the examination. Everything, including the body is put into brackets “to disengage the ego from its natural concerns”.²⁴² In fact, this reduction also involves an ontological separation. So, there will be detailed analysis of the ontological status of mental acts, self and body to solve the old mind-body problem.

All mental processes presuppose the existence of a human being who is the owner of mind. The consciousness of a person is the totality of mental processes or a stream of consciousness. Different and distinct streams of consciousness belong to different persons. All mental processes are subject-dependent or egocentric.

²⁴² Laskey, Dallas, “Embodied Consciousness and the Human Spirit” in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), (New York: Humanities Press), Vol. 1, 1971, p. 197.

Mental processes, which are sensations, perceptions, memory, images, desires and volitions, are generally conscious. Subconscious and unconscious mental processes are also potentially conscious²⁴³ which can become actually conscious whenever one turns his attention to them. Consciousness is the essential nature of the potential or actual characteristic of all kinds of mental processes. After these explanations about the nature of mind and consciousness is necessary to explain the ontological status of mind.

Whether one can reduce the mind into a substance or not? If mind is reducible to a substance, it will be either physical or spiritual. The mind as a physical substance can be identified with an intelligently behaving living body. There is no mind-body interaction problem in which the mind is merely identified with the living body. The mind as a spiritual substance can be in two different forms which are substance dualism and property dualism. The typical example of the substance dualism is the Cartesian dualism in which mind and body are two different kinds of substances. Substance dualism claims the disembodied soul coexisting with the body. Property dualism claims that human being has two different properties which are mental and physical as distinct, dependent moments of one and the same person. In the substance dualism, there is the problem of interaction among these two different substances. In property dualism, there is the problem of interaction among two different types of properties which are physical and mental.

If mind is irreducible to a substance, there will be a question, whether pure consciousness is with or without an underlying ego. Mind

²⁴³ There is the claim about the potential conscious nature of mental processes. See Grünberg, David, "Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and the Mind-Body Problem" in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), 2007, Vol. 94, 2007, p. 237.

as pure consciousness without an ego is exemplified in the bundle theory of mind in the philosophy of Hume and early Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*. Pure consciousness with an underlying ego is exemplified in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

Non-egologic pure consciousness depends on the subjective first person perspective. This perspective can be called as the Claim-1. To define the minds as intelligently behaving bodies depends on the third person perspective which includes objective, publicly observable circumstances. Such kind of perspective can be called as Claim-2. A mind which is embodied within an egologic consciousness is the claim of the property dualism. There is also substance dualism. This perspective depends on the common sense of the “man in the street” and some of the philosophers who also agree with these common sense claims. In *The Crisis of the European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl also claims the existence of the “transcendental ego” or “apodictic ego” as the life-world perspective or life-world attitude. This can be called as Claim-3.

These claims represent different perspectives. Claim-1 is from the first person perspective. Claim-2 is from the naturalistic-scientific perspective or “natural attitude” in the philosophy of Husserl. Claim-3 is from the common sense or life-world perspective or life-world attitude in the philosophy of Husserl. Unlike the Claim-1 and Claim-2 which are theoretical perspectives, Claim-3 is practical. Claim-1 is harmonious with the Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological attitude. Claim-2 provides satisfactory scientific explanations in the limits of the naturalistic-scientific attitude or “natural attitude” in Husserl. Claim-1 and Claim-2 do not lead to the mind-body problem. There is no problem for the relationship among consciousness and the underlying soul as in

the substance dualism or the relationship among experiences and the self as in the property dualism. The question which is how mind is related to body and consciousness to the soul is simply dissolved. One claims that there are no relations among them. Claim-1 and Claim-2 explain the nature of mind satisfactorily from their perspectives. Claim-1 depends on the phenomenological reflection by which one can get the content of consciousness immediately, directly and privately. So, the genuine nature of mind can be grasped via the phenomenological reflection.

Claim-2 also explains the genuine nature of mind as a result of the developments in neurophysiology and artificial intelligence studies. One claims that there will not be any unexplainable phenomenon, as a result of the developments in sciences in the future. In the Claim-3, there is a mind which involves not only body, but also consciousness as distinct dependent moments of one and the same person. This claim is compatible with the common sense claims and life-world attitude. It is clear that human being is able to experience the mind and body separately. The Claim-3 leads to the mind-body problem. To solve or dissolve the problem, one can show the problem in the Claim-3. The problem of the Claim-3 depends on the difference between the first and third person perspectives. The possible solution is to accept either the transcendental-phenomenological claim, Claim-1 or naturalistic-scientific attitude, Claim-2.²⁴⁴

Dissolution of the Mind–Body Problem: There are three competing claims for the dissolution of the mind-body problem.

²⁴⁴ See Grünberg, David who classifies these views of mind as Mind-1, Mind-2, Mind-3 in the article "Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and the Mind-Body Problem" in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), 2007, Vol. 94, 2007, p. 238.

Claim-1 which is the transcendental-phenomenological attitude defines mind without a self-identical "pure ego". Mind is mere totality of conscious experiences or "psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness."²⁴⁵ In fact, these conscious experiences or "psychic acts" are also called as "mental acts" and "intentional experiences". It is clear that Claim-1 depends on the first- person perspective. Whatever is transcendent is constituted as the intentional objects of conscious experiences. So, one can claim the ontological priority of these conscious acts. Since, conscious experiences can be known certainly on the basis of the reality of the conscious experiences, instead of the reality of the objects and their properties, they are also epistemologically primary. The only certain, legitimate source of knowledge is these conscious experiences without any theory, including scientific theories and metaphysical claims. In *Logical Investigations*, "empirical ego" is the unity of "phenomenological ego" and "ego body".

If we cut the ego-body from the empirical ego, and limit the purely mental ego to its phenomenological content, the latter reduces to a unity of consciousness, to a real experiential complex, which we (i.e. each man for his own ego) find in part evidently present, and for the rest postulate on good grounds. The "phenomenologically reduced ego" is therefore nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (New York: The Humanities Press), Vol. 2, Investigation V, § I, p. 535.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., Investigation V, § 4, p. 541.

In the Claim-1, the relationship between the mind and body is that transcendent "ego body" is phenomenologically constituted as the intentional object of some intentional experiences.

Transcendent body is phenomenologically reduced to be an immanent object of the mind. The relation between an immanent mind and transcendent body is dissolved by means of the phenomenological reduction of the transcendent "ego body".²⁴⁷

Meanwhile, "phenomenologically reduced ego" is nothing more than experiences "in the unified stream of consciousness" or "interconnected unity". Husserl clearly denies the "pure ego". In fact, "...the phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness is already constituted, without need of an additional, peculiar ego-principle which supports all contents and unities them all on."²⁴⁸

If Husserl accepts such kind of "pure ego", there will be a "peculiar" kind of transcendence in the consciousness. However, Husserl defines "[c]onsciousness as the inner awareness of one's own psychic experiences" in *Logical Investigations*. However, there is a "peculiar" kind of transcendence of the "pure ego" and different ontological status than its experiences in *Ideas* and in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. To dissolve the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the self-identical "pure ego" in *Ideas* or "transcendental ego" (apodictic ego) in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. In the Claim-

²⁴⁷ This is the possible mind-body solution after the denial of "pure ego" and "Transcendental ego". See Grünberg, David, "Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and the Mind-Body Problem" in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), 2007, Vol. 94, 2007, p. 253.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, Investigation V, § 4, p. 541-542.

1, there is no reality besides consciousness, including “ego body” after cutting the “ego body” from the “empirical ego”.²⁴⁹ So, just “phenomenologically reduced ego” without a “pure ego” remains. In other words, everything is immanent from the first person perspective without letting any kind of transcendences, including the “peculiar” kind of transcendence of the “pure ego”.

The “pure ego” is incompatible with the ontology of the radically immanent transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology should deal with the purely immanent realm of beings, including pure experiences, their meanings and intentional objects, etc. So, Claim-1 excludes all kind of transcendences, including one’s own body. Claim-1 also supports the disembodied, singular consciousness in which all transcendences are excluded and purified. There are mere immanent concrete conscious experiences in the stream of consciousness. Just “phenomenologically reduced ego” which consists of conscious experiences remains from the first person perspective.

Claim-2 which depends on the third person perspective is naturalistic- scientific attitude or “natural attitude”. The nature of mind is explained as a result of the developments in neurophysiologic researches, cognitive science and artificial intelligence studies. The mind and body relation is explained with a physical system which is able to behave intelligently. Scientific explanations dissolve the mind-body problem from the third person perspective. Claim-1 and Claim-2

²⁴⁹ Like the rest of the world, the body is also constituted by me in my experience. So, it is necessary that one should give the analysis of intentional acts. In fact, every act involves a noema which is the intentional object of an act. The central thesis of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is that the world and whatever it contains, including our bodies is constituted by transcendental consciousness. See Schmitt, Richard, “On Knowing One’s Own Body” in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka), (New York: Humanities Press), Volume 1, 1971, pp. 157-158.

are not compatible with the common sense and life-world attitude. *Psyche* or soul which is responsible from the kinestically awareness of the bodily movements and will to move the body is embodied within the body. In other words, *psyche* or soul turns the physical body into a living body. Husserl claims that "[t]he soul 'is', of course 'in' the world."²⁵⁰ Souls are pre-given in the life world, because of the human body. Since, soul or *psyche* is embodied within the body; there is the possible mind-body problem in the life-world attitude.

An original reflective question is now directed toward what and how souls – first of all human souls – are in the world, the life – world, i.e., how they "animate" physical living bodies, how they are localized in space – time, how each one "lives" psychically in having "consciousness" of the world in which it lives and is conscious of living, how each one experiences "its" physical body, not merely in general, as a particular physical body, but in a quite peculiar way as "living body" as a system of its "organs" which it moves as an ego (in holding sway over them); how it thus "takes a hand" in its consciously given surrounding world as "I strike", "I push", "I lift" this and that, etc.²⁵¹

These claims are harmonious with the common sense. However, embodied soul or *psyche* leads to the mind-body problem. One always gets the knowledge of mental acts or conscious experiences from the first person perspective. Our introspective reports also support this claim. Husserl divides the body of human being into two different kinds which are physical and living. From the first person perspective, one experiences the living body by means of introspection of the pain,

²⁵⁰ Ibid., § 60, p. 212.

²⁵¹ Ibid., § 60, pp. 211 – 212.

pleasure of the living body. However, third person cannot get the introspective knowledge of these mental states. In other words, third person perspective is the only possible way to get the knowledge of other person which can be exemplified in the sciences. Unlike the first person perspective, the other persons are necessarily embodied within the body from the third person perspective. In the frame of the concepts which are physical body (*Körper*) and living body (*Leib*), one can re-examine the problem.

When one utters the sentence, "I have a toothache", one can get the knowledge of it via introspection directly, immediately and privately including its *quale* as token of the pain type. When someone utters the sentence "you" have a toothache", "you" refers to the body of the person who utters the sentence "I have a toothache". However, "I" refers to a certain mental state, pain from the first person perspective. What one gets the knowledge of pain from introspection implies the presence of pure consciousness, not body as in the claim of the third person perspective. From the third person perspective, the "I" which is the "you" of the other person necessarily embodied within a body. However, one experiences mental states introspectively from the first person perspective. "I" refers to the disembodied consciousness. It is already shown that introspection neither reveals any brain or neural activities nor the self. It merely supports the disembodied consciousness. In Husserl, just conscious experiences without self identical "pure ego" can be accessed directly, immediately via reflection as in the claim of *Logical Investigations*, not in *Ideas* and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. For example: there must be further phenomenological reflection to access the "transcendental ego".

In the Claim-3, one accepts the identical “transcendental ego” or “apodictic ego”. As a result of the “transcendental reduction”, transcendent *psyche* is re-constituted in the pure consciousness. It becomes an immanent intentional object for itself. So far, these claims are suitable to the spirit of transcendental-phenomenological attitude. However, identical “transcendental ego” does not let the further “phenomenological reduction” to be a mere phenomenon for itself. It is still in itself and it is still transcendent as being contrary to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude. “Transcendental ego” never becomes an immanent intentional object. The Claim-1 avoids this problem, due to the denial of the “pure ego”.

In the Claim-2 which is natural-scientific attitude, one solves the mind - body problem in the frame of sciences. The “natural attitude” defends the third person perspective by leaving the first person perspective. Claim-1 also solves the mind-body problem from the first person perspective in the frame of the transcendental phenomenological attitude.

Claim-1 and Claim-2 do not lead to the mind-body problem. Claim-3 causes the problems which are about mind-body and the transcendence of the “transcendental ego”. Claim-3 includes the problems about the explanation of how mind relates to body in the life-world attitude. In fact, this claim depends on the confusion between the first and third person perspectives. To accept the Claim-1 or Claim-2 can solve the mind body problem. From the first perspective of the Claim-1 and the third person perspective of the Claim-2, the interaction between mental and physical events is not a genuine problem. There is no need to explain the interaction relation from these perspectives. So,

one can accept Claim-1 or Claim-2 to explain the interaction problem.²⁵² Our preference will be the Claim-1 in the frame of the transcendental phenomenological attitude. Why one should prefer the Claim-1 will be explained in the third chapter which is Arguments for the Immaterial Pure Consciousness in the thesis. I will defend the irreducibility of non-egologic pure consciousness.

So far, I have already denied the persisting ego. I also show that the possible solution of the mind-body problem depends on this denial. So, to solve the problem of personal identity is inevitable for the success of these claims.

2.14 Problem of Personal Identity

We are all persons. But what persons are? This is the one of the main questions in the history of philosophy. People believed that we are immaterial souls or egos which are contingently attached to our bodies in the western tradition, during the two thousand years. Plato and Descartes are the two famous philosophers who defend these claims, in spite of the ontological and epistemological problems. There is not only substance dualism such as Descartes, but also property dualism which can be exemplified in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* in the philosophy of Husserl. If one claims that personal identity does not depend on the identity of substance which can be immaterial substance or persisting ego, the

²⁵² See Grünberg, David, "Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology and the Mind-Body Problem" in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), 2007, Vol. 94, 2007, p. 254.

problem of personal identity is inevitable.²⁵³ In the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section, I have already denied the existence of ego. So, the problem of the personal identity is inevitable. The success of the solution of the mind-body problem, which depends on the denial of the ego, also depends on the solution of the personal identity problem.

Is there a self, "I" or an ego which provides the sense of continuity throughout the changes? In fact, everybody experiences that one undergoes from one state of consciousness to another. One should answer the question whether there is an enduring "I" as an existing entity which persists through time. We have already shown that there is no "pure ego" in *Ideas* or "transcendental ego" (apodictic ego) in *The Crisis in European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. If "I" simply refers to my present state of consciousness, it can be different from the previous state of consciousness; even it can contradict with it. In our claim, there is the mere "phenomenologically reduced ego" which is the interconnected unity of experiences, without an additional "ego-principle" as in the initial position of Husserl. So, there can be a question in which what provides the sense of the continuity of the person over time. There are two competing theories in which one defends the mental continuity theory against the physical one. The memory criteria will be used to show that how one considers that there is the continuity and the unity of the self, in spite of the denial of the "ego-principle".

"The question "What is a person" is to be answered by examination of the question 'What am I?'"²⁵⁴ Self consciousness is our

²⁵³ This is the basic claim of Noon. See Noon, Horald W., *Hume on Knowledge*, (New York: Routledge), 1999, p. 188.

²⁵⁴ Sydney, Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self Identity*, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 1963, p. 165.

ability to think about ourselves, our awareness of our existence as individuals and our distinctness from others.²⁵⁵ The self-conscious human being asks that "...what it is to be a person and what it is involved in being the same person over time."²⁵⁶ The strict continuity of the person is questioned by asking "[w]hat is it to be the same person today as one was in the past, or will be in the future?"²⁵⁷ One is aware of the changes of himself, during the transition from childhood to old ages. This problem can be formulated like that "...what does it mean for a person to persist in time when so many changes occur to that being?"²⁵⁸

One examines "...the philosophy of our own strict survival or, to use a professionally popular label, personal identity".²⁵⁹ It is "...central to the issue of personal identity is the old and powerful idea that persons have a *unity* or a *continuity* of consciousness."²⁶⁰ We have strong intuitions about the identity of the persons in different places and times as being part of our common sense beliefs about personal identity in which one sees the belief about a unified mental life of the person.

"Man in the street" observes that people age, some trees regularly shed their leaves, ice melts with the coming of spring in the

²⁵⁵ This definition of self Consciousness is given by Chalmers. See Chalmers, David J., *The Conscious Mind*, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1996, p. 27.

²⁵⁶ Baillie, James, *Problems in Personal Identity*, (New York: Paragon House), 1993, p. 1.

²⁵⁷ Garrett, Brian, "Personal Identity" in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0, (London & New York: Routledge), 1998.

²⁵⁸ Alexander, Ronald G., *The Self Supervenience and Personal Identity*, (U.S.A: Ashgate), 1997, p. 6.

²⁵⁹ Unger, Peter, *Identity, Consciousness and Value*, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1990, p. 5.

²⁶⁰ Wilkes, Kathleen V., "Fugues, Hypnosis, and Multiple Personality" in *Self and Identity*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company), 1991, p. 115.

“fact world”. The world is in a perpetual flux and transformation. In spite of these alterations, we have a natural tendency to claim that this is the same person, the same tree or the same water.

There must be a philosophical reflection about the nature of change and the identification or re-identification of something or someone. In fact, there are common sense claims or natural human inclinations to accept that there must be “*something*” which remains unchanged and unaffected, in spite of the transformations it undergoes. To solve this problem, one can use some thought experiments. Since our common sense beliefs can be unreliable as incompatible with the spirit of phenomenology.

Traditionally, there are two competing theories which defend physical and mental continuity.²⁶¹ According to physical-continuity theory, person A at time1 is identical to person B at time2 if and only if A and B have the same body, because of the continuity of the body. The physical continuity theory is compatible with the practical conviction. However, amputations, cosmetic surgery, even sex-change surgery cause drastic changes without the loss of identity.

One also analysis the famous thought experiments about brain transplantation which seems technologically possible in the future, at least it is logically possible. Mr. Brown and Mr. Robinson²⁶² get an operation simultaneously, due to the brain tumors. During the operation, the careless assistant put Brown’s brain into Robinson’s head and Robinson’s brain in Brown’s head. One of these men immediately dies. However, the other person who is the owner of Robinson’s head and

²⁶¹This division is made by Moody. See Moody, Todd C., *Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall), 1993, p. 153.

²⁶²This example is given by Garrett. See Garrett, Brian, *Personal Identity in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (London & New York: Routledge), 1998, Version 1.0.

Brown's brain regains his consciousness. One can call him as Brownson who will automatically reply that his name is Brown, whenever one asks his name. He can recognize Brown's wife, family and he can describe the detail events of Brown's life. However, he does not have any evidence about the life of the Robinson. So, physical continuity theory fails in this thought experiment. However, physical continuity theory can reject this claim via the narrow version of the theory about the continuity, identity of the brain. So, the identity of the person depends on the identity of the brain, not other body parts. One can imagine a situation in which one can construct a silicon brain to support the same kind of mental life as organic brain. One also organizes a thought experiment in which his brain gets cancer and brain operators will replace cancerous parts step by step with silicon chips to continue his mental life without any change in his beliefs, memories, character, etc. At the end of the operations, the damaged brain tissues are replaced with silicon chips totally. The mental life, physical appearance and the abilities of the person are unaffected, after this replacement. The claim about the identity of the human being depends on the identity of the brain fails in this example.

There is a claim in which one defends that brain continuity supports personal identity, because of the mental continuity. In fact, mental continuity theorist can agree with this claim. However, mental continuity must be much more basic than physical continuity for personal identity. Mental continuity theorists support a kind of dualism. One clearly accepts that mental continuity is quite different than physical continuity. There is the acceptance of non-physical which provides the mental continuity. In fact, the real claim of the mental continuity theory is that mental continuity is not reducible to any particular physical continuity in the mental continuity theory. However, the brain-continuity theorist insists that mental continuity is reducible to the physical one.

To defend the mental continuity theory, one develops the memory criteria of Locke from the phenomenological perspective. Husserl explains the perception which involves its noema and perceptual meaning as "the perceived as such". "Similarly, the recollection, when it occurs has as its own its *remembered as such* precisely as it is "meant" and "consciously known" in it; so again judging has as its own in it; so again judging has as its own the *judged as such*, pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth."²⁶³ So, one can defend continuity of the personal identity by means of the perception and the memory. Temporal objects are transcendent to consciousness such as houses, trees, etc. However, the acts of perceiving houses, trees are immanent to consciousness as being sensory contents which endure in the stream of consciousness. In fact, its main characteristic is duration which has a beginning and end in the stream of consciousness as the privileged now point which involves past and future in the time horizon.

The intentional analysis of "recollection" needs the examination of the perception.²⁶⁴ "Recollection" is merely the re-collection of what was perceived as such. Recollection is the "the original manner of being conscious of the past". Intentional analysis of recollection presupposes perception.

We soon see that we need the intentional analysis of recollection as the original manner of being conscious of the past: but we also see that such an analysis presupposes in

²⁶³ Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas* (translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), (New York: Humanities Press), 1976, § 88, p. 258.

²⁶⁴ Memory presupposes prior perception or perception of the past."[W]hat is remembered is intended as having been perceived". See Brough, John, "The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness" in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame), 1977, p. 85.

principle that of perception, since memory, curiously enough, implies having-perceived”²⁶⁵.

During the “recollection”, there is the mere re-presentation of what has already been perceived. So, there is a strict relation between perception and memory.

...[L]ike memory in the usual sense of intuitive “recollection”, a phenomenon which openly, so to speak, plays a part in object and world-apperception. And thus the different modes of presentification in general enter into the universal investigation we are undertaking here, namely that of inquiring consistently and exclusively after the *how* of the world’s manner of givenness, its open or implicit intentionalities.²⁶⁶

To examine the memory, there is the necessity to examine the perception and how it presents objects to us. Perception directly presents an object to us in the manner of presences and absences from a certain angle or perspective which is called as the “world’s manner of givenness”. The identity of a spatio-temporal object and a human being show similarities. During the different manifolds of presentation, one and the same object continue to present itself. The identity is also given when the object is remembered. Remembering also provides a set of appearances or manifolds through which one and the same object is given to us. However, it still presents the same object as remembered, as past. When one stores the memories, one can claim that they are

²⁶⁵ Ibid., § 46, p. 160.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., § 46, p. 160.

not the images of things. They are the perceptions which are perceived once before. In fact, one stores up the earlier perceptions as they are. There is the storage of the perceptions which one lived once before. When these perceptions are called up, they also bring their objects and their objective correlates. What one remembers or calls up is his earlier perceptions as such and as they are. The most interesting thing is that one remembers the objects as they were given at that time. One captures the earlier part of our intentional life. By means of memory, one can bring it life again and again. There is the conscious activity to relieve the past perceptions. That is why our memories are so nostalgic. The past gains life again in a special kind of absence, not as the absence of the other side of the spatio-temporal objects. In memory, one reactivates not only an object but also a presentation of object as there and then, and yet presenting itself again as here and now, but only as past. Remembered objects takes a different noematic form from perceived objects which are only here and now, not there and then. One merely relieves the past perception. The same thing or object which is there and then is given to me as here and now, but as past.

In memory, the object that was perceived once before is given as past, as remembered. It means that it is given as it was perceived. One organizes an imaginary situation in which he sees an automobile accident. He remembers it from the same angle with the same sides, aspects and profiles from which he saw it once before. One and the same traffic accident can be retrieved again and again by the person who can retrieve the details of the accident. One also can retrieve the color of the traffic light, during the accident. One also tries to bring back the details of the perceived accident as the retrieval of the past perception as it is. The self is the agent of remembering. Husserl defines the recollection as the "original manner of being conscious of the past". He also continues that the analysis of recollection

presupposes the analysis of perception. In fact, memory depends on what Husserl calls “having-perceived”. In fact, one knows that what one perceives includes a certain kind of “world’s manner of givenness” and its retrieval also involves it. In the traffic accident, one remembers the event from a certain angle of the side, aspect and profiles of the past perception. When one remembers something as in the example of traffic accident, he displaces himself into the past. One can realize the distinction between the present self who is here and now in which he is sitting on a chair in a room and the old self who is the witness of the traffic accident which occurred yesterday.

The retrieval of the earlier perception of the person involves the retrieval of the old self who saw the traffic accident yesterday. His past self as the agent of that experience comes to light again, during the recollection of the past perception which is similar to the recollection, retrieval of the perceived object. By means of the memory, a distinction is introduced between the remembering self and the remembered self. One also realizes that self is the identity which is constituted between present self as remembering and past self as remembered via memory. The self is constituted via memory which involves the retrieval of old perceptions. Since, they become the part of the self; the constitution of the self via memory sometimes leads to some problems after some traumatic experiences. Memory brings the old selves who are acting and experiencing as there and then. One cannot be fully aware of the succession of the selves and their continuity without the memory.

One also organizes a thought experiment in which the invented machine “sets aside” whatever is physical, especially brain and all of its neural activities. The machine lets us to watch the traffic accident memories of the person on the curtain. By this way, other persons can watch these reflected memories of the witness of the traffic accident on

the curtain intersubjectively. It is quite surprising that not only the person himself, but also the other persons claim that the present person and the person who saw the traffic accident yesterday are one and the same.

These claims remind the Locke's memory based theory of personal identity on the basis of the ability to remember one's past experiences. For the further analysis, one can examine Korsakoff syndrome which is caused by alcoholism and the deficiency of B1 vitamin (subsequent thiamine). This illness causes a certain degree of amnesia, intellectual and cognitive impairments. The patients of this illness have difficulty in learning and remembering the new information. However, they have the great ability to remember past experiences. So, the patient can retrieve the vivid memories of his youth. However, he still believes that he is still in the same age. If one meets an extreme Korsakoff patient for the first time in the morning, he can not recognize or remember you in the afternoon without realizing that anything is wrong with them. One of the case histories, Jimmie G. also suffers from a certain kind of retrograde amnesia, due to Korsakoff syndrome.²⁶⁷ In 1975, Jimmie thinks that the year is 1945 and he is still nineteen years old. When he looks at the mirror image, he sees a middle-aged man. This mirror image causes an extreme panic for him. However, it continues just few seconds. Then, there is no sense of the passing of time any more. In this example, there is a psychological continuity on the basis of his well-established memories of past events and experiences, prior to 1945. In this psychological criterion, one can mention some other factors such as the continuity of character, values, habits and their remembrance. In this example, Jimmie G. has

²⁶⁷ This example is given by Ballie. See Ballie, James, *Problems in Personal Identity*, (New York: Pragon Houses), 1993, p. 108.

“absolutely originary consciousness” as primal impression. There is also no problem in retention which is “fresh” or “primary” memory. By means of retention, he is aware of the “originary consciousness of what is past”. Whenever he looks at the mirror image, he is conscious of the perceived past, perceived succession, perceived duration of the mirror image of him as primary impression. Retention provides to be conscious of the past. Consciousness continuously fluxes as a stream of consciousness, during the perception of the mirror image. Meanwhile, he is conscious of the past by means of retention as the succession of the duration. During the perception of the reflected mirror image, one knows that there is the now point with its horizon of past and future in the dark horizon. All of these processes show that perception occurs without any recollection of it. There is no “original manner of being conscious of the past” via recollection. Memory does not give any information about what is “having-perceived”. So, he considers that he is still nineteen years old and the year is 1945. There is the sense of personal identity from early ages to nineteen years old via memory. He also can recollect his beliefs, character, values and hopes as being the part of the self when he was nineteen years old. There is the mere a bundle or collection of perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity in perpetual flux and movement. Due to the absence of the memory, Jimmie G. cannot provide the continuity of the self from past to present. So, he can be called as “Humean being”. There is the constitution of the self as an identity in a manifold of appearances of us by means of memory. Unlike other entities, human being presents himself as the agents of his intentional life. The reflected mirror image causes the realization of the “empirical ego”. However, there is no more sense of identity for him, due to the lack of preservation of new memories. Memory lets one to have the sense of

continuity of the self. So, there is no need for the identical “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”.

Here it is a case of inquiries proceeding from real human beings back to their “manners of givenness”, their manners of “appearing”, first of all in perceptual appearance, i.e., in the mode of original self-givenness, of manners of harmonious verification and correction, of identification through recognition as the same human person: as the person previously known “personally” to us, the same one of whom others speak, with whom they also have become acquainted, etc.²⁶⁸.

Husserl also claims that each person recognize each other in different social groups. “There stands a man, in this social group of persons well known to one another”.²⁶⁹ Human being realizes not only the identity of himself but also the identity of other persons.

One organizes a thought experiment in which “mind wipe” technology is invented to delete an individual’s memories and personal dispositions. So, the person in the thought experiment has a mind which is similar to the Lockean “blank state” without any problem in his organic health. However, one cannot say that he is still the same person, in spite of his bodily continuance. So, one can claim that mental continuity is much more important than physical continuity. Phenomenology accepts whatever is non-physical which is not reducible to whatever is physical, including a brain.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., § 54, p. 183.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., § 54, p. 183.

In fact, common sense and practical conviction support that physical continuity is more important than the mental continuity. Despite of our direct and immediate experience of the disembodied pure consciousness without an “ego-principle” from the first person perspective, other persons see our body and bodily continuance which lead to the confused claims of the physical continuity theory.

Briefly, there is the re-examination of the problem of personal identity as a puzzle of the philosophy in the frame of phenomenology. We can claim that mental continuity is much more important than physical continuity for the continuance of the personal identity. There is the continuity of the habits, character and to remember them also provides the continuity of the personal identity. To support these claims, I use the Kafka’s novel, *Transformation*.

2.15 Personal Identity Problem in the New Body Scenario

One supports mental continuity theory to solve the puzzle about the personal identity. However, human being can get so radical bodily changes that one may not recognize him as the same person from the third person perspective. However, there is still the sense of the continuity of the self by means of memory from the first person perspective.

One can imagine situations in which there is a radical body change of a person to show that memory, dispositional continuity, ideas, beliefs, character and mental continuity of persons are more basic than the physical continuity. A person can imagine²⁷⁰ himself in many

²⁷⁰ Phenomenological reduction causes the apodictic self-certainty of the “transcendental ego” which is present immediately to itself in this reflection.

different situations. Memory and imagination show structural similarity. So, one can easily slip into the other. Like memory, some sort of displacement of the self happens in the imagination. In both forms of intentionality, I here and now can mentally live in another place and time. In memory, there and then is specific and past. However, events occur in no where and no when in imagination.²⁷¹ During the imagination, events occur in no where and no when as being totally different then here and now in which I actually inhabit. One displaces himself into an imaginary world,²⁷² even he lives in the real one. In fact, an object in imagination and imaginary object can be taken from real perceptions and memories. However, they are projected into situations that did not occur.

The major difference between memory and imagination depends on the belief. The memories which I call up depend on what really happened and what I did before. One cannot say that one has memories and then one adds belief to them. In fact, they originally come with belief about how it was just as my perceptions come with

Furthermore, this ego can know itself in eidetic variations. "In this self-presence of its constituting functions it is apodictically certain of itself and can know, in eidetic variations, these functions as necessarily belonging to any thinkable Ego at all." To grasp the "eidos" transcendental ego" is thinkable without a transcendental ego as factual. I myself who reflects and varies itself via free fantasy. One realizes the self as the "apodictically the Ego of factual reality", the Ego of abilities which in particular I have acquired for myself in fact as an eidetically thinking and seeing". See Landgrebe, Ludwig, "Phenomenology as Transcendental Theory of History", *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame), 1977, p. 103.

²⁷¹ In spite of some differences, it is claimed that imagination is a mode of memory. See Casey, Edward S., "Imagination and Phenomenological Method" in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame), 1977, p. 74.

²⁷² There is no strict non-existence of phenomena in imagination. If one considers the example of unicorn, one simply contemplates imagined objects or events as possible. An existent or non-existent unicorn is a purely possible beast. So, an imaginary world can be potentially full of possible objects or events. See Casey, Edward S., in "Imagination and Phenomenological Method" in *Husserl Expositions and Appraisals*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame), 1977, p. 74.

belief about how it is. One has to make an effort to delete the belief in the memory or to change it into another modality such as doubt or denial. In imagination, there is a suspension of belief which turns into the mode of "as if". There is a proper modal change in imagination. In imagination, one displaces himself into an imaginary world, not the real world around the person. The real world remains as the believed-in context of the imaginary world in which one is displaced. For all the imagined things, one has the sense of unreality. There is no influence of the imaginations as the unpleasant experiences of the past. Imagination and memory are two different kinds of intentional activities of the pure consciousness.

In all forms of intentional activities, identity synthesis is seen. Similarly, there is also an identity synthesis in imagination. An imaginary object stays one and the same, in spite of different imaginations of the object. One can take the actually perceived objects to use in imaginary scenarios and imaginary objects remain one and the same in different imaginations as in perceptions. One can fantasize the imaginary objects in all sorts of improbable situations. Unlike memory, there is a total freedom in imagination. Therefore, one can claim that imagination works in a *doxic* modality which is different from perception and memory, because of its unreality. In imagination, an event occurs "as if" it really happens. In fact, it does not happen in reality. One sometimes imagines himself in different conditions in the future, when one tries to make a decision or when one makes a plan for future. This is an anticipatory form of imagination which depends on "fantasy". When one tries to narrow the possible options among different choices, one can use his imaginative power. The deliberation involves one's imagination in different imaginary situations. One can experience himself in a new situation by means of the displacement of the self. Decision depends on the calculation of the advantages and disadvantages as being the part

of the rational calculation and deliberation by means of imaginative projection. However, there are also some imaginary projections which can be seen in dreams and fantasy.

The formal structure of displacement helps a person, who is here and now, can imagine himself into a situation in some where and some time in the no-man's-land of free imagination. The displacement of the self is also possible in past or future possible events. These displaced forms of consciousness are derivative from perception which gives the raw material and content for them. Human being lives in the immediately and perceptually given pre-theoretical "surrounding world". However, one also lives in the world of the displaced self as being remembered, imagined or anticipated. All of them occur in the "natural attitude", but they are recognized and described in the "phenomenological attitude". Kafka's novel, *Transformation* also depends on the imaginative power of the writer who creates a kind of new body scenario. I use the novel of Kafka, *Transformation* to show that mental continuity is much more important than physical continuity for the personal identity which has dynamic and constitutive nature.

The hero of this novel, Gregor Samsa sees a horrible dream in which he finds himself as an insect in the bed and he is "embodied within" the insect body. So, his bodily appearance totally changes. His back is similar to an iron plate; his belly part becomes very dark color with little divisions on it. His legs are also so thin that they are shaking unwillingly, as if there is a windy weather. Gregor Samsa tries to understand whether it is a dream or not. He understands that it is not a mere dream. He wants to sleep again to escape from this unpleasant reality. However, he is used to sleep by turning to his right side. He can recollect his habits like this, despite of his insect body. However, his new body does not let him to turn the right side, in spite of his repeated

trials. So, Gregor Samsa understands his radical body change, without the loss of the sense of personal identity. In the story, Gregor Samsa thinks that he is a human being, in spite of his radical body change, due to his old memories. He recognizes his family, his director and he still remembers that he is the represent of new fabrics and he continuously travels for his company. There is the possible recollection of the original manners of the past consciously. Memory lets him to recollect whatever is previously having-perceived. Recollection is a phenomenon which includes the perception of objects, world apperception and "how of the world's manner of givenness". Gregor Samsa is able to recollect all of the perceptions of the objects, world and his past selves, before the transformation. He also can recollect his personal dispositions, beliefs, hopes, character, habits, etc. However, he has new memories about his character; habits and he re-discover his new body and its abilities as a result of this transformation. The treatment and the identity definition of his family also change toward him. His sense of identity decreases as a result of these developments. He knows that he was Gregor Samsa as a human being who has a family, job and he is a member of the *Lebenswelt*. However, he has new experiences and new memories after the transformation. These new memories cause radical changes in the sense of his personal identity. Due to the recollection of his old memories, he knows that he is Gregor Samsa until his death. However, he changes physically which cause the new experiences, new character, habits and the new treatment of other people. So, personal identity is dynamic process in which one defines his identity by means of new memories.

In general, people also sometimes consider that they are still the same person, during their life span. However, their habits, memories, different experiences cause the sense that their present self is quite different than before, in spite of the absence of such kind of radical

change. In this new body scenario, new memories are the part of the self which is re-constituted. Gregor Samsa still identifies himself as the same person, in spite of the radical bodily change and new unpleasant memories after this transformation. However, it is re-defined and constituted as a new self by means of new memories. From the first person perspective of the Gregor Samsa, there is the direct, immediate and private access to his conscious acts and memories. Therefore, there is the continuity of the sense of personal identity for Gregor Samsa. However, other persons, including his family members consider that it is a monster, not Gregor Samsa.

Briefly, mental continuity depends on the memory which provides the continuity of the self, in spite of the succession of the selves. Memory provides the continuity from the past selves to the present one from the first person perspective. The misleading claims of the physical continuity theory depend on the third person perspective about other person's personal identity. The example, Gregor Samsa in Kafka's novel, *Transformation* supports these claims.

CHAPTER 3

ARGUMENTS FOR THE IMMATERIAL PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

3.1 Irreducibility of Non-egologic Pure Consciousness

In this section, I ask that whether psycho-physical identity is possible or not? If it is possible, there will not be any need for phenomenology to examine the nature of pure consciousness. However, such kind of reduction seems impossible because of the two irreducible kinds of entity which are mind and body.²⁷³ Two different domains cause the separation between natural sciences, including psychology and phenomenology.

When the pure consciousness “directs toward” its objects intentionally,²⁷⁴ it reveals the domain of thoughts, sensations or similar mental states, not a domain of electrochemical impulses in a neural network. The identification of mental states with brain states can cause the “category mistake”, because of the conceptual confusions. Mental states and all of its properties are radically different from any kind of neurophysiologic states and properties.²⁷⁵ To analyze these objections,

²⁷³ The irreducible psycho-physical reduction on the basis of the intentionality, in the claim of Brentano is supported. See Wiredu, J. E., “Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 35, (New York: State University of New York at Buffalo, 1975, p. 223.

²⁷⁴ Drummond, John J., “The Structure of Intentionality” in *The New Husserl*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 2003, p. 65.

²⁷⁵ Properties of mental events are different from the physical events such as the experience of pain. Physical events are publicly observable, “spatially locatable”, “swift” and “irreversible”. See Mucciolo, Laurance F., “The Identity Theory and

Leibniz' law which is called as "indiscernibility of identicals" can be used to check the identity of these two items. Leibniz' law states that two items are identical just in case any property had by either one of them is also had by the other. If A is identical to B, then all properties of A must be the properties of B, and vice versa. If one finds a property which is true for brain states, but not mental states or vice versa, the identity of them will fail on the basis of this principle.

In the stream of consciousness which continuously flux, some acts of consciousness is itself time consciousness if and only if its object is a temporal object. The essential feature of temporal object is its duration in the stream of consciousness as being a new now point which will be replaced by new now points in the time horizon. So, perception has duration without spatial position in the stream of consciousness. However, brain states and processes have some specific spatio-temporal location. If mental states are identical with brain states, they must have exactly the same spatial location as in the claim of the identity theory.

But it is literally meaningless, runs the argument, to say that my feeling-of pain is located in my ventral thalamus, of that my belief-that-the-sun-is-a-star is located in the temporal lobe of my left cerebral hemisphere.²⁷⁶

Criteria for the Mental" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 35, (New York: State University of New York at Buffalo), 1975, p. 167.

²⁷⁶ Churchland, Paul M., *Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 1988, p. 30.

In these examples which are “the number 5 is green” or “love weighs twenty grams”,²⁷⁷ there are category mistakes. It is also senseless to ascribe the various semantic properties to brain states. Our thoughts and beliefs have a meaning or a specific propositional content which can be true or false. One can claim that they also enjoy relations such as consistency and entailment. If one claims that thoughts and beliefs are brain states, then all of these semantic properties will be the properties of the brain. “But it is senseless, runs the argument, to say that some resonance in my association cortex is true, or logically entails some other vet assonance close by, or has meaning that.”²⁷⁸

To claim that mental states have anatomical locations and brain states have semantic properties can be the result of the category mistake. How physical brain states can have such kind of semantic properties should be answered by identity theory or any other kind of reductionism. One thinks that “ $2+2=4$ ” is a mathematical proposition which is also a propositional content. Here, pure consciousness “directs toward” intentionally to its object which is atemporal and ideal as in this example. A propositional content seems beyond to all kinds of brain states. Furthermore, intentionality which is the performance of the pure consciousness can not be attained to any physical system as its function, including the brain. There is also the qualitative nature of our mental states. They can be called as *qualia* which can be realized, during the perception of the spatio-temporal world.

The Cartesian philosophy defends that human body and whatever belongs to the outside world is subject to doubt, due to the failure of senses. This claim is repeated in the dream argument.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 30.

However, soul is not open to doubt as being immune to all kinds of doubt. In the evil demon scenario, soul is still immune to doubt. So, the Cartesian mediator still reaches the result, *cogito ergo sum*. Now, a different version of this argument can be used again. Human body and brain are purely complex physical systems which can be known via “empirical intuition” which gives the knowledge of what is contingent, due to the nature of sense perception. However, “essential insight” or “ideation” causes the knowledge of what is apodictic (necessary) such as all kind of knowledge about essences, etc. Whatever belongs to the external world which obeys its natural laws which are also contingent and their knowledge comes from “empirical intuition”. In the domain of pure consciousness, all kinds of knowledge which come from “essential insight” are apodictic.

One can never know whether outside world really exist or not, even our body or brain, due to the contingency of “empirical intuition”, possible “illusions”, “hallucinations” in the philosophy of Husserl. So, what is given to consciousness as appearance, phenomenon is the only genuine reality, regardless of its origin in the domain of pure consciousness.

One can recall the arguments of the Cartesian philosophy about dualism. Mind and body cannot be one and the same, if their essential properties are not the same. Pure consciousness has the ability which is intentionality.²⁷⁹ Perception includes nonphysical *qualia* which is the

²⁷⁹ Intentionality provides the “first person” knowledge of our experiences and their “internal” character as subjective experiences. Therefore, intentionality cannot be explained from the “third person” perspective which does not reveal the internal and subjective character of our experience. Husserl defends a phenomenological concept of intentionality. See McIntyre & David Woodruff Smith, “Theory of Intentionality” in *Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook* (edited by J.N. Monath & William R. McKenna), (Washington: Center of Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University of America), 1989, pp. 151-152.

sign of the purely conscious phenomenon. So, constitution, intentionality²⁸⁰ and *qualia* imply the presence of the immaterial pure consciousness. Besides, feelings and sensations,²⁸¹ every mental act is intentional.

Any physical system, even complex brain system lacks all of these essential nonphysical properties. Therefore, one can not defend the identity of mind and matter on the basis of Leibniz' law. In other words, these essential properties of mind are not owned by whatever is material, including complex brain system. These mentioned special abilities of the pure consciousness will be examined in detail in the following sections.

3.2 Irreducibility of *Qualia*

The reduction of the mental phenomena to the physical one is impossible. In fact, such kind of psycho-physical reduction leads to the reduction of the logical laws to the species specific natural, regulated laws of thinking for human being, not universal, adequate, apodictic laws. There is the mere species specific relativism.²⁸² Unlike contingent

²⁸⁰ The thesis of Brentano about intentionality is "the mark of mental" is used against the psycho-physical identity by Crane. See Crane, Tim, "Intentionality as the Mark of Mental" in *Philosophy*, Vol. 43, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998, pp. 229-252.

²⁸¹ Feelings and sensations are the example of "non-intentional" mental acts. See Monathy, J. N., "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" in *Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research* (edited by Ana Teresa Tymieniecka), Vol. 1, 1971, p. 102.

²⁸² There is the subjective character of an experience which involves immediate phenomenological qualities and a point of view of an organism. There is also an objective point of view as a common species specific point of view. See Hill, Christopher, "Discussion of Bats, Brains, And Minds" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 38, (New York: State University of New York), 1978, p.100.

sense experiences which can change from person to person and from one species to another, there are apodictic truths which are beyond to all kinds of relativism and skepticism. Phenomenology is an attempt to avoid all kind of relativism and skepticism. Furthermore, just irreducible pure consciousness is the owner of such kind of apodictic truths.

Consciousness is the mysterious phenomenon which causes the mind-body problem insoluble, in spite of many materialist and reductionist tendencies by means of psychophysical identification. Unlike the famous scientific identifications such as the identification of water with H₂O, identification of lightning with electrical discharge, the identification of gene with DNA, there is no such kind of successful identification of mental phenomenon with physical one. Water is H₂O in reality. The identification of water with H₂O is formulated as a result of the scientific developments. Every reductionist theory shows these favorite examples of the identification. These unrelated, but successful examples do not show the possible reduction of the mental states with the brain states. There is no possible reduction of whatever is mental into whatever is physical; even how complex it is like a brain. "Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it is hopeless."²⁸³ All kind of reductionism has to make detailed explanation of conscious phenomenon. However, reductionist theories have a great difficulty to explain it.

"Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon."²⁸⁴ Conscious experience can be seen at many different levels of animal life. "No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on

²⁸³ Nagel, Thomas, "What is it like to be a bat?" in *Mortal Questions*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2006, p. 166 (in the 12th printing).

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe.”²⁸⁵ Nagel gives the definition of consciousness in his famous article, “What is it like to be a Bat?” Nagel defines consciousness from the perspective of the organism in which “there is something it is like to *be* that organism.” Husserl claims that “But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism.”²⁸⁶ In fact, this definition is very suitable for the spirit of phenomenology. Furthermore, it also shows the shift in the definition of consciousness. First of all consciousness is defined by means of introspection. However, Nagel claims that an organism has conscious mental states if there is something that “it is like to *be* that organism” or something it is like *for the organism*. All kind of mental states and subjective experiences cannot be possible for robots or automata that behave, as if they are human being. Whatever subjective is called as “*pour soi*” and whatever is objective is called as “*en soi*” by Nagel. What is it like to be an X shows the subjective character of the experience or “*pour soi*”²⁸⁷ which causes the failure of all kinds of materialist and reductionist tendencies. Nagel uses the example of bat which one believes that they have subjective experience. It is a known fact that bats are mammals which is a shared aspect of bats with human beings. However, they have a quite different sensory apparatus which is so different from our sensory apparatus than that their life is called as *alien*²⁸⁸ form of life by Nagel. So, there is something it is like to be a bat.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 166.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 166.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 168.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 168.

Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion and texture comparable to those we make by vision.²⁸⁹

Bat sonar is so different from our perception that one cannot understand the subjective nature of what it is like to be a bat as such. One cannot examine the inner life of the bat from his own case analogously via empathy (*Einfühlung*). In spite of the poor vision of bats, it perceives the surrounding world by a system of a reflected high-frequency sound signals. Human being can perceive that bat catches insects and it spends the day hanging upside down. All of these perceivable appearances of the bat are intersubjectively perceivable by all of the human beings. Human being can also imagine how it is like to be a bat. "Insofar as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for *me* to behave as a bat behaves."²⁹⁰ However, it is impossible for any human being to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat as such. They also show a specific subjective nature which is beyond our ability to conceive. "And if there is conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us."²⁹¹ The similar problem of bat is also possible for Martians or some intelligent creatures in the universe. Nagel uses an argument about *qualia* which is against reductionism.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 168.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 169.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 170.

A Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena, though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world.²⁹²

A Martian scientist can analyze the brain of human being, its physical processes from his own perspective. However, the Martian scientist cannot know what it is like to be the sensation of red, rainbow, pain, sweet for human being from the perspective of the human being. Similarly, human being can also know the physical processes of the brain of bat or a Martian, in spite of the ignorance of what it is like to be a bat or a Martian. All of these explanations cause to restrict the possible psychophysical reduction. There is a species specific point of view or “phenomenal point of view”²⁹³ as such.

The possibility of the psychophysical reduction depends on the reduction of the species-specific perspective and phenomenal qualities which cannot be reduced to any kind of physical phenomena.

As a result of these different perspectives and relativity, one can ask the question whether the world is as we perceive it or not. Kant claims that one can never know the real or “noumenal” world. What one can know as the “appearances” or phenomena, not things in themselves. Our knowledge is limited via the faculties of perception and thinking which organize the raw data of experience. Kant considers that what one knows or what appears to one’s consciousness is not the ultimate

²⁹² Ibid., p. 172-173.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 174.

reality. So, it is inevitable for Kant to separate the phenomenal world and noumenal world as what is in-itself (*Ding an sich*).

These objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, and as some pure understanding would cognize them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility.²⁹⁴

Kant who makes the Copernican revolution in the history of philosophy claims that there are two sources of human knowledge. They are sensibility and understanding. Objects are given to us via sensibility, but they are thought via understanding. One can know things on the basis of the limit and permission of his structured mind.

The distinctive activity of the mind is to synthesize and to unify our experience. It achieves this synthesis first by imposing on our various experiences in the "sensible manifold" certain forms of intuition space and time.²⁹⁵

Kant claims that "[s]pace and time are encountered immediately in intuition and are, at the same time, a priori or, to speak figuratively, lenses through which we always see objects of experience."²⁹⁶ One

²⁹⁴ Kant, Immanuel, *Prolegomena: To Any Future Metaphysics that will be able to Come Forward as Science* (translated by Paul Carus), (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), 1938, p. 30 (in the 7th printing).

²⁹⁵ Stumpf, Samuel E., *Elements of Philosophy: An Introduction*, (Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Company), 1987, p. 426.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

experiences the outside world not only from the limitations of the senses, but also the understanding.

In addition to space and time, which deal particularly with way we sense things, there are certain categories of thought which deal more specifically with the way the mind unitizes or synthesizes our experience. The mind achieves this unifying act by making various kinds of judgments as we engage in the act of interpreting the world of sense.²⁹⁷

One judges the manifold of experience via certain fixed forms or concepts such as quantity, quality, relation and modality. All of these ways of thinking provides the constitution of the act of synthesis which lets the mind to make a consistent single world, in spite of the manifold of sense impressions in the philosophy of Kant. According to Kant, the mind of human being is structured in such a way that it imposes its way of knowing on the world. Due to the active nature of mind, the mind actively organizes our experiences. Thinking involves not only the reception of impressions by means of senses, but also making judgments about what one experiences. It is imaginable that if one wears a fix colored glasses, he will see everything in that color, because of its limitation. In Kant, existence of the outside world is not the production of the mind which just imposes its categories on the manifold of experience. One can know only as it appears to his consciousness which is structured in a certain way. One approaches the world with already armed "concepts of understanding". The famous dictum of Kant claims that "thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind". The mind is already armed with concepts of the

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 426-427.

understanding to interpret the world as such. The concepts of understanding are derived from certain fundamental categories such as the category of substance or category of causality as *a priori* notions or necessary preconditions to experience the world.

Any attempt to transcend the limits of sense experience causes the antinomies, paradoxes and contradictions. The knowledge of the world does not depend on the supposed properties of things in themselves. So, one should examine the nature of mind which is structured in a certain way to interpret the world. As a result of the Copernican revolution, one accepts that law of causation, which means that every event has a cause or every change occurs in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect, is a *synthetic a priori* judgment. The mind of human being has an automatic tendency to spread itself on the external objects. There is the possibility of objective and *a priori* knowledge by accepting the active mind to gain knowledge.

All of these claims show that mind-independent properties of things, if there is really such kind of properties can be quite different from how they appear to us as human beings. If one examines the illusion, "apparent motion", one will see that continuous and rapid succession of the similar diagrams cause that one perceives them as continuous and smooth motion of the shown figures. Similarly, a single colored spot flashes successively with a short distance away. If the time between flashes is short enough (between 10 and 45 milliseconds), then one perceives that a spot is moving from the first position to the second. The movements of the figures in the movies depend on such kind of illusion of perception. It is a fact that blue light is merely and objectively electromagnetic radiation. However, electromagnetic radiation is not blue. Blueness of sky, blueness of the eye of human being, blueness of the rainbow has different reasons. This situation shows that the property,

blueness does not belong to these objects of the outside world as a result of the absence of the common feature of these objects such as a certain molecular surface structure, etc. Blueness as a property does not belong to objective property of things.

There are different features of different things that cause us to see them all as blue, no doubt if our visual apparatus was slightly different, then we would no longer see some of those things as blue; no doubt if our visual apparatus was slightly different, then we would no longer see some of those things as blue.²⁹⁸

If one uses the terminology of Kant, the world is “as we see it” or the phenomenal world is different from our perception. The world, in itself, can be colorless. Perception may be mere interpretation. All of these claims show that there is an inevitable skepticism.

Empirical intuition gives the knowledge of whatever is contingent. Phenomenology should be a rigorous science which can be damaged by relativism and pragmatism which are open to all kinds of skepticism. The famous maxim of phenomenology is the motto which is “back to things themselves”. So, one should return his regard to what is objective which can be ethical or logical as an object of consciousness or intentional object. Husserl tries to radicalize the foundations of human knowledge to make it immune to skepticism. “Back to the things themselves” means that one should go back to the immediate data which are given to the consciousness. Phenomenology avoids the facts, singularities, individuals by dealing with essences, ideas or universals.

²⁹⁸ Goldstein, Laurence, “The World We Perceive it and as it really is” in *The Philosopher's Habitat*, (London & New York: Routledge), 1990, p. 186.

Logic is used to avoid the psychologism and relativism. If a theory denies the possibility of objectively true knowledge, it cannot escape from the relativism which is a form of skepticism. "Logical psychologism" means that logical laws are derived from psychological laws. Logic is considered as "laws of thought" in such a way that logical law is a natural law that regulates our thoughts. There is a confusion of logical laws with regulative natural laws, due to the category mistake of these two different kinds of law. Psychologism makes a category mistake that logical laws have absolute validity, in spite of the probable validity of natural laws. The laws of logic have absolute validity under all circumstances as in the example of the principle of non-contradiction. The absolute character of the laws of logic depend their apodictic or necessary nature. Logic does not refer to the matter of fact and it does not come from the inductive generalizations of the matter of fact. Natural laws are mere inductive generalizations from experience and they are valid only under certain circumstances. The psychological process of thinking is a matter of fact. Logical laws are not the laws of psychological thinking as psychological laws.

Logical laws do not regulate the psychological process of thinking as the laws of nature which regulate natural phenomena. For example; psychological laws regulate psychological processes. Logical laws regulate our thinking, but they do not cause our thinking as psychological laws do. Husserl tries to explain this situation with an ideal person and his thinking process.

Let us imagine an ideal person, in whom *all* thinking proceeds as logical laws require. Naturally the fact that this occurs must have its explanatory ground in certain psychological law, which govern the course of the mental

experiences of this being in, starting from certain initial "collocations". I now ask: Would the natural laws and logical laws in this assumed situation be one and the same? Obviously the answer is "No". Causal laws, according to which thought must proceed in a manner which the ideal norms of logic might justify, are by no means identical with those norms. If a being were so constituted as never to be able to frame contradictory judgments in a unified train of thought, as never to be able to perform inferences which defy syllogistic moods. This would not mean that the law of contradiction, the *Modus Barbara* etc., were laws of nature explanatory of this being's constitution.²⁹⁹

The laws of nature and the laws of logic cannot be one and the same. Because, psychological functioning, thinking is caused by psychological laws. Logical laws just regulate the process of thinking. To support these claims, Husserl uses the analogy between a computer and a human being.

The example of a computer makes the difference quite clear. The arrangement and connection of the figures which spring forth is regulated by natural laws which accord with the demands of the arithmetical propositions which fix their meanings. No one, however, who wants to give a physical explanation of the machines procedures, will appeal to arithmetical instead of mechanical laws.³⁰⁰

Here, the procedures of the machine are not attributed to the arithmetical laws, instead of mechanical laws. In fact, there are the

²⁹⁹ Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), Vol. 1, 1970, § 22, p. 103.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, § 22, p. 103.

mechanical arrangements and connections of the figures for the calculation. The possible causal explanation about the calculation system of the machine is purely physical in accordance with the purely physical laws. However, it is regulated by mathematical laws, despite of the purely physical explanation about how it works.

The machine is no-thought machine, it understands neither itself nor the meaning of its performances. But our own thought-machine might very well function similarly, except that the real course of one kind of thought would always have to be recognized as correct of one kind of thought would always have to be recognized as correct by the insight brought forward in another.³⁰¹

After using this analogy between a computer and the working of mind, Husserl clearly realizes the category mistake of the “psychologicistic logicians”.

The psycholinguistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-to-be-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real grounds.³⁰²

It is clear that the psychologicistic logicians make a category mistake by confusing ideal laws with real laws, normative regulation with

³⁰¹ Ibid., § 22, pp. 103-104.

³⁰² Ibid., § 22, p. 104.

causal regulation, and logical necessity with real necessity. The essential feature of logic is its “normative character”.³⁰³ “Psychology, it is said, deal with thinking as it is, logic with thinking as it should be. The former has to do with the natural laws the latter with the normative laws of thinking.”³⁰⁴ Husserl sharply divides the natural laws of thinking and normative laws of thinking.

Some logicians presuppose psychological principles for logic, but to introduce such principles into logic, is absurd as to derive morality from life. If we take the principles from psychology. i.e. from observations of our understanding, we shall only see how thought proceeds, and what happens under manifold subjective hindrances and conditions. These would only lead to knowledge of merely *contingent* laws.³⁰⁵

Logic does not deal with contingent laws. It seeks the necessary laws. Mathematics and logic are *de facto* sciences. “In logic we do not wish to know what the understanding is like and how it thinks, nor how it has hitherto proceeded in its thinking, but how it ought to proceed in its thinking.”³⁰⁶

In spite of the necessity of laws of logic, there is the contingent nature of the laws of psychology and natural sciences. Husserl states that “[p]sychology must certainly investigate the natural laws of thinking,

³⁰³ Ibid., § 19, p. 92.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., § 19, p. 92.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., § 19, p. 92.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., § 19, p. 92.

the laws which hold for all judgments whatever, whether correct or false”³⁰⁷

In psychologism, laws of logic are accepted as high-level empirical laws which describe how our minds function. In psychologism, the principle of non contradiction is a mere statement about how our mind works, how one arranges our ideas. It merely tells the habits of our mind which can be innate or acquired. It does not say something about how things have to be and how they have to disclose themselves.

Psychologism is the most common form of reductionism. Biologism follows it as a reductionist tendency. In psychologism, one reduces the laws of meaning, truth and logic to psychological laws. One tries to reduce them to the mere biological structures that underlie our psychology.

The tendency to reduce the activity of meaning, truths, logical reasoning as the feature of our psychological or biological make-up is refuted by Husserl. In fact, pure consciousness is not only empirical, but also transcendental phenomenon.

Psychologism claims that reasoning, argument, knowledge and sciences are merely a matter of our psychological make-up. So, sciences such as physics, biology, and mathematics are ways in which human beings adopt themselves to the environment. Apodictic truths, “truth-in-itself” become a problem in psychologism. The judgments and propositions are mere organic or psychic responses which are not different from the beating of the heart, the digestion in the stomach, or the mood of depression.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., § 19, p. 92.

Husserl claims that logical laws do not depend on the make-up human being. Husserl also claims that it is a “specific relativism” which causes a form of anthropological relativism. In this kind of relativism, logical laws are species specific laws which depend on the nature of human being. Therefore, logical laws cannot be eternal and necessary truths. Such kind of relativism causes radical skepticism which leads to unstable, unreliable knowledge.

If there are such traits and laws essentially common to all, men, then they make up the specific nature of man. All truth in its universal validity is therefore relative to the human species, or, more generally, to some species or other thinking beings. If species differ, so do truths and laws of thought.³⁰⁸

One can easily claim that if logical laws merely depend on the make-up of human being, logical laws can be altered because of the further evolution of human species or another rational species.

1. A proposition is true for the *homo sapiens*, but false for a different species.

2. A proposition cannot be both true and false in the same sense.

In Husserl, there is acceptance of the self-evident, adequate eternal and apodictic truths. Logical laws are such kind of truths and their certainty is used to defeat psychologism by Husserl.

³⁰⁸Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations* (translated by J. N. Findlay), (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), Vol. 1, 1970, § 39, p. 150.

Since, appearances are given to consciousness as being proper datum for consciousness, subjectivity of different species and contingent sense experiences of human beings are inevitable. Even bat has such kind of experiences, due to the presence of the some form of consciousness. The absolute, apodictic truths of logic which are beyond the “specific relativism” and all kind of relativism are used to defeat the skepticism in Husserl. To be a human being means to be the owner of the knowledge of logic, mathematics and essences as apodictic truths, which are valid and eternal. Just pure consciousness which cannot be reduced to whatever is material can be the owner of such kind of truths.

3.3 General Comments on Husserl

The main purpose of the thesis is to show that the possible solution of the mind-body problem is to return back to the initial position of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. In fact, the solution of the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the “pure ego” and transcendental ego”. Since, they involve not only the paradoxes, but also the nature of transcendences in the pure consciousness, their denial is the suitable way to clean and purify the consciousness. Husserl accepts the self-identical “pure ego” which involves the paradox which is “transcendence within immanence” in *Ideas*. There is a claim about the presence of the “transcendental ego” which also includes the paradox which is the identity relation between “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego”. In fact, this “transcendental ego” is not only “pre-reflective”, but also “self alienated”. The domain of pure consciousness should be clean from all kind of transcendences, including the transcendence of the “pure ego” in *Ideas* and “transcendental ego” in *The Crisis in the European Sciences and Transcendental*

Phenomenology. Self-identical “pure ego” is directed as if it is an object for consciousness. However, it cannot be grasped adequately, due to the “transcendancy within immanency”. So, to leave the “pure ego” can be a suitable way to avoid such kind problems by defending non-egologic pure consciousness.

The contribution of the thesis is to show the reasons of the denial of the “pure ego” in *Ideas* and “transcendental ego” in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. These reasons depend on the paradoxes which are against the scientific rigorous spirit of phenomenology. There are the formulations of these paradoxes. However, there are no definitions and solutions of these paradoxes, especially the paradoxical identity relation between “psychological” and “transcendental ego”. One of the important commentators, David Bell in *Husserl* also formulates the paradoxical identity relation between psychology and transcendental phenomenology, during the “performance of the reduction”. However, he does not formulate the paradoxical identity relation between “psychological” and “transcendental ego”. He claims that psychology deals with “conscious beings”, “minds”, and “mental events”. However, they are bracketed as a result of the application of the “transcendental reduction”. However, ego and its ego life remain as it is as a contradiction. Phenomenology tries to regain its domain as a rigorous philosophy which depends on the first person perspective. Whatever belongs to the third person perspective can be the subject matter of psychology, neurology, etc. Mental events in the domain of pure consciousness are accessible from the first person perspective after the “transcendental reduction”. So, there is the misinterpretation of the domain of psychology. *Epochē* lets a few presuppositions, especially cognitive presuppositions. However, it is quite successful to show the domain of phenomenology and to “shift” the definition of consciousness.

This misinterpretation can be examined from the perspective of David, Woodruff Smith in "Mind and Body" in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*. He claims that there is a dual aspect monism for human being as the instantiation of two essences which are Nature and Consciousness. Nature and its instantiation can be the subject matter of neurology, psychology or other natural sciences on the basis of the empirical generalizations, not phenomenology. Pure consciousness and mental acts can be the subject matter of phenomenology as the instantiation of the essence, Consciousness. In spite of the failure of Bell about the domain of psychology, he claims that there is a nominal ego, not a substantial one. He defends the "no-ownership", "no-subject" doctrines of the self which is different from acts themselves. He realizes that it has no work apart from its "explanatory task". All of these explanations are compatible with my claim about non-egologic pure consciousness. Similarly, Cornelis A. van Persuen also questions this paradoxical identity relation. He also defends the subject-less experiences. He claims that "transcendental ego" is "a linguistic fiction" which is also quite compatible with my solution. Like Sartre, Gurwitsch defends the non-egological conception of consciousness, but he keeps on his analytic style in his article, "A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness". However, David Carr accepts the existence of the "transcendental ego" in his article, "Transcendental and Empirical Subjectivity" in *The New Husserl*.

I clearly formulate the "difficult" and "paradoxical" identity relation between "human", "psychological" or "empirical ego" and "transcendental ego". "Apodictic ego" or "transcendental ego" is the subject of intentional experiences or acts of consciousness as being identical ego pole, in spite of the alteration of experiences. I use disjunctive syllogism to solve the paradox. Whether there is an egologic pure consciousness or non-egologic pure consciousness.

1- "Transcendental ego" is either an immediate state of consciousness which is experienceable immediately, directly and privately as any other state of consciousness.

2- "Transcendental ego" can be *something* other than a state of consciousness which cannot be immediately experienced. This "I" unifies all momentary states of consciousness, the "I" cannot unify all state of consciousness in the stream. In fact, "I" will be merely one of these states and other states are also waiting to be unified.

If "I" is something different than a state of consciousness by unifying all states of consciousness into one coherent entity, then "I" will not be conscious. Because, all states of consciousness will be ontologically different from what I am. So, the relationship between experience and "I", self or ego is a problem in the philosophy of Husserl.

I use the Sartre's concept, "pre-reflective" to use as adjective of the "transcendental ego". Sartre uses this concept as "pre-reflective *cogito*". My purpose is to show that one is unaware the "transcendental ego" as "pre-reflective". In fact, Persuen is also aware of this problem in which he realizes that "transcendental ego" is not accessible before the "transcendental reduction", besides the paradoxical identity relation between "psychological ego" and "transcendental ego". However, he does not realize the automatic self-alienation of the "transcendental ego". "Transcendental ego" "lifts" itself from all world and human apperceptions. This causes a self alienation. Then, "transcendental ego" becomes unaware, unconscious of its mental acts. I also barrow the concept, "unconscious consciousness", which also implies a paradox, in the article of Rudolf Carnap, "Unconscious Consciousness" in *The New Husserl* to show the position of consciousness as a result of

this alienation. "Transcendental ego" can be defined on the basis of the essential capacity to be alienated from itself. The self alienation of the "transcendental ego" is not realized by Persuen. In fact, this self-alienation causes the disunity and discontinuity of experiences. There can also be the influence of the content of experience and the direction of the flow of experience. There are contents in my consciousness and I am unaware of these contents, due to this alienation. My definition of the self-alienation shows that there can be contents which I am unaware of these contents. In fact, "transcendental ego" cannot be grasped adequately. "Transcendental reduction" brings the "transcendental ego" from "pre-reflective" awareness into reflective awareness. "I" refers to partially transcendent "transcendental ego". There is an incomplete "transcendental reduction". In fact, "transcendental ego" is not an object *for* and content *in* consciousness as the *noumenon* of the Kantian philosophy. I try to show that "unconscious consciousness" causes some unexpected results. I ask that whether "transcendental ego" is a performance, as a result of the usage of "transcendental reduction" or unconscious application of logical laws and syllogisms. Everybody experiences "what is irreducible" which is the claim of Gabriel Marcel in *Being and Having* from the first person perspective. Everybody also experiences the continuous change from one mental state to another. I ask the question which is whether there is the realization of the "transcendental ego" as an inner experience via "transcendental reduction" or there is the unconscious application of certain laws of logic and syllogisms. One can consider that if there is change, *something* must change. There is a change. Therefore; *something* must exist. This *something* is the reason of category mistake in the philosophy of Descartes as immaterial substance and egologic pure consciousness in the philosophy of Husserl as the original claim of the thesis. One can apply to certain laws

of logic and syllogisms as “logical fallacies” which are also borrowed from Ralph Ellis’s book, *An Ontology of Consciousness*. For example; there can be unconscious application of modus ponens which lets to claim the self-identical ego. There can be the law of identity which also lets to claim the identity of the ego. I show that how unconscious application of the modus ponens causes such kind of category mistake. In this syllogism, the first premise is false and falsity is preserved in the conclusion.

If there is change, then *something* must change

There is change

Therefore; *something* must change.

In spite of the usage of *epochē*, there are a few cognitive presuppositions such as transparent and actual or potential conscious nature of mental events. However, *cogito cogitatum* is experienceable, but *ego* is not. It presents itself in “not-now” point in the stream of consciousness. Being-for-oneself is accessible to the inquiring, reflecting ego via inner or self-perception. However, “transcendental ego”, being-in-itself cannot be accessible, even if one applies the “transcendental reduction” to “human” or “psychological ego”. “Transcendental ego” escapes from the complete reduction, because of the incomplete “transcendental reduction”.

“Transcendental reduction” brings the “transcendental ego” from “pre-reflective” awareness into reflective awareness. Attention is also a kind of intentionality. The relationship between the attention and “transcendental reduction” is established as one of the original contributions of the thesis. So, reflected “transcendental ego” as the known “object ego” turns into an intentional object which is known by

the knowing "subject ego". This distinction and their ontological difference are also realized by Sartre. There is an "intentional" and "non-intentional consciousness" distinction. I use these concepts to show the ontological differences among them. "Transcendental ego" becomes an object for consciousness rather than an immanent noetic content within the subjective dimension of the stream of consciousness. However, "transcendental ego" cannot be the proper part of the stream of consciousness.

There are also problems of "pure ego" in *Ideas*. There is "transcendence within immanence" which is contrary to the non-contradiction principle. One can solve the paradox via disjunctive syllogism. "Pure ego" is either immanent or transcendent. "Pure ego" is not immanent, due to its "peculiar" kind of transcendence. To accept the transcendence of the "pure ego" is incompatible with the radically immanent transcendental phenomenology which must consist of purely immanent realm of beings. Pure consciousness should be homogeneous. The original attitude of the thesis is the denial of the "pure ego", and "transcendental ego", because of these paradoxes. Hume claims that introspection does not reveal a self or something physical. It merely implies a disembodied consciousness. It is clear that I cannot experience myself as anything other than the experience itself through introspection. When there is a pain in my leg, I can access it directly, immediately and privately by means of introspection. However, I cannot access a neural network. Hume claims that there is no introspective access to the immaterial substance. I use the similar argument in which nobody can access not only the immaterial substance, but also the "pure ego" or "transcendental ego". Introspection just lets us to know the immaterial, disembodied pure consciousness. To show the difference between the first and third person perspectives, I use the Husserlian distinction between living

body (*Leib*) as my body for me and physical body (*Körper*) my body for others. In fact, the mind-body problem in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* depends on the confusion of the first and third person perspectives. Similarly, when one performs a syllogism, one cannot be aware of the obeying chemical laws and psycho-chemical principles. The same claims are also possible for the logical laws. Unlike the first person perspective, other persons are necessarily embodied within a body from the third person perspective.

I also use the arguments which depend on solipsism. I defend the definition of David Bell about the “priority” and “independence” of mental acts, states of individuals in the weak sense. *Epochē* turns the whole world and all of the individuals into a mere phenomenon for consciousness, including the empirical body. In other words, there will be solipsism in which one can know certainly whatever is in his mind. My claim is compatible with the definition of solipsism in the weak and strong senses. Bell claims that “I alone exist or I am known to exist”, but there are no other minds. Epistemologically, these contents of consciousness have a privileged status to access. Unlike one’s knowledge of his own consciousness, he is ignorant about the change of the particulars in this world as a result of *epochē* like a little god. *Epochē*, “transcendental reduction” and eidetic reduction provide the purification of the consciousness. “Pure ego” shows a “peculiar” kind of transcendence. There is the necessity for the purification of the consciousness from all kinds of transcendences. Both “pure ego” and “transcendental ego” which involve paradoxes do not let the purification of consciousness from all kinds of transcendences which will let the solution of the mind-body problem in the frame of the phenomenology. Argument from the “shift” of the definition of consciousness shows that

there is a radical change in the definition of consciousness, after *epochē*. Before *epochē*, every experience in the sense of *cogitatio* or thought has the form of *cogito* (I think). Don Welton claims that consciousness simply refers to the Cartesian term, *cogito* or “I think” in the pregnant sense. However, *epochē* provides the “shift” of the definition of consciousness. Husserl claims that “...the meaning of the expression ‘*cogito*’, I have consciousness of something, I perform an act of consciousness.” After *epochē*, “I have consciousness of something”. Then, there is the *cogito cogitatum*. Here, *cogito* involves the “pure ego” and its ego-life. There is the successful “shift” of the definition of consciousness, in spite of the failure of the claim about the transcendence of the “pure ego”. Don Welton also stresses this “shift” of the definition about consciousness. However, this definition of consciousness changes slightly, as a result of the further usage of the “transcendental reduction”. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, there is the repeated structure which is *ego cogito cogitatum*. One can experience *cogito* in a direct and immediate way. *Ego* is defined as the identical “ultimate ego pole”. However, it never becomes the phenomenon for the pure consciousness. So, it is the mere negation of *cogito* as unchanging, identical ego pole of all acts. One can ask that whether negation gives knowledge or not as one of the original claims of the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section. My critique depends on the definition of *ego* of the *cogito cogitatum*. After *epochē*, just “pure ego” and its ego life remain. One “puts aside” whatever is physical, including body, brain, neural activities which can be accessed from the third person perspective as the instantiation of the essence Nature. David Woodruff Smith also thinks that there are two essences which are Nature and Consciousness and their instantiations for human being. He supports dual aspect monism for human being. So, phenomenology

should deal with the essence, Consciousness and its instantiations. Phenomenology cannot let anything transcendent which can be “pure ego” in *Ideas* or “transcendental ego” in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. There are the first and third person perspective differences. One experiences the disembodied pure consciousness from the first person perspective. In fact, Bell also claims that there is a “non-solipsistic transcendental idealism” in *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. In fact, the confusion between the first and the third person perspectives are the reason of the mind-body problem in the frame of phenomenology.

There are category mistakes, which give ontologically independent status to the immaterial soul, “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”, not only in the Cartesian philosophy but also in the Husserlian phenomenology. Sartre also calls “error of substance” in his analysis of “the pre-reflective *cogito*” for the self as a substance. He claims that the self is not a thing. Sartre claims that I am a state of consciousness (a *pour soi* rather than *en soi*). Like Sartre, I also support non-egologic pure consciousness, but I claim that it is mere the abstraction of non-egologic pure consciousness, not inner experience as a result of the application of special methods such as “method of doubt” in the philosophy of Descartes and “transcendental reduction” in the philosophy of Husserl. Persuen claims that “transcendental ego” is “a linguistic fiction” in *Phenomenology and Reality*. David Carr claims that to say “self is mere fiction” is a radical claim as in the example of Hume. Carr claims that the self is “*not a thing*”, but “*no-thing at all*”. From the “natural attitude”, “transcendental subject” seems as if it is artificial and mere fiction. From the “transcendental attitude”, the whole world as a whole and my empirical self are phenomenon for consciousness. Then, he claims that there are two radically

incompatible sense of self. He claims that idealism reduces the world and the empirical subject to the representations. I also support the claim that self is "*not a thing*", but "*no thing at all*". What we realize is the "what is irreducible" in the philosophy of Marcel as purely mental phenomenon. However, to claim two incompatible sense of self can cause many problems. I also claim that "transcendental ego" is a mere fiction. To realize its fictitious nature, there is the necessity to examine the part-whole analysis. The originality of my claim depends on this part-whole analysis. People can think and talk about moments abstractly as if they are pieces, not moments. Pure consciousness turns an *abstractum* into a *concretum*. One of the main category mistakes belong to sciences, including psychology which takes physics as model. The attempt to "equate" physical bodily reality with soul is a category mistake. There is also a "parallelization" of the methods. Whatever is mental cannot be put into the category of material as in the example of sciences. The other category mistake depends on separation of a moment from its whole as if it is a piece. Soul is the moment of one and the same person as the instantiation of the essence, Consciousness. In the history of philosophy, soul is often separated from the brain and body as if it is a piece, not a moment. One separates what is inseparable by turning the *abstractum* into a *concretum*. *Cogito* of Descartes has a form which is "I think". This "I" is presupposed as a "grammatical hypostatization". In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, soul or *psyche* is embodied within the body. There is a confusion of the first and third person perspectives. When one gets his own mental states from the first person perspective, one gets the disembodied consciousness. "I" depends on the first person perspective. However, other persons call this "I" as "you" as necessarily embodied within the body from the third person perspective. David Carr also makes a division between real and phenomenal

subjects to show the difference between first and third person perspectives. So, "transcendental ego" merely depends on the abstraction of moments from its whole as the activity of the pure consciousness. This is also one of the main arguments of the thesis to defend the non-egologic pure consciousness. One also gets the knowledge of "what is irreducible" from the first person perspective, instead of "transcendental ego". So far, I defend that there is no "pure ego" and "transcendental ego", in spite of the presence of "what is irreducible" which can be accessed by means of the first person perspective. In fact, the possible solution of the mind-body problem depends on the elimination of the "pure ego" and "transcendental ego". Now, one can examine the explanations of Marcel about "being" and "having" (having-as-possession) distinction. Our body cannot be a possession. It belongs to my being and it helps to constitute what I am distinct from what I have. "What we have obviously presents an appearance of external reality to ourselves. But it is not an absolute externality. He claims that "[I] can only express myself in so far as I can become someone else to myself." We can only express ourselves in terms of "having". He also continues that "[t]he statement 'I have' can only be made over against *another* which is felt to be other." There is a tension between "Same" and "Other". "I" can be used by means of "specialization", "specification" and "partial alienation" of the self. Marcel claims that "I conceive myself as having in myself". In the solution of the mind-body problem, I ask the question whether one can reduce the mind into a substance or not? If mind is reducible to a substance, it will be either physical or spiritual. The mind as a physical substance can be identified with an intelligently behaving living body. There is no mind-body interaction problem in which the mind is merely identified with the living body. The mind as a spiritual substance can be in two different forms which are substance dualism and property dualism. I formulate

the three different and incompatible claims to explain the mind-body problem. Non-egologic pure consciousness depends on the subjective first person perspective. This perspective can be called as the Claim-1. To define the minds as intelligently behaving bodies depends on the third person perspective which includes objective, publicly observable circumstances. Such kind of perspective can be called as Claim-2. A mind which is embodied within an egologic consciousness is the claim of the property dualism. Besides property dualism, there is the substance dualism. This perspective depends on the common sense of the "man in the street" and some of the philosophers who also agree with the common sense. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl also claims the existence of the "transcendental ego" or "apodictic ego" as a part of the life-world perspective or life-world attitude. This can be called as Claim-3. In fact, the problem of this perspective depends on the confusion between first and third person perspectives. Claim-1 and Claim-2 do not lead to the mind-body problem. There is also no problem for the relationship among consciousness and the underlying soul as in the substance dualism. The question which is how mind is related to the body is simply dissolved by claiming that there is no relation at all. Claim-1 and Claim-2 explain the nature of mind satisfactorily from their perspectives. Claim-1 depends on the phenomenological reflection by which one can get the content of consciousness immediately, directly and privately. So, the genuine nature of mind can be grasped via phenomenological reflection. Claim-2 also explains the genuine nature of mind, as a result of the developments in neurophysiology and artificial intelligence studies. One claims that there will not be any unexplainable phenomenon, as a result of the developments in sciences in the future. In the Claim-3, there is a mind which involves not only body, but also consciousness as distinct dependent moments of one and the same

person. This claim is compatible with the common sense claims and life world attitude. It is clear that human being is able to experience the mind and body separately. The Claim-3 leads to the mind-body problem. This problem depends on the first and third person perspective differences. The possible solution is to accept either the transcendental phenomenological claim, Claim-1 or naturalistic scientific attitude, Claim-2. Claim-1 which is the transcendental-phenomenological attitude defines mind without a self-identical "pure ego". Mind is the mere totality of conscious experiences or "psychic experiences" in the "unified stream of consciousness." In *Logical Investigations*, "empirical ego" is the unity of "phenomenological ego" and "ego body". In the Claim-1, the relationship between the mind and body is that transcendent "ego body" is phenomenologically constituted as the intentional object of some intentional experiences. Transcendent body is phenomenologically reduced to be an immanent object of the mind. The relation between an immanent mind and transcendent body is dissolved by means of the phenomenological reduction of the transcendent "ego body". "Phenomenologically reduced ego" is nothing more than experiences "in the unified stream of consciousness" or "interconnected unity". Husserl clearly denies the "pure ego". This denial is the necessary pre-condition to solve the mind-body problem. In fact, it lets the purification of all transcendences from the pure consciousness. Marcel makes a distinction between "being" and "having". In fact, he also claims that what we have obviously presents an appearance of external reality to ourselves. But it is not an absolute reality. What we get is the appearance of the outside world, including our body. One can say "I have" over against *another* which is felt to be the other. Similarly, Husserl also accepts that outside world, including our body is *strange* and *alienated*. Similarly, I dissolve the mind-body problem by leaving the "phenomenologically reduced ego", after cutting the "ego-body".

The main claim of the thesis is the denial of the “pure ego” and “transcendental ego”. If one denies the immaterial persisting substance or “pure ego”, the problem of personal identity is inevitable. The success of the denial of the ego depends on the solution of the problem of personal identity. I support the mental continuity theory. I show that mental continuity depends on the memory, not a persisting, identical ego. There is the re-collection of old perceptions as they are. One realizes himself in different times and places. So, the re-collections or re-presentations of the old perceptions let the sense of continuity of self. I also used the Kafka’s novel, *Transformation* to show the continuity of the sense of self, in spite of the radical bodily changes.

In this thesis, I try to show the necessity of the phenomenology to explain the conscious phenomenon. In fact, some conscious events are unexplainable from the third person perspective of sciences. Furthermore, one cannot show the possibility of psycho-physical reduction on the basis of Leibniz’ law, because of the special abilities of consciousness such as intentionality, *qualia*, constitution, etc. To explain the conscious events, one should use the first person perspective of phenomenology, not the third person perspective of sciences. Intentionality, *qualia*, constitution which is the special abilities of pure consciousness is used to support the claim of Marcel about “what is irreducible”. If one uses the terminology of Marcel to show “what is irreducible” is the “task”. Intentionality is also a special and purely mental ability of pure consciousness. *Qualia* are phenomena which cannot be explained by any materialist theory. All of these explanations show the necessity of the phenomenology to explain conscious events. From the third person perspective, whatever is the instantiation of nature can be examined in the frame of sciences. However, all kind of conscious events as the instantiation of the essence, Nature can be studied in the frame of phenomenology.

4. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I claim that there is no need for the “transcendental ego” in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* and “pure ego” in *Ideas*. I accept the non-egologic pure consciousness as the initial position of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. The possible solution of the mind-body problem depends on the denial of the “pure ego” and the “transcendental ego” which involve paradoxes. The concepts, mental acts, self, body and their relationship are examined in detail in *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas* and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* in this thesis.

First of all, I examine *epochē* and its success. In fact, the “shift” of the attitude is possible by means of *epochē*. The “transcendental attitude” which is the first person attitude replaces the “natural attitude” or third person attitude. The detailed examination of consciousness in Husserl’s different terms and the comparison of phenomenology with natural sciences help us to prefer the suitable solution of the problems in the philosophy of Husserl. Of course, the most suitable position is the initial position of Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. In the Anti Transcendental Ego Argumentations section, I show that the paradoxical identity relation between “human” or “psychological ego” and “transcendental ego” cause many problems in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The possible solution of this paradox is to leave one of them. Our preference is to leave the “transcendental ego” which causes incomplete “transcendental reduction” and self alienation. In fact, it is not a mere phenomenon for consciousness. It is also against the main cognitive

presupposition of phenomenology about the transparent and potential consciousness nature of mental events. Furthermore, "human" or "psychological ego" is the mere phenomenon for consciousness. So, to claim the identity relation between "human" or "psychological ego" and "transcendental ego" is also a problem for phenomenology. There is also a self alienation of the "transcendental ego" which can isolate itself via "transcendental reduction". "Transcendental ego" is also present as "pre-reflective". However, to focus is also a kind of intentionality, but "transcendental ego" does not let to grasp properly. One can also find similar problems in *Ideas* in which Husserl claims the "transcendency within immanency" as another paradox. I also show that the capacities of pure consciousness let to think and talk about the moments independent from their dependent parts. However, these capacities of the "pure ego" cause the category mistakes such as the acceptance of soul in the philosophy of Descartes, "pure ego" and "transcendental ego" in the philosophy of Husserl. To solve these paradoxes, to solve the mind-body problem, the suitable way is to leave the "transcendental ego" and "pure ego" as the initial position of Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl claims that "empirical ego" is the unity of "phenomenological ego" and "ego body" in *Logical Investigations*. "Ego body" is reduced to the "phenomenological ego". So, there is no mind-body and their interaction problem. Because, transcendent "ego body" is reduced to be an immanent object of the mind. The relation between an immanent mind and transcendent body is dissolved by means of the phenomenological reduction of the transcendent "ego body". One also examines the memory and the personal identity relation. Pure consciousness constitutes the personal identity by means of memory, inspite of the succession of the selves. The new body scenario of Kafka's *Transformation* is used to support these claims. Meanwhile, the irreducibility of pure consciousness is claimed on the basis of Leibniz's

Law. To support the claims about the irreducibility of conscious events, intuition, *qualia*, intentionality, constitution, special acts of pure consciousness are used.

Briefly, phenomenology which depends on the first person perspective is the suitable way to examine consciousness, instead of natural sciences. During the examination of the concept consciousness, one sees that the most suitable solution of the paradoxes is the denial of the "pure ego" in *Ideas* and the "transcendental ego" in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The possible solution of the mind body problem also depends on the denial of the ego. Meanwhile, pure consciousness also establishes a connection between personal identity and memory. Phenomenology also shows the special abilities of pure consciousness such as constitution, intentionality and *qualia*. All of them show the importance and the necessity of the phenomenology which depend on the first person perspective, not the third person one.

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SUMMARY IN TURKISH

Tezin genelinde Husserl'in bilinç kavramı incelenmektedir. Tezin amacı "saf ego", "aşkın ego" kavramlarının pek çok problem ve paradoksa yol açtığına gösterilmesine ve bu kavramlardan vaz geçilmesinin gerekli olduğu iddiasına dayanmaktadır. Husserl'in *Ideas* adlı eserinde "aşkın olanın içkinliği", *Avrupa Bilimlerinin Krizi ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserinde ise "psikolojik ego" ile "aşkın ego"nun özdeşliği birer paradoks olarak görülmektedir. Ayrıca, bedende olan, onun hareketini ve kontrolünü sağlayan bir ruh anlayışı ruh-beden problemine yol açmaktadır. En iyi çözüm Husserl'in *Mantıksal Araştırmalar* adlı eserindeki ilk iddialarına geri dönmek, "saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" iddialarından vaz geçmektir. Tez belli aşamaları içermektedir. Bu aşamaların sonucu olarak "saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" kabul edilmemektedir. Aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşması, eksik "aşkın indirgeme", aşkın egonun "yönelim öncesi" bulunması, aşkın egonun bilinç dışı doğası, fenomenolojinin epistemolojik ön-kabulleri, aşkın egonun objeleştirilmesi ve paradokslar "saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" iddealarının kabul edilmemesi için gerekli temelleri oluşturmaktadır.

Husserl *Mantıksal Araştırmalar* adlı eserinde egonun olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Aslında, "saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" hakkındaki iddialar fenomenolojinin bilimsel ve kesinlik iddialarıyla uyuşmamaktadır. "Saf bilinç" bütün aşkınlıklardan arındırılmalıdır. David Bell, David Carr, Cornelis A. van Persuen gibi önemli Husserl yorumcuları bu paradoksları farketmelerine rağmen, bu paradoksların, özellikle "psikolojik ego" ve "aşkın ego" özdeşliğiyle ilgili paradoksun çözümü konusuna açık bir çözüm getirmemektedirler. Paradoksların çözümü tezin birinci katkısıdır. Bu paradokslar Aşkın Egoya Karşı Argümanlar bölümünde yer almaktadır. Aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşma

özelliği vardır. Bu özelliğin fark edilmesi ve aşkın egonun yeniden tanımlanması tezin ikinci katkısıdır. Bu arada, paradokslar arasındaki benzerlikler de gösterilmiştir. Aşkın egonun varlığıyla ilgili iddialar aslında Descartes felsefesindeki maddi olamayan töz iddiasına benzer bir kategori hatasıdır, bu iddia tezin üçüncü önemli iddiasıdır. Bu hata parça-bütün analiziyle anlaşılabilir. Saf bilincin özelliklerinden birisi de özelliklerin bağlı olduğu bütünden soyutlanarak düşünülmesi ve hakkında konuşulabilmesidir. Aşkın egonun bu özelliğide kategori hatasının nedenidir. *Avrupa Bilimlerinin Krizi ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserdeki ruh-beden problemi birinci ve üçüncü kişi bakış açılarının farklılıklarının gösterilmesiyle çözümlenebilmektedir. Husserl'in *Mantıksal Araştırmalar* kitabındaki durumuna dönerek ruh-beden problemi çözümlenebilir. Burada, aşkın "ego beden" fenomenolojik olarak inşa edilmiş ve yönelimsel tecrübelerin objesi haline gelmiştir. Ruh-beden probleminin çözülebilmesi için saf bilinçte bulunan aşkın "pure ego" ve "aşkın ego" bilinçten arındırılmıştır. Böylece, sadece bilince içkin olanların bilinçte kalmasına izin verilmiştir. "Saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" hakkındaki iddiaların kabul edilmemesi benliğin devamı problemine yol açmaktadır. Bu problem genellikle analitik felsefenin çerçevesi içinde tartışılan bir problemdir. Bu problemin çözümünde bedensel olanın devamı yerine zihinsel olanın daha önemli olduğunu savunan görüşleri Kabul etmek fenomenolojinin ruhuna daha uygundur. Bu nedenle benlik ve hafıza arasında bir bağlantı kurarak, ego olmadan da benliğin devam edeceğini savunmaktayım. Bu iddia tezin dördüncü önemli katkısıdır. Aslında, bazı düşünce deneyleri genele ait bakış açısının üstesinden gelmek için kullanılmıştır. Kafka'nın *Değişim* adlı romanından yararlanarak benliğin hafızaya bağlı olduğu ve dinamik süreçleri olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bu tezin beşinci önemli katkısıdır.

Saf bilincin indirgenemeyen özelliklerini göstermeye çalıştım. Bu özellikler, yönelim, soyutlama, inşa etme, fenomenal özelliklerdir (*qualia*).

1. Bölümde, Paranteze Alma ve Ön-kabulsüz felsefe bölümünde, paranteze almanın doğal tavırdan fenomenolojik tavra geçiş için zorunlu olduğu gösterildi. Başka bir deyişle, üçüncü kişinin bakış açısından birinci kişinin bakış açısına geçiş zorunludur. Ön-kabulsüz bir felsefe inşası Husserl'e ait bir idealdir. Ancak, Husserl felsefesi ontolojik, epistemolojik ve formal pek çok ön-kabulü içermektedir. Paranteze alma yöntemi sadece sınırlı sayıda ön-kabule izin vermektedir. Bu ön-kabuller de genellikle epistemolojik ön-kabullerdir. Fenomenoloji bilince verilenle veya bilinçteki görüngülerle ilgilidir. Bunun nedeni de prensiplerin prensibidir. Paranteze alma yöntemiyle başlamak fenomenolojinin ön şartıdır. Bu yöntem bilinç kavramında ve tanımında değişiklikleri zorunlu kılmaktadır. Bu bölümde, üçüncü kişinin bakış açısından birinci kişinin bakış açısına geçiş zorunludur. Bu değişim ruh-beden probleminin çözümünde kullanılacaktır. Fenomenolojinin bilinçle ilgili olayları açıklarken doğa bilimlerinden farklı yanları da açıklanmıştır.

2. Bölümde, bazı kavramlar incelenmiştir. Bu kavramlar bilincin yönelimi, benlik, beden ve bunlar arasındaki ilişkilerdir. Husserl'in *Mantıksal Araştırmalar*, *Ideas*, *Avrupa Bilimlerinin Krizi* ve *Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserlerinde bu kavramları nasıl kullandığı detaylı olarak incelenmiştir.

Mantıksal Araştırmalar adlı eserinde, Husserl "empirik ego" kavramının "ego beden" ve "fenomenolojik olarak indirgenmiş ego" kavramlarını da içerdiğini iddia etmektedir. Husserl ego bedeni empirik egodan ayırmıştır. "Fenomenolojik olarak indirgenmiş ego" bilincin içindekilerin toplamı ve birleştirilmesinden ibarettir, bilinçteki deneyimlerin bir demetidir. Husserl saf egonun varlığını inkar etmektedir. *Ideas* adlı eserde "empirik ego" (insan) "ego beden" ve fenomenolojik

egoyu içermektedir. Pranteze alma işleminden sonra “empirik ego” dışarda bırakılmış. “Saf ego” fenomenolojik alan olarak bilinçte kalmıştır. Ancak, *Ideas* adlı eserde saf egodaki “aşkın olanın içkinliği” problemi sorunlara yol açmaktadır. Benzer biçimde, paradoksa yol açan psikolojik egonun aşkın egoyla özdeşliği problemi *Avrupa Bilimlerinde Kriz ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserinde bulunmaktadır. Aynı eserde, bedende olan ruh kavramı ruh-beden problemine yol açmaktadır. Üçüncü, birinci kişi bakış açısı, bunlar arasındaki farklılığı ve bilimlerin bakış açısını vurgulamak için üçüncü kişi bakış açısı ve materialist teoriler ayrıntılı bir biçimde incelenmiştir. Sartre, Gabriel Marcel ve David Bell’in görüşleri birbirleriyle kıyaslanmış ve karşılaştırılmıştır. Kullandıkları argümanlar Satre’nin Aşkın Egoya Karşı Argümanları, Varlık ve Sahiplik, David Bell’in Yorumları bölümlerinde kullanılmıştır.

“Saf ego”, “aşkın ego” ve bu egoların neliklerine dair iddiaları reddetmek için sağlam temellere ihtiyaç vardır. Aşkın egonun iki çeşit kendine yabancılaşması söz konusudur. Bunlardan biri aşkın egonun kendi yönelimsel eylemlerine yabancılaşmasıdır. Bu tür yabancılaşma aşkın indirgeme sonucu dış dünyadan izole olmanın doğal bir sonucudur. Bu kendine yabancılaşma Aşkın Egoya Karşı Argümanlar bölümünde kullanılmaktadır. Diğer yabancılaşma biçimi kişinin dış çevresinden izole olmasına, yabancılaşmasına ve dış dünyadaki değişimi bilmemesine bağlıdır. Aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşmasını açıklamak amacıyla bir düşünce deneyi hazırlanmıştır. Denedeki kişi dış dünyadan bütün ilişkilerini kesmiştir, bağlantılarını koparmıştır. Böylece, bilince ait zaman anlayışı da mümkün olmamaktadır. Kişi tekillerdeki değişime kapalı olduğundan küçük bir tanrıya dönüşmüştür. Tanrının mutlak bilme biçimine karşın, insanın tekileri ve tekillerdeki değişimi bilmesi problemler içerir. Benzer bir biçimde, paranteze alma yönteminden sonra her şey bilince verilen, bilinç için fenomenlere dönüşmüştür. Bu durum ise solipsizm problemi anlamına gelmektedir.

Aşkın Egoya Karşı Argümanlar bölümünde solipsizm problemi tekrar ele alınmış ve “aşkın ego” kavramına karşı kullanılmıştır.

Aşkın Egoya Karşı Argümanlar bölümünde, aşkın egonun yönelimsel eylemlerinden ontolojik statü farkını göstermek amacıyla “yönelimsel” ve “yönelimsel olmayan” bilinç kavramları ayrımı yapılmıştır. *Ideas* adlı eserde kendisiyle özdeş “saf ego” kavramı ve sürekli değişen yönelimsel eylemler ayrımı yapılmaktadır. Aslında, “aşkın olanın içkinliği” kavramı bu ontolojik farklılığı göstermektedir. Bilincin tecrübelerinin aksine, kendisiyle özdeş olan “saf ego” farklılık göstermektedir. Saf bilinç, aşkın egoya yönelimsel olarak bağlandığında, yönelen ve yönelinen arasında ontolojik farklılıklar olmaktadır. Bu ontolojik farklılıklar nedeniyle, “aşkın ego” kendi deneyimlerinin, yönelimsel eylemlerinin farkında değildir. Benzer şekilde, “aşkın ego” “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemiyle farkedilebilir. Bu aslında dikkatin odaklanmasıdır ve bu da yönelimdir. Bu sayede “aşkın ego” farkedilebilmektedir. Farkedilen bu ego ve farkedilme süreçleri *Avrupa Bilimlerinde Kriz ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserde ayrıntılı bir biçimde verilmiştir. Dikkatin odaklanması bir çeşit yönelimdir. Böylece yönelen ve yönelinen bilinç ayrımı yapılabilir. Bu ayrım yönelinen bilinci “özne ego”nun objesi veya “obje ego” haline getirmektedir. Sartre “aşkın ego” ve bilincin yönelim eylemleri arasındaki ontolojik farkları vurulamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, “psikolojik ego” ve “aşkın ego” arasında ontolojik farklar bulunmaktadır.

Bu bölümde, egosuz bir bilinç savunulmaktadır. Bu aynı zamanda Husserl’in *Mantıksal Araştırmalar* adlı eserindeki iddialarla uyumludur. Egosuz bir bilinç anlayışını savunmak için, tezde yer alan aşkın egoya karşı hazırlanan argümanların incelenmesi gereklidir.

1- Paradoksal özdeşlik ilişkisinin çözümü hakkında argüman: “empirik ego” veya “psikolojik ego” ile “aşkın ego” özdeşlik ilişkisi çözümlenerek aşkın egonun kabulünün bazı problemlere yol açtığı ve

bu iddiadan kaçınılması gerektiği savunulmaktadır. “Aşkın ego” yönelimsel eylemlerin öznesidir. Bu yönelimsel eylemlerin veya deneyimlerin sürekli değişmesine rağmen, “aşkın ego” kendisiyle özdeş olarak kalmaktadır. Bilincin yerleştiği, bulunduğu bir zihin vardır. Bu açıklamalara dayanarak varlığını sürekli devam ettiren bir benlik veya aşkın egonun varlığı incelenmelidir. Paradoks psikolojik ego veya aşkın egodan birini kabul ederek çözülebilir. “Aşkın ego” bilinçteki deneyim olabilir. Bu deneyime hemen, doğrudan ve kişisel olarak ulaşabiliriz. Diğer seçenek ise şöyle ifade edilebilir: bilinçteki deneyimlerden farklı bir şey vardır ve hemen, doğrudan, kişisel olarak ulaşamayız. Ancak, bütün bilinç deneyimlerini bir arada tutma, bir araya getirme özelliğine sahiptir. Eğer benlik bunlardan birincisiyse, bilinç deneyimlerini neyin bir araya getirdiği problem olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan diğeryse, “aşkın ego” kendi bilinç deneyimlerinin farkında olamamaktadır. Çünkü, “aşkın ego” ve bilinç deneyimleri arasında ontolojik farklılıklar bulunmaktadır.

Bazı önemli Husserl yorumcuları paradoksal özdeşlik ilişkisini farketmişlerdir. Ancak, paradoksu açık olarak belirleyip, çözümlenmemiştir. Bu tezin en önemli katkılarından biri paradoksun belirlenip, çözümlenmesidir. Paradoksu çözmek için bulduğum çözüm yolu benlik veya aşkın egonun kabul edilmemesine bağlıdır.

2- Aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşmasıyla ilgili argüman: Aşkın egonun kendi deneyimlerine yabancılaşma özelliği vardır. Aşkın ego izole olarak kendisini bütün deneyimlerinden soyutlayabilmektedir. Aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşması bilincin içinde olan, ancak farkında olmadığımız bir içeriğin olması problemlere yol açmaktadır. Bilincin kendi içeriğinin farkında olmaması ciddi bir problem olarak görülmektedir. Bilincin akışının bir devamlılığı ve birliği vardır. Ancak, aşkın egonun kendisine yabancılaşması bilinç akışının devamlılık ve birliğini bozmaktadır. Paranteze alma yönteminin sonucu olarak

solipsizm problemi kaçınılmazdır. Aşkın egonun kendine yabancılaşması, solipsizm, aşkın egonun kendi deneyimlerini farkında olmaması gibi problemler bu bölümde ele alınacaktır. Aşkın ego tekrar tanımlanmıştır. Bu tanımda aşkın egonun özü kendisini izole etmesi ve kendi deneyimlerine yabancılaşmasıdır.

3- Fenomenolojinin epistemolojik ön kabullerine dayanan argüman: fenomenoloji sınırlı sayıda ön kabule izin vermektedir. Bunlar özellikle epistemolojik ön kabullerdir ve paranteze alma yönteminden sonra kalan ön kabullerdir. Bilincin tamamen saydam olması, bilinçteki olayların potansiyel veya gerçek anlamda bilinçli olması bu ön kabuller arasındadır. Ancak, "aşkın ego" bu ön kabullere uygun değildir. Çünkü, bilince ait bir fenomen olarak bilinmesi mümkün değildir. Bu problemin en uygun yolu "saf ego", "aşkın ego" ve bu egoların doğasına ait iddiaların kabul edilmemesidir.

4- Paradoksa yol açan "bilinçsiz bilinç" kavramına dayanan argüman: "yönelim öncesi" aşkın egonun varlığı "psikolojik ego" üzerine uygulanan "aşkın indirgame" yöntemiyle farkedilebilir.

Psikoterapilerde, bilinçdışı zihinsel olaylara rastlanmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, bilinçdışı, bilinçöncesi, "yönelim öncesi" bir "aşkın ego" anlayışı paradoksa yol açan "bilinçsiz bilinç" durumuna yol açmaktadır. Bilinçsiz bilincin varlığı paradoksa yol açmaktadır. "Aşkın ego" kavramı ise inşa edilmiş "psikolojik ego" ve "aşkın ego" ayırımına yol açmaktadır. *Ego cogito cogitatum* yapısı içinde, *cogito* sürekli değişen bilinç deneyimlerini içermektedir. Ancak, ego kendisiyle özdeş, değişmeyen, ego noktasıdır. Aşkın egonun farkedilmesi için "psikolojik ego" üzerine "aşkın indirgame" yönteminin uygulanması gereklidir. Ontolojik farklılıklar nedeniyle Leibniz kanununa göre bu iki ego özdeş değildir. "Empirik ego" veya "psikolojik ego" hemen farkedilebilmektedir. Ancak, aşkın egonun farkedilmesi için "aşkın indirgame" yönteminin uygulanması gereklidir. "Aşkın ego" psikolojik egodan ontolojik olarak

tamamen farklıdır. Bu nedenle, bu iki egonun özdeşliğini savunmak yerine aşkın egonun varlığını kabul etmemek problemin çözümü olarak düşünülebilir.

5- Eksik “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemiyle ilgili argüman: “aşkın indirgeme” “psikolojik ego” üzerine uygulanır. “Empirik ego” ve “psikolojik ego” bilincin fenomeni haline gelebilir. Ancak, “aşkın ego” bilincin fenomeni olamaz. Bu nedenle, eksik, yetersiz “aşkın indirgeme” ve yöntemle ilgili yetersizlikten bahsedilebilir. Metotla ilgili eksiklik, “aşkın ego” ve aşkın egoyla ilgili iddialardan vazgeçilerek sağlanabilir.

6- “Yönelim öncesi” “aşkın ego” hakkında argüman: dikkatin odaklanması da yönelimdir. Böylece, “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemiyle aşkın egoya da ilgi odaklanır ve varlığı farkedilir. Aşkın egoyla ilgili bilgiler içsel tecrübeye mi yoksa belli çıkarımlara mı dayanmaktadır? “Yönelim öncesi” “aşkın ego” bilinçte farkında olmadığımız içeriğin var olduğunu göstermektedir. “Yönelim öncesi” “aşkın ego” ve bilincinde olmadığımız zihinsel içerik birbirine benzemektedir. Buradan, farkında olmadan kullanılan bazı çıkarımlar olabileceği ve farkında olmadan bazı mantık kurallarının kullanılabileceği savunulabilir. Böylece, aşkın egonun varlığı bir kategori hatası olarak Kabul edilebilir.

7- Yönelinen “aşkın ego” yönelen özne egonun nesnesi olmuş ve bilinen “nesne ego” haline dönüşmüştür. Bu nesneleştirmeye ilgili argüman: Dikkatin odaklanması yönelimseldir. Yönelimsel olması yönelen ve “yönelimsel olmayan”, “yönelim öncesi” bilinç ayrımına yol açmaktadır. “Aşkın indirgeme” her zaman yönelinen bilinci yönelen bilincin nesnesi haline getirir. “Özne ego” yöneldiği “yönelimsel olmayan” bilinci objesi, nesnesi haline getirir. Bu nedenle eksik ve yetersiz aşkın indirgemeden söz edebiliriz.

8- Bilinç akışının devamlılığı ve birliğiyle ilgili argüman: “aşkın ego” bilinç akışının devamlılığını ve birliğini sağlamaktadır. Ancak, aşkın egonun kendine yabancılaşması bilinç akışının devamlılığını ve birliğini

bozmaktadır. “Aşkın ego” ve onunla ilgili iddiaların kabul edilmemesi benliğin devamı problemine yol açmaktadır. Bu durumda, benliğin devamı hafızanın varlığına bağlıdır. Hafıza, daha önceki algılamaların bozulmadan, olduğu gibi geri çağırılmasıdır. Bu problem, benlik problemiyle bağlantılı olarak tekrar incelenmektedir.

9- *Ideas* adlı eserdeki “saf ego” kavramıyla ilgili problemlerle ilgili argüman: Husserl’in *Ideas* adlı eserinde kendisiyle özdeş olan “saf ego” kavramının “içkin olanın aşkınlığı” gibi bazı problemleri vardır. Pranteze alma ve “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemleri “saf ego” dahil olmak üzere bilinçteki aşkın olan ne varsa bilinçten arındırmaktadır. Homojen bir bilince sahip olmak için bilinçte varolanlar bilinçten arındırılmalıdır. Bunun için en uygun yol aşkın egonun kabul edilmemesi ve egosuz bir bilincin savunulmasıdır.

10- İçebakış yöntemiyle ilgili argüman: Descartes, Hume ve Husserl içebakış yöntemi konusunda uzlaşabilirler. Ancak, içebakış yöntemi bize mevcut zihinsel durum hakkında bilgi vermesine rağmen, maddi olmayan bir töz, “saf ego” veya “aşkın ego” hakkında bilgi vermez. Hume da içebakış yönteminin bize maddi olmayan bir töz hakkında bilgi vermediğini savunur. Aynı argüman “saf ego”, “aşkın ego” hakkındaki iddialara karşı kullanılmaktadır.

11- Solipsizmle ilgili argüman: Paranteze alma yöntemi solipsizm problemine yol açmaktadır. Kişi kendi bilincinde olanları bilir. Ancak, dış dünyayı bilmesi zorlaşmıştır. Solipsizmle ilgili olarak David Bell’in tanımları kullanılmaktadır. Düşünce deneyindeki kişi, küçük bir tanrıya dönmüştür, bunun nedeni paranteze alma yönteminden sonra gerçekleşen dış dünyadan kopmanın, izole olma durumudur. Solipsizmde kişi bilincinde varolanlara ulaşabilmektedir. Eidetik indirgeme, paranteze alma ve “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemleri bilinci aşkın olanlardan temizlemektedir. Ancak, “saf ego” da bir çeşit aşkınlığı

içermektedir. Bu nedenle saf egonun kabul edilmemesi problemin çözümü olarak görülebilir.

12- Paranteze almadan önce, her düşünce (*cogitatio*) “ben düşünüyorum” (*cogito*) formuna sahiptir. Ancak, parantez alma tavrı değişikliğine yol açmaktadır. *Cogito* kavramında da değişiklikler olmuştur. Bilinç bir şeyin bilincidir. Don Welton da *cogito* kavramındaki bu değişimi farketmiştir. Ancak, değişim bununla sınırlı kalmamış ve *Avrupa Bilimlerinde Kriz ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserde yapı *ego cogito cogitatum* haline dönüşmüştür. Başka bir deyişle tavrı değişikliği devam etmektedir. Aşkın egoya ulaşmak varlığını farketmek “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemiyle mümkün olmaktadır. Ancak, “aşkın ego” kendisiyle özdeş, değişmeyen, bilinçteki deneyimlerin öznesidir. “Aşkın ego” *cogito* kavramını değillemesiyle elde edilmektedir. Değillemenin bize bilgi verip vermediği bir problem olarak görülebilir. “Aşkın olanın içkinliği” nedeniyle egonun kısmen kendisine yabancılaştığı görülmektedir. Aslında, “saf ego” tam anlamıyla bilinmemektedir. Bu nedenle, egonun tam olarak tanımlanması problem olarak görülmektedir.

13- Paranteze alma yönteminden sonra, “saf ego” ve saf egoya ait deneyimler bilinç alanında kalmaktadır. David Wodruff Smith’e göre Doğa ve Bilinç olmak üzere iki tür öz bulunmaktadır. Beden, beyin ve nöral aktiviteler Doğa özüne ait örneklerdir. Fenomenolojiye alan açmak için bunların parantezin dışına alınması gereklidir. Fenomenoloji bilinçle ve Bilinç özünün örnekleri olan olaylarla ilgilenmektedir. Doğa bilimleri üçüncü kişinin bakış açısına dayanmaktadır. Ancak, fenomenoloji birinci kişinin bakış açısına dayanmaktadır. Bilinçteki olaylara birinci kişinin bakış açısından ulaşmak mümkündür. Ancak, bilinçteki olaylara birinci kişinin bakış açısından ulaşmak mümkünken, saf egoya, aşkın egoya ulaşmak, tam olarak ne olduğunu anlamak mümkün değildir. Bu durum fenomenolojinin kesin vebilimsel tavrına uygun düşmemektedir. Bu

nedenle, “saf ego”, “aşkın ego” kavramlarından vazgeçmek en uygun yol olarak kabul edilebilir.

Bu tezde, Descartes felsefesindeki benzer bir kategori hatası olduğu ve bu hata nedeniyle, Descartes’in maddi olmayan töz anlayışına benzer bir “saf ego”, “aşkın ego” anlayışına rastlanmaktadır. Ancak, bu egoların Descartes’in töz anlayışından tamamen farklı olduğunu da vurgulamak gereklidir. Saf bilincin soyut olarak düşünme ve konuşma yeteneği vardır. Bu nedenle, bilinç özellikleri, ilinekleri sanki kendi kendine varolabilen, bağımsız bir varlık gibi düşünebilmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, *abstractum*, *concretum* haline gelmektedir. Bu durum da kategori hatasının kaynağını oluşturmaktadır. Birinci kişinin bakış açısından sadece mevcut zihinsel durum ve “indirgenemeyen şeyler” farkedilebilir. Bunların soyutlanması ve nesneleştirilmesi kategori hatalarına yol açmaktadır. Özellikler ve ilinekler ontolojik olarak bağımsız varlıklar haline gelmektedir.

Ruh-beden Probleminin Çözümü bölümünde, “ego beden” fenomenolojik olarak tekrar inşa edilmektedir. Böylece, “ego beden” fenomenolojik bir obje haline gelmektedir. Aşkın olan beden zihne içkin bir obje, nesne haline gelmektedir. Fenomenolojik indirgeme sonucunda, içkin zihin ile aşkın beden arasındaki problem çözümlenmektedir. Diğer kategori hatası bilimlerin ruhu bedene eşdeğer görmesi ve benzer yöntemleri uygulamasıdır. Bu kategori hatasının Descartes felsefesine dayanan nedenleri vardır.

Kendisiyle özdeş ve sürekliliği olan aşkın egonun kabul edilmemesi Benlik problemine yol açmaktadır. Bu problem, Benliğin Devamı Problemi bölümünde incelenmektedir. Hafıza sayesinde kişi geçmişteki algılamalarını geri çağırarak ve benliğini farketmektedir. Böylece, hafıza sayesinde benlik devam etmektedir. Benliğin devamı ve hafıza arsında bir ilişki kurulmuştur. Hafızadan anlaşılan ise eski algılamaların hafızadan geri çağırılmasıdır. Bu iddiaları desteklemek

amacıyla, Kafka'nın *Değişim* adlı eserinden Yeni Beden Senaryosunda Benliğin Devamı bölümünde yararlanılmıştır. Bu bölümde hafıza ve benliğin devamı arasındaki ilişki ve benliğin oluşumundaki dinamiklik gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır.

3. Bölümde, neden bilimsel açıklamaları ve üçüncü kişinin bakış açısından açıklamaları kabul etmediğimiz anlatılmaktadır. Leibniz kanunu kullanılarak bilinçle ilgili olayların maddeyle ilgili olaylardan farklılıkları fenomenoloji çerçevesinde açıklanmaktadır. Saf bilincin bazı özel yetenekleri vardır. Bunlar inşa etme, yönelim, sezgi, fenomenal özellikler (*qualia*). Bu özellikler bilinçle ilgili olayların maddi olana indirgenemeyeceğini göstermektedir.

Husserl Üzerine Genel Yorumlar bölümünde, Kendi yorumlarımı Gabriel Marcel, David Bell, David Carr, Sartre gibi filozofların görüşleriyle kıyaslayarak benzerlik ve farklılıkları göstermeye çalıştım. *Varlık ve Hiçlik* adlı eserinde, Sartre "töz hatası" olarak adlandırdığı bir hatadan bahsetmektedir. Ben de benzer bir hatanın Descartes'in maddi olmayan tözü, Husserl'in "saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" kavramlarında var olduğunu savunmaktayım. Tezin en orjinal kısmı "saf ego" ve "aşkın ego" hakkındaki iddiaların reddedilmesi belli paradokslara ve bu paradoksların fenomenoloji çerçevesinde çözümüne bağlı olmasına dayanmaktadır. David Bell psikoloji ve aşkın fenomenoloji arasında özdeşlik ilişkisi olduğunu savunmaktadır. Ancak "psikolojik ego" ve "aşkın ego" arasında özdeşlik ilişkisinden bahsedilmemektedir. Bu paradoks farkedilip, çözümlenmemiştir. Peursen *Fenomenoloji ve Gerçeklik* adlı eserinde, bu özdeşlik ilişkisini sorgulamış, ancak bu problemi tam olarak belirlememiştir. Genel eğilimi aşkın egonun dilsel bir yaratma olduğu ve kabul edilmemesi yönündedir. Benzer şekilde, David Bell de ego kavramının bilinçle ilgili olayları açıklama özelliğinden başka bir özelliğinin olmadığını savunmuştur. Sartre gibi, Aron Gurwitsch egosuz bir bilinç anlayışını savunmuştur. Ancak, Sartre'den

farklı olarak egosuz bilinç anlayışını analitik bir çerçevede yapmıştır. Tezin genelinde egosuz bir bilinç anlayışı savunulmuştur. Ancak, tezde parça-bütün ilişkisi kurarak özellik veya ilineklerin nasıl ontolojik bağımsız varlıklar olarak kabul edildiğini gösterdim. İnsanların ilinek ve özellikler hakkında nasıl soyutlayarak ve izole ederek düşünüp konuşabildiğini göstererek kategori hatasının kaynağı anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu şekilde “saf ego” ve “aşkın ego” ontolojik olarak bağımsız bir statü kazanmıştır. Kategori hatası dışında, “aşkın ego” ile bilinç deneyimleri arasındaki ontolojik farklılıklar da önemlidir. Bu arada, Sartre’nin “yönelim öncesi” kavramını “aşkın ego” kavramına ancak “aşkın indirgeme” yöntemiyle ulaşılabileceğini göstermek için kullandım. *Cogito* kavramından farklı olarak, “aşkın ego” kendisiyle özdeş, değişmeyen bilinç deneyimlerinin öznesidir. Gabriel Marcel de benliğin kısmen yabancılaştığını, özelleştğini savunmaktadır. Aşkın egonun kendisine nasıl yabancılaştığını göstererek, aşkın egonun kabul edilmeme nedenlerini de gösterdim. Ayrıca, aşkın egonun kabul edilmemesi, zihin-beden probleminin çözümü içinde gereklidir. Husserlin *Mantıksal Araştırmalar* adlı eserindeki iddialar zihin-beden probleminin çözümü için gereklidir. Husserl bu eserde ego kavramına karşı çıkmaktadır. “ego beden” empirik egodan ayrılırsa “aşkın olarak indirgenmiş ego” kalır. Aşkın “ego beden” bazı yönelimsel tecrübelerin objesi olarak inşa edilmiştir. Bu nedenle, *Ideas* adlı eserdeki “saf ego” ve *Avrupa Bilimlerinde Kriz ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserde bahsedilen “aşkın ego” kavramı zihin-beden probleminin çözümü için gereklidir. Marcel de “sahip olunanın” dış dünyayla ilgili görüngüler olduğunu savunur. Ancak, bu mutlak bir dışsallık değildir. Marcel “indirgenemeyen şeyleri” de savunur. Marcel gibi, benim argümanlarım da “indirgenemeyen” ve zihne ait olan şeylerle ilgilidir. Leibniz kuralını uyguladığımızda zihinsel olan, maddi olan ve indirgenemeyenin varlığı anlaşılır. Çünkü, zihinsel olanla maddi olan birbirinden tamamen farklı

özellikler gösterir. Bu zihinsel özellikler inşa etme, yönelim, fenomenal özelliklerdir. Aynı zamanda, Marcel'in iddiasında olduğu gibi "indirgenemeyen" şeyleri farketmek ve göstermek bir görevdir.

Sonuç olarak, fenomenoloji saf bilinci uygun bir biçimde incelemek için en uygun yoldur. Eski felsefi problemler fenomenoloji çerçevesi içinde tekrar ele alınabilir. Bu tezde ruh-beden problemi, benlik problemi, bilincin doğası gibi problemler tekrar ele alınmaktadır.

Felsefenin bu eski problemlerini çözmek için, belli aşamalar izlenmiştir. İlk olarak, fenomenolojide belli ön-kabullerin olup olmadığı incelenmiştir.

1. Bölümde, paranteze alma yönteminden sonra bile bazı epistemolojik ön kabullerin olduğu görülmektedir.

2. Bölümde, *Mantıksal Araştırmalar*, *Ideas*, *Batı Bilimlerinde Kriz ve Aşkın Fenomenoloji* adlı eserlerde bilinç kavramı incelenmiştir. "Saf ego", "aşkın ego" kavramlarının kabul edilmemesi ruh-beden probleminin çözümlenmesi için gereklidir. Aşkın ego kavramı kategori hatasıdır. Fenomenoloji çerçevesi içinde, ruh-beden problemi çözümlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Ego olmadan benliğin nasıl devam ettiği de gösterilmiştir. Gregor Samsa adlı kahramanın Kafka'nın *Değişim* adlı romanında yeni bir bedene sahip olması örnek olarak kullanılarak hafıza ve benlik arasında ilişki kurulmuştur. Ayrıca, benliğin dinamik bir sürecin sonucunda oluştuğu da açıklanmıştır.

3. Bölümde, fenomenolojinin bilinci incelemek için neden bilimlerden daha uygun bir yol olduğu açıklanmıştır. Egosuz bir saf bilincin belli yeteneklere sahip olduğu gösterilmiştir. Bu yetenekler, yönelim, fenomenal özellikler (*qualia*) ve inşa etmedir. Fenomenoloji genel olarak üçüncü kişinin değil, birinci kişinin bakış açısına dayanmaktadır.

Kısaca, fenomenoloji bilinci açıklamak için en uygun yoldur. Çünkü, bilincin indirgenemeyen maddeye ait olmayan pek çok özelliği bulunmaktadır.